

THE MAU MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN AND AMERICAN SAMOA:

AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH

by

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
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*ABSTRACT*


During the period 1920-1930, native political movements called *Mau* movements emerged in the territories of Western Samoa and American Samoa. These two territories were inhabited by native peoples of similar cultural and linguistic background, but the territories were administered by colonial governments, namely the United States of America (American Samoa), and New Zealand (Western Samoa) whose policies were distinctive. An examination of archival documents and available published material reveals that the movement in Western Samoa was more strongly supported by the indigenous population and was more highly organized than the movement in American Samoa. In addition, the goals of the movement in Western Samoa centred on the achievement of political autonomy whereas the goals of the movement in American Samoa focussed on incorporation within the American political sphere. It is the central purpose of this thesis to provide an explanation for this variance, taking into account the opinions expressed in the hitherto available literature. To facilitate this task, the interrelationships of traditional socio-political structure, colonial administrative policy and resource potential in each territory are examined. A comparison of social structure shows that the similarities obtaining between the two territories are restricted

primarily to the village and descent group level. On the supra-village political level, the critical distinction is the higher level of sociopolitical organization that prevailed in Western Samoan institutions. American Samoa lacked such institutions, and furthermore was traditionally a satellite territory of one of the districts of Western Samoa. This variance is found to be a significant factor in the development of a stronger and more united movement in Western Samoa. Colonial policies also varied between the two territories. New Zealand administered Western Samoa through a League of Nations Mandate and vigorously pursued an expensive campaign to modernize the territory. Despite the altruistic basis to this policy and the large sums of money invested in various reform programs, the changes in Samoan life introduced by the New Zealand administration were fiercely resisted by traditional Samoan leaders. In contrast, in American Samoa there was no congressional acknowledgement of the American status in those islands, and consequently there was no development of a formal administrative policy. Furthermore, the major source of funding for the American territory was apparently limited to internally generated tax sources. An even more significant feature is the higher percentage of monetary income disbursed in wages to the American Samoans by the administration. In addition, important differences in resource potential between the two island groups had a profound influence on the variance between the political movements. More favourable environmental conditions, high population and the abundance of agricultural land in Western Samoa were associated with a persistent and viable subsistence

economy in which chiefs retained their traditional authority over land and kinsmen and maintained a high degree of economic independence from the colonial administration. However, the relatively poorer resource base of American Samoa made expansion of subsistence agriculture extremely difficult. Therefore, during the navy administration, American Samoans increasingly neglected subsistence agriculture in favor of wage labour, thereby developing an increased dependency upon the administration. Consequently, the variance in character and intensity of the two movements must be considered in light of the contrasts in resource potential and the implications of this factor on the establishment of socio-economic relationships between indigenous leaders and their respective colonial administrations.

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The roots of this project are found in an undergraduate course taught by Professor Rosamond M. Vanderburgh, Erindale College, University of Toronto in 1973. In the process of researching a paper on socio-economic change in Western Samoa, I was exposed to many of the basic ideas contained within this thesis. The intellectual debt to Professor Vanderburgh is enormous.

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While I express my deep appreciation to all those who assisted me in the execution of this project, I acknowledge that the ideas and conclusions presented in this thesis are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of those who contributed.

*DEDICATION*

*To the Memory of my Father*

*"E pala ma'a, 'ae le pala 'upu"*

*ORTHOGRAPHIC NOTE*

The distribution of meaning associated with several traditional Samoan terms changed considerably after European contact. To make these distinctions in meaning clear, this thesis has adopted the practise of writing traditional Samoan terms in lower case except, of course, for proper names, and the modernized version in upper case. A glossary of native terms is provided, page 281.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Samoan Archipelago straddles latitude  $14^{\circ}$  South in the Pacific Ocean. It lies approximately six hundred miles northeast of Fiji, six hundred miles north of Tonga, and one thousand miles west of the Cook Islands. (Fig. 1) Except for Rose atoll, all of the islands in the archipelago are high volcanic units, and are inhabited by people culturally and linguistically identified as Western Polynesians. The islands of the group share many physical characteristics. Each of them has varying widths of coastal belt and fringing reef, and all have extremely rugged interiors covered with dense vegetation. From west to east the islands, known respectively as Savai'i, Upolu, Tutuila and the Manu'a group, become progressively smaller in size, lower in relief and separated from each other by greater distances of open sea. Savai'i and Upolu, the two largest islands lying furthest to the West, today constitute the independent state of Western Samoa. Forty miles east of Upolu lies the smaller island of Tutuila and the Manu'a group sixty miles east of Tutuila. These islands constitute the territory of American Samoa, governed by the United States of America.

In 1900 the Berlin Treaty partitioned the islands along longitude  $171^{\circ}$  West. The islands west of this line were assigned to Germany,




Figure 1. Sketch Map of Samoa in the Pacific Region.

while the islands east of it were handed to the United States government and administered from that time on by the United States Navy. The Germans in Western Samoa were replaced by a New Zealand military administration in 1914, and in 1920 a New Zealand civilian administration assumed control of Western Samoa under a League of Nations Mandate. The American Navy continued in American Samoa until 1951, when it was replaced by an American civilian administration.

During the decade 1920 to 1930, native political movements protesting the respective colonial administrations emerged in both island territories. There were important differences in the historical background, membership composition and strength, internal structure, articulated goals, political strategies, and ultimate achievements of these movements, known collectively as the *Mau*. The origin of the term *Mau* as applied to political movements is uncertain. The formal meanings of the word are "opinion, testimony, evidence, or proposal" (Milner, 1978:141). In its modern context, the word refers explicitly to rebellion or revolution (Milner, 1978:141). *Mau* was most likely first applied to the political movement in Western Samoa in 1926, and since the origins of the political movement in American Samoa preceded this by six years, it seems likely that the term *Mau* was only applied to that earlier movement retroactively. Both of these political movements emerged during a period of culture change resulting from the policies and actions of the respective colonial administrations.

The *Mau* in Western Samoa was a protest movement that united the islands and had the support of over 90 percent of the native popu-

lation. The internal structure of the Western *Mau* possessed several Samoan features that were coupled with extremely efficacious European strategies. A powerful feature of the movement in Western Samoa was the new part-Samoan leadership which bridged the gap between traditional and modern concerns and united various discontented social groups in a solid opposition to the New Zealand administration. The goal of the *Mau* in Western Samoa was self-rule. Although they appeared to have failed at the time, the leaders of the *Mau* became in effect, the progenitors of independence which was granted in 1962.

The *Mau* in American Samoa never attained the same levels of membership as its counterpart did in Western Samoa. The membership and leadership of the *Mau* in American Samoa were essentially restricted to the island of Tutuila, and within that island mostly to the Western District. The grievances voiced by the *Mau* in American Samoa centred on the rivalry between the Eastern and Western Districts that resulted from the enhanced economic position of the Eastern District after American administration headquarters were established in that district in 1900. Consequently, the American Samoan *Mau* cannot be considered a national movement, but more appropriately a factional movement. The leaders of the *Mau* here requested the replacement of the United States Navy administration with a civilian form of government and the granting of full United States citizenship rights to the American Samoan population. Although part-Samoans were involved with the movement, they were not as effective a group as they were in Western Samoa. Despite the fact that some sympathy was raised for the

Samoa situation in the United States, and that a commission was dispatched from the U.S. Congress to American Samoa in 1930, Congress failed to act on any of the commission's recommendations and the American Samoan *Mau* disbanded in 1930 having achieved few of its goals.

These important distinctions that obtained between the *Mau* in the two island territories in this thesis will be examined from the perspective of the following interacting variables:

(1) *Variation in Traditional Socio-political Complexity*

In Western Samoa, the leading political families and the most powerful groups of chiefs were domiciled on the island of Upolu whereas in American Samoa, Tutuila, the largest island was historically a sub-district of Atua, itself a major district of Upolu in Western Samoa. It was then, a territory that paid tribute to the specific chiefs resident in Western Samoa.

(2) *Variation in Colonial Administrative Policy*

The precise relationship between the United States and American Samoa was not officially established until 1929 when Congress finally ratified the cessions obtained from the Samoan chiefs in 1900 and 1904. Policy was set by the governor who answered directly to the secretary of the navy who in turn answered directly to the president of the United States. Each governor was therefore, theoretically, the ultimate authority in the territory with absolute power, but in actual practise this power was softened considerably by his tenuous position, that followed from his not having received congressional ratification. The first task set by the first commandant (the commission of governor

was not created until 1905) was to establish a practical administrative structure by which to organize the new territory. This was accomplished, and the design remained intact until the end of the navy administration in 1951. This new political structure was modelled on the native form of government, but discrepancies between the new structure and the traditional indigenous structure intensified pre-existent rivalries between the two Tutuilan districts. In addition, American policy gave political recognition to the titular chiefs (*ali'i*), but reduced the traditional authority of the village orators or "talking chiefs" (*tulafale*). This led to further increased factionalism.

The colonial situation in Western Samoa was far more complex. The New Zealand administration was guiding political affairs in Western Samoa by a vision of "sacred trust" entrusted to them by a League of Nations Mandate. After an initial period of relative inactivity, the New Zealand administration attempted to implement a radical policy of directed change. Large sums of money were committed to altruistic schemes designed to modernize Samoa. It was the execution of these plans that precipitated the emergence of the *Mau* in Western Samoa. The New Zealand administration was shocked and humiliated by consequent rebellions and treated the rebel groups as illegal seditious organisations. New Zealand invoked military controls over the Samoan dissidents, banishing chiefs, removing titles and restricting movement. These tactics culminated in the shooting and death of several high ranking *Mau* leaders during a *Mau* demonstration in Apia, 28 December 1929. Among those killed was Tamasese, highest ranking chief in the *Mau*

and one of the highest ranking chiefs in all of Western Samoa.

*(3) Variability in Resource Potential*

There are critical differences in the distribution of economic resources among the major island groups. The larger islands enjoy an abundance of cultivable land and greater area of gentle relief to buffer against the effects of natural disasters. The smaller islands are extremely rugged in profile, isolated and restricted in land suitable for cultivation. The effect of Euro-American intrusion in these respective areas therefore, has differed. Western Samoa had land well suited to commercial plantations, and the Germans established several fine coconut plantations on Upolu before 1914 although most Samoans refused to engage in plantation labour. None of the other islands were as well suited. In particular the smaller, more rugged islands of American Samoa were not appropriate for such development and the American Navy discouraged it.

Population growth also varied between the two areas. In Western Samoa although growth was steady up to 1918, the devastating influenza epidemic of 1918 was responsible for the deaths of twenty percent of the population (over 7,000 persons) in a three week period. American Samoa on the other hand, was unaffected by the epidemic. The American Navy quarantined the islands so effectively that no loss of life was attributed to the influenza epidemic. Therefore, population growth in American Samoa was more constant and over population consequently became a serious problem.

In Western Samoa, because of the Samoan reluctance to work on European commercial plantations, horticulture continued as the basis of the native economy. By contrast in American Samoa, wage labour became a common alternative to growing native crops, and one consequence of this was an increasing dependence upon the American administration. The political effect of this economic dependence in American Samoa was a further undermining of the traditional power of the Samoan chiefs. In Western Samoa where wage labour was not common, the economic power base of the traditional leaders changed little. Therefore, the chiefs maintained a kind of political independence that aided them in their *Mau* activities.

A complete analysis of the structural and organizational contrasts between the two political movements demands the consideration and assessment of all these important and interrelated variables.

## CHAPTER II

### THEORY AND METHOD

#### A. *The Dynamics of Sociocultural Change*

##### 1. *Traditional Approaches*

The early years of anthropological research were dominated by 19 century evolutionists. These early scholars were followed by others who developed concepts of "diffusion," "independent invention," or "acculturation" to explain sociocultural change. A growing awareness of the processes affecting small traditional societies in contact with or under the political control of powerful Euro-American governments, emerged from American field experience on native Indian reservations and British field experience in colonial territories. These earlier theoretical models were often based on Weberian notions of ideal types, such as "primitive" and "modern." The analysis of change in acculturation studies was therefore usually a description of the transformation of the former into the latter.

##### 2. *Dependency Approach*

In complete contrast to the traditional anthropological approaches to modernization, the dependency paradigm postulates dynamics of change predicated upon dissymmetrical power relations between dominant and subordinate nations. This distinction is characterized by the contrastive terms "metropolis" and "satellite" (A.G. Frank, 1969).

The critical feature in these relations is not the stimulation arising from contact with "civilized" nations, but the dependency forced on the "underdeveloped" by the "developed." Underdevelopment in this scheme, results from the political and economic domination by the Western nations. It is the inequality of power and prosperity characterizing these relations that also sustains them, so that the "metropolis" continues to develop, while the "satellite" has limited development potential by virtue of its subordinate status. In this theory, the processes of acculturation, adjustment, assimilation or evolution are claimed to be inoperative in the dependency context. Hence, change is accomplished by revolutionary political action. This paradigm is Marxist, and employs explicitly Marxist categories of analysis such as class structure, mode of production and notions concerning capitalist imperialism. It asserts that the real meaning of change is found in the revolutionary realignment of dependency relations, and the goal of change is liberation from all forms of dependency.

Sherwood Lingenfelter has expressed corresponding views in a recent article on socioeconomic change in Oceania:

The superordinate variable in change is the domination of the colonial power which restructures the indigenous societies to extract from them a surplus, which is politically defined, and idiosyncratic to each historical time and place (1977:114).

Lingenfelter stresses that socioeconomic development or the lack of it, is determined by elements of colonial control. The system of colonial exploitation operating to extract surpluses from indigenous societies in a manner to minimize cost and maximize profit, frustrates

native development. The constraints of this system stimulate the outbreak of cargo cults or political movements of withdrawal and non-cooperation (Lingenfelter, 1977:116).

The view of traditional societies projected by acculturation theory emphasizes their receptivity and passivity. The dependency paradigm promotes a more extreme version of this view wherein "primitives" are portrayed as pawns and victims. Within both the acculturation and dependency paradigms, change is assumed to originate externally. For various reasons, internally derived transformations are either denied or ignored. Successful attempts by "primitives" to manipulate and exploit the colonial environment, to develop structurally along unique and multifaceted designs or to develop and implement their own political strategies are disregarded.

### 3. *"Development from Below" Approach*

David Pitt (1976) maintains the position that the dynamics of development can best be explained situationally. Emphasis on the multi-directional dimensions of development is offered as an alternative to the determinism of Marxist and structural-functionalist models. The dominant motif in Pitt's argument is his adherence to the formalist approach to economic analysis. In an earlier study of economic development in Samoa, Pitt (1970) argues against the position of the economist V.D. Stace who had claimed that suitable institutions and social values appropriate to the development of the capitalist spirit were lacking in Samoan society. Pitt attempts to demonstrate that these charges are false, and that Samoan values, sentiments, motivations and social

institutions are well suited to development. However, despite his argument that Samoan tradition was well disposed to surplus production, capital formation and specialization in trade and production, Pitt is nonetheless forced to admit that, however possible development is within the Samoan social context, it has not been realized:

But if traditional institutions have been apparently successful in promoting economic growth why is Samoa still described as an underdeveloped country in the conventional economists' understanding of the term? (Pitt, 1970:264).

Pitt's solution to this dilemma is to argue that neither altruism nor exploitation has any real effect on development because, "the donors or exploiters and the recipients are separated by a considerable social gulf which vitiates effective contact and communication" (Pitt, 1976:1-2). From this he derives his term "development from below," as a label for development that occurs despite, rather than because of colonial aid or interference.

One problem in Pitt's analysis is his reductionist approach to dynamics. Very little attention is addressed to those structural mechanisms operating within the modernization context. The prime mover for Pitt is motivational and generated from within the human psyche. Pitt thus shares with Sherwood Lingenfelter, a reliance on motivational factors to explain socioeconomic change in traditional Oceanic societies:

The real dynamic is an intense desire for European goods; this desire is partly explicable in traditional terms and is achieved through production incentives depending on essentially *fa'a Samoa* patterns of reward in terms of status or goods (Pitt, 1970:9).

Notwithstanding the above criticism, Pitt's concern with internally generated change must be acknowledged as a welcome contribution. It now remains to convert this concern into a theory capable of explaining change.

#### 4. *Ecological Approach*

The 'natural history' approach of A.L. Kroeber (in Steward, 1973) had directed attention away from the search for causality in man-environment relations, but the work of Leslie White and Julian Steward marked a resurgence of interest in causality and evolutionary issues.

White viewed cultural dynamics on the highest possible level of abstraction and permitted no form of biological, psychological or environmental reductionism. His goal was the establishment of universally valid cultural laws of evolution (White, 1959). Although White was undeniably a cultural materialist, rigid adherence to a sui generis view of culture means he is not a cultural ecologist. That distinction belongs to Julian Steward. Quite in contrast to White, Steward restricted his theoretical statements to evolutionary patterns derived from specific local developments. To distinguish himself from the more global scope of White, Steward (1956:11) called his approach "multilineal evolution." To accommodate the manifold evolutionary structures and processes which he recognized, Steward developed a rigidly empirical methodology for establishing evolutionary laws. Somewhat sceptical of the global scope of White, Steward aimed at "middle range causal formations" (Murphy, 1977:30). It was a concept based firmly on the use of the comparative method and on the principles

of ecology. As Steward himself described his work in *Theory of Culture Change*, "My purpose in this collection of essays is to develop a methodology for determining regularities of form, function, and process which recur cross-culturally among societies found in different cultural areas" (1955:3).

The second basic principle in Steward's work was that of cultural ecology, defined by Steward as:

... the study of the processes by which society adapts to its environment. Its principal problem is to determine whether these adaptations initiate internal social transformations of evolutionary change. Its method requires examination of the interaction of societies and social institutions with one another and with the natural environment (Steward, 1969:337).

Cultural ecology is a method devised by Steward to examine the ways in which human societies adjust to their physical and social environments. His research methods proceeded in three steps. The first studied the "interrelationship of exploitative or productive technology and environment." The second determined the "behavior patterns involved in the exploitation of a particular area by means of a particular technology" and the third established "the extent to which behavior patterns entailed in exploiting the environment affect other aspects of culture" (Steward, 1955:40-41). Priority was given to those cultural features which interact most directly with the environment through subsistence activities. These features, which are determined empirically were called the "cultural core" (Steward, 1955:37).

This view of culture is distinctive in that it regards a socio-cultural system as an adaptive system and intrinsically dynamic.

Evolutionary transformation is achieved through the sensitivity of the system and its ability to respond to shifts in the physical or social environment. Analytical power is enhanced through empirical demonstrations of evolutionary processes operating in actual spatial and temporal dimensions. Additional value lies in its appropriateness for studying contemporary problems of modernization. Steward and six of his students illustrated that utility in the *Project to Study Cross-Cultural Regularities* designed to study the regularized features of modernization pertinent to several different types of underdeveloped societies (Steward, 1977:63). Another example of multilineal evolution in contemporary settings is found in an article by Murphy and Steward (1956:335-355). This article describes parallel patterns of work organization in two contrasting physical environments. Marshall Sahlins (1958), working also within an ecological perspective, explored differential social stratification among Polynesian societies of similar historical background and attributed variation to distinctive ecological adaptations. Yet another study by Clifford Geertz (1963) combined ecological and historical variables in an analysis of change in Indonesia.

Critics of cultural ecology have charged that it ignores the impact of colonial dominance. Robert Bee (1974:151), states that Steward's methodology is "carefully designed to exclude precisely this set of factors." With reference to the general state of evolutionary theory, Elman Service states:

It seems obvious that what has been missing in cultural evolutionary schemes is a way of talking about what are its salient dynamics: the evolutionary dominance of modern advanced societies in the form of colonialism and imperialism, and the reactions of some societies to this dominance in various forms of revolution (1971:10-11).

This criticism seems particularly misguided when one looks at Steward's analysis of Puerto Rican society (1955) and the three volumes of the *Cross Cultural Regularities Project* (Steward, 1967). Moreover, in his article "Modernization in Traditional Societies" (1977:297-330) Steward provides an explicit strategy for the study of evolving traditional societies in the context of modernization.

#### *B. Method*

An analysis of the political movements which emerged in American Samoa and Western Samoa between 1920 and 1930 requires more than a documentation of historical events. These movements are analyzed in this thesis on the premise that they represent structural forms emerging within a context of culture change. Therefore, it seems appropriate to adopt research strategies outlined by Steward because they specify those variables essential in an ecological analysis of structural change (Steward, 1977:297-330).

##### *1. The Initial Culture*

Essential to any comparative diachronic study is the establishment of a temporal base line. This is used as a standard position from which subsequent structural change is measured. The first step in the analysis is, therefore, a reconstruction of the Samoan political

structures and environmental relations as they existed within a traditional context. Traditional context is herein defined for the purposes of this study as that which pertains to the period before the colonial partition of the Samoan Islands (1900), and where possible to that period prior to the extensive effect of Euro-American contact (1840). Although it is recognized that some change from European influence may have taken place prior to 1840, the paucity of historical documents make it impossible to reconstruct any reliable picture of an earlier Samoan society.

### 2. *Substantive Effect*

The political movement known as the *Mau* is the substantive element of change that is of concern to this thesis. A measure of structural change can be determined by comparing the structure of the *Mau* to traditional Samoan political structures.

### 3. *Contexts of Change*

A traditional society may be transformed through exposure to outside influences, but modifications are always obtained through specific supracommunity influences (Steward, 1977:299). An admirable demonstration of this principle is found in Spicer's 1962 analysis of indigenous historical developments within their appropriate colonial setting. Steward followed much the same approach in his Puerto Rican study.

Not every society experiencing change is exposed to the same socio-economic features and it follows logically that essential factors of change may therefore vary among societies. This variation

in key factors accounts for the differential forms of transformation achieved through the processes of change:

Variations in the actual effectiveness of particular factors in the social context bring different processes and combinations of processes into operation in different local societies (Steward, 1977:322).

The crucial features of Samoan contact with Euro-American society relevant to indigenous political change are limited and capable of precise determination. Furthermore, an examination of historical documents relating to Samoa reveals there are two major classes of such features.

The first set can be clustered together and designated *cultural ecological*. They comprise such features of the physical and social environment as are relevant to culture change. This analysis describes those environmental potentials which enhanced colonial interest in Samoa and demonstrates the effect of those which had the greatest impact on the indigenous political structures.

The second cluster relates to factors of *colonial administration*. It includes an examination of administrative policies and laws, laying emphasis on those particularly effective in altering indigenous structure such as government services, colonial economic support and strategies for directed change. As Steward points out (1977:304), traditional society does not interact with the total colonial society or even the total resident community, because both societies are socially and territorially segregated. The discussion of colonial society focuses on those administrative agencies and agents that interact directly

with the traditional community.

#### 4. *Evolutionary Processes*

Another aspect of the ecological method is the identification of those processes that specifically affect sociocultural transformations.

Processes have been defined for present purposes as the ways in which factors in the social context especially factors of alien origin within the colonial or national context, operate to bring about transformations in the traditional society. . . . Because the transformations resulting from these processes are actualized internally, and are not adopted directly from external sources, these processes are defined as evolutionary. (Steward, 1977:311-313)

In our case study, it is possible to restrict our consideration to relevant processes: Western Samoan *nationalism*, and American Samoan *factionalism*.

#### 5. *Comparative Approach*

For Steward, the empirical examination of individual cases was only the first step in determining cross-culturally valid laws of process. The value of individual cases therefore depends on the extent to which they contribute to an understanding of universally valid processes. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to compare individual case studies, as Steward fully acknowledged:

Analyses which can isolate out the factors, internal processes, and substantive effects are fraught with many difficulties. Varying degrees of complexity and development of the contexts, distinctions between potential and active processes, recognition of the extent to which processes have culminated, and assessment of the effects of processes upon unlike native or traditional societies make the different cases seem incomparable to one another (1977:323).

The compromise adopted in this thesis, has been to use a restricted form of the controlled comparison (Eggan, 1954:743-763). The causal importance of the varying factors, contexts and processes upon the structure of the *Mau* movement is determined by a comparison of these forms in two closely related sociocultural groups. In a controlled comparison, care is exerted to maintain as much control as possible over extraneous variables. This is achieved by restricting the scale and frame of comparison to its narrowest possible expression. Basic to the comparison is the selection of relatively homogeneous cultural regions. American Samoa and Western Samoa fit this requirement exceptionally well. Both island groups are inhabited by people of the same sociocultural type, with only slight variation of language, material culture, subsistence techniques, social structure and ideology. The islands shared a common political history until 1900, when they were officially partitioned between Germany and the United States. During the period 1920 to 1930, *Mau* movements developed in both Western Samoa and American Samoa.

The method employed therefore, has two major complementary facets. It employs the categories of analysis outlined by Steward: initial culture, substantive structural change, contextual factors, mediating mechanisms and agencies and evolutionary processes. Each of these elements is employed within a comparative framework. It is hoped that through the strict use of the comparative method, various factors that produced change and led to the variation in the *Mau* movements can be identified.

*CHAPTER III**TRADITIONAL ECONOMY IN OLD SAMOA*

William Albert Setchell spent part of 1920 on the island of Tutuila conducting a study of calcareous algae under the auspices of the Department of Marine Biology of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, D.C. His general description of the archipelago reveals the diversity of inter-island terrain and the character of the natural vegetation:

The Samoan Islands lie between the latitude  $13^{\circ}26'$  and  $14^{\circ}32'$  South and longitude  $168^{\circ}11'$  and  $172^{\circ}48'$  West. They form an irregular line from northwest to southeast, following the trend of most of the archipelagoes of the Pacific Ocean. They are separated, even from the islands of the nearest archipelago, by depths of 2,500 fathoms and over, while the eastern group of the Samoan Archipelago, i.e., American Samoa, is separated from the western group of the same archipelago, i.e., British Samoa, by depths of nearly 2,000 fathoms. The Samoan Archipelago, consequently, represents a distinct mountain chain, arising from depths of 15,000 feet or over, and separated into four distinct segments: Savai'i and Upolu, with the small islands of Apolima and Manono in the shallow strait between them, forming the northwestern portion and rising as high as 5,200 feet above sea-level; Tutuila, with the small island of Aunuu, midway and rising to a little over 2,000 feet above sea-level; the Manua Islands, Tau, Olosega, and Ofu, to the southeast of Tutuila, but separated from it by depths of over 5,000 feet and rising to about 2,000 feet above sea-level; and finally Rose Atoll, to the extreme southeast of the group, separated from Tau and the other Manua Islands by depths of over 5,000 feet, but rising only 10 or 12 feet above sea-level. With

the exception of Rose Atoll, all the Samoan Islands are volcanic, with scanty fringing reefs (or, at Apia, on Upolu, a barrier reef) at places along their shores, and clothed from strand to summit with a dense vegetation, for the most part tropical rain forest of more or less typical form. The four groups of islands within the archipelago are also separated from one another by 50 to 80 miles of water.

The Samoan Islands are separated from neighbouring archipelagoes by considerable distances as well as considerable depths. From the high Fiji group to the southwest, from the somewhat elevated Tonga group to the south, from the low Ellice Islands to the northwest, the distances approximate 600 miles in each case. To the east it is 1,000 to 1,200 miles to the Cook and to the Society groups, both possessing high islands, while to the northeast it is about 2,500 to the Hawaiian Islands, whose mountain peaks are the highest in all the Pacific Islands. It has seemed best to call attention to the foregoing details of relation of position, heights, and depths of surrounding water, since these have a distinct bearing on the distributional and related matters connected with the vegetation of Tutuila Island in particular and of the Samoan Islands in general (Setchell, 1924:5-6).

T.R. Smith in his unpublished paper *Samoa* (1975) describes the islands as they were at the time of European contact:

The islands are high, with relatively recent volcanic rocks which weather into fertile soil. Economic minerals have not been found. There are fringing coral reefs, except in places where lava fields have flowed out over the lagoon and reef. Therefore transport in old Samoa was mainly by water within the quiet lagoon projected by the reef, but some roads (for foot traffic) were necessary to cross lava flows or mountain ridges. Because the rock is porous, water is scarce inland. Therefore almost the entire population lives along the coast at points where streams or springs provide the necessary fresh water--and where the outflowing fresh water prevents the growth of coral and leaves reef openings. So conditions favoured the concentration of the Samoan population into a number of separate coastal villages which were to a large extent economically and politically independent (p. 1).




Figure 2. The Samoan Archipelago. (Adapted from J.A.C. Gray, 1960:11).

More recently, R.F. Watters (1956, 1958, 1958a, 1958b, 1959), has written extensively on the Samoan Islands. The following discussion of traditional environment and economies is primarily based on his works.

The tropical climate of the Samoan archipelago is Oceanic mesothermal. Predominantly easterly flows of surface winds mean that the northwestern or leeward areas of the larger islands experience considerably less precipitation than do the southeastern windward portions of the same islands. Average annual precipitation in several Samoan locations is given in Table I.

Table I  
Annual Precipitation in Four Samoan Locations

Village	Location	Precipitation Per Annum (in inches/cm)
Poutasi	Southeast Upolu	180"/461 cm
Falealupo	Northwest Savai'i	90"/229 cm
--	Interior Savai'i	400"/1016 cm
Pago Pago	Tutuila	196"/498 cm

Sources: Western Samoan data from Watters, 1958a, American Samoan data from Bryan, 1927.

In general the soils are immature and predominantly stoney with only moderate profile development. The lowland soils are usually clay loam, with adequate fertility for vegetational growth, but the upland soils are heavily laterised and excessively acidic in places.

A. *The Samoan Niche: Tropical Microenvironments*

A useful concept for analyzing the way in which the Samoans regulated and maintained their food supply is that of a "niche." As defined by Donald Hardesty, "The niche is an organism's share of the limited energy and nutrients available in an ecological system," and in human terms:

The available energy and nutrients can be viewed as a variety of food resources. . . . The resources vary in size, color, distribution in space and time, temperature, mobility, and so forth. Those variants upon which an organism feeds is its niche (1977:109).

The "niche" can be further conceptualized in spatial terms as a composite of microenvironments:

A useful approach is to equate the niche with the spatial use of subsistence resources. Human populations divide their habitat into distinct resource clusters called microenvironments (1977:111-112).

The Samoan food resources are located within a number of distinct microenvironments, as shown in Table II. One can see by studying this table that only eight of the nine microenvironments were exploited for material items by the Samoans; thus the total Samoan "niche" is defined as the composite of the first eight microenvironments listed in Table II.

Table II  
 Samoan Tropical Microenvironments

Microenvironments	Resources
1. Open Sea	bonito, shark, mackerel, turtle, tuna, swordfish, barracuda
2. Reef	shellfish, squid, sea eels
3. Lagoon	fish, sea slugs, <i>palolo</i> , seaweed
4. Littoral Belt	coconut palms, breadfruit, bananas, kava, sugar cane, minor crops, domesticated pigs and fowl
5. Freshwater Streams and Ponds	crayfish, freshwater fish, pond taro
6. Lowland Forest	pandanus, paper mulberry, doves and pigeons, wild pigs
7. Lowland Forest Clearings	taro, yam, minor crops
8. Middle Forest	giant taro, wild taro, wild yam, bananas, paper mulberry, pandanus
9. Mossy Forest	Not generally used.

Source: Adapted from R.F. Watters, 1958b:349.

The Samoan food resources from these microenvironments fall into four major groups: cultivated crops in village gardens, marine resources, forest resources and domesticated animal resources.

1. *Cultivated Crops in Village Gardens*

In 1840, the Samoans depended upon five staple crops: taro (*Colocasia esculenta*), breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* sp.), coconuts (*Cocos nucifera*), yams (*Dioscorea alata*) and giant taro (*Alocasia macrorrhiza*). Taro and yams were the two basic root crops. They were supplemented by the "famine food" giant taro. The important tree crops were breadfruit, coconut and banana. Bananas do not qualify as a true traditional Samoan crop as they were introduced by the missionaries in 1838 after which time the crop rapidly assumed a popular place in the Samoan diet. A complete list of cultivated and collected plants in Samoa in 1840 is found in Tables III and IV.

A certain uniformity characterized Samoan village gardening. Along the coastal fringe were coconut palms which were one of the few types of trees to flourish in the calcareous soil. Breadfruit trees were dotted here and there around the village, planted among the coconut palms and sometimes found bordering the garden plots. It was an extremely important crop. Some breadfruit was commonly stored as a fermented food (*masi*) in storage pits for up to five months and was of critical importance in times of food scarcity (Watters, 1958b:348).

Immediately behind village settlements, the forest was completely cleared and coconut trees were planted in groves that averaged less than one acre per family (Watters, 1958b:348). According to Grattan

Table III  
Cultivated Plants in Samoa 1840

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Food Plants

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<i>Colocasia esculenta</i>	taro
<i>Artocarpus communis</i> spp.	breadfruit
<i>Dioscorea alata</i>	yam
<i>Musa cavendishii</i>	banana
<i>Musa Fehi</i>	plantain
<i>Alocasia macrorrhiza</i>	giant taro
<i>Piper methysticum</i>	kava
<i>Tacca pinnatifida</i>	arrowroot

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Non Food Plants

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<i>Broussonetia papyrifera</i>	paper mulberry
<i>Pandanus</i> spp.	used for mat making
<i>Cordyline terminalis</i>	leaves were used to make kilts
<i>Hibiscus</i> spp.	used for mat making

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Occasionally Cultivated Plants in Samoa 1840

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Food and Non Food

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<i>Aleurites moluccana</i>	carbon used for dyeing and oil extracted from the nuts
<i>Bixa orellana</i>	seeds contain red dye pigment
<i>Saccharum officinarum</i>	leaves used for building thatch, canes used for confection
<i>Derris trifoliata</i>	used as stupifying agent on fish

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Source: Adapted from Watters, 1958b:350.

Table IV  
Plants Collected in Samoa 1840

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<i>Capsicum frutescens</i>	fruit spice in kava drink
<i>Ananas sativas</i>	pineapple
<i>Carica payaye</i>	papaya
<i>Dioscorea bulbifera</i>	wild yam
<i>Descaspermum fruticosium</i>	berry
<i>Boerhaavia diffusa</i>	a herb with 5 ribbed fruit
<i>Inocarpus edulis</i>	nuts
<i>Pometia pinnata</i>	fruit
<i>Hibiscus sabdariffa</i>	beverage
<i>Flacourtia rukam</i>	fruit tasting like cherry
<i>Terminalia catappa</i>	nut like walnut in flavour
<i>Ipomea batata</i>	sweet potato
<i>Eugenia moluccensis</i>	fruit
<i>Curcuma spp.</i>	turmeric

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Source: Adapted from Watters, 1958b:305.

(1948:30), the coconut does not produce well at elevations exceeding 500 feet, hence these trees were mainly distributed along the lowland slopes and the coastal fringe.

The major food crops were located inland behind the tree groves, in patches cleared from the lowland forest. Taro and yams were the most important crops grown in these plots. Taro occupied 70 per cent of the garden plots (Watters, 1958b:341). Taro was preferred over yams not only as a food, but also because it was considered an easier crop to cultivate. Yams produced poorly, in large part because of neglect in cultivation (Watters, 1958b:342). There were 59 forms of taro found in traditional Samoa but it is uncertain how many of these were indigenous. The method of cultivation practised by the Samoans was of a swidden type in which plots were cleared from the forest immediately following the rainy season. Stone adzes were employed to ring-bark the largest trees, some of which were left standing. Fires were set next to the largest trees and the plot completely burned over. The first crop planted in the dry season of June to August was the yam. Using a native digging implement called the *oso*, holes were made approximately three feet apart into which were placed two smooth-ended sprouted sections of yam. Sometimes a natural support was left or placed near the hole. Otherwise the only consideration provided for the growing tubers was to mound the earth around them during the growing season. Assuming all went well, the yams would be harvested before the wet season, which began in January (Watters, 1958:342).

Taro was planted between November and January, before the beginning of the wet season. However in those regions where rainfall variation was less seasonal taro could be planted throughout the year. The average growing season for tubers before harvest was six to seven months. In well-drained areas the tubers could be left in the ground for several more months.

A specialized technique of cultivating pond taro was practised on Aunuu, Tau and Olosega Islands in American Samoa. In naturally swampy areas, taro of a highly glutinous quality (a Samoan preference) and with a shorter growing season of only four months was cultivated. But these two perceived advantages were offset by the inferior keeping qualities and small size of the tubers (Watters, 1958b:343).

The average garden plot was cultivated for two years, during which time three crops could be harvested. However, variation in soil fertility was marked between different areas of the islands. In some particularly well favoured alluvial soils in areas of year round rainfall, continuous cropping was possible with no appreciable reduction in soil fertility. However erosion was often a problem in such areas. Thus Wright (1962:104-111) suggests that fallowing times could vary from region to region, depending on local soil types and rainfall from an area requiring no fallowing to one requiring ten years of fallowing. Watters estimated that the fallow period in the 1840's probably averaged fifty years over most areas of Upolu and Savai'i (Watters, 1958b:345). Although it is common to speak in terms of swiddening cycles which represent the amount of time elapsed from

the time a plot is cleared initially to the time it is cleared for a second usage, the Samoan evidence suggests that such a cycle was only occasionally completed. Watters refers to Samoa as a place where "abundant land permitted a long if haphazard rotation" (1958b:345). Sources are unanimous in stating that taro was the first ranking food crop. Describing the 1840's, Watters emphasized that, "taro (*Colocasia esculentum*) [sic] was the most important of all vegetable crops" (1958b:341). Ultimately the dietary importance of taro depended to a very large extent on the local soil and rainfall conditions as mentioned above. Only in those areas of consistent annual rainfall and high soil fertility could taro be planted and harvested continuously. In those areas with pronounced dry seasons, (such as the northwest leeward side of islands), taro was cultivated for only six months of the year. In these areas, breadfruit assumed greater importance especially as a staple crop during the dry season.

The semi-wild giant taro (*ta'amua*) could also assume great importance in drier and stonier locations. It is difficult to assess the precise importance of coconuts in the diet relative to other food items since it was a food which was used as a condiment in many other dishes such as coconut cream, coconut sauce, coconut pudding. In addition, curdled coconut could be added to taro, breadfruit or banana dishes. It was unthinkable to produce a meal without using coconuts, but its social value might outweigh its actual nutritive value as a dietary item. Nevertheless, throughout Samoa, the general importance of these crops can be listed as follows:

- (1) Taro (*Colocasia esculenta*);
- (2) Breadfruit (*Artocarpus communis* sp.);
- (3) Coconuts (*Cocos nucifera*); and
- (4) Yam (*Dioscorea alata*)

For a variety of reasons, the most cogent of which is a lack of data, it is difficult to rank quantitatively each microenvironment according to the contributions it made toward native subsistence. Various authorities believe, however, that garden produce was of prime importance in the Samoan diet. The priority of root and tree crops, most particularly of taro to Samoan subsistence has been widely asserted.

The reasons for emphasizing the vegetative elements in the Samoan diet are several. Most importantly, the Samoans themselves place enormous value on taro, both as a preferred food and as a ceremonial exchange food:

An outstanding fact in regard to what might at first appear to be a very humble tuber is the importance and high significance attaching to taro both as an ordinary and as a ceremonial food. Many of them [Samoans abroad] claim that they feel weak if deprived of it for any length of time (Grattan, 1948:107).

## 2. *Marine Resources*

In terms of food preference or social significance marine resources were ranked much lower than taro and other garden crops. Fish in fact are classified as *ina'i*, i.e., as a required but subordinate and supplemental kind of condiment:

The basis of the diet is a vegetable one of *talo* [taro] and breadfruit. With this is required an *ina'i* or relish of another kind of food such as flesh or fish. Fish is the staple *ina'i* (Buck, 1930:138).

There are many difficulties in assessing the quantity of marine resources and their contribution to the typical Samoan diet. The kinds of marine resources exploited were diverse and numerous. Many of these were, however, not staple daily resources, but seasonally and intermittently exploited. For example, offshore fishing was a precarious activity and unpredictable in its results. Therefore, although bonito and shark produce large amounts of food per unit of catch, they were not daily items of diet. Furthermore, bonito was only seasonally available in runs which coincided generally with the breadfruit seasons (Buck, 1930:433). Other various species of fish frequented specific lagoons during different seasons. For example, Peter Buck details the passage of red-lipped mullet through Samoan waters. The returns from the runs of red-lipped mullet could be substantial. At Moataa where the fishing was best, up to 3,000 fish could be caught in a single drive (Buck, 1930:433). However, because the route of these fish passed through only a select number of reef openings, not all villages could exploit this resource equally. In fact, the number of villages that benefitted directly from such a catch was restricted, and the resource itself was available for only a short time each year.

The Samoans were limited in their ability to profit from such seasonal abundance because they lacked any means of fish preservation. The only aboriginal method mentioned was preservation by daily re-

cooking. This technique was generally used to build up sufficient meats for large ceremonial events, and it was a technique that could preserve meat for as long as four weeks (Turner, 1884:112, Grattan, 1948:85). Lacking any other methods for storing surpluses, large catches were generally consumed immediately with surpluses distributed widely through village and family exchange networks.

Estimating the importance of marine resources in the Samoan diet further depends on how this importance is measured:

Resource *quality* is a measure of how critical each resource is to a human population and must be considered in evaluating the importance of microenvironments. For example, a microenvironment contributing a large quantity of starchy roots may not be nearly as important as a microenvironment contributing a small quantity of high-quality protein (Hardesty, 1977:112).

The implication is that over and above the quantitative, ceremonial, and social importance of food there is always a qualitative importance that must be assigned to each. In this sense, marine resources, because of the high quality protein they provide in the daily diet, should be considered equal or even superior to the vegetable items in the Samoan diet.

The importance fishing had to the Samoans is further reflected in the elaboration of the techniques and classifications associated with the activity. In 1897, John Stair was able to collect the names of 145 varieties of salt water fish, 8 fresh water fish and 37 varieties of crustacea and mollusca used as food items. He also obtained information on 100 different methods of fishing: 34 with nets, 7 with spears, 16 miscellaneous, 17 for shellfish and 12 with

baskets or pots (Stair, 1897:199-201). Grattan in 1948 collected the Samoan names for 265 varieties of marine resources that were taken and eaten by the Samoans. Watters recorded only seven species of fish that were not eaten in 1840, and five of these were poisonous (Watters, 1958b:349).

Marine resources were obtained from four distinct microenvironments.

*a. Open Sea.* Beyond the reef, bonito, mackerel, shark, swordfish, tuna and barracuda were fished by men in canoes (usually working in fleets). Bonito fishing in particular involved several canoes each carrying several men who trolled. Sharks were baited and lassoed with a shark rope (Buck, 1930:521). Catching a giant shark (*naiufi*), was considered a great accomplishment and awarded high honour to the fishermen. Turtles were classified as a fish by Samoans, and they were occasionally hunted in the open sea. Near the village of Ngatavai, where there was no reef, canoes cruised along the coast while men on the bluffs above signalled the men below when a turtle was seen. The men in the canoes then set their nets parallel to the shore. From this position they were pulled slowly landward thus trapping the turtles (Buck, 1930:452). Open sea fishing was judged the most difficult and therefore the skilled and knowledgeable open sea fishermen were honoured by the title *tautai*. One amongst them was elected chief *tautai* for the village. A strict division was maintained between the authority of leaders on the sea and that of leaders on land in the village council (*fono*). The chief *tautai* had authority only over events specifically related to fishing excursions, including the

necessary preparations conducted on land, but while undertaking these activities his command was absolute and his rank superceded all others regardless of their family or *fono* status (Buck, 1930:518). High chiefs received recognition when the distribution of shark and turtle meat took place. At this time, specific parts were customarily given to them.

*b. Reef.* The bulk of the daily intake of fish and marine protein was taken from the reefs or the lagoon by the women. They worked with only the simplest of tools: a basket called the *ola*; two kinds of sticks, the *mele'i* used for prying up rocks, and the *la'au sao* used to dislodge squids from their nooks and crannies; and a *tu'u'u* basket trap in which a blackstone was placed that attracted unsuspecting fish. This latter technique was extremely effective:

In Savai'i it is the commonest form of fishing used by the womenfolk and their easiest way of replenishing the larder with flesh food (Buck, 1930:448).

In addition to trapping fish, lobster and sea crayfish were caught in pot traps set in reef pools. Spears, nets and traps were used to ensnare eels, squid, octopus, shrimp, oysters, several varieties of *Tridacna*, cockles and other varieties of shellfish. A particular delicacy was the edible annelid known as *palolo*. This segmented sea worm usually 18 to 35 centimetres in length when adult, has a reproductive cycle in which during October or November, the last three-quarters of the worm containing either the egg or sperm cells separates from the head and floats to the waters' surface. This brief season was anticipated with great excitement by the Samoan people who found

the *palolo* a delicious treat.

c. *Lagoon*. Many of the same species taken from the reef were also caught in the lagoon, but in addition sea slugs, sea eggs and edible seaweed were also collected. Of special importance were the schools of migratory fish such as the red-lipped mullet (discussed above) and the mackerel which were caught by a wide variety of techniques including the use of poison and stupefying agents. The most spectacular method used in the lagoon was the communal fish drive using *lau* or sweeps of twisted coconut leaf. Large numbers of many different species of fish were obtained this way. Such a catch was divided amongst all the families participating in the drive with special shares of fish distributed to high ranking chiefs. Communal fish drives were common but not restricted to seasonal fish runs.

d. *Fresh Water Streams and Ponds*. This microenvironment which was not identified by Watters, was nonetheless important for at least two fresh water resources. The young fry (*inaga*) of the fresh water fish called the *apofu* were found seasonally at the mouths of large rivers such as the Vaisigano and the Mulivai in Apia. Fresh water crayfish were also taken from the rivers and streams by snaring, or netting (Buck, 1930:480).

In light of the importance of fish as a source of high quality protein in a diet which otherwise consisted mainly of carbohydrates, and also taking into account the skill and knowledge required for exploiting marine resources, there is perhaps the need to reassess the conventional assertion that "As an economic activity fishing came

second to gardening" (Watters, 1958b:48), and to suggest that perhaps fishing should be judged of equal importance.

### 3. *Forest Resources*

The Samoans had extensive knowledge of the plants in the forest, and Watters lists 187 different uses attributed to various plants. Food however was not the major object in the use of forest resources. Plants were gathered that had medicinal, decorative use or value as construction material or fibres in clothing (Watters, 1958b:48). The wild fruits and roots that were collected were primarily "famine foods" and generally considered inferior to the crops cultivated in the gardens.

Fowling and hunting were also conducted in the forest. Pigeons and doves were the two species most commonly hunted, but fowling was seen as a sport for chiefs and therefore the activity contributed little to daily subsistence. Wild pigs, although hunted occasionally, were not considered good eating, while rats, wild dogs and flying foxes were rarely eaten. The food resources collected or hunted in the forest were therefore supplemental to the more important fish and cultivated garden produce.

### 4. *Domesticated Animal Resources*

Domesticated pigs and fowl were kept enclosed within stone walls behind the houses of the village, and pork was a potential source of protein. However, since pigs were one measure of wealth and prestige, they were generally consumed only on important ceremonial occasions, and their contribution to daily protein requirements was insignificant

(Watters, 1958b:350).

### B. Land Tenure

The largest land owning unit in the archipelago was the village. It formed a self identifiable unit, with definable boundaries, and the villagers exercised authority over the lands so defined. Its jurisdiction lay over the uncultivated and unclaimed land which otherwise lay outside the control (*pule*) of individual families resident within the village. This authority was collectively exercised by titled chiefs (*matai*) who served on the village council (*fono*). Boundaries between villages along the occupied coast were often in dispute, although the villagers always professed to know these boundaries exactly. The borders extended inland all the way to the top of the interior ridge (Kessing, 1934:268-270). Thus each village contained within its territory a slice of the vegetational zones.

Within the village, the major land owning units were the *au'aiga*, glossed hereafter as 'family groups' of which the village was composed. The *au'aiga* were corporate, land holding groups with ultimate ownership vested in the entire membership. In addition, the senior *matai* of each *au'aiga* had a special relationship to family lands. As an elected leader the *matai* did not have the right to dispose of land because he did not own it; his role was solely managerial. But despite this limitation, the *matai* exerted complete authority and control (*pule*) over the lands associated with his title. This "land trusteeship" as Keesing terms it (1973:254), is the greatest privilege of

title, and associated with it are specific duties and responsibilities deemed proper for the administration of the family lands. The *matai* allocated land to family members for use and directed clearing cultivation and other gardening tasks. In the case of a wealthy estate, the *matai* may not be expected to engage in gardening activities himself, but rather is supported with gifts of food from the labourers under his authority.

Each land owning family controlled several parcels of dispersed land. A contemporary description states that the average number of plots per family group varies from five to fifteen, scattered through the village lands, and that these vary in size from one half to four acres ( $\frac{1}{4}$ - $1\frac{1}{2}$  hectares) in size (Ward in Nayacakalou, 1960:125-126). There is no reason to believe that this pattern is fundamentally different from that in existence in 1840.

The land tenure system was sensitive to changing environmental conditions. Since there was surplus land in the islands, the *au'aiga* could expand its land holdings in response to a growing labour pool. This was accomplished by staking out claims to portions of bush land held in common by the village. Once cleared, this land came under the control (*pule*) of the senior *matai* of the homestead from which the worker came. If, on the other hand, an *au'aiga* was shrinking in membership, its ability to retain claim to its landholdings could be challenged: one of the primary rules of the Samoan system of land tenure required validation of land claims through continuous use. Any extended fallowing period immediately weakened

the right of use and threatened its owners with encroachment by others:

To expansion, however, there was a limit: for one's claim had to be kept under constant use to be recognised as valid. If a man allowed a plot of land to revert to bush, especially if he went away for a number of years, he would lose his claim and someone else would clear and use the land. As Margaret Mead puts it, "a claim to new land is easy to establish, but difficult to perpetuate" (Nayacakalou, 1960:113).

In 1840, land was plentiful and except for certain areas of dense population, there was no strain on resources. Within each village, the various *au'aiga* through their system of dispersed land parcels had relatively equal access to all types of food crops and were therefore, self sufficient food producing units. Other major sources of food such as those extracted from the sea were village controlled resources, and therefore also accessible to all residents.

#### *C. Population and Settlement in Samoa 1840*

In 1787, La Perouse estimated the total population of Samoa at 80,000 but this estimate remains unconfirmed (Watters, 1956:Table 9). A more reliable estimate is attributed to Commodore Charles Wilkes USN whose figures provide the basis for Table V (Watters, 1958b:345). It is usual to approach these early population estimates with caution. However, a London Missionary Society census taken seven years after Wilkes indicates that his figures were probably fairly accurate.

Table V  
Population Totals and Densities in Samoa 1839

Island	Area		Population	Density Per	
	sq. mi/sq. km			sq. mi/sq. km	
Upolu	430	1,114	25,000	58	22
Savai'i	703	1,828	20,000	28	11
Manono	3	7.8			
Apolima	2	5.2	1,600	235	123
Tutuila	54	140	8,000	148	57
Manu'a	18.5	48	2,000	108	42
Samoan Group	1,210.5	3,147	56,600	46.8	18

Source: Watters, 1958b:345.

The average density figures are somewhat misleading as they do not adequately reflect the true concentration of population clusters on the islands. The distribution of these centres indicates a different pattern than the statistics above:

Other noticeable features of the distribution pattern are concentrations of population in northwestern Upolu, in the Aleipata area in Eastern Upolu, around Safata in the southwest [Upolu], a strip in south-eastern Upolu, the Safane-Matautu area in northern Savai'i, and the Leone Plain of southwest Tutuila (Watters, 1958a:3).

The same author (1958a) states further that,

The largest plain in the group reaches the sea in the Aana district of northwest Upolu, and its northern fringe was the most densely settled area of old Samoa (p. 5).

It seems clear therefore that the areas of densest settlement were in Western Samoa, particularly on the northwestern shore of Upolu. This point is elaborated in Chapter VIII, pages 251-255.

According to Watters (1958a), population distribution in 1840 was determined by six primary factors:

(1) *Distance from the coast.* Ninety-six per cent of the population or 86 per cent of the settlements were within one mile of the sea (p. 3).

(2) *Location of coral reefs.* This factor was extremely important, for:

Not only did these give shelter but they afforded valuable seafood in the lagoons and reef pools. Settlements were few and small on the exposed coasts, in contrast to the numerous populous settlements that lined sheltered lagoons. The most densely populated stretch of coast in Tutuila and Upolu lined a broad productive lagoon protected by a channel-cut reef (Watters, 1958a:5).

(3) *Reef channels.* Fifty-three per cent of the settlements or 70 per cent of the population lay within three miles of a reef channel. These reef channels were commonly associated with the mouths of fresh water rivers. The variation between settlement and population percentages indicates that those settlements found near reef channels were disproportionately large and socially important. Furthermore, while only 56 per cent of the population in Savai'i lived within three miles of a reef channel, over 80 per cent of the population on Upolu did so. The reef channels were important in providing access to the open sea and access both to the marine resources and also to other

villages and islands. The travel on the open sea was the major means of inter-village and inter-island communication (p. 5).

(4) *Relief*. The importance of this variable is demonstrated by the fact that:

An overwhelming proportion of the population lived on level or gently sloping land, which is to be found almost solely along the coast. Of the 42 settlements lying more than a mile from the sea in 1840, only a few fortified *olo*, or places of refuge, were not located on gently sloping land (Watters, 1958a:5-6).

(5) *Soil Fertility*. Watters describes the relation of this feature to settlement as follows:

The fertility of coastal soils undoubtedly affected population distribution. Soils highest in nitrogen, phosphate and potash are generally nearest the coast. [However] where recent lava soils occurred on the coast, excessive stoniness, lack of depth and profile development would limit their utilisation. Coastal areas of these immature soils occurred in western and northern Savai'i and supported only a few scattered settlements (Watters, 1958a:6).

(6) *Hydrology*. The porosity of the basaltic lavas meant that surface water was almost nonexistent in the interior of the islands. Rain percolated almost directly downwards and reappeared at base level on the coast as fresh water springs. Watters determined that at least 97 out of 223 settlements on Upolu and Savai'i were located near fresh water springs; 26 more were situated at the mouths of rivers. On Upolu 83 out of 120 settlements were located near springs or streams.

Traditional Samoan economic life, including settlement, gardening and fishing resources, was remarkably benign. Margaret Mead seems to have described it well when she wrote, "In Samoa there is no winter,

no lean season, no period when scrimping and saving are necessary" (1930:65). Only infrequent droughts and hurricanes disrupted this picture.

## CHAPTER IV

## TRADITIONAL SAMOAN SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE

In the 1970's, research on the structure of Samoan descent groups and political units was conducted by Walter Tiffany (1971) and Sharon Weston (1972). Tiffany (1971) includes a careful reconstruction of the traditional Samoan political structure, and the following discussion is based primarily on his system of categorization, with additional information derived from Weston (1972) and others as indicated.

A. *Kinship Based Political Units*1. *Au'aiga*

The *au'aiga* is the largest Samoan descent group. It is non-exogamous, ambilineal, non-exclusive and corporate in nature (Tiffany, 1971:134-164). The term ambilineal follows Firth (1957:6) and pertains to the method members use when tracing descent to the group's apical ancestor. In an ambilineal system, descent may be traced through either males or females or any random combination of such links. In the Samoan case, descent may even be traced simultaneously through both maternal and paternal links when parents are both members of the descent group, thus reinforcing claim to membership (Weston, 1972:7).

The *au'aiga* is non-exclusive because all descendants of the apical ancestor are included within the membership. However, from a given individual's point of view, active membership is practically restricted

by a number of factors, especially residence. Nevertheless, when one validates his/her primary membership through residence, he or she does not relinquish the opportunity of changing residence to another *au'aiga* in which he/she also has membership rights, or indeed of conducting affairs in several different *au'aiga* concurrently.

The *au'aiga* is corporate in nature and exercises control over *au'aiga* property which consists of land, house sites, ceremonial goods and chiefly titles. The *au'aiga* is therefore, an extremely important economic and political group. Its composition centres around two types of members; those who form the geographically localized core residing in the village of the apical ancestor, on *au'aiga* land headed by a chief (*matai*) who possesses the senior *matai* title; and those members dispersed throughout the Samoan archipelago who retain active *au'aiga* membership through means other than residence. The most common way of doing the latter is by contributing to the ceremonial activities and responding to requests for economic assistance. Even though the membership may be dispersed throughout several islands, members do congregate when choosing a new incumbent for the senior *matai* title.

Politically, the *au'aiga* wields considerable influence over its members through the *matai* who administers its affairs. Wider political ties are formed through intermarriages arranged between senior *matai* and daughters of senior *matai* in other *au'aiga*. The political alliances thus formed offer additional sources of manpower, and these networks are tapped in times of economic, ceremonial or, in the past, military need.

The sphere of the *au'aiiga* is extensive. In addition to administering *au'aiiga* property, selecting persons to hold the senior title, and establishing military alliances, the *au'aiiga* celebrates important life cycle events and assesses contributions for these events from among its members. It also assigns tasks to its members and adjudicates internal disputes.

In order to understand the workings of the *au'aiiga*, it is necessary to recognize the analytical distinction between authority and power.

Political power embraces and includes authority. Authority is the legitimate use of power. It is, as Nadel has said, *de jure*, deriving from possession of a title, role, or office to which power attaches. Political power, on the other hand, is *de facto*, being derived from a whole range of sources (Cool, 1958:44).

Authority therefore legitimatizes the use of power by providing for the potential use of force with public support or acquiescence.

There are two sources of power for the *au'aiiga*:

- a. *Land control*. The *au'aiiga* has control (*pule*) over all its land resources. The system does not admit private ownership as conceived by western law. All land, house sites, and gardening plots are controlled and administered by the appropriate *matai* on behalf of the *au'aiiga* which is the ultimate proprietor. The *matai* has the right to allocate land to residents of his household, and he also has the right to evict those who displease him or who are not acceptable to him or the other household residents.
- b. *Manpower*. The execution of any public endeavor requires manpower. The *au'aiiga* is an extremely efficient mechanism through which manpower

can be raised. Since the *au'aiga* has a large number of people many of whom are dispersed geographically, and since some members of an *au'aiga* are simultaneously members of many different *au'aiga*, it follows that manpower can be mobilized on two distinct levels. Within the *au'aiga* itself manpower is raised by calling on the dispersed members. In addition to this, each member can tap multiple *au'aiga* through their other affiliations or via affinal connections. In this way, support can be generated from a wide spectrum of villages throughout the archipelago.

Often there are conflicting demands for support. In the past, senior *matai* of different *au'aiga* may have been involved in military disputes and each would have vigorously recruited support. Inevitably, some people would belong to the *au'aiga* of both disputants. In such cases other factors of prestige and influence would play a critical role in determining support. Economics plays a vital role in manpower mobilization. There is a strong correlation between the number of *au'aiga* relationships kept active by an individual, and his ability to bear the economic burden of supporting the ceremonial activities of each. In addition, the wealthier an *au'aiga* is, the greater the number of contacts it can establish and retain with other *au'aiga*. As described in Chapter III, the *au'aiga* is remarkably sensitive to resource variations. Individuals within the *au'aiga* have the ability to shift active affiliation in response to economic and environmental conditions. The descent principles of the *au'aiga* have a high degree of optation. They permit not only maximal circulation of

surplus production through redistribution to other *au'aiga*, but they also encourage wide redistribution of surplus personnel from areas of regional shortage to areas of regional bounty.

## 2. *Faletama*

The *au'aiga* is characterized by branching and segmentation, but it is not internally stratified, so that genealogical distance from the senior lines of descent is not an issue (Tiffany, 1971:164-179). The Samoan *au'aiga* segments into sections called *faletama*. Members of these units are all legitimate members of the *au'aiga* who trace descent to particular siblings or children of the apical ancestor. The *faletama* is a more restricted group. For example, if the apical ancestor had two sons and a daughter, one would expect that within the *au'aiga* there would be three *faletama* groups, all built on similar principles to the *au'aiga*. There would be a senior title holder who would be responsible for the affairs of the *faletama* and these activities would be similar to those described for the *au'aiga*, only more restricted in scope. The *faletama* is fairly autonomous in managing its affairs but in inter-*faletama* disputes, the senior *matai* of the *au'aiga* usually has authority to arbitrate.

## 3. *'aiga*

The smallest structurally relevant social group is the *'aiga* or household (Tiffany, 1971:180-191). Membership in this group is acquired through common residence. Such groups therefore may contain members of different *au'aiga*. Thus the *'aiga* strictly speaking, is not a kinship based group in the same way that the *au'aiga* and the *faletama*

are, since there may be several members in it who are related affinally or via adoption. The common denominator for *'aiga* membership is residence, and only its central core is made up of members of the same *au'aiga* as the household *matai*. Household members who are not members of the larger *au'aiga* have none of the privileges attendant to that affiliation, yet they are expected to fulfil all the obligations and enjoy all the privileges coincident with household *'aiga* membership. This distinction in rights and duties is an extremely fine one, but there are important ramifications. The one occasion on which it appears most clearly is that of choosing a senior *matai* for the *au'aiga*. The easiest way of identifying those household members who are also *au'aiga* members is by observing who participates in the election of its *matai*.

The *'aiga* is the major social unit involved in production and consumption. The *'aiga* conducts all household tasks, dividing them among its members and assessing appropriate labour contributions from each in order to supply *'aiga*, *fale'atama*, or *au'aiga* ceremonial requirements. The most important daily tasks revolve around the care of garden lands and the production of food stuffs for the household. The *'aiga* through its household *matai*, settles internal disputes and coordinates manpower. The basic source of *'aiga* power derives from its legitimate occupation of *au'aiga* lands, and the effective mobilization of its manpower. Within the local household group, young untitled men (*taulele'a*) are obliged to render labour service to their *matai*. These young men form the backbone of the Samoan workforce,

although the *matai* also does his share.

The source of political power is the same in the *'aiga* as in the *faletama* and *au'aiga* except that it draws upon a smaller social group. Control over land is held by the *au'aiga*, so the smaller units have use of land allocated by the senior *matai* of the *au'aiga*. Power is therefore considerably less in the smaller structural units. The power structure is such that the sub-units of *faletama* and *'aiga* nestle within each other in a hierarchical power structure, the apex of which is the senior *matai* of the entire *au'aiga*. One major principle dominates the inter-relation of these units. Since each social unit is an autonomously functioning unit and support for the larger units is voluntary, authority flows from the sub-units to the larger ones. Because consensus is a requirement for *au'aiga* decisions, the units generally cohere from smallest to largest.

#### B. Leadership Offices

##### 1. Qualifications for Leadership and Method of Selection

True political representation within the traditional Samoan political system is granted only to those persons who are *matai* (Cool, 1958:45). A *matai* holds a leadership office which is part of the corporate property of each *au'aiga*. *Matai* titles are the corporate property of the descent group. Succession to title is controlled by the members of the descent group and when titles become vacant the *au'aiga* meets to select a new *matai* from the various candidates. Factionalism is a common feature of this process. Each *faletama* usually

supports a candidate from within its own membership and it may take a long time to reach the required consensus. The senior *matai* of the *au'aiiga* is selected in this way. For lesser titles of the *au'aiiga*, the senior *matai* may appoint a candidate.

Each *faletama* usually has a senior title of its own which possesses less authority than the *au'aiiga* titles, and finally the household may be headed by a *'aiga* who has no wider jurisdiction than over the resident group.

The title system then, is one based on rank and several principles establish the order of rank among titles. Within the *au'aiiga*, rank is usually derived from genealogical age. The original title of the apical ancestor is the title with the greatest prestige and highest rank. Those titles created by this founding ancestor for his children who, themselves are the founders of the *faletama*, are generally lower in rank (Tiffany, 1971:199). Nevertheless, there are several methods by which rank can be altered. If a title is allied with another title of greater rank it will generally have its own rank enhanced. (The way in which this is accomplished is discussed in the following two pages.) Personal achievement can also alter rank because an outstanding *matai* can, through exhibiting administrative expertise, enhance the rank value of his title. In the past, a common way to enhance rank was through military prowess. For example, the Malietoa title in Western Samoa was created during the Tongan Wars in recognition of outstanding military service. However, if a *matai* establishes a reputation for incompetence or unworthiness, not only is his rank lessened but also

that of the entire *au'aiga*. In serious cases, the *au'aiga* reserves to itself the right to remove any title from its incumbent and reinvest it upon a more suitable member of the descent group (Tiffany, 1971: 199-200).

The recruitment principles employed by an *au'aiga* in its choice of a *matai* candidate are:

- (1) The candidate should be a consanguineal member of the *au'aiga*.
- (2) Preference is given to candidates who can validate their genealogical connections patrilineally. This is not a prescriptive rule.
- (3) Preference is given to the eldest surviving brother of the deceased *matai*.
- (4) Preference is given to a candidate appointed by the last wishes of a dying *matai* (*maevega*).
- (5) Achievement criteria are also important. A candidate is given preference because of outstanding service to the *au'aiga*, exhibition of such leadership qualities as success in diplomacy or abilities in uniting various factions within the *au'aiga*.
- (6) Wealth is another important criteria for titles and its importance increases with the importance of the title, because the economic demands placed upon a senior *matai* are heavy. Moreover, the political support necessary to elect him imply that he has kept wide kinship ties active by supporting many ceremonial events in a large network of secondary *au'aiga* affiliations.
- (7) If no consensus can be reached for a candidate drawn from within the *au'aiga*, it is considered appropriate to select an external candidate.

It is obvious that these rules are ambiguous and frequently contradictory (cf., numbers (1) and (7)). The selection system is thus open to prolonged disputes and structurally channelled factionalism. This flexibility however, can also offer scope for men of various qualifications to seek social recognition and political power through election to a title.

The sequence of ranks is relatively unambiguous within each *au'aiga*. However, the relative position of titles between descent groups is much more complex. Within a village the council or *fono* is the recognized political decision making body. Its membership cross-cuts the various descent groups. All members of the *fono* are *matai* and the rank of each vis-a-vis each other is fixed by a recitative charter called the *fa'alupega*. In the *fa'alupega*, all the titles of the village are called out according to rank. This publicly validates the order and also provides a check on the manipulation of that order. But when a *fono* is called between two autonomous villages, a major problem confronted is the lack of a *fa'alupega* that establishes precedence among the *matai*. In fact, the meeting of such a *fono* is impossible until some prior agreement on the relative ranks of the participants has been reached (Tiffany, 1971:213). Since the cooperation between *matai* of separate *au'aiga* is voluntary in nature, the power of coercion which exists within the *au'aiga*, is absent.

The power base of *matai* is derived from a number of sources. Theoretically, individuals have access to a number of *au'aiga* for support. In this regard a *matai* varies in his ability to raise manpower

according to his prestige. Wealth is important here since a *matai* representing a rich *au'aiga* finds that many persons wish to retain membership in it by contributing manpower and/or economic support. In addition to this manpower mobilization the *matai* has particular and direct power over the social unit he represents, whether it be *'aiga*, *faletama* or *au'aiga*, through his *taulele'a* (young untitled men who form the basic labour group).

A *matai* has control (*pule*) over the land of the *au'aiga* and therefore control over the major economic resources of the group. He has the right to allocate land to various individuals so use of garden plots is held through his favour. He retains the right of eviction.

Another type of power he possesses might be called epistemonomic. It derives from his control of certain classes of knowledge. As noted previously, there are seven recruitment principles for titles. The *matai* who is knowledgeable concerning the genealogical history of his own *au'aiga* and also of other *au'aiga* can strengthen his claim and attack the claims of others. Furthermore, during the meeting of the *fono* it is essential that he recite the *fa'alupega*, accurately. This involves mastery of detailed and complicated corpus of genealogy and oratorical knowledge. Although all *matai* theoretically possess such knowledge, there is in fact a special category of *matai* called the *tulafale* who has privileged access to this knowledge. A detailed description of this type of *matai* follows shortly, but for the present one should be aware of the political implications of this differential control. The political success of a particular *matai*

may depend on the knowledge and manipulation of appropriate genealogical information. It follows, therefore, that those *matai* who know and manipulate the genealogies and the *fa'alupega*, have a degree of control over the ranking system itself. Clever manipulation may enhance a candidate's chance for a title or even enhance the relative stature of a *matai* in an inter-village alliance.

## 2. *Categories of Matai*

Throughout the Samoan Archipelago all *matai* belong to one of two possible categories, that of *ali'i* or *tulafale*. The closest English equivalent of *ali'i* is "chief" and the most correct translation of *tulafale* is "orator." In American Samoa, *tulafale* are commonly called "talking chiefs" but this is not considered correct in Western Samoa (Smith, 1975:2). The relationship between these two statuses has been poorly recorded and many misconceptions have arisen from the relative standing of each type to the other. Older accounts such as Kramer (1902) viewed the *tulafale* as servile to the *ali'i*, and many descriptions that followed also implied that the prestige of the *tulafale* has been achieved through the usurpation of privilege accorded more correctly to the *ali'i* (Mead, 1930; Keesing, 1934). More recent literature, particularly from scholars who have conducted field work in Samoa interprets the *tulafale* and *ali'i* statuses as mutually complementary and socially reciprocal in nature (Cool, 1958:76; Gilson, 1970:22-24; Tiffany, 1971:210; Davidson, 1967:19). There are no traditional principles determining rank between the two classes of titles. In many villages the highest title is of the *tulafale* type, in others it is the

*ali'i*. In fact, it is common for the *fa'alupega* to list the ceremonial ranking of each group separately. In almost all cases, the titles whether *ali'i* or *tulafale* are appointed from within the descent group. These descent groups are often linked through alliances maintained between the respective title holders (cf. pp. 61-62). The major exceptions to this are the highest titles in Western Samoa which together form that of paramount chief. These titles were commonly appointed by a group of orators known as *Trumua* and *Pule* discussed later in this chapter.

As head of a social group over which his title has authority, there is no distinction between the duties of *ali'i* and *tulafale*. Both hold the same responsibilities within the family setting. But on a public level, the two statuses form a complementary unit, each one dependent upon the other to execute ceremonial affairs.

The distinctive features of the *ali'i* status involve the ultimate sanctity and authority associated with his title:

It can be said that a chief's mana derives ultimately from his descent from ancestor deities (Smith, 1975:2).

The chief was the titular leader, the ultimate repository of authority (Davidson, 1967:19).

An *ali'i* is a chief with personal sanctity to whom, in that respect, belong certain exclusive privileges and the right to be shown special deference by others. The public conduct of an *ali'i* is, moreover, circumscribed in various ways that ostensibly protect his sanctity from defilement by acts or associations of a "profane" character. Supernatural sanctions apply to the maintenance of these privileges and prohibitions, but their intensity as well as the degree of respect to be shown the *ali'i*, varies with rank, only the more senior *ali'i* . . . those ritually

nearest the seat of supernatural power . . . having a very marked aura of "sacredness" about them (Gilson, 1970:23-24).

On the same hierarchical level, the chief is the exalted, ceremonious, supernaturally tinged, ultimately powerful and responsible leader . . . elite in its fullest sense (Keesing, 1973:40).

The *tulafale* enjoys prestige and honour appropriate to his rank, but the derivation of his authority is quite different from that of the *ali'i*.

The mana of an orator, on the other hand, derives ultimately from his status as the possessor of special knowledge and skill (Smith, 1975:2).

The *tulafale* office has been compared to many western ideals: advisor, spokesman for the *ali'i*, as "minister" to "king," executive agent, or as Keesing says:

. . . steward, brain-truster, and executive to the chief and his adherent group, and the mental storehouse for memories and traditions, the custodian of group knowledge, the lawyer-like manipulator of words (1973:40).

In addition to these, he is also the organizer of formal food distributions, campaign manager for *ali'i* title candidates and master of ceremonies at the installation of a new *matai*. As an orator, it is his role to pronounce the ceremonial speeches such as the *fa'alupega* at the *fono* but also speeches made to welcome village guests. In order to comply with these duties, the *tulafale* must know intimately the various *fa'alupega* for the entire archipelago. By mastering this vast amount of knowledge and with great oratorical skill, a *tulafale* can enhance or destroy an *ali'i's* claim to office.

There are several sets of behavioral differences obtaining between *ali'i* and *tulafale*. For example, seating arrangements within the *fono*, terms of address, means of receiving 'ava, items of apparel, sitting attitudes, and eating times vary between the two types of title holders. These are but outward manifestations of a more significant role distinction. The interdependency of the two chiefly statuses is such that it is impossible to discuss the role of one without referring to the other. All ceremonial activities require the mutual participation of both classes of leader. The *ali'i* is prohibited from speaking on his own behalf by virtue of the sanctity which surrounds his person. But also, the *tulafale* requires an *ali'i* as a vehicle for the demonstration of oratorical expertise. In the economic domain, the *tulafale* has the right of distributing food and ceremonial goods at village feasts. In the many social events which connect the two types of chief through exchange obligations, the *ali'i* is required to give wealth in the form of *siapo* and fine mats, whereas the *tulafale* always gives food. Many other activities are restricted to one class or another, for example:

No *ali'i* may carve and divide a pig; therefore there can be no feast without the *tulafale's* participation; and without the feast, the honour of the *ali'i* is not served (Gilson, 1970:25).

The mutual interdependence of *ali'i* and *tulafale* is institutionalized in several ways. John Cole Cool defines the relationship in terms of *feagiaga* or reciprocity:

Because of this interdependence, chiefs and orators have from early times recognised a relationship of reciprocity between their titles. This reciprocity

or *feagai* may be expressed in a special traditional relationship between two titles, the holders of which are entitled to expect certain services and to fulfil certain obligations toward each other. Such *feagai* relationships are formed between chiefs and orators for a single generation, for a period of years, for a special *malaga* or visit to another village, or may be even so transitory as to endure through only a single ceremonial function (Cool, 1958:76).

These institutionalized sets of bonds between *ali'i* and *tulafale* are of central political importance:

A traditional association for ceremonial convenience between an *ali'i* and a *tulafale* title belonging to different *au'aiga* results over time in mutual involvements and inter-marriages which create an effective political alliance among the members of the *au'aiga* to which the ceremonially related titles belong (Tiffany, 1971:211).

The importance of these kinds of alliances within each village varies slightly from place to place, but . . .

Within the village, the position of each person and part is established and known, including the pairing or grouping of *ali'i* and *tulafale*. *Tulafale* and *ali'i* are usually paired in groups rather than title by title. Within the limits of the paired groups there will be differences of rank, but any *tulafale* might act for any *ali'i*, although a high ranking *tulafale* would prefer to act for a senior *ali'i*, and then only in an important capacity (Gilson, 1970:25).

The *ali'i-tulafale* bonds are effective mechanisms for political unity at various structural levels. They may be manifest either at the village *fono* level between title holders of different *au'aiga*, or they may exist between senior *matai* of different *au'aiga* in separate villages and thereby create significant high level political alliances. The position adopted in this thesis is one of agreement with the more recent literature, that emphasizes the following point:

The significant thing concerning the *feagaiiga* relationship is that it is a mutual acknowledgement of the interdependence of chiefs and orators. Whether based upon kinship, proximity or compatibility, the relationship establishes the fact that each category of *matai* is traditionally dependent upon the other. Together they form a socially viable whole which is capable of responding to, and discharging, the obligations arising from any social or ceremonial situation (Cool, 1958: 76).

### C. Territorial Political Units

Although principles of kinship pervade Samoan political structures at all levels, it is possible to distinguish analytically some which are not primarily kin-based. These features lend distinctiveness to the Samoan case when compared to other Polynesian or Oceanic political structures.

For example, the anthropologist Theodore Schwartz, who conducted research in the Admiralty Islands with Margaret Mead, devised in 1963 a typology of areal integration for Oceanic cultures. There are four types within his classification, but only two of these are of particular relevance to Samoa: type three, the "hierarchic network" or "ramage," and type four, the "council organization." The ramage organization as described by Schwartz "emphasizes the inherent, hierarchic network of relations among segmentary descent groups" (1963:91) and is represented by Tonga. The Samoan structure, albeit segmented, is lacking in genealogical hierarchy. That is, title succession is not necessarily validated by primogeniture, and the various internal sections of the *au'aigea* are not necessarily ranked vis-à-vis

each other through relative seniority. Type four, or "council organization" applies specifically to Samoa, although at this point Schwartz makes the further assertion that the council organization of Samoa is a transformation from ramage-kinship system to a *fono* organizational system within which one of the key transfers has been the accretion to the *fono* and to the *tulafale* of functions previously attributed to kinship groups. At this point the typology is converted to a hypothetical development sequence, one which Mead (1930:26-30) originated, and currently is questioned in the literature (Tiffany, 1972). The theoretical debate concerning the developmental sequence is of little concern to this thesis. It is sufficient to note that there were well defined political units in Samoa whose membership was recruited on territorial principles as opposed to those of kinship. The most important of these was found at the village level or above and was called the *fono*.

#### 1. *Village Fono*

The Samoan village is acknowledged as the most integrated territorial unit of autonomous government in Samoa (Smith, 1975:1; Keesing, 1934:18; Cool, 1958:71; Tiffany, 1971:255; Davidson, 1967:16). In contrast to a North American understanding of the term, a Samoan village is not defined primarily by contiguous residences clustered together, although the settlement pattern may correspond to this. Often the contiguous household units form a sub-village unit known as a *fuai'alo*. These are not recognized as villages (*nu'u*) because they lack essential components for the management of their own affairs.

They have neither *fono* nor *fa'alupega*. Rather, a true village (*nu'u*) is identified not by geographic or demographic criteria, but by its political-territorial completeness. One role of the *fa'alupega* is to identify the village unit. It delimits the community by reciting all the important titles within it. But more than this, the *fa'alupega* is required in order to function as a village; to hold meetings, host ceremonies and receive village guests. One of the problems that emerged during the growth of Apia as the capital of Western Samoa was its lack of a *fa'alupega*. Apia is traditionally a sub-village of Sogauga which of course has a *fa'alupega* and also a *fono*. Apia has neither, and consequently has no traditional system of local government (Smith, 1975:2). Although the village is a composite of the various *au'aiga*, village affairs which cross-cut the scope and authority of the various descent groups are handled by the village *fono*. The activities of the *fono* are those which affect the welfare of the village: settling disputes among descent groups, constructing and maintaining public structures and services such as water systems, pig pens, and guest houses, guaranteeing food supply in times of shortage, military defence and ceremonial activities.

Membership in the village *fono* is restricted to the *matai* resident in that particular village, although visiting *matai* may attend as honoured guests. The *fono* may be called to meet several times a week as need dictates. Each time it follows the same formal procedure. A *tulafale* conducts the welcoming address, the *'ava* is prepared, the *fa'alupega* pronounced, the *'ava* served to each *matai* in sequence according to his rank and then the discussions commence. Normally the

*tulafale* actively conduct the meetings although the *ali'i* may express their views. The latter generally do not do so however since they have briefed their allied *tulafale* in advance. Decision is reached by consensus only. It commonly occurs that two factions develop within the *fono*. The dominant one is usually made up of the highest title and his associates, and the opposition one is formed around the second ranking title holder and his allies (Cool, 1958:65). The activities of the village *fono* are a combination of executive, administrative, legislative and judicial functions. Policies are formulated and enforced, work assignments for village projects are handed down and overseen, and punishments meted out to offenders who break explicit village regulations or implicit village customs.

The village *fono* is distinguished from all other political units on the basis of its power base. It is the only political unit at any level which has manpower over and above the usual mobilization capacities of each descent group. This manpower pool, the *aumaga*, consists of all the untitled young men of the village. It is from the ranks of the *aumaga* that work parties for public projects are recruited. Traditionally the *aumaga* were warriors and their prime responsibility was the defence of the village and the internal maintenance of peace and order. They also provided labour for communal agricultural projects.

Because the village was the highest structural level which had the ability to enforce its commands, most ethnographers have assigned political autonomy to this level:

The village council is the focal point of political authority in the Samoan system. As it is the only territorial division outside the household which has readily available the means of executing its will, if we consider "the control and regulation of physical force" to be the criterion of political organization, it may be regarded as the largest effective political unit (Cool, 1958:62).

Cool (1958:62-63) lists several subsidiary kinds of *fono* meetings common during the pre-European period:

(1) *Fono o le nu'u*. This council met for the purpose of deciding issues of village welfare as described above.

(2) *Fono o le maveve*. This was a judicial council.

(3) *Fono o le vevesi*. This council dealt with military concerns.

(4) *Fono sa*. This was the sacred council, convened in special locations attended by special ritual and it dealt with specialized problems of genealogy and sacred legend.

(5) *Fono fa'afaletui*. This was an instructional *fono* the purpose of which was to refresh the memories of the *tulafale* and teach the *aumaga* some of the legends and histories of various villages. Various *fa'-alupega* would be studied and discussed at these meetings.

It can be seen from the variety in the type of village *fono* meetings that in addition to its political functions, the council served an important role as an educational body, preserving and passing on the oratorical lore, history and genealogies which composed the basic substance of Samoan socio-political life.

## 2. *Supra-Village Political Units*

a. *Institutions.* Political integration at a supra-village level lacked the stability and effectiveness of the village *matai-fono* structure. Above the village level there was no direct mechanism to mobilize manpower as there was between the village *fono* and the *aumaga*. Political cooperation and participation at this level was voluntary, transitory and crisis-oriented. The most usual event to stimulate supra-village political cooperation was some urgent external threat of a military nature (Cool, 1958:69; Davidson, 1967:21). Very few of the administrative tasks of government were conducted at this level. Apparently, each autonomous village was quite capable of dealing with these affairs by itself. The larger territorial units had few of the governmental functions Europeans have come to expect of their political system:

At these higher levels, political activity was largely concerned with the ceremonial, with the advancement of the interests of major family groups, with the settlement of disputes between factions or local groups (such as villages), and with the formation of alliances in times of war, actual or potential (Davidson, 1967: 21).

Lacking the coercive power that the village *fono* had over the *aumaga*, the supra-village political units relied heavily upon principles of diplomacy, alliance, mediation and compensation to achieve goals.

These were institutionalized in the following ways:

(1) The formalized *ali'i-tulafale* role assumed elaborate and intricate proportions at this level. The highest titles were held at the apex of the socio-political structural pyramid and the *au'aiga* holding these

titles were the most prestigious family groups in Samoa. Consequently, one of the fundamental concerns was the installation of title holders. Alliances formed between high ranking families via marriage were considered an excellent way to broaden the genealogical basis for title accession. The *tulafale* who arranged such polygynous marriages were compensated in wealth (fine mats or *ie toga*), and so it was definitely advantageous in an economic sense for the *tulafale* to arrange as many of these marital alliances as possible. Politically, the *tulafale* had great power at this level. In several areas of the archipelago, these orators formed groups. In Western Samoa these groups of orators were known as *Tumua* and *Pule*. In Tutuila they were called *Matua*, and in Manu'a they were referred to as *To'oto'o*. Orators within such groups exerted a great deal of control over political affairs, not just through arranging marriages for the *ali'i*, but also through control of the highest titles:

The orator groups of Leulumoega and Lufilufi were known collectively as *Tumua*. Together with the groups at Malie and Afega and with similar groups in Savai'i, which were known collectively as *Pule*, they constituted the dominant influence in Samoan politics at the higher levels. These groups of orators manipulated the elections to the most important chiefly titles and acted as the spokesmen and executants of the titular rulers. They were the acknowledged authorities on genealogy, history, and tradition. Their political influence was constant and pervasive (Davidson, 1967:27).

Mediation was another important strategy for peaceful resolutions of inter-village conflicts. Villages would resort to the use of a mediator, usually someone with kinship ties on both sides, in order to avoid physical combat. Often a group of chiefs or an entire village would fulfil

this function (Gilson, 1970:49).

Another institutionalized means of avoiding conflict, was the *ifoga* which was used only as a last resort. This involved a ceremonial display of self-abasement and humiliation by the highest ranking chiefs of the village. An *ifoga* conducted within a village between two descent groups required the *matai* of one of them to publicly apologize to the aggrieved party. An *ifoga* between villages was of greater importance since the highest chiefs were expected to humble themselves before their enemies. One ancient account told of chiefs allowing themselves to be trussed like pigs onto stakes and carried off to the enemy village to display their humiliation.

*b. District and Sub-District Divisions.* Larger territorial divisions were composed of varying numbers of villages. The segmentary nature of social groups in Samoa often resulted in processes of village fissioning. In such instances, shared kinship bonds and history smoothed the way to sub-district unity. But not all sub-divisions were formed in a congenial manner. Some were the result of warfare. The unity among sub-districts joined together in this way was much less than in the former case. The normal activities of the sub-district were military and ceremonial, and although they possessed both *fono* and *fa'alupega* they did not interfere in the management of individual village level affairs.

Sub-districts were traditionally included within even larger territorial districts. These maximal units within the archipelago were defined by specific boundaries and contained important cere-

monial "capital centres." Like the sub-districts, districts had a *fono* and a *fa'alupega*, but even less authority and power over constituent members than the sub-district. Therefore, political power in the Samoan Islands was concentrated at the village level where there existed authorized means of enforcing village regulations. On the sub-district and district level, those mechanisms for coordinating inter-village or inter sub-district activities were primarily voluntary.

#### D. *Variation in Traditional Structure*

At the village level, political affairs are handled with a remarkable similarity across the entire archipelago. Major differences obtain at the supra-village level, and these, in the post-contact period became enormously important, particularly for our understanding of the *Mau*.

##### 1. *American Samoa* (fig. 2:282)

The traditional alignment of political units in American Samoa fell neatly into hierarchically ranked geographically discrete and contiguous groupings. There were ten *faigamalo* which in Tutuila formed the smallest territorial units. Several *faigamalo* were joined together to form sub-districts. For example, prior to the American administration in 1900, Sua and Vaifanua were linked together under a single high chief Leiato, Mauputasi and Ituau were similarly linked through high chief Mauga, and Fofu and Aitulagi formed another sub-district under high chief Tuitele. Sua-Vaifanua and Fofu-Aitulagi were also the seat of the *Matua* orators' confederation. These ten

*faigamalo* were divided evenly into two separate *falelima* or districts. In the records for the Government of American Samoa, for many years after cession, these districts were still commonly referred to as *Falelima* East and *Falelima* West. *Falelima* means "house of five" (Cool, 1958:99).

The layout of the forementioned political units in Tutuila was uncomplicated and followed a hierarchical structure on the map (fig. 3). The position of Manu'a within the traditional polity was such that most scholars omit these islands from their discussions (Keesing, 1934:52; Davidson, 1967:24). The reasons for this exclusion are geographic and historical. Manu'a by tradition was the most ancient seat of Samoan society, and traditionally held the highest ranking ceremonial title, the Tui Manu'a. But by virtue of relative isolation from the rest of Samoa, the chiefs of Manu'a came to have little concern with political events elsewhere. In addition, Manu'a was not affected by the Tongan Invasions that occurred between 1200 and 1450 A.D. The rest of the Samoan Archipelago fell under Tongan occupation during this period and it was only through skillful military strategy and great bravery that the Samoans managed to eventually evict the Tongans. This phase left a strong imprint on Samoan political forms. Many of the older titles were entirely lost, and new titles founded during the Tongan Wars. Military expertise was emphasized as a way of achieving high status, and new titles like that of the Malietoa were founded during this period. For all these reasons, Manu'a was quite distinctive from the rest




Figure 3. Traditional Political Divisions of American Samoa.  
(Adapted from U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1932:306).

of the islands especially after the period of the Tongan Wars.

The island of Tutuila on the other hand, was formally subordinate to the District of Atua on the Island of Upolu. Furthermore, its constituent districts were never traditionally united. The major divisions of Tutuila occurred along district lines. In the years before American rule, the two *falelima* formed opposing camps on a number of occasions. The need to select candidates for high titles on Upolu often precipitated a split between these two groups. Within the territory which was to become American Samoa, no structure developed that overcame the inherent factional nature of the district groupings (Cool, 1958:56-57). Major family groups and high titles which dominated political affairs in Western Samoa were also absent. Consequently, none of the titles in Tutuila were considered of equal rank to those on Upolu. Most of the well known American Samoan titles were orator titles, but of lower rank.

The political units of Tutuila formed a truncated structure: the lower village units were functionally similar to all others on the archipelago, but the high titles and offices of the Samoan political apex were not domiciled there. Although this later made administration an easier task for the Americans, it also meant there were structural limits on the degree of political unity possible within the traditional system.

## 2. *Western Samoa* (fig. 4)

Politically, Upolu was the most important island and the main political centre on this island was the north coast (Keesing, 1934:58).

The supra-village units were of a similar structure as the sub-district and district organizations described for American Samoa. In addition, however, they were both more numerous and arranged according to a more complex geographical and social pattern. Furthermore, the high titles and pre-eminent Samoan *au'aiga* of Western Samoa resulted in the development there of inter-territorial alliances that often cross-cut and further complicated the geographical distribution of districts and sub-districts. For example, the island of Upolu was territorially divided into three major districts: A'ana in the west, Tuamasaga in the middle and Atua in the east. Each of these three districts frequently broke up into sub-districts many of which resulted from village fissioning. The actual cohesion varied however, according to whether these sub-districts were linked through a common history or whether they were forced together by military conquest. The island of Savai'i to the west had six sub-districts: Fa'aseleaga, Gaga'emauga, Gaggai'fomauga and Vaisigano which collectively formed the district of I-tu-o-Ta'oa, and Palauli and Satupa'itea which formed the district of I-tu-o-Fa'atoafe.

Cross-cutting such territorial divisions were family ties established by marriage. The highest titles in all of Samoa, the *papa* of Tui Atua, Tui A'ana, Gatoaitete and Tamasoali'i were found in these districts. These four titles theoretically could be held by the same person then known as the *tafa'ifa* or *Tupu o Samoa* (paramount chief). The first *tafa'ifa* was a woman named Salamasina who putatively lived some fifteen generations ago. The history of this title since Salamasina




Figure 4. Traditional Political Divisions of Western Samoa.  
 (Adapted from Watters, 1958b:339).

indicates the fluidity (generally defined by Europeans as instability) of the Samoan political structure.

In order to appreciate the historical dimension of these titles, one must refer to the two major *au'aiga* in Western Samoa: Sa Tupua and Sa Malietoa. In more recent historical times (i.e. since the Tongan Wars), these two families, which often are described as "royal lineages" have dominated Samoan politics. The districts allied to these families were the only ones of Samoa that were unified and possessed clear-cut lines of authority that coincided with recognized territorial boundaries. Most such districts were on Upolu but several on Savai'i were also allied to these families. The general pattern of district alliance was as follows. The Sa Tupua family usually held the titles of Tui Atua and Tui A'ana and therefore usually controlled the District of Atua and A'ana. The central district of Tuamasaga and its titles of Gatoaitetele and Tamasoali'i were theoretically held by Sa Malietoa. In addition Sa Malietoa claimed control over a section of Savai'i known as Fa'asaleleaga and the sub-district "aiga-i-le-tai" made up of Manono, Apolima and Mulifanua.

The situation was further complicated by cross-cutting consanguineal and affinal ties that made it difficult for title holders to count on any guaranteed support (Gilson, 1970:51-64).

Nevertheless the *tafa'ifa* did result in greater unity on Upolu and the eastern portion of Savai'i than was found in other areas of Savai'i, or in American Samoa (Gilson, 1970:53).

The formation of orator groups also resulted in centralization on Upolu. Initially the orators of Lufilufi and Leulumoega banded into a group called *Thumua* and somewhat later were joined by the orators at Malie and Afega. A second orator confederation called *Pule* included the orators from Safotulafai and Saleaula on Savai'i (Davidson, 1967:27).

In summary then, two contrasts existed between the traditional political structures of Western and American Samoa:

(1) In traditional Western Samoa there were sacred, high ranking *au'aiga*. The status of each was acknowledged throughout the whole archipelago. From these families were drawn the key political leaders of Western Samoa.

In American Samoa there were no such high ranking *au'aiga*. Rather, all the chiefs of Tutuila were considered of much lower rank than those of high rank on Upolu. Although the Tui Manu'a was theoretically the supreme ceremonial leader in the entire archipelago, isolation limited his activities to the Manu'an group.

(2) In Western Samoa, the emergence of *tafa'ifa* resulted in a degree of political unity. Complete unity was rare owing to factional disputes but it did occur several times in the early historical period during the reign of Salamasina and later during the rule of Malietoa Vai' inupo in 1830. This unity was primarily ceremonial and therefore had little political importance. On the other hand, the orator groups of *Thumua* and *Pule* were able to establish a more effective political unity and for example call an all Western Samoan *fono* at Leulumoega in order to consider the military threat of the Tongans (Davidson, 1967: 28).

The political system of American Samoa was never unified. No precedent existed for the pre-eminence of any single *au'aiga*. The political system of American Samoa therefore, never evolved beyond the level of autonomous districts.

## CHAPTER V

### BACKGROUND TO THE MAU

#### A. *Western Samoa*

##### 1. *Historical Background*

Representatives of Germany, Great Britain and the United States acting as a joint commission met in Apia on 13 May 1899 to formulate plans for the political future of Samoa. Their report was submitted 18 July 1899, and shortly thereafter the United States of America accepted rights to the Samoan Islands east of longitude 171° West. Germany accepted sovereignty over the islands west of this line and Great Britain renounced her claims in Western Samoa in return for interests over other territories in Tonga, the Solomons and West Africa. The agreements between the three great powers were ratified 16 February 1900, and partition of Samoa was established.

a. *The German Period.* The act of partition placed those islands which today are identified as Western Samoa under German rule from 1900 to 1914. This colonial period established a form of administration which later was adopted with only minor alteration by the New Zealand government which replaced the Germans. This structure was based on a network of district centres and centralized departments of justice, police and prisons, treasury, customs and harbour, public

works, postal, native affairs, agriculture, Chinese labour, health and education (Keesing, 1934:76).

The paramount chief title *Ali'i Sili* had been created by the Europeans in the period before partition. In 1900 it was held by Mata'afa Iosefa. After his death in 1912, the position of *Ali'i Sili* along with the other four major titles which together formed the *tafa'ifa*, were abolished (Boyd, 1960:122). In their place the Germans created the office of *Fautua* or adviser to the governor. This office was designed specifically for the *tama'aiga*, or those who traditionally qualified for the major titles now prohibited by the Germans. However, it allowed for only two appointees, and these were chosen from the two major "Royal families," namely, Sa Malietoa and Sa Tupua. Problems arose from the fact that the Sa Malietoa family had within it only one *tama'aiga* (Malietoa), whereas the Sa Tupua family had three (Tuimaleali'ifano, Mata'afa, and Tamasese). Accordingly, the first two incumbents for the *Fautua* position, namely, Malietoa Tanumafili and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi, were only two of the four equally ranked *tama'aiga*. Thus two of the *tama'aiga* were excluded from a high level position in the new government. In addition, the creation of this position intensified the traditional rivalry between these two families. Even before partition, rivalry between the British and the Germans in Samoa led to a polarization of European support for a proposed "King" of Samoa: The Germans supported the Sa Tupua candidates, and the British backed the Sa Malietoa candidates. This political alignment of European support and Samoan royal families continued on throughout the decade

of *Mau* activity. Under German rule, in the period 1900-1914, the Sa Tupua family was at a distinct advantage with respect to establishing favourable relations with the administration. This situation changed dramatically after the New Zealand assumption of control. It is understandable, that the Sa Tupua *tama'aiga*, aligned themselves against a 'British' administration during the *Mau* and that Malietoa continued his pro-government support.

Very early in the German administration (1905), Governor Solf created a local council of representatives called the *Fono* of *Faipule* (Keesing, 1934:90). Qualification for membership in this body changed during the period of German rule. Initially the council was comprised of high and low ranking *ali'i* domiciled at Mulinu'u (the seat of government). Later, a reorganization of the *Fono* of *Faipule* resulted in the incorporation of the *ta'ita'itu* (district chiefs) within the council. Solf also created a number of new Samoan officials: the *ta'ita'itu* mentioned above, *pulenu'u* or village officials with policing function; and *pulefa'atoaga* or plantation inspectors. With few exceptions, these organizations and officials were the basis for Samoan administration over the next thirty years.

The German administration of Samoa encountered several difficulties. Two notable Samoan disturbances occurred, one in 1904-1905 and the other in 1909.

[In] 1904 definite signs of native dissatisfaction came into the open. . . . During June of that year a letter was written by the *Faipule* gathered at Mulinu'u to the Governor "at the instigation of some mischievous

Europeans" requesting "the right of a Royal Salute for Mataafa, and of uniforms for all officials; they further required him to produce quarterly balance sheets and asked that all ordinances be countersigned by the *Ali'i Sili* before becoming valid." . . . The matter did not end there. Toward the end of the year a "Samoaan Cooperative Trading Society" was initiated by a part-Samoan, son of one of the local white traders, working with the *Ta'imua* and *Faipule*. Plans were made to levy a tax on the whole Samoan population in order to finance the venture. The government refused to permit this levy and forbade any of its native officials to participate in the society. During the absence of the Governor in New Zealand early in 1905, however, the scheme was continued. Two *Faipules* went as organisers to Savai'i, but were arrested and imprisoned. The *Ta'imua* and *Faipule* then broke open the gaol and released them . . . After a council held by the acting Governor, however, the prisoners surrendered (Keesing, 1934:87).

In the aftermath of this disturbance, the Governor took drastic steps, abolishing the *Ta'imua* and the *Fono* of *Faipule*, based as they were on the old *Tumua* and *Pule* and imposed heavy fines on the families of the participants in the disturbance. In addition, one *Faipule* was banished and several high chiefs, including Tamasese and Tuimaleali' ifano were required to publicly apologize (*ifoga*)<sup>\*</sup> (Keesing, 1934: 88).

Normalcy returned until 1908-1909, when:

During another absence of the Governor, an anti-administration movement emerged in eastern Savai'i. This was headed by an orator of that area, Lauati, sometimes known as the Samoan "kingmaker," on account of his prominence in the days of the kingship [before partition in 1900], and pardoned in 1905 for his share in the trouble. The objects of the movement, which was called the *Mau a Pule*, the "Opinion of Savai'i," were to restore the old regime, including the power of *Tumua* and *Pule*, to get Malietoa Tanumafili recognised as king, and to obtain the right to supervise public

finances. . . . Early in 1909 Lauati landed near Apia with twenty-five longboats packed with warriors representing the war troops of *Pule* to enforce his demands . . . . A conference ensued, and finally Lauati agreed to withdraw provided he was pardoned. This request was granted, but no sooner had he returned to Savai'i with the expedition than the agitation started up more violently than before. . . . In this crisis the Governor cabled for a fleet of German warships, which arrived from the China station amid a period of extreme tension (Keesing, 1934:91).

The insurgents were finally persuaded to surrender, Lauati and eleven other *matai* were banished to Saipan in the Mariana Islands where they remained until 1915. In that year Lauati was given permission to return home, but he died en route. This brought to a close the *Mau* of *Pule* movement, as this precursor of the 1926 *Mau* was called.

b. *New Zealand Military Administration*

On 29 August 1914, New Zealand troops landed on Upolu and seized control from the Germans. From then until 1 May 1920, Western Samoa was controlled by the New Zealand military but no changes were made in the existing German system of administration.

c. *The New Zealand Civil Administration 1920-1923*

At the end of World War I, the allies gathered in 1918 to make decisions regarding the embryonic League of Nations to determine the future of the former enemy colonial territories. The Dominion ministers of New Zealand, Australia and South Africa supported the direct annexation of such territories to an appropriate Dominion. Such absolute powers of "annexation" were firmly opposed by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States who was committed to Mandate

principles of administration. After some difficult confrontations, a compromise was accepted by the Dominion ministers in which the Mandate principles were applied to all territories except Southwest Africa and the Pacific Islands. The Pacific Islands would be administered under the laws of the Mandatory state as integral parts of that state. The precise status of Mandated territory to Mandatory administration remained, therefore, a matter of continual controversy (Wright, 1930:105).

The system of Mandatory administration was formalized in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. In it the indigenous territories were described as a "sacred trust of civilisation." The Mandated territories were classified as either of type "A," or "B" or "C." Western Samoa was classified as a "C" Mandate:

This classification was at the bottom of the evolutionary sequence; the inhabitants of these territories were considered the least developed; it was considered imperative to employ the greatest protection and tutelage to these inhabitants who were not considered capable of governing themselves (Arden, 1964:50).

The Mandate philosophy contained within it a basic paradox: the ultimate purpose of the Mandate was to shepherd the indigenous territories toward self-rule, yet the underlying premise of the evolutionary sequence upon which it was based, was an assumption that the indigenes were inherently incapable of self-government. Throughout its administration, New Zealand policy alternated between these two points of view.

The major concern of the League of Nations was to ensure that the Mandate powers administering territories would protect the natives from economic and social exploitation. The primary questions addressed were issues such as the abolition of slavery, protection of womens' basic civil rights, education and the prohibition of alcoholic liquor.

Thus, a philosophy of Mandate trust emerged, which was paternalistic, evolutionary and chimerical in nature. No doubt the responsibility of the Mandatory power was to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory," but no practical framework was provided for this objective. Of all the countries holding Mandates, New Zealand was described as the most single minded in furthering the League of Nations vision (Toynbee, 1927:402).

New Zealand was officially granted the Mandate for Western Samoa 17 December 1920, and the supervisory body to which the Mandatories would report was subsequently established and called the Permanent Mandates Commission. It was staffed by nine members of whom the majority were nationals of non-Mandatory countries. The commission established a system that required Mandatories to submit annual reports for commission scrutiny. The powers of the commission however, were limited to the application of subtle pressure through public censure (Wright, 1930:196). Although New Zealand accepted the Mandate for Western Samoa in 1919, this relationship was not formally recognized by the New Zealand parliament until passage of the Samoa

Act of 1921. The years of the civilian administration up to 1923 were basically caretaking years. The first civil administrator, Colonel R.W. Tate seconded from the New Zealand army, was reputedly cautious and conservative. But in 1923 a new administrator initiated a vigorous program for implementing the Mandate vision. His name was Major General (later Sir) George Spafford Richardson. He would become the leading New Zealand figure during the *Mau* confrontation.

## 2. *New Zealand Policy of Directed Change*

Richardson was a self-made army man who had been seconded for service in Samoa after a distinguished career in the British and New Zealand forces. Such a background provides insight into the problems that arose between Richardson and the Samoans during his administration:

Richardson was only one in a line of former military men who were appointed as Administrator in Western Samoa. None was conspicuous for his knowledge of Samoa nor did any possess previous experience as a colonial administrator. Serious questions can be raised as to whether the typical career officer was psychologically and emotionally equipped to deal tactfully with a proud, sensitive ceremonial people such as the Samoans (Arden, 1964:84).

While it is true that both the American and the New Zealand governments administered their respective Samoan territories through military personnel, yet the case of Richardson is a special one since his term of office from 1923-1928 was the longest of any administrator, American or New Zealand. This length of office did permit a continuity of policy but it resulted in a growth of antagonism between the administrator's office and the native sector.

Acting within the guidelines and philosophy of the League of Nations Mandate, Richardson designed an aggressive policy of social change in several areas including economic development, health and welfare and education. Although not explicitly political all had direct political implications, for the planned reforms required changes in the traditional political structure.

a. *Economic Reform.* Richardson focussed on the economic sector early in his term of office.

Although in matters of health, sanitation and prevention of disease the Native race is progressing comparatively quickly, I cannot say the same in regard to economic development. I have tried to awaken an interest in economic development the results of which I predict will be noticeable in about two years hence (Richardson, 1924a).

The kinds of reform Richardson had in mind involved a directed evolution from the "communal" forms of economy and land tenure practised by the Samoans to a supposedly more efficient, practical and western system geared to monetary profit and individual property rights. To this end, native newspapers were used to encourage an increased production of quality copra, better management of native plantations, and a complete revision of the land tenure system. Plans were also made to introduce a copra marketing scheme that would replace independent traders with a government run body that would encourage the export of high grade copra. This plan was modelled on the American system already in operation which was overwhelmingly supported by all the *matai* in American Samoa. In addition, Samoan agricultural inspectors were appointed whose responsibilities included weekly

searches for the coconut beetle and supervision over the proper maintenance of village plantations. Regulations were also passed that were meant to discourage "wasteful" customs, such as the *malaga* or ceremonial inter-village visits. By 1925, regulations were in place that permanently outlawed the *malaga*, since the labour devoted to such ceremonies allegedly resulted in a neglect of village plantations (Lowe, 1943: 71). No evidence was found to suggest that Richardson was aware of the political implications of these regulations. In November 1924, Richardson sent several of his *Faipule* to Tonga to observe the Tongan system of land tenure which he admired and hoped to impose on Samoa. The *Faipule* returned and in the next year they passed a regulation changing the Samoan system of land tenure:

. . . and in 1925, Richardson, after some difficulty, persuaded the "fono" to adopt a regulation which entitled each taxpayer to a lifetime lease of ten acres of land in return for a rent of one shilling per acre per year paid to the District Council (Gill, 1949:52).

The following year, Richardson sought to convince the *Fono* of *Faipule* that permanent individualized ownership with full rights including that of bequeathal be established. However, even the *Fono* of *Faipule* could not agree to support a proposal which would erode the political power base of the traditional village *matai* and they rejected the proposal.

b. *Health and Welfare Reform.* In this respect, New Zealand pursued a vigorous campaign toward establishing hospitals, public health programs and sanitation schemes. Extension of medical services

received special attention and by 1928 there were 21 medical facilities of various standards in place. Some of these were merely native staffed dispensaries, but full hospitals were established at Tuasivi and Aliepata in 1924 and smaller institutions were opened at Safotu and Falelima in 1922 and 1928 respectively. In 1923 a program was started to train native medical staff and this was expanded in 1926 to include training of girls at the Auckland Public Hospital in New Zealand (AJHR, 1927A-4:14).

An aggressive campaign was waged against yaws and hookworm. During the period 1923-1927, 25,000 cases of yaws were treated and a total of 65,600 injections were administered for this disease. Thus by 1927 this disease was effectively under control. Hookworm was attacked with somewhat less enthusiasm, but by 1926 around 52,783 treatments had been given (AJHR, 1928A-4:14). These and other achievements in public health were greatly admired by European observers. The London School of Tropical Medicine sent a research team to Samoa in 1924 headed by Dr. P.A. Buxton to study filariasis:

It is perhaps not impertinent to state that New Zealand has provided a health service which might serve as a model to any small tropical country and that the administration of that department seemed to be characterised by vision and forethought (Buxton, 1927:4).

A child welfare program was founded that strove to reduce the high infant mortality rate. Birth and mortality statistics are not available before 1923, but in that year infant mortality was estimated at 200 per 1,000 live births. Four years later, the rate was 101 per

1,000 live births (Lowe, 1943:64). The enormous success of this program was largely due to the way it was implemented. Village women were traditionally organized into a group known as *Faletua ma tausī*. This group included all the wives of the village *matai*; one of the functions of the organization was to oversee the cleanliness and general appearance of the village. From these organizations were now selected the women's health committees in each village. The child welfare officer could inspect villages only infrequently. Therefore, day-to-day health and welfare activities were placed in the hands of the women's committees. The committees made weekly inspections of village households, dispensed educational materials pertinent to the health and welfare of mothers and children, and helped care for sick children (AJHR 1926A-4a:19-22).

One should note that it was in the sphere of health and welfare that the Richardson program was particularly successful. It was one significant aspect of his program that was integrated with the activities of traditional structures by the Samoan people.

*c. Educational Reform.* The New Zealand administrators worked closely with the missionaries in order to utilize the missionary network of schools that were already established in the Samoan villages. The New Zealanders were committed to a policy of teaching Samoan students in the vernacular as a method of preserving the native tongue and protecting the native culture against the effects of Europeanization. This was in contrast to the American policy which saw instruction in English as a Samoan prerequisite for functioning within the modern world.

The New Zealand administration was determined to keep the curriculum in Samoan schools pertinent to Samoan needs as defined by the New Zealand administration (Richardson, 1926d). In 1926 an Educational Conference held in New Zealand was attended by members of the New Zealand Educational Department as well as by Samoan officials and officials from other Pacific Island groups, not including American Samoa. Out of this conference evolved a policy which decided:

- (a) to keep education relevant to native life;
- (b) to concentrate on the teaching of the Samoan language;
- (c) to place curriculum emphasis on manual work and hygiene;
- (d) to de-emphasise the teaching of English; and
- (e) to increase the quality of native teaching by providing them with exposure to technical and Maori schools in New Zealand (AJHR, A-4 1926: 5).

The structure of educational facilities on the islands reflected the Mandate evolutionary model. Three separate levels of schooling were established: grade 1 schools operated at the village level and offered mission instruction only in Samoan; grade 2 schools were also mission schools but operated on a sub-district basis receiving partial government funding and offering English as a subject of instruction; grade 3 schools represented the apex of evolutionary pyramid where instruction was entirely in English and with certain vocational or engineering subjects, such as typing, plumbing, and carpentry being offered in addition to regular academic subjects. The students in grade 3 schools were the best matriculants from the village or sub-district institutions. Some further reorganization occurred in 1926

when Vaipuli and Avele were converted to agricultural schools leaving Malifa School as the one school providing higher academic training up to the New Zealand Proficiency Standard. This became the only recruitment centre for Samoans entering government service, the teaching profession and the skilled trades.

The basic educational policy followed the same formula as established for health and welfare reform, a decentralization of facilities which moulded itself quite conveniently to the traditional village-committee structure and probably for that reason it was another successful part of his program.

### 3. *The New Political Order*

After accepting the Mandate, New Zealand secured her legal status vis-à-vis Western Samoa through the interim Samoa Constitution Order of 1 May 1920 and the subsequent passage of the Samoa Act 1921 in April of 1922. The political structure imposed by this act resembled that of other "less advanced British Crown colonies" (Davidson, 1967: 100). It specifically allowed for the establishment of executive, legislative and judicial sectors of government.

a. *The Executive Sector.* The new political order gave executive power to the administrator. The administrator in turn was answerable to the New Zealand minister of external affairs. The administrator of Western Samoa was officially appointed by the governor-general of New Zealand on the advice of the prime minister. Departments of native affairs, public health, police, education and treasury were subsequently established as branches directly responsible to the administration.

b. *The Legislative Sector.* The most distinctive feature of Western Samoan structure was the ability to pass legislation by two alternative routes. Firstly, a Legislative Council was founded with both official and unofficial Samoan and European members. This council could legislate on all matters exclusive of those retained under New Zealand control. The latter areas included those concerned with customs duties, currency, the establishment of municipalities and judicial offences involving fines in excess of one hundred pounds or one year's imprisonment.

Secondly, the administrator retained the power to initiate legislation through New Zealand. This was effected by passing of Orders-in-Council through the governor-general. This alternative obviously by-passed the Samoan Legislative Council, since the members of that body had no power over any legislation submitted by the administration to the New Zealand governor-general. Richardson found such Orders-in-Council a useful strategy for passing legislation unpopular in Western Samoa. For example, the major piece of legislation affecting the traditional political structure in Western Samoa, the Native Regulations (Samoa) Order 1925 recommended by Richardson was proclaimed law in this way. This law generated intense opposition in Samoa.

c. *The Judicial Sector.* Judicial proceedings were conducted through the High Court of Western Samoa. A criminal code was established, a High Judge appointed and jural procedures were adopted. The basic law adopted was the Law of England of 1840 (the date of the establishment

of the Dominion of New Zealand. A legal basis of land tenure was also formalized that divided all land in Samoa into three classes. Native land was an inalienable class with the Crown acting as trustee for its protection. European lands were a class made up of freehold lands previously established. The last class, Crown lands, were sections owned by the government. They included the plantations that were formerly owned by the Germans, known as the "Reparations Estates."

#### 4. *Political Change*

Certain changes in the political structure of Western Samoa were effected by the Germans in the period 1900-1914. The establishment of the *Fono of Faipule*, and the *Fautua*; the abolition of the *Ali'i Sili* and *Tumua* and *Pule* were major structural changes, yet on a local level, the Germans meddled as little as possible. The German concern was to make Samoa governable and an economic asset to the fatherland.

The structures designed by the Germans were the basis for the New Zealand administration, but they underwent massive alteration in the period 1923 to 1926 during Richardson's program of attempted modernization. Since Richardson promoted a frankly teleological reform policy, it was inevitable that major political restructuring became necessary.

a. *"National" Level.* The Legislative Council, introduced by the New Zealand administration was formed partly to provide a voice for the resident Europeans, and partly because the *Fono of Faipule* was not considered prior to Richardson's days as competent to legislate on local matters. The concept of the Legislative Council was based

wholly on the crown colony model. The first council established after the Mandate was composed of four official and three unofficial members. Until 1923, this council served as the major legislative body for native regulations. Its authority was conferred by the Samoa Act of 1921, and its sphere of power was restricted to the passing of Ordinances otherwise not in conflict with existing Mandate or New Zealand law. From its inception, the council was criticized by the European community in Samoa. The major objections concerned the selection of members through appointment by the governor-general of New Zealand. An article in the *Solicitor's Journal*, 3 June 1922 raised the same question:

But although New Zealand is the most democratic of our Dominions it has refused this concession to its satellite Mandate-land.

Responding to this article, Secretary Gray outlined to the Minister of External Affairs Sir James Allen, the guidelines New Zealand was trying to follow with their Legislative Council:

. . . the ordinary Crown Colony usually has to put in an apprenticeship of at least ten years service with an executive of officials only . . . then a further period of from five to ten years with an executive still nominated . . . the last stage before self-government . . . is a partly nominated and partly elected body . . . we have been seriously considering the substitution of election for nomination of the official members (1922).

Shortly after this letter, in August of 1923, a major change increased the number of official members to six, and allowed for the election of three unofficial members. The first elections were held 23 January 1923, and returned the part-Samoan European Olaf Frederick Nelson,

and Europeans<sup>1</sup> George Westbrook and Arthur Williams as the new unofficial members. Although this event was hailed as a major accomplishment by the New Zealand administration, the growing antagonism between Richardson and Nelson exacerbated Richardson's reluctance to work through the Legislative Council. There was, therefore, no support from Richardson for the development of the council as the political institution through which Samoan autonomy could be nurtured. He was firmly opposed to any government legislation passing through the council, as is expressed in the following letter written by Richardson to Secretary Gray the month before the eruption of the *Mau*:

With regard to Native Policy--I would like you and every Minister to have firmly impressed on your minds that *no* [emphasis in original] Native matters--grievances or otherwise, can be discussed with Europeans from Samoa . . . . You cannot control Native Affairs through European representatives. . . . God help Samoa and the Samoa race when the Government allow Native Affairs [to go] into the hands of the European members of the legislative Council (Richardson, 1926a).

The origin of Richardson's hostility seems to be found in an interpretation of the Mandate philosophy that gave precedence to native interests. There are two aspects of this policy. While the paternalism was intended to protect the native population from unscrupulous European exploitation, Richardson did not appear to realize that his favoured *Fono* of *Faipule* was as much a fabrication of Western intervention as was the Legislative Council. To the end of his term in office, he clung to the belief that he was protecting the interests of the native Samoan against alien exploitative European groups. A second issue is that of the definition of "European" and

"Samoan" by New Zealand policy. Aside from the legal problems arising from the peculiar disposition of native status, there was an inherent blindness to the "Samoanness" of any native with less than 100 percent pure Samoan blood. Richardson operated within this myth of racial purity; he was sure that a definite line could be drawn between European and Native. On this basis he rejected the legitimacy of Nelson's leadership in favour of his "100 percent pure" native *Faipule*. A re-consideration of the traditional qualifications for leadership presented in Chapter IV will clarify that Samoans do not distinguish such qualification on the basis of race but on the necessity of establishing consanguineal relationship. If such a relationship can be established through the mother's family, this is an appropriate Samoan method for proving qualification. There was, therefore, nothing inherently unsuitable about Nelson's credentials for leadership in the eyes of the Samoan people. Thus arose the paradoxical twist to the slogan adopted initially by Richardson, that is, "Samoa mo Samoa" (Samoa for the Samoans). This slogan was taken over by the *Mau* to emphasize their view that it was the *Mau* that represented Samoa, and the *Faipule* that represented Richardson (Davidson, 1967:112, 122).

As the friction between Richardson and the European members of the Legislative Council increased, Richardson became increasingly convinced that only real Samoans (i.e., pure natives), were qualified for political leadership. However, Richardson ignored two of the most important traditional native leaders, the *tulafale* and the *tama'aiga*, the former because of their reputed uncooperative attitude, and the latter

because of their reputed inconsequence to political affairs. Richardson chose instead to work through the *Fono* of *Faipule*, constituted as it was of *ali'i*, many of whom were lower in rank to the *tama'aiga* and had been appointed recently by the administration. So in contrast to earlier New Zealand administrators, Richardson ignored the Legislative Council and took the position the *Fono* of *Faipule* was to be his chosen vehicle for Samoan government. Thus in 1923, the *Fono* of *Faipule* was given statutory recognition by the Samoan Amendment Act No. 24. In that Act the method of *Faipule* appointment, and the structure and function of this *Fono* were established. The *Faipule* thenceforth were appointed by the administrator and such appointment could be revoked at his discretion. The *Fono* of *Faipule* became a council of advisers for the administrator. However, the *Faipule* deliberations were restricted to items relative to the welfare of the Samoan people. In a peculiar contradiction of terms, the Amendment Act restricted appointment of *Faipule* to those who were duly qualified in accordance with existing Samoan usage and custom. Since the *Fono* of *Faipule* had no traditional antecedent, it is difficult to know exactly how traditional custom could be invoked to qualify or disqualify a *Faipule* candidate. The *Fono* of *Faipule* was not a new political body having first been established by Governor Solf in 1905 but Richardson saw it in a very different light from any of his German or New Zealand predecessors. The *Fono* of *Faipule* had always been an advisory council, lacking executive and legislative powers. The Samoan community viewed the *Faipule* as essentially government employees, and accorded them little authority

and only slight prestige (Martin, 1959:91).<sup>2</sup> Richardson planned to increase the scope of *Faipule* responsibilities, confident that this political body best represented Samoan interests. In his annual report 1923-1924, Richardson wrote:

In the past the Samoans have not taken much interest in the work of the *Faipule Fono*, but now, through its newly acquired legal standing and the publication of its proceedings in the native press, they are gradually realising its value as a national institution where the opinions of the people can be made known and where their interests will be safeguarded (1924b:5).

Richardson increased the influence of the *Faipule* unofficially by referring all matters of Samoan interest to them for their consideration. Richardson had further plans to provide new legislative powers for the *Faipule Fono*. He wrote to the minister of external affairs in New Zealand and argued strongly for empowering the *Fono* to make regulations affecting the customs and social life of the native population. In so doing, therefore Richardson bypassed the Legislative Council, a body he did not believe should make native regulations. In addition he thought the submission of regulations to the New Zealand Governor-general in council too slow a process. The minister, in a reply dated 10 March 1924, refused to grant such legislative powers to Richardson and his *Fono*, citing the lack of statutory authority as the reason for the denial (Sir Francis Bell, 1924). Richardson would not give up. In a June 19 1924 memorandum he stated:

The council (or fono) of *Faipules* has been legalised by Parliament, but its duties and functions are limited to considering and recommending to the Administrator. I am confident we should go one step further and give

the Faipules more responsible duties and legalise decisions of their Council subject to the Administrator's approval. During the last Fono, Regulations were drafted by me in conjunction with the Faipules on many matters of importance but I cannot enforce them unless the question is discussed in the Legislative Council or the Act is amended (Richardson, 1924c).

The minister in reply 29 January 1925, again reminded Richardson of his position on this matter, stating that it was impossible for him to authorize the *Fono* to make native regulations, even though he expressed sympathy for the problems Richardson had in working with the Legislative Council, and he suggested to Richardson that he by-pass that body and send all native regulations to New Zealand for ratification. Immediately, Richardson drafted a comprehensive set of native regulations known collectively as the Native Regulations (Samoa) Order 1925, and these were passed by Order-in-Council in New Zealand. The effect of these regulations on indigenous village political structure is discussed more fully in a later section.

Richardson persisted in treating the *Faipule* as if they had the authority to legislate, as exemplified by his reference to the "granting to the leaders of the Native race these new legislative powers" (1925a). In the Skerrett Royal Commission Report (1928:380), Richardson was cross-examined by Attorney Baxter, the counsel for the *Mau* and he admitted that he encouraged the *Faipule* to believe that they had legislative power, when in fact they did not:

*Baxter:* Do you think that having been called "laws of Samoa" and having been approved by your Excellency in accordance with the wishes of the Fono, that it was quite likely that the Samoans would get the idea

that the Fono was legislating and passing laws?

*Richardson:* The Samoans would love to feel that their own representative actually made the laws, and if they did get those ideas it would not make any difference.

When Baxter further questioned the wording of Richardson's testimony, challenging his use of the word "law" implying the authority to legislate, Richardson replied in the same document (p. 42):

Yes; and I would be very pleased if it did convey that impression. The Faipules know that laws must be signed by the Governor-General in Council. I want to uphold the prestige of the Faipules as much as possible.

Richardson's policy intensified the pervasive factionalism which characterized Samoan politics. The *Faipule* were not leaders well qualified by Samoan traditional criteria. Many of them who had been appointed prior to Richardson's term had been selected primarily for their congeniality to the administration. Consequently, many of the highest ranking Samoans by traditional standards had been ignored by the selection process. Richardson's efforts to increase the power of the *Faipule* and to treat them as the voice of indigenous Samoans' was at least, a grave misjudgement of the Samoan political process. Many of the *Faipule* decisions were superficially in harmony with administrative policy but this masked their true import for attaining explicitly Samoan goals. For example, the composition of the *Faipule* was dominated by *ali'i* of various rank, but none of whom equalled the ranking of the "royal families." Many of the policies introduced by Richardson would have eroded the traditional power base of the *matai*. Yet these policies were supported by the *Faipule*. It was to the *Faipule's* advantage to have traditional power eroded, since

their status and authority derived from the new administration, not traditional Samoan society. In this way, the decision of the *Faipule* to support changes in land tenure, and the abolition of the 'fine mat *malaga*' make sense as political strategies, since these changes would erode the base of the traditional leader, not the *Faipule*. Therefore the traditional Samoan leader was not only experiencing an attempted erosion of his traditional status, he was also able to attribute this to the presumptuous rise in fortune of the *Faipule*. But whereas the *Faipule* had the support of the administration, the traditional leaders working through the *Mau* and representing the highest ranking families in Samoa had the overwhelming support of the Samoan population. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the major dissatisfaction of the Samoan *Mau* leaders was aimed at the *Fono* of *Faipule*.

Yet a third group was forming during this period as an important political force. In 1920, a number of Apia business men joined together to form a citizens' committee and Olaf Frederick Nelson was chosen as chairman. In that year the committee met with visiting members of New Zealand Parliament and presented them with a long list of complaints: the committee wanted increased elected membership in the Council, an Apian municipality, no censorship of the press, the end of prohibition and the resumption of Chinese indentured labour (Davidson, 1967:100-101). The structure of the 1920 citizens' committee was a novel form in Samoa and it was notably indigenous if not native in origin. In 1926, another citizen's committee was formed and the majority of its leaders were the European members of the Legislative

Council; namely, Nelson, Westbrook and Williams. As will be discussed later this citizens' committee transformed itself into the *Mau*. Here it is noted only that the European aspects of the *Mau* structure, including the committee format, the strategies of petitioning and propaganda were rooted in the citizens' committee and in the experiences of the three elected members on the Legislative Council.

b. *District Level Changes.* In 1900 the Germans divided Western Samoa into eleven districts the boundaries of which corresponded with traditional political divisions. Each district had a native governor, and several judges, policemen and secretaries all appointed by the German governor. Still, the major effect of the German administration was not on the local or district level but at the 'national' level, as the Germans followed a policy of non-interference with district level affairs (Keesing, 1934:151; Davidson, 1973:79).

The New Zealand policy during the years 1914 to 1925 was also one of non-interference at the local level (Martin, 1959:148). The only real linkage attempted between 'national' level structures in Apia and outlying areas was accomplished through intermittent government *malaga* (inter-village tours). The Native Affairs Department penetrated little beyond the Apia area and managed only "quasi-judicial work associated with claims to Samoan land and titles and with the collection of various taxes" (Martin, 1959:148). The New Zealand administration was represented in the outer districts by two resident commissioners one at Savai'i and the other at Aliepata (Upolu). Prior to 1925 these representatives had little impact on outlying Samoan

communities given the large areas under their jurisdiction.

The Native Regulation (Samoa) Order 1925 proposed a major change in indigenous structures from the village to the 'national' level. *Faipule* were to play an important role here just as they were at the national level through the *Fono* of *Faipule*. Richardson decided a new structure was needed to replace the traditional network of reciprocal village and district *fono* and orator alliances which handled district level political affairs. Richardson's Order divided Western Samoa into twenty districts each of which would have a district council. Membership on the district council was divided between representatives appointed from the district's villages plus a number of officials appointed to it by the administration. The senior officer of the district council was a *Faipule* who was to serve as its president. The purpose of these political changes was ostensibly to help Richardson work toward self-government for the Samoans. The *Fono* of *Faipule*, it will be recalled, was the only institution which he recognized as legitimately representing Samoan interests. Samoan opposition to these changes was immediate and strong. The proposed structure would give real structural strength to the *Faipule* at all levels of Samoan politics. The kinds of powers allotted to district councils are enumerated by Martin:

Cleaning of villages; Samoan houses; Cemeteries and Burials; Latrines; Water supplies; Keeping of animals; Gathering in villages; Roads Village Funds; Plantations and food-supplies; the abolition of "Aitagi" or death feast; Treatment of diseases; Breaches of the law by Village communities; and reservation of native land for church purposes (1959:149).

There is no denying that the New Zealand administration believed that these changes would promote Samoan political independence. Yet the very institutions and structures proposed were seen as a serious threat to the authority of existing traditional leaders and therefore they strongly opposed them.

Opposition focussed on the role of the *Faipule* and the number and boundary of districts. Unlike the Germans, who based their administrative districts on traditional ones, Richardson increased their number to correspond to the number of *Faipule* available (Davidson, 1973: 106). The critical feature of each such district was that it also was a *Faipule* district:

When the district councils began to function, they provided the Administrator with a handy instrument for the attainment of his multifarious purposes. Led by the *Faipule*, and with other paid officials among their members, they were generally willing to impose his will on the people (Davidson, 1967:107).

c. *Village Level Changes.* According to the Order of 1925 villages were expected to carry out laws passed at the higher political levels. The traditional political autonomy of each village was therefore subsumed within the overall political structure. This was a far-reaching alteration of traditional Samoan structure. It was a change that was opposed by Samoan *matai* as oppressive and threatening to the political independence of villages. The Order established village committees presided over by the *Pulenu'u* who were paid government officials. The remainder of its committee members were *matai* selected by village election. This procedure was in sharp contrast to the traditional Samoan selection process in which the *au'aiga* and the local village chose their

leaders. Through this new body, the political affairs of each village could be supervised by the administration according to criteria set by the colonial power.

However, these changes in village government were never fully implemented before the emergence of the *Mau*; in fact several authorities have suggested that these proposed regulations helped precipitate the political agitation that led to the *Mau* (Martin, 1959:150; Davidson, 1967:126; Keesing, 1934:151).

#### 5. *Changes in Indigenous Leadership*

a. *Tama'aiga*. Prior to the Richardson era, colonial administrations concentrated on establishing and altering "national" level institutions: the abolition of the *Ali'i Sili* (paramount chief during German rule), the official disbanding of *Tumua* and *Pule* (orator groups), and the creation of the *Fautua* were all examples of this focus. Unofficially, however, it was also the case that government policy attempted to reduce the authority and influence of certain traditional leaders while at the same time increase the influence of others. This rearrangement of authority based on government favour was an important factor in arousing large scale opposition among the traditional leaders during the *Mau*. Most traditional leaders had difficulties with the administration.

The *tama'aiga* (title holders from the royal lineages) were ignored because the administration had decided during the first years of the Mandate that these high chiefs were of little value to their objective. In the period 1920 to 1930, the four *tama'aiga* were the high chiefs Tamasese, Mata'afa, Malietoa and Tuimaleali'ifano. In a

confidential report to the minister of external affairs submitted 17 January 1922, the administrator Colonel Tate had this to say about

*Faipule* and *Fautua* (held by the *tama'aiga*):

Mention has been made of the 'Fautuas.' When the Germans took over the Government in 1900, they found representatives of royal houses for whom some place had to be found. Eventually they appointed Malietoa and Tamasese as Fautuas (Interceders). I presume they used them as buffers.

When I arrived in 1919 Tamasese had died and had been replaced by Tuimaleali'ifano, the Fautuas being himself and Malietoa. I used the two Fautuas as advisers, being informed that such was their office and have had loyal assistance from Malietoa, who however is stupid and inclined to assume authority he does not possess. . . . Tuimaleali'ifano is somewhat of a meddler. As advisers they have little value and their influence depends more on the waning glory of the names they hold than on any capacity of their own.

In 1919 the Faipules seemed to me to be an ineffectual body, but it was not long before I appreciated that they represented the Samoan people in a much more practical degree than the Fautuas and that they were worth developing. They have become a body of advisers of practical use and the Fautuas have become of less importance as the value of the Faipules have increased. A combination of the Fautuas and the Faipules as advisers is not practicable as the elevated names the Fautuas hold would create an insuperable embarrassment.

The Fautuas present a difficulty . . . the Samoan people cannot be reached through them as through the Faipules; they have no role to play; they are in the position of peers in a country where there is no House of Lords . . .

When the present Fautuas die, no successors should be appointed and the offices should be allowed to lapse (Tate, 1923:11).

As can be seen quite clearly from this statement, the administration's attitude was one of contempt for the *Fautua* (and therefore by extension the *tama'aiga*), and from this derived a policy that meant

to lessen the authority of these offices. Richardson continued with Tate's policy when he assumed office in 1923. Both of these administrators seemed to be entirely ignorant of the indigenous authority associated with the *tama'aiga* and the widespread Samoan support for such leaders. The insults leveled at Malietoa, Tuimaleali'ifano and Tamasese reflected not only upon their status but also upon that of their *au'aiga* and even beyond to Samoan society at large. One manifestation of this anti-*tama'aiga* campaign occurred in 1924 when Richardson banished Tamasese from his village following a dispute over a hibiscus hedge. By this and other such acts, the New Zealand policy was viewed by the local community as a direct challenge to traditional Samoan authority and prestige. The Samoans saw the *Mau* movement as one means of resisting such changes.

b. *Faipule*. At the same time that the administration were attacking the power and prestige of the *tama'aiga* they were attempting to increase the prestige and rank of the government sponsored *Faipule*. The threat that the *Faipule* posed to traditional leaders was not simply a manifestation of factional competition for prestige, rather it was a conflict between two opposing sources of authority. On one hand the authority of the traditional leader was seated in the Samoan kinship network. The *'aiga*, *au'aiga* and the village *fono* all discussed in the previous chapter, were important units of this network. The authority of the *Faipule*, on the other hand, derived entirely from acts implemented by the New Zealand government.

In 1918, a disastrous influenza epidemic increased the political dependence of *Faipule* on the administration. During this epidemic, disproportionately large numbers of older males died. Since most *matai* were members of this group, many of the older traditional *matai*, some of whom were also *Faipule* of long standing, died. This presented an opportunity for the administration to replace them with candidates of their own choosing. Accordingly, seventeen new *Faipule* were appointed by Colonel Tate to serve at the discretion of the administrator for indefinite terms of office. The administrator, therefore, between 1918 and 1923, was able to dominate completely the selection of *Faipule* and to ensure that those chosen were sympathetic and supportive of government policy.

c. *Ali'i and Tulafale*. One will recall from Chapter IV that the traditional relationships between *ali'i* and *tulafale* were those of reciprocity or *feagaiga*. Although the *tama'aiga* all held *ali'i* titles, there was no general correlation between type of title and rank. The *tama'aiga* titles were the only *ali'i* titles that were universally accepted as outranking all other *ali'i* and *tulafale* titles. In fact, the major distinction between the two types of titles related rather to the specific socio-political spheres associated with each. The *ali'i* were sacred, ceremonial leaders. The *tulafale* were the secular administrators. Therefore, the source of power for each was distinct. Antony Hooper discusses a recent interpretation of this distinction:

Here, [in Samoa] the female domain has associations of *mana'alu* or 'dignity,' purity, veto over male rule,

and the *ali'i* or chief; by contrast, the male domain has associations of toughness and manipulation, sexual and physical power, temporal authority and the *tulafale* 'orator chiefs' (Hooper, 1981:14).

This role contrast further establishes that secular political power lay primarily within the traditional domain of the *tulafale*. However, colonial interpretations of the division of authority between these two kinds of titles gave primacy to the *ali'i* titles. Consequently, the administrators followed a policy meant to reduce the authority and prestige of all the *tulafale*. This policy was probably implemented because of the difficulties various administrators encountered over the decades when trying to work with the *tulafale*, who owing to their "practical" political role, were noted for intrigue and seemingly endless political agitation. The *ali'i* were less troublesome to administrators since their "sacred" position removed them from this level of practical politics. It followed, then, that colonial administrators found them easier to manipulate and hence preferable to the *tulafale*. Accordingly, the *Tumua* and *Pule* (orator groups) were disbanded while the *ali'i* were consciously favoured for offices in the colonially established government (Keesing, 1934:162-163). These alterations by the colonial administration further resulted in a breakdown of the traditional reciprocity between *ali'i* and *tulafale*. The *tulafale* resented this, and expressed their resentment by joining the *Mau* in large numbers.

The *ali'i* were also upset since the administration had placed them as *Faipule* or government officials, in positions that required

behavior heretofore regarded as appropriate only for the *tulafale*:

For a chief [*ali'i*] to concern himself with matters of public welfare or indeed even to speak for himself violated his dignity, offended his talking chiefs, and lowered him in the eyes of the community (Keesing, 1934:162).

Therefore, one can contrast the way in which the prestige of the *Faipule* decreased among the Samoans with the way the prestige of the traditional leaders was challenged. The erosion in *Faipule* prestige can be traced to their ties to and dependence upon an unpopular administration coupled with the absence of traditional Samoan support for their official positions. The attacks on the prestige of the traditional leaders, on the other hand, can be traced to the direct administrative suppression, but these leaders successfully retained the traditional support for their role through *'aiga*, *au'aiga*, and *fono* sources.

d. *Part-Samoan Leadership*. New Zealand policy toward part-Samoans of European paternity was one of repression. Many of the part-Samoans were legally classified as Europeans, and were therefore excluded from participation in native affairs by the administration. The Mandate charter, with its emphasis on protecting native interests, gave no practical guidance to administrators for the complex kind of social situation in Western Samoa where racial boundaries were not distinct. A further aggravation to the New Zealand administration was that most of the "half-castes" were of German ancestry. Nevertheless, owing to their consanguineal and affinal ties, the part-Samoans were a powerful force that came to oppose a government policy that

attempted to restrict their political power.

B. *American Samoa*

1. *Historical Background*

The American control of the Samoan Islands was formalized by President McKinley through an Executive Order on 19 February 1900:

The island of Tutuila, of the Samoan group, and all other islands of the group east of longitude 171 degrees west of Greenwich, are hereby placed under the control of the Department of the Navy for a naval station. The Secretary of the Navy shall take such steps as are necessary to establish the authority of the United States and to give to the islands the necessary protection (President McKinley in Bryan, 1927:46).

The chiefs of Tutuila voluntarily ceded the islands of Tutuila and Aunuu in April of 1900, and as a gesture validating the exchange, the President of the United States sent gifts of pocket watches to the high chiefs. In July 1904, Mr. E.W. Gurr, former barrister in Western Samoa, Secretary of Native Affairs in American Samoa from 1900 to 1908 and future leader of the *Mau* in Western Samoa, returned from Manu'a with a deed of cession signed by Tui Manu'a Eleasara and other high chiefs. The President of the United States again presented gifts to the high chiefs:

He sent a silver watch with chain (and case) a silver medal (with case), and a proclamation diploma to each signer (Bryan, 1927:48).

Although the high chiefs were satisfied that their island's status was firmly established as a United States Territory, the United States Congress did not officially ratify the cessions until 20 Febru-

ary 1929. When the high chiefs learned during 1920 that formal recognition had been so long delayed they became distrustful of the administration and its motives. This delay also had profound effects on the policy developed by American administration for the islands.

## 2. *Navy Administration and Policy*

During the early years, the American administrative policy seemed to lack specific goals. Among the great powers involved in the partition of Samoa, only the United States had no formal colonial policy or colonial office. Consequently, when the United States came into possession of a number of territories at the end of the nineteenth century (including Hawai'i and Guam) their administration of them seemed marked by disorganization. Other territories, like Alaska and Hawai'i, were placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. The Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico were governed by the War Department, while Guam and American Samoa were administered by the Department of the Navy. With no comprehensive colonial policy, the guidelines for the administration of American Samoa grew in an ad hoc manner from the office of Governor of American Samoa. The guidelines incorporated the following general features:

- (a) Nonalienation of Samoan lands;
- (b) Preservation of Samoan customs;
- (c) Nonexploitation of the people and their resources;
- (d) Promotion of public health and education;
- (e) Samoa for the Samoans (Darden, 1952:xiii).

Theoretically at least, the individual governors of American Samoa were free to formulate, alter, or delete policies or laws which did or did not appeal to them. They therefore appeared to have supreme

power on the islands, and were answerable only to the secretary of the navy and the president of the United States. This concentration of power ran counter to prevailing American doctrine, and this fact rested uncomfortably with many of the governors themselves. In actual fact, such power was considerably tempered by the insecure legal position arising from the delay in ratification of the cessions. Commandant Uriel Sebree in 1902 expressed real concern about his legal status with reference to the possibility of personal legal suits being launched against him with regard to any legislation he might pass or enforce. The navy's response to Sebree's concern was to create the commission of governor of American Samoa in 1905. Prior to this, the commandant of the naval station had no civilian commission through which he might administer the natives. The main purpose of this commission however, was to satisfy military etiquette. It allowed the American administrator to rank equally with his German counterpart in Western Samoa. There was no official policy established to support the commission. The various American administrators frequently approached Washington with a plea for more official authority, but to no avail. For example, the first collection of regulations designed by Secretary of Native Affairs Gurr and Commandant Tilley were presented to the navy in 1900, and though Tilley requested approval, the navy refused to commit itself one way or the other:

The Station Regulations No. 5 have been the subject of consideration, and the Department is not disposed at present to make formal approval, and prefers to allow the conduct of affairs to remain without such

action here for the present. At the same time, you may understand that there appears to be no feature of the regulations that is considered objectionable. You will report from time to time how these regulations are working, and will make such changes as your judgment commends, at the same time stating the reasons therefore in your communications to the Department. It will be the pleasure of the Department, at the proper time, to act formally upon these regulations. For the time being, owing to the novelty of the situation, and the distance from Washington, it may be considered prudent to permit matters to continue as they are (Secretary of the Navy quoted in Cool, 1958:171).

The Regulations were put into effect, without explicit official support, and remained in effect until the end of navy administration in American Samoa in 1951.

The official attitude toward American Samoa was so vaguely defined that an official name for the territory was not selected until 1912. Commandant Tilley, the first American administrator, was invested with authority over the "Naval station, Tutuila" with no reference to *Manu'a*. In subsequent correspondence, American Samoa was referred to variously as Tutuila; Tutuila and *Manu'a*; Tutuila, Samoa, and Samoa. It was becoming increasingly important to differentiate between the naval station at Pago Pago on Tutuila Island and the rest of the group, and by 1904 the commandant recommended that the navy assign an official name to the territory, either American Samoa, Eastern Samoa or Tutuila and *Manu'a*. Nothing was done, and the names proliferated with the governor referred to variously as the governor of Tutuila or the Naval Governor of Samoa. At last on 24 October 1912, Governor Crose received a new commission as "Governor of American Samoa" and this became the official name for the islands east of longitude 171° West

(Bryan, 1927:54).

a. *Health and Welfare Policy.* Despite the limitation set by lack of funds, the Americans pursued a program to improve certain aspects related to hygiene and sanitation:

E.M. Blackwell, Passed Assistant Surgeon, U.S.N., Ship's Surgeon of the U.S.S. *Abarenda*, stepped ashore at Pago Pago with black bag in hand and set up shop under the nearest coconut tree (Darden, 1952:13).

That was 17 April 1900. The following year at Fagatogo a tiny three bed dispensary was established and this was extended in 1904 by a Samoan *fale*, since it was a matter of observation that "the natives thrive best in a house of their own style" (Darden, 1952:13). From these rather modest beginnings, the basic program expanded. By 1909 Commander W.M. Crose, governor of American Samoa had established a board of health, a code of regulations concerning health and sanitation and a hygiene test to be used in the schools. One of the key tasks was the building of village latrines. These became a Samoan fad and proliferated all over the islands. Whether these effected a change in the personal habits of the Samoans is suspect. After the initial fad, most fell into disrepair and most were then destroyed within a short time by the wind and the sea (Bryan, 1927:72).

A major concern in 1909 was that 85 per cent of the population were found to be infected with hookworm, including every member of the native guard (*Fitafita*).<sup>3</sup> In fact, the flurry over latrines and the decision to establish a board of health were the result of this discovery. Permission was received from the Department of the Navy on

4 April 1911 to construct a native hospital on government land near Pago Pago and this was accomplished by 1 September 1912. Compared to the dispensary previously established by Blackwell, it was quite impressive, containing examination room, dispensary, lavatory, sick wards and an operating room. On 4 November 1913, land adjoining the hospital was purchased by the Island Government for the establishment of a school for training Samoan nurses and quarters for the American Navy nurses. The first Samoan nurses graduated on 22 February 1916 and were appointed to duties alternating between the hospital and a number of branch dispensaries that had by now been set up in outlying districts. A rudimentary dispensary in Leone, Western District, was replaced in 1916 by one complete with living quarters. Another started in Tau in 1915, and another which opened at Toaga was later moved to Ofu (all in *Manu'a*) in 1923. Also in 1923 a dispensary opened in Amouli, Eastern District of Tutuila.

Despite the growth of dispensaries in the outer districts, most of which were funded by the districts themselves, the efforts of the Americans to offer medical services were limited to the area around the navy installation. School inspections were sporadic but efforts were made to inspect the students at least annually. Child welfare work was instituted in 1925 but there was resistance to this movement by some of the *matai*. The American policy cannot be said to have been formulated on a comprehensive island-wide basis, for practical realities such as shortage of money and poor transportation effectively restricted work to the Pago Pago centre.

b. *Education Policy.* The general policy toward education and social services for the Samoans is summarized in a statement from the secretary of the navy, dated 14 September 1922. This document says, "Government aid should be discouraged as far as possible and the people encouraged to do more for themselves," (Secretary of the navy in Bryan, 1927:81). As a result of this policy,

The United States have never taken any steps toward the establishment of schools in American Samoa, despite the piteous appeals from commandants and governors (Bryan, 1972:80).

The Samoans were eager for educational services. In fact Commandant Tilley was surprised to discover that the level of literacy in American Samoa in 1900 was higher than that in the United States at the same time. Funds were not forthcoming, however, and no overall policy toward education was developed during the first eleven years of American administration. The educational system was left in the hands of the missionary establishment, though there was talk of providing a secular school system as quickly as possible. The first "public" school opened at Tau in 1903. It professed no denominational connection to any of the missions and in return received a small monthly grant from the Island government funds. Aside from the school on Manua, the first major public school was opened at Fagatogo near Pago Pago 11 April 1904. It was built and operated out of the customs fund of the Island government, and offered scholarships to children of the various districts in the proportions of:

- (a) Eastern District 20;
- (b) Western District 16;
- (c) Manua 16.

Although the school began as a nondenominational co-educational all-Samoan school, the governor admitted that "The school gradually became a boys' school, used by those living in the vicinity, with an attendance of from forty to fifty pupils" (Bryan, 1927:82). In 1908 another school opened at Tau, but the only teacher competent to teach English was a London Missionary Society pastor named Vaega. This school was built entirely by funds from the district of *Manu'a*.

As with other aspects of policy in American Samoa, much depended upon the individual energies and interests of specific governors. Governor Crose who served from 10 November 1910 to 14 March 1913 was especially devoted to the improvement of the educational facilities. His policy included the following elements:

- (a) Compulsory education;
- (b) Coeducational education;
- (c) Instruction in English;
- (d) Attenuated nonsectarian policy;
- (e) Overseas education for selected students.

Working within these guidelines, Governor Crose appointed a board of education in 1911 "to investigate the teaching of English in the schools" (Bryan, 1927:82). He also held a convention of all school teachers at which he recognized the importance of the missionary village school system. In 1912 he issued a regulation requiring all children between the ages of six and thirteen to attend school a minimum of

four days per week. In 1912 the governor enquired of the president of the Hampton Normal Institute in Hampton, Vermont whether it would be possible to send a select number of Samoan students there for training. At that time he did not receive a favourable response. An overture to a school in Hawai'i was more fruitful. On 14 February 1913, the sons of three high ranking *matāi*, Tufele, Uaine and Leoso departed for the Hilo Boarding School in Hawai'i.

An element of friction accompanied the relationship between the administration and the missionary organizations who were running most of the schools. The school conferences which were attended by the catholics were boycotted by the London Missionary Society and vice versa. The governor was quick to take advantage of this inherent church rivalry in order to promote educational development. For example, when the London Missionary Society issued a protest to the governor about the intended employment of three Marist brothers as teachers in a "public" district school, the governor assured them that the catholics were intending to build their own school in the eastern district and invited the London Missionary Society to do the same. He further urged the London Missionary Society to send all their English speaking teachers to American Samoa since the Germans had just passed a law prohibiting the teaching of English in Western Samoan schools (Bryan, 1927:83).

In spite of this interest during Governor Crose's brief span of office, little real educational progress was accomplished. Most of the 'development' comprised written recommendations and dealt with possible

organizational structures:

On June 30, 1914, there were, in addition to village pastors' schools, 8 recognized schools in Tutuila; 6 were sectarian (?); 2 (?) island government--3 were for boys, 3 for girls, and 2 for both boys and girls. These schools were being taught by a teacher from the United States, by Catholic Marist Brothers, by Catholic Marist Sisters, by representatives of the London Missionary Society, and by Mormon elders. July 28, 1914, Governor Stearns issued a very comprehensive regulation relating to education, entitled "The Education Regulation of 1914", organizing a department of education and defining its duties . . . . As there was only one island government public school, this regulation was practically a dead letter, until Governor Evans organized the present public school system in 1921 (Bryan, 1927:85).

Instruction in English was given priority, but in reality opportunities for learning English were limited. During Governor Crose's term of office *Fitafita* were instructed by Chaplain Pearce six hours per week in English. Governor Stearns had plans to make American Samoa an English speaking territory but these hopes were never realized.

On 23 January 1918, the new government high school, Poyer School was dedicated. It was an impressive structure of three thousand square feet, built at an estimated total cost of \$25,000 including land costs. Of these costs, \$3,744.35 was supplied from the eastern district school fund, \$750 from the judicial fund of the Island government, \$250 from the Samoan Hospital drugstore fund and the rest came from the customs fund of Island government (Bryan, 1927:87). Governor Evans quickly acted on his 1921 promise to extend the public school system throughout the island, and . . .

On June 30, 1922, there were 19 schools, 29 teachers (5 white, and 24 native), and 1,567 pupils enrolled (Bryan, 1927:89).

The history of educational development in American Samoa reflects not only the great public interest shown but also highlights the problems associated with providing practical basic facilities for education in the islands. The funds that were available went primarily to building facilities in the Pago Pago centre, while other districts provided their own facilities through school funds generated locally with little or no assistance from the Island government. The first real effort at building a systematic public school system came as a result of *Mau* activity in 1921.

### 3. *The New Political Order*

Notwithstanding the general Washington indifference to these tiny isolated Pacific Islands, the first commandant and the first secretary of native affairs, Tilley and Gurr submitted a document outlining the proposed basic structure for the new government in American Samoa. Since the United States Navy was the first colonial power to administer American Samoa directly, Tilley and Gurr had to create a structure from scratch, rather than adapt a prior administrative structure as could New Zealand. The Station Regulations No. 5 of 1900 provided the structure and the policy. Based on a commitment to indirect rule through indigenous structures and personnel, the administrative policy was also committed to the American ideal of separating legislative, executive and judicial powers wherever possible.

Station Regulations No. 5 established three administrative districts: Eastern District (Falelima East), Western District (Falelima West) and *Manu'a*. These districts were subdivided into fourteen counties and fifty-two villages. The local government at the village level comprised a *pulemu'u* or village chief elected annually by the village *fono* and confirmed by the governor. The composition of the village *fono* remained unaltered. At the county level the traditionally highest ranking *ali'i* was normally appointed by the governor as county chief, while at the district level the governor was also responsible for the appointment of native district governors (Gurr, 1901:1-23).

a. *The Executive Sector.* The first attempt to subdivide the executive branch of the Island government was made by Governor Stearns who reorganized the administration by Executive Order 6 September 1913. He established new departments of justice, treasury, interior (customs), agriculture and public health (Darden, 1952:8). By 1927 the administration consisted of the following personnel and their respective departments: secretary of native affairs, public health officer, superintendent of public works, superintendent of education, chief customs officer and island treasurer. There were boards of education and auditing, directors of the Bank of American Samoa and assessors (Bryan, 1927:59). Of all these positions, the only post held by a civilian was that of secretary of native affairs appointed directly by the secretary of the navy. All other key posts such as those listed above were filled by the following navy personnel: senior medical officer,

public works officer, chaplain, naval officer and supply officer.

There was, however, a strict separation maintained between the administration of the civilian government of American Samoa (or Island government as it was informally called), and the administration of the navy station. The American administrator, therefore, held two commissions, namely commandant of the U.S. Naval Station, Tutuila; and (after 1905), governor of American Samoa. The administration of the Island government, as established by Station Regulations No. 5, was maintained and funded independently of the navy station. In fact, the Island government was mostly self-sufficient in a fiscal sense, supported primarily through internally generated tax and customs revenue. This is an extremely important fact, for a popular misconception exists that the civilian government was staffed, managed and financially supported by the U.S. Navy. It is true, that navy personnel served in a part-time capacity as administrators in addition to their usual military duties. But this status was restricted to the personnel referred to above. Other staff members of the Island government were paid their salaries from Island funds. One consequence of this peculiar staffing arrangement, and the disposition of separate administrative functions, was the official precedence awarded to the civilian secretary of native affairs. This fact created a great deal of resentment among the naval officers. The naval officer second-in-command to the governor (captain of the yard) was, for the purpose of Island government affairs, outranked by a civilian. This unusual situation provides another insight to the hostilities between Lieutenant

Commander Creed Boucher as captain of the yard, and the secretary of native affairs Albert Noble, that flared up during the *Mau* in 1920.

The initial role of the secretary of native affairs was defined by E.W. Gurr in 1901:

The chief duties of that office are to advise the Commandant in native matters, to inspect the work of all native officers and to report to the Commandant (Gurr, 1901:4).

From this most general of duties, the job expanded until:

The secretary of native affairs supervises and inspects all work of the district governors and chiefs, judges and magistrates, and makes regular reports thereon to the governor.

In the government of American Samoa, he takes precedence immediately after the governor. . . [he] also (1) administers the copra industry . . . (2) collects the native taxes; (3) signs all passports . . .; (4) passes upon applications for gun licenses; (4) is ex officio chairman of the board of education; (6) is ex officio chairman of the board of tax assessors; (7) is ex officio vice president of the Bank of American Samoa; (8) supervises native police . . .; (9) has charge of vital statistics (Bryan, 1927: 63-64).

The ultimate authority for the Island government was based on the position of the governor:

The Governor is the head of the government. He derives his authority not only from his commission as Governor of American Samoa, but also from his orders as commandant of the naval station, Tutuila. He is the maker of all laws, and his authority is supreme, subject to orders from the Navy Department (Bryan, 1927:58).

This power was used cautiously. Many of the governors were totally inexperienced at administering civilian governments. They frequently knew nothing about Samoa and were posted there for a short period.

Thus, they tended to rely heavily on the advice of the secretary of native affairs. Once that basic policy was established in 1900 through Station Regulations No. 5, no radical change was made for the next fifty-one years. The primary concern of Station Regulations No. 5 was to legitimize the administration, and establish structures within which the native policy could operate. Even though there was a strong desire to interfere as little as possible with native custom, the necessity of transforming American Samoa into a governable territory often contradicted that philosophy. When such a contradiction occurred, the exigency of practical administration usually prevailed. Major political change was therefore thrust upon the American Samoans in 1900, by this new set of regulations.

*b. The Legislative Sector.* The legislative branch was the least democratically based of all the branches. The governor had absolute power to enact laws by direct promulgation (Darden, 1952:9). The Samoans showed interest in participating in the legislative process and early in the 1900's Commander C.B.T. Moore encouraged a form of "practise assembly" in which electoral procedures of American design were instituted for selecting representatives. But to the chagrin of the governor, *fa'a Samoa* 'according to the Samoan way of life' methods prevailed, and only those permitted to rule by Samoan custom were "elected." This Samoan system of "election" persisted throughout the navy administration (Darden, 1952:9). The governors were willing to include the Samoan leaders in decision making through a newly established advisory committee, the *Fono Tele* or 'Annual Fono.' This

body met to consider items of concern to the native inhabitants. Although the governor acted as president and had complete authority over all decisions, the structure of the *Fono Tele* allowed for full participation from members of all districts. Each district selected ten representatives and those along with the county chiefs, district governors and district judges comprised a committee numbering forty-nine persons. At the village level, where most of the political affairs in Samoa are conducted, ample scope was given to the village *fono* to conduct its own affairs *fa'a Samoa*. The village *fono* was headed by the *pulenu'u*. The village *fono* had authority to legislate on all necessary rules and regulations concerning:

roads, cleanliness, plantations, animals, boats, cookhouses, personal conduct or other matters for the benefit of the people, and to prescribe punishment to the maximum allowed for the enforcement by the village magistrates (Keesing, 1934:202).

c. *The Judicial Sector.* The judicial branch was also created by Regulation No. 5 (1900) and it followed the same hierarchical structure as the administrative units. Village, district and high courts were established. The village magistrate was a Samoan appointed by the governor and given authority to hear civil cases involving sums of less than ten dollars and criminal cases involving Samoans only. In addition to these maximum fines of ten dollars, offenders could be sentenced up to one month of hard labour. The village court had no authority in the area of land ownership. These village courts numbered 35 and were expected to convene weekly. The salary of the village magistrate was paid out of the fines collected at a rate of 40 percent

of all fines to a maximum of eight dollars a month. The five dollar per month salary of the native clerk and three dollar monthly salary of the village policeman were met in the same way. The six district courts exercised wider authority. They heard cases involving Samoans and Americans or Samoan cases where the penalties would exceed ten dollars. These were presided over by a Samoan and American judge who held monthly sessions. At the apex of the judicial pyramid was the high court, presided over by a Samoan judge, an American judge and the commandant or his representative. This court heard all cases involving land ownership, civil suits between Europeans involving amounts exceeding \$250, crimes incurring penalties requiring fines in excess of \$250 or six months imprisonment, crimes of murder or treason, or crimes committed by magistrates or judges.

#### 4. *Indigenous Political Structural Change*

Felix Keesing complimented the Americans for the comparative ease with which they fashioned a "clearly defined district and chiefly organisation into a convenient system of native administration under white control," (Keesing, 1930:1). The key word here must surely be "comparative" for there were serious changes made in the traditional structure.

Traditionally, the island of Tutuila had been divided into two major divisions or *Falelima*, meaning "house of five" (Cool, 1958:99). The political structure of the ten sub-units within the two *Falelima* aligned Saole, Vaifanua, Sua, Mauputasi and Ituau counties in *Falelima East*; and Fofu, Aitulagi, Leasina, Tualauta and Tualatai counties in

*Falelima West*. The traditional high chiefs were Tuitele from Leone village who was high chief of Fofu and Aitulagi Counties; Mauga from Pago Pago village who was high chief of Ituau and Mauputasi Counties; Leiato from Fagaitua who was high chief of Sua and Vaifanua Counties. Chiefs of lesser rank were Faumuina, the high chief of Saole County; Satele, high chief of Tualatai County; and Fuimaono of Leasina County.

a. *District and Sub-District Political Change*. The political structure established by the Americans did approximate the formal, traditional structure, in that the basic district structure was maintained. However, there were certain discrepancies between the traditional and the new, particularly at the County level in *Falelima West*, or the Western District as it was also called. Instead of recognizing the traditional sub-units of Fofu and Aitulagi, the administration incorporated Aitulagi within Leasina County and Fofu within Lealataua. This rearrangement of the traditional structure had important political effects. The senior orators from Fofu and Aitulagi were now ignored although their counterparts in the Eastern District, the *Matua* members from Vaifanua and Sua were accorded official recognition. The prestige of Tuitele who now presided over only one county was greatly diminished and the stability of the Western District was greatly threatened. In the Eastern District only two native governors held office during a fifty year period; whereas in the same period in the Western District the same office was held by ten separate individuals who varied in rank from high chief to low ranking chief to *sa'oaumaga* (head of untitled youth group) (Cool, 1958:203).

John Cole Cool, administrator and social anthropologist, attributed these events to:

an internal struggle for control between the four high chiefs within the [western] district. This struggle was related to the loss of prestige suffered by Tui-tele following the partition and the shift of power within Tutuila to favor the east (Cool, 1958:203-204).

Furthermore, Cool linked the structural changes to the distribution of *Mau* support:

The most significant thing from our point of view is that all such political disturbances derived their Samoan support from Samoan leaders who had reason to be dissatisfied with the changes in the internal balance of power which had been brought about by the navy. Sua and Vaifanua Counties, under Leiato and Mauputasi County, under Mauga, were usually loyal to the Naval Administration. Lealataua County, under Tuitele, Saole County, under Faumuina, Ituau County, and to a lesser degree the other counties of the west associated themselves more often than not, with the opposition or anti-Navy elements (Cool, 1958:214-215).

From these statements by Cool, it seems that the smooth fit between the indigenous and introduced structures was only at the most general of levels, and that upon close inspection key discrepancies point to potential areas of conflict in the integration of the two structures. This resulted in certain inter-district shifts in prestige.

Implicit to the American policy was the establishment of centralized facilities in the Pago Pago area. This resulted in increased factionalism between the traditionally competitive leaders of *Falelima East* and *Falelima West*, and the respective high chiefs Mauga and Tuitele. The advantages conferred upon Mauga served to intensify the historical factionalism because they swung the balance of power in favour of Mauga.

Although the Americans overtly structured the political districts so that each one would be equal in status, in fact, Pago Pago and its immediate vicinity had been elevated to a special position as an administrative centre. Therefore, services established there were conceived as fulfilling the needs of all Samoans, whereas services in Leone of the Western District or those in Manua were conceived as regional district services. This gave Pago Pago a special kind of precedence over her rival village Leone in the Western District. In terms of the services provided or the disbursement of public funds, there was nothing equal about the status of Leone and Pago Pago.

The first school to receive administrative financial support opened at Fagatogo (Naval Station) 11 April 1904. The chiefs in the Western District were upset over the way it was funded. As noted earlier, moneys from the customs fund of the Island government were added to the school fund of the Eastern District in order to build this primary school. The Western District appealed for similar funding for a school in its area but the request was denied. The Western District felt compelled to match the school in Fagatogo and they did so, by levying a tax upon their own district residents and charging a modest tuition fee.

In March 1917, construction began on the Poyer School situated on land purchased on the north shore of Pago Pago Harbour. This project cost \$25,000 funded primarily from the Island government. Almost immediately, the district governor of the Western District requested money from the Customs Fund for a school house in the Western District

and again this was turned down. To this, the district governor retorted,

We are only giving you what the people of the Western District talk about every year. The people of my District think that the Government is spending all the money for the Eastern District (Faiivāe, 1971:6).

But as early as 1904, Faiivāe had questioned the American governor about the disparity in funding between the two districts and had received this explanation:

The Eastern District of Tutuila has more Samoans than any of the others, and also nearly all the white men of the islands who pay duty on the food they eat, the clothes they wear and the furniture they use. Upon a calculation of the duties paid in Tutuila it will be ascertained that the duties paid by the whites aggregate more than those paid by the natives. It is only right that more of the customs money should be expended in the Eastern District than elsewhere (Underwood, 1904: 1-2).

The disparity of service extended to medical facilities. On 4 April 1911 permission was received for the construction of a Samoan Hospital. This was done with funds provided by the Island government. Meanwhile, in the outer districts, medical services were virtually non-existent, and no funds were forthcoming to alleviate the situation. By its own efforts, the Western District opened a medical dispensary at Leone in 1915. In 1919, high chief Satele, district governor of the Western District, presented a resolution to the governor of American Samoa at the Annual Fono, 12 November 1919, stating "that the Samoan nurse stationed in Leone should be fed by the Samoan Hospital Fund just as they do in Fagatogo," but the American governor replied:

The Governor and the Doctor are surprised that Samoan hospitality should be denied the nurse sent to Leone for the benefit of one locality only, namely the Western

District,--The nurses on duty in Fagatogo perform services for the natives of ALL AMERICAN SAMOA and therefore are entitled to be fed from the funds derived from ALL AMERICAN SAMOA [emphasis in original] (Terhune, 1919:1).

Complaints surfaced intermittently from the Western District and they invariably dealt with some alleged disparity in treatment compared to Eastern District:

- (1) In 1904, the Western District was distressed over the removal of the *Fitafita* detachment formerly assigned to Manu'a and the Western District.
- (2) In 1909, resolutions from the Western District requested the establishment of a Lands and Titles Court at Leone. This request was denied. The Western District further requested that two or three chiefs of the Western District be appointed to take part in Lands and Titles Court decisions. This was denied.
- (3) In 1912, the Western District wanted permission for *malaga* from the Western District to embark at Leone. This was denied, but allowance was made for special church and school groups.
- (4) In 1916, the Western District requested that ships be allowed to call at Leone as they do at Pago Pago. The request was denied.
- (5) In 1919, the Western District submitted a comprehensive list of complaints to the American governor through Satele at the Annual Fono. The administration was unsympathetic to the contents (Fono resolutions:1904, 1909, 1912, 1916, 1919).

Further trouble ensued over the issue of roads. In the early days of the administration, Leone was particularly at a disadvantage by being isolated from the Pago Pago area. The first roads constructed were those around the naval station and the Pago Pago area. Funds for public works projects were continually a serious problem. In 1913

Island funds were apportioned to begin building a road to connect Leone and Pago Pago. By 1919 a road suitable for vehicular wagon traffic was within two miles of connecting the two villages. This road had a practical value for the Island economy as a whole, and not just for the Western District:

For some years past the need for a road from the Naval Station to Leone has been apparent. Due to the fact that the major portion of the copra of Tutuila is cut in the Western District, this road has become more essential (Snyder, 1919:10).

The road had other values to the leaders of the Western District. It permitted access to the medical facilities, and access to opportunities for employment and beyond these uses, it brought prestige. Such prestige cannot be underestimated to those leaders of the Western District who had experienced continual humiliation in their relationship with the American administration.

Consciously or not, American policy generally favoured the Eastern District and thereby enhanced the powers and prestige of high chief Mauga. It is not surprising then, that Mauga's opposition to the navy government during the *Mau*, was short lived. The areas of unrest compared to those of loyal support correspond to those whose traditional status was altered by American policy.

b. *Village Level Political Change.* The core of the traditional political structure was the *matai-fono* complex operating at the village level. The American government gave official recognition to this reality and reinforced the authority of the village to conduct its own affairs. Article three of Regulation No. 5 upheld the rights of

hereditary chiefs. However, the village *fono* was incorporated into a new structural hierarchy in which authority was vested in the larger unit, i.e. the American government. This was, of course, a radical departure from traditional village autonomy, but still, on matters of local concern the village continued to operate on much the same basis as before 1900 with little central governmental interference.

Regulation No. 5 further provided for the establishment in each village of the new office of *Pulemu'u* or mayor. This office presided over the village *fono*, nominated new village chiefs if an incumbent was removed by administrative order. The *Pulemu'u* was selected by the village *fono* and was responsible to the administration for the conduct and conditions of his village. The village *fono* adapted to this novel institution with ingenuity. In the beginning it was customary for village *fonos* to appoint the highest ranking *matai* to the position of *Pulemu'u*, but it soon became apparent that such an office placed the incumbent in awkward positions at times when the views of the administration and those of the *fono* were not in accord. In most villages, it evolved into a position in which the appointees were deliberately of low rank. In this way the *Pulemu'u* had no real authority within the village to enforce unpopular administrative policy, yet it was he who had to account for any village malfeasance to the administration. The village *matai* and *fono* therefore successfully brought the position under their control (Keesing, 1934:204).

The U.S. policy emphasizing the separation of powers in government was a novel feature to the Samoans at the village level. Previously

the village *fono* had the power to punish offenders through physical force, banishment, or coercion. This power was now transferred to the newly established office of magistrate of the village court. Since the magistrate was appointed by the U.S. governor the power of the central government in Pago Pago was directly felt at the village level. Therefore, although the local village *fono* retained political power over matters of local concern, its earlier judicial functions were removed.

#### 5. *Changes in Indigenous Leadership*

Under the new system villages, counties, and districts nestled one within the other in a hierarchy of political power that was foreign to the traditional Samoa structure. Native officials were appointed at each level by the central government in supposed accordance with the traditional hereditary ranking system. On occasion an incumbent would not meet the approval of the administration and be removed. A major change was therefore effected in the method of selecting leaders. The right of appointment now lay with the administration, not the *au'aiga* or *Matua* as previously.

Some of the new regulations also restricted the authority of the *matai*. In particular, section nine of the Regulation twelve (1900) denied the *matai* full control over his household members:

If any chief (*matai*) is oppressive, or attempts to inflict punishment himself, the person aggrieved can complain before the magistrate, that the chief may be tried and punished according to law (in Cool, 1958:176).

Shortly after this regulation went into effect, a *matai* became involved in an issue directly relevant to the new regulation. Although this

event happened about 1905, apparently it was only recorded by Dr. E. Blackwell and subsequently recounted by Captain Gray (1960:133). An untitled Samoan ignored a *sa* prohibiting him from eating skipjack, a type of bonito reserved for the high chief. When high chief Letuli was informed of this transgression, he had his *aumaga* destroy the man's house and crops. The chief then banished the culprit from his home village. These were all appropriate punishments according to traditional Samoan custom. However, when the administration heard of the events they brought the high chief to trial, not the miscreant who had broken the *sa* and:

The court found the Letuli guilty of conduct improper under the laws of the United States. He was ordered to make restitution to Fagiema [the *sa* breaker] for the property damage he had inflicted, and he was confined to the Pago Pago area for a period of one year, during which he was to be deprived of the exercise of his high chiefly functions (Gray, 1960:133).

The significance of this event in relation to the outbreak of the *Mau* was pointed out by high chief Mauga in 1928, who stated that the whole episode had grown out of the 'skipjack incident.' This was detailed as follows:

[O]ne of the county chiefs had punished a man for having eaten a skipjack, which he well knew was *sa*, and should have yielded at once to the High Chief, but that the Governor had punished the High Chief. Thus for the first time, said the Mauga, and the Tuitele concurred, the authority of the High Chiefs in Tutuila had been publicly undermined by the Americans, and resistance to the Samoans' own duly constituted authorities had been encouraged (Gray, 1960:133-134).

Control over the *matai* tightened in 1906 when a new regulation prepared by Secretary E. Gurr obliged all *matai* to register their

*matai* title formally with the office of the secretary of native affairs. This new regulation granted the administration the power to withhold official recognition of those *matai* in disfavour. The same regulation prohibited the further splitting of titles. The practise of splitting titles, which continued in Western Samoa, witnessed there an increase in the number of titles as the population grew. With a fixed number of titles and rising birth rates in American Samoa competition for political status through traditional means became keener and the number of young males excluded from political recognition *fa'a Samoa*, increased.

In 1914 another regulation prohibited any Samoan convicted of a felony from holding public office or registering a *matai* title. Later in 1932, title registration was restricted to natives of over one-half Samoan blood.

Thus the American administration was successful in usurping many of the traditional prerogatives of the *matai*, including their right to legislate laws, the right to enforce them and the right to punish offenders. Even the right of awarding titles came increasingly under the control of the administration. Another factor contributing to the erosion of traditional power was the emergence of a new avenue for prestige among young untitled Samoans. The Americans created a new group called the *Fitafita*.

a. *The Fitafita*. In 1902, Commander Sebree announced the establishment of a *Fitafita* guard to be used as a combination Samoan police force and marine contingent. The guard was comprised of 58 young

Samoans who thus formed a privileged group within Samoan society, earning almost the same pay as regular enlisted navy personnel. These young men were issued special uniforms, and functioned as security police around the naval installation at Pago Pago. The effect of this new institution on traditional leadership was profound:

Because of his background, daily association with naval members of the Government of American Samoa and relatively large income, the Fita was respected in his community and other residents of his village often sought his advice. In accordance with the Samoan custom of communal living, Fitas contributed to the support of many members of their families, and their total income, approximately 266,000 dollars annually, has been an important factor in the economy of American Samoa (Darden, 1952:1).

The *Fitafita* provided an opportunity for young, educated Samoans to achieve political recognition without necessarily trying to achieve it through traditional means, that is, through title succession. The two ways were not mutually exclusive. In 1909, Tufele of Manu'a was chosen as the first district governor after the death of the Tui Manu'a. Among his other qualifications was his experience as the leader of the *Fitafita*.

b. *Ali'i-Tulafale Role Changes*. The Americans designed a policy that explicitly repressed the power and prestige of the *tulafale*. E.W. Gurr was responsible for this policy. He had been present in Western Samoa during the confused turmoil of the 1890's when orator groups were interfering with the Europeans' attempts to create a "kingship" out of the Samoan political system. Gurr was therefore prejudiced against the *tulafale*, sharing in the British opinion that

the *tulafale* were conniving troublemakers. He certainly distrusted them and gave deep consideration to obviating those problems that had arisen in Western Samoa:

In each village or settlement there are three or more chiefs, each having his *tulafales*. To preserve the support of the *tulafale*, the chief often was forced to obey the dictates of a *tulafale*, and became a mere tool in his hands. The rivalries of these *tulafales* and their respective chiefs would keep the village in a state of fomenting strife and distrust.

Captain Tilley determined to have only one responsible chief in each town, who would be elected annually by the chiefs and *tulafales* of the town. These chiefs and *tulafales* form the chief's council, but they are all subject to him. The council may enact village regulations. No *tulafale* is eligible to the office of chief.

A chief can take the office of *tulafale*, but the *tulafale* never that of the chief. The *tulafale* who were irritated at this ruling were informed that they would be eligible for the position of magistrate, and would still be able to retain the office of *tulafale*, according to Samoan custom, but that they must not assume or usurp the duties of the chiefs.

In this order, and others, Captain Tilley exhibited a spirit of firmness with the *tulafales* and they felt that it would be useless to be persistent in their efforts to induce him to alter his program. They saw that whilst he was very courteous, kind, and considerate toward them, after their own fashion, he was firm, and would brook no attempt to put the *tulafale* above or on the same level with a chief (Gurr, 1901:4-5).

This drastically altered the roles of *tulafale* and *ali'i* and the various functions of each. The new system now denied coercive powers to the *ali'i* but allowed him to serve executive functions appropriate to the territorial unit he represented. The *tulafale* was made ineligible for any executive post and limited to the office of magistrate. It was therefore, the *tulafale* which lost much traditional power

and prestige and during the *Mau* they joined the opposition against the navy administration in large numbers.

c. *Part-Samoan Leadership.* The American policy in this area is discussed at length in the following chapter, so it is here presented in abbreviated form. In general, the American attitude toward part-Samoans was more favourable than that in the New Zealand policy, since the navy felt morally responsible for the offspring of American men posted in Samoa. Consequently, the policy developed out of the American Samoan Commission of 1930, aimed at eliminating the negative aspects of "half-caste" designation, by providing part-Samoans opportunities for increased political participation. There was therefore, somewhat less repression against this group in American Samoa. In fact, there was no legal definition of part-Samoan. The group as a whole did not command the same internal strength as the similar group in Western Samoa under New Zealand control because it lacked the economic backing and financial expertise of the commercial merchants in Western Samoa. Although this group was supportive of *Mau* activity in American Samoa, it was not a social force that could muster strong political support.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE MAU MOVEMENTS DESCRIBED

A. *The Movement in Western Samoa*

According to Mary Boyd, the New Zealand authority on Samoan history, New Zealand officially accepted the Samoan Mandate in 1920 from the League of Nations with great reluctance. National pride dictated that these islands should not become the Mandate of another power, for the then New Zealand Prime Minister W.F. Massey deemed the latter possibility an "unthinkable humiliation" (Boyd, 1969:124).

The Samoans however were not well disposed towards New Zealand. They blamed the influenza epidemic and its continued after effects entirely on New Zealand's gross ineptitude and indifference. Shortly before the islands were formally assigned, the Samoans petitioned that they be placed under either American or British rule, and flatly denounced New Zealand's earlier administrative role (Boyd, 1969:120). Evidently, discontent was brewing even before the appointment in January of 1919, prior to the formal exercise of the Mandate, of Colonel R.W. Tate, as the first administrator of the new Mandated territory.

In addition, plummeting copra prices in 1920 caused hardship to a number of Samoans who instigated an economic boycott of European goods. This boycott was given the traditional name of *sa* (taboo) and was led by some of the high chiefs. During the *sa*, a majority of the

*Faipule* petitioned the British Crown for the removal of New Zealand's Mandate. Meanwhile the local European population was exceedingly upset over what it perceived to be rampant government interference in their commercial affairs and inefficiency in administering the Samoan Mandate.

On 31 January 1922, a citizens' committee was formed under the leadership of Olaf Frederick Nelson who was of Samoan and Swedish extraction. His father, Augustus Nelson had founded a trading company on the island of Savai'i and married a high ranking Samoan woman, Sina Tugaga, who was related to the "royal" family of Sa Tupua. Nelson himself held the Taisi title through his *au'aiga* membership in the descent group of his mother. The history of this title is given by Davidson:

The original Taisi was a son of Tui'a'ana Galumalemana. One of his descendants married an important holder of the Tuimaleali'ifano title and another Malietoa Laupepa. A daughter of the latter was the wife of Faumuina Fiaame Mulinu'u (later Mata'afa) who was to become a leading political associate of Nelson. The Taisi title had fallen into obscurity; but characteristically its distinguished origin enabled it to become again a title of importance when held by a man of Nelson's distinction (Davidson, 1967:115).

Born at Safune on 24 February 1883, Nelson had a privileged upbringing. He spent his early years in Apia, was educated at the Marist Mission and later served as an apprentice in the employ of the German firm Deutsche Handels und Plantagen Gessellschaft. After the turn of the century, Nelson returned to the village of Safune in Savai'i and assumed increasing control of his father's business. The first

public record of the young Nelson's political involvement occurred in 1910, one year after his marriage to the daughter of the American, H.J. Moors. A petition was sent to the German authorities in Berlin outlining a number of grievances felt by the Europeans in Samoa, and O.F. Nelson was one of the signatories. The grievances expressed in 1910 foreshadow with remarkable precision, the later complaints of the Europeans in the *Mau*. "They complained of excessive taxes, officials, and laws, and of inadequate representation" (McKay, 1968:37). During the war years, O.F. Nelson's copra trading establishment flourished at the expense of the German firms. The latter were forced into liquidation by the New Zealand military administration, and the German nationals were subsequently repatriated.

By the 1920's, Nelson was probably one of, if not *the* most influential member of the European community, but, the New Zealand administration was openly hostile to him. They thought of him as a war profiteer and accused him of exploiting the Samoan people through his copra trading establishment. Mary Boyd describes his relationship with the administration:

He was alienated by New Zealand's policy of racial discrimination, which threatened his commercial interests, denied him a right to a voice in Samoan affairs, and deprived him of his whisky. His family home at Tuaeifu, with its fine private library, lavish entertainments and open-hearted hospitality, rivalled Vailima as a social and cultural centre for all sections of the community. Yet the official stereotype of the 'half-caste' as 'the dregs of civilisation' made it impossible for him to achieve the social and political standing to which he aspired (Boyd, 1969:147).

Prior to establishing a civilian government in Samoa, a New Zealand delegation headed by Sir James Allen (minister of external affairs) spent six days in Samoa in March 1920 to gather information. During this visit, a citizens' committee headed by Nelson presented a list of grievances similar to those of 1910; these were in respect to government extravagance, the restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, the stifling of European political representation and the imposition of prohibition laws. By 1922, the relationship between the Europeans and the administration was further strained by a speech delivered by Colonel Tate at a *Fono* meeting called to discuss the Samoa Act. He deliberately singled out the European sector of the community as exploiters of the natives and accused them of creating agitation against the government while doing nothing positive for Samoa. He advised the high chiefs to choose sides between the Europeans and the administration. It appears that Tate recognized the inherent danger of allowing the native and European segments of Samoan society to display jointly their antagonism toward New Zealand control. With this possibility in mind, Tate executed the design and passage of the Samoan Offenders Ordinance Act of 1922, which among other stipulations, gave the administrator authority to banish and deprive *matai* of their titles. The provisions of this act proved indispensable to the administrator who did not have a naval or military force or even a sizeable police force at his disposal.

Tate's policy was characteristically conservative, and "he hoped that the Samoans would remember him as the man who commenced their

development and said to them 'always go slow; do not go too fast'" (Boyd, 1969:131). This policy was radically reversed in March of 1923 when Tate was replaced by Major-General George Spafford Richardson. Immediately Richardson embarked on a vigorous policy of planned change to fit in with the Mandate philosophy. The thrust of his policy was to promote the welfare of the native race through improvements in health and educational services and also the economy. But in order to achieve these goals major changes in the traditional Samoan socio-political structure were necessary.

Richardson's relationship with the Europeans in Apia steadily worsened. He locked horns with Nelson, Williams and Westbrook continually in the Legislative Council, and consequently turned more and more to the government in New Zealand for the passage of laws required for his socio-economic reform policy. He never wavered from the philosophy that the Mandate was "a sacred trust." He thought that his primary duty was to protect the interests and promote the welfare of the native indigenous Samoans, and that the Europeans in Samoa and their interests must be sacrificed to that end. (This point of view flows through most of Richardson's private correspondence. Consult, for example, NZNA IT 1/33/1 letters dated 9 March 1925, 27 December 1926, 26 July 1927, 29 July 1927, and file IT 1/79/78, letter dated 23 September 1926.)

1. *Chronology of the Mau Movement*

In February of 1926, Nelson left for Australia on a health trip. While in Sydney he was kept informed of local affairs by Westbrook and Williams, the other two elected members of the Legislative Council.

Their reports indicated that trouble was brewing so Nelson decided to return to Samoa via Wellington with the hope of obtaining an interview with Prime Minister Coates in order to discuss some of the more pressing issues. Accordingly on 1 September 1926 Nelson conferred with Prime Minister Coates, W. Nosworthy the minister for external affairs and Sir Maui Pomare the Minister for the Cook Islands. Nelson was seeking support for a ministerial visit to review conditions in Samoa and examine further the grievances Nelson placed before the ministers. This was agreed upon, but only because the minister for external affairs had already discussed with Richardson a similar trip (Boyd, 1969:147; Davidson, 1967:116).

After Nelson returned to Samoa at the end of September, a private meeting was held on 25 September 1926 at the house of S.D. Meredith, a part-Samoan trader, that was attended by both the European members of the Legislative Council and by various high ranking Samoans including Afomasaga Lagolago, Faumuina, Tofaeono, Malietoa and Tuimaleali'ifano. This meeting was called to prepare issues for presentation to the minister on his pending visit of enquiry. They decided to hold a public meeting at the Market Hall, Apia on 15 October. Although Richardson was not given direct notice of this meeting there was no attempt at concealing it. In fact it was necessary to publicize the meeting widely and this was done by publishing notices of it in English in the local newspaper and by posting notices at Meredith's movie theatre in the Samoan language.

This first public meeting was a historic event, as it reflected a cooperative effort by various groups who saw themselves as linked by common residence and social ties of both kin and extra-kin nature. Nelson chaired the meeting and although the administration considered him European this label seemed arbitrary and insignificant to the Samoans themselves. Nelson experienced no difficulty in organizing and working with the Samoan *matai* who had come to him about participating in the meeting. In fact, the vast majority at the meeting were Samoan though others in the gathering included leading Europeans amongst them the chief judge. Total attendance was estimated at 250 to 300 persons. The meeting accomplished a great deal. Reports had been prepared by the Europeans on subjects relating to the legislative council, finance, labour, agriculture and prohibition, and by the Samoans on the subjects pertaining to native affairs. These were presented and approved. It was the intention to present these reports to the minister on his visit, but the cancellation of this visit was announced during the meeting. Apparently, Richardson was most displeased that it would appear as if Nelson was instrumental in bringing the minister to Samoa, and so to display administrative and social precedence, Richardson had contrived the postponement of Nosworthy's visit. In fact, he actually announced the cancellation before notifying Nosworthy (Davidson, 1967:117). On receipt of this news at the meeting, the members elected another citizens' committee. The membership of this committee was radically different from previous committees. The members consisted not only of the three elected members of the

Legislative Council but also A.G. Smyth, S.H. Meredith, A.R. Cobroft, K. Meyer and E.W. Gurr as well as six high ranking Samoan chiefs including Lagolago, Ainuu, Faumuina, Tuisita, Alipia and Tofaeono. This public meeting, attended jointly by Samoans and Europeans, represents the birth of the *Mau* movement, as it later would be named.<sup>4</sup>

The *Samoa Times*, the government supported newspaper, ignored the activities of the committee and refused to publish accounts of their operations. However, *fa'a Samoa* methods of spreading the news were more successful. Immediately following the meeting the "coconut wireless" began spreading the news of the October meeting to outlying areas of Upolu. Afamasaga Lagolago began contacting various *matai* including those visiting the Apia area so that they could carry the news back to their villages. These visiting *matai* thus disseminated the content of the meeting, the grievances being discussed and the action proposed by the committee. The efficiency of transmitting information via traditional Samoan social networks was remarkable. Richardson was caught off guard while on *malaga* (ceremonial tour around the island). Various *Matai* asked him critical questions concerning the public debt. Furthermore, a letter of criticism written by Westbrook to the *Auckland Star*, was circulated through the villages and ended up in the hands of Richardson, and *tulafale* openly voiced the complaints of the committee at *fono* attended by the administrator. It took only a few weeks for agitation to become extremely vigorous in the Apia area where it was still centred. Through the weeks of 15 October to 12 November the citizens' committee assembled regularly.

Policy making increasingly focused on Samoan concerns and a number of Europeans began to withdraw their support. In particular, Cobroft and Meyers as representatives of the Planters' Association decided not to participate in any assembly concerning native affairs. These views were transmitted to the committee at a meeting 26 October 1926. On 12 November 1926, a second public meeting was held, also chaired by Nelson. At this meeting the attendance swelled to over 400 persons, 75 percent of whom were indigenous Samoans (Gill, 1949:80). Before the meeting could get underway, the crown solicitor read a letter from Richardson warning the Europeans present to cease their interference in native affairs. This warning completely disrupted the meeting. Many of the Europeans chose to withdraw permanently, among them Cobroft and Meyers. Once those who wished to had left, the meeting resumed apparently undaunted by the communique from the administrator. Those in attendance proceeded to organize and plan strategy, specifically the submission of reports from various sub-committees and alternate plans for the dispatch of these reports to the minister in New Zealand. The Samoan attendance at the November meeting was derived from the entire island of Upolu not just the Apia area. To accommodate this wider appeal the executive structure of the committee was revised and expanded on 12 November 1926. The form adopted was a specifically indigenous Samoan sub-committee called the *Komiti fa'atonu*. The Samoan response to this new *fa'atonu* was positive and enthusiastic. Many *matai* moved into the Apia area in order to join the organization and the representation widened to include more geographical segments of

the island. The method of personnel recruitment was typical of traditional Samoan political organizations in that each district selected its own representative and sent him to Apia. This seemingly random growth of the movement was difficult for Europeans to appreciate:

[it] just grew up, each district sending a man to Apia with credentials, to say that he was their representative (AJHR 1928A-4B:219).

The *fa'atomu* was now meeting regularly and as its administrative duties increased so did its structure become more specialized. Mata'utia Karauna was selected as the first permanent salaried secretary with an office at Nelson's headquarters in Apia. His duties were varied: dealing with a flood of correspondence, keeping the accounting records, noting the flow of contributions and assisting in the drafting of papers. According to Gill (1949:82), "By the end of 1926 the sub-committee was flourishing." Although the Samoan meetings were now held separately from those of the citizens' committee, a close liaison between the two was developed and maintained through Nelson whose residence 'Tuaefu' was the location for many of the native meetings. He also personally attended and addressed the Samoan audience on many occasions. While Nelson was so engaged, Afamasaga Lagolago prepared and as of 12 November 1926 circulated a pamphlet in the Samoan language outlining the events of the two meetings, and requesting contributions to assist the financing of the proposed trip to Wellington by Samoan and local European delegates bearing reports to the minister for external affairs. This pamphlet, edited by Nelson, was disseminated throughout Upolu by two means. The *matai*

delegates utilized their traditional socio-political *au'aiga* and village networks, and Nelson volunteered his trading stations as distribution centres.

By the end of 1926, the *Komiti* was preparing to carry the pamphlet to the island of Savai'i. Nelson, it will be recalled was originally from that island and his father's business was first established there in the village of Safune. He therefore had a long-standing network of contacts, both kin and commercial-based, which could be utilized for circulating news of the movement. The high chiefs Ainuu, Faumuina and Matu'utia were entrusted with the delivery of the pamphlet to Savai'i but Richardson ordered the Samoan delegates to remain in their villages for three months. Furthermore, Richardson suspended Tofaeono from his position as a native official along with others suspected of being *Mau* supporters. Richardson then refused to issue passports to the six Samoan delegates, thus ensuring their exclusion from the proposed mission to New Zealand.

The citizens' committee and *fa'atomu* decided not to press the point, but agreed to send S.H. Meredith to present their grievances to the minister. Meredith departed for New Zealand where he approached both the prime minister and the minister for external affairs, and published a pamphlet entitled: *Western Samoa--How New Zealand Administers its Mandate from the League of Nations*. Despite these accomplishments, he returned to Samoa in March of 1927 feeling that he had not been successful (Gill, 1949:83).

By January 1927, a strategy of passive resistance and non-cooperation developed in several areas of Upolu. Village civic regulations governing cleanliness in and around the village compound, maintenance of public facilities and the production of agricultural commodities were being ignored. Taxes went unpaid. The administrator on *malaga* was snubbed by the village *matai* who encouraged their people to ignore him when he arrived in the village. The *Faipule* reported during this time that it was impossible to function in areas such as Faleapuna District because of *Mau* activities and influence. On 12 January 1927, Richardson ordered the Samoan delegates into his office and commanded Lagolago, Tofaeono and Ainuu to stop their anti-government agitation on threat of banishment from Apia. High chiefs Anae, Tusila and Alipia were sent home to their villages for three months. These actions had little effect on the movement because they were defied and Richardson had no power at his disposal to enforce his decisions.

The work of the citizens' committee and the *fa'atomu* multiplied. At Nelson's residence, 'Tuaefu,' meetings were being held daily with Nelson chairing most of them. The number of Samoans in attendance varied, but meetings of 200 persons from various districts in Upolu was not unusual (Gill, 1949:83).

The main task set by Nelson and his Samoan delegates was the formulation of a petition to be submitted to the New Zealand Parliament. This petition was subsequently circulated throughout the districts, again by employing Nelson's trading agents. By the time that

the petition was completed and submitted to New Zealand in March of 1927, initial reports from the resident commissioner on Savai'i confirmed *Mau* activity on that island, and implicated some of Nelson's traders. This development signifies the establishment of the *Mau* as a Pan-Western Samoan movement.

The months between March and the ministerial visit in June of 1927 were marked by a continual growth in *Mau* membership, the expansion of the geographical area of support and the clarification of policies. On the administrative level, Nelson and his delegates asserted their right to protest, "any matter affecting laws, government or constitution of the territory which may be considered prejudicial to the welfare and best interests of the people" (AJHR 1928A-4B:467). Furthermore, to counteract the propaganda machinery of the administration, the *Mau* set up their own weekly newspaper, the 'Samoa Guardian,' largely financed by Nelson and edited by E.W. Gurr. The first issue was published on 26 May 1927. A supplement printed in Samoan was distributed with it. The content of both was extremely critical of the administration. Tension increased as the three elected members of the Legislative Council, namely Nelson, Williams and Westbrook, who were also delegates on the citizens' committee openly broke with the appointed members on every issue, affording no opportunity for cooperation or compromise (Gill, 1949:84).

Meanwhile at the village level, the program of passive non-cooperation became more effective as Samoan membership grew. By now, shifts in allegiance from the administration to the *Mau* became common

occurrence. The inherent elasticity of the *au'aiga* political networks allowed specifically for support to move from one high ranking *matai* to another. The principle of option in descent group affiliation expressly permits this mobility in political support. It is therefore theoretically possible for a high ranking *matai* to become so unpopular that despite his rank and ceremonial precedence, his political support can seemingly evaporate. During the *Mau* this is what happened to those high ranking *matai* who chose to remain loyal to the administration. Malietoa Tanumafili, Tuatagaloa and Mata'afa Salanoa Muliufi were three such *matai* who thereby lost most of their popular support and suffered inestimable loss of prestige as a consequence. At the district level, this transference of political support meant that the *Faipule's* authority was being successfully challenged. Governmental regulations were ignored and government institutions were boycotted.

The *Mau* now adopted a distinctive symbol, worn enthusiastically and publicly. At first this was a simple blue or purple badge, but soon an elaborate uniform consisting of a blue turban, white shirt and a blue lava-lava banded in white came into use. Unfortunately there is no mention in the available literature as to the significance or origins of these items of dress.

On 2 June 1927, in the midst of this turbulence, the minister for external affairs arrived. His visit was a fiasco. Apparently Nosworthy had decided to be prejudicially disposed against any opposition statements. He spent the first nine days of his visit

with Richardson as a guest at *Vailima* (Government house), and only two days before his departure on 11 June did he deign to meet with Nelson and a deputation of the citizens' committee and the *fa'atomu*. This meeting degenerated to an exchange of insults in which the minister flagrantly taunted Nelson with racist comments (AJHR 1927A-48:21-32). Two days later the minister announced the amendment of the Samoan Immigration Order which would permit the administration to deport from Samoa, British subjects and Samoan born Europeans. Nelson had worked for years to obtain British naturalization status, as he had always felt discriminated against commercially as a Samoan of Swedish nationality. It seems ironic that his status as a British subject finally realized by him in 1924 would be the instrument of his later deportation from his homeland.

Nosworthy left Samoa 14 June 1927, having incurred with relative ease the total disaffection of most Samoans and Europeans. These shortcomings no doubt account for the manner in which other scholars have described him:

Mr. Nosworthy failed to emerge at all creditably from the episode. He proved prejudiced and intolerant, and little endowed with leadership (Gill, 1949:85).

While the minister was in Samoa, the *Mau* took the opportunity to display its strength and unity. While the administrator staged a government sponsored celebration of the King's birthday on 3 June, the *Mau* counter-staged if not up-staged this with their own sports event. During the conference between Nosworthy and the *Mau*, Faumuina was leading a procession of uniformed *Mau* supporters within earshot.

The amendment of the Samoan Immigration Act and the official backing that it provided, reinforced Richardson's antagonism toward the *Mau* and marked a new stage in government policy. Richardson now adopted a series of offensive manoeuvres. Using the Samoan Offenders Ordinance, Richardson embarked on a course of title deprivation and banishment on a scale unheard of before in Samoa. First Faumuina and Lagolago were banished to Apolima after they refused to disband the *Mau*. Then, over fifty *matai* were deprived of their titles and were banished from Apia. Prior to this, the Ordinance of 1922 had only been invoked on ten occasions for political purposes (AJHR 1928A-4B477-478). As a strategy, it was remarkably unsuccessful. Since the administrator was not the source of authority for *matai* titles (the *au'aiga* was), it was impossible for him to remove them without the approval of the *au'aiga*. The Samoan people ignored his title removals and continued to honour their *matai* in traditional ways. The *matai* refused to leave Apia upon order of banishment and little could be done to enforce the administrator's orders. The only real effect of this strategy was that it presented an opportunity to the *Mau* and to the Samoan people to challenge and flaunt their disregard for the authority of the administrator.

By July 1927, the movement had reached "national" stature. It was well organized and had developed a form based on traditional *fono* structure and manpower mobilization that made it mirror the government's system of district councils. Within weeks of Nosworthy's departure, the *Mau* had effectively crippled New Zealand's ability to administer.

The *Faipule* were helpless to restore or maintain order. Registration of births and deaths ceased, village surrounds were left uncleaned, and commercial activities slowed leaving the coconuts rotting on the ground. In some areas where the *Mau* was strongest, the *Mau* set up their own alternative form of government passing laws and collecting taxes for *Mau* funding.

On 1 July 1927, Nelson left for New Zealand with Smyth where they intended to assist in the presentation of the Samoan petition to the New Zealand Parliament. While the joint committee of the two houses of Parliament headed by Sir James Allen was interviewing Nelson, a royal commission was announced for the investigation of the *Mau* and the joint committee was temporarily disbanded. Unknown to Nelson, the joint committee was a source of embarrassment to the New Zealand government. As reported by Governor Bryan of American Samoa in a series of memoranda to the secretary of the United States Navy on the subject of 'Unrest in Western Samoa,' it was a matter of common knowledge in diplomatic circles that New Zealand had, through inexperience and lack of expertise in colonial administration contradicted a basic principle of British colonial practise by allowing Nelson to petition the New Zealand Parliament directly.

Acting swiftly, the Skerrett Royal Commission set its terms of reference and the members departed for Samoa 10 September 1927. These terms of reference were so limited that most of the grievances of the *Mau* were disallowed as matters of administrative policy and therefore beyond the scope of the investigation. The commission sat

for twenty-three days beginning 24 September 1927, hearing 155 witnesses, and tabled its findings 29 November 1927. Not too surprisingly considering its terms of reference, it completely vindicated New Zealand's stand and suggested punitive measures be directed toward Nelson and the other Europeans involved in the *Mau*. The publication of this report lent support to Richardson's toughening policy and he launched another offensive against the European members of the *Mau*. Nelson and Gurr were deported to New Zealand for five years and Smyth for two. Westbrook, Williams and Meredith were publicly admonished. Another after effect of the Skerrett Report was its use as a propaganda tool for the New Zealand government in their dealings with the League of Nations in Geneva. Later the prime minister wrote to the secretary general of the League of Nations:

As you are aware, in Sept. last His Majesty's Government in New Zealand appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into certain complaints made against the Samoan Administration, and copies of the report have been forwarded to you. There appears to be no complaint included in the petition that was not fully dealt with by the Royal Commission. . . . In view of the report of the Samoan Royal Commission, and considering both the written reports and verbal accounts of the position in Samoa that have been received by the Government from Sir George Richardson both before and since the date of the sittings of the Royal Commission, the Government have no hesitation in asserting that the administration of Western Samoa has been carried out entirely in the interests of the indigenous population and in accordance with the spirit and terms of the Mandate. (Coates, 1928).

In accordance with his deportation orders, Nelson left for New Zealand in January of 1928, thereby opening up a new era of Samoan control in the movement. If the administration expected that Nelson's

removal would end the *Mau* then they were to be proven wrong. Indeed the Samoan opposition became more radical and aggressive. *Mau* police were established in January 1928 and by the end of that month they had already gained a reputation for unruliness, rowdyism and physical intimidation. Through their picketing, a boycott of all European stores in Apia (including Nelson's) was enforced.

Richardson now was becoming seriously alarmed at the disintegration of social order. He called for assistance from New Zealand, and on 21 February 1928 two cruisers were assigned to duty in Samoa. Meanwhile, the Legislative Council passed an ordinance forbidding *fono* and *malaga* as well as the collection of funds and the wearing of *Mau* uniforms. These regulations were totally ignored by the *Mau*, and as a consequence sailors and marines from the two cruisers *Diomedé* and *Dunedin* landed and arrested approximately 400 *Mau* police. They were tried and sentenced to six months imprisonment. In typical Samoan fashion, this event was seized upon as an opportunity to mock the administrator's authority:

But the *Mau* reduced his [Richardson] efforts to ridicule. Hundreds more members asked to be arrested and had to be refused, since the government could not handle the numbers. When he met the detainees and offered to pardon them, if they would place their complaints before him, they insisted on being dealt with by the Court, before which they declined to plead, in order to demonstrate their rejection of its jurisdiction (Davidson, 1967:132).

Another observer of the same event describes the Samoan response with humour:

Royal Marines from the cruisers arrested four hundred of the pickets, and under the emergency regulations all were sentenced to six months imprisonment. Too numerous for the local gaol, the four hundred had rather a hilarious time. They were quartered on Mulinu'u Point, and fed at Government expense. Their days were spent in swimming, fishing, playing cards, and light-hearted conversation. At night, half or more waded across the shallows and re-joined their families. By dawn, they returned voluntarily in such numbers that perhaps six hundred would line up for the rations. After seven days they won, and all were discharged (McKay, 1968:52).

One result of Nelson's banishment was to transfer *Mau* leadership to Samoans who before had preferred to play less conspicuous roles. A leader of considerable merit who emerged at this time was Tupua Tamasese Lealofi, a *tama'aiga* from one of Samoa's leading families. Tamasese had locked horns with the administrator on prior occasions. Richardson had ordered him in 1924 to remove a hibiscus hedge from property which Tamasese claimed to be his. When Tamasese refused, Richardson deprived him of his title and banished him from his village (Vaimoso). When Tamasese left his place of banishment to inquire as to the length of his sentence, he was arrested, tried and imprisoned. This was considered an inexcusable travesty of ceremonial respect by the Samoans. Many Samoan *Mau* members later expressed their belief that Richardson's action toward Tamasese had precipitated the *Mau* (Davidson, 1967:125). In the absence of Nelson, Tamasese assumed a prominent role. On the one hand he was described as possessing temperate wisdom and self-discipline through his discouragement of those political strategies which held no long term benefit to the Samoan people. Due to his persuasion children returned to school and copra

processing was resumed. But, on the other hand, it was also Tamasese who now conceived of and adhered to the idea of self-rule. This concept of independence, emerging as a central objective of the *Mau* evolved largely out of the Samoans' exposure to questioning at the royal commission (Davidson, 1967:132). At that time, Tamasese first articulated it as a *Mau* goal. When Richardson approached those Samoans whom the marines had arrested and offered them pardon, it was Tamasese who adamantly refused any compromise other than the total withdrawal of New Zealand from Samoa. The deportation of Nelson, therefore, marked also a notable shift in goals toward those specifically native Samoans. Following the banishment of Nelson and the publication of the royal commission Skerrett report on 9 December 1927, a shuffling of personnel occurred within the movement. In addition to Tamasese, Tuimaleali'ifano, a respected *tama'aiga* and one of the two *Fautua* joined the movement. He was promptly dismissed as *Fautua* and replaced by Mata'afa Salanoa, a firm supporter of Richardson. There were defections, as well. Lagolago, who had played such an instrumental role in the early shaping of the movement, now resigned from the movement when the Permanent Mandates Commission acknowledged their full support of official New Zealand policy.

In April 1928, Sir George S. Richardson, having completed his term of office, departed from Samoa leaving a wake of turmoil and unrest. A parade of 400 *Mau* police interfered with his planned embarkment in Apia Harbour, and he was forced to leave from Mulinu'u Point. Replacing him as administrator was another military figure, Colonel Stephen

Shepherd Allen, a quiet introspective scholar whose keen intellect failed to conceal a frank condescension and contempt for the native Samoans (Allen, 1931:25-29). He commenced a program of firm police control during which police broke into the house (*fale*) of Tamasese and arrested him. In November 1928, Tamasese was sent to jail in New Zealand.

Throughout the period of Nelson's exile in New Zealand, the opposition continued on two fronts. In Samoa, the headquarters were located in Vaimoso village close to Apia, where the *Mau* organization was operating with great efficiency. It had absorbed many of the functions of the administrative offices thus forming an alternative government structure and one with considerable popular support. The *Mau* passed laws, imposed fines and supervised its regulations in the villages. Its relations with the administration were non-existent and passive non-cooperation continued.

Meanwhile in New Zealand, Nelson and Gurr continued an active campaign to bring the Samoan problem to the attention of New Zealanders, if not the entire English speaking world. Nelson even travelled to Geneva to represent the *Mau*, but the Permanent Mandates Commission would not acknowledge him or allow him to appear. He then initiated a tireless program of public criticism aimed against the New Zealand government. In May 1929, the *New Zealand Samoan Guardian* published its first edition with E.W. Gurr as editor and the New Zealand Samoan Defence League was formed as a supporting organization. These activities were supplemented by an open wooing of the New Zealand Labour

Party which had historically maintained a consistently sympathetic attitude toward the anti-administration voices in Samoa.

The Verschaffelt-Park-Berendsen report on the civil service in Samoa was released in New Zealand in 1929 and caused quite a stir. It was harshly critical of government extravagance and inefficiency in Samoa and its conclusions supported many of the fundamental charges of the *Mau*. As a consequence it was a source of grave embarrassment to the New Zealand government, both at home and abroad where in Geneva members of the Permanent Mandates Commission were shocked by the inconsistencies between this report and the Skerrett Royal Commission Report, and New Zealand was subjected to prolonged critical questioning by the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The 1929 report recommended that New Zealand sharply cut back its expenditures and increase its control over the authority and policy formation powers of the administrator. After the publication of this document certain changes were implemented which can only be attributed to the effect of the report. The *Fono of Faipule* was suspended, as were the district councils. Personal income tax was eliminated, the police force was reduced in size and the Legislative Council was restructured to comprise two elected European members and an additional two nominated Samoan members. The first two nominated Samoan members were, however, Malietoa and Mata'afa. Given their intimate connection with the administration, the promulgated reforms were not treated seriously by the *Mau*. In fact, the *Mau* still considered the nominated members no more than paid government officials (Keesing, 1934:176). After the

dismantling of those political structures which Richardson had designed within the Native Regulations (Samoa) Order of 1925, local government was conducted through New Zealand district officers. The fact that these officers were drafted from the ranks of the police, likely made them, next to the administrator, the most unpopular persons in all of Samoa. This meant that the *Mau* did not consider these moves advances of great magnitude. The *Mau* activities therefore continued unabated. By June 1929 Tamasese had been released from jail and was back home in Samoa. In November of the same year, Faumuina and Tuimaleali'ifano visited Nelson in New Zealand. Each of these occasions was the scene of gatherings, celebrations and marches.

On December 28, 1929 groups of *Mau* supporters in Apia assembled to welcome Smyth back from two years of exile. The *Mau* had obtained specific police permission for the assembly which congregated shortly before dawn and moved en masse to the central office. Here the police moved in and attempted to arrest several Samoans, among them Mata'utia Karauna, the *Mau* secretary. These arrests were resisted by the unarmed Samoan group of approximately 300 men, who now reached the stones piled alongside the roadway as police drew their weapons. While Tamasese raised his hands exhorting his supporters to refrain from violence he and ten other high ranking Samoans were shot and killed by the police. One New Zealand policeman was also killed by the Samoans. Thirty Samoans were wounded, among them Faumuina and Tuimaleali'ifano, the latter a *matai* of over eighty years of age. This day came to be known as "Black Saturday" and Tamasese became martyr

to the *Mau* cause. A full description of the events of the day is found in the January 4, 1930 issue of the *Samoa Guardian*:

With bands playing two processions moved along the Parade--one headed by the High Chief Tuimalealiifano from the Western end, the other from the Eastern end. The two parties were to meet opposite the old Bismarck Wharf and there combine.

The procession from the West had reached a point near the Government Buildings when several European policemen walked alongside the *Mau* people nearly opposite the store of P. Fabricius Ltd. The crowd from the Eastern end had just reached the Vaisgano Bridge. The bands were playing and the flags of the *Mau* organisation were flying.

Suddenly the head of the procession near the Fabricius' store was broken into by the police who attempted to arrest two of the Samoans in the ranks of the band.

A general mix-up appears to have followed, revolver shots were fired into the crowd, the rattle of automatic gun fire were heard, and in a few minutes dead and dying lay on the ground.

It was discovered later that a policeman named Abraham was killed and High Chiefs Tamasese and Tuimalealiifano, with many others of the *Mau* people, were badly wounded. Two of the *Mau* died almost immediately.

The chiefs were taken to the hospital, Tamasese dying the following morning.

The actual shooting did not last longer than a few minutes, but for some little time afterwards excited people thronged the streets in the vicinity of the Parade from the Government Buildings to as far as the Mulivai Bridge.

Due to calm control of High Chief Faumuina and others who assisted him the *Mau* ranks were re-formed and the procession moved off quietly towards the wharf, there to await the arrival of Mr. Smyth, who was accompanied by Mr. Hall Skelton, Barrister, of Auckland.

Following the procession at a distance of a few hundred yards was a party of twenty-five fully armed European police. They had bayonets fixed, and one member of the party carried a Lewis gun. They moved to a point near the Town Clock, but returned in about twenty minutes time to the police station.

Within an hour the Mau had gone on its way to Vaimoso and the town had outwardly resumed its usual quiet aspect--but residents experienced a feeling of horror at the tragic happenings of what is now referred to as "Black Saturday."

This tragedy was in fact, the turning point of the movement. The *Mau* members took to the bush after the events of 28 December 1929. Measures taken to flush them out proved highly unsuccessful. Finally, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, J.G. Cobbe, was sent to Samoa to reach some sort of accommodation between the two sides. An amnesty was called so that *Mau* leaders could meet and consult with the government officials, even though the New Zealand administrator Colonel Allen was personally opposed to this concession. Colonel Allen further insisted on three conditions. First, that the *Mau* leaders should unconditionally surrender to the police. Second, that the *Mau* should meet with the administration and the pro-government Samoan faction. Third, that the *Mau* should disband. The latter two stipulations were unacceptable to the *Mau* and they refused to comply, but the *Mau* leaders did agree to surrender themselves and their followers to the authorities.

After 1930, the *Mau* lost much of the vitality which characterized its activities prior to "Black Saturday" even though the organizational structure was retained and members continued their allegiance. After

"Black Saturday" the policy of Colonel Allen became more repressive and militaristic. On 13 January 1930 the *Mau* was declared a seditious organization and following this, a series of arrests and police harrassments effectively curbed the active mobilization of *Mau* members. The *Mau* leaders were particular targets of police control. Several months after Tuimaleali'ifano was shot in the arm 28 December 1929, he was charged with supporting the activities of a seditious organization, convicted and fined three pounds (Tattersall, 1930). Only a few weeks later the eighty-five year old High Chief was sentenced to three months of hard labour in Vaimea jail for wearing a *Mau* lava lava in his own *fale* (Westbrook, 1930).

The Samoan strategy adopted in the face of these government repressions was highly unusual. There existed in traditional Samoan society a womens' group known as *faletua ma tausii* composed of wives of *ali'i* (*faletua*) and the wives of the *tulafale* (*tausii*). These were the organized groups to which earlier reference has been made in connection with public health projects in the village. Now this same organizational structure carried on the spirit of the *Mau* by forming a *Womens' Mau* and by mobilizing large numbers of women to demonstrate in Apia in support of the *Mau* men. Its composition, membership strength and goals were unknown to the administration, but . . .

In fact, the Women's Mau was a movement which embraced all the activities which, for the men, had been proclaimed illegal, and claimed to represent about four-fifths of the female population. It was formed by the wives and daughters of the Mau leaders, notably the two daughters of H.J. Moors, Mrs. Nelson and Mrs. Muench, one of Nelson's daughters, and the wives

of the late Tamasese, Tuimaleali'ifano, and Faumuina. It was essentially a protest movement against the terrors of night raids by the marines and police in the villages, and the harrying and dispersal of the Mau by force (Boyd, 1969:167).

The *Womens' Mau* convened for the first time at Vaimoso on 11 March 1930, and thereafter held processions on a monthly basis. Westbrook wrote to Nelson in New Zealand on 29 December 1930:

Yesterday . . . I witnessed a wonderful sight. It was a long procession of probably nearly 1500 women, all dressed in mourning, and carrying wreaths of flowers and floral offerings, for the purpose of holding a ceremonial service at the tomb of the deceased High Chief [Tamasese], decorating his grave and the graves of the other Samoans who were slain on the 28 December twelve months ago (Westbrook quoted in Gifford, 1964:79).

Despite these displays of support for the movement, the effect of the *Womens' Mau* on the political aspect of the movement is uncertain (Boyd, 1969:167).

The decline in political activity is also reflected in the statistics for arrests after 1930. Although these statistics could theoretically reflect a more lenient attitude endorsed by the New Zealand authorities, the highly aggressive policy adopted during this period makes this unlikely. Rather, it seems that the *Mau* members were less involved in anti-government activities:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Arrests for Political Activities</u>
1929-1930	422
1930-1931	313
1931-1932	52
1932-1933	8

(Fraser, 1951:33 in Gifford, 1964:78)

A more substantial resolution resulted from the New Zealand election returns of 1935, in which the Labour Party victory completely reversed the policy in effect toward Samoa. After a preliminary fact-finding "goodwill mission" to Samoa, the new government dismissed the charge of sedition against the *Mau* and allowed the *Mau* to contest the *Faipule* elections of 1936. After this election, thirty-three of the new *Faipule* were *Mau* members. In the same year, Mr. Olaf Frederick Nelson was brought back from exile at government expense and Samoan representation on all levels of departmental administration was increased.

All of the foregoing events were but the initiating impulses along a path leading ultimately to independence in 1962, an independence conceived by Tamasese during the early formative years of the movement. Although Nelson would not live to see independence, his daughter Irene married Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole in 1934 (the younger brother of Tamasese Lealofi) who would become with Malietoa joint chief of state of Western Samoa in 1962. It is also to be noted that their son Tupuola Efi is the current Prime Minister of Western Samoa. Furthermore, the first prime minister of the independent state of Western Samoa in 1962 was the son of Fiamē Faumuina Mulinu'u, (later known as Mata'afa), president of the *Mau*.

B. *The Movement in American Samoa*

In contrast to the well-defined sequence of political events in Western Samoa from 1926 to 1930, the chronology of the movement in American Samoa links together several quite separate events in somewhat tenuous association. Although they have been termed *Mau* activities, since the first political movement in American Samoa preceded the movement in Western Samoa by six years, it is likely that the term *Mau* was only applied retroactively to events in the former area, (and this seems to confirm the characteristic amorphism of the American movement).

On 19 June 1919, Commander W.J. Terhune assumed the post of governor of American Samoa. Samoan discontent was aroused in November 1919 by an extremely unpopular order which he issued controlling marriage between Samoan women and American navy personnel. The American governor was distressed over the number of "marriages" contracted by navy men who already had wives and perhaps children in the United States. Although the Germans and the New Zealanders tended to overlook similar arrangements, Governor Terhune attacked them energetically. Soon after his November proclamation he denied permission to one of his officers to marry a Samoan woman on grounds that he already had an American wife and children. This caused a minor uproar among the Samoans who complained that this policy was degrading and discriminatory (Iosofo Tufele in Olsen, 1976:81-82). From their perspective, these "marriages" conferred economic advantage to other members of the Samoan

woman's 'aiga; therefore the prohibition of such unions eliminated one of the possible sources of American goods and cash. A thirty year resident of American Samoa stated:

Lots of the Navy people marry them [Samoan girls] and live with the wives here and go back again [to the United States] . . . This thing is happening all the time, these illegal children. I blame the Samoan chief's [sic] for that, too, for what is going on. I don't blame the Navy for that altogether, ---to allow this to continue and let the sailors in the house and everything. They [the chiefs] know it is going on,--but the people are poor and they want to get a plug of tobacco,---and they do anything for it (Stephney, 1930:275).

From this, one could assume that the Samoan discontent over the prohibition of such unions had a material as well as emotional base.

Another issue brewing was the growing antagonism between High Chief Mauga, governor of the Eastern District and Secretary of Native Affairs A.M. Noble. Mauga accused Noble and his assistant Luther W. Cartwright of alleged incompetence and misappropriation of Island funds.

Both of these issues were raised between February and November of 1920 and resulted in a serious Samoan economic boycott. In the three month period April to June 1920, copra processing ceased entirely, and copra was the only cash crop on the island.

1. *Stage One of the Movement: May to November 1920*

On 3 May 1920, Lieutenant Commander Creed S. Boucher arrived in Pago Pago to take up his duties as Governor Terhune's second in command. With a most remarkable disregard for military convention, Boucher quickly aligned himself politically with the native Samoan dissenters.

The one published account of these events implicates Boucher as an insubordinate junior officer promoting self-interest above duty (Gray, 1960:198-199). This account, written by a naval officer mirrors the official position as established by the Court of Inquiry in November 1920. Another more critical view of the navy's role during this period expresses more sympathy for the difficult position in which Boucher was placed (Olsen, 1976:43-49). The records permit a fairly detailed reconstruction of the events during the months of May to November, yet fail to address adequately the question of Boucher's motivation. It is not the concern of this thesis to speculate on this.

Before Boucher arrived, High Chiefs Mauuga, Tuitele and Satele were highly suspicious of the financial integrity of Judge Noble and his assistant Cartwright. Early in the year 1920 Nelson Tuitele, nephew to High Chief Tuitele of Leone was employed in the office of the supply officer of the Island government. It is highly probable that he had been "planted" there by the high chiefs, since he was instructed by them to keep his eyes open for any evidence of misappropriation of funds, or any other irregularities. Nelson Tuitele believed that he had proof of such in the form of financial records and receipt stubs demonstrating irregularities in the acquisition of road maintenance equipment. Nelson Tuitele turned these records over to the high chiefs. Much distressed by what they thought to be evidence of fraud and embezzlement of Island funds, the high chiefs approached an attorney visiting Pago Pago named Arthur Greene who had his own

personal reasons for supporting any opposition movement to the navy administration (vide infra:183). Greene knew that these documents had been obtained through irregular channels, but before he returned them to the administration he made pencil notations on the backs of several stubs and photographed the entire collection of papers.

Meanwhile, Boucher was convinced by other evidence he had gathered that Noble and Cartwright were engaged in illegal activities. Both Noble and Cartwright came from North Carolina as did Josephus Daniels, secretary of the navy, to whom Noble was thought to be related and from whom Noble allegedly had received his position as secretary of native affairs. Boucher charged that he had records showing that large sums of money were being transferred to mainland banks in Noble's name and that it was impossible for these sums to be explained by Noble's salary as secretary of native affairs. Accordingly, an anonymous navy memo entitled "The 1920 Discontent and Investigation" states that Boucher:

started circulating charges against the Governor and officers among the natives, posed as a secret service agent, and with Greene conducted a campaign to discredit the Governor and officials and stir up Samoans against them.

These activities occurred during May and June of 1920. On 21 June 1920, Boucher presented an ultimatum to Governor Terhune, demanding that Noble resign and that he Boucher, should be appointed as secretary of native affairs. At this meeting, Boucher presented his papers explicitly charging Noble and Cartwright with conspiracy to embezzle Island funds. The governor refused Boucher's demands, and requested a

meeting the same day at his house so that Judge Noble could be present to hear these charges. When Boucher arrived, he repeated his demands, using "disrespectful language" and supposedly handled a pistol which he had in his hip pocket. On 22 June, Governor Terhune requested Boucher's detachment by letter and on 26 June 1920 he placed Boucher under suspension. Finally on 14 July 1920 a dispatch was received from the navy department ordering Boucher to Receiving Ship, Mare Island. The following day Terhune suspended Boucher for mutinous conduct and falsehood. This greatly upset the Samoan chiefs who had been collaborating closely with Boucher and who depended upon him for support. The chiefs on 26 July 1920 sent a letter to the president of the United States requesting the reinstatement of Boucher and the establishment of a board of investigation to examine the situation in American Samoa. Heightening the complicated nature of the problem was the illness of Governor Terhune. Despite the knowledge that the governor was suffering from some ill-defined type of mental disorder, there was a great reluctance to interfere in his sphere of authority. The day after the chiefs submitted their request to the President, Governor Terhune submitted his own to the secretary of the navy including in it a statement of loyalty signed by several chiefs, although conspicuously absent were the signatures of the highest ranking *matai*. Terhune also asked for the removal and dismissal of Boucher and in addition made a casual request for "a battleship or two, with hydroplanes" (Terhune, 1920). On receipt of this request dated 27 July 1920, the following telegram was sent to Terhune at Tutuila dated 6 August 1920:

Captain Waldon [sic] Evans USN ordered as your relief sailing from San Francisco twenty fourth August.

Even allowing for the possibility that Terhune's request for military weaponry may not have been related to the navy's decision to replace him, it seems pertinent that the one followed directly on the heels of the other. It is also pertinent to consider the effect this order would have on an administrator already suffering from mental instability. It surely must have been interpreted by Terhune as a vote of non-confidence from his superiors.

In fact, this one small piece of history has been ignored by navy historians; i.e., that Governor Evans actually received his commission appointing him governor of American Samoa as of 5 August 1920 from the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, but in a notice dated 12 August 1920. In the light of following events, this fact assumes considerable importance.

During the months of June and July 1920, civic unrest among the Samoan *matai* increased:

Since about June, [1920] numerous chiefs from Tutuila and Manu'a have congregated at Pago Pago, have had numerous assemblies and formed a committee that practically was the start of a Native Government (Hughes, 1920).

On 13 July 1920, High Chiefs and District Governors Mauga and Satele called for a large *fono* of all the *matai* on Tutuila Island to assemble at Pago Pago to oppose the administration's policy. This *fono* did not receive total Samoan support, and those who absented themselves or who voiced pro-government positions were subject to retaliation by the

Mauga-Satele faction. Then on 11 August 1920 Governor Terhune ordered the district governors not to hold *fonos* and to send their people back to processing copra. Terhune also ordered the district governors to sign the original memo from him and to return it as proof that it had been received. Mauga signed his, but ignored the instructions within it. Satele refused to sign it, or return it, or obey the contents. Terhune reacted punitively. In letters sent directly to Satele and Mauga on 16 August 1920, he charged them with misconduct for alleging misappropriation of \$10,000 by the Navy for a road roller and neglect of duty for assembling at Fagatogo on 26 July 1920 (the date of the petition sent to the president of the United States). Mauga was additionally charged with communicating with Boucher while Boucher was under suspension. The two district governors were removed from their positions. The Samoan response was immediate and intense. From Leone in the Western District on 17 August and from Pago Pago in the Eastern District on 18 August came letters of protest from the major high ranking *matai*, pleading for the reinstatement of Mauga and Satele. The letter from Leone stressed how upset the *matai* were at the appointment of Faiivae as one of the new district governors since he was not a high chief as was Leoso, the new district governor of the Eastern District, and this meant dishonour to the entire district. The removal of Mauga and Satele from their posts as district governor did not lessen the opposition, for the two high chiefs continued to hold *fonos* on a daily basis throughout Tutuila. The topic of discussion at these meetings

centred on the news of the governor's imminent removal and plans were being formulated for the ceremonial welcoming rituals for the new governor with a high degree of pleasure (Noble, 1920:1).

Also during August, a consortium of loyal chiefs (headed not too surprisingly by the newly appointed district governors) sent a letter to the secretary of the navy asking for a three month extension of Terhune's term of office so that his removal would not appear to be a vindication of Boucher. This letter from the chiefs may have had its desired effect although the navy's reluctance to remove Terhune may have derived from Terhune's rank within the navy. In any case, totally disregarding Terhune's deteriorating health, the order to Captain Evans to report for duty in Samoa 24 August 1920 was revoked although Evan's commission as governor was still in effect. When Governor Terhune received the telegram informing him of the change in his orders on 31 August 1920, he immediately issued a proclamation announcing this to the people of American Samoa. The proclamation forbidding unauthorized *fonos* was reissued. Demonstrating their indifference to these orders, High Chiefs Mauga, Satele, Letuli, Alo, Fui'maono, Molioo, Leoso and Tuitele called a *fono* at the village of Nu'uuli on 31 August 1920 and by 3 September it was still in progress, much to the distress of the secretary of native affairs:

I deem the present situation the most acute that has arisen in American Samoa since the formation of the Government and one which needs a well defined course of action. In order that no misunderstanding may prevail in the carrying out of the Governor's orders, it is respectfully requested that the Governor forward in writing the policy he wishes to pursue and the course of action he deems necessary to be taken to com-

pel a respect for his orders and the Government of the United States (Noble, 1920).

The governor immediately sent an armed detail of enlisted men and two policemen to Nu'uuli to disband the *fono*, but when the detachment arrived it found no assembly, and only a dozen or so *matai* visiting relatives who very politely inquired why the police were armed (McDonald, 1920:1).

The month of September brought no resolution of the Samoan unrest. *Fonos* continued, copra production was still at an all time low. Governor Terhune's health continued to worsen and morale at the naval base plummeted. Commander Kail, who was the replacement for Boucher, requested detachment from duty in American Samoa and reassignment elsewhere. His sympathies in Samoa were supposedly with the *Mau* leaders, and later he would be reprimanded by the Court of Inquiry investigating Boucher's misconduct. Kail's association with the *Mau* must certainly have been an indirect one, for according to Rear Admiral Hughes:

It is impossible to get any actual evidence against Kail . . . but as it is, the only thing was to detach him from duty at Tutuila and apparently he is pleased to get off so easily (1920).

Luther Cartwright also attempted to tender his resignation on 20 September 1920, but pending the official Court of Inquiry, his resignation was not accepted.

By this time all the high chiefs of American Samoa with the notable exception of Tufele, district governor of Manu'a, were solidly supporting the *Mau* as it later would be called. Commander Kail received

a written set of demands from the *Mau* in September 1920. The first petition of 15 September requested the right both to elect and/or to impeach the judge of the High and District Court and the secretary of native affairs (Judge Noble). One hundred and seventy-eight high ranking *matai* signed this petition. On 18 October 1920 another more detailed list of demands signed by 57 *matai* was submitted to Commander Kail, contents of which are discussed in Chapter VII to follow. The situation at the naval base had deteriorated to the point where Commander Kail was moved to telegraph Naval Operations without the knowledge of Terhune:

To Operations:

When does Kansas [ship carrying Board of Inquiry] arrive, from various conversations with Commander Terhune, his actions in regards to serious matters brought to his attention, and practically ordering me to not inquire or investigate into anything I think should be looked into, leads me to doubt if Commander Terhune is in his right mind, I am taking the responsibility of sending this message without the authority and knowledge of the Governor, request instructions.

Signed: Kail 20 October 1920.

This message was aborted by the officer in charge of the naval radio station, F.C. Nantz who held up the transmission and diverted it instead to Governor Terhune on 20 October 1920. By 29 October, problems with naval personnel surfaced again as Commander Kail complained in writing to Governor Terhune about the insubordinate meddling of Lieutenant Commander Dollard, Senior Medical Officer. Throughout these last days, Terhune seemed paralyzed with indecision, and was unable to cope with the mounting problems at the naval base.

On 3 November 1920, one day before the Court of Inquiry was due to arrive on the USS *Kansas*, Governor Terhune committed suicide in the bathroom of Government House. This was the crisis point in the first stage of the *Mau*. Immediately upon news of Terhune's death, Acting Governor Kail appointed Lieutenants Johnson, Smith and McDonald to a Board investigating the circumstances surrounding Terhune's death. On 4 November, Kail reinstated High Chiefs Mauga and Satele to their former posts as district governor and rescinded the appointments of Leoso and Faiivae.

Upon arrival of the USS *Kansas* on 4 November 1920 Captain Evans quietly assumed the duties of governor to which he had been officially appointed nearly three months previously in August. The stewardship of the Court of Inquiry fell to him as well; this was a monopoly of power which probably would have been totally unacceptable in any civil administration. Nonetheless, the relationship between the new governor and the *Mau* leaders improved. On 8 November 1920, Evans appealed to the Manu'an county chiefs Tui'olosegā and Misa, who were in Pago Pago as *Mau* supporters, to encourage their people to return to Manu'a where the *Mau* movement was not represented. A complete reversal in attitude was now shown by the *Mau* leaders. Having had most of their grievances addressed, the *matai*, in a letter to Governor Evans 15 November 1920 expressed complete delight in his appointment. They offered their loyalty and cooperation and indicated their desire to call on the governor at his convenience. At this point, most of the *Mau* leaders resumed a loyal government position. These

included Mauga and Satele, two of the most influential *matai* in the movement. Any unity which had been achieved among the Samoan leaders during the *Mau* agitation broke down into unabashed self-interest and factionalism. Napoleon Samoa Tuiteleleapaga's account of the high chiefs quitting the movement is a pointed one:

I am going to tell you about the Mau trouble . . . some of the chiefs themselves who were the head of the Mau they turned away and said 'we are in favour of the Navy Government' . . . I asked the chiefs in the movement about it. I went to the chiefs who changed in favor of the Navy Government and asked them 'why did you turn away from the Samoan Mau and in favor of the Navy government?' and some of them said 'Gee, if I don't stick with the Navy government I won't get any job. I mention the names of Mauga, Tuitele and others (1930:181).

Complicating the issue even further, another body of interest which can be called the Ripley-Hannum-Greene faction, became involved in the events of 1920. In brief, these people were concerned over the land claims of the Ripley family who were part-Samoans domiciled in the village of Leone in the Western District. The American roots of this Samoan family extended back to a Mr. E.V. Ripley who came from New York, married a Samoan woman and settled down in Leone in the middle of the nineteenth century. The chief character in the land claims issue was the grandson of the original Ripley patriarch, Mr. Samuel S. Ripley. The latter migrated from Samoa to the United States in 1904, settling in California. He fought in World War I, serving in France. Upon his return from active duty he re-settled in California and married a Californian. The new Mrs. Madge Ripley had at one time been in the employ of Mr. C.S. Hannum, an attorney

in Richmond, California. In Hawai'i, the Ripley family was connected to Mr. Arthur Greene a former lawyer employed as city editor for the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. Mr. Greene was married to the daughter of Gretchen Falke who was a sister of Samuel S. Ripley. This genealogical sketch is sufficient to demonstrate the ties of kin and common interest that bound these people together. For some time this family had been toying with the idea of commercially developing land to which they had claim through their Samoan heritage. Some of this land was in Western Samoa, but the bulk of it was in American Samoa. However, this development was not possible within the existing framework of laws, specifically the Native Lands Ordinance established by Commander Tilley in 1900 which prevented the alienation of native lands and the development of commercial enterprise which might be contrary to the navy's interests in American Samoa. Recognizing that they lacked a legal basis for their claims, the Ripleys and Greenes adopted a strategy of challenging the United States' authority in American Samoa. It was perhaps inevitable that this would happen sooner or later since the United States Congress failed to ratify the cessions of 1900 and 1904, thereby making the constitutional basis of United States authority in American Samoa vulnerable to legal challenge. The legal controversy began in March of 1920 when C.S. Hannum opened communication with the United States government. In the same month the Arthur Greenes disembarked in Pago Pago and were soon embroiled in the native discontent referred to previously. The following July 1920, the Greenes were joined by the Ripleys and the

two families enthusiastically supported the Samoan movement: Ripley assumed the position of "agent for the Samoan government," and Hannum the role of counsel for the *Mau*.

As a result of the Court of Inquiry which ended 24 November 1920, Greene was deported from American Samoa as an undesirable even though the legality of deporting an American from American territory was challenged both by Greene and the press in Honolulu. However, one of the advantages of a military administration (in this instance that of the navy) is that many of the normal administrative procedures and power checks can be successfully circumvented if these are determined inconvenient or inconsistent in terms of desired military policy. So Greene was deported without further recourse to arbitration. Following these events, the Hannums and the Ripleys returned to California and embarked on a vigorous campaign to pursue their land claims. Despite the initial support from the *Mau*, the end of the first stage of the movement also ended this source of support for the "California *Mau*" (Gray, 1960:200). The leaders of the second stage of the *Mau* were less inclined to encourage the Ripley-Hannum relationship for they perceived that there was little advantage in it. The fortunes of the "California *Mau*" were also adversely affected by the change in rank of the Samoan leadership, since only the lesser *matai* were now actively cooperating with the Ripley-Hannum faction.

2. *Stage Two of the Movement: 1920-1930*

After Terhune's death and the installation of the new governor, further changes were effected in the administration. Albert Noble was politely asked to resign as secretary of native affairs because he had lost the confidence of the natives. Luther Cartwright also resigned and left Samoa as soon as the Court of Inquiry ended. These events pleased all of the *Mau* leaders and satisfied most of them. As for Mauga, the major obstacles to the resumption of his highly profitable relationship vis-a-vis the United States Navy were removed. But not all of the *matai* were appeased and the body of discontent now shifted to regional issues. The Western District nominally resumed a loyal position through the leadership of district governor Satele, but High Chief Tuitele who officially only held the position of road inspector, remained critical and aloof. He was particularly censorious about the meagre facilities provided for the Western District by the navy administration and cited the paucity of schools and roads. Even after Governor Evans launched a program of development in these areas, Tuitele retained a cool attitude toward the navy (Tuitele, 1930:324-347). He was the one Samoan high chief who had lost the greatest prestige through the changes wrought by the American administration, and the tactics of the new Governor Evans further lowered his status. On 23 December 1920, Evans wrote to Admiral Hughes about his first official visit to Leone. The welcoming ceremonies had been arranged in accordance with traditional Samoan rank with Tuitele as host. However, the governor refused to attend

ceremonies at Tuitele's residence, objecting on the basis that since this was an official trip, Tuitele was not an appropriate host since he had no official position other than road inspector. Since Satele's home was located at some distance, Evans decided that the ceremonies would be hosted by Faiivae who was a county chief of considerably lower rank than Tuitele. These types of actions continued to undermine the traditional status and authority of the Samoan chiefs. As exemplified by the treatment of Tuitele, this public humiliation had an adverse effect on the prestige not just of Tuitele, but also the *au'aiga* he represented and the entire Western District which he also represented. The forementioned provided added incentive for Tuitele's critical attitude toward the administration.

Another faction emerged at this time to assume the leadership of the *Mau* movement. This component was comprised of lesser ranking *matai*, almost all of whom were ineligible for the government sponsored positions of county chief or district governor. As was discussed more fully in the previous chapter, many of these *matai* were *tūlafale*, who were excluded from public office by direct American policy. Another feature of the American policy was to treat the positions of high Chief as hereditary and to ignore those other criteria of traditional title acquisition discussed in Chapter IV. The end result was a more fixed and closed system of native leadership, and one which caused an increase in the number of qualified *matai* excluded from leadership by American policy. These *matai* became the new leaders of the *Mau*.

There was a new geographical setting for the movement. Even though strong support was generated throughout the Western District, the real centre of *Mau* activity was in Itua County of the Eastern District. This county was particularly unstable as a result of a decision in 1908 which removed it from the authority of district governor Mauga. Once removed from his control, a thorny problem arose of choosing a county chief from among seven near equally ranked candidates. According to John Cole Cool (1958:274), this restructuring of Itua County jeopardized the stability of the local government and was instrumental in encouraging dissent. Throughout the 1920's, this county and the village of Nu'uuli within it resisted the authority of the American administration, even to the point of refusing to contribute labour to the building and maintenance of roads within its boundaries.

Governor Evans realized that the Western District was not appeased by his assumption of office and stated so in a letter to Admiral Hughes 23 December 1920. But Evans was convinced that a policy of reason and firmness would handle any opposition. Within a short time, Evans initiated a program designed to conciliate the *matai* by meeting many of their demands. In addition to securing the resignations of Noble and Cartwright, he established the audit board requested by the *matai* and initiated a program of school and road construction as well as the publication in Samoan of the Codification of the Laws.

Although the High Chiefs were satisfied with these moves, discontent was still brewing in other quarters. On 26 July 1921, Evans called together the highest ranking *matai* and demanded from them a

statement of loyalty to counteract a similar but counter-document recently submitted by the *Mau*. In accordance with his wishes, Mauga, Tuitele, Satele, Tufele, Pele and Leoso composed and signed a letter of support along with 33 other high ranking *matai* and presented it to Evans the following day. This action enraged the opposition movement now led by the lower ranking *matai*. Ned Ripley had called a secret meeting of the *Mau* 21 July 1921 in the village of Asili near Leone. Now another meeting was held at Faleni'u village attended by a large number of lower ranking *matai*. They drew up a petition which was signed by 340 Samoans. During the course of the evening tempers flared and violence threatened. Many of the members took to the bush shouting their intention to assassinate the high chiefs. These men were quickly rounded up by a posse sent out by Governor Evans. These *matai* were found guilty of conspiracy and were sentenced on 25 August 1921 to long prison terms and were deprived of their titles. Despite this, the "California *Mau*" tried to maintain a connection with the indigenous component in Samoa, but High Chiefs Mauga and Satele shunned their advances. And, when Hannum sent a request to them for funds in the spring of 1921, they both refused. Although Hannum charged in Washington that the navy had forbade the chiefs to remit money this was never substantiated and it remains more plausible that the high chief's refusal was related to their withdrawal from the movement. On 27 July 1921 Hannum sent a list of objectives to the lesser *matai* for their ratification:

- (1) The Samoans should assert their political autonomy;
- (2) The Samoan Islands had never been properly ceded;
- (3) The *matai* were ready for treaty negotiations.

There is nothing to indicate that these points were derived from the indigenous movement. The petition in any case remained ineffective since S.S. Ripley was not permitted to land at Pago Pago for the purpose of promoting its contents. Although the "California *Mau*" gained maximum exposure both in the California press and through a series of lectures addressed to various civic groups, it remained isolated from the movement in Samoa and never asserted any real direction within the movement. Later, Hannum launched a civil law suit against Governor Evans whose term of office ended in March 1922. After long delays the court found in favour of the defendant. Upon receipt of this verdict, Hannum committed suicide bringing to a conclusion, this part of the *Mau* movement. The activities of the *Mau* were by now so subdued that the three governors between 1922 and 1926, Captain Edwin Pollock, Captain Edward Kellogg and Captain Henry Bryan failed to understand either the exact nature of the movement or its aims (Olsen, 1976:69-70). During the term of Governor Kellogg another faction with a complaint against the Navy joined forces with the *Mau*. Chris Young was a one-quarter Samoan who had a claim to the Tui Manu'a title vacated by the death of Tui Manu'a Elisara on 2 April 1909. This title was deliberately left vacant by American directive and Tufele Timiali was appointed district governor. In the 1920's he was succeeded by his second son. While the latter was absent from

Manu'a in July of 1924, County Chief Sotoa who was acting governor during Tufele's absence attempted to advance his position by installing his brother-in-law Chris Young as the new Tui Manu'a. Governor Kellogg acted swiftly. On 7 August 1924 he pronounced the investiture invalid and prohibited Young from returning to Manu'a from Tutuila. He also deprived County Chief Sotoa of his official position for a twelve month period. The decision to keep Young out of Manu'a led to the emergence of another dissatisfied faction in the Pago Pago area. On 31 January 1925, Governor Kellogg confirmed in a letter to the secretary of the navy that Young had attended a *Mau* meeting held at Fogaitua village on Tutuila Island. From this date, Chris Young was a recognized leader of the *Mau* movement. At this time the movement regained a number of its former leaders who were released from jail through one of Governor Kellogg's last formal acts before the end of his term of office. Of the seventeen *matai* who had been sent to prison it is assumed that three had died. The others were fully reinstated to their traditional status. However, there was no increase in *Mau* activity as a consequence of this event. Indeed, although *Mau* meetings continued throughout the years 1924-1926, the organization kept an extremely low profile.

After several years of silence, in November 1927 the "Committee of the Samoan League" as it called itself, addressed a letter directly to Governor Graham who had replaced Governor Bryan on 9 September 1927. This letter was signed by twenty *matai*. They demanded a number of changes in the administrative structure and threatened non-payment

of taxes if their demands were not met. Acting with restraint, Governor Graham managed to sidestep the challenge in the *Mau* communique. Very shortly after, the holding of the Annual *Fono* presented Graham with an opportunity to make a public response to the *Mau* letter. He avoided any direct reference to the letter but reassured all Samoans that he was willing to meet with any dissatisfied Samoans to hear their point of view. He then issued an invitation to Chris Young to discuss *Mau* grievances in his office. This was an important step in establishing a line of communication with the leaders of the movement. The governor's efforts were rewarded by a formal invitation to a feast held at Nu'uuli village on 8 December 1927. On this occasion both parties expressed their positions. The spokesman for the *Mau* confirmed a fundamental loyalty to the United States but stated the desire for a civil administration. Governor Graham in response reassured the Samoans present that he appreciated their concerns, and that although he himself did not agree with their request for a civil government, that he recognized their basic right as a political minority to dissent. From this date onwards, there was steady improvement in the relations between the *Mau* and the governor's office. An invitation was extended to the governor to attend the inauguration of a new *Mau* "clubhouse" and requested the use of an American flag for the occasion. Graham restated his policy that the *Mau* was considered a legitimate opposition political party and as such, was entitled to exercise its prerogative to dissent. Graham understood the movement to represent social upheaval due to changing social conditions

within Samoa. He saw this change as a challenge to traditional authority by the lesser ranking *matai*, and a challenge to traditional custom by the products of a modern educational system. By treating the *Mau* as a legitimate political movement, the movement was accommodated within the existing administrative structure and an avenue for dialogue was thereby established between the administration and the *Mau*. By 1930 the governors reported the end of *Mau* activity and it has been generally assumed that the *Mau* gradually disbanded after Graham's term as governor.

Concomittant with events in Samoa, various political events in Washington during the years 1926 to 1930 palliated Samoan discontent. The first of these was the introduction of the Lenroot Bill S. 3952 on 10 April 1926 by Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin. He had been working for some time on proposed legislation to acknowledge the cessions dated 17 April 1900 and 16 July 1904. Supposedly, President Harding had been willing to act on this, but President Coolidge was not. Coolidge leaned toward the position of Curtis D. Wilbur who, as secretary of the navy, was understandably opposed to the idea of a civil administration in Samoa. It was a matter of public record that the White House was antagonistic toward the Lenroot Bill which eventually was swallowed up by the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and that the White House was even more antagonistic toward the later attempts at formulating an Organic Act. Following this, Senator Hiram Bingham, grandson of the illustrious Bingham missionary patriarch, who himself grew up in Hawai'i, introduced a resolu-

ion eventually approved as Public Resolution No. 89 in which the cessions were acknowledged and an American Samoan Commission was formed to design an Organic Act for American Samoa.

The interest shown in Washington for Samoa was short-lived. The depression that began in 1929 constricted the focus of America to her own internal problems. Serious opposition arose in congress over the appropriation of \$25,000 for the commission in 1930. This sum was eventually approved, the commission did sail for Samoa via Honolulu and after considerable debate and compromise an Organic Act was submitted for congressional approval. However, Senator Bingham was singularly unsuccessful in achieving the passage of this Act in any of the forms in which he submitted it. Several times it passed through the Senate only to be defeated by the House of Representatives. By 1933 it was generally considered to be quite dead even though Bingham persisted through several more congresses (Cool, 1958:230).

Although general opposition by Samoans to the navy administration by no means disappeared after 1930, the *Mau* organization did. The Samoan opposition to the navy administration, however, came from individuals and small factions. Unlike the *Mau* of previous years, all of these individuals and factions in the post 1930 period operated within a minimum of centralized organization.

## CHAPTER VII

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MOVEMENTS

A. *Characteristics of Membership*1. *Western Samoa*

The *Mau* movement in Western Samoa began in 1926 as a joint endeavor between the indigenous high chiefs and several powerful members of the European community. The latter were linked to the Samoan sector affinally or consanguineally through part-Samoan heritage.

The strength of the movement increased rapidly from October 1926 through the following year, by which time it allegedly represented the views of 90 percent of the Samoan population. This assessment is based on the numbers of *matai* in the movement, for in Samoan society they alone had the privilege of open political participation. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish the validity of overall membership figures because both Nelson and the New Zealand administration used them as propaganda weapons: Nelson claimed to represent over 90 percent of the Samoan population, while the New Zealand government claimed this figure was closer to two-thirds (Boyd, 1969: 157). It is generally conceded by modern scholars that Nelson probably was accurate, and this further justifies the claims of the *Mau* in a petition of 2 November 1929 addressed to the King of England:

. . . that the *Mau* is the one National Organisation of Western Samoa functioning in the social, civil,

and political life of ninety per cent of the people and represents unified Samoa in a manner unparalleled in the history of these Isles.

The peak in membership which was probably reached shortly after the October and November meetings of 1926, was maintained until "Black Saturday" of December 1929.

## 2. *American Samoa*

The membership in American Samoa was composed of various groups, the nature of which changed considerably after the death of Governor Terhune in 1920. Before this event, in stage one of the movement, it was comprised of the high chiefs of Tutuila, a small body of American navy personnel, and a number of part-Samoans and Americans living in Hawaii and California. The Samoan support was strongest during stage one and it reached a peak during the months of July through November 1920. It is again, very difficult to assess the exact membership, but the completeness of the economic boycott effected during this time implies a strong unity. Despite the success of the copra boycott, the request of the high chiefs to assemble for a *Mau fono* during July 1920 at Fagatogo was not met with complete cooperation. Many *matai* refused, even though they faced coercive tactics by the followers of Mauga and Tuitele. For this reason, it is probable that the membership strength of stage one, although strong, did not approach the high levels of membership in Western Samoa.

In stage two of the movement it becomes even more difficult to assess the membership, since the movement now assumed a low profile in public life. The membership now consisted only of the lower ranking

*matai*, Hannum in California, the Ripley family in the Western District and Chris Young from Manu'a. No American navy personnel were involved. The local factions were substantially restricted in mobilizing support because of their lesser rank, and it can be assumed that there was a decline in membership in stage two of the movement.

### B. *Geographical Distribution of Mau Support*

#### 1. *Western Samoa*

After the founding of the movement in 1926, support expanded outwards from the central core in the Apia area. The geographical spread was at first restricted to the Island of Upolu, but by March 1927, it had reached the Island of Savai'i and became a pan-Samoan movement within Western Samoa. This pattern of distribution was punctuated by pockets of loyal pro-government villages. For example, the District of Falealili under the leadership of Tuatagaloa remained loyal to the Richardson administration as did most of the *Faipule* and the other native officials appointed by the administration.

Malietao Tunumafili, a *Fautua*, did not join the *Mau*.

However, the loyal Samoan leaders were disadvantaged politically by their inability to mobilize support from within the ranks of their *au'aiga* network. Malietao and Mata'afa Salanoa were deserted by their followers and suffered enormous loss of prestige during this period (McKay, 1968:57).

## 2. *American Samoa*

There were significant differences in the pattern of *Mau* support in Western Samoa when compared to that in American Samoa. The initial spread of the movement throughout the Island of Tutuila in 1920 was succeeded by a shrinking of *Mau* activity to Itua County, specifically the village of Nu'uuli, and portions of the Western District. The latter retained a nominal loyalty to the government through the leadership of Satele as district governor. The movement was at all times restricted to the Island of Tutuila. There was a Manu'an faction which supported the second stage of the *Mau* but this faction resided on Tutuila, and its activities did not extend to the Manu'an Islands. The movement in American Samoa never reached the pan-Samoan level that its counterpart did in Western Samoa.

*Summary.* The movement in American Samoa followed a distribution pattern of *Mau* support which changed from a more extensive base to a restricted one. As the movement progressed from stage one to stage two, the initial widespread geographical support base dwindled to certain specific pockets. This pattern is different from the one in Western Samoa where the movement spread rapidly to incorporate the entire island group excepting small pockets of pro-government support.

### C. Organizational Structure

#### 1. Western Samoa

The structure of the *Mau* in Western Samoa is described in detail by Keesing:

In each *Mau* community a village committee (*Komiti o Nu'u*) was formed, comprised of the chiefs and orators. Such committees sometimes appointed a mayor corresponding, but in opposition, to the government office of *pulemu'u*. They also sent selected representatives (*Komiti o Itu*) to sub-district committees where such were considered necessary. Each district had a district leader (*Ta'ita'Itu*), a position corresponding to one of the same name established during the King days and abolished by the Germans in 1905. At the Vaimoso headquarters was a central *Mau* committee representing all villages and districts. Usually each village had from one to three representatives there all the time; these individuals being changed as desired. Their food was taxed from the home communities, which were also taxed to support the *Mau* government and cause. Within the Central Committee was a *Mau* executive (*Sui Filifilia*), a selected body of representatives comprised of secretary treasurers of the districts (*Failautusi*) and a general secretary-treasurer (*Teu Tupe*), together with two leaders of the *Mau*, Tamasese (since his death in 1929 replaced by Tuimaleali'ifano) and Faumuina. These latter were the spokesmen in Samoa of the "selected representative of all Samoa" (*Sui Filifilia a Samoa*), Mr. O.F. Nelson . . . . A court of Justice was founded, based on the western pattern, in the outer districts; a police force was also organized (Keesing, 1934: 182-183).

The *Mau* in Western Samoa was characterized by a formally specialized structure and all aspects of social control were accommodated within it, including legislative, executive and judicial matters. In addition it was capable of generating funding to support its activities.

The management and organizational skills of Nelson and the other Europeans were instrumental in the adoption of the European style aspects of the movement. There were, however, marked differences between the organization and structure of the *Mau* and the new committee and district structure proposed by the administration. *Mau* committees convened, conducted business and administered affairs in the style of precedence common to the traditional *fono*. Most important in the selection of representatives and leaders, on the basis of *fa'a Samoa*, due consideration was given to the traditional ranking of *tulafale*, *Fautua* and other leaders slighted by the government. Furthermore, political support whether voiced through membership recruitment or financial backing, was generated in two distinct ways: traditionally through *au'aiiga* village networks, and unconventionally by Nelson and his trading company. The latter contributed approximately 200,000 pounds to the movement. The establishment of *Mau* judicial courts and a *Mau* police force may also be seen as an adoption of foreign institutions, but these in effect became new vehicles for the *matai* to resume those areas of control which historically had been within their jurisdiction. This assumption of traditional authority was the key to the successful spread of the movement in Western Samoa. Consequently, the administration's attempt at a new district structure was a failure, for no government derived plan could achieve success without the support of the traditional high chiefs and the leading families of Samoa.

## 2. *American Samoa*

What information exists concerning the structure of the movement in American Samoa indicates that a similar form of committee and village units existed there. Representatives were selected in a traditional Samoan way, and, particularly in stage two, leadership was expressed through a joint committee.

However, the *Mau* in American Samoa lacked the structural competence that attended the movement in Western Samoa. Specifically absent were those structural components to handle judicial and legislative functions. Consequently, the movement in American Samoa was never able to establish itself as an alternative government organization. Although the *Mau* in Western Samoa evolved an organization explicitly political and highly specialized in form, the movement in American Samoa retained a generalized form of organization more in keeping with the traditional *fono* which, it will be recalled, served multifarious social, economic and political functions. For example, in the second stage of the *Mau*, the American Samoan leaders engaged in activities which were related only indirectly to the attainment of explicit political goals. In 1927, the *Mau* erected a "club house" and invited the Governor to attend its opening ceremonies. The "club house" was of American origin and no comparable institution was adopted by the *Mau* in Western Samoa. Perhaps the "club house" represented for the *Mau* in American Samoa a central interest in activities which could be identified as generalized ceremonial or social, rather than political.

*Summary.* The characteristic features of the organizational structures varied significantly between the two movements. The *Mau* in Western Samoa is characterized by structural completeness, competence, a high degree of specialization and a focus on explicit political activities. The *Mau* in American Samoa is distinctive because of its structural incompleteness, and low level of specialization. It operated within a diffused organizational framework geared mainly to socio-ceremonial activities. Because of this, the movement in American Samoa was not exclusively political in nature.

#### D. *Patterns of Leadership*

##### 1. *Western Samoa*

The leaders of the *Mau* in Western Samoa constituted two major groups. One was made up of high ranking Samoan *matai* including those from the highest "royal families" in Samoa, and the other comprised powerful and wealthy European entrepreneurs who had extended personal and commercial interests in the islands. With regard to the former group, all of the *matai* assuming important positions of leadership within the movement were traditionally recognized and accepted as high ranking leaders but each of them had suffered varying degrees of status deprivation through New Zealand policy. One of these leaders, Tamasese, had been banished from his home village for defending his authority over a hibiscus hedge. Though this may perhaps be considered a trivial issue, its implications in terms of implicit challenge to traditional authority were hardly so. It appeared that Richardson intended to

challenge publicly Tamasese's traditional authority in order to assert government supremacy. Richardson commented on the case in an Interim Report on Native Affairs:

This case which was quickly communicated to all parts of Samoa has done good and strengthened the Native's confidence in the Government by shewing that however high a title an offender holds, he will be treated with the same justice as the ordinary Native. A new policy so far as Native Customs are concerned but one which has given general satisfaction (1924d:5).

The highest ranking members of the "royal families," the *Tama'aiga*, were generally ignored by the administration, so that they too experienced a lowering of the prestige and power they traditionally exerted within Samoan society. Tamasese in particular was disadvantaged in his relation with the New Zealand administration. As noted previously, in the years prior to partition, the British and Germans had polarized around the two major "royal lineages:" Great Britain supported the Malietoa title as candidate for paramount chief, and Germany stood behind the Tamasese title holder. This led to an association of relatively long standing between the Germans and the Sa Tupua family, one which was not to their advantage once New Zealand assumed the administration of the islands. The category of *Tama'aiga* included the two royal advisers or *Fautua*, and one of these *Fautua* was Tuimalaeali'ifano, who later joined the *Mau* and was one of its major leaders. The most crucial feature that these Samoan leaders shared, was that they had been overlooked, or disadvantaged by the administration. In fact, five out of the initial six indigenous leaders had been dismissed from government sponsored positions prior to the

*Mau* (Boyd, 1969:156).

Many of the traditional indigenous Samoan leaders, in addition to their traditional qualifications for political office, that is, possession of title, shared in a common experience as urban members of an emerging educated Samoan elite. The *Mau* leaders were Apia based *matai* who spoke English and were well acquainted with the complexities of European commercial enterprise. Consequently, they had been instrumental in supporting many of the features of modernization which accompanied the European administrations prior to the *Mau*. Consider, for example, the description of high chief Faumuina by Governor Byran in a memorandum to the secretary of the navy dated 3 December 1926:

Faumuina is a very high chief, a member of the Tuiana [sic] family; his wife is a daughter of the Malietoa Laupepa. He had been one of the strongest supporters of the Administration, the head of the Boy Scouts, and the founder of a model village. He is said to have paid 280 pounds for the electric light plant of his village.

Other Samoan leaders who strongly supported the *Mau* were the *tulafale*, whose skills and traditional importance had been ignored through government policy (Keesing, 1934:162). Within the *Mau*, the traditional orator confederation of *Trumua* and *Pule* served as a focal point for authority:

. . . the orator and orator groups, and notably their [the *Faipule*] sponsoring of legislation for the control of fine mat customs in which the orators were vitally interested since it was their means of securing this valued form of native wealth, were important factors in the conflict of 1926. With few exceptions the orators turned to support the *Mau*

and they carried with them by virtue of their standing the greater part of Samoa. It is no accident nearly all the *Trumua* and *Pule* title holders are in the Mau, and that the "loyal" districts such as Manono, Falealili, and northern Aleipata are areas dominated by chiefs [*ali'i*] or in one or two cases by orators who are high native officials (Keesing, 1934:163).

The European group of leaders included O.F. Nelson, S. Meredith, G. Westbrook, A. Williams, A. Smyth and E.W. Gurr. Among them, they possessed an extensive body of expertise in the fields of law, commerce, and communications and had established networks of social intercourse with the indigenous leaders of the Samoan community. Most important of all, this European group considered itself Samoan either by birth, residence, marriage, part-Samoan blood or a combination of these factors. This form of self identification as Samoan can be demonstrated through several statements by Nelson. In 1939, he responded to a Permanent Mandates Commission Report:

M. Van Asbeck [member of the Commission] referred to me as a non-native, and my daughter (who with me, was a member of the Samoan delegation to New Zealand) as 'presumably a non-native also.' It is true that I hold European status, according to law, but no law on earth can alter the fact that I was born in Samoa of a full blooded Samoan mother. My daughter was also born in Samoa, and her maternal grandmother was also a full Samoan.

Some people resent and object to being referred to as either 'native' or 'foreigner' anywhere. I am not one of them, but I certainly do resent and object to being referred to as a 'foreigner' in Samoa, where I was born and lived most of my life.

There were material advantages to be had along with European status. The basis for this was an Ordinance prohibiting native Samoans from owning shares in commercial enterprise. This Ordinance was almost cer-

tainly derived from the German Protectorate, and was upheld in order to protect the Samoans from exploitation (Mary Boyd:personal communication, 1980). Given these restrictions on Samoan commercial participation, the following statement by Nelson shows clearly that for the part-Samoan, the adoption of "European" or "Samoan" status was a choice between two strategies, each of which had its own set of advantages and disadvantages, and also economic and political implications:

As so much has been said about my refusal to change my status from that of a European to that of a Samoan, it is well for me to say something about it now, though it will be a subject which the delegation will take up with the government.

When the Prime Minister informed the Samoans that I may not be a representative of the Samoans in the Legislative Council unless I change my status from a European to a Samoan, I went to Mulinu'u to ask the Fautua and the Faipule what they thought about it. It was unanimously decided that, other than the protection of Samoan lands against the alienation to Europeans, that is, by the conversion of the communal lands of the Samoans into freehold lands with European title for commercial purposes (and the law already provided for that protection), there should be no difference in the status of Europeans and Samoans, except, perhaps, in respect of permission to indulge in alcoholic liquor.

It was also unanimously agreed that when the Fono of Faipule became purely Samoan, without any European representatives in it at all, or when the difference in the status of Europeans and Samoans, in other directions was removed, I should be the first to change from that of a European to that of a Samoan. But so long as the law stands as it does now, the Samoans do not want me to change my status of a European, because they want me to remain on an equal status with the representatives of the Mandatory Government with whom I was expected to deal on their behalf, as their representative. That should, in my opinion, justify the decision arrived at by the Samoans that I should retain my European status for the present. It is, perhaps, not generally known that my daughter married to Tamasese may not take any shares I may bequeath

to her in O.F. Nelson and Co. Ltd., because as a Samoan by marriage, she may not own shares in a commercial concern (Nelson, 1937:2).

Nelson was in fact the most active and influential of a much larger group of Europeans residing in Samoa and was always considered the major force behind the *Mau*. Termed the "lying prophet" by the administration, Nelson was a formidable opponent to Richardson. Both men were noted for arrogance, determination and strength of will and each fancied himself as the true leader of Samoa. Their rivalry and intense dislike for each other became legendary. Richardson was a notoriously difficult man, and stories about his insufferable air of superiority abound. For example, Dr. Lambert who was in Richardson's company on an official trip to Fiji, recalls how Richardson insisted on pointing out to the governor of Fiji all the mistakes the latter was making and the methods by which he could improve affairs. On Richardson's return from this visit, the *Mau* uprising broke out and Richardson's pride was severely wounded. Richardson's experience as a military officer and his expectations of complete obedience were not tolerant of the challenge from a man such as Nelson. Nelson's position was certainly one of strength, which was backed by the financial resources of a company with £150,000 of paid capital (Nelson, 1928), a trading empire that dominated commerce in the islands, and family ties and friendships which linked him to all the powerful Samoan leaders. He was also endowed with enormous reserves of determination, drive and ambition. Controversy surrounds his motives for assuming the leadership of the *Mau*. It is highly probable that the antagonism between Nelson

and Richardson began well before 1926. Nelson was bitterly sensitive to the social discrimination he experienced as a "half-caste" Samoan. In 1922 Colonel Tate openly accused him of misleading the natives and profiting at their expense. Nelson was incensed by this and complained to the administrator. There is no doubt that Nelson was strongly opposed to Richardson's government sponsored copra marketing scheme. He questioned Richardson's real motives for introducing it and charged that it was purely a political ploy designed to drive him into bankruptcy. In fact, shortly after the November 1926 meeting of the *Mau* in Apia, Richardson wrote to the secretary for external affairs concerning his proposal:

I am delighted about the support for the copra scheme. I ought to mention that this was my trump card which was played by surprise and caused a local panic . . . My argument is irrefutable that we want to increase the purchasing power of the Natives and so promote trade. . . . I have enjoyed this recent stunt very much and would not have missed it for anything (Richardson, 1926b).

The curious tone of malice and vindictiveness in this confidential letter, is surely not appropriate to a man charged with managing the complex problems of the native and European communities.

The key thing about Nelson, from the point of view of the *Mau*, was his exceptional ability. He was described to the New Zealand prime minister in the following terms by one of Nelson's political adversaries:

So I claim to know something about the phenomenal industry, painstaking attention to detail, organising ability, and tactical skill which make Olaf Frederick

Nelson the most extraordinary half-caste that the South Seas Islands will ever produce. I hereby inform you that men like Sir Apirana Ngata, Sir James Carrol, and Sir Maui Pomare did not possess one-tenth of Mr. Nelson's ability. Given a seat in Parliament, sir, Mr. Nelson would run rings around the three of them (Gozar, 1936).

The emergence of such a part-Samoan leader with these exceptional qualifications for leadership was a distinctive feature of the movement in Western Samoa. Moreover, the movement here was bolstered by the most powerful groups on the islands, both indigenous and European, and their leaders exhibited a remarkable degree of unity.

## 2. *American Samoa*

The leadership of the *Mau* in American Samoa was derived from three main social groups; namely, the indigenous Samoan *matai*, part-Samoans of mixed American and Samoan ancestry, and a select number of Americans. Unlike the situation in Western Samoa, these groups never coalesced into a well-integrated, supportive body.

In stage one of the movement, the indigenous leaders were the highest ranking chiefs of Tutiula Island, namely, Mauga Moimoi, Satele, and Tuitele. However, after stage one, the indigenous leadership passed on to the *matai* of secondary rank. Their position within the traditional Samoan political structure precluded the mobilization of large scale support from within the indigenous sector. The lesser chiefs not only found themselves in opposition to the navy administration, but also in opposition to Mauga Moimoi, the most powerful *matai* in American Samoa at this time. Furthermore, though the *tulafale* were conspicuous supporters of the *Mau*, twenty years of American policy

had already eroded much of their traditional power and prestige. Consequently, there was no indication of the resurgence of the orator confederations as a vehicle for the organization of *Mau* support such as occurred with similar groups such as *Tumua* and *Pule*, in Western Samoa.

The emerging, educated, native urban elite in American Samoa was not a source of agitation, for here in American Samoa, this type of *matai* profited most by a close association with the American Navy. The traditional non-English speaking *matai* separated from the administration by geographical distance had less chance of obtaining employment with the Americans and less access to the material benefits to be obtained from the navy than did their fellow Pago Pago *matai*. Therefore, while Mauga expeditiously consolidated his friendship with the navy after Governor Terhune's death, Tuitele remained aloof and critical of the administration. This point is relevant to the growing dependency between the Americans and the Samoan *matai*.

The part-Samoans of American Samoa differed from their Western Samoan counterparts in two important ways. Whereas in Western Samoa, the part-Samoans of European status were exposed to commercial enterprise and participated in entrepreneurial activities (usually in association with their European fathers), in American Samoa private commercial enterprise was discouraged by the American administration. The kinds of opportunities in Western Samoa that produced educated, wealthy part-Samoans like O.F. Nelson were not similarly found in the American Islands and no part-Samoan rose to prominence in American Samoa with like vigour and political acumen.

The second feature that distinguished the part-Samoans of American and Western Samoa was also related to different colonial attitudes, for though neither government looked with favour upon the part-Samoan, the stereotype description of pure native and "half-caste" varied between the two territories. The pure-blooded native was generally described as child-like, naive and in need of protection while the "half-caste" was scheming, ambitious, untrustworthy and a total social misfit. But the New Zealanders gave this distinction a special discriminatory meaning by supporting their opinions with the Mandate concept of "sacred trust." The natives in Western Samoa had been prejudged by both the League of Nations and New Zealand to be incompetent for self rule and in need of protection. The "half-castes" were envisioned as a threat to this well intentioned protectionist policy. On the other hand, in American Samoa the fundamental philosophy was the implicit right of the Samoans to govern themselves democratically, albeit under American rule. Although realistically this was not practicable, and certainly never implemented by the navy administration, the American policy at least created a burden of guilt that this could not be so (Olsen, 1976:1-9). The Organic Act as conceived by Senator Bingham and the American Samoan Commission attempted to smooth over these problems by erasing the political and economic distinctions between full-blooded and part blooded Samoans. This policy stood in total contrast to the unremitting paternalism exhibited by the New Zealand administration solely toward the pure blooded Samoan. The basis for this is exemplified by a quote in a letter from Richardson to the minister of

external affairs in 1926:

Half castes [in comparison to full blooded Samoans] are so vain---so keen for power and so cunning---and very different I think from the Maori half-caste that they cannot be trusted (1926c).

This fundamental difference in attitude toward the Samoan natives' capacity for self determination was mirrored in the anthropological community. Keesing, a New Zealander, held the view that the Organic Act was impractical, improbable and premature. On the other hand, the American anthropologist Margaret Mead was confident that the American Samoans were sufficiently capable to deal effectively with the challenges of modern government (Keesing, 1934:209-11, Mead, 1931:226-8).

In addition to the forementioned there was yet another element in the discrimination against the part-Samoans in Western Samoa. Most of the part-Samoans in Western Samoa were of German extraction and their position within a post World War I territory, governed by a British military administration can only be described as uncomfortable. In 1922, the administrator Colonel Tate, discussed this problem in a confidential report to the minister of external affairs:

It will be remembered that most pure-blooded Germans were repatriated in June 1920, and the principle on which they were allowed to stay was their intermarriage with Samoan families. There has been constant pressure for permission for the return to Samoa of members of those families, parents, who were absent during the war, children who were absent for education or employment and so on. Most applications have been refused and lately a second refusal was made in the case of a young Wetzell, a son of a German now deceased by Mrs. Wetzell, a half-caste Samoan, and a sister of

Mr. Nelson. Young Wetzell was being educated in Germany when the war broke out and subsequently served in the German army. [He was conscripted]. He is now in Sweden, but both the Chief Judge and I considered that the return of a man, who, although born in Samoa, had been educated in Germany and served in the German army, was eminently undesirable. No doubt as time goes on, permission to return will be more readily granted, but for the present we have quite sufficient German-bred people to assimilate.

Nelson himself, though a part-Samoan of Swedish descent, was much criticized if not envied, because his business profited most by the repatriation of the German planters. And, as is shown in the above quotation, anti-German prejudice after the war, adversely affected his own family.

When Tate was replaced by Richardson, there was no discernible improvement in the attitude toward the part-German Samoans. Referring to the impending visit of the governor-general to Samoa in 1925, Richardson found it necessary to advise him on certain social conventions and sensitivities within the Samoan "half-caste" community:

The Governor-General is too wise and experienced a man to need prompting, but the conditions here are so different to those obtaining in New Zealand and one has to constantly keep in mind that there are two sections of the community---the natives practically 95 percent and to whom the country belongs, and the remaining small number who are chiefly half-castes (German and Samoan). This strain of German blood must affect the mental attitudes of these "Europeans"---as I am always careful to designate them in speeches . . . (Richardson, 1925a).

The part-Samoan in American Samoa was not exposed to this kind of racial discrimination because, in the main, his or her non-Samoan ancestry was associated with the presence of American navy personnel in Pago Pago. The attitude of the Navy was one of concern. One set of

concerns related to measures to prevent such issues and failing these, the other concerns were in terms of assuming at least a moral responsibility for their welfare. The part-Samoans in American Samoa therefore presented a different sort of problem to the American authorities. The question of the part-Samoan was one of the issues addressed by the American Samoan Commission in 1930; namely, to what extent should the same rights and privileges of the full blooded native be extended to the part-Samoan. The Organic Act requested an expansion of the latter's privileges to include land ownership and participation in the political process at the local level. In addition they were to be awarded full citizenship rights, and the term "native" was to be replaced by the less objectionable term, "person of Polynesian blood."

The third type of leadership in the *Mau* in American Samoa was distinctive. Those Americans who provided such expertise and guidance for many of the legal strategies undertaken within the first few months of the movement were, with the exception of Greene, persons who had no residential status or commercial interests on the islands. Some of them had no discernible ties with Samoa at all. The group of navy personnel, including Boucher and Kail, remain an enigma. Hannum, on the other hand, became embroiled in the legal dispute, but never resided in the islands, nor did he have any connection with events beyond his association with the California Ripleys. Consequently, their overall impact as leaders was minimized. The "expatriate" campaign of Hannum and Ripley in California was therefore in marked contrast to the one conducted by Nelson and Gurr in Auckland. Thus, the "California *Mau*"

could sustain no real effect on affairs in Samoa nor could it justify its claim to be the representative voice of the *Mau* in American Samoa.

*Summary.* One major distinction to be observed in the leadership patterns between Western and American Samoa is the degree of unity among the various groups within each movement. In Western Samoa, the Europeans and the indigenous Samoans formed a well integrated group. Any factionalism that did exist was peripheral to the movement, in that the major factional split was between the traditional *Mau matai* and the non-traditional government sponsored *Faipule*. In American Samoa, the various groups remained isolated from each other and each operated as separate agents within the movement. In addition, factionalism in American Samoa was significant within the movement itself. The shift in the nature of the movement between stage one and stage two was marked by factionalism. As the high chiefs withdrew from the movement, the lesser chiefs conspired to assassinate them for their betrayal of the cause. District Governor Satele was unable to control the Western District's loyalty to the administration because of the rival authority exercised by high chief Tuitele. Again, the intensity of the movement in Ituau County can be related directly to the instability caused by its removal from high chief Mauga's authority in 1908. In this sense, the inherent factionalism within traditional Samoan politics was fully expressed in the movement in American Samoa.

### E. *The Nature of Grievances*

#### 1. *Western Samoa*

In 1926, the grievances leading to the *Mau* movement were distinctively either Samoan or European in orientation. The Europeans were bitterly resentful over their exclusion from affairs affecting their homeland, particularly the way in which Richardson by-passed their authority in the local Legislative Council by securing Orders-in-Council through Parliament in Wellington. In addition they were against the copra marketing scheme, since this program would have bankrupted their trading companies. Prohibition was another sore point. The League of Nations expected prohibition to be enforced in the Mandated Territories, and in a gesture of overzealous compliance New Zealand extended the prohibition to the European residents as well as the natives, although it was not the intent of the League to deny alcohol to the former. The Europeans also levied other charges of over-government, overspending and inefficiency against the administration.

The grievances of the Samoans were less defined. Much of their discontent derived from the exclusion of *matai* from power, and as Richardson attempted to inflate the authority of the *Faipule*, the resentment grew. As the *Mau* progressed, other grievances evolved, some as a direct result of the treatment accorded the leaders by the administrator. The initial grievances of 1926 included the handling of the 1918 influenza epidemic, the invoking of banishment and deportation orders and the degrading of high chiefs through use of the

Samoan Offenders Ordinance of 1922 (including the treatment of Tamasese). Richardson's attempts to replace communal forms of land tenure with individual ownership, to supplant village *fono* and district assemblies with councils appointed by him, and to disallow fine mat *malaga*, also met with disapproval. Later grievances would include charges of violence; for example, the deaths of Tamasese, Molia and others on "Black Saturday," the raids on Vaimoso village by troops with drawn bayonets and the shooting of the *tulafale* Fitialo and Si'au.

The Samoans and Europeans used a number of ways to communicate and publicize their complaints, but by far the most common was through petition. In 1930, the Acting Secretary indicated that petitions had been received from the following:

1. O.F. Nelson;
2. A. Hall Skelton (counsel for the *Mau*);
3. E. Gurr;
4. The Reverend A.J. Greenwood; and
5. Womens' International League of Peace and Freedom  
(the womens' *Mau*).

In addition to the above petitions, another was submitted to the prime minister of New Zealand from Professors J.P. Grossman, Horace Belshaw and over seventy other signatories from University College, Auckland, requesting a formal inquiry into Samoan affairs. The major *Mau* petition was submitted to the League of Nations in 1928 with the signatures of 7,350 Samoans. Many of the signatures on the latter petition were marked with a red star to indicate the signer's status as a *pulenu'u*

or a district officer. Another *Mau* petition was submitted to New Zealand in 1929 signed by most of the high chiefs, including Tuimaleali'ifano, Faumuina, Afamasaga, Alipia and Tamasese.

Other methods were also employed. Nelson and Gurr disseminated statements on *Mau* policy and grievances through the *Samoa Guardian* and the *New Zealand Samoa Guardian*, and *Mau* leaders attempted to present their views at the conference of the royal commission held in Samoa during the months of October and November 1927. Most of these strategies were unsuccessful in achieving a change in government policy, for petition after petition was swept aside by the administration. The way in which the royal commission conducted its inquiry also reflected the general attitude toward any voice of dissention. For example, the commission set its terms of reference so cleverly that none of the *Mau* grievances could be addressed, and this in itself became an additional *Mau* grievance. In the Grossman-Belshaw Auckland petition, the evasiveness of the royal commission is pointed out by referring specifically to topics disallowed by commission's report:

1. *Prohibition*: 'The consideration of this matter is not within the scope of the inquiry and we are not entitled to express an opinion upon it;'
2. *Copra dealing*: 'The system adopted by the Administrator was a pure measure of policy, and does not come within the scope of our inquiry;'
3. *Administrative extravagance*: 'We should not have had the time or felt ourselves competent to embark on a critical examination of the working of the Administration;'

4. *Interference with Native Customs*: 'We do not consider it a part of our duty to express an opinion as to the expediency of enacting laws of the character above described;'
5. *Banishments*: 'The commission held that the evidence as to banishment orders was not to include discussion of the nature of the offence or the validity of the order;'
6. *Legislative Council*: 'The alteration of the constitution of the Legislative Council appears to us to be purely a matter of policy---and therefore outside of the scope of the inquiry' (Grossman, 1930).

Despite all of the efforts exerted by Nelson, Gurr and the high chiefs in Samoa, the New Zealand government persisted in their claim that there were no discernible problems in Samoa, a view expressed in the following quotation from a letter to the secretary general of the League of Nations from Prime Minister G.W. Forbes of New Zealand:

The Administration and the New Zealand Government have at all times been, and still are, ready and willing to discuss any legitimate grievances. They have never found it possible, however, to ascertain what grievances are being complained of, and it is not believed that any material grievances exist (1930).

## 2. *American Samoa*

The grievances of the *Mau* during stage one of the movement related to particular events which occurred in 1920 and these were conveyed to the administration in a series of communications from the *Mau* during the months of July to December 1920. A letter dated 26 July 1920 from the chief chiefs Mauga, Satele, Faumuina, Tuitele, Leaana, Alo, Fuimaono, Letuli, Olo, Masaniai, Savea, Alaipalelei, Leaeno, Pele, Tuiasosopo and Molioo, petitioned the president of the United States for a board of inquiry and the reinstatement of Lieutenant Commander Boucher.

The high chiefs complained of their own ignorance of how the government was run:

We are in the darkness now concerning many things which we think we have the right to know, and we believe the only way for us to get our rights, is to have a hearing before an Impartial Commission sent here from Washington D.C. (1920).

The high chiefs were also alarmed because certain key items of information were being withheld from them. They had been operating on the assumption that, having ceded their islands to the United States, they were now citizens of an American territory only to be informed by Boucher that they had been deluded into thinking so for over twenty years. Not surprisingly, the news that Congress had never ratified the cessions and that their islands had no formal status within the United States, came as a complete shock.

Following the navy's decision to support Governor Terhune in July 1920, the high chiefs' opposition was directed at certain activities within the Island government and assumed a more aggressive tone. A document was submitted to Commander Arthur Kail on 15 September 1920 with the following demands:

1. Replace the Governor;  
Replace the Judge;  
Replace the private secretary;  
Replace the Captain of the yard;
2. Repeal the law forbidding marriages between white men and Samoan girls;
3. Print the laws annually in both English and Samoan;
4. Restore Mauga and Satele as district governors;

5. Discharge British subjects from government positions and fill these positions with Samoans, part-Samoans, or white Americans;
6. Submit an itemized statement of all island funds each month including accounts of the schooner "Leone";
7. Provide adequate schools;
8. Implement a consistent and scientific road building program;
9. Recognize the rights of chiefs to hold *fonos* at any time they see fit, for the discussion of native affairs;
10. End the tyranny, falsehood, and petty revenge as practised by Governor Terhune, Judge Noble, and other officers;
11. Establish an Executive Council composed of seven or nine members, a majority of whom shall be the highest chiefs in Samoa but including one or more white business men on the islands. This council to be selected each year by a grand *fono* of all chiefs of Tutuila and Manu'a. This council to advise with the Governor and the *fonos* of chiefs to suggest improvements in laws, education, agriculture, commerce, morals, religion et cetera.

This document was signed by the 178 *matai*, including all of the high chiefs. When this petition was also ignored by the American authorities, the high chiefs submitted another which was even more demanding in tone, in October 1920. In addition to the cardinal demand concerning the removal of Terhune, Noble and Cartwright, the October document further requested the removal of Lieutenant Commander R.C. Reed, Island Treasurer and Lieutenant W.A. McDonald, Chief Customs Officer:

As we are prepared to prove, that they have been guilty of wilful misappropriation of moneys from the funds of the Island Government of American Samoa and that they

and each of them have conspired together for such reprehensible misappropriation of such moneys and have in fact so misappropriated and embezzled them. . . . And for the further reason that each and every one of the men aforementioned have been guilty of culpable inefficiency and gross mismanagement of the affairs of the Island Government of American Samoa entrusted to them and that each and every one of them is incompetent to properly administer the duties of which they are now assigned.

This petition of 18 October 1920 was signed by fifty-seven *matai* including the high chiefs. The demands of the high chiefs in stage one of the movement were explicitly related to the charge of embezzlement and the demand for the removal of Terhune, Noble and others.

After the death of Terhune and the shift to stage two of the movement, the nature of the grievances also changed. At first, because of the incarceration of the seventeen *matai* who formed the core leadership of the second stage, the movement remained inactive for several years, and grievances were not submitted to the American authorities. But, after the release from prison of the fourteen remaining *matai*, and the recruitment of Chris Young, a new set of grievances was submitted to the administration. These new complaints related to alleged inequities in the system of taxation and a newly formed desire for a civilian government, and were submitted in a formal petition to Governor Graham in 1927. In a further petition to President Hoover 16 January 1930, the *Mau* complained about the increase in the poll tax from nine dollars to eleven dollars and fifty cents, and charged the administration with extravagance. The grievances expressed during the second stage of the

movement had considerable breadth. In an unpublished paper entitled *Samoa* which was submitted to the American Samoan Commission, Faia'oga Iosefa Tufele listed a number of problems that the *Mau* deemed important:

1. The autocratic nature of the military government;
  2. The prevention of marriage between Samoans and whites;
  3. The economic exploitation of Samoans by Americans;
  4. Racial discrimination;
  5. Direct taxation (as inimicable to Samoan notions of communal property)
- (Tufele in Olsen, 1976:81-82).

The American Samoan Committee hearings convened in Samoa 26 September 1930. The American commissioners were Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs and chairman of the American Samoan Commission; Senator Joseph T. Robinson; Congressmen Carroll L. Beedy and Guinn Williams. The rest of the commission was made up of the Samoan representatives, high chief Mauga, high chief Tufele and chief Magalei, the latter being the sole representative of the *Mau*. High chief Tuitele was, however, not invited to be a member and he thereby suffered a further decline in prestige. The administration could not offer the same explanation for this insult to Tuitele as Evans did back in 1922, for Tuitele had by now been elevated to the post of district governor of the Western District.

Both the views of the *Mau* and those of Tuitele were heard by the commission. Tuitele, in his testimony, set out the complaints of his district as follows:

1. The supreme authority of the American Governor and the fact that the *fono* could not initiate its own legislation;
2. The short term of office of the Governor;
3. The denial of land rights to part-Samoans;
4. The lack of financial support given to his district for the maintenance of schools;
5. The poor condition of the road between Leone and Pago Pago. He wished to see it paved in concrete as was the section in Pago Pago;
6. The lack of American support for agricultural development. He spoke of the mono-crop reliance on copra, "Before the government came here, the only way they could make money was through their copra. Today the only way they could get money is copra. There's no difference whatever . . ." (Tuitele, 1930: 324-347).

In contrast to the grievances of the *Mau* in Western Samoa, all of which pertained to alleged administrative interference with native and European affairs in the islands, the complaints of the *Mau* in American Samoa focused on charges of inadequate American attention. In short, whereas the Samoans in Western Samoa were complaining that the administration was overzealous, the Samoans in American Samoa were complaining that the administration was not doing enough.

#### *F. Goals of the Movement*

##### *1. Western Samoa*

In the embryonic stages of the *Mau* in Western Samoa, the goals of the movement were isomorphic with the grievances expressed. The movement emerged as a vehicle for resisting those specific features of

New Zealand's policy that denied traditional power groups within Samoa their full political recognition and participation. However, during the course of the movement, a growing desire for political autonomy took precedence over many of the issues based on factional self interest. Self-rule became the unifying theme and goal of the movement. The New Zealand strategies of repression culminating in "Black Saturday," December 28, 1929, further encouraged this concept, since the philosophy was intimately connected with a growing Samoan enmity towards New Zealand, and the desire to expel the administration from the Samoan Islands.

The theme of self-government was present before 1926. In a petition submitted to the King of England and the Prince of Wales in 1921, the Samoan petitioners stated: "we do not want the right to govern ourselves [to be] ignored by the New Zealanders" (in Keesing, 1934:148). But, the concept of autonomy at that time did not exclude continued relationships with a foreign power. At least some leaders felt that increased autonomy did not preclude some degree of dependency, and, as one unidentified *matai* stated, "so the Samoans should be allowed to control their own government, but given the protection of some European power" (in Keesing, 1934:179). By 1926, the entire question of self rule was, therefore, seen as synonymous with being "against the government." But as the movement progressed and leaders became more experienced through exposure to European political structures and philosophies, the idea of self rule as an end in itself took root and spread. According to Davidson (1967:132), a speech given

by the Maori leader Sir Maui Pomare, minister for the Cook Islands on native development, had a profound effect on Tamasese. Following this exposure to concepts of independence, Tamasese campaigned amongst the traditional non-English speaking *matai* in order to explain the principle and gain their support for an independent Samoa.

## 2. *American Samoa*

In contrast to the goal of self rule that emerged through the *Mau* movement in Western Samoa, the *Mau* in American Samoa owing to its increased dependency on American resources, developed goals that led in the opposite direction, namely, a desire for American citizenship and political recognition as an American territory.

The goals of stage one were much more limited in scope. The high chiefs wanted to replace Terhune, Noble, Cartwright and others, and they wanted an investigation of the financial affairs of the Island government. Once this was done, they were satisfied.

The goals of the second stage of the movement were of a different order. The testimony of the *Mau* leaders during the American Samoan Commission made clear the following *Mau* goals:

1. The formal annexation of Samoa by the United States;
2. Full citizenship rights for American Samoans;
3. The protection of land rights for part-Samoans;
4. The replacement of the Navy administration by a civilian one.

Other factions within the *Mau* in the second stage had their own goals. Tuitele wanted economic and social parity with the Eastern District. Chris Young and the Manu'an faction wanted his assumption of the Tui Manu'a title validated by the administration.

The *Mau* in American Samoa consistently reaffirmed its basic loyalty to the United States government in both stages of the movement. A statement of loyalty was included in the first petition of the high chiefs in July 1920. This loyalty was restated by the *Mau* to Governor Graham in 1927, and by Tuitele to the American Samoan Commission in 1930. In fact, Tuitele suggested that his suffering fellow Samoans in Western Samoa be invited to come under the American flag, but the commissioners stated that this was impossible (Tuitele, 1930:346).

The *Mau* in American Samoa was "against the government," but only in the sense that the real aim was to replace the navy administration, not the American government. All the factions of the *Mau* had this one common goal in stage two of the movement.

#### *G. Summary*

In this chapter several key aspects of the movements in American and Western Samoa have been analyzed, in an attempt to demonstrate that a number of important distinctions characterized the movements in each territory.

One of the most important features of the American movement was the distinctiveness of the two stages. Stage one was characterized by strong leadership from the high chiefs, clear cut but small scale grievances, strong numerical backing and broad territorial support. The second stage of the movement, although expressing more comprehensive political goals, was also characterized by less powerful leadership, smaller numerical backing and a smaller territorial support

base. These latter features seriously weakened the thrust of the movement.

On the other hand, in Western Samoa, the characteristics of strong leadership, strong numerical and territorial representation, was coupled with a structural completeness and the unifying theme of self rule. These features therefore worked in tandem to create an extremely powerful native movement. Although stage one of the *Mou* movement in American Samoa had more of the aforementioned features than did stage two, neither of the stages in American Samoa realized the combination of features achieved in the Western Samoan movements. Assuming that these qualities can be used as positive indicators of the relative strength and effectiveness of each movement vis-à-vis each other, it is possible to conclude that the movement in Western Samoa was stronger and more effective than its counterpart in American Samoa.

## CHAPTER VIII

## ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIANCE IN THE MOVEMENTS

Having established the differences, both in the character and the intensity between the political movements in Western and American Samoa, it is now appropriate to evaluate some of the explanations found in the literature in order to account more fully for this variance.

Since the *Mau* movement assumed considerable importance in New Zealand's internal political affairs, two polarized positions, as described by J.T. Gill, can be recognized:

Among the pamphleteers [of the time] there were two main groups, those who supported Nelson and the Citizens' Committee, and those who supported Richardson and the New Zealand Government (1949:93).

The prime goal of both parties was not so much to explain, but to justify their stand, and in the process to gain support for their respective positions. In doing so, however, the tendency to dwell on factors of individual import rather than those of wider sociological significance becomes apparent. Historians such as A.J. Toynbee, J.B. Condliffe and W.P. Morrell also fall into this frame in the sense that they lean heavily on a "great man" theory to explain the strength of the *Mau*, thereby omitting any consideration of sociological or environmental variables. In a somewhat similar vein are government spokesmen who invoke single historical events to explain the *Mau*

movement; for example, the institution of the copra marketing scheme, the introduction of prohibition or the political meddling of the Europeans. The problem with all of these explanations is that they do not adequately explain the differences between the two movements as documented in Chapters VI and VII.

The man who made the greatest impact with his interpretation of the *Mau* was Felix Keesing, in his book *Modern Samoa* (1934). Keesing's approach was to view the movement as a symptom of cultural disintegration resulting from the intrusion of western civilization. However, it is this point of view which has been criticized in the more recent literature. His oft-quoted description of the *Mau* states that:

The *Mau* is essentially a manifestation of a cultural-pathological condition in Samoan life, product of the long period of conflict, repression, psychological stress, lack of interest and excitement, social disintegration, baulking, and general unbalance and malaise, aggravated after 1924 by sudden official pressure (Keesing, 1934:177).

In countering the above, J.T. Gill asserts:

Yet in fact the "*Mau*" spread and got whole-hearted support. Surely this was an expression of racial vigour and self confidence, a vigorous counter-attack against European domination and a symbol of the strength rather than the weakness of the Samoan polity (Gill, 1949:100).

However, Keesing has often been mis-judged. For example, because of the popularity of the preceding quote, no one appears to have pointed to the following:

From one angle it can be considered as essentially reactionary, the struggles of a dying fa'aSamoa [sic], a revolt and a drawing back from strange and difficult ways of life superimposed from without, a reassertion

of repressed activities; from another as an omen of the future, one of the first kickings of a lusty, reborn Samoa, a promising indigenous experiment in mastering the new and unknown (Keesing, 1934:178).

Of major note is the fact that Keesing refers specifically to the following key factors in explaining the movement's origins:

1. Rapid change in the natives' lifestyle;
2. Discrepancies between traditional Samoan policy and modern philosophies of government;
3. Unwise implementation of colonial policy;
4. Conflicts between the government and private enterprise;
5. Discontents emerging from the part-Samoan group (Keesing, 1934a:297).

Further, in the same article (1934a), Keesing addresses the topic of comparing the movements in Western and American Samoa:

On the whole the native socio-political system in the American Islands has shown itself more adaptable to Western forms than that in Western Samoa. The traditional leadership is more defined, hence more easily utilized. Then too, the small size of the territory, and the completeness of domination by the naval authorities made possible a more thorough, if exceedingly benevolent control (300-301).

In this explanation, Keesing is clearly using a wide number of variables and the differences in traditional socio-political structures are of particular importance:

When the United States authorities assumed control of Samoan affairs from 1900, they fashioned a system of native administration based on the special political forms then existing in Tutuila and Manu'a. This was not accomplished without difficulty . . . nevertheless in comparison with Western Samoa, the task was relatively simple, for here the disruptive conflicts due to the complexity of the Tumua and Pule organization and the rivalries among the districts and families in relation to the "king" title did not exist (1931:38).

The analysis of traditional structure in Chapter IV, and of structural change in Chapter V of the present work, lend support to Keesing's views, in the general claim that such structural differences were of major importance in the pattern of political resistance during the *Mau* in each territory.

Keesing's views provide an interesting contrast to those of Sherwood Lingenfelter published in 1977. Lingenfelter states that social movements of the type similar to the *Mau* are attributable to the overwhelming dominance of metropolitan nations through colonial control. Speaking of the kinds of colonial policies found in the Pacific Islands, he says:

The consequences of this system [European economic exploitation] requiring great effort and yielding small rewards for the indigenes, have stimulated cargo cults, or withdrawal and non-co-operation on the part of indigenous peoples (1977:116).

Most historians or social scientists interested in culture change would agree that a fundamental agent of change is that of the European administration in power. However, Lingenfelter proceeds to claim that the colonial dominance and economic exploitation is the "superordinate variable" directing the nature of social movements in the Pacific. In Lingenfelter's terms, the only factor which would explain the differences in strength between the two Samoan governments would be a variation in the respective colonial policy. Furthermore, he predicts that such variation relates to the colonial policy toward funding the natives' expanding desire for economic growth:

The key to socioeconomic change in Oceania is colonial control, either furnishing or denying support for development (Lingenfelter, 1977:116).

By asserting a form of "colonial determinism," Lingenfelter is compelled to negate the influences of the traditional society. It follows then, that the differences between indigenous structures are necessarily causally irrelevant:

Traditional societies obviously vary tremendously throughout the region: some are more capitalistic and individually oriented, others are more reciprocal and societally oriented; some are loosely structured and others highly centralised. However, the basic proposition of this paper is that the colonial situation minimizes the significance of variation in the traditional societies undergoing socioeconomic change (1977:114).

This statement by Lingenfelter is quite at variance with the findings of this thesis, in which the key distinctions between the traditional social systems in Western and American Samoa are seen to be significantly related to the types of structural changes resulting from the imposition of European administrations.

#### A. *Disparate Levels of Colonial Infrastructure*

It would seem profitable at this juncture to incorporate an assessment of the relation between levels of funding and strengths of the two movements. According to Lingenfelter, a lack of funding, i.e., financial infrastructure, would create a stronger native response of withdrawal or non-cooperation. This would imply that the stronger political movement in Western Samoa should be associated with a relative lack of government support and conversely, the weaker movement in American

Samoa should be associated with greater support.

1. *Colonial Funding in American Samoa*

During the period under discussion (i.e. before 1930), the government of American Samoa was funded almost entirely by moneys generated from within the territory. Congress was not inclined towards disbursing funds for islands which were not yet technically United States Territory. The only moneys sent to American Samoa by the federal government were emergency funds related to the disastrous hurricanes of 1915 and 1926. The source of revenue for the Island government was, therefore, two-fold; namely, internal revenue and local customs revenue.

a. *Taxation.* Regulation No. 21 of 1900 was the first ordinance regulating the assessment and collection of taxes from the native population. Although taxes were a foreign concept to the Samoans, the contributions demanded by *matai* from members of his *'aiiga* were a common Samoan way of meeting civic obligations. The principle of redistribution inherent in the collection of taxes was, therefore, not totally alien to the Samoans. In the beginning, the manner of collecting taxes was close to the Samoan form of economic redistribution. Taxes were collected in copra, with "each district . . . assessed annually a given number of pounds of copra, the sale of which at public tender would realise the amount of money needed for native government purposes" (Bryan, 1927:61). By 1921, a new Regulation (No. 3), repealed the original regulation controlling taxation, and from this point on taxes were no longer paid in copra:

Under the new and present law natives and foreigners pay an annual cash poll tax into one fund, the native tax fund. The poll tax for 1926 is \$6, the school tax is \$3, making a total of \$9. There are 2,260 taxpayers. Due to the lack of birth records, every male Samoan is taxed who has reached the height of 5 feet and 1 inch (Bryan, 1927:62).

b. *Customs Revenue.* The funds available to the Island government in 1902 were small and effectively restricted government activities:

On May 19, 1902, there was only \$80 on hand in the customs fund, and about \$420 in the license fund. The license fund was chiefly used to buy food for the prisoners. The only other island fund was the native tax fund (paid in copra, and used to pay the native officials, district governors, county and village chiefs, native judges, magistrates, police, etc. This fund was all expended among the people where collected). The island government was practically without funds on June 30, 1902 (Bryan, 1927:94).

This situation gradually improved, as the customs duties were progressively raised as from October 1902. As a consequence, the total duty realized in 1925 was \$33,031.24 (Bryan, 1927:96). In 1926, revenues were allotted to the various departments from the general fund in the following amounts:

Department	Payment in \$ U.S.
Judicial Department	5,110.17
Native Tax Department	12,932.00
Department of Public Health	9,549.05
Customs Department	16,900.00
Department of Education	15,335.00
Department of Public Works	23,575.00
TOTAL	83,401.22

Source: Bryan, 1927.

These allotments were based on a projected income for that year of \$86,600.00, and the government support averaged \$9.61 per capita.

2. *Colonial Funding in Western Samoa*

Major sources of funding for Western Samoa included internal taxation, local customs revenue, and New Zealand subsidies and loans.<sup>5</sup>

a. *Taxation.* The total native taxes for the years 1923 to 1928 read as follows:

Period	Amount in \$U.S.
1923-1924	42,070.75
1924-1925	81,618.06
1925-1926	97,155.20
1926-1927	86,567.65
1927-1928	12,009.42

Source: AJHR A-4 1925:34; A-4192:35-36; A-41928:28-29; conversion figures based on Bidwell, 1970:1.

The jump in revenue from 1923 to 1924 is attributable to the introduction of the medical tax totalling 7,705 pounds (32,746.25 \$U.S.) and the low figures for 1926-1928 reflect the refusal of *Mau* members to pay tax.

b. *Customs Revenue.* The customs revenues for the years 1923-1928 are set out below, and they comprised over half of the total annual revenues.

Period	Amount in \$ U.S.
1923-1924	290,028.50
1924-1925	344,370.48
1925-1926	401,594.55
1926-1927	335,004.05
1927-1928	390,622.70

Source: AJHR A-41925:34; A-41927:35-36; A-41928:28-29.

c. *New Zealand Subsidies and Loans.* In addition to the internal revenue, New Zealand provided annual subsidies as follows:

Period	Amount in \$ U.S.
1923-1924	102,000.00
1924-1925	90,723.60
1925-1926	103,790.00
1926-1927	97,000.00
1927-1928	97,400.00

Source: AJHR A-4 1925:34; A-41927:35-36; A-41928:28-29.

Despite these additional finances, the administration in Western Samoa had to struggle to balance its books:

Equally significant was the fact that in spite of the subsidy . . . the budget balanced in only one year, 1925-26. On all other occasions there was a substantial deficit. In the period prior to 1926, this decreased progressively each year till a balance was effected, but after 1926 such a healthy state was not maintained and within twelve months it was as high as ever (Gill, 1949:66).

The New Zealand government had therefore, to provide additional funds in the form of a 100,000 pound loan in 1921, and another of 47,000 pounds in 1926, followed by a further loan of 26,200 pounds

over the years 1927-1929 (Keesing, 1934:489).

The gross figures for 1926 indicate that in Western Samoa, government support, excluding loans, worked out at the equivalent of \$19 per capita.

### 3. *Comparison of Colonial Funding*

There are many problems in utilizing the above crude figures to measure accurately the level of each government's support.

First, the figures for Western Samoa omit the sum of the New Zealand loans. If the latter are taken into account for the period 1921-1928, then the total of New Zealand support is just under \$23 per capita in comparison with the \$9.61 per capita in American Samoa.

Second, if the moneys accruing from Wellington and Washington were used as an indicator, it would appear that New Zealand invested very much more in her trust territory than did the United States; the latter apparently contributed nothing directly to the Island government of American Samoa. This does, by the way, contradict popular, conventional beliefs about the relative funding of these territories (personal communication, Mary Boyd:1980). The reason most people assume a large American investment is explained by Keesing:

Finance in American Samoa has always been so different from that in the larger territory [Western Samoa] as to be incomparable. In spite of the slenderness of revenues from this commercially little developed area the government services are most extensive--thanks to the gratuitous use of the personnel and facilities of the naval station in the work of the administration (Keesing, 1934:490).

From this it appears that the American Samoans were "given" services from the navy which were essentially "free," but these could not be separated from the expenses of the administration. For example, navy personnel who headed the various civic departments of the Island government had their salaries paid by the United States Navy. However, the "free" services upon examination, become surprisingly expensive. This is shown in the following account of the "free" medical services:

At the 1913 fono, the delegates unanimously requested that the Samoan Hospital be absolutely free. To accomplish this and to meet expenses for proposed island government improvements the ad valorem duties were increased from 10 per cent to 15 per cent on November 1, 1913, and the Samoan Hospital declared free to all residents of American Samoa for treatment, operations, etc. . . . The proceeds from the increase in the ad valorem duties were supposed to be credited to the Samoan Hospital, but the Hospital never got the money . . . [After 1920] Hospital deficits were thereafter paid from the Customs fund (Bryan, 1927:74-75).

In the same vein, the navy charged the Island government a fee for processing and handling the copra shipping, and road building expenses were borne by the Island government funds and by the donation of free labour by villages along the proposed route.

Third, many of the expenses of the New Zealand administration were not directly for the benefit of the natives, as was the case in American Samoa. In fact, one source states that only 43 per cent of the expenditures could be related to native policy, and warns that "It is impossible to assess exactly the indirect contribution made by various groups under some heads" (Gill, 1950:67). He states further that:

It is impossible to estimate at all accurately the exact proportion of the expenditure of the Medical Department, Education Department, Agriculture Department., and Police Department that should be attributed to native interests. In the annual reports after 1926 the arbitrary figure of fifty per cent was taken, but this was merely an approximation (Gill, 1949:67).

What this means, is that care must be taken to make allowance for moneys spent by the New Zealand administration on expenses external to native interests. When this is done, by halving the estimates of per capita support previously stated, namely \$19, then the amount is closer to \$9 per capita. This is almost the same amount as for American Samoa, namely \$9.61. Even if the New Zealand loans are included the per capita support is no more than \$11.50.

Fourth, if one takes into account the salaries paid directly by the two administrations to native officials and staff, the figure for Western Samoa for the year 1924-1925 works out at approximately \$2.80 per capita in comparison to slightly less than \$5.00 per capita in American Samoa.

Finally, it becomes clear, that even if both Western and American Samoa disbursed relatively equal mounts of money per capita, there remain real differences in the ways in which this financial support reached the natives. In respect to salaries paid to native officials, approximately \$4 out of every \$10 spent on native affairs in American Samoa went directly to such officials in the form of direct cash disbursement, whereas in Western Samoa only \$1.70 out of every \$10 was so disbursed. Though it must be kept in mind that the admini-

stration in Western Samoa dealt with a more complex territory, and hence required departments such as the Chinese Department and the Department of Lands and Survey which were unnecessary in American Samoa, only 11.9 percent of the budget was allotted to native affairs, whereas in American Samoa the figure was 15.5 percent (see Table VI, page 242).

The implications of the foregoing may well suggest that the key factor in colonial funding may not be support in gross terms, but rather the means of support, the kind of support and directness of its availability to the native islander.

#### *Resume*

It was suggested by Sherwood Lingenfelter that the variation in the intensity of political movements such as the *Mau* could be explained by the level of government support. From this hypothesis it follows that the stronger resistance of the *Mau* in Western Samoa should be associated with a low level of government support and the weaker movement in American Samoa with a higher level of government support. On examining the amounts and kinds of infrastructure provided by the two administrations, and allowing for the incompleteness of the data, there does not seem to be any strong support for this hypothesis, for it appears that New Zealand disbursed considerably more funds for use in Western Samoa than did the American government in American Samoa. There is, however, a more discernible correlation between strength of movement and amounts of money directly available to the Samoans. In American Samoa, approximately twice the average per capita disbursement

Table VI

Departmental Expenditures as Percentage of Total Budget for  
Western Samoa and American Samoa 1925

Department	Percentage of Total Budget	
	1925 American Samoa	1925 Western Samoa
Judicial	6.1	7.7
Native Affairs	15.5	11.9
Public Health	11.5	18.0
Customs	20.2	6.3
Education	18.4	5.5
Public Works	28.3	18.2
SUB-TOTAL	100.00	67.6
Interest on public debt		3.1
Administrative costs		6.8
Treasury and audit		1.7
Agriculture Department		2.2
Chinese Department		1.2
Post Office and Savings Bank		3.6
Wireless Station		4.3
Miscellaneous		7.0
Lands and Survey Department		1.5
TOTAL		100.00

Source: American Samoa: Bryan, 1927:132-134;  
Western Samoa: Richardson, 1925b:41.

	Percentage of Total Budget	
	1925 American Samoa	1925 Western Samoa
Salaries to native officials	40.6	17.0

was provided by the American administration in the form of direct payment to native officials than was so provided in the Western Samoan territory. This fact may well suggest that there was a considerable difference in 'effective value' between cash allotments to native officials and allocations for community services and public works. If this is so then a simplistic evaluation of levels of support will not suffice to explain the variance between the two movements.

The correlation of strong government support and native political cooperation postulated by Lingenfelter is not borne out by an examination of the two *Mau* movements and their respective administration. Though New Zealand provided large sums of money for the administration of Western Samoa to fund progressive socio-economic development programs, it only succeeded in arousing fierce Samoan political opposition. On the other hand, American Samoa was governed without any federal aid on an extremely slender internally self sufficient budget and yet the political movement in that territory was considerably weaker than the one in Western Samoa. This was because the *Mau* in American Samoa exhibited a strong attachment to the prospect of association with the United States and developed a series of strategies aimed at greater participation within the American economic sphere. In contrast, the leaders of the *Mau* in Western Samoa adopted strategies to withstand incorporation within the colonial economic sphere. It is maintained that the feature of disparate infrastructure is but one element in assessing the nature of the two *Mau* movements, and that a fuller understanding of the variance requires an examination

of key physical environmental factors that conditioned the strategies of the *Mau* in the two Samoan territories.

*B. Disparate Responses to the Environment*

Despite the apparent uniformity of physical environmental conditions and traditional lifestyles in the Samoan archipelago, important distinctions obtain between the islands of Western Samoa and American Samoa. It has been demonstrated in Chapter III that economic activities were indeed focussed on the coastal and lowland micro-environments of the archipelago, but the coastal regions themselves exhibit varying potentials for exploitation.

Marshall Sahlins in 1958, postulated a relationship between levels of social stratification and food productivity in Polynesia, namely that, "the degree of stratification in these societies is an adaptive feature related to increasing productivity" (1958:107). This thesis is in general agreement with Sahlins, and it is suggested that the differences in the level of socio-political complexity between the islands of Western Samoa and American Samoa as described hitherto in this work, can be related to the variation in the degree of resource potential between these islands. It is also maintained that the fore-mentioned elements had a direct bearing on responses in the demographic field which in turn had a distinctive influence on the responses of the populace in the two Samoan territories to the colonial presence.

In order to examine these facets of the argument more fully an analysis of each of them is made in the following sections. To begin with, an assessment of resource potential in the two Samoan territories is made through a comparative analysis of human response to physical environmental conditions between the two largest islands in Western Samoa, namely Upolu and Savai'i on the one hand, and the largest island in American Samoa, namely Tutuila, on the other.

1. *Resource Potential in Western Samoa*

Upolu covers 430 square miles (1,114 square Km) and Savai'i about 700 square miles (1,813 square Km). Together they comprise as much as 94 percent of the entire Samoan archipelago.

a. *Upolu*. The island of Upolu has been accepted as the most attractive area in the entire archipelago for settlement. It has extensive coastal plains and even in many areas of the hilly interior where elevations reach 3,608 feet (1,100 metres), slopes rarely exceed eight degrees. The only areas of Upolu which are not too favourable for settlement are in the ten square mile section of the southern coast where recent volcanic material is but barely covered with thin soil (Kear and Wood, 1962:33). Soils elsewhere on Upolu vary in fertility according to the age of the volcanic material from which they are derived, and the degree of leaching related to variable precipitation. The oldest volcanic materials have produced weathered soils of heavy and plastic texture that have limited agricultural value, and the same is true of the very youngest soils which are thin textured, and stony. However, soils derived from the middle-age range of volcanic

material result in clay loams of appreciable fertility, and these cover extensive areas in northwestern Upolu, most particularly the A'ana plain. In addition, the annual precipitation, though low in places, is fairly evenly distributed throughout the year, particularly in Western Upolu, and this provides an added advantage in terms of crop response (Wright, 1962:81). In general then, the physical environment of Upolu is considered well favoured for settlement and the cultivation of subsistence crops.

*b. Savai'i.* On the island of Savai'i, elevations in the interior reach 6,094 feet (1,857 metres), and much of the land mass is useless for exploitation because of recent lava flows which extend to the coast and isolate sections of the island from each other. In addition, the Matavanu lava flow in northern Savai'i cuts off the northern coastal belt from the interior forested zone. A further problem on Savai'i is the paucity of fresh water, and some observers have stated that "Western Savai'i is the region characterised by the worst water supply in the territory" (Kear and Wood, 1962:46). Compared with Upolu, larger areas of Savai'i are, therefore, less suitable for settlement and crop cultivation.

*Distribution of Microenvironments:*

Because of their large size and greater range in elevation, Upolu and Savai'i have the full range of microenvironments that are recognized in Samoa. These microenvironments are set out below in order of their zonal distribution.

- (1) open sea;
- (2) reef;
- (3) lagoon;
- (4) littoral belt;
- (5) freshwater streams and ponds;
- (6) lowland forest;
- (7) lowland forest clearings;
- (8) middle forest;
- (9) mossy forest.

Of the above microenvironments, those ranging from (2) through to (7) are of the greatest importance as sources of food, while (1) and (8) are of lesser importance, and (9) of no importance.

*a. Upolu.* Approximately three-quarters of Upolu is under 984 feet (300 metres) in elevation. This elevation represents the approximate upper limit of the lowland forest microenvironment. Furthermore, an assessment of area with gentle to moderate relief shows that approximately two-thirds of all land in Upolu can be included in this classification. Based on these considerations, and also on a recent land potential map of the island, it can be established that about 78 percent of the total area of Upolu has potential for subsistence horticulture (Wright, 1962:106-107). In addition to the above assessment of land-based microenvironments, it is also important to consider the distribution of reef and lagoon microenvironments, as these provide the major source of high-protein foods. Upolu is particularly well favoured by a fringing reef which extends over 90 percent of the coast,

and a good supply of marine resources are available to most of the villagers. It is to be noted that around northwestern Upolu, one of the areas of densest settlement anywhere in the archipelago, the reef is at its widest and extends offshore up to 4.5 miles (7.25 Km).

b. *Savai'i*. Approximately 50 percent of Savai'i is under 984 feet (300 metres) in elevation, and almost 80 percent of the land is of gentle to moderate relief. This fact, however, belies the actual situation, in that the gentle slopes in Savai'i are often due to recent lava flows, and such terrain is of little value for human habitation and horticulture. Based on these considerations, and on the map of land potential referred to above, it can be established that about 66 percent of the total area of Savai'i has potential for subsistence horticulture (Wright, 1962:106-107). It must be noted, however, that Savai'i is notably devoid of fringing reef. The only exceptions are those around the very eastern end of the island, the pockets of reef along the northern shore and the very small reefs along the southwestern coast. Only on the eastern tip does the reef extend seaward over one mile (1.6 Km).

#### *Resume*

As can be established by the foregoing, Upolu outranks Savai'i in regard to the general suitability of the physical environment for settlement and crop cultivation. Upolu also outranks Savai'i, in that it has a much higher proportion of the most productive micro-environments for food resources from both land and sea.

## 2. *Resource Potential in American Samoa*

American Samoa constitutes only six percent of the land mass of the entire archipelago. The total land area of the American islands approximates 75 square miles (194 square Km) and Tutuila, covering 54 square miles (140 square Km) is the largest of the seven islands of the group.

The island of Tutuila is roughly 18 miles (29 Km) in length, but exceptionally narrow in width with Pago Pago harbour nearly bisecting the island. The snake-like shape of the island reflects the fact that it is a continuous series of volcanic ridges with heights ranging up to 2,141 feet (653 metres). From the dorsal ridge, the land plummets precipitously to a narrow littoral belt with several transverse spurs reaching toward the sea. This produces a fiordic type of landscape. The northern coast is exceptionally rugged and sparsely settled. Crop cultivation on the lowlands is further restricted by recent lava flows. The only sizeable area of gentle relief on Tutuila suitable for cultivation is the Leone plain located in the Western District. The most fertile soils in Tutuila are those of the alluvial talus slopes and these areas are favoured for growing subsistence crops, however their extents are extremely limited, and growing demands for food required the cultivation of steeper inland slopes. These slopes are relatively fertile, but over-use has resulted in serious erosion problems. In addition many upland plots are distant from the villages and extremely difficult to clear and plant. Another feature of consequence is the common occurrence of tropical storms.

According to one source (Visher, 1925), the major hurricane path lies 100 miles (160 Km) to the east of American Samoa. After 1900, four disastrous hurricanes were reported (1903, 1913, 1915, and 1926). Each of these was accompanied by much damage to dwellings and crops.

#### *Distribution of Microenvironments*

Tutuila has little useable land, and one source states that only 15 percent of the area falls into this category (West, 1961:124). Caution must be exercised in interpreting this figure since the upper range of feasible slope cultivation has not been definitively established. Almost all the area falls within the range of elevation containing the four main productive land microenvironments (i.e., areas below 984 feet or 300 metres), and theoretically most of this land should be useable. But because of the ruggedness of the terrain, it is difficult to make reliable estimates. The low estimate by West may, in fact, not take into consideration that slopes as steep as 60 degrees are known to have been cultivated.

The other distinctive characteristic is the absence of the upper forest and this leaves Tutuila with less than a full complement of microenvironments. Furthermore, though approximately 60 to 70 percent of the coastline is protected by a fringing reef, the distribution of reef is discontinuous and narrow in width except at Nu'uuli. Only the southern coast is fairly well fringed by reefs, while the northern coast zone has only sporadic and discontinuous reefs. In addition, because of the relatively narrow width of the reef, large lagoons are rare, and this sets added limitations to the availability of high protein

marine food resources.

*Resume*

The conclusions to be drawn from this comparison of resource potential among the three islands are as follows (Table VII). Upolu is exceptionally well represented by the most productive microenvironments. It has adequate fresh water supplies, extensive surplus areas of moderate relief for crop cultivation and infertile lava flows cover only small extents of the coastal areas. In addition, severe tropical storms are infrequent. Savai'i can be considered the second ranking island in food resource potential. Environmental disadvantages such as extensive areas of infertile lava flow and areas with fresh water shortages are offset by extensive areas of surplus land of moderate relief. Furthermore, tropical storms are infrequent. Tutuila ranks third. Although reef distribution here is superior to that on Savai'i, and though fresh water supplies are more reliable, the areas suitable for cultivation are restricted. The shortage of surplus land and the frequency of devastating tropical storms are additional factors contributing to the low food resource potential.

3. *Demographic Responses*

With the foregoing ranking in terms of resource potential in mind, one could expect that the population density figures for the three islands to rate similarly. The following figures taken from Table V, Chapter III, however, depict a different order of rank:

Table VII

## Summary of Resource Potential for Upolu, Savai'i and Tutuila Islands

Environmental Features	Upolu	Savai'i	Tutuila
1. total area	430 sq mi/1,114 sq Km	700 sq mi/1,813 sq Km	54 sq mi/140 sq Km
2. percentage of total land suitable for subsistence agriculture	80 percent	66 percent	15 percent
3. surplus land suitable for subsistence agriculture	extensive areas of moderate relief	extensive areas of moderate relief	expansion of crop lands only possible in rugged uplands
4. relief of land suitable for cultivation	gentle to moderate	gentle to moderate	moderate to steep
5. distribution of land covered by recent lava flows	restricted areas in southern Upolu	large areas reaching the coast	one large section in southwestern Tutuila
6. freshwater supply	adequate in most regions	serious shortages in several sectors of the island	adequate in most regions
7. distribution of reefs	extensive	limited	moderate
8. frequency of severe tropical storms	infrequent; none recorded between 1900 and 1930	infrequent; none recorded between 1900 and 1930	frequent; four recorded between 1900 and 1930

Islands	Crude Density (1839) Per Square Mile/per sq. Km
Tutuila	148 / 57
Upolu	58 / 22
Savai'i	28 / 11

Source: Charles Wilkes in Watters, 1958b:345.

But, as Donald Hardesty so clearly explains, a pertinent distinction obtains between crude density, i.e.: "the number of individuals per unit of total space," and economic or ecologic density, i.e.: "the numbers of individuals per unit of habitable space" (1977:126). Thus the use of crude density figures can be totally misleading because they do not necessarily reflect the character of the environmental base in terms of carrying capacity nor do they indicate future land potential. Furthermore, yet another distinction may be obtained between Hardesty's "ecologic density" which measures population in terms of the total habitable land, and what could be called "primary ecologic density" which measures population in relation to land actually inhabited. The difference between the values obtained through these two measures is critical, because it could provide an indication of the amount of surplus land theoretically available but not in use. However, in interpreting such figures, care has to be taken to recognize the traditional agricultural practices of a given population. Samoans, for example, do not exploit the upper forest and consequently it would be erroneous to include

such areas in an estimate of "inhabited land" or even "habitable land." This problem of effectively estimating and also of comparing population density figures in the Samoan islands has been raised by others, in particular James W. Fox who wrote:

Changes have occurred since European contact, but by and large, the peripheral pattern of settlement characteristic of 'high' Pacific Islands has remained. Overall densities thus mean very little (1962:113).

Following the line of reasoning developed by Hardesty, the task therefore, is to devise an appropriate unit of measurement. Since the pattern of settlement and land use is so decidedly confined to coastal areas it seems logical to estimate and express primary ecologic density in terms of these coastal units. This is precisely what Fox suggests:

Accordingly, approximations of the density of population in various parts of the islands may be made by dividing the total numbers of village population by the length of the smoothed, generalised coastline where settlement occurs (1962:116).

When such calculations are made for the year 1839 on the basis of generalized coastline length and Wilkes' population estimates, the three major islands can be ranked as follows: Upolu with 250 persons per coastal mile (155 per coastal Km); Savai'i with 173 persons per coastal mile (108 per coastal Km); and Tutuila with 145 persons per coastal mile (90 per coastal Km). These figures differ markedly from crude density figures set out in the table on the preceding page, and the contrasting results are primarily due to the differential, if not disproportionate extents of coastline on the three islands. For, although Tutuila's land area is only 54 square miles (140 sq. Km)

compared with 430 square miles (1,114 sq. Km) for Upolu and 700 square miles (1,813 sq. Km) for Savai'i, the generalized length of coastline for the three islands works out at 55, 100 and 115 miles respectively (88, 160, and 185 km). Furthermore, the significant contrast between the figures based on population per coastal mile and the crude density figures provide an indication of the amount of surplus land that may be available on each island. For example, for both Upolu and Savai'i population figures expressed in coastal length are much higher than the crude density figures. This suggests that there are large areas of surplus land on these two islands. On the other hand, the similarity between the population figures in coastal length and the crude density figures for Tutuila indicates that there is little surplus land on that island.

However, it is extremely difficult to gear directly, land surplus figures with actual useable surplus land. On Upolu this is easiest to ascertain, as there is a high degree of correlation between areas of fertile soils and moderate slope, and hence land suitable for agriculture. On Savai'i, the wide disparity between the figures for crude density and coastal density can be explained in large part by the fact that the island has large areas of infertile lava flows, and hence it is doubtful that Savai'i actually surpasses Upolu with respect to the proportion of useable surplus land. The situation in Tutuila is even further complicated by the fact that although most of the island is under 984 feet (300 metres) in elevation, and though this conforms theoretically with the upper limit of the lowland forest, the slopes are so steep that agriculture is extremely difficult. It is because of the latter point that West assesses only 15 percent of

Table VIII  
Population Concentrations in Samoa 1840

Sector	Island	Territory
1. Northwestern coastal plain	Upolu	Western Samoa
2. Aleipata area	Upolu	Western Samoa
3. Safata area	Upolu	Western Samoa
4. Southeastern coastal strip	Upolu	Western Samoa
5. Safune-Matautu area	Savai'I	Western Samoa
6. Leone Plain	Tutuila	American Samoa

the land as suitable for the growing of native crops.

The significant conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that of the three islands, Upolu was the one that had the most productive physical environmental base, and consequently the inhabitants were able to rely on a hinterland with the greatest potential in maintaining their traditional patterns of living. This contention is further supported by the following two considerations. First, of the six numerical concentrations of regional population identified by Watters (1958a:3), Upolu in 1840 had four and Savai'i and Tutuila one each (Table VIII). Second, if statistics relating to distribution of villages and village populations on each island are taken into account (Table IX), Upolu and Savai'i

had considerably larger average populations per village than Tutuila. Furthermore, the smallest village in Upolu had far more inhabitants than the smallest villages on the other two islands.

Table IX  
Village Population in Samoa 1926

	Upolu	Savai'i	Tutuila
Number of villages	108	62	57
Average number of inhabitants	223	204	116
Population in largest village	956	645	611
Population in smallest village	51	34	4

Source: Keesing, 1934:41.

*Resume*

On both counts, namely, rank order based on resource potential and rank order based on the level of socio-cultural structural complexity, the lead position is held by Upolu as predicted. However, the distinction obtaining between Savai'i and Tutuila is less clear for though Savai'i outranked Tutuila in terms of certain resource factors, Tutuila outranked Savai'i with respect to others. How, one might ask, could Savai'i maintain a higher level of traditional political stratification and socio-cultural structural complexity vis-à-vis Tutuila? The answer is most probably found in the relative positioning of these two islands to the larger and more important one of Upolu. Savai'i

lies eight miles (12.8 Km) distant from Upolu while Tutuila is 40 miles (64 Km) from Upolu. Consequently, Tutuila was effectively isolated from the socio-political developments which took place in the two islands of Western Samoa.

Finally, it is probable that some readers may consider much of the approach adopted in the foregoing sections of this chapter as being too deterministic and unduly subjective in nature. Consequently, in the final section of this work which follows, an attempt is made at restoring the balance by re-examining the human response to the colonial presence on a more empirical basis.

#### 4. *Disparate Responses to the Colonial Presence*

a. *Western Samoa.* The official German enumeration of population in 1900 listed a total of 32,815 Samoans. By 1917 the official New Zealand census claimed a total population of 35,404 (McArthur, 1956:155). Since 1900, the elimination of warfare, the absence of hurricanes and the increase in health facilities had resulted in a steady rise in population. This held true until the disastrous influenza epidemic of 1918 and by 31 December of that year deaths related to the epidemic were estimated at 8,500 persons (Elliot, Wilson, and Sefton Moorehouse, 1919:4). The epidemic exerted profound changes. First, population declined from an estimated 38,302 persons in September 1918, to 30,738 by 31 December 1918. Second, deaths from influenza were highest among males and the elderly. And it must be noted that the traditional Samoan *matai* were drawn from the latter group. Some 2,079 adult males died from influenza on Upolu as compared

to 1,720 adult women and 1,027 children, and the comparable figures for Savai'i were 1,186, 984, and 546 respectively (Department of Native Affairs, 31 May 1919). The *Samoa Times* on 13 September 1919 issued a list of survivors and deceased among the *Faipule* which showed that 24 out of 31 *Faipule* perished in the previous ten month period (Davidson, 1967:444). Third, this scourging of the *Fono* of *Faipule* presented an opportunity for the administration to fill these vacancies with supportive *matai*, and the leadership as a consequence, fell to younger *matai* who were less acceptable by traditional criteria to the Samoan people.

The colonial presence brought about another series of changes. First, internal migration led to the urbanization of Apia. Settlement on the Bay at Apia was originally limited to Apia village as most of the 2.5 mi (4 Km) foreshore was not attractive for indigenous Samoan settlement (Gilson, 1970:162). The arrival of the Europeans drew Samoan settlement to the Bay area. At first, the Samoans were attracted by the presence of the missionaries and their services, and this developed into a major population shift with the interior village dwellers migrating to validate claims to portions of their traditional lands lying on the Bay. By 1840 the Savalalo area was occupied, and by the 1850's Matafele and Matautu were also inhabited (Gilson, 1970:163). Second, the spread of commercial trading posts around the island intensified the traditional tendency for coastal settlement as more of the interior peoples moved to the new commercial sphere. Particularly high growth occurred in the favourable areas of

northwestern Upolu. Third, much of the best land in the same area was taken over by European plantations. By 1886, approximately 7,450 acres (2,980 hectares) were appropriated for German commercial plantations in Western Samoa, and of these, roughly 7,150 were located in the favourable area of north and northwestern Upolu (Lewthwaite, 1962:144 map). After partition in 1900, the increased political stability resulted in a flurry of plantation development, which was cut short by the New Zealand occupation in 1914. Although intensification of plantation agriculture definitely presented problems of localized population pressure and exerted a strain on native resources in the Apia region, it is to be noted that the amount of surplus land suitable for food crops was sufficient to meet overall needs. It must also be borne in mind that though much employment was available on European plantations, most Samoans stubbornly refused to engage in plantation work despite all forms of inducement. So serious was this problem for the commercial plantations, that indentured Chinese labour had to be introduced. In 1903, 279 Chinese labourers arrived and by 1914 a total of 2,184 Chinese and 877 Melanesians were so employed (Lewthwaite, 1962:152). It is highly probable that the Samoans were not inherently averse to a cash income or wage labour, but rather that the advantages were not sufficient to attract them. Indeed, in Samoan eyes, the work was not only menial and underpaid, but also lowered social prestige. Furthermore, cash cropping by the natives was not encouraged during the German times, for,

Not only did it lower quality and tend to depress the reputation of their [the German planters] own produce, but it added to the hazards of production . . . ill-tended plots accentuated the menace of multiplying pests and disease (Lewthwaite, 1962:157).

As a result, very few Samoan land owners entered plantation agriculture, and other than garden stands of coconut, grew only, "some . . . cacao, or trifling quantities of coffee or rubber" (Lewthwaite, 1962:157).

Consequently, the Samoans boycotted plantation employment, and except for the "Apia centred native," the villagers remained aloof from the commercialization and retained their fundamental reliance on a subsistence economy.

In the 1950's, a team of geographers from the University of Auckland established that 124,230 acres (49,692 hectares) or approximately 200 square miles (520 square Km) in Western Samoa were 'village occupied' lands, including crop land both current and fallow, areas in grass, swamp and residential areas. This represents a little less than 20 percent of the total land area of the two islands with the figures for Upolu and Savai'i, being 25 and 12 percent respectively. It was further suggested by Farrell (1962:218), that at the end of World War I, the total occupied village and agricultural land approximated the area listed for commercial coconut production. This estimate indicates that 62 square miles (161 square Km) of Upolu and 49 square miles (128 square Km) of Savai'i were occupied by native villagers in 1920. From this it can be inferred that village life by 1920 had not changed in its fundamental reliance on native crops, and that the populace experienced little difficulty in meeting daily

dietary requirements, for land was plentiful and natural disasters infrequent. An agricultural survey conducted by New Zealand in 1950 established that in an average *'aiga* of 15 persons, four men worked an average of 16 hours per week on tasks associated with the production of subsistence crops, and that three women worked 20 hours per week on similar tasks. Three men and three women also averaged 11 to 12 hours per week on fishing activities. This gives a total labour input of 124 hours in gardening tasks and 72 hours in fishing tasks per week (Farrell, 1962:196-197). It is claimed that this labour input was sufficient to supply the average *'aiga* with a daily harvest of 20 taro, one bunch of bananas, one *ta'amu*, plus coconuts and fish. With taro yields averaging five tons per acre, per capita consumption was approximately 1.8 pounds (.8 Kg) per diem (Farrell, 1962:217). On the other hand, this same *'aiga* in 1950 invested a total of 100 man hours in the collecting, cutting, and drying tasks associated with the production of cash crops. From this it can be inferred that villagers in the 1920's, when the labour requirement for cash crops was no doubt substantially less, would at least have been able to meet the required levels of subsistence food production.

Indeed, so entrenched was the native subsistence economy that by 1950, Jacques Barrau estimated that out of an average total per diem intake of 3,500 calories, only 300 to 500 were derived from imported food stuffs. This suggests that dietary changes over the years were minimal. The retention of a subsistence based economy is corroborated by James Fox:

In short, in Western Samoa, the people could meet all requirements in terms of a subsistence agriculture until fairly recent times--and in fact could more than do so in the period after the first European contact when population declined as a result of that period (Fox 1962:16).

b. *American Samoa.* The first American census of 1900 enumerated 3,923 persons on Tutuila and 1,756 persons on the Manu'a group. From that date, the population began its steady increase and totalled 8,058 persons by 1920 (Evans, 1922:43). The influenza epidemic of 1918 had little impact due to the stringent quarantine imposed and the population continued to climb throughout the 1920's to a high of 10,055 in 1930. This trend was in marked contrast to events in Western Samoa during the same period. Whereas depopulation in Western Samoa further increased the already substantial amount of surplus land available on a per capita basis, sustained population growth in American Samoa made land suitable for subsistence agriculture scarcer and what remained was at a premium. These adverse trends were intensified by migration patterns. Before the arrival of the Americans, the area with the greatest population density coincided with the area of greatest economic potential for subsistence agriculture, namely the Leone plain of the Western district. A major consequence of the American takeover, in addition to the raising of health standards and the resultant lowering of mortality rates, was the stimulation of a large scale reversal of the population levels in the two districts of Tutuila. The pull of Pago Pago as a centre of administration and for educational, medical

and employment facilities meant that the population in the Eastern District grew at a disproportionate rate to that in Western District. During the period 1900 to 1920, the population in the Eastern District increased from 2,221 to 3,777, i.e., an increase of 70 percent, while the population of the Western District grew from 1,702 to 2,408, i.e., an increase of only 41 percent. In fact, in the period 1920 to 1926, the population of the Eastern District increased by 444 persons while the population of the Western District decreased by 13 persons (Bryan, 1927:9). The critical feature of these trends was that population was rapidly increasing in the Eastern District, which as has already been demonstrated suffered from a paucity of suitable agricultural land. In addition, population was being drained from the Western District which was the area with the largest supply of easily cultivated land. This intensified the pressure of population on available land resources for subsistence cropping. Furthermore, commercial plantation cropping on the small and rugged islands of American Samoa was an impossibility. Commercial interests were represented there only by independent trading stores, and the kinds of commercial developments as were occurring in Western Samoa simply were not found on the American islands. From the beginning, Americans and other Westerners were of the opinion that the sole value of these islands was the potential of Pago Pago as a harbour and a strategic Pacific outpost. Consequently, commercial activity on the American islands revolved around the affairs and activities of the naval station. The above considerations exacerbated the problems associated with

increasing population pressure vis-à-vis available land resources. The American Samoans did not have sufficient resources in food stuffs to cope adequately. As early as 1913 it was reported that the one large American Samoan village, namely Leone, had to resort to buying part of its food supplies (Wood, 1926:7). There is also evidence that the Samoan subsistence economy was under increasing strain during the period 1920 to 1930 even in respect to taro production. Although the per capita, per diem production of 1.25 pounds (.56 Kg) of taro (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1932:317) provides substantial nutrition, this level of production in the late 1920's is considerably less than the 1.8 pounds (.8 Kg) per capita, per diem estimated for Western Samoans 20 years later by Farrell. The crucial feature here is that the problem of rapidly increasing population in American Samoa meant that taro cultivation had to be extended into the upland areas far removed from the villages. Therefore, this resulted in a significant increase in labour time. For example, by the late 1930's in the village of Amanave in the Western District, the cultivators of taro had to travel a minimum of two miles (3.2 Km) over difficult terrain to reach their closest taro patch (Coulter, 1941:26). Furthermore, such plots were on slopes as steep as 60 degrees. These marginal considerations associated with subsistence food production periodically reached catastrophic proportions because of natural hazards. For example, storms struck Manu'a on 1 January and Tutuila on 10 February, 1903, and as a consequence the Samoans did not have sufficient food to survive until new crops matured:

To relieve the stringency, a considerable quantity of rice and hard-bread had been bought by the government and paid for out of island funds, and sold to the natives at cost (Underwood, 1903:4).

In April 1913, another severe hurricane struck Tutuila and even the breadfruit crop, a major staple of the Samoan diet, was destroyed:

Many villagers that have had funds in the Island Treasury have been compelled to draw out this money in order to buy foreign food. So great has been the scarcity of food that the stores ran short of provisions such as rice and biscuits (Post, 1913:7).

Two years later, a devastating storm struck Manu'a. Tree crops suffered the most, but in this case, the taro was also severely damaged:

An appropriation of \$10,000 was obtained from Congress, and the American Red Cross contributed \$2,000. Relief work has been continued at regular intervals, and a large number of people over two-thirds of the population have been deported to Tutuila where food supplies are abundant (Parker, 1915:7).

The next major hurricane occurred 1 January 1926. The Navy Department detailed relief officers to Tutuila and Manu'a who distributed 50 tons of rice, ten tons of canned salmon, and 15 tons of biscuit (Governor Bryan, 1926a:5). The secretary of native affairs admitted that:

The recent hurricane of January 1st, 1926 has demonstrated that without the prompt and efficient help of the Government of United States in supplying large quantities of food to all three districts of American Samoa starvation conditions would have existed throughout the islands. At present, most of the Samoans are living literally from hand-to-mouth as soon as their crops of food---bananas, taro, and bread fruit are ripe, they are eaten and the next ripening is awaited, sometimes under distressing circumstances (Wood, 1926:7-8).

In such difficult circumstances, people are often receptive to alternative forms of economic activities which required less labour time for at least similar returns, and in American Samoa they did turn to alternatives which the colonial presence presented.

The American Samoans were eager to participate in a monetary economy from initial days of the administration. At first the natives sold their copra or dessicated coconut to the traders. In 1903 they requested that the administration handle all aspects of the trade in copra. Cash incomes so derived became important to the districts, for it was out of these moneys that the required governmental taxes were paid, and in the outer districts copra was invariably the sole means of obtaining cash incomes. The extreme dependence on copra resulted in less attention being given to the extension of other subsistence crops, and in particular more and more of the Leone plain, the most fertile area in American Samoa was given over to growing coconuts.

Subsistence agriculture was also being neglected because the native populace began to spend more of their time in making trinkets to sell to shipboard personnel when the fleet called at Pago Pago. Since vessels, both navy and commercial, called at Pago Pago in increasing numbers, this method of realizing cash incomes became increasingly popular amongst the Samoans. But even the governor was alarmed at the effect these money generating activities were having on subsistence activities:

There is likely to be a famine next year, because, for months, the natives have neglected their plantations, have failed to weed their taro patches; in the Bay District there are practically no bananas. They have been willing to do nothing except make things to sell to the fleet (Bryan, 1925:3).

Furthermore, employment with the navy was considered a prestigious enterprise, totally unlike the employment in commercial plantations of Western Samoa. In 1927, for example, of the 147 navy personnel at the base, 76 were Samoans. Most of these were members of the Samoan enlisted native guardsmen or *Fitafita*. Considering the fact that these Samoans were earning salaries only slightly less than their American counterparts, the economic repercussions of their status within the navy was felt throughout the *au'aiga* network. The economic wealth of these young Samoans, who were not necessarily qualified by traditional criteria to hold such power, was a serious threat to the power base of the traditional *matai*. In addition, many Samoans obtained a cash income from working for the navy on the many and continuing construction projects. All of these opportunities for wage earning, combined with the payment of salaries to those in official positions, resulted in a large cash flow filtering through the native economy, and this in turn progressively weakened the traditional patterns of living.

Other evidences of economic and cultural change can be demonstrated through shifts in dietary habits. J.W. Coulter recounts of 1937 Tutuila: "Fishing is less important to the Samoans now than in earlier years, because of the importance of canned fish" (1941:31), and Peter

Buck associates the introduction of flour and bread with the decline in yam production (1930:546). Governor Bryan noted in 1927, the detrimental effects of the increased use of imported foods:

A progressively increasing amount of foreign food is being bought. The Samoans refuse to see that they must plant with a view to the future; that a continuously increasing population requires a proportionate increase in the crop of food producing trees and plants (Bryan, 1927a:6).

The American Samoans were further encouraged into the cash economy through various regulations put out by the American authorities. The copra tax was replaced in 1921 with an annual poll tax payable in U.S. dollars, thus forcing all adult Samoan males to earn a minimal amount of cash per annum to meet such dues. In order to meet the financial outlays necessary for administering the islands, the authorities pressured the population in other ways as well:

In order to raise our tax rates without overburdening the natives and causing widespread discontent, if not stubborn resistance, a way must be found to increase this income. . . . The answer to this problem is in increasing the output of copra . . . in order to get an adequate tax income we must increase copra production (Smith, 1925:13-14)

In Chapter V it was demonstrated how the *matai* in American Samoa suffered a serious loss of authority due to administrative policy. This trend was compounded through the inroads of the cash economy. In particular, the increased amount of money in the hands of the young, untitled males reversed the order of precedence within the traditional power structure: the members of the *Fitafita* were the source of cash for their *'aiga*, and through that they accrued prestige vastly out of

proportion to their traditional status. Other factors also threatened the power base of the traditional *matai*. The value of the *au'aiga* lands decreased because of the decline in subsistence agriculture, and it must be emphasized that it was *pule* over such lands (including right of allocation and expulsion) which formed the power base of the traditional *matai*. But now, young Samoans had alternatives to working the family garden plots under the supervision of their *matai*. They could join the *Fitafita*, or work at the navy base, or teach school. The less dependent they became on subsistence agriculture, the greater the erosion of the power of the *matai*. In order to maintain their prestige, the *matai* now needed their own sources of cash incomes, and this bound them in a dependency relationship with the American administration which dispensed such monetary favours. This economic dependency markedly influenced the character of the *Mau* movement in American Samoa. The grievances expressed therein, invariably boiled down to mere factional disputes over alleged discrepancies between districts or chiefs in terms of the relative benefits derived from the administration.

#### *Summary*

##### *Western Samoa*

Here, the nature of the physical environment provided a better base for sustained subsistence agriculture. The growth of European commercial plantations and associated commerce had little effect on the native population's ability to rely on local food resources.

Population pressure was negligible, with the influenza epidemic of 1918 playing a contributory role in this respect. Consequently, the Western Samoans maintained a level of economic self-sufficiency which helped maintain the leadership role of the traditional *matai*. The organization of economic withdrawal from European enterprise was an effective political tool in furthering the *Mau* movement in this island group.

#### *American Samoa*

Here, the smallness of size, paucity of agricultural land and rugged topography provided a basically poor resource base. These features further inhibited later commercial development, and consequently American interest was always trained on the potential of Pago Pago Harbour, first as a coaling depot, and later as a navy station. Population pressures were intensified by the Americans' successful medical program. Furthermore, the attraction of Pago Pago as the administrative centre led to a high level of culture change. Alternative venues of employment became increasingly attractive to the Samoans who adopted small-scale cash cropping, selling of craftware and wage employment. All of this was to the detriment of the traditional subsistence food resource base. These trends seriously eroded the traditional power of the *matai* and drew them into an extreme dependency relationship with the American administration, and this in turn provides the key to the ineffectiveness of the *Mau* movement in this island group.

*CHAPTER IX**CONCLUSIONS*

This examination of the two *Mau* movements, one in Western Samoa and the other in American Samoa, established certain important distinctions between the movements in these two areas.

In Western Samoa, the movement was highly organized and supported by the most powerful indigenous social groups. Natives from both islands of Western Samoa joined the movement. Also, part-Samoans from wealthy and influential backgrounds and Westerners married to Samoans, closed ranks with the leaders from the highest ranking Samoan families to oppose the New Zealand administration's implementation of a "progressive" reform policy. This government program of directed change was meant to improve the standard of living in the islands and guide the people toward independence, but it required the adoption of political changes that threatened the traditional authority of Samoan chiefs and the highly valued Samoan way of life. The leaders of the movement in Western Samoa adopted strategies of non-violent resistance, such as economic boycotts and non-participation in government sponsored institutions. Samoan villagers kept their children home from school, suspended cash cropping, refused to register vital statistics, boycotted commercial enterprise, picketed European stores and withheld taxes. In addition, the *Mau* instituted offices which assumed many of

the functions formerly reserved for the New Zealand administration, including the mobilization of a police force and the collection of taxes. Consequently, during the movement in Western Samoa, new political aspirations for Samoan self-rule and political autonomy emerged as central goals.

In American Samoa, the movement was not as strongly supported by the populace. The goals were less clearly defined, and separate factions had their own reasons for opposing the navy administration. For example, the high chiefs were upset over alleged irregularities in the Island government treasury, and Chris Young of Manu'a joined the anti-government movement merely because he was prohibited from assuming the Tui Manu'a title. It was pointed out that administrative policy seriously undermined the traditional prestige of the high chief Tuitele, and that new regulations excluded the *tulafale* from executive office and also deprived a number of part-Samoans from developing their Samoan land claims. Several navy officers supported the *Mau* in its initial stage, for reasons not entirely clear. These disparate interest groups were never able to work in unison against the navy administration. In the beginning the movement had the support of the high chiefs, but soon the high chiefs resumed a loyal position toward the American administration and the movement lost much of its strength. Though the *Mau* in American Samoa adopted many of the strategies employed by the *Mau* in Western Samoa, the economic boycott organized by them was shortlived and only partially supported by the American Samoans. The most common complaints expressed by the *Mau*

in American Samoa, in addition to the particular complaints of each faction, derived from alleged inequalities in treatment of various Samoan groups by the administration. There was no real interest in political autonomy. On the contrary, the *Mau* in American Samoa demanded full citizenship rights for American Samoans, formal acknowledgement of the islands' status as American territory and the replacement of the navy administration by a civilian one.

The explanation for the variation in intensity and character of the two movements offered in this thesis is based on the consideration of interrelated but conceptually distinct features.

Important distinctions in the level of traditional socio-political structure were noted between the two territories. The highest ranking Samoan families with their associated titles were domiciled primarily on the islands of Western Samoa. Accordingly, the greatest similarity in socio-political structure between the two territories existed at the family and village level. Political structures and institutions above the village level varied considerably. It is a critical feature that Western Samoa which had the more highly developed socio-cultural structural organization was the territory that resisted colonial rule with the more powerful political movement. Differential administrative policy also had a significant bearing on the variance between the movements. Each administration adopted distinct policies with respective sets of socio-political implications for the Samoans. The New Zealand administration adopted a program of assertive planned change that was perceived by the traditional Samoan leaders as a direct

threat to their authority. Part-Samoans and Westerners were restricted from participation in the Samoan government by the application of a Mandate policy by New Zealand and this gave priority to native interests over those of other groups. Furthermore, the New Zealand government's policy strove to minimize the traditional standing of the *tama'aiiga*, the *tulafale*, and also degraded the status of the part-Samoans at the expense of the government sponsored *Faipule*. Government regulations that removed the handling of copra from the independent traders angered the Samoan commercial sector. There were, therefore, many features of the government policy which contributed directly to the escalation of political agitation. Similar trends were discernible in American Samoa. Policies adopted by the American administration also resulted in a rearrangement of traditional authority and prestige among the high ranking *matai*. Those who were particularly disadvantaged by administrative policy, namely, the high chief of the Western District and the *tulafale*, were strong supporters of the movement. Also, the American reluctance to formally ratify the cessions obtained from the high chiefs led these chiefs to the conclusion that they had been betrayed. This same reluctance led to legal disputes in which the U.S. authority in American Samoa was challenged in the courts. However, an examination of the colonial fiscal support provided for each territory did not reveal a strong relationship between the amount of fiscal support and strength of the respective movements. Rather, it was suggested that the movement was less intense in the American Islands where a higher percentage of administrative funds were dis-

bursed as cash directly to the Samoans. In terms of its impact on the movement, this particular method of disbursing funds may outrank gross colonial funding in importance.

Even though the specific colonial policies set out appear to account for the nature of membership patterns and outbreaks of political agitation, they do not adequately account for the difference in intensity and character between the two movements. A clearer understanding of the variance between the two movements was gained from an examination of the differential resource potentials found in the two territories, and the way in which this ecological variance influenced social and political developments during the period of colonial rule.

It was found that in Western Samoa, and especially on the island of Upolu, favourable environmental conditions and abundant arable land resulted in high population numbers and a high level of socio-cultural organization. After the arrival of the Western colonizers, areas of Upolu were developed by the Germans as commercial plantations, but indentured labour was necessarily imported because the Samoans refused to engage in commercial plantation agriculture. The Samoan aloofness from this type of commercial enterprise, and the ability of Samoan villagers to support themselves adequately through subsistence agriculture, meant that the traditional *matai* retained their authority over land and control over the labour force of their *'aiiga* and villages. During the *Mau*, this economic independence from the New Zealand administration, and the retention of traditional political authority, made it possible for the *Mau* leaders to effectively

resist unpopular government policy.

In contrast, the physical environment of Tutuila Island in American Samoa provided a comparatively poor resource base, because of its small size, rugged topography and exposure to tropical storms. After the arrival of the Americans, population growth became a serious problem, particularly as changes in internal migration brought about by the establishment of the administrative headquarters in Pago Pago, further clustered people in an area unable to accommodate expansion of subsistence agriculture. Furthermore, opportunities for involvement in wage labour were greeted enthusiastically by the Samoans. Consequently, large numbers of Samoans were in the employment of the U.S. Navy as members of the *Fitafita* (native guard). Others served as personnel employed by the Island government agencies or as construction workers. Still other Samoans adopted small-scale cash cropping and the manufacture of crafts for sale to the visiting ships in Pago Pago Harbour. Owing to the ease with which such wages and income were widely redistributed throughout the community, these economic changes resulted in an undermining of the economic control and political authority of the traditional *matai* in American Samoa. Increasingly, the *matai* in American Samoa turned to the administration to validate their positions as chiefs, to obtain official positions within the government and for paid employment. In so doing, the *matai* of American Samoa developed a relationship of extreme dependency vis-a-vis the U.S. administration.

The origins of these relations of dependency in American Samoa, versus those of autonomy in Western Samoa are found in the differential but interrelated patterns of socio-political organizational structure, environmental resource potential, and administrative policies specific to each territory. In consequence, the major distinctions in character and intensity that obtained between the two *Mau* movements can only be understood in light of these contrasts in modes of relationship, and their respective ecological settings.

## NOTES

## Chapter V

<sup>1</sup>For a definition of the term European as it is used within this thesis, consult the Glossary of terms, page 281.

<sup>2</sup>Traditional Samoan leaders were supported economically by those they represented. There was, therefore, an intimate relation between traditional Samoan political support and its expression through economic contribution (cf. Chapter IV: 53-58). The earliest native representatives in the German period 1900-1905 were not paid government salaries, but were supported by their home communities whom they represented. By introducing a salary for the *Faipule*, according to Samoan custom, the government was making explicit the relationship between the *Faipule* and the administration. Since the *Faipule* were paid by the government and not the districts they represented, the Samoan people assumed that these leaders were representing the interests of the administration, not those of the Samoan people. It can be noted that the *Mau* representatives sent to Apia, on the other hand, were supported economically by their home communities.

<sup>3</sup>The *Fitafita* is discussed more fully in Chapter V:139.

*Chapter VI*

<sup>4</sup>It is uncertain exactly when the term *Mau* was first used to describe the movement. On 11 June 1927, Nelson explained the meaning of the term at a meeting of the citizens' committee, when Minister of External Affairs Nosworthy was present (IT 1/23/8).

*Chapter VIII*

<sup>5</sup>Conversions from the New Zealand pound to the U.S. dollar are based on the following rates provided by R.L. Bidwell (1970:1) for the British pound sterling 1920-1930:

1920	3.70
1921	3.80
1922	4.20
1923	4.65
1924	4.25
1925	4.74
1926	4.85
1927	4.85
1928	4.87
1929	4.85
1930	4.87

These conversion rates are used, because, "Until 1930, the New Zealand pound has been on parity with sterling" (McLintock, 1966:663).

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- 'aiga household group consisting of consanguineal members of the *au'aiga* plus affines and adopted persons.
- ali'i chief.
- Ali'i Sili paramount chief title created before partition and last held by Mata'afa Iosefa until his death in 1912.
- apofu type of fresh water fish.
- au'aiga largest Samoan cognatic descent group.
- aumaga village group composed of all the untitled men.
- 'ava ceremonial drink (kava), made from *Piper methysticum*.
- fa'alupega ceremonial welcome; recitation of titles according to rank.
- fa'a Samoa Samoan custom
- faigamalo smallest traditional territorial unit in American Samoa.
- Faipule <sup>1</sup>district representatives. During the period of New Zealand administration this refers specifically to members of the *Fono* of *Faipule*. <sup>2</sup>The term is derived from the "lower house" (also called *Faipule*), established in 1873 by Steinberger, and made up of some 30 members from different political districts. In this thesis, the second meaning is found only once, in Chapter V, page 83 (Keesing quote).
- fale house.
- falelima districts in American Samoa.
- faletama a section of the *au'aiga*. Membership is restricted to those tracing relationship to a sibling or child of the *au'aiga* apical ancestor.
- faletua ma tausi a village women's group composed of the wives of all the village *matai*.

- Fautua* office of native adviser created by Governor Schultz in 1912 to be held by those *matai* who formerly qualified for the *papa* titles.
- feagaiga* reciprocity.
- Fitafita* native Samoan guard established by the United States Navy in American Samoa.
- fitafita* warrior.
- fono* council of chiefs.
- Fono* (of) *Faipule* a "national" council of representatives created by Governor Solf in Western Samoa.
- Fono Tele* a "national" advisory council of representatives created by the Americans in American Samoa.
- fuai'alo* sub-village in American Samoa.
- ie toga* fine mats highly valued as articles of exchange.
- ifonga* public apology.
- inaga* the young fry of the *apofu*.
- ina'i* food relish.
- Komiti fa'atonu* Samoan sub-committee branch of the *Mau* organization in Western Samoa.
- la'au sao* pry stick for dislodging squid.
- lau* sweeps of twisted coconut used by the villagers in communal fish drives.
- maevega* last wishes of a dying *matai*.
- malaga* ceremonial inter-village visits.
- masi* fermented breadfruit important as a famine food.
- matai* titled person (may be male or female, *ali'i* or *tulafale*).
- Matua* (and) *To'oto'o* orator groups in American Samoa.
- Mau* political movements which erupted in the Samoan Islands in 1920 and 1926.

- mau* opinion, testimony.
- mele'i* pry stick used by the women in reef fishing.
- nu'u* village.
- ola* basket used by the women in reef fishing.
- palolo* edible annelid.
- papa* highest ranking titles in Samoa (four), exclusive of the Tu'i Manu'a, abolished by the Germans in 1912.
- pule* authority, control.
- pulefa'atoaga* plantation inspectors.
- pulenu'u* village mayors.
- siapo* bark cloth (tapa).
- ta'amu* giant taro.
- tafa'ifa* chief holding the four *papa* titles in Western Samoa which gave to him paramount chief status.
- Ta'imua* an "upper house" of approximately seven of the highest ranking title holders, established under Steinberger's advice in 1873 in Western Samoa.
- ta'ita'itu* district chiefs established 1873 during the period of Steinberger influence, abolished by the Germans. The term re-emerged during the *Mau* as the name for their district representatives.
- tama'aiga* title given to the holder of any of the four highest titles in Western Samoa (namely, Malietoa, Mata'afa, Tamasese, and Tuimaleali'ifano).
- tautai* title for leaders of fishing expeditions.
- tulafale* orator, talking chief
- Tumua* (and) *Pule* orator groups in Western Samoa.
- tu'u'u* basket trap used in reef fishing.

*European*

In Samoa, European was a term used to define the legal status of particular residents. It included persons born in Samoa of European parentage, and also part-Samoans legitimately born to European fathers. Samoan women were assigned the legal status of their husbands. Within the context of this thesis, and in particular in discussing the events of the *Mau* in chapters V, VI, and VII, the term refers specifically to this legal status. Note that in a social sense of the word, it includes many persons who would define themselves and would be so defined by the Samoan community, as Samoans.

GLOSSARY OF ADMINISTRATORS IN WESTERN AND AMERICAN SAMOA

A. *Western Samoa*

*Administrators*

1914	Col. Robert Logan
1920	Col. R.W. Tate
1923	Maj. Gen. Sir George S. Richardson
1928	Col. Sir Stephen S. Allen

*New Zealand Ministers of External Affairs*

1921	E.P. Lee
1923	Sir Francis H.D. Bell
1924	W. Nosworthy
1928	J.G. Coates
1929	Sir J.G. Ward
1930	G.W. Forbes

B. *American Samoa*

*Administrators*

1900	Commander B.F. Tilley, USN, Commandant
1901	Capt. U. Sebree, USN, Commandant
1903	Commander E.B. Underwood, USN, Commandant
1905	Commander C.B.T. Moore, USN, Governor
1908	Capt. John F. Parker, USN, Governor
1910	Commander W.M. Crose, USN, Governor
1913	Commander C.D. Stearns, USN, Governor
1915	Commander John M. Poyer, USN, (Ret.), Governor
1919	Commander Warren J. Terhune, USN, Governor
1920	Capt. Waldo Evans, USN, Governor
1922	Capt. Edwin T. Pollock, USN, Governor
1923	Capt. Edward S. Kellogg, USN, Governor
1925	Capt. Henry F. Bryan, USN, (Ret.), Governor
1927	Capt. Stephen V. Graham, USN, (Ret.), Governor
1929	Capt. Gatewood S. Lincoln, USN, (Ret.), Governor

*ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES CITED*

*I. Abbreviations and Notes*

- AJHR        Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, Government of New Zealand. Annual reports on the administration of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa. Cited by year.
- NZNA        New Zealand National Archives. Wellington. New Zealand.
- IT            Archival records of the Department of Island Territories. Housed at NZNA (see above).
- USNA        United States National Archives.
- GAS         Archives of the Government of American Samoa. Housed as part of the USNA. Located San Bruno, California.

The form of citation and bibliography in this thesis conforms to the bibliographic style sheet of the Smithsonian Institution for the Handbook of the North American Indians.

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*APPENDIX ON SOURCES*

A total of nine weeks was spent in the respective archives re-searching the time period leading up to and including the *Mau* movement in each territory.

*A. American Samoa*

The archives for the Government of American Samoa are part of the United States National Archives currently housed at the San Bruno, California depository. The following is a description of the American records at this branch:

. . . 183 feet of records transferred to the San Francisco (region 9) Federal Records Center in May 1969 from the Offices of the Governor and Attorney General, and from the High Court of American Samoa, located at Pago Pago. The records relate to the period between 1900 and 1966. They are a part of Record Group 126, Records of the Office of the Territories (Introduction, Reel 1:7).

The original files housed at San Bruno are no longer available to researchers for direct consultation because of their fragile condition. The entire collection (with some exceptions), has been microfilmed and is available for viewing. These microfilms are also available for purchase from:

Cashier  
National Archives Trust Fund Board  
Washington, D.C. 20408

The following is a list of the microfilm reels cited in this thesis:

<i>Reel</i>	<i>Description of Contents</i>
1	Annual Reports of the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Governor 1900, 1905-1925
18	Fono proceedings 1902-1929
23	Annual Reports of the Governor of American Samoa to the Secretary of the Navy on government affairs 1902-1923
24	Annual Reports from the Governor of American Samoa to the Secretary of the Navy 1923-1929
30	Congressional hearings 1930 (American Samoan Commission) Evans vs. Ripley 1921-1927
34	Government Affairs. Political unrest. Note: also contains PQ-2 Political Disturbances (Western Samoa) Confidential File
35	Civil government 1922 Civil government controversy 1951-1926, file 1; 1922, 1925, 1926-1928, file 2; 1929, 1930, file 3; and 1936, 1949, file 4. Civil government, Relative Correspondence 1925, 1926, 1936.

An important note concerns the mis-classification of one of the files in Reel 34. The last entry on the microfilm is listed as a file entitled: Civil Government (The Samoan Cause) Hannum, Ripley 1922. Although the file cover does have this subject title, the contents are not related to this subject. Enclosed within this file are a series of confidential reports from the governor of American Samoa to the secretary of the navy 1927-1932 on the subject of the *Mau* in Western Samoa. This provides a fascinating source of information about the American attitude (expressed through the governor of American Samoa)

toward the *Mau* in Western Samoa, and includes some candid assessments of the various personnel involved in the movement (Samoan and New Zealand).

#### *B. Western Samoa*

The primary source for the materials pertinent to the *Mau* in Western Samoa was the Archives of the Island Territories Department, New Zealand National Archives, Wellington, New Zealand. The Samoan records were transferred from the Island Territories Department to the National Archives in 1952. Until recently, many of the files concerning the *Mau* were restricted (cf. Davidson's Note on Sources 1967:436-439). When I was at the archives in 1980, the material from the Island Territories Department was fully available but certain material from the Archives of the Governor was still classified. During my short stay, David Retter, Archivist and I petitioned External Affairs to have these remaining classified materials released to the Archives. This petition was successful, but unfortunately the documents did not arrive in time for me to consult them. Nonetheless, they are now available for other scholars to study. The following is a list of IT files cited in this thesis:

<i>IT Files</i>	<i>Description of Contents</i>
1/1/58	Petition from O.F. Nelson to the League of Nations 1930
1/1/59	Petition from the Samoans to the League of Nations 1928
1/1/60	Petition from the Samoans to the King of England 1929
1/2/11	Policy on Samoan affairs 1922-1960

*IT Files**Description of Contents*

- 1/8/10 Samoan Epidemic Commission 1919. 3 parts.
- 1/23/16 Mau agitation: proposed enquiry into Samoan affairs 1930
- 1/33/1 Private correspondence between Sir George S. Richardson (administrator) and Sir Francis Bell (minister of external affairs) 1923-1927
- 1/38/1 Vital statistics. Parts 1-3. 1917-1955
- 1/67/34 Petitions to the League of Nations: general 1922-1926
- 1/79/2 O.F. Nelson. General correspondence 1919-1940
- 1/79/73 Sir James Allen. General correspondence 1922-1926
- 1/83/5 American Samoa. Part One. 1920-1950

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May 24, 1983

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