

POWER AND LOVE: AN EXPLORATION OF COUNSELLING GOALS

by

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
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ABSTRACT

This study considers the relationship between self-concern and concern for others in response to accusations that the human potential movement and therapy in general promote selfishness at the expense of social responsibility. A philosophical base for dealing with this question is sought in Paul Tillich's ontology of power and love. An attempt is made to show that these are inter-related and inter-dependent.

Self-concern is described as deriving from our power to affirm and express the validity of our own being in the world against internal and external resistance, while "other-concern" (concern for others) is described as deriving from love, the drive we experience towards union with others. Union can only be achieved when one is able to experience and respond to the intrinsically valuable uniqueness and separateness of another. It is argued that I am unable to affirm your validity as a separate person unless I am also able to affirm my own. Yet, equally, I cannot deeply affirm my own until I can also grasp, accept and affirm yours.


The concepts of evil and ambiguity are explored to show how personal power becomes distorted into power over others and love into "need love," both giving rise to attempts to manipulate, control and change others. A perspective on self-actualization is developed based on an examination of essential selfhood, and the actualizing power of love is discussed.

the aims being to show the intimate relationship between power and love and how they manifest themselves in life.


Finally, the central goal of counselling is identified as helping the individual come more deeply into touch with his own power and love. Concepts such as morality, freedom, justice, aloneness, self-responsibility, the goodness of one's essential humanity, self-awareness and self-acceptance are also examined, in order to illuminate some major aspects of the process whereby this goal can be realized.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.	ii
List of Figures	vii
Acknowledgments	viii
Dedication.	ix
I. INTRODUCTION	
The Problem	1
The Purpose of this Study	6
Significance for Counselling.	6
Limitations of the Study.	7
Reasons for Choosing Tillich's Ontology	8
Method and Procedure.	9
II. SELF-CONCERN AND OTHER-CONCERN: POWER AND LOVE	
The Validity of Self-Concern and Other-Concern.	11
Egoistic and Altruistic Ethics.	13
The Ontological Source of Self-Concern: Power	17
The Ontological Source of Other-Concern: Love.	21
Justice	28
The Relationship of Love, Power and Justice to the Self . . .	30
The Relationship Between Power and Love	32
Summary	34
III. A THEORY OF EVIL	
A Theory of Evil.	35
1. The Threat of Non-Being.	36
2. The Vulnerability of the Child	39
3. Karen Horney's Model of Neurosis	42

4. Tillich's Model of Distortion	47
5. Essence, Existence and Ambiguity.	49
6. The Reality of Evil	53
Aloneness and Self-Responsibility.	55
The Concept of Need.	60
Summary.	65

IV. PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-ACTUALIZATION

Essential Selfhood and Its Actualization	66
Reclaiming Power and Freedom	73
Freeing the Spontaneous Self: Natural Self-Affirmation.	77
Man as a Moral Being	80
The Goodness of Essential Humanity	86
Relating to Need Creatively.	90
Summary.	93

V. THE ACTUALIZING POWER OF LOVE

Love in the Self-World Relationship.	94
1. A Definition of Love.	94
2. The Self-Other Polarity	96
3. Love as Union	103
4. The Self-Transcendent Experience.	106
5. The Actualizing Power of Love	108
(a) The Person Who Loves	109
(b) The Recipient of Love.	111
(c) The Intimate Relationship.	113
Love Outside the Interpersonal Relationship.	115
1. Self-Love	116
2. Distortions of Imbalance.	118
3. Social Responsibility	119
Self-Concern and Other-Concern: Conclusion	124

VI. THE GOALS OF COUNSELLING

Self-Actualization as the Goal of Counselling.	129
Preliminary Considerations	131
1. Dangers in Conceptualizing Goals.	131

2. The Process as the Goal	133
3. Standards for Defining the Existentially Ultimate Counselling Goals.	136
Defining the Goals of Counselling.	138
1. Counselling Goals Expressed in a Sentence	139
2. A Formal Definition of Existentially Ultimate Counselling Goals.	141
3. An Informal Definition of Counselling Goals	143
VII. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS	
Shortcomings and Suggestions for Further Research.	145
Implications for Counselling	146
Reference Note	149
References	150

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Essential Selfhood. 70

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To Lynn and Heather
who exemplify vital
living for their
Father.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

In a provocative article in Harper's, Peter Marin (1975) accused the human potential movement and humanistic psychology, both important influences in counselling, of promoting a new narcissism, "a deification of the isolated self. . . . Selfishness and moral blindness now assert themselves in the larger culture as enlightenment and psychic health" (p. 45). Summarizing and commenting on Erhard Seminars Training (EST), "in many ways the logical extension of the whole human potential movement of the past decade" (p. 47), he writes:

The world is perfect, each of us is all-powerful, shame and guilt are merely arbitrary notions, truth is identical to belief, suffering is merely the result of imperfect consciousness--how like manna all of this must seem to hungry souls. For if we are each totally responsible for our fate, then all the others in the world are responsible for their fate, and, if that is so, why should we worry about them? . . . The refusal to consider moral complexities, the denial of history and a larger community, the disappearance of the Other, the exaggerations of the will, the reduction of all experience to a set of platitudes--all of that is to be found in embryonic form in almost all modern therapy. (pp. 46-47)

Marin's protest is not an isolated one. Tom Wolfe (1976) calls the 1970's the "Me Decade" and describes the "new alchemical dream" as one of "changing one's personality--remaking, remodeling, elevating, and polishing one's very self . . . and observing, studying, and

doting on it. (Me!)" (p. 143) In September 1976, both Time and Newsweek carried articles which dealt with this issue. Newsweek (Woodward, 1976) quoted Theodore Roszak as describing America in the 1970's as being launched on "the biggest introspective binge any society in history has undergone" (p. 57). The criticism also comes from within the human potential movement. Charles Hampden-Turner, at that time (September 1976) President Elect of the Association for Humanistic Psychology, was quoted by Time ("Narcissus Redivivus," 1976) as describing the movement as being "top-heavy on the side of self-concern. I think that is self-defeating. [You seek] to become one with the universe, but instead you isolate yourself" (p. 60). Though it is arguable as to whether this decade is, in fact, any more selfish than others, there seems sufficient evidence to indicate that it is at least more openly self-centered, particularly in those sectors of the population that are influenced by humanistic psychology.

Marin's understanding of the human potential movement and his tendency to ascribe responsibility to it for this state of affairs is simplistic. Many forces have converged to produce the current situation. Accelerating technological and cultural change, combined with a revolution of rising expectations based on the new affluence of Western society which makes available to the majority the kind of leisure only available to the rich in the past, have contributed powerfully to the present situation. At the same time, the old systems of commitment to communal purposes, e.g. Christianity and nationalism, have lost their viability in our culture and were already breaking down in Freud's time. Psychoanalysis developed in response to this

situation (Rieff, 1966, p. 71).

The maintenance of the old systems of community was partially based on a legalistic approach to morality. Legalistic moralism involves many "prefabricated rules and regulations" which are not merely guidelines to behavior, but "directives to be followed" (Fletcher, 1966, p. 18). "Protestantism has rarely constructed" as "intricate codes and systems of law" as Catholicism and Judaism, "but what it has gained by its simplicity it has lost through its rigidity, its puritanical insistence on moral rules" (p. 19). Much of the narcissistic quality of the present decade represents an over-reaction to a smothering sense of social obligation built on guilt and fostered in terms of duty, responsibility, and the denial of individual needs in the name of the community's welfare. The human potential movement is as much a phenomenon of, as a cause of the present situation. All this is, of course, not to deny the validity of Marin's concern.

The problem is to find some way of establishing that self-concern and other-concern are both vital for full human and social development, and to define the relationship between them in such a way that the full functioning of each is seen as making possible the full functioning of the other. A simple return to the former state of affairs, based as it was on legalistic morality, besides being impossible, would also be retrogressive as it would deny the real benefits which have been won by the new cultural revolution. "The strange new lesson we have begun to learn in our time is how not to pay the high personal costs of social organization" (Rieff, 1966, p. 239).

The concept of love, with its element of concern for the other, seems to provide a more hopeful basis for a reconsideration of our

relationship with the world. A number of authors, including Murry (1957, p. 17), Lepp (1963, p. 5), Harper (1966, p. 169), Haughton (1970, p. 190), Teilhard de Chardin (1959, p. 265), Witt (1954), Montagu (1959), Toynbee (1971, p. 2), and Sorokin (1950a,^{p.}213), consider love, in one way or another, as being the answer to the problems we face in our society and in the world today. One of the difficulties with this concept is its lack of clarity and the ambiguity of its use in our culture, which may be one reason it has been largely neglected in psychological and educational research, e.g., the Thesaurus of ERIC Descriptors (ERIC, 1975) does not have a category for love. Yet, despite the confusion, the word love still holds a very high degree of symbolic power and I think this justifies any attempt to make it a more serviceable concept in counselling.

Part of the problem in dealing with the relationship between self-concern and other-concern lies in a strong tendency in many people to see this issue in terms of an either-or dichotomy, i.e., to believe that they are mutually exclusive: If I am concerned about myself, it has to be at the expense of my concern for society and I am selfish. If, on the other hand, I am socially responsible, it has to be at the expense of myself, i.e., to be loving or socially responsible, I have to deny myself. One often runs across the idea of unselfish, altruistic or self-denying love. Seldom is an act seen as being able to be of benefit to oneself and the other at the same time.

In this dialectical battle, unselfishness, love, and social concern have a positive ethical appeal while selfishness and sometimes even self-love, carry strong derogatory value connotations. This arises, in part at least, from the continuing emotional power of moralistic

puritanism in our culture. It seems probable that, in the process of rejecting legalistic moralism, deep unresolved feelings of guilt have been generated in many sectors of our society and this lends some justification to Marin's (1975) assertion that

our therapies become a way of hiding from the world, a way of easing our troubled conscience. What lies behind the form they now take is neither simple greed nor moral blindness; it is, instead, the unrealized shame of having failed the world and not knowing what to do about it. (p. 48)

It is critical, in trying to find a productive relationship between self-concern and other-concern, to find some way of overcoming the dualism of selfishness and unselfishness; to find a basis for self-concern that is not narcissistic, and a basis for our relationship with the world that is not tied to the assumptions of legalistic moralism.

Another dimension of this problem relevant to this study lies in the power of symbols to mobilize individuals' and groups' orientations to themselves and the world. No matter how sound and essential it is, the full intellectual explication of a concept such as other-concern or love is not enough. The symbolic form of encapsulating that truth must be adequate to it and point to it rather than away from it or to it in a distorted way. Many of the concepts used in the human potential movement have the partial qualities of symbols and many of these, including, for example, self-actualization, tend to point towards the self alone. In this lies their weakness. Many persons respond to these self-oriented symbols in terms of their need to break loose from the constraints of legalistic moralism and have fallen into a kind of self-indulgence as a result. In this context, the problem becomes one of trying to find formulations which will point to the essential dual nature of self and world in which neither side is lost. This concept

will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The Purpose of This Study

assumed

1. I have taken the liberty in this chapter, for the purpose of developing certain aspects of the problem, of assuming that there are justifiable forms of both self-concern and other-concern. The first purpose of this study is to see whether this can be established as a legitimate position.

2. If this can be done, then the next step is to see if it is possible to define a meaningful relationship between personal growth and concern for others: one that does not fall on one hand into a narcissism which denies the essential relationship of man with his world or, on the other, into a blind moralistic commitment to the world which denies the essential separateness and value of the individual self.

3. If and when the above are established, then the purpose is to work towards a redefining and rephrasing of the "ultimate goals" (Patterson, 1974b, p. 17) of counselling so that they will focus on both sides of the problem and their relationship.

Significance for Counselling

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If a satisfactory resolution of the alleged conflict between concern for self and concern for others can be found, and if this can be stated in terms of ultimate goals, this would be significant for counselling in

the following ways:

1. It would contribute towards the continuing search for meaningful and appropriate goals and towards finding powerful ways of symbolizing these for counselling.

2. It would contribute towards the continuing dialogue between proponents of the responsibility of the individual for himself, and the proponents of the individual's responsibility to others and to society. It would do this, in part, by suggesting that the constructive answer is to be found not so much in an either-or position as in one that sees the dependence of each on the other.

3. It could help the individual counsellor redefine his or her own values and goals. This is of critical importance in the counselling relationship as the counsellor's values influence the way he or she responds to the counsellee. Among other things, it affects the awarenesses to which the counsellor points the client about the significance of the latter's attitudes and behaviors. This could help the people involved in the process to avoid the pitfalls of self-indulgence and hidden narcissism and to find more meaningful ways of relating to the world. Hopefully, it would also lead to a deeper appreciation of and openness to experiencing the depths of what it means to be human.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to a consideration of the ultimate goals of counselling. It deals mainly with these as they affect the question of the relationship between the self and others. The study is further

limited by investigating these issues primarily within the framework of Paul Tillich's ontology of power and love.

Reasons for Choosing Tillich's Ontology

For many years now I have been fascinated by Tillich's thought and have found in it a clarifying quality that goes to the core of many fundamental questions, including the meaning of love. His concepts generally make sense to me, feel right, put issues in perspective, and, at the same time, point to the depth and ambiguity of human life.

Tillich also has the advantage of being one of the "great" philosophical and theological thinkers of our age (Kegley & Bretall, 1956, pp. ix-x), not only in terms of quality but also in the extensive impact he has had on contemporary thought. Theodore Green (1956) writes:

Paul Tillich is, I am convinced, the most enlightening and therapeutic theologian of our time. He analyzes our conscious problems and our unconscious needs more profoundly, and he shows us how these problems can be solved and these needs satisfied more constructively, than any recent or contemporary thinker. (p. 50)

Life ("Paul Tillich: 1886-1965," 1965), in an obituary on Tillich, wrote: "He made Christian theology as important in the thought of his time as Einstein made the equivalence of mass and energy important in modern weaponry. Unlike the atomic bomb, Tillich's theology was not measurable; but it was explosive" (p. 40D). Tillich is mentioned, discussed, or appears in the bibliographies of psychologists such as Gale (1969), Maslow (1970), May (1972), Sorokin (1950b), Laing (1971), Naranjo (1972), Erikson (1968), Fowles (1968), Fromm (1957), Shostrom (1972), Kemp (1970), Kopp (1976); of such philosophers and sociologists

as Sadler (1969), Becker (1973), Shmueli (1972), McConnell (1971), Rieff (1966); and in many books on love including Hazo (1967), Rhodes (1972), Williams (1968), Toner (1968) and Outka (1972). Tillich was also, himself, deeply interested and knowledgeable in psychology, especially in the work of Freud.

Tillich has taken the concerns of the skeptic, the disillusioned, the intellectual and, in particular, the existentialist, as being serious and has attempted to, as it were, speak to them. His position has been one of standing on the boundary between conflicts saying "Yea and Nay"--a position of central importance in this study--rather than "Either-Or". He looked for what was true in each approach while at the same time denying what he saw as false--seldom, if ever, did he reject any position outright.

Method and Procedure

The basic approach in this study is theoretical. The methods used are description, analysis, and philosophical exploration.

I begin in Chapter 2 by showing that there are valid forms of self-concern and other-concern. The nature of these forms and their inter-relationships are then considered in terms of Tillich's ontology of power and love. This ontology has been most fully developed in his Love, Power, and Justice (1954). Other important sources are the three volumes of his Systematic Theology (1953, 1957b, 1964) and "Being and Love" (1958).

In Chapter 3 I turn to an exploration of the question of evil in order to show how power and love become ambiguously distorted. I found Tillich (1957b), Becker (1973), and Horney (1950) particularly useful in this respect. The concepts of aloneness and self-responsibility are developed as two essential principles that need to be grasped if love and power are to be more fully realized. The nature of human needs are also considered, in part to lay the groundwork for an examination in Chapter 4 of how these can be handled in non-destructive ways.

Chapter 4 investigates the relationship of power and love to the concept of self-actualization and then explores more fully the process of actualizing one's power. An attempt is also made to clarify the nature of morality as moral arguments are often central in discussions of self-concern and other-concern. The concept of the goodness of a person's essential humanity is introduced, in part to support an inquiry into some of the conditions required for the growth of power and love, and in part to support a deeper exploration of love in the following chapter.

In Chapter 5, I turn to an examination of the nature of love and its relationship to the self-other polarity in order to show, from another perspective, the inter-dependence of love and power. In order to clarify the breadth of the concept, I also survey how love operates outside the inter-personal sphere. This includes a consideration of social responsibility. I then summarize and draw together the previous discussions of the relationships between self- and other-concern.

Chapter 6 explores love and power in the context of self-actualization as the goal of counselling, and attempts to redefine that goal. Chapter 7 looks at some shortcomings in the study, suggestions for research, and some implications for counselling.

CHAPTER II

SELF-CONCERN AND OTHER-CONCERN: POWER AND LOVE

I start my argument by attempting to show that there are legitimate forms of both self-concern and other-concern. I also examine the question of whether or not one is subordinate to the other. The concepts of power and love are then introduced as the ontological sources of self-concern and other-concern. The idea of justice is discussed, and the relationship of justice, power and love to the self and the relationship between power and love are explored.

The Validity of Self-Concern and Other-Concern

There can be little doubt that there are legitimate or justifiable forms of self-concern and other-concern, just as there are destructive forms. To deny any validity to other-concern would be to live in relation to other people without any kind of genuine respect or caring for them. They could only be seen as objects to be physically or psychologically used or eliminated in accordance with one's own selfish purposes, desires, and needs. Their humanity would be denied. Justice would have no meaning. Relations between people would be based on avoidance, compulsion and manipulation, and would be dominated by fear,

suspicion and deceit. Some of the most widely prized of human qualities, e.g., love, parental nurturing, tenderness, compassion, trust, and honesty, would be meaningless and there could be no basis for genuine community.

To deny validity to any kind of self-concern, on the other hand, would lead to the inherent illogicality of what Ayn Rand (1964) calls the altruistic ethic. She states this in its most extreme form: "Altruism declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and any action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral value--and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than oneself, anything goes" (p. viii). This position, which represents more the unconscious assumptions rather than the conscious stance of many who are raised within the altruistic framework, becomes ludicrous when one attempts to imagine a world in which everyone is only concerned for the other's welfare. The question immediately arises: Would it not be selfish to accept an altruistic action? Even if one is justifiably allowed to, if only to please the other person, this still leaves the decision as to what is good for one in the other's hands, for to express one's own needs and desires is to exhibit self-concern.

In reality, no one other than myself can look after my legitimate interests without at the same time negating my deepest needs, e.g., to be myself and to be self-responsible. Those who try to change me and/or look after my interests and needs for me are there for their own needs, e.g., to be mothering--to keep me dependent--and thus to maintain the illusion of their superiority. These people do not know what my real needs are. Those who do, will accept me as I am and will only want to help me, if I want it, to move towards taking greater responsibility for myself. Also, in reality, there are always individuals ready to manipulate and exploit people's idealism and concern for others. A denial of validity to self-concern can thus lead to, for example, "the fascist theory

of the corporate state and the authoritarian submergence of the individual for the sake of the postulated common good" (Katz, 1972, p. 64).

If the beneficiary of an action is entitled to altruistic treatment, the basis must be that he is a human being. If he is accorded that recognition, the doer is also a human being and is entitled to recognition as such. If the denial of validity to other-concern leads to injustice towards others, the denial of validity to self-concern results in injustice to the self. The individual rejects his own legitimate needs and desires in favor of what he sees as the rights, needs and wishes of others. He fails to develop himself to any extent as an individual with unique thoughts, talents and capacities of his own and simply becomes a reflection of whomever he may be with at the moment. He remains poverty stricken in his internal life and has, in the long run, despite his intent, little of real value to offer and give to others. If people remain merely extensions of others' wishes and needs, there can be no basis for genuine closeness and community.

Egoistic and Altruistic Ethics

It seems clear that there are legitimate forms of self-concern and other-concern. To deny validity to one or the other can only lead to ludicrous positions that cannot stand against basic human experience. It is not enough, however, to simply say that they are both valid. The much more difficult questions arise as to how legitimate self-concern and other-concern are to be defined and what their relationship is. Is one subordinate to the other and, if so, in what way and why? I

would like to look at some of the implications of this last question before proceeding further.

It might be argued that self-concern is primary and that other-concern and a sense of social responsibility are only valid in so far as they contribute to the enhancement of the self. Rand (1964), for example, while stating that all persons, including oneself, are ends, still concludes that "it is one's own personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, earns and derives from love" (p. 44). Philosophically, such a focus leads to an egoistic ethic which is reflected in Rand's statement that "the principle of trade is the only rational ethical principle for all human relationships, personal and social, private and public, spiritual and material" (p. 31). The other is still seen as a source of satisfactions for oneself, satisfactions for which one is willing to bargain. Individuals cooperate with others in order to gain from others what they need for themselves.

An egoistic ethic leads to subtle or gross distortions of man's essential nature. When an individual focuses on self-concern, the mind tends to think in terms of the self, of consciousness of the self, of the self as an object, and of activities, attitudes and beliefs which will bring benefits to the self--encounter groups to deal with hangups, yoga to develop the body, meditation to become peaceful, peak-experiences for the ecstatic excitement in them. A tendency to center awareness on the self is reinforced by the fact that individuals are contained within themselves and experience from within themselves. Distortions are further heightened by neurotic elements which draw the person's consciousness into an awareness of her own needs from the environment--needs for love, respect, affirmation, safety, support, belongingness, stability,

food, shelter, sex, etc. (Maslow, 1970, chap. 4). The environment becomes the source of her satisfactions, of her happiness or hoped for happiness, a means to her fulfillment. At least two things happen. First, even though awareness may be centered on the self, the self is often not seen as a source of her own satisfactions, e.g., the satisfactions that come from loving another, from accomplishments in the world, etc. And, even though it may be acknowledged that other people have rights of their own, her relationships with them will tend to be seen primarily as existing in terms of how they benefit herself--she fails to grasp their otherness internally and will coerce and manipulate them in a multitude of ways in an attempt to have them satisfy her needs, e.g., helping others and giving up her immediate desires in order to meet theirs, all with the usually hidden expectation that they will thereby be obliged to reciprocate.

It is my belief that the deepest and most meaningful experiences in life, e.g., being loved or loving, come to us or are given as free, undemanding gifts, without expectations and strings attached. As I will attempt to show later, this can only occur when the other and the self are seen in their unique, intrinsically valuable, individuality and separateness. An egoistic ethic denies the depths of human relationships.

On the other side, it can be argued, that, though self-concern is important, it is valid only in so far as it contributes to and strengthens other-concern and our effectiveness in promoting the welfare of others and of society. Some writers also claim that self-fulfillment cannot be seen as an end in itself but can only come as a by-product or gratuitous effect of concern for others. For example, Frankl (1966)

concludes that "self-actualization is, and must remain, an effect, namely, the effect of meaning fulfillment. Only to the extent to which man fulfills a meaning out there in the world, does he fulfill himself" (p. 99). Even Toner (1968), who sees the intimate relationship between self-love and other-love in much the same way as I develop it in this study, also claims that "it is . . . necessary to insist that priority belongs to love of the other" (p. 196). These positions can be seen as refined versions of the altruistic ethic.

However, even a refined altruistic ethic, like the egoistic ethic, can lead to distortions of a person's essential being. If we center on the ideal of other-concern and of responsibility to others and society, there is a tendency to focus on the external situation. In our society, strong moral values and shoulds are attached to loving, giving, self-sacrifice, humility and self-negation. These can lead to gross or subtle downgradings and denials of the self and its intrinsic claim for justice. Also, it does no good to tell people that they ought to be loving, socially concerned, and unselfish: "Humaneness derived from guilt is about as trustworthy as chastity imposed by gonorrhoea" (Friedenberg, 1973, p. 106). Genuine self-love gets mistaken for selfishness. The individual tends to lose touch with his needs and desires, tends to react rather than respond to life, and gradually becomes more and more defined by the world around him.

It should also be noted that an emphasis on other-concern may hide but cannot, in itself, eliminate the narcissistic and egocentric elements in the human personality. The world may simply become something to master and control, and within which fame and power over others are to be achieved under the guise of service to mankind. Ideals such as

justice and brotherhood are held and publicly proclaimed and are often accompanied by a political and social struggle to realize them in society. Yet, at the same time, they often remain abstract principles for the individual, rationalizations serving the functions of his neurotic needs, without ever becoming actualized in concrete reality in the individual's interpersonal relationships, particularly those involving his family and close friends.

In this study I will be asserting that neither the altruistic nor the egoistic ethic, no matter how refined they are, is adequate. I will attempt to show that valid self-concern and other-concern are each immanent or implied in the other, that they are mutually interdependent and are, in essence, though not always in actuality, two sides of a single process. They exist in relation to each other like the two sides of a coin. To start my argument I want to establish the foundations of self-concern and other-concern in two ontological concepts taken from Paul Tillich (1954): power and love.

The Ontological Source of Self-Concern: Power

Ontology "asks the question of being as being. It investigates the character of everything that is in so far as it is" (Tillich, 1953, p. 181) and not simply as a thing among other things. It attempts to answer the question: "What does it mean to be?" Ontology looks for the root meaning of basic experiences and concepts, e.g., being itself, the self-world structure of our experience, the nature of freedom, love, power, justice, evil, etc. Tillich (1953) notes that all ontological

concepts are

a priori in the strict sense of the word. They determine the nature of experience. They are present whenever something is experienced. . . . They are products of a critical analysis of experience. . . . Those concepts are a priori which are presupposed in every actual experience, since they constitute the very structure of experience itself. (pp. 184-185)

Thus, for example, experience as we know it is not possible without the split between the experiencing subject and the experienced object. And, as I will try to show, love and power are also present in every experience. However, Tillich (1958) warns that "every ontology is fragmentary because of the finiteness of the human mind" (p. 301). Empirical and psychological knowledge need to be fed back into the refinement and clarification of ontological principles. An ontology must be able to explain human experience if it is to be adequate, even though its only, though "sufficient," verification is through "intelligent recognition" (1954, p. 24).

The source of self-concern lies in the power of the individual to be, to exist, to live--to assert and affirm his being and his existence. Tillich (1954) suggests the concept of power for "a fundamental description of being as being" (p. 35). After discussing Nietzsche's concept of the "will to power," he concludes that

basically the will to power . . . is . . . a designation of the dynamic self-affirmation of life. . . . It is not the sociological function of power which is meant, although sociological power is included as one of the manifestations of ontological power. Sociological power, namely the chance to carry through one's will against social resistance, is not the content of the will to power. The latter is the drive of everything living to realize itself with increasing intensity and extensity. The will to power is not the will of men to attain power over men, but it is the self-affirmation of life in its self-transcending dynamics, overcoming internal and external resistance. (pp. 36-37)

Ontological power is revealed in my ability to say that my life matters, that my existence is important, that, because I am, I am valuable and significant. It is the power that moves me to act and think and feel and create, even in the face of the resistances coming from my own internal fears, weaknesses and doubts, and despite the risks involved in living in the world, e.g., in the put-downs and evaluating judgments of others on the validity and worth of my being. It is the power that enables me to accept the risks involved in making choices about a career or marriage, about starting a new business, or about ambiguous ethical issues.

Power implies power over something. If, in its ontological or essential nature, it is not power over nature or other persons, the question remains as to what it has power over. Tillich (1954) concludes that there is only one possible answer: "That which is conquered by the power of being is non-being" (p. 37). Our essential power is the power to overcome the fear of the threat of annihilation to our being--to our fundamental integrity as a self--implied in death and meaninglessness. I will return to this question in Chapter 3.

Power is dynamic. Likewise, creative self-concern is not a static state. They both move towards expansion and growth. They both move the individual towards becoming more powerful, self-actualized, mature, and, as I will show, loving. This process of growth is intimately connected with the individual's relationship to the threat of non-being.

A life process is the more powerful, the more non-being it can include in its self-affirmation, without being destroyed by it. The neurotic can include only a little non-being, the average man a limited amount, the creative man a large amount, God--symbolically speaking--an infinite amount. The self-affirmation of a being in spite of non-being is the expression of its power of being. Here we are at the roots of the concept of power. Power is the

possibility of self-affirmation in spite of internal and external negation. It is the possibility of overcoming non-being. Human power is the possibility of man to overcome non-being infinitely. (Tillich, 1954, pp. 39-40)

What does it mean to include non-being in one's self-affirmation? In the powerful man, the most centered man, the threat of non-being, the threat of death, the threat of meaninglessness, and the full depth of the ambiguity of his motives and actions, are faced directly, experienced directly, and are accepted and taken into his awareness directly. They are not denied nor repressed. In existence, the threat of non-being is there, it exists in the very structure of our being, it is like the other side of a coin. Its presence is implied by being just as being is implied in the threat of non-being. It cannot be eliminated, but its destructive, controlling power over the individual can be "broken." Sheldon Kopp (1976) puts it clearly: "Because I do not pretend that I have no wish to control and degrade another human being, I come to own those wishes, and to be in a position never to express them except by conscious, deliberate, and responsible choice" (p. 145). From this place the powerful man is able to affirm and assert himself and to act in the world.

On the other hand, the neurotic for example, for whatever historical reasons, finds the threat to his being too intolerable to face directly. His basic view of himself as worthless, evil, or meaningless, is too strong and he represses this threat. However, though the threat may be banished from consciousness, it still demands and pushes towards full expression. Its denial seems to increase its power and it continues to operate, though indirectly, through neurotic symptoms. In large part unconsciously, the neurotic manipulates his environment in an attempt to

have the environment meet his needs, to have environment reassure him of his validity and worth, to assure him that his life is not meaningless, even to assure him that he will not die. Unfortunately, this seldom works. The power of the threat of non-being increases and the individual slowly destroys himself because he hasn't been able to incorporate this threat into his centered, accepting, self-affirming awareness.

Self-concern arises out of a person's power, out of one's self-affirmation and self-assertion against internal and external resistance. It is to claim and assert justice for one's self, for one's right to be and have a place in the human community. How this natural and justified self-concern becomes distorted and destructive as individuals attempt to deal with the threat of non-being is the subject of the next chapter.

The Ontological Source of Other-Concern: Love

The ontological source of other-concern is love. Tillich (1954) notes the widespread confusion involved in the use of the word "love" but feels that it still has an emotional and symbolic power that justifies its continued use. He rejects interpretations that define love in terms of emotions and ethical commands. He thinks that the inherent problems in these definitions can only be overcome if one adopts an ontological approach to love. Tillich (1954) writes:

In man's experience of love the nature of life becomes manifest. Love is the drive towards the unity of the separated. Reunion presupposes separation of that which belongs essentially together. . . . Without an ultimate belongingness no union of one thing with another can be conceived. The absolutely strange cannot enter into a communion. But the estranged is striving for reunion. (p. 25)

Though I will refer to love as the drive towards union, the idea of reunion encloses it and goes beyond it. A full understanding, however, of Tillich's use of the concept of reunion would involve an unnecessary excursion into other aspects of his thought. What is important to note for the purposes of this study, is the emphasis it places on the basic human experience of belongingness: that we belong to this world, that it is right and good to be a part of the human community, and that we strive for union with others and the world. Alienation is the experience of being cut off from this sense of belongingness.

Though Tillich's conception of love as the drive to union is by no means universally accepted, it does have other important supporters. Ortega y Gasset (1957) speaks of love as "a centrifugal act of the soul in constant flux that goes toward the object and envelops it in warm corroboration, uniting us with it and positively affirming its being" (p. 20). Arnold Toynbee (1971, p. 3) also holds a similar position. Whether or not one accepts the drive to union as the fundamental definition of love, its importance in relation to love is difficult to deny. Toner (1968), whom I discuss in Chapter 5, and who rejects Tillich's definition, nevertheless sees union as an important element in love. Sadler (1969) rejects ontological for experiential definitions and describes the space of love as "being at home with another" (p. 186). This has implicit in it the idea of belongingness and union.

Love's presence is experienced whenever we are interested in or fascinated by something or someone, whenever we experience the desire for wholeness and completeness, whenever we have an aesthetic experience. In fact it is the drive that moves us out of ourselves towards the world countless times a day. We experience it whenever we fall in love. We experience it whenever we feel an ultimate concern, a concern, for example, with knowing and thereby achieving union with the truth. It lies at the basis of our being drawn to another and in our responding to the world as I will show in Chapter 5. It is even present as an important element in hatred, violence, manipulation, and greed where it has become distorted. It reaches its most intense and purest expressions in the self-transcendent experiences (e.g. peak experiences). Love is the drive towards union with that to which we sense we belong but from which we are separated: the self with self, with the other, with the world, and with being itself or God.

It needs to be emphasized that, ontologically, love is not an isolated aspect of life, an experience that comes and goes, but that it is, like power, right at the core of our being, of life itself. Tillich (1954) writes: "Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life. . . . Being is not actual without love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is" (p. 25). Teilhard de Chardin (1959), the Jesuit biologist and palaeontologist, expresses a position similar to Tillich's when he writes:

Considered in its full biological reality, love--that is to say, the affinity of being with being--is not peculiar to man. It is a general property of all life and as such it embraces . . . all the forms successively adopted by organised matter. . . . If there were no internal propensity to unite, even at a prodigiously

rudimentary level . . . it would be physically impossible for love to appear higher up, with us, in 'hominised' form. . . . Driven by the forces of love, the fragments of the world seek each other so that the world may come to being. (pp. 264-265)

To use the word life, as Tillich does, is to imply movement, vitality, change. To die, to cease living--physically, psychologically or spiritually, is to lose vitality, to cease movement, to become inert and static. To love is to live. To cease loving is to die. As long as a person continues to be physically alive, the moving power of that life is love. If the drive to achieve union with the world completely ceases, for whatever reason, life ceases. Though it is my position that to cease loving is to die not only metaphorically in the psychological and spiritual realms, but also literally in the physical dimension, the acceptance of the latter is not essential to the central arguments presented in this study.

Though love is not an emotion, Tillich (1954) asserts there is no love without the emotional element: "One can say that love as an emotion is the anticipation of the reunion which takes place in every love-relation" (p. 26). Love moves me to union, for example, with a piece of music and I am aware of excitement and strong feelings. When I become deeply involved in it, I respond to it, flow with it, exalt with it, cry with it. Its melody, its harmonics, its rhythm, its structure are also mine. At some point I become one with the music. I have no awareness of myself as separate from the music. I am no longer an observer of either the music or of myself. I think it could be said that in these moments, and they can only be moments, love ceases--a union has come about and there is no separate self-aware part of me to observe, criticize, or record the experience. Then I drop back into self-awareness.

The moments preceding such points are filled with ecstatic expectation and those following with feeling-full memory.

All Tillich's statements connected with the emotional element suggest strong, passionate, ecstatic experiences associated with love. In one place (1964) he writes: "The emotional element cannot be separated from love; love without its emotional quality is 'good will' toward somebody or something, but it is not love" (p. 145). In doing this I feel Tillich confuses his concept somewhat. Such statements relate to situations where love is operating in a relatively unambiguous form and this tends to depreciate the importance of the drive in the more ambiguous situations of daily experience. It tends to isolate love and makes it more difficult to grasp its central dynamic role in life. If love is pervasive and central, it won't necessarily reveal itself in ecstasy. As Tillich says, it is love that "drives everything that is towards everything else that is" even when it is distorted, as it usually is. As a drive it operates in many ambiguous situations which will be accompanied by ambiguous emotional responses and perhaps even little response (most people have learned to control their feelings). I think it is important to be able to see in these situations what is love, and to see how it is distorted. I will explore this question more fully in the next Chapter. However, I think it is also valuable to call highly distorted love by a name other than love, e.g., need or need love, and I assume this was Tillich's intention.

One factor which makes it difficult to apprehend the unitary nature of love is the variety of forms in which it appears. One solution has been to speak of different types of love. Tillich (1954) identifies four major historical classifications: libido, eros, philia and agape. However, he rejects the idea that these are different kinds of love: "There are not types, but qualifications of love, since the different qualities are present, by efficiency or deficiency, in every act of love" (p. 5). Love is one, the drive towards union.

Tillich equates libido with desire: It is "the movement of the needy toward that which fulfils the need" (1953, p. 311). We desire food, sexual union, friends, etc. However, it is not the pleasure as such that comes from having these needs filled that we desire. Rather, it is "the union with that which fulfils the desire" (1954, p. 29). When we want the pleasure rather than the union, love has become distorted. The other becomes simply an object to fulfill our pleasure.

For Tillich (1954), eros "strives for a union with that which is a bearer of values because of the values it embodies" (p. 30). It "is the movement of that which is lower in power and meaning to that which is higher" (1953, p. 311): We want union with strength, gentleness, beauty, truth, goodness, etc., as they are manifested in nature, culture and the other person. The aesthetic experience or the adoration of a hero, for example, indicates the presence of love. Philia is "the movement of the equal toward union with the equal" (1953, p. 311) and achieves its fullest expression in interpersonal relationships. Tillich (1954) sees philia related to eros in an interdependent polar way where "erōs represents the transpersonal pole, philia . . . the personal pole" (p. 31). We want union with the person as the bearer of values, and with

values as they are manifested in a concrete person.

Agape has often been associated with true or real love. It is seen in people who are able to be "kind and patient, never jealous, never demanding reciprocity. . . . They seemed to find enough pleasure in the act of loving another person so that the matter of reciprocity was almost irrelevant" (Lee, 1974, p. 50). Tillich (1953) describes agape as

the desire for the fulfilment of the longing of the other being, the longing for his ultimate fulfilment. All love, except agapē, is dependent on contingent characteristics which change and are partial. It is dependent on repulsion and attraction, on passion and sympathy. Agapē is independent of these states. It affirms the other unconditionally, that is, apart from higher or lower, pleasant or unpleasant qualities. Agapē unites the lover and the beloved because of the image of fulfilment which God has of both. Therefore, agapē is universal; no one with whom a concrete relation is technically possible ("the neighbour") is excluded; nor is anyone preferred. Agapē accepts the other in spite of resistance. It suffers and forgives. It seeks the personal fulfilment of the other. (p. 311)

When this quality of love is strongly present, there is no anger, envy, or resentment. There is only joy--happiness for the other and for their being who they are.

Though Tillich sees agape as different in fundamental ways from the other qualities, he still sees it as an element in all love. He describes it as entering "from another dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of love. . . . One could say that in agapē ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love" (1954, p. 33). This phrasing reflects Tillich's theological orientation. From a philosophical or psychological perspective, agape comes from the depths of our being, our essence. Though it generally manifests its presence ambiguously, e.g., our concern for the other's fulfillment is usually inextricably mixed with concern about our own fulfillment through the other, it is the dimension that is able to overcome the ambiguities

of love in existence. When we are grasped by agape, we are able, without denying them, to let our needs go in relation to the other. There is no demand, expectation or recrimination if the other does not meet our needs for them to be how we want them to be in relationship to us. Our concern is no longer for our needs but for the other's being and fulfillment. We are only able, as I will try to show, to be deeply in touch with this dimension as we are able to truly affirm our own validity and worth.

Justice

The concept of justice is critical for helping to define what are legitimate forms of self-concern and other-concern. For Tillich (1954) "justice is the form in which the power of being actualizes itself" and "must be able to give form to the encounters of being with being. . . . A wrong, unjust, power relation may destroy life" (p. 56). If the form is unjust, the power of being, instead of fully actualizing itself, becomes at the same time, more or less destructive of the self and of others. Tillich notes that

it is not unjust that in the struggle between power and power one of the beings involved shows a superior power of being. The manifestation of this fact is not unjust but creative. But injustice occurs if in this struggle the superior power uses its power for the reduction or destruction of the inferior power. (p.88)

Parents, therapists, or teachers, for example, can use their power in constructive or destructive ways.

Tillich (1954, pp. 57-62) discusses four mediating principles of justice: adequacy of form for content, equality, liberty and personality. A full consideration of these would involve us in the relationship of justice to cultural and social forms. However, the last one, personality, is more directly relevant to this study. Tillich writes: "The content of this principle is the demand to treat every person as a person. Justice is always violated if men are dealt with as if they were things" (p. 60). People are ends, not means. The fundamental problem with both egoistic and altruistic ethics is that, in the final analysis, they either treat the other or the self as a means to an end.

Love is the principle of justice: "If life as the actuality of being is essentially the drive towards the reunion of the separated, it follows that the justice of being is the form which is adequate to this movement" (Tillich, 1954, p. 57). Justice preserves the integrity of separate beings without which there can be no union between them. The psychological domination or absorption of one person by another is distorted love, e.g., a woman who smothers her child with love, doing everything for the child, protecting the child from all harm, meeting the child's every whim; prevents the development in the child of a separate, centered self without which there can be no real love or union between mother and child. In conclusion, it needs to be noted that though love is the principle of justice, risk is always necessary in human relationships as there are no principles or rules that can be applied mechanically to ensure justice in actual life situations.

The Relationship of Love, Power and Justice to the Self

Self-love represents the drive to wholeness in an individual. We experience deep splits within ourselves and the repressed or rejected parts of ourselves have a kind of independent reality to them in that they all press towards full expression. In this context, self-love is the drive within oneself to reclaim and own all these aspects of oneself, to bring them into the self-centeredness of the self, to become whole. Self-love is also the affirmation of the goodness of one's essential humanity. I will attempt to clarify the concepts of selfishness and self-love further in Chapter 5.

In being just towards oneself "the deciding centre is just towards the elements of which it is the centre" (Tillich, 1954, p. 70). The example Tillich uses to illustrate this reflects an important trend in psychology and therapy: the rejection of the puritanical forms of self-control which deny elements of the self "which have a just claim to be admitted to the general balance of strivings. Repression is injustice against oneself, and it has the consequence of all injustice: it is self-destructive because of the resistance of the elements which are excluded" (p. 70). Whole areas of the human personality, such as sexuality, anger, and personal needs, are being re-evaluated today in the light of such considerations.

Tillich (1954) sees power in relation to the self in terms of self-control: "Self-control is the preservation of . . . centredness against disruptive tendencies, coming from the elements which constitute the centre: One could say that a struggle is going on between these elements, each of them trying to determine the centre" (p. 52). The

more an individual allows herself to see and accept all aspects, both positive and negative, of herself (self-love), and chooses to allow them appropriate or creative expression and/or development (self-justice), through the exercise of choice or self-control (to act, to develop, to allow or deny expression as appropriate, etc.), the more powerful and centered that person becomes. To accept and affirm an aspect does not mean that she should or will always undertake to act on it. If, for example, a self-aware, mature woman experiences sexual desire, she accepts and affirms it and possibly seeks its expression, in a manner and to a degree that allows for justice to it and to other elements of the self, and that does not violate the integrity of the other person. She does not have an unexamined need for reassurance which she seeks to meet compulsively through using her sexuality as a way of manipulating another person. The more centered she becomes the less she is subject to irrational, compulsive and destructive forces within her which arise from denied, rejected or repressed aspects of herself.

In a sense, an individual's center is her self-aware, choosing self. However, this center only gains, as I shall try to show more clearly in Chapter 4, real freedom with the development of self-love and self-control under the principle of justice which calls for respect for each element of the self according to its nature. The center itself does not have independent power: "Its power is the power of a stabilized balance of the elements which are centred in it" (Tillich, 1954, p. 52). Being centered means to be self-aware, free of compulsive drives, and just to one's self.

The Relationship Between Power and Love

Love and power are intimately inter-related. One's ability to love is dependent on one's power and one's power is dependent on one's ability to love. I have attempted to show how our power is constituted in our ability to overcome and absorb into our self-affirmation the threat of non-being. The deepest threat we experience arises in our isolation and aloneness, in our separation from others and the world. Tillich (1954) notes that love

manifests its greatest power . . . where it overcomes the greatest separation. And the greatest separation is the separation of self from self. Every self is self-related and a complete self is completely self-related. It is an independent centre, indivisible and impenetrable, and therefore is rightly called an individual. . . . The centre of a completely individualized being cannot be entered by any other individualized being, and it cannot be made into a mere part of a higher unity. . . . It is the fulfilment and the triumph of love that it is able to reunite the most radically separated beings, namely individual persons. The individual person is both most separated and the bearer of the most powerful love. (pp. 25-26)

Almost paradoxically, the more centered, individualized, and separate we become, the more our ability to love grows. The child, the neurotic, the narcissistic personality, the angry and the rebellious are only capable of loving in fragmentary, distorted, and highly ambiguous ways. The more centered and self-determining we become, the more we are capable of manifesting powerful love--of genuine awareness and concern for the other as other. As we need the other less to meet our own deficiencies, we are more able to see and respond to the other as an end rather than as a means of meeting our need for reassurance of our worth or validity as a person. The neurotic's need for the other is so great that he is unable to transcend himself in powerful non-needing love towards the other as other. The other remains a tool to be used to define and confirm himself.

At the same time, the more loving we become, the more truly powerful we become, the more conquered separation there is. The ability to exercise power over others, to have them be the way we want them to be, is not true power. True power resides in reuniting love which is based, as I will try to show in Chapter 5, on our ability to accept the negative elements in ourselves and in the other. To be a strong man without love, to be, for example, demanding that the other be strong or meet one's own high moral standards all the time, and to thus become judgmental, is an indication of some unresolved weakness that is being denied: "Love is not something that may or may not be added to strength in its fullest sense; it is an element of strength" (Tillich, 1963, p. 131).

Love overcomes separation and the implicit threat of non-being in separation through union. But the truly individual self is not swallowed up and lost in that union and in our life falls back into separateness. This is seen in the continuous movement between involvement in life and reflection, between intense closeness with another and withdrawal into separateness, between being "lost" in the other, music, or an intricate task and self-awareness. The more powerful and loving a person becomes, the more the rhythm flows naturally and the less does the person get trapped into either narcissistic contemplation of the self or frenetic activity in the world.

Summary

I have attempted to establish that both self-concern and other-concern are legitimate, and have questioned the validity of any position

that gives one priority over the other. I have also shown how self-concern is grounded in the individual's power to be and how other-concern is grounded in love. A preliminary discussion of their dynamics and the nature of their relationship has also been introduced. Before proceeding to a fuller discussion of these questions, it is necessary to turn to a consideration of the problem of evil in order to see how power and love become distorted in existence; to see how the ontological drives of self-affirmation and towards union become destructive of the self and others.

CHAPTER III

A THEORY OF EVIL

In this chapter I will first consider the problem of evil. I will also develop the concepts of ambiguity, aloneness, self-responsibility, and need.

A Theory of Evil

A person's basic beliefs, examined or assumed, about the nature of man, have a fundamental effect on his philosophy and orientation to the world. They also have a profound influence on the therapeutic outlook, e.g., if one sees evil in individuals arising primarily as the result of environmental influences, one is more likely to respond to the problem of therapy in terms of social action designed to change the environment, e.g., the radical therapist, than if one sees evil as arising primarily in the individual. I will attempt to establish a position that sees evil as the distortion of basic ontological drives. My belief is that these drives are good or, at the very least, neutral, and that evil arises within ontological structures that are in themselves good. In calling these good I make a value judgment, i.e., I choose to

orient myself to reality as I see it in this particular way, as a participant in that reality.

1. The Threat of Non-Being

The concept of the threat of non-being is critical to an understanding of our life. The ontological question--what is being?--"arises in something like a 'metaphysical shock'--the shock of possible non-being" (Tillich, 1953, p. 181). This recognition is exemplified in the questions of the child: Why are there trees here and not something else? Why is there something? Why is there not nothing? Death, the most powerful symbolization of non-being, resists, threatens, and questions the fact of being. However, this threat is dependent on being: It could not exist unless there were being. The nothingness of death has no existence. How then can non-being resist being? "The answer . . . can only be that non-being is not foreign to being, but that it is that quality of being by which everything that participates in being is negated. Non-being is the negation of being within being itself" (1954, p. 38). This points to finite being.

Finite being is being limited by non-being. Man is finite being: His life is marked by nothingness before his conception and after his death, and by the limitations of his existence and his potentialities during his life. Death, finitude, and meaninglessness resist the integrity of our being -- they stand against us in our experience as threats to our very existence. Only in being itself is the threat of non-being infinitely overcome. Being itself, everything that is

in potentiality and in actuality, is the primary category in ontology. In theological terms, Tillich (1953) states that "God is being-itself." This is the only nonsymbolic statement one can make about God: "It means what it says directly and properly" (pp. 264-265). Any lesser statement about God would make God into merely another being alongside other beings and no longer a matter of ultimate concern.

Shmueli (1972) describes man's disharmony, his lack of unity, his conflicts, as "ultimately" arising in a "discrepancy between his finitude and his longing for infinity" (p. 220). Ernest Becker (1973) phrases this in terms of man's ability to see himself as a god in contrast to his awareness of the inescapability of death, of absolute negation. Man is bound by his finitude, by the limitations of his existence, and yet is able to transcend them, and in his imagination to transcend them infinitely. This potentiality in man provides him with the possibility of creating belief structures and action patterns that seem to provide a resolution to the threat of non-being, e.g., his belief in life after death and in his own immortality and invulnerability. However, no matter what belief systems we construct around death and life after death, and no matter how deeply we may be grasped in transcendental or peak experiences by an experience of meaning or of eternal life, there will always remain a doubt, an uncertainty. Death is a door beyond which we cannot know. As long as there is being there is the possibility of its negation.

Non-being is the basic threat that permeates all of man's existence. When man reacts to this threat by trying to deny either his finitude or his self-transcendent nature, i.e., by trying to be more or less than what he is, the threat gives rise to evil, i.e., to all the negative aspects of the way he behaves. It leads to all the destructive and

self-destructive states, attitudes and acts of man, e.g., hatred, cruelty, war, exploitation, competition, selfishness, sickness, mental illness, anxiety, blaming, manipulation, despair, etc.

Neither non-being nor the threat of non-being can be said to be evil in themselves. Nothingness cannot have any quality. Non-being, in that it simply stands against being, is not evil. Evil arises only when man responds to this threat in such a way that it leads to the destruction or limitation of his being and the potentiality of his being. Also, evil does not, ontologically, have an independent existence: "Everything positive is an expression of being-itself. . . . There is nothing merely negative (the negative lives from the positive it distorts)" (Tillich, 1964, p. 425). Destructiveness can exist only as the negation of being and is therefore dependent on being itself.

Man's freedom is implicit in the question of the relationship between the threat of non-being and evil. Man differs from the animal in his self-awareness and the freedom of choice this brings. Freedom is fundamental to man's essence: Without it man would be a puppet and the question of good and evil would have no meaning. However, when man in his freedom, loses touch with his finitude, his self-transcendent nature, or his freedom, the results are evil. Evil, or the distortion of power and love, represents only one manifestation of man's response to the threat of non-being. The other, when man faces and accepts the threat of non-being directly, and incorporates it within his self-awareness and self-assertion, leads to the actualization of his power and love. I will explore later how these two manifestations are always ambiguously present in man.

2. The Vulnerability of the Child

Though it may seem obvious, I want to emphasize the vulnerability of childhood as it points to the inevitability of the distortion of the basic drives of love and power. Barbara Fowles (1968) notes how the child "feels his insignificance and smallness in comparison with the vastness of the universe constituted by all others who are not he. He is therefore liable to become the victim of a doubt which could paralyse his ability to act, doubting his capacity for sufficient self-assertiveness--to remain alive--to live" (p. 8). In this the child, as a child, is realistic--he cannot survive on his own. He is dependent on others for much more than just physical survival. He has neither the experience nor the perspective that is essential in order to deal with denials of himself in a constructive way. Of necessity he, metaphorically speaking, gives a lot of his own power of self-assertion and self-validation to others, in particular to his parents whom he relies on to confirm or deny the validity of his essential selfhood.

This process is complicated and reinforced, as Jung (1959, p. 83) has shown, by the projection onto the parents of archetypal images that transform them from ordinary mortals into gods imbued with magic powers, e.g., the mother becomes the Great Mother. The child is unable to see them as people. Jung (1954) also points to the child's vulnerability to her parents' conflicts:

The participation mystique, or primitive identity, causes the child to feel the conflicts of the parents and to suffer from them as if they were its own. It is hardly ever the open conflict or the manifest difficulty that has such a poisonous effect, but almost always parental problems that have been kept hidden or allowed to become unconscious. (p. 124)

The threats the child faces are not only external ones. Maslow (1968)

notes "that repression may arise also from intrapsychic, extra-cultural sources in the young child, or at puberty, i.e., out of fear of being overwhelmed by its own impulses, of becoming disintegrated, of 'falling apart,' exploding, etc." (p. 192)

At the core of the problem for the child is the fact that he comes up against other people's needs for him to be a certain way. Karen Horney (1950) puts it like this: "The people in the environment are too wrapped up in their own neuroses to be able to love the child, or even to conceive of him as the particular individual he is; their attitudes toward him are determined by their own neurotic needs and responses" (p. 221). The child, faced with family pressures, ends up with a conflict of needs: In attempting to meet one he has to deny the other and ends up satisfying neither. For example, in order to ensure the love of his parents he attempts to please them, thereby denying his basic need to be himself. He is forced to deny his natural self in order to receive love, but the love he receives for being a false self, i.e., one designed to meet his parents' approval, is not the real love for being himself that he most deeply needs. If he does not try to please his parents to win their love, he may become rebellious or withdraw. Yet, these answers neither allow him to be himself nor gain his parents' love either. Horney (p. 19) sees these three movements--towards, against, away--as being normal in human relationships. They become neurotic only as one of them solidifies into a dominant pattern for coping with reality.

The child, much more open to her feelings than the adult, faces the threat of non-being in its rawest forms. The terror is so great that the child is forced to find ways to mediate this experience, e.g., to

reduce its impact by repressing it. The power to survive the threat is not, however, simply dependent on building up defenses. Becker (1973) notes that "even more important is how repression works: it is not simply a negative force opposing life energies; it lives on life energies and uses them creatively. I mean that fears are naturally absorbed by expansive organismic striving" (p. 21). Another way of saying this is: Being incorporates the threat of non-being into itself. At the same time the child does not have the internal resources that can only come from experience, to give perspective, a sense of identity, and the ability to separate reality from fantasy, that are necessary to see others as persons and to know, let alone accept, the finitude of her own existence. The distortion of the ontological drives is inevitable.

As the infant grows, "aware" of her helplessness and dependence, she will meet experiences which confirm her being and ones which deny it. The more the child has to deal with denials of her true self, the more she is put in touch with the threat of non-being and the more rigid and destructive her neurotic defences become. The more her essential self is confirmed, the more she is in touch with her essential power of being and the more positively she will come to cope with threats to her self.

I use the term neurotic not so much to refer to clinically diagnosed neuroses, as to indicate the negative, destructive, defense patterns present in all of us. These could roughly be defined as those elements which are designed to meet the threat of non-being but which take people away from their essential selfhood at the same time, and in so doing become destructive. Clinically definable neuroses represent extreme cases where these elements have come to dominate to a greater or lesser degree essential selfhood.

3. Karen Horney's Model of Neurosis

Horney's model of neurosis supplies a useful insight into the process by which the ontological drives of power and love become distorted. In touch with his weakness and experiencing the denial of his essential self as being valid, the child begins to form an idealized image of himself. This image is imbued with magical significance which seems, at least in part, to have its roots in the earliest experiences of infancy: Becker (1973) notes that

the child lives in a situation of utter dependence; and when his needs are met it must seem to him that he has magical powers, real omnipotence. If he experiences pain, hunger, or discomfort, all he has to do is to scream and he is relieved and lulled by gentle, loving sounds. He is a magician and a telepath who has only to mumble and to imagine and the world turns to his desires. (p. 18)

This sense of magic power is also fed by the ability of the imagination to transcend reality infinitely. Though it is often buried deeply, this sense never seems to be completely lost. It can be seen in the magical implications of neurotic ambition, in the feelings of frustration and anger when our expectations of others are not met, and in the belief that one should be perfect. "He may know that in some hidden recess of his soul he secretly believes that he, for one, will not die" (Horney, 1950, p. 52).

The greater the threat, the more the individual comes to rely on this ideal image and in time it is turned into an idealized self. The early looseness in the organization of the child's defensive behaviour (spontaneity keeps breaking through) becomes set into more and more rigid patterns. The energy that went into the natural process of self-realization, the actualization of the real self, is now directed towards the actualization of the idealized self (Horney, 1950, p. 24). In this

the individual's power has become distorted. Horney calls this "the search for glory."

The idealized self and the search for glory are maintained by comprehensive neurotic solutions and by an elaborate system of claims, and shoulds. Deeply embedded in this system are neurotic pride, self-hate, and an insistence on perfection. There is also a need for vindictive triumph: "to put others to shame or defeat them through one's very success; or to attain the power . . . to inflict suffering upon them" (Horney, 1950, p. 27) for the wrongs done one in childhood. I now want to look more closely at some of these elements.

First, neurotic claims or expectations. Faced with reality, the neurotic decides there is something wrong with the world rather than with himself and expects "special attention, consideration, deference on the part of others" (Horney, 1950, p. 41). Claims are revealed in how we believe other people ought to see us and treat us and in blaming the world for our miseries. Neurotic needs are turned into claims, e.g., the need to be right is turned into a claim to be never doubted or criticized; the need to be powerful is turned into an expectation of blind obedience from others; the need to be loved is turned into a claim on the other for exclusive and unconditional devotion; and a need to be detached is turned into an expectation that one should never be bothered or have claims made on one by others (pp. 43-44).

Shoulds are an important prop of the idealized self. One of the neurotic's underlying beliefs is that he should be immediately perfect and god-like. In that they define his idealized self, the shoulds provide the driving force to the individual's attempts to actualize his ideal self. Shoulds are also revealed in projections--externalizations

as Horney calls them: either a demand is made on others to be perfect or the individual experiences them as demands coming from others for him to be perfect. "The premise on which they operate is that nothing should be, or is, impossible for oneself" (Horney, 1950, p. 68). The position of some neurotics in relation to love provides one example of this: "I should be big enough to mind absolutely nothing that is done to me; I should be able to make her love me; and I should sacrifice absolutely everything for 'love'" (p. 119)! The neurotic desire for moral perfection appears to be laudable. However, on closer inspection, it becomes highly ambiguous:

Only by focusing on the totality of the picture are we able to get the proper perspective on the demands for moral perfection. Like the other shoulds, they are permeated by the spirit of arrogance and aim at enhancing the neurotic's glory and at making him godlike. . . . When one adds . . . the unconscious dishonesty necessarily involved in making blemishes disappear, one recognizes them as an immoral rather than a moral phenomenon. (p. 73)

Another major element in the system is neurotic pride. This pride is not based on real achievements but on the idealized self with which the neurotic has associated herself. It does not arise from a genuine basic confidence but rather from the deep insecurity of the neurotic. As a result it makes her highly vulnerable to the responses and reactions of the world around her.

The shoulds are not only goals to be pursued but are also measuring rods for judging one's actual self. Their use as standards results in a deepening of self-hate and self-contempt as the neurotic is aware that her actual self does not measure up in any way to how she knows she ought to be. Horney (1950) notes that "the power and tenacity of self-hate is astounding. . . . We must realize the rage of the proud self for feeling humiliated and held down at every step by the actual self"

(p. 114). Self-hate in turn feeds back into maintaining the search for glory--all parts of the neurotic system are interdependent.

For the purposes of this study, it is important to note two characteristics of self-contempt. First: "self-accusations . . . are not for his true self but directed against it, and are meant to crush it" (Horney, 1950, p.131). This leads to increasing alienation from one's true self, which is seen as an enemy. Secondly, self-hate gives rise to

the need to alleviate or balance self-contempt with the attention, regard, appreciation, admiration, or love of others. The pursuit of such attention is compulsive, because of the compelling need not to be at the mercy of self-contempt. It is also determined by a need to triumph, and may amount to an all-consuming life goal. The result is a total dependence on others for self-evaluation; it rises or falls with the attitudes of others toward him. (pp. 136-137)

The other is given the power to determine one's value as a person and the neurotic's energies are directed towards eliciting and ensuring the needed response from others. Fritz Perls (1967) puts it this way: The neurotic "looks for environmental support through direction, help, explanations and answers. He mobilizes not his own resources, but his means of manipulating the environment,--helplessness, flattery, stupidity and other means of more or less subtle control in order to get that support" (p. 14). Horney (1950) comments on the destructive effects of self-hate:

Surveying self-hate and its ravaging force, we cannot help but see in it a great tragedy, perhaps the greatest tragedy of the human mind. Man in reaching out for the Infinite and Absolute also starts destroying himself. When he makes a pact with the devil, who promises him glory, he has to go to hell--the hell within himself. (p. 154)

The individual is trapped by the unrealities of his desire to transcend himself completely.

Horney (1950) also analyzes the effects that neurotic needs have on the way we see others. These distorted perceptions rest on the fact that "every single intrapsychic factor can be externalized" (p. 291). The neurotic sees others in relation to his own needs. If he needs admiration, others become an admiring audience; if he needs to be right, others are fallible and wrong; if he needs magic help, others are given magical qualities. The neurotic "does not experience his own self-idealization; instead he idealizes others" (p. 292). Or, he externalizes his own self-hate and blames others: "What he does not feel is the fact that he responds to something which he himself has put into them" (p. 293). Even when the neurotic is able to see the faults of others clearly, "the perspicacity he may gain in discerning certain attributes is marred by the personal significance they have for him. This makes them loom so large that the individual having them almost disappears as an individual and turns into a symbol for the particular externalized trend or trends" (p. 294). These twisted perceptions seriously affect our ability to love, as undistorted love can only exist to the extent that we truly see and acknowledge the unique otherness of the other.

Horney discusses in considerable detail the various patterns adopted by the neurotic to protect herself from her basic fear of life and death. Among the general factors are alienation from the true self; externalizations; compartmentalization or psychic fragmentation; automatic control, particularly of feelings; and a belief in the supremacy of the mind which results in a battle between the mind on one side and feelings, the body, and the true self on the other. There are also three broad approaches in terms of comprehensive neurotic solutions. First are the expansive ones where the individual identifies

herself closely with her idealized self and sets out to master life and overcome every internal and external resistance. Some politicians, businessmen, actresses, etc., would fall in this category. The second are the self-effacing solutions in which the individual sees in the possibility of love the answer to all her problems. She appeases, subordinates herself and makes herself completely dependent in the hope of winning love. The self-effacing solutions are essentially shrinking processes, as are the last ones involving resignation from the conflict. Horney sees resignation arising in the appeal of freedom, of doing what one wants to do. This is an attempt to preserve one's inner self from being lost in commitment to others or in being smothered by the other.

4. Tillich's Model of Distortion

Toynbee (1971) sees two kinds of desire. One takes "a creature out of himself and makes him give himself to other people, to the world, and to the spiritual presence which . . . lies behind the universe;" the other is where man "tries to exploit the universe, to draw it into the creature himself, to use it for his purposes" (p. 2). Tillich (1957b) expresses the latter in terms of concupiscence or "greed," which he defines broadly:

Every individual, since he is separated from the whole, desires reunion with the whole. His "poverty" makes him seek for abundance. This is the root of love in all its forms. The possibility of reaching unlimited abundance is the temptation of man who is a self and has a world. The classical name for this desire is concupiscentia "concupiscence"--the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one's self. It refers to all aspects of man's relation to himself and to his world. It refers to physical hunger as well as to sex, to knowledge as well as to power, to material wealth as well as to spiritual values. (p. 59)

Love becomes distorted because the drive to union or wholeness is responded to as if devouring the world will fill the inner sense of

emptiness, will bring union with the world. It is distorted and cannot achieve its end because it denies the fundamental principle of justice: respect for the integrity of nature and the personhood of the other. Such an understanding helps to explain the often compulsive and unsatisfying nature of the activities of people bent on acquiring wealth, fame, power, etc.

Concupiscence can also be seen as resting on the distortion of power, one which does not acknowledge its finitude. This is seen clearly in the idealized self of the neurotic and its unconscious claims. For Tillich (1957b) this is the meaning of hubris, or neurotic or spiritual pride: "It is turning toward one's self as the centre of one's self and one's world" (p. 58), egocentricity in Horney's terms. Hubris is for Tillich the other side of "unbelief or man's turning away from the divine centre to which he belongs" (p. 58), which is partially reflected, in Horney's terms, in man's alienation from his true self. Concupiscence, or greed, hubris and unbelief are the marks of man's estrangement.

It is also within a framework such as Horney's that one can understand Tillich's (1957b, chap 15) concept of the structures of self-destruction: By turning away from his true self to his idealized self, man inevitably destroys himself. Man is, in essence, punished by his own act, his own choice, and not by some external force, no matter how powerfully this may be projected onto others, society or god. In their turn, the structures of self-destruction become reflected in social institutions and cultural values which contribute to the perpetuation of man's difficulty in learning how to cope constructively with the threat of non-being. The ontological drives of power and of

love become distorted in existence through the individual's reaching beyond himself in such a way that denies justice and his own finitude.

5. Essence, Existence and Ambiguity

Ambiguity is a reflection of the tension between the essential in man and the nature of his existence. Though there are different ways of expressing the concepts of essence and existence, e.g., Aristotle's potentiality and actuality, no ontology from Plato's to Kierkegaard's, Hegel's or Dewey's can disregard them. Tillich (1962a, p. 44) shows how even existentialism, which attempts to deny that one can affirm any essential elements in man, thereby makes a statement about man's essential nature.

Tillich (1957b) uses the highly symbolic term "dreaming innocence" to point to a state of essential, finite being in man: It "is not an actual stage of human development which can be known directly or indirectly. . . . [It] points to non-actualised [sic] potentiality. . . . In the metaphorical use suggested here [it means] . . . lack of actual experience, lack of personal responsibility, and lack of moral guilt" (p. 38). Dreaming innocence "drives beyond itself" (p. 39) which results in the "Fall" into existence (symbolized in the myth of Adam and Eve) as it is only here, in this life, that man's essence can be actualized.

Existence, however, is a state of estrangement. The fall is a movement from "essential goodness to existential estrangement" (1957b, p. 45).

The state of existence is the state of estrangement. Man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself. . . . The profundity of the term "estrangement" lies in the implication that one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged. Man is not a stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it. . . . The word "sin" cannot be overlooked. It

expresses what is not implied in the term "estrangement," namely, the personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs. Sin expresses most sharply the personal character of estrangement over against its tragic side. It expresses personal freedom and guilt in contrast to tragic guilt and the universal destiny of estrangement. (pp. 51-53).

The state of sin must not be confused with the popular understanding of "sins" as acts of disobedience of moral laws. Existence is a state of separation, a state of sin and of estrangement, in which the threat of possible non-being operates powerfully.

Life is the actualization of essential or potential being in existence. However, Tillich (1964) notes that "every life process has the ambiguity that the positive and negative elements are mixed in such a way that a definite separation of the negative from the positive is impossible. . . . Life is neither essential nor existential but ambiguous" (p. 34). Life is in a state of estrangement but power and love drive towards union, wholeness and unambiguous life, and achieve limited or ambiguous union. The essential in life strives to realize its potentialities and does so in partial and fragmentary ways. Estrangement is never completely overcome but it is, at the same time, never complete.

Horney (1950) is aware of the ambiguous nature of human behaviour: The search for glory is "a creative process" and "stems from man's best desires--to expand beyond his narrow confines. It is, in the last analysis, its colossal egocentricity that distinguishes it from healthy strivings" (p. 176). Creative forces moving towards unity and wholeness, and destructive forces moving towards disharmony and disintegration, counter each other. Creative acts increase the individual's power of self-affirmation and bring about greater union with his self and with others. Destructive acts limit, prevent, or destroy the actualization of essential selfhood and separate men from men; e.g., acts arising out

of the desire for revenge which make reconciliation and union with others impossible; and acts or attitudes arising out of self-hate which destroy or limit the individual's power to affirm himself.

To say that life is ambiguous is also to say that discrete acts and attitudes, etc., are in themselves ambiguous. Men and women, for example, cannot face in its rawest forms the threat of non-being. Denial and other protective mechanisms are essential if a person is to survive as a person capable of expanding, growing and living. Psychotic episodes are examples of what happens when individuals are faced with too much, too fast, i.e., with more than their power of being is able to cope with, with more than they can enclose within their self-affirmation at that moment of time. Thus, denial, blaming, and other neurotic elements serve a protective or self-preservative function and are, to that extent, positive. Yet, at the same time, they represent essentially non-productive solutions to the threat of non-being: they make possible but seriously limit the actualization of power and love.

A differentiation can also be made between intent and effect. Speaking metaphorically, the intent of essential selfhood, including its functions of awareness and choice, is always to actualize the self in a creative way (witness, for example, the power and universality of rationalization). This is still the intent, from a phenomenological point of view, when the self engages in what certain dimensions of consciousness know are self-destructive acts including, for example, suicide. All such acts are, in one way or another, seen as essential to the preservation and actualization of the integrity of the self. For example, self-hate may be so great that the only way the person can see to preserve the moral integrity of her freedom is to destroy what

she sees as so despicable. Even if suicide is seen by the individual as an escape from pain, it is to protect the self from that pain. The self-actualization drive is creative in intent, the creation of a powerful, loving, moral self. Life does not set out to destroy itself. However, when this basic drive is distorted into the service of the idealized self, the positive effects are either limited or overwhelmed by the destructive results.

All our acts, styles of being, beliefs and motivations are ambiguous. Romantic love--falling in love--for example, arises in a desire for union and affirms the divine in the other. However, these truths are seriously compromised by one's need to see the other as a god or a goddess. It does not have any meaningful depth and one ends up seeking union with one's own projected idealized image rather than with a real person. It is unreal because it does not grow out of the dimension of the full reality of the other as an ambiguous human being. Because it doesn't have this dimension, it ascribes to the other person powers and qualities which, though they may be potential in essence, are not actualizable in reality. It makes of the other someone who is above humanness. It is a cheap glorification because it denies the grandeur and depth of the human struggle for meaning and growth.

Another example: Often, in an act of giving, there is not only real joy for the other in the giving but also a hidden expectation of a future return or of, at least, a positive response designed to affirm the giver's being. Or, in an act of revenge, there is the positive attempt to assert the validity of one's self against an experienced external negation of it, limited, unsatisfying, and destructive though it may also be. Life is ambiguous. The most critical question is not how positive or

destructive a life style is, but in what direction it is moving: towards greater openness or towards more rigid defensiveness. Is it moving towards a fuller actualization of the individual's power and love or towards their greater distortion? Because of their positive intent and their protective functions, neurotic elements need to be treated with care and respect. Because of their destructive quality they become important elements that need to be dealt with.

6. The Reality of Evil

I have tried to establish a view of evil which does not grant it a separate ontological reality. Man, good in his essential nature, turns away from his true self. There are two important implications arising from such a position. First, it has a profound effect on one's view of morality as I will try to show in Chapter 4. Secondly, it implies that evil always has an ambiguous quality. The power is in itself good but has not been used positively. Thus, if we attempt to destroy or shunt evil aside, not only will it turn around and destroy from underneath, but its energy will also be denied to creative living. Sheldon Kopp (1976) puts it well: "If we flee from the evil in ourselves, we do it at our hazard. All evil is potential vitality in need of transformation. To live without the creative potential of our own destructiveness is to be a cardboard angel" (p. 109). By facing and accepting our evil impulses and acts and the threat that lies behind them, we can begin to reclaim the energy locked up in them for positive living. This analysis of evil focuses on the personal side of estrangement and the sense of personal responsibility.

I think it is equally important to emphasize that, though evil does not have an independent existence at the ontological level, this is not to deny the real power of evil in life--this is the tragic side of estrangement, its inevitability and universality. There can be little question about its savage reality in all dimensions of our existence, so much so that in some sense it does achieve an independent existence. As long as man exists there will be evil. The recognition of the reality of evil and its root source within each of us as individuals is important for at least two reasons.

First, it helps to guard against naive assumptions and unconscious magical beliefs that evil can be eliminated: If only we changed society; if only we concentrated on love; if only we had better parents; if only we destroyed the evil object outside ourselves, e.g., the capitalist. The if only attitude reflects a naive longing for perfection, for happiness, for an end to pain and suffering. Its operation is also seen in all utopias and in all philosophical-religious movements which claim to have the answer or the ultimate truth. This longing is not in itself bad if it is seen for what it is. But it does become destructive if its goals are perceived, consciously or unconsciously, as real possibilities, and if it is used to avoid taking full responsibility for oneself, as it then takes the individual away from finding constructive ways of dealing directly with the threat of non-being.

The other reason is that, unless evil's depth and reality are acknowledged, it becomes more difficult to understand and accept the persistence of evil in the world and in ourselves; the depth of the pain and terror that lies behind evil, and the difficulty of real growth and change. The growing awareness and acceptance of evil in ourselves and

others are crucial elements in growth. The fact that people generally hide themselves from the full force of the threat of non-being is understandable but it does not change the effects of doing so. If the inevitability of evil is accepted, then, since it cannot be wished away, projected outside of ourselves, or repressed, the only alternative is to face it directly. Knowing the depth of the terror also helps us to refrain from an easy judgmentalism on the personhood of others and ourselves and on the infinite variety of attempts made to resolve the threat. It lays the basis for compassion and reconciling (accepting) justice.

Aloneness and Self-Responsibility

Tillich (1954) writes: "Every self is self-related and a complete self is completely self-related. It is an independent centre, indivisible and impenetrable, and therefore is rightly called an individual" (pp. 25-26). Even cursory observation points to our separation from others. I am trapped inside myself. I cannot enter into another person's mind or body. If I am aware of another person in pain, I cannot literally feel his pain. If I respond with a feeling of pain or compassion, it is my pain, my compassion. I am indeed "indivisible and impenetrable," as is the other. Though this may seem obvious, it needs to be asserted because we are generally unwilling to face this fact directly. I am not only alone. I also need to be aware of my aloneness.

To confront our aloneness is to confront the threat of non-being. Our isolation faces us with a devastating threat to our significance

as a self. One of the things we do to counteract this threat is to attempt to create connections or binding ties with the world and other people to give the illusion that we are not alone. When we blame others for hurting us; when we try to manipulate others; when we see things and people, e.g., our children as being ours, as belonging to us, or as being our property; when we see ourselves as being morally committed to others or as belonging to them; when we have expectations of others; when we assume that others have a right to expect things of us; when we give other people power over us; when we assume responsibility for another's welfare or pain; when we experience guilt; when we assume roles as lovers, therapists, fathers, daughters, in so far as these roles define expectations and responsibilities; when we bond ourselves into exclusive fraternal, religious, national, or racial groups--we seek to create direct connections with the world and others. Only by radically cutting through the illusion of these ties, without attempting to negate their continuing presence in us, can we begin to establish the basis for true love and union and for reclaiming our own power to affirm and assert ourselves. However, even love does not resolve or ultimately overcome our separation: "The ecstasy of love can absorb one's own self in its union with the other self, and separation seems to be overcome. But after these moments, the isolation of self from self is felt even more deeply than before" (Tillich, 1963, p. 10).

As we begin to reclaim our power, take responsibility for ourselves, and accept our isolation, we gradually come to experience the other side of aloneness--the dignity, grandeur and awe of being an alone, self-responsible, centered human being. The word "'loneliness'" expresses "the pain of being alone" and "'solitude' . . . the glory of being alone"

(Tillich, 1963, p. 11).

The discussion of aloneness brings me to another critical concept: Each person is responsible only for himself. Horney (1950) describes being a self-responsible person as involving

no more but also no less that plain, simple honesty about himself and his life. It operates in three ways: a square recognition of his being as he is, without minimizing or exaggerating; a willingness to bear the consequences of his actions, decisions, etc., without trying to "get by" or to put the blame on others; the realization that it is up to him to do something about his difficulties without insisting that others, or fate, or time will solve them for him.
(p. 169)

I am responsible for all my thoughts, intuitions, feelings, actions, and illnesses. No matter how narrow and restricted my alternatives may seem, I still choose my response, even if it is only in how I choose to feel about the situation. In some cases this becomes the only way a human being is able to affirm his dignity as a human being. This is "spiritual freedom" or the "inner superiority of the person over enslaving conditions in the external world" (Tillich, 1954, pp. 60-61). "I won't" acknowledges self-responsibility. "I can't" denies it. In an important sense, I am also responsible for my "universe." I create, by my choices and actions, many of the situations that impinge on me; I create the way I see the world; and I create the way I respond to it. If I take full responsibility for myself, it also means fully accepting the consequences of my feelings, thoughts and actions. To be self-responsible means to be free.

Taking full responsibility for myself does not imply that all my choices are necessarily conscious and subject to my will. And it does not mean that it is necessarily easy, or in practical terms even possible, to consciously choose my feelings. But it does imply that these do

originate within me. They are my feelings. Though they originate in response to an environmental situation, they are not caused by that situation. If my response is caused by the situation, it would be unalterable. In that it is a response, it implies that it can change. No person can hurt me, except in a physical sense, and even then I usually have a responsibility for that situation occurring. I am not a victim. You cannot hurt me, oppress me, or make me feel good.

Being self-responsible also does not mean that I can do anything, and certainly not everything, I might conceive of wanting to do. I operate within the boundaries set by my capabilities, experience, and environment--within the limitations of finitude. My freedom exists in polarity with my destiny. At the same time, it does imply that the limitations of my capabilities and environment are not anywhere as restrictive as I usually imagine them to be.

The inverse implication of self-responsibility is that I cannot be responsible for you--for your thoughts, feelings, and actions. I cannot hurt you or make you feel good. I cannot make you do anything. You will only do it if you choose to submit, for whatever reason, to my pressure. If I try to take responsibility for you, I am trying to take power, i.e., to increase the illusion of my having power. I diminish my own power and, in my eyes, your dignity. Denying self-responsibility and assuming responsibility for others are neurotic distortions of power and love.

Personally, I often choose to adopt a position of responsibility to the other--a position based not so much on obligation or duty as on my love for the other. I see this as being open and vulnerable to the other, accepting and affirming her separateness, aloneness, dignity,

and equality, and attempting to avoid power manipulations which play on her vulnerabilities, I choose this position for myself and out of my love for the other. I use the word responsible in this context in two ways. First, "being a free moral agent" (Websters, 1963). As a free moral agent I am able to respond to the other, I am response-able. This can only come from a position of love. Secondly, acknowledging my finitude and the ambiguity of my actions, I choose in many situations to act out of a sense of duty when the movement of love is not there, or is present only in a highly ambiguous way. When I acknowledge this to myself in each situation, I am more able to let the sense of obligation go and, in so doing, become more response-able. This often occurs in the therapeutic setting or when someone asks for my attention when my energy is otherwise occupied.

Taking responsibility for myself does not deny the ambiguity of my doing so in this life. Neither, however, contrary to Marin's assertion (Chapter 1), does it imply selfishness nor deny my capacity to love the other. Indeed, the assumption of the positions of my aloneness and complete responsibility for myself, and of the other's aloneness and complete responsibility for herself is critical in human relationships as it provides the only basis on which the separateness and dignity of each person can be affirmed, on which manipulations and expectations can be worked through and avoided, and on which the growth of power and love can be built. Only when I can truly say no, can my yes have any real meaning.

If I assume this position of aloneness and complete responsibility for myself, I am, in effect, denying that I need anything from people and the world. I will be examining this and other aspects of the concept of need in the following section.

The Concept of Need

Ben Wong and Jock McKeen (Note 1) assert that love exists in inverse proportion to need, i.e., to neurotic need. From the perspective of this study, this can be seen as a statement of the relationship between love in essence and distorted or need love. Though this principle is most clearly seen in intimate relationships, it also applies to all our relationships with ourselves, with other people, with the world, and with being itself. The more one operates on the basis of need in human relationships, the less is love present. If I love you, I love you and I do not need you to love me.

There is an important characteristic of the word need that should be brought out into the open. Need is "a lack of something requisite, desirable, or useful" (Websters, 1963), Need, especially as experienced neurotically, usually has the quality of demand, i.e., it is felt to be imperative that it be met. However, in using the word there is always an implicit 'if'. I need this if I am to achieve, do, or feel this. The need is always conditional on a goal. If I say I need love, implicit is, "if I am to be happy and fulfilled." If I take responsibility for myself, nothing is absolutely necessary. There are only things or states that I want, that I consider desirable. It is not even imperative, even though I may experience it that way, that I live. The neurotic's claim of absolute necessity is a part of the neurotic structure.

Within the framework I am developing, I would suggest that what Maslow (1968, p. 83) calls the basic or deficiency needs--needs for food, water, rest, shelter, self-esteem and love--are not descriptive of our essential selfhood. Selfhood is more potently conceived of in

terms of power and love which move us through existence and are only experienced as needs in so far as we feel discomfort if they are not acted upon: I need to do this rather than I need this from you. Not even "I need to do this," so much as "if I am true to my nature I do this." In essence we have the capacity to find food and water, to make shelters, to affirm ourselves, and to love--to do the things that are necessary if we are to survive and actualize ourselves. Maslow (1970, p. 135) talks about the deficiency needs as the basic motivators. However, the fundamental human 'motivation' is not to meet the deficiency needs but to live and actualize our power and love. This brings one closer to Maslow's concept of metamotivation (1968, p. 202) and to the concept of ontological forces that move us through life. Deficiency needs--needing something from the world-- are basically neurotic needs, distortions of the vital ontological drives of love and power.

It might be argued that I at least need the world and other people if I am to actualize myself. It is true that the world and people are a requisite to self-actualization. On the other hand, it is also a distortion to use the word need in this context. The world is a given, it comes into the description of what it means to be. It is here. It is where I find myself, both in the sense that I come to consciousness and discover myself in a world, and in the sense that I discover my essential nature as I actualize it in responding to the world. Perhaps the distinction would be clearer, since the word need is so easily and expressively used to imply the concepts of being requisite, desirable, or useful, and since it is not my purpose to attempt to change the normal usage of language but rather to attempt to clarify meaning, if I were to phrase the distinction thus: I need people and the world in

order to actualize myself and my love but I do not need them, even given their ambiguity, to be anything other than what they are in order to do so.

However, a problem arises here. If I find myself as a child in this world and discover that those around me continually deny me, tell me that I am worthless, beat me, put me down or, even worse, totally ignore me and do not respond to me, is there any chance of my actualizing myself? The answer would seem to be no. I would die. There must be a sense in which one can say that the child does have certain needs from the environment if she is to grow and actualize herself.

Although there is no sharp dividing point between childhood and adulthood, I believe a meaningful difference between the two can be established in the context of needs. Ashley Montagu (1959) has put it succinctly and clearly: "Birth is the process by means of which the fetus is prepared not for the assumption of the demands and responsibilities of postnatal existence, but merely for initiation into them" (p. 443). What the child essentially needs is a nurturing environment in which there is care for her physical and psychological needs so that she can live and learn the skills necessary to eventually go out to meet her own survival and growth needs. In relation to psychological growth, what is essentially needed is not approval or teaching of what is right and wrong, but confirmation of the child's essential being.

The child needs a secure base from which to go^{out}/and confront the world and the threat implied in its otherness; and to return to, to integrate his experiences. The security in his base comes from the undistorted quality in his parents' love--the affirmation and confirmation of his essential selfhood. R. D. Laing (1971) describes the confirmatory response thus: It "is relevant to the evocative action, it accords

recognition to the evocatory act, and accepts its significance for the evoker, if not for the respondent" (p. 99). The child does not need confirmations of a false self nor judgments on his personhood, e.g., you are a good boy or you are a bad boy. Tillich(1964) writes:

All men experience pain if their dignity as subject is violated. They suffer feelings of shame if they are made into things to be looked at, bodily or psychologically, or if they are treated as objects of valuating judgments, even if the judgment is favourable, or if they are punished in consequence of condemning judgments, the shame in this case being more painful than the physical suffering. In all these cases the sublime centre of self-awareness is deprived of its greatness and its dignity. (p. 98)

In essence we have returned to the concept of justice. Each being has, at the very least, a minimum claim, or just claim, on the world to be treated according to its power of being: for an adult, essentially as a person; for a child as an evolving person who is vulnerable and who has not as yet developed a strong enough sense of his identity to be able to stand up to consistent onslaughts on his validity as a person. This distinction is perceived intuitively by adults in a sense of protectiveness for children which they seldom extend in the same way to adults. The child needs to be treated justly if he is to grow. The mature person, one with a strong sense of himself and deeply in touch with his power of self-affirmation gained through experience, doesn't need this, although his claim to justice still remains: He has the center and the strength to withstand attacks on his personhood.

The question is sometimes raised as to how a child can learn moral or socially acceptable behaviour if it is not taught to her. Though most such questions are based on an assumption that is not shared by this study, i.e., that man is basically evil, there is still a problem here. Certainly, overindulging or ignoring a child leads to as serious a neuroticism as rigid moralizing and excessive punishment. It is indeed

important for the child to learn the reality of other people and their needs. How is my child to be confronted with my reality as a parent? It is, I believe, most effectively accomplished in a confirming way where her desires and needs are acknowledged. When they conflict with my own, I also confront her directly with my needs and wishes as mine. If this is done in a way that does not discount her own, then I feel she will learn to respond in terms of respect for the rights and needs of others. A child not only needs to receive love but also wants to and does love the other. Neurotic disturbances arise when I as a parent do not own my own need, externalizing it instead in the form of oughts and shoulds, e.g., telling the child, in effect, that she ought not/^{to}want to play with daddy now but ought to love daddy and do as daddy says (love = obedience). It is of course impossible to be a perfect parent. However, we will do more for our children's psychological growth by concentrating on our own, rather than by trying to help our children grow (see Jung, 1954, p. 125).

Summarizing this discussion of needs: I have suggested that the constructive forces in an individual are best seen as natural ontological drives which are only experienced as needs when they are frustrated. In essence, the person requires nothing from the environment. However, the individual does have a just claim for recognition as a person. What the child essentially needs, if she is to grow, is a nurturing environment based on confirmation of her real self. A nurturing environment is often provided the neurotic by the therapist along with approaches designed to help her confront her difficulties. The neurotic does not have a just claim for the confirmation of her idealized self. In principle, for the mature person, needs are neurotic and she doesn't need a nurturing environment, though in reality it will almost always be there for her

because of the way she is as a person. Though both are always ambiguously present, need and love exist in inverse proportion to each other.

Summary

I have attempted to establish a dynamic theory of evil which shows its dependence on the positive forces in life--love and power. Evil arises when we respond to the threat of non-being by denying our finitude and the personhood of ourselves and others. However, life is ambiguous: The positive and negative elements are inextricably intertwined. I have established the importance of claiming our aloneness and self-responsibility, i.e., by facing the threat of non-being directly, if we are to transform the power in evil into creative living. I have also discussed the concept of need and shown its relationship to love. In the next chapter I will attempt to integrate these elements into the concept of self-actualization.

CHAPTER IV

PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-ACTUALIZATION

Life is the actualization of essential or potential being in existence. It is the process of self-actualization. It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive view of self-actualization as this would involve a consideration of the totality of life. Rather, I will concentrate in this chapter on defining essential selfhood, on considering the actualization of power and freedom, and on an exploration of the concepts of morality and essential humanity. The actualization of love will be discussed in the next chapter.

Essential Selfhood and Its Actualization

One of the most perplexing problems that arises in relation to self-actualization is the definition of essential being. Since essential selfhood can only be approached through its ambiguous manifestations in existence, it is open to many possible misunderstandings. One of the most obvious of these is to see the essential self as an object. Essential selfhood is not something (a thing) that simply needs to be discovered. I suspect this error is not so often made at the conscious

level as at the preconscious level of assumption--that somehow, once we peel away all the encrustations of our conditioning, we will find a jewel, our true self, and it will express itself in magnificent splendour for all to see. I generally prefer to use the term selfhood rather than self in this context, as it helps to avoid some of the dangers of objectification.

The search for essential selfhood always remains elusive. Shmueli (1972) understands this clearly:

Whereas personality can be understood as the concrete individual living being when it possesses a coherent pattern of dispositions and habits and is oriented toward norms as the structured particularized Me, selfhood is unalterably secretive and unapproachable from the outside. We do not possess our selfhood, because ultimately it is not objectifiable. All the knowledge gathered about it does not exhaust its secret. Man is more than the idea of man. . . . The I has an elusive interiority with the possibility of withdrawing itself more and more into the inaccessible. This latter activity, the transcending into the interiority, I call introsceding. . . . The direction towards the world must determine objects, the direction towards selfhood, however, is introsceding towards a non-object. (pp. 226-227)

What Shmueli calls personality can also be thought of as the actualized self, the ambiguous manifestation of essential selfhood. A question that arises that Shmueli does not answer is: If introsceding does not move towards an object, what does it introsced towards? Though perhaps it can be suggestive, any answer will be elusive. I would suggest that it moves towards pure content, content without form. In a sense, introsceding moves towards emptiness, towards nothing, i.e., towards no-thing. I am, in my essence, not a thing. At this level I cannot identify my selfhood with any concrete manifestation of my actualized self, e.g., my idealized self, my painting, my thesis; or myself as a painter, a father, a friend, or a counsellor; or with any of my personality traits, feelings or thoughts. These manifestations are

actualizations of pure content, content given form.

What is the nature of this pure content? In attempting to answer this question, I would start by pointing to the metaphor of energy. Physics appears to be moving more and more towards the concept that the foundation of all matter is energy. Following a rock down to crystals, molecules, atoms, neutrons, electrons, etc., leads one closer and closer to the idea of contained energy, energy that has taken form. In the person, the content of essential selfhood can perhaps be seen as energy without form. It cannot be seen, grasped, or known until it manifests itself in form. Energy or pure content cannot exist without form. Thus, the aware self in introscending is caught in a bind: It moves towards pure content but cannot grasp the nature of that content except through the forms it manifests itself in (even the imagination uses forms) yet, at the same time it is not able to associate its selfhood with that form. Though we are the actualized self from the objective point of view, we are not from the subjective. The term real self might be adequate to cover both orientations. The word real can point to essential selfhood which is continually actualizing itself, but also remains as unrealized potential.

The power to be and the drive towards union can be seen as energy. However, since the term energy can have misleading connotations, I prefer to look at power and love as the vital elements of essential selfhood, i.e., the life-giving elements. We can only speak metaphorically or symbolically of this vitality. We can only point to its characteristics by contemplating its manifestations. When power and love arise, and they activate the organism/a person feels, thinks, acts, and loves. Out of emptiness comes movement. Though these are our "depths," they


permeate our total being.

Another major element or content of essential selfhood is freedom. Our potential for self-awareness gives rise to our potential to be free. Though freedom is as insubstantial as power and love, it does not have the quality of vitality. It is an ontological structure through which our power and love are mediated in the world. Our consciousness of self also gives rise to an awareness of the sublime, holy, or intrinsically valuable nature of our selfhood. This is the source of our sense of justice. This sense of justice, along with our freedom, is the foundation of our nature as valuing, self-responsible, moral beings. How this sense of the sublime nature of selfhood becomes embedded in the individual's relations with the world, e.g., where justice is accorded to the other, is discussed in Chapter 5. Justice towards the self also leads to a drive for wholeness. Self-awareness, freedom and justice, like power and love are potentialities--a part of essential selfhood--and are ambiguously actualized in existence.

With freedom and self-awareness comes the recognition of the threat of non-being, the possibility of self-transcendence, and the world of meanings and values. These factors conspire to radically differentiate man from the animal and open to him the potentiality of being destructive or creative. Freedom and self-awareness are denied, except in primitive ways, to animals which operate or express their power of being and love within a much more rigid and limited structure of instincts.

Self-awareness arises in, and is a part of, another order of potentialities. This includes, for example, thought, memory, intuition, creativity, imagination, sensation, feeling, bodily movement, communi-

FIGURE 1
ESSENTIAL SELFHOOD



Powers or potentialities, as they are actualized, become capacities which are capable of growth and subject to decay.

cation, etc. These could be seen as specific powers or structures through which we actualize our power, love and freedom, providing the possibilities for and limitations on that actualization. In a similar way, the powers are dependent upon the biological dimension from which they arise. The term structures differentiates the powers from the forms through which they are actualized. Thus, for example, I can actualize my potential for critical, analytic thought through many different forms, e.g., philosophy, physics, business, etc. The vitality behind their actualization derives, as with freedom, from power and love. They are, like power, love and freedom, essentially pure content, pure potentialities, and cannot be grasped until they actualize themselves.

Essential selfhood is formless. Form arises in existence. Outside the biological dimension, and even to some extent within it, the possibilities for an almost infinite variety of forms come to us from the world.

Aquinas points out that the peculiarity of man is his ability to receive all forms, not physically, but intentionally in the mind. He is, through his mind, all things. . . . If all forms can be present in man, man can then incline toward any and all forms present in him through knowledge. To incline toward all the forms present in him, however, is not yet to choose among them.
(Llamzon, 1973, pp. 24-25)

Except, perhaps, in the biological and instinctual dimensions, choice is implied in every actualization. There is also a sacrifice in any meaningful choice. Kilpatrick (1975) asks: "Where does a man come to grips with his self? . . . It is the point at which a man gives up what he could be and chooses what he will be. Every choice implies a renunciation: to choose one thing is to lose something else. But a man must choose, must commit himself; otherwise he remains only possibilities.

By his choices, painful as they must be, a man defines himself" (pp. 42-43). If a man chooses not to choose, the choice is then made by default. Even though he may try, man cannot change the fact of his freedom. If he disowns it and allows himself to be determined by internal and external forces, he has still made a choice to do so. The denial of freedom can be seen as a highly ambiguous actualization of freedom. Choices for unlimited freedom, e.g., for an idealized self, or in an unwillingness to make any commitments, can also be seen the same way.

As the potentialities or powers are actualized, they become capacities. These capacities represent ambiguous actualizations of my essential selfhood and therefore contain destructive as well as constructive elements. I develop, for example, the capacity to assert myself against criticism coming from other people in positive and in negative ways, e.g., by developing my abilities to manipulate people. My capacities for self-affirmation and loving, to be free and self-responsible, for critical analytic thought, for creativity, for feeling, for physical movement, etc., are not static. The potentiality for fuller development never ceases unless the supporting biological base decays or is destroyed.

In each act of choice I choose to actualize my essential selfhood in a particular form, in a particular time and place. I choose to become a counsellor rather than an artist; I choose to blame another person for my pain rather than face the threat I feel to my being directly. I choose to be open with a friend rather than to let the friendship slowly die. Each choice constitutes a new self. However, within this process of creating a series of real selves, there is a continuing line of identity. This is essential. If the transformation

is too radical, I seriously risk disintegration if I am unable to achieve a new form adequate to the content. Without change, on the other hand, the self loses vitality: "Identity is not a static established achievement but a dynamic and continuous process of consolidation and reorganization. It is a synthesis of many interests and choices into a unique and distinctive style--but a synthesis that never stops" (Kilpatrick, 1975, p. 6). Achieving a balance between identity and change is critical to creative self-actualization and growth.

It needs to be noted that the most important concept of the self is not essential selfhood. Unrealized potentiality has little significance in itself. Nor is it the actualized self, the ambiguous actualization of my essential selfhood. I cannot identify myself solely with either of these. The most significant concept is the real self, in the sense that it encloses both my essential selfhood and its concrete, ambiguous manifestations. The real self points to my essential humanity, a concept to which I will return later.

Reclaiming Power and Freedom

I have discussed how neurotic development is existentially inevitable in the child. The assumption of responsibility for himself gradually increases as the child grows stronger and lessens his dependence on his parents. Entry into adulthood is symbolic and means neither that he has, in fact, assumed full responsibility for his own life, nor that he is no longer in need of help. Rather, it^{is}/symbolic in the sense that self-responsibility has become an issue to be seriously

dealt with. Assuming such a task is assuming a position of personal growth towards becoming a mature person. Maslow (1968) summarizes this task well: It

involves especially giving up the child's desperate wish for the exclusive, total love of his parents while learning to love others. He must learn to gratify his own needs and wishes, rather than the needs of his parents, and he must learn to gratify them himself, rather than depending upon the parents to do this for him. He must give up being good out of fear and in order to keep their love, and must be good because he wishes to be. He must discover his own conscience and give up his internalized parents as a sole ethical guide. He must become responsible rather than dependent, and hopefully must become able to enjoy this responsibility. All these techniques by which weakness adapts itself to strength are necessary for the child but immature and stunting in the adult. . . . He must replace fear with courage. (p. 211)

This turning of weakness into strength is an essential aspect of self-actualization.

The process of growth can be seen in terms of power. I have noted the meaning of giving our power, our natural power of self-affirmation, away: We give the other the power to determine how we feel about ourselves, and the power to determine how we respond and act. In doing this, we also give away our freedom. However, it is only in a highly metaphorical sense that one can speak of the child giving her power and freedom away. Given the child's lack of experience and her dependence upon her parents, her power and freedom can be more accurately seen as being taken away from her, or, perhaps better, their development as being denied, stunted or distorted. Much of the time the child is manipulated through her vulnerability to meet her parent's neurotic needs rather than being allowed to grow and being supported in her need to actualize her own essential selfhood. Our society generally views children as empty containers that must be filled with desirable knowledge and rules, the oughts and shoulds of behaviour.

The denial of our true selves involved in the loss of power is sensed deeply, and is reflected in our rebellion against authority. This is most sharply symbolized in adolescent rebellion in which essential selfhood is desperately saying: "Hey listen! I'm more important than all that crap you're laying on me!" The self cries out in righteous indignation for justice but the individual falls into the trap of trying to force authority, e.g., parents, school, society, to give back to ^{her}her/equality and power, when, in fact, this can only be taken back by the individual in her own power to affirm herself. As long as we are only able to manifest our power when it is given back to us, i.e., when we are given permission by the other to do so, we are still dependent on the other.

Reclaiming one's power is a critical aspect of the development of oneself as a moral being. It is the process of taking fuller responsibility for oneself and in this represents the greater actualization of one's freedom. No longer can one blame others, fate, or the world for what one is. Responsibility is owned, the threat of non-being is taken into one's center, and the individual becomes a strong, moral being. I experience my greatest sense of power when I am truly accepting responsibility for myself. There is a sense of significance and I experience my humanity, freedom, dignity and vulnerability.

From the perspective of power, a major goal of the therapeutic process is to help the individual come to an acceptance of his responsibility for himself.

Every patient barks up the wrong tree by expecting that he can achieve maturation through external sources such as being psycho-analysed, reconditioned, hypnotized, marathonzed, or taking psychedelic drugs. Maturation cannot be done for him; he has to go through the painful process of growing up by himself. We

therapists can do nothing but provide him the opportunity, by being available as catalysts and projection screens. (Perls, 1967, p. 15)

The therapist does not cure the patient. Only the patient can heal himself. Man can change and grow. What he can change is his dependence on neurotic needs. However, he cannot change his essential nature: "You can liberate man only to his freedom" (Tillich, 1962b, p. 180).

When we discover that it is all up to us, we learn that "the secret is that there is no secret" (Kopp, 1976, p. 187). All there is is this life with its daily joys and sorrows, problems to be faced, and tasks to be done. There are no magical secrets to be discovered that will release us from the trials and tribulations of everyday into a spontaneous "happy forever after" life. In a sense we have cycled around to our childhood again when we simply lived and dealt with life, taking it as it was and as it came to us--with one essential difference. We are no longer dependent on our parents or others for support. We can now take responsibility for ourselves and for the consequences of our actions. We have developed our power and actualized our freedom and our integrity as adults. In reality, of course, such a goal is only ambiguously achieved and the process is more one of continuously cycling around to the same old problems at deeper and more subtle levels.

With the idea that there are various life-tasks at different stages of an individual's growth, I have introduced a developmental model into the concept of self-actualization. This model has been a relatively simple one (childhood, adulthood, maturity). There are many others, e.g., Erik Erikson's (1968, chap. 3), that are developed much more extensively and from different perspectives. These need to be

incorporated into any comprehensive view of the process of self-actualization.

Freeing the Spontaneous Self: Natural Self-affirmation

From another perspective, the fuller actualization of our power involves the process of opening up to our spontaneous selves, freeing them from the encrustations of the socialization process. The emphasis here is on unselfconscious, natural self-affirmation, rather than on deliberate choice. Many aspects of ourselves have been severely restricted or denied to us in our upbringing in the home, school and society because they represented threats to those around us: our self-assertion, love, intelligence, perceptiveness, imagination, fantasies, sexuality, fear, anger, sadness, grief, joy, etc. The vitality of youth is often very threatening to parents and teachers. In order to make themselves acceptable to others, children gradually compromise not only their freedom to choose their own lives, but also their natural spontaneous expressiveness.

The fuller actualization of our power involves breaking down the barriers imposed on and accepted by us, and gradually allowing our essential selves fuller expression, controlled from our own deciding center. Much of what first emerges are the repressed aspects of our neurotic selves which we had not allowed into our consciousness because they did not conform with our idealized self-images: rage, terror, weakness, neediness, selfishness, vindictiveness, and sexual "perversions,"--and emptiness when we see the falseness of our facades. As

these elements are expressed and the conflicts dealt with, and as we begin to relate to ourselves and the world in more constructive ways, the channels of expression in the mind and body become clearer. Life energies begin to flow more strongly and activate the organism more fully. Feeling, perception, and intuition are heightened, come closer together, and can lead to peak experiences--moments of ecstatic love. Choice is still present: We allow spontaneous expression at intuitively sensed appropriate times. Spontaneity does not deny our will nor make the grandeur of our freedom any less great. In fact, it increases our freedom by making more parts of ourselves more fully available to us.

As much of what comes out is permeated with the negative judgments of society, which have also been internalized, and as dealing with what emerges means facing the threat of non-being more directly, growth is not only a joyful process of release, but is also heavily overlaid with fear, pain and guilt as we gradually let the cherished, idealized self-images go. What is involved is a transformation of the energy locked up in our negative sides. Kopp (1976) writes: "My task as a guru is to interest the patient in his own evil, so that he may claim and transform it. He must learn to stop fleeing his badness. He must learn instead to pursue the evil urge" (p. 142). The most productive work is accomplished by moving to where the fear, repulsion, and disgust are. Embarking on the task of human growth involves terrors not understood by the client before he starts. It is not a path to be undertaken lightly and it is questionable whether any counsellor has a right to lead an individual there unless there are real indications within the client that his deep growth is vitally important to him.

The final battle between the idealized and the essential self is a deadly conflict involving great pain and terror. The Russians call this the "sick point" (Perls, 1967, p. 16). In Gestalt therapy it is referred to as the impasse. Fritz Perls (1967) explains:

The existential impasse is a situation in which no environmental support is forthcoming and the patient is, or believes himself to be incapable of coping with life on his own. Thus he will do anything to hold on to the status quo rather than grow up and use his own powers. He will change marriage partners, but not his expectations; he will change therapists, but not his neurosis; he will change the content of his inner conflicts, but he will not give up his self-torture games--he will increase the subtlety of his manipulations and his control-madness to secure the environmental support without which he imagines he cannot survive. (p. 16)

The catastrophic expectation is his death. The rewards of moving through the impasse are great, but this remains to a large extent unknown to the individual, and to achieve it he does in fact have to face the reality of his death and the threat of non-being:

What does it mean "to be born again" for man? It means for the first time to be subjected to the terrifying paradox of the human condition, since one must be born not as a god, but as a man, or as a god-worm, or a god who shits. Only this time without the neurotic shield that hides the full ambiguity of one's life. And so we know that every authentic rebirth is a real ejection from paradise. (Becker, 1973, p. 58)

Only a heroic few will actually face the impasse in full force. Most of us who are concerned with our growth, will move more slowly and gradually--but are not to be judged on that account. To do so is to incorporate heroism into the idealized self: "I ought to, therefore I must be Heroic!" This leads to increased self-hate and the blocking of the growth process.

Perhaps I am overemphasizing the dark side of growth. If so, it is because I believe that there has been a strong tendency to stress the other side, and many people who are longing for fulfillment, meaning, and joy, desperately grab onto almost any answer--particularly those

that offer peace without pain, or joy without terror. And some of these do seem to work for many, e.g., Transcendental Meditation. If these prove to be what they want, it is not for me to judge them and their solutions just as I do not judge a person who finds solace in religious belief. All answers are ambiguous. However, I believe it is important not to confuse these solutions with what is involved in the truly powerful actualization of power and love as understood in this study. This necessitates facing more and more directly the threat of non-being without trying to eliminate, repress or disguise it. The real heights of joy and fulfilment cannot be achieved without at the same time facing the threat of death and meaninglessness. Each leads to the other under the conditions of existence. To conclude, I will, with Becker (1973), append a warning to all advertisements of joy: " 'Danger: real probability of the awakening of terror and dread, from which there is no turning back'" (p. 271).

Man as a Moral Being

Since much of the argument between the proponents of self-concern and other-concern is based on moral claims as to what we ought to be and do, this concept needs to be explored more fully. In Chapter 1, I rejected legalistic morality (prefabricated rules and directives to be followed implicitly) as destructive and inadequate to the needs of the present. However, the deeply ingrained effects of such an understanding of morality in our society makes any discussion of this subject hazardous and difficult. For most people morality is legalistic morality.

Some adhere to this ethic with zealous devotion, seeking perfection and salvation in seemingly unambiguous rules. For others, legalistic morality is an anathema and these rebel against the cruelty and inhumaneness implicit in such rigidity. Despite the hazards involved, even perhaps because of them, it is, I believe, necessary to attempt to clarify the nature of morality.

I would contend that we are, in our essence, moral beings. This is exhibited not only in idealists, in those who struggle to be moral, in those who search for the truth, and in those who act in a caring way towards others, but also in the most brutish and cruel who seek to justify, i.e., to make just and thereby moral, their beliefs and their deeds. Though most humane persons may consider a man such as Hitler to be little more than an animal, he revealed his humanity in his need to justify his extermination of thousands of human beings by attempting to deny to them the status of being human.

Our freedom also points to our potential as moral beings. The question of morality can only arise when there is a choice. I would claim that all persons, in intent, choose goodness over evil, right over wrong, and truth over falsehood, though what they understand and interpret as good, right, and true varies incredibly. Even if a person chooses a course that he knows is evil at one level, he does so in the name of a higher principle of justice or morality. He kills in the name of the justice of revenge or self-defense. He exploits others in the name of the survival of the fittest. He rules by divine right or by some other mystique.

The concept of morality implies that there are certain criteria or norms by which we can judge certain acts as against other acts: good or

evil, constructive or destructive, etc. Valuing is essential to selfhood--some things are desirable, some things are not. However, the immediate desire of the person is an insufficient norm for morality as many of these arise in destructive neurotic needs. Other norms are necessary.

The first question that needs to be answered is: What is the source or basis of these norms? Tillich (1954) sees their foundation lying in the essential self:

The law given by God is man's essential nature, put against him as law. If man were not estranged from himself, if his essential nature were not distorted in his actual existence, no law would stand against him. The law is not strange to man. It is natural law. It represents his true nature from which he is estranged. Every valid ethical commandment is an expression of man's essential relation to himself, to others and to the universe. This alone makes it obligatory and its denial self-destructive. (pp. 76-77)

The actualizing of essential selfhood is a moral process--the actualization of freedom, power, love, etc. In doing this, man constitutes himself as a moral being. Three other points: First, the last sentence in the quotation from Tillich ties into his concept of the structures of destruction that I discussed in Chapter 3. By our own choices we destroy ourselves. Second: All men seek to justify their behaviour. Justification is a moral concept. It becomes rationalization when it is used to hide the injustice and ambiguity in our actions from ourselves and from others. Finally, our essential nature can only be ambiguously known--it is not clear and self-evident.

The moral imperative is categorical and unambiguous. However, "this unambiguity does not refer to anything concrete" (Tillich, 1964, p. 47). Though man attempts to deal with the uncertainty of his situation by creating ethical codes of behaviour, e.g., the Ten

Commandments, Bills of Human Rights, social norms of behaviour, etc., there are no specific norms that have absolute validity. They are all relative expressions of particular cultural situations. In addition, because of the ambiguity of life, none of them can tell an individual with certainty what is moral behaviour in the concrete situation.

Tillich (1951), however, is not content with his emphasis on the relativity of ethical norms: "There must be something immovable in the ethical principle, the criterion and standard of all ethical change. And there must be a power of change within the ethical principle itself; and both must be united" (p. 171). He finds that only love, in particular the dimension of agape, can meet these conditions: "Love alone can transform itself according to the concrete demands of every individual and social situation without losing its eternity and dignity and unconditional validity" (p. 173). Love enters the concrete situation seeking the answer that will bring about the union of the separated, under the principle of justice to oneself and the other, i.e., the integrity, dignity and personhood of each.

A problem arises around the idea of the moral imperative being categorical and unambiguous that I want to attempt to clarify. Such a concept seems to imply a strong ought. If there is an ought, there is a command. But one cannot command a person to be truly free, powerful and loving. One cannot command anyone, including oneself, to be something they are not or do not want to be. If there is a categorical imperative, it can only have meaning or significance because it is grounded in a fact. The fact it must be grounded in is that it is our essential nature, for example, to love, and that this is what we most deeply want. Morality has little meaning as an ought. What is

being said is that if an individual seems to want to destroy herself (which she is free to choose to do and in choosing to do so cannot be judged in her personhood for so doing) she is deeply out of touch with what she truly wants. Norms are not oughts except in the sense of saying: If you are to do what you most deeply want to do and be what you most deeply want to be, i.e., powerful and loving, this is the path, i.e., these are the norms you must follow. Other paths will lead you away from that goal. The imperative is categorical only because that is what is most deeply desired by the individual.

Norms are essential in existence. The first point to be made is that they apply to actions, what we do, rather than to feelings. To desire, want, feel, and need are all a part of our essential humanity and are not in question. Norms relate to how we choose to act on these in relation to ourselves, others, and the world.

This study and most of therapeutically oriented psychology contain many implicit, if not explicit, norms. Power and love, for example, cannot be seriously discussed without considering what is understood by these concepts, and these understandings inevitably lead to norms. Self-responsibility, honesty and openness, and the awareness and acceptance of aloneness, ambiguity, and the threat of non-being are other examples of positive norms. Some acts that are considered to be negative or destructive, and therefore immoral, become negative norms, e.g., manipulation, the denial of another's freedom and responsibility for themselves, neurotic pride, the search for perfection, and restrictive moral rules. The enterprise of therapeutic psychology is intimately connected with attempts to define and clarify the nature of these norms, the intensity of their

directive power, and the conditions under which they are applicable, e.g., what does honesty mean? What degree of importance does it have? Do any other principles override it and in what kind of situations? If there were more awareness of, and conscious acknowledgement of, the nature of this task in the area of psychology, the results might be more productive and honest.

All human activity is moral in intent. Even if the intent is consciously anti-moral, it is done in the name of implicit or explicit higher principles, in order to destroy what are considered rigid, destructive rules. Tillich (1954) writes:

If one judges . . . an encounter and its outcome according to previous power proportions, one is necessarily unjust, even if one is legally right. Examples of this situation are a matter of daily experience. They include all trespasses of the positive law in the name of a superior law which is not yet formulated and valid. They include struggles for power which are in conflict with indefinite or obsolete rules, and the outcome of which is an increase in the power of being in both the victor and the conquered. They include all those events in which justice demands the resignation of justice, an act without which no human relation and no human group could last. (pp. 64-65)

Given the ambiguities of existence and the changing nature of society, it is essential to be continually attempting to redefine and clarify norms in order to avoid the inevitable injustice implicit in rigidity. Essential though it is, it remains an elusive and never ending task.

Actualizing ourselves as moral beings means moving closer to our essential selfhood--expressing it in less distorted ways. The norms we develop for ourselves from increasing self-awareness and from our interactions with the norms of others, become productive if we use them as orientations for awareness in concrete situations, as principles that we can use to help us actualize our freedom of choice. They become destructive if they are incorporated into our idealized

selves as shoulds and standards against which we judge ourselves. It is not valid to use norms to judge our desires, feelings, needs or personhood. Their only validity is in relation to specific acts and they need to acknowledge the ambiguity of all acts. This orientation leads to a consideration of the goodness of our essential humanity.

The Goodness of Essential Humanity

When looking at evil in life--pogroms, wars, torture, the stultifying effects of poverty, child abuse, greed, alienation--there is often a feeling of frustration and revulsion, a doubt about whether there is any point to it all. Many become cynical or come to see life as a struggle for the survival of the fittest. The social environment is blamed for the stunting of the person. Many experience life as a burden, something oppressive and hateful. Such attitudes, while natural and understandable, can lead, if they are not owned and faced, to a restriction of one's vital energies. Evil represents a threat to our being.

Despite the reality of evil, it is possible to sense a rightness and goodness to our life on earth. Everything that is, including evil, derives from the goodness of being itself and gains its significance from that goodness. Evil is inevitable. But all evil is ambiguous. It could not exist except for the power it distorts. This is not to say that the specific manifestations of evil are in themselves good--they are destructive. It is to say that evil is a by-product of our freedom, which is good in itself; and necessary to our actualization,

which is good in itself. Without the resistance of the ambiguity freedom produces, the growth of freedom itself, and of self-responsibility, self-acceptance, virtue, strength and love--all qualities of powerful being--would be meaningless. Without freedom, man would simply act instinctually, living out a pre-ordained existence. Man would not be man. He loses his innocence but gains his maturity.

Life and existence are essentially good. On the personal level, I would call this the goodness of my essential humanity, including in this concept my essential selfhood, the ambiguity of its expression and the individuality of its forms. To accept life and our essential humanity is to accept the inevitability of evil and to enclose its threat into our centered selves, thereby to overcome its destructiveness and reclaim its power for creative self-actualization. We are grasped by the power of being itself which encloses non-being in its totality. Grasped by this power, we are able to accept ourselves despite our unacceptability, our imperfection. This is the affirmation of ourselves in which our true power and self-love are constituted.

Tillich (1964) refers to the process of growth as essentialization. Though this term could be interpreted as a simple return to what we essentially are, "'essentialization' can also mean that the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the 'New Being,' not fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfilment" (p. 427). In this theological language, I think Tillich is pointing to a very important experience or reality. Our sojourn on this earth is not merely a painful or joyous episode without signifi-

cance or ultimate meaning, and growth is not simply an interlude that must be endured until we can return to the essential spontaneous and expressive being we lost in childhood.

Even in the most outspoken form of mysticism the mystical self-transcendence has nothing in common with the vegetative state under the dimension of the organic. Its very nature is to overcome the subject-object split after it has fully developed in the personal realm--not to annihilate it, but to find something above the split in which it is conquered and preserved. (p.98)

However it may be expressed symbolically, self-integration and self-creation are intimately related processes in the creation of something new, and are absolutely essential in the movement towards greater and greater self-transcendence. Without them there would not be an individual self to transcend. I will be exploring the concept of self-transcendence more fully in the next chapter.

The concept of essentialization can help to give a sense of meaning and purpose to life and its ordeals and sufferings, and points to an ultimate goal. The image, which must be seen as highly symbolic, is of a fully-actualized separate self in complete union with others and with being itself. In life, the movement towards this state is reflected in the intimate interplay between love, power, freedom and ambiguity.

There is a mystery to the power of life that passes human comprehension. Becker (1973) expresses this well:

In the mysterious way in which life is given to us in evolution on this planet, it pushes in the direction of its own expansion. We don't understand it simply because we don't know the purpose of creation; we only feel life straining in ourselves and see it thrashing others about as they devour each other. Life seeks to expand in an unknown direction for unknown reasons. Not even psychology should meddle with this sacrosanct vitality, concluded Rank. . . . There is a driving force behind a mystery that we cannot understand, and it includes more than reason alone. The urge to cosmic heroism, then, is sacred and mysterious and not to be neatly ordered and rationalized by science and secularism. (p. 284)

To be able to assert from deep within ourselves that our humanity is good, is the power of being asserting that life has meaning in spite of the threat of meaninglessness which lies in our inability to grasp this meaning. We cannot know with absolute certainty that life does have meaning. But even this doubt is enclosed in the assertion. To blame the world for our unhappiness, to see it as a struggle for the survival of the fittest, to see it as a burden, and to look for utopias are all denials of our freedom, self-responsibility, and power.

Accepting life does not imply passivity. It is not a fatalistic resignation, nor a resignation from conflict, in the sense that Horney uses the phrase. It does involve, however, a gradual letting go of the often frantic, neurotic drivenness for perfection, for social power, for vindictiveness, and for change in the environment in order to satisfy one's own neurotic needs, even when this appears in the struggle for just causes and high ideals. This acceptance is not passive as it is also an acceptance of my freedom, self-responsibility, moral nature, and the power which drives to actualize my selfhood and love. True acceptance overcomes the destructive demands of the idealized self and leads to the release of my vitality, to growth, and to my deeper involvement in life. Maslow (1970) noted some of these qualities in his self-actualizing people, e.g., in their "deep feeling of identification" with, and "sympathy and affection" (p. 165) for people and mankind; in their involvement in creative life pursuits; and in their acceptance of the slowness of change in society: "My impression is that they are not against fighting but only against ineffective fighting" (p. 173). In being accepting, they were also more realistic and objective.

Relating to Need Creatively

It is neither wrong nor destructive to have needs or to ask (not demand) openly to have them met. Needs are a part of our nature under the conditions of existence. What is critical is that they should be seen for what they are. They should not be equated with love. At least a part of the reason why love and need are so often confused is that we need to justify our needs. We rationalize them as love and then use this in our power manipulations. Too often when I say "I love you," my purpose is to have you respond ". . . and I love you too." There is a strong expectation laid on the other in this tactic.

If we are to deal with needs creatively, we need first to become aware of them and then to acknowledge them: "If you dare to be what you are, your weakness will become your strength" (Tillich, 1963, p. 126). Joel Kramer (1974) notes that "the fact is I do make demands. I do have certain expectations in relationship. The really interesting thing is not to try to change this, but rather to see exactly how expectations affect your relationships, how demand destroys real relationship" (p. 84). He ties deep self and environment awareness--seeing--directly to movement and growth:

Conflict comes when there isn't clarity in seeing what is. If there is a clarity in seeing what is and if I am in direct confrontation with what is, then there is no conflict. I see something clearly, directly, immediately, so that the seeing is the action of movement.

I'm walking through the forest. Suddenly there's an explosive crack, and the huge tree above me is falling. I see this--I see it is falling. To see the tree falling is to move. There is no choice, no conflict. I don't say, "Should I move, or should I not move?" [sic] Is the tree falling on me, or is it not falling on me?" If I do this, the tree is going to hit me. To see the tree falling is to move. It is not that first I see and then through a decision, a rational process I move. To see is to move--immediately. The

seeing is the movement. . . . Just as a tree that is falling upon me is a physical danger, and to see it is to move; so, too, is conflict a great psychological danger in living. To see it as such is to move. (pp. 25, 27)

Kramer has brought into sharp focus two of the most critical concepts in growth and change, the ones that are necessary if we are to learn to avoid the destructive effects of neurotic ambition. Though deliberate choice is important in change, seeing and acceptance are the foundation of growth. They permit the movement to come from within rather than being imposed from without. They allow the categorical imperative of what we most deeply want to be--powerful and loving--to move us.

Since these concepts are so important, I would like to illustrate how they can operate in interpersonal relationships. Normally, the process is only fully actualized in relationship. Self-awarenesses are essential, but until I share these and they are seen and accepted by you, there is little movement within me and in the relationship. Other forces, often positive, lying underneath the current conflicts within myself do not emerge. Your seeing and accepting me greatly facilitates the process whereby I can accept the need and the fear in me from which it arises, and can let it go as something I must have from you. If you are unable to accept me, I could easily become defensive again. If your feelings seem unresolvable, I can work towards clarity in myself and in relationship to you, but the relationship itself becomes blocked at this point. If the lack of acceptance becomes in any way pervasive, the relationship will quickly lose its viability.

It might be argued then that I need you to hear me and to love me, to see and accept me. This is the paradox. The first point is that this is not a need of absolute necessity, but one that recognizes the

ambiguity of my own strength. Also, I, in fact, do not really need the specific you to hear me as long as I am heard. It is a neurotic distortion to say that it must be the specific you--this is a controlling and manipulative device, a way of avoiding self-responsibility. More fundamental, however, seems to be a transformation process related to Joel Kramer's concept of seeing. Verbalizing the need gives the owning of it a concrete public character. In showing you my need, the need is transformed as the showing is an act of self-love, an act of self-affirmation, and an act of love for you. When the need and the fear are fully owned by me, the need ceases and you are left free to respond to the fear as you want to. I acknowledge the threat of non-being, take it into my center, and let it go as a determiner of my actions.

If there is an expectation that you will (ought to) accept me, i.e., if I show myself so that you will love me or to try to get you to change, that showing is no longer out of love but out of need and becomes a manipulation. If needs are separated from love, they can be openly acknowledged as such: "I need you to affirm me." If it is further acknowledged that, in fact, I do not, in an ultimate sense, need even that, especially from a specific person, this is more honestly stated as: "I would like you to affirm me." Because of the demand quality usually associated with the word need, casting such wants in terms of need can become a manipulation using guilt as a weapon. It makes it more difficult to stand clear of the expectation that you ought to respond as I want you to. "I would like" leaves the other person free of a double bind situation. She can respond as she genuinely feels she wants to, thus preserving the separateness and

dignity of both people. If, when showing our deepest selves, we remain in touch with our fear, with our need to do this for ourselves as part of the process of reclaiming our power, and with the awareness that it is more important to do this for ourselves than it is to maintain the specific relationship, which is of little real value if it cannot deal with this kind of honesty, then I feel we can stay free of it as manipulation.

Summary

In this chapter I have established a working definition of essential selfhood: a person's power, love and freedom. I have shown how essential selfhood actualizes itself through forms, into capacities. I have also looked at the vital role that working on the neurotic distortions play in the actualizing of one's freedom and self-responsibility, and in reclaiming or actualizing more fully our power for creative spontaneous living. I tried to show how there is a developmental pattern from childhood to maturity. In the end, there is no "answer." There are only our lives to be lived. I rejected legalistic morality and arguments in relation to self- and other-concern based on saying what one should be, e.g., that one should be loving and socially responsible, etc., as being basically destructive as should arise in the idealized self. I have suggested that true growth and morality are based more on self-awareness, an acceptance of the goodness of one's essential humanity, and on the actualization of one's power, love and freedom. The emphasis in this chapter has been self-oriented and it is now time to consider the role of other-orientation in the actualization of essential selfhood.

CHAPTER V

THE ACTUALIZING POWER OF LOVE

In this chapter I want to look at the nature of love more closely, especially as it is reflected in interpersonal relationships. Love outside this area and the question of social responsibility will also be considered. Finally, I will summarize the discussion of the relationship between power and love.

Love in the Self-World Relationship

1. A Definition of Love

Tillich defines love as the drive towards union with that from which we are separated but to which we feel we belong: the self, the other, the world and being itself. "Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life. . . . Being is not actual without love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is" (Tillich, 1954, p. 25). Jules Toner (1968) also looks for the "irreducible" in love, which he calls "radical" love (p. 71). In doing so, he rejects Tillich's definition, describing it as one based on the affection of desire (pp. 179-180). As he follows through his analysis, he

defines love as arising in a response to someone (p. 98) and as residing in self-affirmation (self-love) and in the affirmation of the other (p. 142). Affirmation is radical love. The desire for union is secondary: "It is because a man loves himself or another that he desires inter-personal union as his fulfillment or the other's" (p. 114). In that Toner rejects desire as being at the root of love, he is correct. In that he confuses desire with the ontological drive to union, he has misunderstood Tillich's position. Toner's idea of affirmation is contained in Tillich's (1954) concept of justice, of treating persons as ends: "Love reunites; justice preserves what is to be united. It is the form in which and through which love performs its work" (p. 71).

I have introduced this discussion in order to lay the basis for a rephrasing of Tillich's definition of love, which I believe will be helpful without being a misrepresentation: Love is the drive to union and is constituted as love in the simultaneous affirmation of the essential humanity of self and other. To the extent that self and other are not affirmed, the drive to union becomes distorted or need love. "Simultaneous" points to an essentially indivisible process which is, however, to some extent separable in existence. "Affirmation of self" points to self-love and "affirmation of other" points to love in its other-directed aspect. If this definition is rephrased as Love is the drive to union which is constituted in the simultaneous affirmation of self and other, emphasis is placed on the idea that love unites. Distorted love does not unite. I now want to attempt to establish the validity of these two definitions.

2. The Self-Other Polarity

The self-other polarity is a part of the subject-object polarity, the fundamental ontological structure of existence (Tillich, 1953, p. 183). As "the interpersonal relation . . . can never be trapped in a formula" (Rhodes, 1972, p. 229), any comments I make in this area must be considered as preliminary and fragmentary.

Any serious discussion of love needs to affirm our separateness as centered selves. If we achieve union with the other through transcending ourselves in love, our separation is certainly not overcome in a physical sense. The sexual act is only symbolic in this context. Also, union cannot be seen in terms of a complete or partial merger into a single psychological entity: this is constitutionally impossible. And, if there is a mystery and a depth to these experiences, it is not to be found in unknown forces outside ourselves which might provide direct connecting links that would deny in any way our separateness. Obvious though they may be, it is necessary to assert these points in order to guard against mystification in the discussion of love which often uses mystical language. This language is appropriate for describing the experiential quality of love, if it is not misunderstood at the conscious, or, in particular, at preconscious levels of assumption. Most of my discussion will be concerned with the mechanisms or structures of relationship, rather than with its experiential nature.

The world stands against us in its strangeness, otherness, and impenetrability from birth onwards, though the child only becomes aware of this quality with the development of her consciousness. Its separateness denies the omnipotence of the child's mind and she gradually learns that wanting does not automatically achieve its ends.

Undifferentiated experience becomes differentiated into self and other, and the child becomes involved in the life-long task of defining her separateness and selfhood through her encounters with the world. "'I' cannot be 'I' unless 'you' exist to be separate from me" (Fowles, 1968, p. 14).

Since wishing isn't enough, I learn what I must do in order to meet my needs, e.g., when thirsty to get water and drink; to obey my parents to get their approval, etc. I build on experiences, e.g., through experimenting with behaviours and absorbing the responses, a set of beliefs, assumptions and skills which become tools for mediating my experience of the world and for manipulating it. By interacting with the world, e.g., listening to what others believe and observing what others do, I begin to define myself--the ways in which I am different and the ways in which I am alike. The responses of others to what I say and do lead me to reflect on my current definitions of myself and others. I try to understand and explain myself and the other: What is different, what is the same, and why. I become aware of an increasingly wide variety of forms--forms through which I can actualize myself --which I use, incline towards, or reject.

The differentness, separateness, and unknowability of the world, pose a threat to my being. They point to my aloneness, unknowability, and lack of wholeness. Others seem strong. I feel weak. Through my power to be I affirm myself against this threat.

I have discussed how acute the threat is in childhood and how neurotic needs develop out of this. Essential selfhood and the contents of its ambiguous actualizations represent what I want to call the world of internal meanings. Though it can only be actualized in form, meaning

is pure content. My understanding of the objective reality of the world is heavily overlaid with the ambiguity of my internal meanings. In this sense I create my world. Since meanings are formless, it is very difficult to separate them from their actualizations in concrete situations, and this can only be done to a limited extent through using more abstract actualizations, e.g., concepts, ideas, etc., that are built on a continuing consideration of a multitude of experiences.

An example: I tell a woman that I love her. She replies that, though she likes me, she does not love me. I feel hurt and may react in anger or pained withdrawal. The meaning I put on her answer is that she has rejected me, that she does not consider me worthy of her love. My neurotic need for her love--for her to affirm the validity of my being by her making me more important to her than anyone else--demands of her that she love me. When she does not, I reject her, attempt to punish her, put her down, or try to manipulate her into saying that she does love me, etc. I do not see her as a separate person with her own feelings and needs, but as an object to meet my needs. In fact, she may not have rejected me at all, and has most likely only stated that she does not have a need-love in relation to me. And even if she has in her mind rejected me, that has more to say about her than it does about me, and her rejection does not mean that I am, in fact, insignificant and unworthy of love. I can learn to see, and thus to respond, to such situations in many different ways.

Tillich (1964, p. 32) speaks of the self moving out to the world (self-alteration) in such a way that the self is not destroyed or lost (self-identity) and moving back to the self (self-integration), as the basic pattern of self-actualization. Moving out to the world

can be called self-transcendence, the moving power behind it is love, and the mechanism or structure of the movement is the projection of meaning. Self-transcendence is used in a broad sense here--the moving out from self-awareness to an awareness of the world and others. I will consider this concept more fully later. The movement of action, of doing, may or may not occur following self-transcendence, depending on a more or less free choice made by the individual, i.e., she may react, respond, or deliberately choose what to do in relation to the projected meaning.

Projection must not be seen as a negative process. Projection or externalization (Horney) often appears to be destructive because of the ambiguity of our internal meanings and because it has been primarily and exhaustively considered in the context of therapy. Transference, i.e., putting our parental-relationship meanings into other people, insofar as it denies the separateness and uniqueness of the other, is basically a negative form of projection. However, as I have noted before, even our predominately need projections, e.g., in romantic love, also contain positive elements. Being a process or mechanism, projection is neutral. In that it is a structure of being, it is essentially good in itself, even though it carries negative as well as positive meanings outside of the self. I believe, and will try to show, that pure, radical, or agapean love is also a projection phenomenon.

Our meanings are projected onto the world and they cannot become known to our consciousness until they have been. Dreams, fantasies and imagination--projection onto forms that have previously presented themselves to us and retained in memory--are secondary types of projection. Jung (1956) presents evidence that the archetypes will spon-

taneously produce in dreams forms unknown to the dreamer. If these come from "the long buried primitive mind with its host of images" (p. xxix), their sources can still be seen in terms of the racial experience of the external world.

My meanings cannot be apprehended directly, including those operating in the moment, until they are projected onto or into forms.

Unless we prefer to be made fools of by our illusions, we shall, by carefully analysing every fascination, extract from it a portion of our own personality, like a quintessence, and slowly come to recognize that we meet ourselves time and again in a thousand disguises on the path of life. (Jung, 1969, p. 156)

Projection is an essential element, therefore, in the process of coming to know oneself. Our experiences, containing our externalized meanings, are brought back to ourselves and are integrated into our knowing and understanding of ourselves and others. This happens to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the clarity we have already achieved about ourselves, and on the amount of reflection we turn to the experience. When I analyze the example used above of being rejected in love, I can see that my feeling of being rejected arises in my own self-rejection, in my own fear that I am unworthy and of no significance. I see my anger as being defensive. I can then see the woman's response as not involving a meaningful rejection: In the final analysis, only I can do that to myself. Seeing this, I can open myself to her as a person, free of my need to have her respond to me in any particular way. In dealing with my projections, I am able to gradually separate what is mine, what is yours, and what we share in common. Thus I come to know not only myself, but also you as you. This is part of the process of self-actualization--the actualization of my potential for self-awareness into a powerful capacity.

An important question is what happens to projections once they are owned. It does not result in similar ones never occurring again. However, they become more readily recognized for what they are, often to the point that we have almost immediate access to positive responses and choices. Though the destructive, neurotic elements seem to require the most clarity, true strength and self-awareness comes with at least the acknowledgement, not necessarily in every instance as this would be tedious and destructive, that all projections are mine even if they are not all traced back to their source. A more crucial result is that as we own them, our projections move to more deeply buried and more subtle meanings, both in terms of negative rejections and in terms of the depth of our essential selfhood that is expressed. There is no end to meaning.

The mechanism of love and self-transcendence is projection. Meaning and love arise in the self. The experience, however, is one of being drawn to or repelled by things and people. This is what makes owning projections so difficult and blaming so easy. External situations, e.g., various qualities in people, constellate our meanings within us. This is the other side of projection. We experience in others those meanings and are drawn to them (curiosity, interest, fascination), seeking union with them. Hesitancy, conflict, disgust and repulsion all involve fear and the desire to repel, deny or destroy the meaning. All these are, however, first based on attraction. For example, I experience a sense of horrific-fascination in relation to spiders and snakes. Also witness the fascination exhibited by people who put a lot of energy into trying to eliminate sinfulness in others, e.g., pot smoking, pornography, homosexuality, and nude bathing. We seek to destroy in others what we fear in ourselves, even if it involves negating the other as a person,

e.g., in put-downs, sarcastic remarks, judgments, etc. Fromm (1957) illustrates this general process in a striking example that relates to our desire to know and thereby to achieve union with the secret of our own being:

The ultimate degree of this attempt to know lies in the extremes of sadism, the desire and ability to make a human being suffer; to torture him, to force him to betray his secret in his suffering. In this craving for penetrating man's secret, his and hence our own, lies an essential motivation for the depth and intensity of cruelty and destructiveness. (p. 30)

The absence of the movement of love is not hate, but indifference.

I experience myself in relationship with the world. It is not a cause and effect relationship, i.e., you do not hurt me or make me feel good. It is a response to the world in terms of meaning, my meanings. My intrapsychic relationships have their counterpart in my relationships with the world. Another way of saying this is that, subjectively, my self-meanings give meaning to the world and the world gives substance to my self-meanings. My relationships with the world would be empty form without the infusion of my self-meanings. Self-meanings without relationship lack substance, expression or actualization. The development of all aspects of myself are reflected in my relationships with the world. Both sides of the polarity are true: I am alone and completely responsible for myself but I cannot actualize my meanings except in relationship.

Do I then create the world? Is my experience of the world a purely subjective one? The answer is both yes and no. The world is to me my experience of it. It has meaning to me and I respond to it in terms of my understandings, assumptions, and experience of it. In this it is a subjective experience of my own creation. However, at the same time, the world stands against me and moves and lives in terms of its own

meanings. I do not create the reality of that which stands against me. It continues to be according to its own nature no matter how I interpret it, though the way I understand and respond to it deeply affects how I act and am in relation to it. This, in turn, can have a profound effect on how the world responds to me. I am a centered self, completely separate from the world which has its own being and separateness. I will try to show in the next section how I can achieve at least an ambiguous objectivity about the world.

3. Love as Union

When I move towards the other I am moving towards union, towards an actualization of the meaning of my inner self or essence. A problem arises here. If the other is a vehicle for giving substance to my meanings, she becomes an object. If love is constituted in the affirmation of the other as an end, we can ask: How is it possible to do this when our experience is subjective and highly ambiguous, and has large elements of need which distort our perceptions of the other? The only possible answer to these questions seems to be that I can constitute, or bring into being, my love for the other as other, only to the extent that I am able to constitute my love for myself, i.e., in the affirmation of myself as a separate end in myself, in the affirmation of the goodness of my essential humanity. And I can only constitute that affirmation of myself to the extent that I project that meaning onto the other in an act of self-transcendence, of love for the other in the affirmation of the other. "In radical love, the affective energy by which the subject affectively affirms his own self is centered on

the loved one" (Toner, 1968, p. 163). In essence it is an indivisible process in every actual act of radical love for another. In existence, the two aspects can be seen ambiguously separated.

The neurotic element in love always involves the rejection of some part of myself, whether it is experienced negatively in the projection as repulsion or positively as fascination. In one case it is a side of myself that I give negative meaning to whether it is in fact negative or not, e.g., aspects of my sexuality. In the other it can be seen either as something I want for myself, e.g., what I see as strength in the other, or as my idealized image, e.g., of being strong, which I have projected onto the other. In the first instance I am afraid to assert my own strength. In the second I am afraid to acknowledge openly my idealized self for fear of ridicule and rejection--knowing my weakness and imperfection, I am afraid that I am not strong.

True affirmation of myself, on the other hand, rests on seeing and accepting myself for what in fact I am. It is accepting the goodness of my essential humanity: my essential selfhood, the ambiguity of its expression (including my weakness) and the individuality of its forms. In doing this I achieve union with myself. I constitute my own self-love. Only as I am able to do this am I free from my need in relation to the other and can see her clearly (objectively) in her essential humanity as I see myself in mine. Only as I affirm my separateness can I affirm hers, and cease to see her as an object of my need. The process can be seen either in her essential humanity constellating this meaning in me, or as my projecting the meaning of my essential humanity onto her. To attempt to assert the primacy of one side over the other is to break

down the unitary character of the process. Union is achieved through knowing, experiencing, and accepting the depth of our mutual common humanity, which includes the threat of non-being we both face, the pain and terror that lie behind the ambiguities of our actualizations, and our separateness and aloneness. After the ecstasy comes the awareness of the depth of the separateness on which the experience was based.

This analysis explains why I can experience the ecstasy of love and achieve union with the other even if the other does not respond in like manner. My experiences of union and ecstasy are mine. They are not dependent on the other's response or the other's loving, i.e., they are not caused by her, though they arise in my response to her as a human being. The world and, in particular, other people, are not simply objects to give content or form to my meanings because they have a life of their own. In love, the other becomes an end as I am an end.

In existence, however, moving out to the other always involves a risk, a threat, because of the uncertainty of the response. I may feel that I trust the other to respond to my love appropriately. Yet, if I trust another I am expecting something of her--an expectation of a particular kind of response (accepting) and I deny her separateness. Most of what we call trust is a manipulative device. Real trust can only be based on deep self-trust, on the affirmation of my essential humanity, or self-love. In this space the other's response cannot threaten me. Real trust of another cannot mean that I trust that she will respond in a certain way in a specific situation. It can only mean trust in the goodness of her essential humanity. Normally, however, if there is a negative or no response from another person I will

feel threatened. It will put me in touch with my deep fears because my claim to acknowledgement as a person has been denied. This will be more or less threatening depending on how I choose to see the other's response: If I have a neurotic need for an affirming response, I will be deeply threatened. If I am strong enough in my own power of self-affirmation, I will be able to incorporate the threat into my being without its leading to destructive consequences.

4. The Self-Transcendent Experience

The way I have been using the term self-transcendence in this chapter involves the transcendence of one finite situation by another, e.g., in romantic love I transcend myself when my awareness is drawn to the other in fascinated involvement. The element that is clearly self-transcendent in such experiences is the one of awareness--awareness is on the other. What is not clearly self-transcendent is the ambiguity with which I see the other person because of my need in relation to her. Romantic love is bound by the finiteness of being human.

Tillich (1964) believes that it is "appropriate to reserve the term 'self-transcendence' for that function of life . . . in which life drives beyond itself as finite life. . . . Life, in degrees, is free from itself, from a total bondage to its finitude. It is striving in the vertical direction toward ultimate and infinite being" (pp. 33, 92). This quality reveals itself, for example, whenever we ask questions of ultimate concern, whenever we experience moral imperatives, whenever we search for meanings that are larger than ourselves and our culture, whenever we have a deep concern for the welfare of other people, etc.

It is most powerfully experienced in the ecstasy of radical love, of which mystical or peak experiences (Maslow) are examples. In these experiences the ambiguity and finiteness of human experience is overcome to a greater or lesser extent.

When he speaks in theological terms, Tillich (1964) describes these experiences as ones in which the individual is grasped by the Spiritual Presence (p. 115). However, psychology and, I must emphasize, Tillich as well, would deny that there is some vague unidentifiable spirit or presence floating around "out there," or existing in some dimension not accessible to the human senses, just waiting to grasp hold of us if only we are open to it. From a psychological point of view, these experiences arise from within us. Yet, they do have the important quality of not being available to our conscious wills. We cannot grasp them. They grasp us.

Radical or agapean love does not arise in intellectual awareness or in conscious choice. We can only be open to the experience. It is self-transcendent in Tillich's sense. Such love arises from the depths of our power and love. It is this that imbues these experiences with their mystical quality and gives rise to the language of love which often seems to deny the structure of our separateness. Such language must be seen as symbolic. However, in contrast to distorted self-transcendence, this kind is genuine. Not only is my awareness on the other, but I am also claimed by the value of others in their own reality and am able to apprehend the world as it is. I can know, appreciate, and joy in the uniqueness of the other. To truly love another is at the same time the most magnificent affirmation and actualization of myself possible. Likewise, the constituting of my self-love

is at the same time the most glorious affirmation possible of others as ends in themselves. Any attempt, as is reflected in many theories of love and self-actualization, to make one or the other prior, is to deny, ultimately, the dignity either of the I or the Thou and thus denies justice and love.

Though radical love does not arise in immediate conscious choice, each experience rests on the long, hard process of actualizing our self-awareness and freedom, of becoming responsible for ourselves, of claiming our separateness, of breaking down the blocks to our spontaneity, of taking non-being into ourselves, of, in short, actualizing our power, freedom and love. It is well to remember in this context, Tillich's discussion of the qualities of love. We have been considering the dimension of agape. But, as Tillich notes, all finite human love also has the dimensions of desire (libido), the striving for union with values (eros) and the drive to union with the equal (philia). An overemphasis on radical love can lead too easily to its incorporation as a should into the idealized self--a sure way of killing it. Love cannot be commanded.

5. The Actualizing Power of Love

It was noted in the introduction how a large number of authors impute powerful and central, therapeutic and actualizing power to love. The value of ontology and a discussion of the mechanics of the process lies in helping to define love's relationship to life and to avoid distortions in our understanding of its nature. One of the shortcomings of ontological descriptions, however, is that they tend to hide

the experienced ecstasy and power of love in people's lives, which is, in the last analysis, the most important reality in relation to love. There have been many rapturous expressions of the excitement, the releasing power, and the ecstatic quality of love. My purpose, however, is primarily analytical and, in this context, when considering the actualizing power of love, it is necessary to look at it in terms of the person who is grasped by the experience of love, of the person who is the recipient of love, and of the intimate or "We" relationship.

(a) The person who loves. The ecstatic experience of deeply and unconditionally loving another is an end experience for the person who is loving. It is sufficient in itself though action will often flow from it. However, it also has, as I have shown, a profound actualizing power for the individual. There is a tremendous release of life forces which have moved through all the normal constraints we place on ourselves. The loving person is actualizing her deepest inner selfhood and conquering more non-being or separation within herself and between herself and the world. This is not a conscious process, i.e., it is not directly chosen and intended, and the motives of the person are not to increase her own power. In essence, she is grasped by love and is simply being, expressing or actualizing her deepest self, moving from within to overcome separation and achieve union. And in doing so, whether the other reciprocates or not, she does achieve union. There may be a sadness arising in a lack of reciprocation, but it is not destructive as it is encompassed in the affirmation of herself and of the other.

The analysis begins to move towards the other, the recipient of love, when the loving person is moved by her love to work to overcome the barriers that separate and prevent union between herself and the

other. Love is able to enter the concrete situation and know what is moral or creative in that context. It knows what justice demands: the forgiving, accepting and affirming of the other. In this lies its greatest transforming power for the other. Creative love accepts and confirms the other's essential humanity without actively supporting the false, idealized self of the other. It will confirm that which is good within the idealized self--the search to become a self. But it does not accept the neurotic pattern as the way in which the other's deepest needs will be satisfied. It refuses to enter or play the other's neurotic life games. The motives of the lover are not to change the other person--such motivation arises in neurotic need and is often destructive. Love basically works through the acceptance of the other which allows the other to change from within. Such love also calls on the loving person to examine the things within herself which stand in the way of union with the other; both those things which hold her back from moving towards the other and those things in herself that seem to keep the other from moving towards her.

Since freedom is essential to selfhood, true love also affirms the other's freedom:

There is no love without freedom; and there is no freedom without love. . . . It may be that the mass of men is happier in a society which takes the burden of this responsibility from him. But it is not, as the Inquisitor said it was, to love men with a more kindly love to recognize that they are incapable of the responsibility of freedom. Love then ceases to be love. For love cannot but demand that one's fellowmen should be free to be responsible. (Murry, 1957, pp. 12-13)

Love does not hold onto the other. It treats the other as a self-responsible person: "Any lover offers the possibility for those he loves to become what they wish to become" (Pilder, 1974, p. 351), even if this may eventually mean that the person moves in a direction that

takes him away from oneself.

(b) The Recipient of Love. The neurotic is the person, as we saw in Chapter 4, who needs strong, undistorted love the most if he is to grow. Yet, because of the nature of his needs, he is the least likely to receive it in his daily life. He either cuts himself off from deep relationships or ends up living with people who are willing to play his games for their own neurotic reasons (Berne, 1964). The love these people give each other is conditional and unsatisfying. After the initial romantic glow wears off, these relationships will often degenerate into indifference or into what Miller (1977) calls "intimate terrorism," a vicious destructiveness towards each other as each struggles to manifest his power through control over the other.

There are strong factors in the neurotic which make it difficult for him to take in, absorb, and accept the gift of radical love. He feels, often unconsciously, that "nobody does or ever could love him" (Horney, 1950, p. 299). If another appears to love him, he will either think that there is something wrong with her, e.g., she is lonely, or he will believe her love is not for him as a person but only for some characteristic of his that is desirable to her, e.g., his money or his sexuality. He also looks for confirmation of his idealized self, which love does not confirm. Even if it did, it would not be satisfying because it does not make the neurotic perfect as is demanded by the neurotic pride system. The love which refuses to play the neurotic's game can be very threatening as he fears the loss of control. It also puts him in touch with the deep cleavage between his real and actual self which is also disturbing to him.

Despite these factors, unconditional love can result in the releasing of truly powerful transforming forces within the recipient of such love. Being loved for oneself remains the deepest desire of a neurotic individual, no matter how much he may have defensively moved away from an awareness of this. Unconditional nurturing love is normally only very ambiguously present for most individuals in childhood, leaving it as a deeply unsatisfied need which becomes the source of energy for the manipulations of the idealized self. Experiencing relatively undistorted love can put such an individual in touch with his deepest self: with his power of self-affirmation, his self-acceptance, and his true capacity to love. The right internal connections must be made, however, if this is to work and prove lasting.

The individual must break through, to a greater or lesser extent, his neurotic need for perfection in order to release his own power of self-acceptance before his power of self-affirmation can be lastingly released. If these connections are not made, the individual becomes dependent on the other's love in order to release his own power and love. An addiction is formed as difficult to break as any addiction to work, heroin, alcohol or cigarettes (Peele, 1975, p. 1). His freedom remains unactualized and his love remains a need love. This is not as serious a problem in childhood where the neurotic elements have not crystalized into rigid patterns. The child's natural spontaneity keeps breaking through and the simple experiencing of the presence of love is much more likely to be transformed into positive self-assertion. In summary, the person who is the object of radical love may respond in a variety of ways. The loving person is aware of this and holds no expectations of how the other should react.

(c) The intimate relationship. I would like to define the intimate relationship as one where two people come together on the basis of self-responsibility and love. Though there are many degrees of intimacy, for the purposes of this discussion I will assume it to be one where there is a large commitment to the relationship, i.e., when two such people love each other and live together.

In an intimate relationship, the actualizing power of love weaves back and forth in mutually reinforcing ways. I have described radical love as the one where the other is not needed. Yet, this is seldom, if ever, and then only for moments of time, achieved in pure form. In existence we experience the actualizing power of loving in fragmentary and ambiguous fashion. However, the intimate relationship provides the setting whereby each individual is also able to benefit from being loved. Loving and being loved reinforce each other. Each person constellates the other's essential humanity and each responds to the other in deep, relatively needless love. The individuals remain separate and alone yet, at the same time, achieve a transcendent kind of togetherness that is sometimes characterized by the idea of "We." In terms of mechanism, the "We" must be understood as an internal meaning in each individual but where there also is, to a greater or lesser extent, a correspondence between these meanings in the two individuals. I now want to indicate very briefly some experiential descriptions of such relationships.

There is a quality of self-surrender but this does not involve the loss of one's separateness: "Vital ecstasy is self-surrender not to the other being as such but to the other being as far as it is the other side of the love-unity" (Tillich, 1958, p. 306). I seek my fulfillment through the other and she seeks her fulfillment through me and, at the same time, I seek her fulfillment through me and she seeks my fulfillment

through her. Fromm (1957) describes some of the effects of giving in love:

He gives of himself, of the most precious he has, he gives of his life. . . . He gives him of his joy, of his interest, of his understanding, of his knowledge, of his humor, of his sadness--of all expressions and manifestations of that which is alive in him. In thus giving of his life, he enriches the other person, he enhances the other's sense of aliveness by enhancing his own sense of aliveness. He does not give in order to receive; giving is in itself exquisite joy. But in giving he cannot help bringing something to life in the other person, and this which is brought to life reflects back to him; in truly giving, he cannot help receiving that which is given back to him. (pp. 24-25)

One should not forget to add playfulness (Sadler, 1969, p. 220).

There is also a quality of participation in the life of the other.

Toner (1968) describes it thus:

If I did not experience my loved one's success as mine it would not be a participation in his life; if I did not experience it as his it would be impossible for me to find more satisfaction in his success than my own. Even when I do not find more joy or sorrow in the other's good or evil fortune than in my own, there is still this double aspect to the experience of participation in his life. . . . When the loved one's life as his is experienced as mine I become both more keenly alive to my own distinct and unique self and more keenly and reverently alive to the other in his distinct and unique otherness. (p. 134).

The image of two hands clasping has been used. Rhodes (1972) feels that "the most appropriate metaphor is that of musical counterpoint, in which two or more melodies, each a tune in its own right, are intertwined to create a harmony that enriches both and is greater than both" (pp. 236-237). Sadler (1969) describes the space of love as "being at home with another" (p. 186) and the "structure of love's time" as "presence" (p. 180): "In contrast to an encounter with nothingness where one is forced to decide for one's destiny, in love one discovers a presence in which the whole of one's being is affirmed" (pp. 191-192).

What some of these writers do not deal with is the hard, painful,

and often frightening work that is also necessary if a relationship is to become significant. This aspect has been well developed by Wong and McKeen (Note 1). True intimacy requires time, attention, energy, and commitment to one's own growth. In the close contact involved, one's deepest needs and fears are inevitably going to become important factors at times, and if these are not faced directly and worked through to a position of aloneness and self-responsibility, where demands, expectations and manipulations are given up (time after time), the relationship will either remain a pleasant dependent one or degenerate into intimate terrorism or dead emptiness. The deep actualization of power and love require this kind of work.

Love Outside the Interpersonal Relationship

I have considered the relationship between love and self-actualization primarily in terms of loving other persons. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that love is defined as the drive to union with the self, the world and being-itself. When these elements are broken down, we are basically left with the self-world polarity. The other is a part of the world and being itself is an inclusive concept enclosing the self and the world. At its most fundamental level, love is a drive for union with being itself. However, as an object of love, being itself cannot be grasped directly. It is mediated through the concrete reality of self and world. This helps to give perspective to activities the individual engages in outside of the interpersonal relationship.

A person's awareness of the dimension of the ultimate may lead to various activities of worship and contemplation. Our relationship with

the world may be reflected in such activities as camping, gardening, scientific study, public service, horseriding, etc. There are also ways of relating more directly to ourselves, such as artistic expression and reading, though these have large elements of mediated interaction with the world. More directly personal would be pure physical activity, yoga and meditation. All these--being itself, the world and the self--give form to my meanings and I move towards union with them. I would now like to look at some specific aspects of this question more closely.

1. Self-Love

One illuminating example of a direct relationship with the self is provided by what are called Enlightenment Intensive Workshops in the human potential movement (Love, 1976, chap. 11). The structure of these is designed to help the individual move past his mental constructs or beliefs about reality to a "direct experience of the truth" (p. 218) and of himself. Participants attempt to first answer the question "Who am I?" then "What is life?" and "What is another?" Though the verbal expression of these experiences may be the same as or similar to our intellectual constructs, e.g., in answer to the first question the answers may be "I am myself," "I am the source of me," or "I am the 'I can,'" they are distinctly different from simple intellectual understanding because they involve experiencing one's self with one's entire being. In this experience "you are at one with your 'I' in the sense of being your true 'I' consciously. . . . There is no mental dichotomy, no subject-object, but an at-one-ness with yourself" (p. 218).

Though it is the direct experience--which is different for different people--that makes it an enlightenment experience, there are many degrees

of enlightenment. The three "I am" statements above are indications of deepening degrees of the experience. To achieve these states, the individual works through the blocks to the experience, e.g., intellectualizing, negative feelings, and the fear of death. Finally, there is a tremendous release of energy, followed by a glow stage and a pure steady state: "In the pure steady state of consciousness of yourself, as you truly are, your interests will turn to life and others" (Love, 1976, pp. 230-231). Those who have had such an experience

may continue to do the normal things in life, but with a continuing awareness that they are more than any of these things. . . . He thinks, feels, and acts from himself, throwing off more and more the shackles of his conditioning. . . . The compulsive yearning for objects and money as the way to gain happiness becomes secondary to the growing interest in deeper contacts with life and others. In the experience of another, the seeker finds a being equivalent in nature to himself. . . . A new respect grows for all other human beings. (pp. 219-220)

Thus, a direct experience of the self leads to the actualization not only of self-love but also of other-love. This example also helps to give concreteness to the idea of self-love--the self moving to union with the self. The I of my self-awareness moves to union with "the primordial I which affirms my self" (Shmueli, 1972, p. 227) and the total I affirms its essential humanity.

A clearer distinction can now be drawn between self-love (of which legitimate self-concern is a subsidiary concept) and selfishness. Self-love can be seen as the drive to union with essential selfhood, the ground of one's being, and is constituted in the affirmation of the goodness of one's essential humanity. Selfishness is the neurotic distortion of self-love. It seeks union but becomes distorted because it seeks union with the idealized self. Narcissism points to this: love of one's image. Essential selfhood has no image. The self-loving

person introscends towards her essential selfhood, i.e., to no-thing. Narcissism introscends to an idealized self-image. The individual who achieves union with her idealized self-image is deeply disturbed and radically cut off from her essential selfhood and is experienced by others as a phony, as not real. The narcissistic person does not love herself, i.e., her essential humanity. She hates it. She seeks to achieve union by drawing the whole of the world into herself (concupiscence or greed) and uses other people to define herself.

Self-sacrifice is basically a concept applicable only to neurotic love and the idealized self. The powerful, loving, free person makes a choice as to how she will actualize her essential selfhood: Self-sacrifice "can only mean that the resignation of a special time and a special space in the ecstatic experience of Love is the fulfillment of the self-realization" (Tillich, 1958, p. 304).

2. Distortions of Imbalance

When the various objects of love (self, world, other, being itself) and the qualities of love (libido, eros, philia, agape) get cut off from all or any of the others, they become distorted and destructive. One of the most deadly examples of isolated love is being in love with love (eros):

The beauty of being in love with one's own love for humanity consists in the fact that the love for humanity need not be expressed, since it will be sufficient merely to express one's love for that form of love in oneself. And this can be achieved in the act of thinking about, or talking about, one's love for humanity. (Sappenfield, 1976, p. 400)

Such a love can be relatively innocuous or even result in great social accomplishments and works of art, but it can also be pernicious as

Passmore (1970) points out: "Often enough . . . men have sought to demonstrate their love for God by loving nothing at all and their love for humanity by loving nobody whatsoever. These are the men to be feared above all others--the Robespierres who 'love humanity', the Inquisitors who 'love God'" (p. 324). This abstract love can also be seen in people today who angrily proclaim their love for mankind and try to convert others to their love. Since the ideal is so grand, they are usually completely closed to confrontation on the issue. When God is on your side you are invincible.

The emphasis on self-actualization in the human potential movement, can, but does not necessarily, contribute to such a splitting of the loves. Substance and dimension is achieved through the combination of them all. It is, finally, in the intimate relationship, though the intimate relationship is not, in itself, enough, that these loves come together most powerfully. It is here that the personal and transpersonal unite and it is here that we are most starkly and deeply confronted with our humanity in the other.

3. Social Responsibility

In rejecting legalistic morality in the last chapter, I also rejected the idea that one ought to be socially responsible. Nonetheless, it is important to attempt to establish the nature of the creative response to society and culture. Though the groundwork has been established in my discussion of power and love, I would like to approach this question here from a slightly different orientation, that of Philip Rieff.

Rieff (1966) provides a striking analysis of the therapeutic

function of culture. He contrasts what he calls commitment therapies, the analytic attitude and therapeutics. A commitment therapy works through participation in a "positive community" which is "characterized by the fact that it guarantees some kind of salvation to the individual by virtue of his membership and participation in that community" (pp.52-53). Examples would be the state or a religion. "The function of the classical therapist is to commit the patient to the symbol system of the community, as best he can and by whatever techniques are sanctioned (e.g., ritual or dialectical, magical or rational)" (p. 68).

Rieff (1966) asserts that Freud came at a time when the viability of these traditional systems was seriously in doubt. Freud proclaimed the analytic attitude (p. 71), which has become one of the basic therapeutic orientations of the cultural elite. Today man is "psychological man" (p. 55).

To become a psychological man is . . . to become kinder to the self as a whole. . . . In the age of psychologizing, clarity about oneself supersedes devotion to an ideal as the model of right conduct. . . . A tolerance of ambiguities is the key to what Freud considered the most difficult of all personal accomplishments: a genuinely stable character in an unstable time. . . . The therapy of all therapies, the secret of all secrets, the interpretation of all interpretations, in Freud, is not to attach oneself exclusively or too passionately to any one particular meaning, or object. (pp. 55, 56, 59)

Freud sought to increase people's "power to choose; but, he had no intention of telling them what they ought to choose" (p. 87).

Few of Freud's followers maintained a strictly analytic position. Many attempted to transform it into a "cure of souls" (Rieff, 1966, p. 89), trying to unite the analytic with commitment therapies. Among these he includes Adler, Reich, Rank, Jung, Horney and Fromm--such concepts as community, the real self and the collective unconscious took on religious overtones. "Perhaps the freedom to choose is not

therapeutic enough. Finally the content of the choice itself must be recommended, if not prescribed" (p. 90). Rieff sometimes refers to these people as "the therapeutics" (p. 261).

The nature of our relationship to society is partly a question of commitment. In the past, though there were exceptions, commitment to the state or to a religion, with their systems of legalistic morality and shoulds, dominated. The analytic attitude, though apparently without any commitment, still implies a commitment to non-commitment. With the therapeutics, there is a search for more viable commitments than existed in the past. Yet, under the influence of the analytic, the commitments tend to relative. Jung (1963) writes: "Touching evil brings with it the grave peril of succumbing to it. We must, therefore, no longer succumb to anything at all not even to good. . . . Every form of addiction is bad, no matter whether the narcotic be alcohol or morphine or idealism" (p. 303).

I would like to suggest that there can be an absolute commitment, a commitment to being itself, but that this cannot involve an absolute commitment to any particular personal, social, cultural, or religious manifestation of ultimate reality. Absolute commitment to such particular manifestations, e.g., in the commitment therapies, seems to arise in part out of ecstatic self-transcendent experiences.

These experiences appear to be universally available to man. The trouble arises when people search for a rational explanation. Suzuki (1962) notes that the individual "interprets the experience in conformity to his own intellectual resources, and to him this interpretation is the best and the only plausible one to be given to the facts in hand. He cannot accept them in any other light, for to do so will be the same as

rejecting them as illusive and devoid of meaning" (p. 195). The search for understanding is valuable as it represents the actualizing of man's self-awareness, his consciousness. Yet there is a danger: People also want an absolute truth that will shield them against the threat of extinction. What can only be symbolic, i.e., a rational explanation pointing to an ecstatic, profound experience, is turned into literal truth by the believers. Such belief attempts to tie ultimate reality down to our finite minds. This is what Tillich (1964) fought against and considered to be "the most radical refutation of the greatness and dignity of life" in which "the great becomes most profanized, the holy most desecrated" (p. 104).

Witnessing what such literal interpretation has led to in history and society, e.g., the gross evil of holy wars and inquisitions, not to mention the daily pettiness of most churches, it is easy to understand the widespread abhorrence of institutional religion. Nevertheless, the reality of the ecstatic experience and the way in which it points to the mystery of life itself, remains. What Tillich attempts to do is to maintain the holiness of the experience while guarding against its profanization by not allowing its specific rational and cultural manifestations in existence to be raised to the dignity of the ultimate. While psychology is important, Tillich (1964) also claims that it lessens our greatness, dignity, and belongingness to being itself, to attempt to derive meaning in life from our psyche, i.e., to say, for example, that religion represents only our need to escape the threat of death and that it is, therefore, only an illusion: "It is a reductionist profanization of self-transcendence to attempt to derive religion, especially in its ecstatic side, from psychological dynamics" (p. 125).

In this study, non-ultimate commitment is suggested to love, power, freedom, self-responsibility, the goodness of our essential humanity, etc. Commitment's concrete aspect is to persons as ends, which is more concrete than the abstractions of state and religion, though it is less concrete in terms of specific rules of moral behaviour. There is also a recommended commitment to ultimate concern but this is considered most meaningfully approached through the concreteness of individuals--of self and other--rather than through the abstracts of community and ideology.

What then is our relationship to society? What is the role of the state? Rieff (1966) puts it well:

The wisdom of the next social order, as I imagine it, would not reside in right doctrine, administered by the right men, who must be found, but rather in doctrines amounting to permission for each man to live an experimental life. Thus, once again, culture will give back what it has taken away. All governments will be just, so long as they secure that consoling plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really consists. . . . Civilization could be, for the first time in history, the expression of human contents rather than the consolatory control of discontents. (pp. 26-27)

Governments and the state exist not as ends but as the means to provide conditions conducive to the actualization of individuals. Love, in its active aspect of working to overcome the barriers that separate men, works towards providing the conditions in society and in government that will protect the rights of individuals, provide opportunities for fuller self-expression, and create the attitudes that will foster greater union between people.

Another way of approaching the relationship between self-concern and social responsibility is through Maslow's (1964) use of the word synergy, a term he derived from Ruth Benedict's work in anthropology. Maslow (1964) quotes Benedict as stating that in a high synergy culture, "the individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own

advantage and that of the group" whereas, in a low synergy culture, "the advantage of one individual becomes a victory over another, and the majority who are not victorious must shift as they can" (p. 156). For example, cultures which demand obedience to rigid norms of personal behavior and personal sacrifice for the common welfare, and cultures based on hostile competitiveness, are low in synergy. Cultures which respect personal individuality and which foster cooperation, on the other hand, promote the actualization of personal power and love to the real benefit of the group as a whole.

Uncertainty and the threat of non-being will always push men to find the answer. However, assuming the continuance of the present affluence of our culture, the analytic and the therapeutic attitudes not only work against, but make highly improbable the re-emergence of more or less universal compelling therapies of commitment (Rieff, chap. 8). In that he provides a basis for ultimate concern and commitment, while pointing to the ambiguity of any concrete manifestation of such concern, I would call Tillich the theologian par excellence to psychological man. Assuming a position of learning to tolerate ambiguity is much more difficult than the experience of "being chosen" and of giving oneself over to an answer that promises certainty and salvation. Yet it is also the path, I believe, to the more powerful actualization of man.

Self-Concern and Other-Concern: Conclusion

Many authors have attempted to reconcile self-love and other-love. Some, as I have noted, end up by deciding that, though both are impor-

tant, one is a derivative of the other. There are, however, other resolutions. M.C. D'Arcy (1945) concludes that "selfishness is only a vice if it means an undue regard for self; unselfishness is only a virtue if it is countered by self-respect. The two loves, therefore, so far from being opposites appear to require the presence of each other" (p. 322). Katz (1972) rejects "any definition of altruism which assumes a conflict between serving one's self and serving others" as these run into both "logical and psychological difficulties" (p. 67). He defines "altruism as a simultaneous satisfaction of the interests of self and others" (pp. 67-68). He also notes that it is essential "to base ourselves on a holistic conception of the personality" in order to avoid "the horns of defining altruism either as self-sacrificing or as a refined version of selfishness" (Katz, 1972, p. 68).

My position is similar to D'Arcy's and Katz's. I have attempted to show the essential inter-relatedness of self- and other-concern, i.e., of power and love. In Chapter 2, using Tillich's concepts, I tried to demonstrate how actualizing one's power involves incorporating the threat of non-being into one's self-affirmation. Love conquers the separation which gives rise to the threat of non-being. The greatest love conquers the greatest separation, that involved in the separation between two centered selves. Love increases one's power and power increases one's love.

I have also tried to show how power and love become distorted and how neurotic need makes it impossible to constitute our love in the affirmation of the other as an end, because, by turning the other into an object for the gratification of our need, it distorts our perception of the other. For love to grow, we have to deal with our need. This

is accomplished through actualizing our self-awareness and self-acceptance which leads to the growth of our power and freedom.

In this chapter, I have attempted to show even further the intimate connection between myself and the world through exploring the mechanism of projection. My relationships with the world give form to my meanings and my meanings give substance to these forms. The possibility of objectivity towards myself and the world is based on correspondences, the correspondence of the goodness of my essential humanity with that of all men: we all love, feel, think, affirm ourselves, are free, are threatened by non-being, and have our neurotic defenses and manipulations, etc. Only to the extent that I can truly see or know myself, in my essential humanity, can I see the world with clarity and not simply as an externalization of my needs. This leads to the constituting of my self-love and my other-love, both of which are permeated by the dimension of union with being itself. The process of growth is simultaneously a movement deeper within the self and more genuinely outward to the world.

It is no accident that the concepts of power (affirmation of the self against internal and external resistance) and self-love (affirmation of the goodness of one's essential humanity) are so close. A person's power resides in her self-love which is the basis of her other-love. Self-love is also simultaneously constituted with the affirmation of the essential humanity of the other. Though it is valuable to keep love and power as separate vital concepts, they are, even more fundamentally, unitary. I would tentatively formulate their relationship thus: Power, the power to be, is the vitality and love is the basic orientation of

that vitality. Love moves power towards union. Power animates the movement of love. To be truly powerful is to be truly loving. To be truly loving is to be truly powerful. One side implies the other. Like the two sides of a coin, love and power are, in essence, two sides of an indivisible process.

In existence, love and power become ambiguously separated and this makes it possible to orient one's attention towards one or the other. Orlinisky (1972) speaks of a necessary "alternating, dialectical emphasis on individuation and communion" which, in terms of the "pattern of growth resembles a spiral" (p. 144). Though the concept of power is primarily self-oriented, and love, other-oriented, both have self- and other-oriented aspects. These aspects can be seen in relation to the self-world polarity: The most productive growth is achieved by attaining a dynamic tension between the two poles. In essence the process is indivisible; in existence it becomes separable. However, they only become ambiguously separated and each continues to imply the other.

There has been an emphasis on the self in some sectors of the growth movement in which the dimension of other-concern is overlooked. To this extent, Marin and the other critics noted in Chapter 1 are right. On the other hand, this neglect is not implicit in the concept of self-concern and is not true of the whole movement nor of most therapy. In practice, I believe, even though it may not always be clearly formulated, most therapists recognize the significance of love. This is reflected, in part, for example, in their awareness of the importance of sound interpersonal relationships and of the principles that lie behind them.

I have completed my argument in relation to the first two purposes of this study. I have attempted to establish the validity of both self-concern and other-concern in terms of power and love. Legitimate social responsibility is founded on love as an active force working towards breaking down the barriers that separate men and prevent union and personal growth. Seen in their essential nature, power and love do not fall into narcissism on the one hand or into blind moralistic commitment to the world on the other. Most of the argument between the proponents of self-concern and altruism turns out to be a false battle involving confusion over the essential and the existential elements of life. It is now time to turn to a consideration of power and love in relation to the goals of counselling.

CHAPTER VI

THE GOALS OF COUNSELLING

In this chapter I will first consider self-actualization as the goal of counselling. Then, after exploring some dangers in relation to the use of goals, and certain standards that can be applied to their definition, I will attempt three kinds of statements of counselling goals. The first will be a one sentence definition. This will be followed by two longer ones, one formal and the other more informal.

Self-Actualization as the Goal of Counselling

There has been almost no consensus on the goals of the therapeutic process in what little consideration has been given to this subject in the literature on counselling and psychotherapy (Patterson, 1974b, pp. 15-16). C. H. Patterson (1974b, p. 18) proposes self-actualization as the ultimate goal of counselling. It is also a central, explicit concept in the work of Abraham Maslow, Kurt Goldstein (Sargent, 1973, p. 820), and Everett Shostrum (1973). Self-actualization does seem to represent at least the spirit of large areas of therapy, especially those influenced by the human potential movement. C. E. Beck (1963,

p. 33) notes that it has been around as a basic supposition in counselling since before World War II. Maslow (1968) sees his work on self-actualization and the work of Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Carl Jung, C. Buhler, A. Angyal, Carl Rogers, Gordon Allport, E. Schachtel, H. M. Lynd and others as being "crudely synonymous, designating a vaguely perceived area rather than a sharply defined concept" (p. 24). Patterson (1974a) and Shaw (1972) show that many of the goals expressed by other writers are also compatible with Maslow's concept. Its spirit is reflected in such ideas as personal growth, self-realization, becoming, J. F. T. Bugental's concept of authenticity and Hubert Bonner's proactive man (Sargent, 1973, pp. 822-823). I also believe my analysis has established self-actualization as worthy of serious consideration for the central, primary, or ultimate goal of counselling.

However, a serious problem arises in the use of the word. As I have tried to show, the term is an over-arching one that encloses self-orientation (power) and other-orientation (love). Yet, because of the prefix self, it is seen almost exclusively in terms of self-orientation by many people, including such intelligent observers as Frankl (1966, p. 99) and R. W. White: "Maslow's statement of [self-actualization] . . . was beautiful and broadly inclusive. . . . But the name is irretrievably wrong. To call working for the common welfare 'self-actualization' instantly falsifies it into something done for one's own satisfaction, like a game of golf" (White, 1973, p. 69). Before dealing with this problem and the third and final purpose of this study--trying to find an adequate statement for the ultimate goal of counselling--I would like to look at some dangers and standards that need to be considered in the formulation of goals.

Preliminary Considerations

1. Dangers in Conceptualizing Goals

Patterson (1974b, p. 20) draws a distinction between ultimate and immediate or mediating goals. For him, the ultimate goal of counselling is self-actualization. The mediate goals are the ones that lead to self-actualization. The first dangers I want to point to are the ones involved in calling any goal ultimate. It can lead to the many kinds of distortions I have already considered in relation to the ultimate, e.g., rigidity, neurotic pride, the repression of the human spirit, etc. If there is an ultimate goal, it is not to be found in this life and is beyond our comprehension except, perhaps, in highly symbolic ways: "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao" (Lao Tsu, 1972, Pt. 1). Thus, any specific formulation of final and mediate goals as expressions of the ultimate must be treated as temporary and ambiguous, and always pressing towards deeper understanding.

In the final analysis, the dangers of getting tied into goals originate in the threat of non-being and the needs of the idealized self. Amanda, in Tom Robbins' novel, Another Roadside Attraction (1971), speaks of an FBI agent thus:

"A symbol junkie. People like him--that is, the majority--are strung out on symbols. They're so addicted that they prefer abstract symbols to the concrete things which symbols represent. It's much easier to cope with the abstract than with the concrete; there's no direct personal involvement--and you can keep an abstract idea steady in your mind whereas real things are usually in a state of flux and always changing. It's safer to play around with a man's wife than with his clichés." (pp. 302-303)

Insecurity drives us to look for certainty. Most of the difficulty with goals arises in the fact that they are easily objectified.

Setting up descriptions of ideal types of behavior implies objectives. We are moving towards something, the objective, the goal. If, as often happens, I incorporate these into my idealized self, I subject myself to constant comparison between what I am and what I ought to be. The neurotic demand for immediate perfection and the judgments I make on myself take me away from an acceptance of the goodness of my essential humanity and blocks the creative flow of power and love in the present.

Goals can also remove us from reality in another way. Because of our need for control through understanding, rational thought often becomes divorced from reality. There is a tendency, for example, to become reductive, i.e., to say, feel or assume about an experience or a situation that/^{it}is "nothing but this. . . ." There is a mystery and a multi-dimensionality to love, intimacy, human relationships and life that cannot be penetrated by rationality alone, and we need to keep this awareness present whenever we talk about goals.

There are specific dangers in goals for counsellors as well. We may look for a "fixed array of qualities" (White, 1973, p. 69) and start moving people in this direction or that. We are, as counsellors in the face to face confrontation, there "to help people with problems in their own particular lives" (p. 69). It is hazardous, for example, to get locked into the assumption that the kind of personal work involved in bringing about powerful self-actualization is necessarily good for everyone:

Once you accept the truly desperate situation that man is in, you come to see not only that neurosis is normal, but that even psychotic failure represents only a little additional push in the routine stumbling along life's way. If repression makes an untenable life liveable, self-knowledge can entirely destroy it for some people. (Becker, 1973, p. 269)

Defensive and neurotic behaviour exist for a reason and are not to be

tampered with lightly on the assumption that we know what is best for the other. This is a large issue and a discussion of the appropriate norms are beyond the scope of this study, except to say, that unless the forces in the individual indicate a strong internal movement towards growth, the counsellor is usually best to respond to the individual's problems **non-judgmentally** in terms of adjustment and coping.

2. The Process as the Goal

There is a way of looking at goals which can help to avoid some of the more obvious dangers. This is to see them in terms of process. Though self-actualization, power, love, and freedom are nouns, which give rise to their objectification, they refer not to things but to meanings, energies, movements, processes, etc. They only achieve substance and reality in the here and now, in the process of their actualization. Shmueli (1972) notes how "selfhood presses beyond every self-assertion of the fixed ego, whether hedonistic or ascetic, and beyond the many successive selves which we assume in our lifetime" (p. 225). Life is not a static, fixed state. It is movement. It is a process. Don Juan speaks of it as having many paths which one can follow, and comments:

All paths are the same: they lead nowhere. . . . Does this path have a heart? If it does, the path is good; if it doesn't, it is of no use. Both paths lead nowhere; but one has a heart, the other doesn't. One makes for a joyful journey; as long as you follow it, you are one with it. The other will make you curse your life. One makes you strong; the other weakens you. (Castaneda, 1968, p. 76)

Becoming involved in the process of growth, of moving more deeply to express one's power and love, is a path with a heart. An example of a path without a heart would be one based on an attempt to actualize an

idealized self that seeks to exert power over others. The distinction is clearer when one remembers Horney's assertion that what the neurotic is interested in, is not the process of growth but rather immediate perfection, the goal. Instead of centering one's values and attention on unattainable ideal states, it is more productive to find creative ways of being in the world that acknowledge and accept the ambiguity of all life.

Part of a definition of counselling goals needs to emphasize the process. Attention is brought to the here-and-now, dealing with whatever is present. This is reminiscent of the cycle of growth discussed in Chapter 4: When we learn to accept responsibility for ourselves, all we find are the everyday joys and problems of life. Trying to bypass the mundanities of unpleasant, negative and seemingly minor or inconsequential matters, e.g., my selfishness, my anger towards someone, even my sexuality, in order to deal with the important aspects of life and my being, e.g., my love for mankind, my spirituality, etc., has strong neurotic elements in it. If I do this and am honest with myself, I will only find that my so-called deeper experiences remain contaminated and shallow. In reality, I constitute myself as a person, as a moral being, with each choice I make in relation to each contact with people and the world.

It must be emphasized that one can incorporate a process position into the idealized self. If it is set up as an ideal and legitimacy is denied to a consideration of goals and norms, one will only be neglecting a critical element in the process. A person cannot and does not live without norms. At one level these can be seen as the internal meanings of the person which are projected onto the world. The more

these remain unconscious and unexamined, the more the person's response is determined by them. The consideration of our essential nature and of the implicit goals and norms that arise out of such a task, are crucial in the process of reclaiming our power and in actualizing our freedom and love. They give perspectives, guidelines, principles, and orientations by which we can learn to make creative choices within the process of living. Without them we become opportunistic, reacting to whatever situation is at hand. There is a polarity between consciousness of the directions in which we want to move and the choices we need to make if we wish to do so, and the letting go of these in creative spontaneous living. It is not a question of either-or, but of both. It is the process which is the end, as it is in the process that freedom, power and love are actualized. The development of norms and goals are a central element in the process itself--the actualizing of self-awareness.

In considering the goal as process and the dangers in defining goals, I would suggest that it is better to speak of existentially ultimate goals than of ultimate goals. Existential points to at least three qualities of meaningful goals: (1) that we cannot finally grasp the goals and purposes of life except in highly fragmentary ways; (2) that they are related to the living of our lives, i.e., to the process; and (3) that they can only be ambiguously realized in this life. The goal is taken from being out there as something we strive for, and is brought into something achievable, even if only ambiguously, moment by moment. If we say that self-actualization is the existentially ultimate goal of counselling, it is not self-actualization as some state of being that we might or might not achieve in the future. Rather, it is the deepening of the already ongoing process as it happens in every moment of life.

3. Standards for Defining the Existentially Ultimate Counselling Goals

Because of the way they direct our attention, there can be little doubt about the importance of carefully formulating existentially ultimate goals. There are certain standards against which we can evaluate the adequacy of a definition:

1. It should be clear. It should point unambiguously to the reality that is intended in such a way as to avoid, at the very least, major distortions.

2. It should be accessible to common understanding. This precludes the use of abstruse, esoteric, and coined or invented words.

3. It should grasp the imagination and help to mobilize the deepest essential growth forces in a person. It needs to have more than just intellectual appeal. The crucial words used should be symbols. Symbols, in the sense used here,

grow out of the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being accepted by the unconscious dimension of our being. . . . Like living beings, they grow and they die. They grow when the situation is ripe for them. . . . They die because they can no longer produce response in the group where they originally found expression. (Tillich, 1957a, p. 43)

We cannot create symbols for definitions, but we can try to find words that are either symbols or, at least, presymbolic, i.e., possibly on their way to becoming symbols.

Looking at these standards, it is evident that ideal definitions are impossible. It is very difficult, for example, to keep the unitary nature of love and power in perspective because, when one is considered, the other tends to slide out of focus. I have already noted the effect

that our neurotic needs have: We see things the way we need to see them rather than the way they are. Also, each individual's experience with words is unique, resulting in differing understandings and emotional associations, e.g., the word love is beautiful to some and anathema to others. In addition, what may be symbolic for one individual or group may not be for others. There are very few, if any, symbols that have power for the majority of people in Western civilization today, e.g., in contrast to Medieval Europe when Christian symbols were a dominating reality. The difficulties are further compounded in that any consideration of the nature of man does not lend itself to clarity or consensus of view, e.g., in contrast to physics and mathematics.

Despite all the limitations and ambiguities of defining goals for counselling, it is still a valuable and necessary enterprise if we are seriously concerned with what we do to, with, for and in relation to other human beings. There is a moral quality to counselling that calls for this kind of concern, if only because life is ambiguous.

Any definition of counselling goals can only be tentative and one along with others. Jung (1958) makes the point that the therapist "must endeavour to discover just where the sick person feels a healing, living quality which can make him whole" (p. 301). We need to be open to the symbols, myths, and ways of thought that make sense to the other person. The more we are locked into one or two frameworks of thought, the more our ability to respond meaningfully is limited. There will be some approaches that are inimical to us for various reasons, but rather than outright rejection of these, a yea and nay approach is more productive: an openness not only to their dangers, but also to their positive truths.

There is another factor that needs to be considered. Though they are

deeply inter-related, I think a separation must be made between the goals of the counsellor in his role as a counsellor, and the goals of life. There are many forms in society through which the individual can actualize herself, e.g., work, recreation, social groups, etc.; and many resources that she can turn to for help in her self-actualization, e.g., libraries, education, career counselling, etc. In our role as psychological counsellors, our primary concern is to help people come to the point where they take responsibility for themselves, deal with their own problems, utilize their own resources, and go for help when it is appropriate. Our goal is to help people free themselves to the life goals implicit in their own beings: love, power, freedom, etc.

How we as counsellors see the life goals is important as it affects, though it should not determine, our response to those we work with. However, since our perceptions of the life goals rest on our understanding of the nature of man, they are secondary to us in our role as counsellors. Though the distinction is ambiguous, as defining the counsellor's role as helping people to take responsibility for themselves is based on my understanding of essential selfhood, it is valuable as a warning against attempts to impose specific models on the other.

Defining the Goals of Counselling

I will attempt three kinds of definition of counselling goals. First, I will try to find an adequate one sentence statement. The second will be a relatively long, formal definition in which I incorporate explicitly and implicitly the major concepts and terminology

used in this study. The last will be an informal one using more accessible language.

1. Counselling Goals Expressed in a Sentence

In this section I will concentrate on the life goals. I believe it is particularly important to find a symbolic form of expression for these. Though the term self-actualization is philosophical and abstract in nature, it does seem to have at least a few presymbolic qualities for some people. If a single term is used to define the existentially ultimate goal of counselling, self-actualization, because of its comprehensiveness, would appear to be the most appropriate. However, as I have noted previously, it is radically misunderstood by many, if not most people. I believe that its usefulness is seriously compromised not only by this fact, but also by its awkwardness and erudite quality. I would suggest that its use in this context be avoided.

The most obvious symbolic words seem to be ones like power, love, freedom, and justice. These are earthy, gut-level, basic words and carry powerful symbolic content. Words and phrases such as self-responsibility, affirmation, acceptance, essential humanity, and essential selfhood have intermediate symbolic power, i.e., somewhere between that of self-actualization and that of love. However, these intermediate words are more appropriate for inclusion in longer definitions.

If we are to use the words love, power, freedom and justice, it is necessary to consider the problem presented by the multitude of differing meanings people attach to them. Power is understood almost entirely in the sense of power over others, as is suggested in the idea of power

struggles. This study is also based on an understanding of love which is far from being unanimously accepted either in the intellectual community or in popular understanding, where it is often associated with weakness and deeply confused with need. Likewise, freedom is generally understood in terms of freedom from external constraints, and justice is confused with legalism, distributive justice, revenge, etc.

The question which arises is how to use these words, for used they will be--in terms of common understanding or in terms of their fundamental meanings? Given their symbolic power, my inclination is to attempt to return them to their fundamental meanings, especially since there seem to be no other words in common usage that come anywhere near to replacing them. I think it can be argued that, though there is anything but consensus in the conceptual understandings and common usages of these words, that they are intuitively understood at the deepest levels of our being. This is where they derive their symbolic power from, and where we want to move as counsellors and individuals. The most basic distortions in the use of love, power, freedom and justice have arisen in neurotic need. Thus the rescuing of their basic meaning can become part of the deepening and transforming process of actualizing our essential selfhood.

Before proposing a definition, I would like to mention a few points in relation to phrase structuring. "And," e.g., in power and love, implies equality but separates rather than unifies the concepts. Turning one word into an adjective, e.g., powerful loving, overcomes the split but breaks down the equal importance of the two concepts. If this device is used, it should be used in a reversing combination, e.g., powerful love and loving power, to restore equality to the concepts.

These combinations tend, however, to be clumsy. Compound words, e.g., the power-love-freedom process, though they unite and keep equal, are clumsy and artificial. I have not been able to find any phrasing that overcomes all these difficulties.

I would like to propose the following definition: The existentially ultimate goal of counselling is to deepen the unitary process of actualizing essential selfhood: power, love, freedom and justice. More simply, this might be stated thus: The goal of counselling is power and love.

2. A Formal Definition of Existentially Ultimate Counselling Goals

Our purpose and concern as counsellors is to help people deal with the problems of life. Our goal is to help them free themselves to their own power, love, freedom and justice. We do this by helping them to come in touch with the goodness of their essential humanity so that they can take greater responsibility for their own lives.

I, or we as counsellors, understand human life as the actualization of essential selfhood in existence. Essential selfhood is formless content or meaning comprising elements of vitality (love and power) and elements of structure (freedom, justice, intelligence, etc.). Form gives substance to essential selfhood and essential selfhood gives meaning to form.

Essential selfhood is actualized ambiguously, i.e., its actualization in existence contains an inextricable mixture of essential, or positive and creative elements, and evil, or negative and destructive elements. Evil arises when we respond to the threat of non-being, e.g.,

the threat of death and meaninglessness, by attempting to deny it. Though evil does not have a separate independent ontological existence, i.e., it lives off of the positive power that it distorts, it achieves a powerful independent reality in existence.

Power is, in its essence, the power to be, i.e., the power to affirm and express the validity of one's being in the world against internal and external resistance. This power becomes destructive when it is distorted by being used in attempts to manipulate or force others, to, in effect, affirm one's own worth as a person.

Love is the drive towards union with the self, the world, and being itself. Love and union are constituted in interpersonal relationships in the simultaneous affirmation of the goodness of one's own and of the other's essential humanity, i.e., a person's essential selfhood, the ambiguity of its manifestations and the individuality of its forms. This occurs when we are able to experience and affirm the intrinsically valuable uniqueness and separateness of ourselves and the other. Love is distorted into need love when we have a need to see others in a certain way, e.g., when we need to have them affirm us by loving us.

Love and power are, in essence, inseparable sides of a unitary process. I am unable to affirm your validity as a separate person unless I am also able to affirm my own, and I cannot deeply affirm my own until I can grasp, accept and affirm your separateness. In existence power and love become ambiguously separated.

Freedom is actualized in the person accepting responsibility for his own life. Justice, which arises in man's sense of the sublime quality of his essential selfhood, is realized when the self and the

other are treated as persons, as ends. Freedom and justice are essential elements in the actualization of power and love.

If there is an ultimate goal, e.g., eternal life, it is only available to us in fragmentary and ambiguous fashion in existence and only through involvement in the processes of life. Our concern in counseling is to help individuals find constructive ways of dealing with the threat of non-being. Growth occurs as the individual faces more and more directly his fears, accepts his aloneness and separateness, accepts the ambiguity and limitations of his existence, affirms the goodness of his essential humanity, lets go of his blaming and his attempts to manipulate others, and takes more and more responsibility for his own life. Norms and goals, as understandings of our essential being, provide orientations that help us actualize our freedom and essential nature as moral beings.

3. An Informal Definition of Counselling Goals

Our concern and purpose as counsellors is to help people to learn how to deal with their problems and conflicts in such a way as to foster growth. Our goal is to help people reach the point where they can deal creatively with their fears and the problems of life without the need of outside help.

Creative living is the process of growing, of creating ourselves as unique individuals in the world, of bringing out our true nature, of naturally affirming ourselves, and of learning to respond more and more to others as persons. There are two sides to this process: power and love. They work and belong together like two sides of a coin. Power

is our ability to affirm and assert our validity and value as persons despite our fears and the judgments of others. Attempting to manipulate or control others is a distortion of our power. Love is the drive we experience towards union or oneness with ourselves, others, the world and the meaning which is beyond ourselves. Love becomes real when we are able to love ourselves, i.e., affirm the goodness of our essential humanity, and affirm the other in the same way as a separate, unique, person in his or her own right. This is being just to ourselves and others.

Some of the things that hinder or prevent the growth of our power and love are our idealized selves, or what we believe we ought to be; our oughts and shoulds; blaming life and others for our problems; and our self-hate. Growth happens and we become free when we start taking responsibility for ourselves by accepting as essentially good what we in fact are; by not blaming; by accepting the consequences of our actions; by facing directly our fears, including our fear of death; and by recognizing that we can and do make choices about what we do and think.

The actual arriving at some ideal goal, because it is impossible, at least in this life, is irrelevant. What is important is to become involved in growing, in living life fully, in taking risks, in becoming aware of ourselves and what we do, and in allowing our deepest and most real selves to emerge more fully. By doing these things we grow and bring into being our power, love, and freedom.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

Shortcomings and Suggestions for Further Research

Every major concept in this study, e.g., love, power, justice, freedom, essential selfhood, essential humanity, and evil, would benefit from deeper consideration, moving towards greater specificity and clarity. The inter-relationships of the concepts and the processes also need further refinement and precision of analysis. And, though I believe that the approach of this study is basically sound, I think it would have been much stronger in its presentation if all the objections to it had been systematically considered and integrated into it. These are necessary tasks for further research.

This study has developed a particular view of man. To be fully adequate, all the other major systems of therapy and psychology including, for example, behavioral, gestalt, psychoanalytic, developmental, Jungian, existential, body, and encounter, would need to be integrated with it using a dialectical method. A significant contribution of such a study could be the clarification of the particular reasons that make one approach more meaningful to one person than to another. If we could see the basic orientations and needs from which different systems

arise, I believe it would contribute greatly, not only to the therapeutic process, but also to evaluating the positive and the negative elements of each approach. This would help to create a more comprehensive, objective and integrated picture of the total process of being a person.

I also think that there needs to be a clarification and integration of the roles of philosophy, theology, religion, psychology, sociology, biology, etc. There is a great need for more comprehensive views and interpretations of experience, pushing towards more holistic understandings of man. This study makes a small attempt towards integrating philosophy and psychology, but barely touches the biological, sociological and religious perspectives. Part of such a study would involve an elaboration of the mediating principles for the application of the broad realities, e.g., love, power and justice, to everyday living. Though this issue was outside the scope of this study, it is implicit in it. The positions adopted in this paper have little relevance unless they can be applied meaningfully to our daily lives.

Despite a few notable exceptions, love is barely on the way to becoming an acceptable subject of study in science and psychology. Yet, necessary though the task is, it is fraught with dangers, e.g., reductionist ("nothing but") attitudes. The idea of love also needs much more conceptual clarification if research on love is to become really productive. Philosophy has a major role to play here.

Implications for Counselling

There are many implications for counselling in a study of this

nature. The difficulty is in trying to focus on the most important ones as this will vary from individual to individual. Though there is little that is really new in this study, it does point to some important principles that I think deserve repeated emphasis.

1. In counselling, the nature and role of power has barely been considered in the framework of power, other than in its negative aspects, e.g., in terms of power struggles. The desire to be powerful is strong in all of us. It lies at the core of our beings. Because of the symbolic quality of the word power, I think it could become a valuable tool in counselling. I believe that the perspective provided by this study can help people transform their desire for power over others into true personal power.

2. Gilmore (1973), in discussing the characteristics of competent counsellors, shows that the positions of Carl Rogers, C. B. Truax and R. R. Carkhuff, and Leona Tyler, all important influences in counselling, are essentially similar. Using Tyler's terminology, she concludes that "understanding, together with acceptance, together with sincerity, all amplified by skillful communication, lead to an effective counseling encounter" (p. 116). In this indirect way, counselling acknowledges the crucial importance of love. If we can reclaim the meaning of love, I believe it can add a deeper and more powerful dimension to our understanding of our role as counsellors.

Also, I think it is important, because of its symbolic power, to openly bring the idea of love, devoid of sentimentality, into counselling. Love is not just something that would be nice to have. It lies at the very core of the growth process. Seeing this and the ambiguity of

life more clearly can help us to avoid simplistic and egocentric approaches to growth. Likewise, awareness of the unitary nature of love and power should help to avoid distortions in either direction. I also believe it is time to show a greater willingness to confront and use basic gut-level words in counselling, including love, power, freedom, justice, evil, etc.

3. Many of the other ideas discussed, e.g., ambiguity, distortion, aloneness, essential humanity, acceptance, etc., can also be useful in helping people to clarify what is happening in themselves and to come to recognize in what directions positive change lies.

4. Because they are so much a part of ourselves, it is sometimes difficult to pin down how our conceptual systems affect our relationships with people. Yet, though occasionally some counsellors deny concrete value to philosophical considerations, there can be little doubt that our conscious beliefs and our unexamined assumptions do have a profound impact. I would suggest that it is important for the counsellor to carefully examine these from time to time.

5. A consideration of the power-love and self-world relationships strongly reinforces the view that it is critically important for counsellors to be deeply committed to their own growth. The depth of their loving and the clarity of their perceptions of others are primarily dependent on who they are as persons and on the depth of their own self-awareness. Unfortunately, the role of personal growth often does not seem to be recognized in significant concrete ways in some counsellor training programs.

6. Finally, I would only remind the reader of the dangers involved in the use of goals.

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