

COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE USE
OF FORCE, SPACE AND TIME IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AS PROTRACTED WAR

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
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
ABSTRACT

The success of Chinese foreign policy since 1949 can be demonstrated empirically in terms of core national interests defined by the realist international relations perspective: state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socioeconomic development. Influential realist writers, however, fail to consistently identify or explain the success of Chinese foreign policy, despite the work of area specialists who suggest that Chinese foreign policy displays consistent and effective, strategic patterns of force. Strategic thought arises from culturally differing ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions, as modified within specific historical conditions. Using the theoretical approach of comparative strategic culture, an abstract conceptual framework is developed for philosophical analysis of western and Chinese strategic culture. Classical and contemporary western realist-strategic paradigms coexist in theoretical and practical tension, resulting in a western strategic ethnocentrism which explains realist failure to recognize Chinese strategic patterns in foreign policy. Chinese philosophical assumptions, reinforced in linguistic structure, create a culturally paradigmatic approach to strategic thought, modified by the modern historical context of civil/national wars and state-building. The modern Chinese strategic paradigm of protracted war is characterized by the mutually constitutive relationship between the military and political dimensions of force, and by a cumulative, discontinuous pattern of foreign policy and state-building, in which force is created, stored, and applied over space and time.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv

INTRODUCTION

I. APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY	1
II. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949	3
III. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY	10

CHAPTER ONE

STRATEGIC STUDIES, REALISM AND COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE

I. WESTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES: A CRITICAL REVIEW	25
II. CONCEPTS AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STUDIES	35

CHAPTER TWO

WESTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES: PARADIGMS IN CONFLICT

I. THE CLASSICAL STRATEGIC PARADIGM	45
II. THE CONTEMPORARY WESTERN STRATEGIC PARADIGM	59
III. WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY	90

CHAPTER THREE

ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE STRATEGIC PARADIGM

I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF CHINESE STRATEGIC THOUGHT	104
II. MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE	127
III. PHILOSOPHY AS STRATEGY	134
IV. SUMMARY OF CHINESE STRATEGIC PARADIGM	158

CHAPTER FOUR

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE USE OF
FORCE, SPACE AND TIME: THE PROTRACTED WAR

I.	THE INTERNATIONAL THEATRE OF PROTRACTED WAR	161
II.	THE CHINESE STATE: BASE, INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR LINES	172
III.	THE EXTERIOR LINES IN THE BIPOLAR COLD WAR SYSTEM	179
IV.	MODERN STATE-BUILDING: DEVELOPMENT AND REUNIFICATION ON INTERIOR-EXTERIOR LINES:	206
	RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS	231
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	235

**COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE USE OF
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INTRODUCTION

I. APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY

Globalism, realism, and pluralism are major approaches to the study of international relations.¹ Of these approaches, the realist perspective is assumed to most accurately identify, and describe the behaviour, of the fundamental units of international relations: the sovereign states which comprise the international system. Neither globalism nor pluralism accept the nation-state as a sovereign actor whose behaviour is dictated primarily by national interests.² However, the drive to create and to maintain state units of sovereignty, coinciding with ethnic and religious cleavages, has been the hallmark of twentieth century political and military history. While global structural cleavages clearly exist, and some sources of international conflict can be traced to the economic, geographic and historical cleavages found in the

¹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, MacMillan Publishing Co., New York, 1987. The authors provide an excellent summary, in Chapter I, of the key concepts of these approaches to international relations. More detailed analyses are provided in subsequent chapters.

² Jonathan Pollack's Security, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Foreign Policy, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1981, fits partially into the global structuralist category. However, it is not a study in political economy, but primarily a study of the Chinese analysis, consistently couched in Marxist-Leninist terms, of changing global patterns in imperialism and international nation-class struggle. Capitalism is assumed to be the driving force behind western imperialism, but it is the political, rather than economic forms of imperialism, which clearly interested the Chinese during the period covered by Pollack's study. The requirement to take Soviet socialist, political imperialism into account, complicated Chinese analysis, requiring the supersession of simplistic economic theories of global structural underdevelopment patterns.

North-South dichotomy, time and again ethnic, religious and nationalist loyalties have been shown to underlie the regional and civil conflicts which continue to haunt the political theatres of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, mid-Eurasia, and the Asian sub-continent. Even the newly cooperative European states are confronted with an intractable civil war in Yugoslavia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991 has been marked by the resumption of old nationalist, religious and ethnic conflict rather than by a new era of cooperation between interlocking socioeconomic systems.

Neither pluralism nor globalism gives adequate, if any, weight to the unique role of political and other cultural factors, relying heavily on theories of economic interdependence, with the pluralist favouring this trend, and the globalist decrying it as North-South global injustice. The globalist perspective especially fails to understand the pursuit of power to be divided along political, and national lines, rather than along economic or class lines. Pluralism and globalism are also limited in their explanatory efforts by a conceptual inability to accept Clausewitz's philosophy of war as the rational extension of nation-state power. Both schools reject this philosophy of war as normatively unacceptable, and from this position slide to a theoretical assumption that the avoidance of war and other forms of conflict is the goal of all states in interstate relations. As will be shown in Chapter Two, this is the major, unrecognized assumption which now also pervades, and coexists with, the major, classical concepts of realism.

Realists accept as primary concepts the state and its use and pursuit of power, for purposes of national interests, through the exercise of force in the context of ongoing international struggle. Core national interests are defined as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the pursuit of

socioeconomic development. Upon the successful establishment of a state, almost always by means of force, its competition with other states for geopolitical and economic comparative advantage draws it into various forms of international conflict.

II. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949

Drawing a recent example from Chinese foreign policy, only realism would appear to account for the 1992 events in the South China Sea in which China asserted sovereignty over, and proceeded to economic exploitation of, portions of the Spratly Islands. From a pluralist point of view, such actions flouted international norms and made a mockery of China's participation in fora designed to mediate a conflict which China did not admit existed. A globalist, or Marxist structuralist viewpoint is placed in question by the fact that China's Spratly Islands foreign policies directly challenge Vietnam's claims over the islands, and jeopardize the recent accord signed by these two states which share the same revolutionary history and socialist state practices.³

Chinese foreign policy and the use of force can best be measured in terms of key realist concepts. Since 1949, The People's Republic of China (PRC) has pursued its national interests, choosing objectives and policies which have progressively consolidated its external and internal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and achieved socioeconomic state-building which measures favourably against the record of other developing nations of comparable history, size and

³ In Time, July 27, 1992, p. 40: "By fielding a navy in defense of an oil-exploration contractor, Beijing seems to be bullying Hanoi into submission just eight months after their celebrated detente. Today it appears that China is banking less on communist solidarity than on national wealth and power."

complexity. These interests, objectives and policies are briefly outlined as follows.

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity:

1) There has been a continuing trend towards, and increasing momentum in, the reacquisition of claimed national territories, with permanent acquisition of Tibet, consolidation of control in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan, near-unilaterally imposed terms for the reintegration of Hong Kong, and the maintenance of land claim gains from the Sino-Indian War of 1962-63.⁴ In 1974, China used military force to take, from Vietnam, Xisha, a portion of the Western Paracels in the South China Sea. By 1988, China had taken, again by military force, another six major islands in the Spratly chain (Nanshan Islands), also claimed by Vietnam.⁵ In February of 1992, China's National

⁴ Harry Gelber notes in 'China's New Economic and Strategic Uncertainties and the Security Prospects', in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXX, No. 7, July 1990, that despite the flight of citizens and capital from Hong Kong, "Beijing has obviously decided to subordinate such economic considerations entirely to its political imperatives. Unconditional resumption of sovereignty evidently takes absolute precedence." p. 656. See also footnote #11 regarding the Chinese uncompromising stand on Tibet, and footnote #12 regarding the Chinese use of diplomacy to isolate Taiwan. Similarly, the Statistical Communiqué of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development in 1990 includes a footnote stating that "All figures in this communiqué are preliminary, it does not include data for Taiwan Province." *Beijing Review*, March 11-17, 1991, Note 1, p. VIII. These are the ways in which China constantly reminds the world and its target territories that it remains committed to their integration with the mainland PRC.

⁵ Marko Milivojevic, 'The Spratly and Paracel Islands Conflict', in *Survival*, Vol. 31, No. 1, Jan/Feb., 1989, pp. 70-78.

People's Congress adopted a territorial-sea law that extended sovereignty over the Spratlys.⁶

2) China has avoided war on any but its own terms of initiation, duration and termination despite its geopolitical location in a highly unstable region (with even China's Korean war 1950-53 being arguably avoidable or terminated much earlier had the Chinese so chosen).

3) The PRC was admitted to the United Nations in October 1971, on its own terms, with the unseating of Taiwan (Republic of China). China has continued to gain admission to key international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund in 1980, and the World Bank, each time achieving the expulsion of Taiwan and its growing isolation from the protective framework of international law. In the post-Mao era, a PRC representative was elected to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.⁷

4) China has avoided ideological or developmental dominance by any member of the international order.⁸

⁶ Time, July 27, 1992, p. 40.

⁷ Jonathan Spence, The Search For Modern China, W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, pp.709-710.

⁸ The Chinese still regard self-reliance as a key to national sovereignty. Denis Fred Simon notes that there are three basic underlying principles here: 1) avoidance of excessive dependence on all external actors, including concentration of activities with any one nation; 2) active promotion of indigenous capabilities, especially in areas with strategic military application; and 3) resistance to those foreign influences on Chinese culture and society that accompany scientific exchange and technical cooperation. In 'The Changing Role of Science and Technology in China's Foreign Relations', Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo. 1989, p. 273.

5) The PRC has preserved relatively complete independence in the determination of its foreign policy, and its freedom from alliances of major military or political commitment.⁹

Socioeconomic Development and Modernization:

6) A favourable comparison of Chinese social and economic development can be made with that of any other developing nation of even remote similarity in size, population, initial underdevelopment, and complexity, for example India. This favourable comparison can be augmented by the immediately apparent contrast to the 1991 collapse of the other large Eurasian socialist state, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.¹⁰

⁹ This determination has been recently restated by the PRC in a definitive article by State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, 'Adhering to Independent Foreign Policy', in Beijing Review, December 30-January 5, 1992, pp. 7-10.

¹⁰. Harry Gelber, op. cit., pp. 646-668, gives an excellent overview of Chinese developmental achievements, problems and prospects. He notes that China "has for a decade been involved in a development program of unprecedented variety and scope, implying equally unprecedented possibilities for expansion of Chinese power and influence at some point in the future." p. 646. In the ten years since China began its concerted push for modernization, "according to both official statistics and outside observers, China has, indeed, achieved remarkable growth". p. 647. The fact that China now is almost certainly in a genuine recession can of course be compared with any number of western nations thought to be suffering a similar condition. From the Chinese viewpoint, in the west "the law of uneven development of capitalist politics and economy is working" (Qian Qichen, op. cit. p. 7) - this uneven development is precisely the malady from which, in the western view, the PRC is thought to be suffering. According to their February 22, 1991 publication of 'Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China on National Economic and Social Development in 1990, the Chinese are experiencing great difficulties within both their regular and Special economic zones; state-owned enterprises were particularly depressed, and the Chinese also seem quite concerned about tax loss from undeclared profits earned by foreign investors, among other problems in the Special Economic Zones. (See also Beijing

Regional and Global Influence:

7) China maintains an increasingly stronger regional presence, with steady expansion of influence into Indochina and the Pacific measured by the establishing of diplomatic relations and economic ties with most Pacific and Indochinese states, and the steady, significant augmentation of a blue water maritime capability which clearly exceeds "coastal defence" requirements.¹¹ The 1992 assertion of sovereignty was followed by a contract with the American firm, Crestone Energy Corporation to begin exploration for off-shore oil, thought to be a "potential El Dorado".¹²

8) China achieved an effective and significant binding of Japan to Chinese interests in the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty and the resulting indirect alterations in the Chinese-U.S.-Japanese strategic triangle, in China's favour, weakening the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union and Vietnam.¹³

Review, March 11-17, 1991). However, the PRC reports a foreign trade surplus for 1990, the first time since 1984, and the foreign exchange reserves increased.

¹¹ The PRC has evidently placed a high priority on maritime modernization and expansion (see Harry Gelber, *op. cit.*, and Ngok Lee, China's Defence Modernization and Military Leadership, Australian National University Press, 1989, Chapter 6). This increased capability, a new military interest for a nation long noted to be almost exclusively concerned with continental defence, is consistent with possible Chinese long-term plans for regional Pacific hegemony, and the recovery of Taiwan. See Thesis Chapter Four, fn. 33, for a Chinese statement as to the need for China to use the sea for population expansion and economic resources.

¹² Time, July 27, 1992, p. 40.

¹³ See Robert Bedeski, The Fragile Entente: The 1978 Japan-China Peace Treaty in a Global Context, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo. 1983, for a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the strategic application of diplomatic (and even minor military) force in pursuit of an anti-Soviet diplomatic instrument which altered the regional geopolitical configuration in China's favour.

9) China has developed a strong presence in the Middle East through an increasing volume of arms sales, the unstated alternative to which could only be immediate and massive western developmental assistance to China, ending totally the partial international economic chill since the 1989 Tiananmen Square civil strife.¹⁴

10) Newly celebrated diplomatic ties with India, and the continuing good relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan reinforce the Chinese strategic assets in Eurasia; the long-standing military ties with Nepal and good relations with Thailand, Burma and Kampuchea similarly help secure China's South Asian political and military interests.¹⁵

11) The PRC immediately extended diplomatic recognition to the newly independent republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States of China easing the long-standing reality of the "Sino-Soviet rift" and paving the way to possible destabilization of the Commonwealth should this prove to be in Chinese security interests; in exchange for a cooperative China, the Republic of Russia may well settle outstanding land claims and other issues rapidly with China).¹⁶

¹⁴ The advent of a strong Chinese arms sale industry has been well documented. See especially Harry Gelber, *op cit.*, pp. 667-668. The arms sales are apparently being used to finance a low-key but determined and rapid modernization of the PLA (which in the PRC includes all but the militia and nuclear branch of Defence).

¹⁵ Sino-Indian Joint Communique, Beijing Review, December 30, 1991-January 5, 1992, pp. 10-12. It is noteworthy that the new agreements included an MOU ensuring "cooperation in peaceful applications of outer space sciences (sic) and technology". This communique was also the occasion of China's requiring India to publicly denounce Tibetan resistance "to the motherland" (PRC), as a matter of Indian, as well as Chinese principle.

¹⁶ Beijing Review, January 6-12, 1992, p. 6. The PRC recognized the Russian Federation on December 27, 1991, two days following Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation as president of

12) There is evidence that China has developed a large, credible defensive capability including sophisticated nuclear weaponry; the third largest tank army in the world; a huge standing army easily brought up to a modestly-equipped twelve million man army in a crisis situation; increasing maritime capability with nuclear-armed submarine expansion into the Pacific and Indian Ocean blue waters.¹⁷

13) China is rapidly achieving expansion into civil and military space technology with all the concomitant potential applications to both economic development and national defense (including offensive capability).¹⁸

the Soviet Union; on the same day, China sent formal recognition to all eleven of the twelve republics who elected to form the new Commonwealth. It is of significance that by December 26, prior to such recognition, China had already sent the Minister and Vice-Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade to the Ukraine, obtaining a statement that "the Ukraine respects the Chinese position on Taiwan". From Kiev, the officials went on to Moscow. Clearly the Chinese have seized a major opportunity to create a friendlier western and northern border, and also to create bilateral ties which could be used to perhaps exacerbate already evident strains within the new Commonwealth of Independent States.

¹⁷ Ngok Lee gives an excellent account of current Chinese maritime, as well as other defence modernization achievements, in op. cit. see especially Chapter 6 for documentation of vastly expanded maritime capabilities. As well, see Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1988.

¹⁸ See footnote 10. Also see Denis Fred Simon, in op. cit., pp. 264-293, for the high priority given to these spheres of development. Harry Gelber, op. cit pp. 653-54, notes that in March 1986 a "High Technology Research and Development" program was begun, focusing on biotechnology, space, information, laser, automation, energy-related technologies, and new materials. All of these areas of technology have a great impact on China's global presence both economically and militarily. Furthermore, despite some western and Chinese pessimism as to the length of time required for development, technological innovation has been shown over and over to have an exponential expansion dynamic. This is especially true under conditions of national defence and/or expansion.

and finally, but perhaps most significantly,

14) For four decades China waged a successful struggle to avoid permanent dominance by or war with either the Soviet Union or U.S. superpowers, during the most volatile, period of unrelenting Soviet expansionism and American anti-communist containment policies.

III. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Because Chinese foreign policy successes can be measured in terms compatible with the central tenets of realism, this is the analytical perspective which would be expected to provide the explanation for Chinese foreign policy success, and especially of the use of force. However, representative writers from the realist and strategic studies field (which share the same international relations concepts and assumptions) tend to minimize Chinese successes, and to concentrate on perceived failures in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, and especially in the Chinese use of military force. In Defending China, Gerald Segal is explicitly hostile to the notion that Chinese use of force has any conceptual coherence in relation to national interests, and his book seems largely written to refute the literature which might suggest otherwise. In dismissing Chinese philosophy, history, culture, language, geography, leadership perceptions, and so on, Segal states unequivocally that he is clearing the way for scholars to engage in a (long overdue) criticism of what he calls the "hypocrisies and failures in Chinese policy."¹⁹

¹⁹ Gerald Segal, Defending China, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 8. Gerald Segal writes extensively within the field of strategic studies, including comparative strategic culture, and in Chapter Two, his Defending China will be critically analysed as representative of contemporary realists under the influence of western pragmatist philosophy.

Allen S. Whiting, whose The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence has been so influential, uses the realist concept of deterrence, combined with the social scientific rational actor-black box model, and concludes that two and one-half times out of three cases, Chinese foreign policy not only did not achieve the major objective of deterrence, but also failed important tests of the rational actor model, including those of communication techniques.²⁰

Samuel Kim is a realist who hopes for social scientific precision, while retaining many pluralist normative assumptions. Despite the fact that Kim appears to accept the state and national interests for his level of analysis, his pluralist-behaviorism and realism are not entirely compatible. He therefore tends to date Chinese foreign policy "success" only from the adoption of the Open Door, western modernization policy, and further sees the cooperation of China with western institutions and process to be incompatible with the concept

²⁰ Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1975. Whiting is contradictory: he states that "the People's Republic of China has enjoyed more stability and continuity of decision making in foreign policy over the past twenty-five years than any other major power in the world", p. 248. And, he wishes to examine Chinese "rationality, the use of force, and risk-taking".

While this might suggest an assumption of Chinese "successful" foreign policy as a whole, he nevertheless goes on to attribute a consistent record of misperception and miscalculation, to Chinese foreign policy, noting that with nuclear competition, "the perils of ignorance and miscalculation increase accordingly...Korea, India and Indochina testify to the blunders of past decisions", p. 248. and his foregoing analyses make it clear that China shares a large responsibility for these blunders. In Chapter Two, the conflicting assumptions of the western contemporary strategic studies paradigm will be analysed in a more detailed critical review of The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence.

of realpolitik.²¹ He finds another serious obstacle to explaining Chinese foreign policy from the national interest/realpolitik perspective, in the fact (see A. Doak Barnett, below) that "Mao's world-view played an equally important role in Chinese foreign policy change". The assumption that Chinese realism and Mao's world-view are a contradiction in terms may warrant closer examination, in light of Mao's widely acknowledged politico-military strategic skills.

However, considerable western intellectual disarray appears to have resulted from the June, 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, in which the Chinese use of force shocked and surprised many pluralist-oriented western scholars. There exists, in the literature, therefore, a kind of pre- and post-1989 divide. Despite Kim's ambivalence towards a realist conception of Chinese realpolitik, expressed in his 1989 writing, by January 1992, he has reconsidered:

Only a few years ago, most observers, the present writer not excepted, offered a rather optimistic forecast for the continuity of reform and open policy...But now as never before it appears more relevant, urgent and problematic for outside analysts to speculate about the shape of China's international role in the 1990s and beyond.²²

²¹ Samuel S. Kim, ed. op. cit. p. 10. Most of the articles in this book, with few exceptions, adopt the sanguine assumption that with the proclamation of its Open Door Policy, China had foresworn its Maoist, and therefore ideological, hostile and basically ineffective approach to the international system. As with Whiting and Segal, Kim's influential writings will be closely examined in Chapter Two.

²² Samuel S. Kim, 'International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Allen S. Whiting, Special Editor, China's Foreign Relations: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 519, January 1992, p. 156.

Kim now charges the Chinese with the cynical, systematic, and highly successful exploitation of international organizations and processes, in a multitude of ways, on behalf of Chinese power pursuits. He now concludes:

Indeed, China's realpolitik in the grand Machiavellian tradition has captured the imagination of the high priests of global politics everywhere, especially in the United States.²³

In the same issue of The Annals, Allen S. Whiting likewise moves to a more political cultural, rather than social scientific-pluralist approach to Chinese-Japanese relations. Noting that "Sino-Japanese relations suffer from the heritage of bitterness over Japanese expansionism and aggression",²⁴ Whiting concludes that economics may not, in this relationship, be able to take precedence over politics:

There are psychological and cultural factors...that go well beyond the question of foreign policy. Nor are they entirely under the command of a leadership in Beijing, as evidenced by the nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations by university students in 1985.²⁵

Whiting's assumption that psychological and cultural factors "go beyond foreign policy" would, in terms of comparative

²³ *ibid.*, p. 146. This new state of mind may exist, but there is still very little evidence for it in the prevailing literature. Indeed, in this edition of the *Annals*, most of the articles still treat China's foreign policy as cautious, reactive and defensive, rather than bold, initiatory, and primarily offensive, as one might expect of a nation practising realpolitik with the skill denounced by Samuel Kim.

²⁴ Allen S. Whiting, 'China and Japan: Politics Versus Economics', in Allen S. Whiting, Special Editor, *op. cit.* p.39.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 50. Even the much-vaunted economic pragmatism attributed to Deng Xiaoping apparently took a back seat to his war memories, when "intemperate accusations by Deng Xiaoping in 1987 had provoked a vice-minister of foreign affairs in Tokyo to suggest that Deng was getting senile, the resulting furore forcing the vice-minister's retirement", p. 44.

strategic culture, constitute a methodological preference, not a "fact" of political science.

Michel Oksenberg sums up most clearly the post-1989 western recognition that China is playing the international game according to realist rules:

....many Chinese leaders and their strategists still cling tenaciously to the nineteenth-century view of sovereignty as an attainable and essential goal of the state. They hold mercantilist views of international trade...they believe interstate relations are a zero-sum game. Both China's deep past and memories of imperialist domination until 1949 prompt its leaders...to believe that a hierarchy of power inevitably exists among nations, and the more powerful tend to exploit and dominate the weak. Requisite strategies to attain national security and power entail the retention of independence and flexibility and the avoidance of entangling alliances and enduring commitments.²⁶

This analysis corresponds well with the steady progression of China towards what appear to be realist state-centred goals, despite an ever-changing international environment.

Other key sources suggest that Chinese foreign policy as a whole has been very successful, by means of what appears to be a consistent and effective application of various forms of force on the part of Chinese leadership, and here the term strategy enters the literature. These authors raise serious questions about Chinese long-term goals and capabilities, and emphasize that the makers of Chinese foreign policy show no lack of skill in the international arena.

In "The Mouse-trapping of Hong Kong", Chalmers Johnson points out that the Chinese have a consistent, specific "pattern" which they bring to bear diplomatically when in pursuit of certain goals. This pattern, which is one set of tools in an arsenal of foreign policy weapons, is one which Johnson claims

²⁶ Michel Oksenberg, 'The China Problem', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3, 1991, p. 9.

we hardly recognize, and routinely underestimate. Suggesting that the PRC launched a sophisticated, multifaceted campaign of coercion aimed at both British and Hong Kong residents, he goes further:

These tactics suggest that Beijing's strategy toward Hong Kong is part of a larger, high-priority foreign policy to associate the Communist regime with Chinese nationalism and to bring Taiwan under PRC control...Some foreign observers believe that economic modernization is the top priority of the mainland regime and that this priority will cause it to modify its campaign to "unify the motherland". The evidence from Hong Kong indicates precisely the opposite...Despite thirty years of analysis, foreign observers of Communist China still do not seem to understand a united front campaign or to recognize one when it occurs.²⁷

Robert Bedeski uses the Sino-Japanese 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty to illustrate the Chinese use of political, economic and even minor military force, to achieve a multiplicity of interrelated goals having major long-term as well as short-term implications. Like Chalmers Johnson, Bedeski emphasizes the enormous skill displayed by the Chinese in orchestrating a united front campaign, both regionally and globally, and he also finds it noteworthy that western leaders seemed hardly aware of what had been achieved.²⁸ In light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, at whom the treaty was primarily directed as a form of force, Bedeski's comments writing in 1983 have a prophetic ring:

The irony of the Peace and Friendship Treaty was that it probably was a catalyst in a new stage of insecurity and hostility in the region...Perhaps one of the most significant developments of the final quarter of this century in international affairs is that previously neutral spectators in the Sino-Soviet dispute - including Japan, the

²⁷ Chalmers Johnson, 'The Mouse-trapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins', in Yu-Min Shaw, Ed. Mainland China, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1986, pp. 132-134.

²⁸ Robert E. Bedeski, op. cit. pp. 157-158.

U.S., and NATO - have become pro-China participants, and have taken considerable pressure off the Chinese.²⁹

Harold Hinton, on looking over a large sampling of the literature on Chinese foreign policy in 1986, expresses a view which rather directly challenges what may be the naive assumptions of the pluralist school:

"What I do not detect...is a perception of the real policy problem that, in my judgement, mainland China is likely to pose over the coming decades for Asia, and through that area, for the rest of the world...it would be highly desirable for the United States and other industrial countries to monitor very closely the pace and direction of mainland China's industrial and military development, rather than unconsciously supporting a process whose results they and others may have cause to regret."³⁰

In a less ominous, but still concerned vein, Harry Gelber acknowledges the potential threat posed by the Chinese military establishment. While providing a thorough analysis of China's developmental problems, he draws attention to the facts of Chinese power:

None of that is to deny that China is a significant military power or that its power and reach, including perhaps its capacity for intervention, will increase. Nor is it to deny that its ambiguous strategic policies, together with a substantial nuclear force and its geographic position, constitute great assets in the world of major states.³¹

Similarly, Jonathan Pollack reaches the conclusion that it is strategic thought which provides Chinese foreign policy with

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁰ Harold Hinton, 'Interpretations of Mainland China's Recent Foreign Policy', in Yu-Ming Shaw, Ed. *Mainland China*, *op. cit.*, pp. 649-660.

³¹ Harry Gelber, in *op. cit.* p. 668.

its resilience and effectiveness. He suggests that Chinese foreign policy centres on strategy and tactics and the ongoing necessity to adjust tactics to long-term strategic assessments in a hostile and ever-changing world:

"Time, therefore, represents the critical determinant in this process...Provided one is psychologically prepared for the long term, and militarily prepared in the shorter run, ultimate victory is assured."³²

Under such challenging and frequently dangerous political and military circumstances, the task of strategy has always been to somehow steer China past the pitfalls and through the troubled waters that its leaders have inevitably encountered. On the whole, Mao, Zhou, Deng, and others have performed very well on this perpetual and constantly changing obstacle course.³³

Significantly, he adds that:

"the task for the future of Chinese foreign policy will be to see whether their impact is enduring and institutionalized, or whether it will ultimately prove too personalized and transient to serve China effectively."³⁴

The View From the Chinese Mainland:

The Chinese view of their foreign policy is of principled consistency. In the Resolution on CCP History, (1981), the Maoist contribution was summed up:

³² Jonathan Pollack, op. cit. pp. 62-63.

³³ *ibid*, p. 55.

³⁴ *ibid*, p. 55. A major conclusion of this thesis is that Chinese strategic thought is a product of Chinese culture, language, history and geography, and is associated in Chinese political culture with national survival. The "institutionalization" of strategic thought may be irrelevant in such a setting where strategic thought is so culturally diffused.

In his later years, he still remained alert to safeguarding the security of our country, stood up to the pressure of the social imperialists, pursued a correct foreign policy, firmly supported the just struggles of all peoples, outlined the correct strategy of the three worlds and advanced the important principle that China would never seek hegemony.³⁵

Kim points out that below the level of specific policy pronouncements, the Chinese still show an "exceptionist mentality, exempting the history and internal debates of Chinese foreign policy from public criticism and from Chinese scholarship on international relations".³⁶

A. Doak Barnett has emphasized the role of unique culture and political style in the making of Chinese foreign policy. Based on two years of access to high-level Chinese personnel, he concludes that "ultimate decision-making power on foreign as well as domestic policies is still highly concentrated--with one individual, Deng Xiaoping, playing a pivotal role". Barnett reports that Chinese who were close to the process in past decades stressed to him that despite Zhou Enlai's formal role as foreign minister and his undoubted input to foreign policy-making, "Mao was totally dominant and made almost all of the 'big decisions"; "Mao's dominant role, especially in making broad strategic decisions on foreign policy, greatly overshadowed that of Zhou".³⁷

³⁵ Resolution on CCP History, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981, pp. 4-42. Cited in Samuel Kim, ed. op. cit. p. 4.

³⁶ Samuel Kim, *ibid.* p. 4.

³⁷ A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University/Westview Press, Foreign Policy Institute, Boulder, London, 1985, pp. 7-8. See also Jonathan D. Spence, In Search of Modern China, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1990, Chapter 24, Levels of power, especially

Deng Xiaoping is now the centre of foreign policy-making; for example, it is said that the "one country, two systems" approach to Taiwan and Hong Kong is his personal idea, and the issue of territorial integrity clearly falls under the top leader's control. The authority of key individuals appears to be derivative of Deng's, which is said to be based on the generalized respect for his wisdom, born of his political and military experience, rather than on any institutional position.³⁸

It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Defence proper is not, in institutional terms, part of the system concerned with foreign affairs. Barnett states that:

...it is not clear that even at (the top of the system) is any systematic effort--based on thorough research, analysis, and staff work at the lower levels--to combine the politico-diplomatic and military-strategic perspectives of professionals at the two ministries in formulating foreign policy.³⁹

However, some such coordination must exist, because as

Barnett notes:

Since the Communist takeover in 1949, China has been involved in a number of major conflicts and crises....In most of these instances there appeared to be fairly close, and in many respects, effective coordination of diplomatic and military moves in ways that cannot be fully explained by the

p. 91. Spence notes that even the top twenty-five power-holders might not be formally identifiable in relation to institutional titles or functions. The inner circle is composed of a primary individual such as Deng Xiaoping and supplemented by another four or five individuals. The status and power of this inner circle is based on personal prestige based on long experience, and their advice usually carries the seal of authority.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 11.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 104.

available information on the existing institutional mechanisms in China for coordination.⁴⁰

He concludes that such coordination at very high levels must exist in crisis situations, but how it works on lower levels remains a mystery on the basis of what is now known. It is important to underscore two major conclusions from Barnett's study: 1) the role of the top leader in foreign policy formation and execution; and 2) what Barnett calls the "mystery" as to the relationship between political and military leadership, in the light of seemingly effective coordination in practice.

Taken together, these two facts strongly suggest that the relationship between the political and military dimensions is quite different from that found in the west. The central role of one leader suggests also the Chinese assumption that strategic thought belongs properly to the political and cultural realms, with its military application being a subset of a philosophical category. Thus a wise man of varied political and military experience, such as Mao, Zhou, or Deng, would automatically assume himself to be in charge of all branches of the strategic application of force, whether in political or military form.

The View From the Other China:

Tai-chun Kuo, a Taiwan-based scholar, surveys Republic of China scholarly studies of the PRC. He identifies a general consensus among Taiwanese scholars, on the goals and processes characterizing mainland China's politics. In particular, he notes agreement that "in order to analyze Chinese mainland issues, we must often resort to the same dialectical logic

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 105.

which the Communists have used".⁴¹ Significantly, Taiwanese scholars see a Machiavellian use of power by the PRC, and are concerned that western scholars ironically deprecate the insights of Chinese as to the behaviour of other Chinese. Western scholars seem to prefer the abstract models of social science or the values of liberalism to the historical experience, and cultural empathy which give ROC scholars a unique perspective on mainland China's foreign policy. Noting that time has often shown ROC scholarship to have provided valuable documents and intelligence as to PRC activities, Kuo asks:

If the ROC experts produce credible scholarship that is accurate, why have their central findings never been taken seriously by the majority of the China watchers in the West? Why are their findings ignored by their Western counterparts?⁴²

Western scholars would reply that much of ROC scholarship is a polemic, part of an unfinished civil war still carried on by means of propaganda; however, it could be said that precisely because the ROC has so much at stake, it cannot afford to be wrong, and the insights of its scholars may well be important additions to western scholarship.

CONCLUSIONS:

China has been successful in the pursuit of what realists define as the core national interests of sovereignty, territorial integrity, socioeconomic development, and the extension of regional/global influence. However, influential writers within the realist/western strategic studies school find it difficult to ascribe to China the successful pursuit of its national interests since 1949.

⁴¹ Tai-chun Kuo, 'Studies in the Republic of China on Communist China Affairs, 1949-1979', in Yu-Min Shaw, ed. op. cit. p. 69-102.

⁴² *ibid.*, p. 98.

The paradoxical failure of realist literature to identify Chinese realist international practices, suggests the need for an innovative analysis of both western and Chinese strategic thought.

The goals of the research therefore, are twofold: 1) to examine western strategic and realist schools of thought in order to identify ethnocentric dissonance for the strategic thought of non-western states, and in particular, of China; and 2) to seek for an explanatory, strategic account of Chinese foreign policy, which might do justice to the historical record since 1949, and which might provide a better guide to future Chinese international behaviour than that presently found in the literature. These two goals suggest the new field of comparative strategic culture as an appropriate approach for the cross-cultural comparisons of strategic thought; this approach will be conceptually developed, in Chapter One.

CHAPTER ONE

STRATEGIC STUDIES, REALISM AND COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE

In Part I of this chapter, the norms and assumptions of western strategic thought will be briefly examined, in a somewhat critical overview as provided by representative academic analysts of the field. It is hypothesized that apparent weaknesses in the intellectual framework of western strategic studies have contributed to a generalized failure to recognize and conceptualize the origins and patterns of non-western strategic, conflict-oriented foreign policy practice. Strategic thought and practice arises from a specific, often unique matrix of cultural traditions and historical experiences. Therefore, it would seem indicated to turn from a general, western strategic studies approach to the field of comparative strategic culture for the cross-cultural insights which might reveal the underlying philosophical, conceptual and methodological tenets of culture-specific strategic thought.

Therefore, in part II, a comparative, abstract conceptual framework is developed, in order to undertake, in subsequent chapters, a cross-cultural examination both of western and Chinese strategic thought and practice. The conceptual framework developed in this section will hopefully assist in the delineation and resolution of two related problems in the western study of Chinese foreign policy: the lack of western realist insight to Chinese realpolitik, and the culturally concealed structure and dynamics of Chinese strategic thought. Thus, a comparative strategic cultural approach is expected to accomplish the following:

1. It will create a set of universal categories with which to better compare and contrast their particular, cultural form, in Chinese and western strategic thought. This will bring to

light the essential norms and assumptions of western strategic culture, showing how contradictory social scientific conceptions of force and an anti-war paradigmatic shift in western political culture now cause major problems for western political realism. It is this complex cultural problem which helps to explain the lack of western realist insight to Chinese realpolitik.

2. These conceptual categories will then be used in the thesis to reveal the existence and fundamental characteristics of Chinese strategic practice, based upon realist assumptions of state, national interests and realpolitik, as these manifest under uniquely Chinese forms.

I. WESTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES: A CRITICAL REVIEW

THE CONCEPT OF PARADIGM:

A paradigm is a pattern formed by the interrelation of concepts within a set of assumptions, or propositions which as a whole, provides theoretical meaning to the parts. The conceptual components of this pattern are seen to provide categories of thought and analysis which correspond to visible, cognitively distinct components of reality. A paradigm thus directs its user to look for patterns in reality, its whole and its parts, which correspond to the overall pattern and its constituent parts as postulated by the paradigm. In this sense, a paradigm is primarily a holistic correlative device.

A paradigm is a theoretical structure, but is more than a theory. In the first place, a paradigm is capable of generating multiple theories simultaneously. Secondly, a paradigm is a sociocultural phenomenon in that it rests upon a set of fundamental assumptions about the nature of the paradigm's subject matter around which a communal consensus has formed.¹ This consensus permits the automatic, unquestioned operation of the paradigm as a theory-producing phenomenon in the intellectual community for whom the theories have value and meaning. Ultimately a paradigm survives and flourishes, as long as it meets the needs, however defined, of the community it serves. This is perhaps uniquely true of strategic inquiry and problem-solving:

A national style, to endure and attain that status,
is a style that 'works', well enough, for a

¹ I have accepted the by now standard, social scientific understanding of "paradigm" (from the Greek for pattern), which was put forward by Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

particular nation. A national style is not the random product of imaginative thinking by policy-makers; instead it is a pattern of national response to challenge which has worked adequately in the past. This really is a truth by definition, because a strategic culture that failed to meet objective tests of adequacy imposed by external security politics would lead inexorably to the political, if not always physical, demise of the nation.²

Western strategic studies and the international relations school of realism may be said to form a western strategic paradigm, defined as embracing the analysis and practice of foreign policy and the use of force. As John Garnett points out:

...in spite of...differences of interpretation and emphasis, and in spite of serious differences of opinion on particular strategic issues...most contemporary strategists in the Western world belong, in an important sense, to the same intellectual tradition...They share a common set of assumptions about the nature of international political life and the kind of reasoning that is appropriate for handling politico-military problems.³

The historical framework within which this relationship has evolved has played an essential role since 1945:

In much the same way that political realism forms the philosophical backdrop for contemporary strategic thought, so does the cold war pattern of international politics provide the essential model for much strategic speculation. Ideas of

²Colin S. Gray, 'Comparative Strategic Culture', in Parameters, Vol. XIV, No. 4, p. 29. This is of course precisely the failing political and military paradigm within which Chinese intellectual and politico-military leaders found themselves in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

³ John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy, Vol I: Theories and Concepts, 2nd Ed., Holmes and Meier, Publishers Inc., 1987, Chapter One discusses the core assumptions of western strategic studies.

deterrence, arms control, limited war, flexible response and crisis management were decisively shaped and moulded by the intellectual climate of their time.⁴

One of the most outstanding characteristics of the western strategic paradigm is that it appears unified in its assumption that it is a great success. In one of the most widely accepted texts on strategic studies, Garnett identifies as the primary internal problem the old debate between idealism and realism dating from the formal emergence of realism during the 1920s and 1930s. The current victory of arms control over disarmament is cited as evidence of the continued strength of realism over idealism. On the whole, he is satisfied that realism speaks for itself, mirroring the objective realities of the international world.⁵ This vindication of realism appears to preempt a serious examination of other conceptual components of strategic studies as a whole.

Colin Gray⁶, on reviewing the status of strategic studies as an academic and policy-relevant discipline, raises criticisms of strategic studies to which he addresses his book, but he too largely accepts the common set of assumptions:

1) The idealist-realist debate embraces largely the question of the relationship of the political and military community, raising issues as to undue influence of military thinking on the political, the furtherance of western global domination, and the focus on conflict itself. The idealist-realist debate is the only one which is thought to seriously challenge the

⁴ *ibid.* p. 15.

⁵ *ibid.*, Chapter One.

⁶ Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, Greenwood Press, 1982.

foundations of the strategic paradigm, and this is a debate which the strategic community can dismiss, or win, by pointing to the factuality of war; no other genuinely paradigm-threatening questions are seen to exist. Anatol Rapoport⁷ is the most vociferous critic in the vein to which Gray is replying; however Rapoport is concerned to argue within the same idealist-realist parameters as his opponents.

2) Within the paradigm itself, the main issues are technical ones, as to the relationship between strategic, operational, and tactical questions, arms control and verification procedures, and so on. Given the tasks assigned to it by the political dimension, i.e. deterring nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the paradigm workers can rightly assume that they are carrying out their assignment rather well.

3) To the extent that modifications are thought to be needed, therefore, these have tended to arise from a preoccupation with the Soviet Union, Soviet military doctrine and culture. The primary task of the strategic studies community was to simultaneously focus on deterring war with the Soviet Union, and to (increasingly) plan for the newly conceived possibility of such a war occurring.

Gray argues for comparative strategic culture as an essential addition to the theoretical tools of the present strategic paradigm:

...Strategists have tended to simplify their assumed political environment for the purposes of strategic analysis. Proof of this is everywhere at hand in the literature of modern strategic studies, and with some ambiguity, in the practice of American foreign and defence policies. Above all,

⁷ Anatol Rapoport, The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, Paragon House, New York, 1989.

the political values of other cultures have been 'written out' of much of American strategic analysis.⁸

Hedley Bull asserts that strategic writings have become abstract and speculative, and seem to have taken as their starting point the assumption that with nuclear capability, all other historical and cultural "facts" about societies ceased to be relevant.⁹ In Strategy and Ethnocentrism¹⁰ Booth charges the strategic studies community with the assumptions and problems which arise from ethnocentrism:

Ethnocentrism is one of the factors which can seriously interfere with rational strategic planning... Ethnocentrism is an inadequate and dangerous basis for strategic studies, but it has been neglected as a source of misperception in strategy...Strategic studies have become very inbred. The subject needs a more interdisciplinary approach...Strategists as a profession have not accommodated, in deed or word, to the problems of conflict and stability in a multicultural world.¹¹

Booth defines ethnocentrism in two ways. It is used to describe an attitude, the view that one's own culture is superior to others, a tendency to see world events only from the viewpoint of one's own social group and its interests, and so. An even more serious problem, which this thesis addresses, is methodological ethnocentrism:

A technical term to describe a faulty methodology in the social sciences...the tendency to assess aspects of other cultures in terms of one's own culture, and thus in social science research to

⁸ Colin S. Gray, op. cit. (1982) p. 66.

⁹ *ibid.* p. 66.

¹⁰ Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1979, pp. 13-31.

¹¹ *ibid.* p. 18.

apply in a biased and improper fashion the standards and values of one's own culture in the study and analysis of other cultures.¹²

Gerald Segal use the comparative strategic cultural approach in comparing and contrasting nuclear strategies among the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union;¹³ but much of his article is devoted to his assumption that identifying serious cultural differences may lead to the West's copying of these cultural traits. Thus he warns:

To acknowledge that other cultures have different approaches to strategy is undoubtedly important. But to become infatuated with such differences may lead some to reject our own more suitable strategy, and to ignore the important common characteristics of differing approaches to strategy.¹⁴

He specifies:

It would be ethnic chic to adopt the Soviet or Chinese version of deterrence by denial. The fact that they waste their money on defence against nuclear attack does not mean that we should have parity in poor judgement.¹⁵

Kenneth Booth identifies, (and is quoted approvingly by Colin Gray on this issue) the costs to a state of failing to grasp the vital differences which comparative strategic cultural

¹² *ibid.* p. 15. Booth comments that western strategic studies demonstrates what T.E. Lawrence called "a fundamental crippling incuriousness" about its adversaries, p. 26.

¹³ Gerald Segal, in 'Strategy and Ethnic Chic', International Affairs 1984. pp. 15-30. Segal notes that it came as a worrisome surprise to the western strategic studies community that both the Soviet Union and China rejected U.S. conceptions of "deterrence by punishment", favouring the more aggressive war-fighting stance of "deterrence by denial".

¹⁴ Gerald Segal, 'Strategy and Ethnic Chic', in International Affairs, 1984, p. 15.

¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 30.

studies would reveal. He cites the Israeli misreading of the Arabs' willingness to fight without always having an attainable military objective, and the American failure to recognize Chinese strategic imperatives in Korea, as well as the American protracted failure in Vietnam, along with other examples of the national costs of ethnocentrism.¹⁶ In terms of strategy and its relationship to the concept of force, Booth points out that:

Ideas about the usability of force are always likely to decline most amongst those with nuclear overkill, settled frontiers, a horror of violence, vivid memories of total wars and a reduced need to project force beyond their own frontiers. These conditions do not pertain outside the western world: more traditional outlooks persist.¹⁷

A variation of this viewpoint is suggested by such writers as Liddell Hart,¹⁸ who emphasize not so much the horror of violence arising from the experience of total war, as the radicalization of political cultures in the protracted civil and national conflicts characteristic of post-colonial nationalist movements and state-building, whether in western or non-western nations.

¹⁶ Ken Booth, op. cit. 'Failures in Strategy', pp. 32-62.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p. 77.

¹⁸ B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy. The Indirect Approach, Revised Edition, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, p.373-382. He notes the effect that T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom had on Winston Churchill, and the fact that the Resistance in Nazi-occupied Europe inflicted less harm on the occupiers than on the populace. As he points out, and as present Yugoslavian conflict bears out, the Resistance with its utter commitment to the violence of situational ethics set the stage for ruptured post-war social relations; there is a propensity for the near-permanent corruption of state-society relations in many forms of modern, protracted conflict.

As a result of the ritualization of the normative debate and the focus on the Cold War and its related concepts such as deterrence, detente and arms limitations, western strategic studies has failed to deal either theoretically or practically with the emergence and significance of global developments such as: the fact that "deterrence" has failed to deter all but nuclear war; the tremendous proliferation of limited, but protracted wars since 1945, in which conventional direct strategy and related forms of realpolitik have essentially failed; the political phenomenon of the use of force by stateless nationalists; the acquisition of nuclear power and regional influence of new states in a multipolar international system; the demonstrated ability of nationalist sentiments to over-ride economic and political rationality; and lastly, though not exhaustively, the growth and expansion of both China and Japan as potential economic, political and military giants whose relationship to the (westernized view of) world order, may be highly problematic.

Karel Van Wolferen¹⁹ has used an abstract concept of power in order to trace its concrete political and social manifestation in Japanese society, following the trail of power wherever it might lead within the whole culture. He has thus documented the existence and distribution of power in ways which might have some western equivalence in the socioeconomic structures of capitalism, but within Japan at least, do not correlate with the formal, western institutions of political power. His

¹⁹ Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Papermac, MacMillan Publishers Ltd., London, 1990. Significantly, he credits Chalmers Johnson with "daring me to bring into explicit focus some aspects of my subject that I had heretofore thought of as having only marginal significance" (Acknowledgements); Johnson is one of the few area specialists who displays an interest in political science, and political theory, as a comparative framework within which to analyse varying cultural phenomena.

conclusions reflect, in a negative way, upon Japan's problematic relations with the international community as a politically mature and responsible member. Van Wolferen sees Japanese strategic thought, with its implications of conflict-based state practices, to be inherent in the nature and distribution of Japanese power as a social commodity, rather than as a politically delineated and regulated phenomenon.

Scholars have not similarly undertaken the study of Chinese strategic thought within a theoretical framework of comparative, abstract concepts.²⁰ As a result, the great gap between Chinese and western strategic thought is nominally recognized as a cultural divide, but accepted as one that cannot be conceptually bridged. This leaves matters precisely as they have always been; Chinese thought is treated as "untranslatable", except for scholars devoted to sinica exotica, and therefore is ignored by political scientists and the strategic studies community. Commenting that in his theoretical analysis of Chinese deception "It has been the hope...to lay out one fruitful area for development of the almost nonexistent field of comparative strategic studies", Scott Boorman suggests that:

"Such study permits investigation of some very interesting parallels and contrasts between Chinese and

²⁰ Numerous articles and books, appended in the Bibliography, have been consulted for the study of Chinese strategic thought undertaken in this thesis. Scott Boorman's The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Mao's Revolutionary Strategy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1969, is the best book written, in my view, on Chinese strategic thought. See also, by the same author, "Deception in Chinese Strategy" in William Whitson, Ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1972, pp. 313-337. For a somewhat cumbersome, but serious and sustained conceptualization of Chinese strategic thought as a unified doctrine, see Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution, Lexington Books, D.C., Heath and Company, 1988.

Western approaches to conflict, between formal and pre-formal interpretations of strategic behaviour, and between strategy and the larger body of social theory and social practice in which strategy is embedded."²¹

It seems logical to assume that there exists in China, as Van Wolferen found in Japan, an underlying cultural approach to the application of power in the pursuit of goals. A cultural variant of realist international behaviour might be the explanation for Henry Kissinger's statement that the Chinese, and especially Mao, "are the most cold-blooded analysts of international relations".²²

SUMMARY:

The problem for the realist/strategic studies paradigm is to expand the study of conflict to include the possibility that 1) non-western cultures may accept political forms of struggle and even war as constant, operant factors of international relations; and 2) the use of force may entail culturally-determined forms other than military, and 3) all forms of force can be part of an intentional, rational, but culturally differing strategic paradigm employed by the leadership of a state.

²¹ Scott Boorman, 'Deception in Chinese Strategy', in William Whitson, ed., op. cit. p. 328.

²² Henry Kissinger, Seminar on American Diplomacy, Georgetown, 1980, cited in Chong-Pin Lin, op. cit. p. 107.

II. CONCEPTS AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STUDIES

The major concepts involved in the comparative study of strategic culture will be those of culture, strategy, state, force and war. The philosophical tradition will involve conceptions of reality (including space and time), knowledge, rationality, human agency, and a theory of change. These must all coalesce to form the theoretical foundations of strategic thought. The historical experiences of a culture will create, and perhaps modify over time, conceptions as to the nature and relationship between the state and war, force and strategy. The discipline of comparative strategic culture must therefore be a multidisciplinary one, transcending the narrow limits of what are usually considered strategic studies in western intellectual and policy-making communities. The systematic, and ultimately comparative examination of the above concepts across cultures, must be undertaken in order to generate a philosophical and theoretical understanding of strategy as a key concept of political theory, as well as of military doctrine.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE:

Culture implies a long-standing environment within which certain human characteristics, social in nature, are nurtured, develop, and sometimes flourish. These characteristics are, by definition, what separate, rather than unite various social groupings within the human community.

...culture embraces different modes of thought, implicit and explicit behavioral patterns and social habits, identifiable symbols and signals for acquiring and transmitting knowledge, distinctive achievements, well-established ideas and values, particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems, and significant discontinuities

in these respects as between one group and another.²³

Conflict has largely occurred along the cleavages marking these distinct cultural groupings, and in particular between those known as nation-states. If the differences between social groups are profound enough to be worth fighting about or for, it follows that these differences are likely to create specifically cultural forms of strategic thought.²⁴

Personality, society and culture form a continuous whole. Society and culture affect perceptual interpretation, motivation, behavioral norms and the structure of man's expectations; man organizes his cognition and perception of reality in terms of cultural meanings and value. This is true of war and strategy, as it is of other areas of life; it is therefore an important approach for those who want to understand strategy.²⁵

Colin S. Gray writes that:

The concept of strategic culture is a direct descendent of the concept of political culture...a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action...Virtually by definition, strategic culture and national style have very deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience--as locally interpreted.²⁶

ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND RATIONALITY:

Within a given culture, the basic conception of reality gives rise to theories of knowledge and the related practical, linguistic, religious and artistic methods for acquiring, articulating and utilizing its various culturally defined forms. The practical value of epistemology is twofold:

²³ Ken Booth, (1979) op. cit. Chapter One, 'Concepts and Propositions', p. 14.

²⁴ ibid. p. 14.

²⁵ ibid. p. 144.

²⁶ Colin S. Gray, op. cit. pp. 26-28.

theoretically it outlines the structure and dynamics of reality, and practically, it provides insight to the human and natural levers of change by which reality is thought to undergo its transformations in time. Because of the given temporospatial parameters of the human condition of physical locality and mortality, the concepts of space and time are always key, if variable, points of cultural, cognitive reference. The concept of rationality is derived from this integrated world-view, and is defined in terms of human conformity, subjectively and objectively, with the nature of reality, as its processes are observed, recorded, and undergo human interaction, in space and time.

Therefore, a cornerstone of any strategic paradigm will be that of rationality. This concept is intimately related to the way in which a culture understands, defines and interacts with the means-ends logic of strategic thinking, which naturally concerns itself with the possibilities of change through time. This, along with the concept of force, is an area in which cultural differences are most likely to be found. Booth points to the vital significance of varying definitions of rationality:

The calculation of rational behaviour is culture-dependent in two main ways. Firstly, one's cultural heredity can prevent an individual or group from seeing (or seeing as acceptable) certain options which might nevertheless be rational in an objective sense...Secondly, culture is important because it shapes the ends which create the problem to which rational thinking has to be addressed.²⁷

A strategic paradigm will primarily be concerned with the nature of reality and the methods for its manipulation, in accordance with collectively defined goals. The pursuit of these goals will involve the exercise of force, in whatever

²⁷ *ibid.* p. 64.

forms are philosophically and historically determined to be effective.

THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY:

Comparative strategic culture as a field of study implies two things: first, that there exists a concept of strategy which is somehow independent of its cultural origins or situational definitions, such that it can be discerned as an independent field of study; second, that the concept of strategy, embedded in specific cultures, can and will be modified by its location within these divisions of philosophy, language, and historical experience. In cross-cultural studies, the most crucial differences are located in the philosophical assumptions and distinctions, which may vary significantly and need to be examined in a comparative, i.e. conceptual, or abstract context.

Within mainstream western writing, strategy is still seen to be primarily a military concept, and cross-cultural studies, of which there are very few, tend to focus on the military culture or tradition, of a particular state. This conceptual division between military and other forms of strategic thought has, as would be expected, complex origins in the western philosophical tradition, and it is perhaps the primary obstacle to genuinely cross-cultural studies between western and non-western states. The dichotomy between subjective and objective, or mental and physical "realities", represents a major obstacle to the study of non-western strategic culture, where an equivalent to western dualism does not always prevail.

Liddell Hart might have been writing in a post 1991 Gulf War context, when he said:

Post cold-war leaders did not look beyond the immediate strategic aim of 'winning the war', and were content to assume that military victory would assure peace--an assumption contrary to the general experience of history. The outcome has been the latest of many lessons that pure military strategy needs to be guided by the longer and wider view from the higher plane of 'grand strategy'.²⁸

According to Henry Kissinger:

A separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over concern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely" military advice.²⁹

The Canadian Department of National Defence locates strategic studies within a set of operational fields, but still retains a high level of conceptual abstraction:

Strategic studies comprise an attempt to understand the relationship between the total resources available...and the achievement of national objectives in the face of external opposition, particularly when a degree of force, actual or implied, may be involved.³⁰

²⁸ B.H. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁹ Henry Kissinger, cited in John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions', in John Baylis, et. al., op. cit., p. 6.

³⁰ Department of National Defence, 'Military and Strategic Studies Fellowship Program' (application for fellowship); this definition of strategy embraces all the fields of study "...with relevance to current and future Canadian national security problems, including their political, international, historical, social, military, industrial and economic dimensions."

Admiral J.C. Wiley (USN) defines strategy as "a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment". Making the assertion that this is not a definition limited to war or to military application generally, he states that a move to a more abstract level is "necessary for the concept of strategy as an intellectual discipline."³¹

General Andre Beaufre has been the most systematic writer in the approach to strategy as a primarily philosophical concept:

...strategy cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action...war today is total...it will be carried on in all fields: political, economic, diplomatic and military...Equally therefore, strategy must be total. This requirement raises in acute form the problem of the relationship between policy and strategy...A final result is that strategy can no longer be the preserve of the military.³²

Beaufre suggests that the aim of strategy should be understood in a broader sense, to be:

...offensive in character (e.g. conquest or the imposition of severe terms); it may be defensive (e.g. the protection of certain areas or interests) or it may merely be the maintenance of the status quo.³³

³¹ J.C. Wiley, Admiral USN, in Military Strategy, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967, p. 13.

³² General Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, With Particular Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, trans. Major-General R.H. Barry, Faber and Faber, London, 1965, pp. 13-14.

³³ *ibid.* p. 23.

The essence of strategic planning is the dialectical method: "for every action proposed, the possible enemy reactions must be calculated and provision made to guard against them. His reaction may be international, or national, psychological, political economic or military." Success is simply but comprehensively defined:

...the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose upon him.³⁴

Thus for Beaufre, the overall distinction between military strategy and foreign (political) policy, characteristic of western strategic culture has little meaning:

It is through strategy that international politics act and it may therefore well be that the thought processes of strategy will be applicable to the realm of pure politics or indeed to any field in which there is a clash of opposing wills.³⁵

He proposes the following definition of strategy:

...the essence of strategy is the abstract interplay which...springs from the clash between two opposing wills. It is the art which enables a man, no matter the techniques employed, to master the problems set by any clash of wills and as a result to employ the techniques available with maximum efficiency. It is therefore the art of the dialectic of force, or more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute...The outcome desired is to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him. In this dialectic of wills a decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been produced on the enemy; when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or

³⁴ ibid. p. 24.

³⁵ ibid. p. 49.

alternately to continue the struggle. (Emphasis in the original).³⁶

If we are to focus primarily on inducing a particular psychological condition in an opponent, then we can move from the manipulation of material objects in a military arena to a realm of thought processes and intersubjective actions which embrace a broad spectrum of means for the application of force. Force, as a strategic concept, takes on the following abstract definition: Force inheres in any means which is directed toward altering, against his will, the perceptions or behaviour of a designated entity.

Knowledge as to the nature and scope of his enemy's resistance, or counter-force, directs the strategist in choosing the form which force will take, in his "force-breaking, or counter-force-breaking strategy". The concepts of force, epistemology, and thus rationality rise to the same abstract level as the concept of strategy.

THE CONCEPTS OF STATE AND WAR:

The concepts of strategy and force, when located within the study of state behaviour, are embedded in another set of cultural norms and assumptions as to the nature and value of war and of international conflict, in general:³⁷

1. The political philosophy of war is summed up in the words "rational", "national" and "instrumental". War is rational, because it is based on a realistic evaluation of the costs and benefits of a given war; war is national in that it advances the interests of a given state and the entire effort of the

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁷ Anatol Rapoport, ed. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Penguin Books Ltd., 1968: Introduction, pp. 11-80.

nation is involved in prosecuting the war aims; finally, war is instrumental in that it is waged for these national aims only. The defining characteristic of a political philosophy of war is that it revolves around the concept of the state as the highest unit of social order, endowed with the natural law right to use force on behalf of both internal and external sovereignty.

2. The eschatological philosophy of war assumes that the goal of history, or one of its epochs, is to produce some final, decisive, ultimately meaningful result, or "decision" for the human race. This goal may come about through the agency of a particular race or cultural group, or through the chaos of some final transcendental event such as the battle of Armageddon. Here, the state, as such, simply disappears as a redundant, perhaps even wicked vestige of the period of human exile.

3. The cataclysmic philosophy of war depicts war as a devastating calamity on the order of a natural disaster such as a hurricane, tidal wave, "the Flood", and so on. War simply occurs at random, as a frightening force which is part of the human condition; no one is particularly responsible for it, and no one is expected to gain from it. In this philosophy of war, a vital task of the state is to protect its citizens from the calamity of war, primarily by use of political strategies.

The precise manner in which a philosophy of war will manifest in a given culture is the product of the interaction between the philosophical tradition and the historical experience of violence and war. Within this framework, the culturally interrelated concepts of reality, knowledge, rationality, change, time, and space, will combine with the prevailing philosophy of war, and precepts as to the use of force in the

context of conflict. The larger philosophical principles of ontology, epistemology, and methodology will thus form the morphological matrix of an interrelated whole which can be identified as a strategic paradigm.

In the following two chapters, the concept of strategic paradigm will be applied first to western, and then to Chinese strategic culture, in order to identify important cultural variations in strategic thought.

CHAPTER TWO

WESTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES: PARADIGMS IN CONFLICT

Perhaps the most pervasive assumptions underlying contemporary strategy are those associated with the theory of political behaviour known as realism...realists tend to be conservative in their views;...they see virtue in evolutionary change that is sufficiently slow for that which is best in international relations to be preserved...realists tend to accept a world subdivided into independent sovereign states as being the normal, if not the permanent condition of international society, and they consider realpolitik an inescapable feature of the international environment...Men are seen to be inherently destructive, selfish, competitive and aggressive, and the international system one torn by conflict and full of uncertainty and disorder...The realists also emphasize the ubiquity of the power struggle, and their literature is dominated by the concepts of national power and interest.¹

Basic ontological, epistemological and methodological elements of the western philosophical tradition underlie the cluster of concepts associated with the school of realism. Their constituent role in the emergence of what will be designated the classical western strategic paradigm will be examined below, setting the stage for analysis of their historical, twentieth century modification in what will be then designated the contemporary western strategic paradigm.

I. THE CLASSICAL STRATEGIC PARADIGM

Reality:

In the Western philosophical tradition, prior to Hegel and prior to the existentialists' concerns for expressive unity, only the pre-Socratics toyed with the notion of cosmic unity, or with the idea of man as an integral, constituent component

¹ John Garnett, in Baylis, et. al., op. cit. p. 10-11.

of cosmic reality.² Both the Platonic and Christian conceptions of the inferior, debased state of worldly reality contribute heavily to western assumptions, so obvious in the above characterization of realism, that man, and especially political man, cannot change either himself, or his world, in any fundamental way. Formally introduced in Plato's Theory of Forms, and reinforced by the Christian problematic of a hostile soul-body dichotomy, the dualist conception of reality has dominated the western philosophical tradition. The Scientific Revolution, spanning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries articulated as new, "scientific principles", the ontological, epistemological, and therefore methodological gap between objective, physical phenomena, and the subjective world of mind.³ Descartes' observation that "there is nothing included in the concept of body that belongs to the mind; and nothing in that of mind that belongs to the body" enshrined the dualist break between the subjective and the objective in the form and content of "the scientific method", and raised its validity to the level of a cultural icon, where it has remained ever since.⁴

Space, Time and Change:

The physical parameters of Newton's mechanical universe were set by absolute three-dimensional space, and absolute time.

² Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, Penguin Books, 1987, see especially the fragments of Heraclitus, pp. 100-126.

³ Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture, Bantam Books, Simon and Schuster, 1983. See especially Chapter 2 - 'The Newtonian World-Machine', pp. 53-74. Capra, one of the new "philosopher-physicists", has provided here a good synopsis of both old and new physics, as well as of some of the underlying philosophical underpinnings and consequences of each.

⁴ *ibid.* p. 59.

Change as causality occurred through the movement, within this framework of absolute space and absolute time, of homogeneous particles:

Newton assumed matter to be homogeneous; he explained the difference between one type of matter and another...in terms of more or less dense packing of atoms...The motion of the particles was caused by the force of gravity...The material particles and the forces between them were of a fundamentally different nature, the inner constitution of the particles being independent of their mutual interaction.⁵

Change is therefore expressed in the "action-reaction" formula which implies the external movements of two discrete forms of matter, impacting on one another, in a mechanistic, linear chain of events which leaves the internal, constituent components of reality unaltered. Forming in Newtonian terms, the immutable physical framework for "events", or in Kantian terms, the conceptual properties of the human mind, time and space do not interact with matter, as agents of change. Time and space are forms of measure, points on the compass.⁶ The action-reaction theory of externally-induced changes directs western man to look for a linear cause and effect relationship between social or natural components occupying the same or sequential time and space coordinates. In this mechanistic, external understanding of causality, change is measured in quantitative or positional terms; internal, morphological constituents of reality remain unchanged.

Language and Epistemology: Pragmatism and Rationalism

Epistemologically, western man believes that the only genuinely knowable reality is that of the objective, physical world, and this includes the properties and sphere of influence of man's physical body. Methodologically, the

⁵ *ibid.* p. 65.

⁶ *ibid.* p. 66.

foundation of western reason, logic and scientific method arises from the synthesis of Decartes' new language of mathematical, deductive logic (Rationalism), Francis Bacon's inductive experimental methods (Empiricism), and Newton's conception of a huge mechanical universe operating in accordance with discoverable mathematical laws.⁷ Cartesian logic is highly complementary to Newtonian physics, in that it has produced a mechanistic, linear view of language, and hence of reality, which is reflected in western man's analysis of natural or human phenomena:

Descartes' method is analytic. It consists in breaking up thoughts and problems into pieces and in arranging these in their logical order. This analytic method of reasoning...has become an essential characteristic of modern scientific thought and has proved extremely useful... On the other hand, overemphasis on the Cartesian method has led to the fragmentation that is characteristic of both our general thinking and our academic disciplines, and to the widespread attitude of reductionism in science--the belief that all aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts.⁸

Rationalism is therefore both a method of inquiry and a world-view which sets specific limits to possible goals of human activity. Rationalist thought is deductive, working in accordance with algebraic laws which relate components of reality in a logical pattern to which the human mind is thought to be compelled to give assent. "If $A=B$ and $B=C$, then $A=C$ " is the classical example of such logic.

Pragmatism is also a philosophical use of language as method and produces the fragmented, piece-by-piece approach of the inductive "scientific" method of analysis. The goals which

⁷ *ibid.* p. 64.

⁸ *ibid.* p. 59.

emerge from this method are reduced to those which coincide with the existent parameters of a given situation. These goals originate in the objective world, becoming known in small parts, over time; they are focused on past experience, present limits and a sceptical disinterest in the future.⁹ Pragmatism therefore also expresses and reinforces western man's view of time as a series of discrete and phenomenologically distinct "moments"; the past, present and future take on the same physical properties of space, in their finite and absolute separateness, both from each other, and from man's flowing, unbroken subjective processes.

FORCE:

Western man's conception of, and utilization of force as a physical, measurable "quantity", arises from the Cartesian break between mind and matter, the ontological supremacy of matter, and the external, mechanistic conceptions of change. The manifestation of force is seen in the action-reaction relationship between two phenomenologically independent entities. The impact of one on the other shifts the position of both, relative to other variables, and to each other, changing their respective "weights" in what can be also formulated in a rationalist, algebraic equation, which expresses their new potential impact capability.

The Concepts of State, War and Force:

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the western state emerged as a kind of organic, natural entity, entitled to effective self-defence and even occasionally to the rights of

⁹ Bertrand Russell, 'Dewey's New Logic', in The Philosophy of John Dewey, Third Edition, Open Court, 1989, pp. 137-156.

the strong predator.¹⁰ This image of the state as an entity with a will to survive and to expand was fostered by the emergence of various philosophies of struggle, modelled on Charles' Darwin's Origin of the Species, articulated in Marxism, and promoted in the nineteenth century by the Social Darwinists. The political philosophy of war emerged as a natural extension of state power, so that war represented the supreme natural weapon of the State, and was justified by the amoral rules which applied in the natural world of other species, and might be applied in "the City of Man". While Marxism did not take root in western culture, the capitalist socioeconomic and political model based on amoral, "natural" competition and conflict which inspired it, has continued to dominate western politics and global relationships, as a "natural" concomitant to the amoral, survival imperatives of the Machiavellian raison d'etat:

...in the final resort he taught that, in politics, whether an action is evil or not can only be decided in the light of what it is meant to achieve and whether it successfully achieves it.¹¹

In the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, who gave the political philosophy of war his name, war was finally treated and even

¹⁰ These writers included Machiavelli, Hobbes, and others, like Henry the VIII, who in the 1500's had played a large role in creating the secular view of the state, and of raison d'etat. Hegel went on to combine metaphysics with natural law to produce an awesome conception of the State as the embodiment of Geist's creative consciousness in the phenomenal world. It is significant that the biological, evolutionary model of the state has always been in benign tension with the Newtonian conception of the state; this tension becomes a full-blown theoretical contradiction in modern social scientific attempts to locate the concepts of state, force and power within a framework of human agency, required by, yet suppressed by, the rational actor, black-box model of state decision-making.

¹¹ Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull, Penguin Classics, 1961, p. 24.

celebrated as the remarkable phenomenon of nature it seemed to be. Clausewitz did for war what Machiavelli had done for the state, giving it an ontological status, and a logic, or definition of rationality, of its own. His definition of war is only compatible with a political logic predicated on the Machiavellian conception of raison d'etat.¹² Clausewitz could hardly be more clear. If war is not merely additional policy, but embodies the logic of policy, then the political expression of the state must be based upon what Clausewitz calls the "language and grammar", of realpolitik. The laws which govern the survival of the state, in the competing jungle of international relations, are organically connected to the natural law which governs the defensive and predatory use of force in war. The political and the military use of force are, in this view, completely compatible, for they have the same end, and belong to the same continuum of means which arise from the source of state legitimacy: Nature itself.

A state committed to the Clausewitzian, or political, philosophy of war is thus not only willing to undertake war on behalf of its national interests, but is almost certain to be employing a form of strategic foreign policy which constitutes the use of force in its political form, or is "a continuation of war by other means". However, the suggested organicity of political and military thought in the writings of Clausewitz failed to enter into mainstream western strategic thought, as propounded by its leading practitioner, the United States.¹³

¹² Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 402. His famous "war is the continuation of policy" also logically implies that "policy is the continuation of war", and of course this is the view that Mao Tse-tung adopted.

¹³ In 'Vietnam, Mao, and Clausewitz', Parameters, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1977, pp. 79-89, Lieutenant Colonel William O. Staudenmaier (US Army), makes the vital point: "While Clausewitz and Mao constantly stress the interaction of the

The Classical Military and Political Conception of Force:

Clausewitz, as the chief architect of direct strategic thought, laid down as a strategic principle the disutility of both intelligence and stratagem, or deception, as components of force. The exertion of force was to be directed at concrete, physical reality. To attempt otherwise was to become entangled in a process which might well reverberate against its practitioner.¹⁴

The classical conception of political force takes two forms: At its simplest: it is the threat to use the technologically-based instruments of military force; this has been called "coercive diplomacy".¹⁵ In its more complex form, realpolitik, as the political arm of strategic thought, is also engaged in the exercise of force. This takes the form of the mechanistic manipulation of static power. Power is usually

political and military struggle, the United States has historically separated the two. Clausewitz' (and Mao's) philosophy might be stated as "War is politics and politics is war", while the American view held that "There is war and there is also politics", p. 79.

¹⁴ Clausewitz's most clear statement on intelligence was as follows: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain...In short, most intelligence is false." Cited in Victor M. Rosello, Major, 'Clausewitz's Contempt for Intelligence', in Parameters, Spring, 1991, p. 103. In On War, he declares that it is a dangerous waste of resources and of time to deploy forces falsely, stating that insufficient mobility exists for a commander "to play at tricks of agility"...:the pieces on the strategical chess-board want that mobility which is the element of stratagem and subtlety." He does however concede a critical point: "The more helpless his situation...the more readily stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness. Let loose from all further calculations...boldness and stratagem intensify each other..." p. 275 (Stratagem).

¹⁵ George, Alexander, David K. Hall, and William E. Simon, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boston Little Brown, 1971.

defined as the sum of a state's military, technological, economic, and diplomatic assets or capabilities, defined either in some absolute sense, or relative to the capabilities of other states. Power is thus the ability to utilize state capabilities in order to influence the relationships between states in the shared international system, and to gain access to the resources of, other states.¹⁶

The balance of power concept derives directly from the "movements" of a Newtonian machine-like international system, with states moving in and out of various orbits, always seeking, in a semi-automatic fashion, as in nature, a resting state of systemic equilibrium.¹⁷ The relative power, or quantitative "weight" of given states produces a real or potential "balance of power", at any given time.¹⁸ The endless cycles of arrangement and rearrangement of political power are charted in the mathematical equations which quantify the relative total power of states relative to each other at particular points in time. Power can be either increased or

¹⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, op. cit., pp 43-44. The authors emphasize that the concept of power is a vague one, in the literature, and it appears that this would reflect the influence of what I have called the emerging contemporary paradigm, which has indeed presented strong challenges to old and simple realist concepts. The problem for western strategic and realist thought is that these internal theoretical strains, endemic to the new, hybrid paradigm, paralyse academic and political leadership, in theorizing about, or in responding to, international conflict.

¹⁷ 'Realism: The State, Power and the Balance of Power', in Paul R. Viotti, and Mark V. Kauppi, op. cit. pp. 32-77.

¹⁸ As with the concept of power, the balance of power concept has become difficult to define; from the image of concrete, heavy or light objects moving into and out of alliances, modern political thought has moved to the images of mental, perceptual factors, which may over-ride all other measures of "weight", in the old, concrete sense. A so-called balance of power, within the same region, may have different configurations for each of its alleged members, and so on.

decreased as a quantitative substance, relative to its distribution in the international system; it can be removed from one area, and transferred to another. Political force can therefore be the exertion of a "gravitational pull", in the form of state capabilities, on a given state such that it will orbit around the powerful state, and help to provide for its needs, however these may be defined. One of the major mechanisms by which various balances of power can be achieved is that of the alliance:

States wishing to attain or maintain an equilibrium of power can do so either by reducing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the higher scale; the methods have included divide and rule, compensations, armaments, and alliances. For most states alliances are the only way in which they can significantly contribute to a change in the international power structure.¹⁹

Further, any change in one part of the international system will produce changes in another:

The rational policy model has stood hand in hand with the 'action-reaction' phenomenon. This is the idea that an action by one nation, or even a realistically potential action, necessarily triggers reactions by other nations.²⁰

Force, Space and Time:

Space and time, relative to either political or military force, do not play decisive roles within the western strategic paradigm. Clausewitz was unimpressed with the role of time and space.²¹ Space, as in the Newtonian view,

¹⁹ Ken Booth, 'Alliances', in Baylis, et. al. op. cit., p. 265.

²⁰ Ken Booth (1979), op. cit., p. 23.

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, cited in Harold W. Nelson, 'Space and Time in On War, in Michael I. Handel, ed. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, Frank Cass and Company Ltd. 1986, p. 134.

remains a fixed, physical, albeit "geometrical" (logical) entity, and is understood to be geographical terrain. The relationship between a commander and space was, according to Clausewitz, likely to be a hostile one, increasing the amount of "friction" experienced while moving through it, and depending on the ratio of his forces to space.²²

From the military perspective, Clausewitz devoted considerable attention to the concept of time, noting that if anything, time can be the enemy of force:

"space is contested, but time is shared"... "time which is allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender. He reaps where he did not sow. Any omission of the attack...accrues to the defender."²³

Clausewitz definitely grasps the political dimension of time as a modifier of force factors; however, he firmly concludes that:

It cannot be the intent of the strategist to make an ally of time for its own sake, by committing forces gradually, step by step...all forces intended and available for a strategic purpose should be applied simultaneously; their employment will be the more effective the more everything can be concentrated in a single action at a single moment. (emphasis by Clausewitz.)²⁴

Politically, space is sometimes conceptualized as "playing on alternate chessboards". However, these "spaces" are the fixed (absolute) geographical or institutional realities of state structures, and state enterprises, into and out of which power can be moved. In fact, there is a definite avoidance, in

²² *ibid.* p. 136.

²³ *ibid.* p. 138.

²⁴ *ibid.* p. 141.

realist literature, of the theories and concepts relating to the organicity of sociopolitical and socioeconomic phenomena in theories of interdependence.²⁵ Notions of interpenetration of social systems derive from a different world-view than that made possible by the classical realist view arising from Newtonian physics.

Politically, time for the western strategic analyst is a calendar marking the sequential parade of events, which may make the full circle of possible combinations of reality, and repeat itself, in the cyclical conception of history marking the truly conservative realist.

SUMMARY:

The classical western strategic paradigm rests upon the world-view of realism which posits the international community both as a "biological" environment of struggle, and as a mechanistic, Newtonian system of impersonal, abstract forces in constant movement. Realism is therefore a theoretical subset of the political philosophy of war, which explicitly accepts war as "rational, national and instrumental" in the pursuit of state objectives, or national interests. State power is in turn defined as relative capability to so influence the surrounding environment composed of fellow states as to survive and, if possible, to expand. The balance of power refers to a model of systemic equilibrium based on the quantitative distribution of power in relatively equal parts across the system. The key concept underlying the classical western strategic paradigm is that of rationality, defined as the logic of means-end analysis:

...In the context of strategic analysis, rational behaviour refers to behavior in which the actors try to maximize their value positions, as well as

²⁵ Viotti, et. al. op. cit. p. 56.

to behavior in which they do maximize their value positions...the term rational is most appropriately applied to the process of achieving a goal or value, rather than to the goal itself.²⁶

Classical strategic thought as military rationality centres upon the application of increasingly sophisticated, mechanical, quantitative and physical force directed at physical reality. Here, rationality is tied to the physical world, the measurement of quantitatively discrete force, and the ongoing cost-benefit assessment of the win-lose calculus in deploying a given quantity of physical (increasing technological) force. The military formula for classical western strategic success is thus what is called Clausewitzian, or Direct Strategy: maximum material force applied to material targets over a minimal temporospatial framework.²⁷

The classical western political formula for strategic rationality is as follows: the practice of realpolitik for the achievement of a balance of power internationally, primarily by maintaining state alignments through political, military and economic alliances, in order to enhance and maximize the capabilities of western states. This formula includes the willingness to wage war on behalf of state interests, particularly in terms of creating a new, more favourable balance of power, using direct military strategy.

²⁶ *ibid.* p. 17

²⁷ Seldom has a paradigm been so explicitly displayed, nor shown to be so successful in terms of its own logic, as was the western strategic paradigm in the Gulf War of 1991. From the perspective of a competing strategic paradigm however, the limitations of a purely military understanding of "strategy" have been revealed in the post-war period to be dangerously preemptive of a more profound understanding and application of strategy, as comprising the political, as well as military dimensions.

The classical western strategic paradigm would be expected to produce strategic studies and realist foreign policy literature which would readily identify and explain a similar pursuit of power, including the use of military and other forms of force, on the part of other states. However, in the application of strategic thought to foreign policy, some of the key concepts of this "classical strategic paradigm" have been wholly or partially abandoned, or redefined, and overlap with new politico-military conceptions of force, in the emergence of what will be outlined in the following section as the contemporary strategic paradigm.

II. THE CONTEMPORARY WESTERN STRATEGIC PARADIGM

The three crucial factors in the creation of a contemporary western strategic paradigm have been: 1) the paradigmatic shift in political culture since western man exploded the atom bomb; 2) the historical conditions, since 1945, of global cold war; and 3) the rise of the social scientific academic community merging military and civilian strategic thought within a theoretical framework antithetical to classical conceptions of the state and war.

The rejection of the political philosophy of war, and the almost exclusive focus on a group of deterrence-based concepts has destroyed the theoretical unity of the triad of concrete concepts forming the western classical strategic paradigm: the political philosophy of war, political force as realpolitik justified by raison d'etat, and military force as direct strategy. The study of strategy and foreign policy are now bound together in a contradictory relationship manifesting in the western contemporary strategic paradigm. Within this new paradigm, the concepts of space and time have begun to undergo significant change, but their relationship to the use of force remains minimal. The concepts of reality, change, force, rationality, state, and war, have all undergone major changes. In the section which follows, the emergence of these transformed philosophical conceptions will be traced in their interplay with the changing historical conditions of the twentieth century.

1. THE PARADIGMATIC SHIFT

Philosophically, a dramatic shift in western political culture has occurred, in that from the political philosophy of war has come its logical antithesis, the cataclysmic philosophy of

war, which now embraces the western world.²⁸ Nuclear technological capabilities have revealed the means-end logic of violence, bound to its origins in a value-neutral nature, to be unsuitable for human purposes. War, and thus military capability, is freshly seen as anti-human; not only war, but conflict itself which might lead to war, is increasingly rejected as an inappropriate adjunct of political thought. This ethnocentric set of values is projected, via theoretical assumptions, onto the foreign policy and use of force by non-western states.

The New Concepts of Reality and Change:

In the Newtonian universe, on which the western world was conceptually modelled, static units of matter were mechanistically arranged and rearranged either by natural or human energies in accordance with relatively simple, and stable laws of motion. No longer merely the action-reaction mechanism of external impact as a form of causation and change, the new conception of change derives from the cultural image of the chain-reactions of atomic fission. This image has been imposed on conceptions of international "reality", replacing the more static, mechanical image of the balance of power. Reality has recently come to be seen, and feared, as a more dynamic, internally, rather than externally, driven "chain of events", which, once begun, cannot easily be interfered with by human agency. The old discrete boundaries between quantitative units of matter no longer apparently hold; this gives rise to the exciting but disquieting

²⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968. As outlined by Rapoport, the cataclysmic philosophy of war has never attained the systematic clarity of formulation, nor institutional roots in society, as the Clausewitzian, or political, philosophy of war. However, a newly emerging neo-Clausewitzian realism now vies for policy influence at every turn, with a radicalizing, anti-war western political culture.

perception that somehow even objective phenomena of "the real world" interpenetrate each other's internal dynamics.

Politically and militarily, the atomic fission conception of reality found its ultimate expression in the radically new concept of containment, concurrent with, but not the same as, the domino theory. The latter carried within it the old classical conception of change and force as action-reaction, but the sociopolitical and military means of containment released the dynamism, inherent in nature, which could also be found at work within and between states, to a large extent dissolving the old "internal-external" division between the domestic life of the state and its external relations with other states. The notion that once begun, internal processes will become external and the action-reaction chain will cause an eruption of new, uncontrollable phenomena internationally, has permeated the contemporary strategic paradigm at every level.

The new understanding of the inherent instability of reality, in nature, has reinforced the deep distrust of change in political, and especially international reality. Change is now seen as something which "gets out of control", with global challenges to the status quo coming from changes within former colonies, now "developing nations", whose developmental processes are seen to be highly threatening to "order". The exploitation of these highly unstable set of developmental processes by Cold War participants was a massive experiment in the control and manipulation of the newly conceived internal processes of change.

The western deep distrust of these unstable processes finds its antithesis in the western contradictory, revolutionary espousal of change as progress. Both distrust and espousal of change, in the modern age, originate in this conception of

change as an internal fissionary process resulting in the transformation, rather than mere rearrangement, of sociopolitical phenomena. These are the critical processes which can either be controlled, managed, contained, or encouraged to explode, but are genies which seemingly cannot be "put back into the bottle".

Causality, Space and Time:

Because the role of Cartesian logic is still predominant, and causality seen, as in the domino theory, as action-reaction which occurs in a chain, initiated by a key action, the linear, sequential concept of time still prevails. Space still tends to be seen as an absolute, objective set of geographical boundaries delimiting factual events within a set of coordinates, with time as the other dimension. The old Newtonian action-reaction of billiard balls in play is still in evidence at times, in the efforts to maintain or create various balances of power.

However, causality and time are developing a new relationship, and the concept of space is evolving to include conceptual and philosophical meanings. Einstein's suggestion, developed more fully in "the new physics", that time and space actually form a continuum, and have some relationship to event formation is a dramatic departure from the Newtonian conception of time and space as simple mathematical, and therefore abstract, conceptual markers external to the events for which they provide coordinates. The new biological and atomic fissionary images and conceptions, with their implications of time and space as integral, dynamic and internal mechanisms of change, have made a deep impact in the social scientific paradigm from which both realist foreign policy makers and strategic studies experts draw, however implicitly, for their world-view.

Although the internal chain reaction may have a greater speed and complexity than the movements of units of matter, still, causality can be located in the first action, and the chain can in principle be interfered with, to encourage a mutation in the process, provided correct interventions can be made at strategic places along the chain. What is critical here is the notion that qualitative change can be introduced into a chain of events, provided that the relationship between timing and key points, or spaces, in the chain are understood in causal terms. There is an analogy here to the strategies of biomedical research, and to the great potential for helpful but frighteningly uncontrollable intervention at specific points, at specific times, along the genetic coding chain. Thus causation and timing are interrelated, and might turn out to be the same entity, under certain conditions.²⁹

The Concept of Force:

The concepts of reality, change, and force, are intimately related, and undergo reciprocal transformation. Force is now seen to be in some sense an autonomous process, remote from human control; it inheres in reality, and is somehow "released", in the process of change. Man does not always understand "what forces are at work", in a scientific, or any

²⁹ Thus, for example, one finds such oddly folksy terms as "the ripe moment" being adopted in international relations scholarly analysis. See especially I. William Zartman, Ed., Special Issue, 'Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sage Publications, New York, Volume 518, November 1991. In this large survey of regional conflicts, "the ripe moment" was used in at least three of the contributing articles, indicating the emergence formally of a somewhat imprecise conception of time as a strategic variable in western international thought.

other kind of situation.³⁰ It has become evident that force encompasses far more than the impact of one discrete unit of matter upon another; force now involves some form of qualitative disruption of the internal chain of action-reaction processes. This concept of force is only dimly understood, and only experimentally applied. It has instinctively been recognized that this kind of force is more open-ended and thus more difficult, philosophically and politically, to take responsibility for, than the older mechanistic conception of force. Mutating the internal processes of a society, or those of the individual human psyche, is vaguely felt to be ethically on a par with the extreme form of violence associated with the atomic bomb, or with the promethean violation of nature itself, in genetic engineering.

2. The Historical Conditions

The cold war pattern of international politics provides the essential model for much strategic speculation. Ideas of deterrence, arms control, limited war, flexible response, and crisis management were all elaborated by scholars and practitioners whose ideas and thoughts were decisively shaped and moulded by the intellectual climate of their time...Behind almost all western military thought and giving point to it lay the assumptions of the cold war--Soviet intransigence and a bipolar world permanently divided into two armed camps led by two superpowers whose leaders were the only significant decision makers.³¹

³⁰ The "discovery" of the unconscious in what is called appropriately "depth" psychology has paralleled this notion of the "hidden depths" of reality, which may contain "forces" not always benign, and not always controllable. These mysterious processes appear then to be, in the human psyche, as in the political realm, responsible not only for creative beginnings, but also for what Hannah Arendt has called "radical evil".

³¹ Baylis, et. al. op. cit. p. 16-17.

Nuclear Paralysis, Ideology and the Cold War

The post-1945 historical conditions of war and conflict have played a decisive role in radically altering the classical paradigm with its simple concepts of realpolitik, alliances, balance of power, and direct military strategy. Western and Soviet nuclear weaponry created the historical framework of what has been called nuclear paralysis. Technological capability as state power combined with the advent of ideology, creating a new conception of political force based upon the exponential, fission-like process of internal, systemic change. This combination had manifested in fascism and communism, unleashing what Clausewitz only speculated upon, the elemental forces of national and civil total war in the national and international theatres of World War II. The decline of the old imperial empires, with their final, formal collapse in the ruins of World War II, saw not the end, but the emergence of new ideologies, and in particular, the rise of nationalism linked to religious fundamentalism and communalism, frequently utilizing a form of Leninist anti-capitalist revolutionary analysis and organization. The Middle East, India, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States provide but a few examples of such new nationalist movements. These ideologies are now more widely based in societies committed to the notion of "mass participation" from which comes the concept of mass mobilization, in varying forms. Democratized, and hence radicalized, political culture, even in small segments of a society, for example among students and intellectuals, whether western or non-western, became the territorial preserve of normative, passionately held beliefs embracing what had

formerly been perceived as the provinces of either philosophy or religion.³²

The concept of moral responsibility, related to a political world order, gradually became a basic tenet of a newly emerging, normative global political culture, despite the conflict, including violence, between its many varying ideological and national forms. This concept became an ingrained assumption of the western contemporary strategic paradigm.³³ In combination with the rejection of the political philosophy of war, and the requirement to contain conflict, the assumption of western political responsibility is a key reason for the evolution of new mechanisms of political force, as these have been developed primarily by the contemporary western strategic paradigm. The concepts of

³² This was paradigmatically true of many developing nations such as China, as documented in Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1967. It has also been true of the anti-Vietnam war movement in the U.S., and of the internal forms of nationalist political violence globally in recent decades. The current western issue of "political correctness" is the latest, most sophisticated form in which the political dimension has subsumed almost every normative aspect of human collective existence. Catholic humanism, no longer a European counterforce to the seductive, worldly passions of political ideology, has now become a radicalized ideology itself. Thus, the Catholic Church has placed the political agenda of the world at the heart of its new liberation theology, equating individual, internal spiritual goals and problems with the correct, external, sociopolitical structures of the collectivity.

³³ Within the contemporary paradigm, the view that the U.S. is the "guardian of world order" is not so much questioned, but is a matter of approval or disapproval. Colin Gray states that this is a cardinal assumption of the strategic studies community, and he is among those who would defend it as a logical corollary of U.S. power and the nature of the hierarchical international system: Colin Gray, 'Politics and Strategy' in Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1982, pp. 74-75.

realpolitik, balance of power, containment, and limited war, and self-determination interacted, throughout the Cold War, in an unstable, inconsistent pattern of global politics, primarily controlled by the relationship between Soviet expansion and U.S. efforts at its containment.

The State, Force and Politico-military Containment

The Cold War reinforced the classical paradigm's political determination to hold to a realpolitik world-view, in the use of political strategies to further national interests. What had changed was that for both superpowers, national interests now included ideological expansion as essential to national security. National security became linked to political cultural concerns for the protection of various ideological values. In this framework, a win for one was a loss for the other. The contemporary western paradigm saw the political response to Soviet ideological expansion to be the use of the strategy of containment, and limited war to be its military instrument.

Limited war was essentially conducted by certain rules implicitly agreed to by the Soviet Union and the United States, and was practised as part of a grand, global strategy carried on through proxy states. The global strategy utilized limited military force in, or augmented by, covert operations through which each attempted to disrupt and redirect the processes of the social systems of client states, and convert these to either capitalist or socialist "pieces on the board". Externally maintained, regional balances of power, based strictly on national military and economic capabilities in the past, now vied with the perceived global necessity to force allegiance to be defined in the new terms of socioeconomic and sociopolitical ideological congruences. Since mass participation or mobilization affected the political, international affiliations of a state, then the internal

structures to which the masses related themselves had to be the target of external intervention. It was no longer enough to rely upon diplomatic, external agreements with standing governments. Since governments might change, as a result of the unstable internal social system, control of the social system became the target of force at which either or both superpowers took aim.

Because the primary, global U.S.-Soviet balance of power which prevailed was, for the first time in history, too dangerous to challenge with military technological capability, realpolitik, also for the first time in history, could not be backed up by direct strategic, military force. Realpolitik goals of ideological domination, expansion and containment would have to be accomplished through the new concepts of limited war: graduated escalation confined to operational theatres, within which the applications of physical force would be heavily constrained by the strategic concept of deterrence, and would be tactically augmented by the newly developing forms of political force.

The global strategy arising out of ideology and world order had little to do with the classical, direct strategic paradigm's goals and methods in which concrete territorial ambitions dictated the object of military conquest. These ambitions limited the concept of force to the military means to directly conquer a state and require from it certain tribute, whether in land or goods. The new requirement to determine the internal sociopolitical and economic structures played as large a role as nuclear paralysis, in rendering Clausewitzian war obsolete; the political dimension of force was the crucial dimension, for the newly mobilized masses were a new, civilian target, to become either the tool of subversion, or the target of politico-military force in its new combined form.

The Transformation of the Political: The Normative Imperative:

Paradoxically, the new political culture based on the cataclysmic philosophy of war has resulted in a hostile political-military dichotomy. On the other hand, the blending of military and political force is emerging as the hallmark of late twentieth century international conflict. Western political culture now sees the military sphere as hostile to, and disruptive of, genuinely political, or normative thinking. The use of military force, and indeed of political force, is seen not to be a continuation of state policy, but its total failure.³⁴ The contemporary western strategic paradigm, as it coexists with the new western political anti-war political culture, must somehow pursue the goals of realpolitik, without the use of military force, and must, from the vantage point of political force, respect the other fundamental and sacrosanct tenet of the political culture, namely the concept of national "self-determination". This latter concept has stood, throughout the Cold War, in direct contradiction to the ideological mandate of containment and reversal of non-western social systemic processes, and its violation has made of the deeply conflicted, contradictory western political culture a second, decisive front for many anti-status quo revolutionary movements. The new political culture committed to the political value of national self-determination has required the theoretical reconceptualization of political force away from that of coercive diplomacy with the threat of direct military intervention, towards a replacement of realpolitik by

³⁴ While it is true that American public support for the Gulf War would seem to belie this observation, nevertheless the western public came to perceive this war in terms of political failure, from the normative perspective of unsupported Kurdish and Iraqi uprisings. It is doubtful now that another such purely military use of force, without clearly normative political aims, would be supported by western polities.

a normative commitment to the political dimension as a realm of international, cooperative problem-solving through rational means.

In fact, politics has been designated as the proper realm of problem-solving and cooperation, rather than the womb of strategic, struggle-oriented thought. In the scholarly community the paradigmatic conceptual confusion (and normative imperative) has produced a foreign policy studies model which not only excludes, but explicitly denies the role of intentional, conflict-oriented, "strategic" state behavior. International relations continue, however, to manifest the potential and the reality of savage national and international conflict. Western realist-strategic literature and policy has therefore now defined the western political mandate to be the containment, not of Soviet or communist expansion, but of conflict in general. The role of political analysis and policy behaviour is now primarily that of conflict resolution. However, in actual practice, the containment of anti-western ideologies through sociopolitical disruption or penetration processes (creating regional instability), may vie with the equally valid imperative to prevent conflict from escalating in a fissionable process leading to (perhaps) nuclear war.

Since 1945, the new, limited, politico-military forms of war in which western powers have felt compelled to engage, have emphasized the poverty of western strategic thought, both at the "strategic" level, where deterrence has failed to deter any but nuclear war, and at the operational level, where decisive material victory could not be obtained. The attempts to combine the classical techniques of realpolitik, in the context of a radical shift in political culture, with the contemporary strategic military precepts of limited, politically managed war, has proven, for the most part, to be embarrassingly protracted and public failures for its

practitioners, particularly in Korea, 1950-53, in Vietnam, 1954-76, and increasingly in the Middle East, before and after the Gulf War.

The Disappearance of The Balance of Power:

The classical paradigm's notions of change and control as externally produced, and therefore externally controllable, phenomena, were manifested in the mechanistic device of the regional balance of power. This conception of quantitative power stands opposed to the qualitative conception of power as arising from an internal process of change and development. There thus exists a problematical relationship between the classical concept of balance of power as an external, mechanistic political device, and the new, contemporary concept of containment as internal politico-military force. Western efforts are frequently made to maintain a regional balance of power as a classical end, not by the classical means of alliance, but by attempting to utilize, piecemeal, the new forms of sociopolitical system disruption. This process has resulted in complex dilemmas, such as the revolving conflicts between the western capitalist requirement to find markets for arms, versus western political cultural anti-war values, and western national self-determination values versus regional power imbalances.³⁵

³⁵ This has been most evident in the Middle East, and in South Asia. In the former, the global strategic requirement to connect Arab states to western ideological and economic social systems has vied with the regional imperative to "divide and conquer" through the device of a balance of power, primarily to prevent a pan-Arabian union which would be capable of destroying the state of Israel. In South Asia, the U.S. concern for the Indian originally independent tilt to a socialist system led to the U.S. decision first, from an ideological perspective, to deny system support to India, which led to India's tilt to the Soviet Union; following this, the U.S. then strengthened Pakistan, in a bid to establish a regional "balance of power" as dictated by the global balance of power (which had been the original cause of the U.S. anti-

In the Cold War bipolar world, a balance of power in the classical sense has existed only at the level of nuclear capability. The inequality of capabilities between all other states and the nuclear powers has made weak states of most of the international members, who frequently adopt new military and political means of force by which to redress the nuclear balance of power, such that this balance is no longer the relevant one, in terms of global conflict and instability.

Unlike the great powers, much of the strength of weak states is derivative rather than intrinsic. The diplomatic art of the weak states is to obtain, commit, and manipulate, as far as possible, the power of other, more powerful states in their own interests...From the viewpoint of the weak states, it is not so much the structure of the international system that is important, but a certain condition of tension and conflict between the powers and an absence of rigidly defined and mutually respected spheres of influence.³⁶

Further:

The development of nuclear weapons, the balance of terror, and the gradual acceptance by the international community of norms that limit and inhibit the use of brute force by the great powers among themselves as well as against the weak states have further contributed to the safety and improved standing of weak states in the international system...Nevertheless, normative constraints on the use of force have had much less effect on the weak states, especially the less developed ones. In the future there might be fewer wars between the great

Indian position to begin with). Thus a vicious circle was established, as the balance of power regionally led China into the support of Pakistan against India, as a now obligatory ally of the Soviet Union. Both India and Pakistan entered into this balance of power politics, armed by their mentors, and engaged in regional war on three major occasions, with India entering the sometimes acute, always chronic border conflict with China.

³⁶ Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1981, p. 258.

powers and more conflicts between countries such as Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states, and perhaps Turkey and Greece.³⁷

Philosophical changes arising from changing scientific conceptions of reality, force and change, have interacted with historical conditions and the anti-war transformation of western political cultures, to radically alter the underlying images and practical tools of the classical strategic paradigm. However, it is in the new paradigmatic, social scientific community that the images and tools have become reifications blocking creative political and strategic theorizing about conflict, war, and non-western foreign policy.

2. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND METHODOLOGICAL ETHNOCENTRISM

The New Paradigmatic Community

Institutionally, the community of strategic studies and international relations scholars has undergone a sociological shift in keeping with, and reinforcing of, the political cultural paradigmatic shift. These groups have blended, practically and theoretically into one intellectual community.³⁸ As John Garnett has pointed out, in describing the great influence of earlier civilian, academic strategists:

Around them has developed an enormous industry of specialists dealing with issues of war and peace.

³⁷ *ibid.* p. 259.

³⁸ Major John Shephard, Jr., 'On War: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?', in Parameters, September 1990, p. 96: "In the United States, this algebraic war, the political object of which has not been military victory but deterrence...also spawned a new type of strategist--neither military man nor politician. These civilian defense intellectuals, applying new analytical techniques such as game theory and dynamic modelling, wrested from the military much of the claim to expertise in the art of strategy."

This intellectual community is sometimes described as the war-peace establishment...Within this subculture are dozens of research institutions preoccupied with military doctrines, technology, and foreign policy, and hundreds of academics and government officials concerned with national security.³⁹

The anomaly of "peace researchers" within a strategic studies establishment embodies the identity crisis endemic to the classical strategic paradigm. The academic, social scientific enterprise has essentially taken over what was an independent discipline, and this merger symbolizes the erosion of the classical distinctions between political and military strategic thought. This erosion is further deepened by the role of increasingly abstract, social scientific theories as to the origin and processes of social, and international conflict.

Social Science and the Concept of Reality

Western social science is deeply conflicted as to the nature of reality. On the one hand it is a purely scientific concept, defined still in dualist, objective terms; it is thus considered amenable to objective, scientific study, and it is so approached. On the other hand, the question arises as to what role, if any, human subjectivity actually plays in the release of "forces" and hence of change, in the social, economic and political phenomena which constitute the external, natural environment of human beings. The conflict arising from the dichotomy of subject-object agency manifests in a concerted theoretical effort to reconcile blind, systemic, automatic processes of change and development, with some form of human agency, and with some form of human meaning. At the same time, the interrelatedness of all phenomena, in terms of their linked internal processes, has

³⁹ Baylis et. al. op. cit. p. 7.

blurred all the conceptual distinctions of the classical realist paradigm, in which politics, history, economics and war were phenomenologically distinct categories, with their own boundaries of study, and their humanly established rules of connectedness, as opposed to natural laws which operated independently of human agency.

Social Science, War, State, and Force

War:

In what Anatol Rapoport calls the system-theoretic model force manifests as a natural phenomenon, inherent in social processes and over which human beings have little control. In keeping with the now prevailing cataclysmic philosophy of war, war has been reconceptualized as a quasi-natural phenomenon, which somehow erupts, independent of human will, into the human order:

In such theories, war is usually related to certain dynamic properties of an 'international system' which, like physical systems, may persist at times in a relatively stable equilibrium and at other times 'break down' or 'explode', because the stresses and strains within the system have passed beyond certain critical limits.⁴⁰

Here, the conception of force raises certain questions as to the fundamental nature of social reality:

Can it be that some aspects of international relations ...have 'built-in' dynamics and so are guided by an 'invisible hand'...? If so, how do these 'blind forces' interact with supposedly rational decisions of statesmen, and to what extent are the latter merely rationalizations of the trends over which the decision-makers actually have no control?⁴¹

⁴⁰ Anatol Rapoport, in The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, Paragon House, New York, 1989, p. 16.

⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 44-45.

As summarized by Samuel Kim, "the systemic approach is a theory of environmental and structural determinism", and he cites Immanuel Wallerstein's "macrostructural and macrohistorical investigation of the emergence of world capitalism" showing how the latter is a structural system which forces even socialist states to, in effect, behave internationally as though they were capitalist states.⁴²

On the other hand:

For Kenneth Waltz, a system theorist of the more traditional *realpolitik* variety, and a prominent proponent of bipolarity as a system stabilizer, the international system is composed of a structure and interacting parts. The structure of this system acts as a "constraining and disposing force", producing a system-wide similarity in foreign policy behaviour or what he calls "process and performance". As a result, the behavior of states as interacting units and the outcomes of their behavior become both explainable and predictable.⁴³

Thus, as Kim says:

"Waltzian theory is a conservative (realist) theory of structural determinism, and Wallersteinian theory is a neo-Marxist macrohistorical theory of structural determinism."⁴⁴

There is a major contradiction between the efforts of policy-makers, as well as academic theorists, to develop and refine new instruments of political force, and the assumption, deep within the paradigm, that all forms of "force" are impersonal, and although amenable to study, only slightly amenable to human manipulation. An even more subliminal, but ever-present problematic is the political cultural challenge to not only military, but political force as an internal interference in "natural processes", and therefore ethically suspect. Where

⁴² Samuel S. Kim, Ed., (1989) p. 17.

⁴³ *ibid*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ *ibid*, p. 17.

(strategic) force might be used, to create sociopolitical change in the context of opposition, it is thought to be a move which takes man into morally unknown territory where he would be possibly tinkering with unpredictable natural laws or processes, similar to his concerns with genetic engineering.⁴⁵

The Concept of State and The Rational Actor Model:

The concept of state has had to undergo a serious reconceptualization as a result of the social scientific adoption of the biological model. It is no longer seen as the product, in its varying forms, of human agency, but is seen primarily as an evolutionary product of historical and other social science conceptions of force. Because of its obvious incompatibility with the social science method, the concept of state, as it was understood in the classical paradigm has all but been phased out of western political science discourse.⁴⁶

The old Newtonian images of the machine in motion coexists with the images of atomic fission and notions of vast dynamic forces at work in the natural and human order. However, the

⁴⁵ This does not mean that policy-makers do not proceed with such tinkering, in non-western nations, but it means that they are uncomfortable with doing so, and these activities do not form part of a coherently articulated policy, defensible in terms of the political cultures to which they must, electorally, answer.

⁴⁶ The Aristotelian analysis of humanly-designed political structures has been superseded by mathematical, rather than classificatory scientific methods. In 'The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist and Communist Continuities', World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975, pp. 541-568. R.E. Bedeski provides a good theoretical discussion of "the eclipse of traditional political concepts" and the disappearing concept of the state. From the perspective of cross-cultural analysis, it is significant to note his emphasis here on the centrality of the concept of state which "permeates Chinese political consciousness".

abstract forces of these two models are both in tension with the image of the state as an organic entity, with appetites to be fed somehow from the environment, and with a cognitive ability to deal with an immediately threatening environment of other defensive and/or predator states. The biological image was, if not consistent with, at least able to coexist with, the Newtonian image of a mechanical universe and international system; sentient beings could "play God" and manage the mechanistic movements of the parts in accordance with the idea of "equilibrium", which again, is not, for practical purposes, in conflict with the biological notion of "homeostasis". This latter classical image is perfectly consistent with the human agency of realpolitik, in both its political and military dimensions of state struggle internationally.

However, with the advent of social scientific theory building, the biological model of the state lost its sentient "head", and in the reversion to Cartesian subject-object dualism, only the "body" was considered a valid object of study. In combination with the new images from the atomic age of science, the "drives" of the state are assumed to be the behavioral "imperatives" experienced by an organism of primitive consciousness, and to operate in the same way as does the rest of nature, by means of internal dynamics which themselves function as force. Political force is seen less to be a product of human subjectivity and much more the product of impersonal, natural forces which simply accumulate until they force either internal or external change of some kind.

The Rational Actor-Black Box Concept of State:

The substantive vacuity of the rational actor-black box model⁴⁷ reflects the problematic existence of "the state". This model requires the social scientist to assume he can know nothing about the status or nature of the policy-maker's "rationality". In direct contradiction to the dictates of this assumption, however, analysts go on to impute not only the quality of rationality to the policy-maker, but a very western, ethnocentrically conceived form of rationality. In the classical realist paradigm, rationalism merely meant that the means chosen by a state were suitable for the ends desired. Rationality has been redefined by western political culture however, to imply that a state actor is motivated to deter conflict, to resolve crises, and to engage in political communication for the purposes of cooperation. In the study of foreign policy then, there is a normative bias toward the definition of the rational actor, as leadership committed to "deterrence". Thus, a state which is not seeking peaceful, sincere resolution of political or military conflict can only be described as "irrational", and this term would be incompatible with "strategic thought", so the state, if irrational enough to initiate, or fail to control conflict, can not be pursuing an intelligible, and intelligent, strategy.

NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL FORCE

International Perceptions as Political Force:

Nuclear paralysis and the weakening of classical, regional balances of power, no longer backed by strong state realpolitik and direct military strategy, capability, or power, has been redefined, and thus become available to a

⁴⁷ Ken Booth, (1979) op. cit. p. 23. He mentions, as do others, the "black box", the rational actor, and the action-reaction concepts as key components of the paradigm shared by realists and the strategic studies community.

large number of what are no longer classically weak states. Power can be expressed and enhanced by means of shifting alliances between weak states who use the nuclear balance of power as a demarcation of their freedom to manoeuvre.⁴⁸ In the context of a North-South cold war, a changing global political culture now tends to rank problems of justice on a par with those of stability and order. There has thus developed an increasing use of the alliance structures and the international community as informal platforms and courtrooms for the manipulation of normative perceptions and opinions; this manipulation must be understood as a new form of force, and the success in so doing, a new form of power. As a result, the strong western states have found it necessary to utilize alliances less as formalization and publication of the current balance of power, and more as avenues of communication, which express certain intents and encourage certain abilities and attitudes among client states, which may, or may not, orbit around their strong state alliance partner.

With reference to the new international theatre of perceptions, the western use of political force has expanded to the use of sanctions, as an overt, but controllable, experiment in interfering with the "internal processes" of a state. This interference is more subtle and defensible than covert politico-military containment measures. Sanctions also represent an experimental form of moral force exercised as political force. Sanctions tend to be exerted, with intense international advertisements, against certain governments

⁴⁸ This framework of manoeuvre is discussed by General Andre Beaufre, in An Introduction to Strategy, With Particular Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, trans. Major General R.H. Harry CB CBE, Faber and Faber, London, 1965, especially Chapter Four.

whose actions affect a visible internal political group on whose behalf international opinion can be orchestrated. In terms of using political force as sanctions, whether declared legally, or simply informally used as political leverage, western states have found it to be a surprisingly weak tool:

Empirical evidence indicates that most weak states are economically more viable and less vulnerable than commonsense economic theories had prophesied. The great powers, on the other hand, have not always been able to translate their economic strength into political gains. When they have tried to use economic pressure to coerce weak states to accept their political demands, they have frequently failed, again due to the external help obtained by weak states from other weak states or great powers.⁴⁹

With the decline in the utility of direct, Clausewitzian military force, the ineffectiveness of limited wars, the open-ended, political culturally suspect violence of sociopolitical disruption in containment measures, and the uncertainty of balance of power mechanisms, the western strategic paradigm has turned to new politico-military forms of force. On the surface, the newly political focus on incremental, cumulative "victories" of negotiation and cooperation is seen as the antithesis to military and therefore to any form of coercion, and appears to herald a new era of international relations. However, these "victories" are the unstable, frequently short-lived products of the systematic application of western forms of force. The most decisive new form of politico-military force in the twentieth century was the deliberately undertaken, systematic disruption of internal sociopolitical, and socioeconomic processes of target states. However, arising from deep within the western philosophical tradition, and given theoretical and practical prominence in social

⁴⁹ Michael Handel (1981), op. cit. p. 259.

scientific forms, the contemporary western strategic paradigm embodies other, more subtle forms of political force.

For, assumptions of rationality notwithstanding, international relations have increasingly been seen to contain real and potential conflicts which must at all costs be contained. This imperative leads to the emphasis in international relations on two major theoretical frameworks of analysis: one, the deterrence of conflict, and two, the management of conflict. The key concepts in this framework are those of rationality, crisis management, and communication. And, underlying these seemingly force-free concepts, are the two keys to the western philosophical tradition: Pragmatism and Rationalism.

Rationality as Political Force

Rationalism entered twentieth century political life in the form of ideological logic claiming an isomorphic relationship to social reality; indeed, a major characteristic of the 19th and 20th centuries has been the emergence of ideological thinking, positing a pseudo-Kantian a priori synthetic union between the logical laws of the mental world and the empirical laws of socioeconomic and political reality. Ideological thought takes on its tremendous force when it fuses with the formal structures of political, socioeconomic and military organizations.⁵⁰ The hallmark of full-blown ideology is always total, somewhat hysterical mobilization of society in the interests of state-defined, often transcendental and

⁵⁰ While capitalism is frequently not identified as an ideology in the classical sense, one could argue that Japanese social structures provide the perfect environment for the parasitic, diffuse, expansionary processes of a socioeconomic formation. In Japan, capitalism found its most congenial "host": a society in which no formal "political" barriers whatsoever appear to exist which might have halted or modified its penetration of the entire social organism.

transformative goals which ostensibly unite the laws of the subjective with the objective world. Despite its formal removal from this context, western rationalism still embodies the logic of structure and momentum which typifies ideological thought and social process. This has manifested as the assimilation of rationalism to the western normative conception of communication as a problem-solving form of political force. The parameters, components and dynamics of reality are established by Cartesian rationalist principles, such that the deductive rigor of both linguistic and mathematical logic exert a new form of force hidden within procedurally logical negotiation processes.⁵¹

The ominous feature, and inherent flaw, of the new use of rationality is its echo of totalitarian (and, oddly enough, liberal) assumptions that the abstractions of rationalist logic operate on, through, and between human beings, with or without their cognitive understanding or free will assent. Game-theorists, committed to a quantitative understanding of force and power as entities which can be empirically measured, lost, gained and exchanged by the rational calculus of a human being, reveal the grip of Cartesian-based social scientific assumptions in their search for the hidden logical laws of rationality, of which the human agent may not be aware.

The assumption that the so-called rational actor may not be fully aware of his own cognitive processes, permits the western rationalist procedures of international crisis resolution to be conducted even in the absence of genuine political commitment on the part of the participants. The

⁵¹ There is a fundamental similarity, despite important differences, between western and Chinese approaches to the manipulation of political reality by means of linguistic and procedural techniques. These features of Chinese strategic thought will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

participants can be required to go through certain technical procedures of communication which will compel eventual private and/or public assent, which in turn can be used as a publicized political force input to the next round of procedures and communication. This creates the tendency for the western negotiators to achieve short-term "successes" which then disintegrate under the stress of non-western reality structures "back home", where the new political "agreements" simply will not survive.

The Pragmatic-Rationalist Parts Process

Pragmatism has deep roots in analytical philosophy, which is a surviving form of radical empiricism in which language itself is both a method of inquiry and a frequently preemptive definition of the reality under inquiry.⁵² American realist scholars especially tend to adopt pragmatism as both a method of inquiry and as an explanation of state behaviour.⁵³ This Cartesian focus on parts, at the expense of any "whole", has been identified as a tendency consistent with "American strategic culture":

⁵² John Dewey formulated "Pragmatism" as "...consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations..." cited Bertrand Russell, 'Dewey's New Logic', in Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds. The Philosophy of John Dewey, Open Court, 1939, p.148. Russell characterizes this approach as one in which "what passes for knowledge is considered to be no more than a momentary halting-place in a process of inquiry which has no goal outside itself", p. 156. It seems that pragmatism as a method cannot but become its own goal, and this is a dubious proposition to ascribe to real foreign-policy makers, even if it is a comfortable working method for academic analysts of foreign policy.

⁵³ See also Anatol Rapoport (1989) op. cit. pp. 236-238 for a discussion of the relationship between realism and pragmatism.

As a nation, Americans are pragmatic problem-solvers, rather than systematic or long-term thinkers. Our whole experience tells us that it is best to narrow down complicated matters so as to isolate the practical problem at hand, and then to get on with finding a solution. Strategy by contrast is the one practical pursuit that requires a contrary method: to connect the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of things; then to craft plans -- often long range -- for dealing with the whole.⁵⁴

Pragmatists display a low tolerance for the kind of ambiguity which permeates long-term strategic thinking, and they are characterized by a form of strategic cognitive dissonance, an inability to even perceive, much less take seriously, the different problem-solving patterns of perception and communication which frequently exist in non-western cultures.

Pragmatism as a method of analysis and of procedure complements the new forms of political force. Pragmatism shapes communication processes, and institutionalized, step-by-step procedures for achieving limited, piece-by-piece achievements in the tasks of negotiation involved in crisis management, and conflict mediation. The labelling of a regional conflict as a "crisis" highlights this western methodological reductionism, in which language plays a large role. Furthermore, western concepts of space and time are static, atemporal, and aspatial, lacking meaningful relationships to political cultures, territorial identification, and regional histories. The restriction of time and space to their role as geographical and event

⁵⁴Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1989, p.4. See also, Anatol Rapoport, 'Political Realism and Pragmatism as Ideologies', in his The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, Paragon House, New York, 1989, pp. 236-243. Here Rapoport states that "The pragmatic orientation is the problem-solving orientation", p. 237.

coordinates only, presents the ultimate obstacle to understanding the limitations of western piece-by-piece solutions. The western rejection of the concept of "linkage" is, in part, a reflection of the pragmatic separation, thematically, temporally and spatially, of issues and events which may be in the eyes of another culture, nonseparable components of a non-negotiable whole.

Political force can be seen to inhere in the relentless logic of rational, deductive, and pragmatic processes, inherent in western linguistic structure, temporally spaced in their linear, sequential order, imposed on third world societies.⁵⁵ This form of force is rarely successful. The reality of the North Vietnamese determination, by means of protracted war, to unite their country under a Marxist government was neither reflected in, nor affected by, the political force of "rational process", assiduously applied by the U.S. over a period of years in the Paris peace talks.⁵⁶ Nor have western

⁵⁵ Nowhere is this more evident than in the endless rounds of these "steps" which western powers "force" the Middle Eastern states to enter into, with little guarantee that bitterness and misunderstandings will not be enhanced and entrenched by these logically necessary, sequentially ordered processes. And these processes are enforced, regardless of the emptiness of content, or even the worsening of the content of these encounters, contributing to the storehouse of hate-filled political cultures.

⁵⁶ As noted by John M. Gates, 'Vietnam: The Debate Goes On', Parameters, Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp. 15-25: "The will of the communists throughout Vietnam was very strong, although a majority of the generals surveyed by General Kinnard admitted that it was not 'sufficiently considered' by the Americans"...From the perspective of many Americans, communist determination in the face of such high costs may appear irrational, but people throughout the world, particularly revolutionaries, have demonstrated a capacity for such fanatical behavior too frequently for it to be ignored", pp. 21-22.

mediated truces or agreements brought permanent peace to such areas as the Middle East, despite decades of effort.

The new forms of western international political process not only carry within them their own elements of force, but are often inseparable from the new forms of direct, physical acts of violence which precede, interrupt or even celebrate their existence. The new rationalist, pragmatist political procedures of crisis and conflict resolution have developed in a volatile dialectic in which communication and violence merge as a single, organic political phenomenon of the late twentieth century. Western rationalist conceptions of communication as negotiation and compromise are interpenetrated by, and qualitatively changed by, the ongoing developments of violence on both sides, designed to provide additional force inputs to the political dialogue, itself newly conceived as a form of force. The use of political force, by means of sanctions and/or limited military force, to generate internal crisis is aimed at the sociopolitical will of the victim state, to induce it to enter into the "political dialogue" which is merely the second layer of force being applied. Both sides know this - both sides use this. This knowledge becomes another input of force to the process, along with the concomitant, intermittent physical acts of violence, including limited covert or overt war.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ This was very evident as Henry Kissinger increasingly adapted the American politico-military use of force in the Vietnam war, by interspersing diplomacy and negotiation with various levels of military force, over a protracted period. As noted in Chapter Three, the Korean War especially established the "fighting while talking", "talking while fighting" rituals as strategic application of a new form of politico-military force. The protracted negotiations in the context of the Middle East ongoing forms of war and violence is another disturbing example of the new political phenomenon of violence as communication, and even, one might say, vice versa.

The new conception of strategy as political force based on socioeconomic penetration, communication techniques and procedural forms, is a concept of force which is alien to the classical strategic paradigm. This is particularly true when these anti-realpolitik methods are carried over to interfere with the actual conduct of war in accordance with Clausewitzian military principles. In the contemporary western strategic paradigm, therefore, the political is a house divided. It is viewed theoretically as a new, non-realpolitik realm of open discourse for the resolution of bilateral, regional, and global problems. In practice, this translates into an ongoing imposition of western rationalist, ahistorical value judgements and methodology, combined with forms of containment-based sociopolitical penetration, improbably combined with the still extant, classical, mechanical devices of alliance in pursuit of western regional balance of power objectives. The normative conception of the political eschews force of any kind, but this appears only sporadically in genuine form internationally; in practice, the political now constitutes the dominant form of western force, still frequently accompanied by the curious military hybrid which manifests as a semi-covert, limited, and perennially frustrated Clausewitzian direct war.

The anti-Clausewitzian of western political culture looks at the use of military force by other cultures as a failure in political deterrence, and thus as a failure in foreign policy generally. Even the neo-Clausewitzian sees this to be true, at the strategic level. However, at the operational and tactical levels, he still looks for the form and content of western, classical strategy. He still evaluates it in terms of achieving clear-cut material, military objectives, through massive technological force, with militarily, not politically-defined victory as the goal. This victory is limited by western military concepts of time and space, so

that victory is expected to comprise clearly discernible goals, in a specific, geographical theatre, and to be achieved in the shortest time frame possible.⁵⁸ Incremental, cumulative victories, spread out over many difference spheres, over a protracted period of time, is alien to western strategic thought. And because of the still formal separation between political and military thought, once the political leadership hands the reins of policy to military leaders, the unique logic of military thought is assumed to be placed almost totally in charge of strategy. However, the concomitant reliance on the new, politico-military form of force places the military component of the western contemporary strategic paradigm in conflict with its political masters. What is keenly felt to be a violation of their mandate by Clausewitzian military leaders, has become an international norm: namely this new blending of political and military force, in subtle and varying combination.

⁵⁸ The most prevalent example of this strategic bias manifests in the dismissal of the Chinese 1979 invasion of Vietnam as a complete failure in western, and therefore, objective, terms. The notion of success in non-Clausewitzian terms, or of even partial success in any terms, is stubbornly and repeatedly, even triumphantly, rejected by western analysts. This invasion will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.

III. WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

One of the most important features of the western contemporary strategic paradigm is that in addition to misinterpretation of many Chinese foreign policies, it actually fails to account for, or even sometimes to identify, many foreign policy actions which simply appear to be inexplicable in western terms. These actions may be hypothesized to represent specifically Chinese forms of political force which are partially concealed behind culturally distinct strategic practices. Furthermore, the strategic relationship between the political and the military has no philosophical equivalence in western strategic thought. For these two reasons, the short analysis which follows only identifies some obvious misinterpretations of facts, and suggests the explanatory lacunae created by the exclusion of much of the Chinese foreign policy record from the macroanalysis of global/deterrence/cold war frameworks. The historical and analytical record is further distorted by the social scientific emphasis of rationalist, western values, and the de-emphasis of force, history and culture. These macrotheoretical constraints sharply contrast with the deliberately antitheoretical, equally inadequate microanalysis of the pragmatist's approach to Chinese foreign policy, represented here as well.

The Cold War and Global-Regional Constraints Approach:

The literature which does focus on such realist concepts as deterrence, balance of power, and limited war is primarily concerned with the US-USSR-PRC strategic triangle, seeing Chinese foreign policy as a purely reactive series of responses to a long history since late 1950's of Soviet encirclement of the PRC. Eugene Lawson examines the Sino-Vietnamese relationship from the perspective of global "system" constraints established by the US-USSR Cold War and

impacting on regional and bilateral relations between Vietnam and China from 1954-1979. He concludes:

In sum, both Hanoi and Peking subordinated their bilateral relationship to broader security interests, and to their relations with Moscow and Washington.⁵⁹

Because this was true, Lawson suggests that the relationship between Vietnam and China will remain open-ended; that it will vary in accordance not with historical, bilateral or regional concerns, but with the wider global strategic concerns, as these are established by the two external superpowers. His analysis is accurate, as far as it goes. It suggests the role of strategic thought in Chinese foreign policy; however, it is a paradigmatic example of the realist-western strategic studies' projection of Cold War, bipolar considerations onto the foreign policies of non-western states. This approach precludes the possibility that China, as well as, the United States or Soviet Union, may be engaged in an aggressive, independent pursuit of national, regional and global influence.

The Social Scientific Behavioral-Realist:

Samuel Kim has tried to combine political cultural and realist assumptions of state, power and national interest, with the abstract conditioning or determining of the system-theoretic approach which is so compatible with behaviourist models. After concluding that the study of Chinese foreign policy is hopelessly nontheoretical and should avoid reliance on such old concepts as political culture, Kim posits a major

⁵⁹ Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, Praeger Publishers, 1984. Lawson states that he could not document a conceptual framework based on factional politics, bureaucratic interests, etc.; he therefore opted for the national interest, national actor approach, which is the hallmark of both realist and western strategic studies. However, he also added "Kremlinology", or content analysis, which does address the cross-cultural, or cross-ideological issues to some extent.

theoretical framework involving a mix of social-scientific and realist concepts:

"Chinese foreign policy may be defined as an aggregate of purposeful external actions and activities designed to affect the international situation or behaviour of other international actors in the pursuit of some values, interests, or goals."⁶⁰

Significantly, however, Kim accepts the A. Doak Barnett research which concluded decisively that Mao dominated Chinese foreign policy making until his death in 1976. Kim's behaviourist model has little room for such idiosyncratic, voluntarist explanations of foreign policy, and he therefore deals with what he calls the word/deed disjuncture in the following manner:

...by drawing a conceptual distinction between the ideals, principles, and orientations expressed in policy pronouncements and the actual conduct of foreign policy.⁶¹

Kim then posits Mao's means-ends world-view as being in automatic opposition to realpolitik:

...the motives behind Mao's restructuring of Chinese foreign policy should not be reduced to a predictable pattern based solely on the national interest or on realpolitik considerations. Mao's world-view played an equally important role in Chinese foreign policy change.⁶²

The notion that Mao's world-view might have been predicated on a political philosophy of war, and the prosecution of a Chinese form of realpolitik through strategic thought, seems not to have occurred to Kim, despite the fact that the one undisputed fact about Mao was his propensity for, and skill in

⁶⁰ Samuel S. Kim, ed. (1989), op. cit. p. 10.

⁶¹ *ibid.* p. 9.

⁶² *ibid.*, p. 20.

exercising, strategic thought. Here, Kim invalidates what he elsewhere tries to fit into his model: the role of political cultural and historical factors, and especially the world-view of Mao, or other Chinese leadership. Similarly, Kim likewise assumes that the pursuit of national interests through the accumulation of international power is incompatible with international cooperative patterns evinced in the Chinese open door policy:

...realpolitik theory cannot explain either the growing institutionalization of multilateral cooperation through international regimes and functional transnational relations or post-Mao China's growing involvement in such global issue regimes. The phenomenon of international cooperation in the state of anarchy is an anomaly that challenges the self-help assumptions and zero-sum conflict behavior intrinsic to realpolitik theory.⁶³

And yet, in another section of the same article, Kim suggests that the modernization drive could be explained by several of what Kim calls "hypotheses":

The drive could be motivated by 1) an intense status drive...2) the pressure of a born-again realism (and opportunism) to take advantage of systemic opportunities and pay-offs by becoming a de facto partner of world capitalism; or 3) Maoist strategic realism, seeking to maximize long-term self-reliant development by minimizing or neutralizing short-term systemic constraints and penalties.⁶⁴

That all three "hypotheses" add up to a single political cultural explanation of Chinese realism, or realpolitik, completely consistent with both Barnett's thesis of Maoist domination, and with Mao's embodiment of Chinese strategic

⁶³ *ibid.* p. 20

⁶⁴ *ibid.* p. 20. This is probably as succinct and accurate an account of Chinese foreign policy-making as one will find in the literature. Unfortunately, Kim sails over and past this, as a mere gesture to the "rank (status) disequilibrium" theory, failing to do more than note that this approach might have some explanatory value.

cultural patterns, completely escapes the theoretical net of Kim's large, abstract model.

Kim's model is based on the black box-rational actor assumptions of the combined realist-behaviourist model. These then blend with the western political cultural definition of rationality in terms of deterrence of conflict and definition of the political realm as one of cooperation and joint problem-solving. Kim, and others, therefore posit opposition between the unknowable, and hence suppressible attributes of human agency, hidden in the black box, and the allegedly abstract, but knowable, action-reaction systemic laws. These laws, to no liberal's surprise, appear then to work in favour of western pluralist assumptions of international cooperative behavior.

Kim argues for a diachronic analysis of multiple variables, analysis, saying that behavior has both a spatial and a temporal dimension. However, Cartesian rationality holds: the relationship between independent and dependent variables diachronously assumes a linear conception of time and space:

A diachronic analysis should ask: What discrete, manifest behavior at what level or in what domain has changed over what intervals in time, at what rate, with what outcomes or consequences? Foreign policy continuity (or stability) can be captured by the consistency with which manifest behavior toward the same actor, issue or problem recurs with the same mix of instruments over a given period.⁶⁵

While this formula hints at the theoretical flexibility which might enable the detection of foreign policy patterns of behaviour, it imports into the study a definition of change and continuity in terms of stability, a western value, suppressing detection of, for example, non-western, "strategic

⁶⁵ *ibid.* p. 8.

flexibility" cognitive patterns. In the focus on static patterns, Kim's approach will see change in policy as "inconsistency", to be duly noted in the research as a characteristic of a particular period. And this is related to the second problem: the western linear, cause-effect bias here does not allow for the possibility that both dependent and independent variables are situated within a three-dimensional, past-present-future temporospatial framework in which the simultaneous interactions within and between sets of variables on a large gameboard assigns a shifting significance and weight to each of these variables, including their rapidly alternating change in status from dependent to independent variable.

Gerald Segal and the Realist-Pragmatist Approach:

In Defending China,⁶⁶ Gerald Segal explains Chinese objectives as the result of Maoist strategic theory which Segal reduces to the following: "flexible response to objective conditions". Segal finds no underlying strategic or other patterns to either the decision itself to use force, or to the actual implementation of that force. He finds no connection between domestic and external policy, nor does he see any institutional, ideological, geographical or historical influences at work in the Chinese use of force. Segal's review of the Chinese use of force is an historical survey of specific military endeavours on a non-comparative, case-by-case basis. His analysis combines references to

⁶⁶ Gerald Segal, (1985) op. cit. Because Segal is a prolific writer on Chinese military and strategic policies, and because this work covers all of the occasions on which China has used military force beyond its borders since 1949, it has been selected as a significant work from the realist perspective. Because of Segal's repeated suggestion that only "pragmatism" is involved with Chinese foreign policy, he is a good example of the worst features of both the deterrence-oriented realist and the would-be pragmatist "theorist".

"changing strategy under changing conditions", with occasional allusion to concepts of (badly handled) "crisis management" and "communication":

"the Chinese had only limited success in communicating its (sic) objectives to the Tibetans...It was not that the messages did not get through, but rather that they were misunderstood by the receiver." ⁶⁷

Segal suggests that the messages were misunderstood by the Tibetans, yet also asserts that the Tibetans were in fact very clear about Chinese objectives and methods, and were stalling for time while seeking help internationally. Segal does go on to conclude that the Chinese were successful in achieving their objectives in Tibet; however, he does not outline what these might have been, concluding simply that "Pragmatism in seeking the Chinese objective seemed to be a successful policy". Segal presents the military take-over of Tibet as both the end and the means of policy, without providing any explanation as to what national interests this policy might have been served, either in the short-term or in the long-term. Segal does later hint that there might actually have been some substantive purpose to the conquest of Tibet. He notes that real damage would occur in the late 1950's, when "the implications of the extension of Chinese power to the Indian frontier would be fully appreciated". In a belated attempt to acknowledge Chinese purposes at work, Segal introduces the notion of the ideological pragmatist:

A pragmatist is one who adapts his purposes to suit reality. China is more like a pragmatic ideologist, trying to mould reality in the light of its purposes.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ *ibid.* p 87.

⁶⁸ *ibid.* p. 59.

Segal thus manages to deprecate, and thus to dismiss, Chinese strategic manoeuvring by ridiculing it as ideological posturing. The weakness of the western strategic paradigm is further exemplified by Segal's summary of the Sino-Indian War of 1962-63:

Chinese objectives, albeit irregularly pursued, were to deter Indian attacks and safeguard China's definition of the frontier...Chinese strategy was successful in obtaining its objectives primarily because of superior logistics and planning. No particular military strategy was employed other than the most suitable pragmatic one in Himalayan conditions. Unlike the Korean and Taiwan crises...Chinese aggressive phases of operations were successful largely because of the pitiful opponent.⁶⁹

If the military use of force was of indifferent quality, the political use of force was as bad:

The military success should not shroud the fact that China's diplomatic posture, in projecting deterrence messages, was pretty poor. Confusion resulted from numerous factors...This complex decision-making process only added to a crisis based largely on mutual misperception. It was a war wanted by no one. In the end it was China that made the best of the unfortunate situation.⁷⁰

Segal concludes in almost all of his case studies, that Chinese actions were misguided and unproductive. However, some pertinent observations suggest otherwise. China's consolidation of the Tibet base in 1950 made possible the swift and successful military operations in the Sino-Indian War; Chinese success in this war consolidated a line of control running from Tibet through the Aksai Chin to Xinjiang. Xinjiang has always been considered of major strategic

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p. 155.

⁷⁰ *ibid.* p. 155.

importance to China. With these considerations in mind, it is hard not to see a persistent, cumulative consolidation of territorial security, with each new acquisition making possible the next.

In the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Chinese communication techniques appeared to be skilfully combined with limited military force, and to work in China's favour, in buying time to consolidate the Chinese logistical support lines from Tibet, and in confusing all western and Indian observers. A decisive, but relatively inexpensive military victory was achieved in a manner which put all the "property" under dispute in Chinese hands, which could then be traded, serving both needs of territorial integrity and of future national security. The methods and sudden, de facto status of these achievements took all but the Chinese completely by surprise. It seems highly unlikely that such a fortuitous set of interactions, steadily favouring a seemingly "weak state", can really be the product of pragmatist opportunism, misperceptions, ineffective communication techniques and an "unfortunate situation". It appears more likely that western normative assumptions as to the undesirability of conflict, and the lack of western negotiating techniques and procedures have simply blinded Segal to the strategic implications of the facts he is stringing together so haphazardly using pragmatist presumptions of foreign policy goals and methods.

Allen Whiting and The Concept of Deterrence:

In The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence,⁷¹ Whiting undertakes a genuinely comparative case study analysis of the Chinese use

⁷¹ Allen S. Whiting, (1975) op. cit. This is considered the standard, classical work on the Chinese use of force in the three case studies Whiting analyses. Gerald Segal, op. cit. p. 8, Note 5, refers to this as by far the best work in the field.

of force in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Vietnam (1965-68). Whiting specifically rules out Chinese strategic or military thought, political leadership idiosyncrasies, ideology or institutional processes. He states that he is using "modified stimulus-response (black box) methodology", so that only the outputs of the system can be analysed:

Without access to primary sources that explicitly reveal the assumptions that underlie policy decisions, the matter must be approached largely through policy outputs with both domestic and foreign outputs being indirectly inferred. Unless there are powerful indications to the contrary, this analytical process of logical inference tends a priori to favour a rational actor model.⁷²

However, Whiting goes one step further and, true to western contemporary paradigmatic theories, he assumes not only rationality, but defines it in terms of deterrence. He then adopts this macroconcept for the whole study of the Chinese use of force in foreign policy. Since deterrence largely fails, accordingly to his own conclusions, and since he must account for the Chinese failure on some basis, he now attributes "miscalculations" and "misperceptions" to whatever is generating Chinese behaviour from within the black box. Working thus backwards, from failed deterrence policy to flawed rational actor, Whiting's narrow methodology, like Segal's, leads him to his conclusion that the Sino-Indian War (1962) was a war which happened only through mutual miscalculations and misperceptions, leaving both sides net losers.⁷³ This conclusion runs counter to the political and military logical analyses which would, by realpolitik standards, award territorial and political loss to India and substantial net gains to China on both these counts. However, the conclusion that "both sides were losers in a conflict neither wanted" also reveals the more subtle problem in

⁷² *ibid* p. 227.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 169.

understanding Chinese strategic precepts. The assessment of Chinese political ineptness merely reveals the western political cultural anti-war understanding of war as political failure; at the same time, the conclusion of Chinese military failure reveals the application of direct Clausewitzian military precepts which would require taking and holding concrete militarily intelligible objectives. Classical western direct strategy would see the Chinese use of force in India as incomprehensible, and just as frustratingly confined within an unworkable "limited war" as it has been experienced to be in contemporary western strategic experiences. This subtle combination of "limited war" with political forms of force such as deception and the manipulation of national (Indian) perceptions may not be the problem for China that western strategic analysts assume, but may reflect a national style of warfare.

Judged by western criteria of rationality, Chinese communication techniques lack the logic of problem-solving, and appear to be tools of distraction and deception. The western strategic paradigm provides a normative redefinition of rationality as a commitment both to conflict deterrence as a goal, and to "good faith" negotiation procedures as means; both of these norms of rationality are first imputed to China, and then found to be not so much absent, as badly executed. Whiting gives a definition of "rationality" in terms of a deterrence posture:

In a reactive policy against perceived threat, rationality is the attempt to deter an enemy with a credible counter threat of costs which he will find unacceptable if he persists with conflictual behaviour.⁷⁴

Since China's deterrence efforts seem to put in question

⁷⁴ *ibid.* p 226.

Chinese long-term rational capabilities, Whiting might have turned to the other (classical realist) definition which he thoughtfully, but to no apparent purpose, puts forward as follows:

Rationality in an initiatory policy (is)...the pursuit of likely attainable goals through available means where perceived costs are outweighed by anticipated gains.⁷⁵

Although he tries to see this kind of policy as complementary to the reactive, deterrence-based kind, his efforts to combine reactive and initiatory policy produce a microanalytic inconsistency and incoherence which pervades the otherwise excellent, factual account of the events. Whiting's serious problem here is that unlike Segal, he truly attempts to account, theoretically, for the vast array of foreign policy "outputs", and to some extent their positive results for China; however, he cannot make the model work both ways, explaining the facts as failures and explaining them as tools of positive gain.

Whiting points out that "Besides the controlled use of force, its coordination with diplomatic and political moves is an important characteristic of Chinese foreign policy."⁷⁶ Although he states this, he concludes that in two and one-half out of three of his case studies, the Chinese use of force was a failure in terms of the goal imputed to the state: deterrence. The Chinese rational combination of political and military force is not explored by Whiting in terms, for example, of a typology of power, nor as a possibly non-western, culture-specific meshing of types of power. Furthermore, Whiting does not suggest that this acknowledged

⁷⁵ *ibid.* p. 227.

⁷⁶ *ibid.* p. 234.

coordination of the military and political dimensions of force might be directed, in any sustained, initiatory pattern, toward Chinese strategic ends.

Whiting concludes that most often, the Chinese failed in their goals of deterrence, and this failure is the final message of his classical, still widely-quoted study of Chinese foreign policy and the use of force. One of the key problems of the macroanalysis approach using deterrence is that the approach can neither theoretically detect nor explain the positive gains to a state where these are the clear result of the use of military force, and where these gains can be seen to logically be transformed into forms of political force, extending the gains of another foreign policy gambit, either political or military in nature.

Segal's and Whiting's explanation of the Chinese use of force in the major instances since 1949 do not do justice to the role played by the Chinese manipulation of force as political and military dimensions of state power. Concepts of deterrence and pragmatism severely limit western realist analyses, requiring many facts to remain unexplained, and forcing other facts into illogical theoretical formulations. One of the most important features of the western strategic paradigm is that in addition to misinterpretation of many Chinese foreign policies, it actually fails to note possible initiatory relationships between Chinese foreign policy events. The systematic use of diverse, diffuse, and cumulative forms of political and military force may lie concealed within a temporospatial strategic framework.

SUMMARY:

The classical strategic paradigm, weakened by the emergence of the contemporary strategic paradigm, with its rejection of the political philosophy of war, and concomitant

reconceptualization of major strategic concepts, is unable to theorize creatively about conflict, nor to recognize strategic, conflict-oriented precepts in the foreign policy of non-western states. Influential realist accounts of the Chinese use of force in foreign policy leave many positive gains to the Chinese state unexplained, suggesting that the realists' theoretical framework suffers from an ethnocentric assumption of western strategic ends and means, as these are posited by the western contemporary strategic paradigm.

Using the comparative conceptual framework developed in Chapter One and applied to western strategic thought in Chapter Two, the following chapter will be devoted to an explication of the origins of a dominant Chinese strategic paradigm.

CHAPTER THREE
ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE STRATEGIC PARADIGM

I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF CHINESE STRATEGIC THOUGHT

The thesis seeks to establish the existence and origins of a Chinese strategic paradigm. In the Introduction, the suggestion was made that repeating patterns of diplomacy and the use of force appear to characterize Chinese foreign policy. These patterns suggest a paradigm of strategic thought which governs Chinese perceptions of reality and which guides their goal-directed international behaviour. Such a paradigm is likely to have deep, diffuse roots in the philosophical tradition, giving it a firm base in a wide cultural consensus, facilitating its consistent, automatic application to the complexities of modern international relations. At the same time, due to its demonstrable, practical successes, such a paradigm would acquire more and more authority in the culture, and would therefore be expected to continue to operate, despite leadership changes, so long as the present national interests of the Chinese state remained constant. In the following sections, care will be taken to identify and emphasize the most deeply-rooted, enduring, and pervasive elements of Chinese culture, and of the Chinese historical experience of state-building, violence and war.

While recognizing that Marxist-Leninism played, and continues to play a significant role in Chinese international and internal politics, the thesis will accept the radical license for Chinese nationalist self-determination posited by Mao, and quoted in the section below. The largest part of this chapter will therefore concentrate on the more philosophical, abstract concepts underlying the essential form of the Chinese strategic paradigm, noting that its capacity for varying content gives it considerable resilience and utility.

THE MARXIST-LENINIST CONTRIBUTION

The central feature of Mao's "Sinified Marxism" is his insistence that:

A communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used.¹ (Emphasis in the original)

The Chinese import of Marxist-Leninism was facilitated by the isomorphic relationship between Chinese philosophical origins of strategic thought and those of Hegel, as transformed by Marx and Lenin. The principles inherent in Hegelian (and I Ching) dialectics have provided an essentially generic model for strategic thought and practice. Both Marx and Mao "stood their idealist traditions on their heads", emptying out content, while retaining a form which appeared to arise out of the structure of reality itself. Each believed their tradition had failed to recognize that it was the interaction of human consciousness with the material world, rather than with a suprasensory world of "ideas" or "forms", which constituted reality for the human being. However, both Marx and Mao retained what they believed was a fundamental law of the universe, that all reality was interrelated, and was in a continual process of change by means of creative conflict within reality itself.

Thus, Chinese and Marxist-Leninist philosophies converge in three vital and interrelated areas. First, the conception of cosmic unity inherent in Hegelian dialectic philosophy and the

¹ Mao Tse-tung, 'The Sinification of Marxism', in Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, Revised Edition, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 170.

organicity of all Chinese thought; secondly, the notion that change is an internal dynamic, brought about by a shift in the "balance of power" between two internally differentiated aspects of a unitary monad; thirdly, that these principles can be known by man, and applied to all spheres of human and natural life.

A major contribution of Marxist-Leninist thought was its emphasis on the decisive, organic role of History. This seems to have been a very important refinement of the Chinese philosophical tradition, which had not seen change in time as the agent of a qualitative change in existential meaning for human beings. However, the preoccupation of Chinese 19th and early 20th century intellectuals with Darwin and Herbert Spencer's social darwinism proved to open up Chinese thought to the notion that change was somehow more primal and open-ended than the Chinese tradition had conceived it to be. The Chinese conception of change as alternating opposites with which man could and should move in tune had developed the idea of time as "alternating seasons". Despite surface similarity in form, the philosophical content of Chinese time and change were thus quite different from the change of Hegel, Marx and Darwin. That time was the schedule of events marking man's collective self-transformation as a social species, and that he would be directing and experiencing this change as social struggle guided by expanding consciousness was a revolutionary departure from the Chinese tradition. In the event, the organic relationship between form and content held; the Chinese found the old form familiar and the new content intoxicating. Thus "alternating seasons" could become a periodic timetable, a temporal pattern of change repeated throughout all human societies; order was still seen to pervade the cosmos, and this order, manifested in the material living world of men, explicitly celebrated the humanism which grounded all of Chinese philosophy.

The final blend of Chinese and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy did not take place until Mao Tse-tung extracted from each what had repeatedly been proven successful from a practical point of view. The practical application under conditions of civil/revolutionary and national wars highlighted the role of strategic thought, such that it became the ultimate arbiter of successful military and political thought. In the newly emerging synthesis, abstract, generic strategic principles created a simple, powerful and above all universal set of analytical tools which could be applied to all spheres of human life, since there was no human situation in which opposing forces were not engaged.

Mao found a simple, natural form in his own Chinese philosophical tradition, a form which came easily to Chinese thought and discourse, and which could be used, and easily taught, as a generic template to structure the perception, analysis and manipulation of phenomenal relationships. This form provided the grounding for all Chinese strategic thought, compatible with Chinese cultural tradition and linguistic structures. He found in Marxist-Leninism a plausible content which allowed him to confidently engage in empirical analysis, to classify phenomena, and to name and monitor their changing relationships in the new international setting in which China was forced to participate successfully or die. Marxist-Leninist terminology also provided a new international "language" which gave Chinese leaders the dignity of "speaking politics" on terms of equality.

While the Chinese accept the state and its national interests as the primary forces behind international relations, for purposes of the description and prediction of international political-military developments they accept the Leninist

thesis that imperialism is the highest form of capitalism.² Their published analyses of ongoing international configurations of power, over many decades, are cast consistently and reasonably coherently within the framework of this thesis, with Mao's revision cast in analogous, strategically relevant form in The Three Worlds Theory.

However, it was clear that by the late 1950's, as Soviet power expanded and US-Soviet detente appeared likely, Mao recognized that neither Lenin nor Marx had predicted or provided an explanation for the socialist imperialism of the Soviet Union nor the tacit alliance between the two most powerful representatives of the globally competing supersystems. At this stage, it appears that Chinese international relations theory shifted decisively, for purposes of action, from globalist theory to realist strategic thought. While some national actors could be classified and their North-South, City-Rural patterns of interlocking relationships traced out on the globalist map, it was equally obvious that the situation was much more complex, and the stakes extremely high, for once again, the Chinese felt national survival to be in question. From this point on, it is likely that Mao and Zhou adopted a two-track foreign policy framework. On the one hand, they retained the Marxist-Leninist/globalist thesis that the world capitalist system determined long-term historical developments; this would later lead to compatibility with the principle of opening China to western capitalist development, under politically controlled conditions.

On the other hand, international exigencies were so urgent as to require the immediate move back to first principles, to the innate Chinese conception of realism embodied in the already

² Jonathan Pollack, (1981) op. cit.

developed, fully operational strategic paradigm which had first taken shape in Mao's On Protracted War. Emerging international developments put China, for all practical purposes, on a war-footing with the international system's two most powerful states, one of which was socialist. This latter anomaly strongly suggested that generic strategic thought, shorn of ideological content, would have to once again direct the Chinese response to a highly threatening environmental challenge.

Marxist-Leninist thought provided a reinforcement of the basic Chinese strategic principles derived from the unity of opposites, and also provided a layer of empirically-based, socially-derived categories of analysis which provided a common perceptual and linguist framework for the cooperative strategic enterprises of international survival, state-building, and social transformation. Strategic thought delineates relationships holding between and within all reality; it does not and cannot posit content for its own form. Meaningful human content has to be provided from a normative, value-assigning framework, and this content became for the Chinese a choice between the content of the Confucian tradition, or of the Marxist tradition. Both provided for the humanist blend of social, political and natural philosophy which has been the hallmark of the Chinese cosmic view for millennia. Whatever the choice, the implementation of this content would require strategic form, and this was provided by the crude but valid congruence of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory with traditional Chinese philosophical conceptions of the nature of reality, change, knowledge, state, war and force.

THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONCosmic Unity

In stark contrast to the western strategic tradition and its philosophical base, dualism exists nowhere in the vastness of the Chinese tradition. The predominant schools of Chinese philosophy reflect an assumption of the unitary nature of all living energy; man and nature are simply different vessels, or forms of this energy, best known as ch'i (or qi, in modern translations). For this reason, the same philosophical ordering of material reality applies to the ordering of non-material reality, for underneath, these are all one. The western dualist tradition distinguishes between subjective speculation and objective practicality, and philosophy is viewed as an abstract preoccupation benefitting the solitary, unworldly man. For the Chinese, ancient and modern, philosophy is expected to yield practical tools for social problem-solving. Westerners tend to view Chinese apparent fusion of philosophy with foreign policy as a cynical, post hoc, ad hoc "ideological justification" for state mistakes or crimes. However, the lives and writings of modern, "transitional intellectuals", such as Kang Youwei, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, Qu Qiubai, Yan Fu, and Li Ta-ch'ao, not to mention Mao Tse-tung, all display idealistic, poetic visions of cosmic reality which seem embarrassing excesses of emotion with little relevance for what westerners would call "the real world".³ These visions did not evaporate in the heat of political and revolutionary activism, but were in fact

³ Kang Youwei for example believed "we are all parts of an electrical force which interconnects all things, or partake of the pure essence that encompasses all things". Quoted in Jonathan Spence, op. cit., p. 258. Li Ta-chao spoke of "the great tide of reality" from which he believed all life arose in pairs of opposites, and he saw East and West as spiritual and material halves of a great earthly whole. These concepts of a meaningful cosmic purpose and process continued on in Chinese Marxism, since for China no split had ever been assumed to exist between "the ideal and the real".

diffusely incorporated into the foundations of modern Chinese philosophy and state practices.

The Concept of Reality as a Theory of Change:

With the arrival of Marx (and thus of Hegel) in Mao's China, the philosophical principle governing the Chinese conception of reality, known as the "unity of opposites", may be said to have made the full circle from its early origins in both Chinese and Greek thought back to the modern age as the underlying dynamic of Chinese strategic thought. ⁴

As a concrete, "technical manual" outlining both the unity of the cosmos and the universality of human-natural order patterns, the I Ching (or Book of Changes) is the pivotal text in the Chinese philosophical tradition. Its essential principles relate, significantly, to the strategic management of reality.⁵ The first major principle of reality, as laid out in the I Ching, is the idea of change which occurs as a result of the shifting relationship between all of the pairs of opposites which emerge from any point on the circle of reality.

The Yin-Yang classificatory terms characterize the divisions of the cosmos into two complementary principles, of which

⁴ A.R. Burn, The Pelican History of Greece, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 144.

⁵ In modern China, the relationship between the I Ching, and strategic thought is taken for granted: "The Book of Changes...being thought to be a work of the natural and social laws, can be considered as the foundation of the Chinese traditional culture and the source of all the Chinese academic theories...the philosophical ideology on Dao, Bian and Du of the Book of Changes is the foundation of Sun's strategy and tactics. From Li Zhonghui, 'Relationship Between Sun's Art of War Arts and the Book of Changes', in Abstracts, 2nd International Symposium on Sun Tzu's Art of War, published by Foundation of International and Strategic Studies, The Research Society of Sun Tzu's Art of War, October 1990, Beijing, China.

dark-light, weak-strong, male-female, hard-soft, and active-passive are examples. The changing, yet permanently organic relationship between the two complementary aspects of a given reality, is the clue to the understanding of a phenomenally given condition or event, and at the same time provides the key to the human participation in, and even shaping of, the shifting tendencies of a given reality. And since, as will be shown below, all reality is interpenetrating, a change in one set of opposites will affect all other relationships which are within a "field" of reality.⁶

The second major element of the I Ching is the role of ideas. As both Confucius and Lao-tze apparently believed:

...every event in the visible world is the effect of an 'image',...of an idea in the unseen world. Accordingly, everything that happens on earth is only a reproduction...of an event in a world beyond our sense perception; as regards its occurrence in time, it is later than the suprasensible event. The holy men and sages, who are in contact with those higher spheres, have access to these ideas through direct intuition and are therefore able to intervene decisively in events in the world. Thus man is linked to heaven, the suprasensible world of ideas, and with earth, the material world of visible things, to form with these a trinity of the primal powers.⁷

⁶ While this conception of reality has always sounded fanciful to westerners, some of its key principles constitute the emerging "new physics": "the butterfly effect" posits that a change in any component of the universe will change all others; the particle-wave shifting polarity of identity is now a commonplace; and so on. Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture, Simon and Schuster, Bantam Books, 1982. Capra is one of many "philosopher-physicists" writing in this vein.

⁷ Richard Wilhelm, trans. Carey F. Baynes trans. The I Ching, Bollingen Series XIX, Princeton University Press, 1977, Introduction, pp. liv-lviii.

"Consulting the I Ching" therefore produces a condensed "ideograph" which is thought to correspond in structure and content to processes currently at work in the individual or social situation at hand. The "judgements" given move from conceptual insights given into the nature of unfolding worldly reality by means of access to the larger picture - the origins, developmental logic of progressive change - to comment on the probable outcome of all the processes presently at work in reality. The wise man, availing himself of these judgements, is able to insert his will into the process, and to not only "go with the flow", but to subtly alter the flow, as well as to alter himself, in a reciprocal and immensely subtle attunement of the human psyche to a reality which is understood to be governed by the same "laws" as the human psyche itself.⁸

As discussed in Section I, Mao rejected the world of ideas to which the world of matter was thought to correspond. However, he kept the idea that there was at work, in every particular situation, a set of universal principles governing the differentiating, creative processes within a unified cosmic reality, and these principles were accessible to human knowledge. Each particular situation was, as well, an instance of a universal pattern. Mao expressed the "law" of the unity of opposites as follows:

Identity, unity, coincidence, inter-permeation, inter-penetration, inter-dependence (or inter-dependence for existence), inter-connexion or cooperation - all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two conditions: First, each of the two aspects of every contradiction in the developmental process of a thing finds the presupposition of its existence in the other aspect and both aspects coexist in an entity; second, each of the two contradictory

⁸ *ibid.* p. lvii-lviii.

aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform itself into the other. This is what is meant by identity...⁹

Mao is absolutely explicit on the application of this law to all realms of life:

The law of the...unity of opposites, is the basic law of nature and society and therefore also the basic law of thought.

The law of contradiction in things, that is the law of the unity of opposites, is the most basic law in materialist dialectics.¹⁰

Most importantly:

Contradictory things...are characterized by identity and consequently can coexist in an entity and transform themselves into their opposite -- this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction...the struggle within the contradiction is ceaseless; it exists both when the opposites coexist and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and the struggle is especially manifest in the latter case--this again manifests the universality and absoluteness of contradiction.¹¹

The internal relationship of a given unity is transformed in two ways, with the emphasis on one or the other depending on circumstances. On the one hand, there is a change of one polarity into the other, and on the other hand, there is the tendency of this conflict to create a third, new entity. The dialectical process is thus a process of creation by means of a shifting subtle balance between unstable, yet constant dimensions of reality. It is the creative process which preoccupies the strategist.

⁹ Stuart Schram (1969), op. cit., p. 200.

¹⁰ ibid. p. 194.

¹¹ ibid. p. 201.

The Unity of Mind and Matter:

In Mao's materialist dialectics, mind is a form of matter. While non-mind matter produces raw reality, it is mind that processes and makes this reality into humanly usable "knowledge". Mind and matter are a "unity of opposites" - two components of a single reality forming the human world. Their relationship is a dialectical, reciprocal one, with each component taking turns, in the dialectical process, of assuming the lead role. However, in the final analysis, each human mind is a special kind of conscious matter, and it must take responsibility for understanding the conditions and possibilities of the material world and for converting these to human social "goods".

...what we call consciousness is nothing else but a form of the movement of matter, a particular characteristic of the material brain of humanity; it is that particular characteristic of the material brain which causes the material processes outside consciousness to be reflected in consciousness. From this we see that when we distinguish matter from consciousness and when, moreover, we oppose them one to another, this is only conditional; that is to say, it has meaning only from the standpoint of epistemology.¹²

Mao states that "The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its view of matter (the principle of the unity of the world)...The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of movement (or theory of development)". This works in the following manner:

The cause of the transformation of matter is to be found not without, but within. It is not because of the impulsion of external mechanical forces, but because of the existence within the matter in question of two components different in their nature and mutually contradictory which struggle

¹² Mao, *ibid*, p. 189.

with one another, thus giving an impetus to the movement and development of the matter. As a result of the discovery of the laws of such movement and transformation, dialectical materialism is capable of enlarging the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society...Dialectical materialism investigates the development of the world as a progressive movement from the inorganic to the organic, and from thence to the highest form of the movement of matter (society).¹³

Unity of Opposites and the Universality of Patterns

It is the combination of the two principles, unity of opposites and the universality of patterns, reflected in the structure of the Chinese language, which gives Chinese strategic thought its simple, repetitive, paradigmatic utility. The ability to "enlarge the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society", as articulated above by Mao, derives from the Chinese philosophical principles of what has been termed "correlative cosmology".¹⁴ The universalization of patterns, repeating within reality, permits the automatic classification of all human and natural phenomena, at a given moment in time, into one or other of two polar opposites, which are distinct, but interrelated classes. The 'unity of

¹³ Mao, *ibid.* p. 195.

¹⁴ For this section I have utilized the following sources: John b. Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology, Columbia University Press, New York, 1984; Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985; and Angus Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, Open Court Publishing Company, 1989. Henderson points out that the rise of correlative cosmology corresponded with an intense ideological requirement on the part of the Han rulers to justify their newly formed dynasty. While this information is historically valuable, it does not bear on the question of the role of correlative cosmology however it was perpetuated in shaping Chinese philosophical and linguistic trends.

opposites' principle predicts the mechanism and timing of their interrelationship in a theory of change. As an ontological principle, correlative cosmology both identifies and orders reality as patterned, and relational:

Correlative thinking in general draws systematic correspondences among aspects of various orders of reality or realms of the cosmos, such as the human body, the body politic, and the heavenly bodies. It assumes that these related orders as a whole are homologous, that they correspond with one another in some basic respect, even in some cases that their identities are contained one within the other. Correlative thought thus differs from analogy, metaphor, and symbol, which seldom refer systematically to larger orders or domains.¹⁵

The explanatory power of such a system assumes a vast field of application, embracing all of reality in a dense web of interconnecting, interlocking patterns which are reciprocally supportive and extensive of each other. These are "explanations which assume interrelations with all parts of an indefinitely limited structure" such that:

Every explanation therefore is modifiable from elsewhere in an indefinitely extendable pattern, permitting a license which the cosmologist tries to restrict by his principle that the higher in the chain is 'ruler' or 'ancestor' of the lower.¹⁶

Reality and Language:

The Chinese language is complementary to this non-Cartesian conception of reality and explanation in relational terms, as it is highly fluid, using multivalent poetic imagery and structure in order to convey the subtle, ever-present changefulness which is the hallmark of reality. The language tends to uniquely convey, evoke, and create forms of non-

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 336.

cognitively given reality, in which the speakers share. In this linguistic matrix, the implicit reference to, and deference to, a greater Whole, is the essential means by which the partially-formed images within separate Chinese characters are completed, or sketched in, by the participants, as they engage in written or verbal discourse. This cultural feature strongly reinforces the underlying patterned thinking which has permeated Chinese culture over the course of several thousand years; therefore basic categories and patterns of analysis can be expected to repeat, in Chinese perceptions and conclusions about worldly phenomena, whether social, political, cultural, military or scientific.

John Henderson demonstrates that lacking formal noun-verb-adjective-adverb distinctions among characters, the language structure itself frequently conveys the deeper, expanded meaning only by the placement of one sentence relative to another.¹⁷ Correlative cosmology with the systematic relating of a particularity to its place in a universal schema, reflects and reinforces the role of linguistic symmetry or parallelism and of analogy and metaphor which are the basic structures of Chinese philosophical discourse. The strongest criterion of validity in Chinese philosophical argument has been that of analogous application, in that the linguistic parallelism of the argument itself constitutes an implicit proof of the proposition. Angus Graham suggests that the Chinese language carries within it a structural affinity for analogous thought and discourse, which tends to

¹⁷ John B. Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology, Columbia University Press, New York 1984, p.44,

militate against what western philosophy calls deductive logic.¹⁸

For inasmuch as the basic structure of the cosmos is symmetrical, any cosmological proposition which can be stated in a symmetrical or parallel fashion has a strong claim to truth insofar as the structure of language corresponds with the structure of reality.¹⁹

Seen from this direction as a scheme relating man to the cosmos, a correlative world-view discloses a much more favourable aspect. The primary social institution, language, is the one with which it fully shares its structure and for which correlative thinking is perfectly adequate.²⁰

These cultural factors play a decisive role in the formulation of Chinese strategic thought as a set of parts, whose significance can only be grasped, conveyed and utilized in the context of a larger pattern. This is precisely the opposite of western dualist conceptions of reality, and especially pragmatist linguistically-conditioned methods of inquiry and action.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 404. As he says: "...one would expect that a training in Classical Chinese style would be an education primarily in sensitivity to similarities and differences, and so in correlative rather than analytic thinking. The parallelism so noticeable in Chinese style is not mere decoration but an indispensable aid to syntax. Given a language in which sentences are structured by word order, and not only can verbs stand in nominal positions but nouns have causative and putative uses in which they stand in verbal positions, a sentence or clause of any length will be structurally ambiguous unless clarified either by particles or by parallelism with another similar in structure.

¹⁹ *ibid.* p. 44.

²⁰ Angus Graham, *op. cit.* p. 350. Graham is reminding us here of Wittgenstein's earlier conception of language as a family of related ideas, a "field" of branching images off the tree of communal reality.

Time, History, and Human Agency:

The renewed emphasis on time as a strategic concept came from the Marxist conception of History as "humanly meaningful time", combined with Lenin's strategic manipulation of the historical categories (classes as states); change through struggle through time was a fundamental component of Chinese mainstream philosophy, and it was now given renewed significance and impetus through Lenin's thesis of international class struggle within an existentially reassuring time-frame established by the new concept of History.

Timing and Change

A crucial attribute of the transformation of the polarities is that there are, as with an embryo, specific, identifiable "stages" of developmental change. Human intervention must first and foremost be guided by insight to the nature of the stage which a particular reality has reached, and from this understanding, draw the appropriate conclusion for interaction.

Marxist-Leninist thought gave Chinese philosophy the concept of History, as a developmental, evolutionary schedule of events, and all given phenomena can be referred to the schedule, where its placement will provide a necessary coordinate, the other one being provided by space, which is the concrete and abstract dimension of human sociopolitical and geopolitical forms which reality takes. Thus time has three meanings: 1) abstractly, it constitutes, as History, a timetable for existentially meaningful human transformative processes; 2) concretely, it creates, with space, a continuum and matrix within which reality unfolds and by which all threads of reality are interwoven in the material, human world; 3) ontologically, it is an internally posited agent of

change which sustains the dynamic conflict of any unity of opposites.

The concept of History makes time into a collective, rather than individual dimension of reality; time is a socially shared concept, and this universalizes all the particular instances of the time-change dynamic found in human processes, so that individual, localized patterns will be found to be repeating throughout all collective human endeavours, in all cultures.

Social time is social change, and vice versa. Since History carries the full burden of existential meaning, and time is a shared social concept, the individual's life has meaning only insofar as it is tied in to the dynamics of social transformation. Therefore Mao emphasized human will as a major factor in the conflict which he also saw to be the dynamic of History:

The stage of action for a military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur.²¹

As well:

It is a human characteristic to exercise a conscious dynamic role. Man strongly displays this characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat in war is decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging and the international support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone...To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely, the

²¹ Mao Tse-tung, 'Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1968, p. 89.

directing and waging of war, man's conscious dynamic role in war.²²

What is true in war, is true for Mao in all other dimensions of human life.

The Concept of Force

The primary strategic principle of force is contained in the theory of change governing the unity of opposites. Within each unity of opposites there resides a spiralling matrix of force; each of the polarities is governed by the existence of this emerging force, which is engaged in using the inherent, opposing characteristics of each, transforming both into each other, and in so doing, creating something new. The role and mechanism of human agency in the dynamic relationships posited between sets of "unified opposites" is captured perfectly by Angus Graham:

Still avoiding the disputed issue of whether all thinking is at bottom binary, one may notice that the binary tends to leave out the maker of the opposition. 'Left/right', 'above/below', 'before/after'...imply a spatial or temporal centre from which the opposition is drawn, inviting the expansion of the pair to a triad. Thus in China the pair Heaven above and Earth below grows towards the end of the classical period to the triad Heaven, Earth and man.²³

There is thus a "center point", philosophically given, into which the human consciousness can move, taking a voluntarist stand, suddenly expanding any given polarity to a triad in which energy can be concentrated and directed by the human being who has correctly judged the source and direction of the energy flow. The only choice for the human participant in all these polarities is whether to be passively affected by the

²² Mao Tse-tung, in 'On Protracted War' in op. cit. p. 226.

²³ Angus Graham, op.cit. p. 337.

process of change, or to seize the levers of immanent force and move these in a strategically sentient fashion.

The partnership between human mind and time becomes a strategic one, in which the human mind is organically connected to the matter it gives epistemological distinctions to. This relationship allows human agency to delicately distinguish and expertly guide the emerging, developmental stages of social, material reality into their new historically meaningful forms, by the reference to and use of finely-tuned timing. The essence of strategic thought can only be, therefore, the timing and method of man's insertion into the "space" which opens between the binary opposition. History may be seen as "the Primal Space" into which human agency is both permitted and required to creatively act.

In contrast to the western horizontal break between objective reality and human subjectivity, the Chinese philosophical tradition sees a vertical hierarchy, a continuum of unified, but differentiated reality, in which mind is a superior form of energy to that found in its lower form, matter. Therefore, force born of mind is considered to be a "naturally" finer and more effective tool, and will, as a matter of natural law, govern the inferior, lower forms of force found at the physical level. In fact, the only truly "human" use of force will be that proceeding from one mind against another mind. The uses of force grade downward from here to the more bestial, less human forms of force, applied as raw physical power against physical realities.

Force, Time and Space

The permanent condition of "struggle" is not a condition of separateness, but of intimate, organic "interlocking of destinies". Every event, every seemingly separate or static situation, is in fact connected to all other events,

individual or collective in nature; these interconnections form temporary, "readable" patterns of reality, in which all the parts are affected by the whole, which in turn is bounded by space and time, and its process of change. Thus my enemy and I are one; from this paradox arises the fact that all his resources and capabilities can potentially be looped back into mine, while my weaknesses can in turn be looped back to become his.

This is equally true of the philosophical relationship between time and space, so that the force inherent in any space, in any time, can be looped into each other. This principle results in the exponentially accumulative dynamic of force, strategically managed over time and space. The strategic management of this process is therefore assigned the highest priority by leaders engaged in struggle. The larger the space, and the longer the time, the greater the force will be generated. This becomes the governing "law" of protracted war.

Rationality as Epistemology

It is clear that Mao's fundamental premise, even prior to discovering the erstwhile laws of Marxism, is that "Knowledge consists in knowing the things in the world, and in discerning their laws":

Because the oppressed class fails when it adopts the wrong plans and succeeds by correcting its plans, it learns to understand that it can achieve its purposes only when its subjective plans rest upon the accurate understanding of the material nature of the objective world and the fact that the objective world is governed by laws.²⁴

²⁴ Mao Tse-tung, in 'Dialectical Materialism, Chapter One', in Stuart Schram (1969), op. cit. p 184.

and external to the Chinese centre of political authority, has thus always assumed not merely the political utility of, but the moral validity and purpose of the political philosophy of war. Force, and its most primal form, violence, plays a major role in creating and maintaining a correct, universal order in which patterns of human behavior both reflect and support cosmic harmony. In China, the state, and not religion, has always been the cultural institution charged with the maintenance of the universal order based on the cooperation between, and congruencies between, natural law and human law. The state satisfies the requirements of Chinese humanism and of Chinese natural law, and derives its legitimacy from the relationship between these, its constituent components. The state is not only therefore founded on the use of force, as in western thought, but a key reason for its continued existence is to exercise force, both moral and material.

II. MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE:

MODERN STATE, WAR AND FORCE:

In the Anti-Japanese War, Mao re-established, as a strategic principle, the Chinese cultural precept that territorial boundaries were not of themselves vital; in fact it was the operational fluidity arising from the notion of exterior and interior "lines" that was of the greatest strategic value.²⁶ War was not therefore conducted around the usual sovereignty-territory definition of space adopted by modern states, but reflected the old traditional state understanding of territory as "political spaces of dominance, or influence", with military control shading out more thinly towards the less clearly defined geographical boundaries.²⁷

The historical experience of state-founding and state-building is an important cause of the fusion of Chinese political and military thought in strategic thought. Modern China was founded on the complex social violence arising out of national and civil wars. The simultaneous experience of these two

²⁶ Mao Tse-tung, 'On Protracted War', in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1968, p. 246: "For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory, including the recovery of lost territory."

²⁷ Barnett Rubin, 'Lineages of the State in Afghanistan', in Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 11, November 1988, pp. 1188-1209. See also John K. Fairbank, 'China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3, April 1969, pp. 449-463, for a discussion of the traditional "view from the centre" of the Middle Kingdom, in which political power is not restricted to, nor coterminous with, specific state boundaries in the modern sense. This tradition has been, for China, intensely reinforced by the theory and practice of successful protracted war. This is not to be confused with a willingness to cede political sovereignty over "Chinese territory"; but the de facto physical control of such territory can, if necessary, wait, as we have seen with Hong Kong and Taiwan.

kinds of war isolated and refined the concept of strategy as struggle in accordance with universalistic laws which applied equally to the defense of a continental land-mass, and to the pursuit of national development and social transformation. The complexities of dual warfare highlighted the role of philosophical analysis in the strategic management of the desperately limited tactical resources for which two different, ongoing wars competed. The waxing and waning of the prospects of victory over many decades developed and entrenched the political philosophy of protracted war as a strategic paradigm in which the expanded factors of time and China's vast continental space proved to be decisive in the long-delayed, but total victory.

Within the laboratory of protracted war, Mao discovered that force itself was a generic reality, manifesting under political and military forms which could be seen to be organic extensions of each other in a reciprocally-defining relationship. What gave each of these components of force its role and relative weight in the chemistry formula at any given time, were the factors of time and space, which were discovered to be force multipliers when combined with a philosophical technology which related the concept of force to the concepts of time and space, and thus provided the almost infinitely flexible decision-making matrix for the rational choice of strategic method.

The national war established protracted war as not merely an occasional instrument of the state, but the permanent condition of the state's continued existence. The civil war reinforced the strategic blending of political and military force in the tasks of state-building in the context of social transformation. The combination of civil and national wars produced a new conception of war as protracted internal and external struggle through the accumulation and application of

force over time and space. Chinese state policy will therefore remain indefinitely predicated on the internally unifying and externally defensive principle of the political philosophy of protracted war.

The State, Force and Moral Order

Historians such as John Fairbank have persuasively argued that China's continental geography and historical experiences with non-maritime perimeter challenges have produced a peculiarly sinocentric, "Middle Kingdom" view of the world including the Chinese historical sense of responsibility to reestablish the natural, moral world order by means of punitive military strikes.²⁸ The intrinsic Chinese view of the state is that of a socially responsible agent of force in the moral transformation and development of its citizens. This tradition has been reinforced by the historical experiences revolving around the use of force, in state-acquisition and state-building. By extension, both in traditional Chinese and in Marxist philosophy, this transformation should have universal and moral implications for non-Chinese human order. The Marxist conception of time introduced History, and hence a moral world order, as a major philosophical, and thus strategic concept to which both the state-society relationship and that of the state to the world, was tied. Externally, this has given the modern Chinese state a discrete historical identity, which places it on the world time map. It further provides legitimation of the state use of force both within and without Chinese borders in the name of creating, or restoring, the naturally-ordained moral order, on a national, regional or global scale.

²⁸ John K. Fairbank, 'China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3, April 1969, pp. 449-463.

Within the internal political life of China Mao applied these principles in their Marxist-Leninist form which gravely distort the content of I Ching spiritual humanism. However, it remains true for Chinese domestic politics that the Marxist-Leninist conception of force is crudely congruent with the traditional view of the use of force for social ordering and rectification. This use of force is at all times philosophically extensible beyond Chinese state borders, and it is one reason for the Chinese flexibility on the modern legalities of national boundaries.

A second, but also primary function of the state, in ancient as well as modern China, is to extract the "surplus force" inherent in society, and to utilize this as state power or capability. This force is of course available within all the sociopolitical and socioeconomic relationships and processes in which the society is engaged. The most effective politico-military force, identified during the civil and national wars was that of the new citizen,²⁹ and this resource continues to be vigorously tapped for state-building. Revolutionary zeal is not the only form which New Citizen force-resources can take; the Chinese are still in the process of determining, to

²⁹ Liang Ch'i Ch'ao articulated the concept of The New Citizen, differentiating the concept of citizen in a new China from that of the citizen in western liberal-democracies. Liang clearly saw that the power of western societies stemmed from their capability to unleash the potential energies of their citizens, but he distrusted the concept of the sovereign citizen, and proposed that the new citizen of China be related to the state as a patriotic member of a collectivity to which he owed total allegiance. Liang sought to transfer, as Mao did later, the identification of the Chinese from their clans to the state, so that their "force potential" could be directly tapped by the state, without the intermediary, buffering effect of family or clan structures and loyalties. The best overview of Liang's concept of "the new citizen" is in Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i Ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1971, especially Chapters 6, 8 and 9.

their own satisfaction, the most efficient state-society relationship. The state-society relationship continues to be governed by the law of "unity of opposites", and this relationship therefore turns on immanent, developmental properties of force and change. It is the task of the state to identify, and direct the force which is inherent in the state-society relationship.

The Post-1949 Asian Setting:

Just as the bipolar world of the post-1945 Cold War established the strategic parameters of the U.S. and the USSR, so the unique features of post-1945 Asian warfare established those of East Asia, and of the modern Chinese strategic paradigm:

"the adversaries opened a new 'battlefield', the negotiating table. They adopted another means of operation - negotiation - and threw into action new 'troops', the diplomats. Both in the Korean and Indochina Wars, the two largest 'limited' wars so far, more than half of their duration was spent on these 'battlefields', as the two sides engaged each other in simultaneous but different forms of warfare. Never before had there been so delicate an art of combining 'bloodshed politics' and 'non-bloodshed politics'. They were used secretly and openly in various forms, such as 'talking after fighting', 'fighting while talking' and 'promoting talking through fighting'.³⁰

These Asian Wars established that, in the hands of skilful practitioners, the new "indirect strategy" was in fact a form of philosophical technology, which rivalled western direct strategy with its focus on material technology. The politico-military continuum of force was effectively shown to supersede military force, both in Korea and in the 1954-75 war in

³⁰ Zhang Jingyi, 'Korea to Kampuchea: the Changing Nature of Warfare in East Asia 1950-1986: Part II, in Adelphi Paper No. 216. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Spring, 1987, pp. 75-84.

Vietnam.³¹ These experiences set the stage for the continuation of state struggle by political means, with the conduct of foreign policy seen to be the continuation of war by political means. In this vein, Mao bluntly asserts that:

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves;³²

and he explicitly sees the use of force to be inherent in the political dynamics of the state, saying "politics are bloodless war, while war is politics of bloodshed".³³

And, as General Samuel Griffith has observed:

Mao apparently observed that Sun Tzu's precepts are readily adaptable to the conduct of war of either the hot or cold variety...although it was to be many years before he had the opportunity to apply them in the cold war against 'foreign imperialists'.³⁴

And in the application of the political philosophy of war to international relations, Mao's strategic thinking reflected the most profound and enduring aspects of the Chinese tradition:

...Sun Tzu's strategic thinking of "subduing the enemy without fighting" to "win a complete victory" is the fundamental guiding principle of his theory of international relations..."To attack enemy's strategy", "to disrupt his alliance" and "to attack his army" are

³¹ *ibid.*, p. 77.

³² Mao Tse-tung, 'Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', in *op. cit.*, p. 88.

³³ Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Protracted War', in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1968, pp. 227.

³⁴ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, ed. & trans. Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 46.

the three kinds of means of dealing with international relations...³⁵

In fact, the core of Sun Tzu's thought is

...to realize the state's strategic purpose by relying on its comprehensive power and employing all means in the fields of politics, economy, diplomacy, military affairs and others. In the world today where all the countries are interdependent and there are plenty of contradictions in their relations, Sun Tzu's strategic thinking is of more practical significance.³⁶

Mao obviously developed his own strategic, operational and tactical methods suitable to modern nation-state defense and state-building, and these methods centred on the concepts of time and space as the material form, or framework within which all other strategic principles would unfold. It becomes equally clear that the philosophical inheritance from Sun Tzu, embodying the deepest principles of Chinese traditional thought, remained an unquestioned, intuitively given, substratum from which Chinese leadership continues to automatically draw strategic guidance.

³⁵ Huang Jialin, 'Sun Tzu's "Complete Victory" Strategic Thinking and His International Relations Theory', in Abstracts, 2nd International Symposium on Sun Tzu's Art of War, Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, The Research Society of Sun Tzu's Art of War, October 1990, Beijing, China, p. 5.

³⁶ *ibid.* p. 5.

III. PHILOSOPHY AS STRATEGY:

THE CHINESE DIRECT/INDIRECT STRATEGIC PARADIGM

This study will again utilize Andre Beaufre's definition of strategy, as:

The abstract interplay which...springs from the clash between two wills...the art of the dialectic of force...the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.³⁷

One of Beaufre's crucial contributions to the abstract study of strategy is his recognition that:

The game of strategy can, like music, be played in two 'keys'. The major key is direct strategy in which force is the essential factor. The minor key is indirect strategy, in which force recedes into the background and its place is taken by psychology and planning...any strategy may make use of both these keys in varying degree and the result is a large number of 'patterns' of strategy...³⁸

Beaufre emphasises further:

What must be realized...is that these 'keys' and 'patterns' are no more than different solutions within the same framework; they all have the same object, a decision arrived at through the psychological surrender of the enemy; they use the same methods, the basis of which is the struggle for freedom of action...Each is a specially selected amalgam of procedures, selected because they are best suited either to the resources available or to the enemy's vulnerable points which it is desired to strike. This choice of the best procedure is perhaps the most important function of strategy. (Author's emphasis).³⁹

³⁷ General Andre Beaufre, op.cit. p. 22.

³⁸ ibid. p. 134.

³⁹ ibid. pp. 134-135.

Chinese strategic places the emphasis on choice of method and this establishes the origin of force in the human mind. This fact in turn directs the use of force primarily against other minds, other wills, rather than against their physical extensions. The technologically superior warrior is the man who can use mental force, particularly against those who are locked into the logic of material force.

Chinese strategic thought begins with these two principles: that mind is the superior weapon; and that the task of the mind is to combine indirect and direct "keys" in varying combinations of force, deftly and subtly guiding and being guided by the evolution of the strategy as the events evolve. Chinese strategic thought is never direct, or indirect; it is always a combination of both, for this is the ultimate expression of the "unity of opposites".

As Sun Tzu put it:

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard...In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct and indirect -, yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres.⁴⁰

The direct and indirect patterns correspond to the vital "working" pairs of opposites which form the organic relationship of cheng and ch'i. Under the heading of cheng, one would also list: direct, offense, strength, propriety, clarity, consistency, solidarity, regularity, honesty, firm, solid, unyielding; under ch'i: indirect, defence, weakness, unorthodox, ambiguity, surprise, fragmentation, irregularity, deception, flexibility, fluidity, yielding.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, cited in Scott Boorman, 'Deception in Chinese Strategy', William Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 314.

Chong-pin Lin also identifies what he calls the binary opposites of cheng and ch'i, as the strategic template which binds a whole chain of corresponding "unities of opposites" vertically and horizontally. He uses the concepts of "integrated dualism", and "integrated multiplicity", to capture the Chinese assumptions that to be strategically effective, any two derivative pairs from the cheng and ch'i master unity must at all times work together. And each unity will be working as only part of a larger schema in which other pairs of opposites are also in play.⁴¹

In a concise summary of these two principles General Griffith has said:

The enemy, engaged by the cheng (orthodox) force, was defeated by the ch'i (unorthodox, unique, rare, wonderful) force or forces; the normal pattern was a holding and fixing effort by the cheng while ch'i groups attacked the deep flanks and rear. Distraction assumed great importance and the enemy's communications became a primary target...we know that time and space factors were nicely calculated.⁴²

All of the complexities of the human condition, which this ancient formula attempts to embrace, are considered to be present, and to be strategic factors, in the Chinese approach to the use of force in any struggle between opposing wills, which by Chinese philosophical and Marxist extension, involves the whole of collective existence. The shifting patterns of

⁴¹ Chong-pin Lin, op. cit., Chapter 2, 'Strategic Tradition: Historical Roots of Contemporary Chinese Strategy', pp. 17-38. For purposes of the comparative, conceptual approach, cheng and ch'i derivatives will be referred to as direct or indirect in the remainder of the thesis.

⁴² General Samuel B. Griffith, in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. and Introd. General Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 34.

reality call for shifting patterns of strategy, which both uses and creates force.⁴³

Throughout the Selected Military Writings Mao refers again and again to the blending of the direct and indirect "keys". A major example used is that guerilla warfare cannot, under any circumstances, be expected to win a war. It must be combined with regular warfare. Again and again he explains the complementary nature of this unity, which reflects perfectly the creative, complementary nature of the direct-indirect relationship contained in all the unities of opposites. At a tactical level, the guerilla units will be assisting, but not replacing the regular mobile armies:

Among the forms of warfare...mobile warfare comes first and guerilla warfare comes second...we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare.⁴⁴

Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operations. At the same time it includes "mobile defence" which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of

⁴³ Mao apparently instructed a military theorist to "study and publicize the work with a historical and dialectical materialist point of view"; this indicates that Mao found Sun somewhat lacking in "the larger view", and explains his own attempts to provide the temporospatial framework which would make Sun Zi usable, in a modern world. The modern PLA have decided to "use modern methods to undertake research on The Military Science of Sun Zi...(such as) a retrieval system invented by the PLA's Rear-service Academy." From China Pictorial, 3/1992, Beijing, pp. 25-29.

⁴⁴ *ibid.* p. 246.

forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.⁴⁵

Furthermore, although guerilla warfare is of vital assistance, and therefore second to regular warfare, while positional is last,

...we have in mind the strategic task of developing guerilla warfare into mobile warfare...Thus the strategic role of guerilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare.⁴⁶

Noting that the goal is to have guerilla units upgrade themselves into the higher quality of regular troops, Mao clarifies that the real point is to then have high-quality troops who are able to "conduct guerilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated". As he notes: "The principle of the Eighth Route Army is (sic) 'Guerilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable circumstances'.⁴⁷

Thus, the guerilla and the positional forms of warfare represent extremes; Mao sees the concept of the mobile regular army as the primary one, precisely because it alone fully combines the direct strength of positional warfare, and the indirect freedom of guerilla warfare. As the war progresses, mobile regular armies will gain more and more of the indirect freedom that the guerillas have, while the guerillas will gain the direct discipline and strength of the regular army; both will be augmented as necessary by the overall directness of positional warfare, although it too can be either direct

⁴⁵ *ibid.* p. 245.

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p. 246.

⁴⁷ *ibid.* p. 247.

(offensive) or indirect (defensive) in nature.⁴⁸ Mao elaborates meticulously the variety of forms the interrelationships and transformation of opposites can take, within a protracted war:

We can turn a big "encirclement and suppression" campaign waged by the enemy against us into a number of small, separate campaigns of encirclement and suppression waged against us by the enemy.... We can put the enemy who is in a strong position strategically into a weak position in campaigns and battles. At the same time we can change our own strategically weak position into a strong position in campaigns and battles. This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression within "encirclement and suppression", blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity.⁴⁹

This combination of direct and indirect forms of military force still eludes some western military analysts. Colonel

⁴⁸ Despite frequent contrasts between Mao's military theory and the need for a modernized PLA, key structures of Maoist thought are clearly retained. Paul H.B. Godwin unwittingly makes this clear, in his 'Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local and Limited War', Allen S. Whiting, Special Ed. China's Foreign Relations: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sager Publications, Vol. 519, January 1992. The Chinese have developed a "new" concept of highly mobile, airborne units, the elite "fist" groups, for quick, decisive operations on the borders (and obviously for internal control). Godwin does not draw the obvious conclusions, but notes that the Chinese now view their nuclear capability as primarily offensive in nature, designed to prevent the deterrence of China's chosen courses of action. This is a counter-deterrence stance, the indirect politicomilitary cover for whatever direct, military operations the Chinese should care to undertake. It is an error for western analysts to focus naively on China's supposed focus on "containment" of local "brush-fire, local, limited" war.

⁴⁹ Mao Tse-tung, op. cit. 133.

Harry G. Summers Jr. concludes that the Vietnam War was not a revolutionary war because the war was concluded by the North's use of conventional direct strategy. That is, final success came from holding the regular army in strategic reserve above the 17th parallel, until the southern guerilla "diversion" wore the Americans down.⁵⁰ John M. Gates corrects Summers' misconceptions by pointing out that Maoist strategy, used in Vietnam, was classically displayed in the combination of guerilla warfare where it was feasible, and as long as it was necessary, followed by the prescribed and predictable final counter-offensive in which conventional forces are expected to win the day. Contra Summers, Gates concludes: "Revolutionary war theory never implied that the Viet Cong would 'achieve decisive results on their own'".⁵¹

General Giap applied both the political and military dimensions of Maoist strategic thought. With his major military goals being the infliction of heavy American casualties and the destruction of their base areas:

He saw the importance of both the coordinated and independent concepts of operation. The coordinated method, which used main force infantry, artillery, and sabotage units, would be used to attack the enemy when

⁵⁰ Colonel H.G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy, cited in 'Vietnam: The Debate Goes On', in Parameters, Vol. XIV, No.1, 1984, pp. 15-25. Significantly, Maoist strategic thought has been understood almost exclusively in its military setting, i.e. "revolutionary wars", with much analysis of Chinese foreign policy focusing in the past on how much military revolution Mao's regime was "exporting" or supporting. This distortion, wrongly separating the political from the military in Mao's thought, is augmented by the other distortion: that within the military application of Maoist strategic thought, a "people's war" of poorly armed, illiterate peasantry was somehow the best way to win a war. The whole point of protracting a war was to overcome these initial deficits and acquire the enemy's conventional weaponry, while your own guerilla units became more cohesive and well-trained.

⁵¹ John M. Gates, *ibid.*

the opportunity for inflicting heavy casualties presented itself. Guerilla units would be used as auxiliaries to the main force. The independent method would be used to strike allied base areas and strong points with crack commando units that would use rockets and mortars to inflict heavy enemy casualties, while risking few guerilla losses...Khe Sanh and the operations in the Central Highlands furthered the attainment of Giap's two military objectives through coordinated unit tactics, while the independent guerilla attacks on the cities and towns furthered his political objectives.⁵²

And as Staudenmaier further observes, "The timing of the peace talks in May 1968 supports the idea that Tet may have been a political move to put North Vietnam in a favourable negotiating position."⁵³ As is well-known, the peace talks forum and the American political culture were gradually transformed into the decisive fronts of the war, emphasizing the strategic doctrine of protracted war: indirect political victory, gained primarily from indirect, guerilla operations which cause loss of morale and strategic focus, or concentration of forces, is the prelude and precondition to final military victory delivered by direct, conventional regular forces. Western analysts continue to miss the subtle flexibility and vastly expanded scope of operations made possible by this combination of direct and indirect strategy, within and between each of the political and military dimensions, not divisions, of Chinese strategic thought.

Mao's teaching efforts are permeated by his determination to show these broad strategic principles at work in the thinking of a flexible leader; understanding these principles will be the decisive factor in the final victory. Failing this abstract, theoretical knowledge, there will be certain final

⁵² Lieutenant Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, 'Vietnam, Mao, and Clausewitz', in Parameters, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1977, p.85.

⁵³ *ibid.* p. 85.

defeat. The ability to assess the ever-changing nuances of the direct-indirect possibilities in any given situation or event, with its expanded reference to the temporal and spatial matrix, is the hallmark of the great strategist. The most important quality of the commander or foreign policy maker is therefore his "flexibility".⁵⁴ This flexibility consists firstly, in the ability to assess reality, to recognize the ongoing relationship between its direct-indirect elements, and to make quick yet profound judgements as to the nature of action to be "inserted by human agency " into this time and this space. This is a judgement which must take account of the past-present-future time-space continuum, which will influence the present judgement, and will be affected by it. It is assumed that at all times, both 'keys' of indirect and direct methods, can and should be used. The emphasis on choice of the best procedure where it is assumed there are two poles of possibility setting the parameters for action, lays the foundation for understanding the role of mind as technology in this strategic paradigm.

If the first quality of the leader is flexible judgement, its corollary is his ability to get, use and hold freedom, or Initiative,⁵⁵ since this permits the widest possible choice of methods which can be employed. This second form of flexibility, as a politico-military formula is defined as expansion of China's potential, or freedom to manoeuvre. The freedom to manoeuvre is grounded in the leader's perception of, and widening of, the "space" which was described earlier as existing within and between any given sets of "paired opposites". The truly creative leader will not only quickly perceive such a space, or opening, and exploit this fully; he

⁵⁴ Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, in op. cit., p. 241.

⁵⁵ *ibid.* p. 158.

will also, if truly gifted, be capable of widening such a space to the point where it becomes, at near-crisis stage, maximally humanly useable. Achieving this "freedom of manoeuvre" will be the highest priority, and accounts for trading not only space for time, but space for freedom and initiative, to be utilized as commodities, as strategic reserve.

This is the origin and significance of the combination of the exploitation of ambiguity and crisis, as a moment of danger and opportunity. Like Clausewitz,⁵⁶ Chinese strategic thought sees the greatest possible opportunity in these moments when the tension reaches its height within a given phenomenal relationship. If handled correctly, the force within the opportunity can be harvested, and either used, or accumulated. The initiative therefore, has a very precise yet complex meaning, as a particular kind of intelligently useable freedom. It is considered the primary strategic goal because it is the lever of control over all other strategic factors.

Force Accumulation in Time and Space

The ability to acquire and direct force is, for the Chinese, a function of this analysis of reality as creative, changing relationships between various unities of opposites. Since every aspect of reality is in a relational creative process, all events, large or small, will generate force. This force can be tapped, as in atomic fission, by the epistemologically wise. A cumulative effect occurs through the unique use of force as a means to various ends, each of which has a force

⁵⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, 'Tension and Rest', in On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Books Ltd., 1968, pp. 296-297. Thus Clausewitz says: "...every measure which is taken during a state of tension is more important and more prolific in results than the same measure could be in a state of equilibrium...this importance increases immensely in the highest degrees of tension."

potential, so that each new end generates more force as input to the pursuit of another end. Force is both the means and the end in the means-ends calculus; the former continually changes into the latter, and vice versa. In this way, force is multivalent, multidimensional and exponentially cumulative.

Furthermore, since all events are ontologically related, regardless of their superficial coordinates in time and space, all force is related; it forms an ever expanding field of energy, onto which single events form windows, and access points.⁵⁷ The surface appearance of time and space as discontinuous in space and non-linear in time is only apparent. In reality, the underlying interconnectedness of all space and time, as a reflection and constituent component of universal oneness, means that the force inherent in any time or space frame is "automatically" available to augment that of other times and other spaces.

The critical parameters which permit a leader to use his flexibility to seize, hold and use the initiative are those of time and space. It is time and space which permits the crucial new factor of force accumulation to come into strategic play. It is only by the skilful use of these two hitherto discrete, finite and non-strategic factors that the small amounts of force, inherent in temporospatially discontinuous "pieces of the jig-saw" can be accumulated until they expand, and at the same time can be utilized in the most

⁵⁷ Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Mao's Revolutionary Strategy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1969, pp. 167-68. For those who can systematically use the terminology, this is a profound and in my view very accurate exposition of the substratum of Chinese strategic thought. I have chosen a more comparative, culturally portable approach, but I think Boorman is correct to suggest wei-ch'i is a better "game theory" than a western model, for Chinese foreign policy making.

effective and sparing way possible. In this paradigm, force is treated as the primary scarce resource, and it is mandatory that it be accumulated on the one hand, and then used strategically, not necessarily in the place or time in which it had its origin.

Therefore, what distinguishes the modern Chinese strategic paradigm is that the critical choice of method, that is, the relative emphasis placed on direct and indirect "keys" within their assumed combination, is now made by means of reference to a temporospatial, abstract/concrete framework. The time-space-event reference matrix enables the decision-maker to emphasize either direct or indirect strategy, and guides the technical timing necessary for maximal manipulation of the forces inherent in any transforming relationship, at any of its stages of development.

EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR LINES:

Sun Tzu clearly conceptualized space abstractly, though this has received little attention in most summaries of his strategic principles. In 'The Nine Varieties of Ground', which is quite distinct from his chapter on 'Terrain', Sun says:

In respect to the employment of troops, ground may be classified as dispersive, frontier, key, communicating, focal, serious, difficult, encircled, and death.⁵⁸

These categories indicate a clear recognition that the first task of a commander is to make the correct identification of what kind of "space" he is in, or would be considering action in. Mao, like Clausewitz, clearly understood this to be the

⁵⁸ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. & Intro. General Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 130.

fundamental strategic principle.⁵⁹ However, Sun's conception of space remained concrete, and it did not bear a philosophical relationship to time. As Scott Boorman has pointed out:

Although various analogies have been drawn between Sun Tzu and Maoist strategy as a whole...the main influence of Sun Tzu on Mao has been in the area of strategy centring around deception and stratagem. Analogies between Maoist insurgency and the thought of Sun Tzu are much weaker in the sphere of warfare more geometrico...In no sense does Sun Tzu recommend protracted guerilla warfare with widely dispersed base areas of the type essential to Maoist thinking and...to the game of wei-ch'i.⁶⁰

It is argued here that it is precisely this geometrico, temporospatial framework, which is the innovative, dominant feature of modern Chinese strategic thought. It arises out the continental nature and vastness of Chinese space, and out of the strategic use of this space over what became apparent as strategic time, in the protracted war.

TIME, SPACE AND WILL

Noting that there are three intangibles in the strategic calculus, E.L. Katzenback Jr. points out that "It is to these three, space and time, and will, that the industrial Western world has given least thought, and to which Mao has given the most".⁶¹

⁵⁹ ... "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Carl von Clausewitz, cited John M. Gates, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶⁰ Scott Boorman, op. cit. p. 323.

⁶¹ E.L. Katzenback, Jr., "Time, Space and Will: The Politics and Military Views of Mao Tse-tung", in Col. T.N. Greene, ed., The Guerrilla--And How to Fight Him, New York, Praeger, 1962, p. 13.

...Mao's military problem was how to organize space so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how to organize time so that it could be made to yield will.⁶²

This problem establishes the organic relationship between political and military precepts, transforming each in the matrix of protracted war. It establishes time and space as the modern form within the destruction of the enemy's will to resist, can be achieved. It is this destruction of the enemy's mental force holdings that both Sun Tzu and Andre Beaufre isolate as the essential focus of all strategic thought. Mao accepts this as the given goal, and recognizes that in the modern setting of complex international relationships, time and space can be manipulated in endless combinations to eventually wear down and destroy a multiplicity of enemies. For it is the temporospatial dimension, which allows the maximum use, in ever-changing patterns and combinations, of the "barbarians against each other".

THE TEMPOROSPATIAL FORM

The interior and exterior lines concept provides the map or three-dimensional graph, on which the Chinese leader will plot and follow the changing sets of "coordinates" as these trace, over time, the effect of time, on the strategic value relationships and developmental processes within and between all known spaces. Time here will include past concrete time, as the events contained therein still have force potential, if utilized at the right time, in the right place, in the right way. The relationship of flexibility to the concepts of space, time and the unity of opposites is expressed in Mao's explication of the temporospatial "geography" of the interior

⁶² *ibid.* p. 14.

and exterior lines, and the changing configurations of strategically applied force:

The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines...The same can be said of the relationship between the various guerilla areas. From its own viewpoint each guerilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together they form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the enemy...thereby presenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.⁶³

As discussed further in Chapter Four, the exterior-interior lines concept, together with that of the Base Area, forms the theoretical and protective outline of state strategic structure.

ENCIRCLEMENT: TIME, SPACE AND WILL

The strategic principle of encirclement embodies precisely the relationships holding among time, space and will.

The fundamental goal of Chinese strategic thought is the destruction of the enemy with the least expenditure of force. The concept of encirclement embodies the isolation of an entity from reality, to destroy its interconnectedness with sources of life support. The result is a progressively weakening enemy; and as the enemy's connections to reality are systematically broken down, to further goal is to reconnect his "supply centres" to the Chinese strategist's own bases of support.

⁶³ *ibid.* p. 320.

Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy because he is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement...we apply the policy of fighting...from tactically exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Next if we consider the guerilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded on all sides...This is the second form of enemy encirclement...however...we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. This is the second form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy.⁶⁴

In the application to foreign policy, the principle of strategic alliance is revealed to embody and to delineate the ongoing configurations of encirclement as these are developed:

If the game of wei-ch'i is extended to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between us and then enemy...the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, France and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace...On the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may joint it as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit...(we) thus form a gigantic net...⁶⁵

Mao summed up the relationships among time, space and will in the protracted war:

...big pieces of China's territory...the rural areas... will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces...the

⁶⁴ *ibid.* p. 220-221.

⁶⁵ *ibid.* p. 221.

enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness...the protracted and far-flung (war) is a war of jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economically and culturally.⁶⁶

Linking these jig-saw pieces together required the development of a strategic paradigm in which the abstract concepts of time and space would join philosophically those parts which were profoundly separated in the concrete sense.

Chinese strategic analysis will therefore relate the strategic potential of all the direct, and indirect events, situations, activities and qualities under which direct (cheng) and indirect (ch'i) can manifest, and these will be evaluated with reference to their relational positions within their own, and larger temporal and spatial relationships which currently constitute the ever-changing map of reality. Time and space will each have a concrete and an abstract component. Geohistorical time places an event as belonging to a concrete place, with the emphasis on a point in concrete, physical time, and abstract Historical, developmental time.

Spatiality is established by reference to geopolitical frameworks which exist somewhere in time, past, present or future. Geopolitical space will fix an event within a concrete geographical unit, but can abstractly denote the expansion of that concrete space by means of its political "field", which may span several discrete geographical spaces. These frameworks also contain the varying combinations of sociopolitical processes to be expected given the Historical time frame, though these processes will move through ordinary

⁶⁶ *ibid.* p. 222. There is a remarkable correlation here to the present situation in which the Special Economic Zones, on the "exterior lines", have been, one assumes temporarily, "abandoned to the enemy" of capitalism, while the political centre conducts a holding action within the "interior lines".

time at different rates of change. These dynamic processes, in their varying stages, help to relate a geopolitical space to a geohistorical time. This relationship will form a nexus out of which an estimation of force value can be made.

Geopolitically, space is conceived as the power centres of other key geopolitical units, as states, or groups of states. For example, China could evaluate the "geopolitical" configurations extant in Europe, taking the politico-military structure of NATO as the locus and focus of that region's force potential. Alternately, China could identify those nations who are "socialist" as forming a geopolitical "space", capable of generating force. This force will be tapped, if possible, by means of alliances whether direct or indirect, or united front (to be discussed more fully in Chapter Four). Because all reality is interrelated, China is in a relationship with every geopolitical space; the only question is whether this is beneficial or detrimental, formal or informal, direct, or indirect from China's point of view. Direct alliances enhance the freedom to manoeuvre regionally and globally, by means of positive psychological, international perceptions, and at the same time preempts the freedom to manoeuvre by other, opposing states. However, as will be shown, freedom-enhancing indirect alliances also exist (as does the indirect use of a direct alliance). The Chinese strategic value placed on an alliance is always, therefore, a rough guide to China's assessment of the current international correlations of forces.

China's geopolitical relationships represent the abstract location of China's exterior lines. The Chinese self-assigned relationships to geopolitical spaces represent the abstract conception of space in relation to time as History with epistemological value, and to simple time as a commodity with force value.

Concretely, China's exterior lines are very simply those which demarcate the real or desired geographical boundaries of China as a modern, legally constituted nation-state. Concrete time, as history, relates to the shared time with other geopolitical spaces. On the exterior lines, as on the interior lines, abstract time is China's sociopolitical and socioeconomic History aligned with World History.

The interior lines are, abstractly, the internal and external boundaries of China's political sovereignty. The interior lines, concretely, are the heartland of China, which shades out from the core, more rural consolidated political centre of control, and the capital city of Beijing, to the peripheral, more urban, and less consolidated centres under somewhat weaker political control. Time here is the shared historical experience of the Chinese people. Abstract time, as History, places China as a state in world developmental history.

These demarcations indicate a degree of fluidity and flexibility which would be expected from the paradigmatic ebb and flow within unities of opposites. These demarcations at all times are in some state of flux, and the western analyst must watch for subtle interconnections, for these are what is seen in the view from the Chinese centre.

However, some rather fixed/direct tendencies emerge. The designation of the borders as fluid, exterior lines would suggest that Chinese do not see their external sovereignty to be coterminous with geographical boundaries; interior lines, in contrast, correspond to the non-negotiability, or direct, fixed nature of the principle of Chinese internal sovereignty, which cannot be challenged from within and to which the international community must repeatedly provide assent.

The exterior lines are theoretically in ongoing organic relationship both with the interior lines of the political centre, and in relationship with the non-Chinese world on the geographical periphery. Theoretically, and thus spatially linked, the disputed territories are, from the Chinese viewpoint, under Chinese sovereignty already. With the passage of time, the predominant aspect of this linkage will convert from that of exterior to that of interior. Time changes opposites into each other, time is what consolidates space, and time is on the Chinese side.

Geopolitically, China itself is seen as the main "space", the Base Area, with the interior lines as those which demarcate the political power centre, from which expanding operations on the exterior lines can be undertaken. These goals can range from economic development to territorial consolidation of Chinese territory, and working outward, to regional expansion. Therefore, each movement on an exterior line must be carefully calculated, to contain within it future fluidity. Short-term goals must not be at the expense of future expansion as regional influence and/or territorial acquisitions. Thus China carries out border policies which paradoxically do not resolve the legal issues, but which permit China to position itself within these intercommunicating spaces between its periphery and neighbouring states, and to thus exploit the tensions and conflict potentiality as a form of force build-up.

In its most simple, politico-military formula, the partnership of direct and indirect strategy in a border clash or war works as follows: Force accrues to China in four ways, at a minimum. The direct dimension of the military use of force is that some gains are actually made, whether in terms of territory, logistical tests, or intimidation as a form of deterrence; the indirect (political) dimension of the military

use of force is that it serves as an example of military capability as will, reinforcing past such examples, warning of future ones. The military (direct) dimension of the political gain here is that China can "reuse" this military action: China may not need to use military force in a future situation where and when it is not convenient to so - this military action is "in the bank", so to speak, and will save military expenditure of force later (and the military budget now). The indirect (political) side of the political gain is that China is able to probe and test the nature and soundness of other Chinese strategic holdings, whether world perceptions, border situations in adjacent or temporally significant "spaces", or alliance strengths or weaknesses.

Communication:

Communication embodies the most central of classic Chinese strategic precepts: guidao, which means both ambiguity and outright deception:

That particular form of the indirect approach known as stratagem is a manifestation of a strategic style that modern Western cultural mythology tends to associate with the Orient...This concept of strategy through stratagem goes beyond attempts merely to outwit the opponent by conveying false intentions; it involves the more sophisticated task of directly manipulating his perception of reality, and in particular his perceptions of the values to him of various outcomes of the conflict. The aim...is to manipulate his concept of his own objectives and his own "face", to induce him...to assign great psychological utility to courses of action favourable to one's own interest.⁶⁷

Chong-pin Lin amplifies Sun Tzu's "Bingzhe guidao ye" (All warfare is based on deception) with this discussion:

⁶⁷ Scott Boorman, op. cit. p. 315-316.

...guidao (is) the marginal manipulation of the enemy's perception through a combination of massive secretiveness, concealment, and cryptic or redundant revelation. As perception, based on a core of reality, contains a margin of uncertainty, the latter is susceptible to manipulation. Containing yet transcending deception, the art of ambiguity in Chinese strategic tradition is the ultimate form of psychological warfare.⁶⁸

Within the larger map of temporospatial reality, communication can now be correctly directed, in the best strategic form, at the critically strategic points. These points will be the vital interconnecting spaces between unities of opposites, (which describes any geopolitical or geohistorical relationship), which will be the real and potential force centres of any opponent. Thus communication will be any and all of the forms which inter-temporospatial connections can take; political words and military deeds are but two direct forms (each having a variety of indirect formulations however, with indirect and direct impact, and so on). In their most direct forms, China's communications have been understood to be consistent and backed by military force, such as the warning not to cross the Yalu, or the warnings which preceded China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam.

The more indirect, psychological forms of Chinese strategic communication rely heavily on the appeal to and use of the "contemporaneous" nature of political realities, across time and space. The human mind is the processing agent which creates the holistic map of past, present and future, and it is therefore the psychological propensities and cognitive maps of present or potential opponents which is the target of Chinese communication, in direct and indirect forms.

⁶⁸ Chong-pin Lin, op. cit., Chapter One: 'Strategic Tradition: Historical Roots of Contemporary Chinese Strategy', p. 21.

Because the mind, or judgement, of the opponent is his key strategic asset, followed by his ability to link up with and tap into other interconnecting spaces of force potential, a prime goal of communication must be the opponent's mental confusion, and the concomitant disruption, of the communication lines which hold between an opponent and any of his "temporospatial power holdings or sources". Thus a target might be to discredit the past history of a current geopolitical entity - to disconnect it from its validating, force-giving roots in time. Another objective might be to disrupt the perceived congruence of national interests inherent in a current alliance between two spatially separated, but temporally, strategically connected states forming a geopolitical unit. The opponent's mind and his relations to temporospatial power centres can frequently be targeted simultaneously in one "communication operation". This approach to political discourse requires that communication be conceived and executed as a form of force, rather than as an exercise in either joint problem-solving, or as empty words or "propaganda" which can be dismissed.

Thus, the central strategic feature of communication is its role in creating crisis situations, in which the inherent conflict within a supposed "unity" of "opposites" can be forced on the attentions of the two opposites, whose unity will now rupture, in an explosive transformation into open conflict, as each turns its own internal forces on the other. This is the logical corollary of the natural law governing any unity of opposites. Chinese perceptions, and techniques of communication, are at all times finely tuned to the conflict levels, low, rising or high, in the geopolitical centres of the world.

Communication is therefore a practical tool, and is understood to be, in either verbal or nonverbal form, a concrete action.

The tremendous role of parallelism, analogy and metaphor, permeating the Chinese language, is very significant here, and likely to be where western analysts least recognize the use of force. These actions will often be directed at one party but meant to be understood analogously by a third party related to both China and to the party at which the "communication" is directed. These will frequently be ambiguous, sometimes seeming irrational, educative or threatening, communications, and will serve to confuse an enemy as to China's real, or next intentions, and therefore its own. Military actions are a frequent expression of this form of symbolic, analogous communication, which then forms the indirect aspect of what is an otherwise direct use of military force. Communication is a tool of force in constant play, attempting to open windows of opportunity, or spaces, for the Chinese, while fogging, or closing the windows of opportunity for China's opponents.

IV. SUMMARY OF CHINESE STRATEGIC PARADIGM:

The following principles constitute the Chinese strategic paradigm:

- 1) **CRISIS**, the creation of which opens or widens the naturally-occurring "space" within a particular unity of opposites event or situation. This permits maximum freedom and opportunity, if skilfully managed.
- 2) **AMBIGUITY** which creates the conditions of perceptual confusion and manipulation best suited for the creation of crisis and extraction, directly or indirectly, of its force potential.
- 3) **THE TIME-SPACE CONTINUUM**, which manifests abstractly and concretely. This geohistorical and geopolitical framework is created by the philosophical relationship between time and space. It is a relationship which is extracted first from reality, with reference to the unity of all reality; the force potential of every event, wherever located in time or space, can be extracted, used or accumulated, in a strategic process spanning the past and the present, and gaining momentum for the future. Secondly, the time-space-force relationship is becomes a strategic reality by means of reference to the human mind, within which all events in all time-frames, can be made to enter into a state of contemporaneity. Perceptual reality, whether individual or social, encompasses discontinuous events in time and space in a non-linear, non-Cartesian mixture of past, present and future across a diffuse mental, spatial grid. Since mind is the ultimate target of Chinese force, the manipulation of the nature of reality, and of the magnification of force, in the perception of its target, is the strategic goal.
- 4) **THE INTERIOR-EXTERIOR LINES**, forming concentric abstract and concrete geopolitical concentric circles expanding outwards, in alternating waves, from the major political centre, or Base Area. This framework is the essential

back and forth between these lines, using this conceptual structure as a giant loom on which every event is a thread, woven into an invisible, flexible, dynamic, and resilient weapon, which is also a shield.

5) **ALLIANCES**, by which China taps, directly or indirectly, the force potential arising from the geopolitical realities created and shared by all other occupants in the international time-space continuum, which embraces concrete time and abstract History.

6) **COMMUNICATION**, by which the Chinese create alliances, ambiguity and crisis, thus inserting their sociopolitical reality into ongoing international processes, in an effort to influence these in China's favour. Communication, informed by the unique, multivalent qualities of Chinese language, embraces all forms of direct and indirect human intercourse, political or military, including the use of symbol, metaphor and analogy, both in speech and deeds. Communication, as word and deed, structures and processes, enables the extraction of force, and is the means by which time and space are brought into strategic play as force multipliers.

7) **FREEDOM**, or initiative, which bestows maximum capability to put the above principles into play, and which paradoxically results from their effects in action.

The strategic management of these seven principles is conducted according to the theory of change posited within the unity of opposites: flux and fluidity. Thus the ultimate **strategic skill** is that of **FLEXIBILITY**.

The single philosophical principle, "the unity of opposites," running through all of Chinese philosophy, language and culture, and governing all phenomena, re-emerged under the impact of Marxist-Leninist-Hegelian philosophy. Within the historical conditions of civil and national total war, pushed to the edge of survival itself, the winner's understanding of

reality had to derive from a philosophical framework which provided dramatic, immediate insight as to the manipulation of reality. Philosophy and strategic thought, their explicit articulation forced by the exigencies of survival, revealed themselves to be a single entity. This had the effect of simplifying Chinese philosophy, driving it back to its most fundamental insights, while elevating strategic precepts to the status of ontological and epistemological first principles with immediate, practical applicability.

It was Mao's insight that for a weak state in an historically violent, still evolving, and inescapable relationship with the international system, the ancient strategic precepts would only work for China if they were transformed within a theoretical articulation which released their tremendous force potential as a physical property of the time-space continuum.

The application of these principles to the Chinese use of force in foreign policy will be demonstrated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR**CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND THE USE OF
FORCE, SPACE AND TIME: THE PROTRACTED WAR****I. THE INTERNATIONAL THEATRE OF PROTRACTED WAR**

The setting for Chinese foreign policy as protracted war is provided by two defining boundaries or parameters, within which Chinese strategic thought can operate: 1) the spatial forum created by the international community, which shares, through vastly expanded communications networks, concrete time and social time, or History, and 2) the spatiality of a nation-state with its geographically and legally definable boundary relationships to all contiguous nation-states, and the social time pertaining to shared events arising out of this vast perimeter.

The territorial, spatial boundaries of the modern nation-state gave China a strategic "base" from which to carry on its survival-development manipulation of the (now international) environment, with China becoming the "fish in the international sea". By integrating the temporal and spatial coordinates of Chinese historical development with the expanded temporospatial parameters of the international community, China could "live off the environment", extracting from all sources of international conflict lesser or greater quantities of force potential, to be hoarded and applied in varying politico-military combinations, as changing Chinese needs and opportunities defined themselves.

Precisely because China constitutes a legal international entity it has acquired not only its only Base-Area geopolitical space within which to accumulate force, but it has acquired access to a unique, new kind of space which is

the international forum, a stage upon which China can force opponents to publicly appear and to engage in public debate and contests of strength. The strategic timing and favourable conditions of such public contests can be carefully managed by China, with special reference to time in its concrete sense, as an agent of change, and in its Historical sense, in that the public theatre holds the attention of an audience acutely aware since 1945 of the moral and practical significance of shared "global History". This international theatre of operations thus provides the new, vastly expanded temporospatial dimensions of the continued, protracted war. The international system constitutes a working map on which the force centres of global geopolitical configurations can be tracked and tapped, and this permits the maximum use of Chinese basic strategic precepts.

China entered the modern international system just as it underwent a profound, post-Second World War transformation into a bipolar world of two armed camps. This hostile environment set the stage for China to see the "unity of opposites" structure of reality writ large, and to recognize the natural setting of a protracted war. In such a war, the strategic accumulation and management of non-Chinese force would have to compensate for the fact that in terms of the international currency of power, China was bankrupt.

KOREA: THE MODERN FOUNDING MYTH

The Korean War set up a "Founding Myth" , a paradigmatic symbol of China's politico-military relations with the international system. This myth turned the historical past into the present reality, emphasizing the enduring significance of China's pre-1949 national experience of protracted war won through political will; Korea became the embodiment of Chinese patriotic values and strategic skills. Far from being a dead historical record, the Korean war was a

living entity, the force of which China was able reuse, again and again, to evoke both military and political capability in indirect strategy.

Foreshadowing the next protracted war in Vietnam, and underscoring all the lessons of the Chinese protracted civil and anti-Japanese wars, the Korean war established the principle that a protracted war cannot be lost; the changes that accrued over time would benefit the defender, such that he would be in an undefeatable position, while the attacker could only lose his initiative, and his flexibility, and above all, his will. Thus Gerald Segal, even while decrying the failure of Chinese deterrence here, concludes:

It is hard to be sure what the remainder of the Korean war achieved...It seems...likely that China saw the benefit of limited combat behind relatively safe and static fortifications, while the U.S. "bled" and its position in Asia was undermined.¹

Korea served therefore to transfer the Chinese strategic paradigm from revolutionary-civil, and anti-colonial national struggle, to the modern international, state-to-state relationships. Korea gave new validity to the pre-1949 politico-military perception that the key strategic goal had to be: making the most effective use of the force generated by **any** source, one's own or the enemy's, in any form of conflict. This principle yields up its maximum results over protracted time, for force generated can only increase with the passage of time, and with the area of space (number of sources) from which force can originate. These sources will naturally include the enemies mistakes, as well as systemic weakness induced by the protraction which he is or can be

¹ Gerald Segal, Defending China, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 153.

rendered to be unwilling or unable to utilize as a strategic asset.

International Communication: Ambiguity, Deception, Crisis

The strategic relationship between the concepts of **communication, deception (stratagem), manipulation of perceptions, crisis creation and exploitation** is a continually evolving one, transformed within the international temporospatial framework, such that these old precepts assume the status of the tactical means of force, strategically applied within and transferred across temporally linked operational spaces. **Communication**, which embodies and manifests all the ancient strategic precepts, is now oriented not only to the Sun Tzu doctrines of preventing a specific enemy from fighting, or influencing his will. It also includes the more forward deployment of national resources in order to extract from the international environment, over time, key commodities, whose value is primarily expressed in the international unit of exchange: power, or force. This value is manifested strategically in China's relationship to territory, either as the concrete, physical security of the Base Area as China itself, including the consolidation of old (and possibly new) territories, or in relation to the abstract, geopolitical territory of the international system. Scott Boorman has summed up and emphasized the modern Chinese strategic preoccupations:

Three fundamental axioms of the Chinese Communist approach to problem-solving, equally applicable to international diplomacy or to revolutionary warfare, come to mind. The most important of these is the territory-oriented strategic concept of Maoist politico-military doctrine. The second concerns the discontinuous pattern of politico-military operations in space and time. The third, centring around the operational method, involves the decisive character of disconnection, encirclement...The chief goal of the Chinese Communist strategy is control of territory, whether geographical or psychological...the desideratum is

ultimate control of space rather than immediate seizure of any given point in space.²

Communication is the major weapon with which a territorial target is initially strategically assaulted. Communication is used for manipulation of perception, a dimension of reality, particularly for the education of the international community. This in turn allows for the "direct, straightforward, orthodox" exploitation of international laws, institutions, and norms, which gradually isolates the target territory, paving the way for other strategic techniques. If possible, the target will then be assaulted directly, by military means, as was Tibet in 1950, disputed Sino-Indian border regions in 1962, Xisha in 1974, Vietnam in 1979, and the Spratly Islands from 1986-88. If this is not possible, as for example with Taiwan, minor military operations will be conducted when feasible, but attention will be shifted to the political direct and indirect use of force.

The international temporospatial forum especially facilitates the indirect forms of Chinese communication, which western thought would characterize as irrational thought or activity, such as Mao's dismissal of the atom bomb, and vast orchestrated, social upheavals such as the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The goal is the psychological, subjective weakening of the opposing force, and disturbing the opponent's own rational processes can be achieved by introducing him, as a shock technique, to other cultural forms of rationality. Sometimes the shock value lies in what, in western parlance, may be simply termed "lies". These "lies", "double-speak", and other seemingly counter-productive, irrational forms of communication contain, depending of the circumstances and the

² Scott Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 167.

skill with which they are manipulated, far greater force potential than regular, direct, "rational" forms of communication. What western analysts see as "double-speak" is actually communication in play as an educative-coercive tool, whereby reality is described as already being what the Chinese have decided it should become. This creates a shared "artificial reality" between China and the target territory, as well as between China and those other key players or members of the audience whose moral force can be tapped. By refusing to discuss reality in descriptive words other than those which serve Chinese prescriptive purposes, China makes the verbal legitimation of this artificial "reality" a condition for interstate discourse. Once trapped into such discourse, western participants are driven both by their own Cartesian logic and diplomatic courtesy to adhere to the logical implications which are inherent in the use of the prescribed terms, in the prescribed contexts. If they do not accept the logic of Chinese illogic, they must break international rules of diplomacy and challenge Chinese leaders publicly with being liars and frauds. This would be so destructive of what the West believes to be the cooperative point of international discourse, that its leaders cannot bring themselves to mention that the emperor is, in fact, nude. This represents a form of blackmail - a linguistic use of force which in turn sows the seeds of discord and confusion among non-Chinese alliance partners, whose efforts to clarify the language and create a different reality, wind up making clear their own conflicts, and frequently end in mutual alienation. This sets up the conditions of "divide and conquer", and of target isolation, which brings closer the goal of encirclement, which is the direct version of the indirect concept of isolation.

The more indirect variant of this form of communication in evokes the temporospatial dimension, manipulating a current,

concrete reality such that it is expanded, becoming a multilayered reality, by means of its philosophical, theoretical connection to other temporospatially distinct forms of reality. This is carried out often through such publications as Beijing Review and other widely disseminated Chinese "reality-sharing/reality-creating" tools, published for foreign, as well as domestic consumption. The Chinese will frequently place together in one issue, (in that seemingly disjunctive, but infinitely suggestive fashion noted to be a characteristic of Chinese language structure) a set of articles which cover theoretically differing issues occurring decades ago. These "parts" are then linked together and related to a current "whole" political cultural-strategic reality. The unspecified interconnections between these parts are almost subliminally and automatically accepted, and the reader is swept up into a total reality-event which is not in fact existent, but is an artificial construct. The international condemnation of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in June 1989 evoked several such "sets of parts and their whole" which appeared in the Beijing Review.³

In one such set, the first article ("No Butting in Chinese Affairs") warns the seven western industrial nations prior to their Houston summit that economic sanctions imposed on China will get them nowhere. The rest of the article reaffirms the territorial integrity of China, including Taiwan, decisively rejects western abstract conceptions of human rights and affirms their relativity in a legitimate, sovereign (Chinese) social system. The author states strongly that the internal relations of a sovereign state should be neither criticized (words are deeds) nor interfered with by other states. These statements may be taken as defining the minimum requirements

³ Beijing Review, Vol. 33, No. 29, July 16-22, 1990.

laid down by China for peaceful coexistence in the international system.

The second article, ("International Terrorism and Countermeasures") is a major foreign policy statement, as well as a "state of the nation" internal security bulletin. Significantly, the Minister for Internal Security and the head of Interpol-China, are its authors. This article is far from being mere "double-speak" in which China feigns normative allegiance to international principles, standards and definitions for dealing with terrorism. China is making it a condition of its commitment to international law and order that western states support China in its prosecution of internal law and order, and hunt for its dissidents-in-exile. China's definition of internal and external dissidents as terrorists who threaten China's internal and external sovereignty establishes the only terms of reference in which the Chinese will discuss the issue internationally. The rubric of "international terrorism" is China's way of drawing the international community into a web of alleged "terrorist support", which deflects and sends back to the west, its condemnation of China's repressive violence. By defining dissidents as terrorists, China can make the point that "the anti-terrorist-measures taken by China are all within the norms of international law and the law of China". And China wants the extradition of the dissidents, who as "terrorists" come under international laws which provide for this.

Under cover of reassuring the west that China is able and willing, if the good neighbour attitude is reciprocated, to "help out" with the international terrorist problem, the article actually turns inward then, publicly reminding its own citizens that China possesses a sophisticated security apparatus and can deal with "terrorists" very well indeed.

China also reminds Third World states (involved in insurrections) that there is a difference between justified anti-colonial wars of liberation, and internal challenges to duly constituted socialist sovereignty. Thus neither Third World, ideological loyalties nor economic dependence on the West will be permitted to compromise in any way, Chinese internal or external sovereignty.

The third article ("Panmunjom Negotiations: Veteran Soldier and His Book"), placed "grammatically", completes the statements of state rights and capability in the first two articles, adding now the assertion of a powerful national will, grounded in the shared tragedy and triumph of the Korean War. An old retired general is resurrected with his "newly released" memoirs in which a major theme turns out to be the U.S. willingness to stoop to lies and even war crimes (failure to repatriate Chinese POWs, is that "terrorists"?), in order to cover its ignominious defeat by a weak but uncompromised China. It is the past, historical defeat of the West by China, against great odds and at a terrible price, which these memoirs reconstitute as part of the present Chinese and international reality. By means of symbol and analogy, China has reached across time to pull Korea, the great founding myth, along with the Long March, into the present, where it evokes the sombre memories of blood as sacrifice, and yet it sets also a mood of warning, an appeal to Chinese civic virtue, which can be based either on force, or on Chinese love of their motherland, for whom so many heroes have died. This educative-coercive use of communication as force resonates through time and space, from Korea through Tiananmen Square to Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose residents are finely attuned to this subliminal parallelism with which their fates are joined.

Present reality is thus defined and contained by "forcing" its relationship to already well-controlled, historically distant

issues which are to be understood in terms already socially and/or internationally established. The force inherent in the new reality or event is looped back into the force which has accrued to past historical events, and the moral and political force of the past event is looped forward to the present; thus the present potential force is brought under control, through its redefinition in terms of, and reconnection with events across time and space.

In this use of communication, again we see the subtle blending of direct and indirect, education and threat, political and (implied) military capability. China's appeal here is direct, to international laws, normative standards and policing agreements; it is also indirect in that it suggests the threat of China's immense potential as a non-cooperative, hostile member of a community it deems to be violating China's minimum requirements for continued peaceful coexistence.

In an article entitled 'On Human Rights in International Relationships',⁴ a Chinese scholar from the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies explains that "'Human rights diplomacy' is an important means used in contemporary international political struggle". Noting "the relationship between the international protection of human rights and national sovereignty", he emphasizes that while some collective rights do exist, i.e. the protection of women, children and refugees, it is still vital to oppose the theory

⁴ Gu Yan, 'On Human Rights in International Relationships', in International Strategic Studies, Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1991/3, pp. 7-11. The very existence of this Institute and its journal represents a parody of western self-assumed "objective" analysis of international relations. The Chinese assume there is no Archimedean point outside ideological struggle, but grasp that in order to play the international game, as they are required to do, they must pretend what the West sincerely believes, that communication is not a form of force.

that human rights issues transcend national boundaries. The acceptance of international law in some select, collective areas, merely lays, he implies, the foundation for the author's argument that only socialism truly understands human rights in its expanded, collective form. By adopting the western scholarly preoccupation with rationalist definitions, the term itself, rather than the content, of "human rights" can itself be legitimately scrutinized as a problematic. What the West considers the "self-evident, irreducible truths" about the content of human rights, becomes defined away in the Chinese analysis of "human rights diplomacy". And by acknowledging that international law can only reinforce the apparently "real" aspects of human (socialist) rights, the force potential of international structures is drained off, by language and logic, into the Chinese "alternate international reality".

Similarly, a research fellow of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, in discussing the sovereignty conflict over the Nanshan (Spratly) Islands, states blandly:

To solve the controversial issues over the Nansha (sic) Islands, Chinese leaders put forward the proposition of joint exploitation when meeting with visiting foreign leaders in April, 1988. Since 1988, the Chinese leaders have proposed time and again the idea of joint exploitation while reaffirming Chinese sovereign rights over the Islands.⁵

Chen says that this posture demonstrates "the extremely sincere and responsible attitude of the Chinese Government

⁵ Chen Xiaogong, 'China's Maritime Interests and Policies', in International Strategic Studies, Beijing, 1991, No. 3, p. 14. This journal carries the disclaimer that neither the institute nor the Chinese government give particular endorsement to the various authors' views. In the unlikely event that this were true, it would indeed indicate an informal, as well as official, propensity for almost automatic use of direct-indirect (western "double-speak") thought patterns in communication.

towards peaceful settlement of the controversial issues". No specific acknowledgement is made of the Chinese armed take-over of several of these islands which coincides with the very time frame to which he refers: April 1988.

Going through the motions, western-style, of international negotiation and discussion procedures, redounds to the Chinese benefit, since the Chinese can live with the ambiguous juxtaposition of these two opposites - negotiations about sovereignty and the Chinese offer to use its (non-negotiable) sovereignty to share resource exploitation. Thus the actual dispute is advertised to be nonexistent, and the negotiations are used to move the goal-posts, such that the issue is redefined from that of sovereignty to only the methods of international cooperation with the Chinese desire to exploit the islands' resources.

This use of international procedures is then used to declare the "obvious" nature of Chinese peaceful intentions and cooperative stance in the region.

The Chinese use of force through forms of communication oddly parallels, and even mimics, the western use of force, outlined in Chapter Two, manifesting in the use of procedures and institutions as communication technology. The Chinese engage these western international practices, turning their force value back upon frustrated and disillusioned western diplomats. Used in this manner, Chinese communication becomes force as a shield against international force penetration, and simultaneously turns this force into a boomerang, sending it back to its originators.

II. THE CHINESE STATE: BASE, INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR LINES: THE BASE AREAS AND INTERIOR LINES

Borders must not be confused with Base Areas. Initiative, or the freedom to manoeuvre, with its indirect connotations and

flexibility, is given solid foundation in the direct, inflexible establishment and maintenance of base areas. These are not negotiable, and will be defended at all costs.

Interior lines take the Base Areas as the focus of their circle. Encroachment on a Chinese interior line is assumed to be a threat to the political centre. The line here is drawn by the Chinese leadership, and will always be clearly defined. The consistency/inconsistency debate on Chinese foreign policy misses the strategic room to manoeuvre created by the flexible exterior lines concept, which is combined with the inflexible principle of interior lines, the minimal security needed to survive as a political entity in the modern state system. This combination of exterior and interior lines makes it possible to conceptualize Chinese national interests as the interior lines defined by the Chinese centre, pursued by means of strategically flexible operations on exterior lines, which are much more loosely defined, and may change over time.

The Korean war required Chinese involvement primarily as a defence of China itself as the primary Base Area. Tibet was designated a Base Area as well, as can be seen from the dogged military effort to take and hold this mountainous region, particularly just after the civil and national wars, and just as the Korean War was brought to China's door, and as it became evident that reconquest of Taiwan was vital, but not likely in the short-term. These are connected however. The very fact that the major Base, China itself, was threatened, required the uncompromising, public expansion into a major new base, which could also be used in the decades ahead, to launch varying forms of politico-military exercises along this extremely long Himalayan "frontier" which divides China from the Indian Ocean and certain long-term regional goals. In this context, Xinjiang is a Base Area, not a border. As will be seen, the Sino-Indian War of 1962 had both the flexibility of a border dispute and the inflexibility of a Base Area

defence operations, using Tibet to shore up Xinjiang, with some, but not all of the disputed territory being an essential link between these two Base Areas. The flexibility and/or inconsistency on border questions reflects the profound distinction between a true (exterior line) border question and the defence of an (interior line) Base Area.

BORDERS AND ALLIANCES

China's forms of international (and domestic) communication are augmented by two major other forms which delineate and utilize what China considers its international and national exterior lines. The Chinese concept of alliance and the concept of the borders as communicating spaces are the major political and military forms of communication which are at the same time, repositories of force which China accumulates and uses, over time and across space.

THE BORDERS AS EXTERIOR LINES

Borders are exterior lines, on which westerners should expect the Chinese to operate tactically, in the light of larger strategic considerations, which link, for example, all the boundary disputes together over time and space, and which permit maximum long-term "room to manoeuvre" which is the Chinese definition of holding the initiative. Because the borders are considered exterior, rather than, as one might assume, interior, these areas show a high degree of Chinese flexibility and tolerance of ambiguity. The settling of border disputes has, despite its prominence in Chinese public pronouncements, and its use as a stalling technique within a larger strategic framework, never had high salience for Chinese leadership. In fact, periodic exacerbations, initiated almost always by the Chinese (and certainly prolonged by them) have characterized the boundary disputes.

Border Wars as Communication: Threat, Education and Analogy:

In addition to its educative/threatening role in the Chinese strategic paradigm, communication permits the full exploitation of the spaces which open with any given "unity of opposites", in that it creates conditions of perception, which in turn can confuse and disrupt, and disperse enemy forces such that a "window of opportunity" is opened and may or may not be utilized at that particular time, but which may be "banked" for later use. This kind of communication is the major form in which the Chinese strategic principle of (ambiguity-deception) can be manifested and it is used in both political and military deployment of force. In this sense, a vital role of communication is to set up the conditions under which force can be a) applied and b) accumulated.

A border dispute represents an open space, or centre between two opposites, in which this kind of communication can be carried out both symbolically and concretely. A border war itself can be, apart from its concrete military objectives, a political statement in military idiom made to other states. However, communication through the language of border disputes frequently also is a form of ambiguity as deception, both militarily within the conflict itself, and in terms of its confusion of international participants and spectators. Under cover of this confusion, which can protract and obfuscate a crisis, gains can be made. Thus China's border disputes, serve as ongoing open-ended processes in which communication as both education, threat and accumulating politico-military force are all in play.

Border disputes as communication opportunities frequently embody the Chinese material, as well as philosophical dependence upon analogy, to validate an argument. Border wars and clashes appear to carry with them the connotation of "invasion by proxy", usually of a small client state

representing the true "communication target". Thus war against the weak is a deterrence message to the strong.

As well, border wars embody the Chinese traditional state philosophy that force has a rectification function, so that in the interests of a just moral world order China must demonstrate the political and military consistency and will, to punish states who are either regionally or globally out of line in their ambitions and actions. China makes repeated statements to this effect, and border war is never more likely than when China has advanced, in the communication dialectic, to this argument.

ALLIANCES

Alliances are the supreme form of communication because they establish pathways or conduits between concrete and intangible openings, or spaces which exist within and between geopolitical power centres, along which force can be both extracted, and redirected. Alliances advertise the correlation of forces which at all times expresses the non-mathematical, but "scientific" ratio of force to time and space. This advertisement itself acts as a force multiplier, such that an alliance serves purposes which were not originally foreseen or intended by the other party, but who cannot, or will not break international protocol and flatly contradict the loudly advertised "interpretations" of the meaning of the alliance, as publicly extrapolated by the Chinese.

Direct alliances take the form of specific treaties and agreements with various nations, whereby China gains present or implied support for various initiatives, which in turn enhance the freedom of manoeuvre, the vital concept of fluidity and flexibility inherent in indirect strategy. Direct alliances frequently are born out of a subtle

combination of military threat and political coercion, evoked either in terms of the past record or future possibilities, as will be discussed further.

Indirect alliances are those in which China's partner is an unaware, or unwilling participant in a strategic relationship of benefit to China. Because of the underlying assumption of a unified reality, and the oneness therefore of all geopolitical spaces, a direct alliance will in the short or long run provide China with indirect access to political forces released by the ripple effect changes in other geopolitical power centre connections. In this sense, China considers itself to be in de facto strategic alliance, expressed by the "correlation of forces" with all states, though these remain unaware of their status and use.

However, China frequently plans direct alliances which in themselves are primarily designed to act as "force-release" mechanisms in other relationships, making the benefits available to China in ways which are, if not foreseen, not desired by either the state in the new direct alliance, or by other states, connected to the alliance partner, whose resources have now been indirectly altered or tapped into by China. This is a form of "setting up" a situation so that the intended consequences of willing partners become unintended consequences for unwilling partners with whom China has achieved an invisible, indirect, and highly usable "alliance".

Therefore, the only real difference between a direct alliance with its many indirect effects, and an indirect alliance, is that one is formal, with intended consequences, and the other is informal, with consequences intended only by China, and involves a "partner" who would not have directly accepted the role imposed by this indirect alliance.

The United Front Alliance is a major strategic tool.

The cooperation inherent in western conceptions of coalition alliances becomes, in the United Front alliance, a form of political force, such that players in a shared political theatre can all be used, in their turn, by China. As such, this is always a "unity of opposites" strategy, and the united front configurations are always tactical. The united front manipulates a large number of geopolitical units so that a quantitative change in grouping will make a qualitative change in the correlation of forces, or distribution of political force available to the architect of the united front. In the United Front features of both direct and indirect alliances are present, in that some members are overtly aware of and accepting of their involvement in the united front, while others are manipulated into being seen, by the opponent/target, as a member of the Chinese-orchestrated united front.

The two defining characteristics of a United Front Alliance are that it involves, directly or indirectly, the whole international state system, and it has a specific opponent, and it may have a geopolitical target and/or goal. If an opponent is seen to be standing between China and the acquisition of its goal, the collective force milked from the alliance will be systematically and publicly directed against both the target, and its "protecting or covering" opponent.

The United Front Alliance makes specific use of the Sun Tzu principle of attempting to defeat the opponent's, or target's will to continue the resistance. Techniques associated with brain-washing are thus involved here, in particular those of real and perceived isolation, as well as continual public questioning as to the validity of the opponent or target's identity as it defines itself; this can be done by questioning a state's legal status in international law, or its moral

status in terms of, for example, socialist state international responsibilities. As in brainwashing, the direct political impact of a United Front Alliance is accompanied by, as always, subtle or direct physical force or its connotations. Either past or potential military use of force kept in the foreground of the opponent's considerations, by means of various public statements, and analogous or metaphorical references in articles in internationally read Chinese magazines such as the Beijing Review. Direct military action may also be employed, as with other direct alliances, to test the strength and extent of the new alliance, as well as to further threaten the target.

III. THE EXTERIOR LINES IN THE BIPOLAR COLD WAR SYSTEM

China's alliances, as geopolitical exterior lines operations, have always been combined with the exterior lines operations as border clashes and border wars. Together, spanning the globe abstractly, and China's perimeter concretely, these exterior lines operations have represented "mobile warfare" in a protracted war within the international system. Each occasion of intense diplomatic shifting has been accompanied by military force, of varying degree.

A brief outline of the history of Chinese United Front alliances, with their derivative, tactical direct and indirect alliances, interspersed with the record of border clashes, will illustrate the Chinese unique use of force in the political and military politics of communication.

The First United Front - The United States Target

Sino-Soviet alliance which formally began in 1950 went through various stages in which China sought to use the force of political alliance with the Soviet Union in ways which were not of benefit to the latter, and in fact at times enhanced

its international real or potential problems.⁶ In particular, the Chinese insisted, (according to Khrushchev, in 1961 following the Sino-Soviet break), at the Communist summit conference in Moscow in 1957, on the declaration by the Soviet Union of its socialist bloc leadership. This was a departure from what had been their intrabloc mediary role, and a strong resumption of the insistence that the Soviet Union maintain bloc discipline. As Wich puts it:

What Mao sought was to refashion the alliance that he had joined at the beginning of the decade into an instrument of a new forward strategy of greater risk-taking and stronger pressure on the forward presence of the United States.⁷

Finding the Soviet Union increasingly engaged in a "peace offensive" with the United States, China advertised the Three Worlds Theory in a manner which both described and guided China's alignment with Third World states against U.S. imperialism as a contradiction not amenable to peaceful coexistence:

The spearhead of the theory of intermediate zones was directed mainly against U.S. imperialism...the first intermediate zone--consisting of Asia, Africa, and Latin America--would be the mainstay in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. The second intermediate zone--consisting of the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, and Canada (later Japan was also included)--could be united with to form an anti-U.S. international united front. The Soviet Union, whose leaders were hankering for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to dominate the world, was excluded from this united front.⁸

⁶ Richard Wich, 'Chinese Allies and Adversaries', in William Whitson, ed. The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's, Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1972 pp. 291-311.

⁷ *ibid.* p. 294.

⁸ *ibid.* p. 506.

Where frequently analysts have seen the "export of revolution" by Peking for ideological purposes, the Chinese use of alliance in these contexts reveals the strategic use of force to attempt to alter the global conflict between the superpowers in China's favour. For, having been unable to stall Khrushchev's detente policies, and having been unable to utilize the Sino-Soviet alliance any further than the early successes of the 50's, the Chinese created a new set of alliance structures:

Where previously the Chinese had stressed the bipolarity of international forces, they now took Moscow to task for focusing solely on the "contradiction" between the two camps to the exclusion of the other "fundamental contradictions" of the era. Significantly, the Chinese now insisted that the various types of contradictions were "concentrated" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and that the "whole" revolutionary cause "hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of these areas". A major crack in the Communist alliance system had thus been introduced.⁹

This major crack had in fact become obvious during the 1950's, and the Chinese strategic response was to attempt to make use of its existence. The hope was to either succeed in establishing international parameters for Soviet behaviour, or to begin the attempt to isolate the Soviet Union within the socialist camp. Here, the polarity in Chinese strategic thought automatically assigns the category of friend to be used, or foe to be fought. This is a corollary of the "unity of opposites" philosophical tradition, heavily reinforced by the protracted civil and national wars. This political culture of the protracted war, that one is either on one side, as a friend, or on the other as an enemy, is transferred, in toto, to the Chinese conception of, and use of, the alliance.

⁹ *ibid.* p. 297.

The subsequent Chinese international manoeuvres reflected Mao's attempt to conceptualize, advertise and thus exacerbate, the seeming space between the "two worlds" which naturally constituted the world-wide unity of superpower opposites configuration at this time. This space, as the "intermediate zone", should theoretically yield some force which could be used, and in accordance with the theory, Mao naturally hoped it could be used against both of the opposites in the unity, the U.S. as well as the Soviet Union.

Thus China actively sought to weaken the Soviet Union by disconnecting the third world, as a single geopolitical space, from the power, or political centre of the Soviet Union. If successful, such a move would then hopefully enable the reconnection of the third world force-centres to China, which could then redirect this collective force against the U.S. As late as 1965,¹⁰ the Chinese still claimed that the Three Worlds Theory held, but it was clear long before then that China was extracting little force from its geopolitical exterior lines operations, and that the effect of this strategic plan on either the U.S. or the Soviet Union was almost nil. It had also become very clear that any force value in the Sino-Soviet formal alliance had long since been exhausted.

Chinese Alliances and the Use of Boundary Disputes:

While China was losing its war on the geopolitical exterior lines, it stepped up its war on the perimeter of China, the natural, national exterior lines, kept "open" in places for

¹⁰ Ch'ing-yao Yin, 'The Evolution of Communist China's Foreign Policy, in Yu-ming Shaw, ed. Mainland China: Politics, Economics and Reform, Westview Special Studies on China and East Asia, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1986, pp. 499-525. I have used this overview of Chinese foreign policy to trace China's shifting global alignments with reference to the United States and the Soviet Union.

just such purposes. Following the 1957 de facto Chinese creation of a united front socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union, the Chinese used the exterior lines, or borders, to test the soundness of this new structure. The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, served, as always, in a multipurpose fashion. On the one hand, it tested U.S. resolve with regard to maintaining the anti-mainland China security interests of Taiwan. On the other hand, it served to draw the Soviet Union, unwillingly, into the irredentist claims of the China, and to force the Soviet leadership to either assist in the problem, and thus reinforce the global Cold War which showed signs of a slight thaw, or reveal itself to be a faithless socialist bloc pretender. Because the Soviets offered support only when there was obviously going to be no need for it, it established for Mao precisely where his own weaknesses lay, on the temporospatial map - it demonstrated to his satisfaction (and to those internally for whom he needed to provide proof) that the alliance with the Soviet Union had run its course in terms of exploitive possibilities.

Any doubts on this score disappeared during the next multipurpose "probe" on China's geographical spatial periphery. The Soviet decision following the Taiwan Straits Crisis to terminate its nuclear-sharing agreement with Peking was accompanied by its neutral stance in the Sino-Indian War. The Soviet Union had a clear understanding of Chinese actions:

A Soviet statement in 1963...claimed that Peking intentionally became embroiled in a border clash with India in 1959 in an attempt to torpedo the relaxation of global tension that was then taking place. Another Soviet account disclosed that the Chinese shelling of the offshore islands in 1958 was undertaken without consultation with the USSR as required by the Sino-Soviet treaty. Significantly, Moscow has charged that the Chinese probes in this period were undertaken in areas - such as the Taiwan Straits and the Sino-Indian border - that could be manipulated by Peking in an

effort to assume control over the strategy and foreign policy of the entire socialist camp.¹¹

The interrelationship between the ongoing indirect strategic attempts at exploitation of an alliance partner who is being used in both an indirect as well as direct, orthodox fashion, is marked by the use of force both militarily and politically. The use of force in Taiwan and India was intended to achieve concrete territorial goals. However, linked organically to the international Third World United Front alliance, the use of force was a single effort with multitemporal, multispatial and multigoal dimensions designed to not only force the Soviet Union into a supportive position for the alleged, immediate goals of China's military force, but to accept and resume aggressive leadership of the socialist half of the unity of opposites which bifurcated the globe.

The Sino-Indian Border War - 1962

The Chinese use of borders, time, space, communication and military force in a unique strategic blend is exemplified in their orchestration of the Sino-Indian border war in such a way as to link a number of issues, including American intransigence on Taiwan, Soviet failure to hold to socialist bloc solidarity, and the real piece of territory that was of concrete strategic value in terms of national security (the relationship between Tibet, the Aksai Chin, and Xinjiang):

Chinese exaggeration of American intent in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of June, 1962, contributed to an overestimation of the degree to which Indian policy resulted from hostile collusion with the United States or the Soviet Union, or both. This in turn evoked a more militant PLA border stance in July, which had a "self-fulfilling prophecy effect" in triggering an equally militant upsurge of nationalist fervour in the Indian parliament and press. The resulting bind on Nehru's ability to

¹¹ *ibid.* p. 296.

compromise eliminated all possibility of a negotiated settlement, while the steady reciprocal hardening of military postures in the dispute border areas brought on a conflict which planners in new Delhi had not anticipated at the beginning of 1962.¹²

What Whiting goes on to call misperceptions and miscalculations appear to have netted China considerable political gains. These consisted of assessing the international situation and forcing certain realities to light, such as the weakness of China's position in the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the American continued position on Taiwan. At the same time, China gained regional prestige, consolidated even further the hold on Tibet, and preempted any possible erosion of that hold by India. China also strengthened the Xinjiang territorial relationship to China and Tibet by means of the acquisition of the Aksai Chin, which linked the two vital pieces of Chinese territory. Trading the Northeast Frontier Agency, which seemed inexplicable, for the Aksai Chin, made perfect sense in the Chinese strategic lexicon, as the Northeast Frontier Agency was of greater strategic significance to India than to China, while to the Chinese, the Aksai Chin was non-negotiable. Something had to be taken that the Indians would trade the Aksai Chin for. A small territorial gain now, would link up with the previous 1950 conquest of Tibet, the road which had been built into Nepal for Chinese use, and the string of border agreements with, for example, Burma, Nepal and Pakistan, which not only publicly highlighted Indian "intransigence", but which permitted an unobtrusive accumulation of territorial consolidations. However, these agreements, in particular the one with Nepal, left "openings, or spaces", within which later Chinese politico-military skill could operate, in an expansionary process. Thus the agreement with Nepal later

¹² Allen Whiting, *op. cit.* p. 231.

permitted the Chinese to ship arms into Nepal, with obvious anti-India implications, in 1987, along with concluding an intelligence-sharing agreement, again with anti-India implications.

On the other hand, allowing the border dispute with India to remain partially resolved, left open a "space" in which later on, China would have a ready-made "crisis location", into which it could move political and/or military force elements. Thus, should the need arise (for example to build up military forces in the event of a serious rebellion in Tibet, or to prepare for anti-military action against a Soviet-backed Xinjiang insurrection, or perhaps to again demonstrate Chinese political will and military skill in the area, the still-open border, so frustrating to India, would provide strategic "initiative" or freedom to manoeuvre.

In the Sino-Indian border war, communication was utilized politically to stall, confuse, deceive, and ultimately to entrap, Indian political and military forces. As Whiting notes, Nehru was finally placed in a public position, by Chinese pronouncements and "reading of reality" such that military clash was unavoidable.¹³ As well, the stalling techniques of communication permitted the logistical build-up and deployment of military force over the road under construction to the Aksai Chin. In the midst of military clashes, a Chinese "silence" was inserted, with military inaction, combined with a sudden change from hard line to soft line, in the Chinese press. At this point, the Chinese General in charge of the entire Indian border war, hitherto seen as a hardliner in favour of all-out war, now took a conciliatory line, which caused much speculation among Indian

¹³ Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975, pp.231.

and western analysts and decision-makers as to the "fact" of a factional rift within the Chinese leadership. In fact, this was a classic example of communication as the good-guy/bad-guy dichotomy, and the direct/indirect use of force. Just as tensions began to relax with the publication of the new "soft line", the Chinese marshalled their forces and administered a total, humiliating defeat on the Indian forces, in what was an equally classic execution of Mao's strategic counter-offensive, always carried out after a pause, to concentrate and redirect the initiative gained from a series of small victories.¹⁴ The sudden, inexplicable switch from "hard-line" to soft-line, by General Luo, as Chief of Staff, was a force-event of the highest order, in a superb tactical use of communication to exacerbate an already ambiguous situation. The deceit inherent in this form of communication is of course not strictly speaking, an accountable deed, since it was seemingly a "mere" internal publication of one man's opinion, disseminated at a time when the event-context could not fail to assign it a deliberately deceptive meaning for non-Chinese.

The Sino-Soviet Border Clashes of 1969

In the 1969 clashes with the Soviet Union along Sino-Siberian border, it was, as Whiting has recounted, clearly the Chinese who sought and finally obtained, a military confrontation.¹⁵ This would seem inexplicable, in the light of Chinese internal chaos and international insecurities caused by having as enemies the two Cold War superpowers. However, it seems clear that this border clash, as with others, permitted the creation of a large "smoke-screen" which, along with external gains, set the stage for the heightened role of the PLA, whose

¹⁴ The account of the facts has been taken from Gerald Segal, Defending China, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 153. The interpretation is the author's.

¹⁵ Whiting, op. cit. pp. 237-239.

decisive force Mao apparently now required more than he had initially anticipated, for the control of the massive social forces allowed free play during the earlier stages of the Cultural Revolution. Internationally, it was meant to act as a reverse analogy, such that "aggression on a Chinese border" was a concrete and symbolic example of the use of force by the Soviet Union, in its relations with members of the socialist bloc; this was a Chinese form of metaphorical and analogous communication in which the Soviet 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Brezhnev Doctrine, were volubly advertised to the international community. China sought to make direct, explicit exposure of the essentially force-based nature of the Soviet regime and its world-wide operations, in an indirect political manner, carried out by direct military force. This politico-military, direct/indirect use of Chinese force was to especially emphasize the Soviet threat to the United States, to "reveal" that under pretext of detente, the Soviet Union was primarily a warring state.

At this point, the Cultural Revolution actually represents the use of force within both the interior and exterior lines. Turned inward, it was a massive operation dissolving what had been interior lines into endless concentric exterior lines radiating outwards from Mao himself, as the only political centre, or Base Area, unifying the two radically conflicting opposites: state and society. Lacking the ability to extract force as national power from the international community (especially the Soviet Union), Mao sought to generate force from within the Chinese state-society unity of opposites. The Sino-Soviet border clashes, aggressively pursued by China despite Soviet military and nuclear might, turned the internal violence outwards in a belligerent war-fighting stance, underscored Mao's previous communication to the world that the atom bomb was "a paper tiger". This dramatic historical statement was given concrete as well as symbolic force

potential by its connection in time to China's 1964 explosion of its first atomic bomb, (and its hydrogen bomb in 1967). The atomic bomb, considered a huge national triumph by the Chinese themselves,¹⁶ now could be reused, brought out of "history" to participate in present reality-formation. Atomic capability, demonstrated openly once, now manifested its force value in two ways: 1) directly, as Chinese potential military force, and 2) indirectly, as psychological force inherent in the reckless, irresponsible attitude implied by the Chinese stated disregard for the military, even nuclear, power of other states. This combination made of the "paper tiger" a real tiger, for purposes of Chinese international strategic manoeuvring.

Like the symbolic and real force extracted by the Chinese from the atomic bomb, the political violence of the Cultural Revolution was symbolic of, and at the same time concretely exemplified, the open-ended possibilities of force suggested by these prior entries on the historical record. As force turned outward, it was utilized, in Maoist terms, as an "exterior operation on interior lines" - that is, it struck at the decision-making ability of other geopolitical centres, by confusing their understanding of, and raising fears about, the Chinese leadership's rationality, and intentions.

The Sino-Soviet border clashes occurred in the context of the Chinese and international perception, whether or not founded in fact, that the Soviet Union had made an overture to the

¹⁶ It is vital for western analysts to recognize the role played by national humiliation experiences in the perceptions and responses of modern Chinese leadership. After this first atomic explosion, in 1964, Zhou Enlai spent hours watching and rewatching, with childish joy, footage from the explosion; veterans of the Long March, sitting in a Central Committee session, wept openly when the news was announced to them. Chong-pin Lin, op. cit. p. 134.

United States, suggesting that the former deliver a limited, but crippling, nuclear blow in China's crucial northeast industrialized region. The "irrationality" of the Chinese-initiated border clashes, Mao's calls to Chinese citizens to prepare in every way for people's war, combined with the inexplicable internal violence of the Cultural Revolution, served to make use of the only deterrent capability China possessed, strategic psychology expressed in symbolic, analogous, and concrete politico-military communication.

The seemingly irrational willingness of China to confront the Soviet Union in open military conflict appeared to foreshadow the Chinese willingness to engage in nuclear war-fighting concretely, as well as symbolically (as manifested in Mao's use of the "paper tiger" imagery). This direct force of political will was supplemented by the indirect force of seeming instability, and this was at all times a part of American calculations in Vietnam, as they looked at the erratic, and yet disturbingly consistent record of Korea, Tibet, India, the Cultural Revolution, and now, the seemingly open-ended conflict potential of the Sino-Soviet border clashes. Into this artificially created "space" of confusion and threat, the Chinese were thus able to draw the perceptions of the international community, but in particular those of the United States. And the U.S. was the target. The U.S. perception of Chinese threat to world stability led to pressure on the Soviet Union to allow its confrontation with China to "cool"; at the same time, China was able to link up this space, once American perceptions were firmly anchored into it, with the ongoing Vietnam War.

Vietnam: The Next Protracted War

Vietnam was for China an exterior lines operation. It permitted maximum flexibility in the use of communication, and in the use of time and space for the weakening of major

enemies. The geopolitical space of Vietnam was organically linked with the geopolitical spaces of China, the Soviet Union and the United States. Vietnam thus represented the perfect "centre" between polarities multiple unities of opposites, and into this centre China moved with all the skill of those who were the master theorists of protracted war.

From the beginning, as Kenneth Lawson establishes,¹⁷ the Chinese had displayed toward North Vietnam, strategic, rather than revolutionary zeal, beginning with their constant promotion of a negotiated settlement which would not have been in North Vietnam's favour. This promotion served to exacerbate, to open up, the space between North Vietnam and the international community, to reveal the more extreme demands and intentions of North Vietnam which could not be met in a negotiated settlement. In fact, from 1954 onwards, China had sent conflicting, varying signals to Vietnam, and to the Soviet Union, as well as to the United States, in that it appeared to completely support the North Vietnamese, yet evidence indicates an inconsistent pattern of failure to provide either the military or political support minimally needed. This required the Soviet Union to become more and more involved (thus becoming an unwilling, and even unaware, partner in one of China's indirect alliances), at a time when the Soviet Union's national capability would have been seen to already be weakening, in Chinese terms, due to its global dispersion. On the other hand, China gave enough support to ensure that American victory remained out of reach. As the struggle continued, American involvement escalated, and so did that of the Soviets. The Chinese had moved into this great "space" between the worlds largest "unity of opposites", and proceeded to make, from a theoretical point of view, excellent use of the protracted conflict which drained both of the

¹⁷ Kenneth Lawson, op. cit. 1984.

opposites, in each's attempt to turn Vietnam, and the other, into a version of itself.¹⁸

At this time, under a program called The Third Front, China moved key industrial plants from coastal areas and dispersed them among interior provinces. Their pattern of dispersal and concealment, and their linkage by means of hastily constructed new rail lines, all suggested a Stalin-style preparation for war in which coastal and peripheral areas would take sudden heavy losses, and a fall-back industrial defensive line would be the only hope of national survival. The designation as "the Third Front" carries with it the connotation that the Chinese felt they were fighting some kind of war on at least three fronts, probably involving the U.S., the Soviet Union, and internal state-society relations. Garver takes the Third Front preparations as clear evidence of Chinese preparation for war with the United States; however, an attack by the Soviet Union was far more likely than from the U.S., and Mao had been calling, throughout the Cultural Revolution, for visible war preparations seemingly directed against the Soviet Union. Turned outward, towards the world, as an exterior-lines manoeuvre, such preparations could not fail to impress potential aggressors, and suggested a bravado which carried with it considerable psychological force, in the context of Chinese aggression, in the same time frame, along the Sino-Soviet border. Turned inward, Mao would have used

¹⁸ See John W. Garver, 'The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War', in Parameters, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1992, pp. 73-85, for an excellent discussion of this issue. He makes a stronger case than Kenneth Lawson, op. cit., for Chinese material support of the North Vietnamese; this discrepancy may possibly be reconciled if timing and conditions of support are examined. Even if large and sustained, appropriately rendered aid is demonstrated, the fact remains that what the Chinese gave militarily, they regained politically, from the military and political weakening American, Soviet and Vietnamese societies and from their own new rapprochement with the US.

externally created/perceived danger as an opportunity to try to generate, on the interior lines of China as the Base Area, domestic, societal force which would produce some quantum leaps in industrial capability, as hoped for in the Great Leap Forward. Despite its multivalent possibilities, however, the Third Front seems to have played its greatest strategic role in reinforcing the American fear of Chinese intervention.

Far from being a limited, passive policy aimed at the deterrence of US aggression against China, the Chinese ever-present threat to intervene was an active foreign policy which permitted "forward deployment" of immense strategic force:

Summers and similar critics are quite correct in concluding that fear of Chinese intervention was a principal factor underlying the US strategy of graduated escalation. A basic purpose of that strategy was to prevent Chinese intervention by keeping the level of violence directed against North Vietnam controlled, precise, and below the threshold that would spark full-scale Chinese intervention. There is also no question that the China-induced US strategy of gradual escalation was an immense boon to North Vietnam. It allowed Hanoi time to adjust to US pressure and to find ways to circumvent US moves.¹⁹

Nor, however, was Chinese strategy directed primarily at the defence of, or aid to North Vietnam. Lawson is right to point out that despite the Chinese formal, and seemingly enduring commitment to North Vietnamese politico-military objectives, Chinese policy did not embody the usual norms of bilateral, regional affiliations. China was committed to fostering a protracted and debilitating relationship between its two global enemies and Vietnam, its main regional threat. This was a conflict in which each would neutralize or weaken each other's force, and this would generate useable political force for China.

¹⁹ *ibid.* pp. 74-75.

Perhaps of greatest strategic significance, over this protracted period, China was able to utilize communication not merely as the deceptive tool which confused the North Vietnamese, but as a clarification tool to signal to the United States that it was not only anti-Soviet, but not genuinely locked into North Vietnam's "space". China was willing and prepared instead, to display itself as sitting in the middle of the open space between the Soviet Union and the U.S., and to be willing to move over to the U.S. camp, if only indirectly.

China was able to demonstrate this primarily in military and historical idiom as follows: The fact that Vietnam bordered on China, so that they shared a communicating space, set the stage.²⁰ Both the Chinese and the Americans constantly referred to Korea, as the huge military statement written into the record by China, and living on as a politico-military reality in the present. This reality determined the American, not the Chinese, "deterrent" imperative to respect whatever "ground" the Chinese declared to be, in effect, the Korean Line. This was established as the 17th parallel, demarcating the ground theatre of North Vietnam. The Americans put no ground troops there; the Chinese, speaking the same symbolic language, placed on North Vietnamese soil, 50,000 "volunteers" from the People's Liberation Army.²¹

²⁰ For the detailed discussion of this credible interpretation of the events and their sequence, see Allen Whiting, (1979), op. cit., Chapter 6, pp. 170-195.

²¹ A professor in the Department of International Politics, Peking University, Yang Kan writes: "The process of establishing "global reason" is also the process of the exchange and identity of symbols with different political, economic and cultural background...It is also true that reason does not mean and cover everything because of two causes:...reason is not mature enough and different standards are being adopted to make rational judgements. Therefore deterrent power is necessary to be kept to stop the possible

...Chinese deployments were conducted in a way that made their presence plain for the world to see. To avoid locking itself into a situation that might escalate into a direct confrontation with the United States, Beijing did not officially acknowledge its military presence in North Vietnam. But the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) units deployed to North Vietnam retained their normal unit designations, wore regular uniforms, and used nonsecure methods of communication. This insured that Washington knew of China's moves and the seriousness of its intentions.²²

China made it clear, and the U.S. understood, that the only rule was to keep a clear margin between U.S. troops and Chinese territory. This Korean Line outweighed, in both military and political terms, any current force which China possessed. Preventing as it did the full, potentially successful force of American direct strategy in the form of an invasion of North Vietnam, Korea as an ever present symbol was more powerful than China actually was in military terms, in the late 1960's. Establishing the contemporaneity of the Korean War linked a former historical time and space with a present geopolitical space; this linkage multiplied the original force value of the Korean War by obviating the Chinese need to fight a military war, while its indirect, political use in creating a protracted war, made of Vietnam for Americans not only a military defeat, but a major political trauma which tore their nation apart. In the future, not only Korea, but Vietnam, would symbolize to Americans the kinds of wars, in Asia, which they must never again fight.

Despite the proscription of ground assault, air attacks would be tolerated, and in fact, almost encouraged, since it became

conflict escalations...Symbols of violence but not violence itself should be used to keep the deterrent forces active. From 2nd International Symposium on Sun Tzu's Art of War (Abstracts), op. cit., p. 16.

²² John W. Garver, op. cit. p. 78.

apparent that the Chinese had, unaccountably, failed to make operational a jointly constructed air defense system for the North Vietnamese. This not only weakened the Vietnamese significantly, but was a cue duly picked up by the U.S., that even obvious danger to the Chinese PLA from devastating air attacks over North Vietnam could be tolerated by China. Here the Chinese were willing to callously expose their ground troops to air assault, in order to indicate that their political will to withstand American force was strong, but their willingness to negotiate "a separate deal," eventually, was passively suggested. The covert signalling, to which the U.S. was acutely attuned, convinced the Americans that China was seriously open to detente, and that revolutionary warfare, as a crude export, was in fact the last thing on the minds of China's leaders.

In any event, at the end of the war, China could contemplate a Vietnam in ruins, yet owing China regional allegiance as a brother socialist state indebted to China for wartime aid, not the least of which was the assiduously applied Maoist politico-military strategic theory. China could further contemplate a demoralized, radicalized United States political culture, willing to consider detente with China on what appeared to be very favourable terms. Finally, the Soviet Union, sharing global, lock-step strategic over-extension with the United States, could only, in the long run, suffer from its long involvement in the war, and its now certain long-term commitment to Vietnam's post-war development costs. However, in the short-run it still showed the political will to maintain its military expansionist program, and this aggressive momentum the United States could not, alone, contain. This set the stage for the formal move from "the centre of the space" to China's new unity of opposites in which it would join forces with the United States, beginning an operational manoeuvre on the exterior lines against the

Soviet Union which would, a decade later, be converted into a strategic counter-offensive of world-wide proportions.

Using multivalent techniques of communication for international perceptual manipulation, China linked together, over time and space, the military and political force of the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, China's 1964 atomic bomb, the Sino-Soviet border clashes, 50,000 PLA ground troops in North Vietnam, the Cultural Revolution, and the defiant use of force to take Xisha, in 1974, from South Vietnam, over the protests of North Vietnam. Using time and space in the concrete sense, China was able to wait for the protracted war in Vietnam to yield up its conflictual force pay-off to China. As both instruments of communication and as crises from which political and geographical territory could be wrested, China used small, seemingly disconnected events in time and space to achieve a slow but steady accumulation of force, which could be fed back into the cycle, until it gradually increased to the critical mass which it approached, following the Vietnamese War. Time had transformed many negatives into positives by then. Weakness had become strength, an enemy had become a friend, a friend was openly an enemy, China had spent its internal force completely, and Mao was dead. China now turned outward again, to the exterior lines tactic of the united front strategic alliance.

1978: The Strategic Counter-Offensive Begins

The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978 was accomplished by means of direct and indirect force, and considerably altered regional and global geopolitical space connections.²³ This Chinese use of force embodied the

²³ Robert Bedeski, The Fragile Entente: The 1978 Japan-China Peace Treaty in a Global Context, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983. I owe the insights and historical account for much of this section to this comprehensive

central strategic principle of Sun Tzu: to strike first at the overall strategy, and then at the alliances, of the enemy, in a bid to destroy him without the use of physical force. In highlighting the tensions between the USSR and Japan, and in moving Japan away from the US, China also underlined Japanese military vulnerability in the region, and hence the need for either a continued strong US presence or a US-sponsored Chinese regional dominance. Both Soviet and US overall strategic patterns were altered in the region, and both Japan and the Soviet Union suffered serious disruptions and distortions in their alliance patterns, with each other, and with Vietnam. This treaty, for all intents and purposes, announced and enforced the recognition by the United States that China was now the regional hegemon, the naturally-constituted taipan of East Asia.

The Direct Alliance and Indirect Consequences

In the negotiations for the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan, China utilized a great range of direct and indirect methods. A few examples will suffice: China used the promise-threat inherent in access/denial to Chinese economic development; it implied permanent loss of Japan's northern islands, unless the treaty concretely undermined Soviet regional power; it evoked images of U.S. drawdown from the Pacific and Japan's possible military isolation in a problematic historical and geographical setting; when negotiations slowed, China utilized a token military threat by assembling a hostile fleet of Chinese boats off the Senkaku Islands, the subject of a long-quiescent Sino-Japanese territorial dispute. This reminded Japan that militarily, it could not actually defend its own territory, and the action symbolized Japan's necessary reliance on political, rather than military structures, to protect itself regionally. It

analysis of the Chinese strategic management of alliances.

also subtly harkened back to Japanese violence directed against China and the Asian mainland for decades; the whole issue of armed international conflict was thus raised, albeit tentatively and briefly.

The Japanese recognized this subtle use of force, and in particular its timing, since they had been slow to negotiate for some time, at that point. Along with the economic concerns that Europe or the U.S. would get into the Chinese markets before them, this show of military force reminded the Japanese that underneath all international relationships lies the fact of force, and while Japanese military hands were tied indefinitely, those of the Chinese were not.

An increased threat of Soviet hostility towards Japan might well raise the spectre of Japanese aggressive rearmament, and this then turned a key in the lock of the space between Japan and the U.S., making the treaty their treaty. As Robert Bedeski has noted, the Chinese achieved at one blow, the almost total destruction of what had existed of independent Japanese foreign policy, yet paradoxically revealed and reinforced the strains and obligations within the defence ties between the U.S. and Japan. These strains, as always between "opposites" in a relationship, had force value, if they could be tapped and looped into China's force nexus. If the U.S. would not countenance Japanese rearmament (and an Asian hue and cry led by China could internationalize the issue, if necessary), then the U.S. would necessarily, though unwillingly, have to remain a "partner" with not only Japan, in defensive matters, but informally and indirectly, it would remain, as a strong Pacific presence, China's ally against the Soviet Union, a continued guarantor of Taiwan independence-isolation, and would all the more willingly see itself as a natural partner in China's Modernization program.

While negotiating this treaty with Japan, China was also negotiating formal diplomatic relations with the U.S., culminating in Deng's visit to the U.S. in February 1979. The simultaneous negotiations created a sense of urgency on the part of both the U.S. and Japan (their own force potential directed against each other, as China transformed and used their relationship to each other in an indirect alliance) in that each feared the other would get first access to the Chinese economic bonanza.

The U.S. was prepared to give China a free hand in Vietnam and Indochina, seeing the Sino-Japanese Treaty as a Chinese acceptance of regional responsibility for containment of the Soviet Union. While the U.S. clearly wanted the PRC as a regional strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, Japan was an uneasy, indirect alliance partner to the new Sino-American anti-Soviet regional manoeuvring. However, both the U.S. and Japan were quite prepared to abandon Taiwan in favour of the lure of China's huge market. This in turn ensured a perhaps hasty, ill-conceived, and ill-rewarded involvement of both Japan and the U.S. in the uncertainties of transforming an antique but controlled socialist economy into a socially explosive capitalist economy.

By means of this Treaty, China was able to tap, for its own exploitive purposes, the force potential residing within the geopolitical power axes, or spaces, which linked the following "unities of opposites: Japan and the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Japan and the U.S., Japan and Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan, the U.S. and Taiwan, the U.S. and Vietnam. And having done so, China could now divert that force into its own temporally salient geopolitical spatial force centres: China and the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, China and Taiwan, China and Hong Kong.

The Winning United Front Alliance

The strategically critical feature of this treaty was that it marked, in Mao's terms, the beginning of a strategic counter-offensive against the Soviet Union, using "mobile regular warfare" in the sense that the United Front Alliance gathered together all of China's international "force winnings" over the previous decade, and "concentrated this force" by means of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, which was converted to a United Front mechanism. As Robert Bedeski

has said:

...(China) also helped to expand Sino-Soviet conflict to areas heretofore uninvolved. Japan, by August 1978 had acquiesced in an anti-hegemony treaty, and was feeling Soviet pressure as a result. With the short China-Vietnam war, Soviet air and naval presence was extended to Southeast Asia, posing a new threat for Japan and ASEAN as well. China has claimed that these developments merely proved the hegemonistic nature of the USSR. From another perspective, however, it seems that expanded Soviet activities have served to diffuse the Soviet threat to China and arouse other countries' hostility to Moscow. The result has been to project the Sino-Soviet dispute into a worldwide confrontation.²⁴

All of the new diplomatic links basically connected powerful geopolitical centres, willingly or unwillingly, in a new unity in which their opposite was the Soviet Union. European powers spoke openly of the need for an Asian NATO. This made of East Asia a second anti-Soviet front, a global pivot space into which the perceptions and desires of the international community were drawn. Centering itself within this newly created force space, China turned on the East Asian pivot, and directed the cumulative, concentrated force of decades against the Soviet Union. The intensity of this political force was symbolized, and objectively enhanced, by the military invasion of Vietnam.

²⁴ *ibid.* p. 157.

The 1979 Border War With Vietnam

Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978; this action followed a November 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese treaty including military commitment. With tacit (the indirect alliance) U.S. support therefore, China invaded Vietnam in late February 1979, following Deng's late January 1979 U.S. visit. China appeared to be as always, using the exterior lines, this time in their concrete, border form, to test the gains made in the abstract, geopolitical exterior lines. The Chinese invasion demonstrated that its indirect alliance with the U.S., which gave China political "cover" in the region, was sound, and that in point of fact, so-called Soviet support for its new ally amounted to a rattling of logistical sabres rather than any serious strike at Chinese territory. This was probably foreseen by the Chinese, who would remember well the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 when the Soviet Union, as the Chinese alliance partner, proved its faintness of heart in all but military-backed expansion of the Soviet Union itself.

In its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, China would see no need to extend the border war to a military victory, although such would naturally have been welcome. The concept of "victory" has little real application here, in the western sense of the term. Chinese strategic thought has as its bedrock the fallback position that any form of conflict releases force potential, small or large, short or long-term, and this can eventually be moulded to suit Chinese purposes. China had no need or desire for Vietnamese territory, nor did it really have a great deal at stake in the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. In the larger strategic picture, what China needed was a weakened Vietnam, a weakened Soviet Union, and a certain climate of international perceptions within which to develop further strategic positions. These goals could be achieved in the same way China had strategically "overseen" the weakening of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, all

through the protracted Vietnam war from 1954-1975. In other words, the prolonged embroilment of China's enemies in conflict with, or costly support of, each other, was an ideal development to be fostered, from the long-term, strategic view. The invasion of Kampuchea would in the long run weaken Vietnam drastically, and if the Soviet Union financed it indefinitely, it couldn't fail to weaken the Soviet Union. If China's invasion of Vietnam pushed both Vietnam and the Soviet Union to more military entanglements, so much the better. Feeble Soviet response to regional challenge set China up for later local strategic manoeuvres. The new formal Soviet-Vietnamese alliance was for China a perfect instance of two political center spaces being pushed together to the detriment of both, and to the benefit of China. From this perspective, the Chinese 1979 invasion of Vietnam was designed to move into that space between China and Vietnam, symbolized by the border, in order to create a crisis which would actually draw the Soviet Union into Vietnam more deeply.

Further, China needed to publicly identify and, on behalf of a pseudo "regional order", punish Vietnam as a renegade state.

China's invasion of Vietnam highlighted Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea; China was determined to educate international perception/opinion of Vietnam as a rogue client state of the Soviet Union.

Finally, but ranking high in strategic salience, the Chinese once again used military force as both indirect military and political force, across the temporospatial framework of its geopolitical borders and national interests. The invasion of Vietnam, regardless of risks and benefits, underscored once again the Chinese willingness to use force, on Chinese terms, for Chinese ends. In 1974, the Chinese had used military force to capture Xisha, or the Western Paracels, to which both North and South Vietnam laid claim. As discussed below, by

April 1988 China had militarily clashed with Vietnamese forces and taken over at least six major reefs or islands of the disputed Spratly (Nanshan) Islands.

For Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the international community on whose perceptions these two entities have survived, the 1979 invasion of Vietnam rewrote China's regional message once again, in full. The indirect political force generated by such direct military force holds great significance for the long-term, as a force input to the strategy of regaining Hong Kong and Taiwan, and ensuring firm control over Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. In these settings, indirect political force is accompanied by indirect, or passive military force also, since at a future date, China may need little or no military force to convince a recalcitrant target that it must not call China's bluff. It also of course demonstrated to the internal Chinese audience that the state comprised an ever-ready military capability to intervene whenever politically required; this has always been kept in the forefront of domestic Chinese society's perceptions.

The Beginning of the Decline of The Soviet Union

Seemingly right on the Chinese schedule, the Soviet Union chose to carry out its own counter-encirclement effort, and in December 1979, invaded Afghanistan. This justified fully China's international United Front strategy, and the concomitant use, in its invasion of Vietnam, of border war to bolster political alliance force. On China's larger map, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened Cold War tensions, required a U.S. revision of foreign policy and military commitments, and required Japan to weaken its economy by going along with world sanctions. Above all else, however, the parallels to the long war in Vietnam were obvious; the war in Afghanistan almost certainly would be protracted. This could only mean, over time, that the Soviet Union would, like the

U.S. in Vietnam, "bleed until it was white." This the Chinese could now afford to wait for.

The Soviet Union recognized the United Front strategy, understood a successful strategic counter-offensive when it saw one, and realized that it had been "encircled". It saw its geopolitical connection to the Pacific frayed and about to sever, especially since supporting Vietnam was proving to be another symbolic but costly Cuba; furthermore, it had been embarrassing to have the Chinese test the Soviet-Vietnamese military alliance so soon, and to be forced to reveal only a weak commitment. The Chinese coup in East Asia, centred in the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty, whose effects radiated outward in endless concentric circles, may have tipped the Soviet Union that final, critical degree off its strategic balance. For the decisive diplomatic losses in the Pacific theatre appear to have contributed to the decision to use the Brezhnev Doctrine in Afghanistan as a "counter-encirclement" tactic to shore up its faltering Eurasian power base, and to give it better access to a possibly more lucrative Middle East. In the event, the inevitably protracted war in Afghanistan appears, from what we now know, to have contributed to an insupportable drain on Soviet political cohesion and socioeconomic resources. This would be precisely what the Chinese would have predicted, and hoped for.

Against the backdrop of Soviet stubborn over-expansion, the tacit Sino-American anti-Soviet alliance appears to have combined Chinese politico-military cumulative force with the American anti-Soviet massive arms buildup in the 1980's, to push the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse from within. Sun Tzu would have nodded wisely.

IV. MODERN STATE-BUILDING: DEVELOPMENT AND REUNIFICATION ON INTERIOR-EXTERIOR LINES:

The New Unities of Opposites

The newly secure international environment permitted China the strategic turn from an "offensive on exterior lines" demarcated as the international system itself, to a new offensive which turned Chinese fixed, inflexible interior lines into the fluidity of exterior lines, in a classical theoretical "recognition" of the change in the correlation of forces. The strategic counter-offensive against the Soviet Union had been successfully launched by means of action on the geopolitical exterior lines, i.e. a broad international united front, beginning in 1978. This created the initiative, the freedom to manoeuvre so crucial to making strategic choices. The new correlation of forces gave China the opportunity, for the first time, to use constructively the force inherent in the capitalist-socialist unity of opposites. On the geopolitical and geohistorical temporospatial map, China had occupied the centre since 1949, between the Soviet and American giant, contending opposites. China had systematically adapted to all the changes between these opposites, using the force of each opposite, in turn, against the other.

The new relationship with the United States put China inside a Sino-American unity of opposites, of which China was a now key "polarity". There was force here, to be extracted, and the only question was who would do the extracting, the United States or China. The 1979 diplomatic recognition of China by the United States, consolidating the force gains of 1978, marked the Chinese conclusion that they had finally secured the Chinese Base Area as a legitimized nation-state with a permanent, unassailable identity in the international system. China now could go from the international defensive to the

national offensive. It could invest, internally, the strategic accumulation of force over space and time, since 1949. This would require that, in effect, it turn its state-society relationship "inside out", although as always, the opposite condition would coexist. Where the state had faced the world, now it would turn its attention inward, paradoxically by exposing Chinese society outward, to the world.

In its focus on internal geosocioeconomic, rather than geopolitical centres, China would now treat the entire global capitalist system as its partner in a major United Front alliance. China would use the developmental forces inherent in this new organic relationship between China's internal socioeconomic transformative processes and those of capitalist geosocioeconomic spaces. What had been unities of opposites expressed as external state-to-state relationships, would now be transformed into unities of opposing, but, as always, mutually interpenetrating, internal, system-to-system relationships.

THE OPEN DOOR POLICY/COASTAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The Open Door Policy was announced at the December, 1978 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. At this time China stated that: "China would actively expand economic cooperation with other countries and strive to adopt the world's advanced technology and equipment." On July 8, 1979, China adopted the new "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment", paving the way to an activation of the open door policy.²⁵ This new approach, designed to

²⁵ Fuh-Wen Tzeng, 'The Political Economy of China's Coastal Development Strategy', in Asian Survey, Vol. XXX1, No. 3, March 1991, pp. 270-284.

facilitate the Four Modernizations programme of rapid socioeconomic development, has largely taken the form of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), within a larger Coastal Development Strategy:

On February 6, 1988, the Fourth Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP officially adopted the Coastal Development Strategy (CDS) whose ultimate goal is to enable China to expand its exports and compete in the global market. The CDS attempts to link the coastal areas with the global market-place and to promote export-oriented economic development through linkages to inland areas...²⁶

Explaining the CDS's origin in the concept of the "Beneficial International Cycle" (BIC), Tzeng explains that through a process of export-oriented and labour-intensive industrialization,

China would be able to beneficially integrate industrial and agricultural sectors, forming close developmental linkages between coastal areas and inland areas in the process of entering into the competition of the global marketplace.²⁷

From the strategic point of view:

The CDS also has a significant political rationale, which is to strengthen China's international profile and to accelerate its goal of unification with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.²⁸

The Internal Strategic Alliance

The first mandate of the Chinese leadership is seen to lie in maintaining control over the main, or state centre, so as to guarantee Base, or state security, which in turn depends on binding together the subcentres of each derivative, sociopolitical, socioeconomic unity of opposites. The second mandate is to manage the force generated out of the centres of

²⁶ *ibid*, p. 271.

²⁷ *ibid*, p. 272.

²⁸ *ibid*, p. 273.

all these mutually transformative unities.²⁹ In order to hold the State centre, the Chinese leadership will naturally utilize all the shifting force potential as this is liberated, over time, within and between the various internal polarities.

The Special Economic Zones and the Coastal Development Strategy together represent a return to the concept of the internal strategic alliance, within China itself, which Mao conceptualized as the Great Leap Forward strategy of "walking on two legs".³⁰ This is an old Chinese structural pattern in which centres of power complement, stabilize, and use each other, through their fundamental, but creative opposition to each other. The internal strategic alliance was exemplified even earlier, in the long-standing relationship between powerful clans and the imperial court.³¹ The internal

²⁹ Discussing the success of a major industrial enterprise since 1979 reforms, China Pictorial, 3/1992, emphasizes the state's focus on human force potential: "After the implementation of the contract system, the workers' and staff's initiative has been tapped...man is the most active factor in the productive forces. Science and technology would be useless and impossible without the creative forces of humanity", pp. 5-6.

³⁰ Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.56: (commenting on the conceptual division of the entire economy and society into traditional and modern sectors in which each supplemented the other) "...the essential concepts underlying the Great Leap strategy undoubtedly had a certain amount of economic validity...judicious application of underemployed labour to agricultural investment projects using preponderantly labour-intensive industries and the reliance on technological dualism as a significant element in a development strategy can separately or in combination represent crucial elements of a development plan in a densely populated underdeveloped country."

³¹ Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1990, p. 46. The symbiotic relationship between the socioeconomic networks of powerful

strategic alliance is a major form in which the state manages state-society relations.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the philosophical roots of Chinese political theory and the use of force are deep and intertwined, so that in ancient and modern thought force as either violence or authority is assumed to be necessary for the transformation of Chinese society into more "natural, lawful patterns".³² In terms of the recurrence of these philosophical themes in Chinese politics, evidence can be found to show not a change in the normative assumptions, but a desire to revert to older forms of the same social engineering. Thus, in a recent article in Beijing Review, we find an approving review of the revived "world-wide" study of Neo-Confucian thought:

It is hoped that a method may be found in the Oriental culture to ensure a harmonious co-existence of man, nature and society...this exercise combines scientific methods with philosophical and ethical considerations so that man can create positive rather than destructive circumstances for existence by following the principles and laws of nature and mankind.³³

clans with the political, administrative framework provided by the imperial state, is a fascinating dimension of the old state-society tension in Chinese political development.

³² I owe my intense interest in the relationship between the concepts of state, society, force, power and authority especially in the context of state-building, to Robert Bedeski's State-Building in Modern China: The Kuomintang in the Prewar Period, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Berkeley Centre for Chinese Studies, Chinese Research Monograph No. 18, 1981; and also 'The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist and Communist Continuities', in World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1975.

³³ Feng Jing, 'Neo-Confucianism Studies Intensified', in Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 1991, pp. 44-45.

The Coastal Development Strategy is a large conceptual abstraction which is itself a major centre between two extremes, or opposites. On the one hand, it acts as a concrete new "border" which exists as the controlled and defined communicating space between China and the world. In this capacity, it functions as an exterior line formation. The Special Economic Zones in their totality, expressed as the Coastal Development Strategy, represent an opening between China and the world, as a unity of opposites, which contains crisis and opportunity. They also act as a flexible buffer between the interior lines, still defined as the direct, inflexible power of the internally and externally sovereign Chinese state, and the international, potentially hostile system. In this sense the new economic structures represent a kind of dialysing membrane across which force can flow in a monitored and controlled manner, into and out of China.

On the other hand, the Coastal Development Strategy links together The Special Economic Zones, joins these in turn to the other zones of China, and links the whole Chinese modernization program to the political centre. The Coastal Development Strategy is the larger temporospatial map of discontinuous spaces which are now the socioeconomic, rather than political pieces of what Mao once called "a jig-saw" pattern of war. These pieces are separated not only spatially, but temporally in historical, or abstract conceptual terms, in that they are ontologically defined in terms of their different development stages. Hence the role of strategic timing is crucial for intervening in their processes, and for their eventual union. Time in the concrete sense, will link together these temporally and spatially disparate pieces of the Chinese puzzle. Modernization and enhanced state security will be achieved by the passage of time, strategically comprehended in theory, and strategically used in accordance with the principles of protracted war.

Strategically, the Coastal Development Strategy turns what had been China's interior, fixed lines of socioeconomic struggle managed by the political centre, into exterior lines open to the world in a flexible operational manoeuvre. Paradoxically, in the Maoist lexicon, the new exterior line means the designation of a new interior line, and this sets up the rural/urban, inner China-outer China, centre/provincial, centre-regional, political/socioeconomic set of polarities.

The goal will be to oversee the transformation of the exterior and interior lines into each other. The present exterior lines will create a uniformly modernized China, so that the present "uneven development" progresses to nation-wide "evenness". When that time comes, there will be no SEZs, and many of the present unities of opposites will dissolve. Simultaneously, the present interior lines delineating both the underdeveloped state and the fixed, unchangeable rights and responsibilities of the heavily guarded political centre, are to be changed into future exterior lines. That is, all that is good and permanent, conceptually and practically, about the present interior lines, will expand outward, infusing the SEZs with proper socialist political ethics, morality and motivation.

Direct and Indirect Force in the New Protracted War

The new multipolar international setting essentially binds the United States to a host of other geopolitical centres in a multiplicity of "unities of opposites". The hoped for new world order commits the United States, and increasingly Europe, to more and more involvement in regional conflicts on a global scale. Such a complex setting can only provide China with vastly increased opportunities to manoeuvre, and to harvest and utilize every form of force available.

The use of the open door policy to implement the Four Modernizations Program can be seen to be relying on a combination of direct, and indirect political methods. As an international United Front alliance, China is utilizing international laws and financial institutions, and canvassing abroad for foreign investors, making full, direct use of the normal instruments of policy available in the western dominated financial world. China is also now theoretically free to move within the spaces which exist within all the discontinuous, socioeconomic internal relationships which global capitalism creates. These include the "contradictions" within the Third World, wherein capitalist enclaves coexist with traditional practice, providing considerable freedom of manoeuvre. China is able to make use of many of the hidden practices and relationships of capitalism, especially involving war, in parts of the world not subject to even the formal restrictions of liberal-democratic capitalism. This enables China's direct use of the arms trade to accumulate force as new regional influence and currency, which of course creates a whole new set of exterior lines possibilities internationally, remembering that exterior lines and interior lines exist within and between all organically linked international phenomena. Indirectly, the new involvement in regional wars by means of arms supply "subtly" reminds the western states that continued Chinese peaceful membership in the international community depends upon its ability to meet its economic needs, for which it needs the cooperation of the new, partially indirect and even unwilling United Front alliance. This combination of direct political means/indirect political force is subtly, and elegantly (from a theoretical point of view) underwritten by the Chinese indirect decision to raise capital from the sale of arms in the one part of the world conceived to be the major problem for the security of western states: the Middle East. Simultaneously of course, this symbolic, indirect political use of the military

functions directly, and concretely, in that the PLA manufactures much of the arms for sale, and its enterprise earnings are looped back as a foreign currency force input to the direct strengthening of the Chinese military. This in turn strengthens China's indirect political hand, internationally, underlying its inevitable emergence as a military superpower.

Within the United Front alliance, China includes direct alliances with states invited to participate in the New Economic Zones. In the larger picture, these can be seen to comprise one large indirect, or covert alliance with the capitalist states to take over the capitalist development of China. This alliance is a hidden or indirect one from China's perspective, because China's goals for the alliance are not those of the alliance partners. China will economically own the benefits of unchecked capitalism, but can politically disavow its almost certain disruptive, socially dislocating effects. Proving that capitalism is wicked and unworkable would give a new lease on the political life of the present political centre. And in fact the working assumption is that capitalism cannot be a permanent social system; it can only work as the Chinese plan to use it - a carefully controlled tool of social transformation, containing explosive capabilities which Marx outlined well. The whole idea therefore is to treat capitalism as a temporary force input to China's economy, extracted from the dynamic but inherently contradictory relationship between western capitalism and Chinese socialism. In the Chinese view, unities of opposites are complex; this is where strategic skill comes in - the Chinese leadership hope to garner the positive force for their own ends, and to use the expected negative force against both internal and external challenges.

Therefore, for China, the major state enterprise now revolves, both internally and externally around the western capitalist-Chinese socialist internal, socioeconomic unity of opposites. Out of these major global and national unities of opposites great conflictual force can be expected to arise. Strategically designed to facilitate the integration of capitalist and socialist socioeconomic systems under the guidance of the Chinese political centre, the Coastal Development Strategy is the temporospatial blueprint for the political, social and economic development of continental China and of the consolidation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. This new formulation of the temporospatial geopolitical relationships sets the theoretical stage for the force-driven reunification with Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Taiwan, Hong Kong and Exterior Lines Tactics

The Chinese use of direct and indirect political force is exemplified in the Chinese use of Hong Kong's reunification by direct means as cumulative force rerouted, as indirect force, to the regaining of Taiwan. Hong Kong represents the direct political methods available through international law and legal instruments negotiated between nation-states. The Chinese use of communication as force is then applied to create the international, and Taiwanese perception, that the two cases are identical in terms of the political realities. Taiwan has been the main target of China since 1949. It has been the object of both alliances and border-exterior lines operations. Even during the Sino-Soviet alliance, however, China was able to make use of U.S. power in the region to ensure that Taiwan developed economically as a long-term valuable state asset, and also to ensure that at no time would Taiwan be likely to seek Soviet or any other, far more hegemonic protector. In fact, in exchange for China's tacit support of anti-Soviet American policies in an indirect

alliance which was a subset of the larger united front alliance involving as many international states as China could muster, China believed itself to be receiving the American "guarantee" of a secure Taiwan:

As Geng Biao reportedly put it in a secret speech, "At this moment, just let the U.S. defend us against the influence of Soviet revisionism and guard the coast of the East China Sea so that we can have more strength to deal with the power in the north and engage in state construction."³⁴

China could "pick up" Taiwan later, when, as it were, it was "ready for delivery". This would, as always, wait on strategic timing.

The same technique has been employed with Hong Kong, so that the British protectorate guaranteed the regional independence of a valued piece of Chinese property. As with Taiwan, the decision was made to turn the de facto separateness of these Chinese provinces into an asset, whereby each was overseen by states without long-term regional strategic designs. These covert, unwilling partnerships with western states provided via indirect alliances, the strategically vital guarantee that neither would try to declare independence nor would they fall under the influence of states committed to regional domination. At the same time, both would "ripen" economically until they could be plucked from their western vines by future Chinese politico-military strategic methods, chosen carefully, and with particular reference to timing.

The strategy for incorporating Hong Kong and Taiwan into China is based on a forced connectedness between their geohistorical

³⁴ In a 24 August 1976 address to the graduating class of the Beijing Institute of Diplomacy, Geng Biao, cited in Bruce Cumings, 'The Political Economy of China's Turn Outward', in Samuel S. Kim, ed. (1989) op. cit. pp. 222.

developmental identities, as capitalist systems ready to enter into a unity of opposites relationship with the mainland socialist systems. Geopolitically, their political centres are being gradually forced into an internationally validated unity with the Chinese mainland political centre, until all distinctions between these will disappear. Every force gain in the Hong Kong space can be looped back into the Taiwan space struggle, and vice versa, as a momentum of accumulation builds.

Hong Kong is being regained, and is now de facto regained, by two major methods. First, the direct, orthodox approach has been used, by referring the British colonial administrators to their own treaty-lease with China, running from July 1898-July 1997. However, the critical issue of political self-determination applies to both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore the Chinese have adopted for Hong Kong an indirect strategy as well, based upon severing its interior political space from other international geopolitical spaces, and reconnecting it to that of China. This is a form of inverse encirclement which results from international isolation techniques, and has been assiduously applied to Taiwan as well. In both cases, this indirect form of political force has been augmented by a period of intense communication as perception manipulation, and as linguistic shaping of reality, in which self-determination is defined not as a political or economic issue, but as Chalmers Johnson has pointed out, as a matter of cultural and ethnic nationalist loyalty.³⁵ This technique "forces" Hong Kong especially to identify with China, while "forcing" international responsibility away from Hong Kong.

³⁵ Chalmers Johnson, 'The Mouse-Trapping of Hong Kong: A Game in Which Nobody Wins', in Yu-Min Shaw, ed. op. cit. pp. 121-155.

China has already made this an internal matter of state sovereignty.

As well, China has interjected its own political will into the Hong Kong political centre, by paralysing any further evolution of this center toward democratic government which might claim either independence or any forms of self-determination after 1997.³⁶ China has also moved to exercise de facto political sovereignty in decisions involving development projects, military facilities, and the legal system. In an ominous, direct show of political force, the Chinese government has 1) acquired a monopoly on the sources of Hong Kong supply and distribution for the Chinese food staple which is pork; and 2) arranged to all but shut off the alternate sources which have been Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines; and 3) steadily increased the prices to the point of strident, but helpless, local protest.³⁷ This manoeuvre pointedly underlines the literally life and death control Beijing actually has over this "home-coming colony". This new policy seems hardly justified by China's economic needs; however, an enforced economic squeeze on vital foodstuffs is a strategic reminder to the Hong Kong citizens that China also controls their water supply. Not surprisingly, the same article reports that, coinciding with the new pork prices, the fledgling Hong Kong parliament voted "that it did not much want to have any more representative democracy". As discussed below, the explosion of a large nuclear device two months earlier, combined with China's defiant assertion of sovereignty over the Spratlys could not fail to have impressed

³⁶ 'Hong Kong: 1997 Starts Now', in Time, March 16, 1992, pp. 32-33.

³⁷ 'Pork Chinese-Style Comes Expensive', in The Guardian Weekly, July 12, 1992, p. 9.

the Hong Kong citizens almost as much as their new pork prices.

China has vaguely suggested that Hong Kong can keep its social system for perhaps "a long time"; however, as pronouncements on Taiwan indicate, China views time as a strategic tool, which will be given an opportunity to transform the Hong Kong and Taiwan capitalist systems, into their "opposite" , which is the Chinese system. It is a sociopolitical and economic transformation process which will be guided by the Chinese leadership, who see themselves, as a political power centre, to occupy the strategic space between the two opposites; it is the leadership which therefore is in the right position to guide the changes, including those which are conflictual, into new creative patterns.

As a long-term consequence of the fundamentally altered power relations stemming from the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty, neither Japan nor the U.S., both big investors in Hong Kong and Taiwan, have attempted to interfere or to moderate the Chinese position. China is still receiving instalments of force capability from its successful strategic counter-offensive against the Soviet Union, and from the alliances, direct and indirect which were used in the larger United Front Strategy at that time.

As a pointed reminder that economic considerations are one thing, and geopolitical space another, the Chinese have long since signed a 1974 treaty with Portugal, retaining sovereignty over Macao, while allowing Portuguese administration. For neither Hong Kong nor Taiwan, will this formula be permitted.

Islands and Water as Exterior Lines-Border Operations:

The Chinese now clearly include the Pacific Ocean and islands adjacent to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland in their calculation of the concrete border-exterior lines perimeter of China. Having militarily taken and held a portion of the Western Paracels (Xisha), in 1974, by 1986 Chinese PLA naval vessels had set up 167 observation stations in various parts of the Spratly Islands:

The result was 18 months of heightened tension between Vietnam and China, culminating in armed clashes between the naval forces of the two countries in March 1988. In February 1988 the Chinese government had formally asserted its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, by publicly declaring that it had the right to 'survey, study and patrol' the islands and their surrounding waters...Although precise information is still not available, it is reported that Chinese forces had control of six major islands or reefs as of April 1988. This permanent Chinese presence in the Spratly Islands apparently consisted of at least one battalion of marines, whose garrison duties included the rapid construction of platforms and helipads, strongly suggesting that China is determined not to leave the area.³⁸

This direct military force used against both Vietnams, bracketing the 1979 invasion of Vietnam itself, underlined China's regional strategic resolve, highlighting China's willingness to use force, again and again, within strategic parameters set by the Chinese, and interpreted to the world in Chinese terms of multivalent logic. As noted earlier, this willingness to use force holds high, ongoing salience for both Taiwan and Hong Kong. The fact that Taiwan also lays claim to many of the disputed Pacific territories has permitted the PRC

³⁸ Marko Milivojevic, 'The Spratly and Paracel Islands Conflict', in Survival, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, January/February 1989, pp. 70-77. In Time, June 29, 1992, note is made that China has contracted a U.S. firm in May, 1992 to begin oil explorations in a patch of ocean near the Spratlys and Paracels, and further: "Beijing vows it will hold title to the patch of ocean with force if necessary." p. 11

to utilize another opportunity to visibly preempt any question of independent Taiwanese sovereignty, as the PRC will itself proceed to redeem all Chinese irredentist claims in East Asia.

In terms of politico-military force, China has applied this in direct and indirect fashion, using its geopolitical exterior lines as theatres of manoeuvre. Indirectly, the 1979 military invasion of Vietnam underscored, as always, the Chinese political willingness to follow through on announced force threats, and it could be temporospatially linked, as indirect military force, with the direct military force which had enabled China to make concrete military gains from its 1974 conquest of Xisha, and of the Spratlys in 1988. These conquests had indirectly looped back into all the other military actions of the past, serving to emphasise Chinese consistency on territorial claims, and capability to use force where the Chinese considered the stakes high enough. These interconnected military events all hold future, other temporospatial force potential.

Regionally, the implications of the Chinese gradual conquest of more islands are serious. In addition to posing a more credible military threat to Taiwan and to Indochina, the Chinese military actions appear designed to announce a more forward military, and thus political presence in the Pacific. The stakes are high, in that:

...these disputed continental shelf territories and waters bestride one of the most important international maritime corridors in the world, extending from the Straits of Malacca/Singapore in the south, to Indochina, China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan, Korea (North and South) and the Soviet Union to the north, and the Philippines to the north-east. In addition, the continental shelf of Islands - in particular the Spratlys - may contain large oil and gas reserves, whose potential extent and value can only be guessed at...³⁹

³⁹ *ibid.* p. 74.

In an article entitled 'China's Maritime Interests and Policies', Chen Xiaogong calls the sea the "sixth continent on which mankind will live and survive."⁴⁰ With obvious reference to Chinese lebensraum, Chen states that "The construction of artificial cities on or under the sea can expand the living space of mankind and solve the problem of crowded population." He suggests that the integration of land and sea "has long been inherited in the Chinese culture", although it is clear he is emphasizing a modern development, and he underlines the fact that maritime resources represent a vital key to China's modernization program.

The meshing of direct and indirect forms of both political and military force can be observed in the Chinese regional use of force to expand outward in pursuit of national interests, and to defy international efforts to modify Chinese domestic or foreign policies:

In the teeth of all good-neighbour policies, Chinese officials mid-June gave the go-ahead for oil exploration far offshore in the South China Sea. The potential drilling sites underlie waters of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, chains of sandbars that are among the world's most complexly disputed maritime zones. Yet China has brazened forth to exploit its claims just a month after detonating a huge underground nuclear blast in the western desert region of Xinjiang.⁴¹

The Chinese have, in this sequence of events, utilized the direct military potential of a huge atomic blast to provide political "cover" for the political-economic exploitation of their military conquest of the Spratlys in 1988. Even more

⁴⁰ Chen Xiaogong, in op. cit. p. 12.

⁴¹ 'The Great Stone Wall', Time, July 6, 1992, pp.32-33. Asking "why does the world's biggest nation seem to be running so defiantly against the wind?", the article points out that China is systematically, openly, and even aggressively, defying western efforts to engage China in a supportive role for any normative "new world-order".

significantly, from the strategic point of view, China is obviously flanking its "soft" exterior-lines transformative experiments in its Coastal Development Strategy, by a "tough" internal, interior-lines control policy, and an equally tough, external show of state sovereignty and territorial integrity backed by direct (PLA) and indirect (atomic explosion) force. Thus China has reinforced its state sovereignty and territorial integrity by military force, at a time when many perceive Chinese state security to be undermined by western socioeconomic penetration in the Special Economic Zones. Again, the series of concentric circles forms the essential spatial structure of the Chinese strategic paradigm, with temporally designated exterior and interior lines not only providing cover to each other, but extending Chinese state power outward, in progressive, alternating waves.⁴²

TAIWAN: THE ULTIMATE TERRITORY

Hong Kong is already "a captured space", and it is Taiwan which is the ultimate territorial goal of China's slow accumulation of force over the decades. At the Third Plenum of December 1978, which brought Deng Xiaoping to supremacy in the Chinese Communist Party, the three major goals of the Chinese state were listed as: "reunification, combating hegemony, and construction".⁴³ With the examples in space, linked through time, of Mongolia, Tibet, Xisha (1974 conquest from Vietnam), The Spratlys in 1988 and now Hong Kong, the clear message to the world, and to Taiwan, is that as soon as China can achieve the space in which to manoeuvre, or gain the

⁴² This is highly reminiscent of Hannah Arendt's characterization of totalitarian states as requiring an "onion-like" structure for concealment and protection of a "centre" which attempts to provide its own cover in an outward movement of expansion.

⁴³ Gerald Segal, Defending China, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 153.

initiative, (as it did with the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978), it will, by military force if necessary, retake Taiwan.

Regaining Taiwan is becoming essential to China's long-term, more expansion-oriented operations on the ever widening exterior lines internationally, made possible by the gaining of the strategic initiative, or freedom, which resulted from decades of patient temporospatial accumulation, hoarding and sparing use of force. Given its increasing blue-water capabilities, China's new freedom to manoeuvre may be expressed as a projection of national power well beyond what has thought to be likely for this continental power.⁴⁴ China has, as noted above, moved cautiously but decisively to strategically position itself at key points in the Pacific. The sea lanes, the off-shore rights of the 200-mile limit, and the immense richness of Taiwan, are needed for Chinese development. It is also extremely important to an ageing Chinese leadership for whom the prime datum always was the international humiliation of China through the piecemeal acquisition of its territory:

The solution of the issue of Hong Kong and Macao will put an end to the century-old national humiliation and set the stage for the settlement of the Taiwan question.⁴⁵

China's use of force with Taiwan begins with the post-1949 military forays, but has largely been expressed over the ensuing decades through the gradual isolation of Taiwan internationally. This began with its ouster in October of 1972 when China gained the United Nations seat in the Security

⁴⁴ See Harry Gelber, *op. cit.*, and Ngok Lee, China's Defence Modernization and Military Leadership, Australian National University Press, 1989, Chapter 6.

⁴⁵ Wen Qing, 'The Best Way to Peaceful Reunification', in Beijing Review, p. 20.

Council; it climaxed in the January 1979 United States recognition of China and the feeble Taiwan Relations Act, the ambiguity of which has exercised Taiwanese intellectuals ever since. International law has been combed, largely unsuccessfully, by the Republic of China to find precedents for its peculiar non-status as a state.

This use of the international forum and its laws has been augmented by China's use of direct and indirect alliances, as with the United States and Japan, in which the quid pro quo for China has been the tacit agreement by alliance partners that Taiwan is now, an internal matter. In this sense, China has finally succeeded in breaking down the connectedness of Taiwan's political centre with the major geopolitical centres of the world, none of whom value their connections with Taiwan as much as the relationship with a modernizing China.

A military takeover cannot be ruled out should the United States become embroiled in any kind of protracted conflict. While waiting for such a possible strategically perfect moment, the present strategy is to enhance the perception of political isolation and inevitable political death, and to encourage/force reconnection of Taiwan's political centre to that of the People's Republic of China. Recently, China has begun to use communication as the educative-coercive use of force. In this mode, the education function of communication is multivalent - it is directed at the international system, at the Taiwanese government, and at the Taiwanese people. The cumulative effect of this strategy is in turn redirected at Hong Kong, just as the Hong Kong campaign strategy and its results are continually reused as inputs to the reunification of Taiwan.

Two articles in the Beijing Review strongly suggest that ground is being laid for the maximum use of force, possibly including military, in order to achieve reunification. In an

August 1990 issue, an article by Wen Qing lays out the expected theoretical explanation and therefore justification for the reunification:

Unity of opposites is the basic law governing every thing in the universe...two conflicting aspects struggle against and depend on each other at one and the same time, and under given conditions, they coexist in one entity; under given conditions, one side may be transformed into its opposite...Socialism is established on the capitalist material foundation; they two are linked in the chain of development of human history. In a certain historical stage, they will coexist and infiltrate each other. The value of the 'one country, two systems' concept is that in a socialist country it is possible to keep several capitalist regions intact, a practice that also benefits socialism...In short, the 'one country, two systems' is a strategic policy adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in the highest interests of the Chinese nation and in the light of the status quo of the two sides.⁴⁶

Wen underlines the fact that China will not renounce the use of military force, in order to ensure that Taiwan does indeed get on with "peace negotiations". He discusses how theoretically and practically, Taiwanese and mainland development are interrelated realities, and furthermore mentions that Deng's 'one country, two systems' concept is actually a development of Lenin's strategic idea of taking advantage of capitalism. Taiwan's economy, along with the special coastal and other economic zones and open cities, will form a special capitalist enclave from which the rest of China can draw sustenance, until it develops sufficiently to dispense with the last vestiges of capitalist social formation in its midst.

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p. 25.

The latter comments are especially designed to create an indirect alliance between Taiwan and the rest of the capitalist world who are confidently risking their futures in mainland, socialist China. China uses here the force/logic of parallelism and the human-natural law of the universal repetition of patterns. The "natural relationship" which awaits its realization in history is the co-existence, within one unity, of Taiwanese capitalism and Chinese socialism. This is symbolized by, and exists concretely in, the Coastal Development Strategy mainland project.

A second article in a December 1990⁴⁷ issue reprints President Yang Shangkun's speech to reporters from the ROC. The article is significant for its urgent tone, and the repetition of the need to rapidly achieve reunification. In fact, it is reiterated that the ageing leadership wish to see this before they die, and this could mean much more in China, given its modern history, than it would in a western context. In addition to the remarkable repetition of the urgency of the question, the article pointedly mentions that "Taiwan's position is untenable internationally as it has no status in international law". It goes on to stress that "Today, Taiwan's position is not stable and there is a danger of its being taken over by others. Thus, we cannot promise to forego the use of military force in order to prevent Taiwan splitting off from China." This latter comment is again charged with the use of force itself, in that it is basically threatening either Taiwan or a potential ally, that any anti-mainland alliance would be looked upon as justification for invasion or nuclear threat. This of course is designed to further isolate Taiwan, as no other state now wishes to be the occasion of war over Taiwan.

⁴⁷ Shangkun Yang, 'On China's Reunification', Beijing Review, December 1990.

The pattern of force which emerges as the Chinese strategic paradigm, suggests that two necessary conditions now exist for the retaking of Taiwan: 1) China has identified Taiwan as a vital strategic objective; and 2) China has, to its own satisfaction, identified the natural timing to be correct, judging by application of its long-standing "unity of opposites" theory to the socialist-capitalist relationship holding between the two.

In 1949, the Chinese saw Taiwan slip from their grasp; they have waited for nearly five decades to regain this ultimate symbol of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. It is only a matter of time before China redesignates Taiwan from its current flexible, exterior line status, to that of an inflexible, interior line target. Forcible reunification may well be the next Tiananmen Square.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

Because both ancient Chinese thought and Marxist-Leninist politico-strategic theory are predicated upon the simplicity of form and content found in the "unity of opposites", it is obvious why these two seemingly alien traditions should have proven so profoundly compatible. Marxist-Leninist thought, a doctrine of existentially meaningful, collective, and ultimately successful struggle, was imported under conditions of grave national crisis. This philosophical addition appears to have been a synergistic catalyst for the renewed force and applicability of that which the indigenous culture subliminally perpetuated - a philosophical technology which provided a key for the lock of reality.

Protracted war was developed and established as China's philosophy of war and politics during the Anti-Japanese and Civil Wars beginning early in the 20th century. Protracted war identified and used the interrelated factors of time and space as a framework for the strategic management of struggle and the product of struggle: force. It is possible that the next generation of leadership may abandon this tool for state-building and national security, but this is unlikely. The politico-military doctrines which govern temporospatial force accumulation were designed under what Sun Tzu called the death-ground conditions. They proved their value for China's survival then, and for international survival since. Since Chinese strategic culture has its roots deep in Chinese language and philosophy, bridging both political and military thought patterns, it is unlikely that politics as war, or war as politics, will cease to motivate Chinese foreign policy.

Finally, for thousands of years, China has viewed the outside world with distrust. The continued evolution of China's national power in the twenty-first century is certain to enhance the world's reciprocal distrust of China. It seems

very likely, therefore, that China will continue to see the use of force, in the exercise of foreign policy, in the context of a protracted war.

RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS:

Research conclusions are as follows:

1) The PRC has successfully identified and furthered its national interests in a consistent manner from 1949 to the present. Chinese foreign policy appears to be made within the international relations assumptions of realism and realpolitik: competition for power and comparative advantage between sovereign nation-states, seeking to secure basic, enduring national interests.

2) A theoretical framework for the comparative analysis of strategic cultures has been developed. The key concepts of strategic culture are the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of a given philosophical tradition. The derivative concepts of rationality, force, space, and time coalesce with a culture's historical experience of war and violence, to form a strategic paradigm.

3) Using the theoretical comparative framework thus developed, mainstream western strategic culture has been shown to have culminated in contradictory philosophies of war creating a culturally perceived gulf between a political philosophy of war and genuinely "political" thinking. The fundamental tenets of realpolitik (or realism) are based on war as the rational, national and instrumental extension of foreign policy, applied in the strategies of containment and balance of power. These tenets theoretically and practically conflict with the Cold War normative issues of deterrence, arms control, and limited war, in the context of the perceived western mandate for conflict and crisis management. Furthermore, western social scientific theories of conflict reflect western philosophical confusion as to the nature of reality, and thus of the origins of social conflict and of war.

3) Use of the comparative conceptual framework for the cross-cultural analysis of strategic thought has clarified essential features of Chinese strategic thought. Firstly, the international context has been perceived by the Chinese leadership to constitute an appropriate setting for a protracted war. Chinese foreign policy and the use of force are therefore asserted to be the political and military dimensions, respectively, of a new political philosophy of protracted war. Ontologically, the key to modern Chinese strategic thought lies in the conception of reality first outlined in the I Ching, and later reinforced in Marxist-Leninist Thought, in which the principle of the "unity of opposites", and a comprehensive theory of change through time, are fully articulated. The Chinese language reinforces a view of unfolding reality in repeating patterns whose interconnections transcend space and time. Understanding the principles at work in the changing patterns of reality leads to epistemological expertise which forms the essence of strategic skill.

4) The thesis has demonstrated the existence of a coherent, initiatory, and consistent, strategic pattern for the application and pursuit of power in the international system. This takes the form of "Chinese realist theory and practice", based neither on western realist theory nor related Clausewitzian Direct Strategic precepts. Rather it is based on a specifically Chinese strategic paradigm which originates in the interaction of philosophical tradition, historical experience, and ongoing geopolitical challenges, which together have produced a unique matrix of interrelated strategic concepts.

5) The novelty of China's strategic paradigm lies in Mao's use of modern state geopolitical parameters or boundaries, in their concrete and abstract forms, as the temporospatial

"gameboard" for the long-term, changing applications of politico-military force. The political and military dimensions of force are deployed and interrelated by means of their origin in and reference to, this temporospatial conceptual framework whose boundaries are set in space by Chinese geopolitical national interests, and in time by the changing realities and possibilities within the international environment. It is a use of force which differs markedly from mainstream western conceptions of either military force or diplomatic policy. It is a pattern characterized by the mutually supportive, almost interchangeable relationship between diplomatic and military forms of force which is augmented exponentially in a cumulative process of power-building. It can be said that the new temporospatial framework provided a form which linked, concentrated, focused and thus maximized (as would a springboard, or bow), the coherent, consistent and most effective operation of China's indigenous, ancient strategic principles. As the theoretical handbook for the conduct of Chinese foreign relations, Mao's strategic, politico-military framework was a vital addition to the state-building skills of modern China.

6) This strategic paradigm has been shown to be systematically applied to the political, military and economic spheres of state policy such that fundamental patterns are repeated, and are linked both conceptually and practically within and across all spheres of Chinese internationalist pursuits.

7) Finally, in light of the above conclusions, the thesis has demonstrated the theoretical role and value of comparative strategic culture to international relations theory. This approach has assisted in the identification of culture-specific patterns of force underlying the foreign policy of western states, showing that these patterns prevent the

identification of contrasting strategic culture in non-western states. These observations have especially facilitated a clarification of the cultural form and content of strategic thought in the foreign policy practices of the People's Republic of China.

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