

Institutional Reform And Integrated Resource Management In BC

by


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Abstract

The government of British Columbia has long been an advocate of integrated resource management (IRM), a process in which the goals and activities of one environmental or resource sector are coordinated with the goals and activities of other sectors. Successive governments in BC have pursued policies of institutional reform at the central and regional levels to achieve an appropriate balance between forest land uses in IRM. However, in spite of intentions, policy outcomes with respect to land use have historically tended, not towards the development of a harmonious mix of activities and goals but rather to the cacophony of the chainsaw, the blockade and bitter debate.

This thesis examines the ebb and flow between interagency and single agency approaches to IRM in BC over the period 1969 to 1995 and the impact this has had on IRM. Although various governments may have promoted one approach over another, the two have coexisted intermittently over the period studied. The conclusion is that the interagency approach has been an effective tool in delivering incremental changes to the character of IRM. Yet, such reforms have not seriously contested the notion of IRM as “timber management with constraints.” This is attributed to the resiliency and tenacity of the Ministry of Forests (MOF) and its preferred approach to IRM, as well as to broader institutionalized limits to reform. The thesis finds that, in spite of rather significant

concessions to non forestry interests, the MOF maintains a hold on the forest land base that undermines the latest efforts at interagency planning for IRM.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TITLE PAGE.....	i
ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF TABLES.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
CHAPTER 1	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Institutional Approaches to IRM in BC.....	3
1.3 Securing the Forest Land Base	8
1.4 The Character & Efficacy of Institutional Reform.....	10
1.5 Thesis Statement.....	12
CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR IRM: 1968 TO 1995.....	13
2.1 Introduction	13
2.2 Institutional Reform: 1969 - 1972.....	14
2.3 Institutional Reform: 1972 - 1975.....	16
2.4 Institutional Reform: 1976 - 1986.....	24
2.5 Towards a Land Use Strategy: 1986 to 1991	33
2.6 NDP and the Land Use Strategy	39
2.7 Conclusion - Approaches to IRM	46
CHAPTER 3 SECURING THE FOREST LAND BASE	49
3.1 Introduction - The Forest Land Base	49
3.2 Forest Reserves - 1912 to 1973.....	51
3.3 Review of the Provincial Forests Program	55
3.4 Resumption of the Provincial Forests Program	59
3.5 Designating Provincial Forest Lands	71
3.6 Accommodating Wilderness Values in Provincial Forests.....	73
3.7 Proposal to Replace Volume Based Tenures with Area Based Tenures	79
3.8 Protected Areas Strategy	84
3.9 Regional and Subregional Planning	87
3.10 Forest Land Reserve	91
3.11 Conclusions	94
CHAPTER 4	
THE CHARACTER & EFFICACY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM	101
4.1 Introduction	101
4.2 The Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM Dynamic.....	105
4.3 Political Party and Institutional Reform	110
4.4 Impact of Interagency Approaches to IRM on the Forest Service.....	112
4.5 Institutionalized Limits to Reform - IRM, Timber Supply and AAC.....	115
4.6 Conclusions - IRM as an Instrument of Reform and Retrenchment.....	122
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1-1 Land Use Zoning: Comparing Provincial Forests and Parks.....	10
Table 2-1 Status of Land Use Planning in BC - February 1996.....	45
Table 3-1 Crown Land Allocated into Provincial Forests by Year: 1912 - 1973	54
Table 3-2 Land Use Designations Used in CORE and LRMP	90
Table 3-3 Forest Land Reserve Area in CORE Planning Regions.....	93
Table 3-4 Deletions from Provincial Forests: 1983 to 1994.....	99
Table 4-1 Timber Supply Reviews - AAC Determinations	117

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1-1 Type 1 IRM (Interagency Approach).....	6
Figure 1-1 Type 2 IRM (Line Agency Approach).....	6

CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In late spring 1994, on the lawns of the BC Legislature, 27,000 people rallied against CORE's proposed Land Use Plan for Vancouver Island.¹ Their message was simple, "The CORE Report threatens our jobs, our families and our communities. It threatens our future and the future of our children."² An unprecedented level of environmental protection would cost forestry dependent communities dearly, they told the Premier. The rally was reported as the largest ever held on the grounds of the Legislature. In stark contrast, the NDP's earlier Clayoquot Sound land use decision in 1993, which permitted logging on approximately two thirds of the forest land in the Sound, had been greeted by a long summer of protest. In contravention of the law, environmentalists blockaded roads, and forestry operations were disrupted. It was dubbed the largest single act of civil disobedience in Canadian history. Over 800 people were arrested for their part in it.

Central to these protests has been an open conflict, a "war in the woods", over the appropriate balance between environmental protection, and economic and social health.

¹ The Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was established in 1992 and charged with developing regional land use plans in several areas of the province. The first of the regional plans to be completed was the Vancouver Island Land Use Plan.

² "An open letter to Premier Harcourt Re: Yellow Ribbon Week, June 1-7, 1994," *Times-Colonist*, May 31, 1994, B8.

Minister of Forests Andrew Petter summed up the predicament of government in our day.

He said

- *Society will not accept the prescriptions for a healthy environment if they result in the winding down of the province's single most important industry.*
- *But neither will society support the industry if it degrades the forest environment.*
- *Nor will that industry be able to garner wide support if employment and community stability aren't provided.*³

The NDP perceived itself to be ideally situated to strike a meaningful balance between the environment, economy and society.⁴ In affirmation of its role in striking a new balance, the NDP government, upon making a decision over the proposed Vancouver Island Land Use Plan, proclaimed "Rainforests Protected and Forest Jobs Secured." After two years of public consultation "both jobs and the environment are better protected."

The desire to find a balance between divergent interests is not new in forest land management. In BC we have been conducting a decades long experiment in integrated resource management (IRM). The balancing act has taken different forms and weighted forest-related values differently at different times. This experiment is the subject of my thesis. I focus on institutional reforms from 1969 to 1995. After examining the broad institutional approaches to IRM, I move to a discussion of the relation between these approaches and efforts to secure the forest land base. These two discussion areas set the

³ Hon. Andrew Petter (Minister of Forests), *A 2020 Vision for the Forest Sector*. Speech delivered at Price Waterhouse Conference, Vancouver, March 15, 1995.

⁴ Daniel Gawthrop, *High Wire Act - Power, Pragmatism and the Harcourt Legacy*, [Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996], p. 157, 158.

context for a concluding discussion of the character and efficacy of reform. Each of the three dimensions to my thesis are briefly introduced below. A thesis statement closes this introductory chapter.

1.2 INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO IRM IN BC

In BC, as in most other jurisdictions, we have inherited specialized agencies cultured to discretely manage interconnected aspects of a common land base. This was the situation when the concept of integrated resource management (IRM) gained general support as an approach to forest land management in the early 1970s. IRM was introduced in recognition of the need to move forest land use planning away from a strictly timber-centric approach to one which accommodated a multiplicity of resource uses and values. The concept of IRM recognizes that a common land base may have many uses and values for many different reasons. Careful consideration of those uses and values is required to ensure the legitimacy of land use plans, that is, to ensure that they promote the public interest and achieve optimal social and economic benefits. A central component in the effective delivery of IRM is the capacity to coordinate the activities of different resource agencies and organized interests. Therefore, an ambition of advocates of IRM is to develop institutional frameworks which facilitate coordination and legitimate balance of resource uses on the land base.

At the time the concept of IRM emerged, the Forest Service was charged with managing the forest resource. Today the Forest Service, through the Ministry of Forests (MOF), maintains primary responsibility for delivering IRM. The planning and practice

of IRM under such institutional circumstances has been, in the words of Rod Carrow (Dean, Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto), described as “timber management with constraints”.⁵ This means that “virtually every non-timber value is seen as a constraint to efficient and effective timber management”.⁶ Under such circumstances, there is a tendency to recognize timber-centric values more readily than non-timber values.⁷ As such, we have inherited an institutional approach that is aligned to deliver IRM in a specific way. Predominantly, the approach furthers the timber-based program goals of the Forest Service (MOF), often at the cost of another agency’s goals.

Various administrations in BC have encountered this inertia in forest land planning and have responded to it differently. At times, the management of interconnected forest resources through discrete sectoral agencies has left government ill-prepared to meet public and line agency expectations or even pursue its government-wide policies.⁸ In response to such dysfunctions, the government has, at various times, undertaken institutional reforms to alter the course of IRM.

In this regard, the ebb and flow of two predominant institutional arrangements for the delivery of integrated resource management are examined. The approaches are rooted

⁵ Rod Carrow, “Integrated Resource Management in Canada - A Case Study of Unrealized Potential,” *The Forestry Chronicle*, Jan./Feb. 1994, Vol. 70, No. 1, p. 19.

⁶ Rod Carrow, *Integrated Resource Management in Canada - A Case Study of Unrealized Potential*, p. 19.


⁷ “Non-timber values” or “non-timber resource values” are defined by the MOF as “Values within the forest other than timber, which include but are not limited to biodiversity, mineral, water quality and quantity, recreation and tourism, cultural and heritage values, and wilderness and aesthetic values.” See: MOF, *Annual Report 1993/94*, [Victoria: MOF, 1995], p. 138.

⁸ “Line agency” is used in this thesis to refer to sectoral government agencies such as the Ministry of Forests, Ministry of Environment etc. which are responsible for the delivery of land and resource-related programs.

in two ideal types of institutional arrangements for IRM (see Figure 1-1). These ideal types have been dubbed, in this thesis, *Type 1 IRM*, which refers to an interagency approach, and *Type 2 IRM*, which refers to a line agency approach to IRM. Under Type 1 IRM, interagency bodies are used to steer line agencies. The interagency bodies coordinate and provide broad direction to sectoral agencies but they do not replace them. Interagency bodies are linked from the regional level through to the Ministerial level. Sectoral agencies work within the constraints and limits established by the interagency bodies and continue to receive guidance from them. Technical and administrative support is provided by a neutral body directly responsible to the Cabinet level interagency mechanism.

Under Type 2 IRM, a dominant line agency is given the mandate to pursue IRM. Embedded within that agencies' operations we find guiding principles of IRM. The dominant agency assumes primary responsibility for ensuring that interagency planning occurs within its planning framework. In BC, the dominant agency has been the Forest Service (which later corresponds to the Ministry of Forests). A Type 2 IRM also may have interagency mechanisms at the ministerial or ADM level. However, these committees tend to draw upon line agencies and ad hoc committees for support. Overall, interagency committees tend to be less active and focused on short term problem solving than they would under a Type 2 IRM.


**FIGURE 1-1: TYPE 1 IRM
(INTERAGENCY APPROACH)**



Interagency Structure:

- coordinates line agencies with each other
- provides direction re: IRM to MOF
- coordinated at regional and central levels
- secretariat provides technical and administrative support to all levels

**FIGURE 1-1: TYPE 2 IRM
(LINE AGENCY APPROACH)**



Sectoral Agency Approach:

- principles of IRM embedded in MOF
- MOF responsible for coordinating its activities with other agencies
- interagency planning within MOF planning framework

Each ideal type of institutional approach has been embraced at different times as an appropriate means to deliver IRM. The emphasis on developing the capacity to steer IRM through strong Type 1 IRM (interagency) mechanisms has been most strongly associated with NDP governments. The Type 1 IRM has been pursued from 1972 to 1975 and, more recently, 1991 to the present (i.e., early spring, 1996). The Type 2 (line agency) approach to IRM has been most strongly associated with Social Credit governments which formed the administration prior to 1972 and from 1976 to 1991. Although various governments may have promoted one institutional policy over another, the two have coexisted at various times over the period studied. Most importantly, there has been an ebb and flow with respect to the prominence of each approach.⁹

Type 1 IRM (interagency approach) has been advanced to overcome weaknesses in Type 2 IRM (single agency approach). Specifically, Type 1 IRM has been employed to reduce forest industry bias in forest land planning. In many respects then, institutional reforms are intended to change power relations between sectoral agencies - to “level the playing field”. The interagency approach has usually elicited a defensive response from the Forest Service and from the forest industry interests whose base of power was under threat. Under the Social Credit regime, elected in late 1975, many of these threats were mitigated through countermeasures and reforms. By the late 1970’s, Type 1 IRM had receded in prominence while Type 2 IRM (i.e., the MOF) was ascendant. Thereafter,

⁹ Although Type 1 and Type 2 IRM have predominated, alternate approaches have been considered. Most notable among these has been the proposition a new ministry or department to replace the line ministries. (Type 1 and Type 2 IRM do not replace line ministries.) Such alternative approaches are not identified as an ideal type in the thesis because they have been transitory and not widely supported in BC.

weaknesses in the single agency approach grew in prominence resulting in serious legitimacy problems for both the MOF and the government in general. A lack of public support and glaring biases in the single agency approach left government groping for solutions. As a result, Type 1 IRM approaches were gaining support before Social Credit was defeated in late 1991. The emergence of a new Type 1 IRM was apparent in the 1990s under the NDP government elected in 1991. The impact of these mechanisms on an established MOF dominance in planning has yet to be fully understood. Reforms initiated throughout the early 1990's are still rippling through the institutional structure for forest land planning. The ebb and flow of these institutional structures are more closely examined in Chapter 2.

1.3 SECURING THE FOREST LAND BASE

These broad reforms are significant when it is considered that they affect the accessibility to the forest land base upon which timber supply and harvest level decisions are based. For example, interagency approaches in the early 1970's are associated with a significant increase in the areal extent of protected areas. This protection has reduced access to the forest land base and negatively affected timber supply. As such, broad institutional approaches have been accompanied by MOF efforts to regulate encroachments, or capitalize on opportunities to further secure the forest land base. In Chapter 3, efforts to secure the forest land base through land use zoning are examined in the context of broad institutional approaches identified above.

The Provincial Forest Program is a dominant theme in Chapter 3 while the development of a protected areas system and the disposition of lands for agricultural and settlement purposes are secondary. The Provincial Forest designation represented a key mechanism by which the Forest Service and industry strengthened their capacity to dominate in the delivery of IRM. The Forest Act, in its various iterations has allowed for the creation of Forest Reserves (also known as Provincial Forests following the Forest Act of 1978). The Forest Reserve or Provincial Forest “once designated by an Order-in-Council could not be alienated for any non-forestry purpose unless taken out of the reserve by Cabinet.”¹⁰ Those lands not in Forest Reserves were subject to the vagaries of other agency objectives. Most prominent in this respect was planning by Crown Lands. Crown lands, at various times has undertaken programs to sell public Crown lands - some of which were considered part of the Forest Service’s forest land base. Also prominent was the protected areas designation which typically removed land from the forest land base.

Table 1-1, below, illustrates key trends in land use zoning. Most astounding is the expanse of land which has come under the Provincial Forest category over the last few decades. By 1985, approximately 85% of the total Crown land base had been placed in reserves. These lands represent the forest land base upon which the MOF bases its annual allowable cut (AAC) determinations. Having secured the land base, the MOF acquired sweeping powers in relation to IRM. Under the Provincial Forest designation the MOF

¹⁰ Forest Resources Commission, *A History of Forest Tenure Policy*, [Victoria: Forest Resources Commission, October 1989], p. 5.

was given authority for implementing IRM. Over the period 1968 to 1995, therefore, the MOF has increased the security of its hold over the forest land base.

Approach	Year	Provincial Forests - Total Area	Parks - Total Area
		(millions of hectares)	(millions of hectares)
Type 2 IRM	1968	4.4	2.6
Type 1 IRM	1972	21.8	2.9
Type 1 IRM	1973	32.1	3.7
Type 1 IRM	1975	32.1	4.5
Type 2 IRM	1978	32.5	4.5
Type 2 IRM	1984	72.6	4.6
Type 2 IRM	1988	80.3	5.4
Type 1 IRM	1993	79.4	6.3
Type 1 IRM	1996	77	8.7

Each approach to IRM has been accompanied by significant land use zoning initiatives.

Type 1 IRM has been accompanied by the most significant increases in the areal extent of protected areas. Type 2 IRM has been associated with the largest increases in the areal extent of the provincial forest land base.¹¹

1.4 THE CHARACTER & EFFICACY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Viewed in conjunction with the thrusts of reform identified in Chapter 2, the efforts to secure the forest land base raise several questions with respect to the character

¹¹ The early years of Type 1 IRM (i.e., 1972 and 1973) may seem to contradict these observations. However, it should be remembered that the significant gains made with respect to the Provincial Forest program in these years occurred as the NDP was reorienting the institutional structure. These gains may be more properly attributed to a policy trajectory set in motion while Type 2 IRM predominated prior to 1972.

and efficacy of reform. For example, what can be said of the overall dynamic between Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM and their outcomes on land use designations? And, what is the efficacy of Type 1 IRM given the ease with which Type 2 IRM approaches appear to maintain, if not strengthen, MOF security over the forest land base?

Chapter 3 reflects on findings in Chapter 1 and 2 and elaborates on several observations. Four observations stand out.

1. Institutionalized limits to reform point to a continuance of the Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM dynamic. These limits appear as constraints on both the capacity of reformers to enact change, and the capacity of the broader institutional system to thwart change. Key among these institutionalized limits are time constraints and the need to maintain functioning systems. Both limit institutional reform efforts to incremental approaches.
2. There are party specific preferences. The NDP has preferred Type 1 IRM while the Social Credit has preferred Type 2 IRM. These differences are attributed to the NDP preference for value neutral land use planning and the Social Credit preference for forestry dominated approaches to IRM.
3. Type 1 IRM has been successfully used to alter the Forest Service's traditional conception of forest management. As a result, the Forest Service has undergone a noticeable change in terms of its organizational structure and hence its view of the world. This view is more accommodative of a value neutral approach to delivering IRM.
4. However, the Forest Service has kept its core policy priorities - those reflected in its liquidation policy¹² (timber management with minimal constraints) - out of the reach of reformers. This core program not only tempers Type 1 IRM intrusions, but serves

¹² "Liquidation policy" refers to the conversion of old growth forests to managed second growth stands.

to maintain a stream of development that could easily derail the incremental changes wrought to IRM.

Overall, Type 1 IRM reform efforts effect incremental change that is prone to atrophy.

The concept of IRM, as an instrument of reform easily becomes, under such circumstances, an instrument of retrenchment. In other words, the rhetoric of IRM may be used to pursue policies which ultimately undermine the substantive intent of IRM.

1.5 THESIS STATEMENT

In BC, there has been an ebb and flow between two approaches to IRM, Type 1 (interagency) and Type 2 (line agency) approaches. The interagency approach has made incremental changes in the concept of IRM. Yet, such reforms have not seriously contested the notion of IRM as “timber management with constraints.” Over the period 1968 to 1995, a general increase in the security of the forest land base has been achieved. This is attributed to the resiliency and tenacity of a MOF-industry alliance in regulating threats and capitalizing on opportunities. It is also seen to derive from broader institutionalized limits to reform. In spite of significant concessions to non forestry interests, this study finds that institutional reform, and the policy making capacity of the MOF interact to maintain a grip on the forest land base that undermines the balancing act in the latest land use strategy.

CHAPTER 2

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR INTEGRATED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 1972 TO 1995

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter tracks the ebb and flow of Type 1 IRM (interagency approach) and Type 2 IRM (single agency approach) from 1972 to 1995. Type 1 IRM was ascendant in the period 1972 to 1975. Reforms in this period centred on the NDP Government's attempts to bolster the role of the Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC) in IRM through the establishment of the Environment and Land Use Cabinet Secretariat (ELUCS), and Regional Resource Management Committees (RRMCs). Social Credit efforts to reassert Type 2 IRM in the period 1975 to 1991 are then examined. These include the establishment of the MOF in 1978, the development of legislation designed to assert MOF ascendancy, the dispersal of ELUCS, the restraint driven reforms of the early 1980s, and the disbanding of RRMCs. Social Credit efforts in the late 1980's are also significant in that they signal growing difficulties in maintaining the viability of Type 2 IRM. These efforts include the establishment of the Forest Resources Commission, the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, and the Cabinet Committee on Sustainable Development, for example. Following the discussion of Social Credit reforms, NDP reform efforts in the period 1992 to 1995 are examined. These include the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE), the cabinet level Land Use

Planning Working Group (LUPWG), the Integrated Resource Planning Committee (IRPC), Interagency Management Committees (IAMCs) and the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO). The latest efforts have put in place Type 1 IRM. An overview of these reforms reveals that over the period 1972 to 1995 there has been an ebb and flow of interagency and single agency approaches to reform.¹³

2.2 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 1969 - 1972

Resource related conflicts were becoming commonplace in the late 1960's. Many were related directly to jurisdictional overlap between government agencies. Most common were conflicts related to fish, wildlife and forestry interactions. The institutional structure for Crown land and resource management, however, was sectoralized and without an official forum for resolving interagency issues (i.e., issues that were not locatable to a single specific department). Efforts to resolve such issues have been described as "ad hoc" and inadequate.¹⁴ According to one fairly representative commentary, the resolution of interagency issues tended to favour strong agencies. Environmental protection and enhancement generally would lose out to development and growth-oriented proposals.¹⁵ In terms of the broad themes of IRM, a spirit of cooperation had not supplanted competition.

¹³ Although some institutional reforms and proposed reforms have occurred which conform neither to Type 1 IRM nor Type 2 IRM, the ebb and flow between Type 1 and Type 2 IRM is predominant.

¹⁴ Bruce Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.'s Regional Resource Management Committees* (MA Thesis), [Vancouver: University of British Columbia, School of Community and Regional Planning, 1977], p. 18

¹⁵ Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.'s Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 18.

In 1969, the Social Credit Government established the Land Use Committee (LUC) to better manage interagency conflict and issues. This unofficial cabinet committee was supposed to be an important part of conflict resolution where mandates overlapped.¹⁶ It was formalized in 1971 with the enactment of the Environment and Land Use Act (ELU Act), and was officially identified as the Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC). The committee was legislated to,

... ensure that all the aspects of preservation and maintenance of the natural environment are fully considered in the administration of land use and resource development commensurate with a maximum beneficial use, and minimize and prevent waste of such resources, and despoliation of the environment occasioned thereby ...

The act allowed the Lieutenant-Governor in council to make any orders “necessary and advisable.” These orders were to overrule all other resource development or environmental legislation including line agency mandates. As such, the mandate and legislation created a mechanism with great potential power to increase recognition of environmental values in resource use planning and cooperation between resource agencies.

In its first few years the committee was employed restrictively and did not meet regularly. “Less than well coordinated and unsure of its role and purpose” was how one observer described it.¹⁷ Generally, short term solutions to problems were sought and often faltered. Crook’s assessment of ELUC’s performance prior to August 1972 is

¹⁶ Albert H. Niezen, *Integrating Forestry and Wildlife Management Through Forest Management Planning in British Columbia*. M.A. Thesis, [Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Faculty of Graduate Studies, Community and Regional Planning, 1989]. p. 13.

¹⁷ Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.’s Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 20.

typical. She noted that the Act represented a major step forward in terms of the rhetoric of environmental protection but did very little else.¹⁸

2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 1972-1975

The role of ELUC was bolstered considerably in 1972. In that year, the NDP took office. A strong advocate for integrated resource management, the NDP embarked on a number of bold institutional reforms. The ELUC, created by the Social Credit government, provided an excellent nucleus for the NDP reform efforts. The NDP strengthened substantially the role of ELUC. Membership was expanded, and regular meetings commenced. To support ELUC, the Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat (ELUCS) was established. The intention was to use ELUC and ELUCS to address collectively identified issues which required an investigation exceeding the capacity of a single department.¹⁹ ELUC and ELUCS not only took on problems beyond the capacity of specialized sectoral agencies, but were also responsible for recommending procedures and policy that would enable specialized agencies to deal with similar problems in the future.

The NDP was careful to acknowledge the need to maintain specialist agencies, however. In their 1974 annual report, ELUCS explained the role of ELUC and ELUCS. ELUCs observed that government consisted of a number of “specialist” agencies which were “charged with promoting one aspect of resource development, a forest service for

¹⁸ Christianna Stachelrodt Crook, *Environment and Land Use Policies and Practices of the Province of British Columbia*, [Vancouver: British Columbia Institute for Economic Analysis, 1975], Appendix 4A2

¹⁹ Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, *Annual Report, 1974*, p. 10.

forestry, an agriculture department for agriculture, a parks service for recreation and so on.”²⁰ ELUCS noted that the accumulation of information and expertise meant that specialization was essential and that further specialization was to be expected in the future. However, they also argued the need for coordination between agencies. They stated, “... the resource base we are dealing with is a seamless web and that an action in one area or discipline will have repercussions in another...”²¹

Thus, unlike other jurisdictions which had amalgamated sectoral agencies to create one “superplanning” agency, the NDP chose to build lateral mechanisms to coordinate line agencies. ELUCS encapsulated its role in the following excerpt from its annual report from 1974:

*[we do not operate] as a “superplanning” organization. We do not replace the planning operation of individual departments. It is essential for each resource department to continue developing its capability to consider the resource for which it is responsible, prepare plans for its development, utilization or preservation.*²²

An incremental improvement in decision-making for resource use and development was sought. Specialized agencies would gradually improve the capacity to integrate other interests into their decision-making. The style of this integration would largely be influenced by ELUC-lead efforts, however. According to ELUCS, the result was a “sounder approach” that “gradually reduces and resolves areas of conflict”.²³

²⁰ Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, *Annual Report, 1974*, p. 10.

²¹ Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, *Annual Report, 1974*, p. 10.

²² Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, *Annual Report, 1974* p. 10.

²³ Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat, *Annual Report, 1974*, p. 11.

Prominent in its approach to IRM was the emphasis on using neutral planning groups, supported by rigorous analysis.

... The Secretariat is mainly concerned with integrated resource management using bio-physical, environmental economic and social data to determine the best allocation of resource uses for the overall benefit of the Province. The Secretariat attempts to determine the facts relating to resource conflicts through objective and rigorous analysis and place these before the Environment and Land Use Committee for political judgment

²⁴
...

ELUCS' effects on resource management within the broader institutional framework quickly became evident. The use of multi-agency committees and planning teams increased, and the Forest Service began to advocate the need for planning which accounted for all interests in land planning. In its first 18 months of operation alone, ELUCS established 43 interagency task forces.²⁵ In total, ELUC and ELUCS was reported to have had widespread support in many parts of the "Bureaucracy" of government, and was considered by many agencies to be a substantial improvement in the quality of decision making.

The Forest Service was less enthralled. Minister of Forests, Lands and Water Resources Bob Williams also chaired ELUC, and expressed open disdain for those elements of the Forest Service which did not embrace IRM. Williams tended to rely on ELUCS advice more often than that the Forest Service. In response, the Forest Service struggled to adjust its management practices to meet new expectations. Wilson suggests

²⁴ Ministry of Environment, *Annual Report 1976*, [Victoria: Queen's, Printer for British Columbia, 1977], p. 118.

²⁵ Crook, *Environment and Land Use Policies and Practices of the Province of British Columbia (Vol. 1)*, p. 162.

that the Forest Service's efforts to rationalize the old organization with new expectations brought it close to a state of "institutional nervous breakdown".

Regional Resource Management Committees

Efforts were also made to improve the coordination and integration of resource agencies at the regional level.²⁶ These efforts were in response to the report of The Select Standing Committee on Forests and Fisheries (1973) and specific studies undertaken by ELUCS which identified the need to coordinate line agency activities at the regional level. The Select Standing Committee found unnecessary barriers to communication between provincial agencies and between the province and federal government. In order to overcome these barriers, the Select Standing Committee recommended the establishing of common administrative regions for resource agencies, common centres for the various resource agencies' district staff, and a civil service position responsible to ELUC in each region to coordinate activities of resource management regions. Similarly, the ELUC sponsored 1974 Purcell Range, and Mica Reservoir Studies recommended that interagency groups be formally established at the regional level and chaired by a representative of the ELUCS.²⁷

To improve coordination at the regional level, ELUCS encouraged the strengthening of regional mechanisms already evolving informally and requested that the

²⁶ "Regional" refers here to the level generally similar to, but not exactly corresponding to the MOF Region.

²⁷ Alan D. Chambers, *Purcell Range Study: Integrated Resource Management for British Columbia's Purcell Mountains for BC* [Victoria: ELUCS, January 1974], pp. 33-34.

²⁷ K.G. Farquharson, *Mica Reservoir Regional Resource Study Summary Report*, [Victoria: ELUCS, 1974].

Forest Service formalize meetings already occurring. The first of these committees formed in Prince George in the late 1960s and, by 1974, seven committees were operating informally.²⁸ By January of 1975, seven regions along with designated administrative centres were established by Order-in-Council.²⁹ These regions are identified below with their corresponding administrative centres identified in brackets.

- Omineca (Smithers)
- Omineca Peace (Prince George)
- Cariboo (Williams Lake)
- Vancouver Island (Nanaimo)
- Lower Mainland (Greater Vancouver)
- Thompson-Okanagan (Kamloops)
- Kootenay (Nelson)³⁰

Common administrative boundaries were established for most resource agencies, and formally designated through Order-In-Council.

Committees at the regional level served in a capacity similar to ELUCS by facilitating communication and improving coordination between agencies whose mandates overlapped.³¹ Senior regional agency officials comprised RRMCs, and served as the regional vehicle to achieve coordination and were directly linked to the ELUC and ELUCS.³²

²⁸ Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.'s Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 29. These committees, prior to their formalization as RRMCs, were known as Land Use Liaison Committees, and Multi-sector Committees.

²⁹ Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.'s Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 35, notes that government staff interpreted the designated centres to mean a multi-resource agency office building.

³⁰ The process of establishing RRMC boundaries commenced in 1974.

³¹ Heayn, *Integrated Resource Management: B.C.'s Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 47.

³² Crook, *Environment and Land Use Policies and Practices of the Province of British Columbia (Vol. 1)*, p. 313.

Boundaries and administrative centres, for example, were justified by ELUC with the rational that,

*... the basis of integrated resource planning is the bringing together of all departments and agencies which have knowledge, skills and responsibilities for natural resources in an area. Common boundaries, coupled with administration from common centres, will not guarantee integrated planning and management. It does, however, remove a major physical and psychological barrier to the process.*³³

RRMCs, according to Heayn, were intended to: prepare and implement resource master plans, conduct sub-regional studies, provide day-to-day problem solving, review regional environmental assessments, and provide public information.³⁴

In their 1975 submission to the Pearse Commission, ELUCS further outlined a broad vision of how integrated resource management could be delivered at the regional level in the province. ELUCS envisioned the development of “regional resource plans” which would emerge “from a process of analysis which initially focused around a set of immediate, real and geographically focused problems. ... From such a focus, the scope of planning studies must expand outwards geographically.”³⁵ The goal was to implement planning processes to resolve site specific problems. The RRMCs, with field officers attached to the Secretariat (Regional Resource Coordinators) would later conduct comprehensive regional planning processes which were to include broad management objectives and land use zoning. Together, ELUC, ELUCS and RRMCs were to comprise

³³ ELUCS, *Annual Report 1976*, p. 40.

³⁴ However, it was not until early 1976 that guidelines were developed regarding the roles of RRMCs. See: ELUCS, *Draft Guidelines of Regional Resource Management Committee and Technical Planning Committees Participation* [Victoria, February 27, 1976]. The guidelines were refined and released in March 1, 1977.

³⁵ ELUCS, *Submission to the Royal Commission on Forest Resources*, November, 1975, p. 14.

an interagency approach based on relative equality among line agencies. Through this approach, provincial policy could be transmitted and implemented in regional planning.

Integrated Resource Management - Forest Service 1975

By 1975 the Forest Service had aligned itself closely with the interagency concept of IRM. The Forest Service was advocating the need to bolster its integrated resource use planning program, and in their 1975 brief to Cabinet, they defined IRM as,

*The deliberate and careful planning of the integration of various uses to interfere with each other as little as possible and to complement each other as much as possible with due regard for their order of importance in the public interest in each management area...*³⁶

The approach was to “achieve the optimum social and economic benefit to the people of BC.”³⁷ The practical need for integration was justified by the Forest Service on the basis that

*in the past, timber production was the major objective of forest management, but in recent years, the Forest Service increasingly has recognized a responsibility for providing other benefits from the land base to serve better the interests of society.*³⁸

The Forest Service, however, was careful to note that its IRM program was primarily geared to operational planning and that there remained significant gaps in IRM planning at higher (or strategic) levels.

³⁶ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia* (Brief submitted to the Royal Commission on Forest Resources), September 1975, p. 1. It should be noted that the “the intent of the Forest Service planning process (is) to produce management plans that will keep the constraints for forest extraction, as well as on other forms of resource use, to an acceptable minimum (p. 2).

³⁷ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia*, p. 2.

³⁸ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia*, p. 1.

They stated,

Because of the constant pressure to meet the demands of planning for day-to-day operations in the forest industry, implementation of the overall planning process has lagged far behind its conceptual development. We have gone a long way toward reducing land use conflicts at the site specific level, but have much farther to go to produce plans that provide for efficient use of all resources in line with public demands, by allowing optimal allocation on a provincial scale.³⁹

The purpose of regional planning was to highlight opportunities, deficiencies or blockages existing in the region. These factors could include the magnitude of the resource base, opportunities for new manufacturing plants or for expansion of other facilities or services and amenities, and the social and biological factors constraining resource utilization.⁴⁰ As explained by the Forest Service, the relevance of this level of planning to the Forest Service is that,

it places forestry activities in the context of an overall development scheme for the area. Priorities for use can then be assigned to direct the level of utilization, level of investment in stand improvements, and policies relating to manufacturing and effective functions at all lower levels.⁴¹

The Forest Service noted that regional studies should be undertaken “from time to time”.

The NDP was defeated in the election of 1975 and a Social Credit government elected. During their short time in power the NDP accomplished much. It strengthened the role of ELUC, increasing its capacity to monitor and steer IRM. The ELUCS was a key supporting organization, and RRMCs were established with further initiatives undertaken to elaborate the role of RRMCs in regional planning. In sum, developments

³⁹ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia*, p. 8.

⁴⁰ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia*, p. 11.

⁴¹ B.C. Forest Service, *Forest Resource Planning in British Columbia*, p. 11.

in this period resulted in the ascendancy of Type 1 IRM (identified in Chapter 1). By 1975, the NDP appears to have fully articulated an interagency planning system linking government agencies at the central and regional levels through ELUC and RRMCS. Although not replacing the duties of sectoral agencies, the interagency mechanisms steered IRM-related developments.

2.4 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 1976 TO 1986

The Social Credit placed less value on Type 1 IRM and undertook measures which boosted the role of the Forest Service in delivering IRM. Several new sectoral agencies were created and principles of IRM were embedded in sectoral agency mandates. Key among these was the MOF. The Social Credit government was also intent on dismantling the institutional framework for interagency planning. ELUCS was attached to the newly created Ministry of Environment shortly after the Social Credit government came to power and eventually disbanded. RRMCS were disbanded in the early 1980's which further eroded the capacity to undertake an interagency approach. Overall, a commitment to Type 2 IRM fueled Social Credit reforms.

Ministry of Forests Act - Forest Act

The Ministry of Forests Act and Forest Act in 1978 followed on recommendations presented in the Pearse Commission's 1976 report, and were pivotal in the promotion of a Type 2 IRM.⁴² The legislation represented the first rationalization of the many

⁴² The Pearse Commission was appointed by the NDP government. See: Peter Pearse, *Timber Rights and Forest Policy in British Columbia* (Royal Commission on Forest Resources, 2 vols.), [Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, 1976].

amendments made to the long lived Forest Act of 1912 which, in the opinion of Peter Pearse, had not aged well and failed to express important features of policy.⁴³ One of these features of policy was the growing need to plan for integrated resource use.⁴⁴ The forest legislation that followed in response to Pearse's work (The Forest Act and the Ministry of Forests Act (1978)) has been interpreted as a legal requirement compelling the MOF to deliver integrated resource planning on forest lands and land designated as Provincial Forests. This requirement is embodied in the oft-quoted Section 4(C) of the Ministry of Forests Act which requires that the Forest Service:

Plan for the use of the forest and range resources of the Crown, so that the production of timber and forage, the harvesting of timber, the grazing of livestock and the realization of fisheries, wildlife, water, outdoor recreation and other natural resource values are coordinated and integrated, in consultation and cooperation with other ministries and agencies of the Crown and with the private sector.

The act succeeded in identifying IRM planning, which had been understood as a problem common to several resource agencies prior to 1978 as an MOF problem after the act was passed into law. As such, a shift from Type 1 IRM to Type 2 IRM had been effected through the legislation.

⁴³ Over the decades, Pearse noted, "[it had] been repeatedly amended to implement successive waves of public policy. But it has never undergone comprehensive revision. As a result it has become thickly encrusted with amendments, its structure is outdated, and its language fails to express important features of policy." (Pearse, Vol. 1, p. 358.)

⁴⁴ As Pearse continues, "Management of natural resources as extensive and disparate as the forests of this province inevitably calls for decisions that take account of the special characteristics of individual sites in the physical, economic, and social contexts" (Pearse, Vol. 1, p. 358).

Following the new legislation, the MOF embarked on the development of a comprehensive planning “sub-program” to develop and direct planning for the use of forest and range land.”⁴⁵ Its purpose was to provide

*a systematic process to prevent piecemeal planning that would result in confusion of priorities and conflicts of goals and objectives. It integrates all Ministry of Forests’ resource management objectives and takes into account the objectives of other resource agencies and, where conflicts are identified, suggests alternatives for their resolution.*⁴⁶

The planning subprogram consisted of planning at various levels including Forest Management Plans, which were developed for Timber Supply Areas (TSAs), and Tree Farm Licences (TFLs), Local Resource Use Plans (LRUPs) and Resource Development Plans.⁴⁷

The concept of a hierarchical interagency planning system envisioned by ELUC and ELUCS does seem to have greatly influenced the MOF’s planning framework. Yet, although much of the terminology and concepts were borrowed, the essential purpose to which the framework was put diverged in key respects from the ideal planning framework envisioned in the NDP era.

To illustrate, shortly following the Act, the Ministry released the *Forest Planning Handbook*, outlining its approach to IRM. The book is prefaced with the comment that it was designed primarily for MOF personnel. The ministry defined its role in the absence

⁴⁵ Ministry of Forests. *Forest and Range Resource Analysis 1984*. [Victoria: Queen’s Printer for British Columbia, 1984], p. E41.

⁴⁶ Ministry of Forests, *Forest and Range Resource Analysis 1984*, p. E41.

⁴⁷ Public Sustained Yield Units were reorganized into a total of 33 Timber Supply Areas.

of a broader planning framework. The success of implementing IRM, according to the Ministry, was dependent upon many variables and considerations beyond the MOF's jurisdiction.

While planning processes outlined in this Handbook provides that input be obtained from all resource agencies and the public, it should not be inferred that the end result of the process is a comprehensive land use plan. Through its planning processes, the Forest Service strives to adjust forest and range management programs to achieve the desired mix of forest uses but does not assume the responsibility for managing anything other than the timber, forage and recreation resources as defined within the Ministry of Forests Act.⁴⁸

Outside the MOF, though, many of the aspects to a broader planning framework were being dismantled. ELUCS was disbanded in September of 1980 and its duties reassigned to other ministries. The rationale for the reassignment was that ELUCS' duties had been assumed by other agencies including the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Ministry of Intergovernmental Relations and the Ministry of Environment. ELUCS, therefore, was perceived as a needless duplication of functions. ELUC, in future, was to draw on sectoral agencies for support rather than a neutral agency such as ELUCS.⁴⁹

The Planning Act: 1980

While Type 2 IRM was continuing to gain prominence, advocates of strong interagency mechanisms were still active within the Social Credit government. The BC Ministry of Municipal Affairs, in 1980, for example, proposed a planning act to

⁴⁸Forest Service (1978), *Forest Planning Handbook*, Section 1.0.

⁴⁹Minister's Office, Minister of Environment, *New Release*, September, 1980.

coordinate and simplify the overall planning process of government at the provincial and local level. The initiative proposed central and regional committees within government. These committees, comprised of representatives from the various sectoral government agencies, were to coordinate planning efforts and land use.

The Act proposed to recognize Cabinet as the “final authority responsible for land use planning”.⁵⁰ This included the approval of policy statements and provincial regional plans, the delegation of provincial responsibilities to local government and “requiring financial assistance from resource development companies in preparing plans and providing services.”⁵¹ The ELUC was to be responsible for: incorporating ministerial and crown corporation statements into “comprehensive and consistent statements of provincial land use objectives and policies”, establishing boundaries for planning regions, ensuring the planning process is coordinated at the provincial and regional level and between line agencies, establishing programs for the development of provincial regional plans including provisions for public participation in their development; and recommending the adoption of regional plans.

An Interministry Planning Committee was to be established that would consist of deputy ministers and other members that the ELUC “deems appropriate”. This committee was to act as an advisory body to the ELUC and provide technical direction to Regional Coordinating Committees. Regional Coordinating Committees were to be

⁵⁰BC Ministry of Municipal Affairs, *The Planning Act - A Discussion Paper*, [Victoria: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, September 1980], p. 23.

⁵¹BC Ministry of Municipal Affairs, *The Planning Act - A Discussion Paper*, p. 23.

responsible for submitting regional plans to the Interministry Committee for approval. ELUC was to appoint to this regional coordinating committee “representatives of ministries, crown corporations and local government in each major geographical region of the province. In addition to establishing “programs for the development of a provincial regional plan or plans”. Each Regional Coordinating Committee was to “facilitate the coordination of provincial and local government land use and settlement planning policies and programs in its region.”

Plans were to be guided by provincial policy statements prepared by each ministry and crown corporation. Policy statements were to include objectives and polices for the execution of ministry and crown corporation responsibilities related to land use and land allocation on a province-wide scale. Statements were to contain possible alternatives, a rationale for policy, and “an assessment of the implication of each policy alternative for the defined land use policies of other ministries. Prior to approval, the ELUC was to review policy statements to determine whether a comprehensive and consistent statement of provincial land use objectives and polices would be achieved by the implementation of the policy statements. Failing this, the ELUC was responsible for “recommending” changes to “achieve a comprehensive and consistent statement of provincial land use objectives and policies,” and ensuring coordination between provincial and regional levels.⁵² At the regional level, the coordinating committees were to prepare regional plans.

⁵²BC Ministry of Municipal Affairs, *The Planning Act - A Discussion Paper*, p. 33.

The Planning Act was never enacted into law and commentators suggest that the primary reason for this was that it represented too much of a challenge to the existing power relations between ministries.⁵³ The Planning Act embraced an interagency concept of IRM and came across as an attempt to further coordinate line agencies. An equivalent to ELUCS was curiously absent from the structure proposed in the Planning Act, reflecting the Social Credit preference to rely on the expertise from particular resource agencies rather than a non-sectoral administrative body.

The Planning Act is significant, because, in one sense it maintained a commitment to Type 1 IRM. The Planning Act possessed many of the features of Type 1 IRM. However, the lack of a neutral interagency support body like the ELUCS represents a key difference. Without such a body, technical and administrative assistance continued to be provided by sectoral agencies. The capacity to coordinate and integrate, in this regard, undoubtedly would have differed from Type 1 IRM.⁵⁴

Land And Resource Use Planning Under “Restraint”

A commitment to maintaining regional and central coordinating and integrating mechanisms was still evident as late as 1982. For example, in describing roles and responsibilities, ELUTC (Environment and Land Use Technical Committee) and

⁵³ Other detractors of the Planning Act were generally critical of what appeared to be an overly authoritarian, centralist planning system which relied on very little public input and essentially would have reduced the political power of local, and regional district governments.

⁵⁴ The NDP in 1990, for example, prefaced their proposed act to establish an Environment and Land Use Secretariat by stating, “The Bill is necessary in that the Province currently lacks a comprehensive and well coordinated approach to the issue of environment and land use conflict. The establishment of a secretariat will greatly assist the resolution of these conflicts and will ensure that environment and land use decisions are given serious treatment at the highest level of government. See: NDP, *Sustainable Development - BC's Growing Future (1990 Legislative Program for Sustainable Development)*.”

RRMCs,⁵⁵ were discussed in the context of a broad planning framework within which “provincial planning systems” would be introduced.⁵⁶ The details of the planning system were neither identified nor apparent. The most that can be said is that there was an expectation that such a system would be established. The interagency planning framework at this time consisted of ELUC, ELUTC, and RRMCs.⁵⁷

Then, in 1983, the Social Credit embarked on a broad policy of restraint. As part of its restraint package, RRMCs were dissolved and the number of resource management regions was reduced from eight to five.⁵⁸ All regional plans developed through RRMCs were nullified and efforts at regional land use planning ceased. In the same period, considerable downsizing of the MOF took place. Coupled with the dispersal of ELUCS in 1980, the organizational structure required to support an inter-agency approach to IRM at the regional and central levels was dismantled.

By the mid 1980’s, the institutional framework for delivering IRM appeared increasingly fragmented and in disarray. Organizations as diverse as the MOF and Wilderness Advisory Committee had identified serious weaknesses in land use planning.

⁵⁵ Province of British Columbia, *Roles and Responsibilities - Environment and Land Use Technical Committee and Regional Resource Management Committees*, June 1982, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Province of British Columbia, *Roles and Responsibilities - Environment and Land Use Technical Committee and Regional Resource Management Committees*, p. 1. The planning systems would also be given substance through the proposed Land Use Act.

⁵⁷ ELUC comprised nine ministers which had land and resource responsibilities; ELUTC consisted of ELUC members’ deputy ministers. ELUTC, was responsible for advising ELUC and directing the work of inter-ministry task forces as well as the RRMCs. RRMCs were to be responsible for coordinating land and resource use planning activities at the regional level, identifying strategies to resolve resource conflicts, assist in the preparation of regional strategic plans, and for the provision of inter-agency liaison.

⁵⁸ Dorli Duffy, *A Review of the British Columbia Crown Land Allocation and Management Planning Process* (Forest Resources Commission Background Papers, Vol. 2), [Victoria: Forest Resources Commission, 1990], p. 15.

The MOF was unable to convey any sense of an overall land use planning framework. The *1984 Range and Resource Analysis* provides a description of a number of mechanisms for coordination and integration including the Environment and Land Use Committee and various interministerial committees at the provincial level and committees, subcommittees and task groups operating in the regions. However, the report also identified many outstanding issues, many of which had weakened IRM throughout the 1970s.⁵⁹

The MOF encapsulated its thoughts on the state of strategic level planning and IRM planning generally in the *1984 Range and Resource Analysis*. They stated,

*Undoubtedly, strategic planning could provide a good opportunity for rationalizing and coordinating management objectives. Currently however, this opportunity is not being fully exploited. The Ministry of Forests recognizes that the degree of consultation carried out with other agencies on TSA and TFL planning is sometimes inconsistent among forests districts and regions. In addition, because formal strategic planning is relatively new to resource agencies, most have not developed processes to the point where interagency integration can be effectively addressed. Even when the procedures are in place, it is difficult to see how the necessary tradeoffs and compromises will be attained as long as each agency pursues its own mandate, which emphasizes only one part of the overall resource picture.*⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Included among these issues were:

- the lack of an overall policy direction and approved strategic plans to ensure effective local planning;
- an imbalance in amount and quality of information available for representing different interests;
- inadequate allocation of human or financial resources to effectively participate in IRM;
- the use of IRM planning mechanisms to make land use allocation decisions;
- the lack of procedures for dovetailing or ordering the regional and lower level plans emerging in other agencies;
- referrals were still being made at the lowest level;
- referrals of MOF plans have been ineffective because interagency consultation was handled poorly.

⁶⁰ Ministry of Forests, *Forest and Range Resource Analysis*, pp. F6, F7.

The Wilderness Advisory Committee, struck in 1985, reviewed the framework for decision making for wilderness. In their 1986 report they found that "... the institutional framework for land use decision-making in British Columbia has serious weaknesses ... Government agencies are generally seen to make decisions without a broad long term strategy and without coordinating their policies with the policies of others..."⁶¹

2.5 TOWARDS A LAND USE STRATEGY: 1986 TO 1991

From about 1986 to 1991, reform was ad hoc, slowly coalescing around the commitment to achieve sustainability in land and resource use.⁶² A commitment to inter-agency approaches to IRM grew slowly. Most observers of this period emphasize the importance of the World Commission on Environment and Development and their report in 1987⁶³ and Canada's and BC's endorsement of the concept of sustainable development.

Following the endorsement of the National Task Force on Environment and Economy's report which introduced the concept of sustainability in a Canadian context, BC appointed a Task Force on Environment and Economy. The Task Force made a number of recommendations including the appropriate roles of the Round Table in BC; the need for a sustainable development strategy; the need to introduce formal dispute

⁶¹ Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, [Vancouver, March 1986], p. 17.

⁶² "Sustainability" is used interchangeably with "sustainable development" in this thesis. The concept is complex. It has been generalized by CORE as "Economic and social development within the limits required to maintain the environment and natural resources, and ensure the prospects of their use in the future." (CORE, *Planning for Sustainability* (Vol. 2 of the Provincial Land Use Strategy) p. 115.)

⁶³ The World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, [New York: Oxford University Press], 1987.

resolution processes to resolve environmental conservation and economic development disputes. They also recommended that the Cabinet Committee on Regional Development and the Environment and Land Use Committee be combined into a single Sustainable Development Committee.⁶⁴

The concept of sustainable development proved attractive to government and enlivened efforts to suffuse a sagging IRM with new life. In 1990, the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy was appointed, and the coordinating role and majority of other functions undertaken by ELUC were replaced by the Cabinet Committee on Sustainable Development (CCSD) which formed in early 1990.⁶⁵ The committee was responsible for developing policies and programs which “encourage comprehensive industrial and regional development in BC, while weighing environmental concerns.”⁶⁶ Chaired by the Minister of Regional and Economic Development, the committee consisted of 14 ministers. A Deputy Ministers Committee on Sustainable Development and Environment and Land Use supported the CCSD.⁶⁷ The Committee appears to have been occupied mostly by what has been referred to as “linear development” (e.g., the building of site specific projects such as mills, infrastructure such as hydro lines).

⁶⁴ Other recommendations addressed the need for improved communications and education with respect to sustainable development issues and the need for scientific and research activities for example.

⁶⁵ ELUC continued to function during this period was acting as an appeal body under the Agricultural Land Commission Act, and “to enact provisions of the ELUC Act as necessary.” (Duffy, *A Review of the British Columbia Crown Land Allocation and Management Planning Process*, p. 69.)

⁶⁶ Duffy, *A Review of the British Columbia Crown Land Allocation and Management Planning Process*, p. 69.

⁶⁷ Duffy, *A Review of the British Columbia Crown Land Allocation and Management Planning Process*, p. 69.

A number of bold experiments in sustainable development planning were embarked upon as well. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (formed in 1989), and later, the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee were the most famous in this era. The Task Force and later the Steering Committee were charged with developing a land use plan in the Clayoquot Sound that would achieve sustainable development at a local level. Essentially concerned with forest land planning, it was enlivened by an overriding principle of balanced, neutral planning to achieve environmental, economic and social sustainability. Similarly, the MOF initiated a number of TSA level experiments in planning for sustainable development.⁶⁸ These processes emphasized the use of consensus decision-making and inter-agency planning augmented by broad stakeholder participation. A commitment to achieving sustainable development pushed Social Credit towards a Type 1 IRM.

Forest Resources Commission

The most significant of Social Credit-era initiatives related to forest land planning was the Forest Resources Commission (FRC).⁶⁹ The FRC was established to provide a “comprehensive view of what the forests of British Columbia should represent.”

⁶⁸ See for example: Cariboo Local Advisory Council, *A Sustainable Development Strategy for the Williams Lake Timber Supply Area*, [Williams Lake: Cariboo Forest Region, August 1991].

⁶⁹ The relevance of the Old Growth Strategy Project should be noted. The report, *Old Growth Strategy for British Columbia*, released in May of 1992, recommended enabling legislation to create interagency structures at the provincial, regional, and local levels. These bodies were to be comprised of representatives of provincial ministries and stakeholder groups. The land use bodies were to “deal with land and resource allocation issues”. (Old Growth Strategy Project, *An Old Growth Strategy for British Columbia*, [BC Ministry of Forests, May 1992]. pp. 48-55.)

Its mandate further stipulated that,

This view would take into account the full range of forest values, how the forest might be managed to protect and enhance those values and the total economic impact of the forests to the Province.⁷⁰

Reflecting upon its work, the FRC noted a dominant theme - "The way the forests and their many values are currently being managed by government and industry is out of step with what the public expects. It must change."⁷¹ The FRC identified that,

Driving the current level of dissatisfaction is a dramatic shift in society's values. Once valued only for their economic worth, the forest resources now represent a much wider range of values - aesthetic, environmental, social, spiritual, and many more. That shift in values underlies much of the conflict that has dominated the debate over forest resources in the last few years.⁷²

The FRC argued, in its 1991 report *The Future of Our Forests*, that the existing line ministries with specialized advocacy positions should not be responsible for delivering IRM. In place of existing line ministries, the FRC proposed that the Ministry of Crown Lands be restructured and given a mandate to "ensure [an] optimum balance of activities on all provincial Crown lands". The restructured ministry would be responsible for coordinating all land use planning functions and have responsibility for the management of timber and range (MOF), and for water, fish and wildlife functions (Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks). Those portions of the Crown land base

⁷⁰ Forest Resource Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, Appendix 1.

⁷¹ Forest Resources Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, p. 6.

⁷² Forest Resource Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, p. 6.

suited for commercial timber production were to be managed by a new Forest Resources Corporation.

Land use planning to be undertaken through a Land Use Commission structure which in turn reported to the Cabinet Committee on Sustainable Development through the Ministry of Crown lands. This Land Use Commission was proposed as an independent body that assists the Cabinet Committee on Sustainable Development to develop "... broad goals and objectives, provide a neutral forum for information discussion and research on Land Use Plans, and make recommendations to government on the range of values to be considered in making land use decisions."⁷³ The Land Use Commission was to develop land use plans consisting of land use designations (e.g., determining which lands were to be designated as commercial forest lands). Land use zoning was to be undertaken at the local level (i.e., MOF district level). At the local level, professional resource staff, private interests and user groups were to be responsible for developing land use plans. At the regional level, six to eight regions were proposed. Regional planning groups were to have a role in communicating between the Land Use Commission and local groups linking broad provincial goals and objectives with local issues and concerns.

The reforms advocated by the FRC do not fall easily into the Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM categories. The FRC espoused the need to move away from the line agency approaches (i.e., sectoral agencies). Yet, they also proposed reforms which removed

⁷³ Forest Resource Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, p. 14.

planning authority from line agencies completely and placed it within a neutral agency *external*⁷⁴ to government.⁷⁵ In contrast, Type 1 IRM is *internal*.

In the wake of the FRC and growing legitimacy problems, the MOF had begun to review its approach to forest land planning as well. Timber Supply Area (TSA) planning garnered most attention in MOF efforts to both restore the legitimacy of its planning program and to keep step with broader land use planning policy that was emerging. Planning at this level quickly evolved into an inter-agency approach to the delivery of IRM at the sub-regional level. In October of 1989, a multi-agency approach to planning was endorsed by the MOF and viewed as consistent with the FRC's 1990 recommendation that TSA Steering Committee membership be broadened to effect a better balance in planning.⁷⁶ Between November, 1990 and January 1991, the inter-agency concept was explored through a series of informal discussions with the regional level and district level staff from all Forest Regions in addition to headquarters staff and other agencies. Implications of the inter-agency team concept with respect to the planning process were fully explored. General support for the concept was apparent.

⁷⁴ The use of the word "external" has been used imprecisely by the Forest Resources Commission and the Commission on Resources and Environment. They use "external" to refer to institutions independent of line agencies and Cabinet. This can be contrasted with an agency which is internal.

⁷⁵ The proposed land use planning structure was further elaborated in the FRC 1991 report entitled *Land Use Planning for British Columbia*. This report further developed the Land Use Commission model. The notion of a restructured Ministry of Crown lands was conspicuously absent in the Land Use Commission model however. (See: Forest Resources Commission, *Land Use Planning for British Columbia*, [Victoria: Forest Resources Commission, December 1991].)

⁷⁶ Allan Lidstone, Supervisor, Land Use Planning, MOF, personal communication.

2.6 NDP AND THE LAND USE STRATEGY

When the NDP formed the government in 1991, significant proposals for institutional reform had been bandied about through the various Task Forces, Commissions and Inter-agency Committees. The great challenge facing reformers in this period was to integrate many discrete, ad hoc reforms percolating through government into a coherent land use strategy. The work of the FRC, recent efforts by the MOF to bolster its planning at the strategic level, the Parks & Wilderness for the 90's initiative, the Old Growth Strategy, the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, and the recent experiments in consensus planning such as the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee were important.⁷⁷ Each of these initiatives had set out in many different directions, attacking interconnected problems related to IRM from different angles. These processes were succeeding in coming up with different pieces to what was apparently part of a larger puzzle.

The NDP, as they had done before, began to build the capacity to direct forest land planning through Type 1 IRM. The goal was to bring order to an incoherent institutional structure for IRM. The NDP reestablished regional interagency planning groups (Interagency Management Committees or IAMCs) akin to the RRMC's of the 1970's, and set up interagency planning groups at the central level (the Integrated Resource Planning Committee or IRPC). The IRPC and IAMCs are interagency bodies

⁷⁷ The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee was formed in 1991, following the disbanding of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force in 1990. The Committee was mandated to develop a strategy that would achieve sustainable development in the Clayoquot Sound. The Committee, unable to reach consensus on a strategy, was disbanded in the fall of 1992.

working to achieve a higher level of coordination between line agencies. In addition, strategic planning at the sub-regional level (i.e., Land and Resource Management Planning or LRMP) has been refined. Recently, further reform has been undertaken to strengthen these bodies through the establishment of the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) in early 1995. LUCO was established to further develop land use policy and to coordinate land use initiatives and reports directly to the cabinet level Land Use Planning Working Group (LUPWG). Most prominent though, has been the establishment of the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) which was charged with developing a land use strategy for the province. Together, these initiatives bore more than a passing similarity to the NDP reforms of the early 1970s (i.e., ELUCS and RRMCs).⁷⁸

Commission On Resources And Environment

The Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) was given the mandate to “develop for public and government consideration a British Columbia -wide strategy for land use and related resource and environmental management.”⁷⁹ To assist in coordination and integration, CORE set up a Government Liaison Committee (GLC) consisting of 16 senior level staff from resource-related ministries and agencies who were to provide advice regarding CORE proposals and concepts. The creation of the Interministry Policy Committee (IMPC), chaired by a CORE staff member and made up

⁷⁸ A richer description can be found in much of CORE’s work which has chronicled a somewhat revisionist account of the development of the land use strategy that belies the confusion which was a key characteristic of this era. See their 4 volume *Land Use Strategy*, for example.

⁷⁹ Section 4 (1) of the Commission on Resources and Environment Act.

of 20 senior officials was to aid CORE's work through the preparation of background material and by providing advice on CORE initiatives.

CORE was also given the task of undertaking regional planning in several areas of the province. To date, regional planning processes for the Vancouver Island, Cariboo-Chilcotin, and Kootenay Boundary Regions have been completed and are currently being implemented. The processes were to delineate acceptable land use activity through the establishment of various zones for Crown land use. At the sub-regional and local levels, a number of projects have been initiated to resolve more local issues.

In addition, CORE developed a Land Use Charter and Land Use Goals which elaborate upon the principles of sustainability advanced by the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. The Charter has been accepted in principle by government and the goals continue to be elaborated through the work of the Inter-Ministry Policy Committee⁸⁰.

The CORE model was reminiscent of the "external" Land Use Commission model proposed by the FRC. CORE was mandated to develop land use objectives, develop a land use plan, and undertake regional planning. Furthermore, it was independent of line agencies and government. However, it did not replace the planning functions of sectoral agencies nor, did its role in planning ever crystallize within the broader institutional structure. Its primary, albeit vague, goal was to develop a land use strategy for BC. The Commission therefore stood between the past and future, in-between the inherited

⁸⁰ This committee is comprised of representatives from government agencies and reports to LUCO.

institutional landscape and an imagined one. CORE's role was to steer government in the transition to a new institutional structure that could accommodate the goals of principles of sustainability.

CORE has recently released its four volume provincial land use strategy to support the land use strategy and the achievement of land use goals. Volume 1 of the strategy provides a series of recommendations regarding the content of a proposed Sustainability Act for British Columbia. Prominent in the volume is the recommendation that statutory authorization for the interministry approach to planning be given. CORE also recommended the establishment of a "Secretariat" which is "solely responsible for the coordination and integration of land and resource management."⁸¹ The permanent Secretariat would be responsible for ensuring both effective and balanced inter-ministerial coordination. The outcome, ideally, would be the "neutral administration of provincial lands and resources."⁸² To date, government has been slow to respond to CORE's proposed Sustainability Act.

Land And Resource Management Planning

The MOF, meanwhile, continued to develop interagency planning at the subregional level. However, given CORE-related developments it remained unclear how planning at this level was to fit with other reforms initiated by the NDP.

⁸¹ Commission on Resources and Environment, *A Sustainability Act for British Columbia (Volume 1 of the Provincial Land Use Strategy)*, [Victoria: Queen's Printer for British Columbia, November 1994].p. 50.

⁸² Commission on Resources and Environment, *A Sustainability Act for British Columbia (Volume 1 of the Provincial Land Use Strategy)*, p. 50.

As Allan Lidstone (Supervisor, Land Use Planning, MOF) noted in an interagency workshop in 1991,

*The relationship between this Ministry of Forests proposal and other possible comprehensive land planning systems remains unclear, raising questions about long term agency roles and responsibilities in overall strategic land use planning.*⁸³

By April, 1991, the MOF executive had confirmed that revisions to TSA level planning policy and procedures were to proceed as incremental changes to existing approaches.⁸⁴

The incremental approach may reflect a hesitancy to change the course of TSA level planning given the uncertainty surrounding strategic level planning.

The emerging guidelines for planning at the TSA, or subregional level, crystallized into a statement of principles and process for Forest Land Management Planning (FLMP) in March of 1992.⁸⁵ FLMP underwent additional changes to incorporate, among other things, new provincial policy such as the Protected Areas Strategy, and CORE-directed land use planning reforms. Revisions to the FLMP process led to the current Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) processes. LRMPs are intended to establish direction for land use and specify broad resource management objectives and strategies at what is generally the Timber Supply Area (TSA) level. It is

⁸³Allan Lidstone, "Forest Land Management Planning," *Proceedings of the Ministry of Forests Provincial Planner's Meeting*, (April 29,30, May 1, 1991), p. 6.

⁸⁴In April, 1991, the MOF's, "Review of the Timber Supply Analysis Process" for BC Timber Supply Areas was released. It recommended regular AAC reviews and Lidstone noted that the MOF felt the AAC review could incorporate TSA level land use direction where it has been defined, "... but would normally be carried out independently of more comprehensive land oriented TSA level planning". (Allan Lidstone, Forest Land Management Planning, p. 6.)

⁸⁵Integrated Resource Planning Committee, *Forest Land Management Planning - A Statement of Principles and Process (Review draft)*, March 26, 1992.

expected that a final LRMP will be produced for each sub-region and submitted to the Provincial government for review and approval.

As of January 1996, 13 LRMP processes have been initiated in the province with at least two more to be initiated this year. It had been estimated that as many as 40 such processes could be needed to complete planning at the LRMP level. Table 2-1 provides a brief summary of the status of LRMP and CORE Regional Plans in BC.

The LRMP process is innovative in several respects. (1) It represents a significant move away from strategic planning at the TSA level which was centred on MOF objectives and focused on broad production targets such as AAC determinations and recreation use. (2) LRMP relies on joint planning between agencies with interests in the Crown resource base. (3) The LRMP represents a significant shift towards joint planning between government agencies and stakeholders or organized interests. (4) The LRMP proposes a more comprehensive planning process relying on a number of innovative tools which can improve the quality of planning (e.g., multiple account analysis). (5) LRMP is being used to make allocative decisions (i.e., implementing the PAS).

The LRMP process interprets and applies policies and plans formulated at the regional or provincial levels. In turn, LRMPs are to provide a planning context for lower level planning (e.g., LRUP and operational planning). Each LRMP is subject to periodic review (i.e., once every 10 years).⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Integrated Resource Planning Committee, *Land and Resource Management Planning - Public Participation Guidelines*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, November 1993].

TABLE 2-1				
STATUS OF LAND PLANNING IN BC - FEBRUARY 1996⁸⁷				
	PLANNING AREA (ha)	PLANNING PROCESS INITIATED	PLAN COMPLETED	IMPLEMENTED
<u>CORE Regional Planning Processes</u>				
Vancouver Island	3,200,000	November 27, 1992	Nov. 23, 1993	ongoing
Cariboo-Chilcotin	8,460,000	August 1992	July 1994	ongoing
East Kootenay	4,055,000	January 1993	October 1994	ongoing
West Kootenay	4,185,000	January 1993	October 1994	ongoing
<u>Land & Resource Management Planning Processes</u>				
Kispiox	1,220,000	1989	final plan not yet approved	--
Kamloops	2,100,100	1989	May 1995	ongoing
Vanderhoof	1,300,000	October 1993	continuing	--
Fort St. James	3,200,000	1995	continuing	--
Prince George	3,300,000	1995	continuing	--
Fort St. John	4,570,000	1995	continuing	--
Dawson Creek	2,980,000	1995	continuing	--
Fort Nelson	8,340,000	1995	continuing	--
Robson Valley	1,230,000	1993	continuing	--
Kalum South	600,000	1991	continuing	--
Bulkley	762,000	1992	consensus option - 1995	--
Lakes	871,700	1993	continuing	--
TOTAL PLANNING AREA		50,3703,800		--

Initially it was believed that regional plans should focus on broad Crown land reallocation, while LRMPs would refine zoning by developing integrated resource management objectives, and management strategies. As the similarities between the two forms of planning emerged, it was recognized that they were really different approaches

⁸⁷ In addition to LRMP processes identified, processes in the Okanagan, Mid-Coast, Lillooet and Mackenzie LRMP areas are in their formative stages.

to achieve similar objectives. In hindsight, CORE represented a planning structure parallel to the structure emerging from within existing line agencies (i.e., IRPC, IAMCs and LRMP planning). Throughout the last year, CORE receded in prominence as the primary mechanism by which land use planning is to be delivered and has been overtaken by interagency planning initiatives such as LRMP and the IRPC and LUCO.

Government has recently announced that CORE, having successfully fulfilled its mandate, was to be “wound down”.⁸⁸ While functional, CORE stood beyond the cages of sectoral agency mandates, fostering principals, goals and processes that could coordinate and integrate. Many of its approaches were adopted by the interagency structures crystallizing around the LRMP and PAS -related processes. And, having steered a certain course towards a Type 1 IRM, CORE has unceremoniously been put to bed.

2.7 CONCLUSIONS - APPROACHES TO IRM

This Chapter has identified the ebb and flow of Type 1 IRM (interagency) and Type 2 IRM (line agency) to integrated resource management. The broad overview reveals distinct institutional policies. The reforms undertaken by the NDP in the early 1970's were based on the rationale that barriers hindering coordination among agencies with interests in land and resource use were adversely affecting the quality of land and resource management. To overcome such barriers, and to rein in the timber-biased approach to forest land management that had been cultured under the Forest Service, the NDP developed a strong Type 1 IRM. Centring on ELUC, ELUCS and RRMCs, the

⁸⁸ Office of the Premier, “Commission on Resources and Environment Winds Down,” *News Release*, [Victoria: Province of British Columbia, March 7 1996].

interagency approach was directed towards developing a total view of the forest land base which would incrementally improve planning and management by each sectoral agency. Improvements in land use planning were realized with the Forest Service adopting many of the approaches, procedures and tools of planning that ELUCs had formulated.

When the Social Credit government came to power, it pursued a Type 2 IRM and, in the process, discarded many of the structures put in place by the NDP. A conscious attempt to decentralize responsibilities for IRM was embodied in the Forest Act and Ministry of Forests Act. By dispersing ELUCS' responsibilities to sectoral agencies, and by dissolving RRMCs, the Social Credit worked towards entrenching Type 2 IRM. The development of an integrated resource planning system by the MOF in the late 1970's and the elaboration of this system after 1980 served to enhance the Ministry's role as the agent of IRM.

Throughout the 1980's, the delivery of IRM was criticized for its habit of protecting timber values to the detriment of many other resource value perspectives. Restraint driven cutbacks eroded MOF planning capacity, thus interfering with its planning efforts at both the TSA and TFL level. The planning system was increasingly unable to manage the many demands for protection of non-timber values. In short, IRM planning was suffering serious legitimization problems. It often failed to deliver IRM plans, and those plans that were developed were often considered non-viable. Mechanisms for interagency planning and delivery of IRM were in disarray, and

interagency efforts tended to be marred by the lack of a province-wide strategy for land use planning.

Towards the end of the 1980's, efforts to restore IRM's functionality saw the return to an interagency approach. The Forest Resources Commission, and the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy both signified (and contributed to) this shift. Each endorsed planning approaches designed to bring all affected agencies and resource user groups into the planning for IRM.

The NDP, elaborating on the work of the BCRT, FRC and its past efforts, reinforced this reassertion of a strong Type 1 IRM approach. These efforts were initially centred on the Commission on Resources and Environment, which was charged with developing a land use strategy for BC. The work of CORE took place alongside the development of an interagency planning approach rooted in TSA-level planning. The two streams of development learned from each other. Eventually they coalesced around a new mechanism, the Land Use Coordination Office which reports to the Land Use Planning Working Group (LUPWG). LUCO was charged with coordinating several interagency bodies including the Integrated Resource Planning Committee (responsible for overseeing the development of LRMP policies, procedures and guidelines), and the regional level Interagency Management Committees (IAMCs) (responsible for the delivery of LRMP processes and the Protected Areas Strategy). The NDP government has continued to rely on these interagency mechanisms for the delivery of land use planning.

CHAPTER 3

SECURING THE FOREST LAND BASE

3.1 INTRODUCTION - THE FOREST LAND BASE

Historically, the most important aspect of the forest land base was the timber that could be harvested from it. One of the most important decisions in this regard has been the rate at which this stock is harvested. The rate of flow, also referred to as the timber supply is constrained by several factors. These include:

- the extent of the timber harvesting land base⁸⁹;
- the productivity of that land base;
- the intensity with which components of the timber inventory are utilized (e.g., recovery standards and utilization standards);
- the degree of protection given the timber crop; and
- the rules guiding timber harvesting.⁹⁰

The broad institutional approaches to IRM which were profiled in Chapter 2 may seem ephemeral until it is considered that they have lead to both threats and opportunities in terms of timber supply and harvest levels. These, in turn, affect industry profits and

⁸⁹ The timber harvesting land base, which is the land base available for forestry, is determined both by the characteristics of the site and management objectives. Factors which affect the timber harvesting land base include, primarily, harvesting costs, accessibility of stands and management guidelines. Management guidelines include for example those broad guidelines which are used to achieve IRM such as riparian zones, visual quality objectives and biodiversity guidelines. See: CORTEX Consultants, *Developing Timber Management Options*, [Victoria: BC Ministry of Forests, 1993], p. 7.

⁹⁰ Doug Williams, "Timber Supply in British Columbia: The Historical Context," *Determining Timber Supply and Allowable Cuts in BC* (proceedings of a Seminar on Timber Supply and the Determination of Allowable Cuts in British Columbia, Vancouver, March 30, 31, 1993), [Vancouver: Association of BC Professional Foresters, 1993], p. 10.

employment levels, economic health, and re-election chances. For example, the sympathetic administration of the early 1980's was undertaken to facilitate forestry in light of severe economic constraints. This was done by relaxing rules that guide timber harvesting and recovery standards. Similarly, the efforts to provide protection to non-timber values pose a threat to timber supply. In fact, guidelines to achieve IRM have been identified as the "greatest source of downward pressure on harvest levels."⁹¹

However, the removal of lands from the forest land base have posed the greatest threat to timber supply historically, since the reallocation of land both reduces the total growing capacity of the forest land base, and removes high quality old growth stands from the timber stock. Given that the core policy associated with timber supply has been to liquidate old growth stands and replace them with even-aged second growth stands, reallocation of land from the forest land base is a threat because it negatively impacts timber supply.

This chapter focuses on MOF efforts to secure the forest land base through broad zoning from 1968 to 1995. Since institutional reforms reviewed in Chapter 2 have presented opportunities and threats to MOF efforts we can examine efforts to secure the forest land base as a series of responses to these institutional reforms. The institutional reforms therefore can be examined in the context of efforts to define and protect the forest land base through land use zoning, Chapter 3 presents a retrospective of efforts to secure the forest land base in the context of institutional reforms identified in Chapter 1.

⁹¹ Doug Williams, "Timber Supply in British Columbia: The Historical Context," p. 14.

The predominant approaches have been the use of the Provincial Forest and the Forest Reserve designation. The Forest Service (now MOF) repeatedly attempted to secure the forest land base through the designation of Forest Reserves (Provincial Forests). The NDP focus on Type 1 IRM was accompanied by a suspension of the Forest Reserve program which was attempting to further secure the forest land base. As a consequence, the Forest Service was left throughout the NDP years with a forest land base uncomfortably vulnerable to pressures to withdrawal lands from the forest land base for agricultural, settlement and protection purposes.

In the years following 1975, where we saw the rise of Type 2 IRM, opportunities to further secure the forest land base presented themselves. Acting on these opportunities, the MOF and the Social Credit were able to complete their Forest Reserve program and rebuff strong pressures to reallocate portions of the forest land base into protected areas or to dispose of Crown land for settlement and agricultural purposes. Throughout the late seventies and most of the 1980's, the MOF was eminently successful in stalling initiatives that would have encroached on the forest land base. The NDP government in 1992 again pursued a Type 1 IRM and this was again accompanied by threats to the security of the forest land base.

3.2 FOREST RESERVES - 1912 to 1973

BC's first Forest Act was introduced in 1912. The Act enabled the creation of "Forest Reserves" which were to be set aside for the perpetual growing of timber.⁹²

⁹²The Fulton Commission recommended that a moratorium on further alienation of Crown timber be "continued indefinitely and that no further alienation of timber lands take place except under very special circumstances". (p. 55, Fulton Commission).

Section 12 of the 1912 Forest Act and Section 33 of the Forest Act of the late 1960's and early 1970's stated that lands proclaimed as Forest Reserves were to be withdrawn from sale, settlement and occupancy under the provisions of the Land Act or Taxation Act ..."

Land that was designated as Forest Reserves (except those included in a Tree-Farm Licence, were "under the control and management of the Minister for the maintenance of timber growing thereon". Forest reserves further secured the Forest Service's hold on lands classified as forest lands.⁹³ The Forest Reserve designation therefore was of strategic importance in maintaining the timber supply.

Few reserves were actually designated in the first few decades of the program. The program's effectiveness was boosted somewhat in 1925 with an amendment to the Forest Act which established a statutory fund for the development of reserves.⁹⁴ The amendment was introduced by the then current Minister of Lands, T.D. Pattullo who proclaimed the strategic significance of reserves. He said,

*The setting aside of Forest Reserves is the foundation of sound forest policy and the primary object of their creation is to ensure a continuous production of timber.*⁹⁵

In spite of the financial boost, the program continued to languish.

⁹³ The Forest Act allowed for an automatic review by the Forest Service of expiring timber licences and leases in order to determine the desirability of placing these lands within Forest Reserves as well as the allocation of Crown land in Provincial Forests. Reserves could be canceled in whole or in part by Order-in-Council. "Forest lands" are lands "that in the opinion of the Minister will find its best economic use under forests crops." (Section 2, Forest Act, 1912.)

⁹⁴ The annual allowance was to be equal to 3% of the gross receipts from timber related taxes (i.e., royalties, stumpage) in a given year. This has been attributed to a lack of resources in the Forest Service.

⁹⁵ Mulholland, F.D., *The Forest Resources of B.C.*, [Victoria: King's Printer, 1937] p. 137.

In his 1945 Royal Commission report, Chief Justice Sloan reflected on the state of the program bemoaning the fact that,

... it is manifest that very little, if anything, has been done during the past 20 years to bring to fruition the ideal objectives - contained in the speech of the Minister of Lands in 1925.⁹⁶

It wasn't until non-designated forest lands were under threat in the late 1960's that the program was pursued with any vigour.⁹⁷ The forest land base was being eroded through what the Forest Service saw as an uncontrolled disposition of lands for agricultural and settlement purposes. In response, the Forest Service undertook efforts to protect the forest land base from further encroachment. The objective of the Provincial Forests program was modified in 1968 to include all land best suited for "long term management of forest crops"⁹⁸ To this end, the Forest Service proposed to designate all lands included in Public Sustained Yield Units (PSYUs) as Forest Reserves. The Forest Service presented the following rationale to the public and legislature.

It is not the intention of the Forest Service to impede the alienation of arable land or land legitimately required for settlement, but rather to control haphazard settlement and the alienation of forest land which will be of marginal value for agriculture.⁹⁹

The Forest Service's proposed target was ambitious. In 1968, the total area under Forest Reserves was approximately 4.4 million hectares (see Table 3-1 above) while

⁹⁶ Report of the Commissioner Gordon McG. Sloan, *The Forest Resources of British Columbia*, [Victoria: King's Printer, 1945], p. 85.

⁹⁷ Non-designated lands refer to lands which had not been formally designated as reserves, parks, etc.

⁹⁸ BC Forest Service, *Provincial Forests*, p. 12.

⁹⁹ BC Forest Service, *Report of the Forest Service 1969*, [Victoria: Department of Lands, Forests and Water Resources, 1970.]

PSYUs covered approximately 31.8 million hectares. By 1973, approximately 30.3 million hectares of Crown land in the province had been designated as Forest Reserves. As indicated in Table 3-1, the vast majority of these lands, (25.8 million hectares) had been designated in the period from 1969 to 1973.

YEAR	NUMBER OF RESERVES CREATED	AREA ALLOCATED	TOTAL AREA UNDER FOREST RESERVES
	ha	ha	ha
1925	2	15,022	15,022
1926	1	16,576	31,598
1927	1	6,734	38,332
1928	1	16,835	55,167
1929	1	194	55,361
1931	1	259	55,620
1932	1	252,784	308,404
1933	4	1,372,441	1,680,845
1934	4	333,074	2,013,919
1936	1	22,792	2,036,711
1938	2	419,062	2,455,773
1940	1	344,729	2,800,502
1942	1	332,297	3,132,799
1949	2	693,084	3,825,883
1950	1	483,035	4,308,918
1959	1	8,029	4,316,947
1963	2	76,405	4,393,352
1968	1	32,893	4,426,245
1969	12	3,059,308	7,485,553
1970	14	4,722,800	12,208,353
1971	19	4,055,462	16,263,775
1972	14	5,586,112	21,849,887
1973	10	8,452,724	30,302,611
TOTAL	97	--	30,302,611

¹⁰⁰ BC Forest Service, *Provincial Forests*, Appendix. The column identifying the total area under the Forest Reserve designation is an estimate only. Other sources which indicate that, by 1973, the total area under Forest Reserves was 32 million hectares. In any case, very few withdrawals were made from Forest Reserves in the period from 1925 up to 1973.

As noted in Chapter 2, Type 1 IRM was ascendant in 1972 to 1975 period. The overt threat the NDP posed to the Forest Service therefore is very likely causally connected to the drastic acceleration of the forest reserve program in 1972 and 1973. Since more reserves were created in these years than any previous year, the Forest Service may be viewed as scrambling to complete the program as a means to mitigate the threat of an NDP government.

3.3 REVIEW OF THE PROVINCIAL FORESTS PROGRAM

The program was suspended in 1973 by the Minister of Lands Forests and Water Resources, Bob Williams pending a general review of the land use planning process. Specifically, government requested that ELUCS review the Provincial Forest Designation and assess its value as a planning tool.¹⁰¹ The suspension of the program was linked to broader NDP reform efforts and the very notion that the land use designation was being suspended reflected some interest in altering the course of IRM. Williams was instrumental in this regard, openly charting a course directed towards ending Forest Service dominance over the land base.

During the suspension of the program an amendment to the Forest Act was made, specifying that Forest Reserves could also be established to protect recreational lands. This amendment augmented a prior amendment to the Forest Act in March 1972 enabling the creation of reserves for timber as well as grazing. It is particularly significant that the

¹⁰¹ J.S. Stokes, July 21 1976, Memorandum to the Honourable Minister, Subject: Forest Reserves. (MOF File:02361).

reserve designation was being augmented in ways which increased its relevance to a greater number of forest related values in addition to forestry.

This direction signaled by the amendments, it should be noted, was inconsistent with the emergent NDP position on the appropriateness of the Forest Reserve as a land use zone. As discussed in the section that follows, the NDP was arguing for a more restricted use of the zone. For this reason, the amendments which diversified the number of forest values which the Forest Reserve was used to protect is evidence of Forest Service measures to again protect its turf in light of the NDP-driven efforts to reform land use zoning to achieve integrated resource management.

While the program was suspended, ELUCS and the Pearse Commission¹⁰² addressed the issue of land use zoning and how the Provincial Forest designation was to be most appropriately used. In their brief to the Pearse Commission, ELUCS envisioned four sub-zones that could be applied in provincial forest land planning:

- Dominant use areas for commercial and intensive forestry
- Standard multiple use areas
- Special use areas
- Low priority areas for forest use.

Dominant use areas were to include areas where other resource values were relatively low but forest values high or moderate. In such areas, ELUCS proposed that “commercial forest production with possibilities for intensive use should be undertaken with basic protection afforded other resources to maintain an acceptable ecological balance.”

¹⁰² Royal Commission on Forest Resources, *Timber Rights and Forest Policy in British Columbia (2 volumes)*, [Victoria: Queen’s Printer, 1976].

Standard multiple use areas were envisioned to include most of the high to moderate forest capability areas in the Province. The approach to managing these areas was to continue with folio planning “until complementary socio-economic analysis can catch up.”¹⁰³ Special use areas, which were to be defined through folio analysis, were areas where additional analysis was needed to make resource allocation decisions. Additional analysis included benefit-cost analysis which was needed to “derive acceptable integrated resource plans.” ELUCS noted that in some cases special multi-agency teams should probably be created to prepare and analyze information. Low priority areas referred to those areas which were, in general, of low forest productivity and where non-timber values were most important. ELUCS understood these designations to be shifting in nature as new priorities, technologies etc. emerged. Thus, planning, over time, would lead to changes in resource allocation to meet public needs. Increased flexibility therefore was sought in a land use designation system.

Pearse, in the 1976 report of the Royal Commission on Forest Resources, also proposed that the use of the forest resource designation be refined. He proposed a more restrictive use of the designation than had been the practice. Lands suitable for timber production and without special alternate values should be divided into “multiple use” and “primary” timber lands. Of these, only primary timber lands were considered appropriate to the Forest Reserve designation since it was only on such lands that the long

¹⁰³ ELUCS, submission to Pearse, p. 12.

term investment necessary to produce successive forests crops would likely be protected from competing values.¹⁰⁴

Juxtaposed with the recent amendments to the Forest Act which increased the diversity of forest values to be protected under Forest Reserves, ELUCS' and Pearse's position reveal an underlying debate. The debate centred on the appropriate use of the Forest Reserve designation. ELUCS and Pearse were arguing the need to develop a more precise land use zoning system. The designation should be reserved for areas where resource use priorities were unlikely to change over time. Forest Reserves were to be restricted to those lands where an emphasis on long term forest management activities was certain. This could be compared with a broader designation which allocated lands to IRM and in which land use priorities would be refined later through integrated resource planning. The Forest Service was rallying behind this latter, broader application of the Forest Reserve designation.

Thus, under Type 1 IRM, a number of changes in land use zoning were realized. Most significant among these was the suspension of the Forest Reserve program and a review of the Forest Reserve designation. Also significant were the preemptive measures taken by the Forest Service. In early stages of the NDP great increases in the area given Forest Reserve status were realized and Forest Service-driven amendments made to the Forest Act to harmonize the zone with the emergent policy of IRM.

¹⁰⁴ Pearse, *Timber Rights and Forest Policy in British Columbia*, pp. 236-37.

3.4 RESUMPTION OF THE PROVINCIAL FORESTS PROGRAM

The election of 1975 brought a Social Credit government to power. As discussed in Chapter 2 this was accompanied by a drift towards a Type 2 IRM. And, following the defeat of the NDP government in 1975 and the release of the Pearse Report in 1976, the Forest Service began to mount pressure to resume the program. For example, in a memorandum from ADM J.S. Stokes to the Minister, concern was expressed that no reserves had been approved since 1973. Stokes' concern was rooted in the belief that proper forest management was best assured under the Provincial Forests program. He said,

Proper forest management doesn't only lend stability in the economic sense. It can also enhance the opportunities for recreation, improve the habitat for wildlife, and help to regulate stream flow, with all the attendant benefits of good fish habitat and flood control. Forest Reserves make it possible to achieve these benefits, by protecting the land base, and the investments made in establishing and managing succeeding crops of trees.¹⁰⁵

The memorandum inferred that environmental protection was an indirect benefit of Crown lands managed for forestry.

Yet, at the same time there was a distinct timber bias evident in the memorandum.

For example, Stokes noted that

One of the main objectives of Forest Reserves is to provide a stable land base to support the continuous yield of forest products, which in turn leads to stability of employment, industry, and communities.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ J.S. Stokes, July 21, 1976, Memorandum to the Honourable Minister Subject: Forest Reserves.

¹⁰⁶ J.S. Stokes, July 21, 1976, Memorandum to the Honourable Minister Subject: Forest Reserves.

Finally, Stokes registered concern that completion of the Program would place demands on the Forest Service, which could exceed its planning and management capacity. If more reserves were to be created, Stokes noted that the Forest Service would have to improve its planning and management capacity for what would likely result in a drastically enlarged land base over which the Forest Service would have jurisdiction.¹⁰⁷

The issue of Forest Reserves was also considered by the Forest Policy Advisory Committee, appointed by the Social Credit government. The Forest Policy Advisory Committee was charged with preparing new forest legislation in response to Pearse's recommendations. The issue as to whether the new Act should retain the Forest Reserve legislation embodied in Subsection 33(1) of the old Act was of key importance. In a memorandum dated August 22, 1977, from R.S. Wood (Chair of the Forest Advisory Policy Committee) the underlying debate over the appropriate use of the Provincial Forest designation is evident. (The debate, was over a restricted or broad use of the Forest Reserve designation. Restrictive use would see Forest Reserve status given only where timber values clearly outweigh non-timber values in the long-term. A broad use would see Forest Reserves used to protect a diversity of forest land values.)

¹⁰⁷ Stokes noted,

In seeking your approval for more Forest Reserves, we must advise you that there is one complicating factor. Control of Forest Reserves commits the Forest Service to undertake all forms of land management unless some other agency is brought into the picture. We have been trying to work out procedures with the Department of Lands which would allow them to look after what would amount to a greatly expanded workload.

The Forest Service, then, must assume responsibility for land management within the Reserves. In one sense, we are well equipped to do the job, with our network of over 100 field offices spread across the province, in both urban and rural areas. But we do not have the staff to do the job that might be done. ... Our estimates in future must reflect the need for additional staff, if we continue to create more reserves, and keep responsibility for land management

(J.M. Stokes to Honourable Minister, July 26, 1976.)

In that memorandum it was requested of Chief Forester W. Young that,

Since the Committee is not conversant with all of the ramifications of Forest Reserves, we would be most appreciative if the Forest Service could assist us by preparing a presentation which justified the need for securing the land base as a prerequisite to forest and range management. We would also suggest that the presentation address the use of Forest Reserves Legislation, as the means of securing the land base which should include information on the advantages and disadvantages of Forest Reserves from the aspect of intensive forest management, planning, administration, etc. ... and, suggest [an appropriate] division of administrative responsibilities (Forest Service, Lands Branch).¹⁰⁸

The statutory mandate to establish Forest Reserves was retained in the Forest Act of 1978. Forest Reserves, however, were identified as Provincial Forests in the new legislation.

The 1978 act required the MOF to deliver integrated resource planning on lands designated as Provincial Forests. This requirement is embodied in Section 4(C) of the MOF Act.¹⁰⁹ In Section 5(4) of the Forest Act it was stipulated that Provincial Forests were to be managed and used only for:

- a) timber production, utilization, and related purposes;
- b) forage production and grazing by livestock and wildlife;
- c) forest oriented recreation; and
- d) water fisheries and wildlife Resource purposes.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Robert S. Wood to E.L. Young, August 22, 1977.

¹⁰⁹ As stated in Section 4(C), the Ministry of Forests is required to: "*Plan for the use of the forest and range resources of the Crown, so that the production of timber and forage, the harvesting of timber, the grazing of livestock and the realization of fisheries, wildlife, water, outdoor recreation and other natural resource values are coordinated and integrated, in consultation and cooperation with other ministries and agencies of the Crown and with the private sector.*"

¹¹⁰ Forest Act; Section 5(4).

The latter element represented an important departure from prior legislation surrounding the Forest Reserves or Provincial Forests. The newly created MOF had jurisdiction over the Provincial Forests, yet the land use designation could be used to protect resources over which ministries and agencies other than the MOF had the mandate to manage. For example, although the designation could be used to protect wildlife values, the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks was responsible for managing wildlife. The legislation therefore required integration between these resource agencies and placed the new MOF in the role of steward and key coordinating agency to achieve IRM.

The provincial forest designation was being used to protect an ever growing array of resource values. Just a few short years earlier, both ELUCS and Pearse were proposing that the Forest Reserve designation be retained only for those lands most suited for the growing of timber crops in the long term. Under IRM, as set out in the Forest Act, the Provincial Forest designation could be applied much more extensively. The debate over the restrictive versus the broad use of the Forest Reserve designation was laid to rest.

Pressure to resume the Provincial Forests Program continued to grow and efforts were spurred by the *1979 Forest and Range Resource Analysis*. The report identified that large declines in the Forest Land Base had been experienced through the withdrawal of land from the forest land base for settlement, agriculture, parks or other protected areas, hydro rights of ways and so on. The report also projected losses to the existing forest land base of between 20 and 25 per cent over the next few decades.

These projections fueled alarmists pushing for greater security over the forest land base.¹¹¹ The land disposition program proceeding under the direction of the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing in the late 1970s was especially a concern. This program dated back to the late 1960's. However, in the late 1970's the rate at which Crown lands were being sold increased substantially with the approval of the Lands Branch's proposed policy to make land available for purchase by BC citizens. Later, in July of 1980, the rules changed somewhat allowing a much larger number of BC citizens to qualify to purchase land for agricultural purposes. Predictably, the demand for land increased and the Lands Branch intended to meet the demand by continuing to make lands available.¹¹²

The MOF viewed the disposition program as a threat. Advertisements for the program surely resounded ominously with the following introductory statements:

*Over 50% of the Province of British Columbia is Crown land which is outside forest, park or agricultural reserves, and not set aside for specific uses. This is your land, the land of every present and future citizen of British Columbia. While terrain, climate and other conditions make much of it unusable, many areas are suitable for one or a number of uses. It is the task of the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing to assess this Crown land in terms of natural capabilities, and the social, economic and environmental impact of any proposed use, and then to release lands to meet the needs of citizens for housing agriculture, commercial and recreational use.*¹¹³

¹¹¹ It should be noted that even following the successful completion of the Provincial Forests program in the 1980s, the productive forest land base decreased by about 9%. Close to half of this decrease was due to the reclassification of land from low to unproductive land. (see *1984 Forest and Range Resource Analysis*, p. B3.)

¹¹² Fred Dawkins. "The Crown Land Tug-of-War," *Commerce B.C.*, November/December 1980. (The most interesting change was that a person was no longer required to be a farmer to purchase land for agricultural purposes.)

¹¹³ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing (n.d.), *Developing Crown Land for Personal Recreational Use; Developing Crown Land for Rural Housing; Developing Crown Land for Urban Housing*

The MOF responded by noting that although the 50 per cent estimate was technically correct,

it gives a false impression that there is still an abundance of land available for various users. It overlooks the fact that Provincial Forests are yet to be established over a Large proportion of the province, and that the establishment of these Provincial Forests is required in order to maintain the existing forest industry and provincial economy.

Most resource managers agree that, for the southern half of the Province, the demands on the land base have increased to the point where it is not possible to supply all of those demands. Ministry of Forests' public information programs are designed to convey this message to the public, and it appears to be counterproductive for another resource Ministry to convey a contradictory message.¹¹⁴

Conflicting notions of IRM formed a backdrop to this dispute. And, the MOF's lack of statutory authority to prevent Crown lands from proceeding with its land disposition program was vexing.

While the Lands Branch noted that land needed for logging would be excluded from the program, the MOF pointed to a number of cases where prime forest lands had been auctioned off through the program. For example, the Cariboo Lumber Manufacturers' Association (CLMA) drew government's attention to conditions in the proposed Lac La Hache Provincial Forest. The Association estimated that alienation of Crown Land occurring through the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing's land disposition policy would amount to 48 per cent of the Lac La Hache Provincial Forest. The regional impact of these reduced timber supplies were estimated at 220 direct jobs

¹¹⁴ T.M. Apsey (Deputy Minister, Ministry of Forests) to L.I. Bell (Deputy Minister, Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing) May 15, 1980, Re: Brochure "Developing Crown Land for Rural Housing" (File 160-7 Lands Parks and Housing).

and 528 jobs in total.¹¹⁵ (In this period, it was popularly noted that on average every 130 hectares of forest land provided permanent employment for one BC resident.¹¹⁶) The CLMA noted that the province could not afford to put these jobs at risk through alienation of Crown land.

The two programs demonstrated very different approaches to the delivery of IRM. As evident in the BC Lands approach, the sanctity of the forest land base was not ensured. This posed a problem simply because the MOF was dependent upon forest lands over which the Lands Branch was beginning to see itself as having primary responsibility for planning. The MOF had succeeded in designating approximately 32 million hectares of land into Provincial Forests by 1973 yet, the total forest land base over which the MOF was basing its timber supply projections and harvesting decisions exceeded 52 million hectares.¹¹⁷ The Lands Branch maintained primary responsibility to plan for most of the forest land base outside of Provincial Forests and this confounded the long term harvesting plans of the MOF. In a very real sense MOF plans were subject to the policies and priorities of an unsympathetic Lands Branch.

As noted earlier, the Provincial Forest designation prevented the Lands Branch from disposing of land under authority of the Land Act. As such, the Provincial Forest program was an ideal tool to quash the threat posed by the Lands Branch. With the new

¹¹⁵ Cariboo Lumber Manufacturers' Association, *Brief to the British Columbia Cabinet*, [Williams Lake: CLMA, September 22, 1980], p. 5

¹¹⁶ Forest Industry Task Force on Forest Land for the Future, *Forest Land for the Future*, Appendices.

¹¹⁷ The total area classified as Forest Land in 1980/81 was approximately 52.1 million hectares (Ministry of Forests. *Annual Report 1980/81.*)

forest legislation in 1978, a strong mandate to achieve IRM was added to the MOF's arsenal. The MOF and industry were equally adept at wielding the rhetoric of IRM to promote the benefits of allocating lands into Provincial Forests. The following rationalization from the *Journal of Logging* is exemplary.

*It should also be noted that the Ministry of Forests' mandate is to manage forest land for the multiple-use of society. Preserving the forest land base protects not only timber interests, but also wildlife, recreation and environmental interests.*¹¹⁸

Industry and the MOF argued that under the Provincial Forests designation, land is held in trust since it is protected from ad hoc single use withdrawals yet is available for purposes deemed of higher value than forestry at a later date.

More bluntly, the MOF noted that the program was "urgently needed" to provide security to "protect existing investments and provide the necessary climate for further investments in intensive management and utilization of our renewable resources." The Ministry noted that withdrawals from current Provincial Forests and increasing demands for alienation were threatening the long term health of renewable resource-based industries.¹¹⁹

Greater security was urgently needed to avert economic and social ruin, the public was told. An estimate held in high regard by the MOF and industry alike was that 50 per cent of the BC economy was based on forestry.

¹¹⁸ Gary Wheeler, Editorial, *Journal of Logging*, January 1981.

¹¹⁹ B.C. Forest Service, *Provincial Forests*, p. iii.

For example, Tom Waterland's 1980 encapsulation of the social and economic significance of Forestry is fairly typical.

*Our economy is about 50 per cent based on forestry; a quarter of our employment is in the forest industry. Half the government revenues ultimately come from there; therefore about half of the social services that we demand are financed through the industrial use of our forest base.*¹²⁰

An excerpt from an industry brief submitted to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Development in 1981 provides a similar overview.

*The Forest land base constitutes the economic backbone of the province. Forest land withdrawals have a far reaching impact on jobs and communities and ultimately, on the fundamental economic strength of the province. If unchecked, the present erosion of the forest land base will have profound consequences for British Columbia.*¹²¹

Industry noted that withdrawals in the last decade had reduced the forest land base by 16 to 20 per cent in the last decade alone, and noted that measures were required to prevent the continued erosion of the forest land base.

In response to these threats and encroachments, the MOF proposed to establish Provincial Forest status over those Crown lands in the province "on which the optimum use is long term integrated management of renewable natural resources."¹²² In order to accomplish this, the MOF proposed that all remaining Crown land not already designated as Provincial Forest be assessed and classified as either integrated resource management

¹²⁰ Weyerhaeuser News (Canada) October 1980. *Commentary - Tom Waterland: Tough Decisions Ahead.*

¹²¹ Forest Industry Task Force on Forest Land for the Future, *Forest Land for the Future*, May 12, 1981. p. 4.

¹²² B.C. Forest Service, *Provincial Forests*, p. iii.

lands allocated into Provincial Forests or given an appropriate single use designation and excluded from reserve status.¹²³

Other government agencies expressed concern regarding the implications of a greatly increased land base under the jurisdiction of the MOF. Perhaps the greatest outcry over the program came from the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing. It was expected that the program would lead to a doubling of the land area designated as Provincial Forests effectively making the MOF the lead planning agency for Crown land. The Parks Branch (Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing) questioned the MOF's capacity to function legitimately as a the lead agency.

There should still be a concern that there is not an agency in government charged with planning and integrating the needs of all users for public land.

In spite of the good intentions of the Forest Service it is clear that the Forest Reserves are geared primarily to forest and range initiatives and operating around system of withdrawals to accommodate other uses.¹²⁴

... To a great degree the concern at seeing the MOF central to Crown land use planning in the Province stems from the fear that the demands for wood supply will dominate the Forest Service response to uses of forest land for purposes other than wood production ...¹²⁵

The Land Management Branch (Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing) adopted the position that it was "the logical agency to be responsible for major land use planning

¹²³ Raymond Bryant, *The Provincial Forests Program: Protecting the Forest Land Base in the 1980's*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, June 28, 1984] p. 8.

¹²⁴ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, *Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing*, Appendix II.

¹²⁵ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, *Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing*, Appendix II. This conflict is implicit as early as 1976 when the Forest Policy Advisory Committee was debating the appropriate division of responsibilities between Lands and Forests under the new Forest Act and consequent adjustments needed in other legislation.

in the province because it attaches to, or primarily represents no single resource interest and carries no biases into resolving competing and conflicting uses of Crown Land.”¹²⁶

The Crown Land Branch was left unsure of its role following the reallocation of the vast majority of Crown lands it currently administered into Provincial Forests.¹²⁷

Comments made by the Minister of Forests, Tom Waterland exhibit the timber bias garnering the Parks Branch’s attention. At a conference in Kamloops, titled “Alternatives for Growth” in 1980, Waterland at one point quipped,

*We’re always making trade-offs; we always must. Take aesthetics for example. Nobody likes to look at a clear-cut - I do, but nobody else does - but it’s a fact of life; we can’t always select. If we can’t economically harvest our forests the benefits from the industrial use of the forests won’t be ours. The ultimate question is: whose interest should we satisfy?”*¹²⁸

The Parks Branch’s concern with respect to the Provincial Forest Program was that,

*In spite of the good intentions of the Forest Service, it is clear that the Forest Reserves are geared primarily to forest and range initiatives and operate around a system of withdrawals to accommodate other uses.*¹²⁹

They expected the timber bias could be avoided only through the reallocation of lands from Provincial Forests into another designation which gave planning authority to a more neutral agency.

¹²⁶ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, *Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing*, p. 3.

¹²⁷ The Crown Lands Branch wondered aloud, “In the face of the likely extent of the Provincial Forests system, Land Management Branch can be excused for wondering what Crown Land is left and where it is to plan use, and manage.” (*Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, p. 3.*)

¹²⁸ Tom Waterland, Minister of Forests in speech made at “Alternatives for Growth” conference in Kamloops, May 24, 1980.

¹²⁹ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, *Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing*, Appendix II.

Overall, the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing considered the Forest Reserves program to be a “fait accompli” given the enabling legislation contained in Sections 2.3.4 and 5 of the new Forest Act. The agency recognized that events, as they had unfolded, relegated them to a reactive, damage control approach in the Provincial Forests program - a role, which in the case of the Parks Branch they were not completely prepared to undertake.¹³⁰

The Provincial Forest policy saw support from a diverse range of interests in the province including the Truck Loggers Association, Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of America, IWA, COFI, British Columbia Federation of Naturalists, and British Columbia Wildlife Federation. The common ground shared by these interests is described in a document released by the Association of British Columbia Professional Forests (ABCPF) in 1980 titled *Defining Provincial Forests*. The ABCPF pointed to the environmental, economic and social benefits which would be realized through the designation of lands into Provincial Forests.

The statistic that 50 percent of BC's economic product is generated from wood products is well known but these are more than just bare numbers. They can be translated into crown revenues necessary to finance education, health, highways, as well as social programs of all kinds.

In addition, the forests of British Columbia are the essential resource on which wildlife, fisheries, grazing, watersheds, recreation and aesthetic values depend. the connection between these values and the economic benefits of tourism, our number two industry should be obvious.

¹³⁰The Ministry of Lands Parks and Housing noted that their misgivings were best supplanted by “full, supportive participation with the Ministry of Forests as the latter seeks to identify those lands which are best administered under an integrated resource management scheme. While Lands, Parks and Housing is in the position of reacting to Forest Service plans and actions it can still contribute much to identifying land use potentials and defining Provincial Forest boundaries.” See: Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing, *Policy Paper - Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing*, p. 5.

*As the extent of the forest land base is eroded, its ability to produce timber and protect these other forest values will be eroded also.*¹³¹

The background factors cited by the ABCPF necessitating the resumption of the program included:

- The Forest and Range Analysis Report (1979) which forecast a serious shortfall in timber supply by 2000;
- The Forest and Range Analysis Report (1979) which predicted a 22% decrease in the forest land base due to alienation's for non-forest uses between 1979 and 2000;
- Recent dispositions of Crown land, which were contributing to sustained yield calculations and in some cases upon which healthy, immature forests existed.¹³²

A review of documents of the day leave the impression that the Provincial Forest designation was above all else intended to prevent the reallocation of lands comprising the forest land base and contributing to sustained yield calculations.

3.5 DESIGNATING PROVINCIAL FOREST LANDS

Over the course of 1980, the policy was developed, and arrangements made for its implementation. Approval from ELUTC was given in 1980, and government approval followed in 1981. Once approved, the process of selecting and designating Provincial Forests progressed rapidly. Within the first few months of 1981, approximately 2.5 million hectares of land were allocated into Provincial Forests.¹³³ By 1984, the

¹³¹ Association of British Columbia Professional Foresters, *Defining Provincial Forests*, [Vancouver: ABCPF, November 1980], p. 3.

¹³² Association of British Columbia Professional Foresters, *Defining Provincial Forests*. pp. 2,3.

¹³³ In January of 1981, the Premier had deferred decisions with respect to two proposed Provincial Forests for two years in contentious area. In these areas, the Ministry of Forests Provincial Forest Program and the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing's crown land disposition policy (Agriculture and Rural Residential Program) were conflicting. To resolve the conflict, the Premier's office issued a directive for

Provincial Forests program was nearing completion with 134 newly designated Provincial Forests and 5 awaiting final approval. Deferred Area Planning was also scheduled for areas proposed for Provincial Forest status that were “in conflict with the land requirements identified in the Parks and Outdoor Recreation mandate of the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing.”¹³⁴ (Only in a few cases were deferrals made.¹³⁵) Over 80 million hectares of land had been allocated into Provincial Forests by the time the program had been completed.

Although, the MOF assumed the role of lead planning agency over this huge land base, it was faced with a number of considerable challenges.

- Some agencies, namely the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing remained philosophically opposed to the Provincial Forests program arguing that the best land allocation decision required a neutral perspective not attainable through the current structure.¹³⁶
- The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food identified the fact that in the absence of the overall government policy to guide land allocation, the process of designation and reviewing Provincial Forests remained adversarial, and reactive with the MOF as the initiating and lead agency having a distinct advantage in protecting its interests compared to other agencies involved in planning and management efforts.
- A paradox existed where the MOF acted as the lead agency in a process designed primarily to safeguard the Crown land base for future resource users. The most prominent of the Ministry of Forests’ client groups was the forestry industry. Yet according to legislation, the MOF was expected to make

Deferred Area Planning. In February of 1981, guidelines for Deferred Area Planning were issued. (Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing and Ministry of Forests, February 16, 1981, *General Policy Framework - Deferred Area Planning*.)

¹³⁴ Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing and Ministry of Forests, *General Policy Framework - Deferred Area Planning*.

¹³⁵ In the case of the Chilko Lake Deferred Planning Area, a final plan was not delivered until 1993. See: Chilko Lake Study Team, *Consensus Report of the Chilko Lake Study Team (Final Report)*, [Williams Lake: BC Parks, September 1993].

¹³⁶ Bryant, *The Provincial Forest Program: Protecting the Forest Land Base in the 1980s*, p. 19.

decision which acted in the best interests of the public defined by the greatest social and economic benefit to the province.

3.6 ACCOMMODATING WILDERNESS VALUES IN PROVINCIAL FORESTS

By 1983, the MOF was again expressing concern over the potential impacts of future alienations on the forest land base. Jeremy Wilson notes that the threat of single use alienations from the forest land base spurred the MOF's "glowing characterizations of multiple use" at this time.¹³⁷ In other words, IRM was used to rebuff demands for single use withdrawals such as protected areas. An excerpt of DM Apsey's speech to professional foresters in 1983 is instructive. Apsey stated,

*The potential impact of land alienations on our forest land base is staggering. At present, province-wide, the ministry is faced with more than 200 resource use conflicts, each of which could have an adverse effect on the rate of harvest. If we fail to live up to our responsibilities in this area, if we permit the Balkanization of the forest land base into single-use fragments we will have failed in our most basic duty.*¹³⁸

The above statements colour the MOF's representation of the program as an initial broad zoning likely to undergo period review. As acknowledged in the *1984 Range and Resource Analysis*, the Provincial Forests program was not intended to "establish forevermore the optimum use for every acre of land in the province," but should be viewed as an "initial broad zoning" to establish in general terms "the land base available

¹³⁷ Jeremy Wilson, "Wilderness Politics in BC: The Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environmentalism," *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach*, William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad (eds), [Missisauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990], p. 157. Multiple use is used interchangeably with integrated resource management in this thesis in the time period of which Wilson is speaking.

¹³⁸ Quoted in Wilson, *Wilderness Politics in BC: The Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environmentalism*, p. 158.

for integrated forest management.”¹³⁹ The Provincial Forest designation was expected to undergo periodic review.¹⁴⁰ However, there is little evidence to suggest that the MOF maintained a commitment to formal reviews.

Wilderness preservation issues continued to thwart the MOF’s attempts to undertake IRM planning. For example, Local Resource Use Planning (LRUP) for the Meares Island in the early 1980’s was unable to manage a land use conflict largely based on demands for the preservation of portions of the Island from logging. Ultimately the process was augmented to better accommodate preservation oriented interests yet these expanded processes failed too. Similar difficulties were being encountered in many areas of the province.

The lack of a formal process to review the appropriateness of Provincial Forest designations, and the failure to adequately recognize wilderness values in forest land planning produced some major dysfunctions in IRM under a Type 2 approach. There was an unwillingness to recognize significant non-timber values (e.g., wilderness values) in IRM planning. This failure was exacerbated by the poor commitment to review broad

¹³⁹Ministry of Forests, *1984 Range and Resources Analysis*, p. F22, F23. As noted in the 1984 Range and Resource Analysis, “Designation of Provincial forests avoids unjustified disposition of the resource base to alternate uses, while making provisions to accommodate necessary land withdrawals for higher value uses. Under the periodic Provincial Forests Review Process, land withdrawals will be permitted only after careful consideration of the resulting impact on forest, range and dispersed recreational values compared to the social and economic benefits of the alter use.”

¹⁴⁰By 1984, a review policy for Provincial Forests had been developed. See: Ministry of Forests, *Provincial Forest Review Draft Policy*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 1984]. The review was to be undertaken through regional planning, coordinated with other agencies, and designed to accommodate changing land use demands and priorities over time. The MOF was to act as lead agency in the review process with approval being given by the Chief Forester for the reallocation of land from Provincial Forests. With the disbanding of the RRMCS, the very mechanism with which land use zoning was reviewed in 1980-81 was removed. And as noted by the MOF in 1979 at the initiation of the Provincial Forests Program, RRMCS were to be involved in the review of Provincial Forest designations.

zoning. Since wilderness values were not recognized through IRM planning, the removal of significant wilderness areas from Provincial Forest status into protected areas was the only viable solution to ensure long-term wilderness protection. The MOF, however remained uncommitted to a review that would lead to such reallocations.

Wilderness Advisory Committee

In 1985, government took a formal step towards the resolution of the wilderness issue. With the pronouncement that it was time for “planned, comprehensive and balanced approach to the wilderness issue in BC”, the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) was struck.¹⁴¹ The role of the committee, was to address the growing number of allocative issues that were creeping into forest land planning. The Wilderness Advisory Committee was asked to consider 24 areas for their wilderness values and through a WAC devised process of assessment, make recommendations to government “as to the use of, or classification for all or as many of the 24 areas as the Committee is capable of assessing in the time and with the information available.”¹⁴² In addition, the WAC recognized that there were at least 14 other “significant” sites identified through submissions and presentations made to the WAC.¹⁴³

The central issue was whether these areas should be allocated in land use zones which provide for the maintenance of their wilderness values. The WAC noted that the majority of lands in BC were classified as Provincial Forests over which the MOF had

¹⁴¹Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, Appendix A.

¹⁴²Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, p. 5.

¹⁴³Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, pp. 31-33.

legislated jurisdiction. At the same time, the WAC noted that the MOF lacked the mandate to consider wilderness as a forest land value “in fulfillment of its multiple use planning function.”^{144, 145} The WAC recommended that wilderness be recognized as a resource within the Provincial Forests.¹⁴⁶ But, the WAC also felt that “some of the most significant wilderness areas” should be removed from Provincial Forests.¹⁴⁷

In its review, the WAC found an institutional framework for land use decision making in British Columbia with serious weaknesses. The WAC noted,

Many pointed out that decisions on several of the park proposals before the committee had been delayed for a decade or more. Others noted too, that government communication was deficient. Government agencies were generally perceived to be making decisions without a broad long term strategy and without coordinating their policies with the policies of others... And such agencies are seen to be reluctant to consult the views of the public at large. These problems suggest that a new revitalized approach to decisions is urgently required.¹⁴⁸

The greatest weakness lay in the absence of a systematic plan and overall land use strategy. This left “decision making and policy making ... inevitably ad hoc.” Wilson’s

¹⁴⁴Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁵ This omission was noted by forest industry groups such as COFI as well as the BC Forestry Association. Both of these groups had proposed changes to the Act to correct the situation . (At the time, the spokesman for the B.C. Forestry Association was W. Young, a former Chief Forester for the Ministry of Forests.)

¹⁴⁶ The WAC stated, “The Ministry of Forests has been charged with managing all the lands within designated Provincial Forests....these Provincial forest lands cover 86% of the total areas of the Province. They consist of only 53% commercial forest land, the remaining 47% of non commercial land exists largely in a natural state and much of it is superb wilderness in alpine, subalpine and northern areas. Thus if wilderness values are to be recognized, this Ministry must be involved.” (Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, p. 18.)

¹⁴⁷Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁸Wilderness Advisory Committee, *The Wilderness Mosaic*, p. 17.

analysis of submissions to WAC finds that the need for a comprehensive land use strategy was one of the most commonly state recommendations ,

*the most common complaint advanced by those who advanced thoughts about the wilderness (or park) decision process was that the government had refused to develop a comprehensive land use strategy. This theme was developed by groups and individuals on all sides of the wilderness issue.*¹⁴⁹

Given the magnitude of the unresolved wilderness issue, the Provincial Forest program may be understood as a shrewd initiative to “lock up” the land base making it much more difficult for preservationist pressures to compel government to allocate forest lands into protected areas. As noted earlier, the Provincial Forests Program had been completed within a framework incapable of seriously considering the wilderness issue.

Wilderness Policy

Acting on the recommendations of the WAC, government amended the Forest Act (Forest Amendment Act, assented August, 1987), to legally recognize wilderness as a resource and give the MOF responsibility to consider wilderness values in its integrated management of Provincial Forests.¹⁵⁰ The concept of integrated resource management underwent some revision to accommodate this new responsibility.

¹⁴⁹ Wilson, Chapter 5 of an unpublished manuscript, p. 6.

¹⁵⁰ Ministry of Forests, *Managing Wilderness in Provincial Forests: A Proposed Policy Framework*, June 1988, p. i.

In the MOF's' discussion paper on Wilderness policy, IRM was described in the following way:

Integrated resource management does not mean providing for all uses in all areas, or multiple use on every hectare of land. It means identifying and assessing all resource values and providing for a regional mosaic of land uses. Such a mosaic would normally include some areas which are managed primarily for their wilderness values.¹⁵¹

This can be contrasted with Chief Forester J. Cuthbert's reading of the wilderness issue in 1986. Cuthbert noted that "The provincial forest designation is actually an allocation of land to integrated resource management."¹⁵² Integrated resource management, as applied to provincial forests, was defined by Cuthbert as,

the deliberate and careful planning of the integration of various uses, to interfere with each other as little as possible and to complement each other as much as possible, with due regard for this order of importance in the public interests in each management area in order to achieve the optimum social and economic benefit to the people of British Columbia.¹⁵³

Cuthbert noted that,

Integrated resource use strategies cannot be used to resolve land allocation issues. I trust the Wilderness Advisory Committee's recommendations will assist in resolving land allocation issues and we can get on with the job of resolving resource use problems.¹⁵⁴

A distinction was made between the land use designation process and integrated resource management. There was a distinction between single use withdrawals and land to be

¹⁵¹Ministry of Forests, *Managing Wilderness in Provincial Forests: A Proposed Policy Framework*, p. 3.

¹⁵²John Cuthbert, 1986, "Integrated Resource Management," p. 42.

¹⁵³John Cuthbert, 1986, "Integrate Resource Management," p. 42.

¹⁵⁴John Cuthbert, 1986, "Integrated Resource Management," *Multiple Use in British Columbia*, Jeff P. Katuski (ed.), Symposium on Multiple Use, March 8, 1986, Vancouver: University of British Columbia, pp. 46-47.

managed for multiple uses. Preservation, as an element to crown land planning, was outside of the policy for integrated resource management on Crown lands.

The shift in the concept following the 1987 amendment to the Forest Act enabled the creation of protected areas within Provincial Forests. Wilderness came to be considered as a legitimate use within the integrated resource management framework. As such, a major dysfunction with Type 2 IRM had been addressed through legislative reform. Yet, by 1991, the BC Forest Service had established only 3 Wilderness Areas totaling 110,000 hectares.¹⁵⁵ In the context of the millions of hectares proposed for protection through the WAC, the MOF's performance in protecting wilderness values appeared lacklustre. It could be argued therefore that the MOF was protecting its turf, making the necessary concession to pre-empt the risk of bigger losses. In terms of Type 2 IRM, the rhetoric of IRM had been used to maintain an otherwise timber-centric approach to forest land planning hostile to the wilderness issue.

3.7 PROPOSAL TO REPLACE VOLUME BASED TENURES WITH AREA BASED TENURES

Initiatives to further secure the forest land base continued in spite of the magnitude of the unresolved wilderness issue. In 1987, the Minister of Forests announced an intention to "increase the number of TFLs so that their aggregate share of the provincial annual allowable cut (AAC) will increase from the current 26 per cent to

¹⁵⁵Terje Vold, "Wilderness Planning in British Columbia," *The Economic Value of Wilderness - Proceedings of a Conference*, [Asheville, NC: Southeastern Forest Experiment Station, December 1992], p. 252.

about 67 per cent". This policy was built upon enabling legislation enacted in 1982 which permitted the conversion of Forest Licences to Tree Farm Licences (TFLs). Few conversions had been proposed between 1982 and 1987. Implementation policy and procedures for the replacement of FLs and similar tenures was released in July 1988.¹⁵⁶

In the context of the provincial Forest Designation, the TFL as a form of tenure was significant. The TFL was to be exempt from the Provincial Forests Review Program review. Consequently, the conversion policy would have increased the security of the forest land base for industry and made land reallocation much more difficult. The timing of the initiative is significant because, while there was substantial pressure to provide more protection of wilderness values, the conversion program was proposing to make it more difficult to protect wilderness values before they were adequately identified. The proposed conversion policy, therefore, bore the markings of a "pre-emptive strike" to mitigate future potential impacts of wilderness preservation on the forest land base. Again, the MOF's hostility towards the review of the provincial forest designation, the reallocation of Crown lands, and the wilderness issue was apparent

Prior to proceeding with the initiative, the MOF held a number of public information meetings "... to seek comments and suggestions from the public about the policy and the procedures; and then decide whether the program should proceed."¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶Ministry of Forests, *Proposed Policy and Procedures for the Replacement of Major Volume Based Tenures with Tree Farm Licences*, 1988.

¹⁵⁷Ministry of Forests, *Summary of Public Input at Public Information Sessions on the Proposed Policy and Procedures for the Replacement of Major Volume-Based Tenures with Tree Farm Licences*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, 1989].

During public meetings the MOF was greeted with widespread public opposition to the conversion policy. The sentiment expressed frequently and adamantly was that a comprehensive review of current land use allocations was needed before such tenure arrangements could be entered into.

Forest Resources Commission

The proposal to convert volume-based tenures to area-based tenures (i.e., TFLs) was a catalyst to a larger review of land and resource use management on Crown lands. A key component of this larger review was the Forest Resources Commission (FRC) established in November 1989 to provide a “comprehensive view of what the forests of British Columbia should represent.” It was further stipulated that, “This view would take into account the full range of forest values, how the forest might be managed to protect and enhance those values and the total economic impact of the forests to the Province.”¹⁵⁸

The FRC recommended in 1991 that a land use plan be developed to accommodate diverse and changing values. The FRC stated that it,

*firmly believes that the Land Use Plan will provide the best opportunity ... to establish the goals and priorities ... for the protection and enhancement of all values associated with the land and the resources it holds. The plan provides a blueprint for managing all values across the full provincial landscape. It will also permit the full recognition of the gains and losses inherent in choices between different land use classifications and their individual management regimes.*¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Forest Resource Commission, *The Future of Our Forests, Appendix 1 - Mandated Tasks*.

¹⁵⁹ Forest Resource Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, p. 12.

The FRC observed that the broad Provincial Forest designation was not sufficient to accommodate the demands placed upon a common land base by various resource value perspectives.¹⁶⁰ As the FRC *Options Paper* released in 1990 noted, there was a public concern that appropriate areas of public lands be classified as “priority use” - for the full range of forests values.”¹⁶¹ It was with this in mind that the Commission focused on a review of the land use classification system.

They proposed several broad land use zones which were to accommodate a spectrum of use values. These included:¹⁶²

- **Protection/Preservation** (i.e., archeological sites, cultural and spiritual values, ecological reserves, flood or avalanche prevention, parks, special environmental features (sensitivity or instability), unique wildlife habitat, wilderness areas, wildlife migration corridors;
- **Integrated Use Management Areas** (i.e., agriculture/range, energy and mineral, exploration, estuaries, marsh lands, fisheries & wildlife, guide outfitting, hunting, special feature forests, other resource extraction/harvesting, recreation, special purpose (research/harvesting), recreation, special purpose (research, heritage), timber production, tourism, trapping, urban/forest interface, views/landscapes, watersheds (quality/quantity)
- **Areas of Restricted Use** (i.e., corridors, destination resorts, industrial sites, mines, pipelines, transit.

These various categories represented an initial effort to formalize the land classification system to be applied on Provincial Forests. The FRC envisioned that zoning would be

¹⁶⁰ The Commission observed, “The current debate over forest land allocations and uses may have arisen in part, because present classifications are either too broad or insufficient to meet the array of demands on the resource base. It also suggests a lack of compatibility between resource management goals for each particular use or value. The proposed introduction of a land use classification system would permit a broad designation of value objectives for each particular site.” (Forest Resources Commission, *Options Paper*, p. 9.)

¹⁶¹ Forest Resources Commission, *Options Paper*, p. 9.

¹⁶² Forest Resources Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, pp. 19-20.

delivered through interagency planning.¹⁶³ The new Forest Resources Corporation would have responsibility for managing those lands where timber was the primary resource value. The restructured Ministry of Crown Lands was to manage lands with significant non-timber values (except for protected areas). The land use zoning system therefore would have led to a redistribution of responsibilities for Crown land management and planning. As such the proposed zoning system would have allocated forest land management responsibilities to two different agencies - the Forest Resources Corporation, and the restructured Ministry of Crown Lands.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the FRC came in recognition that the Type 2 IRM was no longer ensured. Serious adjustments were required. The FRC recommended radical institutional reforms that were neither a Type 1 nor a Type 2 IRM. The principles guiding broad land use zoning, the underlying management policies for various land use zones and the institutional arrangements to undertake zoning and management were being questioned. It was a period of soul searching for many agencies and for government in general. Land use planning and management was intolerably dysfunctional and the complexity of the problems created a setting conducive to free thinking and imaginative solutions.¹⁶⁴ The work of the FRC, the emergent protected areas strategy, CORE and the

¹⁶³ The proposed zonation system was also significant in terms of the FRC's proposed institutional framework for land use planning. As noted in Chapter 2, some lands designated for IRM were to be managed by the reformed Ministry of Crown Lands. Lands suited for commercial timber production were to be managed by the new Forest Resources Corporation. Criteria by which management responsibility was to be allocated to the Ministry of Crown Lands or the Forest Resources Corporation were not developed by the FRC however.

¹⁶⁴ The key manifestation of a dysfunctional system in this period has been identified by CORE as procedural in nature. The public had become alienated from public decision-making. In turn there existed "widespread public cynicism about government effectiveness and fairness and a resulting dissatisfaction with the actions and decisions of government." At a more material level, CORE identified "ongoing loss of environmental options, resource jobs, community stability, and business

efforts at sub-regional planning have all been discussed in Chapter 2. As noted in that Chapter, the transition from a Type 2 IRM to a Type 1 IRM was made over this period. Below, the impact of the transition to a Type 1 IRM on broad land use zoning are examined.

3.8 PROTECTED AREAS STRATEGY

The Forest Resources Commission was of the opinion that with respect to the protection/preservation and areas of restricted use categories, “most of the major land use decisions have already been made.”¹⁶⁵ However, running concurrent to the FRC was a review of BC’s protected areas and the development of a strategy for developing a protected areas system in BC. The review of BC’s protected areas consisted of Parks Plan ‘90, Wilderness for the ‘90s and the Old Growth Strategy Project. With the exception of the Old Growth Strategy Project, each are briefly introduced below.¹⁶⁶

In 1988, BC Parks released *Striking the Balance* which represented the first comprehensive statement on park policy for the province. Following comments on the discussion paper, revisions were made and the paper was adopted as a strategy intended to direct BC Parks efforts to “formalize and direct park system planning.”¹⁶⁷

certainty.” In summary, the failure to recognize adequately the interdependencies between society, government, the environment and the economy had become intolerable. See: Commission on Resources and Environment, *1992-93 Annual Report to the Legislative Assembly*, [Victoria: Commission on Resources and Environment, June 1993], p. 10, 11.

¹⁶⁵ Forest Resources Commission, *The Future of Our Forests*, p. 20.

¹⁶⁶ The Old Growth Strategy Project made recommendations on a number of deferral areas (areas with high old growth values). These deferral areas were added to the list of Study Areas for consideration in the Protected Areas Strategy. (Province of British Columbia, *A Protected Areas Strategy for British Columbia*, [Victoria: Province of British Columbia, p. 9.]

¹⁶⁷ Summary of Public Comments, Provincial Parks & Wilderness for the 90’s, p. 1.

This represented the first time a guiding policy regarding types of parks, number and locations was proposed. The policy was followed by BC Parks' Parks Plan '90 initiative. The program was intended to address a frequent criticism that there had been no publicly reviewed plan for completing the parks system. By December, 1990, a draft working map locating potential park areas had been released to the public for review.

About the same time, the MOF had initiated a comprehensive review of wilderness values in Provincial Forests. Following the release of the BC Forest Service's wilderness policy, *Managing Wilderness in Provincial Forests*, in December of 1989, the initiation of a wilderness planning process. Public proposals for wilderness study areas were solicited and a list of proposed wilderness study areas compiled based on public and agency comment. This list was released as a draft working map of proposed study areas.¹⁶⁸

In December of 1990, Parks Plan 90 and Wilderness for the 90s were amalgamated into a joint effort, titled *Parks and Wilderness for the 90's*. The joint initiative was to:

- begin a long-term process of comprehensive and systematic planning for protected areas;
- develop an inventory of potential areas of interest for parks or wilderness which may be studied for those purposes in the future;
- integrate the goals of a system of provincial forests and wilderness areas; and
- seek public advice at the outset of the planning process and as the process evolved in the future.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Summary of Public Comments, *Provincial Parks & Wilderness for the 90's*, p.2.

¹⁶⁹ Summary of Public Comments, *Provincial Parks & Wilderness for the 90's*, p.2.

The intention was to develop a “systematic, long-term planning program for the establishment of a system of provincial parks and wilderness areas...”¹⁷⁰ Criteria and priorities for the selection of protected areas at the provincial level were to be developed first. Then regional and local planning processes were to recommend study areas for protection.^{171, 172}

As pressure and momentum towards the delivery of a protected areas strategy and the development of a land use plan for BC grew, the Social Credit government, plagued by scandal, was abandoned at the polls in the election of 1991. The newly elected NDP government announced soon after its election the appointment of the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) and the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS) for British Columbia.

An action plan -- the *Protected Areas Strategy* was announced May 6, 1992. The target established for the program was to have given 12% of BC’s land base protected areas status by the year 2000.¹⁷³ The PAS incorporated existing protected areas initiatives which included the Parks and Wilderness for the ‘90s and the Old Growth Strategy. Recommendations from these initiatives were to be coordinated through the

¹⁷⁰ *Summary of Public Comments, Provincial Parks & Wilderness for the 90's*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁷¹ *Summary of Public Comments, Provincial Parks & Wilderness for the 90's*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁷² The intention was then to seek direction from Cabinet for approved wilderness and park study areas. As Terje Volde (Senior Wilderness Forester, MOF) states, the initiative was “the first comprehensive opportunity for the public and industry to shape the future of parks and wilderness in British Columbia. Land is increasingly a major issue confronting the public and land managers alike. This initiative is aimed to provide greater direction on the protected areas issue - a major component of the land use debate in British Columbia.” (Terje Vold, *Wilderness Planning in British Columbia, Canada*.)

¹⁷³ The NDP had committed itself to the 12% target as early as 1990. See: NDP: *Sustainable Development - BC's Growing Future*.

PAS.¹⁷⁴ In addition, the PAS attempted to account for the various park systems existing in the Province and take stock of significant sites in the province currently protected.

The 12 per cent target was significant in the context of efforts to manage the wilderness issue. For example, by 1988 approximately 6.8 per cent of the land base had been given protected area status. It was further estimated that the provision of protected area status to all remaining areas proposed to government by various preservationist interests would require that between 10 per cent and 14 per cent of the total land base be protected.¹⁷⁵ Thus, the Protected Areas Strategy enabled a great deal of flexibility in accommodating preservationist interests within the land use allocation debate. As a target, it represented a key intervention into the configuration of IRM and a key policy to adjust IRM to better protect wilderness values.¹⁷⁶

3.9 REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL PLANNING

The Protected Areas Strategy supported the emergent Type 1 IRM by providing flexibility to apply a more balanced approach to land use planning, and by formally establishing a policy for reviewing the Provincial Forest designation made previously. The PAS was originally to be implemented through regional and sub-regional planning processes and, in the some cases, study area recommendations made to Cabinet through

¹⁷⁴ In total, 112 large and 72 small study areas were approved as potential candidates for provincial parks and wilderness areas. (Province of British Columbia (n.d.), *Towards a Protected Areas Strategy for B.C.*)

¹⁷⁵ Jeremy Wilson, Draft, Chapter 1, p. 3.)

¹⁷⁶ The lack of a target for wilderness preservation explains partly why very little was accomplished through the MOF's wilderness policy.

special studies.¹⁷⁷ CORE regional planning initially was focused on making protected area recommendations in a regional context. For example, in regional planning, CORE was originally given the responsibility to “coordinate the preparation of regional plans to provide for the delineation of protected areas and those to be managed for integrated resource use.”¹⁷⁸ More recently, the PAS is being implemented predominantly through Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP).¹⁷⁹

In CORE and LRMP processes, the allocation of the land base to different uses relied on a land use designation system based upon four land use categories. These categories represented a continuum of permissible activities ranging from Protected Areas, where the range of activity was relatively constrained, to areas in which extractive resource activities were least restricted. Initially, the four categories’ primary value, at least from a planning point of view, appears to have been in facilitating negotiation by illustrating at a glance what the general nature of constraints would be over a given land base. For example, in the West Kootenay CORE process the argument in favour of four broad categories was that with a broad category one could understand the intentions without having to closely examine the detailed site specific management prescription .

“It allows a spectrum on what is going on in detail and if not dealt with there will be more

¹⁷⁷ Province of British Columbia, *A Protected Areas Strategy for British Columbia*, p. 19-21. Examples of special studies include the Tatshenshini-Alsek, Pincombe-Burke, and Kitlope.

¹⁷⁸ Commission on Resources and Environment (n.d.), *Backgrounder - Commission on Resources and Environment*.

¹⁷⁹ Integrated Resource Planning Committee, March 26, 1992, *Forest Land Management Planning - A Statement of Principles and Process*. Originally LRMP processes were to develop resource management guidelines specific to particular units of lands which fell within Provincial Forests. In the case of LRMP planning, the original FLMP statement of principles and process noted that the goal of planning was to develop resource management objectives and strategies for the whole planning area as well as objectives and strategies specific to units within the region.

difficult in terms of negotiation.”¹⁸⁰ LRMPs developed a similar land use designation system consisting of four broad land use designation.

As the Forest Practices Code proceeded, these designations were adjusted to harmonize the classification system used in LRMP with the classification system used in the Forests Practices Code.¹⁸¹ Later, as the Forest Practices Code came into effect, the zone was given legal standing. In either case, zones may vary in their management guidelines, objectives and strategies between processes and within a single process.¹⁸²

Planning taking place at the regional and sub-regional level represents a comprehensive review of the Provincial Forest designations which were established in the early 1980s, and a refinement of zoning within provincial forest lands. Table 3-2, below, identifies a selection of the broad designations used in CORE and LRMP planning processes to date. All designations, except protected areas, will remain within Provincial

¹⁸⁰ CORE, December, 3,4, 1993, Kootenay-Boundary Regional Planning Process - West Table Meeting Summary Notes, p. 16.

¹⁸¹ The development of the Forest Practices Code began in 1992. The Code came into effect in 1995. LRMP and CORE regional planning processes were developing alongside of the Code. There are many instances where planning processes required adjustment to make them consistent with, and to ensure that plans received maximum adherence through, the Code. The development of resource management zones (RMZs) is but one example of the kind of adjusting that was needed as both regional and subregional planning and the Code developed.

¹⁸² Presently there is debate over the role of the land use designation. As alluded to in some of the comments above, one of the primary uses has been as a tool in land use planning. It functions to simplify complex management prescriptions in a manner which eases negotiation. On the other hand, a recent Price Waterhouse interpretation of CORE material notes that a variety of names for various plan designations have emerged through various planning processes and that this has been some cause of confusion. According to Price Waterhouse, “one of the difficulties in moving to a standardized classification system is that planning teams/roundtable’s have wanted to define land use zones in their own terms, and it is difficult for government to impose a standardized classification system in a region without being accused of intervening too much in the process.” It should be noted that in general, the broad designation system has been used to characterize already formulated management strategies. As such, the classification may also be understood as a communication tool. See: Price Waterhouse, September, 1995, *Analysis of Recent British Columbia Government Forest Policy and Land Use Initiatives*, p. 37.

Forests. Within the broad designations, however there are substantial differences with respect to the constraints placed upon resource development activities. In the case of low intensity or sensitive development areas¹⁸³, resource development activities would encounter a greater variety of constraints than in the general forestry or high intensity areas. Consequently, the refined subzoning on Provincial Forest lands represents a potentially significant constraint on timber flow.

TABLE 3-2				
LAND USE DESIGNATIONS USED IN CORE AND LRMP				
	Extractive Resource Use not Generally Permitted	←————→		Fewest Restrictions Placed on Extractive Resource Use
Vancouver Island	Protected Areas	Low Intensity	General Forestry	High Intensity
Cariboo-Chilcotin	Protected Areas	Sensitive Development	General Management	Enhanced Forestry
West Kootenay-Boundary	Protected Areas	Special Management	Integrated Use	Dedicated Use
East Kootenay	Protected Areas	Special Management	Integrated Use	Dedicated Use
Kamloops LRMP	Protected Areas	Low Intensity Resource Development RMZ	General Management Direction	Enhanced Resource Development RMZ
Bulkley LRMP	Protected Areas	Sensitive RMZ	Integrated RMZ	Enhanced Resource Development Zone

¹⁸³ A Low Intensity Area Review Committee (LIARC) was appointed to recommend procedures and principles that should guide the planning and development in Low Intensity Areas (LIAs) on Vancouver Island. The LIARC recommended that an interagency referral and review process for proposed development activities in LIAs be implemented. If the referral process doesn't lead to agreement over a proposal for development within an LIA, the proposal goes to the IAMC and if IAMC can't reach a decision it goes to LUCO. At higher levels, IAMCs would be responsible for monitoring, auditing and approval of development plans on LIAs. See: LIARC, *Low Intensity Areas for the Vancouver Island Region: Exploring a New Resource Management Vision*, [Victoria: LUCO, January 1995], pp. 130-133. However, one should keep in mind that these recommendations have taken place within a context in which the chief forester can unilaterally alter LIAs. (LIAs are given the status of RMZs under the Forest Practices Code.)

The efforts at regional and subregional planning, supported by the PAS have formed the nucleus of an ascendant Type 1 IRM in the 1990's. Planning under Type 1 IRM has both reallocated land from the Provincial forest land base and it has provided a more refined and formal system of subzoning on Provincial Forests.

As stated earlier, CORE and LRMP planning processes cover approximately 50 of the 85 million hectares of Crown land in the province. The area under protection has risen from 6% of the land base in May of 1992 to 9.16% (i.e., 8,678,503 hectares) in February of 1996.¹⁸⁴ The vast majority of the new protected areas represent a reallocation of land from Provincial Forests to parks. As such, the Protected Areas Strategy has achieved a significant rezoning of Provincial Forest lands. It has been cast as a significant encroachment on the forest land base having a substantial negative impact on timber supply.

3.10 FOREST LAND RESERVE

Efforts to mitigate the threats posed by the latest Type 1 IRM approach are also evident. In this regard, the creation of the Forest Land Reserve bears some significance in terms of recent land use zoning initiatives. Most recently, the Protected Areas Strategy and the sale of private managed forest lands for settlement purposes has met with renewed efforts to again secure the forest land base for long term timber production.¹⁸⁵ The latest efforts have culminated in the Forest Land Reserve Act assented to in July of

¹⁸⁴ Land Use Coordination Office, *BC's Protected Areas Strategy - A Provincial Overview and Status Report.*, prepared by Kaaren Lewis, February 2, 1996.

¹⁸⁵ Price Waterhouse, September 1995, *Analysis of Recent British Columbia Government Forest Policy and Land Use Initiatives*, p. 25.

1994. The Forest Land Reserve Land Act was passed to “protect the forest land base of British Columbia.”¹⁸⁶ When the Act was announced Forest Minister Andrew Petter proclaimed that

*Securing the commercial forest is a key component of our land use strategy. Through this legislation, we're demonstrating our commitment to renew and stabilize our forest lands for long-term sustainability.*¹⁸⁷

Petter noted that “The reserve will foster economic and social stability for communities by securing land for commercial forest activities.”¹⁸⁸ The rhetoric surrounding the announcement of the Forest Land Reserve was reminiscent of that during the resumption of the Provincial Forest Program in the late 1970's.

The Act allows for Provincial Forest Lands to be designated as Forest Land Reserve Lands. Under Section 12, the Lieutenant Governor in Council

*may designate as forest reserve land that part of Crown land within the Provincial forest under the Forest Act that the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers should be protected under this act.*¹⁸⁹

To be excluded from the reserve are lands designated as protected areas, settlement lands, unmanaged private forest lands, private residential or rural properties, and land in the

¹⁸⁶ The Forest Land Reserve designation was developed in response to recommendations which were being made in association with the Vancouver Island regional planning process. (Forest Service, *Backgrounder - British Columbia Forest Land Reserve*, n.d.)

¹⁸⁷ Ministry of Forests, “New Law Protects BC's Commercial Forest Land Base,” *News Release*, June 23, 1994.

¹⁸⁸ Province of British Columbia, “New Law Protects B.C.'s Commercial Forest Land Base,” *News Release*, Ministry of Forests.

¹⁸⁹ Bill 54 - 1994, Forest Land Reserve Act, Section 12.

Agricultural Land Reserve.¹⁹⁰ Private and Crown forest land can be included in the reserve.

To date, the Commission has been developing processes for designating and removing land from the Forest Land Reserve. Forest Reserve does not replace the Provincial Forest designation rather it represents a refinement of sorts.

Once designated, lands can be removed from the Reserve by order of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and only upon the recommendation of the Forest Land Commission. The commission is comprised of forestry industry, and forest dependent community representatives and other appointed members. The Forest Reserve is intended to be used to reserve land for commercial forestry.

Region/Sub-region (Cabinet Approved Plans)	Total Forest Land Reserve Area (hectares)	Forest Land Reserve as a % of Crown Land in Region
Vancouver Island	2,000,000	81%
Cariboo-Chilcotin	6,750,000	80%
West Kootenay Boundary	3,300,000	78.8%
East Kootenay	3,000,000	74%
Kamloops LRMP¹⁹²	1,680,080	80%
Total	16,730,080	78.7%

¹⁹⁰ Province of British Columbia, "New Law Protects B.C.'s Commercial Forest Land Base," *News Release*, Ministry of Forests, June 23, 1994.

¹⁹¹ BC Forest Service, *British Columbia's Forest Land Reserve - Background*, n.d.

¹⁹² In March, 1996 government approved the recommendation made by the Follow-up Committee for the Kamloops LRMP to put 80% of the LRMP area into the Forest Land Reserve. See: Ministry of Forests, *Kamloops Land and Resource Management Plan - Follow-up Committee Recommendations Approved*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, March 1996].

Presently, Forest Land Reserves are being designated following regional, sub-regional and other land use planning processes which are delivering the Protected Areas Strategy. Table 3-3, above, identifies the total area allocated into the Forest Land Reserve in the four regions where regional planning has been completed and for the Kamloops LRMP. As Table 3-3 identifies, close to 17 million hectares of land has been placed in Forest Land Reserve as of July 1995. This represents the vast majority of Crown lands not given protected area status in Cabinet approved regional and subregional planning processes.

The potential of the Forest Land Reserve initiative can be seen in the fact that, for example, approximately 78% of Crown lands not given protected areas status in the four CORE planning regions have been designated as Forest Reserves. As discussed in previous chapters, the intent of forest reserves is to maintain long-term security of the forest land base for the forestry industry. The central impact of the reserve designation is to increase the difficulty with which land in the future can be alienated from the forest land base. As such, the Forest Land Reserve can be viewed as a response to prevent further encroachments on the provincial forest land base.¹⁹³

3.11 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has focused on the impact of institutional approaches to IRM on land use zoning and efforts to secure the forest land base. In the 1972 to 1975 period we saw the rise of Type 1 IRM. ELUC functioned as the nucleus of the interagency mechanism

¹⁹³ Most recently the Kamloops LRMP table noted that the Forest Land Reserve better protects the timber land base than the application of enhanced resource development zones.

augmented by ELUCS and RRMCs. RRMCs functioned as interagency mechanisms at the regional level and ELUCs provided both technical and administrative support to ELUC and the RRMCs. Accompanying these reforms were very real threats to the forest land base. A significant growth in the total area in protected areas occurred in this period through NDP efforts.

The forest land base came under threat as well. The Provincial Forests program was suspended. In a review of the program, ELUCS and Pearse had concluded that the designation was being used too liberally. Only those lands where timber values were clearly dominant and unlikely to conflict with non-timber values in the future should be given forest reserve status, they argued. This vision clashed with the then current use of the designation which was to protect values as diverse as recreation, range and timber.

The Forest Service appears to have used the designation to protect its forest land base in the face of NDP reforms. More reserves were created in 1973 (i.e., 8.5 million hectares) than any year previous. In addition, the 1973 amendment to the Forest Act increased the diversity and relevance of the designation to an increasing number of forest-related values. Thus, given that the program was suspended in 1973, one could interpret efforts in 1973 as a pre-emptive move to secure the forest land base in the face of an administration hostile to the predominant approach to forest land planning.

Starting in 1975, Type 1 IRM was slowly dismantled and a Type 2 IRM put in its place. Moved to the Ministry of Environment then dispersed to line agencies, ELUCS was first to go, followed by the RRMCs. The Social Credit government's disdain for

non-sectoral administrative structures was apparent. ELUC remained however, indicating that the Social Credit government saw value in such mechanisms at a higher level. Most predominant, though, were the efforts to bolster the Forest Service's role in IRM. The Forest Act and the Ministry of Forests Act along with the development of an MOF planning system to deliver IRM are pivotal in Social Credit efforts to reorient the approach to IRM. Along with the disbanding of RRMCS and ELUCS the retrenchment of Type 2 IRM was complete.

The opportunities to further secure the land base grew considerably in this environment. Legislation put in place in 1979 was sympathetic to a Type 2 IRM and increased the diversity of values to be protected under the Provincial Forest designation. This established the legislative preconditions needed to make the MOF the lead agency in terms of delivering IRM. When new threats were encountered (i.e., the disposition of lands for agricultural and settlement purposes) the MOF was quick to respond. The MOF proposed that the Provincial Forests program be resumed. The Lands Branch, as well, represented a significant threat. For, out of the confusion of the ministerial reorganizations in the wake of the MOF-related legislation, the Lands Branch emerged as a significant potential "player" in forest land planning. The Lands Branch, eager to assume role as lead agency on Crown lands, came into open conflict with the MOF. Each agency proclaimed themselves to be the most appropriate agency for land use planning.

The parks issue was also prominent. The Parks Branch argued that the Provincial Forests program essentially foreclosed future options with respect to protected areas and

that they had limited capacity to respond to proposed Provincial Forest designations. Together, the Parks Branch and BC Lands identified the program as a “fait accompli”. Evidence from the mid seventies supports an argument that the program functioned as a grand flanking maneuver carefully planned and ruthlessly executed. Very few proposed Provincial Forests were given deferred area status which, given the resistance of BC Lands and the Parks Branch, is odd. The short reaction time given these branches and the commitment of the Social Credit government to push through the Provincial Forest program could be offered as a tentative explanation for the limited opposition. It should also be noted that the program proceeded in the absence of formal, clear policy and procedures generally.

The effect of the program was to put an end to threats posed by Crown Lands which was developing its own IRM program - one which was not centred on the notion of timber management with constraints. As well, the designation of lands as Provincial Forests ensured that any future alienation's would have to be approved by the MOF. The designation thus permitted the ministry to be much more vocal with respect to proposals for withdrawal. Later amendments to the Forest Act, which recognized that wilderness values may be protected through IRM, allowed the MOF to tighten controls by developing the capacity to manage protected areas issues under IRM as well. This was something that had increasingly come to threaten the relevance of the Provincial Forest designation and its extensive application. In spite of the vociferous demands for wilderness protection, few wilderness areas were designated by the MOF.

Through the 1980's, weaknesses in Type 2 IRM grew. Wilderness values, for example, were inadequately addressed. Consequent repairs to the Provincial Forest designation saw the formal recognition of wilderness values in forest land planning. Yet, very little wilderness was actually formally recognized through the Wilderness Area designation. Sympathetic administration further undermined the MOF's efforts at IRM. By the late 1980's, the MOF was suffering serious legitimacy problems. In the midst of such problems, the MOF embarked on a final effort to secure the forest land base with its proposed policy to convert volume based tenures to area based tenures (TFLs).

The proposed conversion policy precipitated a wider review of forest land planning and management, and led to some significant initiatives including the Forest Resources Commission and Parks & Wilderness in the 90's. With the election of the NDP in 1991 we have seen, once again, the ascendancy of Type 1 IRM. This, presently is represented by the cabinet level Land Use Planning Working Group (LUPWG), LUCO, the IRPC, IAMCs, and CORE.

Table 3-4, below, identifies the extent to which the MOF, following completion of the Provincial Forest Program, has been able to restrict encroachment upon the forest land base. The table identifies "deletions" or lands removed from Provincial Forests over the period 1983 to 1994. The removal of lands for agriculture and settlement represented one of the greatest threats in the past. However, since the completion of the program, there have been very few deletions for the purpose of agriculture and settlement. Deletions for the purpose of parks and recreation have accounted for the vast majority of deletions over

the period 1983 to 1994. Yet, considering the magnitude of protection advocated by environmentalists (i.e., millions of hectares), the program has helped keep deletions at a minimum.

Year	Agriculture	Industry and Transportation	Parks & Recreation	Settlement	Other	Total Deletions
1983/84	88	233	667	56	143	1,187
1984/85	608	170	622	218	407	2,025
1985/86	1,069	307	3,575	280	-	5,231
1986/87	1,095	1,237	11,620	628	8	14,588
1987/88	2,832	86	74,390	145	-	77,453
1988/89	2,541	458	183	359	1,656	5,197
1989/90	4,012	28	2,550	1,478	104	8,172
1990/91	4,100	1,297	147,010	3,319	4,044	159,770
1992/93	4,321	306	3,703	77	168	8,574
1993/94	1,361	86	-	42	54	1,543
Total	22,027	4,208	244,320	6,601	6,584	283,739

Threats to the forest land base have emerged again in the 1990's. The most prominent has been the PAS with its "12 per cent" target. Along with the delineation of RMZs, the PAS represents a significant effort to review the Provincial Forest land designation. The total area given formal protected area status in BC has grown considerably and the area under Provincial Forests reduced by approximately 3 million hectares. At the same time, efforts to refine the broad Provincial Forest designation through the application of subzoning (RMZs) have been undertaken. Subzoning, which delineates different intensities of resource use in different areas, are formally recognized

in the Forest Practices Code (FPC) and, therefore, have legal standing. They represent a formal subzoning system which refines the broad Provincial Forest designation.

This chapter has focused on efforts to secure the forest land base in response to both threats and opportunities posed by the broad institutional reforms identified in Chapter 2. The examination of the Provincial Forests program demonstrates the manner in which the broad reforms identified in Chapter 2 interact with the MOF's goal of maintaining a secure forest land base. We have seen how, by continuing to assert the relevance of the Provincial Forest designation to its program of IRM, the MOF has been able to maintain its hold on the forest land base.

CHAPTER 4

THE CHARACTER & EFFICACY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The thesis has examined the impact of the ebb and flow between Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM. Various governments have promoted one approach over the other, but each approach has coexisted with the other at various times. Incremental changes to the character of IRM have been induced through reforms efforts - most notably through the Type 1 IRM approach. And, reforms have both presented opportunities and threats to MOF efforts to secure the forest land base.

In Chapter 1 we have seen that Type 1 IRM was ascendant in 1972 to 1975 and 1992 to 1996. The NDP government promoted an interagency approach in which ELUC formed the nucleus and was complemented by ELUCS and RRMCs. Following 1975, the Social Credit government, sympathetic to a Type 2 IRM, dismantled the vestiges of the NDP's interagency structures and strengthened the role of the Forest Service in forest land planning. The Forest Act and Ministry of Forests Act along with the MOF's newly developed IRM planning system did much to promote and bolster the MOF's role as lead planning agency. These initiatives were accompanied by the dissolution of ELUCS and RRMCs and a generally reduced capacity for the ELUC to act.

Type 2 IRM was ascendant from 1975 to the late 1980's. The MOF-dominated approach worked through the 1980's and faltered towards the end of the decade. The protection of non-timber values on the land base was viewed as inadequate by

government agencies and the public. Determining an appropriate level of protection for wilderness values was an especially vexing problem. Towards the end of the 1980's a renewed interest in Type 1 IRM was apparent.

Institutional reforms were also proposed which fell outside of the Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM categories. For example, the Planning Act proposed in 1980 bore some semblance to a Type 1 approach with the important exception that a secretariat was not proposed. Also during the late 1980's, the FRC's Land Use Commission model proposed a land use planning structure that was "external" to government, independent from line agencies and accountable to a Cabinet level committee.

Type 1 IRM became ascendant under NDP government reforms in the 1990s. Efforts were initially centred on CORE which was to develop for BC a land use strategy. An interagency approach rooted in TSA-level planning was also emerging. Up till about early 1995 these two streams of development interacted. They eventually coalesced around a new mechanism, LUCO, which reported directly to the Land Use Planning Working Group (LUPWG). While CORE has now been dissolved, a Type 1 IRM approach remains fully functional and dominates the institutional landscape for land use planning.

CORE also could have been viewed as consistent with the Land Use Commission model were it not for the tentative nature of CORE's work. CORE undertook a role as architect of BC's land use strategy. Unlike the proposed legislation for the land use commission model, a planning system was not specified and the exact role of CORE in

relation to the rest of the institutional structure remained less clearly defined. It has been argued in the thesis that CORE served more as a steering mechanism rather than a new institutional approach since it did not replace existing agencies.

In Chapter 3, the impact of the various approaches has been examined in the context of land use zoning. Type 1 approaches have tended to encroach upon the forest land base while Type 2 approaches have tended to protect and increase the security of the forest land base. We have seen that the MOF has undertaken efforts to mitigate the impact of threats and to capitalize on opportunities posed by various institutional reforms. These efforts have been explored in the thesis by focusing on land use zoning.

The remainder of the chapter focuses on themes which have emerged from Chapter 2 and 3 and further support the thesis. The thesis statement posed in Chapter 1 was that the MOF maintains a hold on the forest land base that undermines the latest efforts at interagency planning for IRM. This hold is related to the institutional approaches to IRM and the limits of change under these institutional approaches. Institutional reforms, in this thesis, have been described as working within a Type 1 IRM - Type 2 IRM dynamic. The impact of these changes have been most closely examined in terms of the areal extent of the forest land base and the degree to which it has been secured by the MOF.

This thesis concludes by more fully developing four themes. The first two themes examine the rationale for undertaking Type 1 IRM approaches. The second two themes examine forest land management briefly in order to elaborate upon the implications of the

zoning developments discussed in Chapter 3. The focus on these latter two themes helps to better understand the limits to change in the context of “timber management with constraints’.

1. Institutionalized limits affect the capacity of reformers to enact change and the capacity of the broader institutional system to thwart change. Key among these institutionalized limits are time constraints and the need to maintain functioning systems. Under such circumstances, institutional reform efforts are limited to incremental approaches. Institutionalized limits to reform suggest a continuance of the Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM dynamic.
2. Party-specific limits exist. The NDP party has a preference for (Type 1) interagency approaches, the Social Credit party has a preference for Type 2 (line agency) approaches. This can be attributed to the NDP conception of IRM as a balance between forest values through neutral agencies, while the Social Credit sees it more as a balancing of values through a forestry centred conception. The NDP questions more the core assumption that IRM exists as timber management with constraints while Social Credit governments have not.
3. Type 1 IRM has achieved some success in altering the traditional Forest Service/MOF conception of forest land management. The Forest Service/MOF, has undergone change in terms of its organizational structure and view of the world.
4. The Forest Service/MOF has kept its core policy priorities - those reflected in its liquidation policy - out of the reach of reformers. This core program of the MOF’s not only tempers Type 1 IRM intrusions, but serves to maintain a stream of development that could easily derail the incremental changes wrought to IRM.

4.2 THE TYPE 1 IRM/TYPE 2 IRM DYNAMIC

Approaches to reform examined in Chapter 2 constitute a dynamic. The dynamic between Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM are contained by broader institutionalized limits to reform. The limits to reform are revealed to some extent by an examination of policy options considered, but not undertaken, by reformers. In particular, this section examines reformers' arguments against proposed reforms which move beyond the dynamic. Such proposals have drifted in and out of discussions regarding institutional reform. Yet, there has been an unwillingness to engage in more radical reforms of this sort. Instead, the periodic use of Type 1 IRM (interagency) approaches to adjust and steer the management practices of specialized agencies has been preferred. As a result, reforms continue to work within a dynamic where Type 1 IRM and Type 2 IRM each contain within them reform thrusts creating tensions that eventually lead to their dissolution.¹⁹⁴

Type 1 IRM pushes line agencies to reorganize. As we have seen, this caused anxiety in such agencies. As a result, at certain points, administrations tire of the reform efforts or begin to see unnecessary duplication as line agencies adopt the trappings and approaches proposed through Type 1 IRM reform efforts. For example, the reforms in the 1972 to 1975 era were reported to have caused the MOF to come close to an "institutional nervous breakdown". Certainly, the retrenchment under the Social Credit permitted a breathing space following a difficult period of reform. The resumption of

¹⁹⁴ This observation is analogous to James March and Johan Olsen's "integrative-aggregative cycle" which contains institutional reform. However, this thesis differs in that it has not been assumed, nor would evidence support, that such a cycle is maintained for the life of government as an organization (see James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, [Toronto: Maxwell MacMillan Canada, 1989] pp. 134-137.

Type 2 IRM was justified, at times, as the desire to reduce duplication in government. For example the government dispersed ELUCS, noting that its function had been assumed by other agencies in the wake of reorganization and through the ongoing reforms of the 1970's. RRMCs were also disbanded, and this coincided with the ascendancy of the MOF-centered planning system.

Similarly, Type 2 IRM contains inherent tendencies and a predisposition which pushes institutions towards a crisis of legitimacy. The "timber management with constraints" notion has tended, in the absence of interagency mechanisms, to subvert IRM effected through Type 1 IRM reforms. For example, the MOF's sympathetic administration in the early 1980's, and its inability to legitimately manage the wilderness issue could be offered as evidence of the subversion of IRM taking place in the absence of strong interagency mechanisms.

The most current reforms of the NDP have again chosen to pursue Type 1 IRM. The rationale underlying this preference is revealed in both CORE's work and the efforts to develop protected areas legislation to support the Protected Areas Strategy. CORE assessed the viability of establishing a new Land Use Planning Ministry with the primary mandate for land use planning on Crown and private land.

It concluded that

*...the costs of implementing major structural changes to existing land use planning institutions could be significant in terms of both physical reorganization and program instability. Capacity to deliver and implement plans might be interrupted for a considerable period of time ... Consequently, the enhancement of existing structures, should be used as a model for delivering provincial land use planning...*¹⁹⁵

The primary factors preventing “major structural change” include both the cost of reorganization and program instability, and the erosion of planning capacity and program delivery.

Faced with such costs, CORE endorsed an approach in which incremental reforms would slowly improve the capacity to plan for sustainability. Interagency mechanisms were to direct change in sectoral agencies. ELUCS, it will be recalled, also asserted that it had no interest in replacing the work of sectoral agencies. Rather, it was to augment their roles (in a fashion similar to the approach endorsed by CORE). ELUCS explained their approach by identifying that there was a need for agencies to further specialize. Yet, interagency mechanisms were needed to coordinate these agencies around central core policies with respect to IRM.

An explanation for the reluctance to undertake reforms other than Type 1 IRM is provided through an examination of government efforts to develop supporting legislation for the Protected Areas Strategy. The goal of the proposed legislation was to ensure that new policies and principles embodied in the Protected Areas Strategy were protected with

¹⁹⁵ Commission on Resources and Environment, *Planning for Sustainability (The Provincial Land Use Strategy Volume 2)*, [Victoria: Queen’s Printer for British Columbia, 1994], p. 45.

the force of law. The relative merits of several approaches to institutional reform were weighed. It was concluded that an overriding “Protected Areas Act” would provide “potentially the greatest opportunity for program coordination and integration”.¹⁹⁶ Such an approach, the Cabinet Submission noted, would require a new agency to take on Protected Areas responsibilities currently held by several agencies.

The Cabinet Submission argued, however, that such an approach would create significant disruptions to the existing institutional system and require “extensive drafting of legislation in a relatively short period of time.” For that reason, the preferred approach was to embed the vision, goals and objectives of PAS in legislation in a manner which “does not require repealing or canceling existing protected areas legislation.”¹⁹⁷ They noted that new legislation under the latter circumstances would be accompanied by the establishment of a “central coordinating agency/forum” to oversee and coordinate the delivery of protected areas and resolve issues.”¹⁹⁸

Overall, there exists a hesitancy to embark on more comprehensive reforms. As such, efforts at institutional reform appear to be constrained by broader institutionalized limits. It is implied that reforms should not disrupt the functioning of governance systems but should slowly alter them. The evidence briefly presented suggests that the potential threat of disruption, cost and time required to adjust governing institutions are key impediments. Such threats appear to be sufficient to seriously erode the viability of

¹⁹⁶ Cabinet Submission - Summary Decision Document, *Legislative Options to Deliver the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS)*, February 1, 1994.

¹⁹⁷ Cabinet Submission - Summary Decision Document, *Legislative Options ...*

¹⁹⁸ Cabinet Submission - Summary Decision Document, *Legislative Options ...*

broader reforms. Although more ambitious reforms entailing the creation of single neutral agencies are entertained as most effective in the long term, the long term commitment of resources can rarely be justified.¹⁹⁹ Therefore, more comprehensive reforms are difficult to steer because of long-term uncertainties with respect to budgeting, commitment (political and administrative), and because of the turbulence they create in the short term. Governments thus generally prefer less ambitious reforms which rely on the embedding of government wide principles, along with interagency mechanisms to coordinate the activities of line agencies mandated to pursue these principles. The Type 1 IRM approach then may be viewed as a style of implementing reforms in conditions of long term uncertainty, and the need for short-term stability.

However, the capacity to work towards such comprehensive reforms while taking a Type 2 IRM approach should not be dismissed. In other words, the Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM dynamic is not necessarily a sustained rhythm nor necessarily a cycle. The impact of Type 1 IRM interventions has varied depending on both the capacity of reformers and the capacity of agencies which are the subject of reforms. Reforms undertaken in the early 1970's through the interagency approach increased the capacity of the NDP to undertake more extensive reforms in the 1990's. These reforms introduced, for example, IRM policies and approaches that were readily available for reformers in the 1990's. As well, broad experience with IRM planning throughout the 1980s allowed reformers to capitalize on a base of experience which did not exist when the NDP party took power in

¹⁹⁹ The Forest Resources Commission, it was discussed, also proposed the creation of a neutral planning agency. This proposal appeared to garner little interest beyond the life of the FRC and the Old Growth Strategy, however.

1972. In the period 1992 to 1995, the NDP were able to draw on over two decades of experience with respect to IRM.²⁰⁰ Thus contemporary possibilities for reform differ markedly from those available in the early 1970s

4.3 POLITICAL PARTY AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Approaches to IRM differ between political parties. Type 1 IRM has been strongly associated with the NDP party and Type 2 IRM with the Social Credit party. Social Credit, as noted in Chapter 1, actively dismantled the interagency mechanisms below the Cabinet level ELUC, and the ELUTC. There was a preference for sectoralization and ad hoc interagency bodies when needed. The NDP, in contrast, has tended to depend upon stronger interagency bodies.

At the same time, very real differences in understanding IRM were apparent between parties. The NDP chose to view IRM as forest land planning delivered through neutral agencies which, in turn, foster equality between agencies and interests. The Social Credit preferred to see IRM as a Ministry of Forests policy guiding timber management. This is most apparent in the Social Credit's role in facilitating the completion of the Provincial Forests program and embedding principles of IRM into the

²⁰⁰ Other analyses have identified such "movement" as well. For example Jeremy Wilson identified the progression from concertation to contested concertation with respect to wilderness politics. The conclusion he made in 1990 is that the institutional framework has, to a small degree, become more accommodative of wilderness values. This shift has been realized through reform efforts wrought in the 1970's and the persistence of the environmental movement. (Jeremy Wilson, "Wilderness Politics and the Business Dominated State and the Containment of Environmentalism," *Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach*. William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad (eds.) [Missisauga: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990]).

MOF. The effect of these two measures was to decisively grant the MOF the authority to steer the course of IRM on the vast majority of the Crown land base in BC.

The NDP, in contrast, had suspended the program at a time when approximately 1/3 of the total provincial land base was in Forest Reserves. Under these conditions, the course of land use planning on non-designated Crown lands was contingent upon a planning approach that was not centred on meeting Forest Service objectives. IRM under these conditions was, conceivably, more amenable to accommodating non-timber values. And, there was a clear attempt to settle outstanding protected areas issues in each of the two NDP terms examined. Most important though, the commitment to interagency approaches to IRM make it clear that the NDP has consistently struggled to steer IRM away from a MOF-centred approach.

The party-specific approaches provide a glimpse into differing views on IRM. The NDP, from the early 1970's through to the most recent efforts, has maintained that allocative decisions were needed prior to securing the forest land base for timber management. The approach to making these allocations was to strike a balance through negotiation among line agencies treated as equals in a neutral arena. The Social Credit approach appears to have been predicated on the notion that the allocative decisions had already been made and consequent reallocations were to be reluctantly granted only after bargaining between adversaries. The latter approach assumed a state of conflict between unequal line agencies jockeying to further their agency goals and objectives. The NDP approach tended to see line agencies as necessarily constituting a broader collectivity.

The line agencies worked together towards achieving a balance in IRM that represented this collective vision of land use. Arguably one may find a bit of each approach embedded within each Party's dominant approach.

4.4 IMPACT OF TYPE 1 IRM ON THE FOREST SERVICE

Value change in the MOF has been facilitated through the Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM dynamic, altering somewhat the balance between forest values in IRM. To some degree, the institutionalization of interagency approaches in the MOF is apparent to some degree. Thus, the nature of the ministry is changing as it reorganizes itself to deliver IRM in a coordinated fashion. The MOF has historically been organized along program lines.

²⁰¹ This focus has acted as an obstacle to developing IRM plans because the program focus makes it difficult to tailor the mix a programs to account for site-specific peculiarities and issues. As the MOF moves away from the program focus and seeks a more coordinated approach, we are also seeing that the Type 1 IRM/Type 2 IRM dynamic has potential in moving forest land management away from "timber management with constraints".

Evidence of this transformation is evident in recent MOF reorganization efforts.²⁰² Late in 1992, a meeting was held in which senior managers expressed concern about their ability to cope with an increasing workload. The Forest Practices Code (FPC) and other

²⁰¹ "Programmatic focus" refers to the organization and operation of the MOF along rigid program lines. Programs include silviculture, ranger, timber, harvesting etc.)

²⁰² See for example: Steve Spalding, *Ministry of Forests Roles and Responsibilities Review (Final Report)*, [Victoria: Office of the Deputy Minister, *Ministry of Forests*, January 1994]. Ministry of Forests, *Report on Reorganization*, May 1994.

initiatives, changing public expectations regarding the MOF's role in forest and range management, coupled with "fiscal restraint" were increasing the workload of managers and many were growing concerned about their ability to cope.²⁰³ This prompted the MOF to appoint a consultant to review the roles and responsibilities at all levels of the MOF.

Steve Spalding was appointed to undertake the roles and responsibilities review in December of 1992. Among the many issues identified by Spalding was the impact of the organization of the MOF along program lines on the capacity to "manage and solve issues on pieces of land."²⁰⁴ Spalding traced the evolution of the program focus and concluded that it had developed over 20 to 30 years as the Ministry took on new activities. In the last 10 to 15 years Spalding noted that the program focus had become especially dominant.

*Programs have become more dominant in the last 10 to 15 years as previous governments and the public sought major strategic investments related to forest management. In order to obtain and manage these investments, the ministry added more branches and emphasized a program management focus through the regions and districts.*²⁰⁵

Spalding also noted the recent occurrence of public and other interests which "focus on specific issues and problems relating to sections of forest and range land." The resolution of such site specific issues required that the district level "tailor the mix and level of services" to address specific situations in the district. Spalding concluded that the

²⁰³ Ministry of Forests, *Report on Reorganization*, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ Ministry of Forests, *Report on Reorganization*, p. 16.

²⁰⁵ Spalding, *Ministry of Forests Roles and Responsibilities Review (Final Report)*, p. 16

program-dominated structure was inappropriate and a stumbling block to the management of area-specific problems. Flexibility was required in these areas and the focus on programs tended to reduce flexibility. The program focus, according to Spalding, consumes far too much of managers' time and "prevents managers from devoting sufficient resources to major issues that arise in the front line."²⁰⁶ The structure of the MOF, according to Spalding's review, was an impediment to delivering integrated resource management because it inhibited the capacity to coordinate resource-related activities within the Ministry itself.

The Ministry has responded through reorganization efforts which are being directed to overcome the limitations of IRM posed by the organization of the Ministry along program lines. Spalding's review points to the institutionalization of inter-programmatic approaches to land and resource management. In turn this suggests an increased capacity to institutionalize interagency approaches to IRM, and to work effectively within interagency structures. For example, the institutionalizing of rules that see an organization as interconnected would likely be accompanied by support for linkages to manage interdependencies within the organization. This, then increases the degree to which interagency reforms are valued as mechanisms to manage interdependencies between sectoral agencies. Such circumstances suggest that the Forest Service today would potentially place greater value on interagency mechanisms than has been the case historically. The essential point is that the program focus clashes with Type I IRM. The reduction of such a focus therefore enhances the capacity to effect change

²⁰⁶ Ministry of Forests, *Report on Reorganization*, p. 2.

through Type 1 IRM and to reduce the tendency towards illegitimacy in type 2 IRM.

In some respects, these reforms grew from earlier reforms in the Ministry which led to the creation of the Integrated Resource Branch and the slow growth in the prominence of its activities. This has implications for wider reform efforts, indicating a greater capacity of the NDP to steer reform than in the early 1970s. It also points to long term impacts of incremental reforms on organizations. Since the clash between the program focus and the delivery of IRM has roots in the initial attempts of the Forest Service to embark on IRM in the 1970's under Type 1 IRM.

4.5 INSTITUTIONALIZED LIMITS TO REFORM - IRM, TIMBER SUPPLY AND AAC

Reforms have neither removed the MOF as a key planning agency for IRM, nor reduced its capacity to subvert IRM plans in pursuit of its core program of timber management (with constraints). The central MOF program to secure the forest land base for forestry industry uses and to pursue its liquidation program has been minimally affected by PAS. Protected areas have achieved highest representation in the province's 4 subalpine zones (alpine tundra, mountain hemlock, Engleman spruce-subalpine fir and spruce-willow birch zones). Significantly less representation has been afforded the ponderosa pine, bunchgrass, interior Douglas-fir, coastal Douglas-fir, boreal white and blackspruce, sub-boreal spruce and sub-boreal pine-spruce zones which. According to LUCO all of these zones remain "significantly underrepresented". Areas generally of lowest value to forestry are over-represented while those under-represented generally are

of highest value. It has been much easier to protect areas of lower forest values. This is a point which underscores the limits of what has been accomplished during 25 years of IRM.

Similarly, in terms of annual allowable cuts, BC is experiencing an interesting phenomenon. Table 4-1, below, identifies the new AAC's recently set as part of the Timber Supply Review Process. Several trends are evident. First, many TSAs and TFLs are suffering AAC reductions. These reductions are being offset by the growing deciduous AAC, along with increased AACs in the Northern parts of the province now being opened up for logging. In the last 4 years 3 per cent of BC's total land base has been protected, yet there has been only a 1.2 per cent reduction in the AAC. Therefore, in the drive to meet the "12 per cent" target, the need to secure the forest land base seems to have outweighed environmental considerations (i.e., conservation, biodiversity).

The limited AAC reduction is more striking given MOF assertions in 1991 that significant reductions in the AAC would be required, and given that areas containing significant timber values were woefully underrepresented in the protected areas system at the beginning of this latest round of reform. The review which initiated the Timber Supply Review noted that many MOF staff felt that AACs were too high and that "Many current AAC levels do not allow for the delivery of sound integrated resource management."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Forests, *Review of the Timber Supply Analysis Process for BC Timber Supply Areas Final Report (Vol. 1)*, [Victoria: Ministry of Forests, March 1991], p. 4.

TABLE 4-1: TIMBER SUPPLY REVIEWS - AAC DETERMINATIONS: ²⁰⁸			
TSA	PREVIOUS AAC	NEW AAC	% CHANGE
Ft. Nelson - Deciduous	222,000	900,000	305.4
Ft. Nelson - Coniferous	750,000	600,000	-20
Mid-Coast	1,000,000	1,000,000	0
Revelstoke	269,000	230,000	-14.5
Golden	650,000	540,000	-16.9
Fraser - Deciduous	65,000	57,000	-12.3
Fraser - Coniferous	1,700,000	1,493,000	-12.2
Kootenay Lake	900,000	700,000	-22.2
Bulkley	895,000	895,000	0
Northcoast	600,000	600,000	0
Arrow	619,000	619,000	0
Nass	1,250,000	1,150,000	-8
Kalum	480,000	464,000	-3.3
Soo - Deciduous	4,157	2,500	-39.9
Soo - Coniferous	575,843	503,500	-12.6
Merritt	1,254,750	1,454,250	15.9
Okanagan	2,615,000	2,615,000	0
Cassiar	140,000	400,000	185.7
100 Mile House	1,250,000	1,362,000	9
Quesnel - Deciduous	50,000	40,000	-20
Quesnel - Coniferous	2,300,000	2,300,000	0
Strathcona - Deciduous	16,000	16,000	0
Strathcona - Coniferous	1,677,745	1,404,000	-16.3
Williams Lake	3,975,000	3,807,000	-4.2
Prince George	9,180,499	9,363,661	2.0
Boundary	900,000	700,000	-22.2
Cranbrook	900,947	850,000	-5.7
Invermere	657,264	591,500	-10
Queen Charlotte	514,335	475,000	-7.6
Kamloops	2,416,680	2,679,180	10.9
Robson Valley	600,000	602,377	0.4
TOTAL TSA	38,071,063	37,398,468	0
TFLs			
1	720,000	720,000	0
3	108,000	65,000	-39.8
5	110,000	110,000	0
6	1,300,000	1,288,000	-0.9
8	145,000	145,000	0
15	72,000	78,000	8.3
18	187,000	187,000	0
23	700,000	680,000	-2.9
24	115,000	115,000	0
37	1,085,000	1,068,000	-1.6
38	263,000	263,000	0
41	430,000	400,000	-7.0
43 (Deciduous)	49,660	44,460	-10.5
44	2,450,000	2,228,000	-16.9
49	380,000	380,000	0
53	187,630	204,700	9.1
TOTAL TFL	8,532,290	7,976,160	-6.5
TOTAL	46,960,510	46,390,128	-1.2

²⁰⁸ Ministry of Forests, April 3, 1996.

On the one hand the MOF had argued in 1991 that IRM is jeopardized by current AAC's. We are also told that IRM will likely be the greatest source of reductions to timber supply in the future. Yet, overall, we have, as yet, seen only a small reduction in AAC's. This has occurred in spite of the fact that the AACs generally remain significantly higher than the sustainable harvest level.²⁰⁹ AAC's, which are determinations accounting for both timber supply and social, economic and environmental considerations, arguably, are weighted more towards the economic needs of forestry industries and forestry dependent communities and industries.

This tentative look at the latest AAC determinations begs the question whether the small reduction in the overall AAC thus far is sufficient in ensuring sound IRM? The small decline indicates that the impact of IRM and Protected Areas designations has, to a large extent, been mitigated by "finding" new large volumes of timber which until a few years ago were not economically accessible, or due to assumptions in the Timber Supply analyses, did not exist.²¹⁰ This is the case of the deciduous harvest, and the coniferous stands in the north. Both forest types, incidentally, are considered to be sensitive - the coniferous stands because many feel that it will be difficult to establish new forests in their place, and the deciduous stands because they typically are found in area with higher than average habitat values.

²⁰⁹ This statement is true with the exception of some of the Northern TSA such as Cassiar which lack the infrastructure to harvest the resource.

²¹⁰ The cabinet approved plan for the Kamloops LRMP resulted in an increase in the AAC. The plan, it should be noted, is considered consistent with CORE's proposed Land Use Charter and the principles of sustainability. It is an interesting paradox that in planning for sustainability, the level of harvest may be increased.

This leads to another problem - that as logging progresses, it moves into problem sites and sensitive areas. Together, it means that in our era, the balance in IRM becomes ever more refined, and delicate. In this sense, uncertainty, although it continues to exist, is increasingly significant.

Two key points are examined in the remainder of this section. The first is, given the new balances that are being struck in LRMP and CORE planning, there is a need to examine how such balances are to be maintained over the life of plans. In this respect the role of resource management zones (RMZs) is discussed. Secondly, there is a need to examine the MOF's intentions with respect to development on RMZs and the Forest Land reserve in order to determine the extent to which this clashes with the manner in which plans are to be maintained.

Resource Management Zones (RMZs) & The Forest Practices Code

RMZs are established through interagency planning (CORE and LRMP planning) As discussed in Chapter 3, RMZs have legal status in the FPC. These zones represent a continuum of uses from those least restrictive of industrial uses to those most restrictive. The FPC recognizes RMZs as a component of planning and recognizes that the management directions established in such zones constitute a binding regulation. RMZs are central to maintaining the integrity of land use plans since they are used to allocate the land base to different resource uses. They are integral to enforcing the new balance struck in IRM.

However, RMZs can be established, altered or canceled in the absence of an interagency review or amendment process. The Chief Forester is given ultimate authority to establish, vary or cancel the zone. Meanwhile it is through the LRMP process and joint approval and consensus among a diversity of interests that agreement over initial zones is built. Through Cabinet, plans are approved. The Chief Forester is also given authority to create zones in the absence of LRMP processes. The regulations guiding the Chief Forester note that the Chief Forester must “in the Gazette and in a newspaper notice “ identify the RMZ and its location and objectives, the nature of the proposed decision, and the date upon which the decision takes effect.”²¹¹ However, it is also noted that the Chief Forester does not have to comply with these regulations “if the Chief Forester is of the opinion that the establishment, variance or cancellation of the resource management zone or objective does not significantly affect the public.”²¹² Furthermore “an order establishing varying or canceling a resource management zone or objective may take effect earlier than set out ... if the Chief Forester is of the opinion that the order should take effect at an earlier time so as to adequately manage and conserve the forest resource of British Columbia. “

This clause represents a key mechanism by which MOF authority is maintained over the land base. One implication is that, should the RMZs prove especially onerous to industry, they may be canceled without the working through the interagency process used to establish RMZs. In the past this has been a concern in specific planning processes and

²¹¹ Province of British Columbia, Draft Regulations, Strategic Planning Regulations, Part 2.

²¹² Province of British Columbia, Draft Regulations, Strategic Planning Regulations, Part 2.

in planning generally. Sympathetic administration could be cited as an example. Also one could refer to the Nahmint Watershed Integrated Resource Plan,²¹³ where interagency plans were subverted by single agency objectives. In the case of the Nahmint, plans were unilaterally amended by the MOF to facilitate harvesting operations by MacMillan Bloedel, which found IRM guidelines approved in the plan too costly to implement.

The Liquidation Program

Recent reports in the media of a leaked strategy document (*Forest Management Strategy and Action Plan for British Columbia*) further underline the fragility of interagency approaches to IRM today. The strategy document, drawn up by the MOF and representatives from seven forest industry organizations, is reported to propose a strategy to significantly increase the rate of cut on reserves (i.e., Forest Reserves).²¹⁴ Such a plan would call for much more intensive silviculture and management of second growth stands. Conceived by representatives from the MOF and large organized interests in the forestry sector, the strategy is a manifestation of the steady current bubbling beneath the veneer of IRM. In this current, the MOF and the forest industry strive to maintain the flow of fibre from the forest landscape to the wood products market.

In fact, although the TSR process was embarked upon due to suspicions that AACs were too high, we now see increasing speculation that harvest levels on the remaining forest land base may increase. The honourable Andrew Petter, in a speech

²¹³ BC Forest Service, *Nahmint Watershed Integrated Resource Study*, August 1975.

²¹⁴ William Thomas, "Behind Closed Doors," *Monday Magazine*, February 15-21, p. 4.

given in March 1995, for example, said, “I do not want to say, given what I know, I don’t think it is out of the question that, twenty-five years from now, we could be harvesting as much wood, if not more in BC, than we currently are.”²¹⁵

The key conclusion is that IRM is likely to continue to be extremely sensitive to timber supply concerns. The amending and review of plans may take place in the absence of interagency review. Given the latest rumblings, timber supply concerns will continue to push and pull at the fabric of IRM, occasionally and perhaps often, subverting interagency plans and commitments in the process.

4.6 CONCLUSIONS - IRM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT

While institutional reform efforts effect incremental change, they remain prone to atrophy. Under such circumstances, the concept of IRM, an instrument of reform, becomes an instrument of retrenchment. One interpretation of the Provincial Forests program for example would see it as the strengthening of the MOF power to undertake its central core program of “timber management with constraints”. Wielding the rhetoric of IRM, the MOF, was able to successfully conclude a program whose objective was to increase the MOF’s capacity to regulate and mitigate threats to that central program. The potential use of IRM as an instrument of retrenchment exists today. The advances made in interagency planning, in conjunction with the minimal reduction in the core program of

²¹⁵ Honourable Andrew Petter, *A 2020 Vision for the Forests Sector*, p. 3.

liquidating old growth and undertaking long-term forest crop management over the forest land base, demonstrate the fragile nature of reform efforts today.

This thesis began by identifying a central difficulty faced by reformers. The central difficulty exists because there is a need to effect a balance that heretofore did not exist between environmental, economic and social values. For, historically, our forests have predominantly been managed for their timber values. Michael M'Gonigle writing on the "Clayoquot imprisonments" touches upon the essence of the dilemma facing reformers..

Whether it is an environmental blockade at Clayoquot Sound or a native blockade at the Babine River, the real issues are two-fold. On the one hand is the relentless expand-and-conquer compulsion of our corporate/consumer growth culture that swallows up whole watersheds as quickly as it overruns traditional cultures. On the other hand is the \$64,000 contradiction - how do we get the very institutions that embody this compulsion now to control it?²¹⁶

Institutional reformers are confronted by the difficulty an institutional framework has in reorienting itself to effect a more appropriate balance between environmental, economic and social sustainability.

Ultimately, the thesis has been an examination of efforts to build the capacity to plan - to steer IRM purposively in one direction or another. We have examined the ebb and flow of two approaches to building such capacity - one centred in the MOF, another centred in an interagency approach. This thesis finds that Type 1 IRM is invigorating IRM planning to a degree surpassing the efforts of the 1970's. These initiatives, and their

²¹⁶ Michael M'Gonigle, "Clayoquot Chaos: A Lot at Stake," *Times Colonist*, October 22, 1993, p. A5.

delivery are evidence of increased cooperation, and increasing recognition on the need to ensure a more appropriate balance between environmental, social and economic values associated with the forest land base. We have concluded, however, that IRM continues to hold the trappings of “timber management with constraints”. Although much has changed on the exterior of IRM, the core program remains relatively intact.

Confined to incremental approaches, IRM is both a vehicle of reform and retrenchment. To reformers and “the reformed” we are left with a double-edged metaphor:

The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space.²¹⁷

²¹⁷ From: Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*, [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972], p. 165. Quoted in: John Friedmann, *Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action*, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987], p.417.

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