

THESIS TITLE

UN Strategic Peacekeeping in the Congo and Bosnia: A Comparative Analysis

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on UN strategic peacekeeping in the Congo and Bosnia. While UN intervention seems to have succeeded in keeping the Congo united and indivisible in the face of the secessionists pressures from certain factions, the organization's involvement in the case of Bosnia's conflict has been counter-productive and in some cases has even exacerbated the situation in that country. The core of the thesis deals with various explanatory variables that I have hypothesized as accounting for the observed difference in outcome of the UN peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Bosnia. I contend that the *sine qua non* variable for the overall success of a peacekeeping mission is the political will shown by the major nations in the UN, especially the United States. Other supplementary factors also contribute to the overall success of a UN peacekeeping operation though none is as important as the political context variable.


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Chapter One

UN Strategic Peacekeeping: A Comparative Investigation

Introduction

Peacekeeping and peacemaking can be regarded as two variants of conflict management that can be placed under the rubric of collective security. Neither mentioned by name nor given a specific legal basis in the UN Charter, peacekeeping evolved pragmatically in response to the limited room for manoeuvre afforded the UN by the East-West conflict.¹ Most models of collective security are based on the idea of collective security military enforcement actions in support of states that are victims of clear and naked aggression. In practice, however, most states do not see every conflict as a clear case of aggression, and hence a more impartial approach to defusing conflicts had to be devised. It is in conformity with such a view that peacekeeping has evolved as the principal form of collective military activity.² Since the Cold War ended, peacekeeping has changed from what it was during the time of its invention. UN peacekeeping missions in the new post Cold War period have been so varied and so complex that they have extended the boundaries of both the theory and practice of peacekeeping. As a New Zealand peacekeeper has put it, “the days of turning up with only good intentions, blue berets and a cut lunch are over.”³

The main reason for increased peacekeeping activity has been increased need. With the end of the cold war more of the world’s armed conflicts became ripe for negotiated settlements as client states lost their superpower sponsorship and the Security Council achieved a new unity in actively seeking such settlements. Moreover, there was a greater willingness and commitment by the major powers to seek multilateral solutions to global and regional issues, especially through the UN. This greater cooperation was best

¹Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1992), p. 89.

² Adam Roberts, “From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force,” *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4, Winter 1995-1996, p.14.

illustrated by the infrequent use of the veto in the Security Council. There was also the emergence of a widespread belief that the UN could, and should, play a more prominent role in matters that pertain to the maintenance of international peace and security. This heady optimism in part stemmed from the success of the UN-authorized but US-led coalition that meted out to the Iraqi regime the ‘mother of all defeats.’ Symptomatic of such optimism was US President Bill Clinton who asserted that “the role of the United Nations during the Gulf War was a vivid illustration of what is possible in a new era.”⁴ The effect of that misguided optimism can also be seen in the pages of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace*.⁵

The end of the Cold War has also paradoxically seen an increase in nationalist conflicts, especially in the Balkans, large parts of Africa and several of the former Soviet republics. The overwhelming conflict resolution tool of choice in almost all these cases has been peacekeeping or a variant of it. As a result, more peacekeeping operations have been established since 1989 than in the previous 45 years of the UN’s history. In 1988 the UN operated five peacekeeping missions but the number ballooned to over 18 in 1993.⁶ Concomitant with this expansion of UN peacekeeping operations has been the increase in peacekeeping missions undertaken by other international organizations, especially regional organizations. This type of non-UN peacekeeping has increased from one in 1988 to at least six in 1993. In 1988 the UN had only 9950 troops in the field; by 1993 it had a record 80,000 personnel in peacekeeping theatres all over the world.⁷

³ Trevor Findley, ‘The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,’ in *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report No. 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1.

⁴ Quoted in Charles Mayne, “Containing Ethnic Conflicts” *Foreign Policy* 90 (Spring 1993) p. 3.

⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: UN Publication, June 1992), p. 1.

⁶ Boutros, Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations*, UN document A/50/60, S/1995/1 (3 Jan.1995), para. 11.

⁷ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, note 5.

In addition to the quantitative changes there is also a qualitative change in that most of the new peacekeeping involved civil wars. The UN has previously undertaken missions in civil wars though sparingly. In this era, however, peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts became the norm rather than the exception. Of the 30 or so operations initiated since 1988, 23 have been deployed in internal conflicts. As a product of its time, peacekeeping was destined to change once the cold war ended. Second Generation Peacekeeping missions are qualitatively and quantitatively different from traditional missions, which the UN had characterized as “holding actions”. The new missions are more comprehensive with the UN attempting a near-simultaneous management of political, societal, economic, humanitarian, electoral, diplomatic and military initiatives within a distressed nation. Moreover, the UN duplicated these efforts in several large and complex operations, which were mounted at about the same time. In a zone of fighting, the new peacekeepers attempted to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, disarm and demobilize belligerents, maintain and protect safe havens/areas, enforce weapons exclusion zones, monitor borders, repatriate refugees, and assume temporary control of many government functions.⁸

This expansion of UN peacekeeping into these new uncharted territories invited controversy. The issue of whether it is desirable or feasible for UN peacekeeping to be used in instances of civil conflict has regenerated the debate over state sovereignty and intervention. Some argued that international law gives a sacrosanct recognition to the sovereignty of a state. However, others argued that sovereignty is exercised on behalf of the individual and therefore by extrapolation the individual is sovereign. The Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has argued, “To confine the concept of security exclusively to the protection of states is to ignore the interests of people in whose name sovereignty is exercised.”⁹ The argument therefore leads to intervention in states that perpetrate gross human rights violations on its own citizens.

⁸ S Iqbal Riza, “Parameters of UN Peacekeeping,” *RUSI Journal*, vol. 140, no. 3 (June 1995), p. 17-18

⁹ Cited in Allen G. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), p. 62.

The intractability of internal conflicts has made some to doubt the desirability of peacekeeping in such situations. In internal civil wars “peacekeepers are often faced with unclear boundaries between belligerents, irregular forces outside central control, or some local participants in the conflict who have not agreed to the negotiated truce.” These circumstances will likely lead to increased violence as cease-fires are regularly dishonoured. This UN involvement in civil conflicts has made some apprehensive. Durch and Blechman argue that intervention in a civil war is “a potential political minefield” for the UN.¹⁰ The two scholars point out that once the UN intervenes it is highly likely that at some point one of the parties will see it as biased and thereafter treat the UN as a hostile force. They further argue that the UN must make a dispassionate assessment of the task at hand before it ventures into a conflict. Further

[I]n few situations are the rights and wrongs sufficiently clear, the transgressions sufficiently transparent, and the excesses sufficiently brutal to shock the global conscience and permit the formation of the international consensus necessary for the United Nations to act. In few still will circumstances be sufficiently poignant for national leaders to willingly risk the lives of their citizens who would make up the UN forces.¹¹

Specific types of peacekeeping in internal conflicts also contain unique difficulties. UN missions deployed in support of humanitarian efforts provide a vivid example.¹² It would be very difficult for the UN to distribute aid and remain impartial at the same time. Each side will see the UN supporting their opponent by supplying it with humanitarian assistance. The warring factions may also stop or disrupt the distribution of aid as a leverage. The Serbs in Bosnia have continually used the humanitarian effort to further their cause. Thus, humanitarian support, even if divorced from attempts at conflict resolution, may still result in the UN being drawn into the conflict.

¹⁰ William Durch and Barry M. Belchman, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order* (Washington, 1992), p. 16-21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² For an in-depth analysis of the difficulties of humanitarian intervention see Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian Action in War,’ *Adelphi Paper*, 305 (December 1996).

This study will explore the factors that determine the success of a UN strategic peacekeeping in internal conflicts. This thesis will argue that UN actions in internal wars are greatly enhanced if certain conditions or factors explained in the main body of this chapter, are present. I further posit that if certain conditions are absent or weak, the chances of failure are greatly increased. The case studies of UN operations in the Congo and Bosnia will be used in a comparative manner in order to check the validity of the hypothesis presented. For each case, the relevant factors and conditions which have enhanced or hindered the mission's performance will be identified. This will allow for a comparison across cases and lead to a general explanation of the performance of UN peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts.

To bring out the political nuances embedded in what is otherwise apparently undertaken by an international organization - the UN - a comparison is made between the UN strategic peacekeeping (quasi-enforcement) efforts in the Congo and the lack of such forceful action in the on going war of all against all in the former Yugoslavia. Despite differences in the political atmosphere between the two countries, broadly speaking, the conditions that exist in Yugoslavia merit the same attention and flexing of muscle the organization showed over thirty years ago. A comparison of eras, however, clearly shows that the Congo, whose civil war came at the beginning of the cold war, was kept united because it served the broader national security interests of the United States. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, began its cataclysmic disintegration precisely the moment the Cold War dissolved into the mist of history. Power politics has receded from the horizon and small nations' value as strategic asset has plummeted like stocks in a market crash. With the Soviet empire dissolved and fragmented, the US was, by default, left as the only superpower. The occurrence of such an event has led some to speculate that it heralded a 'unipolar moment' in international politics.¹³

¹³ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 23.

The US - euphoric and in a celebratory mood, but at the same time financially exhausted and fatigued by the Cold War competition - has decided to curtail its foreign engagements and put its financial house in order. Facing the chorus of influential isolationists and fearing suffering 'an imperial overstretch,' the US has reduced its foreign commitments to only those that sufficiently threaten its national interests.¹⁴ The realist explanation, therefore, offers the best explanation for the lack of strategic peacekeeping efforts in the crucible of carnage that is Yugoslavia. Indeed, Yugoslavia was left to tear itself asunder and splinter into fragments. No systematic coordination was exhibited by the international bodies and regional organizations. The EC, given the first chance to exercise a common strategy against a conflict that potentially threatens its security interests, fumbled and bungled the chance.

Apart from the above central explanation that points to the broad political context in which each operation was undertaken, and which in my research methodology, falls under the overarching heading of political and military context, other secondary explanations would be explored to see the differences between the two operations. The other factors considered under the political and military context are: the kind of dispute that is the focus of the UN intervention, the conduct of the host state, the principal protagonists and Third party states, as well as the role regional organizations have played in ameliorating a conflict.

The second category of factors relates to the characteristics of authorization of the peacekeeping force deployed. These factors include the mandate crafted for the operation, which basically sets out the objective to be realized by the peacekeeping mission. A second factor to consider is the resource allocated for the mission. Is the financing of the operation sound and stable? Another factor to consider is the imperative of timing. Did the UN react promptly to the brewing crisis or did it wait a long time before it intervened.

¹⁴See article by Christopher Layne, "Minding our Own Business: The Case for American Non-Participation in International Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations," in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

The third category of factors relates to the characteristics of the operation. The first factor here deals with the operational characteristics and focuses mainly on command and control aspects of the operation. The other factor relates to the contextual variable pertaining to the operation. This factor concerns the geographical environment in which a UN peacekeeping mission is deployed.

In this chapter a definitional explication of peacekeeping and other conflict management techniques of the UN will initially be given. To situate the concept of strategic peacekeeping the main distinguishing characteristics of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement will also be discussed. The legal and political impediments that are generally faced by such operations will be treated broadly before briefly looking at the political autonomy of the UN. The UN, lacking any sovereign status and being a body that unites its members into a fragile and unwieldy club, is always found to be subject to the dictates of its more powerful members. A question to be addressed here is to see whether the UN represents a common vision of interests or a vision as divided as the interests of its member states. The main section of this introductory chapter will focus particularly on the research methodology employed in drawing meaningful observations about the two case studies of the Congo and the former Yugoslavia. Various factors relating to the peacekeeping operations in the two countries will be explored to see what impact they had on the success or failure of the missions.

Many scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping thought that ‘wider peacekeeping’ will replace classical peacekeeping, especially in the early days immediately after the end of the Cold War. However, since then a lot has changed and the optimism previously voiced had been reversed quickly as the major powers are not willing to undertake such missions. As the Economist put it, “the idea that the UN, released from its cold-war bonds, would roam as the knight-errant setting the world to rights has expired in the

blunders, mortifications and recrimination of Bosnia and Somalia.”¹⁵ Strategic peacekeeping, in its rare occurrences, was motivated by the paradox of the Cold War; the US was ready to step in the Congo because it served its interests to counter communism. The West is not willing to go that far in Yugoslavia because its interests are not at stake as communism is in rubble.

Defining UN Conflict Management Techniques: A Definitional Quandary

In this section I will be outlining a typology of the various mechanisms employed by the UN in resolving interstate and intrastate conflicts. There is a great difficulty in drawing a ‘rigid’ typologies in that these typologies tend to shift over time as the international organization extends the range of activities that generally come under its conflict management techniques. As Boutros-Ghali noted in his 1993 Annual Report, “peacekeeping has to be invented every day [and] there are as many types of peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflict.”

Scholars of the UN military activities have tried to define peacekeeping. Some definitions have been found to be very simplistic referring to peacekeeping as conflict management. Others however, have attempted to be more systematic in their definitions. The international Peace Academy has broadly defined peacekeeping as “the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”¹⁶

This definition tends to take into account intra and well as interstate conflict. A similar definition, which tried to take into consideration some of the recent changes in

¹⁵ “Peacekeeping at Bay,” *The Economist* (February 5, 1994), p. 15

¹⁶ Inderjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 11.

peacekeeping, was made by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which defined peacekeeping operations as

actions designed to enhance international peace, security and stability which are authorized by competent national or international organizations and which are undertaken cooperatively and individually by military, humanitarian, good governance, civilian police and other interested agencies and groups."¹⁷

The approach taken by the Center is very novel as it broadly defines peacekeeping to encompass activities ranging from inter-personal conflict resolution all the way to post conflict reconciliation and development. These definitions are broad but they are not specific enough to exclude what is actually not peacekeeping. Also, the above definitions fail to point out the specific characteristics unique to a peacekeeping mission and do not state what peacekeepers essential duties are.

With those factors in mind we turn to some of the other definitions that tried to incorporate more delineating elements of peacekeeping. The UN provides a more strict and limiting definition of peacekeeping. An Agenda for Peace defined peacekeeping as

the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* [emphasis mine] with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.¹⁸

The Secretary General also sees peacekeeping as a "technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."¹⁹ These statements made by the Secretary General are quite revolutionary in that they imply that the UN can in the present time of post-Cold War era deploy a peacekeeping force without the consent of the protagonists. This is a major step away from the previous tenets (precedents) of peacekeeping which have been slowly built up during the Cold War period. However, as a definition its still to broad and it does not address what

¹⁷ *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, vol. 25, no. 2 (March/April 1996) p.1.

¹⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, (New York: UN Publication, June 1992), p. 1.

peacekeepers do. Moreover, this definition does not remarkably distinguish peacekeeping from other kinds of UN involvement in conflicts.

The Blue Helmets, the UN peacekeeping handbook defined peacekeeping missions as involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation...[attaining] their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the UN under Article 42.²⁰

This definition is an improvement over Boutros-Ghali’s definition because it confines peacekeeping to actions short of enforcement measures. However, with the exception of consent, the definition fails to point out the specific characteristics of peacekeeping.

A marked improvement on the above definition is provided by the former Under-secretary General for Peacekeeping Affairs, Kofi Annan, who described peacekeeping as

the use of multinational military personnel, armed or unarmed, under international command and with the consent of the parties, to help control and resolve conflict between hostile states and between hostile communities within a state.²¹

The definition identifies some characteristics of peacekeeping though it dangerously pushes peacekeeping to mean peace-observation, especially when the definition mentions the word unarmed in connection with UN military presence.

Marrack Goulding, the former Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, has defined peacekeeping as

field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of Peacekeeping Operations*, 2nd Edition (New York, 1990), pp. 4-5.

²¹Kofi Annan, "NATO and UN Peacekeeping," *NATO Review*, No. 5 (October, 1993), p. 4.

command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.²²

This certainly is, compared with the above definitions, a more comprehensive definition of peacekeeping. It captures well some of the characteristics of traditional or classical peacekeeping, such as impartiality, collective financing and the minimum use of force. However, even some of these characteristics were not observed in some of the classical peacekeeping cases. Moreover, the above definitions fail to reflect the changes of the 'new' peacekeeping.

Acknowledging the evolutionary change of peacekeeping, Goulding developed a taxonomy, which identified six specific types of operations that in many cases would scarcely have been captured by his above definition. These operations include:

- the preventive deployment of United Nations troops before a conflict has actually begun, at the request of one of the parties and on its territory only (Macedonia)
- traditional peacekeeping (Israel-Egypt)
- operations set up to support implementation of a comprehensive settlement which has already been agreed by the parties (Cambodia, Angola)
- operations designed to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in conditions of continuing warfare (Bosnia, Somalia)
- the deployment of a United Nations force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed (Bosnia, Congo, Somalia)
- Cease-fire enforcement which is essentially a muscular version of the traditional peacekeeping. (Bosnia)²³

As this taxonomy illustrates the tasks of peacekeeping has expanded and so has its roles. The taxonomy also shows how elastic the concept of peacekeeping can be ranging in its activities from traditional peacekeeping to ceasefire enforcement.

²² Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, vol. 69 no. 3 (July 1993), p. 455.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 456-9.

Alan James also developed a typology of operations, which illustrates the wide range of missions, which can be conducted in the name of peacekeeping. James' list excludes peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention but allows the following tasks:

- self-determination,
- ending intervention,
- national reconciliation,
- holding the political ring,
- restoring order,
- humanitarian assistance.²⁴

James' list is, however, confusing as it adds to the list some of the tasks, like enforcement and humanitarian intervention, which he excluded from the outset. For example, how can one undertake the ending of intervention without the use of force or how can one undertake humanitarian assistance without meeting resistant from one of the parties in the conflict, ultimately necessitating humanitarian intervention? These questions he does not answer.

The qualitative changes in peacekeeping that have occurred since the end of the Cold War have led some to suggest that perhaps new terminology should be developed which describes better the essence of the new generation of peacekeeping. Thus, such terms as "second generation multinational operations," multifunctional,"²⁵ "wider peacekeeping"²⁶ and "aggravated peacekeeping" have been suggested. The common denominator in all these terms is the fact that they emphasize the current state of peacekeeping. The UN has tried to come up with a new definition that takes into account some of these qualitative changes in peacekeeping. The organization has therefore recently defined peacekeeping as:

²⁴ Alan James, "Internal Peacekeeping," in David A. Charters, (ed.), *Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution* (Fredericton, NB, 1994), pp. 8-13.

²⁵ John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," *Survival*, vol. 36 no. 3 (Autumn 1994) pp. 149-173.

²⁶ Charles Dobbie, "A Concept of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival*, vol.36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 122.

a United Nations presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangement relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces etc.) and their resolution (partial and comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.”²⁷

While there is certainly a distinction that can be drawn between traditional/classical peacekeeping and second generation/multifunctional/wider/aggravated peacekeeping, several commonalties can be discerned. In many instances the tasks required between the two generations remain the same. In most cases the peacekeepers’ conduct and tasks required of them remain the same in both (first generation and second-generation) instances. In other aspects second generation peacekeeping activities go far beyond the activities that were usually undertaken in first generation peacekeeping. Operations like Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia has seen a sharp extension of activities into uncharted territories. However, there is no need to over-exaggerate the novelty of second-generation peacekeeping. The Congo operation undertaken in the early 1960s shared very much with many of the operation of this new era.

Another qualitative change has been the devaluing of consent in peacekeeping missions. This concept was very crucial in earlier missions. In the operations of the new era, we have certainly witnessed cases in which the UN intervened in the absence of any authority in a given country. The case of Somalia offers a vivid example. Likewise, the SC intimated in its resolution pertaining to the deployment of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia that a clear consent by the parties is not necessary.

In all, peacekeeping activities are generally considered to be a form of peace support operations. Such operations are military activities designed to support diplomatic efforts at peacemaking. They encompass a spectrum (continuum) ranging form UN observation missions through what can be termed “classical peacekeeping” to peace enforcement.

²⁷ Improving the capacity of the United Nations Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary General, A/48/403,Para. 4 (New York: United Nations, 1994)

Traditional peacekeeping certainly occupies the middle ground in that continuum. Now we turn our attention to some of the other conflict management techniques employed by the United Nations.

Other UN Conflict Management Techniques:

Observer Missions:

Observation missions involve small groups of military personnel in the monitoring of an already existing political settlement between belligerent parties. The personnel are only lightly armed, if at all. The observers are there (present) with the consent and blessing of the parties, have no enforcement power. The role of the observer in terms of the use of force is entirely passive.

Peacemaking:

Peacemaking according to Boutros-Ghali is “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means such as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter.”²⁸ The specific tools of peacemaking are set out in Article 33 of the Charter. It states that the parties to a dispute should ‘seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 20-27

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Preventive Diplomacy:

Preventive deployment can be seen as actions undertaken under UN auspices and that are geared to diffusing a brewing conflict. The Secretary General defined preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”³⁰ Preventive deployment occurs before the outbreak of fighting between protagonists and has as its main objective the avoiding of military conflict. Preventive diplomacy efforts are undertaken essentially to nip in the bud conflicts that are about to erupt. These measures usually come before a conflict needs peacekeeping forces.

Peacebuilding:

Peacebuilding can be defined as action whose purpose is to strengthen and solidify the newly created peace. The actions of peacebuilding are meant to re-instate or create a situation that is as close as possible to the status quo ante before the conflict first erupted. Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.³¹ Also, Boutros Ghali noted that peacebuilding amounts to “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructure of nations torn by civil war and strife, building bonds of peaceful, mutual benefit among nations formally at war.”³² The International conference on peacebuilding

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 20-27

³⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, pp. 11-19

³¹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, p. 11.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

has also defined Peacebuilding as “a positive, continuous cooperative human endeavour to build bridges between conflicting nations and groups. It aims to enhance understanding a communication and dispel the ‘wandering rocks’ of distrust, fear and hate.”³³ In the continuum peace-building measures are embarked on after the military and diplomatic phases are over, and they are designed to speed up the returning of normalcy to an area that has been devastated by a conflict.

Peace-Enforcement:

Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves the active use of force to compel a recalcitrant state to conform to UN resolution. In other words enforcement measures are the designed to reverse an aggression by waging a full-scale war on a recalcitrant nation. Peace enforcement has rarely been used. In the rare times in which it has been undertaken, the action was projected under a coalition but with a UN mandate or blessing. Despite its rare occurrence peace-enforcement measures have been given a prominent place in the UN charter. Chapter VII of the Charter exclusively deals with peace-enforcement and its various modalities ranging from sanctions to military intervention. Peace-enforcement measures therefore occupy the opposite polar position to peace-observation mission.

The forms of peacekeeping that combine coercive and non-coercive actions occupy somewhere more than the middle ground in that continuum. This foggy, grey and undefined area where peacekeeping and peace-enforcement merge and mesh with each other belongs to strategic peacekeeping. The traditional view is opposed to any extension of peacekeeping into this middle ground, especially in connection with the issue of enforcement. The UK doctrine on peacekeeping has flatly refused to acknowledge the possibility that there is a middle ground between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement: “The idea... that in post Cold War there is a new middle ground of military operations lying on a linear spectrum somewhere between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement seems not only unfounded historically, but impractical and dangerously destabilizing

³³ Cited in A.B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 132.

doctrinally.”³⁴ Because of the wide difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the two, peacekeeping purists contend, cannot be informed and guided by the same set of principles. The difference between a peacekeeper to peace-enforcer, they argue, is “as referee to [a] football player.”³⁵ The goals of each are distinct; one is there to win, the other to ensure fair play. One is an overseer and impartial, the other a combatant and partial. Despite the black and white way in which peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is defined by peacekeeping purists, the practice of peacekeeping has plenty of examples in which the non-coercive peacekeeping techniques have been mixed with measures of enforcement nature. The Congo UN operation is a good example of that.

In this thesis I will make use of the concept of strategic peacekeeping to analyze my case studies.³⁶ The reason I use this concept is because it perfectly captures the situation that prevailed in the Congo. This mission started as a peacekeeping mission but slowly moved up to become a ‘lethal’ peacekeeping operation. Force was in the end extensively used to bring the errant party to the negotiating table. Enforcement measures were also combined with normal peacekeeping duties to bring an end to a civil war and restore order in a ‘failed state.’ The concept of strategic peacekeeping will also be used in connection to the Bosnian case. Here the question will be why the ‘UN’ failed to undertake strategic peacekeeping.

Since Hammarskjold described traditional peacekeeping as Chapter VI and Half, strategic peacekeeping can aptly be placed under Chapter VI and Three-Quarters. It is short of total enforcement as in the Gulf war, but at the same time it is also antithetical to classical

³⁴Charles Dobbie, *Army Field Manual “Wider Peacekeeping”* (Third Draft), (UK Doctrine and Training HQ, Trechard Lines, Wilts: UK Army, no date), p. 2-15.

³⁵Charles Dobbie, “A Concept of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping,” *Survival*, vol.36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 141.

³⁶ I borrowed this concept from Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, “The Future of peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success,” in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 327-48.

peacekeeping. Strategic peacekeeping therefore essentially combines the functions of peacekeeping with a healthy dose of enforcement measures.

These definitions and typologies have undergone a change, especially after the reactivated period of the UN after the end of the Cold War. The change in definitions is brought about, and to some extent complicated, by the increased range of activities the UN has begun to undertake in this new post-Cold War era. Before this period most of the experts categorized the Congo and even the Korean enforcement mission as peacekeeping missions. These missions however have very little in common with contemporary classical or traditional peacekeeping as it is defined.

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING: CONSTITUTIVE DISTINCTIONS

In this subsection I will be outlining the differences between classical peacekeeping and peace enforcement. I find it necessary to point out these differences at this point so that the reader can appreciate and understand where exactly strategic peacekeeping fits in this continuum.

The differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking can broadly be placed under three categories, which may overlap. The first is environmental and refers to the characteristics “on the ground”. The second is contextual and refers to the situation that would confront the peacekeepers or peacemakers were they to be deployed. The third category is the mission challenges that face the forces in the operation theatre.

Environment:

The environment refers to the conditions that prevail at the time that a peacekeeping or peacemaking action is contemplated. First, the conditions that prevail are either war or peace. In a peacekeeping situation, peace (in this case defined as the absence of war) has been re-established - a cessation of hostilities is in effect. The task that faces peacekeepers in that condition is to maintain the peace. By contrast, a peacemaker is

inserted in a condition of ensuing hostilities and his duty is to quash that hostility and create peace. This distinction is fundamental and affects all other factors and strategies that would be considered in each operation. Second, in an enforcement situation the combatants prefer the continuation of the conflict to their cessation. The opposite holds true in cases of peacekeeping; the absence of hostilities is preferred to the continuation of combat.

These twin influences points to a basic difference in the situation in which peacekeepers and peace enforcers are may be inserted. If peace enforcers are required a state of war obtains and some or all of the conflicting parties prefer that situation to its alternative, a cease-fire. In such a situation where a conflict is raging on, outside intervention would only succeed if taken wholeheartedly and not tepidly with half-hearted measures.

Context:

The context refers to the attitudes and conditions of the host groups or countries where force may be inserted. Three related conditions stand out. First, it is important to see whether the intervening force is invited or not. In the case of peacekeepers, more often than not they are invited. A prerequisite condition to the insertion of a peacekeeping force has always been that a cease-fire should be in place. The peacekeeper only gets involved when the invitation is universal. By contrast, at least one of the parties in a conflict for which a peacemaking may be contemplated does not want an outsider to intervene. That party sees the intervening force to be inimical to its own interests.

Second, the receptiveness of the parties to peaceful political settlement of their differences is another distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. In the case where a peacekeeping role is envisaged, a general desire to deal with the underlying political issues is present. The peacekeepers role is therefore limited to interposing between the warring factions so that they minimize any friction between the combatants that may lead to a full resumption of hostilities. The situation facing the peacemaker is entirely different; at least one of the combatants prefers war to peace and hence the

conflict may not be conducive to diplomatic negotiations. This complicates the peacemakers mission as he has to fight to impose peace whence there is no peace.

The contextual elements define the receptivity of the contestants to outside intervention by peacekeepers or peacemakers. For the peacekeeper, the environment is relatively benign while the peacemaker's is intensely hostile. By interposing themselves between combatants who are intent on fighting, the peacemakers may invite the wrath of one or all of the combatants. Or even worse, the peacemakers themselves may in the end become one of the combatants.

Mission Challenges:

The contextual situation in which a peacekeeper or peacemaker is introduced will affect how the mission will be conducted. The peacekeeper is introduced into a situation where there is peace or where at least there is a semblance of peace. The peacemaker on the other hand is introduced into a situation where there is a simmering conflict. Those conditions make for fundamental difference in how each can operate.

Strict impartiality is one of the hallmarks of the peacekeeper, and peacekeeping mission has always brought in non-partisan forces to carry on in a manner fair to both sides. To act in any other manner would be inviting the wrath of one of the parties and increasing the likelihood of the operation ending in a fiasco.

Peace-enforcement missions initially think of themselves as neutral as well. Such a presumption may arise from the likely humanitarian underpinning of such a mission or from the mistaken believe that peacemaking is a simple step on the continuum of international responses. The organizers of the humanitarian mission usually see their mission as been separate from the other factors that come into play in such operations. They tend to deal with the effect and try at best to neglect the cause of the conflict. However, that is very difficult to do in practice as sooner or later one has to confront with the real causes of the conflict.

Though peacemakers may think themselves as neutral, they may, however, not be seen as such by the victims or the victors of the conflict. The primary purpose of the peacemaker is to alter the existing situation by ending combat and establishing peace. Since peace is not desired by at least one of the parties, the peacemakers presence will be seen by that party as going against its interests. That party would therefore hardly view the peacemakers' presence or actions as impartial.

Secondly, the level of difficulty encountered in accomplishing the mission is vastly different between peacekeeping and peacemaking. If a peacekeeping force is inserted in a true peacekeeping situation where there is a peace to keep, then the peacekeepers mission is simple and straightforward. It is there for a well-defined purpose. It is only when traditional peacekeepers are inserted into a situation where there is no peace to keep that the peacekeeper's task becomes impossible. Peacemaking, on the other hand, is much more difficult than peacekeeping. The underlying internal situations into which peacemakers might be thrust into a likely to be analogous to insurgency-counterinsurgency scenarios, and the success of outsiders in those civil conflicts is generally unimpressive.

Thirdly, the uniqueness and controversy about the mission also distinguishes peacekeeping from peacemaking. The peacekeeping modality of conflict amelioration has been in existence since the late 1950s. It is therefore more generally accepted. The fact that there are about two dozen of them in place around the world is evidence of their legitimacy. With peacemaking, it is quite the opposite. It is relatively new and it has not been undertaken until the end of the cold war. There is a general lack of experience with this kind of operation and the general apprehension that it generates is well founded as this kind of mission is nothing short of war by other means.

Finally the military capability required in a peacekeeping mission is sharply different from that of peacemaking. For peacekeepers the military capacity needed to mount an operation is relatively small. The peacekeepers are lightly armed, defensive in orientation

and use their weapons only in self-defense. Because of these characteristics, they are relatively inexpensive, and that is also one reason why it is so appealing to the perpetually under-financed United Nations.

Peacemakers, on the other hand, are heavily armed and use their weapons not only in self-defense but to create or make the peace. Thus they are essentially combat troops that have offensive capability to mount a full-scale war. Because of the above characteristics, peacemaking troops will be more expensive than peacekeeping mission.

A Legal Outline of UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Activities

In the political dialect of most peacekeeping analysts, UN peacekeeping operations are referred to as Chapter VI operations and peace-enforcement operations as Chapter VII operations. While this is to a large extent true and a shorthand for simplification, it masks the fact that UN peacekeeping operations do not find explicit expression in the Charter. Rather, ironically, the only military operation for which the UN Charter gives explicit expression has never been undertaken so far and there is only a remote possibility that it will ever be undertaken.³⁷

Chapter VI of the Charter is entitled “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” The provisions of this Chapter do not make a pointed reference to UN military operations although analysts insist that the broad provisions of the Articles 33-38 refer to classical peacekeeping, especially with it with the mention of the phrase action taken through “other peaceful means.”³⁸ While discussions as to whether that vague reference in the Chapter makes a case for peacekeeping missions can generate a heated debate between international legal analysts, suffice to say that the connection between the two here is at best flimsy. Thus to suggest that this Chapter provides the UN with a politico-legal

³⁷ Alan James, “The Enforcement Provisions of the United Nations Charter,” in UNITAR, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 213.

framework for military actions would, to say the least, misrepresent the views presented by the framers of the Charter.³⁹ The important point to note is that “the framers of the Charter did not intend for Chapter VI to provide a political, strategic, or operational framework for UN military operations.”⁴⁰ The pacific and limited measures taken in Chapter VI were traditionally considered to fall within the purview of diplomacy, and that is why former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to this kind of military operations of the UN as “Chapter VI and a Half.”⁴¹ The UN itself notes that peacekeeping operations “fall short of the provisions of Chapter VII [but] at the same time go beyond purely diplomatic means or those described in Chapter VI.”⁴²

The very essence of Chapter VII on the other hand was to provide a political, strategic, and operational framework for UN military operations.⁴³ The provisions in Chapter VII imply an escalating sequence of responses to clearly defined aggression. Article 39 allows the Security Council to identify a threat to international peace and security, while Article 40 permits it to call upon the parties to the conflict to voluntarily comply with suggested “provisional measures.” If that fails then the SC can impose economic, political and diplomatic sanctions as provided in Article 41. If all other measures fail to bring the recalcitrant member to its sense, the UN will, under provisions of Article 42, undertake a full fledged military action through “air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The forces of such an

³⁸ John Hillen, “Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager”, *Parameters*, (Autumn 1996), p. 22.

³⁹ John Hillen, “Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager”, *Parameters*, (Autumn 1996), p. 22.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Allen G. Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for Canada*, p. 15.

⁴² United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (2nd ed., New York: UNDPI, 1990), p. 5.

⁴³ Alan James, “The Enforcement Provisions of the United Nations Charter,” in UNITAR, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 214.

operation would be furnished by the member-states of the UN through arrangements concluded under the provisions of Article 43.

According to Article 43 of the Charter, all UN members undertake “to make available to the SC on its call and in accordance with a special agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” However, the provisions of Article 43 has never seen the day of light as the Cold War that soon emerged after the formation of the UN has ripped apart the necessary climate that was needed to negotiate the provision of forces to UN command.⁴⁴ Thus, the rivalry between the two superpowers has deprived the UN of an authoritative and rehearsed mechanism that would allow it to mobilize the military forces of its member states. More importantly, the Military Staffs Committee described in Article 47 has been a nonentity, thus severely crippling the organization’s ability to have professional military advice. Indeed by 1947, Article 43 was, to all intents and purposes, dead. With the demise of that article, “the United Nations had renounced the special quality that was intended to distinguish it from its predecessor.”⁴⁵

Although the establishment of a peacekeeping force is covered by the broad mandate of the UN to preserve and re-establish international peace and security, there is uncertainty about how to classify peacekeeping forces under the Charter. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have previously established peacekeeping forces. The Charter provisions do not bestow on the Secretary General powers to establish and authorize a peacekeeping force. However, he has the power to initiate action pertaining to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, and once authorization has been given to execute it. This function gives him a crucial responsibility in respect of peacekeeping forces as far as their composition, administration and functioning are concerned.

⁴⁴ Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, *The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations* (Aldershot and Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1996), p. 12.

⁴⁵ Abba Eban, “The UN idea Revisited,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74 (September-October 1995), p. 48.

UN peacekeeping as we know them today was first developed by the General Assembly in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. UNEF I was established under the procedures of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the 1950 Korean Crisis. The precedent set by the Uniting for Peace Resolution is an important one as it provided the General Assembly the power to authorize and set up a peacekeeping force when the politics of the Security Council holds up that body from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly had, in a watershed development, passed Resolution 377 ('Uniting for Peace') of 3 November 1950:

If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed forces when necessary to maintain or restore the international peace and security. If not in session at the time the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session may be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the members of the United Nations.

The above resolution has given the General Assembly power to deliberate and authorize a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing mission when power politics between the veto wielding members holds up the Security Council from exercising its responsibility in the area of peace and security.

The scholars who maintain that that General Assembly is a competent body that can authorize a peacekeeping force contend that Article 11 paragraph 2 is broad enough to entitle the Assembly such powers.⁴⁶ However, the limitations imposed by the second sentence of that paragraph is inescapable as it clearly says that '[a]ny such question on

⁴⁶ For a discussion of this see Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 26-7.

which action is necessary' has to be referred to the Security Council. However, what the word 'action' means in this context is open to contradicting legal interpretations. A structural interpretation of the Charter will hold that action in this context refers to enforcement measures and that falls exclusively within the purview of the Security Council. Hence the supporters of the structural interpretation argue that UNEF I was established according to Article 11 paragraph 2, and Articles 14 and 22. The international Court of Justice (ICJ) also supported such a view. The Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, also in his report on UNEF I argued that the GA was competent to authorize the peacekeeping mission on the basis of the uniting for peace resolution. The SG also noted that the GA could create the force as a subsidiary body and thus establish UNEF I as a subsidiary organ.

There is no doubt that the Security Council is the main body entrusted with maintaining and restoring international peace and security. Nevertheless, there has been a lot debate on the legal basis of undertaking a peacekeeping force by the SC especially when that action falls outside the chapter VII. Thus in most instances particular articles of chap VII has been mentioned during the set up of a mission while other times Article 1 paragraph 1 has broadly been stated. A possible source of authority can be deduced from chapter VI and particularly Article 29 which gives the SC the authority to deploy troops as a subsidiary body.

The subject of peacemaking by the UN invariably involves intra-state conflicts, which are mainly in the form of civil wars unlike the inter-state wars where a peacekeeping modality was usually employed. This move into the uncharted waters of peacemaking has presented its own intricate legal nightmares as it opens a fresh the Pandora box that self-determination is. The 'principle of self determination' receives mention in Article 1(2) and also in Article 55. Chapters XI and XII, which are mainly concerned with self-determination for colonized people, is also used as a basis for those wanting to secede. These chapters redefined self-determination in such a way that it gave legitimacy to it only in cases of decolonization.

In cases where the question of self-determination conflicted with member states' sovereignty then the latter was, according to UN Charter, prevail. This can be tangentially deduced from Article 2(7), which insulates a state from an external intervention into "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." However even in this case the UN left for itself a room for involvement in internal matters of a member state as it clearly states that an enforcement measure under chapter VII will effectively end that privilege of non-involvement.

DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: ACTOR OR FRAMEWORK?

An inclusion of a discussion on the role played by the UN as an international organization is imperative. First, it is within the context of UN that peacekeeping operations are undertaken. Actions taken outside the UN framework are usually seen as a unilateral involvement motivated by a country's narrower and parochial self interests. Thus countries usually seek the blessing of the UN, as it is a more legitimate body in the eyes of the international community. Weiss contends that the UN is "an institutional funnel through which member states may channel their foreign policies."⁴⁷ When states comply with the Charter and use UN procedures, their policies acquire the legitimacy and credibility that stems from international law. This assertion is further borne by the general consensus, usually in the form of a mandate, which is developed within the organization in events pertaining to peace and security.

The proponents and critics of the UN hold different and often contradictory viewpoints. Realist scholars see the UN as an instrument to be used in serving the national interests of the major powers. The realists argue that the United Nations is fundamentally an intergovernmental organization in which key decisions are made by governments representing states. The legal entities that make up the UN organization are states. The

⁴⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 10

UN organization is a complex system of policy making and administration in which individuals who are not instructed by states make some decisions. Non governmental organizations (NGOs) are also active and in some cases influential in this system.

Critics of the UN has argued with some justification that the organization is ineffectual and draws whatever strength it has from the actions of its member states, especially the Permanent Five. The critics have maintained that the UN as an organization does not enjoy a sovereign status and hence is not anything more than the summation of its parts - and more so of its major member nations. Realist scholars see the UN as an instrument to be used in serving the national interests of the major powers. Enerst Lefever states: "The United Nation on occasion may be a useful instrument to serve the parallel interests of the United States and other major powers in addressing specific crises."⁴⁸ It is true indeed, that the UN cannot do what its members do not want it to do. The significance of that limitation implies that the efficacy of the organization is conditional to the assent of its members, and that it is an instrument that could be conveniently used by its senior members.

The realists also believe that in power politics it is the concept of national interest that acts as the driving force in the interactions between nations. And to that end national interest imperatives and *realpolitik* calculations motivate nations to use international bodies such as the UN to attain collectively what would otherwise have to be achieved unilaterally. It is with such a perception that one scholar asserted: "The UN remains a mere instrument of nation states, and its success or failure depends, as always, not mainly on the United Nations itself, but on the degree to which sovereign nations states believe that international cooperation suits their own national interests."⁴⁹ It is that fact which

⁴⁸Enerst Lefever, "Reining in the UN: Mistaking the Instrument for the Actor," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 (No. 3, Summer 1993), p. 17.

⁴⁹Kim R. Holmes, 'New World Disorder: A Critique of the United Nations,' *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46 (No. 2 Winter 1993), p. 324.

obviates both the opportunities and limitations of the UN as a peacekeeping or peacemaking body.”

At various points the major powers have employed the UN to attain goals which they deemed to be in conformity with their overall position. It is interesting to note that in the first mission ever undertaken by the UN, the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, the Russians were in favour of the peacekeeping operation as it curbed the imperial activities of Britain and France in the Suez canal. The US, for its part have liberally used the UN as a front for some of its national interest goals and always participated in peacekeeping missions on terms that were on its own making. It is this that made a noted scholar, Conor Criuse O’Brien, to perceptively observe: “The US associates itself with the various UN operations but on its own terms, according to its own agenda and conserving its autonomy while nominally acting under the authority of the UN.”⁵⁰ This, he noted, may be represent the “actual nature, though not the proclaimed one, of the New World Order.”⁵¹

A contrarian position held by idealists believe that the UN, as an international organization which comprises almost all member nations of the world, represents common ideals which are aspired to by the whole of mankind. They also posited that the framers of the UN charter vested in the organization powers and authority in a way that elevated it to a quasi-sovereign or supranational body.⁵² However, this is a minority position that flows from unbridled optimism and is cherished by fervent believers in idealist internationalism. The proponents of such bullish belief in the ability of the international organization made those analyses after the successful campaign of the US led but UN authorized Gulf war.

⁵⁰Mats R. Berdal, “Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping,” *Survival*, Vol. 36 (No. 1, Spring 1994), pp. 30-50.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵² Views such as these can be seen in the pages of Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* and in Gareth Evans’,

A more realistic position is held by certain idealists who yearn for a stronger UN but who realize that the present structure of international politics is such that the international organization would always be subject to the interests of its principal players. The incorporation of internationalists phrases such as "we the peoples of the United Nations," and the certain powers accorded to the Secretary General can be interpreted as a measure of investing "implied power" in the organization.⁵³ Moreover, the UN is on many important fronts a norm setter and as such exerts its influence in very subtle ways. Like any institution, whatever its origins and authority, the UN "has developed a life and an ethos of its own."⁵⁴ As Roberts and Kingsbury have argued, "the UN framework influences states' perceptions of their own interests, the ordering of their priorities and preferences, and the possibilities they see of best advancing their interests."⁵⁵ The UN has also come to represent a limited sense of a collective interest, distinct in particular cases from the specific interests of individual states.⁵⁶

The realists admit that the UN has become more central to the course of global events than in the past but they quickly point out that the UN expanded into this new areas by way of a General Assembly or a Security Council resolution and only at the express permission of states.⁵⁷ The realists therefore argue that states have the capacity to end or limit the activities of UN officials deemed to have exceeded the authority and power

Cooperating for peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (New South Wales, 1993)

⁵³ James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 107.

⁵⁴ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *Presiding Over a Divided World: Changing UN Roles, 1945-1993* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) p. 24

⁵⁵ Quoted in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations*, 2nd edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 16.

⁵⁶ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *Presiding Over a Divided World: Changing UN Roles, 1945-1993*, p. 24

⁵⁷ James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, p. 107.

granted them by the authorizing bodies of the organization, i.e. the Security Council or General Assembly. Postinternationalists on the other hand would argue quite to the contrary.⁵⁸ True, authority has been granted to the UN officials by states but in many cases urgent decisions has to be made on the spot by these officials in implementing the given Security Council resolutions. It is, they argue, in the implementation process that the UN officials have a considerable leeway and since their actions are not subject to monitoring acquires an autonomous authority.⁵⁹

Hence whereas realists view UN officials and agencies as servant and instruments subjects to the dictates of states, postinternationalists see them as independent actors.⁶⁰ Also, whereas realists see UN actions as occurring at the convenience of states and thus always subject to reversal by a vote or a veto in the Security Council, postinternationalists argue that in subtle but substantial ways the ‘convenience-of-states mentality has given way to a states-are-obliged-to-go-along attitude.’⁶¹ They further claim that these attitude are pervasive as to result in states not reversing UN decisions though they continue to have the formal power to do so.

The performance of the UN cannot be assessed separately from those of its member’s states. The UN is, as former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed, a political institution whose members “are pursuing their national interests as they see them.”⁶² It is a creature of states and cannot do anything substantive without their clear approval. This view is a reality check for those “who [allow] their values to govern their judgement,”⁶³

⁵⁸ This is a term I borrowed from Rosenau and Durfee who describe postinternationalists as scholars who believe that power and authority is more dispersed and decentralized than is assumed by realists.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 108.

⁶⁰ James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, p. 107-8.

⁶¹ James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly*, p. 108.

⁶²Cited in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World*, p. 16.

and argue that the UN is superseding the state system, and that it should take initiatives on its own accord and without approval of its member states.⁶⁴ But the UN cannot be understood as merely the sum of its parts. Like all collectivities, Rosenau argues, “the whole is larger is than the sum of its parts, that the aggregation of its members’ inputs creates an entity that “says” and “does” outputs that stand on their own, apart from those who contributed to their formulation.”⁶⁵

In the rest of the thesis, I speak of decisions made at the United Nations. In most of these instances, the UN as a framework rather as an actor obtains. Nonetheless, the acronym “UN” at times represents important behaviour by independent persons representing the international organization. Each major decision made by the “UN” has to be analyzed to distinguish the role played by independent UN personnel, decisions made by states on behalf of the UN, and decisions made by states outside the UN framework. Once allowed to act, UN personnel and institutions may come to play influential roles in the implementation process.⁶⁶ However, state decisions about power and policy are the principal force driving events at the UN. When there is a strong agreement or consensus on a certain issue by the major powers, the “UN” may be allowed to act decisively. When such a consensus is missing or absent then the UN may be limited or constrained in carrying out its most important objective, namely the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.

Although the long range effects of international organization upon the multi-state system cannot be predicted accurately, they, Inis Claude argues, “may be regarded as a process

⁶³ James N. Rosenau, *The United Nations in a Turbulent World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) p. 43.

⁶⁴ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, *Presiding Over a Divided World*, p. 24

⁶⁵ James N. Rosenau, *The United Nations in a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 54.

⁶⁶ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, p. 11.

leading to the eventual transcendence of the multi-state system.”⁶⁷ Their immediate function is to supplement the state system while at the same time aspiring to creating political and legal reforms that would be compliant with the conditions of an interdependent world.⁶⁸

EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF UN ACTION:

The main question that frames the thesis is: What accounts for the varying successes of UN peacemaking operations in cases of internal conflicts? The two conflicts that are used as comparative case studies are the Congo crisis and the Bosnian conflict. In the comparative analysis the main subject areas that I will focus on can be broadly classified under these three headings: the characteristics of the peacekeeping operation; the political and military context and the characteristics of authorization.

A first step in this section is to examine what criteria have been developed by the Diehl and Brown to assess peacekeeping success. Brown identified three different ways of assessing an operation’s success.⁶⁹ These are whether the objectives of the Security Council mandate has been fulfilled; whether the operation lead to the resolution of the conflict and whether the presence of the operation contributed to international peace and security by eliminating the conflict in the area of the operation. Diehl, on the other hand, employed only two criteria.⁷⁰ He measures the success of an operation by assessing its ability to limit armed conflict and also by its ability to facilitate conflict resolution.

⁶⁷ Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1971) p. 447.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Marjorie Brown, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues*, Report for Congress (Washington, D.C., 1993) p. 20-29.

⁷⁰ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, 1993) p. 36

This section will use only two of these indicators of success of a mission that were identified by Brown and Diehl (containing the conflict and conflict resolution).⁷¹ I would not consider the fulfilment of a Security Council mandate as a measure of success because mandates are crafted in such a way that the final draft resolution is always ambiguous. This is due to the fact that resolutions happen to be documents of compromise by the Permanent Five states. Looking at mandates as a measure of a mission's success may be helpful in that it accords something tangible to compare with the outcome of the operation. The objectives attained would be compared with the initial mandates given. However, this measure, as stated above, may not be a good indicator of the success or lack of it in an operation.

However, before we explore the factors that account for the success of a strategic peacekeeping operation in internal conflicts we need to define or operationalize what success in this case means. The fundamental judgement on the success of a strategic peacekeeping mission should be its ability to stop the fight, restore and then keep the peace.⁷² In all strategic peacekeeping operations the main reason for their initiation is to arrest or deter conflict in the area of deployment. Therefore, the main measure of the success of a strategic peacekeeping operation is on the achievement of its intended outcome, which is to impose or create peace where there is no peace. This goal of halting the carnage associated with the conflict is usually the crucial first step before diplomatic initiatives commence.⁷³

Strategic peacekeeping forces rely on several different means to inhibit armed conflict. First, the power of the peacekeeper's arsenal and the strength of the forces is such that they would be able to compel the belligerents parties to observe any agreements that have

⁷¹ Diehl examined UNEF I, UNEF II, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, and the non-UN MNF in Lebanon, while Brown examined UNTSO, ONUC, UNFICYP, UNEF I and II, and UNDOF.

⁷² Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40 no. 2, (June 1996), p.343

been reached between the parties and other organizations, usually the United Nations. Second, as an interposition force the troops do more than force a hostile party to go through the peacekeeping force in an attack. Third, through patrols in the area of deployment, the peacekeeping force can detain violators of the cease-fire.

One may also judge the success of peacekeeping mission by its ability to prevent the onset or renewal of warfare, as well as to limit the death and destruction of violent incidents short of war in their area of deployment.⁷⁴ They accomplish this by acting as a buffer between protagonists, which lessens the likelihood of direct engagement and builds confidence among the opposing sides that a pre-emptive attack is not imminent. Here Licklider's definition of the end of civil wars is useful to measure success of third party intervention (in our case the UN). He considers a civil war to end when either multiple sovereignty ends or the violence in the area of third party deployment is terminated for at least 5 years.⁷⁵ This definition of the end of civil wars is extremely restrictive, although it gives a time reference against which the success of a peacekeeping mission can be assessed.

The success of a strategic peacekeeping operation may also be predicated on its ability to positively contribute to the resolution of a conflict.⁷⁶ Strategic peacekeeping as a grand strategy can be used to facilitate and spur the resolution of the conflict once the armed conflict is halted. Strategic peacekeeping is designed to provide a favourable environment in which to nurture negotiations between the protagonists.⁷⁷ Moreover peacekeeping offers a breather from the conflict and this may provide a crucial time in which the

⁷³ Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," p.341

⁷⁴ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, 1993) p. 35.

⁷⁵ Cited in Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," p. 343

⁷⁶ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, 1993) p. 37.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

bitterness of the conflict may dissipate enough to undertake negotiations for long term resolution of the conflict. By providing some assurance that the cease-fire will continue, a peacekeeping operation also allows negotiators to concentrate on the matters that are at hand without immediate cause to worry that an opponent is acquiring a tactical advantage during the talks.

The two above criteria are not totally unrelated; the limitation of armed conflict may be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition for conflict resolution. However, if a strategic peacekeeping mission succeeds in greatly limiting a conflict that in itself can be, with some qualification, considered a success.

POTENTIAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:

To understand the challenge civil wars pose for UN peacekeeping, this section first identifies the key factors associated with peacekeeping success and failure. The explanatory variables outlined draws primarily from the factors identified by scholars of peacekeeping. Each of these variables will be further expounded in terms of their importance to the overall success of a peacekeeping mission. Also, each of the variables has a bearing on the others and in many cases they do overlap. These factors are then examined in light of the contextual variables related to strategic peacekeeping and civil wars. The discussion about this subject (strategic peacekeeping and civil wars) centers specifically on concerns inherent in the Congo and the Bosnian civil conflicts, as well as those that pertain to UN peacekeeping roles generally.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT:

Under this sub-section, the impact of the political and military variables on a peacekeeping mission will be looked at. Some of these variables like the political context in which a peacekeeping operation is undertaken are found to be crucial to the success of a mission. The kind or nature of dispute that forms the basis of a conflict can also have an acute impact on the success or failure of a mission. Also, the conduct of the host state, the principal opponents in a conflict as well as the behaviour of Third party states are very

important in determining the success of an operation. The role played by regional organizations can also have a bearing on the overall success of a strategic peacekeeping operation.

BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT

Political Support:

Strong political support from the major nations in the international political system has been found to be pertinent for the successful undertaking of a UN military operation. While in the Cold War era the support of the major powers was critical, in the new era the strong support, if it is forthcoming at all, of the US is crucially important. If political support from the great powers is lacking an operation may either never get off the ground or may fail to achieve its desired outcome. US support has been particularly crucial for peacekeeping in the past. As Durch has asserted “In 45 years of UN peacekeeping operations, all that have gone forward have had US support, while others that were still-born suffered from a lack of such support.”⁷⁸

Paul Diehl argues that the support of the great powers, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council is a necessary though an insufficient condition for successful peacekeeping.⁷⁹ However, his contention is called into question by other scholars of the field such as Urquhart and Haas who strongly and cogently argue that the strong political presence of a major power is not only necessary but a very significant indicator of the likelihood of success in a peacekeeping situation.⁸⁰ Indeed Haas argues that the success of an operation is normally associated with the effective application of ‘diplomatic and even military pressure of a superpower’.

⁷⁸William J. Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context,” in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 23.

⁷⁹Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 86.

Kind of Dispute:

Peacekeeping operations are more amenable to conflicts that mainly result from external aggression. Generally the peacekeeping operations that have been more successful were ones that involved external aggression. One analyst argues that “peacekeeping has been less problematic and generally operated more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to peace by external aggression.”⁸¹ The expectation or conventional wisdom also dictates that peacekeeping is more successful when certain issues form the basis of contention.

The general belief that peacekeeping missions are more successful in ameliorating conflicts that involve states is empirically borne out. Diehl who looked at a sample of six UN peacekeeping operations has found out that they were most successful when introduced in cases of interstate conflicts and least effective in limiting armed conflict and violence in cases of internationalized civil war.⁸² Sally Morphet also pointed out that past experience suggests that peacekeeping missions are least effective when inserted in a communal conflict where “the underlying political and societal divisions very deep.”⁸³

The strong correlation between civil conflicts and peacekeeping failure can be explained by several factors. First, civil wars usually involve more than two discernible groups. It is also the conventional wisdom and one supported by evidence that as the number of actors in a conflict increases, so does the prospect that one or more parties will object to

⁸⁰Ernst B. Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict: 1945-1984,” in UNITAR, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 18.

⁸¹ Azzina Nwafor, *United Nations Use of Armed Force in Internal War Conditions for the Maintenance of International Stability* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1970) p. 47.

⁸² Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 77.

⁸³ Sally Morphet, “UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations*, 2nd edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 239.

the cease-fire and the provisions for the deployment of the peacekeeping forces.⁸⁴ In contrast, the conflict between states often involves two countries and hence negotiations can be run more smoothly, and any agreements reached on peacekeeping deployment are usually honoured.

The Conduct of the Host State, the Principal Protagonists and Third Party States:

The full cooperation of the principal parties must be present for a peacekeeping mission to get off on the right footing. The initial agreement of all the warring parties is a prerequisite for a traditional peacekeeping. As Wainhouse argued “where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain.”⁸⁵ Sustaining the cooperation between the parties and the peacekeepers involves several aspects. The protagonists should observe the cease-fire violation by not attacking the other party, as well as the peacekeeping forces. The conflicting parties should also help the peacekeepers keep the peace by not only refraining from engaging in hostile activities but also in helping them with the necessary information and logistics.

Sub-national actors are also important players that can influence the overall success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. Sub-national actors may in some cases actually control larger geographic areas than does the recognized government. Sub-national groups that have as their objective the overthrow of the extant government may view peacekeeping as hostile to their interests. Unlike third party states, however, sub-national actors affect peacekeeping operations principally by direct actions of support or opposition. Their full cooperation could be crucial in fostering a minimum level of violence in the area of deployment.

Civil conflicts pose inherent difficulties for peacekeeping forces especially if sub-national groups do not support their presence, and in any case such support is likely to dissipate

⁸⁴ Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 78.

⁸⁵ David Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966) p. 577.

over time. In many instances, sub-national groups become hostile towards the UN forces and attack the peacekeepers whom they now perceive as inimical to their interests and objectives.

The behaviour of third party states, though often ignored when putting together a peacekeeping force, appears to be of crucial importance in whether an operation would be successful or not.⁸⁶ If a regional power broker in the area of deployment is vigorously opposed to the operation or threatens it by dealing with one of the principal disputants, then that operation is destined to experience problems.

Third party states can effect a peacekeeping mission in several ways. First, they can intervene in the conflict directly and hence undermine the peacekeeping operation in a negative way. Most often that does not happen. What is so common, however, is for third party states to provide arms and in some cases even personnel to one of the sub-national actors that are deeply involved in a conflict. These third party states also bring diplomatic pressure to bear on a sub-national actor it supports; that diplomatic pressure is to make the sub-national actor either to support or oppose the peacekeeping presence.⁸⁷ The behaviour of third states can, therefore, either make or break a peacekeeping operation. If a major regional power is energetically opposed to a peacekeeping mission in its area of influence or more directly if it can pull the strings of one of the primary disputants, then that operation is likely to be imperilled.⁸⁸

It appears that a sustained cooperation of the host state and the principal protagonists may be a necessary but not a *sine qua non* condition for the success of a peacekeeping

⁸⁶ Brian Urquhart, "Peacekeeping: A View from the Operational Center," in Henry Wiseman, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 161-74.

⁸⁷ Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping in Civil Wars," in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., *A Crisis of Expectation: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) p. 230.

⁸⁸ Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 84.

operation.⁸⁹ Cooperation with the host state in and of itself may mean very little if the host government is a weak one or only a minor player in the conflict that plagues its own state. A more crucial role might be played by a third state that holds a large stake in the ongoing conflict. This third state is usually a neighbouring state that has a definite role in the conflict itself, and wants to achieve certain goals that are crucial to its national interests. It is the cooperation of these third party states that might hold the trump card for the success of a peacekeeping operation.

Regional Organizations:

The role played by regional organizations in ameliorating conflicts is a crucial one. The UN Charter has long recognized the pivotal role that such bodies can play in minimizing conflicts that erupt in their region. A role for regional organizations has been envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter, which broadly gives it the role of mediation between neighbouring countries. Article 53 specifically stipulates that “the Security Council will where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” The regional organizations, however, do not have a mandate to engage in enforcement measures without the prior authorization of the UN.

Regional organizations may have unique advantages over UN operations. These advantages include greater consensus in the organization, broader support from the protagonists and a better control over third party states. The greater consensus that one may expect from regional organizations stems from the fact that regional bodies unlike the UN have a membership that is more homogeneous.⁹⁰ States in the same regional body have, in most instances, similar political outlooks flowing from their shared regional problems. Thus, this commonalties and bonds would yield consensus that will pave the way for the authorization of a peacekeeping force.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 81.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 123

In reality, however, regional organizations have authorized few peacekeeping operations. There are often great splits between member states on what to do in regional conflicts. The member states tends to favour one or the other of the conflicting parties depending on where their loyalties lie or what their interests are. The expectation that they would be greater consensus in regional organizations in matters of regional security and peacekeeping is, according to Diehl, not borne out by the available evidence.⁹¹

A possible advantage of regional peacekeeping operations is that they may get greater support from the disputants and local population than would be the case in UN operations.⁹² The local disputants will not see their involvement as outside intervention. The disputants may see the actions of regional organizations as more genuine and legitimate and hence they may be more accepting of the deals they strike with such bodies. Regional organizations, however, have to reach sufficient consensus to authorize the mission in order to give the operation a sense of legitimacy. Concomitantly, the regional organization and its peacekeepers have to be seen as honest brokers in the conflict. If their impartiality and neutrality in the conflict is tainted then the regional peacekeepers will lose their trust with one or more of the disputants and in the process undercut one of their main advantages.

Another possible advantage is the fact that regional organizations are better at accommodating interested third parties.⁹³ This is because third party countries are assured of participating in any regional talks whereas that may not be the case if the UN undertakes the peacekeeping role. By incorporating the third parties, regional organization overcome the main hurdle faced by most UN peacekeeping operations which is the absence of support from a major neighbouring country who is backing one of the

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.* p. 124.

⁹³ *Ibid.* pp. 125-6.

conflicting parties.⁹⁴ However, even in a regional setting this advantage is by no means guaranteed. But where such third party support exists, it is a major benefit of having regional organizations tackle regional conflicts before the UN steps in.

Just as there are advantages in having a regional organization tackle a conflict, there are certain drawbacks associated with regional peacekeeping. Some of these include possible difficulties with resources, organization and neutrality or impartiality.

In a regional group setting the problem of resources may be magnified, as there is a fewer number of states to draw upon for contribution. Thus, an organization with a small number of states may find the resource contribution required quite taxing.⁹⁵ Even richer organizations like the EC or WEU found burdensome in contributing and financing the Yugoslav conflict.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORIZATION:

These factors relate to the authorization of the mission. The outlined provisions of the operation inherently sets limits for a peacekeeping mission. The scope and clarity of the mandate may lead to problems if the scope is limited or the terms vague. The financial stability of a mission, right from the start-up phase to its conclusion, is an important aspect that can have enormous impact on a peacekeeping operation. Another factor to consider is how timely the authorization of the mission is. Was it put up together immediately after a peacekeeping need has been identified or has it taken the UN a long time in recognizing such a need. All these factors which are part of the characteristics of authorization can have a restricting impact on a peacekeeping operation.

Mandate

The mandate of a peacekeeping operation defines its mission and sets out the objectives it has to achieve. The chief aspects of the mandate are its limpidity and specificity.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 126

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 126

Limpidity refers to how precisely the purposes and actions of the force are spelled out. Specificity on the other hand deals with the amount of detail provided as to the how and where of those duties.⁹⁶ According to Mackinlay clear and detailed mandates are necessary for the success of a mission. Goulding points out that one of the key factors for the success of an operation is that “the mandate or task of the peacekeeping operation must be clear [and] practicable.”⁹⁷ Urquhart also argues that a detailed and feasible mandate is essential for the success of an operation.⁹⁸ Diehl also attaches some importance to this factor although he downplays its importance arguing that the process through which mandates are derived in any case ensures a certain level of ambiguity.⁹⁹ In a similar vein Durch argues that “an ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make a straightforward mission difficult, or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world cannot make an impossible mission more feasible. It merely paints the impossible task in high-contrast colours.”¹⁰⁰

The mandate may influence the success of peacekeeping in several ways. First, a precise and exact mandate sets the expectation of the actors involved, probably reflecting a solid consensus among the warring parties and the authorizing body on what a peacekeeping force will perform in the area of deployment.¹⁰¹ There is less chance of disagreement among the protagonists when the mandate is clear. The chance of the warring factions

⁹⁶Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 72.

⁹⁷ Murrack Goulding, “Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without Major Changes,” in *Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1993), p. 101.

⁹⁸ Brian Urquhart, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and How Their Role Might Be Enhanced,” in UNITAR, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 258.

⁹⁹ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 74-5.

¹⁰⁰ William J. Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context,” in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 26

¹⁰¹ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p.72

withdrawing their support for the operation or subjecting the peacekeeping forces to attacks are reduced if the mandate is clear.

Second, an explicit and transparent mandate helps ensure public support for the peacekeeping mission, and this is especially critical in democracies.¹⁰² In order to get the domestic public opinion behind the peacekeeping mission, the force must have clearly identifiable objectives. The lack of a clear mandate may make the public apprehensive about sending their troops to do duties that may potentially involve them in a conflict.

Clear and detailed mandates assist in the implementation of a successful peacekeeping operation. Vague mandates may be subject to various interpretations by the different parties that have an interest in the deployment of the peacekeeping force. More often than not, clear mandates suggest a strong political consensus underpinning the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. However, the majority of the mandates are vague because of the necessity to craft a resolution that will appeal to the majority of the members of the UN.¹⁰³ It is the majority of the members that would eventually have to pass the resolution. Hence a clear and detailed mandate is very important in successfully carrying out a peacekeeping operation.

Financing:

Marrack Goulding, former chief of the UN's peacekeeping department, has in describing the factors that are very important to the success of a peacekeeping operation pointed out that "the member states of the United Nations must be ready to provide the human and material resources needed to do the job."¹⁰⁴ Urquhart noted that a sound financial backing is a necessary requirement for the success of a peacekeeping operation.¹⁰⁵ Durch as well

¹⁰² Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 73

¹⁰³ William J. Durch, "Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 26

¹⁰⁴ Marrack Goulding, "Current Rapid Expansion Unsustainable Without Major Changes," p. 101.

argued that, “it takes money to keep the peace,” and that currently the chronic shortage of funds has a significant impact on the efficiency and contribution of missions.¹⁰⁶ Diehl on his part noted that empirically all UN mission have generally experienced financial difficulties, and that his study found that none of the operations were adversely affected by the financial crunch they faced.¹⁰⁷ The importance of the need for an operation to be well funded from the start-up phase to its conclusion for its overall success can never be overemphasized, notwithstanding Diehl’s contrary position. It takes money and resources to get the operation going and to sustain it thereafter for the entire duration of its existence.

The financial constrains imposed on a strategic peacekeeping mission may affect it in several important ways. First, an operation may have to wrap up prematurely before it finally succeeded in stabilizing the situation or before a conflict has been resolved.¹⁰⁸ Second, its area of operation may be circumscribed or its personnel may be limited to effectively patrol and interpose between protagonists.¹⁰⁹ Finally, the Peacekeeping operation may have to do without some necessary equipment that may be essential for it to carry out its duties.¹¹⁰

The UN has managed to overcome its financial straightjacket by way of deficit spending, increased voluntary contributions and the scaling back of the magnitude of some of its operations. The operational impact that a financial constraint would have on the efficacy of a peacekeeping mission can be significant though it would not entirely cripple it.

¹⁰⁵ Urquhart, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and How Their Role Might Be Enhanced,” p.258

¹⁰⁶ William J. Durch, “Paying the Tab: Financial Crises,” in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 39

¹⁰⁷ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p.76.

¹⁰⁸ Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 76

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

The Imperative of Timing:

The conventional wisdom holds that an early mediation in a brewing conflict has a better chance of success than a conflict that is raging and full-blown. It is out of this growing realization that the UN has of late been emphasizing the wisdom and the need for preventive diplomacy. The UN has implemented its first project of preventive diplomacy in Macedonia, which was a province of Yugoslavia until its disintegration. The timing of UN intervention plays a crucial determining role in the success of a UN peacemaking operation.¹¹¹ Doyle in discussing the factors that contributed to the success and failure of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has emphasized the role a speedy intervention and forces deployment plays in the success of a mission.¹¹² A quick intervention can nip in the bud a conflict that is about to boil over.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION:

The success or failure of a peacekeeping mission might result, in part, from the organization, deployment and direction of the force. Thus the focus is on force composition and behavior, command and control issues, and the locus of deployment. These characteristics are largely within the purview of the sponsoring organization, i.e. the UN and are the factors that are mostly amenable to correcting.

Operational Characteristics:

Operational concerns are very significant in the overall success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. The operational characteristic that is of utmost concern here is the command and control issues of the operation. Emmanuel Erskine, an official with UNIFIL, refers to operational concerns as the single most important factor in the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. This characteristic can further be subdivided into issues that concern the overall command of the operation and ones that focus on command and control of the operation in the field.

¹¹¹ Christoph Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), p. 73.

¹¹² Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995) pp. 59-60.

According to Haas the overall command of the operation and especially the role played by the Secretary General can have a very significant and pivotal contribution to the success of a peacekeeping mission.¹¹³ Likewise, his lack of effort can diminish the effectiveness of an operation. Also, operations that are under the command and control of one commander would be more successful in comparison to decentralized operations whereby command resides under a joint or multiple commands.¹¹⁴

Diehl argues that “empirically, the concern with operational problems seem to be overstated or at the very least not a major factor in the success or failure of peacekeeping operations. Early peacekeeping operations such as UNEF I and ONUC saw active involvement and control by the UN Secretary General.”¹¹⁵ He further posits that “contrary to expectation, the role of the secretary-general does not seem to account for the variation in the success across operations.”¹¹⁶ However, Diehl may have been right when he stated that early peacekeeping operations such as UNEF I and ONUC were successful because of the active involvement of an activist Secretary General. He, However, missed to point out the connection between the role played by the Secretary General and the successes of those missions. In other words, if that observation he made is fully argued out and taken to its logical conclusion, the crucial connection between the role played by a Secretary General and the likelihood of a success in a peacekeeping mission becomes all too evident. Moreover, in a wide and in-depth study done by Haas the importance attached to the role of the Secretary General is heavily highlighted. In his study, Haas found out that the role played by the Secretary General and his hands-on involvement in making all the major decisions pertaining to a peacekeeping mission is highly important.

¹¹³ Ernst B. Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict: 1945-1984,” p. 22.

¹¹⁴ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 68.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Location of Deployment:

According to Diehl the geography factor of a peacekeeping operation is highly important to the overall success of a peacekeeping mission. Kjelsbaek also noted the importance of location of deployment. Geographical terrain as well as population density can have an impact on the success of a given mission. The geographical area in which a peacekeeping operation is to be deployed is a contextual variable. This is a variable which is given and about which almost nothing can be done about. However, the locus of deployment can be affected by the authorizing agent: the size of the buffer zone, the area of patrol and the number of observation posts can all be influenced by the authorizing agency. Thus the authorizing agency can affect the locus of deployment in such a way as to improve its chances of success.

Usually, the larger the area of deployment the more difficult it will be for the peacekeeping force to achieve its objective.¹¹⁷ The terrain of a region can affect an operation: in a desert or flat area with little vegetation, it is easier to detect violations of cease-fire while it is enormously impossible to detect hostile activity in a mountainous or densely forested area or a built-up area.

Like the terrain of an area, the population density of a region plays an important role in making the cease-fire observation easy or difficult. An area with a low population density is much easier to supervise for cease-fire violations because the peacekeepers would be in a better position to monitor the movement of individuals.¹¹⁸ The opposite is true for heavily populated areas; the monitoring of individuals and the detection of the flow of arms is much harder.

¹¹⁷ Kjell Skjelsbaek, "UN Peacekeeping: Expectations, Limitations and Results- Forty Years of Mixed Experience," in Indarjit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds., *The United Nations and Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's press, 1991), pp. 52-67

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The peacekeeping forces must also interpose between the belligerent groups and create a buffer zone. By creating a buffer zone, the peacekeepers would minimize friction between the parties that could escalate into a full resumption of hostilities.

There is also a need to deploy peacekeeping troops in such a posture that is least vulnerable to attacks from any of the parties. Moreover, one of the parties may find it in its interest to severely harm the peacekeepers so that they are withdrawn. To forestall that, the peacekeepers have to be cognizant of the hostile area in which they are and assume a defensive posture.

In all, the locus of deployment is an important though not a crucial factor in the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. To enhance the chances of a successful peacekeeping, the peacekeeping forces should be deployed at an invulnerable position, yet a position that is easy to patrol while keeping the combatants physically apart.

Each of the above points discussed are important to the success of a UN peacemaking mission though incontrovertibly the most crucial single element that will generally account for its successful completion is the political will shown by the member nations - and especially the Permanent Five - to stay the course.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY METHOD

One of the goals of this thesis is to identify empirical generalizations about strategic peacekeeping operations and thereby draw general conclusions about when a particular UN peacekeeping mission has a greater chance of success. The conventional way to achieve this goal is to draw on previous strategic peacekeeping operations and look for common patterns across cases. In addition to the difficulty of attributing success or failure directly to a UN strategic peacekeeping mission, there is the serious problem for the research design of few cases on which to base my generalizations and the relatively large number of variables to analyze.

Since the UN inception as an international organization there have only been a few operations that can truly be defined as strategic peacekeeping missions (indeed, both the Congo mission and Bosnian operation were initially conceived as peacekeeping operations but the contextual circumstances in which they were thrust upon had necessitated a change in direction), hardly a broad base from which to derive generalizations. The inherent risk in a small-N study with many variables is that conclusions drawn may largely depend on one or two particular variables.¹¹⁹ One can hardly be certain that the key factor in question will be repeated in the future, or more importantly, that the effect of that particular factor will be the same.

Several strategies can be utilized to overcome the difficulties of studying only a few cases. One method is to increase the number of cases in the study.¹²⁰ This approach is more successful in studies that are able to generate a sample from a fairly large population; in those instances, one can increase the sample size to get a better and more reliable analysis. In studying strategic peacekeeping operations, the size of the population is very small, and one cannot widen the time frame (we are limited to only UN operations) or identify more cases.

Unable to increase the number of cases, I am left with a comparative case study strategy, focussing on a small number of cases. Within these bounds, it is nevertheless possible to address the problems I face. First, I limited the number of variables thought to be important by combining them in some common configuration¹²¹; I limit them to those identified by scholars and practitioners as pertinent to the overall success of strategic peacekeeping. In this case, more variables were identified by the practitioners in cases of

¹¹⁹ David Collier, "The Comparative Method," in *Political Science: The State Of The Discipline II*, (ed.) Ada W. Finiter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993) p. 105.

¹²⁰ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 65, 1971.p. 686.

peacekeeping, though the factors they pointed in the success of ONUC (the Congo Operation) have been given particular consideration in this study. The practitioners referred to the Congo mission as more or less a traditional peacekeeping when it truly does not meet that definition in today's discourse about UN military involvement in conflicts. In the typology that I outlined above, I pointed out that ONUC operation met the definition of a strategic peacekeeping operation. I further aggregated these factors into three categories (attributes of authorization, operational characteristics and the politico-military context) to facilitate more broadly drawn generalizations, rather than relying on slight variations on a single factor or single case deviations on that factor. More crucially, I selected cases to ensure both that the cases are comparable and that they vary according to the factors of interest to my study.¹²² This strengthens the ability to draw generalizations because of the comparability and makes clear conclusions more likely because of the variability.

My evaluation of strategic peacekeeping success and failure focus on two operations: ONUC in the Congo or UNPROFOR in Bosnia. A number of principles guided the selection of the two cases. On one level, they share similarities that facilitate meaningful comparisons. Both can be considered peacemaking missions that involved the deployment of UN forces in internal combat zones. They were also deployed without explicit consent from some of the parties involved. Thus, I will look only at those operations that meet the conceptual definition of a strategic peacekeeping mission. Moreover, I will look only at operations deployed before a resolution to the dispute was achieved.

The sample has a number of features that make it suitable for drawing generalizations about strategic peacekeeping. First, the two cases vary according to the variables (as outlined above) thought to influence the success or failure of a strategic peacekeeping

¹²¹ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," p. 687.

¹²² Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, vol. 2, 1985.p. 25.

operation¹²³. Second, the sample permits a comparison of international intervention in two different international politics contexts: the Cold War and the post Cold War world. The sample includes operations sent into areas wrecked by intra-state conflicts, in the form of civil wars and secession.

In this case, I will compare outcomes (results) in the two comparative cases and relate the occurrence of differing outcomes to the presence of differing initial conditions.¹²⁴ I will therefore be arguing that the difference in outcome between the Congo and the Bosnian situations despite their numerous similarities can be related (ascribed) to the presence or absence of the Cold War. Active US involvement in the Congo (and in the process an active and energetic UN presence in the Congo) reflected US Cold War concerns while Bosnia's situation was 'negatively' affected by the end of the Cold War (the US, the only remaining superpower, was less inclined to intervene).

The 'with-in case' process-tracing method will also be used in this comparative study in order to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions were translated into outcomes.¹²⁵ In explaining the how the initial variables are translated into outcomes, I will assemble bits and parts of the evidence that I gathered in research to form a pattern.¹²⁶ In that regard, I will be looking at the UN as an organization, and its involvement in the Congo and Bosnian civil/international wars.

Independent or exogenous variables provide points of 'convergence' between the two cases. These shared variables that are found in both cases show there is a basis for comparison between the Congo crisis and the Bosnian situation and how the UN

¹²³ Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," p. 25.

¹²⁴ Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," p. 25

¹²⁵ Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," p. 35.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

behaved/acted in each conflict. These shared variables include: location of deployment, the role played by the Secretary General and the quality of UN military leadership, nature and kind of dispute, the conduct of the host state, the principal protagonists and third party states, UN mandates, resources and logistics and finally, the timing imperative.

There is a factor that was not attendant in the Congo's case but was present in Bosnia's conflict, and that is the role played by regional organizations. There was no formally constituted regional organization on the African continent when the Congo crisis erupted and therefore no role was played by a regional organization. However, in the case of Bosnia there was a multitude of regional organizations that got involved in the crisis. The 'with-in case' congruence procedure will also be used in the case of this variable to assess if its presence in Bosnia's situation (or absence in the case of the Congo) accounts for, or contributed to, the lack of success.

With only two cases, there may be some questions raised as to the generalizability of any conclusions made. There is no guarantee that future instances of peacemaking will necessarily resemble past operations; yet there is a tendency by the United Nations and other organizations (be they regional organizations or others) to rely on past procedures, practices and precedents in conducting activities. The small number of cases is an inescapable restriction, given the rare use of strategic peacekeeping in international politics. With the great number of similarities between the Congo of the 1960s and the Bosnia of 1990s one is inclined to expect, if past experience is anything to go by, that the UN would have reacted in the same way as it did in the Congo. That is the expectation from the theory. However, the observed independent variables (Cold War/post Cold War) could be hypothesized as being responsible for the observed difference in outcome.

CASE SELECTION

The Congo conflict is regarded by many as the first military operation that was wholly undertaken by the United Nations. In all the previous cases the peace-enforcement or quasi-enforcement operations were only UN authorized but conducted entirely under the

authority of a powerful country like the US. It is due to that reason that the Korean operation can hardly be considered a UN operation. Though the ONUC operation in the Congo began as a peacekeeping mission, it soon escalated into a strategic peacekeeping operation. Hence the first UN peacekeeping operation in Africa has the distinction of being the first strategic peacekeeping mission. The combination of factors (parameters/variables) that made possible the undertaking of that strategic peacekeeping operation can be traced to the Cold War era.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia, on the hand, came soon after the embers of the Cold War turned into ashes. The UN's strategic peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia were seen as the pivotal test case for the organization. Many believed that the end of the Cold War would usher in a period of increased relevance for the UN and a period in which the UN would forcefully intervene in cases like Bosnia. That, however, was never to be the case.

SIMILARITIES:

Both the Congo of early 1960s and the Bosnian State of today can be classified as failed states. The reason for their failure, however, can be traced to different factors. The Congo State was not ready or well prepared to attain independence. That combined with the desire of the Belgians to give nominal independence to the Congolese while real power reside in Brussels did not sit well with some of the nationalist Congolese leaders. Bosnia, on the other hand, was born out of the political and nationalist upheavals that visited upon Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The Bosnian state was stillborn as it was never given a chance to attain its full sovereignty as Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats each decided to form their own breakaway republics.

The similarity is further reflected in the UN invocation of its Charter in order to deal with the crisis. In both cases the UN Secretaries General had invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter which essentially gives him the power to "bring to the attention of the Security

Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Thereafter, UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in each case.

DIFFERENCES:

The time in which each of these conflicts happened differ radically. The difference is not just only one of years (or eras) but more importantly the difference in international political climate. The Congo crisis happened in the Cold War era when both superpowers had antagonistic relationship. The Yugoslavian crisis on the other hand happened when the Cold War had ended and a new era of friendlier relationship between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States was witnessed. More importantly, the post Cold War era has ushered in what has been referred to by some scholars as the ‘unipolar moment.’ The Soviet Union has ceased to be a superpower, and the United States is the sole surviving superpower from the Cold War era.

Despite the shared similarities the UN action towards each of the conflicts was quite different. In the case of the Congo the UN’s decision was to keep it united, while in Yugoslavia its aim was just the opposite; every former republic that asked for self-determination and recognition was granted statehood and a UN membership. In the Congo order was restored by essentially enforcing peace even against great odds and hostility, while in Bosnia UN inaction led to a massive human tragedy.

The thesis will deal only with the time period in which the UN troops were deployed in the zone of conflict. In the case of the Congo the period under consideration is from 1960-4. Events that happened subsequent to the UN forces’ departure would not be considered in assessing the success of the Congo operation.

In Bosnia’s case, the time period that is focused on begins with the deployment of the UN forces (June, 1992) till the end of 1994. The first two and half years of Bosnia’s UN

mission set the tone for the operation, and nothing that had happened since then significantly changed the basic inferences (observations) that this study makes.

CONCLUSION:

Peacekeeping and peacemaking have become a growth industry for the UN in the early 1990s. Within a brief period of about three years the UN organization has set up more peacekeeping operations than the previous 45 years of its existence. The end of the cold war has clearly made these conflicts ripe for resolution through a peacekeeping modality. Most of the conflicting parties have lost their superpower sponsorship and that made it possible for the UN to intervene. These conflicting parties were in certain cases also pressured by their erstwhile sponsors to seek an end to their conflict through peaceful means.

The missions undertaken by the UN were also different in scope from what the organization undertook in the cold war period. The new operations were multifaceted in scope and require more resources and sophistication to undertake them. It was not just interposing between enemy troops in two countries anymore. Most of the new operations were intrastate and the objectives of the new operations were multidimensional, varying from enforcing cease-fires, providing humanitarian aid to victims in a conflict, supervising elections to nation building of failed states.

Because of all these new activities that is incorporated with the new peacekeeping, it has become almost impossible to define what a peacekeeping mission is. All attempts to define peacekeeping precisely have been bedeviled by the peculiar nature of the beast. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the Charter, it has never been guided by established theory or doctrine, the term was invented long after praxis had begun and creative improvisation has characterized its evolution ever since.

The peacekeeping missions of the UN are generally regarded to be given a legal authority by the broad mandate of the UN to preserve and re-establish peace and security.

However, there is an uncertainty about how to classify peacekeeping under the Charter given that it is a tool that was improvised and put into operation well after the UN Charter was drafted. The lack of precise legal authority did not stop the UN and its members from using peacekeeping as a tool of conflict management.

There are several factors that would be considered to see how they have contributed to the success or failure of the peacekeeping missions in the Congo and the former Yugoslavia. However, of all the factors considered, the most crucial in the success of a peacekeeping mission is the political will shown by the Superpowers and the other major powers. If a strong political will is present and the major powers feel that their interest is at stake then that operation would have a higher chance of success. The cooperation of third parties that are close to the conflict is helpful in the success of a mission. If a powerful neighbour that is backing one of the belligerent parties opposes the peacekeeping operation then that would complicate the mission and reduce the chances of its success. The attitude of the local parties can also greatly affect the success of a peacekeeping mission. When the local parties are willing to respect and honour the agreements they reach with the peacekeepers then there is good chance that the mission would be a success.

All the other factors considered might hamper or interfere with the efficiency of the peacekeeping operation but would not thwart or cripple the mission. These factors include the drafting of a precise mandate, the financial resources allocated for the operation, the role played by regional organizations, the command and control aspects of the mission and the question relating to the timing of the operation. These factors individually may damage the efficiency or credibility of the mission. However, when most of these factors, in combination with the critical factors, are absent in a single mission then that mission may be fatally wounded or totally doomed.

The previous optimism of the early years of the post Cold War is already being tempered by reality; this may be a new era but it is still the same old world that was defined more by disorder than order. And that even in this new era power politics and national interest

calculations are still paramount in the decision making process of the major powers in considering when and where to intervene. That the US was instrumental in seeing the successful conclusion of the Congo crisis of some thirty odd years, and that the same dominant power is content to sit out of Balkan inferno, can only be explained by the changed nature of post Cold War international politics.

Chapter Two

UN Strategic Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-64

*Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,
mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
W.B. Yeats: 'The Second Coming.'*

Introduction:

The Congo, first brought to the West's attention through the literary exploits of Joseph Conrad's *'Heart of Darkness'*, came to preoccupy the United Nations agenda for four years as the organization mobilized what had until recently been the UN's largest peacekeeping/peacemaking operation. Torn by civil strife, threatened by foreign intervention and destabilized by political uncertainty, in its early days of independence the Congo became the centre stage of international power bloc rivalry. To stop this powerful mix of events from turning into a face to face confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations moved in with a peacekeeping force. However, the sudden turn of events within the Congo made the UN force engage in a peacemaking mission.

This chapter will deal with the first peacemaking operation that was undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. The first section of the chapter will give a brief exegesis of the historical context in which the operation took place. This will be followed with a recounting of the UN intervention and a chronology of the main events that shaped and characterized the peacemaking operation. The next sub-section will deal with the main external players of the Congo crisis, and how each of those countries affected the UN operation. The main section of the chapter will deal with the various causes that determined the events and the factors that accounted for the efficacy of the operation. It

is, in the final analysis, these factors that made the operation a success. To validate the main point that the Cold War was the driving force of the operation, a comparative observation of the present situation in the Congo is made in the concluding section.

The Congo Crisis and UN Intervention: A Background Report

It is imperative at this point to reflect on the historical background to the UN intervention not only as a logical departure point but more so to appreciate the conditions that necessitated the organization's involvement. Furthermore such a general description of atmospherics will shed light on the difficult circumstances this operation had to operate within.

The modern state of Congo was born out of a process that was diplomatically sanctioned by the Berlin conference of 1885 when the major powers of the day met to divide up Africa into spheres of control and domination. The Congo Free State was a fiefdom of Leopold II, the Belgian king, until he transferred its control to the Belgian government in 1908. In January 1959 riots broke out in Leopoldville, the capital city on the Lower Congo River, and in Stanleyville in November. The unrest led Belgium to a Round Table Conference on the Congo in Brussels in January 1960, where a four-year timetable for complete independence was proposed. The invited Congolese leaders instead negotiated for a six month timetable in which to gain full independence. The Belgians acceded to this demand with the view that the Congo, lacking in technically trained personnel, would still need their services, and thus preserve Belgian economic interests. In March of 1960, an Executive College of six Congolese political leaders, including Joseph Kasavubu, Patrice Lumumba, and Moise Tsonbe was formed to advise the colony's Governor-General, serve as a transitional regime, and draft a constitution.

As a prelude to independence, elections to provincial assemblies and a national parliament were held in late May 1960 by “universal male suffrage”. Lumumba’s *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) won majorities in both houses and thereafter he was invited by the king of Belgium to form a government. Parliament elected the Head of State, choosing Kasavubu. Tshombe, who won a slim majority of seats in Katanga’s provincial assembly, was elected provincial president. With those elections completed the stage was set for the three protagonists who were to play critical roles in the drama of the Congo crisis.

Just a day after independence, tribal clashes were reported. As the government was preparing for ways to deal with that something more ominous was brewing: its own forces mutinied. The recruits were usually kept at junior levels and were never trained or given an opportunity to advance in the ranks. Thus the mutineers main demand was the removal of Belgian officers and immediate promotions. There was a mass uprising against the Belgian presence. Premier Lumumba at first sought to force the soldiers to obey the orders of their superiors but after they seized Leopoldville, he had to give in to their demand and order the dismissal of all Belgian officers.¹ The disorder soon spread throughout the Congo. The Belgian Commander of the Congolese Army, General Emil Janssens, stepped down and his position was taken over by General Victor Lindula, who was promoted from a Sergeant Major position.

It was in this confused state and bedlam that the Belgium government parachuted in thousands of its soldiers from Belgium. The Belgium army began to occupy towns and strategic points rendering the whole exercise of independence of the Congo as nothing but a charade.² In a span of a few weeks over ten thousand Belgian troops were in the

¹ Howard M. Epstein, *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64* (New York: Facts on File, inc., 1965) p. 9

country. The excuse for its intervention was to restore law and order but a force of such strength must have had some hidden intentions, namely reoccupying the Congo.

The already fluid situation was further compounded by Moïse Tshombé's decision to announce the secession of Katanga from the rest of the Congo on July 11, 1960. It was no secret that the Belgians encouraged, aided and indeed abetted Tshombé's move of secession. A large number of Belgian troops swiftly moved to key towns and areas of the province. To entrench himself, Tshombé began an elaborate task of forming a strong army. Belgian economic interest in the province was best symbolized by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, which virtually owned the province.³ This company, whose interest was best served by the secessionists, pumped in the required cash to sustain Tshombé's fledgling 'state'.⁴

This state of affairs compelled Lumumba and Kasavubu to ask for external help, first from the United States and then from the United Nations. In their appeal, it is important to note that they specifically singled out the external dimension of the problem as the Belgium aggression. In their telegraph to the UN Secretary General, both Congolese leaders stated that "the essential purpose of their requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."⁵

²*The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1985), p. 218.

³French and British business concerns also owned a substantial share in the Union Minière conglomerate and that lobby was to a large extent influence the two governments decisions on policies pertaining to the Congo.

⁴Anthony Verrier, *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World* (Hamansworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 43.

⁵Burns and Heathcote, *Peacekeeping by UN Forces* (London: The Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 23.

The UN, and especially its Secretary General who was acquainted with the daunting task that awaited the colonized people of Africa, moved swiftly and responded positively to the Congolese plea. By invoking Article 99 he brought the issue to the world's attention. In the first of what was to become a litany of resolutions, the Security Council adopted a Tunisian brokered draft. It mainly dealt with the two issues that, in Hammarskjold's estimate, seemed to foment the crisis: the presence of the Belgian troops and the inability of the central government to maintain law and order. On the first account it unequivocally called for the withdrawal of the Belgium forces while on the second it authorized the Secretary General "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary..."⁶

It is important, however, to understand the assent the UN got from the major (super) powers within its membership. The period of the early sixties were marked by an emerging and dangerous rivalry that pitted the United States against the Soviet Union, the West against the East. This Cold War rivalry staged both in the European theater and other areas around the globe mainly took the form of conflicting ideologies. However, several times that rivalry come perilously close to exploding into a full fledged war, a prospect that was made more ominous by the possession of nuclear bombs by both superpowers. The Congo, rich in mineral wealth, was crucial for Western commerce. The Soviets, on the other hand, coveted it as an invaluable prize to be won where a beachhead for communist expansion into the center of Africa could be established.⁷

⁶Burns and Heathcote, *peacekeeping by the UN Forces*, p. 29

⁷Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation* (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 13.

UN Intervention: A Chronology of Events

The 14 July 1960 Security Council resolution formed the legal basis for establishing the United Nations forces in the Congo. The resolution “authorize[d] the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary ...”. With such a vague mandate in hand Hammarskjold immediately proceeded to provide some concreteness to the idea by setting up a United Nations force. In fleshing out the details of the proposed force the Secretary General made certain observations that were to be his guiding principles. He noted that the UN force would be a “temporary security force” in the Congo and would be there only with the Congolese consent. More controversially he asserted that though “it may be regarded as serving as an arm of the Government for the maintenance of order and protection of life, the UN force was to be under the UN control and would not become a party to the internal conflict.” The Security Council members were also to be excluded from contributing any forces for the operation. Furthermore in line with traditional peacekeeping mission “UN troops would employ force only in self-defense. Any initiative in the use of force was prohibited.” This however, was never observed, as traditional peacekeeping conditions never existed in the Congo.⁸ After the adoption of the UN resolution Hammarskjold requested certain African and European nations to provide troop contingents to the mission. The response was excellent. Within twenty-four hours the first troops for the UN arrived in the Congo. This included contingents from Ghana and Tunisia. A month later the troop strength stood at 14,000 strong and hailed from twenty four states.⁹

With two major peacekeeping objectives-to restore and maintain law and order and to prevent unilateral intervention- and with two major non-security objectives- to restore

⁸David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support-Experiences and Prospects* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 269.

⁹Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 25.

economic viability and political stability- the UN effort was launched. With time these objectives were extended to include the prevention of civil war, the control and pacification of tribal conflicts, and the maintenance of national unity and territorial integrity. The Congo crisis had an external as well as an internal dimension. The crisis involved many political actors-nationalist and secessionist politicians, external powers such as Belgium, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and various African and other Third World countries and multilateral agencies such as the United Nations. All these divergent actors stalked the Congo's political landscape.¹⁰ In addition, these actors tended to be non-unitary and often changed their positions; and the Congolese and the Belgian governments in particular suffered from frequent internal divisions. UN intervention was almost wrecked by this complexity.

The original Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, and the two succeeding Council resolutions during the Lumumba government, July 22 and August 9, 1960, were notably supported by the US, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Poland and Tunisia. The July 14 resolution was only supplemented but never superseded by the subsequent resolutions. The importance of the July 22 resolution was its two pronged strategy of adopting to the radical Afro-Asian Council demand of "immediate" withdrawal of the Belgian forces and its requesting all states to "refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence" of the Congo. This part of the resolution applied to Belgium as well as the Soviet Union, which was trying to deliver arms to the Lumumba regime.

The August 9 1960 resolution, for the first time, specifically addressed the Katanga problem. The resolution called on Belgium to "withdraw immediately its troops " from

¹⁰Collins Carole J.L., The Cold War comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 47 (no. 1, Summer 1993), p.249.

Katanga and declared that "the entry of the United Nations Force" into Katanga was "necessary." In affirming its entry into Katanga the UN contradicted its stance that its forces would not "in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."¹¹ The very presence of the UN forces and their condition for involvement was motivated by the need to restore order, and in the process also to keep the Congo united.

Lumumba, Kasavubu and other Congolese nationalist leaders were divided by competing personal ambitions, ethnic loyalties and political ideologies that shaped their divergent views of the UN mediation effort. Initially both Congolese leaders requested for UN intervention though Lumumba had a different idea from Kasavubu of what that meant: Lumumba sought the UN assistance to help his forces preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congo. But after the UN refused to place its forces under the central authority command, Lumumba seemed to have gravitated to the East to accomplish his goal.¹² Lumumba's disappointment further intensified in August 1960, when the Secretary General ignored him and flew to Katanga to negotiate directly with the secessionist leader, Tshombe.

Events turned for the worse when there was a severe split between the members of the central government. The President, invoking his constitutional authority, dismissed his popular Prime Minister, Lumumba. The Prime Minister in turn returned the compliment by dismissing Kasavubu, the President, from his post and annulling his first pronouncement. Then the president named Joseph Ileo as the Prime Minister and asked

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²July 15, a day after the creation of ONUC, both Lumumba and Kasavubu wired Premier Khrushchev that "we may have to ask the Soviet Union's intervention, should the Western camp not stop its aggression." The Soviet Premier relishing such an opportunity replied that his government "will not shrink from resolute measures to curb aggression." (Zacher Mark W., *Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations*. Columbia University Press. New York, 1970. p. 155)

him to form a new government. On September 7 1960, the national Chamber of Deputies voted to invalidate the dismissals of both the president and the Prime Minister and on the next day overwhelmingly voted in its continued confidence in Lumumba. The president, however, ignored the legislators and on September 10 Ileo accepted the appointment for the prime ministership. In an unprecedented move the Secretary General's representative in Leopoldville, Cordier, closed down the airport to all traffic and he also shut down the radio station.¹³ These actions were carried out by Cordier mainly to thwart any possible Soviet support for Lumumba.¹⁴ The airports were also closed to prevent Soviet IL-14 planes from transporting Lumumba controlled troops to Leopoldville and other strategic strongholds. The Cordier intervention was clearly designed to promote Kasavubu's interests over Lumumba's.¹⁵ Closing down the radio station had the effect of nullifying Lumumba's last desperate effort to mobilize popular support. In this constitutional confusion Joseph Mobutu moved in to fill the political vacuum that existed. On September 14 he announced that the military had taken over control and that it had suspended Kasavubu, Lumumba and Ileo from holding any political office for the rest of the year. To win the trust of the West, Mobutu ordered the Soviet and Czechoslovakia embassies out of the country.

¹³ For Cordier, impartiality was a negative trait and having disdain for communism was a virtue. On communism, he had this to say: "I know that their fundamental aim is one of destruction of Western civilization." On Lumumba's tactics: "he has been playing a game of bilateral competition and has therefore opened the door quite wide to Soviet influence in the Congo." He does not mince his words to show his ideological bias, "One of the extraordinary features of their [Soviet] tactics is the feverish support that they give to people like Castro and Lumumba, persons who are themselves destroyers and who therefore not only become the symbols of Russian influence abroad but the outposts of their effort." (Collins Carole J.L., *The Cold War Comes to Africa*, *Journal of International Affairs*, p. 254).

¹⁴To counter the American presence, the Soviets, in August 1960, demonstrated their support for Lumumba by providing about a hundred technicians with transport aircraft, trucks, and a variety of high powered weapons. With this military assistance Lumumba was able to rally his supporters among the ANC rebels for a projected assault on Bakwanga and Katanga.(Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy towards Africa since 1960*, p.37)

¹⁵Jackson F. Henry, *From the Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy towards Africa since 1960* (New York: William Morrow Co., Inc., 1982), p. 37

The UN sidestepped the chaos of authority in the Congo by recognizing the legitimacy of Kasavubu, the President, whose office, according to Hammarskjold was not compromised by the raging conflict. This policy was also upheld by Rajeshwar Dayal, the new special representative of the Secretary General in Leopoldville, who said his mission was “to help but not intervene, to advise but not to order, to conciliate but not to take sides.”

At this point of the Congo drama it was becoming evident that the internal politics of the host state was becoming a major issue in the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union bet on Lumumba while the West bet on Kasavubu. Each bloc did whatever it could do to bolster the political strength of its ally in the Congo. Under the prevailing circumstances the Security Council failed to operate because of the casting of the veto. However, on September 17, 1960, it was decided, by a procedural vote, to transfer the Congo issue to the General Assembly. By a vote of 8-2 the motion was passed and an emergency session of the General Assembly was convened under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure.¹⁶ The US was instrumental in transferring the Congo issue to the General Assembly where it exercised its political muscle and pulled its purse strings to gain a favorable vote. The US objective of decimating the Lumumba regime crystallized into a concrete form when formal legal and international recognition was accorded to Kasavubu’s government¹⁷. This was achieved after the US, with the support of the Western states, sidestepped the eight power draft resolution and instead handed the task of selecting a Congolese delegation to the UN to the Credentials Committee. With its recommendations an affirmative nod for Kasavubu was achieved by a vote of 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions.¹⁸

¹⁶Thomas M. Franck and John Carey, *The Role of the United Nations in the Congo* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1963), p. 22.

¹⁷The Secretary General and his special representative, Dayal, both refused to recognize the Kasavubu-Mobutu government. That action also “exasperated the representatives of Western governments who, with Lumumba removed from office were eager to obtain international recognition for a regime which, if not their creature, was at least felt to be entirely satisfactory to their interests.”

¹⁸Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961* (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 262-4.

This action of recognizing what appeared to be an illegitimate government had angered even the Asian neutralists like India who thought that the Western induced UN action overstepped the international legal bounds.

Meanwhile events in the Congo were taking a sharp turn for the worse. Lumumba, who had been under house arrest for several months and in UN protection, escaped from Leopoldville in late November 1960. His main aim was to establish an alternative government, or power base from which he could return to power.¹⁹ Lumumba's lieutenant, Antoine Gizenga, had assumed the mantle of leadership in Stanleyville and as a close adherent of his 'mentor', believed in the creation of a strong unitary Congo state. His regime got a diplomatic boost when it gained recognition from the communist bloc, including China, and several of the more militant African states; the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco.²⁰ However, on his way to Stanleyville, Lumumba was captured at Kasai by forces loyal to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. The Mobutu-Kasavubu regime flew Lumumba to Katanga where he was put to death on January 17, 1961, just three days before the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration. It was the fear that the new US administration might change its course that made the authorities in Leopoldville to act impulsively.²¹

The mandate of ONUC to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo was adopted in February 1961, at a time when there were two sets of competing governmental authorities, one in Leopoldville and the other in Stanleyville, each claiming to be the legitimate government of the republic of the Congo and each with elements of the ANC

¹⁹*Ibid.* p. 301

²⁰Protesting the arrest of Lumumba the UAR, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Morocco, Mali and Guinea announced their intention to withdraw their forces from ONUC. This was to be used as a leverage against the Kasavubu government to release Lumumba. The arrest of Lumumba had from the West's point of view a negative effect as it brought the Afro-Asian bloc much closer to the Soviet position.

²¹Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*, p. 307

under its control. Furthermore, at this crucial juncture the country faced more secession than ever. However, the situation was ameliorated by August 1961, when a government of national unity acceptable to all the parties was established, except in Katanga. After the February 21 Resolution was passed Hammarskjold seemed to have formulated a legal position that he had hitherto not held. Hammarskjold gave a brief summary of what was to be done:

1. The mandate of the UN for the protection of law and order authorized it to deploy troops to protect civilians when they are threatened by tribal war or violence.
2. Paragraph A-1 of the Security Council's resolution of Feb. 21 also authorized preventive action by the UN to deal with incitement to or preparation of civil war.
3. (b) The maintenance of law and order or the prevention of civil war might justify, in certain circumstances, the closing of radio stations and airports if it was clear they were used to foment civil war or for other unlawful purposes. The legal basis for taking such measures would be strengthened when the competent authorities of the central or provincial governments had requested or approved such measures.²²

Another major objective of the UN effort was to get rid of the external elements that were exacerbating the crisis. In line with that an immediate withdrawal and evacuation of the all foreign troops and paramilitary personnel not under the UN command was ordered. The main goal was to reduce the foreign interference of the Belgians as well as to discourage any Soviet unilateral intervention.

Early 1961 tragically found the Congo split into four conflicting factions mainly centered in provincial capitals. At this time, Kasavubu had his base in Leopoldville, and he had with him a force of about 7000 troops. Likewise, Tshombe had his headquarters in Elisabethville and had a troop strength of between 5000 and 7000 troops. Gizenga in Stanleyville and Albert Kalonji in South Kasai had troop strengths of about 5500 and

²²Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold* (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 561-562.

3000, respectively.²³ Previously the main threat to national cohesion stemmed from Katanga but now it looked as if a more energetic source for disrupting the central authority came from Stanleyville. This splintering of the Congo into several ‘governments’, as expected, received attention from the US President, Kennedy, who denounced “the purported recognition of Congolese factions as so called governments.” He emphasized US support for the central government of Kasavubu as “the only legal authority” in the Congo.²⁴

With the Congo spiraling downward into a more vicious violence a necessity was seen for a more forceful action. This came in the form of a Security Council resolution passed on Feb. 21, 1961. For the first time this resolution authorized the UN to carry out armed action to facilitate the implementation of its objectives. The Afro-Asian radicals were instrumental in the drafting and passing of this resolution. It was watered down to gain acceptance from the US and, at the same time, it was strong enough for the USSR not to veto it.²⁵ The US Administration had some reservations on the language of the resolution but acquiesced and gave in to the Afro-Asians in order to gain their trust and more importantly to keep the fragile US led coalition intact.

Thereafter a national reconciliation process was initiated to stop further fracturing of the center. The US government was a prime mover of the reconciliation talks that were convened in Tananarive on 8 March, 1961. Much to the dismay of the US the Kasavubu regime, seeking a united front against Gizenga’s rebels, proposed to Tshombe the formation of a loose confederation - something the US fought against right from the

²³Ernest Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: United Nations Forces in Action* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 52.

²⁴Howard Epstein M.(ed.), *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1965), p. 80.

²⁵With the recognition of the Gizenga regime by both Sekou Toure of Guinea and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the threat stood potentially to be more powerful than the posed by even Lumumba. It’s against such a background that the Pentagon started to study a contingency plan for a limited war between the US and the Congo.(Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: US Foreign Policy towards Africa since 1960*, p. 40)

outset. The American government feared that the formation of mini-states would open the door for communist subversion. This was not a misplaced fear since the Gizenga regime was more left leaning than even the late Lumumba's. Gizenga having entrenched himself in Stanleyville received some limited material support from the Soviets.

Alarmed by the cozy relationship developing between Kasavubu and Tshombe, the UN and the US worked hard to derail that relationship. That opportunity came in the Coquihatville Conference of April 24, 1961. There Tshombe threatened to boycott the meeting unless Kasavubu and the other leaders denounced the agreement they reached with the UN, and instead reaffirm the Tananarive decisions. That fiasco ended up with the brief arrest of Tshombe. While relations with Elisabethville and Leopoldville were getting sour, the Stanleyville regime was being coaxed by the UN to support the central government. This plan had two objectives: reduce the fronts of insurrection that the UN had to deal with and isolate the main thorn in the flesh of Congo unity- the Katanga secession. The national reconciliation talks resulted in the formation of the Adoula government. It was the first broad based national government that the country had had in almost a year and hence it was declared as "the legal successor of the first central government of the Republic of the Congo."

Though the constitutional crisis simmered on its level of intensity had, by and large, declined by mid-August 1961. With that taken care of the UN energies were now more concentrated on ending Katanga's secession. With the departure of the Belgian military the mercenaries in the Congo were now considered as the major force sustaining the Katangan secession.

To give substance to the 21 February 1961 Security Council resolution which *inter alia* 'Urge[d] that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the

Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command and mercenaries’, the Secretary General appointed Conor Cruise O’Brien, an Irish scholar-diplomat. His no nonsense brass knuckle approach to the problem was soon to loom large. Indeed in the short stint that he held this position significant events happened. More than anything else he became the first UN official under whose authority armed action against Katanga was first initiated. Supported by Mohammed Khiary, the head of the UN civilian operation, and armed with a strong UN resolution, O’Brien was asked ‘to inform Tshombe that under a formal directive from the Secretary General he was going to proceed with the expulsion of all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries ... and ask him to take the necessary action ... failing which the UN will be compelled to remove them if necessary by force.’²⁶ The main objective of this operation was to round up foreign personnel and mercenaries in Elisabethville and other major towns in Katanga. In addition, precautionary security measures were instituted by the UN forces in Elisabethville. Such security measures included the temporary occupation of the gendarmerie headquarters, the radio station, the post office; and also the sealing of Munongo’s residence.²⁷ Tshombe acquiesced and agreed to full cooperation and by midday he “had terminated the service of all foreigners in the Katangese armed forces effective that day.”²⁸

The operational effectiveness of the UN military operation code-named Rumpunch was undercut by the false assurances the Belgian Consul gave when he promised O’Brien that “he would undertake the responsibility for ensuring the surrender and repatriation and travel of all personnel required to be evacuated, irrespective of their nationality.”²⁹ O’Brien immediately called for a halt to the operation, and shortly thereafter the

²⁶Brian Urquhart, *Hammaraskjold*, p.555.

²⁷Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo:1960-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.129.

²⁸S/4940, 14 Sept. 1961, Para. 4.

²⁹Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo:1960-1964*, p. 131

Belgians, characteristically, reneged on their promise. The initial success turned into a bitter fiasco as the foreign personnel were back to their positions after laying low for only a few days.

To forestall the political fallout and limit the damage to its credibility the UN officials in the Congo initiated a sequel to operation Rumpunch. The new operation was planned to be more efficient in its execution and wider in scope and objectives. Several events precipitated the UN into considering such a widely encompassing drastic action. First, the tribal war between Tshombe's faction and the Balubas was intensifying and the massacring of the latter was reaching unbearable proportions. Second, Tshombe was by deed and word becoming hostile to UN personnel presence. Third and most importantly, a showdown between the central government and the Katangese, which was expected to be launched by the central government, had to be forestalled. Such a showdown, it was feared, would have escalated the civil war and undermined the UN efforts in the Congo.³⁰

On September 13, 1961, Operation Marthor-Smash- the first major United Nations Forces engagement- began to unfold. The major goals of this operation included sealing off Tshombe's house and making him broadcast his acceptance of UN measures, renouncing secession and inviting the gendarmes to cooperate. The operation did not prove to be bloodless as intense resistance was put up by the gendarmes, especially when the UN forces occupied the Radio Station. The UN forces finally gained control but not before suffering casualties. The major flaw of the operation, however, happened when Tshombe escaped from his house. He was to be the main catch and his evasion of the trap called into question the operation's efficiency. Despite this massive setback, O'Brien tried to

³⁰*Ibid.* p. 134

put a positive spin on the incompetently executed operation, and prematurely announced the end of Katanga secession.³¹

While these events were unfolding, the Secretary General was on his way to the Congo in a bid to confer with Tshombe and make him give up his secession attempt through negotiation. The Secretary General had to catch up with the renegade leader who fled to Rhodesia to escape capture. Hammarskjold, however, did not fulfill this mission as his plane came down before touching down at the airport in Ndola. Though the man whom the world relied on to end the disintegration of the Congo was no more, the problem which still laid unsolved was taken over by Khiary who was one of the UN representatives in Leopoldville.

Khiary negotiated with Tshombe and came up with a cease-fire agreement. This agreement, indeed, symbolized UN failure as it ceded more authority to the secessionists than was bearable for the radical Afro-Asian countries. Tshombe, moreover, never honored the cease-fire, and that only meant that a strong foundation for future conflict with the UN was being laid.

The Afro-Asians were critical of the cease-fire and protocol agreements and apprehensive of the consequences of the resulting stalemate in Katanga upon ONUC and the central government, especially as the fighting between the ANC and the Katanga gendarmes was then going on. In early November 1961 Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council “to consider the situation prevailing in the province of Katanga, Republic of the Congo, caused by the lawless acts of mercenaries”.³² An Afro-Asian draft resolution was submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR on November 14,

³¹Verrier, *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*, p. 73

³²Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p.160

1961. The draft resolution, which was finally adopted on November 24, had an important clause, which further reinforced the Feb. 21, 1961 resolution. This clause authorized:

The Secretary General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations command...³³

With such a strong mandate in hand, the Secretary General, U Thant, had more cards to play. Tshombe, upon hearing of this new resolution, was up in arms. He encouraged his rebels to harass the UN forces thus exposing himself widely to UN retaliation. Events soon escalated and the UN forces moved in to 'secure freedom of movement' for themselves as the gendarmes set up roadblocks to obstruct their movement. While reinforcements were awaited for the assault on Elisabethville, the UN airforce went into action over Kolwezi destroying Katangese planes.³⁴ The UN forces also stopped vital troop reinforcements, which the rebels were rushing to Elisabethville. Attacks on radio transmitters were also initiated to stop Tshombe from going on the airwaves to propagate his propaganda.

On December 14, 1961, the UN forces reinforcement was complete and the attack on Elisabethville began immediately. Within two days all strategic areas in and around Elisabethville had fallen to the UN forces, and the last remnants of mercenaries were holed up in few places in town.³⁵ Tshombe's power was collapsing fast, and he cabled President Kennedy affirming his wish to hold direct talks with Adoula. Tshombe's tactic was to disrupt the smooth flow of the operation and reorganize his army for another day. However, U Thant declared with US approval that the operation would not be stopped

³³S/5002 Part B. Para. 4.

³⁴Hoskyns. *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*, p. 452

³⁵*Ibid.* p. 454

until the minimum goals of the UN, namely securing freedom of movement and the security of UN personnel, were achieved.³⁶

Though the Secretary General seemed to be resolute and fully convinced that the only language Tshombe understood was war, he nevertheless went along with the US government's idea of giving the secessionist leader yet another chance. The US government wanted the UN to end the secession through negotiation, and resort to force only if all other means failed. Hence a flurry of diplomatic initiatives were initiated by the interested parties as well as the UN Secretary General. The Kitona Agreement was extracted from Tshombe with stern diplomatic pressure coming from the Americans.³⁷ This agreement paved the way, at least on paper, for the gradual reintegration of Katanga into the Congo.

The Secretary General also took several initiatives to bring the Tshombe regime closer to the central government through negotiations. This he did by presenting a 'plan of National Conciliation' that came to be known as the 'U Thant Plan.'³⁸ The most innovative instrument of leverage that the plan contained was the threat of sanctions, to be imposed if certain items in the plan were not implemented by a certain strict deadline. Taking this softer approach has been necessitated by the hostile reaction the Secretary-General received from the European countries -especially Britain- when armed action was instituted. Indeed Britain threatened to withdraw its support for the operation, both

³⁶Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 172

³⁷ The Kitona Agreement was reached on December 21, 1961. In this Agreement Tshombe recognized the "indissoluble unity of the Republic of the Congo,.....the authority of the Central Government over all parts of the Republic....and....President Kasavubu as the Head of State." (Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p.173)

³⁸The U Thant Plan included a series of substantive proposals which involved the creation of a federal constitution, the division of the foreign exchange proceeds on a fifty-fifty base, the reintegration of the gendarmarie in the ANC and a general amnesty.(Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, pp. 181-2)

politically and financially. In an attempt to pacify those countries, the Secretary General had to be more conciliatory towards Tshombe.

Be that as it may, many of the facts on the ground did not change. In the period of negotiations the secessionist leader was busy building and strengthening his forces. Major support was indeed now forthcoming from Roy Welensky's government in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland who had a large interest in the outcome of this conflict. Mercenaries as well as armament continued to flow from Rhodesia. This inflow of arms and personnel strengthened Tshombe's mercenaries, which started to attack with impunity. In the end it was these continuous attacks and lack of respect for negotiated deals that made the UNF lose its patience.

On December 24, 1962 UNF were shot at by the gendarmes in what appeared not to be sniper fire but well-intentioned, organized and heavy shooting. On the same day an unarmed UN observation helicopter was shot down and one of its officers died. After four days of intense fighting the UNF moved in to facilitate its freedom of movement by dismantling the rebel's roadblocks. To this action the gendarmes offered no resistance. On Dec. 29 Tshombe announced in a strident speech that he would implement a scorched earth policy. On the same day UN Swedish jets went into action over Kolwezi destroying the Katangese planes and rendering the airport unusable. By the end of the day all the roadblocks had been cleared and UNF were in command. The march continued on and by Dec. 30 the Irish contingent occupied the city of Kipushi and UN troops in Kamina base occupied the adjacent town of Kamina-ville.³⁹ The secession of Katanga would not have come to a successful end were it not for the gallant actions of the Indian commander who led the forces. Despite the risks involved, he went ahead, crossed the Lufira River and

³⁹United Nations Review, January 1963, p. 1

occupied Jadotville. With its fall the last nail in the secessionists coffin had been hammered in.

In mid-January, 1963, the Secretary General received through Belgian government channels a statement from 'Mr. Tshombe and his ministers meeting in council in Kolwezi', announcing their readiness to end secession, to allow UN troops freedom of movement throughout Katanga, and to return to Elisabethville to arrange for the complete implementation of the U Thant Plan. In all by Jan. 21 "the UN force had control over all centers hitherto held by the Katangese... The Katangese gendarmerie had ceased to exist as an organized force; and with it the Katanga secession came to an end."⁴⁰

The Main External Players in the Congo Drama:

The United States:

The American commitment was greater than that of any other state, with the sole exception of, perhaps, Belgium. During its first four years of independence, the Congo was on the front burner at the White House and the State Department, sharing with Berlin, Cuba and Vietnam the distinction of having a special task force devoted to its problems.

Washington's objective was seeking a united Congo with a stable and moderate government in Leopoldville, representing all the major factions and capable of sustaining mutually beneficial relationship with the West. The US also wanted to frustrate the Soviet design of forging a close link with the Congo. Washington also wanted to avert the eruption of a civil war, and re-integrate Katanga peacefully. The US saw the developing of a policy towards the Congo as crucial to formulating an overall foreign policy

⁴⁰Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 190

framework towards Africa. Wayne Fredricks of the State Department's African Bureau said, "If we don't have a Congo policy, we don't have an African policy."⁴¹

Despite the Leopoldville government extending a formal invitation for American military involvement in the Congo, the US, for a variety of reasons decided that its best option would be to channel its assistance through the United Nations. The US may have chosen the UN option for fear of engaging in a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Congo.⁴² If the US offered direct military assistance to the Congo then there was nothing to stop the Soviet Union from also contributing military aid to one of the factions it supported. America's warnings that the introduction into the Congo of military assistance not under the UN command or any other unilateral aid would be "in defiance of the United Nations" and would "seriously jeopardize any effort to bring stability and order to the Congo," reflected the overriding concern with Soviet penetration. The Americans rightly estimated that any intervention by them at that juncture would have been counterproductive, as the situation was too confused. Washington was committed to decolonization and as a powerful non-colonial power was eager to show the non-aligned countries that it championed their cause. Lastly, the US was keen not to antagonize its western allies. The US was intent on sharing responsibility with its NATO partners wherever and whenever possible. It was out of that desire of not engaging in an open conflict with its allies that ultimately made the US not intervene unilaterally but opt for the UN alternative.⁴³

The Council of Commissioners installed by September 14, 1960 coup of Colonel Joseph Mobutu received US support. The US Ambassador urged the Secretary General to back

⁴¹ Ernest W. Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 76.

⁴² George W. Ball, "American Policy in the Congo," in Helen Kitchen, ed., *Footnotes to the Congo Story*, (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), p. 63.

⁴³ Ernest W. Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 77

the Council government. Certain UN officials apparently continued to regard Lumumba as the legal Prime Minister, which in fact he was. On this score, American views clashed with those of the Secretary General and his Special Representative in the Congo, Rejeshwar Dayal. Dayal, on November 2, 1960, attacked the Belgian advisers in Leopoldville and Elisabethville. He asserted that the only institutions “whose foundations still stand” were the Chief of State and the parliament thus casting aspersion on the legality of the Council of Commissioners.

On the question of Katanga’s secession, Eisenhower was satisfied with Hammarskjold’s cautious approach. The Kennedy administration supported more vigorous UN measures to create an environment in which the Congolese factions, particularly Leopoldville and Katanga, could reach agreement.

Washington sought to encourage the development of a moderate regime in Leopoldville. The installation of Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister on August 2, 1960, was a manifestation of such a plan. Having achieved that proposition, the American government turned its attention to ending the unfinished business of Katanga’s secession. Sir Roy Welensky, prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland maintains that the Assistant Secretary of State, G. Mennen Williams, told him that the US government sought to end Katangan secession by peaceful means, but by force if need be:

He [Williams] told me that if the Katangan [Government] did not come to an accommodation with the central government soon, it was to be expected that that government would seek to impose its will by force of arms and that the UN forces would be justified in intervening on the side of the central government on the grounds that it was the only legal government.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Sir Roy Welensky, *Welensky’s 4000 Days*, (London: Collins, 1964), p.222

The US also supported Round Two which begun in earnest on December 5, 1961. Washington provided, at the request of the UN, 20 additional transport planes to fly troops and equipment to theatre of operations in Katanga. According to the State Department, “it was this internal airlift that permitted the rapid UN build-up in Katanga.”⁴⁵

Washington faced severe criticism from its European allies about its support for UN forces actions in Katanga. The Europeans urged Washington to call for an immediate cease-fire but the US stuck to its gun insisting that it opposed any cease-fire until the UN forces attained its ‘minimum objectives’.⁴⁶ These minimum objectives included the right of the UN forces to “protect itself, to maintain its freedom of movement and communications.” This strong posture taken by the US government had helped Thant deflect the demand the Europeans had been making to the Secretary General for halting the fight.⁴⁷ The UN forces continued its operations until December 19, and at the time it had succeeded in achieving its immediate “minimum objectives.”

The Kitona agreement which was designed to ease tensions between Leopoldville and Elisabethville did not bear any fruits, and stronger measures to reintegrate Katanga into the Congo was sought by the US. By mid-1962, the US recommended the imposition of tough economic sanctions on the Tshombe regime if it failed to agree to a plan of peaceful reintegration and recognition of the Leopoldville government. In early August, the US government submitted its proposals to the Secretary-General. On August 20, 1962, the US plan with only slight modifications was presented by Thant as the UN Plan

⁴⁵ U.S. Participation in the UN: 1960, Department of State Publication No. 7413 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, August 1962), p. 83.

⁴⁶ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 84

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

for National Reconciliation for the conflicting parties in the Congo.⁴⁸ The US wholeheartedly supported this plan which came to be known as the Thant Plan.

Although both Tshombe and Adoula endorsed the Thant Plan, they did not agree on some of the specific terms contained in the Plan. The failure to reach a workable agreement with Tshombe had weakened the central government and Adoula's position had become highly precarious, with some attendant grave consequences for the whole of the Congo. The impending downfall of the Adoula government made the US government move even faster. In October 1962, George C. McGhee went on a three-week mission to the Congo to foster a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. At the same time, the US was busy coaxing its Western allies to follow its lead. At the conclusion of talks between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Sparks of Belgium, the minister agreed in principle to support the imposition of economic sanctions on Tshombe's Katanga if it failed to implement the Thant plan. Washington also succeeded in twisting the arm of London as the British government promised not to stand in the way of economic sanctions on Katanga.

The situation of the central government, plagued with internal conflicts, continued to deteriorate and Tshombe, on his part, continued to build his forces. The US government at this point sent a fact-finding mission composed of eight men and headed by Lieutenant General Louis Truman. This team was set to "determine what additional forms of assistance the United States could provide to ensure the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Congo."⁴⁹

⁴⁸ William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," in William Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.343.

⁴⁹ Cited in Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 87

The Indian Commanders of the UNF interpreted the arrival of the military team from the US as a strong signal of the American government's willingness to use force as a means to end the Katanga secession. After incessant attacks, the UNF launched Round Three (Operation Grand Slam) on December 28, 1962. The operation was concluded on January 21 1963 with the fall of Kolwezi. That effectively ended the military phase of the UN involvement in the Congo crisis.

The US position had undergone a tremendous change since the beginning of the crisis. Washington regarded the conflict between Leopoldville and Elisabethville as an internal matter that should be resolved by the Congolese themselves. However, the intransigence of Tshombe, and the fear that the Congo crisis could spill over to the rest of central Africa had made the US support the use of force to end the secession. The US supported the use of force even against the opposition of its European allies. The Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland said because of the Congo operation, "there are no uninvited foreign troops, no Communist enclaves, no army of liberation, no reason for a single American soldier to die there, no excuse for a Soviet soldier to live there."⁵⁰ In all, the US objectives had all been achieved by the UN operation.

The Soviet Union:

Moscow's policy toward the UN peacekeeping effort was ambiguous, ranging from initial support, to passive acquiescence, to active opposition, depending on the circumstances. The Russian behavior, much like the US, was moderated and in some cases was determined by the collective behavior of the Afro-Asian bloc.

⁵⁰ Harlan Cleveland, "The UN in the Congo: Three Questions," in Helen Kitchen, ed., *Footnotes to the Congo Story* (New York: Walker and Company, 1967),

The interests and objectives of the Soviet Union were three-fold. First, Moscow wanted the expulsion of Belgian economic influence in the Congo. The Russian felt that political independence should be accompanied by economic independence. It felt that the quick expulsion of the Belgians would be the first step towards achieving the goal of economic sovereignty.⁵¹ Second, the Russians were motivated by the desire to counter American political influence in Africa. Russia felt that as a superpower its reach should be global and hence neutralize American influence anywhere and everywhere.⁵² Third, Moscow was also motivated by the need to support the Lumumba regime and eventually ‘recruit’ him as Moscow’s friend in Africa.⁵³ For expedient and practical reasons, Moscow decided to support the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo. The Soviet Union believed that the deployment of the UNF would preclude active and direct assistance to the Congo government.

The July 14, 1960 Resolution was strongly endorsed by the Afro-Asian bloc, and the Soviet Union felt it had to vote for it, even though it had profound misgivings about UN military aid. With its frequently expressed commitment to “decolonization,” Moscow could not fail to support a resolution backed by the Afro-Asians. Moscow’s early position on the UN force embraced three intertwined strands which characterized its subsequent policy. Support for the Lumumba forces through the UN when possible, but unilaterally when necessary; strong opposition to Katanga secession, and an escalating mistrust and hostility of the UN organization and the Congo operation. Moderating the Soviet Congo policy were the actions of the Afro-Asian states, with which Moscow was at pains to avoid any open conflict.

⁵¹ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 95

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 96

The Soviet Union continued to assert that Belgian aggression was the main stumbling block in achieving internal stability in the Congo. The Russian government also saw a greater western machination in the Belgian aggression: “The bayonet was Belgian, but the bosses were the United States, Belgian, British, and West German big monopolies,” Khrushchev said on July 15, 1960.⁵⁴

On August 15, 1960, Lumumba asked the Russians for transport planes and crew, trucks, various weapons “of high quality,” and other assorted equipment. Lumumba used the Russian assistance to move his troops to Kasai in preparation for his attack on Katanga. The closing of the airports in the Congo to all except UN traffic by Andrew Cordier on September 5, 1960 had the effect of stopping all further direct Soviet military assistance to Lumumba.

From that point on Moscow sensed that the UN Secretariat was siding with Washington. The Soviet response was a sharp rebuke directed at the Secretary General. Alarmed by Moscow’s reaction and interested in eliminating big power intervention in the Congo, Tunisia and Ceylon drafted a resolution reaffirming the previous ones and outlawing military aid outside UN channels. Moscow, for the first time in the Congo crisis deliberations, vetoed the Security Council resolution.

With a deadlock in the Security Council, the General Assembly was called into an emergency session at Washington’s behest. The moderate nations of the Afro-Asian bloc, though disquieted about Lumumba’s ouster by Kasavubu, were more interested in effective UN action to insure decolonization. The resulting September 20, 1960 Resolution prohibited all military assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations. It was adopted by a vote of 70-0. The Soviet bloc, France, and the Union of

⁵⁴ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 98.

South Africa abstained. By abstaining in the voting of the resolution, Moscow had for the first time seen itself in open conflict with the Afro-Asians.

In order to mend fences with the Afro-Asian group, Khrushchev in his Assembly speech of September 23, 1960, demanded that only African and Asian forces should be used in the Congo, and that they should be used only “at the discretion of” the Lumumba government. Moscow had also thrown its full weight behind Lumumba, maintaining that his regime was the only lawful government that “enjoys the confidence of the Congolese people.”⁵⁵ When Lumumba was arrested by Mobutu’s forces in early December 1960, the Russians quickly blamed the NATO powers and the UN Command and called for Lumumba’s release, the disarmament of Mobutu’s forces and the setting up of a special Afro-Asian committee to look into “the sources of financing and supplying arms to the Mobutu gang.”⁵⁶

Although the Soviet Union was one of the two superpowers, the effect of its opposition on the UN peacekeeping mission was, on the whole, remarkably small. The Russians were hampered in their articulation of a response to the conflict by the actions of the Afro-Asian bloc and also by their worsening relations with the Peking government. Confronted by reverses, Moscow found it wise to continue with the UN and refrain from vetoing UN resolutions that did not meet its approval. It found its relationship with the non-aligned group to be important and hence refrained from that point on any action that might antagonize them.⁵⁷

Moscow instead found a way of expressing its opposition to the operation by consistently refusing to pay its share of the assessments. It also refused to purchase or pay interests on

⁵⁵ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 100

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.100-1

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98

the UN bonds that were floated. It is important to note that Moscow did support the UN mission by providing airlift to the operation. This support, which amounted to \$1.5 million and which Moscow never made any claim to against UN expenditure, was given by the Russians in the early days of the operation.

In the Security Council, the Soviet position forced the adoption of compromise resolutions, and the threat of a Soviet veto on one occasion resulted in the transfer of the Congo issue to the General Assembly. The Soviet Union, however, never succeeded in gaining majority Council or assembly support for its Congo policies.

Moscow's attack on the Secretary General had diverted the attention of the organization. It had been disruptive as it had sapped the energies of the Secretary General to deal with the Soviet attacks on him and on his office. The Russians moderated their attacks on the Secretary General once U Thant came to office. The Russians were eager to court the new Secretary General, and Thant also did not undertake any new major initiatives on the Congo. Moreover, two of his most important decisions met with Russian approval-Round Three, and his rejection of the US initiated Greene plan.

In the Congo itself, direct Soviet material support to the Lumumba regime and its successor jeopardized the UN objectives of re-establishing order and maintaining the territorial integrity, and clearly violated the UN resolutions.⁵⁸ Soviet diplomatic support of the Stanleyville leaders was contrary to the intents of the resolutions because it encouraged rebellion against the central government.

Throughout the entire Congo crisis, ambiguity and miscalculation characterized Moscow's policy. The UNF had the effect of stopping unilateral and sustained help to the

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 108.

Lumumba regime. But Russia's fortunes collapsed after Lumumba was forced out of office, and ended with his death. After that, Moscow channeled its support to Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. But that support too had to be discontinued after Gizenga was coopted into the Adoula government as vice-president.

In all, Moscow policy did not succeed in its objective of creating a left leaning, if not a communist regime in the Congo. It instead led to failure and frustration as Moscow misread the fluid situation and the shifting alliances among the political groups that characterized the Congo crisis.

Belgium:

The Belgians were more involved in the Congo crisis than other nation, with the exception of the Congo itself. As former colonial power, Brussels had a profound political and economic interest at stake in the restoration of order in the Congo. However, Belgium's quick intervention and the redeployment of thousands of its soldiers back into the Congo had raised eyebrows as many countries accused her of aggression and attempting to recolonize the country which it just gave independence.

The Belgians hastily gave the Congo its independence hoping that though the Congo would have all the trappings of sovereignty, it would still have to rely heavily on Belgian expatriates.⁵⁹ Belgium, therefore, strongly believed that its economic links with the Congo would remain intact.⁶⁰ However, the mutiny of the *Force publique* and its aftermath has shattered that assessment.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Indar Jit Rikhye, "The United Nations Operation in the Congo: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding," in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) p. 207.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

The objective of Belgium in the post independence Congo was to maintain a sufficient presence in the country to safeguard its interest.⁶² A larger goal was to make decolonization succeed; it was only with a peaceful transition to independence that Belgian interests would be protected. Brussels also wanted to give a sense of security to its citizens living in the Congo.⁶³ Any hasty departure by this large expatriate community would have brought the Congo to a standstill.

The Belgium government justified its military intervention as necessary in order to protect its citizens as the Congo government failed to maintain law and order.⁶⁴ The Belgium authorities naively thought that their action was not illegal and therefore could not be constituted as an act of aggression.⁶⁵ The majority of the UN members, however, did not buy this view, and most of them condemned Belgium for her behavior.

Initially, Belgium authorities believed that the UN operation would be desirable as it would contribute to the restoration of order. Brussels went along with the idea of UN intervention, as the first resolution did not condemn the Belgium government for the crisis in the Congo. However, Belgium did not endorse the July 12 and 13, 1960 appeals of Lumumba and Kasavubu which placed the blame for the breakdown of order in the Congo squarely on the Belgian intervention.⁶⁶ The Security Council statement of July 13, 1960 did not condemn Belgium specifically thought it called for the need to restore order in the Congo. Belgium decided at this point to cooperate with the UN and withdraw its

⁶² Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 98.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 133.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 134

troops as soon as the UN forces were able to take over. The first mass Belgian troop withdrawal started on July 17, 1960 and ended three days later.⁶⁷

Belgium wanted to contribute some troops to the UN mission. The Belgium authorities conferred with Ralph Bunche, the first Representative of the Secretary General in the Congo, and indicated that Belgian troops would be available to the UN if they were to be used in Stanleyville.⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that Belgium would make troops available to quell the rebellion in the Stanleyville, but not make a similar request to crush the rebellion in Katanga. It is obvious that the Belgian authorities perceived Stanleyville and not Elisabethville as the main threat to its interests in the Congo.

The Belgians in Katanga had urged Brussels to grant formal recognition to the Tshombe regime.⁶⁹ The Belgium government hesitated to do that fearing the ramifications such a course of action will have on the international scene. Belgium instead agreed to provide Katanga with its troops in order to neutralize anti-Tshombe forces in Northern Katanga.⁷⁰ The Belgian government also embarked on a plan of delaying the entrance of UN troops into Katanga until it was strong enough to resist an invasion by Lumumba.⁷¹ The Belgians, however, recognized that the UN would eventually show up in Katanga, and when that happened the Belgian troops did not use any force nor did they resist or hamper the international forces' movement.⁷² Hammarskjold was personally involved and, on August 12, 1960, led a force of 240 Swedish troops into Elisabethville. The Belgian authorities tried to obtain guarantees from the UN that the UN forces should not intervene in Katanga's internal affairs.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 135.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

In October 1960, Hammarskjold declared that it was necessary to “fully circumscribe the Belgian factor and eliminate it,” and requested Belgium to “withdraw all the military, paramilitary or civilian personnel which it had placed at the disposal of the authorities in the Congo.”⁷³ Dayal on his part accused the Belgians as having “inhibited peaceful political activity...and the re-establishment of the unity and integrity of the country.”⁷⁴ Both Hammarskjold and Dayal were intent on removing all Belgians from the Congo. The Belgian government protested, insisting that the Belgian expatriate community was needed to make the Congo function. The Secretary General was ‘forced’ to take this action by the hardline stance which the Afro-Asian bloc and the communist states maintained on the issue of Belgians in the Congo.⁷⁵

Belgian attitudes toward ONUC and compliance with UN mandates began to improve after April 1961, when a new coalition government came to power in Brussels, but five more months would pass before Belgian officers left Katanga. However, mercenaries from South Africa, Rhodesia, and France soon filled the vacuum left by the departure of the Belgian troops

The total effect of Belgian policy was to restrain the UN forces’ activities. Belgian policy moved from passive cooperation to absolute opposition, to eventual cooperation, depending on the fast changing events both inside and outside the Congo. There could have been more cooperation from the beginning if the Belgium government never redeployed its forces into the Congo, and if it complied with the international organization’s resolution that pertained to the withdrawal of its forces. Instead Belgium chose to drag its feet and obstruct the UN forces from achieving its goals of restoring law

⁷³ Ibid. p. 138.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 139.

and order in the Congo. The Belgians, contrary to UN resolutions, also armed and supported Tshombe in his bid to carve out an independent Katanga regime separate from the Congo.⁷⁶ In addition, Belgium authorities refused to pay UN assessments in protest of the organization's actions in the Congo. The Belgium government did not pay any of its assessments for the whole four-year period of the UN operation.⁷⁷

In all, Belgium's obstructionist approach jeopardized its interests within the Congo. Instead of being more cooperative with the UN in its attempt to restore order, Belgium decided to torpedo any UN effort that it deemed to be contrary to its interests. However, by engaging in an adversarial relationship with the UN, Belgium seemed to have undermined its interests in the Congo as well as harmed its relations with most of the Third World countries.

The Afro-Asian Bloc:

The Afro-Asian bloc all too well identified with the Congo's predicament as they too had only recently gained independence. The Afro-Asian group saw in the Congo a new country whose independence was threatened by the former colonial power and by related European economic interests.⁷⁸ However, there was a great diversity within this group, at least in political terms. The members of this group had different views about the internal Congolese politics and what the UN forces should do.

Most of the independent African states became interested in the Congo crisis and supported the UN effort, though several of them later withdrew their troops in protest against Hammarskjöld's policies. Tunisia, which was the African member of the Security

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 147.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 157.

Council in the early period of the crisis, was the most active and consistent diplomatic supporter from the continent.⁷⁹ Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana and Tunisia were the largest manpower contributors. A total of 19 Afro-Asian governments provided personnel to the UN operation in the Congo. The combined Afro-Asian troop contribution was 82.4 percent of the total forces.⁸⁰ India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia and Ghana provided 61.2 percent of the total UN forces.⁸¹

The Afro-Asian group was motivated by their interest in seeing the successful decolonization of the Congo, though the members of the group were divided on the specifics and the modality to adopt to achieve that goal.⁸² The group was intent on ensuring the expulsion of Belgian military presence from the Congo as Mongo Slim, the Tunisian Foreign minister, characterized the deployment of Belgian troops as aggression.⁸³ The Afro-Asian group also shared the goal of instituting a strong central government as opposed to a loose confederation. This may have come out of their experiences from regionalism/tribalism, which they encountered in their own countries.⁸⁴

On the Congo issue the non-aligned states fell into two general groups- the moderates and the militants.⁸⁵ Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Ceylon formed the more militant wing.⁸⁶ They advocated rapid decolonization, were severely critical of manifestations of western influence which they regarded as 'neo-colonial' and in general presented a more strident and radical stance. These states were

⁷⁹ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 158

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 160.

⁸⁶ William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 326. See also Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 160.

non-communist, but they were certainly more anti-western than the moderates.⁸⁷ Nationalists who were committed to the ideas of Pan-Africanism ruled the militant states such as Ghana and Guinea. These leaders used the Congo crisis as an opportunity in which to propagate their ideas. Morocco, a Franco-phone country was something of an anomaly in this group. It had joined this group in the hope of enlisting the support of the militants in its claim to Mauritania. The defining issue that separated the militants from the moderates had been the Lumumba issue, and the way the UN handled that problem. The militants were more pro-Lumumba than the moderates.

Ethiopia, Nigeria, Liberia, Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone did not regard the Congo's economic ties as a threat to its independence. These states had all good relations with the West. Tunisia, India, the Sudan, Indonesia and Burma were more neutral in their stand, as their apprehensions were directed to both the East and the West. The views of the moderate group on the Congo crisis were based on their indifference and lack of any immediate interests in the Congo.

The non-aligned states hoped that the UN operation in the Congo would lead to the expulsion of the Belgian troops and insulate it from an East-West showdown. It was with those objectives in mind that the Afro-Asian states responded positively and quickly to Hammarskjöld's call for troop contributions. Other reasons that may have motivated some of these countries might have been the opportunity to get prestige and status on the international scene.

The Afro-Asian countries provided about 83 percent of the manpower for the Congo operation. Without this significant support in manpower, the operation as it unfolded could not have been accomplished. The threat of the militant Casablanca group to

⁸⁷ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 160.

withdraw their troops and their eventual pullout did not significantly affect the policies of Hammarskjold and neither did it cripple the UN operation. Soldiers from the moderate states quickly replaced the troops withdrawn by the militant Afro-Asian group.

The political support of the Afro-Asian states was indispensable as without it no peacekeeping mission would have been authorized by the Security Council.⁸⁸ The Soviet Union would have vetoed the operation were it not for the support shown by the Afro-Asian bloc. The broad support garnered for the efforts of the Congo operation also had to a certain extent strengthened the hand of Hammarskjold and Thant.⁸⁹ However, the Secretaries General could not discount the express wish of the Afro-Asian group, especially when they were united in their stand.⁹⁰

The UN mission was heavily complicated by the actions of the militant group when they subjected Hammarskjold to intense attacks, and when they threatened to pullout their troops from the operation.⁹¹ The militant group undercut their lobbying power by withdrawing their forces and hence paving the road for the moderates to have their way. After the withdrawal of the militants from the operation, the UN mission experienced less acrimony in its deliberations.

Most of the Afro-Asian bloc was interested in ensuring the successful decolonization of the Congo. Despite the confusion and conflicts between the moderates and the militants, both camps were less worried about internal instability in the Congo than they were with the presence of the Belgian troops.⁹² The split within the group may have been occasioned by the significance and legitimacy with which to accord the dismissed Lumumba

⁸⁸ William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 326.

⁸⁹ Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 169.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁹² *Ibid.*

government, and with the perception that it was the best government to ensure Congo's independence. In spite of these differences, the basic thrust of the Afro-Asian group was consistent with the overall UN objective, which was to create a semblance of order and stability within the Congo.

France and Great Britain:

The British and French interests in the Congo did not coincide with either the interests of the US or the UN. France, under de Gaulle, sympathized with Belgium and opposed ONUC, refusing to pay its assessment, although, significantly, it did not veto any of the UN resolutions concerning the Congo operation.⁹³ Paris also persuaded its former French colonies in Central Africa to deny overflight rights to US military aircraft ferrying UN troops to the Congo.⁹⁴

Britain had direct interests in the Congo crisis because of its significant holdings in the Union Miniere, and more importantly its colonial holdings in eastern and southern Africa.⁹⁵ The Federation of the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, which then was a British colony, was instrumental in giving political and military support to Tshombe's renegade forces. Tshombe sought and was given refuge in Northern Rhodesia when the new central government tried to arrest him in September 1961.⁹⁶ However, Britain paid its assessments and purchased UN bonds to finance UN peacekeeping operations.⁹⁷ As well, British officers seconded to Ghana and Nigeria served in ONUC with those countries' troops.

⁹³ William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 324.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

The Determining Factors of the Operation

Political and Military Context:

Broad Political Context:

With the chronological events outlined one can see that the objectives initially set out had been achieved by the time the operation was concluded. These objectives were the restoration of order within the Congo as well as the ending of secession and the reintegration of Katanga. Apart from the political will shown by the UN members, especially the US, there are other factors that played a crucial role in the overall achievement of those goals. But the one overwhelming factor that sustained the operation was incontrovertibly the superpower political rivalry that characterized the Cold War era. By focusing on the broad political context in which the UN intervention took place, it can be discerned that initially both superpowers supported the mission. The US thought the safest way to keep the Congo Soviet free was to keep the UN in and by doing that, it hoped, it would stop any unilateral intervention by the USSR. The Soviet Union, for its part, saw the UN objective of getting rid of the Belgians as being in concert with its own aims. The strengthening of the Lumumba regime thereafter, it assumed, would mean having a communist or at least a left leaning head of state. While the Russians were concerned about the presence of the Belgians as a threat to international peace and decolonization, the US saw the Russian designs as more worrisome.⁹⁸ It is against this background that the total US support for the operation will be analyzed.

Harlan Cleveland, an Assistant Secretary of State in the US government gave a description of possible choices his government faced: Should the Congo chaos be

⁹⁸Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, in his major statement on the Congo accused Belgium apparently with NATO understanding as "sending troops to suppress the people of the Congo by force of arms" on the "pretext of alleged disorder there while in fact order is being introduced." Further diplomatic notes sent by the Soviets to Western governments asked the UN to "put an end to the aggression" pursued by Belgium against the Congo. (Epstein, *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64*, p. 16)

attacked by a hastily assembled international peace force; or should the US send in its marines; or should it sit on its hands and wait for its adversaries to exploit the situation? To avert “risk[ing] a confrontation of nuclear powers in the center of Africa,” the consensus reached by the policy makers was, according to Cleveland, sending a UN force which will serve “the national interests” of the United States and the great majority of the UN members.⁹⁹ US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevens also believed that “the only way to keep the Cold War out of Africa is to keep the UN in the Congo.”¹⁰⁰

As events in the early period in the Congo showed, the East-West tension found its way into the crisis. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union briefly assisted Lumumba and later Gizenga with arms and logistics, generally one can say that the US goal of achieving its objectives with minimum risks through exclusion of direct unilateral military intervention by either superpower succeeded.

To understand the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the contest of the internal politics of the Congo one has to focus on the politicking that went on in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN. The US enjoyed the support of most of the Afro-Asian countries and succeeded in building up a coalition against the Soviet Union. In all the resolutions that were passed, the US demanded the withdrawal of the Belgians but voiced its apprehension about creating a vacuum that would exacerbate the internal situation. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, portrayed itself as the champion of the newly emerging nations and was ready to free them from the “colonialist yoke.”¹⁰¹

Great Power attitudes toward ONUC ranged all the way from supportive (the United States) to lukewarm (the United Kingdom), to obstructionist (France), and antagonistic

⁹⁹Ernest Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo*, p.19.

¹⁰⁰Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo*, p. 19

¹⁰¹Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 14

(the Soviet Union). ONUC's major problem stemmed from the fact that there were too many interested parties in the Congo crisis. The rivalry of the Cold War and the politics of decolonization pervaded every level of the operation.

The Afro-Asian bloc in the UN mostly supported ONUC, and tended to be "Lumumbist" in their political preference. They also sought a greater and more vigorous role for the UN forces in suppressing the Katanga secession. Resolutions drafted or sponsored by the Afro-Asian bloc were often the only politically acceptable basis on which to build majority in support for UN action. Moreover, the major troop contributors in the Congo were drawn from non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia.

The troop contributing non-aligned countries varied in their views of ONUC's proper role. Some, such as India, predicated their agreement to send troops on their being used actively and constructively to restore order and the authority of the central government. Others supported the operation only as long as a favored Congolese faction continued to benefit from it. For example, countries that supported Lumumba's faction removed their contingents in protest after his detention and death, temporarily reducing UN forces by one-third in a crucial period.

Nature and Kind of Dispute:

Other factors besides political ones can be quite as crucial in making a UN peacekeeping/peacemaking operation effective. The characteristics of a conflict play a significant role in whether an operation would be successful or not. The number of factions engaged in the Congo conflict were, by and large, the central government authorities and the secessionist Katanga whose leader, Tshombe, sought a loose confederacy. The threat posed by Katanga was magnified by the fact that it had some

external support mainly from Belgium and Rhodesia. Both countries supplied arms and personnel in the long drawn out war with the central government. The financial backing of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK) and other lobbyists whose interests were intricately linked to the outcome of the fight were invaluable in sustaining Tshombe's holdout.

The threat to the center became three sided after the death of Lumumba. Some ANC troops that were loyal to Lumumba pledged their allegiance to Gizenga, who established his headquarters in Stanleyville. For some time three parallel governments operated alongside each other. Events became ominous for the central government when, in addition to the overhanging Katanga secession, a Stanleyville secession almost become a reality.¹⁰² This especially was the case after the Gizenga regime achieved recognition from the Soviet Union, China and other radical Afro-Asian countries. The Stanleyville threat continued till the National Reconciliation talks were held which were geared towards forming a broad based government. This had been agreed to by all the rebellious groups with the notable exception of Katanga. In the aftermath of these talks Gizenga was appointed as a deputy premier and moved his base, at least for a short period, from Stanleyville. In late 1962, Gizenga once again resuscitated his secessionist ambition but this time he had a much smaller following, and later suffered a devastating blow when the commander of his forces 'defected' to the central authorities side. General Lundula alleged that Gizenga's vision went against that of Lumumba who fought and died for a united Congo.

Other secessionists groups sprang in some other provinces. Albert Kalonji staged a secession attempt of south Kasai. Taking his cue from Tshombe, Kalonji entertained the idea of forming an independent Kasai territory. His dream floundered when the central

¹⁰²Epstein, *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64*, p.86.

government troops subdued his forces.¹⁰³ Moreover, lacking arms and external political support his brief plan for an independent Kasai nation came to an abrupt end.

Despite the numerous factions that existed in the initial stages of the UN operation, the main threat came from Katanga. The other rebellions were less threatening than the one posed by Tshombe. The UN, in the end, isolated the Katanga secession and brought its force to bear in ending the rebellion and thus succeeded in reintegrating Katanga back into the Congo.

The Conduct of the Host State, the Principal Protagonists and Third Party States:

The level of cooperation from the host state is difficult to gauge. Initially, the Congolese government asked for assistance from the UN and wanted the UN forces to assist its forces in quelling the rebellion in Katanga. However, when the UN Secretary General refused Lumumba's wish that the UN forces be used alongside the central government forces in quashing the Katanga rebellion, the Congolese authorities became hostile to the UN mission. Also, both Lumumba and Kasavuba accused the UN forces, at various points, with siding against their party. The UN mission was seen by each of the fractious parties competing for power in the Congo as helping their 'enemy'. These perceptions made the UN operation quite difficult, as cooperation was often difficult to obtain. The UN began to receive more or less consistent support after Lumumba was deposed, and Mobutu took over power.

The other main protagonists in the Congo crisis were Tshombe's Katanga and to a lesser but significant degree by Gizenga. Tshombe's secession started right with the country's independence. Having received significant external help, especially from Belgium,

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 140.

Tshombe wanted to cede the richest part of the country from the Congo. His bid for secession was well financed by the Katanga mining industry, which feared that the anarchy in the Congo would adversely affect its business. Therefore, the threat posed by Tshombe to the Congo's territorial integrity was real as he had both the financial and military wherewithal to translate his dream into reality. It was only the forceful use of military power by the UN that prevented secession.

The other major threat to the Congo's territorial integrity was from Gizenga's forces in Stanleyville. These forces were assembled by Gizenga who became disenchanted with central government authorities after Kasavubu and Mobutu first thwarted Lumumba's hold on power, and then engineered his demise. Gizenga established his base in Stanleyville and his stated goal was to depose the central authorities through war. However, under the broad-based government formed under Adoula, Gizenga was made the vice-president of the Congo. After a brief stint, he went back to Stanleyville to revive his flagging secession bid. At one point, Gizenga posed as much a threat as Tshombe to central government control, especially after his 'government' was recognized by the radical Afro-Asians as well as the Communist countries.

Both these renegade regimes in Elisabethville and Stanleyville only sporadically gave their cooperation to the UN. This cooperation usually was withdrawn as quickly as it was given. Tshombe did not give any substantive cooperation to the UN as he saw it as a body that was out to destroy his ambitions. Gizenga's secession ran out of gas, and though it outlasted the UN operation, it was not of any major threat at that point. It became a fractious, squabbling and rudderless group.

The peacekeeping force in the Congo, by and large, suffered mostly from the actions of Belgium. The presence of Belgian troops and mercenaries contributed immensely to the

violence in Katanga. Until it withdrew, Belgium blocked every move the UN made in achieving the mandate of its peacekeeping mission. Moreover, as the former colonial power, Belgium had significant influence to frustrate and thwart UN efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution and a unified country. Overall, Belgium exacerbated the crisis and prolonged the conflicts by its actions. In the later stages of the ONUC operation, Belgium, with a new coalition government, began to exhibit more cooperation toward ONUC and the UN.

The cooperation of the host state and primary disputants is a necessary though an insufficient condition for the success of a peacekeeping operation. Although the Congolese central government had initially extended its cooperation to ONUC, this did not amount to much. One of the main reasons for ONUC's deployment was the weakness of the Congo government, and hence such a weak government could give little effective assistance to the peacekeeping force. Moreover, this conflict involved more than merely the host state and the primary protagonist. The cooperation of third parties, mainly Belgium, also had to be sought to make the operation effective.

Regional Organizations:

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was not formed until three years after the UN operation in the Congo was first deployed. One of the major principles adopted by the OAU in its Charter was the acceptance of the borders that African countries inherited from the colonial powers. Founders of the organization agreed that any redrawing of maps would lead to great confusion and bloodshed.

One could therefore infer from the OAU Charter Principles that the majority of African nations would have come out against the Katanga secession proposition. However,

though there was no continental/regional organization, different ‘regional’ groups operated within the Afro-Asian bloc. The Brazzaville group, which was mainly composed of Franco-phone nations, took their cue from Paris. France was completely opposed to the UN operation and so were these former French colonies.

The Casablanca group, on the other hand, held a position that was antithetical to the Brazzaville group. This group supported Lumumba and the ideas he represented. The Casablanca group was opposed to Tshombe and his secessionist scheme for Katanga. Indeed many of the countries that were in this group had strong feelings about the situation in the Congo. Many of these countries pulled out their contingents after the death of Lumumba was confirmed. They felt that the operation was not contributing to what they felt was what it should have contributed; use force against the secessionists and keep Lumumba in power.

It may have been a fortunate thing that the organization did not exist in early 1960, as it is very doubtful that the new organization would have weathered the splintering among its member states that the thorny issue of the Congo occasioned. Individual African countries, however, did support different factions in the Congo.

ATTRIBUTES OF AUTHORIZATION:

UN Objectives:

The commitment to go through with a peacekeeping operation is mainly reflected in the UN resolutions that are passed and endorsed, and in the actions of the UN force. The various Security Council resolutions passed pertaining to the Congo did set out the objectives to be achieved. Foremost was the question of maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the republic of the Congo. The most serious threat

to the territorial integrity of the Congo emanated from the secessionist activity carried on since July 11, 1960 by the provincial authorities in Katanga. The integrity of the Congo was therefore in a symbolic sense restored when the Tshombe forces were defeated by the UN force. The threat to the territorial integrity was real due to the Belgian authorities callous act of parachuting in their soldiers in what amounted to an attempted roll back of Congo's independence. Not only that, the Katanga secession would not have stood on its own if the Belgian government did not support it.¹⁰⁴ It only took the use of force by the UN troops to concretely achieve this aim. Also, when the rebels of Gizenga threatened the survival of the central government, the central authorities asked for assistance from ONUC. A combined ONUC and *Armee Nationale Congolaise* (ANC) forces suppressed the rebellion.¹⁰⁵

The UN force assisted the central government in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. From the first Security Council resolution till the last resolution passed on November 1961, the theme of enforcing law and order in the Congo had been consistent. As outlined in Hammarskjold's first report one of the major problems was the lack of central authority to deal with the lawlessness and anarchy that prevailed. As Kanza said, Belgium bequeathed to the Congo independence that was "rotten at the roots."¹⁰⁶ Belgium acceded to Congolese independence without laying down the foundation to hold together such an expansive and diverse country. The national army, the authority that was to institute law and order, become a force of destruction and anarchy. ONUC was a moderating force, stopping the lawlessness of the ANC wherever it could and generally restoring conditions in which normal administrative duty and commerce could be re-established.

¹⁰⁴Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary*, p.45)

¹⁰⁵Epstein, *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64*, p.127

¹⁰⁶Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo: the rise and fall of Lumumba* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 89

Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, addressing the Belgian aggression, called upon “the government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo”.¹⁰⁷ The Secretary General also viewed the Belgian presence as a major contributing factor to the breakdown of law and order. The extent to which that was true could be gauged from the backing the Belgium forces gave to Tshombe once he declared the ‘independence’ of his province. One of the main goals of ONUC was to achieve the withdrawal of the Belgians from all parts of the Congo, including Katanga, and that presented a problem as it was impossible to get them out without the use of force which, at that point, the UN had not authorized.

Coming under strong pressure from its NATO allies, especially the US, the Belgian government had a change of heart; not only did it withdraw its forces but it shifted its rigid position on the Congo and thereby became more cooperative. The change of government in Brussels may also account for the shift in Belgian policy pertaining to the Congo. The Feb. 21 Security Council resolution further strengthened the UN hand in achieving this objective. In it, the Security Council,

1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;

2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Cited in Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Cited in Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 100.

After the demise of Lumumba, the USSR settled for its second best scenario: the ending of the Katanga secession by the UN.¹⁰⁹ The Soviets believed that the ending of the Katangan secession would frustrate Belgium and some other western countries. The US was also disposed to help the “moderate” new government consolidate its grip, and that in part entailed the ending of the Katangan secession.¹¹⁰ It is against such a background of converging superpower positions on the Congo conflict that the November 1961 resolution was conceived. The Security Council expanded ONUC’s mandate by declaring its “full and firm support for the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo” and condemned and demanded the ending of “secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga.”¹¹¹

While the UNF could use force only as a last resort to stop civil war, the November 1961 resolution gave it more power to directly deal with the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops by unequivocally giving the peacekeepers the right to exercise a “requisite measure of force” in order to ensure

The immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command, and mercenaries, as laid down in [part A, operative] paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution [S/4741] of Feb. 1961 [S/5002, 24 Nov. 1961, Paragraph 4]¹¹²

In the end it became imperative, after all other avenues of peaceful withdrawal of foreign troops and mercenaries had been exhausted, to use force. The three UN military operations had the effect of achieving this objective with the corollary goal of ending the secession.

¹⁰⁹ William J. Durch, “The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964,” p. 328.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary. Vol. III, Africa.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) p.47

Military operations aside, the UN also undertook a complex civilian operation in which the provision of technical and humanitarian assistance was paramount. The breakdown of law and order and the resulting exodus of foreign technical personnel threatened the collapse of the public administration and the economy.¹¹³ To forestall such a situation, which would have made the crisis grow even deeper, the UN undertook a massive technical operation. Foremost in the technical assistance was the retraining of the Congolese army, whose lack of discipline and sense of duty, had partly led to the anarchy that abounded. The need for such assistance could not be overemphasized, as the country would not enjoy stability without a strong force that would provide the necessary protection to the civilians. The UN civilian operation also encompassed humanitarian assistance to the large number of refugees who were displaced by the war. The humanitarian effort was mainly concentrated in Kasai and northern Katanga where Tshombe's forces massacred the Baluba.¹¹⁴

The UN objectives in the Congo were quite broad, and at every juncture the necessary legal, diplomatic, logistical and military support was provided, especially by the US. The United States wanted to see that the outlined aims were achieved in line with the wider UN objective of preserving international peace while at the same time ensuring that its parochial interests of keeping communism out was successful. Without such a commitment from a superpower to seeing the implementation of the resolutions, the operation would have floundered.

¹¹³United Nations Review, Feb. 1963, p.11

¹¹⁴ Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 125.

Resource and Logistics:

To illustrate the financial magnitude of the Congo mission, it is worth noting that the operation cost the UN about \$120 million a year at a time when the entire basic budget of organization was only \$75 million annually.¹¹⁵ Also, the political fights over the character and objectives of ONUC spilled over to the budget area, as some states withheld funds to protest UN policy. The result was a financial emergency for the organization. By the end of 1962, total arrears for peacekeeping stood at \$117 million, and only a quarter of the UN membership paid their ONUC assessment.¹¹⁶

The budgetary and administrative body of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly initially proposed in December 1960 that the expenses of the operation should be considered expenses of the organization and thus be subject to mandatory assessments under Article 17(2) of the Charter. The Committee was bitterly divided in passing this draft resolution that pertained to the financing of ONUC. In the end 46 nations approved of the plan while 17 voted against and 24 countries abstained.¹¹⁷ The Soviet Union argued that the operation should in no way be financed through mandatory assessments but that it should be financed by way of voluntary contributions from the western nations that have a direct interest in the conduct of the operation.¹¹⁸

ONUC was sent into the peacekeeping theatre on the Security Council's authorization, without prior funding approval by the General Assembly. The Congo operation's financial fallout precipitated a change in that procedure. In April 1961 the General Assembly authorized \$100 million to cover the operations expenses between January and

¹¹⁵ William J. Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 329.

See Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary*, for a full account on the financing of ONUC, pp. 274 -303.

¹¹⁶ Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 329

¹¹⁷ Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 202.

¹¹⁸ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary*, p. 275.

October of that year. That authorization was billed to member states using the standard scale of assessments with slight changes in levies that were billed to the poorest member states. Any shortfall between the operation's cost and the assessments were to be made up by voluntary contribution by the richer nations. Through 1962, only the US made such contributions, worth \$30.6 million. The financial shortfall was exacerbated by the refusal of France, the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries to pay their assigned assessments.¹¹⁹

In December 1961, the General Assembly authorized another \$80 million to fund ONUC until June of 1962. This extra came just a month after the Security Council had approved the final use of force mandate for ONUC, and as the UN forces engaged in combat in Katanga. The General Assembly also authorized the Secretary General to issue \$200 million in UN bonds to cover expenses for ONUC and UNEF.¹²⁰ The Soviet bloc, Belgium and France voted against the bond issue. The bonds were to be repaid over a 25 year period through regular assessments.¹²¹ Subscriptions to the bond issue funded UN peacekeeping operations from July 1962 to June 1963.

In the middle of 1963, the General Assembly passed another funding resolution in which it authorized \$33 million to cover the expenses of the operation for the remainder of that year.¹²² Of those 33 million, \$3 million was apportioned according to the regular assessment and the rest were apportioned according to the regular scale of assessment.¹²³ Less developed countries were assessed at 45 percent of their regular rate. Developed countries made up for the shortfall through voluntary contributions. In October 1963,

¹¹⁹ Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 203.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 331.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

ONUC's mandate was extended to June 1964, and \$18.2m was authorized and similarly assessed to fund the operation till its completion.¹²⁴

By the end of 1963, the USSR owed \$37 million to the UN, France \$16 million, and Belgium \$3 million.¹²⁵ The USSR and France owed the organization more than the equivalent of two years of regular assessments.¹²⁶ Because of their refusal to pay regular assessments, the USSR and France could have been deprived (under Article 19 of the Charter) of their votes in the Assembly.¹²⁷ Rather than press the issue and cause further divisions within the organization, the US went along with the prevailing consensus in the Assembly that they should proceed without voting in the 1965 session.¹²⁸

The total cost of the operation came to about \$408 million.¹²⁹ Of that amount the US waived about \$10.3 million in initial airlift expenses, the USSR waived \$1.5 million and Canada about \$650,000.¹³⁰ The voluntary contributions for the operation were also overwhelmingly made by the US. In 1963 the US made 63 percent of the total voluntary contributions while it also made 61 percent of the contributions for 1964.¹³¹ Including the cost of bonds purchased, the US contribution to ONUC's military operations totalled nearly 48 percent. In addition, the US funded about 71 percent of the cost of the UN's civilian operation in the Congo.¹³² The US was thus instrumental in sustaining the Congo operation. Without this massive financial support the operation would literally never have got off the ground. Moreover, this huge operation almost led to the bankruptcy and collapse of the organization.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary*, p. 298.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 299

¹²⁹ Durch, "The UN Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964," p. 331.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

The Timing Imperative:

On July 12, 1960, the Congolese leaders asked for UN help. The Secretary General immediately took the matter to the Security Council where by July 14, it was decided that a UN peacekeeping operation should be sent. Immediately after the adoption of the July 14 resolution, Hammarskjold requested certain European and African governments to provide troop contingents for the Congo campaign. Within twenty-four hours the first troops for the UN force arrived in the Congo.¹³³ These included 770 Ghanaians and 593 Tunisians.¹³⁴ A month later, the force totalled more than fourteen thousand men from twenty-four states.¹³⁵ About six weeks after the first deployment the United Nations Forces numbered more than 16,000 strong.

The rapidity with which the UN force was set up and sent into the theatre is something that has not been seen in UN interventions since then. The timely intervention had been made possible by the activist stance Hammarskjold took. Immediately after the Congolese leaders asked for help, Hammarskjold invoked Article 99 of the Charter, which in essence painted the crisis as a threat to international peace and security.¹³⁶ Hammarskjold was also instrumental in getting the UN forces deployed expeditiously by working hard behind the scenes for troop contributions. In addition, the willingness by both superpowers not to intervene unilaterally paved the way for the quick deployment of UN troops.¹³⁷ Both the Soviet Union and the US were keen to see the UN intervene instead of fighting each other in the Congo.¹³⁸

¹³³ Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 25.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 10.

¹³⁷ Indar Jit Rikhye, "The United Nations Operation in the Congo: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding," p. 208.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

The timing of an outside intervention can either exacerbate or lessen the effects of a crisis. And it seems, looking in retrospect, that the Secretary General made the right call in intervening as early as he did. Without prompt UN intervention, the central government would have further splintered into rival blocs, and that would have made any efforts to reunify the Congo difficult, if not impossible.¹³⁹

Characteristics of the Operation:

The Role of the Secretary General:

The Congo crisis shows that the role played by the Secretary General in an operation is very crucial as he can leave his personal stamp in the interpretation of the resolutions. With backing from at least some prominent members of the UN this influence can be enormous. In the case of the Congo the death of Hammarskjold forces us to compare his era with that of his successor, and their different styles as well as their personal impact as heads of the UN becomes more apparent. The liberal idealist background that Hammarskjold came from seemed to cast a shadow over his practical involvement in the crisis. Having acquainted himself with the African continent at a tumultuous time, a time when many of the countries were gaining independence, Hammarskjold came to appreciate the enormous challenges new countries faced in consolidating their independence and national unity.¹⁴⁰ As a result of that exposure and tinged with his conviction that the UN was a useful instrument to handle such crises, the Secretary General was eager to give whatever help he could when the Congo appealed for assistance.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹A proof of this can be seen in the Secretary General's hesitancy to station UNF in Katanga as soon as they arrived. Between the time of their arrival in the Congo and their final entry into the province, Tshombe consolidated his forces with such a rapidity that they became, in the end, a power to contend with.

¹⁴⁰ Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

The Secretary General had a pacifist's mind and sought to avoid conflict at almost all cost. When the first UN resolution spelled out that the presence of the UNF should cover all the Congo- which meant entry into Katanga- the Secretary General backed off. He sought to scrupulously observe or at least seem to give the impression that he was impartial in the conflict between the central government and the Katanga authorities despite the clear resolutions from the Security Council, which only recognized the authority of the central government. He thus tenaciously sought to be impartial even when it was not only untenable but also where impartiality might be unnecessary, undesirable and indeed counterproductive. Hammarskjold, indeed, was so much opposed to the use of force that he even envisaged a situation where the international operation might have been called off if there was a civil war. He was equivocal and divided over what should be done if such a situation arose knowing full well the negative precedent that would have created if the UN cut and run. He therefore proposed that if such a scenario materialized, he "would have put up to the Security Council the question whether the United Nations Force should not withdraw".¹⁴² The Secretary General knew such a drastic measure "would mean failure of a great effort to keep the Cold War in sharper forms out of Africa, and the failure also to stabilize the situation of the Congo through such means as the Charter makes available to the organization."¹⁴³

For Hammarskjold diplomacy and negotiation were the avenues through which to achieve results. But with those tools he achieved little in the Congo and his unwillingness to use force may have undercut his diplomatic efforts. His lack of legal knowledge coupled with

¹⁴² Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 95.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

his idealism may have clouded his judgement to see that prudent use of force sometimes yields better results.¹⁴⁴

U Thant, on the other hand, was in many ways the very antithesis of Hammarskjold. Hailing from a different background only sharpened his different perceptions and viewpoints. Coming from a developing nation that had been colonized undoubtedly gave him an insight into the difficulties such nations faced. Upon acceding to power, U Thant proceeded to get a handle of the problem. Being a man who was not given to musings on moral or idealistic imperatives, U Thant tried to bring a sense of realism and pragmatism to the operation by skillfully using both the tools he had at his disposal: diplomacy and force. He prudently used the carrot and the stick at various points either to induce or thwart the secessionists. When the Nov. 24 resolution was passed he stated that he would “implement it with vigor and determination.” And implement it he did for his period was marked by an increased resolve to eliminate the secessionists. Indeed it was the December assault to which the Secretary General gave the green light that saw the problem of Katanga secession eliminated once and for all. U Thant, it is fair to say, gave less legal justification for the UNF actions though they were, by and large, based on legal consideration.¹⁴⁵ He resorted less often to the advisory committee and not at all to the Security Council after the adoption of the Nov. 1961 resolution in the wake of his election. U Thant’s concept of law, moreover, was less legalistic and procedural, more substantive and teleological.¹⁴⁶ Apart from their personal styles the context within which each of them operated also contributed to the difference in their actions. Hammarskjold’s was the constitutive and most controversial period. By Thant’s era, the pattern had settled, as had the acrimonious controversies over the operation and the role of the Secretary General.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁴⁵ Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p. 198.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 197.

Thant wanted to see the Katanga problem resolved one way or another. He initially tried diplomacy to convince Tshombe to stop his adventurism of secession. But when the talks dithered on without results, Tshombe who had a unique ability to wear out the patience of the pacifist Bhuddist, got what he had coming. The use of force was authorized and the secessionists were routed out. Thant's actions were geared to yielding positive political results.¹⁴⁷

Each of the Secretaries-General had in their own unique way contributed to the solution of the Congo crisis. Hammarskjold who presided over the crisis in the initial stage was accused of being a lackey of the West by the communist countries. Hammarskjold's efforts were at every turn undermined by the Soviet pressure and in the latter period by actions of the Afro-Asians militants. Thant, on the other hand, took over the managing of the crisis after the pattern had settled. The Soviet Union was not as hostile to him as it was towards Hammarskjold. This in part emanated from the fact that Thant did not table any new resolution pertaining to the conflict, and his actions against the Katangan secessionists also pleased the Russians. It was during Thant's era that the Katanga rebellion was crushed. One could therefore argue that, despite the difference in personality and perspective between the two Secretaries General, Thant essentially finished a job whose foundation was laid down by Hammarskjold.

Quality of UN Military Leadership:

Equally important as the other factors, and contributing as much to the shape and final outcome of the Security Council resolutions are the men in the field, both civilian and military commanders, who are entrusted with translating the resolutions into tangible

¹⁴⁷Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence*, p.456.

results. The contributions and the actions of the supporting cast are therefore very important. Ralph Bunche was the first representative of the Secretary General in the Congo. Though he had a great ability and was well experienced in UN management, his great handicap was the lack of a military background.¹⁴⁸ The representatives of the Secretary General though they were normally civilians were also responsible for military matters and hence the force commander came under him. Von Horn who was the commander of UNTSO before he was transferred to the Congo operation did not comprehend the complexity of the new situation, and his staff was likewise incompetent and confused.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, he became very unpopular by acting like a “proconsul rather than a commander.”¹⁵⁰

In July Hammarskjold appointed Brigadier I.J. Rikhye as military advisor. As a trouble shooter he was soon dispatched to the Congo operation, which at this time was being organized. It was crucial that an experienced soldier should plant his feet firmly. Rikhye, for a moment acted over Von Horn, the force commander. That tended to create some problems but Rikhye’s overall impact had been positive.

Anthony Cordier who was acting Representative of the Secretary General before Dayal’s arrival very much influenced events in the Congo through his action. Acting on his own discretion, he barred Lumumba from using the radio station to broadcast his message of appeal to his loyal forces. If Lumumba had been given that opportunity then events might have turned out differently. Cordier’s other act was the closure of the airports to all traffic except UN sanctioned flights. This also had the effect of stopping Lumumba from transporting his forces to Leopoldville where the struggle was staged. The twin decisions of Cordier to a great extent dictated the fate of Lumumba.

¹⁴⁸ Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 175.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Verrier, *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*, p. 58.

Dayal who replaced Cordier had a different view of the UN mission and how its objectives should be realized. He, like Hammarskjold, was steadfast in observing legal rules and abiding by them. He did not recognize what amounted to the deposing of Lumumba and he was reluctant, even more than Hammarskjold, to accord legitimacy to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. This impartiality did not endear him to either side as all factions attacked him. The Kasavubu regime, indeed, asked the Secretary General for his recall. The Secretary General initially refused but later succumbed to pressure from the West which also made a similar request.¹⁵¹

O'Brien, the Secretary General's representative in Katanga, was by far the most controversial official in the whole operation. Once appointed he embarked on a plan that was based on a loose interpretation of the resolutions. Under his command he carried out the first attack on mercenaries in Katanga and later followed up with operation 'Marthor'. It was his understanding that the UNF was to end the secession in Katanga. Ironically, his straight forwardness and candor, notwithstanding his diplomatic credentials, made him unsuitable for the job and soon some countries were calling for his dismissal.

By far the most decisive, pragmatic and best-trained commanders were from the Indian forces. Their preponderance in the official cadres was the result of their numerical significance in troop contribution. The three outstanding commanders in these operations were Brigadiers Raja, Noronha and Major General Premchand. Brigadier Raja was heavily involved in the 'unokat' operation in which the UN achieved its objective of establishing an effective control of Elisabethville.

¹⁵¹Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 80.

The Indian commanders military heroism became clearer in operation 'Jacaranda' which in effect can be called an Indian operation.¹⁵² It also marked an "unprecedented involvement by a Third World member in the United Nations' attempt to be an arbiter of international issues."¹⁵³ General Premchand, who was the overall commander of ONUC in Katanga while Noronha was the commander of the Indian forces in the Province were decisive in obliterating the strength of the secessionist forces. Noronha after quickly establishing control of Jadotville pressed on to capture Kolwezi- the crossing of the Lufira river indeed symbolized the end of the secession. The credit for success belongs to the Indian forces and their commanders.¹⁵⁴ Thus the acts, incremental though they might have been, performed by the supporting cast gave the operation much of its character. Just as much as the supporting cast was to be blamed for the operation's shortcomings, they were to receive credit for its successes.

The Congo operation was one of the most complex and extensive multilateral exercises ever undertaken by the United Nations. Within a short period the UN had soldiers hailing from over twenty countries put under one command structure. The contribution of troops for this operation, because of its political nature, had to be restricted to countries that were neutral or non-aligned like the Afro-Asian countries. However, this restriction was not scrupulously observed as thirteen Western nations have contributed troops to the mission.

Within a few days after the resolutions requiring the stationing of UN troops was announced soldiers poured into the country. This quick intervention would not have been possible without the massive logistical and transport assistance provided by the United

¹⁵²Verrier, *International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World*, p.75.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, p. 176.

States. The US defense department has made available a number of planes and ships to be used for transporting military personnel and their equipment.¹⁵⁵

The US, furthermore, was important in helping the UN stay its course once the resolutions had been passed by ensuring that the Afro-Asian countries were tightly behind American policies; and if they opposed her they remained at least independent instead of drifting to the Soviet position. The Afro-Asian bloc played a balancing and counter balancing game. While most of them were dismayed with the turn of events especially after Lumumba was assassinated their reactions were different; the radicals withdrew their forces to weaken and undermine the operation while the Indian government contributed more to offset the withdrawals and strengthen the UN hand. The Indian government act can be explained by Nehru's activist foreign policy that wanted to carve a special role in international affairs for his country.

Locus of Deployment:

The territories over which the different protagonists in the Congo's civil war were fighting roughly reflected tribal divisions. The Congo being a new 'nation' did not possess a high degree of cohesion that transcended tribal allegiances. Indeed, 'divide and rule' was the tactic the colonists, and Belgian was no exception, had used in occupying a given territory. The emphasizing of tribal differences was the *sine qua non* of colonial policy. South Kasai under Kalonji was mainly occupied by the Balubas who in Katanga formed a significant minority. Initially the Balubas leadership in Katanga sided with the central government and that invited the wrath of Tshombe over them. Indeed Tshombe forces conducted massacres against the Balubas in an attempt to remove them from Katanga.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: 1946-1967. Documents and Commentary*, p. 267.

¹⁵⁶ Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964*, p.125.

The above factors, in all, which revolve around the characteristics and the nature of a conflict, determine the desirability and possibility of successfully undertaking a peacemaking operation. If the factions are many and fractured among themselves, and if the territory they fighting over is not clearly delineated then a peacemaking exercise carried out even with the best intention and effectiveness can easily turn into a nightmare. Fortunately in the case of the Congo the factions were easily identifiable, and so was the territory.

Conclusion:

What was the overall impact of the UN peacemaking effort? The one unquestionable result was that despite all the difficulties, limitations and setbacks the UN mission succeeded in keeping the Congo unified and thereby achieved its primary objectives as enunciated in its resolutions. The countries with vested interests in the outcome varied in their appraisal: the US saw it as a vindication of its broader geopolitical policies while the Soviet Union perceived it to be a betrayal of the UN international mission. That the two superpowers did not meet each other in a showdown but were kept to the sidelines while the UN, with all its imperfections, carried on the show bears some testimony to the success of the organization's efforts to exclude direct superpower unilateral involvement. For once the UN scored a remarkable victory, for without its full engagement, "the Congo would have ceased to survive as a unified nation and could easily have become a battle ground of economic and ideological warfare."¹⁵⁷

The host state, the Congo, had initially invited the UN to get involved in restoring law and order. The Congolese leaders, however, mistakenly believed that the UN would be

¹⁵⁷Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, p. 89.

fighting alongside its own forces. When the UN leadership advised them the mission would be operating independently and impartially, the Congolese leaders quickly became hostile to the UN. Also, the UN became a target for vituperative attacks by both Lumumba and Kasavubu, each accusing the international organization of favoring the other in its actions or lack of thereof. However, the hostility to the UN by the central government authorities subsided after the dismissal of Lumumba. Kasavubu, Mobutu and other central government authorities were, from the point of Lumumba's dismissal, more inclined to give support to the UN effort.

The main protagonists of the Congo civil war were Tshombe's Katanga, and Gizenga's Stanleyville based government. Tshombe was bent on ceding the province in which he was a premier from the Congo. He always saw the UN forces as a threat to his program of Katanga secession, and therefore has remained hostile to the UN operation till its conclusion.

Gizenga, a protégé of Lumumba, initially supported the deployment of the UN force, hoping like the other central government authorities that it would fight on their side. After the death of Lumumba, Gizenga who thought himself as the heir apparent became hostile to the UN operation. He masterminded a scheme of ceding part of the country. However, his stance changed after he was co-opted into the Adoula regime where he was made the vice-president. When the Adoula government fell, Gizenga went back to Stanleyville, and to his secession business.

The third party that was most involved in the Congo crisis was Belgium. The obstructionist behaviour of Belgium has undeniably prolonged the crisis as well as hampered the UN operation. Belgium which was from the start opposed to the UN effort self righteously asserted that the re-deployment of its troops back into the Congo didn't

constitute an aggression. The Belgium government argued that the stationing of its troops was only meant to serve the purposes of protecting its nationals, and its national interests. However, the majority of the UN members did not agree with her position. The Belgium government also refused to pay any of its assessments to finance the UN operation. The initial Belgium obstruction gave way to cooperation in late 1963, after the ascension into power in Brussels by a more moderate coalition government.

At the start of the UN operation in the Congo, there was no continental organization in Africa. However, the fissures of division between what could loosely be described as regional organizations were already present. The Casablanca group, which was pro-Lumumba, wanted to see a more activist role for the UN operation in quashing the Katanga rebellion. The group also wanted Lumumba to be re-instated as the Prime Minister of the Congo. The Casablanca group threatened to withdraw if that objective was not made, and after the death of Lumumba was reported most members of the group pulled out their forces.

The Brazzaville group which was composed of Franco-phone nations and which was closely directed by France advocated a lesser role for the UN forces in ending the Katangan secession. This group also sided with the anti-Lumumba forces within the Congo. The lack of a regional organization certainly did not stop African countries from supporting one of the protagonists in the Congo drama.

The UN objectives were clear from the start of the operation. The key objectives of the UN mission were the restoring of law and order and the ending of the Katanga secession. The mandates of the operation got a shot in the arm after both superpowers supported the UN resolutions. Belgium, which was the most important third party in the Congo, was opposed to the operation. France and Britain, two colonial powers in the continental were

worried about the larger impact the Congo precedence would have on their colonial possessions. For that reason, London and Paris were either cool or hostile to the UN operation.

The indispensability of the US effort for the operation is best exemplified by its massive financing of the whole undertaking. The financial position of the UN became acute after two large contributors to its coffers, the USSR and France, disputed the legality of financing such an operation from UN contributions. The US, worried that such a financial bickering might lead to ONUC's collapse, not only guaranteed the sale of UN bonds but also hiked its own contributions to offset some of the shortfall. Of the \$400 million expenditure on the peacemaking effort the US contributed to over a third.¹⁵⁸

The UN reaction to the appeal for help by the Congolese leaders was apt and timely. Within twenty-four hours after the first Security Council resolution was passed, and just two days after the Lumumba and Kasavubu telegraphed the UN for assistance, the first UN forces found their way to the Congo. It was this swift decision by the UN that perhaps saved the Congo from further splintering and chaos. The quick deployment might also have minimized the UN costs, as it would have found it expensive and dangerous to intervene were the superpowers first to arrive in the Congo. This expeditious and timely UN involvement might have contributed immensely to the operation's eventual success.

Hammaraskjold who was the Secretary General when the Congo crisis erupted acted promptly to the brewing crisis as he invoked the rarely used Article 99 of the Charter. The Secretary General sensing the conflict to be a threat to international peace and security immediately called the Security Council to take action. The deployment of UN

¹⁵⁸The US aid, which was given directly to the Congo or to the UN for technical assistance and peacekeeping activities in the Congo, reached over \$400 Million by the end of 1964 (Epstein, *Revolt in the Congo: 1960-64*, p. 178).

troops in the Congo was the preferred way in which the Secretary General wanted to end the crisis. His plans for the UN troops, however, made him a target of communist countries that saw him as a man who was out to serve western interests. Hammarskjold, however, continued in his position as Secretary General despite the protestations of the Soviet Union who called for his replacement by a 'Troika.'

After the demise of Hammarskjold in a plane crash enroute to Ndola to meet Tshombe, U Thant succeeded him as the UN Secretary General. Although Thant's personality and perspective was different, he did not ask for the drafting of new mandates. Thant instead used the mandates that were previously passed. His period saw the active use of UN troops in quelling the Katanga rebellion. His actions to use UN force in ending Katanga's secession pleased the communist countries, and as such Thant never faced Soviet opposition. In the end, Katanga secession was terminated during the reign of U Thant.

It seems, in retrospect, that Thant and Hammarskjold actions towards the Congo complemented each other. Their personality and perspectives might have been different but their ultimate objectives were the same: restoring order in the Congo and the ending of Katanga secession.

The UN operation also enormously benefited from the capable leadership of its military. The overwhelming majority of the forces hailed from the Afro-Asian group with India providing the largest single contingent. It was not surprising, therefore, that Indian Generals dominated the top military positions of the operation. The professional and effective Indian military leaders were instrumental in ending the Katanga rebellion. Indian generals commanded each of the UN operations mounted to forcefully bring Tshombe's army to heel.

The UN troops of about twenty thousand were scattered all over the Congo, an area that is the size of Western Europe. A force that is relatively that small cannot effectively patrol an area that big. The UN forces were instead concentrated in major urban centers where there were more people and where the forces impact of restoring law and order could be felt more immediately. After some semblance of stability was brought to the rest of the country, the UN was able to isolate Katanga as its only theatre of operations. The territory for UN operation from that point on was clearly delineated, and most of the UN forces were transferred to Katanga to help end its secession.

Today the Congo is in the grips of a potential civil war whose consequences will not be less damaging to its territorial integrity than events that had happened thirty years ago. The perennial problem of secession from Katanga has cropped up several times, but the western powers have directly intervened to support the Mobutu regime. However, events in the post Cold War era have reduced immeasurably the strategic value of many states that lay on the fringes- and Zaire is no exception. Because the Soviet threat is no longer there, the US and other Western nations do not have any preponderant reason for intervening in such conflicts. What becomes salient then is how superpower rivalry once motivated the different ideological blocs to mobilize international organizations like the UN to engage in peacekeeping/peacemaking operation. In the case of the Congo this becomes obvious when the current situation it is in is compared with what had happened in the formative stages of the Cold War.

The UN in the end succeeded in keeping the Congo united despite the great odds the organization faced. The UN quickly assembled a force of more than twenty thousand in a short period of time, and with massive logistical assistance from the United States dispatched its forces to such a remote location as the Congo. The great challenges the UN faced over the conduct of its ONUC operation were many. The Soviets became hostile to

the UN Secretary General, France refused to pay its assessments, and the radical Afro-Asians withdrew their forces. In spite of those challenges, the UN persevered and eventually weathered the controversies. With the successful re-integration of Katanga, and with the restoration of law and order in the Congo, it was mission accomplished for the UN.

Chapter Three

Mayhem in Bosnia: The Failure of UN Strategic Peacekeeping Strategy

The Balkans aren't worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier

Gen. Von Otto Bismarck

We don't have a dog in that fight

James Baker, former Secretary of State of the USA

Bosnia and Herzegovina is not just a homeland, it is an idea. It is a belief that people of different religions, nationalities and cultural traditions, can live together.

Alia Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia

Introduction:

Europe's history this century ends where it seems to have begun - in Sarajevo. The land that gave that continent "the war to end all wars" is once more giving it a new nasty nationalist conflict. Whether this war is a whimper from the nationalist wars of yore or whether it is a harbinger of the new Europe is only a subject of speculation. What is more certain, however, is that this Balkan conflict can reignite the smoldering cauldron of past grievances and unsettled scores from wars past in this highly volatile region. The Bosnian conflict has confounded the international community and perplexed western policy makers for its complex and intricate underpinnings defy simple solutions. Both the European Union and the United Nations strove hard to end the savage conflict through persuasion and the threat of coercion but to no avail.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia imminent the international community preoccupied by other important events in the Gulf and in the Soviet Union paid scant attention to this brewing crisis. However, once the seriousness of the dissolution sank in and as the political and human consequences that could result from such a fallout were realized, indifference paved way to international involvement. The conflict in Yugoslavia has far reaching implications. There is an apparent danger that the war which is now confined

within the Yugoslavian borders could spread into the neighboring countries and engulf the whole Balkan region. The outbreak of large-scale violence in Yugoslavia raised the question of crisis prevention. This was important in other flash points in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. It also clearly and practically showed the need for new creative, effective and innovative mechanisms for crisis management once a conflict begins. Acts of secession by Yugoslav republics were accompanied by their search for international diplomatic recognition. Thus the secession reopened a fresh the question of when to grant recognition to a country and when it is appropriate to deny it. The Yugoslavian crisis also highlighted the important issue of state - and nation-building, something of particular importance in the post Cold War and indeed post Soviet world. The sanctity with which the state, in its immutable form, was taken as the denominator in international relations is being called into question. The sacred cow of international relations - the inviolability of state borders and the integrity of the state - has been slaughtered with impunity. Events in Yugoslavia brought this new dynamic, which are currently in play to the fore.¹

The conflict in the Balkans, however, does not only represent an ethnic fratricidal conflict but carries with it a larger symbol of a 'clash of civilizations.'² In ex-Yugoslavia the Muslim World meets the Christian sphere. And it is in Bosnia where the civilizational clash assumes added significance. Since the splitting of the Roman Empire in the fourth century "the tectonic plates of imperial, religion, and racial interests have ground together in the Balkans. Rome and Constantinople, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Christianity and Islam, Germans and Slavs, Russia and the West - all have clashed along a shifting fault line running down the middle of Yugoslavia (or, more precisely, through the territory of today's Bosnia Herzegovina)."³ Despite the fact that Bosnian Muslims are the most

¹John, Zametica, *Yugoslav Conflict*, p. 46. See also Gow and Freedman, "Intervention in a Fragmenting State: the Case of Yugoslavia" in *To Loose the Bands of Wickedness*, IISS, Brassey's, 1993 , p. 95

²See Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993

³Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New war, old hatreds," *Foreign Policy*, Number 91 Summer 1993. p.4

westernized citizens of ex-Yugoslavia, it is, however, what they come to represent that matters most.⁴ The fact that western nations are less in sympathy with the plight of the Bosnian Muslims is one that is generally noted. “It is an awkward but unavoidable truth that had the citizens of Sarajevo been predominantly Christian or Jewish, the civilized world would not have permitted the siege...”⁵ observed Richard Nixon while George Soros bluntly asserts that “anti-Muslim prejudice has undoubtedly played an important part: It has influenced European policy toward Bosnia at every level; it has permeated even the United Nations forces and the humanitarian effort.”⁶ A cultural curtain that separates the Islamic and Christian worlds is certainly descending in Bosnia.⁷ The fact that the Western world is clearly in a position to arrest such a situation from becoming a reality but have not done so makes them complicitous in the obliteration of the Islamic civilization in Europe. “The real danger,” Nixon warned “is not [that] this clash is inevitable but that by our inaction we will make it a self fulfilling prophecy.”⁸ A by product of the misguided western policy toward Bosnia that is bereft of any moral import is that it will not only aid the fundamentalists’ cause but poison relations between the two world wide religions of Islam and Christianity for a long time to come.⁹

In the initial part of this chapter the historical links that provide a sense of continuity to the unraveling drama in the ex-Yugoslavian federation and in particular Bosnia will be overviewed. The UN involvement in Bosnia has been predicated on assisting in the delivery of humanitarian relief.

⁴Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Balkans: The Cross and the Crescent,’ *The Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1993. P. D3

⁵Richard Nixon, ‘America Must Lead,’ *Time*, May 2, 1994. P. 22. Excerpts from his forthcoming book ‘Beyond Peace.’

⁶George Soros, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XL, No. 16, October 7, 1993. P. 16

⁷Kaplan, ‘The Balkans: The Cross and the Crescent,’ p. D3

⁸Nixon, p. 22.

⁹Kaplan, p. D3

After a general exposition of Yugoslavian history is given, the chapter in its second subsection will specifically deal with the case of Bosnia. The main part of this section will look at the extent and degree of international involvement in the Bosnian conflict and the factors that thwarted any possibility of curbing the carnage and civil strife that plague this new state. The international community's response to the Bosnian crisis is questioned. Why has it meekly responded to the obliteration of a state by dispatching a peacekeeping force instead of forcefully intervening to reverse the process of blatant aggression? It will be argued that the changed atmosphere of international politics in the post Cold War era and the lack of national interests of the major powers in this conflict sheds some light on why force was never countenanced to save the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state. The concluding section will look at the salient features of UNPROFOR and make observations as to the shortcoming of the UN operation in Bosnia.

The Historical Background

The Yugoslav state came from the notion that the south Slavs, sharing a close racial and linguistic commonness, should form a distinct 'nation'. That hope and expectation of the Slavs materialized only for a limited time and in the end the different nations could not overcome the deep historical, political, cultural and religious differences that characterize each of the groups that made up the Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav concept was based on a marriage of convenience and deception. On the one hand the Croats and the Slovenes saw their participation in the formation of the Yugoslav enterprise as the only way to attain their long cherished goal of self-determination. On the other hand, Serbian leaders saw the creation of Yugoslavia as an opportunity to realize their dream of uniting all the Serbs in an expanded Serbia. The divergent views of what Yugoslavia should be undid both the first and second versions of the country and created constant bickering that would have erupted into a bitter war much earlier if it was not for the constraining influence of the great powers. With the demise of the Soviet Union that constraining

influence and the concomitant fear that an internal civil war would give the Soviets an excuse for intervention has diminished. It was therefore not unexpected that Yugoslavia ceased to exist the moment the Cold War ended.

With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires in the course of World War I, the allies at Versailles decided on the creation of an independent Slav State which came to be known as the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.' Right from the start the country was racked by internal nationalist tensions and jealousies. In addition to being different nations, Yugoslavia also contained adherents of three faiths. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a unitary state with a constitutional monarch as its head and multiparty parliamentary democracy as its form of government. However, friction on the type of constitution to adopt and whether the country should be a unitary model or a decentralized federation continued to occupy center stage. This constitutional order collapsed when King Alexander I suspended the constitution and assumed legislative powers effectively ushering in a period of royal dictatorship.

The Second World War period provided Yugoslavia with a most complex time in its ethnic history and can in many ways be seen to have been a harbinger of what was to befall it after the end of the Cold War. In the Second World War period Yugoslavia was engulfed by an international war, an ideological war and an inter-ethnic clash and became a seething cauldron of hatred. These three-wars-in-one exposed the uneasy relations that existed among the major southern Slav communities. Josip Broz Tito's communist partisans won the civil war. The partisans, under Tito, espoused a program of 'Brotherhood and Unity' that was designed to reshape the country in a way that was amenable to those who opposed the first constitution. A federation model was seen to contain the best hope for a united Yugoslavian state. Under Tito's communist regime Yugoslavia was reformulated into a federation of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The internal borders were settled immediately and they very roughly reflected the ethnic and historical divisions. However, while most of the other nationalities happened to be united within the new republics, the

Serbs found themselves scattered all over, save in Slovenia. What made the borders acceptable was the fact that they did not have the character of state borders, and were designed primarily for administrative purposes. The Serbians greatly resented Macedonia and Montenegro being carved into republics as they considered both Macedonians and Montenegrins as part of the Serb nation. The uniqueness of the ethnic mosaic of Bosnia made it possible for its recognition as a distinct republic. The second Yugoslavia, however, failed because the attempt to correct its predecessor's errors satisfied no one. The federal structures created to accommodate the sentiments of the republics succeeded in providing the right framework for nationalists to create embryonic nation-states. Strong agitation from Slovenia and Croatia made the federal government cede more power to the republics in an effort to realize the principle of self-management.¹⁰ The devolution of authority only led to more demands from the nationalist parties at the republican level. The Croatian party was the vanguard in its separatist tendencies and when it crossed the line it attracted the ire of Tito who with the army's help set on a great purge of the Communist Party of Croatia. To placate them, however, Tito adopted the 1974 constitution, which ceded almost total control to the republics. This constitution created a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which remained as part of Serbia. The two regions were made autonomous provinces because they contain large minority population but they were not given republican status because such a move would have been injurious to Serbian sensibilities. Except in areas of defense, foreign affairs and certain joint economic projects the federation ceased to exist, essentially becoming a cross between a federation and confederation consisting of eight units. This new constitution in essence proclaimed the Yugoslavian federation "a state community of voluntarily united nations and their socialist republics," and accorded sovereign status to "nations and nationalities" in their respective autonomous regions.¹¹ The Tito plan substituted increased decentralization for

¹⁰ James Gow, 'Deconstructing Yugoslavia,' p. 293.

¹¹ Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New war, old hatreds," *Foreign Policy*, Number 91, Summer 1993. p. 13

political pluralism. What was to be a political masterstroke, in retrospect, proved to be a monumental failure.

Multi-party reforms, though they came much later to the southeast, reflected the same kind of pattern established in the northwest. The formation of ethnic parties had been prohibited by the electoral laws that were drafted though unfortunately that provision was overridden by the Bosnia's constitutional court.¹² Only the League of Communists (SK-SDP) and Markovic's (Alliance of Reform Forces) could be described as pan-ethnic. Each of the three main parties which emerged in Bosnia represented a particular ethnic constituency: The Bosnian Serbs were represented by the Serbian Democrat party (SDS), the Bosnian Muslims by the party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Bosnian Croats, the Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ).¹³ All these parties, despite their ethnic caveats, were united to the ending of communist rule. The three parties, however, differed on the future prospects of Bosnia's autonomy. While the Serbs could not envisage a Bosnia outside Yugoslavia, the Muslims and Croats welcomed it and even thought of a confederal arrangement between themselves.¹⁴ The Bosnian Croats also thought that would be advantageous to them, as a confederal arrangement with Croatia and Slovenia would offset their minority status within Bosnia.

The republic's tripartite ethnic composition had ensured no one party would win a majority in the election, and therefore a coalition government comprising of the main parties became necessary. Alia Izetbegovic highlighted the diversity and complexity of Bosnia and underscored the need for its preservation by saying, "Bosnia has lasted 1,000 years. I do not see any reason to break it now. Bosnia is impossible to divide, because it is such a mixture of nationalities, just like the apartment bloc where I live."¹⁵ In spite of that

¹² Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, p. 143

¹³ *Strategic Survey: 1992-1993*. Brassey's, 1993, p. 84

¹⁴ *Strategic Survey: 1992-1993*, p. 85

fact or because of it the nationalist parties recorded impressive results, and each party did extremely well in its ethnic group. The three parties won 202 of the 240 bicameral legislature with the Muslims leading the way with 87 seats, the Serbs 71, and the Croats 44.

Certain important factors led to the polarization of the electorate along ethnic lines. These were the strategic location of Bosnia in the center of Yugoslavia; its multiethnic and multiconfessional nature as well as its being the meeting ground of the two main antagonists of Yugoslavia, the Croats and Serbs. After the elections the leaders of the three main ethnic parties strove hard to lay a foundation for a coalition where ministerial and administrative positions would be distributed along ethnic lines. The SDA leader, Izetbegovic, was elected as the president of a seven member multiethnic presidency; a Croat from the HDZ was chosen as the Prime Minister; and a Serb from SDS was appointed as the president of the Bosnian legislature. However, it was clearly becoming evident that the formation of a coalition government was a temporary stop-gap measure at best, as the continual bickering and differing visions each party had were increasingly straining the tenuous unity that was projected. Both the internal and the larger external political atmospherics were to adversely affect this laudable but tentative effort.

Early in the Yugoslav crisis the president of Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, had suggested drafting a new constitution for Yugoslavia which re-defined the powers of the six republics and dominated the Communists as the major force in the government. But this was before the independence declarations of Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991. It had now become clear that Serbia would dominate a rump Yugoslavia to an even greater extent than before. Bosnian independence, at least for the Croat and Muslim communities, was seen as the only alternative to a Greater Serbia. In October 1991, Muslim and Croat deputies in the republic's National Assembly approved a memorandum emphasizing Bosnia's autonomy. But the Serbs were displeased with that move and in November they voted in favor of remaining part of Yugoslavia. The Serbs who were

¹⁵ Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, p. 145

spread over large areas of Bosnia asserted that none of the land, which they inhabited, could leave Yugoslavia. The nationalist Serbs who were heavily influenced by decisions emanating from Belgrade interpreted Bosnia's independence to be a signal for waging war. Haris Silajdzic, Bosnia's foreign minister, reacted to the Serb behavior by saying that if they want war, then they shall have it.¹⁶ Before long hostilities ensued in earnest.

EC PEACEMAKING IN BOSNIA: THE ART OF FAILURE

The European Community's failure in Croatia did not stop it from taking the early lead in mediating the Bosnian conflict. The EC still believed that it had a strong responsibility in searching for solutions to conflicts that erupt in its own backyard. The Community's efforts once again failed to stop or even dampen the conflict. Its efforts may well have complicated an already complex situation, and the Community's efforts might also have sidelined organizations like the UN from intervening in the conflict.

When the Community was preparing to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991, it invited applications from all the Yugoslav republics that wanted independence. The Bosnian government formally requested recognition on 20 December 1991. The Bosnian government further promised to give extensive minority rights to its Croats and Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs, however, would have none of that and reacted to Bosnia's application for independence by declaring their own independent Serbian republic on 9 January 1992.

The Badinter Arbitration Commission, part of the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia that had been set up in the summer of 1991 took up Bosnia's case upon applying for independence.¹⁷ The Commission argued that though popular will for an independent state had not been clearly demonstrated in Bosnia, it could attain recognition if it held an internationally supervised referendum, which was open to all citizens. In addition to that

¹⁶ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 4.

¹⁷ Rosalyn Higgins, "The United Nations and Former Yugoslavia," *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3 (1993), p. 468.

the Bosnian government was to accord minority and ethnic rights to its Croat and Serb communities. The Bosnian government immediately set about laying the groundwork for independence, and on 25 January the National Assembly endorsed plan to hold a national referendum at the end of February. The Portuguese presidency of the EC said that if the referendum were in favor of independence, the EC would recognize the republic as an independent and sovereign country.

There were intrinsic inconsistencies in the Community's approach. The EC expected to play a crucial role in the recognition of Bosnia, but it had no intention of protecting the new state as an independent entity.¹⁸ The Community opted for the recognition option in the hope that such a measure would prevent the onset of conflict in Bosnia. The Community members came to such an understanding because they believed, despite the lack of hard evidence to prove their point, that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia had ended the conflicts there. The Bosnian Serbs - remote-controlled from Belgrade - had malicious intent to mortally wound and even destroy the new Bosnian state.

The European Community continued to hold and encourage talks between the warring groups. The Lisbon Conference, which was held in February 1992, came out with a compromise in which the Serbs agreed to respect the existing frontiers of Bosnia, while Izetbegovic agreed to the idea of a cantonized Bosnia. However, further details about the degree of autonomy these cantons would have were never fully fleshed out and hence, no final agreement was concluded. It was clear that the two sides were in actual fact far apart; the Serbs wanted the cantons to be fully autonomous or even independent cantons, while Izetbegovic wanted the cantons to be ineffective and weak.

The referendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 29 February and 1 March 1992, where 63% of Bosnians turned out to vote, an overwhelming majority voted for

¹⁸ Jonathan Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure* (RUSI, 1993), pp. 76-77.

independence.¹⁹ Serb voters came under intense pressure from their leaders not to participate, and instead boycotted the referendum.²⁰ In a democracy the majority, in most cases just a simple majority, wins. The anti-democratic tendencies and behavior of Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serb Democratic Party in Bosnia was clearly evident when he warned, “we are not going to accept an independent Bosnia Herzegovina.” Izetbegovic, riding high with the resounding verdict on the referendum he received proclaimed Bosnia an independent state on 3 March.²¹ The gathering storm was gaining speed and outbreaks of sporadic violence between Serbs and Muslims were becoming more common in Sarajevo as well as other part of the country.

On 18 March, 1992, Jose Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat who headed up the EC Conference on Bosnia, brokered an agreement in Sarajevo which was very similar to the Lisbon agreement. This agreement that was based on creating three autonomous ethnic regions in Bosnia was destined to fail. The ethnic groups did not live in separate and exclusive areas of the country but lived together in almost all locations. Both the Muslims and Serbs had serious misgivings about the proposed plan. The Muslims rightly saw the plan as the first step in dismantling Bosnia, while the Serbs did not get firm guarantees that Serb inhabited cantons would join the republic of Serbia. The EC had put forward this plan as a precondition for Bosnia’s recognition, something totally unacceptable to Izetbegovic. The Bosnian president showed his unhappiness with the plan by publicly renouncing it with perhaps the understanding of the Americans. Meanwhile, Karadzic embarked on a confrontational journey when he announced the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb republic on 27 March. The time for talks was over, and the Serbs set to gain by violence what they could not achieve at the ballot box.

¹⁹ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) pp. 245-6.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 246.

²¹ *Ibid.*

The US and the EC recognized Bosnia on 7 April, 1992. Some argue that the normal criteria for recognition did not exist, but Bosnia had fulfilled all the preconditions that had been set for its independence. The EC was not very willing to recognize Bosnia but intense pressure from the United States changed their standing on the issue. EC foreign ministers also believed, despite all evidence to the contrary, that recognition would stop the war and preserve a united country. At the same time the EC and the US sent some implicit warning to the Serbs that their aggressive mode of behavior would not be allowed in Bosnia. The warnings and threats did not make any impression on the Serbs as they called the bluff of the West.

As the intensity of the war increased, the EC once again tried to bring the main warring parties back to the negotiating table. Cutileiro negotiated a truce between the factions on 12 April, 1992 but was immediately disregarded by the conflicting parties. In late April Lord Carrington managed to get a cease-fire agreement between factions, which was signed by Izetbegovic, Karadzic and Mate Boban of Bosnia's Croatian Community. This was regarded as important as it had the signatures of all the leaders of the ethnic communities. However, the cease-fire had a shorter life span than the negotiation. Thus began a pattern which was to be repeated again and again over the next two and half years, as the various forces on the ground could did not respect the cease-fires and agreements they had signed.

The fighting was soon raging out of control. On 2 May, 1992 EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Portugal recognized the growing humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and insisted that the delivery of aid to the region be given top priority. On that same day, however, a Belgian member of the EC Monitor Mission (ECMM) was killed and the operation was suspended in protest. The other ECMM members in Sarajevo started to hastily withdraw from Sarajevo. The EC ambassadors to Belgrade were also withdrawn. The chance for an early peace settlement negotiated by the European Community was quickly vanishing.

THE UNITED NATIONS: EARLY INVOLVEMENT

The early involvement of the United Nations into Bosnia conflict was precluded by the EC diplomacy in the region. Eurodiplomacy was going nowhere and the situation in Sarajevo started to deteriorate drastically. The humanitarian crisis of the Bosnian conflict was becoming evident and that increased the pressure to ‘do something.’ The EC foreign ministers realizing their limited ability in dealing with a crisis of Bosnia’s magnitude invited the UN to closely work with them.

Even before Bosnia was recognized as a sovereign state, its president, Izetbegovic, requested the immediate deployment of UN peacekeeping forces.²² The Bosnian president also repeated his request in a fax he sent to the UN Security Council. He wanted UN troops to be deployed along the borders of Bosnia.²³ These requests were continuously made by the Bosnian government in order to avert the conflict that was about to erupt. Such a request was made to Cyrus Vance when he travelled to Sarajevo on 2 January 1992. The Bosnian president requested the preventive deployment of between 2-3,000 UN troops as a deterrent to the outbreak of war. The response of Boutros-Ghali to the request was equivocal. When the request was repeated by Bosnian foreign minister Silajdzic in Geneva in April, the Secretary General was less evasive, observing that “it might be appropriate for EC to expand its presence and activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”²⁴ The Secretary General tried to avoid the UN playing any role in that country. Soon thereafter the position of Boutros-Ghali was affirmed when on 7 April, 1992 the Security Council passed Resolution 749, appealing to all parties to cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

²² Sabrina Petra Ramet, “The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of Accommodation,” *Current History*, vol. 93, no. 586 (November 1994) p. 380.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Report of the Secretary General...*”S/23836, 24 April 1992, p.1.

Boutros-Ghali further argued “the sad fact is that the present conditions in Bosnia Herzegovina make it impossible to define a workable concept for a United Nations peacekeeping operation.”²⁵ However, Boutros-Ghali agreed to the deployment of 100 UNPROFOR military observers after the UN Protected Areas in Croatia were demilitarized.²⁶ A further 41 military observers were deployed in Mostar and other Bosnian towns before the end of April.²⁷ The war in Bosnia was causing the largest humanitarian crisis Europe had known since the end of the Second World War. Millions were displaced by the fighting, while most Bosnian towns turned into killing fields. Because of the magnitude of the crisis and the blocking of humanitarian aid by the warring parties, mainly by the Serbs, there was an increasing pressure for military intervention. The Security Council, in late April, requested the parties not to block the delivery of humanitarian assistance and at the same time demanded that foreign influence in Bosnia cease henceforth. This last part of the Security Council resolution was aimed at Serbia, which at the time was waging a full-scale war on Bosnia. The war in Bosnia, on the surface, looked like a civil war but in reality it was engineered and executed by Belgrade military officers.²⁸

Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping operations travelled to Bosnia to determine whether the situation in that country was amenable to peacekeeping. The Bosnian government, however, continued to press for immediate UN intervention. Boutros-Ghali was not in the mood to haggle over peacekeeping deployment as he argued that “given the intensity and scale of the fighting such a concept would require many tens of thousands of troops equipped for potential combat with heavily armed and determined

²⁵ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 9.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Report of the Secretary General...* S/23836, 24 April 1992, p. 1, 5-6.

²⁸ Warren Zimmermann, ‘The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,’ *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no.2 (March/April, 1995) p. 18.

adversaries. I do not believe that an enforcement action of this kind is a practicable proposition.”²⁹

Having realized the uncompromising position adopted by the Secretary General, Izetbegovic instead requested for a force of about 6-7000 troops to protect the aid convoys. Goulding replied to that request by saying in so many words that such an initiative would be highly problematic. The UNHCR also made a request similar to Izetbegovic and this time Goulding asserted that unarmed peacekeepers would not be up to the job, and more heavily armed troops would be necessary. Goulding further stressed that “such a role, while consistent with customary United Nations peacekeeping practice, would require the existence of a prior agreement among the principal parties to the conflict.” The Secretary General also maintained that “successful peacekeeping operations would require the parties to respect the United Nations, its personnel and its mandate...[F]or all their fair words, none of the parties can claim to satisfy this condition.”³⁰

As the conflict in Bosnia intensified, the UN began to re-deploy in Croatia the military observers it deployed in Bosnia just two weeks before. UNPROFOR headquarters personnel were for the most part relocated from Sarajevo to Belgrade - about 100 military and civilian personnel were left in Bosnia³¹

SANCTIONS:

Notwithstanding Lord Carrington’s view that “everybody is to blame for what is happening in Sarajevo,” it was hard to ignore that the Serbs were the aggressors and the killers in Bosnia.³² The EC asserted as much when it declared that “by far the greatest share of the blame falls on the JNA and the authorities in Belgrade which are in control of

²⁹ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 11.

³⁰ Report of the Secretary General...” S/23900, 12 May 1992.

³¹ *Report of the Secretary General...*” S/24000, 26 May 1992, p.3

³² Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 12.

the army, both directly and indirectly by supporting Serbian irregulars.” The EC threatened Belgrade with diplomatic isolation if it did not withdraw its forces from Bosnia. The SC further passed resolution 752 on 15 May, and demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia cease immediately, and that foreign units be withdrawn, placed under the control of the Bosnian government or disbanded and disarmed. However, barely a half of JNA’s 100,000 strong army heeded the call. The rest continued to fight in Bosnia. Serbia’s role in the conflict had increased the need for military intervention to reverse the aggression. The US had up to that point hardly involved itself in the conflict. However, the Secretary of State, James Baker, urged European leaders at a NATO meeting in Lisbon to do more. He came out in support of military intervention even suggesting that those who are against aggression were “on the wrong wavelength.”³³ The Europeans wanted at that point to do something, though that something remained undefined. The French for one wanted to assume an activist role though they understood the EC’s limitations. It is for that reason that they wanted to see the UN take a more important role.³⁴

Both the UN and the EC felt that the best way to sever links between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs was to impose sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In late May, EC ambassadors imposed a small package of sanctions against Serbia. The UN’s first role in Bosnia came after the Belgrade regime failed to fulfill the conditions of resolution 752. On 30 May, the Security Council in Resolution 757 imposed an embargo on Serbian and Montenegrin products, financial and economic contacts. The Resolution also imposed comprehensive sanctions that denied Yugoslavia sporting contacts and cultural contacts with the rest of the world.³⁵

³³ *The Economist*, 30 May 1992, p.12.

³⁴ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 13-4.

There was an inherent weakness in the sanctions resolutions. First, maintaining and policing the sanctions would be extremely difficult, as Romania and Greece, two main supporters of Serbia, were intent on helping Serbia by breaking the embargo. The UN and the EC decisions also lacked specific punishment provisions in cases where Serbia contravened the embargo. Most experts agreed that the sanctions measures would be an ineffective measure to punish or stop Belgrade's war aims.³⁶

UN Peacekeepers Deployment:

The UN hesitated and postponed the deployment of peacekeepers, insisting the necessary conditions for their deployment did not exist. With each passing day and with every rise in the death toll the pressure increased for the UN to step in. By the fall of 1992, the UN isolationism came to an end. The UN's first effort in Bosnia was the securing of a cease-fire between the Serb and Muslim forces in Sarajevo in order to open the airport and facilitate humanitarian aid for the capital.³⁷ The airport had been under Bosnian Serb control since the start of the conflict. The airport was the only conduit for Sarajevo and the international humanitarian effort. UN sponsored talks had begun on 2 June under UN's Director of Civil Affairs in Bosnia, Cedric Thornberry. In these talk the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) called on the Bosnian Serb leaders to stop shelling the Sarajevo, and hand over the airport to UN soldiers. Several days later the Bosnian Serb forces agreed in principle to the request. Under the agreement, UNPROFOR would secure and operate the airport, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevans. UNPROFOR was also delegated the responsibility of removing anti-aircraft weapons from the environs of the airport and monitor the concentration of artillery, mortars and missiles. In resolution 758, the UNSC broadened the mandate and strengthened UNPROFOR so that it could undertake these new missions. On June 10, 1992 Canadian Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, the new commander of UNPROFOR

³⁶ Cited in Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 14.

³⁷ Mihailo Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama*, 2nd edition (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1996) p. 212.

Sarajevo sector, along with 60 military observers arrived in Bosnia.³⁸ The deployment marked the first UN troop commitment to Bosnia.

The implementing of the airport agreement was a difficult task and it took the arrival of Mitterand on 28 June, 1992 to break the logjam over the negotiations. The area around the airport was the scene of intense battles. Despite the ensuing conflict, UNPROFOR troop deployments continued to trickle in. The first group of 30 was deployed on 28 June, and the French troops began to arrive on 1 July and a Canadian battalion was re-deployed from Croatia to Sarajevo the following day. On 3 July the airport, now under the control of the UN troops, was officially reopened for humanitarian relief supplies. On 13 July the UN Security Council agreed to send an additional 500 troops to join the 1,100 soldiers already undertaking the UN relief operations. By the end of July the Canadian battalion was replaced by forces from Ukraine, Egypt and France. A land corridor extending from Croatia port of Split to Sarajevo was also successfully opened. This land route was to complement the air route and ensure massive humanitarian delivery.

The UN troops were now on the ground but the specificity of the mandate remained cloudy. The Security Council in passing resolution 764 in July, 1992 affirmed that the troops were there in order “to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” The UN forces remained important in keeping the airport open in the face of persistent and constant attacks by local warlords. As a result the Security Council passed resolution 770 on 13 August, 1992 which authorized “all means necessary” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. This was one of the most explicit recommendation for the use of force in an internal conflict (the other exception being the Congo).

The passing of resolution 770 encouraged the European countries to take the lead in contributing troops to the UN mission. On 14 August, France sent a 1,100-strong force,

while Belgium, Italy and Spain all agreed to send troops.³⁹ A few days later Britain also agreed to contribute 1800 troops despite its earlier opposition to the use of ground forces in Bosnia.⁴⁰

The Security Council adopted Resolution 776 on 14 September, 1992. The resolution established a separate Bosnia command which came to be known as UNPROFOR II. The new resolution stated that UNPROFOR II mission was to assist and protect UNHCR in its efforts to deliver humanitarian relief efforts. It also outlined that the troops would follow normal peacekeeping rules of engagement. How these new tasks which clearly called for muscular peacekeeping was to be undertaken by forces who did not have the arms or the equipment necessary to enforce the mandate become the unsolved riddle of the Bosnian operation.

The Devastation of War: The Human Cost

The token measures adopted by the UN Security Council and carried out by UNPROFOR were far from sufficient to stop the war. The conflict in Bosnia made life in that country 'nasty, short and brutish.' The behavior of the Serbs and the savagery and ruthlessness of their conduct has introduced the concept of 'ethnic cleansing' into the annals of war history. The Bosnian Serbs argued that the flow of refugees was a natural consequence of the fighting but that contention was disproved by the horrific discovery of concentration camps. Drawing parallels between this practice and the Nazi concentration camps were hard to resist.

The human catastrophe the war wrought was of biblical proportions. The death toll quickly climbed into the hundreds of thousands, and the displacement of persons into the

³⁸ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 15.

³⁹ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 17.

millions. Over half a million people sought refuge in foreign countries, mainly in Western Europe. It is the massive influx of refugees, which concerned western European nations, and that acutely brought the point home; the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also a problem for them. Germany, which took the largest number of refugees, advocated for the setting up of a quota system that would ensure the sharing of the problem between all the EC countries. However, Britain and France strongly opposed that idea, instead proposing that the refugees should be assisted as close as possible in their place of origin.⁴¹

Other measures to combat with the crimes of the war were also undertaken. These steps however, were mostly symbolic and did not carry with them anything that would relieve the suffering. An extraordinary session of the UN Human Rights Commission held in Geneva on 13-14 August, 1993 strongly condemned the practice of ethnic cleansing and appointed Tadeuz Mazowiecki, the former Prime Minister of Poland to investigate human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.⁴² In his first report released in August, he “deplored the systematic use of violence” perpetrated by the Serbs on Croats and Muslims.⁴³ He also recommended the expansion of UNPROFOR mandate to include prevention and assisting the victims of human rights abuses in Bosnia, as wells as the setting up of a human rights tribunal to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁴

Military Intervention: The International Debate

As EC and UN efforts to curb the conflict with all its horrors failed, there was once again a call for military intervention. As Serbs were now in control of 70 percent of Bosnia, and as the dream of Greater Serbia was quickly taking shape, the window of opportunity for military intervention was now or never.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 19.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.* p. 20.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Democratic Party nominee, Bill Clinton, characterized as a foreign policy novice had seen one weak spot in George Bush's strong suit of foreign policy. Bush still basked in the glory of the Gulf war and was not interested in venturing into a new trouble spot. Clinton, however, rolled himself in Bosnia's flag, claiming that he would do something about it. Other influential elites, especially in the news business, took the cause of Bosnia.⁴⁵ The Muslim states were also in favor in stopping Serb aggression. On 25 August, 1992 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) which essentially made a call to arms should economic embargo fail.

All the military options available to confront the Serbs were said to present certain problems. The number of troops required to give the Serbs a "bloody nose" was said to range anywhere from 120,000-500,000.⁴⁶ Bosnia was said to be tailor made for guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the military towards fighting in Bosnia was aptly surmised by the phrase: "we do desert-we don't do mountains."⁴⁷ The haunting ghost of Vietnam, and not the decisive victory of the Gulf, was resurrected. Surgical airstrikes directed at Serb heavy armaments on the hills surrounding Sarajevo and other strategic locations were proposed but were turned down mainly due to its inefficacy. The airstrikes, it was claimed, would make the Serbs react violently towards the UN forces, and more importantly make the difficult task of humanitarian delivery all but impossible.

Another alternative was to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia so that Bosnians could fight with the Serbs on an equal footing. Izetbegovic wrote to the Security Council on August

⁴⁵ The New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, the European and many other major newspapers in the West advocated for an active and forceful involvement from their respective governments in finding a solution to the Bosnian tragedy.

⁴⁶ James Gow, "Nervous Bunnies: The International Community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, The Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change," in *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (ed.) Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 26.

⁴⁷ J. Fenske, "The West and 'The problem from Hell,'" *Current History*, November 1993, p.354.

3 and demanded that Bosnia's arms embargo be lifted in order to "achieve the right to individual and collective self-defence," guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁴⁸

All these alternatives were debated and all were rejected essentially because no perceptible national interests warranted such an intervention considering the risk that such operations entailed. The US military washed its hands from this conflict contending that "the crisis in Bosnia is ...complex. The solution must ultimately be a political one."⁴⁹

Peace Talks and the London Conference:

The London Conference, which was held on August 1992, was called to deal with the Bosnian conflict and coordinate and systemize the disparate international efforts towards resolving the conflict.⁵⁰ The Conference, co-chaired by British Prime Minister John Major and the UN Secretary General was attended by delegates from the UN, the EC and CSCE, as well as representatives of the main Yugoslavia parties. In this conference a Geneva based negotiating forum jointly sponsored by the UN and the EC was formed. Lord Owen, a former British foreign secretary replaced Lord Carrington as the EC negotiator, while Cyrus Vance remained the UN envoy.

The factions to the conflict were instructed to "immediately and without preconditions...resume negotiations on future constitutional arrangements."⁵¹ The principle upon which these negotiations were to be based on affirmed the "integrity of present frontiers" and that territory seized by force was to be returned.⁵² If a settlement

⁴⁸ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 21.

⁴⁹ Cited in Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 21.

⁵⁰ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) p. 248.

⁵¹ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 23.

⁵² Ibid.

resulted from these talks then a peacekeeping force was to be deployed “to maintain the cease-fire, control military movements and undertake other confidence-building measures.”⁵³ The lack of a set of rewards and punishment that is so crucial to the success of negotiations was missing in these talks. The international community instead tried to punish Yugoslavia with such symbolic gestures as denying them a seat in the UN and the creation of a war crimes commission to look at breaches in international humanitarian law. The Serbs felt that they were no need to comply with the agreements because they would not be punished for their defiance. With that knowledge the Serbs continued to carry on their unholy business unconstrained.

UN resolution 781, approved by the Security Council on 9 October, 1992 imposed a ban on flights of warplanes in Bosnian airspace. UNPROFOR, however, could only monitor compliance but not enforce it. This also was another empty gesture as the role of airpower in the conflict was negligible and thus it did not have any impact on Serb military activities.⁵⁴

As the optimism nurtured by the London Conference began to evaporate and as the Serbs gained ground in the conquest, there was once again a call for intervention. The Islamic nations favored such a position, but Vance and Owen pledged for restraint and avoidance of intervention lest it jeopardized the negotiations.⁵⁵ They also argued that any intervention would pose a threat to the safety and security of the peacekeepers.⁵⁶

The Western nations were again divided on the American proposal of ‘lift and strike.’ This American initiative advocated lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims, and striking at Serbian artillery and other military equipment. The Europeans who had troops on the

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Mats Berdal, “United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) p. 233.

⁵⁵ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 24.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

ground were opposed to the idea. Germany, which did not have troops on the ground, favored intervention. The west European nations opposed the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia arguing that such an action would lead to increased bloodshed.

The French idea of setting up safe haven was considered to be the option that carried the lowest risk.⁵⁷ However, this idea would also involve the deployment of thousands of troops in a combat zone, and that realization made it a hard sale.⁵⁸ The other dilemma the safe haven presented was that it might further encourage ethnic cleansing. NATO planners sensing the risk and the unknowns involved in the plan opted out.⁵⁹ Instead the no fly zone was seen to meet the criteria of doing something while at the same time it entailed no major problems. Hence, NATO foreign ministers agreed on 17 December, 1992 to support any future UN resolution enforcing the flight ban over Bosnia.⁶⁰

New Peace Proposals: The Vance-Owen Plan:

On January 2 1993, the leaders of the three ethnic groups met in Geneva for peace talks. The comprehensive peace package presented by the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owens, had as its cornerstone three important elements: constitutional principles, a map partitioning the republic into 10 provinces, and cease-fire and demilitarization guidelines. These three elements the co-chairmen insisted were interlinked and could not therefore be implemented separately.

Under the terms of the plan Bosnia would become a highly decentralized state with the provinces responsible for everything else except defence, foreign policy and trade. Although none of the provinces would be ethnically pure, each of the three groups would form a majority in three of the ten provinces, with Sarajevo becoming a demilitarized open city. Additionally, the Serbs would receive 45% of Bosnia, while the Muslims and

⁵⁷ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) pp. 24-25.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 25.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Croats would divide the rest.

UN policed corridors would be created to ensure the free flow of peoples and goods between provinces. The Vance-Owens plan tried to appease the Serbs and Croats by generously bestowing upon those two groups large areas of Bosnia while at the same time it tried to preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. The reaction to the plan by the three groups was different. The Croats were happy and their leader, Mate Boban signed all three documents immediately. The Muslims welcomed the plan but had some heavy reservations. The Bosnian president was pleased that Bosnia was to exist as a single entity though it would be a loosely joined one. Moreover, Izetbegovic was also displeased with the fact that the Serbs would be rewarded for their aggression by allowing them to keep 45% of the territory, land that was occupied at the expense of the Muslims.

The Serbs initially refused to sign the documents, voicing their concerns about the fact that all the areas they conquered would not be in their possession. Moreover, the provinces that were designated as Serb majority provinces would be scattered throughout the republic and would not also be contiguous with Serbia proper.

In the end, the Bosnian president signed the constitutional principles document but rejected the map and the cease-fire provisions. Milosevic, playing his well-rehearsed role, 'forced' the Bosnian Serbs to accept the constitutional principles and cease-fire terms.⁶¹ That they did, but the Bosnian Serbs rejected the map even after the EC ministers gave them a six-day ultimatum to accept the plan as a whole.

The American Initiative:

With the sides deadlocked, the venue of the peace talks was moved from Geneva to New York with the hope that the US and the SC would approve or endorse the EC plan. The Americans were highly skeptical about the Vance-Owen believing that it rewarded

⁶¹ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic*

Serbian aggression.

On February 10, 1993 the American government threw its hat into the ring, essentially endorsing the Vance-Owen plan but some conditions of its own to go along with it. The US government stated that no one party should be forced to accept the plan.⁶² Also, the Americans wanted to give muscle to the plan by tightening the sanctions on Serbia and enforcing the no-fly zone. It also wanted to see the establishment of a UN war crimes tribunal. The Americans also promised to lend their support for the enforcement of a “viable agreement” on Bosnia, and created a greater consensus by including Russia as a partner in the peace talks.⁶³ Reginald Bartholemew was also appointed as the US envoy to the international peace talks on the former Yugoslavia.

With the Serbs blocking virtually all relief assistance to the Muslims in the north, the UNHCR suspended its humanitarian operations in mid-February 1993. The Clinton administration responded with a possible solution by involving American troops to air-drop relief supplies to areas cut off from UN operations. Despite some of the potential risks involved such as reprisals against UN troops, and the possibility of American casualties, the Americans made their first air-drop operation on March 1, 1993.⁶⁴

The Bosnian government finally endorsed the Vance-Owen plan after it was assured UNPROFOR would take possession of the Serbs heavy equipment around Sarajevo.⁶⁵ A concession was also made to Izetbegovic about the map provisions with Sarajevo now coming under direct Muslim control rather than a tripartite control.⁶⁶ A fourth document outlining the provisional agreement to be put in place before new elections were held was also signed by the parties.⁶⁷

War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) p. 250.

⁶² Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 28.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 30.

The Serbs, however, continued to hold out voicing their dissatisfaction with the map that required them to surrender some territory. The self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the Vance-Owen plan on 2 April. ⁶⁸On 26 April, 1993 the Security Council reacted to this Serbian obstinacy with a new wave of tighter sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Security Council also froze Yugoslavian financial assets abroad and the ordered the detention of ships, trains and aircraft already abroad.⁶⁹

Milosevic once again tried to paint himself as man of peace by putting pressure on Karadzic to accept the plan after the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the plan a second time.⁷⁰ But Milosevic had his way with Karadzic, and on 2 May in Athens the self-proclaimed president of the Bosnian Serb republic accepted the map provisions of the Vance-Owen plan.⁷¹ That signature was however nullified by the Assembly as it rejected the plan for a third time. The Assembly instead voted to put the plan to a Bosnian Serb referendum that was held on 15-16 May 1993.⁷² As expected the Bosnian Serbs overwhelming rejected the plan and strongly endorsed the idea of a separate Serb state.

Milosevic immediately announced that his country was cutting ties to Bosnian Serbs, and that all the flow of goods, except humanitarian supplies would be stopped from crossing the border.⁷³ The announcement had the effort of knocking the wind out of the international pressure for tougher action. However, as always the sincerity of Milosevic was, at best, doubtful. When the UN offered international peace observers to monitor the borders, he quickly declined the offer.⁷⁴ Supplies continued to follow into Bosnian Serb territory from Yugoslavia.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 31.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 32.

Death of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan:

On May 6, 1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 824 which declared the besieged Muslim enclaves of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica “safe areas.” All the combating factions were ordered to keep the designated areas free from “armed attacks or any other hostile act” and to give full access to UN military personnel.

At a meeting of foreign ministers held in Washington on 22 May, 1993 Russia, Great Britain, the United States, France and Spain signed a joint strategy to guard the safe areas.⁷⁵ The foreign ministers also affirmed that Vance-Owen plan was still alive despite evidence pointing to the contrary. The six designated safe areas were enclaves decimated by artillery bombardment, ethnic cleansing and scarcity of food. As the Serbs tried to tighten the strangulation of the enclaves, the UN forces became more and more involved in efforts to evacuate the besieged Muslims. The case of Srebrenica provides such an example, as the UN forces evacuated the Muslims, resulting in accusations by the international press that the UN was encouraging and assisting in ethnic cleansing.⁷⁶ To protect Srebrenica from the Serbs, the enclave was, in late April, declared a safe area. With the Serbs at this point bent on defeating the last vestiges of Muslim resistance, the UN at the insistence of the French decided to extend the safe area concept to other regions of Bosnia as a substitute for full-scale intervention.

The safe area concept was seen as de facto recognition of Bosnia’s status quo, freezing the territorial outcome of the Bosnian civil/international war.⁷⁷ Many workers of the UN in Bosnia also saw the concept of creating enclaves as infeasible, as the safe zones were practically surrounded by hostile forces.⁷⁸ The safe area concept was by design or otherwise a replication of the “homelands” established in apartheid South Africa.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1994) p. 35.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 36.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ The Economist, 29 May 1993, p. 53.

Izetbegovic rejected the 'safe area' plan out of hand but in July, 1993 reconsidered and accepted the plan with his own conditions attached. These conditions include the extension of the size of the safe areas, the establishment of corridors between the enclaves and the withdrawal of surrounding Serb artillery. However, these demands were sure to invite Serb rejection.

The implementation plan for the safe area concept was been put into place. The Security Council approved Resolution 836 on July 4, 1993 permitting UNPROFOR to use force if any of the six areas were attacked. NATO, the Western defense alliance, was delegated the responsibility of providing protection to UNPROFOR if any of the warring parties were to attack the UN forces while fulfilling the Security Council mandates. Massive troop deployments were needed to enforce the safe area concept. Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgner, UN commander in the former Yugoslavia, estimated that 34,000 troops would be needed but those numbers were later scaled down to 7500.⁸⁰ Britain and Spain refused to send any more troops, and Russia wanted to see a clearer mandate before making any troop contribution commitment. The United States had all along maintained that its troops would not be sent to Bosnia unless there was an overall comprehensive settlement. By the end of July only 1200 troops were available for the six safe areas. Troops continued to come in, with France contributing the most. The concept of the safe areas was, however, never fully implemented, as most of the so-called safe areas were not protected at all.

Balkanizing Bosnia:

Milosevic and Tudjman proposed a plan to divide up Bosnia into three ethnically based states functioning under a federal or confederal constitution. This new plan devised by the two presidents had little pretence to justice as it advocated the divvying up of the Bosnian territory mainly along the lines of the current status quo. Karadzic and Boban started to

⁸⁰ Jane M.O. Sharp, "Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe," in *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (ed.) Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 51-2.

work out the finer details of the proposed borders. The basis of this new plan ran in direct contradiction to the London Conference, which decreed that borders could not be changed by force and that the conquered land was to be returned. Lord Owen as co-chairmen of the conference endorsed the plan quipping: "I am a realist and we have to live with what's happened on the ground."⁸¹ The dream of a new Bosnian state was quickly vanishing.

Under the new plan (Milosevic-Tudjman plan), the Muslims would receive a thin slice of land stretching from Sarajevo to Zenica and Tuzla in Central Bosnia, as well as the northwest enclave of Bihac and a passage to the Adriatic sea. The Serbs and the Croats were to share to rest. The reaction by Izetbegovic to this plan was immediate and understandable. The new Bosnia would be sandwiched between two hostile countries, and it would only be a matter of time before the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs territories were, despite the assurances given by Milosevic and Tudjman to the contrary, annexed to Croatia and Serbia proper.

Izetbegovic came under intense pressure from Owen and Stoltenberg (who had replaced Vance as the UN envoy in the beginning of May, 1993) to accept the plan. Although the community insisted that no party was to be forced to sign, it was clearly by their tactics that they wanted Izetbegovic to sign the death warrant of Bosnia. The international mediators insisted that this is the best deal they could get. In the last week of July Izetbegovic sat down on the negotiating table in Geneva with Milosevic and Tudjman where he agreed in principle to the separation of Bosnia into three constituent republics within a loose federation called the Union of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The role of the new federal government would be limited to foreign policy and trade. Karadzic offered the Muslims 25 percent of the total territory, the Croats 15 percent and the remainder (60 percent) was to go to the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian president found these percentages unacceptable and on August 2, he walked out of the talks.

⁸¹ Vincent Rigby, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The International Response* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament

On August 3, as Serb attacks on Sarajevo and other Muslim areas intensified and as humanitarian assistance efforts were almost brought to a halt, NATO allies started to plan possible air strikes against Serb forces. NATO military efforts were to be coordinated with and undertaken at the request of the Secretary General. On August 9, NATO warned the Serbs to lift the siege around Sarajevo immediately or face the consequences. The Serbs, as usual pulled back their forces at the eleventh hour, thus preventing air strikes on them from been carried out.

The task of air strikes once again created controversy between the US and its other allies who had forces on the ground. The western countries felt that any airstrikes may risk retaliation on their forces from the Serbs. However, the Americans impressed on them the need to use force to give muscle to their rhetoric.

Izetbegovic returned to the negotiations in Geneva on August 16, where upon an agreement on the demilitarization of Sarajevo and the establishment of a two-year UN administration in the capital was reached. Access to the Adriatic Sea at Ploce in Croatia and to the River Sava by way of concrete “flyovers” crossing Serb held territory was also proposed to the Muslims. The Muslims, however, were dissatisfied with the new map, which gave them 30% of Bosnia’s territory compared to 52.5% for the Serbs and 17.5% for the Croats. The proposed UN protected corridors would also depend on the Serbs relinquishing part of the land they conquered. Other thorny issues such as what would happen to people of other ethnic groups left in the territory assigned to another group were left unanswered. If the plan were put into effect, it would have very much in common with ethnic cleansing only this time it would be aided and abetted by the UN. Because of these concerns, and the inherent injustice involved in this solution, the Bosnian Assembly rejected the agreement. In contrast, the Croat and Serb Assemblies expeditiously ratified the agreement.

The never-ending negotiations resumed on 31 August, 1993 with the Bosnian team presenting new territorial demands. The Serbs agreed to widen the proposed corridor linking the Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa with Goradze by only two miles. The Croatian flatly refused the Muslim demand of access to the port of Neum on the Adriatic. The talks once again predictably broke down with Karadzic threatening to leave the Muslims out of partition altogether.

American Gambit: Creation of a Federation

The whole course of the Bosnian conflict changed in February 1994, when a ghastly attack at a market center in Sarajevo revoltingly demonstrated the barbarity and cruelty of this mindless war. In that attack nearly sixty people were killed and over 200 were wounded. In reaction to the horrifying pictures of the attack the western governments for the first time issued an ultimatum to the Serbs to lift their siege of Sarajevo or else face the consequences. In line with that ultimatum all heavy armaments under the command of the belligerent parties would be handed to the UN or pulled outside the 20 km Exclusion Protection Zone (EPZ) around Sarajevo.⁸² Like so many times before the Serbs pulled back and avoided taking on the West. However, with characteristic stubbornness the Serbs once again tested the divided international resolve, and attacked Goradze, one of the UN designated 'safe havens'. The UN and the western countries, for their part, reacted with their well-drilled exercise of indecisiveness, threatening but not delivering.

Since the NATO ultimatum was issued an increased US participation in the Bosnian crisis was witnessed. The Clinton administration made Charles Redman its Special Representative in the conflict negotiations. His efforts led to bringing together the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims into a federation.⁸³ The two communities had

⁸²The EPZ, however, does not include Pale, the capital of self styled Bosnian Serb government which happens to fall within the perimeters of the exclusion zone.

⁸³Presiding over the Croat-Muslim accord (The Washington Accord) signing ceremony, Clinton said the United States "has clear interests at stake" in Bosnia: "An interest in helping prevent the spread of a wider war in Europe, an interest in showing NATO remains a credible force for peace, an interest in helping to stem the terrible destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is generating and perhaps, clearly, a

fought a bitter war for over a year and thus a federation would give a good chance to the viability of a Bosnian state. On March 1, 1994 Haris Siladjic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mate Granic, the Deputy prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and Kresimir Zubek, the head of the Bosnian Croat delegation to the ICFY, agreed to establish a high level Transitional Committee to work on: the constitution of the federation; the preliminary agreement on the confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the proposed federation; an agreement concerning military arrangements in the territory of the proposed federation; and transitional measures to speed up the establishment of the federation and eventual confederation.

The new constitution of the federation was endorsed on March 18 and approved by parliament on March 30, 1994. On May 31, a constituent Assembly of Muslims and Croats voted unanimously for Kresimir Zubak, a Croat, to be president of the federation and Ejup Ganic, a Muslim, to be the vice-president. These appointments were for a six-month period, after which general elections would be held.⁸⁴

The Contact Group Partition Plan

While the federation of Bosnia was a hopeful sign, the war between the Serbs and the Muslims continued. In a last attempt to address the conflict before it took yet another violent turn a Contact Group made up of Russia, the United States, Britain, France and Germany put on the table a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. In this partition plan complete with a proposed map the new Bosnian federation was allocated 51 percent of the territory while the Serbs received 49 percent, thanks to ethnic cleansing.⁸⁵ To project a facade of

humanitarian interest we all share in stopping the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.” (Carrol Doherty, “Defining the National Interest: A Process of Trial and Error,” *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review*, March 26, 1994, p. 752).

⁸⁴Bosnia and Herzegovina- Croatia: preliminary Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation[March 18, 1994], cited in 33 I.L.M. 605 (1994)

decency the plan maintained that the Bosnian Serb territory would be part of the Bosnia Union and will therefore be within the internationally recognized borders of Bosnia. However, notwithstanding the pronouncement of Anthony Lake that, “we did not enter into this diplomatic process in order to preside over the creation of a Greater Serbia,” and that, “the principle of a Bosnian union is fundamental,” the final outcome of implementing the plan will, indeed, *de facto*, if not *de jure*, create a Bosnian Serb state.⁸⁶

The plan had a lot of carrots and not enough sticks; the Contact Group promised to lift the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro if the Bosnian Serbs accepted the plan. If the Serbs rejected the plan, the embargo against the Muslims and Croats would be lifted. The Serbs who by this time were used to the constant threats without any consequences rejected the plan. The Contact Group called an emergency meeting to discuss what to do next. Meanwhile, the Serbs were back to the business of sniping Sarajevans. UN officials fearing airstrikes by western nations against Serb positions opposed such measure as the peacekeepers might in that case face the brunt of the Serbs.

With the rejection of the Contact Group’s plan there was a sense of *deja vu*. The scenario of April 1993 was then re-enacted. Karadzic referred the question to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which rejected the plan in its entirety on 3 August, 1994. The Assembly further referred the question to a general referendum among the Bosnian Serbs on 27-28 August. The results of the referendum were predictable and well rehearsed. The Serbs rejected the plan. Milosevic, as usual, also played his part in the drama. He called for the closing of Serbian border to Bosnian Serb territory though in actual fact they remained wide open.

⁸⁵Roger Thurow and Carla Anne Robins, ‘Bosnian Serbs Skirt Response on Peace Plan,’ *The Wall Street Journal*, July 21, 1994. p. A10. The Muslim-Croat federation wanted a 58-42 percent territory split and the US not wishing to pressure the Muslims went along with such a division. However, the European proposal of 51-49 percent split carried the day and the US obliged (Jonathan S. Landay, ‘US joins Western allies and Russia in backing partition plan in Bosnia,’ *The Christian Science Monitor*. June 8, 1994. p. 2).

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

Meltdown in Bosnia: Another Season of War

After the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group proposal, the Geneva process lost all its use and credibility. The ‘negotiations’ were now contested on the battlefield. There was intense fighting in the northwestern and in central Bosnia. The Bosnian army registered significant gains in the countryside though they did not have the necessary heavy armour needed for successful retaking of strategic locations like towns and cities. On 8 September, 1994 Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia launched a joint campaign against Bosnian government forces in the Bihac area. Bosnian and Croatian government replied to this onslaught by launching a counteroffensive that succeeded in pushing the Serbs back on three fronts. Intense battles were also fought in and around Sarajevo. The Bosnian army also succeeded in crushing a Serbian battalion but on 7 October the UN troops intervened and expelled the Bosnian troops from their locations.

With the Serbs thumbing their nose at the West, the US felt that there is a need to institute military action against the Serbs. On September 28 US Defense Secretary William Perry said that he wanted NATO to use “compelling force” against Bosnian Serb forces. The British and French, however, remained opposed to any talk of force. Even when the UN requested for airstrikes, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, UNPROFOR’s commander in Bosnia only authorized strikes against a Bosnian tank near Sarajevo, and on November 21 a runway at Udbina. Instead of striking at strategic military locations the UN forces were content to authorize only symbolic airstrikes. The Bosnian Serb military command reacted to this airstrikes by forcefully stating, “This means that UNPROFOR and NATO forces are [now] legitimate targets. We reserve the right to retaliate how and when we see fit.”⁸⁷

With the growing harassment the UN forces by the Serbs, there was a growing clamor to terminate the UNPROFOR operation. The French and the British were increasingly getting impatient and wanted to withdraw their forces. In July 1994, the Secretary

⁸⁷ Cited in Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) p. 263.

General recommended to the UN Security Council the withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers from Bosnia and Croatia. Boutros-Ghali further opined at the end of November that the UN peacekeepers should be pulled out. By early December 1994, Britain and France held to their plans of withdrawing their troops from Bosnia. Since British and French forces represented a third of the total UN forces strength in Bosnia, their withdrawal would have compelled the UN to terminate its operation in Bosnia. The Russian government, however, announced that its troops would stay in Bosnia irrespective of what Britain and France do. Izetbegovic meanwhile asked for forces to replace the withdrawing troops and he got positive responses from many Islamic countries. That announcement by Izetbegovic had a volte-face effect on the French who now not only abandoned their intention to withdraw their forces, but actually called for the expansion and strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate.

By the end of 1994 the solution to the Bosnian conflicts seems to be as remote as its has ever been. The war is raging on at full thrust and all attempts at negotiations seems to be bearing no fruits. Lending urgency to the crisis is the talk of UN forces withdrawing, and the ending of the UN operation.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT:

Broad Political Context:

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the numerous Chapter VII resolutions notwithstanding, no political will ever existed within the Security Council for authorizing intrastate coercive military involvement that would redress what is widely viewed as clear transgression of the established norms of international society.⁸⁸ There are two main reasons that could explain why that was the case. First, the western nations were afraid of

⁸⁸ Mats Berdal, "United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia," in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) p. 228.

‘open-ended’ commitments that were not underpinned by any compelling national interest and that were not sustained by public support. The whole debate from that point on became avoiding a ‘Balkan quagmire’, with high casualty rates and massive economic cost. All the members of the Security Council shared this view.

The test case of humanitarianism in the former Yugoslavia has also clearly shown that ‘where there is not a perceptible national self-interest involved, there are few Governments which can pay the potentially high price in blood and resources which may be entailed through dispassionate engagement in the relief of suffering.’⁸⁹ The very fact that the Balkan crisis was defined as a humanitarian problem and not as a strategic imperative shows how the change in international relations in the post Cold War has shaped the response by Western leaders to the conflict.⁹⁰ Secondly, the issues of self-determination, humanitarian intervention and state succession raised by the Yugoslav conflict are extremely complex. There is no common stand on these issues by the SC members, let alone the multitude of members that form the UN. Moreover, there is an inherent contradiction between the principle of self-determination for minorities and the principle which holds that borders should not be changed by means of force.

The Bush administration was in office when the conflict first erupted in Bosnia. Its reaction was to observe and warn but not actively engage in the conflict in a way that would make its involvement crucial. As a senior official in the Bush Administration put it, “American strategic interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia, *per se*, ended with the collapse of the Soviet threat to Europe.”⁹¹ Also the fact that 1991 was close to a presidential election year did not help Bosnia’s cause as “Yugoslavia had become a tar baby in Washington. Nobody wanted to touch it. With the American presidential

⁸⁹ ‘Peacekeeping, War, Humanitarian Action, and Human Rights-the Former Yugoslavia’, Annex to Statement by Cedric Thornberry, Conference at Princeton University, 22 October 1993, pp. 4-5.

⁹⁰ Christoph Bertram, “Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution,” *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), p. 71.

elections just a year away, it was seen as a loser.”⁹² However, in the presidential election campaign the Democratic Party nominee, Bill Clinton, raised the specter of a much broader US involvement. In his campaign speeches, time and again, Clinton observed that something must be done to stop the genocide and put an end to Serb aggression. However, once Clinton came into office the rhetoric was turned down, though in the initial months he tried to persuade the Europeans to endorse his plan, which came to be characterized as ‘lift and strike.’⁹³ This basically involved the lifting of the arms embargo on the Muslims and striking against selected Serbian military targets, with the aim of creating a sense of parity on the battlefield. With the swift rejection of his plan by the Europeans the Clinton administration acquiesced and began to warm up slowly to the Vance-Owen plan, which it previously rejected.

The lack of Western interest was shown more than once by its sabre rattling and the issuance of threats it was sure not to follow. Since the summer of 1993 the Western powers threatened and raised dust, but each time the deadlines passed without any action. The embarrassment the genocide was causing, which by the way, was happening less than an hour’s flight away from Rome was unbearable and that made them react, but in a disjointed and haphazard fashion. The fact remains that no national interest is at stake and thus this conflict did not pass the cold and brutal cost-benefit calculations of the West. The Economist sarcastically but accurately reflected that unlike Kuwait, “western cars do not run on Balkan oil.”⁹⁴ Statements like these were indeed given credence by James Baker, the US Secretary of State, who in reference to Yugoslavia quipped that Americans “don’t have a dog in that fight.”⁹⁵

⁹¹David Gompert, ‘How to Defeat Serbia,’ *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994. p. 33

⁹² Warren Zimmermann, ‘The Last Ambassador,’ p. 15.

⁹³John Fenske, “The West and the Problem from Hell,” *Current History*. Volume 92. No. 577, Nov. 1993, p. 356.

⁹⁴*The Economist*, April 24, 1993, p.15

⁹⁵George F. Will, ‘A Dog in That Fight’? *Newsweek* (June 12, 1995) p. 72

In early February of 1993 the new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, asserted that “bold tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether ethnic cleansing is a policy the world will tolerate...[o]ur answer must be a resounding no.” A year later and with the severity of the conflict heightened the same Christopher declared that Bosnia was “a human tragedy, just grotesque humanitarian situation...It does not affect our national interests except as we’re concerned about humanitarian matters and except as we’re trying to contain it.”⁹⁶ In April 1993, Bill Clinton declared that: “[e]thnic cleansing is the kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree. The idea of moving people around and abusing them and often killing, solely because of their ethnicity, is an abhorrent thing and it is especially troublesome in that area where people of different ethnic groups lived side by side for so long together. I think you have to stand up against it. I think it is wrong.” Despite his revulsion at the suffering of the Bosnians the same Clinton, in September of 1993, told Izetbegovic that “Washington and its allies were not going to commit the military resources to fundamentally change the balance of power” and Izetbegovic therefore had to accept ethnic partition.

Commenting on the civil strife in Bosnia and other regions Clinton was emphatic in maintaining that US intervention would depend on a thorough assessment of “the cumulative weight of the interests at stake.” The President stated, “we cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces...We cannot turn away from them, but our interests are not sufficiently at stake in so many of them to justify a commitment of our folks.”⁹⁷ The cynical realism of the administration, in part, stems from the effect any active intervention might have on pan-Slavic aspirations in the Soviet Union. Clinton in a candid moment told journalists that they had “to see this Bosnia thing in the context of everything else that is going on in the world including

⁹⁶Mats Berdal, ‘Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping’, *Survival*. The IISS Quarterly. Spring 1994.

Russia.”⁹⁸ The West’s eagerness to find an excuse for inaction extended to playing up the effect any strong action against the Serbs might have on Russia’s internal politics. The Western leaders argued that dealing with the Serbs would not only hurt Russian nationalist sensibilities but also will adversely affect the precarious political position of the Yeltsin government. But as a deflated power in political disarray and with a Third World economy it is hard to see Russia projecting its power in areas far beyond its borders. Alexander Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Union’s former foreign minister, put it best when he told a visiting Serbian delegation that Russia cannot help you because Russia cannot help itself. However, for the Russian government and other nationalists the events in Yugoslavia are precedent setting and they may emulate the Serb behavior at some stage especially where ethnic Russians form a sizeable minority in the “near abroad.” As one observer noted, “Russia imperialists and nationalists look to Serbia’s example, not because of lingering religious, national or racial solidarity with the Serbs...but because Serbia’s defiance of a U.S.-led new world order encourages their belief that they too could do so with impunity and restore as much as possible of Russia’s imperial legacy.”⁹⁹

Nature and Kind of Dispute

In the case of Bosnia the situation was complex, as there were three ethnic protagonists in this multinational state. The Croats and Serbs each wanted to seize up large chunks of the Bosnian republic and hence fulfill their dreams of creating Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia respectively. The ethnic hatred in Bosnia is not as deep as it was in Croatia though there is no particular way of gauging it. However, by all indications, at least on the superficial level, Bosnia represented a model of a multiethnic and multiconfessional state. The Westerners in a bid to assuage their guilt for not doing something constructive to stop the "slow-motion genocide" in Bosnia have come up with historical concoctions that

⁹⁷Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Bids Navy Graduates Heed World War II Lessons”, New York Times, Thursday, May 26, 1994, p. A3

⁹⁸Rabia Ali, “Why Bosnia”, p. 24

depicted the war as a product of ancient hatred which is not susceptible to outside involvement or mediation.¹⁰⁰ It is important to recall that on the day Bosnia was recognized by the EC, tens of thousands of Bosnians of all nationalities gathered before the Bosnian parliament and demanded that "the ethnic nationalists who began dominating Bosnia and Herzegovina's politics form a government of national unity."¹⁰¹ Furthermore the deputy commanders of the Bosnian Army, Colonel Jovan Divjak and Colonel Stejpan Siber are of Serb and Croat ethnic extraction, respectively.¹⁰² Also nearly a third of the Bosnian Army is of Serb ethnicity.¹⁰³ Therefore to say that the Serb revolt in Bosnia is a spontaneous civil war and not one stage managed and abetted by the Belgrade regime is to entirely misread the source of the whole conflict. Indeed, it is becoming clearer that simplifying the conflict as a nasty civil war with all parties equally guilty is a cheap alibi for western inaction. The US administrations "portraye[d] the Bosnian conflict as a hopelessly complicated civil war, with all parties at fault and no American interests at stake" whenever its policies came under criticism.¹⁰⁴

The ethnic settlements in Bosnia did not take any pattern as the ethnic groups were spread throughout the state. No one community overwhelmingly dominated though the Muslims with 44 percent of the population formed the largest group. The Serbs represented 34 percent while the Croats made up about 17 percent. This state truly represented an ethnic mosaic for Yugoslavia. Because there was no well-marked and delineated territories, the ethnic conflict became brutal as the Serbs effectively ethnic cleansed the Muslims and the

⁹⁹Stephan Blanck, "New Challenges to European Security," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XXII, No. 3, (Summer 1994), p. 42.

¹⁰⁰Ali and Lufschultz, "Why Bosnia," p. 5.

¹⁰¹Ali and Lufschultz, "Why Bosnia," p. 6.

¹⁰²Rabia Ali and Lufschultz, 'In Plain View,' p. xx

¹⁰³*Ibid*

¹⁰⁴David Gompert, 'How to Defeat Serbia,' p. 40

Croats. This policy of cleansing was mainly geared to achieving territorial conquest, forcing the occupants to either shift or be massacred.

The Conduct of the Host State, the Principal Protagonists and Third Party States:

In the former Yugoslavia the Bosnian government initially welcomed the presence of the peacekeepers. However, over a period of time that welcome dissipated, especially after the UN forces failed to stop the ethnic cleansing and the violation of safe areas perpetrated by the Serbs. The Izetbegovic government several times threatened to withdraw its consent to the UN forces on its soil. However, the Bosnian government never made good on its threats.

The other sub-national actors, especially the Serbs in Bosnia, did not like the presence of the UN forces, as they perceived their presence to be inimical to their interests. UN Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 which authorized UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, while it contained evidence of consent, also specified that the council was acting under the Security Council's responsibility 'for the maintenance of international peace and security'. This is a hidden reference that it was acting under Chapter VII and therefore it does not need anybody's consent to deploy troops in the region.¹⁰⁵ Also by referring to Article 25 of the UN Charter, it reminded states of their obligation to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. This made it clear that although there was a partial consent for the UN peacekeepers to be stationed in the former Yugoslavian theatre, the operation might continue even if that limited consent was withdrawn.¹⁰⁶

The Serbian government consistently supported efforts by the Bosnian Serbs to ethnically cleanse and seize territories formerly occupied by the Muslims. Likewise, the Croatian

¹⁰⁵ Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping,' *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), p. 99.

¹⁰⁶ Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping,' p. 99.

government gave a strong signal to the Bosnian Croats to mount an insurrection whose ultimate aim was to create a Bosnian Croat territory that would eventually be part of a greater Croatian state.

Regional Organizations:

The framework for solving the Yugoslavian conflict was initiated by the EC when it convened the EC Conference on Yugoslavia at The Hague. The EC liberated from the close supervisory leadership exercised by the US felt that it had a chance to bring peace and order to the conflagration taking place in its backyard. This was welcomed by the UN which saw it as a positive step undertaken by the powerful member states and which was to certainly relieve it from the overwhelming peacekeeping missions it had undertaken at that time. However, the expectation that the Europeans would put forward a concerted common position never materialized as each nation had its own interests in the outcome of the conflict, while at the same time no one country had its particular interests threatened to such an extent that it had to intervene unilaterally. The role of mediation played by the EC, however, seemed to have blocked any early UN intervention.¹⁰⁷

Though the Yugoslav conflict was intervened first by the EC, which acted as the regional power, its internal contradictions soon thwarted the common approach it wished to project. Hence any solution envisaged was greatly undermined by the cacophony of discordant voices emerging from the European capitals. Once this become clear it further encouraged the main perpetrators of the civil war, the Serbs, to become intransigent and achieve all their territorial goals by military means as the would be intervenors wrestled with bargaining their interests in a bid to come up with an elusive consensus.

¹⁰⁷Boutros- Ghali, the Secretary General had said the early involvement by the Europeans precluded the UN playing a role as it would have made the protagonists in the civil war play one organization against another.

(Brian Hall, "Blue Helmets, Empty Guns," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1994, p. 38.

The failure of the EC to make headway in calming the turbulent winds of war engulfing the Yugoslav made it possible for the UN to assume an ever increasing role in that conflict. With the growing signs of division among the major European countries (Germany, Britain and France), the UN ‘was viewed as a body whose credibility was uncontaminated by national biases, historical memories or proximity to the conflict.’¹⁰⁸

Attributes of Authorization:

UN Objectives/Mandates

The focus of UN operations in Bosnia was explicitly humanitarian. In the summer of 1992 when UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended to cover Bosnia, the resolution explicitly stated that the peacekeeping forces were there to support the “efforts by the UNHCR to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR’s request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary”¹⁰⁹

UN forces were already in Croatia when the ethnic fighting began in Bosnia and thus deployment of forces was done under resolution 713, which covered all of the former Yugoslavian federation. In resolution 743 (1992) UNPROFOR was given patrolling functions while resolution 761 gave it the task of securing Sarajevo airport and safeguarding the movement of humanitarian aid. Due to the escalating conflict which made the relief effort subject to hostilities, the Security Council passed another resolution on August 13, 1992 authorizing use of “all necessary measures” to ensure that relief supplies reach their intended destination.¹¹⁰ Resolution 781 (1992) further gave it additional assignments such as monitoring the compliance with the ban on military flights

¹⁰⁸ Mats Berdal, “United Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 229

¹⁰⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 758, 8 June 1992

in the Bosnian airspace.¹¹¹ Further resolutions were passed among which the most important was resolution 816 of 1993, which affirmed a previous resolution (781) but now, gave the task of enforcement to NATO. Most of these resolutions also affirmed the ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Resolution 824 of the SC further established safe areas around the besieged towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica.¹¹² In early 1993, the Council renewed UNPROFOR’s mandate to “ensure the security of UNPROFOR” and “its freedom of movement for all its missions”. Chapter VII was also invoked in relation to the authorizing of a ‘no fly zone’ over the designated safe areas in Bosnia. On 9 February 1994, NATO issued a threat of military action against heavy weaponry in and around Sarajevo. The legal basis for this was SC Resolution 836 which gave member-states, acting nationally or through regional organizations, the right to take “under the authority of the Security Council and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹¹³

All these proved to be hollow resolutions, as they were never implemented due to lack of fundamental political will mainly by Western nations. The lack of a firm cease-fire made the deployment of peacekeeping forces inappropriate, as they were neither mandated nor armed to stop the fighting. With the stationing of the UN forces it was hoped that the necessary conditions for negotiations would be created but that seemed unlikely as an active war raged on and a ‘solution’ was being decided on the battlefield.

¹¹⁰ SC Res. 770. Cited in Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995) p. 406.

¹¹¹Higgins, “The New United Nations,” p. 469

¹¹² *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XLIV, No. 1018 - 1022, I. VII - I. XI 1993, p. 13

¹¹³ UNSC Res. 836, June 4, 1993. Cited in Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995) p. 414.

The UNPROFOR mission had five important tasks in Bosnia. The first UNPROFOR assignment in Bosnia was the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport. This assignment was partially fulfilled by the UN troops, and the airport became the only conduit for assistance to the besieged city. The airport was subject to constant closures mainly due to Serb attacks. Despite that the Secretary General noted that “this mandate has been and continues to be effectively fulfilled.”¹¹⁴ The evidence available, however, affirms the fact the UN troops were only partially effective in fulfilling this particular mandate.

UNPROFOR was also to protect humanitarian convoys. The UN forces did not fulfill this mandate very well as the warring factions, mainly the Serbs, constantly blocked their efforts. Humanitarian delivery success also depended on the locations of the enclaves. In central Bosnia the convoys moved largely unobstructed, thanks to the Bosnian Croat and Muslims Federation. However, the situation was quite different in Serb controlled regions where humanitarian assistance delivery was subjected to constant harassment and even total blockade. In many cases the Serbs took a substantial part of the assistance to feed their own troops. In all, UNPROFOR was not able to assist Bosnian civilians in delivering to them the humanitarian assistance in full and on time.

Third, UNPROFOR was to monitor, and with the assistance of NATO, enforce the no fly zone in Bosnia. Between October 1992 and March 1993, the UN troops could not enforce the mandate as they were handicapped by lack of the necessary equipment necessary to fulfill the mandate. In that period alone there were over 540 violations of the no-fly zone. These finally ended after the adoption of Resolution 816, which authorized NATO airforces to ensure compliance. UNPROFOR, on its own, had lacked the means to enforce the no-fly zone.

Fourth, UNPROFOR was responsible for protecting the safe areas on Bosnia. The UN troops were unprepared for this task. Instead of engaging and countering the Serb forces

¹¹⁴ S/1994/300, 16 March 1994.

that laid siege on the UN declared safe areas, the UN troops were content to monitor and report the activities of the Serbs. This more than any other task exposed the defects and weaknesses of the international forces. Even a major city like Sarajevo was not spared as it increasingly came under fire from the Serbs' heavy weapons. Also, the situation in these safe areas were appalling with shortages of food, running water, electricity and all other basic necessities of life.

UNPROFOR was also delegated the responsibility of monitoring the cease-fire provisions in the Bosnian Federation agreement. The cease-fire between the Muslims and the Croats held and UNPROFOR was able to monitor cease-fire violations between the parties. However, the level of confidence and cooperation between Bosnian Croats and Muslims grew after the Federation agreement was signed, and that made the task of the UN troops supervising the cease-fire easier.

The overall performance of UNPROFOR in fulfilling the mandates delegated can be termed as failure. Though it succeeded in monitoring the cease-fire agreement between the Muslims and the Croats and though it also succeeded in enforcing the no-fly zone with the assistance of NATO, its record in the core mandates has been one of abject failure. The forces failed in escorting the humanitarian relief supplies and it also failed to protect the safe areas. Those failures, so far, define the legacy of the UN mission in Bosnia.

Resources and Logistics

There was a great discrepancy between the mandates given and the resources made available to UNPROFOR. The operation was bedevilled by troop and equipment shortages and afflicted with deployment delays. The reason why this was the case can mainly be attributed to the fundamental lack of strong commitment by the major troop contributing nations. The best example of the discrepancy between mandate and

resources is provided by the safe area concept.¹¹⁵ The Secretary General earmarked 34,000 troops to fully protect the safe areas but when that was not forthcoming he opted for a light of option of 7600 troops.¹¹⁶ This light option was to be contingent on the complete consent and the cooperation of the parties.¹¹⁷ The Security Council only managed to grant UNPROFOR 5,000 troops, and these forces received neither the consent nor the cooperation of the warring Bosnian factions. It took another year for the remainder of the forces to be deployed in the ‘safe areas.’

This gap between resolutions and resources also invited the ire of UN officials who thought they were unfairly criticized for the malaise in Bosnia. Kofi Annan, the UN Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping voiced out his frustration by quipping: “it is absolutely unfair when the member states do not want to take the risks, when they do not want to commit the resources, but blame the UN for failure to act.”¹¹⁸ Similar sentiments were also expressed by General Briquemont who observed the disparity between the rhetoric of UN resolutions and the resources made available: “There is a fantastic crisis now because the politicians are writing and voting I don’t know how many resolutions [mandating peacekeeping measures in Bosnia] but we have no means to execute them.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ The UN used the safe area term and not ‘safe haven’ as in Northern Iraq because the latter required the UN forces to protect the inhabitants if attacked. In Bosnia’s case, however, the safe area mandate gave the forces to retaliate if directly fired upon and stopped short of authorizing the UNF to hit back if the inhabitants become targets.

¹¹⁶ In a situation that embarrassed the western nations many Muslims countries volunteered to send their forces to protect the established ‘safe area’ zones. The six countries are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia, Tunisia and Turkey. A Palestinian delegation also offered to send some troops. The total troop contribution they wanted to make was about 17,000. The Western countries, however, turned it down (‘Fear of God,’ *The Economist*, July 17, 1993. p.49)

¹¹⁷ S/25939, 14 June 1993.

¹¹⁸ *The Globe and Mail* (November 29, 1994) p. A6.

¹¹⁹ *The Globe and Mail* (January 24, 1994) p. A6.

The Timing Imperative:

The UN intervened in Bosnia so late that its leverage to influence the flow of events was substantially reduced. In the case of Bosnia the facts created on the ground by the Serbs were hard to reverse without a strong willingness on the part of the major players to engage in a full-fledged combat against them - a prospect that was never on the table. The UN intervened belatedly, meekly and ineptly in the Bosnian theater. Though the explosion of this ethnic tinderbox was predictable given the precedent set in Slovenia and Croatia, the UN did not attempt to forewarn its member nations of the impending catastrophe. An early warning against Serbian aggression and preventive deployment would have been sufficient to hold Bosnia together as a single entity. Once the conflict started, however, a quick well purposed intervention would have made the difference. As Harvey Sicherman writing in the *Orbis* has argued that “a little force, judiciously applied early in the Balkan trouble, could have spared thousands of lives, two years of ethnic cleansing, and an irrevocably broken Bosnian state.”¹²⁰ None of these measures were undertaken and hence the UN and the major western powers were left to design and half-heartedly implement an ad hoc reactive policy against the calculated Serbian expansionist goals. Most US State Department officials concede that the point of forceful intervention should have been right at the start to knock off the momentum the conflict built up. An intervention so late can only, at best, salvage a limited territory for the Muslim plurality.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION:

Location of Deployment:

In Bosnia a clear delineation of territory does not seem to exist. In Bosnia a state that was an ethnic mosaic was torn asunder by a vicious fratricidal triangular war among its three major groups. The Croatia and the Serbia each made claims to large portions of the newly established state and even embarked on making their pronouncements become a reality by actively backing their respective ethnic groups in Bosnia.

The terrain of Bosnia is mainly mountainous and that complicates any sort of peacekeeping. The mountainous aspect would make the supervising of cease-fires and interposing between the belligerent parties difficult if not impossible. Also the mountainous geography makes the undertaking of strategic peacekeeping with forceful military measures quite difficult. It is because of the problems raised by the difficult terrain that the American forces were hesitant to get involved in the Bosnian conflict. The refrain of the American forces from that point on was, 'we don't do mountains, we do deserts.'

A complicating factor of the location of deployment was the urban nature of the areas in which the peacekeeping forces were deployed. It is very difficult to supervise cease-fires in major urban centers like Sarajevo where there is a large population. Also, establishing zones of interposition between the parties becomes impossible in conditions where all the three ethnic groups live together.

The above factors that relate to the location of deployment certainly complicated the UNPROFOR mission in the Bosnia. However, it was not so critical that it could lead to the failure of the mission. The overall impact of the location of deployment was, however, significant in the Bosnian UN operation.

Operational Characteristics:

The Role of the Secretary General

The United Nations Secretary General always has the important responsibility of using his office to bring to the world's attention - and especially to the great power's attention - any conflict that is likely to lead to large scale instability or massive dislocation of persons. Moreover, his office can be used to mediate and if necessary draw up plans to defuse crises by the use of force if need be. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-

¹²⁰ Harvey Sicherman, "Agenda 2000: The Revenge of Geopolitics," *Orbis*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 13.

Ghali, abdicated this responsibility insofar as the Yugoslavian crisis is concerned. The Secretary General was unwilling to commit UN troops to the Yugoslavian imbroglio fearing that it will get bogged down in a quagmire. Boutros-Ghali clearly confined the parameters of UN involvement in ex-Yugoslavia, as he feared that “it [Bosnia] would be a kind of Vietnam for the United Nations.”¹²¹ He also felt, quite wrongly, one may add, that some other conflicts demanded more urgent response than Yugoslavia’s.¹²² In a visit to the besieged city of Sarajevo on 31 December, 1992 the Secretary General told demonstrating protestors, “you have a situation which is better than ten other places all over the world. I can give you a list of ten places where you have more problems than in Sarajevo.”¹²³ Also, by paying overwhelming attention to the question of a quagmire the Secretary General had fundamentally undermined the *raison d’être* of the UN which is predicated on averting conflicts and formulating peace initiatives. When an open conflict between the UN Secretary General and the Security Council erupted in mid 1992, on whether so much resources should be expended on Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General observed that compared to other areas it is a “rich man’s war.”

The Security Council has bestowed much authority on the Secretary General especially when it come to the use of force in Bosnia. He was delegated the responsibility of giving permission to NATO on any bombing mission that was in support of the UN operation. Time and again, however, the ever too cautious Boutros-Ghali hesitated thus rendering the threats of bombing totally ineffective. The Secretary General also has been accused of suppressing reports out of Bosnia that pertain to Bosnia Serb positions and offensives. Boutros-Ghali, for instance, suppressed intelligence reports regarding a Serb build up around Gorazde in March 1994.

¹²¹Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, p. 242

¹²²David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 245.

¹²³Cited in Fouad Ajami, “The Mark of Bosnia: Boutros-Ghali’s Reign of Indifference,” *Foreign Affairs*,

The Secretary General was wrong in defining the Yugoslav problem and what could be done, and he was hesitant and quite reluctant to implement some of the UN resolutions that had certain components of peacemaking nature. The Secretary General “never could find his compass in Bosnia, and his failure went hand in hand with pretensions about the dawn of a new age for the United Nations.”¹²⁴ Indeed, he has been goaded to go along with the final western proposals that a certain flexing of muscle is necessary to spur negotiations and bring the Serbs to the table. Boutros-Ghali’s initiatives in the Yugoslavia crisis has been minimal and his overall contributions to all the facets of the management of the conflict has been, at best, abysmally poor.¹²⁵ All in all, the Secretary General’s contribution to the crisis leaves a lot to be desired.

Quality of Military Leadership

The military decision-making of the Bosnian operation has been far from remarkable. In the case of the UN peacekeeping deployment- where traditional modalities of peacekeeping were employed- the role played by the military brass is not prominent. However, in a case like Bosnia’s, the effectiveness of a military leader is not only desirable but also paramount.

The first commander of the UNF in Sarajevo was Major General Mackenzie of Canada who, it seems, misread the entire Bosnian conundrum by apportioning blame equally on all the three protagonists despite the clear evidence that one side was the victim while the others were the aggressors. Mackenzie instead saw “the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosnians [as] ‘three serial killers’ distinguished only by the number of murders each had committed.”¹²⁶ By presenting consistently such a biased judgement he painted a picture

vol. 75, no.3 (May/June 1996) pp. 164-5.

¹²⁴Fouad Ajami, “The Mark of Bosnia: Boutros-Ghali’s Reign of Indifference,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no.3 (May/June 1996) p. 164.

¹²⁵David Rieff, “The Illusions of Peacekeeping,” *World Policy Journal* (Fall 1994), pp. 10-11. See also David Rieff’s, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of the West*.

that understated the brutality of the Serbian genocidal atrocities. He also passionately dissuaded the international community from getting involved, warning of dire consequences and entrapment into a quagmire.¹²⁷ He represented a General who complained a lot and did very little with the tools that he had at his disposal. As Mark Almond wrote, “ Lewis Mackenzie made his name by firing more from the lip with as little hesitation as he showed reluctance to be drawn into shooting from the hip.”¹²⁸ Indeed the legacy he established was one that lacked any positive precedents. For his uneven handedness and partiality, the Bosnian government signalled its wish to have him removed. As a result Mackenzie left Bosnia.

General Philippe Morillion, Mackenzie’s successor, initially tried to move the humanitarian assistance through the belligerents that were blocking the aid conveyers. However, his lack of political acumen undercut his good intentions when he unintentionally took part in facilitating ‘ethnic cleansing’ by evacuating *en masse* Muslim refugees from some of the besieged towns. After undertaking several such missions, the French government came under heavy criticism for its role in allegedly assisting the Bosnian Muslims. With that political fallout Morillion was recalled to Paris.

General Briquemont of Belgium succeeded Morillion. Initially he like Morillion wanted to get the relief efforts going. But in the final months of his tenure the increased violence and the limited military capability at his disposal made him realize the impossibility of the task he was given. On this policy issue he openly disagreed with the Secretary General. In frustration he handed over the job well before his term expired.¹²⁹

¹²⁶Fouad Ajami, “The Mark of Bosnia: p. 164.

¹²⁷Lewis Mackenzie, *Peacekeeper*, Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993.

¹²⁸ Mark Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans* (London: Mandarin Paperback, 1994) p. 272.

¹²⁹In frustration, Lieutenant - General Francis Briquemont observed that “our mandate is inappropriate. We equipped for peacekeeping, but there is not even a peace treaty. The reality is that there are three factions fighting, while 10000... angels in blue berets provide humanitarian assistance. It has become impossible.” (*Globe and Mail*, Saturday January 22, 1994. p. A7)

The overall military commander of the UN force in ex-Yugoslavia now lies in the hands of Jean Cot. As the inhumanity and barbarity of the war increased, Cot felt that more power should be used. He also felt that a show of force was necessary to put some teeth into the pronouncements of the UN resolution. Fed up with the Secretary General's too cautious policy and his refusal to empower him to order airstrikes he openly criticized Boutros-Ghali.¹³⁰ Notwithstanding the general opposition to the efficacy of air strikes, Cot was in favor of the use of airpower: "In the case of a massive attack against [UN] safe areas or anywhere else, the only means that we have of reacting against this- of reacting immediately - is close air support."¹³¹ His statements and manner of taking to task the UN officials was deemed controversial.¹³²

Michael Rose, Briquemont's successor, established a reputation for effectiveness and toughness. He outlined that force will be used whenever it is deemed necessary to achieve the ends of a passed UN resolution. His assignment came with the bombing in Sarajevo that killed over 68 people. With a NATO ultimatum in hand, the hostile forces besieging the city were forced to withdraw over 20 kilometers from its environs. However, Rose's legacy was no better than Mackenzie's. He refused time and again to call in airstrikes to stop Serb shelling of Sarajevo and the other safe areas. For Rose, "the Bosnian Muslims were tricksters who shelled their own people, cowards trying to get the United Nations to fight their fight."¹³³

¹³⁰Globe and Mail. Wednesday, January 19, 1994 . Briquemont also observed the disparity between the rhetoric of UN resolution and the means to put it into action: "There is a fantastic crisis now because the politicians are writing and voting I don't know how many resolutions [mandating peacekeeping measures in Bosnia] but we have no means to execute them." (*Globe and Mail*. January 24, 1994. p. A6)

¹³¹*Globe and Mail*, Tuesday, January 25, 1994. A6

¹³² In a meeting with president Mitterand on Jan. 8. the UN Secretary General asked for Cot's removal. The French government acquiesced and Cot left the post by the end of March 1994. (*Globe and Mail*, Wed. January 19, 1994)

¹³³ Fouad Ajami, "The Mark of Bosnia....," p. 164.

Conclusion

By the end of 1994 there were over 26,000 UN personnel drawn from over 30 countries that were deployed in the Yugoslavian theater. About 10,000 of these UN troops are monitoring the shaky cease-fires, and assisting in the humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia.

The late intervention of the UN in Bosnia was made at the behest of the EC. With the growing acknowledgement among the Community members that their organization was unable to effectively tackle a problem of the Yugoslavian magnitude and the realization that their nascent and improvising foreign policy structures were too young to present a cohesive strategy, the EC finally presented 'the problem' over to the United Nations. The Yugoslav conflict has cruelly exposed that "no coordinated European security policy exists, [that] no instruments for its coordination are in place, and [that] the 'complementarity' of current security structures is a myth."

The UN peacekeeping mission failed miserably in Bosnia. The sources of this failure lie in the wrong choice of the instrument of peacekeeping instead of peace enforcement. The lack of national interests to be protected by members of the Security Council, in a large measure, explains the hands off approach they adopted in so far as the catastrophic crisis that envelopes the ex-Yugoslavian state is concerned. Hence the Bosnian State was allowed to descend into a Hobbesian state of nature and left to its own devices to disintegrate.

The new security structure which was to be built after the end of the Cold War did not materialize in Yugoslavia, as the international community did not come to grips with the changed realities and new dynamics put into play by the dawn of the new era. This new era made possible by the end of the Cold War, demands, in a great measure, that we stop looking at strategies to adopt from the parochial prism of national interest. The events happening in Bosnia compare in many ways with the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. In its aftermath, the world tarnished with shame cried loudly and in an agonized voice: Never

again! Less than half a century later others are being subjected to the same fate and we all stand around bothered but generally unperturbed as we try to gingerly explain away the calamities of the Balkans.

Chapter Four

Whither UN Peacekeeping?

INTRODUCTION:

The end of the Cold War has made possible the greater involvement of the UN in internal conflicts, which were hitherto shaped by East-West rivalry. Between 1988 and 1992 the UN was involved in many small-scale observer mission operations to oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces from certain conflicts, and it also, at a more ambitious level, supervised the implementation of comprehensive political settlements. The first Security Council summit attended by the heads of state was held after the glorious victory of the allies in the Gulf War. The interest generated was a reflection of the potential which lies latent in the international organization. With the victory in that war as a background, the Security Council leaders reached a consensus whereby new life was to be breathed into the UN which had for a long time been paralyzed by the Cold War Superpower gridlock. Brimming with newly found confidence and overwhelmed by a desire to show its pertinence in the New World Order, the UN launched four large-scale operations in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Mozambique. All these new operations set precedent in their own ways. Moreover, all four operations were geared to ameliorating internal civil conflicts raging within these countries.

In this chapter the two cases discussed in the empirical sections of the thesis will be overviewed. There will also be a broad overview of current trends in peacekeeping. This current trend is increasingly characterized by UN intervention in civil conflicts. The evolving concepts of peacekeeping which require increased international involvement has given the organization added relevance as well as new tasks. A concept like humanitarian intervention has extended the horizon of UN intervention. Several factors have led to the proliferation of UN operations since 1988. These will be looked at and also a brief reference will be made to the growing re-assessment by the major powers to their role in 'muscular' or strategic peacekeeping missions. Such a reevaluation can be seen in the conditions outlined by the US government for its participation in any future UN

peacekeeping operations. While severe problems face UN peacekeeping missions there are certain countervailing events such as the participation of Japan and Germany in the international organization's peacekeeping assignments that would significantly lighten its burden.

A Comparative Assessment of the Congo and Bosnia UN Operations:

BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT

Political Support:

The US involvement in the Congo crisis was motivated by its broad national interest, which in this early period of the Cold War was to contest and oppose the expansion of communism around the world. In the case of the Bosnia, the numerous Chapter VII resolutions notwithstanding, no political will or commitment was present to authorize coercive military engagement to address what is widely viewed as a clear transgression of the established norms of international society.¹


What is missing in the Balkans of today that was present in the Congo of yore is the political will and strong leadership shown by the US in the latter case. The Americans were so disinterested in the former Yugoslavia that they did not even think worthwhile to deploy their troops even in a peacekeeping mode. Western governments have identified no direct and overriding national interests over which to spill the blood of their soldiers. With the demise of the Cold War, the Balkan region has lost its strategic significance, and it possess no vital resources upon which the west depends for its survival.

KIND OF DISPUTE:

Both the Congo and the former Yugoslavia missions involved civil wars. The theory will point to a failure or only a slim chance of success for a peacekeeping operation to resolve these conflicts. However, the theory does not fit nicely with the facts. In the Congo, the

¹ Mats Berdal, "United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia," in Donald and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) p. 228.

UN carried out what would be called in today's term of art robust or strategic peacekeeping. On the other hand, in the case of the Bosnia the UN and the major nations have decided to limit themselves to a more traditional peacekeeping operation combined with a humanitarian mission.

Internal disputes/wars are, for international organizations, the most difficult to resolve. This is due to the inherent difficult of the issues involved and also due to the intransigence of the parties involved. How the international community tries to solve a civil war is dependent on the political will shown by the major powers of the day. This political will is also dependent on perceptions of national interest by the big powers. 

The internal nature of the Congo conflict did not stop the US from 'mobilizing' the UN to achieve its strategic interests in the Congo and Africa. However, in the case of Bosnia the US did not have any significant strategic interest, and hence it did not actively seek a solution to the ethnic conflict.

The Conduct of the Host State, the Principal Protagonists and Third Party States:

The Congo central government initially offered its fullest cooperation to ONUC in the hope that the UN forces would fight along the government forces in quashing the rebellion. However, this cooperation dissipated once ONUC de-coupled its operation from the central government forces. Thereafter, ONUC did not have much cooperation from any of the parties. ONUC once again began to receive a high level of cooperation after the death of Lumumba, and with the restoration of a semblance of a central government.

In the Bosnian the government initially welcomed the presence of the peacekeepers. However, over a period of time that welcome has dissipated when the UN forces did not put a stop to Serbian attacks on UN designated safe areas. The Izetbogenic government has several times threatened to withdraw its consent to the UN forces on its soil. However, the Bosnian government never fulfilled its threats.

The Katangan secessionists clearly did not support an operation among whose purpose was the restoration of the central government's authority over all areas of the country. The Katangan rebels were vociferous in their opposition to the UN forces because they saw the UN as one of their enemies. The sub-national actors, especially the Serbs in Bosnia did not like the presence of the UN forces, as they perceived their presence as inimical to their interest.

The third party that had the most harmful effect on the peacekeeping mission in the Congo was Belgium. Belgian troops and mercenaries who were directly supporting the Katanga secessionist forces had undoubtedly escalated the violence of the conflict. Moreover, as the former colonial power, Belgium used every available means at its disposal to frustrate the UN peacekeeping operation.

The Serbian government consistently supported efforts by the Bosnian Serbs to ethnically cleanse and seize territories occupied by the Muslims. Likewise, the Croatian government gave a strong signal to the Bosnian Croats to mount an insurrection whose ultimate aim is to create a Bosnian Croat territory that would eventually be part of a greater Croatian state.

Regional Organizations:

The Yugoslav conflict was initially mediated by the EC. The EC liberated from the close supervisory leadership exercised by the US felt that it had a chance to bring peace and order to the conflagration taking place in its backyard. This was welcomed by the UN which saw it as a positive step undertaken by the powerful member states and which was to certainly relieve it from the overwhelming peacekeeping missions it had undertaken at that time. However, the expectation that the Europeans will put forward a concerted common position never materialized as each nation had its own interests in the outcome of the conflict, while at the same time no one country had its particular interests

threatened to such an extent that it had to intervene unilaterally. The role of mediation played by the EC, however, seemed to have blocked any early UN intervention.²

The Congo operation started before the organization for African Unity (OAU) was formed. Nevertheless, the broad silhouette of an emerging conflict between the western supported African countries and the communist leaning African nations was becoming visible. However, it lacked a common voice or articulation in a continental organization and thus its impact in undermining the overall UN operations' efficacy was minimal. In that sense the lack of a continental organization was a blessing for it would have brought into sharper focus the differing viewpoints and interests of the neighbouring countries.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORIZATION:

Mandate

ONUC's mandate in the beginning seemed to be clear although a lot more mandates were passed after the initial mandate. The initial mandate of ONUC seemed clear but included few details on how the operation was to achieve the goals laid out for it. That ONUC was allowed to assist the Congolese government in regaining stability seemed incompatible with the restriction that ONUC was allowed to use military force only in self-defense. Some think that the operation encountered difficulties after it took on the duties of imposing law and order in the Congo. The vague mandate was a further source of disagreement among the UN members; the African states and the Soviet Union focused on the external threat posed by Belgian while the US and other countries perceived the chief issue to be of internal disorder. ONUC also received no clear instructions on how to perform such functions as securing the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries. ONUC's mandate changed over time, resulting in some controversy over the force's expanded role and some confusion as to whether it had exceeded its original purposes. In all, problems

²Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General had said the early involvement by the Europeans precluded the UN playing a role as it would have made the protagonists in the civil war play one organization against another. Brian Hall, "Blue Helmets, Empty Guns," *The New Times Magazine*, January 2, 1994, p. 38.

with the ONUC mandate complicated an already difficult situation for the peacekeeping troops.

The focus of UN operation in Bosnia has been from the beginning explicitly humanitarian. In the summer of 1992 when UNPROFOR's mandate was extended to cover Bosnia, the resolution categorically stated that the peacekeeping forces were there to support the "efforts by the UNHCR to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary"³

The initial mandate of each operation was thus clear in the initial stages though no specific instructions on carrying out the objectives of the missions were part of those mandates.

Financing:

The ONUC operation in the Congo run into difficult financial problems that were so severe that it almost led to the collapse of the whole United Nations organization. Because of the financial crunch the operation faced, it was, many argue, forced to quickly achieve its goals by the use of force and get out of the Congo as soon as was possible.⁴ Financial pressures may also have led to the early withdrawal of the forces in 1964. Though it put the operation under some strain, the financial aspect did not play a dramatic role in the outcome of the mission.⁵ Similar to the Congo operation there was a massive gap between commitments and financial resources in the Bosnian UN mission. As of the end of April 1994, contributions outstanding to its special account were about \$686m.⁶

³ UN Security Council Resolution 758, 8 June 1992

⁴Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 76

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping (UN Document pS/DPI?6/Rev. 5, May 1994), p. 84

The Imperative of Timing:

The timing of UN intervention plays a crucial determining role in the success of a UN peacemaking operation.⁷ The points of interjection into the two conflicts provide lucid account on the overall importance of the timing of intervention. In the Congo, the UN intervened early enough before the situation got out of hand while in Bosnia it intervened so late that its leverage to influence the flow of events has been substantially reduced. In the case of Bosnia the facts created on the ground by the Serbs is hard to reverse without a strong willingness on the major players to engage in a full fledged combat against them - a prospect that has never been on the table.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION:

Operational Characteristics:

A comparison of the role the different Secretaries General played can be made. While Hammarskjold and his successor U Thant saw that the Congo problem should be addressed mainly by the UN, the present Secretary General was in the first instance satisfied with delegating that responsibility to a regional organization. Hammarskjold under whose leadership the peacekeeping modality of conflict resolution was first initiated saw the Congo conflict as providing the UN with a new area into which it could expand. Furthermore, he believed that the true essence of the international organization is borne by its ability to dampen conflicts by playing a leading role in preventive diplomacy.⁸

U Thant who acceded to power after the death of Hammarskjold also held similar views. In his era a more forceful use of UN military forces in the Congo theatre had been

⁷ Christoph Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), p. 73.

⁸John Holmes who was Pearson's assistant during the Suez Crisis wrote: "It would be misleading to imply that Hammarskjold welcomed the crisis in the Congo, but he did accept the challenge with enthusiasm. This was the opportunity he had been waiting for to expand the positive function of the UN as a force for progress beyond the wrath of the Cold War." (p. 51)

witnessed. The passive peacekeeping role played hitherto by the UN was upgraded to a peace-enforcement level in an attempt to deal with the complexity of issues fostered by the raging civil war. His views on secession have been clear and he made every effort to thwart the secession of Katanga.⁹

Boutros Ghali, on the other hand, has been unwilling to commit UN troops to the Yugoslavian imbroglio and later to Bosnia fearing that it will get bogged down in a quagmire. The Secretary General had been wrong in defining the Bosnian problem and what could be done, and he has been hesitant and quite reluctant to implement some of the UN resolutions that had certain components of peace-enforcement nature. In a visit to Sarajevo the Secretary General stated to the citizens of the besieged city that they were deeper crises in other places of the world that cried for more immediate UN attention.

While it is hard to make a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of military decision making between two operations conducted in two different eras and over such a long period, a general description of the military quality deployed can be made. In the case of the Congo the military seemed to have been highly organized given their numbers and the territory they were to secure. Having a stronger political will to back them both in terms of the UN mandate and the support of the US assured them that they had the blessing to take decisive military action when push came to shove. A partial credit, however, can be accorded to some of the military leaders who have shown a high level of professionalism.

In Bosnia, however, the military generals deployed did not have a general sense of their mandate and were unsure of even the objectives to be achieved. That has resulted from various factors chiefly the lack of political will to back up the UN mandate with the necessary military power. Part of the blame, however, lies with poor leadership offered

⁹U Thant said in an interview that the UN, as an international organization, “has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its member state.”

by the various generals in the field. Moreover, UNPROFOR did not have a joint operations effort as a different body controls each part of it.¹⁰

Location of Deployment:

The Congo operation initially served a large area; indeed one can argue that the entire country was subject to ONUC action. Thus the large force of over twenty thousand that was deployed was not sufficient enough to keep the peace in the Congo. A factor that played an important role in the latter stages of the operation was the narrowing down of the area of operation to the province of Katanga. The peacekeeping forces operated in densely populated area in the major towns and the terrain in the countryside was dense forest and impassable roads. In addition, there were few clear lines separating the different factions, of which ONUC briefly become one. The geographical context in which the operation took place certainly hampered the progress of the mission though it was definitely not a very critical factor to its overall outcome.

In Bosnia, however, a clear delineation of territory does not seem to exist. In Bosnia a state that was an ethnic mosaic was torn asunder by a vicious fratricidal triangular war among its three major groups. The Croatia and the Serbia each made claims to large portions of the newly established state and even embarked on making their pronouncements become a reality by actively backing their ethnic groups in Bosnia.

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF ONUC AND UNPROFOR:

In this section the performance of the two operation discussed in the previous chapters will be overviewed taking into account how they met the criteria of success that I outlined in Chapter 1. The two criteria that I pointed out in measuring the success of the two

(Kamal S. Shehadi, *Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper*. 283, December 1993, p. 13)

¹⁰The UNPROFOR Force commander did not practically command the whole UN operation in ex-Yugoslavia but real power resided with each command and all therefore operated semi-autonomously. The UNPROFOR was is headquartered in Zagreb, the BHC at Kiseljak, Sector Sarajevo is operated by the French airport battalion and the Macedonian command is controlled from Skjope. The fact that each command

operations are the ability to prevent the onset or renewal of war, and the lesser but important issue of limiting the death and destruction in the zone of deployment. The other criterion that is used to assess the success of a mission is how it contributes to the resolution of the conflict. Each of the two operations will be discussed with special consideration given as to how each met the above two criteria. It is pertinent here to point out that I have already outlined the explanatory variables that might lead to the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission. At this junction I will limit the discussion only to the two measuring criteria.

Limiting the Armed Conflict:

The UN Congo operation was successful in resolving the Congo crisis. The presence of the UN troops led to the resolution of the conflict by forcing the rebellious group (in this case Tshombe) to give up his attempt to secede Katanga from the rest of the Congo. Without the strategic peacekeeping measures employed by the UN troops chances are that the Congo would have split into small ethnic provinces right after it achieved its independence.

The greatest fear of western governments was the spread of the Yugoslav conflict to the rest of the Balkans. However, the war remained exclusively in Bosnia. Various reasons have been advanced as to why that is the case. The most important may be that the Serbs (Bosnian Serbs, Croatian Serbs and Serbs in Serbia) have spread themselves too thin in trying to conquer large areas of Croatia and Bosnia. The Serbs therefore in the end suffered heavy reverses in Croatia, and unexpectedly met heavy resistance from Bosnian Muslims. The pressures brought to bear on Serbia - in terms of sanctions- may also have had some constraining effect on Belgrade and the Serb rebels it sponsored in Bosnia and Croatia. UNPROFOR as it is presently configured has been very ineffective in containing the war or stopping the conflict. Even in areas designated safe areas UN troops were unable to prevent Serb bombardment.

operated semi-autonomously have made coordination between the them to be difficult. (Mats Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping? *Adelphi Paper* No. 280, October, 1993.)

Limiting Casualties:

The ONUC operation has no doubt contributed significantly limited the casualties arising from the Congo crisis. The level of conflict between the various factions was escalating when the UN arrived. The UN troops immediately tried to bring a sense of law and order in a country that was clearly spiralling out of control. By undertaking law and order measures and by interposing between the belligerents factions the UN troops helped to reduce the amount of killing. The humanitarian mission that the UN has undertaken has also reduced the starvation that many Congolese faced as a direct result of the civil war.

The actions of the UN have decreased the level of intensity in tribal warfare in areas where the UN forces were deployed. The situation in Katanga where Tshombe's forces were committing atrocities against the Baluba had been brought to an end largely due to the actions of the UN troops. However, given the size of the Congo and the number of troops deployed in the Congo (about 20, 000), it was not possible for the UN to present and active in all locations. In the four years of the UN presence in the Congo, about one hundred thousand Congolese died in rival clashes between factions and tribes.¹¹

UNPROFOR was also very ineffectual in limiting casualties. It only partially succeeded in limiting factional fighting by interposing between warring parties, and in many cases minimized shelling and sniper fires, especially in Sarajevo. However ethnic cleansing, mass rapes have happened on UNPROFOR's watch. UNPROFOR did not arrive in Sarajevo until mid-May 1992 and it did not have a mandate for the rest of the country until September. Nonetheless, in the years of UNPROFOR's deployment, ethnic cleansing and systematic rape continued, mass graves were discovered concentration camps were being operated and enclaves were strangled and denied humanitarian assistance. What is more genocidal acts mainly against the Muslims were committed by the Serbs during the UN troops tenure. Despite the presence of the UN troops about 200, 000 Bosnians were killed and over 2 million people were displaced.¹² In addition over 50,

¹¹ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, 1993) p. 52

¹² "The Abdication," in Nader Mousavizadeh, (ed.), *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of*

000 women were raped.¹³ Even the UN designated ‘safe areas’ were not immune from becoming massacre zones of Bosnians by the Serbs. Considering the devastation wrought on the population of Bosnia one cannot but say that UNPROFOR’s mission in that country failed to limit the level of casualties.

Conflict Resolution:

In the case of the Congo the fighting was on-going when the UN troops arrived and it continued even after their arrival. Also, the cease-fires negotiated were all broken and were not durable. Therefore in these conditions it was difficult to hold talks that would lead to the resolution of the conflict. Of all the operations against Katanga, only one was carried out specifically in support of a political objective- the implementation of U Thant’s plan for national reconciliation. The successful implementation of this plan depended on the apprehension and removal of ‘all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel and all mercenaries’ as directed in S/5002 of 24 November 1961.

UNPROFOR mission has not led to conflict resolution in Bosnia. Instead, UNPROFOR’s presence can be argued to have prevented an earlier resolution of the conflict by preserving the status quo. UNPROFOR is now stationed in Yugoslavia for more than 3 years and so far has not contributed in any significant way to the resolution of the conflict. Michael Wesley is indeed right when he argued that UNPROFOR was not only “worse than ineffectual” but acted “as impediments to the termination of the conflict.”¹⁴

Explaining ONUC’s and UNPROFOR’s Successes (Failures)

The United Nation’s operation in the Congo had succeeded in its basic objective, which was to end the civil war and stabilize that state. As Lefever stated the UN mission “helped to contain the crisis and mute the conflict.”¹⁵ The UN mission in the Congo was set up to forestall the direct involvement of the Superpowers, though both the US and the

Appeasement (New York: The New Republic, 1996), p. 167.

¹³ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) p. 267.

¹⁴ Michael Wesley, “Blue Berets or Blindfolds? Peacekeeping and the Hostage Effect,” *International Peacekeeping* 2/4 (Winter 1995) p. 458.

Soviet Union supported different factions in the internal conflict. The active political, financial and logistical support of the US was instrumental in bringing the UN operation to a successful conclusion. Although the operation “was authorized under the rules of the UN system and managed by the Secretary-General,” it was, by and large, an “instrument of a coalition of states led by Washington.”¹⁶

UNPROFOR has not succeeded in ending the conflict in Bosnia. The UN Secretariat has argued that the operation “has not...ended the war in that strife-torn country, but it has been neither mandated nor equipped to do that.”¹⁷ That has indeed been the fundamental reason for UNPROFOR’s failure. The UNPROFOR was deployed as a half-measure because the Security Council members were not initially prepared to commit to a large scale operation in Bosnia but neither could they ignore the conflict. Instead a humanitarian mission was initiated to alleviate the civilian suffering while negotiations to end the conflict was undertaken. The humanitarian mission has thus become an excuse for not instituting other more appropriate measures to the conflict such as enforcement.

Bosnia was not ‘ripe’ or ready for a traditional peacekeeping operation because there was no peace to keep. The country was under assault from civil wars fomented by Belgrade, and to a lesser extent Zagreb. It was also subject to more direct aggression from Serbia as the JNA crossed the Drina river to accomplish the goals of Belgrade. Though that was the case the Security Council authorized the dispatch of a classical peacekeeping mission to Bosnia. That is despite the warnings of the UN Secretariat. The hope and the expectation of the Security Council was that the Bosnian parties would provide their consent and cooperation to the UN forces. However as Rosalyn Higgins has argued, “to seek to establish a UN operation dedicated to ancillary relief- the provision of humanitarian aid in this case-without a cease-fire in place is futile.”¹⁸ Without a cease-fire, the conflict

¹⁵ Enerst Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation* (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press) p. 207.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ S/1994/300, 16 March 1994.

¹⁸ Rosalyn Higgins, “The new United Nations and Former Yugoslavia,” *International Affairs* 69 (Summer 1993) pp.468-70.

continues unabated, and “the reality is that we have chosen to respond to major unlawful violence, not by stopping that violence, but by providing relief to the suffering. But our choice of policy allows the suffering to continue.”¹⁹

As the above discussion, as well as the empirical chapters show the most crucial aspect of the Congo mission that is lacking in the Bosnia operation is the political support of a superpower, in this case the United States. The lack of strong support by the US is explained by the change in international relations which has been ushered in by the end of the Cold War. Geographical areas that used to be strategically important are no longer so. That explains the fate that has befallen on Bosnia. While strategically located countries used to attract the attention of the Superpowers that is no longer the case. The political context in which an operation is undertaken is seen to the most important variable in the overall aspect of an operation. Most of the other variables are to a great extent inextricably linked to the political context variable. The presence of the Cold war in the case of the Congo, and its absence in case of Bosnia seem to account for the observed difference in outcomes between the two UN operations.

From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: A Paradigm Shift?

During the Cold War the UN involvement in peacemaking efforts was mainly as a front for the covert operation of the principal players in the international system. The Congo Operation best validates such an observation as the US saw its larger geopolitical role undermined by the policy of Soviet expansionism through the establishment of proxy Marxist and Socialist states. The Congo, rich in mineral resources, as vast as the whole of Western Europe and sharing borders with nine countries, occupied a strategic location in the heart of the African continent. It was believed that any superpower that won this invaluable prize would have won the ideological war in the newly emerging nations of that continent. The UN operation first began as normal peacekeeping though the prerequisite conditions for a traditional peacekeeping were all lacking. It also marked the

¹⁹ Ibid.

debut of the UN in involving itself in a civil war raging within a member state.²⁰ That the UN took the bold step of intervening is remarkable and rather surprising but the brooding motive which moved it toward such an action becomes apparent when the underlying political stakes are considered. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations pursued relatively the same policies in so far as the Congo civil war was concerned. Their policies were geared to seeing a moderate, pro Western regime emerge and to that end they supported the UN effort in all ways short of deploying its own personnel.²¹ In the end, through the persistence efforts of the UN and with the heavy backing of the US, a moderate regime was installed in Leopoldville.

Thirty years later in Eastern Europe a conflict that has torn asunder the Yugoslav republic was unleashed. Coming as it did just after the end of the Cold War and before new security mechanisms and structures were put in place, the international community's reaction and especially the UN's was slow and ineffectual. Even where prompt action was taken by regional organizations like the EC their stand was muddled and their 'paste up' diplomacy was racked by indecisiveness, bickering and the lack of a joint common approach. The EC which has matured into EU- with a supposedly common foreign policy- was unable to find a common voice among its members leave alone a common solution to the Balkan crisis. Having delivered on its promise of protecting Western Europe the US curtailed its foreign engagements. In the first post Cold War conflict in Europe the US delegated the responsibility of securing the peace to Western Europe. It was, according to Boutros Ghali, the engagement of the EC as a regional organization that kept the UN out of the Yugoslav conflict. It was only after the EC gave up hope of presenting a united front and realized that the differences of opinion among its members are irreconcilable that they transferred the Yugoslav issue to the UN.

²⁰At the time the UN was first called into the Congo its application for membership was still under review and it was several months after the dispatch of the peacekeeping troops that it become a UN member. The same is true for Croatia in that it still remained unrecognized by the UN when the first talks pertaining to the deployment of peacekeeping forces was initiated.

²¹In a bid to avoid direct confrontation between the superpower, the UNSG, Dag Hammarskjold, ruled out the participation of NATO and WARSAW member troops in the operation. However, it was US personnel who, by and large, undertook the logistical aspects of the operation.

The UN peacekeeping mission in the Bosnian imbroglio also forms part of the new post Cold War phenomenon in which the UN intervenes primarily for humanitarian reasons. While in the Cold War era such an intervention could have been anything but humanitarian as the emphasis of the Cold War would have given it a low conflict perception, in this new era the absence of such a climate has made this type of conflict, where national interests of the big powers are not threatened, less of a big power game and more of a humanitarian mission. Such a de-emphasis to a humanitarian mission has made the chances of a UN peacemaking effort backed by the US less likely as the motivating factor- or indeed the *raison d'être*- of US foreign intervention is lacking.

Widening the Horizon: Humanitarian Intervention

In the post-Cold War era certain new concepts have arisen which ultimately led to the proliferation of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. While human rights was a subject that was given a certain consideration during the Cold War era it was in most cases overridden by national interest calculations. However, the end of the Cold War saw the rising importance of human rights issues as a matter of international concern. It is out of this that broad concepts like humanitarian intervention emerge.²² Indeed, a new international regime is developing that increasingly makes human rights and minority rights within nations matters of international concern.²³ The Secretary General has also brazenly stated, rather prematurely, one may add, that the world has reached 'a stage in the ethical and psychological evolution of western civilization in which the massive and deliberate violation of human rights will no longer be tolerated.'²⁴

The concept of humanitarian intervention relates to cases in which the citizens of a nation face suffering of a genocidal proportion either as a deliberate grand strategy or as a result of a state sliding into chaos. The situations in Bosnia, Iraq and now Rwanda represent the

²²Robert H. Jackson, *Armed Humanitarianism*.

²³Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order, *Survival*, Vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993, p.

²⁴Gary Klintworth, "The Right to Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, November 1992, Vol. 46 No. 2 p.

former case while Liberia, Angola and Somalia provide examples of the latter.²⁵ The Gulf War provided the first instance in which a UN intervention solely based on humanitarian consideration was undertaken. Resolution 688 was precedent setting in two respects: first, it legalized UN intervention into a sovereign country on issues like human rights which were hitherto a purely internal matter. Secondly, in fulfilling the resolution the UN has set up 'safe havens' in which the targeted group was to be protected by UN forces. This is a concept that has been replicated in other conflicts like in Bosnia and Rwanda.

In Somalia, UNSOM was established after the country collapsed into a Hobbesian anarchy. There was no central authority any more but only marauding bandits that pillaged and looted. It is the direct action of these bands that slid this country into a brutal civil war which resulted in mass starvation. With the situation getting gloomier by the day the Secretary General, in November 1992, advised the Security Council that 'the situation in Somalia has deteriorated beyond the point at which it is susceptible to the peacekeeping treatment' and that the Council had 'no alternative but to adopt more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia'. The Secretary General's request led to the mobilization of a US forces operation whose core objective was to make the delivery of the humanitarian aid possible. Paragraph 10 of resolution 794 (3 Dec. 1992) gave the *carte blanche* in the use of force when it asserted that

acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorizes the Secretary General and member states cooperating to implement the offer [to mount an operation] to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.²⁶

In Somalia it was mass starvation and the resulting catastrophic human tragedy which provoked the international community to act. This is made clear in the preamble of resolution 794 which states that 'the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict

²⁵Christopher Greenwood, 'Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention? The World Today, February 1993, p. 34

²⁶Greenwood, 'Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?' p. 38

in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’

Though the situation in the former Yugoslavia is infinitely more complex than the above two, involving as it did both an international aggression and an internal civil war, the stance taken by the United Nations was similar. The UN Security Council Resolution 770 has given the UN members ‘all necessary means’ to facilitate relief operations. The deployment of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo was done under a proscribed mandate, which required it to confine itself to humanitarian action of safeguarding relief missions. In ex-Yugoslavia the Security Council has the power to view the conflict as either an internal dissension or an external aggression and it could pursue a course of action commensurate with the determination made.²⁷

One thing that the above examples show is that the ground for UN intervention is shifting and is indeed becoming more and more acceptable. However, against that background lurks a larger question which needs hard and thoughtful answers before UN forces are dispatched. Most of the humanitarian disasters are fomented by political questions that are related to either secession or a complete breakdown of governmental authority. Before any intervention is contemplated what the next steps beyond the initial relief will be has to be addressed or otherwise the ‘mercy operation’ might undermine the status quo and even tilt the balance of power between factions within a state as the case of Iraq proves. The case of Bosnia, on the other hand, illustrates the opposite case where the humanitarian concept has been abused: a tougher military action was ruled out, time and again, because it would jeopardize the relief operation. The humanitarian relief operation has become a convenient alibi for Western inaction.

Despite the nobleness of the intention of humanitarian operations, skeptics have begun to suspect what the Western nations real motives, intentions and results are. Prudence, national interest and political considerations are the determining factors of state behavior

and those factors explain the decisions for the humanitarian intervention in some situations while in others no action to alleviate the suffering is made. The UN cannot intervene in every conflict that erupts but should make a choice to intervene in conflicts that might internationalize a local conflict and thus clearly endanger the global peace and security, or where the abuse is of genocidal proportions. Where neither of these two factors are met then, harsh as it may sound, the UN should not intervene. Instead the international organization's effort should concentrate on bringing the protagonists to the negotiating table and should help mediate the conflicting parties in reaching an amicable solution.

Whither UN Peacekeeping/Peacemaking?

The end of the Cold War marked a new beginning for the United Nations. Having been freed from the shackles and constraints of that period the new UN sought to play an activist role in international affairs, commencing with the Gulf War and following it up with more peacekeeping and peacemaking operations than its previous forty years existence. Several important factors have aided the organization in its rapid expansion. These include the end of the Cold War, which saw one of the Superpowers fall by the wayside while the other emerged as the undisputed leader of the world. That new climate ushered in a less raucous and more united Security Council. That spirit of cooperation made the process of establishing new peacekeeping operations a lot easier. Also some of the old ideological conflicts waged in the Third World came to an abrupt end without the sponsorship of the Soviet Union. Also new concepts like humanitarian intervention have broadened the area of UN involvement. Undertaking such operations would not have been possible if the Cold War was still in effect as it would have antagonized many of the communist states who did not have a good human rights record.

Other factors that give impetus to UN peacemaking operations include the closer cooperation developing between NATO and the UN, the leading and more important role

²⁷Greenwood, 'Is there a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?' p. 39

played by regional organizations and the involvement of Germany and Japan, two important contributors to UN peacekeeping funds who were denied active participation on the field for their past misdeeds.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a defence alliance created by Western countries for protection against any Soviet military threat. But once that threat shrivelled with the end of the Cold War, the organization lost some of its significance as the common threat that kept its members united was no longer there. In a NATO ministerial meeting in Oslo, the organization affirmed its readiness to participate in peacekeeping operations but 'on a case-by-case basis' and only at the request of the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE). NATO's greater involvement in a quasi-conflict situation like Bosnia has been necessitated by its 'existential' expediency; it had become anachronistic and hence there was a search for a new cause. The two organizations - the UN and NATO- have been brought together by necessity; the UN lacked the tools to do its job and NATO was an organization in search of a mission.²⁸

By December 1992 NATO expanded its role by placing itself under the Security Council rather than constricting its role to only those pointed out by the CSCE for if it did that it would 'not optimize its new role of supporting crisis management and peacekeeping.'²⁹ While the array of military power presented to the UN by NATO is most welcome as political solutions and diplomatic efforts stick best when backed by the credible use of military power against a belligerent aggressor, the military organization can, nevertheless, be successful only when a coherent political position is established by its members and when the goals to be attained are clearly enunciated. The lack of political will by the West has hamstrung the military efficacy of NATO in Yugoslavia.³⁰ Events in Bosnia have clearly shown that military power without political will would attain no substantive goals.

²⁸Berdal, 'Whither UN Peacekeeping?' p. 70

²⁹Ibid.

Despite the positive trends the UN has also encountered several difficulties. There has been command and control confusion between the two organizations as each jostled for a position of supremacy. The two commands having different philosophies were bound to collide; NATO based its decisions mostly on military efficiency while the UN was more sensitive to political nuances. The military organization also has a large about-turn to make as it prepares to change its course from a defence alliance to becoming an instrument of peacemaking and crisis management. In all, sustaining a collective military campaign under the UN auspices remains problematic and even more so where the conflict is an internal one which has its origins in, and is sustained by ethnic and communal strife. Moreover, the common policy that hitherto forged the organization into a single voice has disappeared with the dawn of the new era; various national interests breed the lack of consensus which is becoming the stock-in-trade of the organization.

A positive development for UN peacemaking operations is the leading role played by the regional organizations in bringing some semblance of peace to troubled spots. In the Balkans the initial mediation role was played by CSCE, the EC and its military arm, the WEU. In Liberia, the ECOWAS intervened militarily to end the carnage which consumed that country. By relieving the UN from the tasks of peacekeeping and peacemaking, the UN can concentrate its energies on focusing on conflicts that can potentially destabilize international peace and security.

Despite the strength which regional organizations can provide to the UN peacemaking operations certain weaknesses attributed to such bodies undercut their desirability. First, the contribution regional organizations can make is limited. There is a crippling weakness of regional bodies especially those outside Europe in matters pertaining to capabilities, financial resources and decision-making structures. In the military sphere only NATO is capable of providing the necessary C3 (Command, Control and Communication) and logistics which can effectively respond to changing mandates and changing facts on the ground. Moreover, regional organizations have been found wanting in their ability to

³⁰Manfred Worner, "NATO's Role in a Changing Europe," *Adelphi Paper*. 284 (Jan. 1994), p. 98

resolve conflicts. Because of their close proximity to the area of conflict regional organizations even where they strive to be impartial fail to be seen as such by one of the protagonists. Furthermore they are, in most instances, partial; there is a continuous bickering as each member nation jostles for position favorable to both its short term and long term interest.

The Yugoslavian conflict has shown the weaknesses of a regional organization involved in a peacemaking operation. The EC countries could not come up with a single position that projected their common aims. Each of the major nations in the Community pursued a policy that was amenable to its own policy objectives. While Germany saw an independent Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to be in its interest, France and Britain did not initially welcome such a move. The Serbs also felt that a German dominated EC was pursuing a policy injurious both to its interests and cause. The lack of faith in EC mediation by the Serbs and the internal bickering between the Community members had, in the end, forced the transfer of the operation to the United Nations.

The end of the Cold War has also made possible the greater involvement of some of the nations constrained from pursuing an active foreign military engagement because of their activities in the Second World War. Germany and Japan, both economic powerhouses but until recently unable to contribute military personnel for UN peacekeeping because of certain provisions in the constitutions, were able for the first time to send their forces overseas under UN command. The Japanese contribution in personnel, logistics and financial support was instrumental in UNTAC's success while the Germans contribution to UNOSOM was invaluable. The material and financial support of these two powerful nations is important for the expansion of UN involvement in peacemaking missions.

While the above factors augur well for the expansion of UN participation in its new role of peacemaking there are nevertheless powerful crosscurrents that are forcing the organization to constrain its level of engagements. These factors include US conditionalities for its participation in peacekeeping operations; the spiraling cost of UN

operations and arguments on burden sharing; the proliferation of missions and the fatigue exhibited by the major resource contributing countries and the intractableness of internal conflicts and the low rate of success in such missions. If the UN is to continue to undertake more missions and expand its horizon into peacemaking the support and active participation of the US is imperative. The US is the most powerful nation and the major financial backer of UN peacekeeping operations, and contributes presently a third of the total peacekeeping budget, so it has to be actively engaged or its withdrawal will lead to a total collapse of UN peacekeeping missions. The early enthusiasm the Clinton Administration has shown for UN activities has evaporated with the setbacks in Somalia and has been replaced since then with a neo-isolationist policy. The Administration's peacekeeping policy review makes it almost impossible for the US to support any future peacekeeping operations as some of the guidelines that will determine its participation are quite limiting. The main questions that need to be answered, from the American perspective, are: What is the threat to US interests? Is the mission clearly defined? What is the cost of undertaking the operation? What resources are available? And what is the likelihood of success?³¹ Some of these questions are not answerable from the outset and are hard to gauge before an operation is actually embarked on. The policy of "assertive multilateralism" has been quickly replaced by the old order of the Cold War era where preference of priority was given in direct relation to the national interest significance of a conflict.

The issue of the spiraling cost of peacekeeping is occupying center stage at a time when the major powers are preoccupied with restructuring their economies. For most of the major countries the end of the Cold War was to give them a 'peace dividend' but that has been made unrealistic by the escalating cost that they have to invest in peacekeeping. The US, which for a long time paid 30 percent of the peacekeeping budget, wants its

³¹Anthony Lake, The New York Times, Sunday, Feb. 6, 1994, p. E 17. The IISS in its Strategic Survey : 1993-1994 has pointed out how unrealistic these determining factors for participation are: 'By the end of the year the US would insist on no open ended commitments, assurances of victory without casualties and on an exit strategy.' It further comments that 'these are awesome guarantees to ask for in today's uncertain world.' (Times-Colonist, May 24, 1994. P. 2)

obligations reduced to 25 percent. Economic powerhouses like Germany and Japan are, on the other hand, expected to increase their contribution.

Another factor that is discouraging contributions by the major nations is the rapid proliferation of peacekeeping missions. In the last six years over thirteen new operations have been set up and they are more crises brewing that potentially require rapid UN involvement. This will be mainly in the former Soviet republics where ethnic violence has already flared up in some while in others the potential for civil war is rapidly rising with the fomenting of Russian nationalism in the new republics. What discourages active intervention is the fact that many of the new conflicts are of civil war nature and that means the ability to contain the consequences of the conflict by external intervenors is minimal since the rapture emanates from internal complexities. While UN intervention can, in some instances, ameliorate the human tragedy, it has been the experience from these operations that their success rate is low.

The United Nations peacemaking operations unfortunately only work when the explicit national interests of a major power is at stake. In the Congo that was the case. The ex-Yugoslavian republics, however, discovered that the demise of the Cold War meant the end of their strategic significance and hence the lack of third party intervention. The UN, which is an international organization that owes its existence to the agreement of the member nations, can only channel the resources put at its disposal by the principal players. But the major powers do not want to involve themselves in the game unless their crucial interests are involved in a conflict. That apparent paradox, ultimately, sabotages the promise the UN had in "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The UN, said Winston Churchill, was never meant to create heaven on earth, just to save it from hell. Judged even by that limited measure the UN has failed miserably in places like Rwanda and Bosnia.

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