The Aborigines' Protection Society as an Imperial Knowledge Network: the Writing and Representation of Black South African Letters to the APS, 1879-1888

by

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Abstract

This thesis presents a case study of letters written by black South Africans to the Aborigines' Protection Society (APS) between 1879-1888. Recognizing that previous histories of the APS have been based primarily on British correspondence, this thesis contends that including these marginalized black letters is crucial if historians are to develop a nuanced understanding of the APS in particular, and of British imperialism in general. By placing these letters within a framework of imperial knowledge networks, this thesis traces how the messages and voices of black South African correspondents traveled in letter form to England and then were disseminated in published form by the APS. This thesis demonstrates how correspondents used writing to the APS as a tool of anti-colonial resistance, as well as how the APS used their positionality to censor and control the voices of its correspondents. Emphasizing the entanglement of correspondents' resistance and adaptation with the APS's imperialist mission, this thesis presents its case study as a window into the negotiated and unstable natures of British imperialism.

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Note on Terminology

Throughout the historiography, the Aborigines' Protection Society is variably referred to as "the APS" and "the Society." I use the same terminology throughout my thesis, switching between "the APS" and "the Society" to avoid using the same word *ad nauseam*. I also occasionally refer to the APS using the pronoun "they." I prefer "they" because "it" depersonalizes the APS. "It" can give an impression that an organization is homogenous, monolithic, and makes decisions based on established policies alone, which is never the case. I use "they" to remind readers that it is people, not policies, that governed the actions of the APS.

There is a tension throughout this thesis between the terms "Indigenous," "non-European," and "black African" or "black South African." None of these terms perfectly encapsulates the people under study. The term "Indigenous" is often used in the historiography of the APS because, in many of the geographical contexts the APS operated within, they were dealing with Indigenous peoples. In South Africa, however, a distinction is made between the "Indigenous" San and Khoikhoi peoples in the west and the "black" peoples of the east. None of the people I study were San or Khoikhoi, and so I do not use the term "Indigenous" through most of this thesis. The term "non-European" is also problematic. It is overly vague, and it enforces a racial binary of European-non-European. However, "non-European" is useful when discussing the APS because the APS worked in so many different contexts, and it is an easy way to refer to all of the Society's demographics in a single word. I tend towards using "non-European" in the introductory and concluding chapters when referring to the larger context of the APS. To avoid overuse I interchange it with terms such as "foreign" and "colonized," though I find "colonized" even more problematic, as it also sustains a binary of colonized-colonizer. I use specific terms such as Xhosa, Zulu, and BaSotho rather than "black African," yet "black African" and "black

South African" are also concise ways to refer to all of the correspondents under study at once, and I use them when referring to my research subjects as a collective.

Introduction

The Aborigines' Protection Society was a British humanitarian organization that operated between 1837 and 1909. The APS was founded upon a belief that Britain and its colonies treated Indigenous, colonized, and non-European peoples immorally, unjustly, and dishonorably. It is important to note that the APS was never opposed to colonization or imperial expansion, but rather desired a style of colonization that was less injurious to those being colonized, typically through proposed schemes of increased central administration of settlers. To that end, the APS assigned itself three core mandates:

1. To collect information on the "character, habits and wants of uncivilized tribes" by "being favoured with communications from well-informed gentlemen resident in all the various localities to which the Society directs its attention."[1]
2. "To communicate in cheap publications, those details which may excite the interest of all classes, and thus insure the extension of correct opinions."[2]
3. To secure policy changes via "the interference of Parliament" to "regulate, as far as law can do so, all the acts of the Colonial Government and of the colonists which influence the progress of the coloured races."[3]

The Society pursued all of these activities vigorously, but there is little evidence of the Society's impact on the empire. Historians have generally concluded that the Society was, overall, a failure. Indigenous-settler relations only worsened as the nineteenth century progressed. Interest in humanitarianism dropped off following the abolition of slavery in 1833, and plummeted

[1] Aborigines' Protection Society, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society, Presented at the Meeting in Exeter Hall, May 6th, 1838* (London: W. Ball, Aldine Chambers, 1838), 12.
[2] APS, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society,* 12.
[3] APS, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society,* 25.

further with the rising popularity of scientific racism following the publication of Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* in 1859. In 1909, the Society was in such disrepair that it was forced to merge with the Anti-Slavery Society.

Yet, if we remember its three mandates, we can really only consider the Society to have failed at the third. It failed to improve Indigenous-newcomer relations, but it succeeded at constructing a massive correspondence network through which people from around the empire contributed their voices and their knowledge. The surviving records of its correspondence contain, by my own count, 9,605 individual letters, totalling well over 30,000 pages of writing. It also succeeded in disseminating information to the public through over two-hundred journal issues, several monographs, and dozens of public lectures. It is this transfer of knowledge from correspondence to publication that I term the APS knowledge network: large amounts of local knowledge was exported from the colonies to England via letter, filtered through the Society's own perspectives, and then re-disseminated throughout the empire via publications. Rather than evaluating the historical significance of the Society as a humanitarian organization, I evaluate the Society as a system of knowledge circulation. This thesis explores whose knowledge was circulated by the APS and how the APS mediated that knowledge, with a focus on voices from South Africa between 1879-1888.

The current historiography suggests that the Society was run by Britons for Britons. Attention is typically given to members and executives in England, and when attention is given to its correspondents, it is focused on missionaries, government officials, and settlers. Thus, the historiography indicates that Indigenous and colonized peoples were passive subjects of discussion within the Society, rather than active agents. I found this not to be the case. In my research I found other voices, voices of black South Africans that have been silenced in the

historiography of the APS. The voices I found demonstrate that people whom historians once perceived as passive subjects of discussion by the Society were not so passive after all. They demonstrate that these correspondents actively tried to influence what people throughout the empire knew about themselves, their politics, and their environment. They also demonstrate one way that the Society's correspondence network influenced British imperial society: by affording colonized peoples a channel through which their voices could be heard and made known throughout the empire. In so doing, this thesis presents a new perspective on the APS, one informed by those voices that have, until now, been overlooked. This thesis challenges existing interpretations of the Aborigines' Protection Society as simply an imperialist organization, and demonstrates how it was also, for a select group of black South Africans, a means of resisting and negotiating imperialism.

Networks and British Imperialism

The term "network" is of crucial importance in this thesis, for it simultaneously locates the theoretical underpinnings of my approach to British imperialism and describes the relationship I draw between the Aborigines' Protection Society and the empire as a whole. Networked approaches to British imperialism emphasize the contingency of the innumerable local histories of the empire upon the connections that tied those localities together. These connections took many forms. There were material connections of capital, commodities, and labour.[4] There were also discursive connections of ideas, identities, and information.[5] These material and discursive connections were never isolated from each other. In one direction, the type of knowledge that was collected and circulated was influenced by material intentions. In

[4] Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain* (London: Routledge, 2001), 6.
[5] Lester, *Imperial Networks*, 6

Edward Said's classic example, British administrations in Asia needed certain types of demographic information to govern large majority populations, and so much of the knowledge of Asian society was collected to fulfill that purpose.[6] Going in the other direction, the types of knowledge that were available influenced material intentions. For instance, the awareness of available resources and perceptions of peoples as "warlike" or "passive" influenced metropolitan material interest in foreign lands.

This thesis is focused on one form of discursive network, often referred to as information or knowledge networks. Approaches that consider the networks through which information was transmitted throughout the empire are crucially important, because they reveal the multi-directional nature of imperialism. This can be illustrated by comparing two common models of empire: the core-periphery model and the web model.

The core-periphery model is the antithesis of networked approaches. It assumes that the imperial core, Britain, existed in a stable relationship with its colonies and territories. By adopting states, colonies, and territories as categories of analysis, the core-periphery model reduces complex regional contexts into predetermined shapes with arbitrarily drawn boundaries which, in reality, were never as solid as they appear on a map. Conversely, the web model is the basis of networked approaches. Rather than imagining a binary connection between a colony and Britain, it assumes a multi-nodal web in which every colony had multiple points of connection, some of which connect with each other, some with other colonies, and some with different points of connection in Britain. It breaks down the focus on state formations to acknowledge the many internal and transnational connections that influenced the operation of empire.[7]

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[6] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 36.
[7] Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 15.

Using the web model, historians have addressed many of the networks that connected and constituted the British empire. Alan Lester demonstrates how imperial newspaper networks facilitated negotiations of the meaning of Britishness between metropolitans and settlers. According to Lester, settler communities in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century grew concerned that metropolitan imaginations of empire were being biased against them by politicians and humanitarians. In response, settler newspapers such as the *Graham's Town Journal* in South Africa, the *Sydney Morning Herald* in Australia, and the *New Zealand Chronicle* in New Zealand focused on representing their own perspectives in order to "persuade other Britons in the metropole to adopt a more global conception of Britishness."[8] As such, Lester argues that "settler newspapers became a channel through which the metropolitan reading public created an imagined geography of empire."[9] Britishness was conceptualized uniquely in different settler localities, i.e. in different nodes of the imperial web, and they each attempted to use print networks to assert their own perspectives.

Similarly, Tony Ballantyne demonstrates how imperial scientific networks facilitated negotiations of the meaning and origins of racial difference across different colonial groups. Ballantyne explores how the philologist William Jones developed the theory of Aryanism in the late eighteenth century: based on a comparative philology of Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, he argued that Europeans and Indians shared an Aryan heritage.[10] The Asiatic Society of Bengal disseminated the theory throughout other imperial scientific societies, which applied the theory to develop their own understanding of their unique places in the world. Ballantyne locates one of these moments in late nineteenth-century New Zealand. In a context of high tension between

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[8] Alan Lester, "British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire," *History Workshop Journal* 54, no. 1 (2002): 32.
[9] Lester, "British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire," 32.
[10] Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*, 26-7.

English and Irish settlers to New Zealand, scholars of The New Zealand Institute adopted Jones' work to theorize a shared ancestry of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon peoples.[11] Meanwhile, with an interest in gaining a better understanding of the Maori to facilitate their administration, Edward Shortland, sub-protector of aborigines in the Eastern District and later native secretary of New Zealand, adapted Jones' work to develop a theory that the Maori had originally migrated from India to Malaysia and then to New Zealand.[12] By tracing how Jones' work was transmitted throughout the empire by scientific networks and then adapted in different ways for locally-contingent reasons, Ballantyne illustrates one more way in which imperial networks created an imperial web of knowledge.

Some of these networks may seem obvious: of course scientific knowledge was transmitted through scientific societies. Yet the networks through which information was transmitted are important because they acted as gate-keepers and barriers, preventing and granting access to different groups of people. Colonized peoples in particular faced substantial barriers to having their voices represented in imperial information networks. Robert Holton's study of non-European inclusion in scientific societies such as the Asiatic Society and the African Society identified some of these barriers. The African Society, established in 1901 in order to "form a Central Institution for the study of African subjects, and the diffusion of knowledge relating to such subjects,"[13] was a key network that circulated knowledge about Africa through the empire via its quarterly journal and its hosted lectures. The African Society was from the outset designed for European membership only, for "persons of prominence connected with the African continent

[11] Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*, 69-70.
[12] Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*, 67.
[13] Robert Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society, 1870s-1920s: Evidence from Global Networks," *Global Networks* 5, no. 3 (2005): 249.

including Governors, travellers, scientists and Officials – a meeting place for 'Anglo-Africans.'"[14] Some of the Society's leaders actively prevented Africans from joining. Harry Johnston, for example, opposed Africans' admission to the Society because he considered them intellectually incapable of conducting the rigorous level of research he expected.[15] More often, Africans were excluded by the upper-class standards of the Society. Edward Blyden, a diplomat of Afro-Caribbean descent, and Richard Blaize, a West African merchant, both made substantial donations to the Society in order to be accepted within its ranks, a financial barrier that privileged Europeans with more disposable income.[16]

These barriers to inclusion in the African Society are one facet of what Ashcroft et al refer to as "imperial control of the means of publication." For Ashcroft and his co-authors, control of the means of publication is one of the essential characteristics of colonial oppression.[17] This is because, for colonial empires, what is known and thought about distant parts of the empire is determined to a large degree by what is written about it. Therefore, whoever can write about a colony and have their voice circulated through the empire has enormous influence over how that colony is imagined. Ashcroft et al assert that accessing the means of publication is crucial to resisting colonialism.[18] However, as they illustrate, it was extremely difficult for colonized peoples to have their voices represented in the nineteenth century. Not only was imperial control of publication experienced through lack of training (i.e. literacy) or lack of resources (i.e. writing utensils or printing technology),[19] but even in those moments where individuals were able to

[14] Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society," 249.
[15] Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society," 250.
[16] Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society," 251.
[17] Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 2002), 78.
[18] Ashcroft et al, *The Empire Writes Back*, 81.
[19] Ashcroft et al, *The Empire Writes Back*, 4-5.

enter "a specific and privileged class endowed with the language, education, and leisure necessary to produce such works,"[20] imperial ownership of publication houses determined to a large extent what was acceptable to publish and how publications could be circulated.[21]

Black African Voices in Imperial Networks

An illustrative example of imperial control of publication in South Africa can be observed in the role played by missionary newspaper editors in suppressing black literary and political voices. For many black Africans throughout the nineteenth century, mission stations and mission educations were the primary, and often only, means of accessing literacy and print culture. Mission stations exposed people to missionary newspapers such as *Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society, Periodical Accounts relative to the Baptist Missionary Society,* the London Missionary Society's *Transactions,* and the Moravian Society's *Periodical Accounts,* all of which would be read aloud at sermons and over meals.[22] What is more, many missions allowed black Africans to contribute articles to these newspapers. Upon first glance, this seems to suggest that mission societies offered black Africans an opportunity to have their voices represented at an imperial level, but these mission societies asserted their control of the means of publication so that African voices could only conform to mission objectives. As Elizabeth Elbourne contends,

> local communities did not have much control over what was said about them, even if converts did occasionally contribute…Editors attempted to impose a schematic epistemological framework dictated by evangelical ideological presuppositions, including the inferiority of societies that were not Christian, as well as by the urgent need for success stories to drive fundraising.[23]

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[20] Ashcroft et al, *The Empire Writes Back*, 5.
[21] Ashcroft et al, *The Empire Writes Back*, 6.
[22] Elizabeth Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Politics of Knowledge," in Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 63.
[23] Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks," 66.

Mission stations had long produced newspapers specifically oriented towards black Africans, but these newspapers were entirely controlled by missionary editors for the purpose of inspiring religious interest. Such newspapers included the *Umshumayeli WeNdaba* (1837), *Ikwezi* (1844), *Isithunywa Senyanga* (1850), and *Indaba* (1862).[24] By the latter half of the nineteenth century, these missionary editors began to allow black Africans a more active literary voice through the creation of newspapers written by and for themselves. The first of these was the *Kaffir Express*, established in 1870 by the Lovedale mission station. In 1876 the objectionable name was changed to *Isigidimi Sama Xhosa* (the Xhosa Messenger) and acquired its first black editor, Elijah Makiwane. However, although the *Isigidimi* allowed blacks a more active literary voice, the vision and the subject matter was still strictly controlled by Lovedale so that black political voices continued to be suppressed. Articles were only to be about religious and educational news, and could not be political in any way.[25]

The refusal of mission-operated black newspapers to deal in politically-contentious topics came to a head in 1884, when John Tengo Jabavu, then editor of *Isigidimi,* was forced to chose between his job and his political voice. Jabavu had signed a three-year contract as editor in 1881, but in 1883 he had become a canvasser for James Rose Innes, parliamentary candidate for Victoria East, and Jabavu's articles began to take on a more political tone. When Jabavu's contract was up for renegotiation in 1884, Lovedale informed him that his contract would only be renewed if he agreed to cease all political activity and restrict his writing to religious and educational subjects.[26] Jabavu chose to leave the *Isigidimi* and found his own newspaper. His

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[24] Siyasanga Tyali, "Ambiguities of a Decolonizating Press Culture: On South Africa's Imvo Zabantsundu (Native Opinion)," *South African Journal of African Languages* 38, no. 3 (2018): 305.
[25] André Odendaal, *Vukani Bantu!: The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912* (Cape Town: D. Philip, 1984), 6.
[26] L.D. Ngcongco, "John Tengo Jabavu," in *Black Leaders in Southern African History,* ed. Christopher Saunders (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 144-146.

newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, was the first fully black-operated newspaper in South Africa, publishing its first issue on 3 November 1884.

Nonetheless, Jabavu's attempt to subvert European control of the means of publication was compromised by his continued dependence on European support. Siyasanga Tyali points to several aspects of this dependence: dependence on mission education for blacks to be able to engage with *Imvo;* dependence on a media structure (the newspaper) which was designed by and inherited from European culture; and, most tangible of all, dependence on European financial backers.[27] Although operated by blacks, *Imvo* was funded by James Rose Innes, member of the Cape parliament, and James Weir, a missionary stationed at Lovedale. Tyali argues that Rose Innes and Weir were actively interested in influencing the black reading audience, that they meddled in the editorial operations of *Imvo,* and that *Imvo* ultimately "privileged the interest of its financiers."[28] Thus, despite an increasing trajectory of black involvement in the production and dissemination of information through missionary networks and print networks, the nineteenth century still witnessed European control of the means of publication and thereby European control of black African access to imperial knowledge networks.

There were, however, cracks in this structure of control, moments of potential opportunity in which black Africans were afforded more access to imperial knowledge networks. The Aborigines' Protection Society was one of these cracks: an organization dedicated to spreading information about the colonized peoples of the empire, its vast correspondence network made it possible for black African voices to reach British and imperial audiences. Did the Society enable black Africans to represent their voices and their perspectives? Did it afford them some control of the means of publication? These are the core questions that this thesis seeks to answer.

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[27] Tyali, "Ambiguities of a Decolonizating Press Culture," 307.
[28] Tyali, " Ambiguities of a Decolonizating Press Culture," 307.

Aborigines' Protection Society

The origins of the Aborigines Protection Society lie in the parliamentary Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) and, by extension, in the British anti-slavery movement. From at least the 1760s to the 1830s, British politics was embroiled in a sustained and impassioned, albeit ideologically divided, campaign against slavery, resulting in partial victories such as the criminalization of the British slave trade in 1807 and the abolition of slavery in British colonies in 1833.[29] Thomas Fowell Buxton, a member of Parliament (MP), had been an active proponent of anti-slavery and was fundamental in pushing the abolition bill through parliament. During the anti-slavery campaigns Buxton had been directed by the missionary John Philip to injustices faced, not only by slaves, but also by many Indigenous peoples throughout the empire, and Buxton sought to capitalize on the heightened liberal humanitarian atmosphere of post-abolition British politics to push for greater protections for Indigenous peoples. On 14 July 1835, Buxton passed a motion in the House of Commons for the appointment of a committee to inquire into "the treatment of the Aboriginal inhabitants in the British colonies."[30] For the next two years, the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) took evidence from 46 witnesses, including missionaries, colonial administrators, settlers, and Indigenous peoples, and published its extensive *Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)* in early 1837.[31] In the course of collecting evidence, Buxton had set up an informal

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[29] These were partial victories since un-free labor continued throughout the century in various forms, including forced apprenticeship, convict labour, and illegal slavery. For an overview of the British anti-slavery campaigns, see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 357-368.

[30] British House of Commons, "Treatment Of Aborigines In British Settlements," HC Deb 14, July 1835, vol 29, cc549-53, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1835/jul/14/treatment-of-aborigines-in-british.

[31] Zoe Laidlaw, "'Aunt Anna's Report': The Buxton Women and the Aborigines Select Committee, 1835-37," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 2 (2004): 4-5.

sub-committee to organize and interview the network of witnesses, headed by Thomas Hodgkin. Following the Select Committee's final report in 1837, Hodgkin's sub-committee went on to become the Aborigines' Protection Society, which was officially established with Buxton as president in 1837. The Society consisted of an executive committee headed by the president and the secretary. Decisions were made by consensus at executive meetings, while the actual publication of articles and writing of petitions was left to the secretary. The APS shared the same purpose and continued the same work as Hodgkin's sub-committee, gathering and organizing evidence on Indigenous-newcomer relations for publication and political mobilization in Britain. The Society's primary goals were to raise popular awareness of the injustices faced by Indigenous peoples because of British imperialism, and to lobby the British Houses of Parliament to improve the treatment of Indigenous peoples by colonial governments and settlers. The Society gathered information from a worldwide network of correspondents and published articles in metropolitan papers such as *The Times* and *The Daily Mail* in addition to its own journal, *The Aborigines' Friend and Colonial Intelligencer* (henceforth called *The Aborigines' Friend).* It also briefed newly appointed colonial governors and encouraged MPs to raise pointed questions when Parliament was in session. It is important to note that the Society was not interested in stopping imperialism or colonization in any way. Rather, the Society's goal was to find a "better scheme of colonization" that was "compatible with the safety and improvement of the Aborigines."[32] Sometimes, this meant supporting the strong policing of territorial boundaries so that Indigenous peoples could live in pre-contact ways of life without intervention from unscrupulous settlers. Other times, this meant supporting "civilizing missions" through which Indigenous peoples could adopt Western lifestyles and demand equal status as British subjects.

[32] Aborigines' Protection Society, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society*, 26.

The Society was amalgamated with the Anti-Slavery Society in 1909, and lives on today as Anti-Slavery International.

The historiography of the APS consists of four waves of research. The first wave included Charles Swaisland's 1968 doctoral dissertation and Kenneth Nworah's 1971 article. Swaisland had worked for the Colonial Office in East Nigeria from 1949-1963 and had wanted to study Colonial Office records for his dissertation, but at that time too many students were already studying the Colonial Office and he was instead assigned to the APS records. This background detail is important because, in many ways, Swaisland's dissertation is a sentimental tribute to what Swaisland perceived to be the goodness and justice of the Colonial Office.

> The APS could only have been effective at all because there was a basic integrity and humanity in the politicians and officials who represented the imperial factor. The Society was in fact an important, but minor, part of the humanitarianism which by that time had become a property of administration.[33]

For Swaisland, the APS was useful primarily as a means by which the Colonial Office could gather information. The Society did good work, certainly, but it did little more than provide information to the Colonial Office, and it was the Colonial Office that took action: the good work of the APS was "in part the fruit of the members' own strength of conviction and honesty in action; but it was equally to be credited to the basic integrity of those with whom the Society was most closely in touch, the politicians and civil servants in the Colonial Office."[34] Nworah's 1971 article is, temporally, a continuation of Swaisland's research: where Swaisland attends to the APS between 1837 and the 1880s, Nworah attends to the APS between 1889-1909. Nworah diverges from Swaisland's emphasis on the collaboration of the Colonial Office and the APS, arguing that the Colonial Office often did its best to impede the APS. In particular, he points to

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[33] Henry Charles Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa" (PhD Thesis--University of Oxford, 1968), iv.
[34] Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society," vii

the Colonial Office's repeated attempts to prove that the APS's informant network was nothing more than letters forged by the APS itself.[35] Nonetheless, Nworah and Swaisland share a similar approach to the APS, treating it as first and foremost a political lobby group that did its best to advocate on the behalf of non-Europeans in the empire.

The second wave of research into the APS included Brian Willan's 1979 article and Ronald Rainger's 1980 article. Both challenge Swaisland's and Nworah's work, albeit in different ways. Willan's article is a case study of the APS's response to the Natives' Land Act of 1913 in South Africa. He identifies a paradox in the Society's response: the Society supported the Act supposedly on the behalf of black Africans, whereas the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), on their own behalf, vehemently opposed it. Willan argues that the Society supported the Act as a political move to further its interests elsewhere, particularly as it feared that annoying the Colonial Office about the Act would reduce the likelihood of the Colonial Office playing ball with them in Rhodesia.[36] By highlighting these petty politics that influenced the APS to lobby the Colonial Office with policies that contradicted black African opinion, Willan challenges the view of the APS as an advocate for non-European peoples. Rainger's article, an intellectual history of the APS, challenges the view that the Society's historical significance lay only in its political activities. Rather, Rainger argues that the APS's efforts to gather information on Indigenous-newcomer relations, in conjunction with the scientific interests of many of its members, set an important precedent that led to the development of ethnological and anthropological societies in the late nineteenth century.[37] Thus, for Rainger, the APS was less

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[35] Kenneth Nworah, "The Aborigines' Protection Society, 1889-1909: A Pressure-Group in Colonial Policy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 5, no. 1 (1971), 86.
[36] Brian Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the South African Natives' Land Act of 1913," *The Journal of African History* 20, no. 1 (1979): 102.
[37] Ronald Rainger, "Philanthropy and Science in the 1830's: The British and Foreign Aborigines' Protection Society," *Man* 14, no. 4 (1980): 710-11.

significant for its political lobbying and work with the Colonial Office than for the way it brought philanthropically and scientifically interested people together to create a new kind of information-gathering society, leading to the birth of anthropology proper.

The third wave of research included Roderick Mitcham's 2001 doctoral dissertation and James Heartfield's 2011 monograph. While separated by a decade, these two pieces share many similarities. Both use a case study of the APS as a means of historicizing modern humanitarianism. Mitcham does this with an eye towards comparing and contrasting the APS's strategies in the mid-nineteenth century with those of the mid-twentieth century to show how the practices of humanitarian organizations evolved.[38] He demonstrates that strategies changed from a focus on lecturing, writing to the press, and publishing journals to a concentration on running travelling pageants and producing radio broadcasts. Despite these changes, he argues that the fundamental strategy of raising awareness and communicating information remained central.[39] Heartfield, a decade later, locates the APS's significance in the way it merged humanitarianism with imperial politics to create what he calls "humanitarian imperialism." According to Heartfield, humanitarian imperialism was a stage of British imperialism in the late nineteenth century in which the annexation of non-European societies was not merely a side-effect of imperial expansion, but a goal in itself. He particularly links the APS with the development of the legal category of British protectorates. A protectorate was a category of British authority that was halfway between annexation and independence. Heartfield argues that the APS wedded imperialism with humanitarianism by calling for the creation of British protectorates, particularly the Western Pacific Protectorate created in 1874 and the Bechuanaland Protectorate created in

[38] Roderick Mitcham, "Geographies of Global Humanitarianism: The Anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines Protection Society, 1884-1933" (PhD Thesis – University of London, 2001), 7-8.
[39] Mitcham, "Geographies of Global Humanitarianism," 232.

1885, which would safeguard foreign societies from the worst effects of contact with the empire.[40] Although Mitcham and Heartfield have different areas of focus, both locate the APS as an important turning point in the development of international humanitarianism.

The fourth wave of research includes Elizabeth Elbourne's 2005 chapter and Zoe Laidlaw's 2014 chapter. Rather than looking at the APS as strictly a British organization operated by Britons, Elbourne and Laidlaw approach the APS as a network through which colonized peoples could exert agency. Elbourne first proposed this view of the Society in a thought-provoking preliminary research note, where she ponders "to what extent a handful of Indigenous people had access to information networks concerning the white settler Empire as a whole, and to what extent these information networks may or may not have affected local communities."[41] Elbourne's chapter surveys a variety of Indigenous engagements with humanitarian networks, from attending schools run by the London Missionary Society to travelling to Britain under the support of the Aborigines' Protection Society. Ultimately, she argues that Indigenous peoples of the empire "took advantage of transnational networks to gain knowledge of other groups and to attempt to negotiate within tight limits with powerful settler states."[42] However, she also points to the significance of these tight limits:

> In order to participate in the international networks of this period with the partial aim of protecting local communities, Indigenous people frequently needed to present themselves in print or in person on the British stage as, to some extent, disembodied actors with the concomitant ability to move between different cultural worlds.[43]

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[40] James Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 49-55.
[41] Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks," 62.
[42] Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks," 78.
[43] Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks," 62-3.

Elbourne asserts the importance of this tension between Indigenous uses of imperial information networks for resistance and the requirement that Indigenous engagements with such networks conform to settler understandings of "civilization," and she calls for further research.[44] Nine years later, Zoe Laidlaw contributed a chapter that focused precisely on this tension between Indigenous resistance and complicity through the Aborigines' Protection Society. Laidlaw's study focuses on nine individuals who embarked on delegations to England with the support of the Society. She identifies the strategic balancing acts that these individuals carried out between performances of "authentic" Indigenous identities and authoritative "civilized" identities. She argues that the need for Indigenous people to appear to conform to settler understandings of "civilization" in order to resist colonialism through the APS did not equate with complicity with colonialism, because their efforts to appear to conform to settler society were strategic performances calculated to increase the effectiveness of resistance.[45]

> Engagement and negotiation with colonisers were significant forms of mid-century resistance for colonized peoples, even though postcolonial and nationalist historians have sometimes neglected their study in favour of more dramatic modes of resistance or stories of victimhood.[46]

These four waves of research had different intentions and goals. The first was largely exploratory, seeking to gain an understanding of what exactly the APS was. The second and fourth were more critical, questioning the alleged benevolence of the Society and looking at it from different intellectual and cultural perspectives. The third was more synthetic, tying what we have learned about the Society into larger historiographies of humanitarianism and imperial politics. Yet beyond their differing intentions and goals, the most striking difference between the

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[44] Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks," 80-1.
[45] Zoe Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors: Networks of Imperial Protest and Humanitarianism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," in *Indigenous Networks: Mobility Connections and Exchange*, eds. Jane Carey and Jane Lydon (New York: Routledge, 2014), 115-19.
[46] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 115.

waves is the primary sources they include: only the most recent wave, constituted by Elbourne and Laidlaw, includes sources other than those of Britons. The other historians justify their ignoring of non-European sources in various ways. Swaisland's only reference to black African agents is his statement that "Most of [the APS's contacts] in South Africa were not themselves the victims of oppression."[47] This was certainly true: letters to the APS from black correspondents are so out-numbered by letters from Europeans that they can easily be missed if the researcher is not specifically looking for them. Nonetheless, Swaisland's overlooking of these letters leads his arguments astray at certain moments. For example, he claims that "Umqikela, the Pondo paramount chief, was led by a mis-translation of an APS letter intended to discourage the sending of a delegation to Britain, into believing it had pledged itself to 'compel the Queen's ministers' to receive the delegates."[48] In fact, the complete opposite is true. In Mqikela's letter to the APS of 12 July 1884, he explicitly stated that

> [My advisor] never told me that 'he held a pledge that the Aborigines Protection Society would compel the Queen's ministers to receive the Pondo deputation.' Nor has he ever said anything, which would lead me to imagine, that he had any kind of promise or pledge from your Society.[49]

Willan includes some non-European voices in his study, identifying the central role of the SANNC's protests against the Natives' Land Act in pushing the Society to lobby for the Act. Yet in Willan's narrative, the SANNC was in a supporting role to the main role of the APS, important for how the APS reacted to them rather than for what they themselves did. Rainger's study, as an intellectual history of an English organization and Thomas Hodgkin in particular, only gives

[47] Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society," ii.
[48] Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society," 406.
[49] Mqikela, "Mqikela to Chesson," 12 July 1884, Bodleian Libraries Special Collections, Anti-Slavery Papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 18 C149/105.

attention to British sources. Mitcham excuses himself from attending to colonized voices by claiming that they did not exist:

> Owning to the absence of the voices of the suffering, the thesis focuses on the numerous actors who claimed to speak for them. The suffering, within the archive, are not speaking subjects, they are objects of discussion: recuperating their consciousness, therefore, would be highly problematic.[50]

Heartfield, in standard academic form, acknowledges that there was a non-European aspect to the history of the APS, but excuses himself from attending to it by placing it outside his scope: "This study goes into some of the Indigenous peoples' struggles…but first and foremost it is a history of the Aborigines' Protection Society and the way it shaped the policy of the British Empire towards natives."[51] To be fair, we should recognize that these historians were writing at different moments in time. Elbourne and Laidlaw, writing in 2005 and 2014, are of an academic environment that encourages and prioritizes Indigenous voices. Swaisland and Nworah, writing in 1968 and 1971, were observing processes of decolonization and the fading of the British empire, and understandably were concerned with reimagining British identities. Willan's article, written in 1979, can be located within the heightened international attention that was directed towards the anti-apartheid liberation movement following the Soweto Uprising in 1976, a moment when people around the world were increasingly interrogating their own societies' roles in supporting apartheid. While recognizing that locating these historians in their temporal context can help explain why they do not prioritize or include marginalized voices, this does not subtract from the importance of including these voices in the history of the APS.

Yet the work done by Elbourne and Laidlaw on including marginalized voices has only cracked the surface. They study Indigenous peoples' delegations to England that were supported

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[50] Mitcham, "Geographies of Global Humanitarianism," 32.
[51] Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society,* xi.

by the APS, and while these were significant and visible engagements of Indigenous peoples with the Society, they were far from the most common. The APS's objective was not to bring delegations to testify in England. Rather, as laid out in its first annual meeting, the first object of the Society was "to open a correspondence with intelligent and benevolent individuals abroad" and thereby collect and publish "authentic information concerning the character, habits, and wants of uncivilized tribes."[52] Consequently, the most common means of engaging with the Society was through correspondence, and yet we know nothing about non-European correspondence with the Society.

By incorporating these marginalized and silenced letters, I offer a new perspective of the APS. To begin this reconceptualization, I ask: who were the Society's black African correspondents? Why did they write to the APS? How did the APS respond to their letters? And does considering their letters alter the established historiographical narrative of the Aborigines' Protection Society? In adopting the framework of information networks and imperial "means of publication," I ask how black Africans contributed to the circulation of knowledge between metropole and colony through written correspondence. Furthermore, by studying how the Society responded to these letters, and how it incorporated or did not incorporate them into its lobbying and publishing activities, we can gain insight into how open imperial information networks were to black South Africa, and the extent to which black Africans contributed to the creation of imperial knowledge.

Methodology

[52] Aborigines' Protection Society, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society, Presented at the Meeting in Exeter Hall, May 6th, 1838,* 11.

This thesis proceeded through two stages of research to address these questions. The first stage consisted of an exploratory survey of letters written by black Africans to the Aborigines' Protection Society. The second stage consisted of a comparative analysis of the content of those letters with the content of the Society's literary outputs including its journal, *The Aborigines' Friend*, its articles printed in *The Times*, and its letters written to the Colonial Office.

In the exploratory stage, I manually searched through the correspondence records of the Aborigines' Protection Society held in the Bodleian Libraries of the University of Oxford for letters written by black Africans. This task was complicated by both the size of the archive, which contains exactly 9,605 individual letters, and the necessity of identifying letters with black African authors. Those 9,605 letters are divided into fonds according to who was secretary of the Society at the time the letters were received, so that there is a Thomas Hodgkin fonds covering letters from 1831-1865, a Frederick Chesson fonds covering 1866-1888, a Henry Fox-Bourne fonds covering 1888-1909, and a miscellaneous fonds. The vast majority of the letters in the collection, 6,773 or 70% of the total, are in the Frederick Chesson fonds.[53] I chose to focus my study on the letters within the Chesson fonds because the small number of letters within the other fonds were unlikely to have contained enough letters from black Africans to occupy a thesis of this length. Focusing on this fonds established my time frame as 1866-1888, but it turned out that the first letter from a black African was not received until 1879, thus determining my time frame

[53] It is unclear why that ratio is so high. Charles Swaisland commented in his dissertation that, prior to being rescued in 1948 by the Bodleian Libraries, the Society's correspondence archive had been languishing in a damp and mouldy cellar on Vauxhall Bridge Road, and that many letters had been destroyed by the mould. It is possible that many of the letters received by Hodgkin and Fox-Bourne perished during that time. Swaisland also comments that many of the letters had been removed by George Cox while researching his 1888 *The Life of John William Colenso*, and are now in Cox's own archival collection. It is similarly possible that the letters to Hodgkin may be held in his fonds at the Wellcome Library in London, that letters to Fox-Bourne may be held in his fonds distributed between the Cadbury Research Library at the University of Birmingham, the Durham University Library, and the London School of Economics Library.

as 1879-1888. As for identifying letters with black African authors, I relied on various clues. The material of the letters themselves often hinted towards their authorship, see Figures 1-3 below. Letters from middle- and upper-class Britons were typically written on heavy, folded cardstock embossed or printed with a coat-of-arms or a place of business. Letters from missionaries were often printed on thin, oily paper reminiscent of magazine paper. Letters from lawyers, as well as formal petitions from black Africans, were typically printed on heavy, oversized cardstock. Further clues could be found in the address at the beginning and the signature at the end of the letter. African names would be obvious clues, but any South African address would draw my attention. When my attention was drawn to a letter, or more accurately, when my attention was not immediately deflected by obvious signs of British origin, I read through the letter in search of subject matter that would indicate black African authorship. When I determined black African authorship, I photographed and transcribed the letter for later analysis. In total, I identified and transcribed eighty letters.


C127/104

Jan. 18. 1880.

15, EATON PLACE,
S. W.

Dear Mr Cheson

I have received the proposed letter on the resolutions. I am not very well pleased with it. I fear it is too long, and that some of the statements are assumed to be correct without sufficient evidence of the points yet to hand. Have we yet any certainty "that soldiers

Figure 1: Letter embossed with a London address



Figure 2: A missionary letter. Notice the thinness and oiliness of the paper, you can see the writing from the next page underneath



Private

C123/40

Temple
June 20th 188?

Dear Sir

Reunion Coolies

Thanks for your note — I am surprised at the answer of Ld Hartington to Mr Fowler's question last evening — My information as to the suspension of the Coolie traffic came direct from Reunion by last mail — my informant has always been so careful and accurate that I cannot imagine a mistake being made in this instance — at all events it is a fact that the Coolies have, or had a month ago, ceased to arrive in Reunion, and it was understood there in the island that two shiploads which had been long expected from India would not now be sent —+

The government have all along shown a singular want of frankness in answering questions — Sir C. Dilke's answer of Augt 23/80 as to the selling of the Coolies was an evasion almost amounting to an untruth — The answer of May 10th 1882 when Sir Charles said that the emigration was virtually stopped was then an unfounded statement as the traffic was still in full swing and according to Ld Hartington it is so now — Next mail will probably show who is right — Anyhow if the traffic is not stopped it must be and

+ I send you some newspaper cuttings which you will see bear unwilling testimony to the accuracy of my information. Kindly return them soon when read

Figure 3: An official petition or legal letter, notice the formal writing and clean lines

Working from these transcripts, I determined which letters were most relevant and would be included in my study. A significant portion, forty-three of the eighty, were letters from white South Africans such as the Colensos, a family of missionaries in Natal, and William Grant,

advisor to the Zulu king Dinuzulu, that contained black voices. These voices took different forms. Sometimes they were "statements" of various Zulu royal family members, where the Colensos had transcribed their statements about specific events. Sometimes they were transcripts of interviews between Zulu royal family members and government officials. Sometimes they were transcripts of messages sent by Zulu royal family members to the Colensos and Grant. I had included these letters in an early draft of this thesis, but I removed them because these were not letters from black Africans to the Aborigines' Protection Society. I could not know whether the owners of the quoted voices in those letters had intended for the Colensos or Grant to transcribe their words and send them to the APS, or if the Colensos and Grant had co-opted black voices for their own purposes. There is a place for these letters in my research, but there was no space in this thesis for the extra dimension they added. I hope to write a separate article on these letters, or perhaps incorporate them into my doctoral dissertation.

The remaining thrity-seven letters formed the foundation of the exploratory stage of my research. I identified six individual correspondents: John Tengo Jabavu, Pambani Mzimba, Samuel Moroka, Maherero, Shadrach Boyce Mama, and Mqikela. These correspondents will be introduced in Chapter One. The intention of my exploratory research stage was to determine who wrote to the APS, what they wrote about, and why. As such, my approach to these letters was simply to read each letter carefully, paying close attention to the words, the messages, and the rhetorical strategies within them.

Letters, of course, are not neutral literary vessels unburdened with social and cultural meaning. Indeed, British letter-writing was, from its beginning, developed to facilitate the imperial project. A government-operated postal system was first established in 1685 as a means of improving merchant and administrative communication across the Atlantic, and the creation

of this system led to a "communications revolution" that in many ways underlay the creation of the British empire.[54] Moreover, access to letter-writing as a communications technology was heavily steeped in British cultural norms that are problematic when studying letters written by non-Europeans. The ability to read and write in English was only the first barrier. The act of writing a letter in the nineteenth century was policed and informed by cultural norms illustrated by the massive proliferation of letter-writing manuals and textbooks in the eighteenth-century, which disseminated standardized formats, styles of writing, and etiquette for letter-writing.[55] For those black Africans without access to this cultural training, even if they had basic literacy skills, letter-writing might have been out of reach pending access to more training or to a trained scribe. The financial cost of sending letters was yet another barrier. In 1863, the cost of a letter from Cape Town to London was one shilling,[56] roughly equivalent to two pounds of beef.[57] In order to send a letter, black Africans would have needed not only to have cash, and therefore likely a cash-paying job, but also expendable income, further limiting access to letter-writing. Of course, previous histories of black letter-writing have shown that from the mid-nineteenth century, black Africans adopted the technology of letter-writing for many and diverse purposes including managing family affairs, requesting familial assistance, and maintaining romantic relationships while working away from home.[58] Nevertheless, all of these factors -- the normative and

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[54] Eve Tavor Bannet, *Empire of Letters: Letter Manuals and Transatlantic Correspondence, 1688-1820* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9-10.
[55] Bannet, *Empire of Letters*, 54-94.
[56] Fred Melville, *The Postage Stamps of the Cape of Good Hope, with Mafeking and Vryburg* (London: The Melville Stamp Books, 1913).
[57] Pim de Zwart, "Cape Colony Price Index, 1835-1910," International Institute of Social History, accessed 13 November 2019, http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php#southafrica.
[58] For an overview of the historiography of black letter-writing, see Karin Barber, ed., *Africa's Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and Making the Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

financial barriers -- imbue the letters written by black Africans with levels of meaning far beyond the words printed on the paper.

That being said, this thesis is primary interested in the words printed on the paper, and does not intentionally seek to unpack these deeper meanings. The letters analysed in this thesis have not been discussed before. Prior to commencing my research, I did not know what they would be about, why they would have been written, or, indeed, if there were any letters from black Africans to the APS at all. Laura Ishiguro recently defended her very similar "just reading" approach to letters written by women from British Columbia by arguing that analyzing the deeper meanings of letters "risks assuming that we already know the dispositions and concerns of the authors, and the particular configurations of power they enacted."[59] In other words, we cannot begin to analyze the deeper meanings within these letters until we have a decent grasp of the prima facie meanings. Like Ishiguro, I have not approached these letters "with the intention of extracting specific topics that I have assumed will be present and significant, but rather have sought to understand first what characterizes this correspondence."[60]

In the comparative stage of my research, I combed through the twenty-four issues of *The Aborigines' Friend* published between February 1879 and June 1889, looking for any articles that referenced South African topics. Articles in *The Aborigines' Friend* were written by the secretary of the Society, in this case Frederick Chesson, although the opinions expressed in the *Friend* were arrived at by consensus at APS executive meetings. I identified 79 individual articles, closely read through them, and categorized them according to subject matter. I also combed through published volumes of British Parliamentary Papers, which are indexed by date and

[59] Laura Ishiguro, *Nothing to Write Home About: British Family Correspondence and the Settler Colonial Everyday in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2019), 24.
[60] Ishiguro, *Nothing to Write Home About*, 24.

subject, in order to find letters written by the Aborigines' Protection Society to the Colonial Office during the period of 1879-1889. Again, these letters were penned by secretary Chesson and based on executive consensus. Using these categories, I was able to pinpoint those articles and letters to the Colonial Office which shared subject matter with black correspondence, and compare how subjects were discussed between the different media. On many occasions, the Society would paraphrase letters from black correspondents, or otherwise reference them by name. Less often, it would quote excerpts from them. On one occasion, it transcribed an entire letter. These are the moments that I particularly emphasise.



Figure 4: Cover of The Aborigines' Friend *(December 1862), Gale Digital Collections, 19th Century UK Periodicals*

Main arguments and structure

This thesis begins with a contextual chapter, where I provide an overview of the major historical processes and events in South Africa that directly inform the correspondence discussed

throughout the rest of the thesis. Chapter One also introduces the six correspondents, explains their backgrounds, and contextualizes them within the larger historical processes and events. Following the contextual chapter, the main arguments of this thesis respond to three main questions.

Question 1: How did black Africans engage with the Aborigines' Protection Society's information network?

Argument: Just as Laidlaw has shown that Indigenous voices contributed via delegations to England, this thesis demonstrates that an even greater number of voices were contributed via written correspondence. And while the Society certainly placed an emphasis on the protection of colonized peoples through imperial administration, education, and Christianization, African correspondence absolutely was not limited to these themes. Indeed, the wide variety of issues written about shows that there was no monolithic conceptualization of the APS's relation to African politics. Instead, the APS's utility was interpreted by these correspondents according to their individual needs at specific moments in time. Amidst this variety, there were three general themes along which correspondents wrote. First, they valued the Society's mandate to collect and disseminate information on colonial events, and sought to have their perspectives represented throughout the empire by providing information on local issues. Second, they valued the Society's political connections and respectability, and sought to harness those connections to gain support for delegations to England. Third, they valued the Society's position outside of government and mainstream media infrastructure, and sought to operate through that positionality to challenge representations made of them by the Cape government and media. I discuss these themes in Chapter Two.

Question 2: How did the Aborigines' Protection Society engage with its black African correspondents?

Argument: Of the six correspondents, only three succeeded in having their voices represented by the Society. What is more, for those three whose voices were represented, the Society interfered with their information. As we will see, the Society censored letters that either offended its subscriber base, offended friendly members of parliament, or disagreed with its own previously published opinions. Moreover, the Society placed a much higher value and credibility on European voices than African voices, and so when the Society received information from African voices, it treated them as less important. I discuss this censorship in Chapter Three.

Question 3: Overall, was the Aborigines' Protection Society an information network through which black Africans represented themselves at the imperial level?

Argument: As Chapter Two illustrates, at least six Africans attempted to represent their perspectives and gain political advantages through correspondence with the Society. And, despite interference, Chapter Three illustrates that the Society published some of the letters sent by Mqikela and Jabavu in its own journal and in *The Times.* It arranged public meetings and published articles discussing Samuel Moroka's perspective, and it arranged meetings between Moroka and the Colonial Secretary. Overall, I argue that the Society's information network afforded some correspondents an undeniable, if limited, means of having their perspectives represented in British imperial information networks. I advance this argument in Chapter Three and in the conclusion.

Chapter One – South Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century

The letters to the Aborigines' Protection Society that I examine in the upcoming chapters were written between 1879-1886, a complex and transitional period of South African history. The correspondents I study were living at the conjunction of two highly disruptive historical processes: the "mineral revolution," when the discovery of large deposits of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 fueled massive economic restructuring, and the "Scramble for Africa," when intense competition between European powers led to rampant imperial activity across the continent from 1879 onwards. Moreover, these two historical processes did not converge on a blank canvas. At the eve of the mineral revolution, the future South Africa was comprised of two British colonies, two Afrikaner colonies, seven independent African kingdoms,[61] two independent Griqua territories,[62] and innumerable smaller African polities and ethnicities. To understand the black correspondence with the APS, we need to have a basic grasp of the historical moment in which they were written. This chapter is dedicated to an overview of the fundamental aspects of South African history that are most relevant to the letters discussed in chapters two and three.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of the period leading up to the 1870s, and focuses on three major processes: the slow expansion of the Cape Colony's frontier eastwards, the retreat of British imperial responsibility in South Africa, and the rising Anglo-Afrikaner tensions culminating in the creation of the Afrikaner republics. The second section provides an overview of the impact of the mineral revolution and the "Scramble for Africa", both in general terms and in their impact on the seven specific regions

[61] The Pedi, the Zulu, the Tswana, the Mpondo, the BaSotho, the Mfengu, and the Thembu.
[62] The Griqua, later classified under Apartheid as Coloured, were a heterogenous collection of mixed-race peoples including Khoikhoi, African, Malay, and European ancestry.

that are referenced in the correspondence I study. The third section introduces the six correspondents who will be discussed in the next two chapters. The concluding section transitions from South African history to the Aborigines' Protection Society by highlighting the Society's opinions and actions regarding South Africa during the 1870s and 1880s.

Section 1: South Africa prior to 1870

Prior to the discovery of diamond deposits in late 1867, the colonization of South Africa followed three dominant processes. First, the eastern frontier of the British Cape Colony slowly crept ever farther into Xhosa territory, sparking enduring frontier warfare known as the Cape Frontier Wars. Second, tensions between settlers of Dutch descent, who became known as Afrikaners, and the British administration that took over from 1806 led to the large-scale emigration of Afrikaners from the Cape and the establishment of the Afrikaner republics in the mid-nineteenth century. Third, Britain's reluctance to fund the expansion and administration of settler colonies in South Africa led to a slow retreat of imperial authority, and resulted in the establishment of responsible government in the Cape and recognition of the sovereignty of the Afrikaner republics.



Figure 5: Eastern expansion of Cape Colony, projected on a map of modern South Africa

Eastward expansion

From the implementation of British rule in the Cape Colony in 1806 to the mineral revolution in the 1870s, Britain was interested in South Africa primarily for the strategic control of the water route between Europe and Asia. Like the Dutch East India Company before it, the British imperial government aimed to restrict inland expansion so as to limit expenditure on costly frontier warfare. As in many colonial contexts, the Cape expanded regardless of imperial intentions. The rural constituencies of Cape society, predominantly pastoralists and farmers of Dutch descent, steadily moved eastward in search of arable land, and in doing so came into repeated conflict with various Xhosa groups. When frontier tensions erupted into large scale

conflicts that endangered the colony, Britain reluctantly defended its settlers and pushed its boundaries ever outwards at the expense of the Xhosa.

British expansion eastward first happened following the Fourth Frontier War of 1811-12,[63] when 20,000 Xhosa were driven out of their territory so that a buffer zone of settlers could be placed on the newly annexed territory known as Albany, theoretically establishing a more secure frontier.[64] It happened again following the Fifth Frontier War of 1818-19, when the Xhosa invaded the Cape in retaliation for a demand to return stolen cattle. The invasion was repelled and the Xhosa were pushed further back and their land was once again annexed. Referred to as the Neutral/Ceded Territory, the land annexed in 1819 was meant to be kept as an unsettled buffer between the Cape and the Xhosa, but it was less than two years before settlement crept in.[65] Cattle theft continued between the Cape and the Xhosa regardless of the government's attempts to maintain a strong boundary, and in 1834 a Cape patrol tried to punish the Xhosa by executing a high-ranking chief. In response, the Xhosa led another invasion of the Cape, known as the Sixth Frontier War. Following the war, the Cape annexed yet another slice of land and ordered the Xhosa to evacuate. However, this annexation was intensely criticized in Britain by the Select Committee on Aborigines, and the annexation was immediately reversed by the Colonial Office. In place of annexation, the Cape reserved the territory then known as British Kaffraria for Xhosa residence, and implemented a series of treaties with Xhosa chiefs that

[63] Part of a series of nine wars between the Cape Colony and the Xhosa stretching between 1779-1879. The first three frontier wars were fought during Dutch rule, and so histories of the British era typically begin with the Fourth in 1811-12.
[64] Martin Legassick and Robert Ross, "From Slave Economy to Settler Capitalism: The Cape Colony and Its Extensions, 1800-1854," in Carolyn Hamilton, Bernard Mbenga, and Robert Ross, eds., *The Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 1: From Early Times to 1885* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 266-267.
[65] Legassick and Ross, "From Slave Economy to Settler Capitalism," 267-269.

required each chief to entertain a Cape military outpost in their territory.[66] The reservation of British Kaffraria lasted only until 1847.

In 1846, the Xhosa chief Sandile disputed the authority of one of these military outposts to try a Xhosa man for the murder of a Cape resident, and refused to recognize the authority of the Cape to extradite and punish his own subjects. The Cape sent a military force into British Kaffraria to detain the accused Xhosa man, and Sandile responded by routing the military force and leading a Xhosa force into the Cape in what is called the Seventh Frontier War. The Xhosa were defeated and British Kaffraria was annexed as a new Crown colony, with magistrates and police forces distributed throughout.[67] Under Crown administration half of British Kaffraria was opened up for white settlement, but when it was handed over to Cape administration in 1866 in order to reduce imperial expenditure, the entirety of British Kaffraria was opened to whites.[68]

Imperial retreat and responsible government

Throughout the process of eastern colonial expansion, the British imperial government was consistently irritated at the inability of the Cape administration to restrict settler expansion. Incoming governors were tasked with preventing imperial expenditure at all costs, but as the bills for frontier conflict continued to rise, Britain retreated farther and farther from responsibility for the Cape. As early as 1823, a commission of inquiry was established to recommend a pathway for establishing representative and responsible government institutions. Early representative institutions were implemented, such as an advisory council in 1825, executive and legislative councils in 1834, and municipal councils in 1836.[69] Yet the imperial government was cautious of

[66] Legassick and Ross, "From Slave Economy to Settler Capitalism," 281-285.
[67] Legassick and Ross, "From Slave Economy to Settler Capitalism," 296-301.
[68] Norman Etherington, Patrick Harries, and Bernard Mbenga, "From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest," in Hamilton, Mbenga, and Ross, eds., *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, 334.
[69] J.L. McCracken, *The Cape Parliament: 1854-1910* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 3-6.

tensions between Cape Town, where political and commercial power was concentrated, and the eastern provinces, where a large rural population resided. Britain feared that providing representative and responsible government to this divided population would lead to civil unrest. Britain was further concerned about the seeming inability of Cape settlers to live peacefully with black Africans. Following the anti-slavery movement and the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833, there was significant momentum in British politics supporting the continued prevention of slavery and slavery-like working conditions. Aware of the long history of Cape Frontier Wars and reports of settlers exploiting black labour, Britain feared that giving the Cape control over internal affairs would lead to unchecked oppression of the black population. However, the exorbitant costs of the Seventh Frontier War (1846-47) pushed Britain to fast-track its retreat from South Africa through representative government, and representative government was granted in 1853.[70] Yet Britain was still concerned that divisions within Cape society between those in the urban centers of the west and those in the rural provinces of the east would be a disastrous foundation for responsible government, and withheld responsible government until the Cape could prove that both sections of society were prepared for it. This took 19 years. Through the 1860s a popular movement for responsible government engulfed Cape politics with a majority of MPs from both western and eastern provinces supporting it, and this united front convinced Britain that the Cape was not too divided to operate as a government. Britain conceded the control of internal affairs to a responsible Cape government in 1872.[71]

[70] McCracken, *The Cape Parliament,* 8-17.
[71] McCracken, *The Cape Parliament,* 24-27.



Figure 6: Cape Colony and Afrikaner Republics, projected on a map of modern South Africa

Anglo-Afrikaner tension

Tensions between Afrikaner settlers and the British administration installed in 1806 steadily increased throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, leading to the large-scale emigration of Afrikaners from the Cape Colony known as the Great Treks, as well as to the creation of three new Afrikaner colonies by mid-century. These tensions first arose from interference the British administration made into Afrikaner society. Interference in land and labour issues were found particularly offensive. First, the Afrikaner loan farm system of land tenure was replaced with a perpetual quitrent system. The loan farm system entailed the payment of a fixed yearly rent regardless of the size or quality of the land. Horrified by the potential revenue that was lost by not accounting for size and quality, the British administration abolished

the loan farm system and implemented the perpetual quitrent system in 1812, requiring land surveys to be performed and approved prior to tenure being granted.[72] In 1828, the British administration interfered in the forced labour of the local Khoikhoi peoples. Prior to 1828, Khoikhoi labourers were kept on farms via a combination of debt bondage, where labourers would be kept in a constant state of indebtedness, and vagrancy legislation, where Khoikhoi individuals required permission from their employer to leave a farm. By the late 1820s Britain was at the height of the anti-slavery movement, and lobbyists (including the Select Committee on Aborigines) succeeded in securing Ordinance 50 to abolish the vagrancy legislation, making Khoikhoi labour much more expensive for Afrikaner farmers.[73] The most offensive interference, often pointed to as the moment that sparked the Great Treks, was the de-annexation of British Kaffraria following the Sixth Frontier War of 1834-35. Around 15,000 Xhosa had invaded the Cape frontier during the war, destroying hundreds of Afrikaner farms and reducing an estimated 7,000 farmers to destitution. The annexation of British Kaffraria was considered by many Afrikaners to be restitution for the loss of their property and a helping hand from the government to rebuild their lives. As such, when Britain de-annexed British Kaffraria, it was interpreted by Afrikaner farmers as a message that Britain and the Cape did not care about them.[74]

Acting upon their outrage and feelings of marginalization, many large groups of Afrikaners began to emigrate from the Cape in the 1830s and 1840s, totalling roughly 10% of the Cape population.[75] These groups established three new Afrikaner republics throughout the

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[72] L.C. Duly, "The Failure of British Land Policy at the Cape, 1812-28," *Journal of African History* 6, no. 3 (1965): 358-361.
[73] *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire*, eds. James Stuart Olson and Robert Shadle (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), s.v. "Fiftieth Ordinance."
[74] Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 142-3.
[75] Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 161.

interior: the Republic of Natalia in the west, the Orange Free State in the north, and the South African Republic in the north-east. At first, Britain was willing to accept the independence of Natalia, as the cost of forcing its subjugation would have been too high. This changed when intelligence reached Britain that the government of Natalia was planning to forcibly relocate the majority of the Zulu within its borders to the south, where they would share a border with the Xhosa. Concerned that this would cause Xhosa-Zulu hostilities that would spill into the Cape, a British force was sent to annex Natalia as the new British colony of Natal in 1842.[76] The Orange Free State was problematic for the Cape because it threatened the security of the Cape's northern border. In the 1830s and 1840s, the region to the north of the Cape was inhabited by two Griqua polities (Griqualand West and Griqualand East), the BaSotho, the Baralong, and a new Afrikaner settlement claiming independence. Since the mid-1830s, the Cape had signed protection treaties recognizing the sovereignty of the Griqua, BaSotho, and Baralong individually. Violence broke out in 1845 between the newly arrived Afrikaners and the Griqua as the Afrikaners began infringing on their land, and tensions also arose between the Afrikaners and the BaSotho. Britain abandoned its individual treaties and declared British rule over the entire region, called the Orange River Sovereignty, in order to better regulate relations between the Afrikaners and the African groups. The Afrikaners offered some military resistance to British rule, but were defeated in 1848 and fled north-east to establish the South African Republic.[77] However, the Eighth Frontier War (1850-53) began shortly after the Orange River Sovereignty was established, and Britain became determined to withdraw from the costly maintenance of interior warfare. Consequently, Britain sought to make alliances with the Afrikaner separatists, who

[76] Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 168-9.
[77] George Theal, *South Africa: the Cape Colony, Natal Orange Free State, South African Republic, Rhodesia, and all other territories south of the Zambesi* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969 [1894]), 244-249.

could be depended on to stabilize the frontier at their own expense. Britain recognized the South African Republic as a sovereign state in 1852, and in 1854 gave up control of the Orange Free Sovereignty, recognizing the Orange Free State as sovereign as well. Natal, meanwhile, was too valuable as an outlet to the sea, and Britain retained it. Throughout the rest of the 19th century, gaining access to the sea was an enduring mission of the Afrikaner republics.[78]

In sum, from 1806 to 1867 the basic framework of colonial relations that informed the 1879-1889 period emerged. The Cape frontier slowly crept eastward over a period of several decades, absorbing Xhosa territories one by one. The cost of this frontier warfare pushed the imperial government to slowly withdraw from responsibility for the region, and the Cape increasingly gained representative and then responsible government. The interference of Britain in Afrikaner frontier society led to the Great Treks, which injected white settlement further into the South African interior in the form of the Afrikaner republics. These republics came into contact with new African groups, so that upon the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in 1867, the consequences would be felt not only by the Xhosa on the Cape's border, but by all black South African societies.

Section 2: Discovery of diamonds, confederation, and Scramble for Africa

From 1874 until the turn of the century, the imperial government reversed its withdrawal from South African affairs. 1877-1885 in particular saw a huge increase of imperial activity, with the annexation of ten new territories to the British empire.[79] The reasons behind this increased imperial activity were twofold. First, the discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State in 1867 generated a massive boost to the South African economy, vastly increasing Britain's interest in

[78] Giliomee, *The Afrikaners,* 174-5.
[79] These include Fingoland, Thembuland, Griqualand East, Griqualand West, Zululand, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Xesibeland, St. John's Port, and the Transvaal.

developing and controlling the region. At the same time, increasing European competition in Africa from the late 1870s onward pushed Britain to protect its claims against inter-imperial threats. It was on the subject of the wars and annexations that resulted from these changes that the six black correspondents discussed in this thesis wrote to the Aborigines' Protection Society. In this section, I give a brief overview of the twin forces of diamonds and European competition, and then provide a more in-depth overview of the seven local contexts that are referenced by the correspondents throughout the next two chapters of this thesis.

Diamonds and the confederation scheme

When diamonds were discovered in the Orange Free State in 1867, South African settler economies were dominated by a skyrocketing wool industry: from 1822 to 1866, Cape exports of wool grew from 2,000 pounds to 2 million pounds.[80] The wool industry had created a demand for cheap labour, and throughout the nineteenth century black Africans from all regions had been steadily pulled onto white farms as first slave and then indentured, apprenticed, waged, and sharecropping labourers. Nonetheless, the discovery of diamonds in 1867, followed by gold in 1886, created a demand for labour that South Africa had not seen before. Within 10 years of discovering diamonds, the diamond trade surpassed the wool trade.[81] And yet the wool trade did not wither. The development of the diamond industry led to an influx of mining companies and labourers who needed food and clothing, which led to a boom in agriculture and wool farming. New towns popped up to accommodate the mining companies, and new infrastructure was built to connect these towns, generating yet more work and boosting the economy further. Following

[80] Stanley Trapido, "Imperialism, Settler Identities, and Colonial Capitalism: The Hundred-Year Origins of the 1899 South African War," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa,* eds. Anne Kelk Mager, Bill Nasson, Robert Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 71-2.
[81] Shula Marks, "Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1880-1899," in *The Cambridge History of South Africa,* eds. Anne Kelk Mager, Bill Nasson, Robert Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 102-3.

the discovery of diamonds, South Africa's economy was hungry for cheap labour, and the black population was looked at to satisfy that hunger.[82] Britain, recognizing the new economic potential of South Africa, developed a confederation scheme that would bring the four colonies and the remaining African kingdoms under imperial rule for the better development of the diamond industry. The confederation scheme was designed to do two things. First, it would annex the remaining African kingdoms[83] thus gaining access to sufficient cheap labour to exploit South Africa's booming economy. Second, it would confederate the four settler colonies and Britain would thereby gain administrative control of "native policy" so as to efficiently distribute black labour from the conquered African kingdoms.[84] Pursued by two consecutive Colonial Secretaries, Lord Carnarvon from 1874-1878 and Michael Hicks-Beach from 1878-1880, and particularly overseen by South African High Commissioner Henry Bartle Frere between 1877-1880, the confederation scheme led to a rapid series of wars and annexations across South Africa. By 1885, however, confederation had run out of steam. Britain had been globally embarrassed during the Anglo-Zulu War, when the British army was defeated by the Zulus at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, as well as during the Anglo-Transvaal War, when the Afrikaners of the South African Republic delivered a humiliating defeat on the occupying British forces at the Battle of Majuba in 1881.[85] Yet the needs and the value of the economy ensured that imperial activity continued well after the plan for confederation had fallen apart.

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[82] Marks, "Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa," 102-3.
[83] By 1870, the largest independent Africans were the Pedi, the Zulu, the Tswana, the Mpondo, the BaSotho, the Mfengu, and the Thembu. By 1885, all but the Mpondo would be defeated.
[84] Marks, "Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa," 106-7.
[85] Marks, "Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa," 107.



Figure 7: Early Scramble for Africa, ~1884, projected on modern map of southern Africa

Scramble for Africa

The mineral revolution was not the only force behind the increased imperial activity of the 1870s and 1880s. Imperial interest in South Africa can also be located within a larger process of increased European imperialism in Africa known as the Scramble for Africa. The narrative of the Scramble often begins with the completion of the Suez Canal in Egypt in 1869, where Egypt had accrued massive debts to France and England. When, in 1879, Egyptian nationalists violently protested against the political influence of their French and British creditors, Britain led an invasion to protect both the strategic importance of the canal's route to the east as well as the massive debt that it was owed. The invasion was ultimately successful, British rule was established in Egypt in 1882, and Britain also assumed France's 51% ownership of the canal.

This pushed France to increase its imperial activities in Tunisia and Senegal as compensation and to prevent British hegemony in Africa.[86] The contemporary diplomatic system of Europe that had been established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, commonly referred to as the "balance of power" system, was based on an agreement that no European state should gain significant continental hegemony over the other states. Debate continues over which aspect was the most important influence behind the Scramble: interest in maintaining balance of power in Africa, interest in exploiting the economic resources of Africa, or the influence of a growing cultural atmosphere of jingoism in the European states. Regardless of which aspect was more important, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy all began expanding and competing for territories and spheres of influence in Africa.[87] In the South African context, competition from Germany and Portugal was of the highest concern, with Germany seeking to gain influence to the north-west and Portugal asserting its influence to the east. This competition, alongside the new potential wealth of the diamond industry, formed the foundation of the increased imperial activity that is the context for this thesis.

[86] Jeremy Rich, "The Scramble for Africa," in *The Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450,* ed. Thomas Benjamin (Detroit: Mcmillan Reference USA, 2007): 996-998.
[87] John Flint, "Britain and the Scramble for Africa," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography,* eds. Robin Winks and Alaine Low (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 456-8.



Figure 8: Map of regions discussed in this thesis circa 1870s, projected on a modern map of South Africa

Regional contexts

Of course, the general features of the confederation scheme and European competition played out very differently in the various regions of South Africa. The correspondents I examine do not make reference to confederation schemes, diamonds, or scrambles for Africa. Rather, individual correspondents reference specific manifestations of these larger processes within their local contexts. Seven of these local manifestations form the majority of the topics referenced by the correspondents: the Anglo-Pedi War in 1877, the Ninth Frontier War in 1877-78, the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879, the Basutoland Gun War in 1880, the exile of Samuel Moroka in 1883, the abandonment of Maherero in 1885, and the passage of the Parliamentary Registration Act in 1887.

1877, Pedi war

Some of the letters I study refer to the imprisonment of Sekhukhune following the Anglo-Pedi War of 1877. An early Pedi Polity emerged in the latter half of the eighteenth century in the north-eastern region of South Africa as a collection of various local groups including the Maroteng, the Tau, the Magakala, and the Roka. Its power was substantially weakened during the 1820s, as the Zulu Kingdom expanded and encroached upon the Pedi, but a new Pedi Kingdom emerged in the 1830s and gained supremacy throughout the region by 1837.[88] Cattle theft and land encroachment led to decades of Afrikaner-Pedi conflict as Afrikaners gradually began to settle in what would become the South African Republic (SAR), and while the geographical size of the Pedi Kingdom did shrink, the SAR repeatedly failed to exact a military victory.[89] In 1873 the Pedi ruler Sekhukhune and his brother Dinkwanyane established a new Pedi settlement within the territory of the SAR.[90] Shortly after, in 1876, the SAR deployed the largest army it had hitherto mobilized in an invasion of the Pedi Kingdom, but was again unable to achieve a victory.[91]

High Commissioner Bartle Frere interpreted the SAR's defeat as evidence of the SAR's inability to manage its own internal affairs, and used this as political leverage to annex the SAR in 1877. Yet there was little popular Afrikaner support for annexation, and Frere looked at the nearby Pedi kingdom as a means of killing two birds with one stone: on the one hand, defeating the Pedi would provide access to Pedi labour, while on the other, defeating the SAR's undefeatable enemy would win over Afrikaner support for confederation. Frere therefore

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[88] Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth-century Transvaal* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1984), 15-27.
[89] Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us,* 126-153.
[90] Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us,* 189-192.
[91] Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us,* 205.

presented Sekhukhune with an impossible ultimatum: he demanded immediate payment of a 2000 cattle reparation fine for the recent war. Sekhukhune initially offered to pay it off over time, but when Bartle Frere refused, the Pedi began a series of cattle raids in the SAR to raise the necessary cattle. Using this as an excuse to go to war, Bartle Frere invaded Pedi territory, routing the Pedi military and imprisoning Sekhukhune in Pretoria.[92]

1878, Ninth Frontier War

Other letters I discuss deal with the annexations of Xesibeland and St. John's Port from Mpondoland in 1878. Following the annexation of British Kaffraria as a Crown colony in 1847 and its later annexation to the Cape in 1866, there were four independent African polities remaining between the Cape and Natal, a region known as the Transkei: three Xhosa kingdoms (the Thembu of Thembuland, the Mfengu of Fingoland, and the Mpondo of Pondoland) and the Griqua of Griqualand East. These four polities held a substantial population of potential black labourers, and following the discovery of diamonds and the development of the confederation scheme, Bartle Frere was waiting for an excuse to take control. This excuse arrived in 1877, when a brawl at an Mfengu wedding sparked the Ninth Frontier War of 1877-78. The Ninth Frontier War was initially between two Xhosa groups and did not involve Britain or the Cape in any way, yet Bartle Frere used the possibility of the war spilling out into British Kaffraria to justify British involvement. Ostensibly to prevent further violence, but mostly to gain access to Xhosa labour, Frere annexed Mfenguland in 1878. At the same time, a magistrate was assigned to administrate Thembuland, although it was not officially annexed until 1883. The Griqua and the Mpondo had remained neutral during the war, and so Bartle Frere found other excuses for annexation. In 1869, the Griqua of Griqualand East had requested British protection from the

[92] Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us*, 218-232.

Mpondo.[93] Similarly, the Xesibe, a small chiefdom within Pondoland that had been clashing with the Mpondo for decades, had in 1874 requested British protection.[94] Frere acted upon both of these requests following the Ninth Frontier War, annexing Griqualand East and Xesibeland in 1878. As for Pondoland proper, there was no political justification for annexation. The Mpondo had never engaged in hostilities with any of the settler colonies. The Mpondo did, however, engage in large-scale cattle trading with Natal, and many of these cattle were paid for in firearms, so that Pondoland had become a gateway for firearms into the interior. Citing the Mpondo trade routes as a threat to colonial security, Frere annexed the Mpondo trading port of St. John's Port, with the hope that interfering with Mpondo trade routes would undermine Mpondo independence and encourage labourers to leave Pondoland in search of work.[95] The cattle trade was primarily conducted over land and so was unaffected by the loss of St. John's Port, yet it did rob the Mpondo ruler, Mqikela, of a large income in shipping duties that was generated by the port. This, in combination with the loss of Xesibeland, seriously undermined his authority, and he was determined to regain his territory.

Parliamentary Registration Act, 1887

Many of the letters covered in this thesis are about the Cape's Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887. The Parliamentary Registration Act was a reaction to rising African voter registrations in the Cape, which threatened white political supremacy. The 1853 Cape Constitution Ordinance had guaranteed a non-racially discriminatory franchise, unique among the four South African settler colonies, but it had done so in a context in which the African

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[93] Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 124-128.
[94] William Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy, 1878–1886," *The Journal of African History* 20, no. 4 (October 1979): 476.
[95] William Beinart, *The Political Economy of Pondoland: 1860-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 31.

population was little serious threat. Before British Kaffraria was annexed in 1866, Europeans outnumbered Africans by nearly two to one.[96] With the annexation of British Kaffraria, Mfenguland, and Thembuland, the demographics had reversed. By the 1891 census, the colonist population had fallen to 25% and the African had risen to 55%, so that the African population of the Cape was now more than double that of the colonists.[97] African voter registrations rose alongside the African population. Prime Minister Sprigg reported to the House of Assembly on 15 June 1887 that six districts in the eastern Cape had been taken over by African voters in the past five years. To stop this trend, the Parliamentary Registration Bill was introduced in 1886. The ostensible purpose of the Bill was to "make better provision than at present exists for the proper and complete registration of persons entitled to vote" by devolving the responsibility for drafting voter lists from civil commissioners to local government officers.[98] However, buried in the 17th clause was the following: "No person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter by reason of his sharing in any communal or tribal occupation of lands, or places of residence."[99] The catch-all qualifier of "communal or tribal occupation of lands" disqualified a large number of Africans who had previously fulfilled the property qualifications by their claims to portions of communal land, and since it was extremely uncommon for colonists to occupy communal land, the Act targeted Africans without explicitly being racial discrimination.[100] While it is impossible

[96] Cape of Good Hope, *Census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1865* (Saul Solomon and Co., 1866), 11, https://books.google.co.za/books?id=0fE1AQAAMAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false.
[97] Cape of Good Hope, *Results of a Census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as on the Night of Sunday, the 5th April, 1891* (W. A. Richards and Sons, 1892), 3, https://www.gendatabase.com/books/Census%20-%20Colony%20of%20the%20Cape%20of%20Good%20Hope%20-%201891.pdf.
[98] Cape of Good Hope, *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope Passed by the Seventh Parliament during Sessions 1884-1888* (W. A. Richards & Sons: 1889), 390, https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/56548.
[99] Cape of Good Hope, *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1884-1888*, 394.
[100] Edgecombe, "The Non-Racial Franchise in Cape Politics, 1853–1910," 28–30.

to calculate the exact effect of the Act, Edgecombe calculates that the voter lists dropped by over 50% in the predominantly African districts of Aliwal North and Queen's Town.[101]

1879, Zulu war

Several of the letters I explore are about the Anglo-Zulu War and the subsequent imprisonment of the Zulu king, Cetshwayo. The Zulu Kingdom was established in the late 1810s in north-eastern South Africa when Shaka successfully united many small groups of pastoral Zulu and transformed Zulu society from pastoralism to militarism. By the 1870s, the Zulu Kingdom remained the most powerful and independent of the African polities, making it a primary target for confederation. Lacking a valid justification for annexing Zululand, Theophilius Shepstone, the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs, began fabricating rumours that the Zulu were planning a pan-African rebellion against the colonies. High Commissioner Bartle Frere became convinced of the reality of these rumours and launched an invasion of Zululand in January 1879, sparking the Anglo-Zulu War. The war became an embarrassing disaster for Britain when the Zulu defeated them at the Battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879, and the resultant public relations nightmare pushed Britain to step back from its confederation plans for Zululand. Yet Britain could not allow the Zulu to embarrass them without punishment, and on 4 July 1879 the British army successfully sacked the Zulu capital of Ulundi.[102] Following their victory, Britain implemented the Ulundi Settlement as a strategy to undermine the Zulu royal family's authority. Cetshwayo was imprisoned in Cape Town, while Zululand was divided into thirteen districts with thirteen appointed chiefs to administer each district with paramount authority. By doing so, it was hoped that the Zulu nation would be stable enough to prevent

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[101] Edgecombe, "The Non-Racial Franchise in Cape Politics, 1853–1910," 34.
[102] John Laband, "The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 92-94; Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (Bristol: Longman Group Ltd, 1979), 41-58.

warfare from spilling into the colonies, yet divided enough to be prevented from uniting against Britain in the future. Rather than promoting stability, the Settlement strained extant tensions between those Zulu factions that were loyal to the royal family and those that were not, and hostilities between these two groups increased steadily from 1879 to 1883.[103] In January of 1883, the imperial government implemented a revised policy designed to address these tensions, and restored the exiled king Cetshwayo in the hope that he could bring the hostile factions back under control. The thirteen districts were scrapped and three districts were laid out: one in the south to be held in reserve by Britain, one in the middle for Cetshwayo to rule, and one in the north for Zibhebhu, one of the more powerful of the thirteen appointed chiefs, whom it was hoped could act as a check against Cetshwayo's power. A civil war erupted almost immediately between the Zulu royal family and Zibhebhu, and Cetshwayo was killed.[104] The royal family signed a treaty with the Afrikaners of the South African Republic, in which the Afrikaners would fight for the royal family in exchange for Zulu land. With Afrikaner assistance, the royal family defeated Zibhebhu in 1884, but Britain became uncomfortable when the Afrikaners claimed a coastal section of Zululand. After three years of negotiations with the royal family and the Afrikaners, Zululand was formally annexed as a Crown colony in 1887.[105]

1880, Basutoland Gun War

Some of the letters I explore in this thesis are about the disarmament of Basutoland and the Basutoland Gun War. The BaSotho kingdom was established in 1824 by Moshoeshoe, who

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[103] Laband, "The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom," 93-94; Guy, *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom,* 69-80.
[104] Laband, Guy, "The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom," 94-95; *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom,* 148-204.
[105] Laband, Guy, "The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom," 94-95; Guy, *Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom,* 217-230.

brought together disparate groups of refugees fleeing the rise of the Zulu Kingdom.[106] Afrikaners began to infringe on BaSotho territory when they trekked inland in the 1830s, claiming land for themselves and employing BaSotho labourers.[107] Moshoeshoe had signed a protection treaty with the Cape in 1843, but this protection ended when the Orange Free State was recognized as a sovereign territory in 1854. A series of conflicts between the Afrikaners and the BaSotho broke out immediately and lasted until 1866, when Moshoeshoe surrendered most of his land to the Orange Free State. In 1867 Moshoeshoe refused to comply with the treaty and resumed resistance, while at the same time requesting British aid. In 1868 the BaSotho were again extended British protection, though with greater imperial oversight than Moshoeshoe had desired.[108] Imperial oversight involved the placement of a resident agent to oversee Moshoeshoe and Letsie, Moshoeshoe's son and successor. Oversight of Basutoland was handed over to the Cape when the Cape received responsible government in 1871, and additional magistrates and police forces were appointed by the Cape. Chiefly authority was made subordinate to the local magistrate, magistrates were given the authority to allocate land, and a hut tax was implemented.[109] In 1879, a sub-chief named Moorosi clashed with the magistrate appointed to him when his magistrate arrested his son. The Cape led a force to subdue Moorosi, who was decapitated and his head taken to the Cape. Furthermore, the Cape instituted a registration scheme for firearms as a means of ensuring peace. Bartle Frere supported the move as a means of undermining African authority and gaining Afrikaner support for confederation in the Orange Free State. Letsie complied with the gun registration scheme to retain Cape benevolence, but the

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[106] Elizabeth Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in LeSotho, 1870-1960* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 28; Stephen Gill, *A Short History of Lesotho* (Morija: Morija Museum and Archives, 1993), 68-72.
[107] Gill, *Short History of Lesotho*, 88-89.
[108] Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa*, 25; Gill, *Short History of Lesotho*, 105-108.
[109] Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa*, 40; Gill, *Short History of Lesotho*, 118-120.

other chiefs rose in armed rebellion, sparking the Basutoland Gun War of 1880-81.[110] Britain defeated the BaSotho and Basutoland was annexed to the Cape. The BaSotho were forced to comply with the gun registration policy, but profits from land sales and the hut tax failed to materialize for the Cape. And so Basutoland was given to Britain as a Crown colony in 1884, which it remained until 1961.[111]

1880, Exile of Samuel Moroka

In the next two chapters, I explore various letters written by Samuel Moroka relating to his expulsion from Thaba Nchu. The kingdom of Thaba Nchu was established by Moroka II, who united various communities of Barolong refugees fleeing the rise of the Zulu Kingdom in the late 1820s.[112] Afrikaner trekkers began to arrive in 1836, and Moroka II was amicable and assisted the trekkers in confrontations with other African groups. The Barolong and the Afrikaners did not maintain a necessarily friendly relationship, but the Afrikaners recognized Thaba Nchu as an independent sovereignty and left them in reasonable peace.[113] Upon Moroka II's death in 1880, a succession dispute arose between his sons Samuel Moroka and Tshipinare. Following Barolong custom, Samuel Moroka was the rightful heir to the chieftaincy, but on his deathbed Moroka II had nominated Tshipinare to become chief. Samuel Moroka and Tshipinare both asserted their respective claims, and the Orange Free State grew nervous of a succession dispute erupting into a violent civil war that would draw the attention of the British imperial government to the Free State and, in the context of ongoing confederation scheming, provide the justification for British annexation of the Free State. Johannes Brand, president of the Orange

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[110] Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa,* 71-2.
[111] Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa*, 32-33; Gill, *Short History of Lesotho*, 127-129.
[112] Colin Murray, *Black Mountain: Land, Class and Power in the Eastern Orange Free State, 1880s to 1980s* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 13-15.
[113] Murray, *Black Mountain*, 15-16.

Free State, intervened, choosing Tshipinare as the new ruler of Thaba Nchu and banishing Samuel Moroka.[114] Samuel Moroka refused to abandon his claim to power, and embarked on a decade-long mission to retake Thaba Nchu, requesting aid from Moshoeshoe, the Cape, and Britain.

1883, Abandonment of Maherero

One of the letters I study was written by Maherero, protesting Britain's abandonment of his people and requesting protection from Germany. In 1879, the region north of the Cape Colony that would become German South West Africa in 1885 and modern-day Namibia[115] was contested by two rival groups: the Herero and the Nama-Oorlam. The Nama were a branch of Khoikhoi pastoralists who had lived in and around southern Namibia for millennia, while the Herero had migrated to northern Namibia in the 17th and 18th centuries. Following the establishment of the Cape Colony in the seventeenth century, and especially from 1730 onward, groups of Dutch and Griqua families, as well as escaped or freed slaves, began migrating north beyond the Cape boundaries in search of land and safety. These groups, known as the Oorlam, began to integrate with the southern Nama peoples and formed a scattered network of mixed societies collectively referred to as the Nama-Oorlam. The Nama-Oorlam dominated central and southern Namibia until the 1860s, when Maherero became paramount chief of the Herero. Maherero led the northern Herero in a series of attacks and raids on the Nama-Oorlam, securing control of central and northern Namibia by 1868.[116]

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[114] Murray, *Black Mountain*, 21-26.

[115] In this thesis, I use the place name Namibia because I have not yet found a better way to refer to the traditional land of the Herero. "Hereroland" was a Bantustan during apartheid that encompassed only a fraction of the traditional land of the Herero.

[116] Marion Wallace and John Kinahan, *A History of Namibia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 51-73, 106-112.

The Cape has been interested in establishing a presence in Namibia since the 1870s in order to prevent the Afrikaner republics from gaining a trading port, yet the imperial government refused to support any expansion beyond declaring a protectorate over Walvis Bay, the main trading port of Namibia, for which a treaty with Maherero was signed in 1878. The imperial government would not condone further annexations until 1883, when Germany established the Lüderitz Bay trading post to the south of Walvis Bay. Three months later, Germany purchased from the Nama-Oorlam land rights to the coast line stretching from Lüderitz Bay to the Cape's northern border. Britain, fearing the loss of Namibia as a sphere of influence and the establishment of a German colony so close to the Cape, tasked William Palgrave to sign treaties with Herero and Nama-Oorlam chiefs in order to counter Germany's claims. On 29 December 1884 Palgrave had received a Deed of Cession from Maherero, in which Maherero pledged his loyalty in return for British protection, and Palgrave appointed an acting British Resident. However, unbeknownst to Palgrave, Britain had already conceded sovereignty of Namibia to Germany on 22 June 1884.[117] Consequently, Britain conceded to Germany and recalled Palgrave, but Palgrave did not receive his recall orders until 10 January 1885, after already signing a protectorate treaty with Maherero. Left with no choice, Palgrave retreated from his treaty and from Namibia, leaving Maherero to deal with the new colonial power alone.[118]

Section 3: The Correspondents

The six correspondents discussed in this thesis hailed from different regions of what we now call South Africa, with different political and socio-economic backgrounds, yet they were

[117] The German government had threatened that if Britain insisted on asserting sovereignty over Namibia, then Germany would intervene in the Siege of Khartoum in Egypt, where General Charles Gordon had been weathering a siege by Mahdist forces since March 11.
[118] J.H. Esterhuyse, *South West Africa, 1880-1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South West Africa* (Cape Town: C. Struik Ltd), 46-83.

all located within an increasingly English and textual world. While mission schools had been a part of the Cape landscape since the eighteenth century, they started to become more accessible and more common from 1854, when the Cape began supplying public funding for mission schools in the eastern territories in order to, in the language of the time, "combat superstition by promoting Christianity…[and] to counteract indolence by industrial training."[119] Following this new policy of supporting mission schools, the number of elementary- and secondary-schooled black Africans in the Cape rose from around 9,000 in 1850 to 100,000 in 1900. When the British government began attacking African societies at an increased rate during the 1870s and 1880s, these mission-educated Africans responded using the Western tools of protest that they had been exposed to at school: political organization, parliamentary protest, and political journalism. Thus, an unintended outcome of increasing mission schools in this period was the formation of the first black political associations: the Native Educational Association in 1879, the Imbumba Yama Nyman in 1882, and the Thembu Association and the South African Native Congress in 1884. Supplementing these groups, the first black political newspapers were formed to connect disparate black communities and disseminate black perspectives. The first of these was Imvo Zabatsundu, established in 1884, followed by Izwi Labantu in 1898.[120] This context of increasing mission schools and Western-style political activity accounts for why we begin to see letters written to the APS from black Africans at this point in time: four of the six correspondents were mission- or university-educated, and one employed the services of a scribe who was university-educated.

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[119] James Stewart, *Lovedale, South Africa* (Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1894), 1, https://books.google.ca/books?id=tGcrAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

[120] Thomas Karis and Gwendolen Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Volume 1: Protest and Hope, 1882-1934* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 3-8.

However, while increased access to mission education may help explain why black African letters began to be received by the APS in the late 1870s and 1880s, it raised another question: why only six correspondents? As will be seen below, there appears to have been a class-related barrier to corresponding with the APS: all of the correspondents under examination hailed from upper-class or royal backgrounds. The cost of paper, writing tools, and postage to England certainly formed one aspect of this barrier, yet I am unconvinced that it formed a major aspect: many people, especially mission-educated people, had access to paper and writing tools, and the one shilling cost of postage to England was costly but not exorbitantly so. Rather, it seems more likely that access to knowledge about the APS was a more significant factor. In order to write to the APS, a potential correspondent must first be aware that the APS existed, and so likely needed to be a regular reader of British newspapers such as *The Times* and *The Daily Mail.* Furthermore, a potential correspondent must also know the address of the APS's secretary. I intend to pursue this issue of classed and, additionally, gendered aspects to correspondence with the APS in my doctoral thesis, but at this point I contend that awareness of the APS and knowledge of its secretary's address likely formed the most significant class-based barriers.

Mqikela

Figure 9: Mqikela, image sourced from www.sahistory.org.za/

The Aborigines' Protection Society received three letters from Mqikela between 1 August 1883 and 12 July 1884. Mqikela was born circa 1841 to Faku, paramount chief of the Mpondo kingdom. Mqikela was not Faku's eldest son, but his mother was the highest ranked of Faku's wives, and so Mqikela became the traditional heir to the Paramountcy. This caused conflict between Mqikela and his elder brother, and so Faku divided Mpondoland into a western district and an eastern district. Mqikela was to inherit eastern Mpondoland, and his brother was to inherent western Mpondoland. Mqikela succeeded to the throne of eastern Mpondoland in 1867.[121] Mqikela's letters to the APS refer to a deputation he wished to send to England to protest the Cape government's annexation of Xesibeland and Port St. John's following the Ninth Frontier War in 1878. It is unlikely that Mqikela himself could write English, but Mfengu leaders had employed Europeans as secretaries and diplomats since 1844, when Faku employed Methodist missionaries from nearby his capital. Mqikela grew impatient with his Methodist agents in 1880 when they refused to send letters to Bartle Frere criticizing his confederation scheme, citing the policy of their mission to avoid politics.[122] From then on Mqikela employed traders and lawyers as his agents, beginning with H.W. Welborne in 1881. Welborne was a lawyer in Kokstad and, as the attorney of several cattle-traders in Natal, was actively interested in challenging British intervention in the lucrative Mpondo cattle trade. He was dismissed in 1882 due to mismanagement of Mpondo resources, and replaced by a trader named Hamilton MacNicholas. MacNicholas and his business partner William Bouverie were also actively interested in preventing British intervention in their trading activities, and enthusiastically

[121] Timothy J. Stapleton, *Faku: Rulership and Colonialism in the Mpondo Kingdom (c. 1780-1867)* (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001), 131–34.
[122] Norman Etherington, *Preachers Peasants and Politics in Southeast Africa, 1835-1880: African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 74.

assisted Mqikela in resisting British confederation.[123] Both of their names appear as witnesses to the letters written by Mqikela, and it is likely that they had translated and transcribed the letters. In William Beinart's study of the relationships between colonial traders and the Mpondo chieftaincy, he argues that MacNicholas and Bouverie were not neutral messengers between Mqikela and the Cape or Britain. Rather, Beinart illustrates that MacNicholas and Bouverie had substantial economic interests in preventing Mpondoland from coming under Cape or British rule. As such, Beinart argues that MacNicholas and Bouverie actively sought to intervene in Mpondo politics to drive a wedge between Mqikela and the Cape, and possibly to foment a war.[124] As such, the role of MacNicholas and Bouverie in translating and transcribing Mqikela's letters is potentially problematic. Of course, every moment of translation is an opportunity for meaning to be changed or eroded. Given MacNicholas's and Bouverie's ulterior motives in working for Mqikela, we have to be even more cautious when approaching these letters. However, I do not think that MacNicholas and Bouverie intentionally or substantially altered Mqikela's messages during transcription. I have compared letters from MacNicholas, Bouverie, and Mqikela, and their messages are not consistent. This will be discussed in much more detail in chapter three, but essentially, the letters from MacNicholas and Bouverie state that Mqikela wanted to go to war immediately, while the letters from Mqikela state that he did not want to go to war, and would utilize all peaceful means of protest first. If MacNicholas and Bouverie had been altering Mqikela's letters, why would they allow his letters to contradict their own? This is certainly not conclusive proof that Mqikela's messages were faithfully represented, but I argue that it is enough proof to treat his letters as reasonably reliable.

[123] Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy, 1878-1886," 478.
[124] Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy, 1878-1886," 478-480.

Samuel Moroka

Figure 10: Samuel Moroka, image courtesy of the J. Paul Getty Museum's Open Content Program

The Aborigines' Protection Society received four letters from Samuel Moroka between 26 December 1883 and 7 February 1884. Samuel Moroka was born circa 1840 to Moroka II, chief of the Thaba Nchu Barolong. Samuel was the third son by Moroka II's great wife, Moilana, and as the eldest son of the great wife he was the traditional heir to the throne. Samuel's father sent him to be educated in Cape Town, and in 1861-1865 Governor George Grey sponsored Samuel to study at St. Augustine's College in Canterbury, England, where he converted to Christianity.[125] Samuel's conversion was problematic for several reasons. The Barolong chief was believed to be

[125] Murray, *Black Mountain*, 19-20.

the link between the ancestral world and the physical world, and Samuel had supposedly severed that link by converting to Christianity. Polygamy was also a customary practice, especially among chiefs as a measure to assure a continuing line of succession, yet as a Christian Samuel refused to marry more than once.[126] As such, Moroka II nominated his elder son, Tshipinare, as his successor, leading to the succession dispute between Samuel and Tshipinare that occasioned President Brand to support Tshipinare and exile Samuel. It was this exile that Samuel wrote about the to APS, seeking imperial support in regaining his throne. Samuel is an intriguing liminal character. Education at an English university and conversion to Christianity undoubtedly gave him greater social capital with the Aborigines' Protection Society. He epitomized their "civilizing" perspective on the potential of colonized people to be remade in the British image.

Maherero

Figure 11: Maherero, public domain image sourced from www.wikipedia.org

[126] R.L. Watson, "The Subjection of a South African State: Thaba Nchu, 1880-1884," *The Journal of African History* 21, no. 3 (1980): 360-361.

Maherero was a chief of the Herero peoples of northern and central Namibia. A brilliant military strategist, he was responsible for defeating the Herero's fiercest enemy, the Nama-Oorlam, in 1870, and for establishing the Herero as the dominant political group of central Namibia prior to German colonization in the 1880s. Maherero was always angling to sign treaties with Western powers that would recognize and codify his independence, and did so with Britain in 1878 and 1885 and with Germany in 1885.[127] Maherero's letter to the APS was about Britain's cession of influence in Namibia to Germany in 1885 in contravention to the protection treaty he had signed with William Palgrave just months previously. Similar to Mqikela, Maherero could not read or write in English, and so relied on translators and transcribers. Maherero's letter is witnessed by Samuel Maherero and Samuel Shepperd. Samuel Shepperd was the son of a Herero man named Saul Shepperd, who as a young boy had been captured by Nama slavers. In 1836, Sir James Edward Alexander had been on an expedition into Namibia for the Royal Geographic Society when he purchased Saul. Alexander wrote of his purchase: "Believe me now, when I say that I did not purchase Saul to sell him again, or to ill use him. I bought him to tend my small flock, and with a view to his eventual emancipation, and education in England."[128] Alexander did indeed release Saul and bring him to England for education, where he attended the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich before returning to Namibia in 1844 and working as secretary to Maherero.[129] Upon Saul's death in 1877, his son Samuel Shepperd took over as Maherero's secretary. There is little information about Samuel Shepperd regarding his

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[127] Esterhuyse, *South West Africa, 1880-1894*, 19-20, 82-83, 104-5.
[128] James Edward Alexander, *An Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa: Through the Hitherto Undescribed Countries of the Great Namaquas, Boschmans, and Hill Damaras* (London: Henry Colburn, 1838), 224-5
[129] Frank Vivelo, *The Herero of Western Botswana* (New York: West Publishing Co., 1977), 168; Jeff Ramsay, "Ghanzi in History (Part 8) – Samkoa and Sheppard," Mmegiblogs.bw (blog), 27 August 2018, http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=77290&dir=2018/august/27#.

educational background, whether he was taught by his father or at a mission school, but we do know that he could read and write. Samuel Maherero, on the other hand, was Maherero's son. Educated at a mission school in Otjimingwe, Samuel Maherero could also read and write.[130] Given their signatures as witnesses to Maherero's letter, it is most likely that one of them translated and transcribed the letter. As such, Maherero's situation was markedly different from Mqikela's. Maherero did not need to rely on European assistance to write his letter, he was able to have it written by people of his own culture. Given that Maherero's words were written down by a member of his own culture, and in the presence of a son who could read the written message, there is no reason to suspect that Maherero's message was twisted in any substantial way.

Mama

The APS received a single letter from Shadrach Boyce Mama dated 29 December 1879. Mama was born in 1855 as a nephew of the chief of the Gqunukwebe Xhosa, who had been expelled from the Neutral/Ceded Territory in 1819 and later established themselves as British loyalists on the border of British Kaffraria. Mama's uncle was the first Xhosa chief to publicly convert to Christianity, and his brother, Boyce, became a reverend at a mission school in Graham's Town.[131] Mama was educated at the Heald Town mission school, received his Government Elementary Teacher's Certificate in 1877, and afterwards worked as an interpreter for the Cape government. He was brought as an interpreter to the eastern Cape during the Ninth Frontier War of 1877-78, and accompanied a group of prisoners who were brought back to Cape

[130] Eric Young, "Maherero, Samuel," *Encyclopedia of Africa*, ed. by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Kwame Anthony Appiah (Oxford University Press, 2010).
[131] J. A. Millard, "Mama, William," in *Dictionary of African Christian Biography*, https://dacb.org/stories/southafrica/Mama-william/.

Town.[132] During this trip Mama witnessed government officials overseeing an auction of prisoners as indentured labour, and it was this auction that Mama wrote about to the Aborigines' Protection Society.

Mzimba

Figure 12: Pambani Mzimba, image sourced from www.sahistory.org.za/

The Aborigines' Protection Society received two letters from Pambani Mzimba, the first dated 28 October 1881, and the second dated 28 March 1882. Mzimba was born circa 1850 in Mfenguland. His father had been educated at the Lovedale mission school and had become a Presbyterian deacon. Following in his father's footsteps, Mzimba graduated from Lovedale in 1875, and that same year was ordained as the first South African-trained black minister. He taught and preached at Lovedale until 1898, when he broke from the Free Church of Scotland and formed his own independent church, which he called the Free Church. Mzimba was also a member of the Native Educational Association, the first African political organization that was founded in 1879. Of the two letters written by Mzimba to the Aborigines' Protection Society, one was in protest to the imprisonment of Xhosa chiefs following the Ninth Frontier War, and the

[132] Shadrach Mama, "Mama to Chesson," 29 December 1879, Bodleian Libraries, APS papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 18, C142/15-16.

other was in response to a question from the Society on the possibility of establishing industrial schools in the eastern Cape.

Jabavu



Figure 13: John Tengo Jabavu (left) and his son Davidson Jabavu (right), public domain image sourced from www.wikipedia.org

The most prolific African correspondent with the APS was John Tengo Jabavu. He wrote eighteen letters in total, the first dated 6 May 1880, and the last 28 November 1887. Jabavu was a mission-educated journalist of Mfengu ancestry. His parents had converted to Christianity and lived on the Heald town mission station. Jabavu completed elementary school and afterwards worked as an elementary school teacher at a Methodist school in Somerset East.[133] While

[133] L.D. Ngcongco, "John Tengo Jabavu 1859-1921," in Christopher C. Saunders, ed., *Black Leaders in Southern African History* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 143-4.

teaching, he also worked as an apprentice for a Somerset East newspaper and studied privately for the University of Cape Town matriculation certificate (equivalent to a modern high school diploma). From 1881 to 1883 he worked as the editor of Lovedale College's Xhosa journal *Isigidimi Sama-Xhosa*, and in 1883 he became the second African to successfully pass the matriculation exams.[134] In 1884, he left Lovedale to establish his own newspaper in King William's Town. His newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu,* was the first African language newspaper published outside the control of missionary organizations, and its goal was to present African perspectives and support African interests.[135] In operation, however, *Imvo* was a mouth-piece for the black elite and for the white politicians who provided Jabavu with funding,[136] and Jabavu has been criticized by contemporaries and historians alike for sacrificing African interests for his own when he declared his support for the Afrikaner Bond in 1898.[137] His letters to the Society encompass a large variety of topics, although recurring topics include the Anglo-Zulu War, the Basutoland Gun War, and the Parliamentary Registration Act.

Conclusion: The APS in South Africa, 1870-1890

This chapter has provided an overview of the historical context to the rest of the thesis. I have explored the major processes that led up to South Africa in the 1870s and 1880s: the eastward-creeping Cape frontier, the imperial withdrawal, and the Anglo-Afrikaner tensions. I have looked at how these processes changed in the 1870s and 1880s: the booming economy created a huge demand for cheap black labour, the imperial government developed the

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[134] L.D. Ngcongco, "John Tengo Jabavu 1859-1921," 144-146.
[135] Les Switzer, ed., *South Africa's Alternative Press: Voices of Protest and Resistance, 1880s-1960s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 59.
[136] Switzer, *South Africa's Alternative Press,* 60-62.
[137] Switzer, *South Africa's Alternative Press,* 63-66; Siyasanga Tyali, "Ambiguities of a Decolonizating Press Culture: On South Africa's Imvo Zabantsundu (Native Opinion)," *South African Journal of African Languages* 38, no. 3 (2018): 307.

confederation scheme, and the Scramble for Africa pushed Britain to consolidate its grip on South Africa. I then zoomed in to the local impacts of these changes on the primary regions to be discussed in the upcoming chapters: the 1877 Anglo-Pedi War, the 1878 Ninth Frontier War, the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War, the 1880 Basutoland Gun War, the 1880 exile of Samuel Moroka, the 1887 abandonment of Maherero, and the 1887 Parliamentary Registration Act. Finally, I introduced the six correspondents whose letters I analyze in the upcoming chapters. To transition from this historical narrative into the topic of black letters to the Aborigines' Protection Society, I will conclude this chapter by looking at what the Society itself was up to in South Africa in the 1870s and 1880s.

As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the Aborigines' Protection Society had never been opposed to the expansion of empire. It was opposed to the injustices that often arose during the expansion of empire, but it was entirely comfortable with imperialism itself. Indeed, the Society considered the best means of reducing the injustices of imperialism to be increasing Britain's imperial presence and instituting a stronger imperial administration system. From the Society's perspective, it was crude and degenerate settler populations who were the source of the worst injustices of imperialism. Metropolitan Britons did not think kindly of settlers. Often forced to emigrate due to economic pressure, religious persecution, convict transportation, and various other unlucky circumstances, settlers were regularly stereotyped as the dregs of society, "those who either for want of character or ability, are unable to succeed."[138] The Society was very much influenced by this perception. It saw settlers as the primary cause of oppression, and it considered the expansion of imperial authority over settler societies as the best means by which settlers could be controlled for the protection of Indigenous peoples. Consequently, for the

[138] Robert Fowler, speech to the Social Science Congress in Manchester, September 1886, quoted in Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society*, 61.

period of imperial withdrawal from South Africa prior to the discovery of diamonds, the Society's calls for increased imperial administration of the colonies had been swimming against the tide. However, when the conjunction of the discovery of diamonds and the Scramble occurred in the 1870s-1880s, the Society found itself in the mainstream for the first time since the abolition of slavery in 1833, and was eager to support and guide the confederation scheme.

For the most part, guiding confederation meant bringing attention to the cruel excesses that typically accompanied imperial expansion. In the case of the Anglo-Zulu War, the APS was generally in favour of annexing Zululand for "the introduction of civilized institutions into native districts and the repression of the military habits of a barbarous race."[139] As such, the Society was not against the war, but it was against its execution. "A policy which in the abstract is good, may yet be made cruel and oppressive by the manner in which it is carried out."[140] Reports about terrible atrocities committed by British soldiers had reached Britain, and the Society published these accounts and sent formal protests to the Colonial Office.[141] Following the Anglo-Zulu War, the APS publicized articles on the injustice of Cetshwayo's imprisonment in Cape Town, and lobbied the Colonial Office to have him returned to Zululand.[142] Upon Cetshwayo's death and the royal family's deal with the SAR to repel Zibhebhu in return for land, the APS lobbied the Colonial Office to annex Zululand outright, sure that "only British intervention could save the Zulus from destruction or enslavement" at the hands of the Afrikaners.[143] Guiding confederation could also entail emphasizing colonial policies that the imperial government needed to intervene in. In the context of the Basutoland Gun War, the Society was firmly against the Cape's

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[139] Aborigines' Protection Society, "South Africa and the War in Zululand," *The Aborigines' Friend* (June 1879): 124.
[140] APS, "South Africa and the War in Zululand," 124.
[141] Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society,* 243.
[142] Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society,* 245.
[143] APS, "The Society on its Defence," *The Aborigines' Friend* (February 1890): 33.

disarmament policy. It deemed it an illogical injustice that the BaSotho should be paid in firearms and then be denied the right to keep them, and asserted that the only result would be that a "once loyal and orderly native people" would be "reduced to a state of anarchy."[144] The Society successfully lobbied for the recall of Governor Bartle Frere, whom they held responsible for the disarmament policy, and supported the annexation of Basutoland as a Crown colony in 1884 as the fulfilment of the BaSotho's requests for protection from the Orange Free State. On the other hand, guiding confederation did not always entail sticking up for black African political rights. When the Parliamentary Representation Bill was introduced in 1887, the Society saw little issue with its disenfranchisement of black Africans under tribal tenure. It declared that "no one…either in this country or in the colony, proposes that natives who are still under the tribal system should be entitled to vote."[145]

The Society's support for confederation is all the more interesting because it placed the Society in an antagonistic position in relation to some of the themes touched on by the black correspondents discussed in this thesis. For example, Samuel Moroka and Mqikela both wrote about their claims to independence for Thaba Nchu and Mpondoland, yet African independence was not reconcilable with confederation. That some correspondents wrote to the APS with perspectives contrary to the Society's own views underlines the importance of one of the foundational questions behind this thesis: how did the Society react to black perspectives it disagreed with? The answer to this question determines the extent to which the Society can be considered a network for black African voices. For, if the Society only published or acted upon perspectives that it agreed with, then through the omission of contrary perspectives the Society would have been actively manipulating the representation of its black correspondents. To begin

[144] APS, "Annual Report," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1884): 164.
[145] APS, "The Native Franchise Question at the Cape," *The Aborigines' Friend* (October 1887): 423.

answering this question, chapter two surveys the range of perspectives conveyed within black correspondence to the APS. Chapter three then explores the Society's reactions and responses to those perspectives.

Chapter Two – Letters from Black Africans to the APS



Figure 5: Herero territory, the Cape Colony, Thaba Nchu, and Mpondoland circa 1875, projected on a modern map of South Africa

Charles Swaisland was correct when he wrote of the Aborigines' Protection Society that "most [correspondents] in South Africa were not themselves the victims of oppression."[146] Of the ninety-five correspondents from South Africa whose letters with the Society from 1866-1888 survive, only six were black. These six were: John Tengo Jabavu, a mission-educated Xhosa journalist from the eastern Cape; Shadrach Boyce Mama, a mission-educated Xhosa interpreter from the eastern Cape; Pambani Mzimba, a mission-educated Xhosa Presbyterian minister from

[146] Henry Charles Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa" (PhD Thesis--University of Oxford, 1968), ii.

the eastern Cape; Mqikela, paramount chief of eastern Mpondoland; Maherero, chief of the Herero of Namibia; and Samuel Moroka, heir to the Baralong chieftaincy in Thaba Nchu.

Few though they may be, the letters sent by these six individuals to the APS are of vital importance. As discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the historiography of the Society has focused predominantly on its white members in England. Those few studies of non-European participants have focused on delegations to England hosted by the Society.[147] No study has yet examined the correspondence between the Society and black Africans, and this chapter begins this work by analyzing the letters from Jabavu, Mqikela, Maherero, Moroka, Mama, and Mzimba. I focus on determining *why* these people wrote to the APS, but I also give some attention to the rhetorical trends within their writing to attend to *how* they wrote to the APS. I show that these individuals engaged with the Society along three overarching themes. Some attempted to have the APS hear or represent their voices regarding local issues. Others sought to harness its influence and resources to support deputations to England, thereby attempting to gain APS support to represent their voices themselves. And yet others sought to use its information network to challenge representations made of them by Cape government officials and the Cape media.

This chapter is structured into four sections. The first three sections attend to each of these themes. It is important to note that I have used these themes as categories to explore these letters, but these categories in no way delimit or define the individual correspondents. Indeed, as will become apparent, letters from individual correspondents appear throughout the three

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[147] See Elizabeth Elbourne, "Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Politics of Knowledge," in *Rediscovering the British World,* eds. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, 59-85 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005); Zoe Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors: Networks of Imperial Protest and Humanitarianism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," in *Indigenous Networks: Mobility Connections and Exchange,* eds. Jane Carey and Jane Lydon (New York: Routledge, 2014), 115-134.

thematic categories, as correspondents had different reasons for writing at different moments in time. I employ these thematic categories as tools to enable us to quickly grasp major similarities and differences across a large body of sources. In the concluding section, I reflect on the implications of my research for the previous historiography of non-European engagement with the APS. I show that black Africans attempted to have their voices represented within the APS knowledge network to a much greater extent than has been accounted for. I also argue that black Africans sought to utilize the APS's correspondence network to disseminate their voices in a manner similar to the way that settlers sought to utilize newspaper networks, illustrating the function of the APS not only as a metropolitan lobbyist group, but also as an imperial information network.

A society to represent Africans

At the most basic level, black correspondents wrote to the Aborigines' Protection Society in the hopes that the Society would represent their voices and their interests for them in England. This section begins by surveying letters from John Tengo Jabavu, Pambani Mzimba, Samuel Moroka, and Mahereo, showing the ways in which they each requested the Society's aid in disseminating their voices on their behalf. After this survey, I compare and contrast their rhetorical strategies, some of which employed explicit and direct demands of the Society, but most of which employed a discourse of ambivalence and humility.

John Tengo Jabavu's pre-1887 letters

Jabavu wrote a total of eighteen letters to the APS, and there are two distinct periods of his letter writing: pre-1887 and post-1887. His eleven post-1887 letters all refer to the Parliamentary Registration Act introduced to the Cape parliament in March 1887, and will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. In the seven letters written by Jabavu between

1880 and early 1887, which I term the pre-1887 letters, he informed the Society of various local issues. Whereas the eleven post-1887 letters were sent within a nine-month period and went into great detail about one issue, the eight pre-1887 letters were sent periodically, no more than one letter a year, and they do not go into extended detail on any of the issues they mention. He spent a proportionally large amount of space criticizing the inability of African political voices to be taken seriously by the Cape government. He claimed that the executive branch of the government was a mere tool in Governor Sir Bartle Frere's hand, "who is the source of this mischievous policy [i.e. the repression of native political voices]," and that the colonial parliament was paralyzed by an Afrikaner majority.[148] He also spent a good deal of space discussing the Basutoland Gun War. The Gun War, fought from 1880-1881 over the Cape government's decision to require the BaSotho to obtain licences for their firearms, ended with Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg being replaced by Prime Minister Thomas Scanlen and Governore Bartle Frere being replaced by Governor Hercules Robinson. Jabavu excitedly and optimistically reported these events, confident that the removal of Bartle Frere and Sprigg would lead to a government that was more responsive to African political voices.[149]

Beyond these two issues, Jabavu dedicated a paragraph or so to a range of other issues. In 1881 he criticized the imperial government for their refusal to release the Zulu king Cetshwayo back to Zululand, calling it a "shabby blot on the Great…high-minded British nation."[150] Cetshwayo, king of the Zulu from 1872-1879, had been deposed following the British victory in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, and imprisoned in Cape Town. Following the Anglo-Zulu War, Britain imposed a poorly thought-out settlement plan for Zululand, based on distributing power

[148] Jabavu to Chesson, 6 May 1880, APS papers, C139/1.
[149] Jabavu to Chesson, 18 May 1881, APS papers, C139/2.
[150] Jabavu to Chesson, 13 September 1881, APS papers, C139/3.

through thirteen British-appointed chiefs. This plan started to fall apart soon after implementation, and Cetshwayo was eventually returned to Zululand on 11 December 1882, in the hopes that he could prevent a Zulu civil war.[151]

Jabavu twice mentioned the Transkeian Territories Representation Bill. This Bill followed the annexation of the Transkeian Territories at the end of the Ninth Frontier War (1877-1878), and was intended to extend the Cape's franchise laws to the newly acquired territory. When the Ninth Frontier War first broke out in 1877, it had been a local squabble between two Xhosa groups: the Mfengu and the Gcaleka. The Cape insinuated itself into the conflict in an attempt to bring the Transkei under its authority. Hostilities increased when the Ngqika decided to join the Gcakelas to fight against the Cape. By 9 June 1878, the Ngqika paramount chief was dead, the Gcaleka paramount chief was in hiding, the remaining Ngqika and Gcaleka chiefs were imprisoned in Cape Town, and the Transkei was being incorporated into the Cape.[152] In his letter of 30 November 1885, Jabavu briefly mentioned a proposed bill on political representation in the Transkei that was making its way through the Cape parliament. Next, in his letter of 21 June 1886, he criticized the Transkeian Territories Representation Bill as being discriminatory towards blacks because it required a higher property qualification for black voters.

> For the white man the franchise as obtained in the Colony is provided, viz. the 25lbs property qualification or 50lbs salary per annum; but the black man must have four times this (100lbs) property before he can be a voter.[153]

The Bill would ultimately fail in 1886 over charges of unconstitutional racial discrimination, and it was revived and passed in 1887 without the differential property qualification.

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[151] Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (London: Longman, 1979), 124–64.
[152] Noël Mostert, *Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People* (New York: Knopf, 1992), 1249–54.
[153] Jabavu to Chesson, 21 June 1886, APS papers, C139/8.

On two occasions Jabavu mentioned proposed amendments to the Cape's Vagrancy Act. Vagrancy Acts have a long history in the Cape as a means of controlling black labour. The Caledon Code of 1809 had required Khoikhoi to carry passes if they wished to leave white farms, and Ordinance 49 of 1828 had required blacks from outside the Cape border to carry a pass if they entered the colony. The pass requirements for Khoikhoi were removed in Ordinance 50 of 1828, but the pass requirements for immigrant blacks remained. These pass requirements were reinforced by the Kaffir Passes Act of 1857, which determined that blacks could only enter the Cape for employment and that they could be imprisoned with hard labour for up to twelve months if they did not hold a valid pass signed by a border magistrate.[154] In the Vagrancy Act of 1867, which was uncoincidentally passed in the same year that diamonds were discovered, the pass restrictions were made more amenable to funnelling black labour into the economy. Rather than imprisonment for up to twelve months, blacks found without a valid pass could be imprisoned for up to one month. More importantly, all magistrates were empowered to renew passes or grant new passes to blacks found without valid passes, rather than requiring blacks to return home.[155] The Vagrancy Act of 1879 further amended the pass requirements to making black labour more accessible, by allowing blacks found without valid passes to be indentured to local whites for up to three months, rather than being imprisoned for up to one month.[156] Yet the pass restrictions still only applied to blacks coming into the Cape, and all black Cape residents

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[154] Kaffir Passes Act, 1857, 29 June 1857, in Cape of Good Hope, *Statues of the Cape of Good Hope, Passed by the First Parliament during the Sessions 1854-1858* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon and Co., 1858), 309-311, https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/51606.
[155] Vagrancy Act, 1867, 16 August 1867, in Cape of Good Hope, *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, Passed by the Third Parliament, during the Sessions 1864-1868* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon and Co., 1868), 427-433, https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/56325.
[156] Vagrancy Act, 1879, 11 September 1879, in Edgar Michael Jackson and Hercules Tennant, eds., *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1895: Volume II, 1872-1886* (Cape Town: W. A. Richards and Sons, 1895), 1614–18, https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/56550.

were exempt. To rectify that, a Select Committee was appointed by the Cape parliament in 1883 to inquire into the desirability of expanding the pass requirements to all black people. A proposed Vagrancy Bill was raised in parliament in June 1885 to do just that, but it was dropped after a week of debate due to the anger it would provoke in the black population.[157] Yet the notion of a similar amendment began to circulate again in late 1885, and a new proposal was raised in April 1886. In protest of this amendment, Jabavu wrote on 30 November 1885 that a Vagrancy Act amendment was going through parliament, and asserted that "I trust the society would not allow it to pass without seeing the Secretary of State about it."[158] Then, on 21 June 1886, he wrote to refute the logic that the amendment was designed to reduce cattle theft: "it is said that the object of [the amendment] is to stop stock stealing. We strongly dispute this; as a man determined on a stock stealing expedition would be more intent upon having a pass…than a native travelling on honest business."[159]

Jabavu also twice mentioned the Cape liquor trade, once in terms of liquor licensing in the Transkei, and once in terms of brandy excise duties in the Cape. Following the annexation of the Transkei Territories after the Ninth Frontier War (1877-78), licensing regulations stipulated that "no natives are to be supplied with liquor except where a written permit from the magistrate is produced."[160] However, on 8 October 1885, Prime Minister Thomas Upington released Proclamation 154, granting all Transkeian chiefs, petty chiefs, and councillors liberty to purchase

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[157] Cape of Good Hope, "Monday, June 6, Bill Withdrawn," *Debates in the House of Assembly, in the Second Session of the Seventh Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope, Opened on the 15th of May, 1885* (Cape Town: Murray and St. Leger, 1885), 138-139.
[158] Jabavu to Chesson, 30 November 1885, APS papers, C139/7.
[159] Jabavu to Chesson, 21 June 1886, APS papers, C139/8.
[160] Thomas Upington, "Thomas Upington to Hercules Robinson," 22 February 1886, in *Correspondence respecting the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors in the Transkeian Territory* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode: 1886), 227, in *Miscellaneous Pamphlets on South Africa, Volume 1* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1898), 222-231, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015084562522&view=1up&seq=9.

liquor, and granting all other blacks in the Transkei the ability to purchase liquor if they held a permit "signed by a magistrate, justice of the peace, or field-cornet."[161] This proclamation greatly increased access to liquor in the Transkei. Jabavu protested to the APS in his letter of 30 November 1885 that, in the face of resistance from black leaders in the Transkei, the Cape government had "issued a proclamation opening the floodgates of liquor over our people. This will cause our extermination."[162] As for the excise duties on brandy, the 1886 Excise Law Amendment Act had repealed "all provisions of the 'Excise Spirits Act, 1884," so that "no excise duty shall be payable upon spirits distilled from wine."[163] Consequently, on 21 June 1886, Jabavu wrote that the Cape government "have acquiescently allowed the repeal of the Excise Tax on Brandy which will render Cape Smoke very cheap," and by so doing, "they have refused to comply with the prayer of the whole native population that the sale of liquor be prohibited to them."[164]

Pambani Mzimba's letters

Mzimba sent two letters to the APS, one on 28 October 1881 and another on 28 March 1882. The first was in protest against the continued imprisonment of Xhosa chiefs after the Ninth Frontier War. Mzimba lamented that the Xhosa chiefs were not being shown the same mercies that other black leaders had been shown. "The Basuto chiefs have been pardoned…Sikukuni [king of the Pedi] is now allowed to go back to his country…but nothing is heard of the kaffir chiefs."[165] Mzimba's second letter is different from the first, in that it is a response to a question

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[161] Thomas Upington, "Proclamation 154," 8 October 1885, in *Correspondence respecting the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors in the Transkeian Territory*, 229, in *Miscellaneous Pamphlets on South Africa, Volume 1*, 222-231, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015084562522&view=1up&seq=9.
[162] Jabavu to Chesson, 30 November 1885, APS papers, C139/7.
[163] Excise Law Amendment Act, 1886, 25 June 1886, in Tennant and Jackson, eds, *Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1895: Volume II, 1872-1886*, 2346.
[164] Jabavu to Chesson, 21 June 1886, APS papers, C139/8.
[165] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 October 1881, APS papers, C143/150.

from the APS. Since receiving Mzimba's first letter, the Society had sent a letter to Mzimba asking "to know my [Mzimba's] opinion on the desirability of institutions for the industrial training of native children, and more particularly institutions of an agricultural character."[166] Mzimba's response was that such agricultural institutions would be great if they could succeed, but that he could see three reasons why they would not. First, because "there is a thorough failure throughout the whole country for want of rain for 6 months."[167] Second, because "the Fingoes and Basutos who are pastoral and agricultural people, still respect a man by the number of his flocks and herds, and not by the amount of land and grain he possesses."[168] And third, because "even if young men could be got to join agriculture, they would not continue in that work long. Agricultural labour is hard."[169]

Moroka's letters

Samuel Moroka sent four letters to the APS between 26 December 1883 and 7 February 1884, through which he sought support in lobbying the imperial government to force the Orange Free State to restore him as ruler of Thaba Nchu. In 1880, the Orange Free State had supported Moroka's half-brother Tshipinare's claim to the chieftaincy of Thaba Nchu, and Moroka had been exiled. In response, Moroka had begun a long campaign in search of an ally who could support a coup against his brother. He was turned down by the Moshoeshoe, the ruler of the BaSotho, and by the Cape government, but he had English contacts from his time studying at St. Augustine's College and he journeyed to England to seek the assistance of the imperial government.[170] It was during this trip that he corresponded with the APS. His first two letters will be discussed in the

[166] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 March 1882, APS papers, C143/152.
[167] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 March 1882, APS papers, C143/152.
[168] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 March 1882, APS papers, C143/152.
[169] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 March 1882, APS papers, C143/152.
[170] R. L. Watson, "The Subjection of a South African State: Thaba Nchu, 1880–1884," *The Journal of African History* 21, no. 3 (July 1980): 360–63.

next section of this thesis. In his last two letters, he asked the APS to convince two influential politicians to support his claim. On 22 January 1884, he asked the APS to convince Richard Southey, ex-Colonial Secretary and Cape politician, to support his claim "because he is much respected in the Free State."[171] Then on 7 February 1884, he asked the APS to talk to Donald Currie, a British M.P., on his behalf.[172]

Maherero's letter

Maherero sent one letter to the APS, dated 20 August 1885, through which he sought the APS's assistance in maintaining British protection from Germany. Throughout the 1880s, the Herero people had been caught up in a diplomatic battle between Germany and Britain over what would become German South West Africa, and diplomats from both empires were negotiating to sign protectorate treaties with the Herero to gain land rights to the territory. Maherero sent his letter to the APS in the middle of these negotiations. Maherero had been promised British protection in a treaty he signed on 29 December 1884 with William Palgrave, the British official who had been sent to the region. However, Britain had already conceded the region to Germany on 22 June 1884 and sent orders for Palgrave to be recalled, yet this news did not reach Palgrave until 10 January 1885, two weeks after he had pledged British protection. Left with no choice, Palgrave and Britain withdrew from their treaty, leaving Maherero to deal with the new German colonial power alone. Maharero wrote to the APS about his situation, and his message was simple: "We gave our country over to the British…We do not wish to have the Germans here, and we never have given and never wish to give our country to them."[173] His purpose in writing was also simple: "I have been told that you can help us in this matter. I say then help us and

[171] Samuel Moroka to Chesson, 22 January 1884, APS papers, C143/66.
[172] Samuel Moroka to Chesson, 7 February 1884, APS papers, C143/67.
[173] Maherero to Chesson, 20 August 1885, APS papers, C139/136.

deliver us from these Germans."[174] Through his letter to the APS, Maherero aimed to use the Society's political influence to regain British protection.

Discussion

All of these letters represent strategic attempts to have the APS represent black voices and political agendas in British metropole and beyond. In some cases, this strategy was made explicit and direct. For instance, when Jabavu was discussing the Cape liquor trade in his letter of 30 November 1885, he demanded of the APS that "you should lose no time in interviewing the Colonial Secretary on these questions."[175] Jabavu clearly articulated his intention that the APS would take his perspective seriously, and would transmit his voice directly to the colonial secretary. In other cases, this strategy was employed more subtlety. Moroka's requests in particular rode the line between explicit and implicit intention. For instance, his statement on 22 January 1884 that "I leave that gentleman [Richard Southey] entirely in your hands, which will be a great support to me because he is much respected in the Free State," clearly indicates his wish for the APS to talk to Southey on his behalf, yet he avoided coming right out and telling the APS what he wanted them to do. This is similar to his letter of 7 February 1884. Moroka tip-toed around his request for the APS to talk to Donald Currie for him, but he still got his point across:

> I saw this afternoon Sir Donald Currie, and had a long talk with him, but he is dead against [British intervention in Thaba Nchu]….But if he sees my case is supported by independent people, he will give me his support….I write you this, so that if you meet Sir Donald you may be on your guard.[176]

[174] Maherero to Chesson, 20 August 1885, APS papers, C139/136.
[175] Jabavu to Chesson, 30 November 1885, APS papers, C139/7.
[176] Maherero to Chesson, 20 August 1885, APS papers, C139/136.

For the most part, however, attempts to strategically utilize the APS to represent black voices were expressed in what Susan Zaeske refers to in another context as a rhetoric of "humility and disavowal."[177] In Zaeske's context of American women's petitions against slavery in the late nineteenth century, she found that petitions written by women "depicted women as assuming a humble stance and politely seeking the attention of representatives rather than making political demands on male authorities."[178] Zaeske argued that this discourse of humility "functioned rhetorically to obfuscate the nature of their petitioning, which was public, political, and considered inappropriate for women."[179] Chima Korieh identified a similar discourse of humility in his study of petitions written by Nigerians to colonial officials in the twentieth century. "Most of these petitions garnered what has been identified in another context as a 'rhetoric of humility and disavowal' and prayed the colonial officials as benefactors to act to protect or save them."[180] Much like those American and Nigerian petitioners, the black African correspondents I've outlined above framed their letters in a discourse of deference and relied on implicit meanings over explicit calls to action. For example, consider what Jabavu wrote regarding his concerns about the rising influence of the Afrikaner Bond: "the eyes of the Society, at any rate, one of its eyes, must needs be kept upon the movements of our present ministry in which we have not the smallest confidence."[181] Consider also how Jabavu wrote about the Transkei Territories Representation Bill. After explaining that the Bill failed to be adopted in 1885, Jabavu wrote: "they will be coming in again next session and you will needs be wide awake."[182] In both cases,

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[177] Susan Zaeske, *Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery, and Women's Political Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 48.
[178] Zaeske, *Signatures of Citizenship,* 54.
[179] Zaeske, *Signatures of Citizenship,* 59.
[180] Chima Korieh, "'May it Please Your Honor': Letters of Petition as Historical Evidence in an African Colonial Context," *History in Africa* 37 (2010): 98.
[181] Jabavu to Chesson, 18 August 1884, APS papers, C139/5.
[182] Jabavu to Chesson, 30 November 1885, APS papers, C139/7.

Jabavu refrained from explaining exactly what he wanted the Society to do about the situation, leaving it up to their best judgement. Mzimba did the same thing in his letter protesting the imprisonment of the Xhosa chiefs. Mzimba clearly established his reasoning for why the prisoners should be released, i.e. that other prisoners such as Sikukuni and Cetshwayo had been granted clemency, and so should the Xhosa chiefs. Yet Mzimba gave no indication of what he expected the APS to do about this. All he wrote is that "I hope therefore you shall see your way clear in doing something for these Kaffir chiefs."[183] This is also the case for Maherero, who gave no more indication of what he hoped the APS to do than "I have been told that you can help us in this matter. I say then help us."[184]

It could be argued that these writers remained vague in their requests because they did not know what exactly the Society could actually do about their situations, but this argument does not hold up. Jabavu and Mzimba were both highly Western-educated and aware of British politics. Jabavu was one of the first black Africans to graduate with a matriculation certificate from the University of Cape Town, and he established the first black African newspaper. Mzimba was ordained as the first South African-trained black minister, he had travelled to Scotland for a religious conference, and later would establish the first black African church. They were also both in executive positions of the early political organization called the Native Educational Association, Mzimba the president and Jabavu the vice-president. I find it highly unlikely that these two individuals would have been unaware of British politics and how the APS could intervene. It is possible that Maherero was unaware of what the APS could do for him, but it is implausible. Maherero had had two Western-educated secretaries to advise him. The first, Saul Shepperd, had been educated at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, England, and

[183] Mzimba to Chesson, 28 October 1881, APS papers, C143/150.
[184] Maherero to Chesson, 20 August 1885, APS papers, C139/136.

the second, Samuel Shepperd, was Saul's son. It is unlikely that the two Shepperds did not have a solid grasp of British politics. As such, I contend that Jabavu, Mzimba, and Maherero refrained from making explicit requests of the APS in order to avoid appearing to be acting "above their station." Like those female anti-slavery petitioners who did not want to offend patriarchal paternalist insecurities, and those Nigerian petitioners who did not want to offend colonial racial hierarchies, these black correspondents utilized a rhetoric of ambiguity to avoid offending the Society's notions of racial superiority.

All of these letters, regardless of their explicitness or humility, are attempts made by black Africans to intervene in imperial politics through the Aborigines' Protection Society. By sending their political perspectives to the APS, these correspondents showed that they perceived their local politics to be intimately connected to a greater imperial community, and that they actively sought to have their voices represented within that community. These letters immediately challenge notions of the APS as an organization constituted by European voices for European audiences, for they show that the APS was, albeit in a proportionately small way, also constituted by black voices. These letters also challenge notions of black Africans as "intensely local and bounded,"[185] since they provide evidence of select black people both imagining themselves as a part of an imperial community and participating in that community. Finally, these letters challenge what Pamela Scully referred to as the tendency of scholars "to represent Indigenous people as victims only, as if acknowledging their attempts to shape their futures in the context of a new imperial or colonial world makes them and their author complicit with colonialism."[186] Indeed, these letters occupy a murky yet crowded space between complicity and

[185] Jane Carey and Jane Lydon, *Indigenous Networks: Mobility Connections and Exchange* (New York: Routledge, 2014),1.
[186] Pamela Scully, "Indigeneity, Agency and Modernity," *The Journal of the Social History Society* 9, no. 4 (2012): 591.

resistance. They are at once partly resistant to imperialism, in that they challenge the oppressive policies of Britain and the Cape, and partly complicit, in that they not only adopt the Western technology of letter-writing as their tool, but they also choose to express their voices through a society that was explicitly designed to bring about a "better scheme of colonization."[187] Recognizing the in-betweenness of these black correspondents' letter-writing is an important step in understanding the complexities of local experiences of empire.

A society to help Africans represent themselves

This section explores the attempts made by Mqikela, Jabavu, and Moroka to gain the Aborigines' Protection Society's support for political delegations to England. Supporting African delegations was not an official object of the Society, although it did do so on occasion. Zoe Laidlaw in particular identified nine such delegations that were hosted by the APS.[188] Travelling to England to speak directly to the British monarch and the Colonial Office was a common strategy of black political leaders in the second half of the nineteenth century. King Sechele of the Kwena Tswana embarked on a mission to England in 1853 to request assistance in resisting the Afrikaners of the South African Republic, although he ran out of funds in Cape Town. King Moshoeshoe of the BaSotho sent a delegation to England in 1869 to negotiate an alliance, but his delegation was not granted an audience. Cetshwayo, the deposed king of the Zulu, travelled to England in 1882 to negotiate his return to Zululand. King Lobengula of the Ndebele sent a delegation to England in 1889 and in 1891 to protest the granting of land rights to the Rhodes mining syndicate. Nine Swazi delegates were sent to England by Queen Labotsibeni in 1894 to request protection from the South African Republic. Finally, three Tswana chiefs, Khama,

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[187] Aborigines' Protection Society, *The First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society, Presented at the Meeting in Exeter Hall, May 6th, 1838* (London: W. Ball, Aldine Chambers, 1838), 26.
[188] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 117-119.

Sebele, and Bathoen, travelled to England in 1895 to request protection from annexation to Rhodesia.[189] It is in this greater context of African delegations to England that some of the correspondents requested assistance from the Society to send their own delegations. The attempted delegations I discuss were all targeted towards the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the head of the Colonial Office. This is somewhat against the grain of African delegations of the period, most of which sought an audience with the queen or another member of the royal family, but it is not unheard of: the Tswana delegation in 1895 also targeted the colonial secretary.[190]

I begin this section by summarizing the letters sent by Mqikela, Jabavu, and Moroka on the subject of delegations. I then compare the specific requests they made of the APS. I show that despite the shared theme of sending delegations, these correspondents imagined the APS's support for their delegations to take a variety of forms, ranging from providing funding and editing petitions to raising questions in parliament and arranging interviews. By locating these requests for assistance within what Gwilym Colenso has identified as a norm of Colonial Office interference with African delegations,[191] I argue that seeking APS support represents an attempt to circumvent imperial interference in the self-representation of African voices. Moreover, I argue that attending to these requests for assistance nuances Zoe Laidlaw's previous work on delegations hosted by the APS, illustrating that sending a delegation through the APS was not a

[189] For an overview of these political missions to England, see Neil Parsons, "Southern African Royalty and Delegates visit Queen Victoria, 1882-1895," in Sarah Carter and Maria Nugent, eds., *Mistress of Everything: Queen Victoria in Indigenous Worlds,* 166-186 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).
[190] Neil Parsons, "Southern African royalty and delegates visit Queen Victoria," in Sarah Carter and Maria Nugent, eds., *Mistress of Everything: Queen Victoria in Indigenous Worlds,* 166-186 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 169.
[191] Gwilym Colenso, "Breaking with the Old Patterns of Control: African Deputations to Britain from Southern Africa in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *South African Historical Journal* 69, no. 4 (2017): 501-547.

singular engagement with the Society, but the final stage of longer processes that both differed for each correspondent and were treated differently by the APS.

Mqikela's delegation letters

Of the three letters Mqikela sent to the APS between 1 August 1883 and 12 July 1884, two contained requests for APS support for an Mpondo delegation to London. The remaining letter will be discussed in the third section of this chapter. Following the Ninth Frontier War (1877-78), Cape Governor Sir Bartle Frere had succeeded in annexing large swaths of the Transkei including Mfenguland and Thembuland. The Mpondo had stayed neutral in the war and Frere had no political justification to annexe Mpondoland as a whole, but he did have reason to annex small parts of it. In 1878 Frere annexed the Mpondo trading port, Port St. John's, because it was allegedly a gateway for firearms to enter the Transkei, and he annexed Xesibeland, a small region in northern Mpondoland, because the Xesibe had requested British protection back in 1874. Mqikela had been petitioning the Cape government to open negotiations over the return of his land since it was taken, and the Cape government had shown interest in opening such negotiations, but only for monetary compensation. Mqikela considered the return of his land to be the only acceptable compensation, and so he and the Cape government had arrived at an impasse. To overcome this impasse, Mqikela began to plan a delegation to England to petition the imperial government to return his land on the Cape's behalf.[192] In the two letters Mqikela wrote to the APS about his planned delegation, he made two specific requests. First, in his letter of 1 August 1883, he asked for a loan.

> I therefore - with the advice of several white friends resident in my country - make an appeal to your Society to assist me with funds for the purpose of sending the above mentioned delegation so that what I complain of will be properly represented.

[192] William Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy," *Journal of African History* 20, no. 3 (1979): 482.

> I do not solicit as a gift, but as a loan which I will repay as soon as I can collect sufficient cattle.[193]

Second, he requested the APS convince Colonial Secretary Lord Derby to receive the Mpondo delegation. Mqikela had been in direct correspondence with the Colonial Office regarding his case. In his letter dated 8 February 1884, he informed the Society of a letter he had received from the Colonial Office which indicated that "Her Majesty's government will not receive any deputation from me."[194] Consequently, Mqikela asked the APS to raise a question in parliament to convince Derby to change his mind: "I should be very thankful if your Society could bring the matter of Lord Derby's refusal to receive my deputation before the house of parliament."[195]

Moroka's delegation letters

Samuel Moroka sent four letters to the APS between 26 December 1883 and 7 February 1884, through which he sought support in lobbying the imperial government to force the Orange Free State to restore him as ruler of Thaba Nchu. Two of his letters have already been discussed: that of 22 January 1884, when he asked the APS to convince Richard Southey to support his claim, and that of 7 February 1884, when he asked the APS to convince Donald Currie to support his claim. Both of those letters asked the Society to represent Moroka's claim on his behalf. However, prior to these letters, Moroka had asked the Society for assistance in supporting his own mission to England. First, on 26 December 1883, he forwarded to the APS drafts of some sort, likely letters, petitions, or speeches, which he asked the APS to help edit and improve.[196] Second, on 1 January 1884, he asked the APS to help him receive an audience with Colonial Secretary Lord Derby, so that he could represent his claim to Thaba Nchu personally.[197]

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[193] Mqikela to Chesson, 1 August 1883, APS papers, C149/103.
[194] Mqikela to Chesson, 8 February 1884, APS papers, C149/104.
[195] Mqikela to Chesson, 8 February 1884, APS papers, C149/104.
[196] Samuel Moroka to Chesson, 26 December 1883, APS papers, C143/63.
[197] Samuel Moroka to Chesson, 1 January 1884, APS papers, C143/64.

Jabavu's delegation letters

As I showed in the previous section, Jabavu's seven pre-1887 letters requested the APS to represent his voice in England on his behalf. His eleven post-1887 letters, on the other hand, all sought the APS's support of a delegation to England so that he could represent his own protests against the Parliamentary Registration Act (PRA). The PRA had been introduced to the Cape parliament in March 1887. The Cape had enjoyed a nominally non-racial franchise since gaining a constitution in 1853, but tensions had begun to grow after sharp increases in the black population of the Cape following the annexations of British Kaffraria and the Transkei territories between 1860 and 1880. Fears of white voters becoming swamped by black voters abounded, and the PRA, guided by the growing influence of the Afrikaner Bond, was designed to reduce the size of the enfranchised black population.[198] Jabavu's first letter on the subject, dated 28 March 1887, informed the APS of the introduction of the PRA, which he called "the disenfranchisement bill," and that a group of local black Africans were organizing against it.

> These lines are written with the object of giving you a note of warning. We are marshalling the local forces to defeat the measure, but with a Dutch majority in the Cape parliament we fear the battle will have to be fought out in England and that by your useful society.[199]

Jabavu made two specific requests of the APS. First, on 2 July 1887, he asked for a member of the APS to "put a question in the House of Commons as to whether this right – free hand [i.e. responsible government] – went to the extent of allowing the Cape ministry of the day to tamper with the Constitution to the extent of disfranchising the native."[200] By this, Jabavu hoped that the imperial government would realize the unconstitutionality of the PRA and disallow it. The issue

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[198] D. R. Edgecombe, "The Non-Racial Franchise in Cape Politics, 1853-1910," *Kleio* 10, no. 1-2 (1978): 22-26.
[199] Jabavu to Chesson, March 28 1887, APS papers, C139/10.
[200] Jabavu to Chesson, 2 July 1887, APS papers, C139/11.

of a delegation appeared in Jabavu's third letter, dated 12 July 1887. Here, Jabavu referenced a letter he sent to Cape Governor Hercules Robinson "to ascertain…whether in the event of the disfranchisement bill passing, our people would have time between its passing and its proclamation to petition the governor and the Queen."[201] Although the Cape had been granted responsible government, the Crown still maintained the rights of reservation and disallowance. When a bill was passed through a colonial parliament, it would be given to the governor for final approval. If the governor felt that the bill significantly changed the legal or political systems of the colony, they would "reserve" the bill for consideration by the British parliament. Jabavu's hope was that the PRA would be reserved for imperial consent, and thereby struck down by the APS's political allies. He transcribed Robinson's reply, that "at present His Excellency is under the impression that it will not require to be reserved," and Jabavu concluded that "there is no time, but the Secretary of State should be interviewed at once, so that he may instruct the Governor to reserve the Bill."[202] To achieve this end, he explained that "at Port Elizabeth a mass meeting of natives has resolved to send a delegation to England to plead their cause before the Secretary of State," and he said to the APS, "I trust you will do all you can for the delegation when it comes."[203] It is at this point that Jabavu made his second request of the APS, that it would stall any parliamentary deliberation over the PRA until after the delegation could arrive. In his letter of 29 August 1887, Jabavu wrote:

> we are still making preparations for furthering our appeal to the Home Government, and we trust if you see fit you will urge upon the Colonial Secretary to suspend recommending the giving of the royal assent to the measure until the delegation reaches London to plead their cause.[204]

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[201] Jabavu to Chesson, 12 July 1887, APS papers, C139/12.
[202] Jabavu to Chesson, 12 July 1887, APS papers, C139/12.
[203] Jabavu to Chesson, 12 July 1887, APS papers, C139/12.
[204] Jabavu to Chesson, 29 August 1887, APS papers, C139/16.

He repeated this request on September 19: "I need not add more further than to say do all you can to prevent the Secretary of State not to close the matter until at least he has heard us."[205]

Discussion

From this overview, we can observe that although Mqikela, Moroka, and Jabavu all wrote to gain the Society's support for delegations, there is little overlap in the specific forms they requested this support to take. Indeed, there are only two requests that appear more than once. First, Mqikela and Jabavu both requested the APS to raise questions in parliament. Second, Mqikela and Moroka both requested the APS to arrange meetings between themselves and the Colonial Secretary. Otherwise, Mqikela was alone is requesting funding, Jabavu was alone in requesting the APS to stall parliament, and Moroka was alone in requesting the APS to edit his petitions and to talk to individual politicians. This variety shows that even though seeking support for delegations is a common theme in the letters from black Africans to the APS, this commonality does not equate with a monolithic conceptualization of the APS's relation to black African politics. Instead, the APS's utility was interpreted by these correspondents according to their individual needs at specific moments in time.

Like the correspondence discussed in the previous section, these letters requesting support for delegations represent attempts by select black Africans to have their voices represented in the British metropole. Yet they take one step further by seeking to represent themselves in person, rather than asking to be represented by the Society. An important question remains: why did these correspondents request this sort of aid from the Society? As mentioned earlier, sending delegations to England was a common enough strategy of asserting African political voices in imperial politics. African delegations to England included the Tswana in 1853

[205] Jabavu to Chesson, 19 September 1887, APS papers, C139/18.

and 1895, the BaSotho in 1869, the Zulu in 1882, the Ndebele in 1889 and 1891, and the Swazi in 1894. However, as Gwilym Colenso argues, delegations to England were subject to extensive manipulation and interference by the Colonial Office. These delegations were mostly funded by the Colonial Office: a substantial budget was dedicated to funding travel, hospitality, and even sight-seeing arrangements. In return, the Colonial Office would insist upon its prerogative to choose the delegations' interpreters, to choose who the delegation could meet, and control the level of publicity the delegation could receive. The 1889 Ndebele and the 1896 Tswana delegation tried to avoid this interference by funding themselves, yet the Colonial Office still insisted upon paying for sight-seeing and public receptions, and used that expense "as a hard bargaining point clearly intended to put the delegates at a disadvantage."[206] Furthermore, if delegations refused to accept a government-provided interpreter, the Colonial Office would simply refuse to arrange meetings with the delegations. This is exactly what happened to the BaSotho delegations in 1869 and 1907 and the Swazi delegation in 1894.[207] In this context, I suggest that requesting aid from the Aborigines' Protection Society represented an attempt to side-step government influence over how the black correspondents' voices were represented in England.

As Zoe Laidlaw has demonstrated, the Aborigines' Protection Society regularly played host to Indigenous delegations from around the empire. She highlights in particular nine such delegations during the mid-nineteenth century, showing that non-European peoples from Canada, southern and western Africa, and India were hosted by the APS in their missions to represent their peoples' voices and perspectives in England.[208] Crucially, Laidlaw argues that the Society's

[206] Colenso, "Breaking with the Old Patterns of Control," 505.
[207] Colenso, "Breaking with the Old Patterns of Control," 525-526.
[208] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 117-118.

own interest in hosting these delegations, its desire to use non-European voices to further its own lobbying, frustrated the delegations.[209] Nevertheless, she argues that studying the language of the delegates hosted by the APS, paying attention to how they strategically performed a hybrid identity of civilized authority and traditional authenticity in order to gain the Society's and the British public's attention, is important because it "illuminates both the workings of colonialism and those who objected to it."[210] I wholeheartedly agree, yet at the same time I question Laidlaw's treatment of delegations to England as a singular moment: she attends to the discourses of civility and authenticity at the moment of the delegation, but she does not attend to how those delegations came to occur in the first place. This section has shown that sending a delegation through the APS was not a singular moment, but the final stage of a longer process that differed for each correspondent depending on what form they envisioned the APS's support for their delegation would take. As I will discuss in Chapter Three, the specific forms of aid that were requested, as well as the specific causes which delegations wished to represent in England, were very important factors that would influence the Society's decision to either grant or refuse assistance to these correspondents. As such, the letters negotiating and leading up to delegations are just as important for illuminating "the workings of colonialism and those who objected to it." Moreover, most of the potential delegations discussed in this section did not come to fruition, indicating that a focus on delegations as they happened in England would exclude many attempted delegations. Therefore, attending to these letters asking for assistance in sending delegations adds important nuance to the study of resistance and self-representation, and attending to the Society's response to them in the next chapter adds depth to the study of the operation of colonialism and the policing of imperial discourses.

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[209] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 133.
[210] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 134.

A society to challenge representations of Africans

Shadrach Boyce Mama, Mqikela, and Jabavu each wrote to the APS on the subject of representations that had been made of them by Cape government officials and the Cape media. Recognizing that they and their people were being negatively represented in imperial discourse, they provided the APS with refutations to such representations. I begin this section by summarizing the letters sent by Mama, Mqikela, and Jabavu on this subject. Mama challenged the Cape parliament's dismissal of his testimony as untrustworthy due to his race. Mqikela challenged claims by Cape officials that his resistance to annexation was orchestrated by unscrupulous whites and unsupported by his people. Jabavu challenged misrepresentations of the Cape press on South African issues by sending his information to the APS and seeking their support in disseminating his newspaper, *Imvo Zabatsundu.* I argue that these letters were written to the APS to access an alternative information network to that of the colonial government and media.

Shadrach Boyce Mama's letter

Shadrach Boyce Mama sent a letter to the APS, dated 29 December 1879, to challenge the Cape government's dismissal of himself as inaccurate and untrustworthy. In his letter, Mama provided an account of Cape officials auctioning off Xhosa refugees as unpaid labour on 25 May 1879. According to Mama, the Xhosa in question were refugees from the Ninth Frontier War of 1877, and they were sold to farmers by a government official named Henry Stereus. Mama's account culminates in the attempted suicide of one woman, who after having her children taken from her, "actually before our presence took a knife out of her pocket and attempted to cut her throat."[211] Mama sent his account to the APS out of frustration at the refusal of the Cape

[211] Mama to Chesson, 29 December 1879, APS papers, C142/15-16.

parliament to take his account seriously. He had originally sent the account to the *Cape Argus*, where it gained the attention of Saul Solomon, M.P. for Cape Town and *Cape Argus* founder. Mama's letter explained that "Mr. Solomon went and read my letter to the House of Assembly," but that "I was very much troubled to hear some of the members in the House of Assembly, notably the premier, making such a strong denial of my statements."[212] Determining that his account was not taken seriously in the Cape parliament because of discrimination against him as a black person, Mama wrote to the APS to assert a representation of himself as civilized and trustworthy. Mama insisted that "my chief object is, I want you to understand that I write this as any Englishman would, provided he is honest. I write because my motto almost in all matters - I am more a whiteman than a Kafir - so I adopt in doing so honesty as my policy and guide."[213] Moreover, Mama's letter can also be considered as an attempt to assert himself as the source of his information. A short paragraph on the APS's correspondence with Saul Solomon about the auction of black indentured labour had been printed in the 27 December 1879 issue of the *Cape Argus*, which read:

> Not long ago a scene took place in Capetown, which two years ago would have caused an outcry of indignation, and now is not noticed. The Kaffir depot was broken up. The old and lame and infirm that were left after all their friends were given out to service, were dragged by policemen through the streets, were placed on board a steamer, and sent back to the frontier, to be restored to their respective clans. This is to relieve the Government of their maintenance. *One woman attempted to commit suicide in the street, on account of being thus torn, by violence, from her children* [emphasis mine].[214]

Having read this and discovering that he was not cited as the source of the information, Mama informed the Society of the role he played in bring the information to light. He wrote:

> My serious attention has been attracted by your correspondence with the Secretary of State for the Colonies - which appearing in the Cape Argus of December the 27th

[212] Mama to Chesson, 29 December 1879, APS papers, C142/15-16.
[213] Mama to Chesson, 29 December 1879, APS papers, C142/15-16.
[214] "Our Native Policy," Cape Argus, 27 December 1879, University of Cape Town Special Collections.

> 1879 and I thought it my personal duty to write to you, as your correspondence on natives affairs was *mainly based on what was written by me originally to the Cape Argus, and I am the man who brought it before the knowledge of Mr Saul Solomon - and the public* [emphasis mine].[215]

By asserting himself as the source of the information, Mama further reinforced his self-representation as civilized and trustworthy. For it offered proof that his information was reliable enough to be printed in the *Cape Argus,* and demonstrated that that the Society had already treated his information as reliable enough to correspond with Saul Solomon about it without knowing that an African was the source of the information.

Mqikela's letter on his representation

Mqikela wrote a final letter to the APS, dated 12 July 1884, to challenge representations made by the Cape government of himself and his planned delegation to England. In this letter, Mqikela specifically referred to two letters from the British Resident in Mpondoland, Olley Oxland, to the Cape Secretary of Native Affairs. In the first, dated 5 June 1883, Oxland claimed that Mqikela's plan to send a delegation to England was attributable to "three choice white rascals…advising and encouraging Umqikela to resist the Colonial Government," and that these white rascals had deceived Mqikela into believing that a recent boundary commission had not been sanctioned by the Cape government.[216] The "white rascals" Oxland referred to included Mqikela's employed advisors, William Bouverie and Hamilton McNicholas, who likely translated and transcribed his letters for him.[217] In his letter, Mqikela himself offered a challenge

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[215] Mama to Chesson, 29 December 1879, C142/15-16.
[216] Olley Oxland, Oxland to Secretary of Native Affairs, 5 June 1883, quoted in Mqikela, Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.
[217] In the previous chapter I argued that Bouverie and McNicholas likely did not substantially alter Mqikela's letters. In comparing letters written by Bouverie and McNicholas on the one hand, and letters dictated by Mqikela on the other, there are substantial contradictions regarding what Mqikela's political plans were. I argued that if Bouverie and McNicholas had been altering Mqikela's letters, then they would not have allowed his letters to contradict their own. For more on the McNicholas and Bouverie in

to the allegation that three "white rascals" had been driving his policy: "Will you be good enough to furnish me with the names of the three choice white rascals mentioned in Mr Oxland's telegram, as I am not aware of any white rascal that attended the meeting in question."[218] And in response to the allegation that his white advisors had been deceiving him about a boundary commission, Mqikela wrote:

> it is utterly untrue, as the Pondos and myself were well aware that the selection of a boundary between Pondos and Xesibes was done in accordance with instructions received from the government…the whole of the correspondence relative thereto, was read and interpreted to me and my people assembled at the Great Place.[219]

The second letter Mqikela referred to from Oxland is dated 4 February 1884. In this letter, Oxland stated that Mqikela's plan to send a delegation to England was based on Hamilton McNicholas' false claim that he held "a pledge that the Aborigines' Protection Society would compel the Queen's Ministers to receive the Pondo delegation," that this delegation did not have the support of the majority of Mpondo chiefs, and that "Umqikela himself is merely a passive agent in the hands of two [white] persons."[220] Mqikela challenged each of these allegations in turn. First, he denied that he held any pledge from the APS:

> Captain McNicholas never gave any such assurance as mentioned by Mr Oxland, neither has he ever stated to me or Umhlangasu [Mqikela's second-in-command] that he held a pledge that the Aborigines' Protection Society would compel the Queen's minister to receive the Pondo delegation.[221]

Second, Mqikela refuted Oxland's claim that his chiefs did not support the delegation, as "not a single chief has refused to contribute [to the delegation fund]."[222] Finally, in response to Oxland's

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Mpondoland, see William Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy, 1878–1886," *Journal of African History* 20, no. 3 (1979): 451-486.

[218] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.

[219] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.

[220] Oxland, Oxland to Secretary of Native Affairs, 4 February 1884, quoted in Mqikela, Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.

[221] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.

[222] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.

repeated insinuations that the Mpondo delegation was the idea of white advisors and not of the Mpondo themselves, Mqikela wrote: "as to being a passive agent in the hands of one or two, should the government be inclined to attach any importance to this part of Mr Oxland's letter, they can easily satisfy themselves as to the untruth of it by sending a trustworthy official to the Great Place."[223] Through these statements, Mqikela not only showed that he was aware of how he was being represented throughout the empire, but also that he recognized the importance of managing his image. Moreover, they illustrate that Mqikela was not a passive victim of imperialist discourses such as the "white agitator." Rather, he meticulously refuted those claims made against him with logic and evidence.

Jabavu's letters on representation

John Tengo Jabavu wrote in his first letter, dated 6 May 1880, of his frustration with a system of information circulation that constantly misrepresented South African affairs in England. He wrote:

> To all this is to be added the misrepresentations of the majority of the press which has not been slow in contributing its quota to our oppressive burden by misrepresentation in England; acts outrageous have been trimmed with euphemistic epithets before transmission to England and by this means we have been disarmed.[224]

The misrepresentations he referred to were those that have already been discussed above: the representation of the BaSotho as a vicious and warlike people who needed to be disarmed and conquered; the representation of Cetshwayo as a conniving rebel leader who could not be returned to his people for fear of reprisals; the representation of black labourers as vagrants who needed to be controlled with pass legislation. Jabavu sought to

[223] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.
[224] Jabavu to Chesson, 6 May 1880, APS papers, C139/1.

combat these misrepresentations through the APS in three ways. First and most obviously, he provided information from his own perspective. In the previous two sections of this chapter, I have outlined how Jabavu wrote to the APS to request the APS represent his voice on local matters as well as to gain support for his delegation to England. Given that Jabavu expressed his frustrations with the misrepresentations of South African issues in the imperial press in his first letter, we can also consider all of the information he provided to be offered in an effort to combat such misrepresentations. Second, Jabavu suggested that a Royal Commission could be appointed "to investigate the manner in which the natives have been treated."[225] He believed that a commission sent by the imperial government could circumvent the Cape government's information network, and thereby transmit knowledge of South African issues free of misrepresentation. Third, Jabavu sought funding from the APS to expand the dissemination of his newspaper, *Imvo Zabatsundo,* throughout the empire. According to his letters, he founded *Imvo* for the purpose of "keeping the public and the government current of native opinion,"[226] and he requested funding from the APS "with a view to make it more valuable – by enlarging and putting into it more information for English readers."[227]

These letters from Mama, Mqikela, and Jabavu display a shared concern with how racial discrimination in the Cape Colony created the flow of information through the empire, and show how they each turned to the APS as an alternative information network. For Mama, the racial discrimination of the Cape parliament prevented his testimony from being taken seriously, and he sent his testimony along with his credentials through the

[225] Jabavu to Chesson, 6 May 1880, APS papers, C139/1.
[226] Jabavu to Chesson, 30 November 1885, APS papers, C139/7.
[227] Jabavu to Chesson, 6 March 1887, APS papers, C139/9.

Society in the hope that his information would not be inhibited by the same discrimination. Similarly, Mqikela and Jabavu both perceived that any information passed through the Cape government and the Cape media would be filtered through settler interests. For Jabavu and Mqikela, writing to the APS was a means of subverting the filtration of representations of local issues through the information networks of the Cape government and the Cape media.

I would like to draw particular attention to the use of the APS as an alternative information network, because it is especially important in light of repeated complaints from Mqikela about the inefficiency of the government information network. Mqikela repeatedly complained that he received no replies from either the Cape or the imperial government. H.W. Welborne, whom Mqikela had recruited as a diplomatic agent in 1881,[228] wrote to Colonial Secretary Lord Derby on 8 April 1884 that "Her Majesty's representative at the Cape, the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, had neglected to reply in any shape or form to the messages and despatches forwarded by the Paramount Chief of Pondoland."[229] Four months later, on 9 August 1884, Mqikela's chief councillor Umhlangaso Faku wrote to High Commissioner Robinson, complaining that "no attention whatever has been paid to the repeated representations he [Mqikela] has made to both the Imperial and Colonial Governments."[230] Finally, Hamilton McNicholas, one of Mqikela's diplomatic agents, wrote to High Commissioner Robinson on 18 July 1885 that "I am directed by Umquikela…to respectfully call your Excellency's attention to the fact that up to the present no answer has been vouchsafed to the

[228] Beinart, "European Traders and the Mpondo Paramountcy, 1878–1886," 478.
[229] H. W. Welborne to Colonial Office, 8 April 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 378.
[230] Mqikela, Chief Umquikela to High Commissioner, 9 August 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa,* vol. 27, 383.

above-mentioned communications [letters dated since 9 August 1884]."[231] From these complaints we can observe that Mqikela received no communication from government channels between 8 April 1884 and 18 July 1885, and we can safely assume that this silence extended prior to Mqikela complaining about it. Yet we can also observe from certain clues in the APS letters that the APS was in sustained contact with Mqikela around this same period. In a letter from William Bouverie, another of Mqikela's diplomatic agents, to the Society dated 13 November 1883, he wrote: "Your letter of 27 Sept has been forwarded on to me here. I have read it to the Paramount Chief, who has desired me to convey to you his heartfelt thanks."[232] Another letter from Bouverie, this time to his father in London and dated sometime in February 1884, reads: "If you see Mr Chesson [secretary of the APS] tell him I received his letters, but that I have not given his message from Fowler to the Chief Umqikela, as matters are not going on very smoothly just now."[233] Finally, in Mqikela's letter to the Society dated 12 July 1884, he wrote that "Capt McNicholas has read to me your letter of the 27th March."[234] These three statements tell us that the APS had sent at least three letters to Mqikela in the period just before Mqikela began complaining about the lack of communication from government authorities. Correspondence with the APS therefore offered Mqikela not just a means of challenging government representations of the Mpondo, it also offered him access to information that the inefficient and slow government information network was failing to provide. Zoe Laidlaw has written extensively on the use of patronage, humanitarian, and scientific networks by colonial and imperial governments to overcome the temporal and regulatory constraints of official

[231] McNicholas, McNicholas to High Commissioner, 18 July 1885, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 421.
[232] Bouverie to Chesson, 13 November 1883, APS papers, C126/67.
[233] Bouverie to Chesson, 5 March 1884, APS papers, C126/72.
[234] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/105.

communication networks.[235] Mqikela's letters illustrate that, in his case at least, non-European political figures also tapped into such networks to circumvent the constraints of official communication.

Like those discussed in the previous two sections, these letters to the Aborigines' Protection Society represent attempts by select black Africans to have their voices and perspectives represented throughout the British empire. This is an important point to acknowledge because it shows that I am not applying my own pre-conceived notion of discursive knowledge networks to these correspondents. These people were not writing to some political version of Santa Claus, hoping to receive a boon or a gift from a black box organization. Rather, these correspondents recognized that the ways in which people throughout the empire thought about Africans was important, and these letters prove that they actively sought to influence imperial perceptions of Africans by writing to the APS.

Conclusion: locating African letters in the greater historiography

This chapter focused on answering the first of my three overarching research questions: How did black Africans engage with the Aborigines' Protection Society's information network? By identifying thirty-seven letters written to the Society by John Tengo Jabavu, Mqikela, Maherero, Samuel Moroka, and Pambani Mzimba, I show that black Africans contributed their voices, their perspectives, and their information to the APS. Moreover, I argue that these letters were more than just words on paper: in the language of Ashcroft et al, they were attempts to challenge British "control of the means of publication," to counter the hegemony of European representations of South Africa and black Africans. These attempts took multiple forms. Some

[235] See Zoe Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-1845: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

sought to have the APS represent correspondent voices on their behalf by raising questions for them in parliament, by interviewing politicians for them, or by raising awareness for them through their publications. Others tried to get APS support for delegations to England so that they could represent themselves in person. And yet others wrote to refute negative representations made of them by using the APS as an alternative to government and media knowledge networks. Through studying these letters, this chapter has expanded our awareness of how and why black Africans sought to participate in imperial information networks.

Comparing the findings of this chapter with the historiography discussed in the introduction of this thesis, two questions arise that will lead into the next chapter. First, there is a striking similarity between the model of imperial information networks proposed by Alan Lester and the attempts by black Africans to challenge representations of themselves. Lester argues that settlers across the empire used newspaper networks to challenge the representations made of themselves within imperial and metropolitan discourses. He argues that settlers used local newspapers to assert their own conceptions of settler identity against negative portrayals made by imperial humanitarians. Lester's argument rings similar to my own, that black Africans used the APS's information network to assert their own identities against negative portrayals by the Cape government and media. The primary difference between these two arguments is that, in Lester's case, settlers were in control of their newspapers, while in my case, black Africans were not in control of the APS. The black press in South Africa was certainly on the rise at the end of the 19th century and John Tengo Jabavu played a huge role in this, having founded the first autonomous black newspaper in South Africa. But when the goal of an information network is to carry representations to government and public audiences in England, settler and black

newspapers of this time period are hardly comparable. Lester describes the extent of the settler newspaper information circuit:

> Bundles of settler papers were continually sent to subscribers in Britain including newspapers such as *The Times*, which extracted much of its colonial news from the settler press. Alongside parliamentary debates, commissions of enquiry and missionaries' reports, then, settler newspapers became a channel through which the metropolitan reading public created an imagined geography of empire…By the mid 1830s, newspapers at every site of colonization were already extracting extensively from each other as well as from the main metropolitan papers.[236]

This extent of information circulation was not possible with late nineteenth-century black newspapers. Siyasanga Tyali argues that the funding for these newspapers was predominantly provided by settlers with political interests in steering the newspapers' messages, and that black control of these newspapers did not develop until the twentieth century.[237] Without holding control of newspaper circuits that could deliver information to the metropole in English, early black journalists did not have access to the same information networks as settler journalists. Instead, this chapter suggests that they had to rely on intermediary humanitarian networks such as the APS. The question then arises: how did the APS's role as an intermediary network influence the representation of the black African voices that were sent to it in the mail?

Second, there is a substantial disparity between the local issues that I have shown black Africans wrote about, and the local issues that Charles Swaisland and James Heartfield have previously shown the APS to have engaged with in their surveys of APS activity. Swaisland outlined five South African issues. Decades later, Heartfield provided a slightly enlarged, yet substantially overlapping outline covering seven issues. This chapter presents a different outline,

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[236] Alan Lester, "British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire," *History Workshop Journal*, no. 54 (2002): 32.

[237] Siyasanga M. Tyali, "Ambiguities of a Decolonising Press Culture: On South Africa's *Imvo Zabantsundu* (*Native Opinion*)," *South African Journal of African Languages* 38, no. 3 (September 2, 2018): 307–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/02572117.2018.1518038.

identifying nine issues. These issues are listed in the table below, which visualizes the differences between our three outlines. There is some overlap between my list and those of Swaisland and Heartfield, yet there are six issues that I have identified which are not mentioned by Swaisland or Heartfield. The most likely cause for this discrepancy is that Swaisland's and Heartfield's surveys were largely based upon the Society's published articles. Swaisland did study the APS correspondence extensively, but he did not pay attention to letters from black Africans; none of the letters discussed in this chapter are referenced in his writings. This suggests that these issues written about by black correspondents but not discussed by Swaisland and Heartfield were filtered out of the APS's publications by the APS itself. This, in addition to the reliance of black Africans on intermediary information networks to assert their identity throughout the empire, makes it crucial for us to understand how the Society impacted how these letters were represented in England. In the next chapter of this thesis, I discuss how the APS responded to and represented the letters discussed in this chapter.

Issues covered by Swaisland	Issues covered by Heartfield	Issues covered in this thesis
Oppression in the South African Republic		
Indenture of Chinese labour		
Langalibalele	Langalibalele	
Anglo-Zulu War	Anglo-Zulu War	
Zululand settlement and civil war	Zululand settlement and civil war	Zululand settlement and civil war
	Basutoland Gun War	Basutoland Gun War
	Parliamentary Registration Act	Parliamentary Registration Act
	Annexation of Bechuanaland	
	1913 Native Lands Act	
		Thaba Nchu
		Mpondoland
		Herero in Namibia
		Ninth Frontier War
		Cape Vagrancy Act
		Cape liquor trade

Table 1: Comparison of issues discussed by Swaisland, Heartfield, and this thesis

Chapter Three – Black African Voices within APS Publications

The previous chapter discussed the letters written by select black Africans to the Aborigines' Protection Society. This chapter moves from those correspondents to the Society itself, analyzing how the APS facilitated and responded to black African voices in order to gain insights into the operation of British imperial information networks. The correspondents under study experienced different levels of success in having their perspectives represented in the APS network. Some found no success whatsoever. Pambani Mzimba's criticisms of Cetshwayo's imprisonment following the Anglo-Zulu War, Maherero's demand for Britain to fulfill its treaty obligations after abandoning the Herero to Germany, and Shadrach Mama's report of an indentured labour auction of Xhosa refugees following the Ninth Frontier War all go unmentioned in the Society's publications, in records of its meetings, in its letters to the Colonial Office, and in questions raised in parliament. I can only speculate on why this is so. Mzimba wrote about the same topic as Jabavu, and so perhaps the Society wanted to avoid redundancy by choosing only one correspondent to represent. Maherero wrote to the Society after Britain had recognized German sovereignty in Namibia, and so it would make sense that the Society ignored an issue that did not involve a British colony. Mama wrote to the APS about an event that the Society had already written about to the Colonial Office and published about in *The Aborigines' Friend*,[238] and so, again, perhaps they ignored Mama's letter in order to avoid redundancy. Without further evidence, the only conclusion I can draw regarding Mzimba, Maherero, and Mama is that the APS failed to represent their voices.

[238] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Cape Colony," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1879): 190, 196, Gale Digital Collections, 19th Century UK Periodicals.

As for John Tengo Jabavu, Mqikela, and Samuel Moroka, they found significantly more success in having their perspectives represented. Jabavu's criticism of Cetshwayo's imprisonment, his views on the Basutoland Gun War, and his campaign against the Parliamentary Registration Act were all included in the Society's lobbying efforts. So too were Mqikela's protests against the Cape's annexation of parts of Mpondoland and Samuel Moroka's protests against his banishment from Thaba Nchu. The Society published their letters, raised questions for them in parliament, and wrote letters to the Colonial Office on their behalf. In Moroka's case the Society arranged meetings between him and influential politicians. Jabavu's, Mqikela's, and Moroka's voices were not represented by the APS entirely as they had intended. The APS censored their letters, removing parts that the Society found disagreeable and twisting meanings to sway readers to desired conclusions. Yet, as I will argue, this censorship did not substantially alter the major points that Jabavu, Mqikela, and Moroka conveyed.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first three analyze how the Society represented the letters from Jabavu, Mqikela, and Moroka. The final section draws comparisons between the censorship of Jabavu, Mqikela, and Moroka with the larger historiography of editorial manipulation, control of the means of publication, and political inclusion/exclusion. I argue that the Society's censorship of its black correspondents fell somewhere in the middle of a spectrum between hostile manipulation and ambivalent editorial changes. I further argue that this censorship did not exclude black Africans from imperial information networks, and I conclude that writing to the APS was an effective, though limited, means by which select black Africans could represent their perspectives throughout the empire

Representations of Jabavu

John Tengo Jabavu, the most prolific of the black correspondents, was largely successful in having his perspectives represented through the Aborigines' Protection Society's information network. Some of his letters were published in *The Aborigines' Friend,* and multiple questions were raised in parliament on his behalf. At the same time, Jabavu's perspectives were not represented in their entirety, and not always in the way he intended. As I showed in Chapter Two, Jabavu wrote to the Aborigines' Protection Society in two ways. First, he wrote to have his voice represented by the Society on his behalf by supplying information on local issues including the Basutoland Gun War, the Cape liquor trade, the Cape Vagrancy Act, and the imprisonment of Cetshwayo. Second, he wrote to gain support to represent his voice for himself by sending a delegation to England to protest the Parliamentary Registration Act. The Society responded to these letters in different ways and for different reasons, but a general trend is discernable: the Society was willing to represent Jabavu's perspectives on his behalf, but it did not support his self-representation in England.

Jabavu wrote two letters sharing his opinion on the Basutoland Gun War, one dated 18 May 1881 and the other 13 September 1881. The Basutoland Gun War of 1880-1881 was a war of BaSotho resistance against the Cape's attempt to implement a mandatory gun registration system, and a British war of confederation aimed at providing labour to the booming economy of South Africa's mineral revolution. Prior to these letters, the Aborigines' Protection Society had mentioned the Gun War eleven times in *The Aborigines' Friend*, in which three primary themes emerged. First, the Society protested that the Cape's disarmament policy, while designed in the interest of securing peace, would shatter the BaSotho's confidence in the benevolence of white people and lead to rebellion.[239] Second, they protested that the justifications offered by the Cape

[239] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Native Question in South Africa," *The Aborigines' Friend* (April 1880): 211; Aborigines' Protection Society, "Sir Bartle Frere's South African Policy," *The Aborigines'*

government for disarming and fighting the BaSotho -- i.e. that the Basuto were warlike and antagonized the Cape through constant cattle-raids -- were false, and that the Cape itself was antagonizing Basutoland because it wanted more land and labour.[240] Third, they heavily criticized Governor Bartle Frere and Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg for their oppressive native policies and their initiation of a war with Basutoland on false pretences, and expressed their faith that the new High Commissioner Hercules Robinson would bring peace to Basutoland.[241] In comparison with these previously expressed perspectives, Jabavu's letter of 18 May 1881 offered nothing new, and merely reiterated the APS's criticism of Sprigg and praise of Robinson.[242]

However, Jabavu's next letter on the Gun War, dated 13 September 1881, gave praise to Frere and Sprigg: "the grievances of the loyalists are championed with a pertinacity and expounded with an ability by Beach-Frere-Sprigg."[243] This statement requires some unpacking. The "loyalists" he referred to are those BaSotho who remained loyal to the treaty relationship entered into with Britain when Basutoland had been extended British protection in 1868. Jabavu considered most of the BaSotho to be loyalists, even those who fought in the Gun War, because the Gun War was considered a war against the Cape rather than against Britain. The loyalists' grievances were that, as British subjects, the BaSotho had the right to rule their territory without intervention from the Cape. According to the BaSotho, they were British subjects because

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Friend (July 1880): 259; Aborigines' Protection Society, "South Africa and the Natives," *The Aborigines' Friend* (July 1880): 237-8; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Cape Government and the Aborigines' Protection Society," *The Aborigines' Friend* (January 1881): 300-1; Aborigines' Protection Society, "Mr. W. Fowler, M.P., on the Basuto War," *The Aborigines' Friend* (April 1881): 343.

[240] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The New War in South Africa," *The Aborigines' Friend* (January 1881): 281-2; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The War in Basutoland," *The Aborigines' Friend* (January 1881): 284; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Basuto War," *The Aborigines' Friend* (April 1881): 328-9.

[241] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Basuto War," *The Aborigines' Friend* (April 1881): 339-40; Aborigines' Protection Society, "Mr. W. Fowler, M.P., on the Basuto War," *The Aborigines' Friend* (April 1881): 343.

[242] Jabavu to Chesson, 18 May 1881, APS papers, C139/2.

[243] Jabavu to Chesson, 13 September 1881, APS papers, C139/3.

Britain had repeatedly signed treaties recognizing the BaSotho as protected allies, most recently in 1868. However, Britain had ceded its authority over Basutoland to the Cape when the Cape was granted responsible government in 1871. The loyalist grievance was that the Cape was claiming to have sovereign authority over Basutoland when the BaSotho had never granted them this authority: they had granted it to Britain. "Beach-Frere-Sprigg" refers to the three politicians most responsible for starting the Gun War in the first place: Colonial Secretary Michael Hicks Beach, Governor Henry Bartle Frere, and Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg. All three were replaced in 1880: Beach was replaced by Kimberly, Frere was replaced by Robinson, and Sprigg was replaced by Scanlen. Jabavu's statement that Beach-Frere-Sprigg, the architects of the Gun War, were now supporting the BaSotho's demands for British subjectivity suggests that Jabavu's previously critical opinion of Frere and Sprigg was improving.

For the Society, which had often and repeatedly criticized Frere and Sprigg, Jabavu's words of praise contradicted their own stance. In the December 1881 issue of *The Aborigines' Friend*, the Society published a full transcription of Jabavu's September 13 letter, including his reference to the Basutoland Gun War, but the published letter did not match the original. Instead of reading "the grievances of the loyalists are championed with a pertinacity and expounded with an ability by Beach-Frere-Sprigg," the republished letter read as follows:

> The grievances of the loyalists are championed with so much pertinacity, and expounded with so much ability by Mr Sprigg's supporters, that many Basutos have been moved off the scent, and have been at a loss for a time to determine who are their friends and who their enemies.[244]

Not only did the APS fabricate a statement that Jabavu never made, but in doing so they changed Jabavu's narrative. Whereas Jabavu's original words had praised Frere and Sprigg, the Society's

[244] Aborigines' Protection Society, "A Native View of South African Questions," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1881): 434-5.

fabricated words implied that the improved behaviour of Frere and Sprigg was only a ruse that was moving the Basutos "off the scent," the scent presumably being the reality of Frere's and Sprigg's disregard for African interests. Through this censorship, the Society removed a statement that had contradicted their own criticisms of Frere and Sprigg, and simultaneously added a statement that reflected those criticisms.

It is important to point out, however, that praising Sprigg and Frere was not the main point of Jabavu's letter. Jabavu ended his paragraph on the Basutoland Gun War with his overall opinion: "We have yet to be disappointed with our present rulers."[245] By "present rulers," Jabavu was referring to Prime Minister Scanlen and Governor Hercules Robinson. In stating his pleasure with Scanlen and Robinson, Jabava was following up his previous statement in his letter of 18 May 1881, when he expressed his hope that the dismissal of Sprigg and Frere marked an improvement in the situation in Basutoland:

> We have reason to congratulate ourselves that matters are wearing a bright aspect. Sir B. Frere a tyrant and a despot has been displaced and Sir Hercules Robinson a prudent and practical man has been placed in his stead…I shall keep you posted up in information about our future.[246]

As a continuation of his previous letter, the main point of Jabavu's 13 September letter was that his opinion on the new regime had not changed. In the published version of his letter, the line "We have yet to be disappointed with our present rulers" was also edited, so that it read "No doubt the *present* Government are [the BaSotho's] friends, and the friends of the natives generally [emphasis mine]."[247] This alteration, unlike that about Sprigg and Frere, did not change Jabavu's overall meaning. As such, I argue that through the publication of this letter Jabavu

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[245] Jabavu to Chesson, 13 September 1881, APS papers, C139/3.
[246] Jabavu to Chesson, 18 May 1881, APS papers, C139/2.
[247] Aborigines' Protection Society, "A Native View of South Africa," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1881): 434.

succeeded in having his main point represented by the APS, if not his exact language and his entire opinion.

We can observe a similar censorship by the Aborigines' Protection Society of Jabavu's letter on the imprisonment of Cetshwayo. Following the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War, the Zulu king Cetshwayo had been imprisoned in Cape Town and Zululand had been (rather catastrophically) divided into thirteen chieftaincies appointed by Britain. Prior to Jabavu's letter, the APS had mentioned the issue three times, each time reiterating two main points. First, they protested that Cetshwayo was not permitted to visit or receive friends and family members while imprisoned.[248] Second, they repeatedly expressed their faith that the imperial government would rectify his unjust imprisonment by the Cape government and send him home to Zululand.[249] In Jabavu's letter of September 13th, he reiterated the Society's criticism of Cetshwayo's lack of freedom to see friends and family, writing that "at present much personal liberty is required for Cetshwayo."[250] Crucially, however, Jabavu did not express the Society's faith that the imperial government would help Cetshwayo. Instead, he criticized Liberal members of parliament for failing to end Cetshwayo's continued imprisonment:

> The retention of this innocent king in captivity is still one of the shabby blots on the Great English nation, hurled at it by the late Tory Government, of which it was, as it ever has been in the past, the simple duty of the Liberal government to rinse it. Perhaps the reluctance of our Great Father the Imperial Government to do this would have been less surprising if our old friend Mr John Bright and our rising one Mr Joseph Chamberlain were not in the Cabinet.[251]

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[248] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Sir Bartle Frere's South African Policy," *The Aborigines' Friend* (July 1880): 258; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Case of Cetshwayo," *The Aborigines' Friend* (August 1881): 400-3.
[249] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Sir Bartle Frere's South African Policy," *The Aborigines' Friend* (July 1880): 258; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Bishop of Natal," *The Aborigines' Friend* (January 1881): 302-3; Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Case of Cetshwayo," *The Aborigines' Friend* (August 1881): 400-3.
[250] Jabavu, "Jabavu to Chesson," September 13 1881, APS papers, C139/3.
[251] Jabavu, "Jabavu to Chesson," September 13 1881, APS papers, C139/3.

Several points of this statement require attention. First, Jabavu considered the Anglo-Zulu War and Cetshwayo's imprisonment to have been "hurled" at the Zulu by the Tories, which included Colonial Secretary Michael Hicks Beach and Governor Henry Bartle Frere, both of whom were heavily criticized by the APS and, at times, by Jabavu himself. Second, he expected that when the Tories were replaced by the Liberals in 1880, the Liberals would ensure Cetshwayo's return to Zululand. In doing so, he further agreed with the Society's previously published opinion that the imperial government would return Cetshwayo. Third, and most important, Jabavu pointed out that the Liberal Party, and especially Liberal cabinet members Joseph Chamberlain and John Bright, had been in power for over a year and yet Cetshwayo had still not been released. This final implication stepped on the toes of the Society, which was traditionally allied with the Liberal Party. While the APS was officially non-partisan, the majority of MPs who would listen to and work with the Society were Liberal. As such, the Society was always careful to avoid offending those Liberal politicians who would suffer their protests, and although the Society certainly had the occasional critique of Liberal politics, "such criticisms were voiced only in private letters."[252]

Jabavu's criticism of the Liberal Party was altered to avoid offending the Society's Liberal allies. This time, however, the APS did not put fabricated words in Jabavu's mouth. It simply omitted the above quoted section entirely, so that the published version of Jabavu's September 13 letter showed no indication of a critical view on the imperial government or its Liberal MPs.[253] We once again have to question whether or not this censorship interfered with Jabavu's main point. Jabavu's criticism of the Liberal Party was certainly a major component of his writing on

[252] Swaisland, thesis, 22-3
[253] Aborigines' Protection Society, "A Native View of South African Questions," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1881): 434-5.

the subject of the return of Cetshwayo. Yet, overall, it was the return of Cetshwayo, not the criticism of the Liberal Party, that was Jabavu's main point. Jabavu wrote "At present much personal liberty is required for Cetywayo [sic] and the APS might do well to keep the subject before the public,"[254] and the Society published that statement word for word. Jabavu did intend to criticize the Liberal party for not releasing Cetshwayo, but that criticism was only a secondary clause to the main point that Jabavu wanted Cetshwayo released. I therefore argue that, like his writings on the Basutoland Gun War, the Society's censorship and alterations of Jabavu's writings on the return of Cetshwayo did not stand in the way of his perspectives being represented. The Society certainly interfered with Jabavu's voice, publishing only those parts that conformed to its own perspective, while omitting and fabricating those that did not. Yet it did publish parts of Jabavu's letters, and most importantly, it published those parts that constituted Jabavu's main points.

It must be remembered, however, that the publication of Jabavu's perspectives constitutes only one form of representation: representation of black African perspectives on their behalf. In the previous chapter, I argued that Jabavu sought another form of representation, that of self-representation against the Parliamentary Registration Act (PRA) through sending a political delegation to England. In this, the APS was less amenable. Jabavu sent eleven letters about the PRA, and made three specific requests: that the APS provide assistance to his delegation when it arrived in England, that the APS raise questions in parliament to bring attention to the Act, and that the APS stall parliament until their delegation could arrive. The Society became involved in the issue from the very first letter Jabavu wrote on the subject. The Society declared its support in the October 1887 issue of *The Aborigines' Friend*:

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[254] C139/3

> We learn from a letter which Mr. Tengo Jabavu wrote to us on July 17th, that at Port Elizabeth a mass meeting of natives have resolved to send a delegation to England to plead their cause in Downing Street. The natives are well advised in taking energetic steps for the defence of their rights, and we shall do all in our power to help them.[255]

The Society also immediately fulfilled Jabavu's request to raise a question in parliament on the matter: the Society-affiliated Alexander McArthur raised a question in parliament on 7 July 1887, asking the Colonial Secretary Henry Holland "whether the adoption of a measure which seems calculated to disfranchise large numbers of Her Majesty's coloured subjects…would constitute a violation of the conditions on which responsible government was granted to the Colony?"[256] Thus, in Jabavu's first objectives, he was largely successful: the Society publicly pledged its support, and asked a question in parliament to bring political attention to the issue. It is in regards to Jabavu's second request, that the Society delay parliament until his delegation could arrive, that the Society faltered. Jabavu had twice requested that the APS delay the Colonial Office's decision to approve the Parliament Registration Act until his delegation had arrived in England: once in his letter of 29 August 1887, and once in his letter of 19 September 1887. Yet in the Society's letter to the Colonial Office of 31 October 1887, they asked for a delay to await the procurement of documentary proof, not for the arrival of an African delegation: "[The Society] would therefore feel grateful to you if you would inform them whether, before coming to a final decision on the matter, you will wait for the detailed information which [Jabavu] has been asked to furnish to Her Majesty's Government."[257] This was in direct contradiction to Jabavu's wishes. He had explicitly written on 19 September 1887 that he

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[255] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Native Franchise Question at the Cape," *The Aborigines' Friend* (October 1887): 425-6.
[256] British House of Commons, "The Cape Colony – The Colonial Registration Bill." HC Deb, 7 July 1887, vol 317, c 73, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1887/jul/07/the-cape-colony-the-colonial#S3V0317P0_18870707_HOC_113.
[257] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Native Franchise Question at the Cape," *The Aborigines' Friend* (March 1888): 483.

considered written documentation inadequate: "[I] fear that the Society will be placed at a disadvantage if they are to act on a written statement of our case…For this reason our committees are absolutely of opinion to send a delegation to the Secretary of State."[258] By replacing Jabavu's request to stall parliament for a delegation with a request to stall parliament for documentary evidence, as well as by publishing articles based on Jabavu's letters, the APS illustrated it preferred to speak on Jabavu's behalf rather than support his self-representation.

To be sure, the articles it published were heavily dominated by white voices rather than Jabavu's. For instance, an article about the Act published in the October 1887 issue is ten paragraphs long. One paragraph is dedicated to paraphrasing "Mr. Tengo Jabavu" and "the objections which he and his fellow-countrymen urge against this Bill."[259] By the time of publication of this article, the APS had received nine letters from Jabavu on the PRA, totalling 4724 words, all of which were condensed into this 248 word paraphrase. Of the remaining nine paragraphs of the article, two are block quotations from Colonial Secretary Henry Holland, one is a block quotation from James Leonard, ex-Attorney-General of the Cape, one is a block quotation from Clause 17 of the PRA, and half of a paragraph is dedicated to quoting Robert Meade, Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office. This pattern is repeated in another article published in the March 1888 issue of *The Aborigines' Friend.* Of this article's thirty-three paragraphs, only one is dedicated to Jabavu's correspondence. Nevertheless, despite Jabavu's extensive writing being edited down and paraphrased, and despite the obvious bias of the Society towards European voices, Jabavu's perspectives were being published and disseminated throughout England at a time when few African voices were represented. While it is easy to

[258] Jabavu to Chesson, 19 September 1887, APS papers, C139/18.
[259] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Native Franchise Question at the Cape," *The Aborigines' Friend* (October 1887): 424-5.

linger on the negative, on how the APS silenced Jabavu's desire to represent himself in person and on how it interfered with Jabavu's exact words, the positive implications of Jabavu's correspondence are equally important. By corresponding with the APS, Jabavu was able to tap into an imperial knowledge network and have, if not all of his opinions and perspectives, at least some of them represented throughout the empire.

Representations of Mqikela

Like Jabavu, Mqikela was partially successful in having his perspectives represented through the Aborigines' Protection Society's information network. Mqikela wrote four letters to the APS between 1 August 1883 and 12 July 1884, for two specific reasons: to gain support for a delegation to protest the annexation of Xesibeland and Port St. John's, and to challenge representations made of him by Cape government officials. Some of his letters were published in *The Aborigines' Friend*, some of his messages were published in *The Times*, and many letters were written by the APS to the Colonial Office on his behalf. Yet, also like Jabavu, Mqikela's perspectives were not always represented in full or in the manner he intended. What is more, the Society did not represent Mqikela's perspectives for very long, and in fact turned against him and began to misrepresent him over time. Again, as with Jabavu, the Society's response to Mqikela's letters followed two trends: it facilitated Mqikela's challenges to representations made of him, but it did not support his self-representation in England.

When the Society first received Mqikela's letters, it had been supportive of him. The Society held a meeting on 18 October 1883 to discuss Mqikela's case, after which a summary of Mqikela's grievances against the annexation of Xesibeland and Port St. John's, along with the

Society's sympathies, were published in *The Times*.[260] A full transcript of Mqikela's letter of 1 August 1883 was also published in the March 1884 issue of *The Aborigines Friend*,[261] and his letter of 8 February 1884 was forwarded by the APS to the Colonial Office. The Society's support was not strong enough to provide Mqikela with the funding he requested, because it felt that a delegation would not be able to change anything. It told Mqikela so, denying his request for funding, but it also sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary Lord Derby dated 28 April 1884, declaring that if, despite the Society's advice against a delegation, Mqikela "came to a different conclusion and decided to send a delegation to England, the Society would render it every assistance in its power."[262] These publications and letter illustrate Mqikela's success at having his perspective represented in England, although it must be noted that Mqikela did not particularly want that sort of representation. He did not want the Society to represent him on his behalf, rather he wanted assistance so that he could represent himself through a delegation. Nonetheless, having his perspective represented through these outputs is quite a bit more than most Africans could have expected at that time.

From that point onwards, however, the Society changed its position and supported the total annexation of Mpondoland. Following its letter to the Colonial Office of 28 April 1884, the Society made only two more references to Mpondoland. The first, an article published in the December 1884 issue of *The Aborigines Friend,* was decidedly dismissive of Mqikela. It selectively quoted his letter of 12 July 1884. In that letter, Mqikela had challenged various representations made of him by Olley Oxland, the British Resident in Mpondoland. He

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[260] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Umquikela and the Pondos," *The Times*, October 20 1883, The Times Digital Archive, 9, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/BVVTB6.
[261] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Case of the Pondos," *The Aborigines' Friend* (March 1884): 96-101.
[262] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office," April 28 1884, in *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa,* vol. 27, 374.

challenged the claims that Hamilton McNicholas, his advisor, had pledged the APS's support for his delegation.[263] He challenged the claim that he was a passive agent controlled by his white advisors.[264] And he challenged the claim that his other chiefs did not support his delegation.[265] *The Aborigines' Friend* article did not reference any of this. Instead, it only referenced the last section of Mqikela's letter, where he implied the possibility of giving up his plan for a delegation and turning to violence: "Do not, therefore, be surprised if I say I quite despair of ever obtaining my rights by peaceful means."[266] The Society quoted these grim expressions, and concluded that the affairs in Mpondoland had to be settled quickly in order to avoid conflict. What is more, the Society was no longer supporting Mqikela's claims to Xesibeland and Port St John's. Instead, it now supported the Cape's policy of offering monetary compensation for annexation: "The case of Umquikela is one which urgently calls for settlement on the lines recommended by the Secretary of Native Affairs at the Cape…an attempt should be made to satisfy him with a money payment."[267]

Two key factors appear to have led the Society to switch from supporting the return of Xesibeland and Port St. John's to the total annexation of Mpondoland. The first factor was that Mqikela began to move towards violent resistance, and the Society wanted to distance itself from this in order to maintain the support of its predominantly Quaker and pacifist backers. From its earliest origins, the APS had been closely tied to the British Society of Friends. The Society of Friends, also known as Quakers, are a Christian denomination founded upon a belief in personal spiritual experience and a dedication to performing faith through personal action. Quakerism is

[263] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/105.
[264] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.
[265] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/106.
[266] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Annual Report," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1884): 165.
[267] Aborigines' Protection Society, "The Annual Report," *The Aborigines' Friend* (December 1884): 165.

guided by four key principles, known as testimonies: peace, equality, simplicity, and truth. The prerogative to perform these principles through personal action, especially the testimony of peace, has led Quakerism to be closely identified with a strong pacifist ideology.[268] As a consequence, Quakers took up important leadership positions in many of the social movements of the 18th and 19th centuries, including both the anti-slavery movement and the protection of Indigenous peoples.[269] As Charles Swaisland has shown, Quakers made up a strong majority of the APS's subscriber base: an estimate from 1877 held that 210 of 263 subscribers were Quakers.[270] Recognizing its financial dependence upon the donations and dues of its primarily pacifist subscribers, the APS was careful to ensure that it distanced itself from anything that could be "suspected of sympathising with the measures of insurrectionary violence."[271]

Mqikela made threats of violence that became stronger over time, bringing his letters into conflict with the pacifist tendencies of the Society's Quaker subscribers. In Mqikela's first letter, dated 1 August 1883, he asserted that he wished to resolve his disputes peacefully, and would only resort to violence if the Cape government forced him to by refusing to negotiate the return of his territory.

> I am an old man now and wish, if possible, to pass the remainder of my days in peace – but it appears to me – unless I can with your assistance send a delegation

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[268] Guy Aiken and Matthew Hedstrom, "Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)," in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives*, ed. by Paul Joseph (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2017), 10.4135/9781483359878.n553.

[269] For more on the connection between Quakerism and humanitarianism, see J. William Frost, ed., *The Quaker Origins of Antislavery* (Norwood, Pa.: Norwood Editions, 1980); Peter Brock, *The Quaker Peace Testimony, 1660 to 1914* (York: Sessions Book Trust, 1990); Brycchan Carey and Geoffrey Plank, eds., *Quakers and Abolition* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2014)

[270] Henry Charles Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa" (PhD Thesis--University of Oxford, 1968), 16; James Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1837-1909* (London: Hurst, 2011), 28.

[271] Aborigines' Protection Society, *The Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the Aborigines' Protection Society* (London: W. Tweedie, 1858), 6.

> immediately to England to get my grievances addressed – that I shall be forced by the Cape Government into war.[272]

This statement hinted of a possible move towards violence, but emphatically prioritized a peaceful resolution. Mqikela made a similar, yet stronger, suggestion of violence six months later, in his letter of 8 February 1884: "it would seem as if the Cape government are desirous of forcing me to resort to arms to obtain the restoration of my country – I will however be entirely guided by the advice I receive from your Society."[273] Mqikela threatened violence just as in his first letter, and again emphasized his desire for a peaceful resolution, but also put more expression into the possibility of a violent rebellion. This pattern of increasing threats of violence culminated with his letter of 12 July 1884, in which he proclaimed his despair at his inability to obtain a peaceful resolution and lamented the seeming inevitability of violence: "I have been told that 'the pen is mightier than the sword,' but I do not think it has been so in my case…I quite despair of ever obtaining my rights by peaceful means."[274] That this ominous portion of Mqikela's July 12 letter was the only part of this letter published in *The Aborigines' Friend*'s December 1884 issue is telling: it shows us that Mqikela's move closer to violence was not lost on the APS. Since we know that the Society was cautious to be associated with violence lest it alienate its largest demographic of subscribers, it is likely that this caution led the Society to turn against Mqikela and stop representing his voice.

The second factor in turning the APS against Mqikela was that his voice was undermined by letters sent to the Society by his European advisors, William Bouverie and Hamilton McNicholas. First came McNicholas' letter dated 7 February 1884, in which he claimed that

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[272] Mqikela to Chesson, 1 August 1883, Bodleian Special Collections, APS papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 18. C149/103.
[273] Mqikela to Chesson, 8 February 1884, APS papers, C149/104.
[274] Mqikela to Chesson, 12 July 1884, APS papers, C149/105.

Mqikela was ready to abandon his plan for a delegation and take up violent resistance. McNicholas informed the Society that upon receiving a letter from Colonial Secretary Lord Derby refusing Mqikela's request to receive his delegation, Mqikela "wished to take immediate action in the matter, i.e. 'expel the Xesibis and Government troops from the country, and take by force St John's River Mouth.'"[275] This suggestion from McNicholas is directly contradictory to the letter sent by Mqikela to the APS dated 8 February 1884, a day after McNicholas's letter, in which Mqikela informed them that Lord Derby had declined to receive his delegation, and asked them to convince Lord Derby to change his mind, thus intimating that he had not given up on his desire to send a delegation and seek peaceful resolution to the land conflict.[276] In the face of Mqikela's and McNicholas' contradictory information, the APS put more weight upon McNicholas', and so became convinced that Mqikela was ready to give up his delegation plans. For instance, the Society wrote to Lord Derby on 28 April 1884 that McNicholas "expresses his conviction that Umquikela would be compelled to abandon the project altogether. *Umquikela also writes in the same vein* [emphasis mine]."[277] William Bouverie also suggested that the delegation plan was not going to work. In a letter dated 27 February 1884, Bouverie wrote:

> Delegation is going on in a very unsatisfactory way, and I must confess that since I first undertook to help them I have altered my opinion and from what I can understand talking privately with the same natives that many would prefer that the government should take over the country as at times great injustices are practiced on them by their chief.[278]

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[275] McNicholas to Chesson, 7 February 1884, APS papers, C141/301.
[276] In chapter one, I argued that contradictions between what McNicholas and Bouverie wrote by themselves and what they wrote for Mqikela indicate that McNicholas and Bouverie did not substantially alter Mqikela's words in their transcriptions. These are the contradictions I referred to. If McNicholas had been altering Mqikela's words for his own benefit, why would he allow Mqikela's letters to contradict his own?
[277] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office," 28 April 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 374.
[278] Bouverie to Chesson, 27 February 1884, APS papers, C126/71.

In this letter, Bouverie became explicitly hostile to Mqikela and changed his position from supporting the Mpondo claim to independence to supporting the British annexation of Mpondoland.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the APS immediately rejected Mqikela's case upon reading McNicholas' and Bouverie's denunciations. The evidence does not support such a position, since the Society's letter to Lord Derby of April 28 was written after receiving the letters from Bouverie and McNicholas, and yet it showed clear signs of maintaining solidarity with Mqikela's claims to Xesibeland and Port St. John's. Other factors were also at play in the APS's withdrawal of support, including Mqikela's increasing threats of violence. We can, however, observe from these two examples that McNicholas's information on Mqikela's dedication to a peaceful resolution through a delegation was blatantly privileged over Mqikela's, and that Bouverie's withdrawal of support for Mqikela's delegation prefaced the Society's. As such, I argue that the Society's attribution of greater authority to European sources led them to misrepresent Mqikela, portraying him as war-ready when he had clearly explicated his continued interest in sending a delegation.

From these two examples, we can see that Mqikela was initially successful at having his perspectives represented by the APS, even though his true desire to represent himself was refused. That the APS later turned against Mqikela and began to misrepresent him because of his threats of violence and the contradictory letters sent by his advisors does not take away from the relative successes that came before.

But what of Mqikela's other intended form of representation, that of challenging representations made of him by the Cape government? Mqikela's letter of 12 July 1884 was intended to challenge representations that his planned delegation was the work of his European

advisors only, that he had been promised the APS's assistance by Hamilton McNicholas, and that his delegation was not supported by the other Mpondo chiefs. No mention of Mqikela's challenges to these representations was made by the APS, despite the fact that other sentences from this letter were quoted in the December 1884 issue of *The Aborigines' Friend.* At first glance, this suggests the failure of Mqikela's correspondence with the APS in challenging representations made of him. It must be acknowledged, however, that the Society had previously challenged these very representations themselves in its letter to the Colonial Office of April 28. First, the Society had refuted a comment made by Olley Oxland, the British Resident in Mpondoland, that Mqikela was "an imbecile drunkard who 'is used as a tool by unscrupulous Europeans.'"[279] The Society wrote:

> That Umquikela is not a mere passive agent in the hands of the persons named by Mr Oxland is, we think, made clear by Mr Bouverie…his testimony conclusively shows that Umquikela's alleged weakness for strong drink does not prevent him from taking an active interest in the affairs of his country.[280]

The Society also referenced Mqikela's letter of February 7 to refute a claim made by Oxland that the Mpondo delegation could not be funded because it was not supported by the other Mpondo chiefs. The APS countered that "on the other hand, Umquikela's statement to us is that he is unable to defray the expenses of the delegation, not because his people are unwilling to contribute, but because there is cattle disease in the country."[281] The statement referred to is found in Mqikela's first letter, dated 1 August 1883:

> I wish to send a deputation to England, and have called upon my people to give cattle to defray the necessary expenses, but from several reasons, such as the difficulty of

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[279] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office," 28 April 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 374.
[280] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office," 28 April 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 374.
[281] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Aborigines' Protection Society to Colonial Office," 28 April 1884, in *British Parliamentary Papers: Colonies: Africa*, vol. 27, 375.

> getting cattle, owning to the amount of sickness amongst them this year…I cannot obtain sufficient cattle.[282]

For the Mpondo, as for many Xhosa, cattle represented not only a major source of nutrition but also a major form of wealth. Cattle were a stable form of wealth prior to colonization, but when European cattle began to be imported in the nineteenth century, bovine pleuropneumonia was introduced to the region and wreaked havoc on Xhosa cattle stocks. This was the cattle sickness Mqikela referred to, an example of the indirect negative impacts of colonization on black societies. These two refutations made by the APS correspond with two of the challenges Mqikela himself made: that he was not being guided by white advisors, and that his other chiefs did not support his delegation plans. In the case of the former refutation, the APS argued that Mqikela was not guided by white advisors based on a letter from his white advisor, rather than on Mqikela's own writing, and so this can hardly be treated as evidence that Mqikela was able to challenge representations of himself by writing to the APS. In the case of the latter refutation, however, the APS argued that the other Mpondo chiefs did support the delegation based on "Umquikela's statement to us." I suggest that this is an instance of success on Mqikela's part. Not all of his representational refutations were facilitated by the APS, but one of them was. It was not facilitated for very long, because the APS's disavowal of violence and greater credulity of Mqikela's white advisors led the APS to turn against him. Nonetheless, for a period of about two years Mqikela succeeded in representing some of his perspectives and challenging some of the negative representations of himself by corresponding with the APS.

Representations of Samuel Moroka

[282] Mqikela to Chesson, 1 August 1883, APS papers, C149/103.

Samuel Moroka's case is unique among those covered in this thesis, in that he alone appears to have been entirely successful in obtaining his desired outcome through correspondence with the Aborigines' Protection Society. Moroka sent five letters to the APS between 26 December 1883 and 7 February 1884, through which he sought support in lobbying the imperial government to force the Orange Free State to restore him as ruler of Thaba Nchu. Prior to receiving Samuel Moroka's letters, the Society had only mentioned Thaba Nchu in passing, always in the context of Samuel Moroka's father, Moroka II, and his conflicts with Moshoeshoe in the 1850s. After receiving his letters, an article about Moroka and his case for the chieftaincy of Thaba Nchu appeared in *The Aborigines' Friend* in March 1884. This article is evidence that Moroka was successful in having the APS represent his perspective.

Yet we must remember that Moroka made very specific requests of the APS beyond mere representation. He wanted the APS to help him edit some of his petitions. He wanted the APS to arrange a meeting between himself and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby. And he wanted the APS to speak to Donald Curie and Richard Southey on his behalf. Unfortunately, we cannot know how many of these individual requests were successful: cannot know whether his request for assistance editing his petitions was agreed to, and there is also no evidence of whether the APS talked to Donald Curie. However, the March 1884 issue of *The Aborigines' Friend* tells us that the APS secured at least two meetings between Moroka and prominent members of parliament. The first meeting was with Robert Fowler, and the second with Wilfred Lawson:

> We may add that both the Chief [Samuel Moroka] and his faithful councillor, William Sekue, have been received by the Lord Mayor [Robert Fowler] at the Mansion House…and a meeting, presided over by Sir Wilfred Lawson, M.P., was held on Tuesday, February 26th, to express sympathy with him.[283]

[283] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Samuel Moroka," *The Aborigines' Friend* (March 1884): 102.

Both Fowler and Lawson were affiliated with the Society, Fowler as a member and Lawson as a recurring collaborator,[284] making it highly likely that these meetings were secured by the Society's influence. There is also some evidence suggesting that the APS succeeded in granting Moroka's request to meet with Colonial Secretary Lord Derby. In a letter from Richard Southey to the APS dated 24 January 1884, Southey mentioned an upcoming meeting between Lord Derby and an unnamed delegation:

> The Lord Mayor [Robert Fowler] has just received the enclosed letter from Lord Derby. Tomorrow at 3 will suit him, if you can get the delegation together in time. In any case kindly write to Lord Derby your decision and let the Lord Mayor know.[285]

Southey's letter did not mention who was in the delegation, but since this letter was written while Moroka was in London, it is reasonable to suppose that Southey was referring to him. Moreover, the letter only tells us that a meeting with Lord Derby was *planned*, not whether this meeting actually took place. Even if this meeting did not take place, however, this letter suggests that the Society at least attempted to fulfill Moroka's request for a meeting with Lord Derby. And the fact that Richard Southey was writing to the APS about Moroka also suggests that the APS talked to Southey on his behalf. In this regard, it is safe to conclude that for Moroka, corresponding with the APS was at least a partially successful strategy for gaining support for his mission to England. Part of this success certainly lies in the considerable social capital that came with Samuel Moroka's English university education. The APS actively sought to take advantage of this social capital in order to popularize Samuel Moroka's mission. Prior to publishing the article, the Society reached out to university staff who could act as character witnesses for Moroka.

> We [the APS] wrote to Dr. Maclear, the present Warden of the College [St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, where Moroka studied as a boy], concerning him [Moroka]; and he has kindly forwarded to us a letter from the Rev. E. R. Orger, of

[284] Henry Charles Swaisland, "The Aborigines Protection Society and British Southern and West Africa" (PhD Thesis - University of Oxford, 1968), 15.
[285] Southey to Chesson, 24 January 1884, APS papers, C149/205.

> Hougham Vicarage, Dover, who was well acquainted with Samuel during his residence at Canterbury.[286]

A transcription of Orger's letter followed, stating that "Samuel was always well-conducted in college; and not merely that - he had the manners and feelings of a gentleman." A letter from Reverend J. S. Watson was also quoted, stating that "Samuel was my pupil when at St. Augustine's College, and I have a very warm regard for him."[287] The Society's collection of these testimonials demonstrate the perceived importance of Samuel Moroka's education to British publics.

Conclusion: editorial changes or manipulative censorship

This chapter has presented two sides of the Aborigines' Protection Society's responses to the letters it received from Jabavu, Mqikela, and Moroka. On the one hand, the Society did represent their perspectives through the publication of their letters, through raising questions in parliament on their behalf, writing letters to the Colonial Office on their behalf, and, in the case of Moroka, arranging meetings with members of parliament. On the other hand, the Society did not represent Jabavu's and Mqikela' perspectives faithfully. The Society changed words, omitted and fabricated sentences, and otherwise censored their voices according to the Society's own interests. I have argued throughout this chapter that the Society's censorship did not substantially infringe upon the main points that Jabavu and Mqikela were trying to make, or, in the case of Mqikela, those censorship did not infringe upon his message until the APS turned against him after several years. To put this censorship in perspective, consider Brian Willan's study of the Society's manipulation of the South African Native National Congress in 1914. Writing specifically about the Native Lands Act of 1913, Willan explored how the Aborigines' Protection

[286] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Samuel Moroka," *The Aborigines' Friend* (March 1884): 101.
[287] Aborigines' Protection Society, "Samuel Moroka," *The Aborigines' Friend* (March 1884): 102.

Society attempted to censor the South African Native National Congress' (SANNC) fight against the Act. The SANNC organized a delegation to London in 1914, requesting that Britain intervene in colonial affairs to overturn the Act. Willan argued that the Society attempted to censor the SANNC's protests because, at that time, the Society had been planning its own delegation to the Colonial Secretary to request intervention in Rhodesia, and it was afraid that making too many demands would negatively impact the Society's tenuous relationship with the Colonial Office and jeopardize its plans in Rhodesia.[288] Willan also illustrated the means by which the Society attempted to censor the SANNC, including pressuring their delegation not to talk to the media, tricking their delegation into signing a memorial in support of the Native Lands Act, and discouraging publishers and investors from funding the publication of Sol Plaatje's *Native Life in South Africa,* itself a scathing critique of the Native Lands Act.[289]

The censorship of Jabavu and Mqikela that I have outlined have little in common with the censorship of the SANNC that Willan identified. In the case of the SANNC, the APS tried its best to counter and obstruct the goals of the delegation. This is certainly not the case with Jabavu. Some of Jabavu's words were omitted so as to prevent him from offending the APS's subscriber base and political allies, and some words were fabricated in order to align Jabavu's message more closely with the Society's, yet Jabavu's overall messages were not changed. Instead, the Society went to the expense and trouble of publishing his letters and of raising his questions in parliament so that Jabavu's perspectives could be represented in England. In Mqikela's case, the Society did end up countering and obstructing Mqikela's intentions, just as it did with the SANNC. But it did so after more than two years of representing his perspectives

[288] Brian Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the South African Natives' Land Act of 1913," *The Journal of African History* 20, no. 1 (1979): 85-6.
[289] Willan, "The Aborigines' Protection Society and the South African Natives' Land Act of 1913," 88, 94.

without substantially manipulating his messages. As such, I argue that it is important to distinguish between cases of antagonistic manipulation and more ambivalent cases of editing. The Society's response to the SANNC in 1914 and to Mqikela from December 1884 onwards were certainly instances of antagonistic manipulation, whereas the Society's response to Jabavu and Mqikela prior to December 1884 is more reminiscent of what I.S. MacLaren identified as the editorial evolution of texts.

Writing about travel writers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, MacLaren compared original field notes with published travel journals and identified subtle yet pervasive differences. "The narratives published in England over these people's names reflect the taste of the readership of the day...The persona of the traveller was made over in the image that his publisher had of what the readership wished."[290] MacLaren argued that the most common edits made by publishers were tweaking the language and the writing style in order to make the author appear more respectable and likeable, while leaving the overall story and narrative substantially whole. In his case study of Paul Kane's writings, MacLaren explained:

> This upgrading of social class by means of the narrator's characterization marks one of the widest distinctions between the field notes and the draft manuscript. In the latter, which also directs more light more often on the person of Kane, the narrator/traveller/persona is not the same man. Not only diction but the introduction of compound sentence structures that lay beyond the grasp of Kane's own pen effect the change.[291]

These sorts of editorial liberties are more reminiscent of the Society's censorship of Jabavu and Mqikela than are the Society's manipulations of the SANNC. Especially reminiscent is the focus of making the text more acceptable to public audiences, for this was why the Society censored Jabavu's criticisms of the Liberal Party and Mqikela's references to

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[290] I.S. MacLaren, "The Metamorphosis of Travellers into Authors," in Germaine Warkentin, ed., *Critical Issues in Editing Exploration Texts*, 67-107 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 67-68.
[291] MacLaren, "The Metamorphosis of Travellers into Authors," 87.

violence: to make their letters more acceptable by Liberal allies and Quaker subscribers. It is further useful to consider the APS's censorship within the larger context of publisher editing because it reminds us that, in the nineteenth century, it was not out of the ordinary for publishers to change the wording and the writing style of its publications. Indeed, MacLaren argued that "where papers are extant to permit comparisons, seldom does one find that what was written in the field or on the seas matches what appears in print."[292] In this light, the censorship revealed in this chapter might reflect the norm of publishing, rather than something unique or targeted towards black Africans. As such, I argue that the Society's censorship did not represent a substantial interference in the representation of black African perspectives in England, and that writing to the APS was indeed a means by which black Africans could have their perspectives represented throughout the empire, if only to a limited extent.

The Society went to the expense and trouble of publishing letters, raising questions in parliament, and sending letters to the Colonial Office on the behalf of its black correspondents, and such actions raise another question: why? More importantly for this study, why did the Society go to this trouble to represent its black correspondents, yet not support their attempts at self-representation via delegations to England? For, as shown above, the Society refused to assist Jabavu and Mqikela in sending delegations. The Society's refusal to support self-representations could be attributable to what Brian Willan argued was the Society's fear of black leaders expressing their own political voices and thereby making the Society, as a representative of black voices, obsolete. "Such a prospect threatened, indeed, the Society's entire raison d'etre as a mediator between the 'native races'

[292] MacLaren, "The Metamorphosis of Travellers into Authors," 68.

and the imperial government."[293] While possible, I do not think this proposal holds water in light of the evidence. As Zoe Laidlaw's study of Indigenous delegations hosted by the APS indicates, the APS was happy to host non-Europeans to speak for themselves. My own research also shows that the APS supported Samuel Moroka's delegation to England. Of course, the Society allowed non-European voices to stand in for its own largely out of self-interest in lending weight to their lobbying: "the APS rated their emotional pull and 'authenticity' over the information and critical insights they provided."[294] Yet this self-interested motive does not negate the fact that the Society clearly was not against helping non-Europeans to represent themselves in England.

Another possibility is that the APS only wanted to support public appearances of non-Europeans who could perform a certain style of "civilization." The APS was certainly embroiled in discourses of civility versus barbarity, and viewed Westernization as the optimal path for non-European people. Laidlaw particularly emphasizes this point, demonstrating that each of the nine delegates she studied were converted Christians, Western educated, and successful professionals.[295] This could help explain why Samuel Moroka received aid for his delegation where the others did not, as Moroka's status as a graduate of an English university distinguished him among the other black correspondents. This status would have gone a long way in cultivating respect and benevolence from the Society. On the other hand, it did not particularly distinguish him from Jabavu, who had matriculated from the University of Cape Town, and only slightly distinguished him from

[293] Willan, "The Aborigines' Protection Society," 87.
[294] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 133.
[295] Laidlaw, "Indigenous Interlocutors," 116.

the mission-educated Mzimba and Mama. Moroka's status may have contributed to his reception by the APS, yet I do not think it was the most direct influence.

Rather, I would argue that what really distinguished Moroka from the other correspondents was the funding he was able to obtain. I cannot find any information on how Moroka got himself to England, but he was the only one who did, indicating that he had some source of funding that the others did not. To me, it is most likely that Moroka was able to raise funds through his contacts in England, whom he had met while studying there. It is also possible that he was able to get funds from Sir George Grey, who had sponsored his education from 1861-1864. As Swaisland has detailed, the Society was not a wealthy one. "Most members of the APS and those closely associated with them were middle class and of the middle and lower strata of it."[296] Unlike the more popular Anti-Slavery Society, the APS did not have a host of royal benefactors, and its subscriber base was significantly smaller. Surviving on the donations of its largely lower-middle class subscribers, the APS simply did not have the money to be funding every delegation that asked for help. Moroka was the only black correspondent who succeeded in gaining APS support to represent himself in England, and while his status as university-educated and Christian may have influenced this, I argue that his ability to travel to England without Society funding probably played a bigger role. To be fair, however, his access to such funding was likely directly connected to the social capital and social networks he was able to foster while studying in England.

This thesis began by situating the history of black African correspondence with the Aborigines' Protection Society within the broader history of British imperial information

[296] Swaisland, "The Aborigines' Protection Society," 18.

networks. Two particular frameworks were introduced: Ashcroft et al's framework of the control of the means of publication, in which non-European voices were subjugated through an inability to represent themselves in imperial print culture, and Robert Holton's framework of exclusion, in which colonized peoples were actively refused access to imperial societies of knowledge dissemination. The second chapter of this thesis confirmed that some black Africans did indeed write to the APS to represent themselves and gain access to imperial knowledge networks, while this chapter attempted to place the Society's responses to those letters into the frameworks established by Ashcroft et al and Holton. I have shown that the APS did not confer any control of the means of publication to its black correspondents. It ignored the letters from Maherero, Mzimba, and Mama, it censored the letters from Jabavu, Mqikela, and Moroka, and it refused support for Jabavu and Mqikela to represent themselves in person. But did the APS exclude its black African correspondents from representing themselves in imperial information networks? Holton, analyzing the exclusion of Africans in the African Society, argued that only those Africans who possessed "mores akin to an elite club of gentleman scholars" were allowed to join.[297] Namely, the only Africans who were allowed membership were those who had received a Western education and had risen to some level of prominence. He points towards two examples of such African members: Edward Blyden, an Afro-Caribbean diplomat, and Richard Blaize, a West African merchant who made a large donation to the society.[298] Given that the African Society restricted African engagement to such a small elite, Holton argues that it cannot be considered to have included Africans in imperial society. In Holton's example, I would agree that "exclusion" is the appropriate word, but the APS did not exclude the correspondents covered in

[297] Robert Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society, 1870s–1920s: Evidence from Global Networks," *Global Networks* 5, no. 3 (2005): 252, doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2005.00117.x.
[298] Holton, "The Inclusion of the Non-European World in International Society," 251

this chapter. It published some of the letters sent by Mqikela and Jabavu, in its own journal and in *The Times*, and it arranged meetings between the Colonial Secretary and Samuel Moroka. By so doing, the APS information network undeniably afforded these correspondents a means of inclusion in British imperial society.

Thesis Conclusion

Three overarching research questions were laid out in the introduction of this thesis:

How did black Africans engage with the Aborigines' Protection Society's information network?

I approached this question by searching through the APS archives for letters written by black Africans and analyzing their contents. While the letters I found were predominantly written by missionaries, government officials, and settlers, I did find a small number of letters penned by six black correspondents. Upon analysis, I found their letters engaged with the APS in three general ways. Some sent information and opinions on local events so that the APS could represent their perspectives in England on their behalf. Others asked for support to send delegations through which they could represent themselves in person. And yet others used the APS's information network as an alternative to that of government communication networks, and to challenge representations made of black African by the Cape government and media. I argued that all of these constituted attempts to have their voices represented in British imperial information networks.

These findings are, by themselves, not very earth-shattering. It may seem a touch condescending to marvel over the fact that black Africans wrote to protest British imperialism, as writing protests is not a very difficult or revolutionary thing to do. However, in light of the historiography outlined in the introduction, my findings are significant. The existence of the letters I found challenges the predominant understanding of the APS as an imperially-complicit organization constituted by, and in the interests of, Europeans alone. The APS was certainly complicit in imperialism in some regards, particularly in its policies for "protecting" victims of imperialism through the extension of British authority and the diffusion of "civilization." Yet, as with many other tools of imperialism (e.g. Christianity, literature, law), I show that the APS was

also adopted as a tool of resistance and of adaptation. By incorporating these letters into the historiography of the APS, I offer a more nuanced view of it, one in which it is difficult to cleanly differentiate between colonizer and colonized. Those APS executives in London were certainly colonialist in their mission to expand the empire, and yet their mandate to obtain local intelligence created a path for anti-colonial voices. Similarly, those correspondents who adopted the APS as a tool of resistance and adaptation were anti-colonial in many ways, and yet by lending their voices to the APS they assisted in and legitimized the APS's colonialist paradigm. In this new perspective of the APS, I hope to contribute towards histories that are more open to the negotiations, the hybridities, the anomalies, and the convoluted contingencies that made up British imperialism.

My findings also challenge notions of the locally-bounded nature of non-Europeans in the 19th century. In the metropole-periphery model of British imperialism, the periphery is a static space that received ideas, peoples, and resources from the metropole. That model marginalized non-Europeans who experienced imperialism, pigeon-holing them as victims rather than agents of empire. In the webbed model of British imperialism, the metropole and the periphery are both recognized as dynamic and mobile, each influencing the other and together constituting the empire. In this model, non-Europeans are recognized as having a profound influence on the empire, but their influence is still often suggested to have been predominantly actualized through European agency. Consider Tony Ballantyne's *Orientalism and Race.* Ballantyne argues that William Jones, a British philologist, developed a theory of Aryanism based on his study of Sanskrit texts. His theory of Aryanism was disseminated throughout the empire by the Asiatic Society, and adopted in different ways by both settlers in New Zealand and Maori. Ballantyne emphasizes the influence of Indian culture upon the Pakeha and the Maori, and thereby

challenges the metropole-periphery model of empire, yet Ballantyne nevertheless produces a narrative in which Europeans are agents of empire and non-Europeans are its recipients. Indians did not influence the empire, William Jones and the Asiatic Society did. In my findings, black Africans were not only written about: they themselves were the writers. Just as Ashcroft et al demonstrated that non-Europeans in decolonizing nations resisted colonialism by representing their own perspectives through their own literary cultures in the second half of the twentieth century, I demonstrate that in a few important examples, black Africans in the late nineteenth century engaged and resisted colonialism by representing their own perspectives through the APS's information network.

How did the Aborigines' Protection Society engage with its black African correspondents?

I approached this question by searching through the Society's journal publications and the Society's letters to the Colonial Office for references to the letters sent by its black African correspondents. I found that three of the correspondents were not referenced at all, and I suggested that the Society screened those letters because they were redundant and because they fell outside the scope of the British empire. Conversely, I found that three of the correspondents were referenced through the publication of their letters and through memorials and petitions written on their behalf. Some of their words and messages were altered to make them compatible with the Society's previously-published opinions and to align them with the interests of the Society's political and financial allies. For the most part, I found that these alterations did not interfere with the correspondents' primary messages. One correspondent's primary messages were at first represented without interference, and then later were entirely misrepresented after the correspondent fell out with the Society. I also found that the Society predominantly only engaged with the correspondents by publishing their letters and acting on their behalf; only one

of the requests for support in sending a delegation to England was granted, and only for a correspondent who likely had their own source of funding.

These findings are significant for the insight they provide into the APS's relations with the people it claimed to represent. On the one hand, the alterations the Society made to black African letters remind us of the banality of imperial systems of exclusion and oppression. Much has been written on the philosophical foundations of the APS's approach to non-European peoples. Historians have pointed to the influence of fatal impact theory's uncertainness about non-European survivability, of Christianity's disapproval of "heathen" spiritualities and moralities, and of social-Darwinian theories of civilizational competition and improvement. All of these influences are important for understanding the unconscious episteme in which the APS operated, but they are less useful for understanding the conscious everyday decisions that constituted the Society's relations with peoples throughout the empire. At some level, the Society's members probably did believe that Europeans were superior to Africans. But when they received letters from Africans, they did not think to themselves: "I am going to engage with these letters in a manner informed by my appreciation of the authors' racial inferiority." The Society engaged with African letters according to immediate and banal concerns, making decisions that were rational and reasonable to themselves. Of course, rationality and meaning was still mired in the discursive episteme of the moment. Still, making alterations to the text of correspondence was, to the APS, a reasonable response to ensure that publications did not offend political and financial allies. By identifying these responses, I contribute to our understanding of not only how the APS engaged with Afrians, but why.

Overall, was the Aborigines' Protection Society an information network through which black Africans represented themselves at the imperial level?

Importantly, I found that the correspondents were not excluded from participation in the APS. The historiography of non-European inclusion in British imperial society has demonstrated that significant barriers existed for non-Europeans to have their voices and their perspectives represented throughout the empire. European "control of the means of publication", as Ashcroft et al describe it, meant that non-Europeans often could only say what Europeans allowed them to say, if allowed to say anything at all. According to my findings, however, the Society's control of the means of publication did not directly translate to silencing African voices. To be sure, in publishing and otherwise representing the perspectives of its correspondents, the APS did not allow those perspectives to be represented exactly as they were dictated. But the APS did represent them, and it altered them in ways that did not interfere with their primary messages. This illustrates a pivotal aspect of British imperialism: not only was imperialism negotiated by colonized peoples through resistance and adaptation, it was also negotiated by Europeans themselves. Control of the means of publication could be leveraged to silence people, as the APS did to some of the correspondents. But it could also be used to empower people who did not otherwise have the means to publish, as the APS did with other correspondents. By drawing attention to the ways that the APS simultaneously silenced and empowered its black African correspondents, this thesis further contributes to moving towards histories of imperialism that attend to its constant instability, contingency, and negotiation.

Further Research

As lengthy as this thesis already is, there remains so much more research to be done. The most pressing item of business is to finish my survey of the APS correspondence archives, as this thesis was limited in three ways. Geographically, I limited my study to South Africa, yet the APS was active all around the British empire, and in my archival work I found many letters from

many other non-European correspondents, in particular from First Nations in Canada and from Maori in New Zealand. All of these letters need further research. Temporally, I limited my study to 1879-1889, but that does not mean there are no surviving non-European letters in the rest of the archive. The APS was active between 1837-1909, and non-European correspondence from that entire period remains to be analyzed. Demographically, I limited my study to black African voices, however, as I surveyed the archive, I noticed a recurring tension between settler and black African letters. These tensions suggest that both settlers and black African sought to have their perspectives represented in imperial information networks through the APS. It must be remembered that settlers were highly discriminated against in the British metropole, often looked down upon as the "dregs" of society who were unfit for life in Britain. The APS was particularly antagonistic towards settlers, whom it viewed as the primary cause of injustice towards non-Europeans. In this context, might it be the case that the APS information network represented a space in which non-European voices were privileged over settler voices? This question requires further analysis of settler letters to the APS.

Besides completing my research on the APS, there is much more research to be done on imperial information networks in general. I chose to study the APS information network because it seemed most likely to have correspondence from non-European peoples, but there are many other imperial information networks through which non-Europeans may have asserted their voices and perspectives. Missionary societies and ethnological societies are good places to start, but I would suggest another approach. Rather than looking for non-European voices in places we expect to find them, perhaps we should start from the other direction. If we begin our research with non-European individuals that we know were prolific correspondents – John Tengo Jabavu, for instance – and identify the people and organizations with whom they corresponded, we might

be able to populate a list of imperial information networks open to non-European voices that we have not considered before. It is my hope that upon completion of my research on the APS in Canada and New Zealand, I will have a number of such prolific correspondents that I can use as starting points to begin finding new imperial information networks to study. In this way, I hope to contribute to a rethinking of the presences and absences of Indigenous and colonized voices in British imperial information networks, and to a broader rethinking of the negotiated and unstable natures of imperialism.

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