POLICY CONVERGENCE IN THE POST-1960 QUEBEC PARTY SYSTEM

by

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ABSTRACT

As major actors in the public policy process, political parties are supposed to be the main articulators of interests as expressed by the people they represent. The problem is that parties and party systems, in recent years, have slowly and methodically been displaced by corporatism, which is the role of special interest groups in the formulation of public policy. As a result, the relevance of political parties is under question. This problem, coupled with an increase in party pragmatism as a response to opinion polls, the media and other stimuli, and a decrease in ideology, exacerbates the situation and downplays democracy.

This thesis analyzes the Quebec party system as a case model, and uses a developmental approach. The Quebec study is a vehicle which reveals the increasing irrelevance of parties in Western nations. Because the very nature of policy convergence is the progressive movement of two or more entitites to common positions over a fixed period of time, the developmental approach can be very useful in providing a framework in analyzing historical fact and building conclusions on these facts.

After assessing policy outputs of successive federalist and sovereignist Quebec governments from 1960, this thesis concludes that policy convergence is clearly evident in Quebec language policy, economic development initiatives, and the entire constitutional and nation-building sphere. Further, it concludes that political scientists have to discern new ways of analyzing party systems and the manner in which they are impacted by corporatism, pragmatism, federalism and the economy.

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Dedication

One could not possibly dedicate a thesis of this nature to anything or anybody but a united and strong Canada. Further, this entails, of course, the active and willing participation of the Québécois, a people who deserve, at the very least, to respond to the future growth and development of this great nation with vigour and a sense of purpose.

Chapter One

Ideology, Typology and Propositions

1.0 Introduction

The 1959-60 "Quiet Revolution" inspired significant ideological transformations which began to alter the traditional Quebec party system. Since then, a largely uniform and systemic orientation has taken hold of Quebec society, particularly in the intergovernmental relations sphere, leading to policy convergence in many policy sectors, including language, state-centred economic development and constitutional policy. In their relationship to Ottawa, the Québécois have maintained a unique cohesiveness and uniformity - regardless of governing party ideology. As Gagnon and Montcalm emphasize:

> Since the early 1960s, all Quebec governments, in sharp contrast to most other provincial governments, have consistently worked to attain special constitutional, fiscal and program arrangements.[1]

The purpose of this paper is to discuss fundamental likenesses between two political parties - the Parti québécois (PQ) and the Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ) - whose apparent goals are to remove Quebec from Canada, and to defend the Canadian federal system in Quebec, respectively. My purpose is to observe "federalist" and "sovereignist" Quebec governments to determine whether convergence has occurred in the post-1960 period and, if so, why? This Quebec case study will, by its very nature, carry the supposition further to examine the issue of the corporatist threat to political parties in Western nations.

Some political observers boldly state that past and present events in Quebec are no more different, and no more important, than events signifying general provincial evolution in this country. Likewise, the same detractors might counter the thought that a province's distinctiveness is worthy of special consideration, often because it might not be politically correct to categorize something this way. This thesis espouses a fundamental point. We are

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[1] Alain Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, Quebec Beyond the Quiet Revolution, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), p. 150.

not simply dealing with party policy convergence; we are considering a societal orientation revealing a high degree of homogeneity. We are not merely dealing with superficial similarities such as agricultural policy convergence in Saskatchewan, or fisheries policy convergence in Newfoundland, though one should not minimize the importance of these policy sectors to these provinces. We are grappling with the ideological foundations of a society's party system, which appear to be dissolving before our eyes, and which have nearly always appeared to be something other than what they truly are.

1.1 Propositions

A number of propositions are central. First, since 1960, successive Quebec governments have advocated and legislated largely symbolic nationalist policies, traditionally in areas of shared or cloudy jurisdiction (particularly in the post-1982 period), which give Quebec a maximal level of autonomy and Ottawa minimal occasion to disrupt their implementation and enforcement. Union Nationale, Parti québécois and Liberal governments have functioned similarly in policy areas they perceive to have great electoral utility. Quebec governments since 1960 have had mixed successes in exploiting nationalism in at least three collective policy goals of Québécois society, leading to policy convergence in language policy, capitalist economic development policy and constitutional (nation building) initiatives.

Second, in using the state to redistribute group power, all post-1966 Quebec governments have, in their own way, inadvertently curtailed the development of Quebec society, which was intensified between 1960 and 1966.[2] Despite the growth of Francophone entrepreneurialism and support for free trade, Québécois society has been transformed into an inward-looking, and possibly xenophobic, entity. Restrictive policies have largely negated

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[2] See Marc Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p.2.

individual rights and, perhaps, natural law[3] and have been detrimental to state autonomy. Charles Taylor offers a valid interpretation:

> Two conceptions of a liberal society meet head on. For one, this society is defined by individual rights. Embracing as a common objective the furtherance of a particular culture or way of life is seen as anti-liberal... and... discriminates between citizens. For the other conception of liberalism, a liberal society always has some common goals, and interprets rights in their own way... Quebec can't live in a society which is defined rigidly by the first conception.[4]

Using arguments for the protection of language and culture, Quebec governments have difficulty reconciling collective rights with individual liberties.[5]

Third, pragmatism and the race for voter support has enabled sovereignist and federalist elements to thrive in the Quebec party system. When they lacked vision, the Union Nationale (1968-70) and the Parti québécois (1985-88) minimized their threats of sovereignty. Conversely, with little or no vision, the Liberal Party's customary federalist orientation has taken on nationalist, even sovereignist, overtones (1978-82, 1987-92).

Fourth, by reaping significant monetary and program rewards from the federal system, Quebec obtained an increasing number of powers. Quebecers enjoy pseudo-sovereignty or de-facto special status in many fields, but rely on the federal government for continued funding in sensitive or expensive policy areas (established programs financing). This dichotomy contributes, in Quebec, to a resistance to orthodox independence. As major actors in Quebec's seemingly difficult journey towards self-determination, Liberal and Parti québécois governments have managed to strike a balance between wide spectrums of

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[3] Natural law can be defined as that common core of rules which all communities observe and, it would seem, must observe if they are to survive. See J.R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 333. Natural law, as universally accepted, is law which cannot be established by legislators, nor can it be taken away by them.

[4] Charles Taylor, "Collision Courses Quebec-Canada". Keynote address given at the Conference on the Future of Quebec and Canada, Faculty of Law, McGill University, November 16, 1990, pp. 2-3.

[5] For an analysis of collective versus individual rights and shared and divergent values, see Charles Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values", in Ronald Watts and Douglas M. Brown (eds.), Options for A New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 53-76.

nationalism and questions of a more pragmatic nature.

Except for a brief look at Quebec history to 1960, this study emphasizes the post-1960 era and the policy outputs of successive Liberal (1960-66, 1970-76, 1985-1992), Union Nationale (1966-1970) and Parti québecois (1976-1985) governments.

1.2 A Framework for Analysis

Analyzing social change would be less taxing if a single theoretical framework and associated factors were adequate to gain a thorough understanding of the subject at hand. To the disadvantage of comparative political analysis, little research into Quebec has done this. Most studies look at single questions involving class or language conflict, federalism, or the simple evolution of nationalist determination and attempt to reconcile a narrow supposition into a supposedly wide-ranging study. The goal here, however, is to look at the Quebec party system as a mirror of society and an incubator of Quebec's ideological development. In one of the most perceptive analyses of Quebec, Kenneth McRoberts uses the "developmental approach". While it is the most comprehensive approach in establishing an initial framework, McRoberts admits that this approach "does not provide a satisfactory body of theory for linking together the various forms of social, economic, and political change it isolates."[6]

While developmental analysis does not automatically link the various elements of political and social change, it is valuable in studying political, economic and societal evolution and provides the pillars on which fact and theory are built. This study[7] will add an ingredient to the developmental approach; the linkage between party development and societal change impacting contemporary Canadian intergovernmental relations.

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[6] Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 3rd edition (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1988), p. 11.

[7] This study does not delve into dependency theory and the cultural division of labour, as these concepts are well defined in Denis Monière, Ideologies in Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), and McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis.

1.3 Definitions

Convergence is one of a number of terms useful in defining and understanding party system convergence. Ideology, developmental analysis and corporatism are also important. If one attempts to calculate convergence or policy similarities between parties within a system, it is first necessary to determine if the parties are indeed different and, if so, what makes them different in the first place. If one can isolate dogma or externally-expressed ideology apart from their obvious utility during election campaigns, one can recognize a party's true policy orientation, presupposing it has one.

Developmental analysis allows for historical analysis and provides a framework for looking at multiple variables. Political science is an inexact science. Though historical analyses are not the norm in political research, they are useful in providing us with concrete facts and provide a foundation for theory. Developmental analysis makes room for the study of historical uniformities which normally appear frequently enough to allow scientific study.

Corporatism links ideology and action and is the tangible expression of Québécois nationalism. The traditional corporatist triangle (business, government and labour) is now supplanted by business, government and nationalism; since 1981, economic hardships have relegated labour to a minor position. The conventional polarization between business and labour in Quebec, with government as broker, has been symbiotically rearranged. The relationship between business and government is not defined in left-right terms but, rather, is expressed in nationalism and regulates Quebec's intergovernmental policy responses.

1.3.1 Ideology

Ideology is a misunderstood concept. The word was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy during the French Revolution and its original meaning, "science of ideas", remains a common definition. As a fundamental notion, in the literature, party systems are often

structured and analyzed from an ideological perspective. Scholars and philosophers have traditionally classified ideology on a left-right continuum, "by their advocacy of societal orders that are egalitarian or elitist in their allocations of wealth, status and power.[8]

A pejorative bias surrounds ideology. Some identify it with hated totalitarian beliefs or propaganda. Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim viewed ideology as the ideas of the capitalist class seeking to rationalize the prevailing order. Neither is ideology a universally negative term. Anthony Downs, for example, describes it as "a verbal image of the good society and the chief means of constructing such a society.[9] In Reo Christenson's view, "Political ideology is a belief system that explains and justifies a preferred political order, either existing or proposed, and offers a strategy for its attainment".[10] Similarly, David Easton sees ideologies as "articulated sets of ideals, ends, and purposes, which help members of the system interpret the past, explain the present and offer a vision for the future.[11]

The human disposition to formulate ideologies surfaces when people believe they are neglected or exploited under an existing order. When their needs are not satisfied, they find the dominant ideology inadequate and do not accept its authority. As such, ideologies are more often than not born out of revolutionary dogma and are perceived negatively. Many ideologies, though, are receptive enough to external influences to conform with immediate goals. These ideologies, generally prevalent in Western industrial societies, allow for pragmatism to take hold of policy initiatives and contribute to endless debates with respect to the significance of political parties and systems. Christenson states:

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[8] Reo M. Christenson et al. Ideologies and Modern Politics, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), p.2.

[9] Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p.96.

[10] Reo M. Christenson et al, Ideologies and Modern Politics, p.4.

[11] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (London: John Wiley, 1965), p.290.

> An ideology is a pattern of ideas integrated around one or a few basic premises, containing its own (often self-fulfilling) rules of change and development. Though it often offers a simple picture of consistency and order nowhere present in complex reality, it may not be internally consistent - frequently embodying contradictory and incompatible propositions, reflecting the ambivalence of human nature and the capacity of men to compartmentalize their thinking and engage in what George Orwell called "doublethink..."[12]

While ideologies may change, they often are subject to intense conflicts (orthodoxy vs revisionism) and tortuous interpretations by those claiming to adhere most closely to the original formulation. This reasoning seems particularly relevant in light of the factionalized in-fighting within Quebec's parties.

Political scientists espouse idealist, materialist, positional, functional and social theories of ideology. However, little research has been conducted into national doctrines of ideology, which are vital to modern Quebec. National theories of ideology have had only minor influence in modern political science, and then usually only within the body of other theories. This study looks at nationalism as an articulator of policy in Quebec society. Quebec cannot be effectively studied using most of the basic theories of ideology, but they can be used as a guide if they are simply explained.

Idealists, notably Friedrich Hegel, assert that man reasons about life, and that behaviour and institutions are products of reason. Political behaviour, then, is shaped by how and what men think about politics, and political ideology is a causal link in politics between reason and action. Objectors to this theory observe that reason alone has not brought common ideologies and political institutions and point to the suspicious coincidence that the ideologies advocated by men are rather consistently attuned to their interests; they are vague and open to wide interpretations when serving as guides to political action; ideological situations vary; men do not reason in a vacuum; most people do not articulate elaborate

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[12] Christenson et al, Ideologies and Modern Politics, p.11.

ideologies but, rather, they are usually ruled by ambition.

Materialists assert that ideologies are determined by self-interest and that rational people consciously pursue status and wealth. Since resources are scarce, competition over them is keen. Those with the greatest resources have the most power to protect and improve their positions. Concurrently, they develop an ideology which justifies their favoured socio-economic position and explains the plight of society's less favoured. Thus, ideology is largely a rationalization of material political interests, tending to be a defense of the status quo or a clear call for change. Materialist theories have failed because they strip ideology of independent meaning, appear sympathetic to the critical or cynical mind and, like the idealist, suffer from oversimplification. Economic interests do not always control political actions and ideas. People with the same class interests often differ politically. This is especially true in Canada, for example, where voting is regionally based. Similarly, people with like interests do not necessarily show congruency in their voting patterns.

Positionalists, like materialists, assume that ideology is a political belief system seeking commitment to sustain, modify, or overthrow a societal order. Inherent in this school is a psychological strand, emanating from the studies of Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow, which advocates that feelings of insecurity and loneliness lead people to seek superiority, security, power and glory in the political arena, often through totalitarianism.

Functionalists view ideology as caused rather than causal. Functionality has led people to look for clues to political behavior in the functions ideologies perform, rather than in their content. Like the positional school, functional theories deal with the psychological factors that create belief and action, leading people to die for ideologies.

Social theorists believe that minimal consensus is required for the survival of society and that without consensus, support for a system requires costlier methods of rewards

or force. This theory is the best general theory to adequately describe Quebec's ideological development. A society cannot function well without an ideology or at cross purposes with its ideology. If the ideology does not change with technology or institutions, for instance, it may be challenged by a counter-ideology.[13]

1.3.1a Inherent Problems With Ideological Theories

By stating that "reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system"[14], O'Connor recognizes a fundamental dilemma in examining ideologies. Likewise, Norma Scarborough considers the difficulty in embellishing ideology into a suitable framework:

> political scientists have had to work without the benefit of a classic theoretical framework within which to place ideologies. There has been little systematic effort to give the concept theoretical status. What we lack is either (or both) a theory of society and politics which might place ideologies within that realm, or a concept that we might place alongside the concepts of power and class as analytical tools.[15]

Notwithstanding the difficulties, this study views ideology from a social-nationalist perspective. In Quebec, nationalism, arguably, has transcended all other theories on which ideology can be based. The dream for nationhood (sovereignty) or special status (sovereignty-association) has defined policy outputs in Quebec and has been the determining factor in party politics since at least 1960.

1.3.2 Developmental Analysis

Many approaches to systems analysis have emerged since World War II, particularly through the behavioural revolution. Political scientists still search for an all-encompassing approach to comprehend the best forms of aggregate data in support of their

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[13] James O'Connor reiterates this view in discussing two divergent capitalist functions, legitimation and accumulation. See O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

[14] W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (London: Columbus University Press, 1969), p.48.

[15] Norma Scarborough, Political Ideology and Voting: An Exploratory Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.23.

hypotheses. Because they have not found one, structural-functional, behavioural, attitudinal, typological, dimensional, developmental and other approaches survive.

Modern political science is fixated with development, a term often used in third-world analyses. Though normally applied in social science research to this effect, developmental analysis can be used in any historically-based study. Scholars like Harold Lasswell emphasize equilibrium and developmental analysis.[16] In their look at Lasswell, Davies and Lewis state that equilibrium analysis "involves identifying and describing the complex interactions between the important factors within the political process, which affect the distribution of values".[17] Equilibrium analysis is vital to a limited study of a system, nation or people, if not used in isolation. In a general sense, equilibrium is said to exist within a system if no variable changes its position or relation with respect to the other variables. In this state, the variables have adjusted to each other and enjoy a condition of harmony and balance.[18] Equilibrium is a component of structural-functional analysis, which posits that systems have identifiable structures which perform functions within the system and, being co-dependent, have meaning only in terms of the working of the system.[19] Davies and Lewis emphasize the importance of linking equilibrium with developmental analysis:

> Social and political systems exist through time and must be analysed in a way that will show their development from one stage to another. Equilibrium analysis facilitates the analysis of the interaction of forces at definite points in time only and not of the changes which take place over a period of time.[20]

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[16] Harold D. Lasswell, Collected Works, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951).

[17] Morton R. Davies and Vaughan A. Lewis, Models of Political Systems, (London: Macmillan Press, 1971), p.152.

[18] For an excellent discussion of equilibrium analysis, see David Easton, "Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research", in H. Eulau, et al. (eds.), Political Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe,Illinois: Free Press, 1959), pp.397-404.

[19] G. Almond and J. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), is one of the better books on structural-functional analysis.

[20] Ibid, p.152.

Lasswell supplements equilibrium analysis with developmental analysis to provide a workable framework and an historical orientation. A premise of Lasswell's is the belief in the notion of historical uniformities; that certain broad social situations recur with enough frequency and under somewhat similar conditions to allow scientific study. In Quebec's case, the more important social situations, such as the development of language legislation, the use of the state apparatus to implement economic development initiatives, and the array of constitutional decisions, have all appeared with predictable frequency to allow specific observation. Equilibrium and convergence are linked in this manner.

Paralleling developmental analysis' historical orientation are development methods. Peter Harris discusses how "a country develops by one of two methods, institutional or determinist".[21] The institutional stresses constitutional order to give effect to the law and to produce beneficial results for the community. Following the thought of Edmund Burke, it argues that institutions are wiser than individuals. Determinism, on the contrary, is a response to economic, social and cultural pressures. Here, political life is a product of a particular force. Modern Quebec politicians have effectively equated the negative elements of federalism to an impinging vice; a force squeezing the autonomy of the province into a weakened state. Thus, an intractable determinism has taken hold of Quebec's development.

In these contexts one can effectively study historical Quebec. In particular, the province's self-determinism can be viewed as a concerted response to the negative elements of Canadian federalism. Simply stated, Quebec's goals are to extract maximum economic and political returns from the system and to achieve constitutionally-entrenched special status in as many policy fields as possible.

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[21] Peter B. Harris, Foundations of Political Science, (London: Hutchinson, 1976), p.303.

1.3.3 Convergence

In the 1960s observers spoke of the "end of ideology".[22] The welfare state had seemingly eliminated political choice problems and remaining challenges were technical. Scientific knowledge, it seemed, generated relativism, objective standards of truth, and a tolerance for dissonance, ambiguity and atheism. Chaim Waxman sums up this mindset:

> We've reached, or at least are well on our way to reaching "the good society", and ideology can only serve to hinder the progress we are making.[23]

Convergence, an outgrowth of the "end of ideology" school, occurs when two or more entities move from different positions toward a common point over a fixed period of time. In the same way, convergence is "the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances".[24] General convergence reasoning, according to Bennett, suggests that "as societies adopt a progressively more industrial infrastructure, certain determinate processes are set in motion which tend over time to shape social structures, political processes and public policies in the same mould".[25] Numerous scholars, using statistical analyses and empirical research, studying many countries at one time, have supported the general argument.[26] However, the nature and causes of convergence are truly complicated issues which raise profound theoretical concerns.

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[22] Countless scholars have postulated in the "end of ideology" school. Some of the more important are Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Seymour Martin Lipset, Joseph LaPalombara and Michael Novak.

[23] Chaim I. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p.5.

[24] Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), p.3.

[25] Colin Bennett, "What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?", British Journal of Political Science, 21, 1991, pp.215-233.

[26] Some examples include Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security Programs, American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1965), pp.537-550; Frederic Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1968); Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

Enquiries into convergence have almost singularly been macroeconomic in nature, emphasizing industrialization and urbanization.[27] Economic convergence is a popular topic - especially in light of European integration and global trading alliances - but is abstract and fails to go beyond the broad correlations between economic development and indices of public policy. Anthony King emphasizes how "aggregate cross-national studies... in some ways resemble photographs taken from a high-flying aircraft; the main features stand out, but much detail is lost - and the lost detail may be important".[28] Only recently have we realized the inherent weaknesses of broad, cross-national studies which focus on obscure generalized theory grounded in macroeconomic statistical analyses. Few scholars have attempted to redefine the scope and means of analysis in order to identify the process of policy convergence. Bennett does not look beyond "cross-national policy convergence", but recognizes the limitations of economic development as the sole foundation for convergence analysis.[29] This study does not reinvent attempts to go beyond international macroeconomic studies of convergence, but is based on micro-policy questions which emphasize the more neglected intra-societal dimension.

The study of convergence within party systems is not well developed. Formal models of electoral competition exist[30], and rest on the notion that in order for voters to affect policy direction, they must be presented with broad, distinct policy alternatives. The

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[27] See Alex Inkeles, "Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies", in Mustafa O. Attir, Burkart Holzner and Zdenek Suda, (eds.), Directions of Change: Modernization Theory and Realities (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981); Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Marbison and C.A. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973).

[28] Anthony King, "What do Elections Decide?" in David Butler, Howard Penniman and Austin Ranney (eds.), Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp.293-324.

[29] Colin Bennett, British Journal of Political Science, especially pp.217-218.

[30] See Albert Breton, The Economic Theory of Representative Government, (Chicago: Aldine), 1974. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.

weakness with most theories of party competition is that they view party competition from an economic perspective, typically using longitudinal correlation between policy outputs (typically public expenditures) and party control of office to determine variables such as increased spending by parties of the left versus monetarism by parties of the right.[31] These theorists, who often advocate Public Choice theory, typically ignore whether political parties matter, let alone their position on the ideological continuum.[32]

An important assumption of representation - that the winning party will carry out its intentions - assumes that voters will be offered a meaningful choice. When this does not occur, parties are accused of deluding the electorate in a competition for votes, announcing intentions that will have no effect in practice. In order to carry out its policy intentions, the governing party must express desirable policies in opposition that are doable within the constraints of office. In one of the better studies of the importance of political parties, Richard Rose has determined that:

> What parties say is not what parties do... to understand the role of parties in government we must distinguish between rhetoric and reality. Rhetoric has its place in securing the support of activists within a party, and in swaying the opinions of voters. But rhetorical skills are of little avail in the face of the problems that confront politicians in government. The ability to face up to reality is crucial if politicians are to survive in office. Rhetorical skills then become a necessary means to convince voters that government policy is not what governors want to do, but what they have to do.[33]

Certain factors must be present to test party convergence. For example, parties must alternate in power at more or less regular intervals; coalition or minority governments

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[31] See, for example, D. Cameron, "The Expansion of Public Economy. A Comparative Analysis", American Political Science Review, 1978, pp.1243-61., and D.A. Hibbs Jr., "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", American Political Science Review, 1977, pp.1467-87.

[32] See E.R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Richard Rose, Do Political Parties Matter?, (London: Methuen Press, 1980); Francis Castles, The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982); and J. McAllister, in Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay, Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization and Representation, (Toronto: Nelson, 1989).

[33] Richard Rose, Do Parties Make A Difference? (expanded 2nd edition), (London: Macmillan, 1984), Introduction.

are not appropriate focuses of study; and, a similar social, economic and policy environment must be present for the parties alternating in power. The Quebec party system fits into this analytical environment well. A significant problem with the party control methodology is the difficulty in capturing changes in policy intentions over time between and within parties. This problem is compounded if a particular study relates to something other than left-right, Keynesianism-monetarism, inflation-unemployment considerations. The continual problem is that nearly all the existing research on party control weigh the differences in party policies on a left-right scale. Yet, if we accept as plausible the thesis that priorities and policies of the left differ from those of the right, should we not also accept as plausible the notion that policies may differ over time within the same party and, further, may lead to convergence between parties? The ideological similarities within modern party systems suggests that we must develop a way of analyzing intra and inter-party policy relations.

1.3.4 Corporatism, Policy Networks and Parties

Corporatism is the direct relationship between government and interest groups in formulating public policy. This relationship is important because, in Quebec, special policy networks have acquired a disproportionate degree of authority in government decision making. On the language issue, for example, le Mouvement Québec Française, le Société Saint Jean Baptiste and smaller fringes have influenced government decision making, and some politically blackmail legislators. Also, agencies such as l'Office de la langue française, le Commission de protection de la langue française and le Commission de toponymie (which is mandated to rename Anglicized mountains, rivers and lakes) are attached to government but not accountable to the electorate, and wield excessive authority into decision making. Many similar groups continue to influence immigration policy, business and market policy and constitutional issues. Business groups, such as Le Conseil des Hommes d'Affaires Québécois

and Souverainété Quebec Inc. have recently sprung up to convince Quebecers of business solidarity with sovereignty-association or independence. In Quebec, interest groups effecting public policy are not particularly class oriented, nor are they polarized on a labour-business scale. However, evidence reveals that articulate and homogeneous groups have played a corporatist role in their sway on public policy and have greatly influenced party convergence.

Hugh Heclo has recognized significant changes in the external environments of government. He observes the proliferation of expertise among newer actors in the policy process: executive agencies, interest groups, industry associations, think tanks and academics, and coined the phrase "issue networks".[34] In Canada, work of this nature has been carried out by Alan Cairns and Paul Pross.[35] Cairns points out the paradox of governments encouraging the articulation and institutionalization of many interests in society, and then themselves being severely constrained as a result. Consequently, government agencies have developed a dependency on these interests which are "embedded" in the state. Pross carries the argument further by advocating the "policy community" concept and postulates that these actors, who comprise a "sub-government", have vested interests in maintaining the status-quo for prevailing policies as well as their own influence over policy direction. In Quebec, disruption is the constitutional status quo. It is in the vested interests of these Quebec "sub-governments" to maintain constitutional uncertainty. The past thirty years reveal that it is in the best interests of the Quebec state to use constitutional disruption to supplement its power and authority. Heclo, Cairns and Pross agree upon the marked increase in the fragmentation of authority, the diffusion of policy expertise and the interdependence between state and

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[34] Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment", in Anthony King (ed.), The New American Political System, (Washington DC: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978).

[35] Alan Cairns, "The Embedded State: State-Society Relations in Canada", in Keith Banting (ed.), State and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); and A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986).

society. This accurately describes contemporary Quebec.

Recently, corporatist scholarship has expanded and is now characterized with four other policy networks (pressure pluralist, clientele pluralist, state-directed, and concertation).[36] This study is not concerned with the entire spectrum of policy networks. However, a strong case can be made for identifying Quebec with the corporatist and concertation models. Both are similar in that a balance is struck between business and government, two competing and well-organized interests, and the organization of business interests is strong. The difference between corporatist and concertation policy networks is that, in the former, the power of one societal interest like business is balanced by another equally powerful interest, sometimes labour, sometimes another business interest or an altogether different group; in the latter model, a strong societal association contends with an equally strong government. The result is a "closed" policy process where only legitimate, monopolized interests with great expertise and a broad vision can participate.

Corporatism can be traced to the simultaneous existence of a strong union movement, weakly organized societal interests who feel threatened, and the policy result of conflict or deadlock between societal interests. Ideology is de-emphasized as labour, business and government are brought into an interactive process which supposedly lowers inflation and unemployment, and maintains a satisfactory level of economic growth. McAllister states:

> What neo-corporatist theory contributes to our understanding is its stress upon the interrelationships between government and interest groups - an interrelationship in which parties are almost irrelevant. Interest groups are legitimized by government when they are permitted to participate in policy making, policy implementation, and even policy enforcement. Often they are financed by the government...[37]

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[36] See Evert A. Lindquist, "Public Managers and Policy Communities: Learning to Meet new Challenges", Canadian Public Administration, Volume 35, No. 2, (Summer 1992), pp.127-59.

[37] James McAllister, "Do Parties Make a Difference?", in Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay, Canadian Parties in Transition, (Toronto: Nelson, 1989), p.490.

In contrast, an advocate of the relevance of parties, Francis Castles, views parties as:

> the central... intermediary structure between society and government and... therefore, it makes an important difference to public policy how they interact and which is in power at any particular time.[38]

In a Quebec study, it is important to move beyond business versus labour questions and to look particularly at corporatist policy networks as they are defined in the main power blocs of that society, as articulators of nationalist thought.

Business and labour corporatism is more influential in Europe and this utopian relationship has never really materialized in Canada. Policy networks notwithstanding, other significant factors determine and limit the policy output capability of parties. Klaus von Beyme discusses seven variables which make it difficult to assign policy output to parties[39]: federalism, where decision-making is assigned to more than one level of government, appears to be vital in terms of Quebec; cooperation (the tendency for a cooperative opposition to develop if parties are moving closer together in their ideas); length of time in office (meaningful relations can only be established between policy and parties if the parties are in office long enough); lack of crises (medium term policy planning can only be implemented in a relatively crisis-free period); role of unions; non-uniform influence (party influence is not equally evident in every policy area); and policy as weapon (policies are not only the output of ideas by parties in power, but are also increasingly becoming a weapon in an election campaign). An eighth factor, external economic influences, is also an integral component in determining party policies. These variables in general, and federalism in particular, should be applied to Quebec. Von Beyme argues that:

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[38] Francis G. Castles (ed.), The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage Publications, 1982), p.5.

[39] Klaus Von Beyme, "Do Parties Matter? The Impact of Parties on the Key Decisions in the Political System", Government and Opposition, Volume 19, 1984, pp.7-11.

> Institutional restraints such as federalism, independent agencies, judicial review by constitutional courts and other institutional variables account for the extent to which parties carry out their programmes. Parties do not matter only as individual organizations, the whole system of parties matters.[40]

After taking these obstacles into account, we can venture a few hypotheses on the comparisons between party dominance and political decision-making. As most comparative studies tend to concentrate on political achievement in the economic arena (OECD studies for example), they are not necessarily practical in analyzing Quebec's intergovernmental policy outputs. Nonetheless, these findings are relevant. One hypothesis, espoused by Wilensky, is that "economic development makes countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions more alike in their strategy for constructing the floor below which no one sinks".[41] A second hypothesis is that social democratic governments concentrate more on reducing unemployment and so accept higher inflation rates, while conservatives tend to concentrate on a maximum of monetary stability, accepting a higher unemployment rate if necessary.[42]

Since the 1970s, there has been a coming together of two rather separate strands of democratic theory: the post-Schumpeterians who always place parties at the centre of their arguments, and the American pluralists (David Truman, Robert Dahl and their followers) who emphasize weak and decentralized parties along with corporatism.[43] One of the central elements in modern democratic theory has been competition between organized political parties. For some, such as Joseph Schumpeter, this element is by far the most important.

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[40] Klaus Von Beyme, Government and Opposition, p.27.

[41] Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p.27.

[42] See Hibbs, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy", pp.1467-87.

[43] See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd Ed., (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1962); and, for the best analyses of corporatism and interest groups in Canadian politics, Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974); and Paul Pross (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, (Toronto: Mcgraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975).

But even those who reject the Schumpeterian model often argue that the availability of alternative parties competing for power is a distinguishing feature of democracy. Competition is a mechanism by which interests can be aggregated optimally. It enables citizens to constrain governments because of the people's dismissal power.

Another view is that competition provides for control,[44] in that, because of competition, citizens can develop preferences about objectives and then express them through devices which provide some kind of connection between preferences and outcomes. The view that political competition involves choices originates in liberal economics and is known as Public Choice theory. Mueller defines Public Choice as:

> the economic study of non-market decision-making or simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of political science; the theory of the state, voting rules, voter behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however.[45]

From the mid-twentieth century, economic and political mechanisms for allocating values came to be seen as instruments to effect choice. On this view, competition translates preferences into optimal policies. The most influential early works that popularized this view were Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, and Anthony Downs.[46]

The foregoing may assist to explain the nature of voter choice in Quebec. Economic choice with political competition is an integral component of Public Choice theory. Anthony Downs studied party competition and developed the first explicitly economic approach to the study of democracy. Downs sought to explain both the constraints the political market placed on suppliers of goods and also the types of choices that would be made

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[44] Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).

[45] Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.1.

[46] See Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1953); and Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.

available to the consumer. There is, however, a crucial difference between the social democratic and the liberal economic view of voter choice. The former have tended to see citizens as not necessarily having the information or the opportunities to make frequent political decisions, so that in many cases they do not really have preferences. On the liberal economic view, citizens are assumed to already have preferences between possible alternatives, or to be indifferent, and political competition is simply a tool to aggregate these preferences and optimize public policies. Consequently, while these two schools have similar views in rejecting the view that elections merely provide constraints on rulers, they differ radically about the nature of voter choice.

We can posit that it is likely parties do matter despite the possibility of convergence. As to what extent, this will not be determined by the computerization of global figures but, rather, by a comparative analysis of policy mixes of Quebec governments under similar social conditions and political challenges. Parties cannot be isolated from their social and organizational environment. The ways parties are involved or integrated with interest groups, their ability to mobilize relatively uniform social groups, the patterns by which exacerbation or settlement of conflict occurs on various levels, and any institutionalization through neo-corporative structures together with any consensus which penetrates most of society, will all impact policy results. Even if parties did not matter very much in correlation to policy output, we are forced to accept the idea that parties do matter as a basic myth of pluralist democracies.

Richard Rose has developed a number of models which help test party convergence.[47] The Adversary model posits that, in a two-party system, opposition intention is not equal to government practice. This model assumes that the party out of office will

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[47] Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, pp.20-27.

emphasize or create disagreements about policy with the governing party.[48] If an opposition party endorsed what was said and done by the governing party, it would be redundant, offering voters little reason to seek change. The traditional justification for parliamentary opposition assumes that good government requires open and searching debate about alternative policies in order to reach the best conclusion.

The Consensus model flatly contradicts the Adversary model, positing opposition intention is equal to government practice.[49] It assumes that at any given point the opposition will not, cannot or should not differ from the governing party. This model emphasizes what politicians have in common, rather than what divides them, and is perhaps the most indicative model in describing party politics in Western democracies. The classic statement of this model was given by A.J. Balfour in his 1926 introduction to Walter Bagehot's The English Constitution:

> Our alternating Cabinets, though belonging to different parties, have never differed about the foundations of society. And it is evident that our whole political machinery pre-supposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker.[50]

The Manifesto model posits that when two parties alternate in office, opposition intention (time 1) is equal to government practice (time 2).[51] This model differs from the two previous models because it is concerned with policy continuity from a party's time in opposition to government. In opposition a party will set out policy intentions and then put these intentions into practice upon entering office. This is invariably assumed to happen in discussions of the Adversary model. The political will of politicians is strongest in shaping

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[48] Ibid, p.20.

[49] Ibid, p.23.

[50] See A. J. Balfour in Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, (London: Collins, 1963), Introduction.

[51] Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference?, pp.26-27.

Manifesto intentions, and even if they prove difficult to realize in office, they cannot be abandoned easily by ministers who have formerly proclaimed them. When and if Manifesto intentions are abandoned, the very fact that a government is departing from its intentions will create difficulties within the party (the PQ's leadership abandoning a quick course to sovereignty is an example). It makes the party leadership vulnerable to attack by the orthodoxy as well as opponents for belatedly abandoning its past.

The Technocracy model posits that, when two parties alternate in office, government A practice (time 1) is equal to government B practice (time 2).[52] This model regards different parties in a similar position at different times and, while not necessarily rejecting the Adversary model, it denies its primacy. It is not concerned with whether parties differ in debate when one is governing, and the other confined to announcing intentions in opposition. Instead it concentrates on whether different parties differ in what they do in office. The Technocracy model can be justified on negative grounds by federal, budgetary or other constraints of office. These constraints may be assumed to be so strong that a new government can do nothing different from the last government. The relationship between party intentions and actions is more or less random. Bagehot's words ring true:

> And the end always is that a middle course is devised, which looks as much as possible like what was suggested in opposition, but which is as much as possible what patent facts - facts which seem to live in the office, so teasing and unceasing are they - prove ought to be done. [53]

Just as the Manifesto model emphasizes continuity within a party as it changes position in politics, the Technocracy model emphasizes continuity within government, notwithstanding a change of parties. Both models, however, have a common weakness in downgrading the importance of public policy.

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[52] Ibid, pp.28-29.

[53] Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, p.128.

1.4 Conclusion

Quebec society has progressed in a predictable manner since 1960. It is a relatively straight-forward exercise to determine what Quebecers want; this is attempted in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Quebec governments with different political orientations have converged in distinguishable policy fields, all which reflect Quebec society's collective demands. The end objective, research reveals, is that Quebecers, by and large, wish their province to remain a vital component of the Canadian federation, with some form of special status. Special status is not a singularly-defined concept. Special status, along with the general role of a national government, means very different things to centralists and provincialists. Those who espouse Pierre Trudeau's vision of Canada believe in a strong national government where equality of citizens is the basis of the state and where there is no need for special status, particularly for collective interests or provinces. Perhaps Trudeau's thoughts are best espoused in his views on the values of a just society:

> The goal of the government I led was to arrive at a more functional distribution of jurisdictions by giving up certain powers to the provinces in return for powers essential for making Canada an economic entity without internal borders. Our strategy was to win the support of Canadians by offering them measures designed to strengthen the sovereignty of the people: a constitution free of British guardianship, a constitutional amending formula providing for recourse to a referendum, and a charter of rights and freedoms common to the whole country (which would include the right to linguistic and regional equality).[54]

Because provincialists, unlike centralists and including Quebec governments, advocate radically decentralized federalism with clearly-defined regional or collective rights and powers, it will be a difficult task to attempt to reconcile these very different belief systems. These differences notwithstanding, there is also a vast difference between de facto and de jure special status; a difference which appears to be at the forefront of today's

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[54] Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society", in Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Trudeau, (eds.), Towards A Just Society: The Trudeau Years, (Toronto: Viking, 1990), p.376.

constitutional debate. De facto special status is assumed by general practice or convention, whereas de jure special status has some definition in law as a right.

We can determine that, once Quebec's wishes are made more evident, it could be up to the rest of Canada to decide the constitutional course of action. The result will be greater autonomy for Quebec and the other provinces, a victory for advocates of centrifugal federalism. However, as will be discussed in chapter 5, Quebec's desire to nation-build within Canada demands that either special status for that province, or radical decentralization as a gift to all provinces, will emerge. Since at least 1971, intergovernmental relations in this country reveal that all provinces except Quebec, for reasons which are not really evident, have largely refused to accept the personal costs, along with the responsibilities, for the natural and ongoing devolution of powers.

In order to deny even the notion of special status for Quebec, the federal government has offered additional powers to the other provinces. However, refusals to accept these powers, with a few minor exceptions,[55] coupled with Quebec's acceptance of greater powers, have led directly to the constitutional predicament we find ourselves in today. Largely by their own decree, the other Canadian provinces have allowed Quebec to attain de facto special status. Ironically, however, many Canadians in some of these provinces find it simpler or less taxing to denounce Ottawa and Quebec for the latter's gains around the constitutional table rather than, short of screaming the equality of provinces principle, proposing even the most incremental resolution to this predicament. Even the strongest proponents of the equality of provinces principle will admit that, with control over its own pension plan, family allowances and immigration, Quebec has attained de facto special status

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[55] This is meant to be understood in relation to those additional powers which were offered to all provinces by Ottawa and, for budgetary, philosophical or other reasons, were accepted only by Quebec. This is not to imply that other provinces do not have some distinctive powers. Alberta, for example, has accepted the right, along with Quebec, to control the rate structure in the national family allowance program. Quebec, however, fully administers its own family allowance program.

in at least three policy fields. What remains to be seen is not whether Quebec is distinct or should be considered distinct, but, rather, whether this reality will be constitutionally recognized and/or whether Canada will be just a decentralized federation or two associated states with an identical economic structure and monetary system.

Whether we are observing a temporary resting place for the special status concept is uncertain. However, any half-serious scholar, in assessing Quebec's post-1960 development, can determine with ease the notion that Quebec nationalism will continually evolve to a finite point. When Quebecers decide they have reached the deep precipice between a comfortable economic position in an economic (and political) union and total separation from the rest of Canada, the finite point will be reached. According to the "separatist" Parti québécois, and reflecting on Von Beyme's contention that certain variables make it difficult to assign policy output to parties, the nearest side of the precipice includes political and national autonomy, membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations, the niceties of a Canadian passport, the free movement of people and goods, free and open borders, and an equal say in the formation of fiscal and monetary policy. With special status or much greater decentralization as probabilities, Quebecers will never postulate a jump over the precipice to radical independence.

Chapter 2 briefly sketches Quebec history from Confederation through to the Union Nationale administration of Paul Sauvé. Chapters 3 and 4 emphasize Liberal, Union Nationale and Parti québécois administrations and their reaction to the policy environment in the language sphere, the constitutional development arena and in capitalist economic development initiatives. One will see how Québécois ideological development is expressed in nationalism rather than any other belief systems which normally define other societies. The Quebec party system's ideology is indicative of party system development throughout the West, in that a growing pragmatism, coupled with corporatism, is now the author of most

public policy decisions.

Even those scholars who dispute the arguments of the end of ideology school, convergence and their subsequent spinoffs should avoid the mistake of de-emphasizing the policy power of stakeholders and special interest groups. In more ideologically polarized provinces, such as British Columbia, one can more readily comprehend the power of well organized and financed interest groups, such as labour (though the 1982 recession did a great deal of damage to the labour movement). In Quebec, however, the traditional corporatist triangle (business, government and labour) has given way to a differently-shaped triad (business, government and nationalism). Business and government in Quebec are now almost totally controlled by nationalism and its associated ideological formations.

Quebec's unwillingness to sign the Constitution Act, 1982, has ensured that contemporary intergovernmental relations in Canada are centred on Quebec. Events since at least 1982 have followed a linear, progressive path and have led directly to the current constitutional dilemma. Quebec's demands for ever-increasing levels of (provincial) responsibility are indicative of national and state decentralization which has been observed in Western democracies since the 1970s.

In summary, chapter 5 is a composite rationalization of the arguments put forward in this thesis and presents a way of analyzing future Québécois politics in an intergovernmental milieu. Further, it provides a basis whereby one can look at the changing role of political parties and their future impact on public policy decisions and societal directions.

Chapter Two

A Brief Overview of Quebec History to 1960

2.0 Introduction

Quebec is the only political region in North America whose residents are predominantly French and Roman Catholic and usually vote as a cohesive and powerful bloc. The sovereignist movement in Quebec is a result of its citizens' homogeneity and has been nurtured by intrinsically Québécois influences. Since before becoming a partner in the Canadian federation, Quebecers have, according to Herbert Quinn, "succeeded in retaining, almost unchanged, their language, their religion, their legal and educational systems, and even many of their customs."[1]

When studying a political system, one must seek to understand its historical and cultural environment. Since the 18th century, three factors have dominated Quebecers' political vision - two are integral to this day. As Quinn states, these are "his preoccupation with the maintenance of his cultural values; his strong adherence to the doctrines and social philosophy of Roman Catholicism; and his lack of democratic convictions."[2]

Modern Quebec is largely secular. Until recently, however, the Catholic church determined attitudes toward man and state, the family, the right of private property and the merits of socialism and capitalism. Because the church was an integral component of Quebec's institutional life, cultural jingoism and democratic shortfalls, its displacement by a new order in 1960 created, in William Coleman's words, a crisis of identity.[3]

A fundamental ingredient of the church's ability to hold indigenous loyalties was

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[1] Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Levesque, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), Introduction.

[2] Ibid, p.3.

[3] William Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p.131.

its close association with the struggle for cultural survival. The Quebec clergy championed a cultural cleavage, fostering Catholicism as the dominant faith. Catholicism interpreted both the natural and supernatural world and defined everyday ethics. In turn this built an educational system which was centred around classical rather than technocratic and business studies. Hubert Guindon argues that the church held a significant advantage over politics and commerce by having a centralized bureaucratic structure with the best communication systems and a discipline and the staff approximating the effectiveness of the military. Further, it controlled the avenues of social promotion by its control of the educational structure.[4] Clearly, Quebec's religious orientation led the way to the educational and economic cleavages prevailing between it and English Canada until the 1960s.

Moving to democracy, until recently a clear interrelationship existed between the actions of the church and the ignorance in Quebec about the underlying principles of parliamentary democracy. There was a direct correlation between the role of the church and in the acceptance that higher authorities would control political decision-making. This outlook is not conducive to a healthy, democratic society. While events such as the French Revolution had little bearing on Quebec society, the church overseas did. During the nineteenth century, the European Roman Catholic church opposed the growth of liberalism and democracy and its demeanor toward government was based on the concept of a natural law which laid down the proper norms governing the actions of individuals and states. French Canadians were not influenced by liberal ideas espoused in such manifestos as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1789).[5] The church and Quebec society

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[4] Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", p.17, and "The Crown, the Catholic Church, and the French-Canadian People: the Historical Roots of Quebec Nationalism", p.97, in Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity and Nationhood, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

[5] The reaction of the Church in Quebec to these revolutionary ideas is described in Arthur Maheux, "French Canadians and Democracy", *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XXVII, 3 (April, 1958), p.345; and Patricia Dirks, The Failure of L'Action Libérale Nationale, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p.35.

did not accept, for example, the doctrine that sovereignty lies with the people.

This non-democratic tradition began when all powers of government were concentrated in the hands of appointed governors and intendants. Quinn states that "the vast majority of people in New France had no opportunity to participate either in decision-making at the political level, or in exercising control over the government."[6] On asserting their control over Canada in 1763, the British found a people who had no tradition of a struggle against an absolute monarchy. Quebec's right to some form of self determination through the French language and civil law system was guaranteed with the Quebec Act in 1774. Coupled with this was the British introduction of limited democratic institutions into Quebec from 1791 to 1848. However, some have argued that the French Canadians accepted these institutions without understanding or appreciating their underlying values.[7] Pierre Trudeau, while perhaps going a bit far, states that Quebecers were a "people accustomed to submission and ignorance"[8], though they did quickly grasp the value of representative institutions as a defence of their society's interests against autocracy. Eventually, the knowledge of parliamentary democracy was used as a weapon and, today, these same institutions are effective in defending the interests of Quebec against Canada's English-speaking majority.

Until recently, the want of democratic instincts seriously affected the functioning of parliamentary government in Quebec. As government expenditures have been looked upon as a gift rather than a right, the party in power often has had the tremendous advantage as benefactor whose generousity is rewarded by another term in office. Is it only coincidence,

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[6] See Quinn, The Union Nationale, p.15.

[7] See Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968); and W.P.M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937, 2nd edition (London: Oxford, 1938), pp.88-9.

[8] Thomas Axworthy and Pierre Trudeau, (eds.), Towards A Just Society: The Trudeau Years, (Toronto: Viking, 1990), p.358.

for example, that, since 1984, the Mulroney government's Quebec caucus has been decimated by an unusually high number of members, including three ministers, found guilty of influence peddling, fraud and breach of trust? Because Quebecers have not struggled to establish proper legislative control over the public purse, they have, in past, been largely unmoved if precise budgetary procedures are not followed by government. Neither have Quebecers been moved by flagrant abuses of patronage, especially at the federal level in recent years. This in no way means that these weaknesses are not found elsewhere. In fact, patronage, it is argued by some, has been far more prevalent in Atlantic Canada. In Quebec, however, the development of healthy, democratic institutions has been curtailed because of these peculiarities found in its history.

2.1 Quebec Politics, 1867-1896

In much of the 1867 to 1896 period, Quebecers supported the Conservative Party. The Tories captured Quebec in every federal election except 1874 and 1891.[9] Provincially, the Conservatives won each election except in 1878, 1886 and 1890. Successes were due to John A. Macdonald, who accepted the fact that on matters of national concern, Quebec's cultural background would provide a different point of view from that of English Canada.[10]

The support of the church also helped maintain Conservative strength in Quebec in the late nineteenth century. The Liberals at the time had a radical, anti-clerical wing, les Rouges, who were influenced by revolutionary ideas in Europe from 1848. They opposed cooperation between church and state, advocated a loose form of federalism in which the member states would remain sovereign and, according to McCall-Newman[11], were "a group

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[9] See E.P. Dean, "How Canada Has Voted: 1867 to 1945", Canadian Historical Review, XXX, 3 (Sept. 1949), p.233.

[10] An excellent though very dated analysis of Macdonald's nation-building is found in A.D. Lockhart, "The Contribution of Macdonald Conservatism to National Unity, 1854-78", Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1938, p.125.

[11] Christina McCall-Newman, Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1982), pp.250-51.

of French-speaking radicals whose chief target was the Roman Catholic Church". Many French Canadians resented clerical interference in politics but, until about 1890, the church's opposition made it very difficult for the Liberals to make headway in Quebec.

The Conservative downfall in Quebec began in the 1880s when the Métis controversy brought conflict between French and English Canada. The Conservatives had lost the 1873 election over the Pacific Scandal, but were returned to power in 1878. Shortly after Confederation, the Métis argued that their lands were being threatened by English settlers from Ontario. After petitions to Macdonald's government, the Métis rebelled in 1885 and set up a provisional government under Louis Riel. Riel was tried for treason, but became the symbol of French Canadian resistance to assimilation. Macdonald twice postponed Riel's execution but capitulated under pressure from the Ontario wing of his party, led by the anti-French and anti-Catholic Orange Lodges.[12]

The integral political result of the Riel affair was the formation of the Parti National in Quebec which fought the Conservative view of Confederation and espoused the compact theory of Confederation.[13] Honoré Mercier, who had led the provincial Liberals, was the party's leader and, with the support of Premier Mowat of Ontario, preached what can be defined as "fortress nationalism", later advocated by both Maurice Duplessis and Jean Lesage. Fortress nationalism was a cross between French power and separation. Its advocates soon argued that since Quebec was a minority in the federation, it should maintain its strength at the provincial level instead, and should be recognized as a province *pas comme les autres*. We will see how the 1956 report of the Tremblay Commission on Constitutional

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[12] Two excellent accounts of the Riel rebellion are Arthur Isaac Silver and Marie-France Valleur, The North-West Rebellion, (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1967); and Thomas Flanagan, Riel and the Rebellion: 1885 Reconsidered, (Saskatoon, SK: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1983).

[13] A number of definitions exist. One view, particularly in French Canada, holds that Confederation was a compact between two founding peoples and/or governments. This theory was widely held among French-Canadian constitutionalists but never acknowledged in similar English-Canadian circles. The other major view is that Confederation was a compact between equal provinces.

Problems worked this theory out most completely; and variations of the "fortress" theme are also found in the Liberal Party's 1980 proposal for a "New Canadian Federation".[14] Underlying these particular strategies is a conception of Quebec as a distinct society, a nation in one of several senses, deserving equality with collective "English Canada".[15]

The federal election of 1896 proved to be a benchmark in testing support for Mercier's theories. Mercier supported the federal Liberal Party which won 35 Quebec seats in 1891 under Laurier.[16] Mercier's nationalist movement, as well as internal problems in the provincial and federal Conservative parties, were the decisive factors that destroyed the dominant position of the Conservatives in Quebec. Though the Conservatives found victory in the provincial election of 1892, they were defeated in 1897. Sixty years passed before the Conservatives again made serious inroads into Quebec - federally or provincially.

2.2 Post-1896 - The Period of Liberal Domination

The Liberals dominated Quebec after 1896. Provincially, after defeating the Conservatives in 1897, the Liberals remained in office for thirty-nine years. Federally, the Liberals won a majority of Quebec seats in every election from 1891 to 1957.

Just as the Parti National sprung up because of strong dissatisfaction with the Conservatives, a second dissident movement, les Nationalistes, sprang up against the Liberals in the early 1900s. This group was dissatisfied with Laurier's support for the Boer War and his decision to build a Canadian navy. Led by Henri Bourassa, a former Liberal MP, the Nationaliste movement contributed to the downfall of the Laurier government by winning

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[14] The Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian Federation, 1980, p.12.

[15] I use the term "English Canada" very loosely. I doubt one can honestly draw many similarities between, say, Ontario and British Columbia, or Alberta and Newfoundland, except for the fact that these are English-speaking provinces. This fact is acknowledged throughout.

[16] Honoré Mercier's impact on federal and provincial elections is well described in Bernard L. Vigod, Quebec Before Duplessis: The Political Career of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986); and P.A. Linteau, René Durocher and J.C. Robert, Histoire du Québec contemporain: De la Confédération à la crise 1867-1929, (Montréal: Boréal Express, 1979).

twenty-seven Quebec seats in the 1911 election.

A certain logic shows why the Liberals retained voter support after 1896. By that time, the party had shed its anti-clerical tendencies. As well, Laurier had achieved a rapprôchement with the church and transformed his party into a moderate, reformist group, along the lines of Gladstone's Liberals in Britain.[17] The issue of provincial autonomy also contributed to Liberal successes. Liberals and Conservatives were guided by the principle that provincial rights had to be respected under the BNA Act. However, from 1867, the Liberals were the more supportive of provincial privileges. No greater test of this existed than the Manitoba schools question of 1890. That year, Manitoba passed legislation eliminating public support for Catholic and French schools and eliminated the use of French in its legislature and courts. This, as well as the 1912 decision to suppress French schools in Ontario, solidified attitudes in Quebec that English Canadian public opinion was anti-French and anti-Catholic. The 1917 conscription crisis, too, set apart French and English Canadians. A coalition government between Conservative Robert Borden and English-speaking Liberals formed in support of the issue. Where Laurier's Liberals had earlier fallen into discontent over the Boer War, the conscription issue was a near-final blow to the Conservatives in Quebec. Laurier won back Quebec support by taking a stand against conscription. To the average Quebec voter, the Liberal party became the strongest defence against Canada's involvement in "imperialist ventures", particularly under Mackenzie King. The Quebec experience up to 1917 shows the determined zeal of the Québécois in supporting any party or movement sympathizing with their interests as a cultural group. Though Quebecers generally supported the two major parties, when they were convinced that their interests were not adequately defended, they shifted their support to nationalist movements whose leaders

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[17] Laurier's commitment to the principles of English liberalism was affirmed in his famous speech made in Quebec City in 1877 on "Political Liberalism".

aggressively pledged to oppose threats to traditional ways of life. This portrays defensive rather than expansionist Quebec nationalism,[18] which concerns itself with the maintenance of existing rights and interests rather than an extension of the influence and attitudes of the group to other peoples and areas.

2.3 A Modern Economy and Nationalist Opposition

Modern Quebec is the result of a diverse spectrum of movements and ideas. Specifically, its roots stem from massive economic changes which overtook the province early in the twentieth century. Radical changes to the traditional economy led to the development of a second form of Quebec nationalism in the inter-war years. To traditional French Canadian interests, economic development emphasized the threat of rapid industrialization and foreign investment pursued by successive Liberal régimes. Such industrialism created absentee ownership and partially devastated the old rural society whose maintenance had always been considered essential for cultural survival.

When the Liberals came to power just before the turn of the century, Quebec conformed closely to the ideal rural and agrarian society favoured by the church.[19] Manufacturing was integrally related to the farm economy and undertaken in small establishments with little capital and few workers. Two convictions, held by successive Liberal administrations from 1897 to 1936, shaped the role the party was to play in transforming Quebec into a modern capitalist economy. Contrasting the idealization of the rural life found among the clerics and intelligentsia, Liberals believed that prosperity

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[18] There have been a number of individual nationalists, however, who have put forward the idea that French Canada has a "divine mission" to spread French Catholic culture in North America. A political example was Alliance Laurentienne (1957). See also, for example, Bonenfant and Falardeau, "Cultural and Political Implications of French Canadian Nationalism", Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1946, pp.65-66.

[19] A good account of rural Quebec is Serge Courville and Normand Séguin, Rural Life in Nineteenth-Century Quebec, (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1989).

depended upon timber, mineral and hydro-electric resource extraction, as well as the rapid development of manufacturing. Second, Liberal governments were convinced that these were tasks of private, not public, enterprise. The Liberals had shed their anti-clerical nature in the nineteenth century, but retained the open economic principles of nineteenth century liberalism.

Since the pattern of landholding was one of diffuse ownership among small farmers with large families, the stability of the system could only be maintained by farm inheritance. To nurture this system, an ever-expanding geographical base was required to absorb surplus populations. When arable land became scarce, this social system became acutely vulnerable and led to urbanization. Guindon discusses this:

> Structural relief could only consist in industrialization, which is the one thing the traditional elite could not deliver since it had not been primarily an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and lacked capital.[20]

Rural Quebec lacked investment capital. Consequently, the Liberals encouraged private foreign and English-Canadian businesses to undertake development of state resources and manufacturing through such means as the enacting of legislation giving private enterprise monopoly control over Montreal's public utilities.[21]

The Louis-Alexandre Taschereau administration of 1920-36 spearheaded Quebec's industrialization. Taschereau's ideology was similar to President Herbert Hoover's in the early 1930s. He was convinced that economic prosperity was solely dependent on rapid private industrial development. In fact, the Taschereau government extended and intensified traditional Liberal policies of land grants, tax exemptions and other concessions to foreign capital interested in utilizing Quebec's resources or in opening up the manufacturing sector. The hydro-electric industry, for example, enjoyed great freedoms to develop "in an

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[20] Hubert Guindon, "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, class, and Ethnic Tension", in Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood, p.46.

[21] There was considerable interest, however, in municipal ownership of such utilities. See C. Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Monopoly's Moment: The Organization and Regulation of Canadian Utilities, 1830-1930, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986).

environment of unfettered private enterprise that public utilities seldom enjoy".[22] Taschereau maintained taxes at the lowest possible level and avoided social legislation because it increased financial burdens and state paternalism. By the early 1930s, Quebec was transformed into a predominantly industrial society. An important characteristic was the concentration of monopoly ownership and control in certain industries. The economic benefits that flowed from the newly-structured economy were overshadowed by difficulties in maintaining the values of traditional Quebec society. Industrialization brought mass urbanization, which destroyed the static, rural society whose maintenance was considered essential for cultural survival. Urbanization radically transformed the nature and function of the family and parish (two primal institutions of Quebec society). Quinn states:

> the most serious effect of industrialization from the point of view of the Church was that it presented a threat to the religiously oriented scale of values of the old peasant society. The industrialists brought with them, not only their language, but also the secular value system of the English-speaking world with its emphasis on material well-being as against the primacy of the spiritual. Inspired by the principles of economic liberalism, they also brought the idea of a self-regulating economic order divorced from all ethical considerations.[23]

Industrialization also subordinated the French Canadian. Foreigners and English-Canadians increasingly controlled Quebec industry and conducted operations almost exclusively in English. Thus, the economic status of most French Canadians changed from land-owning proprietors or skilled artisans to wage earners working for an alien employer. Increased financial security brought the Québécois a loss of cultural security.

Opposition to industrialization came initially from two sources: La Ligue d'Action Française (nationalist intellectuals), and certain Catholic Action organizations. L'Action Française was formed by followers of Henri Bourassa during the First World War. At its

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[22] J.H. Dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development: Quebec, 1898-1940 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p.30.

[23] See Quinn, The Union Nationale, p.35.

formation, it had the limited objective of promoting the use of French and defending French minority language rights in English Canada. After the war, however, L'Action Française expanded its objectives, emerging as a full-fledged nationalist movement determined to defend the traditional rights of the French Canadians as a cultural group.[24] The movement's most outstanding figure was Abbé Lionel Groulx, whose philosophy greatly influenced Quebec for three decades. Guindon defines the relationship between Groulx and the Quiet Revolution:

> Many of the current themes of political concern are to be explicitly found in his writings. Ambivalence towards foreign capitalists and unions, indignation at the handing over of natural resources to foreign investors, the lack of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, the positive role of the state, the lack of proper academic training for the world of business, the "binational" theory of Confederation...[25]

L'Action Française never became affiliated with a political party, but it became the most important movement in the formation and development of a Québécois nationalist ideology. This movement differed from others in its awareness of the serious nature of the economic problem. First, opposition to industrialism arose, on the most part, because of its urbanizing effects. In fact, there was a soon-forgotten attempt to organize a back-to-the-land and colonization movement. Second, opposition revolved around the French Canadian's reduction to simple wage earner. To the nationalists the greater participation of the Québécois in the economic development of their province was a matter of social justice. Like many Quebec movements, L'Action Française declined because of schisms from within, particularly on the steps to be taken to reclaim Quebec's economy for its citizens. Concurrent with widespread disagreements between group members on the solution to the economic problem, L'Action Française lost its power as a nationalist movement because it refused to undertake a

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[24] The group was originally called *La Ligue des Droits du Français*, but changed its name to *La Ligue d'Action Française* in 1918. In 1932 the group became known as *L'Action Nationale*. For a detailed description of the writings of l'Action française and Action nationale, see Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, Action française: French-Canadian Nationalism in the Twenties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

[25] Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, social class, and Quebec's bureaucratic revolution", in Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity and Nationhood, p.32.

sweeping program of socialization, which would have taken the wealth of the province out of the hands of the English and placed it under the auspices of the provincial government.[26] Rejection of this initiative stemmed from opposition within the movement to the concept of government ownership in general. Widespread socialization was contrary to the Catholic social philosophy to which this group adhered and which it tended to interpret in a rather conservative fashion.[27] By and large, however, Quebec nationalist leaders of the 1920s (with the exception of Henri Bourassa) were not so much opposed to capitalism but to large scale English and American capitalism.

Typical French Canadians showed no interest in the ideas of L'Action Française and the Catholic Action groups because the "new economy" provided greater opportunities for employment and a higher income. Greater attention was paid to the nationalists, however, with the advent of the depression in 1929. Ready acceptance of the nationalist ideology was not difficult for the average French Canadian once he awakened to the fact that the ownership and control of the economic system, which was the cause of his hardships, was concentrated in the hands of foreign industrialists. Resentment against capitalism became coupled with antagonism against the English who dominated it.

After 1930, anti-English sentiment grew rapidly and "Quebec for the French Canadians" became the slogan of the day. Anti-English feeling was widespread among the working classes who depended on an alien employer who in many cases maintained his profit margin by drastically cutting wages.[28] Nationalistic sentiments were also found among the

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[26] The various solutions to the problem of industrialism proposed by various members of *L'Action Française* between 1921 and 1928 are outlined in Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1945, Revised Edition, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1968), pp.878-90.

[27] It seems that most of the nationalists of this time, unlike Bourassa, seemed unaware that the Church, while attacking the socio-economic doctrines of socialism, also rejected economic liberalism.

[28] For good examples of this see Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (Ottawa, 1937), p.118. Similar examples of such exploitation are to be found in chapter v of the Report.

small merchants who were less able than their large English competitors to withstand the impact of sharp reductions in sales. In reaction, they organized the L'Achat Chez Nous movement, which supported locally manufactured goods. A third sector of the Quebec population strongly influenced by the nationalists was its youth. Many nationalist leagues formed in the 1930s had the same intrinsic characteristics: they were anti-English and anti-trust, they glorified the French-Canadian race, and they were more often than not tinged with anti-Semitism.[29] These organizations were extremely vocal and attracted public attention, but their influence was limited, their membership small and none of them lasted very long. Paralleling the nationalistic overtures of these organizations was their mutual distrust of the Quebec Liberals. Nationalists felt the Liberals had betrayed Quebec's true interests by their policy of industrial concessions and grants. As long as the economy was prosperous, the Liberals could ignore this opposition. When the breakdown of the economic system resulted in widespread economic hardship and the growth of the nationalist ideology, however, the Liberal position weakened. They were now confronted by demands that the government alleviate economic unrest by curbing the power of the foreign industrialists and by returning Quebec's natural resources to the French people.

Economic hardship, ironically, temporarily brought the government back into line with mainstream nationalist thought. For a party which had done so much to foster industrialization, the Liberals advocated a back-to-the-land movement as the best solution for unemployment and to relieve pressure on relief rolls in the cities.[30] This was strongly supported by nationalists and the church. In co-operation with the clergy, the government embarked upon an ambitious colonization program involving subsidies and assistance to those

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[29] While one should not overplay the relationship between Quebec nationalism and anti-Semitism, it is a source of contention for certain authors such as Mordecai Richler. See Richler, Oh Canada, Oh Quebec: Requim for a Divided Nation, (Toronto: Penguin, 1992).

[30] See Speech from the Throne, 1931-32 Session, Canadian Annual Review, 1932, p.170.

individuals who could be induced to take up farming in the undeveloped Quebec hinterland. The government also spent large sums building public infrastructures in these areas.

In spite of these measures, the government failed to alleviate economic hardship. Obviously these hardships were largely the result of the world-wide breakdown of the economic system. The Liberal administration failed because its laissez-faire philosophy made it reluctant to intervene in the economy and enact reforms which might have improved social conditions. The large sums spent on the back-to-the-land movement did little to ease urban unemployment. Perhaps, most important of all, the Liberal Party's close ties with the industrialists made it unwilling to adopt the vigorous measures demanded by the nationalists to curtail the dominant role played by foreign capital in the economy. Subsequently, resentment against the economic system became directed against the English-speaking capitalists and Taschereau Liberals. More importantly, the government was characterized by nepotism, excessive use of patronage and corruption. The result was that all the various groups opposed to the policies of the régime formed a coalition, just previous to the election of 1935, and launched a new movement, the Union Nationale, to drive the Liberals from office.

2.4 The Formation of the Union Nationale

Like the Parti québécois, the Union Nationale had its origin in a revolt which began in the Liberal Party. In the 1930s, left-wing Liberals (L'Action Libérale Nationale) became dissatisfied with the party's conservative economics; the group's leader, Paul Gouin, was greatly influenced by the nationalism of Bourassa, Groulx and L'Action Nationale (Française). The original plan of the ALN was to reform the Liberal Party by forcing a shift to the left and adopting a more nationalistic philosophy. In 1935, however, the futility of trying to reform the Liberals and wrest control from its ruling oligarchy convined the ALN to sever its ties with the party.

At its launching in 1934, the ALN was met favourably by the population, including the influential L'Action Nationale[31] and the Catholic Action Groups, because its ideology conformed with the nationalist thought then sweeping Quebec. In a province where voting loyalties were inherited with the farm, the Liberals were the traditional ruling party. The ALN sought to correct its lack of political experience by seeking an alliance with another group equally opposed to the Liberals, but with more influence and a better organization. The provincial Conservatives best suited these requirements and had been attempting to dissociate themselves from their federal cousins since the 1920s. Their leader, Arthur Sauvé, adopted most of the ideas of Groulx's movement and L'Action Française and gave his party a revised orientation. For example, Sauvé was critical of the role of foreign capital and attacked the Liberals' generous business concessions. Dirks observes the 1935 Conservative platform, which contradicted the party's traditional support for laissez-faire capitalism:

> This platform, adopted at the 1933 Sherbrooke convention, bore a marked resemblance to the program of the École sociale populaire (and thus to the ALN's program as well). Conservative leaders had doubts about its proposed increases in social legislation and suggested attacks on the trusts, and they were reluctant to give it prominence.[32]

Sauvé and his party only partially succeeded in disengaging themselves from the federal Conservatives. While winning the support of Le Devoir and L'Action Catholique, Sauvé was unable to convince voters that his party was independent of the federal organization and this was an important factor in the Liberal victory over the Conservatives in 1927. Quebec Conservatives still contained a strong right-wing which remained allied with the federal Conservatives. Attacking this group in 1927, Sauvé said "une fraction du parti conservateur fédéral a toujours été hostile à ma direction. On m'accuse de nationalism. Le

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[31] L'Action Nationale espoused a philosophy that combined radical nationalism with a conservative interpretation of Catholic social and economic thought. By far the best analysis of this movement is found in Patricia Dirks, The Failure of L'Action Libérale Nationale, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).

[32] Dirks, The Failure of the L'Action Libérale Nationale, p.56.

nationalisme que j'ai prêché et pratiqué est celui de Cartier, c'est le conservatisme intégral et foncièrement national."[33] Camillien Houde, successor to Sauvé, followed the same line of attack in 1931, accusing the Liberals of turning over the natural resources and wealth of the province to foreign capitalists. His platform consisted of a number of social reforms which the trade unions and farmers' organizations had been demanding: government pensions, reductions in electricity rates, intensified colonization and low-cost rural credit. After defeat at the hands of the Liberals in 1931, Houde resigned.

Maurice Duplessis was elected leader of the Quebec Conservatives in 1933. Duplessis' ideology differed from Sauvé and Houde in that, while being a nationalist, he was not a radical. His main objective was to defeat the Taschereau government. Realizing that the Conservatives were in a poor position, Duplessis saw advantages in an alliance with a group such as L'Action Libérale Nationale. As a result, Duplessis and Gouin formed a coalition, the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin. Duplessis' economic conservatism was only fully understood after the Union Nationale's victory over the Liberals in 1936.

An important component of the UN was the nature of its program. It was significant in two respects: for the first time, a political movement presented the Quebec electorate with a comprehensive set of proposals for reform. Second, the program laid down the basic principles which all reform movements in Quebec followed in the next decade or so. In the past, critics of foreign industrialism never formulated any concrete program of reform; their critique of the system was stronger than any suggestions or policies for its transformation. The social reform element within the Union Nationale found its strongest support in Paul Gouin. Upon founding the ALN, Gouin adopted the proposals put forward by the École Sociale Populaire in its 1933 pamphlet "Le Programme de restauration sociale",

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[33] Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la Province de Québec, XXIX, Vers l'âge d'or (Montréal, 1956), p.98.

which called for rural reconstruction, curbs on the power of public utilities and other large businesses; and the elimination of patronage and corruption.[34] Gouin insisted that Duplessis accept the complete program. In fact, the party's joint statement announced:

> Après la défaite du régime anti-national et trustard de M. Taschereau, le parti conservateur provincial et L'Action Libérale Nationale formeront un gouvernement national dont le programme sera celui de L'Action Libérale Nationale, programme qui s'inspire des mêmes principes que celui du parti conservateur provincial.[35]

The program of the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin of 1935 advocated numerous reforms, affecting almost every area of Quebec life.[36] The comprehensive program indicates the wide extent of the economic, poitical and social changes which the party proposed to introduce and demonstrates the assumptions and basic principles underlying the approach of the nationalists and the church in the 1930s to the question of social reform. Some assumptions included the idealization of the rural way of life; an avowal to break the domination of foreign capital over the economy; and attempts to forge a middle path between laissez-faire capitalism and socialism, with the goal of redistributing private property, not eliminating it.[37]

The Union Nationale's greatest strength was the wide level of support it gained from Catholic trade unions, farm organizations, co-operatives and credit unions, youth organizations and associations of French Canadian businessmen and merchants. These ardently nationalistic organizations opposed Liberal industrial policy and the new movement

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[34] A. Rioux, et al., Le Programme de restauration sociale (Montreal, 1933). See L'École sociale populaire, Pour la restauration sociale au Canada (Montréal: L'École sociale populaire, 1933).

[35] Le Devoir, November 8, 1935.

[36] Reforms included economic, social, political, electoral, agricultural and more. This program first appeared in Le Devoir, 28 July 1924, when it was the program of the ALN. A few weeks later, Gouin delivered a speech in the town of St Georges de Beauce in which he provided further amplification and explanation of his proposals.

[37] Gouin's ideas resembled somewhat the principles of Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States. The primary difference was the emphasis placed by Gouin on the agrarian sector.

had the enthusiastic backing of L'Action Nationale and Le Devoir.

2.5 The First Union Nationale Administration

The Taschereau Liberals controlled the machinery of government and directly influenced control over the public purse and patronage. The absence of a non-partisan, competitive system for the selection of governmental personnel left the way open for abuse. The Liberals held a further advantage in that their huge majority enabled them to manipulate the electorate and handicap the opposition.

The Liberals had never shown much support for the Ecole Sociale Populaire program,[38] but Taschereau, recognizing vast opposition to his policies, did promise to introduce old age pensions and low-cost farm credit. The government also embarked on an extensive public works program, providing local economies with temporary employment and sizeable orders for their goods, putting the government in the position of "benefactor". Taking few chances on electoral victory, the length to which the Liberals went to influence the outcome of the 1935 election and ensure their reelection is emphasized by Herbert Quinn:

> When the polls opened it soon became apparent that the names of many voters who were known to be opponents of the regime had been left off the voting lists. At the same time hundreds or even thousands of fictitious names might have been added to these lists in a particular electoral district. Impersonation of voters, or "telegraphing", was carried out on a large scale, and in certain polls where the party might be expected to do poorly some of the ballot boxes disappeared altogether. In several constituencies "strong arm" squads went from poll to poll intimidating voters, and then proceeded to smash up the committee rooms of the opposition.[39]

Despite its disadvantaged position, the Duplessis-Gouin combination captured forty-two seats, nearly four times the number held by the Conservative opposition in the

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[38] When the program first appeared, Olivar Asselin, a prominent Liberal, stated that "It bears a greater resemblance to a 'bleu' (Conservative Party) pamphlet than to a work of social apostolacy." Montreal Gazette, November 21, 1933.

[39] Quinn, The Union Nationale, p.64.

previous legislature. The Liberals, with forty-eight members, maintained a majority. The downfall of the Taschereau regime began in 1936 with the combination of Duplessis' command of parliamentary rules to hold up the budget process, and the Union Nationale's attacks, through the usually dormant Public Accounts Committee, on the government's misappropriation of funds. The revelations of the Public Accounts Committee completely discredited the Taschereau administration. Early in June, 1936 Taschereau resigned and was replaced by Adelard Godbout, who appointed only four members from the previous government. The 1936 election was fought between two parties with largely similar policies in that Godbout, cognizant of the wide-dissatisfaction with Liberal economic and social policy, set up a similar program to the Union Nationale.

One major policy similarity was the fight for the rural vote. Godbout's interest in emphasizing the farming sector in party policy was strategically-based. Although Quebec was becoming increasingly urban, the rural vote was still decisive. The distorted nature of the electoral system gave rural areas approximately 63 percent of the seats in spite of the fact that by 1931 only 37 percent of the electorate lived in rural districts.[40] The rural voter, according to Quinn, fascinated Duplessis, in that he still idealized the rural way of life and looked upon the farmer as the most stable, industrious, and law-abiding social type, "the true French Canadian".[41]

By 1936, Duplessis firmly guided the Union Nationale. The radicals in the party played a key role in the UN's victory, but Duplessis curbed their influence by leaving the most influential of their number, Philippe Hamel and J.E. Grégoire, out of cabinet. A short time later Hamel, Grégoire and René Chaloult broke away from the party, soon followed by

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[40] In 1936 there were 90 seats in the legislature. They are listed in Quebec Legislative Assembly, Report on the General Election of 1936 (Quebec, 1936), Appendix I, pp. 3-4. According to 1931 census figures, 57 of these districts were rural. See Census of Canada, 1931 (Ottawa), II, Table 16.

[41] Quinn, The Union Nationale, p.79

Oscar Drouin and other leading figures. From this time forward, Duplessis' leadership was not questioned. Gouin quit the coalition in 1936, convinced that Duplessis was trying to usurp control of the party away from its coalition-style leadership. Most of Gouin's supporters, however, reaffirmed their confidence in Duplessis and this support was an asset to him. The remnants of the ALN core concentrated their attack on the trusts and their English owners; Duplessis concentrated on attacking Liberal corruption.

The opposition refused to absolve Godbout and his party of the crimes of the previous administration. Duplessis vowed to make a clean sweep of the whole administration and to end corruption and the squandering of public money. While some reforms were made in 1936 to eliminate the abuses of corruption, after 1944, when the party won its second term in office, "it began to pursue", says Quinn, " a systematic policy of using its control over the administration and the legislature for partisan purposes in an even more compelling fashion than had been used under the old Taschereau administration".[42] The Union Nationale's level of patronage and corruption easily surpassed that of previous regimes; however, its goals were different. To use the characterization of Vincent Lemieux and Raymond Hudon, UN patronage was guided more by a simple concern with securing the greatest number of votes possible. It was less likely than the Liberals to fall into the excesses of nepotism and favouritism. By the same token it was less restricted to members of the party and more open to the electorate as a whole.[43]

The Union Nationale's economic policy was markedly similar to the Liberals under Taschereau, and was based on the conviction that individual initiative and private enterprise were progressive forces whose full freedom to develop and expand were essential for

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[42] Ibid, p. 131.

[43] Vincent Lemieux et Raymond Hudon, Patronage et Politique au Québec, 1944-1972 (Sillery, Québec: Les Éditions du Boréal Express, 1975), Chapter v.

prosperity. Union Nationale economic policy was resolutely non-interventionist;[44] public ownership of industry was absolutely rejected as socialistic. Also, like Taschereau, Duplessis believed that the well-being of the people depended upon the exploitation of natural resources and the expansion of manufacturing.

By 1939, Duplessis had extricated radical elements from the party platform. Since the Union Nationale was elected on the basis of reform, this was a factor in its defeat at the polls in that year's election. On the contrary, however, McRoberts believes that the Liberals regained control of the government in 1939 on the conscription issue:

> ...it could be argued that the Union Nationale lost the election of 1939 because at this point the Liberals had been able to define a more effective position on the issue of conscription: the leading French Canadian members of the federal government had threatened to resign unless the provincial Liberals were elected.[45]

This rejection by the voters did not bring about any fundamental change to Duplessis' economic policies, and subsequent Union Nationale administrations, from 1944, moved even further to the right.

2.6 The Union Nationale, 1944-1959

Union Nationale regimes resisted state-building. Rapid industrialization and urbanization were not accompanied by a marked expansion of government activity or the development of a significant bureaucracy.[46] Further, opposition to expanding government activity led the UN to entice private interests to undertake development projects on behalf of

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[44] For a good overview of post-Taschereau economic policy, see Claude Jean Galipeau, "Le Contre-Courant Québécois", in Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett (eds.), The Provincial State: Politics in Canada's Provinces and Territories, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1992), pp.115-45.

[45] Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 3rd ed., (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1988), p.118.

[46] Among the published analyses of Quebec government activities over this period are: Jean-Guy Genest, "Aspects de l'administration Duplessis", Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, 25 (décembre, 1971), pp. 389-91; Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), chapter v; Gérard Boismenu, le Duplessisme: politique économique et rapports de force, 1944-1960 (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1981).

the Quebec state.[47]

It is important to note Duplessis' opposition to bureaucratic growth. Even though ideologically neutral, the theme was becoming increasingly irrelevant structurally. Because the growth of semi-bureaucratic structures (the Tremblay Commission) and needed seaway, railway and road construction required greatly increased amounts of public money, Duplessis refused to meet the demands of the new-middle class, which developed, in the 1950s, in response to industrialization and urbanization. Therefore, Duplessis and the Union Nationale were clearly resented by this segment of the population.

In the intergovernmental relations sphere, the elections of 1948, 1952 and 1956 all showed the Union Nationale's cogent position on the question of autonomy. Claiming that the federal government was seeking to invade Quebec jurisdictions to pursue assimilationist goals, Duplessis argued that only Quebec could defend Quebec's autonomy. Though the UN's focal point in election campaigns was the economy and public works,[48] it also exploited Québécois nationalism, adopting a Quebec flag and demanding consultation in the choice of a new Lieutenant-Governor.[49] Quebec's relations with Ottawa were indicative of the Union Nationale's aversion to state growth. Normally, Quebec pursued a defensive ("fortress nationalism") strategy seeking to block federal initiatives, which it saw as invasions of provincial jurisdiction, even if it meant a loss of revenues. Quebec nationalists of earlier eras had always argued that the proliferation of specialized and fragmented intergovernmental relationships, such as cost-sharing arrangements, threatened the integrity of the Quebec state.

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[47] See Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 585-7. On one occasion, after being approached by Alcan Aluminim to provide state assistance for a development project, Duplessis turned the Company down, only to find them go to British Columbia to receive massive provincial assistance for development at Kitimat.

[48] Kenneth McRoberts has thoroughly researched Union National election campaigns in "Mass Acquisition of a Nationalist Ideology: Quebec Prior to the Quiet Revolution" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago), 1975, chapter x.

[49] A good description of symbolic nationalism of the Duplessis Union Nationale is found in Black, Duplessis, pp.449-55.

Quebec nationalists have long-opposed co-operative federalism for this reason.[50] UN regimes, however, went further; while resisting state-building, they were notorious for not exploiting these initiatives themselves. For instance, Quebec did not participate in most cost sharing programs and forbade private institutions under its control to accept federal grants; this policy made Quebec lose approximately $82 million in federal funds in 1959.[51]

Aside from the introduction of income tax in the mid-1950s, in conjunction with Ottawa, Duplessis' approach to federal-provincial relations was not innovative. In many matters, he echoed the policies of his predecessors such as Mercier and Taschereau. The basic argument the UN used for its defence of provincial jurisdictions was the "compact theory" of Confederation, propounded by Honoré Mercier in the 1880s, which interpreted federalism as a compact between two nations. Moreover, like Taschereau, the UN did not have confidence in federal initiatives and refused to endorse them. In the 1948 election, for example, Duplessis consistently asserted this theme to justify his policies:

> The legislature of Quebec is a fortress that we must defend without failing. It is that which permits us to construct the schools which suit us, to speak our language, to practise our religion and to make laws applicable to our population.[52]

"The Duplessis administration", argues McRoberts, "approached federal-provincial relations in largely the same fashion as preceeding governments because it shared the same assumptions about the role of the provincial government in Quebec's social and economic life."[53] As Garth Stevenson notes, Duplessis' "policy of using every opportunity to extend

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[50] See for example, Jean-Marc Léger, "Le Fédéralisme co-operatif ou le nouveau visage de la centralisation", in Peter Meekison, Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, 1st edition (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), pp. 317-20; and Claude Morin, Quebec versus Ottawa: The Struggle for Self Government, 1960-1972 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).

[51] See Donald Smiley, "Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945, Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, No. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).

[52] See Quinn, The Union Nationale, pp.117-8.

[53] McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp.125-6.

the Quebec government's autonomy has been continued without much change by his successors of all parties".[54] Though it appears that today's Quebec governments are more demanding than previous ones, pre-1960 Liberal and UN administrations shared an affinity to fortress nationalism and attempted to exact the maximum level of autonomy from Ottawa.

Duplessis' last government was elected in 1956. His victory in this campaign showed the strength of force, in Quebec, of non-fragmented parties, as well as the strength of the Union Nationale election machine. The fragmented opposition included the Liberals (led by Georges-Emile Lapalme), the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, the Labour Progressive Party, independent nationalists, and other independents. Lapalme, who had led the Liberals since 1952, attempted to introduce democratic practices within the then fragmented party.

After the death of Duplessis in 1959, the leadership of the UN passed to Paul Sauvé and, after his death three months later, Antonio Barrette. Scholars, like Hubert Guindon, posit that the Quiet Revolution began under the leadership of Paul Sauvé. Where Duplessis failed, Sauvé succeeded, because he increased grants to universities, implemented hospital insurance and increased salaries to civil servants. As a result, in Guindon's words, Sauve immediately got "the emotional endorsement of the new middle class".[55]

2.7 Conclusion

The next chapter is an overview of the post-1959 Liberal and Union Nationale administrations. Chapter 4 looks at the rise of the Parti québécois and its government policy outputs from 1976-1985. In conclusion, Chapter 5 completes the policy convergence argument by reviewing the findings of the previous chapters and enveloping the analysis into a way of looking at future Quebec-federal relations and nation building.

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[54] Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1982), p. 136.

[55] Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution", in Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood, p.30.

Chapter Three

The Liberal and Union Nationale Administrations

3.1 The Quiet Revolution - An Introduction

This chapter profiles post-1960 Liberal and Union Nationale administrations and posits that inter-party convergence is clearly evident in constitutional policy, language policy and state-centered economic development policy.

In 1960, the Lesage Liberals instituted reforms which moved beyond the foundations of the 1959 Quiet Revolution. These reforms were centred on statism; the increased role of the state in replacing traditional authorities and expanding into economic activities, social services and education. Between 1959 and 1970, Quebec government expenditures per capita rose, in real terms, by over 200 percent,[1] the bureaucracy expanded from 32,000 to nearly 70,000 employees[2] and Quebec's investment in education tripled - reaching $1.3 billion.[3]

Given the perceived constraints of federalism at the time, Quebecers saw Quebec as the only government with a mandate to implement reform. Scholars like Kenneth McRoberts see post-1960 reforms as bureaucratic, seeking a high degree of state-initiated political integration and centralization, institutionalized by government control.[4] Liberal reforms were centred on parallel movements between Quebec's economy and the structural features of developed industrial societies, as well as the growth of elite-building as a state function. International capitalism did mold the Quebec economy, but the Lesage government directly advanced Quebec's internal congruence with these external influences. The role of elites, to a

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[1] Obtained from data in André Blais and Kenneth McRoberts, "Public Expenditure in Ontario and Quebec, 1950-1980: Explaining the Differences", Journal of Canadian Studies 18:1 (Spring 1983): p.30.

[2] James I. Gow, "Modernisation et administration publique", in Edmond Orban et al., La modernisation politique du Québec (Montréal: Éditions du Boréal Express, 1976), p.165.

[3] Ministère de l'Éducation du Québec, Livre vert: L'enseignment primaire et secondaire au Québec (Québec: MEQ, 1977), p.4.

[4] Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 3rd ed., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), p.137.

large degree, was to shape, implement and enforce public policy. The countervailing power to the state was the professional association for the elites and the unions for the organized workers. The structural basis for the eclipse of the rural and backward community in modern Quebec began in this way. French Canadian intellectual advocates of modernization sought a "rattrapage" or catching-up ideology through modernization and, according to Stephen Brooks and Alain Gagnon, used the provincial state as the "moteur principal" of reform.[5]

The Lesage Liberals based their political strength on the support of the "new" politically aroused and vocal middle class. Guindon identifies the linkages between the Liberals and this class in terms of the nucleus of the party's political support, the choice of competent administrative personnel in the civil service, and the nature of its legislative reforms.[6] Linkages between the new middle class, the Lesage Liberals and the Parti québécois are unmistakable. These governments derived a disproportionate amount of their electoral support from this class and adopted policies beneficial to it.[7]

The new middle class concept is fundamental to the three primary schools of thought concerning the Quiet Revolution. The first recognizes the divergence between pre-1960 and post-1960 Quebec, but rejects the notion that Quebec alone is to be singled out for an "interventionist state ethic", or that elements of this state growth were even a radical departure from the past.[8] Scholars such as Daniel Latouche, who assess policy and

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[5] Stephen Brooks and Alain G. Gagnon, "Politics and the Social Sciences in Canada", in Alain G. Gagnon and James Bickerton (eds.), Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1990), p.48.

[6] Hubert Guindon, "Social unrest, social class, and Quebec's bureaucratic revolution, in Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity and Nationhood, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p.31.

[7] Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Parti Québécois Comes to Power", Canadian Journal of Political Science 11:4 (1978); Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism", Journal of Political Economy 72 (1964), pp.376-86.

[8] See, for example, Robert Finbow, "The State Agenda in Quebec and Ontario, 1960-1980", Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 117-35. Other useful readings are Gary Caldwell and B. Dan Czarnocki, "Un rattrapage raté: Le changement sociale dans le Québec d'après-guerre, 1950-1974: Une comparison Québec/Ontario", Recherches socio-graphiques, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter, 1977); and Marsha A. Chandler and William M. Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979).

legislative typologies of Quebec and other governments, posit that similar orientations have occured in other jurisdictions. They contend that the Lesage government did not radically depart from the past and its spending was largely similar to the Union Nationale. In fact, Latouche argues that massive spending and interventionist initiatives took place in the 1945-50 period.[9] A second school posits that the Québécois social scientists who replaced the traditional intellectuals articulated a view that expressed the ascendant interests of the new middle-class. In their estimation, the new middle-class gave birth to the Quiet Revolution. This view is the best grounded in contemporary scholarship.[10]

A third view, emphasized by William Coleman and Dorval Brunelle,[11] states that the new middle-class was not the catalyst but, rather, the product of the Quiet Revolution. Coleman views the post-war transition to monopoly capitalism as accelerating the integration of Francophone society into the North American mainstream. A coalition of classes, comprising a threatened Francophone bourgeoisie, organized labour and elements of the traditional middle class responded by developing an interventionist, secular, Francophone-controlled Quebec state. After the breakdown of the coalition in the mid-1960s, the resulting confusion, it is thought, created the social and ideological conditions for the emergence of the contemporary independence movement. Coleman states that "if one examines closely Quebec's institutions at the end of the 1950s, one finds little evidence of individuals having positions in society that would form the structural base for a new middle class."[12]

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[9] Daniel Latouche, "La vraie nature de... La Révolution tranquille", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September 1974), p.533.

[10] Proponents include McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 1988., Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, xxvi (November, 1960), pp.553-61.; and Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study", Queen's Quarterly, lxxii (Spring 1965), pp.150-68.

[11] Coleman is quick to dissociate his work from Brunelle, but both views are similar. See William Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec, 1945-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); Dorval Brunelle, La désillusion tranquile (Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1978); and Gilles Bourque and Anne Legaré, Le Québec: La question nationale (Paris: Maspéro, 1979).

[12] See Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980, p.7.

The new-found nationalism reinforced the identification of French Canada with Quebec. Therefore, this gave rise to the 1963 Liberal campaign slogan, "Maîtres chez nous".

English Canadians first saw the Quiet Revolution as a Quebec attempt at economic integration; later they saw it as a series of assaults on federalism. Perhaps the backwardness of the Duplessis era led to the contention that Quebec just desired to catch up. Duplessis' successor, Paul Sauvé, however, launched a surprise affront to status quo federalism with his "désormais" (from now on) speech.[13] Later, Jean Lesage presented a "positive autonomy" approach to intergovernmental relations, which directly contrasted Duplessis' defensive posturings. For these reasons the Quebec government became directly involved in measures such as statutory grants to universities, a royal commission on free hospitalization, a revised civil servant pay scale, state-financed education and professionalized welfare. In other words, the aspirations of the new middle class and the growth and development of the institutions they staffed became the political priorities of the Quebec state.

3.2 Constitutional Convergence

3.2a Liberal Constitutional Initiatives, 1960-1966

The Lesage administration can be considered very reformist in nature and was willing to risk entangling relationships with Ottawa to enhance Quebec's status. From 1964, particularly, Quebec assumed a special status rather than just simply claiming autonomy.[14] By establishing new agencies, it took over responsibilities that the federal government could not then easily occupy (through a Ministry of Family and Social Work, for example), while risking continued new conflict. Quebec also championed special program, policy and

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[13] A good description of this is found in Graham Fraser, PQ: René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1984), p.23.

[14] For an excellent study of this era, see Gérard Bergeron, "The Québécois State Under Canadian Federalism", in Michael D. Behiels (ed.), Quebec Since 1945 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 1987), esp. p.180.

constitutional arrangements in order to increase and consolidate its resources and responsibilities. In sum, Gagnon states, under Lesage, "Quebec sought recognition of its special status".[15] At that time, with respect to the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine of provincial autonomy,[16] Quebec developed international governmental and organizational relationships.

Special status is a well-established concept. Initially, it developed out of the 1956 "Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems"[17] (Tremblay Commission), set up by Duplessis to analyse the challenges of American capitalism, federal intrusion into provincial jurisdictions, fiscal arrangements and general constitutional problems. One should not underestimate the importance of the Commission's findings to the development of Quebec nationalism to this day. Garth Stevenson emphasizes this:

> Had many English-speaking Canadians read this report at the time, they would probably have considered its recommendations to be bizarre and extreme, but by the twentieth anniversary of its publication these recommendations had virtually become the conventional wisdom.[18]

The Commission recommended that French Quebec's unique nature be preserved, and singled out the community's dedication to spiritual values, classical education, private, church-controlled social welfare institutions and a rural heritage. Articulating its belief that Confederation was "a pact of honour" between "two great races" (the compact theory), the Commission sketched out a complete political program for the preservation of French-Canadian culture. The Tremblay report proved to be an eloquent statement defending

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[15] Alain Gagnon, "Everything Old is New Again", in Frances Abele (ed.), How Ottawa Spends: 1991-92: The Politics of Fragmentation, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), p.65.

[16] This principle recognized the provincial right to enter into negotiations with international organizations in matters exclusively assigned by the BNA Act of 1867 to the provinces. This is discussed fully by Claude Morin in L'art de l'impossible: la diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960 (Montréal: Boréal, 1987).

[17] The best analysis of the Tremblay Commission is found in Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980, especially pp.65-87.

[18] Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, Revised Edition (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1982), p.57.

centrifugal federalism, proposing that the provinces take over all direct taxation and social security. The Commission viewed the BNA Act as a conduit giving Quebec authority over all matters arising from its historical, cultural and religious character and granting powers over civil rights and aspects of language to the provinces. Its solution to the prevailing constitutional malaise was to give Quebec sufficient powers to enable it to act as the "accredited guardian of French-Canadian civilization".[19] In Frank Scott's words, Canada "is defined to be composed of two races, equal in status"[20]

If one accepts the Tremblay Commission's assumptions, they are the logical foundation for "an associated states" formula, "assymetrical federalism", "sovereignty-association" or political independence. Although McRoberts contends that one should qualify a relationship between the Tremblay Commission and Quebec state activism in the 1960s and 1970s,[21] one should not underestimate Coleman's contention that Tremblay became the cornerstone of Quebec's post-1960 political strategies and the basis for the various movements for independence and renewed federalism that have emerged since.[22]

Just as the issue of founding races continues to be debated, a second contentious federal-provincial issue is the constitutional amending formula. In the 1960-66 period, Quebec rejected two important amending formula proposals, confirming a discernible change in the Liberals' approach to the issue. In 1961, Lesage turned down the Davie Fulton formula because the federal government would not give up the powers it had acquired in 1949, which allowed for unilateral amendment of the constitution in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Similarly, in 1966, Lesage rejected the Fulton-Favreau formula, which called for

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19 See Quebec, "Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems", Report (Quebec, 1956), esp. p.36.

20 Frank R. Scott, "The Constitutional Background of Taxation Agreements", McGill Law Journal 2 No. 1 (1955), pp.1-10.

21 McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p.140.

22 Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980, pp.17-18.

unanimous provincial approval (a universal veto) for constitutional amendments involving provincial powers. For the Lesage Liberals and subsequent Quebec governments, the central issue was not the amending formula, but the overhaul of the Constitution and a new division of powers. Quebec refused to consider patriation or an amending formula unless it clearly defined provincial powers. Unanimity threatened the possibility of Quebec attaining agreements with Ottawa in culturally-sensitive areas, and hindered the transfer of powers.[23] It was not until 1987 that Quebec finally agreed to a formula based on unanimity, because it had already attained significant powers over cultural policy. The Robert Bourassa Liberals have made it a goal to regain Quebec's lost veto with or without unanimity.

Since 1960, Quebec has been perceived as constitutionally inflexible; this problem plagues Quebec for political and economic reasons. Quebecers clearly prefer nationalist provincial governments whereby government and opposition regularly outflank each other on nationalist questions. In 1966, for example, Lesage adopted a special status platform so not to be outflanked by the UN. Paul Gérin-Lajoie stated:

> Up to the present, Quebec has asked nothing for itself which it would not be willing to recognize for the other provinces. But one may wonder whether this is the correct attitude to take. What objections would there be if Canada were to adopt a constitutional regime which would take into account the existence of the "two nations" or "societies" within one Canada?[24]

In economic matters, all Quebec governments, since the era of Duplessis, have successfully exploited fiscal federalism and the administration of shared-cost programs to the point where the province now enjoys de facto special status.[25] All Quebec governments have sought

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[23] Ironically, Quebec had agreed on unanimity in 1980 in order to block the federal government's patriation package. The best analysis of Quebec's role in the "gang of eight" is found in Robert Sheppard and Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1982), pp.174-96.

[24] Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Convocation address at Carleton University, April 1965, quoted in Donald Smiley, "Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), pp.124, 158.

[25] See Morin, L'Art de l'impossible: la diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960; and Alain G. Gagnon and Mary-Beth Montcalm, Quebec Beyond the Quiet Revolution, (Toronto: Nelson, 1990).

greater taxation room and control over federal expenditures in those areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, such as health, education and welfare.[26]

3.2b Union Nationale Constitutional Initiatives, 1966-1970

The Union Nationale recognized the inherent crises within the constitutional arena when it regained power in 1966. Though the Johnson and Bertrand administrations broke from the Liberal economic orientation, they could not reverse Quebec's constitutional course and even carried it further. Even less possible was it to retreat from the Liberal's autonomous positions because, through variations in the vote, the UN seemingly owed its victory to the indépendantistes.[27] Therefore, Daniel Johnson took a firmer stance by advocating independence as a feasible option, carrying the debate a step further than Lesage.

Daniel Johnson's constitutional doctrine was formulated by the booklet "Égalité ou Indépendance",[28] which demanded special status for Quebec and recognized the collective rights of Canadians of both languages. The Liberals, who disposed of René Lévesque's "Option Québec" (sovereignty-association proposal) in 1967, also proposed the special status option in the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (the Rapport Gérin-Lajoie).

Recognizing the successes of the Liberals, the Union Nationale government continued to use an interventionist approach to domestic policy and federal-provincial relations. However, its positions were largely geared to some future course of action and its demands were general and vague. Of particular concern for Johnson was greater Quebec participation in the international sphere, specifically in conferences involving matters of provincial

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[26] Claude Jean Galipeau, "Le Contre-Courant Québécois", in Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett (eds.), The Provincial State: Politics in Canada's Provinces and Territories, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1992), pp.115-45; and J.H. Perry, A Fiscal History of Canada - The Postwar Years, (Toronto: The Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989), pp.383-414, 520-21.

[27] With nearly forty-seven percent of the popular vote, the Liberals had been forced to cede power to the Union Nationale, which had garnered only forty-one percent. It was believed that the small margins of victory by UN candidates were the result of votes cast for the independence parties such as le Rassemblement Nationale and the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale.

[28] Daniel Johnson, Égalité ou indépendance, (Montréal: Éditions de l'Homme, 1965).

jurisdiction. Johnson's theme for the 1966 campaign - Égalité ou indépendance - advocated a constitutional interpretation defining the country as a binational compact between French and English and tentatively proposed special status for Quebec.[29] At the time, this was a stronger attempt to appeal to nationalist forces than the Liberals could make. The 1966-70 Union Nationale administration supported the Tremblay Commission view that a division of powers and revenues should be based on the Quebec interpretation of the BNA Act. As well, it called for entrenched special status for the province and an emphasis on collective rather than individual rights. These proposals allowed the UN to demand limits on transfer payments to individuals through national social programs, and complete federal withdrawal if these were run on a shared-cost basis. Consistent with Duplessis, the Union Nationale, from 1966 to 1970, perceived the federal spending power as a negative influence on the maintenance of federalism because it did not respect a clearly enunciated division of powers between Quebec and Ottawa.

At the time, Daniel Johnson maintained that programs such as family allowance, pensions, social assistance, health services and labour force training should be the sole responsibility of Quebec. Similarly, the Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Liberal Party (the Allaire Report) and several briefs presented before the Bélanger-Campeau Commission advocate this. However, consistent with his earlier positions, Prime Minister Trudeau refused to concede to Quebec any notion of special status.

When Jean-Jacques Bertand succeeded Johnson as Premier in 1968, his supporters supplanted the Johnson technocrats in the party leadership with their own traditional orientation. This generally alienated the party's middle class support and stemmed the flow of its long-term vision of change within the federal system. Bertrand was unable to mend this

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[29] For a more detailed argument see Alain G. Gagnon, "Égalité ou indépendance: un tournant dans la pensée constitutionnelle du Québec", in Robert Comeau, Michel Lévesque and Yves Bélanger (eds.), Daniel Johnson: Rêve d'égalité et projet d'indépendance (Sillery: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1991), pp.173-81.

rift and, even after Antonio Barrette assumed the leadership, Union Nationale support rapidly declined. Unlike Johnson's more radical posturing, Bertrand and the then dominant elements of the UN leadership were more committed to Quebec's future within the Canadian system.

3.2c Liberal Constitutional Initiatives, 1970-1976

One must avoid drawing far-reaching comparisons between the 1970-76 Liberal governments and the previous Lesage administrations. In the 1970s, the Robert Bourassa Liberals were not generally prepared to accept the 1960s contention that Quebec's development necessitated a continuing expansion of state powers. "In particular", as Kenneth McRoberts notes, "they professed a much greater faith in the ability of private economic forces to serve the interests of Quebec without governmental intervention."[30] This appears to be one of the few consistent policy thrusts of all Bourassa governments. Likewise, in 1970, the Liberals attached the same ideological conviction to constitutional initiatives. They were not overly concerned with the constitutional entrenchment of Quebec's national aspirations, but looked instead for revisions to the federal system which would give Quebec the powers and resources it needed for the "preservation and development of the bicultural character of the Canadian federation".[31] Like the Bertrand administration, Bourassa's was clearly committed to federalism. The rationale for this, it seems, was that to stem the growing wave of support for the Parti québécois, the Liberals had to show that federalism benefited Quebec.

At the 1971 Victoria Constitutional Conference, the question of separation of powers and Canadian federalism in general laid the groundwork for modern Canadian constitutional deliberations. The Victoria Charter was a composite of diverse views; most were arrived at with some difficulty. Major provisions broadly included income security programs, political

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[30] McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p.218.

[31] Robert Bourassa, Speech at the First Ministers' Constitutional Conference in Ottawa, September 14-15, 1970, quoted in Jean-Louis Roy, Le Choix d'un pays: le débat Constitutional Québec-Ottawa, 1960-1976 (Ottawa: Leméac, 1978), p.210.

and linguistic rights, the organization of the federal court system, processes dealing with regional disparities and the federal government's consultation procedures with the provinces on these issues. The Charter's Trudeau-Turner formula specified that constitutional amendments were possible if the majority view constituted a province with 25 percent of Canada's population, plus two or more Atlantic provinces and two or more Western provinces with at least fifty percent of the region's population. The Conference's income security deliberations demonstrate how Bourassa was constrained to accept arrangements that fell short of Quebec's demands and to present them as successes. Quebec began the conference demanding legislative primacy over the entire income security (family allowances, manpower training, old age pensions) field. It first appeared that the constitutional debate would be resolved. Soon after, however, Quebec declined because of imprecision on Article 94A, outlining responsibility for these programs. 94A was nothing more than a test showing the extent that the other provinces were willing to push for a new power arrangement. Despite Bourassa's support for the measure, there was intense pressure at home regarding an amending formula that would give Quebec, Ontario, the Western region and the Atlantic region vetoes. The package deal proposed by Ottawa failed because it did not guarantee Quebec control over cultural and social policies.

From 1973 to 1976, Quebec was largely inactive in federal-provincial deliberations. Instead, Bourassa focused on negotiating with Ottawa the terms and administrative arrangements for specific programs. Concurrently, the federal Liberals won a large majority in 1974 and the Bourassa government was embroiled in a number of domestic policy issues, most notably James Bay hydro. The federal Liberal government released a discussion paper in 1975 which proposed patriation and an amending formula. It contained a revised version of the Victoria Charter which reflected Bourassa's views from 1971 that the preservation and full development of the French language and Québécois culture was a fundamental purpose of

the Canadian federation. Seemingly, at this time, Ottawa recognized Quebec's primary interest in the protection and promotion of linguistic and cultural concerns in modifying the federation. This was presented as a recognition of Quebec's demand for "special status".[32] Quebec accepted this approach providing its linguistic and cultural concerns were entrenched in the Constitution. Garth Stevenson states, herein "lurked the spectre of unilateral delegation of powers and of special status".[33]

In exchange for patriation, Bourassa asked that the following provisions, not unlike Quebec's demands at Meech Lake in 1987, be included in a new constitution: a Québec veto; control of education and culture policies; the right to opt out of federal programs with compensation; a more important role in immigration; and limits on the federal government's spending powers.[34] These and Quebec's demand for increased participation in Supreme Court appointments were also outlined in the 1976 Liberal election platform and in its 1980 beige paper, A New Canadian Federation.

The November 15, 1976 Parti québécois election victory changed the course of federal-provincial relations. This election victory came about not because of overwhelming support for the sovereignty-association option but, rather, because Quebecers demanded a change in government and voted the Liberals out of office to ease the many domestic problems that were heavily burdening the province in the mid-1970s.

During the late-1970s, Quebec governments searched for greater autonomy by seeking additional powers and revenues, with a view to preserving and promoting a distinct society. In this context, Bourassa has been pursuing the objectives of profitable federalism and cultural

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[32] See Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, p.210.

[33] Ibid.

[34] See John Saywell (ed.), 1976 Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp.43, 93-4.

sovereignty since 1970. Under successive Bourassa and Lévesque governments, Quebec and Ottawa reached many formal agreements. In the cases of international relations, immigration and family allowances, for example, the other provinces did not wish to assume similar authority. Therefore, Quebec has gained de-facto special status in these and other policy fields.[35] This appears to be a fundamental challenge and continuing obstacle with respect to "English Canada's" objections to Quebec's call for entrenchment of "distinct society" in the constitution. While neither Ottawa nor the other provinces have agreed to constitutional entrenchment of Quebec's rights in these fields, common sense dictates that Quebec is distinct because of them. Mackay and Beckton's words are particularly relevant:

> In our view, regardless of what the politicians, judges, or economists say, Quebec does have a de facto special status in Canada. The question is, how much de jure special status Quebec should have.[36]

3.2d Liberal Constitutional Position, 1979-1980

The 1979 and 1980 Liberal constitutional proposals are excellent examples of the fashion in which that party has moved in divergent directions in recent years. A 1979 constitutional discussion paper, Choose Quebec and Canada was, in the words of Alan Cairns, "the strongest defence of federalism heard in decades".[37] However, prior to the May, 1980 referendum, a second policy paper, A new Canadian Federation, called for the extreme transformation of the federal system in the interests of the provinces and especially Quebec. It espoused a radically decentralized federation and recognized two sovereign jurisdictions and more direct provincial influence on federal activities accomplished through a provincially-

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[35] See, for example, Alain Gagnon, "Everything Old is New Again", in How Ottawa Spends, p.69.

[36] A. Wayne Mackay and Clare F. Beckton, "Recurring Issues in Canadian Federalism", in Supply and Services Canada, Report, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p.3.

[37] Alan Cairns, "Constitution-Making, Government Self-Interest, and the Problem of Legitimacy", in Allan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke (eds.), Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983), p.417.

appointed intergovernmental body called the Federal Council. This met Quebec's need to recognize two founding communities.[38] Proposals included replacing the Senate by a provincially-appointed structure capable of curbing federal powers, proportional representation in the House of Commons and the abolition of the monarchy. Clearly, this extreme constitutional position was dictated solely by the demands of political expediency in order to attract to the Liberal Party its traditional core supporters and approximately 25 percent of the electorate who are always considered soft-sovereignists.

3.2e Federal Initiatives and Quebec Subordination, Post-1980

In the late 1960s provincial governments moved towards a consensual approach in which their formal powers and fiscal resources would be increased. Ottawa's response to the provinces was largely accommodative. Opting out provisions initiated in 1964 opened the door for provinces to withdraw from joint programs without incurring financial penalties if similar provincial programs were established. While invitations were before all provinces, Ottawa consistently hoped that only Quebec would participate. Opting out is a recognized component of shared cost programs, which exist under the terms of Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act (1977). Depending on the policy area, provinces are not obliged to spend federal funds in any specific way. In the 1970s, Ottawa appeared willing to discuss the devolution of some federal powers to the provinces. The combination of minority federal governments, 1972-74, 1979, and the 1976 election of the Parti québécois played a part in this devolution of powers - at the time, a trend clearly at odds with that in other Western countries.[39]

With Pierre Trudeau's return to power in 1980, the accommodative stance

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[38] Douglas Verney, Three Civilizations, Two Cultures, One State: Canada's Political Traditions, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), p.374.

[39] Roger Gibbins, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), pp.1-3.

disappeared and Ottawa began to reassert its presence. A strong majority government allowed Trudeau to act upon his belief in a strong central government by devaluing cooperative federalism, recapturing the power of unilateral action and pulling back from expensive shared cost programs. In the latter case, this was likely because Ottawa was growing uneasy about accountability to Parliament for the expenditure of funds over which it had little control. It did not want to be seen as the government that taxed heavily and did little in return. These are the theories behind the federal government's decision to patriate the Constitution from Britain and revise the amending formula and division of powers.

The 1982 Constitution Act and Charter of Rights and Freedoms fail to address Quebec's place in Canada. While not a signatory, however, Quebec has not lost the jurisdictional authority of the National Assembly nor its representation in federal institutions. Further, Quebec has used the notwithstanding clause (Section 33) to remove certain of its legislation from the Charter's application; though, it is unable to divorce its legislation from the Charter's democratic, linguistic and educational guarantees, which conflict most with its policies. For example, the Supreme Court struck down portions of Bill 101 because it conflicts with the Charter. For these reasons, Quebec wishes to sign an acceptable constitution and does not desire to abolish the entire 1982 Constitution Act, because it contains positive elements, such as a provision in the amending formula allowing for financial compensation when Quebec opts out of certain cultural and educational programs.[40]

3.2f Liberal Constitutional Position, Post-1985

By voting the Parti québécois from office in 1985 and re-electing the Bourassa Liberals, Quebecers reasserted the cultural autonomy and profitable federalism objectives

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[40] Gil Rémillard agreed to this in 1984. See Remillard, American Journal of Comparative Law, #32, 1984, p.81. Section 40 of the Constitution Act, 1982, gives Quebec this right.

advocated by previous Liberal governments.[41] Robert Bourassa's constitutional positions have largely centred around two ambiguous concepts, profitable federalism (federalisme rentable) and superstructure. Both terms defy description but are vital components of the current constitutional malaise. Claude Morin, advisor to five Quebec premiers, and a former Péquiste minister, described the obscure nature of Bourassa's constitutional thought: "Je le trouvai aimable, comme toujours, mais évasif sur les positions qu'il comptait faire valoir devant Ottawa."[42] Morin's view of Bourassa's profitable federalism invokes a sense of humour:

> La fixation de Bourassa sur la notion de "federalisme rentable" m'avait laissé perplexe. Il s'opposait, c'était son droit, à la souveraineté du Québec et, par le fait même, y préférait le fédéralisme. Fort bien, sauf qu'il s'en tenait à une vision tronquée, sectorielle, de ce régime politique. Il mettait tout ses oeufs dans le panier de la "rentabilité" comme si le fédéralisme n'était en définitive qu'une Société Saint-Vincent de Paul pour provinces pauvres![43]

The superstructure idea builds on Bourassa's thesis of "two sovereign states associated in an economic union which would be responsible to a parliament elected by universal suffrage".[44] The possibility of having a commonly elected parliament, however, is unacceptable to orthodox supporters of sovereignty-association, unless powers granted to that (joint) parliament are first delegated by an already sovereign Quebec.[45] This is a major point of divergence between mainstream Liberals and the Parizeau Péquistes.

It appears that the 1985 Liberal policy paper, Mastering Our Future, coupled with the

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[41] Alain Gagnon and Joseph Garcea, "Quebec and the Pursuit of Special Status", in R.D. Olling and M.W. Westmacott (eds.), Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), p.314.

[42] Claude Morin, Mes Premiers Ministres, (Québec: Les Éditions du Boréal, 1991), pp.360-1.

[43] Ibid, p.365.

[44] The Globe and Mail, October 6, 1990.

[45] Jacques Parizeau made this point clear at the opening of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission. See Le Devoir, November 7, 1990. See also Jacques-Yvan Morin, Le Devoir, December 14, 1990. Alain Gagnon discusses the Bourassa views in good detail in " Everything Old is New Again", How Ottawa Spends, p.82.

1991 Allaire Report, continues to be the cornerstone of Liberal constitutional policy. Echoing previous Liberal government perspectives,[46] it criticizes the PQ approach to intergovernmental relations. It outlines five major conditions for constitutional reform and has been reiterated by a speech given by Gil Rémillard, Quebec's Minister of Intergovernmental Relations, at Mônt Gabriel, May 9, 1986: recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society"; Quebec's constitutional right to recruit and select immigrants; a key role in the appointment of three Supreme Court judges; limits on the federal government's spending power; and a full veto on constitutional reform.[47]

The pursuit of profitable federalism objectives was evident at the First Ministers' November, 1986 Conference on the Economy where Bourassa demanded a greater transfer of fiscal resources from Ottawa. At a later constitutional conference, prior to Meech Lake, Quebec insisted that the preamble of the new Constitution include "a statement explicitly recognizing Quebec as the home of a distinct society and the foundation of the Francophone element in the Canadian duality".[48] Other proposed amendments gave de facto recognition to the principle of opting-out with compensation, which had been utilized in certain cases in previous decades, and Quebec's role in the selection of independent immigrants, which had been granted in 1978 under the Cullen-Couture agreement.[49]

Bourassa's 1986 demands are very similar to the conditions outlined in the PQ's 1985 "Draft Agreement on the Constitution" (it embodied the 22 broad objectives which had been

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[46] One of the best analyses of "Mastering Our Future" and other Liberal constitutional policy papers, such as "A New Canadian Federation", "A New Political Leadership for Quebec", etc., is found in John Fitzmaurice, Quebec and Canada: Past, Present and Future, (London: Hurst & Company, 1985).

[47] For an excellent overview of Rémillard's speech, see Peter Leslie (ed.), Canada: The State of the Federation, (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for Intergovernmental Relations, 1987), pp.40-1.

[48] See Dossier du Devoir, Le Québec et le lac Meech, (Montréal: Guérin litterature, 1987), p.53.

[49] Gagnon and Garcea, "Quebec and the Pursuit of Special Status", in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p.315.

Quebec's constitutional demands since the Quiet Revolution)[50] and its 1987 policy of "national affirmation", which retreated from separatism in favour of a gradual increase of Quebec's powers within Canada. Differences between the Parti québécois government after its referendum defeat, and the Bourassa Liberals following their victory in 1985, were differences of degree not of kind. The Liberals made ready use of the PQ's Draft Agreement as a bottom line during subsequent negotiations.[51] Gagnon and Garcea sum up Quebec's aspirations particularly well:

> Bourassa sought a decentralized but a financially "profitable federalism" in which Quebec could attain the requisite powers and financial resources to maximize its autonomy in the social and cultural spheres within the context of the Canadian federal system, even if it entailed some form of special status.[52]

Quebec's five conditions were (temporarily) met with the ratification of the Meech Lake and Langevin Accords, which the Prime Minister and the ten premiers negotiated in 1987. Further, all the provinces were given veto power so as to not accord Quebec de-jure special status in this area. The first ministers also agreed to opt out of new federal programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, with full financial compensation, providing similar programs meeting national standards were initiated. Future appointments to the Supreme Court and to the Senate would be made by the federal government from lists submitted by the provinces, although only in the case of Quebec were three positions tied specifically to one province. The Accord also recognized Quebec's role in immigration - recognition that could be extended to other provinces - and Quebec received very ambiguous constitutional status in the Accord's recognition that it "constitutes within Canada a distinct

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[50] For a full account, see Gagnon and Montcalm, Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution, pp.162-3.

[51] Before 1985, the Liberals had prepared a series of policy papers pointing to areas where compromises needed to be reached. For example, A New Canadian Constitution (1980), A New Political Leadership for Quebec (1983), and Mastering Our Future (1985) that set the five conditions which would eventually constitute much of the Meech Lake Accord. These conditions were made public by Gil Rémillard, in a speech at Mont Gabriel, Quebec. For details see Peter Leslie (ed.), Canada: The State of the Federation 1986, (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1987), pp.97-105.

[52] Gagnon and Garcea, in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p.308.

society".

Debates surrounding the Meech Lake Accord continue, and the defeat of the October, 1992 Charlottetown Accord, which proposed a revamped Senate and other changes to institutions and powers, is seen as a debate between advocates of centripetal federalism, which see the central government as the expression of national interests, and centrifugal federalism, which see Canada as a contract between provinces and a central government which gives peripheral regions sovereignty in their areas of jurisdiction. Of particular consternation to English Canada is the possibility of extending in a greater fashion centrifugal powers to Quebec under the guise of distinct society. Since the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, numerous proposals have been put forward with the goal of including Quebec's signature within the Constitution. Though Quebec's constitutional status weakened between 1980 and 1985 (this will be detailed in Chapter 4), Bourassa's post-1985 initiatives, emphasized in the Bélanger-Campeau and Allaire Reports, have strengthened the province's position. Recommendations from both call for a massive transfer of federal powers.

In contrast, the Brian Mulroney Conservative government has assumed a weak position because of the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Ottawa has been mired in numerous attempts to extricate the country from constitutional disarray. The Spicer Commission and the Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission are examples.[53] Deliberations to find some future common ground will likely include Senate reform provisions, a social charter, economic and fisheries reform, aboriginal self-government issues and, of course, the Quebec agenda. The denunciation of the Charlottetown Accord in Quebec means that a referendum on sovereignty will have to be held in that province before new discussions ensue.

If constitutional entrenchment is ever achieved, it will likely not represent Quebec's

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[53] See Canada, "Citizens Forum on Canada's Future", Report to the People and Government of Canada, (June 1991), "The Spicer Report"; and Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, Report of the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, (February 28, 1992), "Beaudoin-Dobbie Report".

final demands. Certain elements of today's federal structure, such as a non-territorially-based Charter of Rights and Freedoms, conflict with Quebec's distinct society view, and the equality of provinces principle clashes with Quebec's continued claim for special status. This leads one to believe that, unless distinct society and/or a variant of assymetrical federalism is agreed to by English Canada, the present framework is not manageable. Similar characteristics of different Quebec governments in negotiating constitutional powers exist. Quebec parties agree that Quebec must have maximum political autonomy; that there must be "dual federalism" in matters of provincial jurisdiction and "cooperative federalism" and "intrastate federalism" in matters of federal jurisdiction; and that special status should be attained in some, if not all, policy sectors. The question remains not how much de-facto special status Quebec should have, but how much entrenched special status. Special status should not be confused with the rightful assertion of a province in fields of its own jurisdiction. There is a difference between exclusive and shared special status.[54] Alain Gagnon mentions a number of possible scenarios, including simple renewed federalism (reminiscent of the Trudeau Liberals); restructured federalism (like Pépin-Robarts); Parti québécois sovereignty-association; decentralized federalism (Claude Ryanesque); or the superstructure concept outlined by Robert Bourassa.[55]

Unofficially, still, the official Liberal constitutional policy is the Allaire Report, A Quebec Free to Choose, released in 1991.[56] The Allaire Report proposes to diminish federal powers in 22 jurisdictions and is a constitutional negotiating tool. However, "English Canada" will never accept its provisions without a significant payout, partly because

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[54] Gagnon and Garcea, in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p.318.

[55] Gagnon, "Everything Old is New Again", in How Ottawa Spends, p.76.

[56] Comité constitutionnel du Parti libéral du Québec, Un Québec libre de ses choix, January 28, 1991. See also, Le Devoir, March 5, 1991.

assymetrical federalism would give Quebec MPs the opportunity to vote on some policy matters which, while not applying to Quebec, would apply to the rest of the country. The Allaire Report has made room for the superstructure concept, which it presents under the label of a "new superstructure." Inspired by the European Community, it recognizes Quebec's special status and accommodates other provinces wishing to assume additional responsibilities. According to Gagnon, though, it is risky:

> On the one hand, Quebec nationalists would find highly objectionable any initiatives that create a new supreme body above the National Assembly. It is unlikely also that the rest of Canada would accept undermining the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by surrendering authority to this new body. For the rest of Canada it appears that the only acceptable option is the status quo.[57]

Through Allaire, Quebec is also demanding a change in the amending formula, adding, among other things, a Quebec veto. It appears, however, that Quebec would accept universal vetoes in exchange for some entrenched special status; Bourassa did agree to provincial vetoes under the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Other provisions of Allaire include the abolition of the Senate, the establishment of a community tribunal to oversee compliance with a new constitution, and a Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms within a new Quebec constitution.

Tension between individual and group rights in an increasingly rights-fixated world indicate this as a major stumbling block in any new federal arrangement. Public opinion polls in Quebec consistently show a fear of consummate sovereignty and a reaffirmation of the special status concept. Any renegotiated federalism will have to heed the "Charter culture" and be willing to build institutions which are capable of ensuring a greater degree of territorial autonomy than what is now evident. To avoid being trapped into a debate of

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[57] Gagnon, "Everthing Old is New Again", in How Ottawa Spends, p.86.

individual versus collective rights,[58] one must concurrently take into account the question of territoriality so fundamental to Quebec's existence. The failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords demonstrates the need to craft political institutions that are sensitive to both individual rights and collective goals. An acceptable solution for Quebec requires significant changes, allowing at a minimum the recognition of greater centrifugal federalism.

Since 1960, Quebec has succeeded in bilateral negotiations. Once concessions are obtained, the federal government normally offers them to all provinces in order to strengthen its argument that asymmetrical federalism has not developed in Canada. Whatever the end result of the current constitutional crisis, it surely cannot be resolved without an explicit recognition of Quebec's distinct presence and role in the Canadian federation.[59]

3.3 Language Policy Convergence

3.3a Introduction

Before 1960, the status of the French language in Canada was stagnating and unilingual Francophones were clearly disadvantaged.[60] After 1960, a strong segment of Quebec nationalists, highly sensitive to international changes, saw their province as a colonized state and began influencing government by preaching independence with unilingualism.[61] Until recently, these two underlying pretences fixated successive Quebec

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[58] Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams provide a convincing argument concerning the impact the Charter has on both political culture and citizen-state relationships. See Cairns and Williams, "Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada: An Overview", in Cairns and Williams (eds.), Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

[59] Section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 stipulates that "an amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one or more, but not all provinces" may be decided by Parliament and the relevant province(s) alone. This is available to all provinces, but gives some flexibility to the federal government vis-a-vis Quebec.

[60] The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism showed that French Canadians in Quebec placed twelfth among fourteen ethnic groups by average labour income of male salary and wage earners in 1961. Those of British origin placed first, at a level 55 percent higher than French. See Report, Book III: "The Work World" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp.22-24. It should be noted though, that by the 1980s, French had achieved virtual economic parity with the British in Canada.

[61] Some of the separatist books of the 1960s echoed these sentiments. See Raymond Barbeau, Québec est-il une colonie? (Montréal: Les Éditions de l'Homme, 1962); and Andrew D'Allemagne, Le colonialisme au Québec, (Montréal: Les Éditions R-B, 1966).

governments in their implementation of language policy. From the 1960s, Quebec language policy has evolved from Bill 63 (1969) to Bills 22 (1974), 101 (1977) and 178 (1987), reflecting a desire to promote French language primacy. Bills 22 and 101, particularly, were intended to correct the relegation of French to an economically inferior position and to narrow the division between labour and management previously defined along linguistic lines.

The Liberals and Union Nationale have been greater advocates of minority language rights than the Parti québécois. By the same token, they have been greater casualties of fringe nationalist groups such as le Mouvement Québec Française and Société Saint Jean Baptiste, and have acquiesced on language policy rather than implement basic party doctrines. As a result, many Quebecers are now alienated and, as an example, Montreal Anglophones now largely support the rights-oriented Equality Party.

Quebec language laws, with the exception of Bill 101, have consistently revealed the state's timidity to confront the linguistic situation. For example, in 1937, a bill giving primacy to French language legal texts and regulations was withdrawn by Duplessis under heavy Anglophone pressure.[62] Bills 63, 22 and 178 reveal similar conclusions. Even before the 1960s, Quebec governments considered language, education and immigration as three components of one policy output. To this day, language policy is interconnected with immigration and education policy. In immigration matters, the vast majority of immigrants to Quebec chose English education for their children and were integrated into English culture. Demographers even hypothesized that Montreal might have an English-speaking majority by the year 2000.[63] Forced to act on the issue, post-1966 Quebec governments have viewed

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[62] Marc V. Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p.34.

[63] Jacques Henripin saw Montreal as being between 53 and 60 percent French-speaking by 2000, a decline of between 6 and 13 percent, in "Quebec and the Demographic Dilemma of French-Canadian Society", in John R. Mallea (ed.), Quebec's Language Policies: Background and Response (Quebec: Centre international de récherche sur la bilinguisme, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1977), p.57.

immigration from a demo-linguistic vantage point. More than any other institution, schools are the battleground for conflicts between ethnic and linguistic groups and are crucial to the vitality of linguistic communities. Since 1968, Quebec policy has reflected the belief that language policy in education is integrally connected to patterns of language maintenance, language shift, and ultimately group survival.

Acting on the immigration and education policy fields, Quebec governments have dismissed ideology and stressed the language issue, forcing the ethno-cultural view to the forefront. Paralleling this, unilingualist groups and nationalists have acted on their suspicions that, without powerful popular pressure, "federalist" parties such as the Liberals and Union Nationale, would never adopt the bold pro-French measures deemed necessary.[64]

3.3b Pre-Bourassa Liberal Language Policy

Until 1988, Liberal language policy has centred around struggles to accommodate Anglophones and placate the French majority. For example, in 1960, the Liberals promised to assist the "weakened" French language by creating an Office de la langue française.[65] The party's 1965 White Paper on culture (the Laporte Paper) contained the first government call for a coherent language policy, seeking to "make French the priority language in Quebec".[66] Also, the Liberal's 1966 platform included a "Le Québec français" section, which promised to "guarantee the vitality of French" as the "main language of work and of communication".[67] In an accommodative manner, the Liberals declared the objective to be accomplished "with

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[64] Richard Jones, "Politics and the Reinforcement of the French Language in Canada and Quebec, 1960-1986, in Michael D. Behiels (ed.), Quebec Since 1945 (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987), p.227.

[65] Programme politique du Parti libéral du Québec, 1960, p.2.

[66] Ministère des Affaires culturelles, Livre blanc sur la politique culturelle (unpublished, 1965), p.24.

[67] Jean-Louis Roy, Les programmes électoraux du Québec: Un siècle de programmes politiques québécois, tome 2 (Montréal: Éditions Lémeac, 1970), p.433.

full respect for the undeniable rights of the Anglophone minority".[68] It is difficult to determine, though, the extent to which the Liberals would have promoted the French language had they been in the same predicament as the UN from 1966 to 1970.

3.3c Union Nationale Language Policy, 1966-1970

Quebec's most ardent debates about language policy began under the Union Nationale in the late-1960s. On this issue, like others, the UN never managed to live up to its supposed nationalist orientations. The 1966 election campaign showed the success of the party in exploiting popular resentments against changes instigated by the Liberals. In fact, by 1966 elements of French Canadian society were claiming that the Quiet Revolution had gone too far in reforming Quebec.[69] However, UN successes in exploiting opposition to the Quiet Revolution did not relate to language, where it vaguely promised to give French "the status of a national language" without carrying the issue further in the form of a policy output.[70]

The predominant dilemma facing the government was the threat of public schooling as a tool for the Anglicization of Montreal. The Saint Léonard Catholic School Board's decision to eliminate bilingual schools, in 1967, brought this issue to a head. Allophone parents reacted to the imposition of French unilingualism but, after one year, the board declared that the language of instruction in elementary schools will be French.[71] Claude Ryan of Le Devoir warned that "majorities cannot trample the rights of minorities in a democracy".[72] The Saint Léonard decision forced the Bertrand government, in 1968, to introduce legislation

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[68] Québec en marche. Le Programme politique du Parti libéral du Québec, 1966, p.5.

[69] See Vincent Lemieux, "Les partis et leurs contradictions", in Jean-Luc Migué (ed.), Le Québec d'aujourd'hui (Montréal: HRH Hurtubise, 1971), pp.153-72.

[70] Objectifs 1966 de l'Union Nationale, un programme d'action pour une jeune nation, Québec d'abord, 1966, p.3.

[71] Le Devoir, June 28, 1968.

[72] Le Devoir, July 2, 1968.

protecting minority language education rights. Marc Levine notes, "Bill 85 sought a linguistic compromise that would emphasize French as Quebec's priority language while preserving individual linguistic freedom of choice in education".[73] Bill 85 was sound legislation, but PQ leader René Lévesque said it maintained the status quo that undermined French and offered a PQ counterproposal to require all non-Anglophone children to attend French-language schools after January 1, 1969.[74]

Facing a caucus split and fierce nationalist opposition, Bertrand withdrew Bill 85 in March, 1969. This policy debacle led to the creation of the Gendron Commission, with a mandate to "make an inquiry into and submit a report on the position of French as the language of usage in Quebec".[75] Delays in the Commission forced the UN to present a new language policy in October, 1969; Bill 63 was symbolically presented as "the first step toward making French the priority language in Quebec". Anglophone business pressure ensured that immigrants and Anglophones would not be compelled to send their children to French schools. Now in opposition, the Lesage Liberals stated that the bill did not go far enough in promoting the French language.[76] All of these events contributed to the defeat of the UN in 1970.[77] In March 1971, the Mouvement Québec français (MQF) was formed and, by 1974, it would play a key role in the Bourassa government's creation of Bill 22.[78]

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[73] Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.74.

[74] Le Devoir, December 14, 1968.

[75] Order-in-Council no. 3958, December 9, 1968 quoted in Quebec, "Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Quebec", Report: The Position of the French Language in Quebec; II Language Rights (Montreal, 1972), v.

[76] Jean Lesage, speech in the National Assembly, Débats de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec, October 28, 1969, pp.3376-8.

[77] While there is no substantive evidence to support this, Jerôme Proulx, a Union Nationale MNA, upon quitting the party over his condemnation of Bill 63, said that this law destroyed the party. See Proulx, Le panier de crabes (Montréal: Éditions Parti Pris, 1971), pp.111-24.

[78] The best analysis of the political aspects of language legislation in this period is Denis Turcotte, La culture du Mouvement Québec français (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1976).

3.3d Liberal Language Policy, 1970-1976

The Liberal's 1970 campaign theme was "100,000 jobs";[79] it said little about language. The 1970-1976 period reveals a deliberate attempt by the Bourassa Liberals to emphasize economic policy rather than language policy and, like the UN before, substantial interest group interference in the language issue. The Gendron Commission's late recommendations, in 1972, rekindled the issue. After extensive hearings and in excess of forty research reports, Gendron recommended designating French as Quebec's "official language", giving special status to English as a "national language", and "inducing" rather than "coercing" immigrants into French-language schools. In retrospect, the report was a reworking of Pierre Laporte's ambiguous concept of French as a "priority" language in 1965. French nationalist denunciations and the consequent psychological fear of "minorisation" led the Commission to recommend the Bill's modification and to obligate immigrants to send their children to French schools.[80]

The 1973 Quebec election campaign reveals two things about language policy: the Liberals defused the issue (vaguely mentioning French as the proposed language of work) to blunt the Parti québécois' nationalist appeal,[81] and the PQ augmented its share of the Francophone vote by aggressively promoting unilingualism (gaining 44.5 percent of the vote in Francophone Montreal ridings).[82] Conversely, this campaign gave Bourassa the opportunity to develop his views on profitable federalism and cultural sovereignty as an alternative to the PQ platform. As a result, the Liberals secured a sizable victory. Because

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[79] Bourassa hoped the economic issue would defuse nationalism and the language question. See Sheila McLeod Arnopolous and Dominique Clift, The English Fact in Quebec 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p.115.

[80] Le Devoir, February 26, 1974.

[81] Bourassa took this route to avoid mortgaging his political future. See Murray and Murray, De Bourassa à Lévesque, (Montréal: Quinze, 1978), p.183.

[82] Rapport préliminaire - Élections générales 1973 (Québec: Président général des élections, 1974).

Montreal Anglophones represented 30 percent of the Liberal's electoral base in 1973, Bourassa attempted to draft a language law that would quiet nationalist rumblings and appeal to minority language groups. Therefore, the May, 1974 Official Language Act (Bill 22) was judged a non-unilingualist policy because, though it mandated French as a priority, it guaranteed English language rights.[83]

Bill 22 specifically addressed the economy, schools and immigration. It promoted French as the language of work and this objective was backed up by a Régie de la langue française. However, the Bill's concepts were generally unclear (such as "the Francophone presence in management" or "knowledge of French" by company personnel), lacked meaningful enforcement mechanisms, and did not specify how the françisation criteria should be evaluated. The Régie was given further latitude by wording that evaluation of corporate françisation programs take into account "the situation and structure of each firm, of its head office, and of its subsidiaries and branches".[84] Many English-speaking Montreal corporations received certification under these guidelines for the sole purpose of maintaining a good investment climate.

Like Bill 63, the most controversial clauses of Bill 22 dealt with access to English-language schools. Under Bill 63's provisions, the share of total Montreal school enrollments secured by the English had risen from 36.8 percent in 1970 to 40.3 percent in 1974. As well, Francophone schools lost students at three times the rate of Anglophone schools (18.4 percent as opposed to only 5.7 percent reduction in English-language enrollments).[85] These trends reinforced Francophone anxieties. When Bourassa sensed that nationalist mobilization was

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[83] Chapitre II, et Chapitre IV

[84] Kenneth McRoberts, "Bill 22 and Canadian Language Policy", Queen's Quarterly 83 (Fall 1976): pp.464-77.

[85] Conseil scolaire de l'île de Montréal, "Série de données d'inscription depuis 1970 et prévision des populations scolaires du territoire du Conseil scolaire de l'île de Montréal", June 20 1986, p.6.

high, he limited access to English schools to pupils possessing "sufficient knowledge of English". The issue of collective, rather than individual, rights was a catalyst in this policy decision. Bill 22 was unacceptable by any philosophical standard, states Levine, in "abrogating individual rights in the name of a distorted concept of Francophone collective rights".[86] Also, the bill was poorly crafted, leaving far too much authority to the Régie.

Bourassa's attempts to avoid a definitive statement on English-language access by leaving many decisions to the Education Minister, meant both linguistic communities feared that their interests would not be served. Bourassa believed that the "silent majority" would see he had put together a compromise.[87] Bill 22 echoes more recent language policy; there is no middle ground on this volatile issue, and it "fell between two poles of public opinion representing two conflicting principles".[88] Under Bill 22, enrollments in French schools continued to decline. As a result, the English share of total Montreal Island enrollments grew from 40.3 percent to 41.2 percent. The Conseil scolaire de l'île de Montréal projected in 1976 that if Bill 22 remained in force, by 1985 43.3 percent of Montreal's school clientele would be English-taught.[89] Reaction from other sources was more negative and, like Bertrand, Bourassa faced a mini-rebellion within his caucus.[90]

Bourassa called a November 15, 1976 election to de-emphasize the language question and to weaken Trudeau's attempts to patriate the constitution. However, perceptions of corruption and the impact of the language issue played a role. Anglophones voted largely for

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[86] Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.103.

[87] Arnopolous and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p.117.

[88] Michael Stein, "Bill 22 and the Non-Francophone Population in Quebec: A Case Study of Minority Group Attitudes on Language Legislation", in John R. Mallea (ed.), Quebec's Language Policies: Background and Response (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1977), p.253.

[89] Conseil scolaire de l'île de Montréal, "Prévisions des populations scolaires de l'île de Montréal pour 1980 et 1985", June 23, 1978, p.8.

[90] Le Devoir, July 4, 1974.

the Union nationale,[91] which opportunistically advocated repeal of Bill 22's provisions on the language of instruction. As a protest vote, UN support skyrocketed in 1976 in the six chief Anglophone ridings in Montreal, as is shown in the accompanying table:

TABLE 3.1

Riding	PLQ 1973	PLQ 1976	UN 1973	UN 1976
D'Arcy-McGee	93.8	68.0	0.5	22.5
Pointe-Claire	87.8	35.1	0.9	45.0
Jacques-Cartier	69.2	35.4	2.5	31.1
NDG	81.6	43.9	1.5	29.1
Robert Baldwin	81.0	35.9	0.8	26.2
Westmount	76.9	50.7	0.9	20.6

Sources: Rapport du président général des élections pour 1973 et 1976 (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec), 1973 et 1976.

3.3e Liberal Language Policy, Post-1985

By 1985, with few electoral alternatives, non-Francophones massively supported the Liberals because Bourassa promised to amend "useless irritants" in Bill 101, especially its French-only signs provision.[92] Instead, the Bourassa government served up a language policy choice which indirectly killed the 1987 Meech Lake Accord. In 1986, the Bourassa government presented language bills giving amnesty to "illegals" enrolled in English schools (Bill 58); streamlining the linguistic bureaucracy (Bill 140); and guaranteeing English language social and health services (Bill 142). Radical nationalists viewed the enshrining of English-language rights as "a step on the return route to a bilingual Quebec.[93]

Support among Montreal Francophones for unilingual signs dropped in surveys from

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[91] André Bernard, Québec: élections 1976 (Montréal: Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1976), pp.110-1. Montreal Anglophones and Allophones gave certain support to the Democratic Alliance, an English-rights party that won up to 13% of the vote in a Montreal riding.

[92] Le Devoir, October 20, 1985.

[93] Le Devoir, December 23, 1986.

66 percent in 1979 to 46 percent in 1985.[94] The Liberals assumed that this offered an opportunity to soothe the English community while leaving the essentials of Bill 101 intact. Therefore, the 1985 Liberal program called for a Bill 22-type policy: French priority in all signs, but no proscriptions on other languages. In December, 1986 the Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that Bill 101 could legally require French signs, but barring other languages would violate the linguistic equality and freedom of expression guarantees in Quebec's own Charter of Rights. Bourassa, declining to act until the Canadian Supreme Court decided the issue, backed away from his 1985 commitment by noting that social peace came before electoral promises.[95] In 1988 the Supreme Court ruled that Bill 101 illegally proscribed bilingual signs. Declaring that his first responsibility was the protection of the French language and culture, Bourassa invoked the notwithstanding clause (Section 33).

As a compromise, Bourassa offered to maintain French unilingualism on external signs and permit bilingual signs indoors (Bill 178). Three English ministers resigned. Surveys indicated widespread opposition in both linguistic communities.[96] Levine states that, by mid-1989, "the Bourassa government's policy on the language of commercial signs had evolved into something only slightly less rigorous than Bill 101."[97] In the 1989 election, a large proportion of Montreal Anglophones supported the Equality Party and four of its candidates were elected in traditional Liberal ridings. However, for the first time, the Liberals soundly defeated the PQ without significant Anglophone support.

Quebec language policy is the product of vocal nationalist minorities who inspire

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[94] Daniel Monnier, La Question Linguistique: L'état de l'opinion publique, (Montréal: Conseil de la Langue Française, 1984), p.17.

[95] Le Devoir, September 30, 1987.

[96] A SORECOM survey taken December 19-21, 1988 found 69 percent of Anglophones and 60 percent Francophones opposed to Bourassa's solution.

[97] Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.136.

massive demonstrations (like Saint Jean Baptiste day parades), inducing changes to language policy, and who lead the agenda on the language issue. It is also clear that a majority of Francophones continue to accept a certain element of bilingualism, especially in Montreal.

3.4 The State and Capitalist Economic Development

3.4a Introduction

Since 1959, policy convergence in the capitalist economic development sector has been clearly evidenced by Liberal, Union Nationale and Parti québécois initiatives. From 1960 to 1980, Quebec expenditures grew at a faster rate than all other provinces. By 1980, expenditures of all government levels in Quebec were 48 percent of the Gross Provincial Product, compared with 26 percent in Alberta and 37 percent in Ontario.[98] Quebec has made extensive use of Crown agencies to stimulate economic growth and to restructure regional activity. The Quebec state has never wavered, since 1959, in either creating and leading economic initiatives or in vigorously promoting them through the private sector.

3.4b The Liberal Regime, 1960-1966

Francophone businessmen did not control the agenda of the Quiet Revolution. However, government policymakers were committed to using the state to expand the Francophone presence in the private sector. The architects of the Quiet Revolution were nationalists, not socialists, and saw the state as a valuable tool in rectifying the historic weakness of Francophones in Quebec capitalism. To counteract threats of Quebec's marginalization in the economic sphere, the Lesage government adopted a dual strategy of increasing the size, number and influence of state corporations and enhancing its support of Francophone-owned companies. In fact, the overall aim of 1960 Liberal economic policy was

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[98] Statistics Canada, Provincial Economic Accounts, Catalogue No. 13-213, 1980.

to create viable, competitive capitalist enterprises, controlled by Francophones, which would be strong enough to participate fully in North America's advanced industrial economy.[99] The strategy was to create institutions parallel to foreign corporations and to strengthen them where they could be competitive.[100]

An initial Liberal step was the creation of a central planning body, the Conseil d'orientation économique du Québec (COEQ), in 1961. In 1962 COEQ recommended establishing the Société générale de financement (SGF), to support and favour the formation of Quebec enterprises and to sell shares in these endeavours. A second way local entrepreneurs found capital was through the Caisse de dépôts et de placements du Québec. Created in 1964, the Caisse was established to administer funds coming initially from Quebec's pension plan and, as the centrepiece of Quebec financial institutions, holds over $40 billion in assets. This had a dual effect. First, the Caisse became a vital purchaser of Quebec bond issues, which reduced the government's dependence on English Canadian and American capital. Second, it was a source of capital to advance Quebec's economic development. Today, the Caisse enjoys massive support and is lauded as a touchstone of Quebec's economic independence. During the 1960s, Ottawa was unsuccessful in convincing other provinces to follow Quebec's lead in the pension field, so it would not appear to have special status.

3.4c The Union Nationale, 1966-1970

One commonly held misconception is that under 1966-1970 Union Nationale governments, state economic initiatives were weakened and un-progressive. While significant economic growth did occur in the 1960-1966 period, and the Liberals placed a greater

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[99] One of the better descriptions of post-1960 Quebec state growth is found in Gagnon and Montçalm, Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution, pp.25-36.

[100] This idea is emphasized in the "Tetley Report". See Quebec, Executive Council, A Quebec Policy on Foreign Investment: Report of the Interdepartmental Task Force on Foreign Investment, 1973.

premium on government planning, this was largely a response to the "catching-up" mentality that pervaded Quebec society at the time, as well as a counter to the inactivity of the state under Duplessis. However, statistics reveal the fact that the greatest growth of the provincial bureaucracy occured from 1966 to 1968.[101]

It is inaccurate to advance the argument that the post-Duplessis Union Nationale abandoned the statist approach. In fact, the Union Nationale expanded many Liberal initiatives, particularly in social policy and regional economic development - while contending with a stringent financial situation. The UN established a Quebec Housing Corporation (Société d'habitation du Québec), an industrial credit office, Ministries of Financial Institutions, Companies and Cooperatives; Labour and Manpower; Immigration; Public Service; and Communications. In addition, the Union Nationale created L'Office de Planification du Québec, La Société québécoise d'initiatives pétrolières, involved itself in the natural resource sector (REXFOR), expanded SIDBEC steel,[102] and instituted a public health insurance initiative.[103] Specifically, in terms of support for indigenous economic initiatives, the Union Nationale developed an incentive system, in 1968, for high-technology firms locating or expanding in Quebec, awarding grants of up to $5 million. Further, in establishing the CEGEP college system in 1970, the party wasted no effort in furthering its belief that post-secondary education, emphasizing professional and business programs, should be at a high premium in modern Quebec.

3.4d Liberal Governments, Post-1970

After 1970, Liberal initiatives emphasized the Keynesian approach to intervention.

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101 Paul-André Linteau et al., Le Québec depuis 1930, p.627.

102 See McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p.211.

103 See Brunelle, La désillusion tranquille, chapître 4.

Again, a paternal nationalism rather than socialism prevailed. Make-work projects, subsidies, technical support, research and a favourable fiscal environment favoured private enterprise. One of the most important direct business assistance programs, the Société de développement industriel (SDI) - 1971, subsidized small and medium-sized Quebec firms. In addition, it aided in establishing public enterprise as a central feature of Québécois capitalism. Five state corporations were established or expanded during the Lesage administration, and nine more were created between 1967 and 1978.[104]

Besides the Caisse, two other centralized pools of capital are under Québécois control: the Banque nationale du Canada (BNC) and the Mouvement Desjardins. The BNC is the only Francophone-controlled institution capable of offering full industrial and commercial services. The Mouvement Desjardins is the largest financial co-operative in Quebec. In 1986, the Desjardins movement had close to 1500 caisses populaires, with total assets exceeding $30 billion.[105] Collectively, the cooperative movement controls a greater share of savings than any bank. Like the banking sector, the Mouvement has been heavily involved in the centralized control of large amounts of capital.[106] In 1976, the government created the Sociétés de developpement de l'enterprise Québécoises (SODEQS). These institutions provide risk capital for manufacturing enterprises with production concentrated in Quebec, which in turn promotes a Quebec-based capitalist class. Relating this to PQ economic strategy, in its policy paper "Bâtir le Québec", William Coleman notes the private sector "was to be primarily responsible for assuring economic development; it would decide where to start up

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[104] Linteau at al., Le Québec depuis 1930, p.431.

[105] Les Affaires, January 24, 1987, p.8.

[106] A thorough study of Quebec financial institutions is Pierre Fournier, Les Sociétés d'État et les objectifs économique du Québec: une évaluation préliminaire, (Québec, 1979).

an enterprise, where and when to invest, and which new markets would be tackled."[107]

The post-1985 Liberal government has de-emphasized the Keynesian approach and is private sector oriented, advocating restraint and privatization where warranted. Also, Bourassa administrations have conformed to international pressures, led by the United States and Britain, to roll back the state. The party's sizable election victories in 1985 and 1989 attest to perceptions in Quebec that there are inevitable limits to state capitalism, which has been pursued vigorously since 1960. Early in its mandate, the Liberal government released three task force reports which laid the groundwork for its economic orientation. The composition of the committees drafting the reports, and the representation of two of their chairmen at the cabinet table, indicated a turn to the right. In fact, the reports on privatization (Fortier), deregulation (Scowen) and administrative efficiency (Gobeil) all reflected, in Donald Savage's words, "the wish list of the business community"[108], which has changed considerably in the past thirty years.

The current recession has forced the Bourassa government to continue to abstain from state-activist economic policies; however, one should not conclude that this government will remain removed from efforts to stimulate the economy. Despite the economic forces working on the North American economy, the general thrust of the Liberal government has been unshaken since 1985. Further, since 1983, the overwhelming emphasis of Parti québécois and Liberal governments has been to de-emphasize regulation and allow market forces to spur economic growth. The current Liberal administration is endeavouring to promote Quebec's private sector growth and international presence; however, today's fiscal realities have temporarily forced it to emphasize these policies with minimal public sector involvement.

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[107] Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec, p.104. See also Québec, Développement économique, Bâtir le Québec: Énoncé de politique économique, (Québec, 1979), p.4.

[108] Donald C. Savage, "Québec: La démolition tranquille", Canadian Political Science Association Bulletin 16:2 (November 1986), p.12.

Chapter Four

The Parti Québécois

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the roots of the contemporary Quebec independence movement, the polarized ideology of the Parti québécois (PQ), and its subsequent policy outputs from 1968 to the Meech Lake era. It will show how PQ (government) policy orientations have been largely congruent with Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) and Union Nationale policy choices and a contributing factor to the movement for special status.

4.1 Propositions

A number of propositions will test the theory of policy convergence. First, Parti québécois electoral successes were largely due to an ability to harmonize divergent nationalist interests into one voice for sovereignty-association or special status. Its successes were possible only under a strong, charismatic leader with a wide, though not necessarily indépendantiste, policy agenda. Second, harmonization weakened the thrust for independence by drawing mild nationalist sentiment into the PQ, leading to an ineffectual sovereignty policy objective. This occurred because the PQ, to gain electoral success, first had to deny its main policy thrust (independence) and satisfy the largely federalist electorate by promising good government and/or future referenda and negotiations with Canada. Third, notwithstanding the rhetoric, Quebecers have been conditioned since the 1960s to desire nothing more or less than special constitutional status within Canada. Fourth, the PQ's call for sovereignty-association, which is special status, is the outgrowth of intra-party faction and inter-party convergence, epitomizing a form of collusion (perhaps unknowingly) between all post-1960 Quebec governments for special status. Fifth, corporatism thrives as special interest groups, usually extreme in nature, continùe to lead public opinion and adversely impact Quebec governments

on nationalist questions. This analysis of the PQ shows that convergence is apparent in language policy (particularly in education and immigration issues), use of the state apparatus for capitalist-nationalist economic development, and constitutional issues.

4.2 Ideological Roots and Development of the Parti Québécois

The Parti québécois is the outgrowth of extreme ideological polarizations which characterized the beginnings of Quebec's contemporary independence movement in 1957[1]. On the right were groups such as Alliance Laurentienne (1957) and the Parti Républicain du Québec (1962). On the left were Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec (1960), the Parti Socialiste du Québec (1962), as well as other supporters of La Révue Socialiste, a publication through which radical nationalism found expression. More successful movements, like le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), the Mouvement Souverainété-Association (MSA) and the Ralliement National also thrived.

The PQ is a direct outgrowth of at least four groups, each with divergent views on independence: Alliance Laurentienne, le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), le Regroupement National/Ralliement National, and le Mouvement Souverainété-Association (MSA). At the time of its formation in 1968, the PQ's objective was to assemble all the discordant voices calling for independence; to achieve a synthesis of "valid approaches" and a collective personality, wishfully attracting a majority of the electorate.

4.2a Alliance Laurentienne

Alliance Laurentienne, in cooperation with Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec, was one of two movements directly responsible for the modern Quebec independence movement. Citing the brutality of the conquest of 1759 and the threat of assimilation, it began as a reactionary organization aligned with the Société St. Jean Baptiste.

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[1] A good (neo-Marxist) analysis of post-World War II ideological movements in Quebec is Denis Monière, Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p.262.

In 1957, the Alliance organized itself to promote Quebec's political independence. It had a certain nostalgia for the French empire in America and an inherent belief in the superiority of the French humanist culture. Further, it envisaged a radical change - the creation of a Catholic corporatist régime - and saw itself as the movement that would prepare the way for Quebec's Salazar or Bolivar.[2] The Alliance was a minor player in the ideological development of the Parti québécois; it disbanded in 1963 but was reorganized under the Regroupement National banner. Most Alliance Laurentienne members found the PQ too radical and joined the nationalist wing of the Union Nationale.

4.2b Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale

The Rassemblement pour l'indépendence nationale (RIN), the first mass-based vehicle for modern Quebec separatism, advocated the "political disengagement of Quebec from Canada".[3] Formed in 1960 by André d'Allemagne and Marcel Chaput (discontented federal civil servants), it was composed chiefly of disaffected Francophone intelligentsia and radical students concerned "about questions of language and culture".[4] Initially it espoused a form of nationalism which favoured no specific socio-economic group or political doctrine. Rassemblement nationalism was not defensive, reacting to unsatisfied demands, but a moderately aggressive nationalism which could not be satisfied by federalism. Thus, the RIN represented a significant departure from conventional nationalism, though it did support certain traditional measures like claims to Labrador and unilingualism. The first systematic calls for a unilingual language policy were made in the early 1960s by the RIN. Party leader

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[2] Some good reading can be found on this movement. See, for example, Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", in Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXVI (November 1960), pp.553-61; and Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study", in Queen's Quarterly LXXII (Spring 1965), pp.150-68.

[3] Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClellenad and Stewart, 1988), p.245.

[4] François-Pierre Gingras, "Le Rassemblement pour l'Indépendence Nationale ou l'indépendence: du mouvement sociale au parti politique", in Réjean Pelletier (ed.), Partis Politiques au Québec (Montréal: Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1976), p.238.

Pierre Bourgault labeled French language policy in education as "the best means of assimilating" Anglophones as well as immigrants to Quebec."[5] Its 1962 pamphlet, "Le bilinguisme qui nous tué", argued against the inherent inequalities of bilingualism. The RIN also promoted a "nonconfessional social democracy", a mixed economy, massive state intervention and the advance of new secular values. Clearly the leaders of the RIN, in preparing such a broad program, accomplished what no other Québécois party had done.

The RIN never managed to obtain a significant measure of Francophone nationalist support. Though it became a party in 1963 under Bourgault, it continued to concentrate on tactics such as marches, demonstrations and attacks on symbols of English power rather than eliciting support from the electorate. The life of the RIN was marked by several splits - a recurring element of Québécois politics - and in 1962, right and left-wing factions emerged. For example, Bourgault argued that Quebec could not be independent without being socialist.[6] Disagreeing, Chaput and the conservative element left and formed the Parti Républicain du Québec.[7] After accepting Chaput's decision to form a party in 1963, the PRQ disbanded and its members returned to the RIN. The most important split occurred when the conservative element became powerless and Chaput again led a revolt out of the party and formed le Regroupement National, under René Jutras, in 1964. Le Regroupement National later formed an alliance with les Créditistes, becoming the Ralliement National (RN). In 1966, the RIN and RN together gained eight percent of the popular vote, winning no seats.[8] As the first of the new wave of separatist organizations, the RIN came before the PQ in attracting separatists

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[5] Marc Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p.53.

[6] See Monière, Ideologies in Quebec, p.264.

[7] Henry Milner and Sheilagh Hodgins Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p.176.

[8] Réjean Pelletier, Le Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale, Une analyse systémique-fonctionnelle d'un parti politique, (Doctoral thesis, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1972).

of many political persuasions.

The PQ emerged as the principal vehicle for contemporary Quebec nationalism in the wake of the RIN's annual convention in 1968. A severe crisis featuring a split between its revolutionary neo-Marxist faction and Bourgault's middle-of-the-road faction culminated in a resolution to terminate the RIN. The radicals formed le Front de Libération Populaire while the remainder joined the PQ, which had already attracted a considerable portion of the membership, because it had better electoral prospects.

4.2c The Ralliement National

The RN was a conservative party made up of former RIN (Regroupement National) and Social Credit members. Disagreements between the two factions were prevalent;[9] its leaders debated whether to emphasize economic and social reform or political independence. It appears that Lévesque recognized the value of a wide spectrum of support for sovereignty, under the MSA banner, when he sought the support of the RN leader, Gilles Grégoire, after talks with the RIN broke down in 1966. In October, 1968 a joint venture between the MSA, the RIN and most members of the RN created the Parti québécois. However, the RN component of the Parti québécois did not prove to be instrumental in developing specific policy alternatives, and its membership remained on the fringes of the PQ.

4.2d Mouvement Souveraineté-Association

The MSA was carved out of a remnant of the Lesage Liberals (PLQ) after a rift in the party divided it in two. Early in 1967, René Lévesque had initiated informal meetings with confidantes, including Robert Bourassa, to help determine the future course of the Liberal Party. The group's near-unanimous conclusions called for the essential components of independence, and the complete mastery of every last area of collective decision-making along

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[9] For an excellent analysis of right-wing protest movements in Quebec, see Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: A Political Analysis of Social Credit in Quebec, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

with economic association with Canada.[10] Lévesque left the Liberal Party in October, 1967 after its Constitutional Committee rejected his claims. Ironically, the Committee had proposed a resolution calling for sweeping changes to federalism, not unlike Lévesque's claims. In describing the Liberal report, John Saywell states it:

> called for new powers for Quebec: radio and television; immigration; social security and manpower; monetary and tariff policy; marriage and divorce; commercial and financial corporations; full power in international affairs for all matters within its jurisdiction; possibly control over fisheries and transport; and the necessary financial powers to reflect the responsibilities... radical changes in the Senate and Supreme Court, a bill of rights guaranteeing minority rights, and asked whether the country should not be a republic... abolition of the monarchy, the end of appeals to courts outside the province, and a bill of rights.[11]

Similarly, Lévesque's beliefs, and the future PQ platform, were contained in these words:

> we must then propose to maintain an association in a common enterprise without which it would be, for one as well as the other, impossible to preserve and on this continent societies distinct from the United States. Such an association seems to us tailored to permit us to make common cause with permanent consultations, flexible adjustments and appropriate mechanisms which our common economic interest requires: monetary union, a common tariff and coordination of fiscal policies.[12]

After asserting that independence would lead to "the devaluation of money, austerity measures, flight of capital, problems of borrowing in foreign markets and increases in the cost of imports", Bourassa severed his relationship with Lévesque.[13] The Liberal report, though far more radical than the failed 1987 Meech Lake Accord, was proclaimed "federalist" by Jean Lesage, "for it did not do away with the federal parliament." National newspapers

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10 The speech was published in its entirety in Le Devoir, September 19 to 21, 1967.

11 See John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois:1967-1976 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.17.

12 This excerpt was approved by key riding supporters in Lévesque's Montreal riding.

13 Bourassa's report was made public September 26, 1967. For an excellent analysis of the inherent weaknesses in economic sovereignty, see Robert Bourassa, "L'union monétaire et l'union politique sont indissociables", in Textes référendaire, Parti Libéral du Québec, 1980.

quickly criticized the report as totally disruptive if not separatist.[14]

4.3 The PQ - Factions

From its inception, two ideological groupings have constituted the PQ: the technocrats and the participationists.[15] Since 1981 a third faction, les orthodoxes, has arisen in response to the failed 1980 referendum and the 1985 struggle over renewed federalism. This study's fourth proposition is based on the premise that the PQ's progress has been marked at every stage by struggles among these groups; the results can be seen in the party's program, its structures and its policy style.

The technocrats were the Liberal wing of the party, led by René Lévesque[16] and including Jacques Parizeau, Claude Morin, Bernard Landry and Guy Joron. Their goal to create a reformed cadre party and to construct a technically efficient Quebec emphasized rationality, efficiency and functionalism; a "management of society by the state".[17]
The participationists (the RIN component), who were generally radical and concerned with democratic socialism,[18] opposed the emphasis on efficiency and rationality. They underlined the need for grassroots democracy and decentralized decision-making. Represented by André Larocque and MNA's including Robert Burns, Louis O'Neill and Jacques Couture, the participationists proposed a structure similar to the constitution of the Communist League of Yugoslavia. Their goal was to create a party of militants.

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[14] See, The Globe and Mail, October 12, 1967.

[15] Perhaps the two best analyses are Don and Vera Murray, "The Parti Québécois: from Opposition to Power", in Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.243-54; and Denis Monière, Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p.267.

[16] Don and Vera Murray, The Parti Québécois: From..., p.244.

[17] Monière, Ideologies in Quebec, p.267.

[18] Don and Vera Murray, The Parti Québécois: From..., p.245.

Les orthodoxes, led by Camille Laurin, Jacques Parizeau and Gilbert Paquette, emerged after the 1980 referendum and sought to retrench the sovereignty option back into the party. This group represents a cross-section of party/government members whose sole objective is a sovereign Quebec. However, most orthodox members deserted the PQ in 1985 after René Lévesque sought to renew Quebec's position within Canada.

Much of the PQ program, from 1968 to 1971 particularly, bore a remarkable resemblance to the Liberal program of 1966.[19] This is not surprising since this program was largely inherited from the MSA and drawn up by former Liberals. Most importantly, this technocratic-biased program, though amended by five policy conventions, has constituted a general declaration of principles which, except from 1984 to 1988, has characterized the PQ's philosophy since its inception. The most striking example of this "Liberal" ideological orientation can be seen in PQ programs before 1971. There was no systematic critique of the capitalist system and economic efficiency was the primary orientation. When the prospects for electoral victory were bleak (from 1971 to 1974), the PQ's program constituted two elements: social democracy and independence. It had clear technocratic biases, however, vesting in the state a major role in defining and organizing the community. Jacques Parizeau, an economist who joined the party in 1969, and after rejoining as leader in 1988, fervently solidified the party program. Parizeau has consistently stressed the concept of decision-planning and the reality of external decision-making powers influencing the Quebec economy. Notwithstanding the party's past left-of-centre orientation, this continues to be the basis for PQ (Quebec) support for free trade and a post-"sovereignty" economic association with Canada. Under Lévesque, Parizeau and Morin, the emphasis was on the increased role of the state and, today, a variance of the technocratic vision remains predominant. In the economic

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[19] The PLQ program had moved towards nationalism in the wake of PQ and Union Nationale strength, especially on the language issue.

field, for example, the basic principle of the party program has been centralization of decisions coupled with administrative devolution.[20] Even the program's concept of social change is technocratic and hints at no basic modification of the existing social structures. Everywhere in the program, the role of the state is spelled out and its technocratic tools are planning, centralization, reorganization, coordination and, if necessary, nationalization.

The Lévesque/Parizeau wing remains central to party policy. Because of widespread distrust of the aims of the former Liberal group, the participationists continued to play a key role until after 1980 and some remnants of this group remain active. The circumstances surrounding this compromise are important for the understanding of the future functioning of the party. Even René Lévesque was often ill at ease with some MSA policies and structures, especially on the language issue.[21] On another occasion, in 1971, Lévesque was unable to prevent the election to the PQ Conseil Exécutif of Pierre Bourgault, his ideological antithesis. In fact, Lévesque and successor Pierre-Marc Johnson faced policy conflicts at nearly every convention.[22] The paradox is that while the participationists gained ground in radicalizing the party program, the technocrats convinced voters that a contrary evolution had taken place in the party. They did this through tight control of the electoral strategy and machinery. Of the eight members of the crucial cabinet priorities committee, established in 1976, seven were technocrats and only Robert Burns represented the participationists.[23]

Since the mid-1980s, the internal emphasis in the PQ has been the ideological campaign between les orthodoxes, who have grown in number but not stature, and the

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[20] Don and Vera Murray, The Parti Québécois: From..., p.247.

[21] Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.73.

[22] Don and Vera Murray, The Parti Québécois: From..., p.248.

[23] Ibid, p.251.

pseudo-federalist wing, which seeks some sort of special status within Canada. Parizeau seems committed to an orthodox stance; however, most of the caucus is moderate.

4.4 Election Strategies and Public Opinion Polls

Parti Québecois constitutional policy has evolved along with public sentiment on the independence issue. This is clearly evident from historical analysis. Support for Quebec independence has been repeatedly measured in polls since 1962, using either identical or similar questions.[24] National studies in 1968 and 1974 found that only about 9 percent of Quebec respondents favoured separation. Indeed, prior to the PQ victory in 1976, virtually all polls tended to support the argument that the majority of Quebecers neither want nor expect political independence.[25] Since 1976, opinion polls have revealed that the words "separation" and "independence" yield somewhat different results, as do the concepts "political" and "economic independence".[26] A CBC survey found 32 percent favouring "une separation politique du Quebec moyennant une association economique avec le Canada" - the official goal of the PQ.[27] Since the 1987 Meech Lake initiative, a number of polls disclosed the same results. English Canada's rejection of Meech in 1990, however, uncharacteristically raised the level of support for independence to unprecedented heights. However, pro-independence fervour has waned since then and is only marginally higher than the pre-Meech period. A 1991 survey revealed 31 percent support for a completely independent Quebec

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[24] Maurice Pinard has done considerable research into independence polling in Quebec. A good source, which conveys a great deal of information on the subject, is Pinard, "The Dramatic Reemergence of the Quebec Independence Movement", Journal of International Studies, Winter 1992, 45, no. 2. pp.471-97.

[25] Laurence Leduc, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 41, Spring 1977 - Winter 1978, p.348.

[26] Maurice Pinard's consistent view is that in response to various surveys asking whether economic conditions in Quebec would get better, get worse or remain the same should Quebec become an independent country, there has always been a plurality, when not a clear majority, of Québécois who said they expected economic conditions to worsen. In Pinard's view, this is the main motivational barrier to supporting that option. See Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "Motivational Dimensions in the Quebec Independence Movement", Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, 9, 1986, pp.225-80.

[27] Leduc, Public Opinion Quarterly, p. 349.

with no formal ties to Canada.[28] A joint Globe and Mail/CBC poll, April 22, 1991, showed significant support for political independence and economic association,[29] as does a May, 1991 Gallup poll[30] and a May, 1991 poll commissioned by the Centre de Récherche sur l'Opinion Publique.[31] Above all, Angus Reid polls commissioned in 1991 found a massive percentage of Quebecers (80 percent) supporting a "renewed federal system WITH a completely new distribution of powers" (my emphasis added). It is ironic that Jacques Parizeau led the anti-Charlottetown Accord forces in Quebec in 1992 with the proviso that a rejection of the Accord did not mean support for independence.

The fact remains that support for outright independence has not increased enough to confer on the PQ the necessary backing to formulate a hard independence stance. It is also clear, however, that support for sovereignist parties has increased steadily since the 1960s. This began with the approximately 10 percent of the vote garnered by the RIN and the RN in 1966, was expressed in the 41 percent obtained by the PQ in 1976 and culminates in the party's current support level of about 45 percent. However, PQ victories in 1976 and 1981 were not predicated on massive support for independence. In 1976 the PQ campaigned on a "clean government" platform and committed itself to a referendum on sovereignty-association; in 1981, the party was re-elected because of its progressive policies and the inherent weakness of the Claude Ryan Liberals.

Since the early 1970s, the PQ has recognized the need to dissociate itself from radical separatists and has sought out pragmatic policy arenas to exploit. The catalyst was anti-separatists discredited the PQ and nationalism by capitalizing on negativity surrounding

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[28] Angus Reid Group, Portrait of a Troubled Country, (Winnipeg and Ontario: Angus Reid Group, 1991).

[29] The Globe and Mail, April 22, 1991.

[30] The Gazette, January 28, 1991.

[31] The Gazette, May 1 and 4, 1991.

the 1970 Front de Libération du Québec crisis, which brought about the imposition of the War Measures Act. The fallout was so bad that PQ membership declined from eighty thousand in April 1970 to thirty-five thousand by mid-1971.[32] This strategy was successful; the PQ obtained only 23 percent of the popular vote in the 1970 election and 30 percent in 1973.[33] While sovereignty-association remained a cornerstone of the PQ platform throughout its stay in power, it was subordinated during each of its election campaigns from 1976 to 1985 to avoid alienating certain parts of the electorate.

With grim electoral prospects, the PQ leadership, in 1973, based its election campaign on independence and produced an "independence budget", designed to counter arguments against the viability of economic independence. The Liberal strategy successfully focused on the existing order and, subsequently, it secured 55 percent of the vote and 102 seats. Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard show that even the unemployed and those dissatisfied with the Liberals but opposed to independence voted 63 percent and 49 percent, respectively, for the Liberals. The UN and other parties fared poorly in the campaign.[34]

After 1973, when it seemed moderation might produce results, the PQ emphasized issues like electoral reform, the need for a "real" government and freedom from corruption. In 1974 the party executive persuaded a reluctant convention to endorse the commitment to a referendum on independence. However, this commitment was significantly weakened by Claude Morin's policy of étapisme, or a gradual progression towards sovereignty-association. The PQ was thus able to turn aside attempts to frighten voters with radical independence, and embraced the traditional approach of concentrating on the voters' dissatisfaction with the

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[32] Vera Murray and Don Murray, De Bourassa à Lévesque (Montréal: Les Éditions Quinze, 1978), p.141.

[33] Ibid.

[34] The best analysis of the 1973 election is Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Electorate: The 1973 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 2 (June 1977).

incumbent government and by promising a series of short-term social democratic policies which could be accomplished without achieving independence.[35] In the 1976 campaign the PQ reassured the voters, not by asking them to vote for an elaborate program, but instead to cast a ballot for "good government".[36] The relatively narrow range between the PQ's 30 percent popular support in 1973 and 41 percent in 1976 suggests that the linkage between behaviour in elections and expression of opinion toward independence may be more complex than is first supposed. From 1976 to 1985, the PQ legislated popular policies such as consumer protection, campaign financing reform, free medication and dental care for seniors, advertising reform, handicap rights and public automobile insurance. After Lévesque's retirement in 1985, Pierre-Marc Johnson led the fractious government into an election where it retained only 24 seats and 38 percent of the vote. The Robert Bourassa-led Liberals won 98 seats and 56 percent of the vote.

Current PQ strategy is officially focused on Jacques Parizeau's pronouncement, in 1988, that the PQ is "sovereignist before, during and after an election". However, the party has not wavered in its commitment to an economic association, if not attachment, to English Canada. Unofficially, PQ strategy centres around total antagonism to organized attempts to renew federalism, and waiting its turn to form another government. Interestingly, Parizeau's April, 1992 statement that the sovereignty referendum should be put off until the economy stabilizes reinforces the belief that the PQ is still looking for some sort of special status for Quebec. Nevertheless, outwardly, the PQ will continue to lead the call for sovereignty-association.

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[35] A good analysis of the étapisme policy is found in Graham Fraser, PQ: René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1985), p.191.

[36] For an excellent analysis of the 1976 campaign and reasons for the PQ victory, see Raymond Hudon, "Political Parties and the Polarization of Quebec Politics", in Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979).

4.5 Parti Québécois Language Policy, 1976-1985

The PQ's major offensive has been in developing, implementing and defending its language policy. After turning away from radical indépendantisme after 1976, the PQ concentrated on policy initiatives which would strengthen Québécois support for symbolic measures of Quebec power, and increase the province's autonomy within Canada. For example, by limiting access to English-language schools, the government's 1977 White Paper reflected "a determination that Quebec, not Canada, should be the preeminent community" in language policy.[37] As Coleman points out, "the struggle for autonomy in the 1970s was a struggle to integrate several cultures through the use of a common language, French."[38].

Linguist Uriel Weinrich shows that loyalty to one language, "in contrast to other languages, assumes a high position in a scale of values, a position in need of being defended."[39] Moreover, language can dictate the way that we cut perceptually into the flux of nature, the very way we cognitively organize our environment.[40] In the words of René Lévesque:

> We are Québécois... Being ourselves is essentially a matter of keeping and developing a personality that has survived for three and a half centuries. At the core of this personality is the fact that we speak French. Everything else depends on this one essential element and follows from it or leads us infallibly back to it.[41]

Language loyalty has long been a component of Parti québécois ideology. Further, as outlined in chapter 3, Quebec language policy has always been centred around education and immigration. In a bilingual or multilingual environment, particularly, the importance of

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[37] McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p.276.

[38] William Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p.19.

[39] Uriel Weinreich, Languages in Contact: Findings and Problems, (The Hague, 1964), p.99.

[40] Benjamin Lee Wharf, Language, Thought and Reality, (Cambridge, 1956).

[41] René Lévesque, An Option for Quebec, (Toronto, 1968), p.17.

coherent language policy cannot be underestimated. Québécois culture has traditionally been built upon an ethnically homogeneous social base. The conscious strategy of past elite-based Québec governments has been to minimize contacts with other groups and to promote child bearing. As shown below, immigration and education policy has impacted the language issue in post-1970 Quebec in a significant fashion:

TABLE 4.1

Distribution of Allophone Pupils by Language, 1970-1988

Year	French	English
1970-71	7.9	92.1
1973-74	11.4	88.6
1976-77	22.3	77.7
1983-84	45.4	54.6
1984-85	51.3	48.7
1985-86	54.0	46.0
1986-87	60.0	40.0
1987-88	66.2	33.8

Source: Conseil de la langue française, "Vivre la diversité en français: Le défi de l'école française à clientele pluriethnique de l'île de Montréal" (Québec: CLF, 1987)

The language issue has been the best way (others being membership in international organizations and lobbying for unilateral powers over immigration) for all post-1966 Quebec governments to elicit Francophone support for special status. From the 1960s, there was agreement in indépendantiste circles that "in a sovereign Quebec, French will be the sole official language", and that all immigrant children should attend French schools.[42] Beyond this consensus, however, there were sharp divisions over language and schooling.[43] Separatists such as François Aquin and Pierre Bourgault endorsed the abolishment of all English-language schools. Lévesque called this radical position "injustice in response to

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[42] Don and Vera Murray, De Bourassa à Lévesque, p.81.

[43] See Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.72.

injustice"[44] and, when it initially carried at the MSA's founding convention, he resigned, only to return when the delegates reversed themselves. Lévesque demanded guarantees for publicly-supported English-language schooling for Anglophone children. It would be the first of numerous episodes where Lévesque personally interceded to prevent radicals from adopting a hard-line unilingualist stance.[45] In fact, Lévesque always regarded the language legislation process as "fundamentally humiliating" and thought that language laws were "instruments that only a colonized society would give itself"[46]. Since the PQ has never been a monolithic force, intra-party divisions over language and other policies continue. Because of Lévesque's power, the early platforms of the PQ recognized the right of English schools "to be subsidized proportionally to the English-speaking population."[47]

The PQ was able to successfully draft and defend its 1977 language bill (101) because Minister of State for Cultural Development Camille Laurin spearheaded the issue and found nothing at all humiliating about it.[48] Laurin viewed the enterprise as a "projet de société", a kind of shock therapy, which would reassert Francophone identity and self-esteem and bring the English-speaking community to its real proportions.[49] The White Paper, "Quebec's Policy on the French Language", logically unveiled PQ government policy; its underlying premise was that if language were the core of collective community, then French-Québécois culture could not survive in a bilingual framework. The White Paper restated the

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[44] René Lévesque, Attendez que je me rappelle... (Montréal: Éditions Québec/Amérique, 1986), p.306.

[45] Vera Murray, Le Parti québécois: de la fondation à la prise du pouvoir (Montréal: Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1976), pp.109-16.

[46] Lévesque, Attendez que je me rappelle, p.388.

[47] Murray, Le Parti québécois: de la foundation a la prise du pouvoir, p.114.

[48] Laurin's continuous hard-line stance since 1976-77 is ironic in that, until that time, he maintained a position of being a vocal opponent of unilingualist resolutions at PQ congrès general. See Murray, Le Parti québécois, p.116.

[49] Fraser, PQ: René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power, p.96.

standard post-1960 Francophone concerns about cultural security and, citing the proliferation of immigrant Anglicization, declared "there is no doubt that the situation of the French language in Quebec justifies vigilance and intervention by the government".[50] It outlined a far-reaching francisation program for the economy. Public and commercial signs were to be in French only. Over the initial objections of Premier Lévesque, the White Paper proposed that Quebec ignore Section 133 of the BNA Act and declare French Quebec's sole official language.[51] Moreover, the paper called for all municipalities, school boards and health and social service institutions to use French as their language of internal communications, draw up all official texts and documents in French and communicate with the government and other public agencies in French. Hiring and promotions could occur only if the employee had "appropriate" knowledge of French.[52] Like previous governments, the PQ policy emphasized that "the English school must cease being an assimilating force and must be reserved for those for whom it was intended".[53]

The PQ caucus was divided over the measure. All agreed that Allophones should send their children to French-language schools. However, Lévesque, Morin, and Gérard Godin favoured a "Canada Clause" which would permit all English-Canadian children to have access to English-language schools.[54] Lévesque attempted a compromise by proposing "reciprocity accords" with other provinces, but was spurned on the grounds that their negotiating bilateral accords would legitimate the PQ's sovereignty aspirations. While the

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[50] As several critics noted, the White Paper's use of demographic data was especially slippery, relying mainly on the dated 1972 study Charbonneau and Maheu produced for the Gendron Commission, which forecast a solid Francophone majority in Montreal and Quebec through the 1990's given prevailing migration paterns and birthrates.

[51] see Fraser, PQ, pp.101-2.

[52] La politique québécoise de la langue française, pp.36-8.

[53] Ibid, pp.46-7.

[54] La Presse, May 31, 1977; and Fraser, PQ, pp.105-10.

PQ's former Bill 1 contained some radical regulations on language and the economy, pressure from mainly Montreal-based employer groups forced revisions that left Bill 101's francisation program only incrementally stiffer than the Liberal's Bill 22.[55]

Between 1979 and 1988, Quebec courts and the Canadian Supreme Court handed down several judgments that abrogated sections of Bill 101. In 1979, the Supreme Court declared that Chapter III, making French the sole official language of Quebec, was unconstitutional. In 1982, the newly-repatriated Canadian Constitution, in Section 23, guaranteed access to English-language schools in Quebec to children of parents who had received their primary education anywhere in Canada, a stipulation that directly clashed with Bill 101. In 1984, the Supreme Court upheld Quebec lower-court decisions that abrogated Article 73 of Bill 101 - the Quebec clause - as incompatible with Article 23 of the Canadian Constitution. However, a core provision of Bill 101, on the language of education, remained intact - immigrants would still be compelled to send their children to French schools.

Despite these court decisions, by the early 1980s, Bill 101 had generated a sense of "relative linguistic security in the French-speaking community".[56] In 1982, Lévesque negotiated with Alliance-Quebec, the English rights spokesgroup, on "rounding the edges" of Bill 101's most contentious provisions. After two months of hearings, the government introduced Bill 57, which recognized English language institutions; enforced institutional bilingualism in English language hospitals, schools and social service agencies; allowed English language institutions to designate which employees must be bilingual; abolished French proficiency tests for professionals who were graduates of Quebec English-language high schools; and no longer required Anglophone municipal governments and local institutions

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[55] See William Coleman, "From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of Language Under the Parti Québécois", Canadian Journal of Political Science 14:3 (September 1981): pp.459-85.

[56] Daniel Monnier, La Question linguistique: L'état de l'opinion publique (Montréal: Conseil de la langue française, 1984), p.9.

to use French as the language of internal communication or in communicating with each other.[57]

As is very typical of Quebec politics, compromises on issues such as language, brought about by the results of representative public opinion polls, have never satisfied both the English community (represented by Alliance Quebec and the Equality Party) and French nationalists (generally represented by le Mouvement Québec Française, the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste and le Front du Québec Française).[58] For example, an extensive 1988 survey revealed that over 60 percent of Montrealers from both linguistic communities favoured bilingual signs - in short, opposing the stipulations of Bill 101.[59] The survey also revealed, however, that both communities contained substantial "radical cores" on the signs issue: 32 percent of Francophones favoured "French-only" signs, and 34 percent of Anglophones supported complete "free choice". It appears that the power of special interest groups representing a Québec-Français orientation has characterized PQ language legislation, while Liberal language legislation has been commandeered by linguistic radicals from both communities and has subsequently been rendered fruitless.

4.6 The PQ and Capitalist Nationalist Economic Development

The PQ came to power in 1976 with clear nationalist goals and a social-democratic program that was perceived as pro-labour and anti-business.[60] The party extolled the virtues of mixed economies and called for state intervention "to compensate for weakness in the private sector, to ensure coherent development, and the presence of domestic influence in

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[57] Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p.130.

[58] Léon Dion in Le Devoir, January 6, 1989.

[59] Le Devoir, June 21, 1988.

[60] An excellent overview of the PQ's early relationship with business is Richard D. French, "Governing Without Business: The Parti Québécois in Power", in V.V. Murray (ed.), Theories of Business-Government Relations, (Toronto: Trans-Canada Press, 1985), from p.165.

strategic sectors".[61] By the end of 1981, however, the fiscal challenges of advanced capitalism, the deteriorating economic situation, the triumph of pro-business technocrats in the party and the 1980 referendum defeat, resulted in economic policies that veered away from public planning and social democracy and toward the corporatist model of private enterprise and fiscal restraint.

The PQ government was identified with a statist approach to economics, but it gradually converted to the view that the marketplace was the most effective allocator of resources. Jacques Parizeau continues to believe in a "dynamic and efficient" independent Quebec. According to Claude Jean Galipeau, "after the failed referendum vote, the PQ government turned towards markets and attempted to make the private sector into a leading agent of change. In short, "market nationalism" was born of political defeat".[62] According to Thomas Courchène of the Business Council on National Issues, the PQ became "the most business-oriented or market-oriented government in Canada",[63] and Graham Fraser states that Quebec's 1981/82 budget resulted "in the lowest corporation taxes in the country".[64] In fact, by 1983, Parizeau would proclaim that the promotion of a Francophone business class was the PQ's greatest achievement.[65] By 1985, the PQ's relations with business were markedly improved, while it lost its fraternity with organized labour. "From the time of the referendum, and particularly after the lowering of the province's credit rating in 1982", state Gagnon and Montcalm, "PQ policy almost single-mindedly strove to meet the private sector's

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[61] Gouvernement du Québec, Challenges for Quebec: A Statement on Economic Policy (Québec: Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1979), p.52.

[62] Claude Jean Galipeau, "Le Contre-Courant Québécois", in Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett (eds.), The Provincial State: Politics in Canada's Provinces and Territories, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1992), pp.131-2.

[63] Le Devoir, July 16, 1986.

[64] Fraser, PQ, p.266.

[65] A. Brian Tanguay, "Business, Labor and the State in the new Quebec", The American Review of Canadian Studies 17:4 (Winter 1987-88): p.403.

agenda."[66] The government's adoption of a business agenda and its movement away from centralized planning was embodied in two policy documents, Challenges for Quebec (1979) and The Technology Conversion (1982). Both documents espoused the virtues of marketplace economics; The Technology Conversion, which became a handbook for business-government relations after 1981, states that:

> The responsibility of ensuring sufficient, sustained development lies first of all with the private sector, since most enterprises are in this sector. The government of Quebec has, as one of its prime objectives, to create and maintain conditions favourable to the development and dynamism of private initiatives, and feels that the best system for effectively allocating resources remains the market economy.[67]

So important was the fostering of a beneficial relationship that the anticipated cost of the industrial strategy enunciated in these documents was to be, according to Bernard Landry, Minister of State for Economic Development, $1 billion a year up to 1986. The ramifications of this are fortified by the fact that the PQ had to renege on existing contracts with teachers and civil servants at this same time because of financial hardship.

Notwithstanding its past high level of labour, technocratic and intellectual support, the PQ has mirrored the Liberal party's reliance on the private market to regulate public sector salaries and benefits and, in the 1982-85 period, passed more anti-labour legislation than any previous administration. By affirming the private sector, the technocrat and participationist wings became dangerously polarized and destroyed what had once been a stable relationship with labour.

In the government's first term, labour relations did not approach previous levels of hostility. From 1981 to 1985, the PQ was forced to deal not only with constitutional issues, but a rising deficit, a lower credit rating and a recession which increased Quebec's

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[66] Alain G. Gagnon and Mary-Beth Montcalm, Quebec Beyond the Quiet Revolution, (Toronto: Nelson, 1990), p.123.

[67] Government of Quebec, The Technology Conversion (Québec: Développement économique), 1982, p.20.

unemployment rate from 10.4 to 13.8 percent. With 26 percent of Canada's population, Quebec had 42 percent of total unemployment.[68] These largely external pressures forced the PQ to diverge from its social democratic orientation to a position of fiscal restraint and market economics. A number of government bills were introduced in the 1981-85 period: Bill 72 restricted the right to strike for public sector workers; Bill 68 reduced pension benefits; and Bills 70 and 105 removed the right to strike, imposed wage settlements and working conditions until the end of 1985, and reduced public sector salaries by approximately 18.8 percent.[69] Finally, repressive legislation, Bill 111, suspended the Quebec and Canadian Charters of Rights and Freedoms by forcing teachers back to work, under the threat of dismissal or loss of seniority.

Despite this, PQ governments were very active in manipulating the state to kick-start economic development initiatives, including Opération solidarité économique, l'Office québécoise du commerce extérieur (an export promotion agency), and PME-innovatrice (a special assistance program for small and medium-sized firms).[70] By 1978, Quebec-based enterprises had access to more than 160 programs of economic assistance, including low interest loans, loan guarantees, research and development assistance, and provincial government equity and debt financing. Francophone-controlled enterprises have been the conscious beneficiaries.[71] In 1979, the Régime d'épargne-actions (the Quebec Stock Savings Plan) was established. By providing tax credits for stock purchases, the plan bestowed

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[68] Jacques Bélanger et al., La syndicalisation dans le secteur privé au Canada (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1983), p.39.

[69] See Louis Favreau and Pierre L'Heureux, Le projet de société de la CSN de 1966 à aujourd hui (Centre de formation populaire, Vie ouvrière, 1984), p.269.

[70] Gouvernment du Québec, The Technology Conversion, p.44.

[71] See Guide des programmes d'aide offerts aux enterprises québécoises (Québec: Direction générale des services aux enterprises, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce du Québec, 1979).

millions in tax breaks on wealthy Quebecers and raised over $5 billion in first-issue share purchases on the Montreal Stock Exchange. In 1984, the PQ passed Bill 75, deregulating the insurance industry and permitting insurance companies to invest in finance companies, use public deposits to grant commmercial loans and to diversify into mutual insurance, property management and, through holding companies, commercial and industrial investments.[72]

The Parti québécois government will also be remembered for its aggressive stance on the role of the Caisse de dépôts et de placements du Québec, which the Lesage government created to administer funds coming from Quebec's pension plan. Under the PQ, the Caisse became much more active. It was directed to purchase shares in Quebec-based firms wishing to expand or threatened by a non-Quebec firm. Two key examples were the government's defence of Provigo, the large food chain, against Sobey Foods' attempted takeover in 1977,[73] and the Caisse's offensive posturing to push the appointment of French Quebecers to the boards of large Canadian firms, such as Canadian Pacific Limited.

4.8 Constitutional Issues and Federalism

The Parti québécois has passed through four distinct phases in the Canadian intergovernmental relationship. From 1968 to 1974, the party was committed to sovereignty-association and was on the independence track. From 1974 to 1980, it espoused a committment to a referendum to negotiate a new relationship with Canada, and was prepared to hold no less than two referenda before progressing towards this objective. From 1981 to 1987, the party realized its weak position resulting from the failed referendum, patriation of the Constitution and the loss of a veto and began to look at the fine "risk" of federalism. From 1985 to 1987, particularly, Lévesque and Johnson clearly put sovereignty on the back-

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[72] Report of the Consultative Committee to the Ministerial Committee on the Development of the Montreal Region (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), p.278.

[73] Le Devoir, August 24, 1979.

burner. From 1988 to the present, PQ leader Parizeau has recommitted the PQ to its founding objective of political sovereignty with an economic association with Canada. The post-1975 summary of events is outlined below.

4.8a Pre-Referendum Phase

In this phase, the PQ regime was more reactive than proactive. It reacted against federal initiatives for constitutional patriation and reform outlined in the White Paper, A Time For Action, and its corresponding legislation (Bill C-60), which contained many of the provisions of the Victoria Charter. During this time the PQ refused to consider the renewal of Confederation. The Lévesque government opposed at least four major aspects of the federal plan. First, like previous Quebec governments, it opposed Ottawa's approach of postponing negotiations on comprehensive reforms in the division of powers[74] until agreement had been reached on patriation with an amending formula. Second, it opposed any amending formula which did not grant Quebec both broad veto and opting-out powers. Third, it opposed the entrenchment of a national charter of rights and freedoms, because it might circumscribe provincial powers and strengthen the role of the courts. Fourth, it opposed proposals for a limited adjustment to the division of powers prior to patriation.

In 1979, Lévesque tabled his government's White Paper on sovereignty-association, Quebec-Canada: A New Deal. It outlined the PQ's views on economic association and reiterated a commitment to sovereignty, which it defines as the:

> power to make decisions autonomously, without being subject in law to any superior or exterior power, which implies the sovereign state has full jurisdiction over a given territory. Sovereignty ensures complete autonomy in the sense that the state enjoys full legal freedom in all fields; its authority is exercised to the exclusion of any other within the limits of its territory; and it can be present in the community of nations.

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[74] Quebec's fairly rigid position on the division of powers is consistent with past Quebec policy on the matter. See Quebec, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, Quebec's Traditional Stands on the Division of Powers: 1900-1976, (Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1978).

The PQ has always faced uncertainly over the monetary provisions of sovereignty-association, and this issue is discussed in Chapter 5. However, it is evident that "association" is an issue for this very reason. If the two nations shared a common currency, it would be impossible for them to pursue different monetary policies because the effects of these would be nullified by adjustments in the flow of funds and interest rates. Similarly, Canada and Quebec could not have different exchange-rate policies. Also, nothing would stop other provinces from erecting numerous trade barriers to Quebec goods. Therefore, the White Paper's propositions were a design for deadlock from the outset and the current PQ position is unchanged. In more general terms, the Quebec White Paper failed to evaluate the institutional costs of the proposed economic association. This problem is even more exacerbated today. The institutional costs would be detrimental to Quebec in that, as the smaller partner, it would surrender its freedom of action in forming the most important economic policies. Conflicts of interest between Quebec and Canada would be inevitable.[75]

4.8b Post-Referendum Phase

The post-referendum phase of constitutional negotiations was premised on the widespread view that the May 20, 1980 referendum, which resulted in a 60 percent vote not to pursue negotiations on sovereignty-association with Canada, reflected a desire for a new constitutional order which the federalist forces had promised during the campaign.[76] The federal government was motivated by what it considered a moral imperative from the Québécois to achieve reform. It also realized that because it would not be confronting a Liberal Quebec government, the possibility of a schism between these two wings of the party

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[75] For an excellent analysis of the economic ramifications of economic association, see Donald Smiley, in Stanley Beck and Ivan Bernier, Canada and the New Constitution: The Unfinished Agenda, Vol. 1, (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983).

[76] Alain C. Gagnon and Joseph Garcea, "Quebec and the Pursuit of Special Status", in R.D. Olling and M.W. Westmacott (eds.), Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), p.311.

would be minimized. Second, by the fact that the government in power was separatist and had lost political support, Ottawa's hand was strengthened.

The failure of the referendum and the subsequent passage of the Constitution Act (1982) marked a severe setback for the idea of Canada as a bicommunal polity based on the two-majorities model. Quebec emerged much weaker than it had been before.[77] The November 1981 accord, largely a product of Pierre Trudeau, implicitly rejected the view of Canada as a bicommunal polity, though the tradeoffs associated with executive federalism ensured it did not embrace the pluralist view either. It was largely inspired by Trudeau's vision that the Canadian federation, though made up of different units, was expressed in a one-nation concept, and that national interests took precedence over provincial interests. For Trudeau, any changes to the Canadian federal system required the equality of citizens rather than the attachment of groups, languages or special interests to component parts of the country.[78] Seeing the federal government as the preferred instrument for achieving the equality of English and French, Trudeau rejected Quebec's pretensions to special status and did all he could to weaken the principle "one people, one state". To him, this principle, the theory of nationality, implied that the state exists to support the interests of one ethnic or national grouping at the expense of others; the nation state promotes intolerance and is itself, ultimately, totalitarian. After becoming Prime Minister in 1968, Trudeau acted to counteract ethnic nationalism in Quebec by expanding opportunities for the Québécois to fully participate in federal life.

In 1981 Quebec worked closely with seven other provinces to block federal proposals for constitutional reform. The "gang of eight" held a common agreement which

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[77] Peter Leslie, Canada: The State of the Federation, (Kingston: Queen's University - Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, 1985), p.38.

[78] Trudeau, in Towards A Just Society: The Trudeau Years, p.203.

included several major, albeit contradictory, concessions by each province. Lévesque had conceded the equality of provinces principle and, contrary to his earlier position, consented to patriation with an amending formula without revising the division of powers or securing a Quebec veto. This united provincial front broke apart when a compromise agreement, unacceptable to Quebec, was devised. The process was traumatic for Quebec, which felt betrayed. Like its reaction after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the Quebec government reinforced its isolation for a time and suspended normal relations with the other governments. Another reason why Lévesque was unable to conclude an agreement was because of rupture within his cabinet over constitutional reform and the inclusion of the sovereignty option in the next election platform. In 1979, 1981, and 1984 Lévesque had to convince his party to settle for sovereignty-association rather than seek a mandate on independence, because the latter option posed serious electoral risks. In 1985, this and related issues precipitated the resignation of several prominent cabinet ministers and, in turn, the premier's resignation.

All in all, the Constitution Act (1982) significantly modifies the framework of provincial power. Most of the key points are familiar: government actions are subject to judicial review; the rights of the individual are paramount; provincial collective rights are not recognized; the federal government is given exclusive responsibility for collective interests; provincial constitutional powers are subordinate to the principle of Canadian economic union; and in language matters, provinces must conform to the principles imposed. As a result, Quebec's status has been impaired since 1981, because it has lost its conventional veto power.[79]

In December, 1981 the Quebec government proposed a constitutional option that

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[79] See Gérard Boismenu, in Leslie, Canada: The State of the Federation, esp. p.51.

was irreconcilable with the underlying principles of the Canada Bill. In a motion passed by the National Assembly, the government put forth a counter proposal to eliminate constitutional restraints on provincial powers. In response to the theory that Canada absorbs and integrates its minorities, the Quebec government argued that there were two founding peoples and that Quebec must be recognized as a distinct society within the system. Consequently, it saw collective rights of the Québécois as predominant and the Quebec government as the primary, if not exclusive, guarantor of these rights. Therefore, the government proposed that it should have primary responsibility for the province's socio-economic development and that it should be the political expression of the Quebec community. Quebec would only accept, therefore, a version of the Canadian Charter of Rights which does not include a Section 6, concerning Canadian economic union. In this way, provincial regional economic policies could not be restricted in the name of free circulation of factors of production.

Initial reactions outside Quebec revealed that the PQ was expected to lose the next election and held little political weight. The PQ's approach was based on self-delusion; not much attention had been paid to the treatment given in the past to Quebec's traditional constitutional position. In the draft agreement, the government stated that it had refrained from reviewing the backgrounds to the constitutional debate so as not to add fuel to the fire. But this also prevented the government from saying why its proposals should have been greeted more favourably. Overall, the draft agreement supported the proposal for special status, completely in line with the Pépin-Robarts Commission Report, A Future Together. However, in Quebec-Canada: A New Deal, the Parti québécois government had criticized special status as an illusion.[80]

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[80] Quebec-Canada: A New Deal, p.45.

4.8c Post-Patriation Phase

The post-patriation phase commenced after the 1984 federal election, which returned the Conservatives to power after four years.[81] In his speech opening the 1984 fall session of the National Assembly, Lévesque announced an abrupt reversal of policy. Rather than emphasize the structural conflicts within federalism, and recognizing the possibility that Quebec's demands would be recognized by the new Conservative government, he invited his party to take a chance on the "beau risque" of federalism. This support would best be expressed by accepting the Canada Bill provided certain conditions could be met. Lévesque confirmed this position in a serious personal statement to the party executive that November.

In affirming that sovereignty was not an issue in the near future and that, in the meantime, a major task would be to firm up Quebec's constitutional status, the PQ leader was far from receiving unanimous support. The orthodox members, including Jacques Parizeau, Camille Laurin, and Gilbert Paquette, as well as a significant number of party members, opposed the revisionist position of the party executive. Moreover, a special PQ convention in January, 1985 drove a wedge between the two sides and caused a crisis: five ministers resigned, while two backbench members crossed the floor and another resigned. These defections, coupled with four Liberal by-election victories, greatly reduced the government majority. Although the orthodox wing no longer sat with the government, they remained party members and formed a political movement called the Rassemblement Démocratique pour l'Indépéndance (RDI). The situation was made more precarious when these members did not hesitate to bring the government down by supporting a Liberal non-confidence motion on June 18, 1985. These orthodox moves were guided by a desire to move the sovereignty position to the front of the agenda.[82]

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81 Gagnon and Garcea, in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p.312.

82 For an excellent account of this serious split in the PQ, see Gérard Boismenu, in Canada: The State of the Federation, p.48.

In May, 1985 Lévesque presented the Mulroney government with Quebec's "Draft Agreement on the Constitution" containing its twenty-two conditions for signing a constitutional accord. The Liberal Party's 1991 Allaire Report greatly resembles the proposals in the draft agreement, which reiterated positions advocated since 1960 to maximize Quebec's powers, resources and status within Confederation. Its propositions were:

- the constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and its government as the principal authority in social, cultural, linguistic, educational, and health matters;
- the application of sections 3 to 5 only of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Quebec;
- that the Province be given responsibility over employment, economic and regional development policies and programs;
- that Quebec would hold increased powers in telecommunications, selection and settlement of immigrants, and greater status in international relations;
- recognition of Quebec's right to veto not only constitutional amendments, but creation of new provinces and reform of institutions;
- the right to appoint three Justices to the Supreme Court;
- the right to opt out of certain national programs;
- the abolishment of the federal government's reservation and disallowance powers.

The PQ regime, under René Lévesque and Pierre-Marc Johnson, in 1985 accepted special status. The contents of the Draft Agreement and the proposals to grant Quebec a veto and expansive powers suggest the PQ government had settled for something which only six years earlier it had criticized as a dangerous illusion.[83] Conspicuous by its absence from the Draft Agreement was sovereignty-association. In an effort to find a middle ground, Johnson declared that this option had not been abandoned but the immediate goal was to gain

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[83] Gagnon and Garcea, in Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, p.313.

concessions that maximized Quebec's status and autonomy within the Canadian federation.[84] For that purpose, both during the 1985 election campaign and his short term as premier, he endorsed the thrust of the proposals contained in the "Draft Agreement" which constituted the core of his policy of "national affirmation". Many of these proposals were adopted by the Quebec Liberal party during and after the election. Indeed, the two major parties adopted very similar positions on constitutional reform and other federal-provincial matters. It seems that both the Parti Libéral du Québec and the Parti québécois were of the view that the route to economic equality and cultural épanouisement has been through the affirmation of Quebec's character as a distinct society.

4.9 Conclusion

The final chapter is a composite review of the preceeding analysis, and carries the policy convergence thesis further by discussing the future of party systems. It reveals that the power and authority of political parties has declined in recent years, along with ideology, and re-emphasizes the increasing importance of non-government stakeholders and the corporatist movement. Finally, it links corporatism and nationalism in Quebec in order to provide a theoretical avenue for looking at contemporary and future Quebec-Canada relations.

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[84] Ibid, p.313.

Chapter Five

Policy Convergence and Special Status

5.1 Introduction

To comprehend Quebec politics, it is necessary to understand the importance of nationalism as a powerful agent through which all Quebec governments interpret public policy. In Maurice Pinard's estimation, "Nationalist sentiment has constituted the core ideology of French Canadians for at least two centuries, and it has provided a powerful cultural force during each new phase of ethnic conflict."[1]

Second, we must recognize the limits of party systems in developing policy alternatives independent of the parameters defined by special interest groups, budgetary limitations, external factors and broadly based constitutions and charters. This cannot be underestimated by any scholar with a serious interest in comparative party systems. The ideological development of Quebec's party system, as it relates to nation building and special status, is greatly impeded by these factors. Of particular concern to modern governments are the confines of developing policy in conjunction with business and interest groups while, at the same time, showing a real or imagined disinterest in the electorate. Further, we should recognize the corporatist policy network as intensifying the ideological movement in Quebec. Policy networks are a vehicle through which nationalism finds a high degree of expression.

The manner in which many thorough political analyses are conducted is by looking at historical fact - analyzing societal development - and only then venturing to offer a number of possible scenarios based upon that research. For Quebec, we began by comprehending the limits of ideology and the consequent importance of nationalism and pragmatism.

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[1] Maurice Pinard, "The Dramatic Reemergence of the Quebec Independence Movement", Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1992, 45 no. 2. pp. 471-97.

5.2 The Importance of Nationalism

As previously mentioned, very few interpretations of nationalist ideology exist in the literature. This shortcoming makes it difficult to characterize a national system, particularly when factors like intergovernmental relations and federalism are brought into play. Anthony Smith, in outlining the universal difficulty in defining national movements and their impact on politics, states that "There has, in fact, never been a single version of nationalism, and it is vain to search for some 'genuine' doctrine or 'true' movement to act as a criterion for all subsequent cases."[2] Smith revisits the insurmountable challenge that nationalism "does not easily fit into the Left-Right spectrum of 'mass society' theory".[3] Nonetheless, scholars aspiring to study the importance of nationalism to a political unit within a complex federal system must endeavour to provide a theoretical foundation for their postulations, but, at the same time, cannot afford to disregard the deficiency of theory on the matter.

This study has emphasized several specific propositions about nationalism in Quebec. First, in order to be viable electoral alternatives, Quebec's political parties have incorporated a nationalist agenda into their platforms as a measure of attracting those peripheral, though important, voters who make the nationalist question the cornerstone of their voting behaviour. Second, cohesive policy networks from every sector of society have influenced government and opposition to advocate nationalist policy initiatives. Business groups no longer speak only for the business agenda, nor do labour nor other movements simply advocate their traditional interests. The vast majority of business groups, labour unions, professional and technical associations, educators, public service associations, artists and cultural groups now chiefly articulate their support for independence or, at the very least,

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[2] Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford: M. Robertson, 1979).

[3] Ibid, p.151.

sovereignty-association. Third, nationalist philosophy has made the Quebec state different. Quebec's special status is a reality, though one must recognize the increasing difficulty in reconciling this in law rather than just in practice. It also appears that Quebec is now more than just a "distinct society". Quebec is a (cultural) nation unto its own with a special relationship with English Canada. Events of the past thirty years indicate that, despite the objections of many English Canadians, Quebec will continue to reap the benefits of its unique program and fiscal arrangements with Ottawa. Quebec's distinctiveness and calls for increased powers have enabled the province to receive a large proportion of federal benefits and regional development monies.[4]

There also exist negative consequences of contemporary Quebec nationalism. For example, as a fourth point, Quebec's past demands have had the effect of limiting its jurisdiction over those policy fields which benefit it the most - language and culture. These are two of many policy fields over which Ottawa exercises significant authority and spending power. Ironically, Ottawa, in years past and as a result of the Official Languages Act (1969), has been forced to act as a watchdog over minority language and culture throughout Canada. As a result, the federal government is, today, hard-pressed to relinquish its jurisdiction in these areas. Fifth, as ventured in chapter 1, Quebecers have come to rely on the federal system for funding and support in certain policy fields. This makes it all the more difficult for the average Quebecer to claim outright faith in the Quebec provincial government to declare outright sovereignty.

A realistic understanding of Quebec nationalism, coupled with a knowledge of the limits of party system ideologies, will contribute to a fuller understanding of Quebec's future within Canada.

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[4] A good source of information on the federal-provincial fiscal relationship is Kenneth Norrie, Richard Simeon and Mark Krasnick, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Volume 59, Federalism and the Economic Union in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

5.3 The Limits of Party System Ideologies

There is an unwarranted belief by certain academics and politicians that ideologies are much more precise than they happen to be. We have already determined that ideologies are vague and are as useless for the purpose of detailed policies as the general goals which we all feel should be the basis of good party programs. No ideology provides the mechanisms which help override the challenge of translating broader goals into detailed policies. For this reason, party systems as we know them are doomed to fail unless their true natures are recognized. Jean Blondel describes a common weakness of Western party systems:

> Parties are indicted because they care little for putting into practice programmes which are carefully devised and prepared in detail. Far from being "bodies" united for a common course of action and despite the claim, when in opposition, to present alternative programmes likely to help the country or the population at large, they appear unable to do more than make marginal adjustments or give into pressure from the stronger interest groups which express their "demands".[5]

Critics point out that party competition is little more than window dressing. If parties criticize each other only to make identical mistakes and similar policies and give in to the same opposition forces, little is gained from competition. Behind the evident battles over ideas and policies, the real battles are between current and aspiring leaders anxious to wield power. If there is not a coming decline of parties in the West, then there may very well be a decline in the hope that parties are the ideal instrument to bring about a society's goals and objectives.[6] Further, if parties are becoming less relevant, it seems obvious that a greater emphasis will be placed on international bodies, such as the United Nations, the European Economic Community, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, specific policy agencies on the environment and so forth, as well as special interest groups, to help satisfy

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[5] Jean Blondel, Political Parties, (London: Wildwood House, 1978), p.7.

[6] I do not pretend to be the first to emphasize the decline of parties in Canada. In fact, arguments promoting the decline of party school have existed for decades in this country. An excellent broad analysis of party decline is John Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada", in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 4th edition, (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.119-35.

these concerns. The Parti québécois and the Liberals have made known their support for Quebec's right to seek sovereignty through international law, should the Québécois desire this through a referendum.

The framework used for quantifying policy differences between parties is economic in nature and is described as the right-left scale; this has been a valuable research aid into party systems.[7] The traditional ways of looking at two (or multi-) party systems simply cannot be applied to modern Quebec. However, the general theory remains popular, and is based on the traditional left-right view of ideology: an open competitive party system gives a large premium to moderates, while extremists are defeated, because those voters which make the critical difference are located in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Given a system comprising two parties of almost equal strength, the winning party is the one able to obtain the votes of a small segment of the electorate located between the two.

Because modern Quebec politics is structured around the uses and abuses of nationalism, a traditional ideological centre does not exist in Quebec. As long as public policy is superseded by nationalism, an ideological centre between a left-right continuum is largely unrecognizable and unimportant for electoral victory. Only if and when constitutional stability is achieved will voting and political analysis on the simple left-right scale have more than a marginal bearing on Quebec politics. In a perfect world, where neither nationalism nor other principally-based ideologies exist, the narrow ideological fence is always located between the two parties since it is inconceivable that voters located at one ideological extreme will jump from one party to the other. Thus, competing parties tend to strive for a small group of voters at the centre and are obliged to adopt policies which one theoretically expects to be identical, and which in practice are quite similar. Since the Second World War, this has

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[7] An excellent study into inter-party analysis is Klaus Von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (Gower: Aldershot, 1985).

been called consensus politics, end of ideology, deradicalization, depolarization, waning of opposition or politics of accommodation.

The relationship between the goals of different parties within the same party system is, perhaps, the most common question asked about the historical development of party policy goals. This was outlined in chapter 1; however, a few key points merit reiteration. The ideological differences within complete party systems have exercised an increasing fascination. A common concern is whether policy distances between competing parties have lessened in recent years, producing convergence, or whether those policy distances perhaps diverged at some point prior to convergence. Scholars who advocate this position espouse the view that there is implicit, but seldom explicit, suggestion in the literature that competing parties diverged greatly at some point prior to their convergence.[8] However, North American party systems have never experienced the same high inter-party issue differences as other Western party systems and this view is not emphasized as much here. Some attribute this to the lack of a true labour party on this continent. The record seems to indicate the divergence thesis applies to Quebec from 1968 to 1973. While research shows Parti Libéral du Québec and Parti québécois programs displaying considerable divergence in this period, one can argue that this is premised on the Parti québécois "testing the waters" through its first two election campaigns, only to realize the futility of running candidates on an orthodox indépendantiste platform.

Inter-party analysis can be conducted in a number of ways. Although a comparison of programs is the simplest tool to use, one should remember that most parties have election platforms rather than programs, which are oriented towards issues and fortified by public opinion polls. Ideological consistency, moreover, depends on the readiness of the

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[8] The divergence followed by convergence argument is expressed in the works of Kirchheimer (1957), Shell (1962), Hunt (1964), Dowell (1965), Tingsten (1955), and Rustow (1955), amongst others.

public in any jurisdiction to think in right-left terms, and this is a vital element in analyses of inter-party ideology. In pragmatic systems without basic ideological differences, such as Quebec's, voters orient to parties through emotional components and a few vague ideas on the main policy differences.

The increasing differentiation in the social composition of parties suggests that their image as monolithic units is a fantasy which cannot be sustained. The areas of friction which can develop within parties, certainly between the parliamentarians and the grassroots, also suggest that we should begin to look beyond the uniform aspects of parties.[9] Factions within parties will be pervasive where the orientation is more to power and patronage than to ideology. Positions matter much more to a faction than does policy. Modern Western parties, populist parties in particular, have been accused of a tendency to factionalism when they depart from their original ideology. Notwithstanding the widely-held belief that parties are oligarchic,[10] factionalism is one indication that parties are not monolithic, tightly disciplined units, and authoritarian towards their own rank and file.

From examinations of the ideological gap between parties to the implementation of government programs, the fixed image most voters have of their parties becomes ambiguous as new or in vogue political issues such as environmental protection, minority rights and affordable housing arise. Since genuine two-party systems which fully conform to the dichotomy thesis are very rare, many observers of party systems now reduce the variety of recognizable factors to a latent dualism. The trend to form a centre is pervasive in Western political systems. Centrism in Quebec is not economic nor is it a mediator between left and right. In Quebec, the party that mediates best between the ultranationalism of powerful lobby

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[9] Von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 224.

[10] See Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy", in Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, (New York: Free Press, 1968).

groups and the realities of intergovernmental give and take wins the most electoral support. Unfortunately, more often than not, and particularly in the major, collective policy fields such as language, nation-building and economic development, Quebec governments appear to be spooked into action and negatively influenced by the media, public opinion polls[11] and issue politics. Further, single, monolithic issues, which rally the electorate to a common position, always find their way into electoral politics and party programs. The ideological centre can vary according to the subjective view of the parties which claim to belong to it and also to the issues which left and right split, particularly in strongly fragmented party systems. Also, one cannot underestimate the importance of the prevailing trend in Western politics to vote a party out of office, providing the second party with the opportunity to govern, despite its philosophical orientation.

Another question is whether convergence between parties can ever be reversed. We can predict that elements such as political will, politically active citizens or other factors could reverse this trend. However, the literature on party systems indicates that once the process of compromise has been institutionalized, there is little likelihood it will be reversed. One important factor for the purposes of this argument is the process of compromise, which produces both a narrowing of the scope of conflict and a commitment on the part of opposing parties to the new, narrowed scope of conflict. One key reason for continued Canadian-Quebec constitutional conflict is that "English Canada", in its polarized forms, has never really developed a proactive and beneficial way of dealing with societal and political change in Quebec; these changes are determinist and force Quebec parties to demand nearly identical concessions from the federal system. A second basic assumption is that it is possible to identify which part of a party determines its policies. This is made very clear when one

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[11] An excellent analysis of the role of the media, public opinion polls and general party strategy is Benjamin Ginsberg, The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

studies the political history of modern Quebec parties. Every party is dualist when in government; there is inevitably a gulf between the legislative wing and the grassroots. Within the PQ, for example, the technocrats dispensed policy direction in nearly every case, often contravening the participationists. Further, the 1984-85 rupture over the sovereignty-association clause nearly terminated the party.[12] Similarly, the Liberals were severely factionalized in 1967 over the national issue. Today, the party's radical youth wing, caucus nationalists and followers of non-parliamentary nationalists, such as Jean Allaire, greatly influence Liberal constitutional direction and are in danger of repeating the 1967 scenario. The Union Nationale's technocrats were soundly defeated after Jean-Jacques Bertrand assumed the leadership after the death of Daniel Johnson. The distance between party rhetoric and government performance, which clearly exists in Quebec, induces polarization and disappointment, leading the grassroots in all the parties to be distrustful.

In considering how party competition may restrict the activities of parties once they govern, it is useful to distinguish two separate issues. First, does potential competition lead parties to modify their policies and objectives? Second, is there a direct relationship between the degree of competition in a party system and moderation in the policies pursued by parties? Of the major theorists, Joseph Schumpeter comes closest to advocating the position that competition is needed solely to provide a means of restraining politicians; the cornerstone of parties is the organizational structures which provide electoral machinery, while platforms and ideologies merely attract voters.[13] If parties really did not matter, then arguments about voter choice, political socialization and the best means of providing democratic control over parties become secondary issues for political scientists. We must, however, be careful in

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[12] Evidence of this is found in Don and Vera Murray, "The Parti Québécois: From Opposition to Power", in Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.243-54; and Denis Monière, Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

[13] Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed., (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1962).

comparing and measuring policy outputs of different regimes, or in assigning objectives to parties which may over-simplify their real orientation.

Another consideration is that the external constraints on governments have increased. Because of the recent proliferation of interest groups and their impact on policy, parties have infinitely less scope for rigid posturings than they would have had twenty-five years ago. This is evident in the Quebec party system. The Parti québécois, for example, has undergone a significant evolution to make itself a tenable option for voters. According to Richard French, this is because "By the early eighties, indeed, all three of the major themes in the PQ's political philosophy - social democracy, sovereignty, and statism - were coming under increasing pressure.[14] In order to win and conserve power, the PQ had to achieve at least four tactical objectives.[15] First, it had to reduce the importance to voters of the primary item on its program, Quebec independence.[16] This momentous achievement is clear when one considers that the PQ got itself elected despite, rather than because of, its most important objective. This was accomplished by using the mechanism of a subsequent referendum to distance itself from its fundamental option in the minds of the 26-28 percent of the electorate whose support it needed, despite their rejection of independence.[17] Also, it had to do this without alienating approximately 20 percent of the population - the hard-core separatists - who were the bulk of its activists. Second, it had to supply the vocabulary of political discussion in Quebec in order to control the public agenda. For years, the PQ's greatest strength was among those who formed public opinion and who were active in political

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[14] Richard D. French, "Governing Without Business: The Parti Québécois in Power", in Vera V. Murray (ed.), Theories of Business-Government Relations, (Toronto: Trans Canada Press, 1985), p.160.

[15] Maybe five objectives, if you include the maximization of agricultural incomes.

[16] Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Parti Québécois comes to Power: An analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election", Canadian Journal of Political Science 11 (1978), pp.739-75.

[17] The exact size of this group varies according to the relative strength of any third parties.

education and socialization (nationalist groups). Third, it defined the opposition as entirely alien to the political community. The PQ derided the Liberal opposition as illegitimate participants in the public debate. In Lévesque's words, "Sometimes I think it is sad, it is a bit like having people who do not belong in Quebec, in a sense, using politics in order to sustain a system which is remote-controlled from the outside."[18] Fourth, it had to articulate the interests and aspirations of the opinion-oriented middle class.

Likewise, the Liberals have countered the ideological movement of the Parti québécois by downplaying their traditional confidence in the Canadian federal system. In order to counter voter support for the Péquistes, the Liberals advocated the key positions which are still the hot buttons for the Quebec electorate. This means that the party has been advocating a form of sovereignty-association since at least 1990, notwithstanding Bourassa's support for the Charlottetown Accord. One can recall that the Parti québécois and the federal Conservatives developed a cordial relationship after 1984; many in the federal Conservative caucus have had open ties with the PQ and some ministers, like Benôit Bouchard and Monique Landry, supported the YES side in the 1980 referendum. This relationship is unofficially reciprocated by many Quebec members of the Conservative caucus, irrespective of the Prime Minister's friendship with Robert Bourassa. This continues to make it difficult for the provincial Liberals, pressuring that party to continue to talk tough on sovereignty.

5.4 Historical Development

The historical nature of this essay is meant to underscore the importance of developmental analysis, particularly in political science. Because convergence is analyzed by looking at two or more entities over a period of time, historical development is important. To understand event A in the context of event B, which assists in predicting event C, we must

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[18] Graham Fraser, The Gazette (December 23, 1983).

revisit the roots of the society under consideration and understand its social, economic and political development. I have used the developmental approach, albeit in an elementary form, to further the knowledge of modern Quebec and to help gain a valuable insight into Quebec's role in the current debate, as well as Québécois responses to renewed federalism and/or independence.

This analysis of Quebec reveals at least two things. First, Quebec cannot be analyzed from a typical provincial perspective because its distinctiveness or separateness is clear. Attempts to explain Quebec's role in Canada, and particularly those which use typical comparative analyses that do not examine national aspirations, party pragmatism and corporatism, will prove futile and dangerous. Second, Quebec, more than any other Canadian province, but perhaps not exclusively, bears the right to self-determination and its associated responsibilities.

5.5 Corporatism as the New Ideology

We have discussed the advent of corporatism and policy networks at length. However, this discussion merits further dialogue on the metamorphosis of corporatism into ideology in modern Quebec. Corporatist tendencies are clearly a threat to political party systems and neo-corporatism is described by Wyn Grant as:

> a process of interest intermediation which involves the negotiation of policy between state agencies and interest organizations arising from the division of labour in society, where the policy agreements are implemented through the collaboration of the interest organizations and their willingness and ability to secure the compliance of their members.[19]

Business corporatism has absorbed all Quebec governments since the 1960s; Quebec's current political economy resembles Japanese and European models. The provincial

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[19] See Wyn Grant (ed.), The Political Economy of Corporatism, (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp.3-4.

government facilitates investment by financing winners such as Hydro Quebec and initiates shrewd income tax and investment strategies to enable Quebecers to participate and benefit. Business, and sometimes labour, remain important stakeholders in decision-making.[20] The corporatist turn is evident on constitutional issues as well, where there is agreement that Quebec should repatriate the fields of employment and training, among other things.[21] Also, corporatism is clearly evident by the deliberations of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, allowing major interest groups to fully participate in recommending a future course of action, with a goal to further the economic and political interests of Quebec.[22]

Labour remains active, but it is no longer considered a component of the triangle with business and government. This might be explained by viewing Quebec's labour movement as little more than a mouthpiece for radical nationalism. It appears that radical nationalism does not sit well with the goals of market nationalism in Quebec, which emphasizes privatization, restraint and special status, and which has steered the course of post-1982 Quebec governments. Because mainstream Quebec abhores radical indépendantiste philosophy, not to mention socialism, and these are not in the best interests of the corporate elite, labour's traditional place on the stage has been assumed by broadly-based nationalist groups and alliances, which speak for all Quebecers. Secondly, Quebec's unions have been severely weakened by economic recessions, government intransigence, declining membership rates and an aging workforce. Hints of corporatism, under the names of "concertation" and "contrat social" now complement the concern of employers for competitiveness, place union concerns on the back burner and further indicate the legitimacy of business affairs in Quebec.

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[20] Quebec has led the way in forging a European style of cooperation between the public and private sector. See, for example, "50 fastest Growing Public Companies", Canadian Business, October 1990, p. 67.

[21] Le Devoir, November 9, 1990; and December 14, 1990.

[22] Le Devoir, March 30, 1991.

Market nationalism has become the offspring of government policy.

Corporatism will be a future threat to parties if societal demands come to be channelled exclusively through these interest groups, so that parties are no longer articulators of interests and are peripheralized. There could be two aspects to this peripheralization: parties would have less input to the process of policy negotiation because the state agencies concerned develop their own modus operandi; and, parties would exist, primarily, to elect representatives to legislatures. Unlike most pluralist models, a party's links with the state and with citizens might be weakened under such arrangements. Recent events clearly show that the language issue, in particular, fits this type of scenario. The same can be said for post-1982 constitutional initiatives. The current malaise in Canada and the ongoing diatribes against elected officials suggest that Canadians could very well see a much more pervasive role for interest group mediation between people and their governments.

5.6 Conclusion

So what might one conclude for Quebec, particularly in the intergovernmental milieu? Further, what about political parties and party systems? In their look at Quebec's constitutional development after 1960, with a view to possible future scenarios, Alain Gagnon and Mary Montcalm embellish the special status concept and discuss the Quebec economy:

> Recent efforts by the federal government to obtain Quebec's signature on the 1982 Constitution Act suggests an awareness that Quebec's objectives cannot be overlooked or frustrated indefinitely. After all, secession either with or without some limited form of economic association is no longer considered a radical and implausible option. It is perhaps this secessionist potential, presently much stronger in Quebec than in any other province, that partly facilitates Quebec's ability to obtain a special recognition within the Canadian federation.[23]

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[23] Alain Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution, (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1990), p.169.

> Two factors should be watched as Quebec proceeds into the 1990s. First, Quebec continues to be peripheral in terms of the continental and world economy. Notwithstanding the optimism permeating its private sector, the province has many "soft" industries that are vulnerable within the context of a continentalized economy, particularly under the conditions of free trade. Thus, given the precarious nature of Quebec's economy, the much vaunted economic resurgence in the province should not be exaggerated.[24]

Quebec can flourish within Canada. However, it requires constitutional recognition of its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness and, conversely, must demonstrate to English Canada its good faith in upholding the provisions of a new constitutional order. This scenario will prove far more attractive to Quebecers than, in the words of Douglas Fullerton, "the emotional allure of a leaky independence barque, sailing forth on an uncertain course over uncharted seas".[25] Over 25 years of public opinion polling in Quebec leads Maurice Pinard to suggest that "most Québécois still prefer some form of renewed federalism to a sovereignist outcome".[26] Post-1960 events in Quebec have shown us what Quebec wants.

This analysis points to a convergence between Quebec's post-1960 governments in three policy sectors. PQ and Liberal successes to date can be attributed to a skilful exploitation of emotionally charged and jurisdictionally-cloudy issues. The PQ continues to pursue themes such as the threatened French language and culture; the need to regain economic power; priority of the collectivity over the individual; discrimination against Quebec by Ottawa; the assimilationist attitude of English Canadians; and Quebec's right to full self-determination. Most of these propositions came together in the language White Paper (Bill One) and in Parti québécois electoral campaign and Congrès National documents.[27] This

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[24] Ibid, pp. 197-8.

[25] Douglas Fullerton, The Dangerous Delusion, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p.173.

[26] Pinard, Journal of International Affairs, p.496.

[27] It is interesting to note the high degree of similarity between all Parti Québécois policy documents from 1967 to 1992. It is not the policies that are altered in light of public opinion polling and political pragmatism but, rather, the manner in which they are emphasized or de-emphasized before elections.

approach finds fertile soil in Quebec. As long as their provincial government can convince Quebecers that they are on the verge of assimilation within a sea of English, this will continue. The governing Liberals have found that a similar orientation, though with less sensationalism, has also found success with the electorate. The result is that the Liberal Party and the Parti québécois demand special status and/or a massive devolution of powers as a minimum condition for Quebec's further participation in the Canadian federation.

Political pragmatism and the quest for power often relegate intellectual honesty to the dustbin before serious debates begin. Notwithstanding this, Quebec nationalists of all political stripes must get rid of the ambiguity and intellectual dishonesty that has been plaguing Quebec for years. When Quebecers make the decision that a referendum on sovereignty is desirable, their provincial government must formulate a firmly-worded and succinct question seeking the authority to declare full independence. The resounding NO vote in the 1980 Quebec referendum leads one to believe that any future question, unless it is soft and therefore dishonest, will elicit no more than marginal support from the Québécois.

René Lévesque's original thesis, outlined in Option-Québec, still is official Parti québécois policy - though it has undergone interpretive strains since 1976. It assumes that independence must be linked with some kind of an economic association with Canada. It clearly reiterates the vagueness of original indépendantiste dogma, that over the course of two decades Péquiste economic theorists have been unable to enunciate its true meaning. Phrases like "monetary union", "customs unions", "free trade association" and "common market" are tossed around with ease, picked up and then discarded. Loose analogies are made with the EEC, the Benelux, the Nordic countries, and other international associations. To the best of my knowledge no Péquiste (nor nationalist Liberal for that matter) has spelled out in detail what such an association might mean. Two recent attempts to enunciate the meaning of economic association are Quebec's Bélanger-Campeau Commission, 1991, and economist

Georges Mathews' interpretation.[28] The Bélanger-Campeau Commission's excellent work is weakened by the inherent biases written into the report. Mathews' book is very honest, though it falls drastically short of a truly acceptable explanation. Perhaps the proponents of monetary and economic union have not thought about it much. This is consistent with a related hypothesis that the purpose of the "association" argument is simply to allay Francophone fears about the economic consequences of independence. If the details remain vague, the underlying theory that an association is bound to develop after separation, notwithstanding English Canada's perceptions, has become hard-core nationalist doctrine. The theory is supported by a number of assertions, such as Quebec is a good market for Canadian goods; English Canadians are common-sense business people; anyone who attacks the proposed association is simply trying to blackmail or threaten; or without close economic ties with Quebec, the rest of Canada would be swallowed up by the Americans.

Lévesque had some fascinating things to say about association; however, some of these are not realistic. An interesting assumption of Lévesque, in Option Québec, is the possibility of a monetary union and the control of monetary policy by "equal" partners.[29] The Bank of Canada, with its top jobs alternating between the two new states, would manage the common currency, administer reserves and national debt, and "protect the stability of the two states." There is no explanation about why three-quarters (English Canada) would grant an equal voice to one-quarter (Quebec). The importance of this posturing is obvious: if Quebecers can be persuaded that nothing will change except that they will be independent, pseudo-sovereignty will be easy to achieve. Simon Reisman, ironically, Canada's former chief free trade negotiator, stated that:

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[28] Georges Mathews, The Quiet Resolution: Quebec's Challenge to Canada, trans. Dominique Clift, (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1990).

[29] Lévesque, Option-Québec, 1967, p.44

> economic union...breaks down under any kind of rational analysis. Indeed it is a contradiction in terms. Would an independent Quebec with one-quarter of Canada's population and a fifth of Canada's economy expect to negotiate with the rest of Canada as an equal in setting commercial policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, equalization grants, energy subsidies, government procurement policies? Why would the rest of Canada with quite different economic problems and goals accept this? And if the bargaining process and outcome reflected proportional population or economic power what in reality would be left of Quebec political independence?[30]

Further, good management of shared fiscal and monetary policies is, at best, unworkable. If, for example, an autonomous Quebec wanted to fight unemployment by lowering the value of the "common" dollar to favour exports, and at the same time, Ontario chose to fight inflation by increasing the value of the same dollar, in order to reduce the cost of foreign goods, a veritable impasse would ensue. The combined impression of most Quebec commentators, who are not biased by emotion or intellectual dishonesty, is that economic association between an independent Quebec and Canada would only be possible if it were subject to a variety of newer compromises that would, in effect, limit Quebec's freedom to act independently. Moreover, Quebec would find itself in a weaker bargaining position than it maintains now, currently enjoying the benefits of decentralized federalism.

This study postulates that Quebecers desire special status in Canada, particularly constitutional recognition of their distinctive language and culture. It appears that the rest of Canada will have to accept or reject Quebec's demands, most of which appear to be incompatible with the equality of provinces principle. The questions, then, are what does the rest of Canada want and what is it willing to give up? In response to the first question, there is little doubt that "English Canada" outside Ontario desires effective, if not equal, recognition and representation in Canadian institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court. Second, they want institutions that work. Third, the rest of Canada wants to know what

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[30] Simon Reisman, **What's Gone Wrong With Canada?** Speech to Canadian Club of Toronto, January 31, 1977

Quebec wants. Quebec governments have called wolf one time too many. As the rest of Canada recognizes this, further constitutional discussions will not ensue until Quebecers outline their position in a clear and effective manner.

In responding to the second question, it appears that the rest of Canada is ill-prepared to relinquish anything until Quebecers define a constitutional position. We have determined that Quebecers will vote for renewed, though very decentralized, federalism. With this, the rest of Canada will reluctantly accept constitutionally entrenched special status for Quebec in specific, and well-defined, policy areas. However, "English Canada's" basic needs will have to be well articulated in a revised constitution and, second, non-Quebecers will require confirmation that Quebec members of parliament will have no voting rights in those policy areas where the Quebec government would enjoy de jure special status. Language and culture certainly come to mind, but it might be difficult to entrench special status in policy areas unrelated to Quebec's clear distinctiveness. Of course, these necessary changes will involve a healthy rethinking of some aspects of our parliamentary system, particularly voting in the House of Commons and the Senate and the role of party discipline.

There are at least six other reasons why the rest of Canada should decide to grant special status to Quebec. First, for the rest of Canada not to recognize a central aim of our federation - to create a structure which will, within the limits appropriate to a free and democratic society, encourage the survival in North America of a distinctive French language and culture, primarily found in Quebec - will prolong, perhaps indefinitely, the constitutional malaise in this country. Second, polls tell us that Canadians are weary of constitutional discussions but, at the same time, want to resolve these issues in order to tackle economic and social issues. Third, the thought that Ontario would hold fifty percent of the "new" Canada's population, with corresponding constitutional authority and membership in the House of Commons if Quebec were to secede, will prove more repugnant to most non-Quebecers than a

Quebec that is recognized as distinct, with special powers over language and culture. Fourth, most Canadians, faced with a clear choice between breakup or renewal, will choose a united Canada - again, if their needs are adequately articulated in federal institutions. Fifth, if Quebec's special status is not entrenched, that province will not be prohibited from continually using the notwithstanding clause to legally parade its negation of individual rights, and to exercise its cohesive voting power in the House of Commons over many policy fields - impacting all Canadians. Sixth, because West Canadian separatist movements have not developed a significant presence or support level to provide a vehicle for expressive nationalism, it is in the clear interests of Western Canadians to make Canada work. Canada will not work, let alone prosper, if Quebecers and other Canadians do not respect the inevitable tradeoffs that are required to deal with Canada's intergovernmental and constitutional problems.

The general issue of party relevance is another matter. The Liberals' recent ideological movement toward the "national centre" has placed that party under the microscope. The Liberal Party will be held accountable for abandoning a strong defence of federalism in Quebec. The party has been transformed recently into an apologist for sovereignty-association. As an example, not only do orthodox members such as Jean Allaire and the majority of the youth wing ideologically mimic the Parti québécois, but the President of the Bloc Québécois youth wing, Lyne Jacques, is also a member of the Liberal youth. This suggests that there are still some ultra-nationalists in Quebec who rate politics on a left-right scale and support separation with the Liberal Party because they are fiscal conservatives. Modern Quebec is molded by the similar orientation of its two major parties; both have proven themselves very similar in the face of the constraints of elected office. One should not underestimate the predisposition of entrenched national parties to exacerbate ethnic divisions and keep them at the top of the political agenda.

The purpose of this paper has been to discern the increasing similarities between the major actors in Quebec's political system as a means to look at the future of political parties in western nations. If a party system like Quebec's, with such an apparent divergence and polarization, can be scrutinized and assessed as convergent and non-polarized, what does this tell us about more mainstream party systems?

It appears that, unless political parties can articulate the interests of people in a better fashion, by advocating recognizable and consistent ideological positions, and then giving people a clear policy choice, the role of societal elites and special interest groups in representing peoples' needs will only increase, and will further jeopardize participatory democracy.

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