# In the Shadow of the Spectacle: Security and Policing Legacies of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

by

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MA, University of Victoria, 2008
BA, York University, 2006

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# Supervisory Committee

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# Abstract

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International sporting events such as the Olympics and FIFA World Cup can affect entire economies, democratic regimes, juridical structures, urban architectures, organizational capacities, and political communities. Whether positively or negatively, undertaking a major sporting event such as the Olympics or FIFA World Cup represents a distinct opportunity for the host-city to embark on the largest ever domestic logistical project ever undertaken within the countries' borders, which can lead to considerable degrees of short-, medium-, and long-term impacts on a vast array of groups and organizations spanning the public-private divide. Accordingly, the International Olympic Committee has seized on the discourse of legacy to promote and expand the social and political value of infrastructural projects associated with the Games. Over the same period that legacy became a mainstream discourse in the Olympic industry; investment in security, surveillance, and policing infrastructure to protect major sports events simultaneously grew to approximately 20-50% of all expenditures associated with the hosting of an Olympic event. As the discourse of legacy gained currency with Olympic developments, any discourse of security legacies has remained woefully disregarded. Early studies that acknowledge the prevalence of security legacies at major events have focused on event-to-event cases, or have otherwise listed security legacy variables in the absence of any theoretical framework that explains how security governance legacies emerge and endure after the major event has ended. This dissertation presents a robust theoretical framework to address the security governance legacies flowing from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Through empirical case-studies, it details how such investments in security, surveillance, and policing infrastructure often become institutionalized as security governance assemblages that persist after the major event has ended. In particular, the chapters address legacies of redeployable public video surveillance, public-order policing, civilian-military integration, and the legacies of the private security industry. The security governance legacies of the 2010 Games involves significant changes within security, intelligence, and policing assemblages in Vancouver, and Canada as a whole. The dissertation concludes with a discussion on how security governance assemblages from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics might further inform notions of function-creep in the surveillance studies literature.

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## Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ALPR | Automated License Plate Recognition |
| ANPR | Automated Number Plate Recognition |
| ANT | Actor-Network Theory |
| APSA | Association of Professional Security Agencies |
| BSIA | British Security Industry Association |
| BC OIPC | British Columbia Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner |
| BCAS | British Columbia Ambulance Services |
| CCTV | Closed-Circuit Television |
| CCU | Crowd Control Unit |
| CF | Canadian Forces |
| CPS | Calgary Police Service |
| CPTED | Community Protection Through Environmental Design |
| CSC | Contemporary Security Canada |
| CSIS | Canadian Security Intelligence Services |
| DTES | Downtown East Side |
| DND | Department of National Defence |
| E-Comm | Emergency Communications Centre |
| EOD | Explosives Ordinance Disposal |
| EOPS | Emergency & Operational Planning Section |
| FAC | Foreign Affaris Council of Canada |
| FIFA | Federation Internationale de Football Association |
| FIT | Forward Investigation Team |
| FRCCTV | Facial Recognition Closed-Circuit Television |
| GED | Granville Entertainment District |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| HBOA | Homebush Bay Operations Act |
| ICSS | International Centre for Sport Security |
| ISU-JIG | Integrated Security Unit—Joint Intelligence Group |
| ISU | Integrated Security Unit |
| ITAC | Integrated Threat Assessment Centre |
| JIG | Joint-Intelligence Group |
| LCLB | BC Liquor Control and Licensing Branch |
| LRAD | Long-Range Acoustic Device |
| MET | London Metropolitan Police |
| MIE | Multi-Issue Extremism |
| MLO | Military Liaison Officer |
| MLU | Military Liaison unit |
| MSE | Major Sport Event |
| NDEU | National Domestic Extremism Unit (UK) |
| NORAD | North American Aerospace Defense Command |
| NSSE | National Special Security Event |
| NSW | New South Wales |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NYPD | New York Police Department |

| | |
|---|---|
| OEM | Office of Emergency Management (Vancouver) |
| OCTV | Open-Circuit Television |
| PETA | People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals |
| PIA | Privacy Impact Assessment |
| PIDS | Perimeter Intrusion Detection System |
| PIPEDA | Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act |
| POG | Public Order Group |
| PSC | Private Security Company |
| PSU | Public Safety Unit (VPD) |
| RAF | Royal Air Force (RAF) |
| RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
| RFID | Radio-Frequency Identification Device |
| SFOC | Special Flight Operations Certificate |
| SLCU | Snow Leopard Command Unit |
| SOCMINT | Social Media Intelligence |
| SWAT | Special Weapons and Tactics |
| TC | Transport Canada |
| TEMP | Temporary Redeployable Public Video Surveillance |
| UPP | Pacifying Police Units |
| VANOC | Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee |
| VFRS | Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services |
| VHSA | Vancouver Hotel Security Association |
| VicPD | Victoria Police Department |
| VPD | Vancouver Police Department |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## Prologue

On April 11, 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, members of the Rio 2016 Olympic Organizing Committee met with members of Brazil's State Public Security Institutions to discuss strategic operations for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. State Public Security Secretary, Jose Mariano Beltrame, attended with the head of the Civil Police, Martha Rocha, and Military Police Commander—General, Colonel Erir Ribeiro Costa Filho, along with senior members of the Rio 2016 Olympic Organizing Committee (Crook 2013).

In this meeting, the participants would begin to refine general strategies into the Rio 2016 Integrated Action Plan. This extensive Olympic security initiative will coordinate the three levels of government: State, Municipal, and Federal into two distinct priorities—the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs), which are targeted in the impoverished favelas, and the Public Security Integrated Regions that cover the rest of the city.

The State Public Security Secretary boldly insisted that the Integrated Action Plan will be one of Rio 2016's greatest legacies, and not only for citizens of Rio during events like the World Cup and Rio 2016 Games, but for the entire country after the Olympic flame is extinguished. Beltrame maintained that security endowments are "aimed at serving the citizens", stating further, "I believe that the integration exercise shared by the three Government levels and the population, will be the great legacy of the 2016 Olympic Games".

During that same week in Rio, the Brazilian Government announced that it had invested in 34 German-manufactured, anti-aircraft tanks to bolster internal security in preparation of the Pope's visit, the 2014 World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games. The first set of eight tanks will be dispatched on the streets of the capital, each tank equipped with two 35 mm guns mounted on a rotating turret and boasting a fire rate of 1100 rounds per

minute. The tanks join a growing list of Brazilian security investments that includes recently purchased armoured battalion vehicles equipped with situational awareness[1] capabilities such as video surveillance, facial recognition, and other sensors that provide real-time monitoring. Much of this equipment is fed into an extensive municipal smart city operational command centre, which is regularly monitored by city officials. Defence Minister Celso Amorim, the State Public Security Secretary's counterpart, at a neighbouring Defence and Security Expo earlier in the week stated, "It is very important to organize this [expo] in Rio where major investments are made in the technological field."

Remarks from each of these security officials invoke the two core drivers of Olympic security and surveillance legacies—first, as justifications of the event as a catalyst for increased investments in defence and security infrastructure for the host-city and nation, and second, they depict an insistence on the overwhelmingly positive outcomes of these investments as persistent legacies for the citizens as a whole.

The investments are commonly leveraged according to standardized templates that organize increased cooperation between national security, policing, military, intelligence, and municipal authorities and include heavy investment in aerial surveillance technologies, training and investment in public order operations, and vast investment in private security and emergency management operations (Fussey and Coaffee 2011; Fussey et al 2010). While these investments increasingly follow a standardized template across Olympic cities, thereby expressing similar trends across different urban landscapes, their instantiation varies in localized contexts (see Fussey et al 2010; McCann and Ward 2011).

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[1] Situational Awareness (SA) is a concept and field of study concerned with perception of an environment in order to yield relevant information for decision-makers in complex situations. It is most common in aviation, air traffic, military command and control, as well as law enforcement and emergency management occupations. The most widely held definition from Endsley (1995b), "the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future." The concept is increasingly used in homeland security and law enforcement situations that attempt to improve information on threat situations, spatial terrain, and general dynamics of the environment in order to pre-emptively mitigate deviant behaviours.

This dissertation traces a series of security and surveillance practices and assemblages in one such urban centre, one of the most symbolically recognized, affluent, yet also significantly poverty stricken global cities in the world—Vancouver, Canada. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics offer a rich empirical site to come to terms with the full implications of hosting the Olympic Games in the present era of security and surveillance developments. The analysis of these Games allows us to consider the full implications for security, surveillance, and policing trends in the city of Vancouver, and Canada as a whole. Moreover, these insights also provide further insights into how security governance assemblages[2] unfold in a more sustained contemporary historical view, revealing insights into the stability and transformations involved in practices of security governance.

## Introduction

International sporting events such as the Olympics and FIFA World Cup can affect entire economies, democratic regimes, juridical structures, urban architectures, organizational capacities, and political communities (Roche, 2000; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). Whether positively or negatively, undertaking a major sporting event such as the Olympics or FIFA World Cup represents a distinct opportunity for the host-city to embark on their largest ever domestic logistical project ever undertaken within the countries' borders, which can lead to considerable degrees of short-, medium-, and long-term impacts on a vast array of groups and organizations spanning the public-private divide. Hosting an international sporting event of the magnitude and scale of an Olympic games is now synonymous with, or inseparable from, projects of urban regeneration, strategies of accelerated economic development (Gaffney 2008) and tourism, and sustained global media attention, which are all intended to project an image

[2] I refer to security governance assemblages as a technique of governmentality and social control based on associations and contingent configurations of human and non of human actors (Bigo 2005; Latour 2000). Security governance assemblages transcend the traditional public-private divide, and are enacted through " 'tangled hierarchies,' parallel power networks or other forms of complex interdependence" between human and nonhuman objects that make up the assemblage. Security governance assemblages are not to be confused with 'surveillance assemblage,' that is a concept that largely focuses on networks of surveillance and flows of digital information for the purposes of social sorting. Security governance assemblages is a more broadly inclusive concept that attempts to trace a range of ontological associations within a particular technique of governmentality.

of the city as an attractive draw for inward investment (Coaffee and Rogers 2008). However, major sporting events are also inseparable from grand logistical security and policing operations that are intended to secure the infrastructure and integrity of the spaces for world sport (ICISS, 2012). A significant component of hosting major sporting events is not simply about projects of urban regeneration and capital accumulation—managing an event is also about the real and perceived notions of providing the necessary *safe* and *secure* environment for urban regeneration, the event, and even post-event legacies, to unfold (ICISS, 2012). To this end, security and policing practices that are specific to major event initiatives emerge as distinct post-event legacies themselves.

Major sporting events are a key catalyst in a wider trend of security and policing that couples modes of accelerated economic development with the expansion of military practices of identification and surveillance into the governance of urban spaces (Fussey et al, 2011; Molnar and Snider, 2011; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). Since the 1972 Munich Games, when a globally televised hostage scenario ended in the murder of five athletes and six coaches and judges from the Israeli national team, the Olympics have become identified (in military terms) to be a *target rich environment* for terrorist attack and political disruption. After 9/11, when critical infrastructure protection and enhanced security measures emerged as defining features in the societies of western liberal democracies, large scale event security measures exploded as part of a larger burgeoning homeland-security-industrial complex (Samatas, 2004).

High-profile major sporting events now catalyze what are often described as "the largest domestic peacetime security operation" for any host country, where it is now not uncommon for security costs to average 20-50% of the overall Olympics' expenditures for the entire event[3] (for an excellent general review, see Fussey et al 2011, Chapter 2). Much is at stake for urban-based groups and organizations in holding the world's largest

[3] Security operations at mega-events have grown exponentially across the most recent decade. In the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, approximately $180 million USD was spent on security operations. In the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games, the first since 9/11, the cost increased to $310 million USD before ballooning to $1.5 billion USD for the Athens 2004 Summer Olympics. While security estimates for Torino 2006 are estimated at $400 million USD, comprehensive estimates of security costs at the Beijing 2008 Olympics have reached $6.5 billion USD (Boyle and Haggerty 2009).

cultural spectacle. It therefore comes as little surprise that the Olympics catalyze long-term security impacts on a complex web of organizations by way of side-effects, residual effects, or parallel linkages (Hiller, 1998). During the same period that considerable expansion in security initiatives at Olympic events was occurring, however, managerial discourses on post-event legacies, justified as a sound return on investment in urban regeneration projects, gained widespread currency in the Olympic industry.

In 2004, the *discourse of legacy* was officially woven into the constitutional fabric of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (International Olympic Committee, 2011). Bidding for Olympic events is now premised on procuring post-event legacies that will resonate through local communities and host countries long after the flame is extinguished (Gold & Gold, 2008; Hiller, 2000). As a means to leverage large-scale investment through public funds, the IOC continually conducts research into the conceptual meaning and management of post-event legacies. Just two decades ago, the concept of legacy was a faint flicker in the Olympic sports governance industry. Since then, discourses of legacy, through ongoing attempts to positively represent a range of short-, medium, and long-term legacies associated with the Olympics, have become central themes in planning and executing major events (Gold and Gold, 2009; McAloon, 2007; Leopkey, 2009; Gold and Gold, 2010; Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2007; Dickson et al, 2011). These legacies span a broad range of categories including economic (real estate, infrastructure, tourism), culture (heritage, arts, historical memory), and social (transportation, urban regeneration) (Leopkey 2009). However, legacies are process-oriented practices, that unfold in novel configurations at major events—especially those in the context of security, policing, and emergency management.

Given vast expenditures and training in security, policing, and emergency operations as a significant proportion of all spending at major sporting events, it is notable that the IOC and its official partners have largely avoided discussing the prevalence of security and policing legacies.[4] Given this avoidance, coupled with massive economic investments,

[4] No mention of Olympic security and policing legacies can be found in IOC technical research on post-event legacies; however, a few media examples can be found. IOC President Jacque Rogge observed that, "Security investment always leaves a good legacy of security for the country. Whenever the Games are

this dissertation considers a more robust manifestation of post-Olympic legacies – one that traces a range of security and policing practices from before, an after, the event has concluded. As a result, this study considers a range of policing, military, and surveillance practices over the course of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. In doing so, the study contests and extends the realm of predominantly managerially-inflected *legacy discourses* to include more critical empirical accounts of major event security initiatives as legacies, which also highlights both the positive and negative effects of security governance practices and their associated legacies. Security governance is conceptualized in this dissertation as a technique of governmentality and social control, which is increasingly premised on heterogeneous assemblages (Bigo 2005). Security governance legacies often cohere at the nexus of crime control, counter-terrorism, and disaster response, which draws together a broad range of actors and agencies into major event security responses (Fussey 2013).

Addressing these tensions within major event security configurations, this dissertation also provides further empirical and theoretical engagement with security governance practices as distinct sets of assemblages. Through assemblage thinking (Latour 2005; Markus and Saka 2006), I understand security governance practices at major events as ongoing processes of social formation and composition, across, and through human and non-human actants. Accordingly, the dissertation focuses on how frames and processes of security governance assemblages are the product of novel inter-organizational associations, how such associations are held in place, and how they work in different ways to shape discourses and capabilities of authorities' involved in such security governance practices. And most importantly, the dissertation takes as its driving question to explore how security governance assemblages endure and transform, with implications for relations of power emergent within and through these practices.

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finished, everything that has been built, the expertise that has been acquired, the hardware that has been put in place, is serving the country and the region for decades to follow" (in Simpson 2009). Further, former Security Commander for the Sydney 2000 Olympics, principal consultant to the Athens 2004, Turin 2006 and Beijing 2008 Organizing Committees and current IOC security consultant who provided advice to Vancouver 2010, and presently London 2012 and Sochi 2014, opportunistically stated "The preparations for the Games and the investment in security infrastructure will be an enormous legacy for the country and its national security capability after the Games are over. This opportunity should not be wasted" (Ryan 2002: 26).

Massive security operations, and the preoccupation of a range of security, policing, and emergency management practices by OCOG planners, have been taken up by academic researchers. Thus far however, these accounts have been partial and fledgling in their consideration, and tend to focus on disparate events from either a retrospective vantage point (Toohey and Taylor 2012; Samatas 2004; Samatas 2011), or before the event has yet to take place (Fussey et al 2011). In contrast, this dissertation offers an accounting of public safety governance processes and their associated legacies across the lifecycle of a single major event. Given the author's temporal and spatial proximity to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, this study presents a rare before-and-after view of a range of security and policing practices, presented in a series of stand-alone case studies at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. As such, it deepens understanding of several aspects of security and major events, primarily, the pivotal nature of the event for catalyzing a range of security and emergency management practices as an emerging state-of-the-art in standardized security practices at sports major events. Importantly, this study not only accounts for these emergent changes in a localized setting, but traces their associations over the course of an event, and notably considers the duration and shape of these changes *after* the event has ended. Examining the influence of the pre-Olympic context, and the impact of the event in a localized setting sensitizes us to the full impact that such investments in security and policing initiatives have for the local security and policing institutions tasked with an ever expanding range of national security, intelligence, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement responsibilities in Olympic host-cities.

Many of the accounts of security and policing at major events have been disparate and event-specific (Bennett and Haggerty 2012). Attempts to address the temporal emergence of public safety and security practices into localized Olympic settings has been taken up most completely by Fussey and Coaffee (2012), however, much of their work focuses largely on the *spatial imprint* of Olympics security and surveillance legacies as technological infrastructures that "graft onto" the built material environment (Coaffee et al, 2012; Fussey et al., 2011). This study delves further into the connections between material infrastructures and institutional arrangements—particularly as key institutional

practices of municipal police in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. As a result, it underscores the significance that major events have in prompting a broadened threat horizon by authorities across the urban landscape, and the ways in which newly catalyzed security governance assemblages are set in motion through Olympic security responses, and the resonant transformation and durability of these assemblages as ongoing security governance legacies. Further accounts in the security and major events literature also tend to focus largely on retrospective analyses of "authoritarian" security arrangements associated with particular Olympic events (see Samatas, 2012 on Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008). And, as a whole, early attempts at a conceptual register of security legacies appears from Bennett and Haggerty's (2012) *Security Games.* However, this accounting of possible legacies identified by the authors across the range of events appearing in their text deserves further updating and adaptation. Bennett and Haggerty only identify and describe a list of legacies as variables, without theoretical explanation as to how and why these practices emerge as a shifting amalgamation of assemblages, institutions, and actors, which subsequently endure as security governance legacies through sedimentation, repetition, or routinization. Building on Bennett and Haggerty (2012) opens the possibility that more substantial empirical and theoretical claims about how such legacies, as hybrids of human and nonhuman entities, are forged as ongoing security governance assemblages.

Accordingly, the aim of this dissertation follows in the tracks forged by earlier security, surveillance, and policing scholars, but it presents further refinements to existing theoretical and empirical accounts of the subject of Olympic security legacies, as well as to theories of durability and change in security governance more generally. It also contributes to empirical and theoretical development around the range of contemporary urban public safety governance trends. In one way, the dissertation draws on various facets of security and policing that flow from security and surveillance practices associated with the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, understood as catalysts and legacies from hosting major events. The institutional-level, technological, and policy-related issues of security and policing which are addressed in this dissertation clarify the full extent of sustained surveillance legacies over a longer period of time. However, in a second way,

the dissertation also responds to the referential limits of sports management literature about Olympic legacies by expanding the frame of post-event legacies into the realm of security, surveillance, and policing. The reader will also gain a fine-grained appreciation of the various assemblages of security, policing, and surveillance that are at the cutting edge of security governance "best-practices", and are implemented at major events around the world, and in specifically, at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

So, what where the security legacies of the Vancouver Olympics? What exactly do we mean by a legacy? And what accounts for such legacies? Through a series of case studies, this dissertation examines five distinct security and surveillance practices that emerged at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics specifically and examines the degree to which these practices (or trajectories) were, or were not, elaborated upon after the event ended.

By drawing upon historical document analysis, in-depth interviews with key informants, as well as standards for information sharing practices associated with particular crowd management initiatives at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, security governance assemblages of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (and the subsequent 2011 Stanley Cup riot response) are traced to explain the significance of how jurisdictional, institutional, and by extension, spatial configurations have continued, changed, or been abandoned. To this end, historicizing security governance as an ongoing process of transforming and durable associations between a diverse set of human and non-human actants are identified and explained in accounts of continuity and change in urban geopolitical analyses of security and surveillance. This is particularly the case in debates centering on the controversies and opportunities inherent in security legacies and major events, which express a driving dynamic toward the wider securitization and militarization of Western cities.

## The Vancouver 2010 Olympics

Between February 12th to 28th and March 12th to 21st, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and Paralympics spanned more than 100 venues across the British Columbia lower mainland. The cities of Vancouver, Richmond, Whistler, and Callaghan (North-Shore Mountains) hosted the largest peacetime security operation in Canadian history, with security expenditures reaching around $1 billion Canadian Dollars (Lee 2009).

Aside from the enormous capital expenditures for planning and infrastructure that covered three security domains—the *theatre of operation* (Olympic venues), the *urban domain* in Vancouver, and the mountainous Whistler area—the Vancouver 2010 Games triggered unprecedented security and intelligence alliances. The Vancouver 2010-Integrated Security Unit (VISU), a federal initiative involving the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canadian Forces (CF), over 100 municipal police forces, 10 or more federal ministries, the Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee (VANOC), and public transit agencies such as Translink Vancouver, was the largest federal organizational chain-of-command during the Games.

New public-private networks between governments and the security industry were also forged through the co-ordination of 7000 police officers from various forces across Canada, 4000 men and women from the Canadian Forces, and 5000 private security guards (Mercer 2009). A specialized agency, the Joint Information Group (JIG) handled intelligence threat assessments. The JIG, under the auspices of the RCMP, liaised with Canada's Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), a national intelligence body that brought CSIS, local police forces, and certain public agencies together to pool information and shape actionable intelligence. Regulating all of these venues, agencies, and organizations produced assemblages involving multi-scalar hierarchies and inter-jurisdictional modes of security governance that require extensive cooperation between Federal security (RCMP) and the local police force of jurisdiction, the Vancouver Police Department. Earlier research has explored the federal response to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (Boyle 2011; Boyle and Haggerty 2009). However, we know less about the more detailed manifestations of security and surveillance assemblages in the city of Vancouver itself. Because such security and planning investments can be integrated more thoroughly with the day-to-day policing operations in the City of Vancouver, they arguably carry more significant implications for the shape and duration of security legacies after the event has ended.

The plan of the dissertation is as follows. Each of the chapters, while dealing with different technologies, institutional configurations, and surveillance and policing

practices, contributes towards a larger project that considers post-event security and policing legacies that hold together during major sporting events. The importance of a longer-term focus that analyzes these practices over the course of an event is to advance some much needed generalizations about security and policing legacies at major events, how major trends in urban public safety governance are catalyzed through major events, and to consider a full picture of the political implications of these unfolding practices. As a result, this dissertation also lends some empirical weight to discussions surrounding mission-creep. Too often surveillance literatures restrict discussions of mission-creep to technological aspects, particularly with databases and their primary uses. However, the relationship between surveillance and security often straddles the line between emergency management practices, counter-terrorism, and urban crime operations as a whole, meaning that mission-creep is in fact a much wider historical process, where security and policing techniques of government are redirected towards unexpected ends, which demand more systematic consideration in the literatures. Given the propensity for a broad range of technical applications of strategies and technologies across a range of authorities at major events, and the extent to which new institutional configurations are a key facet of Olympic-specific public safety governance, major events are a primary empirical site to revisit questions of mission-creep in a wider institutional context of emergency management, counter-terrorism, and urban criminal investigations to discern what technologies and discourses are mobilized (and/or selectively reapplied) towards differing ends. This is especially particular in Western liberal democracies where questions of "safety and security" are often the primary (and interchangeable) lens through which security and policing strategies are delivered.

The chapters are arranged as follows. ***Chapter Two*** sets out a historical trajectory of the discourse of legacy, the conditions of its emergence, and its relation to the governance of major sporting events across recent decades. The notion of Olympic legacies are dual. On the one hand, actual discernable transformations in the urban environments of Rome, Tokyo, and Seoul, points to there being an 'implicit' material legacy that comes with the hosting of Olympic events. On the other, the use of legacy discourse by sports

governance industry officials refers to Olympic legacy as an explicit discourse facilitate interest-based development.

And yet, just two decades ago, the conception of legacy as a mobilizing discourse was unfamiliar in the Olympic sports governance industry. Since then, through ongoing attempts to positively represent a range of short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes associated with deep investment in Olympic celebrations, discourses of legacy have become a central theme in planning and executing major events (Gold and Gold, 2009; McAloon, 2007; Leopkey, 2009; Gold and Gold, 2010; Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2007; Dickson et al, 2011). In recent sports governance and tourism literatures, the concept of Olympic legacy has been defined as "planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible structures created through a sport event that remain after the event" (Gratton & Preuss, 2008: 1924). Due to the elasticity of the concept and its ability to accommodate a diverse range of values and interests, legacy has come to be identified as "an elusive, problematic and even dangerous word" (Cashman 2006).

The rise of legacy discourse in both official and academic circles has been largely restricted to sports management literature or official IOC discourse, predominantly focusing on economic, cultural, and sporting legacies. The focus on post-event legacies therefore, has been disconnected from the upward trend in security, policing, and emergency planning at major events. This is the key problem upon that is addressed in Chapter Two. Its main contribution is to expand legacy discourse into a much wider realm of public safety governance, and to begin to think more critically about how legacies are social formations born of multiple projects and rationales that are realized through diverse assemblages of institutions, actors, and practices. Theorizing legacies as emergent, and ongoing, assemblages resists the temptation found in sports management literature to understand legacies as essentialized expressions of their categorical traits as either "economic" or "cultural" legacies, for instance.

Legacies are understood in security-specific terms as process oriented configurations of actors and institutions that are relatively enduring throughout time. Flowing from this

revised understanding of legacies, Chapter Two also charts a conceptual vocabulary for considering how security governance practices are formed, and the relative emergence and durability of security governance practices as ongoing legacies, and also importantly, the associated impacts of such ongoing Olympics-related security and policing legacies. The ontological assumptions of this dissertation can be described as *relational materialism* (Law 1999), where the social is (re)produced through patterned networks of material and cultural processes, to understand the associations within security governance assemblages, how they are connected, how they change through interactions, and for our purposes, how the outcomes constitute security governance assemblages as relatively stabilized and enduring social configurations *as security governance legacies.* Here, security governance legacies are understood as emergent assemblages formed of human and nonhuman entities that operate through the networked capacities of their component parts.

***Chapter Three*** is the first of four security and policing case-studies from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. This chapter considers the widespread expansion of video surveillance cameras in public areas that have been prevalent since the 1960s, and the ways in which public video surveillance has specifically evolved in the context of surveillance strategies at major sporting events (Coleman and Sim 2000; Fussey 2007; Goold 2004; McCahill 2002l Norris and Armstrong 1999; Webster 2004, 2009). In spite of the pervasiveness of video surveillance monitoring systems in many Western cities, major events are a significant driver in the ongoing diffusion of video monitoring programmes (Fussey and Coaffee 2010; Klauser 2011; Boyle and Haggerty 2010; Vonn 2009). The recent bombings at the Boston Marathon—and the fact that the suspects' images were caught on video surveillance cameras and became a central focus of the investigation in the public mind—have revived discussions on the placement and effectiveness of video surveillance at major sporting events (Holden 2013).

In Chapter Three, the discussion points to the legacies of street-scape video surveillance from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Accounts of the Vancouver 2010 video monitoring legacies consider the material developments in Vancouver's public-area video

surveillance architecture and the ongoing capabilities it affords monitoring authorities. The available evidence seems to suggest that the use of Temporary Re-deployable public video surveillance cameras (TEMPs) mitigates the extent to which a lasting public surveillance legacy unfolded in Vancouver. However, the issue of whether there has been a temporary video surveillance infrastructure legacy in Vancouver is clouded by the fact that a full account of Vancouver 2010 public video surveillance legacies includes a wider set of institutional motivations and policy justifications that play on the divide between the organizing policy metaphor of "situational awareness" and surveillance practices that structure a divide between public justifications and actual uses of video surveillance in Vancouver.

To portray the issue of public video surveillance legacies in broader terms that include transformations in policy rationales, institutional forms, and practices (and not just material legacies), Chapter Three considers the legacy developments concerned with new policy-specific developments catalyzed in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, and the subsequent lack of adherence to these policies by municipal organizations that arose in Vancouver before, during, and after the 2010 Olympics. On these grounds, the chapter provides a historical analysis of how city officials have oriented their policy around the uses of video surveillance as a broader assemblage that includes material and human entities that emerge as a relatively stable actor-network. The chapter concludes by discussing how these legacies—as tied to institutional motivations—are still part of an ongoing, active, and contested process.

***Chapter Four*** considers the emergence of public order policing assemblages in Vancouver, and related implications surrounding political protest and crowd management at major events. The Olympics and the World Cup draw significant attention as primary sites for political contention and protest, and the IOC has, for decades, encountered criticism concerning the business practices of their major brand sponsors. Periods of accelerated economic development that are associated with major events have also raised concerns around disparities in public spending that often favour dominant interests and, as a result, facilitate the displacement of economic externalities onto marginalized

populations in Olympic cities. These trends, taken with the fact that the Olympics are part of a global media spectacle, make the Olympics a prime site for political contention. Globally, political resistance at such contentious sites has also signalled to security planners that they need to consider the threats posted by potential disruptions to commerce and general civic infrastructures. Authorities and event planners fear such disturbances could negatively impact the reputation or global brand image of the Olympic city (Molnar and Snider 2011). And while political resistance at mega-events is a global phenomenon, cropping up at every major event, it is also one with distinctly local characteristics (Klauser 2008: 72-74; Shaw 2008; Lenskyj 2000, 2006).

Public order security responses for global mega-events then, whether for political protest, hooliganism, or potential riotous behaviours, are all faced with the complex logistical task of monitoring and responding to potentially disruptive crowds, groups, and individuals across a vast expanse of urban environments. Significant spending and policy reforms in public order capabilities after the fallout from the WTO protests have coincided with the catalytic power of major events in the areas of security. Put simply, a new standardized paradigm of public order policing which relies heavily on intelligence-led policing and surveillance, the use of preventive arrest, and militarized spatial control tactics has been appropriated for use in many Olympic cities.

In the lead up to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) prompted major investments in their public order capabilities that brought their practices in line with newly emerging trends. In 2006, three years after the Olympic bid was won, the VPD pursued a reinvigorated mandate to refine its public safety operations to move from its self-described "archaic" method of crowd control to a more modernized approach that draws on many of the best-practices emerging from this new era in public order policing, premised on actuarial justice, or, preventive policing. Preparations for the Olympics catalyzed a massive overhaul of the VPD's approach to public order based on the new penology—which included enhanced capabilities across training, novel forms of intelligence sharing, organizational and command restructuring, new technical equipment, as well as acquiring specialized tactical expertise in the areas of "sports

related riots, urban warfare, and terrorist attacks" (VPD 2011: 24). The extent of this new era was encapsulated in one senior member of the VPD's Public Safety Unit (PSU) insistence that the "Olympics were the new paradigm"[5] that moved from a reactive crowd control squad to a proactive one. Chapter Four deals directly with just how extensive the VPD's transformation in its crowd control policy was spurred on by the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

***Chapter Five*** examines civil police-military assemblages in security governance during the Olympic lifecycle, through the VPD Military Liaison Unit (MLU). Militarization is no stranger to Olympic security planning. Dominant images that emerge in media reports covering Olympic-related stories routinely involve military equipment set against an urban backdrop – surface-to-air missiles stationed in Blackheath, and on top of apartment dwellings in Bow and Leytonstone, aircraft carriers docked in the Thames River, and military personnel patrolling the favelas of Rio in armoured vehicles. Massive investments in security infrastructure at major events are significantly marked through directed funds into the improvement of military capabilities.

What becomes evident from these images—apart from their spectacular juxtaposition against every-day life in the city—is that hosting major events such as the 2012 Olympics, the 2016 Rio Olympics, or the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (as well as major events like G8/G20 economic summits) catalyzes processes that further securitize and militarize the city. What is missing from these spectacular photos, however, is a deeper explanation of the institutional processes that are implicated in the striking resemblances between counter-insurgence strategy in Baghdad or Kabul, and London or Rio (Graham 2010).

Military-related investments have implications for the very way that cities are made objects of securitization (Kitchen and Rygiel 2012; Graham 2010). Academic literature has been quick to point out how such globalizing patterns in homeland security initiatives (such as those seen at major events) resemble securitization trends found in foreign war

[5] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

zones; the patterns entail novel transnational security partnerships, urban warfare tactics, cordoned security zones, aerial monitoring, biometric analysis, non-lethal weapons, and the development of smart city operations that involve extensive data-mining and analytical practices. These trends have been taken up in the literature as comparisons of similarities across the spaces of foreign war zones and domestic public safety operations in the cities of the West (Graham 2010).

However, ***Chapter Five*** takes a more localized and empirical view of Olympics-related securitization and militarization. The VPD Military Liaison Unit (MLU) is examined throughout the life cycle of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Here, the institutional trajectory, catalyzing events, and policy feedback process that have transformed civil police-military relations in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics are considered in greater detail. Following the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter One, Chapter Five considers the processes and political outcomes associated with *mission-based* policing units—in this case, the MLU—that are implicated in the militarization of the home front—as practices of warfare that are "coming home" through major event security governance initiatives (Coaffee and Wood 2006). While the MLU wasn't created explicitly for the Olympics, the unit encountered significant investment and training opportunities that allowed it to expand its partnerships with municipal police across the country, as well as with military officials both in Canada and the US. The implication of these partnerships involves the training and development with new surveillance technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as developing expertise in urban warfare tactics.

***Chapter Six*** focuses on legacies of private security industry and associated regulatory assemblages in the context of major sporting events. For private security companies (PSCs), major sporting events present an extremely lucrative market (Molnar and Snider 2011; Fussey et al 2010; Samatas 2007; Rygiel and Kitchen 2012). However, it is not strictly economic opportunities for private sector emergency management officials--these officials are eager to take advantage of the normative legitimacy afforded through contracting opportunities at major events. For instance, in the lead-up to the London 2012 Olympics, the British Security Industry Association (BSIA), the official trade association

for the private security industry in the UK, released a statement acknowledging that "The 2012 Olympics and its ongoing legacy represent a significant business opportunity for BSIA members." Major events, however, are also significant flashpoints for the redrawing, and weakening, of regulations in the private security industry. And further, a litany of contract failures by PSCs at major events has also lead to significant damage to the reputation of private security industry at major events, indicating the risky nature of involvement in such high-profile and demanding contracts. In full, as much as major events present significant economic opportunities and may further entrench the normative legitimacy of PSCs, they can also present serious political risks to the reputation of PSCs.

All of these cases illustrate how the global Olympic city is reconfigured into a domestic surveillance and combat domain that integrates increasingly standardized forms of conduct across a broad network of military, policing, intelligence, and private security expertise through a range of organizations and technologies. Understanding Olympics-related security and surveillance catalysts—and their associated legacies—are helpful to explore how Olympic-related security legacies yield ongoing implications for how citizens are governed. ***Chapter Seven*** draws from each of these cases to provide empirical and theoretical generalizations concerning how legacies of security and surveillance practices from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics unfold. Legacies are understood as heterogeneous components of security and policing assemblages, and Chapter 7 explores in more detail how these assemblages and orders are assembled, how they hold together, and how they endure as incoherent, materially diverse, yet nevertheless consistent set of strategically guided practices with serious implications for ordering post-games environments. Drawing from the conceptual framework on security and surveillance legacies developed in Chapter One, a discussion that compares the range of empirical dimensions of security and surveillance legacies from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics is presented. More specifically, Chapter Seven raises conclusions as to where and why legacies did or did not occur (raising important considerations about privacy and civil liberties in the context of major event security), but also significantly, to isolate what drivers and influences are at play in the emergence of Olympic security governance assemblages as relatively enduring legacies.

Empirical conclusions are drawn on legacies of informational, legal, technological, subjective dimensions, across the range of cases involving the emergence of public video surveillance; Public Order Policing; Civil Police-Military relations; and the implications of private security. A further focus of Chapter Seven is to revisit the lacunae of security and public safety legacies in the sports management literature. In doing so, it makes a case for a broader framework of official management discourse on major event legacies that includes a process-oriented understanding of security and surveillance legacies. The conclusion to Chapter Seven also explores the effects of such shifts on our understanding of public space, democracy, citizenship, and accountability—both in the *global* cities of the West as well as in cities encountering military intervention.

The final chapter, ***Chapter Eight***, expands upon the empirical and theoretical conclusions laid out in Chapter Seven, and considers how the concept of function-creep might be redefined in the surveillance studies literature in light of the considerations in this dissertation. Chapter Eight examines the relationship between these empirical conclusions and the philosophical and methodological implications of studying continuity and change in security governance assemblages as dynamic and complex networks that are configured of human and nonhuman entities.

More particularly, Chapter Eight considers how a broadened ontological understanding of function-creep, beyond a narrow framing of surveillance technologies, or otherwise as mutations in the uses of personal information or data, might lead to a different understanding of the institutional nuances involved in function-creep. Understanding occurrences of function-creep as part of a wider set of heterogeneous entities within a security governance assemblage invites us to consider how shifts in assemblages emerge through a wide range of entities – where changes in one node of the network might invite changes or shifts elsewhere within the assemblage, and therefore, lead to processes of function-creep. The result of this understanding is that a politics of resistance to function-creep (from formal regulation to political activism and direct-action) might also be imagined, and therefore, practiced differently.

## Methodology

The dissertation follows a qualitative case-study approach that draws on a range of research methods. The broad range of actors involved in providing security and public safety responses at the Vancouver 2010 Games necessitated a research design and range of research methods that could accommodate the extensive range of actors, institutions, and cultural interpretations of security and public safety practices. As such, key cases were selected in order to isolate relatively discrete security and policing assemblages at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, and a subsequent range of methods were used to excavate empirical detail from each case. Key cases included public video surveillance, civil police-military relations, public-order policing, and the private security industry, which as individual accommodate a range of relatively distinct practices of security and policing at the 2010 Games. However, a configuration of cases, understanding them in a parallel context affords possibility to infer generalizations concerning the emergence and durability of security and policing at the Vancouver 2010 Games within a broader sphere of public safety at major events. Overall, the case study approach opens possibilities for how decisions, justifications, programs, implementation processes and organizational changes associated with each case, as a relatively discrete security governance assemblage, delves into the local empirical manifestation of security governance legacies.

Methods of data collection spanned from mid-2009 to the spring of 2013, and utilized a range of research methods. The methods applied in each case depended on the problems posed by each case, the practices under investigation, as well as the degree of research access that was afforded to actors and institutions specific to each case. The use of primary documents, elite-level interviews, and desk research to collect data on security and surveillance assemblages before the event. During the event, I immersed myself in the urban policing environment to observe first hand how the VPD was responding to their public order concerns, both at the Vancouver 2010 Games and the 2011 Stanley Cup riots. Elite-level interviewing *after* the event offered a fruitful configuration of data points to discern both specific and general transformations in specific security and policing practices (technologies, policy development, operational protocols). Perhaps

more importantly however, interviewing after the event provided an interesting opportunity to reflect on what changes occurred throughout the lifecycle of the event, and especially to engage security planners first-hand with what elements of their Olympic security plans persisted after the event had ended.

A total of two focus group sessions and three one-to-one interviews were conducted with officials from the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), Vancouver's Office of Emergency Management, as well as the Victoria Police Department The interviews were semi-structured, and conducted from January to June 2012. Offers for informal follow-up discussions were pursued on several subsequent occasions. Once access was granted by the VPD, rapport building and the establishment of trust led me to be referred to additional officers. Within the VPD, these officials were selected based on their current, or previously existing, roles as directors or lead officials within the Military Liaison Unit, or the Public Order Group. Within the VicPD, a referral was provided by a VPD official to an actor that was responsible for drafting an MLU policy there. And finally, interviews with the head of the Vancouver's Office of Emergency Management during the time of the Games provided valuable insight into the opportunities and challenges of public video surveillance program in Vancouver that mutated throughout the course of the 2010 Games. All interviews were conducted after the event had ended, giving the respondents ample time to reflect on the sorts of security and policing legacies that endured after the Games. Overall, interviews at the local level of public safety and policing present valuable empirical data to the record since currently existing research on security and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics draws almost exclusively from sources and documents acquired from Canada's federal policing agency, the RCMP (Boyle 2012; Klauser 2013).

The use of Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests across branches of the Federal Government of Canada also figured prominently as a way to interrogate the relationships between federal and municipal security agencies. These records were either acquired first-hand through original requests, or were acquired through the public domain. ATIP records included policy documents, public presentations, email files, policy operations manuals, and internal reviews and audits conducted by the agencies

themselves. As such, these documents worked to produce a more holistic view of security and policing assemblages at the Vancouver 2010 Games, and were helpful to fill out the historical record.

And finally, desk research provided empirical details of security and policing activities at major events (as well as associated legacies more generally), in addition to more localized scholarly analyses of security and policing operations at the Vancouver 2010 Games. As previously mentioned, the majority of scholarly information on the Vancouver 2010 Olympics focuses on Federal public safety and policing institutions and organizations, to the detriment of localized policing (see Boyle 2012; Klauser 2013).

# Chapter Two: Framing Olympic Legacies

## Introduction

Just two decades ago, the concept of *legacy* was absent from the agenda in the sports governance industry. Since then, discourses of legacy have become a central theme in the planning and execution of major events in ongoing attempts to positively represent a range of short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes that are associated with deep investment in Olympic operations (Gold and Gold, 2009; McAloon, 2007; Leopkey, 2009; Gold and Gold, 2010; Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2007; Dickson et al, 2011). However, the concept of legacy is far-reaching in its interpretation, inclusive of both intended and unintended outcomes, both positive and negative outcomes, as well as material and ideational legacies that persist after the event has concluded (Preuss 2007: 86). In spite of the conceptual confusion surrounding Olympic legacies, even more unsettled are the difficulties of considering the actual governance of legacies and how to measure them empirically (Cashman 2006). However, as a lived experience, shaping legacy discourse has become a driving obsession of the Olympic Industry (OI), which spans a range of actors, including IOC officials, Olympic industry management consultants, academics, and the media (McAloon 2007). Given the myriad actors shaping the contour of Olympic projects, legacy is identified as "an elusive, problematic and even dangerous word" (Cashman 2006), because of its capacity to accommodate a range of values and interests associated with positive legacies.

In 2004, the discourse of legacy was officially stitched into the constitutional fabric of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (International Olympic Committee, 2011). The Olympic charter lays out the role of the IOC in promoting Olympism throughout the world and has a specific section discerning legacy enhancements, noting that, "[t]he IOC's role is…to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries (IOC 2011). Candidate host cities have also seized upon discourses of Olympic legacy, and, after 2012, have been required to include a section on legacies in their bid-books (Andranovich and Burbank 2011). Bidding for Olympic events is now

premised on procuring post-event legacies, as defined in sports governance and tourism literature, that will resonate through local communities and host countries long after the flame is extinguished (Gold & Gold, 2008; Hiller, 2000). Bid books contain persuasive details about the appropriateness of an applicant city to host the Olympics and span items such as venues, marketing strategies, financial adequacy, and community resources. Notably, they also advance a thorough review of the legacy that the event will leave for the host city, region, and country. Recent Olympics 2020 bid-applicants from Madrid, Istanbul, and Doha have all made lofty claims regarding the ongoing sustainability of post-event legacies. IOC officials, charged with reviewing bid books, evaluate the extent to which the city might live up to its legacy predictions.

Academic or industry research into Olympic legacies plays a significant role in the overall uptake of legacy discourse. On one hand, the IOC conducts technical research into the historical aspects, conceptual meaning, and management aspects of post-event legacies (Leopkey 2009). On the other hand, academics have directed a wave of attention toward legacy discourse in sports management literature, which overwhelmingly focuses on the development of conceptual frameworks, typologies, and models for coming to terms with what, exactly, a legacy is, and how legacies might be observed and recorded (Preuss 2007). Olympic "legacy experts" have subsequently burgeoned in the sports management industry which also drives the upsurge in legacy discourse (McAloon 2007). Generally speaking, these interventions are intended to help categorize and monitor the positive values of "event-strategies" (IOC 2002; Leopkey 2009; Gold and Gold 2010; Cashman 2006; Preuss 2007; Dickson et al. 2011). In spite of the involvement of a wide range of experts in the sports governance industry, notions of event legacy remain firmly rooted in managerial discourse, almost entirely focused on the economic and infrastructural resonances of major events, particularly in the areas of tourism and other entrepreneurial manifestations (Crompton 1995; Daniels, Norman & Henry 2004; Preuss 2000, 2004; Dickson et al 2011). Further, organizing committees overwhelmingly associate the notion of legacy with positive results that almost completely ignore the negative aspects of legacy, such as significant cost overruns, deficits, housing

displacements, environmental degradation, and languishing facilities known as white elephants (Leopkey 2009; Chappelet 2008).

The evolution of legacies can be clearly linked with major trends in the Olympic movement over time. The overwhelming growth of the Olympic Games has shaped the development and formalization of the notion of legacy within the OI from 1896 to the present. The cultural frame of Olympic legacies has changed, leading to the association of legacy with a range of expressions, outcomes, or justifications for hosting an event (Leopkey 2009). Legacies now can be said to include a broad range of manifestations, including cultural, economic, environmental, image, informational/educational, nostalgia, Olympic Movement, physical, political, psychological, social, sport, sustainability, and urban related legacies (Leopkey 2009). Interestingly, security and policing legacies are almost entirely absent from dominant discourses and current research into Olympic legacy themes. During the same period that discourses of Olympic legacy were assuming a hegemonic position in the OI (including within academic research), security initiatives at Olympic events, riding the crest of post-9/11 securitization, encountered considerable growth. However, a proportional uptake in "legacy" discourse for security and policing initiatives did not keep pace.

Given vast expenditures and training in security, policing, and emergency operations at major sporting events, it is curious that the IOC and its official partners largely avoid discussing the prevalence of security and policing legacies in official research documents.[6] In media reports, however, some minor examples can be found. For instance, IOC President Jacque Rogge observed that, "Security investment always leaves

[6] No mention of Olympic security and policing legacies can be found in IOC technical research on post-event legacies; however, a few media examples can be found. IOC President Jacque Rogge observed that, "Security investment always leaves a good legacy of security for the country. Whenever the Games are finished, everything that has been built, the expertise that has been acquired, the hardware that has been put in place, is serving the country and the region for decades to follow" (in Simpson 2009). Further, former Security Commander for the Sydney 2000 Olympics, principal consultant to the Athens 2004, Turin 2006 and Beijing 2008 Organizing Committees and current IOC security consultant who provided advice to Vancouver 2010, and presently London 2012 and Sochi 2014, opportunistically stated "The preparations for the Games and the investment in security infrastructure will be an enormous legacy for the country and its national security capability after the Games are over. This opportunity should not be wasted" (Ryan 2002: 26).

a good legacy of security for the country. Whenever the Games are finished, everything that has been built, the expertise that has been acquired, the hardware that has been put in place, is serving the country and the region for decades to follow" (in Simpson 2009). In another media example former Security Commander for the Sydney 2000 Olympics and principal consultant to the Athens 2004, Turin 2006, and Beijing 2008 Organizing Committees and the current IOC security consultant who provided advice to Vancouver 2010 and London 2012 and presently to Sochi 2014, opportunistically stated that "[t]he preparations for the Games and the investment in security infrastructure will be an enormous legacy for the country and its national security capability after the Games are over. This opportunity should not be wasted" (Ryan 2002: 26). The two examples above indicate that IOC officials are well aware that security legacies both exist and are sought after by authorities in respective jurisdictions. However, the disproportionately small amount of OI publicity given to Olympic security legacies is very minor in comparison to the actual magnitude and ongoing impact of security and planning initiatives at major events. Indeed, much is at stake for national and urban-based security and policing organizations in holding one of the world's largest cultural spectacles, it therefore comes as little surprise that the Olympics catalyze long-term security impacts on a complex web of security, technology, and policing organizations by way of side-effects, residual effects, or parallel linkages (Hiller, 1998).

Recognizing that dramatic shifts in urban security can be associated with major events, academics are considering the impacts of the vast security investments at major events. Currently, however, scholarly research that addresses security, surveillance and policing legacies at major events from Surveillance Studies, Urban Studies, Political Science, Sociology, Criminology, and, to some extent, International Relations, has provided disparate snapshots of major events (Bennett and Haggerty 2011), or it has provided early identification of variable security legacies (Bennett and Haggerty 2011: 1-20). Others studies have focused predominantly on the "spatial imprint" of Olympics security and surveillance legacies into the material infrastructure of urban spaces (Coaffee et al, 2012; Fussey et al, 2011). And still others focus on Olympic legacies as retrospective accounts of "anti-democratic" security legacies (and their associated failings), which are associated

with particular Olympic events (see Samatas, 2012 on Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008). In sum, theoretical advancement and empirical analysis on security and policing legacies at major events entail glaring absences in the mainstream research literature in sport governance, and further, they also need considerable empirical refinement in critical security and surveillance studies. To these ends, Olympic security research begs for further empirical and theoretical attention in terms of the diversity and unpredictability of lasting security, policing, and surveillance effects.

This chapter extends the scope of legacy discourse into the realm of security and public safety at mega-events. The purpose of the chapter is to critically review the recent literature on legacies in mainstream sport management literature—to account for the historical emergence of the concept of legacy and to explore many of the current legacy themes in the Olympic Industry. In response to mainstream claims about Olympic legacies found in the sports management literature, the chapter is also concerned with presenting a flexible, open-ended conceptual heuristic for advancing a legacy research framework in the overlooked areas of security and surveillance. Developing a theoretical framework for security and policing legacies at major sporting events draws inspiration from a diverse set of disciplines and concepts including Sociology, Criminology, Surveillance Studies, Political Science (Policy Studies), International Political Sociology, Human Geography, Philosophies of History, Urban Studies, Science and Technology Studies, and Public Administration.

However, the origins of legacy discourse illustrates a more limited scope of the types of legacies that persist at major sporting events. Legacy discourse emerged initially as a justification for preserving physical infrastructures and touting Olympic ideals for cultural consumption. During this period, legacy projects were largely associated with prospects for nation-state building. However, as the Olympic brand transformed into the more grandiose vision of sports spectacle, drawing on the nation-state capabilities of the UK in the 1940s (Olympics were cancelled in Italy in Japan during this decade) and more subsequently on the private-sector dominated commercialist era in the 1970s, discourses of legacy became inseparable from the commercialism and ‘accelerated development’

associated with urban regeneration projects in host-cities (Gaffney 2007). While the IOC brand transformed, the purpose of legacy changed from one that defined legacy as preserving the sporting infrastructure to one that justified a positive representation for accelerated development and urban regeneration. As a result of these transformations, post-games legacies are now significantly associated with city, regional, and local urban regeneration strategies, which are, at times, synonymous with local security and policing initiatives (Coaffee and Fussey 2010; Fussey et al 2011). To some extent, this new version of legacies also indirectly manifests in claims toward the procurement of post-event security, surveillance technology, and policing infrastructures (Fussey et al 2011). In addition to the historical trajectory of the discourse of legacy, current academic sports governance literature is largely premised on defining what sorts of legacies exist and how they can be measured. Here, economic, environmental, sporting, and urban legacies are dominant expressions shaping the limits of the conceptual landscape (Leopkey 2009).

Given the historical conceptual arc and current typological definitions of Olympic legacy – which are both intimately connected with the commercialization of the Olympic sport – the exclusion of security and policing legacies from the dominant frame of Olympic legacies is remedied throughout the remainder of the chapter. In this section, I examine how security and surveillance legacies have been analysed conceptually and empirically in studies that have focused on particular events. To the extent that security and surveillance legacies feature in surveillance studies and security studies literature, they mostly provide event-specific snapshots of particular legacies, which has limited a more sustained look at the interpersonal, institutional-specific, and contextual resources that inform continuities and changes over time. The chapter concludes with a methodological framework, developing a theory of networked security governance apparatuses as the emergence of security governance legacies, to assist with the conceptualization of security and policing legacies that is revisited in Chapter Seven of the dissertation.

## The Historical Arc of Olympic Legacy

The term “legacy” has, in a relatively short time, become central to the Olympic discourse. Bid and organizing committees of Olympic Games (OCOGs) are heavily

invested in communicating how event strategies can be leveraged within host communities and for the city, region, and country. Legacy talk in bid-planning initiatives first appeared in Olympic circles in the 1990s, and, has since grown to be a central, and now mandatory, feature in OCOG candidature applications and marketing strategies (Andranovich and Burbank 2011). During the 1996 Atlanta Games, legacy first appeared in discussions of positive elements that would be left behind for host communities in the American State of Georgia. Four years later, the concept was again pressed into service during the organization of the 2000 Sydney Games, and just a short time later, the Athens 2004 Olympics unfolded under the motto "A Legacy for Olympism". Since then, China (Beijing 2008 Olympics), Vancouver 2010 Games, South Africa (FIFA 2010 World Cup) United Kingdom (London 2012 Olympics), and Brazil (FIFA 2014 World Cup and Rio 2016 Olympics), and even the Qatar 2020 World Cup, have relied heavily on legacy discourse to catalyze a range of projects slated for major event-related development. Over this relatively short period of time, the discourse of legacy has also become central to the organizational speeches of IOC officials and contractors of bid-committees (MacAloon 2011: 2064).

Prior to the hegemony of legacy discourse in candidature applications, however, discourses of legacy can be charted back even further in the historical past of the Olympic movement. Since the early days of the Olympic Movement (1896), notions of legacy shifted focus from the (intangible) Olympic ideals that are embodied in the ephemeral spectacle of sporting competition (and its associated ideal of virtue) to the provision of permanent (tangible) fixtures of sporting facilities after the Games. Much emphasis on legacy during this period drew upon the development of nation-state capabilities for its citizenry. For example, around the time of the first London Games in 1908, emphasis on the tangible material permanence of physical infrastructural legacies emerged as a justification for ongoing uses of athletic stadia. In this section, I cover a brief history of the emergence of legacy and its purposes. Legacy, it is maintained, can be understood as being tied to the historical emergence of nation-state and capitalist capabilities before giving way to a more commercialist era of legacies in the 1970s. After

this period, Olympic legacies were more strictly formalized through their connection to urban-based accelerated development projects in the post-2000 era.

### Emergence of Legacy

The first use of the word legacy in Olympic literature appeared in the Melbourne 1956 Olympic bid. Melbourne's Lord Mayor, James S. Disney, remarked that the city intended to "establish, as a legacy of the XVI Olympiad, an Athletic Centre" that would provide a physical legacy for amateur sport competition (Leopkey 2 009; McIntosh 2003). Between the 1930s and 1960s, legacy discourse commonly referred solely to the positive benefits or incentives, like physical infrastructure, specifically competition venues that could be repurposed for sporting events after the Games, that were associated with hosting the Games (Gold and Gold 2007). However, it was also common during this period for legacy to infer a culturally symbolic resonance—legacy discourse also conveyed the virtuous ideals of the Olympic Movement—and was used to ascribe a positive image to the local regime that was hosting the Olympic Games (McIntosh 2003). As such, early mentions of legacy discourse as a means to facilitate growth wren only sporadically deployed.

During the 1936 Berlin Games, both the physical and culturally symbolic aspects of Olympic legacy were front and centre. *Legacy* as an explicitly articulated discourse, however, was still absent from public discourse. The expanding scale of Olympic physical infrastructure during the 1930s and 1940s was part of a larger push to procure nation-state capabilities that influenced the expression of Olympic legacies. The construction of the world's largest sports complex, the hulking Reichsportfeld, was indicative of the trend of the expanding scale of Olympic physical infrastructures at the time. Amidst a period that was marked by the dramatic ascendency of the Nazi Party and the continued appeasement of the rest of the European continent, the 1936 Cultural Olympiad served as an expression of the emergent power of the Third Reich. Despite the fact that the term legacy was not used, the Reichsportfeld was purposely designed to accommodate post-Games use—not solely for athletic purposes—but to serve as the world's "largest outdoor theatre" for military pageantry and a showcase for state ceremony (11). This was, perhaps, the first use of post-Olympic physical infrastructure

for military and security ends. However, while *explicit* usage of legacy discourse had yet to feature in bid document marketing and economic (re)development discourse during this early period of the Olympic movement, the notion of "dual-use infrastructure" was firmly established as an appealing policy of infrastructural (re)generation and the Olympic Games. Further to this point, the first relationship between hosting the Olympics and economic development was forged during this time frame because the Games presented a valuable opportunity to catalyze a favourable image for the host country and local regimes that would justify a range of political and socio-economic agendas set out by municipal and national governance bodies (Gold and Gold 2007).

After the Second World War, particularly during the 1950s and 60s, the Games increased considerably in scale. A shift toward global consumption models brought about through mass television media catapulted legacy into a more important cultural justification for hosting the Games (Gold and Gold 2007). As the scope of the Games grew, early indications of non-sports legacies found in urban-based projects of host cities emerged, for example, the Rome 1960 Olympics were the early epitome of the catalytic power of the Olympics as an instrument for urban transformation and infrastructural regeneration as the modernization of the city of Rome took place (Gold and Gold 2010). As the shining jewel in Europe's crown of post-war reconstruction efforts, the Rome 1960 Olympics were a vital contribution in the "Italian Economic Miracle" (Life Magazine 1967) that stunned liberal economists. The Rome Games triggered the refurbishment of two sports facilities, housing conversions, the building of new roads and bridges to connect to the Olympic venues, modernization of the airport, as well as upgrades to communications infrastructure (telephones, telegraph and radio networks) (Gold and Gold 2010: 12). Instead of a "widening" of economic markets, a more intensive "deepening" of capital projects, as urban regeneration, took place.

Through the 1970s and 80s, the OI also entered a more commercial era. This trajectory was marked by important global events such as the terrorist attack at the Munich 1972 Games, the debt-scandals associated with the Montreal 1976 Games, and the boycotts of the Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 Games. And while major event strategies were

recognized as a catalytic spark for the planning, development, and regeneration of local urban economies, emphasis on public works improvements became increasingly fused with a more commercialist agenda during this period. The onset of the popularity and brand recognition of Olympic events, now synonymous with expansive mass media, became fused with a global class of elites in search of lucrative global real estate markets. Most significantly, however, the broad historical trajectory of Olympic legacy from 1960 to 1992 meant "an increasing emphasis on non-sports legacy relative to sports legacy and for cities to merge planning for the Olympics into their overall town planning strategies" (Gold and Gold 2010: 12).

### Commercial Olympic Discourse: Securing an Olympic Legacy

The dawning of a new Olympic era during the 1970s and 1980s continued to shape Olympic legacy discourse. The global reputation of the Olympic industry was seriously hampered after a quagmire of debt engulfed Montreal's 1976 Games. And the following Olympics, the boycotted Moscow 1980 Games, demonstrated that the profitability of the Olympics was floundering. However, the Los Angeles 1984 Summer Games marked a significant turning point in the Olympic Industry as a wave of unprecedented global sponsorship deals initiated a reversal of fortunes in the amount of a 232 million USD surplus (Leopkey 2009; Amateur Athletic Foundation 2004). Commercial marketing and broadcast rights transitioned the meaning and application of legacy toward a formalized concept within a wider set of corporate-influenced rules and policies for governance and sporting event management in urban domains. Indeed, the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics both rescued *and* refurbished the brand of the struggling IOC.

Four years after the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics, a final definitive link between urban planning agendas and candidature applications emerged with the Calgary 1988 Olympics. Organizers of the Calgary Olympics' bid-book projected a lasting legacy for Canadians with the procurement of athletic facilities and an Olympic Endowment Fund (Leopkey 2009). As the IOC's embrace of commercialism took further hold, levels of expenditure that were meant to be used to organize and host major Olympic events were dramatically increasing. For instance, at the 1992 Barcelona Summer Games, dubbed the true

"regeneration games", over 80 per cent of the total expenditure for events was allocated toward urban improvements to air and land transportation, telecommunications, the conversion of the Olympic village into residential and business use, as well as the "place-based" promotion of the city as an attractive inlet for inward capital investment and tourism (Varley 1992, in Gold and Gold 2010: 12). A definitive link between urban planning agendas and candidature applications would soon become the new convention in Olympic legacy discourse. The discourse of legacy now buoyed justifications for a broad range of urban development and regeneration projects – and it was also used to provide justifications for public spending on vast infrastructural projects.

Organizers of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games further rationalized the commercial Olympic legacy discourse. Organizers of the 1996 Games insisted that legacies would not be made only of brick and mortar, but they would also comprise "experience and knowledge for the city's academic community" (Chappelet 2008). However, it wasn't until the turn of the century, when it was adopted as the banner for the Sydney 2000 Millennium Games, that the concept of Olympic legacy secured a formal place in Olympic event history. The Sydney 2000 Olympics were the first Games to make legacy an explicit organizing principle. Two years later, the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympics formalized a $40 million dollar legacy fund, making legacy discourse an actual source of capital reinvestment (Gold and Gold 2010).

It is critical to recall that legacy discourse also exists as a public relations element. Within this realm, legacy serves as one of the IOC's primary public relations responses to prop up an Olympic brand that was (and is often) facing mounting negative pressure. Legacy discourse is sometimes used to appeal to a populace on emotional and ostensible logistical arguments entailing expected legacy benefits. However, evidence indicates that the majority of public citizenries in host jurisdictions shoulder expensive costs with little positive return (Lenskyj 2000). As criticisms of the OI and the economic and social feasibility of public financing of major Olympic events began to seriously threaten the Olympic brand (Lenskyj 200; 2008), a critical political-economic view of legacy that

interprets legacy discourse as a discursive response to crises in the Olympic movement evolved.

The prevalence of "white elephants" in Montreal 1976 and Sarajevo 1984, the pernicious environmental effects of Olympics related development projects (Chappelet 2008), and a range of scandals and corruption allegations that spread throughout the chambers of the IOC (notably, Salt Lake 2002) led many to recognize that the Olympic Games were rife with economic development strategies that increased socio-economic marginalization (COHRE 2007), the criminalization of poor populations (Haggerty and Boyle 2009a), mismanagement of public funds (Lenskyj 2002), and hastened environmental degradation through major development projects that faced little public scrutiny (Chappelet 2008). The decision to move toward increasing commercialism and brand sponsorship—a strategy that arguably rescued the IOC from near demise—was now also undermining public support because many of the Olympic corporate sponsors had damaged their reputations. The Olympic movement was in a clear struggle to convey the positive image associated with its worldwide brand. One of the most-recognized brands in the world was under threat and in desperate need of rejuvenation. Legacy discourse emerged as one possibility to address this shortcoming (Leopkey 2009; Lenskyj 2000). As such, the IOC took serious steps to address the value of legacy for their organizational mandate. Spurred on by the ascendancy (and success) of bid-applicants who included information on post-event legacy outcomes, (and in response to critical provocations launched towards the Olympic Industry), the IOC broadened the place for legacy with the help of academic researchers.

The ongoing formalization of Olympic legacy discourse continued with its expansion into the academic sphere. In 2002, a research symposium at the Olympic Museum in Lausanne was held under the title "The Legacy of the Olympic Games 1984-2000" (IOC 2002). Commenting on the recommendations coming out of the symposium, recently minted IOC Chair, Jacques Rogge, emphasized: "The recommendations formulated by this symposium should be considered as a starting point for a sustainable and useful legacy of the Olympic Games" (Rogge 2003). Researchers, academics, and the IOC itself

were forging legacy discourse as a new normative response to a period marked by faltering circumstances and negative public relations. Most importantly, however, this research provided a solid basis for the eventual formalization of legacy discourse into the Olympic constitution. Just one year after the research symposium on legacy, the IOC amended its Charter to include a 14th mission statement determined "to promote a *positive legacy* from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries" (IOC Charter 2003, italics mine). The circle of Olympic legacies had now been closed. Legacy was formalized in the IOC organizational structure by its enshrinement in the constitution, was made a mandatory fixture in bid committee packages as of 2012, had been extended into research communities, and had even given rise to a new entrepreneurial career - Olympic Industry "experts" who specialized in academic research and legacy consulting (McAloon 2008).

To summarize, from the 1950s onwards, the discourse of legacy transformed from an *implicit* regulative ideal that was associated with preserving athletic structures from a virtuous and celebratory event to an *explicit* discursive formation that was a pinnacle component in the continuously expanding political economy involved in organizing and hosting of the Games (cf. Gold and Gold 2010). As a result, the value of legacy as a regulative ideal in spurring and justifying Olympics related development assumed greater importance and value as the scale and commercialization of the Olympic Movement expanded to include sponsorship deals and the regeneration of local economies. As legacy accrued value and popularity in successful Olympic bid-books (Calgary, Atlanta, Sydney) and as the Olympic movement faced increasing scrutiny for its commercial partnerships, the IOC pressed research into legacies—using scholarly expertise as a basis for formalizing legacy as an official constitutional item.

With the increased growth and formalization of legacy, numerous legacy trends emerged. New legacy themes such as environmental, educational, and information legacies cropped up throughout the historical formalization of legacy discourse. The shape of legacy implementation, and its movement from sporting legacies to non-sporting legacies through urban regeneration initiatives have been a consistent trend (Leopkey 2009). This

historical background goes some way in explaining how the conceptual contours of legacy expressions have emerged. But the discourse is confused. The following section focuses on a typology of legacies that have stemmed from these historical circumstances. In what follows, I examine mainstream academic sports governance literature to find various ways that Olympic legacies have been conceptualized. These conceptualizations have largely had the purposes of enhancing the Olympic Industry and sensitizing us to a range of legacy themes. And while this overview discerns a range of legacy themes and shows how and why security legacies have been relatively absent from official discourse, a robust analytical framework for determining the legacies for any one event is still missing. Excavating the historical overview provides further insight into the types of legacy themes that have emerged over this period. In what follows, I consider the range of legacies and their definitions – as a basis for further theorizing security and policing legacies.

### Conceptualizing Olympic Legacies

A considerable consensus exists in academic circles that the notion of a legacy is ambiguous and perhaps even indefinable (Cashman 2006; Preuss 2007; Leopkey 2009; Thomson et al 2010; Dickson et al 2011; Gold & Gold 2010). Despite this confusion, several attempts have been made to arrive at a clear definition of legacy in sports governance literature as a means to improve upon "event strategies" (Preuss 2007). One recent trend is to categorize and conceptualize the "impacts" of mega-events (Cashman 2003; Preuss 2007; Dickson et al 2011). Attempts to develop an agenda for legacy research are indeed growing, but it remains largely limited to sport management literature (Leopkey 2009). Within this narrow scope, the majority of research on event legacies remains focused on the economic resonances of major events, particularly in the area of tourism (Crompton 1995; Daniels, Norman & Henry 2004; Preuss 2000, 2004; Dickson et al 2011).

However, an historical overview illustrates how legacy themes have diversified throughout the years (Leopkey 2009). Stemming from accounts of these historical trends, IOC-sponsored and academic sports management literature has established a typology of Olympic legacies. The most comprehensive content analysis that deals with legacy

themes is based on a comprehensive review of all available bid documents at the Olympic Studies Centre in Lausaunne. This content review, along with official Olympic Games final reports, forms a solid basis for discerning a legacy typology, showing that legacy themes have diversified over time, and cover a broad range of topics including "cultural, economic, environmental, psychological, social, sport, sustainability, and urban related legacy" (Leopkey 2009).

In a detailed review and synthesis of literature on event legacy, Cashman (2005), Chappellet (2006), and Leopkey (2009) point us toward a working typology of legacies that have been the most prevalent classifications as a starting point into "management-specific" legacy research. These major fields of legacy include: (1) sporting legacy; (2) economic legacy; (3) infrastructure/physical legacy; (4) information and education legacy; (5) urban legacy; (6) cultural legacy; (7) social legacy; (8) psychological legacy; and (9) cultural/symbolic and memory legacy. Further conceptualizations of legacy have been broken down into a more refined set of categories and appear in the table below.

**Table 1 Typology of Legacy Themes and Associated Empirical Examples**

| Legacy Themes | Subcategories |
|---|---|
| Cultural | Infrastructure, programming, opportunities, education |
| Economic | Jobs, tourism, funding, hosting, opportunities, marketing |
| Environmental | Infrastructure, policy, education |
| Informational/Educational | Experience, knowledge, personal development, research |
| Nostalgia | Experience, memories |
| Olympic movement | Global harmony, impact on youth, sport development |
| Physical | Infrastructure, housing, sports facilities, technology, sustainability |
| Political | Policy development, law, working together, |

| | |
|---|---|
| | city planning |
| Psychological | National pride, enthusiasm, personal emotions |
| Social | Social progress, health, impact on youth, aging population, underprivileged and persons with disabilities, new opportunities, civic engagement |
| Sport | Sport development, sport facilities, increased participation, health |
| Sustainability | Long term planning, environment, economic |
| Urban | Sport facilities, infrastructure, recreational spaces |

Table 1 illustrates how emphasis on legacy is very broad and all encompassing (Leopkey 2009: 17-18). A broadening of the scope of the concept of legacy however also leads to imprecision and confusion over its meaning and many of the legacy themes listed above in Table 1 overlap and share similarities with one another. For instance, claims toward economic benefits as an Olympic legacy are not mutually exclusive from claims to "social progress". To illustrate, the Madrid 2016 bid package draws parallel linkages between the images of the city, urban planning, and economic benefits, by stating:

> "Economic benefits are central to our legacy plans through interaction with the business community. Madrid 2016 is working with Madrid Global, a department within Madrid City Council focused on urban renewal and other key stakeholders to raise the city's profile on the world stage, encourage business and tourism opportunities (Madrid Bid Committee 2008, p.5).

These broad and overlapping set of legacy categories have lead Cashman (2003) to insist, "legacy is an elusive, problematic and even dangerous word" (33). I would argue that this is in large part because these categories are the product of historical becoming, and can not simply be derived through a sort of botanical classification that takes the properties of distinct legacies for granted, and therefore, essentializing (and naturalizing) their existence without any inquiry into how these legacies are made more or less durable. The

challenge of discerning what a legacy is, therefore, is made considerably more difficult by the obvious overlaps between legacy themes. Candidature files, media from IOC officials, and final reports tend to ignore any negative impacts of legacies which contribute additional challenges (Cashman 2006; Lenskyj 2002; Leopkey 2009. One stakeholder's positive economic legacy can also involve a negative legacy for other populations. Billions of dollars in investment in sporting, tourist, transportation, and security infrastructures might incur vast amounts of revenue capture for the private sector, but they have been shown to lead to damaging externalities onto the natural environment, marginalized populations, and otherwise underprivileged groups (Gaffney 2007; Molnar and Snider 2011; Lenskyj 2004; Boyle and Haggerty 2009). For this reason, legacies must be considered as value-specific, a point to which we will return to later when discussing security and policing legacies.

In sum, despite the formalization of legacy discourse in bid applications and the execution of major events, only marginal consensus remains on precisely what the word means in academic and managerial discourses. Further, empirical and conceptual understandings of post-event legacies remain significantly underexplored in the areas of policing, public safety, emergency response and security, and they are entirely ignored in official IOC typologies. This absence is glaring because security and policing preparations for major events now comprise approximately 20-50% of total spending on an Olympic event (Molnar 2013). Indeed, a long time before "legacy discourse" became the dominant hegemonic frame of bidding documents, preparation and execution of Olympic events, and even in academic research, the ability to demonstrate an adequate security plan was a compulsory feature for those seeking to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Given the increased emphasis on security planning along a string of terrorist-related events, security and policing preparations for major Olympic events have witnessed a substantial explosion since 1972 and especially since 9/11. Yet, despite this increase, security and policing legacies are rarely mentioned as a positive justification for hosting the Games, except in a few recent sources explored below.

## The Olympic Industry and Security Legacies

Security knowledge networks refers to the ways that a broad range of security actors are implicated in developing security plans, expertise, and information sharing to secure large, temporary events that are subjected to a broad range of real and perceived risk (Boyle 2011). Philip Boyle highlights the ways that inter-event processes of information exchange unfold in ways that build upon and develop a common and shared knowledge around best-practices in Olympic security operations. Within the field of security knowledge networks, a broad range of actors including (but not limited to) federal national security, state and local law enforcement bodies, public safety and intelligence agencies, international sporting federations, international governance organizations, a range of security consultancies and private security technology vendors (often including their "non-profit" industry association groups which lobby on their behalf) are implicated in a configuration of policy-exchange that structures the field of major event security (Boyle 2011: 169-170). Within this field of actors, discourses of legacy have been seized upon by broad range of actors, albeit to a range of degrees. Different forms of expertise mobilize around security planning issues, but in a more particularized sense, focus upon notions of legacy to confer legitimacy within the field.

For instance, the mainstreaming of Olympic and security legacies in official OCOG and IOC literature is a very recent phenomenon. Perhaps the first formal notion of security legacies appears in the *London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy*, which aimed "to host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Olympic and Paralympic Games and *leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK*" (Home Office 2009, italics mine). The relationship between the long-term strategic regeneration of impoverished urban areas of East London and security rationales have been institutionalized in an explicit strategy set out by the UK Home Office.[7]

[7] That notions of "security" have been linked with "sustainability discourse" is a separate, though no less interesting question for security researchers altogether.

The IOC by contrast, has continued to remain relatively quiet on the notion of security and policing legacies. To date, the IOC has not included a sustainable security legacy for host countries in reports or formalized a notion of security in the 14th mission statement. However, the IOC has informally weighed in on the value of security investments being translated into post-event techniques of security and policing governance. While the IOC is unwilling to take up security and policing legacies in formal communications, they are willing to acknowledge the lasting contribution of investments in security and policing infrastructures.

One of the most prominent group of actors that mobilize discourses of Olympic legacy are Olympic-specific consulting and associational bodies. bodies consistently take up the notion of legacies. For instance, The International Center for Sports Security (ICSS) is a "non-profit" organization that was formed in 2011 with the intended focus of "engag[ing] with national and international sports federations and other key stakeholders" to "share knowledge, and best practice" on major event sport security (ICISS 2012). The ICSS's objective is to " contribut[e] to the advancement and sharing of knowledge in sport security" (ICSS 2012). To do that, the ICSS considers itself the "central hub for sports security", providing expertise in the areas of "research, training and consulting." In 2012, the ICSS held the 2nd Annual International Sports Security Conference, drawing a total of 400 attendees to share knowledge and best practices. An entire panel was dedicated to "Maximizing the Legacy and Economic Impact of Hosting a Secure Major Sporting Event." The panel sought to capture the economic spill-over effects of investment in security infrastructure to "develop insights into how to plan, deliver, and maximize design and infrastructure legacy of a safe sporting event." (ICISS 2012). The panel featured speakers from FIFA, National Government Ministries of Community Youth and Sport, the World Bank, as well as the private firm AECOM, a business that provides technical expertise in planning, architecture, and development projects specific to major urban sporting centers.

There are both commonalities and novelties expressed between public safety legacies and other legacy themes. What is common is that the language of legacy has continued as a

historical discourse of development, expressing a further trend in the expansion and formalization of Olympic legacies into security-related matters. What is novel is that this language is increasingly formalized through "global security knowledge networks" (Boyle 2011) that are comprised of an elite network of security officials, government agents, and sports security consultants within both the IOC and major private corporations who are charged with implementing urban architectural design. Research on both the ICSS conglomeration of security knowledge networks and the London 2012 Olympics suggest physical/infrastructural/build-design is in the front of the minds of security governance officials within and "outside" of the private sector (Fussey et al 2011).

However, in spite of the prevalence of a burgeoning Olympic security industry, academic research on security, policing, and surveillance legacies continues to lag behind developments on the ground. This disjuncture is a matter both of limited empirical engagement (often when access difficulties collide with the relative newness of explicit strategies of security governance legacies) and of philosophical and methodological limitations concerning studies on institutional security governance regime transformations during the Olympic lifecycle. However, it remains important to ask how security and surveillance researchers have engaged the topic of major event security legacies so far. The following sections examine literature that has seized upon the notion of securitization and surveillance as Olympic legacies.

## The Legacy Concept in Security and Surveillance Studies

Sustained examinations of security and policing legacies that are associated with major events, particularly the Olympic Games, remain theoretically and empirically underdeveloped. While a handful of materials deal directly with security and surveillance legacies, each offer a different take. Some describe a list of variables about what security and policing legacies exist (Bennett and Haggerty 2011: 1-20; Haggerty 2011), while others deal directly with event-specific security and policing legacies from the Athens 2004 Games or Beijing 2008 Olympics for example (Bennett and Haggerty 2011; Samatas 2011; Eick 2011; Coaffee and Fussey 2011). In each, however, an

explanatory theory of security and policing legacies that suggests how these variables and Olympic events might link together and endure as stabilized assemblages are missing. In the following sections, I review the ways that security and policing legacies are analyzed in the security and surveillance literature, and subsequently develop a theoretical framework around the relational concept of assemblages that considers how a range of entities that comprise security and policing practices at major events might fit together, be held in place, and work as enduring formations through the expressive powers of their parts.

### Security and Policing Legacies

Many academic researchers and commentators understand the Olympics as a "spectacle" that motivates actors to project their relative interests in localized spaces as well as on a global scale (Hiller 2006; Boyle and Haggerty 2009b). In Surveillance Studies, Boyle and Haggerty address the dynamic social implications of the spectacle more directly. Viewed as a focusing event, spectacle entails the rational normalization of the anxieties that are associated with mega-events as detailed through security planners' risk management practices. Indeed, Olympic security and policing initiatives involve massive capital investments, growth in the public and private sectors' planning and knowledge development, and expanded surveillance and policing operations in ways that seriously affect legal rights and civil liberties (Samatas 2011; Lenskyj 2003).

Surveillance Studies scholars often seize upon the popularized "state of exception" argument (Agamben 2005: 1-2) to consider how security initiatives are catalyzed and subsequently manifested as post-event security legacies. According to Agamben's "exceptionality" argument, major sports events present the possibility for a series of political exceptions, amassing political will and economic backing for major development projects that would not, under other conditions, garner public support. In the context of Olympic security and surveillance, the temporary nature of the event highlights anxieties around providing a safe and secure major event and therefore legitimizes significant investment in security infrastructure that facilitates its implementation. The argument here is that provisional transformations intended to secure the Olympic event are subsequently normalized (and therefore more surreptitiously

legitimated) long after the Games have ended. Impacts of normalized security initiatives bear on localized contexts of host-cities, but they also feed back into a more standardized (and globalized) pattern of security best-practices for future Olympics and other major events (Fussey and Coaffee 2011).

These patterns have lead researchers to consider Olympic security legacies in terms of both catalysts *and* legacies. A key contribution from Bennett and Haggerty (2011) conceptualizes security and policing legacies as part of an interrelated set of practices that considers both the conditions for the emergence of security initiatives at major events (catalysts) and their ongoing resonances (legacies). A series of pressures associated with hosting a safe and secure event contribute to the real and perceived necessity of increased security, policing, and emergency management investments associated with the mega-event.

There are a number of catalysts. First, major events have become significant events for vigorous economic competition and "place branding" of global cities (Molnar and Snider 2011). The festivalization of sporting events provides major business opportunities for a range of private sector actors, but city officials are also eager to capitalize on the events by presenting their city as an attractive location for 'inward investment' on a global stage (Harvey 1989). International sports governance agencies, such as the IOC and FIFA, are also interested in protecting the image of their brand and sponsors, and, as a consequence, they scrutinize their prospective host-city bid books for favourable security environments (Fussey et al 2011). Managing reputations through successful events is seen as evidence of a city's stability, financial success, and global identity (Hall 2006; Xu 2006). Maintaining a reputation for the global city through state of the art safety and security is often demonstrated through the expression that "nothing should go wrong", which bolsters justifications for significant investment in domestic security initiatives (Fussey et al 2011; Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006: 508).

Second, significant external pressure exists for OCOGs, city officials, and federal and local police officials to adopt standardized templates for dealing with Olympic-related

security matters (Fussey et al 2011; Klauser 2011). This trend has been pressed forward through security industry experts and the private sector, as professionals in the management of unease (Bigo 2004), or, more specifically in the context of major events, as "security knowledge networks" that facilitate the circulation of event-specific security planning and technical expertise from event-to-event through transnational security networks (Boyle 2011: 170).

Further to the private sector, and third, growth opportunities for major events are staggering. In the 2000 Sydney Olympics, approximately $180 million USD was spent on security operations. Subsequent events have demonstrated a consistent increase: the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games (the first since 9-11) jumped to $310 million USD, Athens 2004 reached an astronomical $1.5 billion USD, and comprehensive estimates from the Beijing 2008 Olympics figure a hefty $6.5 billion USD (SIA 2007; Boyle and Haggerty 2009a). The cost of the most recent London 2012 Olympics reached a staggering £1.6 billion GBP (Fussey et al 2012). Olympic security projects generate vast profits for the defence, military, intelligence and public safety contracting industry. From the top-ten Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contractors in 2008—LockHeed Martin, Northrup Grumman, IBM, L-3 Communications, Unisys, SAIC, Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, General Electric, and Accenture—all have submitted tenders for Olympic security projects.

Catalysts for enhanced security initiatives emerge under the spectacular nature of the event, as justified under "exceptional" conditions, which contribute to pressures from many stakeholders to bolster public safety initiatives. However, these catalysts are also tied up in ongoing resonances after such initiatives have been activated. Such resonances are the primary object of this dissertation, and their resolution in the literature is difficult and complex. In terms of post-event resonances in the literature, these have largely been taken up in terms of event-to-event empirical accounts, or as a descriptive set of variables from Bennett and Haggerty (2011: 1-20). In what follows, I explore discrete event-specific forays into major event security initiatives. While these cases are important for developing knowledge around major event security legacies, they are limited in their

explanatory power as discrete snapshots into such legacies. In many ways, case-to-case expressions focus on a typology of legacies or pre-defined definitions of legacies that become the object of debate, instead of providing an analysis of the social processes that constitute the emergence, and explanations of the relative durability, of security governance assemblages as post-event legacies.

### Exploring Olympic Legacies through Event-Specific Studies

Interventions into event-specific security legacies are scant but do cover a handful of cases. As discrete snapshots of major events, however, they are understandably limited in their explanatory power. The key concern with relying on event-specific interventions is that Olympic security legacies are situated as "snapshots", and therefore limit a more detailed examination of the relations between objects, texts, policies, actors—the discourse of institutions and technologies—and their relation to the sequencing of focusing events as factors in shaping legacies as emergent assemblages of security governance (Thelen 2000: 101). In spite of the difficulties of using cross-sectional comparative data in these interventions, event-specific analyses can help sensitize researchers to the various forms of surveillance and control at major events, and the ways in which they might be embodied in lasting post-games legacies.

By tracing the Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games' surveillance systems, Minas Samatas (2011) considers the "authoritarian effects" of legacies in "democratic and authoritarian Olympic host regimes" (p. 3347). Samatas is distinctly concerned with the negative values associated with security and surveillance legacies, primarily those "which impose restrictions over freedoms and rights, and which also have an anti-democratic legacy beyond the specific event" (Samatas 2011: 3348). Absent are how past sets of relations hold together to create authoritarian legacies. However, as I will demonstrate in this dissertation, not all security and policing legacies can be said to be negatively valued, even. Some legacies might enhance emergency management and disaster response capabilities. Understanding Olympics-related security and surveillance legacies as a value-specific practice restricts the frame of legacies as necessarily

undermining rights and freedoms. However, the emergence of, and implications of, security governance legacies are often much more complex.

In contrast to Samatas' view, Volker Eick's (2011) examination of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany considers security and policing legacies as both positive and negative. For Eick, "the concept of legacy…allow[s] for [an] understanding of the World Cup's positive and negative impacts for all stakeholders involved" (3329). Eick examines the "geographical footprints" as a lasting material infrastructure of CCTV surveillance in Germany, the "technological initiatives" such as Radio-Frequency Identifiable Devices (RFID) enabled tickets and the storage of digital records for subsequent data-mining techniques to deter hooliganism (Eick 2011), as well as "ideological and emotional" legacies stemming from public acceptance (and acquiescence) of an increased security presence (Toohey and Taylor 2012). These accounts do not consider how, for instance, such "geographical footprints" are the effect of assemblages as spatializing forms that are held in place, and unfold in different ways to shape socio-political orders.

Fussey and Coaffee place socio-spatial implications at the forefront of their analysis of London 2012 Olympic processes. For these researchers, the imposition of standardized Olympic security models graft onto already existing urban surveillance and public safety infrastructures. Exceptional and increasingly standardized models that build on "best-practices" knowledge from event-to-event (Boyle 2011) are temporarily designed-in to the pre-existing security infrastructure. Coaffee et al (2012) understand this process as a "lamination" of Olympic security developments into the built environment, which translate into post-event legacies, particularly with regard to public video surveillance. In the case of London 2012, a 1.6b GBP budget generated further opportunity to intensify and embed practices stemming from Olympic standardization plans that were primarily premised on counter-terrorism strategies. In East London, for example, urban regeneration development projects and security-by-design schemes (otherwise known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)) were developed to "minimize crime and security risks" (Home Office 2009c). The MET Police (2006)

emphasize the material dimension of security and policing legacies stemming from the London 2012 Olympics, saying:

> "We want the security legacy to be leaving us with a safe and secure environment for the communities of East London after the games, on issues such as safer neighbourhoods, lighting, and crime prevention. We want a games legacy that will reduce crime and the fear of crime" (MET Police, in Fussey and Coaffee 2011: 3332).

The use of counter-terrorism techniques in surveillance and urban design (from intelligence-led 'pre-emptive' policing to emergency management responses couched in resilience strategies), is largely focused on the built contextual milieu of London for these researchers. However, a similar lamination process applies to the meso-institutional level of security and policing authorities, where the 'Olympic boost' yields transformative effects on public safety assemblages, either directly or through a range of parallel linkages. In this way, the Olympics maximize growth opportunities not only for the private sector but also contribute significant growth opportunities and transformational processes for public safety agencies involved in counter-terrorism and emergency management preparations (Molnar and Snider, 2011). As previously mentioned, a broader understanding of legacies in this regard, to include institutional transformations in the public and private sectors, considers the importance of institutionalized relations between entities in a given security governance assemblage as legacies that are bound up with the broader geographies of exception. In the frame of Fussey and Coaffee (2011), such assemblages yield impacts on the built environment.

Event-specific accounts of legacies are also no doubt important for building a dossier on Olympic legacies. Even though accounts of events are discretely articulated, they do speak to a range of legacies and ways to consider them. And, like many non-security legacies espoused in official sports management literature, both accounts of, and actual instances of, legacies are manifold and express overlaps and differences. In an attempt to collate event-specific accounts of major event legacies, Bennett and Haggerty (2011: 1-20) point out that legacies are "diverse and operating on several scales simultaneously" (7). A list of variables on post-Games Olympic security legacies that is derived from their

work (See Table 2) includes "technological legacies; informational legacies; legal legacies; geographical legacies; and cultural legacies" (Bennett and Haggerty 2011: 7-12). Legacies, in this view, are considered objects of debate, instead of offering an ontological-methodological analysis or explanation of practices that contribute to the emergence and relative durability of security governance assemblages. In what follows, I disaggregate each of the legacies discussed in Bennett and Haggerty (2011) in greater detail.

**Table 2 List of Security Legacy Themes and Associated Empirical Examples**

| Security Legacy Theme | Subcategories |
|---|---|
| Technological | CCTV, RFID, databases, command centers |
| Informational | Collection of personal information, information/knowledge sharing across networks |
| Legal | Federal, state/provincial, and municipal by-laws, policy orientations across networks |
| Geographic (Spatial) | Construction of city spaces, "fan zones", perimeters as "separated spaces", crowd control tactics |
| Cultural | Attitudes, cultural acceptance of security practices, normative exceptionalism |

Technological legacies, as material infrastructure, are most popularly expressed through video surveillance (see Chapter 3). Major events have been and continue to be marked by the use of video surveillance systems, automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems, the use of RFID technologies embedded in event tickets, and several other perimeter intrusion detection sensors and so on (Holden 2013). While public video surveillance is clearly a core aspect of public safety and urban planning policies, major events further catalyze their implementation through both the political exception for increased economic funding, as well as public support for such systems – both of which would be more difficult to justify under more routine conditions. Discussions of technological legacies are significant in that technologies always follow the course of human direction. They are never autonomous from agency practices that reflect particular social and political conjunctures. That is to say, the course and use of any technology is not pre-determined and implicitly holds the capacity to be used in different ways. As

such, investments in security technologies carry a tendency towards "function" or "mission-creep", that is, the notion that technologies find a secondary use apart from their original design, policy justification, and/or deployment in actual circumstances (Bennett and Haggerty 2011: 8-9). Volker Eick (2011) points out how RFID systems that were designed to prevent ticket fraud, were also used as a repository to cross-reference against suspected hooligans (Eick 2012: 3335). Throughout this study, attention is paid to the fungibility of security and policing technologies in the context of shifting rationales of authorities, the relation between games-specific instantiations, and subsequent post-games uses. The conclusion of this dissertation suggests that the concept of mission and function creep can be opened to include a more detailed and broad interpretation, particularly given how security governance technologies are often situated within wider assemblages and rationales. Here, I develop the methodology pursued in the dissertation to open space for examining the range of entities and processes that are implicated in function-creep processes.

Informational legacies refer to softer, intangible legacies and are more difficult to empirically ascertain than material infrastructure. Through everyday transactions that are conducted at major events, many types of personal information on groups and individuals are captured. Subjects of information capture includes individuals and groups who are under surveillance by authorities (Molnar and Snider 2011), but also to fans who purchase event tickets (Eick 2011; Klauser 2011), employees and volunteers who undergo background checks to ensure their eligibility to participate, as well as athletes who undergo random drug testing during the competition (WADA 2009). Improvements in emergency management systems that are designed to reduce response latency times by first responders also include health surveillance databases and real-time GPS monitoring of various authorities' locations. In Rio de Janeiro, the development of a new smart-city public works platform is revolutionizing information sharing between various public service, emergency management, and security and policing agencies and is set to leave a lasting legacy for that city (Anthony 2012). Information legacies not only refer to the establishment of database networks, but also refer to the redrawing of norms surrounding information sharing between traditionally discrete organizations that are increasingly

pressed forward toward greater degrees of integration in the context of major event security projects.

Legal legacies also stem from changes brought about through major events. Changes in legislation often extend executive powers (Eick 2011: 3339), revise the by-law powers that regulate "incivility" and vagrancies which are disproportionately focused on poorer populations (Boyle 2011; Molnar and Snider 2011), or indicate possible changes in anti-terrorism laws, or otherwise alter statutes that regulate public behaviour and civil unrest. Each of these legal changes occurred during the Sydney 2000 Olympics (Toohey and Taylor 2012). Heightened trust-in-government during the Olympic event enhances tolerance for invasive security initiatives that can negatively impact citizen's rights.

Geographical or spatial legacies also exist in an Olympic security legacy typology. Bennett and Haggerty (2011: 11) refer to spatial legacies to refer to urban crime control strategies and the associated strategies of separating and controlling urban spaces. Geographical practices, and their potential legacies, can be understood through strategies of controlling perimeters, rings of security refers to the "splintering" of urban spaces into more tightly controlled areas (target hardening) versus peripheral areas (soft targets). Access controls and search and canvass efforts are practices that separate and control space in order to address crime, terrorism, and other risks. In a different way, Coaffee and Fussey (2011) outline how spatial legacies graft onto already existent infrastructure, which speaks to the mediation of security developments into localized environments. Given the plethora of threats, associated security responses, and urban geo-political contexts, it is important to be reminded that patterns of securitization (and any security legacies for that matter) vary across their particularized context. A further condition of spatial legacies of major events refers to shifts in crowd management strategies, that is, how public space is understood, negotiated, configured, and reconfigured during expressions of mass assembly in urban centers. Chapter Three on the Vancouver Police Department's Public Safety Unit (PSU) speaks most closely to this form of spatial legacy—however, spatial legacies are understood only through the practices that are emergent through security governance assemblages. And further, as discussed below,

Fussey et al (2011) and Coaffee and Fussey (2011) provide an interesting slant on geographical legacies as understood through the event-specific dimensions of the London 2012 Olympics.

Finally, Bennett and Haggerty (2011) identify cultural legacies as facilitating post-event resonances. Local responses and the potential for enduring legacies are conditional upon the attitudes and relative trust that civil society places in authorities. While many host-cities express a greater degree of tolerance, or acquiescence, popular consent to enhanced security and surveillance measures to provide a "safe and secure" games is commonplace (Toohey and Taylor 2012). And further, legacies are also conditional upon a wider set of civic dynamics, which is to say, legacies are neither necessary nor inevitable. The degree of political resistance to security governance assemblages can have an impact on limiting the shape and scope post-Games legacies. However, one of the reasons that security legacies might be so persistent in the context of the Olympics is the general acquiescence of many civilian populations for enhanced security measures at major events. In many instances, civilians are willing to support authorities' security initiatives if the justification is to provide a safe games environment, not to mention improved emergency management capabilities. For instance, Sydney's 2000 bid documents offered guarantees of "effective, friendly, and unobtrusive" security measures from the nation's Prime Minister, the host-state of New South Wales (NSW) Premier, as well as the provincial (NSW) and federal commissioners of police (Toohey 2002: 1). Security initiatives are undeniably buoyed by justifications of emergency management and disaster response initiatives. However, the sheer scope of public safety investments can also have a direct impact on civil liberties, despite their original justification toward disaster response policies, as Chapter Three on public video surveillance demonstrates.

An adaptation to this legacy framework is necessary, however. The primary problem with Bennett and Haggerty's (2011) contribution is that the discusses legacies are only presented as a list. There is no strong theoretical framework to understand the integrated manner of security governance legacies at major events, which will provide a valuable contribution to study future events. Only when we see these legacies as part of a practice-

based historical trajectory do we see more clearly what security governance legacies are, and how exactly, they endure, or are otherwise muted. In this dissertation, I consider the implications of how security governance assemblages at major events are subject to modifications that instigate a process of (re)*institutionalization.* Legacies therefore, refer to how security governance legacies are inherently relational, but are also institutionalized throughout the course of the event. Considering legacies as the institutionalization of assemblages, to some extent, embraces the legacy variables listed by Bennett and Haggerty (2012), and yet crystallize them into a process-based historical reading of how security governance assemblages emerge, are held in place, and work in different ways to open or limit possibilities. In other words, considering Olympic security and policing projects as distinct assemblages tends to consider how security governance is comprised of human and non-human social formations that guide human interaction and shape ongoing institutional procedures. More specifically, a historical analysis of security governance assemblage formations allows us to interpret how existing security, surveillance, and policing practices are the product of decisions, rationales, material infrastructure, expertise, resource allocations, policy, and policy regulations that, through their relational articulations, condition the emergence—and ongoing agency—of security governance practices through the course of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. A key part of this institutional focus of assemblage formations is to examine moments when significant institutional change occurs, which presents a "point of deviation" where historical-cultural practices follow an altered path within, or between elements, of the assemblage.

An assemblage view of security governance legacies rests on methodological contributions from Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Drawing on insights from the sociology of knowledge and cultural theory historiography from ANT perspectives, security governance legacies can be understood as an emergent socio-cultural processes. More specifically, an assemblage approach recognizes the asymmetrical character of the social as ordered around human and non-human articulations, which generates insights into the historical (and process oriented) composition of security governance practices as configurations of a heterogeneous set of actors (Callon and Latour 1992). Tracing the human and non-human elements within such assemblages helps explain the ways that

heterogeneous actors are implicated in creating, reproducing, or altering patterns in security governance practices. A further strength of the ANT approach in the context of institutions involves consideration of how interests, rationales, and norms of institutions cohere to translate these human and non-human arrangements into distinct strategic rationales and justifications. For instance, strategic justification at the level of public policy might contrast with strategic and tactical operations that guide how agents, as an actant within the same assemblage, use specific surveillance technologies. The result is a more complex and multi-faceted reading of institutions as a condition shaping the emergence of security governance legacies. Such an approach more carefully examines how security and policing institutions, and associated technologies, are continually re-enacted features of a culturally-specific historical landscape (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen 2000). While ANT contributes a measure of topological complexity, and gestures towards the heterogeneity within security and policing assemblages, it offers little by way of a concept of power and social control – hence its supplementation in this work with a conceptual emphasis on Foucauldian understandings of articulations of social control and coercion.

Mission-based security, or integrated security enforcement is distinguished by intensified interoperability across public safety institutions and the modes and jurisdictions through which they have traditionally operated. Major events catalyze the blending of these agencies through "mission-based" assemblages that rely on inter-operable technical and human-based networks. Engaging with a complex logistical task of providing robust public safety response (from intelligence-led policing to post-disaster resilience) requires extensive expertise drawn from a range of organizational sources and capacities. To this end, mission-based security initiatives are often introduced as a way to deal with the complexity in threats at major events, and as such, have become the primary strategic-organizational means through which conventional Westphalian articulations of territorial space, borders, security and policing institutions, and the regulation of urban spaces more generally, are being rearticulated (Graham, 2010). These articulations, however, are implicated in the identification and mitigation of risk and threats, which engage of processes of surveillance to parcel out acceptable attributes of populations, spatial

dynamics, or even individuals, from unacceptable or threatening dimensions that are deserving of regulation.

One of the major trends in power and control at major events, and in urban crime control and counter-terrorism operations more generally is the new penology. Since 9/11, however, given the heterogeneity of threats at major events, is only practically applicable in selected aspects of Olympic security. Chiefly, the use of actuarial policing falls largely with anticipatory modes of public order policing and intelligence collections to assist counter-terrorism operations. Emergency management and disaster response operations are very much a reactive enterprise – one component within a more diverse set of strategies.

Whether anticipatory, or as a post-event response, many studies that have discerned major event security legacies in one way or another are only just beginning to examine the interrelation between institutions and assemblages as key mediating factors in these developments (see Fussey 2013). Given that major event security is marked by extensive developments in policy networks, increased collaboration across hitherto discrete organizations (such as military, intelligence, policing, and so on), greater focus on the trajectories of security and policing institutions during the Olympic lifecycle are revealing. To this end, I suggest that a deeper understanding of how Bennett and Haggerty's descriptive list of legacy variables be integrated into an explanatory framework of the institutionalization of actor-network assemblages as sets of practices that condition the emergence of security governance legacies (see introduction of Chapter 7). As is discussed in the next section, Kevin Haggerty (2011) approximates this view most closely in his own articulation of surveillance legacies.

Indeed, Surveillance Studies approaches more closely attend to the dynamic relationship between technology, social practice and temporality, often as they relate to "surveillance creep" or "function-creep". Indicative of this approach is Kevin Haggerty's (2011) argument that shifting (or plastic) normative dimensions intersect with technological and material infrastructures over time to furnish surveillance legacies. The key theoretical

point here is the evolution of socio-technical arrangements, and in particular, how assemblages of normative values fuse with surveillance technologies over time in novel and non-deterministic ways. An assemblage approach, with an emphasis on institutional developments, unpacks this approach further (with the findings of the dissertation) in Chapter 7. In the following section, however, I consider a more detailed discussion of how Surveillance Studies literature considers the notion of legacies.

### Legacies in Surveillance Studies

For Surveillance Studies scholars, surveillance generally refers to the "collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered," and "does not usually involve embodied persons watching each other" (Lyon 2001: 2). Surveillance is largely about the management of information, as a way to count, categorize, and administer populations. In this way, "surveillance as social sorting" refers to how the gathering of personal data for detailed analysis, where decisions are made on the basis of strategic discriminations between categories, is a routine aspect of many organizational mandates, and indeed, of everyday life. In the context of public safety and security, surveillance practices are driven by a rhetoric of security and terrorism, and entail the identification of a range of real and perceived threats that demand techniques of governance that will enhance capabilities for authorities to predict, and intervene, in any potentially damaging attacks or disruptions (Zedner 2009: 257-270).

Surveillance as a technique of public safety governance entails a "focus on the social and economic categories and the computer codes by which personal data is organized with a view to influencing and managing people and populations" as a means for preventing or minimizing the effects of terrorist attacks, political disruption, or for interdicting by authorities in a range of circumstances (Lyon 2001: 2). Toward the ends of security and safety, contemporary (in)security practices entail not only how issues of safety and security are constructed but also the practical and cultural dimensions of technological control enlisted to neutralize real and perceived risks and dangers. This groundwork of surveillance as a distinct focus on visualizing technologies and their connection with the

ontological status of risky objects and subjects in need of regulation provides a useful point of departure for considering more particularly how Surveillance Studies scholars have encountered the prospect of legacies.

Kevin Haggerty (2011) emphasizes the socio-technical nature of surveillance as a mode of governance in a discussion on surveillance legacies. A lasting surveillance legacy is emergent through a dynamic connection between 'material' surveillance infrastructures (such as public video surveillance) and their (re)articulation with shifting socio-normative dynamics of deviance. In ontological terms, this move separates 'intangible' aspects of surveillance infrastructures from 'tangible' elements, and highlights how both structural (material/ technical hardware) and agential (discursive/human-ware) variables are part of a historical relational dynamic of surveillance practices. A surveillance legacy, it could be said, can often lead to the re-emergence of micro-regulatory surveillance projects under a refashioning of new strategic projects of social control. Put in more simple terms, as built material infrastructures such as CCTV developments are introduced under the premise of counter-terrorism initiatives (as they were after the Boston Marathon bombings), so there is a tendency for the built environment to persist and encounter subsequent secondary uses for regulation of other "deviant" behaviours that are beyond the rhetoric of counter-terrorism.

Haggerty (2011) proposes three main kinds of surveillance legacies—each revolving around the general ontological separation between the material and the ideal—and each offering value for fleshing out the conceptual parameters of Olympic legacies. The first reiterates the main problem of the shifting (re)articulations of notions of deviance with increasingly pervasive technological infrastructures. A prime example is how the expansive bureaucratic infrastructure of Nazi Germany (material infrastructure) provided the conditions for the identification and extermination of targeted groups based on the cultural regeneration of normative standards of deviance (Haggerty 2011: 8). Second, Haggerty points out how the relation between enhanced visibility regimes, augmented through the increasing pervasiveness of surveillance technologies, facilitates subtle normative permissiveness around the uses and sharing of personal information.

Establishing a voyeuristic culture through the mediums of ubiquitous digital computing, for example, forges an attitudinal, or social-psychological legacy surrounding the acceptable informational norms in particular digital environments (see also Nissenbaum 2010). Third, Haggerty reflects a more common theme in the Surveillance Studies literature that speaks of a "banalization of surveillance" (Lyon 2001). Haggerty notes how "a relatively permanent surveillance structure can produce a legacy of recalibrated standards of surveillance and energized micro-regulatory projects" (Haggerty 2011: 8). In this final hypothesis, a slippage between security and surveillance regimes, which were originally designed to track terrorists (under legal regimes fashioned after 9-11), has the capacity to be 'redirected' as a strategy that addresses other forms of deviant behaviour, such as political protest and civil disobedience. The most notable example of the 'redirected surveillance apparatus' thesis in relation to major sports events involves how, in the absence of 'actionable intelligence' surrounding a credible terrorist threat, heavy security investments are redirected to police dissent, regulate poverty, and secure commercial rights (Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Molnar and Snider 2011).

Following Haggerty's insistence that security and surveillance issues require further sustained attention, this dissertation examines temporal elaborations on the relation between "meaning" as expressed in representations of risk, deviance, normative ascriptions and the Other with "materializations" of security and surveillance infrastructures, such as technical and "hardware" dimensions including databases, technical apparatuses, bodies, and even the significance of investments of economic capital as assemblage formations that are more or less durable as legacies. This aligns with the view of Coaffee and Rogers (2008: 102) who note that "attempts to create safe and secure city spaces through physical and technological changes at specific sites have often been supported by a range of legislative powers and regulatory guidance which appear to not only target criminal or terrorist activity, but also to control and dispense particular activities deemed 'unacceptable'." During the Sydney 2000 Olympics, for instance, the introduction of specifically formulated legislation in the state of New South Wales (NSW), such as the Olympic Arrangements Act 2000 and the Homebush Bay Operations Act 1999, while premised upon counter-terrorism justifications, were by and

large focused on adjustments with domestic legislation (Toohey 2011). However, thus far, many of these insights have yet to be considered more thoroughly within a systematic empirical and sustained theoretical format.

The consideration of security and surveillance legacies holds a wider relevance apart from legacies specific to major sporting events however. For instance, with the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in domestic Canadian airspace, the development of a material infrastructure by Canadian authorities is already leading to wider range of actual uses for UAVs across an expanding range of shifting institutional rationales. For instance, UAVs are now being deployed for national security purposes, emergency management, law enforcement, and defence, for a range of tactical applications including traffic-collision reconstruction, locating missing persons, detecting marijuana grow operations, targeted surveillance of individuals or buildings. UAVs are a fluid technology that hold their shape across a broad range of shifting institutional rationales – the development of material capacities in one area, such as emergency management, can carry significant direct or indirect knock-on legacies for how surveillance technologies are the product of wider assemblages that span national security and law enforcement. Developing a relational methodology for considering surveillance legacies in the context of major events opens up analytical possibilities in the areas of Surveillance Studies as a whole.

## A Theoretical Framework for Olympic Security Legacies?

Security institutions are now most commonly understood as a characteristic expression of "networked" or "nodal" governance' (Fussey et al 2011). The literature on networked security governance and surveillance assemblage models (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) are owed in large part to the work of Delueze and Guattari, but also significantly, to Michel Foucault, one of the most influential thinkers on assemblages and networks.[8]

[8] The use of the word "network," "assemblage," and even "dispositif," are all referring to the relational and/or associational nature of human and nonhuman objects. The terms will, at times, be used interchangeably. It is important to note however, that the concepts are often tied to different ontologies. For instance, the use of assemblage by Manuel DeLanda is premised on a stratified ontological understanding that attempts to consider the emergent properties within the network. Latour, by contrast, relies largely on an empirical ontology that seeks to trace the associations between human and nonhuman entities at the level of practice.

Assemblage approaches to security and surveillance practices have found considerable traction in the past 15 years as a means to capture how surveillance practices are increasingly defined by the proliferating use of information and communication technologies. Drawing on the conceptual tools of Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari, Haggerty and Ericson refine the notion of ontological form of surveillance practices to probe into the myriad social, technical, and cultural forces and desires that intersect and lend coherence to current expressions of surveillance. Insisting that previous theoretical conceptions of surveillance have been both discretely bounded, structured, and insistent on the overwhelming dominance of totalitarian, state-centric explanations of surveillance that marshals its critical weight through the language of civil liberties. Haggerty and Ericson point out how the proliferation of surveillance architectures are driven by a desire to unify a multiplicity of practices and technologies into a relatively discrete functional entity (Haggerty and Ericson 2000: XXX). In essence, the surveillance assemblage is an invitation to contingency within understandings of how surveillance practices emerge, and are sustained within and across databases, through the linking of data flows and agencies in policing – as a surveillance assemblage that bridges both state and non-state forms.

Another characteristic of the surveillance assemblages moves beyond the question of ontological forms. Haggerty and Ericson explain that surveillance capabilities afforded through advances in information and data gathering capabilities are increasingly directed toward the human body, wherein the body is abstracted into digital simulations, or otherwise stated, as digital or biometric representations of the bodily self. Systems of surveillance therefore emerge through a desire to fuse component parts of an assemblage together—which are largely identified as the fusion of technical or information-specific attributes. Within the surveillance assemblage, data simulations of the body are

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And finally, the use of apparatus by Foucault places greater emphasis on the path-dependent and path-shaping nature (conditions of possibility) of the temporal elaboration of the network. The use, or interchangeable use of the terms in this dissertation is meant to refer to their common emphasis on relational ontology as a core aspect for analyzing techniques of governmentality and social control.

inseparable from the instrumental efficacy of sorting populations and individuals according to institutional interest.

Security governance legacies—and the ANT ontological paradigm—both share an inclination toward the variation in component parts into wider systems. The surveillance assemblage, however, refers more narrowly to the increasing convergence of previously distinct information and data gathering systems – and attempts to draw out the relevant implications for control, governance, security, or even profit, that are specific to the 'visualization' and regulation of data doubles, or risk-based categorical profiles, to assist with the work of institutional procedure.

It seems a natural fit to hold ANT perspectives and the surveillant assemblage together. The surveillance assemblage is very strong on explanations of how surveillance is increasingly facilitated through integrated socio-technical networks, how such systems are driven by desire to regulate or control identities and the human body, and also, how the implications therein of how such actuarial or categorical profiles are redirected back into the body for a multitude of reasons that span crime control to behavioural marketing interests. That being said, the surveillant assemblage is arguably more thin on explanations of how complex and heterogenous governance arrangements that are so important for considering how the securitization of the everyday draws a range of actors together into the realm of crime control and counter-terrorism operations. Integration in national security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, particularly in the context of major events, might partially operate within the discursive economy of the management of digital identities – yet the *effects* of control or governance at major events are emergent through a more diverse range of practices, institutional trajectories, and conflicting norms and values. In short, a more holistic view of techniques of governance (where digital monitoring might only be one aspect) are needed.

In addition to Haggerty and Ericson's (2000) intervention, Foucault's emphasis on security arrangements provide a wider frame of reference for comprehending the associational, or institutional, nature of security and policing apparatuses. In particular,

his concept of the *dispositif*, translated in English to mean "apparatus," originally emerged in the 1970s during Foucault's lectures at the College de France on bio-power and the administering of populations through state regulations as the broader "the government of men" (Foucault 2008). And while Foucault did not provide a clear definition of "apparatus" during these lectures, nor did he do so entirely in his earlier works, such as *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, his work has been seized upon by philosophers and researchers intrigued with the concept. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben has, in a more recent essay added the core features of Foucault's emphasis on the apparatus as a social form.

The core features of an apparatus can be expressed by the following dimensions:

a. the apparatus is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. The apparatus itself is the *network* that is established between these elements.
b. The apparatus always has a concrete strategic-function and is always located in a power relation.
c. The apparatus exists at the nexus between relations of power and relations of knowledge
d. The apparatus always captures, secures, shapes, constrains, enables, conditions and produces its subject. In turn, subjects and subjectivities implicated in the apparatus recursively reproduce the conditions of possibility within the apparatus.

The value of the concept of the apparatus, while ontologically broad, is to highlight how assemblages, or apparatuses, cohere in a spatio-temporally fixed technique of governmentality and social control emergent through a networked set of relations (Bigo 2005). Security responses at major events comprise of a broad range of subjects, institutions, technologies, and strategies, within an apparatus, and are enacted through "tangled hierarchies, parallel power networks or other forms of complex interdependence across different tiers of government" (cf. Jessop 1995: 310). And subsequently, it is these confluences that cohere into a relatively enduring social practice – otherwise defined as a

security governance legacy.

While the nomenclature of assemblage and *dispositif* adequately addresses the form of security governance, a second, temporal element is essential to consider how security apparatuses are shaped and constrained through a historically-specific trajectory. The theory of "path-dependency" from the policy studies literatures supplements assemblage notions of security governance by highlighting how such integrated security arrangements are constrained and enabled by different trajectories. For instance, the theory of path-dependency insists how, after a particular path is 'selected', recursive feedback processes demonstrate a tendency to reproduce the newly selected arrangements, and by extension, prevents a reversal of the initial choice (Pierson 2004; Mahoney 2000; Rast 2012). With reference to the apparatus, or dispositif, its path-dependent features are emergent through the variable configurations of human and non-human elements, underpinned by concrete-strategic functions, within the network. In short, the apparatus, by virtue of its heterogeneous confluence of linguistic and non-linguistic elements, are subject to path-dependent trajectories that expand beyond digital information networks, and encapsulate the potentially paradoxical nature of sporting event security assemblages.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how security and policing assemblages unfold over the Olympic lifecycle, which socio-technical components of these particular assemblages are subject to transformation, and therefore, to explain the conditions under which post-Olympic security legacies (understood as relatively enduring configurations of security and policing assemblages) are persisting through (re)institutionalization (Chapter 6) (Rast, 2012: 22). An historical approach to security governance assemblages as Olympic legacies discerns key conditions of the network as a "trajectory" of development in security and policing assemblages, which are linked to, and circumscribed by, critical juncture episodes (catalysts) (Pierson, 2004: 135). The effects of focusing events in particular policy arrangements within the assemblage conditions the possibility for a transformation in security governance arrangements. To this end, historicizing the practice of security governance assemblages are vital in explaining

accounts of continuity and change in urban geopolitical analyses of security and surveillance. Insofar as both catalysts and path-dependent legacies can be accounted for through this methodological framework, a wider discourse of Olympic security and policing assemblages, as the emergence of an apparatus, or legacy of security governance, can be forged. This is particularly the case in much needed debates that centre on the controversies and opportunities inherent in security legacies and major events, which are a key driver in the dynamic towards the securitization and militarization of Western cities.

## Conclusion

The theoretical framework of this dissertation combines Michel Foucault's emphasis on the *dispositif* and its emphasis on regulation and social control, underpinned by an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired ontology and methodology. As a result, the key ontological and methodological insights that aid this study are four-fold—and focus on radical relationality, generalized symmetry, and association, fused with an epistemological emphasis on the strategic-regulatory dimension of these associations as a distinct mode of governance as a technique of governmentality and social control (Callon 2001; Latour 2005; Law and Hassard 1999).

To briefly summarize, the theoretical framework can be broken down as follows. First, this approach insists on a radical relationality between all entities that exist within a given apparatus (Law 1992). An emphasis on radical relationality is useful for considering how entities within an actor-network make possible the conditions of emergence for public safety governance legacies throughout the duration of Vancouver 2010. Second, the methodology insists on a generalized symmetry between human and non-human entities within an actor-network (see Michel Callon 1986). Emphasis on human and non-human articulations in security governance assemblages are drawn from Deleuze's philosophy of creation, and are applied to the empirical cases in this project to identify and explain how the generative capacities of actor-networks as a hybrid formation of entitities (such as objects, technologies, truths, actors) and dimensions (times, spaces) are brought into being and are more or less relatively enduring as legacies. Third, if we consider legacies in this view, we find that they are not an "economic" or "cultural" thing, but are a type of

relational association between various entities that are both emergent, conditional, and iterative. Emphasis is therefore placed on the hybrid forms of entities that emerge relationally at concrete sites of action – which are explored as the individual case-studies presented throughout the dissertation.

Fourth, and finally, Foucault's notion of the dispositif is an important addition to the assemblage approach in this work that leans heavily on an ANT-inspired ontological approach. The dispositif highlights how actor-network associations have generative capacities that include a path-dependent, regulatory, technique of governmentality. For instance, the apparatus (or assemblage), as a set of heterogeneous entities captures, shapes, and institutionalizes its semiotic and subjective meanings. That is to say, actor-network associations cohere through a strategic technique of governmentality and social control, which places these assemblages squarely within the theme of security governance. Yet, coherence within the network is not immediately given over. It should be noted that institutional change often occurs through incremental and iterative processes, meaning that it is vitally important to continue to examine the ways that any potential reversion, tension, or contradictions still continue to occur. This is particularly if the self-perceived relevance and value of joint-collaboration between institutions subsides or is replaced by other pressing matters (see Birkland 1998).

The purpose of this combined theoretical/methodological approach, is to decenter the object-oriented insistence on distinct legacies themselves, largely within the sports management literature as either economic, cultural, sporting, concepts that pay little attention to the practices that underpin them. Instead, emphasis is placed on practices within an actor-network, and more specifically, on the relatively enduring set of associations that includes objects, tools, technologies, texts, formulae, institutions, and human agency, which are heterogeneously arranged, exist in contradiction, and yet are mutually constitutive of each other (Law 1992). Legacies, therefore, are not things, or distinct realms with clear boundaries, but are a set of hybrid associations that are relatively enduring throughout time.

The combination of ontological and methodological insights that guide the engagement with empirical data across the cases open us up to considerations of what a security governance legacy is, on the basis that we encounter empirical data to discern relatively durable compositions of security governance practices. Assemblage thinking allows us to infer that, while we are still advancing a partial aspect of a larger assemblage across the cases, we can still nevertheless derive some insights about the ways in which security governance legacies unfold in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. The importance of discerning security governance legacies is so that we can (1) see how security governance practices change over time, with implications for distributions of power and control; and so that (2) we can improve our studies of complexly arranged security governance assemblages as historical-sociological practices.

And to conclude with a minor deviation into the implications of this type of study for function-creep (as discussed in Chapter 8). Here, to the extent that Surveillance Studies literatures have *implicitly* engaged the question of legacies, they often present a methodologically and substantively restricted reading of surveillance creep solely as a dual-use application of certain technology or informational database, instead of a larger institutional shift that considers a wider confluence of changes across objects, tools, technologies, texts, formulae, norms, and institutional interests, rationales, and strategies as a shifting set of normative constitutions. By widening the explanatory engagement with questions of function creep through a more ANT-inspired approach, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical development of function creep in the surveillance studies literature. Thus, the following chapters of this dissertation consider security and surveillance practices as a confluence of human and non-human actors that emerge as a series of historical transformations. These hybrid articulations are punctuated via the focusing event of the Olympic Games,  and emerge through institutional conditions, which bear lasting security legacies. The result is a discussion that considers how moments of institutional innovation brought about through Olympic-related security initiatives might become entrenched and reproduced (albeit in non-deterministic ways) through positive path-dependent feedback.

Further to this, a deeper engagement with security as a form of surveillance is pursued, and vice versa, thus bridging some gaps between Surveillance Studies and Critical Security Studies (Lyon and Murakami-Wood 2012). As Lyon and Murakami-Wood (2012) point out, "security and surveillance are concepts that feature frequently as a pair, yet are all to [sic] often separated by disciplinary and semantic divisions of labour" (318). While manifestations of security and safety are commonly expressed as justifications for a range of governmental practices, they have existed as relatively autonomous fields of study. Further, consideration of how rhetorical expressions of security are fused with a historicization of surveillance practices in the context of major event security initiatives contributes to how international security concerns are giving way to a focus on security issues into national and local organizations and spaces – that is, to the ways in which "security is coming home", and staying home, through major event security legacies (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006).

# Chapter Three: Video Surveillance Legacies and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

## Introduction

Video surveillance is now an integral component in public safety strategies during major events. Video surveillance at major events first emerged on a widespread basis at the Montreal 1976 Olympics as a preventive security measure in the wake of the Munich 1972 Black September crisis. Since this era, video surveillance technology has evolved both in terms of its technical capabilities and the institutional justifications surrounding its use. Technically, public video surveillance has evolved to be increasingly integrated into a range of technologies and includes such applications as Facial Recognition (FRCCTV) capabilities and temporary redeployable public video surveillance units. Institutionally, video surveillance is used for an increasing array of purposes, from surveillance and crime control to real-time, live-feed augmentation to direct emergency management operations. Given these capabilities, public video surveillance infrastructure has been built into the extant material infrastructure of local host-cities at Olympic events for the past thirty years. And over this period, particularly from Sydney 2000 to the London 2012 Olympics, legacies of public video surveillance, while varied, have been persistent.

This chapter looks specifically at how public video surveillance legacies have persisted from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Much of the public video surveillance legacy hinges on understanding the local politics of public video surveillance in Vancouver as well as the extent of the material infrastructure that was established during the 2010 Olympics. More particularly, however, consideration of public video surveillance legacies moves beyond material and spatial imprints to include the ways in which the city's competing public video surveillance policies became informally integrated over the course of the 2010 Olympics, which produced a novel public video surveillance legacy in Vancouver. The legacies of public video surveillance in Vancouver involve both an extension of material infrastructures, but, also significantly, they involve a transformation of the

policy landscape itself. The institutional and policy landscape surrounding public video surveillance throughout the lifecycle of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics conditioned a disjuncture between a publicly legitimizing policy design that was premised on improved "situational awareness" capabilities while actual operational practices continued to involve instances of targeted surveillance. The result was a two-sided public video surveillance policy legacy. On the one hand, the city's public policy makes claims to a non-invasive public safety application; therefore, officials feel the program falls outside of provincial privacy regulations. On the other hand, the system is still marked by targeted instances of surveillance in its operational deployment.

### Video Surveillance at Major Events

Video surveillance is perhaps the most widespread element within a surveillance strategy. Organizations who use video surveillance claim to detect and deter a range of normative deviances across a host of public and private urban environments. The expansion of surveillance in urban environments is most often considered in relation to the transformation of urban space towards neoliberal modes of governance (Coleman 2004). Strategies of urban regeneration are often suffused with public video surveillance strategies that claim to reduce or deter criminal behaviour.

However, while basic justifications for using public video surveillance to detect normative deviancies have persisted, over the past thirty years trends in video surveillance have developed. On the one hand, public video surveillance technologies themselves have evolved to boast new capabilities. On the other, the number and function of organizations that deploy video surveillance towards specific ends have both grown and blurred. Given the breadth of institutions that rely on visual imaging technologies, distinguishing police work from emergency response and disaster management has become increasingly difficult as video surveillance gets used for a variety of instances of control. As Richard Jones observes, (2000: 17 cited in Lyon 2007: 107-108), public video surveillance is applied in a practice of 'digital rule' that provides a technical system for "real-time resource for coordination and management". While the technological breadth of video surveillance capabilities continues to widen with the use of facial recognition,

redeployable cameras, automatic license plate recognition, and so on, these technologies are united in their capacity to provide enhanced intelligence associated with their particular field of visibility. Given these enhanced capabilities and applications, video surveillance is a predominant strategy to maintain social order in the broader trend of public safety.

In the context of major events, video surveillance is considered a key visualizing technology to prevent terrorism and provide situational awareness, improving interdiction capabilities for authorities in the event of major disasters, emergency planning, or other public safety issues such as crowd control or other urban disturbances. Often at major events, video surveillance footage is also used as an information-gathering technology for use in post-crime investigations. For instance, police who are investigating public order disturbances often search collected video footage to gather additional intelligence that will support arrest. Authorities also commonly release video images, such as those of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects that reached global audiences, to the public during criminal investigations.

The kidnapping and murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich 1972 Games birthed intense fear over the safety of participants at future Olympics. These fears spurred a "protectionist reflex" that helped to solidify the use of video surveillance at subsequent major events. Since Montreal 1976, CCTV has been a cornerstone of security initiatives at major events (Fussey and Coaffee 2011). Enhanced security measures, which relied heavily on enhanced surveillance, were taken at the Montreal 1976 Olympics, triggering the first widespread deployment of CCTV systems at an Olympic Games, which were largely focused on the protection of the athlete's village (COJO 1976; Fussey et al 2011). At a cost of US $100 million (around $380 USD million today), an extensive CCTV system contributed toward Montreal's stated security agenda to provide "preventive measures, a visible presence of security forces, and enhanced communication systems" (Fussey 2011: 179) in the case of any untoward events.

During the 1980s and 1990s, however, operational uses of CCTV at major events evolved from monitoring and securing athlete participants to monitoring 'external' threats posed by hooliganism and crowd control disturbances. Video surveillance was a familiar facet at British football events (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1998), and during this time, video surveillance systems were primarily used to monitor hooliganism and to augment crowd control capabilities. The technologies were also used as evidentiary support in post-event investigations.[9] After the Atlanta 1996 Olympic bombing, which killed 1 and injured 111 spectators, video surveillance gained further prominence as a strategy for protecting crowded spaces (Fussey et al 2011: 181). Sponsors' exhibits, event live-sites, and other public spaces, designated as "soft-targets" in military speak, were, after the 1996 bombing, considered to be just as vulnerable as the more "hardened targets" of athletes villages and Olympic stadiums and venues (Toohey and Veal 2007). Subsequent Olympic security plans were scrutinized to prevent a similar type incident, which means the range of designated spaces and infrastructure deemed in need of protection was expanded (Johnson 2006). This reformulation (and expansion) of Olympic security responses indicates that these plans, in conjunction with a post-9/11 context of heightened fear, both attributed to the increase in scale and complexity of security and surveillance arrangements. The targeting of "soft-targets" has, in the past, contributed to subsequent "root and branch" responses to security where a broader number of spaces (from entertainment venues to transport systems) are considered vulnerable and in need of protection (Johnson 2006).

While video surveillance technologies and their articulations into wider surveillance assemblages have evolved, the applications of video monitoring at major events are still typically designed to control designated spaces through perimeter security, crowd control tactics, and to urban crime, and terrorism. And while video surveillance applications have persisted across time, it would be remiss to acknowledge that the 9/11 attacks didn't also contribute to this expansion in terms of scale. In what follows, I briefly cover instances of

[9] Fussey et al (2011) refer to "Operation Harvest", which was "the biggest policing operation ever to use CCTV technology" in response to public disorder at a Premier League title match in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne in 1996 (180). The investigation draw on 16-city centre CCTV cameras, which led to raids on 30 suspects' homes and 19 individual arrests.

public video surveillance and major Olympic events to demonstrate the centrality of these surveillance measures in specific Olympic events.

In Australia, the NSW police invested $34.7 million AUD on surveillance equipment for the Sydney 2000 Olympics (Toohey and Taylor 2012). This investment included infrared surveillance cameras, CCTVs, and increased lighting in the central business district. A central command centre was established to assemble operational information across a platform that included radio communication, CCTV, audio conferencing, and satellite GIS information (Tohey 2000). This network was a key material surveillance legacy of the Sydney 2000 Games.

Four years later, and the first Olympics after 9/11, the Athens 2004 Games featured an incredibly extensive video surveillance network. The total cost of the Athens security initiative was $1.5 billion USD (Coaffee and Fussey 2010). One-third of that figure was spent on electronic surveillance measures alone (Samatas 2007). The Athens surveillance system was extensive. SAIC, the security contractor for the Athens 2004 Games implemented a network of 29 subsystems into a C4I ('Command', 'Control', 'Communications', and 'Integration' programme). This programme was originally designed for military requirements and can integrate a vast network of CCTVs, digital applications and databases, across the entire metropolitan Athens area (Warren 2004; Samatas 2011). The surveillance system included over 1000 high-resolution and infrared cameras, 12 patrol boats, 4000 mobile vehicles, 9 helicopters, a surveillance blimp, and 4 mobile command centers (Samatas 2011: 62). The system also included audio-surveillance capabilities that transcribed voice-to-text and Internet surveillance records (Samatas 2011). The C4I system was not operational in time for the Athens Games, which forced the Greek authorities (including the mobilization of 70,000 soldiers) to revert to more traditional military and policing tactics. Despite the failure of the integrated C4I system, a large number of the CCTV cameras remained in operation after the Games. While it might seem that the most significant legacies of the Athens 2004 security initiative were the fall-out caused by a wire-tap scandal and a crushing 1.5 billion USD security tab for the Greek people, the legacy of CCTV cameras that was originally justified as part of an intelligence-led, preventive counter-terrorism

surveillance system ended up being redeployed for routine traffic monitoring and regulating political protest during the national economic crisis (Samatas 2007; 2011).

In 2001, the creation of the 'Beijing Safeguard Sphere' provided the groundwork for the Beijing 2008 Olympics with a citywide CCTV system. The system covered both public and private spaces and reportedly cost over $6 billion USD (Security Products 2007). A range of other major events across the country has contributed to the 'Safe Cities' program that established surveillance cameras in over 600 cities, in addition to Beijing's estimated 300,000 public CCTV cameras (Bradsher 2007). Guangzhou hosted a "2000-camera network in a single large neighbourhood, the first step towards a citywide network of 250,000 cameras to be installed before the Asian Games in 2010" (McMillan 2007; Samatas 2012: 3356). The relative recentness of these systems means that their technical interoperability is enhanced compared to discretely segment video surveillance operating systems. These newly deployed systems, it is argued, have been used for routine surveillance of Chinese citizens, which has prompted human rights concerns (Branigan 2011) to be expressed.

The London 2012 Olympic security initiative involved preparations that drew upon an existing extensive fortification of the urban environment (Fussey and Coaffee 2011). The long history of counter-terrorism and urban crime control surveillance strategies in London meant that the 2012 security programme was laminated onto an already mature security infrastructure. In conjunction with extensive Community Protection Through Environmental Design (CPTED) initiatives, which included fences and bollards to splinter the urban geography, the city of London's "Ring of Steel" was fortified with a broad selection of technological apparatuses, like Automated License Plate Recognition (ANPR), CCTV, and biometric-enhanced video surveillance, to secure the city. Among the range of supplementary surveillance initiatives for the London 2012 Olympics, public video surveillance was the bedrock of the system. Authorities relied heavily on "CCTV, security lighting systems and intruder detection systems to be [established,], integrated with, and [to] form part of, the perimeter security' undergirded the security initiative (ODA 2007 in Fussey and Coaffee 2011: 47). The Metropolitan Police monitored the

event in their Special Operations Room, which was built in 2007. The facility was reportedly built to enhance security operations at major events such as the Notting Hill Carnival, the London Marathon, and other major events including the 2012 Olympics (Fussey and Coaffee 2011: 47). Surveillance footage from the 32 boroughs within London was integrated into the Special Operations Room, which serves as a prime model for an expanding Olympic video surveillance network that is able to harness Olympic expenditures into an expanded technological and institutional apparatus.

### Technological Developments in Public Video Surveillance at Major Events

Since the 1970s, video surveillance at major events has grown both in terms of scale and technical capabilities – demonstrating that CCTV operations might be more adequately theorized as "Open Circuit" TV systems (OCTV). Video surveillance platforms are extensive, and they now integrate a range of technical capabilities that affect ongoing operational capacities and, therefore, feed into a range of applications and authorities' practices. Given the extensive array of video surveillance functionalities and as Fussey and Coaffee (2011) point out, enhanced interoperability in the area of public video, surveillance technologies embody a sort of "nodal security governance" (47), to augment organizationally-specific modes of digital governance. For instance, the integrated nature of the networks and the range of technologies involved (from GIS to video surveillance), operational command centers, and subjective conditions for regulating public safety concerns (counter-terrorism, crime, and deviant or otherwise suspicious behaviour) converge within institutional practices that direct the function and application of video surveillance within a broader technical assemblage. Video surveillance technologies, like the institutions that use them, have evolved significantly over time.

For example, since the 1976 Olympics, public video surveillance technology has evolved considerably as a tool for securing major events. As Fussey et al (2011: 182) point out, at Super Bowl XXXV in 2001, Facial Recognition CCTV (FRCCTV) was mounted at the entry of the stadium turnstiles to record an image of each spectator's face as the individual entered the stadium. The biometric features of all 100,000 attendees were

cross-referenced against an undisclosed database, which resulted in 19 individuals being flagged for further investigation (Los Angeles Times 2001).

Redeployable public video surveillance systems embody a second technological trend in public video surveillance at major events. Redeployable CCTV systems have seen an increase in application at major events due to their flexible deployment at 'pop-up' Olympic installations, compartmentalized urban areas in need of access control, and perimeter intrusion detection. These cameras are also justified on the grounds that they do not necessarily translate into permanent fixtures after the event has ended.

The industry logic behind redeployable camera surveillance is that such systems are more mobile than permanent fixtures, and therefore, can be flexibly deployed by law enforcement in select crime-affected or adjacent to protest areas. With regards to the latter, the New York Police Department (NYPD) deployed a 25-foot mobile 'Watch Tower' surveillance apparatus, with a 2-person observation booth equipped with darkened windows, flood lights, video cameras, a permanent closed-circuit television camera positioned near Zucotti park, the site of New York's Occupy Wall Street protests. The Watch Tower was also accompanied by a mobile surveillance vehicle with a camera affixed to a 20-foot boom (Gillham et al 2012: 86; Turse 2011).

Little information on redeployable surveillance cameras exists (Gill and Loveday 2003; Gill et al 2006; Waples and Gill 2006), but early studies found that the potential deterrence effects of redeployable camera surveillance posed little effect on deterring deviance. Indeed, only 2.6% of respondents reported that redeployable cameras would be more of a deterrent than fixed ones in the context of drug dealing (Gill and Loveday 2003). Subsequent studies also demonstrated that the originally stated benefit of redeployable cameras being able to flexibly target criminal hotspots was undermined by difficulties in the operational process. Implementation of redeployable systems is marred by recurring problems with staffing, technical knowledge and programming, finances, and communications infrastructure—thereby limiting the system's utility and effectiveness (Gill et al 2006). These operational challenges are further compounded by

the fact that redeployable cameras have been shown to "neither reduce crime nor increase feelings of safety" (Hier and Walby 2013: 3) and that project management of redeployable systems face a number of problems spanning planning, operations, and deployment. Redeployable cameras require greater amounts of ongoing intensive human labour and human resources, demand specialized attention with their programming, deployment, proper spatial articulations (stable power sources, access to buildings and poles), and necessary bureaucratic checks (such as privacy impact assessments upon deployment) involving a span of institutions makes them a burdensome enterprise.

Despite this mixed review, redeployable cameras have been the cornerstones of major event public safety video surveillance monitoring in Vancouver since 2002. Previous to the availability of state funding for Olympic surveillance video surveillance initiatives in 2009 however, private security vendors were contracted to perform public safety monitoring at major events (Hier and Walby 2013: 7). This investment was supplemented with a significant number of cameras that were used to monitor event venues. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics security program catalyzed a dramatic upswing in video surveillance capabilities. As Fussey et al (2011) highlight, Olympic security arrangements tend to layer over existing local histories – both in terms of institutional motivations and extant built security infrastructures. In this way, the lamination and intensification of video surveillance as a security mechanism in Vancouver necessitates a deeper understanding of the wider context of public video surveillance in the city.

In sum, over the past 30 years, dominant trends in public video surveillance at major events have been marked by persistent growth in video surveillance technologies, spanning an expansive array of strategic applications. Since the tragic attacks of Munich 1972, video surveillance has been applied, albeit has seen incrementally different applications from event to event. In Montreal 1976, video surveillance was deployed widely to prevent and deter any would-be attackers, but it was largely focused on perimeter intrusion detection. At subsequent Olympic Games, public video surveillance use was based on its justification as a mechanism for crowd monitoring, particularly after the bombing incident at the Atlanta 1996 Olympics. And further, after 9/11, riding a crest

of technological developments favouring enhanced interoperability, the Athens 2004 Olympics and Beijing 2008 Games were prime examples of how public video surveillance saw integration into broader command and control infrastructures and applications.

These examples demonstrate how public video surveillance has followed an incremental and increasingly standardized development across major events that favours technical interoperability into a broader surveillance assemblage. However, this trend does not mean that there is an inexorable march towards increasingly integrated urban surveillance systems. New technologies certainly indicate that interoperability is a default trajectory when it comes to digital surveillance practices. However, trends in public video surveillance towards temporary redeployable systems (particularly in the context of major events) points towards a varied trajectory. Redeployable cameras and private contracts mean that not all surveillance infrastructure is permanent. Public resistance to urban-based street-scape public video surveillance programs also limits the shape of deployments.

That being said, while video surveillance technologies can be temporary and redeployable, the reformulation of policies underpinning such programs are perhaps more significant. The material integration of digital video surveillance towards the ends of public safety (and away from crime control more strictly) as crowd control means that new policy metaphors are also introduced into the discourse of law and security authorities, city officials, as well as regulators. This is especially the case when justifications for major event public video surveillance are premised on public safety initiatives. And in particular when emergency response and disaster management become fused with traditional crime control justifications for public video surveillance. The result are novel legacies at the discursive level of policies and their related operational justifications. Also, domestic opinion means that public video surveillance projects can meet with serious civic opposition. This has, perhaps in part, conditioned the City of Vancouver to favour the use of temporary and redeployable video surveillance programs.

## Video Surveillance and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

Public video surveillance legacies from the 2010 Olympics are, in large part, conditioned by the history of contestations over video surveillance in the city of Vancouver. When the bid was awarded to the city of Vancouver in 2003, the historical politics of public video surveillance collided with a lucrative opportunity for new funding in public video surveillance, and the opportunity for authorities to leverage material infrastructure and new policy design. Public video surveillance legacies in Vancouver are the result of this historical dynamic.

### The Local Manifestation of Video Surveillance in Vancouver

The historical emergence of public video surveillance in Vancouver is marked by two main attempts to establish public video surveillance in the city. First, in 1996, the VPD lobbied for the establishment of cameras in the city's Downtown East side (DTES). The DTES is an area marked by intense poverty, where drug and alcohol addiction collide with low-level property crime and physical assaults. The VPD proposal attempted to establish 16 cameras in the area, however, public opposition sank the initiative. Second, in 2006, the VPD proposed video surveillance along the Granville Entertainment District (GED) in downtown Vancouver. The GED area has seen considerable decline and resurgence--notable because of the area's GED-branded commercial shopping centres, bars, and club venues. Once a site of upscale theatres, the area deteriorated in the 1970s and 1980s and, increasingly, its population was living in poverty, suffering from addictions, and part of a dynamic drug trade. In subsequent decades, city planners designated a stretch of Granville Street the "Theatre Row Entertainment District" and transformed it into an area marked by an increase of licensed liquor seats: from 1,175 before 1997 to an estimated 6,700 by 2007 (Vonn and Boyle 2011: 174-175; COV 2007: 3).

Unsurprisingly, the dense concentration in drinking establishments along the GED posed public order problems for police as larger numbers of people frequented the area. The night time festivities were littered with assaults, noise pollution, and property destruction,

triggering the 2006 to evaluate the contribution that could make to the area. The police issued report, put before the Vancouver Police Board (VPB), cited concerns over alcohol fuelled public disorder, the high number of police and emergency service calls in the area, and a history of 'civil unrest' associated with major events in the area. Vonn and Boyle (2011: 175) mention that the report specifically cites the 1994 Stanley Cup Riot and the 2002 Guns & Roses riot as instances where public video surveillance could have augmented crowd control capabilities. The report also mentioned the potential counter-terrorism applications for public video surveillance infrastructure, citing the upcoming 2010 Olympics specifically, where a proposed initiative could provide "heightened security around the Olympic domain" (VPB 2006: 3). Interestingly, however, while 'Phase One' of the video surveillance program was set to be operational in 2008, the initiative was shelved with no further action pursued by the VPD on the matter.

### Planning and Duration of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

The video surveillance programme for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics requires an understanding of different jurisdictional authorities in the security plan. Security plans for the Games hinged on a socio-spatial distinction between the "Olympic domain," which was under the jurisdiction of the Federal RCMP, and the "urban domain," which was under the jurisdiction of the police force of jurisdiction (often the VPD). The Olympic domain, which included event venues, reached nearly 200 sites, almost eight times the original planning estimate (Vonn and Boyle 2011: 175-176), where the urban domain consisted of all other areas beyond the venues, including live entertainment sites and other heavily crowded areas like the Robson/Granville district. Interestingly, however, according to the Vancouver Police Department's Public Safety Unit, it was only one week before the Games were to take place that these jurisdictional parameters were finally settled between the VPD and the RCMP.[10]

The material infrastructure of CCTV differed between the Olympic and urban domains during the Vancouver Games. The RCMP installed a total of 900 CCTV cameras in Olympic venues, security perimeters, and other Olympic sites. Under a signed

[10] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the RCMP and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Integrated Security Unit (ISU) agreed to have "guidelines in place for the collection, use, disclosure, retention, and disposal of video images, in compliance with the Privacy Act (OPC 2010). The 900 cameras under the auspices of the RCMP were removed after the event ended. According to an email response from RCMP media relations officer, the contract with security provider, Honeywell Canada, "was to supply and install temporary electronic security at the Olympic venues and remove it immediately following the Games. The CCTV cameras were technically "rented" and no cameras were left over after the Games [sic]. It was a service contract only for the installation, maintenance, and removal of equipment. This was not a contract to purchase equipment."[11]

The City of Vancouver also received enhancements to their public video surveillance infrastructure. In the lead up to the Games, the city received additional funding to support infrastructure upgrades including recording equipment, 84 city-operated cameras that were to be deployed in urban areas, some rooftop and some street-level, in Vancouver (such as outside of event venues, including two outdoor live sites in downtown Vancouver), as well as a mounted camera on a police helicopter.

### Vancouver's Public Safety Video Surveillance System

State funding initiatives, in the lead up to the Games, drove the emergence of Vancouver's public safety video surveillance program. A provincial initiative, designed to study the use of video surveillance in high-crime areas of the province, provided Vancouver with approximately half of a $1 million CDN dollar fund made available to competing municipalities through this program (BC 2008). A further $2 million CDN was delivered by Federal RCMP authorities to monitor sites in the urban domain. In early 2009, the following motion came before city council when Vancouver's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) recommended that council accept the combined $2.5 million CDN to attain "rapidly deployable temporary monitoring capabilities at large

[11] Email response from RCMP Media Relations Officer, November 28, 2012.

public events or in response to hazards, emergencies, and other unforeseen eventualities" (COV 2009). This refers to the acquisition of the city's redeployable public video surveillance system as well as their more permanent video surveillance fixtures. However, these funds also contributed to the development of a monitoring station in the city's earthquake resilient OEM building (Vonn and Boyle 2012: 178-179).

These funds contributed to the acquisition of 10 redeployable cameras with wireless transmitters and to the expansion of an 84-camera network across the downtown area. However, funds acquired from the Solicitor General of British Columbia in the lead up to the Olympics were not solely linked to the acquisition of new CCTV hardware and the procurement of a building for the Office of Emergency Management. A second, policy-related development was also catalyzed. One condition of the city's proposal to the Solicitor General of BC involved the city's pledge to refashion its redeployable public video surveillance policy.

It is important to understand ***policy*** development in the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics from two angles. First, as part of the proposal for funds, the City of Vancouver wanted to revise their 2005 Temporary Event Management and Public Safety TEMPS policy. Part of the Office of Emergency Management's (OEM) proposal to receive funding from the BC Solicitor General was that the TEMPS program would be in compliance with the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the standardized best practices guidelines provided by the BC OIPC, and the City of Vancouver's own policy on Video Monitoring Procedures for Open Public Spaces (Hier and Walby 2013; City of Vancouver 2005). The original 2005 TEMPS policy was rewritten to include a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), a condition of receiving the grant. The PIA stated that there would "be no recording or storage of images" during any video surveillance. As a result, officials insisted that Vancouver's TEMPS system posed no threat to privacy since "no personal information is being collected, used or disclosed" (Wipond 2012). This PIA, interestingly, was left unsigned by officials from senior city and BC governments.

The OEM considered that the TEMPS system would provide "situational awareness" in crowd and traffic management at special events and also facilitate emergency management procedures in the event of a natural disaster (Stevens 2012). Notably, city officials did not recognize this system as a mechanism for individualized or group surveillance in crime detection strategies – which is predominantly geared towards the governance rationale of "surveillance". By situating the system under a rationale and policy of situational awareness, the city inferred that provincial privacy protection did not apply to the use of their redeployable cameras for public safety viewing because the cameras were not being used for targeted surveillance. The OEM was able to claim that no particular concerns were associated with "surveillance" because the system was designed to enhance coordination with the public safety unit (crowd control) and emergency responders. Given this, the city insisted that personal data was not collected and stored, and therefore the programme was not actually used for surveillance or law enforcement reasons. At the time, the OIPC was unaware that the city was engaging in this policy.

The second policy angle followed a quite different track. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics entailed a separate video surveillance policy design altogether. The "Olympic policy" established clear guidelines for surveillance, the storage of images, and a protocol for sharing information with law enforcement that governed the use of video surveillance throughout the course of the event (Hier and Walby 2013). The Games policy was supplemented through a network of 84 cameras that were installed across the downtown area and which were integrated into the Emergency Communications Centre (E-Comm).

Importantly, however, the OEM also used the TEMPS to conduct recorded public video surveillance for the Games. The use of the TEMPS during the Olympics meant that the TEMPS monitoring policies and equipment were informally integrated with the Olympics policy and equipment (Hier and Walby 2013). Subsequent policy language was changed in ways that the integration of "situational awareness" and "surveillance" meant a disjuncture emerged between the first policy track (which upheld the discourse of situational awareness governing the use of the TEMPS), and the second policy track that

involved practices of surveillance in terms of its operational deployment. The key point here is that the full extent of surveillance and control emerges through a multiplicity of overlapping practices within the assemblage. It is only through identifying the process-based multiplicity of the assemblage are we able to fully grasp the symbiotic change between divergent elements within the same assemblage, with a fuller recognition of the ramifications for surveillance and control of the public video surveillance assemblage.

This merging, catalyzed by the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, meant that at subsequent major events an interesting legacy development occurred. First, the ten redeployable cameras and the 84 city-wide ones that were attained through funding prior to the event were retained. These cameras have been used at subsequent events, such as the Vancouver's Celebration of Lights and during the Stanley Cup Playoffs (one event that resulted in a major riot in the downtown area involving a litany of property destruction and arson incidents).

Further, while the Closed Circuit Television Systems Setup and Monitoring Policy authorized "short-term" installations of public video surveillance for particular events, many cameras remained in place for subsequent months. Cameras were left for intended use at subsequent major events. OEM Director at the time, Kevin Wallinger, stated that "During the [June Stanley Cup] final series, we actually installed the cameras," going on to say that, "We actually left some of the cameras up through the Canada Day celebration, and also the Celebration of Light fireworks at the end of July" (Wipond 2012).

Official city policy, calling for the removal of any temporary cameras, contradicted the claims of OEM Director Wallinger. City council "agreed to the *temporary* deployment and monitoring CCTV, the OEM will therefore ensure that all CCTV cameras are removed in the immediate post-Games period unless otherwise directed by council" (Office of Emergency Management, 2009). Interestingly, the cameras that remained included many cameras that were mounted at higher locations, up poles and on more

elevated locations of buildings. While these cameras were deactivated, they were reactivated during other major events in the city (Stevens 2012).

Two cameras that were mounted on buildings in downtown Vancouver prior to the Games were never removed. Two other cameras that were situated to provide high-aerial views were installed for the Celebration of Lights, along with another camera that was installed to monitor crowd behaviour during the NHL Stanley Cup playoffs were not removed. Four other cameras that were mounted in the city's library, along with mobile cameras on a police boat, remained embedded in the urban landscape, but they were not activated (Hier and Walby 2013: 12). An additional fourteen cameras were deployed for the NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs. Four cameras that remained from the Olympics, and another eight that are permanent city cameras (also a holdover from the Olympics) were focused on the art gallery (a popular location for political demonstrations) and the library. These cameras were also activated at subsequent major events (Hier and Walby 2013: 12).

The technical/material legacies of these cameras tell only a partial story of public video surveillance legacies in Vancouver. Monitoring at subsequent events provided opportunities for this policy to become entrenched. For example, after the 2011 Stanley Cup Riots, further modifications to Vancouver's video surveillance policy occurred in response to the fallout. Findings of the VPD report, the Stanley Cup Riot Review (VPD 2011), recommended strengthening situational awareness for emergency responders and law enforcement – but with one unique addition – an inclusion of a clause to protect the environment and property to the understanding of situational awareness. As Hier and Walby (2013) note, the OEM's Activation Plan declares:

> Any city department or external agency wishing to co-locate their command post with the EOC should request this from the City's…Emergency Management…The three EOC Operations Breakout Rooms are all available for this purpose. Benefits of co-locating include quick access to CCTV camera feeds as well as cable TV feeds and more efficient communications with other departments and external agencies, while maintaining focus for your department's operations in a separate room.

Camera use after the Stanley Cup riots was also to be conditioned on a precautionary risk assessment model that evaluated the propensity for rioting (Hier and Walby 2013: 10). The broadening of the organizational metaphor of situational awareness was one outcome in the path-dependency of this newly developed city policy, however, during the Olympics and other major events in the city, researchers documented several instances of "surveillance" by camera operators (Hier and Walby 2013). Recorded instances of surveillance are consistent with the merging of the Games policy on the governance of surveillance with the TEMPS policy on the governance of situational awareness. Hier and Walby's (2013) study of the Vancouver OEMs control room found that while the primary use of the cameras supported the city's claim to be using the video infrastructure for situational awareness purposes (locating a pathway for an ambulance, directing support staff to health emergencies, reporting injured persons), the cameras were also used to target several groups and individuals, identified as "gangbangers" in targeted surveillance (10).

The disjuncture between official policy positions that the cameras were to be used for "situational awareness" and the actual operational protocol that utilized the cameras for "surveillance" is illuminating as to how video surveillance legacies emerge, however troubling from a civil liberties perspective. Civic concerns are further compounded by the lack of an audit trail. The city's original 2005 CCTV policy insists that cameras are to be used as a last resort, in the event that "other measures could not address this problem" in order to "outweigh any privacy invasion". The policy goes further to insist that authorities must specify what information will be collected and under what legal authority (Wipond 2012). However, since 2005, no proposal governing privacy considerations has been documented, which is in part, attributable to the city's over-reliance on the policy metaphor of "situational awareness" that arguably falls outside of provincial privacy policy regulation.

The situational awareness rhetoric is legally circumspect because the capture of identifiable images is still covered under provincial privacy law. The Privacy Act states

that "privacy may be violated by eavesdropping or surveillance" (RSBC 1996 ch 373), and more broadly, a facial image is considered personal information under PIPEDA. Because city officials understand their usage of the cameras as being at heightened aerial locations, which to the city does not capture facial images, the cameras are understood to be used for situational awareness, instead of surveillance. However, the operations detail a different use because city officials are still implementing the video-surveillance guidelines, rendering a discrepancy between their interpretation and actual usage. More broadly speaking, however, a facial image is considered personal information under PIPEDA.[12] That being said, when these issues were brought to the OIPC and OEM's attention, the city hired expertise to conduct an internal audit of its operations. The OIPC are awaiting the results of this audit, and the city has also not altered its policy in this regard.

## Vancouver 2010 Olympic Legacies?

The trajectory of CCTV in Vancouver over the lifespan of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics reveals a disjuncture between policy design and actual operational practice. On the one hand, the TEMPS system (designed in 2005, and subsequently reconfigured in 2009 as part of an Olympics grant proposal) was predicated on the organizing metaphor of "situational awareness". On the other hand, a separate public video surveillance policy designed for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics was very much predicated on practices of "surveillance". When these two elements were integrated (since the TEMPS were erected and remained after the 2010 Olympics), situational awareness as a driving policy metaphor animated and legitimized public video surveillance discourse in the city. At the same time, however, the actual operation of the TEMPS system, and the 84 permanently fixed cameras established in the downtown core of Vancouver involved several instances of surveillance (Hier and Walby 2013). This disjuncture creates a sort of "policy shield", where public consumption of city policy is at odds with actual applications of public video surveillance technology. At subsequent major events in the city, this integration

[12] Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act S.C. 2000, c. 5 Assented to 2000-04-13 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/page-1.html

was entrenched as a policy feedback loop. The disjuncture between policy design and operational implementation now sit in a relationship where the policy design legitimizes the system to the ends of "situational awareness." The actual operational implementation of the project involves several instances of personal targeting, as well as the recording and storage of collected images.

Public video surveillance legacies from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics are three-fold. First, the material legacy of CCTV infrastructure is complicated. While all 900 of the RCMP's cameras that were deployed for the Perimeter Intrusion Detection at Olympic venues were removed after the event was over, the VPDs cameras, both the TEMPS system and the permanent fixtures comprised part of a public video surveillance legacy, remained. The 84 cameras that the city established, along with a refurbished OEM building, composed a permanent infrastructural Olympic legacy. The full extent of this material infrastructure is yet to be realized. The TEMPS system cameras, by contrast, were much fewer in number. They did, however, become a part of the city's precautionary risk assessment surveillance strategy in the coming events. A number of the redeployable cameras remained embedded in the urban landscape only to be activated during subsequent events.

Second, the reworking of best practices guidelines by city officials to publicly demonstrate the non-privacy-invasive nature of the TEMPS system (as a mechanism designed to improve emergency management responses) collided with operational policies set out specifically for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. The terms that were particular to the TEMPS system (situational awareness) were merged with operational surveillance policy that was designed specifically for the Games and was premised on routine surveillance, facial image capturing, storage, and law enforcement disclosure policies. Going forward, the TEMPS program was subsequently marked by a disjuncture between its policy claim to situational awareness, which remained at odds with its operational application of surveillance and potentially the law.

Third, the TEMPS policy as premised on situational awareness was redrawn after the Stanley Cup Riots. Situational awareness as a key policy metaphor in the city's emergency response tool kit was further developed by a risk assessment plan that determined a clear threshold for incorporating a range of authorities into future coordinated responses in the event of public disturbances (see Chapter 4). The policy metaphor of situational awareness was extended to include material infrastructure, chiefly the protection of property and the environment.

## Conclusion

In Vancouver, public video surveillance at major events follows standardizing principles common to other major events. For one, enhanced technological capabilities that favour increasing integration of public video surveillance with other technologies. In particular, the role of public video surveillance for public safety initiatives has been a central element of public video surveillance strategies in Vancouver. This role has lead to a reformulation of city policy (both publicly) as well as operations, which has consisted of a mix of emphases on improved situational awareness for emergency responders, but also targeted instances of surveillance. Public video surveillance at Vancouver 2010 diverges in some notable areas however. The Vancouver 2010 Olympic security initiatives, particularly with regards to new public video surveillance developments, were not nearly on the scale of previous Olympic Games, particularly Athens 2004, Beijing 2008, and London 2012. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics public video surveillance infrastructure can largely be considered a genuine "redeployable Games". All 900 venue cameras were redeployable (and subsequently removed after the event had ended), and a large portion of the city's own investments were into redeployable infrastructure – which arguably carries a check on the lasting negative impact on civil liberties.

Given these muted particularities, local politics are increasingly important for understanding the Vancouver public video surveillance case. A series of squashed initiatives by the VPD for public video surveillance programs meant that the public resisted such Olympic surveillance programs. Mounting public pressure against Olympics-related surveillance measures prompted the city to minimize its recording

practices, to make the use of cameras temporary, redeployable, or both and to develop a new policy framework that favoured situational awareness over surveillance. All of these 'concessions' were meant to uphold public consent and to uphold a more decentralized, friendlier, public face for surveillance. However, much of this posturing was largely symbolic because the actual operational uses of the program expressed several instances of targeted surveillance. The disjuncture (and fusion) of public safety uses with operational surveillance means that a veneer of public safety applications upholds justifications for a muted material legacy, but the veneer is a largely symbolic gesture to facilitate a video surveillance architecture by another name.

# Chapter Four: Legacies of Public-Order Policing

## Introduction

Public-order disturbances at major events are regular occurrences. Sustained transgressive protest in Western liberal democracies over the past fifteen years, as flashpoints of public controversy, has led authorities to recognize public-order policing as a policy issue in need of reform. Upswings in events like the Occupy Movement, street riots across during the Confederations Cup and in the lead up to Brazil's Olympic and World Cup events, have captured the media headlines and the political agendas of lawmakers. Police agencies and security planners often speak of adapting to this new public-order reality, which prompts policy reforms in actuarial risk management protocols of security provisions at major events. Sustained public-order pressures at major sporting events, political summits, and with the ever-looming threat of a sports-related riot, such as the Vancouver Stanley Cup Playoff riots in 2011, have made investments in crowd management and public-order strategies a strict requirement in the toolkit of security planners seeking to provide "total security" solutions at major sporting competitions, economic summits, and other similarly scaled gatherings events. Public-order policing is just one part of a total security paradigm, and is carried out at major events through a range of strategies and tactics (spanning intelligence gathering on targeted groups, undercover infiltration, mass arrests, and "street-level" spatial-control tactics in urban centers), across and through, a large number of organizations are integrated to varying degrees into public-order policing initiatives.

Such an influx of public-order disturbances at major events in Western cities makes them primary sites of analysis for developments in public-order policing. Research on public-order policing in Canada is scant (de Lint 2011; King and Waddington 2006; King 2006). The majority of this research is focused on public-order policing as it relates to labour relations (de Lint and Hall 2009) and policing of protest at transnational political summits (King and Waddington 2006). Missing from this research and subsequent analyses are public-order policing strategies in the context of major sporting events as well as during

sports-related riots. For those academic researchers who have focused on security and major events more specifically, many foreground security and surveillance infrastructures, such as intelligence and technologies (Monaghan and Walby 2012), to the detriment of the institutionalized trajectories of policing assemblages themselves. Much more remains to be written in academic literature about public-order policing structures and operational procedures, which will further raise the empirical and theoretical profile of major events as primary sites for the development of novel and transformational security and policing practices.

Public-order policing has evolved significantly since its early days of riot control during the civil rights era. Since the 1950s and 60s, the repertoire of policing tactics at major events, political demonstrations, and public gatherings has evolved from excessive use of force and mass arrests to a more nuanced approach that draws on integrated surveillance and information management techniques, spatial control tactics for regulating flows of people and objects in urban space, and other strategies such as movement infiltration. One of the major differences between the 1960s and now is a move from a 'reactive' riot squad approach, typical during the 1960s to the late 1990s, to a model of public-order policing that is premised on actuarial justice and the new penology. The latter approach relies heavily on intelligence-led policing through threat-based risk management strategies. Recent public-order policing models also employ tactics of movement suppression and preventive arrest to mitigate or neutralize perceived threats before they happen.

The following chapter charts a path on public-order policing at major events, and it considers the evolution of public-order policing at major sporting events during the lifecycle of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Global instabilities brought about through failed neoliberal policies and subsequent austerity packages have, in part, triggered an increase in social unrest. However, public-order police have considered this unrest as a "new period" of protest—one that demands refined strategies, tactics, and operations in controlling unruly and unpredictable populations. Like other approaches to policing and security associated with the new penology, public-order policing has moved from a

'reactive' instrument, to a 'proactive' policy instrument (Zedner 2009) that relies heavily on intelligence-led policing and increasingly militarized spatial-control tactics.

Major events, due to their global media profile and contentious politics, are flashpoints for public demonstrations, which has given rise to increased justifications for enhancing public-order strategies during the course of a specific event. The first section explores investments in public-order policing (training, equipment/technology, policy, organizational structures) at Olympic events prior to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics —to examine how public-order policing developments are catalyzed at major sporting events.

Section two examines the evolution of public-order policing within the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) over the lifecycle of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Public-order policing at the 2010 Olympics is a complex and varied operation involving a range of federal and municipal authorities across a broad spectrum of control. Changes catalyzed in public-order policing at the Vancouver Games point toward an emergent set of standards that the VPD, over the course of their Olympic planning, adopted and refined as their own internal policy towards crowd management. The Olympics presented an opportunity to collaborate in joint-intelligence operations with federal authorities, to form transnational partnerships with "industry leaders" through "best-practice" policy developments, foster inter-organizational training, acquire the latest in crowd management equipment/technology, and to generally hone strategic interdiction capabilities in the areas of public-order and crowd management. One year later, many of these opportunistic investments were placed under the microscope when the National Hockey League (NHL) Stanley Cup riots of 2011 occurred in the city. The subsequent fallout from these riots indicated the extent to which these new crowd control practices had been internalized within the VPD, but it also pointed towards a further round of lesson-drawing in crowd control strategies for major sporting events. The final section of this chapter evaluates how the Vancouver 2010 Olympics have (or have not) roughly mapped onto contemporary trends in public-order policing as outlined in section one. In chapter 7, the full implication of these changes are explored.

## Public-Order Policing and Major Events

Major sporting events are only one phenomenon in a series of flashpoints in public-order policy, which also involve political summits and more common political demonstrations. Global protest, marked by an increase in size and frequency, is challenging the public-order capabilities of national and city-based police operations. After the Seattle WTO protests and particularly after the global economic downturn of 2008, it was common to hear police reference how a change in the character of protest itself had prompted a "new period of public-order policing" (HMIC 2012). This new period of protest was marked by increases in "the numbers [of participants] involved, [their] spread across the country, associated sporadic violence, [the amount of] disruption caused, [as well as] short notice or no-notice events, and swift changes in protest tactics" (HMIC 2011). The police were convinced that they were moving into a new era of uncertainty, leading Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, to insist that "the game had changed" (BBC News 25 November 2010). Key outcomes from this "new period" are that public-order policing responses "have to be as adaptable as possible" (HMIC 2011: 3). The Vancouver Police Department insists that "riots in relation to major events, sporting and otherwise, have occurred with disturbing regularity in Western democracies" (VPD 2011: 98). Other major police forces in Western democracies around the world echo this sentiment, and they typically respond with a combination of negotiated management type strategies (via the use of permits and liaisons) and strategic incapacitation that relies on intelligence-led policing and surveillance, pre-event infiltration of activist groups, enhanced spatial control tactics, and mass-arrest during the event itself.

However, the range of consensual and coercive tactics that are deployed across these contexts vary. Police experience with the type of major event is conditioned by the politics of the spectacle itself. Major sporting events, by their nature, are global media spectacles that rely on brand sponsorship. Managing reputations through successful events is now seen as evidence of a city's stability, financial success, and global identity (Hall 2006; Xu 2006). Given that political summits and major sporting events are high-profile events, they often share comprehensive planning initiatives. At major events, the police have a difficult role to play. They must attempt to keep any potentially explosive

situation safe for athletes, spectators, and other people attending the event, but they also need to avoid aggravating, or even inciting, tensions. Coupled with this responsibility, are demands to balance police enforcement with nonaggressive tactics in such a way that the global spotlight on the Olympic event does not show any policing effort in a disreputable manner, which could damage both the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) and Olympic sponsors' brand reputations. Organizers and host police departments are on global display, and they are cognizant of the implications of communicating to the wider global audience that the host-nation is steeped in authoritarian tactics (Coaffee and Rogers 2008).

By contrast, major political summits have been associated with greater degrees of explicit 'shows of force' in the context of public-order policing (King and Waddington 2006: 95). What major political summits and major sports events share, at least in Canada, however, is an increased emphasis on policing operations that are premised upon intelligence-led strategies through risk analysis, negotiation/liaising with protest movements, infiltration of protest movements deemed to be uncooperative with police communications (where activists are elevated into a heightened zone of suspicion and, therefore, a propensity for violent disruption). Often, protestors planning on attending these events are placed under significant surveillance prior to the event and are subject to arrest before the event occurs. The events, themselves, are also similarly subject to intense real-time intelligence gathering from "evidence gathering teams" and plain-clothes provocateurs, even if they might differ in terms of overtly coercive and combative policing on the ground.

In sum, the dominant paradigm of public-order policing at major events is one of *strategic incapacitation* (Gillham 2011). After the Seattle fallout of 1999, and buoyed both by accelerated investments in domestic security and intelligence after 9/11 and by a transmunicipal approach to information sharing, strategic incapacitation quickly became the most widely used public-order strategy in cities across North America. The primary objective for public-order police under this strategy is premised upon actuarial justice (Zedner 2011: 3), or the 'new penology' (see Zedner). Since 9/11, a new penology, which shifts the governing logic of crime and security to attempting to neutralize threats to

public safety prior to their occurrence, has developed, and strategic incapacitation applies this dominant logic of security for large demonstrations. Given that this new era of preventive policing has coincided with the best-practices policy architecture that has been evolving from the perceived failures of the Seattle WTO protests, strategic incapacitation at major sports events utilizes a combination of tactics that are underpinned by a strategy of actuarial justice (Zedner 2011: 3), or the 'new penology' (see Zedner). Since 9/11, a new penology, which shifts the governing logic of crime and security to attempting to neutralize threats to public safety prior to their occurrence is the dominant trend in policing, and has been extended to public order policing practices as a set of novel characteristics. These characteristics include a tactic that requires advanced contact with authorites so that protestors can follow agreed upon rules for free speech and assembly (which, if subject to violation allows authorities to intervene), the use of non-lethal weaponry, the use of pre-emptive arrest powers, the use of infiltration and informants to gather intelligence in human and digital environments. And perhaps most significantly, are the ways that public order policing at major events across a broad range of law enforcement, intelligence, and national security bodies. This cooperation often spans across city officials, fire, ambulance, police, military, border patrol, and intelligence departments, whom are partnered with law enforcement in varying capacities. For instance, during major sporting events (those that have been declared as 'National Special Security Events' (NSSE)) in the US, extensive co-operation occurs between a range of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The fusion of internal and external security organizations has contributed to aggregate changes in intelligence-gathering techniques and threat categorizations (Monaghan and Walby 2012), and it has expanded the range of security and law enforcement agencies who hold information on activists and can act upon this intelligence within their own sphere of influence.

In Montreal, public-order policing planning was largely considered in relation to the public-order disturbances that happened during the earlier years of that decade. Six years earlier, during the "October crisis of 1970," the War Measures Act had been invoked to deal with a spuriously perceived "apprehended insurrection within the province of Quebec" (Berger 1982: 190-200 in King 1977: 55) by the Front de liberation de Quebec

(FLQ), which prompted the Canadian Armed Forces to occupy Montreal and Quebec (King 1997: 55). While this precedent certainly conditioned the national security and policing terrain in the lead up to the Montreal 1976 Olympics (particularly after the kidnapping and murder of Israeli officials in Munich 1972), the extent to which these conditions fed into the security response at the Montreal 1976 Games is unclear. Elsewhere in Canada, the Calgary Police Service (CPS) established a multi-agency 'Crisis Management Team' in 1988, before the Calgary Winter Olympics. This multi-agency unit was subsequently deployed to provide forward planning for public-order events in that city (King 1997). Edmonton Police adopted the same model shortly thereafter, demonstrating how the circulation of public-order policing best practices did carry knock-on effects during this period.

Public-order policing for the Millennium Games in Sydney was largely pursued through changes in constitutional measures. Wanting to prevent a bombing similar to that which had occurred four years earlier at the Atlanta 1996 Games, planners at the Sydney 2000 Games invoked changes in the lawful rights to assembly, which effectively suspended the basic right to freedom of assembly in the state capital (Toohey and Taylor 2012). Olympic-specific legislative changes meant that areas outside of Olympic venues (so called soft areas) were subject to increased police powers to regulate deviant behaviour. Police were better positioned to control public behaviour and protest, and importantly, portions of the new measures were left in place after the Olympics had ended (Public Interest Advocacy Centre 2000).

In the lead-up to the Sydney Olympics, the NSW Police Commissioner refused to authorize several political protests and intervened in others. For example, new constraints were placed on the route of the International Women's Day march (Lenskyj 2000). Concerns over public disorder at major events in Sydney was also exemplified through the introduction of the Homebush Bay Operations Act (HBOA) 1999 and the Homebush Bay Operations Regulation 1999. According to Toohey and Taylor (2012):

> The Act provided for the development, management, and regulation of designated land at Homebush Bay and other Olympic event sites. The Act and Regulation remained in operation until 31 March 2002, well beyond the 2000 Olympic event, when they were renamed with the Games' provisions remaining. The HBOA gave the OCA the right to appoint enforcement officers with powers exceeding those normally held by police. The enforcement officers could: use reasonable force to remove people, prevent the distribution of materials, ban people in areas under their control, search people and their possessions, and demand proof of identity (Head, 2000). Neither the Act nor the regulations issued under it specified any qualifications needed by these enforcement officers. (Taylor and Toohey 2012)

Such legislative changes indicate how security planning at major events is not restricted to counter-terrorism measures but can yield a distinct strategy to deal with protest through temporary (and sometimes permanent) changes in the laws that regulate potential civic unrest. While enhanced powers were afforded to police and other authorities during this period, critics pointed out that "there was relatively few instances where police, security, or other authorized officials abused the powers granted to them" (Lenskyj, 2002: 65).

In 2006, the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China established "The Beijing Special Weapons and Tactical Unit" (also known as the Beijing Special Police Force) and the Snow Leopard Commando Unit (SLCU) to deal with counter-terrorism and riot control incidents specifically for the 2008 Summer Olympics. The units were unveiled during a special public relations exercise that was designed to demonstrate the authority and expertise that the unit possessed in terrorism, security detail of delegates, and the maintenance of law and order and emergency response in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Xinhua 2005). With an estimated number of 970 officials, the unit operated under the control of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, and benefited from a 280 million (CNY) investment in military grade anti-riot vehicles[13], as well as lethal and "less-lethal" crowd control technologies (Lei 2006). The weapons that these units acquired were extensive and included: sub-machine guns, rifles, and pistols,

[13] A range of vehicles were acquired, including American produced GA-06 anti-riot APC, Hummer H2 and Ford assault vehicles, as well as Mercedes escort vehicles (Lei 2006).

with less-lethal weapons such as holographic weapon sights, battering rams, pepper spray, CornerShot (an Israeli developed rifle that allows the operator to see and attack a target without exposing the operator to counterattack), and protective ballistic shields. One of the more notable weapons included in their acquisition was the Super Talon, which uses compressed gas to deploy a 16-foot-diameter (4.9m) nylon net to incapacitate a target. SLCU operators have subsequently seen action overseas, with deployments alongside Chinese diplomats to foreign war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq (China News Agency 2008).

The United Kingdom is regarded as a global leader in public-order policing. After the London Riots of 2011, police were especially wary of similar public-order disturbances for the London 2012 Games. And while the UK is often recognized as the gold-standard of public-order policing, research on Olympic specific developments in public-order policing is fragmented and limited. However, pinpointing strategic resource allocation is one way of identifying the extent to which public-order operations were strengthened in the lead-up to the London Games.

The Metropolitan Police relied on their Public-order Operational Command Unit to provide public safety security responses for the London 2012 Olympics. The unit, otherwise known by its abbreviated form, CO11, is a central operations unit that provides support in public-order for major events (including Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs), a Dog support unit (DSU), contingency planning, and emergency management services). The unit also collaborates with the newly created National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU), which was created one year before the London 2012 Games. The NDEU provides intelligence on "domestic extremism and strategic public-order issues in the UK" (ACPO 2012) and exists as a hub to "provide a single and co-ordinated police response by providing tactical advice to the police service alongside information and guidance to industry and government" (ACPO 2012). In the lead-up to the London 2012 Olympics, its budget more than doubled, from £2.6m in 2006/05 to £5.7m in 2009/10 (Collins 2011). Part of these investments went toward the development of tools that would scan and capture publicly available social media information in an intelligence-

gathering technique called Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). The Guardian Newspaper reported that the NDEUs undercover operations used surveillance techniques involving, undercover police, paid informants, and intercepts. Through the course of this operation, almost 9,000 political campaigners, deemed "domestic extremists", were swept up. Many of these individuals in the NDEU database have no criminal record (Lewis, Evans and Dodd 2013). The purpose of these tactics for public-order policing are meant to pre-empt and disrupt perceived disorder and criminal behaviour by using software that can track, trace, and identify suspects through geo-location, facial recognition software, social network profiling, and other information collation techniques that work through meta-data traces (Wright 2013). It is expected that this intelligence unit played a significant role in the arrest of more than 100 people in "preventive" operations before the London Olympics, raising questions about the civil rights legitimacy of this public-order tactic and the unit itself (Sengupta 2012). Intelligence gathering techniques were also supplemented with intensified on-the-ground beat enforcement practices that were focused upon poverty stricken areas of East London prior to the Olympics. In the borough of Newham, the use of police powers to stop individuals without reasonable suspicion, under section 60 of the UK Criminal Code, increased by 2,450% from 2007-2010 (du Boulay 2012) indicating a direct allocation of strategic resources to an area that has been identified as a potential vulnerability in the lead up to the London 2012 Games (Fussey et al 2011).

These events demonstrate a changing terrain in public-order policing, but reflect broader trends associated with strategic incapacitation, which emphasize intelligence-led surveillance developments, non—or less-lethal weaponry, the use of preventive arrest, and control through the management of information. That being said, further research needs to be conducted into the precise developments, and subsequent legacies of, public-order policing for these major events, both in London 2012 and internationally. Academics researching security and surveillance in these event areas have not fully considered public order policing as part of the Olympic security paradigm, in spite of the heavy public order police presences in Athens after the Olympics and across Brazil in the

lead-up to the Olympics and World Cup (see Samatas 2004; Gaffney 2008; Fussey and Coaffee 2011).

## Public-Order Policing and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

Public-order policing at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics is a complex, intertwined affair that includes a broad range of organizations and policing tactics. Organizationally, regulating public-order disturbances entails extensive integration between national security and law enforcement authorities that span federal, provincial, and municipal organizations. Such networked arrangements are a standardized paradigm of public-order governance, and they draw upon the collaboration between policing, security, intelligence, military, and first responders (fire and ambulance) agencies (Bigo 2002; Deflem 2008; Dupont 2004). Tactically, a range of practices are deployed, some expressive of a 'softer' (but not necessarily less invasive) approach to public-order policing, such as the use of protest liaisons and covert intelligence gathering (de Lint and Hall 2009; Gillham and Noakes 2007), and span to flexibly deployed paramilitary squads who are dispatched to isolate and neutralize potential flashpoints within demonstrations.[14]

Public-order security preparations for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics involved the RCMP, the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), and the VPD, extending into emergency response, and even into private sector and civil society groups. The ISU, as the central organization responsible for major event planning in Canada, was the primary planning organization—responsible for both the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Toronto G8/G20 political summit security preparations. The Vancouver 2010 ISU operated under the RCMP's command structure and consisted of approximately 15,500 police from 120 police and law enforcement agencies across Canada. The ISU also collaborated with 4000 military and navy personnel, as well as with 5000 private security guards during the 2010 Olympics (Mercer 2009). International collaborations were also the responsibility of the ISU, and partnerships with the United States and NORAD were formed. However, the ISU was responsible for providing operational support in public-order policing only within jurisdictions that fell within the Olympic domain, which included Olympic venues

[14] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

and event sites. Local authorities, by contrast, held an arguably more significant role in public-order policing during the time of the event itself. The VPD operated as the police force of jurisdiction in the urban domain and was responsible for providing public-order policing in all areas that fell outside the Olympic venues, that is, citywide across Vancouver. Given the extent to which the majority of protest unfolded within urban spaces during major events, the public-order responsibilities for the VPD were equally, if not more significant, particularly with regard to the policing of protest during the event itself.

That being said, the VPD and ISU collaborated closely in many areas leading up to the event. Foremost among them in the context of public-order policing was in the area of security intelligence. Intelligence-led policing is also a major component to this networked public-order governance structure, used as a means to advance a *proactive* strategy towards major event public-order policing. Security intelligence refers to "a process that includes coercive or covert acquisition of data about security issues, events and responses" (Lippert and O'Connor 2006: 53) – and such surveillance is a key component to disrupt and detain persons who are perceived to be risks of terrorism or who are otherwise suspected to engage in property damage to critical or urban infrastructure.

The ISU sat atop the security-intelligence chain of command in the lead-up to the Olympics. Early stages of intelligence gathering were conducted under a newly conceived Joint-Intelligence Group (ISU-JIG), which was formed in 2005. The ISU-JIG was initiated by the RCMP and consisted of partners from municipal and provincial police forces, Canadian Forces, and CSIS. In 2007, the ISU-JIG issued a report that described its primary undertaking to "develop a comprehensive public-order portfolio to monitor and assess high risk groups, individuals, and potential threats to Olympic-related events" (ISU-JIG April 1 2007). The JIG continued as a central organization in collecting intelligence in conjunction with a newly formed CSIS agency called the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) (which subsequently changed their name to the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre in 2012). Intelligence operations for public-order policing

at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics were centralized under the JIG-ISU, and it communicated daily intelligence reports to public-order officers.[15] That being said, one-half of the JIG members comprised of Vancouver municipal police.[16] To this end, through a mix of federal and local officers, ITAC intelligence reports became "the uppermost authority for categorizing, framing and prioritizing national security" (Monaghan and Walby 2012: 140). And importantly, this categorization filtered down to the municipal level on a daily basis, leading to its implementation under potentially indiscriminate terms.

In an email written in October 2006, RCMP Director General of National Security, Al Nause, captured the vastness of the integrated nature of intelligence sharing initiated for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics through ITAC. According to this internal email:

> ITAC is comprised of several persons from different constituting agencies including the RCMP, CSIS, FAC, TC, Health Canada, CSC, and CBSA, etc… Each person, in our case the RCMP member on secondment, has access to their respective agency data banks; e.g., SPROS, SCIS etc… Because ITAC has the expertise and the access to a wealth of information interdepartmentally and abroad, the RCMP as well as many other departments rely on ITAC to provide strategic threat assessments.[17]

The ability of CSIS (through ITAC) to construct categorical frames and set their relative national security (and local policing matters) threat priorities is significant. Intelligence preparations for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics underwent a significant transformation in the lead-up to the Olympics. An analysis of the historical trajectory of how threat categories changed in the lead-up to the Olympics reveals how intelligence gathering and threat construction is an iterative process that is assembled through a broad range of participants, which is especially catalyzed during major event planning.

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[15] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[16] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[17] Email from Al Nause, dated 24 October 2006, outlines the powers of the ITAC to act as the central agency for intelligence distribution.

In 2006, early in the intelligence-gathering phase, ITAC established parameters around the scope of their intelligence gathering. Again, RCMP Director of National Security, Al Nause, stated that ITAC is 'responsible for preparing threats assessments for the government of Canada with respect to and *only* terrorism' (emphasis included) in Monaghan and Walby (2012: 140).

On the basis of these counter-terrorism efforts, early threat assessments centred on financial threats, terrorist attacks from Al-Qaeda, and public health dangers. However, as Monaghan and Walby (2012) demonstrate through a host of documents that were acquired from government sources, these threat categories were recoded based on intelligence that was gathered by local police authorities and which was fed upstream into federal intelligence and national security agencies. In the absence of any actionable intelligence on financial threats, public health scares, or threats from Al-Qaeda, the ITAC soon began to reframe threat categories to include groups whom they suspected of using direct action tactics against corporate sponsors of the Olympics. Thus a new threat category emerged in Canadian security history: "Multi-Issue Extremism" (MIE). A first in national security discourse in Canada, federal documents refer to MIEs as being 'non-hierarchical and amorphous in nature, and encourage members to form their own cells and carry out independent attacks' (ITAC 2008 in Monaghan and Walby 2012: 144)—resonating with the wider framing of protest threats after the Seattle 1999 WTO protests. Reports referring to MIE often mentioned threats to 'critical public infrastructure', specifically defined as disruptions of private property, importantly stressing those threats to corporate sponsors of the Olympic Games (Monaghan and Walby 2012: 144).

In 2009, an ITAC report identified corporate brands as needing protection from potential terrorist attack:

> Games symbols have already been targeted, such as the Olympic clock, Olympic flag, corporate sponsors like the Royal Bank of Canada and promotional events, for example, the recently concluded cross-Canada Olympic Spirit Train…in the form of protests, demonstrations, acts of vandalism, mischief, and threatening internet postings. Anti-Games actions have also included road, bridge and rail blockades, office occupations and arson. Calls have also been made for

> economic sabotage, mass convergence, airport, ferry, telecommunications and train disruptions, though these threats have not been acted upon (ITAC 2009 in Monaghan and Walby 2012: 145).

One of the key grievances with the emergent MIE threat category (and especially its spatial diffusion across a wide range of national security and law enforcement agencies) is blurring of a range of definitional parameters that muddies a clear understanding of "terror identities". As a result, participants in the global justice movement become swept up in the counter-terrorism strategies designed to assist the Global War on Terror (Monaghan and Walby 2012).

The category and language surrounding MIEs, which consistently blurs terrorism and extremism, is the first conflation. As a result, extremism as a definitional referent is expansive enough to include a broad range of groups that are perceived as being associated with civil disobedience and direct action tactics. Such groups include movement groups from eco, indigenous, and anarchist movements, some of them very high profile such as PETA and Greenpeace. However, a second conflation also occurs in which a broad number of social movement groups are lumped together through the aggregate threat matrix of MIE. Interestingly, as Monaghan and Walby (2012) point out, a total of zero groups who have been identified within the MIE category have "deliberately harmed or attacked a civilian populations" [sic] (144). Democratic protest and activism morph into a wider national security threat, placing activist groups on par with terrorist threats. And further, the category of MIE elevates the threat-level of activist groups', which prioritizes and legitimizes ongoing applications of extensive surveillance energies from a broad range of government agencies.

A further framing shift between threat categories during the intelligence-gathering phase of the Olympic public-order operation occurred in 2006 and 2007. Threat Assessment reports listed "emotionally disturbed persons" as a potential threat to the Olympic Games in 2006-2007. In 2008, "emotionally disturbed persons" was replaced with the more general "Persons of Interest", whom are subsequently defined as "individuals that make

direct or indirect threats against the Vancouver 2010 Games." These individuals are further described in the report:

> "Such persons may not pose a specific threat and are often merely disruptive; however, it will be important to continue to identify them and to assess their propensity for violence." (ITAC 2008 in Monaghan and Walby 2012: 146).

On the basis of ITAC intelligence, further surveillance and infiltration strategies were commonplace in the lead-up to the 2010 Games (Vancouver Sun 2009). Before the event, activists experienced routine visits from RCMP officers to their workplaces and homes, and they also noted several instances where they were being "followed" by plain-clothes officers. Between the 3 and 5 of June 2009 alone, approximately eight ISU officers visited approximately 15 anti-Olympics organizers (Monaghan and Walby 2012: 137). Infiltration (otherwise known as Human Intelligence) fulfills a few functions for RCMP. It serves as a deterrent for movement participation; put another way, it serves as the suppression of dissent (Boykoff 2007). It also facilitates information gathering that can be used in ongoing surveillance, criminalization of political opposition, and eventual preventive arrests.

Intelligence gathering through the JIG and ITAC in the lead-up to the event was an exemplary example of knowledge-power dynamics in strategic incapacitation *prior* to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. During the event, the VPD has less of a role in intelligence, and relied on daily reports from their ITAC counterparts. However, the VPD did have the major responsibility for spatial control of urban demonstrations. As the police force of jurisdiction in the urban domain, the VPD Public Safety Unit (PSU) was also set to undergo significant transformation in the lead-up to the Olympics.

## Tracing the Historical Evolution of the Vancouver Police Department's Public Safety Unit (PSU)

The Vancouver Police Department's (VPDs) Public Safety Unit (PSU) originated in the 1970s in an informal ad hoc manner. In response to a number of public-order incidents in

the 1970s, the VPD recognized the need for a standing crowd control unit and acquired equipment (helmets, batons, respirators and padding for arms and legs) and training resources for 300 officers. A particularly orderly next 15 years meant the VPD found little use for the equipment, making much of it obsolete and insufficient for use (VPD 2011: 23).

However, planning for the Clinton/Yeltsin political Summit in 1993 prompted the VPD to revive their ailing crowd control strategies. The VPD Crowd Control Unit (CCU) was formed as a new formal unit. Because the summit was a federal initiative, the VPD participated in joint-training exercises with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). During this time, however, the 40-member strong VPD CCU was operating without a formalized training manual.

Just one year later, in June of 1994, the city of Vancouver experienced widespread urban public disorder following the seventh game of the NHL Stanley Cup Finals. A crowd of 40,000 to 70,000 people vandalized and looted the downtown area following the Vancouver Canucks' dramatic loss to the New York Rangers. While the newly revived VPD CCU, with the assistance of the RCMP Tactical Troop unit, managed to disperse the crowd using tear gas, rubber bullets, and batons (COV 2011: 24), damages were extensive—the fallout included over 200 injuries, dozens of arrests, and approximately $1.1 million dollars in damages (Mann 2011).

The street riots during the 1994 Stanley Cup Playoffs were a flashpoint that catalyzed early shifts in the VPD crowd control policy. The 1994 Stanley Cup Riot can be understood as an early shaping in the ongoing reformulation of Vancouver's crowd control and emergency operations policies since it prompted three separate reviews. These reviews carried influence forward into the development of subsequent policy frames. Audits from the provincial government, the city of Vancouver, and an internal review from the VPD presented a range of policy feedback options. At the provincial level, the BC Police Commission provided 32 recommendations in the areas of "event planning, alcohol consumption, media, training, police response, communication between

first responders and police, and equipment issues" (COV 2011: 24). The provincial review prompted the City of Vancouver (COV) and the VPD to initiate a range of policy mechanisms, most notably the creation of E-Comm and Vancouver's first Emergency Operations Centre. Radio networks between first responders and police were also amalgamated; stricter policies around alcohol consumption in the downtown area were implemented; and the VPD CCU received yet further training in crowd management (COV 2011). At the municipal level, Vancouver City Council examined the primary drivers that fed the unruly crowd behaviour. In their bid to prevent similar recurrences, the city conducted background research on the causes of riots and, as part of this research, sought community input through a range of public forums (COV 2011: 25).

And finally, the VPD provided their own internal audit of police actions and conducted further investigations into the criminal acts associated with the riots. The VPD reformulated its operational strategies around large events, including officer deployment and the efficacy of a range of crowd control measures. The results of this evaluation were subsequently incorporated into the policy direction on public order and communication channels established by the VPD and E-Comm. Over the next several years, however, developments in training and planning were ongoing, resulting in only minor adjustments to the CCU (VPD 2011: 23). In 1995, the CCU leveraged the disorder of the 1994 Stanley Cup riots into the purchase of new equipment, but it wasn't until four years later that the CCU had it's first draft of a training manual (VPD 2011: 23-24), and it wasn't until another five years after that, in 2004, that the VPD had finalized and approved a CCU manual.

Even when the formalized CCU training manual was released in 2004, the size, structure, training policies, and equipment of the VPD CCU remained relatively static. Since the CCUs inception, operational tactics focused on large-scale public event operations and were drawn from the Royal Hong Kong Police and RCMP methodologies that saw the CCU held in reserve until a public order issue arose that demanded their attention. And when mobilized, CCU tactics focused on large yet static crowds that were "dominated by the use of lines and gas as methods of control" (VPD 2011: 24). With a 120-member

strong base, the CCU's strengths resided in its ability to operate as a reactive unit to regain order over unruly situations. The VPD felt it was seriously compromised in "more dynamic situations," where large crowds required a preventive approach to stem their spiralling out of control.

When Vancouver was awarded the Olympic bid in 2003, the VPD's approach to crowd control and public order was about to fall under the knife of recognized global leaders in public-order and crowd management—the UK Metropolitan Police. The UK Met crowd control policy was largely premised on developments from a review process that originated as a response to the 1981 Brixton riots. This new approach was to combine a 'softened' image in the spaces of entertainment and consumption with an agile urban tactical unit that could respond rapidly to any instance of public disorder, namely "sports related riots, urban warfare, and terrorist attacks" (VPD 2011: 24). These seemingly divergent, yet parallel tactical advancements speak to the contradictory development of soft "community-based" policing tactics with more overtly militarized tactics. And yet, while early changes the in VPDs public-order division were important for forging the shape of urban public safety governance in Vancouver, it was the significant resource capture and planning for the Olympics, coupled with a shifting normative frame in relation to large celebratory crowds versus potential troublemakers, that vastly transformed the future form of public safety governance in Vancouver.

**From Crowd Control to Crowd Management**

> *[The PSU] is the only unit that if you looked at it 10 years ago, and today, nothing is the same. It's a completely new unit and even the objectives, goals, strategies, are completely different…(but) it's still called the same name"*[18]

Faced with the complex logistical task of patrolling the vast expanses of urban environments and staggering numbers of attendees associated with the Olympics, the VPD prompted a major shift to crowd management. Preparations for the Olympics

[18] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

catalyzed a massive overhaul of the VPDs approach to public order— from training, organizational and command structure, technical equipment, as well as the acquisition of specialized expertise in the areas of "sports related riots, urban warfare, and terrorist attacks" (VPD 2011: 24). The extent of this new era was encapsulated in one senior member of the VPDs Public Safety Unit (PSU) insisting that the "Olympics were the new paradigm."[19]

Hosting the Olympics afforded the VPD special legitimacy and consent to invest heavily in their crowd management unit. While current dollar estimates of capital investment are unclear, high-ranking officials in the VPD PSU insisted that there was sufficient "influx of money to ensure that everything was taken care of, [including] better equipment, and more of it."[20] It is not an exaggeration to state that the Olympics catalyzed a wholesale reconfiguration of the city of Vancouver Police Department's public safety standards, operations, and capabilities. According to one officer, these acquisitions were not purely material, but even filtered "right down to the mindset of the individual [officers]"[21]

Three years after the Olympic bid was won, in 2006, the VPD pursued a reinvigorated mandate to refine their public safety operations. According to a high-ranking official in the VPD PSU,

> "The tactics that we were using during the Olympics were best-practice taken from the UK French and German models, so basically we took the best of everything, put it together, and formed our own." [22]

Seizing the rare opportunity to rebuild the crowd management force in Vancouver, the VPD hired "quite a few British Police officers…some of whom brought high-level crowd control skills" (PERF 2012: 7) in preparation for the 2010 Winter Olympics. According to the VPD, these officers "also had the contacts with trainers in Britain" (PERF 2012: 7).

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[19] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[20] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[21] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[22] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

As a result of these developments, the VPD began sending their Public Order Commanders to the UK and brought British trainers to Vancouver to assist with skills development in "a new style of crowd management (PERF 2012: 7). With their extensive crowd management expertise, the UK officers hastened the transformation of the CCU by immediately implementing increased deployments in the Granville Entertainment District (GED), Vancouver's main entertainment and shopping district. In addition to larger deployments of public order officers, the VPD initiated a shift in their public engagement strategy with intoxicated crowds.

In January 2007, the VPD CCU created a full-time coordinator who was tasked with examining and expanding the existing CCU mandate and to ensure that the early ideational changes that had been imported from the UK were being implemented accurately (VPD 2011: 23). Subsequently, several UK officials were appointed to influential roles, among them the VPD CCU head position, which translated into an official adoption of the UK National Model for crowd management. Under the guidance of officers hired from the UK, the unit was completely restructured and new equipment and new tactics (such as the "meet and greet" tactic which had seen previous use) were formalized. These changes spanned organizational structure, tactics and strategy, equipment acquisition, and even specified individual training and recruitment around these changes.

In March 2007, the VPD officially moved to the UK national model (in terms of chain-of-command) for their public-order unit. While the VPD had used crowd control tactics from the UK for some time, the most significant change, and perhaps largest transformation of the VPD CCU, was this new organizational change. The new organizational model, premised on the UK model, involved a three-tiered command structure referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze, (VPD 2011: 26). The command structure that was specifically implemented for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics was developed in the UK through a review process that was a response to the Brixton riots. The three tiers refer to strategic (Gold), tactical (Silver), and operational (Bronze) levels of control. Gold Command is usually a high-ranking official such as a superintendent or deputy chief who

is brought in at major special events and serves as the main strategic decision maker at a remote location. Silver Command decides on tactical deployment at the event itself, operating as the conduit between strategic decisions made at the Gold level and front line officers. Silver Command also relays intelligence to Gold Command from on the ground. Finally, Bronze Command makes up the operational front line officers who carry out the tactical plans decided upon by Silver.

The new command structure was supplemented with a new change in operational tactics—primarily with a new "meet and greet" strategy. The meet and greet approach, which is drawn from the UK's method of dealing with crowds, prompts front line officers to "smile, engage with the community, be positive and welcoming, have early interaction with crowds and line-ups, and interact with the public with these principles in mind" (VPD 2011: 24). The meet and greet strategy is intended to 'soften' the image of urban public disorder policing in entertainment and spaces of consumption. This strategy is aware of the psychological impacts of "using riot officers in Darth Vader outfits" (PERF 2012: 07) and, instead, seeks to engage crowds to create "a psychological bonding with the crowd that pays real dividends", adding that "its very difficult to fight the police if you've just been friendly with some individual officers" (PERF 2012: 07). Officers in "soft gear" (PERF 2012: 08) are told to maintain a high level of visibility, to become "part of the celebration" (PERF 2012: 8). This strategy paid off "as a force multiplier for police" (PERF 2012: 10). As a barometric measure, the VPD did not have any lawsuits brought against them after the Games.

**Establishment of the POG and the Acquisition of Technologies**

As part of the VPDs approach to public safety at major events, the force established the Emergency & Operational Planning Section (EOPS) to harness cross-organizational resources for complex public safety operations. The same influx of money that allowed the VPD to acquire new equipment, also facilitated organizational reformation. In the lead-up to the Olympics, according to the head of the VPDs Public Order Group:

"there was an influx of money to ensure that everything was taken care of…so they had better training leading up to the Olympics, we had better equipment available that led up to the Olympics, manpower issues: everyone wanted to be involved so they recruited and got the full PSU available.[23]

Based on this funding, the VPD established new units and acquired new technologies in the lead-up to the Olympics. As for units, the VPD established three units in the EOPS: "the Emergency Planning Unit, which is responsible for planning responses to major disasters and other civil emergencies; the Operational Planning Unit, which is responsible for planning for major public events (such as concerts, sporting events, VIP visits); and the PSU, which is responsible for crowd management" (VPD 2011: 32). During training sessions for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the VPD recognized the demand for a distinct crowd management unit, and formed a new Public Order Group (POG). The selection of expertise that was built into the POG comprised the "Mounted Squad, the PSU, the Dog Squad, a Bicycle Team, a Search and Canvass Team, a Device Extraction Team and Negotiators, and also a Tactical Support Unit which was the armed unit of the PSU,"…and are responsible for "chemical munitions, beanbag shotguns, 40mm launchers for less-lethal support as well as VPD issued pistols and Colt C8A2 rifles for lethal support" (VPD 2011: 33).

For the first time, during the Olympics, the PSU was a "24/7 unit". The unit was used as a "quick response team, which was a development within the unit" (Anonymous Interviewee 3 2012). When the PSU first started, it was a reactive crowd control unit, but improved Olympic training catalyzed the unit into "a squad where we can send them out to accomplish a certain task – or respond to a certain scenario with 7 or 8 members and that's what they ended up doing for the most part" (Anonymous Interviewee 3 2012). According to the VPD, "we could never do that before…now it is much more fluid, and the Olympics were the catalyst" (Anonymous Interviewee 3 2012). Emphasis on the role of the Olympics as a catalyst were identified further by the VPD PSU leader, who said, "it forced change" (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2012). The officer went on, "The Olympics was the beginning, we formed relationships, we had understandings, we knew

[23] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

how each other worked…" (Anonymous Interviewee 2 2012). A second officer interjected, "The Olympics were the new paradigm…there was a whole paradigm shift that occurred, now that we're working with the RCMP and even training with them now" (Anonymous Interviewee 1, 2012).

In terms of intelligence, the VPD had established ITAC intelligence streams already in place from the Olympics that they now rely on regularly (Purdy 2012). The VPD has recruited officers from an intelligence background to join its public-order group and these officials bring "those connections with him" (Purdy 2012). According to the VPD, "when it comes to event planning we can feed intelligence into it, those relationships are already established…and we are going back to 2007, 2006, with ITAC and CSIS. During the Olympics, the VPD had almost half of its intelligence members seconded to the JIG (Purdy 2012). While the VPD was already conducting online surveillance, the department enhanced its ability to monitor social media in the lead up to the Olympics. The value of this new surveillance proved itself during two separate property destruction investigations, (both involving the spray-painting of the Olympic clock), "came to successful conclusions as a result of social media" (Purdy 2012).

As mentioned, the VPD PSU also involves an "evidence-gathering team", which according to the VDP, makes sure that the police will have sufficient documentation when arrests are made (PERF 2011: 8). However, the team can also gather intelligence on targeted suspects, which invites a further "chilling" implication on free speech. During the Games, officers used a video camera that was mounted on a pole to capture as much data of the protest as possible (PERF 2012: 8). With regard to the bureaucratic investigatory functions of the PSU, the VPD also assigned detectives to the PSU to coordinate evidence and ensure the quality of administrative and investigative reports to ensure that any arrests were accompanied with documentation that would stand during trial, an unprecedented move for the force.

The use of less-lethal weaponry is also an important tactical development in the trend toward strategic incapacitation. These weapons, however, raise serious questions about

governance through legitimacy and consensus, because the public also looks toward the police to reaffirm the moral order when that consensus appears to be under threat (Jackson and Bradford 2009).

Complicating the predicament surrounding the moral legitimacy to use weapons, the "non-lethality" of non-lethal weapons has been seriously questioned (Anais 2011). During the aforementioned 1994 Stanley Cup riot, the Vancouver ERT used baton rounds and the ARWEN 37 (Anti-Riot Weapon Enfield) gun, which resulted in serious injury. A subsequent BC Police Commission investigation (1994) found that the use of the weapons should be curtailed (66-67). A separate VPD Review (1995) into the same Stanley Cup riots decided against the use of dog arrest teams in public-order situations due to "the affect on the dog and the negative public perception" (VPD 1995: 90). In the lead-up to the Olympics, however, the newly formed PSU retained ARWEN guns and plastic bullets, and kept dog arrest teams (VPD 2011). The VPD also doubled the size of their mounted squad for the Olympics and increased the number of people who could provide motorcycle escorts to VIPs.

**During the 2010 Games**

During the Olympics, two major public-order issues emerged in the urban domain. The first was a march of approximately 3000 protestors through the City of Vancouver that was set to coalesce adjacent to the Olympic Opening Ceremony. The march was tolerated by police, the VPD PSU guided it throughout the city. When the march arrived to the location of the Olympic Ceremony, the venue, a designated hard zone, was heavily cordoned off with perimeter fencing and hundreds of crowd control officers. Intelligence teams were positioned to provide video surveillance of the demonstrators and officers were stationed atop nearby buildings. After the protestors arrived at the security perimeter outside of the opening ceremony, tensions appeared to be mounting when small projectiles were lobbed towards the police. However tensions began to taper off as a cold winter Vancouver rain began to take hold. Protesters slowly filtered away into the night without any incident, and the VPD hailed its performance as a resounding success (PERF 2012: 8).

The second protest was decidedly different, being the target of more specialized spatial control and mobility tactics from the PSU. The march, dubbed "2010 Heart Attack", consisted of between 300 and 500 protestors who wanted to disrupt "business as usual" on the opening day of the 2010 Games by blocking the only route to the mountainous Whistler region (Harris 2010). As the protestors began to march through the city at 9 am, plain-clothes officers who had infiltrated the march accompanied the demonstrators while other officers collected real-time video surveillance of the protestors. As the march progressed from the east end to the downtown core, protestors turned over mailboxes and newspaper boxes and pulled them into the streets in attempts to block traffic. Windows at the Hudson's Bay Company, a company with a long history of colonial enterprise in Canada and also one of the major sponsors of the Games, were broken. A second window at the Toronto Dominion Bank was also broken, which triggered an intensified police presence—officers with full riot shells, some armed with ARWEN weapons appearing from vans that were waiting nearby. As protestors made their way to their intended choke-point, hundreds of officers were already waiting in the area, easily blocking protestors' attempts to section off traffic to Whistler. The protestors took an unexpected turn back into a commercial district, and small groups of seven to ten riot police effectively "splintered" the march, performing smaller practices of "kettling". As the smaller groups continued to break away from the main march, police pursued, apprehended, and placed a number of individuals in awaiting vans. Police surrounded a larger group (including an alarmingly funky brass band) in a west end commercial street where plain-clothes provocateurs stood amongst protest onlookers who were chanting "Let them go!" After approximately one half hour, the police allowed the group to leave. Following orders from their Silver Command, the squad "fell in" with a military march back to its position. The PSU was organized and efficient in its strategy to quell the march instantly. The tactical precision of the unit was frighteningly impressive. A total of 13 arrests were reported, with charges resulting only in a few of those instances (Mackin 2011).

In the more commercial areas of the Olympic Games, the police held to a separate public-order tactic. In these areas, police had to deal with throngs of crowds on a day-to-day basis. These day-to-day affairs were the largest test of the newly designed meet and greet strategy. Much of the work focused on providing emergency contact points for celebrants providing a friendly image of public safety of the city during the event. However, one major public-order challenge appeared when Team Canada faced the United States in the Gold Medal Hockey Game. Crowds of approximately 150,000 people swelled into the downtown areas of the city. Throughout the nearly 13 hours that it took the crowd to dissipate (VPD 2011: 26), the VPD pressed heavily with their meet and greet strategy, in essence, attempting to become part of the celebration itself. In the end, the VPD were contented that its strategy was "highly effective" (VPD 2011: 26).

As part of a broadly coordinated major event operations initiative that involved city officials, local police, the ISU, commercial business, as well as other government authorities, the police attempted to mitigate the risks associated with a highly intoxicated, very large crowd. The VPD, with support from the city of Vancouver, lobbied the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch (LCLB) of British Columbia to close both public and private liquor outlets at 1600 hours on the day of the Gold Medal game (VPD 2011: 46). The unprecedented move was hailed as a success, as no serious incidents occurred while a jubilant crowd celebrated into the night.

The Victoria Police Department (VicPD) also began to adopt tactics set out by the VPD. Long before the Olympics event itself, in 2009, the VPD provided training for VicPD officers who were tasked with their own major event since they were hosting the Olympic Torch Relay in their capital city. The VPD sent its mounted squad and bicycle squad to Victoria to play an active policing role in another jurisdiction.[24] According to the VPD, "these experiences solidified the VPD as a leader in crowd management" (VPD 26: 2011).

[24] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

Challenges remained, however. During the Olympics, the VPD and RCMP had considerable disagreement over operations, chain of command issues, and jurisdictional matters. Put simply, the two forces could not agree on where to decide policing lines. According to one high-ranking VDP PSU officer, "it was monumental" once these spatial coordinates were decided upon. Astonishingly, however, this only occurred "about a week before the Games had started."[25] It took several public-order training exercises to clarify these jurisdictional responsibilities – and only when the RCMP Commander finally agreed to the VPD's role as police force of jurisdiction in all areas outside of venue fence lines did "the games [run] near perfectly."[26] According to the VPD, the training exercises forced these jurisdictional questions to be resolved.

However, many of these tactics were again put to the test only one year later when the Vancouver Canucks made a deep run into the NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs, ending in a catastrophic riot that shook the city. In what follows, I detail how public-order security planning was (or wasn't) inculcated in the next major test of the VPDs public-order initiatives stemming from the 2010 Games.

**After the Games (Stanley Cup Riots)**

During the planning phase of the 2011 Stanley Cup Playoff policing operation, several regional meetings were held. These meetings involved consultation on a contingency planning process across a myriad of agencies, including the BC Liquor Control and Licensing Board (LCLB), British Columbia Ambulance Services (BCAS), Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services (VFRS), E-Comm (which is a dispatch information hub for the region's first responders), Transit Police, the Lower Mainland Tactical Troop, the Abbotsford Police Department, Richmond RCMP, New Westminster Police Service, Surrey RCMP, North Vancouver RCMP, Burnaby RCMP, RCMP Regional Duty Officer, RCMP Island Tactical Troop, Delta Police Department, and the West Vancouver Police Department.

[25] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[26] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

However, on June 15, 2011, the VPDs Olympic-related developments to the PSU were put to the test when the Vancouver Canucks National Hockey League team contested the final game of the Stanley Cup Finals against the Boston Bruins. The city of Vancouver was gripped by unprecedented fan interest in the local team, to an extent that surpassed any previous sporting event finals in the city. A major component of these Stanley Cup celebrations was the city's decision, prompted through Canada's national public broadcasting station, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), to establish "fan zones" that would feature "Live Sites" where spectators could view the games on large screens in the downtown areas. These live areas had been used during the Olympics and there had been no serious challenges by police in managing these sites. The VPD policed 24 playoff games without serious incident. However, in the final game of the Stanley Cup playoffs, 55,000 people gathered to view the game in the Live Site, while another approximately 100,000 crowded the Granville Entertainment District (GED) adjacent to the Live Site. According to the VPD, crowds were larger, more intoxicated, and more belligerent than what was to be expected given previous games and, especially, in relation to the Olympics. According to the VPD, this was likely because of significant differences "in crowd make up, alcohol consumption levels, and the type of event the sites were supporting" (VPD 2011: 47). [27]

As the game drew to a close, it became obvious that the Vancouver Canucks were going to lose the championship game. The crowd became unruly, people threw bottles at the video screen, fights started, and at least one car was overturned and set on fire. A second flashpoint started in a nearby area where police officials "were assaulted by rioters" and where "significant property damage loss occurred" (VPD 2012: 4). According to the VPD, these two distinct flashpoints in the urban theatre made it difficult for the VPD to allocate resources efficiently (VPD 2012: 4). Police cited the encouraging effect that "cheerleaders", who were using hand-held cameras and social media platforms to record and dramatize the unruliness (VDP 2012: 7). However, with broad assistance from

[27] Total costs for managing the event are estimated at $1,241,182 (VPD 2011: 44).

partnering agencies in Metro Vancouver, the riot was quelled in approximately three hours without death or serious injury to either police or public (VPD 2012: 4).

Tactically speaking, the VPD initially tried to rely on their Olympic "award-winning tactic", the meet and greet strategy, but officers seemed unprepared when the situation deteriorated. Eventually however, the VPD deployed fully equipped Public Order and Tactical Troop officers with pepper pray, tear gas, and ARWEN rounds to deal with the situation (VPD 2011: 5). A further preventive public-order tactic that had been developed for the Olympics was reused—liquor interdiction. In game six of the NHL Playoffs, the VPD drew on relations that were established during the Olympics and again solicited the support of the BC LCBL to close all liquor outlets early in the day of the Game. This strategy was deemed a success for the second-last game of the finals, however, it had much less success during the final game. According to the VDP, by this time, "the cat was out of the bag."[28] Crowd goers had anticipated the tactic and had increased their alcohol consumption levels prior to the game, stockpiled alcohol from outlying areas, or resorted to drinking to the hard liquor that was available in their homes.

**Revisiting Public-Order Policing in Vancouver after the 2010 Games**

The VPD again looked to best practices and tactics after the riot the VPD identified several areas of success as well as other areas in need of substantial improvement (Anonymous Interviewee 2012). While policy learning is not necessarily a legacy, identifying areas that need to be reintegrated into overall public-order strategies are amongst the first stages of policy mobilities and mutations (McCann and Ward 2012). Areas identified as successes in enhancing public safety include CCTV[29], the use of the public-order group's UK-imported Gold Command structure which was a change made in the lead-up to the Olympics, as well as the use of less—or non-lethal weapons as an effective means for dispersing crowds (VPD 2011: 9). Areas identified as shortcomings in enhancing public safety include having large-scale events that concentrate large

[28] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

[29] VPD officers stated that "[CCTV] experience with the riot substantiates the validity of its use" (VPD 2011: 9).

numbers of the "young hooligan demographic" into small areas. That being said, VPD shortcomings in the areas of Live Sites could arguably be attributed to an absence of planning and lack of experience in securing such zones during the Olympics. During the 2010 Games, the RCMP had control over the Olympic domain, which included all of the fan zones and Live Sites, meaning that the VPD lacked an established coordinated response when it came to these areas. Further, the VPD identified the need for stronger liquor interdiction capabilities, which could include "airport style screening for certain events" and "increased use of fines" to reduce instances of illicit liquor possession (VPD 2011: 9), for future events. Officials also recommended that transit officials be more effectively incorporated into a broader public-order approach, so in instances of overcrowding in urban area, the trains can be slowed down (VPD 2011: 9). Additionally, the VPD requested more training so it could continue to work on large regional events with authorities in the Metro Vancouver area and surrounding jurisdictions to clarify "roles, responsibilities, authorities, and planning" (VPD 2011: 9, 9, 86). That being said, the Olympics were identified as a key area where new training partnerships were forged with other agencies. According to one officer from the VPD, it's only because of the Olympics and the Stanley Cup run that enhanced training and information sharing emerged (Anonymous Interviewee 2011). And finally, overall, improvement in equipment (both in quality and quantity) were also suggested. In fact, equipment was commonly identified as a problem (VPD 2011: 88). Many public safety officers at the Stanley Cup game noted that they did not have enough crowd management training, were unsure how to coordinate with other agencies, and didn't have enough equipment, or alternatively, were unable to access equipment due to the disturbances (87).

It is important to understand that policy learning is not the same as legacies. Lessons learned do not infer that identifying problems and points for further improvement will be subsequently implemented and thereby manifest as a legacy. They do indicate the process through which areas of failure become identified, and therefore brought into the frame of authorites, facilitating future policy responses.

## Conclusion

Police and protest tactics at major international events are transnational in scope. The widespread use of central strategic incapacitation tactics like intelligence-led policing to accommodate preventive arrests, control of physical urban space, and the use of less-lethal weapons at mass transnational political protests between 1999 and 2003 has been documented by della Porta and Tarrow (2012) (see also della Porta and Reiter 2006). Given the extent to which "best-practices" in public-order policing are shared between political protest and major sporting events, strategic incapacitation strategies are also present at Olympic and other major events. At the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, strategic incapacitation tactics entailed a blend of negotiated management and strategic incapacitation.

The VPD Olympic policing operation reflects many of the dominant trends identified in strategic incapacitation public-order policing. Over the lifecycle of the Olympics, the VPD engaged in a wholesale regeneration of its public-order policing strategies and reflected a broader trend in how major sporting events catalyze broad changes in the areas of public-order policing more generally. The VDP saw the 2010 Olympics as an opportunity to move from its self-described "archaic" model of public-order policing to a more modern and *proactive* public-order policing approach that used "squads and sections".[30]

The public-order policing developments during the Olympics also intensified collaborative partnerships with a broad range of federal, provincial, regional, and municipalities, and other authorities, such as the BCLC, within the Metro Vancouver jurisdiction. Stemming from these relationships are ongoing inter-institutional legacies where "better working relationships" were formed through greater cooperative involvement moving forward. Olympic public-order operations allowed municipal police to more carefully understand the operations of Federal authorities such as the CBSA and CSIS, to "understand their capabilities, their focus, and are now able to utilize – get what we need from them and what they need from us" (Anonymous Interviewee 1 2012).

[30] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

Intelligence-specific legacies are important to the extent that threat constructions over the course of the Olympic event were also newly emergent and iteratively revised, leaving a lasting impact in Canada as a whole. One of the key intelligence legacies of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics is the creation of the threat category, Multi-Issue Extremism (MIE), which blurs national security and counter-terrorism operations with law enforcement concerns surrounding domestic political protest. The blurring of threat categories over the lifecycle of the Olympics is compounded by the fact that this imprecise information is circulated through an increasingly integrated communication infrastructure across a range of authorities.

On the basis of all of these changes, the VPD PSU deeply integrated into a national and transnational network of security professionals who share "best-practices" strategies and tactics in public-order policing. In the lead up to the Olympics, the VPD borrowed heavily from the UK model of public-order policing, showcasing the extent to which public-order policing strategies are increasingly globalized through "security knowledge networks" (Boyle 2011). After hosting the Games, the VPD has recognized a shift in information sharing across policing and security institutions, which also unfolded in Canada as well. Much of this shift was spurred along by extensive integration across agencies, where according to one officer, "nationally there is more openness about people willing to share because of the Olympics. Everyone who sent someone to the Olympics saw what was going on and realized 'we could probably do something different'" (Anonymous Interviewee 2012).

Again, referring to how these partnerships continued to unfold after the 2010 Olympics, one officer remarks on how the relationship between the RCMP and the VPD has continued:

"And now, what happened, is that we went to the Stanley Cup last year, the RCMP would have been involved, that that had come out of the Olympics, again being the catalyst. And out of the Stanley Cup run, I wouldn't say in bed, but we train together now, we discuss more things together, they keep contacting us…about wanting to be involved in more major events…but the relationship has definitely increased and it has become better" (Anonymous Interviwee 2, June 6, 2012).

When asked about the regional meetings that were held to develop contingency planning for the NHL Stanley Cup Playoffs in 2011, one respondent said:

> That group wouldn't have come together in that fashion if it weren't for the Olympics. A second officer interjects, "it forced relationships"…the first officer resumes, "exactly, and those relationships continue, and that is an excellent legacy of the Olympics" (Anonymous Interviwee 2, June 6, 2012).

The relative durability of these organizational relations in public order security governance in Vancouver is evident, and owed in large part, to catalysts that emerged from the Olympics. The were not only located in the urban domain of Vancouver, which involved law enforcement with other regional agencies. They also jumped scale, in some cases, changing the Federal content and structure of intelligence gathering in the country. Even today, the VPD insists that it is "always searching out best-practices and developing new improvements" (Anonymous Interviewee 1 2012) and is reaching out to other cities that are dealing with their own public-order disturbances. The VPD regularly sends its officers to riot-stricken areas (such as the recent student protests in Montreal, as well as the G20 in Toronto) "who were…observers looking at best-practices" (Anonymous Interviewee 1 2012).

The legacies of public order policing from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, however, are extensive – and can be summarized as follows. In the areas of intelligence—a burgeoning component of the best-practice of strategic incapacitation in public order policing—the legacies are manifold. First, at the federal level, the creation of a new arm of CSIS, the JIG, later to be rolled into the ITAC, was an organization set up with the specific purpose to provide intelligence in the lead-up to the Olympics. ITAC has persisted after the Games, meaning that new forms of intelligence sharing from the federal level to municipalities and other federal and provincial partners is an emergent policy structure flowing from the Olympics. During this time, ITAC partnered with a range of federal and municipal organizations, leading to a rescaling of the intelligence apparatus both in Canada and municipally, with the VPD. The implication of this structural sedimentation of a new intelligence apparatus is an increase in the scope of partners included in

intelligence-led, "preemptive", approaches to risk management and security threats in Canada. The number of partners now included in ITACs policy field are extensive, and include the RCMP, CSIS, FAC, TC, CSC, Health Canada, and the CBSA to name only a few. The range of actors now linked together are further fused by actors that are "seconded" to ITAC, which means these members are able to "link" ITAC with their respective partners' databanks. For instance, the SPROS database, which is under the auspices of the RCMP can now be tied into the expertise and wealth of information that ITAC (and other partners in the nexus) can acquire both interdepartmentally and abroad. Under these new normative, ideational, and structural conditions, ITAC becomes the foremost authority for categorizing, framing, and triaging national security risks, placing a premium on the accuracy of the categorizations.

In addition to these structural developments and their legitimizing implication, the transformation of intelligence threat categories is another hangover of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics security project. A new threat category that emerged in the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, MIE, set a precedent in Canada. The MIE threat category blurs a range of definitional parameters between terrorist groups and those that might be perceived as being associated with civil disobedience and direct action tactics. As a result, an ongoing "intelligence legacy" of this new concept that emerged distinctly in the local political milieu of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics is likely to persist in the ITACs ongoing threat assessment reports, which prioritizes and legitimizes ongoing applications of surveillance. A second manifestation in the broadening of threat categories includes the replacement of "emotionally disturbed persons" with the more general "persons of interest" (ITAC 2008 in Monaghan and Walby 2012: 146). Many of these shifts in threat designation that blur the normative and definitional parameters between political activism, extremism, civil disobedience, and terrorism, were further supplemented with enhanced human intelligence and infiltration strategies by federal police, further institutionalizing the drift towards proactive, intelligence-led strategies of public order policing. The end result is 1) a broadening of the institutional nexus surrounding intelligence governance in Canada, notably filtering into the daily practices of municipal law enforcement; and 2), a broadening and blurring of the threat horizon that conflates

domestic political participation with terrorist threat, thereby widening the degree of acceptable practices of surveillance, and further constraining the degree of acceptable forms of political expression available to individuals within Canada.

Legacies concerning intelligence-led policing were further supplemented with other operational changes in the VPD at the municipal level. For instance, the VPD established an organizational format for their PSU that drew from "best-practices" from the UK Model of crowd management. Primarily, this included a complete overhaul in the command structure governing public order events. Organizationally, new contingency planning policies between the VPD PSU and myriad of agencies across Vancouver and the lower Mainland (see p. 114) indicate the extent to which public safety governance is an intensely regional affair (even if these developments are still plagued by jurisdictional confusions regarding chain-of-command). One of the more interesting examples are the way that the BCLC has developed a working relationship with the VPD.

Tactically, the most widely popularized public order change in the VPD was a move towards a "meet and greet" strategy that attempted to make visible a police presence that would be recognized as part of the celebration as a way to influence crowd psychology. Interestingly, this also fits into a proactive, or preemptive, mode of security governance. However, this tactic is also supplemented with a more nimble public order response unit that can respond to flashpoint disturbances at a moment's notice. Teams of 7-8 individuals now provide "quick-response" strategy in urban disturbances. These new teams can be flexibly deployed at a moments notice, further emphasizing a militarized shift towards a proactive mode of public safety governance. However, this legacy can also be understood as a shift in spatial control over the urban domain, buoyed by the acquisition of non-lethal weaponry in the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Games. Overall however, the fact that developments in both the "meet and greet" strategy and more militarized "quick-response" units indicate that legacies are heterogeneous and contradictory, even within a single unit, such as the PSU.

# Chapter Five: Legacies of Civil Military Relations

## Introduction

Major sporting events are hallmarks for the militarization of Western cities. The designation of the major event as an archipelago of 'high-risk' venues embedded within wider urban spaces, makes the Olympic city more prone to a stealthy, "mission-based" militarization in the day-to-day affairs during the period of the event (Graham 2010: XIV). Securing what is often the host nation's largest security-based logistical undertaking involves extensive collaborative governance initiatives across a range of institutions—and the military are significant players among Olympic securitization efforts. Such "joined-up" security initiatives at major sporting events centre on discrete specialized security and policing strategies that are unfamiliar to traditional military strategies and tactics. Equally, however, these partnerships mean that military strategies and tactics are also circulated within and across domestic law enforcement institutions. The Olympic Games now see vast deployments of military personnel and strategies with civilian institutions in domestic urban spaces, particularly in the context of the War on Terror (Graham 2010).

Major sporting events (and political summits), therefore, are key sites that catalyze the circulation between military, surveillance, and policing expertise between neo-colonial war zones and Western cities. Standardized techno-strategies of surveillance and identification are increasingly common across each of these domains (see Fussey et al 2011). Stephen Graham (2010) notes a parallel trend in militarization between foreign occupation zones and cities in the West, where the terrorist attacks of New York, London, and Mumbai share a common thread with the occupations of Baghdad, Gaza, and Kandahar. For Graham (2010), the locus of war is no longer in the open plains or battlefields, in dark jungles or stormy deserts, but in the very warp and weft of 'urban theatres of operation', that is, in city squares, subway transportation links, and in the shipping ports and industrial districts that span the globe.

Models of 'pacification', 'militarization', and 'control', as the practical means through which the West prosecutes its military interventions, are remerging in Western urban contexts during major Olympic events. Often, this policy circulation entails the 're-insertion' of military warfare strategies, which are typically used in foreign interventions, into the routines of urban-based public safety governance. Such techniques of power affirm a mode of colonization that is premised on risk modeling and joint security operations. The complex logistics of homeland security and emergency preparedness operations that are required for securing major sports events—as key moments in the militarization of Western urban space—transform the spaces of everyday citizens' lives who reside in liberal democracies into to a new geo-political frame. Inquiring into *how* urban public safety governance emerges at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, specifically in terms of civil police-military configurations, as well as how these configurations hold together, and endure as legacies in post-Olympic contexts requires a locally situated historical analysis.

Accordingly, this chapter examines civil police-military relations in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics with an examination of the VPD Military Liaison Unit (MLU). The chapter describes and explains how Olympic security and policing initiatives—specifically those implicated in militarizing transformations—are reproduced over time. Instead of a cross-comparative analysis that records common trends between militarization in neo-colonial spaces against Western urban spaces (Graham 2010), and at major events in particular, the chapter examines how security and policing institutions unfold over the Olympic lifecycle, to identify which components of these particular assemblages are subject to transformation, and thereby to explain the conditions under which post-Olympic security legacies persist as a whole (Rast, 2012: 22).

The chapter also builds on research into the security and policing legacies of major events by turning further empirical attention toward institutional-level assemblages of security and policing – particularly on legacies of policing and militarization in Olympic host cities. In the first section, I provide a brief history of militarization in the context of the Olympics. Here, I examine previous Olympic events (two in Westminster liberal

democracies) that have encountered semblances of militarization—the Sydney 2000 Games, the Beijing 2008 Games, and the London 2012 Olympics. In the following section, I examine the Vancouver 2010 Olympics by mapping the trajectory of the first domestic military policing unit of its kind in Canada, the Military Liaison Unit in the VPD, which was heavily involved in coordinating the joint civil police-military effort throughout the lifecycle of the 2010 Winter Games.

## Militarization and the Olympic Games

The increased use of military force in civilian matters are recognized and justified as a necessary component in a robust Olympic security strategy. In the lead-up to the Sydney 2000 Games, the Australian government passed legislation that authorized the use of the military in the event of domestic unrest (Head 2000). The Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2000 allowed the Australian federal government to deploy military personnel in a wide range of circumstances without prior need to consult the individual states. While the primary justification for amending the 97 year-old Act was based on counter-terrorism responses, other responders noted that the use of the military would provide little help in such operations and was more than likely designed to assist police in the event of widespread public disorder (McCulloch 2001). These changes to the federal law enshrined the military with a host of legal protections and authorities. Australian Defence personnel were exempt from prosecution for homicide through a "shoot to kill" provision (Lawson 2000), and they were also given greater powers than police, which enabled them to search premises without a warrant and to detain civilians without arrest (Lenskyj 2000). These legal changes set alarming precedents in Australia's domestic use of military personnel. Supplementing these legal changes was a distinct operational role for the military in securing the Games. Interestingly, however, this military role provided special undercover operations troops to assist police with crowd surveillance during the Games (Taylor and Toohey 2012). While Australia, like Canada, authorizes collaboration between police and military in non-emergency situations, this undercover operation violated rules on the use of the military in civil affairs because, first of all, troops were not wearing uniform, and second, they can be used only when the use of force is not expected. Australian Defence Department

documents showed that troops were deployed to support and defend police who might encounter violence, yet discrepancies remained on the source of this operational approval (Taylor and Toohey 2012). The Chief of the Defence Force signed off, but neither the Minister of Defence or Federal Cabinet members were aware of the operation until a senior military officer reported it to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Lague 2011; Taylor and Toohey 2012).

The biggest mobilization of security and military operations since the Second World War unfolded in the United Kingdom with the London 2012 Olympics. Official IOC estimates placed the total Olympic budget at £11bn (Syal and Gibson 2011), which includes a bulging £1.6b security budget for the 17-day affair.[31] In a country that was still grappling with the shattering 2011, heavy anxieties in the country underpinned an unprecedented security operation involved 89 000 police officers (of 136 000 in England and Wales), 10 000 private security personnel, and 13 500 military officials. Extensive 'on-the ground' surveillance systems were also placed to provide security against the 150 identified potential threats (Fussey 2013; Hamilton, 2012).

Vast amounts of military resources and training exercises were mobilized to fortify the city of London and surrounding English countryside. The amphibious assault ship, HMS Ocean, returned from deployment as an aircraft carrier in Libya to dock on the Thames River. Surface-to-air missile systems were deployed in Blackheath, Bow, and Leytonstone to protect from air-based threats, while Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) provided vertical surveillance capabilities from the air. Royal Air Force (RAF) commissioned Typhoon fighter jets, the Royal Navy's Sea King surveillance aircraft, as well as 'sniper-equipped' Puma and Lynx helicopters also engaged in joint-operational exercises across the predominantly urban geography of the United Kingdom, which was reconfigured as an Olympic-specific 'battlespace' terrain (BBC, 2012). Like Australia, military personnel were also trained in public order policing tactics. Overall, 7,500

[31] It is widely anticipated (and expected) that these official estimates are below actual costs. Security budgets for the Athens 2004 Olympics totalled approximately £1bn, while it is reported the Beijing 2008 Olympics security budget ran upwards of $6bn US.

British military personnel were deployed under authority of section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 with powers to engage in mass arrests.

Beijing's security preparations have been the largest Olympic security initiative in the history of the Games—in large part due to their heavy reliance on human presence. The official tally from Beijing organizers estimate that 92,500 individuals were involved in security at the Beijing Games. In terms of military involvement, an additional 100,000 soldiers (and another 292,000 civilian security volunteers) buoyed this staggering original number (Thompson 2008: 50). Such large numbers of military (and volunteer civilian) deployments were predominantly used to establish perimeter access controls around the entire city. Officers set up checkpoints at major choke points and conducted searches on vehicles entering the area (Yu et al 2009: 393).

It is difficult to imagine the practical security response that such large numbers of military personnel deployment can have in an Olympic city, which suggests a further dimension is at play. Military presence at major events also fulfills an ideological function that affirms the power and prestige of the host nation-state. Given the ideological dimension to military presences, which was popularized during the 1936 Berlin Games with the nascent Third Reich, the symbolic value of a military presence serves to enhance power and prestige in the international community. The visible dimension of military prowess is, itself, a statement on the affirmation of a nation's place in the global hierarchy of modern states (Bernhard and Martin 2011).

Beyond this ideological support, the militarization of the public realm during Olympic-type events perform vital security work when you consider the broader implications in the ongoing militarization of urban public space. Deployments of military operations in urban spaces of Western liberal democracies often necessitate changes to legal statutes, catalyze enhanced civil police-military collaboration initiatives, and promote a cultural reframing of the normative conditions that regulate military force deployment in domestic circumstances. These various changes impact the broader implications of the course of militarization in host-countries, the integration of military institutions in the

domestic security sector, and the implications of these trends for the governance of urban space (Eick et al. 2007; Davis 1992; Mitchell 2003). Vancouver, a city recognized for it's progressive municipal politics, exemplifies the course of militarization in the city, and the country as a whole. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics were a key catalyst for militarization in Canada. In the following section, I explore the trajectory of Vancouver Police Department's (VPD's) MLU, the first military liaison unit of its kind in Canada, and it's implication for the contours and spread of military policies in domestic policing in Canada.

## The Vancouver 2010 Olympics and Militarization of the Police

In the early 2000s, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) established a formalized 'Military Liaison Unit' (MLU), the first municipal police body in Canada to do so.[32] Now, as in the past, the MLU serves as an institutional nexus between police and military agencies to facilitate common communication protocol, and to advance information-sharing capabilities in joint operations between the VPD (as police of jurisdiction in the urban domain), the Canadian Forces, and the Canadian Navy. During the 2010 Olympics, the MLU facilitated joint operations between the Canadian Forces and law enforcement authorities across a range of Olympic-specific, mission-based initiatives (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012). While, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics was a primary justification for the establishment of the MLU. Prior to the Olympics, there was only one officer who was responsible for liaising with the military. This officer, an ex-military officer, was also responsible for establishing the MLU as it exists today. Describing his initial experience on the cultural organizational environment between the military and civilian police in Vancouver, he stated:

> "when I came to VPD….there was a myopic viewpoint that police do this, military does that, and there was this misconception higher up the food chain that the police and military would never work together. Times have changed." [33]

[32] It is important to note that Canadian Police forces have rarely 'cross-pollinated' with military forces in the past.

[33] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

And times certainly changed when Vancouver was awarded the Olympic Games in 2003. After the 2010 Games were awarded by the IOC, the VPD recognized that they needed a unit of ex-military to be able to collaborate more effectively in Olympic security engagements.[34] As the largest-domestic peacetime operation in Canadian history, the Olympic security operation was a critical juncture for the intensification and expansion of the MLU and for conditioning the future shape of militarization in Canada.

The MLU was established in the VPD for two principal reasons. First, and more generally, members of the VPD recognized that the department lacked formal policies governing communications and joint- 'cross-training' - operations between themselves and the military. Second, the planners recognized that the MLU could provide valuable expertise in the cooperative preparatory training for the Vancouver Games. After the Olympics were awarded to Vancouver in 2003, and with the support of VPD management, the MLU grew to a 28-person stand-alone unit of ex-military officers in the VPD. Within a very short time, the MLU has grown to become a highly valued training piece for the Canadian Forces in urban warfare tactics, and it has developed extensive relations with the US Army, the US National Guard, and the US Marine Corps, among other military and government organizations. According to one officer involved with the MLU, the unit "is now an important training piece for the Canadian Forces as well as an important opportunity to learn, and communicate [with the military]."[35] The MLU has also partnered with major police forces in Canada, exporting the MLU command structure, operational model, and tactical expertise, which has prompted more municipal police forces to partner with local Canadian Forces detachments to carry out joint training exercises (Anonymous Interviewee 2012). Currently, several other police forces in major Canadian cities are weighing whether or not to establish their own MLUs premised on the original VPD MLU model.

[34] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[35] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

And while official justifications for the purpose of the MLU are notable, the shape of the institutional emergence of the MLU within the VPD is much more revealing. The creator of the MLU approached the VPD Chief Deputy prior to the Olympics to get the MLU started. According to the initiator and now current head of the MLU:

> "I put to the chief at the time, who was Jamie Graham, that we should have something along these lines…he agrees because he is a base brat, just like I am, our parents are both in the military…I bring to the chief…'we need closer working relationship with the military' and he says 'yes, how do you foresee this happening?', I say, under the auspices of the MLO (military liaison officer) there would be a group of individuals selected who can perform military duties and who have past military experience, who understand how the military works, so that way, if something is to go sideways within the province or within the lower mainland… and we know something is going to happen, whether it be a big earthquake, or a flood, or a forest fire, and the military is going to be involved. Not being constrained like they are in the states on Posse Comitatus, we can work with the military. So, if we can start going out on exercises, and table top scenarios, cross-training, and then that way when the time comes to work with the military, the military, first of all, isn't going to see us as 'oh, you guys are just another arm of the RCMP, or, you guys are a second rate organization because we only deal with the RCMP', all of these preconceived ideas, notions, and prejudices, we have with each other, we can break those walls down. And we can do that ahead of time by having 'face-parade' with each other and working with each other in these scenarios and in the sandbox exercises"[36]

Currently, these relations have continued to expand. The MLU now trains between four and six times per year at a US National Guard training facility in Yakima, Washington, alongside a range of agencies including the US Army, the US National Guard, members from other Canadian municipal police forces, and select individuals from the Canadian Forces. These joint exercises are not simply focused on emergency management, but are very much focused on combat operations that involve live ammunition exercise, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and reality based training in urban tactical military deployments that center on the military grammar of the "three-block war".[37] One of the key purposes of this extensive cross-training is to train military officials how the police model and UAV technologies might be incorporated into urban warfare tactics and for

[36] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[37] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

municipal police to identify and incorporate military tactics and advancements in aerial surveillance into their own urban-based operations. In what follows, I detail how enhanced emphasis on civil police-military relations in Olympic security planning bolstered the form and ongoing transformation of the MLU.

**The Olympic 'boost' and the MLU**

The Olympics catalyzed a 'multiplier effect' on the material and organizational capacities of the MLU. Officials from the MLU identified the Olympics as an opportunity to acquire an extensive amount of equipment and training that would not have otherwise been possible. In technological terms, the VPD invested in public-order technologies that have been adapted from previous military applications for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. For example, the VPD bought Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs) that the American Technology Corporation developed to repel pirate attacks on navy vessels, most popularly in Somali waters of the Gulf of Aden (Canadian Press, 2009a). LRADs are classified as "devices" instead of "weapons," which allows dealers to circumvent US trade embargoes banning weapon sales to particular countries – a loophole that allowed one company to close lucrative deals in Beijing in 2008 (Hambling 2008). The VPDs Public Safety Unit (PSU) and not the MLU acquired the LRAD. However, while these 'public order technologies' acquired by the VPD were for the PSU, the MLU did not go without reward. When asked what resources the Olympics boost allowed the MLU to procure, one respondent enthusiastically replied, "You name it" (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012). During the Olympics lifecycle, the VPD MLU and Emergency Response Teams (ERT) acquired two armoured military-adapted vehicles that were equipped with night-vision technology—making the VPD the first police force in Canada to own one of the military grade vehicles (Vancouver Sun, 2007). Most significantly, the MLU now recognizes itself as more fully equipped than many of the military brigades they encounter (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012).

Justification for large-scale capital investment in public safety equipment is also accompanied with large injections for improvements in operational capabilities. The MLU acquired significant human resources and expertise stemming from Olympics-related investments. After the Games were awarded to Vancouver in 2003, the VPD

sought new recruits with "experience in the military or [those who have] spent time in war zones in non-military roles" (Hogben, 2008). The MLU insists that, even after the Olympics had ended, the unit remains a valuable ongoing recruitment tool for ex-military officers into the VPD.[38] (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012).

### Olympic cross-training security exercises

Olympics-related emergency management training exercises are a vital component in the preparation of public safety agencies (Boyle, 2011). Joint exercises are the first opportunity for police and military agencies to build on enhanced economic, technological, and human resources to work out complex logistical demands. Emergency preparedness exercises deliver a dual inflection. On the one hand, exercises serve as an opportunity to hone responsive capabilities in the face of untoward events. On the other, as Phil Boyle (2011) has pointed out, joint-exercises involve a secondary, 'performative', almost 'theatre-like' purpose, that are crafted in conjunction with media to depict a spectacle that is most favourable for boosting public confidence in the security apparatus (117). In spite of this performative component, security preparedness exercises provide a further critical opportunity for inter-organizational relationship building. Joint-training exercises are perhaps the most *vital* dimension in the creeping militarization of Western cities because they foster cultural meaning and clarify rules of engagement between police and the military.

In preparation for the 2010 Olympics, the Vancouver Integrated Security Unit (VISU) (including the VPD with an operational role for the MLU) conducted full-scale exercises that mobilized all agencies involved in Olympic security. The exercises, 'Pegasus Guardian 3' and 'Spartan Rings,' were developed from lessons learned at previous Olympics-related, cross-training exercises and were intended to challenge the security forces' capabilities in the areas of "tactical procedures, communications, and command

[38] Organizational empowerment for the Canadian Forces (CF) was also extensive. The 2010 Games were secured with a series of portable command posts and F-16 fighter jets. The Department of National Defence involved tendered contracts worth $1.5million for partial renovation of an Air Canada hangar at the Vancouver International Airport (YVR) to bring it up to mega-event capabilities – another legacy of the Games.

and control" operations to test "interoperability" in joined-up security governance initiatives (RCMP, 2009). Such tabletop exercises are crucial for catalyzing the early stages of cross-fertilization between police and military in the context of urban geographies. According to one interview respondent from the MLU, "the Olympics paid back in spades" by having a stream of joint exercises between the military and police.[39] The exercises, it was maintained, were conducted to pre-empt future possibilities when police and military are "forced to work together in the future."[40] The Olympics were critically important to boost the relations between the VPD and the CF. Again, according to another MLU member from the VPD,

> the Olympics were [pretty important because I know the military itself was engaged quite extensively (with the Olympics), and the police were…7000 police officers on the job…and the two parties had to learn how to play in the sandbox together and communicate from two entirely different worlds…and I think that [name withheld] and the MLU was that small gap between the two, they were the bridge in many respects"[41]

The most significant aspects of the Olympic partnership, and particularly the exercises, involved very simple yet compelling processes: they transcended (and re-articulated) discrete policy domains between the civilian police and the military. More importantly, the exercises were vital in breaking down organizational prejudices and "preconceived ideas" (largely in the eyes of the Canadian Forces) about what exactly the MLU was, and what it was capable of accomplishing. Respondents went further, stating that these exercises were a crucial first step in overcoming the cultural divide between the police and the military. Over the duration of the exercises, the "myopic viewpoint" that insisted that military and policing institutions were destined to remain disassociated, given their respective operational functions, was eroded. According to one officer,

> "breaking down those concepts and constructs, and the paradigm at the time, was the biggest problem we had. Because guys move into positions in the military, and three

[39] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[40] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[41] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

> years later they've moved out, and another guy comes in, if he doesn't do a proper handover briefing, its like oh yeah this guy here he is your military liaison officer in case something happens in town…one person believes in it, the next person doesn't…we've run into that problem at 39th brigade out here where certain lieutenant colonels and majors think we're the greatest thing since sliced bread, others think we're a hindrance because we're moving in on their territory, we're not. We're here to share information, we're here to work with them, to make the future work that much better, so that when it goes sideways, I can turn and go [name withheld], grab three of the guys, head out there…and give them anything they want, or try to guide them in a certain area."[42]

It cannot be overstated how important these early cultural practices were for future inter-organizational exchange between police and military. First, Olympics-related training provided the VPD and several military-specific organizations with an opportunity to personalize the other institution as much as they 'professionalized' it. These relations are the first practices that breakdown cultural divides between the organizations, allow an opportunity for trust-building across networks, and as a result, lay the groundwork for establishing new practices, rules, and forms of conduct that may become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently (Lawrence 2002). Fostering intercultural relations between agencies is a crucial beginning in the development of lasting interorganizational relationships, forging a significant legacy of post-event militarization of policing, but also of how the military stood to gain from police expertise.

Second, on legal jurisdictional terms, the joint-operations required common access and disclosure of classified documents between previously non-cooperative agencies. Information sharing between agencies is a fundamental *pre-requisite* of mission-based interoperability. In order to operate in urban contexts, the military or naval rules of engagement (ROE) must be shared with the local police of jurisdiction, which had never been the case. Interestingly, the (cultural) institutional 'closedness' or 'openness' that regulates information-sharing practices (networks of exchange) was significantly pressed towards openness and cooperation in Olympic contexts. For example, respondents described a situation where, during joint-training exercises, the Navy was forced to share

[42] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

its operational policies with the VPD. As police force of jurisdiction over the harbour area of the city, the VPD demanded that they be aware of the Navy's plans in the inner harbour. After a period of reluctance, orders came from Ottawa that demanded the Navy provide their security details to the VPD. After this initial reluctance, the two organizations subsequently shared information across a range of protocols, establishing a more positive collaborative relationship, particularly around norms of information sharing, moving forward into the future (Anonymous Interviewee 2012). Perhaps equally however, these interorganizational configurations that reach across crime control, counter-terrorism, military and policing, utilize tension and varying values and path-dependencies to refine notions of control and regulation in their own everyday operations.

Third, and further related to jurisdictional considerations, the interoperable relations between the MLU and the Canadian Forces and Canadian Navy prefigure future courses of military operations in the urban geographies of Vancouver. With the precedence of the Olympics established, previously murky jurisdictional questions surrounding urban operations have been clarified and formalized. Future military operations in the urban domain of the Olympic-city, whether it is Vancouver or London, will be mediated through the legacies established from the joint cross-training exercises that utilized common cartographies in their collective strategic calculations. In cases where the military would be deployed in an urban-based scenario, it is now a certainty that any future military operations will be mediated by the police force of jurisdiction (in this case, the VPD). A legacy of previously established Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) from Olympics- related exercises will carry over into future operations. In emergency situations where jurisdictional authority over the urban domain was historically unclear, cultural recognition of another organization's "situational awareness" and a newly refined clarity in chain-of-command issues, which stems from Olympics- related training, significantly furthers the rules and policies governing subsequent military-inflected interventions into the urban theatre.

**MLU as 'exporter' to US National Guard and US Army**

The Vancouver Games bolstered transnational partnerships between the VPD and foreign actors. While planning for the 2010 Olympics did not initiate the relationship between the US National Guard and the MLU, the relationship was significantly strengthened during the Olympics period. The head of the MLU attributed the emergence of this working relationship to the improvement of its self-image as a well-resourced, professional operation, facilitated by the Olympic boost (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012). The MLU was outfitted with top-of-the-line equipment, making them better equipped than even the Canadian Forces and thus more able to demonstrate their operational effectiveness to security and military institutions in foreign countries (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012). As the first of its kind in Canada, the MLU established an MOU with the US Army, which allowed the MLU to use the Army's training facilities, and this association has since lead to greater cross-fertilization between the agencies. The MLU currently trains the US National Guard in urban tactical operations (building clearance); in exchange, the VPD ERTs receive training in Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD). Improvements in emergency management responses, particularly in how first responders react in counter-terrorism operations present a contribution to the public good.

However, the line between emergency management responses and developments in militarization is not so clear. For instance, the international character of this cross-training relationship between the separate military and police organizations allows the US Army to circumvent the American statute of Posse Comitatus, where the US Army can secure urban tactical operations training in a way that skirts the American's own domestic legal conventions. Where Posse Comitatus is meant to limit the powers of local governments and law enforcement agencies' reliance on federal military personnel to enforce the laws of the land, the international dimension of this relationship (and the legal circumvention that it involves) provide a novel premise for the way the US National Guard operates. In return however, the MLU, other Canadian Police forces, and the Canadian Forces are able to train and test state-of-the-art UAVs in American airspace. Canadian police and Canadian Forces are also able to skirt their own territorial jurisdictions to test and train with UAVs. Regulatory requirements in Canada insist that

Canadian law enforcement organizations acquire a Special Flight Operating Certificate (SFOC) from Transport Canada (Cavoukian 2012).[43] An SFOC comes with conditions surrounding legitimate applications, and other mandated regulations, such as logging flights, operator training and proper reporting criteria. According to SFOC/TC regulations, authorities can only use drones in Canadian jurisdiction for "Crash Scene Investigation, Search and Rescue, Major Crimes / Ident Scenes, [and] ERT calls" (RCMP 2012).[44] Outside of TC regulations, the VPD are developing training and operational procedures by integrating the use of UAVs in emergency response exercises that centre on urban conflict operations. Such operations are characterized by urban military conflicts, conflicts that have been popularized through asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan as the "three block war".[45] Importantly, the VPD (as well as VicPD and Calgary Police Services) and the CF can test and develop training operations with UAVs in urban-based operations outside of their own territorial jurisdictions (both federally *and* municipally) and operate beyond the scope of Canadian legal code and normative public consultation governing such actions. And further, the private sector can also test and develop their products with potential Canadian consumers in such "reality-based" training scenarios that take place outside of Canadian borders. The resulting conditions opens potential for a stealthy militarization of Canadian police forces that are training with drones in urban-based operations, beyond the scope of Canadian legal code and normative public debate.

**MLU as training node in overseas deployments (externalization of police model to military)**

The standardization of military warfare strategies that are common to foreign interventions does not only flow in an 'inward' direction to Western urban spaces through public safety policies. A further legacy of Olympic preparation exercises involves the 'outward' extension of police models into overseas military operations. Based on enhanced capabilities and operations afforded through Olympics-related

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[43] A Special Flight Operation Certificate (SFOC) is according to 603.67 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. Approval for an SFOC takes approximately 1-3 months.

[44] Domoney, Dave. (2012). "F Div UAV Project: Collision Reconstruction Program Handout Material," RCMP, Presentation.

[45] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

expenditure, the MLU now provides training for both foreign agencies (US National Guard, US Army, United Nations) and domestic agencies (Canadian Forces) that operate in urban domains overseas. The reality-based training that the MLU uses is meant to demonstrate that the police model is applicable to military forces in urban warfare overseas. The VPD is training the Canadian Forces in the areas of 'building clearance', demonstrating to the military that small-scale operational tactics can be more effective than much larger military platoons in urban operations. The MLU has trained members of the unit who are currently serving in Afghanistan and Sudan, which demonstrates how the military police model is applicable to the military's geo-political operations. The military realizes that in the context of asymmetric warfare, the traditional police attention to urban geographies, as well as the police model 'use of force continuum' is much more suited to policing the streets of a foreign occupation.

In terms of the geographical imaginaries, referring to the tactical advantage that the police have in relation to the military, one officer stated: "when we move into an urban domain, we're looking at rooftops, and windows, and that's just what we do. They [the military] don't."[46] Further, in regards to how the military stood to benefit from police training, the respondent continued, "the military is a great organization in a rural environment, when it comes to anything rural, they are top notch. When it comes to the urban environment, they're lost…"[47] With another officer finishing off the sentence "…in dealing with civilians and non-combatants."[48]

In terms of the use of force continuum, the police have been training the military how to engage their targets (civilians) differently. According to one officer,

> "they're [the military] really good doing the fighting part, but it was dealing with the civilians. You can't point a C7 weapon at a civilian and tell them, you know, "do this, do that", the civilian is like "hey, you can't shoot me". Civilians nowadays aren't like they were in the 50s and 60s

[46] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[47] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[48] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

> where just because someone in uniform tells them to do something, they're like, "oh yeah, no problem at all."[49]

A second officer continued,

> "You can't say that everyone is a bad-guy and treat them as bad-guys. You have to be able to decipher between an insurgent and an innocent party…which is very hard to do nowadays, and we as police officers do that everyday."[50]

These quotes indicate the extent to which these partnerships, premised upon institutionalization that occurred through the lifecycle of Vancouver 2010 Olympics carry indirect knock-on effects on how military expertise is changing, not just locally, as a way to sensitize military forces to urban geographical imaginaries, but also in how the military is being trained to engage urban spaces, both for during the Olympics, but also in foreign occupation zones by the VPD MLU.

### MLU as 'internal' transformation within VPD and as 'exporter' to other municipal police forces

The Olympic 'multiplier-effect' also demonstrates a creeping militarization *within* the VPD. A local focus on the MLU shows us that policy mobilities are not simply restricted to inter-organizational effects that span transnational geographies between the neo-colonial spaces of Vancouver and Kabul. The VPDs Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) and Public Safety Unit (PSU) (US equivalency of the paramilitary SWAT and crowd control units) have accompanied the MLU on training missions in the facilities of the US Army. Also, the MLU consists of members who have been recruited on the basis of their ex-military status. Because the members of the MLU also serve on common 'Beat Enforcement Teams' (BETs), there exists the potential for militarized subjectivities to be enacted in routine street-level engagements, leading to another conduit for the intensification of an *internal boomerang* within the VPD itself. And within Canada, the MLU has expanded to two other major city's police forces—Calgary and Victoria—who are pairing up with their own local military brigadiers. These MLUs have been integrated

[49] Anonymous Interviewee 1, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

[50] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, March 9, 2012.

into a common ID card system between detachments, leading to greater interoperability between the municipal forces themselves (Anonymous Interviewee 2012).

### Conclusion

Legacies of militarization are a common feature at major sporting events. In Sydney 2000, the increased use of force in civilian matters were largely facilitated through both enhanced deployments of the military in urban domains as well as revisions to federal law that enshrined the military with a host of legal protections and authorities related to domestic arrest powers and public order policing. In subsequent Olympics, such as the London 2012 Games, an unprecedented range of military, navy, and air force personnel and equipment were deployed around the city of London. Legacies from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics were only marginally different.

Issues of militarization are underrepresented in discourses of Olympic security legacies—and, in particular, legacies of policing and militarization in the Olympic host city of Vancouver are missing. The approach in this chapter historicizes the institutional trajectory of the VPD's MLU as a key unit that has been implicated in the increasing militarization of Canadian law enforcement. Situating a localized view of militarization of Western spaces and institutions in the context of major events tells us more about the shape and penetration of policies between neo-colonial frontiers and Western urban centers than a static cross-referencing between these spaces.

The Vancouver 2010 Olympics catalyzed a multiplier effect on the material (equipment), cultural, organization, and operational capacities of the first civil police-military policing unit of its kind in Canada, the VPD MLU. Materially, the MLU was able to acquire a significant amount of resources, including armoured vehicles, night-vision, and other non-lethal weaponry to the extent that the MLU now recognizes itself as more fully equipped than many of the military brigades they encounter (Anonymous Interviewee, 2012). A further material legacy is the MLUs involvement in UAV training, which effectively invites a "back-door" of UAV training and implementation in Canadian police

forces without public consultation or even under the authority of established Canadian law in these areas.

However, much of these material developments emerged through personal and professional relationships that were developed with transnational partners, such as the US Army, US Washington National Guard, as well as other US organizations. These relationships lead to the militarization of policing, but also to the policization of the military. With regards to the former, joint-training between the MLU and their US counterparts involves ongoing reality based training in urban tactical military deployments that introduce a creeping militarism into the VPD that focuses on trends found in asymmetrical warfare, specifically, with the grammar of the "three block war" pursued in foreign occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A further legacy of these cross-training exercises are the cultural transformations across institutions that unfold as a result, leading to ongoing cross-pollination between civilian and military organizations. With regards to the latter, the policization of the military, US military personnel and Canadian Forces are encountering training in the police model, for use during urban warfare overseas, and potentially in domestic operations during government mandated states of emergency.

Often the most benign and under-recognized legacies of intercultural exchange and cultural recognition of jurisdictional relations through cross-training exercises provide vital points of departure for ongoing post-Olympic legacies of civil police-military relations.

Further, these joint-operations also transformed readily accepted information sharing practices across participating institutions. Norms surrounding information sharing practices are redrawn in the context of mission-based operations that integrate civilian and military organizations. Much of this information sharing leads to a formal establishment of chain of command issues in common jurisdictions, lending a degree of institutionalization to be drawn upon when future military operations unfold in urban domains. And finally, these early partnerships have also been exported to other Canadian

municipal police forces. While the circulation of expertise unfolds between domestic urban environments and foreign occupation zones, the Olympic multiplier effect demonstrates that these circulation of militarized rationales ripple throughout myriad units within the VPD, but also to other municipalities such as the Calgary Police Service, and the Victoria Police Department, whom are implementing the VPD MLUs organizational structure into their own operations, and are now part of the ongoing joint-training exercises with US military counterparts.

# Chapter Six: Private Security Legacies

## Introduction

Major Sports Events (MSEs) are an important flashpoint in the ascendancy of the private security industry. In recent years, particularly since 9/11, domestic policing, counter-terrorism, and emergency management operations have undergone a dramatic and expansive process of privatization and MSEs have been a lucrative facet of an overall trend towards a burgeoning "homeland-security-industrial-complex" (Bayley and Shearing 2001). MSEs feature threat models in security planning that cover an expansive range of real and perceived risks, including urban criminality, regulation of incivilities, terrorism, political disturbances, as well as other natural or health emergency situations (Jennings 2012). This broad threat matrix, coupled with the urban inflection of major events means that a full roster of security responses are activated to stem any potential attack, disruption, or disaster. The scale and breadth of risk-based security initiatives are so extensive that the public sector cannot fulfil these risk profiles alone, meaning that increased assistance from the private sector is required. As a result, these events become the focus of a broad range of offers of public safety 'solutions' from the private security industry.

The extent to which major events unfold through a series of political exception(s) that amass political will and economic backing for major development projects, which would not, under other conditions, garner public support – such events become rewarding sites of economic growth and political legitimacy for the private sector. It therefore comes as little surprise that PSCs are eager to take advantage of a favourable political and economic climates throughout the lifecycle of MSEs. During MSEs, a large influx of security personnel and technologies are required to secure a broad range of threat contingencies to people and critical infrastructure. MSEs are exemplary of the dynamics that Martin Coward (2009) calls the *urbanization of insecurity.* The urbanization of insecurity entails a reciprocal dynamic through which security technologies are oriented towards the characteristics of urban space, while simultaneously, urban spaces are

reshaped according to the governing logics of security technologies (Coward 2011). Specifically, Olympic-specific urban regeneration projects—as a set of urban infrastructural developments—present an ongoing market for security and surveillance technologies (Fussey et al 2011). However, the high-profile global nature of MSEs also means that involvement as a private service provider often comes with the prospect that the reputations and practices of (often) multinational companies associated with the event are more thoroughly scrutinized. Further, pressure to fulfill lofty contract demands under tight timelines carries risks to a PSC's reputation if the contracts are mismanaged. MSEs, therefore, also pose serious risks to brand reputation and the political legitimacy of the private sector industry. While MSEs present a quick opportunity to secure massive economic contracts, PSCs can often succumb to bouts of operational mismanagement that can have lasting effects on the reputation of the private security industry in general, and the reputation of a PSC in particular. The success or failure of PSC offerings at MSEs carries significant implication concerning normative expectations about legitimate sovereign authority to deliver security in the domestic sector as a whole.

In this chapter, I unpack the political economic dimensions of private security industry and MSEs—and I chart private security industry developments in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. In the first section, I explore the general empirical trends in the nascent private security industry during major event security initiatives and explore the lucrative nature of MSEs for the private security industry. I detail the scale and sort of security services on offer by the private security industry. Since Atlanta 1996, after an explosion in a city park that killed two and injured more than 100, organizers and security planners were reminded about the insecurity of a broad range of vulnerable urban spaces that were brought into the frame of the security response and that were unable to be adequately policed by public authorities alone. While the catalyst for private security might have been the Los Angeles 1984 Games, Atlanta 1996 was a moment which evoked the limits of security protections at major events. In this section, I detail the emergence of PSCs at MSEs as a means to supplement public security initiatives at major events. In particular, I examine the conditions surrounding the emergence of private

security at major sports events, the types of actors and companies involved, as well as the varying experiences of PSCs across a range of Olympic events.

In the second section, I focus specifically on the role of the private security industry over the lifecycle of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Approximately 5 000 private security officers were used to provide security at the Vancouver Games, which involved airport style access control services at Olympic venues and the Athlete's village, as well as screening at the media center (Lee 2009). The main contract was held by Contemporary Security Canada (CSC), who received a 97.42 million dollar contract to secure the Olympic event—and that same year, this same company also filled the largest private security contract in the history of Canada at the Toronto G8/20 summit. Given limited research access to the main security provider at the Vancouver Games, I focus on how the common trends involving private security across the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and Toronto G8/G20 major event inform our understanding of the legacies of the private security industry in Canada as a whole. The chapter concludes by discussing some of the benefits and challenges of the private security industry in providing major event security in light of the literature on the political economy of private security, in past events, and in particular to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

## The Political Economics of MSEs and the Private Security Industry

MSEs pose a set of lucrative economic and symbolic political opportunities for PSCs. In purely economic terms, mega-events offer a spate of economic opportunities. The figures are staggering. In the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, approximately $180 million USD was spent on security operations. In the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games, the first after 9/11, this mount jumped to almost $310 million USD, ballooning to an estimated $1.5 billion USD for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. Another four years later, figures for the 2006 Torino Winter Games were $400 million USD. Varying estimates have been provided for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. The Chinese government puts official spending on security operations at $300 million USD, but more comprehensive estimates put this at $6.5 billion USD (SIA 2007; Boyle and Haggerty 2009a). The security budget

for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, originally estimated to be $175 million CAD, ballooned to $900 million CAD by February 2009. The security cost at the London 2012 Games was a staggering $1.5 billion USD (Boyle and Haggerty 2009a). It is difficult to ascertain the exact amount of profits accrued by private security organizations, but as a major contributor to security governance operations at major events, the private security industry comprises a significant portion of these numbers.

As discussed earlier in this thesis, MSEs emphasize security practices as an embedded component of wider urban regeneration projects (Fussey et al 2012). Hosting the Olympics is regarded as a rare and fruitful opportunity to promote large-scale urban infrastructure projects that situate the host-city as a global player that is keen to attract investment. Olympic-related infrastructural developments are most overwhelmingly married to an associated increase in securitization. The spaces and cultural geographies of the commercial zones in the Olympic city's urban landscape are situated in a close relationship with a security-conscious urbanism (Fussey et al. 2012: 265). Urban regeneration that is associated with hosting major events is fused to a spate of security and social control mechanisms that are designed to prepare and maintain the host-city and its neo-liberal spaces of consumption as a safe, secure, and attractive location. As the Olympic economy stimulates infrastructure and development in real estate and tourism, the private security measures that are now synonymous with property protection and public safety become even more prevalent, facilitating "an increasingly robust Security Protection (SP) market for the private sector (SIA 2007).

However, the accelerated development and (re)privatization projects that are associated with Olympic-related infrastructural developments in urban spaces are often accompanied by the displacement of certain groups and the gentrification of urban centers. The negative outcomes of these gentrifications and displacements (72,000 people evicted from their homes in Seoul; 9,000 arrest citations issued to the homeless in Barcelona; and an incredible 1.5 million people displaced in the lead-up to the Beijing 2008 Games (COHRE 2007), are further attempts at the regulation and population

management of social inequalities through enhanced security and surveillance controls (Molnar and Snider 2011).

During any Olympic event, the Olympic Charter grants exclusive brand sponsorship rights.[51] Because governments are legally bound to protect such legally enshrined commercial interests, authorities can justify a range of intensified surveillance mechanisms and sanctions. Indeed, as Boyle and Haggerty (2009a) point out, identifying violations of these commercial rights *presupposes* some sort of monitoring regime (emphasis mine) (63). Private security officials who act on behalf of private corporations and the IOC are thus empowered to police citizen's consumption habits and have the authority to conduct searches and seize items from citizens for displaying unauthorized brands.

Many of these trends, rooted in the economic conditions of MSEs, square with the "mass private property thesis" that has guided understandings of the drivers of private security (Shearing and Stenning 1981). As the major event city undergoes infrastructural projects and move toward the "entrepreneurial city" (Harvey 1989), these trends are a pre-condition for enhanced private security, since private ownership is regularly inclined to contract security services over the course of the major event. MSEs shift urban space into an array of commercialized domains of consumption resulting in an associate desire to regulate incivilities and impurities in typically impoverished neighbourhoods that are slated for regeneration (Fussey et al 2012). Public access to urban spaces, in relation to the spaces of consumption, exemplified by shopping centers, Olympic 'live sites', event venues, and other recreational areas becomes regulated through security governance strategies that rely heavily on private policing and heavy insistence on technological surveillance architectures. Given the heightened numbers of populations to regulate, and the associated 'thinning' of publicly available security and policing officials, private security detail are a necessarily relied upon to fulfill these demands.

[51] IOC Charter, http://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution

Since the pipe-bomb explosion at the Atlanta 1996 Games, organizers have shifted their focus to consider a wider range of 'celebration sites', such as hotels, restaurants, and shopping centers, as potential 'soft targets' that might be subject to attack or disruptions (Fussey et al 2011). However, the large number of venues and other spaces of consumption associated with MSEs means that they cannot all be policed by public entities alone. Uncertainties and anxieties abound, the spaces and threats associated with major events continue to expand, and the demand for PSCs continues to grow. Emphasis on the large number of Olympic venues, celebration sites, and other critical infrastructure, and the increasing demand to protect them has meant an associated explosion in the culture of insecurity at major events – again, an expression of the urbanization of insecurity (Coward 2009), which drives ever-expanding security plans that rely heavily on PSCs (Boyle 2012).

Aside from these push factors, several other "pull" factors condition the rise of the PSC in the context of MSEs. MSEs provide a distinct opportunity for national security officials and local police departments to acquire new technology and equipment. The overwhelming perception from security planners that "nothing should go wrong" (Boyle and Haggerty 2011) has also prompted demand for PSCs to play a significant role in security provisions at major events. Although major events serve as key sites of demand in the global security industrial complex, these security projects are in part an extension of the ballooning high-tech defence, military, intelligence and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contracting industry. Out of the top-ten DHS contractors in 2008—Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumman, IBM, L-3 Communications, Unisys, SAIC, Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, General Electric (GE), and Accenture—all have been involved in MSE security projects. For the private security industry, MSEs provide a distinct opportunity to test the latest developments in their command and control architectures—and to push into new markets that are associated with homeland security initiatives. As such, several private firms position integration practices at the core of their corporate security strategies (e.g., Honeywell Security 2009). As one security analyst states, "unified security platforms that seamlessly blend all security systems into one are the holy grail of the industry" (Himmelsbach 2009). And companies are increasingly able

to 'leverage their security services between MSEs and a range of other areas public safety governance, including border security, disaster management, emergency planning, alarm systems, access control technologies, and other monitoring devices (Aas e al. 2008). A director of AFI International, a Canadian security firm that specializes in securing corporate events and labour disputes (both smaller-scale manifestations of event-led security processes), thinks budget issues alone will force integration, thereby solidifying the future of private security solutions (Cummer 2009).

The ongoing generated profits are enormous. As Boyle and Haggerty (2009a) point out, SAIC picked up $322 million USD profit from the Athens 2004 Games, although this amount is a mere fraction of the company's annual revenues that average $7 and $8 billion USD in recent years. The Beijing 2008 Olympics allowed various American firms (IBM, General Electric, Honeywell, and United Technologies) to expand into the Chinese domestic market (Bradsher 2007a; Haggerty and Boyle 2009a). The "Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere" for example, launched high-tech surveillance systems in 600 Chinese cities (Bradsher 2007b). The Chinese security industry association estimated this market to top 43 billion USD by 2010 (Bradsher 2007c).

It comes as little surprise that MSEs present lucrative opportunities for the private security market. The demands for PSCs are unparalleled because security threats at MSEs are increasingly sub-national, regional, and urban in scale – characterized by the ongoing blurring between national security and domestic law enforcement practices – therefore making them attractive destinations for private security guard services, as well as for security and surveillance technology vendors. Amidst an expansive threat horizon that feeds growing sources of insecurity and public fear, the threat of catastrophic risk and the idea that disaster should be avoided at all costs compels vast public investment into public safety solutions on offer (Boyle and Haggerty 2012; Neocleous 2007: 37). However, commercial/economic shifts in the context of MSEs reveal only part of the story about PSCs and MSEs. Insistence on economic explanations assumes linear growth

and development of the private security industry in the context of MSEs without further empirical detail on the relations developed between the public and private sector.[52]

Enhanced legitimacy flows from massive infusions of economic capital that offer PSCs rich opportunities for the accumulation of symbolic capital. As Bourdieu (1993) points out, control over material resources is closely linked to social and cultural legitimacy and relations of dominance. The overwhelming presence of the security apparatus at major public viewing events legitimates the enormous private sector role that the security industry now plays. Opportunities to rethink and expand capital accumulation strategies abound—MSEs showcase "place-based" security technologies that can be marketed as "state of the art" systems that can be used for homeland security. SAIC, the developers of security systems for Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake 2002, has successfully leveraged each MSEs to this end (Samatas 2007). Corporations insist such contracts are more important "symbolically" rather than financially, speaking to the degree to which involvement in the Olympic spectacle can improve the legitimacy of a PSC. Acklands-Grainger (AG), makers of systems that sniff out chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological threats, insists that its biggest payoff will be increased visibility and influence in the emergency preparedness industry (Lee 2008). Involvement of PSCs in MSEs enhances the normative legitimacy of the company, and demonstrates to its public sector contractors that the experience and professionalism that the company has gained at such high-stakes events can be carried forward into future contracts. Coaffee and Rogers sum it up nicely: "Resilience, safety, and security have...become an...important tool in the armoury of reputation managers and place promoters as security, marketing, economic development and regeneration have become necessarily intertwined" (2008: 215).

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[52] Further inquiry by researchers into the role of the private security industry at major events should address the implication for major sports events to reconfigure the shifting locus of authority between the private security industry and the state, whether, how, and in what ways normative legitimacy is conferred on the private security industry in the context of MSEs. For instance, in what ways does involvement in securing major events benefit or risk the reputation of an often-suspect industry? What are the regulatory mechanisms that exist between PSCs and the state in the context of MSEs? What do these regulatory mechanisms advanced by the state, as well as the experiences of private security industry in securing MSEs, tell us about the shifting locus of authority between the private security industry and the state in the domestic security sector?

Further, the pivotal role of security industry associations and their involvement in the revolving door that exists between government, industry, and business is a further important dimension for understanding the normative legitimacy of the private security industry. Private actors, represented in industry associations, set standards and develop industry norms and 'best-practices' in MSE security governance. Such bodies serve as intermediary organizations between the state and the security industry, and are designed to attract lucrative contracts and enhance the normative legitimacy of the industry as a whole. The British Security Industry Association (BSIA) appointed its own Project Director for the London 2012 Olympic Games, whose job was to provide "significant opportunities for UK business, particularly the security industry" (BSIA 2006). The influence of the industry association is truly global, and represents the extent to which public regulators have shifted responsibilities away from the state in a process of "governing-at-a-distance" (O'Connor et al. 2008). Security industry associations are able to focus not only on licensing and training requirements, but they can also promote economic opportunities and political legitimacy of the private security industry. One network of international security trade associations, the Global Security Industry Alliance (GSIA), has member organizations in the U.S., China, Russia and Brazil, and over the last eight years each of these countries has competed for or is hosting an Olympics or World Cup mega-event. In addition to industry associations, private security consultants, known as a 'caravan' of MSE experts by Cashman and Harris (2012), facilitate knowledge transfer in Olympic security governance (see also Boyle 2011).

Security industry associations form "Proto-institutional" relationships (Lawrence et al. 2002) that expand the reach and capital of the security industry, which fosters growth alongside national, provincial/state- level, and municipal government networks. Through the path-dependent, path-shaping neoliberal disciplinary mechanisms of public-private partnerships in security governance at MSEs (Gill 2003), "mega-event security epistemic communities," interdependent networks of a global commercialized and urban-militarized nature, are reproduced throughout the public sector—which are key to ongoing normative legitimacy within the domestic security sector. Phil Boyle (2011) calls

these "global security knowledge networks," similar to Bigo's (2004) "professionals in the management of unease". But it is not only fear that these professionals have in supply, they are also eager to negotiate with the government rules for their own statutory regulation (White 2010), which serves as a slight redrawing of the permissive normative boundaries over the use (and incremental expansion) of the private security industry. Further research on state intermediaries in the domestic and transnational security sector is required to tease out the duality of regulation and economic promotion functions of these bodies. In what follows, I examine a range of previous Olympics to better understand the economic imperatives for private sector involvement in Olympic games, the trends in statutory regulation that have been present at previous events, and the effect on the legitimacy of the private sector security industry has had from being involved in MSE contracts.

## Major Events and the Private Security Industry

The Athens 2004 Olympic security system was contracted to a consortium between American Science Application International Corporation and the German company, Siemens (Samatas 2004). The decision to contract to SAIC was based on the company's involvement in previous Olympic Games, notably the Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake City 2002 Games. For Athens 2004, SAIC-Siemens called their project "the largest and most sophisticated system for civil safety and security applications in the world" (Info4security 2007). Dubbed the C4I system (Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Integration), this electronic surveillance project integrated Olympic venues, marine infrastructure, and also provided 'smart' city situational awareness capabilities, such as the monitoring of traffic flow. C4I integrated a network of 29 subsystems into one single command system that linked Greek police, firefighters, coast guards, and armed forces (Samatas 2007: 221). The system also boasted 130 fixed and five mobile command centres, vehicle tracking devices, underwater motion sensors, 1250 to 1600 surveillance cameras, and a surveillance blimp—all underpinned by a 7000-strong Greek security force (Samatas 2007: 221). Integration spanned across 35 Olympic venues in Athens as well as four other cities, linking critical infrastructure facilities, including power stations,

water utilities and oil and gas reservoirs (Samatas 2007: 221). Informational databases as part of the C4I system provided real-time intelligence to central command, but were also integrated with data mining projects with SIS and Europol (Samatas 2011). This scale of integration provided a publicly funded opportunity for firms to assess their systems and for purchasers to reallocate uses of surveillance technologies perimeter detection systems, surveillance cameras and informational databases, as "durable assets" for redeployment well beyond their original application (Chase 2010). According to the contract, all of these systems were implemented for use after the Games had ended (Athens News, 5 March 2007: A07).

However, the system was a failure, unable to provide any of the technical functions it promised to deliver on. Delays in its implementation led to operational failures during the event, which continued long after the Games ended (Athens News, 18 February 2005: A08). As a result, SAIC posted a loss of $61 million USD in 2004. Two years later, in 2006, SAICs total losses on the project reached a stunning $123 million USD (Barltett and Steele 2007: 17). The failure prompted the Greek Ministry of Citizen Protection filing an official complaint against SAIC for failing to fulfill its contractual obligations, that is, failing to implement an operational security system with properly trained Greek personnel (Greek Ministry of Public Order 2007). SAIC subsequently counter-sued the Greek government. Seven years later, the case was finally settled through international arbitration (Washington Business Journal 2013). While SAIC was successful in arbitration, its inability to fulfill its contract damaged their reputation, which further tarnished its reputation.

The Beijing 2008 Olympics were the most lucrative Olympic Games in modern history for the private security industry. Total security expenditures for the event are estimated to be $6.5 billion. The 2008 Games precipitated a massive trend for Western private security industry to break into the Chinese market – offering a loophole, specifically, for US companies who are typically bound by US congress legislation from selling military equipment to China (Hambling 2008). A further range of PSCs were involved in security provisions at the event—contributing to what is known as the 'Beijing Safeguard

Sphere'. IBM provided a "smart surveillance system" (S3) in the urban domain of Beijing. Such Safe City deployments, which feature centralized security command centres that connect a range of agencies are common. In the Olympic domain, Panasonic, an official Olympic partner implemented 2000 video surveillance cameras for perimeter intrusion detection. United Technologies in Guangzhou established a "2000 camera network in a single neighbourhood, the first step towards a citywide network of 250,000 cameras to be installed before the Asian Games in 2010" (McMillan 2007; Samatas 2012). GE also provided thousands of cameras that featured Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities, which provided automatic alerts about "suspicious or fast-moving objects, like people running" (Bradsher 2007a). Additional audio and visual surveillance was conducted by telecommunications giants Nokia and Siemens (Moechel 2008). China's relatively immature security market presented vast opportunities for technical developers, even though the use of private security guard companies was smaller when compared with other events. Perhaps attributable to historical-cultural reasons, Beijing relied heavily on a culture of volunteerism over and above the private security industry.

The City of London has a long history of developing security and surveillance infrastructure. The extant security and surveillance infrastructure in London means that Olympic security arrangements tended to layer over already existing infrastructures. Fussey and Coaffee (2012) and Fussey et al (2011) demonstrated this layering effect when they discussed the technological architecture of London's Ring of Steel and the associated use of CCTV and ALPR technologies, which were deployed in some of the poorest areas of London in the lead up to the London 2010 Olympics – more specifically within the 'Olympic Boroughs' of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Hackney.

The UK, however, also has a long history of the use of private security guards (White 2010). The industry has grown fairly steadily since the 1950s, reaching an annual turnover of £476.4 million in 1983 to £1.2256 billion in 1990 (Jordon and Sons 1989 and 1993; quoted in Jones and Newburn 1995: 226; quoted in White 2010: 109). These resources afforded private security executives of the industry with enhanced political sway throughout this period, which eventually crystallized in the 2001 Private Security Act. The main part of this act created the Security Industry Authority (SIA), a state

intermediary under the authority of the UK Home Office that is tasked with regulating PSCs that were subject to the new legislation (White 2011: 141).

On the supply side, the £600 million security budget for the London 2012 Games generated further opportunities for private security guards and technical vendors to sell services and products. The British Security Industry Association, the foremost security lobby association in the UK, was front and centre in promoting the economic and business opportunity that the London 2012 Olympics afforded to the private sector industry. The BSIA director of the body insisted that, "the 2012 Olympics and its ongoing legacy represent a significant business opportunity for BSIA members."

In the lead-up to the event, in March 2011, global multinational G4S was made the official "security services provider" for the London 2012 Olympics, and was set to provide training and management for a 10,000 member security force, which spanned military, private security guards and unpaid volunteers. Just nine months later, a UK government in the wake of the 2011 riots, required that the total number of security guards for the Games should rise to 23,700, more than double original estimates (Chan 2013). G4S's own contract with LOCOG to provide 2,000 officials ballooned to 10,400 security staff. The G4S contract was worth a total of £284m. However, only weeks before the Games were set to be underway, G4S was forced to admit to UK Ministers that it "would not be able to deliver the numbers of security personnel that they had promised" (Chan 2013). Amidst a flurry of negative media attention and public outrage, the UK government drafted up to 3500 troops and hundreds of local police divisions drafted officers from nine forces to close the private security gap (Johnson and Davis 2012). More than £150 million was wiped off the company's market value in two days, a dive of as much as 10% of the firm's total value.

Given these shortages, it was suspected that G4S was "panic-recruiting" people just two weeks before the Games, fanning further disbelief that the company was not fulfilling its regulatory obligations to properly vet and train officers (Johnson and Davis 2012). G4S chief executive Nick Buckles was eventually relieved from his post, and G4S has since

ruled out bidding for contracts at the Rio 2016 Olympics in Brazil "because he fears the reputational damage that would be done to the company if the fiasco of the London contract was repeated." (Telegraph 2013). Total losses for G4S totalled approximately £70 million, intense pressure to its reputation, and the loss of other contracts in the UK (the Wolds prison was returned to the public sector), all of which forced the company to issue a profit warning to its shareholders. If a secondary goal is the accruement of symbolic capital, as a means to capture legitimacy from the state in the domestic security sector, G4S failed emphatically. The implication is a reaffirmation that the nation-state is the rightful source of authority—and that security *ought* to be delivered by the public sector. Interestingly, however, the implication of the public deployment was such that the military was deployed to fulfill this shortfall, thereby effectively not only legitimating that the state is the primary arbiter over the use of force (and safety), but that the militarization of the urban landscape is a salient, and publicly celebrated, means to rescue the population from an uncertain future, and therefore uphold the legitimate authority of the militarized state.

The Sochi 2014 Games could surpass Beijing 2008 as the Games with the highest amount of spending on urban security developments. According to global multinational consultancy, Frost and Sullivan (2013), the total amount of spending on infrastructure for the Sochi 2014 Olympics totals $626.20 billion USD which will present security integrators with significant opportunities over the next 15 years. Among the main attractive developments for the private security industry is the development of urban security or Safe City programmes that are likely to follow the example of Moscow, and will be instituted in more Russian cities. These developments could be a "catalyst for larger Safe City deployments, with centralized command and control connecting multiple agencies". (Frost and Sullivan 2013). Russian authorities are also using the catalytic potential of the Olympics to enhance Russia's geopolitical authority over the Arctic arena. Investments to enhance outdated Cold-War era physical security architecture are confirmed to include "advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies…[that]…will include radars, UAVs, surveillance cameras and night vision technology" (Frost and Sullivan 2013). The Games are also an opportunity for the private

security industry to capitalize on Russia's intention to develop biometric controls at border points. In 2012, Russia introduced an ePassport system. In what is now a common practice at North American and European borders, the border security programme prompts the passport holder to provide fingerprint data in exchange for the convenience of electronic self-service gates. Using the Olympics as a justification, Russia is grafting further advancements in this border security regime so their use is established at several more border crossing before the Sochi 2014 event takes place. The lush opportunities for technology vendors and security integrators are readily apparent. Currently, however, little information is known about the role and scope of any potential application of private security guard patrols, though it is expected they will be in widespread use. Such economic opportunities are buoyed by PSCs who are eager to improve their instrumental legitimacy, that is, the quality and effectiveness of their security solution prior to the Games. The Olympics provide a valuable opportunity to enhance personal partnerships. According to the Olympic security consultancy, "Russia offers opportunity for organizations that are prepared to invest time in building relationships" (Webb, Frost and Sullivan 2013).

### Private Security Industry and Major Events in Canada: The Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the Toronto G8/20 Summit

The Vancouver 2010 Olympics provided a key niche for expanding the global security industry market. With over $900 million at stake, a number of government agencies negotiated contracts with private security firms. One of the largest was Honeywell, who received a contract worth $35.5 million CAD to provide a Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS). The PIDS integrated a range of technologies (surveillance cameras, motion sensors, ground and water-based radar) into a single system and promised "intelligent video" capabilities that could distinguish "normal activity" from "that which poses a security risk" (Honeywell Critical Infrastructure 2009). SAIC, a popular Olympic security vendor in the previous decade was a silent partner on the Honeywell contract.

Richmond, B.C. company, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. also received a $4.8 million contract to also contribute to a second PIDS. The company is a partner with

Israel Aerospace Industries in a $100 million federal contract to manufacture a number of Heron surveillance drones that are used over Afghanistan. And recently, the company has also closed a lucrative deal $11.3 million CAD deal with the Canadian DND to improve aerial surveillance operation capabilities. However, one VANOC source has suggested that the PIDS system did not function properly and experienced significant cost overruns (Mackin 2010), reminiscent of Athens 2004 where the state-of-the-art SAIC C4I system failed (Samatas 2007). If this failure was the case, the company successfully avoided the negative public fallout flowing from its failure to provide a functioning system. Other key contracts included one to Garret Metal Detectors for 550 walk-through metal detectors and 1,100 hand held detector devices – issued despite reports from a previous Olympic organizing executive that airport style checks provide "illusory security" because they cannot detect non-metallic materials in explosives (Boyle and Haggerty 2009a: 50). Weapons manufacturers, Thales Canada and Lockheed Martin, were also awarded a contract to develop two "passive coherent location radar" systems for the Games.

Keeping in line with the cross-fertilization of the private military technology sector and major events, the VPD also purchased a public order technology, the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), developed by the American Technology Corporation for civilian crowd control (Canadian Press 2009a). LRADs use a high-pitched frequency sound, a piercing high-pitched noise so powerful can potentially cause permanent eardrum and heart damage, to break up crowds. Previous acquisition of an LRAD by both the Pittsburgh and Toronto Police, each in advance of their G20 Summit responsibilities, indicates this will be a central technological feature at future mega-events.

The US State Department issued a threat assessment one month before the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, noting the heightened prospect of terrorist attacks to occur in less protected areas adjacent to fortified Olympic venues (Canadian Security Magazine 2010). As we have seen, the heightened anxieties around potential "soft targets" typically prompt an associated increase in the use of private security guards at port facilities, transportation systems, energy facilities, and tourist attractions. Announcements such as these threat assessments prompt the further "responsibilization" of security, the goal of

which is to enhance security protections by widening the range of actors implicated in security provisions to include state, non-state, and other actors, such as private businesses, who are not traditionally involved with security provisions (Garland 1996). By encouraging private agencies, organizations, and citizens to assume reporting responsibilities, authorities encourage a disciplinary effect in which a broad range of actors conforms to particular conceptions of normality. As a result, implicating business organizations and "citizen spies" furthers suspicions and anxieties around categories of the "Other" whom are typically racialized, or otherwise identified with practices, such as political demonstrations, that might infer an abrogation of the national values that are inherent in national security practices. The result is an expansion of the possibilities, actors, and sites where security-specific practices are carried out, often operative through set of tacit knowledges that are held by individuals about what, and whom, is perceived to be threatening.

At the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the "responsibilization" of security was exemplified by the move of security governance into the private business sector of Vancouver during the Olympics. The VPD, when asked about how relationships with the Private Sector unfolded throughout the chronology of the Olympics, responded by saying that deeper ties with the private sector were:

> "…a result of the Olympics. We had formal contacts and informal contacts throughout the private sector, especially in the downtown core of Vancouver, and what I'm talking about are things like building management companies and things like that. Now, those relationships were dramatically enhanced before the Olympics, but a lot of that had to do not so much with us reaching out to them, it was them reaching out to us, and a lot of that had to do with a deputy chief constable from our department who retired and moved into that sector and fanned the flames within the business sector to form those relationships and we now have Operation Cooperation which is in the downtown core, and its sort of a text slash email group with the police, where the police can share information with the business owners and a lot of it has to do with property crime and you know, targets, and things like that. But, there was…those relationships were key to allow me to plan for the larger protests, there was the opening ceremonies protest, and things like that, that I knew I could reach out to various property owners and either have them secure their buildings properly or

> utilize whatever assets they had to support us. And so those relationships continue to this day, and the Olympics were very big on enhancing that."[53]

The VPD's Operation Cooperation points further to how insecurities and threat analysis from major sporting events form a discursive basis to establish pathways of communication and cooperation across public and private sectors. While Operation Cooperation was conceived as an Olympic-specific program, the Games forged a common desire between police and private agencies in a coalition of control to collectively demarcate and regulate threats to the urban environment, and to further develop information sharing protocols that are intended enhance the image and growth of commercialism within Vancouver moving forward.

However, one of the most notable examples of "responsibilization" of security at Vancouver 2010 emerged through the Vancouver Hotel Security Association (VHSA). The VHSA brought together security directors from the city's hotels to share information on thefts, fraud, and suspicious persons. Interestingly, the project grew out of "Operation Cooperation". Clive Hamdorff, director of security with the Four Seasons Hotel in Vancouver, insisted that one of the primary goals of the initiatives was to "keep people up-to-date on new technology," by bringing in speakers to present on surveillance technologies such as CCTV, and "to give everyone an update on how systems are changing rapidly" (Brown 2007). The implication is that these sites are now brought into the threat horizon, which is seized upon by private security integrators as a valuable area for future market growth. These practices indicate the extent to which greater numbers of individuals and organizations are being drawn into security governance initiatives at major events, with the likelihood that these institutionalizing practices resonate after the event has ended.

Like most major events, the largest private sector contracts went to the private security guard sector. The role of private security guards at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics was the largest one-off event in Canadian history. Economic opportunities at the Vancouver 2010

[53] Anonymous Interviewee 3, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

Olympics for private security guard companies were significant. The Integrated Security Unit (composed of the RCMP, VPD, West Vancouver Police, National Defence, and CSIC, among others) issued a notice ahead of the formal contract tender for private security personnel that asked the industry to consider the feasibility of one company providing as many as 5,000 licensed security guards to contribute 900,000 hours of manpower, 24 hours a day, seven days a week over the three-month duration of the Games (Canadian Press 2008). At the time, the provincial government counted only 8,600 licensed security guards in the entire province. Industry officials were quick to point out that provincial licensing requirements prohibited companies from reaching out to other provinces or the US to recruit the required amount of workers – and that changes to already existing provincial legislation that would need to be made so workers from outside Canada to be brought in to assist with the Games. Previous regulations allowed only Canadian citizens to work as licensed security workers in BC.

The province responded with new provisions to the Security Services Act. The amendments, passed in the fall of 2008, authorized Canadian residents with either work visas or student visas to work as licensed private security guards in the province. The provisions also allowed for a ratcheting-down of training and licensing requirements for prospective employees. In order to meet the shortage, a 90-day 'under supervision' license would allow an individual to work for a period of 90 days during the security guard training process. Responding to these changes, Chief Operations Officer of Paladin Security, a private security guard company involved with the 2010 Games, said that these changes were a "knee-jerk reaction" to circumvent a shortage in the supply of guards in the province (Canadian Press 2008).

On the heels of these changes to the Security Services Act in BC, the largest private security contract ever awarded in Canada soon followed suit. Contemporary Security Canada (CSC) received a $97.42 million CAN dollar contract to secure the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. CSC is a consortium of three security firms—Aeroguard International of Toronto, Contemporary International of Salt Lake City, and United Protection Services of Edmonton. The company drew on its legitimacy as an Olympics provider, having held a

previous contract at the 2004 Salt Lake City Olympics and the Torino 2006 Games (Paley 2010). Approximately 5,000 private security officers were used to provide security at the Games, which involved airport style access control services at Olympic venues and the Athlete's village, as well as screening at the media center (Lee 2009). The Olympic drive for private security guards also sparked a 45 percent jump in demand for Commissionaires BC, a second private security guard agency involved with the 2010 Games, when comparing the months of January to March between 2009 and 2010.

As part of their regulatory requirements, CSC was required by authorities to screen prospective employees. The RCMP performed background checks and fingerprinted applicants on about 500,000 individuals. The RCMP collected personal biographical information, similar to what would be found in a passport application, but with the additional capture of biometric fingerprinting. All in all, the RCMP performed accreditation checks on approximately 500,000 individuals, raising concerns that authorities might retain this data after the event had ended. The RCMP however, ensured that all data, including the biometric data was destroyed after the event had ended. There is currently no independent verification that this has occurred.

However, the process was not without controversy as the RCMP was cited for cultural profiling because they denied two Muslim men who had already been hired by CSC (CBC 2010). The increased demands to have a full workforce that was ready in time for the event meant a shortened training programme was in place. New hires were given between 20 and 56 hours of training (Mertl 2010). Privacy critics and local competitors cried foul – but no embarrassing difficulties, such as those seen at London 2012, emerged during the Games (CBC 2009).

Later that same year, in 2010, controversy soon caught up with CSC. The RCMP hired CSC to provide private security guard and security screening services at the G8/G20 political summit in Huntsville and Toronto, Ontario. The contract, worth over $20 million, arranged for over 1000 security guards to provide screening functions around border points associated with the summit security zone. Under similar pressures as the

2010 Olympic planning process, to hire, train, and deploy vast numbers of private guards under a tight timeline, the RCMP hired CSC *before* the company had acquired a legal license to operate in Ontario. The contract angered many other private security guard companies in the industry.

Facing pressures to bring CSC into compliance, the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety & Corrections relaxed regulations governing private security licenses. In a licensing process that typically takes a company six months to acquire, CSC was given a license in just one week (Brown 2010). In a similar ratcheting-down trend as was seen with regulators at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the government of Ontario fast-tracked the licensing procedure in a move that allowed expired licenses to be extended for 30 days, to "ensure that licensees with imminent expiry dates are able to continue to provide security services at this critical time" (Government of Ontario 2010).

A complaint from the president of the Association of Professional Security Agencies (APSA), which represents 18 security companies and 30,000 people in the industry, asked the Ombudsman of Ontario to examine the licensing process and inflated price tag of the G8 and G20 events. An criminal investigation into the contract process was launched.

The investigation found that CSC offered to sell its services while it was not licensed to operate in Ontario. The investigation also lead to a host of violations by CSC security guards, who operated at the G8 Summit in Huntsville. In March 2011, CSC was charged with "three counts of offering security services while not licensed, two counts of failing to ensure proper uniforms, and one charge of hiring an unlicensed guard for the G8 and G20 summits" (CBC News Ottawa 2011). In addition, 12 other persons including the President, Vice-President and Project Director of both the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the G8/G20 were charged with several offences under Ontario's Private Security and Investigative Services Act (PSISA). Suspicions remain about the due process associated with the contract, specifically, with unsubstantiated allegations that partiality was

afforded to CSC because the Vice President of Operations for Aeroguard Security (part of the CSC consortium) was a retired RCMP officer (Warmington 2010).

The private sector also carried significant normative weight, to the extent that it shielded some individuals and areas from deeper scrutiny. In a statement that demonstrates how the symbolic power of the private sector confers a status upon individuals and areas that are less subject to security checks, stated that:

"one of the big things with the Olympics was that a lot of the hotels were booked so far in advance and not by criminals, you know, there was like, entire hotels that coke had, or the ISU had, or the Olympic family had three hotels right? Two huge ones inside a venue and then there were two mini-venues. So there was not a lot of hotel space to be had that wasn't actually completely taken over by some sort of fairly well organized … the ones [hotels] that quite frankly scared us is what's going on in New Westminster…we have no idea… it didn't' turn out to be a problem…"[54]

In this particular case, it would seem that the image and associated normative legitimacy of the private sector excluded them from the threat horizon.

## Conclusion

Generally speaking, the economic potential of one-time contracts for private security guard companies and defence industry technology suppliers is significant. Olympic contracts provide opportunity for large short-term profit windfalls. The widened threat horizon in the urban landscape furthers opportunity for the defence sector to branch into an increasingly urbanized homeland security sector by provisioning security solutions that affirm the idea that international security is "coming home" through increased integration between national security and domestic law enforcement initiatives (Coaffee and Wood 2006).

The vast economic opportunities afforded by security technology vendors are apparent in the massive amounts of profits in contracts that have been contracts awarded to industry specialists. This is the norm for security integrators who look to capitalize on trends in

[54] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012

Olympic related urban regeneration developments and the associated benefits for surveillance technologies that flow from such developments. During the event, vendors can capitalize on massive contracts for access control based technological systems, and look forward to possible future contracts from wider smart city and public safety developments that are the enduring legacy for the private sector industry in an Olympic city.

However, while the economic benefits of Olympic security contracts are clearly lucrative, the opportunities to enhance the normative legitimacy of PSCs in the context of major events has been mixed. The scope of the security requirements, and the accelerated deadlines that accompany security provisions at major events has lead to a long string of bungled Olympic contracts. The negative media attention that has flowed from mismanagement has seriously damaged the reputations of some of the companies that participate in major event security contracts, that as a result, reaffirms the normative authority of the nation-state over the domestic security sector – which is a lasting general legacy to security and policing at major events. However, these same tight timelines that yield challenges for PSCs in carrying out their contracts, also present opportunities for the state to weaken already existing regulations of the private security industry, in order to accommodate heightened demand.

The legacies of the private security sector in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics – and major events in Canada, more generally, are complex and varying. The private security guard industry at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics saw a massive influx to the years profit margins. Security and technical vendors were also keen to reap the profits from Olympic contracts, but other companies noted the distinct opportunity to improve their normative stead with the public sector. At the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the use of private security followed a set of trends that are common to global major sporting events around the world. First, they provided lucrative opportunity for short-term contracts by security technology providers. Second, they presented an opportunity for these same companies to enhance the normative legitimacy of their brand and position in the domestic security sector as a whole, by attending to such a globally significant event. The

risks of negative normative fallout stemming from fulfilling high-demand, short-term contracts at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics didn't occur, such as it did at previous events for London 2012 and Athens 2004, for example.

From a legislative vantage point however, the economic profits attained from Vancouver 2010 would not have been possible without the dismantling of the statutory regulations that govern the private security industry in order to meet heightened demand. Changes to the BC Security Services Act were justified to meet the demands of the Games, and their changes were a lasting legacy of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. A key disciplinary function that shapes the behaviours of the PSCs, such as training and education, were minimized to meet the heightened demand for employees in Vancouver for the event. Changes to the act in order to meet Olympic demand also ratcheted-down hiring requirements for PSCs. Moving forward after the event, PSCs are now able to hire Canadian residents with either work and student visas in the Province of BC – a move which, on the one hand, provides employment opportunities for Canadian non-citizens. On the other hand, this move is also likely to place overall downward pressure on wages as the demand for private security tapers off after the Olympics – leaving a legacy of increased labour supply at lower cost for PSCs in the province of BC.

In terms of state regulation of the private security industry, many prospective PSC employees must be subject to invasive background checks on their past, and submit biometric information such as fingerprints for a criminal record check. With the accreditation of the some 5000 prospective employees who underwent background checks and mandatory fingerprinting at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, and under the auspices of the RCMP, the biometric data that was collected on these individuals was claimed to be destroyed after the event had ended (RCMP 2012). If a legacy can be said to exist in the regulatory dimension of the governance of trust and character of the private security industry at Vancouver 2010, it is that the practices involving such accreditation are further institutionalized as status quo industry policy.

And yet, even under new legal conditions (which have endured since the event has ended), fulfilling massive Olympic contracts pose a further problem for PSCs. While CSC was able to fulfill its contract for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics without controversy, the company encountered incredible controversy in a second major event contract at the G8/20 event in Toronto. The reputation garnered from fulfilling such Olympic contracts – provided they are fulfilled effectively – can be carried forward into future events, but even this advantage can backfire, demonstrating an uneven legacy of reputational risk for private security companies rushing to fulfill large-scale contracts under incredibly tight timelines. CSC attempted to carry a reputational legacy of major event contracts from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics forward to the G8/G20 event, but instead the company found themselves at the centre of an industry controversy and was found guilty of criminal charges for operating without a license in the Province of Ontario. The normative backlash damaged the reputation of the private security industry, but also reaffirmed that the locus of authority in the domestic security sector resides with the state.

Finally, an additional legacy flowing from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics is the continuing development of "proto-institutional" relationships as an aspect of private security assemblages. The penetration of the private security industry across federal, provincial, and municipal levels at the Vancouver Olympics has lead to a legacy of public private partnerships. For example, one representative from the security firm Acklands-Grainger (AG), makers of systems that sniff out chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats, insists their biggest payoff is increased visibility and further influence in the emergency preparedness industry (Lee 2009a). In addition, associated state intermediaries, such as security industry associations, and other private sector organizations, such as hotel associations are increasingly being brought into the fold of security practices—expanding the range of actors and places that are involved with security governance practices. As this chapter noted, one of the implications of this expanding network of security governance in the context of major events (including the Vancouver 2010 Olympics) is the further "responsibilization" of security, a process of

expanded security affiliations which widens the range of actors engaged in subjective practices of security.

Overall, a range of security governance legacies are emergent from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. First, major economic opportunities befall security companies who become involved in major event security. Second, these short term contracts also offer significant opportunity to enhance the normative legitimacy of the private security industry, by virtue of their recognition of being involved with such an elite event, but also in the way that new markets can be cultivated through the expansion of security rationales into the urban (often regenerated) spaces of the urban major event city. Third, given the heightened demand for private security services under a very tight deadline, state governments routinely respond by weakening legislation that governs the use of the private security industry in order to remove obstacles for PSCs to fulfill their contracts. In Vancouver, this left an enduring legacy of weakened state regulation. Legal thresholds for appropriate amounts training were diminished, hiring restrictions based on citizenship statuses were removed, thereby creating a larger supply of labour for the private security industry could seize upon both during, as well as moving forward, after the event. However, even though opportunities for economic windfall, enhanced symbolic legitimacy in the domestic security sector, and an "improved" regulatory environment for business operations by the private security industry in Olympic cities are present, the prospect of failure (and implications therein) linger on. In Vancouver, CSC was able to fulfill their contract without failure, though this is not always the case. The same company faced legal and normative challenges when it was found guilty in a provincial court for operating at the G8/20 event without a proper license. Similarly, and more popularly, major private security firm G4S bungled the London 2012 Olympic security contract with left a legacy of normative and economic fallout for that particular company—enough to dissuade them from participating in any future Olympic contracts.

# Chapter 7: Considering the Vancouver 2010 Public Safety Legacies

Security governance legacies are relatively enduring assemblages of security, policing, and surveillance practices. As an emergent product of the generative capacities of entities that cohere into larger actor-networks, security governance practices take on their characteristics as legacies through their capacity to emerge, stabilize, and persist as relatively durable assemblages. Put another way, security governance assemblages, more specifically, emerge through a hybrid set of entities (objects, technologies, imaginaries, norms, actors) as configurations of 'the social' that are the product of social practice.

Examining security governance legacies means, therefore, examining configurations of heterogeneous sets of material relations, discourses, representations, and the sorts of inclusions, exclusions, and legitimating processes such configurations entail. Governing security and public safety practices at major events means new formations and patterns of collaboration occur, but such configurations does not necessarily entail a solidified unity within the network. Paraphrasing Foucault, the logic of security strategy at major events is about the logic of connections through the heterogeneous elements of the apparatus, and not necessarily about the logic of homogenization of difference. Configurations of control are rife with tensions and multiple regimes of regulation, that while expressive of a trend toward the convergence of crime control and counter-terrorism operations, are heterogeneously assembled. Understanding security governance assemblages in this way, it is possible to discern a politics of security governance legacies as a dynamic and ongoing process. Such an approach more carefully considers aspects of continuity and change in security governance assemblages as a whole, but also on the political implications therein.

The purpose of this chapter is to revisit the case material presented in previous chapters to understand security governance assemblages relationally, and to see how these assemblages are more or less enduring – which conditions their characteristics as legacies. By tracing the associations within the security governance assemblages across

these cases at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and across a range of security and policing assemblages in contemporary security governance arrangements in general, we see that security governance legacies emerge, mutate, spur policy mobilities, or condition new spatial or policy imaginaries that shape and constrain the trajectory of security and policing assemblages in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. The chapter also explores the political implications of these major-event specific transformations in security governance assemblages.

The key methodological (and practical) question of this chapter is: what objects, materials, texts, technologies, agency, or policies are relevant to the emergence of a specific security governance assemblage that conditions the assemblage as a relatively enduring legacy? And further, how do these cases—as relatively discrete security governance assemblages—compare with one another? What insights might we be able to derive regarding Olympics security governance legacies as emergent and relatively enduring actor-network associations? The chapter also explores each of the cases that appear throughout the dissertation, each as distinct sets of concrete practices that comprise hybrid formations of entities specific to the assemblage in question and that translate into a wider legacy. Through a discussion each of these cases, the exploration of the durability of the security governance assemblages, how assemblages transform, what assemblages transform *into*, and the ongoing socio-political implications of such continuities and transformations are explored.

## Public Video Surveillance Assemblage Legacies

The history of public video surveillance in Vancouver, (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3) provides a useful backdrop to consider the continuity of public video surveillance legacies after the 2010 Games.[55] In Vancouver, authorities' previous public

[55] Previous inquiry into public video surveillance legacies in Vancouver after the 2010 Games have been partial and faced methodological limitations. Access restrictions and limited historical distance from the event by the authors during the time of writing made it difficult to provide a comprehensive view of the public video surveillance legacies stemming from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. Given these constraints, only a limited account of camera surveillance legacies in Vancouver has been considered thus far in the surveillance and policy literatures (Vonn and Boyle 2010).

video surveillance agendas included the VPD pressing for cameras in the impoverished downtown east side (DTES), as well as along the burgeoning Granville entertainment corridor, a popular and particularly rowdy night time entertainment district, which is prone to assaults, gang-related activity, and high levels of alcohol-related public order disturbances, which causes it to continue to be an area of interest by the VPD (Sullivan 2006). Little evidence, however, has been found that Olympic related public video surveillance legacies 'laminated' or grafted onto this political history in any straightforward way (see Fussey and Coaffee 2010).

Urban Vancouver locations that once were traditional targets for video surveillance were not specifically designated as sites that needed additional, or even permanent, public video surveillance architecture over the course of the Vancouver Games. As a result, previously identified areas that had been slated for increased regulation and control prior to the Olympics were not subject (directly, at least) to a lasting public video surveillance legacy in Vancouver. And further, subsequent material infrastructure was not "retrofitted" into these areas after the event had ended. Clearly, the Games did not clearly provide new opportunities to revisit old public video surveillance debates in Vancouver.

Attempts to establish public video surveillance in the city of Vancouver have often been stalled and have been regularly derailed (Vonn and Boyle 2012). A strong showing of community resistance to such public video surveillance programs may have limited the extent to which old debates and public video 'hot spots' in Vancouver were avoided. Authorities clearly did not pursue any opportunity to revitalize public video surveillance projects in these areas.

This is not to say that public video surveillance legacies did not emerge in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Games. After the Olympics were awarded in 2003, the city of Vancouver underwent dramatic shifts in its public video surveillance infrastructure, policy and operational knowledge, as well as undergoing transformations in the urban geopolitical imaginaries that shape the use of video surveillance practices in Vancouver.

Notably, these changes did not neatly graft onto the previously identified historical sites that local authorities understood to be most suited for public video developments, which is often prevalent in the major event security literature (Fussey and Coaffee 2011). Instead, the 2010 Olympics provided opportunity for new public video surveillance assemblages to be formed—as a result of newly articulated material and policy developments—in the city of Vancouver.

The Olympic opportunity 'broke open' new possibilities for the material expansion and discursive mutation of the policy, frames that had, until that time, shaped public video surveillance assemblages in the city. The 2010 Games presented an opportunity to acquire new material/public video assemblages and to develop relatively new policy discourses and imaginaries in ways that diverged from longstanding historical agendas. In what follows, I trace the human and nonhuman entities of the Vancouver public video surveillance assemblage and consider how they mutually constitute one another to enable a novel urban public video surveillance legacy to emerge in Vancouver after the Games had finished.

The Olympics focusing event is a useful methodological entry-point because it reveals a deeper set of associations that emerge into public video surveillance legacies in Vancouver. Focusing events are critical events that trigger policy change by changing the dominant issues on the agenda of policy-makers (Birkland 1998; Kingdon 1995). In our case, the Olympics provide just such a focusing event, a catalyst for a range of institutions to leverage their own economic, political, and social agendas (Hiller 1995). In the context of public video surveillance in Vancouver and given the relative population's acquiescence to enhanced security measures during major sporting events (Taylor and Toohey 2012), the 2003 awarding of the Olympics provided authorities with vital economic and political opportunity to acquire new material technological acquisitions and a favourable political context to justify their implementation. Previous public video surveillance agendas that shaped the political history of public video surveillance in Vancouver, surprisingly enough, seemed to dissipate in the context of a revitalized Olympic public security agenda. New opportunities and new agendas stemming from the

Olympics were unfolding.

An influx of state-directed funds presented a new opportunity for Vancouver to acquire material technologies and for the city to reformulate the policies that underpinned camera surveillance in Vancouver. Shortly after the Games were awarded, provincial government funding initiatives that totalled approximately $2.5 million CDN were acquired by Vancouver police and emergency management officials to refurbish public video surveillance infrastructure in the city (BC 2008). The Olympics also created an opportunity for city officials, as part of this funding, to redesign the policies that regulated the use of public video surveillance. City officials understood this moment as an opportunity to renew their commitment to the public for a privacy considerate public video surveillance architecture.

This funding also prompted the acquisition of a new material infrastructure. Recall that in the 2010 security plans authorities' urban geopolitical imagination splintered the spaces of the Olympic city into two discrete domains. First, the venues for sport, as the "Olympic domain", remained under the jurisdiction of the RCMP. Second, the remaining spaces of the city, as the "urban domain", remained under the jurisdiction of the VPD. The material public video surveillance assemblages should be understood as operating relatively discretely between these two domains. Within the Olympic domain, the RCMP had contracted with private security provider Honeywell for 900 cameras as part of a perimeter intrusion detection system. These cameras were fully removed after the event had ended, even though there was some concern about whether they were even functioning properly during the event (Mackin 2012). Within the urban domain, the VPD established 84 cameras city-wide. These cameras remained permanently embedded into the urban landscape and have since been used to monitor traffic and street-level populations. This city-wide network is augmented by the OEM, which operates in a building that was purposefully designed to accommodate future expansions in public video surveillance infrastructure in the city. The broader installation of digital infrastructure that accommodates public video surveillance networks speaks to the way that buildings themselves can be understood as quasi-technologies with specific features

and uses (see Guggenheim 2010). As a building that is premised on providing emergency management and law enforcement functions, the OEM remains a distinct public safety legacy in Vancouver and the Lower Mainland.

The material network of these 84 cameras was supplemented with an official "Olympic policy" that established clear guidelines for surveillance, the storage of images, and a protocol for communication with law enforcement that was in place over the course of the event. This Olympic material and policy assemblage were distinctly expressed through the strategic governing rationale of targeted surveillance – and can be considered as a relatively distinct relational assemblage that was focused primarily on the Olympics.

A second material network of temporary, redeployable cameras (the TEMPS system) was also developed from Olympic-specific state-funded initiatives. A condition of receiving these funds for the Games was that the city was to develop their redeployable camera network infrastructure (TEMPS) and to refashion the official city policy governing its use. The funds allowed the city to purchase ten more redeployable cameras to be integrated into the 84-camera, city-wide surveillance network during the Games. And, as part of the city of Vancouver's commitment to revise their 2005 TEMPS policy, the city insisted through a PIA that there "would be no recording or storage of images" during any video surveillance associated with the TEMPS. As such, a new organizing metaphor for public video surveillance was introduced in Vancouver; the previous TEMPS infrastructure was refashioned with a new rationale to provide "situational awareness" to facilitate crowd management and emergency procedures. In so doing, the city was subsequently able to insist that provincial privacy protection did not apply to the use of their redeployable cameras for public safety viewing because the cameras were not being used for targeted surveillance – and/or law enforcement reasons – as data was not being collected and stored.

Part of this justification stemmed from the actual *physical* location of the cameras. Authorities claimed that because the cameras were mounted in aerial locations, up poles and on top of buildings, they provided a public safety—not a surveillance—function for

the city (Stevens 2012). Further, officials insisted the cameras were problematic service due to their difficulty to program. Because of this maintenance difficulty, the prospect of taking down and erecting the cameras in already difficult-to-reach locations in the urban landscape was compounded, meaning that many of the cameras remained embedded in the urban landscape for these reasons (see pp.74-75). However, while many of the redeployable cameras remained after the event, often they remained deactivated until subsequent events came along.

According to the head of Emergency Operations in Vancouver:

"We wanted to keep them up [the redeployable cameras] because although we wouldn't have any use for them day to day unless a big emergency happened…um…its very costly in terms of resource, and financially to get the cameras up, and re-program the systems, you know, to get the right labels on the cameras and, you know, to line them up, and to put the security screens on so people can't zoom into apartments…you know, there's a little digitally…there's an area where you can block out areas, areas where you don't really need to look, it just greys them out or whatever."[56]

Adding further:

"It's costly to do that [take the cameras down and put them up again], and a drain on staff resources, and it doesn't allow you to respond very quickly…to events you need weeks and weeks of notice, there really needs to be months and months of notice."[57]

The public video surveillance assemblage emerges through the relational configuration of the video surveillance technology, the technology's material manifestation in the urban infrastructure, and the novel imaginaries that condition both official policy and operational uses of the technology given these contingent articulations. The very nature of the technology and it's spatial location in the urban landscape conditions how officials relate to the material assemblage, and, therefore, condition its relative durability in the

[56] Director of Emergency Operations, City of Vancouver, June 22, 2012.

[57] Director of Emergency Operations, City of Vancouver, June 22, 2012.

urban landscape as an ongoing security governance legacy. Because the material sustenance of the cameras requires continued labour resources and their elevated locations in the urban landscape are hard to get to, the cameras are more likely to remain as a legacy of material assemblage.

In sum, the entanglement of the TEMPS into the Olympic material assemblage meant that the TEMPS monitoring policies and monitoring equipment were informally integrated with the Olympics policy and equipment (Hier and Walby 2013). The material assemblage of the TEMPS system and the associated revision of best-practices guidelines that now drew upon the organizing metaphor of situational awareness by city officials became entangled with the material and policy assemblage of the 84 camera city wide network and the associated operational policies that underpinned that system. As a result, after the Olympics a transformed public video surveillance legacy in Vancouver emerged: the terms that were specific to the TEMPS system (situational awareness) merged with the operational surveillance policy that had been designed specifically for the Games and was premised on routine surveillance, facial image capture, storage, and law enforcement disclosure policies.

The resulting video surveillance assemblage legacy had specific impacts on the TEMPs program. Moving forward, it was marked by a disjuncture between its situational awareness policy claim and its actual operational application of surveillance that relied on leftover tacit knowledge from the operators that continued from the Olympic public video surveillance assemblage. The camera operators' agency, another aspect of the socio-technical assemblage, was brought to bear on the operation of *both* systems. Further, this material and agency entanglement changed subsequent policy language so it indicated that the integration of "situational awareness" and "surveillance" rationales meant a disjuncture. Subsequent merging and mutation occurred that entailed a shift between a discourse of situational awareness governing the use of the TEMPS, and the actual targeted practices of surveillance as a routine operational practice of that network.

The result of the disjuncture between official policy discourse and actual operation is an actor-network of public video surveillance governance in the city of Vancouver that expresses a range of legacies. First, is the ***material*** legacy of 84 cameras that were deployed city wide, as well as the redeployable cameras that remain. The *physical location* of the cameras also factors into the emergence of a public video surveillance legacy. Second, is a ***policy*** legacy that emerged in relation to these material features. The redeployable system faced an interesting policy mutation with their newly designated use for situational awareness. The policy language and the strategic rationales that underpinned the material networks changed. The first policy rationale, underpinning the TEMPS system, upheld the *policy discourse* of situational awareness, while the second policy rationale ("Olympic policy") was *operated* under the rationale of surveillance. Moving forward, future major events in the city contributed to the entrenchment of the "situational awareness" metaphor, yet they upheld operational uses of camera surveillance that used targeted surveillance practices. Even after the 2011 Stanley Cup riots, a report recommended expanding the metaphor of "situational awareness" so it encompassed the protection of environment and property, demonstrating the pliability of this shifting rationale and providing an early indicator of the continuing function-creep through the organizing policy metaphor of situational awareness.

This sort of disjuncture – when taken together as a heterogeneous actor-network – emerges into a very distinct public video surveillance legacy in the city of Vancouver. The relatively enduring legacy of Olympic material acquisitions and the focusing event of the Olympics provided a rupture for renewed policy justifications. City officials reworked the best-practices guidelines in order to demonstrate the TEMPS system as a non-invasive system designed to enhance situational awareness, instead of a privacy-invasive system for conducting targeted surveillance. Institutionally and operationally, the human operators of the public video surveillance architecture persisted through a history of learned, routinized, and normative practices that conditioned public video surveillance in the city. As a result, on the basis of an expanded public video surveillance architecture in the city (where even the spatial location of surveillance technologies in the city matters), the disjuncture (and subsequent fusion) of public justifications for situational awareness

changed the public relations dimension of architecture in the city, while papering over the continued operational uses of the system for surveillance purposes.

These policy mutations, as the tension of shifting rationales between surveillance and situational awareness within the video surveillance assemblage, have serious implications for privacy and surveillance. City officials sought to secure a legacy where they did not have to draw upon on PIAs. The definitional parameters between situational awareness and surveillance that governed the use of the TEMPS system, and how these categorizations adhere to compliance with privacy regulations should be subject to critical scrutiny by regulators. Given that the public safety rationale of situational awareness undermines privacy-related protocol, such as the legal requirement to obtain privacy impact assessments (PIAs), and that the technology easily drifts between emergency management applications and targeted instances of surveillance as a tool for criminal justice, greater clarity and oversight of both definitional and operational uses of public video surveillance in Vancouver is necessary.

The political and privacy implications of the redeployable public video surveillance assemblage in Vancouver emerge through the material and spatially-inflected practices that comprise the camera networks. Given that the cameras are located in areas that are "above street-level", city officials define the cameras as public safety tools. However, even in instances where the definitional rationale of situational awareness is deployed, the use of redeployable cameras to monitor human populations continues to run up against whether the captured information is intimate or biographical in nature and whether, even under the justification of "public safety", a search can take place in a sensitive public context such as a political demonstration. Even under the justification of enhanced situational awareness, the use of the technology could still be considered intrusive and therefore objectively unreasonable (Austin 2012). This possibility points to the importance of addressing existing policies and norms that govern applications of 'aerial surveillance' in other areas, such as with UAVs. However, the material location of the cameras matters. The policy mutation that is premised on new forms of redeployable surveillance is reliant on fact that the cameras are at higher elevations in the city. Clearly,

the particularized material attributes of the architecture is a condition for reshaping public video surveillance policies in Vancouver. In order to unpack the relationship between the material location of the cameras and the new justifications of situational awareness policy that accompanies the redeployable network, I turn to emerging strands of critical urban research that address the vertical aspects of contemporary urbanization and urban life practices.

**Redeployable Public Video Surveillance Legacies and the Politics of Verticality**

Geopolitical understandings of security and surveillance practices rely too heavily on a flat, *horizontal* ontology that dominates analyses of urban spaces and politics. Emerging strands of critical urban research address this problem through a so-called 'aerial turn' (see Adey 2010) that consider the vertical dimensions of urbanization and urban life. For instance, Hewitt and Graham (2013) argue for a "fully volumetric urbanism" that considers "the ways in which horizontal and vertical extensions, imaginaries, materialities, and lived practices intersect and mutually construct each other within and between subterranean, superficial and supra-surface domains." (Graham and Hewitt 2013: 74-75)

The push toward a vertical imaginary in critical urban geography produces some interesting ways to consider how dimensions of architecture and politics intersect. And, as previously mentioned, the material location of redeployable cameras matters for public video legacies in Vancouver 2010. Previous studies have explored the growth of urban infrastructure as it relates to the proliferation of urban skyscrapers (McNeil 2005), the significance of top-down visualizations in remote-sensing such as Google Earth (Graham and Hewitt 2013: 75; Dorian 2011; Scott 2010), and the 'vertical sprawl' of gated communities as a protection from the inherently deviant spaces of the city at ground level. Critical urban geographers have yet to fully integrate the productive theoretical work on the verticality of politics within security and surveillance studies, albeit Stephen Graham (2010) and Graham and Hewitt (2010; 2013) have pointed towards the militarized and imperialist implications of "verticalized domination" and how the latest

innovations in military technologies, such as UAVs, provide authorities with new ways to render normative deviances—whether they are illegal border crossers, insurgents, or protest camps—increasingly legible, and therefore subject to state intervention. However, concerning the politics of urban public safety and security in particular, Francisco Klauser (2010) encourages researchers to consider how 'verticalized imaginations of urban space' condition specific patterns of infrastructure, how this infrastructure mutually constitutes interactions between people through imaginaries, and associations of human and non-human entities yield significant political effect.

The discussion of temporary redeployable camera legacies at the 2010 Games pushes this debate further – both in terms of the material implications of aerial surveillance and the ways that 'verticalized imaginations' of aerially situated visualization technologies work to justify a different set of policy conditions and normative exclusions held by Vancouver emergency management officials. Introducing a cultural imaginary of vertical politics invites critical re-examinations of how specific patterns of architectural development of the redeployable cameras in Vancouver – as a socio-technical arrangement of Olympic-specific surveillance technologies – contributed to the policy mutations that occurred at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, which further advanced the lasting legacy of public video surveillance in Vancouver.

To summarize, because the redeployable cameras were installed in aerial locations, officials felt they could justify leaving the surveillance technologies embedded in the landscape, citing concerns that the drain on staff resources would make it difficult to remove the cameras. This ostensible material obstacle and its associated drain on resources has the city of Vancouver pressing forward with plans to maintain the redeployable cameras in current locations over a long term period, thereby extending and entrenching the post-Games public video surveillance legacy.

The higher *physical* location of the cameras in the urban landscape has allowed officials to claim that the redeployable system is for public safety purposes. The height at which the cameras operate from ostensibly excludes their use as a surveillance technology. In

terms of the security governance assemblage, officials have begun to reorient their activities around the object (redeployable cameras) given its distinct material location. As a result, the notion of public video surveillance is dealt with in alternate terms. The new ontological identity of the cameras carries import for the policy imaginaries that accompany it. In this new frame, city officials have been able to cite the exclusion of the cameras from privacy impact assessment protocol in the province, while at the same time, they have justified to the public that the redeployable system provides a check on creeping surveillance measures. All of this, while the actual operational use of the redeployable system is still being used in targeted instances of surveillance. The tacit knowledges of the operators as a different agential entity within the same common assemblage draws out the full implications of these material conditions and the ongoing uses of the public video surveillance assemblage as an outgrowth from the Olympic era.

### Public-Order Policing Assemblage

As discussed in Chapter Three, in the decades before the Vancouver Games were awarded in 2003, public-order policing in the city was a largely unexamined and routine practice. During the 'pre-Olympic' era, the VPD Crowd Control Unit (CCU) consisted of a reactive crowd control unit that included a 'reserve group' of police that could be mobilized during a public order disturbance. The dominant model of public-order policing in Vancouver during this time included an 80-member squad that would respond to an incident only after it had spiralled out of control. After the Olympics were awarded to the city, however, public-order policing in Vancouver underwent a dramatic change. Changes were so extensive that new intelligence networks were formed, new intelligence threat categories were established, and new command and control tactical initiatives to control urban spaces emerged. Spatial control tactics involve highly mobile public order police units, less-lethal weaponry, and "soft" forms of control that demonstrated a highly visible and positive engagement with crowds, showing potential deviants that police were both present *and* part of the celebration in order to dissuade potential outbreaks of disorder.

Public-order policing transformations prompted by the Vancouver 2010 Olympics were so extensive that one high-ranking public order officer with the VPD to remarked:

> *[The PSU] is the only unit that if you looked at it 10 years ago, and today, nothing is the same. It's a completely new unit and even the objectives, goals, strategies, are completely different…(but) it's still called the same name"*[58]

However, closer examination shows that Olympic catalysts of the public-order policing assemblage in Vancouver (and to the extent that Federal agencies were involved, Canada) are not a clear outgrowth of previous localized politics of public order in Vancouver. The distinct emergent shape of the 2010 Games public-order policing assemblage and it's lasting legacy in Vancouver and Canada as a whole is largely attributable to the insertion of global, standardized templates of public-order policing into the VPD at the time. Indeed, situating the deep transformations in the 2010 Games public-order policing assemblages makes more sense when they are considered in relation to wider, global changes in public-order policing strategies during that period.

Drawing on globalized best practices in public-order policing, security planners for the 2010 Games forced significant catalysts in the transformation in public-order policing in Vancouver. The following discussion addresses transformations in the Vancouver 2010 public-order policing assemblage along the contours of globalized best practices in public-order policing and exposes how these changes prompted a lasting set of legacies for public-order policing in Vancouver and for the ongoing surveillance and control of Canadian residents as a whole.

Present day public-order policing best practices emerged in the fallout of the 1999 protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle. During the so-called "Battle of Seattle," police and thousands of protestors clashed in the streets, disrupting the economic meetings, prompting hundreds of arrests, and causing millions of dollars worth of damage. The Mayor of Seattle called a curfew, and Washington's governor

[58] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

declared a state of emergency that mobilized the Washington National Guard to join police in forcefully reclaiming the streets. Fallout after the protests was severe for public authorities. The Chief of the Seattle Police Department resigned, the Mayor lost a subsequent re-election campaign, and police were admonished for excessive use of force in an official city report. A spate of costly lawsuits plagued the city in the months that followed the incident.

Police agencies began to recognize the limits of their own public-order strategies and tactics in the face of protestors' highly unpredictable tactics – a prime shift in the move toward actuarial modes of policing in public order strategies. The decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of leaderless protest movements meant that police were unable to clearly find individuals to negotiate with. And while protest affinity groups, bound together through direct-action tactics, were not necessarily new at the time, they were present in large numbers at the Seattle WTO protests—effectively overwhelming police planning and operations. Demonstrators deemed the protests a success because the WTO meetings were cancelled, and "business as usual" in the city was postponed during the time of the summit. In the face of this new, highly adaptable threat, which police often referred to as "the new breed of protestor" (HMIC 2012), police forces around the world interpreted Seattle as a watershed moment in the advancement of public-order policing responses.

The fallout from the Seattle protests catalyzed a period of national and international collaboration with other public-order experts (della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006). Officials who had been involved in previous events joined security planners responsible for future events at national training regimes and conferences. These meetings began to build a best practices policy architecture for public-order policing. Policing associations and non-profit research organizations, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), published best practices on policing major "sporting events and celebratory crowds", "assessments of incident management protocols", and standardized models for "preparing for protestors at major events" (PERF 2011). The primary objective for public-order police under this strategy is premised upon actuarial justice (Zedner 2011:

3), or the 'new penology' (see Zedner). Since 9/11, a new penology, which shifts the governing logic of crime and security to attempting to neutralize threats to public safety prior to their occurrence, has developed, and present-day public-order policing best practices apply this dominant logic of security for large demonstrations. These principles are used as a basis to form national strategies on public-order policing and often focus on the significance of major events to implement their findings (PERF 2012). Major events became primary sites for the renewed post-1999 and post 9/11 public-order policing tactics—and the development of a globalized approach to public-order policing had significant impact on the development of public-order policing in Vancouver over the Olympic lifecycle. This indicated the extent to which actuarial policing strategies also include aspects of knowledge and expertise brokering, and not merely about anticipating threat. The emergence of a public-order policing assemblage in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, therefore, is better understood in the context of wider transformations in the best-practices of public-order policing that were unfolding during that time.

### Vancouver 2010 Public-Order Policing Assemblage

The Vancouver 2010 Games public-order response is a primary expression of networked security governance in Canada that drew heavily on the standardized frameworks of public-order policing practices. For one, the public-order policing assemblage consisting of a heavily integrated organizational infrastructure spanned federal, provincial, and municipal agencies. Given the integrated nature of contemporary models of public-order policing, the 2010 Games public-order policing assemblage included a broad spectrum of law enforcement and emergency management organizations, surveillance strategies, and tactical operations. However, apart from focusing on the associative organizational networks that form a legacy of public-order policing "on-the-ground" in Vancouver and Canada, the transformation of security intelligence networks also existed as an enduring post-Games legacy. The production of new threat categories and knowledge construction practices that emerged over the course of the Vancouver Games left lasting intelligence legacies in Vancouver and Canada as a whole. Given the broad range of agencies and

tactics implicated in a wider public-order policing assemblage, this section separates elements of the public-order policing assemblage (for methodological purposes) to better understand the distinct emergence of public-order legacies within the public-order assemblage. First is the Federal intelligence assemblage. Second is the municipal crowd management, or public safety component. Each express recurring trends from the globalizing best practices in public-order policing and have mutated into a lasting feature of public-order assemblage in Vancouver and Canada. Two distinct aspects of the emergent Vancouver 2010 public-order policing assemblage are focused upon as lasting legacy effects, and each is dealt with in a way that highlights relevant relationships between the Vancouver 2010 public-order policing assemblage and its relationship to the globalized public-order policing strategy.

### Public-Order Assemblage: Legacies of Security-Intelligence Governance

The use of infiltration and informants to gather intelligence is an enduring and established tactic of policing protest. Intelligence-led policing is a primary characteristic of public-order policing in the standardized model that found consistent use in Vancouver. Gathering intelligence *before* (or between) events through open-source digital networks (OSINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), *during* the event (including real-time video collection), and *after* the major event (post-event analysis) is now a regular feature of regulation and control of protest at major events (Gillham and Noakes 2012).

*Between* protest events, police routinely collect vast amounts of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) about influential activists, their social networks, and even on movement sympathizers from readily available information on social networking services (SNSs) and other online sources. Such intelligence-led policing consists of monitoring protest groups and activities via Facebook, as well as using sites such as Twitter as barometers for potential violent flashpoints during protest events (Fenton 2012). Surveillance of protest groups is not strictly limited to digital environments. Covert efforts to infiltrate groups are a frequent tactic. In many cases, infiltration begins several years before the major protest event occurs. In Canada, the RCMP consistently employ covert operations

to infiltrate activist groups that plan protests such as those against the recent Toronto G8/G20 political summit and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics (Kitchen and Rygiel 2011; Molnar and Snider 2011).

*During* protest events, police "evidence-gathering" teams regularly perform real-time surveillance and intelligence gathering in the field of operation with police videographers who video and photograph demonstrations during the event. In one interview with a digital forensics expert at the Toronto Police Services (TPS), it was learned that police videographers collected evidence to subsequently analyze and determine protester identity with the help of Google's Picasa open-source software (TPS 2012). Picasa's "auto-tagging" feature involves soft-biometric facial recognition that compares and indexes an individual's identity. Police use this information to build data sets that they can cross-reference with other information that is gathered through a range of other surveillance tactics, such as open-source intelligence (OSINT), which is often gathered through social media. In other cases of information management during protest events, authorities depend on video surveillance feeds to provide real-time information to improve overall "situational awareness" and ostensibly to improve emergency services' delivery. Much of this information is subsequently used to build files on target suspects, to submit as court evidence in the event of a criminal case, or to assist further training and development by police, and also to submit favourable images to the media (Gillham 2011: 644).

As we saw in Chapter Three, at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, a federal governance structure was largely responsible for the management of security intelligence governance. The RCMP ISU-JIG issued comprehensive public-order portfolios to relevant agencies that were involved in the public order operation, and collaborated with a newly formed CSIS agency called the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC). While the JIG's structure was federal, approximately half of its officials were considered seconded members from the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). ITAC intelligence reports became the primary medium for categorizing threats, framing risk concerns. Policing authorities—through federal, provincial, and municipal cooperation—distributed strategic

threat assessments on a daily basis to all relevant agencies, particularly the VPD who was responsible for acting on any threats in Vancouver as the local police force of jurisdiction in the Olympic area.

One of the primary legacies to emerge from the realm of security governance intelligence in Vancouver and in Canada as a whole is the extensive government networks that formed to conduct intelligence and share relevant information in the lead-up to the 2010 Games. These relationships spanned national security agencies, intelligence agencies, border security, local law enforcement, transport authorities, Health Canada, and Citizenship and Immigration authorities. These relationships are significant because they catalyzed a range of personalized partnerships, thereby familiarizing human relationships between the previously disparate agencies; at the same time, they are important because each member who was seconded to ITAC from these agencies retained the ability to access the respective agency databanks. For instance, an RCMP member was able to access the SPROS and SCIS databases – and feed that information into the construction of strategic threat assessments that were routinely distributed to national security and law enforcement agencies across the country. It is somewhat difficult to ascertain the full extent that these assemblages persisted after the Games. However, security intelligence operations at the Toronto G8/20 relied heavily on a similar structure and set of partnerships, which indicates that templates from the Vancouver 2010 Games continued to be replicated as a security intelligence governance best practice in Canada. And yet, the legacies of networked security governance through the integration of human and digital database networks are only one aspect of the larger security intelligence governance legacies from the Vancouver 2010 Games.

A second major legacy involves the emergence of new threat categorizations in the Canadian security intelligence governance field. Unprecedented threat categories emerged in the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Games and persist in the lexicon of Canadian intelligence agencies moving forward. The concept of Multi-Issue Extremism (MIE) is a new threat category in Canada. Authorities use MIE to describe social groups that are involved in social justice struggles and are, according to authorities, “non-

hierarchical and amorphous in nature, and encourage members to form their own cells and carry out independent attacks," which authorities typically understand as including "critical public infrastructure" or damaging to private property (ITAC 2008 in Monaghan and Walby 2012: 144). During the Olympics, threats of property damage that were considered strategic threat assessments often identified Olympic corporate branding organizations and their advertizing as needing protection from authorities. However, in the absence of actionable intelligence on many major terrorist attack, and with an immense budget windfall being fed into intelligence-led policing, authorities were able to focus extensively on targets who might be suspected of carrying out political actions.

One of the lasting concerns from the shift in threat designation is a conflation between terrorism and domestic extremism. Authorities can easily classify groups that are perceived as being associated with civil disobedience and direct action tactics into the aggregate threat matrix of MIE. Groups as broad as environmental protestors, anarchists, animal rights activists, or other groups who can be broadly considered part of a nascent global social justice movement are brought under the MIE framing. As a result, domestic activism, which includes a long-standing tradition of protest and civil disobedience as a viable democratic practice, mutate into a wider threat to national security. In addition, the emergent threat category of MIE elevates the threat level of activist groups in Canada, which further prioritizes and legitimizes a security and surveillance response as an acceptable means to deal with civic advocacy. This cycle invites a legacy of an upsurge in HUMINT and OSINT gathering tactics in social movements. Given that a range of agencies are now all selectively applying their version of MIE to local police work, concern over the discriminatory precision of such a concept leaves open a legacy of conflation between political identities conceived of as potential acts of terrorism and those that are legitimately engaging in a politics deemed accessible by the state apparatus. MIE was not the only transformations in threat categorizations throughout the Games; a second shift occurred. A threat category *before* the Games, designated as "emotionally disturbed persons", mutated into a more generalized "persons of interest" category. Moving forward, intelligence authorities sought to render "individuals that make direct or

indirect threats against the Vancouver 2010 Games" more transparent, in order to "identify their propensity for violence" (ITAC 2008: 103).

The mutations in these threat categories and their institutionalization as stable discursive entities that shape acceptable policy frames raise serious concerns. The circulation of broadly articulated threat categories throughout the security intelligence assemblage presents ever more possibility that the categories become increasingly unwieldy. The use of an increasing amount of data identifiers swells the range of data identifiers that are brought into a criteria for suspicion. As a result, a wider scope of information is used to scrutinize and sort the contours of acceptable and unacceptable political practice and risk profiles. In addition, the invitation to have a broader range of agencies involved means that implementing the MIE concept is likely to be done unevenly and indiscriminately across a range of agencies and actors – the push for actuarial risk-based intelligence-led policing brings an increasing amount of organizations into the realm of everyday security.

One of the more disturbing features of these shifts in intelligence categories is the way that authorities are able to justify the use of 'pre-emptive' arrests at major public events, reliant on a broad definition of suspicion. Suspected transgressive actors, who are typically those who are more likely to assume leadership roles in their respective movements, are often arrested prior to the events and before any crimes have been committed. A pre-emptive arrest strategy temporarily neutralizes individuals whose intentions the police might consider unpredictable, which is also a key identity marker of the MIE threat category. Arrests and detentions made before the event are not consistently followed up with charges, and activists are released after the event but before the statutory deadline for charges to be filed under the criminal code. Using pre-emptive arrest powers is neither rare nor limited in scope. At the Toronto G8/G20, activist's homes and temporary lodging quarters were raided prior to the event, and key individuals were held throughout the summit's duration. During the entire event, over 900 individuals were arrested, but only a very small fraction of that number was charged. In Vancouver, however, the use of pre-emptive arrests did not materialize, which might be

attributed to the widespread public global spectacle of the event. As a result, the use and political implications of pre-emptive arrest strategies as a corollary of shifting threat categories cannot be adequately considered in Vancouver as a post-Games legacy.

Intelligence-gathering legacies are only one component in the wider emergence and transformation of a public-order policing assemblage from the 2010 Games. Intelligence-led policing is used, in part, to inform a broad range of other practices of public-order policing, such as spatial control of urban demonstrations. The VPD carried a major responsibility in a range of other tactics and strategies that are part of a public-order assemblage. In what follows, I explore the emergence and transformation of the VPD PSU, to demonstrate the extent of public-order legacies that stem from the 2010 Games operations, and I consider the implications for political expression and urban citizenship in the city of Vancouver moving forward.

## VPD Public-Order Policing Assemblage and Associated Legacies

The VPD public order unit underwent drastic change throughout the 2010 Games. In 2003, when the Games were awarded, the VPD invested heavily in its crowd management unit. The changes were extensive, leading one high-ranking public-order official to insist that the newly formed Public Safety Unit (PSU) is "a completely new unit, and even down to the objectives, goals, strategies, are completely different…"[59] As discussed in Chapter Four, transformations in the public-order policing assemblage started with the evaluation and adoption of crowd management best practice techniques from the UK, French, and German models and were applied to form a customized response unit in the VPD. The recruitment of UK crowd management specialists from the UK Metropolitan Police was undertaken to ensure proper implementation of new crowd control policies. In March of 2007, the VPD officially changed the command structure of the PSU so it emulated the UK national model. Changes in the command structure were supplemented with a shift in tactical strategy.

[59] Anonymous Interviewee 2, Vancouver Police Department, June 6, 2012.

Standardized tactics of public-order policing include distinct spatial control characteristics. City planners, local businesses, and policing authorities often divide urban spaces into three main types of securitized zones (Gillham 2011). *Hard zones* include targeted areas that protests intend to target symbolically. Police render these zones inaccessible except to those who hold proper credentials and are authorized to enter. *Free speech zones* include areas where police have designated a safe area for legal protest to occur. Often, these spaces are distanced from major symbolic protest sites and include an enclosed, fenced-in area. In some instances, such free speech zones have chain link fence, concrete barricades, razor wire, and even overhead netting (Gillham 2011: 647). And finally, *soft zones* include (often crowded) public areas that are located near the so-called hard zones. Often these soft zones are areas that are just beyond the fence line that establishes the hard zone perimeter. For this reason, soft zones are the most common areas where clashes between protestors and police occur and have typically been the area where freedom of speech and peaceful assembly rights are curtailed.

Major legacies in public-order policing tactics emerged through a combination of structural changes and tactics of the public-order policing assemblage. First, a move toward a 'softer' public-order policing strategy, which relied on the deployment of highly visible officers to engage the Olympic crowds with principles of positive celebratory values front and centre, was used. Termed "the meet and greet strategy," PSU officers were instructed to smile and engage the community in order to facilitate a "psychological bonding with the crowd" that was expected to pre-emptively mitigate any propensity for deviant behaviour within the crowds.

Second, and for the first time in Vancouver, the PSU developed a "quick response team" that could respond to an incident with seven or eight members. The Olympics catalyzed a new formation in public-order policing in Vancouver that was capable of being flexibly deployed within the urban landscape and was used to quell protest during the 2010 Games. The quick response units mark a militarized shift from reactive crowd control units toward pre-emptive, flexible, response teams that could simultaneously intervene in various urban locations across the city. These units, while not replacing a larger reactive

crowd control unit should the need arise, were equipped with less-lethal ARWEN guns that fire plastic bullets and new dog arrest teams that were specifically trained for public order incidents (VPD 2011). “Less-lethal weapons” are an additional dimension to public-order policing best practices that are commonly used at major events public order operations. Tear gas, pepper spray, Tasers, rubber bullets, wooden missiles, and beanbag rounds are all part of the arsenal used to temporarily incapacitate real or perceived disruptive protestors. While these weapons are popularly referred to as “less-lethal,” they have, in several instances, lead to serious injury and death (Anais 2012). Given the overtly repressive nature of these public-order tactics, their use is intended to restrict and disperse protesters from secured zones and, importantly, to deter others from encroaching upon prohibited areas. In addition, the VPD increased their surveillance of real-time public-disorder events by using videographers whose presence was officially justified on the basis that sufficient documentation would be available for review for when arrests were made (PERF 2011: 8).

Third, public order event operations for the 2010 Games expanded to include an integrated network of officials that encompassed city officials, local police, the federal ISU (which consisted of officers from dozens of municipalities across the country), commercial businesses (including hoteliers), and other government authorities such as the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch (LCLB) of British Columbia. Such partnerships indicate a broadening expanse of public order and securitization tactics across non-traditional law enforcement agencies. The widening assemblage of actors that are implicated in a heterogeneous but coherent public order policy in Vancouver and that resulted from these relationships is, a significant legacy of public-order policing. The Olympics forged ongoing relationships that were also further institutionalized both during and after the 2011 NHL Stanley Cup Riots in Vancouver.

The breadth of public-order policing assemblage legacies of spatial control tactics through public-order response in Vancouver expresses an interesting duality. On the one hand, the move toward a crowd-friendly mechanism of social control through the so-called “meet and greet” strategy indicates a the degree to which new protest tactics are

emerging in the context of major event security—with particular emphasis on the social psychology of crowd behaviour. On the other hand, the VPD PSU moved toward a more militarized quick deployment team setup where groups of 7-8 officers could rapidly respond to potential flashpoints.

The increased visibility of the community-oriented "meet and greet" team projects a culturally positive value of the police with the communities who engage with the celebratory nature of the event. However, groups that choose to register their discontent with the event itself through public protest, are met with undercover infiltration and are subject to increased surveillance. In concert, both tactics indicate a larger move towards proactive and/or pre-emptive public-order policing strategies as a whole in Vancouver.

While the Vancouver 2010 public-order policing assemblage entails a global strategy that police departments use during other major events, it includes VPD's own novel convergence of a diverse set of policing tactics, which owes itself to the local police force's history, the social movements of the time, and other local particularities specific to the ongoing policing of major events in that city. An overall trend of public order legacy assemblage in Vancouver is complex and varying.

A more conciliatory and community-engaged strategy of public-order policing, which relies on police liaisons with activist communities, is taking place (De Lint and Hall 2009). In addition, increasingly militarized preparations with training in less-lethal weapons and heavy-handed crowd control tactics are supplementing the 'softer' approach (see also King 2004). After 9/11, in Canada and particularly in Vancouver, this parallel trend was accompanied by greater emphasis on intelligence gathering, contingency planning, and spatial control tactics (King 2004). The emergence of a wider public-order policing assemblage from the Vancouver 2010 Games and in Canada speaks to a larger, more general point about militarization in policing. Primarily, an increasing reliance on military knowledge and expertise in policing organizations is often juxtaposed with simultaneous developments in community-based policing trends. The competing trends between militarism and community-based policing as a distinct post-Games legacy

formation invite the need for more careful empirical research and theorizing surrounding the relations among coercion, consent, and public-order policing.

While we may speak of distinct public-order policing assemblages of legacies from Vancouver 2010, the future of public-order policing tactics in Canada and Vancouver are still likely to be selective, contextual, and strategic to the event, perception of the threat, and even the legitimacy of the political claims being made by activist organizations as interpreted by intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Therefore, understanding the conditions under which protest violence and policing responses occur is continually necessary (Waddington 1998). And while the standardization of best practice crowd control strategies is unevenly implemented across police forces in Canada, major events have been a distinct driver in the implementation of new forms of intelligence arrangements, mutations in threat categories, and distinct spatial control tactics as a best practice in local policing jurisdictions.

### Civil Police-Military Relations

In Canada, no legal statutes prohibit or otherwise regulate the relations between civilian police and the military. Against such an enabling condition for civil police-military partnerships to take shape, Chapter Four illustrated how one single Military Liaison Officer (MLO) in the VPD led to a blossoming of militarization in Canada just two years prior to the Olympics being awarded in 2003. Subsequently, the stand-alone Military Liaison Unit (MLU) was created and has since partnered with a wide range of military and law enforcement agencies. The emergence and institutionalization of the civil police-military assemblage was largely catalyzed through practices attributable to the Vancouver 2010 Games.

Historically, Vancouver had never had civil police-military relations at the municipal level. However, from one individual within the VPD, a future of militarization in Canada began to take shape. After the Olympics were awarded, the MLO anticipated the need for a larger role for a liaison unit within the VPD, particularly since it was recognized that there would need to be a reason to communicate with the Canadian Forces. A strategy to

expand the single position into a larger 28-person Military Liaison Unit was established under justifications that an expanded role for an integrated military unit would be required during the Olympic security project.

During the 2010 Games, the MLU facilitated communication between members of the Canadian Forces and Canadian Navy. Since then, the MLU has partnered extensively with the local CF battalion, fellow municipal policing organizations, and regularly trains in urban tactical military operations with US military counterparts across the United States border. The growth and trajectory of the MLU over the lifecycle of the 2010 Games has left a significant legacy of militarization in Vancouver and in Canada as a whole. In order to understand the scale and extent of the militarization legacy in Vancouver and Canada, a deeper discussion of militarism is required. This section visits the emergence of a civil police-military security governance assemblage in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Games, traces its networked assemblage with a broad range of agencies, and considers the extent of these legacies in Vancouver and Canada.

The growth of the MLU as a civil police-military policing assemblage that consisted of other Canadian municipal police forces, members of the Canadian Forces, and US-counterparts that include the US Army, the US Washington National Guard, the Marines, among others, could not have emerged in the form that it did without the direct and indirect influence of the Vancouver 2010 Games. The emergence of the civil police-military assemblage (which is centralized through the MLU) can be, significantly, attributed to a combination of enabling factors. The coincidental presence of a committed MLO in the VPD at the time that the Games were awarded meant that, along with favourable support from the VPD Deputy Chief (whom also had a military background), a larger 28-person unit could be formed and institutionalized in the VPD in *anticipation* of managing a large military partnership in urban police force of jurisdiction as part of the security strategy at the Olympic Games.

In the lead-up to the Olympics, the MLU was further institutionalized and received human and technical resources. The VPD recruited 13 individuals with “previous

battleground experience" whom were seconded to the MLU (Hogben 2013), and purchased armoured military vehicles and an extensive amount of other equipment, which led one official to insist that the unit was more equipped than its Canadian Forces counterparts. Perhaps the most important elements of an emergent assemblage emerged in the context of the military training exercises with Canadian Forces counterparts in Vancouver prior to the Games. These exercises allowed the VDP MLU and the CF to reconfigure previously held cultural divides that upheld the ideal that civilian police and military officials had little to collaborate on. The 2010 Olympic training initiatives also clarified previously murky jurisdictional relationships concerning exactly how the military would operate in urban settings. Further, and perhaps more importantly, the Olympic exercises provided an opportunity to redraw normative boundaries on information sharing between the agencies, but also to personalize the civil police-military partnership significantly as much as the interactions were also an opportunity to clarify policy details.

After the Games, the relationships that had been forged between the MLU, and the local CF battalion and their US counterparts blossomed into an ongoing training regime with regular exercises at a US Army base in Yakima, Washington. These training exercises further solidified an ongoing cross-border dimension to the civilian-policing assemblage as an emergent, albeit indirect, legacy from the 2010 Games. The significance of these partnerships for the ongoing militarization of policing in Canada should not be underestimated as a pertinent legacy from the 2010 Games. Other municipalities, such as the Victoria Police Department and the Calgary Police Services have partnered with their local CF battalions and are involved with ongoing training that centres on the military grammar of the "three block war". The specific dimensions of this transnational civil police-military assemblage are especially worth recognizing given the ongoing legacy implications of these partnerships. As Chapter Four discussed, the MLU is currently training the US National Guard in urban tactical operations by conducting building clearance exercises with smaller, more flexible, emergency response teams. In exchange, the VPD is receiving training in explosive ordinance disposal, improvements in emergency management responses, and skill-sharing in key areas of urban operations.

The training operations between the VPD MLU, the Victoria Police Department, Calgary Police Services, and their US military counterparts are also significant because they present opportunities for Canadian municipal police forces to train in simulated urban-based operations with drones (UAVs) beyond the realm of public consultation and the authority of established Canadian law in the area of UAV deployment (Parsons and Molnar 2013). In addition, the Canadian Forces are subject to strategies of policing that facilitate its own foreign occupations, which are increasingly characterized by asymmetrical warfare—meaning that the acquisition of police training initiatives is having a ripple effect that circulates into foreign occupation zones in Canadian military geo-political operations. Both the Canadian and US military recognize that traditional police attention to urban geographies, coupled with a softer approach to intelligence gathering in civilian contexts, are valuable tactical attributes when policing the streets of a foreign occupation.

In sum, the emergence of a distinctive civil police-military assemblage was institutionalized through funds acquired in the lead-up to the Vancouver 2010 Games. However, a range of other potentialities was activated through these funding initiatives. The absence of legal statutes or other policies that regulate civil police-military relations meant that these relationships could emerge on a relatively ad hoc basis. In addition, the latent potentialities of principle actors in the emerging civilian-military assemblage meant that the VPD provided an ideal social climate for the creation of a military liaison unit. Finally, in the lead-up and during the 2010 Games, training exercises provided further opportunity for personal and professional relationships to be formed –across municipal police departments and the Canadian Forces – and with the internationalization of the civil police-military partnership through an ongoing partnership with US military agencies. The formation of this distinct civil police-military assemblage continues to shape the emergence of operations that are specific to emergency management, urban-based tactical military operations, and carries implications for how municipal law enforcements in Canada use new surveillance technologies such as UAVS.

### Private Security Industry

Legacies of the private security industry from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics are several. Major sporting events present an opportunity for a litany of lucrative short-term contracts for security technology and service providers. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics, like other major events, presented a range of short-term economic opportunities for private security industry, which can be understood as distinct economic legacy for the private security industry. For example, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, one particular company, MacDonald, Dettweiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA), secured a contract to provide a perimeter intrusion detection system for $4.8 million CAD. However, MDA brings a history of partnerships in the military and defence sector. The company had previous contracts with Israel Aerospace Industries to manufacture Heron surveillance drones for the Canadian Forces to use over Afghanistan. Also, more recently, MDA struck a $11.3 million CAD contract with the Department of Defence of Canada to improve domestic aerial surveillance capabilities. A number of other smaller companies also accrued an economic legacy from security products and services contracts during the 2010 Games. Companies involved in security technology provisions at major events can carry forth a legacy of strengthened economic relationships in the private security sector, particularly as a form of private-security civil police-military assemblage as conditioned through the domestic security and foreign military sector.

Economic legacies for the private security sector also extend to the private security guard sector. In Vancouver alone, profits from one security guard provider jumped 45 percent during the 2010 Olympic year when compared with the previous year. In Vancouver, a major security consortium that provided security guard services at the 2010 Games was able to leverage an ability to scale their private security guard services at major events into a subsequent major event with the Toronto G8/G20 later that same year, demonstrating how companies, particularly from the Vancouver 2010 Games, can routinely draw on their experience to secure ongoing major event contracts.

However, as Chapter Five discussed, the opportunities for a short-term economic windfall are beset by risk that can leave a *negative* legacy for the private security

industry. Legacies of private security assemblages at major events are often contingent on the constraints and opportunities that emerge in relation to the demand to fulfill high volume contracts under very tight timelines. That is, one of the key dimensions that shapes the outcome and legacy of private security industry involvement in major events and therefore conditions the ongoing legacies is that of temporal constraints. However, tight timelines can lead to failed contracts, as occurred at the London 2012 Games when G4S failed to fulfill its commitment. The reputation of G4S was seriously damaged, but this mismanagement carried a wider negative fallout for the private security industry operations in the domestic security sector as a whole. If a contract is mismanaged, the ongoing legacy can be one where the normative reputation of the private security industry is compromised, but, by extension, this compromise reaffirms the authority of the nation-state as the primary author of security in the domestic security sector. In Vancouver, all private security contracts appeared to be managed successfully—as a result, the legacy of normative reputation for the private security industry was largely a positive one. Albeit, in one instance, where mismanagement seemed to occur, it was not made fully public. As a result, the normative gains made by the private security industry at Vancouver 2010 could be carried forward as a positive reputational legacy.

A private security industry assemblage as a relatively enduring security governance legacy is contingent on the legal landscape that, in part, conditions its emergence. In our view of security governance legacies, regulatory controls and agencies are part of the private security assemblage stemming from the 2010 Games. The same intervening *temporal* constraint variable conditioned a restructuring of the legal landscape that regulates the ongoing legacy of private security in British Columbia. In the lead up to the Games, again under time constraints, a distinct legislative legacy began to take shape. Prior to the Games, the province of BC weakened the BC Security Services Act, the main piece of legislation that regulates the private security industry in the province of British Columbia. Anticipating a dramatic influx of employees into the private security industry and anticipating that the regulatory protocols that mandated training and education regimes to license companies and employees could interfere with these companies ability to fulfill their contracts, the province of BC revised the legal framework.

The legal changes allowed companies to hire temporary foreign workers and other temporary residents with student visas. After the short-term demand for increased employees subsided (a short-term temporal aspect of the private security assemblage), the legislative changes remained. The full implication of the legislative legacy, therefore, hinges on this temporal contingency within the assemblage. The resulting post-games legislative legacy actually translates into a more favourable economic climate for the private security industry because of a weakened regulatory governance climate, and a prospectively larger labour supply to draw from, which resulted in a downward pressure on the wage system (for a more detailed discussion, see pp. 153)

A final aspect of the private security governance assemblage as a relatively enduring legacy feature of the 2010 Games involves a "surveillance surge" that widened the range of actors within the assemblage. Chapter Six discussed this surge as the "responsibilization" of surveillance, defined as the expansion of security protection rationales through a range of actors who become implicated in security provisions, such as private commercial businesses, hotels, restaurateurs, and so on, who are not traditionally involved with security provisions (Garland 1996).

Under a climate of heightened fear, which often accompanies the hosting of the Olympic Games, the propensity to further private security governance legacies were enhanced and emerged in myriad ways that branched into the wider business communities. With the growing real and perceived risk analyses held by authorities who anticipated that a range of "soft targets," (typically understood as non-Olympic venues) would be subject to terrorist attack, a larger number of private sector agencies, in areas including port facilities, transportation systems, shopping centres, and other tourist attractions were mobilized to provide security support. In Vancouver, in particular, the current relationships between the VPD and the wider business district are a distinct legacy outgrowth from the 2010 Games operations (see pp. 153-154).

The implication of the expanding scale of the private security governance assemblage into commercial centres is that modes of integration between police and the private business community are further institutionalized. Again, an interesting variable to this expansion involves not a larger standardized template grafted onto an already existing institutional framework, but a principle agent whom ushers forth changes, typically premised on a previous biographical history between two distinct fields. In this way, key individuals as "managers of unease" (Bigo 2005) condition a merging impulse to the emergent Olympic assemblage. For instance, a former Deputy Chief Constable from the VPD who retired and moved into the private building management sector formed key partnerships that saw the creation of Operation Cooperation, an information-sharing partnership that linked business owners with police officials. This expansion of the assemblage, institutionalized through the 2010 Games, translated into a lasting legacy where information sharing between authorities could be used in other preparations such as in public-order operations.

So, how do these relatively discrete security governance assemblages compare with one another? What insights might we be able to derive regarding Olympic security governance legacies as relatively enduring actor-network associations? The findings are diverse both between and across distinct assemblages, making broad generalizations difficult. For instance, the materialization of redeployable public video surveillance infrastructure in the urban landscape and the articulation of these material factors with the geo-spatial imaginaries of security planners (and therefore on demarcations that govern the application of surveillance technologies (situational awareness vs. surveillance)) are distinct from questions concerning the framing and ongoing application public video surveillance technologies. Another particular example that carries little by way of generalization across the cases is the cross-jurisdictional legal implications of joint-exercises between Canadian police and US military institutions that condition the ongoing militarization, and the particular implications for the adoption of UAVs for domestic policing in Canada. That being said, such questions open up analysis of aerial surveillance operations as manifestations of security governance assemblages as a whole—in particular, how the classification of aerial reconnaissance as either a practice

of situational awareness or surveillance carries significant normative and legal implications. Security governance legacies, therefore, can be understood to be technologically specific, and specific to the institutionalizing dynamics (whether conditioned through spatial or temporal imaginaries) of the assemblage itself. For this reason, tracing the contingent articulations that configure security governance assemblages, discussed as the case studies, reveals the nuances involved in the emergence of ongoing security governance legacies. However, aspects of the emergence of Olympic-specific security governance legacies across the Vancouver 2010 Olympics can be generalized. A common trend across all of the variables involved a move toward deeper institutionalization of specific security practices.

**Institutionalized Integration of Security Governance Assemblages**

A clear process of institutionalization occurred to shape dominant legacies within, and across, each case. In general terms, increased integration is an exemplar of security governance at major events, the increasing use of integrated models of security and policing at the Vancouver 2010 Games followed included. The institutionalization of integration in security governance is a trend that occurred across all of the cases. The emergence and form of the security governance integration was by no means a straightforward process in each case, however. In the context of civil police-military integration legacies, the indirect effects of Olympic investment expanded to include domestic civil police-military relationships, as well as a cross-fertilization of a range of organizations in cross-border, civil police-military partnerships. These modes of integration were not simply about the militarization of the police; they also expressed a clear tendency toward the 'policization' of the military. In public-order policing, deeper integration that involved a 'whole of government' approach between the areas of municipal government – expressing an expansion in the governance design to regulate public disorder across a range of law enforcement and agencies that have not traditionally cooperated with law enforcement, such as liquor control boards and private sector businesses. A second major trend of integration in public-order policing involves the range of individuals that were involved in intelligence operations. To this extent, the creation of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) initiated the integration

of database networks that are premised on facilitating the digital attributes of processes of categorical suspicion. The implication of expanding the range of available databanks in threat-designation is the potential widening of the threat-matrices that condition interpretations acceptable from 'extremist' political actions. As a result, the result is an expansion in the range of available data indicators that contribute to the emergence of a terrorist, extremist, or otherwise risky profile. And finally, in the realm of private security, integration was extended between municipal police departments and private businesses in downtown Vancouver.

Often, but not always, a timely placed principle agent within the assemblage facilitated the trends toward integration. In the civil police-military case, a relationship of trust and shared biographical-historical background in military operations between the Chief Constable and the officer responsible for catalyzing his post into a larger 28-person unit when the Olympics arrived was an early 'fixing' relation that enabled the emergence of civil police-military relations more broadly in Vancouver. Such principle actors, as managers of unease within the network (Bigo 2005), were able to utilize further justification and opportunity for the acquisition of resources that the Olympics provided. However, it is critical to continue to research and examine the ways that integrated assemblages are held together or decay after the major event has concluded. There is some concern about the longevity of some Olympic-catalyzed integration over others—given their implication on social and political practices, such as political expression. Moving forward, it is interesting to revisit questions that discuss the relative durability of such networks, such that further conclusions can be drawn about the ways in which security governance legacies unfold.

Referring back to Bennett and Haggerty's (2011) descriptive list of legacy variables, the cases of the security governance assemblages at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics as relatively enduring security and policing practices demonstrate the extent to which technological, information, legal, and cultural legacies are all part of a wider relational framework. A focus on typologies or lists of discrete legacies and individually prescriptive definitions of a particular legacy at a single major event allow the concept of

legacy to be reified. Legacies, as such, become *objects* of debate, rather than facilitating analyses of security governance practices that constitute the emergence, stabilization, and relative endurance of security governance practices as ongoing legacies.

Considering elements of security governance assemblages as part of an integrated and relational process sensitizes us to the ways in which the presence or absence of one object (for example, the presence or lack of previously existing legal regulation regarding civil police-military relations) establishes relative conditions with other aspects of the assemblage. A process-oriented view of security governance legacies requires a deeper engagement with the particular associations of human and nonhuman elements in order to explain the emergence and reproduction of security governance assemblages. For this reason, localized histories of security governance assemblages at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, as well as other major sporting events, reveal more about the emergence of security governance legacies than a deductive methodological approach that proceeds from a hypostatization of any particular legacy.

Interestingly, however, Bennett and Haggerty (2011: 1-20) gesture to how legacies are "diverse and operating on several scales simultaneously" (7) – which speaks to the recognition that Olympic security governance legacies are the product of a diverse set of entities within a single assemblage. This dissertation attempts to unpack in more detail than Bennett and Haggerty's contribution, a methodological approach for accounting for security governance legacies, as well as an empirical account of the Vancouver 2010 security governance legacies themselves. Given the relational approach toward security governance legacies pursued in this dissertation, it is worth making one final remark on the notion of spatial legacies. Bennett and Haggerty identified spatial legacies as a discrete legacy. The approach to security governance legacies in this dissertation, however, understands the spatial implications of security governance legacies as nothing more than the "effects" of relatively enduring security governance assemblages. That is, spatial legacies are never separate from the relatively enduring practices as associations inherent in the assemblage. Legacies, in spatial terms, are not predefined by spatial boundaries or scales, but by types and lines of activity; spaces emerge through the

network connecting the different sites (see Latour 2005). The implication is that the historical development of institutions and assemblages is still a primary unit of analysis for discerning the significance and implications of spatial legacies. As we have seen, distinct spatial aspects of the network (including the aerial materialization of redeployable public video surveillance cameras) had implications for how the assemblage moves into the future. We can see that spatial or geographical security legacies are nothing more than a scale of the effects of the associations found within the security network itself.

In conclusion, the case studies in this dissertation, understood as security governance legacies, reveal how legacies emerge through networks that draw together various entities in relationships of risk, threat, material infrastructure, and the associated responsibility held by authorities within those networks, while working within the constraints of the network, to manage or mitigate such threats. Accordingly, previously existing security governance networks in the city of Vancouver were reoriented on the basis of Olympic-specific developments. As limitations of pre-existing capabilities were identified on the horizon of the Olympic event – key actors were able to utilize significant opportunities to capture resources and direct them toward such limitations. In civil police-military relations, this meant anticipating the communicative limits between civilian municipal police and military officials. In working to address this potential shortfall prior to the Games, the cross-fertilization during Olympic training exercises blossomed to include a wide range of organizations – and reoriented the activities of those in the military liaison unit into a cross-border, civil police-military assemblage. Subsequent identities were formed, approaches to securing foreign occupation zones were developed, urban-based tactical operations with the use of UAVs were tested and refined, and regulation's strategies and norms have been continually redirected to new problems and new limitations.

This dissertation insists that the security and governance legacies of the Vancouver 2010 Games are played out through the ontology of the network. The identities and ontologies of the human and nonhuman objects in the network are held together through a more

Foucauldian-inclined approach to understanding the governance assemblage as a legacy in particularized techniques of governmentality. Because the security governance assemblages transformed during the Games, were held together in novel ways, and had entities (human and nonhuman) with new identities and actions that were reformed during the lifecycle of the event, these legacies will not necessarily continue to endure. It will be vitally important to continue to consider the trajectory of the assemblage and to identify the key moments where organizations might revert to informational silos and institutional bunkers after the pressing need for ongoing (and potentially shared) responses subside and political attention turns elsewhere (see Birkland 1997).

And yet, while the institutionalization of security governance assemblages found new forms throughout the course of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, there is always the prospect that these new forms give rise to new, or otherwise unexpected, mutations that change the shape of the assemblage and the potential mode of governmentality associated with it. The final chapter attempts to deal with the dynamic nature of security governance assemblages through the concept of "mission-creep", which highlights how security governance arrangements are always prone to persistent transformation.

# Chapter Eight: On Questions in Function-Creep of Security Governance Assemblages

> *Asking questions about the process of surveillance creep and possible latent goals should be a central part of any public policy discussion of surveillance before it is introduced. Beyond determining if a proposed tactic is morally and legally acceptable, works relative to alternatives and can be competently applied, it is appropriate to ask, once the foot is in the door, where might it lead?" (Marx 1998: 387).*

The issue of function-creep is central to considering the historical evolution of security governance practices. Function-creep most commonly refers to changes in, and additional uses of, technologies that monitor social life (Dahl and Saetnan 2009: 84). In more detail, the concept also refers to how, through processes of surveillance, the collection of personal information under one justification, purpose, or function, can migrate to find secondary uses that exceed the original bases for its collection. Central to discussions of function-creep are the use of distinct surveillance technologies and the ways in which they evolve over their historical-institutional uses. Examples of function-creep in practices of surveillance are many, however, the more popular examples of function-creep involve ongoing debates about the management of personal health records in relation to insurance underwriters, the use of social media data that is often collected through user-generated peer-to-peer communication as a basis to facilitate trust in personal relationships wherein that data is also shared with legal authorities through lawful access regimes, the multiple uses of identity documents—both as a license to drive an automobile, but also as a state-sanctioned security token that regulates access and privileges, and finally, the always controversial stream of questions in criminology about the rightful and appropriate use of DNA information. On this last example, function-creep refers to how the use of forensic DNA data collections expand to include other functions, such as routine collection of DNA in a national criminal record database that is retained as an ongoing forensics repository. Function-creep is clearly a cornerstone issue of security, policing, and surveillance in contemporary societies where the pace of digital technological developments often outstrip laws and policies that are meant to regulate normatively appropriate uses technologies and their capacity to shape normatively acceptable exchanges of information. More specifically however, function-creep is central to even the most common normative apprehensions in a future marked by the

expansion of surveillance practices and the ongoing reservations held by civil libertarians concerning the implications of widespread use of surveillance technologies and the monitoring of social life.

The term function creep is often deployed as a rhetorical device to stress the negative values associated with a murky future where the transformation of a surveillance technology or apparatus is expected to occur. Function-creep, in this way, serves as a conceptual short-hand that tends to hide more than it reveals about *how* function-creep works as a complex social process, and as a result, how understandings of security governance assemblages that inevitably encounter function-creep can become sites of study to understand, and potentially mitigate, some of the more damaging forms of function-creep. In very few instances has the concept and ontology of function-creep been taken up as an actual object, process, or methodological area of critical study. In addition, sustained empirical examinations of the process of function-creep, in spite of its conceptual currency in civil society and academic debates remain limited. The concept of mission and function creep is a vastly rich concept that attempts to explain complex processes involved in the continuity and change of security governance practices. This chapter attempts to consider how the concept of function creep can be supplemented with a rich relational ontology and a related methodological approach, that gestures toward an understanding of function-creep as a distinct process of security governance practices that are often situated within a wider set of assemblages and rationales. As a result, function-creep, it is maintained, should be studied as a rich dynamic process-based understanding of security governance assemblages.

In doing so, this chapter attempts to remedy shortcomings in the security and surveillance literatures. Function-creep, like the notion of security governance legacies, is an inherent transformational process within security governance assemblages. That is, questions of function-creep take place as part of a broad and complex assemblage of human and nonhuman actors. Changes in one aspect or entity within a heterogeneous security governance assemblage can have implications for other parts of the network.

206 By examining transformations in the security governance assemblages of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, this chapter asks, how and why does function-creep occur? What function-creep has taken place at the Vancouver 2010 Games? How might we begin to ontologically refine, methodologically engage, and therefore conceptually refine the concept of function-creep as a result? And finally, the chapter concludes with some recommendations on what steps can be taken to mitigate processes of function creep in relation to consistently heterogeneous, dynamic, and shifting security governance assemblages. As a result, this final chapter revisits conceptualizations of function-creep in the context of security governance legacies at the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. The first section details variations on the definition of function-creep to consider the ways that the process of function-creep has been taken up in the security and surveillance studies literatures. In the second section, I revisit the ways that function-creep occurred as a key moment in the security governance assemblage legacies over the lifecycle of the Vancouver 2010 Games.

## What is Function Creep?

The most common expression of function-creep is its reference to changes in the use of technology, or the secondary use of data (or a database) for purposes that exceed the original rationale or justification for its use. Almost overwhelmingly, the concept of function-creep is used to capture socially, ethically, or politically circumspect changes (typically as further incursions on personal or informational privacy) in a surveillance system.

In the literatures, function-creep is variously defined as function-creep (Schneier 2011; Fox 2001; Dahl and Saetnam 2009), surveillance-creep (Marx 1988; 2005), mission-creep, and even control-creep (Innes 2001). Extending the technology-centric view of function-creep, the concept of surveillance creep is less situated in the information technology / network security understanding of discretely articulated functions, and instead begins to more carefully consider the socio-political implications of how new socio-political interests and practices intersect with the ongoing uses, and transformations of, surveillance systems. Marx discusses the expansionary potential of surveillance

systems, indicating that:

"As powerful new surveillance tactics are developed, the range of their legitimate and illegitimate use is likely to spread. Where there is a way, there is often a will. There is the danger of an almost imperceptible surveillance creep" (Marx 1988: 2).

And further, Marx again,

> "A fascinating aspect of surveillance technologies as hegemonic control involves their tendency to expand to new goals, agents, subjects and forms. The surveillance appetite once aroused can be insatiable. A social process of surveillance creep (and sometimes gallop) can often be seen. Here a tool introduced for a specific purpose comes to be used for other purposes, as those with the technology realize its potential and ask, 'Why not?'" (Marx 2005: 386).

Function-creep, as a concept, has also been situated more clearly in the criminology literature as a process that is more closely connected with the sociological categorical imperative of deviance and regulation. Expanding Marx's approach beyond the capacity of function-creep to include practices of monitoring and regulation, and the implications for enhanced visibility or transparency of certain aspects of social environments, Innes refers to control creep, which is defined as:

> "...the sense in which the apparatus of social control, that is the combination of technologies and instruments designed to respond and to regulate deviant behaviour, are becoming increasingly dispersed and interspersed throughout many different arenas of late-modern social life" (Innes 2001: 2)

Function-creep is a remarkably prevalent, and some might argue, an inevitable aspect of surveillance systems. In the way that surveillance systems are premised upon socio-technical information systems that are implicated in a process of categorizing, gathering, storing, and sorting individuals and populations. Take for instance, the socio-technical trajectory of the driver's license. Originally developed to authorize a credential to operate a motor vehicle, driver's licenses evolved to take on a second application as an age-verification token used to purchase alcohol, or even as a breeder document for other authorize credentials for other publicly funded government services (Schneier 2011). Since then, the driver's license has evolved to accommodate yet another function—as a security (biometrically) enhanced token that is intended to provide security against

terrorists or to retroactively identify individuals who might be wanted for their riotous behaviour during a sports-related riot. A further example is that of DNA information. Genetic information, and generally information gathered from, or relating to, the body can be applied across a range of diagnostics and research practices, such as for criminal record keeping, forensics identification, paternity testing, the prospect or likelihood that DNA information and associated databases to mutate or integrate across diverse policy arenas and practices—practices that have significant implications for the distribution of power and control—is greatly enhanced. The definition of function-creep provided by Williams and Johnson (2008) most closely approximates this process when they write how function-creep describes "how a government's programme of technological intervention into social life is gradually, incrementally, but deliberately, increased over time" (82). Whether referring to the ongoing socio-technical trajectory of rationales and uses underpinning driver's licenses, or the diverse range of strategies and potential 'solutions' on offer (whether to improve the health of an individual, or for the state and criminal justice system to distribute punishment) technologies and information systems are caught up in a range of purposes, justifications, and rationales that affirm or transgress normative principles. It is for this reason, that function-creep is a barometer of the political—and its meaning as a referent to a particular social process is attributable in large part to a wide range of economic resources, legal conditions, normative climate, and civic dimensions that shape the course of how information systems are used in particular institutions and to particular effect.

Function-creep however, does not always neatly graft onto the interests and rationales of institutions. It is also important to acknowledge how function-creep can often be the product of unintended consequences. That function-creep can emerge can beyond the intent and imagination of the original progenitors of a particular surveillance system designer makes it difficult to prioritize as a policy problem that often relies on a clearly identified problem, a clear target for political intervention, especially when it comes to the difficult task of communicating threats to civil liberties wherein the worst potential of a particularly intrusive and oppressive surveillance system have yet to fully manifest. That being said, while the risks inherent in the expansionary potential of surveillance

systems can not be eliminated, and are indeed, an in-built feature of communication through information technologies, attempts must be made to acknowledge future possibilities of function-creep which includes actions designed to anticipate and control negative creep (Yuthas and Dillard 1998: 48). Of course, one of the primary concerns facing regulators (and limiting their available and normatively appropriate) range of instruments to limit expansions of unwarranted or overly obtrusive modes of surveillance is that authorization for a particular expression of a monitoring system will inevitably expand beyond their original justifications or rationales.

**Surveillance Studies and Function-Creep**

In Surveillance Studies therefore, the term is often used to discuss mutations in the use or application of surveillance technologies. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Kevin Haggerty's (2011) conception of surveillance legacies was also a very important place to start when dealing with the question of function-creep. Haggerty's assessment of surveillance legacies grapples with the shifting dynamics between the development of material infrastructures of surveillance and their articulation with regulative ideals of deviance—and the inherent propensity for technologies to encounter subsequent forms of appropriation into newly emergent micro-regulatory projects under these circumstances. An excellent example is the developmental legacy of the Nazi bureaucratic infrastructure and the way that the identity matrices constituting the Jewish problem evolved over time in a way that the horrific regulation, control, and ultimate extermination of Jewish populations in Europe unfolded.

Haggerty's discussion of surveillance legacies as an in-built feature of surveillance practices, which roughly approximate as an explanation of function-creep actually deviates from several pre-existing explanations of the concept of function-creep in Surveillance Studies more generally. However, to the extent that Surveillance Studies literatures have at least *implicitly* engaged the question of function-creep, they often present a methodologically and substantively restricted reading of surveillance creep solely as a dual-use application of certain technology or informational database, instead of a larger institutional shift that considers a wider confluence of changes across objects,

tools, technologies, texts, formulae, norms, and institutional interests, rationales, and strategies as a shifting set of normative constitutions. Haggerty's approach to surveillance legacies, perhaps unknowingly, opens up new avenues for identifying and explaining the process of function-creep. Building on Haggerty's approach, and further utilizing the approach to security governance assemblages that is relied upon in this text, the following section develops an ontology and methodology for encountering processes of function-creep. To more clearly draw out the ontological and methodological contours of this approach, I draw on the case material presented in earlier chapters. Widening the explanatory engagement with questions of function creep through a more ANT-inspired approach, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical development of function creep in the Surveillance Studies literature.

A relational ontology and methodology that is premised on the notion of security governance assemblages opens explanatory possibilities for understanding and studying function-creep. Following the theoretical approach that is pursued in Chapter 2, an STS and Foucauldian-inspired approach to function-creep furthers traditional understandings of function-creep. In particular, it attempts to show how the 'effects' or 'consequences' of technological entities, and their capacity to find secondary applications in a process of function-creep unfolds as the result of a wider heterogeneous set of relational entities within an assemblages or network of security governance. The methodological implication to study processes of function-creep in this way then, is to identify and arrive at an explanation of the dynamic relations of the entities within the assemblage that establish, stabilize, and which might catalyze processes that subsequently transform the applications for technologies.

Moving beyond the narrow focus on technologies in function creep and again, back into our discussion on security governance assemblages, we encounter a more expansive means to study processes of function creep which favours a relational approach to security (and surveillance as a) mode of governance. The following section revisits the case study material to understand the articulation and establishment of relations between entities connected through the network can be traced as a set of dynamic associations,

which can give rise to the concept of function-creep. The network of governance—and inherent processes of function-creep within the security governance network—more carefully considers the way that social control mutates through a shift somewhere along the network, whether through forms of discourse (Foucault 1977), alterations in the strategies of calculation and categorization (Rose 1996; Bowker and Starr 2000), conditions the way that security governance assemblages change – and speak to a more detailed, complex process of how function-creep occurs. A shift anywhere within the assemblage simultaneously carries knock-on effects for other identities, roles, responsibilities, imaginaries, policies, resources, and materializations, within the network. The value of moving toward a broader understanding of function-creep processes in the context of security governance assemblages is several. First, a networked ontology that considers novel articulations of human and nonhuman elements sensitizes researchers to the importance of relational and dynamic transformation in processes of function-creep. As social scientists, working with a rich ontology conditions researchers to more carefully consider the presence (or even the absence) of particular entities within the network that simultaneously condition the potentialities of other entities within the network. It also sensitizes researchers to how security, policing, and surveillance infrastructures stabilize, endure, and transform over time, noting which changes in the assemblage are most common to occur with. Developing an empirical record with an understanding of the ontology of function-creep could create a nomenclature for coming to terms with function-creep in more clear ways. For policy-makers and regulators, sorts of early-warning signals about how certain assemblages have been prone toward function-creep in the past, and in what particular ways, will equip regulatory officials and activists with a much needed language to legitimize questions of function-creep as a salient feature of public debate on the more unappealing or violent practices of surveillance. Much of this conversation has been abstract, turning toward a brief discussion on the elements of function-creep in the case studies will clarify the theoretical framework that is being advanced.

**Function-Creep and Public Video Surveillance**

The public video surveillance assemblage of the Vancouver 2010 Games is a primary example to demonstrate how an assemblage-specific reading of function-creep can reveal hidden processes that attest to the complexities that are often inherent in instances of function-creep. Examining the specific uses of the technology itself would have missed one of the most salient factors that facilitated the function-creep of the public video surveillance assemblage in Vancouver: the materialization of the redeployable system in the urban architecture, and the articulation of this materialization with shifting imaginaries for the cameras itself. These contingent and relational aspect of the human and nonhuman features of the assemblage were a key component for the transformational function-creep of the public video surveillance assemblage in Vancouver.

To explain in more detail, the materialization of public video cameras in elevated areas of the urban landscape prompted a function-creep process as a resignification of the cameras inherently as a situational awareness tool, and not operational surveillance, subsequently restructuring the city's own interpretation of the diminishing relevance of privacy legislation under this new articulation. Interestingly, however, the emergence of function-creep in this particular instance is also very much about *what remained relatively enduring within the network. Or, put simply, what didn't change in the network*. While some aspects of the network were 're-institutionalized' such as the acquisition and placement of the cameras into the urban material environment, the previous institutionalization of operator knowledge persisted. Function-creep, therefore, emerged because of the tacit knowledges of the camera operators whom were still guiding their operations and monitoring practices based on Olympic-specific training that involves explicit tactics of targeted surveillance. The confluence of these actants allowed the process of function-creep to take hold. The relationality of this nonhuman-human articulation are a key ontological and methodological site to unpack the inherent nuances in function-creep in a way that moves beyond reductionist views that often rest at the site of the technology itself.

A further actant that conditioned function-creep with the Vancouver Games public video assemblage emerged. Given the reimagining of the vertical characteristics of the surveillance architecture, a new key organizing metaphor of situational awareness emerged as a way to define the strategic-trajectory of the assemblage. This categorical redefinition (as a form of discursive creep) insularized officials from adherence to privacy controls. And further, the concept of situational awareness after it had been established as the anchor concept for the system underwent a further redefinition itself. As part of policy changes in the wake of the Stanley Cup Riots in Vancouver in 2011, the city expanded the definition of situational awareness to include protections to the urban environment and property. This change presupposes that a surveillance regime is in place if it is to be effectively enforced.

From a regulatory vantage point, the case of the public video surveillance assemblage becomes interesting when held under a relational-ontological conception of function-creep. To regulate, often begins with the question, what is the object in need of regulation? For the Vancouver Games public video surveillance assemblage, would this mean regulating the spatial-location of cameras in aerial / highly elevated areas of the urban environment? Would it mean redrawing the conceptual boundaries between situational awareness and surveillance in a way that constitutes situational awareness as another practice of potentially intrusive and unwarranted surveillance? Or, finally, might it involve an intervention in the security governance assemblage at the level of the operator, who are clearly operating the technology based on the historical durability of tacit knowledge's within the network, and without oversight. Indeed, the problem of function-creep is a difficult and complex one where the potentialities for mutation as a form of function-creep in the assemblage is often conditioned by changes that have occurred at other points along the network.

### Function-Creep and Public-Order Policing

The Vancouver 2010 Games catalyzed deeper integration between agencies tasked with intelligence operations, as well as with the crowd management (public safety unit) responsible for managing crowds and disorder within the urban domain. In terms of the

intelligence assemblage, function-creep involved transformations in the threat categories that constituted risky subjects in need of regulation and control. Key, in this process, was the move towards new threat categories involving "Multi-Issue Extremism" that consider the propensity for individuals to commit acts of violence. While the extension of ITAC with a range of federal, provincial, or municipal agencies occurred as a form of structurally-specific function-creep, importantly the redrawing of the identity boundaries that legitimize targets for surveillance as a risk identity that is connected to specific political practices occurred. Subsequent research has indicated that categorical risk definition for intelligence gathering purposes appears to be selectively applied during specific events – meaning that function-creep is inherent to the institutional trajectory of event-to-event reinterpretations of potential threats. Given this ongoing redrawing of the threat terrain, function-creep begins to look more and more like a basic and mundane shift in security preparations related to ongoing emerging priorities for intelligence. That is, it is currently unclear whether the categorical change MIE at 2010 Games (as well as with the G8/20 which was another major event being held that year) was as process of function-creep, or whether at future events, these categories are always subject to revision. Tracing the public order assemblage across events, therefore, can reveal interesting insights about the inherently ongoing nature of function-creep in strategic threat assessment practices.

In the context of urban-based crowd control tactics, function-creep also occurred as an expansion of the number of officials and agencies responsible for public order. Through the global focusing event of the 1999 Battle of Seattle and its impact on a global revision of standardized templates in public-order policing, fused with the focusing event of the Vancouver 2010 Game, the VPD public-safety unit crept from a *reactive* reserve crowd control unit to a *proactive* crowd control unit. Function-creep, therefore, is also inherently contextual and conditioned through deterritorializing sets of relations. The wider political context that catalyzes shifts in best-practices in public-order policing to adapt to the perception of new highly mobile activist threat, gave rise to the investment and establishment of small size tactical public order squads that are highly flexible units that can be dispatched at different 'hot-zones' across the urban domain. Function-creep in

this way, can be understood as a form of 'policy mobility' (Cood and Ward 2011) which is an inherently power-laden process where embodied forms of public order regulation, and activist protest, in the urban theatre are reframed as increasingly contentious. The police have honed tactics in less-lethal weapons, enhanced their mobility and response times to stem disorder in urban environments, and have redrawn these frames of regulation and control into a wider set of traditionally non-policing entities, such as liquor control boards and private sector business.

### Function-Creep and Civil police-military Relations

Function-creep with the civil police-military governance assemblage at the Vancouver 2010 Games is largely the product of ongoing intercultural exchanges between military and policing institutions. The forms and expressions of function-creep here are many, and are mostly addressed in Chapter Four. However, a few of the interesting points are worth further consideration. First, function-creep emerged in the MLU through a combination of a key 'policy mobilizer' (Larner and Laurie 2010) that catalyzed a key partnership with high-ranking officials to have the MLU institutionalized in the lead-up to the 2010 Games. A single officer was able to seize the Olympic-opportunity to justify the perceived need to have more clearly defined communication, roles, and responsibilities in a partnership with the Canadian Forces. Since then, the MLU has established cross-border relationships with the US Army and other authorities. These sets of partnerships (municipal police to Canadian Forces; Municipal Police to US Army; Municipal Police to other Municipal police) through ongoing training exercises have set in motion a new set of policy assemblages and policy mobilities (Cook and Ward 2011; McCann 2011) that have not only contributed to the militarization of policing, but have contributed to the 'policization of the military'. As a result, this particular assemblage, in a process of coming together through joint-training exercises that emerged during and extended beyond the 2010 Games, are also pulling apart, and being re-skilled and deterritorialized. Function-creep has distinctly extra-local implications in the context of civil police-military relations. For example, for Canadian Forces to learn more clearly the expertise of the police use of force continuum and apply it in military operations in the Sudan or Kabul,

216 Afghanistan, for example, leads to a shift in the institutional capacities of military agencies that are trying to come to terms with how to police occupations. The context of asymmetric warfare, the battlefields within urban domains in the Middle East, have invited a demand to develop expertise that can distinguish between civilian populations and potential insurgents – the traditional work of police in Western liberal democracies. These policies are no doubt remoulded when adopted into a new context, but equally important are the function-creep changes that take place in the situations and environments where joint-exercises or other personal and professional relationships are formed. Researchers of function-creep, in a methodological point then, should pay increased attention to the movement of people, policies, and even places (Marcus 1995) in ways that can attest more clearly to how policy mutations as a form of function-creep occur.

### Function-Creep and the Private Security Industry

The most notable variable that spurred function-creep in the context of private security and the Vancouver 2010 Games was the interpretation of temporal constraints as a means to justify organizational, institutional, and legislative changes to how private security unfolds. Temporal imaginaries that were held by agents within the private security assemblage—including discourses of private industry and government—stretched across a range of actors to establish the required conditions for a broad transformations in the network to occur. Given this cultural imaginary, consent emerged to weaken the legislative regulations facing the private security industry. After the event, however, the amendments to legislative codification as an ongoing dimension of the private security assemblage continued after the event had ended. Function-creep then, emerged through the suppression of a particular entity within the network. Understood here as an absence – that which has been removed from the assemblage.

## Conclusion: Refining Function-Creep?

An understanding of function-creep as a change in parts of a security governance assemblage – which yields a cascading effect on the network – refines our understanding of function-creep beyond a narrow interpretation of technologies and uses of data, and

situates it into wider questions about the institutionalization of transformations in security governance assemblages. The most popularly recognized aspects of function-creep are those that seek to trace a clear line from a single rationale that underpins a technology, to a secondary rationale that ultimately exceeds the original justification for using the data. However, an assemblage approach to function-creep highlights the more mundane and less readily recognizable aspects of the security governance assemblage that includes both human and nonhuman actants. Given that security governance is the product of complex articulation of relatively enduring configurations, a shift in any articulation between entities in the assemblage can lead to a process of function-creep, particularly those that are not traditionally understood as a strategic or technological attribute of function-creep. For instance, the vertical materialization of the public video surveillance cameras in Vancouver meant that a reconditioning of the spatial imaginaries within the assemblage itself catalyzed a function-creep shift in the public video surveillance network. While the public video camera operators continued to collect data in ways that continued from an Olympic-oriented policy, the wider cultural framing of the redeployable pubic video surveillance system itself was implicated in a creep from surveillance (Olympic policy), toward situational awareness (public safety), and therefore allowed officials to avoid privacy regulation protocols and to also redefine the identity of the surveillance assemblage as "less intrusive" to the wider public. Again, these early shifts in function-creep toward "situational awareness" spurred an ongoing widening in the definition of situational awareness to include the protection of private property in the downtown district from suspicious crowds. Such less recognized attributes of the surveillance network – as more mundane aspects that are specific to the location of its materialization (aerial situation in an urban environment) for instance, are equally important for coming to terms with continuity and change in security governance assemblages. Function-creep importantly occurs through infrastructural changes in the network, and in particular, through shifts in the entities that occur outside or beyond the strategic-discourses that shape practices and uses of technologies of surveillance. Security governance legacies, as a whole, are steeped in processes of function or mission-creep. The Olympics catalyze a range of transformations in security governance assemblages throughout the course of the Olympics, yet the legacy effects flowing from

these early catalysts are likely to set in motion a cascading effect of function-creep processes in more localized contexts after the event has ended. Further considerations concerning the degree to which function-creep is an emergent, novel, or inherent, aspect of major sport event security legacies deserves further consideration.

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