Against the Grain:

Why Community Forest Boards Have Not Been

Implemented in British Columbia

by

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ABSTRACT

The controversy over how to manage British Columbia's forests sparked demands for forest policy reform. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, a number of proposals called for decentralized power, local control and tenure reform through the creation of community forest boards. These proposals aimed to bring environmental and democratic health to forest management in British Columbia.

The NDP government was elected in 1991 with a mandate to overhaul forest management in British Columbia. Initially, members of the B.C. New Democratic Party supported structural reforms such as community forest boards which would effect a fundamental change in forestry. After winning power, however, the party did not implement structural reforms. Instead, the government implemented moderate reforms which failed to decentralize power, grant community control, or reform the tenure system.

This thesis investigates why community forest boards were not implemented in British Columbia during the NDP's 1991-1994 term. This analysis explores three interrelated layers: the economic; the bureaucratic and political; and the ideological to reveal some of the factors that impeded the government's willingness to consider the community forest board option.

First, this study demonstrates the importance of the forest sector in British Columbia and the economic constraints that the industry places on policy makers. It argues that the shared understanding between forest companies and government places constraints on decision makers. Yet, these constraints are elastic.

Second, this study shows that the state had autonomous reasons for supporting moderate reform. It illustrates that bureaucratic and the political arms of the state were motivated by particular ideas and interests to support moderate reforms rather than structural reforms. While bureaucrats operate within a culture of expertise, political actors are concerned about electoral success. Neither bureaucrats nor politicians interfered with

the shared understanding or the core ideas of B.C. forest policy. Finally, this analysis explores how the ideological struggle impeded change. It examines the Tin Wis coalition's struggle, and then considers why community forest boards have not achieved widespread support. In doing so, it highlights the challenges of shifting from current ideas about management towards alternative ideas.

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

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

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all those involved in the movement to protect Canada's forests, and the broader movement to achieve ecological, social, and political justice. It is also dedicated to women who struggle and survive in a male-dominated environment. It is a call for us to listen to: ourselves, each other, and to our earth.

INTRODUCTION

The present controversy over B.C.'s forests is satirized in a Victoria newspaper editorial "The Last Tree in B.C."[1] Loggers want to cut down the last tree living in the province, but the environmentalists wish to preserve it. When a government Royal Commission confirms both that the tree is indeed the last one, and that Washington and Oregon are unwilling to sell any of their remaining 100 trees to replace it, the government decides to resolve the conflict by cutting down half the tree for the loggers and leaving the other half standing for the environmentalists. This story illustrates some key features in the current B.C. forest situation. First, the forest policy climate is highly polarized by divergent views on how to manage B.C.'s forests. Second, the government plays a crucial role as mediator between two competing coalitions which hold conflicting views. Understanding how the government responds to the dispute between the two groups is critical because the forests of B.C. are of vital importance to the interests of the province.

The forest industry is the mainstay of B.C.'s economy, accounting for 60 per cent of its exports. Timber extraction is the focus of B.C.'s forest management system. Forests are managed to produce maximum amounts of timber in order to guarantee jobs and social benefits over the long term. Historically, the government granted forest companies licences to log timber. Under a policy known as *sustained yield,* mature timber (old growth) was logged and replaced with farms of younger fast-growing trees. To implement sustained yield, the government offered companies incentives through forest tenure agreements. With tenures such as Tree Farm Licences (TFLs), companies were entitled to log high volumes of timber. In exchange, they paid fees or royalties to the government and carried out some management responsibilities. As a result of this policy, large companies with capital invested in B.C., providing communities with jobs and other economic benefits. In addition, the government gained revenue from resource extraction.

[1] Sid Tafler, "The Last Tree in B.C.," *Monday Magazine*, May 2, 1991.

Persistent concerns about the sustainability of forest resources were deepened in the 1960s and 1970s. As resources dwindled, people realized that forests were not inexhaustible. B.C.'s vast forest industry, comprised of forest corporations, loggers and others, was increasingly in conflict with environmental groups and First Nations people who contested the view that forests should be used merely for the extraction of resources. The question was raised as to why public forests were planned and managed exclusively by government and industry.

In the 1980s and 1990s battles erupted over whether to log or conserve forests in the Carmanah, Walbran, Stein, and Tsitika valleys and a host of other areas. The numerous conflicts between supporters of the forest industry and supporters of environmental groups reached a peak in the summer of 1993 when 800 people were arrested for protesting the logging of Clayoquot Sound. By this time, the controversy over B.C.'s forests had attracted international attention.

The increasingly vocal demands of environmentalists and First Nations people illustrate that British Columbians disagree about how to manage their forests. On the one hand, forest industry supporters want to maintain their rights to cut large volumes of wood. On the other hand, environmentalists, some First Nations people, and many communities will no longer tolerate government-industry dominated forest management that is unaccountable to the public and destructive to B.C.'s forests. Consequently, the latter groups have presented alternative visions of how to reform forest management.

In the 1970s and 1980s a number of communities submitted structural reform proposals advocating *community forest boards*. The community forest board model involves decentralizing power to give control over forest management in an area to local boards comprised of key stake holders. Although provincial standards would be maintained, the boards would be responsible for allocating rights to cut trees and zoning land for forestry. Advocates of community forest boards envisioned small-scale, ecologically sensitive forestry and decentralized management. These proposals will be detailed in Chapter Two.

In 1991, the New Democratic Party (NDP) came to power with a platform to overhaul forest management. Given the pressing need for reform, it is important to understand the nature of the NDP's forest policy initiatives between 1991 and 1995. Has an overhaul indeed occurred?

This thesis describes how the NDP government ignored the proposals for community forest boards in favour of a moderate reform agenda. Initially, members of the B.C. NDP supported structural reforms such as community forest boards which would effect a fundamental change in forest management. After winning power, however, the party did not implement structural reform. This analysis considers the reforms undertaken by the NDP government, highlighting the priorities it gave to policy initiatives such as the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS), the Commission On Resources and Environment (CORE), the Forest Practices Code, and Forest Renewal British Columbia (FRBC). These initiatives failed to implement key elements of structural reform such as decentralized power, democratic control and alternative forms of tenure. The government has not yet addressed the central complaints about management: clearcutting still occurs and management is still centralized. Although the nearly NDP doubled the amount of protected area,[2] the government decided to renew all of the TFLs that were up for renewal in 1995: "The renewals covered 40,000 square kilometres--an area the size of Switzerland--and breathed 25 years of new life into a system of forest management that grants monopoly control over vast tracts of land to a few large companies."[3] Why were plans for structural reform ignored but plans to liquidate forests approved?

This study investigates why community forest boards were not implemented in B.C. during the NDP's 1991-96 term. Our attempt to answer this question is framed with three concepts presented by Paul Sabatier. They are: 1) the concept of core ideas in policy; 2) the concept of significant revision; and 3) the concept of coalitions struggling

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2 The Protected Areas Strategy targets have not yet been reached, although the government plans to double the amount of protected area in British Columbia.

3 Ian Mackenzie, *Ancient Landscapes of British Columbia*. (Edmonton: Lone Pine Publishing, 1995) pp. 123-124.

over the core ideas of policy. Each of these will be discussed briefly. The concept of *core ideas in policy* means that every policy rests on a core of beliefs, values and assumptions. A change in these core ideas constitutes a *significant revision.* The concept of *Coalitions struggling over the core ideas in policy* means that coalitions compete to have their core ideas implemented in policy. According to Sabatier, actors with shared beliefs are members of advocacy coalitions which compete to have their ideas implemented in policy. Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework helps to distinguish two competing coalitions of actors with distinct beliefs about forest management within the B.C. forest policy subsystem.[4] The focus on shared beliefs among coalition members reveals alliances between actors who may have different interests (for example, forest workers and industry executives).

These ideas provide a springboard for an investigation of why the NDP did not choose to implement community forest boards. The analysis will unfold as follows. Chapter One examines the core ideas of forest policy through a discussion of the background of forestry, the system of land tenure, and the beliefs of the dominant actors in B.C. forest policy. It introduces two competing coalitions involved in the battle over B.C.'s forests. Using Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework, they will be called the Development Advocacy Coalition, which defends the dominant ideas of forest policy and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition, which challenges these ideas. The *liquidation paradigm,* including ideas such as sustained yield, the present tenure system, and centralized control over forests, is at the core of B.C. forest policy.

Chapter Two outlines several community forest board proposals. Each challenges the core ideas of B.C. forest policy with new ideas about decentralized power, community control and/or tenure reform.[5] Although a significant revision of policy could take many

[4] The subsystem consists of "actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence government decisions about policy " in a particular sector. See Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1995), p. 16.

[5] Although most of the proposals mention decentralized, community control, they do not explicitly refer to tenure reform. This idea is implicit, however, in some of the proposed new structures.

forms, this chapter explores one form, namely, the establishment of community forest boards. This standpoint provides a benchmark for measuring change since these structural reform proposals provided the NDP government with an opportunity to overhaul forest management in B.C.

Chapter Three discusses actions undertaken by the NDP between 1991 and 1995. It investigates whether initiatives such as CORE, the Protected Areas Strategy, the Timber Supply Analysis, the Forest Practices Code and FRBC involve decentralized power, community control or ideas such as tenure reform. Although the NDP government made numerous changes, it did not implement these elements of structural reform. It did not choose the structural reform path.

Why were structural reforms such as community forest boards not implemented? What factors inhibited policy change? In her diagnosis of the environmental crisis, Joni Seager alludes to several factors that obstructed change:

> The real story of the environmental crisis is a story of power and profit and political wrangling; it is a story of the institutional arrangements and settings, the bureaucratic arrangements and the cultural conventions that create conditions of environmental destruction . . . It is a crisis of the dominant ideology.[6]

An analysis of why the crisis in B.C.'s forests continues is complex and multi-dimensional. Chapters Four, Five and Six explore three interrelated layers: the economic; the bureaucratic and political; and the ideological. Each layer provides a lens for viewing the factors that impede change. The interacting layers can be visualized as an overlay map. Together, they provide a holistic explanation of why ideas about community control have not replaced the core ideas in B.C. forest policy and a catalogue of the barriers to the implementation of community forest boards.

Chapter Four explores the economic layer and highlights the economic constraints that the forest industry places on policy makers. It outlines the importance of the forest

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6 Joni Seager, "Ecology Establishment" in *Earth Follies: Coming to Feminist Terms with the Global Environmental Crisis* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

sector in British Columbia's political economy and shows that the industry generates high revenues, profits, jobs and other benefits. The industry creates these benefits on the condition that it will have continued access to wood. This exchange centres on a *shared understanding* between government and industry which places certain constraints on decision makers.

Economic constraints, however, do not fully account for state action or inaction. Chapter Five explores the bureaucratic and political layer, emphasizing the constraints of this understanding are somewhat elastic since government can act autonomously to implement policies contrary to forest companies' interests. This layer examines the state's autonomous reasons for not choosing to implement community forest boards. Both the bureaucratic and the political arms of the state were motivated by particular ideas and interests to support moderate reforms rather than structural reforms. Factors such as the *culture of expertise* and the bureaucracy's interest in protecting its position motivated it to support moderate reforms. Members of the NDP government also supported moderate reforms because they had concerns about electoral success. This chapter investigates the reasons why neither bureaucrats nor politicians interfered with the shared understanding or the core ideas of B.C. forest policy.

The first two layers highlight economic, bureaucratic and political factors that inhibit change. The third layer shows how the ideological struggle impedes change. Chapter Six examines the Tin Wis coalition's struggle to implement its ideas into policy. It attempts to show why community forest boards have not achieved widespread support. In doing so, it highlights the challenges of shifting from current ideas about management towards alternative ideas.

CHAPTER ONE:
B.C. FOREST POLICY:
IDEAS AND ACTORS

Recent disputes signify the ongoing debate over how to manage British Columbia's forests. When the NDP was elected in 1991 it confronted two sets of ideas. One set endorsed the historical trend or legacy in B.C. forest policy and the other demanded reform. This chapter provides a brief background on forestry in B.C. and introduces two competing coalitions of actors who subscribe to different beliefs about how to manage B.C.'s forests. The Development Advocacy Coalition defends current forest management and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition challenges the core ideas of forest management. This chapter describes the members of each coalition and the core beliefs (that is, their underlying ideas, values and assumptions about how forests should be managed) to which they subscribe.[7] Next, it describes the particular policies that each coalition favours. Finally, it compares the two competing coalitions to highlight their distinct ideas and to reveal the range of policy options that was available to the B.C. government in 1991.

Forestry in B.C.

With its abundant resources, forestry is highly significant to B.C.'s economy. Initially, the province had 60 million hectares of softwood forest, which is roughly 3 per cent of the world's total. As Marchak notes, "lush green gold covered so many hectares that British Columbians came to believe they owned an inexhaustible supply of timber."[8]

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7 See Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach* (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press), p. 25.

8 Patricia Marchak, "The Profligate Century and its Aftermath in British Columbia: A Case Study," *Logging the Globe* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1995), p. 85.

Roughly 45 per cent of British Columbia's land base is covered by forests.[9] Forestry has been the mainstay of the provincial economy for over 100 years. Currently, the forest industry accounts for 60 per cent of B.C.'s exports. It also accounts for 40 per cent of Canada's total forestry export dollars. Since World War II, B.C.'s economy has relied on the export of lumber, pulp and newsprint, primarily to the U.S.[10] The industry produces fine paper, finished wood, and some manufactured goods. Between 1950 and 1980, the B.C. forest industry focused on output and export growth. In the postwar years, the demand for wood products was high, which contributed to high wages, a high standard of living and spin off benefits in resource communities.

Theorist Edwin Black argues that B.C.'s resource-based economy is based on the politics of exploitation.[11] Forestry is still highly important to the provincial economy, yet the industry's future is questionable. Because B.C.'s abundant forest resources have dwindled, the industry faces the inevitable fall down effect. A total of 9 million hectares has been logged, 5 million in the past 30 years.[12] The Crown land clearcut is approximately 150,000 hectares per year. The availability of economically viable forest land is rapidly declining. There are concerns about whether the annual logging rate of about 74 million cubic metres is sustainable.[13]

Other problems that are related to the forest industry are B.C.'s lack of economic diversification and its reliance on external markets. Because of its dependence on resource extraction, the B.C. economy is vulnerable to shifts in the world market. This vulnerability is more strongly felt in resource extraction regions, because these regions have nothing to fall back on. Job loss and declining community infrastructure are some of the consequences that result from dependence on a single industry and a reliance on external

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9 Richard Schwindt and Terry Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree: The Distribution of Wealth from BC's Forests* (Vancouver: The David Suzuki Foundation, 1996), p. 15.

10 Marchak, *Logging the Globe*, p.

11 Edwin Black, "British Columbia, the Politics of Exploitation," in W.E. Mann eds. *Social and Cultural Change in Canada* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970) pp. 112-129.

12 Jeremy Wilson, personal communication, May, 1997.

13 Michael M'Gonigle and Ben Parfitt, *Forestopia* (Madeira Park, B.C.: Harbour Publishing, 1994), p. 45.

markets. Communities suffered from instability when forestry jobs declined even as logging increased.[14] They experienced job loss due to increased mechanization.[15] Between 1981 and 1991, over 24,000 forestry jobs were lost due to mill closures and efforts to increase efficiency.[16]

An important aspect of B.C.'s forest industry is Crown (that is, state) ownership. Presently, the Crown owns 95 per cent of forest land. The government's role as supplier of wood began in 1905 when forests were opened up for temporary tenures to facilitate timber extraction.

The tenure system is the foundation for current forest management in B.C. The *Forest Act* sets up forest tenures and authorizes the Crown to distribute timber cutting rights. A forest tenure is a form of property rights on public land or public timber that the government grants to private individuals, organizations, or corporations. The two most common forms of tenure are Tree Farm Licences (TFLs) and Forest Licences.[17]

A TFL is an area-based tenure in which the tenure holder has property rights over an area with definite boundaries called a tree farm. A TFL confers the right to control "virtually all forest uses within the boundaries of the tenure."[18] The licensee must carry out logging and tree growing activities. For example, Macmillan Bloedel controls TFL 39 which is 715,000 hectares.[19] It extends from Haida Gwaii to Powell River, and includes the north end of Vancouver Island. The annual allowable cut on this area is 3.3 million cubic metres of timber per year (110,000 logging truck loads).[20] Tree Farm Licences are granted for 25 years and are replaceable. A TFL is renewed or replaced every 10 years at the discretion of the licensee. This form of tenure is basically perpetual.

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14 Ibid.

15 The industry became increasingly capital (not labour) intensive. See Marchak, *Green Gold* . See also M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia* .

16 M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia*, p. 9.

17 80 per cent of the logging carried out in B.C. occurs within these forms of tenure.

18 Herb Hammond, *Seeing the Forest Among the Trees : The Case for Wholistic Forest Use* (Vancouver: Polestar Press Ltd., 1991), p. 51.

19 Ibid, p. 51

20 Ibid.

Forest Licences are the major volume-based tenure. A Forest Licence grants a tenure holder a quota of logs--an allowable annual cut--to be removed from a land unit called a Timber Supply Area (TSA). These types of licences do not provide for the extensive management rights and control which are found in a TFL. For example, Finlay Forest Industries (owned by Fletcher Challenge) holds a Forest Licence in the Mackenzie Supply Area with a logging quota of nearly 1.3 cubic metres per year.[21] Forest Licences are granted for 15 to 25 years, and can be either replaceable or non-replaceable. If replaceable, they are renewed every 5 years at the discretion of the licensee. Like TFLs, a replaceable Forest Licence is basically a perpetual agreement.

These forms of tenure entitle forest companies to manage public forests and to extract timber. In exchange for property rights, tenure holders pay stumpage fees to the province. Licensees are also legally required to remove a certain volume of timber each year. The Forest Act gives broad rights to tenure holders, and demands few obligations.[22] The majority of forest management occurs within the framework of these two types of tenure. Management and planning are carried out by government and the licensees, although there are some opportunities for public comment.[23] This brief overview of forest management in B.C. provides the background for a discussion of the competing ideas in B.C. forest policy.

Two Coalitions: The Actors

There are two competing coalitions of actors who subscribe to different beliefs about how to manage B.C.'s forests.[24] The forest policy subsystem is comprised of "actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence government decisions

21 Ibid.

22 For example, tenure holders are rarely held responsible for soil damage, water supply damage, landslides, or damage to fisheries, see Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p. 52.

23 For details on how forest planning is carried out and public participation in forest planning, see Appendix 2.

24 The complex array of actors in the forest policy community can be understood more easily by loosely grouping the actors into two broad coalitions.

about [forest] policy."[25] Within this subsystem there are two main *advocacy coalitions*, which are "people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system--that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions--and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time."[26] The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) can be used to characterize actors in the B.C. forest policy subsystem by identifying them in both formal and non-formal institutions. It also accounts for individuals who move about from organization to organization within the same subsystem, and for instances when individuals within the same institution (e.g. within the same governmental agency) hold different beliefs.[27] Unlike traditional approaches which identify networks of actors with shared interests, the ACF identifies coalitions of actors with shared beliefs.[28]

For several decades, two competing coalitions have existed within the B.C. forest policy subsystem. The following sections describe the Development Advocacy Coalition (DAC) and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC), their members and their beliefs.[29] Each coalition upholds a distinct set of core beliefs about how B.C.'s forests should be managed. In each case, particular policy beliefs derive from the core.

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25 See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning*, p. 16. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith observe that "political elites concerned with a specific problem or policy area tend to form relatively autonomous subsystems." Ibid.

26 Ibid., p. 25.

27 See Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in A. King ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978). See also Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, p. 28.

28 Beliefs can be identified through the mission statement or mandate of an organization, or some of its positions on various issues, This framework focuses on beliefs since they are "more verifiable than interests." Moreover, the focus on beliefs incorporates self-interests as well as organizational interests. Ibid., p. 28.

29 For example, Jenkins-Smith identified two coalitions in the offshore energy policy subsystem: the Development Offshore Energy Coalition and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition. See Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Gilbert St. Clair, "The Politics of Offshore Energy," ibid., p.149-176. For a description of the two advocacy coalitions in the BC forest policy subsystem see Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change, " p. 116-124. For a description of the B.C. forest policy community, see Jeremy Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in B.C: The Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environmentalism," in William Coleman and Grace Skogstad eds., *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada* (Toronto, ON: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990), p. 146.

The Development Advocacy Coalition. The Development Advocacy Coalition's (DAC) beliefs are exemplified in a set of policies implemented after 1945. The ideas behind these policies emerged from several reports by state officials such as C.D. Orchard[30] and industry figures such as H.R. Macmillan.[31] Key ideas also appeared in the Royal Commission of Inquiry reports published by Sloan and others.[32] The belief system is based on a deep core of human-centred tenets, which emphasize conservation for the purposes of human use:

> the province's forests ought to be developed to produce economic benefits for its citizens; though vast and resilient, the forests are not inexhaustible, they must be managed to ensure a perpetual flow of benefits; and since the various facets of policy involve technically complex matters, management should be done by certified experts.[33]

This coalition regards the forest mainly as "logs standing." Many in the timber industry believe that the forest has no value unless it can be converted into profitable uses.[34] They also believe that other "non-timber" uses should be subservient to logging and attempts to grow timber.

The DAC's core policy beliefs centre on the concept of sustained yield. Sustained yield is a rationale for converting old-growth forests into tree farms. Introduced in the mid

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30 Chief Forester C.D. Orchard delivered his rationale for sustained yield forest management to A. Wells Gray, Minister of Lands: "Forest Working Circles: An Analysis of Forest Legislation in British Columbia as it Relates to Disposal of Crown Timber, and Proposed Legislation to Institute Managed Harvesting on the Basis of Perpetual Yield," Memorandum to the Hon. A. Wells Gray, August 1942, vol. 8, file 15, Orchard Papers, UBC Special Collections.

31 H.R. MacMillan, *Forests For the Future: Conditions Essential to a Sustained Yield Policy for Management of British Columbia Coast Forests* (Vancouver: G.R. MacMillan Export Company, 1945).

32 The Royal Commission of Inquiry published the first Sloan Report in 1945 and the second in 1956. See Gordon Sloan, "The Forest Resources of British Columbia," (Victoria, Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1945) . The second Sloan report was published in 1956. The two reports supported the objective to maximize production and make full use of the forest. Sloan encouraged the speedy liquidation of the old forest, stating that "[the people of British Columbia] will not miss the old-age trees of large growth they have never known." He described a future when large old trees would be replaced by smaller, sixty year-old trees. See Sloan, "The Forest Resources of British Columbia," (Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1956), p. 236-7. See also, Peter Pearse. "Timber Rights and Forest Policy in British Columbia: a report of the Royal Commission on Forest Resources," (Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1976).

33 Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change," p. 116.

34 Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p. 49.

1940s, the policy aimed to replace the descending spiral of unmanaged liquidation with an ascending spiral of sustained yield management--from mining to crop renewal.[35] In addition, it intended to maximize the productivity of the forest to ensure a continuous supply of mature trees. Sloan, one of the main advocates of sustained yield, defined it as "a perpetual yield of wood of commercially usable quality from regional areas in yearly or periodic quantities of equal or increasing volume."[36] In order to provide a continuous supply of mature trees, sustained yield required a "normal" forest consisting of fast-growing young trees with an approximately equal distribution of all ages up to the crop rotation age.[37] To achieve this, over mature timber (old-growth) was liquidated and converted into second-growth tree farms. Sustained yield promised to achieve a stable forest economy by carefully managing the forests to produce a perpetual supply of wood at the maximum rate possible. In essence, sustained yield meant rationed liquidation since it ensured that the last old growth would not be logged until the first of the second growth stands were available for cutting.[38]

Related to the ideas of sustained yield are those contained in the tenure system. Members of the DAC believe that in order to attract the capital and investment needed to convert B.C.'s forests into profitable tree farms, the state must grant long term control over forest land to licence holders. The industry-government partnership is elaborated in the discussion of policy beliefs. Specific aspects of this partnership have changed over the years, but in general the tenure system functions as an incentive system. Industry wants access to additional timber and more security of tenure, and the government seeks private sector investment and management to achieve economic growth and community stability. The government grants forest companies rights to cut timber sufficient to supply their mills

35 Gordon Sloan, *Report of the Honourable Gordon McG. Sloan, Chief Justice of British Columbia, Relating to the Forest Resources of B.C.*, Chief Justice Gordon Sloan, Commissioner, (Victoria, BC: Queen's Printer for B.C., 1945), p. 125.

36 Ibid., p. 127.

37 Lois Dellert, "Sustained Yield Forestry in British Columbia: The Making and Breaking of a Policy (1900-1993)," 1994, M.A. Thesis, York University, Faculty of Environmental Studies, p. 22.

38 Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change," p. 117.

in perpetuity, in order to encourage companies to invest in mills.[39] Also, the government grants long-term rights so that companies will invest in the second crop because it will be theirs to log.[40] In exchange for the long-term access to the resource, licensees are required to pay stumpage fees, and taxes, and to follow management guidelines prescribed by the government. The system conferred mutual benefits because the government retained ownership and ultimate control to regulate cutting rates and forest practices, and the industry gained the additional security and timber supply needed to risk investment in saw and pulp mills.

The DAC involves both public and private sector members. The private sector members of this coalition include forest companies such as Macmillan Bloedel, Fletcher Challenge, West Fraser and umbrella groups such as the BC Forest Alliance and the Council of Forest Industries (COFI), which are chiefly concerned with maintaining access to wood. The timber industry's beliefs were exemplified in COFI's 1983 brief to the Ministry of Forests (MOF) suggesting that timber licensees should have greater control over forest management.[41] Another example of industry demands is the Western Wood Products Forum, which is comprised of senior executives of forest companies such as Macmillan Bloedel and Canfor, and representatives from the International Woodworkers Association (IWA). The Forum's 1992 report stated that "the industry needs to be assured by government of a continued access to a flow of wood, and it must position itself to meet the challenges of the emerging global economy."[42] Industry's core belief is that forests should be available for fibre.

Certain forest workers, particularly those belonging to the larger unions such as the

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39 Sloan, *Report of the Honourable Gordon McG Sloan, Chief Justice of British Columbia, Relating to the Forest Resources o f B.C.* , pp. 42-43.

40 Dellert, "Sustained Yield Forestry in British Columbia," p. 30.

41 Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p.147.

42 Ibid., p. 46.

IWA, are also members of the DAC.[43] The IWA is also a member of forest industry lobby groups such as the Forest Alliance, and sits on advisory bodies such as the Forest Sector Strategy Advisory Committee. The IWA believes in maintaining the flow of wood in order to create jobs: "lands dedicated to forestry should be managed in such a way as to provide high and sustained yield as well as maximum employment."[44] The IWA opposes the removal of land from provincial aggregate allowable cuts without worker input and compensation.[45] In addition, its policy paper states that "sustainable forestry means that we have intelligent development with decisions resulting from community debate. It does not mean that we have to stop development."[46] The IWA has a distinct interest in maintaining jobs and worker control, but shares industry's belief in sustained yield and maintaining access to the productive forest.

Key actors in the MOF also subscribe to the DAC's core beliefs. Part of the MOF's mandate is to "encourage maximum productivity of forest resources" and to "encourage a vigorous, efficient, and world competitive timber processing industry."[47] Hammond notes that the MOF has "endorsed the liquidation of old-growth forests in B.C., agreeing with industry's claim that these forests are 'decadent,' dying, or infested with insects or disease."[48] Furthermore, the MOF accepts that the authority for managing forests should be given to industry and the professional foresters who work for them.

The private and public actors within the DAC, however, have always "coalesced somewhat uneasily around the beliefs at the centre of this bargain."[49] An uneasy alliance exists because the MOF has two distinct roles: the regulator/reformer role which gives

[43] Labour plays a minor role in the policy network compared to industry. Labour focuses instead on lobbying at the firm level through collective bargaining. See Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner, "Resistance to Policy Change in the Canadian Forest Sector," *Canadian Public Administration*, 38:3 (Fall 1995) , p. 390.

[44] The IWA-Canada Forestry and Environment Committee, led by Claire Dansereau, released IWA forest policy in 1989. For details see IWA Canada, *IWA Forest Policy* , 1989, p. 6.

[45] Ibid., p. 5.

[46] Ibid., p. 3.

[47] Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p. 48.

[48] The MOF refers to old growth as "aging forest" where "decay overtakes...growth and the volume of timber begins to decline, ibid., p. 74.

[49] Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change," p. 121.

priority to protecting the Crown/public forests; and the industry booster role, which gives priority to protecting the industry and its workers.[50] The Minister of Forests must strike a delicate balance. As well as fulfilling the industry booster roles, MOF officials must also respond to public concerns about the sustainability of the resource, the impact of forest practices on other values and demands for public participation. Aware of the need to attract capital, and conscious of the importance of the tax and stumpage revenues generated through forest extraction, the government looked for ways to convince the public that forests were being managed responsibly.

The DAC's beliefs are reflected in the "twin policy pillars" put in place during the postwar period.[51] The first pillar is the tenure system featuring TFLs, and short-term volume-based licence arrangements which grant companies secure access to timber in exchange for a commitment to pay stumpage and manage in accordance with government prescriptions. The second pillar is sustained yield policy, which supposedly guarantees a perpetual supply of timber by rationing the cutting of old growth and promoting reinvestment in forest land. Sustained yield is a set of symbols that attempts to legitimize the current management system.

In addition to its core belief in maintaining access to wood, the DAC supports certain policy beliefs. This coalition believes in the existing forest management system. In some instances, members of the DAC endorse regulations for responding to public and international pressures, such as the Forest Practices Code. Some forest companies supported the Code in order to regain the confidence of European markets and to maintain a healthy forest industry. The DAC's legacy is hard to disengage. Historically, this coalition's ideas were translated into policy. Presently, its ideas still predominate in forest

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50 Wilson observes the dual role that the MOF plays. See Jeremy Wilson, "Implementing Forest Policy Change in British Columbia: Comparing the Experiences of the NDP Governments of 1972-75 and 1991-?." in *Troubles in the Rainforest: British Columbia's Forest Economy in Transition.* (Proceedings from the Troubles in the Rainforest Conference, forthcoming, 1998).

51 Lertzman, Rayner, and Wilson refer to the "twin policy pillars" in "Learning and Change," p. 118.

policy. The DAC was not significantly challenged until the 1970s.[52]

The Environmental Advocacy Coalition. The Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC) emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to society's increasing concerns about wilderness. In the 1970s and 1980s environmentalists and indigenous people began to criticize the dominance of large companies, the damage to ecosystems and the lack of public or community involvement in forest management. The public became more aware of the effects of logging. This led to questions about the sustainability of forests and the impact of the forest industry on other values.

The EAC includes environmentalists from grassroots groups such as Save the Stein and the Valhalla Wilderness Society as well as key advocacy groups such as the Sierra Club and the Western Canada Wilderness Committee. It also includes national groups, tourist operators, recreationalists, biologists, university scholars, and some officials from the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (MOELP). In many cases, aboriginal people have aligned themselves with the EAC.[53]

The EAC believes that human use for extractive purposes needs to be balanced by a focus on the whole ecosystem.[54] For example, the coalition asserts that the amount of old-growth forest land preserved within the province's parks is insufficient to protect other important values including fish and wildlife, scenic resources, recreational potential, or

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52 Wilson observes environmental groups' challenges to the business-government dominated policy network. See Wilson, "Wilderness Politics."

53 The potential alliance between aboriginal people and members of the EAC will be elaborated in Chapter Six. In this chapter, aboriginal people will be considered as members of the EAC (or potential members of the EAC) because of the alliances between the two groups which have occurred in the past such as the struggle to save South Moresby, and the cooperation between aboriginal people and environmentalists to protect areas like Meares Island. Although Aboriginal people have a distinct interest in regaining control over their traditional territory, this goal is in some ways compatible with the environmentalists' efforts to preserve wilderness. Moreover, traditional aboriginal knowledge about conservation is compatible with some of the ideas that environmentalists have about conservation and protecting biodiversity. In relation to community forestry, both parties have an interest in local control, and in developing sustainable forest practices. For a discussion of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, see Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel, *First Nations' Perspectives Relating to Forest Practices Standards in Clayoquot Sound*, March 1995.

54 Wilson, "Wilderness Politics."

future options. Furthermore, the EAC emphasizes that other values such as biodiversity or ecosystem health should be accorded greater protection in logging plans and operations.[55] It challenged the view that forests should be managed for timber production. Over the years, the EAC has focused on wilderness protection and protecting biodiversity Its members express concerns about the disappearance of old-growth forests and the complex ecosystems that they support.[56]

Along with these core beliefs, members of the EAC hold a variety of secondary or policy beliefs. Many members of the EAC criticize sustained yield and the dominant policy paradigm and support alternative visions of community forest boards. The EAC launched a critique of sustained yield, intending to shake the foundations of the central legitimizing beliefs. If the EAC could call sustained yield into question, it could also raise concerns about "the policy instruments, management practices, and grants of public authority making up the dominant paradigm."[57] Throughout the 1970s and 1980s environmentalists criticized the system that "had always allocated timberland on long-term leases to companies, had charged too little for the resource, and had resulted in land not adequately restocked or no longer salvageable, together with silted stream beds and damaged ecosystems."[58]

Members of the EAC contend that sustained yield and the tenure system result in an unsustainable rate of cut. Between 1911 and 1989, 2.5 billion cubic metres of timber were logged on public tenures. The rate of cut more than doubled between 1961 and 1991, increasing from 32 million cubic metres of wood per year to 74 million cubic metres. Fifty per cent of the volume logged has occurred since 1976. In response to unsustainable forest practices, the EAC supports policies to increase park creation, preserve old-growth forests, and toughen forest regulations.

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55 Ibid, p. 120.

56 For example, the Sierra Club published a detailed map of B.C.'s remaining temperate rainforests as part of its campaign to wilderness areas and biodiversity.

57 Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change," .

58 Marchak, *Logging the Globe,* pp. 110-111.

Some members of the EAC, however, have broadened their concerns:

> environmentalists successfully linked their critique of sustained yield to questions about stumpage, tenure, industry concentration, the centralization of forest management control in the Ministry of Forests and the environmental effects of logging. By the mid-1980s, environmentalists were leading complex debates about value-added manufacturing, the dissipation of rent, and the subsidization of inefficient logging operations.[59]

In the late 1970s and mid 1980s, a number of groups articulated comprehensive alternative visions centring on images of small-scale forestry and decentralized, community forest board management systems.[60] People in both urban and rural communities claimed that they were excluded by the centralized decision making structure and the unaccountable Forest Service. Furthermore, they argued that there were insufficient opportunities for public input. Several communities (and individuals) proposed community forest boards in order to establish local control and democratic participation in forest management decisions.[61] The objective of community control is to "decentralize a range of resource-allocation decisions, or at least to bring into existence a consultative process that is, and is seen to be, accountable to residents of the province."[62] To use a Taylor and Wilson phrase, community forest boards would enhance both "democratic and environmental health" in forest communities. Decentralization would restore democratic health by increasing public participation and local control. Environmental health would be achieved by granting control to people who have a vested interest in maintaining forest resources and who are sensitive to the area. Some of the proposals also involved changes in the tenure system.

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59 Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change," p. 122. See also, Michael M'Gonigle, "From the Ground Up: Lessons from the Stein River Valley," in Warren Magnusson et al., eds., *After Bennett: A New Politics for British Columbia* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1986), pp.169-191 and Herb Hammond, "Public Forests or Private Timber Supplies? The Need for Community Control of British Columbia's Forests," written submission to the BC Round Table on Environment and the Economy, 1989.

60 Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change." See also Michael M'Gonigle "From the Ground Up: Lessons from the Stein River Valley," in Magnusson, Warren et al eds *After Bennett: A New Politics for British Columbia*, pp. 169-191.

61 Not all of the community forest board proposals call for tenure reform; those that do, however, constitute the most significant demands for structural reform.

62 Patricia Marchak, *Logging the Globe*, p.109.

Four proposals will be detailed in the next chapter. The models challenge the existing system of centralized, expert management by presenting an alternative form of management based on public participation and community involvement in decision making. Community forest boards involve the redistribution of power and control over forest resources.[63] Not all members of the EAC advocated community forest boards, proponents of this approach are a subsection which is struggling to translate its ideas into policy.

Table 1 contrasts the DAC and the EAC's ideas about how forests should be managed. The DAC promotes conservation for human use, whereas the EAC supports conservation of the whole ecosystem. The DAC emphasizes forest productivity for economic benefit and human use of resources whereas the EAC promotes a broad range of values including the existence of old-growth forests as well as creating economic benefits. Furthermore, the two coalitions support distinct approaches to management. For example, the DAC believes that management should be done by certified experts from government and industry whereas some members of the EAC believe that communities and members of the public should be involved in forest management. The distinct policy beliefs of each coalition support various reform options. Policy beliefs are the means of how to achieve the broader goals. The DAC supports sustained yield and the existing tenure system. The reform options it supports range from inaction (no change) to moderate reforms such as legislative changes to appease international markets or to increase government legitimacy. By contrast, the EAC criticizes sustained yield and supports a range of reform options such as park creation and old growth conservation. Some members support more fundamental reforms such as decentralizing power to community forest boards.

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63 Jeremy Wilson and Duncan Taylor, "Environmental Health--Democratic Health: An Examination of Proposals for Decentralization of Forest Management in British Columbia," *Forest Planning Canada* 9:4 (1993), pp. 34-44.

Table 1: The Development Advocacy Coalition (DAC) and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC): A Summary of Competing Ideas on How Forests Should be Managed

	DAC	EAC
Core beliefs	Anthropocentric, utilititarian conservationist	Ecocentric: balance human use with focus on whole ecosystem
	Timber resources should be used for benefits	Amount of old-growth preserved is insufficient to protect biodiversity
Policy beliefs	Sustained yield	Need greater park protection
	Faith in centralized management by "experts"	Holistic, decentralized management
		Concerns about tenure, industry concentration, centralized forest management
Reform options	Maintain current system	Increase the number of protected areas in B.C.
	Maintain the current system with minor regulatory reforms to restore confidence of international markets and regain domestic legitimacy	Change the allocation system through tenure reform
		Grant community and public control through community forest boards

The Two Paths. An analysis of the two distinct sets of ideas about forest management highlights the legacy of sustained yield, the challenge that the EAC has mounted, and the options that were available to the NDP government. Sustained yield is a powerful legitimizing ideology, a legacy which is difficult to disengage. Just as wood has a grain, so does forest policy in B.C. Its "grain" is shaped by particular ideas, values, and priorities. Forestry in B.C. focuses mainly on timber extraction. As Chandler notes, the province was built upon the "politics of exploitation."[64] Although ideas about forest conservation were introduced in the postwar period, priority was given to managing forests for human use. Sustained yield is a set of symbols that legitimizes a system that grants forest companies rights to a large proportion of B.C.'s valuable forests. It focuses on timber production, and limits management to a closed network of forestry experts from government and industry. Sustained yield is still the predominant discourse that persuades the public that forests are being managed for the future. Underlying this ideology is the assumption that the liquidation-conversion project will be carried through to its completion (i.e., the remaining old growth will be converted to tree farms). Workers, forest companies, investors and government rely on this project. By the 1990s, the liquidation-conversion paradigm had considerable momentum. Its prevailing assumptions and the policies implemented in the past had created a legacy that constrained policy makers' ability to change the course of forest policy.

However, these ideas are under attack. Environmentalists, First Nations people, and communities challenge these ideas, promoting alternative visions of forestry based on concepts of whole ecosystems, the preservation of biodiversity, decentralized power and democratic/local control. The EAC's demands call into question the allocative system that has been in place throughout the history of B.C. forest policy. As Wilson notes, "environmentalism imperils the unwritten code of speculative rights at the heart of the B.C.

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64 Chandler refers to the "politics of exploitation" to describe the system of forestry in BC in Marsha Chandler and Michael M. Atkinson, *The Politics of Canadian Public Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1983), p. 211. Yet the term was first used by Black. See Black, "British Columbia, the Politics of Exploitation," pp. 112-129.

capitalist ethos, threatening a system that has long legitimized a profitable traffic in rights to Crown resources."[65] Much is at stake. Reform advocates face the challenge of implementing ideas that run against the grain of current forest policy.

The two coalitions provided the government with two distinct reform paths: moderate reform or structural reform. After further elaboration of the second of these paths, we will begin building an interpretation of why the government chose the first.

65 Jeremy Wilson, "Resolution of Wilderness vs. Logging Conflicts in British Columbia: A Comparison of Piecemeal and Comprehensive Approaches." Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association annual meetings, Hamilton, 1987, p.3.

CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURAL REFORM ALTERNATIVE

This chapter illustrates that community forest boards challenge the core ideas of B.C. forest policy. It argues that community forest board proposals presented the NDP with an opportunity to implement a wholesale shift in forest policy. It considers three elements of structural reform and reviews the structural reforms found proposals for community forest boards.

Significant Revision and Structural Reform

This chapter defines a *significant revision* as a change in the core aspects of B.C. forest policy.[66] The policy core involves centralized management, expert control (which excludes the public), and a focus on timber extraction. A change in one or all three of these aspects would constitute a significant revision.[67] This chapter explores a significant revision based on three ideas which directly challenge the policy core: *decentralized power*, *democratic control*, and *new goals for forest management*. These ideas reflect what Paehlke refers to as environmental values. The environmental perspective (which stems from the political economy analysis) includes a preference for political decentralization in order to respect the diversity and complexity of ecosystems. In this analysis, *decentralization* refers mainly to the devolution of power to structures at the community level. Environmentalists have also emphasized "an attraction to autonomy and self-management in human endeavours and, generally, an inclination to more democratic

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66 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith imply that a significant revision of a government program involves a change in the policy core. See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning*, p. 34.

67 Unlike incremental reforms which tinker with the existing system, a change in the policy core involves a paradigm shift, or "a total break from the past in terms of the overall policy goals, the understanding of public problems, the solutions to them and the policy instruments used to put decisions into effect." See Michael Howlett, "Policy Styles, Policy Paradigms and the Policy Cycle," in Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, eds., *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 193.

and participatory political processes and administrative structures."[68] In this chapter, *democratic control* means that representative bodies would have decision-making power. Local people, key stakeholders, and members of the broader public would participate in forest management decisions through these bodies. Finally, the *new goals for forest management* refer to new priorities such as a focus on ecosystems, retaining more benefits for communities, or tenure reform, which reflect values such as respect for the interconnected web of life, humility to other species in the global ecosystem, a holistic perspective, and a long-term time frame.[69]

These ideas will be considered as structural reforms because they involve a fundamental challenge to existing institutional structures.[70] This chapter reviews variations on one form of significant revision, the community forest board.[71] Four community forest board proposals are reviewed in this section. They incorporate aspects of decentralized power, democratic control, and new ideas about forest management.

Review of Community Forest Board Proposals. This review describes four community forest board proposals, highlighting each proposal's: key proponents, strategy to decentralize power (the structure and powers of the local body), method of democratic control (the composition of the board, how members are selected), and some central ideas regarding forest management.

The Slocan Valley Management Plan recommended decentralized forest management, democratic control, and alternative goals for forest management. In 1973, Slocan Valley residents initiated a project to examine issues related to control over forests,

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68 Robert Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 144-145.

69 Ibid.

70 Michael M'Gonigle, personal communication, October, 1996.

71 There are a wide range of reforms that would constitute a significant revision (ie: a change in the policy core). Changes in forest practices or forest tenure might involve this kind of shift, however this thesisfocuses on one particular reform option: community forest boards. Community forest boards would involve a "significant revision" because they would change the allocation of control over resources. This discussion focuses on decentralized power and community control as aspects of an alternative structure for forest management.

as well as the rate of cut and how logging benefits could be better retained by the community. The Slocan Valley Management Plan described how decentralized forest management could be achieved through a local resource committee. The resource committee would have jurisdiction over the resources of the Slocan Public Sustained Yield Unit, allowing local representatives to administer decisions previously made in the provincial capital.[72] A resource manager should be responsible for planning and overseeing all resource management.[73] Democratic control would be achieved through a resource committee with a mandate to represent community interests. The committee would be comprised of at least six elected, unpaid, representatives of the community, along with an equal number of government agency representatives.

The Plan contained alternative ideas about forest management. It included arguments for local control, and reasons why the Allowable Annual Cut (AAC) should be determined on a more local basis. It argued that local people should be involved in forest management since "the people who live in the area most directly affected by resource management and utilization policies need to share in their determination and implementation."[74] Slocan Valley residents also argued that management should be attuned to local conditions. For example, because of the unique nature of each drainage in the Slocan Public Sustained Yield Unit (PSYU),[75] negative environmental impacts result from determining the AAC for the whole PSYU and then cutting the total cut in only two or three drainages.[76] The plan recommended a reduction in the AAC and suggested that stumpage fees be reinvested into the Slocan PSYU.[77]

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72 Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project, *Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project: Final Report*, 1975, section 5.1.

73 The committee and the resource manager would work in conjunction with the community and provincial ministries. Also, they would have the support of a multi-disciplinary team of trained personnel.

74 Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project, *Slocan Valley Community Forest Management Project: Final Report*, 1975, section 5.1.

75 Public Sustained Yield Units comprised a relatively small area, what is known currently as a Timber Supply Area.

76 Slocan Valley, *Final Report*, section 5.10.

77 Ibid., section 1,3, p.14-15.

Community members, scholars, and other people in favour of reform elaborated these ideas. Leading the way was Herb Hammond, who in a series of 1980s publications made a strong case for decentralized power, democratic/community control, and a new set of goals for forest management. In 1989, Hammond presented a model of a community forest board and its enabling legislation, the Forest Use Act.

Hammond's vision of decentralized management promoted the devolution of power to community forest boards. A community forest board would have a broad range of powers to carry out planning and management for all forest uses within a certain watershed. The boards would have discretion to zone for balanced use, and to protect wildlife and ecologically sensitive areas. In addition, the boards would complete inventories, zone land, develop management plans and field designs, allocate use rights, and collect revenues. Each board would have a staff to provide technical assistance.[78] Standards would be set from the ground up, rather than imposed from above. Local boards would operate within province-wide forest practices standards and legislation, yet they would also establish standards sensitive to local conditions.

Hammond argues that democratic control would be established through community forest boards which provide for a balanced representation of stakeholders. The boards would be comprised of representatives of various user groups such as aboriginal people, timber, public recreationists, wilderness and tourism business, fish and wildlife, water, ecosystem protection and local government.[79] In Hammond's model, all forest user groups would be represented equally on the board. To achieve this kind of balanced representation, he suggests that the selection process should combine both appointment by provincial officials and election. Organizations and individuals making up a user group would elect or appoint a member to sit on the board. There would also be an open public election of two to four members by the community.

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78 Hammond details the board's structure in Herb Hammond "Public Forests or Private Timber Supplies: The Need for Community Control of BC's Forests," (Winlaw BC: Silva Ecosystem Consultants Ltd., 1989).

79 Ibid., p. 7.

Hammond presented several goals for forest management. His proposed Forest Use Act would set standards to ensure ecological responsibility in all aspects of forest use. It would govern the inventory, zoning, planning, and implementation of activities. The Act would allow local boards to develop and enforce standards consistent with those specified in the provincial Forest Use Act. Finally, it would phase out the existing tenure system by cancelling existing contracts. This suggestion is based on the rationale that in the past, contracts have been phased out by government for valid social, economic, and ecological reasons. In addition, the boards would negotiate the sharing of revenues from local forests with the provincial government.

Hammond's argument for community control centres on a vision of holistic forest use, that would respect "the complexity, diversity, and dynamics of the forest ecosystem" rather than focusing on the production of forest commodities.[80] This type of management emphasizes the interaction between different sections of the system, the promotion of economic diversity, and zoning on a watershed basis.[81] Control emanates from "those most familiar with, dependent on, and sensitive to the the forest environment...the whole community tends to see the whole forest."[82] According to Hammond, local management also responds to the diversity of communities and ecosystems.[83] A crucial aspect of stewardship is a sense of attachment to the place that is being managed. If this "place is just one more assignment along the road to an administrative position in an urban centre, decision makers cannot realistically be expected to be part of a forest or local community, in either the short or long term sense."[84] In brief, communities can feel a responsibility for their ecosystem in a way that centralized bureaucracies cannot. Hammond argues that local people can provide solutions that are often missed by centralized systems since they

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80 Ibid., p. 7.

81 Herb Hammond, "Community Control of Forests," *Forest Planning Canada* , 6:6 (1990), p. 43-46.

82 Hammond, "Community Control."

83 Hammond, "Public Forests," p. 3.

84 Ibid., p. 4.

have have first-hand experience with the forest and how it relates to their economy and society.

Hammond's ideas about decentralized power and democratic control were further developed in the work of the Tin Wis Coalition. Tin Wis, which involved aboriginal people, organized labour, and environmental, educational and social justice advocacy interests, formed in 1989. By 1991, the coalition had held several meetings and put forward a proposal.[85] The Forest Stewardship Act, drafted by the coalition's Forestry Working Group, outlines a strategy for decentralized power. The Act proposed the devolution of power to Community Resources Boards which would assume "responsibilities and duties for the administration of forest planning."[86] Boards would carry out forest use zoning, the supervision of licensees, the preparation of management plans, and the approval of the AAC recommended by the province's Chief forester.

The Boards would achieve democratic control through the representation of key stakeholders, and through a balanced method of selecting members. The Boards would consist of up to 13 representatives, half appointed, half elected. Six members would be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-council, selected from six different stakeholder categories: i)natives; ii) non-timber-related small business (e.g. tourism business operators); iii) unionized workers; iv) environmentalists and non-commerical forest users; v) timber-related licensee, forest land owners, independent logging contractors; vi) non-timber related licensed resource users (e.g. guide outfitters, trappers, range, licensees, water licensees). Seven members would be elected at large, on an area or ward basis. These wards would be based on natural geographic boundaries. One member at large would be elected to represent each area or ward. In addition to local democratic control, the Tin Wis proposal outlined a strategy intended to represent broader public interests. A provincial Forest Resources Board would consist of six regional representatives from community

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85 Tin Wis Coalition, *Community Control, Developing Sustainability and Social Solidarity* (Vancouver: Tin Wis Coalition, 1991); See also, Tin Wis Forestry Working Group, *Draft Model Legislation Forest Stewardship Act*, (Vancouver: Tin Wis Coalition, June 15, 1991).

86 Tin Wis Coalition Forestry Working Group, *Forest Stewardship Ac t* (1991), section 2(b).

boards, and seven representatives appointed by cabinet. The provincial board would set minimum standards for forest practices and would serve as the appellate body where community board decisions would be contested. The Community Resources Boards advocated by Tin Wis would increase accountability since they would "provide a means of general public participation and involvement in the planning and management of forests."[87]

The Village of Hazelton Framework for Watershed Stewardship also proposed to devolve control over stewardship of natural resources to local boards (called Watershed Authorities). A devolution contract between government and local authorities would empower Watershed Authorities to perform a range of sustainable management practices. In particular, they would assume "responsibilities and duties for the administration of forest planning."[88] While this proposal argues for local control, it also advocates the maintenance of standards. The boards' decisions would be subject to province-wide standards designed to promote goals such as biological diversity, forest industry accountability, reduced corporate concentration, and increased processing in the local area. Finally, the Watershed Authority would have access to resource revenues generated in the region.

Watershed Authorities would also achieve democratic control. Board members representing various stakeholders would be "chosen by a combination of election and appointment by Judges sitting in the local region."[89]

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87 Tin Wis Coalition Forestry Working Group, *Forest Stewardship Act* (1991), section 2(a).
88 Village of Hazelton, *Framework for Watershed Management* (Hazelton, BC: Village of Hazelton, 1991), section 1.2.
89 Ibid.

Comparison of Proposals: Key Themes and Differences

The proposals discussed above outline strategies for decentralized power and democratic control. They also introduce alternative ideas about forest management. The proposals present similar visions of decentralized management. Although the structures and functions of the local boards are alike, the powers and the boundaries of the boards vary. The proposals also outline different strategies for achieving democratic control. Although most proposals advocate local representation, some advocate distinct methods for selecting members.

The proposals all advocate a similar vision of decentralizing power to a local body charged with certain responsibilities. Although the local bodies described above have different names ("resource committee", "community forest resources board, "watershed authority"), they involve similar structures.

The proposals for devolution outline various powers and boundaries for local bodies. Some proposals give full responsibility to the board through a devolution contract; others do not. For example, the Tin Wis legislation and the Hazelton plan both proposed to transfer power and authority to the local board so that it would assume responsibilities previously assumed by the government. The Slocan Valley Management Plan proposed an advisory role for the resource committee. Another key distinction is that the Slocan proposal failed to give enforcement power to the committee, while the Forest Stewardship Act and the Hazelton Charter specify that local boards will have power to enforce regulations. To ensure that standards will be appropriate to the forest conditions within each district, the latter proposals allow boards to enforce specific standards consistent with standards outlined in the provincial forest use act. Such area-specific management respects the specific circumstances of a particular area. Another key issue is whether boards should be responsible for setting the allowable annual cut (AAC). The AAC is currently set by the Chief Forester in BC (Section 7 Forest Act). The Slocan proposal advocates that local boards should have the right to approve the AAC following

the Chief Forester's designation whereas the Tin Wis proposal advocates that the Community forest board should be responsible for setting the AAC in the area it manages. This would require changing section 7 of the Forest Act to grant the board the authority to set the AAC. Although all the proposals have far-reaching plans for the power of community forest boards, they all admit that "central authorities would retain some general standard setting jurisdiction." [90]

The boundaries of local boards also vary among the proposals. Most proposals use watershed features to define the management boundaries. For example, the Hazelton proposal states that Watershed authorities would be responsible for large river basin or a smaller watershed such as the Nechako River basin, the Queen Charlotte Islands, or East Vancouver Island.[91] Hammond agrees that watershed boundaries are appropriate "because watersheds link all parts of the forest ecosystem, forest management by watershed units will permit use and protection of all forest values..." By contrast, the Tin Wis proposal would set up boards in each of the forty-three Forest Districts, using the existing forest service boundaries.

The proposals all contain a mandate for democratic control through a representative structure, yet they outline distinct methods of selecting members. For example, the Slocan Plan proposes that members should be elected in order to represent majority interests, while later proposals attempt to mix the two types of representation. Hammond notes that boards might be susceptible to one dominant group or to majority interests. The Tin Wis proposal responds to this problem:

> the elected members would represent the grass roots, while the appointed members will serve as a check to remind the boards of the overall purposes and policy of forest stewardship. Appointments allow knowledgeable and thoughtful people who might not run for elections to serve, and to provide stable longer-term leadership if they do a good job.[92]

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90 Michael M'Gonigle, "Developing Sustainability: A Native/Environmentalist Prescription for Third-Level Government," *B.C. Studies* 84 (1989-90), p. 94.

91 Village of Hazelton, *Framework*, section 1.2.

92 Tin Wis Coalition Forestry Working Group, *Forest Stewardship Act*, section IV-3.

Hammond incorporates these ideas into his most recent proposal. He suggests that members should be selected both by election and by appointment to achieve "balanced representation." Another difference between the proposals relates to the method of appointment. Tin Wis gives appointment power to the provincial government, while Hazelton gives it to the Judiciary.[93] Another difference is that some plans propose to represent the community at large, while others propose to represent stakeholders. The proposals also vary in terms of which interests will be viewed as stakeholders. Although earlier proposals make suggestions on this matter, the Tin Wis proposal provides the most comprehensive list of stakeholder categories. The proposal aims to represent a broad range of interests and to encourage both local participation and public participation. The proposals seek to balance local participation with broad public values such as environmental quality.[94] Just as there is a need for local participation, so is there a need to represent the broader public interest. The proposals all recommend a representative structure and a mandate to be democratically accountable.

Several themes emerged from the proposals: local boards require certain powers, communities need control over land, local management responds to diversity, and local people have a vested interest in sustainable management. The proposals agree that, in order to be effective, a community forest board requires both the power to set standards and the authority to enforce those standards. Furthermore, they suggest that the board is more effective if the community has control over land. The proposals implicitly support tenure reform because they support community control over forest land. Moreover, they argue that communities should have control over crucial decisions such as the allowable annual cut. The issue of funding is closely linked to concerns involving land tenure. Local boards would require funding. Some proposals emphasized the need for start-up funding from government, but they concluded that local boards require a funding source that is

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93 Village of Hazelton, *Framework*, section 1.2.

94 This point is made by Jeremy Wilson and Duncan Taylor in "Environmental Health--Democratic Health: An Examination of Proposals for Decentralization of Forest Management in British Columbia," *Forest Planning Canada* 9:4 (1993), p. 34-44.

independent of Victoria. Hammond suggests that in order to cover its expenditures, a community forest board could collect stumpage from its area.[95]

The proposals also included arguments that management should reflect diversity in order to respect the forest ecosystem and the local people: "that is, to manage the forest in such a way that we create biological and cultural forest legacies that our children and our children's children will find both useful and rewarding; legacies that maintain the health of the entire system."[96] These proposals recognize that traditional bureaucratic top-down forms do not respond to complex, diverse situations. Conversely, local management responds to diversity, by creating special rules to respect local conditions. Finally, the proposals recognize that local managers have a greater incentive to consider long term issues of sustainability:

> Large scale industrial structures operating under long-term government tenures or on their own land, exercise a different operational philosophy than municipalities or similar low-level government and small landowner structures with their own land holdings. The industrial owner/operator must respond to the shareholders. Typically, the shareholder's main interest is in high dividends and short term profit, and not in the local community. By contrast, a municipality owning and operating a community forest on private or public land has a commitment to the local people, is readily accessible to them, and can be more sensitive and responsive to local conditions, needs and pressures.[97]

Conclusion: The Challenge of Structural Reform

Community forest board proposals constitute a significant revision of forest policy because they incorporate elements such as decentralized power, democratic/community control and new goals for management such as maintaining ecosystem health and responding to the needs of local people. These visions of structural reform challenge the core ideas of B.C. forest policy. Moreover, they provide the government with an

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95 Hammond, "Public Forests."

96 Julian Dunster, "What Community Forestry Can do for the People of British Columbia," speech at Community Forestry Conference in Ontario, 1991.

97 Ibid.

opportunity to initiate a fundamental shift in forest management.

The following chapters discuss some of the ongoing challenges presented by the implementation of change. Chapter Three describes the moderate reform initiatives implemented by the B.C. government during the 1991-94 period. It shows that a significant revision did not occur; the structural reform path was not chosen.

CHAPTER THREE: THE NDP'S MODERATE REFORM INITIATIVES

When the NDP was elected in 1991, the forest policy climate in BC was highly unsettled. Conflicts raged across the province in valleys where logging was to occur. Demonstrations in the Carmanah, Walbran and Tsitika Valleys attracted hundreds of protesters.[98] Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, thousands of forest workers were laid off due to mill closures, increased mechanization and rationalization.[99] The number of forest employees dropped from 97, 000 in 1979 to 70, 000 in 1991.[100] Reports predicted widespread job loss in the future.[101] In 1991, the Forest Resources Commission delivered a powerful message: "the status quo is not good enough. The way forests are currently being managed is out of step with what the public expects. It must change."[102] The Commission articulated a sweeping reform vision. Communities also demanded change. The new NDP government was under significant pressure to reform policy.

The government had several reform options when it came to power. The party platform made reference to both the structural reforms discussed in the previous chapter, and moderate reforms. At the outset, it was unclear which path the government would follow. It soon became apparent, however, that the government would embark upon moderate reform involving incremental policy adjustments. This chapter describes the elements of this moderate reform agenda, starting with an outline of the NDP election

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98 In the Tsitika, there were rallies of over 300 loggers who supported the government's decision to log over half of the valley. See Jody Paterson, "Forest Union Denies MacBlo's loggging plan an invitation for rape," *Times Colonist,* Tuesday April 24, 1990. In the Carmanah, there were numerous blockades as members of the IWA protested job loss, while environmentalists fought for preservation.

99 Marchak discusses job loss and forest industry restructuring in this period. See Patricia Marchak, "The Profligate Century and its Aftermath in British Columbia: A Case Study," *Logging the Globe* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), p. 85-116.

100 Ibid., p. 99.

101 The Western Wood Products Forum predicted widespread job loss in the future. See Western Wood Products Forum, *Human Resources in the British Columbia Wood Products Industry*_(1992 report), quoted in M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia* , p. 24.

102 Forest Resources Commission, *Final Report* (Victoria: Forest Resources Commission, April,1991).

platform.

Election Platform. The NDP's 1991 election platform promised reforms in five key areas of forest and land use policy. The Party committed to protect forest sector jobs, improve forest practices legislation, review the tenure system, increase public involvement, and double B.C.'s parks and wilderness areas.

The platform centred on the Jobs and Environment Accord, which focused on balancing the needs of workers with concerns about the environment. It stated that "we can have environmentally sensitive jobs in our resource economy" and that "forests must be managed to provide the greatest possible level of employment and value added for the people of this province."[103] Furthermore, the NDP promised to increase value added jobs, along with research and development. It would reduce the export of raw logs.

The NDP also promised to increase public participation in forest decision making by "protecting the rights of workers to participate fully in forest management and land use decision making at both the provincial and regional level."[104] The Jobs and Environment Accord proposed to "end the war in the woods" by resolving land use conflicts on a provincial and regional basis rather than on a valley-by-valley basis. In addition, the NDP Standing Committee on Ecology and Economy (one of the party's main forest policy making bodies) suggested that community resource boards should be established to give communities control over land and water use decisions.[105]

The NDP also proposed to "end the neglect of our forests." First, the Party committed to a comprehensive inventory of B.C.'s forests to ensure a sustainable level of logging. Second, it promised that it would "introduce stringent environmentally responsible forest management standards governing logging practices, clear-cutting, waste,

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[103] B.C. New Democratic Party "Government for the 90s: Towards a Sustainable Future," adopted by convention 1990, March 9-11, Vancouver, BC.

[104] B.C. New Democratic Party, "A Better Way for British Columbia: New Democratic Election Platform," 1991, #19.

[105] B.C. New Democratic Party Standing Committee on the Environment for an Ecologically and Economically Sustainable Future (SCOEE), "A New Forest Policy for the British Columbia New Democratic Party," Adopted by Provincial Convention, November 7th, 1992. The report suggests that there should be community resource management boards, section 3.2 p. 2.

reforestation, herbicide use and road building."[106] While the Social Credit government left big companies to police themselves, the NDP promised to develop a Forest Practices Act as recommended by the Forest Resources Commission.[107] The NDP also supported tenure reform, claiming that the present tenure system "lacks flexibility, does not consider other forest values" and ultimately does not perform the functions that it is supposed to. The Party suggested that a "Royal commission on forestry be established to make recommendations on the management, ownership and tenure of our forest lands." [108] Finally, the NDP promised to double BC's parks and wilderness areas by the year 2000.[109]

The NDP's 1991 election platform provided a range of reforms for the government to choose from. The platform included both structural reforms such as community control or tenure reform and moderate reforms for land use planning and forest management. Between 1991 and 1994, the NDP government did not implement the structural reform option. Instead, the government made legislative changes related to land use planning, protected areas, forest management, and forest practices. The flurry of initiatives included the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE), the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS), the Forest Practices Code, the Forest Renewal Plan and the various Interim Measures Agreements with Native peoples involved in land claim negotiations. These initiatives could be classified as moderate reforms.

A Review of the NDP Initiatives Between 1991 and 1994.

Did the NDP initiatives establish decentralized power, democratic control or new forest management ideas such as tenure reform? This review argues that the structural reform path was not taken, nor was it seriously considered. The NDP did not respond to

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106 B.C. New Democratic Party, "A Better Way For British Columbia: New Democratic Election Platform,"1991, #18.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., #17.
109 Ibid., #32.

demands for structural reform, but to a different, if not entirely unrelated set of concerns.

The government initiatives formed a strategy for incremental reform in reaction to concerns about public participation, protected areas, tougher forest regulations, and maintaining forest employment. While PAS identifies candidate areas to protect representative ecosystems across the province,[110] CORE is a vehicle for implementing this strategy.[111] In response to concerns about decreasing employment opportunities resulting from the other initiatives, Forest Renewal British Columbia (FRBC) was developed. FRBC is also an attempt to provide a strategy for dealing with the decrease in fibre supply across the province. This relates to the Chief Forester's review of the AAC. The Forest Practices Code works in conjunction with CORE and the PAS since it functions as a higher level plan. It also responds to demands for tougher forest regulations, and the need to improve forest practices.

In 1991, the NDP faced some important concerns which were outlined in the Forest Resources Commission Report. The report advised that comprehensive planning, democratic decision making, forest practices and tenure reform were needed. It also declared that few opportunities for public input exist in forest planning and management:

> The democratic decision-making process has, over time, moved further and further away from the people being governed. Government ministries and departments have also become further removed--concentrating on the elected government representatives above them rather than the people they were, in fact, serving. Ultimately there were few formal processes that allowed people to be directly involved in the decision making that affected them. [112]

Aside from minimal opportunities within Timber Supply Area and Timber Forest Licence planning, no formalized public involvement existed at the policy and planning level. A number of groups submitted briefs to the Commission requesting greater public involvement. Some called for the establishment of community forest boards or

110 British Columbia, *A Protected Areas Strategy for British Columbia* (Victoria: Province of B.C., 1993), p. vii.

111 The goals of CORE are outlined in BC Commission on Resources and Environment, *1993-94 Annual Report* (Victoria: Commission on Resources and Environment, August, 1994).

112 Quote From Forest Resources Commission report, *Forest Planning Canada* 6:3 (1992).

Commissions to formalize public participation at the local level.[113] The Commission advised that public participation provisions should be enshrined in legislation. It called for a public participation program with a legal mandate to be accountable to the public, and to allow public access at all levels.

The report also recommended new forest practices legislation and tenure reform. It highlighted the need for a forest practices code to improve the enforcement of regulations governing forest use. The Commission said that tenure was too concentrated and should be diversified in order to reflect other values associated with the forest.[114] The current tenure system which gives a few large holders access to most of the timber available for cutting should be diversified so that a larger share of the allowable annual cut (AAC) would be allocated to smaller tenure holders.[115] To achieve this, the AAC would either be managed by a Crown Corporation (dubbed Forestco) or reallocated to small area-based tenures managed by communities, Native Bands, Woodlot operators, or local management boards.[116]

The Forest Resources Commission's impact is debatable.[117] Unfortunately, its recommendations about tenure reform were unclear. In addition, its recommendations on transitional measures ("grand fathering") were obscure. If the report had contained a more detailed strategy for tenure reform, perhaps the government may have been encouraged to move in that direction. Nonetheless, the Forest Resources Commission identified some

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113 Forest Resources Commission, *Future of Our Forests, Background Papers*--Volume 9 (April, 1991), section 3, p. 1.

114 Forest Resources Commission, *Background Papers*--Volume 10 (1991), section 1.4, p. 101.

115 The Commission found support for area based tenures rather then volume-based tenures. Public comments also indicated that there was a need for much more balanced system of larger controlled tenures with smaller, community-based tenure options. It supported the woodlot program and other community based models. Forest Resources Commission, *Future of Our Forests, Background Papers*--Volume 9 (April, 1991), section 1.4 p. 57.

116 The Forest Resources Commission Background Papers suggested that more tenures like woodlots or community TFLs should be created which allow for family and community levels of forest management. For more details see ibid., p. 34.

117 For a more detailed discussion of the Forest Resources Commission, see Hammond, *Seeing the Forest.*

significant concerns, many of which were dealt with by the NDP government in its upcoming initiatives.

The Commission on Resources and the Environment and the Protected Areas Strategy were the government's attempts to deal with concerns about the lack of a comprehensive land use planning strategy, the need for more public participation and the need to reach the 12 per cent protected area goal.

Protected Areas Strategy. The Protected Areas Strategy (PAS) was initiated in May of 1992 as part of B.C.'s Land Use Strategy. Its goal was to develop an integrated system of representative areas protecting conservation, recreation and cultural heritage features. PAS continued the work of Parks and Wilderness for the 90s and the Old Growth Strategy Project, utilizing lists of study areas identified by these processes.[118] The long term goal of PAS is to protect 12 per cent of the province by the year 2000.[119]

To ensure comprehensive planning, the goals of PAS are factored into other planning processes such as CORE and Local Resource Management Plans. Across the province, eighteen LRMPs have been either completed or are in process.[120] These local steering committees were set up to establish public involvement through an open, consultative land use planning process.

There are a variety of players in the development and implementation of PAS. An interagency committee of senior deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers oversees this initiative. Another important body is the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) which was established to oversee PAS, the CORE regional tables and LRMP processes.

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118 BC Ministry of Environment Lands and Parks. Protected Areas Strategy Document.

119 Protected Area status means that the land may not be sold. No mining, logging, hydro dams or oil and gas development will occur within protected areas. For a definition of Protected Area see Government of British Columbia, *A Protected Areas Strategy for British Columbia*, p. 5.

120 Confirmed by a personal interview with an official at the Land Use Coordination Office, May, 1997.

Commission On Resources And Environment. The Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) was established in 1992 to fulfil the NDP's promise to end "valley-by-valley" conflict.[121] The CORE process aimed to designate the protected areas identified by the Provincial Land Use Strategy (PLUS) and to implement the 12 per cent protection goal outlined in the Protected Areas Strategy. It also fulfilled the Environment and Jobs Accord mandate to respect the economic needs of workers and communities as well as preserving long tern ecological sustainability. Just as the Accord promised to bring workers and environmentalists together by "ensure[ing] the highest degree of sustainable forest-based employment while conserving our unique wilderness areas," so did CORE promise both to protect jobs and to involve Labour developing a transition strategy.[122]

CORE was set up as a quasi-independent body with a mandate to facilitate the development of consensus recommendations on a land use strategy which would accommodate the interests of all groups or sectors involved in the forest debate in British Columbia.[123] The Commissioner, Stephen Owen, was authorized to supervise CORE's advisory work and to "report and recommend to the provincial Cabinet on land use and related resource and environmental issues in British Columbia, and on the need for legislation, policies and practices respecting these issues." [124]

The CORE process utilized the principles of shared decision making, meaning that "citizens are involved and participate directly, fairly and with a measure of equality with other more established sectors in the formulation and implementation of government

121 The *Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act* was passed by the B.C. Legislature on July 13, 1992. The Act requires the development of: a British Columbia-wide strategy for land use and related resource and environmental management; regional planning processes to define the uses to which areas of the province may be put; and community-based (local) participatory processes to consider land use and related resource and environmental management issues. See *Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act*, 1992 in Commission on Resources and Environment, Vancouver Island Land Use Plan, Volume I, February, 1994, p. 237.

122 New Democratic Party, "An Environment and Jobs Accord for BC," June 14, 1990.

123 The Commissioner was required to oversee community-based participatory processes and to give due consideration to economic, environmental and societal interests; to local, provincial and federal government responsibilities; and to the interests of Aboriginal peoples. The Commissioner's mandate is outlined in the *Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act*, 1992, Chapter 34, section 4(1-5).

124 *Commissioner on Resources and Environment Act,* 1992, Chapter 34, section 3(1).

decisions which affect their interests."[125] Recommendations were made by multi-stakeholder tables in four regions (Vancouver Island, Cariboo-Chilcotin, East and West Kootenay). Each table represented a range of interests, including the forest industry, fisheries, tourism, environment, and wildlife.[126] Between 1993 and 1995, the tables worked to formulate consensus recommendations.[127] The proposed land use plans for these four regions were submitted to the government between February 1994 and October 1994. Then the government considered and approved the plans for each of the regions.

CORE recommended a Sustainability Act [128] and suggested improvements for land use planning and management.[129] By late 1995, CORE had defined the broad objectives that would provide the context and direction for the Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP). In the spring of 1996, government announced that after successfully fulfilling its mandate, CORE was to be "wound down."[130] The Cabinet and bureaucracy no longer supported CORE for reasons related to the difficulty CORE had

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125 Shared decision making means that all sectoral interests shall have the right to participate directly in the dispute resolution effort, and that participation shall be timely, participants shall have the opportunity to review and make improvements to the decision making process, the participants shall be informed, and that all sectors with an interest shall participate. For a full description, see Bob Nixon, "Public Participation: Changing the Way We Make Forest Decisions," in Ken Drushka and Ray Travers eds. *Touch Wood,* p. 23-65. For a description of an organizational framework for Shared decision-making see the Commission on Resources and Environment, *The Provincial Land Use Strategy, Volume 3: Public Participation*, February, 1995, p. 47.

126 The composition of CORE tables varied. For example, the Vancouver Island table had 14 stakeholders, the East and West Kootenay tables had a total of 52. Each table represented a range of stakeholders.

127 The tables did not reach consensus.

128 It drafted a Land Use Charter, accepted in principle by the government in June 1993, and an extensive list of provincial land use goals, for details on the *Provincial Land Use Charter*, see BC Commission on Resources and Environment, *1993-94 Annual Report*, Appendix 2. Commissioner Stephen Owen made a number of general recommendations in his concluding reports. See B.C. Commission on Resources and Environment, *Finding Common Ground: A Shared Vision for Land Use in British Columbia* (Victoria: Queen's Printer for B.C., 1994). See also, B.C. Commission on Resources and Environment, *British Columbia's Strategy for Sustainability: A Report to the Legislative Assembly* (Victoria: Queen's Printer for B.C., 1994).

129 B.C, Commission on Resources and Environment, *1994-95 Annual Report* (Victoria: Queen's Printer for BC, 1995).

130 Office of the Premier, "Commission on Resources and Environment Winds Down," News Release, (Victoria: Province of British Columbia, March 7 1996).

forming a consensus and budget cuts.[131] The NDP found that other processes and government bodies could assume some of CORE's functions. For example, a new central agency, the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) now performs many of these functions--with fewer complications because LUCO does not have a mandate to involve the public.

The Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) was established in 1993 as a central agency with a mandate to coordinate and oversee land use planning. It increases interagency coordination by ensuring that the interests of all Ministries are represented. LUCO's key role is to review Land and Resource Management Plans (LRMP) to identify potential conflicts. When a dispute arises over a protected area within a particular LRMP, LUCO considers both sides of the issue, points out the options and implications of each decision and refers the matter to Cabinet. LUCO centralized the provincial cabinet's decision making power and increased government's capacity to coordinate cabinet responses to CORE and LRMP processes, and to oversee the PAS. During the 1994-96 period, LUCO's role expanded in order to supervise the numerous LRMP processes. Recently it has been supplying new LRMP's with protected area targets.

Land and Resource Management Plans. The Local Resource Management Plan (LRMP) is an instrument for sub-regional land use planning.[132] Through the LRMP process, the broad objectives outlined by CORE and PAS are interpreted along with the regional (e.g. Vancouver Island or East Kootenay) land use plans in order to create more specific objectives and guidelines.[133] Currently, there are eighteen LRMPs that are either completed or in process.

LRMPs have expanded to become the main players in land use planning. LRMP

131 These are two potential reasons why the government might have wound down CORE. Members of the environmental community were disappointed because they anticipated that CORE would have a watchdog role in the implementation of regional and local land use plans.

132 LRMP includes the same amount of land as a Timber Supply Area.

133 BC Ministry of Forests, *The British Columbia Forest Practices Discussion Paper* (Victoria: Queen's Printer for BC, 1994), Appendix 1.

provide a more comprehensive strategy than previous approaches, and they allow some opportunities for local people to comment on allocative decisions (such as park designation and other land use zonation). Most LRMPs involve a steering committee which consists of local resource managers who work with the public, First Nations, and government agencies to reach consensus on land use issues. Although the LRMP process seems like joint planning between government agencies and stakeholders, LRMP is generally an interagency process which allows minimal public input.[134] Government representatives from the Ministry of Forests, the Ministry of Environment, Land and Parks, and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources oversee the LRMP process. In fact, government ministries are able to subvert the local processes.[135]

In some instances, Community Resource Boards (CRB) were established to increase input from non-government organizations and the public. Community Resource Boards have been established in several regions including Mt.. Waddington, Nootka, Lillooet, Prince Rupert and Bulkley Valley to obtain feedback and involvement from local people. CRBs allow greater participation than LRMP steering committees since they represent a full range of interests at the local level. On some CRBs such as Bulkley Valley, members represent various value perspectives, allowing the Board to identify community values. On other CRBs, members represent interest perspectives. Both types of representation allow Local boards to identify and respond to key community concerns since members have a vested interest to do so.[136] Also, the Boards provide greater accountability and encourage public discussion because Board members are volunteers who must respond to the community.

CRBs develop LRMPs and provide advice to Cabinet through the Inter Agency Management Committee (IAMC) and the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO). They

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134 It is a shift away from the TSA planning system which is dominated by MOF and industry.
135 Members of British Columbia Environment Network argued that LRMP process was being limited by the need to adhere to the AAC's in certain regions. This is an example of MOF, or forestry goals interfering with the process. For details, see BC Environment Report
136 Tim Toman, Chair of the Bulkley Valley Community Resources Board, personal interview, November, 1995.

also work with the IAMC to coordinate TFLs and TSAs and to develop approaches to resource management zonation for the Timber Supply Area. [137] They also set objectives and strategies that guide lower level planning (subject to the approval of the Inter Agency Management Committee).

Although these boards have a broader mandate than the steering committees, they are merely advisory bodies. Although CRBs appear to have more control than regular LRMP processes, CRBs lack authority to make rules. Both processes are closely monitored by the IAMC and LUCO. Furthermore, the final decision about the land use plan is made by cabinet and there are no formal mechanisms to ensure that the government takes heed of the advice offered by LRMP steering committees or Community Resource Boards. Some community members have expressed concerns about the advisory status of LRMPs. Steve Thorlakson, the Mayor of Fort St. John, stated that "the LRMP is an effective organization working towards a realistic management and protection plan, however there is no guarantee that its recommendations will be accepted by the government."[138] These processes allow more public input, but they are merely advisory bodies which lack formal control.

In sum, CORE's demise is linked to the rise of LRMP processes. Writing in 1996, Maki noted that "throughout the last year, CORE receded in prominence as the primary mechanism by which land use planning is to be delivered and has been overtaken by interagency planning initiatives such as LRMP and LUCO." [139] The CORE process created greater challenges (some would say headaches) for the provincial government, since it exacerbated conflict in some regions. By contrast, the first LRMP (Kamloops) reached consensus, drawing rave reviews from government and the public. Government found that it could become involved in the host of LRMPs that function across the province, while maintaining the appearance of public control.

[137] B.C. Commission on Resources and Environment, *The Provincial Land Use Strategy, Volume 3: Public Participation* (Victoria: Queen's Printer for BC,1995), p. 69.
[138] Thorlakson, Steve, "Commentary on LRMP Processes," *BC Environment Report*, 1995.
[139] Tim Maki, "Institution Reform and Integrated Resource Management in British Columbia," M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1995, p. 46.

Forest Management Reforms

Forest Practices Code. In 1992, the Forest Resources Commission recommended that a code of forest practices be established for British Columbia. It suggested that sustainability, public input and increased standards should be the main principles of the new Code.[140] First, the Code should focus on the long-term sustainability of the forest by employing the principles of integrated resource management and linking forest practices to resource management priorities expressed in land-use plans. In addition, the Code should provide minimum provincial standards for practices on forest lands; and the application of these standards should be flexible in response to the varying ecological conditions found in British Columbia. Second, public input is required to develop locally relevant standards and to ensure that decision makers and resource managers are accountable. Finally, the Commission recommended that the Code should reward good practices and penalize poor practices.

Government ministries also supported tougher forest practices legislation. In the mid- 1980s, senior government officials began working on internal studies of forest legislation. By 1990, key officials in the Ministry of Forests and Environment worked internally on forest practices legislation because they anticipated the need for change.[141]

Another push for the Forest Practices Code came from the international campaign that criticized the mismanagement of B.C.'s forests. The campaign focussed on an

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140 For details on the recommendations see Forest Resources Commission, *Future of Our Forests--Background Papers*, Vol. 9, (April, 1991).

141 For details on the changes initiated by Philip Halkett and other MOF officials see "Halkett Attempts to Set a New Course for B.C.'s Forest Service," reprint of Philip Halkett's memo March 28, 1990, *Forest Planning Canada*, 6:4, 1990, p. 5.

international boycott of B.C. forest products.[142] Arguably, the Code is a direct response to pressure created by overseas public relations campaigns.[143]

The government responded to these demands for tougher forest practices legislation by establishing a Forest Practices Board in December 1994, charged with responsibility for designing the Forest Practices Code. The Forest Practices Code Act came into force June 15th, 1995. The purpose of the Forest Practices Code is "to set measurable and enforceable standards for forestry operations in British Columbia."[144] It represents a commitment to better management.

The Forest Practices Code is described as a "cascading set of laws and rules" which begins with the Forest Practices Code of BC Act.[145] The Act is the overarching legal framework by which the component parts of the Code falling beneath it are made law. It establishes the broad principles of the Code, outlines how the legislation will be administered and authorizes the specific rules and penalties associated with violations of the Code.

Beneath the Act are the Regulations which establish fundamental province-wide standards for a range of forest practices from timber harvesting to road construction. The Regulations also describe the contents of the various plans and prescriptions necessary before harvesting may proceed.

Below the Regulations are details for the implementation of the "Chief Forester's

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142 In March of1993, Friends of Clayoquot Sound called for European support for the boycott of B.C. forest products. In June of the same year, German Green Party Members of Parliament declared support for the boycott of B.C. lumber due to destructive forestry practices. Environmental groups approached buyers of B.C. pulp and paper in Britain and Germany and asked them to terminate their contracts with those suppliers who either practiced clearcut logging or who obtained their wood from old-growth forests. The campaign focussed on MacMillan Bloedel, the company with rights to harvest a large portion of Clayoquot Sound. For details, see Carol Anne Mackenzie, "The German Environmental Movement and B.C. Forestry Practices: An Analysis of Strategy Choices," M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1996, p. 12.

143 Mackenzie argues, "Under the threat of boycotts, trade blocks and international disrepute as a result of its logging practices," the NDP government was forced to respond to pressures for environmental protection and sustainable forestry practices. See Ibid, p. 13.

144 Quote from Ministry of Forests, *Forest Planning Canada* ,9:5 (1993), p.5.

145 British Columbia Ministry of Forests, *The British Columbia Forest Practices Code Discussion Paper*, p. 1.

Standards." These will be legally enforceable, area-specific standards set by the Chief Forester to enhance the forest practices outlined in the Act and Regulations and to allow for site-specific variability. These have not been established yet.

Finally, below the Standards are the guidebooks, which assist in the application of the Regulations and Standards to site-specific interpretations. Guidebooks are "how-to" manuals describing key management practices that operators should use in order to meet Code requirements. Guidebooks are legally enforceable as contracts incorporated into license documents, therefore they will be "indispensable to the Code's success."[146]

The Code's central theme is "the command control regulation of our relationship with the forest environment."[147] The Code contains commands and controls in relation to planning, and enforcement, as well as a review and appeals process.

The Code contains rules to guide strategic and operational planning. Both strategic planning which occurs at higher levels and operational planning for specific forest operations must be consistent with broader objectives established by Resource Management Zone designations.[148] Licensees must prepare and submit operational plans to the Ministry which attempt to "incorporate environmental values into up-front planning before operations begin on the ground."[149] Licensees formulate their own plans, which must be approved by the Ministry. Approved plans are then enforceable as law, as a matter of private contract between the government and the licensee.

The Code also outlines details of enforcement including administrative penalties monetary penalties, stop work orders, remediation orders, suspensions and other penalties. These are all subject to review and appeal. In addition, the regulations outline quasi-criminal penalties. The Code increased the number of ticketable offences to 107. It

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146 Ministry of Forests, *Discussion Paper*, p. 6.

147 This quote from Frank Cassidy appears in Tracey Cook, "Sustainable Practices? An Analysis of B.C.'s Forest Practices Code," in Chris Tollefson ed. *The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation and Sustainable Forestry* (Draft, July 1997), p. 335.

148 Based on the advice of CORE and LRMPs, RMZs are to be designated. RMZs are broad land and resource designations that provide objectives and zoning requirements for lower level plans.

149 Cook, "Sustainable Practices?," p. 342.

toughens enforcement by increasing the maximum amount of fines as high as $1 million per day.[150] Furthermore, direct and officer liability is required along with maximum fines and remedial orders to repair damage. Compliance is now mandatory instead of by contract. A violator of the regulations can be refused a permit by the District Manager.

In addition to an increased range of penalties and fines, the Code contains an enhanced statutory administrative review and appeal process. Decisions or determinations made as a result of the Code are subject to the review and appeal process described in the Act and Regulations. The Code allows forest companies or the Forest Practices Board (on its own or on behalf of the public) to request a review or appeal.[151] The Forest Practices Board monitors the implementation of the Code. Promoted as "the public's watchdog on effective forest management,"[152] the Board is responsible for overseeing the activities of both industry and government in relation to the Code by performing independent audits and reporting results to the Minister and the general public.

The Board is also authorized to investigate public complaints regarding the application of the Code, and to publicise its results.[153] The Administrative review and appeal procedure provides a lever for public involvement.[154]

In order to implement the Forest Practices Code, restructuring occurred within the Ministry of Forests, which resulted in increasing the power of District Managers. B.C. Forest Service staff were relocated from Victoria to District Offices so that District

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150 For details, see the section on Administrative Remedies in the *Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act* -- Regulations (Queen's Printer For British Columbia, April, 1995).

151 Cook, "Sustainable Practices?," p. 342.

152 As described by Andrew Petter, then Minister of Forests and Moe Sihota, then Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks, as they announced the approval of the Board on December 21, 1994.

153 Where the Board finds through its audits or as a result of investigating public complaints that the Code's intent is not achieved, the Board may initiate an administrative review or appeal, conduct a special investigation, make recommendations, or publish special reports about all matters of application and implementation of the Code. The Forest Practices Board Regulation, B.C. Regulation No. 170/95 describes how the Board will carry out its mandate, details how auditors are selected and appointed, how audits are managed, and how public complaints will be heard.

154 For a discussion of the Forest Practices Board, see *Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act* -- Regulations, (Administrative Review and Appeal Procedure, Part 3, section 6,7).

toughens enforcement by increasing the maximum amount of fines as high as $1 million per day.[150] Furthermore, direct and officer liability is required along with maximum fines and remedial orders to repair damage. Compliance is now mandatory instead of by contract. A violator of the regulations can be refused a permit by the District Manager.

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154 For a discussion of the Forest Practices Board, see *Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act* -- Regulations, (Administrative Review and Appeal Procedure, Part 3, section 6,7).

Managers could supervise the implementation of the Forest Practices Code and the maintenance of the various guidelines and guides. District Managers have considerable discretion and authority to modify the regulations or to make exemptions.[155]

Critics argue that the Code grants too much power to District Managers. For example, the Code allows District Managers to decide when and where to enforce the regulations. A District Manager has discretion to choose the "appropriate action in any given circumstance."[156] In most cases, District Managers merely give instructions. Forty-nine per cent of all enforcement action taken is in the form of instructions.[157] Another concern is that "It cannot be told how often field staff look away in the face of a potential violation simply to avoid the corresponding paperwork."[158] One scholar, Tracey Cook asks "Who is watching the watchers themselves?"[159]

Although the Code devolved decision making authority from the Deputy Minister of Forests and the Chief Forester to the regional and District managers:

> ...this perception of decentralization is perhaps more illusory than real. District and regional managers are simply another level of the MOF bureaucracy, taking their place near the bottom rung of the hierarchy. District and regional managers owe their allegiances to the levels of the bureaucracy above them, and have little relation to the people and communities in their districts. [160]

Thus decisions under the Code are still being made by agents of the central government, "leaving the locus of power at the centre, rather than dispersed according to the principle of

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155 District Managers have authority to prepare development plans, review operational plans, assess logging plans, refuse a logging plan, and decide which plans require public review. For details on the District Manager's responsibilities see Province of British Columbia, "Effective Enforcement of the Forest Practices Code" (Queen's Printer for British Columbia, November, 1995), pp. 3-5. See also, *Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act* -- Regulations, (Part 2, section 6, and Part 4, section 33).

156 Cook, "Sustainable Practices?," p. 356.

157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., p. 373.

subsidiarity."[161]

The Code contains no provisions for community enforcement, and there are few mechanisms to hold District Managers accountable. District managers are only held accountable by the threat of replacement if decisions are not desirable. Moreover, managers do not gain direct benefit from better management nor do they suffer from declines in resource values.[162]

Critics also argue that the Code is highly bureaucratic and technical in nature, and that it fails to achieve structural change. When combined with all the regulations, proper standards and guides, the Forest Practices Code is 1800 pages. Because of its complex, technical nature, the Code is cumbersome to administer. Scholars argue that the Code relies too heavily on command and control mechanisms and that it increases the role of the bureaucracy.[163] The command and control approach attempts to govern forest resources across the province from central offices in Victoria. Instead, Cook argues "Enforcement under the Code then, should make use of a variety of mechanisms, both carrots and sticks, tailored to meet the requirements of different provisions in the legislation and related documents more efficiently, effectively and equitably."[164]

Although the Code improved substantive and procedural provisions, these changes were superimposed onto a structure of industrial forest production. The Code neither alters the tenure system nor changes the structure of industrial forestry. M'Gonigle argues that by changing the rules of forestry in B.C. without changing the institutional structure, the government has "put the cart before the horse," and significant inroads will not be made towards the goal of sustainable forestry.[165] Proof that little has changed is that clearcutting was approved for 92 per cent of the over 10,000 cut blocks authorized since the Code came

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161 Michael M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Political Ecology Approach," in Chris Tollefson ed. *The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation and Sustainable Forestry* (Draft, July 1997), p. 192.

162 Ibid., p. 192.

163 Cook, "Sustainable Practices?," p. 366.

164 Ibid., p. 366.

165 M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests," p. 192.

into effect. Although the Code seeks to protect biodiversity, it operates within the "sustained yield" paradigm that assigns priority to timber production. Therefore it "neither challenged the productionist economic structure of the forest industry nor the bureaucratic orientation of the Forest Service."[166]

Timber Supply Review. In 1991, MOF reported that the rate of cut, known as the allowable annual cut (AAC) was too high to continue at a sustainable level. The NDP government initiated the Timber Supply Review in order to determine a sustainable rate of cut in B.C. The Chief Forester was responsible for supervising a four stage review process. First, he reviewed the timber supplies in each of the 36 Timber Supply Areas, setting out what reductions in cut (if any) were necessary to reach a rate of cut that could be sustained. Each timber analysis was followed by a report on the economic and social impact of reductions in the rate of cut. Then the Ministry produced a discussion paper on the changes, and invited comments from the public. Finally, the Chief Forester set the new AAC, using the information gathered in the review.

The Timber Supply Review dealt with a highly sensitive issue: the impact of reducing the AAC. Many people expected that the process would have a drastic impact on the level of AAC, resulting in job loss and dislocations in communities. However, the Chief Forester's mandate, outlined in the Forest Act is to look at the impact of changing the AAC and to carry out a socioeconomic analysis. Forest Minister Andrew Petter directed the Chief Forester to avoid reductions in the AAC which would reduce the number of jobs available in the forest sector.[167] Although legally, the Chief Forester "shall consider the social and economic objectives of the government," the recent experience indicates that political interests are interfering with the Timber Supply Analysis.[168] The government was interested in delaying reductions in the cut as long as possible to minimize short term

166 Ibid., p. 192.
167 Vaughn Palmer, "Timber-review delay a break for NDP," *Vancouver Sun*, February 9, 1994. also Andrew Petter letter.
168 Ibid.

job loss and to avoid negative reactions from industry and forest workers.

The Timber Supply Review process involved the government's traditional methods of allowing public input. The public had limited opportunities to react to the process. Reports were carried out by local MOF staff, and the final decision was made by the Chief Forester.

Some critics argue that rather than listening to what the general public wanted, the Timber Supply Review focused on the economic needs of forestry and forest dependent communities.[169] Although one of its initial aims was to lower the AAC, the first round of the process did not significantly reduce the overall AAC. Although the AAC was sharply reduced in the southern half of the province, in areas such as Fort Nelson, the AAC was actually increased. In the last four years 3 per cent of B.C.'s total land base has been protected yet there has only been 1.2 per cent reduction in the overall AAC. Since the Chief Forester considered the government's socioeconomic agenda, the Timber Supply Review maintained the system of large scale timber production and the high rate of cut.

Forest Renewal British Columbia. Prior to the 1991 election, the NDP committed to protecting forest industry jobs. The party platform promised to develop new initiatives in sustainable forestry practices and to expand value-added and remanufacturing employment. Through Forest Renewal British Columbia (FRBC), the NDP reassured workers and forest dependent communities that "not one forest worker will be left without the option to work in the forest."[170] Forest Renewal BC was created in June of 1994 as a result of concerns raised in the CORE process, with a mandate to renew B.C.'s forests and create more jobs.

FRBC is a Crown Corporation charged with reinvesting wealth generated from increased stumpage rates into enhancing forests, getting more value from each tree cut, creating new jobs and helping communities diversify their economies. It invests up to

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169 For details, see Maki, "Institution Reform."

170 Forest Renewal British Columbia, *Our Forest Future: Working in Partnership*, 1995 p. 3.

$400 million each year into forest communities across B.C. The *BC Forest Renewal Act* guarantees that stumpage and royalty revenues will be permanently available to Forest Renewal BC.

Forest Renewal BC has a board of Directors which reports to the Legislature through the Minister. The Board attempts to ensure that forestry stakeholders have input into decisions that impact British Columbia's forests. It includes twelve private sector representatives and six public representatives from various sectors such as forestry workers, First Nations, environmentalists, communities and government. Regional offices were established in each of the province's six forest regions to "work with the knowledge and experience of the local people to develop the best investment strategy for their region."[171]

According to Chair CEO Roger Stanyer, the Corporation's goal is to ensure a healthy future for B.C.'s forest economy.[172] Its priorities involve: enhanced silviculture, restoring and protecting the forest environment, providing new skills and jobs for workers, increasing jobs and value from every tree cut, and strengthening communities that rely on the forests. The Board has committees on Land and Resources, Work Force, Value Added, Communities and the Environment. The Committee members are appointed by the public, board, stakeholders. They consult with interest groups and recommend programs to the board for Forest Renewal BC investments. The committees also make policy recommendations, provide advice concerning appropriate regional investments, and recommend criteria for making, monitoring and evaluating investments.[173] The Board invests in projects on a regionally equitable basis, and attempts to reflect each region's needs and priorities.

FRBC received support from a wide range of people including the IWA, the forest sector and some environmentalists. As Gerry Stoney, an IWA representative and advisor to the Minister said:

171 Ibid., p. 7.
172 Forest Renewal British Columbia, *Handbook For Land Based Programs* ,1995 p. 2.
173 Forest Renewal British Columbia, *Our Forest Future*, p. 8.

> BC is going to have the where-with-all to promote intensive silviculture, value-added (manufacturing) and training in ways...that will add quality jobs, enhance our forests, protect the environment, (and) stabilize forest communities."[174]

Vicky Husband of the Sierra Club also offered support for the program: "This is a major, major step in the right direction...The plan recognizes a lot of things we've been fighting for."[175]

The Central Regional Board and the Interim Measures Agreement.

In 1993 the B.C. government's land use decision for Clayoquot Sound designated areas for protection, areas available for logging, and special management zones. Members of the public claimed that the decision did not adequately protect temperate rain forests. There were numerous protests throughout the summer of 1993 to express public dissatisfaction over the decision. Over 800 people were arrested for blocking roads or interfering with logging operations, making the Clayoquot Summer 1993 the largest civil disobedience case in Canadian history.

In response to the protests, and as a result of recommendations from CORE, the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel was established in 1993. The Panel's mandate was "to develop world class standards for sustainable forest management by combining traditional and scientific knowledge."[176] Employing a consensus based process, it developed guiding principles and 130 recommendations. In July 1995, the government committed to implement the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel recommendations including the adoption of the ecosystem-based approach to planning.

The Clayoquot land use decision was also criticized for its failure to involve First Nations in decisions that would affect their ancient territories and waters. The Central Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation claimed that their interests had not been adequately considered in

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174 Gerry Stoney, quoted in Forest Renewal British Columbia, ibid., p. 21.
175 Ibid., p. 21.
176 The Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound, *Report 3: First Nations' Perspectives*, March 1995: p. 3.

the decision making process.[177] As protests in the Sound continued, negotiations took place between the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation and the B.C. government. The Interim Measures Agreement between the Hawiih [178] of the Nuu-chah-nulth Central Region Tribes and the Government of British Columbia, was signed in March 1994.[179] The Interim Measures Agreement was established to ensure that aboriginal rights are respected and aboriginal peoples are involved in management of and decisions affecting their traditional territory until Treaty negotiation.

The Central Region Board is a joint management process to provide First Nations an ongoing role in resource management and land use planning within Clayoquot Sound prior to the settlement of treaty negotiations.[180] The Board is also responsible for implementing the recommendations of the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel. A brief review of the mandate, objectives, structure and activities of the Board reveals that it provides unprecedented opportunities for First Nations and local people to have input into resource management, economic development and social issues.

The CRB mission is to advise government in regard to the management of lands and resources in Clayoquot Sound in a manner that: "conserves resources in Clayoquot Sound and promotes resource use that supports sustainability, economic diversification and ecological integrity."[181] Another key aspect of the mission is to incorporate the Scientific Panel Recommendations and its acceptance and recognition of traditional ecological knowledge.[182] Some of the key objectives of the Central Regional Board are: "to promote more sustainability, economic development, and diversification for communities within

177 Nuu-chah Nulth land claim...

178 "Hawiih" means chief. The First Nations in Clayoquot Sound include the Central Nuu-Chah-nulth Tribes of Hesquiaht First Nation, Ahousaht First nation, Tla-o-qui-aht First Nations, Ucluelet First Nations and Toquaht First Nation.

179 This agreement was renegotiated and extended as the Interim Measures Extension Agreement (IMEA) in Spring 1996 (Interim Measures Extension Agreement).

180 The CRB was established in response to the BC Claims Task Force recommendation that "the parties negotiate interim measures before or during treaty negotiations when an interest is being affected which could undermine the process" (Clayoquot Sound Interim Measures Extension Agreement).

181 Interim Measures Agreement, section 1.

182 Ibid., section (2).

Clayoquot Sound, including infrastructure within those communities; to support the attainment of the 12 per cent representation of ecological zones for future generations in Clayoquot Sound; and to restore and enhance levels of fish and wildlife."[183] In addition, the Board is responsible for "[assessing] compliance with world class forest standards, such as the Scientific Panel Recommendations and Forest Practices Code."[184] Concurrently, the CRB must provide viable, sustainable forest industry in Clayoquot Sound.[185] Finally, the board is responsible for the maintenance of visual attractiveness and protecting aboriginal uses.

Members of the CRB work towards ensuring that all interests--aboriginal and non-aboriginal--are represented and respected in land and resource use decisions in Clayoquot Sound. Board members include five provincial appointees, five First Nations appointees, and two co-chairs appointed by the Province and First Nations respectively.[186] The five provincial appointees represent regional interests in Port Alberni, Uclulet and Tofino, reporting to their respective councils and communities.

The CRB hears public concerns about resource management in Clayoquot Sound and recommend solutions to government.[187] Board members "wear community hats," meaning they represent the full range of interests and concerns in their community rather than a particular interest perspective (e.g. environmental, labour).[188] This structure of representation encourages discussion between competing interests and promotes a reconciliation between environmentalists, labour, industry, First Nations, recreational users, governments, and all others with concerns about Clayoquot Sound. The Board is guided by the principles of openness, encouraging certain interests to bring their concerns

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183 Ibid., section (8 a, b, d, and e).

184 Assessment shall incorporate the perspective of First Nations, Ibid., section 8(f).

185 Ibid., section 8(g).

186 Ibid., section 7(a).

187 Ibid., section 9(e).

188 The Co–chair, Ross Macmillan, observes that the non-sectoral structure of representing interests provides a more effective means of representation since it avoids the polarization that can occur with a diversity of interest perspectives.

forward.[189]

The Board reviews all government decisions regarding land and resource activities as well as decisions on tenures and renewals (ie: TFLs). The CRB deals with concerns about which geographic areas will be logged, and how to log. The board can accept, propose modifications to, or recommend the rejection of the plan. Alternatively, it can refer the matter to Cabinet.

As mentioned above, another function of the CRB is to monitor the Clayoquot Sound Scientific Panel (hereafter the Panel) implementation process. The government's adoption of the Panel's 130 recommendations including the ecosystem based approach[190] gave the CRB a mandate to adopt a proactive, anticipatory approach. Instead of merely reacting to government proposals, the Board can work from the community level to implement the new approaches.

The CRB represents a major shift of power to local people. Although the board has advisory status, all of its recommendations to date have been accepted by government.[191] The main reason for the CRB's power is that government fears that if it opposes the Board's decisions, it will be criticized by members of the public and the international community.[192] If, for instance, the government did not agree with the board's advice, a dispute resolution process would be initiated which would spark the involvement of broader interests such as labour and environmental interests. As Adrienne Carr of the Western Canada Wilderness Committee observes "what CRB says goes." [193]

Despite the Board's lack of formal authority, the Board has power vested in international opinion and interest groups. It is referred to as the "most extensive decision

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189 The Board is governed by the principle of openness. See Interim Measures Agreement, section 7(e).

190 One of the panel philosophies is that "the world is connected at all levels; human activities must respect...all...life; long-term ecological and economic sustainability are essential to long term harmony; and the cultural, spiritual, social and economic well-being of indigenous people is a necessary part of harmony," ibid, p. 6.

191 Ross Macmillan, personal interview, 1995.

192 Adrienne Carr, Western Canada Wilderness Committee, personal interview September 31st, 1996.

193 Ibid.

making power given to communities and First Nations to date."[194] In sum, the board is a unique body which provides local community members and aboriginal people an unprecedented decision making role. While the CRB allows a significant degree of community control. It is a clearly an anomaly. Rather than being proof of a shift towards community control, it is the result of the peculiar circumstances of Clayoquot Sound, most importantly, the conflict and international attention it has attracted. Since Clayoquot has been in the national, international and provincial spotlight, the B.C. government was pushed to grant local control in the area.

Analysis of the NDP Initiatives

This analysis considers whether the initiatives described above achieved decentralized power, community control, or tenure reform.[195] The first section determines whether these initiatives established community control--granted members of the public and communities authority to make rules and decisions. The second section determines whether any of the NDP's new initiatives altered the centralized system of tenure and control over forest resources.

Public consultation is not community control. Among the policy initiatives discussed above, only the Central Regional Board took measures to shift control over B.C.'s forests to members of the public and communities.[196] Initiatives such as the LRMP, Community Resource Boards (CRB), and the Forest Practices Code did not significantly shift power. Although the policies contain provisions to enhance public input and consultation, they do not implement community control since decision making authority still rests firmly in the Ministry of Forests. For example, the LRMP process allows greater public involvement,

194 Ibid.

195 As noted earlier, these three structural reformelements would constitute a "significant revision" since they would change key aspects of the policy core.

196 Although the government did not formally shift control to the CRB, arguably, where the CRB lacks formal control it has control due to public and international pressure.

but it does not result in the type of community control envisioned in proposals such as Tin Wis. The main actors in LRMPs are representatives of various government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Forests. In some processes, non-government representatives are more involved, for example, when a Community Resource Board (CRB) has been established.

Like LRMPs, Community Resource Boards increase public consultation; however, they do not implement community control. Since Community Resource Boards are merely advisory, they lack the kind of control envisaged by community forest board advocates. In fact, the CRBs which have been established are not that different from the host of public advisory groups (such as the Wilderness Advisory Committee) that have existed throughout the province in the past 20 years. CRBs merely a provide greater opportunities for public review and consultation. These processes merely consult the public instead of granting them power to make decisions.[197] CRBs lack the authority to make rules and they do not have tenure rights over the land. For example, the Bulkley Valley CRB failed to change the AAC.[198] Its recommendations which would impact the rate of AAC, became subject to a government review of the AAC pending the implementation of the land use plan. Even with their input into land use plans, CRBs are powerless to stop large scale industrial forestry from occurring since corporations still hold tenure in the area. Another barrier to the boards' effectiveness is that some communities are hamstrung by the fact that mills control employment and revenue in the community.

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197 Joan Vance measures public participation by using Arnstein's ladder which is a continuum from citizen control through lesser degrees of control such as placation, consultation and informing the public. The government's recent initiatives can be classified as "consultation" or "placation" since public advisory committees or planning teams were employed. Vance states that this approach is tokenism since these bodies are merely advisory, and that the public does not share in decision making power. For more details, see Joan Vance. *Tree Planning: A Guide to Public Involvement in Forest Stewardship* (Vancouver: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1990).

198 Tim Toman, Chair of the Bulkley Valley Board described the experience in a personal interview, November 1995.

Ultimately, cabinet makes the final decision on land use plans.[199]

Similarly, the Forest Practices Code also fails to grant community control. Although the Code provides a lever for public involvement through the review and appeal procedure, this process is overseen by a government-appointed Commission. The Code does not contain provisions for community enforcement. Moreover, the Code grants considerable discretion to District Managers who owe their loyalty to the Ministry of Forests, and few mechanisms exist to hold District Managers accountable to the public. Increasing the power of district Managers does not approximate the model of a local forest board making decisions about its own forest land.

The initiatives mentioned above do not significantly shift power: control and decision making authority continue to rest firmly in the hands of the Ministry of Forests. Although the policies contain community input provisions to enhance public consultation, they do not implement community control. The Central Regional Board is the only initiative that represents a shift of control over BC's forests to the public. The Board structure facilitates an unprecedented degree of accountability and representativeness. In addition, it has the ability to influence government. Yet the Central Regional Board is an anomalous case rather than proof that the NDP government chose structural reform.

Centralized Control of Tenure and Forest Management. Although the NDP mentioned tenure reform in its election platform, this issue was not addressed during the 1992-95 term. The government neither initiated steps towards tenure reform, nor committed to examine tenure reform in upcoming years.

Just as the tenure system was left intact by the NDP, so was the centralized structure for setting the AAC and controlling forest revenues. Even after the NDP's

199 In addition, the need to respect existing tenure arrangements frustrates LRMP and CRB efforts since industry demands compensation for expropriation of its tenure rights. CRBs and LRMP steering committees have no authority to deal with critical issues of tenure or the level of Allowable Annual Cut. As a result, industry retains control of tenures while the Ministry retains ultimate control over decision making.

reforms, the AACs are still set by the Chief Forester and stumpage still flows to the centre. The host of new initiatives did not shift control over the AAC, the Chief Forester makes the final decision about land use (and the AAC).[200]

Just as the AAC remains under centralized control, so do revenues from forestry. Some revenue from stumpage is channelled to FRBC which controls the distribution of funds. For example, communities must submit proposals to FRBC to gain funding for development and adjustment programs. FRBC approves proposals which provide funding for value added industry and enhanced silviculture, in order to create jobs in communities. FRBC, however, relies on stumpage from large scale industrial forestry operations. Therefore benefits are shipped out of communities on logging trucks to return as funds to be spent within parameters set by the FRBC. Under FRBC, communities may apply for programs such as watershed renewal, stream clean ups, and tree planting. However, one concern is that programs of this nature are overly reliant on government hand outs from coffers stocked by revenues from large scale industrial forestry. In sum, FRBC does not decentralize control over benefits from forestry.

Conclusion: Structural Reform, the Path Not Taken

Although the policies reviewed above took some steps toward greater public participation, they did not decentralize power or establish community control. These initiatives increase public consultation but do not redistribute power. They do not respond to demands for structural reform. Instead, the initiatives address other concerns about land use, the lack of public participation, the decline in jobs and inadequate forest practices legislation. PAS created more parks to please environmentalists and members of the public. Similarly, CORE addressed widespread demands for more public involvement and more inclusive conflict resolution methods. In addition, FRBC provided jobs for forest workers. The Forest Practices Code was another part of the NDP agenda which

200 For example, LRMP processes do not have control over setting the AAC.

aimed to restore the confidence of international markets. The government did not initiate structural reform, it merely addressed concerns about legitimacy. The initiatives seem to be an attempt to resolve the crisis of legitimacy by ending the war in the woods. This argument will be expanded later.

These reforms can be classified as moderate or incremental reforms rather than structural reforms. As mentioned earlier structural reform means changing existing institutions to decentralize power and to achieve democratic control. Even though the NDP's reforms indicate a significant shift in the government's priorities the shift did not incorporate these aspects of structural reform. Michael M'Gonigle notes "The various initiatives launched by the government--the Forest Renewal Act, the Protected Areas Strategy, CORE, and the Forest Practices Act are partial solutions, and they are a necessary and important beginning. But the deeper challenge lies ahead."[201] Paul Senez, the forest campaigner for the Sierra Club during the Harcourt years, comments that policies do not satisfy environmentalists' appetite for reform:

> The NDP tells us they're going to send us a pizza, but all they've been giving us is empty cardboard boxes. You open the box and there's no pizza. Forest Practices Code, Land use planning, Forest Renewal: open the box, look inside and you'll be disappointed. If that's the case: why are we being so supportive of this government when all they're doing is giving us is empty boxes?[202]

These policies give B.C. forest policy a "makeover" without correcting the underlying structural faults. The government chose to adopt moderate reforms rather than structural reforms such as community forest boards. Instead of a facelift, however, B.C. forest policy needs a full scale revamping--a significant revision of its core ideas. The NDP initiatives do not significantly challenge the the core ideas of B.C. forest policy. The task ahead is to uncover the reasons why structural reforms were not implemented.

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201 M'Gonigle, 1994 p. 49. Community Forest Board Article. get permission.

202 Paul Senez, (Forest Campaign Director, Sierra Club), personal interview, July 1996.

CHAPTER FOUR: ECONOMIC FACTORS

Introduction

The following three chapters investigate why community forest boards were not implemented in B.C. by exploring three sets of factors: economic, bureaucratic and political, and ideological. This chapter shows how economic factors influenced the NDP's decision to avoid structural reform and opt for moderate reform. Globalization, the capitalist structure and B.C.'s economic dependence on forestry produce a framework of constraints which affect the distribution of bargaining chips between industry and government in forest policy negotiations. Industry uses powerful tools and structural advantages to protect its privileges and prerogatives. For example, transnational corporations can threaten to relocate, as well as apply pressure through more direct methods such as lobbying and elite linkages. Furthermore, underlying the negotiations between government and industry are certain core understandings which neither party wishes to violate. At the centre of this tacit agreement is a consensus on the terms and conditions under which industry enjoys access to the resource and a shared commitment to pursuing what has been called the liquidation-conversion project. From this understanding flowed the B.C. government's decision to avoid community forest boards.

Yet economic constraints cannot fully account for the state's action. They do not explain why the government implemented moderate reforms that were unfavourable to industry. Apparently, business does not always get everything it wants. Although the state depends on industry for job creation, revenue and overall economic health, it must also respond to other political considerations discussed in the next few chapters. The recent policy decisions to toughen regulations and expand the Protected Areas system show that the state has some priorities that are different from industry's. In other words, economic factors strongly influenced but did not determine the government's decision to avoid structural reform.

The Significance of Forestry to B.C.'s Economy

As mentioned in Chapter One, forestry is an important sector in the B.C. economy. Forestry contributes to overall economic health, manufacturing, exports, and employment. Two thirds of the province, or 60 million hectares is covered by forest land.[203] The forest industry makes a significant contribution through exports and manufacturing. B.C. is the leading world exporter of forest products.[204] Over the period 1989-1991 British Columbia averaged 45 per cent of total Canadian forest products exports which is 8 per cent of the world total.[205] B.C. is the world's largest exporter of softwood lumber, representing 9 per cent of world softwood lumber production and 35 per cent of world softwood lumber exports.[206] Forest products are an important source of foreign exchange for both B.C. and Canada. Forest products account for 55 per cent of all B.C. exports of goods.[207] In 1993, a record level of $11.8 billion of forest products was exported, representing 62 per cent of provincial exports. In 1994, forestry contributed $5 billion to the B.C. economy (in constant 1986 dollars).[208, 209] Forestry-related manufacturing (e.g. wood and paper products) including shipping and exports accounts for 50 to 60 percent of provincial activity.[210] The forest industry directly contributes approximately 9 per cent of the

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203 Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree*, p. 15.

204 See BC Ministry of Forests, *1994 Forest, Range and Recreation Analysis* (Victoria, British Columbia: Ministry of Forests, 1994), p. 205.

205 Ibid., p. 205.

206 Ibid., p. 206.

207 Ibid., p. 198.

208 Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree*, p. 16.

209 It was once a widely held belief that 50 cents of every dollar was created by the forest industry. In reality, forestry contributes between 10 and 15 per cent of the GDP. The amount the forest sector added to the GDP has declined from 15 to 10 percent with a low of 8 percent in the 1982 recession. Yet, as a major source of export dollars, forestry is important from an input/output perspective. For more information see Ray Travers "Forest Policy: Rhetoric and Reality," *Touch Wood: BC Forest Policy at the Crossroads* Ray Travers and Ken Drushka eds. (Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing, 1993), p. 183.

210 The manufacturing figure is misleading because not all wealth in B.C. is generated by the production and sale of manufactured goods. Tourism, investment and soft-technology are also important industries. See BC Ministry of Forests, *1994 Forest, Range and Recreation Analysis*, p. 198.

provincial GDP.[211]

The forest industry provides 90,000 direct jobs, approximately 6 per cent of the provincial total.[212] Forest employment dropped to 82,000 in 1986, and then reached a high of 100,000 in 1989.[213] Moreover, a multiplier of two (e.g. that each direct job translates into two indirect ones) is usually assumed, generating estimates of total direct and indirect employment in the 15-20 per cent range.[214] Forestry provides a substantial amount of income for forest workers since they receive a total of approximately $4.5 billion annually in wages.[215]

Just as workers rely on the forest industry, so do communities. Many B.C. communities rely heavily on forestry. A Forest Resources Commission study of the seven main regions across the province confirmed that more than half of the communities in these regions earn at least 30 per cent of their basic income from this sector.[216] A recent study of the Interior, Coast and Vancouver Island had similar results. Of fifty-five study areas, forty of the areas were determined to be "forestry dependent." For example, Campbell River is 70 per cent dependent on forestry; Hazelton is 80 per cent dependent; Burns Lake is 79 per cent dependent; Smithers is 67 per cent dependent and Williams Lake is 72 per cent dependent on forestry. In addition, Prince George is 70 per cent dependent, while Quesnel is 77 per cent dependent.[217] These communities lack economic

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211 This contribution varies from 6.5 per cent to 11.3 per cent over the last 10 years. The significant variation is the result of trends and fluctuations on the world market. Ibid., p. 198.

212 Ibid., p. 197.

213 This discussion shows that the forest industry's share of the GDP is higher than its share of provincial employment. This is because forestry is capital intensive, particularly in paper and allied products. Forestry has high labour productivity.

214 BC Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, *The Structure of the British Columbia Economy: a Land Use Perspective* (Prepared for the B.C. Round Table on the Environment and Economy, 1991).

215 Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree*, p. 16.

216 Forest Resources Commission, *Future of Our Forests*, Background Report--9, Appendix 1.

217 From a report from the BC Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, 1996 on the main generators of jobs and economic activity in communities around the province. Overwhelmingly, the findings support the claims that forestry remains the number one industry in most communities outside the Lower Mainland. For details see Vaughn Palmer "Figures on forest jobs chilling for NDP," *Vancouver Sun*, Monday March 22, 1996.

diversification. As a result, local economies are vulnerable to sudden shifts or downturns in the forest economy.

The province also relies on the forest industry for revenue. Since 95 per cent of land in B.C. is owned by the Crown, the government assumes the role of supplier of wood and fibre for the forest industry. The system of land tenure on Crown land involves three main types of cutting rights: Tree Farm Licences, Forest Licences and Timber Sale Licences. Eighty-three per cent of the cut is managed under these three types of tenure.

The Crown collects stumpages or resource rents, royalties, taxes and payments in kind from the forest companies holding these tenures. On average over the ten year period between 1984 and 1994, the forest industry directly contributed 8.3 per cent to provincial government revenue; in 1993 it provided 9.5 per cent.[218] According to Schwindt and Heaps, the Crown collects $1 billion per year in net revenues. These revenues subsidize the Ministry of Forests. For example, in 1994, stumpage fees accounted for 94 per cent of Ministry of Forests revenue. In addition, the Crown collects annual rent and export fees. Recent policy changes have adjusted stumpage to increase the Crown's net returns. Between 1987 and 1993, net returns nearly tripled, exceeding $900 million in 1993. According to Schwindt, the government has such a 'heavy take' from logging the forest that "there's now a risk the government will fight any attempts to reduce the harvest further."[219] Indeed, the government is mindful that a decline in investment translates into decreased revenues from taxation of corporate and employment income and from consumption.

In sum, forestry is highly significant to B.C.'s economy. A 1991 report examining the structure of the provincial economy and the role of resource industries found that, despite the growth of the service sector over the past 30 years, the province's economic structure had not changed radically. The report concluded that, "the provincial economy

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218 Ibid.

219 Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree*, p.2.

continues to be heavily reliant on resource industries."[220]

An Analytical framework to Assess the influence of Economic Factors

The political economy literature illuminates several economic constraints that affect decision making in the forest sector. The literature helps to answer two key questions: Why are economic factors important? and Why does the government listen to forest companies? The answer in both cases is that the capitalist economy imposes constraints on government. Within this economy, the owners of capital have certain resources and structural advantages. Since the government depends on economic performance for political success, it shares certain priorities with industry. The government cannot afford to ignore the prerogatives of industry. Structure does not dictate, but it constrains.

These ideas are elaborated by both neo-pluralists like Lindblom[221] and neo-Marxists like Gill and Law.[222] These theorists argue that industry affects the economy through investment, contributes to economic growth, creates jobs and revenue and establishes links to international investment or trade. Some theorists argue that the corporate sector's structural power impels government to protect business interests. According to the neo-pluralist literature, the government's political success is related to economic success.[223] Theorists within B.C. suggest that the state can hardly ignore industry's interests because forest companies have control over key decisions which shape the general level of economic prosperity which are important to political success.[224] As

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220 BC Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, *The Structure of the British Columbia Economy: A Land Use Perspective* (Prepared for the B.C. Round Table on the Environment and Economy, 1991).

221 Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books,1978).

222 Stephen Gill and David Law "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (December, 1989), p. 475-479.

223 Lindblom,*Politics and Markets*, p. 35.

224 For a description, see Ray Travers, "Forest Policy: Rhetoric and Reality," in Travers and Drushka eds. *Touch Wood: BC' Forests at the Crossroads* , p. 175. In addition, Stephen Brooks and Andrew Stritch make this point in *Business and Government in Canada* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc,1991), p. 209-211.

noted earlier, the forest industry creates employment and investment, and stimulates the growth rate of the provincial economy.

Business interests have priority attention from policy makers because the state is structurally dependent on certain functions that business performs. Lindblom argues that:

> Because public functions in the market system rest in the hands of those in business, it follows that jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic standard of everyone all rest in their hands. Consequently, government officials cannot be indifferent to how well business performs its functions.[225]

Although these factors seem obvious, they comprise a framework of constraints which continue to influence the government. Government's focus on industry health may impede its ability/willingness reform forest policy. As Andrew Petter observes: "the constraints of current capital markets" make it difficult if not impossible to change the course we are on without risking international financing repercussions.[226]

Industry's Structural Power

The previous section described the forest industry's contribution to B.C.'s economy. This section considers how industry uses its structural power as a lever in its negotiations with government. First, it briefly describes some of the key operators in the B.C. forest sector to illustrate the size and the control that these companies have. Next, it shows that industry can threaten to withdraw its investment or cut back employment. Finally, it considers how industry uses the threat of capital strike to bargain with government.

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225 Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, p. 72.

226 Andrew Petter, then Minister of Aboriginal Affairs told a province-wide CORE meeting. This quote appears in M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia*, p. 46.

A few large companies are the key operators in the B.C. forest industry.[227] Table 4.1 provides a snapshot of the situation in 1996. The top 15 companies controlled 65.5 per cent of the total Annual Allowable Cut in B.C. Most notably, MacMillan Bloedel alone controlled 8.5 per cent of the provincial total, while Slocan Forest Products controlled 5.4 per cent. Other key operators included Canadian Forest Products, West Fraser Mills, International Forest Products and Fletcher Challenge.

Table 4.1: B.C. ALLOWABLE ANNUAL CUT (AAC)--

BY COMPANY GROUP (1996)[228]

Company	Amount of AAC *	% of B.C. Total AAC
1 Mac Millan Bloedel	6.02	8.5
2 Slocan Forest Products		5.4
3 Canadian Forest Products	4.77	6.7
4 West Fraser Mills	4.19	5.9
5 International Forest Products	3.8	5.5
6 Northwood/Noranda Forest	3.6	5.1
7 Fletcher Challenge	3.54	5
8 Doman Industries	2.53	3.6
9 Weldwood of Canada	2.18	3.1
10 Skeena Repap Enterprises	2	2.9
11 Riverside Forest Products	1.8	2.5
12 Avenor Inc	1.69	2.4
13 Weyerhaeuser Canada	1.67	2.4
14 Tolko Industries	1.54	2.2
15 Anderson Stewart Group	1.3	2
TOTAL	46.32	65.5

* million cubic metres

227 A number of studies of corporate concentration in the BC forest economy have been done. See Forest Resources Commission Report "Harvesting Rights in the BC Forest Industry". Also, see William Leroy Wagner "Privateering the Public Forest? A Study of the Expanding Role of the Forest Industry in the Management of Public Forest Land in British Columbia," University of Victoria, M.A thesis,1987. Also, Patricia Marchak documents corporate concentration in "A Global Context for British Columbia," in Ray Travers and Ken Drushka eds. *Touch Wood BC Forests at the Crossroads*, p. 78-80 and in Marchak, *Logging the Globe* . A recent discussion of corporate concentration appears in Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree,* p. 10.

228 Resource Tenures and Engineering Branch, Ministry of Forests. Prepared by Economics and Trade Branch, Ministry of Forests. May 15, 1996.

Companies like MacMillan Bloedel and Fletcher Challenge are multinational corporations with diverse investments.[229] The former Fletcher Challenge of New Zealand entered B.C. in the 1980s after purchasing BC Forest Products and the Crown Zellerbach. Most of Fletcher Challenge's coastal holdings have now been sold to Interfor.[230] Fletcher Challenge also has large diversified holdings in countries such as Chile. By 1988 Fletcher Challenge had become the largest producer of market pulp, the second largest newsprint producer and with all forms of forest production combined, the fourth largest forest company in the world, owning cutting rights on land in Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Brazil.

Fletcher Challenge and Macmillan Bloedel are transnational corporations which are able to shift funds from one country or province to another.[231] Their mobility is a considerable threat since:

> There is nothing to prevent internationalized companies from moving elsewhere. Since they have relatively little stake in the communities where their plants are located, and alternative fibre sources are available elsewhere, it might well be in their interests to cut BC's forests at a rapid pace while there [are still] markets for logs and pulp...[232]

Although companies rely on B.C.'s supply of softwood, which is becoming increasingly scarce in other parts of the world, they are still willing to relocate elsewhere.[233]

Industry can use the threat of capital flight as a lever in forest policy negotiations. Forest companies may convey explicit or implicit threats to relocate, or they may stress the

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229 It is still important to understand how transnational corporations work, however, locals such as Slocan Forest Products and West Fraswer are more prominent now. The local companies can also threaten to close their operations.

230 The sales of company holdings continue, however, these are a few examples of large companies with diverse holdings.

231 They consider legal freedoms, production costs, labour relations, political stability, and financial concessions as criteria for where they want to invest.

232 Patricia Marchak, "Global Markets in Forest Products: Sociological Impacts on Kyoto Prefecture and British Columbia Interior Forest Regions," *Journal of Business Administration*, 20 1/2, p. 339-69.

233 There are numerous examples of forest companies investing outside B.C. for details, see Gordon Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes Outside B.C.," *Times Colonist*, June 14, 1997.

need for a positive investment climate and favourable regulations. In each case, forest companies impart a similar message to government: if government fails to provide secure tenure and access to low cost wood, then companies will relocate, close mills or withdraw investment from B.C. A recent report from the Western Wood Products Forum[234] conveyed the threat of capital flight: "Capital is highly mobile. Recent investments by British Columbia companies outside the province suggest that a positive investment climate in British Columbia will be an important precondition to achieving a successful 'transition' to future prosperity."[235] The Forum hinted that new investment dollars have many options.

Company presidents repeatedly state that industry requires a positive investment climate in order to continue to invest in British Columbia. The President of West Fraser, Hank Ketcham said that "The investment climate needed to make these huge investments in infrastructure and capital requires a great deal of certainty." He also pointed out cost-competitiveness and security of the wood base as reasons for looking elsewhere.[236] Companies are concerned about security of tenure and access to low-cost wood, according to Interfor's chief forester Ric Slaco. He said that industry needs an assured supply of timber to ensure stability for its operations and forestry-dependent communities.[237]

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234 The Western Wood Products Forum is a body composed exclusively of senior executives of big forest companies such as Fletcher Challenge, MacMillan Bloedel and Canfor, and representatives from the IWA and the provincial and federal governments. In a 1992 study, the Forum warned the provincial government that industry has a number of strategic options. In addition, the Forum stated its need for a favourable investment climate. It specified that "the industry needs to be assured by government of a continued access to a flow of wood, and it must position itself to meet the trade challenges of the emerging global economy. These are the "rules of the game" so to speak. For more details see M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia*, p. 45-46.

235 Ibid., p. 45.

236 Gordon Hamilton, "Forest firms seek fortunes outside B.C.," *Vancouver Sun* (Saturday March 30, 1996), p. B7.

237 Malcolm Curtis, "Island Companies Campaign for Larger Harvest," *Times Colonist*, June 14, 1997.

Companies also consider the cost of regulation.[238] Forest companies demand concessions from government such as relaxed regulations. Recently, forest companies demanded $1 billion in annual relief from Forest Practices Code regulations. Top company executives claimed that profits were declining and that new jobs could be created only with lower government costs and relaxed environmental standards. Vicky Husband, of the Sierra Club of B.C. said, "They're blackmailing government, it's pretty straightforward."[239]

Industry officials suggest that if government fails to provide tenure security and favourable regulations, then companies will invest elsewhere. In order to stop the flow of forest industry capital out of the province, said Daniel Veniez, vice-president of Montreal-based Repap Enterprises "the government needs to do its bit to create a climate for investment. Big capital is fleeing. And it's going to be a selling job to attract it back to B.C."[240]

At Price Waterhouse's forestry conference in March 1996, the chief executive officers of B.C. firms outlined their investment plans for B.C. Most were skeptical about new investment in B.C. George Richards, president of Weldwood of Canada Ltd. said: "When it comes to new investment it's hard to rationalize spending in British Columbia today with the climate we have in terms of the regulatory process and the wood costs. There are opportunities outside which are much more attractive."[241]

A growing global demand for engineered wood products makes it easier for B.C.'s

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238 Brian Hobson, Vice President of Canfor Corporation notes:

> The concern is the cost of regulation, the cost of actually being in the forest and harvesting the timber . . . . I regret to report we have now topped the Swedes in the category of fibre costs. These costs are reflected in the comparative profitability of the BC industry with other jurisdictions. Quoted in Gordon Hamilton, "Forest Industry Loses Ground," *Vancouver Sun*, 7 June 1996, p. D6.

239 Malcolm Curtis, "Sierra Club Balks at Forestry Industry Relief," *Times Colonist*, March 4, 1997.

240 Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes," p. B7.

241 Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes," p. B1.

forest products companies to relocate to other provinces and countries.[242] As production costs rise in B.C., companies examine investment prospects elsewhere such as Chile where production costs are lower and there are fewer environmental regulations.[243] MacMillan Bloedel has recently invested in the United States where fibre is inexpensive and environmental costs on private land are minimal.[244]

Mike MacCallum, chair of Price Waterhouse's worldwide forest industry specialty group, estimates only two thirds of earnings in 1996 from B.C.'s publicly traded forest companies come from operations within this province.[245] MacCallum cites the high cost of logging and the expected decline in the AAC as "the primary factors that are going to stop investment."[246] Furthermore, he warns that these factors "are going to stop it cold."[247] The two largest forest companies, MacMillan Bloedel and Fletcher Challenge Canada agree with MacCallum. Tom Williams of Fletcher Challenge Canada said "we are certainly looking for growth opportunities outside B.C."[248]Similarly, in its 1995 Annual Report, MacMillan Bloedel states: "To grow in forest products we have been strategically

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242 For details, see Burda and Gale, "Trading in the Future." See also M.A. Simons, *The Wood Products Sector in British Columbia: The Next Twenty Years, Rising to the Challenge* (Ottawa, Ontario: FRDA 1992), p. 4.

243 Ibid.

244 Similarly West Fraser was interested in investing in Alberta where vast amounts of boreal forest provide an inexpensive and abundant source of fibre. See Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes," p. B1.

245 Almost all the integrated B.C. companies now have significant investments outside the province, a development that has grown during the last three to four years.

246 Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes," p. B1.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid.

expanding our investments throughout North America."[249]

Forest companies are sending the B.C. government a powerful message: either provide favourable investment conditions, or we will invest elsewhere. Keith Purchase, president of Timber West Ltd. said that companies would continue to invest in B.C. "only if we see extremely fast payback."[250]

It is difficult to determine precisely how the threat of capital flight (and companies' investment outside B.C.) influences policy makers, but it is reasonable to assume that the government has several key concerns. The government is mainly concerned with maintaining forestry employment, and maintaining a favourable investment climate.

In response to industry's threats to close mills or relocate investment, government attempts to create a favourable investment climate for forest companies. Government offers concessions to industry to ensure that companies continue to invest in B.C. Moreover, government officials remind companies that B.C. is a profitable place to make investments. For example, Forest Minister Dennis Streifel recently made an appeal to forest companies: "B.C. has quality fibre, and a new FPC to ensure that forest products have a market in an increasingly environmentally aware world."[251] He also promised companies access to wood through the province's strategy of practising intensive forestry on a reduced land base to maintain the rate of logging.

Some theorists predict that the threat of capital flight forces government to attend to certain needs and demands of capital. Gill and Law contend that in the age of TNCs,

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249 MacMillan Bloedel is currently diversifying outside of B.C. It now has 50 per cent of its asset base outside the province. It has recently invested in Ontario, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Pennsylvania, Kentuckyand Mexico. These are all composite production facilities. For details, see Kryzanowski, "MB Looks Beyond BC." The company has recently spent almost $600 million on out-of-province investments. Some of MacMillan Bloedel's investments include a $120 million acquisition of Ontario-based Green Forest Lumber, an 83 per cent interest in a fibreboard mill in Ontario
fibreboard mill in Pennsylvania, a $49 million in a TrusJoist MacMillan engineered wood plant in Kentucky, a $97 million US in a linerboard mill in Kentucky, and $18 million for a particle board machine at Durango Mexico plant For details see Hamilton, "Forest Firms Seek Fortunes," p. B1.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid., p. B7.

"states may be forced to adopt near-mercantilist policies in order to compete better and attract foreign direct investment, in order to obtain the sinews of power (skills, capital and technology)." [252] The B.C. government offers certain concessions such as tenure security for forest companies.

It is reasonable to surmise that government may be wary of tenure reform or toughening certain regulations because such changes might precipitate capital flight. M'Gonigle notes that historically "government was reluctant to regulate for fear of discouraging investment and slowing development."[253] Theorists such as Lindblom argue that government recognizes that weak economic activity, and particularly job loss, inevitably leads to public dissatisfaction and loss of political support. According to Lindblom, a decline in the welfare of business can bring down a government because of the "automatic punishing recoil of the market."[254] This section reinforced the argument that in the face of industry threats such as these, government's concerns about economic health can tend to overshadow its concerns about structural change.

Industry's Direct Power

Forest companies also exercise direct power through elite linkages and lobbying. The B.C. forest industry lobby has a permanent organization, professional staff, financial resources and direct access to political and bureaucratic decision makers. In B.C., large forest corporations have the financial resources to write position papers and respond publicly to policy decisions. Small or medium sized companies have fewer financial and organizational resources.

Major forest companies have a strong presence in the forest policy community because they participate in committees, land use planning and policy advisory processes.

252 Gill and Law, "Global Hegemony," p. 479.

253 Michael M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Political Ecology Approach," in Chris Tollefson ed. *The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation and Sustainable Forestry* (Draft, July 1997), p. 187.

254 Lindblom, p. 38.

For example, Macmillan Bloedel participates in numerous forestry committees through its sophisticated government relations operation.[255] Forest companies have resources and staff to participate in land use planning. For instance, in the CORE process, representatives of forest companies were paid to attend stakeholder meetings and had the support of a mobile office with fax machines, computers, and photocopiers. Forest companies often have the opportunity to comment on policies before other stakeholders. Forest industry representatives sit on policy advisory boards and are recruited to senior government positions. For example, during the NDP's term in office, the Forest Sector Strategy Advisory Committee made recommendations on Forest Renewal BC, and participated in negotiations regarding the Forest Practices Code. The Committee comprises mainly CEOs of major forest companies (ten of twenty members represent forest corporations).[256]

Industry's formal access to policy makers is strengthened by its informal access through personnel interchange and common educational backgrounds. Wilson observes that the forest industry has good access to all levels of the Ministry of Forests (MOF) power structure.[257] Some members of the MOF have developed links with the forest industry. Mike Apsey for example, was Deputy Minister of Forests, before becoming the president of COFI in mid-1984.[258] Claude Richmond was Minister of Forests, before becoming the Chairman of the Western Environment and Development Task Force, a forest industry lobby group at the Rio Earth Summit.[259] Directorships, and the "cross-fertilization" of personnel between the MOF and forestry organizations, reinforces the

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255 Wynn Grant's "Forestry and Forest Politics ," in Coleman and Skogstad eds. *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd. 1990),. p.131.

256 Of the 20 representatives on the Forest Sector Strategy Advisory Committee, 10 are CEOs of major corporarations including Weldwood, Weyerhauser, MacMillan Bloedel, and Canfor. In establishing the Committee, the Cabinet Planning Committee assumed that "groups that refuse to participate in this process (ie: First Nations or Environmentalists) will be consulted within other fora and, over, time, encouraged to join the main advisory committee". From the Cabinet Planning Secretariat "Proposed Forest Sector Action Plan," *Forest Planning Canada*, 9:3 (1993), p. 16.

257 See Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC," p. 153.

258 For example, Mike Apsey was Deputy Minister of Forests, and then became president of the Council of Forest Industries of BC. For more details see M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia*, p. 47.

259 Ibid., p. 47.

network between government and industry.[260] Linkages are also formed through shared values and educational experience along with membership in the Association of BC Professional Foresters (ABCPF).[261] Gender, cultural, and socioeconomic similarities also create a certain affinity. For the most part, elites in the business and government are white males of anglo-saxon origin, with a shared socioeconomic and educational background.[262] Forest company officials and government interact and contact each other frequently, cementing the ties that exist through institutional and network linkages.

Although industry still enjoys fairly good access to decision makers, in recent years its lobbying approach has changed. The centralized forest policy community once dominated by the Council of Forest Industries (COFI) has evolved into a more fragmented structure which includes new organizations and actors, most notably, the Forest Alliance, Share groups, and other associations. This change shows that in order to relegitimize its control over the land base, business employs extensive resources to mount lobbying and public relations campaigns.

The Council of Forest Industries of BC (COFI) represents the extraction components and their concerns about wood products and overseas marketing. COFI uses an annual budget of $10 million to fund trade promotion, product research, statistics gathering and government relations. It lobbies both Ottawa and Victoria through its Government and Public Affairs division.[263] It is capable of coordinating a range of complex information and activities.

Although COFI was once the preeminent industry association in the B.C. forest policy sector, its role changed when environmentalists and the public challenged industry's privileged position in the policy community.[264] The closed or clientelist policy

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260 Ibid.

261 Details on the Association of BC Professional Foresters are provided in Chapter Five, however, it is important to note that both industry and government personnel are members of this association.

262 see Brooks and Stritch, *Business and Government in Canada* , p. 155.

263 Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC," p. 153.

264 Ibid., p. 152.

community broke down, expanding the range of interests included. To meet these new challenges, COFI launched the Forests Forever campaign in 1987. The organization spent $1.5-2 million annually to convince the public that industry was effectively managing the provincial forests. One of the advertisements featured a solemn little girl with a seedling in her hands. Another television commercial showed green tree plantations, pristine wilderness areas, and a deer drinking out of a logger's hard hat. The campaign was scrutinized in a 1990 report entitled "Forests Forever: Corporate Image Building or Misleading Advertising."[265] The ads were cut from CBC for being biased.[266] COFI eventually dropped what it realized was an ineffective and highly criticized public relations program.

COFI also had difficulties developing a strong lobbying position because of its diverse membership. COFI's policy position had been a "bland blend" reflecting compromise among different member companies such as interior or coastal companies. It was difficult to develop a clear mandate because "There [was] no 'industry position' on certain issues."[267] As a result of these differences, the separate sectors were better off taking care of their own concerns about regulation.

Reacting to these circumstances, COFI reorganized itself in 1993 to give more emphasis to "government affairs and less towards customer and public affairs." Responding to the divisions and diverse interests of its members, COFI functions now as an "association of associations" rather than a "peak" association.[268] It focuses more on provincial matters, speaking for a range of organizations.

COFI's new structure represents diverse members.[269] Moreover, COFI represents

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265 Herb Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p. 170.

266 CBC's reasoning was that the ads were "biased" and that "continued broadcast of these messages would have contravened the Corporation's general ban on advertisers purchasing time to influence public opinion on a contentious issue" . Letter from John Davis, CBC, Ottawa to Kalle Lasn, Vancouver. January 13, 1989.

267 This quote appears in Michael James Garvin Dezell, "Grapple-Yarding with the Future: a new mandate for COFI," University of Victoria, M.A. thesis,1993, p. 89.

268 Ibid.

269 COFI is now divided into 6 sectors and 7 core committees as well as the Board. ibid., p. 95.

the province's forest companies on matters of provincial and national forest policy whereas various sectors work independently on regional matters. In brief, the reorganization allows "different elements of the industry to continue to pursue their traditional policy preoccupation in their own backyards while putting their time and funds towards central issues only if those issues are clearly provincial ones."[270] Accordingly, COFI has the power to bring a provincial voice to cabinet when one is necessary, yet it has a lesser role in land and resource use debates than it had previously taken.

COFI is now one of many organizations that work to safeguard industry's access to the public forest. COFI is less involved in market development work or in land and resource use debates. Meanwhile other organizations have emerged to carry out these roles. The new organizations are better equipped to represent the industry in disputes over land and resource use for the productive working forest.

When public opinion polls continued to express mistrust of the forest companies, industry expanded its lobbying and public relations campaign. The CEOs of COFI's largest companies created the British Columbia Forest Alliance (BCFA), forming links with labour, SHARE BC groups and even former environmentalists. Its Chairman is the former head of the IWA, Jack Munro, and its Executive Director is Patrick Moore, one of the founders of Greenpeace. One senior industry official notes that: "the industry in this day and age, is rarely going to be successful if it alone holds an opinion."[271]

Under the guidance of the transnational public relations agency Burson Marsteller, BCFA was launched as a "citizens" lobby group to "foster a better understanding of forestry, and open communication lines between the forest industry and the public."[272] Yet its underlying aim is to restore the legitimacy of timber companies in B.C. Although BCFA claims to be a non-partisan organization representing British Columbians "from all areas of the province and all walks of life, whose common concern is to protect B.C.'s

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270 Ibid., p. 98.

271 From Cashore, personal interview with forest company official.

272 British Columbia Forest Alliance, *Fact Sheet of Forestry Definitions* (Vancouver: British Columbia Forest Alliance,1992).

forest environment and forest-based economy," its funding sources, the structure of the Board, and its activities suggest that it is geared toward promoting the interests of the existing forest industry.

A number of large forest companies founded the organization, providing it with a $1 million dollar operating budget. Funding sources include Weldwood, Macmillan Bloedel and Canadian Forest Products.[273] The BCFA claims that its Board represents "average citizens," but most of of its thirty Board members are CEOs, Corporate Directors or consultants for forest industry companies. Indeed, Gary Ley admits that the board members were chosen in consultation with the 13 forest companies involved in setting up the alliance.[274]

Although the BCFA mandate is to provide information, it is criticized because it attempts to portray industry as a responsible and caring corporate citizen. The BCFA produces a monthly newsletter, and organizes media and educational tours of timber plantations, sawmills and pulp mills. It has also produced a number of half-hour television programs, estimated to cost $16, 000 to $20, 000 for the broadcast time alone.[275] Most of its material aims to increase the legitimacy of the timber industry. For example, one BCFA advertisement features a photograph of a beautiful valley of trees above the caption "this BC forest was clear-cut 20 years ago." Below this in brackets it says "Don't Believe everything Greenpeace tells you." Full page advertisements are run across North America and in Europe as well. Such ads are clearly an attempt to give industry's image a facelift after it was scarred by media campaigns attracting international concern such as the Clayoquot Sound campaign. Critics such as Joe Foy of Western Canada Wilderness Committee refer to these ads as nothing but an elaborate public relations job amounting to a

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273 Other sources of funding include: Doman Forest Products, Northwood Pulp and Timber, Lignum, West Fraser Timber, Crestbrook Forest Industries, Weyerhauser Canada, Skeena Cellulose, International Forest Products, Riverside Forest Products, Scott Paper, Eurocan Pulp and Paper, Fletcher Challenge Canada, and Canfor see Greenpeace book on Share groups

274 Deborah Wilson, "Alliance Challenged by Environmentalists," *Globe and Mail*, July 8, 1991, p. B1.

275 Ibid. p. B3.

"30-minute cigarette commercial."[276] As Herb Hammond observes, "this 'PR' is expensive, strategically designed, oversimplified, and sometimes intentionally misleading. Its purpose is not to inform but to persuade."[277]

Share BC campaigns also attempt to present business demands as reasonable. These groups use media and tabloids to convince the public that multiple use approaches will preserve industry jobs and increase recreational opportunities. Share BC groups are "community based" local citizens' groups such as Share the Forest, Share Our Resources, Share the Stein, Share the Carmanah and Share the Clayoquot, for which Share BC is the umbrella organization. Its director, Mike Morton, is also on the BCFA. Approximately 25 Share BC groups exist in various resource dependent communities.

Spokespersons avow that Share BC groups are "grassroots" organizations of loggers, their families and other townspeople from resource-based communities. However, environmental groups such as Greenpeace allege that Share groups have an industry slant since they receive funding from industry sources such as COFI and Fletcher Challenge.[278] Corporation support for Share BC groups seems to reflect acceptance of "with wise" use guru Ron Arnold's advice: "give them [the pro industry action groups] the money. You stop defending yourselves, let them do it and you get the hell out of the way. Because citizens groups have credibility and industries don't."[279]

Although Share BC groups claim to promote wise use of resources and to protect jobs in resource dependent communities, their agenda aims to discredit environmentalists. They employ tactics that stem from the American "wise use" movement. It aims to protect public and private land for logging, mining and any form of commercial enterprise and to counter the growing role of environmentalists.[280] Pat Armstrong, a leader of the

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276 Ibid.

277 Hammond, *Seeing the Forest* , p. 162.

278 Greenpeace, *Share Group Guide.*

279 Claude Emery, "The Share Group Phenomenon," *Forest Planning Canada* , 8: 4 (1991), p. 36 (excerpted from December 10, 1991 Library of Parliament Political and Social affairs).

280 Ibid., p. 39 .

Share movement in B.C., also ran a wise use group in Idaho.[281] The Assistant Chief Forester of MacMillan Bloedel reflected wise use philosophy in a speech where he stated that the environmental movement's agenda is

> unfinishable: they stand foursquare behind the absolute curtailment of any resource use whatsoever...MacMillan Bloedel is standing tall to set the record straight on some of the half-truths and plain old untruths the environmentalists have told about our industry...Environmentalists are long on archetypal symbolism and short on rational argument...The preservationists present a picture of the virgin forest that is serene and untouchable.[282]

Share BC campaigns arouse fear among workers; they claim that environmentalism causes unemployment. They attempt to convince workers that if they do not support forest companies, their jobs are in jeopardy.

Clearly, industry realized that workers and communities could more effectively defend the forest land base. Share BC groups participated in active demonstrations against CORE for removing land from the productive forest. Most notably, after CORE's Vancouver Island recommendations were released, Share groups flooded the lawn in front of the Legislature in 1994 for the "12 per cent no more" rally. These groups vociferously defend industry priorities under the guise of job protection.

In conclusion, industry's structural and direct power limits the state's capacity to reform policy. Government takes heed of industry's demands because B.C. relies on the forest industry for jobs, revenues and other benefits. Forest companies can threaten to relocate operations or close mills, or they can mount extensive lobbying campaigns in order to negotiate certain arrangements which are advantageous to industry. These arrangements restrict government's ability to respond to non-business interests and to alienate economically powerful groups.

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281 Pat Armstrong is a Director of the Our Land Society, a Wise Use organization based in Idaho, ibid., p. 39.

282 Ibid., p. 40.

State Autonomy. The state has some capacity to act autonomously. The NDP government implemented moderate reforms. Business does not always get what it wants because the state has other concerns, such as legitimacy. In reality, business does not determine policies. In the past in B.C., government and industry have had a partnership which was characterized as "concertation," meaning that "a single association represents a sector and participates with a corresponding state agency in the formulation and implementation of policy."[283] The state agency has considerable capacity in its own right; it is autonomous and able to concentrate power for coordinated decision-making. This type of relationship existed in the forest policy sector when COFI was strong and other public interest groups were weak. When environmentalists and other members of the public challenged this partnership, it was replaced by a relationship more accurately described as "contested concertation."[284] This concept explains why the state responds to interests other than forest companies. It reveals that the government's recent initiatives represent autonomous action.[285]

Recent changes made by the NDP government demonstrate that government responded to other political considerations and made regulatory changes that the forest industry opposed. These changes illustrate that in response to attacks from environmentalists and the public, the state defended its legitimacy. It was concerned about legitimacy as well as economic health.

Shared Understanding. Economic constraints involve both the push of industry's power and the pull of incentives. M'Gonigle notes that throughout the history of B.C. forest policy there has been a "cooperative integration" between big corporations and big

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283 William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Policy Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Approach," in William Coleman and GraceSkogstad eds. *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada* (Mississauga ON: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990), p. 28-29.

284 Jeremy Wilson describes the transition from concertation to "contested concertation" in his article "Wilderness Politics in B.C," p. 162.

285 Ben Cashore,

government -- supported in large measure by organized labour.[286] The partnership is based on a shared understanding focused on promoting the health of the forest industry and furthering the prerogatives of the state, industry, and organized labour. One one hand, the state aims to encourage private sector investment and management to achieve economic growth and community stability (to ensure social contentment) in order to gain re-election. Industry on the other hand, wants access to additional timber and security of tenure in order to succeed and prosper. Finally, organized labour wants secure jobs and high wages.

The main players set their agendas within the ideological framework of the capitalist system which emphasizes growth and expansion. Within B.C.'s resource extraction economy, actors have an incentive to promote forest industry growth. Since citizens believe that a healthy forest industry will create affluence in society, the government also promotes industry growth. Likewise, workers support forest industry growth because they desire high wages in order to consume goods and enjoy affluence. And of course, business desires increasing profits, so it too supports growth. Thus the agendas of the three parties are shaped by the ideology they adhere to.

Furthermore, the parties agree on certain basic principles, such as the tenure system. At the core of B.C. forest policy is the shared understanding that government will provide industry with continual access to wood in order to create benefits and community stability.[287] The government favours large companies because they are perceived to be more reliable (unlikely to close operations during a recession), more responsible (they have a long term interest in the resource and the labour force) and more profitable (since they are so large that they generate higher returns).[288] Within the current tenure system, the government grants industry access to large volumes of timber through permits such as

286 Michael M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Political Ecology Approach," in Chris Tollefson ed. *The Wealth of Forests: Markets, Regulation and Sustainable Forestry* (Draft, July 1997), p. 186.

287 Lois Dellert, "Sustained Yield Forestry in British Columbia: The Making and Breaking of a Policy (1900-1993)," York University, Faculty of Environmental Studies, M.A. Thesis,1994, p. 60.

288 Lois Dellert discusses this point, see Dellert, ibid.

Tree Farm Licences (TFLs). Under this system, industry gains access to wood, the government gains revenue and large unions gain cutting contracts.

Table 4.2: The Shared Understanding Between Government, Forest Companies and Unions

Broad Framework of Capitalist Beliefs:

Parties set their agendas within this framework of ideas

3 Parties' Objectives:

Government Wants:	**Forest Companies Want:**	**Unions Want:**
Economic growth	Profits	Secure Employment
Employment	Access to Wood	
Revenue		

Agreement on Basic Principles such as the Tenure System

The downside of this deal is that it reinforces what Jeremy Wilson refers to as the liquidation-conversion policy, a volume-based timber economy which is based on

liquidating old growth.[289] The rules of the game have not changed according to key industry and union officials at the Western Wood Products Forum: industry expects government to create a favourable investment climate, and to guarantee companies continued access to a flow of wood.[290] Even though this is a self-limiting system in the long run at current rates of timber cutting, the parties are unwilling to renegotiate the core understandings.

Consequently, it is difficult to disengage the highly centralized and entrenched system that exists. M'Gonigle and Parfitt contend that "control of BC's forests and their economic future is dominated by the specific interests of big centralized corporate, governmental and union institutions."[291] They, and forestry critics such as Ken Drushka, argue that the lines between these organizations are blurred. Drushka argues that forest companies, their unions, and the Ministry of Forests "constitute a single monolithic entity."[292]

The ideological core of the state's understanding with industry is the root of the problem according to Travers:

> if forest policy is to progress, it must escape from the ideological ghetto in which it now exists, trapped between liberal/pluralist assumptions about the nature of the public policy process and assumptions about the proper role of the state. On the one hand, it pretends the private corporate interest is identical with the public interest. On the other, it pretends that corporate power does not exist and government is free to exercise the public will. Both assumptions are inherent in the current tenure system and both are false.[293]

Travers argues that B.C.'s system of forest tenure (which favours large companies) is based on assumptions about industry's contribution to public welfare (e.g. cutting rights are granted on the assumption that industry creates jobs for people in B.C.). He argues

289 The liquidation-conversion idea is referred to in Chapter One, See also Lertzman, Rayner and Wilson, "Learning and Change."

290 For more details see M'Gonigle and Parfitt, *Forestopia*, p. 45-46.

291 Ibid., p. 46.

292 Ibid.

293 Ray Travers, "Forest Policy: Rhetoric and Reality," *Touch Wood: BC Forests at the Crossroads*, p. 217.

both that these assumptions flawed and that they restrict the state's abilit_ changes. Furthermore, the state is limited because it relies on industry to perform certain functions and it underestimates the power that forest companies have.

M'Gonigle also argues that B.C.'s forest policy regime constrains policy makers:

> The critical point is that, in looking to future policy, once the resource base is embedded in a legally formalized institutional system dependent on high volume resource production, it is extremely difficult for public bodies to extricate themselves. Existing obligations dictate future opportunities; to alter course is difficult regardless of the merits of doing so.[294]

Furthermore, he contends that the NDP was unable to undertake the structural reforms that would alter historical power relationships. Tenure reform was removed from the government's agenda early in its first term in office.[295]

A thorough discussion of why tenure reform was dropped from the government's agenda is beyond the scope of this chapter. This decision, however indicates that economic concerns influenced the NDP.

Conclusion. It is difficult to identify precisely how the economic constraints may have influenced the government's decision not to pursue community forest boards. This chapter elaborated industry's structural and direct power. It provided examples of companies that have threatened to leave BC (or have in fact invested elsewhere), and it described the powerful lobbying tools and linkages that forest companies use in negotiations with government.

Although this analysis indicates the potential power that industry has, it is merely circumstantial evidence. The analysis is limited because it does not reveal the nature and content of government and industry negotiations that occur behind closed doors.

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294 "One example of this problem is the litigation initiated by Macmillan Bloedel and Timber West challenging the provincial government's right to increase royalth rates on Timber Licences to a level equal to the stumpage assessed on other tenures. The case, initiated in December 1995, has yet to go
to trial." From M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Political Ecology Approach," p. 190.

295 Ibid.

Therefore, this analysis can only make predictions based on what limited evidence is available.

As capitalist producers, forest companies try to ensure that they are competitive on the global market. Security of tenure and access to the resource are the industry's prerogatives. Industry is not in favour of creating a tenure system that no longer guarantees forest companies control over most of B.C.'s productive forest land. Forest companies stand to lose from the transfer of tenure rights and control to communities. It is therefore reasonable to predict that government recognized that implementing community forest boards was not an easy path to follow. Furthermore, because of B.C.'s reliance on forestry, the threat of capital strike and impending job loss, forest industry health was one of the government's's key concerns. It is reasonable to assume that economic concerns may have interfered with the government's's willingness to consider the community forest board option. The NDP government maintained the shared understanding with industry because it was unwilling to risk losing business confidence. Afraid to risk the investment, jobs, and revenue that the forest industry provides, it backed away from policies that would have challenged any of the central tenets of the post-war policy paradigm. The NDP's moderate reform path reflects business power and B.C.'s economic reliance on forestry.

CHAPTER FIVE: A TASTE FOR MODERATE REFORM: BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the strength of the resource sector and the shared understanding that the state has with business. Our review of arguments made by political economists focused on constraints limiting state action. However, economic constraint arguments do not fully account for the state's ability to implement moderate reforms. A more thorough account of why the NDP government did not implement community forest boards moves beyond the external economic factors to consider the internal factors that account for state action. The internal state structure is significant because the state possesses legitimacy and exercises authority. It is capable of acting autonomously.[296] In this case, the state was likely to act autonomously since its legitimacy was in question and society was divided over forest management issues.[297] Indeed, the B.C. provincial government's reforms during the 1991-94 period have been termed "autonomous" by scholars such as Cashore.[298] The government demonstrated autonomous action with its state-led reforms such as the Protected Areas Strategy, CORE and the Forest Practices Code.

This chapter argues that the government's decision to implement this particular set of moderate reforms instead of structural reforms reflects its autonomous interests and preferences. The first section examines general reasons why the state seeks autonomy. The following two sections consider how these general arguments apply to the bureaucratic

296 Michael Atkinson and William Coleman. *The State, Business and Industrial Change in Canada.* 1989 p. 188.

297 Nordlinger argues that legitimacy problems prompt autonomous state action. Also, when state preferences diverge from those of society, or when society is divided, the state relies upon its inherent powers, its plenary authority to translate its preferences into authoritative actions. See Eric Nordlinger , *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* , [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981], p. 139.

298 Ben Cashore, "Governing Forestry: Environmental Group Influence in British Columbia and the U.S. Pacific Northwest," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1997.

and political arms of the state, showing that each has its own reasons for acting autonomously. This chapter demonstrates that the Ministry of Forests and members of the NDP government were motivated by particular interests to support moderate reforms instead of fundamental restructuring. For example, the MOF was motivated to protect its position as expert advisor, and in doing so it resisted change rather than considering alternatives that might threaten its position.

But the bureaucracy alone did not prevent structural reform. The political actors also preferred moderate reform to fundamental change. While bureaucrats were motivated by administrative culture to protect their position, political actors were motivated by electoral concerns to protect their power. The final section of this chapter argues that the NDP was concerned about re-election and maintaining its coalition of support. The NDP's moderate reforms were clearly an attempt to gain legitimacy by rallying support from its diverse constituencies. Since the bureaucratic and political arms both had reasons for taking autonomous action in support of moderate reform, the state did not pursue the structural reform option.

State Autonomy

This section discusses Nordlinger's definition of state autonomy. In this context, the *state* refers to the bureaucratic and political arms of government.[299] In particular, this chapter focuses on the bureaucratic and political officials in the forest policy sector. First, this section describes the state's tendency to seek autonomy, then it considers situations in which the state has capacity to act autonomously. *Autonomy*, in this context, refers to the state's ability to translate its preferences into authoritative actions.[300] It is difficult to determine preferences of the state as a whole, this section discusses the interests or

299 Although there is disagreement over what constitutes the state, this chapter uses Nordlinger's definition to establish the framework for a discussion of bureaucratic and political decisions. See Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, p. 37.
300 Ibid., p. 19.

preferences of the two arms of the state. These interests may or may not be influenced by (or similar to) those of society.[301] This section argues that the arms of the state have preferences, and that they are able to translate them into authoritative actions.

The state has a number of reasons to act autonomously or to enhance its autonomy. Because the state is responsible for making and applying binding decisions, the wider its discretionary power or decision making freedom, the more its members are able to act like, and see themselves as, "state officials". Also, when the preferences of certain arms of the state diverge from societal preferences, these arms seek autonomy.

Nordlinger argues that state preferences derive from several factors: "What public officials do, where they sit, whom they interact with, and what they see and know--these all tend to generate distinctive interests, values, beliefs, and perceptions, and, as such, engender a goodly number of divergent policy views."[302] State preferences derive from several distinctive features of the state:

> the state is a career for most public officials and their colleagues serve as more salient reference groups than do societal actors; preferences for alternative policy options are affected by their attendant processual and decision making costs and benefits; public officials subscribe to the collective interests of their own state units which often impinge upon the relative attractiveness of policy alternatives; some policy preferences have an intellectualized component which is informed by the officials' more or less distinctive information sources, experiences, skills, and professional knowledge; a significant number of public officials hold public interest preferences that differ from some summation of societal preferences...which generate a preference for the state's structured autonomy.[303]

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301 While Nordlinger argues that the state has "self-generated preferences which are not shaped by societal influences or conditions," this chapter does not employ this argument. Although this chapter uses the concept of autonomous preferences, it departs from Nordlinger to highlight the preferences of particular arms of the state, and to show that these arms of the state are able to translate these preferences into authoritative actions. This chapter also departs from Nordlinger, since it does not claim that the state's wants or preferences are "societally un-constrained volitions." It acknowledges that what the state wants may or may not be what members of society want. Moreover, the preferences of the arms of the state may in fact be influenced by societal preferences, nonetheless, it is important to examine the preferences of each arm of the state, and to determine how these preferences shaped the government's decisions. For details on Nordlinger's argument see Ibid., p. 14.

302 Ibid., p. 31.

303 Ibid., p. 39.

State officials are motivated by career and professional concerns. State officials' career patterns are influenced more by other officials than by societal actors. Promotions, assignments, responsibilities, professional reputation, tenure are all affected more by other officials than by societal actors.[304] State officials' particular expertise, (which may derive from distinctive information sources, experiences, skills and professional knowledge) may inform their ideas about policy. Therefore the state recognizes its interests based on a body of information sources that it perceives to be valid. Its members determine their preferences by how the policy alternatives are expected to affect them. Also, public officials within the state have collective interests related to their departments. As mentioned above, since the state is responsible for making and applying authoritative decisions, it prefers to have structured autonomy so it may translate a larger proportion of divergent preferences into public policy with less effort and fewer risks. Finally, officials prefer to be free from societal pressures and constraints in order to achieve security of tenure.[305] Hence, the state has preferences and interests that motivate it to act autonomously. Nordlinger concludes that: "The latent functions of politics are the capture and maintenance of power, the protection and advancement of self-interest, the preservation and expansion of institutions and offices."[306]

Certain circumstances can increase the state's capacity for autonomy. For example, the NDP had a high capacity for autonomy because it was elected on a mandate to end the war in the woods. Therefore, it could carry out its preferences which differed from those of certain sectors of society. The government implemented policies such as the Forest Practices Code even though industry was not in favour of the regulations. While forest companies emphasized profit, the government showed some degree of autonomy from the forest sector by choosing to respond to the public's concerns about poor logging practices. On the surface, the state's action may not appear to be autonomous because the

304 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
305 Ibid., p. 38.
306 Ibid., p 34.

government yielded to public demands. Although the government's interests may have coincided with some public interests, this section demonstrated that the state *had its own reasons for implementing policy, which may or may not coincide with what some sectors of the public want.*

Given these arguments about the state's tendency to seek autonomy, we can move on to consider the general reasons why state officials may act autonomously--or try to preserve or enhance their autonomy. Both political and bureaucratic actors have distinctive reasons to act autonomously. We first focus on bureaucrats.

The Bureaucracy's Resistance to Change

The bureaucracy is inclined to protect its autonomy and to avoid changes that might reduce its control. This section briefly describes bureaucracy as a system of expert administration. Next, it illustrates that, as experts focused on functional management, bureaucrats seek to preserve their autonomy. Finally, it argues that because of these tendencies, the bureaucracy is suspicious of change.

Bureaucratic structure involves specialization, hierarchical organization and rule-based or technical knowledge.[307] Each member of a bureaucratic organization carries out a specialized function in order to increase efficiency. Individual bureaucrats with expertise in a particular area, fulfil specialized functions within a particular Department or office. They follow a chain of command that flows upward to maintain a hierarchical structure. This is a form of organization in which power is by and large in the hands of the officials with the requisite technical skills.[308] At the most fundamental level, bureaucratic administration means domination through technical knowledge.[309]

Bureaucrats tend to seek autonomy because they focus on specific functions, they

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307 Michael M. Harmon and Richard T. Mayer, *Organization Theory for Public Administration*, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), p. 70.
308 Max Weber, *Economy and Society* , Vol. 2. p. 1395.
309 Ibid., p. 1393-1401.

have shared expertise, and they have priorities related to their career or departments. As experts, they are afforded a certain degree of autonomy (freedom from political or public interference) to provide technical advice. Bureaucrats can increase their power from their specific knowledge and experience on the job.[310] Because of their shared skills and professional knowledge, bureaucrats find that their colleagues serve as more salient reference points. They perceive that their work is technical rather than political, therefore they tend to resist external intervention; they seek to buffer themselves against the outside world.[311] Merton argues that bureaucrats' "pride of craft" motivates them to seek autonomy.[312]

Just as the bureaucracy protects its autonomy so do its members preserve their positions within the structure. Career bureaucrats seek to promote their profession or career. Also, bureaucrats are required to promote agency goals and to fulfil particular mandates. When bureaucrats advise their superiors (who in turn advise the Minister) they tend to adhere to these mandates rather than suggest changes. Bureaucrats who must report to their superiors become constrained by the organization itself.[313]

The main drawback of expert systems of administration is that they emphasize organization functioning rather than organizational change. These systems emphasize order, predictability and calculability so that "those within the administrative structure remain narrowly focused on what is directly relevant to their own particular functions."[314] Downs notes that the bureaucracy prefers stasis, particularly in the face of external efforts to alter the status quo.[315] Bureaucrats would prefer to continue established processes

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310 Harmon and Mayer, *Organization Theory for Public Administration* , p. 78.
311 Ibid., p. 103.
312 Judith Gruber, *Controlling Bureaucracies* , (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 100.
313 Paehlke and Torgerson argue that bureaucratic structure limits new initiatives in "Obsolescent Leviathan: Problems of Order in Administrative Thought," Robert Paehlke and Douglas Torgerson eds., *Managing Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State* , [Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1990] pp. 17-29.
314 Ibid., p. 25.
315 Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* , (Boston: Little, Brown,1966), p. 195.

which represent an enormous previous investment in time, effort and money.[316] Paehlke and Torgerson suggest that the the bureaucracy's preference for order limits new initiatives and change: "It can be taken for granted that no radical decentralization or expansion of participation has any place in the administrative sphere--that such moves could only pose a threat to order."[317] Thus bureaucrats tend to resist changes that might endanger their position.

The Culture of Expertise: Professional Foresters

Within the forest bureaucracy, professional foresters occupy positions as experts. This section discusses the culture of expertise and the tendency for professional foresters to seek autonomy and to protect their position.

Like other systems of expert administration, the professional foresters' ethos is centred on expertise, functional management and professional identity. Foresters are experts who carry out rational tasks including scientific experimentation, mathematical modelling and systems analysis. The role of the forester historically was to build up an exact knowledge of the forest. Foresters apply their expertise to perform functional tasks; they are more concerned with means than with ends. For example, cabinet determines the overall policy goals and foresters determine how to implement particular policies. Foresters' training in functional management cultivates a shared professional identity. They are "trained according to a certain type of expertise producing a body of shared knowledge, a common language of problems and a shared institutional affiliation that unites the individual into a larger community of public responsibility."[318]

The Society of American Foresters (SAF), which originated in 1901, exemplifies the kind of values that are shared by professionals. SAF aims to build a network of people dedicated to a common way of seeing the world. The well-known guru of professional

316 Ibid., p. 195.
317 Paehlke and Torgerson, "Obsolescent Leviathan," p.25.
318 Michael M'Gonigle, "The Unnecessary Conflict: Resolving the Forestry/Wilderness Stalemate," *The Forestry Chronicle*, October, 1989, p. 351.

forestry, Gifford Pinchot called this dedication the "spirit" of forestry: "the indispensable condition for the growth of such a spirit is a thorough professional training, both practical and theoretical. The growth of that spirit may be furthered by a free interchange of experience and opinions upon professional matters."[319] Like a scientific community, SAF is a community of shared ideas that aimed to "wrest structures of knowledge out of chaos" and to tease mathematical truths about economic value out of the forests, developing and refining the tools and techniques for creating a vision of the forests that is functional. It permits the work of forestry to be broken down into specific repeatable acts. Thus the discipline of forestry is a way of organizing functional tasks, and a way of thinking about the forest.

Presently, foresters in British Columbia subscribe to a legally regulated code of conduct, the Registered Professional Forester's Code of Ethics. It is central to their cohesive culture. As Larson observes, profession means "a special interest group whose power and prestige rests upon monopolized competence and the undemocratic uses of expertise and the factual demonstration that knowledge is beneficent power."[320] Larson implies that expertise can be used to exclude outside perspectives, limiting democratic discussion.

One potential danger inherent in the bureaucratic/technocratic model exemplified by RPF's is that: "Since RPF's have a shared language, training and allegiance to common institutions they are often unwilling to take seriously or even listen to other entrants to the debate."[321] Studies on the American Forest Service demonstrate uniform values among its members.[322] Due to the similar structure and focus of the Forest Service in the United States and Canada, the American example can be extended to the Canadian experience. Many of the values instilled in professional foresters in the 1960s, still

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319 Pinchot is quoted in Rick Jonasse, "The Forester's Eye: Technology, Techniques and Perceptions in Early American Forestry," *Alternatives* Vol. 21: 3, 1995, p. 35.
320 Larson is quoted in M'Gonigle, "The Unnecessary Conflict: Resolving the Forestry/Wilderness Stalemate," p. 350.
321 Ibid., p. 353.
322 Janus, *Victims of Groupthink* , p. 134.

captivate the minds of foresters.[323] Indeed, the observations about the shared mind set among professional foresters present a picture that is consistent with present day experience. Studies demonstrated that Forest Service members have homogeneous values and a shared ideology. For example, in 1960 Kaufman noted that "one of the most striking conclusions about the Forest Service is the degree of similarity among the men in it."[324] Similarly, Janus identifies foresters' cohesiveness as "groupthink." She also argues that the cohesive mind set can bias and limit a group's recognition of and response to problems or opportunities restricting its adaptiveness."[325] This point is reinforced by Jones' study which suggests that the forest service rejects the values and goals of the other people involved in resource use conflicts.[326]

Although the MOF's perspective has broadened to include some ecosystem and biodiversity concepts, the expert management approach prevails. Foresters are unwilling to accept other viewpoints since they believe they are the best qualified people to make decisions. Finding their colleagues the most salient reference groups, they listen to one another.[327] Non-specialists such as environmentalists or members of the public do not have credibility with professional foresters.[328] Dellert argues that "the technocratic approach excludes other viewpoints and wields knowledge as power to control the policy

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323 Although new concepts such as ecosystem based management have been introduced to the professional forestry dialogue, a shared mindset among experts still exists. This section argues that expert management creates a culture of expertise and a shared mindset among foresters. So, even if the ideas change, the approach foresters take remains similar. For details on the shared values among foresters and the professional foresters' ethos, see Michael M'Gonigle, "The Unnecessary Conflict," p. 351. For details on ecosystem based management and new concepts such as biodiversity in forest management see, Jones, "Ecosystem Management: The Forest Service's Response to Social Conflict." For a general discussion of ecosystem based management, see Edward Grumbine, "What is Ecosystem Management?," *Conservation Biology* 27: 4, 1994.

324 Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behaviour* , p. 56.

325 Janus, *Victims of Groupthink* .

326 Jones cites Coser's 1976 study in his article: "Ecosystem Management: The Forest Service's Response to Social Conflict," *Society and Natural Resources*, March/April, 8:2, 1995, pp. 161-168.

327 Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.*

328 Jones, "Ecosystem Management: The Forest Service's Response to Social Conflict," p. 164.

agenda."[329] The "blinker philosophy" of the forest service manifests in a reluctance to relinquish control over forest decision making.[330] Consequently, the unwillingness to hand over power or authority can inhibit respectful democratic debate and cooperative accommodation of diverse insights and understanding. The danger of this mind set is that "a class of managerial professionals has been created, they pursue self interested goals and serve to maintain the status quo. These institutions may become so self-interested that they resist redirection even when they are harmful to broader social welfare concerns."[331]

As shown above, the shared system of values among experts validates technical expertise, and subsequently denies other viewpoints, particularly the knowledge of non-experts. Now the general arguments about bureaucracy and professional foresters will be applied to an explanation of why the B.C. bureaucracy favoured moderate reform instead of structural reform.

The B.C. Case: Bureaucratic Resistance in the MOF

Since many of its members are Professional Foresters or other technicians, the Ministry of Forests exemplifies a bureaucracy based on scientific expertise. Thus the general arguments about bureaucracy's tendency to resist change in order to protect its interests can be applied to the British Columbia case to explain why the Ministry of Forests (MOF) preferred moderate reform instead of radical restructuring. The MOF undertook reform design work during 1990-91, which provided the new NDP government with a convincing package of reforms. In addition, the MOF facilitated many of the NDP's initiatives by providing expertise and technical support. Although this work was part of the MOF's mandate the the reforms also served to reposition the ministry on reformist territory and to resist ideas that threatened its position.

The MOF faced demands for change that both challenged its role and threatened its

329 Dellert, "Sustained Yield Forestry in British Columbia," p. 118.
330 Ibid. p.119.
331 M'Gonigle, "The Unnecessary Conflict," p. 358.

position. The Forest Resources Commission (FRC) report published in 1991, recommended sweeping changes in management structure that would have revamped the bureaucracy--possibly reducing MOF authority. It recommended that the MOF's authority should be transferred to a Ministry of Renewable Natural Resources with responsibility for policy, regulation and general administration of the forest and range lands of the province.[332] Furthermore, it suggested that a Forest Resources Corporation, Forestco, would assume many of the MOF's management responsibilities.[333] The proposed system of management would replace large tenures with smaller tenures held by a number of small operators. The changes proposed by FRC were a potential threat to the MOF's position. Possibly, the MOF predicted the replacement of the Social Credit party by the reform-minded NDP government. If so, then the MOF may have feared that the new government would take guidance from the FRC report. The MOF chose to pursue reforms when confronted with an inevitable change process.

Aware that the current regime, and particularly sustained yield was under attack, members of the MOF such as Deputy Minister Philip Halkett initiated reform during the 1990-91 period. Two key adjustments that the MOF undertook were the Old Growth Project and a review of Timber Supply Analysis and the AAC determination procedures. The MOF achieved two aims by working on these reforms. First, it kept control within the MOF and defended its position with its response to the challenges it faced. Second, it laid the foundation for some of the NDP initiatives that followed.

Halkett and others within the MOF recognized that public attitudes and expectations about forest management had changed. The rise of environmental and conservation concerns led him to declare that "all [MOF] decisions must be

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332 These reforms are more fully described in the Forest Resources Commission Report, *The Future of Our Forests* , (Victoria: The Queen's Printer for BC, April, 1991), Section 4, pp. 23-27.

333 It would collect revenue, manage the forest and pay dividends to the government. It would operate at arms length from government and ensure that the legislated requirements for public participation were met. Forestco would also be responsible for attaining growth and yield standards. Ibid., p. 25.

environmentally acceptable" and that "the Ministry is the steward of the resource."[334] When the Assistant Deputy Minister of Operations Wes Cheston attempted to claim that the primary use for the provincial forests is the "growing and cropping of trees" he soon retracted his statement. He later stated: "it is clear that provincial forests shall be managed on the basis of integrated use" --admitting other uses such as wilderness protection and recreation.[335] As Chief Forester John Cuthbert stated, it was time to take action.[336]

The Old-Growth Project signalled the first time that the Ministry recognized the legitimacy of old-growth forests for purposes other than maximizing their liquidation.[337] MOF launched the project in order to "identify recommended areas for old-growth protection, and possible changes to forest practices to maintain important old-growth attributes and areas."[338] Eighty-nine people participated in the project, representing a wide cross-section of groups including industry, community members, scientists, academics and government agencies. Eighty-five candidate old-growth areas were submitted for consideration, and seventeen candidate areas were recommended. This project introduced concepts such as biodiversity into the discourse, thus raising alternative ideas about what MOF goals were. Furthermore, the Old-Growth Project laid some important foundations for future land and resource policy, since the areas it identified were later incorporated into the Protected Areas Strategy.

The MOF also initiated the review of Timber Supply planning and AAC determination procedures. Timber supply management had become increasingly complex due to the shift in public values. Timber supply analyses were criticized for being out of

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334 This quote appears in: "Halkett Attempts to Set a New Course for B.C. Forest Service," (reprint of memo March 28, 1990), *Forest Planning Canada* , 6:4, 1990, p. 5.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
337 Old Growth Strategy Project, *An Old Growth Strategy for British Columbia*, [Victoria: B.C. Ministry of Forests, May, 1992], pp. 48-55.
338 Halkett, "Halkett Attempts to Set A New Course," p.6.

date, for ignoring non-timber values, and for overestimating the timber supply.[339] Therefore in 1990, the MOF initiated an internal review of the processes used to determine the rate of cut (or the Allowable Annual Cut (AAC) across the province. The subsequent report, entitled "Review of the Timber-Supply Analysis Process for B.C. Timber Supply Areas," confirmed that the previous process for determining the AAC overestimated the province's timber supply. It also expressed concern that the rate of logging was unsustainable. The review concluded that the AAC needs to be redetermined more often ("no less frequently than every five years.")[340]

In response, MOF officials Cuthbert and Cheston drafted a "Proposed Action Plan for the Implementation of Recommendations from the Report" in April, 1991. The action plan dealt with a number of concerns raised in the review, yet it took measures to protect MOF interests.[341]

Through the internal review and the AAC redetermination process, the MOF attempted to reform one of B.C.'s key forest policy processes. Yet the emphasis on technical expertise and scientific data in the process indicates that the MOF was willing to respond to some, but not all of the public's concerns. The public complained that there were too few opportunities for participation in the highly technical process. Yet the process exposed concerns about the reduction in the amount of fibre supply and jobs, which were the impetus for the Forest Renewal Plan.

In sum, the Old Growth Project introduced the concept of biodiversity and selected candidate areas which would later inform the Protected Areas Strategy and CORE. This project, and the work done in the Timber Supply Review laid the groundwork for the

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339 According to Dellert, these processes have been overestimating the long-run sustained yield by up to 20 per cent. Also, they need to accomodate forest values such as wilderness, old growth, recreation, wildlife, tourism, and biological diversity. These points are discussed in Lois Dellert, "Timber Supply Forecast to 2050, A British Columbia Case Study," *Forest Planning Canada* , 6:6, 1990 pp. 35-38.

340 For further discussion see Ministry of Forests, *Review of the Timber-Supply Analysis Process for B.C. Timber Supply Areas*, (British Columbia Ministry of Forests, April, 1991).

341 The report omitted key issues such as the need to manage for all forest-resources, and the need to incorporate public participation. The report reiterates the Ministry's commitment to timber as their dominant focus.

moderate reforms that the government would later implement. The MOF's technical advice, research and other work formed a blueprint for future reforms: the NDP government elected in October 1991 found waiting at the MOF a well-crafted package of moderate reforms. Since the bureaucracy supported these reforms, the moderate reform package exerted a substantial pull.[342]

By the time the NDP assumed power, the bureaucracy was in high gear. Continuing its reform design work, the MOF facilitated other reforms such as the Forest Practices Code. The concept of a Forest Practices Code was first discussed in the mid-1980s within the Forest Service, and subsequently, support for this type of reform grew within the MOF.[343] However, the real push for a Code came after the release of the Forest Resources Commission recommendations in April of 1991. At this time the Social Credit government was highly concerned about the blockades across the province. Therefore, in response Cabinet's decision that B.C. needed a Code, members of the MOF became highly involved in the development and implementation of the Forest Practices Code.

Although the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (MOELP) were somewhat involved with the Code, members of the MOF were the main actors. In late 1991 the Forest Service set up a number of working groups and technical Committees to deal with aspects such as rules and standards, public involvement, review and appeal. In addition, the Joint Steering Committee of the three Assistant Deputy Ministers was established, comprised of representatives from Ministry of Forests, Ministry of Environment Land and Parks, and Ministry of Mining and Petroleum. Chief Forester John Cuthbert also sat on this committee which responded to significant issues that arose. In the meantime, the bulk of the work drafting the Code was carried out by environmental lawyers, planners, and forest policy experts who coordinated the vast information and

342 Wilson argues that the reforms crafted by the bureaucracy provided a "blueprint" for the NDP in his article. See Jeremy Wilson, "Implementing Forest Policy Change in British Columbia: Comparing the Experiences of the NDP Governments of 1972-75 and 1991-?," *Troubles in the Rainforest: British Columbia's Forest Economy in Transition*, (conference proceedings, forthcoming in 1998).

343 Personal communication with MOF officials (1996, 1997) and with Bob Peart, Ministerial assistant to John Cashore, (August,1996).

formulated the Forest Practices Code legislation and statutes. This work continued until 1994 when the Code was passed.

The Code provided bureaucrats with a prime opportunity to "do what they do best." Members of the Ministry of Forests worked overtime drafting, revising and developing legislation for the Forest Practices Code. It is estimated that several hundred people within the MOF were involved in the formation and implementation of the Forest Practices Code, although only about a dozen staff exclusively focused on the Code.[344] Recently, MOF officials have been busy implementing the Code.

The Code also stimulated the reorganization of the MOF in the summer of 1994. The Compliance and Enforcement Branch in Victoria was created, giving fifteen people responsibility for enforcing compliance. The Code gave bureaucrats a key role implementing the new legislation. While these changes did not solely emerge from the bureaucracy, its members were highly involved in developing and implementing the policy.

The technical advice, research and support work done by the bureaucracy facilitated changes such as the Forest Practices Code. This section shows that in crafting the moderate reforms, the bureaucracy took charge of the inevitable change process. The MOF pursued reforms such as the Old Growth Project, the Timber Supply Review and the Forest Practices Code in fulfilment of its mandate. However, these reforms also preserved the MOF's position as expert and maintained the existing system of MOF-centred control. This experience exemplifies expert administration at work: In response to pressures for change, experts provided advice in accordance with their mandate, and developed moderate reforms. Instead of becoming susceptible to changes that might reduce its authority, the MOF initiated reforms to assure itself a role in the reformed regime. The MOF chose to maintain control, therefore decision making power still rests firmly in the hands of ministry officials.

Bureaucrats within the MOF were skeptical of changes like tenure reform and

344 Ken Baker, Ministry of Forests, personal communication, January, 1997.

community control that might reduce the Ministry's authority over revenues and decision making. MOF officials intend to keep large revenues flowing to the ministry and to maintain their department's control.[345] Indeed, the MOF's functions outlined in the Ministry of Forests Act are: "to make timber available to companies, to foster stumpage revenue, and to encourage industry competitiveness and employment."[346] Although the MOF's mandate is to balance these tasks with concerns about conservation and sustainability, in reality, it is more faithful to its "socioeconomic objectives." In general, the MOF does not consider community forestry as a way to achieve these aims. Although the MOF lacks the authority to decentralize power or to change the tenure system, it has a critical role as expert advisor to the Minister on the issue of community forestry. As one key MOF official states:

> If the Minister wanted to talk about community forestry, we would point out the pros and cons in an economic sense. We would consider, if the province gave up control would the town just chop all the trees down? What would happen to the mill in the area that has harvesting rights? What would happen to jobs and forest revenue? So would the MOF propose community forestry? Probably not. We would make a presentation offering the pros and cons of this policy option.[347]

In accordance with its mandate to consider the impact on economic factors such as timber flow and social factors such as job loss, the MOF would identify the pros and cons of community forestry from an economic standpoint. Indeed, the MOF adheres to its socioeconomic mandate; it aims to ensure a "balanced set of forest resource outcomes." Not to mention the fact that it is required to protect government revenue.

Clearly moderate reform was consistent with the MOF's chief concerns and mandates, whereas community forestry challenged the existing regime. Moreover, bureaucratic norms impeded MOF officials from considering this option. As Torgerson observes: "the administrative sphere resists even the serious consideration of alternatives

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345 Bureaucrats truly believe they are doing their jobs by drawing in as much revenue from stumpage fees and other forestry-related benefits as possible. This function is encoded in the *Ministry of Forests Act*, section 4.

346 Ministry of Forests, *Ministry of Forests Act*, section 4.

347 Interview with MOF official--confidential.

because of the conjunction of ideological presuppositions, particular interests and shared purposes which constitute that domain."[348] In this case, the norms and culture of expertise steered bureaucrats towards their specialized tasks and the interests of their departments. The norms of professional forestry and technical management narrowed bureaucrats' vision, and impeded their willingness to consider alternatives.

Political Motivations

The final part of this chapter shows that the NDP government also favoured moderate reform, but for different reasons than the bureaucracy. While the bureaucratic arm of the state was focused on providing expert advice and protecting its turf, the political arm was focused on legitimacy. The political will and interests of the government favoured moderate reforms to bolster its coalition of support in order to be re-elected.

Although the NDP's forest policy paper[349] expressed support for Community forest boards and tenure reform, once the Party was in power, its main priority was re-election. The NDP was elected on a platform to "end the war in the woods." Its strategy for re-election was to implement a moderate reform package which aimed to convince the general public that the concerns of key stakeholders were being addressed, and that the war in the woods was over. Hence, the government responded to the expectations and demands of key societal groups,[350] particularly organized labour, environmentalists and First Nations.

This section shows that the NDP government was primarily concerned with

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348 Paehlke and Torgerson, *Managing Leviathan*, p. 28.

349 B.C. New Democratic Party Standing Committee on the Environment for an Ecologically and Economically Sustainable Future (SCOEE), "A New Forest Policy for the British Columbia New Democratic Party," Adopted by Provincial Convention, November 7th, 1992. The report suggests that there should be "Community Resource Management Boards" Section 3.2 page 2.

350 Nordlinger contends that an autonomy enhancing strategy of the state is to "stress their responsiveness to societal expectations or demands. " Moreover, the state uses this tactic to increase its legitimacy by convinving the public that it is responsive to members of society. Nordlinger, p. .

electoral success. For this purpose, the government forged a coalition of support by calculating which policies would satisfy its key constituencies. The NDP's platform "to end the war in the woods" attempted to strike a balance between its divergent supporters by appealing both to organized Labour (which had endorsed the NDP historically) and environmentalists (which is its more recent constituency). Once in power, the NDP's priority was to maintain the support of forest dependent communities and organized labour. Since the NDP relied on the political support of forest dependent communities and the IWA to gain re-election it did not want to risk losing their support. Since tenure reform might spark resistance from industry and create dislocations in forest dependent communities, the party thought this reform would threaten its members' prospects for re-election. Therefore the NDP avoided reforms that would jeopardize its political support.

Finally, as its first term progressed, the NDP government was increasingly concerned about maintaining its political support. The Party's prospects for re-election were dim in 1994-95,[351] therefore the government focused on policies that would ensure its re-election. Since the public endorsed park creation and tougher forest practices legislation, the government offered more of these initiatives. The NDP's main prerogative was to appeal to key members of the policy community to create a backdrop of support and thus convince the public that it had handled the war in the woods. In short, the NDP government calculated that the moderate reform strategy was more likely to please the public and to win over its key constituencies than the risky restructuring route.

The NDP Platform: To End the War in the Woods

Public discontent peaked in 1989-91 after the Social Credit government was repeatedly accused of mismanaging BC's forests. The NDP sought to win the approval of voters who were dissatisfied with the Socred regime by speaking out against forest abuses

351 See Angus Reid, *Angus Reid Report 1994* (Vancouver, BC: Angus Reid,1994).

in order. In fact, eighteen points of the NDP's forty-eight point election platform focused on forestry and environmental reforms.[352] The NDP ran on a platform to improve forest management and to end the 'war in the woods.' The platform spoke directly to the Party's main constituencies: Labour, Environmentalists and First Nations.

Historically, organized Labour was the NDP's main constituency. The NDP formed a natural alliance with workers and unions because of the Party's social democratic ideology. Labour was the NDP's main constituency until the 1970s and 1980s when the NDP expanded its coalition to include environmentalists and First Nations. During this period, the NDP put forward numerous private members bills that recognized the concerns of these groups which had been ignored by the mainstream parties.

The NDP's new coalition had inherent tensions since environmentalists' agendas clashed with the priorities of the IWA and organized labour. Since parks decreased the amount of land available for logging, forest workers perceived proposals to increase the number of protected areas as a threat to stable employment.[353]

Therefore the NDP sought to resolve the tensions between environmentalists and forest workers and to win their support. The Party's Jobs and Environment Accord aimed " to end to valley-by-valley conflicts over our forests"[354] and to manage the forest-use crisis in a "comprehensive manner" in order to avoid "ecological depletion and economic stalemate throughout BC."[355] On one hand, it promised "stability and economic security for forest communities and forest workers now confronted with rapid change and an uncertain future." [356] The platform responded directly to workers' concerns about the declining number of jobs by promising open negotiations with workers, supported by technical research, new initiatives in sustainable forestry practices, and new R&D. It also

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352 New Democratic Party, *A Better Way for British Columbia* , (New Democratic Party Election Platform, 1991), items 17-24.

353 Kim Pollock," Clayoquot Decision no Victory for Workers in B.C.," *Lumber Worker*, (IWA--Canada), June 1993, 58:2 p. 3.

354 New Democratic Party, *Environment and Jobs Accord*, 1991.

355 Ibid.

356 Ibid.

committed to increase employment by expanding the value added and remanufacturing industry.

On the other hand, the Party promised environmentalists that it would "preserve our unique ecological and wilderness areas,"[357] pledging to double the number of protected areas in BC and to carry out "an immediate and province-wide inventory of forests that recognizes their diverse economic, ecological and cultural values." Moreover, the NDP endorsed tougher forest practices legislation. In response to environmentalist and First Nations' concerns about insufficient participation, the NDP assured these groups that they would be involved in multi-stakeholder negotiations. Furthermore, the Accord promised "a just and honourable settlement of the outstanding Aboriginal land question claims to the benefit of all British Columbians."

Finally, the platform mentioned some fundamental reforms such as community control and tenure reform. But it did not make a clear commitment to take action on these issues. The Party's Standing Committee on Ecology and Economy supported the creation of Community Resource Boards, yet no clear definition of the role or scope of these boards was outlined in the Party platform.[358] In terms of tenure reform, instead of detailing a strategy, the platform merely encouraged environmentalists' hope for change by suggesting that a Royal Commission might be established.

The NDP platform and particularly the Environment and Jobs Accord appealed to the Party's diverse constituencies. The NDP offered enough concessions to please environmentalists and First Nations without unduly annoying Labour. Therefore it was the Party's first step in fortifying its coalition of support.

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357 Ibid.

358 B.C. New Democratic Party Standing Committee on the Environment for an Ecologically and Economically Sustainable Future (SCOEE) "A New Forest Policy for the British Columbia New Democratic Party". Adopted by Provincial Convention, November 7th, 1992. The report suggests that there should be "Community Resource Management Boards" Section 3.2 page 2.

Political realities: Forest Dependent Communities and Organized Labour. Once the NDP was in power, one of its main priorities was to maintain the support of forest dependent communities and organized labour. This section demonstrates that the NDP relied on these two constituencies for political support in order to gain re-election. Furthermore, it argues that the NDP was reluctant to risk losing the approval of these groups.

A substantial portion of NDP support in the 1991 term was derived from forest dependent communities. Seven ministers from the NDP cabinet represented forest dependent constituencies. These included powerful ministers such as Colin Gabelmann, who represented Campbell River which is 70 per cent dependent on forestry (according to the Ministry of Finance analysis cited in Chapter IV) and Port Hardy which is 61 per cent dependent on forestry.[359] Table 5.1 lists the NDP members whose constituencies included communities with especially high levels of forest dependence:

359 From a 1996 report by the B.C. Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations on the main generators of jobs and economic activities in communities across British Columbia. For details, see Palmer, "Figures on Forest Jobs Chilling."

Table 5.1: B.C. FOREST DEPENDENT CONSTITUENCIES AND TOWNS

Member		Town	% dependent on forest
Jackie Pement	(Kitimat-Stikine)	Hazelton	80
	(Bulkley-Nechako)	Burns Lake	79
	(Skeena)	Smithers-Houston	67
Dan Miller	(Queen Charlotte)		48
		Prince Rupert	30
		Ocean Falls	37
Dave Zirnhelt	(Cariboo)	Williams Lake	72
Paul Ramsey	(Fraser-Fort George)	Prince George	70
Gerard Janssen	(Alberni-Clayoquot)	Alberni	71
Dale Lovick	(Nanaimo)	Nanaimo	54
Jan Pullinger	(Cowichan Valley)	Duncan	62
		Ladysmith	75
		Lake Cowichan	91
Lois Boone	(Fraser-Fort George)		
		McBride-Valemount	71
Frank Garden	(Cariboo North)	Quesnel	77
Helmut Giesbrecht	(Kitimat-Stikine)	Kitimat-Terrace	41

Since so many NDP members represented forest dependent areas, political success was vulnerable to cuts in forestry. A total of twenty-two seats out of the total number held by the government were at stake. Moreover, the NDP had a narrow margin of victory in the 1991 election. Given the Party's dependence on forest dependent communities, the government presumed that changes such as tenure reform or community control might jeopardize the electoral success of individual NDP members and the Party as a whole.[360]

Labour/Union Support. Organized labour was another important NDP constituency during the 1991-95 period. The NDP relied on union support for votes and campaign contributions, and the International Woodworkers Association was particularly important to the NDP.

Forest workers and unions are a sizable constituency. Workers employed in sawmilling and logging are mainly represented by the International Woodworkers Association (IWA) which had 27, 500 members in 1995. Two other key unions are the

[360] Prior to the 1996 election, the NDP held 51 seats and needed another 38 to win a second term.

Paper and Allied Pulp Workers Collective PPWC which represents about 7,007 people and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), which represents over 9,000 members. Of the roughly 85, 000 forest workers in B.C., more than half belong to unions.

In addition to the number of potential votes that organized Labour provides for the NDP, it also provides monetary and volunteer service contributions to the Party's political campaigns. Unions are a major source of NDP campaign funding. For instance, in the 1996 election, unions donated $735, 000 of the $3.8 million that the NDP raised.[361] The IWA--Canada donated $26,440, and many IWA locals contributed to the NDP's 1996 campaign.[362] In addition, a large portion of the NDP campaign support came from contributed services. Volunteer services of lawyers, accountants and others critical to the operation of a campaign were donated by organized labour.

According to Norman Ruff, donated labour and services represent a major source of support to the NDP: "The value of the contributed services is often greater, and more valuable, than cash...The NDP can tap into agencies like unions that other parties cannot. It is not an insignificant amount."[363] Due to disclosure laws, the NDP does not have to claim where these "in kind" donations came from. Still, the NDP spent only $22, 000 on reportable professional services compared to the Liberals $600, 000.[364]

Since the NDP relied on organized labour and forest dependent communities for political success, the Party wanted to be responsive to the expectations and demands of these constituencies. Therefore the NDP safeguarded these constituencies' support by avoiding reforms that might negatively impact them. In addition, the NDP offered them certain concessions.

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361 For details on contributions to the NDP campaign see Jim Beatty, "B.C. Liberals big spenders in loss," *Vancouver Sun*, Wednesday September 4, 1996, p. A3.

362 For example, locals1-3567, 217 and 71, donated $500 each. Locals 423 and 97 each gave $1000, while local 424 gave $1782. Chief Electoral Officer for British Columbia, interview, September, 1997.

363 Norman Ruff is quoted in Jeff Lee, "B.C. campaign costs hidden, experts say," *Vancouver Sun*, Thursday September 5, 1996, p. B3.

364 Ibid.

As noted in earlier chapters, organized labour and forest dependent communities benefit from the existing forest management regime. According to Schwindt and Heaps, Labour receives 67 per cent of the wealth from forests.[365] Unions establish cutting contracts with large corporations to guarantee union members high wages.[366] Marchak observes that the IWA favours an integrated system which provides continual access to large corporate logging contracts since it believes that large companies can plan on long-term horizons, can pay decent wages, and can invest in training for the labour-force, safety measures, and conservation of the forest.[367] The NDP was aware of how forest workers benefit from the existing system, therefore it calculated that alterations to this system might disturb the central ideas behind the Party's relationship with unions.

The NDP was also hesitant to make radical changes because the forest industry was extremely volatile at this time. Due to international environmental groups' campaigns which attacked the BC forest industry, foreign customers were losing confidence in BC. Since tenure reform would undoubtedly spark resistance from industry, the government considered that it would impose undesirable short term costs. The government did not want to battle forest companies--or the IWA. The members of the NDP were aware that creating further dislocations for workers or forest dependent communities would threaten their chances for re-election. Thus, instead of tackling structural reform issues, the NDP undertook moderate reforms to reestablish international confidence so that the industry could run smoothly once again. Reforms such as CORE were presented as part of a transition strategy to decrease negative impacts on workers. In addition, the NDP offered concessions to workers. for example, the NDP passed a bill to ensure that Forest Renewal Plan jobs would be offered first to displaced forest workers. The NDP's reforms which appeared to respond to the concerns of its constituencies, and ultimately bolstered its legitimacy with these groups and the general public.

365 Schwindt and Heaps undertake complicated estimation procedures to arrive at this estimate. See Schwindt and Heaps, *Chopping up the Money Tree*, p. 51.
366 B.C. forest workers wages are 10 per cent higher than those in the rest of Canada, Ibid., p. 53.
367 Marchak, *Green Gold*, p. 61.

Response to Public Concerns

Structural reforms were not the government's priority due to concerns about legitimacy. The government calculated that it could increase its legitimacy by responding to issues that the public was concerned about. For instance, in 1993 the Cabinet's polling results indicated that six in ten people surveyed viewed having "too few designated wilderness areas" as a serious policy issue. Sixty one per cent of people felt that more wilderness is needed.[368] The public was also concerned about forest practices. In 1992, 52 per cent of people surveyed thought that the forestry sector should be more closely watched by government.[369] In 1992-93 it was a common public perception that "heavier penalties and tougher enforcement practices are long overdue."[370] Forty-six per cent of people surveyed agreed, while 39 per cent strongly agreed. Furthermore, 88 per cent of people rated increasing fines to $1 million per day as important according to a MOF survey.[371]

The NDP's moderate reforms described in Chapter Three directly responded to public concerns about park protection and forest practices. Although these changes were not universally praised, "the process of change in B.C.'s forestry was seen by the general public, if not the wilderness groups and the companies, as an improvement over the arbitrary and secretive allocation of property rights that has characterized the coastal province since its beginning."[372] Policies such as CORE earned public support for the most part. The CORE recommendations presented by Commissioner Stephen Owen were accepted by approximately 45 per cent of people surveyed by the MOF in 1994.[373] In addition, the NDP found that it could win public approval by implementing Forest

368 The report surveyed 3, 000 adult British Columbians, for details see Angus Reid, *Angus Reid Poll 1993,* "Wilderness issues in British Columbia--Preliminary Results of a 1993 Province-Wide survey of B.C. Households," (funded by the Forest Resources Development Agreement, MOF Recreation branch, BC Parks, and Environment Canada).
369 Angus Reid, *BC Reid Report* , 1992.
370 Ibid.
371 B.C. Ministry of Forests, *Viewpoints Survey*, 1994.
372 Marchak, *Logging the Globe*, p. 115.
373 B.C. Ministry of Forests, *Viewpoints Survey*, 1994.

Renewal BC[374] since there was public support for introducing re-training for forest workers and increasing value added industry jobs.[375] In 1994, nearly one in three BC residents, rated unemployment as the most important public policy issue. Also, 75 per cent of people surveyed by the MOF thought funding and access to re-training was an effective strategy to deal with unemployment in the forest sector.[376] There was also overwhelming support for designating funds to start other industries that process lumber into finished products.[377] Therefore the NDP's reforms directly appealed to public concerns.

By 1994-95, however, the government's legitimacy was in question. The NDP was on shaky political ground since the 1994 polls showed that the Party was unlikely to be re-elected. Therefore the NDP focused on winning public approval to increase its prospects for political success. NDP ministers began to perceive the land use and forest practice measures as among the only thing the government could base a re-election campaign on. Since moderate reforms were so popular, these took precedence over structural reforms in the NDP's agenda.

Conclusion

This section shows that the NDP government directly targeted key groups of supporters such as organized Labour, First Nations, and environmentalists. The Party pieced together support from its diverse policy community. By gaining at least token support from key stakeholders, the government could convince the public that the war in the woods was under control. Due to the NDP's strong ties to the Labour movement and its reliance on forest dependent communities, members of the NDP government did not

374 Forest Renewal BC was detailed in Chapter Three.
375 There was substantial public support for both of these reforms, see B.C. Ministry of Forests, *Viewpoints Survey*.
376 Ibid.
377 87 per cent of people surveyed supported this idea , ibid.

want to risk their political success by causing disruptions for workers or communities. When the government anticipated slim chances for re-election in 1994-95, it capitalized on what had gained support so far: protected areas and forest practices legislation, hoping to win public approval. Given this situation, it is not surprising that the NDP calculated that structural reform engendered too many risks compared to the moderate reform strategy that would appease its key constituencies, and more importantly, capture public approval.

Clearly, the government's agenda reflects its focus on gaining re-election. This experience demonstrates that the electoral system shapes the feasibility of certain policy options--creating a bias toward short term electoral benefits instead of long term solutions. The NDP insists that the moderate reforms are more than mere concessions to various groups. Andrew Petter argues that the initiatives are stepping stones to structural reform. This is debatable. Yet clearly the NDP was not willing to risk losing the support of its main constituencies. If structural reform came at a price, the NDP was not willing to pay it.

The evidence presented in this chapter also illuminates the shared understanding and how it operates. Just as the shared understanding is reinforced by economic and bureaucratic factors, so is it reinforced by the political system in which governments make calculations about how to maintain support. The bureaucracy did not tear apart this understanding and neither did the NDP due to its dispositions and obligations to certain constituencies. This chapter shows that political calculations also uphold the shared understanding, blocking fundamental change. While this chapter emphasized arguments about the political feasibility of tenure and structural reform given prevailing values and power structures, it left aside more difficult questions about obstacles to this kind of fundamental change which would transform those values and structures. The final chapter addresses some of these concerns.

CHAPTER SIX: THE STRUGGLE OVER IDEAS

Introduction

Economic, bureaucratic and political factors reinforce the core ideas of B.C. forest policy. But ideas can change. The final part of this enquiry considers why the dominant ideas of the liquidation-conversion paradigm have not been replaced by alternative ideas like those contained in community forest board proposals. This chapter returns to our discussion of the two opposing advocacy coalitions: the Development Advocacy Coalition (DAC), with its focus on re-legitimizing the liquidation-conversion paradigm; and the Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC), with its criticism of this paradigm and its emphasis on protecting ecosystems.

This chapter explores why community forest ideas failed to achieve widespread support. It argues that the community forest coalition failed to draw enough support from the EAC, not to mention the DAC. The first section suggests that an effective community forest coalition would draw support from both the EAC and the DAC. It would include environmentalists, Aboriginal people and forest workers. The second section shows that although the Tin Wis community forest coalition was a promising start, many environmental groups were drawn away from pursuit of this approach to participate in the NDP's moderate reform agenda. The final section examines the tensions that exist between environmentalists and some labour organizations; and between environmentalists and Aboriginal people which impede the development of an effective community forestry coalition. It shows that although there is potential common ground among these members of the policy subsystem, this potential has not yet been developed.

An Effective "Counter-Coalition." As noted earlier, advocacy coalitions are "people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers etc.) who share a particular belief system...and who show a non-trivial degree of

coordinated activity over time."[378] According to Sabatier, advocacy coalitions aim to have their ideas translated into policy. The community forestry coalition aims to replace the dominant ideas of forest policy with its ideas. In order to be effective, this coalition needs to instigate a change in the policy core, that is, a paradigm shift.[379] Based on several theoretical insights about paradigm shifts, an effective coalition would need to include "counter-hegemonic" elements and agreement on an alternative paradigm. According to Laurie Adkin, an effective environmental movement requires counter-hegemonic elements such as environmentalists, First Nations and workers.[380] Environmentalists and First Nations have been the most vocal opponents of the current system of forest management. Increasingly, some union members and independent forest workers are voicing discontent. Each of these groups provides an important alternative perspective. Environmentalists provide a focus on ecosystems, and in some cases, a grassroots approach. First Nations provide insights about cultural domination, stewardship models, and a strong case for community control. Forest workers can provide useful insights about the relations of domination-subordination that exist under a system of corporate-run forestry. In addition, forest workers have ideas about participatory worker-run businesses, value-added industry, and creating more jobs. Together, these three perspectives provide the nucleus for a rich critique of the relations of domination-subordination from the perspective of culture, class, and environment.[381] The Tin Wis coalition was an important step toward an effective community forest coalition. It included environmentalists, labour and First Nations. A brief discussion of the Tin Wis coalition illustrates the challenges faced by the community forest coalition as a whole.

378 Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, *Policy Change and Learning*, p. 25.

379 Howlett discusses paradigm shifts in Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh eds., *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 184-197.

380 There is a large body of theory on counter-hegemonic discourse. This reference to counter-hegemony focuses on the need to integrate various aspects of new social movements. Adkin refers to the need for environmentalists, women's groups, unions and other groups such as First Nations to join together. See Adkin, "Counter-Hegemony and Environmental Politics in Canada," in Bill Carroll ed. *Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice* (Victoria BC: Garamond Press, 1992), 153.

381 Adkin's theory is applied here, ibid.

The Tin Wis Coalition. The Tin Wis coalition was the outcome of two decades of struggle for community control. The coalition was formed in 1989 to address broader forest stewardship issues. Its diverse members included a few leading First Nations (such as the Nuu-chah-Nulth Tribal Council), a few key labour unions (such as Canadian Paperworkers Union, the Canadian Pulp and Paperworkers union, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, the BC government Employees Union and the BC Federation of Labour), and environmental groups. Tin Wis was concerned with responsible and accountable management of the "working forest." The coalition lobbied for an agreement about holistic forestry between provincial government, communities, aboriginal people and people most affected by forestry. After its 1990 conference the coalition established a forestry working group to develop reforms. The working group drafted the *Forest Stewardship Act*, which included reforms to achieve "community control, sustainable rates of logging on a regional basis, holistic management for all forest values, optimal wood utilization standards and the recognition of First Nations rights and decision making processes."[382] The Act proposed the devolution of power to local boards which would be accountable to communities. The mandate, structure and composition of a Community Forest Board (CFB) were outlined in the Act. In addition, it described ways to ensure that provincial minimum standards would be maintained. CFBs would have responsibility for regional planning and management, land use zoning and supervision of licensees.

B.C. Environmental Groups' Participation in Moderate Reforms

The Tin Wis movement and the community forest coalition's maturation was inhibited by the government's compelling moderate agenda. During the 1991-94 period, government and members of the Environmental Advocacy Coalition focused their attention on forest practices and park protection. These moderate reform issues provided

382 Evelyn Pinkerton, "Co-Management Efforts as Social Movements: The Tin Wis Coalition and the Drive for Forest Practices Legislation in British Columbia," *Alternatives*, 19:3 (1993), p. 35.

environmental organizations with an opportunity to make concrete policy gains. As a result, the Tin Wis movement lost momentum.

The NDP, elected on a platform to "end the war in the woods," committed itself to double the protected areas system in B.C. and to develop tougher forest practices legislation. The NDP government's moderate reform agenda squarely addressed public concerns by making a direct connection between better forest practices and tougher regulations. Environmental groups saw an opportunity to achieve long sought-after policy gains if they co-operated with the NDP's initiatives such as the Forest Practices Code and the Protected Areas Strategy. Many members of the EAC, particularly environmental lawyers and planners, worked with the government on its moderate reform agenda. Groups like the Sierra Club participated in the CORE land use planning process and development of the Forest Practices Code.

Although many organizations and individuals within the EAC supported community control and tenure reform, few pursued this strategy during the government's first term. Instead, most focused on wilderness protection or forest practices, in accordance with their mandates. For example, the Sierra Club's mandate is to maintain B.C./Canada's wilderness areas.[383] During the 1992-94 period, the Sierra Club participated in the CORE process, lobbied for a tougher Forest Practices Code, and mounted campaigns to protect the spotted owl, grizzly bears, and various protected areas.[384] Also, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society mounted campaigns to protect wilderness areas such as the Rockies whereas WCWC lobbied to protect Clayoquot Sound, to ban clearcutting, and to toughen forest practices legislation. [385]

Environmental organizations concentrated on protected areas and logging -- issues that were high on the public agenda -- because they could make concrete policy gains in

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383 Paul Senez (Forest Campaigner, Sierra Club), personal interview, July 1996.
384 Ibid.
385 Western Canada Wilderness Committee, mission statement.

these areas.[386] For example, the Forest Practices Code promised better forest practices through tighter regulation by the provincial government. It provided a direct response to public demands for tougher regulations.[387] Hence environmental organizations could achieve certain long-sought after goals by participating in such reforms.

Groups lobby for moderate or incremental reforms for strategic reasons. According to group behaviour analyst Eleanor Ostrom, "often, to gain even a portion of what it wants, a strong coalition will engage in compromise, even with its adversaries."[388] Ostrom and other theorists such as Sabatier argue that advocacy groups adopt a strategy that is likely to achieve policy success even if they must compromise certain policy goals.[389] Although groups may share a core belief in fundamental reform (i.e. along ecosystem perspectives or democratic principles), they may support different policy preferences or strategies. Many B.C. environmental groups, de-emphasized fundamental reforms such as changing the tenure system. Instead, they focused on issues within the NDP's moderate agenda (issues that the government was willing to address). For strategic reasons, groups compromised broader goals in exchange for more moderate policy advances such as increased protected areas.

Tensions Which Impede the Community Forestry Coalition

As groups chose to participate in the moderate reform agenda, they set aside deeper concerns, and the Tin Wis movement waned.[390] A number of tensions impeded the development of a strong community forestry coalition. Howlett argues that the forest

386 For a useful discussion on media tactics of environmental groups such as Greenpeace, see Jeremy Wilson, "Green Lobbies," in Robert Boardman ed. *Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics , and Process*, (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 1992], p. 122.

387 Ministry of Forests, *Viewpoints Survey*

388 Eleanor Ostrom, "Structural choice and Guidance Instruments."

389 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning.*

390 Wilson observed that the Tin Wis movement did not reach maturation because many groups chose to work on moderate reform instead. Jeremy Wilson, personal discussion , March, 1997.

policy community "remains torn and divided over a number of issues."[391] Tensions exist between environmentalists and forest workers; and between environmentalists and Aboriginal people.

Forest Workers and Resource Dependent Communities. The tension between environmentalists and forest workers hinders the development of a strong community forest reform coalition in two ways: forest workers view environmentalists' demands as a threat to their livelihood, and unions such as the IWA have formed alliances with industry rather than environmentalists.

Historically, environmentalists' demands for preservation conflicted with forest workers' concerns about jobs and economic stability. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, environmentalists and forestry workers were embroiled in disputes over logging in wilderness areas such as the Tsitika, Carmanah, and recently Clayoquot Sound. When the WCWC claimed that the Tsitika was being over-cut, unions defended MacMillan Bloedel's plan to allow 35 per cent more logging in the watershed. At a rally of over 300 loggers, IWA representative Sy Pederson said that workers were proud of the good integrated plan that the government approved which allowed logging in half of the valley.[392] Union members supported the plan, since it would create jobs and contribute to their community's economy. A similar debate occurred in the Carmanah valley in 1988-89. Members of the IWA who blockaded the road to protest job loss squared off against members of the Western Canada Wilderness Committee. Another furious dispute occurred in Clayoquot Sound as workers from Ucluelet, Tofino and surrounding communities lobbied to protect their jobs. In August 1993, over 5, 000 forest workers gathered together to support the government's decision to log 350, 000 hectares of

391 Michael Howlett. "Resistance to Policy Change in the Canadian Forest Sector." See also Michael Howlett on paradigm shifts in policy "Policy Styles, Policy Paradigms, and the Policy Cycle" in M. Howlett and M. Ramesh eds. *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*, pp. 184-197.

392 Jody Paterson, "Forest Union Denies MacBlo's logging plan an invitation for rape," *Times Colonist*, Tuesday April 24, 1990.

Clayoquot Sound.[393] In the spring of 1994, 15, 000 forest industry workers and their families protested in Victoria against the government's CORE decision.

Forest workers and their communities felt threatened because they believed that demands for wilderness preservation would force them to abandon long-held occupations with no realistic alternative opportunities.[394] One IWA spokesperson stated: "We oppose proposals that would greatly expand protected areas, especially plans that would protect huge areas of low-elevation, fertile land on which safe, sustainable, competitive forestry can best be practised."[395] Similarly, employees of Crestbrook Forest Industries charged that preservationists' appeals for less logging, more parks and single use would result in less land available for logging: "There is only so much land for so many uses and it would be a mistake to reserve all the good timberland for the hikers and the birds only."[396] The IWA says it is unreasonable and unrealistic for environmentalists to believe we can somehow stop cutting timber in Clayoquot Sound, or other controversial regions and watersheds. IWA president Gerry Stoney remarked: "The preservationists want our industry to shrivel up and die. These people are not interested in rational compromise. They want it all. They want every tree to stand where it is until it rots and dies..."[397] In a similar vein, labour representatives refer to "dangerous preservationist notions that would have us shut down whole industries and communities. These policies offer people no options and no future." [398] In response to the loss of 400 forestry jobs in Clayoquot Sound, the IWA's Save Our Jobs Committee stated: "We are the ones with the most to lose. Industry, government and environmentalists can continue with their battles, win, lose or draw, but we're the ones that lose. We're the ones that face the sacrifices and the

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393 IWA Canada, "Clayoquot Decision gets rally support," *Lumber Worker*, 58:5 (September, 1993).

394 BC Commission On Resources and Environment, *Annual Report*, 1994.

395 Gerry Stoney, President's Message, *Lumber Worker* , 58:5 (September, 1993).

396 quoted in Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*

397 "Clayoquot Decision gets rally support" *Lumber Worker*, IWA-Canada, September 1993 vol. 58:5.

398 "Save our Jobs Committee makes video to fight misinformation and to communicate views of workers." *Lumber Worker*, IWA-Canada, vol. 58:2 (June 1993).

downturns."[399]

Since some forest workers feel threatened by environmentalists' demands, they resist changes that might alter the system of large scale forestry. For example, the IWA is skeptical that tenure reform might harm unions. The union argues that taking land away from Macmillan Bloedel, Fletcher Challenge or Canfor will not necessarily create more jobs. Furthermore, the IWA is concerned that smaller tenure holders will not be supportive of unions. Sy Pederson cautions: "or will [community] tenure turn itself into a bunch of gyppo pack sackers who just don't give a damn about the IWA and are impossible to organize?"[400] Members of the IWA are uncertain that smaller is better.[401] Consequently, the IWA lends support to the current system of large scale tenure: "there's no question that large tenure holders have the technology and capital that have made the B.C. forest industry one of the most competitive in the world."[402]

From another perspective, the tension between demands for wilderness preservation and job creation shows that people in urban and rural areas have conflicting mandates. The centre-periphery (or metropolis-hinterland) framework highlights some of the tensions that exist.[403] The urban metropolis is at the industrial, political, and economic centre, while hinterland areas are peripheral.[404] Metropolis areas have a diverse economy, a range of goods and services, and political power, conversely: "Hinterlands are characterized by their role as suppliers of labour and raw materials (i.e. natural resources)

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399 Ibid.

400 Sy Pederson president of Courtenay IWA chapter, "It's time to Examine new options for forest tenure" *Lumber worker*, June 1993.

401 In fact, their policy is to look for an option that will support a more diverse but unionized industry. The union's priority for tenure reform would be to promote more diversification in order to reduce the trend of decreasing jobs, ibid.

402 Pederson, "It's Time."

403 The heartland-hinterland framework is also referred to as core-periphery, centre-periphery, metropolis-hinterland, and centre-margin.

404 For a discussion of heartlands and hinterlands see Maureen G. Reed "Implementing Sustainable Development in Hinterland Regions." Michael M'Gonigle argues that ecological centralism involves resource flows from the hinterland to the heartland. See Michael M'Gonigle, "Structural Instruments and Sustainable Forests: A Political Ecology Approach," p. 195. See also Thomas A. Hutton "The Innisian Core-Periphery Revisited: Vancouver's Changing Relationships with British Columbia's Staple Economy, " *BC Studies*, No. 113 (Spring 1997).

for economic production, a narrow and vulnerable economic base, weakly organized urban systems, and a small scattered population."[405] They are often isolated from political power. As a result of this structure, people in metropolitan or urban areas have put forward different demands than hinterland or rural areas.

For example, research shows that urban people are more likely to have concerns about wilderness protection since they are more likely to hold post materialist values.[406] Since urban people do not depend on forestry for their livelihood, they tend to raise fewer concerns about structural issues such as jobs and sustainable community economies in resource towns.[407] Urban residents of Vancouver and Victoria are most concerned about wilderness areas and particularly areas inhabited by wildlife species which can be popularized such as the spotted owl or the marbled murrelet.[408] Accordingly, the B.C. environmental movement has predominantly addressed concerns of people in urban areas:

> The overall setting of priorities and agendas by environmental organizations has tended to reflect a bias favouring the interests and values of heartland areas over hinterlands. The greatest strength of current environmental activism comes from large urban centres with organizations that have the strategic, financial, and human resources to mount expensive and long term campaigns.[409]

As a result of its urban focus, the B.C. environmental movement had poor links with rural areas in the past. Bill Carroll, author of a number of studies on the B.C. environmental movement, observes:

> There is an urban focus to the environmental movement. The movement is centred around Vancouver. In the past, groups such as Greenpeace and Western Canada Wilderness community focused largely on urban concerns. This was not a conscious neglect of rural concerns, however it did indicate that these groups lacked close connections with local people.[410]

405 Maureen G. Reed. "Implementing Sustainable Development in Hinterland Regions." p. 338.

406 Adkin discusses the range of concerns within new social movements.

407 Reed quotes Ted Schrecker: "urban environmentalists are unlikely to lose their homes, jobs, and social support networks when a transnational forest products firm responds to aggressive pollution control [or land use] policies by closing a mill in [a resource community," See Reed.

408 Reed , "Implementing Sustainable Development," p. 347.

409 Ibid., p. 341.

410 Bill Carroll, personal communication February, 1997.

The environmental movement's urban focus has two main implications: it excludes rural people, and it fails to address structural problems. Since people in rural areas felt excluded by the structure of forest management, they mounted different kinds of campaigns. As noted in Chapter Two, concerns about jobs and economic stability prompted many rural communities to develop proposals for community forestry. The Tin Wis coalition incorporated the concerns of both urban and rural people. However, some people in resource-dependent areas still feel marginalized by policies to increase parks and toughen forest practices legislation.

Protected areas and forest practices legislation fail to address underlying structural problems faced by people in resource dependent areas. For example, creating more parks does not offer a transition strategy for the resource extraction economy.[411] Similarly, implementing tougher forest practices legislation does not change the practice of large scale industrial forestry or the economic system that encourages it. Both policy approaches could be referred to as "band-aid" or "techno-fix" solutions since they fail to remedy the economic, political and social roots of the problem. In fact they leave intact the entire structure that creates and legitimates the current forest management system. When certain environmental groups lobby for these kinds of solutions, they alienate workers and rural people even more. [412]

Thus attempts to forge a community forestry coalition have occurred in a highly polarized context. On the whole, large unions such as the IWA have not cooperated with community forestry movements. The IWA did not participate in the Tin Wis coalition.[413] Environmentalists' attempts to form links with the IWA have failed, partly because the IWA forms alliances with forest companies in search of high wages and job security.

The IWA participates in groups that defend industry priorities such as Share BC

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411 CORE did attempt to offer a transition strategy, but it was criticized by people from resource dependent regions.

412 Adkin notes the environmental movement's failure to address broad structural concerns, see Laurie Adkin, "Counter-Hegemony and Environmental Politics in Canada," in Bill Carroll ed. *Organizing Dissent*

413Although two IWA locals participated in Tin Wis, the union as a whole did not participate.

groups and the Forest Alliance.[414] It also forms links with forest companies through numerous advisory bodies such as the Forest Sector Advisory Committee.[415] Because the IWA has chosen this approach, it has not formed lasting alliances with environmental groups.

Other Unions. Other unions within the B.C. Labour movement have adopted a radically different approach than large unions such as the IWA. Some of the smaller unions and independent forest operators support alternative strategies in cooperation with environmentalists. For example, the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada (PPWC) expressed concerns about clearcutting in its document "Jobs, Trees, and Us." Although members of this union make their living from the forests, they do not identify with the management of the multinational logging companies as the IWA does.[416] By contrast, the leadership and workers of the PPWC are not afraid to declare that our forests are in crisis because a handful of private companies are calling the shots. The PPWC criticized the current forestry system: "The present over cutting of B.C.'s timber resource would seem to indicate that, in the heat of competition with other companies, the B.C. forest industry has lost sight of even its long term survival."[417] The PPWC recognizes that forestry problems are rooted in the volume based forest economy: "The forest companies operating in B.C. export semi- processed materials instead of creating value-added products. When it comes to adding value, B.C.'s forest industry has a disgraceful record." [418] In addition, the PPWC calls for less machinery and more value added to every bit of wood that leaves

414 As noted in Chapter Four.

415 As noted in Chapter Four, the IWA participates in the Forest Sector Strategy Advisory Committee.

416 Betty Krawczyk, the Labour Critic for the Green Party criticizes the IWA's links with large multinationals and claims that the IWA is "passive and management- oriented; it has no vision beyond the next raise for whatever workers are left after the last round of layoffs."

417 Barry Reuter, "Why Should Unions Become Involved in Environmental Issues?" *Chips and Chunks*, Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada, Vol 15 No. 2, October, 1991.

418 Ibid.

B.C. in order to create more jobs in communities.

The PPWC was among the labour organizations that participated in the Tin Wis coalition. Other unions that joined Tin Wis included the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, the B.C. Government Employees Union and the BC Federation of Labour. These organizations have also expressed support for forestry and environmental reforms. For example, the CEP supports alternatives to the present forestry agenda, such as small woodlots, and more labour-intensive forestry. The United Fishermen's Allied Workers Union (UFAWU) has also adopted a pro-environmental stance on a number of issues. Don Mollard, the secretary-treasurer for the UFAWU believes that environmentalists and labour organizations are not natural enemies. On the contrary, he thinks they share similar concerns: "We have a lot in common. We just have different ways of approaching the issues."[419] In addition, the Truck Loggers Association--which represents small contractors, independents, as well as loggers-- expressed support for tenure reform.[420] Although there are rifts between labour and environmentalists, some links have been made between the two groups.

Aboriginal People and Environmentalists. The uneasy alliance between Aboriginal people and environmentalists also impeded the development of an effective community forest coalition. A thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is crucial to discuss both the conflict and the potential for an alliance between these members of the policy subsystem. Since the 1980s, Aboriginal people have worked with environmentalists on a number of campaigns. For example, in 1985 aboriginal people and environmentalists struggled to stop logging on Meares Island. Also, an alliance of Aboriginal people and environmental organizations halted logging operations on South Moresby. Another partnership was formed when the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council

419 Dave Clements, "Sierra Club Aims to Bridge Gaps," *Victoria News*, July 4, 1997, p. 1.
420 The TLA developed a tenure reform proposal and submitted a list of recommendations to the Forest Resources Commission in 1991.

joined the Tin Wis coalition.

Yet the alliance between Aboriginal people and environmentalists is troubled because the two groups sometimes adopt conflicting positions about resource extraction. In some cases, environmental organizations fear that Aboriginal people will promote economic development over environmental protection. Whereas some Aboriginal people feel that environmental organizations do not respect their needs for employment and economic development in their communities. Conflicts occasionally develop when First Nations pursue resource extraction, either on their own, or through a joint venture with a major forest corporation.

Aboriginal people are frustrated because their traditional way of life has eroded and nothing has taken its place. Pat Edzerza, Chief of the Tahltan nation, states: "These areas are being logged and our people were promised jobs to replace trapping, but that hasn't happened."[421] As Aboriginal communities suffer from unemployment, they consider resource extraction as the most viable solution to the social problems they face.[422] Members of the Oweekeno, Kitasoo, Nuxalk Tribal Council are pursuing several forestry initiatives.[423]

Communities confronting similar circumstances are seeking opportunities with forest companies. Squamish chief Joe Mathias, co-chair of a conference between 80 Indian Chiefs and 80 business leaders, said "Poverty is no longer an option for us. We are trying to create opportunities for our people. Aboriginal people historically have dealt with bureaucrats and now they can deal with a core group of business leaders who know what it

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421 Quote appears in Holly Nathan, "Aboriginal Forestry" in Drushka and Travers eds. *Touch Wood*, p. 163.

422 Eighty per cent of the available workforce in the Kitasoo and Nuxalk communities is unemployed. Similarly, the Oweekeno and Heiltsuk communities also suffer from high levels of unemployment. Unemployment in these communities results from declines in traditional activities such as fishing.

423 Members of the Kitasoo and Heiltsuk First Nations are currently training to do silvicultural and logging work with Western Forest Products. The community is also considering plans for joint ventures with Western Forest Products. In the Nuxalk community, Bella Coola Grizzly Holdings Ltd. employs from 25 to 30 people, 90 of whom are Nuxalk. The Nuxalk First Nation is also considering plans for a joint venture value-added company.

takes to make the economy move."[424] Several First Nations established joint ventures with forest companies. For example, the Alkali band developed a joint venture with Lignum Forest Products and the Nuu-chah-nulth started a joint venture with MacMillan Bloedel.[425]

However, aboriginal forestry operations like these can face opposition from environmental organizations. In 1992, environmentalists protested the Coulson Forest Products joint venture with the Ehattesaht band because it involved clearcutting a North Island watershed.[426] Similarly, a dispute occurred when the Stewart-Kincolith Band council wanted to log an area of its reserve in order to alleviate local unemployment.[427] Consequently, many bands are wary of working with environmental organizations that are insensitive to the needs of their communities. Holly Nathan, a reporter who specializes in First Nations' issues, observes: "For their part, native leaders feel environmentalists don't understand their communities' need to create jobs and economic opportunities as well as protect the environment."[428]

The Nuu-chah-nulth's partnership with MacMillan Bloedel also shows that Aboriginal forestry operations can complicate their relations with environmental organizations. The Nuu-chah-nulth formed a joint venture company with MacMillan Bloedel in April of 1997, and gained rights to cut approximately 40,000 cubic metres of wood annually on TFL 44 in Clayoquot Sound. Logging is scheduled to begin in 1998 or early 1999. Nuu-Chah-Nulth Ucluelet Chief Councillor Larry Baird said "There was a window of opportunity and we've taken it." The company will employ 20 people and will facilitate training for First Nations.

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424 Daphne Bramham, "It's All Business for Forest Firm, First Nations," *Vancouver Sun*, April 20, 1995, p. D9.

425 Lignum Forest Products started a joint venture with the Alkali band near Williams lake in 1989. They created Eco-Link, a logging and silviculture company that employed 75 band members. Since then, Lignum signed eight more joint venture agreements with bands in the Williams Lake area. For details, see Ibid., p. D1.

426 Holly Nathan, "Aboriginal Forestry" in Drushka and Travers eds. *Touch Wood*, p. 157.

427 Ibid.

428 Ibid., p. 157.

Environmentalists are confused about the new partnership. Environmental organizations such as Friends of Clayoquot Sound have traditionally supported First Nations interests in Clayoquot, while opposing MacMillan Bloedel. "We've stood with the natives and they've stood with us," said Shirley Langer, director of Friends of Clayoquot Sound. "We've always stood against logging companies like MacMillan Bloedel and here we suddenly have the natives lining themselves up with [the company]. Strange bed partners."[429]

Friction between Aboriginal people and environmentalists escalated, partly in response to the joint venture. In the summer of 1996, and again in 1997, the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation ordered Greenpeace to leave its territory, because the group launched a logging blockade without first seeking approval of the Clayoquot chiefs. The blockade has jeopardized relations between environmental groups and the Indians, said Francis Frank, co-chairman of the Nuu-chah-nulth central region chiefs. "We have formally asked (Greenpeace activist) Tzeporah Berman to request the ship Moby Dick to move out of our territory."[430] In response to this incident, Nuu-chah-nulth chiefs said that environmentalists, government, industry and municipalities must seek permission to enter the area. Ahousaht chief negotiator Clifford Atleo said: "If you want to go out there and log, if you want to go out there and demonstrate - all of those things - this protocol needs to be understood."[431]

Other First Nations have developed protocols for environmentalists to follow. The Central Coast First Nations' protocol on the environment said: "Our First Nations will ensure from this day forward that any organization outside the jurisdiction of our governments, including other First Nations, the Canadian governments, industry and special interest environmental groups, will only enter into our traditional territories

429 On a more critical note, Friends of Clayoquot Sound says that the venture "only goes 51 per cent of the way in reforming tenure control in a portion of Clayoquot Sound."Ann Gibbon, "A New Wind Blows in Clayoquot," *Globe and Mail*, April 16, 1997, p. B8.

430 "Leave Clayoquot, native leaders tell Greenpeace. Enivronmentalists call temporary halt to Clayoquot blockades." Canadian Press Newswire, June 22, 1996, p.3.

431 "Natives want more control over Clayoquot (Nuu-chah-nulth Nation)," Canadian Press Newswire, June 29, 1996, p. 5.

concerning the environment in accordance with this Protocol Agreement."[432] The protocol declares that environmental groups require First Nations' consent to use crests, totems, dances, songs or other symbols to help support an environmental cause.[433]

Despite recent conflicts, however, there is potential common ground between environmentalists and Aboriginal people. The Kitlope experience illustrates that they can cooperate to achieve compatible or even similar goals.

The Haisla First Nation worked with a conservation organization to protect 317, 000 hectares of the Kitlope, an area 100 km south east of Kitimat. Cooperation was possible in the Kitlope because: the Haisla and the environmental organization both wanted to protect the area, the environmental group respected the needs of local people, and the alliance used innovative strategies to convince government and forest companies to set aside the area.

The Haisla opposed West Fraser's proposal to log the Kitlope in 1988. The Haisla First Nation said in the Kitlope declaration of 1991: "We do not own this land so much as the land owns us. The land is part of us and we are part of the land. It is given to us only as a trust: to live within its boundaries in beauty and harmony; to nourish our bodies and our spirits with its gifts; and to protect it from harm."[434]

Ecotrust, a conservation organization based in Portland, Oregon also wished to preserve the Kitlope as one of the last remaining watersheds on the west coast that is larger than 5,000 hectares. The Haisla were willing to work with Ecotrust to protect the Kitlope. Cecil Paul, a Haisla elder recounted a dream he had before Ecotrust came: "I was reaching out for help to save the Kitlope, and reaching down to help me was a white hand. When the whites told me this was the largest untouched forest of its type remaining, I realized that my dream had come true."[435]

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432 "First Nations Protocol On the Environment Central Coast of British Columbia, Canada," Forest Alliance, Fax sent to the Forest Alliance, August 1, 1997.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid., p.8.

Their cooperative effort to preserve the Kitlope involved several unique strategies. As well as holding meetings with the public and with cabinet ministers, the Haisla and Ecotrust convened a Workshop on future management of the region, including representatives from West Fraser Timber to participate in the meetings.

In addition, the Haisla and Ecotrust focused on building local capacity within the Haisla community. They invited forty Native and non-Native children to participate in a two week Rediscovery camp, in order to build a sense of community among the new generation. Ecotrust published a wilderness planning framework which outlined options to resource extraction: rediscovery camps, ecosystem research, guided ecological and cultural tourism, and wildlife viewing.

Another important initiative undertaken by the Haisla and Ecotrust was the Nanakila Institute, established in the summer of 1993. Nanakila means "to guard; to watch over." The institute trains First Nations people to act as conservation officers in Haisla territory. It is the key organization through which the Haisla direct research, tourism and what Ecotrust calls "conservation-based economic development."

Although Environment Minister John Cashore was impressed by this effort, it was another year before the Kitlope was protected.[436] Finally, in June of 1994, the president of West Fraser, Hank Ketcham wrote to the government to withdraw West Fraser's claim to log the Kitlope. Haisla accepted West Fraser's decision to voluntarily give up its rights to 317,000 hectares of its timber supply in the Kitlope.

Cooperation was possible in the Kitlope because the Haisla were interested in forest conservation, and Ecotrust recognized the Haisla's economic needs and worked to develop local capacity.

The Haisla found that Ecotrust had something to offer. An elder said "From the outset, we were quite taken with what they proposed. It wasn't another instance of people dropping in and saying, 'Here's what we want to do, do you want to follow us?'"[437]

436 Throughout the year, Share Groups attempted to gain support from people in Terrace and Kitimat. These attempts failed. For details, see Ibid., p. 10.
437 Ibid., p. 10.

Although Ecotrust's ultimate goal was preservation, it also focused on what Ken Margolis refers to as "capacity building," which aims to develop an area's cultural, educational, scientific, and economic potential. In other words, Ecotrust envisioned more than merely preserving the area. Margolis explained: "We started out assuming that this is Haisla territory, they own it, and we are going to help manage it."[438]

The Kitlope experience demonstrates that there is potential common ground between Aboriginal people and environmentalists especially in relation to forest conservation and community control.

Like many Aboriginal people, the Haisla intend to preserve their traditional lands. Such efforts are partly based on Aboriginal peoples' spiritual connection to the land. The Haisla declaration states: "The land is part of us and we are part of the land."[439] Their holistic view of nature shapes their approach to forestry.[440] Bert Mack, Chief of the Toquaht band said: "We watched what was happening and we didn't agree with it. We are not anti-logging. But we figure there are proper ways of doing it."[441] First Nations adopt an holistic approach, according to Chief Roger Jimmie of the Kluskus Band: "It's more than just trees. Everything that is in the forest is all one and the same thing. We have a holistic view of forest management. Forest management is not viewed as a timber block, but more as a way to protect the whole watershed. Not only that but it will protect the berry patches, it will protect hunting and fishing, and it will also help to prevent water

438 Ibid., p. 11.

439 "First Nations Protocol On the Environment Central Coast of British Columbia, Canada," Forest Alliance, Fax sent to the Forest Alliance, August 1, 1997.

440 "...First Nations strive to achieve holistic integrated resource management...This approach recognizes the importance of being aware of and strengthening the linkages between the forest health, wildlife, and fisheries. This approach respects basic forest management principles, while focusing on the maintenance of sustainable forests and enhancing non-timber forest values and uses. As well, for some First Nations this approach includes community participation in the management process and inspires a sense of community ownership of the First Nations' forest management goals and objectives." National Aboriginal Forestry Association, *Summary of First Nations' Workshops on forest management Programming* (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1994) 10-11. National Aboriginal Forestry Association (NAFA), formed in 1989, developed the Aboriginal forest Land Management Guidelines that set out a flexible and broad framework for aboriginal people to develop and implement community-and ecosystem-based forest management planning that takes into account multiple forest values, including timber.

441 Bert Mack, Chief of Toquaht band near Ucluelet, ibid., p. 160.

erosion, wind erosion, you name it."[442]

Aboriginal peoples' holistic approach is incongruent with current structures of forest management. Government tenures focused on economic production do not allow First Nations to incorporate ecological and cultural values into forest management.[443] Therefore some Aboriginal people share environmentalists' interests in tenure reform. Curran and M'Gonigle suggest that:

> First Nations require a tenure or land holding arrangement that allows each community to detail how management should occur in their traditional forests. This tenure cannot be constrained by volume-based production requirements and short-term time lines. Each community needs the flexibility to plan according to the different requirements and changing conditions of the ecosystems and communities on traditional lands. It is at this point that the interests of First Nations, non-aboriginal communities, and the community forestry movement intersect.[444]

Aboriginal people and community forestry supporters both advocate decentralized control. First Nations' appeals for decentralized control through land claims and self-government incorporate elements of community control like those contained in community forest board proposals.[445]

Aboriginal people consider community participation as critical to effective management:

> [t]hose who are closest to the land and experience the direct consequences of land use decisions should be the ones who are consulted first and last. By providing informed consent, community members will help to ensure that

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442 Ibid., p. 162.

443 For example, the Kluskus band refused an offer for a 5 year timber license on the basis that such a tenure would not adequately protect non-logging forest values . See Deborah Curran and Michael M'Gonigle, *First Nations' Forests: Community Management as Opportunity and Imperative* (Victoria: Eco-Research Chair, Faculty of Law and Environmental Studies Programme, University of Victoria). D97-7, April 1997, p. 22.

444 Ibid., p. 37. See also, the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, and recommendations included in *Restructuring the Relationship*, Part 2. Volume 2 (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group Publishing, 1996) pp. 631-643.

445 For example, the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council are advocating for a First Nations tenure under the provincial system and settlement of their land claims. Their vision of tenure would reconcile economic development and traditional values.

those who carry out forest land use activities care for the land properly.[446]

Moreover, Aboriginal leaders want a voice, "not just token positions on advisory boards with no real commitment from this province to give natives full management decision making powers."[447]

An alliance between First Nations and environmentalists is not only possible, it is beneficial in relation to community forestry (where the two groups have similar goals). Community forest board proposals such as Tin Wis combine First Nations' concerns about subsistence and local control with ecologically sound forestry. Although the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council joined the Tin Wis coalition, it was the only aboriginal participant. A broader link with First Nations is essential for the success of the community forestry movement. Based on the analysis above, this linkage would be improved if environmentalists recognize Aboriginal communities' economic needs and attempt to build local capacity as environmental groups have done in the Kitlope. Furthermore, an alliance could be based on a shared interest in preserving and maintaining a connection to the land (an holistic approach), and a shared interest in community control.

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446 The following five principles are the basis of the NAFA Guidelines for use by Aboriginal communities (at I-2): 1. Ensure that the community guides and accumulates wisdom about all aspects of forest land care.
2. Ensure that Aboriginal forest lands are protected and their management enhanced so as to optimize long term social, spiritual, environmental and economic values.
3. Ensure that forest land management embraces all parts of the forest, including plants, animals, soil, air and water, and all forest users.
4. Ensure that the diversity of Aboriginal communities as distinct societies with their own languages, cultures, values and customs is respected.
5. Be acceptable and optional to Aboriginal communities.
The community based perspective is considered as one of the inherent characteristics of aboriginal forestry:

> Tribes will not cut the forests and move on. The forests comprise part of their permanent homelands, supporting tribal religions and cultures, providing for the health and welfare of tribal members in a spiritual as well as a financial sense. The care that many tribes show for their forests is not merely based upon economic interests. Rather, it reverberates to the very essence of their culture and existence.

National Aboriginal Forestry Association, *A Proposal to First Nations* (Ottawa: National Aboriginal Forestry Association, 1994, Guidelines II-1.

447 George Harrisof the Chemainus tribe at January 1991 Intertiibal Forestry Association Hearing, ibid.

Conclusion: No Consensus on Alternative Paradigm

The community forest coalition failed to achieve widespread support because it neither converted enough members of the EAC, nor developed a unified counter-hegemonic force. This analysis reveals that the community forest coalition needs to draw support from members of the EAC and the DAC. Although few links have been made between environmentalists and members of the IWA, environmentalists have formed alliances with smaller unions such as the PPWC, the UFAWU and the Truck Loggers Association. Cooperation between environmentalists and Aboriginal people is possible, but some tensions persist. The Kitlope experience shows that potential links can be made on the basis of holistic forestry and community control. Overall, there is potential common ground among these groups, but it has not been fully realized.

One important lesson can be learned from this experience. Members of the EAC need to reevaluate their beliefs, and to recognize the structural consequences of certain policy changes. The preservationist strategy of the majority of environmental groups shows a bias towards urban concerns and a reluctance to adopt a coherent strategy of "ecological conversion."[448] This strategy hesitates to attack the dominant paradigm's assumptions about capitalism and centralized structures. The preservation strategy ignores concerns about democracy and community power. A coherent strategy of ecological conversion would no longer see jobs and environment as mutually exclusive elements. It would address the underlying power differentials between centre and periphery and pay more attention to workers' needs for an economic transition strategy. It would integrate ecological with social, democratic and economic concerns. In the absence of such a coherent strategy of ecological conversion, environmental groups were unable to forge strong alliances with critical members of the forest policy community such as labour and First Nations.

When these key members of the policy community recognize that they are fighting

448 Bill Carroll, "Old Unions and New Social Movements, " *Labour* 35 (Spring, 1995), p. 199.

a similar battle, they will be able to unite in common solutions. Kirk Johnson describes some strategies for moving beyond polarization:

> A growing number of rural community residents and environmentalists are working together to try to reconcile the desires for economic vitality and environmental quality. They believe that many, if not all, of their respective goals can be achieved through cooperation; that the constant pitting of the environment against the economy will ultimately lead to the decline of both. The most promising of these efforts do not seek a mythical "balance" between economy and environment that leaves habitats half protected, rural economies weakened, and personal principles bargained away. Instead they look to create synergies; ways that economic activity can promote a healthy environment, and that healthy ecosystems can enrich their inhabitants, economically and otherwise.[449]

Tin Wis and other community forestry proposals exemplify this kind of approach because they attempt to reconcile environmentalists' interests in environmental quality with workers' interests in jobs through labour-intensive selective logging programs managed by Community Forest Boards.

In order to counter the dominant paradigm, according to Adkin, a counter-hegemonic discourse is needed which incorporates the concerns of alternative movements including Labour, First Nations and environmentalists. In order to overthrow the dominant ideology of development, the environmental movement needs to:

> Weave together the threads of the struggles of the alternative movements: against relations of subordination-domination (individual, social, international, environmental); for equality understood as freedom from coercion or deprivation; for citizenship based on participatory rights and responsibilities; for the right to alternatives to the tradeoffs offered by the hegemonic model of development. The movement is a web, made of countless intersections, not a centre. Counter-hegemony is not about imposing the truth of any one view or about imposing a one-dimensional identity upon a political movement. It is about many transformations in the process of relating experiences, recognizing needs, and creating alternatives.[450]

Therefore, the community forestry movement should comprise a web of people, each with

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449 Kirk Johnson, *Beyond Polarization: Emerging Strategies for Reconciling Community and the Environment* (Seattle WA: University of Washington, Northwest Policy Center, 1993).
450 Laurie Adkin, "Counter-hegemony," p. 153.

a different perspective to offer, who are united by certain "intersections." Table 6.1 on the following page notes the intersections between the various components of the community forestry coalition based on related experiences, similar needs, and a shared desire to create alternatives. Kistner, of the labour perspective, advocates that timber industry employees should be "building on our natural alliances with Natives and Environmentalists. All of us have a common interest in the careful management of our forest resource." [451]

451 Kistner, "Unity needed in forest industry," p. 28.

Table 6.1: Environmentalists, Labour and First Nations: Potential Common Ground for a Community Forest Coalition



Environmentalists Want:	First Nations Want:	Labour Wants:
Greater ecosystem protection, better forest practices	Rights to traditional territories	Better forest practices
Protected areas	Cultural and environmental integrity of traditional territories	Job security, more value added industry
Holistic, decentralized management	A Holistic perspective	Smaller unions want change in tenure system
Tenure reform to reduce industry concentration, centralized forest management	Community management, control	Democratic management
Community and public control through Community Forest Boards	Tenure system change to facilitate First Nations' forest management	Greater participation in forest decision making
	First Nations control through treaties, land claims, co-management or community forest board	

This discussion explained why Tin Wis had difficulty maintaining an alliance and it demonstrated that Tin Wis was a significant first attempt, which cleared the path for creating a broader coalition. As the struggle continues, and members of the policy community develop stronger links, the development of an alternative paradigm is imminent.[452] The next chapter draws together the arguments from previous chapters, and provides some evidence that the reform coalition is broadening.

[452] Howlett discusses the need for further links between members of the policy community in Howlett, "Resistance to Policy Change in the Canadian Forest Sector."

CONCLUSION: AGAINST THE GRAIN

This thesis investigated why community forest boards and related structural reforms have not been implemented in British Columbia. It considered a number of questions: What ideas currently dominate B.C. forest policy? What ideas do community forest board proposals contain? What factors help to explain why the B.C. government did not implement community forest boards?

The first part of the analysis showed the dominance of the liquidation-conversion paradigm and the challenge of community forest board proposals. It argued that the Development Advocacy Coalition (DAC) defends the liquidation paradigm including ideas about sustained yield, the present tenure system and centralized control over forests, whereas the Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC) challenges these ideas. In addition, some EAC members advocate greater public control over forest management. Community forest board proposals envision decentralized power, community control and in some cases tenure reform. These proposals directly challenged the core ideas of B.C. forest policy and presented the government with an option to overhaul B.C. forest management.

The second part of the analysis established that community forest boards were not implemented by the NDP in its 1991-94 term. Although the NDP government initiated a number of reforms during the 1991-95 period, these changes did not include structural reforms to decentralize power, grant community control or initiate tenure reform. The reforms designed to increase public participation did not grant the kind of community control envisioned in community forest board proposals. The final part of this study investigated the economic, bureaucratic, political and ideological factors that help to explain why community forest boards have not been implemented.

Findings and Recommendations

This thesis highlighted a nest of intertangled constraints. These include B.C.'s dependence on forestry and the power of forest companies; the culture of expertise; the faith in technocratic, centralized decision making and the liquidation-conversion paradigm; the government's interest in short-term electoral success; and the community forestry coalition's difficulty gaining broad support for its ideas.

This analysis explored economic constraints such as B.C.'s reliance on the forest industry and the powerful resources that forest companies have to defend their interests. B.C. relies on the forest industry to create jobs, revenue and overall economic health. As a result, forest companies can influence government by threatening to withdraw from the province. Furthermore, industry defends its access to B.C.'s forests through extensive public relations campaigns such as Forests Forever and through lobbying organizations such as the BC Forest Alliance and Share BC. Forest companies also have informal linkages to government through shared education. Government is influenced by the powerful measures that industry employs to protect its position.

This analysis neither assessed the relative influence of these factors, nor investigated the government's response to any single factor. Instead, it described the pattern of economic constraints that shaped the government's decision to avoid structural reforms such as community forest boards. It found that a web of interactions exist between industry, government and forest workers who adhere to a shared understanding centred on the tenure system. This understanding confers benefits on each party: by granting industry access to wood, providing employment for forest workers and providing revenue for government. This understanding constrained decision makers because none of the parties wished to violate its conditions.

The tenure system and the issue of compensation are two key reasons why the three parties are resistant to community forest boards. Wilson notes that "despite the presence of compensation clauses that appear to socialize the costs (risks), the forest industry perceives itself to be in a high stakes battle against attempts to reallocate a pie

already committed to it."[453] Similarly, Dellert argues that "as long as industry controls the rights to B.C.'s forests, it will be difficult to shift the focus from timber production..." Therefore a critical assessment of the underlying assumptions of the tenure system and forest company control is required.

The state is motivated by concerns other than those raised by forest companies. Recent changes made by the NDP demonstrate that government, in response to other bureaucratic/political considerations, pursued initiatives that the forest industry opposed. Arguments about state autonomy helped to explain why the government chose to implement moderate reform instead of structural reform. Nordlinger's insights provided a framework for understanding the state's autonomous interests: "the latent functions of politics are the capture and maintenance of power, the protection and advancement of self-interest, the preservation and expansion of institutions and offices."[454] Chapter Five examined the reasons why the bureaucratic and political arms of the state chose the moderate reform route. Systems of expert administration, tend to resist change because they emphasize organizational functioning rather than change. Officials within the MOF subscribe to the professional forester culture so they view themselves as the best qualified people to make forest management decisions. As functional managers, they adhere to the mandates and priorities of their departments. In accordance with their mandate, experts within the MOF crafted reforms such as the Timber Supply Review and the Forest Practices Code. These reforms were consistent with MOF's mandate, and they enabled bureaucrats to take charge of the inevitable change process and to retain expert control. By contrast, community forest board proposals challenged the notion of expert control and the current regime. Paehlke and Torgerson's general account suggests why bureaucrats may have resisted the community control option: "the administrative sphere resists even the serious consideration of alternatives because of the conjunction of ideological presuppositions, particular interests, and shared purposes which constitute that domain."[455]

453 Wilson, "Wilderness Politics," p. 165.

454 Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*, p. 34.

455 Paehlke and Torgerson, *Managing Leviathan*, p. 28.

In sum, this chapter argued that the MOF preferred moderate reforms because they were consistent with its mandate, its socioeconomic objectives and its ideas about expert control, whereas community forest boards challenged these norms and ideas. The bureaucracy's framework of beliefs, values and interests impeded its willingness to consider the community forest board option.

This analysis revealed how systems of expert administration can resist change. Further research is needed to explore how the bureaucracy limits the consideration of options. In particular, a more thorough study of foresters' beliefs is required. Few studies of foresters' beliefs exist and no studies to date have examined the B.C. forest bureaucracy's beliefs (particularly in relation to community control). This research could examine whether foresters believe that members of the public are effective managers, and investigate foresters' beliefs about community control. This analysis would contribute to the debate on expert versus public/local control. Finally, further research could explore the dynamics between Cabinet and officials in the MOF. Particularly, it would be useful to analyse the extent to which the bureaucracy can resist change, by exploring the relative power of the Chief Forester and the Minister of Forests. Another interesting question is whether the bureaucracy's influence is greater or less when political and bureaucratic interests converge. More importantly, when these interests diverge, which interests predominate?

We also examined the political realities faced by the NDP that led the government to pursue moderate reform instead of major structural change. Although the NDP forest policy paper and election platform expressed support for structural reforms such as community forest boards and tenure reform, the government's concern with re-election caused it to ignore these reforms. The NDP's strategy was to initiate moderate reforms in order to convince the public that the concerns of key constituencies were being addressed and the war in the woods was over. The NDP election platform sought support from labour, environmentalists and First Nations. Organized labour and forest dependent communities were key constituencies. By 1995 the NDP was on shaky political ground;

giving it all the more reason to focus on policies that would respond to public concerns about parks and forest practices.

To what extent did the NDP government intend to reform policy? The Party's election platform left the possibility of tenure reform open. On the one hand, Forest Minister Andrew Petter claimed that the NDP's reforms were intended to pave the way for structural reform. On the other hand, the NDP did not commit to tenure reform or community forest boards in its 1996 election platform, and mid-way through its second term the government has not addressed these issues. Was the NDP government's commitment to structural reform inhibited by fear of encountering opposition? More broadly: What are the long-term policy implications of the government's focus on winning support from its key constituencies? Hammond argues, "This is the politics of no models, where governments cling to a dying paradigm, continuing to do things as they have been done in the past in response to lobbying by the largest special interest groups. By refusing to implement models for change, the government speaks neither for the people nor for the forest."[456] Further research is needed to consider the implications of the government's focus on the concerns of certain powerful groups. In a politics of no models, do concerns about jobs and profits predominate the agenda while long-term concerns about structural reform are ignored?

The factors discussed above shaped the NDP's decision to pursue moderate reform rather than structural reform. The government weighed economic, bureaucratic and political considerations in deciding which route to take. It balanced concerns about a healthy economy with concerns about jobs and revenue but also weighed the bureaucracy's interest in moderate reform. The NDP realized that moderate reform could gain the support of the public, forest workers, First Nations and some environmentalists. All of these considerations tipped the scale in favour of moderate reform -- and against community forest boards. Paehlke notes, "In a world of everyday democratic politics it is often easy to lose sight of the long-term future in favour of the immediate concerns of

456 Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p.173.

one's constituencies and the electoral and administrative urgency of the moment"[457]

These layers of the interpretation reinforce the idea that:

> An unconscious acceptance of the systemic assumptions on which existing corporate and bureaucratic institutions are founded continues to determine the solutions which are deemed acceptable. This situation has ensured that the *status quo* has been maintained throughout the past decade of "sustainable development." This is not to deny that there have been reforms, even sweeping reforms. Nevertheless, these reforms have occurred within a limited productionist paradigm . . .

The final layer considered how prevailing ideas on forest management might be changed. We examined several reasons why the community forestry coalition failed to establish broad support for its ideas. We argued that a successful community forestry coalition requires support from both the Environmental Advocacy Coalition (EAC) and the Development Advocacy Coalition (DAC). It requires a broad base of support from environmentalists, First Nations and labour. Although Tin Wis was a promising start, the community forest coalition failed to convert enough members from the EAC, since they were compelled to work with the NDP on moderate reforms. The community forest coalition also failed to establish lasting links with labour and First Nations. Although there is potential common ground among these members of the policy community, it has not been developed. Hammond notes, "the need for change is one of the most obvious aspects of common ground among all people. Our challenge is to combine different facts, different values to reach consensus about ecologically responsible use of the forest."[458] Chapter Six suggested that members of the community forestry coalition (and potential members) need to reevaluate some of their beliefs, and to recognize a common interest in change. Finally, it argued that in order to move beyond polarization, groups must realize that many, if not all, of their respective goals can be achieved through cooperation. Furthermore, groups can create synergies, ways that economic activity can promote a healthy environment and that healthy ecosystems can enrich their inhabitants, economically

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457 Paehlke, *Environmentalism and the Future*, p. 283.
458 Ibid., p. 255.

and otherwise.[459] Similarly, the movement for change needs to "weave together the threads of the struggles of the alternative movements. . .Through a process of relating experiences, recognizing needs, and creating alternatives . . . "[460]

The community forest coalition appears to be gaining broader support as more environmental groups take action on tenure reform. At the 1996 British Columbia Environmental Network annual general meeting in Vancouver, the Forest Caucus began a strategy to address tenure reform. The Forest Caucus chair, Jim Cooperman, published an article that advocated transferring tenure rights to local communities, First Nations and small operators. Furthermore, he stated that "Community tenures should be designated to include management boards that comprise representatives from all sectors." [461] He argued that B.C. needs a more diversified tenure system, and that an open forum is needed to discuss issues and alternatives. A number of other groups are working on tenure reform and community forestry issues. They include: Ecotrust Canada, the David Suzuki Foundation, WCWC and the Eco-Research Chair at the University of Victoria.[462]

Slowly, the community forestry coalition is broadening. Support is developing within small communities. An increasing number of cooperative projects have been established between environmentalists, labour and First Nations. Recently, labour representatives and environmentalists participated in a workshop on the Vancouver Island Resource Target strategy. Organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Western Canada Wilderness Committee are currently working with First Nations on several projects.[463]

Studying of Public Policy: Lessons

This analysis provided some insights about the current struggle over how to manage B.C.'s forests. What lessons can be drawn from this experience? Are the

459 Kirk Johnson, *Beyond Polarization: Emerging Strategies.*
460 Adkin, "Counter-hegemony," p. 153.
461 Jim Cooperman, *British Columbia Environmental Report*, spring 1996.
462 The Eco-research Chair published a report examining alternative forms of tenure. Another study of tenure reform funded by BC Wild is also underway.
463 For example, the Sierra Club is working with First Nations in the Kitlope.

constraints that limited policy change in this case generalizable to policy change in other areas? A number of the constraints appear to be specific to the forest policy sector. Forest policy may create a higher degree of polarization among interests than other policy issues. Another way in which the B.C. forest policy sector is distinct is that the Ministry of Forests has a dual mandate to ensure a vigorous, competitive forest industry and to protect resource values other than timber. This dual mandate is particular to the MOF, other Ministries such as Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks has a mandate focused on the protection of wildlife and environmental values. The findings about bureaucratic resistance may not be generalized to other Ministries which do not have a similar dual mandate. However, the findings about bureaucratic resistance and expert administration can be applied to other Ministries or bureaucracies. A note of caution is needed because the MOF is influenced by the professional forester culture. Although most policy areas involve experts, foresters are part of a professional association which reinforces a common mind set and shared values. One lesson that may be drawn, is that MOF may be more resistant to consider new alternatives than other bureaucracies because of these tendencies.

The struggle in B.C. centres on the reallocation of forest resources. Although not all policy disputes involve the reallocation of resources, many do. For example, fishing rights involve allocative questions. Other issues such as pollution control indirectly involve allocative questions. As environmentalists press companies to upgrade their pollution abatement equipment, companies insist that the extra expenditures will force them to cut jobs or lay off workers. Reallocative questions spark debates about rights to access the resource, or to jobs or products based on the resource. What is at stake is the flow of resources and power. The current system involves a linear flow of resources and power, whereas community forest boards would establish a circular flow.

Many of the constraints discussed above are related to dualisms: linear and circular, expert versus local/public, short term versus long term, economic development versus ecosystem integrity. In order to understand forestry disputes, we need to recognize these dualisms and to identify the underlying ideology they are based on and the powerful

interests that defend it. Ideas about community forest boards challenge the dualisms that stem from the dominant ideology. Ideas about community forest boards challenge the dominant discourse with a holistic perspective, non-hierarchical structures and its circular instead of linear flow of resources and power. The challenge that community forest boards pose to the dominant paradigm is part of the broader struggle to reconstruct a new Environmental paradigm. This analysis explored the difficulties related to discarding ideas of the old Development paradigm and replacing them with a new Environmental paradigm. In the midst of this paradigmatic shift, policy makers and analysts must be aware that:

> Policy analysis is not, as some would have it, simply a matter of evaluating available sets of policy options. Policy analysis must be a more creative process than that; it must be at least as much an art as a science and must incorporate consideration of the evolution of ideas; reflections on the values that are, or might someday be, held by the citizenry at large . . . [464]

Just as wood has a grain, so does forest policy in B.C. The complexity of factors that create resistance to change can be understood as part of the grain of forest policy in B.C. The interwoven economic, bureaucratic, political and ideological layers create a grain that is resistant to community forest boards. The grain reflects the dominant ideas about forest management. The dominant liquidation paradigm legitimates a system of centralized control by experts. Core ideas and the shared understanding about the tenure system have grown together to resist community forest boards.

The path that lies ahead for community forest board proponents, and everyone involved in the movement for change in B.C. forest policy, is paved with complex obstacles.

Hammond summarizes the upcoming challenge:

> Lest we underestimate the task before us, we must understand that we are not talking about tinkering with the present system of forest use. We are not just talking about more parks and fewer clearcuts. We're not talking about changing political parties. We are talking about changing our ways of

464 Paehlke, Robert, *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 274.

thinking. The change is a big one.[465]

This map of the obstacles is intended to empower those committed to fundamental change. The liquidation paradigm is eroding, but the final pieces will not fall away until an alternative is clearly articulated. The present research demonstrated the need for a strong, unified coalition for change. "There are no enemies, there are only people who are afraid of change."[466] Unite, we are not as different as we think we are.

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[465] Hammond, *Seeing the Forest*, p. 255.

[466] Chris Maser, *The Redesigned Forest* (San Pedro, CA: R&E Miles, 1988).

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*wishes to remain confidential

GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ACRONYMS

Annual Allowable Cut The rate of cut.

BCFA British Columbia Forest Alliance

CEO Chief Executive Officer

Community Forest Board A model of forest management involving decentralized power, local or community control and alternative ideas such as tenure reform.

CORE Commission on Resources and Environment

COFI Council of Forest Industries

CRB Central Regional Board

CRB Community Resource Boards

DAC Development Advocacy Coalition

EAC Environmental Advocacy Coalition

FPC Forest Practices Code

FRBC Forest Renewal British Columbia

FRC Forest Resources Commission

MOF Ministry of Forests

NDP New Democratic Party--the Party in power during this period.

IMA Interim Measures Agreement

IWA International Woodworkers Association

LRMP Local Resource Management Plan

LUCO Land Use Coordination Office

PAS Protected Areas Strategy

PPWC Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada

RPF Registered Professional Forester

Sustained Yield A policy aimed at achieving a perpetual supply of wood at the

maximum rate possible by cutting mature forests and replacing them with fast-growing second growth stands of trees.

TFL Tree Farm Licence

TSA Timber Supply Area

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