

THE FRANCO-OTTOMAN ALLIANCE OF THE 16TH CENTURY:
THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an examination of the Franco-Ottoman alliance of 1525 within the context of European diplomacy in the sixteenth century. As such, it deals with an event that has often been misunderstood or ignored, and attempts to assign it a place in modern historical understanding of that period. The thesis explores the development of the alliance and the direct connection between the two principals, France and the Ottoman empire, and then examines the effects of the alliance upon politics and diplomacy elsewhere in Europe at the time.

Historical accounts of the alliance to this point are inconsistent. Christian and liberal influences have badly distorted reporting of both the Ottoman empire and the empire's relations with western Europe. Traditional historical accounts of the alliance depict Francis I of France "calling in" the Ottomans to assist him in his struggle with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, and then attempting to repudiate the Ottomans when he no longer needed their assistance. Many writers are at a loss to understand how the Christian King Francis could have ever seriously undertaken an alliance with the infidel Ottoman. Despite his supposed reluctance to continue the alliance, Francis is also widely blamed for Ottoman invasions of eastern Europe, particularly the campaign of 1526 and the defeat of Hungary.

This false moralizing on Francis I and the nature of his Ottoman alliance has, as has been stated, produced a false picture of the alliance and its consequences. It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a new philosophical approach to the Franco-Ottoman alliance, one which will allow for a more objective approach to the alliance and its position in European diplomacy. The formulation of such an approach, a hypothesis concerning the means and ends of the alliance, is viewed as necessary before any further research on the subject takes place.

The thesis provides first a chronology of the alliance from the first contacts of 1525-26 to the temporary decline of diplomatic relations during the French Wars of Religion. During this period, Francis I and Henry II of France pursued an active Ottoman alliance as a key part of their foreign policy. After setting out the course of events, the thesis then examines the effects of the alliance in the areas of Europe most affected by combined Franco-Ottoman actions: eastern Europe, including Hungary, the Mediterranean, Venice and the Papacy, and the Habsburg empire of Charles V and his son Philip II. Particular attention has been paid to timing, the exact dates of treaties, campaigns, and embassies, where earlier oversights and errors have led to many misunderstandings of events.

Based on this survey, the thesis then concludes that the alliance was not, as has been suggested, an aberration or a historical event of minor importance. The kings of France and the Ottoman sultans pursued the alliance as a very important part of a general policy of containment against the Habsburg empire. Neither state ever went to war with the

Habsburgs after 1525 without first seeking the other's goodwill and support. Through this alliance, other European states were included in what became the first modern European balance of power. The Franco-Ottoman alliance is considered to be of major importance in any study of European diplomatic, political, or military history in the sixteenth century.

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II. GLOSSARY

- akinji** --irregular raiding troops who either preceeded Ottoman armies or operated independently as raiders.
- bailo** --The Venetian official in charge of the Venetian trading station in Constantinople.
- ban** -- a Slavonic title, equivalent to Count.
- comunero** --name given to the rebels of Castile in 1521.
- devsirme** --the Turkish child tribute, levied on Christian peoples in the Balkans. The slave children were raised as converts to Islam and became either soldiers or members of the bureaucracy.
- diet** --a council or assemblage of nobles. The Croatian diet was known as Sjem.
- gaza** --the Moslem holy war. Discussed in chapter III.
- ghazi** --a crusader, or practitioner of holy war.
- janissary** --from the Turkish yeni cheri, or new troops, a special corps of foot soldiers drawn from the devsirme, the elite of the Ottoman armies.
- morisco** --name given to Spanish residents of Moorish descent.
- terrafirma**--lands held by Venice on the mainland of Italy.
- timar** --Turkish equivalent of a feudal fief.
- vizier** --Minister or councillor in the sultan's court.
- voevoda** --literally general in Slavonic, usually denoting the holder of a specific office.
- voynik** --Vlach auxiliary troops who fought as mercenaries for the Ottomans.

III INTRODUCTION

To argue that the sixteenth century alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire is important is to run the risk of setting up a false dialectic. No arguments have yet been advanced to suggest that the alliance was unimportant, or that the study of it is not relevant to the history of European diplomacy. A political and military alliance between two of the most powerful nations in Europe must necessarily have had considerable consequences for those nations and, by association, for their allies and antagonists as well. Yet the substance of the alliance, its consequences and the overall impact of the arrival of Ottoman Turkey as a military and diplomatic force within the European states system, have never received the attention they deserve.

This indifference is all the more striking when one considers the degree to which historians have focussed on the sixteenth century in general. The concept of a European balance of power dates from this time, and the balance created early in the sixteenth century lasted with some fluctuations for the next four hundred years. Bishop Stubbs, for example, lecturing at Oxford at the beginning of this century, identified the concept of the balance of power as the "string or centre of interest around which all the foreign history, and much of the internal history of the nations, may be grouped."¹ Yet Stubbs dismissed the Ottoman Empire, apparently due to lack of time to include it in his lecture: "This, although it has a great interest in many ways, we shall be able to go into only very cursorily."² A more striking example of neglect is David J. Hill's massive A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, where three hundred and fifty pages are devoted to the details of the Habsburg-Valois wars but the connection between French policy and

the Ottoman alliance is ignored completely.³

The result of this indifference is that when historians of the sixteenth century do discuss the Ottoman Empire and the French alliance of 1525 they reach some interesting, but faulty, conclusions. The alliance continues to be regarded as an aberration, something undertaken by France outside the sphere of European politics and diplomacy, and historians have been unable to resist the temptation to pass judgement on King Francis I.⁴ These judgements then cloud historical analysis; the role of Francis as suspected instigator of the Hungarian defeat at Mohacs and his presumed duplicity during the war of 1536-38 are two favourite misconceptions that result from this moralistic fallacy.⁵

This paper will directly examine the Franco-Ottoman alliance in the context of European diplomacy during the sixteenth century, first to correct some of the errors and misconceptions that have occurred, and second to demonstrate the importance of the alliance in many of the diplomatic and political events of the century. It was during this time that the Ottoman empire was transmuted from a purely aggressive military presence, generally regarded as being outside the realm of Christian-European affairs, into an accepted member of the European states system, one whose political and military actions had consequences for nations as distant as Denmark, Scotland, and Portugal. The Empire, already physically a European state, became one politically as well. The Franco-Ottoman alliance was the means by which this process was accomplished.

This examination requires not the discovery of any radically new evidence but rather a reinterpretation of that which is already on hand. As mentioned, many of the political events of the alliance have been misinterpreted, and there has been no attempt to discern any coherent

policy on the part of either Francis I or Suleyman concerning the alliance and its objectives. Before the study of the subject proceeds any further, these faults will need to be rectified. Historians approaching the Franco-Ottoman alliance will need, at the very least, some sort of hypothesis concerning the effects of the alliance in Europe. This paper will attempt to provide such a theory.

Correlating the evidence to provide this general theory involves a number of problems with the sources themselves. Primary sources concerning the alliance remain in a state of disarray; many are unpublished and many, particularly those in the Topkapi archives in Istanbul, are uncatalogued. Secondary works have relied on a very narrow selection of Turkish sources, or even none at all.⁶ Secondary works also suffer from the problems of "tunnel history" and moral judgement as mentioned above. The historical study of the entire Ottoman period has in fact been neglected.

Too many historians of the Ottoman period have allowed their own Christian and liberal prejudices to spoil the objectivity of their work. These prejudices are apparent from the very first when the tract-writers and pamphleteers of the fifteenth century and the gentleman-adventurer historians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries viewed the Moslem Turks as being beyond the recognized bounds of the Christian world. These writers attempted to analyze the body of the Ottoman Empire and understand it as an entity unto itself. Apart from the obvious historical limitations of such an approach, the biases of the writers are usually manifest. Many of these works were written from a Christian point of view with the motive of attempting to understand the Ottomans, the great enemy, and even those French and English writers who supported political alliance with the Turks were often repelled by their oriental culture.

The first historians of the modern period, the Humanists, took much the same approach. Fifteenth century humanists lamented the loss of learning and the treasures of Greek antiquity in Constantinople and Athens,⁷ and later historians generally found themselves in agreement with the religious writers. Little difference is discernible between the words of the chronicler Doukas, lamenting the fall of Constantinople in the middle of the fifteenth century, and those of Cardinal Newman lecturing in Dublin in the middle of the nineteenth. "No race casts so broad and dark a shadow on the pages of ecclesiastical history, and leaves so powerful an impression on the minds of the reader," maintains the latter, and his description of the Turks as "the great anti-Christ among the race of men," has echoes of Martin Luther.⁸

The Turk, oppressor of Christianity, became in the view of Romantic Europe the Turk, oppressor of liberty. The Greek war of independence and the revolts of Ypsilanti and Obrenovich made a deep impression in the west. Contemporary English historians of the Ottomans, Sir Charles Eliot, Sir Edward Creasy, and Stanley Lane-Poole, are plain in their contempt for and dislike of their subject. The liberal historians had simply secularized the older Christian prejudices.⁹ As late as the 1950's Oscar Halecki and Denis Sinor referred to the Hungarian wars of the sixteenth century as a struggle for national freedom.¹⁰ Dorothy M. Vaughn in Europe and the Turk still regarded Francis' alliance with the Ottomans as a betrayal of European interests; she showed an obvious distaste for examples of cooperation such as the siege of Nice and the wintering of the Turkish fleet in Toulon in 1543. In the latter instance in particular Vaughn allows her prejudices to get out of control, and her account of the Turks raiding French villages for galley slaves and selling them in the Toulon marketplace is not only unsubstantiated but at odds with

contemporary accounts.¹¹

A peculiar situation arises in that while the notion of the Christian commonwealth had generally been abandoned some time during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, historians were and often still are under the delusion that it continued to exist. Even Ranke in his Fürsten und Volker von Sud-Europa im Sechzehnten und Siebzehnten Jahrhundert is not entirely free of this, though he is usually cited as one of the first historians to give an objective account of the Ottoman empire.

The empire's role in history did not begin to receive non-partisan treatment until after its demise in 1923. Arnold Toynbee was among the first to attempt revision of Ottoman historiography, and one of the first to attempt to view the empire without personal antipathy.¹² Following many of Toynbee's ideas, the historical community within Turkey itself has over the last few decades produced a fairly wide selection of works on the history and institutions of the Ottoman empire. The result, as more and more "new" material is published, has been an increased awareness of the Ottoman role in world history.¹³ Yet Turkish historians have generally restricted their works to cover the empire itself, its internal history and institutions, to the detriment of foreign policy. The Ottoman State and its Place in World History, edited by the late Kemal H. Karpat, is one of the few works to proceed in this direction.¹⁴

Ironically, the one aspect of Ottoman history to receive an objective analysis at an early date is the subject in question, the Franco-Ottoman alliance. Charrière's Negotiations de la France dans le Levant, published in four volumes from 1848-60, is a valuable collection of letters and documents concerning French foreign policy in the sixteenth century, and the author's own comments on the documents and

the events they refer to are equally valuable. Charrière was one of the first historians to realize that the study of this alliance could provide a means to examine the role of the Ottoman empire in Europe.

Turkish political history during the sixteenth century was so interwoven with that of the European states, the influence of Ottoman interference upon the wars and negotiations of the Christian princes was so marked, that a study of Suleyman's foreign relations becomes almost a study of contemporary Half Europe.¹⁵

Half a dozen other works of a similar nature followed in France, monographs or collections of documents usually based on Charrière and sources such as the nineteenth century German chroniclers.¹⁶ The last of these, Ursu's La Politique Orientale de François Ier published in 1908, expands on Charrière's ideas on the study of the alliance and uses German, English and Spanish sources as well as French; the chief drawback of this work is that it stops short in 1547 with the death of Francis.¹⁷ Political and diplomatic history fell out of favour in France shortly thereafter under the influence of the Annales school and no more such works were produced.

Credible though the works of Charrière and Ursu are, they do not provide a comprehensive view of the Ottoman empire and its role in Europe. When Clarence Rouillard wrote The Turks in French History, Thought and Literature, 1520-1660 in 1940, he found that the history of Ottoman-French political connections in the years following 1525 remained ill-defined. Rouillard notes in his foreword that the work, planned as a discussion of Turkish cultural influences in France, has a preponderance of purely political background material because he had first to include his own analysis of the events of the alliance. There was no adequate historical work on the subject to which he could refer.¹⁸ There is

still no adequate work.

Rouillard's work is in many ways a landmark discussion of the cultural cross-currents which linked France and Turkey in the sixteenth century. It demonstrates that the Ottomans were by no means as isolated from the rest of Europe as was previously assumed. Yet the trend in contemporary European historical writing continues to consign the alliance to a dark corner. Garrett Mattingly's Renaissance Diplomacy¹⁹ was a much needed explanation of the evolution and organization of modern diplomatic methods, but the work gives only a brief and rather vague outline of Franco-Ottoman relations. The mainstream of thought in diplomatic and political history regards the Habsburgs as the pivot around which the rest of Europe revolved and the Ottoman Turks as one of a series of enemies whom the Habsburgs were forced to confront. It is seldom considered, however, that these enemies might somehow have been concerted by another agency, such as France.

Structuralism, one methodology which has the capacity to undertake such studies, similarly fails to examine the alliance. The influence of the Annales school has in many ways been unfortunate. Fernand Braudel in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II describes the events of the alliance but refuses to analyze them in any detail.²⁰ Additionally, his concept of the Mediterranean as being not only geographically and economically separate from northern Europe but politically separate as well has led to a very narrow view of the alliance. This problem is further exemplified in the later work of Dorothy M. Vaughn.

Turkish historians similarly fail to follow up the idea that the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century was a European power, a power which had great influence in European diplomacy. Halil Inalcik states

that "Up to 1596 there was no question of international politics which did not somehow involve the Ottomans,"²¹ but, though he provides examples of contact, he does not relate them to any theme of continuous political involvement. Turkish historians are wont to believe that the Ottomans were the dominant force in this alliance, with France as a reluctant partner. Western historians and biographers writing on Ottoman subjects have begun to follow this lead, apparently still unwilling to believe that a Christian monarch could have voluntarily allied himself with the infidel Turks. Roger B. Merriman in Suleiman the Magnificent takes this view, just as he similarly fails to attribute any sort of forethought or long-term plans to Francis I. In fact Merriman, like Vaughn, is straightforward in his antipathy to Francis, and his assessment of the personality of the French king is thus full of contradictions. This work, the only major English language biography of Suleyman, also has problems with factual verification and points of evidence are not always used critically: at one point, as evidence for his theory concerning important Venetian fleet movements during the siege of Rhodes in 1522, Merriman cites a passage from Othello.²²

The preceding analysis, though far from being complete historiographically, does tend to illustrate the problems involved in a study such as this. In order to discuss these problems it is essential to withhold all moral judgements on the actions of Francis I, and also on the nature of the Ottoman empire. Christian-liberal influences have concerned historians with whether or not Francis was a bad Christian for inviting the Turks into Europe. The question ignores the fact that the Turks were already in Europe, and had been for over a hundred and fifty years. Questionable as their role as oppressors of Christianity and Balkan liberty may be, the Ottomans were a European power.

The Ottoman state had been oriented towards Europe almost from its inception. Sixty years after it first began to expand this state pushed its frontiers into Europe, and thereafter the aggressive foreign policies of the sultans were directed almost continuously towards the west. Ottoman histories to date have emphasized the roles of the sultans as conquerors, overlooking the administrative and political talents possessed by many of these men. Of the three sultans immediately preceding Suleyman, two attempted to consolidate and strengthen the empire as it stood, particularly in Europe. Mehmed II and Bayezid II undertook relatively few wars of conquest. Selim I, Suleyman's father, fought victorious wars with Persia and Egypt, but in the west it was believed that he had done this so he could have a free hand to intervene in the affairs of Europe. By 1525 the Ottoman empire stood with a large portion of its territory and most of its sources of power firmly established on the European side of the Dardanelles. The question as to whether the empire inherited its structures from the Moslem world or from Byzantium after its absorption by the Ottomans is not entirely relevant. All of the manpower for the Ottoman army and bureaucracy, the timber for its navy, food for the capital as well as the capital itself, were European. Due to the frequent marriage with European women, the sultans themselves were more European than not.

If the Ottoman empire had not already been a European power, dominating south-eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, it is doubtful that Francis would have asked for an alliance. France required the assistance of another great power within Europe. It is crucial to make the following distinction. France was not responsible for introducing the Ottomans into Europe, that process had already been accomplished. France was responsible for legitimizing the Ottoman

presence, for introducing the Ottomans into the European states system. Diplomatic contacts between western Europe and the Ottomans at the beginning of the fifteenth century had consisted of trade relations and a few furtive political contacts with the Italian states.²³ A hundred years later every major power in Europe maintained some kind of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman empire and many had resident ambassadors in Constantinople, following the pattern established by France after the alliance of 1525.

The alliance began, according to current evidence, in 1525, very shortly after the battle of Pavia and Francis' defeat and capture by the Imperial forces of Charles V. The motives of both parties in undertaking this alliance have often been misunderstood. The question of how Francis, the Most Christian King, ruler of a nation with a long tradition of war in the service of the church, could ally himself with the Turk has been a particular puzzle. But, as noted, historians have persisted in judging the alliance by the ethical and political standards of medieval Europe, while by 1525 these standards were altering radically. Not all Europeans saw the Turk as the great enemy. Christian antipathy to Islam had never been universal, and even at the height of the crusading period there had been areas, Spain, Sicily, crusader Palestine, where Christians and Moslems had lived together with a fair degree of tolerance on both sides. By the end of the fifteenth century more and more theologians, scholars, and travellers to the Orient were arguing that the Turks, far from being the great enemy, were people of considerable civilization.

At the same time, with the rise of nation-states and doctrines of national self-interest, princes began more than ever to consider the interests of their own states first and those of the Christian commonwealth a distant second, if at all. Machiavelli's doctrine that the

end justifies the means encouraged rulers to think less of religious and more of political consequences. A case in point is the actions of the Lutheran princes of Germany. Martin Luther called for war against the Turks, equating them with the popes as the great enemy of mankind, but at least one of his sponsors, Landgrave Philip of Hesse, felt that Charles V was an even greater enemy. On more than one occasion Philip joined alliances that included both the Ottomans and the papacy against Charles V.

By contracting the alliance of 1525 and subsequently continuing the negotiations towards a permanent alliance Francis can be seen as the first ruler to put this type of political principle into practise where the Ottomans were concerned. It is generally accepted that the French motive for the first contact was the urgent need for military assistance after the defeat at Pavia, but several pieces of evidence indicate that contact may have begun even before Pavia.²⁴ Subsequent events show that both Francis and Suleyman took the alliance very seriously and neither had any intention of relinquishing it.

The urgencies of the moment in 1525 notwithstanding, both France and the Ottomans needed this alliance. France under Francis was almost literally surrounded; nearly all of France's landward borders touched territories governed by the Habsburgs, and Charles V claimed lands such as Artois, Burgundy, Milan, and Navarre which were also claimed by France. The only means by which France could escape the threat of a Habsburg war on all fronts was to apply similar pressure to the Habsburgs in other parts of Europe. Francis allied repeatedly with England, Scotland, Cleves, Württemberg, Hesse, Saxony, Denmark, Poland, Rohemia, Hungary, Transylvania, Venice, Genoa, Switzerland, and the papacy, but in the end was forced to rely on the Ottomans. The Ottomans were the only

other power militarily strong enough to stand up to the Habsburgs, the only nation capable of helping France maintain a balance of power in Europe.

The situation took on another dimension in 1529 when Francis' chief naval ally in the Mediterranean, Andrea Doria, defected to the Habsburgs. The only other naval force capable of meeting Doria on equal terms was the fleet of the North African corsair leader Khaireddin Barbarossa, who also happened to be an Ottoman vassal. To gain the aid of Barbarossa and his fleet Francis adhered to the alliance even more strongly. The alliance was now vital to maintain the balance of seapower in the Mediterranean.

The alliance was equally necessary to the Ottomans, who were as concerned as France about the growth of the power of the Habsburgs. The Ottomans had always feared a unified Christian Europe, which might then turn in a body and conduct a full-scale war against them, and Charles V seemed to represent that threat. The Ottomans did not have the power to deal with this threat directly. Historians have yet to analyze in detail the theory that the Ottoman empire had by 1525 reached the physical limits of its expansion in Europe, but an analysis of the campaigns of 1529 and 1532 shows that this was probably the case. Ottoman armies operated on a seasonal basis, departing from the capital in the spring and returning there each autumn, and the length of the march to the Austrian frontier meant that the armies were often left with little more than a month in the field. Both the above-mentioned campaigns failed, at Vienna and at Guns, when Suleyman was forced to withdraw due to the lateness of the season.

Again in the Mediterranean, once the Turkish short range galley fleets sailed west of the Sicilian Narrows they were forced to rely on

insecure bases in North Africa. Barbarossa in particular was anxious to use French ports as a wintering haven for his fleet, and he was finally allowed to do so in 1543. This experiment was not a success from either party's point of view, but the Ottomans continued to press France to open her ports to the Turkish navy. The Ottomans regarded French cooperation in the Mediterranean as being essential to their fleet movements.

Since the Ottomans could not damage the Habsburgs directly they were forced to look for allies. An alliance with a European power would gain them two advantages, military aid in the Habsburg wars, and diplomatic aid. Acceptance within the European states system would help remove the danger of a Christian coalition against them. Both these objectives were achieved. When correlating the events of the alliance with the major campaigns of the Habsburg-Valois wars it is easy to see that, just as the French armies never went to war unless they were assured of Ottoman support, so the Ottomans seldom launched a campaign without first securing the aid of France and her other European allies. Through the intermediary of France the Ottomans were able to open up direct diplomatic contacts with Poland and Transylvania and indirect contacts with other powers as diverse as the Schmalkaldic League and the papacy.

Perhaps the best indicator of how quickly the Ottomans were accepted as a European state is the speed with which other nations followed the French example of opening up diplomatic relations. Within three years of the first French embassy, Ferdinand of Austria was sending ambassadors to Constantinople, and in 1551 Charles V despatched Malvezzi as the first Imperial resident ambassador to the Ottomans. By the end of the century, England and the United Provinces had also established formal ties and even Philip II of Spain had been forced to maintain loose relations with the Ottomans. The other powers of Europe realized very quickly that the

only counters to French diplomacy were diplomatic initiatives of their own. Though relations were not always cordial (Malvezzi spent a good part of his term in an Ottoman dungeon) relations were nevertheless established and the process of making the Ottoman empire a truly European state was completed.

The effects of this establishment were felt by most of the other powers of Europe. France, of course, was able to continue its fight to recover the disputed territories and resist Habsburg encirclement. Other nations were forced, more than ever, to choose sides. In Hungary, after the defeat at Mohacs, despite the opinions of nationalist historians, many prominent men chose the Franco-Ottoman alliance as preferable to Habsburg domination. The new state of Transylvania introduced a novel element into the anti-Habsburg alliances for the rest of the century. Poland, suddenly confronted with both Ottomans and Habsburgs on her southern frontier, attempted her own balance of power in eastern Europe, but was ultimately forced to accept the Habsburg alliance. In the Mediterranean a similar sort of definition of allegiances occurred. The papacy, choosing one side and then the other over the years, was eventually eliminated as a political power, while Venice managed to preserve her own neutrality only by sacrificing most of her overseas territories. The Knights of St. John, a military religious order with a high percentage of Frenchmen as members, was eventually forced for religious reasons to choose the Habsburg alliance.

The chief short-term effect was doubtless felt by the Habsburgs. Though Charles V's dominions encircled France, it was repeatedly the emperor himself who was surrounded by a ring of dangerous enemies all acting in concert. His problems were compounded by the fact that one element of the alliance, the Lutheran princes, lay inside his own

empire. Correlating the events of the alliance with the career of Charles V, and that of his son Philip II of Spain, may explain many of the reasons why the great Habsburg power of the sixteenth century ultimately came to failure.

This paper will examine the alliance, the consequent appearance of Turkey as a major factor in the alliance systems of the sixteenth century, and the subsequent effects of this new factor in the diplomatic and political history of Europe during that century. Attention will be focussed first on the alliance itself, and second on the ramifications of the alliance in the areas primarily affected, France, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Habsburg empire. Particular attention will be given to the role of France as the intermediary, the coordinator of the alliance system and in many cases the determining factor as to when and where the alliance went to war with the Habsburgs. The conclusion will contain a brief summary of the events and effects of the alliance, and will then state the results of the analysis in a series of hypotheses. It is hoped that these hypotheses will be useful for those doing further research both on the Franco-Ottoman alliance and in the wider context of European diplomacy in the sixteenth century.

The first requirement, however, is to provide a brief examination of the Ottoman power itself and of how it came to be significant in European affairs. The commentary which follows gives particular emphasis to the Ottoman empire's European origins and structures, and provides an objective reassessment of the Ottomans as a European power.

III. FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

- 1 William Stubbs, Lectures on European History (London, 1904), p. 1.
- 2 Ibid., p. 11.
- 3 David J. Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe (1905, reprint New York, 1967). Hill's attitude is not unique. Similar works as current as De Lamar Jensen, Reformation Europe (Lexington, 1981), contain little or no information on the Ottoman role in Europe.
- 4 Leopold von Ranke, Civil Wars and Monarchy in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, trans. M.A. Garvey (New York, 1853), p. 104, sums up the alliance as odious, while Bohdan Chudoba, Spain and the Empire 1519-1643 (Chicago, 1952), p. 68, refers to the alliance of Francis and Suleyman, "the Mohammedan conqueror," as "one of the most significant results of the renaissance decay of European morals."
- 5 These two cases will be dealt with in detail in Chapter V.
- 6 One of the worst offenders in this regard is Roger B. Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent (New York, 1966). While writing what is supposedly the authoritative biography of Sultan Suleyman I, Merriman uses no Turkish primary sources relating directly to the sultan.
- 7 This attitude was doubtless influenced by the influx of refugee Greek scholars into the centres of humanist learning after 1453.
- 8 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. H.S. Magoulias (Detroit, 1975), pp. 236-39; John Henry Newman, Lectures on the History of the Turks (Dublin, 1854), p. 126; p. 128; Mark U. Edwards, jr., Luther's Last Battles; Politics and Policies, 1531-1546 (Ithaca, 1983), p. 191. See also Chapter IX under The Protestants.
- 9 W.H. McNeill in The Ottoman State and its Place in World History, Kemal H. Karpat, ed. (Leiden, 1974), p. 34. McNeill gives a much fuller treatment of this subject.
- 10 Oscar Halecki, A History of Poland (1942, reprint New York, 1976); Denis Sinor, History of Hungary (London, 1959).
- 11 Dorothy M. Vaughn, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool, 1954), p. 127.
- 12 Arnold Toynbee in The Ottoman State and its Place in World History, Kemal H. Karpat, ed. (Leiden, 1974), p. 18. Toynbee

suggests for instance that the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire has been a political disaster for the Middle East. Such a view would have been unthinkable for historians a generation earlier.

- 13 These historians can be roughly divided into two generations. The first, including Fuat Köprülü and Omer Lütfi Barkan, were active in the 1930's and 40's, working primarily with previously undiscovered sources. The second, notably Halil İnalcık and the late Kemal H. Karpat, have consolidated this information and worked towards more general theories of the history of the Ottoman state.
- 14 Karpat, ed., The Ottoman State and its Place in World History.
- 15 E. Charrière, Negotiations de la France dans le Levant (1848-60, reprint New York, 1966), III, p. 3.
- 16 Several German orientalists produced large multi-volume histories of the Ottoman empire during the first half of the nineteenth century, usually based on Ottoman chronicles. The most notable is Baron Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1837-48), a ten-volume work which draws very heavily on Turkish sources such as the chronicles of Kemal Pasha Zadeh and Solakzadeh. This work was for long the only major source of information on Turkish history for non-speaking Turkish historians, and its mammoth size makes it still the starting point for most Ottoman historians today. Nevertheless, it is still a chronicle based on other chronicles and it perpetuates a number of myths. For the role of Hammer in the Mohacs myth, see Chapter V.
- 17 J. Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François Ier (Paris, 1908).
- 18 Clarence D. Rouillard, The Turks in French History, Thought, and Literature 1520-1660 (1940, reprint New York, 1973), pp. 7-11.
- 19 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London, 1955).
- 20 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (1949, reprint New York, 1976). Braudel believes "events" such as the alliance to be ephemeral, surface manifestations of deeper historical forces, and as such not really worth of detailed analysis. II, p. 901.
- 21 Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire; the Classical Age, 1300-1600, trans. N. İtıkowitz and C. İmber (London, 1973), p. 35.
- 22 Merriman, p. 63.
- 23 In the case of Venice, of course, trade and political relations were usually the same thing.

24 The evidence for this point will be discussed in Chapter V.

IV THE BACKGROUND TO OTTOMAN POWER

The Origins of the Ottomans

From the last years of the western Roman Empire until well into the modern period the history of Europe has been altered repeatedly by invasion from the outside. A basic pattern of invasion and assimilation into the European system was followed by tribes such as the Goths, Lombards, and Magyars; much of the political map of Europe today has its origin in the settlement of these tribes and their development into permanent nations. The growth of the Ottoman Empire can in fact be seen as but the last and most complex of these invasions from the exterior.

The origins of the Ottomans are as involved as their own history. Briefly, the new Moslem empire based on that of the Sassanian Persians in the Middle East found itself confronted to the north by a huge confederation of Altaic nomads known collectively as Turks. This confederation, the Oguz, lasted until the tenth century with a relationship to the Moslem caliphate similar to that of the Germanic tribes to the Roman empire. Periodically at war with the Turks, the Caliphate nevertheless accepted many of them into its service, first as soldiers and later as administrators and members of society. When the confederation dissolved one tribe, the Seljuks, adopted Islam en masse and emigrated into Iraq, where by the tenth century they had risen to dominate the Caliphate and their leader Toghrul Bey had taken for himself the title of sultan.¹ The Turks thus not only entered and reinforced the Moslem world but adopted its traditions as well, most importantly the custom of gaza, or holy war against the infidel.

West of the Seljuk power base in Iran and Iraq lay the Byzantine Empire which, by the middle of the eleventh century, was starting to decay badly under a succession of incompetent rulers. The frontier

districts of the empire in eastern Anatolia were poorly defended. Although the Seljuks were primarily concerned with subduing the breakaway Fatimid caliphate in Egypt, it was inevitable that Seljuk raids and then armies would enter the rich imperial provinces in search of plunder. In 1071 the Byzantine field force under the Emperor Romanus Diogenes went out to challenge the Seljuks and encountered their main force under Sultan Alp Arslan not far from Lake Van in eastern Anatolia. At the Battle of Manzikert half of the Imperial army was destroyed and the Emperor was captured.²

Manzikert created a power vacuum in the Imperial lands of which the Seljuks were quick to take advantage. Their armies and raiding parties were able to advance at will. Within ten years all of Anatolia was under their dominion and Turkish troops occupied Nicaea, just across the Sea of Marmara from Constantinople. Alexius Comnenus, on his accession to the throne in 1081, was able to restore the situation to a degree, though his appeal to the west for aid misfired. The crusaders, after capturing Nicaea for him, struck out on their own for the Holy Land, but Alexius was nonetheless able by diplomacy and skill at arms to begin recapturing towns and territories in Anatolia. His grandson Manuel I continued this policy with some success until 1176, when at the Battle of Myriokephalon, the nascent Byzantine army was destroyed by the Turks.

Two factors ensured that the Byzantines would never regain their hold on Anatolia. The first was the deterioration of relations with Western Europe which ultimately led to the Fourth Crusade and overthrow of the Empire. Though Michael Paleologos restored the Byzantines to Constantinople in 1261, he was forced to devote much of his energies to preventing a counter-revolution by western forces led by Charles of

Anjou and ignored affairs to the East.³ The second was the collapse of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, in Anatolia, in 1242 and the subjugation of these territories by the Mongols after the Battle of Kosedag.

The Mongols returned in 1258 when Hulagu sacked Baghdad and killed the caliph. The lack of control after the collapse of Rum led to continued unrest and a revolt in Antolia in 1271 brought permanent Mongol occupation forces and severe repression from the new Ilkhan dynasty in Iraq. The result was that the western frontier districts, more remote from Mongol control, became a refuge for Turks fleeing that control and for adventurers looking for gain. One of the latter group was a chieftain named Ertoghrul, who obtained control of the district of Sogut on the borders of the Byzantine province of Bithynia some time after the revolt of 1271.⁴

By the end of the thirteenth century these frontier districts had developed an independent society of ghazis, literally warriors for the faith, and the concept of gaza provided a new impetus for Turkish conquests.⁵ As Inalcik says, "Society in the frontier principalities conformed to a particular cultural pattern, imbued with the idea of continuous Holy War and continuous expansion of the Dārūlislām--the realms of Islam-- until they covered the whole world."⁶ In the face of weakening Byzantine opposition a dozen Ghazi emirates appeared and began conquering the last Byzantine provinces in Anatolia. One of these emirates was that of Ertoghrul (d. 1280) and his son Osman.

The advances of this small state were remarkable. Quickly capturing several Byzantine towns in the mountain passes of Phrygia, Osman was able by 1300 to isolate the city of Brusa, capital of Bithynia. Though the city did not fall until 1326, Osman's troops defeated an imperial army at Baphaeon in 1302, giving him control of most of the interior of

of the province bordering on the Sea of Marmara. The victory also established Osman's prestige and marked him as a leader of the gaza. Ghazis from other territories came to join him and his military strength grew as well. In the words of Paul Coles, Osman's emirate:

exercised a magnetic attraction upon a stream of adventurers and refugees--Turkish mercenaries drawn by opportunities for booty, dervishes in search of disciples, land-hungry cultivators fleeing before the Mongols. As other ghazi leaders quarrelled among themselves over the partition of occupied Byzantine territory, Ottoman rulers were still able to offer the prospect of land or plunder to all who accepted their command.⁷

Baphaeon, an insignificant battle in military terms, marks the emergence of the Ottoman Turks as a power of note in eastern Europe, and marks also the beginning of nearly a century of uninterrupted expansion of that power.

The Rise of the Ottomans to Empire

For the next eighty-seven years Ottoman expansion continued without a check. Osman was succeeded in 1324 by his son Orhan who captured Brusa in 1326, Nicaea in 1331, Nicomedia in 1337, and Scutari on the shores of the Marmara in 1338. There was no effective Byzantine resistance. The recovery under Michael Paleologos had been the Empire's Indian summer. His successors' dynastic disputes, civil war, and the depredations of the Catalan Grand Company left the empire weak and unable to fight even its domestic disputes without outside help.

In 1341 the bloodiest civil war of all broke out when Regent John Cantacuzenos attempted to usurp the throne from his nephew, the infant John V Paleologos. Cantacuzenos was opposed by the new emperor's mother

Anne of Savoy, who raised a considerable force of Serb mercenaries to back her son's position. The Regent then turned to the only other close source of power, the Turks. He initially used as mercenaries the men of Umur Bey, Emir of Aydin, but this source ceased when a random western crusading expedition under Humbert of Dauphiné seized the port of Smyrna in Aydin and killed Umur. Cantacuzenos then turned to Orhan and in 1346, 5500 of Orhan's ghazis entered Thrace. Part of the Turkish price was a marriage between Orhan and John's daughter Theodora, an event which caused much shock and revulsion both in the empire and in western Europe.⁸

The ravages of mercenaries and the Black Death over the next half dozen years reduced the empire to a badly weakened condition. In 1352 Orhan sent more troops into Thrace to help Cantacuzenos, and this time they stayed permanently in Europe. An earthquake in 1354 broke down the walls of Gallipoli and the Turks seized the city, viewing, as they informed the Archbishop of Salonika, in their successes the manifestation of the will of God.⁹ Able to import troops into Europe with impunity, Orhan's son Suleyman launched a series of independent raids across Thrace. Cantacuzenos, unable to cage the tiger, was forced to abdicate. John V also failed to check Suleyman's raids and within ten years the Emperor was a vassal of the Ottoman Turks. Only the acute diplomatic skill of the last few emperors allowed Byzantium to survive for another hundred years.¹⁰

Orhan died in 1360 and was succeeded by his son Murad I (1360-1389), who continued the advance into Europe. All of Thrace was soon occupied Adrianople (Edirne) having been captured in 1361 and Philipopolis in 1363. This advance finally roused the interest of the Balkan states lying beyond the Empire, but when a coalition of Serbia, Wallachia, Bosnia, Albania, and Hungary sent a powerful force to meet the Ottomans in 1363, this army like that of the Byzantines before it was routed and destroyed.

In 1371 a second Balkan army was defeated at Cernomen, and Murad resumed his advance. A series of campaigns against the Shishmanid princes of Bulgaria brought Sofia and the southern half of the country under direct Ottoman control by 1386, with the rest remaining as a vassal state. More campaigns directed to the west quickly captured Salonika and overran Macedonia, and then pushed on into Thessaly and Albania. Durres, Okhrida, Kavalles, Kroia, and Shkoder had all been taken or subjugated by 1385 and forty years after they crossed the Dardanelles the Ottomans were entrenched on the shores of the Adriatic.

The last remaining power in the Balkans, Serbia, was also quickly despatched. A campaign up the Vardar valley in 1385 crossed the Rhodope Mountains and took Monastir, Pritep, and Nis all in the spring of 1386. With the fall of Nis and Sofia in the same year all of the southern half of the Balkans was under the control of the Ottomans, and raiders were striking as far afield as Bosnia and Wallachia. The last chance to reverse this state of affairs came in 1389 when an army of Serb, Vlach, and Bosnian troops met Murad's army at Kossovo Polje, the Plain of Blackbirds. Murad was killed, assassinated after the battle, but the Turks were once again victorious. Balkan independence was at an end.

The Establishment of the Empire

Murad was succeeded by his son Bayezid I (1389-1402). Surnamed Yildirim, the Thunderbolt, Bayezid has long had the reputation in the west of being another great conqueror like his father. In fact Bayezid attempted few new conquests in Europe. He and the next three sultans were kept occupied subduing those areas which lay within Ottoman

hegemony but were either not fully integrated into the empire or had simply been missed in the first rush of conquest. Bayezid's main European ventures were therefore in Albania, Macedonia, south Serbia, and Bulgaria, where the last Shishman was executed in 1393. He was responsible for the first colonizations by Turkish peasants on occupied European soil, as a means of integrating Europe more fully into his empire; what he was attempting to do was make the European areas of the Ottoman Empire as Turkish as those in Anatolia.

Also significant for the west was the battle of Nicopolis in 1396, which ended for ever the idea of a Christian concert against the Turks. A powerful force of French and Hungarian crusaders advanced rather blindly down the Danube and were overwhelmed by Bayezid's army. Many of the highest nobility of France were among the dead or prisoners. But Bayezid was not able to use this victory to any offensive advantage, and while his blockade of Constantinople from 1395 until 1402 caused great hardship in the city it did not ensure its fall.¹¹ Bayezid's reign ended with the appearance in Anatolia of the forces of Timur. Marching rashly to challenge Timur, Bayezid was utterly defeated by him outside Ankara in 1402. He died in captivity, all of Anatolia was lost, and it appeared that the Ottoman Empire might go the way of the Seljuk.

It did not because even in the short period since the conquest, Ottoman power in Europe had become so strongly entrenched that the European provinces could be used to reconstitute the empire. After an eleven year interregnum while Bayezid's four sons fought for dominance, Mehmed I, with Byzantine and Serb aid, killed the last of his brothers and became Sultan of a still intact empire in 1413.¹² Mehmed reigned until 1420, and once again his reign was essentially one of consolidation. Murad II (1421-1451) also had to spend the first three

years of his reign fighting for his throne against rebels and a Byzantine backed pretender. From 1421-30 he was occupied with regaining Salonika, lost during the interregnum, from Venice.

By this time the Balkan frontier had stabilized. Ghazi raiders were still striking out into neighbouring countries, but no armies were following up their raids. The damage they caused had the effect of crystallizing opposition in neighbouring countries. With the support of Hungary, Tvrtko of Bosnia, Vlad Drakul of Wallachia, and George Brankovic of Serbia were all refusing to pay the tribute demanded of them, and in 1443 Skanderbeg began his revolt in Albania. This manifestation of the power of Hungary marks the emergence of another power in eastern Europe, that of the Jagellon dynasty.

In the aftermath of the first Mongol invasion a succession of powerful grand princes of pagan Lithuania, Mindvog, Gedimin, and Olgierd, had extended Lithuanian power from the Black Sea almost to the Baltic. In 1386 Olgierd's nephew and successor Jagiello adopted Christianity and married a Polish princess, thus creating the combined power of Poland-Lithuania. Jagiello's son Vladislav additionally inherited the throne of Hungary, and with one interruption the Jagellons were to rule most of northern and eastern Europe for the next century.

It was the ambition of the dynasty to extend its power south and unite Eastern Europe by combining all the lands of the Danube basin with those of the north. In the reign of Vladislav II (1434-44) there arose the notion of a combined political-religious war to challenge the Ottomans, enforce the Union of Florence, and rescue Constantinople.¹³ The young king was also powerfully reinforced by the appearance of John Hunyadi, a minor noble of Vlach extraction who rose to be captain of Belgrade and Voivode of Transylvania on the strength of his skill

at defeating the Turks. In 1443 Hunyadi's famous "long campaign" raided through winter weather deep into Macedonia, inflicting such damage that Murad concluded a peace treaty with not only Hungary but George Brankovic and the Serbs.

Hunyadi became the symbol of Christian resistance to the Turks and legendary tales of the White Knight and his victories led to perhaps an overexaggerated opinion of the capabilities of the west to fight the Ottomans. Before the Turkish treaty had been ratified the papal legate, the Florentine cardinal Giuliano Caesarini, arrived in Hungary and persuaded the young king to launch a crusading army into Turkish territory. Vladislas' army met that of Murad near Varna on the shores of the Black Sea and the Hungarians were utterly defeated. Vladislas was killed outright, Caesarini disappeared in the retreat and was never seen again, and Hunyadi himself escaped only with difficulty.¹⁴

There was much dismay in the west, due mainly to the death of Caesarini, but the primary consequence of Varna was that with the end of Jagellonian expansionism that of the Ottomans could now continue unchecked. Murad was succeeded by his son Mehmed II, surnamed Fatih, the Conqueror, in 1451; he had obtained that name by opening his reign with the final siege and conquest of Constantinople in May of 1453. This event marks the appearance of the Ottoman Empire in its final form.

Though surnamed the Conqueror, Mehmed II attempted no sweeping conquests after the manner of Murad I, no great excursions into new lands. The fall of Constantinople itself was essentially a measure of consolidation and establishment of the empire as Mehmed planned it. James Shotwell has commented that this event was, at least symbolically, the basis of future Turkish power in Europe, "a symbol of the impact of the Orient upon Europe."¹⁵ This was true on a number of levels.

From a religious standpoint there was a tradition as old as Islam itself that a Mahdi or true leader would lead the Faithful to Constantinople for in the words of the philosopher al-Kindi, "He will conquer Constantinople and rule over the whole earth will be his."¹⁶ Mehmed was personally attracted to this idea, and had also read Caesar's memoirs and Arrian's Life of Alexander, works which might have influenced his view of his role in the world.¹⁷ He certainly regarded Constantinople as a personal prize, and it was rumoured that during the sack of the city he killed one of his men whom he discovered gouging stones out of a classical mosaic.¹⁸

In more practical terms, the capture enabled him to unify his possessions, removing the danger of the western powers gaining control of the waterways and splitting his empire in two. It gave him also the means to control the northern termini of the Central Asian trade routes. All of the various sources of power in south-eastern Europe were being gathered into Ottoman hands.

The conquest was the logical prelude to two further lines of action. "The Mediterranean and its projection, the Aegean Sea, constituted the highway of foreign commerce for the empire,"¹⁹ while the agricultural wealth of the Black Sea littoral was vital to feed rebuilt Constantinople. Mehmed proceeded to attempt to take both of these areas under direct control, while after a bloody failure before Belgrade in 1456, he conducted only such operations against the west as were deemed absolutely necessary.²⁰

The first area of operations, the Aegean, brought Mehmed into direct conflict with Venice, who also regarded this area as her own. The seizure of the Despotate of Morea in 1460 was interpreted by Venice as a clear threat. From 1463-79 Venice was at war with Mehmed. Venetian

agents encouraged Uzun Hassan of the White Sheep Turks to attack Mehmed in the east. The war was eventually a severe defeat for Venice, which lost the valuable island of Negroponte (Euboea) and almost all of her trading stations in the Aegean, retaining only those in the Morea. Most of the commerce of the Aegean could now be directed by the Ottomans and their clients.

As the war with Venice began to subside Mehmed turned his attention to the Black Sea. He had gained control of Wallachia in 1462, but that control was threatened by the ambitious ruler of Moldavia, Stephen the Great (1457-1503) who had invaded Wallachia and seized the Dobrudja province. Mehmed responded by attempting to annex the entire shoreline of the Black Sea. In the Crimea he was successful, reducing the Crimean Tartars to vassalage, but the army he sent into Moldavia was defeated by Stephen on the River Rakova. A second offensive in 1476 initially defeated the Moldavian prince but was forced to retire when decimated by plague. The important ports of Kilia and Akkerman remained out of Ottoman hands.²¹ Nevertheless, peace had been achieved in the Black Sea and the Ottomans firmly dominated both the Black Sea and its economy.

Only at the end of his reign did Mehmed begin any purely offensive action in the ghazi spirit, and then it was as a continuation of the war with Venice. Bosnia had been completely annexed in 1469 and in 1477, Mehmed moved to direct attack and his akinji raiders moved from their Bosnian bases into the province of Friuli in the Venetian terrafirma. The passages of the Isonzo and Tagliamento Rivers were forced, and the raiders penetrated so far that the flames of burning villages could be seen by night from the bell tower of St. Marks.²² In the following year more raids damaged the Friuli while an Ottoman field force reduced

all of Venice's ports in Albania. There was panic in Venice and a hasty peace was concluded in 1479, in which Venice ceded all territories captured by Mehmed.

Having discovered anew the weakness of the west the army in Albania then turned its attention to the nearest Christian lands, the Kingdom of Naples just across the Adriatic. On July 28, 1480, an Ottoman force under Gedik Ahmed Pasha landed near Otranto and on August 11 the town was taken, the male population slaughtered, and the rest sold as slaves in Albania while raids scoured the countryside as far as Brindisi and Taranto. The forces of Naples and the Duke of Calabria quickly closed in on the beachhead and a major confrontation might have ensued had it not been for Mehmed's death early in the following year. His son and successor Bayezid II, (1481-1512) decided not to support the risky operation in southern Italy and on September 10 Otranto was recaptured. Some of the janissary garrison entered the service of the Duke of Calabria.

The attack on Otranto seems to have been meant quite seriously as the prelude to a full scale invasion, not just another ghazi raid. The presence of the janissaries, Ottoman regular army troops, suggests that Mehmed was seriously contemplating a major campaign in Italy. Such an attempt, however, would have meant that the empire would have had to put forth most of its strength against southern Italy, and Bayezid II was faced with other distractions. In the first place his younger brother Djem had also claimed the throne, and Djem, with support from the Mamluks of Egypt and the Knights of St. John on Rhodes, began a rebellion that paralyzed the empire for the next year. At the end of this time Bayezid was dragged into a damaging war with the Mamluks and not until 1491 did he have a free hand even in Asia. Meanwhile Djem

took refuge with the Knights, who proceeded to trade him off to the papacy;²³ Pope Innocent VIII was eager to use the Ottoman prince as a figurehead in a new crusade.²⁴ To prevent a Christian coalition forming against him while he was occupied in Egypt, Bayezid adopted a conciliatory policy to the west; his ambassadors offered the popes the holy lance²⁵ and sponge as gifts if they would hand over Djem. In 1494, when Charles VIII of France invaded Italy, it was widely feared that he would use Djem in a similar crusading project to recover Constantinople, and Bayezid's agents offered Pope Alexander VI 300,000 ducats to kill Djem.

The Ottoman Empire as a European Power

Djem died in 1495, probably of natural causes, thus removing the greatest obstacle between Bayezid and further campaigns in Europe. Sydney N. Fisher, in The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512, notes an immediate change in Bayezid's attitudes to the west after this event. By 1491, akinji raids from Semendria (Serbia) and Bosnia against Transylvania, Croatia, and the provinces of Lower Austria had been increasing in scale and at the battle of Krbava Polje in 1493 the raiders had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ban of Croatia. This raiding, which was also directed at Venetian possessions in the Morea and Dalmatia, served as a useful outlet for the ghazis, brought back plunder and slaves and kept Venice in particular off-balance.

In 1499 Bayezid struck at the west in force. The victim was once again Venice; raids devastated the Friuli and a Venetian fleet was defeated off Navarino. Lepanto, Koron, and Modon, all important Venetian bases in the Morea, fell. French and Spanish naval squadrons saved

Venice from a worse defeat and Bayezid concluded a victorious peace with Venice in 1502, realizing that the Ottoman fleet was still not powerful enough to stand up to the combined western squadrons. Yet this victory, coming on top of the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Djem affair, reemphasized the Ottoman role in European affairs. The Ottomans as well as France and Spain were now possible intercessors in the affairs of Italy. Several states later threatened to invite the Turks to help redress the balance of power and in 1510 and 1511 Venice, suffering from a manpower shortage after the defeat at Agnadello, employed Turk and Albanian mercenaries.

As well as establishing the empire's position in the Mediterranean, Bayezid prepared the ground for advances into central and eastern Europe. In 1484, despite serious threats to the empire at the time, he mounted a campaign to complete the work of his father and seize the ports of Kilia and Akkerman (Cetatea Alba) in the Dobrudja. This was partly a completion of Mehmed II's policy of economic domination, that the Black Sea should be a "virgin", undefiled by the passage of Christian ships.²⁶ But Bayezid himself was well aware of the strategic importance of these posts; his own statement that Kilia was the key to Moldavia, Hungary, and the Danube Basin while Akkerman was similarly the key to Poland, Russia, and Tartary gives a clear indication as to where future Ottoman ambitions lay.²⁷

The last decade of Bayezid's reign does not reflect quite the same interest in the affairs of Europe. An intermittent revolt in Karamania, the rising Shi'ite power of Persia, and the quarrels and violence between his six sons gave Bayezid little leisure for conquest. In 1512, Selim I with the aid of the janissaries overthrew his father and became sultan himself. Selim Yavuz, the Grim, completed the last step in the

establishment of Ottoman power. Force of personality and an ability to inspire terror (he executed seven grand viziers in an eight year reign) enabled him to override the qhazi tradition and make the Ottomans paramount in the Moslem world. In 1514 the Persians were decisively defeated at Caldiran, and in 1516 a swift campaign including two more victories overthrew the Mamluks and brought Selim into Cairo. Egypt, for long the great enemy, became an Ottoman province.

Following this victory the Sherif of Mecca placed himself under the protection of the Sultan, leading to the eventual adoption of the title of caliph by the Ottoman rulers. The chief holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina, as well as the pilgrimage and trade routes, were now under Ottoman control and the control of Syria, Cairo, and Alexandria gave the Ottomans a monopoly of the silk and spice trades to the west, placing commercial states such as Venice at a great disadvantage and bringing new wealth to the Ottomans. With Asia conquered, Selim turned to the planning of his next campaign, which would be somewhere in Europe. Europe was greatly relieved to learn of his death in 1520, and prayers of thanksgiving were offered up in Rome. His son Suleyman, it was said, would be as peaceful and mild as his father had been warlike.

The vast concentration of power inherited by Suleyman is worth a brief examination. In particular, it is worth noting the European nature of this empire. "The Turks," says Sir Charles Petrie, "conquered Asia and Africa from Europe, not, as is often supposed, Europe from Asia and Africa".²⁸ Suleyman's empire, though oriental in character, was firmly European in its bases of power.

The original concept of the gaza was, as Halil Inalcik puts it, "not to destroy but to subdue the infidel world, the darulharb."²⁹ The initial swift rush of Ottoman conquest in many cases hardly

disturbed the Christian population of south-east Europe and many native princes and rulers remained in their fiefs until the time of Mehmed II. This ruler attempted to consolidate his empire by replacing local princes with his own beys and pashas, and dividing the conquered lands into timars or feudal fiefs in the Anatolian manner. Yet Moslem tolerance still meant that the holder of a timar could be a Christian, and Christians still had a place in the Ottoman army. Auxiliaries such as the Vlach voyniks joined the akinji against their co-religionists and 800 Hungarians and Serbs were part of the expedition to Otranto. Many Christians found life under Islam more profitable than at home. A Hungarian gunner directed Mehmed's artillery at Constantinople and in the next century a Portugese would do the same for Suleyman at Szigetvar. Two of the most famous Ottoman naval officers of the period were renegades, Sinan Pasha being a Jew and Uluj Ali an Italian priest.

Further, it was from the Christian population that much of the administrative and fighting arms of the Ottoman government were drawn. The devsirme, the child tribute laid on the Christian populations of the Balkans, provided the material for the Imperial bureaucracy. The slave children, raised as converts to Islam, became the beys and pashas who governed the empire's provinces, or even the viziers, the ministers of the sultan. Gedik Ahmed was an Albanian by birth; the most famous viziers of the century, Ibrahim, Rustem, and Mehmet Sokullu were devsirme boys. The devsirme also provided the material for the janissaries, the elite fighting troops of the empire. Devoted to Islam and infused with the spirit of gaza through their association with the Bektashi order of dervishes, the janissaries were and remained the cutting edge of the Islamic holy war. Finally, most sultans took

Christian slave women as wives and by the time of Suleyman, the actual Turkish lineage of the sultans themselves must have been quite small.

From his seat of power on the Straits, drawing on the resources of the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Aegean, and the Asian trade routes, Suleyman I controlled one of the most powerful and well organized states in the world. It was a state with a distinct European character, one that had shown more than once it could intervene in the affairs of Europe almost at will. It was, in all senses, a European power.

IV FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

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V WESTERN ATTITUDES TO THE TURKS PRIOR TO THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Despite the crusading movement and general Christian-Moslem religious antipathy, peaceful contacts between Christianity and Islam were almost as old as Islam itself. The great Abassid caliph Haroun al-Raschid (786-809) exchanged gifts and embassies with Charlemagne and among the presents sent to the west was an elephant, which so intrigued the French emperor that he took it with him on all his travels. Charlemagne wanted support against the Byzantine empire while Haroun hoped Charlemagne would attack the rebel Omayyad caliphate of Cordoba in Spain. In 965-966 we find the Caliph of Cordoba himself, under pressure from the reconquista kingdoms of Navarre and Asturias as well as his co-religionists, travelling to central Europe and visiting Cracow and Prague almost certainly to explore the possibility of gaining Christian allies.¹

Such contacts, however, were seldom of a lasting nature. Medieval Christendom as a whole remained both uninformed about and opposed to Islam. Robert Schwoebel in The Shadow of the Crescent remarked that "during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries the Turkish peril was often viewed as the latest phase in the centuries-old assault of Islam upon Christendom. For their evaluation and understanding of the problem, Europeans of the time drew heavily upon the medieval corpus dealing with Islam and the Levant. Even under the pressure of momentous change they clung tenaciously to established categories...."² Hostility to Islam tended to be all-embracing, including all followers of Mohammed who were lumped together without regard to political distinction, just as the Moslems commonly referred to all Christians as Franks.

Even late in the middle ages the Christians had badly mistaken notions about Islamic political geography. St. Louis directed his second crusade against Tunis, unaware, it would seem, that the rulers of Tunis and Jerusalem were in no degree related. By 1360 there was a definite awareness of the threat of the Ottomans and the peril of Constantinople but all too often crusading expeditions attacked targets nowhere near the Ottoman power base; Pierre of Cyprus sacked Alexandria, while Louis de Bourbon raided Mahdiya, and only Amadeus of Savoy in 1366 came into contact with the Ottomans.³

Further, hated though the infidels were, many were of the opinion that heretics and schismatics were a greater evil and a greater threat. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries saw wars against internal heretics, such as the Albigensian crusade, and those outside of the west, such as the wars of Sweden and Novgorod and the various Catholic-Orthodox struggles in the Balkans. The situation was not improved by the reciprocal hatred of Orthodox Christians for the Catholic faith. Michael VIII negotiated the Union of Lyons but was unable to implement it, and dozens of angry tracts appeared denouncing Michael and the unionist patriarch Bekkos as "azymites", eaters of unleavened bread.⁴ After the second attempt at union in 1444, Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev, was imprisoned in Moscow, and Bessarion, leading Greek scholar of his day, was unable to return to Constantinople. The first attempt at a unionist mass in December, 1452, five months before the fall of the city, ended with riots in Santa Sophia.

On the Catholic side, though many humanists were to lament the fall of Constantinople, at least one humanist, Petrarch, urged the Pope and the Christian princes to conquer the city themselves. In 1344 Humbert of Dauphiné's official title was "Captain General of the crusade against

the Turks and those unfaithful to the Holy Church of Rome".⁵ Not until almost the end of the century would the crusading force be applied in the right place, and then in the wrong manner, at Nicopolis.

The crusading movement, the reconquista and the campaigns in Palestine as manifestations of popular religious zeal, is probably the best-known aspect of Christian-Moslem relations, and from 1099 to 1291 the crusades occupied much of the attention of Christian Europe. Although localized religious wars such as the later reconquista and the Lithuanian crusades continued, the zeal for crusade waned. It never fully recovered and the two disasters of St. Louis speeded its decline. As Emil Lengyel remarked, "the mass emotion [the crusades] induced led to a gradual exhaustion...The emotional orgies attendant upon this variety of religious experience were never again equaled."⁶ The popes continued to dream of uniting Christendom in holy war against the infidel and western princes sometimes made serious efforts to renew the crusade. In 1332, for example, Philip VI, first of the Valois kings of France, took the cross at Melun and organized a sizeable fleet to transport his forces to Palestine. However, war with England intervened and the fleet was destroyed at the Battle of Sluys. The crusade of Humbert of Dauphiné in 1344 is an example of a western ruler seriously devoted to spending his life in the service of the crusade, though the only important consequence of this expedition was the death of Canatacuzenos' ally Umur Bey and his replacement by the Ottomans of Orhan.⁷ The disaster of Nicopolis in 1396 put a further damper on crusading ardour, and the renewal of the war with England and the mental illness of the king took France, foremost of the crusading nations, out of the scene for a time. Travellers to the east such as Bertrandon de la Broquière from the Court of Burgundy reported the new Ottoman

empire to be much too powerful to be defeated, while pilgrims were concerned that a crusade would jeopardize their freedom of access to Jerusalem. The crusade of Varna in 1444 received very little western support.⁸

It is important to note that even during this time, roughly from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries while the crusades were at their height, religious antipathy was never universal. Friendly Christian-Moslem contacts were never broken entirely. In Spain, for example, due largely to the Arab willingness to understand and tolerate Christian beliefs, there were a number of such contacts. Rodrigo de Bivar, Christian hero of the reconquista, fought as an ally of Granada on several occasions, while the schools of Toledo drew heavily upon Arab learning.

In Palestine there were a number of friendly contacts, ranging from the mutual admiration of Saladin and Richard Coeur-de-Lion to the more serious friendship of Count Raymond III of Tripoli with several Saracen nobles. By the time the Kingdom of Jerusalem came to an end even the Grand Master of the Order of the Temple had contacts in Damascus and Cairo. In Sicily, where the Norman kings had ruled a sort of meeting ground for Christians and Moslems, and the Hohenstaufens carried on this policy of co-existence, Emperor Frederick II was widely condemned for among other things his friendship with Moslem princes. In England John of Salisbury, secretary to the Bishop of Lincoln, wrote that there was no harm in a Christian warrior serving the infidel, as long as he did not impair or violate his own faith.

Much of the impetus for friendly East-West relations came from trade and one of the consequences of the negotiations of Charlemagne and Haroun al-Raschid had been a stimulus to trade in the Frankish empire. Venice, with her close ties with Byzantium, was the first to develop a

large-scale oriental trade through Constantinople, but it was not long before Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi began competing with Venice, bypassing Byzantium and dealing directly in Moslem lands. Amalfi in particular, even before the First Crusade, had hospices in Antioch, Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Alexandria while Genoa and Pisa extracted commercial privileges from Mahdiya in 1097.

The First Crusade and the establishment of the Latin kingdom in Jerusalem provided a great boost to oriental trade. The debate as to whether the crusades were the main spur to developing western economic activity has not been entirely settled, but, as notes Joshua Praver in The Crusaders Kingdom, "...even if the Crusades were only partially responsible for Europe's economic revolution, there can be little doubt about their role in initiating, enlarging, and consolidating Europe's awareness of the East. This psychological element should not be overlooked when dealing with economic phenomena."⁹ Many of the successful campaigns in the years following the fall of Jerusalem, particularly the captures of the coastal ports, were accomplished with the aid of Genoese and Pisan fleets, in exchange for commercial privileges, and Venice was forced to join these campaigns as well to maintain parity. In 1104, five years after the fall of Jerusalem, construction of the Venetian Arsenal was begun and the shipbuilding industry was nationalized.¹⁰

From the establishment of trading stations in Acre, Tyre, and Antioch it was only a short distance to direct trading with the infidel. In the north Venetian and Genoese penetration of the Black Sea established port towns at Sudak, Kaffa, Tana, and Sinope to meet the trade routes from central Asia; in Palestine the merchants were active in Aleppo and Damascus while in Alexandria the spice trade proved to be a major source of Venetian and Genoese wealth. An entire street, the

Shari-al-Filih, or Pepper Street, was devoted solely to the pepper market.

In 1220 the Senate of Venice concluded a formal treaty with the Seljuk Sultan of Konya, or Rum, the first such treaty between a western power and the Turks and the more remarkable because at this point the Venetians were completely in control of the markets of Constantinople.¹¹ Italian traders penetrated Armenia, Syria and Iraq. By 1300 both Venice and Genoa were maintaining agents at Tauris in Persia to catch part of the Indian Ocean trade coming into Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and adventurers had reached India itself.¹² Nor can the expeditions of men like the Polos and Francesco Pegolotti be ignored; their books of travels provided a great new stimulus to trade and exploration.¹³ The trade with the infidel, which often included the sale of munitions of war, was carried on even in time of war despite papal fulminations. In 1306 Ramon Lull declared that if all Christians could do without spices for six years the Islamic states would be ruined, but such a proposal would have been deeply shocking to the merchants of Venice and Genoa.¹⁴

Trade negotiations were followed by political negotiations. This was especially the case in the Italian states where political interests were almost entirely dominated by economic ones. As Norwich says, "One of the secrets to Venice's rise to power lay in the fact that she never saw the twin necessities of defense and commerce as altogether separate,"¹⁵ nor was there any reason why she should. It is difficult to differentiate between peace and war, or between merchant galley, warship, or pirate, in the Mediterranean in any case, as merchant vessels were not above offensive armed action even when loaded with cargo. One writer has chosen to substitute the broader term "armed violence at sea" for war, concluding that the former is more accurate.¹⁶

After their rise to power the Ottomans were happy to continue granting these trade concessions, knowing that maritime powers such as Venice and Genoa were less likely to league against the Turks if they stood to lose their privileges. This explains much of the hesitation in the west during the final days of Constantinople, as the Senate of Venice debated whether saving the city was worth incurring the anger of the Ottomans. The Genoese of Pera hastened to renew their own privileges while the city was still undergoing sack. Though Venice was at war with the Ottomans on several occasions, each peace treaty always brought a renewal of trade. An agreement of September 24, 1481, for example, given at the accession of Bayezid II, confirms the rights of the merchants of Venice and Genoa to trade in Gallipoli and Constantinople with customs dues fixed at a preferred four percent.¹⁷

Political relations with the Turks were also stimulated by the Byzantine continuance of the late Roman practice of hiring barbarian mercenaries. This practice was widely imitated by Latin powers. Berenguer de Rocafort, captain of the Catalan Grand Company, brought three thousand Turks into Gallipoli to help in his wars with Andronikos II,¹⁸ and later Roger de Lluria, Catalan ruler of Thebes, invited Turkish aid in his war with the Venetians of Negroponte,¹⁹ while the Navarrese Company's wars in the Morea also relied on Turkish mercenaries. Formal aid to the Ottomans by a western power came first from Genoa around the time of the War of Chioggia, with Genoa supporting the Ottomans against Byzantium in hopes of gaining at the expense of Venice.²⁰ Thereafter political relations continued sporadically alongside trade agreements.

The fall of Constantinople did produce shock waves in Christendom; it was attributed by many to be retribution for the sins of Christians,

particularly those of Venice and Genoa who had dealings with the infidel. Christian I of Denmark compared the Turks to "the beast rising out of the sea in the Apocalypse,"²¹ while a monastic chronicler wrote solemnly that "nothing worse than this has happened, nor will happen."²² Cardinal Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini wrote to Pope Nicholas V urging him to take action lest he be remembered solely as the pope in whose reign Constantinople fell. "My hand trembles, even as I write; my soul is horrified, yet neither is it able to restrain its indignation, nor express its misery. Alas, wretched Christianity!"²³

Yet the alarm, though great, was of short duration; as the months went by and it was realized that no general invasion of Europe was contemplated, it vanished entirely, as can be seen from the proceedings of the three imperial diets of 1454-55. In April, 1454, at Ratisbon, with Philip the Good of Burgundy and Aeneas Sylvius representing the empire, the diet agreed to support a war against the Turks and to provide money and troops. But in September of that year in Frankfurt, with the summer campaigning season almost over, the mood had lessened and the diet was charging that the funds raised for crusade were being diverted to the imperial coffers. And in February 1455 at Wiener-Neustadt, in Schwoebel's words, "the Turkish problem was subordinated to questions of German affairs. The emperor was confronted by the disgruntled princes who made their support of the crusade contingent upon his fulfilling their demands."²⁴

In April, 1455, Alfonso Borgia became Pope Calixtus III, promising to sacrifice his own life, if necessary, "to deliver the Christians languishing in slavery, to exalt the True Faith, and to extirpate the diabolical sect of the reprobate and faithless Mahomet in the East."²⁵ He was completely unable to gather any western aid and his sole achievement

was the dispatch of the papal legate Carvajal and the friar John Capistrano to drum up popular support for the relief of Belgrade. In 1458 Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini became Pope Pius II and dedicated the last six years of his life to the crusade, yet he had only gathered a tiny force of men by 1464, when he died at Ancona, on the eve of what surely would have been an utterly futile expedition. Though the popes continued to preach the crusade, they had not the resources to put their plans into action.

The era of the crusades had passed, though the popes were to continually urge it and Charles VIII and Louis XII were to find profession of the crusade politically expedient in their Italian ventures. The Italian secular states had themselves long since given up even the pretense of interest in the crusade. It was widely suspected that Gian Galeazzo Visconti of Milan had passed on the plans of the Nicopolis crusade to Bayezid I, and in the 1420's Filippo Maria Visconti sent an agent named Bartolomeo da Forli to Edirne to mediate a truce between Murad II and Sigismund of Hungary in hopes of persuading both to attack Venice, and Bartolomeo later claimed the credit for the Turkish attack on and capture of Venetian Salonika.²⁶ As Jakob Burckhardt has remarked, "Great as was the terror felt for the Turks, and the actual danger from them, there was yet scarcely a government of any consequence which did not conspire against other Italian states with Mohammed II and his successors."²⁷

Even before the French invasion of Italy upset the balance of power in 1494, Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini was threatening to call in the Turks to maintain the balance against Naples.²⁸ Alfonso of Naples repeatedly sent agents to Constantinople in 1494, asking for aid against the French²⁹ while from 1495 to 1500, Milan, Florence, Ferrara, Mantua, and Pope Alexander VI had agents in the city urging Bayezid

on against Venice.³⁰ Upon conclusion of the war with Bayezid, Venice then returned the favour by pressing Bayezid to invade Naples. In 1498 King Federigo of Naples concluded through his ambassador, Tomaso Paleologo Asani, a treaty of friendship but not outright alliance with Bayezid, and in 1500, as the French invasions renewed and Milan fell, Bayezid offered Federigo 25,000 men in exchange for Taranto.³¹ The fall of Naples to French and Aragonese forces in 1501 put an end to that dialogue, but not to others.

It should be noted that these relations and treaties of amity were still insecure. Religious feelings still ran high. While the Italians, who usually both feared and despised the infidels, conducted relations with them out of a high degree of economic and political necessity, either in self-defense or to strike second-hand at an enemy. There was certainly no concerted action in support of the Turks. Bayezid, after several years of trying to arrange such action, finally lost his patience in 1498, beheaded the Milanese envoy, and sent the rest home. Westerners like Francesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, who had a personal friendship with the sultan, were fairly rare.³²

Nevertheless, the precedent for involving the Turks diplomatically in European affairs, even if on an informal basis, had been set. Just as the conflicts of the Bogomil heretics with their Catholic oppressors had brought the Ottomans into Bosnia, so the quarrels of the Italian states and the overflow of that conflict into northern Europe brought the Turks onto the political scene in Europe.

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VI THE FRANCO-OTTOMAN ALLIANCE I: THE BEGINNINGS OF FRANCO-OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY

The First Negotiations

For four centuries France had been foremost in the defence of Christendom. The greatest crusaders, from Godfrey de Bouillon to Pierre de Lusignan, had been French or of French descent, and the kings of France had been savage in the repression of heresy within their own realms. Nor did the dedication to crusade disappear from the public image of the Most Christian Kings even after the crusading movement itself was all but finished. Both Charles VIII and Louis XII maintained that their Italian conquests were merely the prelude to ventures further east and it is even possible that these professions were genuine.

Louis XII died on New Year's Day, 1515, and was succeeded by Francis I. It seemed at first that he would continue the tradition of his ancestors. Pope Leo X in particular had high hopes of the young king and in the years following the Concordat of Bologna in 1516 urged him to join the current projected crusade. This Francis appeared eager to do.¹ In 1519 when Francis stood for election as Holy Roman Emperor, he made his fitness and zeal for war with the Turks a major part of his campaign platform, stating that he would take Constantinople within three years or die in the attempt.² Yet, in 1525, he appealed to Suleyman of Turkey for aid, and eleven years later he concluded the first formal military treaty between a western power and the Ottomans.

Traditionally historians have been at somewhat of a loss to understand Francis I and the seeming contradictions of his reign. It is at first difficult to understand how he could both agree to join crusades and then treat with the Turks, persecute Protestants at home and then ally with them abroad. With the concept of the House of

Habsburg as central to European history in the early sixteenth century, Francis is almost invariably considered in light of his role as the perpetual enemy of Charles V, a nationalist opponent of Charles' dream of European unity. Depending on the view of the rights and wrongs of the Habsburg cause, Francis is portrayed as either a heroic defender of national liberties or "purely selfish, wanton, revengeful, and for the gratification of these instincts he sacrificed the welfare of Europe."³ Although the Habsburg wars were indeed an integral part of the reign of Francis I, historians remain so bemused by them that it is difficult to find a work dealing with Francis' reign as an integral unit, or one that reflects the relationship of his policies to those of his son and successor Henri II, the last ruler before the outbreak of the religious wars.

The character of Francis is variously described, and while he does appear to have been something of a Rabelaisian, fond of hunting, drinking, and women, he was also a serious patron of learning and arts who employed Leonardo, Cellini, and Il Primaticcio.⁴ But politically, the evidence of his own actions points to his being what modern observers are fond of calling a "political animal". The concept of raison d'état had not yet been formally developed, but it applies to Francis' actions. To preserve France and his own dynasty, and to recover those lands which were considered to be part of the French heritage, he was willing to subvert all previously held emotions and ideals. Every weapon which came to hand was used. Not all of these weapons were entirely salutary ones, and to the contributing factors in the defeat of Charles V must be added the fact that he was not usually willing to stoop as low as his enemies.

In the sixteenth century the foreign policies of France and Turkey depended on the use of anti-Habsburg elements. Virtually every resource

available was subordinated to this policy, and the wars which ensued were general European wars, in the course of which France brought Turkey into the European system as a political unit. Contrary to Mattingly's opinion, the European balance of power was created here.⁵ The conflict was still one of dynasties rather than states, each pursuing its territorial ambitions, but the effect remained the same. The various Valois policies of rapprochement with Poland, Hungary, Venice, England, Denmark, the Pope, the Lutherans, and the Ottomans can be seen as part of a vast web of foreign policy, attempting to check the power of the Habsburgs. Just as the Habsburg possessions encircled France, so France attempted to encircle the Habsburgs and coordinate attacks against them on two or more fronts. The patterns laid down would stand for several hundred years; an axis of France, Poland (later Prussia) and Turkey against the Empire, Russia, and often England or Spain. It says much for the force of impact of Francis' policies that not only did other European powers follow in his lead regarding Turkey, but the alliance system he created was zealously followed by his own successors and the first kings of the Bourbon dynasty.

It had suited Francis' interests to be an exponent of the crusade. It had helped to appease the Pope over his invasion of Milan in 1515, especially since the Pope himself was anxious to promote the crusade and steer the Fifth Lateran Council away from the issue of reform. It had given him some support in the imperial election, though not enough to offset the Fugger gold of Charles V. By courting the alliance of the pope and of England, whose prime minister Wolsey seems to have wanted to play the role of a counterweight in a balance of power between France and the Empire, Francis was able to continue to try and recover Milan. A

second invasion in 1521 was successful, but in 1522 his forces were defeated at Biococca and Milan was lost once more. It was at this time that Rhodes fell, with the appeals of the Knights of St. John ignored in the larger issue of the war in Italy.

In 1524 Francis tried again, and was baulked this time at the fortress of Pavia where a Spanish garrison under de Leyva resisted the French army. A winter siege of Pavia was unsuccessful, and an Imperial relieving force under Lannoy, the Viceroy of Naples, the Marquis of Pescara, and the renegade Constable de Bourbon arrived on the scene and, on February 24, 1525, crushed the French army. Most of the senior French officers, including la Palice and la Tremouille, veterans of Charles VIII's wars, were killed, and the king himself was physically overpowered and captured.⁶ He was taken to Spain and held in prison, where Charles demanded of him the relatively lenient terms of cession of all rights to Burgundy, Milan, Naples, Artois, and Navarre in exchange for his freedom and peace.

At this point there occurred the historic and often misunderstood embassy to Constantinople. Inalick's statement "When Charles V took Francis prisoner at Pavia in 1525, the French, as a last resort, sought aid from the Ottomans"⁷ is a standard summary. It is a summary that deserves both elaboration and revision.

The first embassy was in fact despatched by the queen mother Louise of Savoy, regent of France in the king's absence. The exact date of the embassy's departure is unclear; it is known to have numbered twelve men and carried rich presents valued at 12,000 ducats. None of the names of the men are known, and the embassy never reached its destination. All of the party were murdered in Bosnia, quite possibly at the instigation of imperial agents who got wind of the affair. Few documents survive in the

west, and the Turkish historians have maintained a "profound silence".⁸

A second mission was much more successful. Reportedly despatched personally by Francis, by a process not easily explainable since he was in prison in Madrid at the time, Count John Frankapan left for Constantinople in December 1525⁹ and returned in February, 1526, with an effusive letter to Francis from the sultan, promising aid and succour.

You have informed me that the enemy has overrun your country and that you are at present in prison and a captive, and you have asked aid and succours for your deliverance...my imperial knowledge has comprehended in detail and I have taken complete cognizance of it...Take courage then, and be not dismayed!...Night and day our horse is saddled and our sabre girt. May God on high promote righteousness! For the rest, question your ambassador and be informed. Know it to be thus.¹⁰

Though these stirring words hardly indicate any specific action, they were the beginnings of the Franco-Ottoman alliance. After years of threatening, a western sovereign had finally called in the Turks.

It is generally accepted that the Turks were called upon as a sort of last-ditch desperate measure, but there are several points to the contrary worth noting. First of all, the French had long since begun their search for anti-Habsburg allies, both for political pressure and as sources for mercenaries. The Concordat of Bologna had already demonstrated that Francis was willing to use religious interests to gain his political ends. Mattingly notes that France's main diplomatic efforts had been aimed at the Swiss,¹¹ with Boisrigaut in the Twelve Cantons and Grangis in the Grisons as resident ambassadors by 1522, recruiting troops and passing back information. But in 1521 French agents were also in Utraquist Bohemia, once again attempting to recruit mercenaries,¹² while in 1524 Francis sent Antonio Rincon as ambassador to Poland to propose a marriage alliance between the Valois and the Jagellons.¹³

It would appear that the Ottoman policy was initiated not by Francis but by the Queen Mother, Louise of Savoy. Francis relied heavily on his mother, frequently entrusting her with considerable power while he was absent from the capital. Louise herself was something of an orientalist and had already despatched one of her household, Father Thibaud, on a mission to India and Persia. Louise seems to have been responsible for initiating the Frankapan mission where the Count travelled from Paris to Madrid and then to Constantinople, and she was certainly responsible for the unsuccessful first mission.¹⁴

The timing of this first mission is also significant. Acceptance of the view that Franco-Turkish relations began in the aftermath of Pavia, with a view to rescuing Francis and restoring France's fortunes, is not compatible with the evidence that Louise despatched the ill-fated first envoys before Pavia.¹⁵ Certainly Franco-Turkish relations were begun before the events of Pavia became a factor in international affairs and it is probable that there was some sort of Franco-Turkish accord existing even prior to Louise's first mission.

Two points support the latter statement. There were Turkish envoys in the French camp during the siege of Pavia; Ursu maintains they were Moors, but he draws his information from a Spanish source where centuries of habit had led the Spaniards to regard all Moslems as Moors, just as the Moslems called all Christians Franks.¹⁶ What the proceedings may have been are unknown, but they may possibly be linked to the other point, contained in a letter from Ferdinand to Charles on March 14, 1525, a bare eighteen days after Pavia.¹⁷ The French, Ferdinand stated, were already considering an alliance with Turkey, and had already reached an agreement with the Pasha of Bosnia to supply

troops and support the Frankapan family of Croatia in an invasion of the Carniola and Styria provinces of Austria. As far away as England, Cardinal Wolsey seems to have caught wind of a similar rumour.¹⁸

In view of the employment of John Frankapan as envoy to Constantinople and the subsequent conduct of his cousin Kristofor in 1526, this theory of a Franco-Turkish agreement, at least in Bosnia, is highly plausible.¹⁹ Certainly in the employment of Frankapan we can see the use of yet another anti-Habsburg element. Little attention is generally paid to the Frankapans; Count John Frankapan, correctly Ivano Frano Frankapan, is often referred to as John or Jean Frangipani.²⁰ Some have stated them to be of Venetian origin, which is odd considering that the Italian Frangipani family were from Rome. Only Ursu in La Politique Orientale de François Ier has them correctly identified as Croats.²¹

Croat historian Stanko Guldescu²² identifies the Frankapans as an Avar family, who became lords of the island of Krk as early as the seventh century. At some point, possibly due as Guldescu suggests, to some service for the papacy or a marriage alliance, they did indeed become associated with the Roman Frangipani. They were a powerful family, foremost in the defence against the Turkish raids in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, but for some reason not yet known they were also violently anti-Habsburg, and Kristofor Frankapan was to lead the pro-Zapolya resistance to the Habsburgs in 1526-27.²³ Ursu says John Frankapan was "well-known for his pro-Turkish sympathies,"²⁴ while Rouillard identifies him as "a Hungarian refugee in France."²⁵ If Ferdinand's intelligence was correct, Frankapan's presence in Paris may well have been to promote the Franco-Croat-Turkish accord.

It should be emphasized that much of the preceding is still theory. Guldescu, who does not seem to have attached much importance to Frankapan's mission, leaves much of the family's history out of his narrative, and most of the primary sources are in Zagreb. Nevertheless, the evidence available makes this theory at least plausible; that the French, looking for anti-Habsburg allies in eastern Europe, had encountered the Frankapans, had planned secretly with them and the Turks some action against Austria, and that, upon the breakdown of these plans after Pavia, if not before, these contacts had led to direct negotiations with Istanbul.

The First Phase of the Alliance

"The importance of this negotiation is conjectural, but Turkish historians attribute to it the second Hungarian campaign of Soliman, and the Very Christian Francis I may be partly responsible for the great slaughter of Christians at Mohacs."²⁶ Statements of this sort first appear in modern historical writing in Baron von Hammer's Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches²⁷ and are repeated by Sir Edward Creasy in his History of the Ottoman Turks which draws heavily on von Hammer,²⁸ thus transferring the idea into English historiography. Merriman in his biography of Suleyman states categorically that Francis' plea for aid resulted in the Ottoman conquest of Hungary "...the real answer to Pavia was to be Mohacs."²⁹ A pupil of Merriman, Garrett Mattingly, picked up the idea and repeated it almost word for word in Renaissance Diplomacy: "The Turkish victory at Mohacs was the answer to Pavia."³⁰ And, since Renaissance Diplomacy is today the standard work in its field, the diffusion of this idea has become general.³¹ Unfortunately it is an

idea without a single piece of direct evidence to support it.

There are two probable sources for this tradition. One is that of the Turkish chroniclers of the later Ottoman empire, who, "wishing to underline their lord's importance in Europe, depict him as graciously exerting himself for the succour of a prostrate western monarch."³² Suleyman's own letter to Francis certainly adopts that tone. Kemal Pasha Zedah and in particular Solakzadeh, whom von Hammer used extensively as a source,³³ both maintained this tradition and traces of it can be found even today in the works of Inalcik and Karpat, stressing the importance of the empire in European affairs. The Ottoman government, in order to maintain a sort of moral ascendancy over western powers and their agents, usually adopted a tone of lofty condescension towards them.³⁴ Suleyman's "succour" of Francis is likely a deliberately created impression.

The other source for this tradition is the imperial government of Charles V. Charles was warned immediately of Frankapan's mission, which does not seem to have been a very well-kept secret. Report of his mission and arrival from Constantinople in Brescia on March 29, 1526, was transmitted at once to Venice where Marino Sanuto noted in his diary on March 30 that Frankapan had been negotiating with the Turks for Francis.³⁵ Lope de Soria, imperial agent in Genoa, also knew of the mission, and succeeded in laying hands on one of the letters Frankapan was carrying on his return, forwarding it to Charles on July 15, 1526, "that His Imperial Majesty may know what the intentions of the infidel are."³⁶ Charles was able to use this and subsequent information to some effect.

Late in 1526 there appeared a document known as the Pro Divo Carolo, written by Charles' chancellor Mercurino Gattinara and

remarkable as one of the first instances where a government used the printing press to directly publish its views on a popular basis. The Pro Divo Carolo was published by a Mainz printer early in 1527 and received a wide popular distribution; it was a direct attack on the empire's two chief enemies, France and the Pope. The arguments against the latter usually receive far more attention, coming as they do from Gattinara's own north Italian background in the tradition of Dante's De Monarchia and Marsiglio of Padua's Defensor Pacis, and appearing as one of the last great manifestations of Ghibelline philosophy. But Gattinara also attacked France, whose king he saw as an obstruction to the old ideal of a united Christendom, and among the arguments aimed at Francis was that his alliance with the infidel had been responsible for the shedding of Christian blood at Mohacs.³⁷

The same idea is promoted by Charles himself in 1527, when in a letter to the German princes he maintained that the Sultan had followed Francis' counsel in attacking Hungary.³⁸ Francis denied this vigorously, still representing himself as the defender of Christendom, and a sort of propaganda duel developed, but it was widely believed at the time as it is today that Francis had in fact instigated Suleyman's attack on Hungary. However, Francis does not seem to have suffered any political ill effects, and Charles was shortly busy defending himself against the much more serious charge of instigating the sack of Rome.

Ignoring for the moment the politically inspired opinions of Imperialists and Turks, there are some logical reasons why the Ottomans might well have undertaken the Hungarian campaign without reference to the French. These include the long-standing enmity of the Ottomans and Hungary, begun in Murad I's reign and continuing through Hunyadi's wars; the desire to strike at the Jagellons, then controlling more land in

eastern Europe than either the Habsburgs or the Ottomans; the possibilities provided by the growing internal chaos in Hungary; and the revolt of the Janissaries in 1525, disgruntled at not being led on the gaza. All of these must have been in the sultan's mind. The last in particular had almost cost him his life. The taking of Belgrade had been the prelude to a campaign that must surely have come at some point.

According to Grand Vizier Ibrahim in 1530, upon receiving Frankapan's messages Suleyman first contemplated an invasion of Italy and a seaborne sweep against the Spanish coast, but abandoned both projects on learning of the release of Francis and the signing of the Treaty of Madrid early in 1526. In that case he cannot have contemplated them for very long. Both projects were highly risky in any case, and a campaign in Hungary would be much more feasible and satisfying.³⁹ The formation of the League of Cognac in the spring provided a perfect opportunity. Beset in Italy, the Habsburgs would have little energy to spare for the relief of Hungary.

Thus, indirectly Francis may be guilty of contributing to the defeat of Mohacs, but it is unlikely that he is so directly. In the first place, the Hungarian army would likely have been defeated at Mohacs anyway. France had nothing to gain from a Hungarian defeat, and in the event the Habsburgs were able to seize for themselves a wide strip of northern and western Hungary and create there a fortified zone that made inner Austria virtually impregnable.

We come, therefore, from a picture of Francis urging Suleyman on against Hungary to one of Suleyman stimulating French resistance, particularly in his famous letter, and taking advantage of it for his own ends in the conquest of Hungary. Again there are problems with the evidence. The opinions of Ibrahim, as expressed to Imperial ambassadors

Von Lamberg and Juristic, are suspect; Ibrahim regularly fed selected information on Franco-Turkish relations to the Habsburgs just to keep the pot boiling. The Ottomans were as interested in promoting Franco-Habsburg rivalry as the French were in supporting a Habsburg-Turkish conflict, for basically the same reasons.⁴⁰ Each party hoped that the other would take the lead in a major conflict, leaving them free to pursue their own ambitions.

The Course of the "Secret" Alliance, 1526-1534

With these ideas in mind, events can be reconstructed as follows. In 1524 Francis invaded Milan, at the same time casting about for other allies. Secret Anglo-French talks were opened, Antonio Rincon was sent to Poland, and an interest in Turkish affairs began to form. In February, 1525, Louise of Savoy despatched what was probably the first envoy directly to Constantinople. On February 24, 1525, Francis was defeated and captured at Pavia.

Louise, as regent, now stepped up the search for allies. Gian Giacomo Passano and Jean Brinan went to England, where they concluded the Treaty of More in August, 1525.⁴¹ A settlement with Venice was reached in November, and an attempted alliance with the Pope at this time was only narrowly thwarted by imperial agents.⁴² In December the Frankapan embassy left for Istanbul.

In January Francis agreed to surrender Burgundy by the Treaty of Madrid, but asked to be set free to implement the terms of the treaty. The emperor followed the advice of Lannoy, who thought that Francis could be trusted, against that of Gattinara, who did not and who was right, and released Francis, who returned home in early March, 1526. At

about the same time Frankapan arrived back in Italy from Constantinople, and Francis refused to ratify the Treaty of Madrid. He was almost immediately approached by Venice and by Pope Clement, alarmed at the strength of the Empire, with a view to forming a league against Charles. In May, 1526, the Holy League of Cognac was formed, "Pavia might as well not have happened,"⁴³ and Suleyman finished mustering his army at Constantinople.

All in all, the diplomatic efforts of Francis and Louise had paid off very well. France had weathered the crisis of Pavia almost intact; instead of using force to implement the terms of the treaty, Charles was instead forced to turn his attention to Italy where the papal forces tied down his resources. Francis himself remained at home that summer, building up his power and trying to urge Henry VIII to join him. Affairs might have worked out better in Hungary, where Suleyman destroyed the royal army in August and ravaged the countryside but then withdrew instead of invading Austria. German troops freed from the defense of Austria, particularly Frundsberg's landsknechts, then came over the Alps to join Bourbon in Italy. But even this worked to French advantage, for though the sack of Rome on May 6, 1527, removed Clement as an ally, it also served to drive Henry VIII further into the French camp; the English king, attempting to have his marriage to the emperor's aunt annulled, could hardly do so while the emperor held the pope prisoner.

Francis does not appear to have followed up the Frankapan mission during 1526, waiting, perhaps, for the result of the Mohacs campaign. The outburst of imperial propaganda in that year seems to have taught him as well that to avoid outraging public opinion he would have to proceed more cautiously. Nevertheless, contacts were not broken.

At the end of 1526 a new anti-Habsburg power appeared in eastern

Europe. Upon the death of Louis II of Hungary at Mohacs, his brother-in-law Ferdinand of Austria claimed the throne. His claim was contested by the lesser nobility led by John Zapolya, Voivode of Transylvania, who was established as anti-King; war broke out between the two factions and Zapolya was driven into exile in Poland. Zapolya needed aid, while Francis saw the chance to attack the Habsburgs from yet another direction. In February, 1527 Antonio Rincon departed again for Poland, while Jerome Laski, a Pole in Zapolya's service, arrived in Paris.⁴⁴ Here it seems that Francis urged him to go on to Constantinople, as the Turks were better placed to give direct aid to Zapolya's cause, and French influence was probably used to give Laski a favourable hearing at the Sublime Porte. Certainly his visit there in 1528 coincided with another French initiative, through Venice, concerning the protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

In this case Contarini, the Venetian agent in Constantinople, passed on letters from Francis to Suleyman concerning the restoration of a church which had been converted into a mosque. Suleyman refused the request on religious grounds, but his second letter to Francis⁴⁵ promised to guarantee religious freedom to Christians in the Levant. This accord, sought by Francis both as a means to obtain a predominance over other Christian nations in the Levant and as a decent excuse in Europe for having dealings with the Sultan, evolved into the famous dispute over control of the Holy Places and was among the contributing causes of the Crimean War.

It is probable that Rincon, with Zapolya in Poland, also dealt with Constantinople, as he was in contact with Laski after the latter's arrival there. Rincon negotiated a treaty with Zapolya and forwarded 40,000 écus for the purchase of mercenaries, a major factor in Zapolya's

re-occupation of Transylvania in 1528. In 1529 the combined efforts of Rincon, Laski, and Luigi Gritti, the Sultan's agent in Transylvania, led to the third Hungarian campaign and the siege of Vienna.

The invasion of 1529 came at the right time for Francis, whose own forces had met with another disaster. After the collapse of the papacy, Francis had sent his forces into Italy. The army under Lautrec overran Milan once more, and then, supported by a Franco-Genoese fleet under Filippino Doria, moved south and blockaded Naples. The campaign was initially a success; a Spanish relieving force under Moncada, the new viceroy, was destroyed and Moncada killed. Then cholera broke out in Lautrec's army, and at about the same time Andrea Doria reached an understanding with Charles V and defected to him and Filippino's fleet was withdrawn from Naples. Lautrec died of cholera on August 17 and the remains of the army were forced to surrender. Genoa was liberated on September 12, and an attempt to retake it in the spring of 1529 failed. Pope Clement, seeing the collapse of the French, made his famous declaration to "live and die an Imperialist," which in England led to the fall of Wolsey, prompted Henry VIII's decision to break with Rome, and caused the loss of England as a useful ally for some time.

On August 5, 1529, the Treaty of Cambrai was concluded. Known as the Paix des Dames, because the two chief negotiators were Louise of Savoy and Margaret of Austria, the treaty obliged Francis to surrender once more his claims to Artois and Milan; he was allowed to keep Burgundy and his two sons, held as hostages in Spain, were returned. If Francis needed peace badly, so did Charles. The armies of Suleyman were advancing once more in Hungary, as letters from his brother continually pointed out, and he himself needed peace in Italy to patch up his relations with the Pope and achieve his long delayed coronation. Thus,

though Francis' military efforts had failed him, his diplomatic strategy in Italy and Hungary had drawn off imperial resources to a degree so that a more satisfactory peace could be arranged.

Further, there was now a strong base for future operations. Rincon had concluded the Franco-Transylvanian treaty at Buda in the late summer of 1529, a few days after Zapolya swore homage to Suleyman. On the return of the Turkish army Rincon, on the instructions of the king, joined it and went on to Constantinople, where he explained to Suleyman the Treaty of Cambrai, particularly the provision whereby Charles and Francis promised to undertake a joint crusade, as a sham.⁴⁶ He returned to France in February, 1530, bringing presents from the sultan to the king. Noting the connection between Rincon's movements and the siege of Vienna, the imperial propagandists assailed Francis once more.⁴⁷

Imperial intelligence services seem to have been in excellent working order. In the spring of 1531 they could report Rincon's second mission to Constantinople, and measures had been put in hand for the arrest of the "traitor" and his torture until he should confess the truth of his dealings with the Turks. On this occasion he escaped. The Imperialists also knew of the arrival of Giorgio Gritti, brother of Luigi, in Paris in 1531; him they did arrest on his return trip, but he was released when Suleyman threatened to begin arresting German pilgrims in Jerusalem.

Rincon's mission of 1531 (which did not actually commence until 1532 due to his illness and long stay in Ragusa) was aimed at directing the sultan away from Germany and into the Mediterranean. The mission was too late to prevent the 1532 campaign which was halted at Guns, and the response to that campaign confirmed the correctness of Francis' actions.

With the Turks literally at the gates of Germany, Charles and Ferdinand had been able to make political capital out of Francis' role as a Turkish accomplice; at the cost of some religious concessions a sizeable army had been gathered, and even Luther was supporting war against the Turks.⁴⁸ The threat of foreign invasion could possibly reunite the empire, which was the last thing Francis desired.

Francis wanted Ottoman power re-directed to the Mediterranean. With the Imperialists dominating Italy he no longer had to fear public opinion there, and the Lutheran princes were unlikely to be worried if the Turks made war on Spain or the Habsburg possessions in Italy. This meant abandoning the Transylvanian party to some extent, but Transylvania was now so far in the Ottoman camp that its protection was assured. Francis' ideas as communicated by Rincon came at the right time; not only had Suleyman come to realize the futility of trying to invade Austria, but he, like Francis, was concerned by the growing power of the Imperial fleet under Andrea Doria. It was in 1532 that the latter took Koron and Lepanto.

The Capitulations and the War of 1537

"As Thomas Cromwell once remarked, no Christian scruple would deter the king of France from bringing the Turk and the devil into the heart of Christendom if this could help him recover Milan."⁴⁹ French diplomacy in the years following the Peace of Cambrai was nothing if not eclectic. While reaching an understanding with Henry VIII that led to the meeting of the Field of the Cloth of Gold, Francis also opened dealings with Pope Clement VII who was wavering once more in his imperial alliance. In 1531 his first envoy to Germany, Gervais Wain, had

worked with such effect that the Protestant Swabian League and the Catholic Bavarian dukes had actually agreed to ally against the Habsburgs and then fought a victorious war over Württemberg. The preparations for the next offensive were stepped up. Francis attempted to mediate in the dispute between Henry VIII and the Papacy (failing largely through the former's intransigence), and, through Wain's successor Guillaume du Bellay, attempted also to mediate in the German religious dispute. At one point the Lutheran theologian Philip Melancthon was prepared to go to Paris to help negotiate a religious settlement.⁵⁰

In the summer of 1533 the Cardinals de Grammont and de Tournon were in Rome where they negotiated the marriage of the pope's niece Catherine de Medici to Francis' son Henry, later Henry II.⁵¹ At about the same time Rincon's negotiations were bearing fruit. The Sultan refused to stop all campaigning in Hungary, but he did promise to send instructions to Barbarossa to consult with Francis.⁵² In 1533 Suleyman's messenger to Barbarossa asked him to make contact with France. An envoy, duly despatched, met Francis at Le Puy, bringing with him a number of presents which included, in a gesture reminiscent of Haroun al-Raschid, a tame lion.⁵³ This envoy was somewhat of an embarrassment to Francis, who was still trying to maintain the fiction that he was not allied to the Turks. Suleyman, who had troubles of his own with Persia and had to make peace with Austria to deal with this new threat, was now putting pressure on Francis to ally openly with him. To the Austrian envoy Scepper, in 1534, Suleyman referred to Francis as his "brother".⁵⁴

Barbarossa arrived in Constantinople in 1533, where he was made Kapudan Pasha and brought a revamped Ottoman fleet west in 1534 to attack Tunis. In the spring of that year, possibly before Barbarossa's

departure, another French agent, the Ragusan Seraphin de Gozzo, met with Ibrahim at Aleppo and began negotiations for a formal commercial agreement. This was probably intended right from the beginning to mask a military alliance.⁵⁵

The events of 1534 inclined Francis still further towards a formal alliance. Detente between Ferdinand and Zapolya in Hungary had removed one ally, and the problems attendant upon religious schism and an unpopular marriage had neutralized England where Henry was also nervous of Francis' new ties with the pope. Clement died in 1534; the new pope, Paul III, maintained that he was dedicated only to making peace with Charles and Francis and brought up once more the idea of a joint crusade. Most damaging of all was the religious dissent inside France which boiled over in the Affaire des Placards when Calvinist protests against the Mass brought down savage reprisals from the parlement and Sorbonne. This caused an outcry in Protestant Germany and Melanchthon's trip to Paris was forbidden by the Elector of Saxony. At Schmalkald, du Bellay attempted to pacify the princes by blaming the excesses on the right-wing zealots of the Sorbonne; Francis himself, du Bellay maintained, held views on religion little different from those of Melanchthon.⁵⁶ Nevertheless the princes' accord with Francis was undone, and the Swiss likewise refused him, maintaining that dealing with the French was "like holding an eel."⁵⁷

In 1534 Barbarossa sailed west and Luigi Gritti informed Scepper that his aim was to attack Genoa and Doria.⁵⁸ Instead, after retaking Koron and Lepanto, the Ottoman navy raided the coasts of southern Italy and then captured Tunis, a base strategically well-placed for short-range galley operations against Sicily and Naples. In October of that year Barbarossa sent another embassy to France, and Turkish

galleys sailed openly into Marseilles harbour to land the envoys. There was some popular alarm in France, but since the loss of the German princes Francis seems to have felt that he had nothing to lose by openly receiving the envoys of the Porte, though he continued to maintain that the alliance shaping up was a purely commercial one.⁵⁹

In Rouillard's words, "An open alliance with the Turks was now not only useful but nearly indispensable. Francis I decided to forsake further attempts at secrecy and to despatch a resident ambassador to Constantinople to carry on negotiations, the first of which should be to urge Soliman to return to Europe."⁵⁰ The ambassador chosen was not the slightly shady Rincon but Jean de la Forest or la Forêt, "a gentleman of Auvergne,"⁶¹ a royal secretary, abbot, and Knight of St. John. Included in the embassy were Seraphin de Gozzo and Cesare Cantelmo, aide to Rincon, and also Charles de Marillac, another of the royal household, and Guillaume Postel, a oriental scholar charged with hunting for manuscripts for the royal library. This was official contact between the court of France and the Sublime Porte at a very high level. Francis still attempted to put a good face on the treaty; it was, he insisted to the parlements, a merchants' treaty, and his own involvement was due to a desire to further protect Christendom as he had already done with his involvement with the Holy Places.⁶²

In February, 1536, La Forêt and Ibrahim signed the famous Capitulations.⁶³ The Capitulations, based on similar treaties granted to the Venetians and Genoese in Constantinople, and also by Selim to the French merchants in Alexandria in 1517, were now all-embracing.

Subjects of both signatories were given the right to travel and trade freely in the dominions of the other and to pay especially low customs duties on imports and exports. The French consuls were given

the right to hear and judge all civil and criminal cases arising among, and between French subjects in the Sultan's dominion without interference by Ottoman officials or judges...Civil cases involving Muslim Ottoman subjects still had to be tried in court according to Muslim law, but the defendants were allowed to have French consular representatives to advise them. In criminal cases French subjects were excused from being called before Ottoman judges but instead were referred to the grand vizier or his agent.⁶⁴

Knecht describes the treaty as "...this was the first general codification of privileges granted to a great Christian power, and a significant document in so far as it proved not only the close relationship between France and the Porte, ...but also the position occupied by France as the most favoured nation at the Porte."⁶⁵ This treaty, as Shotwell remarks in Turkey at the Straits, is the beginning of Turkey's formal appearance as a power in Europe, not just as invader, and the consequences would lead to the Crimean War, the Straits Question, and in no small part to the current chaos in the Middle East.⁶⁶ Yet the real immediate purpose of the treaty, as Francis' instructions to La Forêt make clear, was formal military political alliance against the Habsburgs.⁶⁷

The actions that followed are once again open to debate. Vaughn in particular believes that Francis betrayed Suleyman's interests in the alliance; urging Suleyman to attack Italy in conjunction with French forces, he then turned himself to northern Europe and broke faith with Suleyman, meaning that the alliance failed.⁶⁸ In fact, an analysis of Francis' instructions to la Forêt and his own actions make clear that this was not the case. The instructions stated that Francis was claiming the restitution not only of Milan, Asti, and Genoa in the south, but also of Artois and Flanders in the north. The initial plan of

campaign worked out by la Forêt with either Ibrahim or Suleyman on the latter's return from the Persian front, detailed that Francis was to invade Lombardy while Suleyman invaded Naples from Albania, but the plan proceeded to break down on several points.

In 1535, Charles V, maintaining a desire for holy war but more probably alarmed at the growing power of Barbarossa and reports of his relations with France, descended on Tunis in force and succeeded in destroying a large portion of Barbarossa's new Ottoman fleet. Though the Kapudan himself escaped, the Ottoman navy would take some time to rebuild. Charles returned to Rome in triumph, and the discovery of some French cannon at Tunis prompted him to denounce Francis and challenge him to a personal combat. The Bishop of Maçon, French ambassador in Rome, wrote worriedly that Charles was planning an invasion of France.⁶⁹ In early 1536, taking advantage of the death of Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan, Francis invaded Savoy, but the invasion came to nothing and the Ottomans were temporarily paralyzed by the loss of their navy and the death of Ibrahim. Open war broke out and French troops, by holding on to key fortresses, were able to defeat Imperial advances in both Provence and Picardy in the summer of 1536.⁷⁰

In August, 1536, Jean de Monluc was sent to reinforce the mission in Constantinople, and no doubt to make certain that the sultan truly planned to move. Francis then laid his own plans for a strike in Picardy in the spring of 1537, and it is on this point that he is condemned for serving his own interest and abandoning the sultan, a complaint based mainly on the complaints of the sultan himself.

In fact, Francis and the Constable de Montmorenci opened their campaign in Picardy early in March, 1537, and swiftly overran the County of St. Pol. On May 6, three full weeks before Suleyman's troops even

began appearing in Albania, Francis halted the advance, detailing 10,000 troops to remain behind in St. Pol while he and Montmorenci prepared to direct all remaining troops and funds south to Piedmont in preparation for a campaign against Genoa.⁷¹ The consequences of a combined Franco-Ottoman invasion could have been serious but Italy was saved from the prospect by the Regent of the Netherlands, Mary of Hungary, and her generals who launched a counter-attack that drove the French back from St. Pol and laid siege to the vital fortress of Th rouanne. A crisis developed, and the Piedmont project was cancelled. The situation in the north was not resolved until the end of July when Mary, short of money, asked for a truce.

Suleyman was not pleased by the turn of events; it is possible that he rightly feared the consequences of such a prior commitment. He repeatedly demanded of la For t the reasons for the absence of the French army and the unfortunate ambassador must have been hard put for an excuse. Yet Suleyman's own conduct during this time deserves some explanation. He had more than 200,000 men in and around Avlona in Albania, and a brand new fleet under Barbarossa ready to transport it. An attempt by Doria to intervene was defeated off the coast of Calabria, a bridgehead in Italy was established at Castrio, and a preliminary attack was made on Otranto.⁷² Yet, according to Suleyman, he could make no move without French help.

The Sultan was in fact also pursuing a policy contrary to his ally's interests, namely an attack on Venice, which was one of the states usually sympathetic to France. Suleyman suspected the Venetians of aiding Charles and Doria in the attack on Tunis⁷³ and was also determined to take from them their last Morea possessions and dispute their control of the mouth of the Adriatic. He went to war with Venice,

and la Forêt, gravely ill by mid-August, was unable to stop him. St.-Blancard's French Mediterranean fleet departed from Marseilles on August 15 to support the Ottoman operations. Four days later the Sultan began preparing to attack Monemvasia and Napoli di Romania in the Morea while committing the bulk of his force to the siege of the strategic island of Corfu.⁷⁴ Rouillard has referred to this as a "fiasco", commenting that "the power of the Emperor, far from being broken, was fortified by gaining the alliance of Venice and the Pope."⁷⁵ St.-Blancard, trying to at least get some naval aid from the Turks, was unsuccessful.⁷⁶ On September 15, bad weather forced Suleyman to raise the siege of Corfu and attempt a naval blockade instead. He prepared to go home. By the time Francis, hurrying south to Lyons, could muster his forces in Provence and push them through the Val di Susa as far as Turin in mid- October, the Ottomans had disappeared from the scene entirely.⁷⁷

This war, from France's point of view, was not a great success. Suleyman in the following year defeated the combined Imperial- Venetian fleet at Prevesa and was thus able to obtain his objective, a victorious treaty with Venice that reduced the Republic's maritime power still further. But France had reached the point of fiscal exhaustion. Lack of money forced Francis to make peace once more.

VI FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

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- 3 William Stubbs, Lectures on European History (London, 1904), p. 31.
- 4 Knecht's very recent book is a good account of the king, while Desmond Seward's Prince of the Renaissance (London, 1973) is a good popular history with a view of Francis as a patron.
- 5 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London, 1955), pp. 174-75. Mattingly's views, which are not entirely acceptable, are that Renaissance monarchs were still possessed of entirely medieval attitudes and casts of mind regarding diplomacy.
- 6 Knecht, pp. 165-72; Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1937), pp. 192-203.
- 7 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age, 1300-1600, trans N. Itkowitz and C. Imber (London, 1973), p. 35.
- 8 Charrière, I, p. 115, who notes that a ruby ring included in the presents later appeared on the finger of grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha. See also Clarence D. Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature, 1520-1660 (1940, reprint New York 1973), p. 106; J. Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François Ier (Paris, 1908), p. 29; Paul Henry-Bordeaux, Louise de Savoie (Paris, 1954), p. 325; D.M. Mayer, The Great Regent (London, 1972), p. 199.
- 9 Rouillard, p. 106, comments that Frankapan carried a letter from Louise as well as from Francis, indicating that Louise was likely responsible for this embassy as well.
- 10 Charrière, I, pp. 116-18.
- 11 Mattingly, pp. 172-73, who says this was France's sole attempt at diplomacy.
- 12 Paula Fichtner, Ferdinand I (New York, 1982), p. 45.
- 13 Charrière, I, p. 149.
- 14 Henry-Bordeaux, pp. 326-28.
- 15 Rouillard, p. 106, affirms that the envoy was sent in February; Pavia was fought on February 24. Henry-Bordeaux, pp. 325-26, and Mayer,

- p. 199, state that the envoy was definitely sent before Pavia, but without documentary proof, which neither provides, there is no way of knowing for certain.
- 16 Ursu, p. 28. Henry-Bordeaux and Mayer maintain the identity of the envoys as Turks.
 - 17 Charriere, I. p. 113.
 - 18 G. Jacqueton, La politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie (Paris, 1892), p. 376.
 - 19 It does not, however, explain why the first envoys were murdered in Bosnia.
 - 20 Dorothy Vaughn, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool, 1954), p. 111: "the great Hungarian noble house of Frangipani."
 - 21 Ursu, p. 28.
 - 22 Stanko Guldescu, History of Medieval Croatia (The Hague, 1964), p. 309; Guldescu, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom (The Hague, 1970), pp. 12-16.
 - 23 See Chapter VI on Hungary.
 - 24 Ursu, p. 30.
 - 25 Rouillard, p. 106.
 - 26 Ibid., p. 107.
 - 27 Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1828), II, p. 45.
 - 28 Sir Edward Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks (London, 1878), p. 165.
 - 29 Roger B. Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent (New York, 1966), p. 132.
 - 30 Mattingly, p. 177.
 - 31 Vaughn is inclined to doubt this; the only other example uncovered is Sinclair Atkins, "Charles V and the Turks", History Today, 30 (Dec. 80), p. 14.
 - 32 Vaughn, p. 112.

- 33 And was published in Istanbul in 1729, two hundred years after the fact.
- 34 "Until 1606 the treaties...with the Holy Roman Emperor began with the humiliating formula; 'Graciously accorded by the Sultan, ever victorious, to the infidel King of Vienna, ever vanquished.'" Sir Harry Luke, The Making of Modern Turkey (London, 1936), p. 7.
- 35 Ursu, pp. 34ff.
- 36 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, (London, Public Records Office,) cited by Ursu, p. 35.
- 37 For more on the Pro Divo Carolo see J.M. Headley, The Emperor and his Chancellor (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 104ff.
- 38 Ursu, p. 39.
- 39 Ibrahim related these details to the Imperial ambassadors, Joseph von Lamberg and Nicholas Jurisic, in 1530. Ursu, pp. 38-39.
- 40 H.D. Jenkins, Ibrahim Pasha (1911, reprint New York, 1970), p. 69; Vaughn, p. 115. Vaughn remarks that Ibrahim's actions were "with the aim of maintaining friction." Given this it is difficult to see how she can maintain the view that Francis "repeatedly made terms to suit himself," while the sultan stuck faithfully to his ally's best interest, p. 127.
- 41 Mattingly, p. 175; Knecht, p. 185; full details are to be found in Jacqueton.
- 42 Knecht, pp. 186-87.
- 43 Knecht, p. 210.
- 44 Ursu describes the subsequent negotiations, pp. 40-49.
- 45 Charrière, I, pp. 129-31.
- 46 Too much has been made of this apparent duplicity. The Holy League of Cognac also stated that one of its objectives was war with the infidel, but Suleyman, well-informed of European affairs through agents in Venice and Ragusa, does not seem to have been upset. See Charrière, I, p. 207, for Rincon's report on the subject in 1532.
- 47 Rouillard, p. 108; Ursu, p. 58.
- 48 See Chapter VIII on the Protestant Princes.
- 49 Eustace Chapuys to Charles V, quoted in Knecht, p. 225.

- 50 H.M. Baird, History of the Rise of the Huguenots (London, 1880) p. 160, pp. 181-91; V.L. Bourilly, Guillaume du Bellay, Sieur de Langey (Paris, 1905), pp. 196-202.
- 51 Negotiations in Charrière, I, pp. 239-49.
- 52 Ursu, pp. 82-91. Information on the embassy was passed on once more to the Austrian envoys, Cornelius Scepper and Hieronymous von Zara, by both Ibrahim and the sultan himself. In addition, Luigi Gritti, who wanted the French alliance scrapped in favour of greater involvement in Hungary, informed Scepper of some of the more secret parts of the agreement.
- 53 The lion was duly immortalized by Vasari, appearing in his painting of the marriage of Catherine and Henri, along with Francis and the pope. It is not clear if Vasari was aware of the lion's origins.
- 54 Ursu, p. 78.
- 55 Rouillard, p. 110, is a little unclear, stating that Gozzo went first to Barbarossa in Africa, but that he returned to France while Barbarossa was still in Constantinople. Possibly de Gozzo made his journey in 1533, in response to the first Turkish envoy.
- 56 Meanwhile in Paris the Sorbonne (it was incensed over the prospect of Melanchthon's visit, and to calm Francis maintained that it was he who had forbade the idea. Baird, pp. 181-91.
- 57 Knecht, p. 276.
- 58 Ursu, p. 85.
- 59 Rouillard, p. 110; Charrière, I, p. 249.
- 60 Rouillard, p. 111.
- 61 Charrière, I, p. 255.
- 62 For details of la Forêt's mission see Rouillard, pp. 111-12; Ursu, pp. 91-98; Charrière, I, pp. 255ff.
- 63 It should be noted that this was one of the last major acts of Ibrahim, whose downfall and execution were engineered shortly thereafter. Ibrahim, a protege of the Sultan's first wife Gulbehar and her son Mustafa, was maneuvered out of the way by a court faction led by Khourrem, or Roxelana, the sultan's energetic second wife. This faction was also supported by La Forêt, who hoped that succeeding grand viziers would be more attentive to western affairs than to Persia.

- 64 Charrière, I. pp. 285-94, contains the text of the treaty in French and Italian; establishment of a consulate and freedom of worship for French subjects were also included. Stanford Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge, 1976), p. 97.
- 65 Rouillard, p. 113.
- 66 James Shotwell, Turkey at the Straits (1940, reprint Freeport, N.Y., 1971), p. 12.
- 67 Charrière, I, pp. 255ff.
- 68 Vaughan, p. 164.
- 69 Charrière, I. pp. 252-54.
- 70 Ottoman financial aid may have helped; on this occasion la Forêt asked for a million ducats in subsidies, but it is unclear how much he actually received. Inalcik, p. 52.
- 71 Knecht, p. 286.
- 72 Rouillard, p. 114; Charrière, I, pp. 281-282; Macon's letter to Francis, p. 337.
- 73 Ursu, p. 102.
- 74 Ibid., p. 104.
- 75 Rouillard, p. 115.
- 76 Ursu, p. 104.
- 77 Knecht, p. 286.

VII THE FRANCO-OTTOMAN ALLIANCE II - THE OPEN ALLIANCE

The Mediterranean Alliance, 1538-1544

If Francis had overextended himself in a war on two fronts, so had Charles. The Empire had had to bear the cost of the Tunis expedition of 1535 and support Doria's fleet against the Ottomans in 1537-38. By forcing Charles to fight a war on several fronts, France's Ottoman diplomacy had once again saved her from a worse defeat. In January, 1538, a truce was arranged and in May occurred the conference at Nice, with Paul III acting as go-between for the two sovereigns. A ten-year truce was arranged. In July the king and emperor met personally at Aigues-Mortes, and seemed on the surface to be reaching an accord. Francis promised not to meddle in the affairs of Germany and in April, 1539, he informed the Schmalkaldic League of his neutrality. He recalled his ambassador to England, and he agreed to try to dissuade Venice from making a separate peace with the Ottomans.¹ In the winter of 1539-40 Charles even visited Paris, but this was to prove the highwater mark of reconciliation. To the disappointment of Montmorenci and the conciliatory party in France, Charles showed no signs of giving up Milan, and by June 1540, negotiations had collapsed completely.

Just how sincere Francis was in these negotiations for a permanent peace is hard to ascertain. Certainly throughout this time he did nothing to actually compromise relations with his former allies. He refused to take any action against the Protestants in Germany, for example, and he posted a new resident ambassador, Charles de Marillac, to London after the latter's return to Constantinople. Also most important, he kept up his Ottoman alliance.

La Forêt's illness had forced him to return home, but in the autumn

of 1537 St.-Blancard and Marillac accompanied the Sultan to Constantinople and the French fleet spent the winter there and was treated with honour. Barbarossa even lent St.-Blancard money, when the latter ran short, to pay for supplies and salaries. At first Marillac and Rincon, who succeeded him in May, 1538, appear to have been in difficulties, lacking instructions and facing, in Rincon's words, Suleyman's "displeasure and irritation"² over the permanent truce while the sultan was left to fight the Holy League alone. However, a vigorous campaign of present-giving to the sultan and his viziers appears to have allayed suspicion³ and the victory of Prevesa ensured the defeat of the Holy League in any case.

In May, 1539, the tensions seem to have cleared for Suleyman wrote once again to Francis to assure him of his eternal friendship should the war with the empire be renewed.⁴ In 1540, as Charles was entering Paris, more presents were distributed in Constantinople, to further goodwill.⁵ It is hard to know how seriously Suleyman took the ongoing Franco-Imperial negotiations, particularly the idea of a joint crusade; articles 23, 24 and 26 of the Treaty of Madrid and similar articles of the Treaty of Cambrai had enjoined a similar crusade but nothing had come of them. Suleyman was, however, actively trying to pressure Francis back into a military alliance, particularly in view of recent Habsburg encroachments in Hungary.

The breakdown of the conciliatory campaign coincided with this renewed warfare in Eastern Europe. In Transylvania, upon the death of John Zapolya, Ferdinand of Austria had once again asserted his claims and it became clear that Ottoman action would be necessary to restore the balance. As the treaty talks broke off, Francis' diplomatic network went into action once more. While Annebault and Pellicier in Venice

tried publicly to persuade the Senate to stay in the war with Turkey, Rincon in Constantinople helped arrange a quick peace treaty. Rincon was also in contact with Laski, negotiating support for Zapolya's infant son.⁶ In the autumn of 1540 Rincon returned to France to consult with the king, leaving Vincenzo Maggi as chargé d'affaires in Constantinople; he arrived in Paris in March, 1541, and set out for Constantinople again in May, 1541, with letters and fresh instructions. At this point Charles, seeing the alliances gathering against him, attempted a forestalling move and on July 4 near Pavia Rincon and his secretary Ceasare Fregoso were murdered. The Marquis of Vasto, governor of Milan, maintained that bandits were responsible, but it was quickly learned that he had planned the murder on Charles' orders. Mendoza, Imperial ambassador in Venice, was also implicated.⁷

Francis, believing the assassination to be a prelude to Charles' own offensive, was able to apply some propaganda pressure of his own for there was considerable scandal over the murder of an accredited ambassador. In the summer, while troops were mustered in Provence and Picardy, Francis began his preparations for war. In Venice, Pellicier was able to defeat Mendoza over the Rincon affair and Venice promised to remain at least neutral. At the Diet of Ratisbon, Pierre Raymond urged the Protestant princes on against the emperor; in London Charles de Marillac pressed the suit of the Duc d'Orléans for Mary Tudor, and, upon the failure of that attempt, the French turned instead to James V of Scotland. In June, 1541, Duke William of Cleves married Francis' niece Jeanne d'Albret, while envoys to Denmark were able to conclude a treaty in the following year. In August, 1541, a new envoy to the Ottomans, Baron Polin de la Garde, arrived at Suleyman's camp in Hungary.

All was prepared for war, and Charles opened the proceedings by

attempting to take Algiers, a move that, if successful, would have cost the Ottoman navy its only major base west of the Sicilian Narrows. However, the campaign ended instead in disaster and Francis took the opportunity to attack. His own forces launched offensives in Piedmont and Luxembourg, while the Duke of Cleves raided the Netherlands, attacking Antwerp and Louvain, and James V launched an invasion of England that was quickly defeated at Solway Moss.

Polin was back in France in late 1542, but it was too late for any effective Franco-Ottoman co-operation to be mounted in that year. After some bloody fighting the Luxembourg campaign ended in stalemate, while the English sacked Edinburgh and joined Charles, and Cleves was completely overrun. Francis was thus reduced once more to the Ottoman alliance, which essentially meant the Ottoman navy since Suleyman and the army were still occupied in Hungary. Both France and the Ottomans were making little headway in their Habsburg wars and accordingly a combined foray in the Mediterranean was planned, intended as a diversion from the other theatres of war. In April, 1543, Barbarossa led 110 galleys from Constantinople to the western Mediterranean where they raided Sicily, pillaged Reggio, and anchored off Ostia for a time, causing a panic in Rome.⁸ On July 5, the fleet made rendezvoused with a French squadron under the Duc d'Enghien off Nice.

From August 7 to September 6, the Franco-Ottoman force assailed Nice, a strategic port that could have both served as a base for control of Provence and a base for intercepting Genoese shipping. Contrary to the notion that Barbarossa was upset because of the lack of French co-operation during the operation, his men and the French under Polin and Leone Strozzi appear to have fought well together, and only a spirited defence of the citadel prevented the whole of Nice from falling before

the arrival of an Imperial relief force.⁹

With the campaign season ended, the French as an experiment offered Barbarossa a French harbour in which to winter his fleet. The port chosen was Toulon. The Toulonnais were turned out of their homes, and the town and harbour handed over to the Turks for the winter, where, to the intrigue and scandal of modern historians, they established a Turkish enclave on French soil. "While French Protestants were undergoing savage persecution, Turks on French soil turned unmolested to Mecca," says Vaughn, and nearby villages were supposedly raided for oarsmen while Christian slaves were sold in the marketplace.¹⁰ Contemporary evidence points to the occupation as being relatively orderly, and biscuit and provisions were provided by the French crown.¹¹

However, the experiment was not a success. Barbarossa complained that the supply arrangements were far from adequate. This was likely not the deliberate breakdown it seemed, but an illustration of how totally inadequate most army commissariats of the time were. In the rapidly evolving and changing field of war it is rare to read of a western army that was adequately supplied. The Turks, however, were used to a greater standard of efficiency. Further, Barbarossa wanted to concert additional action, including a raid on Spain, but the formidable forces Charles was gathering on his north-east frontier bid fair to absorb all of Francis' resources. It is not surprising that the allies came to a parting of the ways. In the spring of 1544 Barbarossa prepared to depart, venting his displeasure by refusing to pay for any of the supplies he had received and sacking several French merchant vessels.

The occupation of Toulon was the high point of Franco-Ottoman co-operation during the sixteenth century. The Ottomans, on Barbarossa's

advice, did not believe that the French could adequately support their fleet outside of its own waters, while for the French the affair had been costly both in terms of money and public opinion. Dealing with corsairs, who expected either plunder or expensive gifts as a matter of course, could be highly difficult. Never again would Ottoman forces be invited onto French soil.

Moreover, the Imperial armies in the summer of 1544 penetrated into northern France as far as Soissons. Both sides were now exhausted and peace was finally established at Crespy in 1544, ending the last of Francis' wars with the empire.

The Alliance in the reign of Henry II and after

The diplomacy of Francis during his last three years does not compare favourably with that of earlier times. He proposed various schemes of alliance against Charles, all unworkable and all changing so quickly that his ambassadors often found themselves working at cross purposes. This was the case in particular in Constantinople in 1545 where Jean de Monluc had instructions to promote a truce between Suleyman and the Empire, while d'Aramon, the new resident, had instructions to oppose it. Suleyman, facing a new war in Persia, signed the truce anyway. In 1546 Francis, attempting still to form a league of England, the Pope, and the Schmalkaldic League against Charles, had despatched d'Aramon to Constantinople once more just before his death in 1547.

The accession of Henry II and the end of the almost personal enmity between Francis and Charles might have served as an excuse for a badly needed peace in Europe. But Henry, from what can be guessed of his

character, seems to have been fond of war and intrigue for their own sake, much as Francis but without the latter's judgement of his own resources or sense or purpose. Henry decided to continue his father's policies against the Habsburgs, and in particular his diplomatic policies.

Gabriel de Lutz, Baron d'Aramon, was the next ambassador to Constantinople. His two embassies of 1547-1550 and 1551-1554 are of interest because of the large amount of information available, thanks to the practice of including scholars and scientists on the more prominent missions. Pierre Gilles and Pierre Belon have left accounts of Aramon's first mission, while Geographer Royal Nicolas de Nicolay accompanied d'Aramon on the second and in addition, d'Aramon's secretary Jean Chesneau wrote his own account.¹²

D'Aramon's embassy, despatched before Francis' death, represents the interests of the French in maintaining the Ottoman alliance in view of the continuing Anglo-Habsburg relations; even though there was peace for the present, the balance of power needed to be maintained.¹³ D'Aramon tried unsuccessfully to turn Suleyman's interests back to the west, but the sultan's problems included not only Persia but a potentially serious plot centering around his son Mustafa. The Ottomans did not turn back to the west until 1550, when an expedition under Doria to rout out the newly established corsair base at Mahdiya¹⁴ coincided with a fresh Habsburg invasion of Hungary. War began to develop once more in the west. Suleyman sent d'Aramon back to France to discuss a joint strategy, while his fleet under Barbarossa's successors Sinan Pasha and Dragut Reis recaptured Mahdiya, raided Malta and Gozo, and seized Tripoli. The dangers of relying too heavily on the corsairs were shown once again; Sinan and Dragut were settling old scores with the

Knights of St. John, not supporting Ottoman policy against the Habsburgs. On this particular occasion d'Aramon attempted to intervene in the siege of Tripoli but was compelled to remain in the Ottoman camp lest he reach the Sultan and secure his intervention,¹⁵ and he was allowed to ransom back French members of the Order only at the cost of virtually all the money and treasure in his squadron.¹⁶

Nevertheless, 1551 saw the French diplomatic network in action once more; Henry concluded a successful league with Maurice of Saxony, resulting in the latter's attack on Charles at Innsbruck, while the Ottomans pressed their retaliatory campaign in Hungary. Nor had affairs in Italy failed entirely; Henry had supported the rebels of Siena with troops under Piero Strozzi and Blaise de Monluc, and was later to support the Pope against Charles as well. In the years 1552-1554 three Ottoman naval expeditions came west, capturing Corfu and raiding Elba and the Italian coast in full co-operation with French squadrons under Polin.

There were, however, no great successes. The Hungarian campaign concluded, the Ottoman army turned east once more to deal with the Safavids in 1554, and the death of Maurice freed Imperial strength to concentrate on Siena and on France in the Low Countries and the Three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. Though the Ottoman fleets defeated Andrea Doria one last time off Messina in 1552, Dragut and Sinan were chary of operating too far from their North African bases, and the French were not to repeat the offer of Toulon. It was suspected that Genoese bribery also induced the corsairs not to press their attacks too heavily, as in the case of an abortive expedition by Piali Pasha in 1558.¹⁷ All in all, the fleet actions accomplished very little.

Charles' abdication in 1555 saw the war conducted now by his son

Philip of Spain, who still held the great bulk of Habsburg family lands in Italy, Burgundy, and the Netherlands. But by this point both nations were running to exhaustion. Francis' careful use of his resources had left Henry a debt of only two million livres; by Henry's own death twelve years later the debt was 42 million and increasing at a rate of 2.5 million annually. On the Spanish side, state bankruptcy in 1557 caused a financial crisis all over Europe and though Philip won a great victory at St.-Quentin, he was literally unable to pay his armies to exploit the victory.

The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 put an end to the war, and Henry's own death in 1559 followed by that of Francis II in 1560 saw the beginning of thirty years of religious civil wars that were, except for one brief interval, to completely paralyze French foreign policy. In 1566, Suleyman died in the course of yet another campaign in Hungary, and his indolent son Selim II was not inclined to active diplomacy.

The first stage of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy ends here, to all intents and purposes, and the alliance was not resumed in any continuous manner until the early years of the next century. It is worth noting, however, that contacts were not broken, despite the strongly Catholic bias of the ruling factions which might have inclined them more to an alliance with Spain against the Protestants. Politics still dominated religion to the degree that relations between Paris and the Sublime Porte became steadily more cordial in nature. The balance of power was still in effect, and the interests of France and Turkey in Europe remained basically the same. Aramon was succeeded by Henri de Codignac from 1554-56, Jean de la Vigne from 1556-59, Antonine Petremol from 1564-66, Grantric de Grandchamp from 1566-69, and Claude du Bourg from 1569-70. Du Bourg's embassy is of note in that the Capitulations were renewed and were now made perpetual.

From 1571-1575 François de Noailles, Bishop of Acqs, headed a large mission to Constantinople, intent once more on combining with the Ottomans against Spain and detaching Venice from the latest Holy League. A French invasion of Flanders coincided with the Ottoman recapture of Tunis in 1574 and Ottoman support for Henri de Valois in his election as King of Poland in 1573.¹⁸ But in the years following as the French government became steadily paralyzed by religious war, diplomatic missions were allowed to run down and not until the accession of Henry IV was an ambassador of high calibre, Jacques Savary de Brèves, despatched in 1589.¹⁹

For their part the Ottomans continued to be interested not only in the French government but in the various factions in France, looking to support any who might be properly grateful afterwards. This was the particular policy of Mehmet Sokullu during his tenure as grand vizier. As they had been interested in using the Lutheran princes against the Empire, so now the Ottomans were interested in using the French Protestants against Spain. When, during the period of Coligny's ascendancy in France before the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, French troops entered the Netherlands in support of the Dutch revolt, Selim II offered the use of the Ottoman fleet in case of war with Spain; this was in the year after Lepanto.²⁰ Coligny himself had been fishing for possible Ottoman support even during Suleyman's reign.²¹ Claude du Bourg the former ambassador returned to Constantinople in 1577 where he transmitted an offer from Murad III to Henry of Navarre, for use of the Turkish fleet against Spain and the Catholic League in exchange for a permanent base. The offer was repeated in 1590.²² Oddly, religious scruples may have determined Henry's refusal of the offer. Those among the Protestant cause like François de la Noue, whose writings are filled

with an almost medieval concept of the infidel and urge for crusade, objected strenuously to the proposals.²³ Du Bourg was also acting as agent for the Duc' d'Anjou, youngest of Henry II's four sons, who was interested in marrying Elizabeth of England and creating a state for himself in England and the Netherlands and who felt Turkish sea-power in the Mediterranean could help him in his aims.²⁴ Thus by the end of the century negotiating with the Ottomans had progressed from its furtive and tentative beginnings to a generally accepted practice.

The Public Conception of the Alliance

It is often assumed that Francis proceeded with the alliance in the face of considerable opposition, to "the scandal of Europe". But the effects of foreign criticism can be over-estimated; a good part of the foreign comment on the alliance was politically motivated, beginning with the Pro Divo Carolo and Charles' letter to the German princes. In 1532 the Imperialists once again made capital out of Rincon's presence in the Turkish army and in Rome the Bishop of Auxerre reported that the Imperialists were pressing to know what affairs the King of France could have in Constantinople and suggesting that the French were spying for the Ottomans. To quell the growing outcry Francis eventually had to go through the motions of preparing troops to help defend Italy against Barbarossa.²⁵ In 1534 the presence of Turkish envoys in Paris caused another furore; this time Francis defended himself to the German princes by, ironically, citing Imperial dealings in Constantinople over the last three years as a precedent.²⁶

The most serious attack came in 1543, over the wintering of Barbarossa's fleet in Toulon. Again complaints came from Germany and

du Bellay, sent to defend Francis' conduct, was forbidden to enter Germany,²⁷ while the Diet of Speyer in 1544 was for once united and voted 30,000 troops for Charles, which he used to nearly take Paris that summer. Sinclair Atkins believes that this unity was caused by alarm over the Turkish presence.²⁸ However, the proceedings of the Diet show that Charles was only able to obtain these troops through massive concessions to the Protestants, including the promise to summon a diet to decide the reform question. France and the Ottomans do not appear to have figured prominently in the responses of the Princes. Despite the detention of du Bellay, there was a French agent, Johannes Sleidan, present and in touch with at least the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse.²⁹ It is safe to assume once more that most of the outrage, and the measures against du Bellay, were again directed by the Imperialists.

Nor was Imperial conduct always blameless, and Francis was able to mount propaganda counter-attacks over the Sack of Rome and the murder of Rincon. There were outbursts of anti-French feeling; an Italian ambassador once referred to the alliance as "an ignominious blot,"³⁰ and the humanist poet Pietro Aretino wrote to Francis, "Now I regret bitterly that I can call you neither King of France nor François. For how can a man be called either King or free, which last quality is implicit in both France and François, if he goes and begs aid from barbarians, foes of his race, and turns against his creed? My lord, for so I still address you, you have thrust the sword of the Ottoman into the heart of Christendom!"³¹ Nevertheless, the popular outcry was never loud enough to cause Francis to back down, although for a number of years he maintained that the alliance was only a commercial one. The Popes, who might have been expected to lead the religious accusations

of Francis, remained prudently silent on the matter.

The caution with which Francis proceeded was due as much to fears of internal as external opposition. In this area Francis had some initial difficulties. A powerful court faction led by Grand Master, later Constable, Anne de Montmorenci (nephew of Grand Master de l'Isle Adam of the Knights of St. John) and the Admiral Chabot was opposed to any approach to the Turks and Montmorenci in particular was moved by the old religious spirit of hatred for the infidel. In 1532 Rincon was ordered to conceal his mission from Montmorenci who was still objecting to the Turkish alliance, a factor which led to his ultimate disgrace.³²

Further opposition, of a limited nature, came from the right-wing religious factions of the parlement and the Sorbonne. Francis had firmly curbed the power of these bodies, who were in any case more occupied with the repression of heresy within the kingdom; nevertheless they voiced complaint over the embassy of 1534 and the wintering of Barbarossa in Toulon. The Toulonnais themselves were, naturally, vocal in their dissent over the latter, and religious and superstitious dread of the Turks manifested itself on both occasions. Yet once again Francis appears to have been able to proceed in spite of public opinion, and to have done so, moreover, with the general confidence of the establishment. Neither the Bishop of Auxerre, ambassador to Rome in the 1520's, nor his successor the Bishop of Maçon betrayed in their letters any unease over the idea of an Ottoman alliance.³³

Francis succeeded in his policies through use of the new diplomacy and through the prevailing spirit of political realism typified by Machiavelli, of whom Francis was an admirer, but he succeeded mainly because he was undisputed master in his own house. The Concordat of

Bologna³⁴ had given him complete control over ecclesiastical appointments, which in turn meant that the church hierarchy assured Francis of his rightness in using any means available to defend himself against the Habsburgs. He was able to suppress heresy firmly, often brutally, inside France--the retributions following the Affaire des Placards and the massacres of the Vaudois in Provence in 1544 being the chief examples--thus destroying the bases for possible Protestant challenge to his reign. The centralized government was able to levy taxes far more effectively than the Spanish cortes ever were, and the rebellions of La Rochelle which accompanied the introduction of the gabelle in 1542 were easily put down. One analyst³⁵ has shown the French government in the form of a diagram in the shape of a wheel, with the king as the axle, the cardinals and princes as the hub, and the four spokes of church, finance, judiciary, and army reaching out to encompass every aspect of government. It is not an unreasonable idea. Francis controlled his realm far more effectively than his rival could ever hope to.

But more than this, Francis appears to have exercised a moral and philosophical ascendancy that made his authority and acts unquestioned. To the common people he was still the Most Christian King; his touch could cure scrofula, the King's Evil, which not even the Pope could do. To the men of learning and power he embodied that new ideal, the national will, with the ability to break free of the Habsburgs whose borders marched with France's on every side. There was a sense of being in a new age, in a changing world. Philippe de Commynes had already introduced the idea of a balance of power, of God applying a check on the wickedness of princes by setting other princes against them and Frenchmen could without difficulty see their king playing that role.

The national and moral enthusiasm of Lefebvre d'Étaples, Le Roy, and Budé backed him up. Contemporary scholars, Budé, Robert Estienne, Duchatel, Etienne Pasquier, were full of praises for the qualities of their king.³⁶

In 1535 Francis told the Venetian ambassador Marino Giustiniani, "I cannot deny that I wish to see the Turks appear powerful at sea; not that I am pleased with the advantages they obtain, for they are unbelievers and we are Christians, but because they keep the Emperor occupied and thereby confer greater security on other potentates."³⁷ Not until after the failure at Nice and the problems attendant upon the wintering at Toulon did the alliance begin to be of less importance, and then as much for the reason that the two rulers were otherwise occupied, Suleyman with Persia and Francis with a growing fiscal exhaustion. Even then, although few major military actions were concerted, the grand embassies of d'Aramon and Noailles openly proclaimed France's acceptance of the Ottoman Empire as a European state. The effects of this acceptance, beginning in 1525, were to be of considerable importance in the subsequent history of Europe.

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- 7 Bourilly, Guillaume du Bellay, Sieur de Langey (Paris, 1905), pp. 329ff; Erika Spevakovsky, Son of the Alhambra: Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 1504-1575. (Austin, 1978), pp. 110-11. Charles had more than one reason for wishing to dispose of Rincon, who as one of the comunero rebels had opposed his rule in Spain before taking refuge in France. He reportedly spent 150,000 ducats to trace and kill the ambassador.
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VIII THE ALLIANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Coming just eighteen months apart, the battles of Pavia and Mohacs have a common denominator in that they helped spread the Habsburg-Valois conflict in northern Italy into a general European war. In particular Mohacs, simultaneous with the Franco-Turkish alliance in its first stage, brought about the destruction of the medieval kingdom of Hungary and moved the boundaries of the Ottoman empire into direct contact with those of the Habsburg hereditary lands. Hungary itself became a disputed area between the two powers, and the dispute became a major pre-occupation for Archduke, later Emperor, Ferdinand of Austria and his successors. In the decades to come that dispute would absorb much of the attention and resources of the empire.

Though represented as an attempt to defend Christendom, Ferdinand's efforts in Hungary were often of a more offensive nature. For Ferdinand these wars were vital, establishing a defensive barrier against the Turks and completing along with his seizure of Bohemia his idea of a Habsburg pan-Danubian state. From Charles' viewpoint, however, "Ferdinand's predicament in...[Hungary] was an unwelcome diversion from what he increasingly treated as his main theatre of activity, the west and the Mediterranean."¹ Charles attempted to make the defense of eastern Europe "primarily the responsibility of that area's rulers,"² and the most that the Reichsregiment would do in 1522, the year of Biococca and Rhodes, was to proclaim "an edict on March 25, for the institution of public processions of prayer, and ordered that at midday in all the towns, boroughs and villages a special bell should be rung, at the end of which all the people should offer up prayers to God, 'that he might withhold the thunderbolts of his wrath and grant the Christian

people victory over the Turk.'"3

Thus in 1521, Charles refused to aid the Hungarians and at the Diet of Nuremburg in 1522, Bernardin Frankapan's warnings of the oncoming danger were again ignored, as was a third request for aid before Mohacs. In fact, in 1526 Charles had asked Ferdinand to send him troops to aid against the forces of the League of Cognac in Italy. The Archduke was mustering troops at Innsbruck when the news of Mohacs reached him, and by September 15 he had abandoned his campaign and was back in Vienna meeting with the Hofrat to prepare a campaign to rescue Hungary.⁴

Yet Charles continued to try to ignore the situation, and in the spring of 1529 he requested that Ferdinand direct more troops south to Italy.⁵ The request was only cancelled upon the arrival of Suleyman's huge army before Buda. The result was nearly a disaster; Ferdinand's antagonism of the Diet of Ratisbon in the same year meant that he had less than 30,000 men available to defend Austria against Suleyman's estimated 250,000. In this circumstance, the ability and courage of Salm, commander of Vienna, must be appreciated. Without his firm defense, Austria would have been devastated like Hungary before it.

Charles then began to urge a policy of peace on Ferdinand and the siege of Vienna was followed in 1530 by two embassies, that of Joseph von Lamberg and Nicholas Jurisic and that of Lamberg and Graf Leonhard von Nogarola, to Constantinople to discuss terms for a truce. Yet Ferdinand did not give up on his own idea of political necessity, and the ensuing Hungarian wars, lasting intermittently throughout the century, were a constant drain on the resources of the empire.

The anti-Habsburg forces were able to exploit this division, both in terms of their own strategic plans, and through use of anti-Habsburg forces in Hungary. A significant proportion of Hungarians had decided

that they preferred Turkish rule to Habsburg. "For Hungary," as Sinor has remarked, "the problem lay at a more practical level: either they sided with the Habsburgs and bled to death in defending the prosperity of Austria, or they allied themselves with the Turks, in which case their country would again become a battlefield."⁶ For a hundred and fifty years, until the second battle of Mohacs, this faction placed itself in opposition to the Habsburgs; the case of 1619, when the pro-Turkish prince of Transylvania Bethlen Gabor invaded Austria with the aid of the French-backed Bohemian rebels of Prague, has strong parallels with the events of 1527-29. Moreover, the Hungarian-Transylvanian situation was to exercise an influence over the other nations of eastern Europe, notably Poland.

Hungary

Looking at the history of the kingdom of Hungary in its last years one sees an aristocracy seemingly bent on self-destruction, and the wonder is that the Turkish conquest did not come sooner. In the space of a few decades Hungary's pre-eminent position in eastern Europe had collapsed completely.

Devastated by the Mongols in 1242, Hungary was almost completely reconstructed by one of the last kings of the Arpad dynasty, Béla IV. Under Béla and succeeding kings, notably the Angevin Louis the Great, Hungary joined the ranks of European powers. Hunyadi's military strength held the realm together through the crisis of the mid-fifteenth century. After his death shortly after the seige of Belgrade, his son Matthias Corvinus became king (1458-1490), and under him Hungary experienced her "last age of happy prosperity and national greatness."⁷

Yet, due to Hungary's system of elective kingship, Matthias' accomplishments were all but wiped out on his death. The nobility were not interested in having a strong king who ruled them and they elected another Jagellon, Vladislas II, in 1490. For the next few years he and his brothers Jan Olbrecht of Poland and Alexander of Lithuania ruled over more land than the Habsburgs. Yet their power was nothing like so great. In Hungary Vladislas proved to be a cipher in the hands of ambitious nobles such as the Palatine Count Stephen Bathori and Archbishop Tomas Bakocz of Estergom. Notes W.H. McNeill, "The nobles' effort to hedge in the monarch and check his power meant that effective military defense against any major foreign assault could no longer be organized. Moreover, at home the factionalism of the Magyar nobility itself prevented the attainment of a reasonable level of peace and order in the countryside".⁸ Matters came to a head in 1514 when Bakocz, the Cardinal Primate, stood for election as pope in one of the most expensive campaigns in papal history. Upon Bakocz' defeat, the new pope Leo X as consolation appointed him head of a new crusade to be gathered in Hungary.

Among those opposing this idea was the treasurer, Stephen Telegdy, who maintained that arming the peasantry for a crusade would be "equivalent to arming their own enemies."⁹ Bondage to the soil and its attendant miseries had been introduced twenty years before; the peasantry, who were often not of Magyar blood, came forward in masses to escape their landlords, and then at some point the movement changed into a popular rebellion. The Kurucz, or Dosza, Rebellion, led by a Szekeler knight named George Dosza, lasted all that summer; the monarchy, helpless, turned for aid to John Zapolya, Voivode of Transylvania, who crushed the rising with considerable brutality. Fifty thousand peasants

were killed, more men than were to die at Mohacs.

The Diet of nobles that met that fall, according to Vambery, was divided between a faction that wanted to slaughter all the peasants in the realm outright, and those who wanted to put them into perpetual servitude at the nobility's pleasure. The latter faction won, and the Diet passed the Tripartitum, a document that lives in Hungarian history as having fixed in place the divisions and weaknesses of the nation for centuries to come. After enslaving the peasants,¹⁰ the triumphant nobility then turned on the monarch; the Tripartitum stated that the nobles had freedom from taxation and arrest, and concluded: "if the king disregards the foregoing principles, the nobles acquire the right to resist him."¹¹ When Vladislas ventured to protest, Bakocz informed him that if he did not comply he would be deposed in favour of a king who would.¹²

The result, as stated, was to fix in place the factionalism inside Hungary. The minor knights and nobles led by Zapolya faced the church and the great magnates led by the Palatine Count Bathori. Vladislas, dying in 1516, was replaced by his young son Louis II, who became still more of a pawn. The young king was encouraged in his love of feasting and dancing and the court staggered on the edge of bankruptcy. In 1521 the wedding of Louis and Mary of Habsburg was celebrated with much pomp, while Suleyman's army began to approach Belgrade and Sabacs and Hungarian envoys begged for aid from the Diet of Worms. The captains of Belgrade were then in Buda, trying to obtain funds for the defense, and the seamen of the Danube river flotilla, unpaid for three years, deserted en masse. Forces under Bathori and Zapolya took the field, but neither would move against the Turks for fear of the other.

Thus even before Mohacs the kingdom was on the verge of breaking up

and becoming a battleground for the competing factions. Zapolya, the richest man in Hungary, was acting like an independant monarch in Transylvania, the eastern third of the kingdom. The western third, the old Triune Kingdom of Croatia which had accepted the Hungarian kings in 1091, began considering breaking away and joining Austria, where Maximillian and Ferdinand were more sympathetic to their interests and were aiding them in their defense against the Turks.¹³

Behind Croatia lay Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria, and Croatia was suffering bitterly from the annual raids aimed at these provinces; resistance had been effective for a time, but the loss of 10,000 men at the Battle of Krbava Polje in 1493 had seriously impaired Croatian fighting power. Under the impact of the raids the surviving population was driven north and the southern half of the country became a nicija zemlja, a no-man's land.¹⁴ Vladislav had already insulted the Croats by referring to them as a subordinate kingdom, and the Sabor or Diet of 1526 debated the proposition that "owing to his neglect of Croatian interests vis-a-vis the Ottoman peril, Louis was held to have forfeited the allegiance of Croats."¹⁵ The debate was to reach a crucial point upon the death of Louis that summer.

Louis had attacked too soon at Mohacs, while sizeable portions of his army had not yet been gathered; he had basically only the contingents from the central plain under his command. The Bohemian levies were still at Raab in the north, Zapolya's Transylvanian contingent was at Szeged, and the Croat forces under Count Kristofor Frankapan were at Agram. Of these three groups, the Bohemians surrendered their allegiance to Ferdinand at once, the Croats wavered for several years before coming down on the Habsburg side, and Zapolya was firmly against them. The actions of the latter two are of particular interest in the context of

the supposed Turkish-Croat connection with France, together with John Frankapan's presence in France during the summer of 1526, many questions are raised.

Certainly Frankapan seems to have moved swiftly to secure power in Croatia for himself. On September 23, less than a month after Mohacs, the Sabor of Slavonia nominated him their "high defender" despite the fact that the pro-Habsburg Francis Batthyany was then Ban of both Croatia and Slovenia. In October, while his cavalry harassed the Turks as they withdrew from Hungary, Frankapan seems to have tentatively favoured Ferdinand, but by the time of Zapolya's coronation as King of Hungary in November his mind had changed once more. On December 31, 1526, Batthyany and the Croatian Sabor informed Jurisic that they would recognize Ferdinand, and six days later, Slavonia deposed Batthyany and elected Frankapan as Ban.

"We can only conclude," says Guldescu, "that Count Kristofor thought that he and Zapolya...could play a lone hand against both Ferdinand and the Sultan."¹⁸ But such a concept connotes a high degree of naivete on Frankapan's part. Hungary, devastated by the campaign and an ensuing peasant's revolt, and bereft of her lay and ecclesiastical hierarchy at Mohacs, was in no condition to resist either Habsburg or Ottoman. When in the summer of 1527 the Habsburg army invaded Hungary to assert Ferdinand's rights, Frankapan tried to stop them and was mortally wounded in action near Varazdin on September 26. Five days later, Slavonia recanted and pledged allegiance to Ferdinand. As for John Frankapan, he seems to drop out of sight after his return from Istanbul in November of that year. The Ottoman connection in Croatia thus disappeared.

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Frankapan was not alone in his anti-Habsburg sentiments, for what-

ever reason they were held. Simon Erdödi, Bishop of Zagreb, was a firm supporter of the count, and in 1529 he once again attempted to seize control in Croatia; the street fighting between pro and anti-Habsburg factions in Zagreb only ended with the approach of the Turkish army. Another Croat, Thomas Nadasdy, defended Buda against the sultan in the summer of 1529, and then against Ferdinand in the spring of the following year. The Croat monk Juraj Utensic, better known as Martinuzzi, joined Zapolya, and his urgings appear to have been instrumental in Zapolya's decision to seek aid from the French. On the whole, however, Frankapan seems to have been the moving force of the anti-Habsburg faction in Croatia-Slavonia, and his death brought about its general collapse. By 1530 the old kingdom had been reorganized as the Croatian military borders of Austria, fortified zones aimed at delaying Turkish advances and protecting the Austrian hinterland from raids. Yet the question of the Frankapan family's relationship with the Turks and the French remains an interesting one, and if that relationship can ever be determined exactly there may be found further clues about the nature of the Franco-Ottoman alliance and the events of 1525-27.

Transylvania

About Zapolya there is much less doubt. The only debate concerns the moment at which he first called upon foreign aid. His action in remaining at Szeged in 1526 was highly suggestive of treason at the time, and it is possible that Zapolya had reached some sort of understanding with the Turks,¹⁷ though formal relations do not appear to have been established until 1528. But certainly the defeat at Mohacs and death of the king left him holding a strong position in Hungary, with his forces

and his Transylvanian lands intact. Ferdinand was already pressing his claims, and Zapolya quickly attracted the lesser nobility of the kingdom, opposed as ever to the great magnates who had already sided with the Habsburgs and their Fugger bankers. This action can be seen as patriotic, but it was more likely a simple continuation of the factionalism enshrined in the Tripartitum. This was now to have serious consequences.

On November 10, 1526, Zapolya was elected king by the Diet of Tokay, and crowned by Bishop Peter Perenyi. On December 17 the magnates held their own rebel diet at Pozany (Pressburg) and elected Ferdinand as their king. In 1527 the Habsburg forces crossed the border and drove Zapolya's troops back, killing Frankapan with the consequences as described above, and taking Buda. On November 3, 1527, Ferdinand was crowned in Buda, also by Bishop Peter Perenyi. Zapolya was forced to flee to Poland, whose king Sigismund I Jagellon was related to him by marriage.

Sigismund, cousin also to the dead Louis II and no friend of the Habsburgs, covertly put considerable resources at Zapolya's disposal and many Polish volunteers joined the Transylvanian army. There was also a French connection in Poland; three years earlier Rincon's embassy had suggested a Valois-Jagellon marriage. When Zapolya sent further appeals for aid to England and France, Francis was quick to respond. Rincon came to Poland once more; Laski went to Paris and was forwarded by the French to Constantinople; Rincon, via Venice and Dalmatia, forwarded 20,000 écus and promised 100,000 more for mercenaries, while a Franco-Transylvanian treaty was signed in 1529.¹⁹

Through Laski, Zapolya was also receiving subsidies from Constantinople, and had promised to swear fealty to the sultan. Anti-Habsburg

forces coalesced. With French, Turkish, and Polish backing and co-operation with the Landgrave of Hesse, Zapolya returned to Hungary in 1528 and occupied Transylvania with little resistance. Ferdinand began a counter-attack in 1529, but his aggressions in Hungary, now regarded as part of the Ottoman domains, brought the sultan personally north. Zapolya met Suleyman near Mohacs, swore fealty to him, and then returned to Transylvania while the Turkish army moved on, occupied Buda, and moved against Vienna. A Turkish garrison was installed in Buda, with Luigi Gritti its commander instructed to advise Zapolya and maintain contact with Constantinople.

Thus for the next ten years, two kings reigned in Hungary, and Zapolya, along with the Protestants, became another part of the Franco-Ottoman network of anti-Habsburg elements. Contact between all the powers was close. Gritti had assumed considerable power in Transylvania, and in 1530 his janissaries helped Nadasdy's Hungarians throw back Ferdinand's next attempt to take Buda.²⁰ Gritti had the ear of Ibrahim, as did Laski, still in Constantinople, and the Pole was further in close contact with Rincon. French and Protestant emissaries continued to arrive in Transylvania, and Zapolya himself sent regular agents to the Imperial Diets in Germany.

Gradually, however, the alliance deteriorated. The defeat at Guns in 1532 and the turning of Franco-Ottoman interest to the Mediterranean meant that Transylvania was of less importance, and the assassination of Gritti in 1534 removed another strong force holding the alliance together. In 1537 another Habsburg invasion was defeated at Essek, but in 1538 the Ottoman campaign of suppression against Voivode Peter Rares of Moldavia seems to have worried Zapolya, and in the same year the treaty of Nagyvarad or Grosswardein allowed Ferdinand the throne if the

then unmarried Zapolya died childless. It is hard to say what sort of pressures he was under at this point, but in 1539 he married Isabel, daughter of Sigismund of Poland, and in 1540, just days before his own death, a son was born.

Ferdinand promptly invaded Hungary, but Isabel, with Turkish backing, defeated the Habsburg general Rogendorf at Buda. Three years of fighting ensued. Suleyman was forced to conduct two major campaigns, in 1541 and 1543, to stabilize the situation, but at the same time Francis was able to take advantage of the consequent drain on Habsburg resources in Hungary and at Algiers to launch his own war in western Europe. The results of Ferdinand's invasion were a general European war which the Habsburgs weathered only with difficulty, and the permanent occupation by the Turks of central Hungary, including Buda, Pecs, Szekesfehervar, and Estergom with a pasha in Buda to govern the region.

By this point France's direct involvement in Hungary had stopped. Francis was content to let Suleyman direct that aspect of operations, while his main focus continued to be the northern frontier and the Mediterranean. The chief effect of French involvement had been simply to place a large part of Hungary in the anti-Habsburg camp, and this effect was to last long beyond the end of the Habsburg-Valois wars. Though the Zapolya dynasty ended in 1571, the Catholic Bathorys who succeeded them were still pro-Turkish, often out of necessity; the Ottomans backed Bathory in his election as voivode and later both they and France supported him in his election as King of Poland following Henri of Valois' abdication. Though Bathory's nephew Sigismund in fact joined the Habsburg camp as the Long War broke out in 1593, the conduct of Imperial troops in the country coupled with recurrent invasions by the Turks and Michael the Brave of Wallachia led to a revolt which placed

Stephen Bockskai as Prince of Transylvania. Turkish support was obtained for him on this occasion by Bethlen Gabor, who later succeeded him. In effect, from 1528 on, Transylvania was pro-Turkish.

Thus, though active French intervention in Hungary waned after a few years and was replaced by a more direct Ottoman control, it is important to note that the French were partly responsible for the success of Zapolya and Transylvania. By recommending them to the Ottomans as a client state, rather than the normal course of occupation and annexation, Francis was able to bring Transylvania and most of Hungary into the Franco-Ottoman alliance as a political unit, one more factor in the French program against the Habsburgs.

Poland

Closely bound up with the Hungarian question were the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The merging of the realms of the Piast dynasty and the pagan Lithuanian rulers had taken place in 1386, and Poland-Lithuania under the Jagellons had crushed the power of the Teutonic Knights and become the dominant power in the north-east of Europe, with visions of an empire stretching east almost to Moscow and south into the Danube basin. A superb army, built around light horse lancers, hussaria, armoured cossacks, infantry with plenty of firearms, and wagon-forts in the Hussite manner, backed up the royal policy.

Yet Poland, like Hungary, had problems both internal and external. Jagellon territorial interests clashed with those of the Habsburgs, the emerging power of Russia, and Moldavia, while inside the country the nobility took advantage of the principle of elective kingship to assert their own rights. While a powerful king such as Kasimir III (1444-1492)

reigned, the nobles were kept in check. But Kasimir's successors Jan Olbrecht (1492-1501) and Alexander, (1501-1506) let the royal power decline. Jan Olbrecht's attempt to annex Moldavia was defeated by the voivode Stephen the Great, at Bukovina, and this plus the Russian war of 1500-08 and the loss of Smolensk caused a dramatic decline in royal prestige.²¹ In 1505 the Sjem, or diet of nobles, passed the decree of Nihil Novi. On paper, it sounds like a fine assertion of democracy,²² but the problems of factional strife and "decentralized violence" would lead as in Hungary to national decline and collapse.²³

Poland's chief external problems lay to the east and south-east. To the south and south-west the Carpathian mountains constituted a partial barrier to Habsburg or Turkish aggression, but the plains of the east were wide open to invasion, as the Mongol experience of 1242 had shown. The Muscovites repeatedly attempted to batter their way through to the Baltic. Ottoman monopolizing of the Black Sea had collapsed the Pontic grain trade and southern Lithuania, economically depressed, was suddenly exposed to the devastating annual slave raids of the Crimean Tartars. Though nominally Ottoman vassals, the Tartars continued their raids in war or peace, and the slave raids depopulated the south and tied down a large portion of Polish resources.²⁴

Polish diplomacy was therefore forced to resort to a policy of neutrality against both Habsburgs and Ottomans in order to defend against the Tartars and the Russians. Yet this was not as easy as it might seem for the Polish kings still had to keep close watch on events to their south lest a third threat develop. It was the task therefore of Sigismund I (1506-1548) and Sigismund II August (1548-1572) to maintain their own balance of power in central Europe between the two antagonists. Thus the territories of Moldavia, and in particular Transylvania, became of some importance. Both had to be

kept at least nominally independent, to prevent either power from gaining too great a foothold on Poland's southern border, and, since it was the Habsburgs who were most interested in taking over Transylvania, it was against the Habsburgs that Polish foreign policy was at first directed. A Polish-Habsburg détente had been worked out in 1515 between Sigismund I and Maximilian I at the Congress of Vienna²⁵ but after the arrival on the scene of Charles and Ferdinand the Poles became wary once more.

The collapse of Hungary was thus of some moment, and Poland for a time became a passive member of the new Franco-Ottoman alliance. The Habsburgs, especially after Ferdinand's swift annexation of Bohemia, were more to be feared than the Turks in Hungary. While Sigismund, as Oscar Halecki suggests, was aware that a total Turkish domination of Hungary could be even more dangerous to Poland, there might be time to prevent that later, and there was always the Tartar problem to consider.²⁶ Sigismund thus supported John Zapolya, gave him refuge in 1527, and allowed him to receive foreign embassies and recruit troops on Polish soil, nor did his interest end in 1528 with Zapolya's return to Hungary. In 1538, after the Treaty of Nagyvarad, Sigismund arranged the marriage of his daughter Isabel to Zapolya in hopes of preventing the treaty from coming into effect, and this marriage successfully destroyed one of the last chances for a peaceful settlement of the Hungarian situation.

For the Poles, like the French and the Turks, the chaos in Hungary was profitable in that it tied down Habsburg troops and money that might have been used elsewhere; it was in Poland's best interests to support Transylvania. Yet it was equally in Poland's best interests to keep the Ottomans out of Moldavia, a state that could be used as a partial shield against the Tartars coming from the south-east. Jan Olbrecht had attempted to annex Moldavia: now in 1531 Sigismund attempted to place his

own candidate as voivode. In 1561 his successor tried again with John Paleologus Basilikos, a Dominican who had become friendly with Melanchthon and converted to Lutheranism. John, espousing the interesting concept of a crusade to recapture Constantinople and erect a Lutheran Byzantine Empire, was then driven out by the Cossack leader Dmitiri Vishnevetsky in 1562, who tried to create his own state in Moldavia.

The Moldavian problem was partially solved in 1595 when the Peace of Cecora between Poland and the Tartar khans established a sort of joint protectorate over Moldavia; but the Poles then had to contend with attempts by the Bathoris in Transylvania and Michael the Brave of Wallachia to seize the country. However, with the Poles constantly equivocating between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, the French alliance could never really include Poland as an integral element. Only when the Habsburgs threatened Hungary would the Poles become hostile to Habsburg interests, and then in a fairly passive manner.

The one chance to alter this state of affairs came with the death of the last Jagellon, Sigismund August, in 1572. The election for kingship was open to all, and both the Habsburgs and their enemies bid for the throne. The two chief claimants were Matthias, son of the Emperor Maximilian II, and Henry, Duc d'Anjou, brother of Charles IX of France; thus the results of the election would place Poland firmly in one camp or the other. Noailles' embassy in Constantinople received instructions to ask the Ottomans to help promote Henry's claim, and Mehmet Sokollu, who had just seen his Caspian Sea project defeated by the Russians, was anxious to have an ally to use against both Moscow and the Habsburgs. There was the prospect of a new balance of power in eastern Europe. French and Turkish persuasions helped the Sjem elect Henry as king in 1573.

His brief reign as king of Poland gives some indication of how affairs might have gone. Henry began at once to bring Poland firmly into the French alliance system. His correspondence contains messages for all nations friendly to France; one letter for example, records the arrival of Dansay, the French ambassador to Denmark, in Poland to negotiate a Polish-Danish alliance,²⁷ while another, written shortly after his accession, is to Selim II, thanking him cordially for his support in the election.²⁸ However, whatever had been planned for the Polish connection fell through when Charles IX died in 1574 and Henry departed, literally by the back door of the palace, to become Henry III of France.

In the second election the Ottomans and French supported Stephen Bathory of Transylvania against Matthias and a half-hearted candidacy by Ivan IV of Russia. They were again successful. Maximilian, fearing the result of a coalition against him, was preparing to establish Matthias on the throne by force when he died in 1576. Renewed domestic troubles in both France and Turkey meant that Bathory was free to direct his foreign policy as he chose, but his highly successful war with Ivan IV must have been regarded with satisfaction in Constantinople.

Bathory's death in 1586 marks the end of Poland as a possible factor in an anti-Habsburg alliance. Royal control over the nobles was already disappearing, and the Swedish prince Sigismund Vasa, elected in 1587, would ultimately come out for the Habsburgs. The Franco-Ottoman alliance ultimately failed in Poland, because of Poland's own territorial problems with the Ottoman Empire and its allies. Yet it is interesting to note that the French never stopped trying to entice Poland into an alliance against the Habsburgs, and the alliances and marriage contracts continued up to the time of Poland's dismemberment.

Napoleon was later to revive the idea of an independent Poland against the Habsburgs and Russia. French efforts in this direction had begun as early as 1524 with Rincon's first mission, and they had certainly solidified by 1528 when the Franco-Ottoman alliance began its support of John Zapolya.

Conclusions

The Turkish invasions exercised a strong distorting force on the history of eastern Europe. The destruction of the medieval states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary and the long confrontation with Austria are major events in European History. In light of the events described, it would seem that the Franco-Ottoman alliance had a certain role to play in that history. Though the alliance of France with the Ottomans has been seen as a desperate measure, and much of the subsequent events as coincidental, an equal case can be made for the theory of France using this opportunity to deliberately open a second front against the Habsburgs.

It is possible to see in the affairs of Hungary in the years following Mohacs the first-hand involvement of France, with a view to promoting an anti-Habsburg faction, and the handing over of that faction to the Ottomans who were better placed to support it. It is possible to see also a sort of reverse escalation developing as Poland, still trying desperately to maintain a neutral position ultimately swung from the Franco-Ottoman axis over to the Habsburg alliance. Whatever the case, it is worth noting that by the end of the sixteenth century western Europe had become united with the east in a single structure of foreign policy and diplomacy, and it is also worth noting the effects of the Franco-Ottoman alliance on that unification.

VIII FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

- 1 Paula Fichtner, Ferdinand I, (New York, 1982), pp. 80-81.
- 2 Ibid., p. 48.
- 3 Johannes Janssen, History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages, trans. A.M. Christie (London, 1910), III, p. 308.
- 4 Stanko Guldescu, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom 1526-1792, (The Hague, 1970), pp. 11-12.
- 5 Fichtner, p. 81.
- 6 Denis Sinor, History of Hungary (London, 1959), p. 154.
- 7 Count Paul Teleki, The Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History (1933, reprint Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1975), p. 49.
- 8 W.H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier (Chicago, 1964), p. 18. McNeill accounts for the collapse of Hungary and the similar defeats of Moldavia and Wallachia in more detail, noting especially the population base and economic factors.
- 9 Armin Vambery, Hungary (1866, reprint Freeport, N.Y., 1972), p. 268.
- 10 Ibid., p. 275. The wording of the act ran: "The recent rebellion, aimed, under the pretext of a crusade, against the whole nobility, and led by a robber chief, has, for all days to come, put the stain of faithlessness on the peasants, and they have thereby forfeited their liberty and become subject to their landlords in unconditional and perpetual servitude. The peasant has no sort of right over his master's land save bare compensation for his labour and such other reward that he may obtain. Every species of property belongs to the landlord, and the peasant has no right to invoke justice and the law against a noble."
- 11 Sinor, p. 142.
- 12 Vambery, p. 258.
- 13 Stanko Guldescu, History of Medieval Croatia (The Hague, 1964), pp. 270-73; The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom (The Hague, 1970), p. 64.
- 14 Guldescu, The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom, pp. 9-10.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
- 16 Ibid., p. 16.

- 17 Ibid., p. 16.
- 18 Guldescu asserts this, citing two Hungarian documents. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on the validity of these sources. Other writers such as Sinor maintain that Zapolya only called on the French and the Turks after Ferdinand's troops had driven him out of Hungary. The Creatsan-Slavanian Kingdom., p. 41.
- 19 J. Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François Ier (Paris, 1908), p. 48. Note that some of this money went on to Hesse.
- 20 Luigi Gritti was the illegitimate son of Andreas Gritti, then Venetian bailo in Constantinople and later Doge. Luigi and his brothers Lorenzo and Giorgio all rose in the sultan's service; Luigi in particular, as purveyor of jewels to Suleyman's court, had access to the highest levels of government. After his appointment to Hungary he seems to have attempted to play the role as kingmaker, disposing of nobles who did not agree with him, and may possibly have been planning to take control for himself; however, in 1534, he was assassinated by the son of one of his former victims.
- 21 Oscar Halecki, A History of Poland (1942, reprint New York, 1966), p. 102.
- 22 "Since common laws and public constitution concern not one person but the whole nation, we have decreed that from now and for ever thereafter nothing new shall be decreed by us or by our successors without the joint consent of the Lords of the Council and the Deputies from the constituencies..." Konrad Syrop, Poland (London, 1968), p. 37.
- 23 McNeill, p. 34.
- 24 Slave-raiding in fact replaced the grain trade as the economic base of Pontic Europe. "Tartar slave-raiding thus constituted a special case of a general phenomenon familiar to economists, whereby in remote regions where transport is the limiting factor upon the exchange of goods, livestock--being both more mobile and more valuable per unit bulk--is more easily manageable than vegetable or mineral products." Ibid., p. 29.
- 25 At the Election Diet of Augsburg the Poles had supported Charles V, and ties were also strengthened when Sigismund married Bona Sforza in 1518.
- 26 Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization (New York, 1952), p. 150.
- 27 Michel François, ed., Lettres de Henri III (Paris, 1950), p. 349.

28 Ibid., pp. 292-93.

IX THE ALLIANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The campaigns of Selim I, the subjugation of Egypt and the defeat of the Safavid Persians at Caldiran, had left Suleyman with a relatively free hand in Europe, and thus from 1521 to 1532 he could personally conduct four major land campaigns in Hungary with only the minor distraction of a revolt in Egypt. From 1532 on, however, eastern problems were constant and pressing. The Safavids, resurgent under Shah Tahmasp, had begun a systematic persecution of orthodox Sunni Moslems, particularly in the area of Baghdad and western Iraq, and the sultan, as defender of Orthodox Islam, was obliged to protect the Sunnites against the Shi'ites of Persia. As well there was the danger that a strong Shi'ite entrenchment in Iraq could be the prelude to a military push into Syria or Eastern Anatolia.

These events developed as the fourth Hungarian campaign bogged down before Guns, and as noted earlier the Ottomans were to undertake no more offensive campaigns against Austria in that century.¹ With the Persian problem growing and the European offensive out of steam, the Ottomans might have become a largely passive force in Europe, and this might in fact have happened if Charles V, seeking to divert attention from Vienna in 1532, had not attempted to divert the Ottomans by sending Andrea Doria and the Genoese-Imperial fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean. The fall of Koron and Lepanto pointed out to Suleyman the weakness of his own fleet and the need for urgent action in the Mediterranean.

The mission of Rincon in 1532, as discussed, arrived too late to prevent the Guns campaign but was nevertheless well timed. The campaign had shown that not only were such long-range operations extremely diffi-

cult, but that a Turkish threat to Germany was about the one thing that could cause the Emperor and the Lutherans to be reconciled and present a united front. Neither of the allies wanted this, and Francis, through Rincon, urged the sultan to turn his attention to the Mediterranean and Italy.

When examining the history of the alliance from 1532-1544, and again in Henry II's reign, one is struck by its lack of real successes, in terms of conquests or gains in territory. The reason for this is quite basic; neither side regarded any Mediterranean objectives as primary. Suleyman was occupied in Persia and in Hungary, Francis in the Low Countries and Burgundy. All actions in the Mediterranean were fairly straight-forward offensive actions at sea, either piracy or formal military operations, which were intended to divert Imperial resources that could be used to better effect elsewhere. Thus Francis attempted several times to seize Milan and Savoy as a bulwark against invasion from the south-east, but his operations after Pavia were never confined exclusively to the Italian front. His aim was to attack the Empire on as many fronts as possible, but his own attention had to be concentrated on the north, where the Habsburg power bases of the Low Countries and Burgundy were uncomfortably close to Paris. The events of 1537 reinforced that lesson. Thus, at no time would the French divert a major portion of their own strength to the Mediterranean.

Ottoman objectives were never so well defined. The fleet, under Barbarossa, was active, but a fleet unsupported by a sizeable land army could do only a limited amount of damage to coastal areas. Only once did a Turkish field force enter the Mediterranean area; its specified aim was to invade Italy, but it made only halting attempts to do so. In light of the almost constant Persian troubles and Habsburg incursions

into Hungary, Suleyman's Mediterranean policy must be seen as mainly preemptive. The raids and incursions of the Ottoman fleet were made in hopes of keeping the Habsburgs and their allies on the defensive, unable to gather and attack Suleyman at their leisure.

Fernand Braudel, despite his concept of the Mediterranean as a separate "world", has remarked that "the major political problems of the dramatic year 1552 were not in the Mediterranean."² The foreign impetus to Mediterranean politics had in fact begun long before, certainly by 1532. For the next twenty years or more political events in the Mediterranean took place almost entirely at the whim of powers whose interests bounded only partly on the Mediterranean. For those political powers still remaining after the Ottoman conquests and the Spanish conquest of much of Italy, it was a time of continued political diminution.

The Papacy

The course of papal relations with the Ottomans from the fall of Constantinople to the middle of the sixteenth century has been described by Hans Pfefferman in Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Turken.³ Pfefferman points out that no pope, despite the many projects of crusade, ever entirely ignored the Turks as a political force. Pius II's letter to Mehmed the Conqueror, urging him to convert to Christianity, may well have been secretly inspired by the thought that Christian Turks could restore papal power to the heights aimed at by the Guelphs. The Guelph-Ghibelline wars had ensured the establishment of the Papacy as a secular political force in Italy, and once the shock

occasioned by the fall of Constantinople had worn off it was only a matter of time before the popes followed the examples of Venice, Naples, Milan, and Florence and entered into negotiations with the Ottomans. There had been dealings with Islamic nations already; after the fall of Constantinople, papal agents had contacted not only Christian rulers in Georgia and Ethiopia but also the Karamanid Turkish sultans, the independant Beys of Sinope, and Uzun Hasan and the White Sheep Turks. It is thus not surprising that when domestic political problems became pressing, Alexander VI would look to Bayezid II for support against the invading French.

It is during the reign of Alexander that the closest papal-Ottoman relations occurred. Alexander took over the custodianship of Bayezid's brother Djem, and Bayezid, alarmed at the rumours that Charles VIII intended to seize Djem, offered Alexander 300,000 ducats to assassinate him in 1494.⁴ Amicable relations continued, and it is worth noting that crusading against the Turks never figured high on Alexander's list of priorities.

The invasion of 1494 meant the end of the Italian balance of power, despite the continuing efforts of Julius II and Leo X to play off one side against the other. Naples and Florence were subjugated by Spain and her allies and Milan became a battleground. The role of the papacy, certainly from the reign of Julius II onwards, in European and Italian politics became somewhat different. Stubbs' comparison of the Habsburg-Valois wars as a see-saw with the pope tipping the balance holds true at least where Italy is concerned.⁵ The pope as a Habsburg ally, or at least determinedly neutral, could help ensure Spanish and Imperial hegemony in Italy: the pope aligned with France meant war in Italy, to the detriment of the Habsburgs and the advantage of both France and the

Ottomans. Not surprisingly, therefore, few Franco-Ottoman endeavours proceeded in the Mediterranean without an attempt to win over the pope.

The popes and the Guelph faction were originally able to take advantage of this. Julius II manipulated the League of Cambrai to enlarge the papal states and humiliate Venice, then joined Venice to avoid too great an accession of power to Spain, and in 1511 joined Spain and Venice to prevent the same happening with France. After the Spanish defeat at Ravenna in 1512 Julius continued to espouse their cause, and in 1513 he re-established the Medici in Florence with Spanish troops.

His successor Leo X continued in the same vein; the famous remark, "God has given us the papacy, let us enjoy it," definitely applies to his political policies.⁶ Initially, faced with a preponderance of Spanish power, he laid plans to overthrow the Spaniards, but he was interrupted by the designs of Francis in Italy. Against the advice of Machiavelli, Leo chose to oppose Francis, bringing down Matthew Schinner, Cardinal of Sion, and the Swiss of the Twelve Cantons to oppose the French army. The result of the two-day battle of Marignano was the defeat of the last papal attempt to hold the balance of power in Italy. Henceforth, as Ranke remarked, "A pope was not so insignificant that he could stay neutral in a strife between...[two greatly superior states], neither was he sufficiently powerful to secure preponderance of that scale into which he should cast his weight, his safety could only be found in the dextrous use of passing events."⁷

The remainder of Leo's reign resembles a man walking a tightrope. The Concordat of Bologna secured the friendship of Francis for the time, but by 1521 papal policy had veered once more and Leo was intriguing with Charles for the recovery of Milan following the French invasion of that year. It is interesting to note that the pronouncements of the Diet

of Worms and Leo's edicts against Luther date from around this time.⁸

The election of 1521 set the tone for papal elections for some time to come. On one side stood Alessandro Farnese, tacitly backed by the French; on the other was Adrian of Utrecht, friend and advisor of Charles V. Adrian's victory seemed to be a symbol of the enforcement of Imperial rule in Italy and the Roman populace was outraged, the Cardinals themselves sacking the Vatican,⁹ there were revolts in Urbino, the Romagna, Bologna, and Siena. Papal-Imperial collusion was all too visible in the War of the Lombard League in 1522 when Italian forces under Pescara and Colonna joined the Germans under George Frundsberg to defeat Lautrec at Biococca.¹⁰ Adrian's death was received with almost universal delight in Italy, and thus another factor is introduced: all popes, except the present one would be Italians. Not only the Guelph heritage, but a general desire to lessen Imperial control over their own lands, would lead many of them to oppose the Empire.

Adrian was succeeded by another Medici, Clement VII. Gregorovius in Rome in the Middle Ages saw Clement's reign as the end of the political power of the papacy as an independent force.¹¹ Clement himself, though recognizing that the papacy had to preserve its independence or be swallowed up like Naples and Milan, was totally incapable of carrying on the policies of Leo. He turned therefore to France, just as France began her own league with the Ottomans, and the new alliance was to exploit Clement's difficulties with considerable skill.

For example, in the formation of the League of Cognac after Pavia, Clement plunged ardently ahead even while Francis was still in prison. He paid for this policy in the summer of 1526 by being left to fight on his own while Francis encouraged him and sat quietly rebuilding his own

power in France. The sack of the Vatican and St. Peter's by Spanish troops under Pompeo Colonna in September, 1526, was but the prelude to the Sack of Rome in May 1527. Clement, barely escaping with his life on both occasions, finally recognized the futility of his policies and became reconciled with the emperor at Bologna. Such a reconciliation, however, meant the end of any chance of increasing papal power in Italy.

Clement attempted for a time to remain neutral, promoting the crusade in defence of Italy and Hungary, but his fear of Charles ultimately proved too great. In 1532 he again entered negotiations with France, and he must have been aware that in doing so he was entering a league that France was currently attempting to form with his chief enemies, England, the Lutherans, and the Ottomans. In 1533, in the same year that Turkish envoys landed in France and French-backed Protestant troops entered Württemberg, Clement cemented Franco-Papal relations by marrying his niece to Francis' son. From the canny political manoeuverings of Julius and Leo the papacy under Clement had become just one more anti-Habsburg element, to be used by France whenever necessary or possible.

To be fair to Clement, who died in the following year, it is difficult to see what else he could have done. The new "superpower" states of France, the Empire, and the Ottomans now hemmed him in on every side, and the chances of the papacy's survival as an independent political force were negligible. Had he remained neutral he might have prevented much bloodshed, particularly the Sack of Rome; as it stands, his adherence to the France-Ottoman alliance hastened the decline of the papacy in Europe.

Alessandro Farnese, who succeeded him as Pope Paul III in 1534, did

first attempt neutrality by turning most of his energies to the religious question. The Pope who introduced the Jesuits, the Inquisition, the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, and the Council of Trent is also the one who helped arrange peace between Charles and Francis at Nice in 1538 by suggesting the settlement of their differences by conciliation. Yet Paul could be and was as politically active as his predecessors, collecting lands and territories for his kinsmen, and the growing power of the Farnese family in Italy did not escape the notice of the emperor. Thus as his reign progressed, he moved further into the French camp to protect his own interests. Ranke remarks ironically that in 1547, while Charles employed a Protestant general to restore papal authority in Germany, the Pope, along with France, was in fact encouraging the Schmalkaldic forces. The French, "pointed out the fact to his notice, that the imperial predominance would be extended to Italy also, and make itself felt in his spiritual affairs as well as those temporal."¹² As the Imperialists turned more and more to Italy after Francis' death and the Protestant defeat at Muhlberg, Paul concentrated on gathering all the anti-Habsburg forces available and only his own caution prevented an all-out war in Italy.¹³

Julius III (1550-55) at first aligned himself with the empire, but once more the erosion of papal authority in the Council of Trent alarmed him and he began swinging into the opposite camp. He did nothing to hinder the uprising in Siena and the revolt, spreading throughout the Maremma by 1555, was backed by French troops under Piero Strozzi and Blaise de Monluc. Paul IV (1555-59) was a violent anti-Imperialist, wholeheartedly supporting both French and Ottomans; more French troops under Guise entered Italy, but the defeat in north France in 1557 caused their recall. Once again, Spanish troops occupied Rome, and the Siene

revolt collapsed shortly thereafter.

With Paul's death ended the last traces of papal ability to support an anti-Imperial faction. The next two popes took no part in the wars of Europe. Pius V (1566-72) again attempted to stir up a crusade, and later Clement VIII (1592-1602) would attempt to turn the Long War in Hungary into a crusade: Clement sent Alexander Komulovic, rector of the South Slav church of San Girolamo in Rome to visit Sigismund Bathory, Michael of Wallachia, the Zaporozhe Cossacks, and Tsar Fyodor of Moscow in 1593-94, attempting to form a new Holy League.¹⁴

The political alliances of the papacy depended strongly on the character and family alliance of the pope then in office, but, while there was no continuous policy, a general trend can be marked. Pro-Imperial popes almost always attempted to remain neutral, while pro-French popes were eager to go to war regardless of the fact of alliance with heretics and infidels. These popes were encouraged by France, where Francis and Henry attempted where possible to make the papacy dependent on France for support against the emperor. The result for the papacy, especially as France was seldom willing to run any risks to support her ally, was catastrophic. Temporal and spiritual authority both declined as the popes were not strong enough to take their place militarily in such an alliance and were repeatedly defeated. Neither Clement VII nor Paul III nor Paul IV ever realized that for France, all operations in Italy were basically diversionary, and France was never willing to support the papacy at its own cost. The essential mistake of the popes was to fail to recognize that the political power of the papacy no longer had a place in Europe.

The Knights of St. John

The Papacy, through its dogged maintenance of Guelph policies in spite of the demonstrated futility of such policies and the urgent need for reformation, had often adhered to the Franco-Ottoman alliance and in doing so had ruined its own power. An interesting corollary to the papal policy is that of the Knights of St. John: also a religious power, also dedicated to the defence of the faith, the Knights preferred instead to sacrifice their own independence in order to continue the fight against the Turks.

The Knights of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem were a military religious order, with origins dating to pre-crusader Palestine. Their expulsion from the Holy Land in 1291 saw them re-established in Rhodes, not as knights in the traditional sense but as sea-rovers, preying on Moslem shipping and raiding the coastlines. Two Ottoman attempts to dislodge them from Rhodes failed, but a third in 1522 was successful, and the Knights under Villiers de l'Isle Adam were for the moment homeless. From that moment on, their chances of survival as an independent power were non-existent. The Grand Master knew this, and thus he appealed for support from some larger power.

The entire reason for a military religious order to exist was the fight against the infidel, and the consequences of failure to continue this mission could be disaster. The powerful Templars had been brutally suppressed just twenty years after the fall of Acre. The Teutonic Knights had declined in power and in 1525 the Prussian commanderies had succumbed to Protestantism. In Spain after the end of the reconquista the orders of Alcanatara, Calatrava, and Santiago had gradually faded away. Villiers de l'Isle Adam's appeals to the Papacy and to Francis

thus had a great deal of urgency; if the Knights did not find a new home from which to fight the Turks they would disappear entirely. Already in Poland many of the commanderies were following the example of the Teutonic Knights and going over to Lutheranism.¹⁵

However, in 1530, Charles V offered the Knights Malta and Tripoli with the obligation to defend these two ports and check the growing power of Barbarossa. The price, as is well-known, was homage to the emperor and payment of a falcon annually. The decision proved to be a wise one. The forces of the Knights were small; at the siege of Malta in 1565, for example, La Valette could muster only 474 members of the Order,¹⁶ and only three Maltese galleys were present at Lepanto.¹⁷ Yet the Knights' formidable military skill gave them a reputation in the Mediterranean far beyond their size. In 1535 they played a key role in the capture of Tunis; in 1551 the Turkish expedition into the western Mediterranean was deflected instead against Malta and Tripoli, and was repulsed in the first case. In 1564 Maltese corsairs under the Chevalier de Romegas were striking as far as Alexandria, capturing Moslem pilgrim vessels and ships belonging to the court,¹⁸ and the retaliation in 1565, an all-out attack of Malta, resulted in a severe Turkish defeat: the loss of trained seamen and gunners at Malta may have affected Ottoman operations for several years to come.

Yet the Knights' actual strength was far too small to interfere with major Turkish fleet movements. Like the papacy, their power had become almost an anachronism, and only through a firm reliance on Spain, whose Sicilian galleys could come quickly to the rescue, could the Order preserve itself. The Knights had to join one of the two armed camps, and their religious ideals precluded any alliance with the Turks.

An interesting closing note regarding the Knights is the fact that a large portion of their membership was in fact French. Villiers de l'Isle Adam, Didier de St.-Jaille, Claude de la Sengle, and Jean de la Valette, grand masters in the sixteenth century, were all in the difficult position of being dedicated to fight their homeland's chief ally on behalf of its chief enemy. The problem lay in the fact that any severe defeat of the Turks could lead to France withdrawing its support of the Order. Such a situation was not without precedent; Philip the Fair had suppressed the Templars in the best interests of France and more recently Henry VIII had dissolved the Order in England. Even the Spanish grand master Juan de Homédes respected this fact, and the Knights never interfered with regular Ottoman movements that were connected with French plans, expending their energies instead on raiding the corsair havens of North Africa.¹⁹ The Franco-Ottoman alliance seriously hampered the policies and power of the Knights.

Venice

A somewhat different case was Venice, still a major power and the foremost trading nation in the Mediterranean. Unlike the papacy and the Knights of St. John, Venice had no ideological commitments at all. "Venetians, first, Christians only afterwards," had been the Republic's motto throughout the Middle Ages, and the Venetians continually maintained their own interests before those of the rest of Christianity. Those interests dealt almost exclusively with trade and economic necessity.

The Ottoman empire had expanded at the expense of the commercial empire of Venice. Mehmed II's policy of securing the economic hinterland

of Constantinople had meant for Venice the loss of her Black Sea and Aegean colonies, particularly Negroponte, and the war with Bayezid caused the loss of most of the Morea ports and some of Dalmatia and Albania as well.

The problems facing Venice as the sixteenth century dawned were manifold. Best-known is the alarm over the Portugese arrival in India and the return of Cabral's spice fleet in 1501 with cargoes of pepper; there was desperation in Venice for some time as the Portugese blockade of the Indian Ocean routes cut into the spice trade through Alexandria.²⁰ The Ottoman conquest of Egypt promised to restore this situation, but it also meant that the Venetian luxury trade in silks and spices was now conducted entirely through Ottoman middlemen in Alexandria, Aleppo, and Constantinople. Closure of these ports in time of war meant the ruin of trade.

More vital was the grain trade, a necessity for Venice whose terrafirma, vulnerable to attack from the rest of Italy and from Germany, could not be counted on to feed the city. "Venice throughout her history was, inevitably, largely dependent on imported food and the maintenance of the corn supply was to her a matter of greater importance than the politics or faith of the power which at any given moment controlled the grain-producing lands or the grain-exporting harbours."²¹

Grain could be purchased in Naples and Sicily, and often was,²² but the government in those lands was apt to divert supplies to other imperial holdings. Grain could be shipped from the remaining Venetian possessions in the Levant, Crete and Cyprus, or shipped directly from Egypt, but for this to be possible a state of peace with the Ottomans had to be maintained. So, the policy of Venice after 1500 was peace with

the Ottomans at almost any price. Horatio Brown describes how

...the Venetian envoy was called upon to steer his perilous course. He was expected to preserve the peace, to persuade the Turk that the balance of sea-power in the Mediterranean...lay with Venice, to prove to the Turks that the Republic could rely on the support of Europe, and, while preventing the sultan from thinking that she would join a Christian coalition against him, yet to convince him that she could do so if she chose. To support him in the delicate mission the bailo had little that was solid at his back.²³

In the war of 1499-1503 the French and Spanish fleets had indeed given Venice some support off the Morea, but the Italian states had unanimously urged Bayezid on against Venice.

On the other hand, the war of the League of Cambrai and the near-total defeat of Agnadello in 1509 had taught Venice the necessity of a low profile in European politics. Though by 1517 most of the terrafirma had been recovered²⁴ and the disaster repaired (at about the same time as the spice trade began to show signs of recovery), the Venetians had learned their error. On receiving the news of the Battle of Pavia, Doge Andrea Gritti remarked, "I rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep." Though Venice joined the League of Cognac, like France she maintained a fairly passive role during 1527 and following the Paix des Dames concluded her own peace with the Empire.

If the Venetians regarded the Ottomans as a dangerous necessity, the Ottoman attitude to Venice was very similar. Venetian naval power was still formidable, and, when combined with that of other western powers, it was still more than a match for the Ottoman navy. The Ottomans needed to reduce the power of Venice to prevent the Habsburgs

from acquiring a powerful ally. France regarded the problem somewhat differently in that Ottoman strength spent in attacking Venice did no damage to the Habsburgs. French diplomacy therefore concentrated on manoeuvring Venice out of any Ottoman war in which she became involved, and preferably to the detriment of Venice, for if Venetian strength could be crippled by diplomatic means the Republic would become both less of a threat to the Ottomans and less of an aid to the Habsburgs.

The best example of this was probably the war of 1536-40, a war which Venice neither wanted nor asked for. Though sympathetic to French anti-Habsburg interest, Venice had not joined France's new league. The Franco-Ottoman alliance had just turned to the Mediterranean, and Barbarossa had expelled Doria from Koron and then had gone on to take Tripoli, which he lost to Charles in 1535. La Forêt had concluded the Capitulations with Turkey in 1536, preparing a new alliance against the Habsburgs. In the same year Suleyman also advised the Republic that it might like to join the alliance. "If Venice were to accept [Suleyman] would have her active help in acquiring an insuperable position in the central Mediterranean from which he could subsequently bring her to her knees; if she were to refuse it would give him a useful pretext for immediate war against her."²⁵

When Venice refused, Suleyman moved 200,000 men into Albania in 1537 where, for reasons discussed earlier, he first meditated on an attack on Naples and then turned the bulk of his force on Corfu. This powerful fortress was the key to the Adriatic;²⁶ its possession would enable the Ottomans to hamper Venetian shipping to a degree, and probably only the advent of bad weather saved the defenders from what would have been a very serious defeat for Venice.²⁷

Due largely to the efforts of Pope Paul III, who mediated a peace

settlement between Francis and Charles, a Holy League of Venice, Genoa, the Empire and the papacy was formed, which in 1538 sent out a fleet under Doria to confront Barbarossa's renewed activity off western Greece, but the result was the defeat of Prevesa. Antonio Rincon in Constantinople then began, on Francis' instructions, working to conclude a peace between Venice and the Ottomans. He was in contact with Guillaume Pellicier in Venice, through intermediaries in Ragusa, and thus learned of the despatch of the Venetian envoy Contarini to Constantinople in 1540, with a complicated set of instructions for bargaining. Pellicier passed these instructions on to Rincon, who in turn informed the viziers. Contarini, all his bargaining power gone, was forced to conclude a very disadvantageous peace which took Venice out of the war and surrendered her last possessions in the Morea and the Aegean.²⁸

Braudel notes that the Persian and Portugese wars for a time diverted Turkish strength away from the Mediterranean after 1544; in 1553 for example, Dragut only mustered sixty galleys in support of the French attack on Corsica.²⁹ But in the late 1560's the Turks returned to the Mediterranean in force. Once again, in 1570, the Ottomans had the chance to cripple Venice and once again the French ambassador to Constantinople, Noailles, quickly negotiated Venice out of the war with the surrender of Cyprus.³⁰

It is difficult to state when the decline of Venice as a power began. Many factors contributed, and many of them were linked together. The overthrow of the Italian balance of power and the defeat of Agnadello is one point. Turkish aggression and the loss of Negroponte, the Morea, and Cyprus is another: the rise of ocean-going commerce and the invasion of the Mediterranean by English and Dutch ships is a third.

France was bound up in all of these. French troops fought at Agnadello, French diplomacy abetted Ottoman military force in the reduction of Venetian power in the Levant, and the French power in Turkey was an example for the English and the Dutch to follow.

The struggle between the Habsburgs and the Franco-Ottoman axis would not admit the type of neutrality that Venice desired. Admittedly the choice was hard; siding with the French would have exposed the terrafirma to Imperial attacks, as the example of the papacy had already shown, while siding with the Empire against the Ottomans could only lead to the loss of trade and the stoppages of grain and other commodities. The fact that Venice by the end of the century was experiencing a trade recovery shows that the doges and diplomats had done quite a creditable job of preserving the republic, but the fact remains, as Braudel has indicated, that Venice would never again be the dominant power in the Mediterranean.³¹ When describing the decline of Venice, the impact of the Franco-Ottoman alliance must not be overlooked.

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- 2 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949, reprint New York, 1976), II, p. 925.
- 3 Hans Pfefferman, Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Turken (Winterthur, 1946).
- 4 The message and agent were intercepted near Ancona by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, later Julius II, who was probably in French pay. Djem was to die of natural causes, but this did not prevent Alexander from attempting to claim the reward anyway. Sydney N. Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512 (Urbana, IL, 1848), p. 46.
- 5 Willian Stubbs, Lectures on European History (London, 1902), p. 8.
- 6 Christopher Hibbert, The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici (London, 1981), p. 218.
- 7 "The conclusion of a treaty with one party need offer no obstacle to the conclusion of another in the opposite sense with his opponent." Leopold von Ranke, History of the Popes trans. E. Foster (London, 1856), Vol. I, p. 64.
- 8 It is generally accepted that Leo urged Charles to punish Luther; however, Ranke's view is that the edict against Luther was part of the alliance of 1521. Leo was certainly not generally anxious for scrutiny of religious questions, as his side-tracking of the Fifth Lateran Council onto the issue of crusade demonstrates. Ibid., p. 65.
- 9 "Gonzaga thanked the bystanders for resting satisfied with contemptuous speeches instead of avenging the public disgrace by throwing stones." Gregorovius, History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages (New York, 1967), VIII, pt. 2, p. 418, p. 424.
- 10 Adrian had made the fatal mistake of admitting to Christian abuses within the church in order to establish a more honest footing for a plan of crusade. This not only offended almost all of the College of Cardinals, but also proved a considerable aid to the reformers in Germany.
- 11 Gregorovius, VIII, pt. 2, p. 702.
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- 13 Ibid., pp. 199-202.
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- 16 Whitworth Porter, A History of the Knights of Malta (London, 1858), p. 70.
- 17 Ibid., p. 170.
- 18 Francisco Balbi di Corregio, The Siege of Malta, trans. Ernle Bradford (London, 1965), pp. 28-29.
- 19 Though, after Tripoli, Homédes accused several French knights of treason, imprisoned Villier, the commander of Tripoli, and refused to let d'Aramon enter Grand Harbour. See Nicolas de Nicolay, The Navigations into Turkie (1588, reprint Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 20-29.
- 20 Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973), p. 290.
- 21 Dorothy M. Vaughn, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700. (Liverpool, 1954), p. 5.
- 22 In 1569, for example, 500 Venetian merchants bought grain in Apulia. Braudel, I, p. 391.
- 23 Horatio Brown, Studies in the History of Venice (New York, 1973), II, p. 36.
- 24 W.H. McNeill, Venice, the Hinge of Europe (Chicago, 1974), p. 124.
- 25 John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice (London, 1983), p. 451.
- 26 Braudel, I, p. 110. In 1572 Corfu reportedly had 700 pieces of artillery.
- 27 Norwich, p. 452.
- 28 Ibid., p. 455. Pellicier bribed two Venetian secretaries of state to get the informaion.
- 29 Braudel, II, p. 907; p. 928.
- 30 The Cypriot War is chronicled by George Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge, 1972), III, pp. 878-1041.
- 31 Braudel, I, p. 393.

X THE ALLIANCE AND THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

The object of Francis' thirty-two years of military struggle and diplomatic manoeuvring was the defeat of the Habsburg power of the Kingdom of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, combined after 1519 in the person of the Emperor Charles V. This conflict was almost inevitable, given the nature of the emperor himself. Heir to the traditions of the medieval empire, the courtly chivalry of Burgundy, the pious humanism of the Netherlands, and the crusading ideals of the Spanish reconquista, Charles saw himself as the chief protector and defender of the Catholic faith and the universal Christian ideal. To his enemies, however, his power was a constant menace, and his ideas on Christian unity threatened the growing concept of national states both within and without the empire. It was on this basis that Charles and Francis collided, and from this point that many of the wars and alliances of the sixteenth century proceeded.

The debate on Charles has lasted well beyond his time, and opinions of him range from the attacks of Robertson--"Ambition, not generosity was the ruling passion in his mind"¹-- to the defence of the Bishop of Oxford, who maintains Charles deserves the accolade of greatness.² But on one point at least there seems no disagreement; Charles' attempts to realize his ideas were not successful.

How far he may have intended to carry his policies is also a matter for debate. Gattinara, the most strongly imperial in outlook of all his counsellors, wrote to him in 1519, "God has set you on a path towards a world monarchy, you will unite Christendom under one yoke,"³ but the chances of his doing so were remote. If his power was great it was also greatly feared. If Gattinara and others saw "a God-given opportunity,

holding out the promise of universal peace and unity among all Christians and Christianized heathen, [it] appeared to his enemies as a sinister quest for universal domination."⁴ His very existence could be constituted as a direct challenge to an ambitious monarch such as Francis I. His territories marched with those of France on every border, and he claimed many territories also claimed by France, Flanders and Artois, Franche-Comte, Milan and Genoa, and Navarre. Nor is it surprising that, given the character of the French monarch, France should respond to the challenge and fight Charles nearly continuously throughout his reign.

From the first to the last of his reign, Charles was on the defensive. At the Diet that elected him he had to defend his previously assured candidacy against Francis. At his first Imperial Diet, at Worms, religious unrest in Germany coincided with popular revolt in Spain, the Comuneros and the germania of Valencia. Luther was summoned to the Diet and appeared on April 17. Suleyman's forces were preparing for an assault on Belgrade, and a Hungarian envoy, reinforced by the warnings of Ferdinand, was begging for aid. France was attacking Milan once more, and the Diet was not enthusiastic about helping Charles recover it, nor were they willing to pay to support a Reichsregiment or council of regency in the emperor's absence.⁵ The dangerous popular revolt of Hutten and Sickingen was already brewing. It is hardly surprising that Charles failed to give his full attention to any of these matters, and the Hungarian envoy in particular was dismissed empty-handed.

"God's standard bearer," he called himself at Tunis, purported as the opening of a holy war against the Turks, yet even this was a defensive counter-measure prompted by the new threat of Barbarossa.⁶ The formidable military power of his Spanish veterans, backed up by German

and Italian mercenaries, could usually give him victory in the field, but there was seldom enough money to pay for their near constant maintenance. Seven Perus, wrote the chancellor Granvelle in 1535, would not suffice to pay for the defence of Lombardy; between then and 1538 the Spanish treasury sent a million ducats to Lombardy.⁷ "In 1538, after the debts incurred in his French, North African, and German campaigns, the budget revealed that the prospective revenue for the next four years would not even meet the ordinary expenses of government, much less the campaign planned against the Turks."⁸ Taxation throughout all of his domains thus rose steeply; in the small German state of Lippe the expected contribution rose from 20 florins and a contingent of troops in 1489 to 375 florins in 1530,⁹ while rising taxes in the Netherlands caused revolts in Ghent and Brussels. Close behind religion and nationalism as sources of popular discontent came the rising burden of taxes; among others, the sharp increase in the Turk tax was responsible for the German outbreaks of 1525.¹⁰

Thus, while Francis could concentrate on external diplomacy to try and break the ring of Habsburg encirclement and open up a second front against the Empire, the politics of Charles were almost entirely internally directed, attempting to muster his own resources to defeat his various combinations of enemies. His external policies were aimed mainly at attempting to split the enemy's forces; in Mattingly's words, "if the emperor could only put off enough of his difficulties so that he could deal with them one at a time, he might find the strength to master them. The tactical role of Charles V's diplomacy was therefore reduced to fighting delaying actions, keeping existing contacts, winning time."¹¹ So efforts following the Sack of Rome were aimed at conciliating the Pope and returning him to the pro-Imperial camp; efforts from 1537 on were aimed

at influencing Venice to stay in the Ottoman war and maintaining a balance of seapower against the Ottomans;¹² and from 1540 on the Imperialists were concerned with keeping England away from France and thus in the process neutralizing Scotland. Policies of aggressive force were only occasionally attempted. The attacks on Tunis in 1535 and Algiers in 1541, heralded as crusades, were in fact attempts to cripple Turkish seapower and isolate France.

Curiously, Charles was already suspecting French involvement with the Turks as early as the siege of Rhodes. In a letter of August 25, 1522, he stated his anxiety over the safety of Sicily and Naples if Rhodes were to fall, and asked that the forces granted by the Diet of Worms be diverted to a campaign to rescue Rhodes. He concluded by referring to the "French Turks"; "If only the Turks were not stimulated and encouraged in their undertakings by those who are the real authors of all the evil and who are delivering up Christendom to perdition."¹³ Whatever the truth of his allegations against Francis on this occasion, it is evident that the French king made a bid to be elected King of the Romans in 1524, making overtures to the Elector of Brandenburg on the subject. Then in the next year occurred Pavia and the Turkish alliance.

The point need not be laboured any further. It is evident that the empire of Charles V succeeded in few, if any, of its aims, and among the primary causes for this failure should be numbered the activities of Francis I. How he used his military strength and in particular his network of diplomatic alliances can best be seen by an example inside the empire itself, the French and Turkish backing of the Protestant princes.

The Protestants

It is quite widely accepted that the Ottoman threat in central Europe was a major factor in the political success of the Reformation. The Emperor, in order to deal with external threats, repeatedly had to make internal concessions. "The consolidation, expansion, and legitimizing of Lutheranism in Germany by 1555 should be attributed to Ottoman imperialism more than to any other single factor,"¹⁴ wrote Stephen Fischer-Galati in Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, and he detailed how the princes exploited every such opportunity that came, refusing to grant aid to the emperor or to Ferdinand unless their demands were met. Virtually every major act of the Reformation can be connected to an external crisis: The Recess of Speyer in 1526, the Religious Peace of Nurnberg in 1532, the Compact of Cadan in 1534, the Declaration of Regensburg in 1541, the Recess of Speyer in 1542, the Peace of Passau in 1552, and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 can all be connected to actions of the Ottomans and the French.

What Fischer-Galati does not mention in detail is the fact that this relationship was not one-sided. The Ottomans, through the intermediary powers of France and Transylvania, could concert actions and plan their own offensives for times when religious trouble was reaching a head, and both forces thereby profited from the necessary division of Habsburg strength. This scenario was to be repeated frequently throughout the reign of Charles V.

This is all particularly interesting in light of the Lutheran theological view of the Turk as the scourge of God, a divine punishment inflicted on sinful Christendom and a forerunner of the Apocalypse. This particular idea of the Turk had gained considerable credence after the

fall of Constantinople and the nearly simultaneous introduction of the printing press. One of the earliest specimens of printing, from Mainz in 1454, is a copy of the indulgence of Nicholas V in 1451 to raise money for a crusade. Various Turchenbuchlein proliferated in Germany in particular through the last part of the fifteenth and the early years of the sixteenth centuries, most relating some form of the tradition of the Turks as the menace of the Apocalypse, to be eventually conquered or destroyed by the emperor in preparation for the final judgement. Most, it should be noted, used this form to mount attacks on the abuses of the church, whose sins were increasingly considered responsible for the visitation.¹⁵

A different approach is that of the Turkenspiel of Hans Rosenbluet of Nurnberg, a carnival play in which the sultan appears, "not as a bloodthirsty conqueror but as one sent...in answer to the complaint of the downtrodden peasant and harassed merchant."¹⁶ Most, however, as the Turkish advance continued, still saw the Ottomans as adversaries and were concerned with military action. In 1523 Hartmut von Kronberg wrote that secularization of church wealth would create enough money to finance a crusade, and the same idea was repeated in 1530 by Hoogstraten, chancellor of the Netherlands.¹⁷ Others foresaw a Utopian world to come; Hans Hergot's On the New Transformation of a Christian Life in 1527 states that the peasant uprisings of 1525 were intended as God's punishments, but, since this had not been recognized, he had sent the Turks instead to destroy the wicked among men.¹⁸ In 1521, Muntzer's Prague Manifesto had threatened much the same.

Thus this concept was fairly entrenched by the time Martin Luther appeared on the scene. His theme in the Resolutions Disputing the Virtue of Indulgences, published at Heidelberg in 1518, that "to fight the Turk

is to resist the will of the Lord, who visits our sins with such rods," was nothing new, and was merely one of a series of arguments which Luther used in his attacks on the papacy.¹⁹ By 1529, the year of the siege of Vienna, Luther had formulated his ideas on the Turks more clearly. The Turk was the "Final Gog and Magog," in a letter to Wencelas Link in that year, "to...perish, together with his companion, the Pope." In The War Against the Turk and Army Sermon Against the Turk, both of 1529, Luther makes the Turks a part of his own apocalyptic vision: the appearance of the Turk is foretold, he maintained, in the seventh chapter of Daniel.²⁰ His lead in this was widely followed, notably by Justas Jonas, a theology professor at Wittenberg, with his work The Seventh Chapter of Daniel. While continuing to maintain that no one should respond to papal calls for crusade, Luther was adamant that the Turks should be resisted, to the death if necessary, and he fully supported imperial efforts against the Ottomans. He was also scathing in reference to the French. In 1542 he referred to Francis as "His Most Turkish Majesty": "so the king is called Most Christian because he put many Christians to death."²¹

This is in contrast to the attitudes of both Lutherans and Calvinists in Hungary where, because of Ottoman toleration, one writer in 1545 was to describe the Ottoman conquest as "a special mercy of God."²² It is in even more sharp contrast to the attitudes of the Lutheran princes, particularly men such as Landgrave Philip of Hesse, who helped to organize the Schmalkaldic League in 1531 in the hopes of just such a Turkish threat as appeared in the next year.

French involvement in Germany dates from 1519, and its inception was not auspicious. Most of the powers at the time backed Charles in the imperial election; German bankers such as the Fuggers refused to give

credit to French agents, and Bonnavet, their chief, was hunted by the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, the consequences of the Diet of Worms meant that the Protestant faction was placed in definite opposition to the Habsburgs. While they had no religious affinity, the Protestants had much in common politically with both France and the Ottomans. France in particular was involved with the German princes even before the Turkish alliance, particularly with Ulrich, the outlawed Duke of Württemberg.²³ The Battles of Pavia and Mohacs altered the situation still further; France needed fresh allies to take up the struggle once more, and the Ottomans, through their new client state of Transylvania, were now directly in conflict with the Habsburgs themselves.

In 1526 the League of Torgau, which would later evolve into the Schmalkaldic League, was formed between Hesse and Saxony. Philip of Hesse in particular sought a variety of allies. He received Ulrich of Württemberg, then in the service of the French, allied with the Zwinglian Protestant faction in Zurich, with whom Ulrich was also connected, and in 1528 he applied as well to John Zapolya of Transylvania. At about the same time as Rincon was negotiating with Zapolya and Laski was in Constantinople, Philip's emissary Otto Pack visited Zapolya in Poland and came away with a promise of 20,000 florins monthly for military support, money derived from French and Turkish subsidies.²⁴

To follow the military and political manoeuvrings of the Schmalkaldic League through its history and to relate each movement to Franco-Ottoman pressures would require an entire work of its own. The point need not be laboured. It should also be noted that such negotiations were not necessarily common only to the Protestant princes. In 1531, as Philip of Hesse was beginning to develop his "no aid without concessions" policy with regard to French and Turkish attacks on the

empire, Zapolya's agent Minckwitz was in Bavaria and the duke's envoy Kresdorfer was in Transylvania, proposing a league for the purposes of driving the Habsburgs simultaneously out of Bohemia, Hungary and Württemberg, "and if necessary to make use of Turkish help for the purpose."²⁵ With the conquest of Württemberg achieved the German princes thus negotiated the Peace of Cadan in 1534, to the irritation of Francis, Zapolya and Suleyman.²⁶

Even Jean Calvin, forced into exile from France by the Sorbonne in 1533, acted as a French agent in Germany. Through his sister Marguerite de Navarre,²⁷ Francis had excellent connections within French reformist circles, when he chose to use them, and in 1540, as Rincon returned from Constantinople to prepare for the next war, Francis, through Marguerite, contacted Johannes Sleidan of Cologne, later historian of the Schmalkaldic League. Sleidan in turn recruited Calvin. Sleidan, Calvin and Johann Sturm of Strasbourg were all at the religious conference of Hagenau in 1540, urging Hesse and Saxony to adopt a new anti-Imperial alliance.²⁸

During the war that followed the League repeatedly obtained sweeping concessions from Ferdinand and Charles, and not until peace had been reached, with France in 1544 at Crespy and with Turkey in 1545 at Adrianople, could Charles deal effectively with the League. Francis again attempted to take advantage of the Schmalkaldic War, and on March 21, 1547, ten days before his death, promised two hundred thousand thalers to the Elector of Saxony and informed them that both he and the Sultan would undertake campaigns against the empire. Possibly d'Aramon's mission to Constantinople was to arrange such a plan.²⁹ Even after the Battle of Muhlberg and the defeat of the League forces, Henry II continued to encourage and subsidize Philip of Hesse.

By the following year he was negotiating with the princes of Württemberg and Brunswick-Lüneburg and in 1549 he opened further negotiations with the Markgraf of Brandenburg, who was also sending agents to England, Poland, Denmark, and Maurice of Saxony. It was through his agency that by 1550 Maurice was in personal contact with France and Markgraf Albert was urging an immediate assault on the emperor.³⁰ French agents at the Diet of Augsburg that year included not only Sleidan and Sturm but Charles de Marillac, former ambassador to Istanbul and London, and their efforts led in 1551 to the League of Chambord between Maurice and Henry. At the same time Aramon was returning to Constantinople with fresh plans for the sultan, and in 1552 the sultan wrote directly to Maurice, encouraging him with the news of a forthcoming attack on Germany.³¹ This in fact never materialized, and after the Protestant victory and the Peace of Passau, Maurice's forces even campaigned for a time against the Turks in Hungary. There was a difference, it seemed, between cooperation at secondhand through France or Transylvania, and direct cooperation with the scourge of God; the later example of François de la Noue in France would demonstrate this again.

There is one more incident that might indicate a Protestant-Turkish contact. The patriarchs of Constantinople were appointed directly by the sultan, and on two occasions the Protestant leaders had contact with the patriarchs. In 1558 Melanchthon wrote to Patriarch Joasaph; in 1576 Lutheran agents Jacob Andreae and Martin Crusius visited Patriarch Jeremiah in Constantinople.³² Though interesting, these contacts probably did no more than provide the Lutherans with intelligence regarding the Turks and the Orthodox church. Lutheran theology was too much imbued with the concept of the Turk as anti-Christ for informal

relations to be considered.

But the Lutheran politicians were ready nonetheless to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Ottomans and France and the consequent pre-occupation of Charles and Ferdinand with foreign affairs to seize more and more concessions either by extortion or by force. Through Zwinglian Basel, through Calvin and his friends in Strasbourg, through various Lutheran agents and princes, France supported the Reformation and indirectly aided Zapolya and the Sultan to do the same thing. If the Ottomans made up one part of the French combination against the empire, the Protestants comprised another, dangerously placed within the heart of the empire itself.

The Alliance against Philip II

The combination proved to be one that the empire was never able to surmount. After each war, though often defeated in the field, France remained whole and intact and was able to begin forming a new coalition. Thus, after Francis' death, Henri II leagued with Maurice of Saxony in 1551 and Turkish galley fleets appeared once more in the western Mediterranean. Imperial retaliation resulted in the bloody siege of Metz, November 1552 to January 1553, where the French defenders under Guise repulsed Charles with heavy loss. "Imperial policy collapsed. The Emperor even lost confidence in himself. It was as though Heaven had deserted him."³³ Not long after Metz, he began considering abdication, and he was eventually succeeded by his son Philip in the Spanish portion of his dominions.

Philip's dominions, though minus the German territories of the empire, were still great, including the Netherlands, Burgandy, and most

of Italy. Like his father he believed in the primacy of house, less in the universal scheme than in a sort of Spanish hegemony which would lead Europe rather than control it directly.³⁴ Perhaps for that reason he used his power far more vigorously than Charles for the suppression of anti-Catholic dissidents in his own realm. He seems to have implicitly believed what Juan de Santa Maria wrote of him: "He that is good and just is a God upon earth, and from thence is the name of King derived unto him, and is His Vicar in all causes for to maintain his subjects in justice and truth by his empire and command."³⁵

In fact, Philip, like his father, was to find his reign hampered repeatedly by internal revolt and financial crises. The first of these occurred in 1558, precipitating banking crashes in Antwerp and Genoa and the first Spanish state bankruptcy, and this, as much as the military stalemate following Saint-Quentin, prompted the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis and the end of what had become known as the Habsburg-Valois wars. He was also faced by the growing problem of the North African corsairs; Dragut was operating out of Djerba, and Uluj Ali and Barbarossa's son Hassan had established themselves in Algiers, and they took Tripoli in 1551 and Bougie in 1555. An attempt to reestablish the line of presidios, the North African fortresses, met with immediate failure when Medina Celi's attack of Djerba failed with the loss of thirty ships and 15,000 men. This loss meant that Spain was suddenly very vulnerable in the Mediterranean.

Philip was thus fortunate that his enemies were unable to take advantage of his position. France was the throes of the first Wars of Religion, and the Ottomans, in Suleyman's declining years, were relatively quiescent. Not until 1565 did they move in the Mediterranean and then it was against the Knights of Malta. On this occasion Turkish

ambassadors came to France to ask for the use of a French port in revictualling the fleet.³⁶ No help was given, however, and the Turks were repulsed with heavy loss including the death of Dragut.³⁷

The siege of Malta, however, had the effect of heightening international tensions once more. Spanish troops had fought on the island, and anti-Turkish feeling was running high in Spain after the disaster of Djerba. This feeling quickly centred on the Moriscos, who were suspected of being in collusion with the Algerines and the Ottomans, and a spy incident in 1565 added to this feeling. In 1567 the Moors rose in a revolt that would occupy Spanish forces for the next two years. This time international intervention in the situation was prompt. Hassan and Uluç Ali sent 4,000 men and some ships to support the revolt and themselves seized Tunis from Spain.³⁸ In Turkey the new sultan Selim II and his vizier Mehmed Sokollu also sent arms and troops and, guessing that Spain would be unable to support Venice, prepared to invade the Venetian territory of Cyprus.

Events in the Mediterranean coincided with further Spanish setbacks elsewhere. In 1566 the Dutch Calvinists had finally risen in open revolt and though the arrival of Alva and 10,000 troops in Antwerp the following year suppressed the initial violence the problem did not disappear. Overseas, clashes with English and French forces in the New World caused a deterioration in relations with those nations just as they were beginning to reemerge onto the diplomatic scene.³⁹

In France many of the extremists on both sides were now dead, and it looked as if there was a chance for civil peace. The Protestant court party led by Coligny convinced Charles IX that involvement in a foreign war with Spain might provide some measure of national unity. The

policies of Francis were revived. Coligny opened negotiations with the Dutch, while Catherine de Médici corresponded with Elizabeth of England, and in 1571 the grand embassy of François de Noailles attempted to reactivate the Turkish alliance.

For the next few years political events moved in very much the pattern of the wars of Francis and Charles. France, the Ottomans, the Moors and the Dutch were able to combine together very effectively. Ottoman contacts in western Europe were excellent, not only with France: Sokollu was in touch with the Moors, while Joseph Nasi had resided in both Spain and Antwerp and had contacts. Particularly in the latter Nasi received an envoy from William the Silent in 1569.⁴⁰ Thus the seizure of Cyprus was planned in the expectation that no effective counter-measures could be organized, and Girolamo Zane's relief expedition of 1570 did indeed fail.

The Morisco revolt was crushed by 1570, and Pope Pius IV proceeded to bully Philip into joining the latest Holy League against the Turks by threatening to cut off the cruzada, the 400,000 ducat annual subsidy still enjoyed by the kings of Spain.⁴¹ Philip thus instructed Don John of Austria and the Spanish fleet to join the navies of Venice, the Papacy, and the Knights of St John and on October 7, 1571, the combined forces defeated the Ottoman navy at Lepanto. This victory proved to have little significant result, as Cyprus was not saved, and Uluj Ali was cruising with more than two hundred galleys off the Morea in the following spring.⁴²

The respite afforded to Spain was thus a brief one. In May of 1572 Dutch Calvinist corsairs descended on Brill and the provinces of Holland and Zealand rose in revolt, while with the support of Coligny and France, Louis of Nassau was also invading the Netherlands from the

south.⁴³ At about the same time Philip learned that Hassan had offered Algiers to Charles IX and that the French were considering establishing the Duke of Anjou as king there.⁴⁴ As a result Philip cancelled his orders to Don John respecting the operations of the Holy League for the summer and instructed the fleet to remain at Messina, keeping an eye on Algiers, and the threat of a complete Spanish desertion prompted Venice to conclude a separate peace with the Ottomans in the following year. The Venetians were ably assisted in this by François de Noailles, "who had been sent to Constantinople such a peace" as one of his aims; by drawing Venice out of the war, France hoped to isolate Spain. By 1574 Philip had virtually abandoned any Mediterranean policy and Don John had gone north to deal with the growing problem in the Netherlands. The second Spanish bankruptcy in 1577 was almost simultaneous with the opening of negotiations with the Ottomans, and a formal peace treaty had been concluded by 1581. Like his father and uncle before him, Philip had finally learned that the only effective way to counter the Ottoman alliance with other European powers was to negotiate with the Turks himself.

Conclusions

As has been seen, the important short-term result of the Franco-Ottoman alliance was to achieve a kind of political-military stalemate in Europe. No major gains were made by either side in the long series of Habsburg-Valois wars and the intermittent conflicts which followed. 1525 should have seen the beginning of a decline in French power, but at the death of Francis I two decades later France was still intact, with a deficit considerably smaller and far fewer internal problems than the

Empire. The problems of the Empire were not necessarily caused by France, but they were certainly exacerbated by the French crown at every opportunity, and the same pattern is played out, to a lesser degree in the reigns of Francis' successors. Without the Ottoman alliance it is difficult to see how France could have maintained the position it did through this time.

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- 1 William Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V (Dublin, 1769), II, p. 230.
- 2 William Stubbs, Lectures on European History (London, 1904), p. 7.
- 3 H.G. Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe (Ithaca, New York, 1971), p. 2.
- 4 Ibid., p. xii.
- 5 For proceedings of the Diet see Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, trans. C. V. Wedgewood (London, 1954), pp. 128-130; Johannes Janssen, History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages, trans. A. M. Christie (London, 1910), IV, pp. 161-196.
- 6 Henry Kamen, Spain; 1469-1714 (London, 1983), p. 67.
- 7 Koenigsberger, p. 55.
- 8 John Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs (1954, reprint Oxford, 1981), I, p. 50.
- 9 Gerhard Benecke, Society and Politics in Germany, 1500-1750 (London, 1974), p. 245.
- 10 Peter Blickle, The Revolution of 1525 (Baltimore, 1981).
- 11 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (1955, reprint London, 1964), p. 185.
- 12 See Erika Spivakovsky, Son of the Alhambra: Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 1504-1575 (Austin, 1978) for Mendoza's term as ambassador in Venice and his diplomatic rivalry with Guillaume Pellicier.
- 13 Janssen, IV, p. 7.
- 14 Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 117.
- 15 See John Bohnstedt, "The Infidel Scourge of God: the Turkish Menace as seen by German Pamphleteers of the Reformation Era" Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 58. 1968, pt.9.
- 16 Dorothy M. Vaughn, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool, 1954), p. 28. V.
- 17 Leopold von Ranke, A History of the Reformation in Germany, trans. Sarah Austin (New York, 1966), II, p. 580.

- 18 Blickle, pp. 150-151.
- 19 It is often confidently noted (e.g. Vaughan, p. 105), that this assertion was one of Luther's 95 Theses, thus making it a basic part of his theology. It was not. The title of the work in which it is contained gives one clue to the argument's origins, and after the various ideas of Luther had been condemned in the bull Exsurge, Domine of 1520, Luther elaborated still further in the thirty-fourth article of his defence of 1521. "How shamefully the pope has this long time baited us with the war against the Turks, gotten our money, destroyed so many Christians and made so much mischief!" (Works of Luther, [Philadelphia, 1930], III, p. 105.) Explains von Ranke: His indignation and disgust had been excited by the hypocritical outcry for war against the Turks for the sake of the Christian religion, and the appeals to the faithful for contributions which were applied to very different purposes." (p. 580).
- 20 Daniel, 7:7-8 (New Jerusalem Bible): "Next I saw another vision in the visions of the night; I saw a fourth beast, fearful, terrifying, very strong; it had great teeth...and ten horns. While I was looking at these horns, I saw another horn growing among them, a little horn; three of the big horns were pulled out by the roots to make way for it." Luther interpreted the beast to be the Roman Empire, and the ten horns were the ten kingdoms that succeeded it. The Turks were the little horn that conquered the kingdoms of Greece, Asia, Minor, and Egypt. For more on Luther's concepts of the Turks see Kenneth Setton, "Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril", (Balkan Studies, 3, 1960); Mark U. Edwards, jr., Luther's Last Battles (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983).
- 21 Martin Luther in Luther's Works (Philadelphia, 1976), vol. 49, p. 217.
- 22 Vaughn, p. 143.
- 23 Janssen, V, p. 2.
- 24 Ibid., V, p. 175.
- 25 Ibid., V. p. 369.
- 26 Ibid., V, pp. 430-431; pp. 434-35.
- 27 Marguerite had for example been a patron of Lefebvre d'Etaples and a supporter of the Meaux Circle.
- 28 Janssen, VI, pp. 136-37.
- 29 Ibid., VI, p. 358.

- 30 He wrote in July, "the summer is going by and peace seems established everywhere; it is most unfortunate."
- 31 Halil Inalcik in The Ottoman State and its Place in World History, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, (Leiden, 1974), p. 53.
- 32 Sir Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe (New York, 1965), p. 249.
- 33 Brandi, p. 622.
- 34 Adam Wandruzka, The House of Habsburg (New York 1964), p. 113.
- 35 Juan de Santa Maria, Discourses on the Christian Commonwealth, Ann Arbor, University Microfilm Series, 1974; (English translation, late 16th century), p. 11.
- 36 Clarence D. Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature, 1530-1660 (New York, 1973), pp. 127-28; p. 130.
- 37 Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta, 1565 (London, 1961).
- 38 Lynch, I, p. 224.
- 39 Specifically the battle fought at San Juan de Ulloa between Spanish ships and the English squadron under Hawkins and Drake, and the destruction of a French colony in Florida. There were other such examples, as neither England or France recognized the Treaty of Tordesillas. See Henry Folmer, Franco-Spanish Rivalry in North America (Glendale, Ca., 1953).
- 40 Vaughn, p. 145; Cecil Roth, The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos (Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 58-61. Noailles mission to Constantinople reported in 1572 that prayers were offered in the mosques for continuation of the highly useful religious divisions among the Christians. (Vaughn, p. 144).
- 41 Lynch, I, p. 239.
- 42 See John Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys (Cambridge, 1976); Michel Lesure, Lépante: La Crise de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1972); Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1976), notes the appearance of the new Ottoman fleet, II, p. 1120.
- 43 Nicola Sutherland, The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict (London, 1973), pp. 222ff.
- 44 Braudel, II, pp. 1110. At the same time Anjou was also campaigning for the crown of Poland.

XI CONCLUSIONS

It is probable that as more evidence becomes available the consequences of the Franco-Ottoman alliance will be found to be even more extensive than this paper suggests. Students of sixteenth century Europe, particularly those with an interest in a specific national history, will already recognize a number of gaps in this examination. The affairs of a number of nations have been left out or mentioned only in passing. Scotland, for example, had very close ties with France, particularly during the 1550's when the Franco-Ottoman alliance was also very active. The Protestant King Christian of Denmark similarly allied himself with France against the Habsburgs. However, it is impossible to tell without much more extensive primary source research how either of these nations was affected by the alliance.

Russia was also growing into a major European power during this period, and under Ivan III and Ivan IV Russian took her first steps towards inclusion in the European states system. Ivan III had sent embassies to Constantinople while Ivan IV fought the Ottomans and their vassals, the Kazan and Crimean Tartars. In 1570 Russian troops defeated an Ottoman army near Astrakhan. It was in retaliation for this action that the Crimean Tartars burned Moscow in 1571. Yet Russian affairs are not included in this paper because, with the sole exception of the English contact through the Muscovy Company of Merchant Adventurers, Russia remained outside the European states system through most of the century. Russia's formal assimilation into European affairs cannot be said to have been completed until the following century.¹

Similarly, Portugal remained largely aloof from the affairs of neighbouring states. Portugal's orientation was towards the Atlantic, not

towards Europe and the Mediterranean. The Portugese discovery of the ocean trade routes had a tremendous impact on Europe,² an impact which was increased when the Ottomans seized Egypt and gained a monopoly on the traditional trading ports of the Levant. Portugese seamen fought a series of actions with the Ottoman navy in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as the Ottomans tried to protect their trading position. How these events affected Ottoman approaches to European affairs might well be another subject for further enquiry.³

The annexation of Portugal by Spain in 1580 may well have hastened the appearance of English and Dutch ambassadors in Constantinople. England almost certainly moved to conclude an Ottoman alliance in order to have a strong ally in the Mediterranean in case of war with Spain. The United Provinces had used Portugal as a middleman for their own oriental trade, but this became dangerous after 1580 and in 1594 Spanish troops seized fifty Dutch ships in the port of Lisbon. Shortly thereafter the Dutch pioneered their own trade routes to the east. Friendly contacts with the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean, plus a powerful ally against Spain, made the Ottoman alliance increasingly more important to the Dutch.⁴

The long-term effects of the alliance have also been ignored. For the moment it can be said that the Ottoman presence in European diplomatic affairs is continuous right through to World War I and the Empire's inclusion in that war and subsequent defeat led to the partition of its Middle East territories. As Toynbee pointed out, those partitions are still having violent consequences today. Turkey itself, despite the loss of almost all its European territories, has continued to be regarded as a European power, and as a member of NATO, Turkey is now a significant part of the new balance of power.

It can thus be seen that the Franco-Ottoman alliance had consequences far beyond the immediate event. Obviously the subject still requires a great deal of study. This paper has attempted, first, to point out the importance of the alliance, and second to demonstrate that importance through an examination of some aspects of European diplomacy in the sixteenth century. Through that examination the alliance and its events can be placed within the wider context of European diplomacy and European history, and thus some focus can be given to future studies.

The events of the alliance during this century fall roughly into four stages. The first, which may be called the secret alliance, began no later than 1525 and ended in 1536. This stage can itself be divided into two substages. From 1525-26 until 1532 Suleyman was occupied with the subjugation of Hungary and several attempts to break into Lower Austria. Francis first supported his ally's wars with Austria, giving aid to the sympathetic principality of Transylvania. But the Turkish failure before Vienna, resulted in, among other things, the defection of Andrea Doria to the Imperial cause. For the next three years Francis was more concerned with the growing imbalance of Mediterranean seapower, and he began to urge Suleyman to turn his attention more to the Mediterranean. From Suleyman's point of view the need for a change in strategy became apparent in 1532 when his army failed in its second invasion of Austria and Imperial fleets raided Ottoman territory in Greece. From 1532 until 1536, therefore, the allies began to focus more of their attention on the Mediterranean. Throughout this period French diplomacy with the Ottomans was of a supposedly secret nature. Negotiations were undertaken not by formal ambassadors but by envoys such as Jean Frankapan, Antonio Rincon, and Seraphin de Gozzo, or through intermediaries such as Barbarossa or the court of Transylvania.

The second stage begins with the Capitulations of 1536 and the formal establishment of the alliance, and ends around the time of Francis' death. The focus of the alliance continued to be on the Mediterranean, with the allies attempting to concert actions there to tie down Imperial forces while they themselves attacked the Habsburgs on other fronts. The Habsburg-Valois wars of 1536-38 and 1541-44 are notable in that they became general European wars, with the second in particular involving most of the major powers of Europe. Fighting occurred in Algiers, in Italy, on the Anglo-Scottish border, in the Low Countries, and in Hungary as the Habsburgs and their allies went to war with the Franco-Ottoman alliance. This period is noteworthy because at this time Francis began sending accredited ambassadors as residents to the Sublime Porte. The first of these, Jean de la Forêt, was a member of the royal household, and he was succeeded by other French noblemen, Charles de Marillac and Gabriel de Lutz, Baron d'Aramon. By the end of Francis' reign the Ottomans were a fully recognized component of the French alliance network.

The third stage encompasses the reign of Henry II. If possible even more warlike than his father, Henry promoted an active alliance with the Ottomans through most of his reign, 1547-1559. D'Aramon's famous second mission to Constantinople to ask for Ottoman military cooperation coincided with the beginning of another general European war. From 1551-59 Ottoman and French naval squadrons cooperated on a regular basis in the Mediterranean, though as has been seen with little tangible result.

The end of the war in 1559 saw the beginning of a period of fiscal exhaustion and political turmoil for all three powers, France, the Habsburgs, and the Ottomans. France was preoccupied for the next three

decades with internal religious wars and there were few intervals in which an active foreign policy could be promoted. Nevertheless the Ottoman alliance did not rupture, and France continued to send resident ambassadors to the Sublime Porte. That the alliance could be reactivated when necessary was amply proved during the years 1566-72 when the alliance turned against Philip II of Spain, as described in Chapter IX. At the same time Ottoman and French agents were promoting a French candidate for the throne of Poland, a move that could have caused a major threat to the Habsburgs in Eastern Europe. After the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre Franco-Ottoman contacts declined again, but they were quickly renewed by Henry IV upon his accession to the throne of France. By this point a number of other nations had also established or were establishing diplomatic relations with the Ottomans.

The events of the alliance, the dates of the treaties and embassies, are relatively easy to discover and place in chronological order. When coming to their context, however, the process becomes more difficult. As has been indicated several times, there are still many unanswered questions concerning the alliance, and many gaps in the evidence. But, with the evidence that is at hand, looking at the alliance within the general setting of European affairs, it is possible to come to the following conclusions.

First, the Ottoman empire had, prior to the treaty, already successfully transformed itself from an Asiatic warrior state into a fully developed European power. This point has been repeated several times; suffice it to say now that without the European position of the Ottoman empire it is highly unlikely that such an alliance would have had any real value for Francis I. The alliance might never have occurred if the empire had remained an Asiatic state.

The second conclusion is that the theory, expressed by Inalcik among others, that Francis called upon the Ottomans in desperation after Pavia is less than the full truth. Francis' appeal after Pavia may well have been desperate, but there are several points of evidence which indicate that France may already have been contemplating an Ottoman alliance before the defeat. The timing of the despatch of the anonymous first embassy, the alleged presence of Turkish envoys in the camp of the French army in 1525, the connection with the Frankapan family and their known pro-Turkish sentiments, the rumour referred to by Ferdinand in his letter to Charles, and Charles' own accusation of Franco-Turkish collusion three years earlier, all indicate that Francis and Louise of Savoy were contemplating an Ottoman alliance well before the crisis produced by Pavia. Such an idea was not inconsistent with the political climate of the times. Francis had already opened up a wide range of diplomatic initiatives, and the new political doctrines of national self-interest were more than capable of overcoming most religious scruples about dealing with the infidel.

Third, relating to the preceeding point, both Francis and Suleyman regarded the alliance as necessary. Neither power was capable of fighting the Habsburg empire unaided. Both wanted to see the strength of that empire reduced. Events show that neither France nor the Ottomans attempted any major campaigns against the Habsburgs after 1525-26 without making sure of the ally's support. In 1537 Suleyman, with a huge fleet and an army of over 200,000 men, declared himself unable to invade Italy until he was sure of support from France.

Subsequent to the determination of the events of the alliance there are several minor points which need to be stated. Concerning the first year of the alliance, there is no hard evidence to suggest that Francis

urged Suleyman to attack and destroy the Kingdom of Hungary in 1526. Quite probably Francis realized that such an action would do the Habsburgs no direct harm and might even turn out to their benefit and such indeed proved to be the case. Ferdinand of Austria gained Bohemia, Croatia, and a strip of northwest Hungary which he fortified to protect Vienna and Lower Austria. It is far more likely that Suleyman undertook the campaign of 1526 for motives that were primarily his own.⁵

Francis did not attempt to back out of the alliance after the crisis of Pavia had passed. Though his contacts remained at a rather low profile until the second crisis of 1529, Francis did maintain contact with the Ottomans through the court of Transylvania. Through a series of intermediary agents he helped promote a new balance of power in eastern Europe after the collapse of Hungary. The renewal of directies and the closer accord reached with the Capitulations of 1536 are evidence of how important the alliance was to both parties. The Capitulations can be seen as a direct result of Doria's defection to the Habsburgs.

The campaign of 1537 was not an example of Francis leaving Suleyman in the lurch. The fact is that both parties had separate aims and interests and both attempted to pursue them independently. Suleyman's attack on Venice was at least as damaging to the combined plan as the failure of Francis to invade Milan. The entire affair has received far more attention than it really deserves. This was not the first time in history that two partners in a military alliance would seek to maintain their own strategic interests over those of their allies, nor would it be the last. Certainly the failure of 1537 did not radically alter the nature of the alliance, as can be seen by the close ties maintained in 1539-40.

Vaughn's description of the Turkish occupation of Toulon is both

erroneous and irrelevant. Attention might properly be focussed on how the failure of the experiment affected the alliance in the future. The refusal by France to continue to provide wintering facilities for the Ottoman navy is an important factor in determining subsequent Franco-Ottoman naval strategy.

Questions of moral judgement upon Francis are further rendered fallacious when it is seen that the alliance continued to be important after his death. The Ottoman alliance played a key role in the foreign policy of Henry II, and even during the Wars of Religion both Catholic and Protestant factions in France continued relations with the Ottomans as a normal part of foreign policy.

Equally it is clear that Francis was able to maintain the alliance without serious opposition or damage from negative public opinion. Medieval intolerance of the infidel was already declining and other states, notably Venice, had already opened trade negotiations with the Ottomans. Thus the French action was not completely radical. Those instances of complaint against French action which do appear are often traceable to Imperial sources. The Concordat of Bologna had already given Francis complete control over the Gallican church, the popes were content to ally themselves with the Ottomans, and the Protestant princes did the same despite the anti-Turkish feelings of Martin Luther. Once again, religious considerations cannot be seen to have played any significant role in the political decisions of the time.

The final conclusion is that France, by allying with the Ottomans in 1525, legitimized the Ottoman presence in Europe and made the Ottoman Empire a generally accepted member of the European states system. By examining the alliance it is easy to see that the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into European diplomacy had a considerable impact on the

subsequent history of Europe, particularly in eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, and in the breakdown of the Habsburg empire of Charles V. The Franco-Ottoman alliance became a major factor in the new European balance of power that replaced the older notion of a Christian commonwealth.

The Franco-Ottoman alliance is thus an important event within the context of European diplomacy, and of European history in general. The study of the effects of the alliance upon Europe during the sixteenth century has been largely neglected by historians, and the event itself has been ignored or misunderstood. This paper has attempted to establish the significance of the alliance and place it in its proper perspective within European history. The ideas will hopefully provide some working hypotheses for future research on the subject.

XI FOOTNOTE REFERENCES

- 1 An understanding of the development of Russia during this period, however, is of considerable use in understanding the history of eastern Europe. For those interested in the subject, source material on sixteenth century Russian political history is included in the bibliography under the heading D. Eastern Europe in the Sixteenth Century.
- 2 One chronicler solemnly called it, "The greatest event in the history of the world, apart from the incarnation and death of him who created it." C.W. Boxer, The Portugese Seaborne Empire (London, 1967), p. 1.
- 3 As noted, the history of Portugal may have been affected in various ways by the alliance. For those interested in further information sources on Portugal in the sixteenth century have been included in the bibliography under the heading G. Miscellaneous Works.
- 4 Sources on English and Dutch initiatives to sign their own capitulations with Constantinople are listed in the bibliography under the heading G. Miscellaneous Works.
- 5 There is of course one obvious candidate for the incitement of Suleyman against Hungary; Jean Frankapan, the Croat noble with known pro-Turkish sentiments. Frankapan, possibly in concert with his cousin Kristofor, may well have acted independantly of the French crown in this matter, and the breakup of the Kingdom of Hungary most certainly would have benefitted Croatia from Frankapan's point of view. Assuming Suleyman did not already have the idea of attacking Hungary in mind, Frankapan may well have been responsible for the suggestion.

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Title of Thesis/Dissertation

THE FRANCO-OTTOMAN OF THE 16TH CENTURY:

THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT

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