

Questing for Legitimacy in the Ivory Tower:  
Risk Management and the Legitimation Work of University Security Services

by

Blair Russell Wilkinson  
Master of Arts, University of Windsor, 2010  
Bachelor of Arts (Honours), University of Windsor, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department of Sociology

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University of Victoria

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## Abstract

Despite an on-going focus on private security provision, Canadian scholars have largely ignored those security services operating in closest proximity to their knowledge production: university security services. I address this gap in sociological understandings of university security services through research carried out at five Canadian universities. Research data were obtained through fifty-six interviews, two-hundred-and-forty-six hours of observation, and document collection. Findings from these data were arrived at through the use of an analytical framework which draws upon conceptual, theoretical, and methodological insights of scholarship on institutional logics and that related to the legitimacy and legitimation work of policing and security services and their personnel. The focus of this research is on how, through engaging in legitimation work, university security personnel draw upon and translate the frames of reference (i.e., rules, practices, and the symbol systems) of the institutional logic of risk management into the organizational field of university security to seek legitimacy.

University security personnel's legitimation work is undertaken in their attempts to overcome negative perceptions of their services and involves processes of organizing, reproducing, and giving meaning to their work lives according to frames of reference which are culturally and organizationally acceptable (i.e., legitimate). First, university security personnel engage in legitimation work whereby they represent a professional identity vis-à-vis their professional associations and an organizational support role identity vis-à-vis their universities' missions, goals, values, and the communal good. Alignment with these frames of reference is further negotiated, represented, and demonstrated as university security personnel translate frames of reference from the logic of risk management into their organizational field as they attempt to identify risks of harm to their organizations and communities. In translating the logic of risk management into their organizational field, university security personnel are attempting to attain legitimacy through alignment with their organizations and communities' expectations of care while downplaying perceptions of control.

This research extends past scholarship on how alignment with varying frames of reference is negotiated, demonstrated, and represented; this is accomplished in the context of the translation of the logic risk management into the organizational field of

university security. Although prevailing institutional logics are adopted to increase legitimacy, I demonstrate how their meaning is adapted as they are translated against other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. Through understanding how university security personnel engage in legitimation work, this research enables an understanding of how university security arrangements, and those of the wider organizational fields of public policing and private security, can be directed toward more progressive or equitable outcomes.

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## Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge and thank the many wonderful people, without whom this dissertation would not be possible.

I would first like to thank my advisor, Sean Hier, for his encouragement and support. It was Sean who expressed confidence in my abilities and recruited me to the University of Victoria on the promise of research opportunities and, importantly, Victoria's cherry blossoms and campus bunnies. Although Sean followed through on his promise of research opportunities and I continue to enjoy the spring cherry blossoms, his last promise was no match for the will of University administrators who found the need and the means to eradicate the "risky" bunnies.

A sincere thank you also goes to my committee members, Ben Goold and Garry Gray. Ben was with this project from its inception and provided much-appreciated feedback which helped to shape this research. Garry arrived at the University and this project after its inception, however, his contributions are no less appreciated as his expertise and advice have greatly benefitted the development of this dissertation.

A special thanks also go to Randy Lippert and Kevin Walby. Both Randy and Kevin have been instrumental in my academic development. This dissertation could not have been completed without their continuing support.

To my many friends, thank you from the bottom of my heart. A special thanks to all of those friends whom I have had the pleasure of also calling my colleagues in the Department of Sociology. Special thanks to Al, Shrub, and Dom who shared with me not only the ups and downs of grad school but also a home; to Becky who was instrumental in pushing me through a gruelling first year; to Edward and Edwin for their always open office doors and for shaping me into a DnD wizard; and to Andrew for being both a friend and a collaborator. To my friends outside of academia, I am grateful for the inspiration, encouragement, and the much-needed fun and distractions that you provide. While each of my friends has helped me get to this point, additional thanks are in order for the special support and encouragement I have received from Aaron, Andrea and Niko, Brian and Jane, Charlotte, Cody, Josh, Kayla, Scott, Shannon, Stacey, and Kristen.

And finally, to my family. Although my journey has taken me far from home, your love and support are always dearly felt.

## Chapter 1 Introduction

Private security services have a near-ubiquitous presence in Canada's major urban centres. In fact, private security personnel have outnumbered public police officers since the 1980s (Shearing and Stenning 1983; Swol 1998). Clifford Shearing and Phillip Stenning (1983, 1981) first drew attention to the expansion of private security services in now seminal works wherein they proposed their mass private property thesis. According to this thesis, the rise in numbers of private security services and personnel could be explained by the growth of mass private property, that is privately owned but publicly accessible property. Shearing and Stenning's work contributed to increased sociological and criminological scholarship on those private security services which operate within a variety of publicly accessible communal spaces, such as shopping centres, condominiums, industrial centres, public parks, hospitals, and government facilities.<sup>1</sup> As the private security literature burgeoned and scholars studied the activities of private security services operating across all manner of communal spaces within Canada's urban centres, neglected were those private security services operating in the closest physical proximity to academic knowledge production: university security services.

Given that Canadian university security services work on the same campuses as scholars who study private security services, there is indeed irony in the fact that these

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<sup>1</sup> The mass private property thesis has been criticised by Jones and Newburn (2002, 1999, 1998) for it not being able to accurately describe the rise of private security outside of North America. Kempa, Stenning, and Wood (2004) responded to these criticisms by suggesting that the underlying thesis of Shearing and Stenning's work is that changes in property relations which allow for exclusionary practices have contributed to the expansion of the private security industry. This expansion is not only occurring within mass private properties but within all manner of "communal spaces" (ranging from public parks to gated communities).

services have failed to capture significant scholarly attention (but see Gomme and Micucci 1997; Micucci 1995, 1998; Walby 2006b).<sup>2</sup> The lack of studies on Canadian university security services is attributable to university campuses being oft-conceived as safer and more secure than other urban locales. The perception of the safety and security of universities is perfectly captured in the “Ivory Tower” metaphor; this symbol, which commonly conveys the disconnect of academic endeavours from the concerns of the so-called “real world,” invokes imagery of university campuses as defensible spaces. Within the university-as-Ivory-Tower, university students, faculty, and staff are understood as being not only intellectually but also physically sheltered from the real world (Shapin 2012; see also Bordner and Petersen 1983). This perception is sure to be reinforced amongst policing and security scholars whose primary interactions with their own organizations’ security services are likely limited to relatively minor occurrences. For examples, when the absent-minded professor forgets their keys and requires university security personnel’s assistance to gain access to their office or when the financially-struggling graduate student attempts to avoid paying for parking and returns to their vehicle to find a ticket, issued by university security personnel, on their windshield.

In contrast to popular understandings of campus safety and security, universities and their communities (i.e., faculty, staff, students, other legitimate campus users) are not sheltered from “real world” issues. This is why Canadian universities have employed or contracted dedicated security personnel dating back to the turn of 20th Century (Rigakos and Ponting 2013; see also Anon 1907a, Anon 1907b, Anon 1909, Anon 1913, Anon

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<sup>2</sup> This is in contrast to the United States where there has been sustained interest in university security services since the 1980s (Allen 2014, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Bordner and Petersen 1983; Bromley 1999, 1995; Bromley and Reaves 1998; Jacobsen 2015; Johnson and Bromley 1999; Paoline and Sloan 2003; Patten et al. 2016; Peak 1995; Peak, Barthe, and Garcia 2008; Wada, Patten, and Candela 2010; Wilson and Wilson 2015).

1924). Collectively, contemporary Canadian university security personnel engage in various duties through which they attempt to protect against threats to the well-being of their organizations, whose annual revenues total thirty-six billion dollars, and over two million campus community members (Statistics Canada 2016; Universities Canada 2017). Given that universities have sprawling campuses, massive budgets, and large community sizes, rather than relying solely on contracted security personnel to protect their organizations and communities, the majority of Canadian universities operate *in-house* security services (also known as proprietary, organizational, or corporate security services; see Walby and Lippert 2014:3). These services employ in-house management teams and have frontline security personnel who are employed in-house, contracted through a third-party private security company, or a combination thereof.

Canadian universities' reliance on in-house security services provides another explanation as to why scholars have overlooked university security services; the bulk of research on private security services focuses on *contract* security providers that sell services to other organizations rather than in-house services. Where research exists on in-house security services, it is largely descriptive and oriented towards security professionals (Borodzicz and Gibson 2006; Challenger 2006; Nalla 2002, 2004; Nalla and Morash 2002). More critical research on these services exists but typically focuses on those services working within private organizations (but see Lippert and Walby 2012, 2014; Walby and Lippert 2012b; Walby, Lippert, and Wilkinson 2014; Walby, Luscombe, and Lippert 2014; Walby, Wilkinson, and Lippert 2016). The relative lack of scholarly investigations on in-house security services within public organizations, including university security services, is attributable to scholars' interests in

understanding and problematizing the selling of security as a private good and focusing on security provision that serves private as opposed to collective interests (Loader and Walker 2001). Because university security services, and other public in-house security services, do not receive the same attention as contract security services or in-house security services operating in private organizations, there remains a significant gap in understandings of both private security, in general, and university security services, in particular.

In this dissertation, I address this gap in sociological and criminological research. To do so, I undertook field-research at five Canadian universities, where I conducted interviews with members of university security services and other university organizational units (e.g., residence services, student services, risk management services), observations of university security personnel engaged in frontline security work, and collected numerous documents. The findings of my analyses of these data, which I present within, are informed by an analytical framework which combines conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and empirical insights of scholarship on institutional logics, including that situated within the perspective of *sociological institutionalism* (see Bell 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 1983; Hall and Taylor 1996; Nee and Brinton 1998; Scott 1995) and the *institutional logics perspective* (see Friedland and Alford 1991; Lok 2010; Thornton 2002; Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; Weber, Patel, and Heinze 2013), and scholarship on legitimacy and legitimation (Allen 2017; Barker 2001; Côté-Lussier 2013; Jacobsen 2015; Mulcahy and Ellison 2001; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Thumala, Goold, and Loader 2011; Tuchman 1978; Tyler 2011, 2006; Wada, Patten, and Candela 2010; Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby et

al. 2016; Wilson and Wilson 2015). Through the application of this analytical framework, I examine how university security personnel strive for legitimacy as they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with socially and organizationally acceptable frames of reference in their attempts to provide for the safety and security of their organizations and communities.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I place university security services in their historical, contemporary, and organizational contexts. Second, I outline the analytical framework of this research. Last, I provide a brief description of this research project and describe the structure of this dissertation.

### **1.1 The Organization of University Security Services**

Dating back to the turn of the 13th Century universities have continually “resorted to private security in one form or another” (Shearing and Stenning 1981:229; see also Bruce 1999; Rashdall 1895b, 1895a; Walford 2004). In Canada, as in the United Kingdom and the United States, administrators (e.g., presidents and proctors) and faculty were tasked with providing for the safety and security of their universities (Gelber 1972; Gidney 2001; Hackett 1984; Rashdall 1895b; Sloan and Fisher 2011; Van Die 1989). In 1904, the first dedicated Canadian in-house university security service was established at the University of Toronto when the University hired J.P Christie to police their campus (Rigakos and Ponting 2013); concurrently, several Canadian universities were employing security watchmen to protect against fire and theft (Anon 1907a, Anon 1907b, Anon 1909, Anon 1913, Anon 1924). Contemporary in-house security services, however, would not be established at Canadian universities until the 1960s and 1970s (Rigakos and Ponting 2013).

Classified by the legal authority of personnel they employ, there are two types of contemporary Canadian university security services. The first type is the *security officer service*. Security officer services operate at universities in every province, except Prince Edward Island. These services employ security officers who, along with these services, are governed by provincial private security statutes and regulations. Concerning their legal authority, security officers can make arrests as private citizens and as agents of a property owner (i.e., their university) under Canada's *Criminal Code* (s. 494). Security officers are also able to make arrests under provincial trespass acts in Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Ontario (Carroll 2004:11). In addition to the authority provided by the state, university security officers are authorized to enforce a diverse range of university regulations. These include, but are not limited to, code of student behaviour, residence, alcohol, use of space, traffic and parking, and smoking policies.

The second service delivery type is the *peace officer service*. These services employ peace officers, known as special constables or security police officers in certain jurisdictions. In the seven provinces in which they operate (i.e., Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan), provincial legislation governs the authority of peace officers and their services. In some instances, policing agreements with their local jurisdictions' police services/police services boards also govern the authority of these services and their officers (Rigakos and Ponting 2013:10–11). Dependent on the limits set by provincial legislation and policing agreements, peace officers are variously authorized to enforce provincial trespass acts, other provincial acts (e.g., traffic, liquor), elements of the *Criminal Code*, other federal acts (e.g., *Controlled*

*Drugs and Substances Act*), and local by-laws. Peace officers' authority to enforce state regulations is generally limited to properties owned by their universities and their affiliated colleges. In some instances, the authority of peace officers extends to public spaces, such as sidewalks and highways, which abut these properties. Although their level of authority extends beyond that of security officers, peace officers "are never granted full police status and authority" (Rigakos and Ponting 2013:13). Similar to their security officer counterparts, peace officers are authorized to enforce university regulations.

Despite the differences between peace officer and security officer services, herein, both are understood to be the same type of organization (i.e., university security services). According to Hodgson (2006), organizations have four principal criteria. First, organizations have specific criteria which delineate their members from non-members. University security services' members include their management, peace officers, security officers, and administrative staff; these members are delineated from non-members, such as university faculty, staff, and students. Second, organizations specify the scope of organizational practice. In the case of university security services, the scope of organizational practice entails duties carried out for the protection of the safety and security of their organizations and communities. Third, organizations have principles of sovereignty establishing who is in charge; the individual in charge of university security services is typically given the title of "director". Last, relatedly, organizations have a chain of command which delineates the responsibilities of their members. In the case of university security services, specific command structures and members' duties vary across universities.

It is important to note that in-house university security services are not standalone organizations. Instead, these are organizations-within-organizations or the organizational units of universities. Concerning Hodgson's criteria, universities have administrators, staff, faculty, students, and members of their governing bodies (i.e., boards of governors, senates) who are considered to be the members of their organizations. These members who, as a group, are oft-referred to as "university communities" engage in practices which support universities' educational missions, which entails research, education (teaching/learning), and service/engagement (Amit 2000:220). Concerning principles of sovereignty and chain of command, universities' presidents typically occupy the top of their organizations' hierarchies. Below them lie a complex arrangement of vice-presidents, associate vice-presidents, deans, associate deans, chairs, and advisors. These university administrators oversee their respective organizational units: academic faculties (e.g., Faculty of Social Science), academic departments (e.g., Department of Sociology), and non-academic organizational units (e.g., university security services, residence services).

Organizations, including university security services, occupy multiple and overlapping organizational fields: "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:148). University security services are key organizations within the organizational field of university security. Also occupying positions within this organizational field are external organizations (e.g., contract security services, public police services, professional associations) and other university organizational units (e.g., residence services, student services, risk management services). These organizations are part of this organizational

field due to their having enduring networked relationships with university security services (on security networks see Dupont 2004, 2006; Johnston 1999; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shaw and Shearing 1998; Shearing and Froestad 2010; Whelan 2017; Yar 2011).

The organizational field of university security overlaps with other organizational fields. Those which overlap with that of university security, and which are relevant for this research, are the public policing, private security, and university (post-secondary education) organizational fields. University security services' position within the organizational field of public policing is due to their sustained relationships with municipal, provincial, and federal police services, including through training, intelligence networks, professional associations, and, in the case of peace officer services, their legal relationship vis-à-vis provincial legislation and policing agreements. The organizational field of private security is occupied by university security services due to their connections with professional associations, through their actions undertaken on behalf of universities' private interests, and, in the case of security officer services, their legal status as private security. University security services' position within the university organizational field is due to their being organizational units within universities. That university security services occupy these intersecting organizational fields is important for how university security personnel strive for legitimacy.

## **1.2 Institutional Logics and Legitimation Work**

To understand how university security personnel organize, reproduce, and give meaning to their work in culturally and organizationally acceptable ways, I draw upon conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and methodological insights from scholarship on

institutional logics and on policing and security. Specifically, insights from sociological institutionalism (e.g., Bell 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 1983; Hall and Taylor 1996; Nee and Brinton 1998; Scott 1995) and the institutional logics perspective (e.g., Friedland and Alford 1991; Lok 2010; Thornton 2002; Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Thornton et al. 2012; Weber et al. 2013) are integrated with Thumala, Goold, and Loader's (2011) conceptualization of "legitimation work" and other scholarship on policing and security services' legitimacy and legitimation (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015; Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 2003, Tyler 2011, 2006; Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby et al. 2016; Wilson and Wilson 2015). Through integrating these areas of scholarship, I developed this research project's analytical framework and orienting strategy, that is set of "assumptions and conceptions of the actor, action, and order" (Thornton et al. 2012:7; Berger and Zelditch 1993).

At the core of institutionalist scholarship, including sociological institutionalism and the institutional logics perspective, is the concept of institutional logics (or institutions). Key proponents of the institutional logics perspective, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury caution that this concept is "difficult to define and even harder to apply in an analytically useful manner" (2012:1). In order to overcome such difficulties and to apply this concept in an analytically useful manner, I define institutional logics as socially constructed and historical patterns of *frames of reference*, which are rules, practices, and the symbol systems by which these are represented, through which actors organize, reproduce, and provide meaning to their lives and experiences (Friedland and Alford 1991; Scott 1995; Thornton 2002; Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Thornton et al. 2012). Herein, practices are understood as routinized or ritualistic activities, including

what is said and what is done. Practices shape and are shaped by institutional rules, which are injunctions or dispositions which dictate the appropriate response in a given situation (see Hodgson 2006). There are three principal types of rules: regulative (or coercive), normative, and cognitive (see Scott 1995; Thornton and Ocasio 2008).

The first type, regulative rules (regulations), are formal rules. These include laws, such as the provincial police, peace officer, and security services acts that give authority to university security services and their personnel. Regulations also include contracts and policies (e.g., code of student behaviour policies) which direct actions through the mechanism of coercion; when acting according to regulations, actors are understood to be engaged in instrumental action due to the threat of punishments or promise of rewards associated with breaking or following these rules (Scott 1995). The second type is normative rules. These include expectations (e.g., missions, goals, objectives) and values that specify what is to be done and how it is to be done (Scott 1995:37). Normative expectations and values can also be expressed together as roles or identities, which are “conceptions of appropriate action for particular individuals or specified social positions” (Scott 1995:38; Berger and Luckmann 1967; Thornton et al. 2012). Through providing actors with an understanding of what to do and how to do it, normative expectations and values direct actors to act according to a “logic of appropriateness” (Scott 1995). When drawing upon normative expectations, actors are guided by the question: “what is the appropriate response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?” (Koelble 1995:233). The third and final type of rules is cognitive rules or scripts. These rules are comprised of actors’ internalized and subjective representations of practices, regulative rules, and normative expectations and values. As internalized rules, cognitive scripts

“provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor 1996:947; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hodgson 2006; Jepperson 1991; Scott 1995).

Institutional logics are sustained through “self-activating social processes” (Jepperson 1991:145), whereby, in order to organize, reproduce, and give meaning to their work lives, actors exercise their “embedded agency”. This type of agency is understood to be enabled and constrained by the frames of reference available and accessible to actors given the situation and their cultural and organizational positions (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Lok 2010; Seo and Creed 2002). Thus, institutional logics are not understood as dictating actors’ behaviour but rather as providing actors with a particular set of tools: the frames of reference utilized by actors in their decision making (Gray and Silbey 2014:104; McPherson and Sauder 2013). Through understanding institutional logics as providing frames of reference that organizational actors draw upon to make decisions and engage in action, I explore how university security personnel draw upon particular frames of reference as they quest for legitimacy through engaging in “legitimation work” (Thumala et al. 2011).

In their original conceptualization, Thumala et al. understood legitimation work as “the rituals and claims intended to justify the activities and purposes of the security industry” (2011: 284). In other words, legitimation work is what is said and what is done by members of the security industry, such as university security personnel, in order to be viewed as legitimate. In what follows, I extend the concept of legitimation work by integrating it with the institutionalist literature discussed above; university security personnel are understood to engage in legitimation work by exercising their embedded agency to negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with institutionalized, or

culturally and organizationally acceptable (i.e., legitimate), frames of reference. For greater clarity, negotiations are internal, cognitive processes through which actors select and translate frames of reference. Through their negotiations, actors form new understandings of frames of reference and select from various frames of reference which guide their actions. Second, demonstrations are activities undertaken by actors which are structured by negotiations of culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference and are routinized or ritualized as practices. Last, representations involve the use of symbol systems (e.g., talk) through which actors claim how they are in alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. Each of these processes is mutually constituted; each works in conjunction with and is informed by the others in the tripartite. It is also important to note that because negotiations are internal/cognitive processes, these processes can be revealed only through analyses of demonstrations and representations of alignment with institutionalized frames of reference.

Consistent with the above scholarship, in what follows, university security personnel are understood to adopt available, accessible, and institutionalized frames of reference to organize, reproduce, and give meaning to their work in a manner that makes it likelier that their services will be viewed as having legitimacy. In this context, legitimacy is understood to be attained where the work of university security personnel is legally sanctioned, perceived by others as being aligned with normative expectations, and consistent with university security personnel's internalized (cognitive) understandings of regulative rules and normative expectations (e.g., roles or identities, goals, and action scripts; see Thornton et al. 2012). To be sure, this research is not concerned with whether

university security personnel have achieved the *condition* of legitimacy; Instead, it explores the *processes* of legitimation work (i.e., negotiations, representations, demonstrations) through which they strive for legitimacy (Barker 2001; Thumala et al. 2011). Moreover, I do not distinguish between legitimation work which is consciously undertaken (i.e., with the express intent of aligning with acceptable frames of reference) and that which is not.

Through examining university security personnel's legitimation work, I explain how these actors engage in the ongoing translation, into the organizational field of university security, of the culturally acceptable, available, and accessible logic of risk management, which provides frames of reference for maintaining the safety and security of organizations and their members (see Chapter 2; on translating institutional logics see Friedland and Alford 1991; Lok 2010; Sahlin and Weldin 2008). This translation-through-legitimation-work involves university security personnel negotiating, demonstrating, and representing the logic of risk management such that its frames of reference are brought into alignment with other frames of reference that are appropriate, accessible, and available to them in their positions within their organizational fields of university post-secondary education and university security. While those frames of reference with which alignment is sought include regulative rules, such as provincial legislation authorizing policing or security activities, other state regulations, and university policies, my principal focus is on how university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with normative expectations of their universities, including their missions, goals, and values (Amit 2000; Birnbaum 2001), the expectation that university security personnel engage in activities of benefit to their communities'

“communal good” (Côté-Lussier 2013:184; Loader and Walker 2001) and which are, relatedly, perceived as caring/protective as opposed to controlling (Allen 2017; Dupont 2014; Jacobsen 2015; Wada et al. 2010; Wilson and Wilson 2015). I also consider how university security personnel engage in legitimation work indexed to the normative expectation of professionalism (Abbott 1991; Thumala et al. 2011; Tuchman 1978; Walby et al. 2016).

This study of university security personnel’s legitimation work extends institutional research that has examined issues related to how actors negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with different frames of reference (van den Broek, Boselie, and Paauwe 2014; Gray and Salole 2006; Reay and Hinings 2009). The practices of university security personnel are not understood as being the result of competing logics (Gray and Salole 2006; Heimer 1999; Sauder 2008). Instead, I consider how university security personnel’s risk management expertise and positions within their universities, as those tasked with providing for their organizations and communities’ safety and security, and their positions in overlapping organizational fields provide them with particular sets of tools (i.e., frames of reference) that are used by university security personnel to guide their practices (on variations in practice resulting from position’s and expertise, see Gray and Silbey 2014). Through this, I extend DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991, 1983) institutional isomorphism thesis, which states that prevailing institutional logics are adopted to increase legitimacy, in the context of the translation-through-legitimation-work of the logic risk management into the organizational field of university security.

Last, it is vital to note that because the availability and accessibility of particular institutionalized frames of reference varies according to the situation and according to

actors' positions, expertise, and autonomy (Gray and Silbey 2014:99), actors constantly "improvise and invent new understandings and interpretations that guide their daily activities" (Scott 1995:51; Hodgson 2006; Thornton et al. 2012). These new interpretations, when paired with "collective action" (e.g., protests), can result in "environmental shocks" (e.g., legislative changes) which change the accessibility/availability of frames of reference and contributes to institutional change (Jepperson 1991). Through understanding the frames of reference that constitute university security personnel's embedded agency, this research provides the opportunity for understanding how university security arrangements, and those of the wider organizational fields of public policing and private security, can be directed toward more progressive or equitable outcomes (Kempa et al. 1999; Wood and Shearing 1998).

### **1.3 The Research and Thesis Outline**

Research findings are based on data collected over a four-year period at five Canadian universities, in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario. Data collection involved fifty-six interviews with members of university security and other university organizational units, two-hundred-and-forty-six hours of observations in the form of "ride-alongs" carried out with university security personnel, and the retrieval of documents from various sources. The use of these methods means that this research departs from the traditional approach of studying institutional logics quantitatively and instead follows more recent scholarship which addresses institutional arrangements through the use of qualitative methods in order to examine institutional logics and practice (Almond and Gray 2017; Gray and Salole 2006; Gray and Silbey 2014; Heimer 1999; McPherson and Sauder 2013; Reay and Jones 2016; Sauder 2008). Further,

consistent with the perspectives guiding the orienting strategy of this research, I arrived at these findings inductively (Hay and Wincott 1998; Reay and Jones 2016; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Weber et al. 2013).

This dissertation proceeds in seven chapters, inclusive of this introduction, in which I have described the analytical framework and orienting strategy of this research. The following chapters explore how university security services engage in legitimation work in their attempts to secure legitimacy among university administrators, staff, faculty and students and to justify to themselves that they are legitimate. To do so, I focus on how university security personnel seek legitimacy through appeals to their professionalism, organizational support role identity, and the logic of risk management.

Chapter two provides greater context for this study through an examination of frames of reference provided by the institutional logic of risk management and university security services' quest for legitimacy. I focus on the history of institutional logics in the organizational field of university security and the institutionalization of risk management, including by specifying the key features of this institutional logic. I also discuss those other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference that university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with as they translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field.

In chapter three, I discuss the research process. This chapter includes an overview of the research sites and a discussion of the methods of data collection and analysis. I also explore the research roadblocks, or impediments, which I encountered encountered while brokering site access, managing the loss of access at one university, and while negotiating research ethics procedures. I argue that these roadblocks demonstrate that

frames of reference drawn from the logic of risk management are used to organize and give meaning to decision-making processes within universities. Last, I reflect on the research process and research limitations.

The presentation of research findings commences in chapter four. This chapter begins with a discussion of how university security personnel understand how others perceive them. I argue that negative perceptions of university security personnel inform frames of reference that university security personnel must seek alignment with in order that they may find the acceptance of members of their university communities. These frames of reference include the communal good and, relatedly, university community members' desires for care and the need to downplay perceptions of control. Following this, I discuss how university security personnel attempt to overcome others' negative perceptions, and their own internalized understandings of these perceptions, by engaging in legitimation work. Specifically, I focus on legitimation work which involves university security personnel's negotiation and representation of their professional and organizational support role identities.

In chapter's five and six, I further examine university security personnel's legitimation work through an exploration of their translation of the institutional logic of risk management. In chapter five, I focus on the translation of risk management through how university security personnel construct their risk portfolios (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Dupont 2014). Here, I discuss how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management as they conceptualize risks and harms to their organizations and communities. I argue that university security personnel translate the logic of risk management through negotiating and representing its frames of reference as being in

alignment with their organizational support role identity and their communities' normative expectations of care rather than control.

In chapter six, I focus on how university security personnel attempt to demonstrate alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. This discussion involves the examination of how university security personnel translate risk management practices into their organizational field. Those practices investigated include promotions aimed at having individuals take responsibility for risk management and which may be productive of university security personnel being viewed as caring rather than controlling. I also explore how university security personnel demonstrate care and downplay perceptions of control when engaging in frontline risk management practices (i.e., patrols, investigations, and regulatory enforcement) and in attempting to manage risks posed by protestors and outsiders.

In chapter seven, I provide a brief synthesizing discussion of the research findings. I also discuss how this research on legitimation work offers an analytically useful framework for considering the translation of institutional logics into organizational fields different from those in which they originate. Last, I consider the implications of this research and how university security practices can be directed towards more equitable outcomes.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Risk Management and University Security Personnel's Quest for Legitimacy**

The origins of the logic of risk management trace back to the 17<sup>th</sup> Century. It was at this time that the first organizations dedicated to insurance and private security were formed in response to the recognition that responsibility for harm could be redistributed (Hacking 2003; see also Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Garland 1997; Simon 1994). However, it was not until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century that, due to the professionalization of risk analysis (Dionne 2013; Hacking 2003; Power 2007), the institutional logic of risk management would be taken up across many organizational fields. Given the drive to increase organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Jepperson and Meyer 1991), this logic has been taken up in the organizational fields of public policing and private security (e.g., Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Harcourt 2007; O'Malley 1992; Wakefield 2014; Whelan and Molnar 2017), health care (e.g., Smith et al. 2011; Taylor 2005; Waring 2007), social work (e.g., Pollack 2010; Stalker 2003), and university post-secondary education (e.g., Achampong 2010; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Power et al. 2009:303).

Given that the organizational field of university security is positioned at the crossroads of three of the aforementioned organizational fields (i.e., public policing, private security, and university post-secondary education), it is unsurprising that the rules, practices, and symbol systems of the logic of risk management are institutionalized within it (Moore 2000; Simon 1994; Toomey, Lenk, and Wagenaar 2007; Walby 2006b). Despite risk management being institutionalized within this organizational field, university security personnel must still engage in legitimation work to translate frames of

reference from this logic to be in alignment with other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. This chapter focuses on the institutionalization of risk management and those other frames of reference with which university security personnel attempt to align this logic in their quest for legitimacy.

## **2.1 The Institutional Logics of University Security**

The institutionalization of the logic of risk management within the organizational field of university security occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s (Gomme and Micucci 1997; Simon 1994; Wood and Shearing 1998). Before this, other institutional logics were predominant within this organizational field. These logics are *in loco parentis* (i.e., in place of the parent), *laissez-faire* (i.e., let do), and law-and-order. In this section, I discuss these other logics and factors which contributed to the institutionalization of risk management in the organizational field of university security. This is followed by a discussion of those frames of reference from the logic of risk management which university security personnel translate into their organizational fields.

Through the 1970s, the logic of *in loco parentis* provided frames of reference to those within the organizational field of university security who regulated student social life (Simon 1994). Under this logic, these actors were to stand “in place of the parent” and engage in “the moral guidance of students” (Gidney 2007:147). University security practices included the implementation and enforcement of policies which instituted curfews for students and restricted students from frequenting certain off-campus establishments (Gidney 2007; Simon 1994). Where students were found to have violated these policies, faculty, administrators, or other staff attempted to correct behaviour both through Christian moral teachings and punishments, including expulsions, fines,

whippings, and “groundings” (i.e., students were prohibited from leaving residence buildings at night; see Gelber 1972; Gidney 2007, 2001; Simon 1994). In the United States, the logic of *in loco parentis* was a recognized legal doctrine, which contributed to its reproduction. In Canada, there was no legal basis for *in loco parentis* (Lewis 1983:253); however, this logic reproduced due to normative expectation that universities would act in place of the parent (Cameron 2001; Gidney 2001).

The reproduction of the logic of *in loco parentis* was disrupted during the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s, which were marked by progressive social movements and the beginning of the corporatization of universities (Delanty 2002; Ginsberg 2011; Oakeshott 2004; Readings 1996; Trow 1994). The disruption of this logic was caused by legal challenges and the increasing availability and accessibility of a market-oriented *laissez-faire* logic within the organizational field of university post-secondary education (see Lewis 1983; Simon 1994). Under the logic of *laissez-faire*, there was the expectation that universities recognized students as consumers of education; with respect to “curriculum as well as lifestyle, students were [to have] the sovereignty to pick and choose the kind of experience they wanted to have” (Simon 1994:23). With this shift in logics, universities were no longer expected to provide a duty of care to students who engaged in potentially dangerous activities (Simon 1994:26); however, there remained a legal obligation for universities to maintain a safe campus environment (Lewis 1983:257).

This shift in obligations, combined with mounting pressures due to student unrest, resulted in universities having two choices for how they maintained the safety and security of their campuses: operate in-house security services or allow outsiders (i.e.,

public police services) to police their campuses for them. For the most part, universities chose the former option and, in doing so, frames of reference were drawn from the organizational fields of public policing and private security. Specifically, universities modelled their services after municipal police services; beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, many employed sworn peace officers while others employed private security officers (Gelber 1972; Rigakos and Ponting 2013; Sloan 1992). Given the availability and accessibility of frames of reference from the organizational field of public policing and private security, universities hired security personnel with public policing or military experience and those interested in using university security as a “stepping-stone” into public policing (Gomme and Micucci 1997; Micucci 1998).

As a result of their past experience in or their aspirations to join public police services and supported by organizations such as the International Association of College and University Security Directors (later International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators), university security personnel began to organize their work according to frames of reference from the organizational field of public policing. This meant adopting the institutional logic of law-and-order. Under this logic and that of *laissez-faire*, university security personnel reacted to issues of misconduct engaged in by students who had been given considerably more leeway to make their own choices. When caught by university security personnel or others, students who violated either state or university regulations were subject to punitive sanctions either through their university or the criminal justice system (Berman 1971; Sloan 1992).

In the 1980s, universities were contending with growing pressure to address safety and security issues that had gone unaddressed under the institutional logics of *laissez-*

*faire* and law-and-order (see Simon 1994). These pressures were concurrent with the increasing availability and accessibility of the logic of risk management. This was due both to the professionalization of risk analysis (see Dionne 2013; Hacking 2003; Power 2007) and the increasing numbers of private security personnel relative to public police officers (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1983; Swol 1998). As a result of the increasing availability and accessibility of this logic, personnel working within universities and their security services would come to incorporate its rules, practices, and symbol systems as frames of reference through which they organized, reproduced, and provided meaning to their work lives and experiences (Simon 1994; see also Gomme and Micucci 1997; Moore 2000; Wood and Shearing 1998).

Presently, the logic of risk management provides frames of reference through which university security personnel are to organize, reproduce, and provide meaning to their work lives and experiences. Those frames of reference that university security personnel negotiate include expectations and attendant practices for the framing of safety and security issues. Specifically, these are the normative expectations that safety and security issues are to be framed as risks, which are anything that is collectively understood and represented as a potential source of harm (see Boholm and Corvellec 2011; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Hilgartner 1992). Under the logic of risk management, those harms that are to be protected against include those suffered by organizations, including economic harm (Bland 1999; Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Hacking 2003) and, relatedly, reputational harm (Dupont 2014; Meerts 2013, 2014; Meerts and Dorn 2009; Nalla and Morash 2002; Power et al. 2009; Wakefield 2014; Williams 2014, 2006). The logic of risk management also provides frames of reference regarding the need to protect

against harms to the physical and mental health and the economic well-being of individuals who are members of a “community” (Hier 2003; Levi 2000; Moore 2000; Rose 1998; Simon 1994; Sloan 1992; Sloan and Fisher 2011; Wood and Shearing 1998). Within organizations, including universities, such harms are to be understood and represented vis-à-vis organizational goals (Walby and Lippert 2014:2).

The process of understanding and representing risks which have the potential to cause harms is the result of an inherently creative process because “there is no risk in reality [and] anything *can* be a risk” (Ewald 1991:199, *emphasis in original*). To be sure, while anything can be a risk not everything will be understood and represented as a risk. This is because this creative process, which results in various risks coming to constitute an organization’s “risk portfolio” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Dupont 2014), is constrained by those frames of reference that are available and accessible to actors within their organizations and organizational fields (Boholm and Corvellec 2011; Dupont 2014; Hutter 2005; Short 1992:199; Tierney 1999; Vaughan 1999). Given their membership in the organizational fields of private security and public policing, university security services commonly have risk portfolios comprised of criminal risks (e.g., theft, harassment, assaults) and health and safety risks (e.g., fires, medical emergencies, trip and fall accidents, and motor vehicle collisions; see Dupont 2014). Due to the prevalence and extent of students’ substance use (American College Health Association 2013), the risk portfolios of university security services also include substance use risks (i.e., the consumption of alcohol and other drugs; see Hall, Graham, and Hoover 2004; Moore 2000; Simon 1994). University security services’ risk portfolios also contain protest risks,

due to universities being expected to value freedom of expression and, in some instances, being legally required to allow protests to occur on their campuses (see below).

The logic of risk management also provides frames of reference about those individuals or groups who are to be classified as “high-risk” (i.e., posing an elevated likelihood of harm). High-risk individuals or groups include those who are not considered to be members of the organization or community to be protected from harm. Commonly, these outsiders are understood as risky others (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008). The logic of risk management also provides the expectation that those individuals who fail to take personal responsibility for their problematized behaviours will be classified as higher-risk. It is the prudential principle of the logic of risk management that informs why these individuals are viewed as risks. This principle specifies that individuals should make responsible choices and take on individual responsibility for the management of risks (O’Malley 1992:261). Counter-posing those who fail to take personal responsibility for their actions with risky others blurs the line between morality and immorality. As a result, the logic of risk management differs from that of *in loco parentis* because moralization occurs through understandings of risk and responsibility rather than in relation to “a transcendent set of values” (Simon 1994:31; see also Hier 2008; Hunt 1999, 2003).

Given its focus on individual responsibility, the prudential principle of the logic of risk management provides organizational actors with the expectation that they proactively reduce the risk of harm through “creating the conditions for responsible choice” (Simon 1994:32). Specifically, conditions are to be created so that individuals manage their risk of criminal victimization (Levi 2000; Moore and Valverde 2000; Simon 2000; Wood and

Shearing 1998), criminal offending (Piper 1999), and workplace safety victimization/offending (Almond and Gray 2017; Gray 2006, 2009; Gray and Silbey 2014).<sup>3</sup> In order to create conditions for responsible choice, university security services engage in myriad practices: they modify the built environment using the principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in order to design out crime (on CPTED see Cubbage and Smith 2009; Hummer and Preston 2006; Parnaby 2006), use video surveillance cameras to detect would be offenders (Walby 2006b), and administer access control and alarm systems to prevent theft and identify other hazards, such as fires (Gomme and Micucci 1997).

University security personnel and others in their networks enforce various university policies in their attempts to manage risks through creating the conditions for responsible choice. Universities' residence policies, for example, include provisions through which university staff attempt to manage risky behaviour within student-residence buildings. Specifically, these policies include prohibitions against particular activities (e.g., drinking games, drinking in common areas) that have been associated with a higher likelihood of the occurrence of harm. University security personnel enforce these prohibitions through engaging in practices by which they monitor for risky behaviour. These include residence walk-throughs and alcohol compliance checks (see Simon 1994; Toomey et al. 2007). These practices beget others. For examples, university security personnel can refer students have violated university residence policies to alcohol education programs which attempt to modify these students' irresponsible

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<sup>3</sup> The requirement that students take responsibility for risks associated with their educational choices (Peters 2005) further suggests that frames of reference of risk management, particularly the prudential principle, have been institutionalized within universities.

drinking behaviours (Moore 2000). Alternatively, university security personnel can apply sanctions under university policies or refer students to others who can apply sanctions (e.g., public police services, residence services, code of student behaviour adjudicators). Although these practices occur in reaction to risky behaviours, following the proactive principle of the logic of risk management, the above practices are to be understood and represented as being for the purposes of correcting future (mis)behaviour (i.e., to proactively manage risks) rather than as punishment (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Moore 2000; Walby 2006b).

Last, consistent with the proactive and prudential principles of risk management, university security personnel engage in practices through which they promote the need for individuals to take personal responsibility for risk management. These practices include advertising campaigns which encourage the reporting of suspicious activities, and thus mirror campaigns found in other settings (e.g., “If you see something, say something” found in public transit facilities; Petersen and Tjalve 2013). University security services also operate or refer students to campus safety talks or workshops which promote responsabilization (Barberet and Fisher 2009; Moore 2000; Wood and Shearing 1998). The goals of these practices are to encourage university community members “to feel a sense of responsibility for, and allegiance to, fellow university members and [...] to avoid situations that would pose a threat to their own safety” (Wood and Shearing 1998:86).

## **2.2 University Security Personnel’s Quest for Legitimacy**

The transformation of universities into “consumer-oriented corporation[s]” (Readings 1996:11; see also Delanty 2002; Ginsberg 2011; Oakeshott 2004; Trow 1994),

means that frames of reference from market-based logics, including the logic of risk management, have become increasingly socially acceptable within these organizations (Achampong 2010; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Power et al. 2009). That the logic of risk management has found acceptance within universities, does not mean that the translation of this logic into the organizational field of university security is a *fait accompli*; university security personnel must translate the logic of risk management into this organizational field. This is due to numerous factors. These include the fact that practices of risk management necessitate the exercise of control, that university security personnel are often negatively stereotyped (Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998; Patten et al. 2016; Wada et al. 2010; Wilson and Wilson 2015), and that economic-focused risk management decreases trust in organizations (Hutter and Power 2005:6).

In order to translate the logic of risk management into their organizational fields, university security personnel engage in “legitimation work” (Thumala et al. 2011). Translation-through-legitimation-work involves university security personnel exercising their embedded agency as they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with frames of reference from the logic of risk management and other frames of reference that are culturally and organizationally acceptable (i.e., legitimate). These other frames of reference include professionalism, universities’ missions, goals, and values, and conceptions of the communal good. These frames of reference are negotiated and represented as roles or identities (i.e., professional role identity, organizational support role identity; see Chapter 4).

The first frame of reference that university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with when translating the logic of risk management

is that of professionalism, or professional role identity. This identity is institutionalized as an acceptable frame of reference; it is negotiated, represented, and demonstrated vis-à-vis knowledge, accreditation, and credentials obtained through professional associations (Fournier 1999; Scott 1995; Wilensky 1964). For example, Thumala and colleagues' original study on the legitimation work of members of the organizational field of private security focused on their professional identity. They claim that members of this field signal their professionalism through several types of rituals and claims. These include seeking out and talking about education, accreditation, and credentials obtained from professional associations, such as ASIS International (formerly American Society for Industrial Security; Thumala et al. 2011). Similarly, in their study of municipal corporate security, Walby, Lippert, et al. (2014) found that in-house municipal corporate security personnel attempt to portray themselves as "highly motivated, highly trained, and ASIS-certified" (p. 271) to distance themselves from stigmatized contract security personnel. Professional identity is also negotiated and represented without reference of professional associations, as evinced through its use as a rhetorical device used by others in the organizational field of public policing (Côté-Lussier 2013; Mulcahy and Ellison 2001).

Canadian university security personnel also translate the logic of risk management through legitimation work as they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with frames of reference that are acceptable within their universities. These include universities' missions, goals, and values. For university security personnel, these frames of reference are negotiated and represented through their organizational support role identity and demonstrated through risk management practices (see Chapter 4).

Universities' missions and goals are developed and refined through strategic planning processes, involving months of consultation during which these organizations engage their various stakeholders (e.g., staff, students, alumni) about organizational priorities. Following these consultations, universities release finalized documents, often referred to as their "strategic plans." These plans contain universities' "corporate" mission statements which are usually framed as "academic missions". Universities' academic missions consists of three pillars: *research*, *education (teaching/learning)*, and *service/engagement* (Amit 2000:220). In their strategic plans, universities also set forth their organizational goals (Birnbaum 2001:63–67). Universities' missions and goals provide expectations of the ends to which all members their organizations, including university security personnel, are to organize and give meaning to their work (Connell and Galasiński 1998).

Universities also ascribe to particular sets of organizational values. These values include, but are not limited to, equality, diversity, academic freedom, and freedom of expression. These values provide expectations about how university security personnel are to organize and give meaning to their activities. That universities are understood as public organizations reinforces the expectation that university security personnel coordinate their activities according to the value of freedom of expression. This is due to the common assumption that there is a legal obligation, under the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, for university security personnel to engage in activities that are in alignment with this frame of reference. However, universities' legal obligation to uphold community members right to freedom of expression varies across those provinces in which universities in this study are located. In Alberta, where Poplar University is

located, the courts have ruled that universities are *not* a “Charter-free” zone (*Pridgen v. University of Calgary*, 2012 ABCA 139; *R. v. Whatcott*, 2011 ABPC 336). Contrariwise, in a British Columbia case involving Maple University and an Ontario case (*Lobo v. Carleton University*, 2012 ONSC 254) courts ruled that universities are not always bound by the *Charter*. As such, universities in those provinces can limit certain forms of expression.<sup>4</sup> Regardless of whether there is a legal obligation for universities to uphold freedom of expression, this and the other values espoused by these organizations “can prove challenging for security executives who must implement satisfactory levels of risk management while avoiding any perception of excessive control” (Dupont 2014:276). As a result, such values have the potential to lead to more progressive or equitable forms of security provision (Kempa et al. 1999; Wood and Shearing 1998).

In addition to contributing to the expectation that they uphold individuals’ rights to freedom of expression, the public nature of universities also informs the expectation that university security personnel engage in practices that are in the interest of the public or “communal good” (see Côté-Lussier 2013:184; Loader and Walker 2001). University security services are expected to demonstrate their actions as being consistent with the law and procedural justice (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015). Relatedly, “students expect to be protected from outside harms on their terms through contacts that they initiate, as opposed to having their behaviours policed through contacts that officers initiate”

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<sup>4</sup> The extent to which university security personnel’s activities are subject the *Charter* hinges on whether or not they are acting as agents of the government. Thus, because universities in Alberta are providing education on behalf of the government, as prescribed by the *Postsecondary Learning Act*, these organizations can not infringe on individuals’ freedom of expression on campus (*Pridgen v. University of Calgary*, 2012 ABCA 139; *R. v. Whatcott*, 2011 ABPC 336). This is in contrast to Ontario and British Columbia where universities can act autonomously from their provincial governments. It must be noted that there are no known cases of the courts testing the applicability of Section Two of the *Charter* as it relates to university-employed peace officers, in jurisdictions such as Ontario, while they carry out university-specific duties (e.g., administration of codes of student behaviour).

(Jacobsen 2015:327). University community members' expectations that university security personnel will serve the communal good, including through engaging in activities by which they protect or care for, rather than control, members of their communities serve as key frames of reference which university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with as they translate the logic of risk management and seek legitimacy.

### **2.3 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have described the history of the provision of security within the organizational field of university security, outlined key frames of reference from the logic of risk management that university security personnel translate into this organizational field, and discussed those other frames of reference that university security personnel negotiate alignment with as part of their legitimation work. With respect to the logic of risk management, there are several key frames of reference that university security personnel must translate. First, they translate expectations and attendant practices for how to frame safety and security issues; that is, as risks that pose potential harms to the economic and reputational well-being of their organizations and to the health, safety, and prosperity of their communities. Second, this logic provides frames of reference regarding high-risk groups or individuals, including outsiders and those who fail to make responsible choices. Last, the logic of risk management provides frames of reference for managing risks. Specifically, risks are to be managed, or represented as being managed, proactively rather than reactively.

Although the logic of risk management has found some acceptance within universities, university security personnel still must translate its frames of reference

through legitimation work as they attempt to align this logic with other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. This translation is necessary to positively affect others' perceptions of university security personnel and to overcome the fact that risk management requires the exercise of control which can decrease trust in university security services. Those frames of reference that university security personnel negotiate as part of their legitimation work include those of professionalism. They also include organizationally acceptable frames of reference, including universities' missions, goals, and values as well community members' desires to be cared for rather than controlled.

The presentation of findings on how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management through legitimation work is pre-empted for a chapter as I describe the research settings and processes. To be sure, the following chapter addresses the appropriateness of the logic of risk management within universities through a discussion of various roadblocks, or impediments, encountered during the research process.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Research Process and Research Roadblocks**

In this chapter, I discuss the research process from its inception through analyses. First, I describe the research sites: the universities and their security services which participated in this research. Second, I explain the process of data collection and analysis. Third, I discuss the significant roadblocks, or impediments, encountered in the process of conducting this research.<sup>5</sup> I argue that these roadblocks, encountered in relation to the brokering of initial site access, the subsequent loss of access at one university, and research ethics procedures at multiple sites, reveal that frames of reference from the logic of risk management are used to organize and give meaning to decision-making processes within universities (i.e., the logic of risk management is institutionalized within the administrative structures of universities). Fourth, I offer personal reflections on this research study and outline some of the limitations of this research. Last, in the conclusion, I provide a brief chapter summary.

#### **3.1 Research Sites**

I collected the research data over the course of a four-year period (2011-2014). Data were collected at five universities with the principal criterion for inclusion being that they operate an in-house security service. Further, I only considered universities in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario for inclusion in this study. In total, I contacted security services at ten universities and, of these, five agreed to participate in this study. These universities, referred to by pseudonyms, are Cedar University (British Columbia),

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<sup>5</sup> Some of the roadblocks discussed in this chapter have been explored and reported elsewhere (Lippert, Walby, and Wilkinson 2016).

Maple University (British Columbia), Oak University (Ontario), Pine University (Ontario), and Poplar University (Alberta). These universities are located within census metropolitan areas with populations ranging from three-hundred-and-thirty-thousand to two-and-a-half million. Staff and student populations at these universities range from twenty-thousand to fifty-thousand. Concerning on-campus residence options, each university has undergraduate residences, graduate residences and, except Pine University, residences that can accommodate students and their families. Between September and April, residence populations range from fourteen-hundred to forty-five hundred (or between five and twelve percent of the total university populations).

Three of the university security services in this sample are peace officer services and two are private security services (see Chapter 1). The statutes authorizing these services and providing their legal authority are detailed in Table 1. Oak and Pine Universities' security services employ peace officers known as special constables. The authority of these officers comes from the Ontario *Police Services Act* and the services' agreements with their local police services boards. Oak's peace officer service also has an agreement with a local, private security company through which they contract private security officers. These contract security officers obtain their authority from the *Private Security and Investigative Services Act*. Pine University's special constables are the sole policing and security providers for this University, as per the University's "Security and Policing Policy." Under this policy, the University does not employ private security officers in-house or on contract for its normal operations; however, private security personnel operate on campus when employed by external contractors (e.g., on construction sites) and for special events. Poplar University also operates a peace officer

service, which employs Level One Peace Officers as authorized by Alberta's *Peace Officer Act*. All peace officers in this sample can exercise their legal authority on properties owned by their respective university, those of affiliated colleges, and on abutting thoroughfares (under their statutory authority and, where applicable, agreements with local police services boards).

Cedar and Maple Universities exclusively employ private security officers. Maple University operates a service comprised of both in-house management and in-house security officers (who are unionized). Cedar's security officer service is comprised of an in-house security management team and contract security officers. Although employed through a contract with a Western Canadian private security firm, these security officers are selected for work at the university by the in-house management team, work consistently at the University, wear site-specific uniforms, and are to follow in-house standard operating procedures.<sup>6</sup> Both Maple and Cedar's security services and their officers are subject to the British Columbia *Security Services Act* and its regulations. Under this *Act*, the authority of university security personnel is limited to the properties owned by their respective university.

### **3.2 The Research Process**

The original plan for this research project was to explore the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance projects at Canadian universities. A cursory examination of Canadian university websites, with a focus on the websites of university security services and other sources (e.g., security industry news websites), suggested that CCTV

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<sup>6</sup> Following data collection, a National security company took over the Western Canadian private security firm; this is consistent with private security industry trends (van Steden and de Waard 2013).

**Table 1: University Security Legislation**

	<b>Cedar</b>	<b>Maple</b>	<b>Oak</b>	<b>Poplar</b>
<b>Authorizing Legislation</b>	<i>Security Services Act</i> (SBC 2007, c 30)	<i>Security Services Act</i> (SBC 2007, c 30)	<i>Police Services Act</i> (RSO 1990, c P.15)	<i>Peace Officer Act</i> (SA 2006, c P-3.5)
<b>University Acts</b>	<i>University Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 468)	<i>University Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 468)	<i>Oak University Act</i>	<i>Post Secondary Learning Act</i> (SA 2003, c P-19.5)
<b>Federal Statutes</b>	<i>Criminal Code</i> (RSC 1985, c C-46) Section 494	<i>Criminal Code</i> (RSC 1985, c C-46): Section 494	<i>Criminal Code</i> (RSC 1985, c C-46)	<i>Criminal Code</i> (RSC 1985, c C-46): Section 494
<b>Provincial Statutes</b>	<i>Trespass Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 462)	<i>Trespass Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 462)	All Provincial Offences including <i>Liquor License Act</i> (RSO 1990, c L.19) and police powers under <i>Highway Traffic Act</i> (RSO 1990, c H.8) and	Under Sections 5 & 7 of <i>Peace Officer Act</i> (SA 2006, c P-3.5): <i>Trespass to Premises Act</i> , <i>Gaming and Liquor Act</i> (RSA 2000, c T-7; s. 69, 70, 71, 74, 83, 84, 87, 89, 107, 108, 115 [subject to 53 of <i>Police Act</i> (RSA 2000, c P-17) peace officer authority restricted to Regulation AR 143/96 section 87.1], <i>Petty Trespass Act</i> (RSA 2000, c P-11), <i>Provincial Offences Procedures Act</i> (RSA 2000, c P-34), <i>Tobacco and Smoking Reduction Act</i> (SA 2005, c T-3.8), <i>Traffic Safety Act</i> (RSA 2000, c T-6) [restricted by University Policy], <i>Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act</i> (RSA 2000, c E-12, Part 9 Division 2 sections 179/182)
<b>By-laws</b>	No	No	Yes	No
<b>Limits</b>	As prescribed by the <i>Criminal Code</i> and <i>Trespass Act</i>	As prescribed by the <i>Criminal Code</i> and <i>Trespass Act</i>	University and affiliated colleges' properties. Within 30 metres for incidents starting on campus.	On-campus and abutting roadways/sidewalks.
<b>Other Relevant Acts Highlighted by Security Personnel</b>	<i>Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 165), <i>Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i>	<i>Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act</i> (RSBC 1996, c 165), <i>Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i>	<i>Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act</i> (RSO 1990, c F.31), <i>Occupational Health and Safety Act</i> (RSO 1990, c 0.1), <i>Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i>	<i>Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act</i> (RSA 2000, c F-25), <i>Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i>

surveillance projects were not prevalent on Canadian university campuses nor were those CCTV systems in place monitored to the same extent as their nearest analogue (i.e., streetscape CCTV surveillance projects; see Hier 2010; Hier et al. 2007; Lett, Hier, and Walby 2012; Walby 2005, 2006a; Walby and Hier 2013). Moreover, a review of the academic literature revealed only a handful of studies which involved research explicitly conducted on Canadian university security services (Gomme and Micucci 1997; Micucci 1995, 1998; Walby 2006b) or which directly addressed their practices (Moore 2000; Wood and Shearing 1998). These factors influenced the decision to expand the scope of this research project (see below).

Before researching university security services, in the fall of 2011, I made a research ethics application to the University of Victoria Research Ethics Board. Having secured ethics approval (Protocol 11-446), the process of obtaining site access began, with the intention of conducting a pilot study. With their security services accepting the invitation to participate in this research, I undertook the pilot study at Maple and Cedar Universities (see below).<sup>7</sup> The pilot project began in March 2012 at Maple University, where I conducted ride-along observations over three evening shifts (Thursday/Friday/Saturday). In September 2012, I conducted observations for two day shifts (Tuesday/Wednesday) and three evening shifts (Thursday/Friday/Saturday) at both Maple and Cedar Universities. Observations entailed the shadowing of university security personnel as they worked. During these observations, I also conversed with university security personnel about a range of topics (e.g., questions about incidents, officers' work

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<sup>7</sup> Consent to conduct this research at each university was obtained from university security directors, some of whom had to get consent from others within their universities. This organizational-level consent was obtained either during an initial meeting to discuss the research or at a later date (e.g., via email correspondence or upon arrival to conduct fieldwork).

experience, officers' views of their work). I recorded notes about observations and security personnel's comments in notebooks. I later transcribed these notes into a word-processor. During the pilot project, I began initial document collection/review and I conducted one semi-structured interview (see below).

One of the initial findings to emerge from the pilot project was the extent to which university security services are enrolled in security networks. These networks include university security services, external organizations (e.g., public police services, private security services), and other university organizational units (e.g., residence services, facilities services). On its own, the fact that university security services network with external organizations in their attempts to keep their campuses safe and secure is unsurprising as networked security arrangements have been common for over twenty years (see Johnston 1999; Shaw and Shearing 1998). Moreover, these networks were expected as university security services are never granted full police authority and, therefore, require the assistance of police to deal with certain issues (e.g., sexual assaults, issuing trespass notices; see Carroll 2004), receive training from their local police services (Rigakos and Ponting 2013), and employ security officers through contracts with private security companies. That university security services are not the sole university organizational unit to engage in security-related tasks is also unsurprising based on the history of campus security provision and findings from other contemporary research on university security arrangements (Moore 2000; Reaves 2015; Walby 2006b; Wood and Shearing 1998). Although this research addresses university security services' networked relationships, a more detailed examination of these relationships is beyond the scope of this thesis and has been reported elsewhere (see Wilkinson 2014).

Following the pilot project, I proposed a full-scale research project. The principal aim of this research was to address the gap in the academic literature left by the neglect of the study of university security services. I did not set out to address this aim through an analytical framework informed by the institutional logics perspective and sociological institutionalism nor did I intend to study university security personnel's legitimation work; therefore, this analytical framework was only applied after data had been collected and after preliminary data analysis.

### **3.2a Research Data**

Research findings are based on the analysis of three types of data: interviews, observations, and documents. Myriad documents were collected as part of this research. From university security services, I requested standard operating procedures, training materials, internal policies/procedures, organizational charts, operations (ops) orders for special events, statistics, incident reports (including those from incidents observed during observations), annual reports, job descriptions, budgets, crime prevention advertising, and documents for university security initiatives (e.g., bait lockers). Which of these documents were released after my informal requests varied across universities; some universities provided extensive documentation while others offered limited access.

Freedom of information (FOI) requests were considered to compel those university security services that did not provide full, or even extensive, access to requested documents. However, I made the decision not to utilize this method of data access. I arrived at this decision for two key reasons. First, a condition of the research agreements allowed for termination of the research agreement at any juncture. This condition made it imprudent to use FOI requests; it was possible that formal requests would have strained

research relationships or even resulted in the loss of site access. For example, at one university, where I was provided access to limited documents, the university security administrator responsible for responding to FOI requests indicated that a request would not be appreciated. This, he claimed, was due to the significant personnel resources that responding to an FOI request would require (e.g., to redact personal information).

Although my relationship with this individual was positive, insofar as they facilitated site access and provided me with some documents, this experience suggests that there are access limits, even in so-called “warm” research environments (Hier 2012). Second, given the nature of the data requested (e.g., standard operating procedures, incident reports) it is possible that some universities would have invoked law enforcement or privacy protection provisions of their respective provinces’ FOI legislation to deny my requests. Although it is possible to appeal to provincial privacy commissioners to overturn such decisions, such appeals can be time-consuming, costly, and, importantly, detrimental to research access.

Given that the resulting releases of documents varied extensively across universities, document analysis is based on a limited selection of data from across sites. These include job descriptions, annual reports, university security statistics, accreditation files, standard operating procedures, ride-along incident reports, and university security services’ websites. Further, I collected various documents from university websites. These include the code of student behaviour policies, residence policies, use of space policies, and strategic plans. Also included are policies on violence and threatening behaviour, smoking, access control, harassment, and health and safety (see Tables 2 & 3).

The primary data that I collected and analyzed for this research were obtained through conducting observations and interviews. A total of 85 individuals participated in this research. I obtained informed consent from individual research participants. To ensure ongoing consent, where participants signed consent forms before site visits or participated on more than one occasion (i.e., during multiple site visits or in both observations and interviews), I reminded participants of the aim of this research and addressed additional questions or concerns before proceeding with data collection.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 2: Policies Commonly Used by University Security Services<sup>9</sup>**

	<b>Cedar</b>	<b>Maple</b>	<b>Pine</b>	<b>Poplar</b>	<b>Oak</b>
<i>Code of Student Behaviour</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Residence (Policies/Contracts)</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Smoking</i>	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
<i>Access Control</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Parking, Traffic, or Vehicles</i>	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
<i>Violence/Threatening Behaviour</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Liquor</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Use of Space</i>	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
<i>Harassment</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Health and Safety</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Security or Policing</i>	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓
<i>Visiting Film Crews</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
<i>Posting Announcements</i>	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
<i>Video Monitoring</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓

<sup>8</sup> Organizations and participants were notified in that their anonymity could not be guaranteed; however, this research adheres to the confidentiality guaranteed in the consent forms (see Appendix A). To this end, interviewees have been assigned pseudonyms containing a standardized business unit identifier (e.g., University Security, Residence Services) and randomly assigned interview number. In some instances, identifying information (e.g., participant's title, gender) accompany data to provide greater context. In such cases, generic modifiers may not accompany the data. Observational data is reported using university pseudonyms and not attributed to individual officers (e.g., Oak University Fieldnotes).

<sup>9</sup> Names have been standardized and, in some instances, more than one university policy exists within each category. The determination of if a policy is used was based on a review of university policies, interviews, fieldnotes, and other data.

**Table 3: Principal Documentary Data Sources**

	<b>Cedar</b>	<b>Maple</b>	<b>Pine</b>	<b>Poplar</b>	<b>Oak</b>
<i>Ride-Along Incident Reports</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
<i>Standard Operating Procedures/ Directives</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
<i>Accreditation Files</i>	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
<i>Statistics</i>	2003-2012	2006-2013	2009	2005-2012	2000, 2013
<i>Annual Reports</i>	✗	2012	2012-2013, 2014-2015	2012, 2013	2011, 2013
<i>Job Descriptions/ Officer Appointments</i>	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
<i>Ops Orders</i>	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
<i>Security Advertising</i>	✓ (e.g., website, newsletters, employee orientation package)	✓ (e.g., personal safety brochures)	✗	✓ (e.g., website, Don't Feed the Thieves campaign)	✓ (e.g., website, Dating Safety PDF)
<i>University Security Website</i>	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
<i>Other (Security Services)</i>	✗	University Security /Data Breach Report	✗	Independent Report on Violent Incident	CPTED Reports
<i>Other (Universities)</i>	Strategic Plan (2012)	Strategic Plan (2012)	Strategic Plan (2010)	Strategic Plan (2009)	Strategic Plan (2007)

To gain a better understanding of the practices of university security personnel, I carried out two-hundred and forty-six hours of observations at four of the five universities; Pine University was excluded due to a research roadblock (see below). In total, forty members of university security services participated in observations (thirty-six males and four females). This includes twelve members from Maple University (ten security officers and two security team leaders), sixteen members from Cedar University (eleven contract security officers, four supervisors, and one supervisor of patrol operations), six members from Oak University (four special constables and two acting sergeants), and six members from Poplar University (five peace officers and one

sergeant). Of those participating in observations, eleven also participated in a recorded interview (see below).

As was the case in the pilot study, I conducted observations during day shifts (Tuesday/Wednesday) and night shifts (Thursday/Friday/Saturday). The oversampling of night shifts was informed by Micucci's (1995, 1998; Gomme and Micucci 1997) research and on the assumption that, because of students' consumption of alcohol and other drugs (Allen 2013, 2015, 2017, 2016; American College Health Association 2013; Sloan and Fisher 2011), these shifts would be busier for university security services and thus produce more data. This assumption did not hold. Although substance use was a major issue addressed at night, evening shifts also involved a significant amount of mundane security work (e.g., locking doors, paperwork) and by the early morning hours, there was sometimes little work, beyond random patrolling, engaged in by security personnel. Ride-alongs were discontinued at times due to researcher fatigue, on the suggestion of participants, or a combination thereof. Further, day shifts were often very busy due, in part, to there being significantly larger campus populations during daytime hours when classes are in session and administrative staff are at work.

The use of "ride-along" observations as a method of data collection produced invaluable data as it allowed me to develop a certain level of rapport with participants. One way I established rapport was through assisting university security personnel in certain aspects of their work (e.g., door checks). Such actions, known as "commitment acts", help to break down barriers between researchers and participants (Cunliffe and Alcadipani 2016; Feldman, Bell, and Berger 2003). I used these commitment acts in conjunction with other strategies of researcher image management, or presentation of self

(Goffman 1959). This management of self-presentation included my maintaining a so-called “professional” appearance, accomplished through wearing business casual attire (e.g., dark dress pants or jeans, a dress shirt, dress shoes).

I also engaged in researcher image management during my interactions with participants. This included how I managed interactions in which participants said or did things that conflicted with my values (see below). This also included my joining some security personnel on their smoke breaks, which allowed for more relaxed and candid conversations. In some instances, I would discuss personal details about myself and my family (i.e., my family members’ work in emergency services). Discussing these details was useful when discussing certain aspects of security work with participants, including the emotional impact of serious incidents (van Hulst 2013; Pogrebin and Poole 1988; Waddington 1999). To be sure, I did not enjoy the same level of rapport with all participants; however, consistent with Pogrebin and Poole’s experiences, many were indeed willing to provide information one might not expect would be shared with an outsider. For example, several university security personnel would share “the latest organizational rumor or personnel gossip [and] ‘war stories’” (Pogrebin and Poole 1988:186). Such information proved useful in triangulating other data and in constructing more reliable and valid data (Pogrebin and Poole 1988:177).

I also produced data through conducting semi-structured interviews between September 2012 and September 2013. I conducted interviews with university security personnel (N=41) and other principal actors from various university organizational units (e.g., risk management services, residence services, legal services, student services) involved in university security/risk management (N=15). Interviews with university

security personnel were conducted at Cedar University with the director, patrol operations supervisor, access control and physical security coordinator, student safety program coordinator, contract security site supervisor, four security supervisors, and two security officers. Interviews at Maple University were conducted with the director, a manager of operations, two personal safety coordinators, two security team leaders, and one security officer. At Oak University, I conducted interviews with the director, leader of operations, coordinator of CPTED and safety programs, three sergeants, one acting sergeant, and three civilians (coordinator of communications, campus student foot patrol manager, and technical coordinator). Poplar University interviewees were the director, two superintendents (administrative services and corporate services), inspector (patrol duty), acting sergeant (training and support), two sergeants (patrol duty), and three community liaison officers. Finally, at Pine University those interviewed were the director, sergeant in charge of emergency planning and preparedness, and community services/crime prevention officer. Across all universities, I interviewed a total of twelve female university security personnel. These include two administrators, three frontline personnel, five personnel in specialized roles related to community outreach, and two civilian members. That less than one-third of interview participants are female is not surprising given that in-house security is male-dominated (Lund Petersen 2014; Walby and Lippert 2015).

Interviews were also conducted with those from other university organizational units. At Cedar University these interviews were with three members of their risk management unit (chief safety officer, emergency planner, policy/program development coordinator) and a director of projects who was responsible for their code of student

behaviour policy. Interviewed at Maple University were the policy development and judicial affairs manager and a residence coordinator (student leadership/community development). Oak University interviewees were the residence services' associate vice-president and residence director, student council manager of student life, and a university lawyer. I interviewed a Pine University insurance/risk management officer. Finally, at Poplar University I interviewed the coordinator of a unit dedicated to helping at-risk individuals, judicial affairs director/discipline officer, an assistant dean of residence and the associate vice-president of their risk management unit. Of those participants in this group, eight were female and seven were male.

Interviews ranged in length from 10 to 120 minutes, for a total length of 49 hours and 26 minutes. Interviews were based on three semi-structured question guides (i.e., university security management, university security officers, non-university security personnel; see Appendix B). The use of multiple semi-structured guides allowed for multiple areas of research to be addressed, probes beyond the prepared questions (Berg 2007:95), and for interviews to be tailored according to participants' knowledge (Barriball and While 1994; Fylan 2005). Interviews with frontline security personnel and management focused on various matters, including about university security services' histories, administration, relationships with their university community and other organizational units, risk management practices, and work challenges and rewards.<sup>10</sup> The interviews conducted with those outside of university security services focused on connections between their work and that of university security services. Topics included

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<sup>10</sup> Questions for university security personnel/management were informed by Rigakos' (2005) typology of policing.

the participants' current and past working relationships with university security services and how members of their organizational unit conceive of and manage risks. These interviews also provided insight into the various university regulations (e.g., residence contracts, codes of student behaviour) that provide frames of reference that guide how university security services manage risks. Although it was not an intended purpose of these interviews, many non-university security participants provided answers that contained outsider insights or critiques of university security services or otherwise confirmed or called into doubt claims made by participants from university security services; this was useful in helping to conceptualize the data produced as being legitimation work.

### **3.2b Data Analysis**

Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis (see Braun and Clarke 2006; Zengin 2010) and was an ongoing endeavour throughout the research process. Thematic analysis began with "immersion" in the data during fieldwork (Green et al. 2007). Throughout the process of conducting interviews and observations, I was constantly engaged with the data. It was in the early stages of data collection (i.e., the pilot study) that codes, categories, and themes emerged and this information informed further data collection. For example, I wrote reflections about the data and would include new site-specific questions in interviews. Further, immersion occurred as I collected documents. This included collecting and copying of documents at Oak University (archival and university security service internal documents) and Cedar University (archival documents). During this process, I was able to gain an understanding of the contents of documents. Immersion in the data also occurred as I transcribed interviews. My

immersion in the data at this stage was important as it “allow[ed] a detailed examination of what [was] said and stimulate[d] a process [of] ‘incubat[ing]’ ideas about the possibilities of analysis” (Green et al. 2007:547).

**Table 4: Coding Categories**

<i>Category</i>	<b>Description</b>
<i>Background</i>	Organizational unit structure, staffing, training, history
<i>Customer Service</i>	Security practices framed in terms of service to universities/communities
<i>Education</i>	Appeals to educational nature of risk management practices; university security services’ risk management promotion
<i>Legal Toolboxes</i>	State regulations and universities’ policies/procedures informing university security practices
<i>Networks</i>	Relationships between university security services and other organizations/organizational units
<i>Perceptions</i>	University security personnel’s understandings of others’ perceptions of their services; non-university security participants’ perceptions of university security services
<i>Risks</i>	Constructions of relationships of risk; management of risks
<i>Alcohol/Drugs</i>	Alcohol and drug risks and risk management practices
<i>Criminal</i>	Criminalized risks (e.g., theft, vandalism, assault)
<i>Health and Safety</i>	Risks to individual/community health or safety and management of health/safety risks (e.g., trip and fall accidents, hazardous materials)
<i>Mental Health</i>	Mental health as risk and mental health risk management
<i>Protests</i>	On-campus protests as risks and protest risk management
<i>Sexualized Violence</i>	Sexualized Violence as risk and sexualized violence risk management
<i>Workplace Violence</i>	Workplace violence as risk and workplace violence risk management
<i>Stress/Rewards</i>	University security personnel’s job stresses and rewards
<i>Values</i>	University and university security services’ values (e.g., dignity, respect, freedom of expression)

The thematic coding of data was informed by my immersion in the data. I coded the fieldwork data (i.e., interviews and observations) into the following principal thematic categories: background, customer service, education, legal toolboxes, networks, perceptions, risks, stress/rewards, and values. The risk category was further thematically

sorted into the risk categories of alcohol/drugs, criminal, health and safety, mental health, protests, sexualized violence, and workplace violence. While this thematic coding was useful for organizing and thinking about the data, Charmaz argues that coding is but “the first step in taking an analytic stance toward the data” (2005:517). Having built this “analytic scaffolding” (Charmaz 2005:517), I began the writing process.

Following Augustine (2014), the writing process was not exogenous to but instead constituted data analysis (i.e., writing-as-analysis). It was through the writing process, in which I produced more than two-hundred documents representing various drafts of/analyses for this dissertation, that I built the assemblages between my conceptual framework and my thematically organized data. Thus, while past scholarship guides this research, consistent with my analytical framework all findings were arrived at inductively (Hay and Wincott 1998; Reay and Jones 2016; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Weber et al. 2013).

### **3.3 Risk Management Roadblocks in University Security Research**

Others who study policing and security agencies have noted that the research process is not always straightforward or uncomplicated (e.g., Brewer 1990; Fox and Lundman 1974; Greene 2014; Rigakos and Worth 2011). This is also true for this research, wherein I encountered numerous roadblocks related to research site and data access. These roadblocks contributed to researcher anxieties and required additional time, effort, and patience to overcome. These difficulties include temporary and permanent roadblocks encountered when brokering research access with organizational gatekeepers, a permanent roadblock erected by the union representing Pine University’s special constables, and temporary roadblocks put up due to research ethics boards engaging in

practices of “ethics creep” (Haggerty 2004). These roadblocks reveal that frames of reference from the logic of risk management organize and give meaning to decision-making processes within universities. Specifically, in each instance, this research or researcher were understood and represented as posing potential risks of harm to the interests or resources of universities, their security services, or their staff, and thereby proactive steps were taken to mitigate or eliminate these perceived risks.

### **3.3a Research Access at Participating Sites**

I commenced the brokering of access to undertake research at ten universities, with five university security services eventually agreeing to participate in this research. At Cedar and Poplar Universities, research approval was granted after phone and email correspondence with university security directors and/or their immediate supervisors, who were given with the organizational “Request for Access/Invitation to Participate” (Appendix A). At the three other participating universities, in-person meetings were held with university security directors before they approved research access. At Maple and Oak Universities, permission to conduct this research was contingent upon their receipt of my criminal record check from the Victoria Police Department. I also offered my clean criminal record check to other participating universities. As an additional condition of research at Oak University, their university security director requested that I obtain approval from their University’s research ethics board (see below). The amount of time passing between initial contact and research approval at the participating universities ranged from 7 to 118 days.

The process of brokering access provided my first encounter with the logic of risk management in the context of universities and their security services. In being requested

to obtain and provide my criminal record check for Maple and Oak Universities, it was signalled to me that there were concerns that I may pose a risk of harm. This is likely due to this research involving unprecedented access to sensitive organizational documents and to conduct observations. That these participants chose a criminal record check as the method through which to assess my riskiness, as opposed to contacting work or academic references, is attributable to the fact that those requesting this check previously worked as public police officers. Given their careers within the organizational field of public policing, the practice of using these checks to assess risk, internalized as cognitive scripts, would have been readily available and accessible to these individuals. Further, such checks are now a culturally acceptable practice through which the assessment of individuals' riskiness undertaken (e.g., for making volunteer or employment decisions) and, in some instances, are legally mandated.

### **3.3b Brokering Access with Non-Participating Universities**

The scope and duration of access brokerage varied at the five university security services, which were contacted but did not participate in this research. I excluded two services early in the research process. In February 2012, I attempted to contact the director of one Alberta-based security officer service. This contact included a phone message left on the voicemail of the director and a follow-up email to invite the director to meet with me the following week. The director did not respond to these attempts at contact and, therefore, I excluded this service from consideration.

A second university security officer service, in British Columbia, was excluded from the sample after a brief phone-call with their acting director on 23 May 2012. During this phone call, the acting director denied my request for access for two reasons,

both of which demonstrate alignment with the logic of risk management. First, the acting director claimed that they would not grant access to the documents requested due to the sensitive nature of the data. Second, the acting director contended that observations were not permitted due to issues surrounding organizational liability. In both instances, this research (and myself as the researcher) were represented as posing a risk of harm to the university security service and the university *vis-à-vis* loss of control of informational resources and potential financial harm if I were harmed and attempted to engage in a civil lawsuit against the university.

In two other instances, initial contact with the directors of university security services proved promising as the directors indicated support for site access. On 18 December 2012, I emailed the director of a university peace officer service in southwestern Ontario. The director of this service responded and was seemingly open to the request, asking several questions that I promptly answered by email. Because this email did not receive a response, I sent a follow-up email on 10 January 2013. The director responded that ongoing budget planning was serving as an impediment to a decision and no progress had been made regarding access. The director responded to another follow-up email on 22 February 2013. This email stated that the director had not yet spoken to their immediate supervisor; however, the director continued to express interest in participating. In response, I informed the director by email that it was not too late to participate and that I could schedule fieldwork for the following September. After this email, I received no further correspondence and decided to exclude this university security service from this research. At another university in Ontario, which employs security officers, a face-to-face meeting with the university security director occurred in

June 2012. During this meeting, the director appeared receptive to participating in this research. Because the director did not respond to subsequent telephone and email contact I excluded this service from this research.

At the completion of fieldwork, attempts were made to contact the latter two directors to gain insight into the reasons contact was broken off. The director of the first service did not respond to this request. The director of the second service, who had since moved to a position at another post-secondary organization, responded with their rationale for denying access. The decision to deny access was made in conjunction with human resources staff and the explanation provided was that they believed that participation in this research could cause harm to the university and their security service. First, this research was viewed as posing a risk because the university security services' participation would have coincided with their shifting from a non-intervention to an intervention model of security. This change was politically sensitive on their campus and they believed that this research could draw unnecessary attention to the changes; here, this research was understood to raise the risk of reputational harm to the university and their security service. Second, with human resources involved in the participation decision, there was concern that this research could harm the university's position during collective bargaining with the security officers' union.

The last university that did not agree to participate in this research operates a peace officer service. This Ontario university requires that researchers (both internal and external to the university) submit a formal request under their policy for "Access to Faculty, Students, Staff for Research Purposes." The stated aim of this policy "is to prevent survey fatigue, protect confidentiality and employee rights, and ensure that

access does not conflict with any current or planned research to be conducted by the University or its administrative/academic units.” I sent an access request via email on 10 November 2011. This email included the standard “Request for Access/Invitation to Participate” used for all sites along with the required confidentiality agreement. Twenty-two days later, I received a letter, sent as an email attachment, which was signed by a faculty/academic life administrator. The letter states that my request was denied because the university believed this research “would require extensive coordination and resources from the University and [the University was] not in a position to provide that kind of support.” The letter also cited the “highly unionized” university environment as a secondary concern.

After receiving this rejection, I continued my attempts to broker research access at this university. In an email sent on 5 December 2011, I informed my contact, who was a vice-president of human resources and equity, that I could make research modifications to address their concerns. In part, this email read:

I am sympathetic to the concerns expressed as the reasons for denying my request for access (The Provision of Security at Canadian Universities); however, I was wondering if it would be at all possible to discuss further the request and reasons for its denial. I would also be very appreciative of the chance to enter into a dialogue about possible changes to my request that may lead to some level of access to conduct my research. I am currently in similar negotiations with other universities and am open to exploring a range of possibilities for modifying the research design to accommodate the individual needs of each particular research site.

I received no response for fifty-one days. I then made a second attempt to contact this vice-president by telephone; there was no answer, so I left a voicemail message. Two days later the vice-president reiterated the denial of the request via email. This email contained an apology for the delay and the following:

I agree that the questions you wish to research are very important – but they are also exceptionally complex and constantly evolving. As a faculty member who supervises graduate students, I understand and support the need to obtain data from universities. However, regrettably I do not believe that it is in the best interests of the [university] to be involved in your research study at this time.

Here, the vice-president had provided a new rationale for denying access (i.e., the complex/evolving nature of research).

Given that this vice-president had provided multiple rationales for denying access and believing that an FOI request at the organizational level was unlikely to hinder future research access, I submitted an FOI request:

1) All correspondence that relate to my request for ‘Access to Faculty, Students, Staff for Research Purposes’ made/received by [university] email accounts dating between November 8th, 2011 and January 27th, 2012. This should include but not be limited to emails sent and received by the following accounts or persons [...] In addition to these persons/accounts correspondence made/received by others contacted in relation to my request for research access is requested.

2) All other responsive files related to my request for ‘Access to Faculty, Students, Staff for Research Purposes’. This may include but not be limited to non-electronic correspondence, electronic or non-electronic (i.e., paper) notes or files.

In total, the university produced fourteen pages of responsive records. The only redacted information was a personal phone number, the release of which would have constituted an unjustified invasion of privacy under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*.

Within the documents provided, I identified ten individuals from four different university organizational units. Conspicuously absent from the documents released is any indication that university security personnel, who would be best positioned to assess the benefits and harms of their participation, were involved in the decision making process. Despite this, personnel involved in the decision-making process were found to have been influenced by frames of reference from the logic of risk management. Specifically, in one

exchange, those who assessed this research were found to be in agreement that my position as a researcher external to this university made this research more problematic; I was classified as a risky outsider (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008).

In the three instances where I was provided with a rationale, it is evident that university security management and other organizational gatekeepers made decisions based on assessments of risks and harms. Both myself, as the researcher, and this research project and its findings were viewed as posing risks of harm to universities' resources (e.g., finances, reputations). That university security managers conceived of this research in terms of the organizational risk it presented is perhaps to be expected; assessing and managing risks is central to their day-to-day work. However, the involvement of other university organizational units in assessing the potential harms versus the potential organizational benefits of this research suggests that others within universities rely on the logic of risk management to organize and give meaning to organizational processes; that is, risk management is institutionalized within universities (see also Achampong 2010; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Peters 2005; Power et al. 2009). The institutionalization of risk management is important as it means that university security services' activities guided by this logic are likely to find organizational support amongst those within their organizations who are also organizing, reproducing, and giving meaning to their work according to this logic.

The rationales for denying research access given by those representing the two Ontario universities are not only indicative of institutionalization of the logic of risk management but also of the increasing corporatization of universities (Aronowitz 2000;

Jarvis 2001; Readings 1996). First, in both cases, these decisions were arrived at in consultation with human resources personnel and included the fact that the university security services employ unionized employees. In the one case, the former director noted that the university was concerned over this research potentially harming the university's position in collective bargaining with the security officers' union. While the second university did not make explicit their rationale as to why the unionized environment impacted their decision not to allow this research, it is indeed curious that the released FOI documents do not show that any consultation was undertaken with unionized security staff. This lack of consultation is important because one of the explicit purposes of their vetting of projects is to "protect [...] employee rights". If research access was indeed denied without consulting with unionized staff, it raises the question: to what extent was the protection of employee rights weighed along with other organizational concerns (e.g., reputational harm, financial harm *vis-à-vis* loss of bargaining power)?

Second, denials were made in the interest of preventing reputational harm (Dupont 2014; Meerts 2013, 2014; Meerts and Dorn 2009; Nalla and Morash 2002; Power et al. 2009; Wakefield 2014; Williams 2014, 2006). Attempts at preventing reputational harm are evinced where the one director mentioned that they were attempting to avoid drawing further attention to the move from a non-intervention to an intervention model of security, which was opposed by some university community members. The FOI documents from the other university also suggest that my being an external researcher, who presumably would be less concerned about revealing damaging information, contributed to the university denying research access.

That the frames of reference from the logic of risk management, specifically market-oriented frames of reference for understanding risk, are evinced in the above decisions about what research should be permitted is particularly problematic in the university context because research is one of three main elements of universities' missions (see Amit 2000). Although alignment with universities' research missions is negotiated, demonstrated, and represented as part of the translation of the logic of risk management into this organizational field (see below), that fifty-percent of those universities/security services contacted were unwilling to engage in meaningful discussions regarding research access suggests that other frames of reference, including those of risk management, are privileged in decision making. This is particularly problematic because the reliance on risk management, and particularly reputational risk management, can restrict research access and result in narrow understandings of organizational practice (Watson 2015). As non-academic administrators gain more organizational decision making power (Delanty 2002; Ginsberg 2011; Trow 1994), this can further erode the ability of university researchers to find organizational support for much needed social research that may be deemed risky. This includes research involving international travel to areas designated as high-risk, fieldwork within other difficult to access organizations (e.g., prisons, slaughterhouses), or ethnographic research on marginalized groups (e.g., street-entrenched drug users).

### **3.3c Losing Access at Pine University**

At Pine University, the union representing special constables erected research roadblocks. I had already conducted interviews with two members of this service when, during a research interview, their director indicated that approximately half of the

members of the service had expressed interest in participating in the project; however, the labour union representing the special constables had advised them against doing so. The director provided me with the contact information for a union representative. During a brief telephone conversation with this representative, I attempted to gain their support so that I could conduct interviews and observations which I had planned for later that week. The representative made it clear that the union did not believe this research was in their members' best interest and, therefore, that numerous members were refusing to participate. Given the union's stated opposition to this research and nature of the workplace, in which I was likely to observe those members who explicitly refused to participate, I decided to discontinue data collection at this university.

I was given no official rationale for the union's unwillingness to endorse this research. However, contemporaneous events at Pine University suggest that organizationally-specific politics lead to there being a perceived elevated level of risk of research participation that, when weighed against the benefits of participation (see Appendix A), could not be overcome by the union. In fieldnotes which I wrote following my meeting with the director, I noted some of these anxieties:

There were concerns on behalf of some members about the research and a fear that the study would be used against them at a later date. Although the director did not know the exact rationale, there are several reasons for this refusal, including previous bad press about incidents involving campus police and a recent move to outsource janitorial staff.

Concerning the outsourcing, Pine University had recently announced its intentions to cut a large percentage of their unionized custodial staff and contract out their responsibilities. In the same week that fieldwork was to occur, there had been a protest against the changes during a Board of Governors meeting. The outsourcing of unionized custodial staff would have been particularly worrisome to the special constables' union as their

collective agreement was nearing expiration. That outsourcing was a concern of the union is most certainly confirmed by the inclusion of a clause in the special constables' collective agreement. This clause recognizes that the special constables have historically undertaken all policing/security work on campus and that this work shall continue to be undertaken exclusively by these officers in campus spaces occupied by faculty, staff, and students. These contemporaneous events would have meant that the risk of harm to special constables (i.e., through outsourcing their services) would have been particularly available and accessible as frames of reference negotiated as they made decisions about participation.

Although I was not conducting research on behalf of the university security services' management, that I had not included the union in the initial brokering of site-access likely contributed to union members perceiving this research as a risk. To my knowledge, no other unions discouraged their members from participating in this research. However, this experience should serve as a reminder for researchers to be aware of site-specific events and politics which can influence the availability and accessibility of particular frames of reference, and thereby affect research access. More importantly, however, is that this experience highlights the need for researchers to meaningfully include unions or other stakeholder groups when brokering site access.

### **3.3d Research Ethics**

Also presenting roadblocks to research were universities' research ethics boards. These boards operate under the auspices of the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* (TCPS2) and are intended to protect the rights of research participants by mitigating research risks. To conduct research involving

human participants, researchers must first get approval from the research ethics board of their affiliated university (or universities). Although all universities operate under the same provisions of the TCPS2, the requirements for ethics board approval varies across organizations. Thus, despite this research having been approved by the University of Victoria Research Ethics Board (Protocol Number 11-446), I was also required to consult with other universities' research ethics boards in order conduct research within their organizations.

The requirements set forth by the ethics boards of the universities in this study varied. The protocol of my home university sufficed for three of the sites. However, additional approvals were required at two sites. The first site where additional approval was required merely requested that I submit my approved protocol to their ethics board for expedited review. This ethics board approved the project with no changes.

Significant roadblocks were, however, erected by the research ethics board at Oak University. At this University, the research ethics board initially requested that this research project have a principal investigator (PI) affiliated with Oak University. Due to my lack of academic contacts at Oak University, I first attempted to apply through the University's online ethics system without providing a principal investigator affiliated with the University. However, the ethics officer flagged the application. I was sent an email which reads: "As per our guidelines you will need to have a PI dedicated at [Oak University] to oversee your project. This person will become responsib[e] for the conduct of the study at [Oak University]. We cannot approve this study without such person." I then engaged in further conversations, both by phone and email, in which I expressed concerns about my ability to locate a principal investigator who, having no ties to myself

or this research project, would agree to take on responsibility for this research. During email correspondence, I leveraged my knowledge of the logic of risk management, which informs research ethics boards' decisions (as evinced by application questions that ask the researcher to identify risks/harms posed by research), to point out that the principal investigator would be assuming "the risk of a research project with no tangible reward". This correspondence resulted in the ethics board consulting with the University's legal counsel about waiving the principal investigator requirement. After this significant delay, the University waived the need for ethics approval and I was able to proceed with research at this site.

That ethics boards from universities other than my own requested oversight of this research is demonstrative of "ethics creep" (Haggerty 2004). Here, researchers are distrusted or viewed as posing risks to participants and universities, through association with research which causes harm, and the belief that this ought to be managed through additional ethical oversight. The distrust of researchers has been singled out as problematic by other scholars. Linda Eyre (2010) argues that the application of TCPS2 requirements, which are informed by the biomedical, physical science, and positivist social science disciplines, can stifle qualitative research as the ethical requirements for the latter disciplines are not the same as those for qualitative social research. Further, Wynn's research on ethnographers' experiences with research ethics boards suggest that these boards "are predisposed to protect powerful [organizational] interests and this may lead to a watering down of critical research" (2011:101). Although my University's research ethics board did not present major obstacles to my research, and that I was able to overcome the roadblocks put up by one research ethics board, my experiences still

suggest that ethics boards negotiate frames of reference from the logic of risk management as they serve as organizational gatekeepers. In turn, this reduces the ability of researchers to conduct important research in which they are “studying up” (Nader 1972) to reveal the practices of powerful organizations.

While others have discussed the issues of ethics creep within their university’s ethics boards, my research suggests that not only are researchers distrusted, or classified as risky, but so too are other research ethics boards. Specifically, the research ethics board which sought significant oversight of my research was also clearly mistrustful of the University of Victoria’s Research Ethics Board’s oversight of the project. Although both ethics boards operate under the same TCPS2 guidelines, the competency of the reviewers at the University of Victoria was called into question by the significant oversight requested by the other board. This extension of distrust, despite boards operating under the same guidelines, suggests that research ethics boards may view their board colleagues in other universities not as competent peers but as lacking the requisite skill required to identify and mitigate research risks.

### **3.4 Reflections on the Research Process and Research Limitations**

As evinced in the preceding section, in conducting this research there were numerous outside challenges; there were also several personal and ethical challenges, both in data collection and in the presentation of data. As a critical policing and security scholar, one of the principal personal challenges arose from conducting fieldwork, often hours at a time, with individuals whose politics and personalities sometimes clashed with my own. At one university, I was required to bite my agnostic-tongue during one meal break when the officer I was on the break with attempted to convert me to Christianity

and denigrated the views of avowed atheists Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. (Apparently, I was not the only one to have received this lecture; the next day his co-workers asked if an attempted conversion had occurred). In other instances, I made the conscious decision not to “rock the boat” by calling out problematic language used by officers. As I reflected in my fieldnotes for one university:

The [...] service is male-dominated [...] During one of the night shifts[,] one of the officers was discussing his sex life and simulated intercourse while cupping both hands near his crotch. The sexual humour exhibited by guards could also be seen in another guard’s comments about “polishing knobs” [...] I found myself in the position of having to sit back and observe and not interject when language or actions occurred that could be perceived as sexist or demeaning.

Navigating these interactions required that I put my personal politics aside to maintain research access. At the same time, these interactions, which occurred when university security personnel were not interacting with their communities (i.e., in the “backstage”; see Goffman 1959) reinforce an understanding of institutional logics as tools used on a situational basis (see Gray and Silbey 2014).

While some individuals said or did things that required me to bracket my personal politics or ethics for the sake of data collection, the sustained interactions with university security personnel during fieldwork also provided me with a unique perspective that informs this thesis. After spending several hours, or more, with individuals as they worked and through conversations with these individuals there was a certain level of familiarity and rapport developed. This rapport resulted in me considering the question: how could I maintain a critical stance while accurately representing the lived realities of research participants? It was through consideration of this question, combined with collaboration with Randy Lippert and Kevin Walby on other analyses of legitimization work (see Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby et al. 2016) and suggestions from

committee members, that I ultimately decided to consider and extend legitimation work by integrating it with institutionalist perspectives. Adopting this analytical framework allowed me to develop an understanding of university security that captures key frames of reference that influence the “front stage” work of university security personnel while still maintaining a critical stance through considering how understanding these frames of reference can have the potential to create more equitable security arrangements (Kempa et al. 1999; Wood and Shearing 1998).

At the same time, I recognize that this approach does have its limitations. While centring the voices of university security personnel represents their lived realities it also means that other voices are excluded from this research. Originally, I intended to conduct many interviews with university students. However, due to time constraints and research fatigue resulting from multiple weeks-long fieldwork trips, including maintaining a shift-work schedule while doing so, transcribing interviews, data analysis, and other personal and professional commitments, this group was excluded from this research. The exclusion of students means that the findings presented within do not reveal the extent to which university security personnel are *actually* meeting the normative expectations of their communities (i.e., whether they have legitimacy). Rather, they only reveal how university security personnel attempt to do so (i.e., how they engage in processes of legitimation; on legitimation versus legitimacy see Barker 2001; Thumala et al. 2011).

This lack of engagement with students, combined with my own experiences with university security personnel (i.e., as the people I called when I forgot my keys), also meant that this research does not reveal potential abuses by university security personnel or others in their security networks. Had I engaged with students, I may have learned

about the suppression of sexualized violence complaints within student-residence buildings and then, if I did not believe that doing so could endanger site access, used FOI requests to obtain information about such suppression.<sup>11</sup> Relatedly, information on sexualized violence does not play as predominantly in this thesis as one may expect given recent attention to this campus social problem. This lack of attention can be attributed to the way in which I asked questions about sexualized violence (i.e., as part of a question about the risk management of student social life more generally) or may indeed be representative of university security personnel and others engaging in reputational risk management. To be sure, while this lack of attention to sexualized violence is an oversight and limitation of this research project, it represents a lack of understanding of university security personnel's *legitimacy* rather than of their attempts at *legitimation*.

A final limitation of this research is also related to the issue of differences between those whom I interviewed and those I observed. I conducted the majority of interviews, within university security services, with upper-level administrative or supervisory staff; whereas, I conducted most observations of frontline officers. This disjunction between who was interviewed and who was observed means that the findings of this research rely on what management said and what frontline officers did. Given that organizational position may influence which tools university security personnel draw upon (Gray and Silbey 2014), while I am confident that frontline university security personnel negotiate, represent, and demonstrate alignment with the frames of reference discussed within, it is possible that, in some instances, other frames of reference that frontline university security personnel draw upon to guide their actions remain hidden.

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<sup>11</sup> These allegations have both been shared with me and reported in the press.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the processes involved in this research including data collection, data analysis, issues related to site access, and limitations of this research. Of the ten universities/university security services contacted, five agreed to participate in this research. Data collection included interviews with fifty-six participants, with employees of university security services (41), residence services (4), enterprise risk management departments (4), other university departments (6), and a university students' union (1), and 246 hours of observations of university security personnel. Various documents obtained from universities and their university security services supplement these data. The analytical framework described in chapter one informed the inductive analyses of these data.

Although I was able to conduct research at five universities, the institutionalization of risk management presented roadblocks to research access due to organizational actors perceiving this research as risky. These roadblocks were presented by organizational gatekeepers within university security services, including management and unions, and gatekeepers from other university organizational units (e.g., human resources, ethics boards). These roadblocks can be understood to be informed by the negotiation of frames of reference from the logic of risk management as participants attempted to prevent economic and reputational harms to themselves and their organizations. That I encountered these risk management roadblocks within universities should give pause to critical researchers who, in the future, may have to contend with such roadblocks in their research and must be increasingly aware of the fact that their universities may impede their research should it be deemed too risky.

Last, in this chapter, I outlined personal and ethical challenges in this research and the limitations of this research. Concerning the limitations of this research, these include the lack of engagement with university students which may have problematized some of the activities of university security personnel and furthered understandings of university security personnel's legitimacy. However, since this thesis focuses on legitimation (as a process) rather than legitimacy (as a product), such limits do not affect the overall findings on university security personnel's legitimation work. These findings, however, are limited due to the possibility that there are disjunctions between those frames of reference relied upon by management and frontline level university security personnel.

Despite the research roadblocks and minor research limitations, I present the results of my analyses in the following chapters. I begin this presentation of data in the subsequent chapter, wherein I explore perceptions of university security personnel and their legitimation work involving negotiations and representations of their professional and organizational support role identities.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Not Just Wannabes and Rent-A-Cops: Legitimation Through Professionalism, Organizational Support, and University Values**

In this chapter, I examine university security personnel's subjective understandings of how members of their communities perceive them and how, to combat negative perceptions of their services, they engage in legitimation work (Thumala et al. 2011). This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I discuss how university security personnel understand others' perceptions of their services. I pay particular attention to those negative perceptions which are indicative of university security services' lacking the full support of members of their communities and how these perceptions indicate that university security personnel understand that they have not achieved legitimacy. Second, I examine how university security personnel engage in legitimation work through which they negotiate and represent alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. I explore their professional identity, which is negotiated and represented vis-à-vis their professional associations (Côté-Lussier 2013; Mulcahy and Ellison 2001; Thumala et al. 2011; Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby, Luscombe, et al. 2014), and their organizational support role identity, which is negotiated and represented through generic claims of professionalism and alignment with their universities' missions, goals, and values.

Through exploring university security personnel's understandings how others perceive them and legitimation work undertaken to combat negative perceptions, I also focus on the normative expectations that university security personnel serve the communal good (Côté-Lussier 2013; Loader and Walker 2001), including through caring for, rather than controlling, their communities (Allen 2017; Dupont 2014; Jacobsen 2015;

Micucci 1998; see also Chapters 5 and 6). I argue that university security personnel's internalized understandings of these normative frames of reference are provided by and revealed through others' negative perceptions. In turn, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through organizing and representing their work in a manner that aligns with these normative frames of reference. It is through organizing their work according to these identities that university security personnel align themselves with normative expectations as they translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field. Thus, while this discussion of legitimation work does not focus explicitly on the logic of risk management, such legitimation work is central to the translation of this logic. This is elaborated on in this chapter's conclusion.

#### **4.1 Perceptions of University Security Services**

University security personnel occupy positions within the stigmatized organizational field of private security (Thumala et al. 2011). As such, these personnel are often viewed negatively by members of their communities. Like the inept watchman and gangster stereotypes described by Livingstone and Hart (2003), university security personnel claim there are perceptions that they are “lazy” (University Security Interviews 9, 31) or “campus cowboys” (University Security Interview 18). University community members are also said to stereotype university security personnel due to the belief that they lack regulatory authority; security personnel claim that others perceive them as being a “token response unit” (University Security Interview 15), “toy cops” (University Security Interview 28), not “real police” (University Security Interview 23), “wannabe cops, [and] rent-a-cops” (University Security Interview 33; see also Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998; Patten et al. 2016; Wada et al. 2010; Wilson and Wilson 2015). In an

ironic twist, university security personnel also suggest that members of their communities view them negatively due to their use of their regulatory authority as they engage in enforcement practices (see Chapter 6). The director of Maple University's security officer service made the claim that university security personnel are sometimes viewed simply, and dismissively, as the parking "ticket writers". Other participants espoused claims that students view university security personnel as being overzealous in their enforcement of alcohol-use regulations (e.g., provincial liquor acts, universities residence, code of student behaviour, and alcohol policies). This perceived overzealousness results in the perception of their services as being the "beer police" (University Security Interview 30) who act as the "campus buzz kill" (University Security Interview 21).

University security personnel understand that not all university community members share the same perceptions of their services. Perceptions, particularly negative ones, are allegedly dependent on individuals' backgrounds or situational factors. Several participants articulated the belief that international students' perceptions of university security services are informed by frames of reference drawn from their cultural backgrounds:

Students say coming from other countries might not have the perception of police or security that I know I did growing up in Canada [...] There could be definitely that difference of feelings towards who to go to for help. Would you go to [university] security? Would you go to us in uniform on campus if [you] needed help? (University Security Interview 14)

People have pre-existing notions about security in general. And, depending on if they are international students, they will have a slightly different perspective on authority figures, especially if they come from back in Asia or Eastern Europe. (University Security Interview 11)

One security officer claimed that many of the international students at their university perceive university security personnel as the "authority figure [and] feel that sometimes

[security officers] have a bit more legal power than anybody else” (University Security Interview 7). While this may be of benefit in some instances (e.g., to gain compliance), a female peace officer suggested that such perceptions of authority may be problematic. She argued that many international students hold negative perceptions of university security personnel due to their coming from situations “where law enforcement is corrupt” and that some international students do not respect women in uniform due to their cultural backgrounds (University Security Interview 38).

University security personnel also claim that there is, in general, some antagonism towards their services from students. During observations at Maple University, there were numerous comments from security personnel that they are not respected by students. Based on my observations, it is understandable that officers hold this view; during fieldwork at this university, I witnessed students demonstrating a lack of respect, for example, through greeting university security personnel with sarcastic remarks. The view that students become antagonistic towards officers was reinforced by a member of Cedar University’s security officer service. This supervisor claimed that perceptions of their service are, in general, positive but that this “change[s] when the students have been drinking or they’re drunk” (University Security Interview 12). This supervisor was not the only one who espoused this view. The director of Maple University’s security service also indicated that this is such a problem that organizational practices have been re-organized to address this. Indeed, university security personnel at multiple universities were observed engaging in patrols of residences early in the night in order to develop better relationships with and gain the trust of students.

Members of university security services also revealed that they believe that faculty and staff sometimes view them negatively. Although it is university students who are popularly portrayed as being entitled, one peace officer claimed that it was not students but rather “academic staff and faculty staff and high-level staff [who] have a real sense of entitlement” (University Security Interview 38). Asked to give an example of this entitlement, this peace officer provided the following reply:

[T]his one guy who no longer works here, he was a recruit at the time, he pulled over this professor for a blatant traffic violation. Like a really unsafe traffic violation. [The peace officer acted] really professional, used verbal judo, super professional. And the [professor’s] wife, who is also a professor, just started beaking off: “You have no authority to give us these tickets. I’m going to have your job. I’m going to write your boss.” [P]eople who are high-level, like [vice-presidents and associate vice-presidents], when they catch wind of something they will automatically go to [complain to] our director [...] Or like [there is a] professor-alumnus [who] wants to shower naked in the communal showers in the public area of the swimming pool. Or swim whenever he wants to when the pool is closed and tells the staff to go fuck themselves [...] We have to go over there and escort a naked 90-year-old man out of there. (University Security Interview 38).

This was reiterated by another peace officer who stated that “[f]rom the staff [...] there’s a sense of entitlement, especially these deans or professors that have been [at the university] a long time” (University Security Interview 41).

University security personnel shared other sentiments about university staff and faculty members’ negative perceptions of their services. These negative views are said to be due to a disjunction between faculty and staff expectations and the actions of university security personnel. At Maple University, security officers are said to be viewed negatively, such as community members referring to them as the “parking police” (University Security Interview 21); this was attributed to “faculty [who] don’t have an understanding of what [university security officers] do in [the] department beyond writing tickets and locking buildings” (University Security Interview 13). A similar view

was shared by a member of Cedar University's security officer service. This participant claimed that staff and faculty generally have "a negative opinion only because they only see [university security officers] when there is a problem [or in the case that] their room is not unlocked [and] [t]hat will stick with them as their view of what security does and what security is: they're just lazy, they don't do anything" (University Security Interview 9).

Although university security personnel understand that community members have varying views of their services, the above claims suggest that those within their organizations/communities do not always support university security services. This lack of support threatens university security services' legitimacy and, by extension, can impede their ability to gain cooperation in managing risks (see Tyler 2006). Negative perceptions also both provide a basis for and inform the frames of reference that university security personnel must negotiate alignment with as they engage in legitimation work and translate the logic of risk management into the organizational fields of university post-secondary education and university security. Specifically, negative perceptions related to enforcement activities or expectations of what security personnel should do and how they should do it provide a basis for university security personnel's understandings of the expectation that they are to care for or protect, rather than simply control, members of their communities (Allen 2017; Dupont 2014; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998; see also Chapters 5 and 6).

#### **4.2 Seeking Acceptance through Professionalism, Organizational Support, and University Values**

In order to align with their communities' expectations that they are protected and not controlled, university security personnel engage in legitimation work (Thumala et al.

2011). This legitimation work involves their organizing their work lives through negotiations, demonstrations, and representations of their alignment with other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference: professionalism and organizational support. Through organizing their work around these other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference, university security personnel represent their desires to care for their communities and to downplay perceptions of control.

#### **4.2a Legitimation through Professional Associations**

Membership in professional associations, and the knowledge and expertise, accreditation, and certification which they provide, inform the legitimation work of university security personnel. Through drawing upon these professional associations they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with the culturally and organizationally acceptable frame of reference of professionalism or professional identity (Abbott 1991; Côté-Lussier 2013; Fournier 1999; Mulcahy and Ellison 2001; Scott 1995; Thumala et al. 2011; Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby, Luscombe, et al. 2014; Walby et al. 2016; Wilensky 1964). For university security services, there are three principal professional associations in which they are members: The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Agencies (IACLEA), and ASIS International (ASIS). University security services and their personnel also claim membership in the regional affiliates of these professional associations and other professional associations (e.g., Ontario Association of College and University Security Administrators, Campus Security Administrators Workshop, Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police).

Membership within professional associations does not require that organizations receive accreditation through professional associations; however, two of the five universities in this study have done so. Oak University's Campus Police Service attained accreditation from the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Agencies (IACLEA). This accreditation process involves a self-assessment, an on-site compliance visit, and the payment of annual fees. The director of this service described how, before being hired into that position, he was contracted to conduct a review of the service and how this led to their obtaining accreditation:

Part way through [the review process], I won't say I couldn't get the policies and procedures written to the extent that we could and we relied quite an extent on the ones that were already here over the years and then the ones from [the municipal police service]. We were getting a really good relationship with [the local police service]. And then a combination of those, drafting our own [policies and procedures]. Then at a point saying "Well we've gone about as far as we can here, we should get into an accreditation" [...] Recognizing the various unions that were involved and the number of companies that were accredited and what some of those were going through and I was involved in some of that. Well figuring that we should do the same thing and that's sort of evolved into the IACLEA standard.

In seeking out, obtaining, and talking about accreditation, members of this university security service engage in legitimation work as this process and status as an accredited agency provide the frames of reference through which they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent their professional identity. That this service sought accreditation due, in part, to their seeing other organizations within their organizational field do so underscores that accreditation is sought for recognition (i.e., legitimacy) within an organizational field and is indicative of the drive towards the adoption of institutionally isomorphic frames of reference (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 1983).

The second service which is accredited by a professional association is at Poplar University. Their Protective Services became accredited by The Commission on

Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). This accreditation was achieved under CALEA's Advanced Law Enforcement Accreditation program. The accreditation process involves a self-assessment in which the university security service compiles proof of compliance with CALEA standards and an assessment conducted by CALEA assessors. Accreditation also requires that the service pay a fee based upon the number of employees, the costs associated with the on-site assessment, and an annual continuation fee.

According to the individual responsible for, amongst other things, overseeing the accreditation process, "CALEA, in a nutshell, is an excellent quality assurance program [that] provides an opportunity to compare [Protective Services'] policies and procedures against Internationally recognized standards". As with accreditation at Oak University, the ability to compare themselves with other organizations signals that this organization is seeking legitimacy through adopting those policies and procedures that are isomorphic to those of the wider organizational fields of public policing and private security for which CALEA provides its accreditation services. This, according to the individual who oversees the accreditation process, provides their staff with "a lot of assurances that they're working for a professionally organized organization" due to their "knowing that [Protective Services'] policies are based on these International standards and they're not just some flippant [policies with] a lot of creativity". This sentiment about how adopting isomorphic frames of reference enables the adoption of a professional identity was echoed by another Protective Services' member who claimed:

[The] move towards being a CALEA certified organization, an accredited law enforcement agency, was a big goal of [the Protective Services' director] which he achieved with a lot of hard work from a lot of the members here. It's all about standards. Electronic equipment in cars. Specific types of radios and equipment.

We're using some standards set out within that CALEA organization, which we have to meet and that flows over to certain security measures within the department and within the organization as a whole. The influences, I think it's all the policies and procedures that have come about as a result of the CALEA [accreditation] has really set the tone for our organization as one of the more professional-type law enforcement or security agencies in terms of universities. This is probably the closest you might get to being in a police service without being a police service [...] I think reaching that level of professionalism only improves our ability to do our work. (University Security Interview 32)

This participant's claim that employment with their accredited service is "the closest you might get to being in a police service without being a police service" contributes to the professional identity of this services' members. Through the creation of rhetorical linkages between this service and public police services, which are associated with providing for the communal good (Côté-Lussier 2013; Loader and Walker 2001), this representation of the professionalism of this service is an act of symbolic borrowing. This symbolic borrowing enables this service to, through association, acquire "a reputation for competence and an image of respectability and honourability" (Bourdieu 1984:291; see also Thumala et al. 2011). Through symbolic borrowing, university security personnel give culturally acceptable meaning to their work and through claims-making represent this to others (see also Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014).

Although legitimation work vis-à-vis accreditation enables university security personnel to organize, reproduce, and provide meaning to their work, a key element of legitimation work is also representing a professional identity to others in their organizations/communities. At Poplar University, professional identity by way of accreditation is represented through frontline peace officers wearing nametags that have the CALEA logo on them. Likewise, the Campus Community Police vehicles at Oak University are adorned with a sizable decal that declares their services' accreditation.

Both services also represent their professional identity through actively promoting accreditation on their websites and through other means, including press releases. In doing so, university security personnel represent that they are acting in socially acceptable ways (i.e., professionally).

Although only these two security services' legitimation work involves participating in on-going accreditation processes does not mean that they are the only ones to organize their work lives around a professional identity vis-à-vis accreditation. A participant from Pine University's peace officer service explained that their service had once started the process of accreditation through IACLEA. This included bringing the service's standard operating procedures in line with "the IACLEA standard which is the worldwide association of [university] policing". Although this negotiation and demonstration of legitimacy did not result in members of this service being able to represent their legitimacy vis-à-vis professional accreditation, the participant suggested that not getting accredited is not something "to write off":

[W]e're following the standard for emergency management here. [We are following] the IACLEA standard even though we aren't accredited. [We are] going to follow that standard to have what they have put in place for us here. So when we do [go for accreditation], [we] will be compliant already. (University Security Interview 30)

Through becoming compliant with the standard, the activities of personnel within this service are organized around a professional identity and claims about meeting these standards can be used, as in the above quotation, to represent this professional identity to others. This legitimation work is also noteworthy as it suggests that negotiating and representing alignment with a professional identity is not dependent on accreditation (i.e., demonstrating a professional identity).

University security personnel also engage in legitimation work involving talk and actions around membership in other professional associations. This includes talk about membership in ASIS International (ASIS). ASIS offers a range of knowledge, education, standards, best practices, and certifications. One participant, whose role involves the development of policy for their university's security service, described how membership in ASIS provides university security services with information about best practices, which are used to negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with a professional identity:

[ASIS] is very technologically-driven but it also has a lot of best practices. For example, violence in the workplace is a huge area that they look at. They go across university organizations and business organizations and government organizations and come up with the best practices and they set forward guidelines as to how things should happen. It definitely is heavier on the security component of it, but the way they go about things and the processes and coming up with these best practices is very useful. It will often allow us when we go to one of our departments on campus trying to get them to buy into something; it has more of an academic side to it because of the research that [ASIS] has done. It helps with the sell. It helps with the buy-in from them. (Risk Management Unit Interview 4)

In relying on the research done by ASIS, university security personnel can demonstrate that they are organizing their work in culturally acceptable ways (i.e., professionally) and justify their practices to other university stakeholders. This legitimation work also occurs through university security personnel negotiating their professional identity alongside their universities' research missions (see below).

Legitimation work involving the negotiation, demonstration, and representation of professional identity vis-à-vis the information or knowledge provided by ASIS is also evinced in the claims of other university security personnel. During an interview with an access control/physical security coordinator, I noticed and asked about ASIS manuals that were on the bookshelf. Although this participant did not have membership in ASIS, he

represented alignment with a professional identity by claiming that he would be focusing further on the information in the manuals as “they have a lot of technical information [to] leverage”. Similarly, the director of one security officer service claimed he was gaining knowledge through ASIS:

ASIS, I am involved with. I have been for the past year. They’ve got some nice training courses but I don’t know when I’m supposed to do that. I haven’t got [...] a minute. I develop my own job every day but where am I supposed to find time to deal with this [...] I’ve thought about getting my CPP [Certified Protection Professional], which is a designation through them. I’m thinking, yeah I can get my CPP but I don’t physically think that I can maintain it. Does that make sense? [Interviewer: Yep]. There is a book. I won’t get the name right but it’s basically security and asset control. It’s an educational program. My commitment this year is I’ll get the books, I’ll read the books. If I get the time to write the test. You basically get the book and take the test and keep up the certification. I want the education; I don’t think I can give them the time commitment. But I’ll pay my dues to keep the information flowing. That’s how I’m probably ... I think more and more managers are getting that way. You can’t be the figurehead boss anymore. (University Security Interview 8)

This legitimization work involves the representation of professional identity through ASIS membership and the negotiation of the frames of reference provided through ASIS education. Further, both of these participants demonstrate how professional standards, education, and professional identity is negotiated and represented, even where there is a lack of achievement and possession of principal indicators of legitimacy (i.e., accreditation or certification; see Scott 1995; Thornton and Ocasio 2008).

#### **4.2b Organizational Support Role Legitimation Work**

Universities, like other organizations, have specified missions, goals, and values. The mission of universities, commonly referred to as their “academic mission”, involves the tripartite of research, education, and service/engagement (see Amit 2000; Birnbaum 2001). In pursuit of their missions, universities also set forth, in their strategic plans, a variety of goals. These include those related to the maintenance of university resources

(i.e., finances, physical property, information, and reputations; see Chapter 6 on economic harms) and the health, safety, and achievement/prosperity of university staff and students. Universities' missions and goals serve as frames of reference (i.e., normative expectations) that specify the ends to which university security personnel and other organizational actors should direct their activities toward (see Scott 1995; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). These missions and goals, along with professional identity (see above), constitute university security personnel's organizational support role identity. This identity is then negotiated, demonstrated, and represented, through legitimation work, as university security personnel organize and give meaning to their work. Further, given the content of these missions and goals, which are centred on organizational and community well-being, university security personnel align their work with expectations for care and the downplaying of control as they negotiate, demonstrate, and represent this identity.

As part of their legitimation work, university security personnel negotiate and represent their alignment with an organizational support role identity in numerous ways. First, university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent their organizational support role identity through indexing their professional identity:

Stats here are just ... It seems that everything goes on stats because we have to prove to the higher-ups, and there's quite a hierarchy here, that we're doing our jobs and that we're professional in what we do. (University Security Interview 12)

I think in general because we have such a diverse group here that work for us that they do try and maintain a high level of professionalism when they're out there in public. (University Security Interview 21)

We know if we make a mistake it could affect someone's life, depending on what the incident is. Because we are the first line that the public is dealing with we always have to make sure that we are on and professional and even if we are having

a bad day, which everyone is allowed to have, but we can't display that. (University Security Interview 2)

The above claims are largely devoid of substance (i.e., professionalism is undefined); when considered in light of other participants' claims, however, the above quotations illustrate how professionalism is linked with the organizational support role identity of university security personnel. The director of one university security service stated:

[A]s a professional [...] I see the critical role that campus security plays in facilitating the operations of the university as a whole. Somebody once said to me that "[university] security isn't mission critical, but it's critical to the mission." And that is very, very true. Without a professional security entity on campus [...] the university would not run as smoothly [...] There needs to be somebody on site that is responsible for making sure that everybody is looked after, just like there needs to be people on site to facilitate education [...] [W]e're that important. [We're dealing with] these really complex, detailed situations that nobody really knows about. That's really what the job is all about, making sure this place is safe and secure for the students, faculty and staff to come up here to provide educational services. So when I say that we are *academic support professionals* that's truly what we are [...] You have to do that in a manner that supports, always supports the academic process. I think the move that we are making towards changing our own mindsets within the department to being that of "you're here to support academics" [...] [Y]ou may be a security guard or you may be a security guard and you may have been a policeman for 30 years prior to coming here, but the bottom line is this is a completely different environment and you have to dedicate yourself to supporting academics. (University Security Interview 17 *emphasis added*).

A second director made a similar claim when they stated that their service had become much "more professional [through becoming] service driven" and began to organize their practices to better support of the needs of other organizational units (University Security Interview 8). As professionalism here is rhetorically tied to organizational support or service, this suggests that negotiations, representations, and demonstrations of both organizational support role and professional identities are inextricably linked.

Second, university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with organizational goals about the health, safety, and support of staff and students. These goals include:

Supportive and Healthy Work Environment: [Cedar University] will recognize, respect and value the essential contribution made by staff and faculty, and will seek to build and sustain a work environment that is equitable, supportive, rewarding and enjoyable. (Cedar Strategic Vision 2012)

At [Oak University], academic life can flourish in a setting that ensures space for work and contemplation, safety, and personal security. (Oak University Strategic Plan 2007)

[Maple University is] committed to [...] environments for work and study that are safe, supportive, inclusive and healthy and that foster mutual respect and civility, recognizing that people are our primary strength (Maple University Strategic Vision 2012)

That university security personnel organize and give meaning to their work vis-à-vis these goals is evinced in the following statements:

I see our role here at the university environment; our purpose is to keep the peace and maintain a good safe and secure environment for students to study [...] We are here to serve and protect them in order for the students to achieve [their goals] in a safe environment. That's our challenge. That's our mission, that's our purpose in our department. (University Security Interview 11)

[O]ur mission to make this a place where we can all live and study and work and feel safe and secure [...] (University Security Interview 14)

Obviously, our main focus here is to provide a safe working environment for staff, faculty and the students. So that's our main goal here. (University Security Interview 25)

These claims show how university security personnel represent their organizational support role identity through direct alignment with organizational goals of safety, security, and support.

University security personnel also engage in legitimation work when they represent their risk management practices as being in alignment with student support and well-being goals. For example, one university security administrator stated:

Student safety is always going to be paramount. Whether it's the need to have a camera there or a need to take some other steps in order to ensure that's a safe place. Whether it's better lighting, whatever is necessary. Better access, card access, control, whatever. We have work-safe programs. If someone is working alone that they can call and we will make sure they have escorts or whatever they need. Check in every so often to make sure they are okay. Those types of things. Personal safety will not be sacrificed under any circumstances. (University Security Interview 23)

Here, university security personnel align their practices with student safety goals through discussing their practices of proactive risk management (e.g., cameras, lighting, access control; see also Chapter 6). Similarly, university security personnel's promotion of risk management practices was invoked by another participant who stated that university security personnel "try to encourage [students] to have a safe environment for their education and that's part of our job" (University Security Interview 12). These representations suggest both that organizational goals about safety, security, and support are negotiated by and inform how university security personnel demonstrate their worth to their organizations and communities. Further, because these goals are about the well-being of their communities, university security personnel are representing their practices as being in alignment with expectations that they care for, or protect, members of their communities (see Allen 2017; Dupont 2014; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998).

Third, legitimation work is undertaken through negotiations and representations of an organizational support role identity vis-à-vis talk about key frontline practices, which university security personnel do not represent as being risk management, but which support their communities and the operations of their universities. One of the key

practices invoked in this legitimation work is the provision of general assistance, such as “giving information, giving directions” (University Security Interview 15). University security personnel’s organizational support role identity was also represented where one officer claimed they are part of “a service [unit] that has great value to the school [and security personnel act as] ambassadors for the[ir] school” (University Security Interview 21). The director of this same service stated, in no uncertain terms, that since the mid-1990s their service had the “goal of being customer service driven [and now] “Services” could be written down [each officers’] arm [...] because it’s service driven” (University Security Interview 8). These statements suggest that university security personnel negotiate their understandings of organizational goals about creating supportive spaces for work and study (see above) as they organize and give meaning to their work.

Fourth, legitimation work involves negotiating and representing alignment with organizational goals related to student recruitment, a task central to universities’ academic missions as without students there is no education. The negotiation and representation of alignment with these goals is evinced in one university security director’s claim that if their service did not work to ensure that their campus is “safe and [...] secure then there would be nobody coming [because] there are a lot of different [colleges and universities] out there” (University Security Interview 17). Another director claimed that the number one concern of the parents of incoming undergraduates, who exert influence over their children’s choice of university (Baker 2014; David et al. 2003; Maringe 2006), is “not what programs are available or what they serve in the cafeteria [but] how safe is it [...] to go to [the university] for the next four years?” and that university security personnel must “be able to say: ‘Yes, it is [safe]’ [And to] be able to

demonstrate it” (University Security Interview 31). The accuracy of the above statements about university security services’ role in student recruitment is questionable; numerous studies reveal that campus safety is not a top priority of students nor their parents (Coccarri and Javalgi 1995; Janosik 2004; Veloutsou, Lewis, and Paton 2004). However, these statements are important as they illustrate how university security personnel construct their organizational support role identity around goals not directly related to university security and risk management.

Fifth, relatedly, university security services’ legitimation work involves their negotiating, demonstrating, and representing alignment with universities’ goals about to students’ education, specifically those about experiential learning (i.e., learning outside of the classroom):

Emphasize the importance of broad experience outside the classroom for all our students, recognizing that these activities build the leadership capacity which characterizes [Oak University] graduates. (Oak University Strategic Plan 2007)

Experiential learning is a feature that differentiates [Maple University] from many [universities]. Co-operative education, practica, field schools, internship programs and a range of civic engagement opportunities enrich the learning environment, contributing to our students’ intellectual development and their civic-mindedness. These features of our educational experience will be enhanced in the years ahead. (Maple University Strategic Plan 2012)

University security services also demonstrate alignment with these frames of reference through their involvement in volunteer programs, including “Walk Safe”, student security patrol, and emergency response (i.e., first aid) teams. At Cedar University, under the direction of Safety and Risk Services, further opportunities for experiential learning were being developed to align the mission of university security services, and other units within that portfolio, with that of the University. In particular, this security service was looking towards collaborating with students under the guidance of faculty members on

security-related research (e.g., on emergency communications and video surveillance). Through integrating students into their services in these ways, university security personnel demonstrate that they care about the educational success of their communities and, through alignment with these normative expectations, university security personnel may be able to mitigate negative perceptions of their services.

Sixth, university security personnel negotiate and represent their organizational support role identity in relation to their universities' economic-oriented goals. These goals centre on the protection of various university resources, including those of the economic, infrastructural, informational, and reputational varieties. Given the intimate link with economic-oriented frames of reference of the logic of risk management (Bland 1999; Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Hacking 2003), these goals and legitimation work around them are discussed further in the following chapter. However, it is important to note here that an important facet of the legitimation work of university security personnel is the extent to which these goals are downplayed as university security personnel organize and give meaning to their work lives around the other elements of their organizational support role identity. It is through drawing upon these organizationally acceptable frames of reference that university security personnel provide their work lives with meanings more closely aligned with the communal good rather than with a private good. This enables their being able to demonstrate alignment with the expectation that they care for members of their communities.

Finally, university security personnel engage in legitimation work by negotiating, demonstrating, and representing their organizational support role identity vis-à-vis alignment with their organizations' core values. These core values include freedom of

expression, academic freedom, diversity, respect, dignity, fairness, ethical conduct, and equality. That these are values of universities is evinced in strategic planning documents. For examples, Poplar University's Vision Document (2009) states that the university values "integrity, fairness, and principles of ethical conduct built on the foundation of academic freedom, open inquiry, and the pursuit of truth; [and] a diverse, yet inclusive, dynamic collegial community" and Maple University's Strategic Plan (2012) reads:

The following fundamental values will inform all of our actions and are a prerequisite to fulfilling the purpose of the university: intellectual and ethical integrity[,] freedom of speech and freedom of inquiry [and] equal rights and dignity of all persons.

These values are also represented in the mandates and mission statements of university security services. Oak University's peace officer service claims that they are "a values-driven service based on dignity and respect [...] committed to [...] contributing to the safety, security and quality of life in the diverse University community". Similarly, Pine University's peace officer service claims their service "supports the academic mission of the University by creating a safe, secure and equitable environment for all members of the community" (Pine Campus Community Police Mandate) and Poplar University's peace officer service claims that their core values are "Integrity, Diversity, Human Dignity, Ethical Behavior" (2012 Annual Report).

In their legitimation work, university security personnel talk about (i.e., represent) their negotiations and demonstrations of alignment with various organizational values, including that of respect. When asked about how university security personnel attempt to gain compliance from various campus users, one security officer stated that they "try to treat faculty and staff, not just faculty and staff but everyone with the respect that they

deserve” (BC1Guard1). A similar sentiment was echoed in other security personnel’s statements:

Faculty can be really challenging. You’ve got groups, people who’ve got tenure and stuff like that so they do have the ability to do pretty much whatever they want. But again they are professionals, they are adults, so we don’t have problems with too many of them. The biggest problem we have with faculty would be is if rooms aren’t open on time, they get a little snarky about it. But usually treat them with respect and they’ll respect you back. (University Security Interview 9)

I can tell you that I’ve even had different circumstances, or different interactions with the same person where say in one circumstance the [person has] been arrested for being intoxicated or charged for being intoxicated; specifically, a liquor ticket is what I’m talking about. So they’re held for a brief moment and given a liquor ticket [...] Later that person will say lock themselves out of their room, they need some assistance getting back in. So you can have varied interactions with people on campus. I could generalize for you and suggest that on Friday nights the kids down in res[idence] see us as campus buzz kill. On some days there would be groups that would see us as the parking police and nobody likes parking tickets. What I would say is that I know that I go out there and I try and just treat people with respect and be friendly. (University Security Interview 21)

Similarly, during observations at Maple University, a security officer claimed that “most of the job is how you treat people [...] if you treat them with respect, they go away happy” (Maple University Field Notes). Other representations of negotiations and demonstrations of alignment with the value of respect were given by an upper-level peace officer who stated that university security personnel “have to react accordingly with different events [and] the big thing is being organized and having open communication and having a mutual respect for all persons involved” (University Security Interview 26). Likewise, an upper-level security officer claimed that they attempt to ensure they treat those below them in the organizational hierarchy “with dignity and respect” (University Security Interview 11).

A second university value that university security personnel negotiate, demonstrate, and represent alignment with through legitimation work is that of diversity. This value is

espoused in universities' strategic plans. For example, universities claim that they will strive to attract students from "traditionally under-represented groups" (Oak University Strategic Plan 2012; see also Maple University Strategic Plan 2012). These groups include Indigenous and rural students (Poplar University Vision Document 2009).<sup>12</sup> Moreover, efforts to internationalize universities through recruitment of international students, faculty, and staff are indexed to a commitment to diversity: "[Oak University] is also enriched by the cultural and personal diversity provided by an international faculty, student, and staff community" (Oak University Strategic Plan 2007). Alignment with this organizational value is represented in the claims-making of university security personnel. One security officer explained that the diversity of their university was one of the factors considered when they chose to leave their previous retail security job and to apply to work at the university (University Security Interview 13). Another security officer expounded on this value as they spoke of their embrace of the diversity of their university community:

Then we have people from all around the world that come here. There are different cultural groups, different religious groups. There are different [...] interest groups. People of [...] different gender identities [...] Then all of those things can combine [...] It can get very, very enmeshed [...] That makes it awesome. (University Security Interview 21)

Additionally, one university security administrator claimed that, in their day-to-day activities, officers need "to be objective and be sensitive to various cultures and perceptions" (University Security Interview 23). That diversity is a frame of reference to

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<sup>12</sup> The institutionalized nature of universities' goals is perfectly illustrated in the parallels between passages about diversity in the strategic plans of Maple and Oak Universities. The former University's strategic plan reads that the University will work towards "removing barriers and expanding opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups" and the latter reads that the University "seek[s] to recognize and remove the obstacles faced by traditionally under-represented groups".

be negotiated by university security personnel as they organize and give meaning to their work is evident in a security officer job description from Maple University. This job description states that security officers must have the “[a]bility to work effectively as a member of a team or alone in a culturally diverse client service oriented environment”.<sup>13</sup>

The final values that are negotiated, demonstrated, and represented through university security personnel’s legitimation work are contained under Section Two of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. These values are those of “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression” (2b) and “freedom of peaceful assembly” (2c). Although the applicability of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* varies across provinces (see Chapter 2), these values are replicated in universities’ code of student behaviour policies which are used by university security personnel in the management of student misconduct (see Chapter 6). In Ontario, Pine University’s code of student behaviour states that the University “is a place where freedom of expression is protected vigorously and uncompromisingly and where civility of expression in word and deed is the code of conduct”. Similarly, Oak University’s code states that it “shall [not] be construed to prohibit peaceful assemblies and demonstrations, lawful picketing, or to inhibit free speech as guaranteed by law”. In British Columbia, a clause in Maple University’s code of student behaviour states that it is not to be interpreted such that it “unreasonably limits demonstrations that are safe, non-violent and non-destructive; [or] unreasonably limits the free expression of ideas”. Cedar University’s code, as well as that of Poplar

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<sup>13</sup> That sexist and other problematic language was used by officers, as described in Chapter 3, does not negate that university security personnel negotiate, represent, and demonstrate alignment with the values of diversity and respect. Instead, that this language was used in the “backstage” (i.e., when not interacting with community members; see Goffman 1959), reinforces that institutional logics and their frames of reference are used as tools and that the selection of appropriate tools is situationally dependent (see Gray and Silbey 2014).

University, in Alberta, provide similar provisions that serve as frames of reference to be drawn upon by university security personnel.

University security personnel engage in legitimation work through making claims that they are in alignment with the above values. For university security personnel, alignment with these fundamental values is represented in their claims-making about their management of risks associated with campus protests and strikes held by students, staff, and non-affiliated persons (see also Chapter 6). For example, an officer at Oak University stated:

Obviously, our main focus here is to provide a safe working environment for staff, faculty and the students; so that's our main goal here. But [...] we're an institution of higher learning, so we don't want to restrict groups from expressing opinions as long as it's done appropriately. (University Security Interview 25)

Likewise, an officer in charge of special event security at one university stated in relation to on-campus protests that “[personnel] certainly recognize in our department [...] the right to freedom of expression [and we're] reaching out to these groups and saying we're not here to destroy anyone's right to free speech [...] but we say we want to make this a peaceful and successful event for you” (University Security Interview 41). *Charter* rights as organizational values were also raised in relation to the online behaviour of students; for example, students making social media posts with negative comments about faculty (University Security Interview 38; Fieldnotes).

University security personnel's negotiations and representations of their alignment with *Charter* values serve as legitimation work in two ways. First, this legitimation work represents university security personnel as organizing their practices around those values that are supported both within their universities and the wider culture. Alignment with these values, enshrined in law by the state, is particularly important within universities as,

regardless of whether they are legally understood to be acting on behalf of the state (and, by extension, the public), these organizations are culturally understood to be public and expected to serve the public good. Second, through rhetorically linking freedom of expression with the need to maintain a safe campus, university security personnel represent their practices that organize how protests occur as being in alignment with students' desires to be cared for; this, in turn, can assist in downplaying perceptions of control (see also Chapter 6).

### **4.3 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I discussed how university security personnel understand others' perceptions of their services and how, to address negative perceptions and to strive for legitimacy, university security personnel engage in legitimation work. This legitimation work involves negotiations, representations, and demonstrations of their professional and organizational support role identities. Concerning negative perceptions of university security personnel, these are claimed to principally arise from university security personnel's position in the stigmatized trade of private security and through disjunctions between community expectations and university security personnel's actions. Such negative perceptions are indicative of university security personnel lacking legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy can influence others' cooperation with university security personnel's attempts at managing risks. In order to overcome these perceptions and to seek legitimacy, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through negotiating and representing alignment with normative organizational and cultural expectations.

Two types of legitimation work were explored in this chapter. First, university security personnel were shown to engage in legitimation work around a professional identity. This legitimation work involves their negotiating, representing, and demonstrating their affiliations with professional associations (e.g., ASIS, CALEA, IACLEA). Through seeking out and talking about the accreditation and knowledge gained through membership in professional associations, university security personnel negotiate, represent, and demonstrate alignment with the normative expectation of professionalism, which is institutionalized within society and for policing security services. Not only do university security personnel rely on their professional role identity as part of their legitimation work but their adoption of professional standards also supports DiMaggio and Powell's (1991, 1983) isomorphism thesis. This drive towards adopting isomorphic policies and procedures may be understood to limit the potential for creating progressive change within the organizational field of university security. However, it is also possible that university security services positions within their professional networks may enable practices informed by universities' progressive values and university community members' normative expectations for care to be translated into the organizational fields of public policing and private security. The result of which could be progressive change within those fields.

Second, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through appeals to their organizational support role identity. This identity is related to their professional identity, as university security personnel make generic appeals to their professionalism (i.e., appeals which do not index their professional associations). Although many such appeals are without much substance, claims by other security personnel demonstrate the

links between the two identities. As part of their organizational support role identity, university security personnel negotiate, represent, and demonstrate their alignment with their organizations' academic missions, goals and values. Concerning universities' goals, university security personnel negotiate and represent alignment with those related to health and safety of community members and about the support of community members and their organizations (e.g., through supporting recruitment/retention, experiential learning, and academic success). And concerning universities' values, university security personnel represent their alignment with the values of respect, diversity, and freedom of expression. Through negotiating, representing, and demonstrating alignment with the above frames of reference, university security personnel are also attempting to align with their communities' expectations that they will be cared for/protected rather than being controlled.

In this chapter, I have focused extensively on legitimation work while making little explicit mention of frames of reference from the logic of risk management. This is not to suggest that these frames of reference are not negotiated as part of the legitimation work discussed above; rather, the minimal presence of risk management's frames of reference is attributable to the discussion in this chapter being largely removed from frontline practices of university security personnel. In the subsequent chapters, I examine how the logic of risk management is translated through practices which are negotiated, represented, and demonstrated as being in alignment with the culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference explored above.

## **Chapter 5**

### **University Security Services' Risk Portfolios: Understanding Risks through Legitimation Work**

University security personnel are tasked with managing myriad risks within their services' "risk portfolios" (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Dupont 2014). These include health and safety, criminal, protest, and substance use risks. In this chapter, I discuss how university security personnel understand these risks and the harms they pose by translating the logic of risk management into their organizational field. This translation occurs through legitimation work involving university security personnel's negotiations and representations of alignment with this logic and other organizationally acceptable frames of reference.

In this chapter, I focus on how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management through legitimation work in two ways. First, university security personnel translate the economic and community-oriented scripts of the logic of risk management. This translation occurs through legitimation work that represents these scripts as being in alignment with universities' missions and goals (i.e., organizational support role identity). Moreover, by focusing on harms to the communal good, university security personnel translate risk management's frames of reference to be in alignment with community members' expectations for care and the downplaying of control. Second, I examine how university security personnel translate the prudential principle of the logic of risk management through legitimation work. This involves university security personnel juxtaposing community members' personal responsibility for managing their risk of victimization against conceptions of risky outsiders. Through this legitimation work, university security personnel strive to provide culturally and organizationally

acceptable meaning to their risk management practices (i.e., as being in alignment with community members' expectations of care; see Chapter 6). Following this discussion, I provide a summary and reflection on this chapter's findings and link the legitimation work explored in this chapter, which rests largely on negotiations and representations, with university security personnel's legitimation work involving demonstrations of alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference.

### **5.1 Representing Risks, Harms, and Care**

University security personnel understand risks, and the harms they cause, through translating frames of reference from the logic of risk management by negotiating and representing alignment between this logic and other organizationally accepted frames of reference. First, from the logic of risk management, the frames of reference translated are those that direct attention to the need to protect organizational economic interests (see Bland 1999; Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Hacking 2003). These frames of reference are negotiated and represented alongside those organizational goals which direct attention to the protection of universities' economic interests (see Chapter 4). Second, university security personnel translate those risk management frames of reference which direct attention to the protection of the physical, mental, and economic well-being of communities (see Hier 2003; Levi 2000; Moore 2000; Rose 1998; Simon 1994; Sloan and Fisher 2011; Wood and Shearing 1998). These frames of reference are translated through their being negotiated and represented along with the organizationally acceptable frames of reference of university security personnel's organizational support role identity vis-à-vis missions and goals. It is through their engaging in more extensive representations of risk management's community-oriented scripts as being in alignment

with their organizational support role identity that university security personnel provide their work lives with culturally and organizationally acceptable meanings. Specifically, this allows university security personnel to represent themselves as being in alignment with expectations that they care for community members (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998) and, in turn, to downplay perceptions of control (Dupont 2014).

University security personnel translate the logic of risk management's economic well-being focused scripts through legitimation work indexed to their role in supporting their organizations achieve their missions and goals. This involves talking about their role in preventing organizational liability. This translation was represented by university security administrators who discussed preventing liability in instances of health and safety risks (i.e., trip and fall accidents). For example, one administrator claimed:

Risk management plays into our day-to-day constantly. The risk manager, I bring him into things [...] We want his direct insight into what he thinks of when it comes to risk and liability. For the guys, a lot of it is front line response when it comes to risk and liability where if [supervisors] go to a slip and fall, they're taking pictures, they're noting what kind of tread the person has [...] The contract guys have also been learning a lot more of that too, where they are starting to recognize big picture risk and liabilities. So the supervisors will let them take on a portion of it and let them fill in the blanks while they train them to be good investigators in that sense. I look at risk and liability more for the events that sort of thing.  
(University Security Interview 15)

Similarly, the director of one service represented himself as a "bean counter". This meant that he is concerned about protecting his organization against claims of liability by ensuring that, for trip-and-fall accidents, his frontline personnel identify "how they tripped, what they tripped over, and what we did so nobody else is going to trip over it".

University security personnel's role in supporting their organizations through mitigating liability is also represented in university security personnel's discussions of their understandings of other risks and liability. For examples, the director of one peace

officer service invoked their role in managing the liability posed by underage drinkers (University Security Interview 31). Likewise, an administrative-level peace officer discussed how their university updated their alcohol policies, which are enforced by university security personnel, because university administrators “are really concerned about liability” (University Security Interview 34). University security personnel also engage in legitimation work when making even broader claims about their role in preventing liability. The director of one service proclaimed that risk management is “all about protecting the university from liability” (University Security Interview 39) and a security officer supervisor claimed that at their university “everything [...] hinges on liability” (University Security Interview 12).

University security personnel also translate risk management’s economic-focused scripts through their legitimation work. This legitimation work entails their negotiations and representations of risks which, if not properly managed, they believe and claim will result in harms to universities economic resources by way of damage to universities’ property.<sup>14</sup> For example, the risk of vandalism, a criminal risk commonly associated with students’ alcohol use and managed by university security personnel, including through state and university regulations (see Chapter 6), is represented as harmful due to the damage it causes to universities’ property. When asked about the tools university security personnel rely on in their day to day work, one security supervisor used the example of “a group of rowdy youth that are intoxicated and [...] considering throwing golf balls at the library window” (University Security Interview 21). The director of one service made a

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<sup>14</sup> The direct link between property damage and universities’ economic well-being was revealed by several participants who discussed the costs of property damage. At one university there was a total of \$55,000 of damage to a residence building caused in one year (Residence Staff Interview 3) and a single act of vandalism at Oak University was estimated to have caused \$3,000 of damage (Oak University Fieldnotes).

similar link when explaining that members of their service lay code of student behaviour charges in instances where an individual “through alcoholism has broken doors or windows” (University Security Interview 39). Likewise, a security supervisor discussed how they had once observed, on video surveillance monitors, an intoxicated student breaking a window on campus. This participant claimed that this student later indicated that this event caused him to get his drinking under control (University Security Interview 9). As such, the participant represented the role of university security personnel in ensuring that students’ behaviour is managed so that they do not pose further risk of harm to their universities.

In the above examples, through legitimation work, university security personnel translate the logic of risk management’s scripts about their organizations’ economic well-being. Specifically, this legitimation work involves negotiations and representations of alignment with university security personnel’s organizational support role identities (see Chapter 4). In translating the logic of risk management’s economic-oriented scripts, university security personnel are representing how they support their organizations in achieving goals about economic sustainability. These include Cedar University’s claim that they seek “economic sustainability through [their] programs and operations” (Cedar University Strategic Plan) and Poplar University’s claim they will implement “best practices to achieve and maintain good stewardship of financial resources” (Poplar University Strategic Plan). Through the above legitimation work, university security personnel also translate the logic of risk management as being in alignment with organizational frames of reference (i.e., goals) related to university infrastructure. Such goals are invoked in Maple University’s Strategic Vision (2012) that claims “faculty,

staff and students, as well as visitors to our campus, depend on effective and efficient infrastructure [...] to ensure that they are able to achieve their goals”. It may very well be that university security personnel are not specifically or directly negotiating these frames of reference as part of their legitimation work. Rather, these frames of reference are inextricably linked to and negotiated through internalized scripts about university security personnel’s organizational support role identity, as these scripts are informed by frames of reference regarding the achievement of universities’ mission and goals (see Chapter 4).

In this legitimation work, whereby university security personnel translate risk management’s economic-oriented frames of reference, university security personnel represent alignment with frames of reference that are organizationally acceptable. These frames of reference are likely to be most accepted by university administrators who also organize their activities according to these frames of reference (Achampong 2010; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Power et al. 2009). However, university security personnel cannot rely only on the above types of legitimation work to give culturally and organizationally acceptable meanings to their work. This is due to the decrease in trust in organizations that can result from a focus on economic risk management (Hutter and Power 2005:6),

In order to provide their work with meanings that are more likely to be deemed acceptable by members of their communities, university security personnel engage in significant legitimation work around translating the community-oriented scripts of risk management. This involves their representations of risks they understand to cause harms to community members. For examples, university security personnel discussed harms from the health and safety risks posed by motor vehicle and trip and fall accidents:

[University security services are] involved [with] assessing personal safety issues around the physical plant. [We] monitor each and every incident. If there's a simple slip and fall where we have to request an ambulance because someone has injured themselves, we look at that from a risk management point of view. Was there a hazard that was preventable? The same set of circumstances and criteria that [the] health and safety [unit] would look at it because our role is to report to management any issue that may pose a risk to anyone, under any circumstances, not just of a criminal nature. (University Security Interview 23)

The only time we really get involved with other parking issues is if there is a matter requiring us to go, like personal safety, just simple documentation of an incident involving vehicles. (University Security Interview 7)

University security personnel also engage in legitimation work through negotiating and representing how they prevent harms to their communities vis-à-vis the prevention of workplace violence:

I've had a few issues where people were reluctant to come forward with information for whatever reason [due to] their personal backgrounds. Some issues surrounding required attendance to church, which may put them at exposure to an aggressor [but] I haven't had a lot of struggle getting through to people and making them understand that their personal safety is really important. (University Security Interview 15)

[T]oday, for instance, I have dealt with - I have two issues on the go right now of personal safety where somebody has come and scared [members of] the department. They haven't physically done anything but man they talked in an aggressive tone. (University Security Interview 8)

In discussing these incidents, university security personnel represent alignment with both their organizations' goals about community safety and with community members' expectations for protection against outside harm.

University security personnel also engage in this type of legitimation work through talking about risks of harm to the mental health of staff, faculty, and students. This legitimation work was engaged in by the director of one service who discussed how his service works to prevent harm to community members. He claimed that his service is a "major player" in their university's mental health strategy:

Mental health disorders. Mental health is huge. There are a lot of people suffering from mental health disorders on this campus: Students, faculty and staff members. We're a major player in the mental health strategy on our campus. We have to be able to go out and deal with these folks, make contact with these folks, refer them properly, document our interactions with them and work as a team member within the mental health strategy to make sure that this person is productive and gets the help they need. (University Security Interview 17)

This was echoed by an administrator at a peace officer service who stated that “mental health is a growing concern” which is to be managed by university security services (University Security Interview 23).

In legitimation work around mental health, persons experiencing distress related to their mental health are represented as posing a risk of harm both to themselves and the well-being of other university community members. For examples, a peace officer claimed that “sometimes students [...] become a danger to themselves or a danger to the community so they need to be removed from the university” (University Security Interview 37). Likewise, an administrator of a security officer service argued that “mental health issues are problematic [but] [w]e want to support them and we have to come up with a plan to keep everyone else safe and them safe as well” (University Security Interview 15). Through framing mental health issues as posing both a risk of harm to the individual experiencing mental health issues and the wider community, university security personnel represent actions taken to manage these risks as benefiting both the individual experiencing distress and their wider communities.

One significant way university security personnel translate community-oriented frames of reference is through legitimation work involving representations of causal links between students' substance use and community well-being. This includes legitimation work around representations of harms associated with physical violence. For examples,

one director raised the possibility of the code of student behaviour being used in an incident where someone may cause injury because as a result of their “alcoholism [they have] thrown a bottle at someone on the street” (University Security Interview 39). Similarly, a security officer suggested that during my observations I might observe security personnel addressing an incident where the potential for injury was present due to “a belligerently drunk person [being] in a fight at the pub” (University Security Interview 7). This was echoed by others who discussed how they attempt to manage risks of “drinking and fighting and craziness over in residence” (University Security Interview 15) and “fights up at the pub” (University Security Interview 5).

Translation-through-legitimation-work also involves representations of alcohol use as being a causal factor for self-inflicted illness or injury. The director of one service engaged in such legitimation work when claiming that responding to medical emergencies associated with alcohol use was one of the primary duties of their personnel (University Security Interview 8). Frontline university security personnel also engage in legitimation work which invoked those alcohol-related harms that they take steps to manage:

I go through the reports from [frontline personnel]. I go through the reports from the emergency response team, the medical team [...] to look at incidents where either one of them have had to be called because of over-consumption. And, you know, treatment nine times out of ten the students have to be taken to the hospital. (University Security Interview 29)

Alcohol would associate with [...] a lot of first aids [...] It certainly caught the attention of [the local emergency medical services] and [fire department] as well. Sometimes they would be shaking their heads that they would be coming for the third time that particular night and having to take someone to the hospital to get their stomach pumped. Not a good situation. (University Security Interview 33)

Another aspect is the drunks in residence. We have the OFA [occupational first aid], and we've had people that have passed out or are having a hard time or

difficult time and they're assisted by our first aid attendants. (University Security Interview 12)

A lot of our students when they get drunk they get too drunk to the point where they're passing out. That becomes a medical emergency. The ambulance has to be notified as well as the police because there's a possibility of death or alcohol poisoning which can also lead to death. (University Security Interview 19)

Another officer noted that, since a crackdown on public consumption and underage drinking at their university, their personnel had been helping more students through responding to "more intoxicated medical calls [...] in the residence" (University Security Interview 20).

University security personnel also translate the community-oriented scripts of risk management when they discuss work they undertake to prevent long-term health effects which they causally associate with alcohol use. Several participants, including two peace officers and residence staff, discussed how they are involved with programs that use alcohol risk assessment tools to provide students with information about the health effects of alcohol use (University Security Interview 29, 38; Residence Staff Interviews 1, 2; see also Moore 2000). University security personnel also noted that, despite the extent of alcohol misuse, there had been no deaths as a direct result of alcohol poisoning or other alcohol-induced problems (e.g., asphyxiation on one's vomit):

[T]here were a lot of drinking concerns [due to] a lot of binge drinking. One comment that was made when one of our officers did quite an extensive investigation about stuff there and some of the hazing that was going on [was] "I can't believe someone hasn't died yet." I would certainly agree with that statement (University Security Interview 41)

Knock on wood there haven't been serious incidents on our campus but there certainly have been in American universities where it's [resulted] in death. Alcohol is something that is on campus [...] the pub, Friday or Thursday or Wednesday tradition. That level of drinking is a concern. It always has been. (University Security Interview 14)

These were reinforced by the director of residence services at one university who stated that although they had some “close calls” in their close to twenty-years at the institution there had not been a death by alcohol poisoning in residence but that this would be “worst possible outcome” (Residence Staff Interview 2).

The translation of risk management through legitimation work also involves university security personnel representing the harms associated with other drugs, which they attempt to mitigate through their work. In discussing medical emergencies related to alcohol use, one security service director represented their staff as the “medical folks” who “need to know if there are [alcohol and] drugs on board” (University Security Interview 8). This director also discussed how at weekly marijuana rallies, where a group gathers on-campus to engage in marijuana activism, socialize, and smoke marijuana, his biggest concern would be “passing that joint from buddy to buddy” due to potential health effects. During observations, after getting a group of individuals who were suspected of smoking marijuana to cease their activities, one officer invoked how such work was to prevent the deleterious effects of marijuana use in saying, out of earshot of the group, “keep killing your brains” (Cedar University Fieldnotes). This legitimation work also involves claims-making about how university security personnel address harms to the wider community. For examples, one participant talked about how security personnel respond to calls and address the issue of “outdoor exposure” to second-hand marijuana smoke (University Security Interview 15). Similarly, a frontline security officer suggested that addressing marijuana use is done because it is “a safety issue; the smell itself can affect other people [and smoke] can set off fire alarms” (University Security Interview 19).

Finally, university security personnel translate community-oriented frames of reference as they negotiate their organizational support role identity to understand and represent risks of harm to students' academic success and their pursuit of future endeavours. First, substance use risks are represented as negatively affecting students' grades; for examples, a peace officer focused on both "the effects of alcohol on the body and on their grades" (University Security Interview 29) and a residence administrator claimed that the GPAs of students living in one problematic residence were lower than those of students living elsewhere (Residence Staff Interview 3). Officers at Oak University also made claims suggesting they are concerned about ensuring students' future success. This was evident when one peace officer referred to a student being questioned about alcohol-associated vandalism as "a pretty smart guy" and asked this student "why [he'd] throw it away on a drunken night?" (Oak University Fieldnotes). Second, university security personnel represent the links between committing criminal acts and the loss of opportunities. An administrative member of a peace officer service mentioned that criminal charges against students could "impact on their career" and, as such, university security personnel generally avoid laying charges (University Security Interview 24; see Chapter 6). Likewise, a management employee of a security officer service discussed a fraud case. He focused on how he went about telling the student that they "screwed up [and] I don't want you to do it again" and how, if they were charged, they "might get a criminal record. Then you're hooped: you can't go to the States, you can't do other stuff" (University Security Interview 18). Last, through legitimation work, protest risk management is indexed to university security personnel's role in protecting students from harms to students' academic achievement that can result from these events.

For example, through their disrupting the ability of students to “get to and from classes” (University Security Interview 15; see also Chapter 4).

How university security personnel translate frames of reference from the logic of risk management (i.e., scripts about the need to protect their organizations’ economic well-being and their communities’ well-being) and represent risks and harms is an important part of their legitimation work. University security personnel translate scripts regarding the protection of their organizations’ economic well-being as they negotiate and represent their organizational support role identity and, by extension, their organizations’ missions and goals. Focusing on how they protect their organizations from economic harm is important for university security personnel to gain the support of university administrators who are known to organize their activities according to these frames of reference (Achampong 2010; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Power et al. 2009).

Translating economic-oriented frames of reference alone, however, is not enough for university security personnel to represent themselves in organizationally acceptable ways. This is because representing risk management solely in the interest of universities’ economic interests contributes in community members losing trust in their universities (see Hutter and Power 2005:6), for example, due to this leading to perceptions of control. This lack of trust means that university security personnel also must translate other risk management frames of reference to align with the expectations that they care for/protect their communities (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998) and to assist in downplaying perceptions of control (Dupont 2014). University security personnel engage in a significant amount of legitimation work wherein they represent causal links between

the risks they attempt to manage and harms to members of their communities. This positions university security personnel's practices of risk management as being undertaken in the interest of the communal good (Côté-Lussier 2013; Loader and Walker 2001) and, by extension, as practices through which university security personnel care for rather than simply attempt to control their communities.

## **5.2 Representing Responsibility and Care**

University security personnel also translate, into their organizational field, the risk management principle of prudentialism (Garland 1997; O'Malley 1992) and its scripts regarding outsiders (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008). In translating these frames of reference, university security personnel understand and represent community members as lacking responsibility for preventing harms and community outsiders as being responsible for harms to their organizations and communities. This enables university security personnel to translate the logic of risk management into the university and university security organizational fields as they align with organizational goals and expectations of care. Specifically, this occurs through university security personnel negotiating understandings of and representing responsibility for harms vis-à-vis the juxtaposition of community members' (ir)responsibility with the threat of outsiders.

As university security personnel translate the prudential principle of the logic of risk management they represent university community members as having responsibility for harms suffered due to their not managing their risk of various forms of victimization. These include instances of health and safety risk victimization in the event of trip and fall and motor vehicle accidents. One peace officer service administrator represented trip-

and-fall accidents as being the result of individuals not making the responsible choice in wearing “wrong shoes” (University Security Interview 40). Likewise, an administrator for a security officer service discussed how personnel responding to trip-and-fall incidents place responsibility on the victim:

[At a trip-and-fall] the in-house security supervisor will be looking around and saying: “There’s a handrail here, were you using the handrail on the way down? [...] No you weren’t. So running in stiletto heels, listening to your iPod, didn’t grab the handrail, and then it’s snowing out”.

This administrator also explained that, in the case of motor vehicle accidents that occur in the winter, university security personnel will attempt to assign responsibility on drivers, for example through checking to “make sure the tire tread was okay or it wasn’t [and for] [s]now tires versus all seasons” (University Security Interview 15).

University security personnel also translate the prudential principle through negotiating and representing their understandings of the need for students to make responsible choices around substance use and related activities. This is evinced in one peace officer’s description of how university students will post videos and photos of their alcohol-induced “antics” online:

They like to film it right? You’ve seen videos on YouTube and you’re like, “This is hilarious. I can’t believe this person is doing this”. They like to film all their silly antics and put it online [...] I think a lot of people, especially the young student leaders, like 18, 19, 20, they don’t realize that those [things they put online] are now out there forever. Anyone can see them. Even if I’m not a friend, if I’m a friend of a friend, I can look at all your photos on your [Facebook]. I can print off your wall. I can read your Twitter. Things like that. It’s learning. *It’s the first time you’re away from home, with alcohol, with adult choices. It’s just learning.* (University Security Interview 38 *emphasis added*)

Here, in referring to so-called “adult choices”, the peace officer is suggesting that students are not as responsible as they are expected to be with respect to their alcohol use and other activities that have been causally associated with this risky behaviour. Another

peace officer raised students' "irresponsible" alcohol-use choices when discussing the discretion afforded to law enforcement personnel:

[O]bviously the courts have ruled that discretion is a component of law enforcement, an afforded legal ability of law enforcement officers. And I think it's good at a university level in that we do see from time to time again kids who are ordinarily good kids who [think] "It's university let's party, let's have fun". And they make poor choices that get them in trouble. (University Security Interview 41)

The translation of the prudential principle by university security personnel was also revealed during observations when they made references that represented students as needing to take more responsibility for their substance use. For examples, a peace officer told two first-year students caught with marijuana and paraphernalia to "start making better choices" and a security officer's comment, out of earshot of students, to "keep killing your brains" with marijuana use are both evocative of the prudential principle.

The translation of the prudential principle is also evinced where community members are represented as bearing responsibility for sexual assault victimization. One member of a peace officer service discussed an alcohol education session that their service refers students to. In these sessions, student-participants learn about "the effects of alcohol on the body and on their grades and maybe unwanted sex and all the fallout from that" (University Security Interview 29). Another member of a university security service also discussed the potential for non-consensual sexual activities that constitute sexual assault:

I think in [residence] the alcohol is a concern. Again, first time away from home, peer pressure. You met a nice guy. It's only been ten days. You think you know each other super, super well. You go to a party together. You are both drinking and you wake up the next day and you regret something having happened. You don't quite know if something happened but you regret it. Was it acquaintance assault? Was it not? (University Security Interview 14)

In both of these instances, there is an indication that university security personnel are negotiating not only the logic of risk management but also cultural rape myths which have been found to be supported amongst university security personnel (see Smith, Wilkes, and Bouffard 2016).

Theft victimization is one of the principal risks for which university security personnel translate the prudential principle. In these instances, university security personnel translate this principle through placing responsibility for theft prevention on community members. This occurs through suggestions that students are not responsible for their property:

[S]tudents, especially at certain times of the year - into exams - you might say they're a little brain-dead in that they're maybe not as responsible with their own private property as they should be. We try to drill the importance of controlling your property but we have had a rash of thefts of [...] things that are considered easy targets: cell phones, laptops. (University Security Interview 25)

You're not in this lovely safety bubble that people may feel they are in. Things can happen. We're in a big area. It's a lot like travelling - if you wouldn't leave your things unattended in the airport - why would you leave them unattended in the library when you're going to get a chocolate bar? Because that we see all the time. Laptop, brand new expensive calculator, everything in your knapsack gone in 90 seconds because you've just gone to the vending machine. [We also see students] leaving their dorm door [unlocked] to go watch a half an hour show in the lounge. They come back and their wallet full of cash, their brand new laptop, on their bed, beside their bed, gone. (University Security Interview 14).

Interestingly, students' lack of responsibility for their possessions was represented as resulting from feelings of relative safety:

[A] lot of [Chinese] students think it's safe [at the university] and they never run into - they come here and they feel relaxed. They don't feel like I have to put my wallet in my front pocket instead of the back because it won't get crowded and stolen like in China if you go through a train station or in a public place. Here they feel better and they tend to leave laptops in [the campus mall] or the library. (University Security Interview 36)

Most students I've found in [commercial/student residence building] don't lock their doors. I find that strange. Inside the units, they share a room and they have three more units. They'll lock their bedroom door but in their kitchen area and common area is laptops and phones and purses left. I'm like "Why wouldn't you lock your door?" "Well, I feel safe." (University Security Interview 37)

Representing students as lacking responsibility and suggesting that this is the result of feelings of relative safety enables university security personnel to translate the prudential principle into their organizational field. This translation is legitimation work. First, combined with their practices of risk management (see Chapter 6), these claims represent university security personnel as concerned about students' well-being; this is in alignment with organizational goals and students' expectations for care. Second, relatedly, since university security personnel address campus safety issues, the assertion that students feel safe represents university security personnel as being viewed as caring for their communities, while also allowing for university security personnel to absolve themselves from blame should harms occur. This allows university security personnel to understand and represent themselves as exercising care, even if they fail to manage risks.

To be sure, in the above instances, representing university community members as responsible for harms suffered is victim blaming (see Almond and Gray 2017; Gray 2009, 2006; Gray and Silbey 2014). Considered in isolation, this appears out of line with expectations that university security personnel care for members of their communities. However, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through these representations. In doing so, they give organizationally acceptable meaning to their work in two key ways.

First, through representing community members as lacking responsibility, as per the prudential principle, university security personnel negotiate and represent alignment

with their organizational support role identity and thereby their organizations' missions and goals. Specifically, claiming that community members are responsible for their victimization necessarily involves the negotiation and representation of university security personnel's alignment with goals related to community health and safety. At the same time, in representing how they attempt to mitigate organizational liability through their practices, university security personnel align with their organizations' economic-oriented goals. University security personnel are representing both caring for their organizations and their communities and thereby organizing and giving multiple acceptable meanings to their work lives.

Second, this legitimation work cannot be separated from representations of risky outsiders, which are translated from the logic of risk management. Consistent with the prudential principle and risk management scripts about risky outsiders (see Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008), university security personnel contrast outsiders with legitimate community members:

People come to campus that are legitimate users and there are the ones that come here for [another] reason. If they can go through the library and blend in as a student and see a laptop unattended, they are taking it. (University Security Interview 37)

[T]he persons who are here for nefarious reasons, the people who should not be on campus, they are easy to pick out. You know yourself [that within a university] people are busy, they're going about their own business. They're not looking around. They're too busy going about their legitimate business. People who come here for the wrong reasons don't look like that at all. They can dress like you and I, but they're not paying attention to their business, they're paying attention to everyone else's business. (University Security Interview 39)

The delineation of outsiders from the campus community was also represented by one peace officer who spoke of how "being in close proximity to the downtown [...] attract[s]

certain elements from the city that aren't actually associated to the university but they'll come up here because they figure it's a target rich environment" (University Security Interview 25). Likewise, a university security director claimed that past problems at the campus pub were attributable to "people from downtown [who were] beating up the back door" (University Security Interview 8).

University security personnel also represent (ex)partners of university staff as risky outsiders. This is evinced in one university security officer's discussion of how, the day following the research interview, they would be having a meeting with a staff member who was "having major issues with her husband who's abusive [and] concerned that he's going to come on campus and hurt her" (University Security Interview 13). Similarly, an administrative member of a peace officer service discussed how they had worked on a safety plan for a university staff member where "there is a real possibility [that a staff member's abuser] is going to come [to campus] because he's been here before and knows where she works" (University Security Interview 24).

Through translating scripts about risky outsiders as having responsibility for harms to university community members, university security personnel are engaged in legitimation work. Specifically, university security personnel represent alignment with their organizational support role identity and their organizations' staff and student well-being goals. That these scripts are negotiated alongside those of risk management is evinced in the following representations of the work of university security personnel:

[University security services] protect [students] from outsiders that approach our campus community that will jeopardize the students' safety in achieving their studies. Whether it be vagrants, thieves or gangs ... we're here to protect the students from that outside environment [...] the trouble that happens [...] it's usually outsiders from the campus community. (University Security Interview 11)

This counter-posing of risky outsiders to representations of community responsibility enables university security personnel to mitigate allegations of victim blaming through representing their actions as being organized around protecting community members from outside harms (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015).

### **5.3 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have examined how university security personnel engage in legitimation work as they negotiate and represent frames of reference to translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field. First, I demonstrated how university security personnel translate the economic and community-oriented scripts of the logic of risk management in order to represent risks in relation to harms to their organizations and communities. In translating the economic scripts of risk management, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through which they organize and represent their work in organizationally and culturally acceptable ways. This legitimation work includes university security personnel representing their alignment with organizational concerns over liability and economic sustainability and, thereby, also representing to administrative stakeholders that their services are not a burden to their organizations' financial bottom-lines (see Challinger 2006; Micucci 1998). This, however, can reduce community trust (Hutter and Power 2005:6). In attempts to gain their communities' trust, university security personnel also translate the community-oriented scripts of the logic of risk management, through legitimation work, to organize and represent their alignment with their organizations' community well-being goals, provincial workplace health and safety legislation, their communities' expectations of care, and the expectation that they downplay perceptions of control.

Second, I explored how university security personnel translate the prudential principle and risk management scripts regarding risky outsiders into their organizational field. In translating the prudential principle, university security personnel place responsibility for victimization on members of their communities. Through this legitimation work, university security personnel organize around and represent alignment with their organization's goals about preventing economic harm vis-à-vis mitigating organizational liability. However, translating the prudential principle can also constitute victim blaming. Overcoming this issue requires that university security personnel also translate risk management scripts regarding risky outsiders. Juxtaposing the individualizing discourses of personal responsibility for risk management against the collectivizing discourse, which represent the risky outsiders to be avoided, serves as legitimation work. This occurs due to these representations of risk blur the boundaries of morality and immorality (Hier 2008; Hunt 1999, 2003). In doing so, university security personnel reject the explicitly moralized discourse of *in loco parentis*, which resulted in universities exercising parental control over students (see Cameron 2001; Gidney 2007, 2001; Lewis 1983; Simon 1994). This rejection of moralized discourses enables university security personnel to represent their alignment with community members' expectations of protection from harm and to downplay perceptions of control.

University security personnel's legitimation work around representations of harm and responsibility cannot be separated from practices of risk management. In the following chapter, I explore how university security personnel engage in practices of risk management to govern at a distance (see Garland 1997; Gray and Salole 2006; Rose 1998; Rose and Miller 1992). This involves university security personnel attempting to

“creat[e] the conditions for responsible choice” (Simon 1994:32; see Chapter 6) so that they can demonstrate care for their communities and mitigate perceptions of control.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Risk Management: Protection and Control**

University security personnel engage in many tasks through which they attempt to support their universities and communities. As members of their universities' so-called "catchall" (University Security Interview 21), university security personnel become "involved in just about everything on campus" (University Security Interview 10); their activities can include everything from delivering newspapers to addressing issues with campus wildlife and, as part of their organizational support role, university security personnel also engage in practices of risk management. In this chapter, I explore how university security personnel engage in risk management practices in a manner through which they attempt to align with organizationally acceptable frames of reference.

This chapter proceeds in four substantive sections. First, I explore how university security personnel translate the proactive and prudential principles of the logic of risk management as they engage in safety and security promotional practices. Second, I examine how frontline university security personnel engage in the management of health and safety, criminal, and protests risks through practices that are not dependent on their enforcement of state and university regulations. Third, I address how university security personnel engage in practices involving the use of their legal authority. Fourth, I discuss how university security personnel attempt to manage harms posed by outsiders. In each section, I focus on how, through adopting these specific practices, university security personnel engage in legitimation work to demonstrate that their work is organized around culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. This chapter concludes by way of a brief synthesizing discussion.

## **6.1 Promoting Responsibility**

University security services engage in a variety of promotional (or advertising) practices in their attempts to “engrain safety and security as part of the campus culture [with] responsibility [put onto] the community” (University Security Interview 17). Promotional practices include the posting of material to university security services’ websites and social media pages, the production of pamphlets given out to university community members, and the display of information on television screens on campus. University security personnel also promote similar information to community members through personal safety talks. These risk management practices constitute legitimation work; university security personnel organize their work through their negotiations and demonstrations of alignment with the proactive and prudential principles of risk management and other culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference. Although university security services’ promotional practices target other risks (e.g., motor vehicle accidents, workplace safety), in what follows, I focus on the translation of risk management and university security personnel’s legitimation through focusing on two principal risks: theft and sexual assault.

### **6.1a Promoting Responsibility for Preventing Thefts**

A common focus of university security services’ promotional activities is theft victimization. For examples, the website of Maple University’s security officer service has a “Crime/Theft prevention” section that encourages the reporting of crimes. This section includes the following passage:

Students, staff, faculty and visitors are encouraged to take an active role in order to minimize crime and ensure a safe environment for all.  
If you see it...Why not report it? 40,000 eyes are watching out for your well-being.

Similarly, Oak University's Campus Police website, under the "Theft Prevention" section, reads:

**Preventing Theft on Campus is a Community Effort** Thousands of dollars worth of thefts from the university community are reported annually to Campus Police. Most of these losses are not recoverable through insurance. Can we afford these losses? Our Police Service strives to keep our community safe and secure but cannot succeed without your help.

Various tips accompany this message, including to "not leave your laptop [...] unattended" and to "[r]eport any suspicious persons [...] to Campus Police".

Poplar University's peace officer service takes theft prevention promotions one step further with their "Don't Feed the Thieves" campaign. This advertising campaign involves three key components: a poster campaign, website, and video. First, brightly coloured posters are displayed throughout the campus. These posters feature the image of a raccoon holding a backpack; over the raccoon is the widely recognized symbol for "prohibition" (i.e., a red circle with a diagonal line running through it). Accompanying this image is the tagline "DON'T FEED THE THIEVES" in large text and, in smaller text, the instructions to "KEEP AN EYE ON YOUR THINGS OR LOCK THEM SECURELY". Echoing the messages on other university security websites, in a less prominent text the posters read "Report suspicious behaviour to [Poplar University] Protective Services". This is followed by their phone number and website link.

On the "Don't Feed the Thieves" webpage, community members are warned that "Thieves are on the watch for opportunities to grab our laptops, wallets and purses, cash, backpacks, [...] and any other portable, valuable items we don't want to lose". The website then offers suggestions "To help keep you and your stuff together". These include:

**Don't** leave your things unattended – even when you only plan a quick trip to the washroom.

**Do** take your things with you or leave them in the care of a friend or other trusted person (emphasis in original)

Also provided are tips on how to prevent oneself from becoming the victim of locker, office, car, and bike thefts.

Displayed on the webpage for the “Don't Feed the Thieves” campaign are calls for the reporting of suspicious individuals and activities to this university security service.

This is followed by the claims that such reporting “make[s] a HUGE difference in controlling crime” and that “most calls made based on intuition are well founded”.

According to the webpage:

Suspicious people are people you do not recognize that:

- Enter rooms, offices, labs, with no apparent business to transact
- Solicit, ask for donations, etc.
- Sleep on chairs, furniture or the floor
- Carry weapons such as knives or guns
- Tamper with locks on doors, windows, bicycles and vehicles
- Carry unwrapped property at unusual hours
- Carry suspicious items such as crowbars, screwdrivers or bolt cutters
- More concerned with who is around them than what they are working on or looking for
- Refuse help if you ask to assist them
- Appear scared, nervous or anxious

These characteristics are reinforced in the “Don't Feed the Thieves” video; before he steals a laptop, the thief is portrayed fidgeting with his ear (i.e., “Appear[s] scared, nervous or anxious”) and is staring intently at the soon-to-be-victim (i.e., “More concerned with who is around them than what they are working on or looking for”). This portrayal is consistent with university security personnel's representations that they work to protect their communities from risky outsiders (see Chapter 5). The characterizations of suspicious persons in this campaign are notable in that they define the danger. This is

in contrast to other universities' messages which "simply insinuate[] danger" (Petersen and Tjalve 2013:11), including Maple University's vague question of "[i]f you see it...why not report it?" and Oak University's call to "[b]e aware of suspicious or unauthorized persons in your area" (Oak University Campus Community Police Theft Prevention Webpage),.

The above practices constitute the translation of risk management through legitimation work. Specifically, these practices are organized around the prudential and proactive principles of risk management, with university community members being called upon to take responsibility for proactively managing their risk of theft victimization. University security personnel translate the aforementioned frames of reference through demonstrating alignment with organizational goals about safety and security and expectations that they care for members of their communities. University security personnel accomplish this through focusing on crimes that are represented as harmful to community members and, thereby, representing these practices in alignment with organizational goals about community well-being and expectations for care (see Chapters 4, 5). Relatedly, these practices allow university security personnel to "govern at a distance" (Garland 1997; Gray and Salole 2006; Rose 2000; Rose and Miller 1992); with responsabilized community members being expected to take a more active role in their own risk management, university security personnel are attempting to manage risks proactively and without having to engage in enforcement activities. This allows university security personnel to organize their work in a manner that downplays perceptions of control (i.e., through limiting face-to-face practices of risk management; see below).

### 6.1b Promoting Responsibility for Preventing Sexual Assault

University security services also engage in practices through which they promote the need for community members to take responsibility for managing the risk of sexual assaults (or sexualized violence). Through these practices, university security personnel place responsibility for sexual assaults, to a large extent, on victims. At Cedar University, tips for “How best to avoid Acquaintance Sexual Assault” are advertised on their website and in a pamphlet that is provided to staff and available to others. These tips include to “[b]e aware of your surroundings” and “[r]efrain from excessive use of alcohol and other drugs, especially if you are around people you do not know or trust”. Statements about preventing sexual assault through limiting alcohol use and protecting oneself from illicit substances commonly referred to as “date rape” drugs (e.g., Rohypnol, GHB, Ketamine) are also found in these promotional activities:

Be cautious about taking unsealed drinks. A growing number of sexual assailants give their targets drugged drinks. (Maple University Website)

Whether you are out at a bar, or at someone’s house for a small get together, remember you can become a victim. When your back is turned, all it takes is for someone to place a small amount of a “date rape drug” in your drink to get you in the position that they want. (Oak University Dating Safety PDF)

The Oak University Dating Safety PDF also includes an unattributed quote, which appears to be from a sexual assault survivor; it reads:

“While I was gone to the washroom, he said he would watch my drink. I trusted him, I have seen him around campus a lot, and he seemed nice. For some reason that night, after only one drink I felt weird, and really tired...I don’t even remember leaving the bar. When I woke up, I was in his bed...he told me I wanted to do it.”

This was accompanied, on the same page, with a clipart image representing a woman consuming an alcoholic beverage.

These promotional practices, which attempt to get community members to take responsibility for reducing their victimization risk, are demonstrative of university security personnel organizing their risk management practices in alignment with organizationally acceptable frames of reference. Specifically, promoting ways in which individuals can prevent victimization is consistent with an alignment with organizational goals about community well-being (see Chapter 4). University security personnel, however, have more difficulty in demonstrating that they are caring for all community members through engaging in these promotional practices. This is due to these practices reinforcing gendered constructions of sexual assault risks through focusing extensively, if not exclusively, on the responsibility of female victims (see also Moore and Valverde 2000). Thus, while university security personnel may be able to understand these practices as consistent with their communities' desires for care, it is possible that many others will perceive these practices as placing an undue burden on potential victims and therefore as not demonstrating care.

To overcome assertions of victim blaming and to better demonstrate alignment with expectations of care, in these promotions university security services also underscore that sexual assault victims are *not* to be blamed for their victimization:

Believe in yourself. What happened to you was wrong, and you are not to blame.  
(Stay Safe at [Cedar University])

If you are sexually assaulted, remember that you are not alone and are not to blame.  
(Oak University Campus Community Police Website)

If you are sexually assaulted [...] Always remember, someone else did it to you.  
What has happened to you is NOT your fault! (Maple University Campus Security Website)

Relatedly, these promotions place some responsibility on would-be offenders. The website of Maple University lists under the heading “Don’t be an offender” several tips, including “[d]on’t ASSUME. It is NEVER okay to force sex on someone”, “[l]isten to and respect the person”, and to “[r]ecognize that being drunk is no excuse”. Likewise, Oak University’s Dating Safety PDF has “Advice for guys”, such as “[i]f the response you get is not clear, don’t go any further”, and “[k]eep in mind that drugs and alcohol can cloud your judgment”. These two strategies constitute legitimation work as they serve to help circumvent issues associated with victim blaming and demonstrate that university security personnel are attempting to care for the well-being of their communities and, through governing at a distance they may downplay perceptions of control.

## **6.2 Managing Risks with Care**

In addition to the above practices through which they govern at a distance, university security personnel engage in many safety and security practices wherein they are visible to and interact with their communities. These frontline activities include identifying and addressing hazards, providing medical aid, conducting building checks and access control, and carrying out investigations. Through these practices, in which university security personnel do not rely on their legal powers, university security personnel translate the logic of risk management and, through legitimation work, attempt to demonstrate alignment with their understandings of their organizational support role, the desires of their communities to be protected, and the expectation that they downplay perceptions of control.

### 6.2a Managing Health and Safety Risks with Care

With various factors, such as motor vehicle and pedestrian traffic, being understood as contributing to the risk of personal injury and university liability due to accidents (see Chapter 5), frontline university security personnel organize their work to proactively manage these risks. For example, university security personnel engage in patrols of campus in which they are on the constant lookout for potential trip and fall hazards:

[I]t also comes down to being more vigilant for everyday, common occurrences. Water leaking from the ceiling, as the university ages and the infrastructure starts to crumble a little bit, we come up with water leaks; that's a slip and fall hazard. We train our officers to not ignore that. Call in the cleaning services to clean it up, but in the interim standby until the janitor shows up or grab something to mop it up, then mop it up, or put some sort of marker to say there's a hazard. This is just part of the culture that we instil in our officers. If there's garbage on the floor or newspaper on the floor, there are all sorts of campus newspapers or other documents that float around, well pick that stuff up because someone could slip and fall on that. (University Security Interview 17)

Through these practices, university security personnel attempt to prevent harms to their universities and communities. However, these practices are not successful at preventing all risks. As such, where failures to manage risks occur, university security personnel organize their responses in a manner that is also oriented toward proactively preventing future harms. For example, a security officer supervisor explained the measures taken following a trip-and-fall accident to ensure a similar event would not occur:

[O]ne of our main goals over here is to make sure that everything is safe, that nobody can get hurt [...] I'll give you an example, last Friday night, there's a wooden ramp behind the classroom block over there. It wasn't freezing out but it was damp. It's a horrible classroom; when they built that ramp they used treated cedar or something. When it got wet it was like sliding down ice and a cleaner fell and hurt his back and banged his head pretty good. Our job is to make sure nobody else [falls]. This happened on a Friday night. We cordoned it off. We put up danger tape. We put up enough tape that nobody can get through it. We make sure the report goes in. That particular incident, I had my dispatcher call up the [occupational health and safety director] at home to let him know this has

happened. Do something on Monday. That's how we make sure to try to cut down the insurance risks on campus. (University Security Interview 10)

Through these practices of risk management, university security personnel negotiate and attempt to demonstrate alignment with the expectation that they protect or care for community members (i.e., by removing hazards). And, as a security supervisor explained, through creating a "paper flow" (University Security Interview 12) university security personnel demonstrate that they are helping their organizations achieve their goals through protecting them against liability claims.

University security personnel's negotiations of alignment with expectations that they protect their communities are also demonstrated through how they organize their responses to incidents deemed trivial or otherwise not theirs to address. An Oak University special constable was called to the report of a smell of "gas" within one campus building. This officer sarcastically referred to this incident as "thrilling stuff" and claimed that responding to these incidents was the organizational duty of members of the fire safety unit. Yet, he responded to this incident, met with the complainant, identified the issue (as industrial adhesive remover), and dispatched facilities management to address the issue by taking precautions to prevent a similar situation from occurring in the future. That is, rather than choosing the alternative of notifying the fire safety unit and absolving himself of the duty of attending to the incident, this officer organized his response in a manner in which he could demonstrate care for the complainant.

In another incident, a Maple University security officer was dispatched to provide medical assistance for a "scraped foot". On the way to the incident, the security officer commented that they "sometimes [...] think this is a kindergarten, not a university", directly acknowledging students' expectations that university security personnel provide

care. Consistent with these expectations, the officer who had been providing an additional security presence at the university bookstore, due to the increased risk of textbook thefts, promptly responded, provided basic first aid, and, because the injury was more serious than first reported, transported the individual to the on-campus health clinic for additional medical care.

University security personnel also demonstrate alignment with expectations for care through how they organize their responses to incidents in which intoxicated students have injured themselves or become seriously ill. One security officer described how one evening he was dealing with a female student who was having difficulty walking but who was not exhibiting severe mental impairment. He described how he organized his actions to demonstrate care; he carried the intoxicated student down several flights of stairs, transported her to another residence building, carried her up another flight of stairs, and left her to be looked after by her roommate (Maple University Fieldnotes).

Similarly, a Poplar University peace officer was observed organizing actions in a manner that demonstrated care for a highly-intoxicated student who had an unknown foreign object lodged around her eye. This injury occurred due to the student playing with dirty caulking they had removed from between floor tiles. The peace officer, along with a residence staff member, accompanied the student to the washroom in an attempt to dislodge the foreign object. When attempts at removing the foreign object from the student's eye were unsuccessful, the peace officer transported the student, in a Protective Services' patrol car, to the Emergency Room of the hospital adjacent to campus. During this incident, the peace officer reassured the student that she had no interest in pursuing any form of punishment related to the consumption of alcohol and that her only concern

was the student's well-being. In addition to reassuring the student, the peace officer waited and made conversation with the student and a residence staff member who had accompanied them to the Emergency Room. The peace officer would eventually leave the student at the hospital under the supervision of a residence staff member. However, when the student was released from the hospital, approximately two hours later, the peace officer returned to provide an escort back to the residence building demonstrating further care for the student's well-being.

The above examples illustrate how university security personnel organize their work to demonstrate care. This occurs through their attempts to prevent harms to members of their communities and through providing service that is outside or beyond their organizational responsibilities. In addition to negotiating and demonstrating alignment with community members' expectations for care, university security personnel are also demonstrating alignment with their organizational support role identity (see Chapter 4). That is, university security personnel's actions described above are in alignment with organizational goals related to community members' health and safety and, concurrently, with provincial workplace safety legislation.

### **6.2b Managing Criminal Risks with Care**

University security personnel also translate the proactive principle of the logic of risk management as they address criminal risks without appeals to or use of their legal authority. This translation occurs as they engage in frontline duties, including investigations. Through these practices, university security personnel organize their activities in a manner aligned with their community members' expectations of care and with their organizational support role identity.

Concerning theft risks, frontline security officers demonstrate care as they manually lock and unlock various doors on campus (e.g., classrooms, buildings). Officers also patrol buildings, including as they check office doors and windows for insecurities and patrol parking lots for potential theft risks (Cedar University Fieldnotes; Maple University Fieldnotes).<sup>15</sup> Although a mundane function of their work, it was clear that university security personnel use these tasks to demonstrate alignment with universities' missions and community members' expectations that they will be protected from outside harms. This was evident during observations when a Maple University security officer conducted door checks in a campus arts building. This officer demonstrated their dedication to caring for community members through being able to predict which of seven doors remained insecure (i.e., unlocked) and then securing the doors. This officer's pride in this aspect of his work was indicative of his understanding that he was organizing his work in a manner that demonstrated care for those who fail to take responsibility for their own risk management.

University security personnel were also observed engaging in patrol duties which they represented as being one way they demonstrate to their universities that they are contributing to the protection of their organizations and communities. One security officer explained that he was conducting a parking garage check to "get his stats up". Another described how, although it is not necessary, he uses his "key card" to check through certain rooms in order for there to be a record that demonstrates he is fulfilling his duty to protect the organization and community from harm (Fieldwork). These rituals

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<sup>15</sup> At Cedar University, theft prevention notices are also left where there are insecurities within buildings (e.g., unsecured ground level windows or office doors). These notices act as another strategy for responsabilizing university community members.

are a form of legitimation work; university security personnel are organizing their work specifically to demonstrate to themselves and others that they are aligned with their organizations/communities' expectations.

How university security personnel organize their investigations is also informed by their organizational support role identity. This was most evident when, at Cedar University, I became the "target" of an investigation into an alleged security breach. This investigation was launched after a security officer, who was informed by his superiors that there were no limits to my access, took me into a "high security" data centre. This "unauthorized access" resulted in a complaint to university security management. This incident could have been resolved simply by informing the complainant that there had been a misunderstanding as to my level of access; however, in order to meet the expectations of the complainant, a significant investigation was undertaken. This investigation included a supervisor processing over one-hundred still images, taken every thirty-seconds, from video surveillance cameras.<sup>16</sup> Another supervisor worked concurrently on the investigation which was being overseen by the supervisor of patrol operations. As I sat with one supervisor, he explicitly linked the extreme measures being taken to individuals becoming "emotionally involved" with minor issues within the university. Given that the outcome of the investigation was already known, it is clear that it was conducted solely for university security personnel to demonstrate to the complainant that they were concerned about the community member's well-being and the security of the organization's data.

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<sup>16</sup> I wrote in my fieldnotes that the images "show nothing [of note]. I am only in one [image] and it is just the top of my head". This is consistent with findings from my past research which demonstrates that the usability of video surveillance images for investigative purposes is dependent on the technological limits of the cameras and recording devices (Wilkinson and Lippert 2012).

Alignment with expectations for care is also demonstrated through how university security personnel organize their responses to frontline responses to incidents of a criminal nature. This was evinced during special constables' response to a fight between two sisters living together in residence at Oak University. While escorting the perceived perpetrator out of the building, a special constable put her hood up to prevent others from seeing her face. When asked why the officer put the hood up, he responded that it was to "show[] empathy [even] when you don't have to"; this action was specifically done to demonstrate care. Following their investigation, the special constables also helped one of the sisters to move into a new dorm room. When doing so, the officers only provided an escort as far as the main lobby to prevent rumours about the move. These actions enabled the officers to demonstrate their care for those involved and, in proceeding without charges, they downplayed that they were engaging in the control of students' behaviour.

### **6.2c Managing Protests with Care**

Consistent with the proactive logic of risk management, university security administrative personnel attempt to mitigate risks in advance of on-campus protests. This is accomplished by identifying potential issues and using their universities' use of space policies to modify how protestors use campus spaces. In organizing their protest risk management practices, university security personnel act in a manner that is demonstrative of their alignment with expectations that they care for their communities and downplay perceptions of control.

Identifying protest risks is undertaken by various upper-level university security personnel (e.g., directors, sergeants, supervisors) either in conjunction with or to be reviewed by other university or university-affiliated staff. For example, at Cedar

University the “operation orders [are] put together that are reviewed by [the director] and brought up to [his superior] for his information” (University Security Interview 17).

These operation orders are made after consulting with organizers and other sources of information, such as social media posts. The orders are “all detailed” meaning that they include orders such as “call transit because it could affect the buses[,] [c]all the police [and] call the fire department just to let them know that if they have to come up here it could affect them” (University Security Interview 10). Such orders, or directives, are created to ensure that university operations are not impeded and also dictate the responses of university security personnel on the front lines (see below).

In consulting with protest organizers, university security personnel attempt to proactively manage risks associated with protests by modifying how campus spaces are used, as authorized by universities’ use of space policies. One university security director described one such case, in which both Palestinian and Israeli student groups had proposed events to be held at the same time and in the same place near the on-campus student centre. This director met with the Palestinian group to understand their goal (i.e., to promote their views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). During the meeting, the director learned that the group was planning to invite high school students to their event. The director believed that having both groups’ events at the same time and place and the presence of high school students posed an elevated level of risk; he claimed that the groups “want to agitate each other” and this can lead to a “melee”. As such, the director proposed an alternative plan. Rather than disallow one of the groups from holding their event, he proposed that the Palestinians move their event to another location. This location was smaller but the director informed the group that it would “make 200

[attendees] look like 400” (University Security Interview 22). This plan was accepted and both events were said to have occurred without incident.

By allowing both events to proceed, while limiting interactions between the groups, the director translated the proactive principle of the logic of risk management into organizational practice. This strategy of modifying how university community members use campus spaces while maintaining their right to protest allows university security personnel to demonstrate their organizational support role identity. University security personnel demonstrate that they are working to ensure the operations of their universities and, concurrently, are demonstrating that they care about community members being able to express the concerns for which they are holding their event. Through modifying how space is used by protestors, rather than disallowing the protests, university security personnel are organizing their work in a manner through which they seek to be able to demonstrate their alignment with universities’ values (i.e., freedom of expression), even where no legal obligation exists to do so. This allows university security personnel to represent alignment with the expectation that they downplay perceptions of control.

Attempts at managing risks before events mitigates the need for frontline university security personnel’s presence at protests. For examples, Pine University’s security personnel manage campus protest through “a few drive-bys [or] a police officer discretely [monitoring]” (University Security Interview 30). At Maple University, weekly marijuana rallies are only responded to if other community members make a complaint (University Security Interview 21). Through not attending unless a complaint is filed, university security personnel organize their activities both so that they downplay perceptions of control (i.e., through their usual lack of presence) and care for other

community members (i.e., through addressing their complaints). To be sure, there are protests that are believed to necessitate a decision to “put extra guards on in uniform to monitor the situation” (University Security Interview 17). However, additional officers are represented as being put on duty to ensure that the university operations are not disrupted and that no harms come to the participants or other community members. In such cases, monitoring is supplemented with more covert forms of surveillance, such as the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV):

We have operation orders that we put together that are reviewed [...] and brought up to the chief safety officer for his information. They say basically, “This is what we’re going to do”. So we deploy assets, we deploy CCTV cameras to monitor the crowds (University Security Interview 17).

In terms of surveillance of [demonstrations]. It would be dependent on the situation, it might not necessarily in a position that we can survey by cameras. But they can be used as a law enforcement tool and we have that right to use it as a law enforcement tool to be able to monitor a situation if there is a potential [for problems to occur] (University Security Interview 30).

Through keeping a low profile at events and through the deployment of more covert forms of surveillance, university security services translate the proactive principle of risk management. They do this by organizing their work in a manner that attempts to demonstrate their alignment with their organizational support role identity (i.e., through ensuring university operations continue unimpeded) and the expectation they mitigate perceptions of control.

### **6.3 Risk Management through Educational Enforcement**

Although university security personnel manage myriad risks without appealing to their legal authority, when necessary, they also enforce various state and university regulations (see Tables 1, 2). The enforcement of regulations occurs reactively (i.e., in response to the occurrence of risky behaviour); however, unlike practices informed by

previous institutional logics, university security personnel translate the logic of risk management by understanding this enforcement as being oriented towards “educating [and] not punishing [people]” (University Security Interview 8). Through understanding their practices as being oriented towards education rather than punishment, university security personnel are engaged in legitimation work; they translate the logic of risk management through negotiating their organizational support role identity, including the expectations of care for their communities and that they downplay perceptions of control.

In this section, I focus on how university security personnel engage in legitimation work as they target criminal and substance use risks posed by students.<sup>17</sup> In this examination of legitimation work related to educational enforcement, I focus on practices that involve university security personnel making appeals to and enforcing state regulations (e.g., the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*, *Criminal Code*, provincial liquor control and trespass acts) and university regulations (e.g., code of student behaviour policies and residence policies).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> University security personnel can use state and university regulations to manage risks posed by faculty, staff, and other community members; however, the management of specific risks posed by these members of their university communities was not salient in the data.

<sup>18</sup> Residence policies apply to the behaviour of students living in on-campus housing. These policies govern a range of activities from food fights to violence. These policies also prohibit the possession and use of illicit substances (e.g., marijuana), restrict where alcohol can be consumed, with most policies restricting the consumption of alcohol to the rooms occupied by residents, and regulate “high-risk” drinking activities (e.g., drinking games and the use of beer bong). Violations of these contracts can result in sanctions, up to and including eviction for serious or repeated offences. Code of student behaviour policies apply to all of a university’s students and are broad in the scope of behaviour they govern. In addition to specifying particular behaviours, these policies contain vague language or specific clauses that make these policies all-encompassing. For example, Pine University’s code includes as an example of misconduct: “Knowingly creating a situation that endangers or threatens the health, safety or well-being of any person or that threatens to damage or destroy property, while on campus or while off campus and representing, or acting as a representative of, the University or a student group/organization”. The code of student behaviour policies of both Oak and Poplar Universities allow these universities to apply these policies in instances where a student has violated any federal or provincial statute or regulation and municipal by-laws. Similarly, at Cedar and Maple Universities these policies can be used where students have been convicted in criminal court or had a civil court judgment against them. Violations of these policies can result in various penalties, up to and including expulsion. University security personnel can be authorized to issue fines under their code of student behaviour policies, as is the case at Poplar University.

### 6.3a Educational Enforcement and the Management of Criminal Risks

University security personnel negotiate and attempt to demonstrate alignment with the expectations that they care for students and downplay perceptions of control through using code of student behaviour policies instead of criminal charges. This is evinced in the statements of university security personnel at Oak and Poplar Universities:

As far as the [code of student behaviour,] we find is a very effective tool and in a lot of respects carries more weight than even a *Criminal Code* charge would with certain people that we deal with here on campus [...] As I say, we can deal with situations using the [code of student behaviour] without destroying a person's future. But on the other hand, depending what line of work they're going to be getting into it could even impact to a greater extent. (University Security Interview 25).

Well the [code of student behaviour] is a blessing really because in a lot of cases students get messed up and do something that they have a lot of remorse for and wish they hadn't have done it [...] But in a true sense, if they possibly got a criminal charge out of it they would probably ruin their career and their aspirations completely [...] It's like a warning with a big star on it. Either change your ways or you'll find yourself either out of the university or in front of the court system. It's a great thing! (University Security Interview 28)

When I came in here, I had numerous meetings with the discipline office and explained to them "[that] if there was a code of student behaviour charge, write it up, send it off, let them deal with it". Not in all cases do we need to deal by way of through the discipline office. We have an option here of writing a violation ticket [...] [S]ometimes charging the person [criminally] doesn't solve the problem but there are other steps you can take to mitigate it or have it never happen again [...] (University Security Interview 40)

The above quotations illustrate how university security personnel, who have the authority to lay charges under the *Criminal Code*, understand the use of code of student behaviour policies as a form of educational enforcement; by reacting to the initial offense, university security personnel seek to modify behaviour and, by doing so, they attempt to manage future risks.

Through addressing students' criminal behaviour using the threat or application of charges under code of student behaviour policies, university security personnel translate

the proactive principle of risk management to be in alignment with the expectation that they care for their communities. They do this by representing the use of code of student behaviour policies as a more effective and less harmful alternative than sanctions which could be laid under the *Criminal Code* and which can result in lengthy criminal justice proceedings and potential criminal records that can seriously harm students' career and life (e.g., international travel) opportunities. By positioning code of student behaviour policies as alternatives to the criminal justice system, university security personnel are attempting to demonstrate alignment with expectations that they downplay perceptions of control.

University security personnel who lack legal authority as peace officers under the *Criminal Code* also manage risks through appeals to and enforcement of code of student behaviour policies. Maple University's security director claimed that "[security officers] need to know the [code of student behaviour] policy, which is an interesting piece of policy [...] because it's based on educating students, not punishing [them]". Similar sentiments were echoed by personnel at Cedar University:

The big stick that we carry is the [code of student behaviour policy] because students up here know that our reports are forwarded to student services for [potential code of student behaviour sanctions]. That could involve disciplinary actions: suspensions, dismissals, a whole bunch of stuff. A lot of times when we deal with, for example, the football team at the pub, the football team captain will step in. They know there's consequences to their actions. And that goes same for [other] students too. (University Security Interview 11)

It's a university so when you're dealing with students, like I said, I use that authoritative and educational approach and you really have to. The minute you tell somebody "You can't do that," they don't want to hear you. But if you tell them that "Hey, I wouldn't suggest doing that because the [code of student behaviour] says blah blah blah", [then] usually that makes them stop and think that there really is something here written that I have to follow. I find that really helps when dealing with students. (University Security Interview 9)

This “big stick” (University Security Interview 11) is wielded to manage risks; however, frontline officers often wield this big stick only to bluff students into compliance rather than with the intention of going through the formal process of laying code of student behaviour charges:

The other [policy] that we’re able to reference is now the university has the [code of student behaviour]. That one seems to bear a little more weight if you start talking about it. Often the young people don’t know about it and then when you mention that it exists you can see the wheels turning and the process resolves in a different way. (University Security Interview 21)

At one security officer service, one of their members explained how frontline officers are not formally trained in their code of student behaviour. However, as this individual explained, this lack of training does not stop frontline officers from invoking this policy to gain compliance:

We don’t really get trained in the student code of conduct, that’s more of a tactic we can use. If you find a guy smoking [...] you just have to instil a little bit of fear to get them to stop doing it. [B]y you using those things, not necessarily you knowing a whole bunch about it. It’s not a law setting, you’re just trying to stop someone from that action. What I would do is say “You’ve got a possibility of being suspended, expelled, possible charges if you’re found with X amount of marijuana.” (University Security Interview 5)

Framing code of student behaviour as being a tool used to educate students so they make more responsible decisions enables university security personnel to address behaviour using these policies in a manner that is rhetorically linked to and therefore serves to demonstrate their alignment with their organizations’ educational missions and goals. Further, as a security officer explained, university security personnel generally do not lay code of student behaviour charges because universities do not “like to put people under the [code of student behaviour as] [t]hey feel that the students are putting out too much money” (University Security Interview 10). Thus, in addition to demonstrating care for

students through invoking but not charging students under the code of student behaviour, university security services' actions are also aligned with their organizational support role. This further enables them to be viewed as “implement[ing] satisfactory levels of risk management while avoiding any perception of excessive control” (Dupont 2014:276).

### **6.3b Educational Enforcement and the Management of Substance Use Risks**

University security personnel also translate the logic of risk management through legitimation work as they organize their proactive management of substance use risks. Practices include appeals to and enforcement of both state and university regulations. Commonly appealed to state regulations are provincial liquor acts, specifically regulations on underage and public consumption, and the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*. University policies enforced include in residence, code of student behaviour, liquor, and smoking policies.<sup>19</sup> In seeking to manage substance use and those other risks that are causally linked to substance use (e.g., vandalism, violence, illness, death; see also Moore 2000:200), university security personnel organize their activities according to their organizational support role identity and they attempt to demonstrate care and to downplay perceptions of control.

Peace officers, at Poplar University, were observed addressing the behaviour of students who were intoxicated without resorting to the application of state or university regulations. This included an incident where a student was observed with his pants open, having just relieved himself behind a bush. The peace officer informed this student that

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<sup>19</sup> As with provincial liquor regulations, university policies prohibit public and underage consumption of alcohol. Consistent with provincial legislation, such as tobacco acts and workplace smoking acts, smoking is not permitted in campus buildings and vehicles and use near buildings is restricted (e.g., to more than 10-metres from doorways and air intakes). At Maple University, smoking has been restricted to designated smoking areas and is not allowed within the centre of campus (bounded by the school's main roadway).

public urination is illegal; however, rather than resorting to the application of sanctions, the student was permitted to leave. In another incident, a couple of young men were caught consuming alcohol in public. The peace officer warned them that charges could be laid and told them to be less obvious when consuming in public in the future. Through organizing a response that resulted in warnings in place of citations under the *Gaming and Liquor Act* or code of student behaviour policy, the peace officer attempted to downplay that control was being exerted. This was reinforced by the peace officer imploring the two men caught consuming to simply do so in a manner that would not be observed. Even in instances where peace officers issue code of student behaviour tickets, these actions are represented as being organized in a manner that is consistent with expectations that university security personnel care for the well-being of students. The peace officers represent the use of code of student behaviour tickets as being less costly and, because the money collected through these fines is put into a bursary, that this tactic further benefits students (Poplar University Fieldnotes). Moreover, because the use of code of student behaviour tickets keeps students out of the public eye, this tactic may protect the reputation of this University as being a safe place (Poplar University Fieldnotes).

Maple University security officers also translate the logic of risk management to manage alcohol use in a manner by which they may be able to demonstrate alignment with the expectation that they downplay perceptions of control. This was evident on one evening when municipal police officers were on campus as part of a “pay-duty” policing arrangement (Lippert and Walby 2013; Lippert, Walby, and Taylor 2016). Under this arrangement, police officers are paid by the university with the expectation that they

enforce the *Liquor Control and Licensing Act*.<sup>20</sup> When one security officer was accompanying the police officers as they issued tickets, principally for public consumption and minor in possession (with fines of \$230), two other security officers set off ahead on patrol. When these officers encountered a group of students they informed the students of the prohibitions against consuming alcohol in public and, consistent with university policies, that they are only permitted to drink within the residence rooms. Although these officers were enforcing university policy, rather than invoking their authority, they informed the students that municipal police were on campus issuing tickets to those who were caught. These officers were controlling behaviour and attempting to proactively manage harms associated with substance use (see Chapter 5). However, through informing the students of the possible sanctions that would be applied by municipal police officers rather than appealing to their authority, these officers organized their work to demonstrate their alignment with the expectation that they protect students. That is by preventing them from the financial penalty associated with a ticket from the police. This also may assist them in downplaying perceptions of control.

Similar attempts to demonstrate care and downplay perceptions of control were observed as Oak University special constables attempted to manage substance use risks. In one incident, on a cold February night, special constables observed an individual

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<sup>20</sup> These pay-duty enforcement nights occur on Friday and Saturdays, between 2100 and 0200, during the school year. This program was initially implemented in recognition that the University needed better access to municipal police to manage risky behaviour that had come to be viewed as “just a regular night in ‘res’” (BC2Director). During the pay-duty shifts, municipal police officers patrol as a pair and are accompanied by university security personnel. Police officers primarily patrol the open public spaces abutting the residence complexes and the student union building, where the pub is located, and sometimes officers will patrol within the residence buildings. In addition to enforcing the *Liquor Control and Licensing Act*, police officers are expected to respond to other on-campus incidents (e.g., marijuana use, public urination, assaults).

whom they believed was in possession of alcohol. The officers proceeded to turn around in a parking lot to go talk to this individual. When they arrived, the original suspect was no longer holding the beer; this 19-year-old had passed the alcohol to his friend who was a minor. Not only was this individual a minor in possession of alcohol, but he was also found to be in possession of two pieces of identification. The special constables ticketed the minor for underage drinking under the *Liquor Licence Act*, a \$125 fine, and warned the student that it is illegal to possess the false identification. The officers also warned the 19-year-old that he could be charged with providing alcohol to a minor. The special constables also informed this student that they would have given him a warning had he not given the beer to his friend and that it was his responsibility that his friend was ticketed. Although the officers exercised control over these students' drinking, including through citing one for underage drinking, their actions were consistent with their understandings of their organizational support role identity and with expectations that they downplay perceptions of control. The attempts to downplay the perceptions of control occurred through their issuing only one citation when it was possible to issue multiple citations for both men and by placing responsibility for the ticket, and thereby their controlling actions, on the 19-year-old. It is important to note here that downplaying control was dependent on the officers articulating to the two men the additional penalties that could be incurred.

Special constables also attempt to downplay perceptions of control as they address students' marijuana use. In one incident, officers were called to a residence building for suspected marijuana use. The student-resident, who had been involved in another incident involving marijuana use the previous night, was initially uncooperative; it was not until

the third time being asked that he finally admitted to having smoked marijuana. The student-resident then produced a small amount of marijuana. One officer searched the room and located a water bong. The other officer questioned the student-resident about where the drugs were purchased. At one point the officer asked if the student-resident had “ever heard of self-preservation”; this represented that the officer was attempting to keep the student out of potential legal trouble. The student then provided information about an off-campus dealer. Not satisfied with this, the officer informed the student they would “trade” leniency for information about on-campus drug dealers. The leniency, in this case, would be special constables withholding the from residence staff the fact that they had confirmed the student smoked marijuana in his room; this was meant to assist the student in avoiding possible sanctions under the residence contract. The student was given until the special constables’ next day shift, in a couple of days, to provide the information. Having left the room, the special constables kept their end of the deal by informing the two residence staff, who had been present in the hall during the duration of the investigation, and two others who were present (positions unknown) that they could not confirm whether the student smoked in his room.

In another incident, two special constables were dispatched to attend a student residence building for a report of students playing beer pong, against residence policy, and for the smell of marijuana. Upon initial questioning, neither of the students were forthcoming. In their attempts to gain compliance, the special constables informed the students they could face sanctions under the residence contract and even draw the attention of their faculty’s academic dean. One of the student-residents was more cooperative with the officers. This individual was escorted by one of the special

constables to their residence room, which was shared with the other student-resident involved. The student was asked to produce his marijuana; he did so. The special constable also asked if there were any other drugs in the room. At this point, the student produced his roommate's bong. The special constable informed this student-resident that he would tell the other roommate that the bong was spotted in the open; the student-resident was told that it would be best for this student to do the same. This, the special constable explained to the student, would help to prevent issues arising between him and the roommate. For his cooperation, this student-resident was informed that he would be getting off scot-free, from the special constable's perspective, and that the non-cooperative student would be facing residence follow-up.

In both of cases, the special constables were translating the logic of risk management as they sought to prevent health and safety harms and liability to their University in a manner that could be perceived as demonstrating care and downplaying perceptions of control. Although special constables appeal to punitive sanctions, where the actual penalties (i.e., residence policy sanctions) are far less severe than those potential actions highlighted by officers (e.g., *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act* charges), these officers are also seeking to downplay perceptions of excessive control. Other actions of these officers, for example their not notifying the residence staff who were present that they confirmed the student smoked in his room, are also consistent with their attempts to demonstrate care for students. To be sure, the incident report which would be shared with residence services confirms the use of marijuana. However, because further sanctions for the students' behaviour would be applied by residence services, as opposed to through the use of special constables' legal authority, the above

actions are legitimation work; they seek to represent university security personnel as being caring rather than controlling through leaving more obvious control tactics (i.e., application of sanctions) to others in their security networks. Last, in other instances where university security personnel understand that sanctions may be applied by others, university security personnel attempt to protect students from punitive sanctioning (e.g., through including information within incident reports in their attempts to help students to escape more severe sanctions; Maple University Fieldnotes).

#### **6.4 Managing Risky Outsiders**

In contrast to the above practices, which generally result in the maintenance of risky students' inclusion within their universities, university security personnel are more likely to use trespass law to banish or disperse outsiders from campus (see Beckett and Herbert 2010; Walby and Lippert 2012a). Typically, university security personnel choose less permanent dispersal tactics over permanent banishment. This allows university security personnel to translate the logic of risk management by proactively managing risks posed by outsiders while downplaying perceptions of control.

At Oak University, a taxi driver was in a dispute with students. When special constables arrived, the students claimed the driver was driving erratically and that he drove at them after they exited the cab. After getting the students to pay for their taxi-fare, the special constables verbally warned the driver not to return to campus for the rest of the night (i.e., dispersal). This was accompanied by the threat of banishment, by way of a permanent trespassing notice, if he returned. The officers demonstrated care not only by resolving the issue but also by driving the students back to their residence (Oak Fieldnotes).

In another incident at Oak University, at approximately 0130, special constables were called by a security guard who had caught a man cutting through a construction site. This man was attempting to meet his girlfriend so that he could be snuck into her all-female residence building. Because it was winter, and temperatures were freezing, the officers brought the man, who was dressed in only a t-shirt and pants, inside to await the arrival of his girlfriend. The officers informed the man that he could be issued a no-trespassing order and, thereby, be banished from the property. Rather than pursuing this option, the officers only required that the man leave the campus (to stay the night in a motel with his girlfriend). In choosing to make the man disperse from campus, and by not formally trespassing him, the special constables demonstrated alignment with the expectation that they downplay perceptions of control.

Dispersal tactics are also used at Poplar University. This was evinced in one incident in which a peace officer had stopped a man for public intoxication. I arrived with a second peace officer and observed the officers attempt to contact the man's aunt, whose number he provided. This was to find the man a safe way home. Unable to get in contact with the man's aunt, the peace officers decided to check for warrants; the man had a warrant for his arrest due to failure to pay. This was not a serious charge, in the view of the peace officers, so they continued in their attempt to contact the man's aunt. This was intended to save the man from ending up in jail. Consideration was also given to sending the man to a local men's shelter. The peace officers, however, did not want to do so because the shelter was deemed to be dangerous for those who are not street "hardened". One of the officers commented that they did not want anything bad to happen to those

they interact with; however, having failed to get in contact with the man's aunt, the peace officers used their authority to arrest the man and turned him over to local police.

The above actions of university security personnel suggest that even when they have the legal authority to engage in practices of exclusion they still attempt to downplay perceptions of excessive control. Additionally, although the above individuals were not members of their university communities, officers also demonstrated an ethic of care, particularly as they attempted to get the intoxicated man home without the involvement of local police. These actions, as legitimation work, are also consistent with how peace officers, at Oak and Poplar, address outsiders' motor vehicle infractions. Officers address these infractions largely through the use of warnings and university traffic policy (at Oak University). Only in instances of arrestable offences (e.g., driving while suspended) or where violators are found to have significant past offences do university security personnel typically use their peace officer authorities. This approach to addressing dangerous others was directly linked to "the political [aspect of] how [university security personnel are] perceived in the community [resulting in officers] want[ing] to not go too hard on people" (University Security Interview 41). University security personnel are actively organizing their work to demonstrate their alignment with the expectation that they downplay control as they translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I examined how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field. Due to how university security personnel understand their organizational support role identity (Chapter 4) and conceive of risks

and harms (Chapter 5), the above practices are understood as being organized in a manner that demonstrates alignment with their universities' missions and goals. Further, in translating the logic of risk management into organizational practice, university security personnel engage in legitimation work as they organize their practices to demonstrate alignment with the expectations that they care for their communities and that they downplay perceptions of control.

University security personnel demonstrate alignment with these expectations by managing risks "at a distance". This occurs in a number of ways. First, university security personnel encourage community members to act responsibly. This is accomplished through promotional activities aimed at preventing criminal victimization and attempts at creating conditions for individuals to make responsible choices, such as arranging how protestors use campus spaces. Given that risks are framed, to a large extent, in relation to harms to community members (Chapter 5), through these activities university security personnel attempt to demonstrate that they care about their communities' safety. These practices, if successful, are important because, through governing at a distance, they also allow university security personnel to appear less controlling. This is because, when individuals exercise their own risk management, university security personnel are less likely to have to rely on their legal authority.

To be sure, such practices are not enough to eliminate risks. Thus, university security personnel must engage in frontline activities wherein they enforce state and university regulations. The enforcement of these regulations occurs during routine patrol duties, in which university security personnel engage in practices by which they attempt to demonstrate care for their communities and organizations (e.g., through creating a

paper trail, through ensuring the security of access points). Moreover, university security personnel may have to enforce regulations following investigations, some of which may be undertaken for the express purpose of meeting community members' expectations of care.

Where university security personnel invoke or apply state and university regulations, they do so in a manner through which they attempt to demonstrate care for their communities and downplay perceptions of control. This occurs through university security personnel understanding and representing these activities as a form of educational enforcement. This enforcement is represented as being oriented towards preventing future harms as opposed to punishing behaviour. University security personnel engage in this educational enforcement as they invoke regulations to gain compliance but do not sanction offenders, even where they have the legal authority to do so. Educational enforcement also occurs through the use of university policies instead of criminal charges. In engaging in educational enforcement, university security personnel translate the proactive logic of risk management by attempting to prevent future harms. This also involves the translation of the prudential principle as the aim of these practices is to get community members to take responsibility for their actions. As such, educational enforcement can serve to reinforce university security services' attempts at governing at a distance. These practices of educational enforcement demonstrate care, by attempting to prevent students from suffering harms associated with being sanctioned, and, by extension, allow university security personnel to downplay perceptions of control.

It is important to note that due to the availability and accessibility of frames of reference regarding the need to exercise care and downplay perceptions of control,

university security personnel's practices of risk management align with these expectations even where the risky persons being managed are outsiders. To be sure, when university security personnel target outsiders they are more likely to engage in exclusionary practices than when they address risks posed by university community members. However, that expectations for care and the downplaying of control still inform how university security personnel manage risks posed by outsiders suggests that there is a potential for security practices to organized toward more progressive ends (see Kempa et al. 1999; Wood and Shearing 1998). I discuss this potential in the following chapter as part of the overview of findings and reflections on the importance of this research.

## **Chapter 7 Conclusion**

In this dissertation, through analyses of data collected as part of the first major multi-site research study on Canadian university security services, I explored university security personnel's quest for legitimacy. This quest for legitimacy entails university security personnel negotiating, representing, and demonstrating alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference as they translate, through legitimation work, the logic of risk management into their organizational field. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the findings of this research in two parts. First, I provide an overview of and reflection on key research findings. Second, and last, I discuss the major tension inherent in university security personnel's quest for legitimacy. Through this, I illuminate how university security arrangements and those of the wider organizational fields of public policing and private security may be oriented toward progressive ends (see Kempa et al. 1999; Wood and Shearing 1998).

### **7.1 Legitimation Work and the Translation of Institutional Logics**

Thornton et al. (2012), key proponents of the institutional logics perspective, claim that the concept of institutional logics is both difficult to define and, even more so, to apply in an analytically useful manner. It cannot be said that this claim is without merit. In order to overcome these difficulties, I established and applied an orienting strategy and analytical framework based on sociological institutionalism, the institutional logics perspective, and scholarship on police and security services' legitimacy. Specifically, institutional logics were understood not as providing frames of reference that dictate behaviour, but as providing frames of reference which are used as tools. These tools are those that are used by actors (i.e., university security personnel) to organize and provide

culturally and organizationally acceptable meaning to their experiences (see Gray and Silbey 2014; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Lok 2010; McPherson and Sauder 2013; Seo and Creed 2002). When using institutionalized frames of reference in their quest for legitimacy, university security personnel were understood to be engaged in legitimation work (Thumala et al. 2011; see also Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby et al. 2016): the tripartite of negotiations, demonstrations, and representations of their alignment with culturally and organizationally acceptable frames of reference.

Through focusing on the tools, or frames of reference, that university security personnel use to give acceptable meanings to their work, I explored the translation of the logic of risk management into the organizational field of university security. Those frames of reference that were the focus of this research were key normative expectations of the logic of risk management. First, this logic provides expectations that safety and security problems be conceived of as risks (i.e., anything understood as having the potential to cause harm) and that steps are to be taken to reduce or eliminate these risks. Relatedly, risks are to be understood in relation to perceived harms to organizations' economic well-being (e.g., Bland 1999; Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Hacking 2003) and the physical, mental, and economic well-being of members of a community (Hier 2003; Levi 2000; Rose 1998; Simon 1994; Sloan 1992; Sloan and Fisher 2011; Wood and Shearing 1998; Moore 2000). Second, the logic of risk management provides frames of reference about who is to be classified as high-risk. These include those who are outsiders a community (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008) and, consistent with the prudential principle of this logic (O'Malley 1992), those who fail to take personal responsibility for the management of

risks. Last, relatedly, the logic of risk management dictates that risks are to be proactively managed through “creating the conditions for responsible choice” (Simon 1994:32).

As past research reveals, the logic of risk management is accepted amongst various actors within the organizational field of university post-secondary education and is, therefore, able to be drawn upon to organize and give meaning to decision-making processes (Power et al. 2009:303; Cameron and Klopper 2015; Clyde-Smith 2014; Achampong 2010; Peters 2005). The institutionalization of this logic was evident during the research process when roadblocks stifled my ability to conduct research (see Chapter 4). Specifically, this research and myself as a researcher were at various times classified as being potentially harmful (i.e., risky) to universities and their community members. This research was classified as risky by various institutional gatekeepers, including not only those representing university security services or personnel (i.e., a labour union) but also human resources units and research ethics boards/units. In most instances where myself or my research were classified as risks, including at those universities where research was undertaken, it was largely in relation to concerns over potential harms to the universities’ economic interests vis-à-vis liability and reputational harms. This is consistent with the logic of risk management and is perhaps unexpected given the corporatization of universities (see Aronowitz 2000; Delanty 2002; Ginsberg 2011; Jarvis 2001; Oakeshott 2004; Readings 1996; Trow 1994).

In several instances, this research being classified as risky presented not insignificant delays. For sociologists and social scientists, the institutionalization of risk management should raise concern. This is due to the potential that reliance on those frames of reference which direct attention to the identification and management of

economic and reputational harm will restrict research access that ultimately result in restricted understandings of organizational practice (Watson 2015). That risk management has been institutionalized within universities is alarming as it presents a possibility of a reduction in organizational support for important, but potentially risky, research.

The institutionalization of risk management should be particularly worrisome for qualitative social researchers. This is for two reasons. First, social researchers must contend with university research ethics boards impeding qualitative social research due to “ethics creep” (Haggerty 2004). This ethics creep may be exacerbated by the fact that considerations of risk are largely drawn from the disciplines of biomedical sciences, physical sciences, and positivist social sciences (Eyre 2010). Moreover, as past research indicates, research ethics boards are predisposed to protect the interests of those powerful organizations which are studied by qualitative social researchers (Wynn 2011). Second, the creation of understandings of risks is an inherently creative endeavour (see Boholm and Corvellec 2011; Ewald 1991; Hilgartner 1992). This means that understandings and representations of risk do not have to be tied to any objective measurement of risk. Therefore, it is possible that, following the logic of risk management, critical social research may be impeded in any instance where subjective and rhetorical linkages can be created between the research and potential harms. To be sure, this also means that critical social researchers can exploit the logic of risk management to overcome research roadblocks by appealing to those harms that may be able to be prevented as a result of the production of research findings.

The roadblocks encountered during this research indicate that the logic of risk management organizes decision making within Canadian universities. This, however, does not mean that, through organizing their work according to this logic, university security personnel automatically enjoy the full support of their communities. In Chapter 4, I discussed how university security personnel face the type of stigmatization endemic to the organizational field of private security; they are commonly viewed by their community members as lazy, wannabe-cops, and ticket writers (see also Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998; Patten et al. 2016; Wada et al. 2010; Wilson and Wilson 2015). In order to overcome these perceptions, university security personnel engage in legitimation work. Through this, university security personnel translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field, in attempts to gain the support of their communities and, importantly, as a form of self-justification.

University security personnel's legitimation work is organized around their professional and organizational support role identities (Chapter 4). University security personnel's professional identity is developed through their negotiations, representations, and demonstrations of their membership in professional associations, including The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Agencies (IACLEA), and ASIS International. Through their membership in these associations, university security personnel obtain knowledge, certification, and accreditation which are used as a basis for how they organize and give meaning to their work. Seeking, obtaining, and talking about accreditation, and their other connections with professional associations allows university security personnel to claim legitimacy because professional identities are culturally

acceptable identities within the policing and security fields and society more generally (see Abbott 1991; Côté-Lussier 2013; Fournier 1999; Mulcahy and Ellison 2001; Scott 1995; Thumala et al. 2011; Walby, Lippert, et al. 2014; Walby, Luscombe, et al. 2014; Walby et al. 2016; Wilensky 1964).

Two of the universities in this study were accredited by professional associations. Members of these services engage in legitimation work as they organize their activities according to the standards provided by these associations. The seeking of accreditation is also indicative of a drive toward isomorphism within the organizational field of university security (on institutional isomorphism see, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991). However, what is even more remarkable about legitimation work linked to professionalism is that professional identity is also represented in generic terms, that is, in the absence of indicators of professionalism (i.e., accreditation, certification; see Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Scott 1995). This confirms that adopting a professional identity is about self-justification and gaining community acceptance (i.e., being viewed as legitimate) than it is for other purposes (e.g., to adopt effective or efficient practices).

University security personnel's generic claims of professionalism connect their professional identity with their organizational support role identity. The latter identity is negotiated and represented by university security personnel seeking to align themselves and their services with their universities' academic missions (and attendant goals) and values. Universities' missions and goals specify the ends to which university security personnel are to direct their activities (see Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Scott 1995). As "academic support professionals" (University Security Interview 17), university security personnel claim they have a role in supporting the overall operations of their universities.

In addition to aligning with goals about organizational safety and security, university security personnel claim they contribute to their universities' ability to attract students and the ability of staff, students, and faculty to work, learn, and research. Relatedly, university security personnel engage in legitimation work through representing alignment with universities' values (i.e., diversity, respect, freedom of expression). In engaging in legitimation work around their organizations' missions, goals, and values, university security personnel represent alignment with expectations that they care for both their organizations and communities and that they downplay perceptions of control (Allen 2017; Dupont 2014; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998).

University security personnel translate the logic of risk management through legitimation work that indexes their organizational support role identity. In Chapter 5, I discussed how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management as they negotiate and represent understandings of risks and harms. First, university security personnel translate risk management's frames of reference that direct attention to organizations' economic interests (Bland 1999; Castel 1991; Ewald 1991; Hacking 2003). This is accomplished through university security personnel representing these frames of reference as being in alignment with their universities' missions and goals. Specifically, university security personnel talk about how they protect their organizations from liability and other sources of economic harm (e.g., vandalism). Because focusing risk management practices solely or extensively on organizational economic harms can erode the trust of their communities (Hutter and Power 2005:6), to seek legitimacy, university security personnel also translate the community focused frames of reference from this logic (see Hier 2003; Levi 2000; Rose 1998; Simon 1994; Sloan 1992; Sloan

and Fisher 2011; Wood and Shearing 1998; Moore 2000). University security personnel were found to focus a significant amount of attention on representing harms to their community members. Through focusing on harms to their communities, university security personnel also represent alignment with community members' expectations that they are cared for (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998). The effect of shifting attention from organizations' economic harms to community harms has the further effect of aligning university security personnel with the communal good (Côté-Lussier 2013; Loader and Walker 2001). By framing their actions as protecting the communal good, university security personnel better position themselves to be viewed as legitimate as this may assist in their ability to downplay perceptions that they are exerting control over community members (Dupont 2014).

In Chapter 5, I also explored how university security personnel translate risk management's prudential principle (see Garland 1996; O'Malley 1992) and frames of reference about risky outsiders (see Blakely and Snyder 1997; Brown and Lippert 2007; Fischer and Poland 1998; Kempa and Singh 2008). This was accomplished through focusing on those groups which university security personnel represent as being responsible for harms. The prudential principle is translated by university security personnel who represent university community members as being responsible for harms suffered as the result of their not managing their own risk of various forms of victimization. Frames of reference about risky others are translated by university security personnel as they represent individuals who are not affiliated with their universities as posing risks to community members' safety and security. The juxtaposition of the individualizing discourse of community members' responsibility for risk management

against the collectivizing discourse of risky outsiders produces representations of risk which blur the boundaries between morality and immorality (Hier 2008; Hunt 1999, 2003). This results in the rejection of the explicitly moralized discourse of *in loco parentis*, which resulted in universities exerting parental control over students (Simon 1994). This, in turn, allows university security personnel to self-justify their actions and potentially to be viewed by others as more caring than controlling.

In Chapter 6, I examined how university security personnel translate the logic of risk management as they engage in practices through which they attempt to “creat[e] the conditions for responsible choice” (Simon 1994:32; see Chapter 6). Practices through which university security personnel translate the proactive and prudential principles of the logic of risk management are oriented at getting community members to take responsibility for managing risks. These practices include crime prevention promotions aimed at getting community members to prevent thefts and sexual assaults and attempts at managing protests by modifying participants’ use of space. Such practices enable university security personnel to “govern at a distance” (see Garland 1997; Gray and Salole 2006; Rose 1998; Rose and Miller 1992). If successful, these practices allow university security personnel to become less involved in enforcing regulations on the frontlines. As such, university security personnel downplay perceptions of control while, at the same time, signalling that university security personnel are caring for their communities by assisting community members in their ability to make responsible choices.

Although university security personnel attempt to govern at a distance, they are still called upon to manage risks on the frontlines. On the frontlines, university security

personnel engage in practices to demonstrate that they are preventing economic harm to their organizations. This includes university security personnel creating paper trails of their actions to show how they assist in mitigating organizational liability. Care is also demonstrated for community members as university security personnel engage in activities that go above job expectations. For examples, university security personnel will demonstrate care through attempting to resolve situations that are the organizational responsibility of other units and by going beyond the scope of their responsibilities in assisting community members needing assistance (e.g., first aid).

In some instances, university security personnel must appeal to their legal authority to manage risks. When doing so, university security personnel translate the proactive and prudential principles of the logic of risk management through attempting to downplay perceptions of control. Specifically, university security personnel frame their attempts at managing risks through the use of their legal authority as being oriented at educating students to make more responsible choices. This enables university security personnel to downplay potential punitive sanctions that arise when they use their legal authority. In many instances, university security personnel will downplay perceptions of control by invoking state and university regulations to gain compliance without applying sanctions. Moreover, where university security personnel do apply sanctions, they often proceed through university regulations, such as residence and code of student behaviour policies. These policies carry sanctions that university security personnel are represented as being less damaging to students' education and careers than criminal sanctions. Through representing their risk management practices as less harmful to students, university security personnel downplay perceptions of control and demonstrate that they care about

the educational success and prosperity of students (i.e., organizational support role alignment).

This research reveals that university security personnel negotiate their understandings of their communities' expectations for being cared for, rather than being controlled, as they organize, reproduce, and give meaning to their work and translate the logic of risk management into their organizational field. This is not to suggest that university security personnel are not engaged in control functions nor that their university communities' expectations for protection are met. For example, while it may be the case that sanctions under code of student behaviour policies do not carry the stigma or other negative consequences of criminal charges and/or convictions, these policies still control students' behaviour and can limit students' opportunities (e.g., through suspensions). Further, on a structural level, it is not evident that university security personnel's practices of risk management are directed toward progressive outcomes or that they "specifically target the concerns of marginalised groups" (Kempa et al. 1999:206). For examples, homeless persons at one university were targeted when "picking" through trash and bottles due their representing a perceived risk to universities and there was little indication that, beyond a couple of mentions of cultural sensitivity training, university security personnel take the lead on addressing the needs of marginalized groups. Therefore, future research should focus on community members' perceptions of university security personnel to explore the extent to which university security arrangements are directed toward progressive outcomes and that university security personnel address the needs of marginalized groups.

## **7.2 The Tension of Legitimation Work and the Possibilities for Progressive University Security**

That university security personnel engage in legitimation work in an attempt to be viewed as legitimate, that they do so through translating the logic of risk management means there remains a major tension in university security personnel's quest for legitimacy. This tension arises because university security personnel are expected to protect their organizations' economic interests and the well-being of their communities: when the focus is put on managing risks to universities' economic interests, community members' trust in university security may decrease (Hutter and Power 2005:6). While this tension may exist for all in-house security services, this loss of trust is exacerbated within universities due to the expectation that university security services engage in practices that support the communal good (Côté-Lussier 2013; Loader and Walker 2001), which is to be done through protecting or caring for members of their communities (Allen 2017; Jacobsen 2015; Micucci 1998) and downplaying perceptions of control (Dupont 2014). This tension, between the need to protect organizations' economic interests while maintaining the trust of communities, is likely to evolve over the coming years in tandem to changes within the organizational field of university post-secondary education.

First, as universities continue to face financial pressures from decreased per-student public funding, university security personnel and others involved in campus risk management are likely to be increasingly called upon to find ways to protect harms to their universities' economic interests. This includes attempts at demonstrating to their universities that they are protecting against reputational harms. One of the ways that university security personnel can ensure that they are protecting both against reputational harms and harms to members of their communities is to take lessons learned from

numerous scandals involving universities in the United States (e.g., Penn State sexual abuse scandal; see Garoian 2012; Giroux and Giroux 2012, 2016; Gutierrez and McLaren 2012). Cases, such as the Penn State scandal, demonstrate that privileging economic and reputational risk management over the protection of community members is likely to have the opposite of the desired effect when wrongdoing is eventually exposed.

University security personnel should keep this in mind when attempting to manage risks. Privileging the protection of individuals, such as survivors of sexual assaults, over the protection of economic interests is both the right thing to do and may prove to be the more prudent choice for the long-term management of economic and reputational risks.

Second, relatedly, in their on-going quest for legitimacy university security personnel will likely need to double-down on their efforts to ensure they are engaging in practices through which they demonstrate their respect for diversity. For example, university security services should take steps to ensure that frontline officers represent the diversity of their student bodies. This means ensuring that officers reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of an increasingly internationalized student body. This also means bucking the trend of private security being a male-dominated field (Lund Petersen 2014; Walby and Lippert 2015). This can be accomplished by engaging in hiring practices which ensure greater gender diversity amongst frontline staff. Through demonstrating their alignment with their universities' value of diversity university security personnel may be more likely to be perceived as legitimate, and this may further their risk management goals as legitimacy begets cooperation (Tyler 2006).

Third, legalization and changes to the regulation of marijuana possession are likely to result in new challenges for university security personnel as they attempt to manage

substance use risks. Although there may be pressures for personnel from university security services and other organizational units (e.g., residence services) to implement risk management practices using a top-down approach, in order to ensure alignment with community members' desires for protection, university security personnel may benefit from looking to harm reduction strategies as their model for substance use risk management. Specifically, in order to both proactively manage harms associated with marijuana use (e.g., second-hand smoke exposure, fires) and to respect and care for their communities, changes to the management of substance use risks should draw on the harm reduction principle of "nothing about us without us" (see Jürgens 2005). This principle encourages the inclusion of those being targeted by policies and practices to be meaningfully included in their creation and implementation. Following the "nothing about us without us" principle may also be beneficial in addressing other campus risks, such as sexual assaults. Through including students in the creation and implementation of risk management policies and practices, university security personnel will likely find themselves in a better position to manage risks and to be viewed as legitimate by these community members.

Through their negotiating and demonstrating their alignment with their communities' expectations of care over control, university security personnel can work toward bringing progressive change that ensures the protection of the well-being of all members of their communities. In doing so, these personnel may also find they can develop new and effective ways of both managing risks and their legitimacy. Further, university security services are connected to other policing and security agencies both through their professional associations and wider security networks. As such, through

their focus on the well-being of people over the well-being of their universities' profits and reputations, university security personnel can take the lead in bringing progressive change not only to the organizational field of university security but also to those of public policing and private security. Through leading the way for policing and security agencies to adopt progressive forms of risk management, university security personnel can make progress in their quest for legitimacy.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A: Sample Invitation to Participate/Request for Access

Dear [Director],

Despite being an important part of ensuring safety on university campuses, the work of university [security/policing] services has been under researched. Thus, I am conducting a study of the provision of [private policing/security] on Canadian university campuses. I am writing to request access to conduct interviews and observations with campus [security/policing] officers at [University Name].

The objective of this research is to understand the provision of [security/policing] on Canadian university campuses. This research will examine how campus [security/policing] is delivered by looking at a range of topics. These include: the history of campus [security/policing]; the regulatory frameworks for campus [security/policing] (e.g., legislation, university policy, agreements with local police); the organization of campus [security/policing] services (e.g., command structure, staffing); hiring and training procedures; funding; resources (e.g., facilities, vehicle fleet, physical tools, security technology); and the day-to-day delivery of policing.

The study is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

If permission is granted to carry out the study at [University Name], I will make at least two visits to the campus to conduct research. These dates can be negotiated. Each visit would entail approximately one week of research.

The study involves two main components. The first component is semi-structured interviews that will be conducted with [security/policing] service personnel (e.g., directors, supervisors, technology specialists, officers, etc.). In these interviews I will engage the participant in open-ended conversation about campus [security/policing] services. I am interested in understanding the how campus policing and security is undertaken and I do not intend to represent the personal views or opinions of participants.

These interviews, which will last from *15 to 90 minutes*, will be audio recorded using a digital recorder. Copies of the digital audio files will be uploaded to my password-protected personal computer and will be saved for a period of approximately 5 years. At no time will digital copies of the interviews be shared with, or used by, anyone other than members of my doctoral dissertation committee and myself.

The second component involves observations (e.g., “ride-alongs”) of [security/policing] officers. This component will entail myself observing [security/policing] officer(s) as they work in order to understand the duties of officers. *Observation shifts could range from 3-12 hours*. The exact times can be negotiated; however, I am interested in

observing both during the day and over night. During my observations, basic descriptive data will be gathered on instances of officer interactions with the public (e.g., age of subject/suspect, activity that instigated officer activity). I will also record data on other officer activities (e.g., CCTV monitoring, alarm checks, etc.). These observations will ideally be interactive. I do not wish to passively record officer activities. Rather, through dialogue with the officers, I would like to understand how officers perform their tasks, what factors inform interactions with the public, and how they reflect on their activities, positions, and places in the wider policing and/or security culture.

In addition to getting a better understanding of the work of individual officers, I will take the opportunity during my time on campus to get a sense of the working environment and resources available to campus security. This will entail observing campus security facilities (e.g., dispatch room, CCTV control room) and resources (e.g., vehicles). I will also make notes on the physical layout of the university. This will assist in me understanding the unique challenges of policing and security on university campuses.

Lastly, I would like to access and review relevant documents, including training manuals, procedure manuals, operational budgets, and internal communications (e.g. memos, policies). I am particularly interested in incident reports written by officers. Incident reports often contain a general record of officer activities, interventions, and outcomes that are helpful for understanding the work of security and police officers. It is anticipated that the review of documents will take place on-campus in the form of recorded notes; however, I will also request permission, from the security director/manager, to make photocopies of relevant documents. Throughout the process of document review, the director/manager (or designate) will be invited to remove or black out information deemed sensitive (if applicable). I will also never present personal information (e.g., officer's name) in any publications.

I have spoken with you previously about this research study. I would like for you to share the details of my study with employees in campus [security/policing] prior to my arrival. When I arrive, I will meet with participating employees at their convenience and explain the purpose and intentions of the research. I will also ask every participant to sign a form indicating that they understand the purpose of the research, that their participation is entirely voluntary, and that they grant their informed consent to participate.

Confidentiality is limited within the research site. It is possible that other employees will know who participated in the observational components of the study. However, I will not use the actual names of universities in any publication. A pseudonym will be used (e.g. Urban University, in Southern Ontario). Confidentiality is also limited to the extent that the identity of participants (e.g. campus security director) could be inferred by outside readers. However, I will not identify any participant by name. I will make every effort to ensure confidentiality. I will do so by only using information that is absolutely necessary to achieve the research goals.

This project requires time devoted to participating in the research while participants are at work. It is possible that some participants will grant personal time to an interview, thus being willingly inconvenienced by the research.

Participation in this study is voluntary, and you or any participant may withdraw *at any time without explanation or consequence*. If you wish to terminate participation, you may choose to have all of the information revealed (including interviews, observations and information collected in the review of documents) removed from the study. This applies to individual participants as well. Prior to follow up meetings, I will remind all participants that participation is voluntary and that they have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without consequence or explanation.

Considering that I will visit the university on multiple occasions, ongoing consent is necessary. On subsequent visits, I will remind participants of the purpose and intentions of the project, and what participation entails. I will not ask for new signatures, however.

This research represents an important, timely and original contribution to knowledge about contemporary policing and security practices. The results of this study will be of interest to a number of groups: scholars interested in contemporary policing and security practices (e.g., sociologists, criminologists); policymakers; the general public (including potential students and their parents); and policing and security practitioners.

This project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Board at the University of Victoria. *There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research.* You may verify the ethical approval of this study, or to raise any concerns you might have, by contacting the Human Research Ethics Office at the University of Victoria [phone and email].

A copy of this consent form will be left with you. I will retain a second copy. You may contact myself, Blair Wilkinson, at [phone and email] or my advisor, Dr. Sean Hier, at [phone and email] if you have any questions or concerns.

Your signature below indicates that you understand the conditions of participation in the study, “The Provision of Security at Canadian Universities”, and that you have had the opportunity to have your questions answered.

Thank you very much,

Blair Wilkinson

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Name of Participant

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Signature

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Date

## **Appendix B: Sample Interview Scripts**

### **Campus Security Officer Script**

Could you tell me about your educational and work background?

Where and how do you get your knowledge and expertise to do what you do?

What about courses/programs to enhance your knowledge that you have undertaken to enhance your policing/security knowledge?

What type of training/education does the work related training does university provide for you?

Why did you choose to become a campus security/police officer?

How many years have you been in campus security/policing? How many in a related field?

How does this job compare to other policing/security work you have been part of?

I understand that campus security/policing work can require a broad range of tasks and responsibilities. Could you tell me a little about your day-to-day work?

How has university policing/security changed since you began?

Has technology changed the way campus security/policing is undertaken?

Has legislative change affected campus security/policing?

Have changes to university policy/by-laws affected campus security/policing?

### **University Community:**

Who do you conceive of as being members of the “university community”.

How does having to work with these various populations affect how you go about your work?

How do parents of students influence how you do your work? What are their expectations? How do you address this group? Are there problems dealing with parents?

How do you feel these various groups perceive campus security/police?

Is there anything that you think could assist in improving how these groups perceive you?

I would like to know more about the relationship of campus security with other departments within the university. Could you tell me about that (e.g. residence services, student services)?

- Are there any departments that influence how security is conducted?
- Or any departments that security influences?

## **Policing Tasks**

### *Patrol:*

What legal regulations (laws) or university by-laws/regulations do you invoke to accomplish your work?

How do various tools (e.g., radios, vehicles, bicycles) enable you to accomplish your tasks?

How do you exercise your discretion when citing violators or in any other area of your work (e.g., report writing)?

Could you give some examples of how you exercise discretion?

What factors influence your use of discretion?

### *Civic-Sumptary Policing:*

How and to what extent are you engaged in policing ‘student social life’ on campus (e.g., alcohol or drug consumption, sexual behavior)?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to police student social life?

As a front-line officer what is your involvement in these programs?

How do you identify students who may be at risk to themselves or to others as a result of their non-academic behaviour on campus?

How and to what extent is your police/security service engaged in policing ‘student academic life’ on campus (e.g., plagiarism, falsified credentials)?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to police academic life?

### *Sentry-Dataveillant/Investigative:*

How and to what extent are you involved in monitoring the activities (e.g., movements, internet usage, etc) of students/faculty/staff?

What specific surveillance and/or investigative strategies are used?

CCTV?

Alarms?

Is this surveillance and investigation primarily reactive (based on complaints regarding fraud, Code of Conduct violations, or criminal activities?) or is it also proactive?

Can you elaborate?

Do you share this information with other university departments?

If so, what departments?

How is this information shared?

Do you share this information with (other) police services or (other) private security firms?

How is this information shared?

Does your employer monitor your activities (e.g., checkpoints on buildings, quotas, etc.)?

*Polemic:*

I understand that university campuses can be the site of many forms of protest and the exercise of freedom of speech.

As a campus security/police officer, how do you go about monitoring and policing these activities?

How do you manage the need for security with the right to freedom of speech?

### **Challenges, Job Perceptions and Changes?**

What are some of the important problems or issues campus security/law enforcement is facing?

What are some of the major challenges of your job?

How about in terms of your own kind of job satisfaction - can you say a little bit about some of the stresses of working in this unit?

What is the most rewarding of the job?

What is the least rewarding of the job?

Are there any stories you could share that exemplify what you see your role being in the policing and security of the campus?

### **Other**

How would you describe your overall relationship with:

Management?

Your immediate supervisor?

Your fellow security/police officers?

Other members of the campus police/security service (e.g., Personal Safety Coordinators, office staff, etc.)

Is there anything else that you think I should know about policing/security on the university campus that we haven't touched on today?

## **Campus Security Management Script**

### *Background:*

Could you tell me about your educational and work background?

How many years have you been in campus security/policing? How many in a related field?

How did you become involved in the management of campus security/policing?

I understand that managing a campus security/police service can require a broad range of tasks and responsibilities. Could you tell me a little about your day-to-day work?

### *Campus Security Administration:*

I want to understand clearly the history of campus [police/security] at [university]. Could you provide some information on that? (e.g., did it emerge out of restructuring of Facilities Services?)

The following questions are about the day-to-day operations of campus security/police:

How many staff do you employ?

- Officers:
  - Backgrounds?
    - What kind of training do you provide?
    - What is your turnover rate?

Operational Budget?

- With budget issues and austerity, is your unit facing any cutbacks or changes?

What type of programmes are offered by campus security?

- Security outreach (advertising)?
- Volunteer programs?
- Who could I talk with further about these programs?

What physical resources are at the disposal of campus security?

Use of Force tools

What laws must your officers rely on in order to accomplish your work?

What university regulations must your officers regularly rely on in order to accomplish your work?

*Role of Campus Security in University Community:*

Who do you conceive of as being members of the “university community?”

How does having to work with these various populations affect how you go about your work?

How do you feel these various groups perceive campus security/police?

Is there anything that you think could assist in improving how these groups perceive you?

I would like to know more about the relationship of campus security with other departments within the university. Could you tell me about that (e.g. residence services, student services)?

- Who is your department (officially) accountable to?
- Are there any departments that influence how security is conducted?
- Or any departments that security influences?
- Do other departments in the university contact you for security advice?

*Changes in Campus Security/Policing*

How has campus security/policing changed since you began?

Has technology changed the way campus security/policing is undertaken?

Has legislative change affected campus security/policing?

Have changes to the university itself (size, administration changes, policy changes) affected campus security/policing?

Are there any plans for the future changes to the provision of campus security at this university?

*Role of Campus Security in Security/Policing Networks:*

I would like to know more about the relationship of campus security with the municipal police service in xxxx.

What kinds of knowledge or information do you share with these agencies?

I would like to know more about the relationship of campus security with private security providers in xxxx.

What kinds of knowledge or information do you share with these agencies?

Do you communicate other Canadian/American university police/security services?

Do representatives from other universities contact you about implementation or about your specific operations?

How and to what extent are you involved in security industry associations/policing associations such as CSA or ASIS, CACP?

Do you attend policing/security expositions?

Do you use or purchase materials from CSA, ASIS or similar private security industry associations?

*Risk/Liability Management:*

To what extent and how is campus security/police involved in university risk management and asset protection (e.g., securing buildings, alarm-system, CPTED, Self Defense)?

What kinds of risk are managed?

What types of strategies do you undertake to manage risk and protect assets?

How do you communicate particular risks to the university community?

*'Student Social Life' Policing:*

How and to what extent is your department engaged in policing 'student social life' on campus (e.g., alcohol or drug consumption, sexual behavior)?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to police student social life?

How do parents of students influence how you do your work? What are their expectations? How do you address this group? Are there problems dealing with parents?

*'Student Academic Life' Policing:*

How and to what extent is your police/security service engaged in policing 'student academic life' on campus (e.g., plagiarism, falsified credentials)?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to police academic life?

*Polemic:*

I understand that university campuses can be the site of many forms of protest and the exercise of freedom of speech.

As campus security/police, how do you go about monitoring and policing these activities?

How do you manage the need for security with the right to freedom of speech?

*Surveillance:*

How and to what extent is your service engaged in the surveillance and investigation of students/faculty/staff/visitors?

Is this surveillance and investigation primarily reactive (based on complaints regarding fraud, University by-law violations, or criminal activities?) or is it also proactive? Can you elaborate?

What specific surveillance and/or investigative strategies are used?  
CCTV? Electronic pass cards?

Do you ever engage in covert investigations and surveillance?  
Do you monitor electronic communications and Internet use?

Do you monitor officers' activities (e.g., checkpoints on buildings)?

*Workplace Violence:*

With respect to workplace violence, are you involved in producing individualized plans to ensure the safety of at-risk staff members?

Elaborate.

*Challenges, Job Perceptions and Changes?*

What are some of the important problems or issues campus security/law enforcement is facing?

What are some of the major challenges of your job?

How about in terms of your own kind of job satisfaction - can you say a little bit about some of the stresses of working in this unit?

What is the most rewarding of the job?

What is the least rewarding of the job?

## **Non-University Security Sample Script (Oak Residence)**

### *Background:*

Could you tell me about your educational and work background?

How many years have you been involved in this position? How many in a related field?

I understand that managing a residence service can require a broad range of tasks and responsibilities. Could you tell me a little about your day-to-day work?

### *Administration:*

The following questions are about the day-to-day operations of residence services.

How many staff do you employ?

- Backgrounds?
  - What kind of training do you provide?
  - What is your turnover rate?

Operational Budget?

- With budget issues and austerity, is your unit facing any cutbacks or changes?

What type of programmes related to (safety, security, student social life) are offered by residence services?

- Who could I talk with further about these programs?

I'd like to understand a little about the university regulations or contracts that are enforced. Could you tell me what these are and the processes through which they are applied?

### *Networks*

Can you speak about your relationship with campus police?

What role does Campus Police take in assisting with ensuring safety and security in residence?

What special programs are in place?

Communication of safety/security risks?  
Investigations related to code of conduct/residence contract?

*Changes in Campus Security/Policing*

How has the management of residence life changed since you began?  
Technology, legal?

Have changes to the university itself (size, administration changes, policy changes) affected residence life management?

*Risk/Liability Management:*

What kinds of risk are managed?  
What types of strategies do you undertake to manage risk and protect assets?  
How do you communicate particular risks to residents?

*'Student Social Life' Policing:*

How and to what extent is your department engaged in policing 'student social life' on campus (e.g., alcohol or drug consumption, sexual behavior)?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to manage student social life?

Use of Student code of conduct?

Can you talk a little about the rationale of a dry orientation week? How are students dealt with who break this rule?

Can you talk a little about the categorization of high-risk drinking paraphernalia – hookahs as drug paraphernalia?

How do parents of students influence how you do your work? What are their expectations? How do you address this group? Are there problems dealing with parents?

In your handbook it states that parents may be notified of unruly behaviour – does this apply only to under 18 or to all residents?

*'Student Academic Life' Policing:*

How and to what extent are you involved in assisting with 'student academic life' on campus – e.g. monitoring for signs of academic performance issues amongst residents?

What strategies or programs does your office deploy to assist with academic life?

*Polemic:*

I understand that residence is a location in which students are coming from various backgrounds.

How do you manage conflicts between beliefs (e.g., religious views against homosexuality vs. LGBT youth?)

How do you ensure free speech is protected while also protecting individual rights?

*Surveillance:*

Can you talk about some of the ways that residences are monitored or secured to protect against unwanted persons or behaviours?

- e.g., surveillance, visitor wrist bands, keycards, etc?
- Can you talk about the history and/or development of any of these programs?
- Monitoring of social media?

I'd like to know more about the investigation into issues as it relates to your behaviour management program.

I understand from your residence handbook that investigations into behaviour take place and these may include the use of data gleaned from such things as outside sources and meal card usage. Can you talk a little about who undertakes these investigations and how they are conducted?

What is the "burden of proof" used in these investigations?

Who adjudicates these cases?

What is the appeal process?

Is it possible for me to get some example cases or statistics on discipline?

*Challenges, Job Perceptions and Changes?*

What are some of the important problems or issues facing your department as it relates to safety and security?

What are some of the major challenges of your job?

How about in terms of your own kind of job satisfaction - can you say a little bit about some of the stresses of working in this unit?

What is the most rewarding of the job?

What is the least rewarding of the job?