

TECHNIQUES OF VISION: PHOTOGRAPHY PRACTICES AND THE GOVERNING
OF SUBJECTIVITIES

by

Goldwynn Lewis
BA, Concordia University, 2002

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This thesis explores how photography has been used in the governing of subjectivities and draws on the following three forms of governmentality identified by Michel Foucault: biopower, discipline and ethics. In photography's early history discourses on character and insanity privileged visual observation and the camera was used as a more precise extension of the clinician's eye. With the emergence of Freud's "talking cure" the use of still-photography in treatment and diagnosis was generally neglected until the 1970s when the medium was re-configured as an ideal technique for accessing the unconscious. Currently Phototherapy clients, with the aid of a therapist, use personal photos in order to identify and modify problematic aspects of self. I draw on Michel Foucault's second and third period work in order to investigate these shifting relationships of photography to subjectivity.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

From its earliest applications photography has been instrumental in cultural practices of governing subjectivities; practices of governing aim to “shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon 1991:2). Michel Foucault identifies practices of government using his concept of governmentality. This thesis will examine the relationship between photography practices in fields related to psychology and psychiatry and the exercise of three forms of governmentality identified by Foucault: biopower, discipline and ethics. My understanding of these terms is that they are not mutually exclusive. The sociological significance of the study is to examine the potential impact of photography practices on the formation of subjectivity. In addition, the research is intended to address a gap in Foucauldian interpretations of photography practices by introducing his concept of ethics¹ to the study. Lastly the study will suggest possible avenues for future research.

In Michel Foucault’s final works he turns his political analysis towards the perspective of governmentality or the “conduct of conduct.” In his essay title “Governmentality,” Foucault examines various texts that address the question of “how to govern” that began to multiply beginning in sixteenth century Europe. Governmentality, as the management of possibilities, replaces Foucault’s earlier focus on power-knowledge. In keeping with his argument that “the State, for all the omnipotence of its

¹Foucault distinguishes ethics from morality. John Rajchman writes, “‘morals’ refers to the prescriptive code one is obliged to follow on pain of sanction, internal or external. ‘Ethical’ refers to the kind of person one is supposed to aspire to be, the kind of life one is incited to lead, or the special moral state one is invited to attain. There are thus ‘moral’ problems about the code, its principles and its application; then there are ‘ethical’ problems about how to turn oneself into the right kind of person” (1991: 90).

apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations,” governmentality corresponds to non-sovereign games of power (Foucault 1980:122).

Governmentality refers to the way we think about governing others and ourselves. Foucault states that, “‘governmentality’ implies the relationship of the self to itself, and covers the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use in dealing with each other” (1994a: 300). Mitchell Dean writes “to analyze government is to analyze those practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (1999: 12). Foucault argues that the perspective of governmentality can be applied to a multiplicity of relations, “not only the legitimately constituted form of political or economic subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, that [are] destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people” (1994b: 341).

In this thesis I am using the concept of governmentality in an inclusive way similar to that used by Foucault in his essay “The Subject and Power.” Here he includes all relations which involve “the conduct of conduct” and importantly presupposes the freedom “of those who are governed entailed in the capacities of acting and thinking” (Dean 1999:15). “In this sense one might speak of the government of a ship, of a family, of a prison or factory, of a colony, and of a nation, as well as the government of oneself” (Rose 1999:12).

Overview of the chapters

In this chapter I outline my methodology and the theoretical approach used in the thesis and I present a justification for the study of photography. I argue that the perspective of governmentality is well-suited to this study because it analyzes non-sovereign forms of power. In addition I suggest that the Foucauldian concept of the gaze is useful for the purposes of this study, but should be supplemented with a view to Foucault's later work on ethics. Lastly, I discuss Niels Anderson's description of self-technologies (2003) and outline the three main themes in practices of photography as therapy, or in therapy that have appeared over time.

Chapter 2 is an overview of Foucault's concepts of biopower, discipline and ethics and their application to photography. The chapter is divided into three sections that present a summary of each individual concept and includes an explicit linking of Foucault's concept to a photography practice/representation. This will enable me to launch into a general discussion of psy photography and governmentality in chapter 3.

Chapter 3 presents my analysis of the shifting interpretations of psy photography and is structured around Hugh W. Diamond's 1856 arguments for the use of photos in psychiatry. In this section aspects of positivism and realism are considered. The role of positivism in early psy photography is essential in understanding the work of Dr. Diamond and his contemporaries as well as understanding the medium itself. The second section of this chapter provides a description of phototherapy case examples.

Chapter 4 is my conclusion. I restate the findings of chapter 3 on the relationship between photography and the governing of subjectivities and include some ideas on

possible avenues for future research. This thesis is exploratory and will hopefully act as a stepping-stone towards future projects. In a broad sense it is an opportunity for me to examine how photography potentially produces, explains, and challenges social relations and subjectivities. Lastly this thesis is intended to contribute research to an under-theorized area of sociology and allows me to consider photography practices in relation to one of the traditional questions of this discipline: “how [subjectivity] is formed, how it furthers or undermines social domination, how it might be re-formed” (Valverde 1991: 174).

Schematic:

Governmentality →

Biopower	Discipline	Ethics
<p>Goal: manage health of population and reproduction of life.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phase 1: beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and exercised by various regimes such as churches and schools. Phase 2: bio-power is taken up and primarily exercised at the level of state governments, this is also the time in which photography emerges. Phase 3 present-day: biopower is increasingly downloaded onto corporations and individuals. <p>Concerned with strategies which will maximize life of population.</p>	<p>Goal: prediction, increased capacities and simultaneously utility of individuals. Strategies include examinations, drills, surveillance.</p>	<p>Goal: management of self by self, i.e., self-mastery. Relies on strategies which will mediate relation of self to self towards particular ends.</p>

Applies to the thesis in the following ways:

<p>First systematic use of still-photography was in psychiatry where it was used to create large indexes of illnesses and their symptoms. The strategy was to manage the health and illness of populations in order to enable large scale intervention, i.e., division of populations, institutionalization, and treatment. Photographs were also used to render the progress of illnesses/cures predictable and thereby to open the future to technical intervention. Photographs produced and used almost exclusively by clinicians.</p>	<p>Photography as apparatus of the gaze. Photographs used to monitor and assess an individual's degree of deviation from norms of mental health and compliance with goals of treatment. Photographs produced and viewed by patients and public occasionally but primary consumers are clinicians.</p>	<p>Photographs used to identify problematic aspects of self that are then worked on with a therapist. Ethics implies some form of self-activated activity. Photographs produced by clients, patients and therapists. Interpretation of image content by client is privileged over that of therapist.</p>
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Methodology

I have narrowed my analysis in chapter 3 to photography practices and media that use photos in the governing of subjectivities in order to keep my study very specific and avoid over-generalizing the meaning and uses of photographs. I have generated approximately twenty images for my analysis. I have chosen these particular media because they lend themselves to sociological and historical analysis. In many instances large catalogues of photographs were produced in a single publication that are all very similar in composition and content; therefore one or two images were selected to represent the collection. Also this sample explicitly addresses questions of identity, which makes them ideal data for this study since my aim is to examine the governing of subjectivities via photography.

My sources include books, essays, websites and lectures published by therapist and other mental health workers; these media were produced for students and clinicians in the psy disciplines. I also draw on my participation, notes and handouts at a phototherapy workshop in August 2005 as part of the 26th Annual Canadian Art Therapy Association Conference. My discussion only takes into account those practices that used pre-filmic and filmic processes and includes photographs by Jean Martin Charcot, and Hugh W. Diamond who both worked in asylums mid to late eighteenth century, as well as Judy Weiser's *PhotoTherapy Techniques: Exploring the Secrets of Personal Snapshots and Family Albums* (1993), David Krauss and Jerry L. Fryrear's (eds.), *Phototherapy in Mental Health*(1983), and Linda Berman's *Beyond the Smile: the Therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993). With the advent of Freud's 'talking cure' in the early 1900s

photograph as a therapeutic tool is deemphasized and does not have much of a presence until the 1970s when it is combined with talk therapy to produce the discipline of Phototherapy. In the introduction to *Phototherapy in Mental Health (1983)*, Fryrear and Krauss provide the following two definitions of phototherapy 1) “the use of photography or photographic materials, under the guidance of a trained therapist, to reduce or relieve painful psychological symptoms and to facilitate psychological growth and therapeutic change,” 2) “the systematic application of photographic images and or the photographic process (often in combination with visually referent language and imaging) to create positive change in clients’ thoughts, feelings and behaviours” (3).

I have chosen to work with pre-existing texts for this study for the practical reason that it allows me to examine a wide-range of practices separate from social settings which would normally be restricted to members of the public, i.e., private therapy sessions. Also, this study is grounded in the theoretical perspectives of Michel Foucault who favours viewing individuals as produced within various practical systems. Therefore “in order to understand the social world and, more specifically, how meanings are created and social power is enacted researchers must go beyond ‘imprinted’ individuals and deconstruct cultural texts” (Hesse-Biber 2004: 306).

I will only examine photography in disciplines related to psychology and psychiatry, hereafter referred to as “psy” disciplines but presume that therapeutic uses of photography are to some extent “an extension of ‘lay’ uses of photographs,” (Cronin 1998:70) since phototherapists rely on their clients already having particular relationships to and understandings of photographs. I do not make any general claims about the essential nature of photography, as for instance Roland Barthes has done in *Camera*

Lucida (1981), but structure my understanding of the medium around Alan Sekula's essay, "On the invention of photographic meaning" (1975). In this essay he argues that photographic discourse has articulated two prominent truths of the medium: 1) photography is an unmediated, transparent copy of reality: and 2) "the image is also invested with a magical power to penetrate appearances to transcend the visible; to reveal, for example, secrets of human character" (Sekula 1975:36,39). Over the course of its history psy photography has incorporated both of these assumptions and sometimes both.


Justification of the problem

Psychology and psychiatry are disciplines that play an important role in processes of subjectification, indeed some academics have gone so far as to comment on the rise of a “therapeutic culture of the self” (Rose 1998:156). Disciplines within the field of psychology are characterized as “caring” professions, i.e., concerned with the promotion of individual health and wellness. According to Nikolas Rose over time the expertise and vocabularies of psychology have dispersed across the social body.

Psychology has been embodied in the techniques and devices invented for the government of conduct and deployed not only by psychologists themselves but also by doctors, priests, philanthropists, architects, teachers. Increasingly, that is to say, the strategies, programmes, techniques and devices and reflections on the administration of conduct which Michel Foucault terms governmentality or simply government have become "psychologized". The exercise of modern forms of political power has become intrinsically linked to a knowledge of human subjectivity [Rose 1991].

Personal cameras have also become increasingly accessible and common place. The practice of photography has progressively increased since its invention; according to “the 1992-93 Wolfman Report (a large scale market research survey carried out periodically on behalf of the photographic industry), 17.2 billion photographs were taken in the US in 1993, in comparison with the 8.9 billion photos taken in the US in 1977, and 3.9 billion in 1967... in the UK, the ‘Kodacolor Gold’ Survey (1990) reported that 80 percent of households owned cameras” (Cronin 1998: 70). Although I do not explore the similarities or differences in the ways individuals use and interpret photographs in their everyday life with the way clients use and interpret photos in phototherapy practices, with the prevalence of psychological expertise and photography alike it is probable that there exists some overlap.

Photography has been present in the psy disciplines since the mid-nineteenth century. According to Sander L. Gilman “it was in psychiatry...that the first systemic theory and practice of clinical photography were undertaken” (1976: 5). As early as 1856 and less than twenty years after the invention of photography Dr. Hugh W. Diamond presented a series of photographic studies on types of insanity to a London audience, and argued in favour of using photography in clinical work.



Photograph 28

Figure 1.1 Source: Linda Berman. 1993. *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of photographs*. London: Routledge, pp. 181.

Photographic practices and meanings are complex and multiple, for example many artists such as Richard Billingham (Figures 1.2) or Christian Boltanski have produced or exhibited family photographs, while psychologists use similar images as a therapeutic technique called “Phototherapy” (Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1 was taken from Linda Berman’s, *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993). She writes, “In Photograph 28 we see Colin as a small child. The picture sums up some of the confusion that Colin must have experienced from an early age” (180).

Although “no photographic or video image need have one single identity...no images are, for example, essentially ‘ethnographic’ but are given ethnographic meanings in relation to the discourses that people use to define them” (Pink 2001: 28). Generally, over its history photography has been used as a tool for documentation and exploration by professional, “lay” photographers and scientists from various disciplines alike.



Figure 1.2 Billingham, untitled 1995

The colour photograph is by British artist Richard Billingham of his family and was published in 1996 by Scalo in a book titled *Ray's a Laugh*. www.designboom.com/eng/funclub/billingham.html, accessed February 2005.

Presently psy photography is moving towards the possibilities of digital technologies through for instance neural imaging techniques and e-therapy or cybertherapy². Phototherapists are exploring the potential of new imaging technologies like scanners and digital manipulation.

The emotive quality charged through images can captivate and motivate the human psyche in ways that other media simply cannot. Perhaps it is because the evocative power of a photographic image can stir the soul back into a time long forgotten. Coupled with the power of technological advances, *people can rework past images and their selves in the process*. Phototherapy continues to progress just as surely as the human race does in its quest for continued development. As

² Cybertherapy and e-therapy denote the use of Internet (email, real-time chat, videoconferencing, instant messaging) and Virtual Reality technologies in individual therapy. Also referred to as e-counseling. E-therapists do not diagnose or treat mental illness.

technology advances, so too, does the palate of phototherapy [Horovitz 2001:16 *italics added*].

It is likely that the possibilities for reworking the self and governing subjectivities will change and multiply with the proliferation of new photography practices and with the increase of personal photographs.

In *Governing the Soul* (1989), Nikolas Rose looks at images used in the psy disciplines, and includes a small number of photographs (Figure 1.1) and illustrations. He discusses these images in relation to techniques of inscription, which he argues make new areas of life practicable: “devices and techniques for visualization and inscription are not merely technical aids to intellectual processes. To think this is to accord too much to a faculty of abstract thought and too little to the technical mechanisms by which thought operates” (Rose 1989:149). Maria Valverde argues that “problematizing the world in a new way makes certain techniques appear as more useful than others” (2004: 76). His discussion of photography as a “technical mechanism” though is limited to a few brief sentences. My contention is that photography has played a critical role in the production of knowledge of individuals and groups and as such warrants investigation. As Michel Foucault wrote in one of his final essays,

The historical ontology of ourselves must answer an open series of questions; it must make an indefinite number of inquiries which may be multiplied and specified as much as we like but which will all address the questions systematized as follows: How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions? [1994a: 318]

This project will hopefully provide some insight into how photography has been figured into our present taken-for-granted ways of thinking about subjectivity and visibility.

Plate 2: Normalizing development



Source: Arnold Gesell, *The first five years of life*, London, Methuen, (1950)

Figure 1.3 Nikolas Rose, *Governing the Soul: the shaping of the private self* (1989). London: Routledge, pp. 145.

Why study photography?

From its inception in 1839 photography has been a source of controversy. Some like Charles Baudelaire felt that photography and realism would lead the masses away from artistic truth, which he thought of as imagination, dreams and fantasy. In an essay written in 1859 titled "The Modern Public and Photography," Baudelaire wrote: "Can it legitimately be supposed that a people whose eyes get used to accepting the results of a material science as products of the beautiful will not, within a given time, have singularly diminished its capacity for judging and feeling those things that are most ethereal and immaterial?" (1980:89). A little over a hundreds years later Susan Sontag argued that "needing to have reality confirmed and experience enhanced by photographs is an aesthetic consumerism to which everyone is now addicted. Industrial societies turn their citizens into image-junkies: it is the most irresistible form of mental pollution" (1977: 24). Indeed, photographs and automatic cameras are so commonplace we tend to take their existence for granted. The 1993-1994 *Wolfman Report on the Photographic and Imaging Industry in the United States* states,

It [photography industry] is spread out over several continents, absorbing new technologies, and involved in virtually every phase of modern life. As with any dynamic situation, there is a high discomfort index but despite the travail, more and more people in more and more parts of the world continue to take more and more pictures. Unless and until this situation changes, photography will continue to maintain its solid growth, not a bad prospect for any market [1994:100].

Nonetheless as a topic of sociological inquiry, photography has remained very low on the list of important subject areas. As Celia Lury argued in the introduction to her book *Prosthetic Culture: photography, memory and identity*, "[w]hile there is a long-standing and growing literature on the subject-effects of narrative, the significance of the image

for understandings of the self in modern Euro-American societies still remains somewhat under-developed” (1998: 2). Similarly Scott McQuire writes,

for a variety of reasons, a decisive absence still structures the dominant routes of politics, sociology and social theory: a paucity of references to the camera and a lack of consideration of the scope of its social and political effects, which are regularly consigned either to the margins and footnotes, or the implicitly narrower domain of ‘media studies’ [1998: 5].

And yet most people would agree that it is almost as unusual to pass a day and not see a photograph as it is to not see written text. “In one institutional context or another – the press, family snapshot, billboards, etc. – photographs permeate the environment, facilitating the formation/reflection/inflexion of what we ‘take for granted’” (Burgin 1982:142).

Disciplines such as neuroscience and psychology have long established the importance of studying visual technologies. Rogowitz et al.’s article, “Human vision and electronic imaging,” outlines the relationship between research on the ‘human visual system’ and imaging technology and argue that this two-way interaction “will continue to grow in scope and importance,” particularly with what the authors refer to as higher-applications such as visualization and digital libraries (2001: 17). Photography and other visual technologies continue to create and alter objects of knowledge and forms of subjectivity through various practices related, for instance to surveillance and security, travel photography, family albums, or the creation of enormous image-memory banks.³

³ For example, to date the National Library and Archive Canada has over 23.1 million still photographs in its collection, a large number of which are part of a public digital archive. Private corporations have also embraced a move towards digital photography archives. “The Batman Archive, one of the USA’s largest picture collections known for its ability to sell in bulk to major media markets, has been acquired by Corbis Corporation, the digital image library and distribution company set up by Microsoft’s Bill Gates. The 16 million image collection includes all of the United Press archive and was founded by Dr Otto Bettmann in 1930. Corbis has already acquired images from David Meunch, Roger Ressmeyer, Galen Rowell and many other photographers.” *Photon*, Web Edition press release, December 1995.

Understanding how people use photos and how practices of looking inform and shape forms of subjectivity is both under-theorized in sociology and a significant area of research. As Scott McQuire contends “the ability to witness things outside all previous limits of time and space highlights the fact that the camera doesn’t only give us new means to represent experience: it changes the nature of experience and redefines our processes of understanding” (1998: 2).

Why Michel Foucault's work is well-suited to the study

Foucault distinguishes between sovereign and non-sovereign forms of power and this analytic distinction makes this work well-suited to this study. Governmentality is a non-sovereign form of power that Jack Bratich argues reformulates

the governor-governed relationship, [and] does not make the relationship dependent upon administrative machines, juridical institutions, or other apparatuses that usually get grouped together upon the rubric of the State...the conduct of conduct takes place at innumerable sites, though an array of techniques and programs that are usually defined as cultural [2003: 4].

The sovereignty model continues to hold a place of prominence in legal institutions and political theory where research and polemics often centre on the sovereignty of “the nation,” or “the people” and addresses problems of legitimacy and ideology. For example, Ladelle McWhorter argues that debates concerning the legalization of abortion that frame a body as the property of an individual mind, or perhaps for those who oppose this right as the property of God, are positions that are structured around the idea of sovereignty (1999: 142-143). As Foucault remarks “such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty. What we need, however is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition” (1980: 121).

I acknowledge Foucault's argument that it is not accurate in post-monarchical societies to view power only or primarily in terms of sovereignty; in his words “[i]n political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (Foucault 1978: 88-89).

Sovereignty emerges as a theory and practices of monarchical rule that is later democratized through liberal and democratic states with their representative institutions. Its characteristic mechanisms are constitutions, laws and parliaments.

Sovereign power is exercised through the juridical and executive arms of the state. It is exercised over subjects. Discipline, on the other hand, has a long history with diverse origins in monastic, military and educational practices. It concerns the exercise of power over and through the individual, the body and its forces and capacities, and the composition of aggregates of human individuals (classes, armies, etc.) [Dean 1999:19].

During the classical era power is defined in relation to a sovereign (king) who is both above the law and exercises the law; this is also referred to as the juridical model of power. Juridical power revolves around laws and is a negative power, meaning it stops people from doing particular acts and presupposes a universal subject who is a bearer of rights and duties. “Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms – that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control and even “protection” of individuals” (Butler 1990:2). In the modern era, the sovereign model of knowledge-power is accompanied by disciplinary knowledge-power. For example, within contemporary penal and legal institutions disciplines like psychiatry and criminology are commonly accepted forms of authority found for instance in the expert witness or testimony.

The perspective of governmentality allows me to remain focused on photos and photography practices themselves, while arguing that they are part of the larger cultural imperative of governing populations and individuals. Other paradigms or perspectives often assume one type of practical system (body of knowledge) is sovereign or determining to some greater or lesser extent of others, whether, for example, it is the economy, patriarchy, or religion. In addition, Nikolas Rose argues that Foucault’s work rejects two ways in which we tend to think about power and subjectivity that are useful to the thesis.

Foucault... analyzes power not as a negation of the vitality and capacities of individuals, but as the creation, shaping, and utilization of human beings as subjects. Power, that is to say, works through, and not against, subjectivity. Further, we think about political power largely in terms of oppositions between 'the state' and 'private life', and locate subjectivity within the latter. But Foucault conceives of power as that which traverses all practices – from the macro to the micro – through which persons are ruled, mastered, held in check, administered, steered, guided, by means of which they are led by others or have come to direct or regulate their own actions [1999: 151-152].

Foucault's theories do not claim a foundational subject; it is only through a multiplicity of practices and games of truth that we are self-constituted as subjects of one kind or another. Within psy photography practices there are numerous subject positions created but generally they can be dichotomized under the themes of healthy-pathological.

Foucault discusses the word "subject" invoking a double sense of the word: "he means to say that modern forms of power tie the subjectivity (conscience, identity, self-knowledge) of the individual to that individual's subjection (control by another). The subject is one who is both under the authority of another and the author of her or his own actions" (Cruikshank 1999:21). There is no clean distinction between subjection and subjectivation as in private/public, structure/agency. As agents we are both subject to norms and enabled by norms. Power always involves resistance and hence these processes are always incomplete, i.e., we are never fully normalized. Disciplinary power responds through reform, so there is a sense of these relations being fluid and adaptable. As Nikolas Rose maintains, "the heterogeneity of these practices and techniques [technologies of the self] – their multiple interconnections, alliances, conflicts, and divergences, the different promises they hold out, and the variable demands they make of human beings – can produce all the effects of resistance, appropriation, utilization,

transformation, and transgression...without the need to invoke a unifying conception of 'human agency'" (1999: 187).

The relationship between therapist and client-patient, I think, is one of government since it involves both politics (power relations) and ethics (relation of self to self). Phototherapist David A. Krauss writes "the therapeutic process is a process of change. It is a refocusing of feelings, thoughts, and behaviours, which help create a different outlook and greater insight. Much of this process is educational where we collaborate with clients to help them 'to be' different" (1983: 65). In addition R.H. Spire a nurse working with female patients at a psychiatric hospital and using photographic self-confrontation as therapy writes "at times, a major psychotherapeutic objective is to charge the patient with the task of remolding his [sic] self-image so that it approximates the image that others have of him" (1973: 1207). In both cases these clinicians use their authority over others to encourage a new relation of the subject to itself and claim that this activity should be self-activated and internalized. This does not necessarily mean that photography is used to mediate a relationship between these clinicians and their patients-clients that is oppressive, although this is one possibility. Helen O'Grady, for example, has made affirmative links between Foucault's critique of disciplinary-normalization and narrative therapy arguing that

Narrative therapy applies Foucault's general point to particular, individual cases as reflected in its practical investigation of the historical processes that have constituted individuals as they are, and the exploration of possibilities for self making more in line with their preferred ways of being. The forging of reauthored identities in relation to the sociohistorical context frees people from subjection to an essential identity and leaves open the possibility of ongoing self-making [2005: 120].

Likewise Barbara Cruikshank claims in *The will to empower (1999)*, “the will to empower others and oneself is neither a bad nor a good thing. It is a political thing; the will to empower contains the twin possibilities of domination and freedom” (2).

The gaze

Imagine a world where visualization is routinely used to enlighten, enrich and enhance life. (From the mission statement of Oregon 3D, 2004)

A discourse is similar to a practical system in that both terms refer to a body of knowledge. Generally, discourse analysis is concerned with the study of broad social domains, such as discourses of law, medicine, criminality and so forth (Cartwright 2001: 94). Discourses are mutable, respond to reforms and are made of diverse rules, practices and statements which produce a variety of subject positions. For example, eighteenth century discourses on insanity in Euro-America societies were based on the rules and techniques of phrenology and physiognomy and produced the “hysteric” as a type of subject. Over time these bodies of knowledge and the designation of “hysterical” were transformed, discredited or abandoned; thus, discourses are historically and culturally specific. Lisa Cartwright claims that “photography has often been a central factor in the functioning of discourses since the nineteenth century” (2001: 95). Discourses produce specific practices of looking that are often examined using the concept of the “gaze.”

The gaze is a prominent concept in visual studies, which follows two general trajectories; one is linked to Foucault’s work and examines an institutional gaze, “the gaze as an apparatus of investigation, verification, surveillance, and cognition...” the other relates to the gaze as desire, “which splits spectatorship into the arena of desiring subjects and desired objects” (Rogoff 1996:189). The gaze is an important concept in Foucault’s work and is linked to the will to know discussed in the following chapter.

Although both the psychoanalytic and Foucauldian use of this concept deal with looking and relations of power the gaze as fantasy is a very different idea from Foucault's.

Gillian Rose writes,

Content analysis, semiology and psychoanalysis all assume that analysis needs somehow to delve behind the surface appearance of things in order to discover their real meaning. ...Foucault rejected such 'penetrative' models of interpretation at the level of method, but also at the level of explanation, since he also wanted to avoid explanatory accounts of why power works in the way it does [2001: 139].

The gaze in Foucault's writing is a practice of looking that is a means of exercising and negotiating power within a given institutional context (Sturken 2001:356). In *Discipline and Punish* (1977), alone there are numerous references to for example a normalizing, inspecting gaze (170, 171, 184), and the gaze as surveillance and disciplinary apparatus (173, 177, 187). Foucault will later argue in his essay "The Eye of Power," that "the gaze has had great importance among the techniques of power developed in the modern era," but it is not the only or principle technique employed (1980:155). Nonetheless most applications of Foucault's work to visual studies have draw on passages from *Discipline and Punish*, such as, "In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection" (1977:187). Scott McQuire argues that "a decisive factor in the construction of the disciplines was the transformation of habitual ways of seeing....Throughout Foucault's work on the disciplines this systematic realignment of vision and power is prominent" (1998: 37).

Many theorists have used Foucault's work on disciplinary normalization and surveillance to understand institutional uses of photography and their representations, for

instance, John Tagg's *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (1988), or Eric Margolis's essay "Looking at discipline, looking at labour: photographic representations of Indian boarding schools" (2004).



Figure 1.4 Source: Eric Margolis. 2004. "Looking at discipline, looking at labour: photographic representations of Indian schools." *Visual Studies*, (19)1: 80.

Margolis writes of Figure 1.4 "like mug shots and rogues' galleries [the photographs] suggest the facial expressions of those who have no ability to resist the gaze of the lens or the power of the photographer to take a picture. In examining the photographs one can also discern a number of covert institutional agendas including power, propaganda and the surveillance to which teachers and students alike were

subjected” (2004: 80). John Tagg makes similar use of Foucault’s work in his analysis of vision, power and photography.

We have begun to see a repetitive pattern: the body isolated; the narrow space; the subjection to an unreturnable gaze; the scrutiny of gestures, faces and features; the clarity of illumination and sharpness of focus; the names and number boards. These are the traces of power, repeated countless times, whenever the photographer prepared an exposure, in police cell, prison, consultation room, asylum, Home or school. Foucault’s metaphor for the new social order which was inscribed in these smallest exchanges is that of the ‘Panopticon’ [1988: 85].

According to Tagg photography was used in institutions such as asylums during the late nineteenth century as a technology of power, and he rejects any claim to an essential meaning of photography and photographs. In his words photography’s “status as a technology varies with the power relations which invest it. Its nature as a practice depends on the institutions and agents which define it and set it to work” (1988: 63). John Tagg provides examples of photography used within institutional settings such as Figure 1.5 that depicts a woman under the care of Dr. Hugh W. Diamond, superintendent of the Surrey County Asylum for women in 1856. He claims that these photographs and practices were used to discipline and to identify patients. “In this formulation, the gaze is not something one has or uses, rather, it is a spatial and institutionally bound relationship into which one enters” (Sturken 2001:365).

The application of the gaze has been a fruitful way of examining photography practices yet tends to neglect the insights of Foucault’s final works on self-technologies. As Burchell has commented “in *Discipline and punish* Foucault emphasized the subjectification of individuals through their subjection to techniques of power/domination, the perspective of government establishes an essential relationship between these and other techniques of the self in the subjection of individuals” (1996:20).

John Tagg's account of the gaze theorizes photography as a technology of power and hence emphasizes social control and the asymmetry of particular relationships, but does not generally include an analysis of the relationship of oneself to oneself (ethics) in the rearticulation of subjectivity.



PLATE 16

Figure 1.5 Hugh W. Diamond, 1856
Plate 16, unnamed patient, Surrey County Asylum
Source: John Tagg's *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (1988). Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, pp. 79.

In Foucault's words the "encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call 'governmentality'" (1994a: 225). According to Anderson,


...demands are made on the individual not to simply receive oneself passively but actively to give oneself to oneself. In that sense, the aforementioned mode of subjection [subjectivation] is a mode of transformation – it invokes the passively receiving and subjected so that s/he may cross the line from subjection to subjectivation, thereby making her/himself actively sovereign in her/his own self-creation [2003: 24].

Again these aspects of subjectification in the relationships between subjects/photographers and photos is often missed or under-theorized in Foucauldian accounts of photography practices.

Foucault discusses three levels to his analysis of power: strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination (1994b: 299). When analysing the images it is necessary to understand the relationship between photographers and individuals being photographed. The relationship of Dr. Hugh W. Diamond or Dr. Jean Martin Charcot (Figure 1.5 on following page) to the psychiatric patients they photographed might best be described as a collapsed relationship where there is little to no room for both parties to modify the norms or possibilities of the relationship – in extreme examples this would be a form of domination. Relations of domination consist in "social boundaries that severely restrict participants' mobility, where mobility is the capacity to manoeuvre and act to change power relations" (Hayward 2000:39).

NOUVELLE ICONOGRAPHIE.

T. II, PL. XXXIII.



Phototypie Bertheud

CONTRACTURE DE LA LANGUE PROVOQUEE A L'ETAT DE VEILLE
CHEZ UNE HYSTERIQUE PAR REFLEXE AURICULAIRE

LECROSNIER ET LABÉ, ÉDITEURS

Figure 1.6 M.M., 22yrs old, servant
Jean Martin Charcot. 1889. *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, Clinique des maladies du système nerveux, tome deuxième*. Paris : Lecrosnier et babé, libraire-éditeur, Plate XXXIII.

Charcot believed that only people with hysterical disorders could be hypnotized and that when hypnotized their symptoms would become more visible. He used a variety of techniques to induce visibility to observe and record symptoms. In this image the hypnotized woman uses her tongue to follow a sound from a tuning fork.



Figure 1.7 Blackbridge & Gilhooly
 Royal Hospital: Crazy (inside text: Eventually I began to believe I really was crazy)
 Photo: Kiku Hawkes, from *Still Sane* (1985), Press Gang Publishers, pp. 16.

By contrast the photographic reproductions of sculptures done by Persimmon Blackbridge and Sheila Gilhooly (Figure 1.7) both of whom were institutionalized illustrate a critical form of resistance to processes of normalization by drawing attention to the coerciveness of being classified mentally ill or in their words “crazy.” For example

Figure 1.6 is a portrait taken by a clinician of a clean, well-groomed young woman. The media below describes the symptom represented and the photography presumably also gives authority to Charcot's argument that insanity was a product of neurological illness since the subject is exhibiting a physical reflex that is 'abnormal'. The image implicitly speaks to the expertise of her clinicians and the objectivity of her diagnosis and treatment. Figure 1.7 on the other hand is a representation of the patients' subjective experience of institutionalization. The vulnerability of the subject is explicit: the mould of her body is unclothed and broken in places and she lacks hands and legs that might enable her to move and resist physical confrontation. The text is placed inside the image and expresses her lack of power; her thoughts like her body are under control by others. Hence Figure 1.7 calls into question the treatment of people who institutionalized and classified mentally ill. As Foucault suggests in his final works, "freedom comes from the ways in which individuals negotiate power relations, rather than evading them altogether, so he suggests that while some practices of the self are disciplinary and constraining, other are more autonomous" (O'Grady 2004:92). In this case Blackbridge and Gilhooly's use of photography encourages their freedom.

Analyzing the Images

Discourse analysis is an ideal methodology to investigate how therapists and their clients use photography to identify aspects of their selves that need to be worked on, and how they use images to produce truthful accounts or their identities. Discourse analysis focuses on photo practices rather than content and describes practices of looking in psy photography over time. Gillian Roses writes “doing discourse analysis assumes that you are concerned with the discursive production of some kind of authoritative account – and perhaps too about how that account was or is contested – and with the social practices both in which that production is embedded and which it itself produces” (2001:142). According to Nikolas Rose “to govern requires knowledge for its possibility, its legitimacy, and its effectivity. Knowledges here should not be understood as purely contemplative phenomena, but rather as *intellectual technologies*, assemblages of ways of seeing and diagnosing, techniques of calculation and judgment” (1999: 120). Therefore, I will be examining how the photographs from my sample were interpreted by clinicians, patients, clients and how they were used to achieve particular goals related to the governing of subjectivity. Discourse analysis is best suited to this study because it focuses on the images themselves and how they are used to articulate and re-articulate subjectivities.

Anderson writes, “subjection...signifies the space where one receives oneself, whereas subjectivation signifies the space where one gives oneself to oneself”⁴ (2003: 24). The claim that photographs potentially impact a person’s self-concept was stated in the first arguments given for the use of photography in therapy by Dr. Hugh W. Diamond in 1856. Diamond was a psychiatrist and founder of the Royal Photographic Society of London, in 1853. He produced his first photographs of lunacy in 1851 and is considered the first person to make a systematic use of photography in psychiatry (Didi-Huberman 1982: 38). Hugh W. Diamond made three arguments for using photography in psychiatry in his address to the Royal Society that John Tagg discusses in his analysis of early psychiatric photographic practices and that are noted by David Krauss and Jerry Fryrear in their introduction to *Photography in Mental Health* (1983). His arguments comprise the principal themes in practices of photography as therapy, or in therapy that have appeared over time: 1) it is useful as an aid in treatment, and he argued that in some cases photography could alter a patient’s self-concept, 2) photographs were useful as a diagnostic tool, and 3) photography was an important means of rapid identification of current and readmitted patients (Sander 1976:19-23). “[S]elf-technologies are procedures that prescribe how the individual is to define, maintain and develop her/his identity with a view to self-control and self-awareness” and this type of analysis “attempts to capture the ways in which an individual can give itself to itself” (Anderson 2003:25, 30). Foucault provides four criteria of self-technologies: the transformational mode of subjecting, the

⁴ Foucault’s term is *subjectification* or *subjectivation*, “...the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity, which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness.” (quoted in, James Tully’s essay, “To Think and Act Differently: Foucault’s Four Reciprocal Objections to Habermas’ Theory.” *Foucault contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Theory* (1993). S. Ashenden and D. Owens (eds. Pp. 93. London: Sage Publications.

objectification of the self, self-activating activity, telos (Anderson 2003:25, 30). Self-technology analysis “divides the world into subjecting and subjectivation, and constructs a sensitivity to the practices through which the self can summon itself and activate itself in order to master its own creation” (Anderson 2003: 26).

Again, “...subjection means that an individual or collective is proclaimed subject within a specific discourse. The individual or collective is offered a specific position in the discourse from which one can speak and act meaningfully in a specific way. Foucault speaks of subjectivation when the individual or collective has not only been made the subject but also wishes to be so” (ibid.:24). For example within phototherapy discourse photographs and people are produced and made intelligible through specific practices, techniques and beliefs – they are subject within a specific discourse. Yet, clients who enter into phototherapy may also wish to have “good” self-esteem, to overcome co-dependency, to improve personal responsibility, self-fulfillment and so forth.

CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINE, BIOPOLITICS, AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Introduction: The Will to Knowledge

In this chapter I will consider Michel Foucault's concepts of discipline, biopower and ethics and relate these concepts to photograph practices. One of Michel Foucault's best known texts from his genealogy period is *The History of Sexuality: an Introduction, Volume One* (1978). The French title of this text is *La Volonté de Savoir* (1976), or the will to knowledge. This is a critical idea that can be traced throughout these works and focuses on how subjects are discursively constituted as objects of knowledge through forms of disciplinary power/knowledge (human sciences). In *The History of Sexuality: an Introduction* (1978), he states that his analysis of (sex)uality is not meant to "determine whether these discursive productions and these effects of power lead one to formulate the truth about sex, or on the contrary falsehoods designated to conceal the truth, but rather to bring out the 'will to knowledge' that serves as both their support and their instrument" (11-12). In *Discipline and Punish* he writes, "[t]he historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely" (1977:137-138).

Foucault's historical studies focus on three forms of relations, which should not be taken as necessarily or completely independent from one another: 1) relations of control over things (knowledge), 2) relations of actions upon others (power), and 3)

relations with oneself (ethics) (Foucault 1994a: 318). His final work on ethics shifts focus from processes of objectification to those of subjectification and depart from what some commentators view as his quasi-structuralist description of subjects in his second period studies. “Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercise upon himself by means of the technologies of the self”⁵ (Foucault 1994a: 225). Photography has been used in the psy disciplines in both respects: in processes of objectification and subjectification.

⁵Technologies of the self are defined as those technologies “which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” (Foucault 1994a: 225)

Discipline and psy photography

In *Discipline and Punish (1977)*, Foucault describes the transition from what he terms the classical to the modern era, seventeenth century to the present, by studying how human bodies have been perceived, organized and governed through legal and penal relations. Through historical analysis and examples of legal, military and pedagogical practices and techniques he argues that sovereignty was supplemented by a new form of power based on the human sciences or disciplines that he termed disciplinary power. For Foucault this was largely by chance, by “a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce a blueprint of a general method” (Foucault 1977:138). Through examining these relationships he argues that since the time of the Enlightenment the human sciences or disciplines have generated new techniques for governing human beings that link knowledge and power in a circular and productive relationship. “In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge” (Foucault 1977: 28).

This marks changes in how human bodies are conceived and de-centres the exercise of power, “[d]iscipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an

‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (Foucault 1977: 215). Discipline is best defined as a set of techniques for governing individuals, which increases their capacities and their controllability. “To discipline people is to turn them into certain kinds of subjects, in the sense of bringing them to act in accordance with disciplinary norms and standards, behavioural ideals which the human sciences define as normal, natural or essentially human” (Falzon 2000:205).

Unlike juridical or sovereign power which is negative or repressive, disciplinary power produces subjects, and acts directly on bodies via surveillance, examinations, drills, etcetera; it is a positive power which creates structures of desire, modes of identity, our sense of self-awareness, and time and so forth. According to Foucault this is “[w]hat makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (1980:119). Disciplinary power-knowledge is organized around statistical norms, “whereas the juridical systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms, the disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate” (Foucault 1977: 223). Disciplinary power aims to produce docile and utile subjects through processes of normalization, where regimes of knowledge and “[d]iscursive practices are not purely and simply modes of manufacture of discourse. They take shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioural schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them” (Foucault 1994a: 12). The coupling of increased utility with increased docility is not by chance. McWhorter writes,

“disciplinary normalization was first used on soldiers, people who were being trained to use deadly weaponry. If you want to train a soldier to use a lethal weapon, you want to be sure that he will use it as you tell him to. His obedience, his docility, is not an incidental outcome; it is essential to the task you have set for yourself” (1999: 180).

Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power-knowledge also illustrates the ways processes of normalization mark a reversal in the process of individualization. In a feudal society where sovereignty is exercised by people at the highest levels of power, such as land owners, are most distinguished through rituals and/or visual reproductions whereas,

In a disciplinary regime... individualization is ‘descending’: as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative measure that have the ‘norm’ as reference rather than genealogies giving ancestors as point of reference; by ‘gaps’ rather than by deeds. In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of these parts that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when one wishes to individualize the healthy, normal and law-abiding adult it is always by asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what fundamental crime he has dreamt of committing. All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root ‘psycho-’ have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization [Foucault 1977:193].

Moreover, disciplinary knowledge-power produces bodies and subjects as temporally defined or as developmental organisms, rather than as machines or assemblages of moving parts as Descartes’ man-the-machine. “This new object is the natural body, the bearer of forces and the seat of duration; it is the body susceptible to specified operations, which have their order, their stages, their internal conditions, their constituent elements” (Foucault 1977:155). As Foucault remarks the disciplining of bodies was not new to the modern era, there had been disciplinary projects during the classical era, for example, in

monasteries, yet he argues that there are several new aspects to discipline in the modern era that distinguish its current forms, for instance in the scale of control, bodies where no longer simply disciplined en masse but where treated individually (Foucault 1977: 137).

...by “normalization” Foucault names a mode of observation, ordering, intervention, and control that simultaneously homogenizes and individualizes its target population. ...Normalization is rooted in the notion of temporal process – norms have to do with stages of growth, stages of moral development, stages of civilization, etc. [McWhorter 1999:156].

As I stated earlier, the aim of disciplinary power is to increase our utility and our docility. As agents we are both subject to norms and enabled by norms (i.e., the double meaning of the word subject: subject to discourse and subject of one’s actions). Power always involves resistance and hence these processes are always incomplete, i.e., we are never fully normalized. Disciplinary power responds through reform, so there is a sense of these relations being fluid and adaptable. As Nikolas Rose maintains, “the heterogeneity of these practices and techniques [technologies of the self] – their multiple interconnections, alliances, conflicts, and divergences, the different promises they hold out, and the variable demands they make of human beings – can produce all the effects of resistance, appropriation, utilization, transformation, and transgression...without the need to invoke a unifying conception of ‘human agency’” (1998:187).

Two important new technologies of power in processes of disciplinary normalization that Foucault describes in his genealogical period are panopticism and confession. Technologies of power are techniques for “influencing or determining the conduct of others” (McWhorter 1999:211). These technologies illustrate how disciplinary knowledge-power is linked to forms of surveillance and the production of knowledge of the ‘deep’ self. In the *History of Sexuality, an introduction* (1978), Foucault links this

self explicitly to scientific discourses on sex(uality), and contends that “the confession was, and still remains, the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex” (63). Both technologies interiorize subjects and promote homogeneous forms of self-awareness and identity.

The panopticon was designed mid-eighteenth century by Jeremy Bentham to ensure and maximize the efficiency of prison security. His design specified that prisoners reside in individual cells constructed in a circle around a central tower. The cells would open to the centre yard and would be visible to a guard situated in the tower, who in turn would not be visible to prisoners. “The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately” (Foucault 1977: 200). Because prisoners could not tell whether they were being watched, the design incited a sense of constant surveillance which over time would be internalized. Generally, Bentham’s design and proposed building was a failure; it was never built, nor did it attract much favourable attention. Yet Foucault writes

the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use [Foucault 1977: 205].

The panopticon represents the ideal of a perfectly normalized society, where people watch over themselves and an external observer is no longer necessary. According to Foucault, techniques of surveillance work so well we become self-policing animals. In his words: “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power...he becomes the principles of his own subjection” (Foucault 1977: 202-203).

Less coercive forms of disciplinary power also serves an important function in relation to discourses on sex. For instance in volume one of *The History of Sexuality* (1978), he describes the problematization of sex and consequent emergence of the problem of the hysteric, the invert or the hermaphrodite in the eighteenth century. In relation to the problem of children's sex, he gives the following description:

Here guided by the theme of the "flesh" that must be mastered, different forms of discourse – self-examination, questionings, admissions, interpretations, interviews – were the vehicle of a kind of incessant back-and-forth movement of the body of the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses, servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of his sex [Foucault 1978:98].

Although this example is in some sense the inverse of the first example (many watching over one, rather than one watching over many) the result Foucault claims of both is the normalization and subjection of the subject through different matrices of disciplinary knowledge-power which are internalized and productive. Although this last example has a somewhat disturbing tone, it is important to recall that these new forms of power-knowledge were designed to maximize, protect and govern life. "[Sex] was reported, so that the authorities could figure out how to manage populations and administer resources...Concern for the individual as well as for the general population demanded that information be gathered. There was nothing fundamentally malicious here" (McWhorter 1999:17).

The act of confessing had existed for some time, but "[t]he seventeenth century made it into a rule for everyone" (Foucault 1978: 20). Foucault claims that during the nineteenth century this practice was reworked into the disciplines as a therapeutic operation. The technique of confession, which he examines primarily in volume one of *The History of Sexuality* (1978), hinged on discovering the truth of oneself via one's

sex(uality). He argues that sex was problematized and consequently attended to in various scientific discourses because it “is located at the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of population” (Foucault 1980: 125). This meant that confession and the sexual domain were “placed under the rule of the normal and the pathological; a characteristic sexual morbidity was defined for the first time; sex appeared as an extremely unstable pathological field; a surface of repercussion from other ailments, but also the focus of a specific nosography, that of instincts, tendencies, images, pleasure, and conduct” (Foucault 1978: 67). Reworked as a therapeutic practice this technique, Foucault writes “becomes one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (1978: 59). Lastly, “[confession] tended no longer to be concerned solely with what the subject wished to hide, but with what was hidden from himself, being incapable of coming to light except gradually and through the labour of a confession in which the questioner and the questioned each had a part to play” (Foucault 1978: 66). In conclusion panopticism and confession are technologies which are tied to forms of disciplinary normalization, i.e., increased social control and the narrowing of behavioural possibilities.

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are examples of photography used as apparatus of the gaze. The photographs were produced by Issac Kerlin in 1857. Kerlin is considered the first psy-practitioner in North America to publish medical photographs in his book *The mind unveiled or A brief history of twenty-two imbecile Children (1858)*.



Figure 2.1 Grubb ca. 1857



Figure 2.2 Imbecile boys, 1857

Reproductions from Issac Kerlin's *The Mind Unveiled (1958)*. Pennsylvania training school for feeble-minded children.

Source: James W. Trent, Jr. *Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation in the United States (1994)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 224-225.

The purpose of the photographs was to document the apparent “normalcy” of his patients and gain public support and funding for his work. The photographs were tools used in the governing of a problematic identity, i.e., moral idiocy via their ability to act as documents that monitor and assessment the youth’s degree of deviation from the norms of mental health and their compliance with the goals of treatment. James Trent writes of Figures 2.1, 2.2

Obviously posed, the photograph showed a moral idiot transformed by the watchful guidance of the asylum no longer condemned by his natural frailty but amenable to learning. ...the photograph illustrated a vision superintendents like Kerlin were beginning to formulate: only under the guidance, care, and restraint of the institution could moral idiocy be controlled [1994:22, 34].

As I stated earlier governmentality is concerned with the management of possibilities; discipline aims to increase the capacities and utility of individuals. “Within the ideal panoptical design, compliance with institutional/organizational norms is ensured ultimately through the inculcation of self-policing as individuals come to interiorize the external gaze of authority” (O’Grady 2004:94). The subjects are presented alongside objects that suggest they are functionally literate. Their dress and group pose convey that they are cooperative and capable of exercising self-control. In other words the images provide evidence that with the correct training each boy will ideally internalize the authority or gaze they are subjected to at the institution and become compliant and useful members of society.

The Problem of Population: Biopower and photography

Le pouvoir est de moins en moins le droit de faire mourir, et de plus en plus le droit d'intervenir pour faire vivre, d'intervenir sur la manière de vivre, sur le « comment » de la vie...
 « Faire vivre et laisser mourir : la naissance du racisme ».



Figure 2.3 Frances B. Johnston. The old well. *Hampton Album* (1966). New York: The Museum of Modern Art, pp. 16.

The photographs published in *Hampton Album* (1966), were produced by American feminist activist Frances Benjamin Johnston and were first exhibited at the Paris Exhibition of 1900. These photos (see Figures 2.3, 2.4) depict the transformation of marginalized, or “problem” populations (African-Americans and Native Americans) through disciplinary practices. Disciplinary power is inseparable from the problematization of populations which came about with the rise of industrial capitalism and urbanization. In Foucault’s words, “les mécanismes disciplinaires sur le corps et les mécanismes regularisateurs sur la population, sont articulés l’un sur l’autre” (1991 :49).



Figure 2.4 Frances B. Johnston. The improved well (three Hampton grandchildren). *Hampton Album* (1966). New York: The Museum of Modern Art, pp. 17.

In an essay titled "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual' in Nineteenth-century Legal Psychiatry," Foucault writes,

In the eighteenth century, the development of demography, of urban structures, of the problem of industrial labour, had raised in biological and medical terms the question of human "populations," with their conditions of existence, of habitation, of nutrition, with their birth and mortality rates, with their pathological phenomena. The social "body" ceased to be a simple juridico-political metaphor and became, instead, a biological reality and a field for medical intervention [1994b:184].

Biopolitics and biopower refer to "a form of politics, conducted largely since the eighteenth century, concerned with the administration of the conditions of life of a population" (Dean 1999:209). Foucault argues that "population" emerged as an economic and political problem, for example in relation to labour capacity and the need to maintain a balance between people and resources, and made it necessary for modern states to invest in the task of analyzing such things as "the birthrate, the age of marriage,

the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile” and so forth (Foucault 1978: 25).

Biopower is a form of governmentality and a non-disciplinary power; it does not act directly on bodies like discipline. Rather, biopower takes the population as a whole as its target. It can in large part be traced to Western Europe from the sixteenth century and has been exported to large parts of the globe through colonial expansion (Dean 1999: 210). The photographs from the Hampton album illustrate the assimilation or normalization (similar to “naturalization”) of freed African-American slaves and Native Americans into Euro-American society. Biopower is directly concerned with problems of population, but not in terms of right or wrong (juridical), but in terms of the maintenance and reproduction of life. Nikolas Rose contends that “from at least the eighteenth century, the capacities of humans, as subjects, as citizens, as individuals, as selves, have emerged as a central target and resource for authorities” (1999: 152).

Disciplinary knowledge-power is applied at the local level, acts directly on bodies and requires simple techniques such as hierarchical observation and the examination, which normalize and individualize. As such, disciplinary knowledge was easier to institute and hence it emerges prior to biopower. Biopower on the other hand attends to the body as species, a more difficult task since it requires the collection and production of knowledge of bodies en masses in Foucault’s (1991) words “après une première prise de pouvoir sur le corps qui s’est faite sur le mode de l’individualisation, on a une seconde prise de pouvoir qui, elle, n’est pas individualisante mais qui est massifiante, qui se fait en direction non pas de l’homme-corps mais de l’homme espèce” (1991: 41). Foucault cites the example of the problematization of sex at this time in order to illustrate the

political transformation generated through the emergence of biopower, a transformation he states which adapts a sovereign's "right to kill or let live," with the contemporary imperative of those who govern to maximize life itself. In the *History of Sexuality, volume one*, Foucault writes "at the juncture of the 'body' and the 'population,' sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death" (1978:147).

In her book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2002), Rey Chow comments that "[s]een in the light of biopower, sexuality is no longer clearly distinguishable from the entire problematic of the reproduction of human life that is, in modern times, always racially and ethnically inflected. Race and ethnicity are thus coterminous with sexuality, just as sexuality is implicated in race and ethnicity" (2002: 7). According to Foucault, in a society of normalization that focuses on the imperative of the maximization of life, "race" and racism are conditions which make killing acceptable (1991: 54). "The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population" (Foucault 1978: 137). The disciplines of the body and the regulation of populations constitute the two poles around which the organization of power over life is realized.

During the eighteenth century childhood and the family also become privileged targets of discourses on the health and vitality of individuals and populations. In "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," Foucault states,

the problem of 'children' (that is, of their numbers at birth and the relations of births to mortalities) is now joined by the problem of 'childhood' (that is, of

survival to adulthood, the physical and economic conditions for this survival, the necessary and sufficient amount of investment for the period of child development to become useful, in brief the organisation of this 'phase' perceived as being both specific and finalized) [1980: 172].

The social sciences and psychology disciplines in particular have played key roles in producing knowledge of normal developmental stages of human life. This knowledge is applied to the governing of individuals at micro and macro levels. For instance, there is a vast literature directed to parents, and mothers in particular that gives expert advice on how to raise children: how to manage behavioural problems, nutritional guidelines, the age at which specific capacities are normally acquired and so forth. At another level government programs are instituted in order to combat childhood obesity, promote physical activity, and enforce schooling.

In relation to governing populations photography was used extensively beginning in the eighteenth century to produce large indexes of illnesses and their corresponding symptoms in order to divide populations and monitor individuals as cases of normal versus abnormal subjects. As I stated earlier discipline is inseparable from the problem of population (biopower).



Figure 2.5 Jean Martin Charcot. 1889. *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, Clinique des maladies du système nerveux, tome deuxième*. Paris : Lecrosnier et babé, libraire-éditeur, Plate XLIV.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the intersecting of these forms of governmentality. As Helen O'Grady comments "self-policing works in the service of what Foucault describes as the modern imperative towards sameness and the pathologizing of difference. This is

characteristic of societies in which human worth has come to be measured primarily by the scientific categories of the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’” (2004:94).

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 are reproduced from Jean Martin Charcot’s *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, Clinique des maladies du système nerveux, tome deuxième* (1889). Figure 2.5 is a photograph of a “hysterical” patient in a “normal” state and is contrasted with an image of the same patient in Figure 2.6; the text below her second photograph reads: “hysterical sleep.”



Figure 2.6 Jean Martin Charcot. 1889. *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, Clinique des maladies du système nerveux, tome deuxième*. Paris : Lecrosnier et babé, libraire-éditeur, Plate XLV.

Charcot was named Professor of Pathological Anatomy, 1872, and later Clinical Chair of Diseases of the Nervous System, 1881, at the Salpêtrière. The Salpêtrière was the largest hospice in France and had a population of more than four thousand people at the time he published his three volumes of the *Nouvelle Iconographie* (1876-77, 1878, 1880). The Salpêtrière was used to conduct clinical research and Charcot held lectures each week; his texts were translated into numerous languages. This production and circulation of knowledge of subjectivities enabled experts to better predict and intervene in the governing of populations, in part by making it possible to divide diverse groups in order to better care for and/or insure security. Lastly, as I mentioned earlier disciplinary power is inseparable from the problem of population and this is also evident in the photographs (Figures 2.5, 2.6) since they construct a normal state against which to measure the stages or levels of deviation. Disciplinary knowledge is exercised directly on individual bodies via drills, training and surveillance. In Figure 2.6 the patient is restrained to a bed and observed; it is unlikely that she has consented to, or is even aware of the camera.

Ethics and photography

Foucault's concept of ethics is best understood as a form of action of the self on itself via technologies of the self. Mitchell Dean writes "the practices by which we endeavour to govern our own selves, characters and persons, then, are a subset of this broader domain of the 'conduct of conduct'" (1999: 13). A self-technology is a "self-directed activity which has a telos," for instance "the diary as self-activity that emerged in the 2nd century in the Roman Empire, or the confessional practice of the Catholic Church" (Anderson 2003:26, 106). Foucault defines self-technologies as those practices that "permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (1994a: 225). In his analysis of ancient Greek and Roman self-technologies, ethics is aligned with self-transformation, self-mastery and practices that enhance the individual's enjoyment of life. Foucault argues that self-technologies have the ability to counter the normalizing and homogenizing tendencies of modern society, but as Helen O'Grady points out there also exists the opposite possible that self-practices whose purpose is to achieve self-mastery may produce an "inner gaze" (2004: 101-102). Self-technologies contain both possibilities: freedom and domination.

Foucault claims that self-technologies almost always work in accord with three other technologies he identifies: technologies of production, sign systems and power (ibid.). The gaze is an example of a technology of power, i.e., a technique for "influencing or determining the conduct of others" (McWhorter 1999:211). It is the

intersection of technologies of power and the self that are examined in relation to psy photography practices in this thesis.

One theme that is consistently found across the history of psy photography practices is the idea that photographs can enable the transformation of self-perception. Practitioners generally claim that this is made possible via self-discovery and/or by providing the client with more accurate knowledge (picture) of its characteristics and thus enabling a new self-relation. Figure 2.7 is taken from phototherapist Linda Berman's *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993), and depicts two split face photographs that she claims helped construct new self-understanding and relating. Linda Berman describes uses of right and left-mirrored facial portraits as a way of enhancing self-awareness. The person represented (Yoka) states of her photographs:

I think the right side (Photograph 32) is my ugly side, fleshy and big – but it is also happy. I would have expected the left side (Photograph 33) to be happy, but it is not. It is prettier and smoother, though. That shows me that real happiness and beauty is from the inside, not dependent on superficialities. I think the right side is more at ease, it does not have to try to be anything other than it is. It has completely come to terms with being ugly; this is the part of me that is happy being myself [1993:195].

In the description Yoka provides she uses the photograph to objectify her self and classify her various qualities as a subject in new ways. Unlike the other photographs examined in this chapter, the subject's interpretation of her photograph is privileged over that of a clinician or a therapist. The telos of these ethical practices (increased fulfillment, self-actualization via self-knowledge) tie into the concerns of biopower that I stated in the schematic on page 4 are increasing downloaded onto individuals and corporations. Nikolas Rose writes "government in liberal democracies takes a characteristic form. It certainly construes the health, intelligence, adjustment, and virtue of its citizens as values

vital to national success. But the scope of direct political action upon citizens in their everyday lives is limited” (1999: 121). Hence there is a broad social imperative for individuals to self-govern themselves and these processes are often mediated through psychological expertise. In the second half of chapter 3 the still-photography practices reflect this move towards ethics which begins to emerge notably in the 1960s. Phototherapy procedures are explored as self-technologies that “provide the individual opportunity to define, maintain and develop her/his identity with a view to self-control and self-awareness” (Anderson 2003:25,30).

196 Beyond the smile



Photograph 32

Photographs and the self 197



Photograph 33

Figure 2.7 Yoka. 1993. Source: Linda Berman *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993). London: Routledge, pp. 196-197.

CHAPTER 3 PHOTOGRAPHY PRACTICES

Interpreting bodily surfaces: documenting and disciplining subjectivities

In this chapter I examine psy photography practices in relations to the forms of governing described in the last chapter: biopower, discipline and ethics. First, I supplement this theoretical framework with an analysis of the medium that covers the strategies of positivism and realism that are central to the histories of photography. This includes an examination of the dominant discourses of insanity mid-eighteenth century since these discourses make the choice of using photography commonsensical. Second, I discuss the use of photography in processes of standardization via the work of G.B. Duchenne, Jean Martin Charcot and W.H. Seldon. Third, I reintroduce Hugh W. Diamond's arguments for the use of photography in psychiatry and discuss each as general themes that appear over time. His argument that photographs are valuable tools in therapy and facilitate the (re)articulation of subjectivity is considered last since it provides a logical opening to the self-technology of contemporary phototherapy practices. Over time there is a general shift in how still-photographs are used in the governing of subjectivities from a solely realist interpretation to one that moves between realism and symbolism.

Schematic:

Still-photography becomes viable
new technology 1839

1850s Dr. Hugh W. Diamond begins first systematic photography studies of insanity. He presents 3 arguments in favour of the use of photography in the study of insanity: 1) photographs are useful in therapy, 2) photographs are superior diagnostic tools, and 3) photographs are useful for purposes of surveillance.

Late 1800s photography is well-established as a technique for producing scientific knowledge of subjectivities. Jean Martin Charcot (mentor to Freud) publishes three volumes of iconography of the Salpêtrière that are translated into numerous languages and widely circulated.

Interpretation of medium

Phrenology and physiognomy are dominant sciences of mind. These discourses relate problems of mind to physical processes in the brain and privilege visual observation. Photographs interpreted as objective copies of reality and the camera as a more precise extension of the clinician's eye.

Dominant Function of photographs

Photography used by clinicians and scientist to create large scale catalogues of mental disturbances and their corresponding symptoms in addition to general production of knowledge addressing the relation between mind and brain.

Early 1900s Freud pioneers his theories of the structure of the unconscious. With Freud's "talking cure" talk/listening are privileged over visual observation in therapy.

Early to mid 1900s Photography used for purposes of surveillance and in experimental psy studies as a superior method of data collection. Still-photographs interpreted as copies of reality. W.H. Sheldon (1940) and Werner Wolff (1943) produce studies linking bodily surfaces to subjectivities. Still-photography no longer has a prominent place in the therapy or study of mental disturbance.

Beginning in **1960s** and early 1970s studies emerges that link still-photographs with (re)articulation of subjectivities through photographic self-confrontation.

By late **1970s** new discipline of Phototherapy is established and incorporates elements of Diamond's arguments and Freud's talking cure.

In phototherapy still-photographs are interpreted as documents of unconscious via symbolist and realist interpretations of medium.

Still-photographs considered a superior tool for access the unconscious. Still-photographs lessen problems of resistance in therapy and enable new self-relation. Still-photography continues to be used in experimental psy studies as a method of data collection.

Presently dominant function of still-photographs is to provide an adjunct to talk therapies. Digital imaging technologies like MRI scans have replaced still-photography in studies of mind and brain correlations.

Soon after its invention photography became a valued tool in the production of knowledge of subjectivities. It was used extensively in the classification of various illnesses and mediated the division of populations into cases and types; knowledge that aided scientist and other experts govern through prediction/intervention, and surveillance of populations and individuals. By the late nineteenth century the use of still-photography in medicine and psychiatry was well-established. Some examples are Henri Dagonet's *Nouveau Traité Elémentaire et Pratique des Maladies Mentales* (1876), and Jean Martin Charcot *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, volumes 1-3, (1876-77, 1878, 1880)*. Dr. Félix Auguste Voisin also from the Salpêtrière published photographs of his work on nervous disorders in 1876. And in the North America Isaac Kerlin is considered the first psy practitioner to publish medical photographs in his book *The mind unveiled or A brief history of twenty-two imbecile Children* (1858).

The problem of insanity and human character in general were largely understood through the science of physiognomy that was systemized by Johann Caspar Lavater in the 1770s and later phrenology which was developed by Franz Josef Gall at the end of the eighteenth century (Wells 1996: 164). “The photograph became the key to the new scientific physiognomy....the photograph was perceived, at least in the first decades following its introduction, as the ultimate means of creating an objective reproduction of reality” (Gilman 1982: 164).




Figure 3.1 Source: G. Spurzheim. 1832. *Phrenology or the Doctrine of the mental phenomena, Volume one*. Boston: Marsh, Cape & Lyon, title page.

These sciences relied on external clues such as facial and head characteristics that were thought to correlate with human character and illnesses of the mind. Liz Wells writes that “the success of these popular sciences in the late nineteenth century has been described as part of a ‘vast attempt at deciphering the body’ in which the desire to classify bodies according to visual appearance is justified by the belief that the surface reveals hidden depths” (2004: 164). Franz J. Gall and his colleague G. Spurzheim believed that all problems of mind were directly correlated to changes in the brain and were visible in the shape of the skull. Figure 3.1 provides an example of how scientist mapped the surface of the skull; each area was correlated with specific capacities and

potential disturbances. These ideas were also aligned with racial and criminal typology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An excerpt from the general overview of *Phrenology or the Doctrine of the mental phenomena (1832)*, reads:

Gall's first inquiries were physiognomical; he looked for external signs of internal capacities. ...When we began to publish in 1808, under our joint names, the title, *Anatomy and Physiology of the nervous system in general, and of the brain in particular*, seemed preferable to designate the nature of our investigations. In extending my views, I found it necessary to change the name again. I have chosen that of PHRENOLOGY, which is derived from two Greek words: φῶν - mind, and λογος - discourse; and I understand by it, the doctrine of the special phenomena of the mind, and of the relation between mental disposition and the body, particularly the brain [12].

These discourses were grounded in positivism a perspective and practice that sought to establish universal laws from the production of value-neutral knowledge or knowledge that could be verified via sense perception. Physiognomy and phrenology both privileged visual observation and as a consequence "photography was ... established as a more perfect extension of the clinician's eye, a means of recording objective truth and knowledge" (de Marneffe 1991:79). Duchenne de Boulougne, for example, a French neurologist and mentor to Jean Martin Charcot produced over 750 photographic plates on the study of facial muscles and expression in *Mécanisme de la Physionomie Humaine ou Analyse Electro-Physiologique de L'Expression des Passion (1862)*. These images demonstrate the accumulation of knowledge of normal and pathological functioning of bodies. In addition Duchenne used his studies to illustrate differences between truthful or authentic facial expressions and feigned ones. This he claimed could help an actor perfect his craft or a psychologist more accurately read a patient's facial expression and hence his or her feeling state. In order to isolate and analyze the individual actions of facial muscles he used electric shocks to induce contraction of facial muscles that were

then photographed and classified. Duchenne claimed to have discovered the subtleties of expression and could describe the difference, for instance, between celestial and terrestrial love (1990:111).




Plate 58



Plate 60




Plate 63

Figure 3.2 Plates 58, 60, 63. Source: G.B. Duchenne de Boulogne. 1990. *The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression* (1862). Edited and translated by R. Andrew Cuthbertson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.184, 186, 189.

From its first uses in psychiatry photography was utilized as a way of ensuring the neutrality of the information recorded. Scott McQuire writes,

The camera was invented and found its footing in an era in which positivism held sway. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this conjunction.... At the historic moment in which positivism subjugated virtually the entire field of Western knowledge, the camera was able to fuse the realism of geometric perspective and the theological investment in light as the origin of truth with the scientific valorization of the objective eye. In an age in which machines held the promise of the future, the development of photography perfectly fulfilled the desire to invest truth in the disinterested gaze of an optical machine [1998: 33].

Photography was very quickly appropriated as an ideal tool in the production of positivistic research because photographic representation was correlated with realism. The relationship between photography and realism is commonly related to a modernist

confidence in science and progress since "...the nineteenth-century desire to explore, record and catalogue human experience, both home and abroad encouraged people to emphasise photography as a method of naturalistic documentation" (Wells 2004:14). Dr. Hugh W. Diamond claimed that


Photography gives permanence to these remarkable cases, which are types of classes, and makes them observable not only now but for ever, and it presents also a perfect and faithful record, free altogether from the painful caricaturing which so disfigures almost all the published portraits of the Insane as to render them nearly valueless either for purposes of art or of science [1973:24].

And in the preface to the *Photographic Journal of the Hospitals of Paris (1869)*, Montméja and Rengade wrote "a mode of illustration, entirely new to medicine, has allowed us to accompany this journal with plates, the truth of which is always superior to that of any other iconographic genre" (Didi-Huberman 2003:283). Photographs were "imagined to have a primitive core of meaning, devoid of all cultural determination....[which] elevates the photograph to the legal status of document and testimonial. It generates a mythic aura of neutrality around the image" (Sekula 1975:37).

Alan Sekula writes, "a photographic discourse is a system within which the culture harnesses photographs to various representational tasks" (1975: 37). For example the photographs and illustrations from asylums that are reproduced in this thesis attribute various capacities (capable of rational judgment), qualities (delusional, mania) and statuses (insane/cured) to particular agents. Gillian Rose comments that "it is possible to think of visuality as a sort of discourse too. A specific visuality will make certain things visible in particular ways, and other things unseeable, for example, and subjects will be produced and act within that field of vision" (2001: 137).

Standardization of framing and photographic process is an important aspect of most of the photographs from my sample that was used to further control the validity and reliability of data produced. As Scott McQuire comments “one means advocated to ward off the perils of ‘subjectivism’ was standardization in framing, particularly in photographs of the body” (1998: 44). Figure 3.3 shows the plan of the photographic services at the Salpêtrière. The hospice employed a full-time photographer, Paul Régnard, who came to live at the Salpêtrière in 1875; he was later replaced by Albert Londe who would begin publishing his own books of medical photography in 1893. He designed a 12 lens battery camera that is illustrated in Figure 3.3 (following page). This camera was designed to take multiple pictures in quick succession so that clinicians could study the movements of patients during epileptic and hysterical attacks. The photographic services at the Salpêtrière included a glass-walled studio, dark and light laboratories, platforms, beds, screens, backdrops, headrests and gallows (Didi-Huberman 2003:45). Iron gallows were used to suspend patients who could neither walk nor hold themselves upright. Albert Londe stated that “this mobile gallows on an axis is normally folded up along the wall of the studio. The patient is maintained upright with a suspension apparatus that holds his arms and head; this apparatus is along the same lines as the one that serves for the method of suspension” (Didi-Huberman 2003: 285).

Chapter 3



Plan du Service photographique de la Salpêtrière (*).

- A. Atelier vitré.
- B. Laboratoire noir.
- C. Laboratoire clair.
- D. Entrée en chicane du laboratoire noir.

Figure 17

Map of the photographic service of the Salpêtrière.






Figure 18

Poyet, *Photography at the Salpêtrière*
(Bibliothèque nationale, East Wing).



Figures 19 and 20

Albert Londe's stereoscopic camera (fig. 19) and camera with multiple lenses (fig. 20), *La photographie médicale* (1893).

Figure 3.3 Figures 17-20, Source: Georges Didi Huberman *The Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière* (2003). Translated by A. Hartz. London: The MIT Press, pp. 46-47.

Patients at the Salpêtrière were subjected to the gaze of the camera in an effort to create objective knowledge of subjectivities and their relationship to bodies. These processes of objectification were often though not always, explicitly coercive. For instance compare Figures 3.4 and 3.5.



Figure 3.4 Georges Luys, « Les emotions chez les sujets en état d'hypnotisme ». Source : Georges Didi-Huberman, *Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière* (2003). Translated by Alisa Hartz. London: The MIT Press, pp. 218.

As I mentioned in Figure 1.6 (page 28) Charcot and his contemporaries would hypnotize patients in order to induce the visibility of their symptoms for further study what Didi-Huberman describes as “an art of making-visible” (1982: 211). Figure 3.4 is a series of photographs taken of “Esther” a patient of Dr. Jules Luys, whose hypnosis has been induced by “olfactory stimulation”⁶. Dr. Luys concocted numerous recipes based on things from fennel and spruce powder to hashish and morphine hydrochlorates in order to induce hysterical symptoms for documentation. The objectification of Esther in Luys pictures is represented in her obviously altered state, the number placed on her body and the clinicians hand casually inserted into the photograph (placed there to hold her head motionless for the camera exposure?). These photographs refer to the body politic what Foucault calls “a set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes and supports for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault 1977: 28).

Figure 3.5 (following page) like the photographs produced by Duchenne (Figure 3.2) are more innocuous representations. The *Nouvelle Iconographie*, contains a wide range of representations like Figure 3.5 alongside more disconcerting photographs of patients who are clearly not able to resist or consent to being studied and photographed, i.e., they are unconscious, or drugged. Nonetheless it is possible to see the interrelation of all these representations as visual clues from which to measure normal versus abnormal. In addition, from the perspective of governmentality power does not

⁶ Olfactory pertains to the sense of smell. It was not uncommon for patients to be given substances to inhale in order to supposedly stimulate areas of the brain related to their illness. This would then accentuate their symptoms for study and classification. As Didi-Huberman states “a large number of hysterics died addicted to ether, alcohol, or morphine” (2003:216).

dependent on consensus or repression but rather is the conduct of conduct, “a management of possibilities. Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual engagement than a question of ‘government’” (Foucault 1994b: 341).





Figure 3.5 Henri Bi...y, 24yrs old, tailor
Jean Martin Charcot, *Nouvelle Iconographie de la Salpêtrière, Clinique des maladies du système nerveux, tome deuxième* (1889). Paris : Lecrosnier et babé, libraire-éditeur, Plate XLI.

Jean Martin Charcot relied on a methodology – a will to knowledge – aimed at deciphering a multiplicity of corporeal signs that could provide evidence of internal disease. And he used visual observation and photographic representations as a way of diagnosing and recording symptoms because he believed it produced the most objective information. Although the obsolete diagnosis of ‘hysteria’ is primarily associated with ‘female hysteria’ or *la grande hystérie*, Charcot included a number of symptoms under the classification of hysteria and argued that both men and women could suffer from hysterical disorders. Working from the perspective of positivism Charcot produced diagnoses based on evidence which could be verified by sense perception, i.e., visual observation hence his use of photography and illustrations to create an index of illnesses. Daphne de Marneffe claims that unlike Freud who shifted his study of hysteria from looking to listening and who predominantly worked with patients from a similar economic and cultural background to his own, for Charcot she argues “to listen to (poor, sick) women’s accounts, to see them as something other than ‘babbling,’ and to use these as scientific evidence was to throw into confusion accepted notions of knowledge and power” (1991: 105). Although Charcot did not find hysteria to be only a female illness this is very likely another reason that he relied exclusively on visual observation.⁷

Once the techniques and mentalities of sciences such as phrenology that privileged vision were displaced (and eventually discredited in the first half of the

⁷ Charcot believed that hysteria was a neurological disease that was hereditary and was set off by a traumatic event like an accident. With Freud hysteria is reconstructed as originating in the unconscious, which is (from the perspective of Freudian psychoanalysis) intimately linked to psycho-sexual development or the Oedipus complex. Hysteria is thought to be caused by repressed traumatic experience that manifests in somatic and psychological symptoms. From *The Ego and the Id*: “It is essentially in hysteria and in states of a hysterical type that this [the sense of guilt remains unconscious] is found....The hysterical ego fends off a distressing perception with which the criticisms of its super-ego threaten it, in the same way in which it is in the habit of fending off an unendurable object-cathexis – by an act of repression” (Freud 1960:52-53).

twentieth century) and as imaging technology improved uses of photography in positivistic research shifted towards techniques that look inside the body, specifically the brain. The last major study undertaken to refine and establish the validity of phrenology using still-photographs that I found was published in 1940 at Harvard University by W.H. Sheldon, S.S. Stevens, and W.B. Tucker, and was published under the title *The Varieties of the Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology* (Figures 3.6, 3.7).



Three extreme varieties of human physique

Figure 3.6 W.H. Sheldon, three extreme varieties of human physique. Source: W.H. Sheldon *The Varieties of Human Physique: an Introduction to Constitutional Psychology* (1940). New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, title page.




FIG. 80. A 541 at age 18




FIG. 81. A 541 at age 27




FIG. 18. The somatotype 117-127 (117, 127, 117, 117, 127)




FIG. 19. The somatotype 217-216 (217, 217, 226, 217, 216)

Figure 3.7 W.H. Sheldon, Fig. 80 A541 at age 18, and Fig. 81 A541 at age 27, and Figures 18-19. Source: W.H. Sheldon *The Varieties of Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology* (1940). New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, pp.35.

These photographic studies are also strong examples of the use of standardization. Figure 3.6 represents extreme examples of the three main body types the researchers constructed; from top to bottom they are: *endomorph*, *mesomorph*, *ectomorph*. This study included 4000 photos/subjects and examined the relationship between anthropometric⁸ measurements to psychology. The preface states:

⁸ Anthropometry is the scientific study of human physical dimensions.

The Project's appointed task is that of providing frames of reference for the study of basic individual differences. To the psychologist, the educator, the clinician, the anthropologist, the criminologist, and the actuary, a systematic schema for the description and classification of human beings is of obvious importance [Sheldon 1940: xi].

Each step of this process was control; the researchers used only 5x7 film and large-format camera, all exposures (i.e. aperture, shutter speed), lens, lighting and poses were all standardized. In some instances subjects were photographed standing in front of a grid (Figure 3.7), and in all the photographs subjects stood on a pedestal that revolved to three stops so that each exposure was identical. As I stated earlier photography has been used extensively to control the validity and reliability of measurements and assumed in its early history a strictly realist interpretation of the medium. In addition these images represent what Foucault referred to as a reversal in processes of individuation. In the acquisition of normalizing knowledge of bodies and hence subjectivities individual differences gain importance. More precise and detailed information is sought in order to classify and predict individual capacities and identities.

One final point that should be made concerning the standardization of photography and the images discussed so far is the use of timelines to measure changes. As I stated in chapter 2 on discipline and photography, "normalization is rooted in the notion of temporal process – norms have to do with stages of growth, stages of moral development, stages of civilization, etc." (McWhorter1999:156). In Figure 3.7 researchers measure corporeal changes in the same subject over time. The study of corporeal changes over time provides information about what is natural or normal for bodies. This knowledge can then be used to enhance and build upon the natural

capacities of bodies. These forms of knowledge are significant in light of questions of governing individuals and managing populations.

Thus it is possible for successive stages of training to depart more and more from the “original” condition of the body without violating its “natural condition. The point of normalized training is to augment and channel, not impose, but the result should far exceed anything pure imposition could produce [McWhorter 1999:153].

Dr. Hugh W. Diamond was a psychiatrist and founder of the Royal Photographic Society of London (1853) and he produced his first photographs of lunacy beginning in 1851 (Didi-Huberman 1982:38). Hugh W. Diamond made three arguments for using photography in psychiatry in his address to the Royal Society in London in 1856 that are noted by David Krauss and Jerry Fryrear in their introduction to, *Photography in Mental Health* (1983), and appear as general themes over time. I use these themes to structure the remainder of my discussion of governmentality and photography leading up to the emergence of phototherapy.

In his address to the Royal Society in 1856, one of Hugh W. Diamond’s arguments for the use of photography that is still practiced today is their use as a means of rapid identification of current and readmitted patients, i.e., for purposes of surveillance and security (Tagg 1988:80). With the increased spread of urbanization mid-eighteenth century it was no longer possible for police or other officials in charge of the care of large groups of people to know them individually; photography was quickly taken up to assist in identifying people. Even within the spaces of psychiatric hospitals themselves keeping track of patients and processing them more efficiently was enhanced by using photography. For instance in an article titled “The Use of Photography in Psychiatry”

Graham writes, “Depression, anxiety, personality characteristics and various other cues about behaviour, manner and mood were clearly portrayed. Such a procedure [Polaroid images of patients] is probably most useful where a large number of screening interviews must be carried out” (1967: 425).



Figure 3.8 Photographs from the archive of the former mental hospital Paolo Pini, by permission of Camera Chiara, Milan, 1938. Photographs used to identify patients. Source: F. Manzoli. 2004. “Images of madness. The end of mental hospitals illustrated through photographs.” *Journal of Science Communication*, 3(2): 2. <http://jcom.sissa.it/jcom0302.html>, accessed January 16, 2005.

Photography is a principle tool for identification in numerous areas of contemporary life and is not unique to the psy disciplines. The photographic image has become an integral aspect of bureaucracies and record keeping: photos are relied upon in courts of law to produce authoritative accounts of events. The photographs reproduced in Figure 3.8 are examples of photos used for documentation and surveillance. Despite a

difference of approximately 80 year, Figure 1.5 (page 26) and the images in Figure 3.8 closely resemble one another in framing and posing of patients.

What is most noticeable in these images is that several of the patients pictured in Figure 3.8 appear to be restrained or physically coerced into posing, presumably to ensure the conformity of documentation. These photographs are also reminiscent of W.H. Sheldon's work pictured in Figures 3.6 and 3.7; both present a homogeneity of content or representation and both sets of photographs are intended for identification and documentation. In Figure 3.10 the standardization of the photos is done to facilitate rapid identification rather than ensure the reliability or validity of measurements.

Diamond also argued that photography was a superior aid in the diagnosis an idea that was touched on already in relation to phrenology and Jean Martin Charcot's work (Figures 2.5, 3.4, 3.5). Diamond's argument included a conviction that visual observation was superior to other forms of interpretation. In his words a photographer "needs in many cases no aid from any language of his own...it is unnecessary for him to use the vague terms which denote a difference in the degree of mental suffering, as for instance, distress, sorrow, deep sorrow, grief, melancholy, anguish, despair; the picture speaks for itself with the most marked precision" (1976:19).

Diamond also argued that photography was valuable in the treatment of insanity, and in some cases photography could alter a patient's self-concept. In one of Dr. Diamond's examples he claims that using a photograph in therapy with his patient A.D. "unquestionably led to [her] cure" (1976:23). Some of his patients were given photographs of themselves to help them recognize their distressed state (usually through signs such as dress and hygiene) and as proof of their cure which they could then self-

monitor themselves. Diamond described the following example in his presentation to the Royal Society:

There is another point of view in which the value of portraits of the Insane is peculiarly marked - viz. in the effect which they produce upon the patients themselves - I have had many opportunities of witnessing this effect. In very many cases they are examined with much pleasure and interest, but more particularly in those which mark the progress and cure of a severe attack of Mental Aberration... This patient (Figure 3.9) could scarcely believe that her last portrait representing her as clothed and in her right mind, would even have been preceded by anything so fearful; and she will never cease with these faithful monitors in her hand, to express the most lively feelings of gratitude of a recovery so marked and unexpected [Gilman 1976:21].

Figure 3.9 (following page) illustrates the temporal process of a patient's return or reform to a 'normal' state. Below the images we read the diagnosis: puerperal mania in four stages. John Connolly described each stage and photograph of this patient's recovery for *The Medical Times and Gazette* (1858). With each image he contrasts his interaction with her to her facial features, posture and dress in the photographs. In the first representation he describes her general character as dull and apathetic, in the second photograph she is described as mirthful; her "mouth is drawn out laterally, the nostrils are expanded, and the lively eyes, the elevated eyebrows, and the merry cheeks and chin are felicitously rendered in the place" (Gilman 1976:60). In the third photograph he writes "there is a tension of the facial muscles, which prevents the experienced Physician from concluding that all the malady has yet passed away" (Gilman 1976: 60). In fact he states that the patient relapsed to the state represented by the second photograph before fully recovering. The fourth image shows her cured. This is how photographs were used in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disturbance, i.e., through a combination and comparison of individual interaction and photographic monitoring, but Dr. Diamond also proposed the use of photographs in therapy. In his address he describes his interaction

with one patient who believed she was a “Queen”. Through discussion of her portrait and the photographs of other royalty at the asylum he claims that his patient eventually formed an accurate self-image and abandoned her delusion. In other words the photography was used to mediate a new self-relation. Lastly Photographs like those in Figure 3.8 were also used to testify to the validity of treatment (see Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 also) when clinicians have lobbied for public support.



PLATE 14

Figure 3.9 Hugh W. Diamond, Plate 14, 1856. Source: S. Gilman (ed.), *The Face of Madness: Hugh W. Diamond and the Origin of Psychiatric Photography* (1976). New Jersey: The Citadel Press, pp.61.

The concept of photographic self-confrontation that was first proposed by Dr. Diamond in 1856 is a significant theme in contemporary phototherapy and in the use of photography in the government of subjectivities that begins to reappear again in the 1960s. Some research on photography and subjectivity is done prior to this date but the emphasis on visuality shifts after the emergence of the “talking cure.” Prior to the discipline of phototherapy in North America in the 1970s, Freudian psy practitioners wrote about the psychological significance of a patient’s photography practice rather than advocate for the use of photography in therapy. Articles that are often included in the literature on phototherapy include, M.F. Fox’s (1957) “Body Image of a Photographer,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, and D.B. Colson’s (1979) “Photography as an extension of the ego,” *International Review of Psycho-analysis*. Generally, photography practice is link to the patient’s “intrapsychic conflicts.” Fox’s essay includes the following description that typifies this paradigm’s emphasis on psycho-sexual development:

[The patient] also projected his bisexual identification onto his camera. In an early interview he mentioned that the long lens of his camera reminded him so much of a penis that he sometimes changed it for a shorter lens because he was afraid that everyone would recognize it. He added that he had an urge to get a long telescope so as to see far away, which he related to looking through the keyhole at his mother [1957: 100].

Moreover Colson claimed that photography is such a popular pursuit because “the camera is an analogue of certain ego processes thereby allowing conflicts about the exercise of those functions to become externalized and subject to a greater sense of mastery and control” (1979:280). Although neither writer is proposing that photography be used during therapy, their claim that photos and photography may symbolically give insight into the unconscious is an important assumption that can be found in the work of

phototherapists and later is taken up as a valuable tool in the re-articulation of subjectivity.

Examples of photography used as aids in self-recognition and in practices of self-confrontation include R.H. Spire's (1973) "Photographic self image confrontation," *American Journal of Nursing*, F. Miller's (1962) "Responses of psychiatric patients to their photographed images," *Diseases of the Nervous System* and F.S. Cornelison and J. Arsenian's (1960) "A study of the response of psychotic patients to photographic self-image experience," *Psychiatric Quarterly*. Unlike Diamond though none of the authors concluded that their patients' recovery was a direct result of the photography experiments; they only conclude that change was noted and the relationship between mental disturbance and self-image confrontation should be further studied.




Figure 3.10 From, R.H. Spire. 1973. "Photographic self image confrontation". *American Journal of Nursing*, (73)7:1207-1210. (image on left from pp.1208, on right from pp.1209)

Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 are images from early photographic self-confrontation experiments. Because these experiments were conducted in psychiatric hospital very few photographs are published. Figure 3.10 are illustrations made by two patients deemed

chronically ill with schizophrenia who participated in a photographic self-image confrontation experiment. These images provide one method used to measure the progress of treatment. In addition these practices locate the gaze within the patient. Mitchell Dean contends that “regimes of government do not determine forms of subjectivity. They elicit, promote, facilitate, foster, and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents. They are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities, qualities, and statuses” (1999: 32). Through active self-appropriation s/he crosses the boundary of subjection to subjectivation and becomes someone who takes on responsible: “the individual is not only required to fill out a particular subject position but also to care for her/himself independently” (Andersen 2003: 24).




Figure 3.11 Before and after photographic self-confrontation. Source: F.S. Cornelison and J. Arsenian. 1960. “A study of the response of psychotic patients to photographic self-image experience”. *Psychiatric Quarterly* (34):4.

Figure 3.11 shows the first image from a before-and-after group of a woman who was hospitalized and diagnosed psychotic. The photograph was destroyed by the patient after she initially viewed it. Regarding Figures 3.11 and 3.12 Cornelison writes

Three days after the initial self-image experience session, the patient was visited by her husband. She told him she had seen a picture of herself and did not wish “to be that way” any longer. On the following day (four days after the initial self-confrontation session) the photograph below was made of the same subject. At that time she was virtually free from the manifestations of psychosis [1960: 4].

With these photography practices the location of authority or responsibility for interpretation begins to shift from clinician to client. Governing occurs in the relation of self to self through self-evaluation and possibly self-policing based on photographs of the self. As Foucault comments in *Discipline and Punish*, s/he who is “subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power” (1977: 202). The shift towards self-evaluation is more fully realized in the phototherapy practices examined in the following section.



Figure 3.12 Before and after photographic self-confrontation. Source: F.S. Cornelison and J. Arsenian. 1960. “A study of the response of psychotic patients to photographic self-image experience”. *Psychiatric Quarterly* (34):4.

Accessing the unconscious and re-articulating subjectivities

It is difficult to argue with what a photograph shows you of yourself.
(Phototherapist Judy Weiser 1998).

The photography practices described in the previous section of chapter 3 largely enabled the disciplining of subjectivities. The technique of standardization and a realist interpretation of the medium both played crucial roles in the utilization of photography. Beginning in the 1970s still-photography is reconceived as a superior tool for access the unconscious and re-articulating subjectivity towards the goals of autonomy and self-governing. In Nikolas Rose's words, "in the nineteenth century, psychology invented the normal individual.... today, psychologists elaborate complex emotional, interpersonal, and organizational techniques by which the practices of everyday life can be organized according to the ethic of autonomous selfhood" (1999: 17). Additionally market researches found that snap-shot photography had gained in popularity while the number of "art" photography hobbyists had declined and that pictures of people remained the overwhelming favourite subject (Wolfman 1994: 32). In the early history of photography taking photos was an elite practice and hobby which few people could afford; the accessibility and popularity of still-photography has steadily grown (represented for instance in new products such as cell phone cameras and disposable digital cameras) and has allowed photos to assume greater importance in our social relations.

Judy Weiser, one of the pioneers of phototherapy recounted during her workshop at the Canadian Art Therapy Association Conference (2005), that when she first began using photographs in her practice in the 1970s she assumed that she had invented a new

form of therapy. After publishing her first article on phototherapy she discovered that many practitioners, independent of one another, had at around the same time begun to incorporate this technology into their practice. In 1979 the first International PhotoTherapy Symposium was held in Illinois, and in 1982 Judy Weiser opened the PhotoTherapy Centre in Vancouver, BC, the same year David Krauss opened the Centre for Visual Therapies in Ohio and Jerry L. Fryrear opened the Institute for Psychosocial Applications of Video and Photography at the University of Houston.

Contemporary phototherapists reclaim Diamond's initial position that photography used in/during therapy may transform self-concepts, but the medium is no longer interpreted exclusively as a neutral representation of reality. Discourses on the inherent objectivity of photography have been challenged at various points in its history and with the advent of digitalization "many people anticipated a loss of confidence in the medium...that this does not appear to have happened is testimony to the complex ways in which we use and interpret photographs" (Wells 2004: 23). Orla Cronin's qualitative research on 'lay' interpretations of photos concludes that

The two myths [realism and symbolism] were discernible, [but] no individual was exclusively located within either of them; rather, individuals moved freely between them. ...when talking about photographs in the abstract, my participants tended towards the symbolist myth; whereas they switched to the realist myth when talking about specific photographs [1998: 75].

Cronin claims that photographs in therapy are "used to change the self-image of the client by using them to provide feedback and to confront distorted self-images" (1998: 79). In a study that compared two groups of institutionalized boys – experimental or comparison – Milford et al.'s "Phototherapy with Disadvantaged Boys," found that "the photography group described themselves as more improved in their overall

behaviour and particularly as more sociable” (1983: 227). Also, supervisors “noted that both groups seemed to improve in responsibility and grooming, with the photography group showing significantly more improvement on the Milford Grooming and Behavior Scale”⁹ (Milford et al. 1983: 227). In the conclusion the authors write that “it seems clear that the addition of photographic self-confrontation to an ongoing activity/discussion program can significantly enhance the therapeutic potential of such a program” (1983:228).

In a case study presented by Cosden and Reynolds the authors conclude that “a 20-year-old young man with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, three prior psychiatric hospitalizations and a long history of multiple drug use” (1983:21-22) and receiving various therapies (psychotherapy, chemotherapy, group activities) significantly improved his self-image by taking photographs. In their words “the camera gave structure to his social interactions and became a form of social currency to supplant his previous reliance on drugs. The positive feedback he received from others for his work, as well as his own pride in his accomplishments, helped to improve his self-esteem and counter years of failure and despair” (Cosden 1983: 22). Still-photography practices are used in these examples to transform self-relations.

The practice of using still-photography as a tool in diagnosing psychological disturbances is limited after the advent of psychoanalysis. Phototherapists may use photos as a diagnostic aid but only in conjunction with questions concerning image content. Phototherapists would likely reject the claim that photographs can act as a diagnostic aid

⁹ The Milford Grooming and Behavior Staff Rating Scale was designed specifically for this study. It is a test based on 26 items (unnamed in the essay) that were used by supervisors, counselors, or individuals working with the youth in order to assess their behaviour and grooming during the preceding week.

and would more likely consider them “emotional icebreakers” (Medina 1981:35). Despite this there are examples in the literature on phototherapy that seem to support the use of photos in diagnosis. David Krauss, one of the pioneers of phototherapy states of his work with a partial hospitalization program “we use Polaroid photographs as diagnostic aids in our initial interviews with clients. In addition to the background information such interviews provide, these instant Polaroid photographs tap into another dimension of a client’s orientation and perception” (1983: 414). Another well-known pioneer of phototherapy Joel Walker has patented four of his photographs – the Walker Visuals (1978) – for use as projective aids by other therapists. According to Joel Walker patients/clients “take these unstructured stimuli and put them together in the way they live in the outside world or their inner world. How one copes and how one relates is reflected in this process. I found it very economical in that it could quickly cut through resistance and define major conflict areas” (1983: 136). A client’s response can then be measured and compared by the clinician against normative responses using an assessment form, while a “self-assessment form monitors change over time and captures clinically relevant information” (2004: MHS-online catalogue). Unlike psy clinicians working in the nineteenth century, phototherapists would not form conclusions about a patient’s health based only on visual observation, but use photos to learn about their client’s “present level of self-awareness, ability and willingness to self-disclose, and their sense of the future” (Walker 1983:136).

Contemporary uses of photography in therapy also privilege vision but in a very different manner; they are no longer privileged as more objective but rather as more efficient at accessing the depths of the psyche. According to Weiser if therapy is “based

only on verbal interaction between client and counsellor, [it] will probably never be as efficient as when that language of therapeutic communication can also include the use of additional visual-symbolic representations that can metaphorically bridge into the unconscious, into places where words do not (and cannot) go” (2001: 2).

Photography practices that are not produced for the purposes of positivist research maintain some relationship with realism¹⁰ but are more likely to locate the evidence symbolically. As a result photographs are relied upon to reveal information about subjectivity that might even be hidden from the client his/herself. For example Adrien L. Coblenz comments in “Use of photographs in a family mental health clinic,” that each new family arriving for treatment was requested to bring a recent family photo because he argued photographs provide clues to family dynamics: “a mother who worried lest her fatherless son grow up to become a sexual deviate or juvenile delinquent gave us a picture of her son dressed as a choirboy. That she gave a picture of only the boy was indicative of how she saw herself as having no life of her own but was living only for the boy and his future” (1964: 602). Phototherapy marks a complete break with positivist uses of photography for instance Judy Weiser argues that “the ‘truth’ of any particular snapshot will always be a relative one; it will signal very different meanings, depending upon who is looking at it (or remembering it later)” (Workshop handout 2005). In

¹⁰ As I stated earlier realism is used in this thesis to refer to the assumption Diamond and his contemporaries held that photographs produce a neutral record of ‘reality’ which exist independent of perception. Phototherapists would reject this claim and would argue that photos do not mean anything *until* they are interpreted and that there is no right or wrong way to interpret a photograph. In fact, Judy Weiser states that this is one of the strengths of the medium since no one is wrong in their interpretation it tends to diminish the asymmetry of the therapeutic relationship. In addition, Weiser states that art therapies which use other media such as painting produce a stronger sense of ownership of the representation because the viewer assumes, “I’m looking at someone’s interpretation,” with photography, “I’m seeing what you saw.” (Workshop, 2005) The use of photos in the context of phototherapy does not seem to produce any strong dichotomy between realism and symbolism, but draws on both assumptions at different times.

addition, standardization is no longer utilized and the onus on interpretation is placed on the client with guidance from a therapist.

Cronin found that although not common “therapists infer a variety of emotional, dysfunctional or pathological states from individual photographs and collections belonging to clients. For example, the client is said to reveal their depression through facial expression, or their poor capacity for personal relationships through the choice of inanimate subject matter for their photographs” (1998: 74). Realism within this discourse is supplemented with a symbolist folk myth which posits that still-photographs can reveal hidden truths not because they are more objective representations per se (the case with early still-photography used in the psy disciplines), but because photos are considered a superior channel to the unconscious and a valuable technique in liberating repressed emotions.

Certainly, photos are visual documents of places we’ve been and people who’ve mattered, but also of our inner journeys, whose meaning at the moment of taking may not really come clear until later – they are not only ‘footprints of our mind’ in terms of where we have been, but also of where we might be heading (without even realizing it yet!) [Weiser 1988:246].

While eighteenth century photography practices produced knowledge of subjectivities that was used primarily by authorities to promote greater controllability of individuals, and populations, contemporary uses of still-photographs in therapy are non-coercive and favour enabling the client to better exercise self-control. This is achieved in part by using photographs to construct a history of the subject. Weiser states, “[photos] are perceived by most of us to represent (and re-present) reality, the emotional truth, and the unarguable proof of a split-second slice of time” (1993: 345). The relationship between photos and the documenting of moments of time is a significant function of the

medium in the construction of personal narratives. In phototherapist Linda Berman's words "photographs can be used to re-edit the past and challenge the myths and legends that have been cultivated about us and with which we have colluded during that period of growing up" (1993: 48). The following two examples provide descriptions of how photographs are used in phototherapy. I have selected these examples because they offer different uses of photographs to achieve similar goals and demonstrate how photos are used to transform self-relations.

"Jane"



Photograph 10
Posed by models



Photograph 11
Posed by a model

Figure 3.13 “Jane,” a clinical example. Photograph 10-11. Source: Linda Berman *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993). London: Routledge, pp. 84-85.

“Jane” and “Matthew’s” experience doing phototherapy describe how photography is used in the re-articulation of subjectivity. Andersen states that self-transformation requires “the objectification of the self, which concerns the form of knowledge that the individual can establish about itself as self” (2003: 26). In these examples the telos for life includes working towards autonomy and self-knowledge. The client’s conduct is shaped towards the goals of responsibility and positive self-esteem. Photos are used in both cases to construct a coherent personal narrative of the client’s self which can then be worked on with the therapist.



Photograph 12
Posed by a model

Figure 3.14 “Jane,” a clinical example. Photograph 12. Source: Linda Berman *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993). London: Routledge, pp.87.

In *Beyond the smile: the therapeutic use of the photograph* (1993), Linda Berman argues for the inclusion of photography in psychotherapy. She describes and analyzes her work with Jane in order to illustrate the effectiveness of using photographs as an adjunct to talk-therapy. Jane was referred to her by her psychiatrist and was in therapy with her for the duration of sixty-two sessions. A goal of Jane’s therapy was to help her quit Valium, which she had been taking for over twenty years (Berman 1993:82). According to Berman Jane’s “self-esteem was low and her fear of making mistakes meant that she never took risks; life felt hollow and meaningless” (Berman 1993:82). In phototherapy research poor self-esteem is credited with causing a variety of risky

behaviours deemed harmful – everything from illegal drug use to repeat teen-pregnancy. Judy Weiser writes “the concepts of self-image, self-esteem, self-acceptance and self-confidence lie at the core of most therapeutic work” (1988: 272). In Jane’s case involves describes the objectification of the self (self-mastering of the feeling self) and self-activating activity (self-disclosure and exploration of self with a therapist).

The photographs in Figure 3.13, 3.14 were selected by Berman to illustrate how she and Jane used photographs to work on and modify problematic aspects of her clients self-concept. Photograph 10 “showed her when she was on holiday with her family – she was arm in arm with her father, and he looked very depressed and sad” (Berman 1993: 83). According to Berman this particular photo triggered a memory for her client of how her family holidays had always been spoiled by her father’s illnesses and “she saw in the picture the source of her inability to enjoy holidays in her present life” (Berman 1993:83). Berman remarks that the “vital black and white evidence of the photograph helped her make the clear connection between past and present that was crucial to her subsequent understanding of her adult dilemmas” (1993:84).

Photograph 11 shows Jane’s father again, this time standing alone and dressed for someone else’s wedding and Jane recalls with her therapist how he had missed her wedding due to illness. Again Berman draws attention to how photography acts to reawaken painful forgotten memories. “Deeper exploration of her anger and sadness in connection to this picture of her father was too overwhelming. Her feelings began to surface in an agonising way; father was re-experienced, the emotions recalled” (1993: 84-85). According to Berman, Jane withdraws from working with photos for a while because “unconsciously, [Jane] had known she was not ready to encounter the most

painful issues ‘yet’” (1993:86). By implication her personal photos were functioning as a form of confrontation with painful memories. Berman quotes her as stating : “I want to face my wedding album and look at the feelings, and cry and then put them away...I’ll be honest with you, if I had the pills, I’d take them, to hide the pain, but I haven’t, so I’ll do it this way” (Berman 1993:86). Berman concludes that “these two pictures represented general childhood feelings of loss and emotional deprivation, of not being seen, heard or given enough parental attention” (Berman 1993: 86).

In Photographs 10, 11 self-objectification is done mainly through recalling feelings from the past that were ‘triggered’ from viewing the image. The last image Berman chose for this case example (Photograph 12) she describes as “particularly distressing” for her client because she draws symbolic meaning from the presence of her sister’s books in the image (1993:87). In both cases the image content is evidence of a specific emotion and/or event(s) that are used to create an authoritative account for of her relationships. These relationships are evaluated by the client and her feelings and self-knowledge are potentially modified.

Berman also claims that Jane “began to recall feelings towards people who were not actually in the photograph, but where elsewhere in the house at the time. The photograph enabled a recall outside its own parameters, triggering fuller memories than it was able in itself to visually record” (1993: 88-89). In addition Berman states that Jane was able to reconstruct a complete scenario from the captured time-fragment of specific photographs (ibid.). Jane also began to address people in her family photographs by writing letters – which were not mailed – that she discussed with her therapist, and as “inner work” done in relation to images (Berman 1993: 89). Nearing the end of her

sessions with Jane, Berman remarks that her client became much more active in her use and exploration of the photographs, tearing some images in order to express her rage and speaking to people represented in other images which she could not have confronted face to face. Berman writes, “through the safe medium of the photographs, Jane was somewhat freed from the fear and guilt that would have been involved in confronting me directly, or in addressing the real people represented by the photographs” (1993: 97).

“Matthew”




Photo 3.8

© Copyright, 1999, Judy Weiser

Figure 3.15 Judy Weiser, metaphor for the self. Source: Judy Weiser. *PhotoTherapy Techniques: Exploring the Secrets of Personal Snapshots and Family Albums* (1993). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 86.¹¹

¹¹ Photo is © Copyright, 1999, Judy Weiser, and is copied with her permission from *PhotoTherapy Techniques: Exploring the Secrets of Personal Snapshots and Family Albums*, PhotoTherapy Centre Press:1999:86.

Matthew's use of photography is somewhat different from the previous example; he worked primarily with only one image (Figure 3.15) and it was a photograph produced by phototherapist Judy Weiser. Matthew is a colleague of Weiser's who attended one of her workshops on phototherapy techniques and discovered Photo 3.8 during an exercise. He later approached Weiser and asked her to continue to work with him and the photograph, which they did over the course of two and a half years. Like Jane, Matthew is primarily seeking self-knowledge which he claims is hidden from him. He claims "my child part of me [still] gets frightened and triggered so damn easily that I have great difficulty staying in my adult self and dealing with that angry person as the adult" (Weiser 1993:107). His process entails the objectification of the self (self-mastering of the feeling self) and self-activating activity (self-disclosure of repressed memories) mediated through phototherapy. Weiser writes, "his goal throughout these sessions was to work the image until there was no more psychological tension in it when he looked at it" (1993:110).

Matthew's case highlights the use of photography in therapy to "trigger" memory of repressed events and the reconstruction of the past and self-knowledge. Through the process of phototherapy Matthew gained conscious awareness of childhood abuse that he had been unaware of previously. In Weiser's words, "the example that follows illustrates how projective PhotoTherapy techniques helped one person regain unconscious information and begin to heal" (1993: 95-96). I draw on his example in order to describe how a photograph was used to mediate the relation of self to self.

Throughout this case example the photograph is consistently referred to as eliciting feelings from the client. Matthew claims to have been drawn to the photograph

initially because he had an increasingly negative reaction to the image content. For instance he stated to Weiser that the door itself was evoking his anger, "I wanted to kick it down – kick through it, get it out of the way" (Weiser 1993:97). He also feels an "air of menace" from the tree; he experiences a "fear of passing by either one of them" and he experiences the room as "a very small cell rather than as a large room" (Weiser 1993: 97-98).

Objects in the photograph served as metaphors for significant others. For instance, the door itself was at times used as a symbol for his mother: "he had come to believe that there was something about the door that reminded him of his mother, and he could not just bypass the door" (Weiser 1993: 97). At another point the photo is likened to Matthew's birth process (100,103) and the tree trunk is used as a metaphor for his paternal grandmother who symbolically is blocking the doorway and is "blocking him from emotional freedom" (Weiser 1993:107-108).

From these emotive reactions, Matthew and the therapist begin to construct a narrative of events. Weiser instructs Matthew at various points in his sessions to take the perspective of objects in the photograph and to put objects into dialogue with one another (98, 100, 107, 108) or to place himself as a child into the room pictured in the photograph (101). At each point he is prompted by his therapist to dialogue with the objects and to analyze the relationships between them and his feelings around these relationships. Hypnosis is also used in conjunction with working the image to aid Matthew's ability to enter the image/unconscious (106, 108).

Through these practices Matthew is able to identify and work on problematic aspects of self. Andersen comments that a mode of transformation invokes "the passively

receiving and subjected so that s/he may cross the line from subjection to subjectivation, thereby making her/himself actively sovereign in his/her own self-creation” (2003: 24). Matthew’s relation of self to self is modified in order to gain greater autonomy and this is achieved by increasing his self-awareness through the construction of a newly discovered personal history. The process of this construction was mediated through the photograph, which acted as a metaphor for various people and feelings.

In phototherapy practices the images are used to illicit the discovery of a ‘true’ self set within a developmental narrative. Strategies include remembering/reworking of repressed memories and emotions through the clients interpretation of particular photographs. These photo practices may utilize forms of governmentality related to disciplinary normalization through discovery of one’s true nature (a normalized construct), and in all cases through ethics or by bringing about with the help of a therapist the transformation and internalization of self-relations aimed at self-awareness and self-control. In the case examples photography was used to construct an authoritative account of a personal history. In the case of Jane the photographs function more as documents, i.e., their content serves as evidence of various significant events from her past, which are then open to interpretation and extrapolation. With Matthew the photograph is used strictly for its symbolism. Regarding this case example Weiser comments that “a perceived reality that makes sense and feels valid for the client can be worked with therapeutically” (1993: 103). In other words the image need not imply any actual relationship between its content and the subject.

Early uses of still-photography in psychology and psychiatry depended on realist assumptions of the medium and had the goal of making visible the underlying universal

structures of bodies and subjects much like present day imaging technologies like MRI scans (see Figure 3.16, for example). Contemporary phototherapy practices break with positivism and take up both realist and symbolist interpretations of the medium and contend that photographic practice and photographic self-confrontation are potentially curative of emotional disturbances. Phototherapy practices utilize photos to bridge conscious and unconscious self-knowledge, construct personal narratives over time and enable the objectification of the self so that it may be re-worked and transformed. In David Krauss's words photographs act as "artefacts that symbolically show relationships, contexts and the dynamics of peoples' lives" (1983: 60). Photos may reveal information about the client's life (past, present, future) and emotions that were potentially hidden.




Figure 3.16 MRI Scan illustrating brain activity. "Areas of activation of disgust versus neutral statements," (74). Source: Moll et al. March 2005. The Moral Affiliations of Disgust: A Functional MRI Study. *Cognitive Behavioural Neurology* 18(1): 68-78.

CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF POSSIBILITIES

Of course, the “history” of PhotoTherapy will continue to advance, and with the arrival of newer digital technologies, scanners, computer-generated imagery and interactive cybertherapy in general, the potential of PhotoTherapy to assist in the counselling of others will likely expand exponentially into applications not even dreamed of today. (Judy Weiser 2001)

With this project I have attempted to embrace the critical attitude of Foucault’s thought. In a sense it is a questioning of what we take-for-granted or what we silently think. For Foucault this means examining “not the representations that men give themselves, not the conditions that determine them without their knowledge, but rather what they do and the way they do it” (1994a: 317). I have chosen to keep the focus throughout this study on the practices and rationalities of psy photography.

Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying [Foucault 1994a: 315].

This study has investigated how photography practices have been used in the governing of subjectivities and contrasts these practices historically. Discourses create objects of study that bring particular elements of a field into sharp relief while ignoring others; in the case of early psy photography focus is on the surface of isolated bodies and their appearances. From these photographs pathologies were diagnosed and treated by clinicians. This is distinct from phototherapy images which seem to consistently relate the subject-observer to others even when they are not present in the image. In contemporary psy photographs clients are encouraged to interpret and produce their own

images. The focus is on the interpretation of subjectivities but the field of visibility opens up to include relations to others present or absent from the photographs.

Within a very short period of time photography has assumed a very prominent place in society and the use of personal cameras continues to grow in popularity. More importantly this study illustrates that photography has consistently been used to construct authoritative accounts of subjectivities. In other words photos are very powerful carriers of information that may have significant social and political consequences. For instance some of the photographs reproduced in this thesis were used to sway public support or validate diagnoses of mental illnesses. In other examples from this study photos were used to mediate self-confrontation; a technique used to propel an individual into an improved, transformed sense of self. Much of psy photography practice has focused on the transformative potential of photographic self-confrontation, a type of relationship facilitated by a therapist and based on ethical reflection of the sort of person one aspires to be. In Foucault's words, to govern "is to structure the possible field of action of others" (1994b: 341).

This thesis has discussed photographs utilized in a number of practices of looking in the psy disciplines. By producing an account of these practices – from large photo indexes created in asylums soon after the invention of photograph to contemporary phototherapy practices which use photos to access the unconscious – I have attempted to illustrate how photography has served a number of functions related to the governing of bodies and selves. Some of these still-photography practices have included diagnosing and treating insanity through the separation of various mental disturbances and hence populations. At a later point photographs are used to teach clients a new self-relation so

that s/he may exercise greater mastery over his/her self. In Weiser's words, "the therapist's role is to encourage the client's own discoveries as they draw personal meanings from photos and what these might symbolize. In fact the 'non-interpretation' of the photograph by the therapist can serve as a model for clients to assume their own responsibility for interpretation, insight, growth and change" (1988: 256-257).

Foucauldian studies of photography have largely focused on the technology of the gaze and relations of domination. It has been argued that processes of subjectivation are often overlooked or under-theorized in Foucauldian accounts of photography practices. Because digital technologies are facilitating and increasing the ways people interact with photographs it is important to study these practices from the perspective of ethics; the concept of the gaze tends to gloss over how individuals use photographs in ethical practices; it describes largely how individuals are acted upon without observing the ways that they may actively care for and transform their identities via photography. By introducing the perspective of governmentality and self-technologies a potentially more complex analysis can be investigated, one that does not assume that people naively consume images or are passively produced through photography practices but interact with them in a myriad of ways in practices of truth-telling.

Lastly it has been argued that early uses of still-photography in psy depended on realist assumptions of the medium and had the goal of making visible the underlying universal structures of bodies and subjects, much like present day imaging technologies like MRI scans. One possible avenue for future research would be to examine the impact of digital technologies on psy photography practices. In its brief history photography has undergone two significant technological revolutions that shape how we use photo-

images: the first came with the invention of negative-positive printing in the 1850s, a technique that has by and large completely replaced the daguerrotypes. The second began in the 1980s with the introduction of digital cameras, and digital technologies which have steadily and rapidly transformed and proliferated. This technology continues to evolve and will likely replace neg/pos printing in future. "Our world has developed such a voracious appetite for information in visual form, and the digital image has such overwhelming technical and economic advantages as a way of meeting this demand, that it seems certain to succeed the photograph as our primary medium of visual record" (Mitchell 1992:19).

A defining aspect of psy photography has been its relationship to realism, something that many people thought would be undermined with the arrival of digital technologies. In an article titled "Digital Photography: Truth, Meaning, Aesthetics", Steven Skopik writes, "[r]eview a dozen or so essays on the subject, and one is variously informed that the digital image 'challenges, nullifies, damages, undermines, subverts, and perturbs' the veracity of the chemical photograph" (2003: 264). In the future imaging technologies are likely to continue to advance into numerous areas of social interaction. Digital technologies will speed up the production and circulation of photographs and will make images more easily produced and manipulated. If photos are used as documents and metaphors of subjectivities as I have argued in this study then it is likely that our capacity to objectify and work on bodies and selves via photos will also be enhanced. It what ways will this open up new spaces for processes of subjectification and subjection?

It will be important to investigate how these changes impact and in turn are impacted by the ways we govern ourselves and others if as social scientists we are

understand how individuals and communities produce, contest and manage a diversity of identities.

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