

At The Margins: Uyghur Ethnicity and the Friend/Enemy Dialectic in Xinjiang

by

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BA, University of Victoria, 2008

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of the Requirements for the Degree of

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in Political Science

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## **Supervisory Committee**

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## Abstract

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This thesis builds on Michael Dutton's work on the policing of the political in China. It explores the role of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang. The analysis centers on the Uyghurs and argues that ethnicity has played a central role in shaping the excision of enemy from the category of friend since the construction of the People's Republic of China. This identification of enmity is undergirded by the particular ethnic vicissitudes that have produced both a horizontally inclusive and vertically hierarchical Chinese nation. This ethnic component of Chinese nationalism situates the ethnic Han majority as the core of the nation. Beginning with the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang and its incorporation into the PRC and extending to the "7.5" race riots and hypodermic needle attacks in the summer of 2009 the thesis contends that the categories of ethnicity have been at the heart of the elimination of the enemy in China and can be linked directly to many of the Chinese state's colonial practices.

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## Chapter 1

The relationship between ethnicity and the territory of the People's Republic of China has become an increasingly recognized and urgent topic of analysis. The field has expanded considerably since the initial ethnographic surveys of China's "ethnic minorities" were written, seeking to challenge the dominant understanding of Chinese ethnic questions. Consider the argument by Eric Hobsbawm that: "China, Korea, and Japan ... are indeed among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically, almost, or entirely homogenous. Thus of the (non-Arab) Asian states today Japan and the two Koreas are 99% homogenous, and 94% of the People's Republic of China are Han."<sup>1</sup> Anthropologists specializing in China such as Dru Gladney and Stevan Harrell have sought not only to dethrone this conception of a homogenous Han China but have also mapped the discursive interplay between different ethnic identities to chart their mutual constitution and their hybridity.<sup>2</sup> Put another way, not only is China not ethnically homogenous but there is considerable diffusion of culture among the various ethnic nationalities that help to produce the boundaries of each group's self-perception. There has been much illuminating work done in fields such as anthropology which highlights these arguments via outlining the ethnogenesis and the development of minority nationalities particular identities, and by discussing the history of their particular constitutions, the relations among each other and their relationship with the Han ethnic group, and their representation with a greater Chinese national identity. While the anthropological

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<sup>1</sup> Hobsbawm quoted in Dru C. Gladney, *Dislocating China: Reflections On Muslims, Minorities And Other Subaltern Subjects*, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 6.

<sup>2</sup> See for example: Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism In The People's Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Studies, 1991); Gladney, *Dislocating*; Stevan Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995).

literature has explored many interesting questions pertaining to these areas of study, what is missing is a politically oriented analysis and specifically a politically oriented analysis of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang.

Until recently, China's ethnic problems were typically affiliated with the Tibet question. While the problems in Tibet still remain, Xinjiang has garnered increasing attention; its ethnic issues in particular are a topic that has gained considerable intellectual traction, especially since the Chinese state enthusiastically signed on to the American-led global war on terror. Much of the political literature on Xinjiang is synthesized with these sorts of issues and therefore hinges on the binaries of support for and the possibility of Uyghur separatism.<sup>3</sup> This thesis explores the politics of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs from a different direction, undergirded by a particular definition of politics which has played a central role in China since the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This analysis builds on the work done by Michael Dutton in *Policing Chinese Politics* which utilizes Carl Schmitt's definition of politics vis-à-vis the friend/enemy dialectic to probe the political violence that shadowed the Party's rise from its formative origins at Yan'an to the virtual anarchy of Cultural Revolution. It has been a crucial work for understanding both the political violence that has occurred since the CCP was created and the technologies of control deployed in the PRC. Using Schmitt's friend/enemy dialectic, Dutton discusses the way in which mass-driven, mass-inflicted political violence emerged and was sustained. While Dutton's work is compelling, what it fails to account for is how the friend/enemy dialectic operated in accordance with the

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<sup>3</sup> See for example: Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35 (2008): 15-29.; Yitzhak Shicor, "Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang, China," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 32:2 (2005): 119-136.

categories of ethnicity. Thus, following from Dutton's analysis this thesis will argue that the friend/enemy dialectic has played and continues to play a critically important role in Xinjiang. This analysis diverges from Dutton's work in discussing who became targeted via the dialectic by situating the discussion as a problem of ethnic politics and by focusing on the Uyghur identity. Ethnicity has acted as a primary category in determining who and who was not identified as an enemy. Through Carl Schmitt's friend/enemy dialectic, this thesis invokes discourses of nationalism and ethnicity to demonstrate the hegemonic role these categories have played in demarcating friends from enemies in Xinjiang. It charts this, beginning with the establishment of the PRC and proceeds into the 1980's and Deng's economic reforms, and continues to the July 5<sup>th</sup> "race riots" of the summer of 2009. This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first situates the discussion articulated in the preceding chapters, and outlines the critical concepts and ideas that the thesis relies on. The second chapter discusses the friend/enemy dialectic during the Mao period in Xinjiang. Both the third and fourth chapters discuss the friend/enemy dialectic in the post-Mao period. The fifth chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing its key findings. The remainder of this section will discuss the three primary chapters, the second, the third, and the fourth in more detail.

The second chapter targets the Mao period for analysis. In discussing this epoch, the chapter demonstrates through a discussion of political campaigns in Xinjiang, that Uyghur identity played a critically important role in identifying friends from enemies. The chapter argues that while the language of class was deployed, the friend/enemy dialectic was contingent on the boundaries of ethnicity. The confines of class were unable to contain the boundaries of ethnic identity which resulted in the practices of excising the

ethnic enemies from the Chinese nation. By invoking Mao, Marx, and Lenin the chapter demonstrates the discursive limits of the Party's strategy of development of the Uyghurs to push them through the stages of revolutionary history and in doing so illustrates the fundamental category that distinguishes similar campaigns that Dutton identified in Han regions in China. The chapter explores some different ways through time and across space that the friend/enemy dialectic took hold from the peaceful liberation onwards. In spite of the inclusive rhetoric of the time, the friend/enemy dialectic operated in the region in a manner that constantly (re)situated many Uyghurs from the category of friend into the category of enemy based mainly on a particular understanding and vision of ethnicity. The chapter focuses on three political campaigns to demonstrate this: the Hundred Flowers Movement, the Anti-Rightists campaign, and the Great Leap Forward.

The third and fourth chapters examine the friend/enemy dialectic since the Mao period. This is the period which Michael Dutton has theorized as embodying the death of the friend/enemy dialectic vis-à-vis the massline in the Han dominated regions in China. These two chapters challenge this assessment and highlight the continued importance of the friend/enemy dialectic, sustained in the three evil categories of the terrorist, extremist, and splittist. This is argued through the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics which explains the seemingly contradictory and simultaneously operating logics of the friend/enemy dialectic and the widespread policies of development and affirmative action that the Chinese state has deployed in the region, and thus continuing the colonial processes largely begun during the Mao period from a different trajectory to facilitate the integration of the Uyghurs. The third chapter outlines both the macro strategies and micro tactics that have emerged to facilitate this process and locate the friend/enemy dialectic in

the region. At the limit of this process rests the friend/enemy dialectic. It is extended when the subjectification processes immanent in the policies and practices of biopolitics fail. The third chapter provides the broad strokes of this intimate relationship between the Uyghurs and the friend/enemy dialectic.

The fourth chapter of this thesis examines the July 5<sup>th</sup> (7.5) riots in Xinjiang and the hypodermic needle attacks that occurred in the summer of 2009 as a case study to further buttress the argument made in the preceding chapter. A reflection on the state's reaction to the violence illustrates the contemporary relevance of the friend/enemy dialectic in China at a time in which the political demobilization and the death of politics have been eulogized through the increasing prominence of the logic of the market. The state's overwhelming reaction to the riots via the institutions of policing and security indicate yet another (re)emergence of the friend/enemy dialectic.

Before delving into the body of this thesis, a conceptual framework must be articulated to establish the limits and legitimacy of this project and to situate it in the existing literature on the topics that are engaged. This chapter will begin by discussing Carl Schmitt and the friend/enemy dialectic and explain what it is and why it is central to the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. This will include an examination of Dutton's use of the friend/enemy dialectic to resituate it for this thesis. The following section will outline the way the concepts of nationhood and ethnicity are deployed in this thesis since both are central to the argument of this thesis. Next, a look at the discourses of Chinese nationalism will be enunciated, since ethnic relations under the auspices of the Chinese nation are a critical component of this thesis and require deconstruction. Following this, a

short answer to the question “who are the Uyghurs?” will be outlined. The introduction will then conclude with a brief look at the limitations of this study.

### **Schmitt, Dutton, and the Friend/Enemy Dialectic**

Since this thesis is dependent upon the friend/enemy dialectic, a brief outline mapping its definition is of great importance. Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist and one time Crown Jurist of the Third Reich, wrote a compelling treatise on the requisite need for the possibility of the use of force, violence, and death in order to sustain the existence of the modern state. His main work, which this thesis relies on, is *The Concept of the Political*. In it, he argues that this possibility of violence is what distinguished politics from all other fields and to remove this option would be to threaten political existence in general. It is also in this work where Schmitt offers the friend/enemy dialectic which captures this possibility of violence in the concept of the enemy. Thus to understand Carl Schmitt’s friend/enemy dialectic is to understand the lynchpin of his conception of the essence of politics.

It is my contention that the friend/enemy dialectic presupposes a politics of identity. There are several components to this dyad that must be elucidated in support of this claim. First and foremost is the centrality of the identity border, the line that separates friend from enemy. As Schmitt plainly states, “the political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”<sup>4</sup> What is critical in this quote is the notion that politics presupposes a categorization, a discrimination that identifies and separates the two camps: friend and enemy. The process

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<sup>4</sup> Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007), 26.

of identification is what polices the political: the myriad discursive fields play out through the construction of enmity shape the malleable border between friend and enemy, constantly drawing and redrawing the lines demarcating the two. The possibility of identifying an “other” in enmity must be maintained in order for politics to exist and it is this discursive reality that distinguishes the political from all other spheres of the administration of the human body. The possibility of violence being exacted upon the other, identified as enemy, is essential to the sustenance of politics. There are no certain criteria that shape who is enemy and who is not as Schmitt argues:

The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transaction. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.<sup>5</sup>

This quote demonstrates the flexibility and oscillatory nature of the friend/enemy distinction. Categories shaping enmity and also, by association, friendship are never fixed since the two are inextricably constructed, operating dialectically, always in relation to one another. Friendship is known through the concept of enemy; who is friend and who

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<sup>5</sup>Schmitt, 27.

is enemy are understood only to the degree that they are implicated with one another. This dialectical relationship exists through a multitude of structures of power; the constitution of enemies is contingent on these structures. The limits of this political discrimination, between friend and enemy, are heavily reliant on a multiplicity of discourses that determine the horizons of possibility that exist for their constitution. These discourses operate in relation to one another, and indeed in relation to this discursively constructed identity border. Understood as a discursive formation, the friend/enemy border can be read to operate contrapuntally, produced in the interstices of a variety of discursive fields: for example, ethnic, religious, cultural, scientific, social. However contingent the category of the discourses that police the limits of this identity border, what is certain is that they gain different inflections across space and through time. Therefore, at the heart of enmity lies the chimera of contingency, albeit a discursively constrained contingency.

A point of clarification is required here. Although Schmitt maintains the existential nature of the construction of enemies, arguing that they exist in empirical reality, his logic is highly theoretical and based on the abstract category of enemy. The argument that “the friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, not mixed and weakened by economic, moral, and other conceptions, least of all in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private emotions and tendencies”<sup>6</sup> is not in opposition to the point made above regarding the flexibility and permeability of the two poles of politics. It is my contention that they are understood as praxis, since the friend/enemy dialectic’s

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<sup>6</sup> Schmitt, 28.

theoretical precepts are inextricable from its concrete practices, each informs and reinforces its counterpart. The empirical existential process of identification is contingent on its theoretical construction; the construction of enemies is contingent on a particular grid of intelligibility which constitutes empirical reality. Since the practices of defining an enemy require this theoretical constitution to render the enemy intelligible, the theoretical is intrinsically related to practices that are represented by Schmitt as purely existential. Thus, his theory is implicated in a variety of processes that are not by any means “existential”. The process of identification with structured antagonistic categories is requisite to the practice of the identification of bodies in enmity. Having now outlined the dialectical nature of Schmitt’s friend/enemy dialectic, the question remains as to what occurs in response to this unveiling of the enemy? Schmitt’s politics of exception provides the answer.

The terms “state of exception” and “decisionism” are also used throughout this thesis, so a word is required on each of these, since both are Schmittian terms. The politics of exception can be understood at the empirical excision of friend from enemy. The identification of an enemy that threatens the security of the friend, the self, is what allows the politics of exception to coalesce into the operating logic. Until this point I have left the friend/enemy dialectic in rather abstract terms; however, having outlined the border demarcating friend from enemy it is essential to connect the State to this system, including its particular mechanisms and technologies. It is, for Schmitt, the political unit, the tour de force in framing the question of the political. As he clearly argues, “in its entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy

distinction.”<sup>7</sup> The decision on who is enemy is what distinguishes the concept of decisionism, while the action that such a decision necessitates sets in motion a politics of exception, or the concept of the exception, which operates to disarm the threat by whatever means are required, including the existential extinguishing of it. However, although the state is most often the primary unit invoking through decisionism the politics of the exception, it is not necessarily the only unit that can invoke it. This weds to Dutton’s use of the friend/enemy dialectic and what distinguishes my use of the term.

As mentioned above, Dutton’s work in *Policing Chinese Politics* offers an empirically based, highly theoretical analysis on the widespread violence that defined much of the Mao period. Dutton argued that the friend/enemy dialectic vis-à-vis politics operated antagonistically through this concept and played a central role in shaping the direction and intensity of violence. Dutton’s argument focused on demonstrating that Mao’s question, “Who are our enemies, who are our friends?”<sup>8</sup> was responsible for shaping the politics of the PRC, and that the unremitting policing of the friend/enemy border was responsible for the explosion of passions which produced the normalization of the processes of the identification of enmity. A crucial component of Dutton’s work is his focus on the massline as an essential technology and as crucial player in the decisionism of who was enemy and what price was to be paid; it was through the massline that the masses were mobilized and violence exacted on the enemies of the Chinese nation. My argument refocuses Dutton’s discussion by injecting the question of ethnic identity politics into the discussion. While noted above that Mao postulated a similar question to Schmitt asking “who are our enemies, who are our friends?”, it is Schmitt’s framework

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<sup>7</sup> Schmitt, 30.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics: A History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 3.

via ethnicity that allows a richer analysis of the friend/enemy dialectic since Mao fails to account for identity outside of the definition of class. Thus, the friend/enemy dialectic, while shaping the course of the PRC for half a century is also deeply immersed in the majority/minority politics of nationhood and ethnicity in the PRC.

Defining the category of friend as a question of national identity recasts Schmitt into the politics of the Uyghurs. The categories of friend and enemy are directly related to questions of national identity. It is enemies who threaten the existence of the national community, necessitating their destruction. The enemy is discursively and physically eliminated from the national community; the enemy is not a part of the Chinese nation. However, this opens up questions of definition of what constitutes the Chinese nation and moreover, what is its relationship to the concept of ethnicity? The following section answers this.

### **Mapping Nationhood and Ethnicity**

While the term nation is often treated synonymously with state, the definition used in this paper is closer to Anderson's term of an imagined community.<sup>9</sup> While Anderson's work has been critiqued for a number of oversights and presuppositions<sup>10</sup> its broad idea of a psycho-social perception of a discursively reproduced common identity shared by those inside the community is critical to the way in which nation will be used in this paper. Additionally, the concept of nation is not static, nor is it fixed, though it might be represented as such. Often the notion of a common territory is listed as one of

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<sup>9</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> See for instance, Partha Chatterjee, "Whose Imagined Community?" in *The Nation And Its Fragments: Colonial And Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3-13 and Prasnejit Duara, *Rescuing History From The Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 51-53.

the primary categories that constitute a nation. However, it is crucial to note that national boundaries do not exist outside of their discursive construction; there are no “natural” territorial borders that are synonymous with a nation; they are discursively constructed in relation to one another. Moreover, as nations are discursively constructed, in that they exist through a multiplicity of discourses that are (re)produced in countless permutations, with particular forms gaining salience at different times, together they operate in a myriad of ways supporting the notion of a shared community. They are in constant motion. Nations are contingent and thus must be constantly reproduced. This occurs in a variety of abstract processes that are reified in material realities acting within the limits presupposed in their enactment. In a word, it is important to keep in mind that nations are not a historical given (though they are constructed in time through historical discourses).<sup>11</sup> They are the product of countless discourses that determine both a nation’s shape and form, what characteristics are considered part of it, what is considered outside of it. Although nations often appear to have spatial and temporal stability, fixed conceptions of territorial borders and a fixed notion of what constitutes their identity through time, they are built on contingency. As the following section will point out, China is not an exception to this argument. A final point of note is that nations are not necessarily the products of states. Although this seems obvious, it is often overlooked. The state does not dictate the shape of the nation, though it is crucial in helping to sustain it through a panoply of modes of reproduction; the limits of a nation are thus demarcated by the discourses which constitute it; the state embodies one of many of these mechanisms and is the focus for this thesis.

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<sup>11</sup> Duara, 15.

Ethnicity, as it is used in this thesis, also requires a brief discussion. The concept of ethnicity is critically important to the concept of nation, and again China is no exception. As the quotation from Eric Hobsbawm in the introduction to this chapter noted, the concept of ethnicity bears a critical relationship to nationhood. However, the concept is not to be understood primordially, nor does it exist atemporally. Like nationalism, it is a term which eludes a rigid definition; it is by all accounts an amorphous concept both in theory and practice that has a host of different meanings in different spatial and temporal contexts, but it can be argued that it is always involved in movement and subject to identification and classification. Ethnicity relies on a discursive discrimination between self and other. I will use the term ethnicity to connote an ascribed or shared understanding of group but also individual self-identity. Ethnicity is a process rather than a stable category, and the concept assumes a mutually constitutive border between self and other that requires constant reproduction for its sustenance. Culture, a concept often affixed to ethnically understood difference, has been thoroughly demonstrated as stability; it is a process of production and thus ethnicity cannot be guarded by the category of culture. As Homi K. Bhabha has argued, culture is a performative act ever-changing, ever redefining itself in the in-between spaces of discourses emanating from a variety of these spaces; it is always subject to contestation and negotiation<sup>12</sup>. Ethnicity, like culture, is similarly constructed and intrinsically related. There is another side of ethnicity that must be mentioned, and that is the role that biology and race play in the reproduction of different ethnic groups; the body, as a site of reified ethnic difference, has played a critical role in shaping the borders of nationality in China.

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<sup>12</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 2.

This understanding of ethnicity as outlined does not undercut the concrete reality of attempts to fix the concept through representation. The borders which ethnicity constitute must be policed to be maintained, since it is through discrimination or differentiation that these boundaries exist. Ethnicity occurs from a recognition and identification from outside as well as from inside, but there exists disparity in terms of the power and primacy that certain ethnic tropes or stereotypes take. W.E.B. DuBois's *double consciousness* is a concept that might be helpful in terms of unpacking this notion of ethnicity. The concept highlights that what is crucially important is not only an identification of one's self but a recognition of the other's gaze in the constitution of one's self. Thus ethnicity not only entails an understanding of one's self vis-a-vis the other, but also where one is situated according to this relationship. Likewise, Stuart Hall provides an insightful conceptualization of this reality with the term "relations of representation," used to describe the way in which ethnicity is reproduced according to asymmetries in power, since requisite to the process of identification as a member of an ethnicity is a set of classificatory schema or taxonomy through which an ethnic group and members of the group are identified.<sup>13</sup>

It is crucial not to conflate the concepts and processes of ethnicity and nationhood, although they were fused together in the imagining of the Chinese nation. While sharing similar attributes, ethnicity need not be national in character; though the concepts of nation and ethnicity often appear coupled, it is important to understand the differences between them. The following section will outline the relationship between ethnicity and nationhood in the Chinese state.

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<sup>13</sup> Stuart Hall, David Morley, and Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues In Cultural Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 442.

## **Ethnicity, the Chinese Nation, and the Friend/Enemy Dialectic**

Since this thesis is underpinned by the argument that ethnicity plays a formative role in Chinese nationalism and is enacted in the ethnically defined Chinese friend/enemy dialectic, an explication of the relationship between nationhood and ethnicity is needed. This understanding of ethnicity and nationhood hinges on the notion that the Chinese nation presupposed the Han as its ethnic core. However, China's national minorities are also ethnically imagined and discursively written into the nation, albeit in a manner that places them in a subaltern position. Thus, there is a vertical and horizontal component to the Chinese nation. The definitions used for each term given in the previous section are reflected in the empirical material regarding the Chinese nation. Two works attest to this understanding of the Chinese nation. Frank Dikotter's *Discourses of Race in Modern China* and James Liebold's *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism*. Read against one another, the deficiencies in Dikotter's work are answered by Liebold. The deficiency in Dikotter's book centres on his discussion of a genealogy of race and ethnicity almost exclusively in relation to an "external" other. There is simply not enough discussion of the role that ethnic minorities, China's "internal" others, played. It is a silence that is fleshed out by Liebold, who aptly displays how these ethnic groups in China contributed to the construction of the Han ethnicity as well as to the constitution of the Chinese nation. As we will see, Han ethnicity and the Chinese nation are not coterminous; this is a critical distinction which is often ignored.

Frank Dikotter's *Discourses of Race in Modern China* identifies a number of different discourses in the genealogy of race: race as culture; race as type (1793-1895); race as lineage (1895-1903); race as nation (1903-1915); race as species and race as

seed(1915-1949); and race as class (1949-onward.)<sup>14</sup> It is upon these seven differing conceptions of race that Dikotter charts the processes and implications of the movement of race in the imagining of a core Han ethnic identity. He offers a sophisticated understanding of the central role that race played in understanding ethnic difference and the establishment of the Han as a distinct nation group. Dikotter highlights the oscillatory nature of the concept of race, demonstrating its spatiotemporal contingency. In his final chapter entitled “Race as Class” which focuses on China since the creation of the PRC, he argues that race as a concept was officially cast out of the country, denigrated and exposed as being a bourgeois concept and replaced by a form of class that in many ways shared a number of features with the earlier understandings of race;<sup>15</sup> assessing Mao’s writing he argues: “it is clear his sense of nationalism was based on a strong racial consciousness and a sense of biological continuity.”<sup>16</sup> So although the term of race has been exorcised, its legacy remains; heavily indebted to it are the concepts of ethnicity and nation. Dikotter’s book stands as an excellent source in mapping one of the key psycho-social processes in the imagination of Chinese nationhood, demonstrating the centrality of the Han as a critical group in this picture. This latter argument needs to be further explicated. James Liebold’s *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism* pursues the internal other line of inquiry that is silent in Dikotter’s analysis. It is a focused study on the transition from the Qing Empire up to the establishment of the PRC, highlighting how China’s ethnic minorities played into the construction of the Chinese nation. It begins

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<sup>14</sup> Dikotter will be treated at length since his text largely remains the most important work in the field in spite of its shortcomings. Frank Dikotter, *Discourses of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). Dikotter will be treated at length since his text largely remains the most important in this particular field.

<sup>15</sup> Dikotter, *Discourse*, 191-195.

<sup>16</sup> Dikotter, *Discourse*, 192.

with an analysis of how the spatial borders of empire were reimagined into the Chinese state and concomitantly how the disparate groups of peoples living within these spatial borders were temporally written into the Chinese nation.<sup>17</sup>

What is most salient about Liebold's work for this section is twofold. First, his argument contests the notion that Chinese nationalism is synonymous with Han nationalism. This thesis shares this perspective. Moreover, his analysis of the discursive statements that emerged through this period demonstrates that rather than being imagined out of the Chinese nation, groups such as the Uyghurs were imagined into the nation. Chinese nationalism is ethnically plural and inclusive of all national groups horizontally but also immanent is an ethnic hierarchy privileging the Han above all other groups. The Chinese nation is not akin to Han identity but locates it at the center, as the most important component. This is perhaps the least often understood part of Chinese nationalism. Second, and deeply connected to the last point, the Chinese nation, while being civically inclusive is simultaneously racially exclusive. Although the term "race" may have been demolished by the PRC, a racial hierarchy privileging Han ethnicity remains.<sup>18</sup> It is along these lines that the current colonial project in Xinjiang can be better understood. Liebold argues that virtually all ethnic minorities in China were understood as backward, primitive, barbarian peoples in relation to the Han. The minorities written into the Chinese nation were vital to its survival, given that they occupied many of the strategically important borders of the state, and yet because of their purported ethnic inferiorities they would be unable to reach the modern stage of development that the Chinese nation required. In sum, the Chinese nation assumes both an ethnically Han

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<sup>17</sup> James Liebold, *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

<sup>18</sup> Liebold, 43.

centre as well as a minority periphery that is nevertheless linked culturally and racially through interactions with the Han to an overarching Chinese nation. It is also important to point out that the Chinese nation has been largely constructed according to the history written by the CCP. While it is contested both inside and outside the state by people of Han and minority ethnicities, the stark reality is that this particular imagining of the nation has had concrete implications since the establishment of the PRC.<sup>19</sup> Having articulated the shape of the “ethnic Chinese nation”, it is important to connect it with the friend/enemy dialectic.

The friend/enemy dialectic is complicated by the fact that its boundaries are more flexible than the borders of ethnicity. This flexibility enabled virtually anyone to become an enemy, as the deaths of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao demonstrate. The identification of one as an enemy could hinge on a multiplicity of factors. However, because of the particular construction of the Chinese nation, the category of enemy bears an intimate relationship with ethnicity. Given the location of ethnic minorities in the Chinese nation, included in its scope but marginalized as backward, these minorities exist in a tenuous position. There is an interaction between these political boundaries of nation and ethnic boundaries that renders the ethnic minority suspect. While political reliability and commitment to the revolution has rendered Hans as enemies too, this reliability did not emerge from an ethnic understanding of their bodies. By contrast, it was because the Uyghurs were ethnic minorities that their status as political friend has been continuously called into question. Accordingly, it was the dubious nature of their friendship that enabled the classification of so many ethnic minorities as enemies. As the following

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<sup>19</sup> See Liebold for an in-depth analysis of the contingency and debate surrounding the Party’s minority policies, 147-176.

chapters of this essay will outline, the boundaries of enemy and ethnicity were not coterminous; rather, the relationship has shifted in accordance with the political milieu of the time. Thus, to understand the relationship between the friend/enemy dialectic and the Uyghurs is to recognize the tenuousness of the Uyghurs' classification of friend. The following section will provide a brief history of the Uyghurs and their relationship with the Chinese nation and state to answer the question: who are the Uyghurs?

### **Xinjiang and the Uyghurs**

The Uyghurs are one of China's fifty-five state recognized national minority groups that, together with the Han, make up the Chinese nation. They are one of thirteen ethnic groups in Xinjiang and the most numerous. In a census in 1953 the Uyghurs made up around 3.6 million or 75 percent of the region's population, but due to a range of factors to be discussed in the following chapters the demographics rapidly changed.<sup>20</sup> The Han presence in the region grew exponentially, from 6% in 1953 to about half of the region's population by 1979.<sup>21</sup> The region's history is dynamic but through the Chinese state it links the Uyghurs through their interactions with the more civilized, advanced, modern Han core. Emerging out of a collection of distinct nomadic groups, those that are now identified as Uyghurs were said to have arrived and settled in the area between the 7th and 9th centuries. Far from being a cohesive nation with any sense of unity, the people living in the region lived in distinct communities around various oases. Officially the Uyghurs were identified as an ethnic group based on the CCP's schema, Stalin's four

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<sup>20</sup> Stanley Toops, "Demographics And Development In Xinjiang," *East-West Center Washington Working Papers* (May 2004): 1.

<sup>21</sup> Although, McMillen argues the percentage of Uyghurs at the time of liberation accounted for 90 percent. Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang And The Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 6. (Jul. 1981): 74; McMillen, *CCP*, 66.

commons: territory, economy, language, and psychological makeup manifested in common culture.<sup>22</sup> This schema has been central to the Party's official recognition and designation of ethnic group and its use with groups such as the *Hui* has indicated its haziness as well as its debt to the discourses of race.<sup>23</sup> Thus while the "four commons" appear to be an innocuous set of defining categories, they are deeply related to the racialized, hierarchical understanding of ethnicity discussed in the previous section.<sup>24</sup> It is important to note this because the identification of the "Uyghurs" as a distinct national group situated them within a category that embodies a conflation of the elements of race, ethnicity, and nationhood.

The name "Uyghur" first referred to a tribe and empire that emerged in the 9<sup>th</sup> century and largely disappeared after the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The name was then appropriated and applied to a collection of distinct groups living in the territory that occupies contemporary Xinjiang some four hundred years later by Soviet anthropologists in 1933.<sup>25</sup> At the time of identification the Uyghurs lacked any shared consciousness of an overarching national identity built on this ethnic label.<sup>26</sup> Rather those identified as Uyghur in the area were more likely to align themselves with their Islamic faith or their local community.<sup>27</sup> Islam was said to have entered the region by way of contact with Central Asian peoples between the 10th and 16th centuries. At the time of liberation 75

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<sup>22</sup> Gladney, *Muslim*, 66.

<sup>23</sup> Gladney, *Muslim*, 66.

<sup>24</sup> Gladney, *Muslim*, 94-96.

<sup>25</sup> Gladney, *Dislocating*, 207.

<sup>26</sup> Gladney, *Dislocating*, 216.

<sup>27</sup> Justin Rudelson called these Oasis Identities and has argued that these fragmentary identities have continued to undermine cohesive national solidarity movements, see his book by the same name. *Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

percent of Uyghurs were Muslim and faith was an inextricable part of daily life and social systems.<sup>28</sup> This faith has become a defining collective characteristic of the Uyghurs. The Uyghur language is Turkic and is accompanied by an Arabic script.

According to the Chinese state's definition, the Uyghurs were to be understood as a distinct collective, albeit under the grand meta-identity of the Chinese nation.

Temporally, the Uyghurs were represented as having existed continuously through time, as the following quote from a Chinese state ethnographic survey articulates: "The Uyghurs, together with other ethnic groups, have opened up the region and have had very close economic and cultural ties with people in other parts of the country, particularly central China."<sup>29</sup> The quote captures the temporal relationship the Uyghurs have shared with the Han vis-à-vis "central China". Connected to the temporal construction was a spatial component which centered on the trope of a historical unity and continuity between Xinjiang and China. This was based on hackneyed argument that: "Xinjiang has been part of China since ancient times."<sup>30</sup> Thus Xinjiang and the Uyghurs were also spatialized into the overarching Chinese national geobody as an indivisible part of Chinese "territory". As the following chapters will flesh out, this relationship or immanence of the Uyghurs in the margins of the Chinese nation has played a critical role in shaping the friend/enemy dialectic.

## **Research and Limitations**

Each chapter relies on a different strategy for amassing research materials, however all materials are from English language sources. The first chapter relied mainly

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<sup>28</sup> McMillen, *XPCC*, 66.

<sup>29</sup> Ma Yin, *China's Minority Nationalities*, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 137.

<sup>30</sup> Ma, 137.

on secondary historical sources in addition to primary theoretical writings. Although the former sources are rich in description, many lack a comprehensive discussion of many of the concerns of this thesis. As such, the chapter is constructed as a tapestry, with disparate threads taken from a number of rich sources and woven in a manner such that a picture of the concepts under analysis can be represented accurately. In addition to this and identified by other scholars is a lack of empirical primary research materials on Xinjiang during the Mao period. In weaving these sources together a bridge was constructed to span this empirical chasm. Thus, this second chapter relies heavily on the secondary sources it uses for its accuracy. By contrast, because of the recency of events under analysis, the third and fourth chapters were able to utilize more primary, empirical sources than the second chapter. However, much of the information used is Chinese state-produced through news institutions such as *The People's Daily*. Accordingly, the arguments put forward assume a certain amount of reliability and accuracy from these sources. Given the producers of statistics and information, this thesis does not emphasize quantitative analysis and instead relies more heavily on qualitative information. A final point for consideration in the potential limitations of this thesis is the contentiousness of the issues under analysis. Overall, the nature of ethnic discourse in China and its relationship with the Chinese nation and state has produced objections from different ethnic groups at different times of censorship, inaccuracy, or favouritism in reporting. These debates surrounding the legitimacy of the information and statistics produced have required extensive cross-checking of sources. The next chapter will examine the friend/enemy dialectic during the Mao period.

## Chapter 2

This chapter will examine the role of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang during the time of Mao. Michael Dutton's *Policing Chinese Politics* describes this period as the high tide of the friend/enemy dialectic, of politics understood as class struggle between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. The identification of enemies in the margins of the revolutionary class ebbed and flowed in intensity in accordance with a chimerical blend of discourses that emanated from a variety of sources during this time. These sources included the policies and directives from the Central Committee and the Politburo and a host of other institutions including the Ministry of Public Security and the PLA. At the heart of this demarcation of friend from enemy was the role that a particular form of popular sovereignty played, which is embodied in the concept of the massline. The massline rendered many of the campaigns of political violence possible since they relied heavily on the use and mobilization of popular support and collective action. In many cases the physical excision of the cancerous enemy from the Chinese body politic through execution, purging, or jailing was made possible by a galvanized citizenry operating in a close relationship with the governing institutions. The identification of enmity in the midst of the population was enabled by a translation of policy from below that operated in accordance with a disparate collection of technologies of coercion, discipline, control and reward. These apparatuses emanated from central, regional, and local authorities. To understand the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang however requires a shift from the discursive milieu of the political campaigns that occurred in Han Chinese areas.

This is not to say that the friend/enemy dialectic operated the same throughout Han areas in China; without a doubt it operated with varying degrees of intensity. Rather, it is to say that the ethnic composition of Xinjiang played a critical role in how the friend/enemy dialectic emerged. For example, the policies and political campaigns encouraged from the institutions of governance aimed at the Han masses appeared and were received differently by the masses of Xinjiang. In this manner, a technology like the massline could not necessarily be incorporated into the colonial periphery of Xinjiang. The enemy, for a variety of reasons to be discussed below, could not simply be smoked out by the minority nationalities themselves. Expanding on a silence in Dutton's analysis, it is my contention that ethnicity played a vital role in shaping the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang during the Mao period. I argue that to understand the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang we must situate within the backdrop of the colonial discursive networks that infused the way the region rendered intelligible the body of the ethnic Uyghur other. This analysis centers on the Uyghurs since they were the most populace ethnic group in the region and because of their history of resistance to both the Qing and the ROC. To understand the role Uyghur ethnicity played in shaping the friend/enemy dialectic it is important to outline how the Uyghur and other ethnic minority groups were understood in the psychogeography of the Chinese nation. Situating the discussion in this context allows a prism through which the shape and form the friend/enemy dialectic took in the region can be refracted. This chapter thus begins by explicating the limits of the construction of ethnic identity during the period of the CCP's consolidation of power in Xinjiang. Next, the chapter sketches the social and political structures in Xinjiang on the eve of its peaceful liberation and notes some of the key differences when compared with

the Han regions of China. The two subsequent sections discuss the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang. The first of these sections examines the friend/enemy dialectic from 1949 until 1954 beginning with the peaceful liberation to highlight the dialectic's beginnings under the PRC. The second part of this analysis will examine the close relationship between the friend/enemy dialectic and ethnicity in relation to three (in)famous political campaigns in China: the Hundred Flowers Movement, The Anti-Rightists Campaign, and the Great Leap Forward.<sup>31</sup>

### **Mao, Marx, and Lenin and the Ethnic Question**

In general, the politics of identity during the period under analysis attempted to subsume ethnic identity into the logic of a *class based* friend/enemy dialectic.<sup>32</sup> It is for this reason that the literature during this period looked to Marxist-Leninist structuralism to understand theories of ethnicity and nationhood. It is therefore important to cast into relief the particular way the ethnicity was framed against the backdrop of the discursive metanarrative that defined the period. It is essential to do this because this vision was translated directly into policies and political practices in Xinjiang. This metanarrative was fundamental in shaping the CCP's understanding of the empirical reality of its minority regions and concomitantly shaping the political practices that were imagined and instituted to deal with the areas and peoples. This understanding, fused with a number of other discourses, made up the CCP's "Chinese" framework for understanding Uyghur

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<sup>31</sup> Although the Cultural Revolution was said to be particularly disastrous for the Uyghurs it will not be analyzed. It was not selected as an exemplary case due to the extreme lack of empirical materials available. However, the fragmented sources that are available indicate its extreme destructiveness in the region. See for example: June Dreyer, "The Cultural Revolution And Minority Nationalities," *The China Quarterly* 35 (Jul. – Sep., 1968): 96.

<sup>32</sup> While not referring to the friend/enemy dialectic Gladney has argued similarly regarding class and ethnicity: *Muslim*, 92.

identity. This mode of analysis produced an ideological lens which was central in the understanding of ethnicity as a class problem which led to the treatment of many Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities as enemies. This section begins by exploring the role of Marxism and the way in which it shaped the Chinese nation and its relationship with its ethnic minorities.

The metanarrative of Marx's universal History was sublimated directly into the psychogeography of the Chinese nation vis-à-vis Mao and the CCP understanding of it.<sup>33</sup> History was understood as a constant movement through contradictory stages and its linear, teleological understanding of material existence was framed dialectically.<sup>34</sup> Each stage required a transformation that would occur between a thesis and an antithesis. Out of these struggles would emerge a synthesis in which a reality more progressive, advanced, and modern would be reached.<sup>35</sup> It was this metanarrative of a universal drive of History that was used to translate all countries and societies. This drive towards the *telos* of global communism was important to the question of ethnic minority nationalities because it informed the way minority nationalities were understood in relation to a Han ethnic other. Following this logic, as all societies and nations progressed to further stages, the boundaries that manifested oppression, including ethnic boundaries, would disappear. However, there were countries and nations that were closer to achieving national communism than others, and it was along this line that Lenin and others entered the dialogue.

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<sup>33</sup> See for example: Duara, 13.

<sup>34</sup> *Karl Marx Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977): 179.

<sup>35</sup> See for example: Mao Tse-Tung, *Four Essays on Philosophy* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1968), 26-27.

The transposition of universal History into the particular case of the Chinese nation required a translation into ethnic terms due to the legacy of racialist, anthropological, and scientific discourses and the pre-existing identification of ethnic difference.<sup>36</sup> The previous chapter discussed the construction of the Chinese nation as both ethnic and multinational and the role that Stalin's four commons played in identifying the Uyghurs; however, Lenin also needed to be reckoned with. A speech by Wang Feng, former Vice-Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, which was subsequently published in the *People's Daily*, illustrates the point:

Lenin, in commenting on the question of autonomous right for nationalities, he said [*sic*]: “Marxism absolutely demands that in analyzing any question, we must bring it up with a certain historical scope, and then extend it to the country concerned (such as its nationalities principle), and in this connection, its concrete characteristics and the characteristics of the other countries in that historical period must be taken into full account.... Since the countries are different from one another in the speed of development and in the composition and the distribution of its nationalities failure to pay due attention to those historical and the concrete conditions will prevent the formulation of a nationalities principle of the Marxist order.”<sup>37</sup>

While the quote was from a speech delivered in 1959 it nevertheless captures the centrality of Lenin in the translation of universalism into the particularities of China's ethnic question. What emerged was an articulation of discourses of anthropology,

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<sup>36</sup> For a thorough treatment of this see Liebold, *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism*; Dikotter, *Discourse*.

<sup>37</sup> *Communist China 1955-1959* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 564.

political theory and a host of others that bridged the divide of the universality of Marxism, the particularity of the ethnic question and the case of China. This produced an interdisciplinary classificatory schema that provided a sub-division of nationalities according to the stage of communist development each had attained. The “scientific” production of knowledge of minority nationalities was essential in this process of translation. Anthropology played a critical role in this act since it identified, categorized and appropriated, and (re)produced knowledge of the ethnic other in China. This discourse played a critical role in circulating power and control through the production of knowledge of the Uyghurs. This knowledge directly affected the colonial project in Xinjiang, the policies of development for the Uyghurs, and later the friend/enemy dialectic. Fei Xiaotong illustrates the importance of this. He was one of China’s most respected anthropologists and sociologists who participated in the field work that led to the classification of minorities during the early years of the PRC. He described ethnicity in a paper entitled *Social Transformations*: “The ethnicity of a nationality takes shape, grows and passes away in history according to its own law of development.” And moreover, “Generally speaking, human society develops according to the universal order from primitive communism to a society with classes, and then to a society without exploitation or classes.”<sup>38</sup> Fei’s anthropological understanding of the notion of stages was one of many nodes of power that acted as a nexus through which the superstructure of Marxism and Leninism was deployed into the construction, understanding, and strategies of handling ethnic difference.<sup>39</sup> Thus minority nationalities were inscribed in to the

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<sup>38</sup> Fei Hsiao Tung, “Social Transformations,” *Towards A People’s Anthropology* (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), 41.

<sup>39</sup> Gladney, *Muslim*, 72-74.

imagination of the Chinese nation, situated in a subaltern hierarchically defined position legitimated by their perceived cultural and racial inferiority.<sup>40</sup> Given the importance of ethnicity in the Chinese nation the question is why did this translation matter?

The answer is that the inclusion of minority nationalities into the horizontal scope of the Chinese nation did not necessarily entail the *integration* of these groups as distinct, self-governing nations as Lenin had suggested Marxism required. Rather, the vertical component of this inclusion presumed a subaltern minority who would require tutelage to bring them out of their backwardness. Indicative of this perspective was the CCP's omission of the right of "self-determination" (*minzu zijue*) in its nationality platform during its Second Congress of Soviet Delegates in 1934. The Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities became, in James Liebold's terms, the "Han man's burden."<sup>41</sup> The stages of communist development classified and institutionalized through state discourses thus produced a minority nationality other that legitimated the CCP's colonial construct, its "civilizing project."<sup>42</sup> The articulation of Marx's superstructure, Lenin's self-determination, and the particular discourses of fields like race, anthropology, and ethnology ultimately resulted in the construction of the Chinese ethnic question into a revolutionary class question. Accordingly, Mao described race thusly: "The racial question is in essence a class question. Our unity is not one of race; it is the unity of comrades and friends. We should strengthen our unity and wage a common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and the running dogs, to attain complete and thorough

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<sup>40</sup> Although the language of racialological alterity was forbidden by the CCP, it is safe to say it remained in the categories of cultural and class difference, Dikotter, *Discourse*, 191.

<sup>41</sup> Liebold, 101-102.

<sup>42</sup> Stevan Harrell, *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 8-36.

national independence and liberation.”<sup>43</sup> From this perspective and in both ethnic and class terms, groups like the Uyghurs were in need of tutelage from the Han to bring them to the necessary threshold of modernity, thereby allowing them to become a developed revolutionary *class*. In a similar way and as Mao noted, the Opium Wars and the colonial exploitation of China provided evidence that outside forces could be propellers of modernity. History thus proved the truth of the civilizing colonial project.<sup>44</sup> In fact, without the interference of an outside group this natural teleological historical process could take an infinite amount of time and the incorporation of minorities could not be guaranteed.

Overall, the lack of minority development that required the “civilizing project” was a drag on the drive towards modernity and the attainment of communism of the Chinese nation. Thus, the Han man’s burden, the question of the elimination of ethnic difference was framed as a question of class. That the construction of a complete Chinese revolutionary class would eventually give way to utopia was contingent on the national minorities playing catch-up. The Han would take the role of instructor. The expectation of the colonial project, discussed below in the context of the friend/enemy dialectic, was to be the withering of the boundaries of minority ethnicity and the Uyghurs incorporation into the revolutionary class. Ethnicity was thus viewed as an affliction that hindered this development. In this way, becoming a revolutionary class and maintaining ethnic identity were diametrically opposed. So, until the corollary limit was reached by each minority nationality, the class consciousness that precluded a group’s incorporation into the

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<sup>43</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, “The Racial Question Is A Class Question,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*. <[http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9\\_06.htm](http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_06.htm)>. (17 March 2010)

<sup>44</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, *Four Essays on Philosophy* ( Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1968), 56.

revolution could not occur. What was especially problematic and was to become an enormous site of contention and defining locus of enmity was the relationship between the Uyghurs and one of their key non physiological markers of ethnic difference: Islam. Marx's distaste for religion as false consciousness was equally matched with Mao's disdain, in spite of his inclusive rhetoric of a united front;<sup>45</sup> this, coupled with the historical legacy of Islam in the previous Chinese Empires helped situate the Uyghurs in a position of dangerous alterity.<sup>46</sup> Put simply, this section has argued that while Uyghur identity was ethnically defined, it was situated as a class problem. Uyghur identity was in many ways at odds both with revolutionary theory and the dominant discursive formations of power allowing a wide classification of enmity to emerge. The following section will situate Xinjiang in the context of the region's pre-existing socio-political structures and the revolutionary experience in Han areas of China.

### **Situating Xinjiang**

Before discussing the two periods outlined below two comments are required. First, a short discussion of the Uyghur social and political structures that existed prior to 1949 must be disclosed to contextualize the subsequent sections. Second, a brief word is required on the campaigns that are discussed later: the Land Reform and the Campaign Against Counter-Revolutionaries, the Hundred Flowers Movement to the Great Leap Forward. This discussion will examine how they took shape in Han areas in China to highlight their distinguishing features in Xinjiang. To understand the particularities faced

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<sup>45</sup> Michael Y.M. Kau, and John K. Leung eds. *The Writings Of Mao Zedong: 1949-1976*, (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1986): 101.

<sup>46</sup> See for example, Marx's "On the Jewish Question" and "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," *Karl Marx*, 39-74.

in Xinjiang a word on the pre-existing social and political structures prior to 1949 is needed.

In 1884 the region had become more than just a site of military garrisons and colonial outposts, but according to Dillon: “as far as possible the Qing ruled through the existing political and religious structures.”<sup>47</sup> There was little Qing social control and the region was loosely connected to the Empire. This began to change with the establishment of the ROC in 1912. During the Republican period three successive governing regimes existed. Each embodied a different style of governance and produced different implications for Xinjiang’s socio-political structures. The three styles can be briefly summarized as follows. First, Yang Tseng-hsin (1912-1928) implemented a policy of cultural “sinicization” and economic development with a heavy emphasis on attempting to develop tighter links with the rest of China; these policies helped to foment unrest and resistance leading to a number of rebellions.<sup>48</sup> Second, Chin Shu-jen’s regime (1928-1933) followed a similar line to Yang’s, but was considerably less successful, so much so that a Uyghur Republic was declared in 1933 in Kashgar.<sup>49</sup> Third, was Sheng Shih-ts’ai (1933-1944) who reversed much of the sinicization project—although he destroyed the Kashgar government—and stimulated economic development by working closely with the Soviet Union. Foreseeing the destruction of the USSR in the Second World War Sheng had an about face regarding his close relationship with the Bolsheviks. Sheng embraced the KMT’s governing policies and reversed his cultural stance towards the

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<sup>47</sup> Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 18.

<sup>48</sup> Svat Soucek, *A History Of Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 269-270.

<sup>49</sup> Soucek, 271.

Uyghurs and focused on a more repressive Sino-centric line of policies and governance.<sup>50</sup> Under Sheng's leadership there was a revolt similar to the one faced by his predecessor which led to a Uyghur revolutionary government (the Three Districts Revolution) being established in Gulja, Kashgar and Ili. This alternative government was unable to be controlled by the ROC's central government in spite of many attempts.<sup>51</sup> As the Chinese civil war neared completion, the territory of contemporary Xinjiang was ceded to the CCP and incorporated by the PRC in what was called a "telegram uprising" (*tongdian qi yi*) negotiated between PLA general Tao Zhiyue, KMT general Zhang Zhizhong, Mao, and Burhan Shahidi (who would become the region's first chairman of the region's government.)<sup>52</sup> Shortly after these negotiations an airplane crash killed eight prominent leaders of the Three Districts government who were en route to Beijing to negotiate the terms of this incorporation *post facto*. The CCP had little to go on in the beginning of its reign and the social and political structures that had existed were attacked during the various campaigns discussed below. On the eve of liberation the social structures were extremely diverse, mainly due to the region's existence as a periphery during the Qing period and perhaps most importantly due to the complex physical geography of the region. As argued in the previous section the Uyghurs were understood as backward; this situated their pre-existing social systems in a similar position. The social structures needed to be eradicated to integrate the people into the revolution. Although there was a panoply of cultures and social systems, what most of the Uyghurs shared in common was a deep commitment to Islam. Dillon captured this reality in describing Kashgar, stating

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<sup>50</sup> Soucek, 271-272; Dillon, 21-22.

<sup>51</sup> Soucek, 272.

<sup>52</sup> Dillon, 34.

that: “Islam was a society and society was Islam.”<sup>53</sup> This importance in the daily lives of Uyghurs in Xinjiang led it to become critical terrain in which the friend/enemy dialectic would emerge.

Before discussing the political campaigns in Xinjiang a discussion of their form in Han areas of China needs to be noted. All of the political campaigns discussed below took violent and coercive forms in the Han areas. Thus a question that must be asked is what distinguishes Xinjiang and the Uyghurs from the friend/enemy dialectic in other, Han dominated regions? The preceding section highlighted the theoretical milieu of the definition of minority nationalities in China which supported and legitimated the methods used by the CCP to create the colonial social and political institutions in Xinjiang, but many similar institutions were also created in Han regions. However, an important distinction was that in most other regions in China the CCP sought to capitalize on social structures already in place. As Teiwes described the situation: “At one level, there was considerable structural continuity throughout the period of the Maoist state despite drastic changes in political and even in the functioning of major institutions. With a few exceptions, there was considerable continuity in intermediate territorial administration . . . which also reflected continuities with the traditional state.”<sup>54</sup> As we will see below, the case of Xinjiang was an exception to this rule of continuity. Also noteworthy was that at every level of governance that was constructed in Xinjiang a Han cadre was required to supervise.<sup>55</sup> These cadres were placed in a position that ethnicized their existence.

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<sup>53</sup> Dillon, 28.

<sup>54</sup> Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Chinese State During The Mao Period,” in *The Modern Chinese State*. ed. David Shambaugh (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 112.

<sup>55</sup> Donald H. McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 44, 48.

Dichotomies such as rural/urban and cadre/masses played a critical role in the sharpening of the divide between friend and enemy during the Mao period. What was not shared in the experience of Han regions was a sharpening of this divide based on the concept of ethnicity. The Han cadre's role wasn't only as ranking officer in the CCP and institutions of governance, and likewise the PLA troops were not simply soldiers. Important in the establishment of the social and political structures in Xinjiang, in contradistinction to most other regions of China, was the placing of Hans in supervisory positions. This allowed Hans to override decisions made by Uyghurs based on their ethnic superiority. In an analysis of the organizational causes of the violence of the Cultural Revolution Lynn White focused on the importance of class labels, arguing that they created mass political groups which peeled into antagonisms.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, the political campaigns discussed below focused on ethnic labels and categories, an experience not shared in Han areas. The remainder of this chapter will look at the establishment of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang and the role ethnicity played in its operation.

### **Peaceful Liberation and the early years of Xinjiang**

The theoretical milieu discussed above was directly related to the strategy and deployment of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang from 1949-1954. The political practices that emerged cannot be understood without this backdrop. The CCP faced a number of substantial challenges in Xinjiang. To begin with, the region's people had heavily resisted previous authorities and established a number of autonomous governments in the recent past. Secondly, Xinjiang possessed a wide array of valuable

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<sup>56</sup> Lynn T. White, *Policies Of Chaos: The Organizational Causes Of The Cultural Revolution*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12.

natural resources but was bordered by the Soviet Union, a country that had historically played an active role in the region.<sup>57</sup> Thirdly, the region was crippled with a backward populace that lacked cultural development and class consciousness. For these reasons, the CCP sought immediately to establish and demonstrate its sovereignty as the proprietor of the region. While in many other regions the Party was able to quickly dispose of those designated as counter-revolutionaries and class enemies, it was not so fortunate in Xinjiang due to the plethora of ethnic identities. While the deployment of CCP officials to learn from and indoctrinate communities happened across the country, the Party did not infiltrate and utilize the Uyghurs' hitherto existing socio-political structures to nearly the same degree.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, the hostility of the local population warranted the region being positioned in a Schmittian "state of exception" directed by the central government thanks to the declaration of martial law and the violence that followed it. While stability was established shortly thereafter thanks to the PLA, the series of policies that will be discussed below point to intense political violence that occurred from 1949-1954.<sup>59</sup> From the day of "peaceful liberation" in early September 1949, the people of Xinjiang were subjected to institutionally directed violence. Following the declaration of liberation, chaos engulfed Xinjiang as KMT officials, local nationalists and ethnic leaders attempted to fight the rules of the formal incorporation.<sup>60</sup> Locals attempted to provoke a mutiny among the surrendering 80,000 KMT troops stationed in the region in an attempt to pit them against the incoming PLA soldiers.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> For a discussion of the Soviet Union in the region see for example: Soucek, 270-274.

<sup>58</sup> Dutton, 89; See Lynn White's analysis of this utilization of structures in Shanghai in White, 50-103.

<sup>59</sup> Martial Law was declared in Xinjiang on the 26<sup>th</sup> of September, 1949. McMillen, 24.

<sup>60</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 24.

<sup>61</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 24.

With the hindsight offered by the present, the orders issued to the people of Urumqi under the threat of death, to enthusiastically greet the PLA upon their arrival by air, can be read as a fitting introduction of the people of Xinjiang to the PRC.<sup>62</sup> Over a hundred and twenty thousand people walked the handful of miles to greet their liberators under this shadow.<sup>63</sup> Following the PLA's arrival, the First Field Army under Wang Zhen became the region's guarantor of security, stability and acquiescence. The Xinjiang Military Region was established under the direct control of the Central Committee as a pillar of stability to allow the Party to establish control. Since many of the revolutionary technologies of control that relied on discourses of Chinese culture were not necessarily applicable to the Uyghurs who were culturally different and overwhelmingly religiously Muslim, the minorities would need considerably more remoulding than their Han compatriots.<sup>64</sup>

The problems associated with Xinjiang mentioned above, coupled with its discursive location in the Chinese nation, rendered the policing of Xinjiang an urgent task, so urgent that it was not until 1954 that the territory was declared one of China's autonomous regions. It was during this time that the Party had begun to establish and to staff its non-military institutions in the region. The violence during this time was quite intense. Although there are no completely conclusive statistics, we can make inferences based on the information available. The statistics on the region in its first three years are quite telling of the centrality and of the quotidian nature of the friend/enemy dialectic;

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<sup>62</sup> Christian Tyler, *Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang* (London: John Murray, 2003), 129.

<sup>63</sup> Tyler, 129.

<sup>64</sup> For discussions of these technologies and the culturally Chinese elements see Frank Dikotter, "Penology And Reformation In Modern China," and Michael Dutton and Xu Zhangrun, "A Question of Difference: The Theory And Practice Of The Chinese Prison" both in *Crime, Punishment And Policing in China* ed. Børge Bakken (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) 29-63, 103-140.

from 1949-1952 between 30,000 and 120,000 people were liquidated.<sup>65</sup> To provide some perspective, Mao in his famous speech *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*, contested an inaccuracy of the newspapers in Hong Kong. He stated that 700,000 was the true figure of those executed in the first three years of the PRC.<sup>66</sup> If we take Mao's citation seriously then a large asymmetry emerges. The population statistics cited from the census conducted in 1953 placed the population total at 4,874,000 with the Uyghurs making up the largest population group at 74.7 percent of the total and Hans accounting for a mere 6.1 percent. While the population of Xinjiang makes up only a fraction of a percentage of the total population of China during the same period, the deaths of so many counter-revolutionaries adds up to somewhere between 4 and 17 percent of the total, thus illuminating a marked disparity in estimated political deaths in the region. This is clearly a significant number that translated on the ground constituted a large human atrocity. Alternatively, the *Urumqi Evening News* placed the number of people executed or sent to labour reform (*laogai*) camps during the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries at half a million individuals producing an even larger disparity in the intensity of violence experienced in Xinjiang.<sup>67</sup> By contrast, the same counter-revolutionary campaign in Shanghai which had a population at the time of just over five million saw the arrest and trial of 38,000 with only a small fraction of these people put to death.<sup>68</sup> Clearly, there was a palpable difference in the intensity of the number of enemies from Shanghai to Xinjiang. Having established the depth of the friend/enemy dialectic a

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<sup>65</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 101-102.

<sup>66</sup> Interestingly, this portion of the speech was not included in the Foreign Press's release of the speech. See Mao, *Four Essays* and Mao Tse-Tung, *The Secret Speeches Of Chairman Mao*, eds. Roderick Macfarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 142.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in Dillon, 35.

<sup>68</sup> White, 94.

question yet remains: who were these enemies? The Land Reform campaign and the movement against counter-revolutionaries will answer this.<sup>69</sup>

The Land Reform campaign directly situated the discussion of social and political reforms into the friend/enemy dialectic. From the beginning of land reforms the campaign to eliminate counter-revolutionaries was inextricably connected to it. The Land Reform campaign was supervised by the Xinjiang Agrarian Reform Committee through the PLA and operated from 1949 until February 1954. It oversaw the seizure and redistribution of 7,370,000 *mu* to over 650,000 poor and landless households. Moreover, it also began social restructuring by putting over 30 percent of the peasants in rural areas into 58,773 Mutual Aid Teams.<sup>70</sup> The practices of land reform also enabled the identification of friends and their separation from enemies' vis-à-vis owners of large amounts of land. As Mao pointed out both in *On Contradiction* and elsewhere, although clear lines must be drawn between “ourselves” and the enemy if properly handled the antagonistic relations between the two groups could be “transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods.”<sup>71</sup> This meant that the categories of enmity needed to be dovetailed to allow a variety of degrees of guilt and a taxonomy to accordingly distribute punishment. Through the PLA and the process of Land Reform the CCP attacked the social, political, and religious structures of the Uyghurs and other minority nationalities. As elsewhere in China, the Land Reforms in Xinjiang were as much about redistribution as they were about shaking up the pre-existing social

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<sup>69</sup> Dillon, 35.

<sup>70</sup> McMillen, 134-135.

<sup>71</sup> Mao, *Four Essays*, 82.

structures.<sup>72</sup> This would allow the Party to rebuild the backwards ethnic territory in the vision it wanted. Since wealth, authority, and social structures were linked so tightly with the ownership of land, owners of large plots were among the first to be identified as enemies. Also implicated were Uyghur clergymen, moneylenders, and Uyghur intellectuals. Many of these people were sent to *laogai* camps or executed. The PLA constructed work teams which played an important role in the process of establishing peasant associations and cultivating local minority cadres, all under “Han direction,” to redistribute land and isolate enemy elements.<sup>73</sup> While this process occurred in the countryside across China, the ethnic component rendered the experience in Xinjiang more overtly colonial than might have been interpreted in other regions, an argument all the more supported by the Party’s emphasis on always placing Hans in positions of authority.<sup>74</sup> While political reliability was cited as a concern and a rationalization for this supervision, it was also a concern in Shanghai and most other regions, and yet the problem was handled without a hierarchical ethnic component.<sup>75</sup>

During this period the friend/enemy dialectic was defined in the symbolic categories of sheep and goats, goats being the enemy. The category of goats was refracted into various levels depending on a range of factors including social status and land ownership. Those that occupied the upper strata of both groupings were mostly executed while those that occupied the lower strata were capable of reforming through a variety of disciplinary and/or educational mechanisms. Sheep were in one of two groups, either

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<sup>72</sup> Tony Saich, *Governance And Politics Of China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 32-33.

<sup>73</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 131-132.

<sup>74</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 29.

<sup>75</sup> See the Three and Five Anti Campaigns for a discussion of these problems: Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics And Purges In China: Rectification And The Decline Of Party Norms 1950-1965* (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1979), 128-131.

middle class friends and the proletariat or farm labourers and peasants.<sup>76</sup> The result was that many of the most powerful and most charismatic Uyghur elites were executed.<sup>77</sup> To enable this violence, at least five hundred thousand soldiers and civilians from greater China were moved to the region from 1949 until 1954.<sup>78</sup> The stated purpose of these Han people was to provide internal and external security, against minority unrest vis-à-vis “local nationalism” and the need for combat readiness against foreign aggressors respectively.<sup>79</sup> While military control was quickly repealed in other areas in China with distinct public security bureaus being established, in Xinjiang the military continued to play a central role in policing and attempting to deconstruct the threat of minority revolt. This movement of Han bodies testifies to the ethnic component of the process of consolidation executed under this period. From 1949-1954 policies were not simply about consolidating local support, since the Party was able to recruit a considerable many Uyghur cadres in spite of the Party’s rhetoric of ethnicity as a class problem. If class was the main problem Han migration should not have been important to secure control in the region. In other words, this movement of the population as well as the hegemonic positions of governance occupied by Han ethnics demonstrated the incommensurability of class questions with ethnic questions. The CCP’s project in Xinjiang was not simply about securing local support as was the case elsewhere; the Uyghurs needed to become a revolutionary class *through* Han tutelage. The movement of Han bodies thus played a critical role in securing the region and this is why the Party encouraged and coerced so

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<sup>76</sup> Tyler, 132-133.

<sup>77</sup> Tyler, 133.

<sup>78</sup> Tyler, 135.

<sup>79</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 102.

many Hans from other regions to move there. Their presence later enabled a more thorough destruction of dangerous enemies from the ranks of the population.

In sum, the security of the region provided by the PLA enabled the CCP to establish itself, recruiting thousands of cadres and eliminating countless threatening bodies from the national corps.<sup>80</sup> The barrel of the gun was critical to enabling the negation of the enemy other en masse; this process was not a reflection of popular sovereignty, with the masses leading the praxis of the friend/enemy dialectic. While there were certainly segments of the Uyghur population who greatly benefited from the land reforms, overall there continued a strong sentiment of resentment towards the CCP in general and Hans in the region in particular.<sup>81</sup> In short, although the official policy towards minority nationalities was represented as a “united front”, the CCP’s policies indicate otherwise. The uprisings in Khotan in 1954 attest to this. A *laogai* camp was attacked and rebels took to the streets. The rebels were quickly subdued but they issued a proclamation stating their grievance: “The enemy of the religion the CCP has occupied the Muslim homeland, has plundered Muslim land, minerals and other property.”<sup>82</sup> Couched in the language of religious intolerance, this quote speaks to the sentiment of those ill affected by the policies pursued by the CCP during the early years of their rule in Xinjiang. The friend/enemy dialectic was ubiquitous during the period and pushed forward by the central government. From the inception of the region under a spectre of violence -the forced audience of the people of Urumqi under the gaze of the PLA- to the cessation of land reforms in 1954, the period was characterized by widespread political

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<sup>80</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 103.

<sup>81</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 131-133.

<sup>82</sup> Dillon, 55.

violence. This situated all differences in the region as a question of class although much of the evidence points to the notion that Uyghur ethnicity was the problem. The future of the region and of the friend/enemy dialectic is captured in the spirit of the Xinjiang People's Production Corps, (the XPCC or *bingtuan*,) which after being established in October 1954, became a testament and pillar to the governance of Xinjiang and is discussed in the next section.

### **One Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap**

The period from Hundred Flowers Movement until the Great Leap encompassed a wide range of policies from the CCP. In 1954 both the *bingtuan* and the Xinjiang Autonomous Uyghur Autonomous region were created. The policies surrounding security also began to change. Two things enabled this: the execution or jailing of a huge segment of Xinjiang's population identified as negative class elements, and the seizure and redistribution of land. The result was that the friend/enemy dialectic took a more radical form. The political rhetoric that stated if "the conditions are not right we cannot carry out reform" was to become less of a contentious issue to Mao and the central government in Xinjiang.<sup>83</sup> The preconditions that had been identified in Mao's speech, *Don't Attack on All Fronts*, quoted above, had been met. The armed forces, cadres from minority nationalities, and the masses were aligned in a constellation such that the conditions were reaching a threshold enabling the primitive social structures to be totally obliterated and allowing for the birth of revolutionized structures. The Party's position on Han Chauvinism or Great Hanism on the one hand and its identification of the threat of local

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<sup>83</sup> Michael Y.M. Kau, and John K. Leung eds. *The Writings Of Mao Zedong: 1949-1976*, (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 1:105.

nationalism on the other hand legitimated the intensification of the friend/enemy dialectic in the region. Since the Party had situated itself by condemning its unenlightened Han elements in Xinjiang while simultaneously attacking resistance under the auspices of local Uyghur nationalism, the CCP was able to represent itself as acultural and unconcerned with ethnic questions, a position that was of course out of step with its theoretical underpinnings, its ideological imagination, and its public policies. In the face of all of this however, this representation allowed a shift in the boundaries of the friend/enemy dialectic. Accordingly, the ethnic demographics of the population in the region were rapidly changing which enabled the radicalization of the Party's policy and its further ethnicization, meaning that ethnic markers or identifiers gained increasing salience in the identification of enemies. From this perspective, this section will frame the discussion of the friend/enemy dialectic around three events to show the normalization of this tendency: the Hundred Flowers Movement, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, and the Great Leap Forward.

Having begun to construct Party centered social and institutional structures in the region, a more radical policy of dealing with ethnic difference emerged. Also important were the physical structures constructed by the Party, which included the Lanzhou-Xinjiang railway which was begun in 1955 and completed in 1962. In addition were the improvements of highways linking Urumqi to Korla and Tashkurgan to Kashgar. The development of social networks, through the Party's construction of local organs in Xinjiang, coupled with the increasing development of transportation networks was central to the construction of a security apparatus. By this time in Xinjiang, the Party had over 60,000 members (around 40 percent Han,) 2,500 branches, over 18,000 Han cadres

and over 35,000 non-Han cadres. Supplementing these numbers was the *bingtuan* which had over 300,000 members and by 1960 was managing over one third of the region's farmland.<sup>84</sup> Established also were 10,781 agricultural cooperatives accounting for two thirds of all farmers,<sup>85</sup> and by 1956 all businesses in Urumqi had been converted to joint state-private ownership. Unfortunately there is little academic research on the particular technologies of social control used in Xinjiang in contradistinction with other regions in China. However, given the state's deconstruction of the Islamic social order vis-à-vis the expropriation of the *waqf* (land holdings,) elimination of the legal authority of the mosque, and the state's assumption of these tasks in conjunction with its domination of the sphere of production, there is no question that the Chinese state had tighter social controls in place than it had ever had in the region. It is essential that the Hundred Flowers Movement be understood from this perspective since the ethnic identification via the friend/enemy dialectic was directly related to these institutions. They allowed for the representation of a deeper relationship between ethnic characteristics and the category of enemy.

On December 2, 1956 the question "are there truly no problems?" was circulated in Xinjiang, kicking off the Hundred Flowers Movement. It began in the newspapers with an editorial that critiqued the abject status and overall haughty treatment of minority nationalities. The article cited the emphasis on the Chinese language in governance and the subordination of Uyghur cadres who attempted to use their own language.<sup>86</sup> These

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<sup>84</sup> Donald H. McMillen, "Xinjiang And The Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 6. (Jul. 1981): 74; McMillen, *CCP*, 74.

<sup>85</sup> James A. Millward, and Nabijan Tursun, "Political History And Strategies Of Control, 1884-1978," *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*. ed. S. Frederick Starr, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 91.

<sup>86</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 90.

accusations struck a chord with Uyghur and other ethnic groups in the region because of its critique of Great Hanism.<sup>87</sup> In contrast to other regions in China the Hundred Flowers Movement in Xinjiang was framed around to the problems of Great Hanism and local nationalism. Accordingly, Wang Enmao acting as both political commissar and commander of the Xinjiang Military District attempted to address these issues by constructing a rectification team to examine them. The decision led to a rectification campaign and a purge which attempted to handle both the accusations of Great Hanism and local nationalism. Wang called on all Party organs to engage these topics in open discussion to expose the proponents of these different problems.<sup>88</sup> Wang also sought to rectify this problem by sending both Han and non-Han cadres to engage in transformative labour, justifying the Party's relocation of more than 2,700 to rural areas. As it turned out, the purpose of this was not only to (re)educate these cadres about the local material conditions but also to further facilitate the Party's infiltration in the Xinjiang's minority dominated countryside.<sup>89</sup>

The shift of the Hundred Flowers Movement, from an airing of grievances and suggestions for the PRC's improvement to a political campaign that attacked those who had chosen to speak out, was an experience shared in Xinjiang. Perhaps one of the chief reasons for this shift in Xinjiang was that in September 1957 a "counter-revolutionary" organization called the Chinese Nationalities Unity Party was discovered by the Regional Public Security Department of a Xinjiang *danwei*. The report that cited this discovery also gave the following statistics for Xinjiang in 1957. Eight hundred and thirty people

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<sup>87</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 90.

<sup>88</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 90.

<sup>89</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 90.

had been arrested, 100,000 more had been listed as suspects, and 53 cadres had been killed by counter-revolutionaries. Mass public trials were held to sentence these suspects.<sup>90</sup> This security scare degenerated into a widespread intensification of state led violence. This event coupled with Mao's decision to close the Hundred Flowers Movement brought about the further destruction of lingering "anti-revolutionary elements" in Xinjiang. This infamous reversal of the Hundred Flowers Movement led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the intensification of the role of the friend/enemy dialectic.

Given the circumstances in Xinjiang at the time, especially the construction of the Han-led colonial structures discussed above, the Hundred Flowers Movement had brought a popular airing of grievances on the terrain of Great Hanism by the Uyghur masses.<sup>91</sup> Consequently, those who had critiqued the state regarding Xinjiang's purported autonomy were punished.<sup>92</sup> As before, initially the hammer came from central government directives rather than popular mobilization. However, this time the friend/enemy dialectic expanded its scope. The Party took action and minority cadres who had spoken out were purged. The campaign then erupted and expanded to include minority nationalities more generally. The movement focused on the destruction of ethnic characteristics and the people embodying them. The enemies during this time were constituted by the ethnic borders that were crucial markers of Uyghur and other national minorities' identities: religious practices, dietary habits, and cultural differences all represented a close affiliation with enmity, though they did not necessarily equate to

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<sup>90</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 91.

<sup>91</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 91.

<sup>92</sup> Millward and Tursun, 92-93.

being an enemy.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, this ambiguity produced an intensification of violence directed at those who had not necessarily resisted the Party in any direct way. Having extinguished so many enemies from the upper echelon of society since liberation, the Party took on those that hindered communist development, the backwards “average” Uyghurs. Thus, enemies could be identified based on their adherence to their cultural norms, this marking a more overt shift from the supposed class-defined borders of the previous counter-revolutionary campaign. Accordingly, minority language was attacked and the Uyghur Arabic script was replaced with Cyrillic characters. The Chinese language was also imposed on the Uyghurs. The legitimation of this was based on the notion that backward languages impinged the Uyghurs’ and the Chinese nations’ progression to communist enlightenment.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, cultural heritage was identified as being a historical relic, worthy of existing in a museum but not of grounding quotidian practices. Accordingly, overt displays of cultural difference were attacked. Islam became a primary target and many members of the religious elite were singled out for criticism and re-education. Although there are no statistics from the region during the Hundred Flowers Movement and the subsequent Anti-Rightist Movement, a distinct shift was demonstrated in the Party’s overt attack of Uyghur and other minorities’ cultures. The friend/enemy dialectic was opened up to include those who in the past were merely the backward masses. The rapid assimilation of the Uyghurs was demanded by the state and those that rejected these policies became enemies. The structural framework discussed above was brought directly to the fore of the policies of the Party, the PLA and the other administrative bodies in Xinjiang.

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<sup>93</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 116-117.

<sup>94</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 119.

The Hundred Flowers Movement and its shadow the Anti-Rightist Campaign served as the foreword to the Great Leap Forward in Xinjiang which occurred between 1958-1961. Wang Feng's *Great Victory in Our Nationalities Policy* was written in 1959 and highlighted the successes the Party had enjoyed since liberation. As in previous Party statements, it noted the essence of the conditions of all areas and peoples was a class question, and that most resistance been destroyed and that continued resistance would meet a similar and historically proven fate.<sup>95</sup> Although the language posited a class-based question, once again the state's practices were conspicuously grounded on the foundations of ethnicity. The Great Leap Forward in Xinjiang represented a continued push by the Party to facilitate the incorporation of national minorities into the progressive stages towards communism. In this sense the question was class-based but it was the lack of withering of ethnic identity that undermined this project. Like elsewhere in China, the Great Leap in Xinjiang involved an amalgamation of bodies into large communes. The process included under its auspices a further movement of Han ethnics into the area: with 2 million entering the *bingtuan* during the Great Leap alone.<sup>96</sup> The influx of the Hans required the institutions such as the XPCC to absorb them. Donald McMillen's review of the organization fittingly titled *A Han Organization in a Non-Han Region* identified three primary roles of the institution: to exploit the region's resources, to act as vehicle to shuttle Han bodies into the region to acculturate the Uyghurs, and to provide internal and external security.<sup>97</sup> This coalescing of Han bodies made possible by the collective institutions like the *bingtuan* allowed the vision put forth by the Great Leap to be enacted.

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<sup>95</sup> Communist China, 563-567.

<sup>96</sup> Millward and Tursun, 90.

<sup>97</sup> McMillen, *XPCC*.

Thus, a more all-encompassing operation of the friend/enemy dialectic governing the treatment of the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities emerged.

The violence of the Anti-Rightist campaign that emerged out of the ashes of the Hundred Flowers movement was intensified in the Great Leap Forward, including its hallmarks of cultural intolerance. Secret executions, purges, imprisonment and *laogai* continued through the period.<sup>98</sup> The increasing pressure upon the minority groups caused a number of uprisings among the minority populace in Xinjiang including one in Hotan that reportedly lasted two months and required PLA reinforcements to be brought in to extinguish it.<sup>99</sup> Other examples of this resistance in reaction to the hardening of policies include riots and uprisings in Wusu, Qumul, and Baicheng, all occurring in 1958 alone. The language reform that had been pushed during the Hundred Flowers movement changed focus from Cyrillic to a Latin-based script with a Chinese phonetic system. This reform also marked a movement away from Soviet influence, a paranoia that had paradoxically been exacerbated by the intensification of the civilizing project and the deeper penetration of Central government institutions. Supplementing this was the realization of almost complete primary school enrolment with 957,000 children of the region by 1960.<sup>100</sup> Religious leaders and Islam itself, which hitherto had not been an overt focus outside of its well establish clerics prior to the Hundred Flowers Movement, came increasingly into the crosshairs of enmity. Arguments such as the following by Burhan Shahidi justified these actions: “Individual counter-revolutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam, and putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out counter-

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<sup>98</sup> Millward and Tursun, 94.

<sup>99</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 119.

<sup>100</sup> J. P. Lo, “Five Years of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, 1955-60,” *The China Quarterly* 8 (1961): 100.

revolutionary activities.”<sup>101</sup> But increasingly, the problem was not the instrumental problems with religion but Islam itself. The *People’s Daily* declared in August 1958 that war was declared against “all backward customs which stood in the way of progress and production” and yet emphasized that only the “evil” customs of religion would be eliminated to bring about national ethnic convergence.<sup>102</sup>

The characteristic mass mobilization of the Great Leap enabled both increased surveillance on the ethnic others and an intensification of the friend/enemy dialectic, since enemies were increasingly subjected to the gaze of the ethnic Han friend. Although, like the Hundred Flowers Movement, there is a lack of statistical data available regarding jailings, executions, purges, and excision from the social body to *laogai* camps during the period, nevertheless the postulation of a more widespread application of the friend/enemy dialectic is indicated by some statistics. In 1960, Party membership in Xinjiang totalled 176,970 with over 11,000 Party organs at all levels, with the Uyghurs accounting for over 60,000 of this figure and Kazakhs about 6,000. What is particularly interesting is not these statistics themselves but the temporal trends that predated these numbers. In the nine months predating the total above 38,000 new members had been recruited while since 1957 80,000 new Party members had entered the fold. McMillen cites these statistics to show the Han dominance of Party membership while also noting the tendency of non-Han cadres being placed behind Han members in positions of authority ensuring the watchful eye of Han cadres took precedence over minority nationalities.<sup>103</sup> The statistics also indicate a more complicit minority population, who were paradoxically a

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<sup>101</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 115.

<sup>102</sup> Article paraphrased in McMillen, *CCP*, 118.

<sup>103</sup> McMillen also suggests the statistics of minorities were likely inflated giving further credence to the point argued. *CCP*, 76-77.

crucial element in the opening up of the friend/enemy dialectic. These statistics also show that there was a movement among the Uyghurs to “self-colonize” and join the ethnicized project of political, social, and economic reformation and reconstruction of themselves and the territory of Xinjiang. In spite of these supportive elements Saiffudin emphasized that local nationalism was still a problem because many were: “holding tight the old, traditional culture”.<sup>104</sup> The friend/enemy dialectic was deployed to handle those “local nationalists” who resisted not only the policies of the Great Leap but also by extension the CCP’s ethnic authority.

Discussions of the Great Leap Forward in relation to other parts of China usually note its horrific level of starvation. Although the figures are not completely clear, at least several thousand died of starvation in Xinjiang during the period, yet for a number of reasons the havoc was not that catastrophic in Xinjiang. However, there is another side to this comparative strength in agriculture. The lack of starvation contributed to the migration of over 1 million Han people from China proper during this time, allowing a further strengthening of the construction of a Han population base in Xinjiang and concomitantly an increasingly inclusive boundary of enemy for ethnic minorities. The increasing classification of minority enmity was rendered intelligible in a variety of ways, including demonstrated resistance to any of the policies instituted during the period. There were a number of policies that produced considerable resistance: the almost complete institution of collectives in industry, pastoralism, and agriculture; the abolition of material incentives for production; the seizure of private holdings of land; the closure

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<sup>104</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 118.

of rural bazaars; and the fervent attacks on Islam. Exemplifying this resistance was the mass out-migration of primarily Kazaks, and many Uyghurs, from Xinjiang in 1962.<sup>105</sup>

Beginning on April 10<sup>th</sup>, between 60,000 and 120,000 fled the region through Gulja into the USSR to an area that is now Kazakhstan to avoid persecution.<sup>106</sup> The widespread fear instilled through the opening of the friend/enemy dialectic to the masses of ethnic minorities is supported by the diversity of Kazaks that chose to flee. Those who left were mainly peasants, herdsmen, and workers but not insignificantly some were Party cadres and government officials. This indicates that the category of enemy was not only strong enough to drive people to migrating out before the borders were closed but also that the oscillation of the category reflected in the assortment of those who left did not necessarily protect those who were Party members.<sup>107</sup> Scholars have all attributed this out-migration to the intensification of pressure brought on by the radical policies of the Great Leap, most of which were inextricably sutured to Han chauvinistic sentiments.<sup>108</sup> These policies coupled with the Soviet Union's logistical support through the issuance of doctored passports and propaganda production which pointed out the violence and chauvinism of the Chinese state's policies led to this ethnic minority exodus. The Chinese state's response to this outflow further supported the argument of the ubiquity of an ethnicized friend/enemy dialectic's during this period. The Chinese state closed its borders at Gulja on the 26<sup>th</sup> of May precipitating a protest which sparked a riot. State buildings were sacked, equipment destroyed, records stolen, and Han and minority

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<sup>105</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 122.

<sup>106</sup> Dillon, 56.

<sup>107</sup> Dillon, 56-57; McMillen, *CCP*, 122.

<sup>108</sup> Dillon, 56; Tyler, 147-149.

employees bound, beaten, and dragged to the Party's headquarters.<sup>109</sup> The rioters chanted slogans highlighting the ethnicized nature of the conflict: "Xinjiang belongs to us!" "The Chinese have occupied our land!" "Down with the Communist Party!" and "Destroy the Chinese!"<sup>110</sup> The riots were violently suppressed and followed by the deployment of 341,500 Chinese military veterans and the construction of fifty-eight colony farms along the Gulja border which included the forced movement of people living in the area.<sup>111</sup> The Great Leap Forward, as in the previous political campaigns since the establishment of Xinjiang, directly linked the friend/enemy dialectic to the terrain of ethnicity.

The friend/enemy dialectic from the peaceful liberation forward can be seen to have intensified and widened its scope through time. In spite of the intensity of violence which characterized the Party's early years in Xinjiang there was marginal tolerance to the ethnic minority masses. The friend/enemy dialectic focused on structures of ethnic leaders and elites to challenge the structures of authority. These strategies were eventually transposed as the CCP tried to destroy or infiltrate the social structures in the region and (re)construct them in its own image. The image of course was directly related to the blend of discourses that had created the Party. They were a combination of Marxism, Leninism, Mao's thought and the discourses of anthropology and ethnology, among many others. These discourses, coupled with the ethnic and racial component of the Chinese nation, as multi-national but Han-centric, infused the policies used in Xinjiang.

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<sup>109</sup> McMillen, *CCP*, 123.

<sup>110</sup> Tyler, 148.

<sup>111</sup> Tyler, 148.

The increasing and intensifying attacks on the ethnic minorities in general and the Uyghurs in particular were further made possible by organizations like the *bingtuan* which encouraged the inflow of Han bodies to the area by providing the means to absorb them. As the CCP established itself and Hans began flooding the region, the friend/enemy dialectic gradually focused more on the categories of Uyghur ethnicity. In sum, although between the campaigns from Hundred Flowers and the Great Leap and after there was a relaxation of the friend/enemy dialectic, it is clear that wave after wave of violence was commonplace during this period. Put another way, a normalization of the exceptional violence embodied in the decisionism of the friend/enemy dialectic was occurring. In many ways, these campaigns allowed the establishment of apparatuses of control that relied on mass support similar to that which existed in other regions in China at the same time. The collectivization of production and the migration of Han ethnics were essential to this. The established precedence of violence directed at the categories of ethnicity manifesting the excision of ethnic enemies is what distinguished Xinjiang from most other regions in China.

While this analysis is fractured by its reliance on a multitude of disparate sources and misshaped pieces so too was the period fractured. Situating the discussion in the terms that Mao proposed, that “we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution” would be to obfuscate the multiplicity of forms the dialectic took as it (re)emerged at various times.<sup>112</sup> From the Land Reforms onwards who was identified as enemy was a site of movement and contingency both across space and in time but at all

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<sup>112</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, “Analysis Of The Classes in Chinese Society,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*. <[http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1\\_1.htm](http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm)>. (18 March 2010)

times hitched to the categories of ethnicity. In short, the friend/enemy dialectic operated outside the confines of class in spite of the fact that it was often framed that way and violently focused on ethnic categories. The death of Mao in 1976 brought substantial changes to the friend/enemy dialectic and processes and policies described throughout this chapter. The following chapter will discuss its relocation.

### Chapter 3

It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars causing so many men to be killed. –

Michel Foucault – History of Sexuality Vol. 1<sup>113</sup>

The centrality of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang during Mao’s reign has shifted its locus of abode since the introduction of reforms. The shift away from the tumultuous pursuit of revolutionary politics has slowly faded from the register in most areas of China. As the systematic demobilization and depoliticization of the Chinese populace has gathered momentum, traces of the friend/enemy dialectic in the field of ethnic politics have remained; these processes have been unable to extinguish the political violence embodied in this discursive field. While the security apparatuses have been under constant reform since the 1980s and the beginning of the “age of the contract”,<sup>114</sup> ethnic politics has been unable to be dissolved under the relentless current of Chinese-style capitalism and the concomitant explosion of markets in Xinjiang. These reforms have brought with them “neo-liberal technologies of governance” which Jeffreys and Sigley have defined as governing from a distance via technologies of the self.<sup>115</sup> Paradoxically, while the encouragement of entrepreneurship, capital development, and privatization have taken hold of the Chinese psyche, displacing the sovereignty of populist driven decisionism characteristic of the Mao period, there has been a problematic trickle-down into the registers of ethnic difference. The theoretical framework constituting the concrete

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<sup>113</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction* (Toronto: Vintage, 1990): 137.

<sup>114</sup> Dutton, *Policing*, 251-300.

<sup>115</sup> Elaine Jeffreys and Gary Sigley, “Governmentality, governance and China,” *China’s Governmentalities* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 2.

policies of negotiating ethnic difference have remained overwhelmingly intact. This means that as neo-liberal technologies of governance have taken hold and the *biopoliticization* of the population has come to the fore as the dominant strategy of governance, the project of ethnic integration through the colonization of Xinjiang has not faded along with the coercive techniques of control of the Mao period. As the homogenous universal time of capital has taken hold and displaced the universal history of Marxism as driver of the Chinese nation, the spatialized psyche of the Chinese nation has not accommodated a (re)imagining of ethnic difference that redraws its boundaries. It remains as an on-going, progressive colonial project, fraught in the contrapuntal inclusionary and exclusionary nature of the Chinese nation discussed at length in the previous chapters.

The growth of biopolitics, a concept which will be defined below, has not meant a destruction of the friend/enemy dialectic but rather its repositioning in a multiplicity of spaces. Countless grievances perpetrated by the Chinese state and its corollary institutions against the minority populations in Xinjiang have rendered what Michael Dutton refers to as a “colonial governmentality,” a situation that emerges in times of emergency by-passing the otherwise rational, neo-liberal forms of governance, which through countless policing campaigns is a permanent state of affairs in the region.<sup>116</sup> The explosion of Uyghur restiveness since the beginning of economic reforms has guaranteed the sustenance of the friend/enemy dialectic as a central part of daily life in Xinjiang though in a different form than during the Mao period. Fuelled by economics, and supported by both hands of the Chinese government, the velvet glove of affirmative

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<sup>116</sup> Michael Dutton, “911: The After-Life Of Colonial Governmentality,” *Postcolonial Studies* 12, no. 3 (2009): 305.

action policies and direct investment and the iron fist of the state's security apparatus, the friend/enemy dialectic has continued to play an important if not hegemonic role in the state's policies in the region. This chapter begins by briefly discussing what is meant by biopolitics and discussing its importance to the contemporary situation in Xinjiang. The chapter will then discuss the government policies in the region in-depth, breaking them into macro strategies and micro tactics to emphasize the incisive changes from the Mao period. I will conclude the chapter with a discussion of how these policies have been translated into the friend/enemy dialectic, sustaining its existence within the trifecta of categories: terrorist, extremist, and splittist.

### **Foucault, Schmitt, Xinjiang: resituating Chinese governance and its limits**

Biopolitics, a term coined by Foucault, refers to a complex field of power which gradually subordinated the either/or binary of sovereign decisionism.<sup>117</sup> The logic of sovereignty, through which the friend/enemy dialectic is produced, reflected the sovereign's power over life and death. Paradoxically, only at these moments in which the sovereign identified enemies and destroyed them was its right to life displayed. For a host of reasons which Foucault discusses, there was a shift and a change of emphasis in sovereign power. This change resituated the logic of sovereignty, which had hitherto privileged a power over death. The movement was to a logic that focused on the "power to make live and let die."<sup>118</sup> While the technologies of discipline constituted the bodies of the individual subjects as malleable and docile, "man-as body", the technologies of biopolitics wagered the biological existence of the collective on the political operations of

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<sup>117</sup> The concept briefly discussed below relies on Foucault's discussion in *Society Must be Defended* and the *History of Sexuality*.

<sup>118</sup> Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* (New York: Picador, 2003), 241.

the state repositioning as “man-as-species”.<sup>119</sup> The penetration of disciplinary mechanisms at the level of the individual both enabled and occurred with the normalization of the population and the construction of the concept of the population biologically understood as an object of knowledge. This normalization and construction of the concept of population included a certain predictability of operations, of vitality, and of health that articulated with the myriad networks of power that produced individual subjects. What emerged was the changing role of the state, a shift to a nurturing of the population, a shift of both visions and operations of power that then became productive rather than deductive: in short power working to optimize life, to sustain it.<sup>120</sup> Foucault cites the twin phenomena of an explosion of demographics and the simultaneous processes of industrialization as being colonized into the equation of the state allowing the biopoliticization of the population to occur.<sup>121</sup>

However, in spite of this shift from the reductionism of sovereignty to a productive form, the matrixes of power, war and political violence have remained and indeed flourished, leaving a deeply troubling problem. Put another way, how could the sovereign justify taking life -as it most certainly did- when its role had changed to emphasize the production and sustenance of life? The answer lay in the concept of race. The constitution of the sovereign’s responsibility for the biological existence of the population meant that war and violence was to be inflicted for the protection and flourishing of the national species. In other words, it was waged for the race rather than for the sovereign. In Foucault’s words, this relationship of war, that “in order to live you

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<sup>119</sup> Foucault, *SMBD*, 243; Michel Foucault, *The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction* (Toronto: Vintage, 1990), 139.

<sup>120</sup> Foucault, *HS*, 140; Foucault, *SMBD*, 248.

<sup>121</sup> Foucault, *SCMB*, 249.

must destroy your enemies”, was wed to a logic which suggested that “if you want to live the other must die.”<sup>122</sup> War was thus waged for the very survival of the race, defined in *national* terms. This identification of threats against the national species was situated within a milieu of racism such that threats to biological existence were directly related to the hierarchical structures of race. The implication is that not only was the execution of the racially inferior other justified but was in fact necessary for the growth and survival of the national population. Further, the justification of this widespread violence waged against other populations was legitimized in that they were neither part of nor concerned with the survival of the national race which in theoretical and practical terms (re)position the enemy horizontally outside of the nation and vertically outside of the “human” race.

Through Foucault’s discussion of biopolitics there is a connection between the racist underpinnings of political violence which lead to Schmitt’s friend/enemy dialectic. Foucault’s discussion of the legitimation of political violence exercised in the name of the population weds beautifully with Schmitt’s friend/enemy dialectic. Foucault demonstrates that the friend/enemy dialectic through sovereign decisionism always remains on the horizons of possibility, uneclipsed by the liberal state or liberalizing state, and furthermore that this identification of friend from enemy and its destruction is sutured to the concept of race. Though Foucault’s discussion centers on sources most concerned with Europe we can nevertheless connect Schmitt, Foucault and Xinjiang through the Reform period.

The question is how is this Euro-centric political theory at all helpful for a discussion of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang? On the surface is the reality that many of the

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<sup>122</sup> Foucault, *SCMB*, 255.

discourses of scientific technologies of population management and administration as well as discourses of anthropology, bio-medical sciences, and ethnology were adopted by the Chinese and invoked by implication both the racialist underpinnings and the practices made possible through these power-knowledge constructs.<sup>123</sup> While a critique might be levelled that through the process of translation perhaps the deeper instantiations of these discourses might be lost, and that the problematics identified with the West's constitution of these technologies were lost in translation. However, this is contestable.

Since biopolitics rests on the presumption of a disciplinary individual subjectivity acting as a relay through which power flows in and out of the individual, he must be able to be self-governing. For biopolitics to exist a threshold must be reached in rationality, rendering the calculations of governance of the population truthful. Conversely, if the population is not a population at all, meaning that it lacks the ability to govern itself in accordance with the rational technologies producing subjectivity, it is incapable of being governed through the capillaries of power that produce the requisite docile body.

Although the Reform period has privileged a rationalization of governance, a demobilization of the population and an invigorated focus on its health, there has been an articulation or an oscillation of logics of power centered on race and ethnicity. So, while there has been a movement towards the governance of the Uyghurs in accordance with the tenets of biopolitics, some Uyghur bodies seen as unable to be governed in accordance with the technologies on the table, are treated by the extremity of biopolitics, the friend/enemy dialectic. The tensions in the repression of Uyghur identity in

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<sup>123</sup> For a more thorough discussion of these see Liebold, *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism*; Dikotter, *Discourses*.

conjunction with the drive to produce modern Chinese Uyghur subjects plays a critical role in enabling a large segment of the group to become enemies.

Enemies are made intelligible through their recalcitrance, demonstrated performatively in a host of different ways, ranging from political murders, rioting and bombings to non-violent modes of resistance such as writing, lecturing, and peaceful protests. To be sure, the purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the roots of conflict but rather to discuss in detail the networks of power that renders the terrorist, splittist and extremist intelligible. The ethnic construction of the Chinese nation with its minorities at the margins thus places the Uyghurs in a vacillating position given that they are already at the border of Chinese national identity and that the friend/enemy dialectic relies on the practices made possible by a discursive externalization of the enemy. The violent enemification of Uyghurs via resituating them in the three categories above is thus legitimated in the name of national survival.

The spatial position of Xinjiang, the ethnicized psychogeographic imagination of the Chinese nation, and the quotidian nature of the friend/enemy dialectic of the Mao period has helped to constitute a situation which has resulted in an active policing style and a reliance on the (re)deployment of campaign-style politics reminiscent of the violence discussed in the previous chapter. An analysis of the political economy of the region and its deployment of the dyad of development on the one side supports a range of employment opportunities and on the other side deploys disciplinary mechanisms in an attempt to sublimate the defiant, the resistant, the enemy other.

## **The Biopoliticization of Xinjiang**

### *Macro Strategies*

To understand the biopoliticization of Xinjiang we must discuss both the macro strategies and micro technologies that have been deployed to develop and control the region and its ethnic minority population since the Mao period. The macro strategy of incorporation operates between the twin poles of repression and development; the latter of these will be discussed in the following section. Although the “Develop the West Campaign” was conceived in 2000, it has continued the Party’s age-old strategy of incorporation through development that has been in action since 1950. The statistics on the region are substantial: since the peaceful incorporation of Xinjiang the Central government has invested 386 billion *yuan* and since 1955 the XUAR government has received 375 billion *yuan* in subsidies to facilitate development. This funded large infrastructure projects, the development of industry, agriculture and services sectors of the economy, and expanded resource exploration and exploitation.<sup>124</sup> The GDP in 2008 stood at 420 billion *yuan*, a number twice as large as in 2000 when the Develop the West Campaign began, thus providing evidence that while the strategy has not changed, its intensification has increased.<sup>125</sup> Both intra-province and national highways have been constructed, railways maintained and expanded, airports built, and high-tech telecommunications networks established or expanded. Crucial also has been the opening of borders to neighbouring countries allowing the movement of people, information, and perhaps most importantly capital. These statistics and information are from the recent white paper on *The Development and Progress of Xinjiang* which in triumphalist fashion demonstrates that Xinjiang has never been in better shape, discursively (re)producing the truth of Chinese-

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<sup>124</sup> The Information Office Of The State Council, *White Paper On The Development And Progress Of Xinjiang*, 21 September 2009, < [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content\\_8717461.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/21/content_8717461.htm)> (18 March 2010).

<sup>125</sup> *White Paper On Xinjiang*.

led development: “Xinjiang has entered an era of rapid economic and social progress and enhanced comprehensive strength, with the local residents enjoying the most tangible benefits.”<sup>126</sup> However, as important to the project of development of infrastructure investment and the growth of factories is the social project as noted in the quote above. The project of social stability and ethnic integration has not been left out of the (re)imagination of a depoliticized harmonious Chinese society in the Western frontier of Xinjiang. The economic project of development in Xinjiang is tied directly to the social project of (de)ethnicization of the region which has been aided by the enormous in-flux of Han settlers and Han floating population. In other words, in spite of the drive for economic reform, the colonial project deployed to (re)construct Uyghur and other minority subjects has not changed in substance and it is still buttressed by a stabilizing force of Han ethnics. A deeper reflection of the Xinjiang white paper opens up a wealth of knowledge that pertains to the deployment of economic reform to eradicate the question of ethnicity that the Maoist period was incapable of dissolving- in spite of the relentless campaigns directed at the ethnic enemy other.

The population of Xinjiang, with emphasis on the Uyghurs, has been subjected to a range of policies and tactics that have attempted to facilitate this broad strategy of incorporation with the end goal of a normalized population. The logic of biopolitics is contingent on a certain predictability and rationality of the population, which is deeply indebted to the stabilizing force of Hans. In spite of the wide range of literature that cites the political repression in Xinjiang, arguably more important is the logic of biopolitics that enables a diversity of policies from affirmative action hiring practices and hiring

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<sup>126</sup> *White Paper On Xinjiang.*

quotas to universal primary education prefaced on the notion of development and integration. To be sure, the more overt technologies of repression are to be understood as the violent twin of the normalization process, but as the friend/enemy dialectic has been dismembered since the reform period began, ending the internal wars against counter-revolutionaries, a set of productive policies has risen to prominence in the strategies of incorporation. The biopoliticization of the population is prefaced on caring for the collective through the production and sustenance of subjects that conform to the dictates of the system of state and the strategies of governance it embodies. In other words, the concern with the welfare of the Uyghurs and the population of Xinjiang is a legitimate concern of the Central government, since economic development and efficiency is contingent not on tacit complicity but on active production. However, since many refuse to conform to the norms and regulations established by the state to produce healthy Chinese subjects, a schism is opened that exists at the margins of biopolitics. Adherence to Islam is an obvious example of this refusal of conformity since it has been unrelentingly a target of the Chinese state's scrutiny. In spite of the control being managed through the state run Chinese Islamic Association, it nevertheless is continually situated in an ambiguous position with regards to being placed in the category of enemy. The *Xinjiang Daily* nicely sums up the state's position: "We must distinguish between lawful religious activities and those which are against the law, and between authentic believers and those who are plotting separatism."<sup>127</sup> Indicative of this is the disproportionately high number of political and religious prisoners with Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Mongols accounting for two-fifths nationally, despite accounting for only

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<sup>127</sup> James D. Seymour and Richard Anderson, *New Ghosts Old Ghosts: Prisons And Labour Reform Camps In China* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 119.

around 1 percent of the population.<sup>128</sup> Thus, as more and more the Chinese state has (re)constructed its role as administrator and rational guardian of the population as a biological species, the inability of the government to produce minority subjects that are woven into the Chinese national population undercuts its very *raison d'être*: that is its protection and caring for its population. To think of it in more concrete terms, since the Uyghurs are already imagined as a crucial component of the Chinese nation, the Chinese state's inability to harness and produce normalized, depoliticized subjects who conform to its particular rationality actively shows a schism in the imagined Chinese nation and the empirical lived reality: a cost-benefit analysis cannot by itself undermine problematics hinged on identity.

Demonstrating the importance of the incorporation of Uyghurs as Chinese nationals is the discourse and practice of development in Xinjiang. The discourse of development is captured in the White Paper *On China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups*. The document begins by situating the discussion of the region within the national framework, articulating a history of minority nationalities akin to the one discussed in the previous chapters. However, two points are particularly noteworthy from the first act of this document. First, the title of the first section aptly captures its spirit: *A Unified Multi-Ethnic Country and a Nation with Diverse Cultures*. The section serves to set the stage for the entire remaining discussion executed in the document, and works to contain the discussion of ethnic policy within the established discursive limits of the Chinese nation; the section acts to stabilize and secure its borders. In its words: "Although the origins and histories of ethnic groups in China are

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<sup>128</sup> James D. Seymour, "Sizing Up China's Prisons," *Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China* ed. Borge Bakken (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 153.

different, the overall trend of their development was to form a unified, stable country with multiple ethnic groups.” So although the origins of each ethnic group might be clustered heterogeneously over space and time, their historical development has taken place at such a trajectory that there has been a synthesis of all, which has been contained in the Chinese nation. In the words of the Chinese state, “As early as in the pre-Qin Dynasty times before 221 BC the concepts of ‘country’ and ‘unification’ had taken shape in the minds of the Chinese people.”<sup>129</sup> The second point of note is the inclusion of a list of the names and population growth of China’s ethnic minorities. Accompanying this list is a graph which charts the ever-increasing percentage of ethnic minorities in China and graphs its numbers in millions. While the chart might appear innocuous as a simple statistical reflection of the minority nationality demographics, in the context of the transformation of ethnic policy, and the colonially rooted process of biopoliticization it operates as a device which demonstrates the changing role of the state and the logic of sovereignty. The graph is a marker of success, demonstrating the growing numbers of ethnic minorities and therefore underscoring the notion that the state has been successful in fostering life. That these segments of the population which are handicapped by ethnic inferiority can be successfully subjectified by the Chinese state proudly demonstrates its success in transitioning to biopolitics. This is not an over-reading of this simple chart; the remainder of the white paper proceeds in a similar fashion, noting its successes. Much can be inferred by reflecting on the titles selected for the following chapters: “Full Equality among Ethnic Groups”, “Consolidating and Developing the Great Unity of All Ethnic Groups”, “Upholding and Improving Regional Ethnic Autonomy”, “Accelerating

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<sup>129</sup> The Information Office Of The State Council, *White Paper On China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups*, 27 September 2009, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content\\_8742753.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-09/27/content_8742753.htm)>, (18 March 2010).

the Economic and Social Development of the Ethnic Minorities and Minority Areas”, “Protection and Development of Cultures of the Ethnic Minorities”, “Striving to Foster Cadres and Talented People of the Ethnic Minorities”. All of the titles and indeed the content of the sections reflect a vision of Xinjiang that highlights productivity and successes focusing mainly on the Uyghurs and the other ethnic minorities. The success of the Party in bringing the region and the Uyghurs forth into modernity reflects the productive logic of biopolitics a shift from the deductive politics of the Mao period.

There is however another side to this development which is also noted in the text of the white paper. The development project remains unfinished; the backward have not yet been completely subjectified. The Uyghurs have not yet reached a level of development wherein they are no longer a drag on the progress of the nation, or a level wherein they are no longer a problem for the state:

The state is convinced that quickening the economic and social development of minority communities and minority areas is the fundamental solution to China’s ethnic issues. Overcoming the difficulties and solving the problems in the minority areas hinges on development. For many years, the state has attached strategic importance to the development of ethnic minorities and the regions where they inhabit, and worked out guidelines and strategic arrangements in line with the realities of ethnic minorities in their different development stages to support the development of the ethnic minorities and the areas they inhabit in policies, capital, human resources and technology. . . . Through persistent efforts, the working conditions and living standards of ethnic minorities and the

minority areas have been greatly improved, and their standards of ethics, science, culture and health have been raised to a great extent.<sup>130</sup>

In stark terms, the quote echoes the notion that the biopoliticization of Xinjiang requires a continuous process of development in all of the fields mentioned: ethics, culture, health, science. In sum, the white paper captures the discourse of development as it pertains to the practices deployed in the biopoliticization of Xinjiang. Although the region is labeled as an autonomous region, a reflection on the literature discussed reveals the chasm between ethnic subjectivity and state envisioned Uyghur subjectivity. The Chinese state dreams of the possibility in the future but neither the region nor its ethnic minority subjects are at a level rendering them autonomous in any form.

#### *Micro Tactics*

The micro tactics deployed to push the development of the Uyghurs are as diverse as they are penetrating. Although there are many discursive fields through which the logic of biopolitics operate, or attempts to operate, there are a few streams of policy directed at Xinjiang and the Uyghurs that will be briefly discussed: education and language, healthcare, and culture. Commencing with education and language, the previous chapter noted the imposition of the translation of the Uyghur language into Cyrillic and subsequently into Latin characters. While these policies have been lifted, the state's emphasis on learning Chinese has not.<sup>131</sup> This emphasis has not necessarily translated into a large increase in the shedding of ethnic language given the statistic that

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<sup>130</sup> *White Paper On Ethnic Policy.*

<sup>131</sup> Interestingly the state now described this linguistic/cultural violence as a process that helped "minority people create or improve their scripts." *White Paper On Ethnic Policy.*

approximately 70 percent of the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang are illiterate in Chinese.<sup>132</sup> This lack of Chinese literacy is understood as serious problem “posing challenges for the minority people themselves and the region’s development.”<sup>133</sup> To rectify this, the region’s government passed a law requiring high school graduates to be fluent both in their mother language and Chinese. Doubtlessly, the pressure to learn Chinese has resonated among many Uyghurs. A number of scholars have noted the dilemma facing Uyghur elites regarding the choice to send their children to schools wherein they will be educated in Chinese (*min kao han*) or schools that are taught in Uyghur (*min kao min*) and supplemented with Chinese courses as a reflection of Chinese dominance in the region. On the one hand, educating children of Uyghur descent in Uyghur has the obvious advantages in cultural and social spheres since language itself is a powerful marker of identity and represents a different epistemology and worldview than another language offers. On the other hand, mastering Chinese opens up a plethora of opportunities not only in the various industries in Xinjiang, of which most are dominated by ethnic Hans, but also the possibility of working outside of the region. However, selecting *min kao han* may bring a powerful social stigma that may have a range of different repercussions inside and outside of the community.<sup>134</sup>

The 1990’s saw the establishment of several minority education projects such as the Ethnic Minorities Education Aid Special Fund, Project Hope, and the Border Areas Construction Aid Fund. In addition, the Central government increased investment in

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<sup>132</sup> *White Paper On Xinjiang*.

<sup>133</sup> Nicolas Bequelin, “Staged Development In Xinjiang,” *China Quarterly* 178 (2004), 376.

<sup>134</sup> A term used to describe these children as *Han mijaz*, a perjorative indicating that they have the temperament of a Han. Ildiko Beller-Hann, “Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur Han Relations In Xinjiang, Northwest China,” *Imagined Differences: Hatred And The Construction Of Identity* ed. Gunther Schlee (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 64-67.

minority education through the State Education Commission to one billion *yuan* per year.<sup>135</sup> This investment has helped establish, on paper, a nine-year compulsory education program for all ethnic minorities. Moreover, the two overlapping sets of policies, the “two-exemptions and one subsidy” (exemption from school fees and payment for school material and subsidy for boarding school), and the “four guarantees” (free food, clothing, boarding, and study materials) have been established to ensure the education of the Uyghur children and adolescents of Xinjiang.<sup>136</sup> Beyond this, a number of mechanisms, including enrolment quotas and lowered exam requirements, have been set up to ensure a high percentage of ethnic minority university students. This is to facilitate a production of high quality minority persons to participate in the development and economy in Xinjiang. A final point worth considering regarding the state’s biopoliticization of the Uyghurs is the curriculum itself. Unsurprisingly, the agenda in the class room is consistent with the state’s historical narrative. Ethnic unity is an area of focus with exams on the subject given at all levels of education to confirm a baseline of understanding and acceptance.<sup>137</sup>

The healthcare system is critically important for the production of healthy, autonomous Uyghur subjects. With the rationalization of governance and its aura of scientificity, the support of a scientific discourse which demonstrates the state’s success of helping to produce and sustain the ethnic minority population is crucial. This fits with the government’s general strategy of biopoliticization also directed at Han peoples.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang,” *Working Papers in the Social Sciences: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology* 32, (September 1997), 10.

<sup>136</sup> Sautman, Preferential, 11; *White Paper On Ethnic Policy*.

<sup>137</sup> *White Paper On Ethnic Policy*.

<sup>138</sup> See for example: National Population And Family Planning Commission of China, *China’s Population and Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 18 November 2002, <<http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/about/detail.aspx?articleid=090430105302500045>> (18 March 2010).

However, the case of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs is clearly more complex, and as has been discussed previously, there is a considerable blurring of the categories of race and ethnicity, of biology and ethnology; the discourse of bio-medical sciences is crucial both to supporting the project of development and to the biopoliticization of the population.<sup>139</sup> Given the backwardness of the Uyghurs, it is obviously essential that the powers of the bio-medical sciences be deployed to inject its knowledge of life into their existence; fostering life at its most basic physiological level is essential to the project. It should therefore come as no surprise that the healthcare policies reflect this importance. Citing the abysmal life expectancy of 30 years and the infant mortality rate of 420-600 per 1000 on the eve of Xinjiang's incorporation, the state has established a number of institutional responses to the challenge. From an immunization program and the construction and constant renovation of Xinjiang hospitals to the establishment of a "three-tier" disease-prevention and healthcare network, the government has argued its successes in improving the circulation of life in its minorities.<sup>140</sup> The 2008 statistics for infant mortality at 29.76 per 1000 and the growth of life expectancy to 72 years acts as indisputable scientific proof of the state's successes. In spite of these statistical success for Xinjiang, the data for China overall places the life expectancy at 73.5 and more dramatically the infant mortality rate at 20 per 1000.<sup>141</sup> While these statistics are not leagues apart a number of quality related issues have been raised regarding the level of technology and care provided in hospitals in Xinjiang. The system is argued as being both underdeveloped and ill-equipped and more generally is described as lacking in the areas of prevention and

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<sup>139</sup> Foucault, *SMBD*, 250-253.

<sup>140</sup> *White Paper On Xinjiang*.

<sup>141</sup> *White Paper On Xinjiang*.

treatment.<sup>142</sup> Though the state's argument that: "the level of medical services in minority urban areas has been remarkably enhanced, the medical conditions in agriculture and pastoral areas have been noticeably improved, [and] the difficulty of ethnic minorities in getting adequate medical service has been alleviated", is accurate, it is also misleading in that the statistics do not reflect the qualitative differences between Xinjiang and many other areas in China.<sup>143</sup> Xinjiang's healthcare system is of much lower quality and much less accessible than most other regions in China.<sup>144</sup> The situation can be summarized as somewhat contradictory given the attempt to produce a healthy, biopoliticized Uyghur population. In spite of the concrete reality of the situation, as noted, the triumphs and not the failures of the system are aggrandized lending their scientific weight to the state's ability to yield results even amongst its most backwards, undereducated population.

The final discursive capillaries of power that will be discussed are cultural policies to which we will extend to include religious policies. Cultural and religious policy is a crucial component to the project of biopolitics given that both are seen as serious hindrances to the development of modern Uyghur subjects. It is from this perspective that Han migration is thought to help development not only through their possession and embodiment of modern knowledge and work ethic but also through cultural fields. Accordingly, the terrain of culture and religion are also constantly policed as sites of potential resistance to the project of biopoliticization thus making their effective and affective administration all the more urgent. To characterize many sites of

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<sup>142</sup> Jay Dautcher, "Public Health And Social Pathologies In Xinjiang," *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*. ed. S. Frederick Starr, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 277-282.

<sup>143</sup> *White Paper On Ethnic Policy*.

<sup>144</sup> Dautcher, "Public Health And Social Pathologies In Xinjiang," 277-278.

culture as active sites of performative recalcitrance would not be inaccurate.<sup>145</sup> Policy is prefaced on an understanding of culture as a static field of knowledge and existence. The structuralist underpinnings of this understanding of culture have sustained the torrent of economic reforms and to (re)think this categorization would throw the entire project of the Chinese nation into question, given that much of its legitimacy is based on the conception of fixed, linear stages of identity. It is therefore unsurprising that it remains largely intact and still retains a hegemonic role. Culture and religious policy are therefore critically important loci allowing for the biopoliticization of the Uyghurs. Without cultural reformation vis-à-vis the shedding of the constricting dead skin of ethnic identity, the processes of development are undercut.<sup>146</sup> Arguments proposing that “under the impacts of the Han culture, some [Uyghurs] become outstanding politicians, military strategists, writers, historians and translators,”<sup>147</sup> or statements such as the following from Wang Enmao that: “we have achieved a long-standing stable political situation and a sound economic and cultural basis[,] these, together with our rich natural resources, will ensure Xinjiang’s economic and cultural boom in the near future,”<sup>148</sup> clearly articulate both the project and the vision. The project is subject to (re)development and the vision imagines this to be a Chinese modernity, a vision very much indebted to Han migration. While it might be argued that this perspective is dated, a reflection on the revamped Chinese constitution echoes this project in Article IV, Chapter I proposing that: “The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and

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<sup>145</sup> See for example: Nimrod Baranovitch, “From Resistance to Adaptation: Uyghur Popular Music and Changing Attitudes Among Uyghur Youth,” *The China Journal* 58 (July 2007), 59-82.

<sup>146</sup> Fei Hsiao Tung, *Towards A People’s Anthropology*, (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), 84.

<sup>147</sup> Ma Yin, 140.

<sup>148</sup> Ma Yin, 142.

cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority nationalities.”<sup>149</sup> The policies dictated to handle cultural and religious practices work to mould and sanitize their exercise, sublating their excesses into a manageable form. Cultural policy thus plays a dominant role in shaping its practice. As Chih-yu Shih argued in relation to Mosque-State relations in China, the state attempts to render ethnicity irrelevant to quotidian affairs.<sup>150</sup> The state sponsors ethnic and religious festivals in an attempt to control them; art, folk dances, and music all fall into this category and are collected, recorded, and redistributed by the Chinese state. This process is projected as an overwhelming success, showing that the Chinese state has played an essential role in promoting the rescue and preservation of its Uyghur vis-à-vis “Chinese” culture. It has systematically recorded countless pieces of literature and colonized over 4,000 physical locations of “cultural relic sites” shouldering the administrative responsibility and placing them under state supervision. This policy and process of recording and the systematic administration of culture has helped to transform its plethora of meanings and fix culture as a static body of knowledge. Culture and cultural artifacts are represented as an unproblematic reflection of the past which helps to sustain the veracity of the claim of backwardness of the Uyghurs.<sup>151</sup> The religious policy of the state reinforces this argument. The role of the mosque as disseminator of knowledge and education has been identified and colonized, resulting in a tight set of regulations dictating what is acceptable discussion in the shadows of the minarets. All clergy

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<sup>149</sup> *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Adopted December 4 1982, Updated March 22 2004 <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>>, (March 18 2010).

<sup>150</sup> Chih-yu Shih, *Negotiating Ethnicity In China: Citizenship As A Response To The State*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 145.

<sup>151</sup> See for example: Gladney, *Dislocating*, 61.

members must be registered with the state and attend regular classes on appropriate conduct. Again, the state's administration is rooted in biopolitical terms with the argument put forth that "The state and the government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region administer religious affairs and protect the legal rights and interests of believers, religious organizations and venues for religious activities."<sup>152</sup> The state demonstrates its productivity and its protection of the Uyghurs. Accordingly, when resistance comes to a head and violence emerges in the interstices of control throwing the legitimacy of the biopolitical project into relief, among the first sites to be shut down are the mosques and *meshreps* under the auspices of the protection of society. The action is always justified in a biopolitical manner, for the safety of society.

In sum, we can see from the very brief discussion above regarding the macro pole of development and the micro tactics manifested in education and language policy, health policy and cultural and religious policy, the process of biopolitics plays a critical role in the discourse surrounding both the larger strategy envisioned for the Uyghurs and among the smaller capillaries of deployment. There is clearly considerable overlap among all of the categories, and it is worth recapitulating the notion that all of them rely heavily on the particular discursive construction and (re)production of the Chinese nation. The final section of this chapter will discuss the violent margins of biopolitics, the logic of deduction, and the friend/enemy dialectic.

### **The Limits of Biopolitics: The Friend/Enemy Dialectic**

Reflecting on the previous section it should not come as a surprise that there is considerable hostility to the general strategy of development, the policy tactics employed

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<sup>152</sup> DPXJ, 25

and the state's representation of the process of biopoliticization of the Uyghurs. These have generated considerable angst amongst the Uyghurs. While the preceding section discussed the productive logic propelling development and policy, and in a few cases the disjuncture between the concrete reality on the ground in Xinjiang and the arguments put forth by the Chinese state, this section will look at the margins of this process. It will examine those who fall on the "let die" side of the equation. To understand this component, a brief discussion on China's criminal justice system must be executed to explicate the way in which the friend/enemy dialectic has been displaced to the "three evils": the categories of terrorist, extremist and splittist.

For China, the rationalization of governance and the logic of productivity, of life-giving life sustaining administration have been contingent on a normalization of the legal system. Leaving behind the legal elasticity of the Mao period the government has worked hard to establish a set of legal norms that dictate daily life. The chaotic politics of a ubiquitous friend/enemy dialectic do little to stimulate foreign investment and growth of the economy which plays a key role in sustaining the CCP's leadership.<sup>153</sup> Dutton has made a similar argument stating that after the arrest of the Gang of Four there was a "movement away from state legitimation based upon the operation of the political dyad to one in which economy and development held center stage."<sup>154</sup> This process has (re)invigorated the legal system deploying the logic of legality/illegality in exchange for the friend/enemy dialectic. In line with this, the criminal justice system has been in a process of normalization since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The legal system has

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<sup>153</sup> See for example: Kam C. Wong, "Policing in the People's Republic of China: The Road To Reform In The 1990s," *British Journal of Criminology* 42 (2002), 291.

<sup>154</sup> Dutton, *PCP*, 252.

become the site in which struggles are demarcated, in physical terms the popular politics on the street have moved into the administrative justice of the courtroom. In the words of Hsing and Lee there has developed a “fetishization of the law”.<sup>155</sup> This has resulted in the (re)construction of both of the primary policing agencies, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the People’s Police (PP). Their roles have been reformed in accordance with the shift away from the sovereignty of the friend/enemy dialectic, to agencies concerned with law enforcement and order maintenance. Articulating this shift is the change of language from government sources. Consider the following quote from a document promulgated by the Military Affairs Commission in 1960: “Politics is both the supreme commander and the soul; political work is the lifeline of our Army and the fundamental assurance for the success of all our work. . . . Therefore, in all work the supremacy of politics must be emphasized.”<sup>156</sup> By contrast, in a Ministry of Defense outline of the contemporary role of the PAP during public emergency situations in which the enemy is “existentially” threatening, the PAP “always exercises caution in the use of force, compulsory measures, police instruments and weapons. It cracks down on a handful of criminals in accordance with the law and deals with public disturbances, riots, illegal demonstrations, group fighting with weapons, acts of violence and terrorism *efficiently, appropriately and legally*.”<sup>157</sup> The prominence of legality in the use of language even at the most extreme limit of illegality mirrors the state’s paradoxical vision of the resection

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<sup>155</sup>You-Tien Hsing and Ching Kwan Lee eds., *Reclaiming Chinese Society: New Social Activism* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 9.

<sup>156</sup> Resolution Made by the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Authorities of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening Political and Ideological Work in the Army, Peking, October 20, 1960: J. Chester Cheng ed. *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966), 66.

<sup>157</sup>My emphasis: Ministry Of National Defense, “The People’s Armed Police Force,” <<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ArmedForces/armed.htm>>, (March 18 2010).

of politics from the Chinese body politic. Furthermore, the *Emergency Response Law* promulgated by Hu Jintao in 2007 to replace the state's *Martial Law* of 1996 further rationalized and depoliticized even the most dire of cases.<sup>158</sup> Even the shift in language, from martial with its bellicose shadow to the sanitized concept of emergency, demonstrates the attempts to remove the political affiliations of war from the internal situation. However, in spite of this attempted rationalization of both the legal system and the exceptional situations that warrants the label of the “emergency” the friend/enemy dialectic is still alive and well in the politics of ethnicity in Xinjiang.

In spite of the language and desire to economize and privatize policing and the police force as has been instituted in the coastal areas of China, the explosive moments of ethnic violence and the state's reaction to them demonstrate how the friend/enemy dialectic has been sustained. In spite of the mechanisms in place for the biopoliticization of the Uyghurs, in spite of the pressure the marketization of the population has bestowed upon them, the logic of political decisionism always overrides the projected rationality of the Chinese state. In fact, the maintenance of policing controls in the region requires an enormous expenditure of resources, and given the economic output of the region it is not a profitable venture. The political situation in Xinjiang has brought forth waves of constriction during which the friend/enemy dialectic has re-emerged in the categories of terrorist, extremist, and splittist. In the face of the criminological literature that has noted the overall ineffectiveness of the strike hard or firm blows campaigns (*yanda*) which are characterized by severe highly public punishment, an enormous spike in arrests and

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<sup>158</sup> Emergency Response Law: Emergency Response Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress on August 30, 2007; Martial Law: Adopted at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 1, 1996 and promulgated by Order No. 61 of the President of the People's Republic of China on March 1, 1996.

streamlined trials, a loosening of procedural protections, and a dramatic increase in executions, their continued existence demonstrates that the state continues to rely on the old mechanisms deployed in the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries.<sup>159</sup> These old technologies that enabled and intensified the friend/enemy dialectic during the Mao period include a loosening of the constraints of legality, and the deployment of the mass-line through policing organizations in contemporary Xinjiang. As an example, in Beijing during the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries from 1950-1952 the *hukou* “blacklist” yielded 12.5 percent of those arrested; this number exploded to 74.5 percent of all those arrested in subsequent campaigns. The numbers were no doubt very different in Xinjiang given the hostility of the local population and the system’s reliance on residential committee members and secret informants, but the system remains in place with those targeted watched as closely and secretly as possible year round. The system in contemporary Xinjiang has been highly useful and yielded the destruction of several terrorist cells.<sup>160</sup> It seems highly likely that the ethnic variable has played a role in that the continued migration of Han bodies to Xinjiang, the rural to urban, south to north migration trends as well as the continued importance of the Han dominated *bingtuan* has helped to sustain the success of this system in spite of the increasing distaste for secret policing in China more generally.<sup>161</sup> Without a doubt this technology has been essential in the exceptional strike-hard (*yanda*) campaigns. A more detailed look at the

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<sup>159</sup> Murray Scot Tanner, “Campaign-Style Policing In China And Its Critics,” *Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China* ed. Borge Bakken, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 171-174.

<sup>160</sup> Wang Fei-Ling, “Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China’s Hukou System in the 2000s,” *The China Quarterly* 177 (2004), 124-129.

<sup>161</sup> Herbert S. Yee yielded interesting statistical evidence in Urumqi regarding Han distrust of Uyghurs, 18.4 percent disagreeing with the statement “most Uyghurs are honest and reliable”: “Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: a survey of Uyghur-Han relations in Urumqi,” *Journal of Contemporary China* (12:36), 440.

particularities of these campaigns will help illustrate the fact they rely on a politics of exceptionalism vis-à-vis the friend/enemy dialectic.

To begin, what separates the strike hard campaigns in Xinjiang from the rest of China is that they are directed at the category of the enemy through the label of terrorist, extremist, and splittist, whereas in the rest of China the campaigns are directed at “criminal” elements. The former three exemplify the highest seriousness of “crime” in that they are state subversives rather than mere social deviants. These campaigns have been normalized through the reform period, for example from 1996-2000 one campaign occurred each year: in 1996 a Strike Hard campaign targeted “splittism and illegal religious activities” with arrests and detentions so numerous that it is alleged one in ten Uyghur families had a relative arrested, persecuted, or executed; 1997 saw after the destruction of the Yining-Ghulja uprising provoking yet another campaign called “the rectification of the social order”; 1998 Jiang Zemin declared a “People’s war” against separatists; in 1999 two were pursued, a “special 100 days strike hard” campaign and a general campaign against terrorism; and the year 2000 saw a “focused rectification of religious places” campaign.<sup>162</sup> Unfortunately, the statistics regarding the number of arrests, executions, and detainments during these campaigns are unknown but what is evident is an increasing war-like situation taking hold during the closing years of the millennium. The intensification of state attacks against terror were certainly in step with an intensification of overt violent and non-violent forms of resistance, but the conclusion remains that in spite of the language the Chinese state engaged in a war against its Uyghur population in the name of the nation’s survival. The result of these campaigns is

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<sup>162</sup> Nicolas Becquelin, “Criminalizing Ethnicity: Political Repression In Xinjiang,” *China Rights Forum* 1 (2004): 41; Brent Hierman, “The Pacification Of Xinjiang: Uighur Protest And The Chinese State, 1988-2002,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 54:3 (2007): 55-57.

a normalization of intensified of violence; in essence the situation is a war against terrorism, a war that was declared in China well before the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> but one that has intensified policing through the military due to the situation in Afghanistan. This war has continued through the 2000's directed against the categories of terrorist, separatist, and extremist all united under the banner of East Turkestan.

The move to link all three of these groups into the terrain of an alternative nationhood, East Turkestan, reflects the discursive move to classify those within the three categories at the external limit of the Chinese nation. Without this externalization the waging of campaigns against these dissidents would be paradoxical given the biopolitical processes and inclusiveness of the Uyghurs inside the Chinese nation. However, since the Uyghurs already exist in a subaltern position in relation to the Han, the campaigns against the terror can be directed with less resistance from the Han majority. In other words, the marginal position of the Uyghurs eases their discursive enemification. The filial bonds of nationhood are slit asunder in these campaigns enabling an ease of operations. The minority extremity is then subjected to a biopsy allowing the state to identify those elements that are not a part of the nation and the remainder is then sutured back to the Chinese body politic. The wars waged through the political campaigns against terror allow an externalization of the enemy, discursively excising them from the body politic to legitimize their destruction. So what does this mean? This is a highly symbolic and meaningful process that reflects the Chinese state's desire to live up to its neo-liberal dreams of an economically-minded, productive biopolitical society. These dreams help to makes sense of how the state-led violence can be understood. The strikes against the internal enemy are not as pervasive as they were during the Mao period; the strikes are

more surgical but equally violent. While a considerable number of people are subjected to the violence inflicted by the PAP and PP it is certainly more isolated than before. Thus, in spite of the rapid process of disassembling the Marxist project as reflected in the demolition of the legal category of counter-revolutionary in exchange for the charge of jeopardizing state security, a reflection on the politics in Xinjiang shows the salience of the friend/enemy dialectic and echoes the opening quote by Foucault, with which I will conclude this chapter:

It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars causing so many men to be killed.<sup>163</sup>

The following chapter will examine the friend/enemy dialectic from the perspective of the Urumqi riots and the hypodermic needle attacks of the summer of 2009.

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<sup>163</sup> Foucault, *HS*, 137.

## Chapter 4

The summer of 2009 demonstrated yet again that though the obituary of a distinct Uyghur subjectivity has been carved into the physical territory of Xinjiang -from the military facilities at Lop Nur to the oil fields in the Tarim basin- and as well into the temporal geography of the official history of the Uyghurs as an inextricable part of the Chinese nation, the recalcitrance directed toward this colonial project refuses to die.<sup>164</sup> While this was previously contested by scholars like Brent Hierman who have cited the “pacification of the region” it is clear that resistance was not been completely (de)constructed.<sup>165</sup> What began as a brawl in a toy factory in Guangdong that resulted in the killing of two Uyghurs on the 26<sup>th</sup> of June quickly escalated 4000 kilometers away into the death of 197 people and the injury of some 1,700 others on July 5<sup>th</sup> in Urumqi. The term “7.5 riots” has since been coined as shorthand for this violence that engulfed the political capital of Xinjiang. A state of emergency was declared on 7.5 and the violence which was mainly directed at Hans living in Urumqi by Uyghurs was brought to a close. Scarcely a month after the suppression of this riot a new wave of violent resistance emerged. Needle attacks directed at mainly Han ethnics were being reported across Xinjiang. At the heels of this second wave emerged a large protest of Hans in Urumqi that resulted in the death of five Uyghurs. This reactive violence was also arrested by the People’s Armed Police and order was once again restored. This final chapter will examine the Chinese state’s reaction to this explosion of violence to extend the argument put forward in the previous chapter. The Chinese state’s declaration of emergency and the subsequent policies

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<sup>164</sup> For discussions of this survival of ethnicity see for example: Baranovitch, “From Resistance to Adaptation”.

<sup>165</sup> Hierman, 48.

enacted and technologies deployed after the rioting reflect the (re)emergence of both a Schmittian state of exception -wherein the logic of rational governance vis-à-vis biopolitics was upended by a perceived threat to survival of the nation- and a return to sovereign decisionism embodied by the (re)deployment of the friend/enemy dialectic. This chapter will thus examine the events of the summer of 2009 as a case study to buttress the argument put forward in the previous chapter. To recapitulate, the argument is that the friend/enemy dialectic continues to play a critical role in negotiating the terrain of ethnicity in Xinjiang.

The economic reforms that have led to both the (de)mobilization and (de)politicization of the Chinese masses have been received by the Uyghurs in a way that at times necessitated a return to the violence of the friend/enemy dialectic.<sup>166</sup> Though terms like normalization, order, and stability have been used to explain the moments preceding and immediately following the flashes of violence executed by Uyghurs and Hans, the declaration of emergency in Xinjiang and the subsequent actions taken and policies written demonstrate the schism between the norms imagined for Xinjiang and the continued problematics postulated by ethnic difference. The crisis propelled by the 7.5 riots resulted in a folding back of biopolitics into the logic of the friend/enemy dialectic enabled by the plunging of the region into a state of exception. The chapter will begin with a more thorough elucidation of the citizen-driven violence that led to the most recent (re)emergence of the friend/enemy dialectic of state directed violence. Next, it will discuss the state's reaction to the violence and explicate how it represents a deviation from the practices of biopolitics. The subsequent section will look at how the

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<sup>166</sup> Dutton, *PCP*, 251.

friend/enemy dialectic was (re)deployed in response. Finally, the chapter and the thesis will conclude with a look at the various roles the friend/enemy dialectic has played from the Mao period to this most recent wave and end with a brief discussion of the implications of this most recent wave of violence and end with some thoughts on the future.

### **From Toys to Syringes**

The events leading up to the 7.5 riots in Urumqi, the intensification of policing and the declaration of a state of emergency in Xinjiang were disparate. The spark that ignited the most recent wave of violence began near the coast of China in Guangdong province. On the 26<sup>th</sup> of June a situation began with an accusation of rape directed at some Uyghur migrant workers at a toy factory in Shaoguan.<sup>167</sup> These accusations quickly turned violent. The suggestion that Uyghurs had perpetrated this heinous act led to the galvanization of Han ethnic workers for retribution, resulting in the beating to death of at least two Uyghur workers.<sup>168</sup> One hundred and eighteen more were injured including some Hans.<sup>169</sup> This event proved to be a rallying point around which violence emerged some nine days later in Urumqi. It is unlikely that any one person can be held accountable for the violence that occurred on July 5<sup>th</sup> but the Chinese government has maintained that the riots were incited by Rebiya Kadeer,<sup>170</sup> a wealthy Uyghur business

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<sup>167</sup> Lin Meilian, “2 people killed in fight at factory,” *Global Times*, 29 June 2009, <<http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2009-06/440730.html>> (20 March 2010).

<sup>168</sup> It was also reported days later that no rape or attempted rape had occurred. Liang Qiwen, “Peace reigns at toy factory in Shaoguan where brawl killed two,” *China Daily*, 29 July 2009, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-07/07/content\\_8385191.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-07/07/content_8385191.htm)> (20 March 2010).

<sup>169</sup> Liang Qiwen.

<sup>170</sup> Relieve The Pain In Xinjiang,” *Global Times*, 8 September 2009, <<http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/urumqi-riot/comments/2009-09/465619.html>> (20 March 2010).

woman in exile who has increasingly been represented as the face of the separatist East Turkestan movement outside of Xinjiang. What is certain however is that violence flared on the streets of Urumqi leading to the killing of 197 people (including some Uyghurs), the injury of around 1700 others, the destruction of 627 vehicles, and widespread damage to surrounding property.<sup>171</sup> The People's Armed Police and other security forces put down the riot within several hours and by the sixth of July 1,434 people had been detained.<sup>172</sup> Aside from a number of other scattered incidents, the PAP with assistance from other police forces managed to quell the violence.

The next wave of violence was perhaps much more psychological than physical but nevertheless inflicted considerable damage. Since Xinjiang is plagued with a particularly high rate of HIV infection, needle attacks directed by Uyghurs at Hans were frightening.<sup>173</sup> This wave, which began in early August, resulted in the self-diagnosis of stabbing by hypodermic needle by 531 (mainly Hans) people across Xinjiang and not insignificant was the detail that only around 100 of these were actually confirmed by medical professionals. This disparity in self-diagnoses and medical professional diagnoses attests to the success of the attacks in spreading fear. Although it turned out that the needles were not infected with anything the psychological cost of the attacks was immense, so much so that they were deemed crimes against society and as an endangerment to social and state security, as Du Xintao, a legal affairs official with the

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<sup>171</sup> Fighting separatism a long-term, complicated task in Xinjiang: senior official," *Xinhua*, 7 March 2010 <[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/07/c\\_13200845.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/07/c_13200845.htm)> (20 March, 2010).

<sup>172</sup> Timeline of the riots in Xinjiang," *Global Times*, 16 July 2009, <[http://special.globaltimes.cn/2009-07/447815\\_2.html](http://special.globaltimes.cn/2009-07/447815_2.html)> (19 March 2009).

<sup>173</sup> See: Dautcher, *Public Health*, 280-281.

XUAR Public Security Department, argued.<sup>174</sup> On a similar note, Yan Yuxing, former president of the Intermediate People's Court of Urumqi, stated that the needle attacks "were copies of violent, terrorist crimes" and that the attackers might face the death penalty.<sup>175</sup> On September 3<sup>rd</sup> and in response to these attacks there was a protest by tens of thousands of Hans in Urumqi who touted CCP and PRC flags. Demands were made for severe punishment of the mob responsible for the stabbing and for better security provisions.<sup>176</sup> Wang Lequan, the CCP's secretary of the regional committee of the XUAR, addressed the crowd calling on them to stay calm and to show restraint.<sup>177</sup> Despite Wang's plea five people were killed during these demonstrations and another 14 hospitalized by the protestors who were eventually dispelled by the police. Interestingly, during this protest the police "rescued" a Uyghur man who was accused of stabbing a young girl in a local market as the protest was happening, saving him from the crowd in the process.<sup>178</sup> Following this last protest, the collective violence perpetrated by both Hans and Uyghurs against one another had virtually stopped, or at least reports of violence had ceased to be publicized. The next section discusses the mechanisms deployed during these acts and how they indicate a folding back of the logic of biopolitics.

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<sup>174</sup> More Suspects Prosecuted while Urumqi syringe attacks described as 'violent, terrorist' crimes," *Xinhua*, 9 September 2009, <[http://www.china.org.cn/china/xinjiang\\_unrest/2009-09/09/content\\_18489455.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/xinjiang_unrest/2009-09/09/content_18489455.htm)> (19 March 2010).

<sup>175</sup> More Suspects Prosecuted, *Xinhua*.

<sup>176</sup> Tens of thousands of protesters demand security guarantees in Urumqi after hypodermic syringe attacks," *Xinhua*, 3 September 2010, <[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/03/content\\_11991116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/03/content_11991116.htm)> (19 March 2010).

<sup>177</sup> Tens of thousands, *Xinhua*.

<sup>178</sup> Tens of thousands, *Xinhua*.

## **Violence on the Streets and the Displacement of Biopolitics**

What all of the violent acts in the previous section share in common is the trait of collective action; all of these acts enacted the friend/enemy dialectic and read the body through ethnic categories to distinguish friend from enemy. The 7.5 riot was a chilling example of decisionism; the crowds of rioters decided who lived and who died, who was maimed and who was left unharmed. This violence proved threatening not only in the widespread destruction that it left in its wake, both psychological and physical, but also in the contestation over possession of the monopoly of the *legitimate* use of violence. While these sorts of actions were common-place and indeed encouraged during the Mao period, this level of political mobilization has garnered quite a different response from the Party and the institutions of state. The second chapter that discussed the Mao period highlighted from the peaceful liberation into the heart of the Mao period that the friend/enemy dialectic was ubiquitous and was encouraged and aided by state authorities. However, as the previous chapter argued, the logic of biopolitics has deemed these sorts of chaotic actions illegitimate. It is no longer rational for the state to pursue revolutionary politics. The fact that the Chinese state has attempted to move beyond the friend/enemy dialectic does not simply mean that it has been able to. The intensification of violence brought to the streets in Xinjiang, arguably the most widespread and destructive of such actions in several decades, led to an intensification of the friend/enemy dialectic and was led by the institutions of the Chinese state. This in turn resulted in a short-circuiting of the logic and processes of biopolitics.

What is of particular significance for this chapter is how these riots spurred the (re)emergence of exceptional politics, and enabled the friend/enemy dialectic to once

again play a central role in Xinjiang. The previous chapter noted the constant succession of strike-hard campaigns that have been directed at the “three evil forces” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism, and how these indicate a return of the friend/enemy dialectic. Similarly, the 7.5 riots as well as the hypodermic needle attacks impelled yet another strike-hard campaign, another deployment of the friend/enemy dialectic and a state of exception that took precedence over the biopolitical logic that the government has deployed to (re)mould the Uyghur ethnic masses. What is critically important is the discourse that is deployed to capture the 7.5 riots and the needle attacks. This discourse as mentioned above relies on the “three evils”. The forces of terrorism, extremism and splittism were called on to lend their discursive weight to the heavy deployment of the security apparatus, calling on the People’s Armed Police and the military to institute emergency (martial) law to attack and destroy these national threats.

Before discussing the institutional response to these attacks and the deployment of the three evils, which the next section will examine, the empirical evidence that points to the obfuscation of the “make live” side of biopolitics leading to the deployment of the friend/enemy dialectic needs to be outlined. The previous chapter argued that biopolitics was encompassed both by a strategy of development, and a micro tactics of policies that sought the integration of the Uyghurs. The riots brought on a refocusing of actions away from the productive biopolitical policies. Among a host of examples, two things are indicative of this. First, reflective of the state’s movement away from biopolitics was the action taken by one of the central government’s stalwarts in the field of development: the Han dominated *bingtuan*. The XPCC was the first responder to the riots in Urumqi. The policing wing of the XPCC was first to alert the PLA and the PAP of the looming threat

of violence in the early morning hours of the 5<sup>th</sup> of July.<sup>179</sup> This continued reliance on the policing function of Xinjiang's key industrial producer illustrates the oscillating role that public industries must play in Xinjiang: producing and policing. The suppression of the riots within mere hours on the 7.5 demonstrated the ability and reliability of the police forces in Xinjiang including the *bingtuan*. Moreover, this rapid deployment and repression was attributed by the government as one of the key reasons similar riots did not emerge in other cities across Xinjiang. According to Nur Bekri, chair of the regional government: "Authorities successfully stopped organized plots planned in Kashgar, Hotan, Aksu and Ili, which prevented the spread of further violence soon after the July 5 riot".<sup>180</sup> Thus, in spite of the more focused reliance on biopolitical technologies of governance, the bedrock of control, policing through the devices that are also central to Xinjiang's development remain in the shadows in case of events like the 7.5 riots.

Second, and perhaps most important, was the barrier to communications. Xinjiang, like most places, relies heavily on communications technology for business and social interactions, and thus the importance of their suspension cannot be overstated. The closure of communications is akin to a symbolic siege. It is as much psychologically violent as physically violent. Immediately following the riots, communication in the region was effectively cut off. Less than twenty-four hours after the 7.5 riots there was a complete suspension of cell phone service in the region. The blackout lasted over six months but has been incrementally opened since the beginning of 2010. Text messaging, an important method of communication in Xinjiang, was also cut off following the riots.

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<sup>179</sup> Timeline Of The Riots In Xinjiang," *Global Times*, 16 July 2009, <<http://special.globaltimes.cn/2009-07/447815.html>> (19 March 2010).

<sup>180</sup> Cui Jia, "Xinjiang security funding increased by 90 percent," *China Daily*, 13 January 2010, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/13/content\\_9311035.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/13/content_9311035.htm)> (20 March 2010).

It returned on January 18<sup>th</sup> 2010 but with strict restrictions on the number of messages allowed to be sent while a blackout on international texting remains. International calling was also blocked but has since been opened in China Telecom locations if one is willing to register their identification first.<sup>181</sup> Clearly, phone service is essential for the sustenance and development of the economy in Xinjiang. Many anecdotal cases have been reported about businesses failing or owners having to travel extremely long distances simply to place orders or contact suppliers or customers.<sup>182</sup> The lack of phone service was compounded by the concurrent suspension of all internet service in the region on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July. However, like cellphone service, internet has been gradually restored after since December 31<sup>st</sup>, beginning with access opened up to *Xinhua*, *The People's Daily*, and two other commercial websites.<sup>183</sup> Since then a handful of other sites have been unblocked, but internet communication remains heavily restricted. Overall, these measures amount to one of the largest communications blockades the Chinese government has ever enacted. In general, all of these actions have been to the detriment of business, education, and public life in the region. These three areas are all critically important to the biopolitical project. Thus has occurred is the suspension of the logic of biopolitics through the stringent regulations and dual role of industry outlined above. All of these actions have been legitimated through the categories of the “three evils” and seek to isolate and excise the enemy from the Chinese nation. The following section will look

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<sup>181</sup> Cui Jia, “SMS Returns To Xinjiang,” *China Daily*, 18 January 2010, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/18/content\\_9332764.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/18/content_9332764.htm)> (21 March 2010).

<sup>182</sup> “The Missing Link,” *People's Daily*, 5 November 2009, <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6804414.html>> (20 March 2010).

<sup>183</sup> Cui Jia, SMS.

at the particular mechanisms that have contributed to the intensification of the friend/enemy dialectic.

### **July 5<sup>th</sup> and the Imminent return of the Friend/Enemy Dialectic**

Enacting the categories of the three evils signalled a return to the decisionism logic of the friend/enemy dialectic. The terrorist, extremist, and splittist come to the fore of the nation just as they are excised from its body leading to a situation which necessitated a (re)construction of the apparatuses of security, a revisiting of their projects and mandates, and the legal elasticity essential to accomplishing these tasks. Invoking the three evils allows the state to accomplish the task of excising the enemies from the body politic without a question of the legitimacy of these actions. The Uyghurs who participated in the acts of violence were discursively (re)constituted outside the boundaries of the Chinese nation and therefore encompassed by and subject to the logic of the friend/enemy dialectic and its particular boundaries. The events following the 7.5 riots and the needle attacks highlight this all-out attack on the enemy and the establishment of a state of exception to cut out these elements. From the moment the police were deployed in Urumqi a strike-hard campaign was enacted.<sup>184</sup> These *yanda* campaigns discussed in the previous chapter rely on severe highly public punishment, an enormous spike in arrests and streamlined trials, a loosening of procedural protections, and a dramatic increase in executions. They reflect a short circuiting of the logic of biopolitics. Put another way, through these campaigns the state shifted its focus away from supporting life and focusing more on suppressing a certain segment of the population to allow the rest of it to live. As the previous chapter discussed, these

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<sup>184</sup> Timeline, *Global Times*.

campaigns are highlighted by an intensification of violence waged at the enemies whom they target. Thus the campaign declared in Xinjiang did not end following the suppression of the 7.5 riots or needle attacks; rather, the mobilization of security forces was extended in November until the end of December 2009.<sup>185</sup> The campaigns have centered on the “manhunt to nab suspects in connection with the July 5 riot in Urumqi, the regional capital”<sup>186</sup> but have extended far beyond that as a hunt for anyone seen to have a connection with the three evils. By January 15<sup>th</sup> 26 executions had taken place to swiftly punish those involved in the 7.5 riots and some of the needle attackers have received prison terms of 15 years for their actions. Many more have been arrested, are in detention or are on trial. Although this campaign was set to finish at the end of December, it has been expanded until the end of 2010.<sup>187</sup>

To accomplish the goals of this political campaign the budget of the People’s Armed Police in Xinjiang has been ratcheted up by 90% from 1.54 billion *yuan* to 2.89 billion and the Ministry of Public Security has declared that for 2010 the “main task of law enforcement agencies is anti-terrorism.”<sup>188</sup> Five thousand new special police officers have also been added in Xinjiang whose mandate is specifically to crackdown on terrorism.<sup>189</sup> Many other measures have been taken including the training of public officials in the proper actions during emergencies because of the “complicated and volatile public safety situation in Xinjiang” as Kang Yanfeng, the region’s director of the

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<sup>185</sup> Xinjiang Steps Up Fight Against Terrorism,” *Xinhua*, 15 January 2010, <[http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/15/content\\_19240790.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/15/content_19240790.htm)> (20 March 2009).

<sup>186</sup> Xinjiang Steps Up Fight, *Xinhua*.

<sup>187</sup> Xinjiang Steps Up Crime Crackdown,” *China Daily*, 4 November 2009, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-11/04/content\\_8908760.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-11/04/content_8908760.htm)> (20 March 2010).

<sup>188</sup> Cui Jia, Xinjiang Security.

<sup>189</sup> Xinjiang beefs up special police unit,” *People’s Daily*, 4 February 2010, <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6888131.html>> (19 March 2010).

administration of civil service, put it.<sup>190</sup> Further, these officials have been instructed to (re)engage the masses in these circumstances to accomplish their public security goals since the “most valuable source of information comes from people.”<sup>191</sup> The regional government has also amended their security provisions by revising their “Regulations on Comprehensive Management of Social Security” to further strengthen and legitimize their treatment of emergencies and to strike a hard blow to the three evils by eliminating the extra-loopholes that were a stumbling block to enforcing order.<sup>192</sup> Similarly, the first law in Chinese history regarding the PAP has been passed to make legally clear that this body of law enforcement would be responsible for “riots, unrest, [and] large-scale violent crimes and terrorist attacks.”<sup>193</sup> In addition to all of these actions taken by the government of Xinjiang, it has also adopted a law that has further entrenched the friend/enemy dialectic by specifically designating a law to enhance ethnic unity. This law effectively criminalizes dissent, and establishes a direct link between ethnic unity and secessionism (splittism). This law, which will take effect February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010, has placed the burden on all of Xinjiang’s citizens to “work towards national unity and against secession, and defines the principles, ways and content of ethnic unity education with regards to all people in Xinjiang.”<sup>194</sup> The law has endorsed the enforcement of the category of friendship, and in doing so redefined the borders of enmity. According to

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<sup>190</sup> Officials Get Emergency Training,” *China Daily*, 4 December 2009, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/04/content\\_9113705.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/04/content_9113705.htm)> (20 March 2010).

<sup>191</sup> Quoted from Cui Jinggang an instructor in these sessions and professor at Xinjiang Police College: Officials Get, *China Daily*.

<sup>192</sup> Xinjiang To Implement Amended Public Security Measures To Safeguard Social Stability,” *Xinhua*, 7 January 2010, <[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/07/content\\_12767366.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/07/content_12767366.htm)> (20 March 2010).

<sup>193</sup> Zhu Zhe, “First Armed Police Law Set To Pass,” *China Daily*, 25 August 2009 <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/25/content\\_8610543.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/25/content_8610543.htm)> (20 March 2010).

<sup>194</sup> Xinjiang Adopts Regional Law to Enhance Ethnic Unity,” *Xinhua*, 31 December 2009, <[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/31/content\\_9252347.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/31/content_9252347.htm)> (20 March 2009).

Eligen Imibakhi, chairman of the Standing Committee of the region's People's Congress, the law "rules that all people and organizations are banned from promulgating speech detrimental to ethnic unity, and from gathering, providing, producing and spreading information to that effect."<sup>195</sup> Clearly, this has the potential to exponentially expand the category of enmity to all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, not necessarily only the Uyghurs. Pitman B. Potter has demonstrated that there exists a systemic asymmetry in the institutions, laws, and practices of governance in Xinjiang and a continued focus on improving the material conditions of minority nationalities which continues to ignore "the very cultural dimensions that are at the core of minority nationality identities."<sup>196</sup> This systemic issue of continued ignorance of the cultural factors when coupled with a law that enforces an obligation to pursue ethnic unity vis-à-vis the suppression of dissent on the long problematic ethnic disparity of power, economic conditions, and cultural imperialism effectively silences this debate. This renders criticism, even when voiced within the limits of the Chinese state, legally suppressed. Compounding this is the declaration of the illegality of all public demonstrations in Xinjiang since the Han demonstrations during the needle attacks. The re-emergence of legal flexibility, the institutional refocus of policing, and the imposition of the ethnic unity law all point to a dangerous pretext. All of these actions contribute to or legitimate a widened categorization of Uyghur enemies. Time will tell what the long term results of these actions will be, but it is clear that there has been intensification in the presence of the friend/enemy dialectic given both the state's response with its ethnic focus and its

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<sup>195</sup> Xinjiang Adopts Regional Law to Enhance Ethnic Unity, *Xinhua*.

<sup>196</sup> Pitman B. Potter, "Governance of the Periphery: Balancing Local Autonomy and National Unity," *Columbia Journal of Asian Law* (2006), 315.

suspension of the rational governance of biopolitics. While many of these actions and laws have not explicitly mentioned the Uyghurs, there is no question that there is a conflation between the three evils and this ethnic group in particular. All of the riots were situated within the three evils and focused on the Uyghurs to target policy. After all, it was not Hans in the regions who called for independence, were religious extremists, or were terrorists. Accordingly, the types of laws and mechanisms in Xinjiang have not been deployed in other areas of China. The ethnic other Uyghurs are the problem, not the Han. Further indicating this is the fact that only after these riots has Xinjiang begun publishing national laws and regional regulations in Uyghur. Additionally, following the riots the region has deployed a team of 7,000 “harmony makers” to “go door to door to explain policies and solve disputes”. This further indicated the region’s perception that Uyghurs were the problem.<sup>197</sup>

A final point is needed before concluding. A critique could be made that in the face of the riots in Xinjiang the state’s response has been measured, and that if Hans committed a similar act, a comparable response would be incurred. Certainly the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident at Tiananmen Square could be pointed at as an example of this. However, what this argument ignores is that the importance of the ethnic body in the actions discussed above. It is quite overtly an ethnicized issue given the targeting of ethnic bodies on both sides and the state’s response to this but the fact that it is an ethnic issue rather than an issue of social class or stratification has enabled a response that can be isolated via ethnicity. Consider an incident that occurred in Zhushan, Yongzhou, in 2007 that speaks to this: twenty thousand villagers clashed with local police over rising bus fares, they

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<sup>197</sup> Thousands Of Harmony Makers Sent To Xinjiang,” *Xinhua*, 7 September 2009, <[http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/07/content\\_8660860.htm](http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/ethnic/2009-09/07/content_8660860.htm)> (21 March 2010).

burned buses and encircled the village's police station and threw rocks at the officers and were eventually subdued with force.<sup>198</sup> Soon after, *The Study Times*, a weekly paper sponsored by the Party, argued that state officials should use restraint when dealing with mass incidents citing the importance of negotiation, rather than forceful suppression. It also noted the importance of reducing regional inequality and attacking corruption to counteract protests.<sup>199</sup> Clearly, this delicacy has not been extended to Xinjiang given the overwhelming reaction to the riots of the summer of 2009. While the events in Zhushan were not on the same scale in terms of deaths as the riots in Urumqi, they were nevertheless destructive. The state's reaction was quite limited and neither included accusing the residents of being any of the three evils nor (re)situating them as enemies of the nation. The friend/enemy dialectic was not deployed in spite of the damage and the Party even went as far as calling for more consideration and less force when dealing with protests. By contrast, almost every situation that has occurred in Xinjiang has led to an intensification of state directed violence to hunt down and punish the "terrorists". Even community events and gatherings are subject to intense restrictions. Jay Dautcher in his anthropological examination of Uyghur culture provided a number of salient examples of this ranging from *meshrep* restrictions to the suppression of a city-wide children's soccer tournament. The latter of these resulted in a *de facto* declaration of martial law with tanks sent to occupy the soccer fields, road blockages with barbed-wire set up, and armed police sent to patrol for evil elements.<sup>200</sup> Without a doubt the disturbances and social

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<sup>198</sup> China's Party Paper Tells Local Governments To Restrain From Force When Dealing With Protests," *Xinhua*, 23 March 2007, <[http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/23/eng20070323\\_360233.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/23/eng20070323_360233.html)> (21 March 2010).

<sup>199</sup> China's Party Paper, *Xinhua*.

<sup>200</sup> Jay Dautcher, *Down A Narrow Road: Identity And Masculinity In A Uyghur Community In Xinjiang China*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 278-280.

stirrings in Han dominated regions in China do not share the same degree of suppression that such protests bring about in Uyghur areas in Xinjiang. The ethnic factor is the key to explaining this.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

This thesis has explored the myriad emergences of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang, with a particular focus on its relationship to the Uyghurs. The first chapter began with a discussion of the importance of ethnicity in the construction of the Chinese nation.

Underpinning the analysis was the argument that the nation was constructed with a horizontal and vertical component. These elements shaped the parameters under which the friend/enemy dialectic would emerge. These boundaries were the product of a symphony of discursive streams. Historical, cultural, anthropological, and biological/racial discourses were all central in defining the composition of the Chinese nation. The nation's horizontal scope assumed a multinational China, a nation comprised of a multitude of ethnicities. However, the vertical component situated these groups according to a strict hierarchy, with the Han at the top. These hierarchical and horizontal portions interacted with the friend/enemy dialectic. Simply put, ethnic minority groups were tenuous friends in the Chinese nation. Depending on the political milieu, the boundaries of the friend/enemy dialectic expanded and contracted.

The second chapter of the thesis pursued this argument regarding the Chinese nation. It explored aspects of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao's Thought to show how they articulated and affected the range of policy options that emerged to handle ethnic groups. In short, this range of options was hinged on an attempt to reduce the boundaries of Uyghur ethnic difference according to the limits of class. Through this backdrop of Marx's teleology of History, Lenin's self-determination, and Mao and the Party's vision,

the friend/enemy dialectic was projected. These theories provided the grid of intelligibility for the emergence of the friend/enemy dialectic. The second chapter then moves the discussion to the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang in 1949. The experience in the region during the time of the Great Helmsman was intensely violent, more so than in Han regions. To demonstrate this, the analysis followed the Party and state's policy directives and the development of its institutions. The project was essentially colonial, and like most colonial situations, violence followed from the CCP's occupation and development of Xinjiang. By contrast, prior to the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang in 1949 the region operated as a frontier with little connection to its colonial overlord, the Qing Empire. Despite attempts otherwise, the ROC's policies followed a similar trajectory as the Qing's. It was only following the establishment of the PRC that the region became tightly linked with the Chinese state. The construction of the PRC's institutions of governance and control and Han migration allowed a radicalization of the drive to exorcise "ethnicity" from China's national minorities. This vision led to the deployment of the classification of enemy.

The second chapter focuses on a number of political campaigns to understand the friend/enemy dialectic during Mao's time. Beginning with the early years of Xinjiang, the chapter analyzed the Land Reform Campaign and the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries. The friend/enemy dialectic, through these campaigns, began to attack the Uyghurs. The subsequent Hundred Flowers Movement, Anti-Rightist Campaign, and Great Leap Forward, brought further violence and upheaval to the region. Through time, the campaigns focused increasingly on Uyghur ethnicity as a problematic element. Overall, the relationship between Xinjiang and the Uyghurs with the PRC became

increasingly more violent. This violence targeted the Uyghurs as an ethnic group for (re)construction and rebirth into the Chinese nation.

The third and fourth chapters argued that the ubiquity of violence that had characterized the Mao period was reframed following the Chairman's death. The third chapter discusses the claim that there has been a movement away from the friend/enemy dialectic. It was the policies of economic reform and the rethinking and (re)construction of revolutionary institutional purpose and systems of governance that led to the move away from politics. This has led to the disappearance of the friend/enemy dialectic in most Han areas of China. Vital to this movement was biopolitics. The biopoliticization of the population in China has displaced the sovereignty of the friend/enemy dialectic. Defining the biopolitical project was the logic of "making live or letting die". This logic focused on the establishment of population and its administration through neo-liberal technologies of governance. These technologies of governance imagine a *telos* of administration from a distance and minimum political expenditure to achieve policy goals.

In Xinjiang, the process of biopoliticization was a colonial project. It relied on a broad macro strategy of development and micro tactics to (re)produce Uyghur "Chinese" subjects. The third chapter discussed a number of policies designed to achieve this dream. The discursive fields of education and language, health, and culture were all outlined since each has played a critical role in the development of biopolitics. The policies and technologies used by each field were based on power operating productively. However, at the margins of biopolitics was the "let die" segment of the process. This legitimated a short-circuiting of biopolitics in the interest of the protection of society. In this manner,

resistance to the biopolitical project rerouted the state's actions in accordance with the logic of the friend/enemy dialectic. The third chapter charts this process, and argues that there has been a resurgence of the friend/enemy dialectic through the reform period. This directly challenges the argument that China has been (de)politicized and its population (de)mobilized. Several examples were used to argue this, including: *yanda* campaigns, legal elasticity, and the three evil categories. The chapter demonstrated that the death certificate of the political, understood through the friend/enemy dialectic in China, has not yet been signed.

The fourth chapter extended the argument made in the third chapter. The argument was that the friend/enemy dialectic has not disappeared since end of Mao. It used the riots of the summer of 2009 in Xinjiang as an empirical case study. Analyzing the aftermath of the mainly Uyghur driven violence, the chapter examined in detail the policy responses and security practices that embodied the state's reaction. The resurgence of violence and the extreme emphasis the Chinese state placed on policing and securing the region, provided ample evidence that the friend/enemy dialectic has not yet disappeared. The communications blockade and the challenges it posed signalled an overt movement away from rational biopolitical modes of governance. Further, from the 90 percent increase in security funding to the declaration of the primary task of policing as fighting terrorism, the logistical mechanisms were been put into place to hunt down the shadowy three evils in the territory of Xinjiang. These actions all signalled a movement away from the rational biopolitical mechanisms. However, these political campaigns were tied directly to the biopolitical project of developing the Uyghurs in a particular manner. In practice, the failure of the biopoliticization of the Uyghurs was secured with

the safety net of the friend/enemy dialectic. When the project was exposed for its failures, as in the 7.5 riots, the logic of the friend/enemy dialectic resurged and regained control of the region through punitive, violent measures.

The essential point in this chapter is that the policies and responses generated by the Chinese state focused on the Uyghurs as the problematic group. They were the target of policing, since it was their ethnic identity that constrained development and produced violence. A number of pieces of evidence supported the previous contention, but perhaps most important was the translation of national laws into Uyghur and the passing of the “Ethnic Unity” law. Both of these actions directly indicated the focus on the Uyghurs as the suspect group. To sum up, and echoing the third chapter, a reflection on the empirical evidence associated with the 7.5 riots illustrates the continued prominence of the friend/enemy dialectic in minority political spaces.

### **Final Thoughts**

Wading through the macabre friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang and the elimination of Uyghur enemies is a melancholy endeavour. Much critical insight can be gained into the perpetuation of Uyghur resistance in the region as well to China’s war against the three evils. However, as problematic as the Chinese state’s continued project is in the region, there exists a lack of academic discussion that discusses this as a problem of colonialism. One cannot help but think of Frantz Fanon when reflecting on the continuation of violence produced from both the Chinese state and Hans migrants in the territory and the Uyghurs. A quick reading of Fanon’s famous chapter “On Violence” in *The Wretched of the Earth* reveals many parallels with the experience and material conditions in Xinjiang. One particularly incisive quote in this text stands out which

captures the spirit of the experience of the Uyghurs and the Chinese state in Xinjiang: “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence.”<sup>201</sup> It is a poignant quote, and from his discussions on the psychology of violent resistance to the writing of national history, Fanon’s analysis is syncopated with the contemporary colonial problems in Xinjiang. It is along this line that this thesis ends. If a final thought can be articulated it is this: if there is one realization that this project has opened up it is the need to continue to pursue a political analysis centered on the colonial relationship that exists between the Chinese state, the territory of Xinjiang and both the Han and Uyghur people. Deconstructing this relationship can only contribute positively to decolonization and the dethroning of the prominence of the friend/enemy dialectic in Xinjiang.

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<sup>201</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched Of The Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Groove Press, 2004): 23.

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