‘That Immense and Dangerous Sea’: Spanish Imperial Policy and Power During the Exploration of the Salish Sea, 1790-1791.

by

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BA, University of Victoria, 2007

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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In the years between 1789 and 1792 the shores of what is now British Columbia were opened to European scrutiny by a series of mostly Spanish expeditions. As the coastline was charted and explored by agents of European empires, the Pacific Northwest captured the attention of Europe. In order to carry out these explorations the Spanish relied on what turned out to be an experiment in ‘gentle’ imperialism that depended on the support of the indigenous “colonized”. This thesis examines how the Spanish envisioned their imperial space on the Northwest Coast and particularly how that space was shaped through the exploration of the Salish Sea. A close examination of the Spanish explorations of 1790-91 opens a window on this distinctive Spanish imperialism, on Aboriginal culture and politics in this era, and on the cartographic and cultural mapping of this the centre of gravity of modern British Columbia.

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Introduction

> "I hope that one day, in the not too distant future, but maybe after I am dead, someone will read what I have written and be a little wiser about our roots, about how we came to be here, how this incredible hodge-podge of nations came to be welded into what today we call British Columbia". -John Crosse, 1995.[1]

In April of 1596, at a café in Venice Italy, three men sat conversing in broken Italian and Spanish, while excitedly pointing to a rudimentary chart of the Pacific Ocean. The names of the three men were: Tomas Douglas, a British navigator employed by a Venetian shipping company, John Lok, a British merchant-adventurer, who had famously been one of the financiers of Forbisher's expeditions to the eastern Arctic in 1576, 1577, and 1578, and Juan de Fuca, otherwise known as Apóstolos Valerianos, a Greek born ship's pilot, who had recently returned from almost 40 years service in the Spanish navy mostly in the Pacific Ocean.

The three men were discussing Fuca's claim that in 1592, Fuca had sailed from Acapulco commanding two small vessels, and sailing North and Northwest had come to a large opening between 47^{o} and 48^{o} North latitude.[2] At the entrance to this opening, Fuca noted a large, distinguished, spired rock, and he proceeded to travel in this waterway for twenty days. While in this waterway, Fuca passed different islands, densely populated by people clad in beast skins, until he came to a sea which was larger than the Strait he had entered. Assuming that he had found the Northwest Passage, and unable to defend his ships against the large number of indigenous people who resisted his presence, Fuca felt he had accomplished the objectives of his mission. Fuca turned around and returned to Mexico, expecting to be rewarded for his accomplishment.

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[1] UBC Special Collections, John Crosse Fonds: Box 2 File 3.

[2] The actual entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca is located between 48^{o} 25' and 48^{o} 38'

When Fuca arrived in Mexico, he was warmly received by the ruling Viceroy, but no significant reward was forthcoming. So Fuca made his way to Spain, in the hopes that there the King would give him some reward for his service, but again Fuca was denied satisfactory compensation. Frustrated, Fuca left Spain without permission and made his way to Italy in order to make it home to his native Greece, so that he could essentially retire. While in Italy, Fuca met Douglas, who introduced him to Lok.

During their conversation Fuca made it known to Lok that the reason he had not been rewarded for his discovery of a northern strait, was that Spain was under the impression that England had given up its hope of finding a Northwest Passage, and there was no worry in Mexico about Englishmen entering the Pacific through a northern route. Fuca proposed that if the Queen of England would repay him the monies that had been taken from him by the pirate Thomas Cavendish, he would be willing to lead an expedition to the strait he had discovered and give England a northern entrance into the Pacific.[3]

In the end, Lok could not generate any excitement, or more importantly, money, in England over Fuca's claim, and nothing came of their meeting. Fuca died in 1602 on his native island of Kefalonia, and Lok's account of their meeting was published in 1625 by Samuel Purchas, in *Purchas His Pilgrims.*

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[3] Warren Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 22-29, 539-543.

For over two centuries Fuca's tale tantalized the minds of European geographers and explorers. James Cook, in 1778, looked for the Strait of Juan de Fuca while sailing along the Northwest Coast, but missed the opening due to bad weather. Then, in 1786, Charles Barkley and his wife Francis, while trading along the coast of Vancouver Island, found the entrance to the long fabled Strait, and named it after the man they felt was the original discoverer, Juan de Fuca. Despite this discovery, there was little impetus for the early fur traders on the Northwest Coast to explore a passageway they considered dangerous and lacking in sea otter skins. It was not until the Spanish established themselves on the coast in 1789, with the objective of sovereignty instead of trade, the Strait of Juan de Fuca became the center of four years of trade and exploration within its waters.

There is a considerable lack of knowledge surrounding Spain's efforts to explore and chart Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea, the large body of water encompassing the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Georgia Strait, and Puget Sound.[4] Each summer from 1789 until 1792 the Salish Sea region was explored by ships and sailors in the service of Spain. Very little is known about these explorations: the context for them, how they were carried out, where they went, and how they interacted with indigenous groups. The lack of knowledge surrounding this subject is not just confined to the general public. Historians, particularly English speaking ones, have also had difficulty properly portraying the Spanish efforts in the Salish Sea.

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[4] The name "Salish Sea" was adoped by governments on both sides of the international border in January 2009. Much like the term "Cascadia," for the Northwest region, the adoption of a sinlge name for the transnational body of water was done in the hopes of fostering and recognizing the shared envrioment that exsisted long before the international border.

There are many such examples of these difficulties. A recent one is Keith Carlson's *Sto:lo Coast Salish Historical Atlas,* which includes a plate on "Voyages of Scientific Exploration, Geographic Discovery and Colonial Expansion: The First *Xwelitem,* 1790-1792". This plate attempts to trace the explorations of Quimper, Eliza/Narváez, Galiano/Valdés, and Vancouver, while highlighting their interactions with the Salish people of the straits. Unfortunately Dr. Carlson was not able to locate Wagner's *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca* and states erroneously that there are no journals available for either the 1790 or 1791 explorations. The plate also includes the tracks of the vessels which have been placed in a general manner on his map and are in no way correct.[5]

Historically too, depictions of the Spanish explorations have been problematic. In 1941 J.S. Matthews, the archivist for the city of Vancouver, wrote a largely imaginative and racist article entitled "Pilot Commander Don Jose Maria Narvaez", where timeless savages watched a "leviathan" of a vessel approach the Spanish Banks in Vancouver, which unknown to the Squamish was the portent of their undoing as the "great Victorian Age" made its way westward across the continent.[6]

Between these two examples many other writers have commented on the Spanish explorations in the Salish Sea. One of the significant issues, as demonstrated by J.S. Matthews' work, is that many writers have only had an interest in one place or explorer. For example, Jim McDowell in his book *José Narváez: The Forgotten Explorer* only covers Narváez’s time inside the Salish Sea, giving only cursory mention of the important explorations carried out in Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds.

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[5] Keith Carlson, "Plate 28B, Voyages of Scientific Exploration, Geographic Discovery and Colonial Expansion: The First *Xwelitem* 1790-1792". in *Sto:lo Coast Salish Historical Atlas* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2001), 86-87.

[6] J.S. Matthews, "Pilot Commander Don Jose Narvaez, 1791" Vancouver City Archives, 1941.

The same was true of John Crosse, who was fascinated with Narváez’s exploration of Georgia Strait. John spent from 1988 until his death in 2006 researching and working on a book in which he describes his attempts to re-create Narváez’s journey by sailing around the Salish Sea, on the same days, with the same tides as Narváez had done a little over 200 years previously. Most of Crosse’s work however, has remained unpublished due to the difficulty he had in creating a narrative in his manuscript *In the Wake of Narváez*. Much of his research material, which is now housed in the Special Collections department of the University of British Columbia, was an invaluable resource for my own investigation. Other writers, such as Tomas Bartroli and Nick Doe have focused on the Spanish explorations of the city of Vancouver region and the Gulf Islands respectively.

The objective of this thesis is to contextualize, in a historic and theoretical framework, the Spanish explorations along Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea that were carried out in 1790 and 1791. The Strait of Juan de Fuca and the intricate coastline it connects to was, at the close of the 18th century, the area that held the greatest potential as a location of imperial and colonial interest and for the possibility of a Northwest Passage. The Salish Sea was host to concurrent and overlapping explorations by Spanish and British explorers. While Daniel Clayton and others have recently written on British exploration and creation of imperial space, there is little notice taken of the Spanish efforts at the same time in the same locations.[7] This thesis intends to examine how the

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[7] Daniel Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998).

Spanish efforts on the Northwest Coast fit into their efforts to preserve and promote their empire across the Americas, how the Spanish envisioned their imperial space on the Northwest Coast and how this compares and contrasts with British efforts at the same time. This thesis will examine in what ways was British and Spanish imperialism was the same, how it was different, and how the various indigenous groups in the region shaped imperial constructions. By examining Spanish constructions of space, and the dialogical relations between Spanish explorers and First Nations, the thesis will explain how what were to become Vancouver Island and the mainland of British Columbia was constructed by Spanish explorers. This thesis will demonstrate that there was not one homogenous notion of European and Indigenous space, but rather fractious conceptions, which depended in large part on the relations between the groups.

By engaging in this examination, I hope to provide a better understanding of the pre-colonial history of British Columbia by demonstrating the contributions of historically marginalized groups, mainly the Spanish, and First Nations. A thorough investigation of the Spanish explorations will highlight the important contributions made to cartographic and ethnographic knowledge of the region by the explorers. This work has many implications, the foremost being a clear understanding of the actions of the Spanish explorers which will correct the confusion that has been apparent in each attempt to cover the subject. Through a complete examination of the Spanish explorations in 1790 and 1791, it will be possible to see how and why the Spanish acted the way they did while at the same time allowing native peoples to act and speak with their own voice through the Spanish records in a far more nuanced way than has been done previously. An additional benefit will be an understanding of the importance of the Strait of Juan de

Fuca as a corridor for trade and communication long before European settlement. The Spanish did not enter a stagnant world; they trespassed through territories and trade networks about which they could only make scant observations. Still, those observations are a goldmine of information regarding how indigenous societies who were on the periphery of the sea-otter trade were adapting to, and participating in, the new dynamics which grew out of Euro-American and indigenous contact on the Northwest Coast.

My primary sources were principally found in the 1933 publication by H.R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*. While some aspects of this publication have been criticized for the brevity and inexactness of the translations, it is the most complete synthesis of source material for the Spanish relating to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The documents in this publication include Manuel Quimper's 1790 Diary of his explorations inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca, along with 4 letters written by Quimper to the Viceroy, the Conde de Revilla Gigedo, at the terminus of the 1790 exploring season. Also included is the Viceroy's response to these letters. For 1791, Wagner included the "Secret Instructions to Eliza," Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra's letter of instruction to Eliza, and an extract of Eliza's navigational log. This is augmented by Pantoja's account of the same explorations, and a letter he sent to a friend in Peru. These accounts are further supplemented by statements made by Juan Carrasco and Salvador Fidalgo concerning the explorations in 1791. I was also able to procure copies of the manuscripts of the Eliza and Pantoja accounts housed in the Museo Naval in Madrid which allowed me to check Wagner's translations against the originals. While some of Wagner's translations are not exact, I did not come across any passages where the meaning of the original Spanish was lost when translated into English, or where the passages could have been improved significantly with a new translation. To supplement the above mentioned sources, I also translated a letter written by Manuel Quimper the day before he set sail to explore the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1790. The letter gives Quimper's account of his sail to Nootka from San Blas, Mexico, and demonstrates Quimper's strong dislike of his vessel the *Princesa Real,* as well as the amount of Catholic spiritual belief that permeated all aspects of life for the Spaniards on the Northwest Coast. This letter has never before been available to English speaking authors and is a valuable contribution to the historiography of the exploration of British Columbia's coasts.

Another source of primary documents is the book *El Final del Descubrimiento de America,* in which the Spanish historian Francisco Fuster Ruiz examines "the contribution of the General Archive of the Navy" to the understanding of the exploration of Canada and Alaska. Ruiz's careful examination of the archive contributed numerous documents previously ignored by other scholars, including Martinez's impressions of the 1789 expedition he sent to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the instructions issued to Quimper prior to his expedition to the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1790. Supplementing these published primary sources was the material available in the John Crosse fonds in the Special Collections holdings at UBC. Of particular relevance was Crosse's work on the background of the *Santa Saturnina,* the boat utilized by José Narváez in 1791, and copies of Narváez's service files, one of the few sources of information we have on the activities of Narváez in 1791. In addition to these primary sources I was able to locate a number of unpublished notes on the explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca while looking through the holdings of the archive in the *Museo Naval* in Madrid.

The major issue many historians have had when examining the Spanish explorations in the Salish Sea is the missing journal from José Narváez's exploration in 1791. Many historians and researchers have attempted to track down Narváez's journal with no success. Recently, Jim McDowell, author of *José Narváez: The Forgotten Explorer*, launched an extensive search for the 1791 journal. We know that in 1840 the French historian Duflot de Mofras, met with Narváez shortly before his death in Mexico. During that visit Narváez still had the original journals and charts of his 1788 and 1791 expeditions to the Northwest Coast. We know this because while discussing these expeditions, Mofras notes, "In 1840 Don José Narváez brought out his Journal and the original charts of his interesting voyage for our inspection."[8] Soon after this meeting Narváez was dead and his family made an attempt to sell his journals to the Mexican government in return for back pay Narváez was owed from his time serving in the navy of the new republic.[9] This request was turned down by the Mexican government, and it is assumed that Narváez's family sought a private collector to buy the documents. To investigate this possibility, McDowell traced the path that saw Narváez's 1788 journal from his voyage to Alaska end up in the possession of the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library at the University of California Los Angeles.[10] Documentation indicates that the 1788 Journal was purchased by Clark in the early 1930's from Dr. Abraham Rosenbach, a leading North American dealer of rare manuscripts and books. It is believed that Rosenbach bought the collection he sold to Clark from a Philadelphia lawyer named George Heart, who auctioned his collection of 18th century Mexican manuscripts in

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[8] Duflot de Mofras, *Travels of the Pacific Coast* Vol 1. Marguerite Lyer Wilbur ed. and trans. (Santa Ana: Fine Art Press, 1933), 63 note 64.

[9] Jim McDowell, *Jose Narvaez: The Forgotten Explorer* (Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Co. 1998), 90.

[10] Ibid., 92.

1922.[11] Heart would have bought his collection at an auction in 1893, when almost 3000 different items from the second collection of Henry Ward Poole were liquidated after his death. Poole was an efficient collector of Mexicana in the 19th century; his second collection totaled about 10,000 dossiers.[12] Unfortunately no catalogue for the 1893 auction has survived, so it is not known what documents were sold, or to whom. It is known that most of the documents known to have been in Poole's collection simply have disappeared; only "a portion re-emerged in the Library of George H. Hart."[13]

McDowell theorizes that if Narváez's 1791 journal still exists, it most likely sits forgotten in a private collection after being acquired sometime around 1900.[14] What is even more curious about Narváez's missing journal is the lack of any copies. All Spanish officials, like Narváez, had to have their journals copied so that their results could be submitted to authorities in Mexico City and Madrid. The large amounts of uncatalogued material at the Biblioteca Nacional and the Archivo General in Mexico City offers a chance that a copy of Narváez's journal may still rest somewhere in Mexico.[15]

In order to supplement the written accounts of the Spanish explorations, and to make up for the missing Narváez journal, I have made extensive use of the cartographic records created during and after the voyages. These included Manuel Quimper's map of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which was prepared after the 1790 exploring season, which accompanies the charts of the harbours of the Strait of Fuca which Quimper and his pilots prepared. For the 1791 exploring season Juan Pantoja's chart of Clayoquot Sound, and Narváez's charts of Barkley Sound were used when discussing the explorations of those regions. These two maps were later included as part of the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* which shows the extent of the explorations in the Strait of Georgia carried out by Narváez that year. The 1791 *Carta* is one of 5 maps produced as an outcome of the explorations in 1791, all of which serve as primary sources for the exploration due to the missing journal of Narváez. Of course, there are certain colonial and ideological paradigms which cannot be separated from the creation or reading of maps. The theory behind the creation and use of these cartographic records forms a significant part of my second chapter, where I compare the Spanish and British creation of imperial space on the coast.

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 93.
[13] Ibid., 94.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 95.

With my emphasis on the creation of imperial space, the most important secondary work which I employed is Daniel Clayton's *Islands of Truth: the Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island*. This work is the most up to date synthesis of British activities on the Northwest Coast prior to the onset of official colonialism. Clayton's post-colonial approach to contact, the fur trade, spatial politics and appropriation served as a model and a foundation for my own work. Part of my goal for this thesis is to position my own work into the silences left by Clayton. I feel some of his conclusions about how imperialism progressed on Vancouver Island are undermined by the fact that he ignores the presence and the influence of the Spanish had during the 1790's.

In order to bridge the gap between Clayton's work and my own, I relied on David J. Weber's books *New Spain's Far Northern Frontier*, and his recent seminal work, *Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment*. These two books reveal Spain's dynamic and shifting responses to the problems caused by a massive uncontrollable frontier and hostile native groups. By including Weber's work I hope to demonstrate that the classification of Spain's actions on the Northwest Coast within the limited context of the expansion to California is misinformed. As well, I demonstrate that Spain's actions on the Northwest Coast were influenced by imperial actions and outcomes from across Spanish possessions in the Americas.

The basic outline of the activities of the Spanish on the Northwest Coast has been provided by Warren L. Cook's *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest 1543-1819.* Still regarded as the best work done to date on the Spanish activities on the Northwest Coast, the book is beginning to show its age. While Cook's use of sources is excellent, and his description and synthesis of Spanish actions are accurate, there is no attempt at understanding the intercultural contact that took place within an ethnographic understanding. Cook positions the Spanish as a force that acted on the First Nations of the region, but does not imagine local First Nations had any influence on the Spanish settlement.

Warren Cook's position is modified somewhat by Christon Archer's considerable number of articles including the important "Seduction Before Sovereignty: Spanish Efforts to Manipulate the Natives in their Claims to the Northwest Coast" in Robin Fisher's and Hugh Johnston's *From Maps to Metaphors.* In the article Archer makes a clearer case than Cook for a reciprocal relationship between the Spanish and the local First Nations, but fails to place the Spanish occupation of Nootka in the correct context. Archer places the Spanish occupation of Nootka within the context of the expansion into California, and argues that missionary zeal (or lack of it) was the primary factor in Spain's presence on the coast.[16] Archer characterizes the relationship between First Nations and the Spanish as "ad hoc" and different from previous imperial policies, when this was clearly not the case.[17] As Weber explains in *Barbaros*, many different times, in many different places across the empire, Spain had to deal with and come to terms with independent non-agrarian First Nations, and did so to varying degrees of success.

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[16] Christian Archer "Seduction Before Sovereignty: Spanish Efforts to Manipulate the Natives in their Claims to the Northwest Coast" in Fisher and Johnston eds. *From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific World of George Vancouver* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993.) 127.

To date the only book that attempts to deal with the Spanish on the Northwest Coast from an ethnographic perspective is Fernando Monge's 2002 publication *En La Costa de la Niebla: El Paisaje y el Discuso Ethnografico Ilustrado de la Expedicion Malaspina en el Pacifico,* which translated reads *On the Foggy Coast: the Illustrated Landscape and Ethnographic Discourse of the Malaspina Expedition in the Pacific*. This small book is an excellent synthesis of the ethnographic endeavors of Malaspina and the context in which he worked. The book includes the best historiographical essay to date on the Northwest Coast. It engages both English and Spanish source material to give a clear understanding of how the Northwest Coast has been written about to date, and the failures and successes of those authors. The book goes on to cover such themes as "scenarios of knowledge-power and commerce in Spain and the Pacific," how the Malaspina expedition described the physical features of the Northwest Coast, and how they constructed their view of the world they visited.

There are a variety of other secondary works on the Spanish on the Northwest Coast which I also incorporated. One of best of these is Donald Cutter's book *Malaspina and Galiano: Spanish Voyages to the Northwest Coast, 1791 & 1792.* This well-researched book places Malaspina's voyage in the context of the other Enlightenment voyages that had preceded it. As well, it contains a lengthy treatise on Galiano's 1792 reconnaissance in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Georgia Strait, in which he links that expedition to the overall efforts of Malaspina, calling it a "sub-expedition" of the Spanish navigator’s enterprise. These secondary sources, along with many others too numerous to mention, allowed me to present the Spanish exploration of the Salish Sea in the best possible context, and present an account that fits within the ongoing scholarship regarding Spain’s colonial holdings.

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[17] Ibid., 132.

In this thesis, the first chapter will lay out the imperial context and position of the Spanish move up the North Pacific Coast and place this movement in the context of the larger Spanish empire as a while. The second chapter will discuss my methodology for the examination of the Spanish explorations; it will also examine the creation of Spanish imperial space on the Northwest Coast and contrast that creation of space with the British project that was occurring at the same time. The second chapter will also highlight the power of cartography and naming in relation to the creation of empire and examine what sorts of differences were apparent between the Spanish and British maps of the region. These differences can tell us about the types of empires these two nations were attempting to implant in the Salish Sea region. Most importantly this examination of cartographic practices will highlight the need for the local indigenous people to acquiesce to the presence of a cartographic mission and the outcomes of failing to do so. The next three chapters contain thorough examinations of the Spanish explorations during the 1790 and 1791 expeditions to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and its interior. Chapter 3 focuses on the expedition under the command of Manuel Quimper who explored the West coast of Vancouver Island and the Strait of Juan de Fuca from May 31st 1790 until August 3rd 1790. Chapter 4 focuses on the important explorations of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds during the expedition under the command of Francisco Eliza from May 4th until the beginning of June 1791. Chapter 5 focuses on the explorations of the same expedition, but this time in the Gulf and San Juan Islands and the first European penetration of the Strait of Georgia from mid-June until the expedition left the Strait of Juan de Fuca in mid-August.

Before proceeding I wish to include a note about what “Spanish” means within the context of this thesis. During the close of the 18th century when the explorations I am studying took place, the Spanish empire was a massive entity that encompassed the modern country of Spain as well as many other parts of Europe, including various parts of what is now Italy. The empire also stretched across the Atlantic and encompassed most of the Americas, from New Mexico (now part of the U.S.) to Southern Chile, excluding the territory in Brazil held by Portugal. While some of the officers who commanded the expeditions came from Spain proper, many others came from other parts of the empire, especially Peru which was the birthplace of Bodega y Quadra and Manuel Quimper. Many of the crews of the vessels were mulattos (a people with a mix of Spanish and indigenous blood) recruited from the region around San Blas in Mexico, where the expeditions to the Northwest Coast were staged from. When this thesis discusses the “Spanish,” it does not do so in a modern sense that would only be inclusive of people who had their origin on the Iberian Peninsula. “Spanish” in this thesis is taken to mean all of those who were serving under the flag of Spain, regardless of their own region of origin, and who promoted the interests of the Spanish Crown on the Northwest Coast so far away from where many of them would have been comfortable.

Chapter 1: An Imperial Context for the Spanish Presence on the Northwest Coast

> "Any establishment by Russia, or any other foreign power, on the continent, ought to be prevented, not because the king needs to enlarge his realms, as he has within his known dominions more than it will be possible to populate in centuries, but in order to avoid consequences brought by having any other neighbours than the Indians".[1]
>
> -Viceroy Antonio Maria de Bucareli y Ursua, July 27th, 1773.

The Spanish presence on the Northwest Coast of the Americas has always been considered within the context of Mexico and what has been termed the "thrust" to California by Spain in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. Historians of the Northwest Coast have taken the view that the establishment of a Spanish military garrison at Nootka Sound, isolated and thousands of kilometers away from the nearest Spanish settlement, was unique. The fact that almost no effort to Christianize the natives was undertaken has been puzzled over, as have the agricultural efforts undertaken by the Spanish at Nootka.[2] It is a common assumption that the poor agricultural potential of the area plus the lack of a missionizing endeavour on the part of the Spanish doomed their presence from the outset. The establishment at Nootka was haphazard and never sustainable; it was merely a piece in the game of eighteenth century European international rivalries.[3]

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[1] Cook, Warren L. *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543- 1819 (*New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 55.

[2] There are various nomenclature associated with the site of the Spanish outpost. The Nuu-chah-nulth name for the location is Yuquot, in Spanish it was called Santa Cruz de Nutka, and it is common to use the English spelling of that name to describe the location, although now Nootka Sound refers to the entire region around Nootka Island, the actual cove where the outpost was is named Friendly Cove, and was sometimes referred to as 'Cala de los Amigos' by the Spanish.

But was the Spanish presence at Nootka so unique? Spread across incredibly long frontiers, in what would become the Southwestern United States, Chile and Argentina, Spain had a multitude of small, isolated military establishments, acting both as deterrents to foreign encroachment and as centers of trade and diplomacy with independent First Nations. By the time Spain sent agents of the crown to the Pacific Northwest, they had the experience of almost 300 years of colonialism in the Americas to draw upon. In that, time Spain's American empire had witnessed multiple successes and failures. The Spanish garrison at Nootka was not conceived and built in a vacuum of knowledge; rather Spain brought its long history of colonialism with it to the Northwest Coast.

The strategic nature of the Nootka Sound region and Friendly Cove was recognized immediately by every European who visited the location. The nature of the winds and currents rotating in a clockwise manner in the North Pacific Ocean, in what is known as Fleurieu's Whirlpool, naturally push incoming sailing ships directly to Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island.[4] Friendly Cove, the site of the Spanish base, is located at Latitude. 49°35'00," and Longitude. 126°37'00," almost half way along the coast on the seaward side of Vancouver Island, right at the entrance to Nootka Sound. Except for the fog that is prevalent up and down the coast, it is maybe the most convenient port for sailing ships to enter north of San Francisco. Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra wrote in a letter to Viceroy Revilla Gigedo in 1792 after his stay at Friendly Cove to meet with Captain George Vancouver that:

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[3] Christon Archer in "The Transient Presence: A Re-Appraisal of Spanish Attitudes toward the Northwest Coast in the Eighteenth Century" *B.C. Studies* no. 18. (1973): 3-32 Calls the establishment at Nootka "irrational and overly hasty", and Cook's chapter "The Iberian thrust to Alta California and Alaska" in *Floodtide of Empire* places the expansion in the context of the situation in Europe.

[4] R.P. Bishop. "Drake's Course in the North Pacific" *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (July 1939): 151-82.

> The port of Nutca(sic) is of the best proportions that can be encountered along the entire coast, in which the winter can be passed without apprehension, it is possible to enter and leave with promptness at anytime, its habitants are docile, the climate healthy, it does not lack land for seeding, nor wood for construction. In its immediate area abounds the fur-trade, and in one word despite the reports that I have and the judgement that I owe, I see today it is the only place, without reservation of our *presidios*, in which it would be possible to form an establishment advantageous and useful to commerce.[5]

Spanish agents believed correctly that fortifying the cove, and establishing a policy towards First Nations that encouraged them to support Spanish claims to the coast, would enable agents of the crown to solidify their enforcement of Spanish sovereignty on the entire Northwest Coast.[6] This was especially true after the proposed settlement at Neah Bay at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca was deemed unsuitable as a demarcation point between Spanish and British holdings on the Northwest Coast.[7]

When placed in the imperial context of the Spanish empire in the Americas, instead of the expansion to California, the similarities of the Spanish experience at Nootka, and other locations in the empire are easy to locate. The examination of similarities between the Northern and Southern edges of the Spanish empire is a relatively new undertaking, with the first suggestions and examinations occurring at a conference held in 1992.[8] The only other explicit connections made between the Northwest Coast, and the Southern Coast of South America, is a Spanish language article entitled “Notes for a Comparison Between the Expeditions to Patagonia and those to the Northwest of America,” and David Weber’s comprehensive book *Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment,* in which Weber uses the Malaspina expedition to link Spanish policy towards First Nations across the Americas.[9] In “Notes for the Comparison . . .” historian Ángel Guirao Vierna lays out what he understands to be the general objectives of Spain during its expansions and expeditions to the far reaches of its empire during the close of the eighteenth century. These included increasing the cartographic knowledge of unknown or poorly mapped coasts, the protection of Spanish possessions from all its European rivals, the maintenance of communications between the metropolis and the periphery, and the maintenance and formation of new secure shipping routes.

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[5] Quadra a Revilla Gigedo, Monterrey 24 Octubre, 1792. (AHN, Estado, Legajo 4287) quoted from Note 19 in Freeman Tovell, "Rivales y Amigos: Quadra y Vancouver" in *Nutka 1792*: *Viage a la Costa de la America Septentrional por Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, del Orden Santiago, Capitan de Navio Real Armada y Commandante del Departamento de San Blas, en las Fragatas de su Mando Santa Gertudis, Aranzazu, Princessa, y Goleta Activa, Ano 1792.* Merdedes de Palau, Freeman Tovell, Pamela Spratz y Robin Inglis eds. (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriors de Espana: Direccion General de Relaciones Culturales y Cientificas). Author's Translation.

[6] Cook, *Floodtide of Empire*., 275.

[7] Christon I. Archer, "Retreat from the North: Spain's Withdrawl from Nootka Sound, 1793-1795." *B.C. Studies*,no. 37, (Spring 1978): 19-36.

Linked with these objectives was the ability to vindicate before foreign nations the discoveries realized by Spaniards, and by default Spanish sovereignty over those said territories. The ability to carry out these objectives was linked with the creation of a cartographic center in Spain with the view to make navigation easier and to remove the reliance on maps made by foreigners.[10] After identifying the imperial objectives of Spain, Vierna points out six similarities between the Northwest Coast and Patagonia. These included both regions being of primary importance to the borders of Spain’s American holdings.

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[8] Donna J Guy, Thomas E. Sheridan “On Frontiers: The Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire” in *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 3.

[9] Ángel Guirao de Vierna “Notas Para una Comparación entre las Expediciones a la Patagonia y a las del Noroeste Americano” in *Culturas de la Costa Noroeste de America.* Jose Luis Peset ed. (NP:Turner, 1992)

[10] Ibid., 266-7.

It was supposed that whoever had control of the Northwest Coast would be able to control the North Pacific, especially if a passage across the North American continent could be located. In Patagonia, where there was a passage between the Atlantic and Pacific, control of the Strait of Magellan would mean control of all of the ports in the Southern Pacific.[11] Another of the similarities between the two regions was the considerable interest by foreigners in both zones, and the fact that the two zones were separated from the centers of Vice-regal power by thousands of kilometres.[12] There was also the necessity of establishing a secure port of refuge in zones that were dangerous for navigation, while at the same time affirming the active presence of agents of the Spanish crown.[13]

The Spanish move up the Northwest coast was concurrent with other movements in the empire. Between 1765 and 1795 Spain sent 8 different expeditions to the Falkland Islands, while sending 4 expeditions from Peru to islands in the South Pacific, such as Tahiti, in order to block British expansion into those areas.[14] In fact some of the officers that would later be sent on expeditions to the Northwest Coast and Nootka participated in the expeditions to the Falklands and the South Pacific.[15] Along with these expeditions, it was the Viceroyalty of Peru, not Mexico, which initially paid more than 100,000 pesos for a frigate, arms, equipment and personnel for the 1779 voyage of exploration to the

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[11] Ibid., 272.
[12] Ibid., 273.
[13] Ibid., 274-5.
[14] Carlos Martinez Shaw "The Spanish in the Pacific" in *Spanish Pacific from Magellan to Malaspina*. Carlos Martinez Shaw ed. (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1988), 22
[15] For instance Manuel Quimper saw service in Southern Chile, and was part of the 1774-5 expedition to Tahiti (Amat) to enforce Spanish sovereignty there. Eric Beerman, "Manuel Quimper y Bodga y Quadra: Dos Limenos en el Servicio del Armada Real" in *Nutka 1792*, 32.

Northwest Coast under the command of Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra.[16] This again demonstrates that the Northwest coast was an imperial concern, and not a project solely related to California or even Mexico.

Spain's possessive attitude to locations they claimed but did not occupy was well founded; the foreign and particularly British threat to Spain's perceived empire was very real.[17] The British push to Nootka at the end of the 1780's followed on the English expansion to the Falklands in 1771, and the establishment of the colony at New South Wales, Australia in 1787.[18] In fact, at the same time Spain was preparing to occupy Nootka Sound to counter a perceived Russian threat, the British government was preparing three vessels for a naval expedition to occupy the Northwest Coast via Australia and Hawaii.[19] The planned British expedition involved sending three ships, the H.M.S. *Discovery,* H.M.S. *Gorgon* from England, and the H.M.S. *Sirius* from the East-India squadron, to rendezvous at Hawaii. They would then proceed to the Northwest Coast, where they were to establish a colony and link up with an overland expedition sent from Montreal.[20] The outbreak of the Nootka Crisis put a hold on the plans for a colony, but the H.M.S. *Discovery* would still be sent to the Northwest coast with the H.M.S. *Chatham* under the command of George Vancouver. And officials in Canada were impressed enough with the proposal to encourage Alexander Mackenzie to be the first to cross the North American continent by land.[21]

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[16] Salvador Bernabeu, "Los Viajes de Bodega y Quadra al Virreinato del Peru (1776-1783)" in *Navigare necesse est. Estudios de Historia en Honor de Lola Higueras,* ed. Luisa Martín-Merás (Gijon, 2008), 81-105, Bodega's time in Peru is covered on 88-89.

[17] Despite being claimed by Spain, most of the Americas remained in the hands of indigenous peoples until after the period of national revolutions in Latin America. David Weber, *Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 6, 257-278.

[18] Barry Gough, "New Empires of Trade and Territory in the time of Malaspina" in *Malaspina 92 Jornadas Internacionales.* Mercedes Palau Baquero, Antonion Orozco Acuaviva eds. (Real Academia Hispano-Americana, 1994), 132

[19] "The Right Hon. W.W. Grenville to Governor Phillip" *Historical Records of Australia. Series 1: Governors's Desptches to and from England. Vol. 1, 1788-1796* (Sydney: The Library committee of the Commonwealth Parliament, 1914), 161-164

[20] René Chartrand "Malaspina and the Spanish Explorations: A contribution to the Geostrategic History of Canada's West Coast". In *Malaspina 92,* 322.

Although the Spanish position in the Pacific has often been portrayed as weak and the Spaniards themselves as backward, lazy or vicious[22], this characterization is more a result of 19th and 20th century developments and the cultural bias of reporters, as opposed to the reality of the late 18th century Americas. As one commentator pointed out,

> . . . the sharp decline of the Spanish Empire in the 18th century, and the rise of the British Empire –followed by the American Empire in the 20th century- were decisive factors in the English speaking world's consciously and intelligently exhibiting the Pacific as its own conquest and historic-geographical sphere of influence, while glossing over the earlier or concurrent presence of the Spanish in those waters in the best possible way.[23]

From its naval bases along the Pacific Coast, from Valparaiso and Talcahuano in Chile, Callao in Peru, Guayaquil in Ecuador, and San Blas and Acapulco on the west coast of Mexico, the Spanish navy operated from a position of relative strength when compared to the other European visitors to the coast. The Russians had only four small trading ships, with no heavy artillery, operating in Alaskan waters. British subjects had to contend with the long and treacherous voyage from Europe via the Cape of Good Hope and Canton or Bombay in order to reach the Northwest Coast of the Americas.[24] After his time in Alaska, the French explorer Jean François de Galaup, Comte de La Pérouse immediately recognized the strategic placement of New Spain relative to the Northwest Coast, due to the fact that the trade items most valued by the First Nations on the coast were easily accessible in Mexico. If need be, copper could have been shipped easily from Chile to Mexico and other points along the Northwest Coast.[25]

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Christon I. Archer "Spain and the Defence of the Pacific Ocean Empire" *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* Vol. 11, No. 21 (1986): 25-39

[23] Damaso de Lario, "Forward" in *Spanish Pacific from Magellan to Malaspina"* Carlos Martinez Shaw ed., i-xxi.

[24] Wallace M. Olson, *Through Spanish Eyes: The Spanish Voyages to Alaska, 1774-1792.* (Auke Bay Alaska: Heritage Research, 2002), 216-17.

The trope of the poorly organized backward Catholic Spaniard, who came to the North in order to convert the Natives as popularized by Christon Archer and Warren L. Cook, does not fit well with the reality at Nootka. First and foremost it should be understood that Spain and its agents had absolutely no desire to spread the Catholic faith on the Northwest Coast. The instructions issued to Juan Perez for his 1774 voyage to the Pacific Northwest were the only time out of a possible forty expeditions to the region[26] that carried the provision that the reason for the voyage was a "spiritual conquest" of the Native inhabitants.[27] Even this assertion has been dismissed as a "smokescreen" by some historians as the instruction has more the appearance of a legal trope than actual policy. [28] As evinced by Bucareli's 1773 statement at the beginning of the chapter which states that Spain had no desire to expand its actual dominion, and was perfectly happy to have independent indigenous peoples along its frontier as opposed to European rivals. This runs counter to the arguments of Christon Archer in his articles "The making of Spanish Indian Policy on the Northwest Coast" and "Seduction before Sovereignty: Spanish Efforts to Manipulate the Natives in Their Claims to the Northwest Coast" where he quite clearly argues for a missionary intent, both as a reason for expansion, and partly as a reason for the failure of Spain on the Northwest Coast. As Archer points out, Spain failed to expand the Californian institution of the mission-presidio to the Northwest Coast and the only successes of the friars were the conversions of the Native children they purchased.[29]

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[25] James R. Gibson "Nootka and Nutria Spain and the Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast" in *Malaspina 92*, 140.

[26] Donald Cutter. "The Malaspina Expedition and its place in the History of the Pacific Northwest" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentennial of the Malaspina Expedition 1791-1791.* Robin Inglis ed.(Vancouver: Vancouver Maritime Museum Society, 1992), 4.

[27] Manuel P. Servin, "The Instructions of Viceroy Bucareli to Ensign Juan Perez" *California Historical Society Quarterly* No.40 (1961): 237-48.

[28] Gibson "Nootka and Nutria Spain and the Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast" in *Malaspina 92*, 139.

While some authors have focused on how the establishment at Nootka failed as an outgrowth of the Californian mission-presidio; no one has mentioned how the garrison resembles another institution of Spain's Northern frontier, the *establecimiento de paz* (peace establishment). The idea behind these institutions was that soldiers instead of missionaries would settle Apaches and other First Nations who had resisted missionization in communities around a garrison, and carry out non-spiritual cultural exchange.[30] Spanish officials were painfully aware of the Spanish Black Legend, and operated within an enlightened policy that did its utmost to avoid conflicts with the very independent First Nations along the Pacific Northwest Coast. [31] Missionary proselytizing was forbidden in *establecimientos de paz* in 1791 in order to not annoy the residents and cause them to leave.[32] The mission and the *establecimiento de paz* represented the dual Indian Policy of Spain's Northern frontier: there was a policy for sedentary peoples who could be easily incorporated into traditional missions, and a policy for nomadic peoples, where the mission structure could not be applied.[33] The *establecimientos* had mixed results in acculturating independent First Nations. There were some successes, but in many cases the attempted communities were destroyed by acts of violence between the frontier soldiers and the Indigenous group invited to settle around the garrison.

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[29] Christon I Archer "The Making of Spanish Indian Policy on the Northwest Coast" *New Mexico Historical Review* Vol. 52, (1977): 45-70. And "Seduction Before Sovereignty: Spanish Efforts to Manipulate Natives in Their Claims to the Northwest Coast" in *From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific World of George Vancouver*. Robin Fisher, Hugh Johnston eds. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 127-159.

[30] Weber, *Barbaros*., 194.

[31] The Black Legend was a predominantly English notion of Spain's conquest of the Americas, based off of Las Casas' 16th century book, *Destruction of the Indies,* which chronicled the initial conquest and enslavement of many of the America's original inhabitants during Spain's expansion into the Americas in the 15th and 16th centuries. By the 17th and into the 18th centuries the Legend had come to stand for what was perceived to be Spain's greed, immorality, cruelty, treachery, and pride. William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The Development of anti-Spanish sentiment, 1558-1660* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), 132.

[32] Weber, *Barbaros,* 194.

[33] Joseph P. Sanchez. *Spanish Bluecoasts: The Catalonian Volunteers in Northwest New Spain 1767-1810.* Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1990. p. xii

Despite humanistic directives from officials, the *establecimiento de paz* could sometimes be disrupted due to outbreaks of violence between frontier soldiers and the native communities. Frontier soldiers tended to be convicts or conscripts pressed into service. The poor living conditions of most frontier outposts, along with the general incompetence and corruption of officers, made it easy for violence and acts of insubordination to occur. In order to prevent this at Nootka, Spain sent the First Company of Catalonian Volunteers to the settlement. The company had been created out of recruits from the Catalonia region of Spain and had been in New Spain since 1767, mostly fighting against 'rebel' indigenous groups in the Sonora region of Mexico.[34] The idea behind sending well-trained and armed professional soldiers to Nootka instead of conscripts was that they would be able to withstand any sort of surprise attack, be it from another European power trying to dislodge the Spanish from Nootka, or from Native populations.[35] At the same time it was assumed that the soldiers would be disciplined enough not to mistreat the native peoples of the region and thus endanger Spain's position on the coast.

Once established at Nootka, the garrison's duties included first and foremost the protection of the isolated establishment. The soldiers were ordered to act ". . . as if they are in the presence of the enemy," or in other words to always be at a state of readiness.[36] Out of an optimal force of thirty-four soldiers, twelve were always on patrol. Four were stationed at the Fort of San Miguel, guarding the entrance to the cove, and four were always manning the ship of war *Concepcion* or similar vessels that were serving as the naval presence for the garrison, while four soldiers patrolled the settlement itself.[37] This arrangement gave the small settlement 3 lines of defence. The battery of San Miguel and the garrisoned ships in the cove were to guard against any naval action, and were also to provide the soldiers in the settlement with supporting fire in the case of a ground attack. The fort was always to be the last line of defence for the small settlement, as it would be the most difficult to take in the case of a conflict.[38] Despite these obvious defensive preparations, historian René Chartrand has noted the settlement lacked any serious defensive works to guard against a land attack, and that the settlement did not consider a shore landing or native attack to be a primary threat.[39] The garrison had other duties as well. At least one member, Cpl. Gabriel del Castillo of Guadalajara, was given special pay to learn Nuu-chah-nulth and be the garrison's full time translator and at least two members were given the assignment as the garrison's full time gardeners.[40]

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[34] Sanchez, *Spanish Bluecoats*, 14

[35] Sanchez, *Spanish Bluecoats*, 36-7

[36] Ibid., 23.

The Spanish settlement at Nootka had more the appearance of an *establiciemto de paz* than a traditional mission. It lacked a church or any other religious structure, except for a large cross set up adjacent to the cemetery. Francisco Eliza even issued orders for the garrison that the members should do all they could to attract Natives to the establishment so that they could learn Spanish customs and slowly learn the benefits of what the Spanish perceived to be a superior European civilization.[41] The success of such a policy can be seen in comments by observers such as Joseph Ingraham of the American trading vessel *Hope*, who commented that chiefs, when at the Spanish settlement are ". . .meeting and parting with strangers with a great deal of bowing and scraping 'Adios Senor' in the most approved Castilian style."[42] Other observers commented that Chief Hannape and his four sons spoke more or less fluent Spanish, as well as English, and were forthcoming about sharing knowledge of their culture with Europeans and learning about the cultures of the European visitors.[43] These examples demonstrate that the Spanish settlement had some success as a location of cultural exchange, and had a policy geared towards the promotion of such an outcome. Although the intensity of the cultural exchanges varied depending on which commanding officer was presiding at Nootka, Martinez, Eliza with Alberni, Saavedra, and Quadra were all enthusiastic about promoting cultural exchange. In the later years of the settlement's life, Salvador Fidalgo closed off the settlement to the local First Nations, except for occasional visits by local chiefs.

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[37] Museo Naval, Madrid. MS 330: Doc 24, fol. 86

[38] Sanchez, *Spanish Bluecoats,* 80.

[39] René Chartrand, "The Soldiers of Nootka: Spanish Colonial Troops at the End of the 18th Century" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast,* 112.

[40] Donald Cutter, *Malaspina and Galiano*: *Spanish Voyages to the Northwest Coast 1791 & 1792*. (Vancouver: Dougals & McIntyre, 1991), 77, 79.

[41] Archer, "Seduction Before Sovereignty" in *From Maps to Metaphors*. Johnston and Fisher eds., 148.

Spanish policy towards First Nations on the Northwest Coast involved more than just establishing a framework for cultural exchange. It was hoped by cultivating strong ties between Spaniards and First Nations, Spain would be able to enforce its sovereignty along the coast by encouraging Native peoples to resist the presence of other Europeans. To date the best statement of the form of this policy is by Donald Cutter in *Malaspina and Galiano,* where he explains,

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[42] Christon I. Archer, "The Transient Presence: A Re-appraisal of Spanish Attitudes toward the Northwest Coast in the Eighteenth Century" *B.C. Studies* no. 18, Summer 1973, 3-32.

[43] Yvonne Marshall, "Dangerous Liasons: Quadra and Vancouver in Nootka Sound, 1790-5." in *From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific World of George Vancouver*. Robin Fisher, Hugh Johnston eds. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 166.

> Spain's new control system was: 1) to abandon any attempts at evangelization with the accompanying Franciscans acting only as military chaplains to army and navy personnel; 2) to use gift-giving as a means of attracting and maintaining native friendship and partiality toward Spain, placing it in competition with rival nations; and 3) to establish what promised to be permanent occupation posts of a non-commercial sort. It was a program which had a great command advantage since with few exceptions all participants were military men, not traders. An obvious drawback was expenditure without hope for profit.[44]

While Cutter has done an excellent job explaining Spanish policy on the Northwest Coast, especially as it counters the opinion of authors such as Warren L. Cook and Christon Archer who have been convinced of the missionary intent of the Spanish, Cutter does not place his outline of a Spanish policy in the context of the Spanish empire as a whole. When placed in the context of the empire as a whole it is easy to see how Nootka is not as unique as some authors have portrayed it. The Spanish outpost at Nootka shares many similarities, not only with the *establiciemtos de paz* in Northern New Spain, but also with frontier outposts in Chile, Argentina, Central America and the Caribbean. There, good relations with independent indigenous groups, especially where rival powers were present, were key for Spain to ensure its sovereignty.

How this policy was enacted on the ground depended to a large extent on the officer in command. A cursory examination of the personnel who worked on the Northwest Coast appears to indicate those who had experience in the empire, where interactions between independent First Nations and Spaniards occurred, approached the peoples of the Northwest Coast in a more open manner than those who had little, or no experience, with independent First Nations. Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra and

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[44] Cutter, *Malaspina and Galiano*, 13.

Manuel Quimper were both from Lima Peru, and each had experience working in South America, especially Chile, where a large part of the territory was still controlled by independent First Nations.[45] On the Northwest Coast, both officers have had their interactions with First Nations characterized as friendly and welcoming.

On the other hand, the treatment of the local First Nations by the two officers from Lima contrasts to the way they were treated by some of the Spaniards who had little or no experience in other imperial centers outside of Europe. Jacinto Caamaño, a Spaniard who spent time on the coast, felt that the best and only way to deal with the First Nations was through the use of fear tactics.[46] Salvador Fidalgo, another Spaniard who took over the command of Nootka, after Bodega y Quadra left in 1792, closed the establishment to the local indigenous population ending the warm receptions that Chief Maquinna and other local chiefs had become accustomed to.[47] The closure of Nootka by Fidalgo came after his stint as commander of the short lived settlement at Neah Bay, at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, named by the Spanish Núñez Gaona. During his time as commander at Nuñez Gaona, Fidalgo opened fire indiscriminately on two canoes full of members of the nearby native community after discovering that pilot and close friend, Antonio Serantes, had been murdered after straying away from the new Spanish fort. This action brought Fidalgo censure from Bodega y Quadra, his direct commander, who stated somewhat sarcastically "When the assassin is unknown it does not seem to me to be necessary to take vengeance upon persons who perhaps were innocent."[48] Once Fidalgo's actions were known in the imperial centers, he received further reprimands from Viceroy Revilla Gigedo in Mexico, and later the King Carlos IV sent a letter expressing his disappointment with Fidalgo.[49] While Fidalgo's action is deplorable, and more akin to the violence witnessed between traders and First Nations, no fur trader on the coast faced the prospect of official sanction from their sovereign for acting inappropriately.

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[45] Eric Beerman, "Manuel Quimper y Bodga y Quadra: Dos Limenos en el Servicio del Armada Real" in *Nutka 1792,* 33-34.

[46] Archer, "Seduction Before Sovereignty" in *From Maps to Metaphors,* 155.

[47] Ibid.

As historian David Weber has pointed out, there does not seem to be any indication that Bourbon administrators explicitly made any links between the situation in Chile and the Patagonia where 'Indian Republics' were recognized, and the situation that faced them on the Northern frontier of the Spanish empire.[50] That is not to say officers and others that had lived the experience of dealing with independent First Nations in South America, would not have brought that knowledge and experience with them to the Northwest Coast.

The Spanish policy towards First Nations became somewhat more problematic when the relations between ordinary sailors and soldiers and the indigenous common people of the Nootka Sound region are considered. There is evidence in Spanish texts of violence between common sailors and the native inhabitants. Jose Moziño commented that the sailors, due possibly to the excellent treatment the local chiefs received at the garrison, killed and crippled some of the retainers who accompanied their chiefs.[51] The jealousy that spawned such violence could have originated due to the fact that Chief

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[48] Freeman M. Tovell, "The Career of Bodega y Quadra: A Summation of the Spanish Contribution to the Heritage of the Northwest Coast" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentennial of the Malaspina Expedition 1791-1792* Robin Inglis ed. (Vancouver: Vancouver Maritime Museum, 1991), 175.

[49] Cook, *Floodtide of Empire*. p. 352.

[50] Weber, *Barbaros*. 218

[51] Jose Mariano Mozino, *Noticias de Nutka: An Account of Nootka Sound in 1792*. Iris H. Wilson trans. (Seattle: University of Wastington Press, 1991), 84.

Maquinna and other First Nations were continuously housed in the commandant's house overnight, while the soldiers and sailors were relegated to the small and uncomfortable barracks that had been constructed for the enlisted servicemen.

Moziño also was critical of the theft of house boards that occurred after the re-occupation of Nootka in 1790. Apparently, Francisco Eliza despatched sailors and soldiers, with no officer, to the village of Tlu-pana-nutl, where they forcefully removed house boards so they could be used in the building of the new Spanish establishment. As Warren L. Cook points out, this episode, along with the shooting death of Chief Cuallicum the year before was probably the low point in Spanish-Native relations. Still, this was not as bad as some of the actions carried out by other Europeans on the coast. The Native inhabitants of the Sound knew where they could find the Spanish, and seek redress for any and all insults or thefts.[52] In fact the Spanish in their use of native house boards seemed to be following what at that time was established tradition. John Meares had also constructed his little hut at Friendly Cove out of Native house boards, due to the common assumption by Europeans that it was easier for Native peoples to mill boards than the transient Europeans.[53] Much has also been made of Juan Pantoja's comment in 1790 that stated ". . . they [the Nuu-chah-nulth] are continually asking when we are going to leave, the eagerness with which they solicit this being noteworthy".[54] Once communication at Friendly Cove improved as First Nations in the area learned Spanish, and some Spaniards learned Nuu-chah-nulth, some sort of agreement about the ownership of the cove must have been worked out. Evidence of this is in the *Archivo Histórico*

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[52] Cook, *Floodtide of Empire*., 285.
[53] Freeman Tovell, "*Rivales y Amigos: Quadra y Vancouver"* in *Nutka 1792.*, 75.
[54] Robin Inglis, "The Spanish on the North Pacific Coast –An Alternative View from Nootka Sound" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentennial of the Malaspina Expedition 1791-1792* Robin Inglis ed. (Vancouver: Vancouver Maritime Museum, 1991), 135

Nacional in Spain, where a notarized deed of purchase of Friendly Cove by the occupying Spaniards exists.[55]

A Native oral history account of the Spanish at Nootka indicates that some of the local women were raped and tortured with hot pokers at the settlement's blacksmith's shop, but there is no other documentation available to confirm or deny such accusations.[56]

Despite sporadic violent events and grievances born out of cultural misunderstanding, the Spanish policy towards First Nations on the Northwest Coast can be characterized as successful. Christon Archer has criticized the Spanish outpost noting that in the final years of its life, it "made little impression upon the Native world. . . in many respects, the small Spanish garrison at Yuquot became the hostage of Native activities and of the rivalries among the different Nootka tribes."[57] This is in effect exactly where the Spanish wanted to be. Reinforcing their relations with the First Nations on the coast was the easiest and only way the Spanish hoped to legitimize their sovereignty in the region in regards to the other European nations (and by this time the United States of America) operating in the area. Eventually the Spanish were even being potlatched like any other group in the region.[58] The Spaniards attending indigenous ceremonies like the potlatch may not have completely understood their significance, but they were still acting appropriately within the context of the local customs. Enough was understood of these events that one Spanish commentator noted, "vaunting each above the other is the main topic of conversation among the 'taises' or 'chiefs.'"[59] That the Spanish were invited to potlatches should be considered a political victory for the Spanish. As Mozino noted, "many of our officers went alone and without arms to visit a number of villages, conducted in the savage's own canoes. They always returned impressed by the affection and gentleness they had observed in everyone."[60] Clearly the Spanish had done enough to ensure the security of the outpost, and themselves, while integrating themselves into the indigenous political structure of the region.

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[55] Donald Cutter, "Spanish Scientific Exploration Along the Pacific Coast" in *Spain's Far Northern Frontier: Essays on Spain in the American West, 1540-1821*. David J. Weber ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), 47. The deed to Friendly Cove is listed as AHN, Estado 4290.

[56] Peter S. Webster, *As Far as I Know: Reminiscences of an Ahousat Elder.* (Campbell River: Campbell River Museum and Archives, 1983), 59

[57] Archer, "Seduction Before Sovereignty" in *From Maps to Metaphors*, 155.

[58] Marshall, "Dangerous Liasons" in in *From Maps to Metaphors*, 166.

If the Spanish had failed to ensure the security of the establishment, Chief Maquinna made quite clear what would happen to the Spanish if they raised the ire of the local Native population. After being somewhat insulted at being implicated in the murder of a Spanish cabin boy in 1792, Maquinna told Bodega y Quarda,

> Do you presume that a chief such as I would not commence hostilities by killing the other chiefs and placing the force of my subjects against that of their *meschimes*? You would be the first whose life would be in danger if we were enemies. You well know that Wickaninish has many guns as well as powder and shot; that Captain Hanna has more than a few, and that they, as well as the Nuchimanes [Kwakwaka'wakw], are my relatives and allies, all of whom, united, make up a number incomparably greater than the Spanish, English, and Americans together, so that they would not be afraid to enter combat.[61]

In these early years of the fur trade the indigenous population clearly held the upper hand and controlled relations with Europeans, and especially the Spanish, who unlike the rest of the transient Euro-American population of the coast, could easily be found at Friendly Cove. Complaints against Spanish personnel were heard by the base commander and those who were found to have violated orders or transgressed against

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[59] Ibid.
[60] Mozino, *Noticias de Nutka,* 84.
[61] Marshall, "Dangerous Liasons" in *From Maps to Metaphors*, 169- 170.

First Nations were flogged.[62] As it has been pointed out earlier in the chapter, the defensive nature of the Spanish garrison was geared more towards defending against a European sea-based attack, as opposed to a Native attack by land.

As other historians have commented, the Spanish outpost at Nootka Sound when considered within the context of the Spanish push to California seems out of place and entirely a unique adventure. But when the outpost at Nootka is considered within the context of the Spanish empire as a whole, it ceases to be a unique entity and instead fits logically into Spain's efforts to preserve and promote its empire across the Americas. The garrison at Nootka was neither the first nor the last Spanish outpost to ignore the traditional mission system and instead center itself on a system of cultural and material exchange with independent indigenous groups to help re-enforce Spain's conceived sovereignty of a region. Agents of the Spanish crown had varying experiences across an incredibly large empire, and brought the lessons learned in prior assignments to the Northwest Coast. Despite a lack of missionary effort and little or no opportunity for the Spanish crown to make a profit on the Northwest Coast, the Spanish presence here should be considered a success. If the reactions of the Nuu-chah-nulth and other First Nations in the region are any indicator the Spanish became an accepted part of the political make up of Nootka Sound. Ships of all nations who visited the Spanish outpost at Nootka found it prudent to defer to the Spanish flag until the British ensign was run up an impromptu flag pole on the beach of Friendly Cove in 1795. Spain did all it could to promote its empire in the years it was active on the Northwest Coast, and within that context, the Spanish effort can not at all be considered unique.

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[62] Archer, "Retreat from the North," *B.C. Studies*, no. 37, (Spring 1978): 23.

Chapter 2: Exploration and Power in the Strait of Juan de Fuca

> 1st: The principal and almost only objective of your commission (entirely subordinated to His Excellency) is that of exploring all the internal channels of the strait of Fuca, giving priority to the maximum penetration of the sea or navigable rivers towards the east to decide once and for all the excessively confused and complicated questions of the communication or proximity of the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic in this parallel [of latitude]. Afterwards, a secondary objective is to look into the veracity of the words of the English Captain Meares in relation to the discoveries of the Lady Wasington [sic] and the Princesa Real and finally ascertain for the true utility of Geography what are the true limits of the continent and how far to the east the archipelago extends, which so far has been explored between 48 and 56 of latitude.
>
> -Alexandro Malaspina. Corvette Descubierta, 6th of December, 1791. Instructions for Srs. Dionisio Galiano and Don Cayetano Valdes, commanders of the goletas Mexicana and Sutil of the Royal Navy.[1]

The Spanish exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and its adjacent waterways form part of the last imperial expansion undertaken by Spain prior to the collapse of the empire at the start of the nineteenth century. The Northwest Coast, first visited by Spaniards in 1774 and Englishmen in 1778, had been an important location of trade and exploration since the mid 1780's. After 1789, the Northwest Coast became the center of an imperial contest between England and Spain. Both nations felt their legitimate claims to sovereignty had been violated by the other nation during the outbreak of the Nootka Crisis; which was precipitated when a provisional Spanish outpost at Nootka Sound seized British ships trading on the coast. The Northwest Coast came to epitomize the imperial notions of both nations. Spain felt a threat to its perceived northern holdings was one step away from a threat to its valuable mineral extraction sites in what is now Mexico, while England, slighted after the loss of its American colonies in the Revolutionary War (while Spain still managed to hold onto is massive American empire), looked to expand commercially and militarily into the Pacific.

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[1] John Kendrick, trans. *The Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana 1792: The last Spanish exploration of the northwest coast of America* (Spokane: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1991), 40-1.

During the years 1790-1792, the Salish Sea became central to the imperial competition between Spain and England. The Strait of Juan de Fuca was the last real possibility for a Northwest Passage, and its geography was central to determining the territorial limits of the competing empires. Due to its perceived importance, the Strait of Juan de Fuca was subject to concurrent and overlapping Spanish and British explorations, each with its own goals and expectations. Central to these explorations were three practices which allowed the Spanish and British to exert their concepts of imperial power over the region. These practices included cartography, naming, and especially in the case of the Spaniards, relations with local indigenous peoples.

Historian David Weber notes that despite the failure of Spain to retain any aspect of control or sovereignty over the coast, "it is interesting and instructive to see how Spain played the game –what it did and how and why it lost."[2] This is especially true in the context of the historiography that exists to date on the subject of the Pacific Northwest. The historical consciousness of the coast is dominated by English-speaking writers. These authors naturally write about the British exploration, military and economic endeavors that took place on the Northwest Coast. While this perspective is understandable, these narratives mis- and under-represent other nationalities, including in most cases, First Nations and the Spanish, giving the narratives an incomplete and ahistorical feel. Writings such as these, place "others," whether they are indigenous or peoples of a different European nationality, in a historical void where they operate outside the historical forces and processes that informed their situations and leads to their mis-representation in the literature.[3] The actions of people and communities can only be understood if they are properly characterized within the social and historical framework in which they lived and existed.

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[2] David Weber, "The Spanish Moment in the Pacific Northwest" in *Terra Pacifica: People and Place in the Northwest States and Western Canada.* Paul W. Hirt ed. Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1998, 4.

By examining the expression of Spanish imperial power during the explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca from a post-modern perspective, an understanding of the deployment of Spanish imperial power and Spanish-Native interaction emerges where both groups can be examined in their own cultural settings. Despite the records of the explorations being almost exclusively Spanish, this does not completely undermine efforts to understand Spanish-Native relations. As Spanish historian Fernanado Monge notes "such ethnocentrism [of the Spanish journal writers] today does not impede the excellent description and analysis of what is conserved –if we contextualize it in its moment- of many of the cultures visited."[4]

My methods for examining Spanish-native interaction throughout this thesis, in the context of the deployment of Spanish imperial power, will be a combination of the "microstoria assumptions" laid out by David Boje and the concept of dialogism/intertextuality developed by Mikhail Bakhtin.[5] The assumptions of Microhistory include a rejection of universalizing grand narratives, an examination of local ways of knowing and being, the acceptance of a reality and historical process outside of the text, and the belief in the power of archival research to rescue unknown histories from oblivion.[6] This historical principal combines easily with the concept of dialogism, which assumes that every act and utterance is a form of dialogue.[7] As John Lutz states, "dialogism focuses on the interactive aspect of speech . . . nothing is said that does not take the listener into account."[8] This is especially true in the case of Spanish journals of exploration that were created during their sojourns on the Northwest Coast and into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. All the journals were created with the knowledge that they would be read by superiors in Mexico.

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[3] For example Patricia E. Roy and John Herd Thompson, "Contesting Empires: Prehistory to 1858," in *British Columbia: Land of Promises* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2005) which completely and erroneously mis-represent the Spanish presence on the NW coast.

[4] Fernando Monge, *En la Costa de la Niebla: El Piasaje y el Discurso Ethnografico Ilustrado de la Expedicion Malaspina en el Pacifico*. (Coleccion Tierra Nueva e Cielo Nuevo No. 44, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Instituto de Historia: Departmento de Historia de America, 2002), 83.

It must be understood that the dialogical relation in the journals is twofold when referencing First Nations. First, there is the dialogism between the Spanish journal writers and the Native peoples that they are interacting with. Second, there is the knowledge in the act of recoding, that whatever is going to be put to paper will be scrutinized by superiors. As Monge explains, the image that emerges in the Spanish journals is of the "intermediary who transmits their own vision of the cultures of the Northwest Coast through which they display their mode of trying to understand the 'other.'"[9] This can be expanded slightly in the case where individual journals formed the official record for the voyage. In such situations, ship's officers would have to sign off on the veracity of the account presented in the journal.[10] Cases such as these are both a blessing and a curse for historians. Sworn veracity of the journal allows a reader to approach the statements contained therein as factual representations (from within their own culture) free of the editorial homogenization that characterizes many British accounts of exploration.[11] Meanwhile, however, the individual assumptions and experiences of the various other officers and crew are lost in the totalizing statements of the senior officer writing the journal.

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[5] David M. Boje, "Microstoria analysis" in *Narrative Methods for Organizational and Communication Research.* (London: Sage Publications, 2001); Tzvetan Todorov, "Intertextuality" in *Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogical Principle, Theory and History of Literature*, Vol. 13. Wlad Godzich trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984)

[6] Boje, "Microhistoria analysis", 47.

[7] John Lutz, *Makuk: A New History of Aborigional-White Relations* (UBC press, 2008), 16.

[8] Ibid., 21.

[9] Monge, *En la Costa de la Niebla*, 138. Author's Translation.

Understanding the differences between how the Spanish and other European nations wrote about 'others' is important for the examination of the Spanish journals relating to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Spain is often criticized for not publishing the outcomes of the voyages of discovery it undertook throughout its colonial endeavours. Many English-speaking authors assume a simple policy of secrecy emanating from the Spanish Crown, which did not allow for the publication of the journals from voyages of exploration.[12] While this may have been true of an earlier period, by the time Spain explored the Northwest Coast, the government in Spain made public the outcome of most of the voyages of exploration.[13] When the results of explorations were suppressed, there were often other factors involved, most importantly economic interests.[14] England, on the other hand, carefully controlled what and how the information about its voyages of discovery was disseminated, thereby trying to demonstrate its "own pre-eminence over other nations who were in possession of a strategic area."[15] The differences however, do not only apply to writing about competing claims in strategic frontiers. When it came to writing about indigenous peoples Monge notes:

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[10] An excellent example is the sworn statement at the end of the Perez Journal for 1774, in Herbert Beals, *Juan Perez on the Northwest Coast: Six Documents of his Expedition in 1774.* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1989)

[11] Ian MacLaren, "Exploration/Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Author," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 5 (Spring, 1992).

[12] See for example the criticisms of the policy in Warren L. Cook. *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 530-2.

[13] For example the results of the 1774 and 1775 expeditions were published in Madrid and London. Freeman Tovell, *At the Far Reaches of Empire: The Life of Juan Francisco de la Bodega Y Quadra.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 44, 46-7.

[14] Monge *En la Costa de la Niebla.,* 85. Author's Translation

> The diaries and memorials of the Spanish do not only accentuate, like everyone else, the exotic and rarity of the cultures visited, but also they put a greater emphasis on the diplomatic relations and general good understanding, such as with their alliance with the King of Spain.[16]

These claims to links between the crown and indigenous peoples on the strategic edges of empire worked to undermine the interests of other European nations and aided in the defence and development of the interior of the empire.[17]

The Spanish documents relating to the Pacific Northwest have some pecular characteristics that must be understood before examining of the sources. Spanish journals of exploration have much more of an "official" character, than the journals written by other foreigners, who had a mind towards publication. The Spanish journals were, to a certain degree, more professional and geared to "administrative functions, cold with no thought of publication, or use as a tool for political propaganda."[18] Journal entries that had to do with indigenous peoples carried with them a "series of particularities that originated out of Spain's cultural traditions."[19] These included the notion of true and precise "natural histor[ies]" of illustrated diaries of voyages, and concepts for the exploitation of the region, distinct from what other European crowns had expressed. Over the century, Spanish accounts were slowly acquiring naturalistic traits that would become predominant across Europe in the Romantic period.[20] What is most important to take into account is how the written Spanish texts "show us the characteristics of the visited cultures from lens of the explorers national and cultural, as well as personal interests and obsessions."[21] Contact on the coast was always a high tension affair, understanding and compromise (the two themes that show up in the journals most often) were highly performative, and actions were carried out and understood within different cultural precepts.[22]

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[15] Ibid. AT
[16] Ibid. AT
[17] Ibid. AT
[18] Ibid., 86. AT
[19] Ibid., 89. AT

The Spanish journals relating to their explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca were the outcomes of a historical process that had been developing over a century. From William Draper's 1697 *A New Voyage Round the World,* until 1798, when both La Perouse and Vancouver had their journals published, a change in the way the Pacific was written about can be discerned. The people of the Pacific by 1697 were considered either ignorant pagans, or providers of goods and services.[23] By the late eighteenth century, Europe desired a different kind of empire. The old perspective of church and conquest shifted to one of missionization and commerce, with the missions taking a less important role than the commercial interests.[24] Spanish journals in particular experienced a significant change in style after the 1783 publication of a French atlas entitled *Encyclopedie methodique ou par ordre de matieres* by Masson de Morvilliers. In the atlas, Spain comes under heavy criticism in an article entitled '*Geographie moderne'* for embodying the dark and reactionary characteristics of earlier times.[25] Morvilliers' atlas urges Spain to play its part in the advance of modern science and knowledge. This criticism generated a "wave" of articles in response, and inspired an institutional change in the way Spanish journals were composed that included an increased scientific element.[26] The dialogism of the journals can then be combined with the cartographic outcomes of the Spanish explorations in order to build a fairly comprehensive understanding of how the Spanish understood and deployed their imperial power.

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 95.
[22] John Lutz, "First Contact as a Spiritual Performance: Aboriginal—Non-Aboriginal Encounters on the North American West." in John Lutz, ed., *Myth and Memory: Rethinking Stories of Indigenous-European Contact* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 30-45.
[23] Monge, *En la Costa de la Niebla.,* 83.
[24] Ibid.

Another type of dialogue closely related to the process of journal writing is cartography. It is generally assumed that to map an area is to appropriate it, which brings the previously unknown area/region into alignment with an ordered Western conception of the world. Maps are merely one type of dialogue in a world that is completely socially constructed. As J.B. Harley has explained, "maps are a way of conceiving, articulating, and structuring the human world which is biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon particular sets of social relations."[27] Much has been written on the cartography of George Vancouver and the influence his maps had on later colonial developments in British Columbia. It was his maps that were used by the British during the Oregon boundary dispute to effectively argue for British sovereignty over the area around the 49th parallel.[28] As Harley makes clear, it is through maps that "political power is most effectively reproduced, communicated and experienced."[29] For the British, this power was expressed "by the centering of particular types of knowledge[e.g. maps] for political ends. . . [which] tied the Pacific to ideas about the national good, and . . . filtered out issues of Native territoriality."[30] Vancouver's maps turned the unknown into the known, chaos into order, and the native world into the European world, without the difficulty of the viewer being present.

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[25] Ibid., 86.

[26] Ibid.

[27] J.B. Harley, "Maps, knowledge and power" in *The Iconography of Landscape,* D. Cosgrove and S. Daniels eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 277-312.

[28] Daniel Clayton, *Islands of Truth, the Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vacouver: UBC Press, 2000), 166.

[29] Harley, "Maps, knowledge and power," 279.

Recently, Daniel Clayton has critically engaged the cartography of the Vancouver expedition. Clayton argues that Vancouver created maps which were bound up with British colonialism and imperialism. Whether Vancouver knew it or not, his maps were desocializing the region he was mapping in a way that connected his cartography with British sovereignty and worked around or ignored "Native geopolitical dynamics."[31]

Combined with Vancouver's cartography was the process of assigning British names to the places delineated. This process, Clayton explains, created "a cartographic and toponymic totality that was deployed for political purposes [and] connected Vancouver Island to a broader imperial horizon. . . Vancouver made Vancouver Island British rather than Spanish, American or Native."[32] Vancouver ignored maritime fur traders, thinking of them as adventurers who had no time to make accurate maps. The Spanish he distrusted, and his maps make no mention of the numerous Native villages he visited or the place names told to him by the Natives. Clayton explains that by the end of the entire process

> the Admiralty engravers produced a chart that displays the technical skill of the British Admiralty but hardly anything of the contact process. In effect, this chart suppresses the idea that the Spanish had mapped the region, that Vancouver had traversed Native Space, and that Native

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[30] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 183.
[31] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 192.
[32] Ibid., 194.

> peoples and traders were in close proximity of each other's ways.[33]

Vancouver's cartography highlights his and Britain's presence on the coast. As Clayton points out, this project was what Harley called the "anticipatory geography of colonialism."[34]

Where, then, does this leave the Spanish cartography of the Northwest Coast? The Spanish cartography of the coast was at once very similar to the British project that would be carried out in 1792, and also very different. On a basic level the Spanish maps do the same thing as the British maps, that is, appropriate the region. At the same time, whereas Vancouver's maps anticipated the strong advance of the British Empire into the area over the next hundred years, Spanish imperial dominance of the Pacific Northwest never came to pass. The Spanish efforts to map the region were part of a larger colonial discourse amongst European nations over which should have sovereignty in the region. With the Spanish lacking any extensive presence on the ground, Graham Huggan and Homi Bhabba have identified this type of colonial discourse as "agonistic rather than an antagonistic mode whose effect is not to reinforce colonial authority but rather to produce a form of hybridization which mimics that authority."[35] It is important to recognize that there are critical distinctions between the imperial maps produced by the major European powers which involve the scope of spatial discourse contained therein. This discourse involves who is doing the mapping, who is being mapped, who is reading the maps, and

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[33] Ibid., 202.

[34] Ibid., 203.

[35] Graham Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and the Cartographic Connection," *Ariel* 20, 4 (1989): 115-31, quote from 116.

"how, socially, politically, and geographically do these social actors stand in relation to each other."[36]

The explorations that were carried out by the Spanish in 1790 and especially 1791 can be seen as the beginning of the second round of what has been called European 'cycles of accumulation' in regards to exploration. The idea behind these cycles was that voyages of exploration would bring back or dispatch charts and other measurements to Europe. These documents were to provide information regarding not only the landscape but also the human and natural inhabitants of the region. This accumulation allowed knowledge to be kept in a 'center' and distributed to subsequent expeditions, allowing those expeditions to deal with the people and the places visited from a position of power.[37]

The year 1791 can be seen as the start of the second round of the cycle of accumulation for the Spanish on the Northwest Coast. When Ramón Saavedra brought the *San Carlos* to Nootka with supplies and instructions for Eliza in the spring of 1791, included with the instructions was a 'general map' of the entire Northwest Coast from California to Alaska. This map, drawn by Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra for the Malaspina expedition, showed for the first time the Northwest Coast with some accuracy from Baja California to the Aleutians. The map was to help "avoid the confusion which up to that time, had been caused by everyone removing old names and giving new ones," and formed the backbone of the intense cartographic efforts that the Spanish carried on for the next three years (1791-1793).[38] This cartographic centralization was reinforced by a centralization of the documentation relating to the Spanish efforts on the Northwest Coast. Late in 1790, while overwhelmed by the Nootka Crisis, Viceroy Revilla Gigedo placed Antonio Mourelle in charge of organizing the massive amount of correspondence relating to the Spanish on the Northwest Coast up to that time. Royal orders, instructions, journals, reports and other miscellaneous documentation relating to the Spanish efforts on the Northwest Coast were compiled by Mourelle "into one consecutive corpus, eliminating repetitions, and making a more readily comprehensible source."[39]

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[36] James Akerman, "Introduction" in *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire* James Akerman ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 6.

[37] Clayton, *Islands of Truth,* 182.

Little is known about how the Spanish maps of the Northwest Coast were produced. As suggested earlier, they were both very much the same, and at the same time different from the charts that were produced as a result of British visits to the region. One of the principal differences was that Vancouver's charts were engraved by the Admiralty in order to enter the public domain and discourse surrounding British imperialism, whereas the Spanish charts were produced by the officers who had done the exploring as a private discourse amongst themselves. The private, as opposed to public nature of the maps, limited what Clayton termed the "process of abstraction," by which (British) imperialism justified itself, a fact not lost on contemporary British commentators during the Nootka Crisis in the 1790's who decried the secrecy of the "Tyrant."[40]

Following the 1790 expedition to the Strait of Juan de Fuca under the command of Manuel Quimper, Pilot Gonzalo López de Haro was responsible for drawing up the charts that resulted from the voyage.[41] These included maps of San Juan Harbour, Sooke, Esquimalt, New Dungeness, Port Discovery, and Neah Bay. After returning to San Blas in November 1790, these sections would have been combined to form the *Plano* which formed the basis of the exploration the next year. The place names on the chart would have been done on location by Quimper, and for the most part honored members of the expedition or important officials in Mexico or Spain. These included the Viceroy the Conde de Revilla Gigedo and Antonio Valdez the Minister of the Navy.

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[38] "Bodega to Eliza, March 12, 1791," in H.R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca.* (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 140.

[39] Warren L. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 303.

[40] Daniel Clayton, "The Creation of Imperial Space in the Pacific Northwest" *Journal of Historical Geography*, 26, 3 (2000): 327-350, 336.

The 1790 chart of the Strait of Juan de Fuca played an important role in the local and international Spanish presence in the strait. In the local context, Eliza carried at least one copy of this map with him in the *San Carlos* when he headed into the Strait of Juan de Fuca the following year. The chart allowed a continuation of the explorations of the year previously by revealing the open passageways at the end of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. While at the same time the chart also allowed the massive *San Carlos* to easily reach Esquimalt, where it could wait for the *Santa Saturnina* to finish exploring Barkley Sound and rendezvous with it there. Later, during the explorations in 1791, it was again this chart along with the recommendation of Pilot Juan Carrasco who had been on the previous expedition which was used by Eliza to guide his decision to transfer the base of operations from Esquimalt to Port Discovery so that they would have easier access to the *Canal de Fidalgo*. This was one of the few times that a Spanish chart of a part of the Northwest Coast was used by a subsequent expedition. In most cases, due to the limited period the Spanish were active on the Northwest Coast, the Spanish would visit a location, chart it, and then never return.

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[41] The description of the *Plano del Estrecho de Fuca* (1790) states that it was drawn by Haro.

In an international context, the 1790 chart was incorporated into a map prepared under the direction of Viceroy Revilla Gigedo. This map was created in late 1790 in order to fix a demarcation line between the British and Spanish on the Northwest Coast (see Appendix: Map 1). The proposed boundary ran directly north from the entrance of the Strait of Fuca to 60° latitude; which would have ceded Nootka to the British as per the terms of the 1790 convention. At the same time it protected the unexplored interior of the Strait of Fuca and all points south from unwelcome foreign (British) intrusion.[42] In the end, the proposal of a border between English and Spanish possessions at the Strait of Juan de Fuca came to nothing. While at Nootka Sound in 1792, Bodega y Quadra quickly realized how unsuitable Neah Bay would be for a base. At the same time, Vancouver refused to enter into any sort of negotiations on a demarcation line, rendering the proposed border useless.[43]

The Spanish attempt to enforce a boundary at the Strait of Juan de Fuca highlights what one author has called the "irony of imperial map making." Matthew Edney has defined imperial maps as ironic, due to how they present notions of power. Maps of far off territories, or in this case, the attempted creation of a border along the Strait of Juan de Fuca, are ironic because they are tied to national discourses and peoples who did not even inhabit the depicted territory.[44] The irony is furthered by the fact that the map, as demonstrated when the negotiations between Bodega and Vancouver broke down, only played a superficial role in the imperial discourse. As Edney explains, "the construction, normalization, and naturalization of 'states' and 'empires' depends neither on the content of the map nor on cartographic technologies but rather how they are deployed within spatial discourses."[45] Maps were but one tool in the arsenal of imperial creation. Beyond mapping, empire is created on the foundation of inequality, subordination, and distinction.[46] These were characteristics that the Spanish were unable to bring to the Pacific Northwest due to their limited time in the region. In fact, one eighteenth-century Spanish theologian warned of the madness of assumption that holding a map of a region was tantamount to holding dominion over the said region.[47] Instead of being considered tools of alienation, maps can, and in the case of the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* are, productions of hybrid knowledge which is representative of local power relations.[48]

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[42] An excellent copy of the map is located between p.60-1, in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca.*

[43] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 301-3, 366; Tovell, *At the Far Reaches of Empire*, 194-5, 253.

[44] Matthew Edney, "The Irony of Imperial Mapping" in *The Imperial Map* James Akerman ed., 38.

The 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* or 'Chart that details…' is one of the most recognizable and oft-cited maps the Spanish produced during their time in the Pacific Northwest. (see Appendix: Map 2.) The expedition that was responsible for collecting the data which would make the creation of the chart possible will be detailed in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. What will be covered now will be the actual physical production of the map and how it shows the local power relations between the Spanish and local First Nations and how these processes differed from Vancouver's maps of the region.

Creating maps of unknown regions was a difficult task in the eighteenth century. It was an inexact science that caused numerous errors. While not entirely important when considering cartography as a projection of imperial power, it is still relevant to understand how these maps were made and what sort of cartographic errors were created as a result. The basic method of charting as practiced by the sailors serving in the Spanish navy, such as Quimper or Narváez, involved first taking up a position, know as a 'station,' at some point along the coast. From a station, compass bearings of prominent features would be taken and recorded. The ship would then move along the coast until taking up another station where the same points which had been surveyed previously would have their bearings taken again. The line between the two stations would form the baseline. When the length and orientation of the baseline were known, the intersections of the bearing taken at each station would be enough to triangulate the position of the points.[49]

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[45] Ibid., 12-13.
[46] Ibid., 40.
[47] Ibid., 25.
[48] Ibid., 16.

Unfortunately, this type of surveying tended to propagate four distinct errors which inhibited the creation of an accurate chart. These errors included issues of scale, orientation, location and triangulation. Scaling errors occurred when the length of the baseline was improperly calculated and tended to make linear distances under or over estimated. This did not, however, have an effect on the shape of the region surveyed. Errors in orientation were the result of taking bearings from a compass reading off magnetic North and then orienting the position on the chart to true North. This orientation caused a rotation of the chart segment when it was incorporated into the larger chart. There were also errors in location, or more specifically errors in latitude and longitude. Determining latitude in the eighteenth century was a fairly simple process, but calculating the correct longitude of locations remained difficult and time consuming. Once the longitude of one location was determined, it was common to measure other points based on the distance from the first point to the others and apply the distances to a longitude scale. Alejandro Malaspina had accurately fixed the longitude of Friendly Cove at

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[49] Nick Doe, "Some Anomalies in a Spanish Chart of Vancouver Island 1791" *Lighthouse* 56, (Fall 1997): 7-20.

Nootka Sound at 21° 20’ west of the meridian established at San Blas on the Mexican coast. This was only helpful, however, if the other map segments also had properly scaled latitude and longitude, which normally did not occur during ship-board surveys. Errors in triangulation were the result of mishandling compass bearing measurements, usually due to the same problems which affected measuring scale. All of these issues appeared on the Spanish charts of the region and specifically the 1791 *Carta*.[50]

In addition to the errors mentioned above and significant to the 1791 *Carta* were errors inherent in the process of its construction. The 1791 *Carta* was the final outcome of an intense surveying season that produced at a minimum 5 different charts of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Georgia up to the region of present day Comox. These include three *Carta Pequena*’s (CP), ‘small maps’, or drafts which were drawn up by various officers to be sent with letters to friends or patrons demonstrating their activities over past months.[51]

One CP was drawn by Narváez and another by Pantoja which is obviously a copy of Narváez’s. Lopez de Haro also created a CP similar to the other two, although Nick Doe suggests that this CP cannot be a copy of the first two because it lacks latitude and longitude scales (see Appendix: Maps 3-5).[52] This assertion is tenuous at best, as the lack of latitude and longitude scales on the CP depends on which copy is being examined. The copy of Pantoja’s log and CP which stayed in Mexico and is now housed in the Bancroft Library at Berkley lacks the scales as mentioned, but the original forwarded to Madrid includes latitude and longitude scales.[53] There is also a curious and little known

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[50] Doe, “Some Anomalies in a Spanish Chart” *Lighthouse* 56, 8-9.

[51] Nick Doe, “The Origin of Gabriola’s Name” *Shale* No. 8, June 2004, 12-28.

[52] Ibid., 24.

[53] Ibid., 19; Museo Naval, Madrid. MSS 331

Carta Esferica (see Appendix: Map 6.) drawn by an undetermined hand (most likely Carrasco), and the final and well known *Carta que Comprehende*.

With the exception of the *Carta Esferica,* all of these maps were comprised of numerous field sketches, of which few survive. In an attempt to rectify the errors on the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende,* amateur historian Nick Doe attempted to plot all of the points given on the chart and correct their positions using modern latitude and longitude. It was hoped by attempting to realign these points that unidentifiable features on the map would then become identifiable as they moved to their modern co-ordinates.[54] While this attempt only produced a moderate correction to the chart, Doe's plotting revealed similar localized errors of the kinds discussed previously. By grouping the localized errors together, Doe was able to identify which segments of the map belonged to which field survey. He used this method to identify 18 different surveys, although this number is an approximation as some points included in one survey could easily belong to another.[55] Still, all of this information is useful when determining how the 1791 *Carta* was created.

Once the 1791 expedition had concluded its reconnaissance of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Georgia Strait, José Narváez was explicitly transferred to the *San Carlos* under the command of Francisco Eliza so "that he might assist also in finishing the many charts which have to be made."[56] Once the *San Carlos* arrived at Friendly Cove on August 30th of that year, Narváez, along with José Antonio Verdia (another Pilot who had been on the *Santa Saturnina* while exploring Georgia Strait), Pantoja and Eliza all would have begun the task of compiling the charts of the expedition.[57] The members of the expedition had just over a month, from August 31st until October 15th to complete their charts. These charts which would have included some of the CP's previously mentioned, were then placed in water-tight tubes for transport to San Blas on the *San Carlos* under the command of Ramon Saavedra.[58] After a difficult voyage during which the *San Carlos* essentially ran out of food, the ship and the charts reached San Blas on December 22nd, where Carrasco began the process of compiling the 1791 *Carta*.

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[54] Doe, "Some Anomalies in a Spanish Chart" *Lighthouse* 56, 9.

[55] Ibid., 12.

[56] Juan Pantoja, "Extract of the Navigation" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 181.

A significant aspect of the creation of any map, including the 1791 *Carta*, is the process of naming features. Naming offered interesting opportunities for those involved in the process. As Paul Carter states about James Cook's voyages, naming is "an opportunity to memorialize all the historical and personal facts that converged and found their historical climax in the voyage."[59] In this regard, there were significant differences in the ways the English and the Spanish used naming to appropriate space and legitimize empire. For the British, specifically Cook and later Vancouver, naming a place became part of the narrative of the voyage. Naming was as integral as the journal when the narrative was put into print and entered public discourse, which allowed for an intellectual appropriation of the place by people with no links to the region.[60]

Spain constructed imperial space in a slightly different manner than the British. As one author has explained, England practiced an empire of exclusion while Spain's empire was based on inclusion.[61] Since the beginning of the conquest, the principal mode of Spanish colonization involved founding cities in the midst of native territory to facilitate spiritual conversion and labour needs. British America, on the other hand, was founded on the necessity of the absence of native peoples. This method is seen in the creation of the border between British North America and native territories along Appalachian Mountains. Population demographics support this idea of inclusive versus exclusive imperial space as well. It was common for Spaniards in the new world to inter-marry with indigenous women, while it was rare for Englishmen to do so, especially in the region which would become the United States. By 1770 it is estimated that 56% of the population of Spanish America was indigenous, compared to only 6% in the British holdings.[62] These differences between the Spanish and the British in the makeup and conception of their empires affected how discoveries were named.

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[57] Ibid., 195. Pantoja states that it was Narvaez, Verdia and himself who had been working on the maps while at Nootka, but it can be assumed that Eliza oversaw the production of these charts.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An essay in Spatial History* (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), 6.

[60] Brian Richardson, *Longitude and Empire: How Captain Cook's Voyages Changed the World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 9, 30.

[61] J.H. Elliot, *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 160.

When the *Carta Pequeñas* of the Spanish explorations in the Salish Sea were compiled at Friendly Cove, the narrative of the explorations played a significant role in the naming and portrayal of the locations. Locations such as *Sucia, Mal Abrigio,* and *Socorro*, all denoted physical features or important events in the exploration. When these maps arrived at San Blas and were given to Juan Carrasco in order to compile a general chart (the much discussed 1791 *Carta que Comprehende*), names were changed or added that minimized the narrative aspect and instead focused on making the names on the map politically appropriate.

In San Blas, Carrasco would have been aided in his creation of the 1791 *Carta* by Pantoja who came down to San Blas on the *San Carlos* with Saavedra. Input for the map's creation also would have come from Lopez de Haro, and Bodega y Quadra. Due to the importance of the discoveries made that summer and the upcoming negotiations with Vancouver, it has also been suggested that Viceroy Revilla Gigedo also may have had input into the creation of the map.[63]

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[62] Ibid., 150.

The 1791 *Carta* must have been based off of a draft that we no longer have, possibly the map that went missing with Narváez's journal. The strongest evidence of this we have is the fact that Lopez de Haro's *Pequeña Carta* is not a copy of the Narváez or Pantoja *Pequeña Cartas* that still exist.[64] Instead of accepting the on the spot naming which was generally the practice when new areas were mapped, names were applied to the 1791 *Carta* after consultations between the previously mentioned officials. While some of the early names were preserved at least two were rejected (including the first name for Texada Island, *San Felix*). Fourteen locations were named after high-ranking officials in the military and navy, five were members of the Spanish government during the explorations, five locations along the east side of the Strait of Georgia were named after saints (only two were named for saint's days that occurred during the time frame of the exploration), five were descriptive, and two locations were named after persons who are now unknown.[65]

An important aspect of the 1791 *Carta* that differentiates it from Vancouver's cartography is the inclusion of native space. As opposed to the erasure practiced in Vancouver's cartography, Spain's need of native assistance to enforce their conception of sovereignty meant that their map was dotted with First Nation villages. Along with the presence of villages, especially in the region of Nootka Sound, the native names for locations have been preserved on the chart. Also as will be seen during the explorations of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds in the summer of 1791, where the Spanish took time to follow local indigenous protocols their cartographic efforts were generally successful, as opposed to the difficulties they had when they showed up in a location unannounced or uninvited. At the time the chart may have been a form of dialogue which, while it did not directly include the residents of the region being mapped, they were at least present in the minds of the map makers and readers. Instead of Vancouver's maps, which made an exclusively British space, the 1791 *Carta* created a space that was Spanish as well as native.

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[63] Doe, "The Origin of Gabriola's Name" *Shale* 8, (June 2004): 17.
[64] Ibid., 24.
[65] Ibid., 25-26.

Rather than creating an appropriated space, the Spanish created a hybrid space. This effort at hybridism can especially be seen in the Spanish efforts to collect the native place names of the locations that they visited. The Spanish knew that their place names would have no meaning for the local inhabitants, so most voyages of exploration carried lists of the supposed native names for different locations.[66] In many cases, the Spanish names were merely a Hispanicization of local indigenous names. For instance, the full Spanish name for today's Port Renfew was *Puerto de San Juan de Pachina*, an excellent attempt at preserving the native name of Pacheena for the location.[67]

As this chapter has demonstrated, the Spanish deployment of imperial power on the Pacific Northwest Coast depended on its own unique characteristics. The deployment of dialogism, cartography and naming in this thesis, will emphasize that while British and Spanish colonialisms shared some characteristics, they were also the unique outcome of their previous colonial endeavors. The erasure of Cook and Vancouver's cartography stands in stark contrast to the efforts of the Spanish. During this period the British were working on forcing their way into the Pacific as a means to expand their empire after the loss of their important colonies on the eastern seaboard of the Atlantic. Spain on the other hand was trying to preserve its empire and (at first) was dragged unwillingly into the region. These two goals of expansion and preservation influenced the actions of the historical actors present on the coast during this period. British actions created an exclusive place whose inhabitants had little importance in the imperial aspirations of the nation, while the Spanish created a hybrid space where they recognized and depended on the local population for the preservation of themselves and their empire.

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[66] Cecil Jane, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the Northwest Coast of America* (New York: DeCabo Press, 2nd ed. 1971), 35.

[67] Pantoja, "Extract of the Navigation" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 185.

Chapter 3: Into the Unknown; Spain and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 1790

> "Today I sail only for the discovery of the Strait of Fuca; it is of much consideration."
>
> -Manuel Quimper, May 1st, 1790.

Before focusing on the Spanish explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca during 1790 and 1791, an earlier context of the European exploration of the Strait needs to be understood. Assuming that neither Francis Drake or Apostolos Valerianos (otherwise known as Juan de Fuca) visited the Salish Sea in the late sixteenth century, the first European to note the existence of the waterway was Captain Cook in 1778. On 22nd March of that year he named Cape Flattery at the South entrance to the Strait because it "flattered us [the ship] with the hopes of finding a harbour."[1] The first Europeans to recognize the Strait of Juan de Fuca as it is, were the British fur trader Charles Barkley and his wife Frances in 1787. After leaving Barkley Sound (named after them), in July 1787, Frances Barkley states in the fragments of her journal that survive: "we arrived off a large opening extending to the eastward . . . which my husband immediately recognized as the long lost strait of Juan de Fuca, and to which he gave the name of the original discoverer."[2]

After continuing to trade southward along the coast, Barkley returned to Macao where John Meares was outfitting for a voyage to the Northwest Coast. From Charles Barkley, Meares obtained a copy of his journal and map, which allowed him to make his own claim to the 'discovery' the Strait of Fuca on the 29th of June, 1788.[3] That afternoon Meares sailed to the South side of the Strait of Fuca and had the first recorded European meeting with Chief Tatoosh, whom he labeled as "barbarous, savage, and [of] frightful appearance."[4] Four years later the Spanish would describe the same person as "exceedingly friendly" and "very intelligent and well behaved."[5]

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[1] F.W. Howay, "Early Navigation of the Straits of Juan de Fuca" *The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society*. March 1911, Vol XII, No.1., 1-32., 2.

[2] Ibid., 8.

While he was still on the coast, Meares dispatched a long-boat under the command of one of his officers, a Mr. Dufferin, who was charged with carrying out an exploration of the Strait. This expedition on the 13th of July 1788, made it as far as Port Renfrew (named by the Spanish as Port San Juan), before being attacked by local indigenous people and forced to retreat.[6] The next European in the Strait was Charles Duncan aboard the *Princess Royal,* who spent 2 days in 1788 anchored in Neah Bay (called by Duncan Claaset). The chart that he produced and which was later published in England indicates that Duncan made it a few miles beyond Port Renfrew, and he was informed by the native peoples of Claaset that the Strait of Fuca ended in a sea that extended both North and South.[7]

Robert Gray Captain of the *Washington* also entered the Strait of Juan de Fuca late in the fur-trading season in 1789. Gray reported to George Vancouver in 1792 that he had been 50 miles into the Strait, and had returned the way he had entered, discounting Meares' claim that Gray had sailed around the island.[8] The fifty miles Gray is said to have traveled is countered by Robert Haswell (one of Gray's officers) who stated that

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[3] Ibid., 12.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 13.
[7] Ibid., 16.
[8] Ibid., 18.

Gray sailed 4 leagues, or 12 miles into the Strait, but to go any further "would have been the height of imprudence."[9] From these antecedents it is probable that the Spanish explorations of the Strait of Fuca were carried out in a region where First Nations had knowledge of, but very little experience dealing with European intrusion.

The first Spanish exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca was very similar to the other early European explorations. In June 1789, after the *Iphigenia Nubiana* and the *Northwest America* had been arrested by Martínez, preparations were made to send the *Northwest America,* renamed the *Santa Gertrudis,* to the Strait of Juan de Fuca to confirm its existence.[10] On the 21st of June, 1789, Second Pilot José María Narváez commanded the little schooner down the coast and into the Strait. With him was David Coolidge second mate of the *Lady Washington*, to act as an interpreter, and it can be assumed guide as Robert Gray had already been in the vicinity of the Strait.[11] An account of the voyage that is in the National Record Office of the Spanish Navy (AGM), which it seems Warren L. Cook did not have access to, outlines the extent of the exploration:

> Pilot José María Narváez . . . went to explore the coast from the port of Nootka until below 48 degrees to see if the Strait of Juan de Fuca did indeed exist, which in our time is the object of all the maritime nations of Europe, [in] which they suppose they could discover the desired passage to the *Mar Oceano* [Atlantic]. He entered more than 20 leagues, made a map of its coasts, and ports at the entrance, being the first Spaniard to have the glory of navigating its waters.[12]

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[9] Ibid., 28.

[10] Warren L. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-181* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 164.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Francisco Fuster Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America: California, Canada y Alaska (1765-1822) Aportacion Documental del Archivo General de la Marina. (*Murcia: Servicio de Publicaciones Universidad de Murcia, 1997). 292. Author's Translation.

As Warren Cook points out, this expedition did not go much further than Port Renfrew.[13] Even so, that does not diminish the perceived importance and excitement contained in the extract penned by Martínez. It was known at Nootka at this time that none of the maritime fur traders had penetrated any depth into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Martínez must have sensed an opportunity for Spain, not only to glorify itself, but also to solidify its position and claim to the coast. Martínez's enthusiasm for Narváez's expedition can be seen in his journal entry for July 5th 1789, reproduced entirely in the introduction to H.R. Wangner's *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*; where Martínez goes to great lengths to theorize how the Strait must link up with the Mississippi River, and its connections to the Strait of Admiral Bartholomew de Fonte, which Martínez was convinced he had discovered with Juan Perez in 1774 –today's Clarence Strait.[14] This introduction to the Strait of Juan de Fuca set the stage for the explorations over the next three years.

After Martínez abandoned Friendly Cove at the end of October 1789, leaving the cove empty of non-Natives for the winter, the new Viceroy Revilla Gigedo issued orders for the immediate re-occupation of the cove at the beginning of 1790. Three ships, the *Concepcion, San Carlos,* and *Princessa Real* (the captured *Princess Royal)* were dispatched from San Blas at the beginning of February. All three vessels had harrowing voyages to Nootka in the late winter/ early spring weather of the North Pacific.[15] After arriving at Nootka, but before setting out as commander of the 1790 expedition to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Manuel Quimper, who commanded the *Princessa Real,* wrote a letter to his brother in Lima, Peru that would later be published in one of the city's newspapers. The letter outlines the difficult conditions encountered on the sail from San Blas to Nootka, which were compounded by the poor sailing qualities of the schooner. The letter also demonstrates how Catholic spirituality permeated every aspect of life for the Spanish who came to the Northwest Coast. The letter is also interesting in that it is one of the few documents from the period of the Spanish on the Northwest Coast that was not in any way official. It was meant as a personal correspondence between brothers and although it may have been edited prior to being published in the paper, there is no indication that this had been done. It is interesting to see what parts of the voyage to Nootka Quimper thought important enough to communicate to his brother, mostly the stormy weather, and the 'new discoveries' that Quimper had accomplished. This interesting document also reveals how, even early in its existence, Nootka Sound and the outpost at Friendly Cove was being incorporated into and understood as a part of the larger Spanish empire. The letter reads:

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[13] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 164.

[14] Henry R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca* 2nd ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 5-9.

[15] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 276.

> Port of Santa Cruz de Nootka, 31st of May 1790.
>
> My esteemed brother: After my previous letter that sent news to you. The voyage that I was going to undertake from the Port of San Blas in the expedition that is making for Nootka and running of the entire Northern Coast, from 61 degrees to 48 degrees in which is situated the Strait of Juan de Fuca. This is comprised of a Frigate under the command of Don Francisco Eliza Lt. in the Royal Navy, Chief of the expedition, a Packetboat commanded by Don Salvador Fidalgo of the same rank, and a Schooner, seized from the English in the expressed port of Nootka, whose command I obtained.[16]

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[16] The frigate was the *Concepcion* and the packetboat the *San Carlos.* The seized schooner was the *Princess Royal* which had been on the Northwest Coast in 1788 and 89 under the command of Tomas Hudson, one

The 3rd of February of the current year at 10 in the evening we set sail for our destination. The 18th because of the slow speed of my boat the Commander of the expedition determined to leave me because of his precise [instructions] to fortify Nootka before any other nation; that which could not be accomplished if he gave the convoy to the Schooner[17]; the night of the 19th a storm befell me and I was obliged to ride it out for 36 hours; after which I continued with my navigation only in the harshness of winter with an eggshell, and this useless for all its parts[18], making a course to the mentioned Nootka which is situated at 49 degrees 37 minutes[19]: The equinox of March passed equally with nothing but pantaloons and [waterproof] capes with the temporary waste as the blows of the sea entered and exited inside [the schooner], in this arrangement I feared we would be de-masted, and therefore cause us to be a shipwreck: the 31st of the same month we found ourselves at mid day 33 leagues[20] from the land closest to us which was the port named Boiset[21], I continued with all sail around it, until 6 in the afternoon when there was summoned from the second quadrant the wind with a very bad quality, I prepared my equipment waiting for the results: At 9 in the evening the bull was in the plaza, maybe not the Schooner of the sea[22]: at 10 considering by my dead reckoning to be 20 leagues from the coast and the weather was charging every instant we were put closer to the cape[23]; at 2 in the morning the sailor on lookout at the bow called out: Land; in effect was not very far from us, then none the less the heavy fog that was around us did not leave any doubt, in that same moment I changed sail away until 5 in

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of the "Associated Merchants" in John Meares trading company. For an account of the seizure of the ship see Warren L. Cook *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819*, 177-9.

[17] By "giving the convoy to the schooner" Quimper meant that his superiors could not let the poor sailing *Princess Royal* dictate the speed of their sailing. The primary objective of the orders issued to Francisco Eliza by Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra was that Eliza should reach and fortify Nootka before any other European power. See Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 275.

[18] Quimper uses a variety of colloquialisms to describe the poor sailing ability of the schooner, this was one of them. The Spanish reads "seguí mi navegación solo en el rigor del invierno con un cascaron de huevo, y este inútil por todas sus partes".

[19] The exact location of Friendly Cove is Lat. 49°35'00", Long. 126°37'00". From http://ilmbwww.gov.bc.ca/bcgn-bin/bcg10?name=34082 (accessed Nov 19th, 2008)

[20] Later in the letter Quimper states that 2 miles =2 1/3 leagues. Which would make a league approximately 0.8 miles or .4 kms long.

[21] It seems evident that Quimper was North of what today is known as Brooks Peninsula. It appears on the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* as Pta. Boyse.

[22] Another colloquialism, Quimper here is comparing the movement of the ship to a bull. The Spanish reads : A las 9 de la noche ya estaba el toro en plaza, pues no cabía la Balandra de el mar

[23] Brooks Peninsula.

the morning when it calmed. We continued the 1st of April, Holy Thursday, and clearing a little discovered land; I turned with all sail to come back to it, in order to reconnoiter it with a light south wind until 4 in the afternoon when it cleared and we saw Boise Point that was off my South East at a distance of 15 to 16 leagues; for whose demarcation came the knowledge that these waters throw towards the North. [24] We took the corresponding demarcations and tacked to veer to be somewhat relaxed and refreshed the wind variable from the 3rd quadrant, ultimately declaring itself from the 2nd with stormy discharge; at 10 at night as we continued exiting the point of land taking distances of a league from the most northerly point that I demarcated, I found a new opening and in the last instant of our lives to find myself in the middle of an archipelago of islands[25], the wind with hurricane discharges, the sea very Gray, and for that reason we could not see in front of us which was the only will in the prayer, certainly by another way it is certain we would be on the rocks, I determined to pass scratching by the most distant island we had off our prow, which was 2 miles which is the same as 2 1/3 leagues but I was missing the jib, which the wind carried away.[26] In such an unhappy situation we expected no more remedy than the divine to which all of my people implored to the Mother of God of Carmelo which was the only hope that we had to safeguard us, supplicating that she conserve our ship[27], the lime we offered in recognition of such a sovereign favour, because if we failed this in the opening that we were going to enter by the canal of the 2nd isle, the last will to see if we would be saved of such manifest danger, although with the dissatisfaction of not knowing if the canal has a sufficient depth, reefs or high rocks, and being a night so gloomy we could barely distinguish the isles distant from us less than a mile, the charts do not show these islands but indicate a dotted coast that means unknown; maybe in reality I have been the first Spaniard that has discovered (by [near] fatal accident), from 50 degrees until 51 degrees 10 mins. And of all the nations the first that has strode between these islands, ultimately I embarked from the mentioned canal at 11 at night and at 11 ½(11:30) seeing myself safe of it I sang the *Salve A María Santisima* in an action of thanks, but yet I was on foot for my fear to not disregard where I had been put; because as I have outlined that I was the 1st to enter between these islands, I thought it prudent to judge that it was not enough to keep watch and as such maintained all of the people over the covers, the axes, anchors and cables ready; until 5:30 the morning of Holy Friday when it started to clear and I found myself in between seven islands, and giving infinite thanks to the Allpowerful, for the favor he had shown me, in whose powerful name I began to vacate myself from them, but the storm (that still existed) and the many currents would not allow me to leave. This conflict I maintained until the 4th Easter Sunday that I embarked by the canal of another 2 islands, achieving this way of exiting them; but offsetting me on the coast, at 6 in the afternoon befell the wind and a travesty of a sea so strong that it pushed me over the land in such a disposition that at 10 at night I was a league distant from it waiting for the instant when we would hit; but the Mother of God, whose favor we had implored, the wind freed us and so I freed myself of the coast, coming up 4 leagues from it.

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[24] Brooks Peninsula again, the prevailing wind and currents were keeping the Schooner North of the peninsula, the poor sailing qualities of the ship were making it difficult to round the cape.

[25] Quimper had rounded Brook's Peninsula and found himself in what is the myriad of islands that comprise Kyuquot Sound.

[26] It is quite obvious that the schooner was heavily damaged at this point.

[27] It is interesting to note the strong influence Catholic Spiritualism had on the ship's crews. The safe passage of vessels seemed to be attributed to divine intervention, as opposed to any sort of skill on the part of the officers and crew. While many scholars have discussed Native spiritual responses to the appearance of Europeans on the Coast it is important to keep in mind that Europeans also viewed and understood the world in spiritual terms as well.

The 6th I was distant 5 leagues from Nootka at 5 in the afternoon: and when I thought I would reach the port a disturbance that I saw obliged me to turn out until the next day when I came to anchor at 4 in the afternoon, with only a three day difference from the Frigate and Packet boat which anchored on the 4th.

These ships as well were almost lost entering this port almost without anchors, and with persistence stung the moorings of the coast.[28]

Today I sail only for the discovery of the Strait of Fuca; it is of much consideration.[29] Entrust me to God, to whom I beg he guards you many years.

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[28] While trying to enter Nootka Sound a boat from the *San Carlos* capsized drowning two sailors and both ships lost anchors trying to work their way into the Sound. See, W. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 276.

[29] No one knew where the Strait of Juan de Fuca led, and it was still believed that it could be the entrance to the fabled Northwest Passage.

> Manuel Quimper.[30]

The expedition into the Strait of Juan de Fuca which was undertaken in June 1790, under the command of Manuel Quimper in the *Princesa Real*, carried with it very specific journal instructions that reflected the increasing importance of natural science to the Spanish Crown. Although some historians have characterized the instructions as "worthless," they clearly laid out Quimper's objectives and his journal reflects his efforts to follow them.[31] The orders included directives to "examine and reconnoiter well the Strait of Fuca, which is what most interests [the Crown] because it is unknown where it leads and this should be the principal goal of your commission."[32] The instructions also carried provisions for making exact plans of the geography of the region, lists of natural objects, including insects and plants, and explicit instructions concerning First Nations. The two provisions in the instructions for encounters with First Nations included:

> 6th: Note the spirit, character, temperament and number of Indians that inhabit those lands, taking every measure possible to cultivate their friendship.
>
> 7th: Permit your crew to make exchanges with those natives, treating them with the greatest merriment and diplomacy; recover all the sea otter skins you find in exchange for the copper for which you are bringing, making an exact account of its distribution in return for the skins that you receive.[33]

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[30] This letter made its way to Lima, Peru where it was eventually published (probably by Quimper's un-named brother) in *Mercurio Peruano de la Historia, Literatura y Noticias Publicas que da la luz La Sociedad de Amantes de Lima.* No. 175. 6 Septiembre 1792.: 13-15.

[31] John Kendrick, "End of the Northern Mystery: The Spanish in Juan de Fuca and Beyond, 1790-1792." In *Malaspina 92 Jornadas Internacionales.* Mercedes Palau Baquero, Antonion Orozco Acuaviva eds. (Real Academia Hispano-Americana, 1994), 101.

[32] Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America*, 335.

[33] Ibid., 336. Author's Translation.

The ethnographic material present in the Quimper narrative becomes apparent very early in the voyage. While at Clayoquot Sound, Maquinna (who had removed himself from Nootka due to the Spanish presence) asked Quimper for a sail to be made for him so he could easily return to Nootka and visit the new Commandant Francisco Eliza. This Quimper did, not only for Maquinna, but also for Wickaninish. As Quimper states,

> although I had already presented him [Wickaninish] with two large sheets of copper and three yards of scarlet cloth I decided not to refuse him, as the friendship of this Indian is very advantageous, in view of the fact that the foreign vessels which come to this coast have their greatest trade.[34]

This exchange demonstrated two important facets of contact and the Spanish presence on the coast. On one hand, Quimper was eager to cultivate a friendship with Maquinna and Wickaninish in order to secure Spain's territorial claim. A t the same time this is an excellent example of Indigenous Peoples adopting European technology to their own needs. Wagner criticizes Quimper for spending "entirely too much time in Clayoquot Sound," but in the context of the trouble of the previous year, when Martinez shot Callicum the brother of Maquinna, Quimper's diplomatic efforts with Maquinna and Wickaninish, and his cartographic efforts that would allow other Spaniards to safely travel to Clayoquot, are completely justified.[35]

Quimper, with the aid of an informant named Tutuciaticuz, who he identified as the brother to Wickaninish, learned the approximate names of the fur traders whom had visited Clayoquot, valuable information for the Spanish at this time as they tried to get a grasp on the extent of the foreign fur-trade in the region.[36] An interesting performative aspect of contact was carried out by Quimper and the population of Wickaninish's village (Opitsat). Every night the ship would fire a swivel gun in order to warn the indigenous residents to stay away from the ship during the night. Each time this happened it was replied by one or two musket shots from on shore.[37] This could have been a reciprocal warning or salute by the Wickannish's people as they would have learned very quickly about the propensity of Europeans to salute each other with salvos when greeting or parting from each other's company.

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[34] Manuel Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage by Quipmper" in Henry R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 87.

[35] Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 16

While also at Clayoquot, Quimper's expedition carried out an approximate census of the inhabitants, along with a description of the village. Quimper indicates that each head of a household at Clayoquot was a brother of Wickaninish, and that the village contained more than 1000 people.[38] Quimper, and in the next year Juan Pantoja, combined to give a very detailed description of Wickaninish's house. They reported that the house was 90 feet long, and supported by three columns; the center being carved in a human figure, with the mouth acting as the door.[39] The houses of the village were said to be separated by "narrow alleys" which were necessary to travel in order to enter the house. The house was divided into three aisles, a central living space, and the two outside aisles that served as separated living quarters, which the Spanish assumed were separated by gender.[40] In a blatant example of the dialogism present in the journals, while commenting on the village at Clayoqout, Pantoja notes:

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[36] Quimper, "Dairy of the Voyage…", 87-8
[37] Ibid., 86-7
[38] Ibid., 85.
[39] Ibid., 85, 165-66.
[40] Ibid., 166.

> In order not to give any cause for suspicion we did not take the dimensions of the gallery, but in a view of its length and width and the numerous Indians who assisted at the function [the officers had just gone to a demonstration of song and dance] I have calculated that it is capable of lodging 900 to 1000 Indians.[41]

The dialogical aspect of the journal is apparent in Pantoja's navigation of space. He did not want to "give any cause for suspicion" by making detailed and scientific measurements of the house, but at the same time he was explaining and justifying his actions to the Viceroy, who would have the final say in judging Pantoja's actions.

While at Clayoquot, Quimper complained in the diary of not having enough boats to carry out reconnaissance missions in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In order to accomplish this, he purchased two indigenous canoes for 4 large sheets of copper and 28 paddles for another 2 sheets of copper.[42] There have never been any comments by historians about these purchases, but they should be noted. The common trope of contact is one where Europeans are identified with the ships they were sailing on, which helped delineate clear notions of European and Indigenous space.[43] It must be taken into account, that the first impression for many First Nations of the Spanish once inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca was one of White Europeans, and mestizo sailors arriving and being seen in an easily recognizable indigenous mode of transport.

It is important to recognize the Native world at Clayoquot into which the Spanish were entering. As explained by Daniel Clayton in his excellent article on the spatial politics of Clayoquot Sound, in the late pre-contact era Wickaninish had been expanding and consolidating his territory to include both Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds. While the

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 87.
[43] Aurora Perez Miguel, "Relaciones Diplomaticas de los Europeos con los Indios de la Costa Noroeste de America" in *Culturas de la Costa Noroeste de America*, 226-7.

Spanish were soliciting the friendship of Wickaninish to augment their claims to the coast, Wickaninish "expected traders [and the Spanish] to participate in his world of power and prestige . . . by attending feasts traders [and the Spanish] acknowledged his power and thereby confirmed his status".[44] Examples such as this are crucial for the use of European writing about Native culture. Alone, the Spanish journals demonstrate very little of the dynamic processes that were shaping the coast during the early years of sustained contact. It is only by incorporating indigenous knowledge and history into the sources created by Europeans that the full concept of the historical processes of the Northwest Coast comes to life.

After leaving Clayoquot on June 10th, it took Quimper one and a half days to sail to Port Renfrew (see Appendix: Map 7, to follow Quimper's explorations). He arrived the afternoon of the 11th after spending the previous night anchored along the coast of Vancouver Island between Barkley Sound and the entrance to the Strait of Fuca. Quimper was quick to divide a copper sheet between the two chiefs who came to greet the schooner in a canoe, explaining as per his instructions "as they[the chiefs] asked for it, and their friendship was necessary."[45] Quimper's expression that the chief's friendship was necessary was not only to prove that he was complying with his orders, but also because a sailor in one of the canoes that had been purchased in Clayoquot had an arrow shot at him in the afternoon. Quimper would not have wanted his exploration marred or halted due to violence. The next day the Spanish continued their strategic and cartographic fact finding.

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[44] Daniel Clayton, "The Spatial Politics of Exchange at Clayoquot Sound" in *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 135.

[45] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage.." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 91-2.

The "chief of the district," whom Quimper records as Xanape, visited the ship, and as Quimper states in his letter to the Viceroy recounting his exploration, Xanape "recounted to me, the effect of a present, that various foreign vessels had anchored in the port to trade for furs."[46] It is interesting that this sharing of knowledge was counted as a "present." Clearly local First Nations were learning the difference between the various nations which were frequenting the coast, and the needs and interests of each. How Xanape learned what information was most valued by the Spanish in such a short time is a bit of a mystery. Perhaps Narváez's sojourn in the same port the year prior had alerted local leaders to the interests of the Spanish.

The good weather on the 13th allowed the longboat and canoes to leave the schooner and finish sounding the port. While sounding the boats discovered both the Gordon and San Juan Rivers, which empty into the Northern and Eastern side of the port, the fresh water from the rivers was described as "delicious," and the two First Nations villages present (each at a terminus of one of the rivers), were noted on the chart, and an approximate census of the port's inhabitants was taken, in which Quimper estimates 200-300 people living in each village.[47] Today there is an Indian reservation at the exact spot where the village is indicated on the Spanish map of the port along the Gordon River. While the reservation along the San Juan River is on the opposite bank from where the village is indicated on the map, the old site is now part of the Pacific Rim National Park.[48] While sounding the pilots and sailors noted the evidence that trees had been cut and processed to make spars, confirming recent activity of other Europeans. And Quimper noted that the port abounded in large salmon, as it still does today.[49]

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[46] Ibid., 77.

[47] Ibid., 93, 128.

[48] See *Plano del Puerto de San Juan o de Narvaez*. Reproduced between pages 92-3 in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca*

Quimper had the *Princesa Real* ready to leave Port San Juan at 2 am on the 15th, but due to a lack of wind the ship was forced to wait until the morning to leave. By 7:30 am they were out of the port and after trading for some sea-otter skins from a canoe that visited them from the south side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, they continued along the north shore. The first landmark that Quimper gave a name to was Magdalena Point (still named as such), about half way between the Sombrio River and Jordan River. Wagner asserts that since Quimper's naming began with Magdalena Point, and not the Sombrio River, it can be assumed that the Sombrio (which means 'shady', one of the few descriptive names given by the Spanish on the coast) was the furthest point reached by Narváez the previous year.[50] Quimper continued on, naming prominent points as they made their way along the north shore of the strait. San Simon Point (still named as such) with the cove that it creates was described as "pretty. . . but small." [51] Today the cove is known as China Beach Provincial Park, and is popular recreation spot, and the eastern terminus/entrance to the Juan de Fuca marine trail. Between San Simon Point and another point named by Quimper as *San Esubio* (today's Sherringham Point), "there is a river which, on account of the flowery and pleasing country through which it runs, I[Quimper] named *Rio Hermoso*."[52] *Hermoso* of course means 'beautiful' in English, again one of the few times that the Spanish used a descriptive (and accurate) name for a coastal feature.

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[49] Ibid., 93.
[50] Ibid., 94.
[51] Ibid., 95.
[52] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 95.

The river is only named as such in Quimper's journal, when the earliest map of the Strait of Fuca was drawn, the name was changed to the *Rio Jordan* or Jordan River (the name remains to this day), after Alejandro Jordán, one of the chaplains who had accompanied the Eliza expedition to Nootka that year and would spend three winters at the establishment.[53] Quimper continued on to the next prominent point, named by him *Punta San Antonio*, known today as Otter Point. Quimper sent the longboat ahead of the schooner to sound the bay that forms between Sheringham and Otter Points. Quimper followed and dropped anchor for the day as the wind was rising and fog obscured the land, making surveying impossible.[54] The bay was named by Quimper as *Orbea*, which today has been anglicized into Orveas Bay. Quimper noted the presence of, but did not name Muir Creek; it appears that Quimper was quite impressed with the land he saw, other than naming the Jordan River '*Hermoso*', he also noted that Otter Point [*San Antonio*] "is easily recognizable by the three green little meadows which look as if they were sown with wheat."[55] These comments, while being personal in nature, also demonstrate what Quimper thought appropriate to relate to the Viceroy, as per the 4th instruction given to him, which included to "scrupulously observe the nature and the production of the land."[56] The next morning, while still anchored in Orveas bay, Quimper continued his in-depth reconnaissance by sending the longboat and one of the canoes ashore to explore. The expedition was only gone for about an hour, but in that time they returned with a favorable account of the land, and examples of some of the natural produce of the area, which included Salmon-berries, wild onions, roses, and what are known as *quiletes* or foxtail amaranth, an edible flowering plant which is common in most of the Americas.[57]

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[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid., 96.
[56] Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America: California, Canada y Alaska*, 336. AT

Continuing deeper into the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Quimper relied on Native information to direct his navigation. Sailing along the North shore, the *Princesa Real* was overtaken by a canoe from Port Renfrew which informed the ship of the existence of Sooke Harbour. In return for this information the Native informants asked if they could be towed by the longboat the remainder of the way to Sooke, as the paddlers were tired. The longboat undertook the task of towing the canoe to Sooke, and returned to the *Princesa Real* to later confirm what their informants had told them.[58]

It took Quimper a further three days to make it into Sooke Harbour. Contrary winds and currents kept the little schooner anchored outside the points that form Sooke Bay. The journal notes that they were continuously trying to warp into the bay, as the current which flows out of Juan de Fuca Strait was causing the ship to drag its anchor and Quimper was afraid they would be carried out into the Strait, losing ground. On the 18th another expedition was sent inland for 2 hours, but the crew members returned with the same information as before on the natural products of the land; they also noted the lack of any sort of fresh water. Eventually on the morning of the 19th, the wind was favorable enough for the *Princesa Real* to set sail and make for Sooke.

The *Princesa Real* dropped anchor in the middle of the channel that forms the entrance to Sooke harbour. Quimper quickly noted the presence of large poles suspended upright, which to the Spanish observer looked like flag poles. Quimper assumed that these served as navigational buoys for entering and leaving the channel, as they had been placed right at the end of the sandbank (Wiffen Spit).[59] These were actually poles from which the local First Nations suspended nets in order to catch waterfowl, although this information was never gleaned by the Spanish or Vancouver who also puzzled over the poles when he witnessed a similar set up two years later.

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[57] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 96.
[58] Ibid., 97.

While at Sooke, Quimper noted the numerous foods that were available and brought out to the ships –including what was probably cooked camas. Quimper noted there were two settlements, and that he gave the chiefs gifts of copper.[60] The expedition also paid some of the residents of Sooke to take them overland to try and discover the source of the Sooke River. Some of the Spanish were taken about one mile inland where they observed the land along the banks of the river was flat and covered with grass.

At the lagoon at the river's mouth, the expedition noticed there were three canoes each containing a deceased Indigenous person. The Spanish understood the placement of these bodies in canoes as a mode of burial.[61] Along with making a general reconnaissance of the area, members of the ship's company spent three days making a detailed chart of the harbour (it actually took 4, but one day was lost due to a storm and no activities were undertaken by the Spanish on that day –the 21st). Once the chart was completed, Quimper could carry out the act of possession.

The act of possession, a formulaic act that had its roots in the re-conquest of Spain, was necessary to legitimize Spain's claim to the coast. As Historian Patricia Seed has pointed out in her book *Ceremonies of Possession*, each major European power had their own notions of what constituted an act of possession, "which at a very basic level was a mix of language and gestures combined with law."[62] While all European nations shared this basic trope of legitimization, Seed points out that each power considered their method of confirming possession as the only legitimate means of establishing power over a region. These ideas of legitimacy were entrenched further due to the fact that no nation bothered to learn how other nations conceived and practiced possession, which led to a myriad of confusions and contradictions between powers, the Nootka Sound crisis being one of these.[63] First Nations of course did not figure into any of these acts, except that Spain was the only European nation to concede and recognize indigenous rights and ownership to lands held by them.[64] On the Northwest Coast, Spain and England both performed ritualized acts of possession, but due to the eventual abandonment of their claims based solely on the acts, H.R. Wagner points out in a very forward thinking manner for an statement made in the 1930's, that sovereignty remained, and had always belonged to the Natives of the region.[65] As Seed notes when studying acts of possession it is important to treat "all rationales and legitimization of the exercise of imperial political power as cultural constructions."[66] This then is what Quimper was carrying out, a relevant Spanish cultural construction that was necessary to legitimate that nation's actions on the coast. Warren Cook chides Quimper for the time he wasted performing these acts instead of continuing to chart the coast. Although in the end the acts of possession had no influence on indigenous peoples or who gained ultimate sovereignty of the region, in Spanish and Quimper's mind (and per his instructions) the acts were completely necessary.[67]

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[59] Ibid., 98.
[60] Ibid., 99.
[61] Ibid., 101.

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[62] Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6.

[63] Ibid., 11-12.

[64] Ibid., 85. Within a legalistic sense Indigenous Peoples in the Americas had the same rights as non-Christian groups in Spain.

[65] H.R. Wagner, "Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts" *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. vii (1938), No. 4, 297-326.

[66] Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*, 13.

The day of the act of possession took place in what is now Sooke harbour, the 23rd of June, 1790, began like most other days; with the longboat including López de Haro and Juan Carrasco dispatched to survey some rocks in the entrance to the port that had been exposed by the low tide, and not previously noted. After a few hours the work was done, and the longboat returned to the schooner. Quimper than states,

> I immediately embarked in her [the longboat] with the pilots, and with the greater part of the soldiers and sailors in armed canoes, to take possession of the port, carrying the Holy Cross which was to be planted on shore. I disembarked, and performed the ceremonies which the instructions prescribe, except those which pertain to the chaplain, as none had been given to me. I planted it in the name of His Catholic Majesty Carlos IV, whom God guard. . . I gave the name 'Revilla Gigedo', had three salutes of musketry fired on shore and one of the sloop of twenty-one shots. After having refreshed the men with some salmon berries and the kind of grape whose fruit is abundant I went on board.[68]

There is an interesting visual aspect to this performance that has not been noted by other scholars. The 'armed canoes' that Quimper mentions were the canoes purchased in Clayoquot Sound. Quimper and the other officers and pilots were in the longboat with the cross, but along side of this there were two indigenous canoes full of mestizos. The ceremony could not have been as European as many have described, there was an obvious indigenous presence just through the equipment used and the mixed nature of the Mexican boat crews. The prescribed instructions would have take 15-20 minutes to perform, depending on how long the litany took to sing. The whole action, including salutes, the placement of the cross and the burying of the copy of the act of possession, would have taken about an hour. The name, *Revilla Gigedo,* as Wagner points out was part of the name of the Viceroy of Mexico, his full name being Juan Vicente Güemes Pacheco de Padilla Horcasitas y Aguayo, Conde de Revilla Gigedo.[69]

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[67] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*., 283.
[68] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wager, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 101-2.

Concluding the act of possession seemed to warrant a day off. After refreshing themselves with local produce, the officers and crew of the *Princesa Real* returned to the schooner and did no further activities that day. This whole process seemed to have little effect of the real owners of the territory: the journal notes that six canoes passed into the port in the morning, and later in the evening two canoes arrived from around the south end of the entrance of the port to trade otter skins with the schooner.[70]

It took the little schooner three days to leave Sooke. There was either no wind, or when there was, it was from the West or West-South-West, what Quimper and all mariners refer to the third quarter. Along with the contrary winds was the constant fog that hangs over Sooke in the summer. Quimper described the weather for the three days he spent trying to get out of Sooke as “ugly,” and he was obviously not to keen on taking any chances, probably due to his knowledge of the poor sailing abilities of the *Princesa Real*, which he had already characterized as an ‘eggshell, but useless in all its parts’.[71]

It took Quimper a day of using a kedge anchor to warp the schooner into the entrance of the port before they could even consider leaving. In order to keep the schooner from drifting onto the rocks that are in the entrance to Sooke harbour, Quimper had to send men ashore with cables in order to pull the schooner into position by hauling the lines after wrapping them around Douglas fir trees on the East and West entrances to the port. This maneuver allowed them to get past the point of Wiffen Spit, and position themselves beyond the entrance to the harbour, in order to wait for the appropriate conditions to continue their explorations.[72]

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[69] Ibid., 102 note 47.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid., 103. Also see Quimper’s comments on the sailing abilities of the *Princesa Real* in the letter he sent to his brother.

The 27th of June, four days after completing the act of possession in Sooke, the *Princesa Real* was still anchored, according to Quimper, about a mile just outside the entrance to the port. Quimper notes that San Juan point, today's Company Point, was North-East of their position. At this point they were far enough out into the Strait of Juan de Fuca to be able to see Donaldson Island, which Quimper gave the name *Dona Rosa* Island, which Wagner states was most likely the name of the Viceroy's wife.[73] By 8:30 on the same morning, the fog had reappeared, and the ship spent another day waiting for conditions to improve. The fog burned off by the early evening, but Quimper did not want to begin new explorations with only a few hours of daylight left and the wind blowing hard. So the ship "maintained . . . position with a single anchor, so that if it should blow very much harder I could suspend it and take refuge in the port, as this is very sheltered and the channel is very narrow."[74] Again Quimper appears to be overly cautious, but having no conception of what else the Strait of Juan de Fuca contained, he was trying to get into a position to carry out his explorations in a competent manner.

There is an interesting silence in Quimper's journal over the four days spent trying to leave Sooke, in regards to the First Nations population in the area. After faithfully recording the comings and goings of locals up until the day of the act of possession for the next four days there is no mention of any First Nations. This could be because after what would have appeared as a strange procession complete with fusillades of musketry, the local inhabitants gave the schooner a wide berth. Alternatively, the same foul weather that kept Quimper in the port kept locals at home, but neither of these explanations seem likely.

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[72] Ibid., 103.

[73] Ibid., 104. Note 50.

[74] Ibid. Wagner states in note 51, that this is a reference to the Strait, which can not be, as Quimper makes explicit he is referring to "the port" and the sheltered and narrow channel is obviously the entrance to Sooke Harbour.

The journal entry for the 28th, the day the *Princesa Real* got away from Sooke, notes that "a canoe now came out with four Indians. One of these had stolen from us a half-minute watch glass in *Puerto Revilla Gigedo*, which had been taken away from him, but he, as well as the other Indians manifested much joy. I presented them with some iron cask-hoops and some beads."[75] Clearly Quimper and the crew of the *Princesa Real* continued to have contact with local First Nations, but Quimper obviously felt that he had commented sufficiently on the 'spirit and temperament' of the locals to not bother to record further interactions. The fact that the ship was subject to petty thefts may have also played into Quimper's silence in the journal. Recording instances of theft and what was probably a minor castigation of the offender(s) would not have lived up to his instructions to cultivate friendship among the Natives. Although at the same time it must be noted that Quimper also did not complain about the thefts as many Europeans on the coast did, and his reaction to them must have been tempered as at least one attempted thief was happy enough to see the Spanish again.

After four days of waiting for opportune weather, Quimper was finally able to make sail, and within one hour found himself between Beechy Head and Cape Church. Quimper named these locations *Benites del Pino* and *San Cosme*, and noted but did not name Becher Bay or Wolf and Fraser Island.[76] Soon after Race Rocks were sighted along with Bentinck Island, which Quimper mislabelled as *Punta* (point) *Moreno de la Vega*.[77] The *Princesa Real* made its way through the channel that separates these landmarks and soon found itself in Pedder Bay, a "large and beautiful roadstead," which Quimper named *Eliza*, after the commander at Nootka.[78]

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[75] Ibid., 105.

It seems at this point Quimper believed that he had reached the end of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, as he notes the shore continued north and then east, going on to "unite with that of the south shore of the strait, proving here was a great bay."[79] From his viewpoint in Pedder Bay Quimper assumed that the South end of Vancouver Island, the San Juan archipelago, Whidbey Island, and the South shore of the Strait were connected and formed a basin, which he would name *Seno de Santa Rosa* a few days later.[80] In Pedder Bay Quimper encountered the canoe from Sooke which contained the thwarted watch-glass thief.

The *Princesa Real* had only been sailing for three hours by the time they reached Pedder Bay, but Quimper was more than happy to drop anchor in what he assumed was a good anchorage, and continue explorations via long boat. In the afternoon the longboat with the first pilot López de Haro and second pilot Juan Carrasco were dispatched to explore two points which had been sighted on the entrance into Pedder Bay. The first was William Head, named by Quimper as *Santa Domingo*, which forms the Northern side of

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[76] Ibid., 104-5. "Benites del Pino" was Quimper's second last name. Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America*, 337.

[77] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 105.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., 109.

Pedder Bay; and Albert Head, which Quimper designated as *San Miguel*.[81] The pilots reported that these points formed another bay, known today as Parry Bay, which Quimper named *Solano* after a high ranking naval official.[82] In a strange act of clairvoyance the pilots reported to Quimper that beyond the second point was "another fine roadstead extremely large and of good depth, capable of holding a great squadron at anchor and sheltered from the winds of the first and second quarters."[83] This of course was Royal Roads, which within seventy years of Quimper's explorations would become the Pacific Station for the British and later Canadian Naval fleets. The pilots also countered Quimper's assertion that the Strait of Juan de Fuca was closed by telling him that a few leagues east of where they had been there was a point with an island off it, which formed a channel.[84] This was the first sighting of Haro Strait by Europeans, and the unexplored channel would remain a tantalizing hope of a Northwest Passage until it was explored the next year.

Early the next morning the schooner was visited by three canoes of local First Nations. Quimper distributed gifts and inquired, in what was probably broken Nuu-chah-nulth and hand signs, if there was indeed a channel in the eastern part of the Strait of Fuca. Quimper reports, "they answered in entirely understandable signs, that there was a very large and wide one which tended somewhat towards the north-west, and that at the end of the range of mountains on the south coast there was another like it."[85] After this meeting, one of the schooner's canoes was sent ashore to collect water with the guidance of one of the locals. While on shore the sailors cut the branches from a pine tree so that it formed a cross. This was done so that any other Europeans who visited what Quimper considered a good anchorage, would know that it had been previously visited. Later in the morning Quimper dispatched Carrasco in the "armed longboat . . . to reconnoiter the third point to the northeast to see if the information of the Indians that there was a channel there was true."[86] The difference between the longboat and an armed longboat would indicate that this expedition, leaving the relative security of the schooner, contained members of the elite *Volunterios de Cataluñia*, who had accompanied the expedition. In the afternoon Quimper and Haro climbed Mary Hill on William Head to get a better view of the area, but not much could be made out in the distance due to the summertime haze coming off the water.

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[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., note 60.
[83] Ibid., 105.
[84] Ibid., 106.
[85] Ibid.

Carrasco and the longboat returned at one in the morning after a 14 hour round trip from Pedder Bay to Gonzales Point (now the 9th hole of the Victoria Golf Club) and back. Carrasco brought back the news that confirmed the Strait of Juan de Fuca was not at all closed. The channel "extended a long distance, as no land could be seen in the north except some mountains which could scarcely be made out".[87] Carrasco in the short time that he was there did a good job of noting the turbulent tides and rocky shoals that dominate Mayor and Baynes Channels between Gonzales Point and Discovery and Chatham Islands. He noted the "true channel" was between the islands and the east coast of the channel (the San Juan Islands), which of course today is known as Haro Strait.[88] It seems that when the longboat had departed it was encumbered with a cross, which Carrasco planted on Gonzalez Point. Carrasco reported that the point where the cross was erected was “flat with much green grass.” The reason for the cross again was to demarcate to any other Europeans who might enter the strait the Spanish precedent of discovery.[89] This was especially true for such an important location like Haro Strait, which as far as anyone knew at this time, could lead anywhere into the North American interior.

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[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 107.

The crew from the longboat journey would not have much time to rest as the preparations for the next day, June 30th, began shortly after their return. At 6am the longboat and one of the canoes was sent to collect wood and water respectively, while a few hours later the other canoe was sent ahead to the north side of Albert Head with a wooden cross to await the rest of the ship’s company for another act of possession.[90] At four in the afternoon, after an hour of rowing from Pedder Bay to Royal Roads, Quimper, Haro, and most of the ship’s crew stood on a prominent table of land located on the north side of Albert Head, about 100 meters from Albert Head lagoon, and performed the “prescribed” ceremonies, bestowing the name *Rada Váldez y Bázan* to the bay after the Spanish minister of the marine.[91] Another tree was stripped of most of its branches to form another cross to go with the one that was planted, and multiple salutes were fired. By the evening everyone was back on the *Princesa Real* as a lightning storm passed through the area.[92]

The three days after the act of possession followed a similar stagnant pattern as occurred while at Sooke. The 1st of July was spent creating a detailed map of the area, and collecting a two-week supply of fresh water. The weather had again turned squally, and it seems obvious that Quimper had no desire to sail his ship except in ideal conditions, probably due to the ship's poor sailing qualities, and the fact that exploratory efforts would be hampered by the poor visibility that accompanies rain on the coast. Quimper did take this time to fill his journal with more comments on the 'spirit and character' of the local First Nations, per his instructions. He notes that they were again visited by a few canoes, and when questioned, the occupants gave the same answers as previous visitors to the ship relating to the nature and extent of the channels leading north and south from the strait. Quimper then continues:

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[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid. Note 63.
[92] Ibid.

> All these Natives display good dispositions, and in contrast to the other Indians outside [the strait] are very poor, as they have no sea otters. They have, however, the advantage that their country consists of level thickets with few trees and is very prolific in roots and fruits on which they all maintain themselves. Even those who live at the mouth of the strait and outside of it come to provide themselves with what they need to pass the winter.[93]

By mentioning interactions with and amongst indigenous peoples not previously mentioned in the journal, this statement again indicates that Quimper had not been recording each encounter between the ship and indigenous peoples that had occurred. In the four days the ship had been in Pedder Bay, the Spanish must have noticed, and possibly encountered indigenous peoples from the outside coast trading with the locals. Their limited knowledge of Nuu-chah-nulth allowed the Spanish to differentiate and notice differences in native languages, and gave them some sense of the tribal differences that existed on the coast. It is interesting to consider if this passage was not written with a hint of admiration by Quimper for the agricultural efforts that the locals employed, while at the same time noting that they did not have the resources to engage in commercial exchange with Europeans.

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[93] Ibid., 108.

After the three days of inaction, Quimper finally got underway on July 4th, heading for the south side of the strait "for the purpose of finding out if the news which the Indians had given me was true, that there was a very wide channel which tended to the southwest".[94] Sailing southeast, Quimper headed for the point on the west side of the sand spit at New Dungeness. While on his southeasterly course Quimper missed the entrance to Port Angeles, but noted Observatory point, to which he gave the name *Salvi*.[95] Quimper explained that this point was directly south of Beechey Head and that these two points formed the entrance of what he had deemed the basin of *Santa Rosa*. When the schooner was about two kilometers from the south shore of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Quimper was able to make out the prominent sand spit at Dungeness, and tacked to the north east to make his way around it. Once he was on top of the spit, the ship tacked to the southwest in order to enter the bay the spit creates and anchored the *Princessa Real* for the evening. Ever since the schooner had been east of the sandspit, it had been followed by canoes full of locals. When the *Princesa Real* was secured Quimper made a show of the gifts he had for those in the canoes in an effort to convince them to come along side. Quimper noted,

> These Indians by their suspicion showed manifestly that they had never seen such a vessel . . . I noted that hanging from their ears they wore some pieces of copper and beads. These I thought they had obtained in trade from the Indians

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid., 109.

> at the entrance to the strait. They also wore English, Portuguese, and Chinese coins as earrings.[96]

This is an interesting moment of first contact. Although the Natives in this part of the Strait of Juan de Fuca manifested they had never seen an European vessel before, they certainly had knowledge of these outsiders provided through the contacts that had been established on the coast outside the waterway. The locals returned to their "settlements" as night fell and Quimper states he took "the same precautions as at other anchorages to prevent being surprised by the Indians".[97] Quimper had not noted what his precautions were at the previous anchorages in the Strait of Fuca, so one can only infer that the practice started at Clayoquot, of firing a gun at night as a warning, continued throughout the voyage.

The following day was an eventful one for the crew of the *Princesa Real*. From daybreak until sunset the little schooner was surrounded by local indigenous peoples. The locals brought with them fish and deer meat for the ship's crew, which Quimper purchased with cask hoops from empty barrels. While at the same time he gifted sheets of copper to "the principal chiefs . . . as a sign of friendship."[98] The natives also took this opportunity to trade a variety of skins, blankets and mats to the Spanish. Dressed hides were shown to the Spaniards as pieces of armor, as multiple hides would be stacked and sewn together to form think cuirasses. "With these" wrote Quimper, "they defend themselves from their enemies of the north coast."[99] Just who these "enemies" were is the matter of some conjecture. Wayne Suttles suggests that the "enemies" across the strait probably refer to the somewhat distant Cowichan, whose territory is located around the present day town of Duncan on the east side of Vancouver Island.[100] Suttles' reasoning for this is that "people . . . out of enlightened self-interest, maintained friendly relations with near neighbours, regardless of language boundaries, but were often in conflict with more distant groups."[101]

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[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid., 110.
[99] Ibid.

This suggestion has been countered by Keith Carlson, who while examining the same subject states, "there is no evidence to suggest that relations with neighbors were necessarily any less violent than those with more distant groups."[102] Despite not knowing who exactly the peoples on the south side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca warred against, it does appear that conflicts were a regular occurrence. Quimper's the journal notes, "the beaches are strewn with the harpooned heads of their enemies."[103]

The residents of the anchorage were also quick to point out the two rivers that emptied into the strait nearby. Quimper sent his two armed canoes with a native canoe as a guide, to fill the water casks. This was quickly done and on their return the crew members reported that the river was "very beautiful".[104] This was most likely Cassalery Creek near the present town of Jamestown, as the journal mentions the discovery of the Dungeness River when the longboat was sent to map the bay the next morning.[105]

That same morning the longboat had been dispatched under the command of the second pilot Juan Carrasco, "to reconnoiter two points" that were east of the anchorage "to see if these formed the channel for which I [Quimper] was hunting on the information from the Indians."[106] The longboat returned at 10 pm, following fifteen hours of exploration, with news that the Strait of Juan de Fuca seemed closed. The longboat must have departed the *Princesa Real* on a northwesterly course, as Carrasco returned reporting that he had sighted "two inlets in the coast, apparently small ones. . . in the middle of one he [Carrasco] saw a front of high land and believed it ended there."[107] This was the current Rosario Strait, to which Quimper gave the name Boca [mouth] de Fidalgo, after Salvador Fidalgo, who at that time was commanding an expedition to what is now Alaska. The second opening was given the name Boca de Flon, after Manuel de Flon, the governor of Puebla Mexico, which is today's Deception Pass between Whidbey Island and Fidalgo Island in Washington State.[108]

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[100] Wayne Suttles, "They Recognize no Superior Chief" in *Culturas de la Costa Noroeste de America,* Jose Luis Peset ed. (N.P.:Turner, 1992), 256.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Keith Carlson, " 'We Could Not Help Noticing That Many Of Them Were Cross-eyed' Historical Evidence and Coast Salish Leadership" Forthcoming. 14.

[103] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 131.

[104] Ibid., 110.

[105] Ibid., 111.

Carrasco reported to Quimper that the first point he explored "only formed a bay," which of course was erroneous.[109] The 'bay' was in fact the entrance to Admiralty Inlet. The map of the strait showing that year's explorations prepared by López de Haro, clearly shows that Carrasco kept the longboat west of Wilson Point on what is today Quimper Peninsula. Haro's map shows a *Pta. De Mendez*, on today's Whidbey Island at the site of the Fort Elby State Park, which is not mentioned in the narrative; nor is the name continued on any of the subsequent Spanish maps of the region. Carrasco must have assumed given the curve of Whidbey Island that the terrain closed itself off south of Wilson Point, assuming it to be a bay the body of water was given the name Ensenada de

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[106] Ibid., 110.
[107] Ibid., 111.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.

Caamano, after Jancinto Caamano, one of the Spanish officers who had come over from Spain in 1789.[110]

Quimper is often criticized for failing to find Admiralty Inlet, but it should be pointed out that it was Carrasco, not Quimper, who failed to find the waterway into Puget Sound. Carrasco did find Protection Island to the North of Discovery Bay, to which Quimper bestowed the name Isla de Carrasco after his second pilot, in order to give him some credit for his discoveries.[111]

The next two days were spent mapping and sounding the port when the strong wind that was blowing from the west would allow it, and the local people continued their trading with the Spanish vessel. Quimper, feeling that he had probably made enough comments on the nature of the people and the trade with them, was reduced to saying "as on other days Indian canoes have come out" by the third day of the stay at Dungeness Bay.[112]

On July 8th, the fourth day at Dungeness, López de Haro was left in charge of the *Princesa Real* as Quimper, Carrasco, and most of the sailors and soldiers departed the ship at 5:30 in the morning in order to take possession on "the point of the tongue of flat land at the entrance to the bay."[113] According to the map of the port, the cross was erected east of the native settlement that was near Cassalery Creek, which has been replaced by the modern native community of Jamestown. Quimper was back on the *Princesa Real* by 9 am after "all the ceremonies which the instructions prescribe being performed," including bestowing the name *Puerto de Quimper* to the location; a little self-recognition on the part of the expedition's commander.

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[110] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire* 280.
[111] Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca.*, 111.
[112] Ibid., 112.
[113] Ibid.

The act of possession, like the others that had been carried out prior on the expedition, warranted a day of rest for the ship's company. Instead of continuing to sound the harbor, the journal notes that half of the crew and soldiers went ashore in the canoes in order to wash everyone's clothing. This was completed by mid-afternoon, and no other activities were undertaken that day. The journal entry for this day also notes that trade with the local First Nations was limited somewhat due to the strong winds, although the ship was visited by a canoe "from the south point of the entrance to the strait which exchanged four sea-otter skins for the king's copper."[114]

It is important to notice that outside native groups could quickly and easily find and gain access to the Spanish inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Although much of this work has focused on the observations made by the Spanish of indigenous groups, it should be noted as well, that the Spanish too were being observed, and where they were, and what they were doing, was probably information that was constantly being relayed from village to village up and down the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

Once again, as in Sooke and Pedder Bay, Quimper cited bad weather as an excuse to not continue exploring immediately after completing the act of possession. Nothing was accomplished on the 9th or the 10th due to high winds, except for a few hours of sounding in the longboat the morning of the 10th. Native canoes continued to visit the ship during this time, supplying the Spaniards with salmon and the now famous Dungeness crab.[115]

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[114] Ibid., 113.

Early in the morning on the 11th of July, the longboat carrying Carrasco was again sent out to examine a point that Quimper could see to the southeast of the ship. Twelve hours later the expedition returned noting that they had found "a very good port behind the point which he [Carrasco] had gone to examine."[116] This was what today is known as Discovery Bay. Carrasco took soundings of the entrance and noted that the *Isla de Carrasco*, or what would be named Protection Island by George Vancouver, created two channels through which ships could pass easily.

It was either on this trip or the trip two days later when the *Ensenada de Bertodano* was sighted, but not explored. This was most likely the entrance to what is known today as Sequim Bay, although Wagner does not think it was.[117] Since there are no other geographic formations between New Dungeness and Discovery Bay that resemble a bay, this *Ensenada* must be Sequim Bay. Wagner's dismissal of this reasoning has to do with his estimation that "it is not far enough away" from Dungeness on the 1790 map of the strait prepared by Haro.[118] Considering that the entrance to the bay was noted by dead reckoning while in transit via a longboat, such errors were bound to occur.

The next day "Gray clouds and a very light wind" were enough to deter further exploration, and it was not until the 13th that Haro and Carrasco were sent in the longboat and one of the canoes to finish sounding the port and to take possession.[119] The cross was erected (it seems without the usual formal act of possession) on what is now known as

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[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid., 112, note 77.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid., 114.

Carr Point about half way down on the southwestern side of the bay. The idea of placing the cross in this location was so that it could be "seen when entering the mouth [of the bay]."[120] The river beside the cross was aptly named *Rio de la Cruz* (river of the cross), and today it is known somewhat disappointingly as Contractors Creek. The Spanish probably did not make much of a physical impression at the site, as George Vancouver commanding the *Chatham and Discovery* anchored at the very same location two years later, and assumed he and his crew were the first to enter the bay.

The next day was spent waiting for the weather to pass, and in the afternoon some of the sailors and soldiers were sent again to one of the rivers near Dungeness to wash their clothing. During this time relations with the local native peoples had been continuing, although all that Quimper says on the subject is that "canoes have come out to trade, first one than another."[121]

July 15th was an important day for the expedition. Quimper's instructions included a provision that he should be back at the establishment at Friendly Cove by the 15th of August.[122] With this in mind, Quimper called a meeting of his pilots in order to come to decision whether the expedition should continue through one of the unexplored passages that were open to them, or if they should start their return in order to be back at Nootka by the appointed time. In his journal entry for that day Quimper lists the arguments he gave to his two pilots. They included first his standing order to be back at Nootka by the 15th, which he felt would be difficult to accomplish owing to the constant winds from the west and the fact that they had found the tides and currents inside the strait to be unpredictable.[123] Complicating this was the *Princesa Real*, “a vessel with no life in her . . . [and] which made no headway to windward.”[124] This was the first time in the journal Quimper had explicitly condemned the ship. Read in the context of his letter to his brother, it is obvious that Quimper was not at all a fan of the little boat.

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[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America,* 336.

Unfortunately for Quimper he would be the commander of the *Princesa Real* for another year. On his return from the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Quimper would be charged with taking the boat across the Pacific to Macao to return it to the South Sea Company, despite the fact that Thomas Hudson, the erstwhile Captain of the *Princess Royal,* would drown when the longboat that he was in capsized in a storm off Estevan Point in October 1790.[125]

Having made his argument (note he made no points towards furthering the exploration), Quimper awaited the decision of his pilots, who deemed “I should not continue further.”[126] Quimper noted unsurprisingly “I agreed with them,” and had them record their opinions in writing. So that the expedition was not seen to be completely abandoning its charge to explore the area, Quimper included that they would continue to “explor[e] the south coast to the outlet of the strait.”[127]

This meeting was the only significant action taken that day as once again the weather seemed unfavourable to Quimper. Quimper did note, however, that three canoes visited the ship and traded a “great number of ducks” and other fish and venison to the crew for cask hoops. Three fresh otter skins were also traded to the Spaniards, to which

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[123] Quimper, “Diary of the Voyage…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 115.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Ruiz*, El Final del Descubrimiento de America,* 347-351, and W. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire,* 292.
[126] “Quimper, “Diary of the Voyage…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 115.
[127] Ibid.

Quimper stated “they [the natives] said that they [river? otters] were very abundant, but these lazy natives do not catch them.”[128]

The above passage is interesting for numerous reasons. It was generally assumed by fur traders at this time that the interior of the Strait of Juan de Fuca did not contain sea otters. This information could have only been received through native middle-men on the outside coast, who would have been well aware of the need to protect their position in regards to foreigners visiting the coast. Due to the unknown nature of the Strait of Juan de Fuca no trader ever ventured into the waterway to test this theory. It was obvious even to Quimper that there was extensive trade going on between the inside and outside groups in the strait, making it more than likely that the interior groups of the strait would have been trading sea, or lesser value river-otter pelts with those native groups with easy access to foreigners. It is also interesting that the Spanish accepted “fresh” skins from the native people, as most traders refused unskinned sea-otter carcases or uncured skins, not having the ability to cure the skins themselves. Traders would often try and instruct native people to cure the skins first and then bring them to the ship.[129]

The next day, despite Quimper’s assertion that it was calm and that there were favourable winds from the north-east, no action was carried out except for a one hour-long canoe expedition to obtain two weeks of water from one of the rivers. It was not until the next day Quimper at least made an attempt to get underway despite shifting winds. From 5pm until 6pm the little schooner manoeuvred out of Dungeness Bay until it was directly east of the point of the sand spit, where the anchor was once again dropped so that the ship would be "ready to sail whenever the weather should permit."[130] Although no mention of it is made in Quimper's narrative, it was probably at some point in the expedition that Mount Baker and the Cascade Range of mountains to the south were named. They appear on Haro's map of the strait as *La Gran Montaña de Carmelo* and the *Sierras Nevadas de San Antonio*. The feast day for the saint *Nuestra Señora del Carmelo* is the 16th of July, which gives credence to the mountain being named on this day. The feast day for *San Antonio* [Saint Anthony] is in early June, and there is no indication of why the mountain range is named as such.[131]

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[128] Ibid.

[129] Charles Bishop, *Journal of the Ruby 1794-95* has many instances of this. BC Archives: A/A/20.5/R82B.

There was some concern during the night as it was discovered that the *Princesa Real* had anchored on a shoal that extended from the sand-spit at Dungeness. At daybreak, Haro in the longboat was sent out to take soundings around the ship, and despite the water being shallow there was no real danger to the ship. At 9am on the 18th a wind came up from the south-east and the *Princesa Real* finally got underway in its bid to return to Friendly Cove. The journal entry for the day shows very well the difficulties in sailing the little schooner. For the first half hour, the ship had to be towed by the longboat until the wind shifted to the south. Quimper states that he tried to keep the prow of the ship heading west by south-west, but by 11am the wind had shifted to a south by south-west direction, and the little ship was forced to head north. At mid-day Quimper gave his position in relation to known landmarks the expedition had discovered. New Dungeness was south-east of their position with Haro Strait to the northwest. Beechy Head was almost directly west of the ship at an estimated distance of about 25 kilometres.[132] This would have put the ship in the middle of the strait almost directly above the current international boundary between Canada and the United States. It was slow sailing, and by 4:30 in the afternoon the wind had shifted west by south-west, and Quimper tried to make for Pedder Bay, the *Rada de Eliza*, where he had spent a few days earlier in the expedition, or Parry Bay, in order to have a secure anchorage, and also be in a position to continue on out of the strait. The winds would not allow the little schooner to do this, and Quimper instead had to settle for an anchorage at Royal Roads, which they reached by 6pm. Quimper's first act once the anchor had been set was to dispatch the longboat with Haro to see what had happened to the cross that had been erected eighteen days earlier, as it was not visible from the ship. Haro returned and reported that the native people had apparently taken it down and carried it away, although how he came by this information is not noted in the journal.[133]

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[130] Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 116.
[131] Ibid., 17.
[132] Ibid., 117.

The next day Quimper sent the longboat out with Carrasco to see if he could "find any river from which to fill the empty casks."[134] This is odd, considering that the ship had taken on two weeks of water only three days before. Quimper must have been very concerned about his water supply, possibly due to leakage, but also possibly because he had been destroying water casks in order to cut up the iron hoops so that they could be given away as presents. It is very possible by this point in the exploration, that the ship had a very limited number of water casks and Quimper wanted to keep his water supply as topped up as possible, never knowing when they would have to rely on their water stores alone.

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[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.

This expedition ended up being fortuitous as not only did Carrasco find some springs of fresh water along the beach he also discovered

> a tidal lagoon of salt water and to the east of it and father in the roadstead he found a port, very sheltered from all winds, with a depth of 6 or 7 fathoms of water at low tide, mud bottom, about 1½ miles long and 1½ mile (sic) wide.[135]

Also important was Carrasco's report that the forests "show by their little height and few trees that they are transitable, and of good land," and that the indigeous people who inhabited the port manifested "their joy" at seeing the longboat.[136] These locations of course were the harbour of Esquimalt and Esquimalt lagoon in Colwood. This was the first introduction of Europeans to the port that would be the center of the British colonial enterprise on Vancouver Island and British Columbia for the next hundred years. Quimper also had another tree made into a cross by stripping it of its branches in order to replace the one that had been taken down.

The next morning one of the canoes was sent to collect water, while the longboat and the other canoe, armed with soldiers and under the command of Haro and Carrasco, were sent to make a plan of the port of Esquimalt, or *Puerto de Cordova*, as the Spanish named it after the Captain General of the Spanish navy Luís de Cordova.[137] In the eight hours they spent sounding and mapping a very good map of the port was produced. The chart covers the central part of the port, including Constance Cove, the main location of the Canadian Forces Naval Base. It is possible to see where the small expedition went, thanks to the soundings present on the chart.

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[135] Ibid., 118.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid., note 88.

Fisgard Island was noted and the passage between it and the island that has since been filled in was sounded. From the entrance the soundings go tight past Duntze Head to Munroe Head, and then fill in the central areas of Constance Cove. Inskip Island and Yaw Point form the north-eastern extent of the chart and it is obvious the expedition only saw these features from the southern end of the port, as only the one side of Inskip Island is shown and the map does not continue past Yaw Point. The fact that only half of this excellent port was mapped and sounded probably had to do with a number of factors, including the large native population that lived in the deeper part of the harbour, time constraints, and that the part that was mapped is the best portion of the harbour, at least from a naval perspective. Constance Cove was the center of the Royal Navy base at the location in the 19th century and continues to be the main dockyard for the Canadian Forces Pacific Fleet.[138]

While the boats were sounding the harbour "three canoes came out from the *Puerto de Cordova* loaded with seeds [possibly indigenous black berries or camas], with which the port abounds, for food."[139] All of the canoes were from Port Renfrew and included Chief Xanape, who the expedition had met early on in their explorations. Quimper noted "I treated him like a well known friend and he manifested much pleasure at meeting us."[140] Once again the Spanish were witness to the constant trade that went on between the peoples of the Salish Sea, while at the same time they were managing to introduce themselves in a positive way.

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[138] Ibid., The Spanish chart of the harbour is between pages 118-9. Current Place names taken from http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms_images/MARPAC_images/gallery_images/large/Esquimalt_Hbr(Chart_3440Extract)_Limits-20Jun02.jpg (accessed Feb 18, 2009)

[139] Ibid., 118.

[140] Ibid.

The time constraint must have been weighing on Quimper. Having completed the reconnaissance of Esquimalt, he did not even wait for sunrise to continue his attempt to leave the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At 2:30 in the morning Quimper got underway, raising the anchor and having the longboat tow the *Princesa Real* past Albert Head.[141] From that point the ship caught the wind and began to slowly sail to the southeast so it could round Race Rocks and begin to travel out of the strait. Being in these waters for a few days three weeks earlier probably gave Quimper the confidence to depart at night and cover known ground in darkness.

By 6am the ship was past Pedder Bay and out in the middle of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Quimper was trying to sail with the outgoing tide, but by 9:30 the tide had almost finished running, and worse, the wind had almost completely died. Once again, the longboat was dispatched to tow the schooner into a bay. Quimper feared that the incoming tide would push them deep into the end of the strait, the opposite of where he was taking the schooner. After some difficulty finding the bottom and a suitable anchorage, the *Princesa Real* finally established itself inside what is now known as Freshwater Bay in Washington State. Not long after two canoes visited the ship bringing berries and salmon for the crew. Quimper gave them iron in return and inquired about the availability of fresh water. The locals pointed out the Elwha River to Quimper and a canoe was dispatched with the empty casks to be refilled.[142]

Quimper's stay in Freshwater Bay was not long; once again he set sail at 2am as the tide was running out of the strait. The bay it seems was not important enough to warrant a name but the two points that form its contours were. The *Pta. Salvi*, which had already been identified on the sail to New Dungeness, formed the eastern point of the bay, while the western point was given the name *Punta de Davila,* after a Spanish captain of that name.[143] Soon after the anchor was raised the wind died out, but the current was running with enough force that Quimper had the longboat guide the schooner’s drift past Observatory Point. Once past the point, the longboat was not needed, and only the force of the current was used to propel the little schooner along the south shore of the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

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[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid., 119.

Eventually the longboat had to resume towing the ship, and as this was underway, a canoe bearing chief Tatoosh of Neah Bay came along the schooner to parlay with Quimper. Tatoosh had come to try and convince Quimper to visit his village, informing him that “his port . . . was sheltered and that there was an infinite number of sea-otter skins there, six vessels having been there and carried many away.”[144] The fact that a single canoe was able to track down the schooner at 5am demonstrates just how aware the native people in the region were of the Spaniards’ location as they moved inside the waterways of the Salish Sea. Tatoosh, along with trying to generate direct trade with the Spanish, also may have been concerned about their cutting into his lucrative trade with the inside indigenous groups.

With a helpful wind the *Princesa Real* continued along the south shore of the Strait of Juan de Fuca until it reached Pillar Point, where the force on the incoming tide forced Quimper to drop his anchor so as not to lose ground. The small bay was given the name *Ensenada de Soto Aguilar*, and a small river east of it was given the name *Rio de*

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[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid., 120.

Canal, after Sebastian Canal, an officer in the Spanish navy.[145] There is some disagreement about which river the *Canal* is. Wagner complains that "this part of López de Haro's map is not very accurate," and lists a few possibilities, but feels that it was most likely the Twin River.[146] A comparison of Haro's map with a modern rendering of the strait seems to indicate that the *Rio Canal* was probably the Twin River. Haro's map is not all that bad considering the coast in this section was charted in one day from onboard a moving ship. Other locations were named during this day's sail, but not mentioned in the journal. These included the *Ensenada de Villarva*, which is today's Crescent Bay, and the *Rio de la Cuesta*, which is assumed to be the Lyre River.[147]

Quimper did not stay anchored for long in the *Ensenada de Soto Aguilar*. As soon as the tide began to run out of the Strait of Juan de Fuca in the evening he set sail again. The *Princesa Real* sailed through the night until 5:30 in the morning when the longboat was needed again to tow the schooner close to shore so it would not lose ground when the tide came in.

By mid-morning they had reached a bay which was given the name *Ensenada de Rojas*, today's Clallam Bay.[148] Quimper was quick to note the presence of two separate native villages in the bay. The residents seeing the longboat towing the schooner came out to the ship, and Quimper states "ten canoes of Indian men and two of Indian women towed me to my anchorage in the bay. I presented to some of them pieces of cask-hoops. Many others brought out fish and salmon berries for barter."[149]

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[145] Wagner, *The Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 22.
[146] Ibid., 22, Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wagner, *The Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 120 note 92.
[147] Wagner, *The Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 22.
[148] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…", 121.
[149] Ibid.

Quimper did not stay long in Clallam Bay. At 1am he raised anchor in order to use the tide to move out of the Strait. The wind was uncooperative, however, and the ship could not make much headway to the west. Quimper hauled the ship on a northward course until the sun came up and he could identify the port that Tatoosh had promised him was on the south side of the Strait.[150] Once the sun was up Quimper identified what he assumed was Neah Bay, and deployed the longboat to tow the schooner towards the bay. By 7:30 "a large canoe of Indians came along side who told me that the opening for which I was steering was the port, that it was clean, of sufficient depth and sheltered, all of which they gave us to understand by clear signs."[151]

The Makah at Neah Bay were at this time one of the more experienced First Nations in regards to dealing with visiting Europeans. They knew what ship captains were looking for and were quick to aid prospective trade partners. Quimper entered Neah Bay between Waaddah Island and the eastern point of the shore. Once inside the points of the island Quimper furled sails and dropped the anchor so he could wait for the tide to finish running and the ship could warp into the center of the bay. The rest of the day was spent interacting with the local people who brought "fish, salmon berries, and a fruit like a cherry of good taste" out to the ship for barter.[152] Around 9 pm, Quimper moved this ship into the center of the bay using a series of warps.

The following day, July 25th, was almost exclusively spent trading with the local people. In order to avoid any problems that could occur if his boat crews were outnumbered Quimper sent out both canoes with soldiers around 5 am to refill the water casks at Village Creek which runs into the bay. They were back onboard by 6 am and soon

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[150] Ibid., 121-2.
[151] Ibid., 122.
[152] Ibid.

> Many canoes of Indians, men and women, came out with whom barter was carried on for woolen cloaks, bear skins, delicious fish, among which were salmon of 100 pounds or more in weight, and the fruits previously mentioned. Sixteen sea-otter skins, large and small, were traded for the king's copper.[153]

When night fell the locals returned to their village on Tatoosh Island at the point of Cape Flattery.

The next day was one of the most eventful of Quimper's voyage. Early in the morning, half of the soldiers and sailors were sent ashore to wash their clothes, while the others were set to work repairing the sails "which had been badly damaged."[154] At 9:30 am Quimper observed a large commotion on the shore and dispatched the other canoe with soldiers to see what the ruckus was about. One of the sailors had wandered into the forest away from the washing party in order to eat "berries and other fruits."[155] Aware that the sailor was on his own, a group of locals stole the sailor's cutlass and attacked him with it, striking him across the head a number of times. When the sailor attempted to defend himself, the locals moved away and shot arrows at him, one of them striking the sailor in the face. The assailants quickly made their escape when it was perceived that the schooner had dispatched another boat to investigate the commotion on the shore.

The attackers left two canoes on shore and Quimper had these brought alongside the ship "to see if they would come for them."[156] Quimper came very close to losing his composure in this situation. While the commotion had been occurring on shore the *Princesa Real* was still surrounded by other canoes, who were engaged in trade with the vessel. Quimper notes that

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[153] Ibid., 123.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.

> At 10, notwithstanding the fact that the Indians who were alongside the sloop in numerous canoes were aware of the danger I felt at the daring of their comrades, three Indians in a small canoe decided to come alongside and carry off one of the captured canoes which was tied to the ship. They paid no attention to our warning to them to let go of it until I fired a swivel gun. For fear of this they let loose of it and fled. All these natives are warlike, treacherous, very thievish, and boast about having killed two captains of vessels which had come to trade with them.[157]

The validity of Quimper's concern was later justified that afternoon when the *Princesa Real* was visited by large canoe carrying an English flag. In the canoe was Tututiaticuz (sic) the brother of Wickaninish "who had told me in his port how very bad these Indians at the south point of the entrance to the strait were."[158] Tututiaticuz said that he had explicitly come to see how Quimper's journey was faring, and he informed Quimper that he had seen a large three-masted ship the day before but had not been able to approach it. Quimper was happy and impressed to see his previous acts of friendship producing dividends, and to strengthen his earlier overtures, the chief was given wine and biscuit, "of which he is very fond."[159]

The following morning, despite the problems that had occurred on shore the previous day, Quimper sent a group ashore to cut and fashion a new spar to replace the topmast which was broken. Canoes again came out to the ship with fish to trade for iron, included in the canoes was a delegation from Tatoosh, who reported he had punished the thief of the cutlass. On hearing this news Quimper gave the messenger some gifts and “delivered to him the two canoes to give the chief in my name to make him see that I did not wish to take away anything from them but to make presents to them instead.”[160]

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[157] Ibid., 123-4. There is no record of the attacks against fur-traders.
[158] Ibid., 124.
[159] Ibid.

This exchange highlights another example of the dialogical representations in the Spanish journals. Here we see Quimper acting in his mind benevolently towards the Native residents of Neah Bay, and reporting it as such to the Viceroy who was looking for, and expecting such overtures. The reality of the situation, however, was Quimper had no need for, nor did he want the canoes as he could not take them with him. The pragmatics of the moment dictated that it was simplest to return the canoes, and style it both for Tatoosh and the Viceroy as a benevolent gesture. As it was later seen, when the *Princesa Real* departed on 3 August, Quimper exchanged the two canoes he had purchased at Clayoquot for fish, as he could not take them with him on his trip down the coast.[161]

Heavy rain descended on the bay for the next three days, which was enough for Quimper to suspend all work on shore. The only actions of the ship were the continued trade for food and sea-otter skins with the local people. On the 29th Tatoosh and some of his family visited, and López de Haro purchased a girl of 8 or 9 for “a little copper and a small cutlass” so that she could be adopted by a crew member and raised as a Christian. Quimper assumed the girl was the daughter of Tatoosh’s brother, but she was most likely a slave.[162]

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[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid., 127.
[162] Ibid., 125.

The 31st was a busy day for the crew of the *Princesa Real*. Despite the continuing rain, Quimper could not wait to finish the spar for the mast, so early in the morning some of the crew were dispatched to bring the spar onboard and to collect "wood which was lacking."[163] Quimper says at 3 pm a delegation of canoes visited the ship, including a young chief that the Spanish named "Cuney." Quimper described Cuney as "a young man of about twenty-four years of age, of light color, well formed and of agreeable countenance."[164] While Cuney was onboard Quimper was passed information from Tatoosh's people that this young man had killed an English fur trade captain named Mile[s]. Quimper questioned Cuney over the supposed murder and "he began to tremble and endeavoured to flee from the sloop," but Quimper calmed and reassured the young chief that nothing would happen to him, and continued to trade for his skins.[165]

When Cuney left the ship some of Tatoosh's people urged Quimper to shoot the rival chief, but Quimper "made them understand that I did not wish to harm anyone."[166] Although there is no record of any attack on a Captain Mile[s] but judging from Cuney's reaction to being questioned about such an occurrence, it appears there was an element of truth in the information that was passed to Quimper. There is a chance that Captain Mile[s] could have been one of many captains of vessels who arrived on the Northwest Coast only to be attacked by local inhabitants, and leave no record.[167]

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[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid., 126.

[165] Ibid.

[166] Ibid.

[167] F.W. Howay, "Indian Attacks Upon Maritime Traders of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1805." *Canadian Historical Review* 6, (1925): 305. Cook in *Flood Tide of Empire* makes no mention of this incident, 282-3.

Later that evening at approximately 11 pm there was another incident which required one of the sentinels to fire a warning shot to keep a canoe away that was trying to approach the *Princesa Real* in silence. Quimper relates that,

> We inferred that the father of the Indian girl whom the pilot bought was in this canoe for the purpose of stealing her, having some agreement with her, because all during the night she did not wish to go below to the place assigned to her in which to sleep, and when it was necessary to force her to do so, her grief was manifested by copious tears.[168]

It is puzzling that Quimper recognized the reason for the duplicity and did nothing to rectify the issue. No attempt to trade the girl back was made by the Spanish, despite the fact that it seems obvious that the father did not really want to sell his (presumed) daughter. Quimper and Haro, the girl's purchaser, could have believed that since they had obtained the girl through an indigenous context, it was appropriate in their social context to keep the girl so she could be turned over to the missionary friars and be given a Catholic upbringing in California.

The next morning Haro and Carrasco were sent out in the longboat and one of the canoes to draw up a plan of the bay. When they returned in the early afternoon, Quimper and most of the ship's company went ashore to complete the last act of possession in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Again Quimper notes "I took possession of it [the bay] with all of the ceremonies which the instructions prescribe."[169] The cross was planted near what is now Village Creek, and the bottle containing the act of possession was buried at the foot of a pine tree behind the cross. The bay was given the Spanish name Nuñez Genoa, after Manuel Nuñez Genoa a high ranking officer in the navy. Wagner reports that the native name for the place was Nisma, but a Spanish list of native place names compiled in 1792 lists the native name as Quinicamet.[170] Today the native name for the site is given as Deah, while the Makah name for themselves is Qw idicca?a ‘tx, which explains why the Spanish believed Neah Bay was called Quinicament.[171]

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[168] Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 126.
[169] Ibid.

While discussing the act of possession in the journal, Quimper also took the opportunity to give a definitive opinion of the port. “It is sheltered from the first, second, and third quarters, abounds with fish, among which are delicious salmon, salmon berries and three other kinds of fruit, sea-otters, bears, deer, rabbits, foxes and dogs.”[172] While Quimper’s list of the local produce is accurate, it is interesting that he does not note the negatives of the port that would overshadow the attempted settlement at Neah Bay two years later. Contrary to what Quimper noted, the port is not at all sheltered from the winds of the first quarter, which is the prominent direction from which the wind blows for a large part of the year. Also Quimper failed to relate that the port has a rocky bottom, and larger vessels had to anchor beyond cannon shot of the shore.[173]

August 2nd saw Quimper prepare to leave the Neah Bay. The pilots were dispatched early in the morning to add soundings of the bay to the map they had prepared the previous day, and Quimper raised the stern anchor so “as to make sail as soon as the weather permitted.”[174] Unfortunately the weather did not permit Quimper to set sail, so he had to be content to continue to engage in the fur trade, acquiring twenty-two otter skins in the afternoon.[175]

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[170] Ibid., note 98. And Cecil Jane, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the Northwest Coast of America* (New York: DeCabo Press, 2nd ed. 1971), 37.

[171] Olympic Peninsula Intertribal Cultural Advisory Committee, *Native Peoples of the Olympic Peninsula: Who We Are*, Jacilee Wray ed. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002., 151-2.

[172] Quimper, “Diary of the Voyage…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 126-7.

[173] Ibid., 65.

[174] Ibid., 127.

The following day, Quimper's last in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the *Princesa Real* had trouble getting underway. The port was beset by fog in the morning, and shifting winds only allowed the schooner to sail for half an hour before being forced to anchor again. In the mid-morning after two failed attempts to get underway Quimper realized that he could not take his two canoes with him so he quickly traded them away. Another attempt to leave was made in the afternoon, but once the ship got beyond the protective Koitlah Point the wind fell calm and the tide began to flow back into the Strait of Fuca. Quimper had to quickly drop his anchor, and spent the night in this precarious position before finally setting sail the next morning.

Quimper's problems with the sailing ability of the *Princesa Real* did not end when the little ship left the Strait of Juan de Fuca. It took six days to sail up the coast to the entrance to Nootka Sound. Unfortunately for Quimper, dense fog, and the prevalent westerly current took the *Princesa Real* beyond Nootka. Quimper was forced to anchor outside of Esperanza Inlet on the north side of Nootka Island to await the favourable winds necessary to make it to Friendly Cove. On the 16th, one day after Quimper was supposed to reach Nootka, he was still in Esperanza Inlet. The *Princesa Real* was taking on 2 inches of water per hour, and their supply of food was precariously low. Quimper called the pilots together and they decided to head for Monterey "without loss of time."[176] By September 1st the ship was at Monterey to be joined by the *San Carlos* two weeks later. Neither ship had been able to reach Friendly Cove as ordered, and Francisco Eliza had to wait until the spring to find out the fate and the results of the two expeditions he had sent out the year before.

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[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid., 80-1.

Numerous opinions have been expressed about the success, or lack thereof, of Quimper's explorations. Wagner, who translated Quimper's diary and other relevant documents, states that other than the trade for sea-otter skins, "the expedition had no tangible results."[177] Warren L. Cook chides Quimper for his numerous acts of possession in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, noting that "Quimper's scrupulous attention to such formalities every time he took possession absorbed much of his time during this expedition; by and large it was a wasted effort."[178]

These opinions are countered by other authors such as the Spanish historian Francisco Ruiz, who notes Quimper's exploration was the first of the great expeditions that charted the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the surrounding region, and that his acts of possession were important from a judicial point of view as the Spanish presence on the northwest coast was becoming more permanent during this time.[179] Freeman Tovell completely counters Wagner by stating "Quimper's effort was not wasted."[180] Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra would use Quimper's acts of possession inside the strait as the basis for trying to establish the Strait of Juan de Fuca as a dividing line between Spanish and British interests during the negotiations with George Vancouver at Nootka Sound two years later.

When news of Quimper's expedition reached Madrid the reaction was one of excitement, and a Royal Order was immediately issued stating that the canal at the eastern end of the strait (Haro Strait) should be explored, even if it was discovered it led to nowhere at all.[181] Quimper's interactions with the local First Nations, despite some nervous moments, established a framework of understanding, revolving around trade and diplomacy that would be built on by subsequent expeditions; and despite numerous difficulties, Quimper's interactions with indigenous peoples was for the most part positive. The acts of possession, as opposed to taking up too much of Quimper's time, only took up a few hours on four separate days, and when they occurred they accompanied a day of rest for the crew, who for the most part were subject to cramped living conditions and were constantly being dispatched on expeditions in the longboat or canoes. Quimper's slow going was more the result of the bad weather, the poor sailing ability of the *Princesa Real*, and Quimper's caution while he took his ship through unknown waters. All of these points were noted by Quimper, and then subsequently overlooked by other historians. Quimper's explorations laid the groundwork for the subsequent expeditions in the next two years, and for the first time noted the strategic nature of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and its potential for a colonial enterprise. Quimper's expedition was most definitely not a wasted or useless exploration. The Strait of Juan de Fuca was one of the few places on the coast that had not been explored by foreigners, and Spanish officials saw an opportunity to solidify their claims to the coast without competition from other European powers.

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[177] Wagner, *The Spanish Explorations of the Strait of Fuca,* 18.
[178] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire,* 283.
[179] Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America,* 338.
[180] Freeman Tovell, *At the Far Reaches of Empire: The Life of Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 157.

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[181] Ibid.

Chapter 4: Indigenous Territory and the Exploration of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds

> "Coming towards us he received us with the endearing expression '*guacas'*, that is to say 'friends'". –Juan Pantoja, Clayoquot Sound, 1791.[1]

In 1790 Manuel Quimper's explorations had demonstrated the extent of the Strait of Juan de Fuca proper but the unexplored Haro Strait at the end of the Strait of Fuca still offered a tantalizing hope of an unexplored Northwest Passage. On February 4th 1791 Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, after one year in command of the San Blas Naval station in Mexico, issued new orders to Francisco Eliza, the commander of the Nootka establishment. The two important aspects of those instructions were stressing good relations with any British traders who came to the coast and to continue exploring and most importantly mapping the coast. In his instructions Quadra implored Eliza to examine the areas that were not yet properly mapped; these locations included the *Entrada de Bucareli* in Alaska, the *Estrecho de Fonte* known now as Dixon Strait, the *Entrada de Ezeta;* today known as the Columbia River, and the bays of *San Rafael, Carrasco,* and *Clauycaut,* in what are today's Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds. The instructions especially stressed exploration in the interior of the Strait of Juan de Fuca.[2] In hind sight it may appear that this list of instructions was far too ambitious for one surveying season, but at the time the instructions probably reflected Bodega's enthusiasm for his position as the commander of the

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[1] Juan Pantoja, "Extract of the Navigation" in H.R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca* (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 166.

[2] Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, "Secret Instructions to Eliza" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 137-41.

San Blas Naval Station.[3] There was also the strong possibility that Bodega thought the Strait of Juan de Fuca would be closed at its unexplored end, and would not have taken much time to explore. Bodega hoped for an "exact general plan of the whole coast," which not only would have made the dangerous task of sailing the Northwest Coast a little safer, but would have also improved Spain's claims to sovereignty over the entire coast. As outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the centralization of this knowledge was one of the imperial objectives of Spain.

This chapter will focus on the attempt to complete these objectives within the context of the explorations of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds, which is an excellent opportunity to examine how imperial projects overlapped and interacted with native territorial dynamics. At the same time the explorations in Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds set the stage for the explorations that would occur later in the summer deep in the Salish Sea. Understanding how Pantoja and especially Narvàez went about these earlier explorations is useful for understanding how the later explorations were undertaken. This is especially relevant in the case of Narváez, whose journal is not available for reference. Understanding how Narváez proceeded with his explorations and cartography of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds offers hints about how he might have proceeded while exploring the Strait of Georgia.

The winter of 1790-1 was the first to be passed by the Spanish on the Northwest Coast. The rains descended onto the little outpost before the dry storage could be constructed to house the Spanish rations on land. As a result, the stores on the three ships left to winter at Nootka either rotted or were destroyed by the ship's rats.[4] The strain on the garrison's stores was further augmented when on January 3rd 1791, the once arrested *Argonaut* under the command of the possibly mentally ill James Colnett dropped anchor at the Spanish base. After nearly a year of being held as a prisoner in Tepic Mexico, Colnett was released with the single provision that he would not trade on the coast claimed by Spain; which is what he then proceeded to do. After spending the last half of the summer and the fall trading up the coast, Colnett intended to pass the winter in Clayoquot Sound, away from the Spanish. This plan was undermined when Colnett took Wickaninish's brother and another native man hostage because Colnett believed there was native treachery behind the loss of his longboat and crew which he had sent on what Warren Cook called a "suicidal effort" to see if the *Princess Royal* was at the Spanish base.[5] In response to this action Wickaninish's people tried a direct assault on the *Argonaut* on December 31st 1790. Although the attack was repulsed it was an obvious sign that Colnett's welcome in Wickaninish's territory in Clayoquot Sound was over and the English trader made for the safer location of the Spanish base. On his arrival he was warmly welcomed and given the last livestock at the settlement including two pigs, chickens and hams.[6]

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[3] John Kendrick asserts that it was Viceroy Revillagigedo who wrote the instructions to Eliza, while Freeman Tovell demonstrates that it was in fact Bodega who drafted the instructions. See John Kendrick, "The End of the Northern Mystery: The Spanish in Juan de Fuca and Beyond" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentenial of the Malaspina Expedition 1791-1792;* Robin Inglis ed. (Vancouver: Vancouver Maritime Museum, 1992), 100-110; and Freman Tovell, *At the far reaches of Empire: The life of Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 147.

[4] Ibid., 294.

While at Nootka, Colnett took the opportunity to try and convince Francisco Eliza to return the schooner that had been in pieces in the hold of the *Argonaut* when it was confiscated in 1789. This schooner, originally to be named the *Jason*, was to operate much like Meares' *Northwest America*, and act as a coastal trading vessel that could be left on the coast with a small crew to trade year round. After Bodega gave Colnett a low-ball offer of 92 dollars, the two men haggled and the frame was sold to the Spanish in San Blas for a price of 500 dollars.[7]

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[5] Ibid., 293.

[6] Ibid., 294.

[7] F.W. Howay, ed. *The Journal of Captain James Colnett Aboard the Argonaut from April 26, 1789 to November 3rd, 1791* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1940), 128, 133.

The value of the schooner may have been overstated by Colnett as he told Bodega that the boat was “70 feet keel,” but when it was completed at Nootka its length was only 40 feet.[8] The keel for the ship had been laid on May 26th, 1790 and the members of the garrison continued to build the ship throughout the summer and fall so that it was complete by the time Colnett arrived at the beginning of January. The ship was named the *Santa Saturnina* after the wife of the commander of the settlement Santurnina Eliza, who was also the sister of Jacinto Caamano, another Spanish officer serving out of the San Blas Naval Station.[9]

The beams for the *Santa Saturnina* would have been a Chinese hardwood such as Oak or Laurel, while the deck and planking would have been made out of local fir.[10] Colnett harassed Eliza about the ship enough that the Spanish commander considered giving the ship over to Colnett. In his journal Colnett complains that Eliza was constantly changing his mind over the matter. Caught between appeasing the easily angered Englishman and the need for another Spanish surveying vessel on the coast, it is easy to see why Eliza vacillated. At one point the Spanish commander informed Colnett that he could take over the ship, which the Englishman happily did. Once Colnett had finished rigging the schooner Eliza informed him that he would owe 3000 Dollars for the schooner, which caused Colnett to return the boat to its Spanish owners.[11] Despite claiming that the Spanish had robbed him of all of his trade goods (an obvious lie considering the trade goods Colnett later had), Colnett managed to collect 700 skins from the Nootka region before he departed for China on March 2nd.[12]

By early March the *Princesa* was dispatched to the California missions with thirty-two infirm members of the garrison, including six who were in very serious condition, with the hope that the warmer climate would improve their health.[13] Relief came when the *San Carlos* under Ramón Saavedra arrived at Nootka on the 26th of March after a 50 day sail from San Blas.[14]

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[8] Ibid., 124; and *Santa Saturnina Manifesto,* Mss 332, Museo Naval, Madrid.
[9] John Crosse Fonds. UBC Special Collections, Box 1 File 1.
[10] Ibid.
[11] F.W. Howay, ed. *The Journal of Captain James Colnett,* 206-7.
[12] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 296; and Juan Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 155.

Soon after the Nootka garrison served its purpose as a bulwark of Spanish sovereignty and Native interaction, when on April 3rd two natives appeared at the Commandant's house in the mid-morning, informing the Spanish that a fleet of 5 ships, including one of 3 masts and 4 of two masts had been seen in front of Esperanza Inlet on the north side of Nootka Island.[15] Fearing either a Russian or English attempt to remove the Spanish from Nootka, the settlement was put on high alert including the installation of two cannons at the back of the settlement facing the beach in order to prevent a landing from the seaward side of the port.

Pilot José Verdía was sent with a longboat to Bajo Point about 10 kilometers away from the settlement so that he could see the outside of Esperanza Inlet, returning in the evening with nothing to report.[16] Still not satisfied, Eliza dispatched José María Narváez in the *Santa Saturnina* with 15 sailors and 4 soldiers including the garrison's translator Cpl. Gabriel de Castillo of the First Cataluñan Volunteers to travel around Nootka Island through the inside passages via Tahsis inlet and the narrows. Considering the tight waterways that would cause lulls or unpredictable winds Narváez and the *Santa Saturnina's* crew would have quickly gotten used to rowing the schooner with the 8 oars it was supplied with.[17]

The *Saturnina* returned to Nootka four days later with information from the local people around Esperanza inlet that four months previously, there had been four ships in the area, and that another had left from there to Clayoquot only two days previously.[18] This news caused Eliza to modify his plans for the summer explorations; he decided to leave the massive frigate *Concepcion* which could mount 30 cannons as the naval presence for the base, while he took the smaller packet boat *San Carlos* and the schooner *Santa Saturnina* to carry out the explorations on the coast.[19]

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[13] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 296.

[14] Juan Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 155.

[15] Idid., 157.

[16] Ibid.

[17] John Crosse Fonds, UBC Special Collections, Box 1 File 1. Narvaez, *Manifesto Santa Saturnina, San Lorenzo de Nuca, 1791*. Museo Naval Madrid, Mss. 332.

[18] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 157-8.

On May 3rd, a day before the expedition under Eliza was to depart, the entire settlement celebrated a religious ceremony in honor of the Virgin of the Rosary, the patroness of the Spanish on the Northwest Coast. As seen by Manuel Quimper's letter to his brother in the previous chapter, although there was little effort to introduce the native population to Catholicism, the religion played a major role in the day- to-day spiritual lives of the Spaniards on the coast.

With no church at the settlement, the carpenter's shop was decorated with "becoming flags and a diversity of flowers," and the image of the Virgin of the Rosary was taken from the *San Carlos* and placed in the gallery of the shop on an alter made for that purpose.[20] With everyone at the settlement gathered "Mass was sung with the litany to implore her clemency for the happy outcome of the present expedition."[21] The members of the settlement then marched in procession shouting "Viva la Virgin!" while saluting with their artillery, until the image of the Virgin and the crew of the *San Carlos* were back on their ship, where they then chanted a salutation to the Virgin Mary.[22]

In these spiritual aspects the Spanish were more like the local First Nations than their Protestant European brethren. Both cultures stressed the importance of the spiritual realm, and strongly believed that spirits could and did have an influence in the material world. In this case the Spanish believed that properly honoring the Virgin Mother was the only way to ensure a successful outcome of the soon-to-be-departing expedition.

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[19] Ibid., 158.
[20] Ibid. And, W. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 304.
[21] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 158.
[22] Ibid.

On May 4th 1791 the expedition under, Francisco Eliza in the *San Carlos* and José Narváez in the *Santa Santurnina,* departed Nootka. After two days of trying to beat up the coast, Eliza quickly realized that trying to make it to 60° N before starting the explorations (as Bodega's enthusiastic instructions asked) would take up most of the summer season. Instead Eliza decided to head for Clayoqout and explore from there south, in which case the wind would help instead of hinder their efforts.[23] What Narváez thought of this development we may never know. As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the written documentation from this expedition comes exclusively from the journals of Francisco Eliza, and 1st Pilot Juan Pantoja, both of whom were on the *San Carlos*.

After two and a half days of trying to make headway to the north, the *San Carlos* and the *Santa Saturnina* made their way into what the Spanish called *Puerto Clayocuat* (See Appendix: Map 8) which today is the waterway that separates Meares Island from the town of Tofino. The ship was anchored by 6 pm and was quickly surrounded by more and more canoes. Pantoja relates that by 7 pm they were surrounded by 44 canoes, while Eliza states that by sundown (about 9 pm) the ships were surrounded by 58 canoes, each with between 4 and 12 persons in them.[24] One of the canoes included Chief Wickaninish and his three sons. Wickaninish's sons went aboard the *San Carlos* where they were given a present of a sheet of copper and a dozen abalone shells; Wickaninish declined going aboard and instead directed his followers from his canoe.[25]

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[23] Francisco Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 143, 163-4.

[24] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 143-4, 165.

The Spanish were entering a completely different political space than what was present at Nootka. Instead of being an umbrella chief like Maquinna, Wickaninish was a patriarch whose family and followers had been extending their control over Clayoquot Sound and the Broken Islands groups of Barkley Sound through a series of wars and amalgamations that had been ongoing since just before contact with Europeans was established.[26] During this time, Opitsat was the largest single native settlement on the Northwest Coast, which allowed Wickaninish to have power over not only his native subordinates, but Euro-American visitors as well.[27]

After distributing presents to Wickaninish's sons, Eliza asked the single most important question for Spanish on the coast: when had Englishmen last been in port? Once again the Spanish were depending on the good-will of native peoples to help ensure their sovereignty on the coast. On being asked, all three sons replied twenty days previously a Captain "Claie" and "Thomas Duglas" had finished trading and sailed away, the first a few days before the second.[28] In all likelihood, Wagner's assertion that the first name refers to Captain Robert Grey of the *Columbia Rediviva* is most likely correct. The second is probably Captain William Douglas of the *Grace,* who was on the coast that spring. This is disputed by Derek Pethick, who does not think Douglas and the *Grace* had enough time to sail from Macao to the coast prior to when the Spanish were at Clayoquot.[29]

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[25] Ibid., 144, 165.

[26] Clayton, *Islands of Truth,* 132.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 144, 165.

[29] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 165 note 38; and F. W. Howay, "A List of Trading Vessels in Maritime Fur Trade 1785-1794" *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada.* 3rd ser. 24 (1930): 111-34. Listing of the *Grace* on 120. Derek Pethick, *The Nootka Connection: Europe and the Northwest Coast, 1790-1795* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1980), 227 note 7.

The crews of the vessels continued to trade for seafood and a few sea-otter skins until dark, and the next day as the two ships made their way into a better anchorage “a short mile” south of Opitsat.[30] The journals do not mention what trade items were exchanged for the skins and the foods, but it was most likely more Abalone shells, an item that was cheap for the Spanish to obtain and highly desired by the indigenous peoples on the coast. Also, when copper was exchanged, the journals tend to mention the transaction, as the Spanish had orders to keep a tally of their expenditures of this item.[31] This was the case when Wickaninish’s sons were given copper as the boats were moving to their anchorage deeper in the port.[32] As Daniel Clayton has pointed out, Wickaninish’s large territory and power base allowed him more self-sufficiency than Maquinna. Trade with Europeans played a large part in Wickaninish’s growing wealth and prestige and traders and explorers were expected to participate in reinforcing his chiefly power.[33]

This is what occurred on June 10th when Eliza, Pantoja, the other pilot José Verdía, Chaplain José Villarende, and Surgeon Father Juan Ferron from the *San Carlos* and Narváez and pilot Juan Carrasco from the *Santa Saturnina* paid a visit to Wickaninish at Opitsat.[34] These officials brought Monterey shells and a sack of ship’s biscuit as gifts and obviously pleased Wickaninish with their presence. On entering Wickaninish’s house, the Spaniards were warmly greeted by the chief who called them ‘*guacas*’, which the Spanish took to mean ‘friends’.[35] Cedar mats were spread on boxes, and through signs, Wickaninish prompted the Spanish to sit on them next to him and other important subordinates. A song and dance was then performed for the Spanish in which Eliza estimates 600 people took part. This would seem to corroborate

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[30] Eliza, “Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 144.

[31] Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, “Secret Instructions to Lieutenant Eliza -#14” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 139.

[32] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 165.

[33] Clayton, *Islands of Truth,* 135.

[34] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 166.

[35] Ibid.

Pantoja's assertion that when the song reached its crescendo, the noise was so loud that the three massive beams that supported the roof trembled.[36] The performance lasted for an hour, after which Wickaninish's three sons and his father accompanied the officers back to the *San Carlos* to have lunch with them. Eliza inquired as to why Wickaninish did not come aboard any of the ships like his sons. To this Wickaninish replied that he did not out of fear. When he had gone to visit Colnett earlier in the year with his brother, his brother had slipped off the ladder onto the *Argonaut* and drowned.[37]

The trip to Opitsat involved some careful cultural negotiation. Pantoja noted that in order not to offend or cause suspicion he did not measure the size of Wickaninish's house, although he notes "by accident" he found the beams that supported the roof to be 5 1/3 feet thick.[38] That afternoon, while Wickaninish's sons and father were having tea on the *San Carlos*, the *Santa Saturnina* departed to explore the channel leading east from where they were anchored south of Opitsat (see Appendix: Map 9 to follow Narváez and Pantoja's explorations).

The next day the *San Carlos* was once again visited by Wickaninish's sons and a group of visiting chiefs, who had come to Opitsat to attend a feast being held by Wickaninish to celebrate the birth of a son to one of his wives. Eliza presented Monterey shells to the visitors, and excused himself for not coming ashore again. The reason for this being that Eliza only had the shells he was giving away as trade goods, and would not have had enough for all who would request them if he or another officer were to go ashore.[39] That afternoon Pantoja was dispatched in the *San Carlos*'s 28 foot long boat with 14 other armed sailors to explore the Northwest section of the sound.

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[36] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 146, 166.

[37] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 166.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., 167.

On the 12th as the *San Carlos* and its crew waited for the return of the recently departed expeditions, a canoe with a letter from Narváez in the *Santa Saturnina* arrived. The letter informed Eliza that Narváez had penetrated Browning Passage to its end at Grice Bay and that he was going to explore the two channels extending north from the first passage (Tofino Inlet and Fortune Channel).[40]

Two days later on the 14th Narváez returned saying the first channel which he named *Poco Agua* or 'little water' ended after about 15 miles where it connected with both of the channels that ran northward and "ended at the foot of mountains covered with snow."[41] Narváez reported four rivers in the first arm that extended northward which he named *Seno de Gervete*. According to the chart of the sound these would have been Tofino Creek, Onad Creek, Marble Creek, and the Kennedy River; which was named *Rio Cauldaloso* or The Abundant River.[42] Narváez then went partly up Fortune Channel which he named *Brazo de San Juan de Dios.* It is possible to tell from this section of the chart that Narváez stuck to the western shore in Fortune Channel. Windy Bay and Lane Islet are clearly mapped, but the Wood Islets and Dark Island are too far east.

It is clear from the lack of detail that Narváez did not make it around Plover Point to see how far Warn Bay receded, or that it was open through the Matleset Narrows to Bedwell Sound. Mosquito Harbour is shown behind the Wood Islets, but it is obvious that Narváez did not approach close to this location as the shape of the harbour does not resemble at all what is on the chart.[43] This is an excellent example of how Narváez proceeded with his explorations. At times

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[40] Ibid., 167.

[41] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 144, 167.

[42] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 144.

[43] Ibid. Wagner assumed that the *Brazo de San Juan de Dios* was Tranquil Inlet, which due to its position on the chart clearly is not. Wagner also states in note 11. On 144, that "Carrasaco apparently discovered the lake now called 'Kennedy,'" although there is no textual or cartographic evidence that I have seen to suggest so.

Narváez could be very through, as his exploration of Tofino inlet demonstrates. At the same time, youth and inexperience possibly caused him to assume too much, as his turning back in Fortune Channel before rounding Plover Point demonstrates. Without a journal we have to rely on Narváez's cartography which seems to indicate that he relied at least in part on assumption to avoid extra work when charting certain areas.

On the 19th, Pantoja returned after 8 days of uncomfortable living in the small longboat. He had left the *San Carlos* at Opitsat and gone through Maurus Channel along the north end of Vargas Island which was named *Isla Ferran* into the *Boca de Saavadra* around the area of Russell Channel.[44] While in this area, Pantoja discerned that large vessels had little hope of using this entrance to the sound due to the numerous islands that dot the area so he moved on after doing a fairly thorough job of mapping the numerous island and rocks. Next Pantoja moved around the northeast side of Flores Island through Millar Channel. Pantoja gave the channel two names: the *Seno de San Juan de Bautista* for the part of the channel south of McKay Island, and the *Canal de San Antonio* for the part of the channel north of McKay Island.[45]

The 15th was an extremely eventful day for Pantoja, as they continued up Millar Channel. They found and named *Puerto de San Ysidro* and the *Isla de San Pedro*.[46] It can be assumed that these places were found on the 15th, as both of the named saints celebrate their feast days on that date. The Port of *San Ysidro*, which today has no name, is the small bay just east of Sulphur Passage. The island of *San Pedro* is Obstruction Island. Dixon Bay, across from the west side of Obstruction Island, was also found and its entrance sounded. It was given the name *Puerto de Rivera.*

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[44] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 167-8.
[45] Ibid., 168.
[46] Ibid.

As Pantoja made his way through Shelter Inlet he rounded Starling Point and entered Sydney Inlet. The Sydney Inlet had been seen by ships headed to Nootka previously and named *Puerto de San Rafael*. As Pantoja started to make his way through the passage towards the open ocean, he noticed two large villages, one on each shore. These would have been Tootoowiltena, on Flores Island and Openit, on the Openit Peninsula.

As soon as the residents of these two villages saw the longboat they embarked in canoes and began to fire arrows at the Spanish as soon as the longboat came into range. Pantoja relates that the longboat made a "prompt defense" with the muskets and one native person was seen to fall.[47] It is obvious from the chart that the longboat had made it to the approximate entrance of the inlet formed by the end of the Openit Peninsula and the coast of Flores Island. At this point Pantoja decided that he would use the wind coming up the inlet from the ocean to make his escape, and had a shot fired against the shore. This caused his attackers to pause their fusillade of arrows, during which Pantoja "withdrew, without firing on them again, completely finishing the plan, or taking possession of the place, as I should, as it was clear to sea."[48]

Pantoja elected that good relations with local native peoples were more important than his imperial project, and headed deeper into Sydney inlet, which he labeled the *Canal de San Francisco*. While being generally pleased at his escape, Pantoja stated in his Journal

> I did not resort to my swivel guns. Although I was in a favorable position to do them great damage, as the Indians were notably numerous, the Lord was pleased to cause me to reflect on the charity with which I ought to look on my neighbors and that I was not ordered to send souls to the inferno.[49]

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid. When the Mss of this account was checked against Wagner's translation, a passage in parenthesis where Pantoja stated that this encounter was very short "*muy breve*", was omitted from the English translation.

[49] Ibid.

Compounding his decision to leave Sydney Inlet partially uncharted, was the fact that "if I [Pantoja] should keep on to finish what was left to do, I would have to pass the night in sight of the settlements and would find myself in greater straits."[50] The men from the two villages which had attacked the longboat continued to follow as it approached Holmes Inlet, named the *Boca de Santa Saturnina* by Pantoja at the Northeast end of Sydney Inlet. Pantoja saw another village near Young Bay in Holmes Inlet and decided at 9 pm to stop for the night at a small unnamed island directly across from the entrance to Shelter Inlet. Pantoja believed it would be easier to escape an attack from this location, than if he went deeper into the waterway.[51] For the rest of the night, Pantoja and the crew of the longboat waited, fearful of being attacked again. At one point a large amount of shouting was heard, but the night being dark and foggy, nothing could be seen. It was during this time that Pantoja decided he would leave the inlets in front of him unexplored, and only having a few days of his allotted time left, decided to return and explore the waterways he had sighted north of Opitsat.[52]

At daybreak on the 16th of May, Pantoja made for the narrows that separate Sydney Inlet from Shelter Inlet so that he could once again travel through Millar Channel to head north around Meares Island. As the longboat approached the narrows, it was challenged by a canoe full of locals. Pantoja ignored them and continued on his way as the passengers in the canoe yelled after the longboat.[53]

The longboat then made its way through Epper Passage, between Vargas and Meares Islands and Catface Mountain. Pantoja named the passage *Canal de San Juan Nepomuceno*, as the 16th of May was the saint's feast day. Despite being named as such in both Pantoja and

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[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 168.
[52] Ibid., 169.
[53] Ibid.

Eliza's Journals, the name was changed to *Canal de Noroeste* (Northwest Channel) when the chart of the sound was produced (See Appendix: Map 9).[54] Beyond the passage, Pantoja found the *Puerto de Guemes* and the *Puerto de Giraldez*, known today as Bedwell Sound and Warn Bay.[55] From the chart it is easy to see that from Warn Bay, Pantoja saw into Fortune Channel, the same channel that Narváez had been in only a few days previously, which led to an awkward representation of this area on the chart that was produced.

Narváez believed the arm he had explored and named *San Juan de Dios* was closed, while Pantoja had come from the other side of Meares Island and saw an open channel, but returned the way he had come. This led to both representations of the same area being placed side by side on the map in a confusing manner. Narváez's closed arm sits close to the open arm that Pantoja saw, which continues to an unknown ending. The size of the channel and the fact that according to the map the channel has to close at some point before reaching the area seen by Narváez, makes one wonder why, or how the officers did not make the leap of logic and realize they had been to the same place, and that the land on which Opitsat was located was an island and not part of the assumed mainland. One also has to wonder why no one bothered to ask any of the local residents about the confusion. Clearly the Spanish thought they could depend on First Nations for information on visiting ships, but for some reason not geographic knowledge.[56]

Part of the reason for the confusion about the area around Warn Bay could result from the preparation of the chart. From May 14th, when the *Santa Saturnina* returned, until the 20th when the schooner was ordered to explore Barkley Sound, Narváez and Eliza worked on drafting the chart. That means that Pantoja would have had only part of a day to add his explorations to the chart that was already in progress before the expedition left Clayoquot for the Strait of Juan de Fuca.[57] There is, as well, an interesting difference between the chart that was produced at Clayoquot and the charts that were produced by the British the next year. Instead of Clayton's criticism that British maps ignore native geopolitical dynamics, the Spanish maps, especially of Clayoquot Sound, demonstrate those dynamics.

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] One of the interesting characteristics of the 1791 *Carta Esferica* is the inclusion of native information on the position of Woss and Nimkish Lakes behind Tahsis.

Unknown to the Spanish, the Clayoqout Sound region was dominated by three different native groups. The most important and powerful of these were the Clayoquot under the control of Wickaninish. When the Spanish expedition anchored off of Opitsat, to the best of their abilities they honored Wickaninish, and observed proper protocol for a visiting group. This approach allowed them to place themselves in an advantageous position for carrying out explorations in the territory controlled by Wickaninish. When the *Santa Saturnina* departed towards Tofino Inlet Wickaninish's sons and his father were on board the *San Carlos* and it can be assumed the local population of Opitsat would have been keenly aware of the purpose of the *Santa Saturnina*. Within this context it is easy to see why Narváez did not have any problems with local people, and in fact was able to convey letters to the *San Carlos* through a native letter carrier as he explored his portion of the sound. All of the areas Narváez explored were controlled by Wickaninish and his people. Not surprisingly, Narvaez was able to carry out his explorations unmolested.

The opposite happened to Pantoja. The instant he headed west from the anchorage by Opitsat, he would have been in Ahousaht territory. During this time the Ahousaht were independent but closely connected to Wickaninish. It was possibly the chiefs of this territory who had been at Wickaninish's feast, and had come aboard the *San Carlos* for an introduction and gifts on the 11th.[58] This treatment of the Ahousat chiefs would explain why Pantoja only encountered difficulty when he crossed into Hesquiaht territory in Sydney Inlet. The Hesquiaht had been mostly left out of the direct fur trade with Euro-Americans due to their territorial location. Hesquiat Harbour was not even noted or charted by the Spanish during their time at Nootka, despite only being around Estevan Point, some 25-30 km from Friendly Cove. The fact that the groups the Spanish were trying to be closest with were the Hesquiat's most important rivals at this time could have also played into the less than friendly reception Pantoja experienced.

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[57] Juan Carrasco, "Carrasco to Fidalgo, 9 Noviembre 1791." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 200-202.

As a result of Pantoja's difficulties the map of the Sydney Inlet region was left unfinished which, opposed to Vancouver's maps, can be read as evidence of native geopolities. Despite the fact that the Spanish explorers did not know they were crossing set native boundaries, they very much were. This can be seen in the charts the Spanish produced. Where local customs were followed by the Spanish their cartographic efforts were generally successful and not at all hindered by local people's interference. Where the Spanish showed up unannounced or uninvited, they were treated as possible invaders and locals defended the sovereignty of their territory. This would be especially true if the Spanish were seen to be operating within the local power structure; in this case Pantoja would have been readily associated with Wickaninish. This association would have helped or hindered Pantoja depending on where he was in Clayoquot Sound. The same would have been true for Narváez as he moved to Barkley Sound to continue explorations there.

On May 21st 1791, the day after Pantoja returned with the longboat from Sydney Inlet, Eliza dispatched Narváez to Barkley Sound, known to the Spanish by the hybrid name *Archipielago de Nitnat ó Carrasco*. Narváez had informed Eliza that since he had been in the region of Barkley Sound when he first went to the Strait of Juan de Fuca two years previously, in 1789, he knew that there was no secure anchorage for the *San Carlos*.[59] Due to Narváez's missing journal it is impossible to know exactly what occurred while he was in Barkley Sound. Still, comments from Eliza and Pantoja's journal along with the cartographic records of the exploration (See Appendix: Maps 10-11) and with the known ethnographic history of the region can be combined to give a reasonable picture of the *Santa Saturnina*'s movements. No other historian has attempted to reconstruct this aspect of the exploration, but as shall be seen, Narváez's actions in Barkley Sound had an important effect on the later explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Georgia.

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[58] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 143.

Of the three known charts of the Barkley Sound region produced from the 1791 expedition, one is different from the others by having place names (the other two have no place names) and some sections show the route that the *Santa Saturnina* took while in the archipelago (see Appendix: Map 10-11). There is also a small section of text attached to the dotted line demarcating the route of the schooner that says in Spanish "Entrance of the *S^{ta} Saturnina* in May 91." The chart indicates the ship entered the waterway to the west of the Deer Island Group, on the east side of Barkley Sound, between Folger Island and King Edward Island. The *Saturnina* then anchored off the south point of Fleming Island, after crossing Satellite Passage and rounding Sandford Island. From this point, the locations that the schooner visited are marked alphabetically on the chart. However, a few of the letters are undistinguishable or missing.

From Narváez's position south of Fleming Island, Bamfield Inlet was sighted and demarcated before the *Saturnina* sailed deeper into Barkley Sound. The schooner then approached Nanat Islet at the southern end of Numukamis Bay before tacking towards Tzartus Island, the largest island in the Deer and Chain Group of islands. The explorations were hampered by the poor weather, and Narváez would later complain about the constant wind and rain. These conditions would explain why the Sarita River was missed and the Northeast section of Numukamis Bay is drawn as an unexplored channel.[60] The next anchorage for the schooner was a small bay on the East side of Tzartus Island near the present day Nachaquis IR 2.

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[59] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 146.

From this anchorage the *Santa Saturnina* sailed up to Chup Point and anchored off the village which was located at the entrance to Uchucklesit Inlet, given the name *Fondo de Vernaci,* near the present day reserve of Cowishil. It was most likely here that the local population indicated to Narváez that they were surprised to see a ship that far into the archipelago. Wagner uses this statement to question the prior discovery of the region by Charles Barkley and others, but the statement is fairly clear; traders had no reason to penetrate deep into the region and tended to stay on the outer coast, hence the surprise by locals at the presence of a European vessel in their territory.[61]

From this location the *Santa Saturnina* entered the Alberni Inlet, as far as the small bay at the entrance to Coleman Creek. With the wind blowing contrary to the direction the *Saturnina* needed to leave the inlet, Narveaz decided to turn around and head back to Uchucklesit Inlet, anchoring in Green Cove near Cheeyah Island.[62] From this position the schooner moved around Fullerton Point at the north end of Tzartus Island and anchored near Holford Bay between Stud and Diplock Islands. This caused Narváez to miss Useless Inlet and Effingham Inlet at the bottom of Vernon Bay. The *Santa Saturnina,* however, must have sailed partly into this bay on its way to the anchorage on the west side of Tzartus Island as the Alma and Russell Islands and the native village at Outs are shown.

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[60] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 149, 172.

[61] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 149.

[62] Ibid.

It is at this point, near Outs, that the maps of the expedition become a little confused. It seems after returning from the Alberni Canal and Uckucklesit Inlet, Narváez assumed that the west side of Tzartus Island and the Deer Group south of it were different islands than the ones which he had traveled up on the east side. They were in fact the same islands, although because this was not recognized the group appears twice on the map.

Part of the reason why these islands appear twice on the map may have to do with the problems Narváez encountered with the local indigenous groups. When Narváez gave his report of his expedition to Eliza, he stated that twice he had been attacked by upwards of 200 natives, and that he had to use his cannons (but not grape shot) to frighten the assailants off.[63] Narváez did not know it, but he had entered a highly volatile and divisive area.

When Narváez had entered Barkley Sounsd near the Deer Group Islands and stayed on the east side of them, he had been firmly in Haachaht (Hatc'a'atH^{a}) territory, and had stayed in that territory except for the stops in the Uchucklesit Inlet, which was controlled by the group for whom the inlet is named after (the Uchucklesaht).[64] The west side of the Deer Group and the Broken Islands Group, in the center of Barkley Sound, was controlled by the Sheshart (Ts!icya'atH^{a}), who had been in a state of war with both the Haachaht and the Toquart (T'ok'wa'atH^{a}) and Ucluelet (who were subordinate groups to Wickaninish's Clayoquot) since before contact with Europeans had been established.[65] Narváez's appearance in Sheshart territory close to one of their villages near Marble Cove on Tzartus Island would have been viewed negatively, especially if the schooner was associated with Wickaninish and/or the Haachaht. It was most likely here that the *Santa Saturnina* was first attacked, which would explain why the schooner would have headed for the Broken Islands group before determining that the island(s) that they were anchored off were the opposite sides of the ones they had previously visited.

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[63] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 149, 172.

[64] Alan McMillan, *Since the Time of the Transformers: The Anciet Heritage of the Nuu-chah-nulth, Ditidaht, and Makah* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 25.

[65] Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 145-8.

After stopping off the west side of Tzartus Island, the *Santa Saturnina* headed for the Broken Islands Group. Rounding the outside of the islands, the schooner penetrated between Benson and Wouwer Islands, and anchored in Coaster Channel near Cooper Island. From this point, Narváez's movements become more difficult to trace, as the alphabetical indicators of the points visited by the schooner grow confusing. It was probably at this point or at some other time while the *Saturnina* was in the Broken Island Group that the schooner was attacked again. The charts of the expedition indicate a large village, most likely the one on Effingham Island. They also show that the schooner seemed to stay as far away from this village as possible, only exploring the west side of the islands in the group. Following the sounding Coaster Channel, the *Santa Saturnina* then picked its way between Clarke and Turret Islands and anchored again close to Dodd Island on the west side of the Broken Islands Group. This anchorage would have been completely out of sight of the village on Effingham Island, again indicating that it was probably with this village that the *Saturnina* had problems. From this spot Narváez continued to head north, making his way through Peacock Channel and anchored again on the south side of the small passage that separates Prideaux Island and Nettle Island.

Narváez's scant explorations from this point onwards would indicate it was at or about this point; he began to become concerned about his stores of food and water, a common theme throughout the rest of the exploring season.[66] Sechart Channel between Nettle Island and Howard Point was quickly sounded and the schooner headed northwest into Mayne Bay. The *Saturnina* then passed through the small channel between the Stopper Islands as this is the only place where a sounding was taken in this part of Barkley Sound.

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[66] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*., 173.

The chart indicates how poor the visibility must have been in the continuing bad weather. It shows Harris Point as an island instead of a peninsula, and Toquart Bay and Pipestem Inlet both appear as unexplored passages. Toquart Bay is less than 6 kilometers from the Stopper Islands, which would indicate that the visibility was less than that when the schooner was in the vicinity. This is also another example of Narváez's reluctance to completely chart an area, if it meant the exploration would be overly difficult or time consuming.

While near the Stopper Islands Narváez must have seen the Toquart fish camp of *Ch'itkis* and headed there as his map indicates that the schooner replenished its water from the Maggie River.[67] Again, the association between the Spanish and Wickaninish probably paid off at this point. There is little reason to suspect that Narváez had any problems with the locals, as good watering place right beside a village probably would not be marked on the charts if there had been a confrontation between the schooner and the local villagers.

After replenishing his water, Narváez rounded David Island and exited Barkely Sound. The *Santa Saturnina* made its course for the *Puerto de Cordova*, today's Esquimalt Harbour, where Eliza and the *San Carlos* waited so that the explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, started the year previously, could continue.

Narváez's exploration of Barkley Sound again highlights his methods as an explorer which would come into focus a month later as he explored the Strait of Georgia. As in his explorations of Clayoquot Sound, Narváez was fairly accurate depicting features that he actually saw while at the same time he used assumptions about the geography he was witnessing to fill in sections of the map which were unclear or would have been time consuming to properly chart. This is best seen in the placement of Tzartus Island and the Deer Island Group twice on the map. A more thorough exploration would have quickly revealed the single chain of islands instead of the two chains which appear on Narváez's maps. Other factors probably came into play regarding Narváez's errors in cartography which included the horrible weather he encountered, time and supply constraints, and most importantly difficulty with indigenous groups. Unlike in Clayoquot, Narváez for the first time encountered resistance to his presence from local peoples and it seems did his utmost to remove himself and the *Santa Saturnina* from locations of conflict. All of these issues and the responses to them would occur again during the exploration of the Strait of Georgia. By understanding how Narváez responded to the difficulties he faced in Barkley Sound it is easier to comprehend how he carried out his explorations a month later in the Strait of Georgia.

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[67] McMillian, *Since the Time of the Transformers*, 189.

On the 21st of May, as Narváez departed to Barkley Sound, Eliza prepared the *San Carlos* for departure as well. On the 22nd, the packet boat cleared the entrance to Clayoquot and headed for the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The same bad weather that hampered Narváez's explorations in Barkley Sound thrashed the *San Carlos* in the open water between Clayoquot and the Strait of Juan de Fuca to such an extent that Eliza feared the ship would be dismasted.[68]

It took five days of difficult sailing for the *San Carlos* to enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The entrance was easy enough for Eliza to find, but contrary winds and the necessity to tack out to sea once the sun had set due to a lack of vision, made actual ingress into the Strait of Juan de Fuca very difficult. Eventually Eliza modified his tactic somewhat, and on the 26th as night fell, he came as close to the shore as possible just south of Barkley Sound, so he could follow the coast south during the night, and enter the Strait Juan de Fuca in the morning. This tactic for entering the Strait of Fuca paid off for Eliza, as the *San Carlos* entered the waterway at 7 am on the 27th.[69]

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[68] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 146
[69] Ibid., 147.

As soon as the *San Carlos* was inside the two points that mark the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, known as Bonilla Point and Cape Flattery (known to the Spanish at *Punta de Martinez*), canoes approached the ship from both the North and the South shores. Both Eliza and Pantoja note that the local inhabitants who came out to greet them were well armed with bows and quivers of arrows with bone and metal points, something they had not witnessed at Nootka, or at Clayoquot.[70] While Eliza distributed small gifts to the occupants of the canoes, the local native people inquired into the destination of the ship. Pantoja relates that "On our making signs to them that we were going to the interior they repeated many times the words 'Chocons Pizeguei' (which means 'very bad men'), who would wound and kill with spears, arrows and clubs, making themselves sufficiently clear and displaying some anger."[71] The canoes followed the *San Carlos* until about noon, when they left the ship as it continued into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The wind died in the evening and the *San Carlos* anchored in Orveas Bay, no doubt using Quimper's information from the year prior that the bay was a good anchorage.[72]

The next morning Eliza mentioned that they only had a "light sea breeze." It must have indeed been light, as by 6:30 in the evening, the *San Carlos* was only as far as the entrance to Sooke Harbour, and it took the ship another 3 hours to round the Bentinck Islands and Race Rocks.[73] The ship then spent the night anchored somewhere in front of Pedder Bay, and the next day was spent towing the *San Carlos* to the entrance of Esquimalt Harbour at Royal Roads, where Eliza intended to wait for Narváez and the *Santa Saturnina* to arrive from Barkley Sound.

The 30th would have been spent securing the *San Carlos*' anchorage and exchanging formalities with the local inhabitants, although there is no mention of this in any of the journals.

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[70] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 148, 171.

[71] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 173.

[72] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 148.

[73] Ibid.

At 5 am on the 31st, the longboat under the command of 2nd Pilot José Verdía was sent to explore Haro Strait between Vancouver Island and the San Juan Islands. This area had been briefly visited by Juan Carrasco the previous year. In his work on the Spanish explorations in 1791, historian John Crosse suggests that the longboat would have rounded Trial Island and then traveled through Mayor and Baynes Channels on the West side of Discovery and Chatham Islands (see Appendix: Map 12).[74] When Carrasco had visited Gonzales Point in the previous year, he gave a good indication of the rocks and strong currents that dominate the small passage between Gonzales Point and Discovery and Chatham Islands and noted the "true channel" which lay beyond.[75] The shoreline along what is now Victoria was obviously not approached closely by the expedition under Verdía; Victoria harbor does not appear on the chart due to the bar that used to block the entrance along with the curve of the harbour would have made it almost invisible.[76]

The omission of Cadboro Bay from the map is curious. Had the longboat entered Mayor and Baynes Channels, the bay would have been plainly visible, yet it does not appear on the chart. The first prominent location denoted in Haro Strait on the Vancouver Island side was Cormorant Point. It is shown with a village nearby, and probably where the longboat encountered its difficulties. At 10:30 pm on the same day that it had departed, the longboat returned to the *San Carlos* and Verdía informed Eliza that he could not continue exploring Haro Strait. Verdía reported that when he was two-and-a-half leagues into the channel he had been surrounded by native canoes. This location would have been right off Cormorant Point in the Victoria neighborhood of Gordon Head, as the chart indicates the longboat got close to the shore to take a sounding and the distance mentioned by Verdía is almost exactly the distance listed by George Davidson in his 1889 *Pacific Coast Pilot* from the entrance of Haro Strait to Cormorant Point.[77] When Verdía reached this location at least six canoes each with between 16 and 20 occupants, began harassing the longboat with arrows and long spears with bone tips. Verdía states that the canoes overtook the longboat and he was forced to fire on at least one of the canoes in order to escape.[78] He saw more canoes being launched, and in the face of the mounting resistance to his presence, Verdía made for the *San Carlos* at the entrance to Esquimalt.

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[74] UBC Special Collections, John Crosse Fonds, Box 9 File 8.

[75] Manuel Quimper, "Diary of the Voyage by Quimper…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 107.

[76] George Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th edition (Washington: Government Priters, 1889), 548.

This event would have been extremely difficult for all concerned. As has already been demonstrated, the Spanish explorations crossed native boundaries without any knowledge that they were doing so. The longboat was obviously an unwelcome intrusion and the local people defended their sovereignty. The longboat was also in an untenable situation on an unknown coast, at least a half day's row from the nearest aid at the *San Carlos*. The fact that the longboat was engaged with spears indicates how close the small boat was to being overwhelmed, and Verdía and his small crew would have probably only had time to stop rowing to fire one devastating volley which opened up the space to escape.[79] In light of this difficulty Eliza decided to wait for the arrival of the *Santa Saturnina* in order to carry on explorations.

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[77] Ibid., 557. Davidson's directions are for Cormorant Bay (the point is still called as such), which was re-named Cordova Bay in 1905 by the Geographic Board of Canada. See Capt. John Walbran, *British Columbia Coast Names: 1592-1906* (Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 1971), 112.

[78] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 148-9, 171.

[79] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 171.

Chapter 5: Spain and the Strait of Georgia, 1791

Aquel inmenso y peligroso mar [José María Narváez, 1791]
-That immense and dangerous sea

Narváez arrived at Esquimalt from Barkley Sound on June 11th 1791, and reunited with the *San Carlos* reported on his findings. The next few days were spent gathering wood and water for the *Santa Saturnina* so that it could be sent with the longboat to continue the exploration of Haro Strait.[407] Concerned over the attack that was directed against the longboat when it had previously gone into Haro Strait, Eliza had the schooner and longboat crammed with supplies and personnel. Eight of the ten *Voluntarios de Cataluña* who were accompanying the expedition as marines, were transferred to the schooner and the longboat from the *San Carlos*. Five of the *Voluntarios* were with Narváez on the *Saturnina*, and three were in the longboat with Pantoja.[408] In the longboat the three soldiers would have joined the two officers Pantoja and Verdía, and 13 other seamen to make a very cramped little vessel. The *Saturnina*, along with the five *Voluntarios*, had Narváez and Carrasco as officers, accompanied by two other petty officers, five gunners, five seamen, two boys and one servant. With the hull of the schooner full of supplies for the two vessels, all cooking and sleeping happened on the exposed deck of the *Saturnina* regardless of weather.[409]

The little vessels were obviously prepared for a conflict. Pantoja relates that the *Saturnina* was given enough powder for 25 shots for the six 3 pound bronze cannon it carried.[410] This armament was augmented by four swivel guns; two on the schooner and two which the longboat was equipped with. Various small arms that would also have been carried by the crews; each of the *Voluntarios* would have had the musket and bayonet they were issued on their arrival at Nootka the year before, and each gunner would have also had a musket from the *San Carlos*' stores. The officers and possibly gunners would have been issued pistols, and pikes would have been a part of the *Saturnina*'s equipment in case of close quarters fighting.[411]

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[407] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in H.R. Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca* (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 149.

[408] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." and Carrasco, "Carrasco to Fidalgo, 9 Noviembre 1791" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 172, 201. See also John Crosse Fonds, UBC Special Collections Box 1 Folder 1.

[409] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 172. John Crosse Fonds, UBC Special Collections Box 1 Folder 1.

Pantoja was given command of the expedition, and it is interesting he states Eliza's instructions for him included "the task of examining carefully the *Canal de Lopez de Haro* and to punish the Indians in case they came back or tried to attack us as they had done Don José Verdía."[412] The Spanish in the manuscript of his extract reads *insultar nos*, or "insulted us," when referring to what happened to Verdía. Eliza and the rest of the crew most likely felt slighted because their supposed superior weaponry was not enough to overcome resistance to the explorations.[413] This would have been compounded by the frustration of having to wait two weeks to continue exploring after the longboat was turned back.

The idea of sending the longboat with the *Saturnina* was introduced as a time saving measure; it was thought that each boat would be able to cover one side of the Haro Strait, and therefore the reconnaissance would go twice as fast.[414] Considering Haro Strait appears closed to the North, when first entering from the South, and since Verdía only penetrated a few kilometers into the passage, Eliza was probably still hoping the passage would be closed, as every other passage on the Northwest Coast explored this far had turned out to be.[415] In light of this fact, the longboat and schooner were only allotted four days for exploration.

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[410] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 172.
[411] Santa Saturnina Manifesto, San Lorenzo de Nuca, 1791 Museo Naval m/s 332. Also UBC Special Collections: John Crosse Fonds, Box 1 File 1.
[412] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 172.
[413] Pantoja "Extracto de la Navegacion…" MSS Copy UBC Special Collections: John Crosse Fonds.
[414] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 173.

At 9am on June 14th, the schooner and longboat under the overall command of Pantoja, departed Royal Roads on the first of two major explorations to occur in June and July 1791 (see Appendix: Maps 13-14). The goal of this expedition was the exploration of Haro Strait with the hope of discovering if this passage linked up with the *Boca de Fidalgo*, which had been seen the year previously. With a wind from the Southwest they made their way past what is today Victoria's waterfront and entered Haro Strait through Mayor and Baynes Channels between Vancouver Island and the Discovery and Chatham Islands. These small islands were named "Aguayo" by Pantoja in his "*Pequena Carta*" (see Appendix: Map 4) which he drew at the end of the 1791 exploring season, but the name was transferred to the Clark Islands off Lummi Island in Washington State when the "1791 *Carta que Comprehende*" was drawn.

The strong current that passes through Haro Strait was noted by Pantoja, who said that it gave the impression that they were sailing up a river.[416] Although it may have seemed risky for the schooner to take such a small passageway around the Discovery Islands, the route had been scouted by Verdía in the aborted expedition the month prior, and the hazards for the boats were all marked with beds of kelp, allowing them to be easily avoided.[417]

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[415] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th edition, 556.

[416] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 172-3.

[417] George Richards, *The Vancouver Island Pilot* (London: Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 1864), 27.

After passing Cormorant Point where Verdía had clashed with the local native people, the expedition continued up the passage sticking close to the shore of Vancouver Island. Only one native person was seen from the boats but fires in the distance on the Saanich Peninsula indicated unseen villages. Soundings were taken off James and then Sidney Island and the village of Tsawout was marked on the chart as the ships passed through Sidney Channel and continued into Prevost Passage. Coal and Piers Islands were approached near Swartz Bay and the numerous islands that were in this vicinity were given the name "*Islas de San Antonio.*" It was most likely at this point that the realization of their task's difficulty dawned on the Spaniards. Pantoja described the Western part of the Gulf Islands, named by the Spanish as the '*Bocas de Bazan*', as an "indescribable archipelago of islands, keys, rocks, and big and little inlets."[418] The strong wind that had originally helped the vessels fight the current now became somewhat of a problem as the longboat, lacking any sort of centerboard, was falling far leeward of the *Saturnina.*[419] As the two boats were supposed to travel together, the schooner lay to and the longboat took up its oars and rowed to the position of the schooner. The wind continued to cause problems for the longboat as it moved towards the *Santurnina.* Pantoja complained that the longboat took "plenty of water over the gunwale as the sea was choppy."[420] Once the longboat had caught up with the schooner the two boats continued northward heading up Moresby Passage between Portland and Moresby Islands. It was at this time that the crews would have become aware of the passage leading east towards Georgia Strait.[421] Still, they continued heading more or less North towards a "front of land," which was the south end of Saltspring Island, east of Fulford Harbour.[422] As the wind died in the evening the *Saturnina* headed for either Port Washington or Otter Bay on the Northwest side of Pender Island, the chart being unclear as to exactly where the ship anchored. Meanwhile, Pantoja and the longboat took to their oars in order to investigate what lay beyond the side of Saltspring Island that they were facing. The chart indicates that they rounded Beaver Point and sighted the South end of Prevost Island. They also saw the outlying islands in front of Ganges Harbour as far as Captain Passage between Prevost and Saltspring. The longboat then returned to the *Saturnina*, most likely sighting the south end of Active Pass as it made its way towards the anchorage. During a meeting that evening, Pantoja and Narváez decided to keep the longboat and the schooner in close communication during their subsequent explorations; the longboat would tow the schooner when there was no wind, and the schooner would tow the longboat when there was wind. They decided to head towards the eastern opening they had sighted that afternoon at the first possible light.

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[418] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 173-4.

[419] Ibid., 173.

[420] Ibid.

[421] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot*, 4th edition (Washington: Government Priters, 1889), 558.

After a short rest, the two boats got underway at 3am in the morning. The longboat towed the schooner, which was also being propelled by oars at this time.[423] They headed south and east around Pender Island, named first *Isla de Z[S]ayas* by Pantoja, and later on the 1791 *Carta* as the *Isla de San Euevio*. After three hours of rowing the little procession of boats came to a halt at the entrance to Bedwell Bay, just off of Wallace Point, on the west side of the harbour; the easterly wind had become too strong for them to make any headway. While the *Saturnina* stayed at anchor just outside the port, Pantoja in the longboat entered and sounded the harbour, giving it the name

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[422] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 173.
[423] Ibid., 174.

Puerto de San Antonio.[424] The wind died down while the longboat was in Bedwell Bay, and it was not until 10am that the convoy got back underway. The longboat continued to tow the schooner as they both used their oars to advance directly into the wind. Their rate of progress was little more than one kilometer per hour, so by noon they found themselves outside the body of water that separates Pender from Saturna Island, known as Plumper Sound.

Once again the schooner anchored and the longboat went into Plumper Sound to quickly sound and chart the area. The longboat went north, just beyond Browning Harbour on Pender Island. Although Pantoja called this a "negligible exploration," he was still able to confirm that Pender was indeed an island; he noted that the entrance in the fourth quarter (the Northwest) was the one he had explored the previous afternoon.[425] This statement confirms the idea that the longboat had gone to the north end of Pender and Pantoja had seen Active Pass when on his way to meet the *Saturnina* the previous day. By three the longboat had reunited with the schooner and they continued east along the south shore of Saturna Island headed for East Point.

As soon as the boats rounded East Point on Saturna Island, at around 7 pm on the 15th of June, they found exactly what the Spanish and indeed all seafaring nations had been searching for on the Northwest Coast: a broad inland waterway that led to the interior of the continent. As soon as the boats emerged into Georgia Strait, the wind picked up, this time from the Northwest.[426] They also would have had to immediately deal with Tumbo Reef, one of the most dangerous sailing hazards on the entire Northwest

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[424] Ibid., 175.

[425] Ibid.

[426] Richards, *The Vancouver Island Pilot*, 118. Notes that emerging from Haro Strait is difficult for sailing ships, not only do ships have to deal with frequent calms while in the Gulf Islands, but the wind tends to be constant from the Southwest, until the Gulf of Georgia is reached where they blow from the Northwest.

Coast. The reef extends for approximately one mile off East Point on Saturna and the currents rush upwards of 7 miles (11km) an hour through the rocks. In his *Pacific Coast Pilot,* George Davidson mentions the danger of this location and relates the story of a 5 oared whale boat that was swamped in the current going through the reef.[427] During the bi-centennial celebration and re-creation of the discovery of Georgia Strait in 1991, the replica Spanish longboat *Juanita* had to be towed through this section without anyone in it due to fears that the strong current would capsize the small vessel.[428] In the longboat and *Saturnina* respectively, Pantoja and Narváez would have had no prior knowledge of this location until they were on top of it. Which is exactly what happened: the reef with its prominent rocks is clearly shown on most of the charts produced at the end of that year. On the original or at least oldest copy of the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* there is a written note in a different ink than the rest of the map which names this location "*P[un]to agua sucia"* which means 'point of dirty water'. On the rest of the copies of this map the location appears as *P^{ta} y bajo de S^{ta} Saturnina,* which translates as 'point and reef of Santa Saturnina,' from which the island received its corrupted English name 'Saturna'. Pantoja gives some indication of the difficulty that the crews faced at this location noting, "close to the point at the south-west end of this small island there are such whirlpools that without exaggeration there seems to be a small vortex."[429]

Once free of the dangers of the reef, the boats had an hour of easy sailing towards Patos Island as the sun set to take the bearings of the new waterway they had found. The only land that was visible in the broad passage before them was "a small hill like a sugar loaf' in the middle of the waterway.[430] Wagner indicates that this was probably Lasqueti Island, an idea that has subsequently been propagated by McDowell in *Narváez: The Forgotten Explorer*.[431] Considering there is some 100 kilometers between the South end of Saturna Island and Lasqueti, such a sighting does not seem possible. Richards in the *Vancouver Island Pilot* notes that on exiting Haro Strait into Georgia Strait, Point Roberts will immediately be seen, its white faced cliff appearing as an Island in the middle of the channel, at a distance of about 11 miles (17.5 km). Point Roberts certainly was the 'sugar loaf' Pantoja saw.[432] Pantoja also noted "very high mountains covered with snow" and a large amount of marine life, including "whales of great size."[433] The mountains were of course the coast and cascade ranges, and the large whales could have easily been members of the resident humpback population which were eradicated in two years of industrial whaling in 1907-08.[434] Pantoja gave the name of "*El Gran Canal de Nuestra Senora del Rosario*" to the waterway, they had found "the most important place we had discovered up to the present."[435]

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[427] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th edition, 572.

[428] John Crosse, "Spanish Re-enactment a Flag Waving Success" *Boat World* (July 1991). UBC Special Collections: SPAM 22209.

[429] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 176.

The boats passed the night anchored off the South shore of Patos Island, while the strong Northwest wind continued to blow. By the next morning the wind had died down and the little convoy continued east southeast and as Pantoja states they were "in quest of the channel of the east which from the first day we had intended to follow."[436] This statement most likely meant that they had set out with the idea of trying to locate the Boca de Fidalgo (today's Rosario Strait), which had been located by Quimper's explorations the year before. Under sail or oars depending on the amount of wind, the boats made their way past the north of Sucia Island and Matia Island, which is a corruption of the Spanish name "Mata" given to the small island. An attempt to anchor was made between Barnes and Clark Islands at the north end of what is now Rosario Strait. These were the islands that were given the name "*Aguayo*" on the 1791 Carta, after Pantoja had given that name to the Chatham and Discovery Islands. Pantoja's name for these islands was "*mal abrigo*," or 'bad shelter.' Considering this poor anchorage, the expedition probably moved at this point to Legoe Bay, on the West side of Lummi Island, where there is an anchor on some of the versions of the 1791 Carta, and the expedition would have at least been protected from the wind coming from the Northwest. It was probably while at this location that the wind changed and a large rainstorm descended on the expedition from the Southeast.[437] The boats would have gone under oars fighting the wind and waves to round the south end of Lummi Island, named "*Pachero*" by the Spanish on the 1791 Carta. Once around Carter Point on the southern tip of Lummi Island, the longboat and *Saturnina* would have found themselves in Bellingham Bay, named by them as '*Seno de Gaston*'. Unfortunately for the boats, they would have found little respite from the storm as the floor of the bay offers very poor holding ground, especially during storms from the Southeast.[438] Eventually they would have made it into Chuckanut Bay on the east side of Bellingham Bay to wait out the storm. Chuchanut Bay was named "*Puerto de Socorro,*" or Port of Succor, highlighting the fact that the expedition found relief here from the storm which lasted two full days. When Pantoja drew his "*Pequena Carta*" (see Appendix: Map 4) to accompany his extract, the Puerto de Socorro is only one of four locations to physically have its name on the map, as opposed to the rest of the features on the map which are numbered and correspond to a legend at the top of the map.

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[430] Ibid., 175.

[431] Ibid., note 63, and McDowell, *Jose Narvaez: The Forgotten Explorer* (Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Co, 1998), 54.

[432] Richards, *The Vancouver Island Pilot*, 102.

[433] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 175-6.

[434] Terry Glavin, *The Last Great Sea: A Voyage Through the Human and Natural History of the North Pacific Ocean* (Vancouver: Greystone Books, A division of Douglas & McIntyre. The David Suzuki Foundation, 2000), 150-1.

[435] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 176.

[436] Ibid.

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[437] Ibid.

[438] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th ed., 570.

By the time the storm had passed over, it was the 20th of June. The expedition had already been away from the *San Carlos* for six days, two days longer than Eliza had stipulated their explorations should last. The expedition spent the next four days making its way along the north side of the San Juan group in an attempt to make it back to the *San Carlos* waiting for them at the entrance to Esquimalt.

It is difficult to determine the route the boats took on their return to Esquimalt, as Pantoja is silent on where they went on their return and the 1791 *Carta* does not show most of their anchorages. Anchors appear on the 1791 *Carta* when there was good holding ground, which make the map somewhat problematic as a primary source. Not every anchor denotes a place where the boats stopped, as some just mark good spots to anchor. While the boats sometimes stopped at places that do not show an anchor as the locations did not turn out to be good anchorages. Pantoja would cite the lack of good holding ground as one of the reasons for the *San Carlos* to not continue with the schooner during the second expedition.[439] So, it can be assumed that the expedition did not have the most secure return. Pantoja remarked "from the scarcity of these [anchorages] we have seen ourselves in the schooner and the longboat in some straits, although they are such small vessels compared with the packet boat."[440]

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[439] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 177.

The most likely route back for the longboat would have been out of Chuckanut Bay and again around the south end of Lummi Island. From there they would have headed towards Lawrence Point, the most easterly point on Orcas Island. The boats then made their way along the north shore of Orcas Island slowly moving away from the shore, as the chart (see Appendix: Map 14) indicates they went north of Parker Reef. They then continued around the north side of Waldron Island, and then down towards the north end of Stuart and Johns Islands. Amateur historian Richard Blumenthal contends that during this phase of the exploration, the boats returned to Bedwell Harbour at Pender Island for a night, although there is very little evidence to suggest so.[441] As Pantoja explains in a letter to his friend José de Prados y Salbatierra, a resident of Lima, Peru, it was during this time he had the opportunity to honor the Viceroy of Peru, Francisco Gil y Lemus, by naming Doughty Point on Orcas Island (Wagner's Nob Point) '*San Gil*', and Waldron Island '*Isla de Lemus*'.[442]

The *Santa Saturnina* and the longboat eventually made it down past Spieden Island and anchored just south of Battleship Island along Henry Island at the western edge of the San Juan group on the night of the 23rd. The 24th was spent rowing against the wind down Haro Strait until the boats were free of it at 4 pm, where they anchored by the

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[440] Ibid., 178.

[441] Richard Blumenthal, *The Early Exploration of Inland Washington Waters: Journals and Logs from Six Expeditions, 1786-1792* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co. 2004.) 47.

[442] Pantoja, "Letter of Pantoja" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 198-200.

Trial Islands off Victoria, “so that the crews could obtain some rest from their fatigue caused by the great amount of rowing done during the day.”[443]

As soon as the *Saturnina* and the longboat were spotted by Eliza on the *San Carlos*, he dispatched the other ship’s boat to fetch Pantoja. Eliza was anxious to find out as soon as possible what had happened to, and what had been discovered by the expedition. Pantoja informed Eliza that they had no contact with native peoples, and that they had made the discovery of Georgia Strait, the *Gran Canal de Nuestra Senora del Rosario*.[444] The next day, once the *Saturnina* and the longboat had rejoined the *San Carlos* at the entrance to Esquimalt, Eliza had a meeting with Pantoja, Narváez and Verdía to determine what their next move should be. Eliza wanted to move the *San Carlos* into the Georgia Strait in order to supply explorations by the *Saturnina* and the longboat. The three pilots countered Eliza, and felt that the *San Carlos* should not enter either Haro or Fidalgo Straits out of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, citing the contrary winds, strong currents, unknown rocks and reefs, and the difficulty of finding anchorages, as reasons for the large vessel to stay behind.[445] The outcome of the meeting was the resolution to move the base of operations from *Cordova* (Esquimalt/ Royal Roads) to *Puerto Quadra* (Discovery Bay), so that they would be closer to the point where Quimper had left off his explorations in the previous year.[446]

During the ten days that the expedition had been away, Eliza had not been completely sedentary. Eliza did not have much to say about the native people of the region, stating that he found everything conformed to what Quimper had reported the year previously.[447] Considering the size of the native population that Quimper had encountered the year before, and which Galiano and Valdes encountered the next year, Eliza would have had daily or almost daily transactions with the local population. Although these transactions may have been less frequent than at other locations. Pantoja may have noted the consequences of the smallpox epidemic that swept the Strait of Georgia in 1782 when he noted after the large population at Port Renfrew, the population of indigenous people at Esquimalt was “but very few.”[448] At least one memory of the Spanish visit to Esquimalt survived into the 19th century. In his *British Columbia Coast Names,* Captain John Walbran relates the story of Old Jane a Lukwungen woman, who was supposed to be upwards of 100 years old when she died in 1888. According to her, “when a child of about five years of age she went with her father, who was a chief, on board a vessel in Esquimalt harbour, and the Tyee (chief) of the vessel gave her father a paper.”[449] This meeting could have occurred during either the Quimper, Eliza, or Galiano and Valdez expeditions, although the length of time that the *San Carlos* spent at Esquimalt would seem to indicate that it was probably Eliza who gave Old Jane’s father the piece of paper. The paper most likely stated something to the effect that the Spanish had been to the said port, and that the chief had been friendly. The Russians handed out similar notices to the native peoples of Alaska.[450] Eliza also went ashore numerous times while at Esquimalt to look over the land, and found the area around the harbour flat and suitable for crops, the exact reasons the Hudson's Bay Company would found the city of Victoria nearby some fifty years later.[451] These expeditions obviously did not penetrate deep into the surrounding country as Victoria harbour remained unnoticed. Eliza and the rest of the crew probably did not venture out of sight of the *San Carlos* for obvious safety reasons. Eliza was also impressed with the clay found in the soil around Victoria stating "Clay is also found of a superior quality for any construction which one may wish to make, some of which I brought back to use for making an oven."[452] This statement highlights the interesting practice of Spanish ships transporting flour instead of biscuits and baking fresh bread daily instead of relying on hardtack.[453]

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[443] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 177.

[444] Eliza, “Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 149-150.

[445] Eliza, “Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…” and Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 150, 177.

[446] Eliza, “Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 150.

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[447] Ibid., 151.

[448] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 185; Cole Harris, “Voices of Smallpox around the Strait of Georgia” in *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 3-30.

[449] Walbran, *British Columbia Coast Names*, 171..

[450] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 124.

Along with Eliza's reconnaissance and interactions with local peoples, another member of the crew most likely busy while the *San Carlos* was at Esquimalt was Father Chaplain José Villaverde. When the American ship *Columbia* visited the village of Classet just south of Cape Flattery on the 15th of September 1791, a chief there named Clahclacko informed the Americans

> the Spaniards had been here since us endeavoring to convert them to Christianity, that he and several others had been baptized, as also several of their children. This ceremony he went through, as also the chanting of some of their hymns with a most serious religious air, though it was in broken Spanish and Indian, yet he imitated the sounds of their voices, their motions and religious cants of their faces

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[451] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 151.

[452] Ibid.

[453] "Fidalgo's opinions regarding the settlement of Fuca". Official Documents Relating to Spanish and Mexican Voyages of Navigation, Exploration, and Discovery, made in North America in the 18th Century. History General Archives Vol. 44, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 324, 397. Internal Provinces General Archive Vol. 134. Translated from the Spanish by Mary Elizabeth Dalton 1939-40. Works Progress Administration Project No. 2799. Seattle Washington. BCARS A/A/10/M57t/v1-5.

> to a miracle at the same time condemned our irreligious manner of life.[454]

This statement makes obvious the fact that the Spanish chaplains were making some attempt to spread knowledge of the Catholic faith, although not in any systematic way. It is doubtful that the native peoples who lived around Cape Flattery could have learned so much of the Catholic rituals in the three days that the *San Carlos* and *Santa Saturnina* were in Neah Bay. Considering the large amount of back and forth native traffic in the Strait of Juan de Fuca that was chronicled by all the Spanish expeditions, it is likely that these rituals were learnt during visits to Esquimalt or Port Discovery, where Villaverde would have had months to indoctrinate residents and visitors into the ways of the Catholic faith.

After residing for thirty days outside of the harbour of Esquimalt, the 28th of June saw the *San Carlos* and the *Santa Saturnina* weigh anchor and head for the south side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. By nightfall they had made it as far as Dungeness, the *Bahia de Quimper* of the previous year. After spending the night anchored inside the spit at Dungeness, the boats continued on to Port Discovery, known as *Puerto de Quadra,* and anchored just inside Cape George at the eastern point of the entrance.[455] The reason for moving anchorages, as Eliza states, was to be closer to the *Boca de Fidalgo* which had been sighted but not explored by Quimper's group the year before.[456] As this had been the passage that Pantoja had hoped to find during the expedition from the 14th-24th, the

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[454] John Hoskins, "John Hoskins' Narrative of the Second Voyage of the *Columbia*" Frederic Howay ed. *Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1941)., 245. And Warren Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 306.

[455] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th ed., 534.

[456] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 150.

Spanish must have the realized that this was another entrance that would allow them access to the *Gran Canal*.

The 30th of June would have been spent collecting water and wood, and once again stuffing the hold of the *Santa Saturnina* with supplies for the upcoming expedition. It was during this time that Juan Pantoja was transferred back to the *San Carlos* and overall command of the expedition to the *Gran Canal* fell to the 26 year-old José María Narváez.[457] Eliza had fallen sick, and Pantoja was needed as a second in command if Eliza were to become incapacitated.[458] Other than this change, the expedition was most likely undertaken with the same personnel who had explored Haro Strait from June 14th to the 24th.

On July 1st 1791 the *Saturnina* with the long boat from the *San Carlos* departed Discovery Bay and headed north towards the *Boca de Fidalgo*, today's Rosario Strait. Little did the expedition know that they were embarking on one of the most important exploratory efforts in the history of British Columbia, which would see them chart almost the entire Georgia Strait from the San Juan Islands to Cape Mudge (see Appendix: Maps 15-16).

After rowing until they cleared Protection Island (*Isla de Carrasco),* the expedition made for Smith Island, named by the Spanish as the *Isla de Bonilla*. There is a strong possibility that it was this island that appeared at the entrance to the *Boca de Fidalgo* on the Quimper map of the year prior, as Carrasco had only done a quick reconnaissance in the longboat and would not have been able to see how far the island was from the *Boca de Fidalgo*. This would explain Pantoja's accusation that the island was not at the entrance when Narváez actually penetrated the *Boca* turned *Canal*.[459] Narváez was fortunate in his choice of a course towards Rosario Strait. By steering for Smith Island the boats were probably just far enough away from the entrance to Admiralty Inlet to not be molested by the strong currents that cause problems for sailing vessels entering Puget Sound.[460] Although seemingly free of the currents that trouble the entrance to Admiralty Inlet, Narváez did see the entrance, which had only been perceived as a bay the year before. Narváez noted that this was an *Entrada* (entrance), instead of a bay, but decided to leave exploring it until his return. Narváez figured it was only a short distance from where the *San Carlos* was anchored, and as such would be easy to explore at a later date.[461] From Smith Island the expedition probably made a small turn to the northwest in order to sight the opening between San Juan Island and Lopez Island. The opening was given the title of the *Boca de Horcasitas*, which was both one of the Viceroy's many names as well as the alias of the *Santa Saturnina*.

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[457] UBC Special Collections: "Narvaez Timeline" John Crosse Fonds, Box 10 File 4.
[458] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 178.

The expedition would have probably had to do a significant amount of rowing as soon as they entered Rosario Strait, as the mountains on both sides of the pass obstruct the wind.[462] The first night was spent anchored in Shoal Blight in front of Lopez Pass on the east side of Lopez Island. The area was well sounded by Narváez's crew, the ledge that offered them anchorage was well denoted on the 1791 *Carta*, and the soundings correspond with the depths given by Captain Richards 60 years later.[463]

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[459] Ibid., 179.

[460] John Crosse, "In the Wake of the Spaniards: Through the Rosario Strait," *48º North* (October 1994) 42-47; and Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th ed., 589.

[461] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 179.

[462] Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot* 4th ed., 562.

[463] Ibid. Although the *Pilot* was published in 1889, Davidson did most of his surveying in the 1850's.

The boats would have been underway at first light on the 2nd. They crossed Rosario Strait to head into Guemes Channel between Fidalgo and Guemes Islands, but had to anchor off the southwest tip of Guemes Island when the ebb tide began to run against them.[464] Once the boats had waited out the tide they made their way through the short Guemes Channel into Padilla Bay (*Seno de Padilla),* which was one of the names belonging to Viceroy Revillagigedo in Mexico. Guemes Channel was probably traversed using oars, as the channel appears well sounded on the chart. The *Saturnina* anchored a little south of Hat Island in the middle of the bay while the longboat explored to the south. Despite the inviting appearance of the Skagit Valley to the southeast, the longboat found no passage inland and instead noted the extensive mudflats of the Skagit River estuary. On the mudflats there were local indigenous people digging for shellfish, but none of the surviving documents relate how first contact between the Spaniards and the locals played out.[465] The village of E-céqen is shown at the base of Samish Island which the Spanish thought a peninsula (as it is today) which they named *Punta de Solano*.[466] The village was most likely denoted that afternoon as the expedition left Padilla Bay by following closely along the Northeast shore of Guemes Island. It is possible that the expedition spent two days in Padilla Bay, as the area is reasonably well depicted on the map. The 3rd of July was also a Sunday, and it is doubtful whether much or any activities would have been undertaken on a specified day of religious rest.

When the expedition left Padilla Bay, the boats passed between Guemes, Jack and Vendovi Islands before turning to the northeast to cross Bellingham Bay. From there they reached Post Point, just outside the north end of Chuckanut Bay, where the expedition had previously spent two days during the storm of the 18th-20th of June. Due to the scarcity of information in the sources it is completely possible that this was the first time that the Spanish reached Chuckanut Bay if the Pantoja reconnaissance only reached the outside Lummi Island during the first foray into Haro Strait. Considering however, the importance of this location on the Pantoja map and the fact it took the expedition four days to row back to Esquimalt through Haro Strait, it is almost certain that Narváez came to this location in order to confirm that there were indeed two passages from the Strait of Juan de Fuca into what was then the *Gran Canal de Rosario*. While at Post Point Narváez may have charted the northern section of Bellingham Bay, named by the Spanish as the *Seno de Gaston,* although there are no soundings to indicate a thorough examination.

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[464] Crosse, “In the Wake of the Spaniards” *48º North* (October 1994): 44.

[465] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 180.

[466] Wayne Suttles, *The Economic Life of the Coast Salish of Haro and Rosario Straits* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 44.

From Post Point the expedition made its way through Hale Passage between the eastern side of Lummi Island and the Lummi Peninsula. The expedition either had light winds or was under oar power, as the passage is extensively sounded. They next anchored just outside Lummi Bay, about half way between the two points that form the bay the Lummi Peninsula and Sandy Point. The bay was not given a name when the chart was complied, but Sandy Point was given the name *Punta de Loera*.

The next day the expedition only went up the coast a short way and anchored off Cherry Point between Lummi Bay and Birch Bay. At this point it seems the entire expedition was running low on fresh supplies. Back at Port Discovery, the *San Carlos* was sending out hunting parties out for food, and at this point it seems Narváez also began sending out his own foraging parties.[467] Despite no surviving written source mentioning it, we know Narváez sent a party ashore at this point because Lake Terrell, located about 2 kilometers inland from Cherry Point, appears on the 1791 Carta as *Punta y Laguna de Garzon*, or Garzon Point and Lake. It is not known how far the foraging party went inland or whether they were successful, but a small group of men in the service of Spain trekking though the Washington State wilderness during the first week of July in 1791, must have been a unique experience.

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[467] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 178.

The boats then continued up the shoreline, passing over Birch Bay and anchoring on the north side of Birch Point outside of Drayton Harbour, named *San José,* in Semiahmoo Bay. While at this location, the boats attempted to check the magnetic variation of the compass. Narvàez noted a 12^{o} 32’ variation to the N.E which is at odds with the variation listed on other parts of the 1791 *Carta* which indicated a variation of 17^{o}, a variation which is much closer to the modern variation of 20^{0}.[468] They also saw and possibly dealt with the village of Semiahmoo near the Campbell River just east of the present town of White Rock. From where the boats were anchored outside Drayton Harbour, the low end of Boundary Bay some 15km away could not be seen. Due to the low floodplain being invisible Boundary Bay appears to continue into Burrard Inlet on the 1791 *Carta*. When the 1791 *Carta* was assembled in Mexico the winter of 1791 this important looking inlet had its named changed from Bodega which appears on the early *pequena carta*’s to Florida Blanca after the Chief Minister of Spain at the time, José Moñino conde de Floridablanca. The shoreline shown beyond the *Punta de San Rafael* (Kwomais Point) is merely the hills that dominate most of Surrey, which are sometimes called the ‘Sunshine Heights’.[469] As Nick Doe has pointed out, the continuance of the shoreline towards the northeast was probably just Narváez indicating the general trend of the mountains in the Fraser Valley, or maybe Indian Arm; it was only when the map was looked over by superiors in Mexico that the possibility of an inland sea, beyond the Georgia Strait, began to tickle imaginations.[470]

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[468] Amateur Historian Nick Doe notes the modern variation is about 20^{o}, and despite the fact the variation changes, it has never been as little as 12^{0}. Nick Doe, “Fraudulent Bay-Spanish explorations of Boundary Bay”, 34(4), *British Columbia Historical News* (Fall 2001): 23-28.

After leaving the anchorage near Drayton Harbour, the *Saturnina* and the long boat sailed across Boundary Bay and named Point Roberts *Isla de Zepeda*. The point had appeared as an island since it was first sighted when the Pantoja reconnaissance exited around East Point on Saturna Island the month previous. With the shoreline of Boundary Bay invisible, Narváez would have had no evidence to change the assumption that the point was anything other than an island. This was the beginning of the first ever European exploration of the mainland coast of British Columbia. Over the next few days the expedition would visit the future site of the City of Vancouver, the sunshine coast, sight Cape Mudge and chart Nanaimo harbour.

Once past Point Roberts, the strong current caused by the Fraser River entering into Georgia Strait caused the *Saturnina* and the long boat to be pushed 2 leagues, or almost 10 km away from the mainland coast. Many authors have surmised that due to being pushed so far from the mainland, the actual discovery of the mouths of the Fraser River was missed; Narváez assumed he was looking at low lying islands instead of an estuary.[471] Most of the cartographic records of the Narváez exploration do not show a river where the Fraser is located. The *Carta que Comprehende* indicates the presence of the North Arm of the Fraser, but does not label it as such. On the lesser known *Carta Esferica* the Fraser River is clearly denoted separate from Burrard Inlet and Howe Sound. The omission of the river from the rest of the charts could have to do with Narváez not being able to confirm the presence of the Fraser by exploring it. Still, it is clear Narváez and his crew knew that there was a river nearby. Narváez noticed the distinct discoloration that occurs in the waters of the Strait of Georgia where the Fraser meets the salt water. Pantoja relates that while Narváez was out in the middle of the waterway, "they sailed through a line of white water more sweet than salt."[472] There is also evidence that the weather at this time was poor, which affected Narváez's ability to search for the river.[473]

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[469] Ibid., 28.
[470] Ibid.
[471] McDowell, *Jose Narvaez: The Forgotten Explorer*, 56.

Once a little north of the Fraser, the boats were again able to head toward the mainland shore. An anchorage was found about 3 km off Point Grey, near the present day University of British Columbia and the principal settlement of the Musqueam people. This was not the meeting of untutored ignorant savages and enlightened Europeans that Major J.S. Matthews presented in the 1940's.[474] Considering the large amount of inter-tribal trade the Salish peoples participated in, both with outside groups on Vancouver Island and with interior groups, they would have been well aware of the existence of outsiders in strange boats that brought valuable goods.[475]

The *Saturnina* and the long boat were quickly surrounded by canoes, which due to the problems that the expedition had encountered at Clayoquot, Barkley Sound, and Haro

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[472] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 186.

[473] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 152.

[474] J.S. Mathews (Major), "Pilot Commander Jose Narvaez 1791" Vancouver City Archives, 1941.

[475] Keith Carlson, "Plate 18: Expressions of Trade and Exchange" in *A Sto:lo Coast Salish Historical Atlas* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2001), 56-7.

Strait, caused some trepidation.[476] These anxieties were relaxed when it was discovered that all the native people visiting the ships were unarmed and only had fish, including "large and delicate salmon" to trade.[477] While most of the Spaniards who had spent time at Nootka did not speak Nuu-chath-nulth, they had spent enough time among speakers of the language to recognize when "the idiom of these natives was different from that of those at Nootka."[478] This knowledge was an immense help when trying to determine the make up of the peoples of the region. By at least being able to recognize differences in linguistics and noting those differences, the Spanish were able to gain a rough understanding of complex social world in which the native peoples of the Northwest Coast resided.

While the boats were at Point Grey, the locals visiting the ships "explained with entire clearness that there had been vessels within the canal much larger than the schooner."[479] This enigmatic statement is difficult to interpret, but some meanings are viable. As explained previously, prior to the Spanish penetration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, traders had only been on the outside of the strait. Still, it is conceivable that any trade which occurred with those ships might have been considered 'within the canal'. There is also the possibility that the ship referred to, may have traded with local peoples in the Queen Charlotte Strait, near the north end of Vancouver Island. This interpretation is especially relevant when considered in the context that the residents around Point Grey were doing their best to explain to the Spanish that "the grand canal carried much further on."[480] There is also the outside chance that the local people were referencing a much earlier visit by Francis Drake, Juan de Fuca, or other European voyages that may have visited the Northwest Coast in the 16th, 17th or early 18th centuries.[481] The local people already had European trade goods, including brass bracelets engraved with a bruin, which they did not want to trade or give over to the Spanish visitors.[482]

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[476] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 152.
[477] Ibid.
[478] Ibid.
[479] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 187.

While at or close to this anchorage, at least 3 villages were seen by Narváez. At Point Grey, or as Narváez named it '*Langara'*, there is a village depicted which is most likely the village of Eyalmu at Jerico Beach.[483] Just north of *Langara* there is another village located on the *Punta de Bodega*. There is some contention as to which point the *Pta de Bodega* represents due to the fact it is connected with the north shore of Burrard inlet on the 1791 *Carta*. Wagner thought this could be Point Atkinson, but more recent work suggests correctly that *Pta de Bodega* was Ferguson Point on the west side of Stanley Park.[484] There was a third village located on the eastern edge of the *Bocas de Carmelo*, today's Howe Sound, which was most likely the village that was historically located on the western tip of Horseshoe Bay.[485]

As mentioned previously, Burrard Inlet is named the *Boca de Florida Blanca* on the 1791 *Carta*, and appears to continue without a perceived end into the continent. This is at odds with the three other contemporary maps from that year, the two made by Pantoja, and one made by Lopez de Haro, which all give the name of the inlet as the *Boca*

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[480] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 152.

[481] For accounts of some of the other voyages that potentially made their way to the NW coast see: Peter Gerhard, *Pirates on the West Coast of New Spain: 1575-1742* (Glendale: The Arthur H. Clarke Co. 1960).

[482] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 187.

[483] Tomas Bartroli, *Genesis of Vancouver: Explorations of its Site 1791, 1792 and 1808* (Vancouver: Published by the Author, 1997), 39.

[484] Derek Hayes, "The Spanish Reach Vancouver" in *Historical Atlas of Vancouver and the Lower Fraser Valley* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2005), 10-11.

[485] Bartroli, *Genesis of Vancouver*, 39.

de Bodega. This name change gives further credence to the idea that the designation was changed due to the perceived importance of this waterway once the charts were reviewed by superiors in Mexico.[486]

After being at the anchorage by Point Grey for a day or more (it is difficult to know how the poor weather affected Narváez), the *Saturnina* continued along the east side of the Georgia Strait. Along with Howe Sound which received the name *Carmelo*, Bowen and the surrounding islands were named the *Islas de Apodaca*. The boats continued on along the Sunshine Coast until they found a small river running into the Strait of Georgia. The *Saturnina* and longboat anchored between the White Islets and the coast near the present community of Davis Bay, just east of Sechelt. At this point the expedition had been out of Port Discovery for over a week, and Narváez took the opportunity of easily accessible fresh water to refill the casks. The river, which was either Wilson or the more voluminous Chapman Creek, was named *Rio de la aguada*, which translates as 'River of water giving'. This little stop to get water is interesting as it may have been the only time that agents of the Spanish crown set foot on the actual North American Continent, as opposed to islands, in territory that would later be claimed by Canada.

After refilling their water, the boats then headed another 10km east and rounding Bertha Island, anchored off the south end of South Thormanby Island. This island was given the name of *San Ignacio*, and it appears that Narváez once again sent a hunting party ashore. The only indication that a hunting party went ashore is a small circle that appears on the island in the 1791 *Carta*. The circle is similar to the depiction of Lake

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[486] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 163.

Terrell, and is most likely the unnamed beaver pond on South Thormanby. The area is now a provincial park and boasts that despite a lack of trails the beaver pond is easily accessible from Farm Bay, the location where the *Saturnina* was anchored.[487]

There is the question of why Narváez would have decided to send a hunting party ashore on the island instead of the mainland. Despite there not being a village depicted on the 1791 *Carta* by Chapman Creek, where water was taken on board, there is a modern reservation (Tsawcome) at that location. Perhaps the local native people protested an armed party going inland which would have stymied any hunting attempt. Or perhaps a hunt was attempted, but met with limited or no success, causing Narváez to think that the confines of an island would offer better hunting opportunities. Despite lacking textual verification, this is not an outrageous suggestion, as even today (in season) hunting is one of the activities permitted in Simson Provincial Park, the area where the party went ashore.[488]

From the anchorage at Thormanby Island Narváez next moved the boats into Malaspina Strait between the mainland and Texada Island. Proceeding up Malaspina Strait, the boats were most likely under oar power fighting the prevailing Northwesterly winds. Narváez would have quickly realized that going this way they were cut off from the main part of the Georgia Strait by Texada, so the boats turned around in the vicinity of Temple Rock and headed Southwest after sighting Agamemnon Channel, which was named the *Boca de Moñino,* again honoring the chief minister in Spain, the Conde de Floridablanca. Cockburn Point was the furthest point sighted on the mainland which was later given the name *Punta de Arze,* after an official in the Spanish navy.[489] Now able to use their sails, the *Saturnina* most likely towing the longboat, rounded the south end of Texada and Lasqueti Islands and once again headed north.

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[487] "Simson Provincial Park" http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/bcparks/explore/parkpgs/simson/ (Accessed Aug 31st, 2009)
[488] Ibid.

Texada Island was originally given the name of *San Felis* (sic) on the early charts, indicating that it was most likely sighted, or approached closely on July 12th, the feast day of Saint Felix. Lasqueti Island was given the title of the *Isla de Texada,* but had its name changed when the 1791 *Carta* was prepared in Mexico. It is obvious that the expedition did not try to enter the channel between Texada and Lasqueti as the numerous rocks and islands that dominate the passage are absent from the charts.

After rounding Lasqueti Island, the boats made their way further up the Strait of Georgia. Conditions must have been clearer than previous days on the voyage as Pantoja's account notes that the weather allowed Narváez to measure their latitude. These measurements demonstrated that they had reached the same latitude as Nootka. Short on food and with the Strait of Georgia continuing to appear open to the northwest, Narváez made the decision to turn back and head for Port Discovery and the *San Carlos*.[490] Due to the ambiguity of this region on all of the charts which were produced at the conclusion of Narváez's explorations, it is difficult to exactly say where Narváez turned back. The most likely place where this occurred, based on the features present on the charts and the statement that the boats reached the latitude of Nootka, is in the vicinity of Flavada Point on Texada Island, about at the midway point of the Strait of Georgia between Texada Island and Cape Lazo. From this position Harwood Island near the town of Powell River would have appeared as a point, as it does on all the charts. Savory Island and Hernando

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[489] Nick Doe, "The origin of Gabriola's name" *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 12-28.

[490] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 180.

Island also appear as points north of Harwood. These three points were given the names from south to north as *Punta de Camino, Romay,* and *San Luis*. The name *Camino* is one of the few descriptive place names the Spanish gave on the Northwest Coast. No reason for this name has ever been discovered by researchers, but it could simply denote the end of the expedition. *Camino* can mean road, path or course, so there is a decent possibility that this point was named as a designator of where the boats turned back. Just beyond the points of *Romay* and *San Luis,* there is the faint outline of the shore of an island which was given the name of *Campo Alange* after a government official.[491] This feature is most likely the south end of Quadra Island known as Cape Mudge, a fitting feature to denote the end of Narváez's exploration up the Strait of Georgia. On the chart prepared by Lopez de Haro based on Narváez's report, the waterway between *Campo Alange* and *San Luis,* which would later be known as Sutil Channel, was named the *Boca de Flores* in honor of the Viceroy.

On the west side of the Strait, Cape Lazo near Comox was sighted and named by the Spanish as *Punta de Lazo de la Vega* after an important naval officer.[492] It is apparent from the charts that the shoreline near Courtney was not seen, although there is a rarely cited map (see Appendix: Map 6) which, despite being generally overlooked due to the geographic inaccuracies present on it, does denote 'high and snow-covered mountains' on both sides of the Strait of Georgia in the region of Comox and Powell River.[493]

Further mystery is added to the question of just how far north the expedition reached when one examines the chart of Vancouver Island produced by Lt. Joseph Baker of the

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[491] The significance behind the names of *San Luis* and *Romay* has not been discovered; there are at least two different San Luis'. Doe, "The origin of Gabriola's name" *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 22-23.

[492] Ibid., 22.

[493] UBC Special Collections, John Crosse Fonds: Box 10 file 1.

Vancouver expedition. This chart includes the results from Narváez's expedition and tends to conform to the information available on the 1791 *Carta.* An exception is in the area of Cape Lazo. Baker's chart, unlike the Spanish maps from the 1791 expedition, includes features on the shore north of Cape Lazo purportedly taken from a Spanish survey. The details indicate that the Little River and Oyster River were both sighted by Narváez. Their absence on the Spanish charts could have to do with Narváez sighting them in poor weather, which would have made it impossible to take a bearing of the features. Without a proper bearing to demarcate the points, the Spanish officials may have been uneasy including these features into their charts when the rest of the points on the coast had at least had two bearings taken to fix their approximate locations.[494] The inclusion of these features on Baker's map may also indicate the possibility that Galiano had more than one chart of the Strait of Georgia with him in 1792 when he encountered Vancouver. This possibility gives further credence to the idea that there is at least one map of the Strait of Georgia which was produced by the Spanish and has subsequently been lost, as suggested in Chapter 2.

Moving down the Gulf of Georgia from Cape Lazo, the next point on the west shore heading south is the *Punta de Araus*. This point has long gone unidentified by researchers, but now is believed to be Longbeak Point on Denman Island, despite being shown as part of Vancouver Island on the charts. This point, appearing as it does on the charts, gives credence to the idea that the boats under Narváez's command did not make it much past Favada Point on Texada Island. A curious bit of evidence that corroborates this assertion is the fact that only the east and south side of Hornby Island is shown and was named with Denman as the *Islas de Lerena* after a government official. These islands are shown too far south on the charts, but as Nick Doe has demonstrated this was due to a simple mistake of orientation when the charts were prepared, and not Narváez seeing the islands where they were not. That the expedition passed south of Hornby is apparent as Deep Bay and Baynes Sound are clearly evident on the charts and named as the *Boca de Valdez,* after the minister of the navy.

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[494] Nick Doe, "Some Anomalies in a Spanish Chart of Vancouver Island 1791" *Lighthouse* 56 (Fall 1997): 7-20.

The east shore of Vancouver Island was approached closely near the present town of Qualicum Beach. A now unnamed point, possibly along the Western edge of the bay, was given the name *Punta de San Leonardo,* after an aristocrat with connections to the navy.[495] The boats then made their way along the Vancouver Island shore until reaching Parksville Bay. An anchor is shown to the east of the Englishman River, which was sighted and given the name *Rio de las Grullas*, or River of the Cranes, after the blue herons which would have been present in the estuary collecting food for their young.[496] Either while at this anchorage, or soon after the boats would have had interaction with the residents of the village that appears on the charts at Cottam Point which forms the eastern edge of Northwest Bay.

The charts indicate that from the Englishman River the boats left the immediate shoreline and headed back out into the Strait of Georgia to avoid the numerous islands that dot the shore between Northwest Bay and Nanaimo. The Ballenas Islands were passed and given their present name. *Ballenas* in Spanish means whales, although it is not known if these islands were named due to their appearance as whales on the horizon, or due to sighting whales around the islands. After passing the Ballenas Islands, Nanoose Bay was sighted, but obviously not entered, and given the name *Ensenada de Rualcava* after an unknown officer.[497] Nanaimo Harbour was next approached, and while there is no anchor present on any of the maps, due to the poor holding ground the longboat obviously carried out some exploration in this neighborhood. Departure Bay was entered and accurately depicted and the entrance to Nanaimo Harbour was seen with the turn towards Northumberland Channel, although this was not entered until the next year when the *Sutil* and *Mexicana* stayed in the vicinity.[498] This entrance was given the name *Boca de Hijosa* on the early charts, after Francisco Hijosa, a naval administrator in San Blas. Once the final 1791*Carta* was prepared the name was changed to *Boca de Wenthuysen* after an important Spanish admiral.[499]

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[495] Doe, "The origin of Gabriola's name" *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 22.

[496] The scribe who made the copy of the 1791 *Carta* which is in *Floodtide of Empire*, missed the plural 's' making the name appear as *Rio de la Grulla.*

The next anchor is shown on most charts along the Georgia Strait side of Gabriola Island. Orlebar Point on the northeast side of the island was given the name *Punta de Casatilli* after another naval official. The southern point of the island near the Flat Top Islands was given the name *Punta de Gaviola*, from which the present name of Gabriola has been derived. It should be emphasized that this name is not a corruption of the Spanish word *gaviota* which means seagull as many authors have suggested, but an honoring of an unknown individual in the Spanish service with the Basque name of Gaviola.[500] The boats most likely stopped in front of Porlier Pass as well because it is shown with Reid Island behind. The poor anchorage at the mouth of this pass, however, meant that no anchor was placed there. It was given the name *Boca de Poliel*, but later misspelled by Galiano the next year who gave the pass its current name of *Porlier*.[501]

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[497] Doe, “The origin of Gabriola’s name” *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 22.

[498] John Kendrick (trans), *The Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana, 1792: The last Spanish Exploration of the northwest coast of America* (Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1991), 122.

[499] Doe, “The origin of Gabriola’s name” *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 22.

[500] The suggestion that Gabriola came from ‘gaviota’ began with Wagner and continued with each subsequent author who examined the subject. See Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 40; and Doe, “The origin of Gabriola’s name” *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 12-28.

From Porlier Pass the *Santa Saturnina* and the longboat would have cruised along Galiano Island, sighting Active Pass and the areas that had been explored with Pantoja over a month prior. After passing Active Pass the boats moved away from the Gulf Islands in order to pass through Rosario Strait once again. Due to moving away from the outer coast of the Gulf Islands the very small gap between Mayne and Saturna Islands was not seen and as a result the islands appear as one.

When returning through the Rosario Strait it is possible that one of the anchorages that has been attributed to the Pantoja exploration at either the Barnes and Clark Islands or on the west side of Lummi Island, was in fact an anchorage for the *Santa Saturnina* and the longboat under Narváez's command. The boats continued down the west side of Rosario Strait, passing the west side of Sinclair and Cypress Islands as they had been passed on their east side when the expedition had come up the passage some three weeks earlier.

Although no anchor is shown, due again to there not being good holding ground, it appears that the *Saturnina* and the longboat passed close to, or stopped at Obstruction Pass on the Southeast side of Orcas Island. The chart is not the best in this region; Obstruction Island appears too far back in the pass, but a native village (possibly X^{w}t?iex) is present on the Obstruction pass side of Deer Point on Orcas Island.[502] Despite being low on food, in all probability Narváez instructed the longboat to penetrate Obstruction Pass in order to get a quick idea of the extent of the San Juan archipelago.

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[501] Doe, "The origin of Gabriola's name" *Shale* No. 8 (June 2004): 22.
[502] Suttles, *The Economic life of the Coast Salish of Haro and Rosario Straits*, 37.

There is a strong possibility that it was here, despite no mention of it in either Eliza or Pantoja's accounts, that the longboat was once again attacked and the *Saturnina* was forced to come to its aid.

The missing Narváez journal makes it difficult to prove, but there does seem to be evidence that at some point Narváez was forced to fire at native assailants while on the expedition into Georgia Strait. When discussing the expedition in 1791 Narváez's service file states that "on many occasions he was forced to use force against the heathen Indians."[503] This could just be a reference to when Narváez fired over the canoes who assaulted the *Saturnina* when it was in Barkley Sound, but there are other indications that this happened while the *Saturnina* was escorting the longboat from the *San Carlos*. In the *Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana* a curious episode is mentioned when the boats reached the area of Royal Roads near present-day Victoria. As the *Sutil* and *Mexicana* were passing Race Rocks, canoes full of local residents came out to greet the ships. The narrative mentions "one of our sailors knew one of the Indians, who in the previous year had been one of those most deeply involved in taking the launch of the storeship *San Carlos."*[504] A few pages later, when the author of the narrative is discussing *Cordova* (Esquimalt), he states "It was in this harbour that the schooner *Saturnina,* of the previous year's expedition, opened fire with its cannon on the canoes of these inhabitants in order to defend the launch of the storeship *San Carlos* which came into their preserve, and which they stubbornly tried to seize."[505] It is extremely curious that this incident received no mention by either Eliza or Pantoja, as not doing so could have been considered a dereliction of their duty as officers. There is one other source, albeit secondary, that also mentions this incident. Warren Cook, the author of the still definitive text of the Spanish on the Northwest Coast *Flood Tide of Empire* mentions, without citing a source, "near the San Juan Islands war canoes again attempted to overpower the longboat, but the schooner succeeded in frightening them off by firing its cannons over their heads."[506]

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[503] Archivo General de la Marina. Oficiales de Guerra, leg 620/826, "exp. De Narvaez". Quoted in Francisco Fuster Ruiz, *El Final del Descubrimiento de America: California, Canada y Alaska (1765-1822) Aportacion Documental del Archivo General de la Marina* (Servicio de Publicaciones: Universidad de Murcia, 1997), 353.

[504] Kendrick, *The Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana*, 99.

[505] Ibid., 103.

While these sources do not tell us exactly what happened, they do indicate that something happened and some sort of attempt was made on the longboat which forced Narváez to use the artillery on the *Saturnina* to intervene. As indicated previously, my own conclusion is that this attack occurred when the boats were passing through Rosario Strait on their return to Port Discovery. The confusion over this incident and the implication that the attack happened in Esquimalt is likely due to the author of the *Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana* misinterpreting what the sailor meant by "this harbour." The implication in the text is that the 'harbour' refers to *Cordova* (Esquimalt), but the *San Carlos* was never in Esquimalt. The ship spent most of June 1791, anchored just outside of Esquimalt, in what is today referred to as Royal Roads. This had been named by Quimper as the *Rada de Valdez y Bazan* the year previously. There was also the *Seno de Santa Rosa* of Quimper, which comprised the cul-de-sac formed by the eastern end of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. If 'this harbour' (the Spanish text reads *Puerto*), is a reference to the *Seno de Santa Rosa,* and the attack took place in the San Juan Islands, as suggested, than the sailor's comment is completely accurate.

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[506] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 304.

While the Salish Sea today is a transnational waterway, with an international border enforcing an artificial division of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, it was not always so. Both the Spanish and local indigenous people considered the local waterways and islands as more or less one entity. In fact, the idea that the longboat and *Saturnina* were involved in a conflict while returning through the San Juans is given even more credence when the movement of local inhabitants is taken into consideration. It was part of the seasonal migration of the Straits Salish people to move between the Saanich area and the San Juan Islands.[507] It is entirely logical that after making one attempt on the longboat in Haro Strait and later moving to the San Juans, due to either the attack or for regular resource procurement, the same group would try again to take the longboat when the opportunity presented itself a month later.

Regardless of whether or not the longboat was attacked near Deception Pass, the expedition continued down Rosario Strait in the direction of Port Discovery. The boats made it across the entrance to Admiralty Inlet, but were forced to anchor one last time at McCurdy Point at the head of the Quimper Peninsula while the tide ran against them. Finally, on the afternoon of the 22nd of July 1791, the tiny *Santa Saturnina* and the longboat of the *San Carlos* reunited with the store ship. This meeting brought three weeks of exploration to an end in *that immense and dangerous sea,* known today as the Georgia Strait and recently re-named Salish Sea.

While the *Saturnina* and the longboat had been away, the crew of the *San Carlos* had kept busy with their own various tasks in and around Port Discovery. Due to being sick, Eliza's report on the time spent in Port Discovery is even more laconic than the rest of his writing during this year's explorations, but luckily Pantoja was a keen and interested observer of the world around him. As mentioned previously, the chaplain José Villaverde would have been busy tending to the spiritual needs of the crew of the *San Carlos,* while also taking opportunities to proselytize to any indigenous people he could. Villaverde's opportunities, however, were probably limited considering there was no village nearby and contact between the Spaniards and native peoples only occurred at Port Discovery when the natives sought the Spanish out.[508]

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[507] Homer G. Barnett, *The Coast Salish of British Columbia* (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1955), 2—21.

Food was also an obvious concern for those left behind at Port Discovery. While Narváez was sending foraging parties ashore as he made his way up the Georgia Strait, Pantoja was doing the same in the hills and forests around Port Discovery in an effort to feed the eighty or more people on the ship. These hunting parties were able to take advantage of the forests around them, to provide themselves with a variety of different game. Animals encountered included bears, cougars (called leopards by Pantoja), wolves, coyotes, rabbits and grouse.[509]

Pantoja was obviously intrigued by the numerous grouse that he found, as he discussed the birds on two separate occasions in his journal. The Spaniards had never seen them before, noting "their flesh does not differ from our chicken."[510] Pantoja would have been in a position to make a judgment about the meat of the little birds, as over 50 of them were killed to feed the crew during the three weeks the *San Carlos* was in Port Discovery, as the crew was in "great need" of food by this point.[511] The greatest relief for the ship's food problems came on the 13th of July when a gunner out with Pantoja managed to bring down a Roosevelt (Olympic) Elk. Pantoja describes the animal as larger than any steer, and goes on to describe its appearance in relation to domestic animals common in Spain.[512] The meat from the elk was enough to feed the entire crew for two or three days and the officers for four, an important enough event that even Eliza commented on it.[513]

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[508] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 188.
[509] Ibid.
[510] Ibid., 184, 188.
[511] Ibid., 188.

The dressing of the elk turned into an opportunity of inter-cultural interaction between Pantoja and his hunting party and visiting First Nations. While the elk was being skinned the locals explained that it was with this skin "that they made their beautiful and perfectly dressed leather shirts," and Pantoja was curious to understand if the hide shirts were used by the locals as protection against the "intemperate weather."[514] This curiosity by Pantoja prompted the natives to explain "for this purpose they had and wear an abundance of blankets of very course wool, with which most of the crew have supplied themselves, and that they only used these skins during their skirmishes or war to protect themselves from arrows."[515] Some of these examples of armour were purchased by Pantoja, who seemed very impressed with them, comparing them to the "doublets in Spain."[516] Unfortunately, none of the pieces bought by Pantoja seem to have made their way into the collections of material from the Northwest Coast now housed in Spain.

Along with the edible game, Pantoja seemed impressed with other aspects of Port Discovery. Features he seemed intrigued by included "thickets of rose bushes with innumerable roses of red colour and of five pedals" and "an incredible quantity of very tame bees," although they were unable to find any hives in order to get a supply of honey.[517] What food they did have was improved somewhat near the end of the stay in Port Discovery by "the great abundance of a special thick bramble which at the end of July began to ripen."[518] These were indigenous Trailing Blackberry (*Rubus Ursinus),* and not the introduced Himalayan Blackberries (*Rubus Armeniacus),* now common to this region. Pantoja also noted that Port Discovery contained various types of fish which also helped alleviate the food problem. These included "flounder, turbot [halibut], and dog fish."[519] Salmon was probably added to the menu when First Nations traveled to the *San Carlos* to trade.

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[512] Ibid., 178.

[513] Eliza says the elk fed the crew for three days, Pantoja says two. Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 151, 178.

[514] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 179.

[515] Ibid.

[516] Ibid.

Despite the need for food, it seems, however, that the principal trade objects between the First Nations who visited the *San Carlos* and the Spaniards were slave children.[520] Eliza states that during their time at Clayoquot, Esquimalt and Port Discovery, seven girls and thirteen boys between the ages of four and twelve, were purchased for copper.[521] These children were put into the care of various people on the *San Carlos*, including the officers, caulkers, carpenters and gunners, so that they would be raised as Catholics and have their soul saved from a presumed paganism.[522] A boy who was purchased by the *San Carlos*' store keeper José Ignacio Gonzalez, informed the Spaniards of indigenous people who visited the coast from a "flat country" inland. The boy indicated that the visitors used horses (confirmed when the boy was shown a drawing of a horse) to bring European trade goods to exchange for salmon.[523] This tidbit of information is an excellent bit of ethnographic information which helps chart the spread of horses into the interior of the North American continent from Mexico.

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[517] Ibid., 184-5.
[518] Ibid., 188.
[519] Ibid., 188.
[520] Ibid.
[521] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*., 154.
[522] Ibid.

Many historians surmise that this boy was purchased by Narváez's expedition in the region of the Fraser River, as the information appears in Pantoja's text immediately after, and in the same paragraph, as the information about Narváez's explorations in the Strait of Georgia. Historian Tomas Bartroli, was the first to point out this error, as the *San Carlos*' store keeper Gonzalez would have never left the ship. It is also doubtful that Narváez would have spent valuable time purchasing children, when the *Saturnina* would have lacked the space to properly house any children for the weeks he was exploring.[524] In practice, the children who were purchased by the Spanish would have become free citizens once they reached the age of 18, although it is difficult to determine what really happened to the children once they reached Mexico. Concerned over the possible abuse of the purchased children, Viceroy Branciforte carried out an investigation in 1795 and found that most were happily living as children of their adoptive parents.[525]

Eliza was obviously pleased with the results of Narváez's explorations. The day after its return, the *Saturnina* was grounded on the beach so that it could be quickly careened in the hope that this would improve the little schooner's sailing ability enough to reach Nootka with the *San Carlos*.[526] As the *Saturnina*'s poor sailing had been an issue all summer, there was not much faith in the little schooner. Narváez and four out of the five *Voluntarios* were transferred back to the *San Carlos* in case the schooner was unable to follow the frigate; which was indeed what occurred once the boats were free of the Strait of Juan de Fuca.[527]

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[523] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca.,* 187.
[524] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 187; Bartroli, *Genesis of Vancouver*, 171; Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 305.
[525] Christon Archer, "Retreat from the North: Spain's withdrawal from Nootka Sound, 1793-1795." *BC Studies* no. 37, (Spring 1978): 19-36.
[526] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 180.

Depending on the winds, entering or leaving the Strait of Juan de Fuca can be a difficult task for sailing ships. George Davidson in the *Pacific Coast Pilot* warned 19th century navigators that it could take a week of sailing to get from Cape Flattery to Admiralty Inlet going either way, depending on the prevailing winds.[528] Four days after the return of the *Saturnina* and the longboat from the Strait of Georgia, the expedition attempted to leave Port Discovery and return to the Spanish base at Nootka. Eliza stated his principal reason for returning to Nootka was the nine sick crew members (it is unclear if Eliza counted himself amongst the sick), and the appearance of scurvy in the crew.[529] The lack of food, apparent through Pantoja and Narváez's need to constantly send out hunting parties, was also mentioned by Eliza as a problem.[530] Conversely, Pantoja cited the principal reason for leaving the Strait of Fuca before examining Admiralty Inlet as the difficulties expected from the contrary winds when exiting, and the need for Eliza to return to Nootka as he was the assigned commandant of the establishment.[531] There was also the outside hope that the schooner might be able to return with the *San Carlos* to Nootka if the expedition left the Strait of Fuca when it did. As Pantoja was aware that

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[527] Carrasco, "Carrasco to Fidalgo, 9 Noviembre 1791." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 201.

[528] G. Davidson, *Pacific Coast Pilot*, 520.

[529] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 152.

[530] Ibid.

[531] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 180-1.

August “is the latest that the season favorable for reaching 50° and running down an unknown coast can be extended.”[532]

Difficulties were encountered immediately when the expedition tried to leave Port Discovery. The *San Carlos* first lifted its anchor on the morning of the 26th of July and moved away from Cape George. Eddies that swirl at the entrance to the harbour, combined with light winds and unfavorable tides, meant that it was four days before the frigate was free of the port.[533] Once free of the entrance formed by Protection Island and Clallam Point, it only took a few hours of sailing to reach New Dungeness, which Pantoja states they reached at about 10:30am on August 1st.[534]

As with Quimper in the previous year, the ships were quickly surrounded by canoes from the nearby village. The ship’s situation regarding the lack of food was momentarily relieved when “rich and tasty salmon were exchanged for Monterey shells.”[535] Pantoja states, “on the 5th [an error for 2nd][536] we continued with the towing as soon as the tide began to run out,” which is how the entire trip out of the strait can be envisioned.[537] The ships would anchor during the incoming tide, and then use the current from the outgoing tide, along with any help that the wind and a tow from the longboat could give, to move along the south shore of the Strait of Fuca.

That afternoon the ships reached Port Angeles, a feature missed by Quimper the year before. The location was given the full name of *Puerto de Nuestra Señora de los*

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[532] Ibid., 180.
[533] Ibid., 181.
[534] Ibid.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Carrasco, “Carrasco to Fidalgo, 9 Noviembre 1791.” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 201.
[537] Pantoja, “Extract of the navigation...” in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 181.

Angeles by Eliza, as the 2nd of August was the feast day of Our Lady of the Angels.[538] While the tide was running against the ships the longboat was dispatched and a fairly accurate chart of the port was made which eventually became an inset on the *1791 Carta.*

From Port Angeles, it took the expedition six days to reach Neah Bay using the now prescribed method of sailing only when the tide was running out of the Strait, then anchoring when the tide began to run against the ship's movement. The anchorages used along the south shore, going from east to west, included Striped Peak, the Lyre River (*Rio de la Cuesta)*, two spots east and west of the Twin River, and Callam Bay (*Ensenada de Rojas).* The boats had to pause at other points along the south coast of the Strait of Fuca, as Eliza mentions they had to anchor every six hours, although the anchorages are not shown on the *Carta* as they were probably considered poor.[539]

By the evening of the 7th the ships had reached Neah Bay, known to the Spanish as *Nunez Gaona*, where they were quickly surrounded by canoes offering sea-otter pelts for trade. Trade was poor, however, as the residents of Neah Bay wanted one 26 x 22 inch sheet of copper for each otter skin. The residents of Neah Bay explained to the Spaniards, that the English traders who came to their village, and Port Renfrew across the Strait of Fuca, paid similar prices for the skins they acquired, but both Eliza and Pantoja thought the bargain too costly, and as a result both sides kept their goods.[540]

The next three days were spent preparing the ships for their trip to Nootka. All the sailors had an opportunity to wash their clothes in the stream that runs into the bay while others collected water and firewood.[541] This would have also been the time Chaplain José Villaverde would have baptized and attempted to instruct the local residents in the basic tenents of Catholicism. It was also during their stay at Neah Bay that Pantoja noted the problems with the anchorage that would hamper Fidalgo's settlement there the next year. These included the poor anchorage comprised of rocks, which was out of cannon shot from the shore, and the large rollers which made their way into the bay on a too frequent basis.[542]

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[538] Ibid., 182.

[539] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 153.

[540] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" and Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 153, 182, 189.

On the 11th of August, at about 8:30 in the morning, the two vessels departed Neah Bay and headed in the direction of Nootka. For three days the two ships beat up the coast until a heavy fog set in on the 14th. This fog, and the strong winds coming down from the North and Northwest, caused Eliza some trepidation. As a result the *San Carlos* changed course for the Southwest, in order to be clear of any dangers from the coast, and give the large vessel some room to maneuver as it beat upwind.[543] For almost two weeks, the *San Carlos* stood off the coast of Vancouver Island waiting for the wind to change direction so as to allow the ship to approach Nootka Sound. On the 27th the wind changed direction and blew from the west, which allowed the *San Carlos* to run for Nootka. The *San Carlos* arrived there on the 30th of August, 19 days after leaving Neah Bay and the entrance to the Strait of Fuca.[544] This was a commendable effort for Eliza, someone who has been criticized for giving up too easily on tasks assigned to him.[545]

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[541] Pantoja, "Extract of the navigation..." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca,* 182.

[542] Ibid., 189.

[543] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 153.

[544] Ibid.

[545] Kendrick, "The End of the Northern Mystery: The Spanish in Juan de Fuca and Beyond" in *Spain and the North Pacific Coast,* 103.

On the 29th, when just coming into view of Nootka, the *San Carlos* sighted two large vessels heading to sea which it was not able to investigate. These ships turned out to be the *Descubierta* and *Atrevida* of the Malaspina expedition. It would have been a disappointment to both commanders that they had missed each other after coming so close to being able to share information on each other's explorations that summer.

After losing sight of the *San Carlos* on the 14th of August, the *Santa Saturnina,* now under the command of Juan Carrasco, made a resolute but ultimately futile effort to reach Nootka. For two weeks spanning the 14th until the 28th, the tiny schooner stayed off the coast of Vancouver Island attempting to beat up the coast against the contrary winds. Finally on the 28th, with their already poor food supply reduced to only a few barrels of water, a little rice, and some beans, Carrasco decided to turn to the south and head towards Monterey. The schooner reached Monterey on the 15th of September, finding Malaspina's ships riding at anchor in the port.[546] This would have been the first opportunity for Malaspina to learn the extent of the explorations of that summer, which would form the basis of his instructions for the voyage of the *Sutil* and *Mexicana* the next year.[547]

The explorations under Eliza in 1791 can be considered both a success and a failure. Warren Cook had a dim view of the efforts undertaken by the Spanish commander, criticizing Eliza for not finding anything beyond what Quimper had done the previous year and failing to explore Admiralty Inlet.[548] In fact the explorations under Eliza's direction had gone far beyond what Quimper had been willing to discover in the little *Princesa Real*. Thanks to the 1791 explorations, Clayoquot Sound, Barkley Sound, the Gulf and San Juan Islands, and the Gulf of Georgia had all been roughly charted. This feat would not be repeated until the British Admiralty began charting the coast in the 1850's. It is true that the Spanish explorations had failed to chart Puget Sound, which allowed Vancouver to gain accolades for completing this task the next year. Not charting Puget Sound was not a case of neglect on the part of the Spanish; Narváez and the rest of the Spanish officers were well aware of the opening to the south and could have decided to take the *Saturnina* into Admiralty Inlet, instead of north into the Gulf of Georgia. The northern waterway however, which had already been sighted by Pantoja's expedition, was deemed far more important than the southern opening. As Eliza states in his extract which was sent to the Viceroy, the *Gran Canal* was either the long sought for Northwest Passage or it was all continent. In other words if the Northwest Passage did exist, it was in the Gulf of Georgia, or nowhere at all.[549] Indeed instead of thinking about which areas the Spanish left for Vancouver to chart, it is useful to consider the opposite and examine how the Spanish maps aided the British navigator.

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[546] Carrasco, "Carrasco to Fidalgo, 9 Noviembre 1791." in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 202.

[547] Kendrick, *The Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana*, 42.

[548] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 306.

Vancouver's instructions were to map the continental shore. Only a small portion of the island that now bears his name was even charted by him. Apart from the area around Johnstone Strait, Vancouver relied on the Spanish charts of Vancouver Island when preparing the atlas of his voyage.[550] Without Eliza's expedition there would have been no map of Vancouver Island included in Vancouver's charts of the Northwest Coast. It is one of the odd happenings of history that Vancouver Island, which was charted under orders from Juan Francisco Bodega y Quadra and who resided in the vicinity of the island for a summer, was named after Vancouver; while Quadra Island, which was visited and charted by Vancouver, but never by Quadra, wears the name of the Spanish commander.

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[549] Eliza, "Extract of the Voyage by Eliza…" in Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca*, 152.

[550] Derek Hayes, *Historical Atlas of the Pacific Northwest: Maps of Exploration and Discovery* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2001), 89-93.

Conclusion:

The experiences of the Spanish on the Northwest Coast and in the Salish Sea region were incredibly complex and unpredictable. The close attention this thesis has paid to the Spanish explorations has revealed elements which other histories of the region have missed. When the Spanish first entered the Strait of Juan de Fuca, they were entering a region where there was no prior knowledge of the geography, climate, or inhabitants. It should never be forgotten just how dangerous the explorations in the Salish Sea were. In an unknown waterway with fast currents, rocks, and reefs, the Spanish had to proceed with caution, or run the risk of shipwreck or a conflict with the local inhabitants, which could have easily led to the enslavement or death of the ship's crew.

As outlined in chapter 1, the Spanish attempted to bring all their experiences of empire with them when they first approached the Northwest Coast. The Spanish recognized that this region was unique, and particularly different from California. A different sort of presence was required on the Northwest Coast than had been necessary in California, and so, institutions from South America and the interior of the empire, such as the *estableciemento de paz,* were modified for use at Nootka. The type of empire that Spain brought with them to the Northwest Coast was not the empire of the *Conquistadores*, that so often comes to mind when imagining the Spanish Empire in the Americas, but one of peace and cultural negotiation.

Violence was not a useful tool for the Spanish, in a region so far removed from supply centers and where their population was numerically vastly inferior to the local residents. The two instances in which the Spanish blatantly used violence in an attempt secure respect, when Martinez shot Callicum dead in 1789 at Nootka, and when Fidalgo opened fire on the canoes at Neah Bay in 1792, almost caused the Spanish position on the coast to be untenable. As can be seen throughout this thesis, the indigenous peoples of Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea held a strong position of power relative to the Spanish whenever and wherever the two groups encountered each other.

This desire to have a different type of empire played into the cartographic efforts of the Spanish. While the British were creating an open space devoid of the presence of other peoples, be they native, Spanish, or Euro-American traders, the Spanish, due to the fact that they already had a permanent presence in the region, created much more of a hybrid space. Native peoples, so integral to the goal of Spanish sovereignty in the region, were included, both in the cartography of the region that the Spanish produced, and through the collection of place-name lists, which were necessary for when the Spanish hoped to return to a previously visited location. These types of efforts by the Spanish reflected their goals for the Northwest Coast. This was not a region the Spanish hoped to dominate, but one that they wished to make secure against European intrusion that might threaten Spanish holdings further south, in California or Mexico. The defensive and inclusive nature of the Spanish efforts led to many important instances of cultural negotiation.

Cultural negotiation is almost always present in the journals of the Spanish explorers. Caught between their duties to fulfil to the best of their ability the instructions issued to them from the Viceroy, while at the same time negotiating the cultural minefield of inter-cultural contact, the dialogical aspect of the Spanish journals shines through. In many cases, such as the stops at Opisat, much of the ethnographic information which the Spanish collected had to be done so “by accident” so as not to offend their hosts.

Dialogism has proved to be a very effective way of negotiating the statements in the Spanish journals and accounts of exploration. By understanding that the text being studied is an intermediary between the actions of the Spanish on the ground, where they were exploring, and interacting with indigenous groups, and the Viceroy, new avenues for understanding the Spanish statements and actions have been opened up.

One of the best examples of this is when Quimper donated the two canoes he had purchased to Tatoosh at Neah Bay, at the close of the 1790 exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. In the journal, this exchange is presented as a gift to prove the kindness of the Spanish to the residents of the village, while at the same time demonstrating to the Viceroy that interactions with indigenous groups had occurred peacefully as instructed. In reality, Quimper had no more need for the canoes and needed to get rid of them. In this case, by employing dialogism to dissect the text, it is possible to see Quimper re-orient the meaning of his words and actions to suit his perceived audience. The same negotiation of language, apart from the interactions with indigenous groups, can be seen in the journals as the Spanish explorers attempted to fulfil their instructions while overcoming deficiencies in their vessels. This was the case with Quimper and the poor sailing qualities of the *Princesa Real*, or the lack of supplies which was a major theme in the 1791 expeditions under Eliza and Narvàez.

This thesis, for the first time, has given an in-depth look and a properly contextualized examination of the Spanish explorations of the Salish Sea and the west side of Vancouver Island. The Strait of Juan de Fuca had been ignored by the international fur traders, who had seen but not penetrated the Strait, believing it lacked the sea-otter population necessary to make any venture into its labyrinth of waterways profitable. By exploring the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Spain hoped to exploit a unexplored portion of the coast, solidify its claims to sovereignty, while at the same time preserving for Spain an inland waterway that could have led anywhere into the interior of North America. Quimper's multiple acts of possession inside the Strait of Juan de Fuca were a valuable attempt to create a solid foothold for Spain in the region. Although these acts of possession were subsequently disregarded, and the time off that Quimper gave his crew after each ceremony has been criticized as a waste, it should be kept in mind that in 1792 George Vancouver also carried out an act of possession in Puget Sound, complete with a holiday for his crew.[1] Although both Quimper and Vancouver's acts of possession later became worthless in the context of the eventual sovereignty of the Northwest Coast, it is difficult to say they were not worthwhile in the context of their time.

Quimper's expedition into the Strait of Juan de Fuca was also notable for the sea otter skins that it acquired. When Quimper sailed the *Princessa Real* to the Philippines in 1791, the ship had on board 3,356 otter skins.[2] These skins were most likely comprised of those collected at Nootka and during the cruise of the *Princessa Real* during the summer of 1790, and sold for 21,000 pesos at the Canton market, making a profit of over 10,000 pesos for the Mexican treasury.[3]

Another interesting outcome of the Quimper exploration in 1790 was the importance placed on Gonzalez Point. For one year, Gonzalez Point, the most southeasterly point in the city of Victoria, was the high-tide mark for European knowledge of the Northwest Coast. The unexplored Haro Strait tantalized the minds of officials in Mexico and Spain during the winter of 1790, offering a multitude of opportunities beyond what had already been seen. Although quickly surpassed in the next year, it is interesting to see the importance that Gonzales Point and other easily looked over locations on the coast had, and the connection Victoria's landscape has with exploration, and European knowledge.

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[1] W. Kaye Lamb ed. *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World, 1791-1795* Vol. II. (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1984), 569.

[2] Warren Cook, "Appendix C," in *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 549.

[3] Ibid.

The explorations from 1791 carried out by Eliza, Pantoja and Narváez were some of the most important ever carried out in what is now British Columbia. The Spanish charts of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds were the only representations of these areas available for the next fifty years, until the Admiralty charted the areas again in the 1860's. Along with improving the European knowledge of the region, the maps of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds offer a view of the native geo-polities that were in place during the Spanish explorations, and offer a unique look into how the native world was organized and was being reorganized during the important period of early contact along the coast.

The exploration of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds was also extremely important for setting the context of the subsequent explorations in the Salish Sea later that summer. The relations with the indigenous populations of Clayoquot and Barkley Sounds, both the negative and confrontational and the positive, helped prepare the boat crews for later encounters in the Strait of Georgia. The cartographic methods that Narváez employed while exploring these regions, including adding detail to areas actually visited, while using assumption to fill in areas that would be difficult or time consuming to actually chart, would be repeated throughout all of his exploring expeditions. This knowledge of how Narváez carried out his explorations and cartography is especially important considering the lack of a written account from this person.

The explorations of Haro Strait in June 1791, followed up by the exploration of Georgia Strait a month later in July, was a watershed moment for British Columbia. For the first time the western world had some concept of the continental shore north of 48^0. The Fraser River, and a passageway heading east, today known as the Fraser Valley, tantalized imaginations with what they might hold. Lacking a definitive text from the principal explorer, Narváez, previous historians have had to rely on conjecture to fill in the details of the exploration. Throughout time, these conjectures have led to errors which were then repeated, and repeated again by subsequent writers. Examples of this type of error include Wagner's erroneous assertion that it was Lasqueti Island, and not Point Roberts which Pantoja and Narváez saw when they first rounded Tumbo Point on Saturna Island and saw the Georgia Strait for the first time, or J.S. Matthews's assertion that Narváez had traveled overland from Boundary Bay to Burrard Inlet. Although my work has not been entirely free of either conjecture or assumption, I have had the benefit of building on the work of pervious scholars and researchers, while at the same time employing relatively new technology, such as comparing satellite pictures to the Spanish cartography. Ideally, this thesis will be a benefit to any who wonder about the earliest explorations of Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea.

An aspect of British Columbia's history I hope this thesis has highlighted is the vibrant native world into which the Spanish explorers entered. The Spanish records which were produced during the exploration of the west coast of Vancouver Island and the Salish Sea tended to focus more on the political situation of the indigenous societies they encountered, than solely their trade potential. As a result, the ethnograpahic complexity of the indigenous societies in the region has been revealed. The indigenous peoples of the region were not the ignorant, history-less savages, awed by gigantic floating islands that J.S. Matthews presented in his article. It is quite obvious from the Spanish accounts that communication up and down the Strait of Juan de Fuca was fluid and constant. Inside groups, while possibly not having first-hand experience with Europeans prior to the Spanish explorations, certainly were aware of the existence of these foreigners and already had trade goods of European manufacture. Tied closely to this notion of communication and trade was how well adapted the indigenous people living along the waterways of the Salish Sea were to their environment. It is a common assumption that the technology of sailing, which allowed the Spanish, British, and others to visit the Northwest Coast, was far superior to any technology employed by indigenous peoples already residing on the coast. The fact that chiefs like Maquinna and Wickaninnish both asked the Spanish for sails has been used as evidence to support this claim.

While sailing technology may have given the Europeans an advantage over canoes on the open ocean, once inside the constricted waterways of the Salish Sea, however, the sailing technology used by the explorers became a liability. It was quite evident in the Spanish sources that the canoes used by the peoples of the Salish Sea were the perfect vessels for navigating their waterways. Even in the 19th century it could take a week to sail from Cape Flattery to Puget Sound or to go the other direction. Both Quimper and the Eliza/ Narváez explorations had difficulty exiting the Strait of Juan de

Fuca. Meanwhile there is plenty of evidence in the Spanish journals that it took only two days to paddle the same stretch of water. The Spanish seemed to recognize the need for oar power in the Salish Sea as well. Quimper, in 1790, simply purchased two indigenous canoes which allowed his crew far greater mobility to carry out their explorations. The next year, in 1791, possibly due to the success of the canoes the year prior, the *Santa Saturnina* was equipped with oars to give the ship maximum versatility, enabling it to travel either under sail or by rowing.

The Spanish accounts of the explorations of the Salish Sea have also offered up a large amount of ethnographic information beyond what has already been discussed. Information about indigenous warfare, trade, communication and diet can all be gleaned from the Spanish sources. One of the most interesting points of information is Pantoja's comments about the young boy describing a horse he had seen to the Spanish. This tiny piece of information is extremely useful for understanding the spread of the use of horses up the North American continent. When Alexander Mackenzie crossed Canada from Montreal to Bute Inlet on the BC pacific coast in 1792, he did not encounter any indigenous peoples with horses. When Simon Fraser descended the river that now is his name-sake in 1808, he did encounter horses in the possession of local peoples. Since the boy that talked about the horses to the Spanish in 1791 was from the Puget Sound region, we can infer that by this time horses had spread as far as the interior of Washington State, but had not yet penetrated deeply into British Columbia.

One of the more interesting aspects of the Spanish accounts of the exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, is the lack of wonder contained in them. As pointed out earlier in the thesis, the Spanish accounts of exploration were of a far more official character than those of the British explorers, many of which were subsequently prepared for publication. Still, it is interesting and indicative of just how official the Spanish documents were, that they contain no hints of wonder, or amazement, while exploring the waterway which up to a few years prior had been considered strictly mythical. Thomas Manby, Archibald Menzies and even the stuffy George Vancouver, all include statements of wonder and excitement at the prospect of exploring the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Manby gives the best impression of what it was like being one of the first Europeans to enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca, noting, "It [the strait] had more the aspect of enchantment than reality, with silent admiration each discerned the beauties of Nature, and naught was heard on board, but expressions of delight murmured from every tongue."[4] One has to assume the same type of wonder occurred on the *Princessa Real, San Carlos,* and *Santa Saturnina* during the two years previous to Vancouver's visit to the Strait of Fuca. Unfortunately, statements of amazement and wonder were probably deemed unimportant to relate to the Viceroy, and a little imagination is necessary in order to comprehend how the Spanish felt about exploring this important waterway. On the other hand, the Spanish accounts of the Strait of Juan de Fuca contain multiple comments about the beauty of the region, which should come as no surprise to any current resident living along the shores of the strait.

The exploration of the Salish Sea which the Spanish carried out in 1790 and 1791 led directly into the later development of British Columbia. It was through Spanish eyes that the first knowledge of the geography of Vancouver Island and the lower mainland came into the European view. Even the maps of George Vancouver, which formed the backbone of the later British colonial expansion to the region, and were the principal tool for arguing British sovereignty north of the 49th parallel, would not have been as complete without the Spanish efforts. Today, these maps are even being appropriated again, this time by the people they first dispossessed, as indigenous nations use the Spanish record of their village sites as evidence in the BC treaty process.

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[4] *The Journal of Thomas Manby,* John Lutz typescript Mss from the Beinecke Library, 83.

The goal of this thesis was to examine the Spanish explorations of the Salish Sea, both because it is interesting, and because the studies of this subject up to this time have been few and error prone. By collecting the relevant primary and secondary material into one location, correcting common mistakes, and presenting a unified picture of the Spanish efforts in 1790 and 1791, a better and more nuanced picture of the history of British Columbia has emerged.

Along with being relevant for the later history of British Columbia, the Spanish exploration of the Salish Sea in 1790 and 1791 opened the way for the Spanish presence in the Strait of Juan de Fuca during the summer of 1792. That summer, Salvador Fidalgo established a short-lived outpost at *Nuñez Gaona*, today's Neah Bay, on the south side of the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The summer of 1792 also saw the first circumnavigation of Vancouver Island by the *Sutil* and *Mexicana* under the command of Dionisio Alcalá Galiano and Cayetano Valdés in tandem with the better known voyage of George Vancouver. These two events have lived at opposite spectrums of the historiography surrounding the Spanish presence on the Northwest Coast. Fidalgo's almost farcical attempt to establish a settlement at Neah Bay has largely been ignored or overlooked, while many authors have written on the explorations of the *Sutil* and *Mexicana*, due to the publication of an account of their voyage in Madrid in 1802.

Neither of these two events has been particularly linked with the expeditions that went before them except for the recognition that the Galiano and Valdés expedition carried with them the rough copy of the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende* which was then copied by Vancouver. The previous expeditions, however, did much more than just provide cartographic information. They provided a social and material base which the Spanish efforts in 1792 were able to expand upon.

For instance, whenever the *Sutil* and *Mexicana* visited a location which had previously been examined by one of the earlier expeditions, Galiano and Valdés were recognized by the local inhabitants as a part of the group which had come previously. This is best seen when Chief Tatoosh of Neah Bay was given a ride on the *Mexicana* as far as Esquimalt. Throughout the trip from Neah Bay to Esquimalt Tatoosh (Tetacus in the *Voyage*) astounded the Spaniards with his cordiality and frankness.[5] This harmonious interaction was not a one-off event, but the result of the efforts of the Spanish over the two previous years to cultivate the friendship and respect of the groups they dealt with.

This friendship between the Spanish and Tatoosh, was completely undone by Fidalgo and the settlement under his command at Neah Bay. As mentioned previously, this establishment was almost farcical in its existence, but also demonstrates and reinforces how important the good relations with the Nuu-cha-nulth at Nootka, which were outlined in Chapter 1, were integral to the Spanish presence on the Northwest Coast. Fidalgo was only supposed to stop at Neah Bay and form a temporary base there in order to bake bread while he spent the rest of the summer surveying the Strait of Juan de Fuca for a suitable harbour in which to form a settlement. The settlement was to be “sheltered .

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[5] John Kendrick trans, ed. *The Voyage of the Sutil and Mexicana, 1792: The Last Spanish Exploration of the Northwest Coast of America* (Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Co, 1991), 97-101.

. . having the smoothest bed, and with opportunities for planting, water, food, and wood."[6] Neah Bay had some of the required perquisites, but was seriously lacking in shelter for the Spanish vessels which had to anchor out of cannon-shot from the settlement. As opposed to the Spanish base at Friendly Cove, where the defensive set up existed to resist European attacks on the settlement, the exact opposite happened at Neah Bay. The Spanish settlement at Neah Bay was an unwelcome intrusion to the local residents and was treated as such.

One event almost undid all of the work which had been carried out previously by the Spanish to establish a good rapport with the indigenous peoples of the coast. Fidalgo's own account hints that although defensive from the beginning when the *Princesa* arrived on May 29th 1792, it was not until Pilot Antonio Serantes disappeared on July 2nd, when things turned for the worse at Neah Bay. As Fidalgo relates,

> From the moment that I arrived, I gave out the strictest orders so that no one would go away from the vicinity of the barracks, then I cleared a circular field around them having a radius of a gun-shot, I mounted four cannon for our defence, in case of our being attacked, and I erected a bakery, a kiln, a blacksmith's shop, corrals for the live stock, all of these structures, although temporary, are in very good condition, and are roofed with grass. I also cultivated a plot of ground which yielded vegetables in great abundance for the whole crew, I won, by a display of good fellowship and by presents, the friendship of these natives, but pilot Antonio Serantes' failure to obey my orders changed all my plans. He went, on his own authority, seeking his own destruction, and I found his body on the 5th of july at a distance slightly greater than

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[6] Mary Dalton trans, "Official Documents Relating to Spanish and Mexican Voyages of Navigation, Exploration, and Discovery, made in North America in the 18th Century." History General Archives Vol. 44, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 324, 397. Internal Provinces General Archive Vol. 134. BCARS A/A/10/M57t/v1-5., 69-70.

> half a gunshot from the barracks in the thick part of the woods.[7]

Despite being under orders to “use the gentlest means” when dealing with the local inhabitants, upon discovering the body Fidalgo had the *Princesa* open fire with its cannons on two canoes which were nearby, killing all the occupants except for a young boy and girl.[8] Fidalgo goes on to describe his difficult position:

> This Tutusi has his village. Containing many inhabitants, South of the Straits, and night and day I am armed awaiting the moment when he attacks me on shore, with his people. Since I can not bring the frigate within gun-shot of the land because of its rocky bottom, and I do not dare to have the natives come on board because this would imply that we are in possession of the land, since that might involve the crown. The barracks are well fortified, well provided with men, cannon, flintlocks, and munitions, and is in an advantageous position, connected with the sea by a river which passes through it so that in case of not being able to resist the attack, we could board it while firing, leaving the land and abandoning everything. I am persisting in the continuation of my activities, coming and going from ship-board to shore, but I am forced to fire on any individual that I see, as I was able to verify this morning in the case of two canoes, of whose occupants I hold a boy of about 15 years and a girl of six, the others having been the victims of Serantes’ transgression.[9]

The small settlement remained in this state of siege for the rest of the summer until it was abandoned on September 29th of that year. It took the Spanish less than a day to tear the settlement down, and since then has remained in the hands of the Makah people.[10] It is difficult to know for certain, but had Fidalgo followed his instructions, and formed a settlement in an advantageous position in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, it would have been likely that Bodega y Quadra would have been more willing to cede Nootka in the summer of 1792. This would have had a significant effect on the later colonial development of the Northwest Coast as the northern extent of the Spanish empire would have been clearly delineated at the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

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[7] Ibid., 91.
[8] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 351.
[9] Mary Dalton trans. “Official Documents Relating to Spanish and Mexican Voyages of Navigation,” 88.
[10] Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 386.

The relative success of the Spanish outpost at Friendly Cove, and the failure of the base at Neah Bay, demonstrates what was necessary for a successful settlement by Europeans on the Northwest Coast in the 1790's. As this thesis has demonstrated the essential key to any sort of meaningful presence on the Northwest Coast was the cooperation of the local people. As Meares and the Spanish demonstrated at Nootka, European settlements could be relatively secure assuming they had permission for their presence. Others who attempted settlement without permission, such as Colnett in the winter of 1790, Fidalgo in 1792, and the Butterworth Squadron in that same year, found their positions untenable in the face of indigenous resistance to their presence.[11] As the examples throughout this thesis demonstrate, the Spanish in the Salish Sea region were involved in a very careful negotiation of cultures amongst very difficult conditions. Contact was always a high-tension affair fraught with danger, not just for the Spanish and other Europeans operating on the coast, but also for the indigenous peoples who had to deal with strangers who were ignorant of, and trespassed through, long established cultural and territorial boundaries.

As the epigraph to my introduction written by John Crosse states, the Spanish explorations form one of the roots of British Columbia. We have always been, and will always remain a hodge-podge of nations living in a shared space. By understanding the cultural negotiation that the Spanish undertook while exploring the British Columbia coast, we are in a better position to understand our own antecedence, and hopefully cast a critical eye at how we too, as a diverse cultural entity in the 21st century, negotiate culture and place.

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[11] For information on the Butterworth Squadron see: Derek Pethick, *The Nootka Connection: Europe and the Northwest Coast 1790-1795* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1980), 121-123.

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Appendix

Spanish Cartography Relating to the Salish Sea 1790-1792.


Carta de las Castas
Reconocidas al Norueste de la California
60
Entrada del Pr. Carlos
Posesion por los Españoles en 1779
Ba. del Controlador
S. Elias
Monte de S.n Elias
I. del Carmen
Pto. de Beering
Is. de Hijosa
Bajo pompe...
Ba. de las Islas
Po. de los Remedios Pos.n por los Españ.s en 1775
Po. de Guadalupe
Monte de S. Jacinto
Is. de Lobos
Cs. de Engaño
Po. del Susto
Sierras altas y nevadas
Po. del Principe
Las dos Hermanas
Entrada de Bucareli Posesion por los Españoles en 1774
Cs. de S. Bartolome
Is. de Carlos
Entrada en que estuvo Juan Perez en 1774
Is. de Sta. Margarita
Po. del Infante
Costa no reconocida
Esta Linea puede ser la Demarcacion divisoria para promover las Internaciones
Ba. de la Esperanza
Po. de Nootka
Po. de Haro
Entrada de Fuca
Is. Dolores
Ba. de los Martires posesion por los Españoles en 1775
Ba. visto por D.n Bruno Hezeta en 1775
Las tres Marias
Cs. gran tiempo
Cs. Toledo
Cs. diligencia
Ba. donde deve estar el Rio de Martin de Aguilar
Cs. S. Sebastian
Pto. de la Trinidad Pos.on por los Españoles en 1775
Ba. de las Tortolas
Pta. Gorda
Cs. Mendozino
Pta. delgada
Pto. de la Bodega
Pto. de Reyes
Pto. de S. Fran.co
Pto. de año nuevo
P.ta de Pinos
Pto. de Monterrey
50
45
40
55
Longitud Occidental del Cavo de San Lucas

(Map 1: Proposed Boundary between Spanish and British Possessions running north from the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca.)


Carta que comprehende
Archipielago de Clayocuat
Archipielago de Nitinat o Carrasco
Estrecho de Juan de Fuca
Gran Canal de Nuestra Sra del Rosario
Pto de la Sta Cruz de Nuca
Pto de Sn Rafael
Pto de Clayocuat
Pto de Buena Esperanza
Longitud Occidental del Meridiano de Sn Blas

(Map 2: 1791 Carta que Comprehende, “Bis 1” Museo Naval, Madrid: 3-E-11)


Canal del Rosario
Longitud occidental del meridiano de S. Blas

(Map 3: Narvaez "Carta Pequena" 1791)



Pequeña Costa que comprehende los interiores, y veril de la costa desde los 48 gs. de Latd. N. hasta los 50; examinados los expresados interiores
con la prolixidad posible por los Pilotos del Paqt. de su Magd., el Sn Carlos y Goleta Sta Saturnina mandados ambos por el Teniente de Navío de la Rl. Armada Dn.
Franco Eliza y descubierto el Gran Canal de Ntra Señora del Rosario por los mismos en la Goleta y Lancha del Paqt. en este año de 91: Arregladas sus Longdes
al Merido. de Sn Blas y ala ultima obson Astronomica que en Agosto de este mismo año hizieron las Corvetas Españolas. Los numeros de carmin demues-
tran los nombres por ser muy reducidos. 1° Punta de Boisè. 2° Boca de la Baía de Buena Esperanza é I. de Mazarredo. 3° Entrada de Noca. 4° Pto de S. Rafael.
5° Bocas de Saavedra: 6° Entrada de Cayuelà: 7° Archipielago de Carrasco: 8° Punta de Bonilla, y Pto de S. Juan: 9° Pta de S. Eusebio: 10° Ensenada de
Orbeás. 11° Pto d Revilla Gigedo. 12° Moreno de la Vega: 13° Pto de Cordoba: 14° Boca del Canal de Lopez de Aro é Ias de Aguallo: 15° Isla de Zayas.
16° Bocas de Bazan: 17° Id de Hijosa. 18° Isla de Llerena. 19° Bocas de Valdes. 20° Punta de Laso de la Vega. 21° Campo Alange.
22° Punta de Sn Luis: 23° Isla de Sn Felis: 24. Isla de Texada: 25° Bocas de Moñino: 26° Idem del Carmelo: 27° Isla de Zepeda. 28°
Boca de la Bodega. 29° Ias de Patos, sucia, y mal abrigo y Seno de Gaston. 30° Seno de Padilla. 31° Isla de Guemes.
32° Id de San Vizente: 33. Archipielago de S. Juan y Bocas de Orcasitas: 34° Puntas de Sn Gil é Islas de Lemos: 35° Boca
de Fidalgo: 36 Idem de Caamaño: 37° Puerto de Quadra. 38° Idem de Quimper: 39° de Ntra Señora de los Angeles: 40
Punta y Ensenada de Soto. 41° Id. de Rojas: 42° Baia de Nuñez Gaona. 43° Pta de Martinez. 44° Pta de Hijosa; y 45° Boca de Alba.

(Map 4: Juan Pantoja “Pequena Carta” 1791)


Plano reducido que comprende parte de la Costa Setentrional de California desde los 47 grados de latitud Norte, hasta los 50. Corregido y enmendado hasta la Boca del Estrecho de Fuca; y levantado el Plano de él en las expediciones que se executaron los años de 1790. y 91, desde el Puerto de S. Blas. Construido y delineado por el Primer Piloto de la Real Armada D. Gonzalo López de Haro, en el dicho Puerto en Enero de 1792.
Longitud Occidental del Puerto de S. Blas.
Boca de Flores
Boca de Caamaño
B.a de Quimper
P.ta de Cepeda
48
49
50
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16

(Map 5: Lopez de Haro, “Carta Pequena” 1792)


son de Agua dulce
Vltimas Tierras vistas desde A donde llegaron la Goleta Sta Saturna
y la Lancha del Paquebot Sn Carlos el Filipino
A
Montañas altas de Nieve
Canal del Rosario
Costa de Montañas de Nieve en la q. hay muchos Canales
nanis
En este Pto se vió fondear una Fragata Americana
Ensenada de Agua dulce
Parage de muchas Yslas
Canal de Fidalgo
Canal de Lopez de Haro
Pto de Sn Juan
Pto de Cordova
Pto de Revillagigedo
Pta Martinez
Estrecho de Juan de Fuca
Pto de Nuñez Gaona
I. de Dolores
Canal q. hace Orizonte
Pto de Quadra
Ba de Quimper
Pto y Ensa de los Martires

(Map 6: Detail of the Carta Esferica showing the Salish Sea and demonstrating the extent of Narváez's explorations in 1791.)


Plano del Estrecho de Fuca
Reconocido por el Alférez de Navio de la R.l Armada D.n Manuel Quimper, en la Expedicion que hizo con la Balandra de S.M. de su mando nombrada la Princesa R.l en el año de 1790.
Levantado por su Primer Piloto D.n Gonzalo Lopez de Haro
Canal de Lopez de Haro
Seno de S.ta Rosa

(Map 7: Haro, "Plano del Estrecho de Fuca" 1790)


P.to de Clayocuat
Escala de una milla
Variacn. N.E. 16.45.

(Map 8: Inset of “Puerto de Clayocuat” from the 1791 Carta que Comprehende)


7
Plano
del Puerto de Clayocuat situado en la latitud
N de 49° 7' Longitud 20° 22' al O de S.n Blas
reconocido en los años de 89 y 90 p.r G. Narbaez
Quimper y Eliza.
Variacion 17° N.E.
Ysla de Flores
Seno de S.n Juan Bautista
Bocas de S.n Bonifacio
Ysla de S.n Pedro
Bocas de Saavedra
Canal del Norte
Puerto de Clayocuat
Canal y seno de poco fondo
Escala de 3 mi
llas maritimas
1
2
3

(Map 9: “Plano de Puerto de Clayocuat” 1791)


Boca de Caña Veral.
Fondo del Venado
Canal d Alcani.
Rio de la Aguada
Enzenada Alegre
Plano del.
Archipielago d
Nictinac, ô d Carrasco
En la Isla de Quadra y
Vancuber en la Costa
NO. de America
Variacion NE 17° 30'
Escala de 6 m. Maritimas
Entrada de Sta Saturnina en Mayo de 91
Punta d Alegria.

(Map 10: "Plano del Archipielago de Nitinat ó Carrasco" showing the course of the Santa Saturnina, 1791)


Plano
del Archipielago de Carrasco situado en la
Lat.d N. de 48.º 51.' Long.d 2.º al O. de S.n Blas
reconocido en los años de 89 y 91 por D.n Josef
Narbaez.
Escala de 6 millas maritimas
1 2 3 4 5 6
8.

(Map 11: “Plano del Archipielago de Nitinat ó Carrasco, 1791”)

THE SPANISH DISCOVERY OF THE GULF OF GEORGIA


VANCOUVER ISLAND
½
0
1
2
nautical miles
HARO STRAIT
Cordova Bay
Cormorant Pts
Hangaver Bay
Gordon Head
Cadboro Pt
Chatham Is
Discovery I
Gonzales Pt
Trial Islands
Beacon Hill
Victoria Hbr
Duntze Head
Esquimalt Harbour
Rodd Hill
Esquimalt Lagoon
Royal Roads
Albert Head
JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT
John Crosse 3.9.02

FORAY 1: THE BATTLE OF GORDON HEAD, 31ST MAY 1791

(Map 12: John Crosse, “The Battle of Gordon Head,” UBC Special Collections: John Crosse Fonds, Box 9 File 8)


THE SPANISH DISCOVERY OF THE GULF OF GEORGIA
Otter Bay
East Point
Plumper Sound
Blunden Islet
Patos Island
Bedwell Bay
Legoe Bay
Chuckanut Bay
Battleship Island
Royal Roads
Trial Islands
JEL 14/9/02
FORAY 2: PANTOJA'S EXPEDITION INTO THE GULF, 15TH to 24TH JUNE 1791
5
0
10
20
30
Nautical Miles

(Map 13: John Crosse, "Pantoja's Expedition into the Gulf," UBC Special Collections: John Crosse Fonds, Box 9 File 8)


Rosario.
Ya. de Zepeda
Declin.on Observ.a N.E. 12°. 30'.
Punta d Sn. Jose
Pta. y Laga. del Garzon
Seno de Gaston.
Pta. Loera
Ya. de Patos
Ya. Sucia
Ya. d Mata
Yslas de Aguayo
Pto. del Socorro
Ya. d Pacheco
Ysla y Archipielago de Sn. Juan
Pta. d Solano
Ya. de Guemes
Seno de Padilla
Pta. de Herrera
Boca de Orcasitas
Canal de Fidalgo
Boca d Flon
Ys. d Bonilla
Canal
Canal de Haro
Pto. d S. Gonzalo
Pto. de Revilla Gigedo
Rada d Eliza
Ya. d Sta. Rosa
Pta. de Moreno d la Vega
Juan de Fuca

(Map 14: Detail of the region explored by the Pantoja/ Narváez expedition in June 1791, from the 1791 *Carta que Comprehende*)


FORAY 3: NARVAEZ HIS FARTHEST, JULY 1ST TO 21ST 1791
N
Narvaez his farthest
Little Qualicum River
Temple Rock
Englishman River
North Thormanby Island
Wilson Creek
Northumberland Channel
Gabriola Island
Point Grey
Otter Bay
Point Roberts
Bedwell Bay
Plumper Sound
Blunden Islet
Semiahmoo Bay
Battleship Island
Patos Island
Royal Roads
Cherry Point
Lake Terrell
Trial Islands
Lummi Bay
Barnes & Clark Ils
Legoe Bay
Post Point
Chuckanut Bay
Kellett Ledge
Guemes Channel
Padilla Bay
McCurdy Point
Discovery Bay
Source: Eliza, Carta que Comprehende, 1791
JAL 29/10/02
Nautical Miles 5 0 10 20 30 40 50
Statute Miles 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

(Map 15: John Crosse, “Narváez his Farthest,” UBC Special Collections: John Crosse Fonds, Box 9 File 8



los interiores y veril de la Costa desde los 48 de Latitud N. hasta los 50 examinados escrupulosamente por el Teniente de Navio de la Rl. Armada Dn. Franco. de Eliza Comandante del Paquebot de S.M. Sn. Carlos del porte de 16 Cañones, y Goleta Sta. Saturnina, (Alias la Orcasitas)

Y descubierto nuevamente el Gran Canal de Ntra. Sra. del Rosario arregladas sus Longs. al Meridiano de Sn. Blas, y á la ultima observacion Astronómica hecha en es[illegible]uerto de la Sta. Cruz de Nuca en este año de 1791 por el Capitan de Navio de la Rl. Armada D. [illegible]xandro Malaespina, Comte. de las Corbetas de S.M. la Descubierta, y Atrevida. Hechos estos reconocimientos en este año de 1791.

Nota.

1a. Que los parajes donde se denota Ancla indica ser buen tenedero: 2a. Los quadros de Carmin que estan sobre el veril de la Costa son Rancherias de Yndios, y las Derrotas del mismo color que tienen los Puertos, son las que se deven executar para tomarlos: 3a. En los Puertos que comprehende esta Carta, se ha Observado sucede el fluxo maximo el dia de la Conjuncion y Oposicion á las 12¼ de la tarde.

Pta. de Sn. Luiz.
Ya. de Campo Alange.
Pta. de Romay
Pta. de Camino
Gran Canal de Nuestra Sra. del Rosario.
Ya. de Texada
Pta. de Arze
Pta. de Lazo de la Vega
Boca de Moñino
Ya. d Sn. Ygno.
Rio de la aguada.
Bocas del Carmelo
Boca de Florida Blanca
Pta. de Araus
Ya. de Lasqueti
Ys. de Apodaca
Pta. de la Bodega
Boca de Valdez
Ys. de Lerena
Ya. de Sangaza
Pta. de Sn. Rafael
Ys. de las Ballenas
Ys. bajos y anegadas
Ya. de Zepeda
Declin. obserba. N.E. 12° 30'
Punta d Sn. Jose
Archipielago de Nitinat o Carrasco.
Pta. de Sn. Leonardo
Rio de las Grullas
Ea. de Rialrum
Boca de Winthuysen
Pta. de Cuadra
Pta. de Gaviola
Boca de Pineda
Pta. y Lag. del Garzon
Canal de Alberny.
Seno de Gaston
Ya. de Patos
Pta. Lorca
Pta. Sucia
Ya. d Mata
Ys. de Morales
Yslas de Aguayo
Pta. del Socorro
Punta de Bonilla

(Map 16: Detail of the region explored by the Narváez expedition into the Gulf of Georgia from the 1791 Carta que Comprehende)