

Environmental activism, anarchist methodology, and Indigenous resurgence: Renewed possibilities for ecological security in Canada

by

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We acknowledge and respect the $l\acute{a}k^{w\acute{a}}\eta\eta\acute{a}n$ peoples on whose traditional territory the university stands and the Songhees, Esquimalt and WSÁNEĆ peoples whose historical relationships with the land continue to this day.

Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

As climate change becomes a pressing concern for policymakers and citizens around the world, a variety of security discourses have emerged framing the environment as a security issue. While dominant frameworks focus on securing national interests, the international order, or individuals in vulnerable positions, the ecological security framework presents a radical alternative discourse. Ecological security requires a refocusing of the security discourse onto the environment itself, vulnerable communities, and future generations, and requires the exploration of alternative forms of social and economic organization. This framework has often been discounted as an impractical and radical alternative to dominant discourses, however, in this thesis I argue that ecological security can, and is, being enacted by local communities around the world. Similarly overlooked, yet highly relevant to ecological security, is anarchist political thought and methodology. I suggest that anarchist methodology, when employed by environmental activists through direct action, can enable the enactment of ecological security by local communities. By investigating the connections and overlap between blockadia activism, anarchist methodology, and Indigenous resurgence, it is possible to envision a locally-based, bottom-up model of ecological security. Through an investigation of the conflict between Wet'suwet'en land defenders and the Coastal GasLink pipeline, this blockadia-anarchist-ecological security nexus is drawn out and examined as a possible path forward for climate security.

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Chapter One: Introduction

The role of critical theory is to both critique and explore; it aims to expand disciplinary boundaries when and where current theory and scholarship falls short. Taking up a critical security studies perspective requires one to critique existing security regimes, however, it also necessitates a certain amount of intellectual and scholarly imagination to look outside one's original frame of reference and consider new possibilities. Currently, one of the largest problems facing the global community is climate change and the accompanying threats to human health, infrastructure, and standards of living. There is a growing consciousness among communities in many regions of the world that we cannot continue living, working, and relating to each other and our environment in the same way that we have been for the past 200 years. A radical shift in perspective is necessary to develop alternative forms of economic, social, and political relations which may address the growing climate crisis, as current approaches are falling short. The concept of ecological security as a critical security framework offers one such opportunity to explore an alternative way of providing security in the context of climate change. However, simply turning dominant security discourses towards an ecological model is not enough. To truly engage in a critical manner with ecological security, we must also adopt a framework of radical inclusion, specifically towards Indigenous communities. By stepping outside of our own perspectives and worldviews, and considering the contribution of Indigenous peoples to ecological security, we may begin to locate the potential for new forms of social and economic organization which could enact an ecological security framework. In this thesis I examine the interaction between environmental activism, anarchist methodology, and Indigenous resurgence in order to envision how ecological security can be, and currently is, being enacted within Canada.

Over the past 50 years, climate change has been increasingly recognized as a major global challenge impacting the lives of people in all states and regions. Often characterized as a ‘wicked problem’ (Levin et al., 2012), a ‘threat multiplier’ (Dalby, 2020), or simply as the most pressing threat to the survival of humankind (Scott, 2015), climate change has permeated nearly every aspect of local, national, and global politics in the 21st century. International bodies such as the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have recognized the threat that unchecked climate change poses to humans and the environment. From the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to the 2015 Paris Agreement, states and international organizations have engaged with climate science in an attempt to identify and pursue possible strategies of mitigation, adaptation, and technological innovation.

The growing acknowledgement of the risks to ecological systems and human existence has led to climate change being increasingly characterized as a security issue by national and international actors. To date, over 70% of countries have identified climate change within their national security strategies (McDonald, 2018, p. 153). International organizations such as the United Nations Security Council have held discussions about climate change since the early 2000s, with subsequent scholarship theorizing the link between national, international, and human security and climate change (Holland & DeGarmo, 2014; Scott, 2015). Framing climate change as a security issue draws on the status of exceptionalism granted to issues of security, affording it the political priority and resource mobilization which accompanies such a designation (Greaves, 2018). This increased interest in ‘climate security’ has led to the emergence of several different discourses of climate security, which variously address the national, international, and human security aspects of climate change.

These dominant discourses of climate security differ in who or what they identify as the referent object of security, the acting subject of security, and their specific prescriptions and recommended actions. The ‘referent object’ of security refers to who or what is being secured, and the ‘acting subject’ refers to who or what is responsible for securing that referent object. These discourses variously locate elite or institutional actors as the acting subjects of security, and generally advocate for solutions which do not radically alter status-quo systems of social and economic organization. On the other hand, a more recent discourse of climate security, the ecological security approach, presents a different conception of climate security. Ecological security “encourages us to re-examine the nature of our relationship to the natural environmental, and to fundamentally challenge existing structures and norms that encourage or even compel environmental change” (McDonald, 2013, p. 49). In this discourse, the referent object of security becomes the biosphere, vulnerable communities, and future generations, with local communities and individuals being empowered to act as the provider of this security (McDonald, 2018). This framing of the relationship between climate change and security necessitates an alternative approach to security than the institutional, top-down approach advanced by dominant climate security discourses. As with many frameworks of knowledge which resist dominant discourses, the ecological security approach has not been as fully theorized and applied to existing movements for climate security as more established frameworks have. To this end, in this thesis I address the lacuna in scholarship regarding how and where ecological security may be put into practice by examining how anarchist methodologies are employed by modern environmental movements to create an extant example of ecological security.

To explore how ecological security may be meaningfully put into practice, I consider the intersection of anarchist methodology and modern environmental movements. Anarchist political

thought has always encoded a resistance to forms of domination, most notably the state, and an opposition to coercive and hierarchical relationships. Unlike some types of political theory, anarchism has always been more focused on methodology and practice than ideology.

Particularly in the post-WWII period, anarchist thought has shifted towards the practical application and gradual adoption of anarchist principles in everyday life (Pauli, 2015). The common refrain amongst anarchists of ‘creating a new society in the shell of the old’ is representative of the prefigurative aims of much anarchist thinking (Graeber, 2004, p. 7). This shift from a revolutionary to evolutionary conception of anarchism has opened the door for methodology to become a more central element of anarchist theory.

The works of David Graeber (2009) regarding anarchist thought and methodologies, particularly direct action, voluntary association, and deeply democratic modes of organization, are highly resonant with modern environmental movements. Naomi Klein’s coining of the term ‘blockadia’ to describe “a roving transnational conflict zone that is cropping up with increasing frequency and intensity wherever extractive projects are attempting to dig and drill” (2014, p. 294) captures the character of contemporary environmental movements. This type of grassroots environmental movement generally consists of local communities actively opposing extractive resource projects taking place in their homelands. From Texas to Tofino, some local communities are taking matters into their own hands by using their bodies and their resources in attempts to stop the progression of various extractive industries. This form of local activism differs from more visible, global movements which appeal to national and international bodies for environmental action, such as Fridays for Future.

Blockadia activism thus represents a type of local, direct action, and often incorporates anarchist methodologies such as mutual aid and voluntary association. Though not only a 21st

century phenomenon, a recent rise in popular and scholarly interest around ‘blockadia’ movements can be largely attributed to Naomi Klein’s (2014) work, *This Changes Everything*. In this thesis I contend that examining the intersection of such methods with environmental activism reveals how this type of activism can be useful for enacting the key features of ecological security. Both ecological security and anarchist political thought include a critique of current social and economic structures, and a relocating of agency towards local communities and away from national or international institutions of governance. In this way, local environmental movements are able to draw on anarchist methodology to provide ecological security in a bottom-up manner. Therefore, unlike the dominant discourses of climate security which focus on national or international-level solutions and action, the intersection of blockadia activism and anarchist methodology suggests that ecological security may be provided at a local level by local communities resisting current social and economic structures.

To demonstrate this argument, I conduct a case study of Wet’suwet’en resistance to the construction of the Coastal GasLink pipeline in northern British Columbia. This case demonstrates that anarchist methodologies such as direct action and voluntary association can be employed by local communities to achieve ecological security through opposition to extractive capitalism, settler colonial structures, and state incursions onto Indigenous lands. The case of Wet’suwet’en also allows for an examination of the connections between grassroots environmental activism, anarchist methodologies, Indigenous resurgence in Canada, and ecological security. Indigenous communities in Canada have been resisting colonial structures of domination for centuries, and much can be learned from the intersection between Indigenous resurgence, environmental activism, and local attempts to provide ecological security. Numerous overlaps in goals and practices between Indigenous resurgence and anarchist methodology

makes this case study a nuanced example of the blockadia-anarchist-ecological security nexus described in this thesis. This understanding of climate security as ecological, local, and even radically decolonial may pave a path forward for a less hierarchical, and more inclusive model of climate security.

Research Design

Considering the current lacuna in scholarship regarding the local provision of ecological security and anarchist methodology, this thesis is motivated by the research question: How can grassroots environmental activists utilize anarchist methodology to provide a local model of ecological security?

To explore this question, I investigate the connections between ecological security, local environmental activism, and anarchist methodology. Throughout this scholarship, security is interpreted as a socially constructed and discursively produced category which has a “logic that encourages urgency and exceptionalism” (McDonald, 2013, p. 44). I take a broader view of security than other dominant constructions, in which I recognize the ability of local, nondominant actors to produce and respond to security discourses.

Following an investigation of existing climate security discourses, I trace the emergence and evolution of Western environmental movements from the Industrial Revolution to the emergence of ‘blockadia’ activism in the early 2010s. Using David Graeber’s work on direct action and anarchist methodology, I demonstrate that such methods can be identified within blockadia environmental activism. This investigation primarily relies on previous ethnographic work, such as that by Graeber (2009) and Klein (2014), as well as primary and secondary textual sources regarding the intersection of activism, anarchism, and climate security. Here, I develop and

explain the relationship between local environmental activism, anarchist methodology, and ecological security, which addresses my research question.

I then turn to a case study of the Wet'suwet'en blockade in northern BC in order to illustrate the theoretical connections developed earlier in the thesis. Through an assessment of primary and secondary sources produced by and about Wet'suwet'en activism I demonstrate that this case represents a concrete example of anarchist methodology and grassroots activism enacting a local model of ecological security. Case studies in general are useful research methods for illustrating a theoretical argument and providing an example of the theorized relationship in practice (Moses & Knutsen, 2019). The particular case of the conflict in Wet'suwet'en territory was chosen because it is ongoing and there is readily available and verifiable information from both scholarly and firsthand sources regarding the conflict which I am able to analyze in this thesis. In conducting this case study, I draw on scholarly and legal sources regarding the background of the Wet'suwet'en conflict, as well as firsthand testimonials and accounts from Indigenous and settler activists in order to identify how anarchist methodologies are employed within the movement and examine how their inclusion is assisting in the provision of ecological security.

Additionally, the case of Wet'suwet'en resistance was chosen due to the Indigenous-led nature of the resistance and the overlap of Indigenous issues such as land rights, sovereignty, and traditional practices which colours this case. Unlike settler-led movements, examining Wet'suwet'en allows for a richer analysis of how anarchist methodology and ecological security are supported by, and interact with, Indigenous worldviews and decolonial goals. Considering that the key feature of anarchism and ecological security is a deep questioning of, and resistance

to, the status quo, examining an Indigenous case study provides an opportunity to extend that resistance and incorporate anti-settler colonial elements within my analysis.

This thesis makes an original contribution to existing literature in the area of climate security, environmental politics, and the broader study of social movements by addressing the relative lack of scholarship that investigates anarchist organization and environmental movements. The application of anarchist political thought and methodology to environmental movements and ecological security presents an opportunity to consider the interaction between anarchist theory and responses to the environmental crisis while analysing environmental movements from a new perspective. In 2001, Jon Barnett suggested that future research in the field of climate security requires an ongoing critique of existing theories and practices of environmental security, coupled with a need to “construct multiple maps that show the dimensions and spectrums of other political, ecological, social, economic and cultural spaces and processes” (p. 157). Barnett (2001) hoped to see scholarship which looked outside the narrow Western worldview, forged connections with communities in different ‘frames of reference’ and searched for ‘alternative histories’ which may offer promise for imagining different forms of social and economic organization. I believe that this thesis, particularly through its engagement with Indigenous communities such as the Wet’suwet’en, is addressing Barnett’s desire for a more expansive and inclusionary theory of environmental security.

Limitations and Challenges

It is important to acknowledge some of the limitations and challenges of this project, and consider my own positionality in relation to this work. Though the post-positivist approach to examining the intersection of environmental movements and ecological security taken up in this thesis may lack the perceived rigour of quantitative analysis, it nevertheless plays an important

role in investigating potential connections and opening up a new field of discussion. Though there remains room for disagreement and scholarly debate regarding my analysis and conclusions, I believe this form of analysis is useful for stepping outside one's own experiences and considering alternative discourses and points of view. As is the case for most qualitative research projects, the accounts provided by personal or official documents are limited to the perspectives of those who chose to participate, and thus these written contributions may not be representative of all views and individuals involved. For this thesis, I am limited by the availability of written material and am not privy to the viewpoints of those who are not represented in the materials I am able to consult.

The case study examined in this project, while illustrating the argument developed throughout the thesis, is highly complex and nuanced. Though I attempt to present a comprehensive and accurate account of the conflict in Wet'suwet'en territory, there remain important elements of this case which I, as a white settler, cannot fully understand. Furthermore, this discussion which applies the concepts of anarchist methodology and ecological security to the case of Wet'suwet'en is not intended to impose Western academic concepts onto an example of Indigenous activism and resurgence. Rather, this case study is intended to locate interconnections, forge strategic alliances, and offer a perspective which takes the project of decolonization seriously as an important aim for all social movements. Glen Coulthard (2014) and Leanne Simpson (2011) have called for the acknowledgement and incorporation of decolonization as an integral imperative of settler-dominated movements, such as environmental and anarchist projects. This thesis attempts to incorporate a decolonial perspective within the praxis of ecological security through the study and discussion of Wet'suwet'en resistance and the relationship between decolonization, anarchism, and ecological security.

Finally, as a settler of Ukrainian and British descent who grew up in Ontario, I am approaching this project from a Western position and worldview. As a result of my positionality, I have been able to pursue my education and conduct this research from a place of significant social, financial, and academic privilege. I currently reside upon and have conducted the research and writing of this project on the unceded territory of the Lekwungen peoples, the Songhees, Esquimalt, and WSÁNEĆ, in what is currently known as ‘Victoria’, the capital city of the province of ‘British Columbia (BC)’. BC is the province at the center of the Wet’suwet’en pipeline conflict discussed in Chapter 4, and is responsible for the authorization of the pipeline, granting of an injunction order, and subsequent policing of Indigenous land defenders involved in the conflict. In both my home province of Ontario and here on Vancouver Island, I have participated in Indigenous-led acts of resistance and environmental activism, and I feel that these experiences have been integral in shaping me into the student and political scientist that I am today. I recognize the importance of acting in solidarity with Indigenous communities, and in both my academic and activist work I aim to use my position of privilege in ways which uplift Indigenous and marginalized voices. It is my hope that this project can continue this aim of working in solidarity with Indigenous communities towards a more just future for all.

Chapter Outline

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 three outline the relevant literatures on climate security, environmental movements, and anarchist methodology, respectively, while Chapter 4 applies these concepts to the case study of the Wet’suwet’en pipeline blockades in British Columbia and Chapter 5 offers some key takeaways and conclusions to be drawn from this discussion.

Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the issue of anthropogenic climate change and introduces current discourses of climate security. By attempting to construct climate change as a security issue, certain environmental issues and possible solutions may achieve the urgency of matters deemed ‘security threats’ with the associated transfer of resources and interest. This classification has led to several academic and policy-based climate security discourses that are widely varied and evolving. Using McDonald’s (2013) typology of climate security discourses to navigate this topic, I examine discourses related to national, international, and human security interests which can be understood as different types of environmental security discourses. These dominant discourses are positioned against the ‘ecological security’ framework, which alternatively focuses on ecosystems, vulnerable communities, and future generations. Ecological security takes the natural environment and vulnerable populations as the referent object of security, rather than conventional foci such as the state or human beings as a species. In this chapter I differentiate between the ecological and the national, international, and human security discourses according to their policy prescriptions and suggested responses. While dominant climate security discourses advocate for strategies of adaptation or mitigation which do not rock the proverbial boat of current social, economic and political structures, the ecological approach calls for a radical reorganization of these very systems.

Chapter 3 turns away from policymaking and academic climate security discourses to examine a different set of actors responding to the climate crisis: social movements. Many social movements have emerged around the world in response to climate change, such as Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, and others. Beginning around 2010, environmental activism has increasingly shifted towards a more local form of action known as ‘blockadia’. Here, I discuss

some of the key features of blockadia movements, followed by a discussion of anarchist political theory and methodology. I focus on the work of David Graeber to explain how anarchist methodology is employed by blockadia environmental movements. This discussion suggests a relationship between anarchist methodology, particularly that of direct action, and environmental movements. Following this discussion, I return to the climate security discourses discussed by McDonald (2013) and examine how blockadia activism enacts ecological security. I draw on the understanding of environmental movements as employing anarchist methodology to argue that local blockadia activism may provide an opportunity for the realization of meaningful ecological security. Through direct action and voluntary association, anarchist methodology equips local environmental movements with the appropriate tools to oppose resource extraction and explore new, non-hierarchical methods of social and economic organization. In this way, blockadia movements are taking up the ecological security call to radically reimagine social and economic structures. This chapter lays out the central argument of this thesis: that ecological security can be enacted at a local level through the use of anarchist methodology within environmental social movements.

Chapter 4 provides an illustration of this argument by examining how the Wet'suwet'en pipeline blockade in British Columbia successfully employs anarchist methodology in order to work towards ecological security. By using direct action, voluntary organization, and traditional practices of governance the Wet'suwet'en checkpoints and land defenders are enacting an ecological security approach to the climate crisis. This case study thus presents an example of how local activism may incorporate anarchist methodology to enact the ecological security framework. Within this chapter I also consider the intersection of Indigenous resurgence, anarchist methodology, and ecological security. The interaction between Indigenous resistance to

colonization and environmental activism is highly nuanced and complex, however, as Chris Crass (2013, p. 18) notes, “if systems of dominance are interconnected, then systems of liberation are also interconnected.” Taking up an ecological perspective, this discussion highlights that the provision of ecological security can be an intersectional and decolonial practice when enacted from the local level.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I offer some conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion of anarchism and climate security and suggest directions for further research. With the increasing visibility and severity of the impacts of climate change, discourses of climate security are becoming areas of increased contestation. Though dominant understandings of climate change and climate security place emphasis on elite, institutional actors and express concern regarding international conflict, refocusing the climate security discourse to focus on ecological security and to take local and anarchist forms of organization seriously may be an avenue for cooperative collective action towards social and environmental justice. I suggest that rather than limiting climate security discourses to the familiar top-down, institutional model of security, it is important to recognize the potential for local communities to become the providers of security themselves.

Chapter Two: Climate Security and the Ecological Security Discourse

The investigation of social movements, anarchist methodology, and ecological security is informed by an understanding of the nature of the climate crisis, and the framework of security discourses within which this discussion is taking place. In this chapter I briefly trace the development of scholarship regarding the climate crisis and climate security, identify and explain key terms relevant to this project, and outline the main approaches to climate security. These concepts and ideas underpin many of the arguments throughout this analysis and will be returned to over the course of this work. This chapter begins with a brief overview of climate change as a global crisis, followed by a discussion of its construction as a security issue. I conclude with an explanation of the various climate security discourses by differentiating between national and international security discourses, human security, and ‘environmental’ and ‘ecological’ approaches. Thereby, this chapter aims to situate the climate crisis within the critical security literature and make clear the distinction between dominant discourses of climate security and the ecological security approach.

Climate Change and the Anthropocene

The ongoing climate crisis, driven by human activity, has evolved over the past sixty years into a major scientific, political, and social force. To begin this investigation, it is first necessary to clarify the term ‘climate crisis’ and briefly examine both its scientific and political dimensions. More specifically, this discussion provides an overview of the primary drivers and consequences of climate change, and how this transformation of the biosphere constitutes a crisis.

Currently, the Earth’s climate is approximately 1 degree Celsius warmer than it was prior to the Industrial Revolution, and is expected to rise an additional 1.5 degrees or more between

2030 and 2052 (Bradshaw et al., 2021, p. 4; IPCC, 2018). One primary driver of this warming is the significant increase in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into Earth's atmosphere following the Industrial Revolution. Greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, produce a 'greenhouse effect' in which heat from the sun's rays is trapped within Earth's atmosphere rather than escaping, causing an increased warming of Earth's atmosphere. This effect is largely driven by the burning of fossil fuels, which emit GHGs into the atmosphere and is regarded as the principal driver of human-generated climate change. Fossil fuels are responsible for 85% of global commercial energy and are considered the core of the modern global capitalist economy (Bradshaw et al., 2021, p. 4).

This 'global warming', now commonly referred to as climate change, is accompanied and exacerbated by a wide range of environmentally destructive practices, ranging from resource extraction methods to urban sprawl, and resulting in a significant reduction in natural spaces that are not impacted by human activity. In 2019 it was estimated that over 70% of the Earth's land surface has been altered by human activity, including land-clearing for farming, resource extraction, and human habitation (Bradshaw et al., 2021, p. 2). These major alterations to the Earth's biosphere are producing unprecedented changes which have only recently begun to be recognized and the gravity of their impacts understood. Relatedly, scientists believe that a sixth mass extinction event is beginning as a result of this continued loss of biodiversity (Ceballos et al., 2015, p. 1). Rapid loss of biodiversity has adverse effects on the ecosystems in which they are embedded, such as a reduction in pollination, soil degradation, lower air and water quality, and compromised human health. Taken together, this drastic alteration of the global biosphere through GHG emissions, environmental destruction, and biodiversity loss has led scientists to define the current geologic era as the 'Anthropocene' (Lewis & Maslin, 2015). This term

reflects the significant impact of human activity on the ecosystems and climate of the planet, by identifying human activity as a geological force responsible for reshaping the very composition of Earth's surface.¹ This characterization has been challenged by scholars such as Jairus Victor Grove (2019), who proposes the term 'Eurocene' to reflect the specific way that global geopolitics and the climate crisis has been steered by European imperialism, and present environmental issues were not catalyzed by all states equally (p. 41).

Over the past six decades of scientific research and increasing political awareness, the dialogue surrounding climate change and environmental degradation has turned towards the language of crisis. The use of this terminology reflects the growing urgency of climate change, and this language of crisis has increasingly been adopted by scholars, scientists, policymakers, and the media.

Security Constructions of the Climate Crisis

Post-Cold War era security politics have become progressively more engaged with concerns which lie outside the traditional state-versus-state model of conflict (Brown & McLeman, 2009). As greater interest has been placed on non-traditional and nonmilitary security concerns such as human security and resource conflicts, environmental concerns have similarly found their way onto the security agenda of powerful states and into the works of security scholars. The climate crisis is now considered a matter of national and international security, rather than being a topic reserved for scholars of political ecology. A substantial body of literature has emerged in response to growing concerns about the security dimensions of

¹ For more on the current and projected effects of climate change, see Carleton & Hsiang, 2016; Forster et al., 2020; Ripple et al., 2020.

environmental issues and has expanded to encompass a highly interdisciplinary and widely varied set of approaches to this intersection of fields.

Beginning in the 1980s a series of scholarly works began exploring climate change as a security issue. Norman Myer's 1989 suggestion that environmental factors be considered within American security planning, and Jessica Tuchman Matthews' 1989 assessment of environmental threats to national security began linking climate change and national security. Continuing this line of scholarship, Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" (1994) and Thomas Homer-Dixon's "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict" (1994) pointed to the destabilizing effects of climate change and the potential for environmental shifts to catalyze violent conflict. Since then, climate change has often been understood as a 'threat multiplier' which can exacerbate existing social and geopolitical tensions or lead to the emergence of new domestic and international conflicts (such as the 'climate migrant crisis' causing rising tensions in Europe) (Dalby, 2020, p. 6). However, it is also increasingly understood that the ecologically destabilizing effects of climate change are sources of insecurity for millions globally, as extreme weather events threaten key infrastructure, shifting weather patterns threaten livelihoods, and melting permafrost threatens to expose pathogens presenting a risk of new global pandemics.

The increased visibility that accompanies the recognition of environmental issues as security concerns has been a driving reason for framing environmental degradation and the climate crisis within security discourses (Dalby, 2015; McDonald, 2013). 'Security' itself is a contested concept; definitions and invocations of security are regularly debated and questioned as the language of security is a "powerful social and political signifier" (Greaves, 2018, p. 110) which indicates the gravity and priority of an issue. Securitization, referring to the process by

which some issues are permitted to enter the ‘arena’ of security, is therefore also a highly contested concept and practice (Browning & McDonald, 2011). Successful securitization

Shifts the issue from the realm of ‘normal politics’ in which actors are bound by rules of appropriate political conduct into the realm of security politics, whereby the sovereign is authorized to use exceptional measures to defend the object that is threatened. The shift from politicized to securitized elevates the specified issue to the apex of political priority and denotes an official recognition of its perceived importance. (Greaves, 2018, p. 110)

Thus, by elevating a specified issue to the sphere of security politics there is increased attention, resources, and urgency transferred to the issue than would otherwise be possible. While the framework of securitization has often been used to discuss the discursive construction of climate change as a security issue, this thesis takes a wider view of the social construction of security. Considering McDonald’s 2008 critique of the securitization framework as problematically narrow, I understand security discourses to be produced by both dominant and marginal actors, and to be responded to in a variety of ways and by a variety of actors. Rather than only viewing the construction of climate change as a security threat through the framework of securitization, I widen the lens to see how both institutional and grassroots actors view climate change as a security issue, and how both these groups respond to climate change as a security threat in different ways. Therefore, throughout this discussion, the terms ‘climate crisis’ and ‘climate security’ are used, as these terms indicate the perceived severity and risk level associated with the arrival of the Anthropocene (or Eurocene), and the broadly constructed discourses of climate change as a security issue.

The more frequent inclusion of the climate crisis within security discourses can be seen in recent academic works (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Dalby, 2020; McDonald, 2018), as well as in

state policy discussions and in international institutions (Dellmuth, 2018; Greaves, 2021). For example, Canada's most recent defence strategy, released in 2019, incorporates climate change as a security issue primarily through the lens of environmental instability, classifying it as a 'threat multiplier' (Gov. of Canada, 2019). The policy document, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, recognizes the potential of climate change to "aggravate existing vulnerabilities, such as weak governance, and increase resource scarcity, which in turn heightens tensions and forces migrations" (Gov. of Canada, 2019, p. 2). This line of reasoning implies that climate change is being understood as a security issue and a 'threat multiplier' by the Government of Canada. The incorporation of climate change into national security planning is not unique to Canada, in fact recent estimates suggest that over 70% of states that have released national security strategy documents have explicitly addressed climate change (McDonald, 2018, p. 153).

In the international sphere, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has held discussions relating to climate change since 2007 (Maertens, 2021, p. 641). Over these years there has been substantial debate continuing over the perceived connections between climate change and threats to international security and what type of action the UNSC should take, if any (Conca, 2019; Maertens, 2021; Purvis & Busby, 2004). Similarly, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has recognized the link between climate change and international security. In a 2007 report the UNEP linked the conflict in Darfur with environmental stressors resulting from climate change, referencing changes to rainfall patterns and population displacement among other factors (UNEP, 2007, p. 4). Recently, the role of intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in working towards climate security policymaking has been growing (Dellmuth et al., 2018).

This increased inclusion of the climate crisis into national and global security conversations has come in part as a result of the growing identification and acceptance of the connections between the climate crisis and human security. The introduction of human security discourses continued the gradual move away from the traditional, realist, state-based security paradigm that narrowly focused on territorial, state-versus-state conflicts. This shift opened the door for ‘softer’, nonmilitary issues, such as access to healthcare and the impact of climate change, to enter security discourses and be considered alongside and in dialogue with harder security agendas. Introduced in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme, the concept of human security draws attention to vulnerable individuals and communities, and suggests that issues such as poverty and lack of access to healthcare or education should be considered issues of security as they affect the life outcomes of individuals (UNDP, 1994). The UNDP’s 1994 report outlines seven key types of threats which have the potential to undermine human security. These threats are categorized as follows, with each category representing a type of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political (UNDP, 1994).

Several case studies, largely located in the Global South, have demonstrated that climate change has negatively impacted vulnerable communities by reducing access to resources and services, precipitating changes to seasonal climate patterns which impact sources of economic stability, and increasing the vulnerability of communities to the threats discussed above (see, for example, Ehiane & Moyo, 2014). There has also been some consideration of the link between violent conflict and climate change-related stressors as a source of insecurity which limits the ability of communities to secure access to the seven categories of human security (Barnett & Adger, 2007). Here, climate change is generally understood as exacerbating threats to human

security. These threats include issues such as resource scarcity and political violence which can destabilize the daily patterns and sources of livelihood for vulnerable communities (Barnett & Adger, 2007). This human security-focused discourse of climate change continues to be an important and relevant framework through which environmental issues are understood as security threats.

Climate Security and the Ecological Security Approach

Though the recognition of the climate crisis as a security issue has been seen within national security policy, UN Security Council discussions, and brought to the attention of global media through prolific social movements such as Fridays For Future, there remains significant debate about the particulars of how climate change should be framed as a security issue. This includes a lack of consensus around who or what climate change threatens, and how individuals, states, and the international community should respond to this threat (McDonald, 2013). In this respect, McDonald (2013) arranges the variety of climate security approaches into four categories that reflect what the referent object of security is taken to be. These categories are as follows: the national security threat, the human security threat, the international security threat, and the ecological security threat. The first three of these approaches can reasonably be considered together under the term ‘environmental security approaches’ and referred to as the dominant discourses, while the final approach will be referred to as the ‘ecological security approach’ and differentiated from the previous three. Within this literature on security and the climate crisis, environmental security approaches foreground the consequences of ecological instability for states, humans, and the international system. As the dominant approach, environmental security is primarily concerned with securing both individuals and states against a changing and unpredictable environment (Detraz, 2009). The preservation of human lives, as

well as the state, as a functioning and hegemonic unit of organization are key priorities of this approach (Greaves, 2014; McDonald, 2013). Ecological security is a more recently established and emerging area of interest within this literature, which proposes a more radical approach. Rather than accepting an anthropocentric orientation, ecological security is focused on the preservation of the environment as necessary for human life, yet having an intrinsic value independent from human requirements (Detraz, 2009; Greaves, 2014; McDonald, 2018).

All discourses and approaches to climate security employ assumptions and theoretical commitments regarding the nature of the relationship between humans and nature. To clarify, framing these approaches as *discourses* regarding security and the climate crisis is intended to draw attention to the constructed nature of these academic and policy-oriented conversations. Such a discussion is intended to indicate that these are not neutral and unbiased assessments of the climate crisis, but rather deliberate constructions of the security-climate nexus which identify different referent objects of security. McDonald (2013) defines climate security discourses as “frameworks of meaning that provide the lens through which climate change is conceptualized and addressed in particular contexts” (p. 42). The environmental and ecological security discourses provide alternative answers to the key questions asked within the field of Security Studies, such as ‘what is the threat or primary concern?’ ‘what is the referent object?’ and ‘what are the prescribed responses?’

In order to provide some context for the following analysis, the following discussion provides an overview of the distinctions between environmental and ecological security discourses. This discussion considers both the academic and policy dimensions of these discourses.

Dominant Climate Security Discourses and Environmental Security

As has been discussed by Detraz (2009) and Greaves (2014) among others, ‘environmental security’ has been adopted into many mainstream security studies discourses. Recalling McDonald’s (2013) distinction between discourses which locate humans, states and international society as the referent objects of security, we may differentiate between human-centric and state-centric discourses of climate security. While the general concept of ‘environmental security’ encompasses these three categories, it is necessary to highlight the distinctions between these frameworks.

What I refer to as the ‘environmental security approach’ is closely linked to human security discourses (Detraz, 2009), and is primarily focused on preserving the current state-centric world order, neoliberal global economic system, and status-quo human activity while responding to environmental concerns (McDonald, 2013).² While environmental security discourses can be differentiated and organized as McDonald (2013) suggests, the key commonality between these various state-centric and human-centric discourses is their commitment to the preservation of present social and economic processes. Rather than question the underlying logics of Western socioeconomic organization, these discourses seek to preserve current ways of life, institutional structures, and processes of resource extraction and use in varying ways. In this way, environmental security rationale places its focus on human life and social structures, founded on the premise that these must be secured from environmentally based threats such as natural disasters and resource scarcity (Dalby 2020). Barnett (2001) presented a

² Though there has been some debate within the literature surrounding the classification of human security discourses as environmental (Detraz, 2009) or ecological (Barnett, 2001), in this thesis I align human security with environmental security discourses in order to draw clear boundaries around ecological security. While human security and ecological security discourses share a focus on vulnerable communities, the policy prescriptions (‘suggested responses’ in fig. 1) differ significantly.

framework of environmental security-as-human security in his influential work *The Meaning of Environmental Security*, drawing a clear link between the needs of humans for a stable environment and the impetus to prevent environmental degradation. Barnett notably disentangled national security from environmental security by suggesting that a shift away from the conventional state-centric model of security is necessary for human security with respect to the environment.

Dalby (2020) explains that environmental security is generally understood as “the provision of the conditions necessary for sustainable development” (p. 2). Broadly, environmental security focuses on the role of natural resources in ensuring stable international and domestic conditions, the progression of human development, and the ability of global systems of agriculture, industrial production, and trade to continue. Dalby (2020, p. 4) acknowledges the lack of a common definition of environmental security beyond this general understanding that ‘sustainable development’ relies upon a stable environment and predictable natural processes. Though scholarship on resource security has begun to advocate for a transition to renewable resources, policymakers have been reluctant to move away from the current fossil fuel-based economy, and therefore discussions of environmental security have remained centered around sustainability and mired in debates regarding decarbonizing Western economies.

The discourses encompassed by environmental security aim to reduce threats to human wellbeing and national or international stability without deeply interrogating or radically altering dominant political and economic systems. In these approaches, humans, or human-constructed institutions (such as states) are accepted as the focal point of study, and protecting economic activity from environmental threats while preserving our state-centric world order is the ultimate goal (Dalby, 2015). Within this approach, ‘sustainability’ is a flagship term suggesting that

reliance on economic globalization and technological innovation will remove the need to compromise present economic gains for the ability to meet future needs (Dauvergne, 2008, p. 7). Sustainable solutions focus on making small adjustments to current practices in order to ensure their longevity. This focus on sustainability demonstrates confidence in the belief that human scientific innovation can overcome and temper natural processes, and the absence of a need for radical change to present political and economic structures (Dalby, 2015).

These assumptions of the environmental security approach rely upon the view that environmental resources exist for human use, and threats to those resources and their consumption will lead to conflict and insecurity for those who depend on them (Detraz, 2009). In the context of environmental conservation, the environment must be preserved primarily because its resources are requirements for human life and its degradation will negatively impact the humans who depend on its healthy functioning. In this context, it is clear why ‘sustainability’ is a cornerstone of this approach; it confirms that there is no need to radically alter resource extraction and consumption in the present (i.e. no conflict over current resource management), yet there will also be no future conflict (due to the presumed preservation of those same resources for future generations) (Dauvergne, 2008, p. 7). Based on these theoretical commitments, environmental security attempts to explain and prevent occurrences such as conflict driven by environmental factors and human security concerns including resource scarcity (Detraz, 2009).

While great strides have been made in including environmental security as a legitimate focus within academic and policy discourses, this approach remains limited in many ways. As explained by Greaves (2014) “such an approach largely endorses the civilizational status quo, comprising an invitation to ‘green’ global modes of production and consumption without

challenging the essential ethics or basic sustainability of such practices” (p. 86). Outside of critical interventions, environmental security discourses largely avoid critiquing the underlying social and economic structures that contribute to many of the conflicts and insecurities the approach seeks to investigate (Dalby, 2015). While many scholars have pointed to the causal link between environmental instability and global neoliberal capitalism (Dalby, 2015; Klein, 2014), this approach remains largely devoid of serious engagement with critiques of dominant economic and political modes of organization. Environmental security is a problem-solving approach seeking to remedy the destructive relationship between humans and the environment through dominant understandings of modernization, technological advancement, and economic market practices (Cox, 1981). The classic example of this is the carbon-tax system which claims that existing capitalist market mechanisms can be used to lower greenhouse gas emissions, and through a gradual and painless process both the Western capitalist economic model and the planet will be preserved and remain intact (Klein, 2014).

This approach lacks a radical commitment to restructuring modes of production, patterns of consumption, and the current neoliberal free-trade global economic model. Dalby (2015) draws connections between neoliberal modes of organization and reluctance to embrace a climate security programme which advocates for the reshaping of current economic structures. Dalby (2015, p. 428) suggests that ‘security’ itself operates to protect neoliberal economic interests, and environmental security specifically is preoccupied with reducing emissions using market mechanisms, providing market-based incentives towards green innovation, and finding ways of ‘managing’ the biosphere in order to avoid rocking the proverbial boat of neoliberal economics and capital markets. For this reason, while palatable to many due to its focus on small-scale and short-term solutions, and its relative influence in policymaking, environmental

security remains a primarily state-centric and anthropocentric discourse which lacks the radical orientation which many deem necessary to remedy the root causes of environmental insecurity. In this thesis, I contend that the dominant environmental security models are inadequate, exclusionary, and too limited to provide a meaningful way forward, and we should instead take the ecological security approach more seriously.

Ecological Security

In contrast to environmental security, ecological security presents a more radical yet undertheorized intervention into environmental security debates. Within the ecological security framework, the environment itself takes on the role of the referent object of security (Detraz, 2009; McDonald, 2013). Security in this framework does not only refer to securing humans against environmental threats, but rather recognizing environmental systems as being worthy of preservation for their own sake, and having value both to, but also outside of their usefulness to human life (Greaves, 2014). Whereas environmental security strives to protect human interests and views the natural world primarily in terms of its value for human activity, ecological security rejects this anthropocentric conception and seeks to preserve the environment as a standalone referent object in addition to the recognition of the dependence of humans on ecological systems (Detraz, 2009; Greaves, 2014). This framework views the natural world not as a danger to humans, but in danger from them.

McDonald's taxonomy of climate security approaches recognizes the ecological security approach as a distinct departure from other framings of the relationship between climate change and security. McDonald (2013) describes ecological security as "a discourse that focuses on the need to fundamentally rebalance the relationship between people and the natural environment, orienting around the referent object of the biosphere" (p. 48). In later works, McDonald (2018)

clarifies that an ecological security approach rejects the separation of human life from ecological processes as is seen in scholarship which more closely aligns with the environmental security framework. While attention is also given to ‘vulnerable human communities’ and a focus on ecosystem resilience in McDonald’s (2018) understanding of ecological security, the most important element of this approach is the adoption of the biosphere itself as the referent object of security, rather than this position being filled by states or humans.

A second key feature of ecological security which sets it apart from environmental security, is its rejection of a hierarchical relationship between humans and nature (Detraz, 2009). By suggesting that the environment has value separate from its role in supporting human life, ecological security implicitly calls into question the dominant view that nature is subservient to humans. This theme of decentering the human parallels scholarship on ethics which ascribes value to non-human beings, and this line of ethical reasoning informs ecological approaches to climate security (McShane, 2016; Nolt, 2011). The practice of removing humans from a central role in analysis is unsettling to many, and is one reason why ecological security has yet to be accepted into mainstream security discourses.

Greaves (2014) explains that the ecological approach is a critical rather than problem-solving one as it challenges core understandings of the human-nature relationship and “is a project of radically realigning the relationship between humanity and the complex web of biospheric relationships in which it exists” (p. 87). Environmental security attempts to work within the dominant framing of this relationship, while ecological security critically examines the relationship itself. Neoliberal economic structures, assumptions of human dominance over nature, and anthropocentric solutions to environmental challenges are no longer unquestioningly accepted within the ecological security framework. The core of this approach is the radical

rejection of the human-nature hierarchy and the recognition of environmental value for its own sake and separate from humanity.

Security Discourse	Referent Object	Acting Subject	Primary Concern	Suggested Responses	Key Authors/Works
National	Nation-state	The state	Threats to sovereignty, domestic conflict	Adaptation	Tuchman Matthews (1989); Greaves (2021)
International	Stable and peaceful international community of states	International organizations and institutions; regional organizations	International conflict over resources, migration, and other effects of climate change	Adaptation and Mitigation	Kaplan (1994); Purvis & Busby (2004)
Human	People	NGOs, states, international organizations, local communities	Loss of access to basic needs for vulnerable communities, threats to the achievement of UNDP goals	Mitigation	UNDP Human Development Report (1994); Barnett & Adger (2007)
Environmental	Resources	States, international organizations	Exhaustion of natural resources leading to conflict and loss of way of life	Mitigation; Sustainability	Dalby (2020); Dalby (2015); Barnett (2003)
Ecological	Ecosystems, vulnerable communities, future generations	Local communities	Changes to biospheric processes, destabilization of climate	Fundamental reorganization of social and economic structures	McDonald (2018; 2021)

Table 1.1 Table of Security Discourses (adapted from McDonald 2018, 163)

While attempting to classify and categorize the breadth of scholarship regarding security and the climate crisis into these two approaches by nature produces an artificially binary view, for the purposes of the following discussion it is useful to differentiate climate security discourses in this way. The different emphases and referent objects in these two categories of

security discourses has important implications for how these frameworks approach solutions to the environmental crisis. Though the national, international, and human security discourses have dominated the climate security sphere, these frameworks are often Eurocentric, prioritize the status quo, and lack engagement with critical viewpoints. I believe that the ecological security discourse offers a renewed opportunity to include marginalized voices, look outside the dominant worldview, and identify opportunities to challenge and improve current social, economic and political systems. I now turn to a discussion of some of the social movements responding to the climate crisis, and the forms of anarchic organization they employ. This discussion of climate security discourses, and ecological security in particular, will be revisited in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3: Anarchist Methodology, Direct Action, and Ecological Security

This chapter examines how anarchist methodology is visible within modern environmental movements, and how this interaction represents an example of the ecological security discourse in action. I first sketch out a brief history of the Western environmental movement, specifically locating the Canadian, and British Columbian, movements within this larger tradition. For the purposes of this thesis, I define a ‘social movement’ as “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society” (Castells, 1997, p. 3 cited in Smith, 2014). According to Smith (2014), social movements have several key characteristics which differentiate them from other forms of public organization such as interest groups. Social movements challenge the boundary between state and society, they promote the creation of certain values and identities rather than material interests, and they often engage in methods and tactics which are more ‘radical’ than those of other civil society groups (Smith, 2014, p. xix). Following a discussion of environmental movements, and specifically ‘blockadia’ environmental activism, I outline the key features of postwar anarchist theory and methodology. The anarchist practice of direct action is then connected to blockadia organizing in order to develop the concept of a ‘blockadia-anarchist-ecological security nexus’.

Environmental Social Movements

A brief history of environmentalism in the West

In the West, public awareness of environmental degradation began in the mid nineteenth century as land was increasingly cleared by farmers for cattle, and urban centers began to expand. This early move towards environmental awareness was initiated by the conservationist

and preservationist movements, which aimed to preserve natural spaces and conserve natural resources. These movements primarily focused their efforts on lobbying government authorities to promote legislation that protected the natural environment, resources, and wildlife (Paehlke, 2014, p. 286). Mihaylov & Perkins (2015, p. 123) note that these movements, though highly progressive for their time, were oriented around assumptions about the right of humans to dominate nature, and thus reproduced anthropocentric views of the natural world. These early social movements largely oriented themselves towards appealing to regional and national authorities to achieve environmental protection. These movements were characterized by the creation of formal groups such as the Canadian Commission on Conservation. Though some of these groups were founded by local communities, such as the Federation of Ontario Naturalists, this early stage of environmental organizing was unlike the movements of the 21st century, which are far more grassroots-based and action oriented than the formal commissions and organizations of the early 1900s (Paehlke, 2014, p. 284).

The Western environmental movement truly took off in the 1960s alongside anti-war campaigning in opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War (Rootes & Leonard, 2009, p. 837). The publication of Rachel Carson's book, *Silent Spring*, in 1962 is often cited as the catalyst for the modern environmental movement (Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015; Rootes & Leonard, 2009). Carson (1962) discussed the impacts of chemical agents, such as DDT, on ecosystems and the potential long-term ramifications of the increase in commercial use of related products. This work was important for raising public consciousness about the human impact on fragile ecosystems and is still known for precipitating the rise of Western environmental activism. The environmental movements of the 1960s and 70s were largely oriented around

pollution-reduction projects which correlated with growing concern from the public about air quality, food safety, and clean drinking water (Paehlke, 2014).

In the United States and Canada, the early 1960s also saw several initiatives led by local environmental groups opposing energy projects that could negatively affect the environment, and this decade is remembered as bringing about an “environmental revolution” in the Global North (Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015, p. 123). Notably, in the United States, opposition to the Storm King Mountain hydro-electric dam in New York state ended with the courts’ 1965 ruling that the natural environment was entitled to some legal protections (Rootes & Leonard, 2009). This case laid the groundwork for subsequent environmental campaigns to pursue legal action at the regional or national level in order to achieve their goals of preservation and mitigation of human impacts on the environment (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015). Similar to earlier movements, environmental activism in this period was characterized by local groups of concerned citizens appealing to state authorities in order to achieve environmental protections. In Europe, the environmental movement led to a proliferation of ‘green politics’ in the 1960s, with Green parties emerging in many countries in order to represent environmental interests in national governments (Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015). This decade also saw the emergence of more radical forms of environmental thinking, such as the ‘deep ecology’ perspective. Unlike the early conservationist and preservationist schools of thought, deep ecology called into question the human-nature hierarchy and relationship of domination, opposing anthropocentric thinking and advocating for equality of all forms of life, human and nonhuman (for more on deep ecology see Bellamy Foster et al., 2010; Naess, 1973).

The 1970s saw a sharp rise in institutional responses to the growing environmental movement, with the first Earth Day being celebrated in April of 1970 and attracting over 20

million participants in the United States alone (Rootes & Leonard, 2009). State responses, such as the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States and the Department of the Environment (known as Environment Canada) occurred in the early 1970s, along with the passing of several acts of legislation, such as the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the Canada Wildlife Act, and the creation of the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (Government of Canada, 2021; Rootes & Leonard, 2009). These institutional responses were largely precipitated by a rise in non-state advocacy groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and conservation organizations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which emerged in 1969 and 1970, respectively (Rootes & Leonard, 2009, p. 837). This increase in environmental institutions and legislation corresponded with what Paehlke (2014) describes as the increasing ‘professionalization’ of the environmental movement (p. 289). During the 1970s, universities began offering more programs and certifications in the field of environmental studies. Coupled with the proliferation of environmental legal and consulting firms, this led to a shift within the environmental movement where more activists and members were a part of the educated, upper-class elite and could therefore appeal to state bodies more effectively for the creation of institutional responses (Paehlke, 2014).

In British Columbia (BC) specifically there has been a long history of environmental activism and awareness. In 1997 BC claimed the highest density of environmental activist organizations out of all ten provinces, with 24% of all Canadian organizations residing in BC (Blake et al., 1997, p. 455). It has also been noted that activists in BC are somewhat more inclined towards direct-action tactics than those elsewhere in Canada, particularly when it comes to issues of forestry and logging (Blake et al., 1997). Environmental movements in this region are also more cognizant of Indigenous issues and more collaborative with Indigenous

communities (Salazar & Alper, 2011). Perhaps the most well-known example of BC environmentalism is the organization Greenpeace International, which is known for its highly visible, and sometimes even dangerous, protest tactics. Greenpeace was founded in 1971 by a group of activists from Vancouver opposed to nuclear testing, and has since gained such a following that the group is nearly synonymous with environmental activism itself (Greenpeace Canada, 2022).

Environmental justice and climate justice

Building on these earlier developments, protests in 1982 against the disposal of PCB-contaminated soil in a Warren County, North Carolina landfill mark the beginning of the environmental *justice* movement (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 360). This movement continued its growth during the 1980s as communities of colour became more aware of the fact that hazardous facilities were often located in neighbourhoods with lower median incomes and a higher concentration of families of color (Rootes & Leonard, 2009, p. 840). In 1983 the first major study of the relationship between race and the location of toxic waste sites in the US was published. This report drew a clear link between communities of colour and the geographic distribution of hazardous materials facilities (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 360). Drawing on the inertia of the recent civil rights movement in the United States, the environmental justice movement grew into an intersectional movement linking together many diverse communities (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014).

The environmental justice movement bridged concerns regarding environmental sustainability and conservation with social justice issues. This new phase of environmental mobilization saw environmental conditions as “yet another indicator, another symptom, of the larger reality of social and economic inequity many communities lived with every day”

(Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 361). In this way, environmental justice is regarded as critical of broader systems of inequality and domination, rather than being limited to issues of environmental legislation. Closely linked to the environmental justice movement is the concept of environmental racism, which examines the relationship between race and the disproportionate impacts of environmental issues on communities of color (Pulido, 2016). This concept was brought to public attention during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, when it became apparent that minority communities were not provided with the same level of assistance that predominantly white communities were afforded (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 361). More recently, the issue of water contamination in Flint, Michigan, has been touted as an example of environmental racism. Partly due to the contamination of the Flint River, and partly due to deteriorating infrastructure, the community of Flint was unable to access clean drinking water in what many have termed an ‘abandonment’ of a ‘disposable’ community (Pulido, 2016). This episode is a key example of racial capitalism and the systemic devaluation of Black communities in the United States, and is a commonly cited example during discussions of environmental justice.

Similarly, the drinking water crisis on Canadian reserve lands brings together issues of racism, colonialism, and environmentalism. In Canada, households located on reserves do not have the same level of access to running water and safe drinking water as the rest of the Canadian population (Galway, 2016). Water on reserves is often contaminated with bacteria, leading to drinking water advisories (DWA) being issued, or sometimes is not available at all. There are currently 18 DWAs issued for 16 First Nations communities in BC alone, as of April 2022 (First Nations Health Authority, 2022). The issue of clean drinking water highlights the disparities between Indigenous peoples in Canada and other Canadians, as inequities between

these groups have been recorded in numerous areas such as access to healthcare, social services, and poverty levels between groups (Galway, 2016). The drinking water crisis is a prominent example of an environmental justice issue in Canada and emphasises the ongoing need for collaborative solutions which factor in issues of race, class, and location within environmentally based issues.

Beginning in the late 1990s, the term environmental justice was largely eclipsed by the rise of ‘climate justice’ as concerns about human-caused climate change took centre stage (initially known as ‘global warming’) (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014, p. 362). Climate justice has quickly become a key rallying point of modern environmental movements, with grassroots organizations using the concept to advocate for a ‘just transition’ to a post-carbon economy. These movements have been requesting that industrialized states take the lead in international climate negotiations, and in advancing ‘polluter pays’ policies (see Luppi et al., 2012). Most notably, climate justice critically interrogates status-quo social and economic systems and processes, including global capitalism, colonialism, and Global North-South relations (Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015). This recognition of power inequities and the need for intersectional approaches differentiates the climate justice movement from the earlier movements of the 1960s and 70s. Furthermore, the climate justice movement purposefully shifted the focus away from individuals and towards the effects of climate change on local communities and ecosystems, a shift which has only continued to grow in the intervening years (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Today, while global activism remains a key objective of many climate justice and environmental groups, grassroots movements and local communities are growing focal points for activism (see Tramel, 2018).³

³ For more on climate justice and activism, see Pellow & Brulle (2005) and Schlosberg (2009). For a detailed overview of the global climate movement, see Dunlap & Brulle (2015).

Environmental activism in the 21st century – The rise of blockadia

Today, the shift towards local, grassroots organizing has culminated in the rise of ‘blockadia’ activism. Popularised in Naomi Klein’s 2014 book, *This Changes Everything*, Klein describes blockadia as “a roving transnational conflict zone that is cropping up with increasing frequency and intensity wherever extractive projects are attempting to dig and drill” (p. 294). Blockadia activism is characterized by local resistance to extractive industry, often in the form of direct-action protest where individuals from a community physically prevent the progression of industry projects. Industries at the center of such conflicts are generally those which extract natural resources, such as logging, mining, fracking, or the construction of pipelines (Klein, 2014). Though occupation and physical blockading of space as techniques of protest have been used since at least the 1960s, ‘blockadia’ as a relatively new term ties this action to small-scale, local communities and narrows the focus to environmental issues. Blockadia also ties these disparate struggles together, encompassing a variety of local movements around the world by identifying their unifying characteristics and similar motivations. Driven by a desire to protect their lands, water, and environment, local communities participate in blockadia action against extractive industry in different geographical locations, but generally for similar reasons.

The term ‘blockadia’ was first used in 2011 by a local group in Texas who planned and carried out an 86-day blockade opposing the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline in the United States. Referring to this type of strategy, Chen (2021) further explains that blockadia is “marked by a ‘web of protests’ during the early 2010s launched by residents along the routes of controversial oilsands pipeline proposals” (p. 1423). Blockadia now refers to this growing

movement of local small-scale resistances to extractive projects of all kinds (not only pipelines) which encroach on the lands, and threaten the environmental wellbeing, of communities.

This emergence of blockadia activism is an important departure from earlier activist strategies and forms of organization in several important ways. First, blockadia marks a shift towards local, grassroots organizing (Chen, 2021). This type of activism includes people from all walks of life united by their desire to protect their communities from the destructive objectives of corporate interests, coming together and using their time, skills, and bodies to protest (Klein, 2014). Blockadia activism is different from earlier environmental movements in that it is radically local and characterized by “increasingly interconnected pockets of resistance” (Klein, 2014, p. 295). While global networks of activists are important for spreading information, gathering widespread support, and eventually advancing policy changes, the basic unit of blockadia remains the local. The Keystone XL pipeline resistance in the US is generally understood as the earliest example of blockadia, but this movement has quickly spread to communities globally. Klein (2014) discusses examples of blockadia such as local resistance to a mining project in the small Greek town of Ierissos, Mi’kmaq opposition to fracking exploration in Elsipogtog, Canada, and the disapproval of herders in Inner Mongolia to mining in their region of China.

This shift toward local activism has been noted by other scholars as having several strengths compared to more formal forms of activism seen on the global stage. Local activism is often directed at a specific issue or policy, whereas broader activist projects can be less focused in their objectives (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015; Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015). The specificity of local activism often translates into more immediate action as local groups can articulate exactly what type of support is needed to achieve their goals, and this support is oftentimes small-scale and

can be put into action more quickly than large-scale demands (Mihaylov & Perkins, 2015).

While global networks offer advantages in terms of resources, support, and simply the number of activists available to assist on any given issue, local networks often incorporate specialized community knowledge. These strengths of local activism help explain the recent turn towards local community organizing rather than a continuation of the global activism of the early 2000s.

A second key feature of blockadia activism is the underlying desire for increased democracy and opposition to extractive capitalism which animates the turn towards local, direct activism. Similar to earlier environmental and climate justice movements, participants in blockadia often express concerns regarding the inequities and power disparities which derive from current extractive capitalist relations (Chen, 2021; Klein, 2014). Rather than placing their confidence in large-scale environmental organizations or state leaders and international climate negotiations, local communities are attempting to provide both concrete climate action, and reclaim democratic practices (Chen, 2021). Responding to frustrations regarding the closed-door nature of conventional environmental and climate politics, blockadia activism is simultaneously opposing extractive projects *and* the undemocratic processes which exclude local voices from relevant debates.

Scholars such as Bosworth and Chua (2021) have identified the connection between blockades as a technique of resistance and Indigenous issues such as resurgence. They explain that “[t]he blockade is a threat to settler society because it is both a reciprocal relation through which Indigenous communities assert responsibility to land and life, and an assertion of Indigenous jurisdiction in opposition to settler accumulation” (Bosworth & Chua, 2021, p. 6). Thus, blockadia as a form of environmental activism can also be an avenue through which to protest interconnected issues of colonialism, racism, and inequality.

Illustrative cases

Before continuing this discussion, I will now outline three useful examples of environmental social movements using blockadia tactics from recent history which will be referenced over the course of this chapter: the Keystone XL pipeline resistance in Texas, the Clayoquot Sound ‘War in the Woods’ in British Columbia, Canada, and the resistance to the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) in the American Midwest. Each of these examples represent very different approaches to, and scales of, environmental activism, and highlight different aspects of the connection between blockadia activism, anarchist methodology, and ecological security. Additionally, both Keystone XL and Clayoquot Sound reveal some weaknesses and missing pieces, suggesting that an increased focus on Indigenous-led movements such as DAPL and Wet’suwet’en may be more productive for the provision of ecological security.

Keystone XL

In 2012, TransCanada Energy applied for a Presidential Permit to expand the existing Keystone Pipeline System by 1,700 miles in order to transport 830,000 barrels of oil from the tar sands in Alberta, Canada to refineries located on the Gulf Coast of Texas (Kojola, 2015; Parfomak et al., 2015). The cross-border nature of this project required the consent of the American federal government, making the approval or rejection of the Keystone XL project a key focus of President Obama’s tenure. While the Obama administration was considering the proposal, protests raged across the United States as environmental groups rallied against the expansion, staging a variety of protest actions which attracted media attention and began a national debate regarding the Keystone XL proposal (Kojola, 2015). Though President Obama’s

administration denied TransCanada the expansion in 2015, in 2016 President Trump revived the project and the controversy continued (Denchak & Lindwall, 2022). The project was terminated by TransCanada in 2021 when President Joe Biden denied a permit for the progression of the Keystone XL project (Denchak & Lindwall, 2022). With over ten years of protesting behind them, the final defeat of the Keystone XL expansion was heralded as a major victory for environmental activists.

The route of the Keystone XL expansion was a major rallying point for activists, as a diverse array of individuals and communities were opposed to having the pipeline run through their backyards. Indigenous communities, business owners, and Texas ranchers all joined forces with environmental activists to protest the proposed pipeline cutting across their lands (Denchak & Lindwall, 2022). Opposed parties to the expansion project engaged in a variety of protest tactics, notably an act of civil disobedience at the White House that resulted in the arrest of 1253 people in Washington, DC, and the “Forward on Climate Rally” attended by over 40,000 people at the same location in 2013 (Bradshaw, 2015). In Texas, a local group in Winnsboro who called themselves the “Tar Sands Blockade” occupied treehouses and other erected structures along the proposed pipeline route for 86 days in order to block construction on Keystone XL. The Tar Sands Blockade considered themselves to be a direct action group, and in fact coined the term ‘blockadia’ which was subsequently popularized by Naomi Klein, as described earlier (Bradshaw, 2015, p. 444).

Though the Tar Sands Blockade fared admirably during their 86 day direct action campaign, this was not a widespread or sustained method of protest against the Keystone XL expansion. In 2013, TransCanada filed a lawsuit against the Tar Sands Blockade and two other groups, claiming financial damages due to the delays caused by the group’s actions. Following

the lawsuit, the Tar Sands Blockade and similar groups refrained from further direct action, instead focusing their efforts on supporting conventional protests, events, and other methods of activism (Bradshaw, 2015). Thus, while the events in Texas against the Keystone XL expansion were important for bringing awareness to direct action as a tactic of resistance, the movement as a whole relied more heavily on conventional (also known as ‘conciliatory’) techniques of protest such as public demonstrations, letter-writing, petitioning, and media advertising (Bradshaw, 2015, p. 437). Another dimension of this movement to consider is that while it included Indigenous participation, it lacked Indigenous leadership, which will be shown as contributing to more sustained direct action and blockadia activism in later examples and the Wet’suwet’en case study in Chapter 4.

Clayoquot Sound

In 1993, the provincial government of British Columbia (BC), Canada, announced plans to allow for the logging of old-growth temperate rainforest located on the west coast of Vancouver Island, in an area known as Clayoquot Sound. The Sound, approximately 350,000 hectares in total area, is made up of a collection of small islands, watersheds, and is home to a uniquely pristine rainforest ecosystem. This region is the traditional home of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations, and the area that was proposed for logging is located on unceded territory, as is the case with much of BC.

Environmental groups in BC were opposed to the logging of Clayoquot Sound and began protesting the provincial government’s plans through conventional activist tactics such as raising public and media awareness, producing informative brochures, and protesting outside the provincial legislature. However, during the summer of 1993 over 850 individuals were arrested for blockading logging roads and preventing access to Clayoquot Sound, an event which gave

this movement the nickname the ‘War in the Woods’ (Tindall & Robinson, 2017). This protest included the construction of an encampment known as the ‘Peace Camp’ which was organized and erected by the local group ‘Friends of Clayoquot Sound’ (FCOS) and supported by various environmental groups and individuals opposed to the logging of Nuu-chah-nulth lands (Tindall & Robinson, 2017). An important forerunner to contemporary environmental conflicts in Canada, the Clayoquot Sound protests and Peace Camp brought issues of land claims, Indigenous sovereignty, and environmental protection to the attention of the Canadian public and government (Tindall & Robinson, 2017).

The protests at Clayoquot Sound were the largest act of civil disobedience in Canada for decades, only recently being surpassed by the Fairy Creek anti-logging protests and led to the designation of the Sound as a UNESCO biosphere reserve in 2000. The protests also prompted the signing of an agreement between First Nations and the provincial government to co-manage the area, with First Nations chiefs announcing a moratorium on all industrial logging in Clayoquot Sound in 2015 (Tindall & Robinson, 2017). In this regard, the protests at Clayoquot Sound can be considered successful, however, criticism has been weighed against the activists involved for lacking the inclusion of Indigenous communities in the movement.

Taking place before the appearance of the term ‘blockadia’, the Clayoquot Sound protests nonetheless were an example of blockadia action in which a local community established their own ‘autonomous bubble’ and directly confronted an extractive project threatening their local environment.⁴

Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)

⁴ It is worth noting that though the term ‘blockadia’ was not coined until 2011 and popularized by Naomi Klein in 2014, there nevertheless exist many examples of blockadia activism before the 2010s. Clayoquot Sound is one example, however other instances of community-based resistance to extractive industry can be found throughout history, such as the 1990 Oka Crisis in Quebec or the Ipperwash Crisis in 1995.

Beginning in 2014, protests against the DAPL have taken place across the United States, with global support and media coverage keeping the movement in the spotlight for several years. Running 1,172 miles from North Dakota to Illinois, the DAPL transports crude oil and crosses the Missouri River and Lake Oahe, two primary sources of water for the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North and South Dakota (Greenfield, 2021). For the DAPL, the pathway of the project is just as contentious as the construction of the pipeline itself. Indigenous protestors have raised concerns regarding the possibility of contamination of these water sources from the pipeline, with the rallying cry “water is life” being heard from Standing Rock to Washington, DC. Indigenous peoples belonging to the wide-ranging and diverse Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota society, known as Oceti Sakowin, argue that DAPL runs through their traditional lands which were not ceded consensually, and remain highly important to their people’s health and wellness (Whyte, 2020). Though President Biden followed through on his campaign promise to end the Keystone XL expansion project, DAPL has been left intact with only the promise of an environmental review (Greenfield, 2021).

Led by Indigenous inhabitants of the Dakota states, what has become known as the #NoDAPL movement has made use of a variety of different protest tactics ranging from conciliatory to blockadia-style. The Standing Rock Youth Council has organized a series of long-distance relay runs aiming to both raise media awareness of #NoDAPL, and engage Indigenous youth in activism (Greenfield, 2021). Along with protests in Washington, petition campaigns, and mass demonstrations, the #NoDAPL movement has been making their voices heard through conventional protest practices for several years. However, at Standing Rock itself, Indigenous land defenders founded the Oceti Sakowin Camp where Indigenous activists and allies have gathered to halt the DAPL (see *Oceti Sakowin*, 2022). Referring to themselves generally as

‘water defenders’ in reference to the threat posed by DAPL to Lake Oahe, the Standing Rock Sioux and allies at Oceti Sakowin Camp represent an example of blockadia activism similar to those preventing the Keystone XL expansion or the FCOS Peace Camp at Clayoquot Sound, however, this movement is led by Indigenous water defenders rather than settlers.

The Indigenous leadership of the #NoDAPL movement and the intersection of the DAPL project with issues of colonialism, Indigenous land claims and resurgence sets this case apart from those discussed previously. Whyte (2020) recognizes that though the environmental assessment of DAPL did not mention possible dangers to the Standing Rock Reservation less than a mile downstream from the Lake Oahe crossing, it did reject an alternative route upstream of the state capital of Bismark due to the potential risk of spills and water contamination (p. 3). As the population of Bismark is mostly White, the decision to route DAPL upstream of Standing Rock is an example of environmental racism and the pervasive devaluing of Indigenous lands and peoples within a settler colonial society (Whyte, 2020). Therefore, while #NoDAPL is a fight against environmental degradation and extractive industry similar to Keystone XL and Clayoquot Sound, it is uniquely intertwined with Indigenous issues and activism.




Figure 1.1: Environmental Movements, Actions, and Objectives

This grid maps various social movements on an axis of ‘settler-led’ to ‘Indigenous-led’ which reflects the leadership and composition of the movement, against an axis of ‘conciliatory’ to ‘direct action’ which reflects the type of tactics used by the movement. In this context, conciliatory action refers to conventional activism and protect practices such as marches, petitions, and raising media awareness, whereas ‘direct action’ refers to blockadia-style tactics of physical occupation of space and direct prevention of industry progression. For example, while Keystone XL engaged somewhat in blockadia tactics, it was largely settler-led and conciliatory, whereas #NoDAPL is more deeply engaged in blockadia activism and is generally Indigenous-led.

Anarchism and Anarchist Methodology

Anarchist political theory has a long history which is often traced back to key thinkers such as Peter Kropotkin, Mikhail Bakunin, and Emma Goldman. Classical anarchism properly emerged in the 19th century as a critique of the European state structures of the time and became

embroiled in a long intellectual conflict with Marxism which continues in some measure to this day (Kinna, 2005). Rather than providing a complete inventory of anarchist thought over the past two centuries, this discussion outlines the direction of contemporary anarchist theory through a focus on anarchist methodology. Post-WWII anarchist thought has been variously referred to as ‘new anarchism’ (Pauli, 2015) or ‘practical anarchism’ (Kinna, 2005), with the incorporation of prominent thinkers such as Herbert Read, George Woodcock, and Murray Bookchin. Here, I briefly discuss some key features of anarchist thought in general, before focusing on the methodology advanced by postwar anarchism through a consideration of David Graeber’s writings on direct action.

Emma Goldman (2005) describes anarchism as “the philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary” (p.3). Anarchism has long been understood as the opposition to any form of domination and coercive authority (Neal, 1997). The anarchist project is largely, though not exclusively, premised on opposition to the state and a rejection of state authority. This view of coercive authority as illegitimate extends to representative democracies, as many anarchists believe that the separation of decision-makers from the communities they serve delegitimizes the authority they hold. Beyond the state, anarchists reject hierarchical systems of organization and government in any form, and instead advocate for relationships to be based on voluntary association, equality of parties, and mutual aid (Graeber, 2009). Generally, anarchist thought advocates for the abolition of all systems of domination and contains prescriptions for the reconfiguration of economic and social relations along more egalitarian lines. This rejection of hierarchical and dominative relationships can be extended to include the relationship between humans and the environment, with some anarchist

scholars suggesting that rather than dominating nature, humans should attempt to form a reciprocal relationship with the environment (see Bookchin, 1982; Foster et al., 2010). Hall (2011) notes that anarchists also critique the ‘corrupting nature’ of power itself and locate the source of relationships of domination within the tendency for individuals to accumulate and abuse coercive power. Therefore, the tenets of classical anarchist theory such as that written by Kropotkin and Bakunin can be summarized as follows:

- 1) A refusal of the state as a source of authority
- 2) A condemnation of imposed power relations and systems of domination
- 3) A rejection of the concepts of authority and hierarchy (Hall, 2011, p. 377)

While early anarchist theory was largely oriented around prominent writers and the dissemination of anarchist revolutionary thought in manifesto-like texts, Pauli (2015) suggests an important shift occurred in anarchist thought after the Second World War.⁵ Following the suppression of Spanish anarchists by the government in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, the difficulty of maintaining an anarchist movement through the complex political dynamics of WWII became apparent (Pauli, 2015). Furthermore, the retrenchment of the state and renewal of nationalist rhetoric which occurred following the conclusion of WWII left anarchists in a difficult position to advocate the classical anti-state anarchist position (Pauli, 2015). This post-war condition required a new form of anarchism and a new generation of anarchists to put theory into action.

These conditions led to the emergence of ‘practical’ anarchism. Kinna (2005) explains that “[t]he leading insight of practical anarchism is that revolution can be achieved by evolutionary

⁵ However, Graeber (2004; 2009) notes that ‘anarchist’ societies have existed outside the West long before such terminology was used to describe these forms of socioeconomic relations. The present discussion is highly Eurocentric, yet this should not be taken to suggest that anarchist relations are confined to Western revolutionaries.

means” (p. 142). Practical anarchists are more open to the suggestion that social change could be worked towards incrementally by putting anarchist principles into practice, rather than remaining focused on an eventual ‘revolution’ (Kinna, 2005; Pauli, 2015). This shift towards a more actionable anarchism did not necessarily erode the underlying principles and ideology of anarchism, but was an important move towards a reinvigoration of anarchism in the post-war period. Neal (1997) distinguishes between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ anarchism to elucidate the difference between an ideological and methodological approach to anarchism. In this formulation, ideological, or deductive, anarchism places its emphasis on ideological conformity and believes that action should follow from key anarchist texts (Neal, 1997).

On the other hand, methodological, or inductive, anarchism believes that it is actions rather than theory, which makes an anarchist (Neal, 1997). David Wieck (1971) exemplifies this position by describing anarchism as necessarily ‘anti-ideological’, as allowing a theory or set of texts to direct one’s action is analogous to – and often opens the door to – submission to an authority. For this reason, anarchism is unavoidably a practice which must be undertaken rather than remaining purely an ideology. Graeber (2009) further explains that anarchism is “in no sense a doctrine. It’s a movement, a relationship, a process of purification, inspiration, and experiment” (p. 216). Graeber’s (2009) view is that anarchists have always been suspicious of the type of ‘high theory’ which characterizes other revolutionary movements (notably Marxism), and that contemporary anarchist theory is intended to be a “kind of inspirational, creative play...an extrapolation from and imaginative projection of certain forms of practice” (p. 221). For Graeber, anarchism is a project rather than solely a theory, and for this reason an anarchist methodology is, in fact, the heart of anarchism itself.

Direct action: An anarchist methodology

Moving from an ideological to a methodological understanding of anarchism requires an investigation of what such a methodology would entail. Graeber (2004) explains that contemporary anarchism is a “project, which sets out to begin creating the institutions of a new society ‘within the shell of the old’, to expose, subvert, and undermine structures of domination but always, while doing so, proceeding in a democratic fashion” (p.7). For Graeber, this process of creating a new society rests on the use of ‘direct action’ by groups to begin enacting the principles they want to bring about. Direct action, in an anarchist context, refers to a specific type of political resistance which puts into actions the ideals of whatever type of society a group is attempting to create. Graeber (2009) explains that the essence of direct action is “the insistence, when faced with structures of unjust authority, on acting as if one is already free” (p. 203). Rather than waiting for permission, a community engaging in direct action will act as if the state or government holds no authority over them and proceed with the creation of whatever forms of organization, resistance, creation, or relations they feel are best (Graeber, 2009). Rob Sparrow (1997) explains that direct action can include a range of techniques, such as blockades, strikes, or deliberate destruction of property or goods, but also involves the formation of autonomous systems of trade, spatial organization, and interpersonal relations. Thus, direct action encompasses active political resistance in the form of conflictual, oppositional actions yet also requires a simultaneous creation of societal relations within the movement. In this way, direct action movements are both destructive to the systems and actors they oppose, yet constructive of a new type of society and new structure to societal relations.⁶

It is helpful to contrast direct action with other forms of political resistance, particularly civil disobedience, in order to clarify the unique character of anarchist methodology. The most

⁶ For a deeper treatment of prefigurative politics, see Raekstad & Gradin (2020), *Prefigurative Politics: Building Tomorrow Today*.

important difference here is that civil disobedience recognizes the legitimacy of the state and directly opposes its actions or policies, whereas direct action simply acts as if the state does not exist and holds no legitimate authority to govern or police one's actions. In acting as if the state 'does not exist', activists are operating in a manner which questions the legitimacy of state power through a refusal to appeal to state apparatuses; they are not truly operating under the assumption that the state is not a real institution which does not hold and wield power (this is an accepted fact). To participate in civil disobedience is to address one's actions to the state, to directly defy state laws and orders or act in a way which alerts the state that there is opposition to its policies and operations. Direct action, on the other hand, acts as if the state has no power or control over one's conduct and therefore direct actionists proceed in stopping projects which they oppose and forming collectives that they want to participate in as if there is no competing authority (Graeber, 2009). Though both direct actionists and those participating in civil disobedience are often subject to conflict and suppression by state authorities, the civilly disobedient believe that the legal consequences of their actions constitute part of their resistance (for example, mass arrests as a technique of civil disobedience require an active engagement with the state to arrest and detain individuals), while direct actionists do not view such engagement or consequences as a necessary or integral part of their activism (Graeber, 2009).

Due to its complete rejection of state authority and hierarchical relationships, an engagement with anarchist tactics opens the possibility for other types of relations to exist within a movement. Of particular importance to this discussion are radically democratic forms of consensus-building and mutual aid. As many direct action movements result in the creation of "temporary bubbles of autonomy", these zones of protest are also often the site of radical experiments in direct democracy and voluntary organizing (Graeber, 2009, p. 210). For example,

during the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, Graeber (2011) recounts the experience of putting a 'horizontal' form of organization into action, wherein a decision-making process was created by dividing participants into smaller 'working groups' which deliberated on specific issues before returning to the collective where each group reported their recommendations. In this type of consensus-finding process there was no hierarchy or vertical organization where one individual took on the role of 'leader'. Rather, each participant was an equal and active member in determining the trajectory of the group. Horizontal processes such as these often arise organically rather than being prescribed by convention or tradition, and therefore in the Western context which we are observing them they can be considered highly experimental.

The practice of mutual aid is another practice often seen during direct action organizing. In tandem with the reclamation of communal resources (such as through community gardening projects), the organization and division of labour among participants according to their abilities and skills is a feature of these 'autonomous bubbles' which arise during direct action movements (Graeber, 2009; see also Kropotkin, 1902). The use and reliance on communal resources is particularly important for marginalized communities, or groups who have had access to traditional or local sources of sustenance or income restricted. Rather than asking individuals to contribute to the group using a specific standard of involvement (such as by donating x amount or taking a mandatory shift at the kitchen), individuals are free to participate in whatever manner they feel they are best able to. In theory, this should result in the realization of the anarchist principle of free association, since all participants contribute and labour simply because they want to, not because they feel any coercive pressure to. In practice, this can be a more complicated endeavour, yet nonetheless this type of organization has been seen in social movements around the world such as among the Zapatistas movement in Mexico and Occupy

Wall Street in Seattle (Graeber, 2011). Occupy was widely criticized for its relative failure to produce meaningful change, and the lack of diversity within the movement, similar to critiques of Clayoquot Sound. The present discussion, and the case study presented in Chapter 4, may address some of the critiques of direct action more broadly by considering the intersection of Indigenous leadership and anarchist methodologies. Though there is a relative lack of engagement with anarchist political theory and methodology within scholarship on environmental politics, as I explore in the following section, these methodologies are beginning to appear in local environmental movements and may hold great significance for the future of environmental activism.

Direct Action & Blockadia: New Possibilities for Ecological Security

Recalling the earlier discussion of anarchist methodology, I will now demonstrate that blockadia activism employs methodologies such as direct action and mutual aid as tools to achieve environmental goals. Furthermore, the use of anarchist methodology by these movements allows us to see the possibilities for the enactment of an ecological security approach in blockadia activism.

Blockadia as direct action

While it may appear obvious that blockadia activism is a form of direct action, a deeper exploration of this strategy reveals some of its unique characteristics. The immediate connection is, of course, that blockadia movements often create the type of ‘autonomous bubbles’ which are characteristic of anarchist direct action. In resisting extractive projects, blockadia participants set up physical spaces of exclusion where territory, and passage through territory, is restricted and controlled by protestors. This occupation of physical space is a form of direct action in that activists refuse to acknowledge the authority or legitimacy of industry or state actors and

physically prevent them from accessing the area which activists aim to protect. The use of protestors physical bodies and construction of barriers to prevent the progression of extractive industry is also typical of direct action techniques. Rather than protesting in front of legislative buildings, activists use direct action in the contested space to have an immediate effect of halting the project they intend to stop. This type of direct action has been seen in opposition movements against various pipeline projects in Canada and the US, including the Keystone XL and DAPL projects. In both these cases, activists established physical zones of exclusion wherein land was occupied by protestors such that industry was unable to continue working.

Not only do activists ‘take over’ this space, but they refuse to leave when asked by state authorities, which expresses a similar refusal to accept the legitimacy of the state – another key feature of anarchist methodology and direct action. While some examples of blockadia activism can be considered a form of civil disobedience, as activists’ actions are sometimes directed at the state itself, there is ample evidence that this is not always the case. When pipeline protestors in Texas chained themselves to industry machinery to prevent the progression of the Keystone XL pipeline, these individuals were not addressing their actions to the state in order to appeal for policy changes, but rather were acting as if the state was not a legitimate holder of authority. It was assumed that at some point, state agents would remove the protestors from the machinery, but the primary goal of these activists was to physically prevent the progression of the pipeline project using whatever means possible, not to ‘send a message’ to the American government, as other forms of protest such as marches and petitions aim to do. Therefore, while some environmental activism is considered to fall within the category of civil disobedience, such as the symbolic mass arrests outside the White House during the Keystone XL protest in 2011, blockadia activism is better described using the language of direct action as it takes place at the

site of industry advancement and is primarily directed at immediately preventing the progress of said industry. Conciliatory action and civil disobedience remain important forms of advocating for change, however, they differ from direct action and blockadia in that they appeal to lawmakers and state officials to change policies, use media attention to challenge social norms, and work towards change while leaving the overarching institutions of state governance intact. Direct action, on the other hand, questions the legitimacy of the state itself, and therefore goes beyond attempting to change the laws and norms of such institutions.

Furthermore, while blockadia movements directly oppose extractive projects through techniques such as the establishment of blockades and disruption of industry activity, the movement also encodes a deeper opposition to status-quo capitalist relations through the creation of a new type of society. Within the ‘autonomous zones’ of blockadia a new type of societal organization arises. Following the prescription of direct action to ‘create a new society within the shell of the old’, blockadia movements around the world are redefining the rules of living together. As discussed by Klein (2014), the desire within many blockadia movements for a ‘new form of democracy’ has left the door open for the creation of alternative systems of organization. As with more directly anarchist-inspired movements such as the Occupy movement, the local grassroots nature of blockadia activism allows for participants to engage in deep democratic practices such as mutual aid and consensus-finding rather than defaulting to the vertical, representative power structure that Western society is familiar with. It should be noted, however, that many activists who engage in these types of movements are not themselves ‘anarchists’, but rather are simply using anarchist tactics because the methodology suits their immediate goals. Though the use of anarchist tactics opens up the possibility of exploring alternative forms of social organization, the activists themselves are not necessarily directly working towards such a

lofty goal. In many cases, the use of anarchist tactics and practices stems from their utility as a form of protest and the achievement of more immediate, tangible goals, such as stopping extractive projects, rather than a deeper commitment to anarchist ideology.

Returning to the DAPL example, the overlap between direct action and blockadia can be further clarified. The #NoDAPL movement is an example of blockadia activism, as water defenders at Oceti Sakowin Camp are physically preventing the DAPL through the creation of an ‘autonomous bubble’ formed by the local community and supported by allies. This occupation of physical space and prevention of industry action places #NoDAPL within the blockadia category, but the movement also resonates with the anarchist resistance to illegitimate and coercive authority, making the connection to direct action more robust. Bacon (2020, p. 143) suggests that the DAPL is an example of colonial ecological violence, a specific form of harm within settler colonial societies where the relationships between Indigenous peoples and their lands are disrupted. The Indigenous water defenders are highly aware of the settler colonial context in which they are fighting the DAPL, and recognize that the #NoDAPL movement is in many ways emblematic of the deeper fight against ongoing colonialism and dispossession of Indigenous lands. This resistance to the colonial structures and institutions which are causing the underlying conflict between Oceti Sakowin and the US State Department can be read as a resistance to an illegitimate and dominative authority, a reading which resonates with anarchist principles. Therefore, while not explicitly anarchist in theory or practice, the #NoDAPL movement nevertheless represents an example of blockadia as direct action in methodology while also connecting to anarchist methodology on a deeper level.

Blockadia and anarchist methodology: An avenue towards ecological security?

While blockadia activism represents a meaningful application of anarchist methodology to the environmental movement, how does this connection produce examples of ecological security in practice? Recall from Chapter 2 the ecological security paradigm, which has often been criticized as an idealistic and impractical alternative, rather than understood as an important avenue for imagining a post-capitalist society. Considering the intersections of anarchist methodology and blockadia activism, we can see the theoretical framework of ecological security being concretely put into practice in a number of ways. The use of direct action by blockadia activists places the environment itself in the role of referent object to be defended, the local level of blockadia action takes up the ecological security call for communities to become the acting subjects of security, and the opposition to current social and economic systems inherent in blockadia activism puts into practice the call to reorganize those systems. Anarchist methodology supports these aims, and assists in the creation of the ‘autonomous bubbles’ of blockadia where ecological security moves from theory to practice.

First, through the use of direct action to stop extractive projects, communities are functionally providing security for their local ecosystems. Returning to the example of the Keystone XL pipeline, by employing direct action techniques such as blockades and the use of protestors’ bodies to physically prevent industry progression, these movements are ensuring that their local environment is not disrupted by extractive activity. During these conflicts, the protestors place the ecosystem in the role of referent object and the local activists in the position of acting subject. Rather than appealing to institutions such as national governments, local groups undertake direct action to protect the ecosystems they rely on, which places the focus on the natural environment itself. There is no middleman or institution through which this act of security is directed through or diluted by; rather, through these actions we see that individuals

form a community to protect their environment from the threat of extractive industry. The direct actions undertaken by blockadia movements are thereby examples of how the environment itself can be positioned as the referent object of security, rather than the focus being placed on the humans who depend on natural resources, or the state borders which the environment lies within.

Currently, this type of security action can be seen in the example of the 1993 Clayoquot Sound protests on Vancouver Island, British Columbia. At Clayoquot Sound, protestors engaged in direct action in order to prevent the logging of old-growth rainforest. In this case, protestors were not concerned that logging old-growth would threaten their own security, or the ability to meet their own needs (as a human security approach would suggest), the security of Canada as a nation (as the national security discourse would suggest), or the stability of the international system (as the international security discourse would suggest). Rather, they took action to protect the forest itself, because they believed that old-growth trees are inherently valuable, and play an important role in the ecosystem which they are a part of. This case demonstrates that for those activists, and similar movements, the security of the ecosystem itself is the focus of their action, and therefore such cases can be read as examples of ecological security in action.

Anarchist ideology and methodologies implicitly support this repositioning of the ecosystem as the referent object of security, as anarchist thought rejects the type of hierarchical thinking which positions humans as inherently more valuable than nonhuman animals or the environment. Whereas much of Western political thought is anthropocentric and views the environment primarily as a warehouse of natural resources available for the satisfaction of human needs, anarchist ideology leaves open the possibility of thinking about the relationship between humans and nature as one of equality and interdependence rather than hierarchy and domination. The anarchist rejection of hierarchical relationships can be extended to include the

relationship between humans and the environment, suggesting that rather than dominating nature, humans can work towards a reciprocal relationship with the environment. This type of reciprocal relationship would require that humans provide security for the environment and position the environment as the referent object of security when threats arise; in return humans will be able to enjoy the increased environmental security and peace that comes with a stable and secure environment. While several subfields of anarchism have emerged which explicitly address this human-nature relationship, for the purposes of this discussion, it is enough to simply recognize that anarchist thought in general is more conducive to an eco-centric worldview and therefore supports an ecological security approach to climate activism.⁷ The methodology of direct action helps put this ideological perspective into action by suggesting a way that activists can concretely advocate for the environment and put this ideological relationship of equality into action.

Furthermore, the local level of blockadia action and anarchist methodology puts into practice the position that ecological security cannot be meaningfully provided by national- or international-level institutions and must be taken up by local communities. Many grassroots environmental movements view governments as beholden to corporate interests and not working in the interest of citizens or local communities, and this view is reflected in the adoption of direct action techniques such as blockades which do not rely on appeals to state authorities or institutions to achieve the goals of the community. With the adoption of anarchist methodologies that reject the legitimacy of the state, these environmental movements refocus their efforts on becoming the providers of security for their communities. Paralleling the anarchist suspicion of top-down, hierarchical forms of organization, blockadia movements believe that appeals to state

⁷ For more on social ecology, eco-anarchism, and anarcho-primitivism, see Bookchin, 1982; Morris, 1996; and Zerzan, 1994.

governments or international institutions to provide environmental protections are essentially looking to the cause of the problem for the solution. Therefore, both in anarchist methodology and in blockadia organizing, the solution must be found within the community itself. In the case of ecological security, it is the local community who must provide security, protect the local ecosystem, and critique the systems and actors responsible for perpetuating environmental injustices and climate change. The effectiveness of this type of action has been seen in the success of movements such as #NoDAPL at Standing Rock in preventing the continuation of business-as-usual practices of environmental destruction and insecurity. The activists in these movements are aware that the state cannot adequately provide security for their communities and their environment, and thus an alternative to top-down security politics must be explored. Anarchist methodology in this case, encourages a refusal of state authority which translates into a relocation of the role of 'protector' to the local community and away from top-down institutions.

Finally, the use of anarchist methodologies in blockadia activism also serves to critique and oppose the status-quo social and economic institutions which permit and require extractive projects such as pipelines to continue and prevent action curbing the drivers of climate change being implemented. Through the methods of direct action and the formation of new types of societal relations, blockadia activism puts into practice the ecological security opposition to current social and economic processes. Within the 'autonomous bubbles' of blockadia, day to day activities are often governed by systems of mutual aid and voluntary association, where each participating individual is encouraged, but not coerced, to assist the group in whatever way they are best able to. The communal systems of blockadia are not simply small-scale versions of hierarchical capitalist relations, but employ the anarchist rejection of coercive authority to create

economic relations which are founded on principles of free association and voluntary labour. Similarly, social relations within blockadia communities are non-hierarchical and often operate through systems such as consensus-building rather than by relying on elected leaders or constructing ‘chains of command’ within the movement. This type of communal relationship where individuals work together in a non-accumulative, non-capitalistic system represents a possible model of the type of reorganized society that the ecological security framework suggests is necessary.

The use of consensus-building processes and systems of mutual aid have been seen at the FCOS Peace Camp established during the Clayoquot Sound conflict. At the peace camp, the FCOS group established daily discussion circles in which all members of the group would participate in a consensus-based process of decision making (McLaren, 1994, cited in Hofman, 2021). This anarchist method of coming to collective decisions ensures that all participants are able to voice their opinions, and that a direction for collective can be decided upon which is, at the very least, acceptable to everyone (Graeber, 2011). The discussion circles used at the FCOS peace camp provided an avenue through which the governance of the camp could remain non-hierarchical and collective, rather than top-down and overseen by formal ‘leaders’. Participants and members of the peace camp recounted positive experiences with the community-building and educational opportunities that this type of structure afforded, and the use of these consensus-finding practices has been tied to the longevity and ultimate success of the movement (Moore, 1996, cited in Hofman, 2021). Here it is clear that the use of a classic anarchist practice, such as consensus-finding practices, is tied to the ecological security aims of the FCOS peace camp. The FCOS did employ direct, grassroots action to protect Nuuchahnulth territory, which satisfied the ecological security imperative to take the ecosystem as the referent object and the local

community as the acting subject. However, the use of these anarchist methodologies also allowed the peace camp to explore and build alternative social structures to the hierarchical, Western society from which many activists had come. This restructuring of communal relations within the camp reflects the desire within the ecological security approach to restructure the current social and economic patterns which permit the continuing destruction of the environment. Therefore, the FCOS camp presents an early example of anarchist methodology supporting a local model of ecological security in practice.

Further highlighting the possibilities for ecological security within direct action blockadia activism, we can return briefly to Standing Rock. One of the key ways that the Oceti Sakowin water defenders are resisting colonial ecological violence and refusing to participate in extractive capitalism is through the installment of the Cannon Ball Community Solar Farm. The Sioux Nation partnered with non-profit organizations such as Indigenized Energy to bring the Solar Farm to life in 2019, in what was understood as a major step forward for Indigenous energy independence and the growth of the green energy industry in North Dakota (Ellsmoor, 2019). The Solar Farm now powers the Sioux Nation Community Center, and the savings from reducing the community's reliance on traditional energy have been redistributed within the community itself (Ellsmoor, 2019). The Solar Farm thus represents an example of how ecological security can be realized by a local community acting in their own interest. By reducing their reliance on traditional energy sources, the community at Standing Rock is seceding from the settler colonial energy regime and creating the type of energy independence that will allow this community to flourish on their own terms. As the water defenders place the environment in the role of referent object through their blockadia activism, the local community is simultaneously creating alternative systems of energy production that will help realize the ecological security prescription

for a radical reorganization of the status quo. The Standing Rock Sioux are therefore putting into practice an Indigenous-led, clean energy-based, and environmentally respectful societal order on their own territory.

By employing anarchist-inspired systems of mutual aid, the communities of blockadia are demonstrating that the ecological security call for a radical reconfiguration of economic relations is not only necessary, but possible. This incorporation of the anarchist rejection of relationships of domination allows blockadia communities, such as the FCOS peace camp and Oceti Sakowin Camp, to create their own forms of social systems, and in this creation there is a refusal to participate and condone the current Western settler colonial social relations. In this way, the ecological security critique of current social and economic systems is taken up by blockadia movements through their incorporation of experimental anarchist systems of economic and social organization. The three short examples discussed in this chapter provide an important background to the conflict which I will now turn to in order to illustrate this connection between anarchism and ecological security: the case of Wet'suwet'en resistance to the Coastal GasLink pipeline.

Chapter 4: Wet'suwet'en vs. the Coastal GasLink Pipeline: A Case Study

The topic of climate security in Canada presents a particularly interesting opportunity to investigate the intersection of anarchist methodology and ecological security. The long tradition of Indigenous resistance coupled with the continued reliance of the Canadian economy on natural resource extraction makes Canada a highly nuanced and deeply layered case through which to examine my main argument. Conflicts between environmental activists and the Canadian state have been a key part of the Canadian political landscape beginning in the 1880s and persisting into the 21st century. Until very recently, the 1993 protests at Clayoquot Sound, known as the 'War in the Woods' represented the largest act of civil disobedience in Canada with over 800 activists arrested (Tindall & Robinson, 2017). During the summer of 2021, the blockade at Fairy Creek on Vancouver Island surpassed Clayoquot Sound as Canada's largest act of civil disobedience, and has resulted in over 1100 arrests to date (The Canadian Press, 2022). It is notable that both these conflicts occurred in the province of British Columbia (BC), and both are tied to protests relating to the industrial logging of forest located on contested Indigenous territory. Considering this background, it is appropriate to examine the case study of Wet'suwet'en resistance to the construction of a pipeline through their traditional territory in northern BC as the intersection of Indigenous land claims and resurgence are inescapably intertwined with questions of resource extraction and climate security in Canada.

This chapter begins with an overview of climate security in Canada and the Wet'suwet'en struggle, drawing on this example to illustrate the interaction between anarchist methodology and the provision of ecological security in Canada. This chapter also considers the relationship between Indigenous resistance, ecological security, and anarchist methodology.

Before continuing this discussion, it should be noted that this analysis is not intended to simply impose the Western academic concept of ‘ecological security’ onto the resurgence and resistance of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Indigenous lifeways, worldviews, and legal orders exist outside of and independent from settler concepts of security and climate politics, yet have been and continue to be deeply impacted and conditioned by settler institutions and structures. This being the case, the aim of this discussion is rather to draw connections, locate parallels in goals and methods, and explore the ways in which Indigenous land-based resistance may offer lessons and opportunities for the realization of ecological security in Canada. Identifying the areas of overlap between Indigenous resurgence, anarchist methodology, and the desire for an ecological approach to climate security has the potential to forge connections and encourage solidarity between Indigenous peoples, grassroots activists, security intellectuals, and Canadians at large. Furthermore, there must be a complementary effort to preserve Indigenous sovereignty and acknowledge the independence of Indigenous actions.

Canada and Climate Security

To contrast the expression of ecological security being enacted by a local grassroots community in Wet’suwet’en territory, I first discuss the discourses of climate security visible within official Canadian policy. Highlighting the national, human, and environmental security discourses within Canadian policy provides a contrasting example to the illustration of the blockadia-anarchist-ecological security nexus visible in Wet’suwet’en resistance and further demonstrate the radical nature of the ecological security discourse. Covering a vast and diverse array of natural spaces, Canada is set to be affected by climate change through extreme weather events, loss of habitable land and biodiversity, and several Arctic-specific threats such as the thawing of permafrost and the accompanying potential risks to human health (Bush & Lemmen,

2019). These are among many other climate related factors that highlight why climate security has begun to enter Canadian national security discourses in recent years. Greaves (2021) outlines five key areas in which climate change poses an acute and severe threat to Canada and its national interests. For Greaves (2021, p. 186), threats to the human security of Canadians, economic insecurity, threats to Canada's Arctic region, humanitarian emergencies both within Canada and in the world at large, and increasing domestic conflict are five issue areas which climate change will be, and already is, affecting. Extreme weather events, such as the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire and the fall of 2021 flooding event in British Columbia's interior have already begun to cause insecurity among the population of BC, and such human security-related threats are projected to become more common in coming years. Researchers have suggested that many populations within Canada, particularly Indigenous communities and those in northern or Arctic regions of the country, are going to face increasing challenges as a result of unchecked climate warming, such as infrastructure damage and even increased fatalities due to extreme heat and flooding resulting from unpredictable and extreme weather events (Bush & Lemmen, 2019; Greaves, 2021). However, perhaps of more immediate concern to the Canadian government is the financial strain that such extreme weather events have placed on provincial and federal governments, the insurance sector, and the oil and gas industry (Greaves, 2021). These are only a few of the ways that climate change has begun to threaten Canada, however, current national security documents do not reflect all five of these areas of concern.

As Greaves (2021) demonstrates, Canada's current incorporation of climate threats into national security documents and objectives is primarily focused on the human security aspects of climate issues. Canada's most recent defence strategy, released in 2019, incorporates climate change as a security issue, yet is primarily focused on the human security and economic impacts

of a changing climate (Greaves, 2021). The policy document, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, recognizes the effects of climate change primarily through the lens of environmental instability as a ‘threat multiplier’ (Gov. of Canada, 2019). Explicitly acknowledging climate change as a security threat, the defense strategy states:

The increased frequency, severity and magnitude of extreme weather events all over the world ...will likely continue to generate humanitarian crises. The effects of climate change can also aggravate existing vulnerabilities, such as weak governance, and increase resource scarcity, which in turn heightens tensions and forces migrations (Gov. of Canada, 2019, p. 52)

Examining the defence strategy in light of the climate security discourses outlined in Chapter 2, it becomes clear that the Canadian government is beginning to adopt an approach to climate security which incorporates the environmental security, national security, and human security discourses. Though climate change has only recently begun to be formally considered an issue of national security, the Canadian government has become primarily focused on the humanitarian costs and the potential for political instability that climate change brings. The references to “forced migration” and “heightened tensions” in Canada’s defence policy underscore the focus on the potential destabilization of current social and political systems in Canada as a result of climate change. This language suggests that the Canadian government may be concerned with the security implications of climate threats for Canada’s borders and immigration policies; concerns which are found within national security discourses of climate security. Here, the defence policy places Canada (the state) in the position of referent object of security which must be secured from external threats. The focus on ‘humanitarian crises’ clearly draws on the language of human security to suggest that Canadians will be positioned as the referent objects of security who are threatened by non-Canadian ‘others’ who may migrate to Canada as a result of natural disasters or other disruptive events caused by climate change. Here,

the threat is not originating from within Canada, or coming as a result of changes to the Canadian natural environment, but it is Canadians who are threatened by the global consequences of climate change in the form of mass migrations from more acutely affected areas of the world.

The current defense strategy also reflects Canadian governments' increasing legitimization of the use of force against groups who oppose resource extraction projects (Greaves, 2021). In fact, "environmentalist groups" were identified in Canada's first counterterrorism strategy as one of the most likely sources of extremist beliefs and potential violence (Greaves, 2021, p. 197). This increasing criminalization of those opposed to extractive industry activities in Canada is operationalized through the surveillance of Indigenous land defenders and the mobilization of police and paramilitary forces against environmental protestors, sanctioned and conducted by both federal and provincial Canadian governments (Monaghan & Walby, 2016). This element of Canadian defence policy is directed at securing the interests of the Canadian economy and reflects the key tenets of the environmental security approach, as it aims to secure Canadian resources and industry from the threat posed by environmental activists who aim to stop such projects. In this regard, the defence policy places Canadian resources and the resource-based economy in the position of referent object of security, and echoes the environmental security drive to maintain current modes of social and economic organization so as not to threaten the longevity of this industry.

Crosby and Monaghan (2016) examine the Idle No More movement as an example of the increased surveillance and policing surrounding Indigenous-led activism in Canada. Through an examination of documents from Canadian state agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) they demonstrate that Indigenous-led movements are increasingly being viewed as security threats to the Canadian

state, particularly because of their ability to impact the Canadian economy through tactics such as railway blockades (Crosby & Monaghan, 2016, p. 45). Agencies such as CSIS are increasingly using language typically ascribed to counterterrorism initiatives, such as ‘hot spots’ to discuss the policing of Indigenous-led movements, indicating that the Canadian state views such movements as serious security threats to the nation. Crosby and Monaghan (2016) rightly assert that this level of policing is because Indigenous movements “[threaten] the material and immaterial values of settler colonialism by asserting self-determination and land and treaty rights” (p. 42). Because Indigenous-led activists often target the extraction and transportation of natural resources, this state-sanctioned repression of such movements suggests a deeper conflict between the environmental and ecological approaches to security within Canadian society. This is where the national discourse of climate security is apparent within Canada, which can be contrasted with the enactment of ecological security by activists and Indigenous communities to reveal the conflicting climate security discourses taking place. My analysis now turns to a discussion of the ongoing conflict in Wet’suwet’en territory to explore how the ecological security approach is being enacted and put into practice in British Columbia.

The Wet’suwet’en: People, Governance, and Legal Structure

To understand the ongoing struggle in Wet’suwet’en territory, it is first necessary to explore Wet’suwet’en governance and the underlying legal tensions between Wet’suwet’en and the British Columbian and Canadian governments. Wet’suwet’en are divided into five clans (didikhni), 13 houses (yikh), and more than 100 house groups (Gidimt’en Yintah Access. n.d.b; McCreary, 2020). The conflict involving Coastal GasLink is located in Unist’ot’en territory, and therefore centers largely on Unist’ot’en, which is one group in Gilseyhu Clan (Wolf/Bear Clan) affiliated with the Yex T’sa wilk’us House (Gidimt’en Yintah Access. n.d.b; McCreary, 2020).

Within the Wet'suwet'en governance system, authority is exercised through the title of chief. The highest authority is given to the 12 hereditary house chiefs, followed by 12 corresponding subchiefs, then those who are heirs to the head chiefs (McCreary, 2020). The title of chief is not given lightly, as hereditary chiefs must prepare throughout childhood and adolescence to be leaders who are respected, helpful, and who understand the responsibilities accompanying their position (McCreary, 2020). Chiefs hold the responsibility for deciding how Wet'suwet'en territory is to be used, and thus are the proper legal authority to consult regarding land use within Wet'suwet'en legal structure (Gidimt'en Yintah Access. n.d.b; McCreary, 2020). The title and authority of chief is transferred and affirmed through the traditional practice of feasting. The feast, prohibited under colonial law until the 1950s, was and still remains the central feature of Wet'suwet'en culture, social organization, and political life. Feasting enacted laws, transferred authority and power, and was a key arena in which to recount the kungax (oral history) (McCreary, 2020). Recognition and respect for the Wet'suwet'en structure of authority, practice of feasting, and deference to the hereditary chiefs is directly connected to the resistance to the Coastal GasLink pipeline.

Legal Background of Wet'suwet'en Land Claims

The passage of the *Indian Act* in 1876 by the Canadian government attempted to erase existing Indigenous legal structures and jurisdictional authority across the country through the implementation of the reserve system and the band council system (McCreary, 2020). By outlawing traditional Indigenous governance systems and replacing them with elected band councils, jurisdictional authority over reserve lands was transferred to the band councils. This move was in some ways a step forward for Indigenous communities, as previously the governance of reserve lands had remained in the hands of the Canadian government through the

authority of appointed Indian Agents, however, the legitimacy of the band councils and elected chiefs continues to be challenged by the authority of hereditary chiefs. As the band councils, elected chiefs and hereditary chiefs all boast some level of support from the community they represent, it can be difficult to discern the overall desires of a specific community when these different stakeholders are in disagreement (Greaves & Lackenbauer, 2019). Due to the variety of viewpoints regarding extractive industry within Indigenous communities, with some members inviting the economic growth that these industries might bring and others opposing such projects, the internal divisions within communities can be exploited and framed in different ways by actors with a vested interest in the outcome of such debates (Greaves & Lackenbauer, 2019). These competing jurisdictional claims between band councils and hereditary chiefs, and differences in opinion between members of the same group, have left space for industry and government actors to claim support from a community when that support may only reflect a portion of the overall community (Greaves & Lackenbauer, 2019). The territory in question often further complicates such claims and disputes, as less than 20% of British Columbia is covered by historical treaties between Indigenous nations and Canada and not all disputed territories are reserve lands (Hume & Walby, 2021, p. 510). Land disputes in BC are therefore particularly subject to these types of overlapping and competing jurisdictional claims, since BC lacks the treaty structure that other provinces enjoy to settle land claims in a less conflictual manner (Hume & Walby, 2021; McCreary, 2020).⁸ Many claims made by Indigenous communities extend beyond designated reserve lands, and contain resources that extractive industries are keen to exploit and commodify.

⁸ See Paul Tennant's (1990) work, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics* for a more comprehensive discussion of the unique position of Indigenous communities in British Columbia.

In 1984, 12 Wet'suwet'en and 39 Gitksan house chiefs launched a legal case aimed to resolve the outstanding land claims resulting from the absence of treaties covering 58,000 square kilometers of Wet'suwet'en and Gitksan territory in northern BC (McCreary, 2020). In what is now known as the Delgamuukw-Gisdaywa case, the Wet'suwet'en and Gitksan chiefs argued that they have maintained and never ceded jurisdiction of their territories through the practice of the feast as a traditional system of governance (McCreary, 2020). Initially, Justice McEachern of the BC Provincial Court ruled that any Indigenous rights to the territories in question had been extinguished at the time that the colony of BC was formed, with his decision reflecting a refusal to acknowledge the oral history of Wet'suwet'en and Gitksan as legitimate sources of testimony (Hume & Walby, 2021). When challenged in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, McEachern's decision was overturned, and the court conceded that Wet'suwet'en/Gitksan title had not, in fact, been erased. The Court therefore affirmed that Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs remain the titleholders of their traditional lands, and the province still has the duty to consult with Indigenous communities before encroaching on their territories (Hume & Walby, 2021).

Following this ruling, the case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) to determine the "nature and scope" of the rights affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The SCC defined the meaning of Aboriginal title in Canadian law as "a right to the land itself; the right to exclusively use and occupy the land, including the right to choose how the land can be used and articulated that provincial laws cannot extinguish these Aboriginal rights" (Hume & Walby, 2021, 513). The SCC decision also ruled that oral history is a legitimate form of testimony, and that feasting and feast systems are valid traditions which can prove Wet'suwet'en and Gitksan rights and title (Hume & Walby, 2021). This is the legal background against which Wet'suwet'en are continuing to oppose pipeline projects on their traditional territories, however,

it is not only important to understand what Wet'suwet'en are fighting to achieve, but also how their resistance is constructed and operationalized.

The Coastal GasLink Pipeline Conflict and Wet'suwet'en Jurisdiction

There are currently three resource extraction projects attempting to cross through Wet'suwet'en territory: the TransCanada Coastal GasLink pipeline, the Chevron Pacific Trails pipeline, and the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline (Hume & Walby, 2021). The most expansive of these projects, the Coastal GasLink pipeline, is intended to run 670 kilometers from Dawson Creek to Kitimat, BC, and is part of the largest private sector investment in Canadian history, with \$40 billion invested in the project (Hume & Walby, 2021). The Coastal GasLink pipeline is owned by TC Energy, formerly known as TransCanada Energy which is the same company who was funding the Keystone XL pipeline. In October 2014 an application from TC Energy to the BC Environmental Assessment Office was accepted and an Environmental Assessment Certificate was issued approving the initial pipeline route, however, an alternative route was proposed by TC Energy in 2015 which would take the pipeline south of Houston, BC. In 2016 TC Energy received 10 permits from the BC Oil and Gas Commission, which was the last of all the major provincial approvals required for construction on the Coastal GasLink pipeline to begin. In 2018, the alternative southern route for the pipeline was approved by the BC Environmental Assessment Office and TC Energy announced that this was the final route which the pipeline would take (Coastal GasLink, n.d.). However, Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs and all five Wet'suwet'en clans have expressed their opposition to the pipeline project since 2015 regardless of which route is taken, and maintain that free, prior, and informed consent has not been given to industry or government officials (Ducklow, 2019; Gidimt'en Yintah Access. n.d.b; Hume & Walby, 2021; Tait & Spice, 2018). In late 2018, when the pipeline route was starting to

be cleared, industry workers were blocked from crossing the bridge at the Unist'ot'en Healing Centre, and an injunction was granted to Coastal GasLink to authorize removal of the Unist'ot'en blockade (Hume & Walby, 2021; Tait & Spice, 2018). After Unist'ot'en refused to take down the barricade, RCMP forces moved in and forcibly removed the blockade, arresting 14 land defenders (Hume & Walby, 2021). Spurred on by the Unist'ot'en resistance, the neighbouring clan, Gidimt'en, established a blockade of their own, which fell outside of the area covered by the original injunction granted to Coastal GasLink (Ducklow, 2019; Gidimt'en Yintah Access. n.d.b; Hume & Walby, 2021).

These two blockades, often referred to as 'checkpoints', have become prominent sites of conflict in BC and point to a deeper struggle for Indigenous resurgence. These checkpoints are passable to visitors and allies who are granted permission by Unist'ot'en Traditional Chiefs and Matriarchs following the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) protocol, but are closed to all others, specifically industry workers and law enforcement agents (Hume & Walby, 2021; Unist'ot'en Camp, 2017). The FPIC protocol requires visitors to identify themselves and explain their relationship to the hosts, and is a longstanding tradition which provides Unist'ot'en with the authority to determine who may enter and access their territory (Unist'ot'en Camp, 2017).




Figure 2.1 Map of Wet'suwet'en territory and the proposed Coastal GasLink pipeline route.

Retrieved from BBC News (2020).

Wet'suwet'en as Direct Action & Anarchist Methodology

The Wet'suwet'en resistance in BC is an example of blockadia activism and direct action in Canada. Similar to Clayoquot Sound and the #NoDAPL movement, Wet'suwet'en resistance is characterized by groups of activists (generally referred to as 'land defenders') physically preventing the progression of industry through Indigenous territory. As stated above, this is primarily done through the establishment and maintenance of the Unist'ot'en and Gidimt'en checkpoints. Considering the methodology of direct action, these checkpoints represent the types of 'autonomous bubbles' created when protestors engage in this form of activism. Understanding

these checkpoints as examples of direct action requires understanding how they are creating and enacting a new type of society within the overarching structure of existing Canadian colonial practices. Within the checkpoints on Wet'suwet'en territory there exists a different set of social relations and norms which govern the blockade community; these communities do not simply reproduce the dominant structures which exist in Canadian society on a smaller scale. These checkpoints and camps are, in fact, enacting a radically different type of society from the one which exists outside these zones. For example, the Unist'ot'en checkpoint features a Healing Center constructed to support Indigenous land defenders and individuals and facilitate the resurgence of traditional Wet'suwet'en practices (Gidimt'en Yintah Access. N.d.b). The Healing Center holds events such as art camps for Indigenous youth and provides a space in which traditional teachings and practices can take place. The construction and operation of the Healing Center therefore represents a concrete example of how communities may create the society they desire by carving out space to put such desires into action. The operation of the Healing Center suggests that the Wet'suwet'en checkpoints parallel direct action tactics as land defenders and activists are engaging in political resistance which includes the formation of new spaces and societal relations within the movement.

Further investigation of Wet'suwet'en land defenders' social media highlights the connections between direct action and the checkpoints on Wet'suwet'en territory. One social media account run by Wet'suwet'en women highlights the goal of fostering an anti-patriarchal culture and community within the checkpoints. Posts by this group advocate respect for women and elders, for example writing that “[p]atriarchy in movements is detrimental to any and ALL fights for human rights” (wetsuweten_checkpoint, 2021). This commitment to gender equality within the Wet'suwet'en movement is only one small example of the direct-action imperative to

create the type of non-dominative and non-hierarchical society one wishes to be a part of. A series of posts shared by the same account also speak to the focus on community-building and systems of mutual aid fostered within the checkpoints. These posts, highlighted on their social media page, read: “Decolonizing means: understanding that *contributing* does not necessarily mean monetary – our systems were not monetary. Trade learning for goods, services, supports.”, “Decolonizing means: recognizing that we must take care of each other. We cannot move forward & strengthen community, if we are leaving people behind.”, and “Decolonizing means: mutual aid, community care, and decentralizing.” (Capitalism & Colonialism Kill, 2021). These brief but explicit mentions of ‘decentralizing’, non-monetary systems of aid, and a focus on taking care of the community reflect the anarchist goals and methodologies discussed in Chapter 3. Here it is clear that land defenders are not only engaging in practices of mutual aid, voluntary association, and creating a new form of social relations at the Wet’suwet’en checkpoints, but that these practices are connected to the deeper goal of decolonization.

While the construction of checkpoints, blockades, and the occupation of territory as a technique of resistance has been used by Indigenous protestors in land claims conflicts since the 1970s, contemporary movements such as the Wet’suwet’en conflict have been increasingly connected to broader goals of Indigenous sovereignty and resurgence (Canning, 2018; Simpson, 2014; Tennant, 1990). Though media representations of the checkpoints and land defenders are primarily focused on the land rights and pipeline issues, this overwhelming focus on the pipeline opposition obscures the underlying goals of the movement and provides a deceptively one-dimensional view of the issue (Hume & Walby, 2021; Tait & Spice, 2018). As land defenders have repeatedly explained, the struggle in BC is not only over a pipeline, but is also an issue of respecting Indigenous rights, sovereignty, and resurgence (Hume & Walby, 2021; Tait & Spice,

2018). As Hume and Walby (2021) explain, the conflict in Wet'suwet'en lands "is not just an act of resistance against a pipeline, it is an enactment of transformative resurgence that flows from traditional epistemologies" (p.523). For Wet'suwet'en protestors, this fight is about both the immediate remedy of preventing pipeline construction, and about asserting Indigenous sovereignty, as well as protecting the territory for the land, animals, and future generations (Tait & Spice, 2018).

These broader goals make anarchist tactics such as direct action highly applicable to the Wet'suwet'en project, in so far as direct action and resurgence share several key qualities. Leanne Simpson (2011) explains that, for her, Indigenous resurgence means that "we need to re-establish the processes by which we live who we are within the current context we find ourselves" (p. 17). Resurgence requires the active engagement with, and practice of, traditional ways of being in order to reclaim and reinvigorate Indigenous culture and lifeways. While 'direct action' is a Western academic concept and cannot be simply applied to Indigenous resurgence movements, there exists some overlap in the requirement for action and 'living as if one is already free' within both resurgence movements and anarchist methodology. The community aspect of resurgence further strengthens the connection to direct action, as Jeff Corntassel (2012) explains that community-centered programs and practices of resurgence are integral to resistance to settler colonial forces. For Corntassel, resurgence is comprised of "re-localized, community-centered actions premised on land, culture and community" (2012, p. 92). Therefore, while the deeper goals of resurgence underpinning the conflict in Wet'suwet'en territory are uniquely the purview of Indigenous land defenders and social movements, there is space for a tactical alliance between anarchist methodology, such as local-scale direct action, and Indigenous resistance (recall the social media posts mentioned above).

Simpson (2011) differentiates between mainstream social movement theory and Indigenous movements by explaining that “[a]t their core, Indigenous political movements contest the very foundation of the Canadian state in its current expression, while most theories of group politics and social movements take the state for granted” (p. 16). Here, there is a clear connection between anarchist ideology which rejects the legitimacy of the state, and Indigenous political movements which also reject the state (albeit for different reasons). This connection suggests that an alliance between anarchism and Indigenous resurgence may not only be possible, but productive. In the case of Wet’suwet’en resistance, it is possible to locate anarchist methods being incorporated into an Indigenous-led movement as a result of these areas of overlap which make such an alliance possible.

Examining the use of the FPIC protocol provides a further example of the embodied nature of resurgence within the movement. One settler ally explains their experience with the FPIC protocol, writing, “when I first arrived at the Unist’ot’en Camp, ... [we] walked to meet the Unist’ot’en on the bridge that crosses the Morice River, we were asked to introduce ourselves and who we were, what our intentions are, and what skills we have to offer if allowed to enter” (Freedom Manuel, 2019, para. 4). The FPIC procedure clearly limits settler and non-Wet’suwet’en access to Wet’suwet’en territory, and locates the authority of permitting or denying entry with the Indigenous inhabitants of the land (Tait & Spice, 2018). These types of blockade experiences put abstract concepts such as resurgence and decolonization into action and draw protestors of all backgrounds into community with each other. In this way the FPIC protocol assists in the creation of a new society, an ‘autonomous bubble’, by regulating the space of the blockade and shifting power back into the hands of Wet’suwet’en community members. This is also indicative of the FPIC protocol as being one method through which resurgence is

concretely put into practice rather than remaining an abstract goal or aim. The FPIC can be read as an example of direct action, as it is an instance where Indigenous community members are acting as if they are already living in the society they aim to achieve. Rather than asking permission from the state to assert sovereignty on their own land, Wet'suwet'en leaders are acting as though such permission is not necessary. Therefore, through this example it can be seen that the anarchist tactic of direct action can be identified within the Wet'suwet'en conflict due to the shared methodology between direct action and Indigenous resurgence.

Wet'suwet'en Resistance as Enacting Ecological Security

Considering the immediate and broader goals of the Wet'suwet'en conflict, as well as the incorporation of anarchist tactics within the movement, several parallels can be drawn between the framework of ecological security and the Wet'suwet'en checkpoints and conflict. Both the goals and methods of the movement reflect the ecological security discourse's focus on the environment and the local community, and its broader critique of status-quo social and economic relations in Canada. These features of Wet'suwet'en resistance represent a real-life application of ecological security in Canada and provide an alternative approach to climate security compared to the national, international, and human security framings used in the current Canadian defence policy.

The centering of the environment as a referent object of security, detached from human extraction of natural resources, is a key feature of the ecological security approach that is visible within the Wet'suwet'en struggle. There is a deep respect for the land within traditional Wet'suwet'en law and governance which is expressed both through their unwavering opposition to the Coastal GasLink project, and wider traditional practices. Indigenous ontologies, or worldviews, are generally understood as relational, circular, and based on principles of mutual

respect and reciprocity. Within a relational ontology, the ability to form relationships between and among different human and non-human beings is prioritized, and value is derived from these connections rather than from a hierarchical ordering of individuals (Little Bear, 2000; Reddekop, 2014). Understanding Indigenous ontologies as ‘circular’ highlights the focus on relationality and reciprocity, as understanding all beings as interconnected necessarily makes constructing hierarchical relations among them unthinkable (Sinclair, 2018). For many Indigenous groups, including the Wet’suwet’en, the land itself is included in this web of relations, as all living things are able to form relationships including the trees, salmon, humans, and even natural elements such as rivers and lakes (Corntassel, 2012; Gidimt’en Access Point, 2020). Since this type of ontology, radically different from that of most settler societies, enables and necessitates forming deep connections to land, nature, and nonhuman beings, Indigenous communities have a different type of relationship to land and other living beings which makes ecological security a more readily adopted security paradigm (Tkachenko, 2022). Gidimt’en spokesperson Molly Wickham discusses Wet’suwet’en worldview by contrasting it with settler views, saying that Indigenous people have a “holistic worldview” unlike the way that “the western worldview really compartmentalizes everything” (Gidimt’en Access Point, 2020, 3:20). This type of ontology makes placing the environment itself in the role of referent object, and refusing anthropocentrism in climate security discourses more broadly, a natural and obvious course of action for Indigenous communities. Therefore, within both ecological security and Wet’suwet’en resistance, a concern for the security and preservation of the environment is paramount, and this concern is not framed in the language of resources or ‘sustainability’ with its accompanying anthropocentric implications. Corntassel (2012) explains that viewing lands as ‘resources’ commodifies Indigenous territory, whereas within Indigenous worldviews land is viewed as one

part of the complex web of relationships humans are situated in (p. 92). The relationship between Wet'suwet'en and the land is shaped by respect rather than ownership, and this perspective necessarily permits and requires opposition to settler capitalist resource extraction. In this way, the aims of the movement closely parallel the drive within ecological security to oppose the dominant capitalist relationship to land and reframe the relationship between humans and ecological systems. As Glen Coulthard (2014) explains, Indigenous relationships with the land are premised on mutual respect and responsibility rather than domination and the extraction of economic value. Therefore, while a reciprocal, respect-based relationship with land has been the norm within Indigenous societies for millennia, settler states have yet to shift their social and economic processes towards this type of relationship and away from the logic of capitalist extraction.

The use of direct-action tactics within the Wet'suwet'en movement translates these ideals into practice by physically centering the land as the referent object of security which the local community is protecting. In an interview with media, Unist'ot'en spokesperson Freda Huson explains the relationship between Wet'suwet'en people and their lands, saying the land is "actually...life. ...everything out here is alive...Our people's belief is that we are part of the land. The land is not separate from us. The land sustains us. And if we don't take care of her, she won't be able to sustain us" (Veeraraghavan, 2014, para. 17). Huson's statement echoes the type of reciprocal, respect-based, and interconnected relationship that Indigenous peoples feel towards land and the environment. Understanding this ontological connection to the land helps explain why the ecological security discourse finds such purchase with Indigenous communities and the Wet'suwet'en conflict. As ecological security requires a centering of the environment itself in the role of referent object, and a decentering of the human, Huson's explanation of how

Wet'suwet'en understand the land as connected to themselves helps explain why Indigenous land defenders center the environment as the object of their defence. Here, we can see that Wet'suwet'en defense of their traditional territory, and Indigenous land defense more generally, is an example of the ecological security discourse in practice.

As with many examples of blockadia activism, Wet'suwet'en is a case where a local community takes on the role of acting subject in order to provide security for their environment. In this way, it can be seen that Wet'suwet'en represents a concrete example of anarchist methodology being employed to achieve a local model of ecological security. The focus of Wet'suwet'en land defenders on the local community and future generations as secondary referent objects of security further strengthens the connection between Wet'suwet'en resistance and the ecological security approach. As has been explicitly stated by Wet'suwet'en land defenders and organizers, and implied through the practice of traditional forms of Wet'suwet'en governance, the anti-pipeline movement is focused on preserving Wet'suwet'en territory for the use of current and future generations. Comments by participants, such as the testimonials discussed earlier, display the deep concern and responsibility that Wet'suwet'en protestors feel for maintaining a stable environment for the survival of future generations and their own present community. A prominent quote in large text on the homepage of the Gidimt'en Checkpoint official website reads: "Our responsibility is to protect our yintah for future generations" (Gidimt'en Yintah Access, n.d.a). This goal is restated across the Gidimt'en website and social media, with statements such as "We are obliged to protect our ways of life for our babies unborn" expressing the deep responsibility to future generations felt by land defenders (Gidimt'en Yintah Access, n.d.a). The banner on the homepage of the Unist'ot'en Checkpoint website reads "The Unist'ot'en are fighting for the future health of the land...to ensure that the

natural beauty and bounty of the earth will be enjoyed for generations to come” (Unist’ot’en Camp, 2017). This care for the wellbeing of both the land and those other than oneself is a key principle of ecological security, as this security discourse locates future generations and vulnerable communities as referent objects of security in addition to the environment itself. The Wet’suwet’en movement enacts this concern by centering those subjects as the objects to be secured, and in this way the movement is embodying an ecological security approach to climate security.

Not only are the stated objectives of Wet’suwet’en resistance in line with an ecological security framework, the broader context and character of the movement also reflects important themes of this approach. By situating itself within a broader context of resistance to settler colonialism and resource extraction in Canada, the Wet’suwet’en movement represents a challenge to the dominant socioeconomic order and the validity of the settler state apparatus itself. Indigenous resurgence in Canada has been opposing “settler common sense” (Rifkin, 2013) and extractive capitalism for centuries, with Wet’suwet’en representing one of the latest installments in this long history. Unlike dominant climate security approaches, ecological security requires a critical examination of status-quo modes of social organization and economic production, something that Indigenous resurgence movements have consistently been advocating for.

In the case of Wet’suwet’en, the opposition to the Coastal GasLink pipeline is part of a broader resistance to the settler resource-based economy and the hierarchical relationship of domination between Indigenous communities and the Canadian government. As with other blockadia movements, the communities operating the blockade camps at the Unist’ot’en and Gidimt’en are exploring alternative forms of social and economic organization in the course of

their resistance to settler exploitation of their territories. In their discussion of the United States' government's response to the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipeline projects, Bosworth and Chua (2021) explore how blockades as a protest tactic represent a resistance to the settler colonial capitalist order for Indigenous communities. Bosworth and Chua (2021) recognize the threat that assertions of Indigenous sovereignty pose to the political and economic stability of settler states and discuss how blockades specifically bring these tensions to light. They explain that

blockades evidence the capacity to build lasting land defence alliances, and to practice a politics of what Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017) calls “generative refusal” – enacting another way of relating to the world while rejecting the assumed sovereignty of the settler state (Bosworth & Chua, 2021, p. 2).

Bosworth and Chua (2021) draw on Simpson's work regarding refusal and resurgence to demonstrate that blockades, as a tactic of resistance and protest, are specifically threatening to the settler state because of their multifaceted critique of economic, political, and social systems. By building alliances across “constellations” (Simpson, 2017, p. 213) of different groups, including Indigenous communities, settler allies, and environmental activists, blockades are particularly dangerous to status-quo settler state operations. Blockadia activism, when incorporated into movements bringing together concerns over Indigenous sovereignty and environmental issues, is therefore a powerful technique of resistance to multiple interconnected problems. Coulthard (2014) recognized the connection between blockades as a tactic of resistance and Indigenous sovereignty, suggesting that blockades are expressions of “disruptive countersovereignty” (p. 118) which directly oppose the settler status-quo. This multifaceted critique of economic and political modes of organization encoded by blockadia activism puts

into action the ecological security prescription for a radical reorientation of current social and economic relationships.

At the Unist'ot'en camp, the community of Indigenous and settler activists have constructed a cabin, permaculture garden, solar-powered mini grid, and healing center under the guidance of Wet'suwet'en elders (Gidimt'en Yintah Access. n.d.b). Members of the community explicitly state that they are attempting to "create a working vision for future generations", referring to a new set of social relations (para. 4). Freda Huson explains that one of the goals of the checkpoints is to "develop a community, and the purpose of the community is to decolonize our people" (Veeraraghavan, 2014, para. 7). This establishment of a community goes beyond simple protest tactics and brings Wet'suwet'en resistance into the realm of direct action and ecological security by aiming to develop a society of their own, using different (in this case, traditional Wet'suwet'en) principles of social and economic organization. Though not consciously framed as such, the organization of such a community can be understood as an example of the anarchist practices of voluntary organization and mutual aid in practice. The volunteers at the checkpoints do operate under the guidance of Indigenous elders, which may appear to contrast the anarchist commitment to horizontal organization, however, the inversion of the settler-Indigenous relationship within these spaces arguably still fits within an anarchist framework as it rejects the dominant power relationship and replaces it with a legitimate structure of mutual respect which upholds Indigenous sovereignty. As Kahala Johnson and Kathy Ferguson (2019) explain, both anarchism and Indigenous politics aim to enact "ways of living that embody their goals and resist incorporation into hegemonic arrangements" (p. 698). While it cannot reasonably be claimed that Indigenous land defenders at Wet'suwet'en and beyond are anarchists, or are deliberately practicing anarchism, the similarly counter-hegemonic

and state-critical goals and character of both movements make tactical alliances possible and productive. Johnson and Ferguson (2019) suggest that anarchism and Indigenous resistance and resurgence “share an insistence on confounding the dominant historical narrative about what has been and what is possible” (p. 700). Since opposition to, and the creation of alternatives to, this very narrative is at the core of the ecological security approach, collaboration between Indigenous communities and environmental activists through anarchist tactics of resistance seems highly fitting.

Therefore, it can be seen that the case of Wet’suwet’en resistance illustrates how anarchist methodology can be incorporated into blockadia movements and how ecological security as a theory and discourse can be put into practice. The Wet’suwet’en and their allies, though possibly unaware of the implications of their actions for climate security discourses, are working towards ecological security using anarchist methodology through their commitment to a reconfiguration of relationships of domination between settlers and Indigenous peoples, and their radical opposition to status quo state operations.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and New Directions

In this final chapter, I highlight some of the major findings and key takeaways from the thesis. I also address the potential critique that ecological security and the provision of such security from bottom-up, grassroots institutions, is simply a reformulation of previous arguments regarding the human security dimensions of environmental security. More specifically, I will distinguish my theory of anarchist methodology and ecological security presented in this thesis from the 2001 work of Jon Barnett, who presented a theory of environmental security reformulated as human security. This discussion differentiates the work of this thesis from previous attempts to critically interrogate dominant conceptualisations of environmental security, and also positions the potential of this work to serve as an ‘opening up’ of the imaginative possibilities surrounding climate security. An important task for critical scholars everywhere is to not only critique, but to imagine; a challenge which this thesis has attempted to take up. I conclude with some possible future directions for research and scholarship in the area of critical security, political theory, and environmental politics.

Key Takeaways

One of the major takeaways from the argument developed in the preceding chapters is the understanding that security can be provided in a bottom-up manner, from the local community which is under threat. Traditionally, dominant security discourses have largely focused on the top-down provision of security by national or international institutions. Within the national and international climate security discourses, the responsibility for providing security responses lies with governing bodies such as national departments of defense, the UN, or international organizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the responses provided by these actors primarily focus on the security of national borders, the stability of the international system, and similar national-

or international-level referent objects. However, the present discussion has suggested that grassroots-level organization may be better able to support local communities and provide ecological security in a bottom-up manner. While the global nature of climate change makes relying solely on small-scale, local solutions impractical, as some measure of global cooperation is necessary, the examples discussed throughout this thesis nevertheless demonstrate that top-down solutions are not the *only* possible effective response.

Traditionally, security has been the purview of high-level institutions with an air of impenetrability, existing as something of a ‘black box’ of governance and policy. As McDonald (2008) notes in his critique of securitization theory, the language of security is often employed by powerful actors and elites in order to access the resources of state policy or international institutions. While McDonald is specifically critiquing the invisibility of marginal actors within securitization theory, the broader recognition that security politics are often closed off to nondominant actors and marginalized groups suggests that critical security studies needs to find ways to incorporate these actors and recognize their unique security capabilities. By offering a framework that consolidates ecological security, direct action, and Indigenous resurgence, I suggest a prescription to meaningfully incorporate a variety of marginalized actors into the provision of climate security. Identifying the possibilities encoded within different worldviews, the resonance between community independence, along with various forms of resistance and resurgence can open up new avenues to bring disadvantaged groups into the fight for climate security.

This local, grassroots-led type of security can be clarified by returning to the Canadian defense policy discussed in Chapter 4. Whereas the Canadian state has clearly begun to adopt an approach to climate security which draws on the national, human and environmental security

discourses, the ecological security approach is being enacted by grassroots actors at the sub-state level, such as the Wet'suwet'en. The pipeline conflict in particular clearly depicts how Canadian defense policy attempts to secure the ability of extractive industry to continue fossil fuel production through the criminalization of individuals and activists who oppose such projects. This policy centers the resources and economy which depends on them as the referent objects of security, and by extension, the policy is attempting to preserve Canada's status quo processes of land dispossession, fossil fuel extraction, and the capitalist economic order. These aims are consistent with the dominant climate security approaches, making it evident that this approach is able to be incorporated into national security policy. On the other hand, through their opposition to resource extraction, land dispossession, and colonial logic more broadly, Wet'suwet'en resistance provides an ecological security approach to the pipeline issue. By challenging both the pipeline project and the state land claims, as well as the broader structures of colonialism and extractive capitalism, the Wet'suwet'en movement embodies an ecological security paradigm. Therefore, rather than dismissing ecological security as an impractical and unattainable alternative to environmental security, the Wet'suwet'en case demonstrates that this approach can be meaningfully enacted by nonstate actors and grassroots organizations. This is particularly important for Canada, as recent conflicts between industry and local communities indicate that this issue cannot be overlooked. Ongoing struggles such as the over 1200 arrests in British Columbia in protest of logging in the Fairy Creek watershed suggest that Canada will continue to see conflicts at the intersection of blockadia, direct action, and ecological security in the coming years.

It is also important to recognize the role played by anarchist methodology in this discussion. Anarchist political theory and practice is often excluded from security studies, and

international relations in general, or viewed as a fringe ideal of radical ‘others’. ‘Anarchists’ are in fact sometimes identified as national security threats, and their ideas are rarely taken seriously as possible methods of political change (Kinna, 2005). However, the connection between methodological anarchism and the provision of ecological security by environmental activists has demonstrated that a different relationship to anarchist political theory is possible. The critique of dominative, hierarchical relationships in practice does not have to look like political violence and the issuing of provocative manifestos, but can instead look like an Indigenous community creating a traditional permaculture garden, or a group of passionate activists in the BC forest sitting in a circle to discuss how best to protect their local rainforest. Similarly, direct action is not necessarily a threat to an orderly society, but may be an opportunity for experimentation and the development of a more collaborative and inclusive society.

Challenges to Ecological Security: The Human Security Paradigm

Jon Barnett’s (2001) framework of environmental security as human security offers an interesting perspective through which to elucidate the framework I propose. Addressing some of the concerns raised by a human security framework demonstrates that the ecological security discourse cannot and should not be dismissed within the climate security literature. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the human security framework positions individual humans as the referent objects of security, and is therefore primarily concerned with how climate change will impact the ability of people to achieve development goals, avoid humanitarian crises, and continue to live safe and healthy lives. Barnett (2001) connects the human security paradigm to environmental security, arguing that a human-security oriented framework of environmental security is necessary to produce a meaningful type of peace in reference to environmental insecurity. Barnett argues that by focusing on human security, the frame of analysis is shifted

away from the national or international level, and instead the focus becomes “the immediate vulnerability of most of the world’s population, as opposed to hypothetical threats to nation-states” (2001, p. 127). The focus on vulnerable populations bears some similarity to the ecological security discourse examined throughout this thesis, and the shifting of interest away from the national or international level of analysis is consistent with the aims of ecological security, blockadia and direct action, and anarchist methodology. However, though Barnett (2001) concedes that he is not opposed to ecological framings which position of the environment itself as the referent object of security, he maintains that the principal referent in a human security discourse is humans themselves (p. 129). The reasoning for this unwavering focus on human subjects is because “a concern for the environment *per se* is less likely to mobilise action” (Barnett, 2001, p.129).

This thesis contends that concern for the environment can, in fact, mobilise significant action in the form of local resistance to extractive industry and environmentally harmful practices. The four cases discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of the Keystone XL pipeline, Clayoquot Sound’s War in the Woods, the #NoDAPL movement, and the ongoing Wet’suwet’en conflict demonstrate that it is both possible to position the environment as the referent object of security, and certain anarchist methods such as direct action enable such a commitment to be put into action. Barnett’s (2001) argument that a focus on humans as the referent object of security is necessary to secure popular support is somewhat Eurocentric, as it does not engage the various Indigenous ontologies and practices which find the health of the environment and the land inseparable from human wellbeing. While Barnett (2001) argues that concern for the environment stems from the fact that humans are dependent on a stable and healthy earth for survival, this framing is not the same as the relational and reciprocal character of Indigenous

worldviews. Considering the statements given by Unist'ot'en and Gitimt'en spokespeople in Chapter 4, it cannot be said that the Wet'suwet'en people solely care for the land because it supports them, but rather they view the land and nonhuman beings as alive, valuable, and as deserving of protection as humans are. The ecological security discourse leaves space for such different worldviews and interpretations of the relationship between humans and the environment whereas a human security-centered discourse frames this relationship more narrowly.

The most significant difference between Barnett's (2001) human security-as-environmental security framework and the ecological security discourse is Barnett's willingness to accept, or moderately reform, existing institutions in order to provide security. Ecological security requires a deep critique of, and an attempt to move away from, status-quo systems of social and economic organization, since it is these systems which often create insecurity in the first place. While Barnett's framework does move away from the national and international security discourses, clearly advocating for a "full or partial dissolution of national power through progressive relinquishment of that power" (2001, p. 148), he nevertheless maintains a role for dominant institutions such as the military and international councils and organizations. The mere reform of such institutions is not sufficient within the ecological security discourse, hence the connection drawn between anarchist methodology, Indigenous resurgence and sovereignty, and ecological security in this thesis.

The difference here may perhaps be best exemplified by examining the role Barnett outlined for Indigenous groups within his human security-as-environmental security framework. When discussing the need for increased participation in governance by individuals from a range of backgrounds, Barnett suggests that Indigenous peoples should be represented proportionally

within decision-making and legislative bodies to ensure a minimum standard of access to such institutions (2001, p. 150). This type of inclusion within existing institutions has been criticized by Indigenous scholars as part of the politics of reconciliation which lacks meaningful challenge to the settler colonial order (Coulthard, 2014). Comparing this kind of institutional inclusion with the direct action campaigns undertaken by the Wet'suwet'en and others, we can see that Indigenous resurgence may be more meaningfully realized when Indigenous communities are able to take on positions of leadership in the course of defending their lands, on their own terms. The establishment of the Unist'ot'en Healing Centre and permaculture garden are examples of enacted resurgence which will assist the Wet'suwet'en in continuing their culture on their own land – an aim which is not necessarily fulfilled by simply ‘adding in’ Indigenous representation to dominant institutions of governance.

The difference in role for Indigenous peoples between Barnett's framework and that discussed in this thesis is emblematic of the core difference between our conceptions of ecological security. I follow the argument of McDonald (2018) in that I believe true ecological security requires a move away from current social and economic systems. Ecological security cannot be achieved within the current world order as elite interests do not align with the values needed to recenter the environment, prioritize vulnerable communities and future generations, and reorganize current forms of social and economic organization. Assisting Indigenous communities with achieving goals of sovereignty and resurgence on their own terms may represent one concrete way of challenging and reforming the dominant social and economic orders. It has been acknowledged that Indigenous participation in environmental programs and policy development leads to better outcomes (Clark, 2002), however, by examining and

supporting Indigenous-led local activism we may learn how to better move towards enacting ecological security.

Future Research Directions

By way of conclusion, I think there are several areas of future research which can continue to strengthen and progress the ecological security discourse. Firstly, the connection between Indigenous resurgence and ecological security should be further examined, both in the Canadian context and elsewhere. Considering the impact of scholars such as Coulthard, Corntassel, and Simpson, Indigenous-led scholarship elucidating the connection between ecological security and community-based resurgence may be able to penetrate the existing climate security discourse in a unique way. Such work would also help to address the lack of inclusion of marginalized groups within climate security conversations identified by McDonald (2018). I believe it is important to provide opportunities for Indigenous peoples and communities to enter into climate security debates and discussions on their own terms and using their own voices.

Secondly, further exploration of how methodological, and even ideological, anarchism can support the enactment of ecological security may help identify new strategies of local security. Challenging the notion that anarchism is solely destructive, and instead identifying the possibility which lies within such a radically non-hierarchical paradigm may open the door for innovation and imagination within climate security discourses. The role of critical theory is, in the words of Barnett himself, to “open up thinking space and to generate alternatives” (2001, p. 158). Bringing anarchism into conversation with ecological security provides an opportunity to theorize what an ecologically secure future may look like, and further work in this area could

include conducting further case studies, such as that of the Wet'suwet'en, to identify areas of overlap and connection.

Finally, a shortcoming of the present discussion is a lack of full consideration of the global nature of climate change, and how local security can be extended to the global scale. Though this thesis has argued that local, bottom-up security is both possible and necessary, there remains questions about how the local can translate to the global. Future scholarship on ecological security and direct action should therefore investigate how the types of non-coercive and non-hierarchical organization developed within direct action blockadia activism could be applied to issues which cannot be localized, such as pollution and global emissions. While not an easy task, such research could investigate how local communities could be efficiently networked without sacrificing the integrity of each community's security paradigm.

I believe that local communities have the potential to reshape the climate security landscape. Anarchist methodology and ecological security, like any radical challenge to the status quo, have been pushed to the margins of security studies rather than deeply engaged with by academics, policymakers, and leaders. My hope is that this thesis illuminates a path towards opening our collective imagination to the possibilities for meaningful change within anarchist methodology and ecological security, and I hope we can work towards a more inclusive, diverse, and secure future.

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