Philosophy of Art Forgeries: The Aesthetic Difference Between Originals and Copies

By

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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This thesis consists of three chapters and deals with the aesthetic status of forgeries regarding works of literature, the visual arts, and musical works. The first chapter deals with the definition of forgery and I explain the difference between forgeries and mere fakes. I also give examples of famous art forgeries. In the second chapter I explain the leading arguments regarding the aesthetic status of forgeries. These arguments come from Nelson Goodman, Alfred Lessing, Mark Sagoff, Denis Dutton, John Hoaglund, Tomas Kulka, Kendall Walton, and Sherri Irvin. In the final chapter I give my own view and explain what exactly is aesthetically wrong with forgeries. My main issue with forgeries deals with deception and with what this deception entails.

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents: Brian and Marilyn Negrich. They have always been there for me and have always pushed me to do my best and to get my work done.

Chapter 1: On Forgeries

Introduction to Chapter 1:

Forgers seem to have existed as early as the second millennium B.C.E. These earliest forgers were the Phoenicians who trafficked in art forgeries and lived near the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. One of their forgeries in particular is of an ancient terra-cotta bowl, which seems to have been art that was traded to ancient Italy. In the nineteenth century, this beautiful and ancient bowl was found at a dig sight near Rome. At first glance the bowl seemed to have been ancient Egyptian. It depicts a pharaoh in a chariot shooting arrows at his enemies. However, upon closer inspection, the picture reveals comical mistakes. For instance, the hieroglyphs are gibberish, and the chariot is not attached to the horses. The bowl was made cheaply and quickly and the name of its previous Phoenician owner is engraved into its surface.[1] Since the time of the Phoenicians, fakes and forgeries have been turning up everywhere and often.

Thomas Hoving was a curator at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Throughout his career he examined thousands of genuine works as well as forgeries. He claims that about 40 percent of the works he examined were forgeries, misattributed works, or so altered and restored that there was hardly anything left of the original artist's work.[2] Peter Watson (a research associate at the Illicit Antiques Research Centre) and Oskar White Muscarella (an archaeologist whose speciality is in Ancient Near Eastern Art) also claim that about 40 percent of the artworks and objects tested at the Oxford Thermoluminescence Laboratory turn out to be fake.[3]

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[1]Thomas Hoving, *False Impressions: The Hunt for Big Time Art Fakes* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 24-25.
[2]Hoving, *False Impressions*, p. 17.
[3]Peter Watson, "How Forgeries Corrupt our Top Museums," *New Statesman*, 129 (2000), p. 14.

It can be difficult to tell whether a work is a mere copy which may be in homage or whether it is a forgery which was intended to deceive. For centuries, many artists openly copied works, or the *styles*, of known artists. This was often seen as respectful as it honoured the original artist.[4] These works can be detrimental to art history and frustrating to deal with for art historians. The closer in history the copied work is to the original work, or to the life of the original artist, the more difficult it is to determine that the work is a fake. Especially if there are two similar works whose dates of productions turn out to be similar. Trying to figure out which of the artworks is the original can also be a problem. All of these problems create a false history of the artworld and it can be difficult to rectify even if we learn the truth about the works. This is explained more extensively in the third chapter of this thesis. Some fakes and forgeries might never be exposed. Others might question the authenticity of a work; nonetheless, there might never be enough proof to confidently deem it genuine or fake.

Between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, many artists, including Pierre-August Renoir, Rembrandt van Rijn, and Sandro Botticelli[5] encouraged the reproduction of their artworks. This was done as a means of training their students or to meet market goals. Sometimes the masters even signed the works that his students created,[6] and some artists even copied their own works. For instance, Pierre-August Renoir copied many of the works he thought were his best and then sold them.[7] For these and many other reasons it is especially difficult to determine whether a work is a forgery or something else. This determination also depends on the definition of forgery that one uses. For instance, if

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[4]Brian Innes, *Fakes and forgeries: The True Crime Stories of History's Greatest Deceptions: The Criminals, The Scams, and The Victims* (London, UK: The Readers Digest Association Inc., and Amber Books Ltd., 2005), p. 42.
[5]For examples see: Innes, *Fakes and forgeries,* pp. 45-46.
[6]Innes, *Fakes and forgeries,* pp. 41, 45, 46.
[7]Hoving, *False Impressions,* p. 75.

being from a period later than the time when *O* was produced is a necessary condition of *F* being a forgery of *O*, then certain works will not count as forgeries. For instance, if artist *B* copies the work of artist *A* at the same time that artist *A* creates his work then the work of artist *B* could not be a forgery. However, if artist *B* copied the work two decades after the original work was created then the work could be a forgery. Even though artist *B* could have the exact same intentions for his work in each example, the above definition of forgeries treats the two cases differently. However, if forgeries are determined by whether deception is involved then the work created by artist *B* could be classified as a forgery.

This thesis is on the aesthetic status of forgeries of works of literature, works of visual arts, such as paintings and sculptures, and musical works. It consists of three chapters: in the first chapter I give examples of forgeries regarding the visual arts, literature, and music. I will also define what a forgery is by using Michael Wreen's definition, and explain the difference between fakes and forgeries. All forgeries are fakes in some sense, but not all fakes are forgeries. A further question I pose and answer is whether one, even one of the greats, can forge one's own work.

In the second chapter I give different arguments as to what is wrong with forgeries. Nelson Goodman first brought the topic into an interesting philosophical debate when he argued that the formal features of the two works differ even when the forgery seems to be a perfect copy. Since Goodman, aestheticians such Alfred Lessing, Mark Sagoff, Denis Dutton, and Sherri Irvin have been eager to contribute to the topic. Lessing argues that the aesthetic value of an authentic artwork and a forgery are no different. However, he does not necessarily believe that a forger, such as Han van Meegeren, is as great an artist as one of the masters, such as Johannes Vermeer. Sagoff argues that the

only aesthetically relevant aspects of artworks are the history of the work and how it was created. According to Sagoff, a work is aesthetically inferior if it is forged. Dutton argues that forgeries misrepresent artistic achievement and, by doing so, they misattribute aesthetic value. In other words, a forgery's aesthetic value differs from the aesthetic value of an authentic work. One might not realize a work's true aesthetic value if one does not realize that the work is a copy. Lastly, Irvin argues that the damage that forgeries cause is more severe than previous views suggest. She explains that forgeries corrupt our aesthetic understanding of not only the work that is forged but also works that we associate with the forgery. History is distorted when we do not realize a work is a fake.

In the third and final chapter I lay out my own thoughts as to what, if anything, is aesthetically wrong with forgeries. I will adopt a position similar to that adopted by Dutton and Irvin. In other words, with Wreen's *definition* of forgeries and the views that Dutton and Irvin have *of* forgeries, I develop my own theory. With this, I explain some possible repercussions of not realizing that a work is a forgery. I will also explain whether a misattributed fake does the same aesthetic damage as a forgery. Finally, I will investigate whether there is any aesthetic worth to copies or forgeries. For the purposes of constructing a narrowly focused thesis I leave moral considerations aside. In other words, I do not explain whether or not it is moral to forge an artwork. That is not to say that such considerations ought to be left out of the philosophy of forgeries; however, they ought to be left out of the aesthetic side of the debate.

Forging the Visual Arts, Literature, and Music:

In this section I look at different forgeries and briefly explain their stories. I do so in

order to give background knowledge that will be necessary for later parts of this thesis and to show that the problem of forgeries is one in every area of the arts. I start with the visual arts, proceed with literature, and end with music. In regards to the visual art forgeries, I start with the works of Han van Meegeren, particularly *The Disciples at Emmaus,* and then I discuss the Mona Lisa forgeries. The latter forgeries leave art lovers with many unanswered questions, including the worth of the present Mona Lisa in the Louvre.

If Han van Meegeren is one of the most talked about forgers in the philosophy of art, the reason is most likely that his works are not total copies; they are forgeries in the sense that he copied the style of an artist. His works tended to be pastiches of different artworks as well (by 'pastiches' I mean taking different aspects of an artist's work and incorporating them into another body of work, similar to when we copy and paste in word processing documents). During the mid 20th century, new paintings in the style of the great artist Johannes Vermeer were discovered. These paintings were given high aesthetic praise by many art critics and art lovers. Among these newly discovered works was a painting called *The Disciples at Emmaus* which was praised above the others. However, not long after, the works were found to be forgeries made by Han van Meegeren. One of the supposed reasons why van Meegeren created his forgeries was for his critics either to admit that they were wrong and that their aesthetic judgement is fallible, or to recognize him as an artist as great as Vermeer. Van Meegeren thought this trapped his critics in a dilemma: to either stick by their initial judgement and praise a worthless painting or to feel stupid for praising it in the first place.[8]

[8]Alfred Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" in *Arguing About Art, Contemporary Philosophical Debates*. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 90-91. For more information on Van Meegeren and his forgeries, see: Hoving, *False Impressions,* pp. 164-179.

A second interesting case deals with the *Mona Lisa,* which was stolen from the Louvre in 1911. There are many different stories concerning why it was done and what happened to it. Some conspiracy theorists also believe that the one in the Louvre is a fake. One popular story states that the artwork was taken to Florence, copied by gifted forgers, and then a mere copy of the Mona Lisa was returned. Another story is that the work was stolen in order to make copies to sell to collectors. Every once in a while another authentic-looking Mona Lisa is discovered. Some Mona Lisa's have paint and wood panelling that look to be contemporaneous with the original, others have faked documents claiming they are from the 16th century, and others are said to have Leonardo's fingerprints.[9] By the end of the third chapter I will explain whether we are praising the wrong painting if in fact the painting in the Louvre is a fake, and I will also explain why van Meegeren's reasoning was faulty.

Letters, books, poems, short stories, and manuscripts can also be forged. Michelangelo Buonarroti, Thomas Chatterton, and James Macpherson are among such forgers. Michelangelo Buonarroti is the famous Italian Renaissance painter and sculptor who forged a sculpture of a beautiful life-size sleeping cupid in 1496. It is said that after Michelangelo carved the *Sleeping Cupid* a friend told him that it looked good enough to be an antique masterpiece. He told him to bury the statue for a time and then retrieve it. This would make it look much older than it was. Then he told Michelangelo to send it to Rome as an antique. This would increase the value of the statue and Michelangelo could sell it for more money. Some say Michelangelo did as his friend suggested. Others say that the friend took it to Rome and buried it himself. The Cardinal of San Giorgio, Raffaello Riario, ended up buying the *Sleeping Cupid* for 200 crowns. Later on he

[9]Hoving, *False Impressions,* p. 85.

discovered that the work was a forgery and wanted his money back. For this the Cardinal was laughed at and was scolded by art lovers for not seeing the artistic merit of the *Sleeping Cupid*. As a result, Michelangelo and his works became even more popular. In Mantua, during the sixteenth century, the statue was shown in the d'Este collection next to a genuine antique, perhaps to show its viewers Michelangelo's skill.[10]

Thomas Chatterton is one of the youngest documented forgers of all time. In 1762, 10 year old Chatterton started forging fifteenth-century manuscripts under the name Tomas Rowley, who was allegedly a priest. At the age of 15, Chatterton even conjured up a family tree for Rowley. However, when the boy was 17 years old, the people of London started claiming that his manuscripts were forgeries. Chatterton committed suicide, perhaps to escape punishment and humiliation. Still, after his death his forging abilities were hailed by many poets including William Wordsworth and John Keats.[11]

The poems of Ossian are also among the most famous forgeries. Around the mid 18th century, a man named James Macpherson claimed to have found the poems of Ossian. In the Preface to the First Edition, Macpherson says,

> Several people of rank, as well as taste, prevailed with me to make a journey into the Highlands and Western Isles, in order to recover what remained of the works of the old bards, especially those of Ossian, the son of Fingal, who was the best, as well as most ancient, of those who are celebrated in tradition for their poetical genius. I undertook this journey, more from a desire of complying with the

[10]Innes, *Fakes and forgeries,* pp. 44-45. See also: Hoving, *False Impressions,* p. 55.
[11]Innes, *Fakes and forgeries,* pp. 94-95.

> request of my friends, than from any hopes I had of answering their expectations. I was not unsuccessful, considering how much the compositions of ancient times have been neglected, for some time past, in the north of Scotland. Several gentlemen in the highlands and Isles, generously gave me all their assistance in their power; and it was by their means I was enabled to complete the epic poem… It is only my business to lay it before the reader, as I have found it.[12]

This statement shows how Macpherson was really trying to push to make it seem as though the poems were genuine. He writes how he undertook a long journey in order to retrieve the poetry and how he never thought he would be successful. However, he writes how successful his journey turned out to be and how he supposedly found the Ossianic poetry in the highlands and Isles of Scotland. Finally, at the end of the statement he claims that the poems in the book are exactly as he found them. In other words, he claims that he did not add a poem or line to any part of the collection.

These poems were said to be as great as Homer's and this was extraordinary news for the Celts: since they were a constantly defeated people, they searched for years trying to find the next Homer among their people; however, when they looked, no poet existed.[13] When Macpherson claimed to have found the Ossianic poems the Celts finally celebrated their history. Nevertheless, in time Macpherson's poems were revealed for what they were. Macpherson had falsified the poems in order to give his people what they were looking for. Scholars have found and studied most of the authentic manuscripts and Ossianic poetry taken from oral recitation that Macpherson used. They found that

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[12]James Macpherson, *Poems of Ossian* (Edinburgh: The Mercat Press, 1971), p. 1xii.
[13]Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Invention of Scotland: Myth and History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 76, 86.

Macpherson's poems held minimal similarity to any authentic ballads and that hardly any lines were genuinely reproduced. Therefore, though Ossianic ballads did exist, none were close to Macpherson's epic poems. Moreover, the poems that claimed to be of Scottish decent were actually Irish.[14] Macpherson's poems fooled many people including the philosopher David Hume. Even though Hume was sceptical of other supposed early Gaelic poetry, he stoutly supported the authenticity of *Fragments*.[15]

Music is the final medium I examine in regards to artistic forgeries. Peter Kivy lays out a possible example of a musical forgery and the steps it might take to forge such a work. First, one must decide which work to forge. Kivy says that Bach's Partita in A-minor for Unaccompanied Flute is a good example, though any other work where the original autograph is lost would do as well.[16] Second of all, the composer and musicologist should make themselves accustomed to Bach's style, particularly the style of Partita. Next, one who can forge signatures should become familiar with Bach's penmanship and should master Bach's musical script. The composer and musicologist must then work together to create a work that differs from any existing manuscript; they forge their work in the *style* of Bach's music. Next, they present their work to the forger who constructs the fake manuscript of the Partita. The forged manuscript is altered to look aged, and then one of the forgers claims to have found the lost manuscript of the Partita stored away in his attic. Finally, one might publish one's 'research' in a book or journal article.[17]

The supposed Haydn sonatas are examples of possible forged music which are

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[14]Trevor-Roper, *The Invention of Scotland,* pp. 111, 112, 114, 117, 123, 138.
[15]Trevor-Roper, *The Invention of Scotland,* pp. 91, 95, 101.
[16]Peter Kivy, "How to Forge a Musical Work," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 58 (2000), p. 233.
[17]Peter Kivy, "How to Forge a Musical Work," pp. 233-234.

usually attributed to Winfried Michel: in the early nineties, a manuscript of six new piano sonatas by Joseph Haydn was found. The news was printed in an issue of BBC magazine and the dean of Haydn scholars, H. C. Robbins Landon, claimed that they were genuine. However, a month later a retraction was printed after evidence came out which questioned the authenticity of the works. It is said that the flute player, Winfried Michel, was the forger. It was he who presented the sole copy of the work in the first place. However, even though evidence suggests that the manuscripts are forged, it is extremely difficult to prove for sure. This is the case with many musical forgeries.[18]

Though I agree that Kivy's detailed example describes one way to forge a musical work, there are also other ways. For instance, one can also simply speed up or alter a performer's voice using technology. If one does so with the intention to deceive the public, as to the actual achievement of the artist, then the work becomes a musical forgery. This, and how the other examples I used above are forgeries, will be explained in the next section of this chapter.

What is a "Forgery"?

To get to what is wrong with forgeries I must first define what a forgery is. To begin, I will explain what Alfred Lessing takes a forgery to be and then I will explain Denis Dutton's view and Michael Wreen's view. Dutton and Wreen's views are the most similar. Nonetheless, Wreen's account in richer and more detailed. His definition is the one to which I am most sympathetic. It seems to be the view that best explains how we use the term "forgery" and it seems to be the most explanatory compared to other views.

[18]Michael Beckerman, "CLASSICAL VIEW; All Right, So Maybe Haydn Didn't Write Them. So What?" *New York Times*. May 15, 1994. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02EFDD1339F936A25756C0A962958260 (accessed 1 March 2011).

Alfred Lessing takes forgery to deal with the concept of originality and a work's date of production. According to Lessing, Vermeer discovered his own technique and it is this technique that is original and can be forged. For instance, among other features, van Meegeren forged the way Vermeer used colour and created light since these features were unique to Vermeer's works.[19] Nonetheless, Lessing argues that forgery does not merely deal with originality. His definition of forgery moves away from an individual work to a whole body of work. By "originality in art," Lessing means "the totality of artistic productions of one man or even one school… [It also] depends entirely on a historical context in which we are placing and considering the accomplishment of one man or one period."[20] He also says, "What makes *The Disciples* a forgery is precisely the disparity or gap between its stylistically appropriate features and its actual date of production."[21] What this means is that if van Meegeren painted his works around the time Vermeer was painting then his works would not be forgeries. Therefore, according to Lessing, a work is not a forgery if one wants to deceive the public and copies another artist's work so long as the gap between the original date of production and the date of production of the copy is small.

In order to understand the consequences of Lessing's definition, picture a contemporary artist, John, who has never seen or heard of Vermeer's works and happened to recreate his style. Had Vermeer never existed, John would have been the first to create the famous style. John personally achieved as much as Vermeer. It is just that he happened to create his works in the 21st century rather than the 17th century. However, according to Lessing's criterion of a stylistic gap, if van Meegeren lived during

[19]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" p. 96.
[20]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" pp. 97-98.
[21]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" p. 99.

the time of Vermeer John's works would be forgeries whereas van Meegeren's works would not. Van Meegeren intentionally copied Vermeer's style, yet John unintentionally recreated it. It seems odd to say that John's work is a forgery though van Meegeren's work is not. Most people take forgers to be intentional deceptive copiers.

Denis Dutton's definition is much more appealing than Lessing's theory up the gap since it seems to coincide much better with our usage of the word today. Dutton defines the word "forgery" as "an artifact of one person which is intentionally attributed to another, usually with the purpose of turning a profit."[22] In other words, forgeries intentionally mislead art critics and art lovers. Dutton also acknowledges that that there is always a chance that a work's performance might be unintentionally misunderstood or misrepresented. For instance, one might believe that a copy of an artwork, one that is not intended to deceive, is actually the original, or that a work created in the style of van Gogh, in order to give homage, was intended to look like a newly discovered van Gogh. However, Dutton realizes that unintentional misrepresentation does not make a work of forgery.[23]

Moreover, though forgeries are necessarily unoriginal in some sense, Dutton thinks that originality *can* still be seen in some of them. Pastiches, for instance, combine different elements from different artworks to create a new work. Also, as explained above, none of van Meegeren's forgeries are direct copies. In fact, there are aspects of his works that are entirely his own (for instance, the eyes van Meegeren painted on his subjects). Originality is relevant because it highlights the importance of the works' origins in regards to our appreciation of it. Nevertheless, Dutton does not believe that

[22]Denis Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," in *Arguing About Art: Contemporary Philosophical Debates*. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 107.
[23]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 107.

unoriginality is the most significant aspect of forgeries. The crucial difference between original works, copies, and forgeries is between correctly represented and misrepresented performances.[24]

The final definition of forgery to be considered is that of Michael Wreen. Like Dutton's definition, Wreen's is origin-related. It also explains how a work can be forged in the same historical period, how one can forge the work of a non-existent person, such as Ossian, and how forgeries of forgeries can exist, [25] such as a forgery of *The Disciples at Emmaus*. According to Wreen "a forgery has to be understood as a forged XY… A forged XY isn't a genuine XY, but is represented as a genuine XY, and is so represented with the intention to deceive."[26] Wreen labels 'X' as the source or person who forges or creates the work, and 'Y' as the artifact forged or created, such as a painting. He then explains that by 'genuine' he means that a forged XY is not an actual XY.[27] Therefore, the artist who copies some aspect of his or another artist's work, with the intention to deceive, is a forger. However, the artist who does not intend to deceive is not a forger. Wreen explains,

> A student who copies great works as an academic exercise is not ipso facto a forger; he is an apprentice craftsman, learning the techniques of painting in the only way possible: by practice. If our budding painter went on to represent his works as authentic Toulouse-Lautrecs, Renoirs, and de Koonings and did so not as a joke, and not accidentally, but believing that he could deceive and

[24]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," pp. 110-111.
[25]Michael Wreen, "Forgery," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* 32 (2002), pp. 155, 158.
[26]Wreen, "Forgery," p. 152.
[27]For more information see: Wreen, "Forgery," pp. 152-153.

> wanting to deceive art historians, art critics, and the general public about their genuineness, then, it seems to me, we could justly accuse him of forgery.[28]

Another attribute of this definition is that a forger can forge the work of a non-existent person as well. The reason is that, according to Wreen's definition, the work need only be *represented* as a genuine XY; there need not be a genuine XY. This definition can be used, not merely as a definition for artistic forgeries, but as a general definition of all forgeries. It explains how such things as stamps, wills, bank notes, credit cards, shrouds, identification cards, and so forth can be forged.[29]

The difference between a fake and a forgery is the difference between mere copying and intentional deceit, and between natural artifacts, such as stones or driftwood, and human agency. As stated above, if an artist intends to pass off a copy he created as an original then the copy is a forgery. If, on the other hand, the artist created the copy but does not intend to pass it off as the original then the work is merely a copy. This is the case regarding the many reproduced works in retail stores which are sold everyday. The two main differences between fakes and forgeries are 1) we know that such works are fakes, and 2) fakes tend not to have the possible damaging effects that forgeries have. However, a mere copy could still be misattributed as an original. In these cases the works are still not real forgeries, they are misnomers. In other words, the works are thought to be forgeries but are not themselves real forgeries.

Wreen also explains why natural objects usually are not taken to be forgeries. The reason has everything to do with the definition of forgeries. Wreen states,

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[28]Michael Wreen, "Is, Madam? Nay, It Seems!" in *The Forger's Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art*. Denis Dutton (ed.), (California: University of California Press, 1983), p. 189.
[29]Wreen, "Is, Madam? Nay, It Seems!" pp. 189-190.

> [N]o non-artifact kind will do for forgery. Non-artifacts don't have a source of issue, even though they're created out of pre-existing materials of some kind… That's why diplomas, chairs, violins, letters of recommendation, perfumes, diaries, and so on can be forged, but plants, bones, rocks, skulls, and so on can't be. This isn't to say, of course, that a natural object, such as a wind-sculpted rock, can't function as a forged David Smith sculpture… a forger need not actually have made the object that is the forgery.[30]

In other words, concerning natural objects, the genuine 'Y' condition in Wreen's definition (that is, the artifact forged) might be seen as met; however, the genuine 'X' condition (that is, the source or person who created the work) is not since natural objects do not have a creator.[31] The Piltdown Man skull is an actual example of a fake natural object. Between 1908 and 1912 human skull fragments, supposedly millions of years old, were discovered close to Piltdown. The man was named the "Piltdown Man" and was allegedly the earliest human discovered. It was deemed one of the greatest archaeological discoveries of all time. Forty-one years later, the authenticity of the skull was questioned and analysis on it was done. The analysis proved that the Piltdown Man had never lived; the whole thing was a hoax. It is not a forgery under the ascribed definition since skulls do not have a source of issue as paintings or chairs do. Rather, the Piltdown Man case was a hoax or kind of fraud.[32]

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[30]Wreen, "Forgery," p. 153.

[31]That is, unless one wants to argue that natural objects are God's creations.

[32]For more information see: Miles Russell, "Piltdown Man: Case Closed," Bournemouth University: Centre for Archaeology, Anthropology & Heritage, http://www.bournemouth.ac.uk/caah/landscapeandtownscapearchaeology/piltdown_man_a.html (accessed 1 March 2011). Also see: Miles Russell, *Piltdown Man: The Secret Life Of Charles Dawson*. (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing. 2004).

In regards to the latter part of Wreen's statement, Wreen simply means that nature itself cannot forge an artwork. Nature can happen to create a stone sculpture similar to an artwork which was already created; nevertheless, that naturally crafted stone is merely a coincidental copy unless a traveller tries to pass it off as the original. However, it gets trickier when he says "a forger need not actually have made the object that is the forgery."[33] As stated above, if a work was not created with the intent to deceive then the work cannot be a forgery. Since the rock was not created as such it would seem then that it cannot be a forgery. However, human agency and deception *are* present once the traveller tries to pass the rock off as the original work. Therefore, there are some similarities between deceptive natural artifacts that are brought into the artworld and forgeries.

This example seems analogous to an art dealer who tries to pass off a copy created by another artist, who had no intention to deceive anyone, as an original. If the art dealer's deception does not turn a mere copy into a forgery then it seems as though the traveller's deception does not turn the stone into a forgery either. That being said, according to the above definition of forgeries, the art dealer cannot turn another artist's work into a forgery. The art dealer might have played the biggest part in the deception though he still did not create the work. He used the work just as a golf club can be used as a hammer but is not itself called a hammer. The art dealer can *use* the copy as if it was a forgery but its initial purpose had nothing to do with deception. Therefore, calling the work a forgery seems to be a misnomer, just as a misattributed forgery is a misnomer. As such, a more restricted route than Wreen uses here seems to fit better with the current definition of forgeries: the stone can be *used* in the traveller's scheme though it is not

[33]Wreen, "Forgery," p. 153.

itself a forgery. It was not *created* to be one. A better name for the naturally carved rock might be a 'deceptive fake' rather than a forgery.

If one compares Dutton's definition with Wreen's the two are very similar, if not the same. First of all, Dutton acknowledges that a forgery is an artifact made by a person. This is Wreen's condition of why something is a forgery rather than a fake. Second, by using the word "person" in Dutton's definition, Wreen's 'X' condition is met. Furthermore, by using the word "artifact" in his definition, Wreen's 'Y' condition is met. Third, by mentioning that a forgery is something intentionally misattributed to another, Dutton meets Wreen's condition of there needing to be an intention to deceive. Therefore, though Dutton might need to explain his definition more, including some of the words he uses, his definition is fairly reasonable.

According to the view of forgeries that I endorse, there is also a spectrum to consider. This spectrum is determined by how close the work is to the artist and how original the work is. In regards to the former, it might be seen as being 1) created by the actual artist, 2) created in the same studio of the artist, 3) created in the same school of the artist, which means created around the same time and in the same way as the artist, or 4) not created by the artist.[34] In regards to the latter, the work might be a perfect copy, a pastiche, in the style of a particular artist, or partly restored. Therefore, an obvious forgery can also be partly original, and an original, perhaps created by Vermeer, can be partly forged.

If an artwork is original in style, design, and colour, with no intentional deception regarding who its artist was, then the work would be at the authentic side of the spectrum. If on the other hand a work is a copy of another work, with the intention of deceiving

[34]These are categories the artworld uses to place given artworks: Innes, *Fakes and forgeries,* p. 48.

people as to its date of production, originality, and true artist, then it would be at the inauthentic side of the spectrum. A work close to the centre of the spectrum might be one that is mostly original in style, has unique colour combinations, and is signed by its true artist, but uses some attributes and objects of other paintings and claims to be completely fresh and original. However, if there is no intent to deceive on the part of the artist then we would be dealing with the part of the spectrum where we find copies, not forgeries. That is, one side of the spectrum would deal with total originality while the other would deal with absolute copies. It is deception and the masking of the truth that is at the heart of forgeries.

Now that I have established the definition of forgeries, and have given examples of forgeries, I return to whether an artist can forge his own work. According to my definition described above, if the artwork is not a genuine XY and the representation is intentionally deceptive, then the answer is yes. For instance, if Pierre-August Renoir intended to deceive his buyers by telling them that their copies were his original works then those copies would be forgeries. Though the works would be genuine Renoir paintings (X), the artifacts created would not be genuine since they were not his original works (Y); they were copies of his works created by his own hand and merely represented as genuine works. In other words, Renoir's work would be a genuine X, though it would merely be represented as a genuine Y.

Conclusion to Chapter 1:

In this chapter I looked at different forgeries regarding the visual arts, literature, and music. I then explained why such works are forgeries. I endorse the origin-related

definition of Michael Wreen, which states that a work is a forgery when a forger creates a work with the aim of deception. By doing so the work is *represented* as a genuine work created by a genuine artist. This definition explains how one can forge one's own work, the work of a non-existent person or being, and how one can forge a forgery.

I also differentiated between fakes and forgeries. One of the differences depends on whether there was human agency: to be a forgery, a genuine work must have a creator, or be represented as having a creator, and the forged work must have a creator as well. Since natural objects do not have a creator they are not forgeries. The difference is also between mere copying and intentional deceit: if an artist does not intend to create a deceptive fake then the work is not a forgery. In the next chapter I will explain different views as to whether deception has any bearing on a work's aesthetic appraisal.

Chapter 2: Arguments Regarding the Aesthetic Status of Forgeries

Introduction to Chapter 2:

When two paintings, a genuine artwork and a forgery of it, look exactly same we often wonder whether there is any aesthetic difference between them. Earlier aestheticians usually thought not; they thought that any differences (such as its history of production) between the two paintings are aesthetically irrelevant.[35] In this chapter I look at eight different arguments given by philosophers of art regarding the aesthetic status of forgeries and whether there is any aesthetic difference between two artworks that, according to appearance, seem to be entirely identical. The philosophers I present have different views on the value of formal aesthetic properties and extra-aesthetic properties when it comes to a proper aesthetic evaluation of artworks. Formal aesthetic properties are such things as the colours in the work, its shape, the way the curves on a sculpture are formed, the accuracy and speed of a guitar solo, etc. In short, these are any formal features of a work that one can *see* or *hear*. A work's extra-aesthetic properties deal with the work's origins: how the artist created it, why, when, as well as the constraints and limitations imposed on the artist. That is to say, a work's extra-aesthetic properties are its historical and contextual features. I categorize art-historical features as a sub category simply to minimize any arguments or confusion regarding the extra-aesthetic and what one takes to be historical. Nonetheless, most extra-aesthetic features are art-historical.

When it comes to the aesthetic status of forgeries, the most popular argument is the "commonsense argument." This argument is one that many aestheticians use to prove

[35]Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 100.

that there is no aesthetic difference between a genuine work and a forgery of it. The argument can be put as follows:

> There can be no aesthetic difference without a perceptual difference.
>
> There is no perceptual difference between an original artwork and a deceptive forgery of it.
>
> Therefore, there is no aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a deceptive forgery of it.[36]

This argument is valid. However, if one can argue against its premises then one can argue that the conclusion is false. Thus, those who argue that there is no aesthetic difference between genuine works and forgeries maintain that the argument is valid and explain why, whereas those who argue that there is an aesthetic difference between the works must argue against one or both of its premises.

The arguments I look at come from the writings of Nelson Goodman, Alfred Lessing, Mark Sagoff, Denis Dutton, John Hoaglund, Tomas Kulka, Kendall Walton, and Sherri Irvin. These views are the main theories in the field of aesthetics. Goodman argues that there are differences between originals and forgeries on the grounds that their formal features differ. He says that the way we perceive artworks, and thus experience them aesthetically, is partly determined by the knowledge we have of those works. Lessing says that the aesthetic value of an authentic artwork and a forgery are no different. Nonetheless, he argues that mere forgers are not as great artists as any of the masters since they forge the originality of another artist. This is the case whether it is a perfect

[36]Argument stated by Thomas Foster and Luise Morton in "Goodman, Forgery, and the Aesthetic," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 49 (1991), p. 156.

copy or a work in the style of another artist or school. Sagoff argues that the only aesthetically relevant aspects of artworks are the history of the work and how it was created. Dutton says that forgeries misrepresent artistic achievement, and, by doing so, they misattribute aesthetic value. He argues that our aesthetic experience involves certain information we have of a work; when the information we have of a work changes then our experience and enjoyment of the work also changes. Hoaglund outlines what he takes "authenticity," "uniqueness," and "creativity" to mean in regards to art, and argues that aesthetic uniqueness and originality contribute to aesthetic value. Therefore, such information must be taken into consideration when making an intelligent aesthetic appraisal. Kulka opts for aesthetic dualism since he believes we value two separate things. One side of this dualist view deals with the aesthetic value of art and the other deals with an artistic value. The former deals with the work itself, whereas the latter deals with the artist and the historical context of the work. Walton says that a work's aesthetic properties do not solely depend on its perceivable properties. There are certain categories of works that must also be taken into consideration. Finally, Irvin presents reasons to believe that the damage that forgeries cause is more severe than the previous views suggest. According to her, forgeries corrupt our aesthetic understanding the work that is forged *and* those works we associate with the forged work.

Goodman's Argument:

Nelson Goodman is one of the first philosophers to make ideas about the aesthetic status of forgeries famous. In his book *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* Goodman asks,

> Is there any aesthetic difference between the two pictures for *x* at *t*, where *t* is a suitable period of time, if *x* cannot tell them apart by merely looking at them at *t*? ... Can anything that *x* does not discern by merely looking at the pictures at *t* constitute an aesthetic difference between them for *x* at *t*?[37]

In this statement, *x* represents the person discerning whether there are any aesthetic differences between the artworks, and *t* represents the moment in which *x* is viewing the works. What Goodman is asking here is whether there can be an aesthetic difference between the two artworks if person *x* cannot, at the given time *t*, see any differences. Goodman's response to his question is that there is an aesthetic difference between the original artwork and the forgery. Goodman accepts that the commonsense argument is valid; therefore he must pick one or both of its premises apart. He decides to agree with the first premise, "there can be no aesthetic difference without a perceptual difference" but he rejects the second, "there is no perceptual difference between an original artwork and a deceptive forgery of it." Hence, he wants to show that there are perceptual differences between the two paintings and, for that reason, that there are aesthetic differences between them also.[38]

For Goodman, subtle differences can significantly alter one's aesthetic experience. If one can, at some point, pick up on the differences between an original and a forgery then one's experience of the two artworks can change. Goodman says,

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[37]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 102.

[38]In his attempt to argue that there is such an aesthetic difference between originals and forgeries Goodman also wants to make it clear that he does not necessarily believe that genuine works are superior to forgeries. For Goodman, there is an important difference between claiming superiority of an original to its reproduction and a claiming that there is an aesthetic difference between them. However, if there is such a difference it is likely that one is in some way superior to the other. Nevertheless, the forgery is not necessarily the inferior work.

> Extremely subtle changes can alter the whole design, feeling, or expression of a painting. Indeed, the slightest perceptual differences sometimes matter the most aesthetically; gross physical damage to a fresco may be less consequential than slight but smug retouching.[39]

Once one picks up on the subtle differences between paintings *A* and *B*, the aesthetic experience one has of painting *A* can be much different than the aesthetic experience one has of painting *B* even if the works are practically identical.

However, according to Goodman, the fact that one cannot see an aesthetic difference between the works does not mean that there are no aesthetic differences. Goodman gives two reasons for this. In regards to the first point, Goodman says,

> Although I cannot tell the pictures apart merely by looking at them now, the fact that the… one is the original and the… [other the] forgery constitutes an *aesthetic difference between them for me now* because knowledge of this fact 1) stands as evidence that there may be a difference between them that I can learn to perceive, 2) assigns the present looking a role as training toward such a perceptual discrimination, and 3) makes consequent demands that modify and differentiate my present experience in looking at the two pictures.[40]

Thus, with the given knowledge that the one is a forgery and the other the original one might, at any given moment, be able to recognize the actual differences. This might take time, training, preparation, and a keen eye. Nevertheless, just because one does not see a

[39]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 108.
[40]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 105.

difference now does not mean that one will *never* be able to learn to see one. The possibility is always there, even if one is never able to. Time can, and often does, reveal many secrets.[41]

When we have knowledge of certain things, that one is genuine and the other a fake for instance, we start looking at the works differently. We want to see if there are any noticeable differences between them. Therefore, while we look upon the works we train ourselves to try to notice differences in the future. We become more attentive and things that once seemed invisible to the naked eye can become visible. Twins, for example, might seem impossible to tell apart. Nonetheless close relatives and acquaintances tend to be able to distinguish them. Goodman also explains how a newsboy might not be able to tell the difference between a genuine picture and a fake at first. However, if he becomes a museum director his visual attention becomes more acute and the differences between the two paintings can become more obvious.[42]

In regards to Goodman's second point, how even if one cannot see an aesthetic difference there can still be differences, Goodman states,

> Since the exercise, training, and development of our power of discriminating among works of art are plainly aesthetic activities, the aesthetic properties of a picture include not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine *how it is to be looked at.*[43]

In other words, the act of training to discriminate between the forgery and the original makes us look at the works differently, and the way we look at a work makes up the other

[41]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p.105.
[42]Goodman, *Languages of Art,* pp. 103-104.
[43]Goodman, *Languages of Art,* p. 112.

part of that work's aesthetic properties. Therefore, if one looks at painting *A* differently than the way one looks at painting *B*, even if the works look similar, then one's aesthetic experience of the works are different.[44]

Goodman argues that the aesthetic difference between forgeries and originals is indeed a formal one. He believes that there are small differences between the works and that we can sometimes train ourselves to one day see them. His argument depends on there being perceptual differences between forgeries and originals. If some forgeries really are perfect copies, then the aesthetic difference between the works depends solely on the way we look at the copies and the originals once we discover the forgeries.

Lessing's Argument:

In his article "What is Wrong With Forgery?" Alfred Lessing argues that the only aesthetic qualities are formal qualities. Since none of the formal features of an artwork change once it has been found to be a forgery no aesthetic change occurs either. From merely an aesthetic point of view, it seems as though there is no difference between a van Meegeren forgery and a genuine Vermeer. Lessing explains, and rightly so, that we cannot solely draw a distinction between originals and forgeries on the grounds that the one is a forgery and the other is a genuine; this would simply be begging the question.

According to Lessing, a work is aesthetically valuable based on its beauty and beauty is purely formal. Therefore, if we want to give a work pure aesthetic appraisal we can only focus on its beauty.[45] The notes of a song and the brush strokes on a canvas can be beautiful since they are formal features. However, the history and knowledge behind a

[44]Goodman, *Languages of Art,* p. 109.
[45]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" p. 91.

work's creation cannot be beautiful since these features are non-formal. Any forgery that is as visually beautiful as its original, or as visually beautiful compared to similar looking original works,[46] ought to be seen as aesthetically valuable as the original. Take *The Disciples* by van Meegeren, for example. As described in the preceding chapter, this work was praised by many before it was discovered to be a forgery. Lessing says that, aesthetically, this and other van Meegeren forgeries are "capital works"[47] since they are beautiful. Hence, they ought to be aesthetically valued as such.

Lessing believes that for an ideal aesthetic experience the less information that one has, or lets oneself take into consideration, the more accurate the aesthetic appraisal. This information can deal with the artwork's history of production, the artist, or any background knowledge about the artworld. Lessing asks us to picture a man who knows nothing and cares nothing for van Meegeren, Vermeer, or any other artist. He cares only for the painting itself. According to Lessing, this man is somehow more attuned to the aesthetic qualities of the painting and does not have any extra information to cloud his judgement.[48]

Lessing says that his problem with forgeries is non-aesthetic. The issue for him is that forgeries lack originality or creativity.[49] Thus, when a critic gives high aesthetic praise to an artwork before realizing it is a forgery the forger is justified in arguing that his work is as aesthetically valuable as the original. However, according to Lessing, if the forger believes that his own artistic accomplishment depends on the aesthetic value of his works he is wrong. Artistic accomplishment deals not only with aesthetic enjoyment but also any extra-aesthetic features that tell us how the artist succeeded or failed in creating

[46]The latter is in regards to any works which are not complete copies.
[47]These are Lessing's words in reference to Decoen: Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" p. 91.
[48]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" pp. 92-93.
[49]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" pp. 94, 96.

his work. Even if everyone agreed that van Meegeren's forgeries were as beautiful as Vermeer's, van Meegeren did not accomplish as much as Vermeer: part of Vermeer's greatness lies in his genius of creating a new art style. Van Meegeren merely copied Vermeer's style. Although both are kinds of accomplishments they are much different. The ability to copy a work or the style of another artist can be learned after much training and practice. However, coming up with a new style takes not only skill but also creativity.

To sum up, Lessing believes that aesthetic value depends solely on formal properties. Since *The Disciples* is a pleasing object to view, it has aesthetic value. This is the case for any artworks which are pleasing to look at or listen to. Once a critic realizes that what he has praised is a forgery he ought not change his aesthetic appraisal. In fact, he ought to be proud that he made a purely aesthetic appraisal without external information clouding his judgement.[50] However, *The Disciples* and other forgeries are copies of someone else's creativity. Therefore, the forger's achievement is different from the achievement of the original artist. A feature that counted as creativity in the original work is seen as something that has already been done with regards to the forgery.

Sagoff's Argument:

Mark Sagoff argues that the beauty and skill of a forgery and an original are not similar enough to be compared since their cognizable properties are so different. According to Sagoff, comparing a forgery and an original is as different as comparing the skill of an original artwork to a jailbreak.[51] Like a jailbreak, a forgery must be compared in its *own*

[50]Lessing, "What is Wrong With a Forgery?" pp. 92, 96.
[51]Mark Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," in *The Forgers Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art.* Denis Dutton (ed.), (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 131, 151.

class. Forgeries do not have the same stylistic qualities that originals have, though they do have their own.

Sagoff cites Kant, who creates an example of a forged event and says how most people tend to react. Afterwards, Sagoff attempts to explain this phenomenon. The example Kant gives is of a boy who cheats his listeners: he makes his listeners believe they are hearing a nightingale sing when in actual fact the sound is created by himself. At first, his listeners are enticed by the sound, believing it to be produced by a nightingale. However, once they find out the actual source they no longer remain listening. Since the guests are no longer interested in listening to the sound once they learn its actual source, Sagoff says that there is an aesthetic phenomenon that must be explained. His explanation deals with his theory of relations which is explained below.[52]

Sagoff's argument begins with his view of style which he acquires from Nelson Goodman. In regards to style, Sagoff quotes Goodman who says, "*style* consists in those features of the *symbolic functioning* of a work that are characteristic of author, period, place, or school."[53] For Sagoff and Goodman, style deals with symbols, which are generally seen as aesthetic features, and reference classes, which are divided according to stylistically relevant or similar properties. If this view of style is correct, then what the work represents and the qualities it has as a result of its syntactic and semantic symbols can count as aesthetic properties.[54]

A property might be stylistically relevant for some works, irrelevant for others, or merely relevant for being unique to a particular class. Take for example painting *A*, which has been painted by Giotto. One might say that painting *A* is either geometric for

[52]Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," p. 141. Also see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H Bernard (New York: Hafner Library, 1951), p. 145.
[53]Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," p. 136.
[54]Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," p. 137.

Giotto or geometric for a fourteenth century Florentine painting. If the former, the property of being geometric is not seen as a stylistic quality since this property is unique to Giotto. It may, nonetheless, be aesthetically interesting. On the other hand, take Mondrian, a Neo-Plasticist, who created painting *B*. Painting *B* has the stylistic quality of being geometric as a Mondrian since *being geometric* is common to works created by Mondrian. However, the property of being geometric is not merely a property used by Mondrian. Mondrian's work can be seen not merely as geometric in relation to other Mondrians, but also in relation to other geometric works created by other artists. Interestingly enough, these artists tend to live in the same time and place.[55]

When it comes to purely formal grounds, Sagoff concedes that forgeries and originals do have qualities in common and can be seen as having their own class relation. However, according to Sagoff this relation is uninteresting and uninformative.[56] For instance, it does not explain why we can easily walk away from a painting we once thought was beautiful, or why the people in Kant's example walked away from the sound they once thought was lovely. If aesthetic enjoyment of an object depended solely on formal grounds, then our enjoyment of it ought not change when we discover something of the work that is external to its formal qualities.

If we look back on Kant's example and incorporate Sagoff's theory of relations, we now have one explanation of why many of the listeners want to leave rather than stay and enjoy the sound. Basically, one judges the sound or the visual aspects of a work based on the relational qualities one believes that work has. If these qualities are discovered to be mistaken, then re-evaluation is done taking the new information into account.

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[55]Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," p. 138.
[56]Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," p. 146.

If Sagoff's view is right, then originals and forgeries cannot be equally skilful or creative. A forgery can be skilful and creative in its own way; nonetheless this skill and creativity cannot be compared in relation to the skill and creativity of the original work since that would be like comparing apples to oranges. Therefore, any critics who evaluate an artwork assuming it has a particular stylistic quality, when in actual fact it has another, are not in danger of the supposed paradox mentioned in the first chapter.[57] The paradox was never there to begin with since the critics were mistaken in the kind of work they were evaluating.

Dutton's Argument:

In "Artistic Crimes" and "Authenticity in Art" Denis Dutton tries to discredit the view that the aesthetic object perceived as authentic is the same object once it has been found to be a forgery. Dutton argues that both the formal aesthetic properties of a work and its extra-aesthetic properties are relevant in regards to a work's aesthetic understanding and value.

Dutton starts his argument by giving an example of Smith and Jones who hear a new recording of Liszt's *Transcendental Études*. Smith is ecstatic about the performance. He boasts about how beautiful the work is: how the pianist has perfect speed, control, and accuracy. Jones, however, is less enthusiastic. He explains how the piece was electronic. The music was recorded at practice tempo and was electronically sped up. With this new information, Smith's excitement decreases or is killed completely. Dutton notes that "Smith cannot with his ears discriminate the difference between the pianist's technical

[57]To either admit that they were wrong and that their aesthetic evaluation is fallible, or to admit that some forgeries are as great as original artworks.

accomplishments and an engineer turning and knob."[58] For Smith, the work itself might be the same but he now views it differently. He is disappointed by what he learned and his aesthetic judgement is now altered. Dutton's problem with forgery is that it intentionally misleads. By misleading us, the achievement of the artist is misrepresented. Those achievements we believed we were honouring by enjoying the art were never there in the first place.[59]

After learning that the work was electronically altered, Smith might still enjoy the work on a different level. For instance, he might admire the skills of the engineer who electronically altered the music as well as the sound itself. Nonetheless Dutton says that, though the engineer ought to be credited with some sort of achievement, the kind of achievement in the field of electronic engineering is different from the achievement of a pianist.[60] Thus, we can enjoy fakes and forgeries, such as *The Disciples*, just as we can enjoy genuine works. Nonetheless these kinds of enjoyment are as different as enjoying the work of a great engineer and the work of a great pianist.

As John Dewey wrote, "Mere perfection in execution, judged in its own terms in isolation, can probably be attained better by a machine than by human art."[61] A computer or machine can create the same images or sounds that an artist can create. In fact, the machine's images or notes of a song might actually look or sound better than what any artist can do. A computer can be more precise, create straighter lines, or create more fluent brush strokes or notes. It can also speed up sound in ways a human being finds virtually impossible. Although the works of a machine can be the same as the works of a human being, if not better, we tend to enjoy the works of a machine differently, or even

[58]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 103.
[59]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 107.
[60]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 108.
[61]John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1934), p. 47.

less, than those of a human being.

Dutton argues that all artists perform in some form or another when crafting their art, and it is these performances that are evaluated. In painting, the performance is what brings the work into being: how the artist worked, what was needed to perform it, etc. However, we tend not to perceive this performance; we see the final product. This final product then becomes representative of the whole. Dance, on the other hand, is different since the performance is also the object of our contemplation. No final product is needed to represent the whole.[62]

The crucial point for Dutton is that performances involve a kind of accomplishment or achievement. Knowing a work's origin is an indispensable factor to fully appreciating it. Artists operate on constraints and limitations. Artists might be limited, for example, by certain colour conventions. As such, they may or may not create beautiful or great works. When they do, we honour these achievements by enjoying the art and understanding what they have done.[63] If we look back at the work of a machine versus the work of a human being we might say that we appreciate the works differently because of the differences in difficulty that were placed on each of the creators. We appreciate such difficulty. Once designed and constructed to do so, machines can create works with ease, whereas many human beings find it very challenging, if not impossible, to create art. For all those who can create art, even fewer can create great art and be original.

Dutton also examines originality and its bearing on the debate. His thoughts are that even forgeries can be original in some sense. Pastiches, for instance, combine different elements from different artworks to create a new work. Furthermore, none of

[62]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 104.
[63]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 106.

van Meegeren's forgeries were direct copies. In fact, there are aspects of his works (his depiction of eyes, for example) that are entirely his own. That being said, Dutton does not believe that unoriginality is the most significant problem of forgeries. The crucial difference is between correctly represented and misrepresented performances. We aesthetically misevaluate works when we have the wrong information.[64] However, Dutton realizes that originality is still relevant; it highlights the importance of the work's origins in regards to our appreciation of it.[65]

Dutton's argument is a mixture of both Mark Sagoff's and Alfred Lessing's views. Rather than being one sided, Dutton finds himself arguing for a middle position. He believes that both sides of the debate are important and neither ought to be left unappreciated. When it comes to the qualities of a work that are to be aesthetically evaluated, we cannot leave out those properties that diminish or increase our enjoyment. Therefore, according to Dutton, aesthetic evaluation is a two dimensional process: 1) a work's formal features and 2) its historical and contextual features go "hand-in-hand" with each other.

Hoaglund's Argument:

John Hoaglund argues that aesthetic uniqueness and creativity contribute to aesthetic value. He maintains that the features of a work that are found faked, unoriginal, and which falsely contributed to aesthetic enjoyment in the first place, are to be taken into consideration on an intelligent aesthetic appraisal. Therefore, since a forgery is

[64]Though he also acknowledges that an honest misidentification is not fraudulent. See Denis Dutton, "Authenticity in Art," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, Jerrold Levinson (ed.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 260.
[65]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," pp. 110-111.

misrepresented, art critics and art lovers need not admit that their aesthetic evaluation was flawed, nor need they admit that a good forger is as great an artist as one of the masters. A critic cannot evaluate a work or artist properly without the correct information.

Formalism asks the observer, if he is even able to, to wipe clear his knowledge of the artwork, art history, and any achievement of the artist. He must also forget his own personal experiences and view the artwork with a blank slate. This is similar to a small child who regards an artwork for the first time. The child might only be attracted to the work because of its weird designs, interesting colours, or even shininess. On the other hand, an intelligent aesthetic appreciation of art is one that takes other, aesthetically relevant, information into consideration. This appreciation of art is seen as being *intelligent* because the viewer is not merely attracted to pretty, sparkly, or colourful objects; other, extra-aesthetic, aspects of the work can also be attractive since knowledge too can be pleasing. Given the fact that we want to judge copies differently from originals, and we often enjoy copies less, we have reason to accept an intelligent aesthetic appraisal; it accounts for why we enjoy the copy or forgery differently from the original. For these reasons Hoaglund wants us to *intelligently* appreciate artworks. [66]

According to Hoaglund, on an intelligent appreciation, the aesthetic value of an artwork is also associated with the aesthetic uniqueness of that work and the creativity of the artist. There are two main conditions regarding the former: 1) aesthetically, there is no other artwork like it, and 2) at time *T*, where *T* represents the time the work was created, no similar painting existed. An artwork possesses aesthetic uniqueness in relation to other artworks.[67] Hoaglund says,

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[66]John Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 16 (1986) pp. 51, 54.
[67]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," pp. 48-49.

> Because of the temporal aspect of the judgement of uniqueness in art we must first authenticate the art work before we can ascertain whether it is aesthetically unique. Thus, authenticity is a necessary condition of uniqueness, which in turn is a necessary condition of aesthetic value.[68]

In other words, if *B* is an exact copy of *A*, then *B* was created after time *T*, where *T* represents the time in which *A* was created. Therefore, *B* does not have the aesthetic uniqueness that *A* has. After authenticating *A*, and determining that *B* is inauthentic, we are now in a better position to evaluate the aesthetic uniqueness of *B*. Taking this into consideration, Hoaglund says that copies therefore cannot have the same aesthetic value as originals. The reason is that since aesthetic value and uniqueness are intertwined and since copies or even a partial copies, such as pastiches, do not have the same kind of aesthetic uniqueness as originals, original artworks and forgeries must be evaluated differently.[69]

For Hoaglund, when a work is an *exact* copy we can look at that copy and evaluate the original through it. In other words, our judgements about perfect copies are actually judgements about their originals. When a work is a *perfect* copy, we can judge the original work through the copy since the visible features are the same. When it comes to other non-visible features that the original work has, we can picture the copy having such features. The end result is a judgement of the original work which was made through the copy. On this Hoaglund states, "we look through the copy, so to speak, at the original; our judgements, though made at the copy, are made of the original in the

[68]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," p. 50.
[69]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," p. 49.

knowledge that the copy faithfully renders it."[70] This is the case only if the work is an exact copy. Problems arise when there are minor differences between the copy and the original.[71] In such cases, we lack the appropriate knowledge to make an accurate, intelligent, aesthetic appraisal of the original work.[72]

The creativity of the artist is Hoaglund's next condition of aesthetic value since it too furthers our appreciation of artworks. Here, "creativity" refers to the originality of a particular work, which includes the artist's style.[73] Artists who strive to be original operate on constraints, limitations, and other pressures. These constraints and limitations actually lead to originality. Hoaglund says, "The way in which [the artist] successfully meets the challenge to produce unique works constitutes part of his creativity." The artist learns to work his way around the pressures and obstacles he is faced with. These constraints, limitations, and other pressures are unique to the artist's situation, and, as a result, his reactions to them are original as well. Perfect copies, pastiches, and other forgeries cannot claim to have this creativity. Although the forger and copier do operate on constraints, limitations and other pressures, they are not the same kinds in which the original artist worked under and ought to be judged differently.

To sum up, Hoaglund wants us to base our aesthetic appreciation on an intelligent appraisal rather than on a childlike, blank slate, appraisal. This kind of appraisal lets us take knowledge, including personal experiences, aesthetic uniqueness, and artistic creativity into consideration. Such information is relevant since it can change one's aesthetic appraisal. Since such additional knowledge shows us there are aesthetic

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[70]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," pp. 49-50.
[71]We can also appreciate the copy's likeness to the original.
[72]For this reason, Hoaglund would likely agree that copies are inappropriate mediums for judging the aesthetic value of an original.
[73]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," pp. 51-52.

differences, even perfect copies ought to be evaluated differently from their originals. Thus, one need not admit that one's aesthetic evaluation was flawed if one was mistaken about a work's extra-aesthetic information.

Kulka's Argument:

Tomas Kulka argues for a dualist perspective on fakes and forgeries since, he believes, we value two separate categories. He calls this view aesthetic dualism. One side of this view deals with the *aesthetic value* of art and the other deals with *artistic* or *art-historical value*. In other words, Kulka believes that both the formal view and the art-historical view ought to be taken into consideration when it comes to the work itself. Both contribute to its overall value.

According to Kulka, creativity does not determine one's aesthetic judgement. However, that is not to say that creativity is irrelevant. Creativity is to be evaluated under a separate category. On this point, Kulka states,

> Whether the composition is well balanced, whether the colours are harmonious, whether the contrasts are telling, whether the picture is dynamic, whether the picture expresses tension, etc., are features that are relevant for the appraisal of its *aesthetic value*. What inspired the work, to what extent it is original, whether it points to new directions, and how its new features were further developed by other artists are factors that are relevant for the determination of... *artistic value*.[74]

[74]Tomas Kulka, "Forgeries and Art Evaluation: An Argument for Dualism in Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 39 (2005), p. 64.

It is here where we see the difference between aesthetic value and artistic value. Aesthetic value depends on the formal features of a work and artistic value depends on its historical and contextual features. For Kulka, the one category does not seep into the other. Nonetheless, both are relevant when it comes to the work's value.

Kulka's view seems similar to Lessing's view. Both Lessing and Kulka see artistic value as separate from aesthetic value, and the problem of forgeries for both philosophers is an artistic one. They both believe that the artistic value of a forged work is different from the artistic value of an original work. The reason is that the forged work has a different art-history than the original work. However, though Kulka and Lessing's views are similar, they are also slightly different. Lessing does not want artistic value to fall in with the value of the artwork itself. He sees artistic value as strictly associated with the artist. That is, the originality of a work, the constraints and limitations an artist had to go through while crafting his work, and the accomplishments he made along the way have nothing to do with the value of the work itself. Kulka, on the other hand, sees artistic value as something to be associated with the artwork itself. This distinction is demonstrated in both "Forgeries and Art Evaluation" and "The Artistic and Aesthetic Status of Forgeries." In the first article Kulka says,

> It should soon transpire that we value important works of art not only for their aesthetic qualities, (or beauty, if you like) but for their ideas and innovative approaches, which offer solutions to the topical artistic problems.[75]

[75]Kulka, "Forgeries and Art Evaluation," p. 69.

In the second article Kulka says,

> When presented with an original and a good forgery, one has reason for not considering them of equal value. They need not differ in their aesthetic value, but there is a significant difference between their artistic or art-historical value. Clearly, one does not want to give the same credit to someone who merely copied a work in which an artist invested ingenuity and original thinking.[76]

Since we value both the aesthetic and artistic aspects of the artwork we might be impressed by the work's aesthetic value yet be unimpressed by its artistic value, and vice versa. Aesthetic and artistic value are both taken into consideration when we weigh a perfect copy against an original. Therefore, since the artistic value of the copy is not equal to the artistic value of the original the value of each work is different. For instance, say the overall value of a work is scored out of 10, half aesthetic and half artistic. If the aesthetic value of an original is 4 then the aesthetic value of a perfect copy is also 4. However, even if the artistic value of the original is only 3, the copy's artistic value cannot match that of the original. If half points are not given, the perfect copy would score at best an overall value of 6 and the original would score a 7.

If Kulka's distinction between artistic value and aesthetic value is right then, if one accepts Kulka's view of aesthetic dualism, one has sufficient justification to favour many originals to forgeries. Moreover, art critics and art lovers need not admit that they were wrong about their aesthetic judgement. According to Kulka, since they had the wrong art-historical information they could not properly assess the work's artistic value.

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[76]Tomas Kulka, "The Artistic and Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," *Leonardo*, 15 (1982), p. 117.

Therefore, although their initial aesthetic judgement was right, their judgement of the work's *overall value* could not have been.

Walton's Argument:

Kendall Walton argues that the aesthetic features of a work *depend* on extra-aesthetic features such as the relevant historical information behind the work. Moreover, just as Sagoff has argued above, Walton says that there are different categories of art. Some of these categories deal with the genre, style, and form of the work, and include such things as classical sonatas, cubist paintings, realist art, Gothic architecture, and pointillism to name a few. For Walton, one sees works differently depending on the category that one views it in.[77] Therefore, the critic who judges a work's aesthetic qualities ought to judge the work based on its extra-aesthetic features. One who does so discovers the correct categories of art and can then accurately perceive the artwork.[78]

Judging a work based only on its formal qualities is similar to judging a painting based on merely a portion of its canvas. The other half might make the work better or worse overall and such a view might augment or lessen one's previous aesthetic judgement. On the other hand, we might believe that the painting is of *A*, when in fact the painting is of *B*. In this case, our second aesthetic judgement can be entirely different. When we see the full painting and realize our mistake we reassess our judgement based on it being a painting of *B* rather than of *A*.

According to Walton, judging a work's aesthetic properties is not as easy as listening to a work or viewing it in an ignorant, childlike fashion. Walton says,

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[77]Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," *Philosophical Review*, 79 (1970), pp. 338-339.
[78]Walton, "Categories of Art," p. 366.

> Aesthetic properties... are not to be found in works themselves in the straightforward way that colours and shapes or pitches and rhythms are. But I do not mean to deny that we perceive aesthetic properties in works of art. I see the serenity of a painting, and hear the coherence of a sonata, despite the fact that the presence of these qualities in the works depends partly on circumstances of their origin, which I cannot (now) perceive… the point is not that the historical facts… function as grounds in any ordinary sense for aesthetic judgements… We must learn to perceive the work in the correct categories, as determined *in part* by the historical facts, and judge it by what we then perceive in it.[79]

In other words, the way we see a painting or listen to a song depends on our beliefs and the category in which we view it in. There may be three or more possible categories in which we can view an artwork and our judgement of the work might differ in each category. Walton says, "And of two works which differ *only* in respect of their origins- that is, which are perceptually indistinguishable- one might be coherent or serene, and the other not."[80] Extra-aesthetic information, such as art-historical information, assist us in making correct aesthetic judgements. They help us realize which category an artwork resides in. After we decide which category a work belongs to we are then free to take the work's formal features into consideration.

When we see a work in a category which it does not belong our aesthetic judgement is therefore false. On this point Walton states,

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[79]Walton, "Categories of Art," pp. 364-365.
[80]Walton, "Categories of Art," p. 364.

> We are likely to regard, for example, cubist paintings, serial music, or Chinese music as formless, incoherent, or disturbing on our first contact with these forms largely because, I suggest, we would not be perceiving the works as cubist paintings, serial music, or Chinese music. But after becoming familiar with these kinds of art we would probably retract our previous judgements, admit that they were mistaken… Thus it seems that, at least in some cases, it is correct to perceive a work in certain categories and incorrect to perceive it in certain other; that is, our judgements of it when we perceive it in the former are likely to be true, and those we make when perceiving in the latter false.[81]

Paintings, music, and sculptures are entirely different from each other; thus, ought to be judged differently as well. The criteria for judging a song is different from the criteria for judging a painting because these works are under different categories of art. The categories of music, painting, and sculpture are so large that they too have their own categories. Take music for instance, although music styles can often seep into each other, they can be very different as well. Among many other styles of music, there is classical, American pop, heavy metal, country, gospel, and jazz. There is also Chinese music, French music, Arabic music, Russian music etc., the list goes on. The criteria for judging Chinese music is different from the criteria of judging French music, and the criteria of judging gospel music is different from that of classical music. Since many Canadians and Americans are not used to Russian music we might not enjoy it as much as the music with which we are familiar. We might even dislike the music altogether. However, the

[81]Walton, "Categories of Art," p. 356.

more we listen to that style of music the more we might come to respect it. Someday we might even learn to like or even love it.

Classifications of artworks not only depend on historical features, but also on features which Walton calls *standard*, *contra-standard*, and *variable*. A standard feature of an artwork is one that the work must have in order for it to be under a certain category. A feature that is contra-standard is one whose presence in a work disqualifies it from being in a certain category. A feature that is variable is one that is irrelevant to classification in regards to any category which one considers. That is to say, such possession of this feature, or lack of, would neither qualify nor disqualify it from any one category.[82] For instance, the presence of many small, distinct, dots of colour is a standard feature of pointillism, whereas the presence of many long, fluent, brush strokes is a contra-standard feature. The former feature is necessary for pointillism artworks and the latter disqualifies the work from this category. However, the colours used or the image of a garden is variable for pointillism. These features neither qualify nor disqualify the work from the category of pointillism. Painting *A* is likely in its correct category *C* if 1) it has minimal or no contra-standard features, 2) it is perceived best when judged in category *C* rather than any other category such as *D*, *E*, or *F*, and 3) painting *A* has been recognized by the art community as being in category *C*.[83]

Our judgement *depends* on extra-aesthetic information, whether it is a conscious or unconscious judgement. That is, we can admit that we believe it is a lovely painting of a garden, or simply say that it is a lovely painting or artwork. It might not actually be a painting of a garden. It might not even be a painting at all. Without knowing a work's extra-aesthetic information we might never know whether our aesthetic judgement is

[82]Walton, "Categories of Art," pp. 338-340, 342.
[83]Walton, "Categories of Art," p. 357.

correct. Thus, even if we have the correct beliefs, and unconsciously judge the work based on those beliefs, that does not mean that knowing the historical and contextual information is useless. When people forge they misrepresent the category. This is why Walton's argument is relevant to forgeries. If we want to make sure we are judging a work correctly, then we must clarify whether our beliefs are correct and whether we are judging it in the correct category.

Irvin's Argument:

Sherri Irvin believes that aesthetic understanding is historical in nature and agrees with much of Denis Dutton's view. However, she does not think that Dutton's view, or any other view I have outlined above, fully explains the extent of the damage that forgeries cause. In other words, the fact that forgeries create problems for effectively evaluating works is not the sole problem the artworld is faced with. Irvin's main concern is that forgeries corrupt our aesthetic understanding of not only the work that is forged but also works that we associate with the forged work and the history that is established along with it. Moreover, a bit of aesthetic uncertainty is natural.[84] The problem is that forgeries undermine our strategies of trying to overcome this aesthetic uncertainty. Their existence makes it more difficult to achieve real aesthetic understanding.[85]

According to Irvin, aesthetic understanding implies some sort of knowledge and belief since the word "understanding" suggests a cognitive component. It deals with the ability to recognize aesthetically relevant properties of a work, to compare artworks with

[84]This would be the case even in a world without forgeries: when an artist does not sign his name we wonder who created the work, when a student merely creates perfect copies in order to learn an artist's technique we must separate the real artwork from the fake, and so on.
[85]Sherri Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 37 (2007), pp. 299-300.

respect to these properties, and the ability to judge a work aesthetically. Moreover, Irvin takes a similar stance as Walton regarding the base of aesthetic evaluation: Irvin says, "aesthetic evaluation and the sensory perception that underlies it are highly dependent on the knowledge and belief we have already amassed."[86] Thus, Irvin believes that our aesthetic understanding is subject to both our perceptual abilities and background knowledge. The way we view a work depends on extra-aesthetic information.[87]

Causing many to mistake a work's aesthetic achievement is not the only problem that forgeries create. We often look for aesthetic relationships between artworks. One of the reasons we do so is to account for artistic developments. Another is for pure enjoyment and to further our aesthetic knowledge.[88] As such, forgeries make us build artificial histories and associations between works and inhibit us from achieving real aesthetic understanding. Irvin states,

> Eradication of the mistaken views engendered by a forgery may require sustained examination of the forgery itself and the circumstances of its acceptance, as well as of its relations to other works.[89]

Once a forgery is exposed, rectifying mistaken assumptions might take years. Books and articles will likely have been written on the forgery claiming it to be a "new great work" of Vermeer, Mozart or Michelangelo. Other books and articles must rectify these mistakes and any lines of connection that people have drawn between the supposed new great work and other artists must also be cut off and rectified. However, Irvin suggests

[86]Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," p. 295.
[87]Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," pp. 294, 297.
[88]Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," pp. 298-299.
[89]Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," p. 293.

that not all forgeries are this harmful. A forgery that is hidden in a basement, unknown to the general public, only fools those few who view it. These works do not have the ability to harm the artworld, and it is much easier to rectify any damage such a forgery might cause.[90]

Irvin's main problem with forgeries is that they damage aesthetic understanding. This is the case of not only the forged work or the original(s) but also any other works that the artworld associates with the forgery. Once a work is recognized by the artworld it develops a fake history. This history intertwines itself with the histories of other artworks and artists. The longer a forgery goes undiscovered the larger this history will grow and the harder it will be to fix.

Conclusion to Chapter 2:

In this chapter I have looked at the theories of Nelson Goodman, Alfred Lessing, Mark Sagoff, Denis Dutton, John Hoaglund, Tomas Kulka, Kendall Walton, and Sherri Irvin in regards to the aesthetic status of forgeries. Goodman argues that there are aesthetic differences between originals and forgeries since their formal features differ. Lessing argues that the forgery and the original are aesthetically the same. Sagoff argues that there are differences on the grounds that the history of the works and how they were created are different. He takes these aspects as the only aesthetically relevant features since he believes that formal similarities are uninteresting. Dutton argues that, in regards to aesthetic value, the work's formal features and historical and contextual features go "hand-in-hand" with each other. Therefore, since the works historical and contextual features differ, the forgery and the original are aesthetically different. Hoaglund argues

[90]Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," pp. 297-299, 301-302.

that aesthetic uniqueness and originality are essential for making an intelligent aesthetic appraisal. Therefore, since forgeries and originals differ in this respect, they are aesthetically different. Kulka argues for aesthetic dualism. Half of this aesthetic dualism deals with aesthetic value, the other half deals with artistic value and the historical context of the work. It is here where forgeries and originals differ aesthetically for Kulka. Walton explains how a work's aesthetic properties depend not only on its perceivable properties but also on certain relevant categories. One cannot judge a work's aesthetic value until that work is correctly placed in its category. Lastly, Irvin says that the aesthetic differences between the original and the forgery corrupt our aesthetic understanding. She also explains how the corruption goes beyond the original and forgery. This corruption includes all works which the artworld has associated with the forged work. I have not yet evaluated these theories. Evaluation will be done in the third and final chapter.

Chapter 3: What, Aesthetically, is Wrong With Forgeries?

Introduction to Chapter 3:

In this final chapter I explain why many of the previous theories regarding the aesthetic status of forgeries are flawed and why my own view is best. I take a hybrid position with respect to formalism and historicism. I argue that we have certain beliefs regarding the work we are considering and these beliefs are necessarily linked to our physiological and emotional responses to art. Since our beliefs are linked to our emotions they are linked both to the way we feel about art and the way we contemplate it. Thus, our enjoyment of a work is not merely associated with its formal features; certain beliefs (for instance, that a work is a forgery or that the artist created his work under significant constraints and limitations) and extra-aesthetic information can also significantly alter our enjoyment of a work. As such, both the formal features of a work, such as the brush strokes and the colours on the canvas, *as well as* our enjoyment of a work based on our beliefs and the work's extra-aesthetic features, make up the way we aesthetically evaluate artworks. However, although the aesthetic value of an original is different from the aesthetic value of a forgery, that does not mean that we cannot appreciate forgeries. We can appreciate, for instance, the expert craftsmanship regarding the deception, the likeness to the original(s), or the originality of a pastiche.

Response to Nelson Goodman:

In the second chapter I outlined the commonsense argument and explained what it means to accept the first premise but reject the second, and vice versa. As a reminder, the commonsense argument is as follows:

There can be no aesthetic difference without a perceptual difference.

There is no perceptual difference between an original artwork and a deceptive forgery of it.

Therefore, there is no aesthetic difference between an original artwork and a deceptive forgery of it.[91]

Nelson Goodman accepts the first premise but claims that the conclusion does not follow since he rejects the second premise. My focus on Goodman's argument is on whether Goodman has sufficient reason to reject the second premise of the commonsense argument.[92]

Goodman rejects the second premise[93] since subtle differences can change one's aesthetic experience. If, for instance, the colour on part of a forgery is a fraction of a shade off, if a brush stroke is not delicate enough, or if a miniscule piece of the work was omitted in the forgery, then one's aesthetic experience of a forgery can be quite different from that of its original.[94] Goodman goes on to concede that some forgeries are so close to their originals that one cannot tell the differences between them in the beginning. Nevertheless, Goodman argues that such a concession does not mean that there are no aesthetic differences between the two works or that one can never discriminate between them. With knowledge that the one is a forgery and the other the original, in accordance with time, training, preparation, and a keen eye, one might be able to recognize the differences.[95] Furthermore, even if one never recognizes the differences between the

[91]Argument stated by Thomas Foster and Luise Morton in "Goodman, Forgery, and the Aesthetic," p. 156.
[92]It is also important to note that Goodman's argument deals more so with so-called perfect copies rather than pastiches or works in the style of other artists. Clearly pastiches or works in the style of other artists are formally different from their originals.
[93]He argues that there are perceptual differences between original artworks and deceptive forgeries of them.
[94]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 108.
[95]Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 105.

works, we start to look at the works differently as we train ourselves to discriminate between the forgery and the original. This causes one's aesthetic experience of the works to differ.[96]

The first part of Goodman's argument is often true: a different brush stroke can make a forgery look harsher or more delicate than its original; a subtle colour difference might throw off the harmony of the colours that the original artist created; a small omission can throw off balance, and so on. With experience and training it would be easier to notice these subtle differences. However, Goodman's argument falls apart when he attempts to argue that there are no *perfect* copies of artworks. To this day it is unclear whether any work is a *perfect* copy. However, present circumstances may differ from future ones and one might, at some point, encounter such a work. One can conceive of a case where a forgery is so perfect[97] that no human or machine can ever tell the difference between the two works.[98] The fact that it is not necessarily the case that a forgery cannot be perfect gives one reason enough not to reject the idea.

Moreover, the second part of Goodman's argument, on how we engage in an aesthetic activity by attempting to differentiate the works, does not lead one to the conclusion that the two works are *formally* different.[99] One can concede that such an activity is in the realm of aesthetics. Nonetheless, such a concession does not lead to the fact that the works are *formally* different. In cases where one does not know which work is the forgery, each work elicits the same thoughts and emotions in the viewer as the

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[96]Goodman, *Languages of Art,* p. 109.
[97]Taking into account the formal appearance and how old the forgery looks compared to its original, and excluding scientific advancements in determining the date of creation.
[98]To achieve a perfect copy it might need to be created by a machine rather than a human being. Nonetheless it is easy to conceive of a perfect copy worthy of absolute formal deception.
[99]As stated in chapter 2, formal features are those which one can *see* or *hear*. Such features include the colours in a painting, the soft texture of a statue, and the speed of a piano solo.

other since each work's authenticity is doubted.

On the other hand, one could grant that one's aesthetic experience of each work differs on the grounds that one of the works is a known forgery. This is what Goodman wants us to grant. However, this aesthetic experience is clearly not formal. First of all, knowledge is extra-aesthetic. Thus, knowledge that one is a forgery cannot be a reason to view the two works as as being formally different. Secondly, the act of viewing the two works differently, without being unable to *see* any differences, is purely mental. As such, this act is tied to knowledge or belief. Therefore, when there are no formal differences between the two works the only differences are extra-aesthetic.

After examining the above arguments it is clear that one cannot reject the second premise of the commonsense argument on Goodman's reasoning alone. This does not mean that the conclusion of the argument is true; it simply means that one either has to improve Goodman's theory or reject the first premise of the commonsense argument rather than the second. I see no way to show how forgeries necessarily differ formally from their originals. However, I need not prove this since, in the following sections, I will show that the path of rejecting the first premise is correct. There may or may not be minute differences between forgeries and their originals. Either way, there are aesthetic differences between forgeries and originals since there are aesthetic differences without perceptual differences.

On Feelings and Emotions/ Aesthetics:

The fact that our emotions are linked to our beliefs is supported by scientific research. In *Deeper than Reason* Jenefer Robinson explains emotional responses and physiological changes. First of all, we cannot always control our emotions; secondly, our emotions are

connected to both our conscious and subconscious beliefs. Since aesthetic evaluation deals with our emotions and interests in artworks, our beliefs are tied into evaluation as well.

One scientist Robinson discussed was Paul Ekman, who conducted many experiments on the nature of facial expressions, physiological changes, and emotions. One of the results of Ekman's experiments suggested was that particular movements of facial muscles influence physiological changes, which are identified with certain emotions. Results also showed that physiological changes are not limited to facial expressions. Behaviour, posture, and vocal expressions also manipulate emotional response.[100] It was also shown that labelling certain emotional states that one is in such as anger, sorrow, or happiness, despite whether the person is actually in such emotional states,[101] can actually manipulate behaviour and physiological states as well. This, in turn, can lead one to actually elicit the labelled emotion.[102] For instance, one might believe that an artwork was created to elicit sadness, happiness, anger, or contentment in the viewer. This belief could produce a change in one's facial expression, posture, and behaviour while contemplating the artwork. As stated above, this may produce real emotions in the art viewer.

Experiments have also shown that emotional states need not require complex cognition; some emotional states are linked to subconscious beliefs and preferences. Human beings as well as other species have instinctive responses.[103] Robert Zajonc has contributed largely to this topic and his extensive experiments have shown that certain

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[100]Jenefer Robinson, *Deeper than Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 35-36.
[101]For instance, if one is given a shot of adrenaline and is unsure which emotion one is experiencing, or if one is simply unsure which emotion one is experiencing.
[102]Consult: Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*, pp. 82-85 for more information regarding these experiments.
[103]Robinson, *Deeper than Reason,* pp. 37-38. Also see Rene Negrich, "Emotions and Emotional Responses to Fiction," Philosophy of Aesthetics, Class 541 A01, April 16th 2010.

appraisals are involuntary and occur before any cognitive evaluation. That is not to say that no evaluation is made whatsoever; the evaluation is subconscious and happens before conscious recognition. One of Zajonc's experiments tested neural stimulus responses to Chinese ideographs which were set next to a smiling or angry human face. The test subjects did not know Chinese and the ideographs were shown so quickly that the subjects were unaware that they had seen anything. The result was that the ideographs set with smiling faces were more liked than those with angry faces. This shows that some appraisals are made, within milliseconds, without conscious awareness.

In another experiment, Zajonc and his colleague W.R. Wilson proved that people enjoy stimuli that they have been exposed to over stimuli which they have not seen before. For the experiment, Zajonc and Wilson flashed a set of slides in front of their subjects. These slides were shown too fast for cognitive recognition. The subjects were then asked which slides they recognized and which they enjoyed the most. The rate of enjoyment depended on whether the subjects were previously exposed to the slide, whereas the rate of recognition was equal to chance.[104] After taking the results of their experiment into consideration, Zajonc and Wilson concluded that,

> Individuals can apparently develop preferences for objects in the absence of conscious recognition and with access to information so scanty that they cannot ascertain whether anything at all was shown. The results thus suggest that there may exist a capacity for making affective discriminations without extensive participation of the cognitive system.[105]

[104]Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*, p. 39. For information on Zajonc's extensive experiments see: Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*, pp. 38-41.
[105]Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*, p. 39.

In other words, the subjects in the experiment developed unconscious preferences for the familiar. This gives us reason to believe that there are other appraisals which we make without conscious realization: for instance, preferences toward certain artworks based on our memories and beliefs.

A final significant factor regarding non-cognitive responses deals with memory. The memories and emotional reactions that one has of certain events can be stored in one's mind and evoked at later times. The emotion can occur even without conscious realization of the reason. Therefore, the connection that one makes between a memory of an event and a similar event, book, movie, or an artwork may be subconscious and uncontrollable.[106] Thus, one might also consciously or unconsciously associate artworks to one's own life.

The information provided above suggests that we are not always in control of our appraisals. We can also say that the way one feels about an undiscovered forgery will be the same way that person would feel when viewing or experiencing an original work of art. That is, of course, only if one believes that the undiscovered forgery is actually an original. The reason is that we judge a work based on our beliefs. If we believe that the forgery is an original then our beliefs regarding that forgery would be the same had the work actually been an original. However, if this belief changes then one's feelings and aesthetic interest in the work will also change. The knowledge that a work is a forgery makes one reconsider the way the work was designed. Feelings of happiness and contentment could change to one of anger and betrayal. Admiration for effort and originality could change to admiration regarding the craft of copying. Though one might still admire a forgery, this is a different sort of admiration which leads to a different sort

[106]Robinson, *Deeper than Reason,* p. 72. Also see Rene Negrich, "Emotions and Emotional Responses to Fiction," Philosophy of Aesthetics, Class 541 A01, April 16th 2010.

of enjoyment.[107] As we saw in Chapter Two, Denis Dutton[108] holds that a difference in kind leads to a different sort of appreciation. Appreciation regarding a forgery and appreciation regarding an original artwork are as different as enjoying the work of a great carpenter and a great painter.

Formalism, Historicism/ Contextualism, and The Hybrid Position:

In the previous chapter I explained the views of Alfred Lessing and Denis Dutton. Lessing argued that a forgery ought not be destroyed and that, since the forgery and the original have the same formal qualities, the two works are aesthetically equal. According to Lessing only formal qualities matter to aesthetics, and the problem of forgeries lies in artistic originality which is not aesthetic. In other words, the problem of forgeries lies with the artist rather than the work itself. On the other hand, Dutton argued that both the formal aesthetic properties of a work and its extra-aesthetic properties are relevant in regards to a work's *aesthetic* understanding and value. According to Dutton, we cannot separate formal features or extra-aesthetic features from aesthetic value since both contribute to our enjoyment.

I agree that a forgery ought not be destroyed: it might have historical significance or educational use, it might help fake busters discover other forgeries, or it might simply be formally enjoyable. I will have more to say on this last topic further on in this chapter. However, as I explained in the previous section, our beliefs play a large factor in our aesthetic evaluations since they are tied to our emotions; therefore, I disagree with Lessing's main argument. Since Dutton acknowledges equal consideration of formal

[107]In other words, one could still value a forgery for reasons other than originality. More will be said on this topic in the next section of this chapter.
[108]Also see Dutton,"Artistic Crimes," p. 108.

features and extra-aesthetic ones in regards to aesthetic evaluation, I am sympathetic to Dutton's view.

According to Lessing, an ideal aesthetic experience is one in which the viewer knows nothing of the artwork, the artist, or whether it is a forgery. This person is supposedly more attuned to the artwork since there is no extra information to cloud judgement. However, there are two arguments against Lessing's ideal state. First of all, as Kendall Walton previously argued, aesthetic features of a work *depend* on extra-aesthetic features. One cannot evaluate a work properly until one knows which category to view it in.[109] One ought to know, for instance, that the work is a painting, a sonnet, or a sculpture and what that means. As stated in chapter two, the criteria for judging various categories will be different for each. The categories of music, painting, poetry, and sculpture are so large that they need to be divided into other categories. If it is a painting one ought to know what kind of painting it is. For example, a painting with sharp rigid lines and a similarity to broken glass might be a great artwork in the category of cubism yet a hideous artwork in the category of rococo.

A second argument against Lessing's ideal experience is that, even if one knows nothing of the artist or the painting, one might still have one's own beliefs which can diminish or augment one's aesthetic appraisal. This might be done consciously or unconsciously. One might not be able to separate oneself from one's beliefs or additional information one possesses. As such, these beliefs and extra information can alter one's view and enjoyment of the work. Leonard Meyer said it best in "Forgery and the Anthropology of Art" when he stated, "The fact of the matter is that the mind cannot

[109]Walton, "Categories of Art," pp. 338-339. For more information on the categories of art see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

ignore what it knows and the body's physiological responses are not separable from the mind's cognition."[110]

It does not seem as though aesthetics deals merely with things that one can see, like the colours of a painting on a canvas, or listen to, like the notes of a flute in a song. When it comes to poetry, Lessing's ideal state would mean that one ought to be interested in the flow of the poem and the way the words of the poem sound. However, although these features of a poem can be enjoyable, they are not the sole features we are interested in. We are also interested in what the words signify and the meaning of the poem itself.

There are those who agree that only formal features are aesthetic and yet they still want to take that position that a forgery's overall value is different from an original artwork. In order to do so they differentiate aesthetic value of a work from its overall value. For instance, according to Tomas Kulka, aesthetic value depends on formal features and artistic value depends on extra-aesthetic features. The two categories are not connected and are each taken into consideration when one weighs a perfect copy against its original.[111] However, as stated above, we cannot separate the *aesthetic* from the extra-aesthetic since extra-aesthetic features necessarily fall into the realm of aesthetics. As such, Kulka's separation theory fails. Nonetheless, a distinction can be made between *formal features* and *extra-aesthetic features* since the extra-aesthetic is, by definition, not formal. In other words, one can break down the *aesthetic* aspects of a work into two categories, the formal and the extra-aesthetic, and then evaluate the overall aesthetic value of the forgery.

Others argue that aesthetic value depends on whether a work is unique in relation

[110]Leonard B. Meyer, "Forgery and the Anthropology of Art," in *The Forgers Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art,* Denis Dutton (ed.), (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1983), p.91.
[111]Kulka, "Forgeries and Art Evaluation," p. 64.

to other artworks at the time of its production. John Hoaglund, mentioned in the previous chapter, says that there are two main conditions regarding the aesthetic value of an artwork on an intelligent appreciation: (1) aesthetically, there is no other artwork like it, and (2) at time *T*, where *T* represents the time the work was created, no similar painting existed. According to Hoaglund, the reason is that an artwork possesses aesthetic uniqueness in relation to other artworks.[112]

In the first chapter of this thesis I asked the reader to picture a contemporary artist, John, who had never seen or heard of Vermeer's works and who happened to recreate his style. To explain what Hoaglund's theory entails I will draw up a similar thought experiment: John was raised by his parents from birth in a remote cabin in the woods. For the first part of his life he was cut off from the modern world. John's parents let him contemplate only certain artworks, ones that Vermeer would have been accustomed to seeing. However, John never viewed any of Vermeer's works. In fact, John never even knew that Vermeer existed. When John is five years old he started to paint. After many years he came up with a style unique to any artwork he had yet to see. When John was old enough he left home with some of his prized paintings and headed toward civilization. Not long after leaving home, John discovers Vermeer's works and realizes that their style matches his own. He also realizes, with shock, that one of his works is an exact replicate of one of Vermeer's works.

Had Vermeer never existed, John would have been the first to create Vermeer's famous style and it likely would have been John who would become one of the greats. John did not cheat when he created his style or his artworks and, as seen on their own, the value of his works parallel those of Vermeer's works. According to my own theory,

[112]Hoaglund, "Originality and Aesthetic Value," pp. 48-49.

John achieved as much as Vermeer and his works are as aesthetically valuable as Vermeer's even though they were created at a later date. Had John recreated a sculpture, sonnet, musical score, or even a physics theorem under similar conditions from that above, the same reasoning behind this thought experiment would apply. However, according to Hoaglund's theory John's works are not as aesthetically valuable as Vermeer's since they were created after Vermeer's works.

One cannot merely take extra-aesthetic features into consideration either though. Just as I have argued that we are interested in extra-aesthetic features, it is also the case that we are interested in formal features. We enjoy the speed, tempo, and notes of a song; the colours, brush strokes, and obscure symbols or resemblances to real life that a painting might have; the smooth surface, marble colouring, and soft feminine features that a statue might have, and so on. Thus, if we cannot leave out extra-aesthetic features because they contribute to our enjoyment of artworks then we cannot leave out formal features either.

Denis Dutton's argument fits perfectly with the fact that our beliefs influence our emotions and enjoyment of works, and yet he *also* believes that formal features matter. According to Dutton, formal features and extra-aesthetic features go hand-in-hand when it comes to aesthetic appreciation. Dutton also gives plausible examples to prove his point. One of his examples deals with Smith who listens to a new recording of Liszt's *Transcendental Études*. Before Smith finds out that the piece was electronically speeded up, he is ecstatic about the performance and thoroughly enjoys the music. However, once Smith finds out the truth his excitement and enjoyment of the work lessens. In other words, Smith starts to view the work differently.[113]

[113]Dutton, "Artistic Crimes," p. 103.

This is merely one example of an aesthetic evaluation that changes; it happens all the time. Therefore, the formalist must concede these types of phenomena and explain why our judgement, once altered, is therefore wrong. However, the formalist cannot say that Smith's judgement is wrong simply on the grounds that it is not purely formal. Just as Lessing says it is circular reasoning to assume that a forgery is aesthetically different just because it is a forgery, it is also circular reasoning to assume that aesthetics deals solely with formal qualities since only formal qualities matter to aesthetic evaluation. If something alters one's aesthetic appreciation then that can be said to be aesthetic unless one arbitrarily restricts what is significant to aesthetic evaluation.

Hence, if extra-aesthetic information, such as the constraints and limitations of the artist, can alter one's appreciation of a work, then it too is linked with aesthetics. If formalists want to set limitations on the value of art then, instead of calling it *aesthetic evaluation*, they ought to call it *formal evaluation*. According to such an evaluation, one might value a forgery and an original equally. Nonetheless, these same paintings, *aesthetically* evaluated, will likely be given different praise. For instance, a forgery, seen as being a copy of a van Gogh, might be given low aesthetic praise and high formal praise. The original van Gogh, seen in accordance with the constraints and limitations that were put on the artist, might be given high formal praise *and* high aesthetic praise.

On the other hand, if it was the case that art appreciation depended merely on formal qualities then aesthetic appreciation could fluctuate for individuals and be different from person to person. There would be no solid criteria for judging other than personal preferences regarding colour and design. Formal interests and evaluations can change for one over time and can be different for different people. Anything can be pleasing or interesting to look at for the first time for those with no knowledge

whatsoever. Shiny objects, bright colours, a light bulb, any kind of movement, and other images and sounds that most of us see everyday are interesting to look at or listen to for those experiencing them for the first time. Picture a child who is taking in the images, sounds, smells, and feel of the world for the first time. Children are fascinated by everything they first encounter. Then, after a period of time, children will either get bored of the sound or object and move on to something else, or they learn more and decide to stay and amuse themselves. If formal features were the only features that mattered in regards to aesthetic evaluation then such evaluations would be child-like rather than intelligent.

Moreover, people's likes and dislikes of colours are different, and can even change over time. Person *A* can like greens and blues, but dislike pinks and yellows, whereas person *B* could like pinks and yellows, and dislike blues and greens. Nonetheless, both persons could get bored of these colours and change their likes to other ones. Person *A* might also like the look of dogs and dislike the look of mice, whereas person *B* could like the look of mice and dislike the look of dogs. Therefore, person *B* could dislike paintings of dogs and enjoy paintings of mice, and the opposite could be said for person *A*. This shows how preferences can be different from person to person; therefore, if aesthetic evaluation depended on personal preferences then it too would be different from person to person and would continue to change as preferences change.

My sole issue with Dutton's argument is that he did not explain what, if any, repercussions there are in not realizing that a work is a forgery. When it comes to Dutton's theory, his emphasis on the importance of understanding artworks and the achievements of artists is essential. However, he does not go further and explain what the

repercussions might be for not knowing the information.[114] It is not clear whether he believes that this information is necessary only to the enjoyment of the single artwork at a given time or whether it can ruin a bigger picture of aesthetics.[115]

Another argument that might be made against Dutton addresses what he takes to be important information for aesthetically evaluating artworks. One might ask why it is important to know that the artist was blind or deaf, or what kind of paint the artist used. However, if a blind artist painted a masterpiece his performance would be much more impressive. As a result, the artwork itself might also seem more impressive. The kind of paint an artist used is another issue. Knowing this information is not necessarily going to change one's view of the work. Nonetheless, if it does it would likely be because of educational intrigue which can also be connected to enjoyment. Philosophy itself means a love of wisdom, which entails that many people enjoy learning new information and seeking knowledge. Perhaps the kind of paint was unique and used by no other artist. This information might spike some sort of interest. The point is that knowledge of the kind of paint an artist used is not likely going to change our enjoyment of a work and if it does it is not likely going to be a significant change. In any case, extra information can influence our aesthetic judgement. Though some extra-aesthetic information is trivial, such as the paint used, some information, such as whether a work holds originality, can completely alter our enjoyment of a work. If extra-aesthetic information alters our enjoyment or aesthetic judgement of a work, then there *is* reason to accept it as relevant information.

In regards to the appeal of art and the importance of the historical and contextual

[114]For an example of such a detailed argument regarding the history of art, see Sherri Irvin's argument in chapter 2 of this thesis or see: Sherri Irvin, "Forgery and the Corruption of Aesthetic Understanding," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* 37 (2007), pp. 283-304.
[115]Nonetheless, this criticism of Dutton clearly does not tear down his theory.

features for human beings, Dutton says,

> If works of art appealed only to our formal or decorative aesthetic sense, there would indeed be little point in establishing their human contexts by tracing their development, or even in distinguishing them from similarly appealing natural objects – flowers or seashells. But works of art of all societies express and embody both cultural beliefs general to a people and personal character and feeling specific to an individual. Moreover, this fact accounts for a large part, though not all, of our interest in works of art.[116]

In other words, we are naturally curious and we want to know the background of the art. We are invested in *not only* the formal features but also the contextual and historical features of the artwork. Although Dutton did not have the scientific support that is currently out there[117] to show that our emotions and beliefs play a part in our aesthetic evaluations, his initial judgement regarding our natural interests was nonetheless correct.

The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly:

Even though the value of a forgery is different from the value of its original, one can still enjoy forgeries. One can admire the efforts that were put into creating them, any originality put into the work on the part of the forger, and the ways in which forgers go about creating their works. It is difficult, for instance, to hide the fake's age, and the forger must also be skilled at drawing or crafting perfect copies, pastiches, and the like.

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[116]Dutton, "Authenticity in Art," p. 270.
[117]Such as the scientific support that Jenefer Robinson gives in *Deeper than Reason.*

Good fakers must also analyze their own styles and mannerisms and constantly scrutinize their forgeries in order to be sure they do not show up in their forgeries. Many forgers also have a way of replicating what looks like a rush of creativity that original works have. One way to do so is to repeatedly practice the process in which the original artworks were created. Another way is to copy a work as fast as possible. Both ways take a great deal of skill.

Van Wijngaarden found a way to use gum in his paint instead of oil. This method was genius at the time since the standard test for authenticity early in the twentieth century was to rub alcohol over an area of the painting and see if the paint softened. The paint on ancient works softened, whereas the oil paint on modern works did not. Van Wijngaarden's gum-paint acted as ancient paint would and became a breakthrough in forging techniques.[118] Other techniques forgers have used to make their works seem old is to bake them in the oven, bury it for a period of time, or partially damage it. Pietro Maria came up with the idea of damaging his works and then making it look as though ancient repairs were done to them. He used bands of corroded copper and dented lead plugs. This forging technique is still popular today.[119]

Fiona Stafford, a scholar of the Ossian book of poems written by James Macpherson, said that the Ossian works were aesthetically valuable even though they were not what they claimed to be.[120] Hubertus Von Sonnenburg, a famous fake buster, used to get excited about great art forgeries and would dream that one day he would put together the biggest, most important, exhibition of art forgeries to date.[121] Sonnenburg

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[118]Hoving, *False Impressions*, pp. 164, 168.
[119]Hoving, *False Impressions*, p. 54.
[120]James Macpherson, *The Poems of Ossian and Related Works*, Howard Gaskill (ed.), Fiona Stafford (intro.), (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996, reprinted in 2002), p. xviii.
[121]Hoving, *False Impressions*, p. 225.

once said "People find it almost impossible to admit that there are any great fakes at all. Oh, how wrong they are!"[122] Thomas Hoving, another famous fake buster, suggested that "the world wants to be fooled."[123] That is, we enjoy the hunt for fakes, the excitement when we realize we found out something new, and the general thrill of knowing that some works might have a dark secret that might never be discovered.

When it comes down to it, forgeries can be fun puzzles to solve, amusing jokes placed on art critics or friends, pieces to enjoy for their formal characteristics, or we can enjoy them for their histories and significance to the artworld. We can also respect the forger for his craftsmanship and the labour it took for him to pull off his deception. However, I also agree with Sherri Irvin who argued that forgeries can damage aesthetic understanding if they go undetected. That is, undetected forgeries not only develop an undeserved aesthetic value, they also lead art-historians to create false relations between other artworks and a false history of the artworld. The more an artworld develops without discovering such a forgery, the larger this fake history will grow and the longer it will take to fix.

Things might also be condemned as forgeries that are not actually forgeries, and this problem can also be extended to undiscovered artists who pay small tributes to some of the greats in their artwork. Picture a newly discovered painting that was attributed to some famous artist because of the style of eyes he used. Say this newly discovered painting used light and colour unlike any artwork before it. Once more information is known, we find out that this supposedly great painting was not created by any famous artist. This artist did not intend to deceive the artworld nor did he intend to create a forgery; he merely wanted to pay tribute to his favourite artist by incorporating the style

[122]Hoving, *False Impressions*, p. 255.
[123]Hoving, *False Impressions*, p. 23.

of eyes that his idol used.

Conclusion to Chapter 3:

Since our aesthetic evaluations deal with formal appraisals as well as historical and contextual appraisals, a hybrid position is necessary for a proper aesthetic evaluation. That is, one must have knowledge regarding its origins, other extra-aesthetic information, and the work itself in order to contemplate its formal features. With this information one must then establish which category of art the work falls into, and can then determine its value and true significance to the artworld. The hybrid position also entails that the value of an original artwork is different from the value of a forgery. The reason is that forgeries have different extra-aesthetic features than their originals. Therefore, even if the two works are identical formally, they differ historically and contextually. This entails a difference in aesthetic value. Nonetheless, although the value of forgeries and their originals are different, forgeries can still be admired and enjoyed. For instance, one can admire the skill of the forger, the likeness of the forgery to the original, and the invention of certain methods that make forgeries seem older.

Seeking out proper aesthetic knowledge is necessary for both the forgery and the artworld itself. Until a forgery is discovered, not only will it be given unworthy praise, it will also lead art-historians to create false relationships between artworks and a false history of the artworld. This problem relates to genuine works as well since the aesthetic value of a genuine might be diminished if its genuineness is not authenticated. Clearly this is an extensive task which will never end so long as new artworks are being created. Nonetheless, acknowledging that this problem exists and attempting to amend it is a start.

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