

Europe in the Sahel: Analysing the Failures of Capacity Building

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Introduction

The EU and the UN have failed to create peace in the Sahel region in Africa by building the coercive capacity of local states. This project asks: **How do the EU and UN explain their failure to build state security capacities in the Sahel, and to what extent are these explanations similar?**

Methodology

This paper;

- Adopted a qualitative approach
- Analyzed 6 total government documents from the EU and UN using NVivo 14
- Employed a proprietary typology
- Attempted to identify EU and UN perspectives on;
 - who was at fault for program failure
 - what was wrong with the programs

Literature Review

This paper created an analytical framework by combining the work of Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele (2012), Nilsson and Zetterlund (2011), and Pal et al. (2014). This project also drew on the EU Peacebuilding and UN Peacekeeping literature to detail how global peacekeeping efforts have been co-opted by NATO powers in order to control African politics.

Results

Figure 1: EU Docs Program Failure Codes by Actors





Figure 2: EU Docs Program Failure Codes By Eval. Category



EU Document Results

- EU Docs do not clearly identify who the EU views is responsible for program failure
- EU Docs suggest that the content of capacity building programs is responsible for their failure

Figure 3: UN Docs Failure Codes by Actor





Figure 4: UN Docs Program Failure Codes by Eval. Category



UN Document Results

- UN Docs uniformly claim local actors are responsible for the program failure
- UN Docs uniformly claim programs failed due to a flawed implementation

Discussion

The high rate at which the EU and UN blame local actors for program failure in the Sahel is likely due the model of peacekeeping the EU and UN employ in the Sahel. The literature notes how liberal peacekeeping in Africa is neo-colonial, which local actors strive to resist. It is likely that local resistance to the EU and UN's capacity building programs occurred due to the neo-colonial tendencies of these programs. However, more research on local actor preferences is needed to affirm such a conclusion.

Conclusion

This paper has been unable to identify who the EU views is responsible for their failure in the Sahel. However, the EU does view the content of their programs to be the main issue with the program. Contrastingly, the UN firmly claims that local actors impeded in program implementation. These findings imply that the EU and the UN explain their failures in the Sahel differently. The results revealed that whereas the EU is beginning to recognise that this approach to peacebuilding policy has problems, the UN still remains unaware of the barriers its neo-colonial peacekeeping model creates.

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Works Cited



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