

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF PORPHYRY

by

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We accept this thesis as conforming
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the philosophical thought of the 4th century C.E. author Porphyry of Tyre. It is intended primarily as a bibliographical status quaestionis. Since I consider reference material on Porphyry currently available in English to be only partially satisfactory, I have thought it desirable to provide, for the student interested in Porphyry, information on what useful primary and secondary sources may be most profitably consulted, and in what editions Porphyry's own works may be found.

Underlying the thesis is the conviction that the picture of Porphyry emerging from the few works in English which deal with him is one-sided. There he is portrayed as a derivative and uninteresting popularizer of Plotinus. I try to show that researches by continental European scholars must cause us to re-evaluate this view. Porphyry, besides being a prolific scholar, is to be considered a creative ethicist and metaphysician, highly influential on the Medieval Latin West, and probably on the Islamic East as well.

In Chapter One, I sketch Porphyry's life and times, giving data on the contents and composition of some of his more influential works. Chapter Two deals with 20th-century Porphyrian scholarship. I attempt to describe the conflicting assessments of Porphyry's thought given by Anglo-Saxon and Continental scholars. The one-sided portrayal given by the former is attributed to a positivistic methodology inadequate to deal with the subject at hand. Chapter Three sketches Porphyry's cosmology, ontology

and metaphysics, as they have recently been reconstructed by European scholars, especially Hadot. Chapter Four discusses the conflicting interpretations given by modern scholars to Porphyry's influential doctrine of the soul: its descent from the intelligible world through the celestial spheres to incarnation on earth. The role played by the pneuma or astral body during the soul's descent, its psychological function during terrestrial existence, and the decisive part it plays in the post-mortem destiny of the soul, are discussed.

A brief Conclusion discusses future prospects for Porphyrian studies. Finally, a Bibliography of Ancient Authors gives information on editions and translations of Porphyry's writings, as well as those of his contemporaries, and an Annotated Bibliography gives a critical evaluation of 20th-century secondary literature relevant to Porphyry's life, thought and place in the history of ideas.

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DILECTISSIMAE CONIUGI

AVOQUE VENERABILI

DIISQUE MANIBUS AVIAE

Abbreviations

- ANF The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325 (American reprint of Edinburgh edition; Grand Rapids 1983).
- Budé Collection des Universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé, Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres" (Paris).
- CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (Berlin 1882-1907).
- CHLGEMP The Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge 1967).
- DK Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker⁹, Griechisch und Deutsch von Hermann Diels, neunte Auflage herausgegeben von Walther Krantz, 3 vols. (Berlin 1960).
- EH Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique, Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'Antiquité Classique (Vandoeuvres-Geneva).
- GCS Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Leipzig and Berlin 1897-).
- Lampe A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. by G.H.W. Lampe (Oxford 1961-1984).
- LCL The Loeb Classical Library, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge and London).
- LP Lexikon Plotinianum, edd. J.H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series I, II, Leiden and Louvain 1979).
- LS A Latin Dictionary, founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary, revised, etc. by Charlton T. Lewis (Oxford 1879; reprinted, 1984).
- LSJ A Greek-English Lexicon⁹, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, revised and augmented ... by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie et al.... with a Supplement (1968) (Oxford 1940; reprinted, 1977).
- OCD The Oxford Classical Dictionary², edd. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (Oxford 1970).

- OCT Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford).
- Patrology Johannes Quasten et al., Patrology. 4 vols. (vols. 1-3 1950-1960; reprinted, Westminster, Maryland 1983; vol. 4, ed. A. de Bartolo, trans. P. Solari, Westminster 1986).
- PG Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca, ed. Migne, 162 vols. with Latin translation (Paris 1857-1866).
- PL Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina, ed. Migne, 221 vols. (Paris 1844-1864).
- RE Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, herausgegeben von G. Wissowa (quem seqq. W. Kroll, K. Mittelhaus, K. Ziegler; Stuttgart 1893-).
- Rév. A.-J. Festugière, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste. 4 vols. (Paris). 1. L'Astrologie et les sciences occultes (1950²). 2. Le Dieu Cosmique (1949). 3. Les Doctrines de l'Ame (1953). 4. Le Dieu inconnu et la Gnose (1954).
- SVF Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim. 4 vols. (Leipzig 1905-1924; reprinted, Stuttgart 1964).
- Teubner Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Stuttgart and Leipzig).

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

PREFACE

In prefaces to theses of this nature, it is customary to outline the contents of the work, and to state the goals the author had hoped to achieve in writing it. I shall not break with this tradition, but I do feel that it is equally important that I state briefly at the outset what I have not set out to do.

The last author to devote a book-length study to Porphyry in English¹ -- one of very few written on him in any language -- was criticised by a reviewer in the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie that "the title of this book promises far more than it in fact delivers." I would not incur the same reproach, and would therefore like to emphasize that I have not set out to give a complete and exhaustive presentation of Porphyry's thought. When dealing with an author who wrote more than fifty works that we know of, touching on every aspect of ancient learning, from astronomy to Homeric criticism, chronology, geography, theurgy and comparative religion, as well as every branch of philosophy, I could not hope to touch on every aspect of Porphyry's literary activity. Such a task would be beyond the scope both of my learning and the acceptable dimensions of a Master's thesis. It is, moreover, an impossible task so long as we lack an edition of Porphyry's fragments. If I accomplish no more in the present work than to add one more voice to the chorus of those calling for the publication of Porphyrii omnia quae supersunt, I shall be satisfied.

Nor will the reader find in this thesis a critical presentation of Porphyry's thought.² No pronouncements will be made upon the validity,

truth, falsity, logical consequence or otherwise of a given Porphyrian idea. I believe that criticism presupposes understanding; an impossible ideal criticism would be based on a complete knowledge of every fact concerning Porphyry's life, every book he ever read, every idea that influenced him. The best modern scholars can hope for is a distant approximation to that ideal understanding. I am conscious of my distance even from an adequate -- not to mention a hypothetical complete -- understanding of Porphyry, and at this stage of my studies, and probably for many years hence, I shall concentrate on trying to improve my understanding of Porphyry's thought, leaving critical assessments for some point in the future, when I shall have approximated my unattainable goal a good deal more closely.

In the meantime, this thesis represents an attempt at "clearing out the underbrush."³ I believe that Porphyry has been given short shrift in standard English-language histories of philosophy, and that the treatment he has been accorded therein -- at best dismissal as "unimportant"; at worst contemptuous disdain and misrepresentation -- has hindered both the interest of potential students and the research of scholars on Porphyry in the English-speaking academic world. If I harp on what I feel are inadequacies in current and recent Porphyrian scholarship, it is because I feel the picture frequently presented of Porphyry, as a derivative pedant, fanatically superstitious opponent of Christianity and defender of Oriental barbarism, or composer of "Cole's Notes" on Plotinus, depending on which modern authority one consults, is both inaccurate and unfair. It fails to take into account P. Courcelle's proof of the extent of Porphyry's influence on late Latin Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and ignores the

discoveries of P. Hadot, who, attributing to him a previously anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides, has shown Porphyry to have possessed a fascinatingly complex metaphysical system, which deserves its place alongside mankind's most creative intellectual constructions. Finally, the question of Porphyry's influence on Islamic thought has so far been merely raised, but not pursued. Over the next few years, I hope to begin the investigation of the extent of this influence, which may lead, on the one hand, to the recovery of Greek philosophical texts, lost in the original but preserved in Arabic, Persian or Syriac translations and adaptations, and on the other, to an improved understanding of ancient and modern Islamic thought.

For the moment, I have thought it useful to provide an initial orientation to this little-known thinker. Chapter One gives the outlines of Porphyry's life and times, with some discussion of his more important works. Chapter Two sketches the history of Porphyrian scholarship in this century; in line with the general bibliographical orientation, I have indicated which works I have found most helpful, and which deleterious, to an improved understanding of Porphyry's philosophy (the Annotated Bibliography and Bibliography of Ancient Authors are intended to provide fuller information along these lines). Chapters Three and Four provide brief sketches of Porphyry's metaphysics and ethics respectively. Much more could have been written, but I did not wish idly to repeat what has been so excellently stated elsewhere. The interested reader is again referred to the Annotated Bibliography. Finally, in a conclusion, some indications are given as to what possible directions Porphyrian studies may now take.

The shortcomings and omissions of this thesis are due to lacunae in my own knowledge; over the next few years, with the help of a generous grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, I hope to remedy these gaps at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris, under the direction of M. Philippe Hoffmann. I shall also benefit from the guidance of M. Pierre Hadot, the world's leading expert on Neoplatonism, who has already provided me with invaluable advice and information. To M. Hadot, to the learned Mme. Ilsetraut Hadot; to Alain-Philippe Segonds, Père H.-D. Saffrey, and M.R. Goulet, I am indebted for valuable information, advice and orientation. May they find here the expression of my respectful gratitude.

My principal debt of gratitude is, however, to the Department of Classics of the University of Victoria, which allowed me to venture into this little-trodden field, and then stuck with me throughout the completion of this thesis, and especially to my Supervisor, Dr. Gordon Shrimpton, who, with long-suffering patience, has done all he could, and then some, to see this project through. My thanks go also to Mrs. A. Nancy Nasser, whose expert typing skills and unfailing obligingness made a tedious and difficult typing job seem easy.

I owe more than I know how to express to Professors David Campbell and Peter Smith, my teachers, respectively, of Greek and Latin. I will do my best not to squander the priceless gift they have given me.

This thesis would not have been possible without two years of generous financial support from the University of Victoria. The research that went into it was greatly facilitated by the always-cheerful and helpful staff of the Inter-Library Loans Department of the McPherson

Library; thanks go to Betty, Arlene, Cynthia, Cathie and Karen.

A special debt of gratitude goes to my esteemed friend and teacher,
Mr. Moḥammed N. Aziz. mâ taf' alû min khayran ya'lamtu-l-lâhu.

Notes to Preface

1. Smith (1974).
2. Modern Western scholars have, especially in the study of non-Western and pre-modern systems of belief, perhaps been too quick to criticize first and understand later. A reaction, to which I heartily subscribe, seems to be developing to this way of thinking; see Duerr (1985); Feyerabend (1987).
3. The phrase is Idries Shah's: see his Wisdom of the Idiots (London 1969), Learning how to Learn (New York 1978), Thinkers of the East (London 1971), etc.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

Chapter I

(Porphyry) was an extraordinarily versatile erudite, but no independent thinker, and despite his numerous philosophical writings there exists no Porphyrian philosophy.

Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, "Plotinos,"
RE Bd. 4 (1953), col. 583.

"Ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν προτιμῶσιν, ὥς Πορφύριος καὶ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν, ὥς Ἰάμβλῑχος καὶ Συριανὸς καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ οἱ ἱερατικοὶ πάντες.

... that some prefer philosophy, as Porphyry and Plotinus and many other philosophers, others theology, as Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus and all the theologians.

Damascius, In Phaed. 1.172.1-3
Westerink¹

It will be one of the principal goals of this thesis to try to show that Damascius writing c.500 C.E., had a more accurate view of Porphyry and his literary activity than did Schwyzer, one of the leading Neoplatonic scholars of our time.

There have been as many definitions of philosophy as there have been philosophers -- rather more, in fact -- and even if someone had the requisite learning and temerity to attempt one of his own, it could easily be shot down by a philosopher of differing views. I will therefore restrict myself to the observation that, throughout recorded western history, there have been certain questions which mankind seems repeatedly to have raised, with an urgency and insistence not usually accorded more mundane problems of everyday life. Some of the most frequently recurrent of these questions are: Why does there exist something, rather than nothing? Why is there so much suffering in human life, and what might be a possible

remedy to this suffering? (a corollary to this is the question: What is happiness and how are we to attain it?). Finally, what, if anything, happens to us after our death? Both those who have formulated these questions and those who have proposed solutions to them have generally regarded them as in some sense "philosophical."²

Every student begins his investigations already equipped with a considerable weight of methodological baggage: acknowledged or unacknowledged prejudices and preferences; personal tastes which made him consider this field, rather than another, worthy of study; assumptions and partis pris which make him accept some sources, authorities, and types of evidence as conclusive, and reject others. It is as a confession of my personal methodological preferences, then, rather than as a dogmatic assertion, that I propose the following definition of philosophy: An honest attempt to find answers for the above-mentioned questions, which, due to the frequency with which they are raised, in all sorts of guises, and the urgency with which an answer to them is sought, must have their source in some constant and deep-seated recess in the human spirit. According to this admittedly arbitrary criterion,³ then, anyone attempting to answer these questions would be a philosopher; it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition that he commit his conclusions to writing and present them with a certain rigour and consistency (philosophy so presented does, however, greatly facilitate the task of the historian of philosophy).

Porphyry did have a philosophy in the sense outlined above: This paper's goal will be moreover to show that he had a fully developed cosmology, ontology, ethics and eschatology, in the sense modern philosophers

have defined these terms. The majority of Porphyry's philosophical output is not extant. This is a contingent fact with which modern historians must deal, but which has nothing to do with the question of Porphyry's importance, influence, or lack thereof. What is important is that in a period crucial for the development of Western and Near Eastern civilization -- the 3rd to 6th centuries of our era -- he was widely read, and his writings exercised a powerful influence on contemporary and subsequent thinkers.

Of Porphyry's 77 or so works, only a portion has survived. Few of them have been edited, and of these only a fraction are available in adequate English translations, while the secondary literature consists mainly in specialist material in French or German.⁴ Faced with such a sparsity of material, the historian of philosophy can throw up his hands and conclude, using argumenta ex silentio, that Porphyry cannot have had anything interesting to say, or else he would have been better known. If, however, one seeks a fuller understanding of the causes of the current state of neglect of Porphyrian studies, one may be led, as I was, to find through a survey of Porphyry's available works and the relevant secondary literature that he did, indeed, have something worthwhile to say.

There are few issues in Porphyrian studies upon which scholars have reached agreement; this will emerge from the next chapter, in which I sketch the history and present state of Porphyrian scholarship. Before going on, in subsequent chapters, to discuss Porphyry's metaphysics and doctrine of the soul, as they have been reconstructed by the modern scholars I find most convincing, it would be as well to resume the few facts about Porphyry which are more or less agreed upon by the scholarly

communis opinio.⁵

Porphry was born in Tyre, probably in 234 C.E.⁶ If his reported Syrian name, Malchos, which the Greeks translated as βασιλεύς, is any indication, he came from a rather well-off family, and we may assume he received the best education coastal Syria had to offer. This region had been a flourishing intellectual center for centuries, and the schools at Antioch, Edessa and Nisibis, inter alia, would constitute some of the foremost centers for the study, preservation and transmission of Greek learning right down to the Arab conquest in the 7th century. Indeed, this area, left largely untouched by the violence attendant upon the fall of the Severan dynasty, was, along with Egypt and Asia Minor, one of the cultural capitals of the Roman Empire in Porphyry's time.⁷

Porphry's native tongue will have been Aramaic, the lingua franca of Near Eastern commercial and intellectual exchange which had, by this time, eclipsed koiné Greek. It is likely that he knew Classical Hebrew,⁸ and, in general, we may speak with Bidez⁹ of "the encyclopaedic knowledge he had of the things of the Orient." At the library-school at Caesarea, he may have met and heard the great Christian theologian Origen (185-253),¹⁰ with whose teachings Porphyry's fully developed philosophy was to have a great deal in common.

At some point before the age of thirty, a now-Hellenized Porphyry set off for Athens, then, as in Cicero's time, a university town attracting the sons of the élite from all over the Empire. There he studied grammar under Apollonios, mathematics under Demetrios, and rhetoric under Minucianos.¹¹ The teacher who had the strongest impact on the young Malchos was, however, undoubtedly the learned philologist and philosopher Cassius

Longinus (c.213-273),¹² with whom he would remain in contact until the latter's violent death. It was from Longinus that Porphyry obtained the expertise in literary criticism, exegesis and allegorical interpretation which were to characterize such writings as the Homericae Quaestiones, De Antro Nympharum, and Contra Christianos.¹³ And although Porphyry's future master Plotinus expressed a low opinion of Longinus' philosophical abilities ("φιλόλογος μὲν," ἔφη, [sc. ὁ Πλωτῖνος] "ὁ Λογγῖνος, φιλόσοφος δὲ οὐδαμῶς"; Plotinus apud Porphyry, Vita Plotini 14, p.15, 19-20 (Bréhier), it seems that it was from Longinus that Porphyry learned that form of pre-Plotinian Platonism -- the so-called Middle Platonism¹⁴ -- to which he was to remain faithful in certain crucial respects in his philosophical thinking. Longinus seems to have taught that the Intelligibles (νοητά, the Platonic Forms or Ideas) subsisted outside the hypostasis Νοῦς or Intelligence. He perhaps also held, as did Porphyry's future classmate Origen the pagan,¹⁵ that there existed no higher level of reality above the Noûs. Both these doctrines were anathema to Plotinus; yet it seems to have been on Longinus' recommendation that, in 263, Porphyry left Athens for Rome to seek entry into Plotinus' philosophical conventicle.¹⁶

No brief summary could do justice to the subtle complexity of the thought of Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism and one of the most brilliant creative thinkers in history.¹⁷ In its barest outlines, the structure of his system is as follows:

From the ineffable, unthinkable One, characterized by complete simplicity and beyond motion and thought, there derives, by an effortless flow which does not diminish its source (just as the outpouring of light

does not diminish a fire), a second level of reality, the Noûs, containing the archetypes of all phenomenal reality. By further spontaneous emanation, the hypostasis Soul is produced. More precisely, each hypostasis is characterized by two forms of activity, one inner and one outer. The inner activity consists in self-contemplation, and serves to maintain the respective hypostasis in existence. As a by-product (πάρεργον) of its outer activity, each hypostasis produces a kind of "spiritual matter," which imparts Form to itself when it contemplates (θεωρεῖν) the superior hypostasis which produced it. Thus it is the external activity of Soul which creates the universe, at the point where the entire process of creative emanation is losing its substantiveness and impetus. As a result, Matter, the end-point of the process, is endowed with only a kind of quasi-reality (each level of emanation represents a falling away from Unity and Simplicity, the highest desiderata, into multiplicity and divisibility). Thus Plotinus often seems to consider Matter as the ultimate Principle of Evil, bereft of participation in the Form of the Good. The same holds true for human bodies, unworthy containers of a portion of divine Noûs, which is the source of our higher contemplative faculties.

Soul and Nature, meanwhile, are the origin of our lower mental and purely physiological functions. The philosopher's goal should be to seek real knowledge; that is, to ensure the re-ascent of the particle of Noûs within him to its primordial state of unity with the hypostasis Noûs, where the distinction between subject and object disappears.

Such, in truncated form, is the schema of reality that Porphyry and his contemporaries came to take for granted.¹⁸ Whether Porphyry brought substantial modifications to this schema, or whether he was a simple

popularizer or even plagiarist of Plotinus' ideas is a matter of debate, and will have to occupy us later.

Porphyry was to stay with Plotinus six years, attending public readings and discussions of philosophical texts, composing his own refutations of opposing viewpoints, and generally imbuing himself with the Master's thought, as well as with mathematics, music, and astronomy, in an atmosphere of highly-charged intellectual tension and excitement, until he had rendered himself, in Bidez's words, "the most intelligent and fervent adept" of Plotinus' ideas, and "united in himself all the learning (science) of his time."¹⁹

Perhaps the atmosphere was a bit too highly-charged. We need not go as far as Bidez and claim that Plotinus' alleged "hatred for the body" was responsible; it was more likely a simple case of depression caused by nervous exhaustion which led Porphyry to consider taking his life in 268.²⁰ Plotinus, at any rate, saw his star pupil's state less as a metaphysical crisis than a psychological one, and prescribed travel. The diagnosis seems to have been correct; Porphyry set sail for Lilybaeum in Sicily, and arrived later that year. He was 35 years old.

Porphyry's literary activity continued unabated during his Sicilian period, even after news reached him in 270 of the death of his beloved master Plotinus in Campania. Indeed, it is from the Sicilian period that many of Porphyry's most influential works date: the Isagoge,²¹ or Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, which introduced Aristotle to the Neoplatonic school curriculum and, in Latin translation, remained a student's first introduction to the Stagirite's thought right through the Middle Ages; his fifteen books Against the Christians;²² a devastating textual

and doctrinal critique of the upstart religion, the De regressu animae²³ (perhaps better entitled the Περὶ ἐπανόδου ψυχῆς), his treatise on the post-mortem destiny of the soul which so influenced Augustine and Macrobius, among others; his four books De Abstinencia ab esu animalium;²⁴ a plea for vegetarianism and against animal sacrifice, which also contains some of Porphyry's finest philosophical passages; and a number -- as yet undetermined -- of commentaries on Plato, Aristotle and Ptolemy, none of which has come down to us in its entirety.²⁵

From this point on Porphyry's life is less well documented. It is likely he returned to Rome sometime after Plotinus' death, and that he assumed the leadership of the latter's school (Iamblichus may have been one of his students, but few other names of his disciples have been preserved). From this period date his Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes,²⁶ his most important ethico-metaphysical treatise of uncontested authenticity, extant only in fragments and textually a jungle of corruptions; ethical treatises like the Περὶ τοῦ Γνωθὺ σαυτὸν²⁷ and the Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν²⁸ and the Ad Marcellam.²⁹ This last work provides our last data about Porphyry's life: it presents itself as a letter written in consolation to his wife Marcella, a widowed mother of seven Porphyry had married in his old age, but whom he had been forced to leave after only ten months, when called away on official state business (καλοῦσης ... τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρείας, Ad Marc. 4, p.106, 15-16 Des Places³⁰). It consists largely of edifying ethical maxims culled from various sources, and contains passages of great beauty and profundity.

Also from this final period of Porphyry's life (i.e. sometime after 298) dates his supreme labour of love for his master Plotinus: his

meticulous edition of the Enneads, whose 54 treatises he carefully divided into six groups of nine,³¹ adding his own "commentaries and summaries,"³² and prefacing it with one of the finest biographies to have reached us from Antiquity, the Vita Plotini.³³

The last date mentioned by Porphyry is 301 C.E., when he was sixty-eight years old.³⁴ The date and circumstances of his death are unknown.³⁵

Such are the outlines of Porphyry's life, as best we can now reconstruct them. Before proceeding to give an account of his thought in later chapters, I shall, in a survey of the literature, try to gain some insight into the reasons for the widely divergent evaluations of Porphyry's philosophy held by modern scholars.

Notes to Chapter I

1. Previously attributed to Olympiodorus (by e.g. Beutler [1953] col. 280; Wallis [1972] 3 n.2; Smith [1974] xviii n.22), this quotation, and the entire Commentary on Plato's Phaedo from which it is taken, now appears to be by Damascius, the 6th-century student of Proclus, teacher of Simplicius and last head of the Platonic Academy. On the attribution see Westerink's edition (1977) vol. 2, pp.15-17; Saffrey (1988) 20 n.48. On Damascius, ignored by Lloyd (1967), cf. J. Combès' Introduction to his Budé edition of Damascius' On First Principles (1986) ix-lxxii; I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris 1978) passim; L.G. Westerink, "Damascius commentateur de Platon" in Le Néoplatonisme (1971) 253-260; M.-C. Galpérine, "Damascius et la théologie négative," Ibid 261-263; "Le temps intégral selon Damascius," Etudes Philosophiques (1980) 325-34.
2. Kant would have claimed that these questions are illegitimate, being transfers of the data obtained by the categories we use to perceive the phenomenal world to a domain where these are not applicable. Wittgenstein might have likened such questions to screws which are not part of a mechanism because they do not turn anything; they are statements which have only the appearance of real sentences, but are not really such, since no circumstances can be imagined in which they could be answered according to the "logical grammar" of our "language games." Gilbert Ryle, finally, would dismiss these questions as "category mistakes"; the goal of philosophy for him is not to answer such questions but to eliminate them, by showing that they are incorrectly formulated. This is not the place to discuss such objections, nor to investigate the question whether a smug positivism or "critical rationalism" in the Popperian vein still has the right to call itself "love of Wisdom." See Duerr (1985) esp. pp.89-103.
3. My only consolation is that any other definition of philosophy is equally arbitrary.
4. Bidez (1913, 65*-73*) had listed 77 works by Porphyry. Beutler (1953, coll. 278-301) arrived at a total of 72, of which he judged four to be doublets and eleven to be of doubtful authenticity, leaving a total of 57. J. Bouffartigue and M. Patillon (1977), listed 21 of these as having been "reproduced or reconstituted in part by editors" (xiii-xvii). I know of no significant additions to this list since that time, although E. Des Places' edition of the Life of Pythagoras and the Letter to Marcella constitutes an advance on the previous texts of Nauck (1886) and Pötscher (1969) respectively. Work has recently begun at the CNRS in Paris on a badly-needed new edition of Porphyry's Sententiae, but will require five or six years for publication. (I am grateful to Mme. Ilsetraut Hadot for this information.)

5. We have two main sources for Porphyry's life: his own Life of Plotinus, prefaced to most modern editions of the Enneads, containing much autobiographical material, and the Lives of the Sophists by Eunapius (c.345-420). The latter's account of Porphyry's life, written a century after his death, must be used with caution (cf. Bidez [1913] 53 n.1; who nevertheless reproduces the relevant sections of Eunapius, following Boissonade's 1822 text, pp.47*-51*). The best modern edition of Eunapius is that of C. Giangrande, Rome 1956). There is also a Loeb edition by W.C. Wright (1922). The only modern biography of Porphyry we possess is that of Bidez; it needs replacement, but is reliable for factual data. In what follows I shall be utilizing Bidez extensively.
6. More precisely, October 5, 234, if, with O. Neugebauer, in A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, Pt. 2 (Berlin 1975) 944, we identify part of Porphyry's horoscope in Hephaestius, Apotelesmatica 2, 10 (ed. Pingree, Leipzig 1973, vol. 1, p.112, 16-20), cited in Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) xi n.3.
7. On the state of the Empire in Porphyry's time, see Rostovtzeff (1957) 1, Chap. 10, pp.433-468, "The Military Anarchy," Chap. 11, pp.469-501, "The Empire during the Anarchy."
8. Bidez (1913) 9; Wilken (1984) 128. As "the best scholar of his time," Porphyry "was equipped with a better knowledge of Hebrew than Origen had," Dodds (1965) 126. Cf. Wallis (1972) 101; Bidez (1913) 9.
9. Bidez (1913) 10; Beutler (1953) col. 276. We may wish to disagree with Bidez's nineteenth-century conception of a monolithic "Orient" sharing a set of identifiable characteristics that an intelligent scholar, like Porphyry, could assimilate.
10. On this brilliant scholar, who composed some 800 works of which we know the titles (Jerome ascribed to him 2,000 works; Epiphanius 6,000!), amongst which was a critical, comparative text of the Old Testament, see the bibliographical material in Patrology, vol. 2 (1953) 37-101; add now Dodds (1965) 106f.; 134f.; 117-119; 127-132; H. Chadwick in CHLGEMP 182-192, and Bibliography pp.675-676. Henri Crouzel, Bibliographie critique d'Origène (The Hague 1971; Supplément 1982) gives hundreds of pages of items on Origen, up to 1980.
11. Bidez (1913) 30; Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) xii; Beutler (1953) col. 276, 53ff.
12. Not, as was often thought in Antiquity, the author of On the Sublime, but the Longinus who, called to the court of Zenobia at Palmyra, died during the siege of that city when Aurelian crushed Zenobia's revolt. His thought deserves a monograph; meantime, we must be content with the accounts of his life and thought in Bidez (1913)

- 29ff.; Dörrie (1959) 4; 104-107; Lloyd (1967) 283-284; Wilken (1984) 130-31; Wallis (1972) 38-39. Smith (1974), and Dillon (1977) (except for pp.255-256) are oddly reticent about him. Longinus' fragments are accessible in Toup's 1778 edition of the *Περὶ Ὑψους*; there is also an edition of his rhetorical fragments by A.O. Prickard (OCT, 1908) 13.
13. From this period of Porphyry's literary activity date his *Homérika Zétémata*, in which, among other observations, he uses his critical acumen to dispute some of the deletions carried out by Aristarchus on Book XI of the *Odyssey*; *Porphyrii quaestionum homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquiae*, ed. H. Schrader (Leipzig 1890) p.108, 5-10. The same editor collected Porphyry's comments on the *Iliad*: *Porphyrii quaestionum homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquiae* (Leipzig 1882). On these neglected sources of Homeric criticism see Bidez (1913) pp.31ff.; 71*; J. Pépin in *Le Néoplatonisme*, 167-192; Wilken (1984) 131.
- Porphyry's religio-philosophical works probably also date from this early period, viz. *Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων* (text in Bidez [1913] 1*-23*); the *Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, ed. Gustavus Wolff (Berlin 1856; reprinted, Hildesheim 1962). These two works have not helped Porphyry's reputation among rationalistic modern scholars; for Bidez (1913, p.15) they are full of "Demonology, magic, astrology and Oriental superstitions," while Geffcken (1978, 57-59) speaks of "an extravagant quest after oracles and theurgy," "documents of the most rampant superstition," and is visibly shocked by the "almost incredible lack of discrimination" with which "a trained philologist such as Porphyry" could have collected these recipes for the animation of statues by gods, prayers, invocations, magical spells and oracles, into works which are "in an absolute sense ... unattractive composition(s)." Apart from the rampant ethnocentrism and latent racism evident in such pronouncements, however, perhaps some caution should be used. These works have been reconstructed on the basis of quotations preserved in Church Fathers such as Eusebius, Augustine, Theodoretus, Lactantius, and Nicephorus Gregoras, whose purpose was precisely to scrounge about in Porphyry's works in order to cite passages which would cast the most discredit upon the hated arch-enemy of Christianity. Lloyd (1967) p.286 n.2, deduces from Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* IV 7.2 (I 77 Mras) that "what has survived of this work (i.e. the much-maligned *Philosophy from Oracles*) is misleading"; so Wallis (1972) 99, n.1. On the whole question see Pierre Hadot, "Citations de Porphyre dans Augustin," *Revue des études augustiniennes* VI (1960) 205-244; Wilken (1984) 148ff.
14. On Middle Platonism, the philosophical movement extending from the death of Plato in 347 B.C.E. to the period of Plotinus' activity, there is a scarcity of material. The only survey of the period as a whole is Dillon (1977). The section on the period in the *CHLGEMP* 43ff., by Philip Merlan, is sketchy, treating individual authors only inasmuch as they shed light on Plotinus. Editions of individual authors continue to appear in the Budé series (see Bibliography of

- Ancient Authors). The so-called School of Tübingen, which has since the late 1950's revalorized the "Unwritten Doctrines" of Plato, has made important studies of Middle Platonic thinkers, who constitute their principal sources; see Krämer (1964).
15. Who was indeed a different person from the Christian Origen; see K.-O Weber, Origenes der Neuplatoniker (= Zetemata t. XXVII), München, 1962. Whether or not they both studied under the mysterious Ammonius Saccas, teacher of Plotinus and Longinus, is a matter of ardent debate amongst learned adversaries which would take us too far afield here; for a concise and sober summary of the issues see E.R. Dodds, "Numenius and Ammonius" in EH 5 (1960). On the divergent views of Plotinus and Longinus see A.H. Armstrong, "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect,'" EH 5 (1960) 393-413.
 16. Beutler (1953) col. 277.
 17. The bibliography on Plotinus is enormous; for a first orientation see Hadot (1973²); Armstrong (1940; 1979), and his excellent contribution to the CHLGEMP (Part 3, pp.195-268; bibliography 676-677). The editions cited in the Bibliography of Ancient Authors contain useful notes and bibliographies; there is rich parallel material in Bouillett (1857-1861). See also H.-R. Schwyzer, "Plotinos," RE 21 (1951), col. 471-592; W. Theiler in R. Harder, R. Beutler and W. Theiler, Plotins Schriften (Hamburg 1956-1971), vol. 6, pp.103-175; Dodds (1965) 69-101; and "Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus," Journal of Roman Studies 50 (1960) 1-7; Smith (1974) 2-80. On Plotinus' legacy in the history of western ideas see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (= The William James Lectures, delivered at Harvard University 1933, Cambridge and London, 1964²).
 18. There is a lack of material on Plotinus' Neoplatonic successors available in English. The best survey is probably that of Wallis (1972); the CHLGEMP, envisioned as a continuation of Guthrie's History of Greek Philosophy, is inconsistent; first-rate sections (e.g. Armstrong's) are interspersed with decidedly slipshod ones. The most valuable material has been contributed by European scholars: see the papers collected in Le Néoplatonisme (1971), Etudes Néoplatoniciennes (1973), and volumes 3 (1955), 5 (1960), 12 (1966) and 21 (1975) of EH, as well as in the Mélanges Trouillard (1981). Collections of the papers of individual scholars have also appeared: see Festugière (1967; 1971; 1972; 1975); Courcelle (1984, especially Bibliography 11-25); Hadot (1968a, bibliography vol. 2, pp.123-134; 1977²); Theiler (1927; 1966); and Dörrie (1976; bibliography 525-527). On individual Neoplatonists, the respective articles in RE are to be consulted: R. Beutler on Numenius, Plutarch of Athens, Proclus and Olympiodorus; K. Praechter on Syrianus, Hierocles and Simplicius. Praechter's articles, however, as well as his influential article "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus,"

in Genethliakon für Carl Robert (Berlin 1910), have since been largely supplanted by the work of Ilsetraut Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiérocles et Simplicius (Paris 1978).

19. Bidez (1913) 48. For a vivid account of life in Plotinus' inner circle see Hadot (1973²); Armstrong in the CHLGEMP 195-221.
20. Bidez (1913) 52f.; Beutler (1953) col. 277. Franz Cumont (1919) gives a good account of his incident. Reports of Porphyry's "naturally hypochondriac disposition," "sombre and fanatical temperament" [Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics vol. 3 (1917) 317] or "carácter tétrico y atrabiliario" [Enciclopedia Universal vol. 46 (1922), 515], seem greatly to have been exaggerated. As Bidez remarks (1913, p.52 n.1, "On peut passer par une période de neurasthénie sans être, dans l'état normal, porté aux idées noires. Rien, dans le reste de la vie de Porphyre, n'indique un tempérament triste et déprimé."
21. Isagoge sive quinque voces, ed. A. Busse, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.1, Berlin 1887. See Bidez (1913), 58ff.; 138-139; Beutler (1953) col. 252-253. Commented by Ammonios Hermeiou, Johannes Philoponus, David, Elias, Theodoros Prodromos, Tzetzes and Boethius, it was translated into Syrian, Arabic, Armenian and Latin. The work was intended as a defence against the criticisms of Plotinus (e.g. Enn. 5, 2, 9, 7-27). See Courcelle (1948²) 396f.; Wallis (1972) 24.
22. This important work deserves to be exhumed from the Abhandlungen der königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil-hist. Klasse I (Berlin 1916), where Adolf von Harnack, having reconstructed it from fragments preserved in Macarius Magnes, had published it ("Porphyrius Gegen die Christen, 15 Buecher, Zeugnisse und Referate"). with Bidez (1913) 52* 20; pp.77ff.; Beutler (1953) no. 52, col. 298-299; see Wilken (1984) ch. VI: "Porphyry, the most Learned Critic of All"; Dodds (1965) 107-9; 112; 115; 118; 125-27; 135; Geffcken (1978) 62-65; Wallis (1972) 101-105.

Not only was it due to this work that Porphyry became persona non grata amongst early Christians (he was "refuted" by Methodius, Eusebius, Apollinarius of Laodicea and Philostorgius, among others) but his work was ordered burned by the emperors Valentinian III and Theodosius II in 448. [πυρὶ παραδιδόσθαι Cod. Just. 1.1.3. The text of the decree is reproduced by Bidez (1913) 79 n.2; Courcelle (1948²) 395 n.2.] All of this contributed to the state of ravaged dispersion in which Porphyry's works came down to us: Christians who admired and utilized his writings -- and there were many -- did not dare to cite him by name (he was considered so dangerous an enemy of the faith that the "refutations" written against him were consigned to the flames at the same time as his own writings). Moreover, questions as to the reliability of Macarius Magnes (5th cent.) are obstacles in the way of the publication of a new critical edition, with notes and translation; a prerequisite, of course, for

any eventual complete edition of Porphyry's fragments. See Goulet (1974).

23. Fragments from Augustine's De civitate Dei reproduced in Bidez (1913) 27*-44*; cf. pp.88ff.; Beutler (1953) col. 294; Courcelle (1948) 226ff. J.J. O'Meara's attempt (in Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine, Paris 1959), to identify this work with the Philosophy from Oracles has met with little acceptance; see Hadot (1960); Wallis (1972) 99 n.1; Smith (1974) xiii. Courcelle (1948)² 25-28; 165-67; 225ff., argues that Bidez's collection is incomplete, lacking extracts from Macrobius, Martianus Capella, and Claudianus Mamertius.
24. Bidez no. 41 (cf. pp.98ff.). The need for a new edition of this work to replace that of Nauck (1886²), described by Beutler (no. 40, col. 29), as "dringend erforderlich," has been admirably, if as yet only partially, filled by the excellent edition of Jean Bouffartigue and Michel Patillon (1977-1979).

The work has attracted most attention as a document of antique Vegetarianism [see Haussleiter (1935)], and for its utilization of an extended passage from Theophrastus' Peri Eusebeias, Bernays (1866); W. Pötscher, Theophrastos Peri Eusebeias (*Philosophia Antiqua* 11, [Leyden 1964]). The De Abstinentia maintains its antiquarian value, but at the same time -- and this has been too often overlooked -- it constitutes one of the summits of the expression of Porphyry's mature religio-philosophical system. Cf. Sodano (1958) xxxv-xxxvi: "... L'anello è saldato: dalla Filosofia degli oracoli al De abstinentia, attraverso l'Epistola ad Anebo e il De regressu, il pensiero religioso di Porfirio è giunto alla sua definitiva sistematizzazione."
25. Bidez and Beutler list commentaries by Porphyry on Plato's Cratylus, Parmenides, Phaedo, Philebus, Republic, Sophist, and Timaeus; on Aristotle's Categories, Physics; Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, Ethics and book 12 of the Metaphysics; on Theophrastus' Περὶ καταφράσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως; on Ptolemy's Harmonika and Apotelesmatiké, and on Euclid. Leaving aside, for the moment, the litigious case of the In Parmenidem, only three of these works have so far, to my knowledge, been reconstructed by editors: the Commentaries on Ptolemy (Harmonics, ed. I. Düring [Göteborg 1932]; Apotelesmatiké, ed. Weinstock-Boer [Catal. Cod. Astrol. Gr. 5.4, Bruxelles 1940] pp.187-228), and on the Timaeus (Sodano, Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta 1964), in addition to the Isagoge (n.21, above). How many of the lost commentaries may eventually be discovered in translation from as-yet-unexamined Arabic, Syriac and Persian manuscripts is a tantalizing but as yet unanswerable question. The commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is extant in Arabic; while that on the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας may be too.
26. The edition of E. Lamberz (1975) has rendered obsolete the previous editions of Mommert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), Creuzer (Paris 1855), and Holstenius (Rome 1630¹; Cambridge² 1655). But until the

appearance of the Budé edition (see above n.4), we are stuck with antiquated translations based on Creuzer's text. And while some scholars refer to the work as a vulgarization of or easy introduction to the thought of Porphyry (Bidez suggested for the title the disparaging translation "Trésor de pensées pour qui veut arriver à l'Intelligible" (1913) p.106, a translation is essential, since the Sententiae are composed in what must be some of the most difficult Greek ever written; see Lloyd (1967) 286ff.; Wallis (1972) 98. I have used the translation made by a certain Thos. Davidson, and appearing in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3 (1869) 46-73. Thomas Taylor's translation (1823) was the first into the vernacular, followed by Lévêque in vol. 1, pp.XLV-LXXVI of Bouillet (1857-1861).

27. Bidez (1913) no. 40, pp.109f.; Beutler (1953) no. 39, col. 291. This work deals with self-knowledge as a prerequisite for the ascent of the soul in the Intelligible world. Fragments of the 1st and 4th Books are preserved in Stobaeus, vol. 3, p.579, 6-583, 4 Hense. See further Theiler (1933; = 1966, pp.218ff.), who proves extensive utilization of this work by Augustine in his De Trinitate. Dörrie (1966b) 183 proves Ambrosius' dependence on it in his De Isaac vel Anima.

28. Bidez (1913) no. 39, p.39; Beutler (1953) no. 38, col. 290-291. In the form of an exegesis of Plato's Myth of Er in the Republic, Porphyry here treats of the conflict between free will and predestination. It also deals with the pre-existent soul's choice of incarnations; the souls first choose a constellation, on the basis of "Forms of life" (bioi), displayed for them on the dome of the fixed stars. According to this first choice, they then choose the "kind of life" they wish to live; i.e. in the first instance they may choose whether they wish to live as lions or men; in the second, assuming they have preferred a human life, whether they wish to be tyrants or sages. Fragments preserved in Stobaeus vol. 2, pp.163, 17-173, 2 Wachsmuth. Mention should also be made here of Porphyry's influential work Περὶ Στυγός (Bidez no. 53; Beutler no. 51, col. 298). Fragments apud Stobaeus, p.66, 26-70, 13; p.418, 9-429, 6; vol. 2, pp.14, 9-15, 3; vol. 2, p.873, 10-15; p.944, 4-9. In the Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων [Bidez no. 35; Beutler no. 34] Porphyry sought to show that Plato's division of the soul into parts and Aristotle's into δυνάμεις or functions were both correct, depending on the point of view from which the enquiry is conducted, and the goal envisaged. Two Porphyrian characteristics are well in evidence here: his "perspectivism," or readiness to approach problems from different points of view, and his interest in showing the fundamental accord, despite surface differences, between Plato and Aristotle.

29. Des Places' edition (1982, pp.104-127) takes its place alongside W. Pötscher's text (Leyden 1969), both of them superseding that of Nauck (1886²), while his translation stands comparison with that of A.-J. Festugière (Trois dévôts païens, II: Porphyre, Lettre à Marcella

[Paris 1944]) which has become hard to find. Festugière (p.17) regarded the work as "The last word in ancient wisdom" and "the spiritual testament of paganism."

30. It has been suggested by Des Places (1982, p.157), note complémentaire 2 ad p.106; cf. Bidez (1913, p.116) that Porphyry was en route to a conseil de guerre convoked by the Emperor Diocletian to decide the details of the Great Persecution unleashed in 303 C.E. Dodds (1965, p.109) finds this unlikely, pointing out that in the Adv. Christ. Porphyry "does not call for persecution; indeed, he seems to have spoken with pity of the many Christians whom the teaching of their Church caused 'to be inhumanely punished'", citing Adv. Christ., fr. 36.9 Harnack.
31. Pierre Hadot, EH 12 (1966) 127ff., has shown that this arrangement was not arbitrary, but corresponded to a precise pedagogic scheme: The 1st Ennead groups together ethical treatises, designed to procure for the student an initial purification; the 2nd and 3rd are devoted to physics, in an attempt to show the vanity and transience of things of the phenomenal world; while Enneads 4, 5, and 6, dealing with the Soul, Intelligence and the One, correspond to the "metaphysical," "theological," or "epoptic," stage; in which the supra-sensible spheres of the Forms and "véritablement étants" are revealed. Here again Porphyry is faithful to a long tradition of Middle Platonism, as were the Church Fathers who adopted this "psychagogic" schema, substituting the Book of Proverbs for Ennead I, Ecclesiastes for Enn. 2 and 3, and the Song of Songs for Enn. 4, 5, and 6; with exactly the same pedagogic goals in mind (Pierre Hadot, unpublished remark made at the conference "Les sagesses du Monde," held at Loches, France, July 18-23, 1988).
32. ὑπομνήματα ("commentaires"); κεφάλαια ("sommaires"); ἐπιχειρήματα ("résumés de l'argumentation"). Plotini Vita 26, p.31 Bréhier, using his translations. These "commentaries, summaries and résumés," which Bidez (1913, p.120) thought lost, are likely the basis of the pseudonymous Theology of Aristotle, which exercised a tremendous influence on the development of Islamic thought. It was published, along with other "Plotiniana Arabica," in G. Lewis' English translation in: Plotini Opera, tomus II: Enneades IV-V, ediderunt Paul Henry et Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Museum Lessianum series philosophica XXXIV) (Paris and Brussels 1959). See Praefatio 6, "De Plotinianis Arabicis," pp.xxvi-xxxvi. On the derivation from Porphyry see Walzer (1965); S. Pinès in Le Néoplatonisme (1971); P. Thillet, Ibid pp.293-302; 315-317; Wallis (1972) 173.
33. The Plotini Vita is prefaced to almost all modern editions of the Enneads; see Bibliography. On its value, cf. the reserved praise of Bidez (1913) 120-121: "We can be assured that anyone other than Porphyry would have dealt with the same subject much worse," with that of A.H. Armstrong in the CHLGEMP, p.195: "... generally recognized as a work of quite unusual quality, with no parallel among

Ancient philosophical or literary biographies...."

34. Beutler, loc. cit., col. 278. It should be borne in mind that the lists of Porphyry's works by Bidez, Beutler, and Bouffartigue and Patillon deal only with the titles that we happen to know about; and that the Souda (ed. Adler, vol. 4, p.178, 29) ends its enumeration of Porphyry's works with καὶ ἄλλα πλεῖστα. It is anyone's guess how many of his hitherto unknown writings may lie in the libraries of Middle- and Near Eastern mosques, containing as-yet-undiscovered Persian, Syriac and Arabic translations and paraphrases of the works of ὁ τὴν κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἐφύβριστον γλῶσσαν κινήσας (Souda 30-31).

Mention should also be made of Porphyry's Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν ζ' (Bidez no. 31-32; Beutler no. 20-21). That there was only a surface difference between the teachings of Plato and Aristotle had been maintained by Antiochus of Ascalon; through the intermediary of Ammonios Saccas it had, by Porphyry's time, become "Schulprogram" (Beutler 1953, col. 282). It was almost certainly through Porphyry, however, that the doctrine passed down to the great Islamic thinker al-Fârâbî (fl. 950).

35. No more faith is to be accorded the story that Porphyry killed himself (Johannes Chrysostomus, In Johann. Hom. 66.65 [= PG 59, 370]), than to the assertion, common amongst Church Fathers, that he was born and raised a Christian.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

Chapter II

Toute pensée est neuve quand l'auteur l'exprime d'une manière qui est à lui.

Il y a beaucoup de choses que nous savons mal et qu'il est très bon qu'on redise.

Vauvenargues (1715-1747), Réflexions et maximes §§398, 399

Ya se acepta que el rasgo esencial del genio no es la novedad u originalidad absoluta..ni puede consistir en la facultad, exclusiva de Dios, de crear de la nada así la forma como la materia.

Ozenam, Des Sources poétiques de la Divine Comédie, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 5 (Paris 1859) p.498, quoted in Asín Palacios (1984) p.4.

Porphyry's reputation has fluctuated more in this century than that of almost any other thinker of Antiquity. Opinion is sharply divided: some modern scholars, mostly Anglo-Saxon, consider him an unimportant, derivative pedant, a populariser of Plotinus and Aristotle but devoid of interest on his own account. Another group, however, made up largely of Continental scholars, consider that not only did Porphyry have a fully developed metaphysical system, alongside the ethical system evident in his extant works (those, that is, which the general consensus of scholarly opinion ascribes to him), but that his thought had, through its translation and adoption by Christian and pagan thinkers of the Latin West such as Marius Victorinus, Macrobius, Augustine, Boethius, Cassiodorus and Ambrosius, a decisive influence on the formation of some of the most fundamental philosophical tenets which went into the making of our contemporary Western world view.

In this chapter we will try, through a survey of the recent scholarship on Porphyry, to discover how it came about that two groups of scholars, equally learned and capable, arrived at such completely contradictory estimates of Porphyry's worth and significance for the history of philosophy.

A contributory factor to this divergence of opinions is the fact that, to this date, no complete edition of the fragments of Porphyry exists. While the last generation has witnessed a proliferation of first-rate critical texts and translations with commentary of Proclus¹ and Iamblichus,² more editions and translations of Plotinus³ than one could shake a stick at, and even first-rate editions of obscure Middle Platonic texts such as the Corpus Hermeticum,⁴ the Chaldaean Oracles,⁵ and the fragments of Numenius⁶ and Atticus,⁷ we are still poorly served with regard to Porphyry. Only a fraction of his literary output has been edited, few works have been translated into modern European languages,⁸ and, with the exception of the period of Thomas Taylor's enthusiastic activity (c.1820),⁹ virtually none into English.

Bidez was the first to undertake the task of a Porphyriosausgabe,¹⁰ the completion of which his friend Franz Cumont announced as imminent in 1919.¹¹ Although Bidez had apparently collected a considerable amount of material [he speaks of a "volumineux ensemble de textes," (1913, p.iv) at his death the task remained incomplete, and Nilsson (1974, 436 n.4), writing probably in 1950, still lamented that "eine Gesamtausgabe ... fehlt leider immer noch." At Vandoeuvres in 1965, the late Richard Walzer of Oxford was asked about "the present state of the work he had proposed with a view to publishing the fragments of Porphyry in their

entirety";¹² his response, unfortunately, is not recorded. E.R. Dodds reported (OCD² 865) that "a complete edition of the fragments by H. Dörrie is in preparation," but at Dörrie's death nothing had yet appeared.¹³ The latest scholar to announce in print his commitment to the project is Andrew Smith¹⁴ of Dublin.

As matters now stand, however, we possess no complete edition of Porphyry's surviving works and fragments. This entails an important consequence, all too often overlooked in the specialist literature. Pending the publication of such an edition, all assessments of Porphyry's thought -- its coherence, "originality," place in the history of philosophy and relevance, or lack of same, to current thought -- must be provisional.¹⁵ The details of his system must often be pieced together in more or less plausible reconstructions. More than in most others, in the field of Porphyrian studies caution must be the order of the day. Today's dogmatic assertion may be the laughing-stock of next month's philological journals. Throughout this paper, therefore, whenever a statement about the content, value or significance of Porphyry's thought is offered, the proviso "as far as we now know" is to be added if it is not explicitly stated.

The lack of an undisputed Porphyrian corpus is, then, a partial explanation of the contrasting estimations of Porphyry's thought at which modern scholars have arrived. Depending on what writings one accepts as genuinely "Porphyrian," and what ancient testimonies one regards as trustworthy, one can piece together wholly different pictures of Porphyry's writings and beliefs. Classical Studies are no more immune to shifts in methodological fashion and underlying philosophical presuppositions than

any other discipline, and just as in linguistics, political theory and contemporary philosophy, certain positivistic tendencies have become dominant in the English-speaking Academic world, so these same tendencies are apparent in Classical Studies. This "positivistic" approach consists in taking into account only such "evidence" as is solid, verifiable or otherwise "reliable"; it may be termed the "Just the facts, Ma'am" methodology, and tends to reject as "pure speculation" any assertions which cannot be "proved".¹⁶ For a doctrine to be ascribed to Porphyry, for example, it must either be explicitly and unambiguously stated in a work unanimously ascribed to Porphyry, or, more dubiously, must be deducible¹⁷ from such attested statements. This methodology tends to rely heavily on argumenta ex silentio: If an author does not mention a given doctrine in his extant works, then he probably did not hold it.

It can be seen that in a discipline such as Classics, where the vast majority of the relevant solid, documentary evidence is irreparably lost, the available quantity of data having the desired probative value is likely to be small. This is especially true in the case of an author like Porphyry, where, in addition to the usual losses of material wrought by the ravages of time, historical accidents (his opposition to Christianity, for instance, and the consequent burning of his books and hostility felt towards him by Christians, who, after all, accounted for most of the transmission of texts from Antiquity down to the Renaissance in the West) have still further reduced the proportion of his total output now available to us for study. If one thus reduces one's data base to eighteen or nineteen, out of a total of more than seventy, of Porphyry's works, it is easy to see how one could arrive at an image of Porphyry as an unoriginal,

pedantic commentator of Plotinus, Aristotle and Ptolemy, editor of Plotinus' Enneads, and author of a biography of his master. This is precisely the picture of Porphyry that emerges from most English-language reference works. The great E.R. Dodds, writing in the OCT² article cited above, for example, pronounces Porphyry "unoriginal and uncritical," adding that "as a thinker he is unimportant." In arriving at this appraisal, Dodds is but following the lead of Joseph Bidez, who sums up his judgment of Porphyry thus (1913, 132f.):

Porphyry's work reveals to us a genius victimized by its curiosity and spoiled by too much suppleness. This Syrian polygraph is one of those whose extreme ease in assimilating the ideas of others greatly diminishes their originality .. he had the quick and rapid mind of an excellent publicist, an alert pen, skillful scissors ... (but) in all that remains to us of his writings, there is not one thought, not one image which one can confidently affirm belongs to him.... A personality of this type cannot exercise a first-rate influence on the progress of thought ...

Most English-language encyclopedia articles present the same picture of Porphyry as derivative and uninteresting. The Encyclopedia Britannica's unsigned article on Porphyry in the 1962 edition¹⁸ (vol. 18, p.246) is a reprint of the 1910 article, unaltered except for the addition of one bibliographical item (dating from 1849!) and several silly spelling mistakes. It devotes a grand total of 17 lines to Porphyry, and his philosophical significance is stated to consist in his endeavour "to render the obscure doctrines of Plotinus ... intelligible to the average reader." We encounter this claim again and again¹⁹ in what I shall henceforth refer to, for convenience's sake, as the "positivistic" school of Porphyrian scholars; those, that is, who base their study of Porphyry on a (more or less careful) analysis of the traditional Porphyrian corpus.

It usually goes hand in hand with the claim that Porphyry, if he did not merely paraphrase the writings of Plotinus, certainly did not alter them to any significant degree.²⁰ Were these claims true, they would largely justify the treatment of Porphyry as a philosophical non-entity. But both views are, I believe, untenable.

The view of Porphyry as primarily a "populariser" goes back via Bidez (who harps repeatedly on Porphyry as "né vulgarisateur" 1913, 60; cf. 80; 106; 108; 121; 133), to a passage in the 5th-century historiographer Eunapius (reprinted in appendix in Bidez, 1319, 47*ff.), according to which Porphyry, τὸ φάρμακον τῆς σαφηνείας ἐπαυνέσας, (p.49*, 11f. Bidez), acted as a heaven-sent clarifier of the teachings of Plotinus:

For Plotinus, owing to the sublimity of his soul and the ambiguity and enigmatic nature of his words, came across as difficult and unpleasant to the ear, but Porphyry, like a kind of Chain of Hermes dangling down to mankind, expressed everything in a pure and easily intelligible way. (ὥπερ Ἑρμαϊκὴ τις σειρὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐπινεύουσα, πάντα εἰς τὸ εὖγνωστον καὶ καθαρόν ἐξήγγελλεν.²¹

Eunapius' testimony should be regarded with caution; writing a century after the fact, in an attempt to produce a pagan competitor to the Christian hagiographies, Eunapius "ne se fait pas scrupule de dénaturer comme à plaisir les détails qu'il rapporte" (Bidez, 1913, p.2). At any rate, this one passage seems a shaky foundation on which to base such a widespread topos, especially since it does not hold water when confronted with the facts. Porphyry is simply not, in his extant writings, a clearer or "easier" writer than Plotinus. The extreme density of his Sententiae has already been remarked upon, and the difficulty of the work is conceded even by some of the same scholars who elsewhere speak of Porphyry as a

"populariser".²² When the great Hellenist Festugière came to translate Porphyry's Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, he found Porphyry's style more difficult than that of Proclus, and was forced to confess "je ne suis pas sûr d'avoir partout bien compris ce texte."²³ Far from it being the case that "his simplification of his master's thought appealed to the practically-minded Romans' distrust of the subtleties of theoretical philosophy" (Wallis 1972, 96), it is much more likely that, as Courcelle suggests (1948², 394-395), Porphyry's thought gained more favour with the Romans than that of Iamblichus, Julian or Plotinus because of its unique mixture of philosophical and religious elements.

Nor is the often-held view that Porphyry plagiarises or only slightly modifies the thought of Plotinus tenable. As we shall see in the following two chapters, in which Porphyry's metaphysics and ethics are sketched, striking divergences from Plotinus are evident in Porphyry's thought, even if one restricts oneself, as do all the authors mentioned so far, to a study of the "traditional" Porphyrian corpus. To anticipate our conclusions, we will find that in ontology Porphyry devised a system at the same time more dynamic and monistic than that of Plotinus: monistic in the sense that, originally, all the hypostases were contained without differentiation in the One, but dynamic in the sense that Noûs and Soul subsequently unfold themselves from the One into autonomous existence, only to finally reintegrate themselves with it. We will also find Porphyry concerning himself more than his master with the fate of the common man;²⁴ this causes him to place greater emphasis on soteriology,²⁵ the finding of a means of post mortem salvation not just for philosophers, but for all mankind. To this end, Porphyry scrutinizes, much more than Plotinus, the

religions current in his time: traditional Greek mythology, Pythagoreanism, Christianity, Gnosticism, and, perhaps most intensely and influentially, that mixture of Middle Platonic cosmology and theurgical prescriptions contained in the Chaldaean Oracles.²⁶ Indeed, we shall find that the central preoccupation of Porphyry's thought -- and one which he transmitted to his Neoplatonic successors down to Damascius in the 6th century -- was to reconcile the doctrines of Plato's dialogues with those contained in the Oracles.

These final conclusions are largely the result of the researches of the "Continental" school of Porphyrian research, more specifically of the work of Pierre Hadot, his predecessors and colleagues (Theiler, Courcelle, etc., about whom more shortly). Those scholars who disregard the findings of this school, to whom we have referred as the "positivists", are forced to derive their picture of Porphyry's system from a few works -- the Sententiae, De abstinencia, De regressu animae, Ad Marcellam, Ad Anebonem, as well whatever fragments of his various Commentaries are preserved, in whole or in part, in later authors. A fair-minded appraisal of Porphyry's ethics can still be arrived at by using this approach; as an example we may choose F.H. Sandbach's article in the 1966 edition of Chambers' Encyclopedia (Vol. 11, 62). The author mentions Porphyry as "being more concerned with religion" than Plotinus, while according more importance to rationality than Iamblichus. Capitially, he draws on the Sententiae and the De Abstinencia to characterise Porphyry's central concern thus: "what he regards as of prime importance is to withdraw the soul from contact with the sensible world and turn it to the contemplation of intelligible reality" (loc. cit.). This is true, as far as it goes, and already points

to an important area in which Porphyry differs fundamentally from Plotinus: his emphasis on the importance of asceticism and purification; his clear distinction between the intelligible and material planes of reality and the necessity of detachment from the latter and conversion to the former if salvation -- the goal of all Porphyry's philosophy -- is to be achieved.

Not much progress is to be noted in the three major works on Porphyry in English to have appeared since Sandbach's article: A.C. Lloyd's section on "Porphyry and Iamblichus" in CHLGEMP (1967); the relevant sections of R.T. Wallis' Neoplatonism (1972), and Andrew Smith's Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (1974). All three authors restrict themselves to the traditional Porphyrian corpus (with the exception of Lloyd, whose heavy reliance on suspect sources, combined with a questionable methodology, has done much to cloud the issues of Porphyrian studies), and in consequence contribute little to modifying Bidez's portrait of a self-contradictory and unoriginal Porphyry mainly concerned to popularise, if not plagiarise, Plotinus.

Meanwhile, another group of scholars, not content with the meager results obtained by the study of the traditional Porphyrian corpus, undertook a bold reconstruction of his thought. Granted the mutilated state of Porphyry's legacy, and the fact that Christian authors, even if they wished to utilize his findings, could not have expressly quoted him by name, these scholars, mostly French and German, sought, by following strict methodological procedures, to discern Porphyrian doctrines in the writings of later authors. They arrived at the conclusion that not only did Porphyry have a fully developed ethical system, evident in his extant work (those,

that is, that current scholarly opinion agrees in ascribing to him), but also a fully developed metaphysical doctrine, demonstrably highly influential on the Latin Medieval West, and which exercised a not-yet-investigated, but probably equal influence on the philosophers, poets and theologians of Islam.

As long ago as 1933, Willy Theiler, having concluded from his researches that Porphyry was "the missing star in the constellation,"²⁷ the link explaining the transmission of ideas between Plotinus, Marius Victorinus and Augustine, formulated the following Arbeitssatz, or methodological principle:²⁸

If a piece of doctrine (Lehrstück) appears in a post-Plotinian Neoplatonist, which can be compared with a similar one in Augustine as regards content, form, and context, but does not occur -- or not to so great an extent -- in Plotinus, that piece of doctrine can be taken to be Porphyrian.

Armed with a methodological principle of such formidable range and power, Theiler proceeded, with almost overwhelming erudition, to ransack all of Augustine's opus, concluding that "almost everything philosophical in Augustine can be regarded as Porphyrian."²⁹ Nor did he stop there; some of the other authors his Arbeitssatz mandated him to search for Porphyrian Gedankengut were Proclus, Olympiodorus, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Hierocles, Aeneas of Gaza, Zacharias of Mytilene, Simplicius, Sallustius, Nemesis of Emesa, and, on the Latin side, Marius Victorinus, Macrobius, Boethius, Cassiodorus, Ambrosius, Martianus Capella and Firmicus Maternus.

Building on Theiler's conclusions (which he largely accepted, though finding he had sometimes taken them too far), the great Latinist Pierre Courcelle applied his profound knowledge of Late Antique civilization to amplify Theiler's results. In a work which remains unsurpassed, Courcelle

showed, by detailed philological analysis and comparison of texts, the extent of Porphyry's influence on Late Latin authors, concluding that he had exercised an unrivalled hold over Latin-speaking intellectuals from the 4th century on,³⁰ until, in the 9th century, Johannes Scotus Eriugena's translations of the pseudo-Dionysius re-introduced an Athenian-school variety of Neoplatonism ultimately deriving from Proclus.

The first Neoplatonic scholar to utilise these results in a well-respected reference source was no doubt Rudolf Beutler, in his important article on Porphyry written for the RE in 1953. Beutler's work is a landmark in Porphyrian studies, and still indispensable for the student of Porphyry, not only for his painstaking catalogue of Porphyry's works,³¹ but because Beutler, one of the very few critics not to treat Porphyry as a simple populariser of Plotinus, also gave a careful, detailed and thorough account of his thought. He too, however, restricted himself to a study of the traditional Porphyrian corpus -- he would not even concede that the Ad Gaurum was by Porphyry³² -- and as a result his overall picture of Porphyry's system ends up as a static, hierarchical structure. He drew many of his conclusions from a close analysis of the Sententiae (though the only text then available to him was the inferior one of B. Mommert), and, adhering to the traditional view of this work as a systematisation of Plotinus' teachings, departing from the latter only slightly,³³ he tended to present Porphyry's doctrines as rigidly dogmatic, whereas more recent research has shown his thought to be more pluralistic, dynamic and open to modification. For Beutler, then, everything in Porphyry's universe has its assigned place in a rigidly fixed Wertpyramide; everything is either valuable or damaging, according to its distance from the One, principle of

all things.³⁴ Sin, in this vertical scale of values, consists in an entity's directing its attention to the level of reality below it, thereby sinking to that level and disrupting the divinely-ordained order of things (Stufenreich).³⁵ Free will plays a decisive role: it is up to each soul, for example, to decide where it will direct its attention, whereupon it suffers the consequences of its choice: Elevation and eventual continuous bliss in the Noetic sphere, should it keep its attention directed to the Noûs, loss of rank and reincarnation at a lower level should it sinfully look to what is beneath it.³⁶

Thus Beutler was the first to point to the importance of some constantly recurrent Porphyrian themes: The importance of asceticism and of "returning into oneself" for salvation,³⁷ and the theoretical basis for this: since "in the realm of the Spirit knowledge and possession are identical"

durch sein γνῶσις erhält der Mensch ... sich selbst zurück (Col. 307). Besides stressing this vital function of self-knowledge in Porphyry,³⁸ he emphasised the important Porphyrian themes of the descent and nature of the soul;³⁹ the role of the pneuma or φαντασία both in psychology⁴⁰ and eschatology,⁴¹ and the difference between the "inner" and "outer" man.⁴² On the question of historical influence, Beutler echoed Courcelle's high estimate of Porphyry's significance: "ist die Wirkung von Porphyrios Philosophieren kaum hoch genug zu veranschlagen" (Col. 312).

Yet Beutler was troubled, like his predecessors, by Porphyry's apparent inconsequence and contradictoriness. He could see no solution but to have recourse to the hypothesis of "two Porphyries": when writing as an expositor of the Chaldaean Oracles, Beutler found, Porphyry equated his Highest Principle with the Πατήρ of the Chaldaean triad Πατήρ -

δὺναμις - νοῦς. When, however, Porphyry writes "in den Schriften zu Plotin" (i.e. in the Sententiae), he seems to place that same Highest Principle far higher than anything else, so that it is ineffable, inconceivable, indescribable and incapable of relation to anything else.⁴³

This seemingly insoluble contradiction, which had puzzled students of Porphyry since Antiquity, could not, in fact, be resolved as long as a purely static view was taken of Porphyry's system, and the dynamic, dialectic character of his thought remained unrecognized. This recognition, in turn, would have to await the researches of Pierre Hadot, and his proof of the ascription to Porphyry of the Turin Commentary on the Parmenides. First in an article appearing in 1961, and then, more extensively and to my mind conclusively, in Porphyre et Victorinus (1968), Hadot showed, by detailed comparison with doctrines preserved in Marius Victorinus, that this Commentary, previously described as anonymous or attributed to Plutarch of Athens, was indeed by Porphyry. The In Parmenidem contains a complete metaphysics, including developments on negative theology as a means of access to the One; on the One as the Idea or Form of Being; and on its equation with Existence, from which Life emerges by procession, and to which Intelligence (Noûs) returns by conversion. None of these ideas occurs in Plotinus, but they do, as Hadot has shown, in Marius Victorinus.⁴⁴

If the Commentary is indeed by Porphyry, it is no longer admissible to regard him as an unimportant, pedantic scrivener; he must be accorded his place as a creative metaphysician of the first importance. This much is conceded even by Positivistic writers like Lloyd, Wallis and Smith. These last-mentioned writers simply reply to Hadot's discoveries that "there is no proof," and continue to present the same hackneyed picture of

Porphyry as derivative and not very interesting. The present writer finds Hadot's arguments entirely convincing, and the following chapters, in which I sketch Porphyry's metaphysics and ethics, will take Hadot's attribution of the Comm. in Parm. as proven, and will rely heavily on the results of this fine scholar's research.

In response to the oft-repeated charge of Porphyry's "inconstancy" and "fluctuations," it is possible to maintain, with recent editors like Sodano and Bouffartigue,⁴⁵ that Porphyry went through a clear, traceable evolution in his thought, from the naïve acceptance of crude superstitions in the Philosophia ex oraculis, through the doubts expressed in the Letter to Anebo, to the mature systematisation of the De Abstinencia, Sententiae, and De Regressu animae. Given such an evolution, it becomes illegitimate to extract phrases from works pertaining to different phases of Porphyry's development, compare them, and point triumphantly to contradictions between them, without taking into account their context (which, due to the uncertainty of the chronology of Porphyry's writings, and their mutilated state, is not always easy to determine).

Alternatively, we may take the view that Porphyry approached each issue he dealt with in an entirely different way, conforming in this, according to some modern scholars,⁴⁶ to the practice of antique philosophy since Plato. Even Aristotle, that most "systematic" of thinkers, had no philosophical system,⁴⁷ according to this view. Rather, in each of his surviving works, he approached a particular problem with the methodology and from the point of view appropriate to that problem, and to it alone. The conclusions of these various separate investigations may or may not accord with one another in every detail; this was not Aristotle's concern.⁴⁸

Here again, Porphyry may have remained true to ancient practice, considering several different approaches to a given problem even within a single work, and rejecting nothing a priori. This method is the very antithesis of scholastic dogmatism, and we must question the adequacy of such characterizations of Porphyry as "the first Scholastic."

The final reproach often made against Porphyry, supposedly justifying his neglect, is his "unoriginality." We must again beware of anachronism in applying categories like these to the study of ancient thinkers. It could be argued that the very concept of "originality" is a quite recent invention, and that it would never have entered the mind of a Greek or Roman philosopher to ask himself, "Am I being original enough?" His primary concern would certainly have been: "Is what I am writing true or not?" By Porphyry's time, he may also have wondered -- and this question is fundamentally identical with the preceding -- "Does what I say accord with what Plato (and/or the Chaldaean Oracles) has said?" But that there was such a thing as "originality," and, if there was, that it was desirable, are concepts foreign to the intellectual climate of Porphyry and his contemporaries. As for the Classical Greeks, so for the Neoplatonists: νέος is a derogatory word when used to qualify an idea or doctrine, and rival thinkers, Pagan and Christian alike, outdid one another in attempting to prove their teaching was "more ancient" than that of their opponents. The further inference, that if it was more ancient it was more likely to be true, was so self-evident it did not need to be stated. A thinker in the pursuit of truth, such as Porphyry, would not hesitate to use whatever doctrines, from whatever source, he thought would approximate that truth, and he would likely only state his source, or acknowledge the fact that he

was quoting, in a polemical writing, or in order to back up a statement with an appeal to authority (which would be equivalent to proving the doctrine's antiquity). Porphyry's willingness to revise his own views in the light of criticism or new discoveries, his openness to consider and adopt viewpoints, whatever their origin, that might contribute to his search; in short, his readiness to admit he had been wrong, are qualities that bespeak intellectual courage and integrity. For Porphyry, every consideration -- including, ultimately, consistency -- is subordinate to his overriding concern: the quest for truth. Rather than classify this attitude as the sloppy syncretism characteristic of a degenerate epoch, we moderns would do well to emulate Porphyry's dedicated, disinterested search for truth, as an example of "doing philosophy" in the only true sense of the term.

Notes to Chapter II

1. By Festugière, Saffrey, Westerink, Segonds and others; see Bibliography of Ancient authors and, on the activity of the "chantier Proclus" in Paris in the 1950's and 1960's, supervised by Festugière, the "Preface" of Saffrey and Westerink to their edition of Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, vol. 5 (Paris 1987), pp.vii-viii.
2. To Des Places (1966) and Dillon (1973) one may add recent Teubner reprints of the De Vita Pythagorica, ed. L. Deubner; the Protrepticus, ed. H. Pistelli; De Communi Mathematica Scientia Liber, ed. N. Festa; In Nicomachi Arithmetica Introductionem Liber, ed. N. Festa; Theologoumena Arithmeticae, ed. V. De Falco.
3. To the editions listed in the Bibliography of Ancient Authors, add V. Cilento, Plotino, Enneadi, versione italiana e commentario critico, 3 vols. (Bari 1947-1949); R. Harder, R. Beutler and W. Theiler, Plotin's Schriften (Hamburg 1956-1971); P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini Opera (OCT) 3 vols. (1964-1978).
4. Edd. Nock and Festugière (Budé) 4 vols; (reprinted, 1972-1983).
5. Ed. Des Places (Budé 1971). See Annotated Bibliography.
6. Ed. Des Places (Budé 1973). See Annotated Bibliography.
7. Ed. Des Places (Budé 1977).
8. See Chapter 2, n.4, above.
9. On the flamboyant Taylor, see, with the literature cited in the Annotated Bibliography, G.M. Harper, The Neoplatonism of William Blake (Chapel Hill 1961) 17-33 and passim.
10. Bidez (1913) p.iv.
11. Cumont (1919) 117.
12. EH 12 (1966) 298.
13. It appears that the material Bidez had amassed came into the possession of Dörrie at the former's death. They may therefore be amongst the mass of papers that scholars at Münster plan to publish over the next few years as Dörrie's Nachlass (see Annotated Bibliography). My thanks go to M. Richard Goulet, of the CNRS in Paris, and to Herr Theodor Heinze of Münster, for this information.
14. Smith (1974), Preface.
15. Smith (1974), p.xii begins his study by enjoining caution in drawing

final conclusions about Porphyry, "because little is left of his massive output." As his work progresses, however, he seems to forget this caveat and ventures sweeping generalizations and judgments.

16. See, as an example, the judgement of Smith (1974) xii on Hadot's ascription of the Commentary on the Parmenides to Porphyry: "the arguments are persuasive and as certain as the evidence allows. But they are not absolutely certain." What kind of assertion, one wonders, besides logical tautologies, is ever "absolutely certain?" Is this not rather too strict a criterion to apply to the study of Antiquity?
17. This methodology lends itself easily to abuses, of which Dörrie (1959; 1966b) and Lloyd (1967) are among the most frequent practitioners. It consists of taking a piece of Porphyrian doctrine, usually out of context and often based on paraphrased and textually uncertain passages (Dörrie based himself largely on an antiquated text of Nemesius, who paraphrased freely; Lloyd often chooses his exempla from doxographic reports preserved by Porphyry's rival Iamblichus, often preserved only in textually corrupt passages in Stobaeus), and then arriving, via a series of more or less plausible inferences, at the desired conclusion. It is thus that these two authors concluded that Porphyry viewed the embodiment of soul as an illusion; that he "telescoped," or made no distinction between, the hypostases, and that he regarded the individual soul as impassible. None of these views occurs elsewhere in Porphyry or in reports about him, and indeed they are in direct conflict with the rest of his attested writings.
18. In the 1985 edition (vol. 26, p.616) we read with some astonishment of Porphyry's "On Abstinence (1965 translated by T. Taylor)." That Thomas Taylor, who flourished c.1830, should have been still translating in the 1960's is unlikely even for the energetic Taylor. The work in question is, of course, the pirated Centaur Press edition of Taylor's translation, which bears the copyright date 1965, and is the only widely available text of the work in English (the University of British Columbia, for example, possesses two very frequently used copies).
19. See Wallis (1972) 96; 111; Lloyd (1967) 283; Nilsson (1974³) 437.
20. Smith (1974) 19; cf. Beutler (1953) col. 302; 303.
21. Bidez (1913), p.49*, 12-17.
22. Lloyd (1967) 286; Wallis (1972) 98.
23. Festugière (1970) vol. 3, p.349 n.2.
24. Smith (1974) 21; Wallis (1972) 3; 108; Dörrie (1966b) 191.

25. Dörrie (1966b) 182.
26. Cf. Beutler (1953) col. 247. The fundamental work on the Oracles is Lewy (1978); see also Theiler (1942; = 1966, pp.252ff.; Wallis (1972) 105-106; Dillon (1877) 312-396. Hadot in Tardieu (1987) 13-34; and the editions cited in the Bibliography of Ancient Authors.
27. Theiler (1934) 495.
28. Theiler (1333) 4.
29. Theiler (1933) 3.
30. Courcelle (1948²) 394ff.
31. Beutler (1953) col. 278-301.
32. Beutler (1953) col. 290.
33. Beutler (1953) col. 302; 303.
34. Beutler (1953) col. 306; a thing's worth (ἀξία) is determined by its distance from the Highest Being (col. 305, following Theiler [1933] 11ff.).
35. Beutler (1953) col. 306; 308.
36. Beutler (1953) col. 306.
37. Beutler (1953) col. 307, citing Porphyry, Sententia 32.
38. Beutler (1953) col. 291; 312. In both the Περὶ τοῦ Γνωθὺ σαυτὸν and the Sententiae, self-knowledge is the first stage on the road to salvation.
39. Beutler (1953) col. 310.
40. Beutler (1953) col. 308-309; quoting Synesius, De insomniis 134A to 142D Terzaghi; Sententiae 36; 41; 5.
41. At death the πνεῦμα either drags the soul down to the Underworld (De Antro Nympharum p.64, 19ff. Nauck²), or, if it has been dried out by theurgical practices or, preferably, philosophical living, dissolves itself back into the planetary spheres whence it was collected. Porphyry in Proclus, In Timaeum 3, 234f. Diehl.; De Regressu Animae fragment 2, Bidez.
42. Beutler (1953) col. 311; 312, citing Sententia 32.
43. Beutler (1953) col. 297.
44. Hadot (1968a) passim; "Conversion" in (1977²) 181-182.

45. Sodano (1958) xxxv-xxxvi; Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) xxxviii: "L'évolution de la pensée porphyrienne a été cohérente."
46. In particular I. Düring, *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1966), quoted in Hadot, "Exercices spirituels," (1977², 64-66).
47. I. Düring, "Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz," in *Aristoteles in der neueren Forschung* (Darmstadt 1968), p.259 [quoted in Hadot 1977², p.65 n.166 "... der Gedanke, ein geschlossenes System zu erschaffen, hat ihm gewiss nicht einmal vorgeschwebt."]
48. "Chaque λόγος est un <<systeme>>, mais l'ensemble des λόγοι écrits par un auteur ne forme pas un système." Hadot (1977²) 64.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

Chapter III

The origin of all motivation is the movement of the Cosmos out of its state of nonexistence in which it was latently until its existence, it being, so to speak, a stirring from immobility. The movement that is the coming into existence of the Cosmos is a movement of love. This is shown by the Apostle of God in the saying, "I was an unknown treasure, and longed to be known," so that, but for this longing, the Cosmos would not have become manifest ... the Cosmos longs to behold itself in existence as it did in its latency, so that, in every respect, its movement from the latency of nonexistence into existence is a movement of love by the Reality and the Cosmos.

Muḥyī 'al-Dīn ibn 'al-'Arabī (c.1165-1240), Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, (trans. Austin [1980] p.257).

πότερον δύο εἰσὶν αἱ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ πρὸ τῆς νοητῆς πρώτης τριάδος, ἥ τε πάντη ἀρρητος καὶ ἡ ἀσύντακτος πρὸς τὴν τριάδα, καθάπερ ἡξίωσεν ὁ μέγας Ἰάμβλῖχος ... ἢ ὥς οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ἐδοκίμασαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀρρητον αἰτίαν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην τριάδα τῶν νοητῶν ἢ καὶ ταύτης ὑποβνσόμεθα τῆς ὑποθέσεως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Πορφύριον ἐροῦμεν τὴν μίαν τῶν πάντων ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα τῆς νοητῆς τριάδος;

Damascius, Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis, ed. Ch. Ruelle, §43, vol. 2, p.86, 3-10.¹

... are there, prior to the First Intelligible Triad, two first principles, viz., (first) the absolutely ineffable principle and (secondly) the principle which is not coordinated with the Triad, as the great Iamblichus esteemed? Or, as most of his successors believe, does only the first Triad of the Intelligibles come after the ineffable Cause? Or, finally, must we go beyond this hypothesis as well, and say along with Porphyry that the Father of the Intelligible Triad is the unique Principle of all things?

Damascius continues indignantly:

How could the uncoordinated, absolutely ineffable Cause be co-numerated with the Intelligibles and be called Father of the First Triad? For the Triad is only the summit of existants, whereas the ineffable Cause surpasses them all.²

What Damascius is complaining about here -- and he is not alone (see Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem 6, p.1070, 15 Cousin³) -- is that Porphyry, by identifying the Ground of all Being, the ineffable One, with the first term of the Intelligible Triad proclaimed in the Chaldaean Oracles (Πατὴρ, δύναμις, νοῦς; fr. 4 Des Places),⁴ has lowered its dignity. The One, protested Damascius, is beyond all human conception; we cannot ascribe to it any predicate at all (or, with equal justification, we can ascribe to it all predicates, even contradictory ones simultaneously).⁵ We cannot, however, ascribe to it a relation to anything else.⁶ The One is the ground or principle of all qualities and relations; its omnipotence cannot be circumscribed by any predicate, for all predication is limitation and circumscription⁷ (if I say the One is black, then it cannot be white. But there is nothing that it is not; it is the maximum of all qualities at the same time as it is the maximum of indetermination;⁸ in short it is the site of the coincidentia oppositorum).

What is more, Porphyry himself elsewhere insists on the absolute transcendence of the One. In his Philosophos Historia, fr. XVIII, p.15, 8-12 Nauck², he writes of the One:⁹

And just as the First God is always alone, although all beings come from him, because of his mode of existence he cannot be counted among them or coordinated with them insofar as his value is concerned ... (μὴ τοῦτοις συναριθμεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὴν ἀξίαν συνατατάττεσθαι τῷ ἐκείνου ὑπάρξει κτλ).

Moreover, the first part of Porphyry's Commentary on the Parmenides is a virtual text-book on negative theology, continually insisting on the One's lack of relation to anything else (cf. In Parmenidem III, 7; VI, 19). Here we would seem to have a flagrant example of that inconsistency

and self-contradictoriness with which critics both ancient and modern have charged Porphyry. There could hardly be a more fundamental point in a philosopher's system than his conception of the Principle of Principles; indeed, Pierre Hadot has gone so far as to write that "le problème fondamental de la métaphysique de Porphyre consiste dans l'opposition entre 'incoordonné' et 'coordonné'."¹⁰

Hadot's solution to the contradiction is that it is only apparent. Rather than giving two contradictory accounts of the same state of the same object, viz., the One, Porphyry is giving two viewpoints, or ways of considering the One, at two different stages in a process of development it undergoes. On the one hand, the One exists in a state of initial immobility, as pure being or existence (ὑπαρξίς);¹¹ at this stage it is absolute and uncoordinated with anything else, prior to any determination or qualification.¹² From this initial viewpoint, the Father can be considered the Form of Being. But it cannot stay in this state of complete isolation. In its pure simplicity, the One or the Father lacks self-consciousness, since no distinction between subject and object yet exists. In a sense it is an empty concept; a Platonic Form without anything "participating" in it. To attain consciousness of itself, and substantialisation, then, the One must unfold itself, develop its latent potentialities.¹³ Intelligence, existing in a latent state within the One, must emerge from its indistinction, "sortir de soi pour se connaître," according to the principle thus formulated by Hadot:¹⁴

... thought cannot apprehend Being immediately: it must emerge from it, distinguish itself from it, become Life and Otherness, in order to know it (i.e. Being) by returning to it.

From a second viewpoint, then, the Father -- the One or transcendent Being -- is in relation to something else; indeed it is identical with Intelligence in the first moment of its three-stage process,¹⁵ consisting of Existence, Life and Thought, of the "autoposition of the Intelligence."¹⁶

Intelligence, too, as Hadot remarks, can be regarded from two aspects: first, one in which it is still identical with the One, pre-existent and pre-eternal;¹⁷ secondly, it can be seen as passing from a state of non-manifestation to one of manifestation, of self-generation and -constitution.¹⁸ This movement of Intelligence away from its intuitive union with the One is one from unity to multiplicity, and is experienced as an abandonment of wholeness and an entry into Life, otherness and infinity, under the irresistible desire for self-expression.¹⁹ The Porphyrian Odyssey of the Intelligence resembles many an adolescent's life-story; abandonment of the comforts of the parental home under the imperative of the need to "find oneself," to "express" or "realise" oneself, followed by an experience of solitude, confusion and fear, as the recognition emerges that independence involves, along with freedom, dangers, hardships and painful separation. Nor would Porphyry, I feel, have found this parallel odd or unsettling: since Reality is one and each of its levels reflects all the others, there would be nothing surprising in the fact that pre-cosmic events involving metaphysical entities are mirrored by events in the lives of ordinary human beings.

At any rate, the wanderings of the Intelligence in this realm or stage of Life are finally brought to an end by Thought, a limiting, circumscribing force which induces Intelligence to undertake the return back

to integration with the One.²⁰ Having "become itself," through the experience of alienated wanderings in Life and otherness, Intelligence returns to the One. In so doing, it contributes to the latter not only its hard-won self-consciousness, but an actual increase in reality. The One, prior to the self-generation of the Intelligence, had been, as we have remarked, merely an empty Form. But the passage from its state of uncoordination to coordination is also a process of concretisation and particularisation: the Form "Horse" becomes in a sense more real, as well as more concrete and particular, when the individual horse "Mr. Ed" comes to participate in it. The unparticipated One was mere Existence; now, via the traumatic process of the self-generation and return of Intelligence, it has been given content. From Existence it has become Substance, endowed with the invaluable attribute of self-consciousness.²¹

The best summary of this difficult doctrine is provided by its discoverer, Pierre Hadot:²²

"coordinated" Being is derived from "uncoordinated" Being.... "coordinated" Being distinguishes itself by its own movement from "uncoordinated" Being, it comes out of the state of uncoordination and indetermination in which it finds itself at the origin, and enters into relation with itself ... this entering into relation with itself is nothing other than knowledge; it is realised in the movement of emerging from itself (*sortie de soi*) and of return to self which constitutes Intelligence.

These two characteristic Porphyrian tenets: (1) that the One is the same as the Father, and that (2) it is Being, containing within itself, in a latent unity, Life and Thought, are radical departures from anything Plotinus taught. Hadot, using a modified version of Theiler's Arbeitsatz, found the same schema in the Commentary on the Parmenides²³ and in

the Adversus Arianos²⁴ of Marius Victorinus Afer. In the systematisation of his results he published in 1968, Hadot described Porphyry's metaphysics as follows:²⁵

(the) substantialisation of the One takes place through a setting in motion (*mise en mouvement*), by an actualization which passes through three moments: rest, procession and conversion, or else existence, life and thought; the motive force of which is the desire of the Intelligence, still undistinguished (*confondue*) from Being, to see itself.

This triad of Being, Life and Thought, then, produces Universal Soul, in a manner similar to that by which a mirror reflects images of objects; the same procedure, in turn, accounts for the production of individual souls by the Universal Soul.²⁶ The triadic structure of the Intelligible World (Being, Life and Thought) is reflected in that Intellectual Triad which is the Universal Soul²⁷ (it is Intellectual -- νοερά -- rather than Intelligible -- νοητή -- because it is the subject of intellectual activity, specifically contemplation, whereas the νοητά are the proper objects of contemplation).²⁸ The now-independent Soul, having separated itself out from the Intellect just as the latter did from the One, continues to exercise the same functions of Being, Life, and Thought, only on a lower level corresponding to its diminished degree of reality. It is the universal Soul, then, which subsequently creates the inferior levels of reality, according to the direction of its attention.²⁹ It first engenders the level of reality consisting in "seulement intellectuels," or individual souls, and then goes on to create the levels of sensible, material reality.³⁰ Remaining immobile themselves, the divine realities produce the lower levels in the hierarchy of Being "en laissant se réaliser, par un acte dérivé, des reflets d'elles-mêmes."³¹ Every level of reality

(ὑπόστασις) pre-exists in the immediately superior level in a transcendent form, so that "la génération n'est ... que la manifestation d'une réalité préexistante, donc elle est une autogénération."³²

By the Universal Soul's directing its attention to different levels, then, we wind up with the following Porphyrian hierarchy of levels of Being, along with their designations in Marius Victorinus (Ad Candidum 6,5ff., vol. 1, p.138f. Henry/Hadot); in Proclus (In Timaeum vol. 1, 233; 2, 127, 33; 129, 5 Diehl), and in the discoverer of these parallels, Pierre Hadot.³³

Degress of Reality (beneath the One)	Victorinus	Proclus	Hadot
Intelligibles	quae vere sunt	ὄντως ὄντα	véritablement étants
Souls	quae sunt	ὄντα	étants
Phenomenal World	quae non vere non sunt	μὴ ὄντως μὴ ὄντα	non-véritable- ment non-étants
Matter	quae non sunt	μὴ ὄντα	non-étants

This scheme of reality bears little resemblance to Plotinus' teachings. For one thing, there can be no question for Plotinus of the pre-existence of diverse levels of reality in the One; the latter is absolutely one and simple, and produces further emanations by sheer superabundance of Power. For Plotinus it is rather the lower part of each hypostasis which produces, by its external activity, a shapeless mass of "spiritual matter," which then enforms itself by contemplating its generator.³⁴ Whereas for Porphyry the Highest Principle is Being or Existence itself, for Plotinus Being was identical with the Intelligible and therefore the Intellect, and consequently a potential object of knowledge, while the One, elevated

far above the Intellect, is accessible to human cognition only in rare and privileged moments of ecstasy.

One of the main points that divided Plotinus from his Middle Platonic predecessors was precisely the assertion of an ineffable One above the hypostasis of Intelligence. Porphyry, who had learned Middle Platonism from his Athenian master Longinus, required extensive and repeated convincing by Plotinus' senior disciple Amelius before he would accept this doctrine, when he first arrived as a prospective student at Rome. It is possible that he was never, in fact, quite convinced. Throughout his career, Porphyry was concerned to reconcile Plotinus' teachings with those of the Chaldaean Oracles, which proclaimed the co-extensiveness of the Father and his Powers; the solution he appears to have found was to look at Intelligence from different perspectives. From the Plotinian perspective, Intelligence can be considered, in its as-yet-unmanifest first moment, as identical with the One, and as such it is as sublime, transcendent and unapproachable as the most ardent negative theologian could wish to see it described. At the same time, however, viewed from the religio-philosophical perspective of the Chaldaean Oracles, Intelligence is that which unfolds itself into manifestation in the forms of Existence, Life and Thought.

Porphyry's successors, especially Iamblichus,³⁶ reacted strongly to his perceived diminution of the transcendence of the Highest Principle. They harped incessantly on its remoteness and elevation, finding themselves obliged, in consequence, to multiply intermediary levels of reality and divine entities, in order to ensure that some form of relationship remained possible between the sublime One and the phenomenal

world. This Iamblichean/Proclan version of Neoplatonism would triumph in the Eastern parts of the Roman Empire, where it survives in the liturgy and mystical theologies of the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches, and would resurface in the West in the 9th century, when the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius,³⁷ with their rank upon rank of Celestial Hierarchies, Christianized under the form of Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones, Powers and Dominions, became popular.

Porphiry's brand of Neoplatonism, representing as it did a branch between Plotinian rationalism and Chaldaean religiosity, was more appealing to the Latin-speaking West, where it held uncontested sway between the 4th and the 9th centuries. Easily adaptable due to its "perspectival" approach, moreover, it quickly caught on in the lands which were to become Islamic, where Porphyry's view according to which all reality could be viewed as the multi-staged manifestation of a single divine Reality was eminently suited to a strictly Monotheistic system of beliefs. Thus Porphyry, more perhaps than any other thinker, came to exercise a fundamental influence both on the Christian West and the Islamic East, and the study of his thought cannot help but contribute to an enriched understanding of both cultural traditions, seemingly so irreconcilably diverse.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Only the first volume of Damascius' On First Principles has so far appeared (see Bibliography of Ancient Authors), and it breaks off at 1.86. 2 Ruelle. Pending the imminent publication of Volume 2, then, we must rely on the text of Ch.-E. Ruelle, ed. Damascii successoris Dubitationes et Solutiones de primis principiis in Platonis Parmenidem, 2 vols. (Paris 1889-1899; reprinted, Brussels 1964). There is a new French translation by M.-Cl. Galpérine: Damascius Des Premiers Principes. Apories et résolutions (Paris 1987). On the passage cited, see Combès' and Westerink's Budé edition of vol. 1 (Paris 1986), p.137 n.3; p.173 n.2. For other translations of this passage see Hadot (1966) 132; (1968a) 1, p.96.
2. Translation after Hadot (1966) 136.
3. Quoted in Hadot (1966) 136.
4. On the importance of this fragment in Chaldaean and later Neoplatonic cosmology, see Dodds (1963²) 253; Lewy (1978) 78ff.; 79 n.47; Festugière (1966-1968), vol. 2, n.5 to pp.256-57.
5. In Sententia 28, p.17, 2-10 Lamberz, Porphyry intentionally applies contradictory epithets to spiritual entities, "afin de nous faire renoncer aux idées d'origine corporelle [Hadot (1966, 134)]. In the Commentary on the Parmenides 14, 26-29, vol. 2, p.113 Hadot (1968) Porphyry, following Plato, Parmenides 145b-146a, applies similar incompatible predicates to the Intelligence, as well as to the One (cf. I, 6; II, 10-14).
6. "Le Père, tout en étant le premier terme de la triade suprême, ne fait pas nombre avec elle, il n'y pas de συνάρσις parce que cette triade transcende le nombre" (Hadot 1968a, vol. 2, p.93 n.3).
7. Hadot (1968a) vol. 1, 280-281.
8. Hadot (1968a) vol. 1, 282.
9. Cf. Seconds (1982) p.144 n.5; 190 n.5, and n.6 above.
10. Hadot (1966), 131.
11. In this sense, ὑπαρξίς no longer has its usual meaning of "subsistence, existence, substance" (LSJ). It rather serves to designate "l'être pur, encore indéterminé, n'ayant pas encore reçu les déterminations qui constitueront sa substance" (Hadot 1968a, 1, 268ff., further literature cited p.489 and n.1). ὑπαρξίς will keep this technical sense right up to the 5th-6th centuries, with Proclus and Damascius [references in Hadot (1968a, 2, 267ff.)]. Following Hadot, I shall translate it as "existence."

12. Hadot (1966) 141.
13. "Cette simplicité première veut se déployer. Ce désir, cette volonté c'est ... l'épanchement de l'Un." (Hadot 1966, 142). This sexual imagery used to describe the desire of the Ultimate principle to create recurs constantly in the Fusus 'al-Ḥikâm of Ibn 'Arabî, who likens the whole process of creation to pregnancy and birth going so far as to speak of the "labour pains" of the Ultimate principle and its subsequent relief at creation; see Austin (1980) passim.
14. Hadot (1966) 137.
15. Hadot (1966) 144.
16. Hadot (1966) 142; 135-136.
17. Hadot (1966) 142. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology I, 11, vol. 2, p.51, 4-8 Saffrey and Westerink; cited in Hadot (1961) 424 n.72; (1966) 145-146: "Porphyry, in his turn, following Plotinus, states by numerous excellent arguments in his On First Principles (ἐν τῇ Περὶ ἀρχῶν πραγματείᾳ) that the Intelligence is eternal and that nevertheless it also possesses within itself something pre-eternal (ἔχειν δὲ ὅμως ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ προαιώνιον τι).
18. On the concept of self-constitution see Whittaker in EH 12 (1975).
19. Hadot (1966) 141.
20. Hadot (1966) 140.
21. Hadot (1968a) 224; 269-270.
22. Hadot (1966) 154-155.
23. In Parmenidem XIV, 16-26 = Hadot (1968a) vol. 2, pp.111-112.
24. Adversus Arianos I, 57, 9ff., quoted in Hadot (1966) 136.
25. Hadot (1968a) 1, 274.
26. Hadot (1968a) 2, 196; 333.
27. Hadot (1968a) 1, 338.
28. On the νοερά - νοητά distinction see Hadot (1968a) 1, pp.99ff.; Festugière, Rév. 3, p.56 n.3; 4, p.113 n.3.
29. Hadot (1968a) 1, 196.
30. Hadot (1968a) 1, 190ff.

31. Hadot (1968a) 1, 341.
32. Hadot (1968a) 1, 484-485.
33. Hadot (1968a) 2, 148.
34. Smith (1974) pp.9ff.
35. Hadot (1968a) 1, 482-483.
36. On Iamblichus' multi-tiered hierarchy of reality, and his utilization of the Chaldaean Oracles, see Dillon (1973) 26-53; Hadot (1968a) 1, 95-97.
37. On the Pseudo-Dionysius, see I.P. Sheldon-Williams' contribution to the CHLGEMP, 457-472; and Bibliography p.685. Dionysius' complete works are now available in English translation, with important introductory material by P. Rorem, R. Roques, J. Pelikan, J. Leclercq and K. Froehlich: Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York 1987). Contains useful bibliography pp.291-293.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

Chapter IV

Hoch auf strebte mein Geist, aber die Liebe zog
 Schön ihn nieder; das Laid beugt ihn gewaltiger;
 So durchlauf ich des Lebens
 Bogen und kehre, woher ich kam.

High my spirit aspired, truly, however, love
 Pulled it earthward; and grief still lower bows it down.
 So I follow the arc of
 Life and return to my starting-place.

...Hölderlin, "Lebenslauf"¹

O falcon of lofty vision
 Sitting on the sidra-tree
 Not thy nest is this corner of the world
 Full of woe.
 From highest heaven's pinnacle
 They utter a cry for thee
 In this snared place.
 I know not what hath befallen thee
 That with it thou art fascinated.

...Shams al-Dīn Ḥāfiẓ Shīrāzī
 (c.1325-1389).²

Ἐοίκαμεν γὰρ τοῖς εἰς ἀλλόφυλον ἔθνος ἥ ἀκοῦσιν ἢ ἐκοῦσιν
 ἀπεληλυθόσι καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶν οἰκείων ἐξοριστοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐκ τῆς ξένης ἐμπληθεῖσι παθῶν τε καὶ ἐθῶν καὶ νομίμων
 ἐκφύλων καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ῥοπὴν ἐσχηκόσιν.

We are like people who have emigrated to an alien land,
 willingly or unwillingly; not only have we been banned
 from our own homes and possessions, but, under the in-
 fluence of this foreign land, we have become filled with
 alien passions, ways and customs, and have taken a
 liking to them.

...Porphyry, De Abstinencia, 1, 30, 2.³

At least since Plato's Phaedrus, thinkers in the Platonic tradition
 had taken the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul for granted. A
 main source of the Neoplatonist's disagreement with Christianity was that
 the latter, while admitting an unlimited duration of the disembodied soul

after death, would not allow its existence prior to incarnation.⁴ For the Neoplatonists, the question was not whether, but how and why the individual soul left the Intelligible world for existence in a material world they regarded as, if not positively evil, certainly a far cry from the beauty and perfection of the Neotic world. For the Gnostics the solution was simple: Incarnation was an unmitigated evil, the work of a malevolent demiurge or the result of a series of tragic sins and errors in the supra-celestial pleroma of mythological figures. For Neoplatonists, wishing as they did to preserve the belief in a benevolent and omniscient Providence, the question was more difficult: How could a good and all-powerful God permit such an apparent evil as the soul's incarnation? As Jalâl'ûd-Dîn Rûmî (1207-1273) has the "Ambassador of Rûm" ask the Kaliph 'Omar:

O Commander of the faithful, how did the soul come down
to the earth from above?
How can so noble a bird be confined in a cage?⁵

Porphyry's doctrine of the soul has been perhaps the most widely influential aspect of his philosophy. It is also one of the most debated points in contemporary Porphyrian research. Different scholars present, with equal authoritativeness, accounts of Porphyry's doctrine of the soul which are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. For H. Dörrie, Porphyry teaches that the soul, being an immutable νοητὴ οὐσία,⁶ cannot be in any way damaged or altered in its embodied state. It then becomes incomprehensible that Porphyry should have written his longest extant work, the De Abstinentia, precisely to warn against the eating of meat because of the harm it does to the soul. A.C. Lloyd comes to a still more paradoxical conclusion. Porphyry, he finds, "regarded the embodiment of soul as an illusion of thought."⁷ Space precludes an extensive discussion of Lloyd's

argument, as well of his article as a whole, which, appearing in such an authoritative work of reference as the CHLGEMP, is one of the few standard sources to which the English-speaking student curious about Porphyry would turn. Here it must suffice to say that it is inadequate and misleading, consisting of a series of discussions of arbitrarily-chosen aspects of Porphyry's thought, in which, by a series of dubious inferences from obscure, often textually corrupt and frequently utterly irrelevant texts (few by Porphyry himself) Lloyd arrives at a picture of Porphyry's thought which -- where it is not incomprehensible -- is distorted beyond recognition.⁸

Wallis, normally a sober and sympathetic analyst of Porphyry's thought, becomes oddly vague and difficult when attempting to defend Lloyd's view of the embodiment of soul as an illusion of thought.⁹ His argument, as best I can follow it, runs like this:

1. Soul has kinship with the Intelligible world.
2. Therefore, union with the body is a mistake.
3. Dualism is unacceptable to Neoplatonists.
4. Therefore, the lower levels of existence are mere illusion.

This argument would be admissible only if 1, 2, and 3, besides being true, added up to a contradiction which required 4 to resolve it. But this is not the case. 2 does not follow from 1, and is simply not true; nowhere does Porphyry state it, and there is no reason to believe he may have done so in some lost writing. Without premise no. 2, Wallis' argument collapses, and it will be up to someone else to undertake the Quixotic task of defending Lloyd's odd assertions.

Not that the matter is simple; the question of the causes of the

soul's incarnation is a difficult one, which Dörrie¹⁰ once considered insoluble: he wrote,

In the final analysis, it cannot be explained what exactly caused the soul to forsake its individuality -- τὸ καθ' ἑαυτήν -- and to venture into the state of relationship to a body -- σχέσις -- which poses such a danger to it.

It is more likely the case that Porphyry proposed several different answers to the problem, which may or may not be ultimately reconcilable.

The best solution seems to be that suggested by Andrew Smith:¹¹ the first descent of the soul from the celestial regions into the body is inevitable, because willed by God. From then on, however, depending on the person's behaviour during this first incarnation, it may either return to celestial beatitude, or be sent back down to earth for a further incarnate existence.¹² The deciding factor is the individual's behaviour: whether, during his terrestrial existence, he has more or less continuous regard for the Intelligible realm, or whether, seduced by the false charms of matter,¹³ his soul becomes so engrossed in material life as to forget its celestial origin. It then is guilty of breaking the universal law that a hypostasis -- in this case Soul, must have regard only to the level of reality above it -- i.e. Noûs, but never to the one below it (i.e.) matter.¹⁴ Should the soul, in the exercise of its free will, choose to break this law, it cannot expect to escape paying the penalty of a reincarnation lower down on the Scale of Being (one of the expressions recurring most frequently in Porphyry is δίκην ἀποτίνυσθαι).¹⁵

Porphyry seems to have given different reasons for the divine decision to ordain the soul's first descent.¹⁶

1. In the De Regressu animae, frr. 39*, 4 and 41*, 2 Bidez, the soul

is said to have been sent into this world so that it might have the salutary and edifying experience of contact with evil and matter, which often seem for Porphyry, as they were for the Middle Platonists, to be virtually the same thing.¹⁷

2. In the *Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν* (apud Stobaeus vol. 2, 167, 20ff. Wachsmuth), the soul, prior to incarnation, freely chooses the type of existence it wishes to lead, but is subsequently forced to live out that life with the body and character appropriate to its initial choice. These accounts, together with two others which Bouffartigue and Patillon adduce, but which I have not reproduced because they are based on textually dubious passages, seem reconcilable with Smith's reconstruction. The soul originally inhabits the realm of Forms. By divine Providence it is thence dispatched to Earth, partly because, in accordance with standard Platonic doctrine (cf. *Phaedr.* 246c; *Soph.* 246eff.), all matter needs a soul to animate it, govern it and enable it to move itself; partly, or viewed from another perspective, because it is an educative and perhaps corrective experience for the soul.

In the *Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*,¹⁸ the process is described by which the soul makes its choice of its first terrestrial existence. From its dwelling-place in the Heaven of the Fixed Stars, the soul chooses one of the constellations which the revolving heavens constantly present it. It moves to the constellation it has chosen, and from this vantage point the soul sees the different *βίαι*, or types of existence it has the possibility of leading, inscribed on the sky. It selects one, thereby committing itself to a particular body and character, and, waiting for its horoscope to indicate to it the correct moment, plunges itself into the world of

generation through the gate of the constellation of Cancer (it will use the gate of Capricorn to re-ascend). Now begins for the soul its downward journey, through the spheres of the seven planets, towards Matter and embodiment.

Here we encounter the Neoplatonic concept of the astral body (πνεῦμα or ὄχημα), which plays so central a role in Neoplatonic anthropology.¹⁹ It was a Platonic school-truism that two entities so different as incorporeal soul and material body could not possibly exercise any action upon one another. Since Aristotle, the existence of a fifth element, besides the traditional earth, air, fire, and water, had been postulated, and by the 1st century BCE, the πνεῦμα/ὄχημα, a tertium quid composed of this substance and possessing both material and immaterial qualities, had been assumed to act as intermediary between soul and body. For Porphyry (apud Proclus In Remp. 3.192.22ff. Diels) the World Soul had an ὄχημα of luminous substance, which had been the first entity to come into existence. And just as the World Soul needed an intermediary medium to impart motion to the κόσμος, so too did the individual or partial (μερική) soul.²⁰

The topos of the descent of the soul was well-established by Porphyry's time; it went back at least to Numenius if not to Antiochus of Ascalon and Posidonius. In Porphyry's version,²¹ the soul in its descent must pass through the seven planetary spheres, before it reaches Earth. As it does so, its ὄχημα, originally of the same substance (although "plus grossière et moins subtile"),²² as the ὄχημα of the World Soul, progressively accumulates elements from each of the spheres, causing it to become heavier and more moist. For example, from the sphere of Mars there accrues to the soul its irascible element; from the sphere of Venus its concupis-

cent element, etc. By the time it reaches the earth, the soul's primordial purity has been obfuscated by layer upon layer of these astral accretions and excrescences, until it all but loses its identity.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Pierre Hadot has arrived at a seemingly different picture of the soul's descent. Once the World Soul has been derived, by way of reflection, from the Intelligence, it may descend to the point of creating the sphere of the Fixed Stars.²³ This is as it should be; up to this point the notions of moral choice or culpability do not seem to come into play. But unlike other hypostases, the soul has the freedom to direct its attention (προσοχή) wherever it pleases, and this is a moral choice. For Porphyry, as for Plotinus, the direction of the attention is creative. The World-Soul, for example, when it first detaches itself from its original intuitive unity with the Noûs, creates the Intellectual-and-Intelligible level of reality to which it then descends.²⁴ Moreover, once it has fulfilled its mission of creating the celestial sphere, the soul can and should return to the Intelligible realm from which it came. Being endowed with free will, however, the soul can also make the blameworthy moral choice of looking below itself to an inferior level of reality, that of the material world. When it does so, it may be seized by a desire to descend to this world and communicate life to it.²⁶ The danger here is that the soul may be seduced by matter to the point of forgetting its celestial origin. Should this happen, its only hope is the spark of Intelligence (σπίνηρ νοῦ Synesius Hymn 1, 561, p.57 Lacombrade) which the soul took with it when it separated itself from the Intelligible world. For the soul to be saved, it must be awakened from its forgetful slumber, reminded of its celestial origins and thereby freed from the

loathsome swamp of matter. The spark of Noûs, incorruptible beneath its many layers of alien accretions, must be made to blaze up (elsewhere it is pictured as a seed which must be allowed to sprout and grow). According to Hadot, then, it is the soul's pre-ordained descent to create the celestial sphere which is "natural," "une épreuve et surtout une mission et un service,"²⁷ while the real fall -- the one freely chosen and hence culpable -- is that in which the soul continues its descent to the material world. This second fall is brought about by the dizziness and "fougue indiscrete" which the soul experiences upon glimpsing matter, here, as often in Middle Platonism, conceived of as a semi-independent entity, thoroughly evil, but endowed with seductive charms and the power to give off exhalations which cause the soul to forget its origin.

Rather than two irreconcilable accounts of Porphyry's thought, we may here have a prime instance of what has been referred to as Porphyry's "perspectivism." From one point of view, the World-Soul's detachment from its intuitive unity with the Noûs and its subsequent disaggregation into the multitude of individual souls, is "its fault"; brought about by its illegitimate direction of its attention and by its desire "to be itself, in itself."²⁸ From another viewpoint the process is inevitable and even desirable: The World-Soul's emergence from the Noûs is a necessary stage in the self-manifestation of the One, whereby It attains self-consciousness.²⁹ Moreover, other modern scholars have reconstructed different amounts of Porphyry's doctrine of the soul, and it is entirely likely that Porphyry himself expressed conflicting views in different parts of his opus. But this method may not have seemed as perplexing or objectionable to Porphyry as it does to many modern readers. In Hadot's terms, Porphyry's method

is "pluraliste":³⁰

... it studies each portion of the text it is commenting and deals with it on its own, without seeking to unify its interpretation; it proposes several explanations of one single text, without aspiring to coherence.

Hadot is here speaking about Porphyry's activity as a commentator, but the observation applies, I believe, to all his philosophic/literary activity.

Such a stance is, of course, anathema to modern positivists, for whom every statement is either "true" or "false"; every interpretation "the correct one" or "incorrect." Yet some modern philosophers, referred to by their opponents as "relativists," have advocated a remarkably similar "pluralistic methodology," having as its goal just such a proliferation of seemingly contradictory viewpoints.³¹ Here again, as with his textual criticism of Christianity, Porphyry may yet turn out to have used a methodology about 1700 years ahead of its time.

To return to Porphyry's Seelenlehre: when, from its supracelestial vantage point, the soul sees pass before it a "horoscope of conception,"³² the soul, already encrusted in its "abominables excroissances"³³ comes instantaneously to animate a body. As Porphyry describes the process in the Ad Gaurum,³⁴ this pneumatic soul comes to lodge itself in the body of the foetus once the latter has separated itself from its mother's body (the soul together with its ὄχημα is variously designated by Porphyry as the "pneumatic," "irrational," "lower" or "inferior" soul; after its embodiment, it may properly be termed the "vegetative" soul (Aristotle's θρεπτικὸς νοῦς; De Anima 2.2.413b etc.), in accordance with the function it will fulfill in the newly-constituted soul-body compound we call

a "person"). The body, in turn, has attracted to itself its particular soul as the one best suited to its stage of development. Just as the soul and its ὄχημα are united by a kind of sympathy or pre-ordained harmony, so does this harmony obtain between body and soul. "It is by virtue of an affinity (κατὰ συγγένειαν φύσεως)," says Porphyry (Ad Gaurum ll. 2, 48. 29-49, 2 Kalbfleisch), "that the body predisposed to be directed by a soul attracts the soul to the body thus predisposed" (... τὸ ἀρμοσθέν πρὸς ψυχῆς κυβέρνησιν τὴν ἐπιτηδεύσαν ψυχὴν τῷ ἀρμοσθέντι [sc. ἔλκει]). Similarly, by virtue of this same harmony, the now-embodied vegetative soul attracts (ἔλκει) the appropriate "logical soul" -- the divine spark of Noûs -- willingly to enter into it as its "pilot" (κυβερνήτης).

Once the soul has thus become embodied -- it should be kept in mind that the entire process just described takes place "instantaneously" (ἐξαίφνης ἡ παρουσία Porphyry Ad Gaurum 3, p.49, 9f. Kalbfleisch) -- the soul remains in some sense joined to the body until the natural death of the organism. The exact nature of this connection has been, however, a subject for prolonged debate among scholars. As indicated above, Heinrich Dörrie was the most influential advocate of the view of Porphyry as holding an "extremistische Seelenlehre."³⁵ Basing his conclusions on his reconstruction of Porphyry's Σύμμικτα ζητήματα from fragments and paraphrases culled from Nemesios of Emesa (fl. 400) and Priscianus (early 6th cent.), he presented his portrait of Porphyry's doctrine of the soul in a series of books and articles, most influentially in 1959's Porphyrios' Summikta Zetemata and his 1966 presentation at Vandoeuvres, "Die Lehre von der Seele." Here we learn that Porphyry made practically no distinction between Noûs and Soul,³⁶ that the soul, being a νοητὴ οὐσία, cannot possibly

be affected by what happens to the body ("jedes In-Mitleidenschaft-Gezogen-Sein der Seele ausgeschlossen wird";³⁷ and, perhaps most astonishingly, that all perception is self-perception on the part of the soul³⁸ (these ideas are perhaps at the origin of Lloyd's even more radical conclusions as to the "telescoping of hypostases" and "illusory" nature of the embodiment of soul).

We have alluded to the contradictions this interpretation of Porphyry's thought involves: The same thinker who preaches the soul's impassibility writes, in the De Abstinentia, some of the most appalling portraits of the soul's depraved condition when man gives in to moral excesses and vices. Dörrie³⁹ attributes this "aufällige Diskrepanz" to the conflict between theory and practice: As a theoretician, Porphyry wishes to preach the identity of the One, Noûs, and Soul, and the impassibility he believes is entailed by this view. When he looks at lived practice, though, Porphyry is led to prescribe the strictest adherence to ascetic/cathartic practices as the only hope for the soul's salvation.

It is more likely, however, that the inconsistency is attributable to Dörrie than to Porphyry.⁴⁰ Refusing to accept Hadot's ascription of the Commentary on the Parmenides, Dörrie is left with the hierarchical, dualistic view of Porphyry's thought bequeathed by Beutler's researches. Thus, although he insists on the importance of viewing Porphyry's system as dynamic, he arrives at the same static results as had Beutler. By failing to recognize that Porphyry is describing different stages in the dialectical development of the same entity -- in this case the soul -- rather than giving contradictory accounts of a self-identical object, Dörrie fails to take into account the fundamental distinction he

himself emphasized, between the soul καθ' ἑαυτήν and the soul in σχέσις.

In the former state, it is indeed a pure noetic essence, to which the categories of space and time do not apply, and which is unalterable.

Once, however, it enters the world of generation, it undergoes the process of envelopment by the ὄχημα we have described above, and due to this ὄχημα, point of contact between corporeal and incorporeal nature, the embodied soul cannot by any stretch of the imagination be said to be impassible. Dörrie's argument may be schematized as follows:⁴¹

1. Soul embraces (umfasst) all beings.
2. Therefore, soul embraces Reality.
3. Reality is unchanging.
4. Therefore, Soul's knowledge of Reality is unchanging.
5. Hence the soul is unchangeable.

This argument falls flat, because 3 is false. As Dörrie himself elsewhere emphasizes,⁴² for Porphyry

... in allem und jedem die Entfaltung des Einen zum
Vielen, oder umgekehrt die Einung des Vielen vor
sich geht.

Reality is not unchanging for Porphyry; this view of the Porphyrian universe as a static hierarchy has been rendered obsolete by Hadot's proof of its complex, constantly dynamic and dialectic structure.

Dörrie's contribution to the advancement of Porphyrian studies was far from entirely negative. He made essential advances over his predecessors in his studies of Porphyry's ethics and psychology. His view of the nature of the soul's connection to body as one of σχέσις, relation or "inclination towards," is important, and borne out by Hadot's researches. The soul, by its own freely-willed choice, permeates the entire body in a

mixture which is neither παράθεσις, the mere juxtaposition of elements, nor σύγχυσις, the inseparable fusion of parts. Rather it is implicated in a mixture that combines the separability of παράθεσις with the thorough intermingling of σύγχυσις (we are here in the presence of another instance where Porphyry has taken categories from Stoic physics and applied them to the metaphysical domain).⁴³ Dörrie also rightly stressed Porphyry's closeness to Middle Platonism.⁴⁴ Most importantly, he stressed the importance for Porphyry's ethics of self-knowledge, the withdrawal into oneself to contact the deeply-buried kernel of divine Intelligence which constitutes our real Self, and the necessity to maintain a strict asceticism -- abstinence from consumption of meat and wine, as far as possible from sex, and even from attendance at public games. All Porphyry's ethical injunctions are aimed at restricting to an absolute minimum our contact with matter, portrayed as a πορνή anxious to seduce us into forgetting our supracelestial origins.

From another perspective, Porphyry's ethical exhortations have as their goal the proper care and tending of our ὄχημα/πνεῦμα. This πνεῦμα, which during our incarnate life plays the psychological role of imagination, indispensable intermediary between the corporeal and incorporeal which accompanies all our thoughts, remains as an outer coating of the soul throughout our life.⁴⁵ This πνεῦμα, constituted of a half-corporeal, half-incorporeal substance, is variable in volume. Any thought showing concern for matter, whether sexual titillation, greed, anger or fear; anything leading to the excitement and stimulation of the senses, is susceptible of thickening our πνεῦμα,⁴⁶ rendering it still heavier and more moist, while a life of asceticism can "dry it out" (Sent. 29, p.20, 4;

6. Lamberz), reduce its volume and make it lighter. Upon the death of the organism, when the soul leaves the body it is still encased in its πνεῦμα. If it has led a moral life -- consorting with the Intelligibles by withdrawing into itself, there to seek the spark of divine Noûs; striving to bring its spiritual members back from their current state of dispersion throughout the body to its previous unity (Ad Marcellam 10), maintaining an ascetic dietary regime and paying a homage of pure thoughts and prayers to the Intelligible God, its πνεῦμα will be sufficiently light and dry to allow it to ascend immediately back to the Intelligible world, shedding each layer of pneumatic/astral accretions as it arrives at the planetary sphere where it first gathered them up (Proclus In Timaeum 3.234.20ff. Diehl). These accretions will dissolve back into the elements from which they were constituted, and the soul, reduced now to its primordial purity, will enjoy an uninterrupted beatific communing with its fellow noetic essences, never more to be forced to undergo the traumatic process of incarnation.

If, however, the soul's πνεῦμα is wet and heavy upon the former's separation from the body, its weight will tend to drag it, together with its soul, down to the subterranean regions. Alternatively, depending on the extent of the perversity of its earthly existence, the soul may be given a sun- or moon-shaped ὄχημα.⁴⁷ In any case the impure soul is doomed to reincarnation, and an indefinite postponement of the goal to which all Porphyry's philosophy is designed to exhort mankind: "eternal life in the world which is akin to us," where the distinction between subject and object has vanished, and where "rien ne pourra plus interrompre l'union avec Dieu."⁴⁸

To obtain this blissful homecoming after our long terrestrial exile, writes Porphyry (De Abstinencia 1. 30. 4-6; vol. 1, p.65 Bouffartigue and Patillon): "We must accomplish two distinct exercises.... First, we must abandon everything that is material and mortal. Secondly, we must try to accomplish our return and our survival, by elevating ourselves to the upper world by a movement in the opposite direction to that of our descent."

Notes to Chapter IV

1. Translation by Hamburger (1966) 43.
2. Unpublished translation from the Persian by Dev Prakash.
3. Bouffartigue and Patillon, vol. 1 (1977) p.64. The τόπος of the soul's fall from the Intelligible world into the material world of generation and corruption (τὸ εἰς γένεσιν πτώμα Porphyry Ad Marcellam 5, p.107, 7 Des Places [1982]; cf. 6, p.108, 1-21); its subsequent seduction by matter and forgetting of its celestial origins (Ψυγμοῦ τε πλήρους ὄντος τοῦ τόπου, ἐν ᾧ διατρίβομεν ... καὶ πρὸς καρηβαρίαν καὶ λήθην πάντας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καθελκουσῶν ἀναθυμιάσεων. De Abstinencia 1, 28, 2; vol. 1, p.64 Bouffartigue and Patillon [1977]) was widespread in Porphyry's day. It occurs in the Corpus Hermeticum, Traité 1, vol. 1, pp.7-19 Nock and Festugière (1972³), in the Gnostic "Hymn of the Pearl" (= Acta Thomae 108ff., in M.R. James, ed., The Apocryphal New Testament [Oxford 1926] pp.411-415). The theme generally includes the reawakening of the oblivious soul by a celestial messenger, who persuades it to return to the noetic world; in this version the story forms the central theme of Valentinian, Manichaeic and Mandaean gnosis: see H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston 1967) passim; H. Corbin, 1'Archange Empourpré (Paris 1976) 267-268. In Greek thought its origin may be traced from Heraclitus (frr. 75:89 DK) through Plotinus (Ennead I, 6, 8, 16ff.) and Porphyry (to references cited above add Sententia 29, p.17, 11-20, 6 Lamberz [1975]; De Abstinencia III, 27, 5 = [Bouffartigue and Patillon, vol. 2 [1979] p. 190). Finally, the τόπος is widespread in esoteric Islamic thought; see Ibn Sînâ, "The Tale of Ḥayy ibn Yaqzân" in H. Corbin, Avicenne et le Récit visionnaire² (Paris 1979); Sohravardî, "Le récit de l'exil occidental," in 1'Archange empourpré, cited above, pp.265-287. Porphyry is likely to have adapted the theme from the Gnostic-Hermetic milieu which were flourishing in his day, and he may well have been an important link in its transmission to later Islamic Persian authors such as Ḥafiz, Ibn Sînâ and Sohravardî.
4. Many early Christians did allow for the soul's pre-existence, but were viewed with suspicion by the Church. The doctrine was eventually tagged as Origenism -- the great Alexandrian contemporary of Plotinus and Porphyry had maintained it -- and declared heretical at the Council of Constantinople in 553 (Wallis [1972] 104-5). On Origen's beliefs see H. Chadwick in the CHLGEMP, 190-191. The ancient debate still arouses strong feelings: J. Quasten in Patrology vol. 2 (1953) 42 laments that "Origen made the mistake of letting the philosophy of Plato influence his theology.... This led him to very serious dogmatic errors, especially the doctrine of the pre-existence of the human soul." See the same author's The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. Vol. 2: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (Chicago and London 1971) 337-338. For an excellent survey of Pagan Greek views on the problem see Rév, 3, 77ff.

5. The Mathnawi of Jalâlû'ddîn Rûmî, ed. and trans. R.A. Nicholson, Vol. 2 (London, 1926; reprinted, 1977) p.80, LL. 1146ff.
6. Dörrie (1966b) 177; 178; 182; 186.
7. Lloyd (1967) 288; article "Porphyry" (1967) 411-412.
8. See the pertinent objections of Smith (1974) 47 and n.10; 145-146. See Annotated Bibliography.
9. Wallis (1972) 112.
10. Dörrie (1966b) 180.
11. Smith (1974) 30; 35; 39.
12. Smith (1974) 38 sees in Porphyry's emphasis on the possibility of permanent escape from the cycle of reincarnations one of the points where his differences with Plotinus are most marked.
13. On the seduction of soul by matter see, with Dörrie (1966b) 180; Hadot (1968a) 1, 186; Smith (1974) 37, Synesius Hymn 1.572., p.57 Lacombrade; De Insomniis p.154ff. Terzaghi; Porphyry De Abstinencia 4, 18; Theiler (1942, p.32 = 1966, p.284); Lewy (1978) 188-190, notes 45-49.
14. On this law, formulated by Porphyry in Sententia 30, see Beutler (1953) col. 306; Dörrie (1966b) 185.
15. Sententia 40, p.51, 8-9 Lamberz; De Abstinencia 2.46 (= Bouffartigue and Patillon [1979], vol. 2, p.112).
16. In what follows I rely on Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) vol. 2, pp.xlvf.
17. Cf. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 10.30: "ad hoc Deum animam mundo dedisse, ut materiae cognoscens mala ad Patrem recurreret."
18. On this difficult passage, see Festugière's annotated translation in (1970), vol. 3, pp.349-357; Bouché-Leclercq (1899) 601-602.
19. The locus classicus on the Astral body in Neoplatonism is Dodds (1963²) 313-321; see also Beutler (1953) coll. 307-310; Verbeke (1945) 363-374; Lewy (1978) 122; 182 n.26; 184 n.24-30; 416 n.66; Hadot (1968a) 2, 181-2; Proclus, In Timaeum 3.234.26 Diehl; Synesius, De Insomniis p.149, 16-165, 17 Terzaghi.
20. Verbeke (1945) 363-364.
21. Porphyry's doctrine can be reconstructed from Sententia 29, p.18, 6-7 Lamberz; Ad Gaurum 6, 1, p.22, 31 Kalbfleisch; De Regressu

animae fr. 2, p.28*; 3, p.32*; 4, p.32*, 12, p.41* Bidez (1913);
De Antro Nympharum 22, p.64, 15 Nauck (1886²); Macrobius In Somnium
Scipionis 1, 11-12 = Stahl, Macrobius' Commentary (1952), pp.130-137;
 Dodds in EH 5 (1960) 8-9; Courcelle (1948²) p.30; Lewy (1978)
 p.142 n.287; 186 n.26; 413-417; Hadot (1968a) 1, 181f.

22. Verbeke (1945) 365.
23. Hadot (1968a) 1, 179.
24. Hadot (1968a) 1, 180.
25. Hadot (1968a) 1, 186.
26. Cf. Marius Victorinus Adversus Arianos 1. 61.135f., = Henry/Hadot (1960) vol. 1, p.376, 12ff.: "tenebrata autem (sc. anima) deorsum ducitur."
27. Hadot (1968a) 1, 186.
28. Hadot (1968a) 1, 191.
29. As Smith (1974, 29) points out, there is a similar tension in Plotinus. Every emanation, insofar as it is a departure from unity, is an evil; yet it is ontologically necessary and therefore good.
30. Hadot (1968a) 1, 95.
31. See Feyerabend (1981; 1987). Duerr (1985), while in sympathy with Feyerabend's approach, distances himself from some of the latter's more extreme conclusions.
32. Bouché-Leclercq (1899) 602.
33. Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) xlvi.
34. I am here following Hadot's account (1968a, 1, 188f.), and using Festugière's translation of the Ad Gaurum in Rév. 3, 265-305.
35. Dörrie (1966b) 171.
36. Dörrie (1966b) 168.
37. Dörrie (1959) 73; cf. pp.37-38; 85; 157; (1966b) 178; 182; 186.
38. Dörrie (1959) 157.
39. Dörrie (1966b) 186-187.
40. Bouffartigué and Patillon (1977) xlix ff., present objections to Dörrie's theories which I find convincing.

41. After Dörrie (1959) 157.
42. Dörrie (1966b) 124.
43. Cf. Hadot (1968a) 1, p.89 n.89 n.5, 6; 105, 110. On Stoic mixtures the works of Bréhier (1951; 1974⁴); Goldschmidt (1985⁴): Hahm (1977) and Sambursky (1959) have been useful to me.
44. Especially, and brilliantly, in (1966a).
45. Porphyry Sententia 16; Synesius De insomniis p.155, 2-156, 3 Terzaghi.
46. Hadot (1968a) 2, 187; 197-206; Verbeke (1945) 363f.; Smith (1974) 22-25; Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) xlvii; iv.
47. Smith (1974) 33.
48. Bouffartigue and Patillon, vol. 2 (1977) lviii.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Porphyry

Conclusion

Even had Porphyry written nothing but the "traditional" body of writings usually ascribed to him, he would remain a far from insignificant figure in the history of thought. His vast learning has always been recognised:¹ Much of the information in the Homeric scholia,² most of our doxographic notices on Middle Platonists,³ as well as innumerable details of religious ritual, both Greek and otherwise,⁴ have been preserved for us only by Porphyry's careful scholarship. It was also no mean accomplishment to have re-introduced Aristotle into the Neoplatonic school-curriculum,⁵ and to have provided with the Isagoge a work that would serve, in Boethius' Latin translation, as the most widely-used introduction to Aristotelian logic in the West throughout the Middle Ages and into the Modern Age. In Arabic translation, the work was still fulfilling this purpose in Egyptian universities until as late as a generation ago.⁶

Porphyry's ethical treatises, while perhaps too rigorous and ascetic for modern western taste, are penetrated by a deeply genuine religiosity. Whereas Plotinus and his predecessors the Middle Platonists had been little concerned with the non-philosophical "man in the street," Porphyry made room for the average Joe,⁷ allowing that at least a partial redemption of the soul could be obtained through theurgical practices. He seems genuinely to have wished to find a way of universal salvation (*universalem ... viam animae liberandae*, Augustine De Civitate Dei 10.32 = De Regressu Animae fr. 12, p.42*, 8-9 Bidez), which would include all races and

classes, regardless of their philosophical aptitude. Less anti-Semitic and nationalistic than, for example, Celsus, Porphyry strove all the same to bolster the traditional Greco-Roman religion against what he correctly foresaw as the destructive onslaught of revolutionary, upstart Christianity. He was a moralist of the first order, and his teachings, as applicable today as when he formulated them, should alone suffice to preserve him from oblivion:⁹

Man must, so to speak, every day and every hour renounce the *μερσιμός*¹⁰ (fragmentation; dispersion; distraction) which threatens him.... He is in constant progress. Ever anew must that which has fortunately been achieved be defended. All standing still, or resting on one's laurels, would already constitute a step backwards.

It should now be clear, however, that Porphyry's ethical exhortations were not his only contribution to philosophy. Most scholars now accept Hadot's ascription to Porphyry of the Commentary on the Parmenides,¹¹ as well as the complex metaphysical system Hadot reconstructed on the basis of it. This being the case, it is, as we saw, no longer admissible to regard Porphyry as a mere populariser of Plotinus.

Porphyry's newly-discovered system departs in several important respects from that of Plotinus. Not only are there differences in emphasis or "point of view" between the two thinkers, but important doctrinal oppositions: Porphyry's equation of the One or Ultimate Ground with Being, his doctrine of the pre-existence of all the hypostases or levels of reality in the One, and their eventual re-integration into it; his preference for Negative Theology and interest in the Chaldaean Oracles mark important departures from Plotinus, as do his greater interest in popular religious forms,¹² stress on asceticism¹³ and the distinction between the

Intelligible and phenomenal planes of reality,¹⁴ and his concern for eschatology.¹⁵ It is perhaps no exaggeration to state with Dörrie that, in the final analysis, Porphyry was closer to Middle Platonism than he was to Plotinus.¹⁶

The researches of Theiler, Courcelle and Hadot have shown the extent of Porphyry's influence on the Latin-speaking West. Nor was it confined to the Middle Ages; it has long been known that the Platonism which permeated the Florentine Renaissance,¹⁷ and inspired German Idealism¹⁸ and English Romanticism,¹⁹ was derived as much from Plato's Neoplatonic interpreters as from Plato himself. It now appears that Porphyry constituted a major channel for the transmission of this Neoplatonic interpretation. The full extent of his influence remains to be determined; researches such as those of J. P  pin²⁰ on the historical legacy of Porphyry's methods of allegorical literary interpretation, for example, continue to produce fascinating results.

The casual reader is struck by the parallels, both textual and conceptual, between Porphyry's writings and those of such Islamic, mainly Iranian Sufis and Sh  'ites as H  fiz, R  m  , 'Ibn 'Arab  , Alaoddawleh Semn  n   and Najmodd  n Kobr  . We know that Porphyry's works were read in the Islamic world in Arabic and Syriac translations, but what little research has so far been done has largely been confined to the influence of his logical works on the Hellenized Sunn   philosophers such as 'al-F  r  b  , Ibn Rushd.²¹ No work has yet been undertaken on Porphyry's possible influence on esoteric Islamic thought; now that, thanks to the researches of P. Hadot on Porphyry, and of H. Corbin²² on Iranian philosophy, the foundations have been laid for such an enquiry, a wholly new field of research

has been made possible.

Much work remains to be done on the sources of Porphyry's thought. Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977, xxii) make the interesting suggestion that Porphyry may have belonged to some kind of "closed Collectivity" of Neo-Pythagoreans. The history of this shadowy movement, however, remains to be written. Likewise, the results of the investigations of the School of Tübingen have not yet been systematised; it remains to be shown to what extent the Unwritten Doctrines of Plato -- if they can be usefully differentiated from Neo-Pythagoreanism -- may have influenced Porphyry and the other Late Neo-Platonists.

Before much further progress in Porphyrian studies can be made, however, an edition of Porphyry's complete fragments is badly needed. It is to be feared that, if Andrew Smith is indeed in charge of this project, and if his criterion for ascribing a work to Porphyry is still "absolute certainty,"²³ then so fundamental a work as the Commentary on the Parmenides may be omitted from an eventual edition of Porphyry.

The issues at hand are complex.²⁴ When an ancient author comes down to us in so fragmented and mutilated a state as Porphyry, some kind of method is required to reconstruct his lost writings. But if, using a method such as Theiler's, we reconstruct Porphyry's philosophy mainly on the basis of the views attributed to him by Proclus in his Commentary on the Timaeus, we must first equip ourselves with a thorough and minute knowledge of Proclus' thought, style and vocabulary, so as to be able to distinguish what stems authentically from Porphyry, and what represents the views of Proclus himself. If we are to base our reconstruction on Porphyry's Sententiae, we must have a similarly complete familiarity with

Plotinus. A like situation occurs when we scrutinize Eusebius, Nemesius, Cyril of Alexandria or any other ancient compiler, with a view to dis-interring from them lost Porphyrian Gedankengut. But every time a new critical edition appears of an author known to have preserved Porphyry's writings -- Stobaeus, Cyril and Alexander of Aphrodisias are overdue for such editions -- we are afforded new possibilities of recovering from them more scraps of Porphyry's shipwrecked opus. Technological advances in lexicography and the treatment of texts may be of assistance in this process. Of equal and perhaps greater importance are, I feel, the studies currently being carried out by Pierre and Ilsetraut Hadot and their colleagues on the nature, structure and function of philosophical schools in late Antiquity, their teaching activity, and the philosophical commentaries they produced during the course of the latter.²⁵ We are now more and more able to discern, in a given Late Neoplatonic philosophical commentary, what elements are mere rhetorical or polemical topoi, what passage might be a more or less veiled allusion to a piece of Porphyrian doctrine, and what might be a verbatim quotation from the Tyrian philosopher himself.

At the outset of this thesis, I spoke of a hypothetical complete understanding of Porphyry, making possible a perfectly adequate criticism. The fact that such an understanding is impossible to attain need not prevent us from using it as a goal in our researches on Porphyry. In Stoic ethics, man's moral goal was thought to consist in modelling his behaviour on that of the Ideal Sage, even though it was admitted as possible that no such Sage ever had existed, or ever would. The concept of the Sage acted as a transcendent norm: impossible to attain, one could nevertheless approximate closer and closer to the goal of imitating the Sage's

behaviour. In a similar way, it is possible to aim at a completeness in our understanding of Porphyry, and an accuracy in the establishment of a critical edition of his fragments, which we know can never be attained in practice, but towards which we can progress ad infinitum, by the slow but constant augmentation of our knowledge. I am convinced, at any rate, that the method of careful, detailed comparison of texts, as proposed by Theiler, improved by Courcelle, and brought nearer and nearer to unattainable perfection by M. and Mme. Hadot, is the most fruitful and promising avenue of progress in the study of the philosophy of Porphyry.

Notes to Conclusion

1. φιλομαθῆς ὁ φοῖνιξ, writes David c.550 (ed. Busse, CAG 18.2, p.92. 3). Quoted in Smith (1974) p.xviii n.22.
2. See references in note 13 to Chapter One, above.
3. Dörrie (1966a) 9, n.2 gives a list of sources on Middle Platonism which have not come down to us through the intermediary of Porphyry; there are only seven.
4. Principally in the Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων and the De Abstinencia. See Chapter One, notes 13 and 24.
5. Beutler (1953) col. 282.
6. References in Chapter One, n.21. At Cairo's 'al-'Azhâr university in the 1950's, students read an introductory textbook on logic written by a certain "'Îsajôjî." This is, of course, Porphyry's Isagoge, the title of which had been understood as the name of the author. (My thanks go to Mr. M.N. Aziz for this information.)
7. Porphyry's "democratic" leanings are emphasized Dörrie (1966b) passim; Wallis (1972) 3; 108; Smith (1974) 21.
8. Wilken (1984) 126.
9. After Dörrie (1966b) 185.
10. On the importance of the "return to self," equivalent to the "return from dispersion (μερισμός) to unity" (Bouffartigue and Patillon [1977] LV), see Porphyry, De Abstinencia 1. 29ff.; Sententia 32, p.32, 3-8 Lamberz, Ad Marcellam 10, p.16, 16-19 Des Places and n.1, p.111; Ad Gaurum 4.9, p.40, 15-16 Kalbfleisch (cf. Chrysippus in SVF, 3, nos. 462; 467). Modern literature: Beutler (1953) col. 312; Theiler (1933) 48ff.; Hadot (1968a), 1. 91 n.1; 327 n.5.
11. G.J.P. O'Daly in Classical Review N.S. 28 (1978) 93, speaks of "the 'unoriginal ... uncritical' (OCD², p.864) fiction of some earlier scholarship."
12. Wallis (1972) 97.
13. Smith (1974) 20.
14. Οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁ νοῦς, says Plotinus (Ennead 5, 3, 3, 31); Αὐτὸς δὲ ὄντως ὁ νοῦς, Porphyry De Abstinencia 1.29.4 [quoted in Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) p.L].
15. Hadot (1968a), 2, 89 n.2; Bouffartigue and Patillon (1977) liii-liv;

and Smith (1974) 145 remark on the frequent recurrence of the words *ωτηρία*, *ωτήριος*, *ἀλζειν ἑαυτόν*, *ωτηρία τῆς ψυχῆς* in Porphyry's writings, while the last-named author argues that Porphyry's primary concern was for the release of the soul from the cycle of repeated incarnations [(1974) 35; 40; 70].

16. Dörrie (1959) p.vii.
17. See, for example, Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance (New York 1935; reprinted, 1968).
18. Ernst Benz, Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendländischen Willensmetaphysik (Stuttgart 1932), makes Plotinus directly responsible for the development of German Idealism; but see Theiler (1934); Hadot (1968a) 1, 16-20.
19. To the references given on Thomas Taylor in the Annotated Bibliography, add G.M. Harper, The Neoplatonism of William Blake (Chapel Hill 1961).
20. See Mythe et Allégorie: Les Origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes² (Paris 1976); La Tradition de l'allégorie de Philon d'Alexandrie à Dante (Paris 1987).
21. See the works of R. Walzer and S. Pinès cited in the Annotated Bibliography.
22. For an orientation to the work of Corbin see the volume of Cahiers de l'Herne devoted to him (Paris 1981).
23. See above, p.36 n.16.
24. They are outlined by Sodano (1966).
25. Of capital importance in this regard is Mme. Hadot's contribution to Tardieu (ed., 1987): "Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens," pp.99-122. The results of P. Hadot's ongoing researches are published annually in the Annuaire du Collège de France.

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11 Wachsmuth; l. 49. 65-67, vol. 1, 454.10-458.25, Wachsmuth.
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"Negative Theology, Myth and Incarnation," in Mélanges Trouillard (1981) 47-62. An examination in continuance of articles 23 and 24 of the preceding item, of Negative Theology in its historical development and its relevance for modern thought. Contains (49; 58n.4) an appreciative discussion of the Turin Commentary on the Parmenides, although the author there disputes Hadot's ascription of it to Porphyry. He has since revised his views and accepted Hadot's attribution (letter dated Jan. 13, 1989).

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Bidez, Joseph. Vie de Porphyre, le philosophe Néo-Platonicien, avec les fragments de traités Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων et De Regressu Animae (Gand, Leipzig 1913; reprinted Hildesheim 1980). Still the only biography of Porphyry, Bidez's work combines the best and worst features of 19th-century scholarship: massive erudition and careful philology, on the one hand, and on the other a positivistic-rationalistic disdain for "superstitions" and ill-concealed contempt for the supposedly effeminate and sub-rational "Orient." It has been greatly influential and, since it remains unique, is still indispensable for the student. The origin of the view of Porphyry as an unoriginal scrivener, Bidez's work must now be supplemented and corrected by those of Hadot (1968a, b; 1981, 1987²) on originality in Antiquity, and by that of Saïd (1978) on "Orientalism." Bidez's work is perhaps most valuable for its Appendices: No. I, 1*-23(: the only edition of Porphyry's Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων, Greek text, mainly from Eusebius, with ample textual parallels; II, only edition of the De Regressu Animae, Latin text, mainly from Augustine, 27*-44*; III, Extracts from Eunapius, The Suda, Ibn Nadîm, 'al-Qifî, Ibn Sînâ etc. on Porphyry's life and works, 47*-65*, and, most importantly, a list (65*-73*) of the 77 works Bidez considered authentically by Porphyry, grouped according to subject-matter with bibliographical data. Along with the lists given by Beutler (1953), Bouffartigue-Patillon (1977) and Badawî (1987), Bidez's careful enumeration remains a useful research tool.

Beutler, Rudolf. Article "Porphyrios," RE 22.1, (1953), col. 275-313. Among the first works to take Porphyry seriously as a philosopher in his own right (Hadot 1968a, l. p.27), Beutler's article is equally valuable for its list of Porphyry's works (col. 279-301; he counts 57) and for its methodical, scholarly discussion of his thought (301-312). On neither account is the work beyond reproach: Beutler has been accused of excessive conservatism in his attributions of works to Porphyry [see Altheim, Stiehl (1954) 7 for his neglect of Arabic sources]; while as regards doctrine, Beutler, writing before Hadot's discovery (1960; 1968a) of the dynamic character of Porphyry's system, gave a static, rigidly hierarchical picture of his thought which proved to require modification. Nevertheless, to Beutler goes the credit for having removed Porphyry definitively from

the limbo of philosophical insignificance, thereby paving the way for the work of Dörrie, Hadot et al.

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Bouffartigue, Jean, and Patillon, Michel. Porphyre: De l'Abstinence 1, Livre I, texte établi et traduit par Jean Bouffartigue (Paris 1977); 2, Livres II et III, texte établi et traduit par Jean Bouffartigue et Michel Patillon (Paris, 1979). A fine edition. The "Introduction" (l.xi-lxxxii) contains, xxxviii-lx, a section on "La Philosophie de Porphyre" which is probably the best short account of the subject. "Notices" 1. pp.1-42; 2. pp.3-71 and pp. 127-151) thoroughly cover the sources, analysis and textual history of the D.A., while the accompanying notes are judicious and informative. l.xiv-xvii, gives a list of the 21 works by Porphyry which had been wholly or partially edited by 1977. Livre IV by Alain-Philippe Segonds, is slated for publication in the same Budé series in the near future.

Bouillet, M.-N. Les Ennéades de Plotin, chef de l'école Néoplatonicienne, traduites pour la première fois en français, accompagnées de sommaires, de notes et d'éclaircissements et précédées de la Vie de Plotin et des principes de la théorie des Intelligibles de Porphyre (3 vols., Paris 1857-1861; reprinted Frankfurt 1968). A neglected translation, now valuable primarily for its notes and illustrative material, including several elsewhere untranslated works by Porphyry, by Eugène Lévêque. l.li-lxxxiii: translation of Porphyry's Sententiae; lxxxvii-xciii: On the Faculties of the Soul. 2.615ff.: Porphyry's treatise On the Precept; 'Know Thyself'; On the Soul. 3.622ff.: Life of Plotinus; 626ff.: Philosophy from Oracles and Life of Pythagoras (extracts).

Bréhier, Emile. La Théorie des Incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme⁴ (Paris 1970); Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme² (Paris 1951). These two works, written with admirable clarity, constitute an excellent presentation of the thought of the Stoa, which so deeply influenced Porphyry.

Brown, Peter. The World of Late Antiquity from Marcus Aurelius to Muhammed (London 1971). A good brief survey, with useful selective bibliography.

Courcelle, Pierre. Les lettres grecques en Occident, de Macrobie à Cassiodore² (Paris 1948). An epoch-making study of Greek literary-philosophical culture in the late Roman Empire, and its influence on late and Medieval Latin authors. Following and expanding upon Theiler (1933), Courcelle showed the previously unsuspected extent to which Porphyry had influenced Macrobius, Boethius, Servius, Cassiodorus, even through treatises now classed as "minor" (On the Sun; On the Styx; his Commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, etc.) The breadth and depth of Courcelle's knowledge both of Greek and of Latin

literature caused a shock in France when the book first appeared, and has, perhaps, hindered its being as influential as it should have been (Hadot 1987²).

Opuscula Selecta (Paris 1984), contains 11-25, a bibliography of 204 items, published between 1938 and 1980, many of which deal extensively with Porphyry.

Cumont, Franz. "Comment Plotin détournait Porphyre du suicide," Revue des Etudes Grecques 32 (1919) 113ff. A reconstruction of the arguments Plotinus used to dissuade his star pupil from suicide [Bidez (1913) 52-53], and their possible preservation by Macrobius.

Lux Perpetua (Paris 1949). The posthumous work of the great Belgian scholar, summing up a lifetime's research on Hellenistic religiosity. The pages on Porphyry (Chap. 8, II, 361ff.: "De Porphyre à la déchéance du paganisme") are, unfortunately, sullied by the same rationalistic, anti-"Oriental" bias to be found in the works of his contemporaries Bidez, Geffcken and even to some extent Nilsson.

Des Places, Edouard. Jamblique: Les mystères d'Egypte. Texte établi et traduit par E. Des Places, S.J. (Budé, Paris 1966).

Oracles Chaldaïques, avec un choix de commentaires anciens. Texte établi et traduit par E. Des Places, S.J. (Budé, Paris 1971).

Numénios: Fragments. Texte établi et traduit par E. Des Places, S.J. (Budé, Paris 1973).

Porphyre: Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella. Texte établi et traduit par E. Des Places, S.J., avec un appendice d'A.-Ph. Segonds. (Budé, Paris 1982). The highly prolific Des Places tends to work quickly; with the occasional carelessness this implies. His texts thus are usually no great advance over their predecessors (Parthey, Kroll, Leemans and Nauck respectively), but his translations are often the first into the vernacular, and are characterized by extensive notes, useful Greek word indices and good bibliographical notices. This is especially true of his 1982 publication, which benefitted from the observations of Alain-Philippe Segonds. A good bibliography is given (31-32) and the notes and indices are unusually thorough.

Dillon, John. Iamblichus Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, edited with translation and commentary by John M. Dillon (= *Philosophia antiqua*, 23, Leiden 1973). Although not primarily concerned with Porphyry, Dillon's work, one of very few consecrated to Iamblichus, includes many references to Porphyry, Iamblichus' teacher, especially in his excellent Introduction (3-68).

The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220. (London 1977). The only comprehensive work in English dedicated to

this movement [See Theiler (1927), Krämer (1967) and Richard (1986) for European contributions] which provided the background in opposition to which, to a large extent, Plotinus reacted [EH 5 (1960) *passim*], and of which Porphyry was, in crucial respects, the continuer [Dörrie (1966a)].

Dodds, E.R. "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'," Classical Quarterly 22 (1928) 129-142. An early study on the history of Neoplatonic exegeses of the Parmenides, focusing on the 1st-century(?) Neo-Pythagorean Moderatus of Gades, a figure influential on both Plotinus and Porphyry, who preserves passages from his Lectures on Pythagoreanism in the Vita Pythagorae 48-53 (p.58.21-p.62.1, *Des Places*) and in book 2 of On Matter [preserved in Simplicius, In Phys. p.230, 34ff. *Diels* (CAG 9), *Dillon* (1977) 344-351].

The Greeks and the Irrational (= *Sather Classical Lectures*, vol. 25; Berkeley and London 1951). A highly influential classic, though one may take issue with some of Dodds' Freudianizing and Shamanizing explanations. Mainly deals with the Classical Greek period, but Chps. 7 ("Plato, the Irrational Soul, and the Inherited Conglomerate," 207ff.); 8 ("The Fear of Freedom," 236ff.) and Appendix II ("Theurgy," 283ff.) are relevant to Porphyry's epoch.

"Numenius and Ammonius," EH 5 (1960) 1-60. Contains good exposé of the doctrine of Numenius (2nd cent. A.D.), a thinker highly influential on Porphyry, and a masterly debunking of some of the wilder hypotheses about the identity of Plotinus' teacher Ammonius Saccas.

Proclus: The Elements of Theology², revised text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary by E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1963; 1st ed. 1933). Remains the single most important work on Neoplatonism in English. Section 3 of the Introduction ("Proclus and his Predecessors"; xviii-xxvi) sketches the history of Neoplatonism. Appendix II, "The Astral Body in Neoplatonism" (313-321), is the locus classicus for this doctrine, which plays such a central role in Porphyry's thought. Cf. especially 318-319, "the Astral Body in Plotinus and Porphyry."

Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety. Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (New York and London 1965). A socio-psychological panorama of Late Antiquity. Again, some of Dodds' interpretations are debatable, but the erudition and humanistic religiosity make the work highly suggestive. Contains valuable pages on the "mysticism" of Plotinus: 78ff.

Dörrie, Heinrich. Porphyrios' "SUMMIKTA ZETEMATA," ihre Stellung in System und Geschichte des Neuplatonismus, nebst einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten (= *Zetemata*, Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Heft 20, München 1959). Originally planned as the first installment in an edition of Porphyry's collected fragments, this

work has been influential in its own right. Based on extracts from the De Natura hominis of Nemeseius of Emesa -- for which he had to rely on Matthaeis' inferior 1801 text -- Dörrie attempted to reconstruct a lost writing of Porphyry, to which he appended a commentary explaining the latter's philosophy, in particular regarding the soul-body problem. But through over-reliance on the wording of paraphrased, out-of-context fragments, based on an unreliable text, Dörrie was led to conclusions, e.g. about the immutability of the embodied soul, which are inconsistent with Porphyry's other writings and not borne out by other testimony. In this respect, the work had a deleterious effect on Porphyrian scholarship, especially when its conclusions were carried even farther by, e.g., Lloyd (1967). Yet it performed the important service of drawing attention to Porphyry's debt to Stoic physics (the doctrine of various types of "mixtures", 24-73), and the importance of the distinction between the soul κατ' ἐαυτό and ἐν σῶματι.

"Die Schultradition im Mittelplatonismus und Porphyrios," EH 12 (1966a) 1-32. Presents Porphyry's relation to his Middle Platonic predecessors. To prove the continuity of the Logos, Porphyry wishes to show the agreement of all representatives of the Platonic tradition; all apparent discrepancies and differences must be only verbal misunderstandings. Porphyry, in one sense "the last Middle Platonist" (3) in another sense "prepares the transition from Middle- to Neoplatonism by philological means" (8). Dörrie emphasizes (9ff.) that Porphyry is by far our single most important source for Middle Platonic doctrines.

"Die Lehre von der Seele," (= 1966b), 165-192. Represents Porphyry as torn between his theoretical beliefs -- the soul, as a νοῦς οὐσία virtually identical with the Noûs is impeccable and cannot be altered -- and his practical observance of the facts of everyday existence, which teach him that only a strict asceticism can lead to the soul's salvation. The inconsistency is more likely Dörrie's than Porphyry's; the former deduces Porphyry's metaphysical principles from a few statements in the Sententiae and Summika Zetemata, and fails to take into account the ensemble of his writings. He rightly puts emphasis on the necessity, for Porphyry, of constant ethical striving, and the ever-present danger of backsliding.

N.B. Many of Dörrie's papers on Middle Platonism, Plotinus and Neoplatonism are collected in Platonica Minora (Studia et Testimonia Antiqua 8, München 1976); cf. especially his important "Bibliographischer Bericht zum Stand der Forschung zum Mittleren und zum Neueren Platonismus", 524-527. More volumes can be expected to follow; the team of scholars at the University of Münster currently at work on Dörrie's unpublished Nachlass project some fifteen in total.

Duerr, Hans Peter. Dreamtime: Concerning the Boundary between Wilderness and Civilization (London and New York 1986). A translation by Felicitas Goodman of the author's Träumzeit, first published 1978.

A thought-provoking critique of Western ethnocentrism in the supposedly "objective" social sciences.

EH 5 (1980). *Les Sources de Plotin*. Contains exposés by E.R. Dodds (q.v.), W. Theiler, P. Hadot, H.-C. Puech, H. Dörrie, V. Cilento, R. Harder, H.R. Schwyzer, A.H. Armstrong (q.v.), P. Henry.

EH 12 (1966). *Porphyre*. Contains exposés by H. Dörrie (a and b), J.-H. Waszink, P. Hadot, R. Walzer (q.q.v.), W. Theiler, A.R. Sodano, J. Pépin.

EH 21 (1975). Contains exposés by B.D. Larsen, R.E. Witt, E. Des Places, J.M. Rist, H.J. Blumenthal, W. Beierwaltes, J. Trouillard, H. Dörrie and J. Whittaker (q.v.)

Etudes Néoplatoniciennes (Collection "Languages"; Lausanne, 1973). A republication of n°2 (1973) of the Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, which in turn had published the lectures given at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, during 1971-1972, by J. Trouillard, P. Hadot, H. Dörrie, F. Brunner, M. de Gandillac and S. Breton. Each contribution is followed by a select Bibliography of the author's works to 1971 (but see, for Trouillard, Mélanges Trouillard (1981) 313-316, and for Hadot, Hadot (1981) 15-22).

Festugière, André-Jean (O.P.). *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, (Etudes Bibliques, 4 vols., Paris 1949-1954; reprinted in 3 vols. Paris, 1986). The classic reference work on Hellenistic to Late Antique spirituality, still unsurpassed. Covers every aspect of thought in the period, from Hermetism and Astrology to Plato; magical papyri to Philo, Gnosticism, Neopythagoreanism and Neoplatonism. Of particular value are the Appendices to vol. 3: I, pp.177-264, a richly annotated translation of Iamblichus, *De Anima* (preserved in Stobaeus 1, p.362, 23ff. Wachsmuth), containing many doxographic notices on Porphyry; and II, pp.265-302, a translation of Porphyry's *On the Animation of the Embryo* (after the Greek text of K. Kalbfleisch, in the *Abhandlungen Berliner Akademie* [1895] 33-62).

Hermétisme et mystique païenne (Paris 1967).

Etudes de Philosophie grecque (Paris 1971).

Etudes de Religion grecque et hellénistique (Paris 1972).

Etudes d'histoire et de philologie (Paris 1975).

The last three items represent journal articles by the great Dominican scholar, all of whose work is characterized by vast erudition joined to razor-sharp philological acumen. All the studies they contain are valuable contributions to classical scholarship; two of particular relevance to Porphyry are "Les trois Vies" (1971) 117-156, a thorough survey of Greek conceptions of happiness, which sheds light on Porphyry *De Abstinencia* 1, 28, 3ff. Bouffartigue, Patillon; and

"Une source hermétique de Porphyre?" (1975) 141-150, on De Abstinencia 2, 47.

Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée, traduction et notes par A.-J. Festugière, 5 vols. (Paris 1966-1968).

Proclus: Commentaire sur la République, traduction et notes par A.-J. Festugière, 3 vols. (Paris 1970).

These are important research tools; Festugière gives a clear, lucid translation of the 5th-century Neoplatonist's Commentaries, after the text of E. Diehl (1903-06) and W. Kroll (1899-1901) respectively, together with his inimitably acute philological and philosophical notes. Both works are completed by valuable indices (Auctorum, Nominum, Verborum), compiled by A.-Ph. Segonds. In 3 (1970) 349-357, the author gives a fully annotated French translation of Porphyry's Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν (under the title "Sur le libre arbitre"), preserved in Stobaeus II 8, 39-42, 2, p.163, 17ff. Wachsmuth, the only translation, to my knowledge, of this difficult text.

Feyerabend, Paul. K. Philosophical Papers. 1: Reason, Revolution and the Scientific Method. 2: Problems of Empiricism (New York 1981).

Farewell to Reason (London and New York 1987). Representative works of a leading contemporary philosophical trend, termed "relativism" by its opponents; the spiritual heirs of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Following on 1975's Against Method, where the author had proclaimed (23) that "The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes," the author went on to formulate the principle: 1987, "For every proposition, there is evidence justifying the claim that its opposite is true."

Geffcken, Johannes. The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism (= Europe in the Middle Ages: Selected Studies, 8, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford 1978). A translation with references updated to 1976, by Sabine MacCormack of the 1929 revised edition of Geffcken's Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums. Further revised by Richard Vaughan. Despite all its revisions and updatings, one could still say of this work, as Geffcken said of Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles, (58): "In an absolute sense, it is an unattractive composition." Although useful on some aspects of Porphyry's thought (his discussion of the Contra Christianos (62-65) is dispassionate and thorough), there is throughout the work, besides the positivistic horror of "superstitions" the author shares with his contemporary Bidez (1913), a rather unpleasant undercurrent of anti-Semitism in Geffcken's frequent references to Porphyry as an "Oriental" (e.g. 57) and "the spirit-conjurer of Tyre" (58). The portrait of Porphyry which emerges here is of a neurotic, superstitious bookworm, honest but unworldly, who "misrepresented his own time" (67) and "almost invariably followed along an erroneous path." This attitude, based on a partial acquaint-

tance with only some of Porphyry's works -- even these viewed through the Orientalistic prejudices so well analysed by Saïd (1978), has, unfortunately, not been demolished by the recent discoveries of more disinterested scholars; we find it repeated by Dodds in the OCD ² (864-865), and it perhaps underlies the enigmatic comment of the Plotinian scholar V. Cilento (in Le Néoplatonisme [1971]): "Porphyre est un Phénicien plein de choses diverses."

Goldschmidt, Victor. Le Système stoïcien et l'idée de temps (Paris 1985). A philosophically dense and allusive exposition of Stoic doctrine. Often merely restates in abstruse terminology what Bréhier (1951; 1970) had stated more clearly. Good, however, on Stoic doctrine of mixtures (44-45; 207) which Porphyry adapted from Stoic physics to explain the relation between soul and body [Dörrie (1959) 45; 54ff.; 160; Hadot (1968a) 1, 225-246; 486-488, etc.].

Goulet, Richard. Makarios Magnès: Monogénès (Apocriticus). Introduction générale, édition, traduction et commentaire du Livre III, ainsi que des Fragments des livres IV et V, 4 vols. (Thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris I, Paris 1974). Highly sceptical as to whether Porphyry is really Makarios' pagan interlocutor, as Harnack had assumed when he relied heavily upon this work to reconstruct Porphyry's Adversus Christianos . (Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl. , 1916; Sitzungsberichte, Ibid. , 1921, 1. 266-284; 2. 834ff.). If Goulet is correct, the publication of this extremely important document for Early Christian-Pagan relations may be indefinitely postponed. I am unqualified to pronounce judgment; the author informs me he will enlarge upon the reasons for his scepticism in his forthcoming edition of Makarios for SC .

Hadot, Pierre. "Heidegger et Plotin", Critique 145 (1959) 539-556. An early attempt by the author to show the relevance to modern life of Antique philosophers. Includes reviews of works on Plotinus which have remained fundamental on Plotinus, by G. Huber, J. Trouillard, M. de Gandillac.

Marius Victorinus, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, texte établi par Paul Henry, introduction, traduction et notes par Pierre Hadot (= SC 68-69 [Paris 1960]).

"Fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide ." Revue des Etudes grecques 74 (1961) 410-468. The first paper in which Hadot suggested his attribution to Porphyry of the previously anonymous palimpsest manuscript F. VI. 1, from the Library of the University of Turin, containing a total of seven pages, each of which with recto and verso containing a commentary, written in 5th-century Greek uncial, of Plato's Parmenides 137a-143a [for complete bibliographical data and textual history of the ms. see also Kroll (1892), Hadot (1968a, 2, 61-62); Saffrey (1988) 1-3]. Hadot later incorporated and greatly expanded his discussion of the Commentary (1968a).

"La Métaphysique de Porphyre," EH 12 (1966) 127-163. Hadot's first, brilliant study on this subject, the existence of which had been largely unrecognized; Hadot himself had been led to the discovery of the extent of Porphyry's philosophical activity through his detailed analysis of their utilisation by Victorinus (see above). In his 1966 paper, Hadot set forth for the first time Porphyry's doctrine of the self-constitution of the Intelligence, with its three phases Being, Life and Thought (136); a doctrine Hadot was to elaborate, with the aid of massively thorough documentation, in 1968a.

"Neoplatonism," New Catholic Encyclopedia 10 (1967), 334-336.

Porphyre et Victorinus, 2 vols. (= 1968a) (thèse de doctorat ès lettres, Paris 1968). Hadot's magnum opus and the definitive work on the philosophy of Porphyry. Utilising the results of his previous researches on Marius Victorinus (1960) and the Turin Commentary on the Parmenides (1961), Hadot here describes, with vast erudition (his "Index des textes cités," for example, covers pp.133-156 of vol 2), every aspect of Porphyry's thought. After an important Introduction (1.11-41) where the history of Porphyrian studies is critically surveyed, the author goes on, in Part Two (1.147-451) to discuss "Les Thèmes porphyriens": his conception of God as the "non-étant au-dessus de l'étant" (173-178); identified with the Father of the Chaldaean Oracles (258-259) and described as "un agir pur" (283-297); the autogeneration and conversion of the Second One, i.e. Intelligence (317; 326-330); his distinction of the hierarchies of Being (225-226; 237-239); his doctrine of the soul (320-344), etc. A thought-provoking section on the impact of the revised image we must now form of Porphyry's place in the Neoplatonic tradition closes the first volume (485-492). Volume 2 contains (14-55) a selection of 93 Latin texts from Marius Victorinus, and, most valuably (61-113), the Greek text, with introduction, French translation, commentary and textual notes, of the Turin Commentary on the Parmenides (whose contents are also summarized and commented 1.102-143). A full "Index bibliographique" (2.123-131) and a valuable Greek word-index to the Commentary (2.159-165) complete this masterpiece of exhilarating scholarship.

Hadot's major contention in this work, on which his reconstruction of Porphyry's thought rests, is his attribution of the Commentary to Porphyry. Most Neoplatonic scholars have been convinced by the rigour of Hadot's reasoning and the astonishing breadth and quantity of the evidence he so painstakingly gathered (when he wrote, Hadot did not have the benefit of the large number of improved texts and translations of Neoplatonic works which have since appeared). W. Theiler, W. Beierwaltes, H.D. Saffrey, A.-Ph. Segonds, and, most recently, A.H. Armstrong, have all indicated their agreement. Those few scholars -- A.C. Lloyd and Andrew Smith are the only ones who come to mind -- who still hesitate, give as their reasons that "there is no proof." One wonders, if Hadot's masterful, exhaustive arguments have not convinced them, what further proof they require.

"Philosophie, Exégèse et contresens," Akten des XIV. internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie 1 (Vienne 1968), 333-339 (= 1968b). A brief examination of how, in both Pagan and Christian milieux, from late Antiquity until today, philosophy has been conceived of as the extraction of sense, by allegorical and other methods of exegesis, from a small number of texts considered fundamental and authoritative. This procedure necessarily leads to entire systems of thought being based on misunderstandings, wrong translations and discoveries of meanings where none were intended in the original texts, but such a procedure, though "wrong," may lead to extremely fruitful results. Profound truths may be based on what -- at least to us -- seem laughably false premises. Porphyry is adduced as an example of "les incompréhensions et les contre-sens qui ... ont provoqué une évolution importante dans l'histoire de la philosophie" (337-338).

"Porphyre," Encyclopædia Universalis 13 (1972), 356.

Plotin ou la simplicité du regard² (Paris 1973; 1st ed. 1963). A splendid, lyrical introduction to the thought of Porphyry's master. Chapter 1, "Portrait" (11-19) gives an evocative picture of Plotinus' school at Rome as it was when Porphyry arrived there in 263 A.D. The author's "Bibliographie Analytique" of editions (165-171) and secondary literature on Plotinus (171-173) provide an invaluable first orientation in the study of this complex and seminally important figure. See now the author's Ecrits de Plotin, Traité 38 (= Enn. VI, 7), Introduction, traduction et notes par Pierre Hadot (Paris 1987), the first instalment in a projected translation and commentary of the whole of Plotinus' Enneads.

Titres et Travaux de Pierre Hadot (Vesoul 1981). The Curriculum Vitae the author submitted upon his election to the Chair of Roman and Hellenistic Thought of the Collège de France in 1983. Contains, under the rubric "Publications" (15-22), a Bibliography of 85 items, dating from between 1953 and 1981. Includes (7-14) a retrospective discussion of the author's main concerns, areas of interest and methodology, and (23-30) a sketch of the themes that guide his current investigations: On the one hand, the study of "the rules, forms and models of discourse" which determined the form, and often the content, of ancient philosophical texts; and on the other the intense study of how these rules were put into practice, especially in the writings of Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus and Augustine. In addition to the items listed in this work's bibliography, the following, published since 1981, should be mentioned:

"Préface" to Richard, Enseignement oral (1986) 7-15. Important considerations on the book in Antiquity, as well as the primarily oral and public nature of Philosophical instruction in Antiquity.

Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique² (Paris 1987a; 1st ed. 1981). A collection of Hadot's articles on ancient philosophy, some previously unpublished. Those on "conversion," "negative theology,"

and "exercices spirituels" are especially relevant to Porphyry's epoch.

"Théologie, exégèse, révélation, écriture dans la philosophie grecque," in Tardieu, Michel, ed., Les règles de l'interprétation (Paris 1987b) 13-34. Concentrates on the effort made by the later Neoplatonic philosophers to reconcile the theosophical poetry of the Chaldaean Oracles with the philosophy of Plato and Plotinus.

Hahm, David M. The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus, Ohio 1977). Useful on the Stoic doctrine of the elements.

Haussleiter, Johannes. Der Vegetarismus in der Antike (= Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 24, Berlin 1935). As the title indicates, mainly concerned with Porphyry's defense of Vegetarianism in the De Abstinentia; see Chap. 32 (316-337), "Der Neuplatoniker Porphyrios."

Hölderlin, Friedrich. Friedrich Hölderlin, Poems and Fragments, translated by Michael Hamburger, Bilingual edition with a preface, introduction and notes (London 1966).

Jones, A.H.M. The Decline of the Ancient World (London 1966). An abridged version, minus notes and appendices, of the author's 3-volume Later Roman Empire (Oxford 1964).

Krämer, Hans Joachim. Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin, von Hans Joachim Krämer (Amsterdam 1964). Contains valuable discussions of Numenius (63-91), Neo-Pythagoreanism (45-82), and Plotinus (292ff. et passim). With K. Gaiser's Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre (Stuttgart 1963), this work was at the origin of the so-called "School of Tübingen"'s work on Plato's unwritten doctrines. Their research, pursued fruitfully up to this day, has tended to show the Neoplatonists' ontology of multiple hypostases existed in nuce in the Platonic Academy, where it was transmitted orally. The picture emerges of an uninterrupted continuity of Greek philosophical thought, from the pre-Socratics to the sixth century A.D. See now Richard (1986) for a survey of their findings.

Kroll, Wilhelm. "Ein neuplatonischer Parmenideskommentar in einem Turiner Palimpsest," Rheinisches Museum 47 (1892) 599-627. The first publication and description of the anonymous Commentary, which Hadot was to ascribe to Porphyry (1961; 1968a); Saffrey (1988) 1-3.

De Oraculis Chaldaicis, ed. W. Kroll (Breslau 1894; reprinted Hildesheim 1962). The first edition of the Chaldaean Oracles, which exercised so great an influence on the philosophy of Porphyry, and through him on all subsequent Neoplatonists (Hadot 1968a passim). Still useful to consult as a supplement to Des Places' edition (1971).

- Lamberz, Erich. Porphyrii Sententiae ad Intelligibilia ducentes, edidit Erich Lamberz (Teubner, Leipzig 1975). Totally replaces the inadequate edition of B. Mommert (Leipzig 1907), from which scholars had hitherto been forced to work; on its imperfections see Lamberz' Praefatio LVIII-LIX. The author gives a lengthy, informative Introduction, (V-LXXVIII) discussing textual history and previous editions and translations (esp. pp. LIV-LXIV). Each of the 44 Sententiae is accompanied by extensive textual parallels and references to the rich bibliography given pp. LXXII-LXXV. Valuable Greek word index 69-88. An important contribution to Porphyrian studies.
- Lewy, Hans. Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire. Nouvelle édition par Michel Tardieu (Paris 1978; 1st edition Cairo 1956). An important, if quirky, study of a murky subject by a brilliant, idiosyncratic scholar. Lewy attempts to systematize the teachings of these difficult hexameters, which have been characterized [by Hadot in Tardieu (1987)] as "half pre-Plotinian cosmology, half theurgical prescriptions," and by Dodds, more succinctly but less sympathetically, as a "theosophical farrago" (1965, p.57). Of the work's 12 Excursuses, No. II (449-456), on "Porphyry and the Chaldaeans," and No. XI (503-512), on "Origen the Pagan" as the source for Porphyry's demonology in the De Abstinencia, are most directly relevant for our purposes. The Prefaces, Indices, Concordance, Notice, and Bibliography of Hans Lewy, by Michel Tardieu, plus contributions by P. Hadot and E.R. Dodds, make of this re-edition an impressive monument to scholarship.
- Lloyd, A.C. "The Later Neoplatonists" in Armstrong, ed., CHLGEMP, Part 4 (1967), 272-330. A lengthy review would be required to enumerate the shortcomings of this article, which, appearing in such a prominent and often-consulted reference work, has done much to discourage the study of Porphyry in the English-speaking world. At the outset Lloyd announces his methodology (272-273): he will "select," from the Neoplatonists' writings, "what is likely ... to be of philosophical interest in some currently accepted sense of philosophy." One wonders how an accurate, non-anachronistic historical study could possibly be carried out in such a way. At the term of a sloppily written, hard-to-follow exposition, full of inaccuracies [Proclus, In Tim. III, p.334 is criticising Theodore of Asine, not Porphyry (290n.3); Sent. 27 has nothing to do with the announced topic of virtues (293-294); Proclus In Remp. II p.307, 14-23 does not report Porphyry's views, but Proclus' (285), etc.], the author comes to the conclusions that Porphyry made no distinction between Noûs and the Soul, but rather "telescoped" the hypostases (288; 290); that all the hypostases are, for him, mere appearances of the One without substantial reality (291), and that the embodiment of the Soul is an illusion of thought (288; 293). It will have to suffice here to state that these assertions are simply false; nowhere does Porphyry say them; we have no testimonies stating he does; and Lloyd's faulty reasoning based on false premises is inadequate to infer

anything about Porphyry's thought. Lloyd's views have been criticised by Smith (1977) 5f.; 47n.10). The last word shall be that of Lloyd's friend and editor, A.H. Armstrong (1979, XXIV p.180 n.4): "If the Neoplatonists had thought like Professor Lloyd, they ought, no doubt, to have been strict monists in his sense. But I do not think they did, or were."

"Porphyry," Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 6 (1967) 411-412. Displays the same condescending lack of comprehension as the previous item; e.g. 412 ad fin. "while respectable in their day as philosophy, (Porphyry's writings) are of small philosophical interest in the modern sense."

Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics² (London 1986). The best brief survey of Porphyry's philosophical predecessors.

Mélanges Trouillard. Néoplatonisme: mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard (= Les Cahiers de Fontenay, Nos. 19-22; Fontenay aux Roses 1981). Contains 19 articles by eminent Neoplatonic scholars. Of particular interest for Porphyrian studies are the contributions of A.H. Armstrong (q.v.), H. Dörrie (141-159); P. Hadot (205-214); J. Pépin (275-290).

Merlan, Philippe. Part I, "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," CHLGEMP (1967) 14-132. Contains interesting discussions on Alexander of Aphrodisias and Numenius, but the author's treatment of the period as a whole is curiously sketchy. He has elsewhere produced valuable contributions to Middle- and Neoplatonic studies: see From Platonism to Neoplatonism² (the Hague 1960).

Morani, Moreno. Nemesii Emeseni de natura hominis, ed. Moreno Morani (Teubner, Leipzig 1987). Replaces the 1802 edition of C.H. Matthaeus, on which e.g. Dörrie (1959) was forced to rely. Useful Greek word index (146-193), but one could have wished for fuller textual parallels, Bibliography and Introductory material.

Nauck, Augustus. Porphyrii Philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta² (Teubner, Leipzig 1886, reprinted Hildesheim 1977). Still contains the only accessible text of the Philosophos' historia and Book IV of the De Abstinencia.

Le Néoplatonisme. Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, sciences humaines, Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969 (Paris 1971). Contains text of 41 communications on various aspects of Neoplatonism, by eminent international scholars. Of most immediate relevance to the study of Porphyry are the studies of P. Courcelle (153-165); J. Pépin (167-191); and G. Rocca-Serra (193-201). The studies of P. Thillet (293-301) and S. Pinès (303-317, q.v.) on Arabic Neoplatonism are particularly suggestive.

- Nilsson, Martin P. Geschichte der griechischen Religion (= Handbücher der Altertumswissenschaft, fünfte Abteilung) zweiter Band: Die Hellenistische und römische Zeit³ (München 1974). At pp.436ff. the author gives detailed analyses of Porphyry's De Abstinentia, Ad Anebonem, Περὶ Ἀγαλμάτων, Philosophy from Oracles and De Regressu Animae. He relies heavily for his interpretation, however, on Geffcken and Bidez. To be used with caution.
- Pinès, Salomon. "Les textes arabes dits plotiniens et le courant 'porphyrien' dans le Néoplatonisme grec," in Le Néoplatonisme (1971) 303-313. A stimulating comparison of the so-called Plotiniana arabica (The Theology of Aristotle, Epistle of Divine Science, and Sayings of the Greek Sage [accessible in G. Lewis' English translation in Plotini Opera, 3 vols., edd. P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzler 2 (Museum Lessianum, series philosophica, 34, Paris-Brussels 1959)], and Porphyry's Commentary on the Parmenides, ed. Hadot (1968a, Vol. 2). Many authorities now concur that these highly influential Arabic writings derive from Porphyry.
- Richard, Marie-Dominique. L'Enseignement oral de Platon: une nouvelle interprétation du platonisme (Paris 1986). A thorough, well-documented survey of the findings of the "School of Tübingen" (see above, Krämer 1964). As a highly valuable appendix, the author has added a selection of Testimonia Platonica (243-381): 94 passages, reproduced from Gaiser's Platos Ungeschriebene Lehre, with Greek and facing French translation, illustrative of Plato's oral teaching.
- Rostovtzeff, M. The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, 2nd edition revised by P.M. Fraser, 2 vols. (Oxford 1957).
- Saïd, Edward. Orientalism (New York 1978). An illuminating study of how economic interests influenced the West's conception of the Orient (the very concept of which is, for the author, a misleading fabrication). Even the most "objective" academic studies have been, and still are today, tainted by ready-made clichés of the "Oriental" as effeminate, lazy, sensual, intellectually inferior, irrational, etc. Saïd denotes this conglomeration of preconceptions, usually held unconsciously, as "Orientalism," and it is in this sense that I would refer to the above-mentioned works of Bidez, Geffcken, Nilsson et al. as to greater or lesser degrees "Orientalist."
- Saffrey, H.D. "Connaissance et inconnaissance de Dieu: Porphyre et la Théosophie de Tübingen," in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75 (Buffalo 1988), 1-20. An attempt by an eminent Dominican Neoplatonic scholar to prove, via comparison with the late fifth-century Theosophy of Tübingen, that the Commentary on the Parmenides is indeed, as Hadot first claimed (1961; 1968a etc.), by Porphyry.
- Sambursky, Salomon. The Physics of the Stoics (London 1959).

Segonds, Alain-Philippe. "Les Fragments de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," Appendice to Des Places (1982) 163-197. A French translation, with extensive and important notes, of Porphyry's Philosophos Historia (text in Nauck² (1886 4-16). A valuable contribution, especially for its learned discussion of the work's possible influence on the Islamic world.

Smith, Andrew. Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague 1974). Part I, 1-80, contains a detailed, if somewhat pedestrian, account of Porphyry's doctrine of the soul, relying heavily upon the findings of Heinrich Dörrie. (Part II, 81-141, deals with theurgy and is less directly concerned with Porphyry). While useful for carefully-delimited discussions of Porphyry's doctrinal differences from Plotinus, Smith's work suffers from his refusal to take into account the Turin Commentary on the Parmenides, which Hadot (1960; 1968a, etc.) has shown to be by Porphyry.

Sodano, Angelo Raffaele. Porphyrii in Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta, (Napoli 1958). A collection of fragments taken from Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus. For which the edition of E. Diehl (Leipzig 1903-06), and the French translation of A.-J. Festugière (1966-68) are to be preferred.

"Porfirio commentatore di Platone," EH 12 (1966), 193-228.

Porfirio, Lettera ad Anebo (Napoli 1964). Text and Italian translation, replacing the edition of Th. Gale in Jamblichi de mysteriis liber, rec. G. Parthey (Berlin 1857). Contains valuable introductory material vii-xxxv, on Porphyry's life and thought, and two Appendices (47-71) on the work's relations to divination and theurgy, and to the Hermetic writings. Textual history xxxvii-1.

Tardieu, Michel, ed. Les règles de l'interprétation (Paris 1987). Contains articles by authorities on the "religions of the Book" Christianity, Islam, Judaism etc., on diverse aspects of religious textual exegesis. Especially revelant to Neoplatonism are the contributions of Pierre Hadot, "Théologie, exégèse, révélation, écriture dans la philosophie grecque" (13-34 q.v.); of Ilsetraut Hadot, "Les Introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens" (99-122), and of M.-D. Richard, "La méthode exégétique de Schleiermacher dans son application au platonisme" (209-225).

Tarn, W.W. Hellenistic Civilisation³, revised by the author and G.W. Griffith (New York 1952; reprinted 1975). On the period immediately preceding Porphyry. Apt to be somewhat dated, but still useful; especially Chapter X (325-360): "Philosophy and Religion," which benefitted from the observations of A.D. Nock.

Taylor, Thomas.. Select Works of Porphyry, containing his four books on Abstinence from Animal Food, his Treatise on the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs, and his Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures, translated from the Greek by Thomas Taylor (London 1823). Contains what is still the only accessible translation of Book IV of the De Abstinence, and one of only three translations of Porphyry's Sententiae (Lamberz [1975] LXIII-LXIV). The 1965 Centaur Press edition of On Abstinence is nothing other than a pirated version -- with no indication of date -- of this translation; a fact of which the Encyclopedia Britannica [17 (1985) 616] seems unaware. On Taylor and his important translation activity see Kathleen Raine and G.M. Harper, Thomas Taylor the Platonist: Selected Writings (Princeton 1969); Raine in Le Néoplatonisme (1971) 475-483: "Thomas Taylor et le mouvement romantique anglais."

Theiler, Willy. Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (1927; reprinted Berlin and Zürich 1964). A pioneer work in the study of Neoplatonism, emphasizing the influence of Posidonius and Antiochus of Ascalon.

Porphyrios und Augustin [Schriften der Königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse 10, Heft I, Halle 1933; reprinted in the author's Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 10; Berlin 1966).] The author's most influential -- and controversial -- work on Porphyry, in which he claimed all of Augustine's philosophical knowledge derived from Porphyry, and formulated his celebrated Arbeitssatz. A monument of erudition -- he discusses some 30 of Porphyry's works -- Theiler's central theses have met with only qualified approval; see Hadot (1968a) 1.24-27; A.H. Armstrong's review in Gnomon 40 (1969) 204-206.

Review of E. Benz, Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abend-ländischen Willensmetaphysik, Gnomon 10 (1934) 493-499.

Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios [1942, reprinted in Forschungen (1966) 252ff.] All Theiler's works are marked by vast learning; but his style, consisting of lengthy, dense sentences interrupted by Latin and Greek quotations, several references and renvois to numerous footnotes, make him extremely difficult to read. A complete and thorough reading of Theiler's work would require much time and a very well-stocked library. I have not yet undertaken such a complete reading, and so am as yet incapable of judging the validity of Theiler's arguments.

Todd, Robert B. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the de Mixtione with text, translation and commentary (= Philosophia antiqua 28, Leiden 1976). Contains rare translations of texts by Alexander, an important influence on Porphyry.

Verbeke, G. L'Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma, du Stoïcisme à S. Augustin (Paris and Louvain 1945). The most thorough and well-

documented survey of the subject. Chapter IV, pp.363-374, on Porphyry, is indispensable for the role the pneuma plays in Porphyry's doctrine of the descent of the soul through the celestial spheres, in human psychology and epistemology during our terrestrial existence. In eschatology, finally, the weight and consistency of the pneuma determines whether the soul reascends to the Noetic regions, or else is subjected to a further reincarnation.

Wallis, R.T. Neoplatonism (Classical Life and Letters 4, London 1972). The first study of Neoplatonism in English since Whittaker's Neoplatonists² (1916), and probably still the best. Clear and well-written, Wallis' treatment of Porphyry (94-137) suffers from a too-heavy reliance on the untenable arguments of Lloyd (1967), and from that congenital defect of the "Liverpool School": the refusal to accept Hadot's attribution of the Commentary on the Parmenides to Porphyry (99; 119 etc.). Paradoxically, this does not prevent him from giving, in his Chapter on "Porphyry and Iamblichus," the most penetrating and perceptive analysis of the Commentary yet written in English (110-118). Wallis' discussions of Numenius (32-36); the Chaldaean Oracles (105-106); and Plotinus (37-93) are particularly strong.

Walzer, Richard. "Fūrfuriyūs," Encyclopedia of Islam 2 (1955) 948-949.

"Porphyry and the Arabic Tradition," EH 12 (1966) 275-297.

"Early Islamic Philosophy," Part VIII, CHLGEMP (1967) 643-669.

"Lost Neoplatonic Thought in the Arabic Tradition," in Le Néoplatonisme (1971) 319-328. One of the very few researchers in the field of the influence of Greek philosophy on Islamic theology, Walzer made, for reasons unknown to me, an unfavorable impression on some of his fellow scholars [Badawī (1987), for example, attacks him in vitriolic terms in his opening pages, while Segonds (in Des Places 1982, p.169 n.2), dismisses Walzer's 1966 paper as "superficiel"]. Whatever may have caused these negative appraisals, Walzer's efforts to prepare the ground for the recovery of lost Greek texts from Arabic translation was worthwhile in intention, if not in execution.

Waszink, J.-H. "Porphyrios und Numenios," EH 12 (1966) 38-83. An interesting topic, but Waszink's picture of Porphyry's thought derives from Beutler (1953), and does not take into account Hadot's discoveries. Waszink is more informative on Porphyry's influence on Calcidius (whom he has edited) than on the former's debt to Numenius.

Whittaker, John. "The Historical Background of Proclus' Doctrine of the 'ΑΥΤΟΓΕΝΕΤΑΤΑ," EH 21 (1975) 193-237. An erudite, stimulating study, in which Porphyry, among many others, is used as evidence for the doctrine of the self-generation of the second hypostasis (i.e. Intelligence). The doctrine that the ultimate principle, be it the Neoplatonists' One or the Christian's God, was self-generated rather

than not generated at all, had been taught by Plotinus, but was subsequently decreed a heretical belief. Whittaker's tracing of the "hereticization" of the belief in the self-generation of the Ultimate Principle, and of its survival in heterodox milieux, both Pagan and Christian, is the main object of this fascinating study.

Wilken, Robert L. The Christians as the Romans saw them (New Haven and London 1984). Chap. 6 (126-160) indicates by its title, "Porphyry, the Most Learned Critic of All," the respect the author has for Porphyry as a philological and Biblical textual critic. In the course of a good discussion of Porphyry's Contra Christianos, Wilken gives a good account of the work's content, and of the debate now raging about the reliability of the sources [Primarily Makarios Magnes (c.400)] used to reconstitute the Contre Christianos; a major obstacle to the Fragments' edition and translation. Up-to-date bibliographic status quaestionis given in the chapter's footnotes. Other good studies of Neoplatonic objections to Christianity may be found in Dodds (1965); Wallis (1972) 100-110.

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