The Concept of Security and Canadian Defence Policy

by

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Abstract

Conventionally the concept of security has been defined as the ability of autonomous states to protect all national interests by whatever means considered necessary. Sovereign states were seen to have the right to protect their territory and citizens from internal instability and especially external threats. This conception has been viewed as increasingly problematic. Many have argued, for example, that the traditional conception of security does not take into account the increasing permeability of states economically, environmentally, technologically and culturally. Consequently, unless a revised concept of security has been developed it is difficult to conceive of policies that might generate more effective forms of global stability.

This analysis is less concerned with developing a new or revised concept of security, than with an analysis of the limits of the present conceptualization. The approach taken in this thesis involves an examination and use of the concept of security, through a form of discourse analysis in both an official state policy position paper (the 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence Policy) and in a theoretically sophisticated reappraisal of the concept of security by Barry Buzan in People, States, and Fear; The

National Security Problem in International Relations.

In order to situate these two works, the thesis begins with a broad assessment of contemporary theories of international relations and their assessment of the concept of security. The thesis then goes on to analyze, compare, and contrast the four Canadian government White Papers on Defence Policy issued since the end of the Second World War, exploring how the 1987 paper fits into the overall policy direction of the successive Canadian governments. In each of these White Papers, the concept of security has been presented in the conventional sense of protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, participation in collective security arrangements (NATO and NORAD), prevention of internal strife, and participation in global peacekeeping.

This thesis shows the limitations of the discourse used by both the White Paper and by Buzan and how this has the effect of marginalizing positions that are critical of the conventional concept of security. Building on assumptions that are taken for granted, but which express an understanding of political life that is arguably inconsistent with contemporary realities, these texts simply reproduce the problems they seek to resolve.

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THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Introduction

Introduction

In an era of interdependence and increasingly permeable boundaries, as well as of weapons of mass destruction and a deteriorating planetary ecology, the concept of security has become increasingly problematic. This thesis explores the limits of this concept as it has been used in modern theories of international relations and as it has been used as a guide to the formulation of state policy.

Conventionally, security has been understood in relation to the power of formally autonomous states. At least from the time of Thomas Hobbes, states have derived their authority from their ability to claim the power to provide security for their citizens and to maintain their territorial integrity. In an age in which the state boundaries have become blurred, many analysts have claimed that it has become increasingly difficult for states to secure their autonomous national interests. Consequently, more and more voices are rejecting accounts of security that are concerned only with military strategy and presumed national interests. Both scholarly analysts and those

seeking to develop more effective public policy have become increasingly concerned about finding alternative ways of thinking about security, a concern that has become especially urgent with the collapse of the Cold War stereotypes.

This thesis examines some specific instances of this concern. It does so first by looking at one scholarly attempt to make sense of the concept of security and reclaim something from what has become little more than a rhetorical device. It then compares the scholarly work with a specific policy attempt to formulate a credible security policy for one particular state using the traditional concept of security at a time when the conventions of the Cold War were beginning to look obsolete. The scholarly analysis chosen is the work of Barry Buzan. The particular policy process involves the White Paper on Defence prepared by the Canadian Department of Defence in 1987. In both cases, the thesis will suggest, it is possible to see, and to learn from, the way they both remain caught well within the conventional assumptions about security. Many observers have not treated the Canadian White Paper very seriously because of its rapid obsolescence. Yet, I will argue here, its fairly obvious limitations are closely related to the limitations of Buzan's much more sophisticated and rigorous attempt to ask what security can now mean.

In chapter one I will examine some general problems

with the concept of security in international relations theory. In particular, I am most interested in the basic theoretical assumptions which surround and support the concept of security in the literature. I examine specifically ideas about various "levels of analysis" and the way in which the concept of security is informed by the broader debate between the realists and idealists. I will examine a representative selection of international relations scholars to identify how they have used and made sense of the concept of security.

In chapter two I will conduct a reading of the history of Canadian defence and security policy as it evolved from the end of the second world war through to 1987, in order to get a sense of the persistent problems and dilemmas experienced during this period. In particular, I am interested in the way in which the concept of security has been seen persistently as a strictly military issue and one which protects something called the national interest. As a result of such a limited conception of security, the perceived possible policy responses to a given problem were restricted, thereby having the effect of creating persistent problems rather than instilling the ability for creative solutions.

In chapter three I will conduct a reading of the 1987 White Paper on Canadian defence policy. I will establish the limitations and thereby the boundaries of the concept of

security in the White Paper. Through an analysis of the discourse[1] of the document I will identify the centre and what has been marginalized from the debate and therefore what the limits are for further broadening the horizons of the policy process. The focus of the chapter will be to show that as a result of the identity of a particular conception of global relations present in the document, a conception which places clear limits on policy options, and prohibits thinking in ways that would expand the horizons of the discourse in the White Paper.

In chapter four I will examine Barry Buzan as someone who, while offering what is essentially a traditional realist account of international relations, makes an attempt to explore the limitations of that approach and makes an important attempt to expand the horizons of the discussion, but is ultimately unable to do so due to the very limitations which he is bound by within traditional realism. Using a similar approach of discourse analysis as was used on the White Paper, I show that Buzan is bound by similar irreconcilable limitations in his attempt to reclaim the concept of security. The argument is based upon the notion that the discourse of realism does not allow for sufficient progression in a post Cold War world to develop an acceptable concept of security. Only through the complete

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[1] I will be elaborating what I have taken discourse to mean in chapter 3.

rejection of many of the assumptions of realism, most particularly that of the autonomous state, will a useful approach be found.

In the conclusion I will argue that the horizons for the discourse of Canadian history, the Canadian White Paper on Defence and for Buzan are all essentially similar. They are all bound by the same assumptions and structural constraints. Beyond these horizons, however, there is a great deal of thinking being done to expand the concept of security in areas such as the environment and global development and that it is possible to see and learn from the way in which both Buzan and the White Paper have been caught within conventional assumptions.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Chapter 1

The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory

The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory

The concept of security has traditionally been thought of in strictly military and strategic terms, the object of security being the state, and security really equating to national security. The purpose of this thesis is two fold. First, is to look at the concept of security in Canadian defence policy as it has been articulated in the most recent White Paper, and to delineate the limitations of such a strictly militaristic conception of security. Second, is to identify the horizon of mainstream international relations theory as put forward by Barry Buzan in his attempt to expand the limitations of the traditional conception of security.

As the concept of security in the Canadian White Paper is grounded in the theoretical framework of international relations theory, it is necessary to first examine how the concept of security has been delineated in the literature. Therefore, in this first chapter I will examine security as it is presented in mainstream international relations theory, focusing my attention on what I see as the two main sources of controversy in the literature, the level of

analysis and the purpose and direction of the material.

The most prominent source of disagreement and controversy in the study of international affairs is the so-called level of analysis, whether it is a matter of studying state and inter-state relations, or how non-state and multi-state entities enter into the analysis. The debate which divides the literature presents itself in certain parameters: should world politics be studied as a whole system, should it be studied regionally, or should it studied at the level of a particular problem? In addition there is the distinction between theoretical study and "practical" policy applicability.

In the world of the late twentieth century, the factors, events, conditions and dynamics of global activity have greatly changed, making not only the approach but our understanding of politics very different from the time of Thomas Hobbes. This leads to an additional problem in the debate, which is a disagreement over the conventional distinction between the empirical and the normative, a distinction which has traditionally been associated with the distinction between realism and idealism in international relations theory. For realism, the state is the primary actor and its actions are principally to seek and assure its own security and prosperity within the limits of available resources. In addition, the state is assumed to have control over the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Consequently, the international political system, or interstate relations, involves the protection of national security and the defence of national interests in a competitive and conflicting world. Essentially, realism is often said to be grounded in the anarchical conditions described by Hobbes. For idealism, although the state remains a significant force, it has undergone a transformation due to the emergence of a variety of non-state actors (sub-national - interest groups, supranational - EEC, and transnational - Multinational Corporations), and therefore can no longer lay claim to the ultimate control over territory and sovereignty. Therefore, for idealism, international relations although based upon state foreign policy, can no longer be separated from the wider political processes at home and abroad. For those idealists closely associated with the work of Kant, the essential question arises from the differentiation of people as citizen and people as member of the human race.[2]

This chapter is based on the understanding that it is important to examine the emergence of current thinking about

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[2] There are several other approaches to international relations theory which tend to have a less influential following, but are nevertheless not to be dismissed. There are those who operate from a Marxist tradition, interested in the politics of dominance and dependence. There are those who are moving toward a post-modernist approach, interested in a critique of the entire way of thinking, and the assumptions and the bias of the above mentioned theories of international relations. And then there are those who defy categorization.

security in the context of the primary debate in mainstream international relations theory between realism and idealism.

International Relations Theory: Realism

For the early realists of the 1950's and 1960's, like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, it was the state which provided protection and security, and power which provided the key to all international politics. Carr writes, "power, which is an element of all political action, is one and indivisible. It uses military and economic weapons for the same ends."[3] He later goes on to conclude that "[international] politics are always power politics; for it is impossible to eliminate power from them."[4] Unlike Carr who connects economics and public opinion to politics, Morgenthau sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action from economics, ethics, aesthetics or religion.[5] But whether economics or ethics form the same ends or not, each of these thinkers has placed security within the confines of national security, and the state of nature within the bounds of international relations. Both subject the theory of politics to the tests of reason and experience, and both are caught

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[3] E.H. Carr; The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939; London: The MacMillian Press Ltd., 1939; p.132.

[4] Carr; op. cit.; p.145.

[5] Hans Morgenthau; Politics Among Nations; 5th Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1973; p.4-15.

in the dualism between the state versus the universal.[6]

In the 1950's, John H. Herz was one of the first to explore the nature of security within the realm of power politics as established by Carr and Morgenthau, in what he described as the security dilemma. The initial distinction which Herz makes in his analysis is that the socio-political attitudes formed by individuals and groups within a society imitate Hobbes' state of nature. Those concerned with their security strive for protection from attack, subjugation, domination, or annihilation through the search for power. But, the acquisition of some power requires the ever increasing drive for more power in order to escape the impact of the superior power of others; power for power.

> Whether one accepts the distinction of types of psychological reaction to the basic social condition that we have called here the security and power dilemma, or whether one rejects this distinction, one must recognize the basic phenomenon of irrationality with which man is confronted in society. The fundamental antagonism

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[6] This particular form of dualism results from the liberal tradition of thinking where human nature is one of self-determined, rational individualism, and where experience and reason are considered to be the tests for political prowess. Consequently, it is possible to confine the idea of security to one of rationality as translated from this understanding of human nature and therefore argue for the need to protect the individual from the society as a whole. This liberal rationalisation forms the fundamental basis for the work of both Carr and Morgenthau. The first principle of political realism outlined by Morgenthau states that "[political] realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature, with the operation of these laws being impervious to individual preferences. That the theory of politics must be subjected to the dual tests of reason and experience." Morgenthau; op cit; p.4-15.

> between co-operation and conflict, the need to depend upon his fellow man, and at the same time the necessity for distrusting and possibly destroying him, this is the contradiction with which man is faced once he becomes conscious of his status in the world and society.[7]

The security dilemma dialectically translates into the national and international sphere whereby equality is precisely the condition that Hobbes believes leads to insecurity. In this condition, states naturally feel insecure as a result of their mutual suspicion and fear, thus, ever escalating the competition for power. Only more and more power can guarantee security, whereby the effort becomes a self-defeating posture in that true security is ultimately unattainable.[8]

The analysis of Herz' security dilemma has been extended by Robert Jervis. Where Herz began with the individual and the group within society and moved to the state, Jervis started with the idea applied to the individual state, then moved to the idea of security regimes; he moved from the state to the system level of analysis.[9]

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[7] John H. Herz; Political Realism and Political Idealism; A Study in Theories and Realities; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; p.16.

[8] See both Herz; Political Realism and Political Idealism; op. cit., and John H. Herz; International Politics in the Atomic Age; New York: Columbia Press, 1959.

[9] Robert Jervis; Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976; esp. ch. 3 "Deterrence and the Spiral Model". And, "Security Regimes", International Organization;

> The lack of a sovereign in international politics permits wars to occur and makes security expensive. More far-reaching complications are created by the fact that most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others...In extreme cases, states that seek security may believe that the best, if not the only, route to that goal is to attack and expand.[10]

Herz and Jervis adopt a positivist stance that perceptions and misperceptions effect the actions of states and if measured, calculated and incorporated into a rational process of decision making, will ensure an equal playing field in international relations. This approach however, produces the same result as the ineffectual tests by Morgenthau and Carr using both reason and experience.

As international relations theory developed and specialized, and as the world became seemingly closer, many authors sought to develop and expand their thinking. For realists like Kenneth N. Waltz, the description of the state, its relation to other states and the emergence of a bi-polar world meant that the thinking of the earlier realists was no longer adequate. He set out to reaffirm the basic realists' premise but from a position of greater theoretical rigor. His renewed realist stance, or what he calls a model, stipulates that the ordering within the state (i.e. the internal system and hierarchy), the differentiation of international political from

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[10] Jervis; Perceptions; op. cit.; p.63.

international social and economic theories, and the relative size, economic stature, and relationship to the great powers, are all combined with the strength and stability of a bi-polar system.[11] Security for Waltz is perhaps a more complicated component of power politics than for the earlier thinkers as it incorporates both the system and the structure, but it nevertheless retains the Hobbesian state and power as the issuer of security.

Many of the idealist thinkers, in contrast to the above, believe, with Robert Johansen, that:[12]

> Technological changes and their military consequences have outpaced the capacity of the international system to protect people's security and to meet basic needs. The balance of power system cannot prevent war for long, nor can it reduce to an acceptable level the prospect of nuclear catastrophe. Yet policy makers have excluded from their agendas policies that question this anachronistic system or the basic direction of time-honoured diplomacy. Fundamental changes are needed but encounter psychological as well as political and economic resistance, including the belief that the present international order is more or less permanent. Building a more durable peace therefore requires identifying policies that will not jeopardize security in the short run but that will lead to a more effective security system in the long run.

The idealist approach will be taken up in greater detail later in this chapter.

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[11] Kenneth N. Waltz; Theory of International Politics; Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc., 1979.

[12] Robert C. Johansen; "Toward an Alternative Security System: Moving Beyond the Balance of Power in the Search for World Security" in Alternatives; A Journal of World Policy; Vol.VIII, no.3 Winter 1982-83; p.293.

Barry Buzan, in his book People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations and in his follow-up article "Peace, Power, and Security,"[13] seeks to find a workable common ground between realism and idealism; or what he refers to as power and peace. He argues that realism offers a simplistic reading of international relations, that it is a position which is no longer applicable in our presently volatile world. But, he also argues that idealism in its counter-offer to realism is naive and simply too abstract to be appealing let alone useful to most policy makers. In addition, Buzan argues that in both realism and idealism, the concept of security is seen as a derivative of the concepts of either power or peace.

> Peace directs attention towards the need to remove violence in relations between and within states. The peace perspective is oriented towards solving the insecurity problem by removing its cause. Power directs attention towards the means by which individual states can be both controlled internally, and pursue their competitive interests within the state system. It approaches the insecurity problem on the unit level, seeking to solve it by guiding states to play the game of international relations in such a way as to maximize their own advantage. Security directs attention towards the need to find methods that can satisfy the legitimate concerns of states without at the same time amplifying the dynamics of insecurity among them. The security perspective

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[13] Barry Buzan; People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations; North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. And, Barry Buzan; "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations" in Journal of Peace Research; Vol.21, 1984.

> rejects the notion that the problem of insecurity can be solved. It tries instead to develop a management approach which is equally sensitive to both the national and international dynamics of the insecurity problem.[14]

In essence what Buzan is trying to offer is a dynamic to Waltz' structural-system model while trying to work in some of the peace pre-requisites of individual, societal, cross-national and global concerns. Buzan, like Waltz, differentiates between the individual, the state and the international system. He then shows how for each level the function of security often operates in a contradictory manner. He then goes on to develop an interdependent and integrative conception of security based upon the notion that state sovereignty and international anarchy are simply opposite sides of the same coin. He argues that by definition, one cannot exist without the other. Once Buzan has established his framework, it is possible for him to advocate that if one is interested in reducing insecurity (the crux of his argument), then one has to work at diminishing or maturing the level of anarchy between states. For the remainder of the book he goes on to explore and define certain options open to the analyst and the policy maker.

A full and detailed description and critique of Buzan shall be conducted in chapter 4, but suffice it to say that

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[14] Buzan; "Peace, Power, and Security;" op. cit.; p.112.

Buzan is operating from what some call a neo-realist perspective, Buzan still maintains many of the restrictive terms and ideas of realism yet attempts to develop a theory inclusive of some of the critical ideas of idealism.

International Relations Theory: Idealism

According to many critics the process of change is seriously neglected by realists. Not only are realists largely unconcerned with the dynamics of the international system, but they have given little attention to how to conceptualize change in international relations in a theoretically sophisticated manner. A collection of essays titled Change and the Study of International Relations edited by Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones, offers an important analysis of the tension which exists between change and continuity in realist analysis of international relations. The volume as a whole argues that the realist account of the structural representation of power politics through the behaviourist tradition of empirical analysis is inherently unable to offer more than a superficial explanation of change.

> [And in addition, an] important related observation is that a theoretical bias towards continuity facilitates the illusion that value-free theory is possible. Theories emphasizing continuity can more easily be presented as 'objective' and apolitical, whereas any theory able to account for change will necessarily rest upon, and project explicitly, a value orientation because of the profound human consequences which

are at stake on this level of analysis.[15]

The paper by Jones in the volume addresses the need for a conceptual model of international relations which accounts for the dynamics of the international system. This piece highlights and emphasises critical positions presented throughout much of the idealist literature. He argues for example that what makes change significant or insignificant depends upon the role of the theory, the analyst, and the actor as well as the time and the place. He also argues that Waltz's 'true' systems-level theory, which states that in all modern history the structure of international politics has only changed once, must be considered "clearly too blunt." Jones suggests that there are two major errors with Waltz's theory. First, that the identification of criteria for inclusion or exclusion in the model are not coherent, as characteristics of any (existing global or regional) system. And second, that the ultimate usefulness of such a restrictive structural model is questionable. More importantly, the overall inability to account for the ever changing reality of international politics, makes the ability to render down to a neat system of determinate behaviour impossible.[16]

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[15] Barry Buzan & R.J.Barry Jones eds.; Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension; London: Frances Printer (Publishers) Ltd., 1981; p.2-3.

[16] Jones; "Concepts and Models of Change in International Relations" in Buzan and Jones, op. cit.; p.19.

To circumvent the analytical inadequacies of the realists' methodology, Jones outlines a complex dialectical approach of qualitative discontinuities which incorporates the many patterns and processes of change. He identifies three major analytical dichotomies central to his study which show the realist inability to address the concept of change. The three dichotomies are, first, the quantitative and the qualitative, second, the continuous and the discontinuous, and third, that which is analytically or subjectively identified by the actors concerned.[17] What he is suggesting is a much needed and complete transformation in the way international relations is analyzed. Instead of using the static and single system structure model of Waltz, Jones argues that systems are complex and internally differentiated and that some internal developments may take on a dialectical form.

> Explanatory and predictive statements therefore have to assume a probabilistic form: a probabilism, albeit, that stresses the governing influence of prevailing conditions. Progress with a probabilistic social science remains possible, however, if conceptual clarity and analytical rigor are maintained.

The remainder of the volume of essays explores the ideas of complex differences and the effects of change from within states to within the international system. Some of the essays propose possible approaches while others simply

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[17] Jones, op. cit.; p.11-29.

critique previous approaches. All retain some form of international system in which a variation of a state is retained. Each of the essays is concerned in the transference of the particular to the universal as each is in some way identifying some case example and trying to infer from it some universal knowledge. Each in some general way explores the difficulty of incorporating change into a system, and how it might be possible.

Security for the realists has been understood as a continuity. The progression, at times both evolutionary and revolutionary, of politics, states, relationships and societies has sometimes been reduced to a quirk of history. Where many of the idealists are predominantly concerned with examining the faults, omissions, and misinterpretations of the realist school, many others are more interested in the pursuit of examining the theoretical basis of human relationships. They are interested in the identification of a better, or at least a more attractive possible, political social, economic and environmental direction. The three following authors, Andrew Linklater, Richard Falk, and R.B.J. Walker, each have approached the problems of realism from a slightly different perspective and therefore see the concept of security in a variety of ways.

In his book Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, Andrew Linklater's pivotal consideration for the study of international relations is

defining the reasoning behind membership within a state. As well, he explores how that affects men's obligations as both members of humanity and as citizens of a state. Based upon the Kantian recognition of the inherent conflicting obligations between those as men and those as citizens, Linklater is interested in further developing the conceptualization within the realm of international relations theory. He argues that through the extension of the moral and political boundaries, men would be able to develop a fundamental, new and equal community, while still retaining the cultural and societal functions of the sovereign state. However, he cautions against the use of ahistorical and mechanistic explanations of the necessary composition of international life as thinkers such as Waltz have done. "[What] was crucial for Kant's perspective is the fact that the necessity for an international state decreases as civilization progresses."[18] Kant believed that the only way to achieve international cooperation and alleviate conflict, was through universalism, where all men would be treated as ends.

Linklater's own thinking takes on much the same tenor as he sets out the stages through which international relations must progress. This progression, originating from within the Hobbesian realm where states exist in a state of

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[18] Linklater; op. cit.; p.113.

nature, moves through initial contact to a stage of interdependence, and shifts ultimately to a situation in which ethical life gains a foothold when international relations becomes moralized. With the introduction of universally acceptable rules and procedures, the power of citizenship will be overruled by that of human equality. The final stage would be reflected in a concentration on solely legal and political practices, where economic and social conditions were equal, creating a web of universal rules for international states. For Linklater, security is found through equality and the universal implementation of these acceptable rules and procedures. It is the progression or change in growth of individuality and what that means as our understanding moves from tribalism through societal in the context of independent states to the societal as universal. The concept of security is one which changes as the concept of the individual in relationship to others moves from kinship to citizenship to the state of a universal society. This new order creates a society of free beings with rights and duties expressive of their identification with humanity.

Richard Falk in his essay "Towards Security for the People,"[19] examines what he sees as the rising costs and dangers of security as presently practiced by governments.

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[19] Richard Falk; "Towards Security for the People," in The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations; Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987; pp. 220-249.

He argues that this governmental idea of security has produced a nuclear arms race that is a threat to human survival, a threat which even without the apocalyptic menace, has created a war system in the modern world which exacts an enormous, avoidable toll in human suffering through the prohibition of full human development. Falk argues that the traditional governmental sense of security extends even further to cover the entire range of public policy, and that in a fundamental respect it is military prowess that underpins the realization of its most ambitious non-military goals. He further argues that the language of the whole security discourse in the modern state makes a nuclear balance of power appear rational, while at the same time allowing security planners to ignore or discredit potential opponents as too naive to be taken seriously.

Falk's basic argument is that the meaning of security as defined by governments is coming under increasing criticism from a variety of sources. At its extreme, this criticism has taken on the form of siege generating radical militarism which has at times been used as the principle explanation for increasing recourse to extremism and desperation by both minorities and majorities. Militarism is embodied by four different but interrelated structures in its setting of the security agenda for governments of the world:

1. The strategic arms race (East/West rivalry and predominance);

> 2. The closely associated managerial dynamics of arms sales, hegemonic geopolitics on a global scale and intervention in the internal affairs of weak states (North/South; East/West; East/East; South/South);
> 3. The peripheral war system of proxy war, state building conflict, and regional rivalry (South/South; East/West; North/South);
> 4. The internally repressive tendencies of the militarised state (systematic in scope as in many third world states).[20]

Falk has developed a "process imagery" to suggest distinct demilitarizing paths, where "[demilitarization] implies a re-orientation of government identity, where the content of security is provided by popular will rather than by the calculations of interests and the protection of privileges set forth on behalf of elites."[21]

It is the retention of a Clausewitzian/Machiavellian rationalised war system, combined with the bureaucratic technological framework of the state, which perpetuates the conception of hostility and prohibits a simple reformation of the system. Therefore, Falk argues, that it will only be through a process of system-transformation that security for the people will be possible, a transformation which he believes is able to overcome the very design of the state system as it is presently known.

Falk makes several general suggestions to indicate a sense of direction for the transformation toward his

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[20] Falk; op. cit.; p.234.

[21] Falk; op. cit.; p.235.

Table 1 The Demilitarization Process

Militarism ->	Demilitarisation ->	Genuine Security
1. Strategic Arms Race	Stabilisation, detente, defensive postures	Disarmament, peacekeeping, resistance training
2. Hegemonic geopolitics	Respect for sovereign rights (including self-determination)	World community of diverse peoples
3. Peripheral war system	Procedures for peaceful settlement	Regional communities of diverse peoples
4. Internal militarism	Human rights; civilian rule; reduced defence sector	Humane governance

conception of security. First is the recognition of the struggle of the oppressed to give images of an alternative people's security. Second is the withdrawal of consent and cooperation in the fashion demonstrated by Gandhi to present a peaceful alternative to the perpetual cycle of militarism. Third is the empowerment of the people giving them the sense of popular competence as opposed to the traditional notion of only official competence. Fourth is the recognition that we are all oppressed as humans by the present militarised system thereby giving all humans a new identity. And finally, allowing for the development of concrete objectives for people's security. The necessary steps toward an imagery of people's security would be as follows:

> A first step would be a new configuration of military capabilities and consciousness based on strictly construed defensive missions; a second, the development of confidence in non-military forms of resistance against attack, the extension of the ethos of non-cooperation and grassroots competence to the situation of resisting occupation and conquest. A third step would be an increasing reliance on what Thomas Jefferson once called 'an energetic citizenery' rather than a professional military caste to provide the community with security and a forth, a post-Machiavellian global framework suitable for the interplay of diverse politics, stressing shared destiny and identity.[22]

For Falk, the concept of security is one of a world order which is mobilized by the masses, as opposed to Linklater, who saw the movement beginning with the individual. It is a form of globalism and protection through the development of a sense of single identity as global citizens. In essence, Falk is exploding the traditional notions associated with the international system of sovereign states. He argues that the system as it is presently conceived, defies reformation instead what is needed is to completely transform the system. The exercise is one in which the boundaries of not only the structure of a world made up of sovereign states but the underlying assumptions come under scrutiny; in short, he presents a sweeping alternative to structuralism.

International Relations Theory: Post Structuralism

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[22] Falk; op. cit.; pp.247-248.

An extensive amount of literature now goes even further than Falk in its use of the technique of deconstructionism. "To deconstruct" means not only to critically explore the traditional notions of language and linguistics, but also to destroy the very foundations upon which we base our interactions. The argument, albeit much simplified, is that language is constructed of differences, that things or concepts are described and identified by their differential relationship to other things or concepts. If carried through, this line of analysis will lead to the realization that not only are means of communication but our entire entity is as much in a state of flux as our linguistic inferences. When applied to literary criticism, not only the text but the author are questioned.

In an article exploring the foundations of the body of literature which deconstructs the idea of language as communicator, Kenneth Asher returns to Nietzsche.

> [In the essay entitled "Truth and Morality in an Extra-Moral Sense"] Nietzsche is at pains to free European man from the straitjacket of scientific thought whose misguided optimism makes impossible anything like the tragic culture Nietzsche so admired in presocratic Greece. In order to undermine what he takes in to be the epistemological arrogance of science, Nietzsche first protests against the correspondence theory of truth. We cannot know things as they really are; our notion of truth, he argues, is merely a convenient fiction: "What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, anthro-pomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, transposed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are

> illusions; worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses; coins which have their images effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal."[23]

For the specific criticisms aimed at the study of international relations, the deconstructionists quite rightly identify and nullify the western belief that western thinking is somehow universal. They argue that the linguistic implications which are so easily assumed by the international thinkers of modernity, in actuality form a fictionalized representation and dissolve any distinctions between the objective and the subjective. For the west to be able to seek power, there emerged through an evolution in the rational concept a means by which to provide an illusion of a value-free and an apolitical theory. The emergence of modernity provided not only political leaders, but scientists, philosophers, and the everyday student a new means through which to view the world. The deconstructionists, however, show quite clearly that there can never be an objective, disinterested knowledge of the world, as we are all confined by nature to a "perspective."

In what has been written as a post modernism critique of

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[23] Kenneth Asher; "Deconstruction's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche" in TELOS No.62, Winter 1984-85; p.171 quoting from Friedrich Nietzsche; "Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischem Sinne" in Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by G.Colli and M.Montinari; Berlin: Watler de Gruyter, 1980; p.880-1. Translated by Oscar Levy; The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche VolII; New York: MacMillian, 1909; p.180.

both the discourse and language of international relational theory, R.B.J. Walker's work provides a most succinct exploration. In his two papers, "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity," and "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,"[24] Walker formulates the argument that the present process of international political theory is both culturally and linguistically inadequate for the task it purports to do. The strength of modernity rests in its reliance on structuralism and rationality; which, when seen from the bounds of post modernity, has meant that our ability to understand is limited by the inadequacy of both the theoretical and conceptual coherence of the empirical processes.

> Security has become the preserve of theorists of relations between states. The assumption that security means national or state security has thereby been reinforced. But this division between states embodies a very fundamental schism between the claims of citizens of states and the claims of human beings as human beings...And, of course, with contemporary military technology, the pursuit of security by states in the name of their citizens increasingly implies the insecurity of all human beings as human beings. State security threatens global insecurity.[25]

For Walker the contradictions of militarization in modernity have meant that the production of weapons and

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[24] R.B.J. Walker; "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity" in Alternatives Vol.10 1986; p.485-504. And "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory" in International Studies Quarterly; Vol.??? 1987; p.???.

[25] Walker; "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity"; op. cit.; p.492.

machinery for war form a very important part of our economic structure. The present tendencies of fear and alienation mean that the contemporary militarization has to be understood as a process occurring in both the future and the present, that war is an intrinsic part of our everyday life. "[Language] is a medium of both communication and mystification. Therein lies much of its political power."[26]

The traditions of both Kant and Machiavelli have presented only two possibilities for future international politics, the seemingly tragic continuation of the same old game of power and war, or the unprecedented historic leap towards a universalist global community. The creation of insecurity, rather than security, occurs with the rationalization of militarization. This argument explores the practices of states in their defence of militarization, which emphasises identity versus difference, order versus conflict. This argument claims that human societies are intrinsically different and therefore inevitably in conflict.

> Change, in short, has come to be understood in terms of the desirability or the impossibility of a move from difference to identity, from pluralism to universalism, from conflict to peace...In the strategy of reduction, time can be turned into space, history turned into structure, pluralism turned into hope for universalism. Ambivalence is cancelled, but the central insight of historicist forms of realism is lost. The temptation to abolish the moment of difference can thus be

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[26] Walker; "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity"; op. cit.; p.495.

> understood as part of a larger project of escaping from history; and from politics.[27]

Walker concludes that throughout, there are two possible lines of analysis which may be taken up to compensate for the problems established above. The first involves taking the claims of difference seriously rather than as just a negation of identity. The second involves a re-examination of the analysis of the way in which claims of identity and difference have been mediated within specific historical structures.

Conclusion

The above exploration shows that the traditional realist concept of security can be critically examined from many perspectives and that it is becoming increasingly imperative that the traditional realist approach be re-examined from a wholely different perspective. It is the limits of the concept of security in realism which forms the central study for this thesis.

The usefulness of applying linguistic analysis as a means of moving from the particular to the universal has been made obvious. The analysis of particular documents through the analysis of their discourse, translates abstract

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[27] Walker; "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory;" op. cit.; p.16.

ideas to specific documents and situations. The approach therefore, enables us to further development of the field of international relations theory.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Chapter 2

The History of Canadian Defence Policy

Canadian Defence Policy

A wealth of contradictions exist not only within Canada, but also between Canada and the other states of the international system. Canada has been called a middle power and a satellite state, a leader in peacekeeping forces and an unmilitary nation. Canadians have been called upon to mediate international and regional crises, all while cutting back on defence spending at home.

The very nature of states means a perpetuation of conflicts, in that states are charged with the responsibility of protecting individuals, society, and the state as a whole, all while still being a functioning and contributing member of the "united" nations.

The two principle contentions of Barry Buzan's book, which will be discussed in detail in chapter four of this thesis, are

> first, that one needs to understand the concept of security in order to have a proper understanding of the national security problem, and secondly, that in its prevailing usage the concept is so weakly developed as to be inadequate for the task.[28]

Through a descriptive account of the evolution of Canadian defence policy, this chapter will provide the basis to

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[28] Barry Buzan; People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations; North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1983; p.1.

explore and develop an understanding of the concept of security.[29] It examines the link between the political and the practical side of defence policy, and between the politicians and the defence departments senior staff perceptions of the concept of security.

This chapter will also seek to identify the implementation of defence policy over the period as a continuous reflection of the politicians' realist discourse. The first chapter of the thesis explored the parameters of international relations theory. For the realists, it was the state which formed the centre of the search for security, this chapter takes this idea one step further to include a sense of military and pragmatic opportunism of the party in power is a state. For the idealists, it was the state which formed the greatest threats to peace and security. They argued that it would only be through the elimination of the integral strength and dominance of the state powers that true security might be attained.

To begin to establish how the strictly military perspective of defence and security became entrenched both politicians and generals we turn to Carl Von Clausewitz and his nineteenth century treatise On War.

> War is a mere continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of

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[29] A chronology of events, issues and happenings relevant to this study of Canadian foreign and defence policy has been listed in Appendix 1.

> political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.[30]

By this, Clausewitz is referring to the implicit or underlying goal of war. The explicit or immediate goal of war insists that war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.[31] He goes on to say that,

> if two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist.[32]

In the twentieth century the principles for defence have not really changed, only the magnitude and the scope of the threat and the weaponry. At least for much of the northern hemisphere, alliances have been seen as necessary for the protection of the state. It must be made very clear however, that national security ensured through an alliance or collective defence arrangement, should not be equated with international security. Alliances have evolved through necessity, as the costs of independent or individual defence - economically, strategically and politically - have become prohibitive. For Clausewitz, disarming the enemy, whether that be through war or by some other means, was the ultimate objective. Within the alliance structures of the twentieth

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[30] Carl Von Clausewitz; ON WAR; ed. by Anatol Rapoport; Middlesex, England: Pelican Books Ltd., 1968, p.119.

[31] Clausewitz; op. cit.; p.101.

[32] Clausewitz; op. cit.; p.111.

century the means and ends have not changed all that much, only the process has become more complicated and the costs more forbidding.

The essence of the realist state-centred power politics has not been transformed with the move from the time of Clausewitz to the twentieth century; in fact, one could argue that support for the view has become that much more compelling and entrenched. On the other hand, with the advent of nuclear weapons, the call for peaceful idealism has also become that much more urgent. In an electoral sense, politicians must seek to placate both sides, while at the same time, react to the "reality" of the international system.[33]

In Canadian politics, and Canadian defence policy in particular, the use of the term "security" is rhetorical in nature. It is only vaguely based upon any conceptual structure, and its meaning varies from speaker to speaker, from issue to issue, and from time to time - often manipulated in an opportunistic manner, and always reflective of political expediency.

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[33] When one speaks of the "reality" of the situation, one is being caught in the realist discourse. Throughout the following discussion the text will continually define and observe policies and patterns from a realist perspective as that is the manner in which they have been written. To conduct and analysis in a non-realist fashion, to criticise from, say, an idealist perspective would cause the entire line of thinking to branch off into another direction and distract the focus away from the original objective of the analysis.

This chapter reviews the events, issues, and statements on defence made by the federal government since 1945. It provides support for the argument that Canadian defence policy has been inherently realist. To do so I will examine the white papers issued during this period, the unification of the Armed Forces debate, the AVRO ARROW decision, the granting of the CF-18 Jet Fighter maintenance contract, and the overall policy development process within the government executive and the Defence Department. The Canadian defence policies have also reflected a softer more global approach to international affairs. To study those I will examine Canada's peacekeeping activities, and to a more limited extent, the inclusion of Article 2 of the NATO treaty.

The Canadian Experience

Since the end of the second world war there have been four major defence policy planning statements, or "White Papers," issued by the Canadian government. Each successive paper, in 1959, 1964, 1971 and 1987, identified the long

range plans for the defence of Canada.[34] By the time the 1959 paper was issued, Canada had been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for ten years, and North American collective air defence arrangements had been formally established for two years, in the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). The 1964 paper came about when the Liberals gained office from the fallen Diefenbaker administration.[35] Pierre Elliott Trudeau was elected in 1968 with a platform which included a commitment to review of Canada's defence and foreign policy. The 1971 white paper was a reflection of the 1968-69 policy review process. Brian Mulroney came to power sixteen years later with a similar commitment to review the defence and foreign policy which resulted in the 1987 white paper.

It is possible to read each of the government statements at, at least two levels. The first is simply to recite the objectives as stated in the introduction and text of each paper. This presents to the reader a very simplistic

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[34] Although the 1959 statement was not explicitly referred to as a white paper, it does contain the long term planning format of the 1964, the 1971 and the 1987 white papers. In addition, as the 1959 statement was issued by a Conservative government, the 1964 one by a Liberal government, the 1971 one by a subsequent Liberal government, and the 1987 one by another Conservative government, the ability for comparative analysis becomes that much more extensive when included in a review of this kind.

[35] The Diefenbaker administration was defeated in a non-confidence vote in the House of Commons in Feb 1963, over their nuclear weapons policy.

and unsophisticated level of understanding of the content, and offers a very cut-and-dry perspective of the material. The second level occurs when the underlying intentions are explored, thus giving the reader a much more complex understanding of the content. For most government documents there is benefit gained from reading at both levels, in that it has often been written with two levels of audience in mind, the general public and the specialist.

The following excerpts come from the introductions of the four white papers.

> Canadian defence policy derives directly from our foreign policy and is designed to ensure our national security and the preservation of world peace. These objectives are reached through collective arrangements within NATO and the United Nations. While increased range of offensive weapons equipped with nuclear warheads brings the North American Continent within the target area of any future war, it is realized that the defence of this area cannot be considered in isolation...[36]

> The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be dissociated from foreign policy, are to preserve peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air-space and coastal waters.[37]

> Defence policy cannot be developed in isolation. It must reflect and serve national interests, and must be closely related to foreign policy, which the government reviewed concurrently with defence. In the course of these reviews the principle that defence policy must be

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[36] Defence 1959; Department of National Defence, Hon.G.R. Pearkes Minister; 1959; p.5.

[37] White Paper on Defence - 1964; Department of National Defence, Hon. Paul Hellyer Minister, 1964; p.5.

> in phase with the broader external projection of national interest was underlined. In addition, internal aspects of national defence were also considered; these include aid to the civil power and assistance to the civil authorities in the furtherance of national aims. National Aims: In the foreign policy review general national aims were defined as follows - that Canada will continue to serve as an independent political entity; - that Canada and all Canadians will enjoy enlarging prosperity in the widest possible sense; - that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose. Policy Aims: To achieve these aims, the themes of Canada's national policy were more specifically defined as seeking to: - foster economic growth, - safeguard sovereignty and independence, - work for peace and security, - promote social justice, - enhance the quality of life, - ensure a harmonious natural environment.[38]
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> The optimism of that earlier White Paper 16 years ago reflected the same hope for international peace and security which is shared by all today. The realities of the present, however, call for a more sober approach to international relations and the needs of security policy... The first objective of Canada's security policy is to promote a stronger more stable international environment in which our values and interests can flourish. It does so within the framework of collective security... Canadian security policy has three major components: defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes.[39]

Not only are the words and phrases similar, the principal direction for each of the four papers appears to have remained the same: maintain the defence of Canadian territory and the North American continent, maintain

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[38] Defence in the 70s; Department of National Defence, Hon. Donald Macdonald Minister, 1971; p.3.

[39] Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada; Department of National Defence, Hon. Perrin Beatty Minister, 1987; p.2-3.

collective defence and security through alliance arrangements, and assist the UN and other international organizations toward world peace. The overall focus of each identifies a sense of hierarchical priorities. First, security for the state is to be ensured through collective arrangements. Once the alliances have been stabilized, international organizations, such as the UN, can be supported and given a role in the protection of states and their citizens at a broader global level. The identification of peace and security as ultimate ends, at least under the conditions of state security, establishes a sense of stability between each of the member states in the world. With each of the above means, there essentially is no crossing over from state to the international system in terms of **security**. The contradiction inherent in this argument is whether or not states lose their sovereignty in order to gain their security under the auspicious of the UN.

The objectives of each of the papers are specified in the body of the text, outlining the internal organizational policies for the department. These policies have, more often than not, been decided upon at the political level rather than the Chief of Staff level, many of the decisions in fact being made in complete opposition to the recommendations of the defence staff. The ramifications of this can be found in the almost complete lack of coherence and connection to possible ways and means of implementing the broad statements

made by the politicians, into actual actions by the department. On the other hand one might argue that in peace time it is difficult for a government to implement defence policies which do not take into account the other needs of the society; the economic, the social and the political.

As Gilles Lamontagne pointed out, "white papers have... been vehicles for announcing policy decisions resulting from a process of policy review by the government rather than vehicles for stimulating public debate on policy issues and policy options."[40] If taken further, one could argue that it is the policy implementation after the white papers which provides a better reflection of the entire process. For is not the making and implementation of policy by a state its most identifiable act of philosophy?

The following areas under consideration reflect various notorious examples of Canadian defence policy decision making, in addition they originate, in part, in one of the white papers. Each has two key factors in common. The first is that there appears to be a distinct split between the role of the government executive as compared to the role of the top personnel of the Department of National Defence in the decision making process. And second, although it has

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[40] Gilles Lamontagne; "A Preliminary Reaction To The Work Of The Parliamentary Committees" in Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination; Brian Macdonald ed.; Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982; p.107.

generally been thought that military and strategic considerations are reflected in the allocation of resources for defence expenditures, throughout Canadian defence policy history, it has instead been a case of the latter guiding the former.[41] It is the complete separation of principle from practice which is of note - between the issuing of grand statements in the white papers and their translation into policies. This "bottom line" pragmatic mentality supports the realist idea of the state through the protection of the integrity of the state by whatever means is deemed necessary.

In 1947 when the military was scaled down to peace-time requirements, and the political and strategic environment pointed to collective defence arrangements, the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton put forward the need for "progressively closer co-ordination of the armed services and unification of the Department so as to form a single defence force in which the three armed services work together as a team."[42] This philosophy which set in motion the most innovative, and some would say destructive, process

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[41] See R.B. Byers; Canadian Security and Defence: the Legacy and the Challenges; The Adelphi Papers 214, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1986; p.31-44. And, Brian Crane; An Introduction to Canadian Defence Policy; Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964; p.34-44.

[42] Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization; Department of National Defence, Hon. Brooke Claxton Minister, 1947; p.11-12.

of change in the Canadian defence organization.

Between 1947 and 1972 the Department of National Defence and the Canadian forces went through a tremendous metamorphosis. On the initiative of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence from 1963 to 1967, two of the most important pieces of legislation were passed. The first, debated between 1964-65, was for the integration of the command structure of the department. The second, debated between 1966-67, was for the unification of the army, navy and air force into one; the Canadian Armed Forces.

The rationale behind the passage of Bill C-90, which called for the integration of Command, was three-fold. The first was economic, in that many, Defence Minister Hellyer included, believed that streamlining bureaucracies could free resources for other activities. The second rationale stemmed from the idea that the application of the corporate administrative principle to the Armed Forces would allow for a much more efficient and centralized means of control within the department. And, the third rationale stemmed from Hellyer's vision of civilian control of the military and the part the Minister should play in the administration of policy.[43]

The debates on the passage of Bill C-90 were conducted

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[43] For an in depth analysis of the process see Douglas Bland; The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985; Kingston, Ontario: Ronald P. Frye & Company, Publishers, 1987; p.39-47.

under the assurances that Hellyer was only addressing integration of command and that unification would come much later. Hellyer's response to questioning about the issue was that, "[the] three services [would] continue as legal entities at least for some considerable period of time."[44] For Hellyer, just over two years was a long time, and the introduction of Bill C-243 for the reorganization of the forces was introduced. The ultimate effect of the passage of the second Bill; like the first, is not as of great importance to our study, as is the manner in which the Minister pushed for the passage over and above many, if not all, of the defence senior staff.

As Bland points out, when the Bill went before the Standing Committee on National Defence, for the most part the only witnesses were Hellyer, his officials, and those opposed to them, including various civilians, special interest groups, and retired service officers.

> The result was in Admiral J.V. Brock's terms "gobbledegook intended more to confuse than to enlighten." Most of the confusion was inspired by Hellyer's insistence on only defending what he had so far proposed, leaving his critics to stab at very thin air. Most of the service arguments ranged around such intangibles as morale, loyalty, and esprit, all of which were deflected by Hellyer's assertions that time would redress any wounds necessarily opened by changing conditions. Given the general faith in newness, management techniques, and the propensity of the admirals and generals to present themselves as "blimps," it is not surprising that Hellyer successfully presented himself as the champion of

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[44] Hellyer's address to the Special Defence Committee; No.2, 28 May 1964; p.46-47.

> progress over the rebels of reaction. Even the voluntary and forced retirements of dozens of officers on principle, their strongest legal protest, was turned against them by Hellyer who was able to present himself as defending civil authority over that of the military.[45]

Hellyer's ability to politically manipulate the restructuring and reorganization of the defence department, was in part facilitated by the existence of a Canadian belief that the publicly elected officials must maintain strict control over the military establishment. Hellyer has perhaps been one of the more successful Ministers of the department to establish and institutionalize such control, but by no means has he been the only successful defence politician. In fact, the final act of unification of the department came in 1972, when, under the Minister Edgar Benson, the civilian and military elements of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces were completely integrated into the National Defence Headquarters.

The effect of the implementation of corporate principles and the unification process as a whole has had a tremendous effect on both the philosophy of running the department and the psychology of the armed forces. On the one hand, a single administrative methodology has been put in place to run a department which has two roles; that of a military in peace time and that of a military prepared for war. On the other hand, the relationship between defence

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[45] Bland; op. cit.; p.49.

policy and military professionalism has meant a clear loss of the military's role as advisor and executor of defence policy and administration in Canada. The whole unification process was based upon political and economic expediency and had very little to do with the interests of "security."[46]

The meddling of politicians in procurment policies for the Department of National Defence for reasons of political and economic expediency have also been well documented. Perhaps two of the most infamous are the cancellation of the AVRO ARROW in the 1950's and the granting of the CF-18 maintenance contract in the 1980's.

In the case of the AVRO ARROW, the cancelation was justified to the Canadian public on strategic grounds, that the aircraft would not respond to the percieved threat from Soviet ICBM's, and that it was imperative that a North American system be put in place. This system was to be the US made BOMARC, a system which was itself not completed at the time. The rhetorical use of the term security in this case, used to infact cover up the economic and therefore the ultimate political "costs" of the decision, exemplifies the underdevelopment of the concept of security in the realist

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[46] For an interesting analysis of this area see R.B. Byers and Colin S. Gray, eds; Canadian Military Professionalism: the Search for Identity; Wellesley Paper 2 Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973.

thinking of Canadian politicians.[47]

The political costs of the ARROW decision have been felt by both Conservative and Liberal governments since that

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[47] The AVRO ARROW incident needs to be explained in context, by first establishing the circumstances leading up to the 1959 decision to cancel the program. Experience gained during the Korean war of the Soviet advanced jet production capabilities, meant that Canada's subsonic CF-100 aircraft would soon be obsolete. As a result, in the early 1950s the design program for the next generation CF-105 airframe was approved. Throughout the 1950s the Canadian involvement in the project moved from the design of only the airframe into design for each of the four components - the airframe, the engine, and the fire control system, with the weapons being developed elsewhere with Canadian funds. The unexpected expansion of the program into all facets of design was one of the main factors leading to the spiralling of costs of the project. In fact the initial project estimate was approximately $1 to $1.2 million per aircraft, by 1957 the estimated costs had risen to somewhere between $2.6 and $8 million dollars, and by Sept 23, 1958, Diefenbaker announced that the costs had risen to $12.5 million each. The extreme differences in cost estimates were in part due to the piecemeal accounting system which came about as a result of the incorporation of each of the component parts into the Canadian design requirements over the years since 1950, in part due to the inability to differentiate between the flyaway cost and the average unit cost.

The main reason for the government's indecision on the ARROW project, as costs were known to be getting high by 1956-57, was political. As Louis St. Laurent faced another election, he felt that it would be unwise to deal with such a politically sensitive issue in the last year in office, so he postponed making the decision until after the election had been won. However, the Conservatives won the election and John Diefenbaker was left to make a decision. As the Conservatives were in a minority government situation after the 1957 election, and were planning to call an election soon into 1958, the decision on the ARROW was postponed once again. By the time Diefenbaker was back in office, the ARROW situation had become critical.

For an in depth discussion of the aircraft's development see Jon B. McLin; Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance; Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967; p.61-84.

time. As a result, one would have thought that governments would be particularly careful not to be caught in a similar predicament ever again. The granting of the CF-18 Jet Fighter maintenance contract however, is just such a case.

The granting of the CF-18 maintenance contact in 1986 occured after long process of contract bidding, review and evaluation, and was given to the Montreal group, Canadair, over the recommended Winnipeg group, Bristol, a decision which explicitly ignored the work of the review and evaluation committee.[48]

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[48] Much of the following analysis is taken from Murdock N. Matheson; "The Awarding of the CF-18 Maintenance Contract" in Cases in Canadian Policy-Making; edt. by Donald C. Rowat; Ottawa: Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 1987; p.57-77.

In 1980, the Canadian government awarded the McDonnell Douglas Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri the contract to supply the Department of National Defence with 138 CF-18 aircraft, and to handle the system engineering support, and airframe repair and overhaul until the last plane had been delivered in 1988. In 1981 the Canadian government decided that the long term support for the maintenance of the aircrafts should be undertaken in Canada, so the government notified sixteen Canadian aerospace companies seeking interest in the project. The companies formed themselves into three consortia for the purpose of bidding on the contract; one consortium led by Bristol Aerospace Ltd. of Winnipeg, another by Canadair Ltd. of Montreal, and the third by IMP Group Ltd. of Halifax. By November 1984 the government had awarded a $250,000 contract to each of the three consortia to prepare a preliminary statement of work.

In July of 1985, the government procurement review committee recommended that each of the three consortia be invited to submit bids for the contract. Once the procurement plan had been approved, each of the three were issued a request to submit proposals. An inter-departmental evaluation plan was approved, and a seventy-five member team was established with staff from the Department of National Defence, Supply and Services Canada, and the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion to conduct the evaluation process. The first proposals from each of the three groups

Although justified on the grounds that the granting of the contract to Montreal would result in technology transfer, the decision was ultimately made on the basis of the percieved need by the Conservative government to give the contract to the most politically important area of the country. What gave the contract to Canadair was political expediency and political need. Mulroney's Conservatives had

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were returned to them for revisions by the review committee in April of 1986. The full re-evaluation of re-submitted proposals was completed by the review committee by late May 1986, and their recommendations were provided to the ministers one month later. The recommendations of the interdepartmental evaluation team were as follows:

> that the IMP Group proposal be deemed unacceptable on the basis of technical non-compliance; that the Bristol Aerospace and Canadair bids be considered compliant and technically acceptable; and, that the Bristol Aerospace consortium be selected as the CF-18 system engineering contractor based on having presented the most favourable price and technical proposal.
> (Matheson; op. cit.; p.59.)

The basis for the decision by the Committee was derived from four requirements established and approved in 1985 by the government. The first requirement, referred to as Project Requirement, defined the technical capability of the contractors to initiate, manage, and accomplish the project on schedule through both the implementation and steady-state phases in accordance to the provisions outlined in the statement of work. According to the evaluation, Bristol won 926 out of 1000, as opposed to Canadair's 843. The second requirement was financial, and referred to the total costs to the government. Again, Bristol underbid Canadair by $4.5 million on the initial phase of an approximately $1.4 billion project overall. The third requirement related to the bids acceptance of the terms and conditions of the statement of work. And the fourth requirement was known as socio-economic benefits. This required that the contractor use Canadian labour resources in management, engineering and production. For both the third and fourth criteria, all three of the consortium bids were deemed to have complied.

won the 1984 election through their ability to sweep Quebec, and it was recognized that in order to retain power in a future election, they must retain Quebec's support. Having suffered through a string of scandals, particularly in Quebec, it was imperative that some sort of damage control be implemented immediately. The need to retain seats in Quebec, was far greater than the need to retain seats in Manitoba - a reality which has been rubbed in the face of non-Quebecers throughout the years.

Not only does the CF-18 case exemplify political interference in policy making, it identifies a complete separation between defence needs and policy directives and their implementation in Canadian politics.

The final section of this chapter explores the "softer" realist traits already in existence in Canadian defence policy. By softer, I am referring to the implementation of more internationally focused policies. In the following instances the strictly political and domestic considerations have given way to a more global perspective.

To date, Canada has contributed troops to every peacekeeping operation that the UN has been responsible for. This involvement has not been simply a means of protecting Canadian national interests in other countries, nor really even an extension of Canadian foreign policy; although these no doubt have been considered. Rather, it has often been out of a genuine desire to seek peace in the world for the sake

of the innocent peoples involved. Examples of this attitude can be found throughout Canadian history. In 1956, Canada abstained from voting for a resolution put forward by the US, calling for the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops during the Suez crisis. Lester Pearson, in justifying the abstention stated:

> I believe that there is another omission from this resolution,... The armed forces of Israel and Egypt are to withdrawal, or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where presumably, if this is done, they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the **status quo**? Such a return would not be a position of security or even to a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges, and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations armistice commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate.
> I therefore would have liked to see a provision in the resolution...authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with the member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.[49]

The role of peacekeeper for Canada has meant an opportunity to be a major world contributor to international security.

> The need for our continuing and active support for [peacekeeping] has not diminished with the passage of time. For Canada now to lose heart, and reduce its interest in peacekeeping would be an abdication of responsibility. No other country could fill the gap

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[49] L.B. Pearson; "The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December, 1956";Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1957; p.8-11. As reproduced, with permission, in Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite?; J.L. Granatstein, ed.; Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1973; p.84.

> thus opened - and the development of peacekeeping would be set back with incalculable, but certainly disastrous effect.[50]

It has not always been easy for the Canadian government to play a completely disinterested role as peacekeeper. The Canadian population is made up of groups from various parts of the world, many which have experienced conflict. It is difficult for a government to reconcile opposing views when one group representing one side of a particular conflict elsewhere in the world lobbies the government against the wishes of another representative group in the Canadian population. The best example of this is the very well organized, and wealthy, Jewish lobby over involvement in the middle east, as opposed to the less well organized, and much less wealthy, Arabic lobby in Canada.[51]

Canada's peacekeeping activities have not always gone as smoothly as hoped. Operations have often been troublesome, lives have been lost, financial outlays extensive, diplomatic costs have been weighed, domestic pressures have been strong, and occasionally whole operations have had to be cancelled, such as the Suez in 1967. As the Minister of State for External Affairs in 1964,

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[50] Eighth Report; Senate Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 1969; p.21.

[51] Peter C. Dobell; Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era; Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972; p.16-18.

Paul Martin, said when referring to a number of operations in which Canada had participated,

> [it] is a long and expensive list, [and] it is politically difficult at home because of the risks; and we get small thanks abroad for our work. We do it not for glory but as our duty, since there are not many of us willing and able to move in quickly with an effective force.[52]

To connect Canadian defence policy to the realities of peacekeeping, one is immediately struck by the observation that in Canada specific allocation for peacekeeping forces have never occurred. It has always been assumed that the forces regularly stationed in Canada would be available for temporary peacekeeping assignments. As Cuthbertson points out.

> The idea of forces specially tasked and equipped for peacekeeping was never realistic because the size and type of force Canada might be requested to provide were unpredictable. Experience has demonstrated that any conceivable peacekeeping requirements can be met if the forces in Canada are equipped and trained for war.[53]

The inclusion of article 2 in the NATO Agreement was done at the insistence of the Canadian government, and states,

> The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by

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[52] J.L. Granatstein; "Canada: Peacekeeper" in Alastair Taylor, et al.; Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response; Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968; p.177-187. as quoted in Granatstein; op. cit.; p.161.

[53] Brian Cuthbertson; Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers; Toronto: Fitzhenrey & Whiteside Limited, 1977; p.266.

> bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.[54]

This places an economic dimension alongside the need for collective security and broadens the focus of defence arrangements to recognize global stability as an inherent part of NATO security. Although since the time of the signing of the agreement, very little notice has been taken of the intent of article 2, the possibility for a recognized re-orientation, within the present alliance framework, is plausible.

Reviewing this chapter, the political interference in Canadian defence policy has been made explicitly clear. The transfer of practical to political has been made with amazing ease. Defence policy has been determined by the politics of the time rather than by defence needs. And ultimately, the politicians' perception of the state has been inherently realist.

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[54] NATO; The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the NATO Handbook; Paris: NATO Information Services (XVI), 1961; p.8-9.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Chapter 3

Canadian Defence Policy: A Discourse Analysis

The aim of this chapter is to identify and discuss the purpose and focus of the concept of security implicit in Canadian defence policy, and to determine the extent to which the 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence fits within the traditionally defined realm of realism. It sets out to explore what the characteristic elements of the policy discourse are in general, and what the particular elements of style are, and how they both effect and affect the exercise of "power" through such a document.

The analysis shall be done using a composite methodology which incorporates the use of grammatical and semantic analysis which I have taken from a number of approaches within the philosophy of language, as well as a certain amount of counting.[55] In addition, the visual component of the document shall be explored using techniques borrowed from the fields of cartography and psychology. Moving from the general to the specific, a number of

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[55] The primary sources of information for my analysis came from the following sources: Frank Burton and Pat Carlen; Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979. Paul Chilton ed.;Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today; London: Frances Printer (Publishers), 1985. Diane Macdonell; Theories of Discourse; An Introduction; Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986. W. Ross Winterowd; Contemporary Rhetoric: A Conceptual Background with Readings; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975.

questions arise which help to identify the realist perspective: What is the role of the state with respect to the protection of its citizens and itself? What is the role of the state in international affairs? And on the discourse side: What is meant by discourse within the confines of this analysis? By exploring the discourse of the policy document as a whole for its realist perspective, how then is security conceptualized? What can be most readily identified as the "centre" of the discourse? By exploring what is placed in the centre, those areas which are moved to the margin are more easily identified. How does this process of marginalization reinforce the limits of the discourse and how it can be used in the preservation of the status quo?

There are many different approaches to the use and meaning of the term discourse in the social sciences, I have approached the term "discourse" as a dynamic concept. To develop this approach I have drawn on a composite of several thinkers' ideas. For Diane Macdonell, a discourse is the particular area of language which is used by and identifies an institution, and by its very nature presents certain objects and puts forward certain concepts often necessarily at the expense of others. For Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, official discourse (as is presented by the White Paper) represents a system of intellectual collusion whereby selected "officials" put forward forms of knowledge which delineates both knowledge and the ability to reason,

therefore constantly renewing hegemonic domination. For Gunther Kress, the traditional theories of linguistic process operate from the point of the producer alone, whereby the means are both produced and imposed from a particular point, a system which excludes the consumer's involvement.[56] Therefore he argues, it is necessary to move from the analysis of **what is** to asking **what can be**, and **what can be done**. For this chapter, I have used the term discourse to mean an exploration of what is, more so than what can be, therefore making greater use of the ideas of the first two thinkers, leaving for the next chapter a more through exploration of the ideas put forward by Kress.[57]

Introduction

In 1987 the Mulroney government issued its long awaited White Paper on Defence. It was heralded as a document which would redress the wrongs of the past, and would rejuvenate the armed forces and prepare them for the twenty first century. With much pomp and ceremony, Challenge and

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[56] By producer he is referring to the writer or speaker who is initiating the ideas/comments/etc.. By consumer he is referring to the listener or reader. In other words, the traditional linguistic approach does not see the process or dialogue as part of the discourse.

[57] Diane Macdonell, op. cit.; pp. 2-3. Frank Burton and Pat Carlen; op. cit.; pp.1-14. And, Gunther Kress; "Discourses, Texts, Readers and the Pro-Nuclear Arguments" in Paul Chilton, ed; op. cit.; pp.65-87.

Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada[58] was introduced to the House of Commons.

A dramatically coloured and visually impressive document, it explained the then current global environment, how Canada was deemed to fit into that environment, and how both the challenge and the commitment were to be met. Without a doubt the document painted a world in which the tensions of the late cold war were real and where the east was pitted against the west. A world in which Canada, geographically, occupied the dubious position of being strategically located between the two superpowers.

Great pains were taken throughout the document to point out that "Canada alone [could not] assume its own security (p.3)." The first objective of Canada's security policy must be to promote a stronger and more stable international environment, but that this could only be accomplished within the guise of collective security. Canadian defence policy, it said, was to be based upon the maintenance of security, and that although Canada has no aggressive intentions against any states, "[our] objective is to deter the use of force or coercion against Canada and Canadian interests and to be able to respond adequately should deterrence fail

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[58] Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada; Department of National Defence, 1987. For the remainder of this chapter any reference to the document shall be made within the body of the text using the following format (p.**).

(p.17)."

The document is just over ninety pages in length, a deceptive number as little of it is text - most of it is either pictures, maps, graphs, charts, or simply white space. Ones first impression comes from the glossy front cover depicting a green global map from a Lambert Arctic Centred Projection on a blue air-brushed background with white concentric latitude lines (giving the impression of a Bull's Eye centred on the arctic). Canada, the only politically identifiable state, is white having an enlarged silhouette of the arctic archipelagoes projected toward the bottom left hand corner. The viewer is left with the distinct impression of Canada's globally central location, between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the arctic being of strategic importance. The visual impression of the remainder of the document shall be left for later analysis.

The text is divided into ten chapters:

I Introduction
II The International Environment
III The Military Threat
IV Canadian Defence Policy
V The Structure of the Forces
VI The Commitment - Capability Gap
VII The Way Ahead
VIII Foundations for Defence
IX The Armed Forces and Society
X Conclusion

The purpose of spelling out the chapters is two fold. First, it quickly identifies the language and genre of the text as

a realist discourse. Realist referring to the supremacy and sovereign nature of the state, the centrality of power politics and the retention of a "given" global environment. And second, it allows for easy subdivision of the document. Chapters one through four outline the objectives and perspectives, and therefore the theoretical bent of the document. Chapters five and six establish a justification, based on the above objectives for a "shopping list" (my term) for the proposed purchase of new equipment, etc.. Chapters seven and eight simply itemize the shopping list. And, the final two chapters offer the reader what appears to be a fluctuation in the purely state-centred arguments presented above by introducing society and non-defence aspects for the defence forces. (By "appears" I mean that with a more careful reading of the text, the presentation and placement of the arguments in fact further delineates the realist discourse much more succinctly - a point which shall be explored in the later part of this chapter.)

A Realist Reading

A realist' view of the international environment is one based upon the role of power. Where power achieves both stability and change, especially in relation to the security of sovereign territory. Power is ultimately defined in military terms and requires the necessary availability of

force. For realists, peace is dependent upon the construction and preservation of the balance of power. Balance, in the present day nuclear capable world places national security in the context of a planned and credible deterrence, operating in a discrete and rational world.[59] The realist discourse must therefore encapsulate the contentions of power, eliminating or at least marginalising those characteristics which might work to diminish or dispute the discourse as a whole.

The terms "security policy" and "defence policy" are used interchangeably in the White Paper, thus bringing out an interesting twist for an analysis of the document. According to the realist argument, security is a derivative of power -- through the maintenance of a balance of power, a stable international environment is achieved and thus security for the sovereign state is attained. But if it is security that we want, why must it be seen as a derivative of something else; why cannot it be seen as an entity in and of itself?

As has been said, the first four chapters of the White Paper delineate the objectives, perspectives and theoretical framework for the document as a whole. And, as the language of the paper retains an almost precise consistency

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[59] Richard Falk; The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations; New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1983; pp. 3-15.

throughout, and as each chapter builds on the ones before it, it is possible to limit the identification and analysis of the boundaries of the discourse, at least initially, to this first section.

Only postulation is possible when moving from the particular to the universal, and establishing a path to explore such a leap is difficult indeed! It is from the field of linguistic discourse analysis that I found a rather simple introduction to what later became a complex process. Ross Winterowd provides a simple but useful introduction in his volume Contemporary Rhetoric, in which he defines rhetoric as "the global art that develops theories concerning, and studies the manifestations of all human discourse, not just persuasion."[60] With the aid of the following linear model, Winterowd lays out his ideas



"The Addresser" identifies the originator of the work, that is who wrote it? In the case of the Canadian White Paper, it was a government document primarily prepared by bureaucrats but under the direction of politicians. It is work which to a certain extent is adjusted according to elements deemed important by elected officials, but as has

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[60] W. Ross Winterowd; op. cit.; p.2.

been shown in the previous chapter, historically speaking, it is simply a continuation in the same direction as all the previous White Papers on defence.

"The Context" refers to what the work is about.

> The question takes us into the real world 'out there' to see how the works interpret reality as we see it, and, 'in there' as the author sees it in his mind. But we can only determine what is in his mind by understanding the fictive world that he presents in his works.[61]

For the Canadian White Paper, this fits into the government's overall view of the state, foreign policy and international relations and how Canadian defence policy must fit into the 'world'.

"The Message" refers to what is being said about the context; ranging from the baldest paraphrase of the text to the "meanings" that have become so subtle that they are hard to detect. In other words whenever we are dealing with the form of the text, we are dealing with the message, and further, when we are speaking of the aesthetic value, we are talking about the message.

"The Contact" is the medium through which the discourse occurs. In the case of the White Paper, it is the glossy, textual, graphical, and pictorial document, each element of which adds to both the physical and psychological connection between addresser and addressee.

"The Code" involves more than simply the language, it

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[61] Winterowd; op. cit.; p.4.

also incorporates the overall impression conveyed by the text or message. In the case of the White Paper this would incorporate the subtleties of the "military" language and the institutional terminology, in conjunction with the "english" of the text. "The code" embraces the features of the message at both the level of the sentence and at the level of the overall or global level of coherency.

And finally "the Addressee," the recipient of the communication.

> [Making] the work disappear into the reader's experience of it is precisely what should happen in our criticism, because it is precisely what happens when we read. The lines of the plot and argument, the beginnings, middles and ends, the clusters of imagery, all the formal features that are observable when we step back from this reading experience, are, during the experience, components of a response; and the structure in which they are implicated in the structure of the response. In other words, there is no necessary relationship between the visible form of the work and the form of the readers experience -one is a complex of spatial, the other temporal, patterns - and since it is in the context of the latter that the meaning occurs, a criticism which restricts itself to the [document] as "object" will be inadequate to its pretensions.[62]

Winterowd's method of dissecting a discourse provides a solid foundation for the specific method which I have employed for this particular analysis. In keeping with Winterowd's design, I shall be working from "the middle out" in the sense that I will first explore the Context, Message, Contact and Code before moving to the Addresser and

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[62] Winterowd; op. cit.; p.5.

Addressee.

The Analysis

"The Context" refers to the most general exploration of what the White Paper as a document is about, and therefore represents the most primary reading of security in the work. Through a simple process of counting clauses which include or refer to "security" or "the means of securing," I have been able to identify how, at least at a very primary level, security is perceived. In this first section there are over forty references or phrases, each of which I have reduced into the following four general categories: cooperation with allies and/or other democracies (18), international peace and stability (10), protection of territory (sovereignty is used interchangeably with territory) (9), and deterrence and arms control achieved through a balance of power (7).[63] The placement of the state, power politics and the balance of power all translate into a very traditional realist reading of security and international relations based squarely within a period of the cold war.[64]

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[63] See Appendix B for data base of "**security is..**" used for this portion of the analysis.

[64] A further and more in depth analysis of these clauses as parts of the discourse will be conducted in later sections. For the present the "counting" provides a very crude measure of the phraseology without exploring how that in turn delineates the discourse.

The realist cold war discourse runs deeper than simply its general tenets, and can be found in the language and the visual impressions conveyed by the document as a whole. I have taken the term cold war to refer to a relationship of "war," or hostilities between the two camps of east and west. Although the tensions have usually not resulted in any direct military intervention, it has resulted in a period of pervasive and persistent conflict, a constant struggle which affects many dimensions of modern life (ideological, economic, cultural, sport, etc.). The basis of this conflict, although exacerbated by other issues, is based upon a philosophical and moral fear of each side for each other - a fear which causes each regime to see the other as its exact negative.[65]

The use of a descriptive method of analysis allows for a closer examination of the style of the document, or in Winterowd's terms "the Message," through an exploration of the clauses of the text to identify their "meaning." Chapter II, The International Environment, identifies the centrality of the cold war and east-west relations.

> While the conflict between East and West is not intrinsically military, it **could lead** to a clash of arms. For its part, the West **would resort** to armed force only in its **own defence.** Although some would say that the same is true of the East, can Western governments responsibly base the well-being and future of their own people on **expressions of goodwill** and on the most optimistic

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[65] K.J. Holsti; International Politics: A Framework for Analysis; New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983.

> interpretation of the intentions of others? It is a fact, not a matter of interpretation, that the West **is faced with** an ideological, political and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is **to mould** the world in its own image. That adversary has at **its disposal** massive military forces and **a proven willingness** to **use force,** both at home and abroad, to **achieve political objectives.** Perhaps this is a reflection of a deep-rooted obsession with security, well-founded on the bitter lessons of Russian history. It cannot but make everyone else **feel decidedly insecure.** This does not mean that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable or that **mutually beneficial arrangements** should not **be pursued.** It does mean that unless and until there is **concrete progress,** the West has **no choice** but **to rely** for its security on **the maintenance** of a rough balance of forces, **backed up** by nuclear deterrence.(p.5)
>
> [The **emphasis** does not occur in the original text, I has been used it to highlight the verbs and processes in the paragraph so as to identify the participants (east and west) and the nature of their relationship.]

I have selected the above paragraph from the document for two reasons the first is that I feel that it epitomizes the tone of the discourse, and second, that it legitimizes the entire document, indeed the entire notion of Canadian defence, as perceived by the government.

The text is written in such a manner so as to identify specific happenings and to interpret and explain them in a certain light. This process of explanation and interpretation associates events with the other side {"could lead," "to mould," "a proven willingness," "achieve political objectives..."} and, the need for reaction with our side {"would resort," "is faced with," "feel decidedly insecure," "no choice," "to rely,..."} Thus creating a

tension between the active and the passive and hoping to create an emotional association within the Addressee. The tensions between east and west are identified as an unfortunate eventuality {"unless and until there is concrete progress"}, caused by the aggressive nature of the east and necessarily resulting in the unfortunate need for the west to prepare for hostilities and be willing to take action {"maintenance of a rough balance of forces, backed up by nuclear deterrence"}.[66]

The Message is not limited to analysis in one paragraph; it can be explored throughout the text. We are told that Canadian security policy has three major components: defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes (p.3). Both defence and collective security and arms control and disarmament require the maintenance of the dual alliance systems which in turn relies on a the doctrine of deterrence.

But what does deterrence consist of? The White Paper tells us that

> [at] present, the only effective counter to such a threat [from a Soviet nuclear attack on North America] is a strategy of deterrence based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces. Such forces must be capable of surviving an attack and retaliating in a manner so devastating as to convince any potential aggressor that the penalty

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[66] For a similar analysis of United States official discourse see Peter Moss "Rhetoric of Defence in the USA"; in Chilton; op. cit.; pp.45-63.

> he risks incurring far outweighs any gain he might hope to achieve. Each superpower now has the capacity to obliterate the other, even after having absorbed a nuclear strike. For that reason, the structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so. (p.17)

In simple terms, deterrence means a sort of mutual agreement exists which stipulates that if attacked, one side will be killed, but before dying, will kill the attacker - mutually assured suicide.

Deterrence means having the **capability** to carry out the threat of retaliation as well as the **intention** to do so. As Canada does not poses any nuclear weapons, we rely on the nuclear forces of our allies (p.17). But what does **capability** entail? Chapter III, The Military Threat, tells us that over the past forty years the Soviet Union has "persistently expanded its military power" ...and, "as a result...has reached rough parity with the United States in strategic weapons while maintaining numerical superiority over allied conventional forces in Europe" (p.9). The idea conveyed to the reader is that a lack of parity in one area creates a partial imbalance which the Soviets may attempt to use and take advantage of in some way. The argument necessarily lends support for the continuation of the endless escalation of the arms race. The move from strategic to conventional forces within the quotation, illustrates how words can be used as an additional tool in supporting the capability argument over and above actual "comparable"

destructive power.

The irony of the capability argument comes into play when one matches the resulting need for continued escalation in the arms race at the same time arms control is considered. On the one hand the need to continue support for the United States in its bid to maintain survivable nuclear forces (ever increasing) as a stable and effective deterrent (p.17), and on the other arguing that arms control is essential to a more peaceful and secure world. "It offers the prospect of reducing threats, constraining the competition for military advantage, increasing stability and providing a predictable advantage (p.7)."

The second significant factor in the doctrine of deterrence is the stated **intention** to carry out the threat.

> Our objective is to deter the use of force or coercion against Canada and Canadian interests and to be able to respond adequately should deterrence fail (p.17).

This implies that there is a willingness within the population to defend itself and a firm belief that we are fighting for a just cause. It also implies that the population is united in supporting the cause as well as the methodology. This is a line of reasoning which marginalises the part played by dissenters, such as peace groups, as they seek to impair the unity of the alliance and therefore the credibility of the intention.

William Van Belle and Paul Claes, in their article "The

logic of deterrence: a semiotic and psychoanalytic approach,"[67] argue that the paradox of the politics of deterrence is that it combines a moral or spiritual power with a material power. On the one hand your adversary must believe that you will do something which you yourself must believe you will not do. On the other, "credibility means that you increase the objective probability of the use of nuclear weapons in order to be as convincing as possible."[68]

> The dynamics of that illogical logic arise from the idea that security is enhanced by enhancing insecurity, a mode of reasoning leading to the following spiral of pseudo-syllogisms:
>
> Deterrence functions only if it is credible. Credibility is something gradual. Consequently, deterrence may be increased by gradually increasing the quantity and sophistication of nuclear weapons (smaller warheads,...)
>
> Credibility is a matter of probability. Consequently, deterrence may be increased by increasing The probability of the use of nuclear weapons (smaller and more accurate systems, launch on warning,...)
>
> Credibility is greater if restraints are few. Consequently, deterrence increases as we subject the use of nuclear weapons to less restrictions.[69]

The analysis comes full circle when explored from this angle. Security is in fact caught in the particular paradox

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[67] William Van Belle and Paul Claes, "The logic of deterrence: a semiotic and psychoanalytic approach" in Paul Chilton ed.; op. cit.; pp.91-102.

[68] Belle and Claes, op. cit.; p.99.

[69] Belle and Claes, op. cit.; p.99.

of the more security sought and promised, the more insecurity remains.

Visual Analysis

The White Paper has been designed to appeal to both the analytical and the visual cognitive senses. In the introduction I briefly described the front cover of the document, now I wish to conduct a more in depth analysis of the visual Message and Contact (Winterowd's terms) emitted from the document.

As I am not a professional cartographer or a psychoanalyst, I have borrow some of their simpler concepts to conduct a rudimentary analysis of my own. The hope of this section is to add weight to my textual discourse analysis, as I believe that the visual imagery acts to reinforce the textual.

I have divided the visuals in the document into several categories: maps, pictures and graphs. For simplicity, I shall study them individually in this order before exploring the overall imagery later in the chapter. In total there are ten maps used in the document, including the front cover, approximately fifty photos and drawings (artists conceptions); and eight graphs.

Like most analytical work, there are limitations inherent in the approach. The ability to analyze visual

imagery is not only a contentious proposition but argued by some to be very difficult if not impossible.

> [Stimulation] does not fall on the passive receiver. The individual, on the contrary, is "prepared," implicitly or explicitly, for certain kinds of input; the input is actively dealt with on the basis of this preparation. The fate of any input is at least partly dependant on the nature of the preparation.[70]

The simplicity of the stimulus-response models have, to a great extent, been dismissed within the academic fields of the study of perception, and been replaced with a host of new questions: Is knowledge supplied through visual processing, or is it constructed? Is it really possible to breakdown the particular processes and then hope to reconstruct some sort of theory? Is it possible to adequately conduct a full analysis of the environmental and cognitive aspects of seeing?[71]

As those in the fields of perception psychology and cartography disagree on the fundamental ability to explain and theorise, An analysis such as mine will perhaps be thought of as tentative. As a result, what I have done should perhaps better be called a personal and subjective

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[70] William N. Dember & Joel S. Warm; Psychology of Perception, Second Edition; New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1979; p.335.

[71] For further critical analysis of perception in both psychology and cartography see Ian E. Gordon; Theories of Visual Perception; New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1989. And, J.S. Keates; Understanding Maps; London: Longman Group Limited, 1982.

analysis based upon my own individual perception and understanding, using some input from the two fields.

My analysis of the maps explores two levels: one is the spatial, geographic content and the overall depiction, the second searches more deeply into the message inherent in the maps. If there is such a thing as a discourse of maps, then it is this that I am most interested in.

David Urwin, in his book Introductory Spatial Analysis, describes the various general uses for maps: as a medium for data storage, as a means to record administrative and other legal boundaries, or as a means to demonstrate phenomena and relationships of special interest.[72] But like all things, maps have their deficiencies. First, they are essentially static in that they cannot be drawn so as to incorporate a time dimension, and as a result neither the physical nor the human processes can be displayed directly. Second, the spatial process or spatial transfer causes a geographical and representational distortion through the transfer of a curved and physically uneven surface onto a flat surface. And third, and of most interest to our analysis is that

> because their makers are human - they can be used to lie. Maps can display misleading or inadequate data in equally misleading or inadequate ways, and the message they carry depends not only upon their compilers' preconceptions, but also on those of their users.[73]

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[72] David Urwin; Introductory Spatial Analysis; London: Methwen & Co., Ltd., 1981; p.5.

[73] Urwin; op. cit.; p.9.

Taking the above into account, what can immediately be concluded from a review of the maps in the document? Eight of the ten maps in the document are Azimuthal Equal Area Projections (Lambert Projections), having their centre of origin (the centre where there will be zero distortion) on the north pole, thus emphasising the centrality of the Canadian arctic through the concentric equidistant latitudinal lines associated with this projection.[74] The effect is that of a Bulls Eye centred on the arctic. The other two maps show the structure of the forces and their organization in Canada, and, a map of Canadian contributions to peacekeeping in the middle east.

Other than the continental juxtaposition, the primary form of information contained in the maps is the political boundary identification of the NATO (in blue) and Warsaw Pact countries (in red). And secondarily, the variations of emphasis for each particular map as follows: the main Soviet Fleet patrol areas in the Atlantic, Pacific and the Arctic; conventional force dispersement in central and northern Europe; possible Soviet submarine paths through the arctic ice cap; the air defence surveillance plan for Canada's north warning system; and the consolidation plan for Canadian forces to be moved into Europe.

The remainder of the globe is apparently

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[74] D.H. Maling; Coordinate Systems and Map Projections; London: George Philip & Sons Limited, 1973; pp.159-165.

inconsequential as it warrants no more than a pale orange blob. We are shown the main Soviet Fleet patrol areas but not the NATO ones, and we are shown the Soviet submarine paths through the arctic but not the American ones. My interpretation of the maps is based upon a view that the representations are simplistic in that the contrasting use of colours (the primary red and blue for the "actors" and the subdued natural tone for the remainder of the globe) are crude in their dismissal of the dynamic nature of the globe as a whole. The omission of the NATO and particularly the American presence is an exercise in falsification. And, the overall the image implied is one of a territorial dispute, thus ignoring the broader issues of economics, technology, international law, international organizations and the general interconnectedness of the globe above and beyond the northern hemisphere. Thus the visual elements are used to reinforce the realist concerns and priorities of the text.

The analysis of the imagery conveyed by the pictures and photos is a bit more difficult to qualify as there must be a differentiation between black and white and colour photos, as well as a differentiation between the primary and secondary subjects, in this case either human or inanimate. This final distinction is a judgment call on my part and by far the most subjective part of my analysis.

Due to the parallel relationship between text and graphic elements, I have again subdivided the document as I

did in the textual analysis. Sections one and two (chapters one through six) present the outline, objectives and perspective as well as the justification for the entire document; section three (chapters seven and eight) provide the shopping list; while section four (chapters nine and ten) present an apparent "non-realist" perspective on Canadian defence policy.

If sections one and two are describing and outlining the objectives and perspectives of the philosophy of Canadian defence policy, and if the visual images used in conjunction with the text augment the Message, then what images do the pictures and photos contain?

My first impression of the photos was that pictures of people (where people were the central figure, having recognizable features) were primarily in colour by a ratio of 7 to 3; while the photos of machinery and military installations were primarily in black and white by a ratio of 15 to 2. The image presented is one of the bright smiling faces of those brave soldiers who have willingly chosen to protect us from the evil menace coming from the sinister, clandestine looking black and white photos which are primarily of soviet machines and installations. If the difference in ratio were marginal the argument that the selection was simply a matter of availability could perhaps have been made, but as the text has been so carefully worded, it seems ridiculous to argue that the selection of

Table 2 Visual Analysis

Sections A and B

Black/White	People	3
	Inanimate, machine, installation	15
Colour	People	7
	Inanimate, machine, installation	2
Maps	Lambert	2
	Other	1
Graphics	Chart	1
	Tables	4
Chapter Headings		6

Sections C and D

Black/White	People	4
	Inanimate, machine, installation	6
Colour	People	4
	Inanimate, machine, installation	3
Maps	Lambert	4
	Other	0
Graphics	Charts	3
	Tables	1
Chapter Headings		3

Note: At the beginning of each chapter an enlarged image, covering at least one and one half pages, has been used to illustrate the contents of the chapter. Due to their large size and their explicit significance, I have conducted a special analysis of each one in sections A and B.

photos was arbitrary. This is a line of thinking which I believe is confirmed when applied to the analysis of the

large images used as markers at the beginning of each chapter.

The large image identifying Chapter I, the Introduction, is a collage of ten historical photos from the first and second world wars; the military is famous for its nostalgia.

The image used at the head of Chapter II, The International Environment, is a Lambert projection map which politically identifies the states in western and northern Europe as well as Canada and the United States. The NATO countries are blue and the Warsaw countries red, while the remainder of the globe is a pale orange. (See previous section for the critique of the maps in the document.)

The image used at the head of Chapter III, The Military Threat, I find the most interesting and perhaps the most telling. It is a picture of a Soviet T-72 tank on parade in Moscow's Red Square driving below the oversized picture of Lenin. The photo however, has been cut off so that the top of Lenin's head down to his eyes is missing, leaving me with a rather humorous image of Leninism with no brains!

The image at the head of Chapter IV, Canadian Defence Policy, is a colour photo of a female enlisted technician at a control board in the North Bay Ontario, NORAD control centre. Not only does this show a commitment to equal opportunity in the forces it emphasises the key role of NORAD in Canadian Defence policy.

The image used to head Chapter V, The Structure of the Forces, is a back-lighted, pale grey oblique view map of Canada. No name places are given and the only distinguishing features are the political boundaries delineating the provinces and territories. What appear to be three dimensional, coloured blocks have been used to identify Department and National Defence installations (bases, stations, sites, etc..). I was struck by the politically significant placement of the blocks. They showed installations in the underdeveloped regions of the country - Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, in and around large population centres - the Toronto/ Montreal corridor, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and in, strategically located across the north. The placement of each installation appears to have been made for one of three reasons - regional development, vote getting, or strategic protection (which is perhaps arguably the only legitimate military reason).

The image heading Chapter VI, The Commitment - Capability Gap, is of a World War II vintage Boffin gun being fired. Although the caption, in small print, reads "The Past: These Second World War vintage Boffin Guns protected Canadian airfields in Europe," the picture (in black and white) is of two modern soldiers in berets and 1980's issue combat uniforms, with ear protectors actually firing the gun. If one missed the caption, one could easily

be left with the impression that these weapons were still being used today, thus confirming the extent of our commitment - capability gap.

The above section shows that the overall the visual imagery used in this document "the Message" as expressed in the text. The realist discourse comes across in both the visual imagery and the text.

Decoding the Document

Winterowd defined the Code as something more than the level of the sentence, he described it more as moving into the level of overall or global coherency. In applying this notion of standing back and looking at the overall level of coherency, I found that what came across was a "Common Sense" approach to security and defence.

By "common sense" I mean that within a community, having a common history and a common experience, the members are expected to understand and react in a similar manner in any given situation. If this in fact does produce "common sense," and if one is able to identify the community, then one can assume that given a certain set of circumstances, all members of the community will relate and understand an argument from a particular perspective. What this line of thinking does however, is delineate those who conform and are included within the community and those who are

marginalized and either dismissed or simply excluded.

The document tells us that

> Canada's security in the broader sense is inseparable from that of Europe. There is nothing new in this reality. Twice in this century Canadians have fought in Europe for their freedom. (p.6)

In other words, historically we have been, and therefore remain, inseparable from Europe, or more specifically, our historical reality dictates the current defence policy and will continue to for the foreseeable future. Further, those dissenting from this viewpoint are dismissed as not recognizing and participating in the play of reality and condoned and excluded as self-serving outsiders.

> Like each of its predecessors, this government believes whole-heartedly that there is no acceptable alternative and rejects as naive or self-serving the arguments of those who promote neutrality or unilateral disarmament. (p.3)

More specifically, these dissenters are marginalized through the dismissal of their arguments as Utopian.

> Short of the utopian state of an unarmed world, arms control will never be a substitute for adequate defence. (p.26)

> Unilateral disarmament measures will not enhance Canadian security. Experience has shown that effective arms control can only be achieved through the careful negotiation of balanced and verifiable reductions or limitations. (p.27)

This idea of community is taken one step further in the document. Where sections one, two and three discuss the objectives, justification and the "shopping list," section four discusses the Armed Forces and society. Up to this

point in the document, "we" "our" "us" etc., has been taken to be the generic "we," the Canadian people, the Canadian government as representing the Canadian people, or the Canadian state as a member of the world community, section four seeks to define the community and identify the "we."

> In their primary role, the Canadian Forces make a vital contribution to keeping Canada a free, peaceful and democratic society. The Canadian Forces make other valuable contributions to society in ways that are not always obvious or fully understood. In living the concept of service before self, members of the Forces and their families develop to a particularly fine degree those qualities of citizenship and community service that bind us as a nation and focus our national identity. Through application of skill, determination and discipline, Canadian service personnel have earned an international reputation as exemplary soldiers and citizens. Canada's participation in peacekeeping has earned us a reputation as responsible, reliable and trustworthy members of the world community. The Forces enrich the civilian labour force through the addition of trained, motivated and educated individuals. In the normal course of their professional duties they offer emergency assistance to the public. In private life they are well-known for support of community activities. (p.81)

In this paragraph, the members of the Forces and their families are held up as exemplary models for "society," with their dedication and commitment within their own community offering a focus and goal for the remainder of Canadian society.

The text explains how the Forces form an "integral part" of society. In this capacity it is imperative that they be provided with the best tools to do their job.

"Canadian security policy and the roles of the Forces must be widely understood, if the Forces are to enjoy the support they require." (p.81)

The chapter goes on to explain how the Forces are working toward a greater representation of society and its multicultural make-up, that it is working toward the fulfilment of all parts of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, all while maintaining a cohesive and successful military organization. In addition to the employment policies of the Forces, the presence of a military force contributes to society in several other ways: that defence expenditures contribute to the economy and have been used to promote regional development in the country; the Forces conduct a significant portion of the search and rescue operations in Canada; the Forces provide humanitarian and philanthropic assistance to Third World countries; the Forces provide assistance to Civil Authorities and Civil Organization in Canada (when requested); and finally, they provide a training ground for the young through their Cadet programmes.

The implication of all of the above is that the Forces provide for all Canadian security needs; militarily and otherwise. But the argument is in fact simply another link used to support the proposed "shopping list" when we see it being brought around full circle in the Conclusion: "our examination revealed that the primary means with which

Canadian security policy is implemented, the Canadian Forces, have been sadly neglected." (p.89)

The document is written in such a way as to appeal to many levels of the Addressee's awareness; the intellectual, the analytical and the emotional close to home level. It identifies those arguments which are central and those which can be dismissed, and likewise it delineates those individuals who are included as part of the community and those who are marginalized due to their own lack of conformity.

The average person picking up the document for the first time will probably first flip through the pages looking at the picture, maps and graphs before reading the text, an activity which will no doubt leave an implicit message and prepare the reader for the text in a very supportive manner. During the first reading the reader may or may not get through the 90 pages, thus probably only receiving the "Military Threat" message, reinforced by the visual images. The placement of the societal message at the end of the document instills the implicit message that the issue is perhaps of least importance, somehow marginalizing the "citizenry concerns" over defence, and again reinforcing the Government's notion of security being primarily concerned with territory and state sovereignty. It reinforces the idea that the protection of the non-military concerns for security comes as a result of the maintenance

of security at the military level, and further that in order for the Forces to even begin to think about the protection of civil concerns they require the proper tools of their military trade.

Overall, the separation of the state from the individual and from the international, has allowed for the perpetuation of the Hobbesian notion of the Leviathan: protection of citizens from the state of nature. The exclusion or at least marginalization of any notion which questions this distinct separation of individual and international from the supremacy of the state, has the effect of removing the need for consideration or discussion as these are excluded from the discourse. If the marginalized had been considered and been made part of the policy making process, the White Paper would not have been so thoroughly realist in its presentation. The monopoly on power and the perpetuation of the status quo are insured so long as the discourse of authority excludes dissent.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Chapter 4

Barry Buzan *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*: A Discourse Analysis

Neorealism Verses Realism

There has been an explosion of late in the body of literature which has come out in criticism of traditional realism. I say traditional realism because there has been a group of thinkers trained in traditional realism who are now trying to revitalize realism into a new or neorealism. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the work of one such neorealist, Barry Buzan, and weigh his work against the analysis I conducted in chapter three, to see if he indeed was able to revitalize realism in a progressive and dynamic manner, or if in fact the fundamental flaws inherent in the assumptions and framework of both realism and therefore neorealism prohibit the theory's redemption.

The first three chapters of this thesis moved from the general exploratory to the critically specific. Chapter one

surveyed the literature within the "discipline,"[75] identifying the various perspectives and approaches in comparison to one another. Chapter two was an exercise in conducting a historical case study of Canadian Defence policy from 1945 to 1987 to establish how and which theory of international relations has been applied. (In the Canadian case there was a consistent application of traditional realism over the whole period irrespective of the political stripe of the government in power.) In chapter three I critically analyzed the discourse of the Canadian White Paper on defence policy to find both the inherent weakness and limitations of such a realist position, and therefore also of its theoretical basis.

Barry Buzan: The Concept of Security

Buzan begins his work by suggesting that the general appeal of realism is that it is so simple and straight forward and that it offers a sense of continuity. But, he argues, that unfortunately neither simplicity nor continuity have proven satisfactory guideposts in the present, volatile

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[75] So far this thesis has been an exercise in exploring, analyzing and weighing the arguments of the "discipline" of international relations. I say "discipline" in quotation for it is exactly that which has come under analysis, the breadth and depth of this vast collection of knowledge which has been, I will argue, incorrectly subsumed under one title.

world. The great appeal of idealism, he suggests is that it reintroduces the human factor into international relations, and as opposed to the precariousness of realism, it offers an alternative framework from which to view security. The idealists, however, more often than not operate on a level of theoretical abstraction which bewilders the reader and offers little advice or direction of an attractive nature to any practical state leader.

Acting out of frustration with the inability of either the field of international relations or the field of strategic studies to satisfactorily respond to the reality of the existing international system while still recognizing the human factor of security, Barry Buzan wrote a book titled People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations.[76] The main contention of the volume originates from the argument that the division which has solidified the traditional field of international relations has rendered any advancement in the level and kind of understanding about the relationship between people, states and security impossible at a time when it is most

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[76] Barry Buzan; People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations; North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

needed.[77]

Buzan proposes a re-evaluation of the conceptualization of security, a separation of the concept from its present subsidiary position to power (realism) and peace (idealism), and a development to a level in and of itself. He delineates and articulates the present problems which exist within the study of international relations and proposes his own approach, an approach which he hopes will bridge the gap between realism and idealism. Although based solidly within the state structure, his approach attempts to take account of the individual and societal influences and concerns over international affairs, as well as the interconnectedness of the international system. He seeks to articulate a means to develop an international system which crosses over and often infiltrates the state and therefore impedes the true notion of sovereignty.

For Buzan, realists examine what they argue is the basic pattern of capabilities and the primary motive for the behaviour of actors, **power**. While the idealists attempt to analyze the problem in more holistic terms and find a solution through **peace**. The ultimate result is a process of seeming antagonism and contradiction between the realists

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[77] In addition see the follow up article which was written to solidify his earlier conceptualizations of security: Barry Buzan; "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations" in Journal of Peace Research; Vol.21, 1984; p.112.

and the idealists. Accordingly, the concept and role of security is not only left inadequately developed, but also ultimately used as a derivative of each.

> Peace directs attention towards the need to remove violence in relations between and within states. The peace perspective is oriented towards solving the insecurity problem by removing its cause. Power directs attention towards the means by which individual states can be both controlled internally, and pursue their competitive interests within the state system. It approaches the insecurity problem on the unit level, seeking to solve it by guiding states to play the game of international relations in such a way as to maximize their own advantage. Security directs attention towards the need to find methods that can satisfy the legitimate concerns of states without at the same time amplifying the dynamics of insecurity among them. The security perspective rejects the notion that the problem of insecurity can be solved. It tries instead to develop a management approach which is equally sensitive to both the national and international dynamics of the insecurity problem.[78]

Buzan explores security and its conceptualization. In particular, he is interested in what is meant by "security" in the general sense. How is this general meaning transferred to the specific entities like states in which we are interested? What exactly is the referent object of security when we refer to national security? If it is the state, what does that mean? Are we to take the meaning of the state as the sum of the individuals within it? Or is it in some sense more than the sum of its parts? In either case, how do individuals relate to an idea like national

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[78] Buzan; "Peace, Power, and Security;" op. cit.; p.112.

security in terms of their own interests? At the other extreme, what does international security mean? Does it apply to some entity higher than states, or is there some sense in which security among states is an invisible phenomenon?

Buzan identifies the political arena as a multi-dimensional entity, incorporating the three substantive levels of the individual, the state and the international system. Turning to the first level, Buzan argues that as the system exists at present, security for the individual can be both protected and threatened by the state. In essence, the state forms the greatest and most intense threat for most individuals. As for the second level, the state is made up of three component parts: the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state.[79] Protection of national security must therefore explore each of the three areas as each area will encounter different types of threats from both internal and external sources. Since the idea of the state is much less quantifiable than the physical or institutional bases, it

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[79] The idea of the state reflects the ideological, cultural, and societal make up of each state, thus distinguishing the particular type of state: the nation-state, the state-nation, the part-nation-state, and the multi-nation-state. The physical base is the most easily identifiable component representing the physical territory, resources and the population. And the institutional base comprises the entire machinery of the government including the legislative, administrative, and judicial; the laws, the procedures and the norms which operate the state.

requires the most difficult and different approach to security. Buzan concludes that as a result of the combination of the three components, states are exceedingly dissimilar objects of security, and their strength neither depends on, nor correlates with power.

> Where the state is strong, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference. The idea of the state, its institutions and the territory will all be clearly defined and stable in their own right... Where the state is weak, only the physical base may be sufficiently well-defined to constitute a clear object of national security. Because the idea and its institutions are internally contested to the point of violence, they do not offer clear referents as objects of national security because, by definition, they are not national in scope.[80]

The dialectical nature of Buzan's thinking falls into place as he connects the state and the third level of analysis, the international system; in particular the international political system to the state as well as the international economic system to the state. Just as the realists' exclusively external view of national security distorts and covers up the internal dimension of security, so does it distort the view of international security. The insistence on the primacy of a power-structure model of international relations emphasises military rivalry and can better be seen as defining a problem of insecurity. This easily translates into the argument that an anarchic

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[80] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.67.

structure within the international system can only be maintained with a balance of power, both economically and strategically. Thus his analysis leads him to the conclusion that the balance of power and international anarchy form opposite sides of the same coin.

Buzan's "defence-dilemma" and the "power-security dilemma" resemble the Hobbesian dilemma on the most basic of levels.[81] It is not until they have been identified and connected in a dialectical fashion that they offer a slightly different perspective. Buzan argues that security can never be fully realized within either realm of power or peace , and that once it can establish itself as an identifiable concept it will offer a much more solid perspective. Buzan is careful to point out that the concept of security, however, should never be mistaken as an absolute; rather it is a dialectical process of advancement which must combine a national security strategy and an international security strategy.

> If we start with the tautology that the purpose of national security policy is to make the state secure, or at least **sufficiently** secure if we reject the absolute possibility, then we at least are led to the question of "How?". It is within this question that the divide on security occurs. The whole inquiry assumes that threats exist, that insecurity is a problem. The divide is this: security can be pursued either by taking action to reduce vulnerability, or by trying to eliminate or reduce the threats by addressing their causes at

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[81] Buzan's "defence-dilemma" and "power-security dilemma" will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

> source. The first of these options we shall call the **national security strategy**, because it is based largely within the threatened state. The second we shall call the **international security strategy**, because it depends on the adjustment of relations between states.[82]

The proposal divides the referent object of security between the state and the international system. The implication is that if all states were to make themselves secure by dealing with threats at their external source, then the system structure would also be secure, probably in the form of a "mature anarchy."

Buzan's conclusion reiterates that the concept of security binds together individuals, states and the international system so closely that it demands to be treated in holistic terms. Although some sense can be made when looking at each of individual, national and international security in isolation and as ideas in their own right, a full understanding can only be gained when viewed in relation to each other. Attempts to treat security on a single level invite serious distortions of perspective.

Buzan's argument is predicated upon the assumption that, at least for the interim, the state system shall remain in existence. More specifically, he argues that the state system offers some very beneficial components and roles, but that the mentality and insight of the state

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[82] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.217-218.

leadership and population must be re-educated. The interconnectedness of the global environment touches a whole range of areas and that if left on its present course, the prospects for the future look grim.

The Realist Discourse

Remembering back to chapter three, the focus of the analysis was the exploration of a realist reading through its identification of the role of the state with respect to the protection of both its citizens and itself, and the role of the state in international affairs. Using this technique, it was possible to identify the centre of the discourse, and then it was possible to explore those areas which were marginalized from the debate.

In the Canadian White Paper, the state was clearly identifiable as the central actor in terms of both the protection of the citizens and itself as a geographic, political and strategic entity. The state was determined to be somehow greater then the sum of its parts, and therefore placed in a role of protector and provider. Only those citizens which participated in the community, a community epitomized by the Armed Forces community, were included in the mainstream, the social whole, the debate. The individual was not considered per se, only as a citizen and only then as an agreeable and participating member of society.

Buzan in his first chapter explores the importance of the individual as an entity seeking security. Where the White Paper only referred to the citizen as being protected by the state, Buzan acknowledges the relationship between states and individuals, that there is a dynamic of threats and vulnerabilities flowing from each to the other, and that in his view in fact the greatest source of insecurity for the individual comes from the state, and that often it is the individual who can form the greatest threat to the state.

> The unavoidability of this contradiction between the individual and state security must be emphasised. The contradiction is rooted in the nature of political collectives. In the real world, it can be neither resolved nor evaded. Consequently, our task in the succeeding chapters will not be to reduce the other levels down to some basic common denominator of individual security. To attempt this, would in my view simply avoid the reality of the permanent tension between the individual and the collective. Instead, our task will be to register this contradiction as a central dilemma in the concept of security, and to observe its effects on the other levels of the problem.[83]

There are several levels in which to read Buzan on this idea. The first is to say that he has recognized the need to overcome the traditional realists' separation of the state from the individual. In doing so, Buzan recognizes one of the major flaws in traditional realism and descriptively lays out what he believes to be the groundwork for his

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[83] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.31.

development of a "new" concept of security. However, as his book proceeds, in spite of his claim for the need to register this contradiction, he is unable to do anything more than acknowledge these differences. He is not able to actually incorporate them into his thinking in a substantive manner, due to the structural limitations of realism, in both its traditional and neorealist forms. There is almost a schism in Buzan's writing: the first chapter explores in great detail the human element while the remainder of the book pays mere lip service to these concerns; it is almost a case of the book being composed by Buzan 1 and Buzan 2. This argument becomes the key to the remainder of my critique of Buzan but will be taken up in much greater detail as this chapter progresses.

The entire White Paper was dedicated to the maintenance of a balance of power and the protection of Canada through a system of defence through collective security, a system which relies on the doctrine of deterrence. Like the White Paper, Buzan agrees that the international political system is one of anarchy, with its principle defining characteristic being the absence of any overarching government.[84] Where Buzan changes in his approach is to flip over the understanding of what is traditionally thought of as the meaning of the balance of power model.

As a system model, the balance of power offers no

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[84] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.94.

> more enlightenment on the national security problem than do other power structure models. Indeed, with its emphasis on military rivalry and great power interests, its acknowledgement of the interdependence and uncertainty of security relations, and its open-minded view about the role of war in the system, the balance of power model might better be seen as defining the problem of insecurity.... An anarchic structure can only be maintained by a balance of power. Thus the balance of power and the international anarchy are opposite sides of the same coin.[85]

Buzan concludes that by thinking of the international sphere in this light, the balance of power structure will last as long as international anarchy, and therefore the anarchic system becomes the object of security. By making the anarchic system the object of security, one is able to incorporate all of the system structure models into one level of analysis and therefore overcome the ongoing argument of how the distribution of power affects the model. Buzan acknowledges that this high level of generality does not provide much guidance for the problem of national security, and he therefore recommends a middle level of analysis which concentrates on the more immediate (often this can be equated to the regional level) security environment of states, a level he calls "security complexes."

The interesting thing about Buzan's writing is that he is very aware of many of the criticisms of system structure models employed by realists and spells them out in his text,

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[85] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.103.

yet goes on to either dismiss or ignore their objections. For instance, he explains that the problem with the whole attempt to define and compare system structures is that it is one-dimensional and ahistorical.[86] Yet, he goes on to use such a system structure to support his conception of security. His security complexes are defined as groups of state whose primary security concerns link them together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.[87] Or in other words, by acknowledging the problem and by calling them complexes as opposed to regional systems, Buzan believes that he will not be subjected to the same criticisms.[88]

In chapter three I described a "common sense" approach to defence and security that had been taken in the White Paper. In the context of the White Paper, I suggested that this means that an understanding within a given community, having a common history and a common experience, that the members are expected to understand and react in a similar manner in any given situation. I believe that Buzan has adopted a similar, yet much more complex "common sense"

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[86] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.104.

[87] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.106.

[88] The whole notion of structuralism in realism and neorealism shall be dealt with in greater detail later in this chapter.

approach to international relations as a whole.

Buzan has portrayed throughout the book the idea that a "certain knowledge" or set of givens exist in all states in spite of their differences. These givens relate to several major premises. First, there exists a general agreement on the relative permanency of the state. Second, this agreement is based upon a recognition for the need for the imposition of some sort of order or structure on humanity according to some form of the rule of law. Third, there is a general agreement on the role and/or objective for the mature state/citizen relationship. Fourth, there is a general agreement as to what is thought to represent and epitomize development, and that all states wish to work in that given direction. The "common sense" to this understanding is that all those who are in agreement are heralded while those who disagree are referred to as either utopian or arguing at theoretical levels inappropriate to reality.

> The state may be a lumbering, incoherent and generally Brontosaurus-like in its behaviour, but it has no fear of certain death, can defend itself much more efficiently than a sleep-betrayed and easily killed, individual, and can command an enormous range of resources to its support. Furthermore, while the state may reflect its human components to some extent, it may also become more than the sum of its parts, and therefore develop non-human modes of behaviour.[89]

> Much energy has been spent arguing about the criteria for, and significance of, changes in the structure (as pattern of distribution of power) of the international system, though in the absence of

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[89] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.38.

> agreement about the significance of the patterns themselves this debate is largely confined to abstract realms.[90]

In chapter three, I spent a great deal of time exploring what was meant by deterrence and how that affected the notion of security. What I found was a peculiar paradox in the approach as it resulted in a situation in which the more that security was sought and promised, the greater the overall sense of insecurity became. Buzan's way of dealing with this whole idea of military, strategic and state relations is to separate the problem into two. The first he calls the defence dilemma, and the second the power-security dilemma.

> The defence dilemma arises not from the dynamics of relations among states, although these do contribute to it, but from the nature and the dynamics of military means as they are developed and deployed by states....
> The defence dilemma can come in several forms. In the milder cases defence measures are inappropriate or irrelevant to security. [Example: when states economic and political well being becomes too dependant upon the international economy, a situation which cannot be protected through military means]...
> A more serious case of a mild defence dilemma arises when defence by military means becomes impossible because offensive weapons have a marked advantage of some sort over the defensive weapons available against them....
> The most serious defence dilemmas occur when military measures actually contradict security, in that military preparations in the name of defence themselves pose serious threats to the state. These threats can take the form of economic damage, or social and political dislocation, caused by military mobilization beyond the state's needs or capabilities. More seriously, they can

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[90] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.103.

> take the form of unacceptable damage, either self-inflicted, or risked as part of an explicit policy involving relations with other states.[91]

In this description of the defence dilemma, as he calls it, he recognizes the inappropriateness of military build-up, its economic, social and political costs. He goes on to say that the whole system of nuclear deterrence is the best and clearest example of a serious defence dilemma as it presents a serious contradiction between defence and security. He then goes on to show how the whole process of military build-up in the United States and in Europe during this century has in fact created a greater fear of war all the while exacerbating an already serious contradiction between defence and security.

Having said all that, he goes on to describe how the defence dilemma is an integral part of the state system, and that in spite of its contradictions, there are several reasons why defence cannot simply be phased out of the domain of security. First, the need for defence by states against threats due to hostile relations in an anarchic system, leaves states with absolutely no option but to remain armed or else submit themselves to the will of all other states. Second, defence has a strong institutional and historical momentum within the life of most states. Both the armed forces and the armaments industries have become deeply

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[91] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; pp.158-159.

institutionalized while at the same time have taken on images of heroic proportions in the lore and culture of many states, and as a result carry a great deal of weight. Third, and I believe the most telling, "national defence cannot be disengaged from national security because the only apparent way of doing so would be to create an effective collective defence/security system."[92]

Buzan is correct in identifying weapons as a source of tension in the debate. He recognizes the dynamic of the problem and the inability of a single definition to suffice. However, he proposes only one solution or option, that of a globally sanctioned source of collective defence and security. His failure and/or inability to consider other options prohibits him from making any truly progressive suggestions as to a new direction in international relations. Instead, his only recourse is to retain to the unfortunate, but as he sees it, the inevitable state/anarchic system structure.

It is a combination of the desire to retain the structural make-up of realism and the retention of the Hobbesian definition of the state of nature, that prohibits Buzan, and for that matter all neorealists, from moving beyond the limits of traditional realism.

To allow the defence dilemma to work as a separate

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[92] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.169.

level of understanding, Buzan has separated and defined the power-security dilemma. The power-security dilemma operates again on several different levels. At one end of this model there is the ceaseless struggle for survival and dominance by states in their pursuit of power. At the other end is the tragic struggle for security, states are trapped in a system which "distorts their legitimate efforts at self-protection into a seamless web of insecurity and conflict,"[93] Buzan argues that because this model operates at a level of theoretical abstraction, it is easier to study it in two different ways. The first way is to look at the nature of the actors in the system (the kind of states of which he has identified fall into two general types: status quo and revisionists), and to examine the nature of the weapons and the military balance. In other words, what Buzan is trying to do is separate on one level the political from the military (a differentiation between a power struggle and a security struggle). While on the other level he is using the military as part of the support for his model, but not as the key as has been the case for traditional realism.

The distinction of status quo and revisionist states is very predictable. Those states which wish to retain the system and their place in it are status quo, while those who want to revise the power structure and have it more evenly

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[93] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; op. cit.; p.173.

distributed (re-order the status quo), those who want to transform the overall organizing principles of the system itself (true communism), and those who wish to seek reform from within the present system through a significant adjustment to its operation (Group of 77) are all considered revisionists.

Buzan's argument is that once you have identified the kind of state, it is possible to identify the kind of threat it feels to its security or power when the military component is added into the equation. He argues that if there is a quantitative improvement in the weaponry of one state, this represents a power struggle to another state, as the first is perceived to have more power. However, if there is a qualitative improvement in the weaponry of the first state, this represents a security struggle.

Placed on top of this imposed differentiation is the idea that the arms race is a permanent feature of global relations. It too can be seen as two different activities, that of arms maintenance and that of arms build-up. Once all of these layers of compartmentalization have been developed, Buzan argues that if a global practice of arms maintenance is adhered to it will be transformed into a power struggle, and if the practice of arms build-up is minimalized than the levels of insecurity can be reduced and kept at a minimum. Therefore, he is able to conclude that the world can work toward a mature anarchy in which the power distribution is

the only concern that will then be possible!

Of Human Nature and the Imposition of Structure

Buzan's idea to separate, compartmentalized layers simply provides a smoke screen for a filtered system structure imposed upon international relations. By pointing out all the criticisms and separating the various ideas and renaming the components, Buzan believes that his conceptualization is in some way different from that of traditional realism. I suppose that to a certain extent he is correct in that he has broken down the problematic areas for detailed criticism, but he ultimately only puts them back together, albeit in a much more carefully descriptive manner.

There are several reasons for Buzan's inability to come up with a revised and revitalized theory for international relations. The first reason that I see is that realists and neorealists refuse to give up this particular notion of the system structure model for political organization. At no point have they seriously considered its flaws to be anything more than superficial, and at no point have they been willing to base their ideas on another notion of the tenants of human nature. So long as realists retain the

Hobbesian notion of human nature,[94] and refuse to see the individual in some other light (perhaps one at the societal level, as a social being rather than as naturally anti-social), they will retain an imposed and potentially nihilistic ordering for global politics.

In fact it is because of the retention of this idea of human nature that Buzan and all realists are unable to truly reform and revamp their thinking. But more importantly, it prohibits them from actively participating in the debate which is occurring in the "discipline" of international relations. It is because of this inability to participate that I do not see this as a single discipline, I see it rather as a discipline of global systems analysis and a discipline of global human analysis.

The second reason for Buzan's inability to advance realism is much more abstract. The French philosopher Gabriel Marcel has explored the differentiation between a

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[94] Buzan; People, States, and Fear; For Buzan the state of nature represents a primal anarchy in which the conditions for the individual are marked by unacceptably high levels of social threats. "Unacceptable chaos becomes the motive for sacrificing some freedom in order to improve levels of security, and, in this process, government and the state are born. In the words of Hobbes, people found states in order to 'defend them from invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly'" p.20. This idea of human nature sees the individual as rational and self-interested, and it sees the individual as an individual first and as a social being second, something with which many thinkers would disagree.

problem and a mystery. Marcel's distinction between the two hinges on an understanding of what is meant by an object. An object is something which is external to us as an individual, something which is set over against oneself. An object is juxtaposed to oneself and is not involving oneself.

> I can envelope it in a clear and distinct idea which delineates its limits. With this clarity comes perfect transmittability, and with the transmittability the object begins to lead that public and independent life which is the privilege of the problematic...The problem, then, is an inquiry which is set on foot in respect to an object which the self apprehends in an exterior way.[95]

In this sense a mechanic trying to find what is wrong with an engine, is exploring the problematic, as is the mathematician trying to solve an algebra problem.

> A mystery, on the other hand, is a question in which what is given cannot be regarded as detached from the self. There are data which in their very nature cannot be set over against myself, for the reason that as data they involve myself... The attempt to isolate what is before me from what is in me breaks down completely here... A mystery is a question in which I am caught up. In the area of the problematic, the status of the questioner is completely prescinded from, and only the object is called into question.[96]

The title of Buzan's book, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, epitomizes his argument. Buzan, like all realists and

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[95] Kenneth T. Gallagher; The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel; New York: Fordham University Press, 1975; p.31.

[96] Gallagher; op. cit.; p.32.

neorealists, sees the world and all "political" behaviour as a problem, something for which a solution can and must be sought. The possibility of a solution however, is directly related to the objectified nature of the datum. Buzan is not isolated or independent from the data, but is in fact part of it. Buzan is not merely a spectator of the world, his "observations" are therefore reflective of his experience.

Security is a "mystery" not a "problem." The search for security cannot be solved through the imposition of a system structure. The insistence of Buzan and the others on retaining this notion of politics as a problem as opposed to a mystery, prohibits by its very nature any true reformation or revitalization of realism.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Conclusion

Conclusion

When I began working on this thesis, I was intrigued by the deep divisions which existed within what was the so-called the "discipline" of international relations. The term "discipline" is in fact a misnomer as the body of literature, as I see it, can be divided into at least four groupings: the realists, the idealists, the Marxists, and the post structuralists. While recognizing that there is in fact some overlapping between these groups, and that according to one, the post structuralists, there are really only two groups - themselves and the others who are still trapped in the structural limitations of modernity - for present purposes I will consider these as four separate groups.

The realists perceive the world as being made up of unitary, rational actors, sovereign states, which are operating, and to a certain extent co-existing, in an anarchic international system. The state in this system presides over the civil society, and is above and somehow immune from the societal forces. Its activities in the international sphere are considered to be completely self determined and are thought to be conducted in the best

interest of the state.

The idealists formed from a position of critical opposition to the realists. They argue that the realists' notion of a balance of power is the greatest source of international instability and, in an age of nuclear vulnerability, could ultimately result in global annihilation. In addition, they argue that the realists' state centric view of the world excludes the role of the individual and the society from any acknowledged political participation. Rather than focusing on a position of power, they look for a solution through peace to find stability in international affairs.

The Marxists (which includes those who focus on some variation of Marxism) are concerned with the role of capital in international affairs. They are often most interested in the dominance and dependency relationship between states, sub-states and companies as created by the control of capital. For this group it is the ownership of capital which determines power and effects the balance of power.[97]

The post structuralists are concerned with the limitations, some would argue debilitating limitations, of

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[97] Note: Marxist international relations represents a sizable and very important part of the debate in international relations theory and therefore deserves mention as a distinct and separate group. However, as its inclusion in the analysis would have significantly changed the focus of the thesis, it has not been incorporated into the study.

the confines of politics and political understanding as defined by the above three groups. In their view it is the inability to transcend the dualistic limitations of the structure and system of traditionally conceived political relations which prevents any progression beyond the present realm of modernity.

One way to look at the above debate is to see it as a tarnished and battered core (realism) placed at the centre of the controversy with the other groups attacking the core from various distances. The reason that I refer to realism as "the core" is not in any way to imply a position of pre-eminence, but rather to show that its place is central to the critical debate, and that as a group, realists have tended to dismiss any and all criticism as either unrealistic or utopian and therefore usually do not participate in the debate.

Each chapter in the thesis has been built on the previous one and is designed to, on the one hand place the realist discourse in reference to policy within the wider debate, and, on the other hand to critique the recent neo-realist attempt to look outward from the core and try to address some of the criticisms levelled at the group by the others. The first chapter laid out the debate between the realists, the idealists and the post structuralists, identifying where each sits in the debate, how each defines and criticises the others and how each deals with power,

peace and security.

Chapter two explored the historical development of Canadian Defence Policy since the end of the second world war, looking at how each of the successive White Papers on Canadian Defence Policy, as well as the everyday policy decisions, retained a consistent perspective on global affairs and on the state's need for defence and security. The significance of this is that the Canadian government, no matter what its political stripe, has retained a consistently realist policy perspective since 1945.

In chapter three I conducted a detailed discourse analysis of the 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defence policy so as to establish the limitations of the discourse in the context of a policy statement and direction and therefore the limitations for debate as a whole, especially as it relates to those opposed to the realist perspective. This is based upon the premise that the realist discourse prohibits dissent or criticism through the marginalization of the opposition, and that as in the theoretical realm of international relations theory, realism isolates itself from the debate.

Chapter four represents a test case of a neo-realist, Barry Buzan, who has tried to address some of the criticisms of realism through a process of revitalising the theory's approach. Buzan argues that the weakness of both the traditional realists and the idealists was that they had

focused on either power or peace and that the key should be to focus on the concept of security. He shows how security has often functioned in a contradictory fashion at the individual, the state and the international level and that were it to be fully developed as a the central concept, while still retaining a dynamic and mature international anarchic system, a revitalized neo-realism would address many of the "legitimate" criticisms of realism. Buzan's contribution to the debate has been his exploration of the sources of insecurity at each of the three levels, and how it is really a sense of fear that has caused much of the tension in the world.

It was hoped that finally, in Buzan, a break had been made away from the limitations of traditional realism, that in some way neo-realism was able to cross the divide between realism and idealism and at the same time address some of the major structural criticisms levelled at it from the other groups. Unfortunately, Buzan ultimately fails to do anything more than reiterate the realist thinking, albeit from a slightly broader and more complex position, all the while keeping a strong state-centred anarchic system approach to international relations. Through a process of comparison between the content of the White Paper and Buzan's book, it becomes immediately obvious that there are a great deal of similarities at the various levels of analysis.

As in the White Paper, Buzan's adoption of a state centred approach means that he sees states as interacting only on a strategic level, and consequently that the use of the military provides a rational tool for policy makers to make use of, create policy, and attempt to deal with what he calls the national security problem. In essence what this does is separates the domestic or societal from the security dilemma.

The notion of community in the White Paper is only made in reference to the ideal societal model as put forward by the armed forces families as a community, suggesting that all others groups and individuals in society in general are supposed to emulate that model. In the first chapter of Buzan, he explores the social sources of insecurity and acknowledges that the greatest source of insecurity for the individual most often comes from the state, that there is indeed a great deal of tension between the individual, interest groups at both a sub-state and a cross-state level and the state. However, after chapter one he goes on to separate the individual and societal level from the national policy decision making process in what he calls the security dilemma. At no time does he reconcile the conflict between his attempt to infuse a humanist element into his thinking and his continued retention of the sovereign state as elemental.

The global vision of the White Paper is one deeply

entrenched in the cold war, where the east is pitted against the west. Buzan, in an effort to look ahead, offers the ideal of working toward a single world state, but is able to dismiss this as unlikely if not impossible given conflicting interests, issues and ideologies. By offering a world state as the only option and then dismissing it, Buzan is able to fall back on nuclear deterrence as the only viable option for maintaining global stability and therefore security.

I showed in chapter three that the doctrine of deterrence was the underlying principle in the Canadian White Paper on defence policy. The idea of deterrence as articulated in the document means having both the capability to carry out the threat of retaliation as well as the intention to do so. The underlying implication is that not only does this mean that the enemy must believe that you are ready, willing and able to do what ones own population must believe you will not do, but that the dynamics of the logic are illogical in that in order to enhance one's security, one must in fact also enhance one's insecurity. The contradictory notion of security (or reduced insecurity) through deterrence holds as true for Buzan as it does for the White Paper. He argues that the defence dilemma has established itself as a durable feature of the security problem, and that in fact the nuclear dilemma may provide the key to a mature anarchy, and supports this argument by explaining the connection between the political economy of

the armaments industry and the beneficial influence of the technology on the state as a whole.

Buzan's argument suggesting the benefits of the defence dilemma to the international system and his proposed security complexes are again a result of his reliance on the state-centred perspective of international relations, and reflect his inability to conceptualize the dynamics of the contemporary global interrelationships. The scope of global conflicts as reflected in the world military order, the worldwide sale of arms, and the intricacies of military and security alliances are reduced to little more than local defence issues, while the differences between the capitalist and socialist countries, developed and underdeveloped are all subsumed under the simplistic concept of the political.

As in the White Paper, Buzan dismisses all criticism as either utopian or else not able to be proven according to his positivist criteria. Thus all opposition is marginalized and only those operating within the discourse of realism can participate in the discussion.

It is not so much the fault of either the authors of the White Paper or Buzan that they have been unable to break from the confines of their "common-sense" reading of realism. The theoretical basis of realism has been separated from both a strong sociological and philosophical basis from its inception, a product of both strong historical and social forces. Without understanding the historical forces,

realists will never be able to break from their inability to understand the world military and economic order, and without separating themselves from the social forces they will never be able to understand the cultural biases implicit in their theories.

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Appendix A

1945	Apr 25	The San Francisco Conference opened to discuss the founding of the United Nations, closing June 26.
	Jun 11	Mackenzie King and the Liberals won the federal election 125 seats, Conservatives 67, CCF 28, Social Credit 13, and independent 12.
	Nov	Canada officially became a member of the United Nations.
1946	Feb 5	A Royal Commission was established to examine Igor Gouzenko's allegations of the existence of a Soviet Spy Ring in Canada.
1947		The Visiting Forces Act granted the US Services Courts jurisdiction over the discipline of US forces in Canada, and reserved to Canadian courts the trial of all offenses under Canadian law.
1948	Apr 29	St Laurent suggested the formation of a "Collective-security league" which led to the formation of NATO.
	Jul 6	Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the US met in Washington to discuss the formation of the North Atlantic Security Pact.
	Nov 15	Louis St Laurent became leader of the Liberal party.
1949	Apr 4	Canada became a member of NATO - pledge by all members to defend each other in the event of a Soviet attack.
	Jun 27	The Liberals won the federal election with 190 seats, Conservatives 41, CCF 13, Social Credit 10, independent 8.
1950	Apr 1-3	Defence ministers of the 12 NATO powers approved a plan of collective self-defence against aggression.
	Jun 25	The invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
	Jun 30	Canadian Destroyers were ordered to sail to Korea for service in UN forces there.
	Jul 19	An RCAF transport squadron requested to assist in UN airlift in Korea.
	Oct 26	Canada signed an agreement with the US outlining six economic principles for joint defence production, which would eliminate all barriers to the free flow of arms and equipment.
1951	Jan 4-12	Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London to discuss Commonwealth defence policy.

	Feb 5	A three year $5 million rearmament program for the armed forces was announced.
	Feb 27	Canada's first step in providing ground forces in Europe was initiated with the posting of an Army Officer with the Supreme Allied Command's staff.
	Apr 1	Dept of Defence Production established.
	May 1	The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was formed for service in Europe with NATO forces.
	Jul 10	Canada formally ended state of war with Germany.
	Spt 8	Canada signed Japanese Peace Treaty.
	Oct 18	Announced that 12,000 army and air force personnel would be maintained in Europe as Canada's NATO committment.
1952	Oct 14	Lester Pearson elected President at opening of the 7th session of the UN General Assembly in New York.
1953	Jul 13	Armistice ended the Korean War hostilities.
	Aug 10	The Liberals won the federal election with 171 seats, Conservatives 51, CCF 23, Social Credit 15, independent 5.
	Oct 9	The formation of the 1st Canadian Division, the army's first in peacetime, was announced.
1954		The Pinetree Line of early-warning radar stations went into operation. Twelve of the thirty four stations were in Canada.
1955	Oct 29	The first of a series of 14 new destroyer escorts was commissioned in Montreal.
1956	Nov 4	Canada's representative, Pearson, sponsored a plan for a special UN police force to serve in the Suez which was adopted by the Assembly Nov 6, a Canadian was appointed Commander of the UN Emergency Force.
	Dec 13	The North Atlantic Council of NATO approves report of the "three wise men" (Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway and Lester Pearson of Canada) and adopts resolutions on the peaceful settlement of disputes between member countries and on non-military co-operation in NATO.
	Dec 14	John Diefenbaker was elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.
1957	Jan 1	The Mid-Canada radar warning line went into operation from James Bay to the Peace River area.
	Jun 10	The PC Party won the federal election with 112 seats, Liberals 105, CCF 25, Social Credit 19, independent 4.
	Jul 31	The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line of radar stations was put into operations.

	Spt 12	The North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed.
1958	Jan 16	Lester Pearson was elected leader of the Liberal Party.
	Mar 25	Regarded as one of the most advanced aircraft of its day, the AVRO CF 105 ARROW flew for the first time.
	Mar 31	The PC Party won the federal election with 208 seats, Liberals 49, CCF 8.
	Jul 8-11	US President Eisenhower visited Ottawa for discussions which resulted in the establishment of a Canada-US Joint Committee on Defence.
1959	Feb 20	The govt announced the cancellation of the ARROW project because of costs, and the scrapping of the existing seven aircraft. The Bomarc-B guided missile was to be installed at North Bay, Ont and La Macaza, Que as an alternative defence system.
	Jul 17	The govt established the Emergency Measures Organization to deal with the possibility of a nuclear attack.
1960	Jun	The Minister of National Defence, Pearkes, presented Statements on Defence Policy and its Implementation to the Special Committee on Defence Expenditures.
	Aug 13	Canadian Army Signalers, first group, assigned to the UN forces in the Congo, left Canada.
1961	Jun 12	Canada agreed to buy 66 US made F101 Voodoo interceptor aircraft in exchange for the US assuming operational responsibility of the Pinetree Line. Both govts agreed on a Joint Mutual Air Program providing for the Canadian purchase of 200 Canadian built F104 Starfighter aircraft.
	Spt 7	It was announced that the Canadian Armed Forces would be increased by 15,000 and that 100,000 Canadians would be trained in a national survival program.
	Oct 14	Canada and the US conducted a test of North American air defence in a simulated nuclear attack.
1962	Jun 18	The PC Party won the federal election with 116 seats, Liberal 100, Social Credit 30, NDP 19.
	Jul 18	The Royal Commission on Government Organization (the GLASSCO Commission) was released.
	Nov 5	The Political Committee of the UN approved a Canadian proposed formula for halting above ground nuclear bomb tests by Jan 1, 1963.

1963	Feb 4	Defence Minister Harkens tendered his resignation over the govt refusal to accept US nuclear warheads for Canadian Bomarc missiles and Voodoo interceptors.
	Feb 5	The govt was defeated in the House of Commons in a non-confidence motion over the nuclear weapons policy, making a federal general election necessary.
	Apr 8	The Liberals won the federal election with 129 seats, PC 95, NDP 21, Social Credit 5, Creditiste 9, independent 2.
	May 10-11	PM Pearson visited Hyannis Port, Mass. for talks with US President Kennedy. Announced agreement to equip Canadian forces with US supplied nuclear weapons.
	Dec 31	Nuclear warheads for Bomarc missiles arrived at the RCAF base near North Bay, Ont.
1964	Mar	The White Paper on Defence was announced.
	Mar 13	The govt approved a Canadian contribution to a UN international peace keeping force in Cyprus. The first Canadians began their duties on Mar 27, 1964.
	Mar 26	Defence Minister Hellyer announced plans to integrate the army, navy, and air force into a single service.
	Jul 16	Bill C-90 received Royal assent, establishing a single Chief of Defence Staff in place of the three separate Service Chiefs.
	Nov 3	The disbanding of nearly 60 units in the militia reorganization was announced.
	Dec 21	A $1.5 billion equipment procurement plan was announced, including 200 ground support aircraft, four helicopter-equipped destroyers, and 155mm howitzers.
1965	Jan 6	The formation of a NATO anti-submarine destroyer squadron, with Canada included, was announced.
1966	Nov 16	A Royal Commission headed by Maxwell Weir Mackenzie was appointed to conduct an investigation into Canada's national security.
1967	Apr 25	The House of Commons passed an Act combining the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force into a single unified service known as the Canadian Armed Forces.
	May 27	Egypt demanded the immediate withdrawal of Canadian peace-keeping troops from Egypt. The Canadians were airlifted out within 48 hours.
	Dec 13-14	North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting approves the Harmel Report on the future tasks of the alliance.

1968	Mar 7	The External Affairs Minister announced that Canada would participate with the US in developing an airborne radar system to replace all or part of the DEW-Line radar stations in northern Canada.
	Mar 30	Canada and the US agreed to renew the NORAD Agreement for 5 years from May 12, 1968.
	Apr 6	Pierre Trudeau elected leader of the Liberal Party.
	Jun 25	The Liberals won the federal election with 155 seats, PC 72, NDP 22, Creditiste 14, independent 1.
	Jul 22	Canada signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty at Moscow, London and Washington.
1969	Apr 3	PM Trudeau made known his position on defence matters and announced plans to reduce Canadian forces in Europe, while still remaining in the NATO Alliance.
	Jun 26	Among the recommendations in the report of the Royal Commission into the operation of Canadian security methods were the re-structuring of the RCMP directorate of security and intelligence, and the establishment of an independent review board to hear complaints about security decisions.
	Aug 24	The US oil tanker Manhattan, left Chester Pennsylvania on a trial voyage through the northwest passage to prove the feasibility of the route for transporting arctic oil. With assistance from the Canadian ice-breaker CCGS John A MacDonald, and the US USCG Westwind, the Manhattan reached Sacks Harbour NWT on Sept 15, 1969.
	Spt 19	A re-organization of the Canadian Armed Forces was announced, including a 50% reduction of NATO manpower contributions, early retirement of the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure, and the removal of the Canadian Guards Queens Own Rifles, and Black Watch of Canada infantry regiments.
	Dec 19	The reduction of the Canadian Armed Forces reserves was announced, along with closing of 41 armouries.
1970	Apr 17	The Ministry of National Defence announced that Yellowknife NWT would be the permanent headquarters for the Canadian military activities in the north.
	Jun 25	The White Paper on Foreign Policy outlining govt objectives of safeguarding Canada's sovereignty and increasing foreign aid.
	Jun	Parliament passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Bill, in an effort to protect the

		Arctic from pollution by foreign supertankers.
	Oct 16	The govt invoked the War Measures Act, allowing the govt to overrule civil rights and authority to deal with the FLQ October Crisis.
	Oct 19	The House of Commons approved the introduction of the War Measures Act, 190 votes to 16.
	Dec 16	The Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act was passed in the House of Commons to replace the War Measures Act. The new act continued the outlawing of the FLQ and allowed the police to arrest without warrant and hold suspects for as long as one week without laying charges.
1971	Jan 4	Troops were withdrawn from Montreal and all other parts of Quebec.
	Apr 30	The govt allowed the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act to lapse at midnight. The FLQ remained an illegal organization under the Criminal Code.
	Aug 24	The White Paper on Defence was announced.
1972	Oct 30	The Liberals won the federal election with 109 seats, PC 107, NDP 31, Social Credit 15, independent 2.
	Nov 14	Approval was given for the installation of the SAMSON (Strategic Automatic Message Switching Operation Network), a computer controlled message handling network connecting Canadian Armed Forces Bases in Canada and Europe.
1973	Jan 5	The govt officially condemned US raids on Hanoi and Haiphong North Vietnam, and urged the US to refrain from further raids.
	Jan 24	The govt announced that Canada would become a member of the International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam for a 60 day period.
	May 20	Canada announced that it would withdraw from the ICCS truce observation force in Vietnam by July 31, two months after the end of the initial 60 day period.
	Nov 2	Canada agreed to share a support role with Poland on the UN Middle East peace-keeping force.
1975	Jan 17	The formation of a separate Air Command in the Canadian Armed Forces was announced.
	Nov 27	The govt announced its intention to spend close to $1 billion an a fleet of new long-range patrol aircraft, and up to $200 million for modern tanks for the land forces in

Europe.

1976 Feb 22 Joe Clark was elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.

1977 Jul 5 PM Trudeau announced the formation of a special organization to examine national unity.

Jul 15 The govt announce that the strength of the Armed Forces would be increased by 4,700 to 83,000.

Dec 22 Govt approval was announced for the design and cost details for the first of six new naval frigets, part of a $1.5 billion naval program.

1978 Jan 24 COSMOS 954, a nuclear powered Soviet satellite re-entered the atmosphere and crashed in the NWT. The Canadian Armed Forces launched a large operation to recover radioactive debris scattered over a wide area.

1979 May 22 The PC Party won the federal election with 136 seats, Liberal 114, NDP 26, Social Credit 6.

1980 Jan 28 Canada's Ambassador to Iran, Kenneth Taylor, arranged the escape of six US Embassy employees from Tehran. The six had escaped from the US Embassy when it had been occupied in Nov 1979.

Feb 18 The Liberals won the federal election with 146 seats, PC 103, NDP 32, vacant 1.

Jun 25 PM Trudeau met British PM Thatcher in London to disclose Canada's plans for the patriation of the constitution.

1981 May 12 The North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) became the North American Aerospace Defence Command, after the five year renewal of the NORAD agreement.

Nov 5 PM Trudeau and all provinces except Quebec, reached a constitutional agreement for the patriation of the constitution from Britain, an amending formula, and a two-tiered Charter of Rights, based on a proposal put forward by NFLD Premier Brian Peckford.

1982 Mar 8 The Canada Bill, allowing Canada to patriate the constitution, was passed by the British House of Commons.

Oct 14 A car bomb explosion outside of the Litton Systems Canada Ltd. plant in Toronto, injured 7 including 3 police officers. The blast caused heavy damage at the plant which produced the guidance systems for the US cruise missiles.

Nov 15 PM Trudeau attended the funeral of the Soviet

President Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, and discussed the arms race and detente with Soviet officials.

Dec 10 Canada along with 118 other countries signed the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention gave international recognition to Canada's 200 mile economic zone, as well as agreement on pollution and environmental control, seabed mining and exploration, and the establishment of Canadian sovereignty of the Continental Shelf for 350 miles offshore.

1983 Feb 10 It was announced that Canada and the US had signed an agreement allowing US testing of military equipment in Canada, including cruise missiles.

Jun 11 Brian Mulroney was elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.

Jun 13 Canada received a request from the US to test the cruise missile in Canada early in 1984. Approval was given on July 15.

Jun 29 Contracts were let for 6 new patrol frigets for the Canadian navy, worth $3.2 billion. Also announced were a $650 million contract to refit 4 other ships, plus the construction of new coast guard icebreakers and fisheries vessels.

Nov 8 PM Trudeau met the leaders of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, and Pope John Paul II on his European peace mission, until Nov 11.

Nov 28 PM Trudeau discussed his nuclear disarmament peace initiative with Chinese PM Zhao Ziyang and Chairman Deng Xiaoping, until Nov 29.

Dec 5 PM Trudeau returned from a 19 day trip to Japan, Bangladesh, China and the Commonwealth conference in India, where he promoted his peace initiative. On Dec 10 Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu became the first East Bloc leader to endorse his proposal. US President Reagan backed the initiative on Dec 15.

1984 Jan 11 PM Trudeau discussed his peace initiative with UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

Feb 14 PM Trudeau attended the funeral of Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov in Moscow, and held discussions with Soviet leaders regarding his peace proposal.

Mar 8 The cruise missile was first tested in western Canada. The unarmed missile was attached to a B-52 bomber during the 2500 km flight.

	Apr 16	Legislation was introduced to establish the govt funded Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, to make annual reports to parliament on disarmament issues.
	May 11	Legislation was introduced to establish the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, a civilian security agency to replace the RCMP in dealing with espionage, terrorism, subversion and threats to Canadian security.
	Jun 16	John Turner was elected leader of the Liberal Party.
	Sep 4	The PC Party won the federal election with 211 seats, Liberal 40, NDP 30, independent 1.
1985	Jun 23	An Air-India flight from Canada to India blew up over the Atlantic ocean, killing all 307 passengers and 22 crew.
	Sep 4	The US icebreaker Polar Sea made a challenge to Canada's Arctic sovereignty by voyaging through the northwest passage.
1986	Apr 16	PM Mulroney backed the April 14 US bombing of Libya in retaliation of terrorist attacks in Europe.
	Oct 6	The people of Canada were awarded the "Nanser Medal" by the UN for their role in assisting refugees from around the world. This was the first time that the award had ever been given to a whole nation.
	Dec 19	Canidair Ltd of Montreal was awarded the first stage contract worth approx $1.2 billion over 20 years, for the maintenance of the CF18 Jet fighters.
1987	Feb 24	After the successful test of a US cruise missile on this day, the Dept of External Affairs announced that the 1983 pact to test the cruise over Canada (which was to expire on Feb 28) would be renewed for another five years. On Mar 1, another cruise test took place.
	Mar 2	Secretary of State for External Affairs announces that Canada will build the Class 8 icebreaker in order to enhance Canadian Arctic claims.
	Apr 28	The Brundtland report by the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, was released.
	Jun 5	The Minister of National Defence tables the government White paper on defence, Challenge and Committment, in the House of Commons.

Appendix B
Data Base for Text Analysis of White Paper in Chapter 3

Security is...

* cooperation with our allies (page ii)

* efforts we undertake to keep the peace (ii)

* protect our shores, our waters, and our airspace... therefore... Canada's sovereignty as a nation (ii)

* security and our defence relationship with other democracies (iii)

* international peace and security (2)

* Canada alone cannot assure its own security (3)

* ultimately requires the maintenance of a peaceful international order (3)

* to promote a stronger and more stable international environment (3)

* collective security (3)

* in a larger family of like-minded nations (3)

* (neutrality would be hypocrisy) [our] security would continue to depend upon the deterrence provided by our former allies..., [without] any say in the management of that deterrent (3)

* Canadian security policy (CSP) has three major components: defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes (3)

* CSP must respond to an international environment dominated by the rivalry between east and west (5)

* [adversaries]... massive military forces and a proven willingness to use force, both at home and abroad... The West [must]...rely for its security on the maintenance of a rough balance of forces, backed up by nuclear deterrence (5)

* A free and secure Western Europe remains critical to Canada's future (5)

* Canada's security in the broader sense is inseparable from that of Europe (6)

* the need to remain intimately engaged in European security issues (6)

* The presence of Canadian armed forces in Western Europe contributes directly to the defence of Canada (6)

* ensures that we have a say in how key [European] security issues are decided (6)

* must also take into account the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region (6)

* Canada's security requires a forceful and effective Canadian contribution to the peaceful resolution of disputes and to peacekeeping (6)

* arms control [is] essential to the search for a more peaceful and secure world (7)

* some of the more promising developments in arms control, such as nuclear reductions in Europe, could make Canada's contribution to collective security even more important (7)

* {military threat} the principal direct threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union; a threat from land-launched, submarine-launched, and air-launched attack (10)

* {military threat} The soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies also threaten Canadian security with their nuclear and conventionally armed forces concentrated in the European theatre (12)

* {military threat} the Warsaw Pact would be able to select the time and place of attack..., NATO, as defender, would be obliged to thin out its divisions across the entire front (12)

* {military threat} The Warsaw Pact has a geographic advantage, as NATO suffers from a lack of strategic depth (12)

* {Cdn def pol} our objective is to deter the use of force or coercion against Canada and Canadian interests (17)

* {Cdn def pol} and to be able to respond adequately should deterrence fail (17)

* {Cdn def pol} [as both the US and USSR are conducting research into the development of strategic defences against ballistic missiles]... the Government will follow closely

the progress of such research in order to determine its implications for international security (19)

* {cdn def pol} stable deterrence at the strategic level is essential to the security of Canada (19)

* {cdn def pol} the most effective counter to the conventional threat is to convince any potential aggressor... [that were he] to persist in his aggression, he would run the risk of a nuclear response (20)

* {cdn def pol} Canada makes its contribution to its own security and to that of the North Atlantic Alliance through [maritime, land and air forces] at home and in Europe (20)

* {cdn def pol} Deterrence is not divisible. If it fails in Europe, it fails everywhere (21)

* Our determination to participate fully in all collective security arrangements affecting our territory or the air or sea approached to our country and to contribute significantly to those arrangements is an important affirmation of Canadian sovereignty (23)

* The military role in sovereignty is that of the ultimate coercive force available when the capabilities of the civil authorities are inadequate to enforce Canadian laws and regulation or when Canada's rights to exercise jurisdiction is challenged by other states. (24)

* an important manifestation of sovereignty is the ability to monitor ...[all] areas of Canadian jurisdiction (24)

* support for the United Nations and its pursuit of global security represents an important contribution to world stability and thus to Canadian security (25)

* arms control will never be a substitute for an adequate defence. Conversely..., we cannot rely on military force alone (26)

* Unilateral disarmament measures will not enhance Canadian security (27)

* we believe that the focus should be on effective confidence and security building measures (27)

* and on the establishment of a more stable balance of forces (27)

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Title of Thesis: The Concept of Security and Canadian Defence Policy

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