

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA POLICE COMMISSION:
A CASE STUDY OF SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

by

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
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ABSTRACT

In 1974, when the Government of British Columbia decided to improve the quality of police services in the province, the method chosen was to create a new structure, the British Columbia Police Commission (BCPC), to promote and implement necessary reforms. This thesis is primarily concerned with an analysis of the BCPC's impact. It is a case study of bureaucratic resistance to programmatic change, examining the obstacles encountered by the commission in its endeavors to deal with the main issues related to the improvement of police services in the province. These issues, first defined by discussion groups which preceded the formation of the BCPC, are listed in the first bulletin published by the commission. They are: police role, standards for police services, recruitment, training, community relations and the abuse of police authority. It is these issues, later translated into BCPC goals, upon which the evaluation of the BCPC's progress is based. Original goals statements are compared with actual BCPC achievements to determine the extent of the agency's impact.

This thesis first examines the theory of administrative reform and deals especially with Anthony Downs' concept of the 'special organization', a model to which the BCPC seems

to conform. Then, following a discussion of the merits of case studies the study turns to the BCPC's background and setting. Because the police commission does not exist in a vacuum its immediate background in British Columbia as well as police related developments in Europe and elsewhere in Canada are presented. Chapter III follows with a study of the chief provisions of the Police Act which relate to the BCPC, while Chapter IV, the largest section, is devoted to an analysis of the consequences of creating the police commission. Commission goals and attempts to implement them are examined. Special attention is given in Chapter V to the most important of the BCPC's achievements, the creation of the Police Discipline Code and the B.C. Police College. The next chapter is concerned with the subject of overcoming resistance to BCPC reforms. Sources of resistance are identified as are the means utilized to overcome obstacles to BCPC programmes. Most successful of these means was the 'absorption of protest' strategy in which the police commission's client groups were encouraged to participate in the BCPC's decision making. This study concludes that the BCPC has successfully, in terms of its original stated goals, carried out a programme of administrative reform and that there is evidence that the quality of policing in British Columbia has improved.

EXAMINERS

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Chapter I

Introduction

Organizational change is an inevitable and universal phenomenon. It occurs under different circumstances at every level of human interaction. Chief among the sources of change is an organization's external environment which contains the 'revolutionary' social, political, cultural and technical forces which act as pressures for innovation.¹ It is our "increasingly knowledgeable society" itself, as Robert Lane suggests,² that is responsible for organizational change as newly acquired information constantly stimulates re-evaluation and improvements. Moreover, society's aspiration levels do not remain absolutely constant but tend to rise slowly, applying pressure to innovate in all areas.

Organizational change is either the result of a combination of circumstances beyond human control or the result of planned efforts by people calculated to attain a definite end. Gerald Caiden has labelled the former type of change as 'administrative change' and the latter as 'administrative reform'. The distinction is quite arbitrary but useful as it provides a convenient differentiation between natural organizational evolution and contrived change involving persuasion, argument and sanctions. Caiden defines administrative change as "a process of self realization assisted by harmonious interaction."³ Administrative change then is natural innovation, marked by a distinct lack of resistance. If resistance

appears then change gives way to reform.

Administrative Reform

Administrative reform, on the other hand, is in Caiden's words, the "artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance."⁴ It also contains an implied moral aspect, that is the faith in the superiority of its ultimate objective. This final goal is the achievement of a new equilibrium for the proper functioning of the organization, to be attained through the application of appropriate knowledge and social technology to existing organizational systems.⁵

The whole concept of administrative reform rests upon the premise that some person or group of people can work consciously toward attaining pre-planned goals. An important point is that for administrative reform to take place a plan for the reform can only be made prior to the inception of the social action to which it is to be applied. The plan must include at least one goal which is formulated through an understanding of the nature of the organization's external environment and the variables operating therein.⁶

Though administrative reform can take place in a wide variety of environments it can only assume significance in markedly bureaucratic middle sized organizations. It has little meaning at the lower levels of administration, for problems there are more often resolved informally and deadlocks can be broken by group reorganization. In the middle sized bureaucratic organization, however, structure and

organization are often too inflexible and roles too differentiated to permit these relatively simple solutions, so reform is necessary to implement change.⁷

Administrative reform is often initiated when the pace or nature of administrative change fails to keep an organization abreast of developments in its field of concern and a gap appears between the reality of its performance and the expectations concerning its performance that are held by those in a position to influence it. In Anthony Downs' words, "a significant discrepancy exists between what it is doing and what it 'ought' to be doing."⁸ More specifically, administrative reform often results when an organization fails to meet the demands placed upon it or when it is not equipped to handle extra demands. In a case where an organization with a reserve capacity is unable to anticipate future demands or fails to adopt the most effective policies, then administrative reform may again be the solution.⁹

The Necessity for Administrative Reform

Why is administrative "change" often inadequate? One explanation has been offered by Robert Michels who theorized that as time passes in a bureaucracy a preoccupation with administrative matters will generally supplant the pursuit of its original fundamental goals.¹⁰ Herbert Kaufman offers other explanations for the failure of organizations to make necessary changes. He identifies the collective benefits of stability, the desires to maintain prevailing advantages, to

protect the quality of services rendered as well as the often high physical and psychic costs of change as factors which inhibit efforts to modify organizational procedures. Such obstacles as limited resources, prior commitments accumulated through sunken costs and interorganizational agreements and the official and unofficial constraints on behavior may also dampen change. In addition, organization members may be blinded to the need for organizational change by ingrained and inflexible behavior patterns.¹¹ Similarly, Anthony Downs has described the "rigidity cycle or the ossification syndrome" which can effect a large bureaucracy under certain conditions.¹²

Downs suggests that as an organization expands, its top administrators will lose power to their subordinates and that the men nominally in charge will then endeavor to preserve their diminishing authority. These attempts to counteract the power drain can lead to inflexibility within the organization as subordinates use up time meant for decision making in attempts to satisfy or circumvent management controls.¹³ Downs points out that the loss of overall perspective and the coordination difficulties associated with intensive specialization also lengthen overall decision making time and ultimately increase organizational rigidity.

As the organization's leaders continue protecting their power, coordinating their specialists and promoting their supporters from the lower ranks, key decision points in the

organization tend to rise to ever-increasing heights in the hierarchy. This escalation of operating authority increases the distance requests, suggestions and directives must travel up and down the administrative ladder, again lengthening decision making time and increasing the likelihood that misinterpretations, accidental or deliberate, will delay or stop innovative procedures.¹⁴ All the above factors then, in one combination or another, can lead to the organizational rigidity which so often precludes successful administrative change.

A variety of factors also determine the selection of a technique for implementing administrative reform. Of these the most important include the extent of reform contemplated, the nature of the formulated objectives, the current state of the organization's external environment and the intentions of the reformers. They may decide to proceed with or without general support, within or outside existing channels, with or without the use of sanctions.¹⁵ Reform also requires a variety of capabilities. Intellectual capabilities are necessary to create novel solutions and new procedures; sociological capabilities are required to identify problems and to provide leadership in the change process; and financial capabilities are absolutely indispensable to underwrite the chain of events from research to implementation and adoption of the reform. General managerial capabilities are also essential as are political capabilities which are needed to supervise the

entire reform process and guide it past any pitfalls.¹⁶ Thus the intentions of the reformers and the capabilities necessary to implement the reform determine its form.

The obstacles to reform may be offset in a variety of ways. Resources may be imported if they are lacking. This is often difficult and expensive but may be necessary to overcome the obstacles of resource limitations. On the other hand resources may be concentrated by establishing priorities for their use and standing by them. However, this approach may prove even more difficult than importing resources for the concentration of resources in one area is only accomplished at the expense of another and the adjustment of priorities is often difficult and painful. Sunken costs may be diminished by entering into leasing arrangements and for organizations in which it is practical, official constraint on behavior and innovation may be lifted. Another popular strategy for overcoming obstacles in the path of reform is reorganization. This is often done to facilitate coordination and efficiency but serves to disrupt existing relationships within the organization as well, enabling the introduction of new behavior patterns. As Kaufman points out, "Reorganization is frequently nothing more than a 'shakeup' intended to loosen the system a little."¹⁷ Reorganization is often particularly effective against those unofficial constraints within the organization that are difficult to identify and to reach but which may be upset by a general administrative disruption.¹⁸

In some instances, however, reorganization may also make change more difficult to implement. For example, where reorganization results in the creation of new administrative echelons proposals for reform must negotiate a longer administrative ladder in which lines of communication are stretched and the influence of organization leaders over their subordinates is attenuated. Moreover, the creation of new administrative echelons is likely to increase the costs of organizational operation while reducing the attractiveness of formerly high positions to potential organization recruits. If the latter circumstance impedes recruitment then organizational leaders often must draw from less qualified candidates who have been socialized to a routine rather than an innovative organizational environment. Thus, instead of creating conditions conducive to change reorganization may accomplish the opposite.¹⁹

The Downsian Special Organization and the BCPC

Frequently, when a reform is contemplated after an organization has reached the stage at which it can no longer satisfactorily respond to the administrative rudder, a new organizational unit is created outside the normal operations of the bureaucracy and charged with the task of first elaborating the reform and then implementing it. Downs describes this new unit as:

...much smaller than the bureau as a whole, though it may contain many members. These members have somewhat broader capabilities and are more competent

than the bureau's average members, since they have been specially picked for this task. They are also exempt from normal rotation "for the duration," so turnover is low. The new organization is not integrated with the bureau's hierarchy, but reports directly to its top-level officials. Moreover, it contains enough specialists and has enough resources so that it is not dependent upon the bureau's regular chain of command for major services. It is exempt from almost all existing controls, regulations and procedures, and is free to invent its own. Finally, it has high priority access to resources so its allocation requests need not compete directly with all other possible users of resources within the regular bureau.²⁰

This thesis is a case study analysis of an attempt by a special organization, similar to the one described by Downs above, to overcome the bureaucratic resistance to its administrative reforms. More specifically, it examines the consequences from 1974 to 1976 of the creation of the British Columbia Police Commission in the Department of the Attorney General.

The British Columbia Police Commission (BCPC) was formed in 1974 to facilitate legislation and policies aimed at altering the character of policing in British Columbia. It could be argued that the Commission has not been in operation long enough for its full impact to be assessed. While this may be true some measure of the BCPC's effectiveness should now be possible. The commission's initial mandate may be identified by studying the intentions of its creators while its progress and impact may be evaluated by examining its accomplishments and how it is perceived by its client groups.

Methodology

There are certain advantages to approaching this kind of problem in administrative reform by a case study. First, as Gerald Caiden notes, a case study is problem oriented, seeking answers to theoretical problems in descriptions of real situations. It is an interesting approach and a flexible method as well, allowing selective treatment and a variety of forms of presentation. Moreover, general principles drawn from a series of similar studies can be further tested for accuracy and though each case study is unique it may contain features in common with other studies that can be combined to add to the existing body of theory.²¹ Furthermore, case studies of small organizations lend themselves to various interlocking research procedures. Direct observation, the study of documents, and the conducting of interviews can be combined to corroborate empirical data on a specific problem. The range and accuracy of information collected is improved by access to these different research techniques for the best method to obtain a particular piece of information can be utilized.²² By using a multiple perspective the author may also allow the various participants in the narrative to voice their own particular opinions. On the other hand, though useful, this device is often illusory, leading the reader to believe he knows the 'whole story' instead of only those pieces of the story which the author has discovered and deemed important and which he has reconstituted for the reader.²³

In addition, as Peter Self warns, though case studies provide a very good way to illustrate theoretical administrative difficulties and are a means of gaining valuable insights into the processes of government they individually offer a limited basis for theorizing.²⁴ One must beware of leaping to conclusions prematurely.

This case study would be incomplete if the administrative reforms of the BCPC were not evaluated. Evaluation must involve the analysis of results within the context of a given hypothesis, for to take reformers at their word is clearly dangerous. The question is how to evaluate the results. First, the actions of the BCPC have been clearly observable and it is possible to compare end results with the original intentions. A comparison of this kind will also reveal any abortive reforms attempted by the commission. An absolute, albeit low, standard for evaluating the success of the BCPC's reforms is whether the commission secured sufficient authority to prevent its opponents from stopping implementation of proposed reforms.²⁵ A more substantial measure of success is the permanence of any intended change. More particularly, whatever the implementation and dislocation costs for the BCPC's reforms, their consequences must invariably and permanently improve the character of policing in British Columbia, in terms of BCPC objectives. As Caiden suggests, "Temporary relief from administrative shortcomings, however welcome is unsatisfactory and does not constitute reform."²⁶ Finally,

elements of J.Q. Wilson's discussion of innovation are applicable to the evaluation of administrative reforms. Wilson defines an innovation as a fundamental change in a significant number of tasks.²⁷ Though subjective, this standard of fundamental changes in a significant number of tasks can help cull the incremental reforms from the fundamental.

Chapter II

Background and Setting

Recent Developments in European Policing

Since the main source of organizational change is the external environment of the organization and because the nature of contemplated reforms and the selection of methods for their implementation are often influenced by comparisons with the achievements of other organizations in the same field, a brief survey of some of the more recent developments in police administration and general policing elsewhere may be useful at this point. This is not to suggest that police oriented reforms in British Columbia are simply replicas of the examples below but that police reformers in the province could not help but be aware of their existence and that this awareness had some degree of impact on their outlook and decisions.

Cultural, traditional and political differences between Canada and western Europe limit the applicability of European police reforms to police practices in British Columbia. However, the innovations made by certain urban and affluent European societies on a variety of fronts to deal with police related problems deserve mention for in many instances they represent the most advanced and sophisticated stages of the police 'art', if it may so be called.

In Germany, for example, police recruits undergo a 3 to

4 year school and training program. Psychology, history, and government processes comprise 25% of the subject matter in the first year's study time. Democratic values are emphasized during the training period and the need for courtesy and friendliness, human understanding and a sense of humor is stressed. Even social graces are not forgotten as the Berlin police school offers dancing instruction to its pupils. In Sweden the study of law takes up 25 percent of class time during a police recruit's training period while social studies, which include psychology, are allotted 15 percent of class time. Civil liberties, minority rights and the principles of democracy are also stressed. The French police recruit is taught to observe the following priorities: "first a citizen, secondly a civil servant, and thirdly a policeman."¹

Police training for senior positions can take from 6 months to one year depending upon the country and the rank, and instruction usually includes human relations and psychology courses. In Sweden, officer trainees also tour psychiatric clinics, prisons and alcoholism centres. Most continental police forces make some provisions for lateral entry. In Germany 10 percent of police detectives are recruits from the legal profession. In France, 50 percent of the present police inspectors were non-police law graduates. Lawyers also hold some 300 of Sweden's top police positions.

Though the French police remain almost completely male, women are finding places in most other European police forces.

In England 5 percent of all constabulary positions are held by women while in Germany policewomen exclusively deal with all children under the age of 14 who come into conflict with the law.

Many European police departments view positive police work as an integral part of their vocation. In contrast with North American police² European police, at least in England, Germany and Scandinavia are not reluctant in becoming involved in anything closely identified with social work or social workers. In fact, the Swedish policeman's favorite alternative profession is social work.³ In Sweden police patrol cars carry motorist aid kits (spark plugs, extra gas, etc.) and detective clubs for children are run by the police. In France, the *Sûreté* operates and staffs summer camps for youths.

Underlying these European police developments are several fundamental features which typify modern European police forces. First, these police forces are highly centralized and are becoming more so.⁴ Centralization has permitted the concentration of superior personnel at the top of the police hierarchy, facilitated the creation of larger, more comprehensive police academies and training programmes, and allowed the grouping of resources for uniform countrywide positive programmes. However, since centralization inhibits flexibility and the freedom to respond to local needs, the decision to centralize presupposes a jurisdiction-wide uniformity of demand.

The second fundamental feature is civilian control of the police. In most western European countries civilians not only oversee but also run the police forces. In Sweden the police are directed by a former judge who is responsible to a 5 man board appointed by the Swedish Parliament. State police commissioners in Germany are professional civil servants who report directly to the state ministers of interior. A civilian secretary general directs the unified French police while the Sûreté and the Paris Prefecture are also headed by civilians.

European police forces are also characterized by a high degree of bureaucratization and highly developed police unionism. Moreover, police are involved to a considerable extent in the political process. European police departments tend to operate by typical fixed standards of operation and behavior while virtually all policemen, including those in the upper echelons, belong to unions. Though legislatures exert substantial pressure upon the police, the police forces often are represented before the government by their own members. German and Scandinavian police are permitted to hold political office and often do.⁵

Recent Developments in Canadian Policing

Changes in European society have been paralleled by developments in Canada where increasing crime rates and costs of policing have prompted a re-evaluation of various aspects of policing. In 1962 the province of Ontario moved to improve

the quality and effectiveness of its municipal police forces by establishing a new permanent semi-independent agency charged with the promotion of maximum efficiency of police forces in the province through the supervision or provision of advisory services, crime intelligence, police training, disciplinary procedures and technical services.⁶ Commenting on the formation of the 3 member Ontario Police Commission Walter Lee has written:

What appeared to be envisioned was some form of permanent non-political body which could carry out a continuous study of police needs and enforcement problems on a provincial scale and with authority to take remedial action to correct weaknesses. The government concluded that the police system, which had seemed adequate in earlier times, was no longer capable of coping with the present day threats of crime in the expanding growth and economy of the province. The government decided that immediate steps be taken to improve and modernize our police services, to ensure a higher degree of uniformity in qualifications, training and general efficiency of the police.⁷

The Ontario Police Commission (OPC) plays 2 major quite different roles. First, it manages programme administration and central support services for the police and second, it fulfills certain quasi-judicial functions.

In relation to the first function the OPC has studied local law enforcement agencies to discover means by which the effectiveness of both the police forces and their members can be improved. The OPC also instituted a promotion by merit programme to increase professionalism in the police, moved to increase personal contact between policemen and sponsored

uniform policing procedures.

In accordance with its second function the OPC has been empowered to investigate the performance of all police chiefs and their subordinates in the province. The OPC has also investigated local police forces, usually at the request of municipal authorities, to determine the adequacy of police personnel qualifications.⁸ Perhaps this control exercised by the OPC over the municipal police forces is the most important of all its duties for by law each community in Ontario must maintain an adequate police force and this adequacy is determined by the OPC. In addition, the Commission may examine the internal administration and records of the municipal police departments. In practise, these examinations have more often resulted in constructive criticism than remedial action against local officials.⁹

In part, the continuing existence of the OPC is necessitated by the need for a central agency to provide support, central services, coordination and a tie to the provincial government for municipal police forces. By virtue of its province wide structure the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) inherently has all these and the OPC has no direct operational control over it. A direct involvement with the OPP would fundamentally alter the OPC's independence from police operations.¹⁰ However, the Ontario Police Act does provide that, with the Attorney General's approval, the OPC may direct the OPP.

The Ontario Police Commission was the first provincial

police commission in Canada. Drawing upon the Ontario experience Quebec in 1968 and Alberta in 1971 created similar commissions. By 1974 Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan as well as British Columbia had turned to the concept.

Common features shared by these provincial police commissions have been outlined by William and Nora Kelly in their study of Canadian policing.¹¹ Standard cords of discipline for provincial municipal forces have been created by the legislation establishing the commissions; each commission is provided with the right to hear appeals stemming from internal police discipline cases; each has the authority to investigate the conduct and performance of a municipal police chief and his subordinates; each police commission must approve any move to amalgamate municipal police forces; and all police commissions have the mandate to continually advise police forces on organization and administration. Clearly then, Canadian provincial police commissions have at least the legislative authority to make a significant impact on policing in their respective provinces.

The Background of the BCPC

Before discussing the impact of the British Columbia Police Commission it is necessary to examine in more depth the reasons for its creation and the functions it was intended to perform. An examination of the BCPC's immediate external environment will identify the chief problems perceived by those concerned with the nature of policing in British Columbia

as well as the reforms proposed to rectify them.

In his discussion of the B.C. Justice Development Commission J.T. Morley points out that though the Attorney General's Department generally maintained a low profile during the late 1960's certain aspects of the administration of justice in British Columbia were under criticism, chiefly by members of the largest opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP), but also by a number of lawyers in the province.¹² Under the Attorney General, Leslie Peterson, the B.C. Law Reform Commission prepared its own assessment of the state of justice administration in B.C. and presented a report to the Attorney General in August of 1972.¹³ This report followed by approximately one month the submission of an earlier report dealing strictly with the matter of policing in British Columbia.

In February of 1970 Peterson had authorized the formation of a committee consisting of representatives of the B.C. Association of Chiefs of Police, "E" Division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and members of the Department of the Attorney General to study the current state of police services in the province, to discuss the necessity of a new approach to policing, and to make recommendations concerning changes. The committee's main concerns were that the quality of police training and police services varied tremendously throughout B.C., that no uniform code of discipline existed nor were there certain operational procedures applicable to all police forces in the province. In addition, communications

between the various police forces were poor. There were no long range plans in the field of law enforcement in B.C. and the police were not given instructions on a province wide basis to assist them in properly carrying out their tasks.¹⁴

The reasons for these difficulties become clearer upon examining some aspects of the nature of policing in B.C. at the time. The provincial power over policing is derived from Section 92(14) of the British North America Act, 1867 in that it falls within the scope of the "Administration of Justice in the Province." Under this head of power the province of British Columbia holds the exclusive right to create and maintain provincial courts and to administer justice in the province, which includes the establishment and operation of law enforcement agencies. Section 92(15) of the B.N.A. Act provides the authority for B.C. to create offences within the scope of its constitutional power and to impose penalties for the infraction of provincial laws. Regulations for the enforcement of these laws are found in the British Columbia Police Act which also provides for the creation of a Provincial Police force and the option for the province to enter into an arrangement with the Government of Canada for the policing of B.C. by the RCMP. This option was exercised and the RCMP, for the purposes of the Police Act, are deemed to be the Provincial Police and have been such since 1950 when the British Columbia Provincial Police were disbanded.

There are several advantages to the province in a federal-

provincial policing contract of this sort. The problems of administering and maintaining a large police force are eliminated for the province while it benefits from the expertise of the RCMP. Moreover, the problems of police recruitment, training, and the provision of costly facilities and equipment are removed. The possibilities of local political interference with the police are also reduced and the province is assured that additional manpower is usually available when necessary.

Nevertheless, such an arrangement has an important drawback in that it takes a degree of the control over the police, which rightfully rests in the hands of the Attorney General by virtue of s.92(14) and places it with the federal government. The RCMP are a federal force, created by and operating under a federal statute. Yet the RCMP are obliged to serve another master, the province in which they work and which pays part of their salary. This dilemma is particularly important in British Columbia for it is the largest RCMP contract province, with a strength of over 3600 men in 1976.¹⁵ "E" Division, as B.C. is known, contains 7 subdivisions with a total of 175 detachments, 38 of which are municipal detachments. Detachment strength usually varies from one to 30 men while the Burnaby municipal detachment has 188 men.¹⁶

In contrast, municipal police departments, under the Attorney General's exclusive jurisdiction number only 12. These ranged in size in 1972 from 30 officers and 783 men,

plus 159 civilian employees in the Vancouver City Police Force down to a Chief Constable and 5 men in the Central Saanich Police Force.¹⁷ The total complement of all the municipal police forces in 1976 was 1565.¹⁸ Thus, the provincial Attorney General has complete control over only 40 percent of the police in B.C.

Until this time major conflicts have been avoided. There have been disputes between federal and provincial authorities over the right to prosecute certain cases but these have been minor.¹⁹ More important, however, is the fact that internal disciplinary procedures in the RCMP have been outside the scope of provincial power. Since the RCMP police most of British Columbia they bear the brunt of most of the citizens' complaints concerning the abuse of police authority. Provincial investigation of such cases may be prevented by the constitutional division of powers and more often than not, grievances against the RCMP have gone unanswered.²⁰

Furthermore, the assumption of provincial policing duties by the RCMP disturbed the relatively unified structure of law enforcement in B.C., increasing difficulties in communication between and the coordination of law enforcement agencies. Prior to 1950 the line of authority over the police in the province descended from the Attorney General to the Commissioner of the B.C. Provincial Police. Under the supervision of the latter, members of the B.C. Provincial Police administered prisons in the province, the Provincial Liquor Act,

the B.C. Game Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, and acted as Fire Marshals.²¹ Law enforcement in B.C. was relatively unified and coordinated. After 1950, however, when the RCMP assumed most of the duties of the defunct B.C. Provincial Police the various branches in the Attorney General's department recruited their own officers, creating a whole myriad of quasi-policemen and fragmenting law enforcement in the province.

Municipal police departments have in the past always assumed the responsibility for training their own men, either by providing in-service training or by sending recruits at their department's expense, to the Vancouver Police Academy. The RCMP also provided in-service training for some municipal policemen at Naden in Victoria.²² Clearly the standards of police training and services were likely to vary under these circumstances. In addition, changes in the law brought about by provincial or federal legislation were only discussed with the RCMP and municipal forces to the extent that the Attorney General's Department found the necessary time. Larger municipalities such as Vancouver and Victoria occasionally provided legal advice and instruction to their police departments while the smaller police forces followed the lead of their larger counterparts or sought instruction from the Attorney General.²³

In June 1972 the committee on policing submitted a report to the Attorney General recommending that there be established

in British Columbia a police commission to promote the prevention of crime and the efficiency of police service in the province. Two months later, before any action was taken, the Social Credit Party lost a provincial election and was replaced by the NDP as the government of British Columbia.

As Peter Self notes, "An important effect of a change of political leadership is the opportunity thus provided for changing the policies of sub-systems."²⁴ Changes in the character of policing in B.C. were not initiated immediately, however. The new NDP Attorney General, Alex Macdonald, studied various ideas for reform during his first year in office and then appointed David Vickers, a Vancouver lawyer, as his deputy in September of 1973. It was after this point that concrete reforms in police administration began to take shape.²⁵

In October 1973 Alex Macdonald asked Simon Fraser University criminologist John Hogarth and Chief Judge Lawrence Brahan of the Provincial Court to create some form of citizen review board to handle complaints against police members.²⁶ Hogarth and Brahan, after a series of discussions, suggested to the Attorney General that it was possible to expand upon the review board concept by creating a mechanism to deal effectively with most of the complex and sensitive issues relating to policing.²⁷ Hogarth stressed the necessity of involving law enforcement agencies from the beginning in any discussions

of the purpose and functions of such a mechanism.²⁸

The following month the Attorney General called together a group consisting not only of members of police departments but also members of the Bar and Bench, civil liberties people, representatives of Native Indian organizations, and some people representing social services who came into contact with the police, to discuss the future of policing in British Columbia. The group, numbering about 25 people, met for a one day session on the University of British Columbia campus on November 28, 1973. They examined the various roles police play in society, police training, the relationship between police and social services, and the appropriate balance between law enforcement and crime prevention. They discussed points of conflict or potential confrontation between the police and the public and identified various needs in policing in B.C.

This discussion group noted that while the traditional work of the police officer was increasing rapidly because of the great increase in crime in B.C. new demands were also being placed on police services. These two factors stretched police services very thinly, especially since police strength in the province on a population basis fell below that of most other provinces.

The group also agreed that the image of the police officer in B.C. was poor and that there was a need to create positive roles for the police in the community while maintaining their

link with the law. While it was recognized that police should not perform the role of the social worker there was general agreement that police, since they are the principal agency responding to crisis situations 24 hours a day, should be trained to handle domestic quarrels, racial conflicts and the whole host of problems which are peripheral to core policing duties. Training, integration with social services, the use of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, experimentation and innovation were seen as means for improving the response and referral roles of the police.

In addition, the group expressed the need to establish minimum standards of police service on a provincial basis and the desirability of a standardized procedure for the recruitment and training of police officers. While policing problems differed throughout the regions of the province, each requiring its own degree of police service, certain municipalities were identified as providing an inadequate standard of policing. It was felt that a general standard to which all municipal police forces must comply was necessary. The discussion group also expressed concern about a perceived insufficient number of women police officers and officers drawn from minority groups.

Various options for police training were discussed as well. These included the creation of a provincial police college, the use of existing facilities at the British Columbia Institute of Technology and community colleges, and the utilization

of recent developments in criminology instruction at Simon Fraser University. Procedures for certifying courses meeting minimum standards for police training at various levels and the necessity for coordination of training were also considered.

The discussion group regarded current methods of dealing with the abuse of authority by individual police officers as inadequate. Some felt existing disciplinary procedures were too invisible to inspire confidence in their fairness while others saw the need for independent investigation of complaints against the police. Police representatives were concerned about the lack of due process protecting their rights in hearings and some of their number felt the lack of sufficient uniformity in disciplinary procedures in the various police forces. There was a general consensus, however, that most complaints could be handled informally and successfully at the police detachment level and that most complaints need not be escalated into major issues. It was felt that mechanisms to handle serious complaints against police officers initiated by the public or by senior police officials should be developed nonetheless.²⁹

In summary, the chief issues which emerged from the discussion group talks were: defining the police role, standards, recruitment, training, community relations, and the abuse of authority. The Attorney General, surprised and pleased that people who had been in polarized positions were able to reach

a substantial degree of consensus, requested Hogarth and Brahan to carry the project further by expanding the working group in order to prepare a draft for a new Police Act which would incorporate the group's recommendations on the chief issues into a legislative format.³⁰

In February of 1974 the first draft of the new Police Act was prepared. The expanded group did the classical work that would normally be done in the Attorney General's department but attempted throughout to view the technical parts of drafting the statute as secondary and to ensure that the fundamental parts were the policy issues emanating from concrete experience. The objective was to draft a Police Act that would not only be acceptable, practical and useful to people in the field but which would also be perceived as such. This marked the first time in British Columbia that a statute was drafted not by the provincial government but by those people most likely to be affected by the legislation. It was also the first time that members of the province's police forces were given an opportunity to participate in the drafting of legislation which was to govern their work. The idea of asking the community affected by legislation to draft their own bill was inspiring for some, energizing them to participate to a greater degree than they might have otherwise. However, from the beginning some participants suspected that the whole process was co-opting and deceptive and that it contained a hidden agenda. Suspicion of this sort persisted beyond the

initial stages of the project and Hogarth did not feel sure of total support until well into 1976.³¹ Work on the statute proceeded and in April 1974 the Attorney General informed the group that their submission, as presented, was acceptable in principle. The fifth draft of the Police Act passed third reading on June 12, 1974.

That a new agency was established to carry out administrative reforms is significant for it indicates that the ongoing police bureaucracies had become ossified and that the process of natural administrative change was no longer proceeding at an adequate pace to keep up with new demands placed on police services. It is likely then that the BCPC was intended to function as a Downsian 'special organization' with a mandate to induce rapid administrative transformations against resistance. Evidence presented in later chapters of this paper will show that the BCPC conformed not only in structure to Downs' model but also in life cycle, passing from an initial high productivity phase into a stage in which its special status declines and it is threatened by absorption into the every day bureaucracy.

If the BCPC was successful in its reform efforts then its success must be measured in terms of attainment of its pre-planned goals. Substantial improvements in its reform areas should be evident. One would expect to see the establishment of a uniform quality of police training and minimum standards for police service throughout the province, the creation of a

uniform discipline code and a grievance procedure for all police which would lead to better methods for dealing with cases of abuse of authority and eventually to an improved police image in British Columbia. Successful reform efforts would also be reflected by the institution of long range police planning and improved communications between police forces as well as new positive roles for the police. All the above should combine to noticeably and permanently improve police administration in the province. This thesis will attempt to show that for the most part these goals were attained and that the BCPC has had a considerable impact upon the nature of policing in British Columbia.

Chapter III

The Police Act

As originally conceived, the new British Columbia Police Act served generally as enabling legislation, providing the statutory consent whereby the policing of the province could be administered in new ways. Commenting on the Act, Premier Dave Barrett stated, "the RCMP and municipal forces have asked for a clarification of legislation and the Act would be a matter of clearing up a problem that has been ignored."¹ The broad aims of the legislation were to establish a mechanism for provincially regulating police forces and to determine the powers of the proposed police commission.

The Act provided for the creation of a British Columbia Police Commission and set out its functions. The commission was to consist of three members, appointed by the provincial cabinet, who were to hold office for a term not exceeding five years. Their fundamental duties were:

- (a) to maintain a system of statistical records, and to carry out research studies or projects, related to law enforcement and crime prevention, for the purpose of assisting the provincial force and municipal forces;
- (b) to consult with, and give information and advice to, the commissioner, chief constable, boards and committees, on matters related to police and policing;
- (c) to establish, subject to the approval of the minister, minimum standards for the selection and training of constables;
- (d) to establish and carry out, or to approve and supervise, programmes for the training and retraining of constables and persons who

- intend to become constables;
- (e) to establish and carry out, or to approve and supervise, programmes for the promotion of harmonious relationships between constables and the public;
- (f) to assist in the co-ordination of policing by the provincial force and municipal forces; and
- (g) to perform such other functions and duties as may be given to it under [the Police Act] or the regulations.²

In addition, the Act introduced a new method of dealing with citizens' complaints against the police. Though sections of the Police Act dealt with police discipline they were not brought into force until a uniform discipline code embodying a code of procedure for municipal police forces was created in 1975. The procedures set out originally in the Act in Sections 37 to 47 encouraged the informal resolution of complaints but provided the right to an open hearing if an informal resolution proved impossible. An open hearing was also guaranteed if the complainant or municipal police officer was dissatisfied with the results of an enquiry into a complaint. To protect the rights of the individuals concerned certain procedures were set out in the Act which govern the process. Any investigation or enquiry is conducted using the adversary system, with reasonable opportunity provided to every person likely to be affected by the investigation to appear and be heard either in person or through counsel.

The Police Act also clarified relationships in police matters between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments, the police forces operating in B.C. and the British

Columbia Police Commission. Essentially, the Act provides that any community required to supply policing services (any community with a population greater than 5000) may either contract with the RCMP or operate its own police force under the direction of a municipal board. Section 19 of the Act calls for the creation of police boards in municipalities having their own police force. These boards are to consist of the council mayor, one person appointed by the council, and three persons appointed, after consultation with the council, by the provincial cabinet. In this manner, while all municipal police forces remain locally controlled the cabinet appointees to the board ensure a degree of provincial government influence over each. Moreover, it is the task of the BCPC to ensure that levels of police service are adequate, so there is in fact a double provincial presence affecting every municipal police force. In dealing with the RCMP, the Act specifies that the federal force is functioning in B.C. only in the capacity of a provincial police force or as a municipal police force under contract.³

In order to ensure that justice is not only done but is seen to be done, the Police Act, in Section 48, provides that, "...every meeting and hearing of the commission, and of every board and committee, shall be open to the public." This rule is always in force except when a matter of public security arises, or when a financial or personal matter respecting a person is discussed in which the person's interest in the

matter outweighs the concern of the public. In any case, only that part of the meeting or hearing in which such a matter is discussed is held in camera. Section 52 of the Act further protects the public by providing legal rights, privileges and immunities to persons and witnesses attending or giving evidence at disciplinary tribunals, studies, and enquiries. These include the right to be represented by counsel, to call and examine witnesses, and to rely on any provisions of the Evidence Act or the Canada Evidence Act.

The Police Commission

The British Columbia Police Commission itself was seen by Hogarth as a scaled down version of the B.C. Labour Relations Board. It is independent of the provincial civil service and has the authority to hire, notwithstanding the Public Service Act, but subject to the approval of the Attorney General, any necessary consultants, experts and specialists for two year terms. The BCPC may also employ, subject to the Public Service Act, such persons as it considers necessary to carry out its proper business.⁴

The first appointees to the BCPC were: John Hogarth, appointed as chairman; Assistant RCMP Commissioner Gordon Cunningham, appointed as a commissioner; and Reverend Robert Burrows, also appointed as commissioner. All three had participated in drafting the Police Act. Cunningham, however, declined the appointment to the BCPC. RCMP sources mentioned

Cunningham was opposed to police being given the right to strike and that he felt his convictions were incompatible with his responsibilities on the commission.⁵ He was replaced April 1, 1975 by Geoff Mortimer, director of the B.C. sheriff services. At the outset, Hogarth's primary responsibilities within the commission were for the maintenance of the relationship with the provincial government, for formulating and criticizing legislation involving the police, for developments in police discipline, and for hearings and enquiries held under the auspices of the commission. Burrows was responsible for matters involving the provision of social services and for those involving the status of women and Indians. Mortimer's initial responsibility on the commission was the establishment of uniform standards of policing throughout the province and his duties were to oversee the introduction of uniform standards for uniforms, rank structure, weapons, police strength, equipment and costing agreements in all municipal police forces. His task was also to supervise management training to upgrade supervisors and administrators in municipal police departments.⁶

The use of the approach to administrative reform which the BCPC represents involves several problems. First, enough money must be available to the commission for it to carry out its plans. Hogarth had originally estimated the operating budget for the first year to equal approximately \$293,000 and had counted on the commission having access to funds made

available under the Criminal Justice Authority to sponsor courses, seminars, research and innovation.⁷ The provincial estimates for 1975/76 reveal that the BCPC was voted \$1,370,260 for that fiscal year while estimates for the following year show the commission's allotment was reduced by \$1,000 to \$1,369,259. Clearly then, the provincial government was willing to financially support the new agency.

The second problem involved the willingness of the province's elected officials and administrators to encourage experimentation in the policing field. Without strong support at the top neither the BCPC nor any other agency is likely to alter traditional habits of attitude and action, but since a separately funded, relatively low visibility agency such as the BCPC does not involve substantial political costs this support is often not difficult to obtain. This is especially true in the case of the BCPC where the initial impetus for its formation originated partly in the Department of the Attorney General. At any rate, both Hogarth and the Deputy Attorney General admit the commission received little, if any, interference from the administrations under which it has existed⁸ and obtaining the freedom of action is tantamount to receiving support.

The third problem is the limited number of people with the talent and perseverance to direct and work within an organization such as the BCPC. Intellectual prowess must be coupled with the relatively rare capability to continually re-evaluate

not only the policies of the commission, but one's own attitudes and commitments as well, if reforms that are not exceedingly bound and hampered by tradition and precedent are to be secured. It is often claimed that the traits required of top executives during the reform process are different from those necessary during the subsequent programme execution phase. The differences are evident - 'idea man' versus 'orderly bureaucrat'.⁹ Executives with the desirable capabilities are often in demand elsewhere while the prospects of the difficult and less visible effort involved in the long process of negotiation and follow-up work discourage many potential candidates.

John Hogarth, convenor of the committee meetings drawing up the Police Act and vice-chairman of the Justice Development Commission, was a logical choice for the position of chairman of the BCPC. He had been the director of several research projects for the law reform commission of Canada and his report on dispute settlements and criminal law was published by that body. Another of Hogarth's reports, on drug offenders, was published by the Le Dain Commission. Hogarth had studied law at the University of British Columbia and received a doctorate at Cambridge. He had also authored various articles, research reports and book reviews on subjects related to criminal law. In November of 1973, his book, Sentencing as a Human Process, was awarded a prize by the International Society of Criminology as one of the three best books in the field's international

literature during the previous four years. While studying law at U.B.C. Hogarth had worked with the Narcotics Addiction Foundation of B.C. and after graduating he was employed as a probation officer in Dawson Creek, Port Alberni, Burnaby and Vancouver. In 1968 he taught at the Ontario Police College and remains a permanent guest lecturer at that institution. Hogarth has also been a research associate at the Centre for Criminology at the University of Toronto and has served as president of the Canadian Society for the Advancement of Research in Criminal Justice as well as a member of the executive committee of the International Association of Penal Law.

At the time of his appointment to the BCPC Robert Burrows was superintendent and minister of the First United Church in Vancouver. He had also been a Vancouver police commissioner since July 1973 and was extensively involved in community service work. Burrows was co-founder of the Vancouver Inner City Service project and founder of the Dugout Day Centre for downtown residents. Before coming to Vancouver he had done mission work on the B.C. coast, both as a ship captain and as pilot of the United Church aircraft based at Alert Bay. Burrows had also aided in starting the Outreach Project and Outreach School for dropouts in the skidroad area of Vancouver.

Geoff Mortimer had served with the RCMP for 35 years prior to his appointment to the commission and was currently director of the British Columbia sheriff services. While with the

RCMP he had been employed as deputy commissioner in charge of services and supply and had also worked in Ottawa as an assistant commissioner responsible for services and supply. In addition, Mortimer had served a term in Victoria in the position of chief superintendent in charge of administration and finance. He had been responsible for organizing the sheriff services in B.C. since July 1974 and was to remain as a senior consultant in that division after taking up his duties with the police commission until a new director was appointed.

At this point it becomes clear that the model of the British Columbia Police Commission falls within the Downsian definition of the 'special organization'. The commission was created by an act of the provincial legislature which provided for the commissioners to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and that the commission could employ certain persons irrespective of the Public Service Act. The former factor indicates the importance attached to the new agency while the latter, when coupled with the broad mandate of the commission, exempted the organization from most governmental restraints. In addition, by appointing John Hogarth, vice-chairman of the JDC, as Chairman of the BCPC the Attorney General ensured that the new agency would maintain a steady liaison with senior government administrators, that is, with David Vickers, chairman of the JDC and Deputy Attorney General. Though the BCPC was part of the

Department of the Attorney General David Vickers stated, "The issue of independence, I think, was important and, in addition, the need, as we saw it then, not to get buried within the bureaucracy as so many things seem to do. Once buried in the kind of bureaucratic structures that exist here in Victoria [there is] very little opportunity to do anything. The commission, set apart from that was, I think, able to move quicker and more independently from government."¹⁰ Furthermore, the persons appointed as commissioners and those subsequently hired by the commission in the capacity of directors and research consultants had more experience in police related matters than the average civil servant in the Attorney General's department. As a result, the commission was composed of individuals that, "have somewhat broader capabilities and are more competent than the bureau's average members since they have been specially picked."¹¹ Thus, it is evident that the BCPC closely resembles the Downsian model. It was created as an organization with two mandates: to plan large scale reforms in the field of policing and to implement those reforms.

Chapter IV

Consequences of Creating the BCPC

There have been a variety of consequences flowing from the creation of the BCPC which indicate that in the face of resistance the police commission has managed to induce administrative reforms in terms of each of its preplanned goals. Programmatic accomplishments in a number of areas - police role, standards, recruitment, training, community relations and abuse of authority - are evident and just as the existence of the Justice Development Commission enabled the Department of the Attorney General to recruit a higher calibre of professional staff¹ the creation of the BCPC has allowed the Attorney General's department to hire a staff with broader experience and a higher overall capability to implement police reforms. In relation to police matters the research and planning capabilities of the Attorney General's department were also expanded and to an extent its operating atmosphere has been affected. The Deputy Attorney General suggests, "You cannot live in a partnership with a mind like Hogarth's without it having some impact on you. His impact on the department, I think, is very real. First of all, his constant challenging of the kinds of things we do over here in head office has been healthy. He and the commission bring ...the style of openness which has been helpful for the rest of the department to see."² Finally, in the course of imple-

menting its proposals the BCPC has encountered a degree of resistance from its client groups - the police, the public, the police unions and members of the legislature - and the resolution of these conflicts is itself an important development. Thus, it appears that the BCPC, originally created to promote and implement rapid administrative transformation in the field of policing, has had a considerable impact not only upon the nature of policing in the province but also upon the ongoing bureaucracy to which it is attached.

Programmatic Accomplishments

One of the most pressing organizational problems in the early period of a new agency's existence is the formulation of a clear and simple idea of its mission. Once solved, the organization's leaders are provided with a coherent environment for their decision making. Guiding principles are first developed and from them the key decision premises on which activity rests are derived.³ The guiding principles for the British Columbia Police Commission were laid out in the Police Act, but in broad terms, necessitating a more specific delineation of the agency's mission. Toward this end the Planning and Research Unit of the JDC, in conjunction with members of the BCPC, prepared a series of preliminary goal statements dealing with the different facets of the police commission's mandate: training and personnel qualifications, research, the police and social services, and standards and performance.

Chief among the initial concerns of the BCPC was the issue of police training. The police chiefs had emphasized the need for better training in the 1972 committee report on policing in B.C.; the discussion group which had preceded the formation of the commission had identified police training as a top priority; and the Deputy Attorney General stressed in early 1975 that retraining and a different kind of training which involved the police in the community was the key to crime prevention, the area where government money should be spent.⁴

The preliminary overall aim in the area of training and personnel qualifications was identified as creating the ability to meet the requirements of the changing police role through "an integrated manpower development programme including basic, professional and executive training, building a mixture of police skills, academic education and practical field experience."⁵ Though this preliminary goal statement narrowed down the task of the BCPC considerably the goal remained too broad to be operative at that level. It provided little guide for action because of the difficulties of measuring both the degree of its attainment and the effect of positive action upon it. As Herbert Simon points out, decisions are usually made "in terms of the highest level goals that are operative - the most general goals to which action can be related in a fairly definite way, and that provide some basis for the assessment of accomplishment."⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that the fundamental aim stated above was

reduced further to a series of sub-goal statements to which concrete action could be applied.

The investigation of training needs and approaches to coordinating the police with government agencies and other service organizations was the first of these sub-goals. This was to be accomplished by: studying and comparing the historical development and current status of police education and training in B.C. and elsewhere; negotiating with the RCMP on training procedures and participation; the discussion of programme design with members of the British Columbia Institute of Technology, Simon Fraser University, and various community colleges; the development of a working relationship with the Department of Education; the investigation of community resources with the view of possible future cooperation in police training; and finally, the maintenance of a close liaison with any BCPC task forces on women, Indians and minority groups.

The second sub-goal identified was the development of a training philosophy embodying the needs of both the police and the public. Expanded career opportunities for the police were envisioned through the development of a police career line, the provision of educational grants and fellowships and the creation of a whole range of training programmes. To ensure a normalization of police training so that it would coincide with existing adult education opportunities, standards for the certification of courses were to be developed

and course prerequisites and certificates were to be systematized. The accomplishment of the latter would permit the possibility of long range career planning. Positive evolutionary changes in the police role were to be enhanced by the promotion of student internalization of the belief in fairness and justice. Planned police training was also to include the promotion of mutual trust between the police and the public.

The third sub-goal was the creation of an organizational framework which would provide the basis from which course planning could be done. The first step in this process was to obtain the cooperation of all municipal police chiefs in the transfer of training responsibility to the BCPC. Then, funding for all municipal police recruit training was to be arranged directly through the provincial government. The selection of proper personnel for assistance in curriculum design and to develop standardized recruitment procedures was necessary. Finally, the feasibility of developing a provincial police college was to be assessed along with the availability of suitable staff and adequate space for its location.

The last sub-goal associated with police training was identified as the formulation of a pilot model, to commence operations on January 6, 1975, which would design teaching programmes to ensure a high level of competence in human relations as well as traditional police skills and which would develop academic and community relevant experiential programmes.

Furthermore, the development of a process to continually evaluate the programme was considered.

The Police Act also directed the BCPC to create a means for collecting information and for conducting and fostering research. The aim was to aid the municipal forces and the RCMP in gaining a clearer understanding of both the nature and importance of criminal activity and the impact of police behavior on the public and on the justice system as a whole. Toward this end the BCPC was to maintain a close liaison with all the police forces in the province, with representatives of the other agencies within the justice system, with the Planning and Research and Information Services Units of the JDC and with the Attorney General. The BCPC functions with respect to research were essentially the promotion of and participation in police oriented research, the transmission of research data and other information, the provision of assistance in the establishment of an information system to collect and organize information meeting the needs of all its client groups, and the fostering of a joint plan to aid the coordination of a changing organization to meet the needs of a changing society.⁷

To accomplish this integration of the police with the total justice system and to aid in the coordination and development of jointly planned innovative projects designed to improve police response to community needs a variety of sub-goals were conceived. First, after consultation with the

JDC and the police forces in the province an information system meeting the needs of all parties was to be developed. This system would solicit input from the police, keep statistical records and periodically review the manner in which information was collected in order to maintain the system's effectiveness. Second, in order to carry out research programmes requested by the BCPC's client groups, to develop criteria for the selection of research programmes and to encourage research on local police problems at the community level the commission was to conduct ongoing research and promote pilot projects of various types. Ongoing research would also serve to analyze information regarding criminal activity, police response and the impact of police activity. Finally, the BCPC was to act as a clearing house, sharing research information among the province's police forces and thereby preventing unnecessary duplication of research.

A third concern identified in the BCPC preliminary goal statements was in the area of police standards and performance.⁸ To improve the quality of police service and the image of the police it was recommended that overall minimum standards should be established and current methods for handling complaints against the police should be redesigned. The standards and procedures of internal police discipline were to be more visible to the public. These changes would occur during a major revision of police objectives and were intended to result in the alteration of functional attitudes and conduct

of police members. The creation of a revised disciplinary code was proposed to weaken the para-military style of police operation and to improve communication, innovation and flexibility while assuring police integrity. The proposed redesigned standards were intended to reflect the changing role of the police but were to be shaped substantially by inputs from the RCMP and municipal police forces to ensure that the rights and needs of their members were protected.

To develop an overall code of minimum standards for policing in B.C. the BCPC planned to examine the current status of standards and performance in the province and elsewhere to identify problems and their locations. Input and response to code development was to be solicited from the municipal forces and the RCMP and then a proposal for a new code was to be prepared.

In order to create new mechanisms for the uniform investigation and enforcement of discipline and to provide that police services were adequately performed the commission considered the development of an adjudicative tribunal as well as independent forms of investigation in the order of civilian review boards. The preference for preventive techniques over punitive sanctions was emphasized and to preserve the authority of top police officials a better method for handling the complaints of superiors against their subordinates was to be sought. The commission also noted the desirability of developing a flexible framework for handling minor complaints so that

quick resolution could be provided, complaints could be dealt with at the local level, and the escalation of minor cases into major issues might be avoided.

Changes in disciplinary procedures were also seen as a means of improving police-public relations, another sub-goal in the standards and performance area. The BCPC proposed to allow and encourage healthy regional variations in policing, so long as they remained above minimum standards. By reducing the disciplinary posture of police management and removing fear as a major factor in obedience to disciplinary codes the BCPC hoped to increase the opportunities for individual development and fulfillment among police officers. At the same time, police discipline procedures that were more visible to the public would increase citizen and press awareness of fair proceedings in disciplinary hearings. The commission also intended to promote police discretion based upon the criterion, "what is most likely to produce the greatest amount of public good." By refocusing the matter of police discipline to take into account overall policing objectives instead of only the performance of particular duties and by studying the problems related to the extent of or level of enforcement the BCPC hoped to implement this goal.⁹

The final area in which preliminary goal statements were prepared was 'police and social services' which included the issues of women and minority groups and their relationships with the police. The overall preliminary aims in this area

were the promotion of a more equitable and efficient interaction between the police and the province's social service organizations as well as an improvement in the understanding between the police, minority groups and women and a large scale reassessment of the role of the police in the community. Various measures were envisioned to meet these goals.

To better define the objectives of policing in B.C. the commission proposed the solicitation of input from police ranks, from representatives of the community and from interested citizens. The commission also suggested that field investigations be conducted in order to learn more about non-law enforcement police functions and that the impact of 'crisis line' demands upon various aspects of police activity be studied.

To improve communications with relevant government agencies and community organizations the plan was for the BCPC to compile a list of names, addresses and other related information for referral purposes and for existing liaisons at all levels and in all regions to be improved. To ensure that unnecessary duplications and misunderstandings would be kept to minimum the preliminary goal statement proposed the solicitation of all available input regarding the improvement of the police referral role.

The need of support for and a greater understanding of the integration of police service roles with community and government organizations was stressed as well. The BCPC was to

promote an understanding of the wide range of positive roles played by the police while emphasizing that the police are not social workers and without impairing their ties to the law. The commission was to develop guidelines for the exercise of police discretion with regards to referral and to encourage flexibility according to regional needs through innovation and experimentation. It was also to develop guidelines for the future expeditious and just handling of non-criminal crisis situations throughout the province.

On the issue of policewomen the preliminary goal statement made several recommendations. First, the BCPC was to explore ways by which more women could be brought into the police. Second, the commission was to conduct research into the special problems involved in police interaction with female victims of crime. Third, similar research into police treatment of women prisoners was suggested.

Recommendations concerning the relationship between the police and Indians and other minority groups included the promotion by the BCPC of the hiring, training and extending of career opportunities to members of minority groups currently under represented on the province's police forces. Furthermore, the promotion of greater community orientation in policing was planned with the intention to better reflect the special needs and cultural characteristics of regional minority groups. The BCPC was also to promote police participation in the discouragement of racial and religious dis-

crimination.

These preliminary goal statements were completed by early July, 1974 and the material was circulated by Hogarth among interested parties for further comment. By the end of August, however, Hogarth was becoming concerned over the lack of progress in the commission's activities. In a memorandum sent to all members of the commission he wrote, "It is becoming clear that the Commission is in danger of not being able to meet its objectives due to many conflicting pressures of time and levels of expectations."¹⁰ These conflicts likely stemmed from the disparity between the expectations of the future held by the BCPC's client groups and both the goals and realities of the changes being thrust upon them. From these conflicts often emerges a resistance to change.¹¹

Resistance to Reforms

The chief source of resistance met by the BCPC was the police community itself.¹² There was first of all the suspicion that the creation of the police commission was simply a prelude to ending the RCMP role as the provincial police force and re-establishing a 'true' provincial police. Vancouver Chief Constable John Fisk, a member of Hogarth's original discussion group representing the police, predicted that one of the first acts of a provincial police commission would be to recommend the introduction of regional policing.¹³ This idea was played out in the community at the political level as late as December, 1975 when it became a minor political

issue in the provincial election held that month.¹⁴ Members of the police were also concerned that the commissioners might prove to be a group of academics, full of theory but short of experience, and that they would not be prepared to deal with traditional policing problems but would become primarily involved in a kind of public relations policing or community and team policing. Another initial concern of the police was that the commissioners would be political appointees, more interested in providing for their own future than in improving the nature of policing in the province.¹⁵ There was also a feeling among some police officers that the creation of the BCPC was an attempt to politicize the police, along with the sheriff's programme or "Barrett's Brownies" as they were sometimes called. Finally, there was likely a suspicion of Hogarth himself which could be attributed to his reputation as a radical among traditionally conservative police administrators.¹⁶

Besides these suspicions concerning the possible ulterior motives of the reformers the BCPC may have faced more deeply entrenched obstacles to reform within the police community: the collective benefits of stability; a degree of calculated opposition to reform; and possibly an inability to change in certain areas.¹⁷ The first of these factors involves the perception that regularities are necessary to maintain operational efficiency and that unknown imperfections are less desirable than known ones. The second factor arises out of

the concern about a possible erosion of quality of service rendered and the fact that some individuals want to protect their prevailing advantages. Still others resent the possibility of bearing the costs of reform, which can be monetary or psychic. An inability to change occurs when, intentionally or unintentionally, a mode of behavior is programmed into an organization's members. Traditionally, police candidates have been screened carefully and then 'fitted' into the system. By the time the recruit reaches the management level he is likely to have been within the system long enough to internalize its collective attitudes, procedures and goals. Moreover, police insularity reinforces this inflexibility by diminishing sensitivity to and awareness of changes in the organization's external environment.

A second source of resistance to BCPC reforms has been the political community. Reflecting on the response to the creation of the BCPC from some members of the opposition parties in the province David Vickers stated, "I think initially the position taken by some provincial politicians was that this was the heralding of a new police state."¹⁸ The chief criticism was that many provisions of the Police Act placed too much power in the new commission. Among the more muted of the reactions to the Police Act was that of Hugh Curtis (PC; Saanich and the Islands). "It is really a very serious piece of legislation if in the wrong hands," he said.¹⁹ The Deputy Attorney General expressed his concern that much of the

initial opposition to the new bill was purely political and therefore unhealthy criticism. At a time that was important for the police and for justice in the province criticism of that sort did not help, he claimed.²⁰

The strongest criticism of the commission, however, came from the press. The Victoria Daily Colonist viewed the creation of the police commission as another step towards "dangerous authoritarianism". The government was creating "a bureaucracy which possesses powers heretofore unknown" the newspaper accused, listing a number of other steps in the process which included the creation of the Insurance Commission, the Land Commission, the Liquor Commission, the Gulf Islands Trust Commission, the Universities Council, and the Energy Commission. According to the Colonist, "these commissions are being given enormous powers which properly belong to the elected representatives of the people. Such a system is vulnerable to abuse and a departure from governing principles the name of the ruling party implies. Or is this the New Democracy?"²¹

Other public criticism of the Police Act was more qualified. R.A.H. Robson, president of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, approved the basic principles embodied in the Act on behalf of his organization but had considerable misgivings about certain aspects of the legislation. These chiefly involved the anomalous position of the RCMP as the Provincial Police, in respect of which none of the Police Act

tribunals would be able to make binding disciplinary orders. The "recommendations" the police commission was allowed to make in disciplinary cases involving the RCMP appeared to have no authoritative force.

Robson spoke with Hogarth about this apparent weakness in the Act and Hogarth explained the complications arising out of the contract between the various municipalities, the province and the federal government regarding the position of the RCMP. Hogarth felt that the public hearings of complaints provided by the Police Act in cases involving the RCMP would ensure that appropriate action was in fact taken by the RCMP. Robson's experience, on the other hand, indicated that the RCMP was, and had always been, an organization particularly well insulated against public pressure, and he was therefore sceptical that any changes in the behavior of the RCMP would result from the provisions of the Police Act or the activities of the BCPC.²²

To identify reasonable proposals for reform, such as those made in the preliminary goal statements, is one thing; to implement them in the face of resistance is another. As suggested above, members of police organizations, like those of most bureaucracies, prefer to maintain familiar habits of thought and practise even when confronted by demands for change. In fact, the police in B.C. may well have been more resistant to innovation than members of most other organizations in the province because of the fragmentation of policing

into a number of small insular, relatively independent police forces, and the presence of the RCMP. The traditional isolation of the police, courts and other justice agencies from one another can also combine to hinder reforms in police practices. The implementation of new policies usually requires a degree of agreement between some of these organizations and a lack of close working relationships between them places another obstacle in the path of change.²³ However, the existence of the JDC in B.C. did, to an extent, mitigate this last difficulty as will be discussed later. Nevertheless, as a consequence of these conditions the BCPC was confronted with the prospect of its proposals being ground to pieces by the bureaucratic system.

Thus, the problem of police reform involves more than identifying proposals which appear reasonably helpful in meeting current wide issues. The BCPC had to cope with other inter-related questions. First, a method for carefully evaluating the proposals in terms of their impact was to be selected and, second, the commission had to decide upon the manner in which the stronger proposals could be implemented.

Reform Implementation

A strategy adopted by the BCPC for the first task was the experimentation with proposed improvements on a pilot project basis. Gains and losses which would result if each reform was put into effect more widely could be carefully assessed and then the commission could ensure that the proposals which

proved favorable were actually put into effect throughout the police system. All the commission's Crime Prevention programmes were initially pilot projects.²⁴

To meet the second problem, Hogarth adopted a plan in which the members of the BCPC would be responsible for developing a series of interlocking work plans which, together, were intended to implement the goals set out for the commission.

He wrote:

We must...turn our minds to setting priorities in a real way, even though this may force some changes in timing schedules. As a first step in coming to grips with this problem, I would ask you to complete a critical path for the next 12 months, setting out the steps needed to achieve concrete objectives in each area of your work with your best estimate of the time required to achieve each stage in that process. I will then see to it that a master plan is prepared which will guide us in the allocation of resources and in setting priorities.²⁵

Work in this direction commenced in September, 1974 and research for the first draft of the master plan was completed, with a code of procedure and explanatory notes, by November of that year. During November and December the commissioners discussed the issues relevant to the plan with interested parties and the final draft was ready for presentation to the cabinet in January of 1975.

The work plan also fulfilled at least four secondary functions: it provided a basis for presenting budget arguments; it assisted the Attorney General, the Attorney General's department and the JDC in determining priorities; it provided for the JDC an overview of all events in the police commission's

sphere, providing information on overlap with other agencies involved in justice administration, the necessity of further coordination, directions for future development; and it established a reference point for activity scheduling and progress reporting.

The master work plan, as it emerged, identified the goals the BCPC was to pursue, the major programme objectives, the chief tasks involved in meeting these objectives, the time-frame in which the work was to take place, and finally, the resources available for each activity.

The improvement of police services by working with individual police forces and the RCMP to improve their crime control and law enforcement effectiveness was identified as the first goal by the BCPC. Related to this goal were a number of programme objectives.

The BCPC intended to encourage police administrators to apply modern management principles to virtually all activities directed toward the improvement of police service and to develop specific policies in a wide variety of policing areas ranging from traffic control to family crisis intervention. Other programme objectives were the creation of better methods of communication between police departments so that knowledge of new and evolving programmes would be more widespread, and the obtaining of changes in the policies and practices of other government departments when necessary to improve police services.

In November and December of 1974 the BCPC worked with individual chiefs of police to develop methods for setting programme objectives for their forces. The commission also sponsored a series of work-shops with senior police management which was completed by early December. Follow-up work-shops were arranged for October, 1976.

From January to April 1975 the commission undertook a number of major tasks intended to improve police services. The members and staff of the BCPC discussed with the various police departments the organizational work required to achieve the objectives which had been developed earlier and encouraged discussion at all levels in each police department on formulating plans of action within given timetables. Priorities among the competing objectives were established and the commission clarified its role in assisting the police in achieving their goals. In each police department one major project was selected in which the BCPC would participate, setting an example, leaving the other projects to the initiative of the police alone. For each project sponsored or supported by the BCPC the members of the commission developed a suitable budget and a line of responsibility. Throughout this process the commission maintained a liaison with the JDC, where ultimate approval of such projects resided.

From July, 1975 to June, 1977 the execution of the planned projects commenced with the BCPC monitoring progress and evaluating results. August, 1975 saw the beginning of a

province wide crime prevention programme in which 73 projects were funded by September, 1976. In November, 1975 discussions on impaired driving began and diversion planning with the Department of Human Resources commenced in 1976. Emergency Response Teams were selected and trained by May, 1976. Ongoing studies of police handling of domestic disputes also were initiated as was an ongoing Police and Community Services Project in South Vancouver in January of 1975.

As each project developed the commission discussed its progress with the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police (B.C.A.C.P.) in monthly meetings. Often, discussions with individual police departments took place and more recently quarterly meetings with the British Columbia Federation of Peace Officers have been scheduled. In addition, where problems and policy issues had intergovernmental implications, these were taken up with the appropriate departments for action. Finally, when the various projects reached a fairly developed stage the public was invited to discuss their effects.

Throughout the process of working to improve police service in B.C., the BCPC planned for the disposition of both human and financial resources. Hogarth maintained the responsibility for policy and legislative implications and for intergovernmental issues, Mortimer was assigned as overall management consultant to all projects, and Burrows was responsible for budget control. The BCPC funded all initial

planning, consulting and development up to project approval while the JDC paid for the execution of specific projects approved by both the BCPC and the JDC executive.

The second goal identified by the police commission was the increase of public awareness about policing through the development within the BCPC of the capacity to provide to residents of the province constructive advice concerning crime and policing problems. There were five basic objectives in this area. The BCPC wished to: establish a constant communication with persons in the public and private sectors concerning local crime; encourage local citizens to recognize and deal with their own crime problems; sponsor workshops with interested community members; place commission staff in positions in the community where they could aid in problem solving; and bring policy issues to the appropriate provincial body for action. Burrows was assigned the lead role in this entire area and he received the assistance of Hogarth and other commission staff when required.

The first step in raising the public level of awareness was the surfacing of issues and the generation of discussion of policing matters with the public and with public officials. Hogarth assumed direction of this task. Issues relating to the police were discussed at regional Justice Council meetings and BCPC Bulletins were prepared and distributed. Hogarth also appeared on radio and television broadcasts and made press statements to publicize the activities of the commission.

To encourage real community participation in policing matters Burrows ensured that local police boards and committees were composed of qualified and interested persons. By November, 1974 all 12 municipalities having their own police forces had appointed police boards and a police committee was established in the Trail area in April, 1975. Consultation with other areas regarding the creation of police committees was in progress throughout 1976.

The BCPC also sought to establish relationships with individual communities through the police boards and committees. Burrows discussed individually and collectively with the new police boards and with the Trail committee the functions they were to perform within the overall police structure. To reinforce the liaison an ongoing programme of on-site visits to communities with policing problems was created. Burrows was primarily responsible for making these visits but all the commission staff, excluding the secretaries of course, were available as required. Contact with all regions in the province were made by early 1975 and by September, 1976 about 130 visits had been conducted by BCPC members to deal with a variety of issues.²⁶ Where action was deemed necessary and desirable Hogarth took up local issues at the provincial level.

Within the context of developing a system of police accountability to the public the BCPC planned a number of programme objectives. Primarily, the commission was con-

cerned with the creation of a mechanism for handling citizens' complaints against the police. To accomplish this, however, a code of substantive offences and a procedural code were to be developed first. Moreover, the commission had to establish policies in discipline matters. The BCPC also desired to institute mechanisms for police-community communication and to develop projects within the community which would involve joint planning and the coordinated delivery of police related services.

After the passing of the Police Act which set out the general scheme for handling citizens' complaints against the police, the BCPC began preparing a discipline code which would define substantive offences and create procedural mechanisms. Professor Alan Grant of Osgoode Hall Law School was brought in as a consultant in the process and in November of 1974 the code was ready in first draft form. The proposed code was discussed by members of the police forces and by interested citizens until January, 1975. The amended code was then completed in April, 1975 and formed part of the Police Act through regulations.

To establish policies for the BCPC work on protocols for handling specific discipline cases to be followed by the police boards, committees and the police commission itself was begun and continued as an ongoing programme. Hogarth and the commission staff also prepared a "Public Information" package to be distributed among the public and the police. The package

consisted of information about police rights, duties and responsibilities under the Police Act and was completed by April 1, 1975.

In order to increase the harmonious interaction of the police with the communities in which they serve the BCPC encouraged the education and participation of police in community matters. In January of 1975 police-community relations issues were incorporated into the curriculum of the B.C. Police College as part of the human relations programme. In addition, the commission sponsored an ongoing programme of police participation in community planning and problem solving. It had also attempted to ensure that appropriate government and community policy making bodies listened to legitimate police concerns. Burrows dealt with issues involving the police with social services while Hogarth has been responsible for issues relating to the provincial government. The BCPC also recommended that individual police officers become part of local and regional planning groups.

Other tasks the commission set for itself were the assessment of public demand for police service in non-criminal matters and the assessment of the quality and frequency of police response to these types of calls. These assessments were intended to lead to the identification of gaps in police service and to indicate the reasons for them. At the same time the BCPC hoped to determine the nature of the relationship between the police and social services. A working party made

up of crisis center staff, police constables and others working hand in hand with Burrows was given the responsibility to carry out this task.

On a regional basis the commission sponsored the development of resource handbooks to be used by police in making referrals to social agencies. The Vancouver Crisis Centre had completed a handbook by 1975 and others were in various stages of completion at that time. Depending on interest, need and resources the BCPC also conducted short training workshops for police constables regarding their referral role. Vancouver was the first community to take advantage of this service, hosting a workshop in December of 1974.

To further improve coordination between the police and other community services the BCPC encouraged the development of specific projects which would bring the two together. A number of these projects were in operation in mid 1976 while others remained in the planning and development phases.²⁷ Burrows was assigned the responsibility of maintaining a liaison between the commission and each project.

Finally, the commission attempted to formalize relationships on a regional and provincial scale to resolve conflicts, work out joint strategies and make recommendations and policy. An agreement was reached with the Department of Human Resources and with the Corrections Branch of the Attorney General's department to form Regional Joint Management Committees consisting of representatives from each agency. These committees

were in place by October, 1976.

The fourth large scale goal identified by the BCPC was the improvement of the police image in B.C. This was to be accomplished by raising the public's level of understanding of the police role.

To reach this objective, Hogarth, supported by commission staff as required, embarked on several ongoing major tasks. First, regular exposure of policing issues was sought through various forms of public media. Hogarth appeared on television programmes, radio hotline shows and made himself available to newspaper reporters. Second, the BCPC produced yearly issues of a police commission "Bulletin" to keep elected officials and the general public aware of its activities. In addition, the commission encouraged and at times sponsored specific public education programmes concerning policing in the province.

Improvement in police training, the major BCPC goal, was to be accomplished through the attainment of a number of lesser objectives. The BCPC desired to establish a British Columbia Police College as an important resource center for the training of all police personnel in the province. The college was to provide necessary upgrading for all existing constables as well as high quality training for all municipal police recruits. Furthermore, the police commission saw the necessity to provide supervisory, specialty and advanced technical courses for all constables and non-commissioned officers and executive

development courses for senior police personnel. The commission also planned to distribute information on the learning resources available to police personnel throughout B.C. and to coordinate and guide career development programmes. Finally, the commission hoped that by providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and information its members could foster a better police-community relationship.

A BCPC planning committee completed the recruitment of personnel for service as staff and faculty at the B.C. Police College by the end of November, 1974 and the successful candidates were trained for their duties during the following two months. Members of the commission and the college director, G.B. Kilcup, found a temporary location for college operations in the Seaforth Armouries in Vancouver in November of 1974 and the facility was equipped for operation at the end of January, 1975.

The planning committee and police college faculty developed an appropriate curriculum for recruit and advanced programmes as well as specialty and management courses. Their initial reports were published in July, 1975. Recruit training commenced in March of that year as did a field instructors' course. A hostage negotiators' course began in February, 1976 and was followed by the commencement of senior management, mid-management and general supervisory training in April.

Under BCPC leadership police college executives began the development of a close working relationship with municipal

police departments in order to identify other current and future training needs. In June of 1975 the college executive began the development of education programmes relevant to policing functions for community agencies and for the general public. The college faculty and staff also began an ongoing programme for the generation of a staff development scheme which would utilize the police college, community colleges in the province, universities and other educational institutions as well as a proposed Justice Education Centre for training and upgrading police officers. Within the framework of the yet to be built Centre the college faculty and staff were to locate the permanent police college and work out relations with other users. The name of the planned Justice Education Centre was changed to the Justice Institute in 1976 but work on the project had not proceeded past the planning stages in early 1977. To review progress towards achieving objectives in the area of police training the BCPC and police college executives also developed an ongoing evaluation plan.

Another major goal for the BCPC was an increase in the number of women and minority group members among the ranks of police constables in the province. The commission wished to open policing careers to women and minorities and to ensure that hiring, employment, promotion and benefits were nondiscriminatory.

Burrows and a BCPC Task Force on Police and Women completed a survey in October, 1974 which examined existing employment

practices in the province's police forces. To ensure that police recruitment strategies conformed to provincial human rights legislation, in October of 1974 the commission communicated to all chiefs of police the requirements of that legislation. By December Hogarth and Burrows had conveyed the same information to all local police boards. The two commissioners also worked with individual police departments to set realistic but firm minimum targets for the employment of women by the police. Targets for 1975 were set by the first of the year.²⁸ Hogarth and Burrows then developed policies concerning the careers of police women throughout 1975 and 1976.

Assistance to police forces in the recruitment and development of opportunities for minority groups was provided by the BCPC as well. Hogarth and Burrows, with the aid of Regional Council Coordinators and Native Indian organizations began the negotiation of a common strategy with the Department of Indian Affairs, the Solicitor General's Department and the RCMP in the formulation of a plan for employing Indians to police Indian reserves and those communities with a high proportion of Indian people. The initial meeting was held in October, 1974 and a general policy was developed regarding an Indian Constables programme. In 1976, 12 Indian special constables were hired by the RCMP and 24 others were slated for employment in 1977. Moreover, in March of 1975 the BCPC established a small committee to informally assist it in

developing future policies concerning matters involving the police and Native Indians. Burrows, the BCPC representative on the committee, also initiated an ongoing series of personal visits to communities in which problems, real or perceived, existed between Indians and the police.

Yet another major goal identified by the BCPC was the creation of criteria and policies which would ensure the maintenance of adequate police strength throughout the province. A number of programme objectives were set to attain this goal. The BCPC planned to develop a formula for the determination of the number of police personnel necessary for policing a given area and to formulate strategies for deployment which would maximize police effectiveness. The use of quasi-police, such as sheriffs, was encouraged to free police constables for the tasks of crime prevention and law enforcement. Finally, the BCPC desired to develop a cost sharing formula which would permit municipalities to provide adequate police protection for their citizens.

The commission studied existing police strength in the province in relation to population, crime rates and other similar factors, and conducted a parallel examination on a city by city basis. Figures from these studies were compared with those from other parts of Canada and formulae used elsewhere for determining minimum and optimum police strength were researched. Burrows and Hogarth then adopted a working formula for British Columbia which indicated the policing needs of

each community. In January, 1975 Hogarth presented BCPC proposals regarding police strength to the three levels of government.

The BCPC hoped to expand the number of police in B.C. by 800 during the following three years at an initial cost of approximately \$18 million. On a police to population ratio the police commission determined that B.C. required 500 more policemen to bring provincial strength to the national average but on a police to crime ratio the formula called for an additional 2000 police officers. Hogarth claimed, however, 800 new constables would, "give a reasonable level of service provided new strategems are adopted to make the best use of police resources."²⁹

Mortimer assumed the tasks of developing deployment strategies to maximize personnel efficiency and creating policies intended to release police officers for the most essential policing duties. By mid 1975 the Sheriffs programme was nearing completion and, as resources became available, crown attorneys and court clerks have been replacing police in certain non-policing functions. In April, 1975 the first police clerks were hired to extend the office hours of small RCMP detachments in B.C. and in 1976 a study was underway to find a means of relieving police constables of guard duty in police jails.

Mortimer was also responsible for encouraging the use of new developments in technology and communications to make

the best use of existing police personnel. This ongoing programme was underway in 1976 in various communities, including Victoria and Vancouver, and was applied to the RCMP operating in the lower mainland.

The BCPC, under Hogarth's direction, studied the costs of maintaining adequate police services in the province as well. Cost analyses were carried out for the RCMP-Province of British Columbia policing contract and, on request, for several B.C. municipalities. During 1975 and 1976 Hogarth conducted negotiations with the Government of Canada on behalf of the Province and interested provincial municipalities concerning a new RCMP contract for the years, 1976-1981. In January, 1975 Hogarth began meetings with representatives of the three levels of government in an effort to find an equitable distribution of policing costs between federal, provincial and municipal authorities. The contract was finalized in February, 1977 on terms which the press claimed, "paved the way for stabilization and cooperation among the [police] forces."³⁰

The BCPC regarded the fulfillment of its research function as another important goal. Through research the commission hoped to develop a method for evaluating police effectiveness with regard to specified criteria. There were a number of programme objectives in this area.

The definition and development of measures of police effectiveness which could find general acceptance and which could be replicable was one such objective. In November, 1974

members of the BCPC staff completed a working paper on preliminary issues and their findings were discussed within the commission. During December the commission circulated a document setting out the chief means of evaluation to chief constables and senior police officers in the province. After their comments were received work continued and the completion of the development of quantified measures of police effectiveness was scheduled for December, 1976. Throughout the process the BCPC maintained a liaison with researchers of the American Justice Institute who were working in this area as well.

Another BCPC research objective was the development of a routine information system which would provide data concerning criminal activity on a province wide basis. The BCPC set out to draw up a standardized crime report form for the collection of basic crime data to be used by all police departments and a standardized arrest and police deposition form for the collection of information on adult and juvenile suspects. The commission also intended the information system to serve as a clearing house for up to date material relating to policing to fulfill the needs of the police, the public and the various levels of government.

Members of the BCPC paid preliminary visits to police departments during November and December of 1974 and in February, 1975 pilot-forms were prepared and submitted for comment to the police. Pilot tests of the forms were conducted

during March and April, 1974. The project was then taken on by the Justice Information System, an agency of the Attorney General's department, in mid-year and became operational in January, 1976.

To develop projections of crime rates over a 5 year period in order to facilitate police manpower acquisition, deployment and planning the BCPC set about collecting data for the 5 year period from 1970 to 1974. Statistics Canada provided information concerning British Columbia and selected provincial police departments while the use of census extracts and other sources of relevant social data enabled the commission to collect demographic and social statistics on areas policed by various out of province police departments and detachments.

In an effort to initiate and assist with pilot projects in policing services and to evaluate their effectiveness the BCPC endeavored to provide the Attorney General and police departments requesting such aid with technical assistance. Members of the BCPC became involved in an RCMP anti-auto theft plan and in an ongoing programme the commission sponsored the assessment of crime prevention projects. The first such attempt at evaluation, an examination of the Burnaby RCMP "Operation Identification" was published in October, 1976.

The BCPC was also interested in initiating and sponsoring, where necessary, research in areas related to policing by other individuals, groups and agencies. A series of research projects on a variety of subjects were completed by late

required by overriding public interest. This was a last resort measure and has not been required to date.

Chapter V.

The Police Discipline Code and the
British Columbia Police College

Perhaps the two most tangible of the BCPC's programmatic accomplishments have been the creation of a new method of handling citizens' complaints and internal discipline for police members and the establishment of the British Columbia Police College. The former accomplishment was intended to institute a fair and impartial method for resolving citizen complaints against the police and to provide a standard procedure for dealing with internal discipline charges within the 12 municipal police departments, while the goal of the latter was to provide a means of educating and training police officers for the province of British Columbia and instilling in them skills and attitudes consistent with professional police service. Both accomplishments deserve closer examination.

On April 30, 1975 an Order-in-Council proclaiming the new Police Discipline Regulations came into effect. The Regulations are divided into 4 parts: internal discipline; disciplinary action against chief constables; public complaints against the police; and appendices setting out discipline offences and forms to be used under the Regulations.

Three basic principles underlie the discipline provisions of the Police Act and the Regulations. The first is that opportunities should be provided for the public and the police

to resolve differences without intervention from higher authorities. For this purpose provisions for informal resolution of both complaints and matters of internal discipline are embodied in the Act and the Regulations. Major confrontations over minor matters may thus be avoided. Second, it is assumed that the police, since they are drawn from the public, are responsible to the public. In line with this reasoning the Regulations provide for an absolute right to a public review of a citizen's complaint against a municipal police officer, but only after certain preliminary steps have been taken, and with safeguards to protect all the individuals concerned. Third, the Regulations are based on the assumption that police constables must be afforded the same rights as public citizens if the police are to respect those rights for others.¹

The citizens' complaint procedure is described in laymen's language in the police commission brochure, "The Public are the Police and the Police are the Public." The procedure contains a number of significant features. It establishes a common code of discipline for all municipal forces by setting out offences subject to discipline, removing archaic language and out of date concepts, and extinguishing the threat of arbitrary judgment by police superiors. The range of penalties provided by the code range from a verbal reprimand to dismissal, depending upon the seriousness of the charge. Only the more serious penalties are entered in a police officer's

record, however, and even these may be expunged after a period of good conduct. A police officer charged with an offence under the code is informed of the maximum penalty he faces, allowing him to judge the seriousness of his situation and to determine whether to admit or deny the offence.

The first stage of the internal discipline hearing is before the chief constable or his delegate. A decision at this level, in the sphere of municipal policing, may be appealed to the municipal police board and a further appeal is available to the BCPC. The police commission intends, over time, to aid in the establishment of uniformity among the various police forces in the province through consistent reasoning in handling disciplinary appeals.² Where a municipal constable is dismissed by a decision at the first level an appeal of the decision is directed to a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. At each stage of the process beyond the initial hearing before the chief of police rights to counsel and rights to all the extraordinary remedies of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, etc., are provided and at all stages the option of disposing of the matter by way of mutual agreement among the parties exists.

As mentioned above, in cases involving municipal police forces the citizen and the police constable each have the right to request a public hearing before the police board in the municipality, but in cases involving the RCMP public review of a citizen's complaint is available only at the

Attorney General's discretion.³ Where the Attorney General decides a particular case merits further enquiry he may direct that a public hearing be held by the BCPC, by a police committee consisting of local residents who are not members of the police, or by a combination of both bodies. In any case, a disciplinary tribunal holding an enquiry respecting a complaint against a member of the RCMP is limited to making recommendations concerning disciplinary action.⁴

Amendments to the Police Act accompanying the incorporation of the new discipline code were for the most part minor. Most were concerned with the clarification of ambiguous terminology and with provisions ensuring the effective operation of the disciplinary code. A major amendment clarifies the relationship between the Police Act and the Labour Code of British Columbia in the area of police discipline.⁵ The Labour Code continues to apply to all grievances not arising out of a discipline charge against a member of a municipal police force. Moreover, provisions of the Labour Code apply to the interpretation and application of collective agreements with the police so that any potential discipline problem growing out of a dispute concerning rights conferred under a collective agreement would first be settled by the Labour Board of B.C. before the Police Act could apply.⁶

Participants in the drafting of the amendments to the Police Act and the Regulations included individual members of the Bar and Bench, members of the B.C. Association of Chiefs

of Police, the B.C. Federation of Peace Officers and representatives of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association as well as members of other interested groups. Thus, it is not surprising that the amendments and Regulations were generally warmly received. B.C. Federation of Peace Officers president, Fraser Macdonald, whose group had its first important input in the matter of the discipline code,⁷ called it, "a step into the twentieth century."⁸ However, since their inception, some reservations about the discipline code and grievance procedure have emerged.

Phil Jamieson, B.C. Federation of Peace Officers president in 1976, claimed the disciplinary code is an "overwhelming success." He stated it is, "working very well" but admitted in some respects it is "slightly cumbersome."⁹ At least one B.C. chief of police agreed with Jamieson on the last point.¹⁰ He stated:

I think the provisions for discipline in the Police Act are far too complicated. For example, at one time if a man was careless in the handling of equipment and he lost a radio I would have it investigated and if I had made my mind up I would decide to discipline him, and he could be assessed the amount of recovery or he could be reduced in rank. We can still do that but it is such a complicated long drawn out procedure we, as administrators, shy away from it...it is just far too complicated to have quick justice or discipline ...and it is just so impractical.¹¹

The same chief of police also expressed an ambivalent opinion about the new grievance procedure. The new system for handling citizens' complaints was reasonable, he stated.

"It makes it easier for an individual to make a complaint

but offers an opening to the chronic complainers. They are going the whole way for publicity and taking advantage of the system."¹² A differing opinion was expressed by Reg Robson, president of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, whose organization influenced the formulation of the informal part of the grievance procedure.¹³

Robson maintained that one of the chief problems was the position of the RCMP in the province and the ambiguous relationship between the Department of the Attorney General and the RCMP. Robson claimed, "the number of complaints we get about the RCMP is not significantly different from what we had before the [Police] Act, while that is certainly not true for the Vancouver police force."¹⁴ Robson attributed the ineffectiveness of the BCPC in the RCMP area to constitutional barriers and to the over sanguinity of the commission that the openness approach would overcome problems with the RCMP.¹⁵

Robson also criticized the citizens' complaint procedure for its complicated structure. "It is a long and painful process," he claimed. "The vast majority of citizens cannot hold the kind of hostility toward the police for that length of time. We say three days; after three days the fire goes out of those people." Robson also suggests that the process of complaining is intimidating for most people. He reports at least one person has been harassed by the police after complaining about police misconduct.¹⁶

On the other hand, the BCPC and the Deputy Attorney

General are clearly pleased with the new grievance procedure. Hogarth stated, "The citizens' complaint mechanism is, I think, the best in North America. It is now being used in other jurisdictions, adopted in whole and in part elsewhere...."¹⁷ Reflecting on the area of citizens complaints Vickers said, "I think the tensions have just dropped to almost zero where they were there before all the time. I was continually getting complaints across my desk from civil liberties type organizations. I think that the mechanism that has been structured, while not perfect, brings the issue on the table and gets a resolution earlier than letting it build up."¹⁸

It appears as if both the discipline code and the citizens complaint mechanism have contributed, if only to a limited degree, to the improvement of policing in B.C. The internal discipline regulations, by clearly defining breaches of discipline, effectively delineated the boundaries of proper police conduct, protecting the municipal police officer from arbitrary judgments and guiding him in the carrying out of his duties. At the same time the disciplinary code enables the citizen to know more accurately what to expect from the police serving his community and to recognize breaches of proper conduct when they occur. That these breaches continue to occur is unfortunate but the new grievance procedure permits the concerned citizen to voice his complaints with some assurance that, at least by municipal police forces,

they will be taken seriously.

To reduce the number of these confrontations between the police and the public and to meet the demands for competent, highly trained police officers the British Columbia Police College commenced operation in March of 1975, providing educational and training programmes for all municipal police departments in the province. The system of basic training involved a three year period of preparation before recruits were eligible for first class status.

The first block of recruit training, 10 weeks in length, is carried out at the police college. Police skills are stressed and the recruit is introduced to topics in the social sciences which relate to their work. The primary purpose of this first block is to prepare the recruit for the period of field exposure which follows.

During the next 14 weeks the recruit works in the field in his home municipality under the direction of an experienced and specially trained first class constable. Theoretical knowledge gained at the police college is applied to a wide variety of real policing problems during this period.

The recruit then returns to the college for another 10 week session for an upgrading in general police skills and instruction on the social dimensions of police work. Subjects ranging from conflict management to emergency care are covered in depth. One to two weeks are also spent by each recruit with other organizations in the criminal justice field: courts,

probation, penal institutions and community service agencies.

During the following 90 weeks the recruit works in his home department, performing general police duties under minimum supervision. A personal assessment training file is maintained on each recruit and as he or she attains certain standards of performance the recruit becomes eligible for promotion.

For the final 10 week block of instruction the recruit returns to the police college for advanced police skill training. Management concepts, leadership training, social science material as it relates to policing, and a variety of policing techniques including community policing are closely examined. After completing this last stage of instruction the recruit is eligible for promotion to first class constable.

In 1976 all full time faculty at the B.C. Police College were serving police officers of provincial municipal police departments and the RCMP who had been seconded to the college for periods ranging from two to three years. Each instructor was responsible for an important specific subject area and had received training in teaching methods. In addition to its full time faculty the police college utilizes part time lecturers from the community colleges and other educational facilities to expand upon and supplement recruit training. Consultants in the fields of psychology, sociology, criminology, social work and management development are employed on a regular basis.

Besides offering a nucleus of programmes for training police recruits the police college has also endeavored to provide programmes in other areas. General supervisory, middle management, field instructors' and emergency response courses as well as courses teaching special and technical skills have, along with basic recruit training, been attended by over 700 police officers as of September, 1976.¹⁹ Moreover, some 60 B.C. police officers received advanced training in senior management and specialized technical skills at the Canadian Police College in Ottawa during the same period.²⁰

Appraisal of the B.C. Police College was for the most part uniform. Hogarth was among the first to stress the college's merits, stating, "I think in long term training the B.C. Police College offers the best police education programme in North America now, and that is the judgment of others, not mine."²¹ Victoria chief of police, J.F. Gregory, echoed this opinion. "I don't think you could improve on the quality of the training at all," he stated.²² Yet others, including the president of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association felt that in spite of the high quality of police training offered by the college its impact will prove minimal and that the real problems affecting the police lie in the structure of the police system. Robson suggested that, "Rookies after training turn into replicas of the old cops on the beat within six months."²³ The Deputy Attorney General offered a different opinion. He stated, "I am really proud of the work in the college and that

is...not going to be seen over night. I think when there are a few more generations of policemen that have graduated through the academy out there on the street, they will have a major impact on the policing in the province. So it is slow but it is there."²⁴

Another aspect of police training also emerged as a source of conflicting opinions. Certain rules made by the BCPC in July of 1976 under sections 5 and 6 of the Police Act respecting the exercise of the commission's powers to establish minimum standards for the training of recruit constables provided that, "any municipal constable who is appointed to a municipal police force after the B.C. Police College commenced operation on March 17, 1975 shall, unless the Commission grants an exemption in writing, attend the first available recruit training programme upon which a vacancy is offered."²⁵

At that time, the Victoria City Police Department had 19 recruits lacking formal training. The chief of police, concerned about the shortage of manpower his department would face if all 19 men were sent to Vancouver for training, applied for only 12 seats in the recruit class. The BCPC insisted, however, that all 19 attend the class. The matter was settled when Chief Gregory found support in his local police board and the BCPC was persuaded to allow 7 recruits to remain with the police department until a future date. "I can see their [BCPC's] point quite easily," reflected Gregory, "They don't want anyone out on the street unless

they've had training. Well, Rome wasn't built in a day. These differences of opinion I put down to their lack of practical experience and my lack of theory."²⁶

Chapter VI

Overcoming Resistance

Besides encountering resistance to upgrading police training from some police chiefs and police boards the BCPC found obstacles in the path of other proposed reforms. Some police members did not wish to make concessions to an independent review of complaints against the police while others pointed to the dangers of police recruits emerging from the B.C. Police College with a large amount of theoretical learning but with little common sense understanding of street level police work. Still others disliked the idea of unwarranted interference in police matters by a group they suspected was unable to really understand the problems faced by police officers and therefore suspected the discipline code and citizens' grievance procedure. Some dead-ended police constables and noncommissioned officers viewed the new BCPC-B.C. Police College training plans as a threat, fearing that they would be bypassed by the younger recruits coming through these programmes. Resistance to democratizing the police structure, to putting more responsibility in the constable, and to the ideas of modern management principles emerged as well.¹ In addition, the resistance of politicians who saw the creation of the BCPC as the forerunner of a centralized police state had to be overcome.

One strategy for conflict management which cast doubts on

the usual assumptions about the interplay of resistance and reform has been termed, 'the absorption of protest' by Ruth Leeds (1968). In this paradigm an organization offsets the harmful consequences of conflict by admitting dissenters as a sub-unit of the organization. In this manner the dissenters gain recognition and legitimacy while the larger organization gains acceptance. As J.M. Thomas suggests in his study of change and conflict this concept provides a structural method of realizing the positive potential for dissent while accommodating the organization's fundamental goals and policies.²

Hogarth and the BCPC adopted a form of this concept in their attempts to quell resistance to proposed reforms. Although dissenters were never formally admitted into the BCPC as sub-units of the organization Hogarth ensured that from the beginning all points of view were heard before a major decision was reached. The early brainstorming session on policing, the working party assembled to draft the Police Act, and in fact every aspect of the police commission's activity was conducted in this manner.

Within the BCPC itself no formal votes on any subject were ever taken. "I don't believe in Parliamentary democracy," Hogarth stated, "I think it is illusory. It is crypto-democratic and it does not lead to organic solidarity in a small group. All decisions are unanimous decisions."³ In Hogarth's opinion, a small group of some 15 individuals requires a degree of agreement as to goals, purposes and direction. In

addition, a group of that size must be very productive and efficient with little duplication of effort if it is to fulfill the tasks set out for the BCPC. Hogarth adopted a number of methods, all outside the formal decision making structure of a classical hierarchical bureaucracy, to ensure these two goals were met.

First, only some of the junior commission staff were assigned office space, and only because of the private nature of their work. Hogarth did not have a private office. He circulated through the BCPC office, attempting to remain accessible to his fellow commissioners and staff at all times. When he was away from the BCPC Vancouver office his staff usually knew where he was and what he was doing. Second, all Hogarth's mail, incoming and outgoing, was photocopied and circulated, and all BCPC workplans, with reference to whom the commissioners were seeing, deadlines, and future appointments were posted in the BCPC office. When answering the telephone, BCPC secretaries informed callers what the commissioners were doing if they were not available to receive their calls. "We keep no secrets from one another about what we are doing and why we are doing it and there is less paranoia immediately about people doing other people in....," stated Hogarth.⁴

The BCPC also operated within the framework of an agreed upon work plan with goals, deadlines and assignments of responsibility to individuals within the commission. Progress in a variety of areas was reviewed weekly. Accountability

was to the whole group and the activities of one were supported by the whole group. When the BCPC operated as a team on a given project lead responsibilities in specific areas were given to individuals within that team. They were given full leadership and credit for achievements in their own particular field of expertise. For example, when members of the BCPC attended a Quebec conference of police commissions where there was a round table at which the chairmen of the commissions were to sit, Hogarth only took the chair when dealing with his own part of the commission's work. The other commissioners sat at the table when discussions centered on their part of the task. According to Hogarth this sharing of real responsibility supported a high level of morale among commission members. In Hogarth's words, "That energizes them, gives them a sense of self confidence and competence."⁵

The way in which a unanimity of opinion was sought within the BCPC was much the same as the manner in which Hogarth attempted to achieve a consensus among the commission's client groups. Protest was absorbed by offering opposing groups the opportunity to meet and discuss their differences with each other and with the BCPC, and to comment on BCPC proposals. Hogarth welcomed the conflict which stemmed from these meetings, stating:

Resistance is good... in fact, I think the most creative things come out of conflict, provided that you don't keep the conflict down. You let it come out. You let it surface. You deal with it then honestly and you balance off the weakest element. You give it some strength so that the people that

are strong are forced to accommodate as well and deal with change that way..⁶

The same strategy proved effective for dealing with unsympathetic politicians. David Vickers described how the BCPC overcame that hurdle:

One overcomes politics by becoming a little political one's self and I think, again, Hogarth was superb at that. We tried to draw them into the process as much as possible and I think the thing that finally caused us to succeed was the way in which local police boards were appointed. Rather than being appointed directly by the Attorney General they were appointed in public on recommendations of municipal governments, and that style has continued with this government [the Social Credit Administration] so therefore the notion of the police state central control has largely been dissipated.⁷

However, not everyone was as convinced as Hogarth and Vickers that the absorption of protest technique was totally successful. Commenting on Hogarth's attempt to reach 'practical solutions' in cases in which he has been involved Reg Robson stated:

What he [Hogarth] has tried to do in cases where we have had disagreements with the police is to bring the police and us together with the expectation that after a meeting the problem will go away, that we're going to reach a compromise or something like that. And of course, that simply doesn't happen. Some principles are beyond compromise.⁸

Another strategy used by Hogarth to overcome resistance and to encourage public participation in BCPC programmes was to raise the visibility of the commission's work when there was a problem to be discussed requiring police, community and political support. Members of the BCPC first discussed the issue with representatives of the police union and the police

chiefs' association. During the course of this process ideas and plans often changed but after they assumed a substantial form they were surfaced for public reaction. Hogarth appeared on radio hotline programmes, television news telecasts such as CBC's Hourglass; he spoke at public meetings, and at times, he would meet with the Leader of the Opposition in the legislative dining room in Victoria. Finally, Hogarth presented amended proposals to the Attorney General for examination, attempting all the while to indicate a feeling of competence, not only in his own capabilities but in those of the whole commission. The whole process was consciously carried out in the most open and visible manner to allay suspicions and to encourage trust.⁹

In addition, the BCPC conducted all its formal meetings in public. Occasionally, when the subject matter was particularly newsworthy, portions of the meetings were televised.¹⁰ Commenting on the effects of this open style of operation, the Deputy Attorney General stated, "All the commission's work has been very open and I think, as a result, it has encouraged more openness among policemen towards their work, towards the communities that they live in...I think that is healthy and that more of that should continue. We tend to be, again, far too secretive."¹¹

Perhaps one of the most important factors in overcoming resistance to BCPC programmes was Hogarth's dual role as both chairman of the BCPC and a vice-chairman of the JDC. While

manager of a specific ongoing programme area Hogarth also had the task of making recommendations concerning the Provincial justice system as a whole. This structure enabled Hogarth to fit BCPC programmes into the overall coordinated justice plan.¹² Moreover, Hogarth by virtue of his position in the JDC, was aware of changes and plans throughout the justice system and was able to discuss his own proposals with his counterparts in different areas. More significantly, various groups affected by BCPC policies (chiefly from the police sector) which attempted to bypass the police commission to deal directly with the government or the JDC were not successful. As Vickers recollected, "...most of the groups played the game and played it very well. I guess I had some private conversations with some groups; all of those private conversations were known to Hogarth though....There was some attempt at 'endrunning' but not very successful."¹³

The JDC was also an indirect source of policy for the BCPC. Though no grand design was ever set out for the police commission by any outside body Vickers claims Hogarth received a fair amount of input from his colleagues on the JDC, accepting both criticism and suggestions but remaining as the guiding force behind the police commission.¹⁴ Because Hogarth and the JDC (and thus the government for as Vickers explains, "what is not understood...by most people is that whether it is my office or the Justice Development Commission, what we are essentially talking about is a partnership of professional

people involved in the delivery of justice service....)¹⁵ maintained a close liaison and because there was a constant exchange of ideas and information between the BCPC and other government bodies resistance from this direction was diminished. By working hand in hand with the BCPC, the provincial government, through the Department of the Attorney General and in turn through David Vickers and the JDC, ensured that BCPC programmes were aligned with ultimate government goals. "So long as lines of communication between the police commission and my office are open, I think it will function well," stated Vickers, "if there were ever a breach between the chairman of the commission and the deputy [Attorney General] I think it might cause concern for government because it would not be very happy if the commission took off in a direction which was inconsistent with the policies of government in terms of delivery to the justice system."¹⁶

Finally, the method by which the BCPC coordinated the activities of the different police forces in the province and fulfilled its latent role as a supervisory body for these forces likely inhibited resistance. In classical bureaucratic terms the leadership provided by the BCPC was charismatic rather than traditional or legal-rational.¹⁷ The commission had no administrative tasks in the running of police departments, only advisory tasks. Its effectiveness, according to Hogarth, stemmed from its ability to generate interest, enthusiasm and a sense of direction and then to allow the

people in the police system to carry out reforms because they believed in them. This philosophy was embodied in the Police Discipline Code. Authority to handle a complaint in the first instance remained with the police manager and the local detachment. It was not handed to an outside group. Hogarth felt this approach stimulated support for BCPC programmes and diminished the likelihood of sabotage, or formal compliance with no real compliance. Furthermore, it lessened the probability that persons would seek excuses for not performing their duties.¹⁸

Within the commission itself, the strategy of seeking a consensus rather than the imposition of authority had an important impact. As Hogarth pointed out, "...not having formal votes avoids the problem of having those who voted against a resolution but being in a minority being able to sabotage and say 'I told you so', and those in a majority position never re-evaluating whether they were right or wrong because they believe it was democratically achieved."¹⁹

Though as J. T. Morley suggests²⁰ the BCPC did impose some control over the police by the provincial authorities it did not exercise that control in the manner that might be inferred. The BCPC did not sit as a body telling the police what to do. Municipal police are controlled by their local police boards and to the extent that the police commission involved itself in the work of the police boards and to the extent that it sat in appeal from their decisions there was

an element of supervision. In cases where the BCPC conducted a public enquiry into a complaint against the RCMP a similar degree of control was exercised. Thus, by keeping the BCPC clearly separated from the police forces in the province Hogarth ensured that it was not perceived as a body interfering with street level police management. This factor and the 'charismatic leadership' approach utilized by the commission removed the grounds for a considerable degree of resistance.

Recent changes in the nature of BCPC activity have presented another cause for resistance as well as a new challenge to reform. During the first two years of the BCPC's existence much of its energy was absorbed in creating fundamentally new structures (the Police Act, the discipline code, crime prevention programmes, etc.) but as the commission's credibility developed it began receiving an increasing volume of requests from communities, police departments, RCMP detachments and police unions to provide consultation and advice on very specific community problems. Commissioners were invited to visit communities in crisis, suffering from problems ranging from vandalism to racial conflict, to solve their problems.

Members of the police commission responding to such requests for help attempted to show that these crises were not just problems for the police but involved the community as a whole. All the social elements involved in the controversy were brought together in an effort to create a community catharsis around the issue. The BCPC representatives conducted

public meetings and met with persons and groups in private when necessary, providing an opportunity for all grievances to be aired and for all opinions to be voiced. Once in the open underlying sources of conflict could be dealt with. The BCPC attempted to involve community and police members in reaching decisions concerning the solutions to problems and to leave behind clearly specified tasks as well as committees with agendas to carry them out. Afterwards, BCPC members revisited the communities to check on progress.

One result of this activity, according to Hogarth, was that the BCPC was in danger of being perceived by the police community as more powerful than it actually was. Hogarth was convinced of the need for a short term, small community maintenance, small problem solving role for the BCPC but he worried that the commission would inadvertently develop a negative-punitive image among the police, particularly in cases where the BCPC might have recommended police personnel changes. The frequency of BCPC responses to community requests for assistance (over 120 as of November, 1976)²¹ might also have been interpreted as a desire by the agency to run policing in the province. Chiefly, Hogarth was concerned that by forcing the police to confront the community and by holding the police accountable to the community the BCPC might alienate police support in other areas.²²

At least one police leader believed Hogarth's fears were groundless. Phil Jamieson, president of the B.C. Federation

of Peace Officers, stated that if the BCPC maintained its integrity, fair play and exposure it could only help everyone, including the police.²³

Chapter VII

Conclusions

Overcoming Resistance & Programmatic Accomplishments

Having examined the goals of the British Columbia Police Commission, the strategies used to implement those goals, the resistance encountered by the police commission and its accomplishments it is necessary to consider its impact and to question whether policing in the province shows signs of significant improvement.

The evidence presented in the previous chapters indicates that the BCPC has in fact taken positive steps to improve policing in B.C. Its chief goals, the establishment of standardized police training and the creation of a police discipline code have been realized. The B.C. Police College now trains all municipal policemen in the province while the Police Discipline Code provides a constraint on the abuse of police authority and a formal procedure for settling the grievances of the police officer and the citizen.

However, as before, the RCMP providing policing services for some 65 percent of British Columbia remain outside the effective scope of provincial jurisdiction. The RCMP continue to train their own recruits (most of them ultimately posted in B.C.) instilling in them their own particular values, attitudes, and procedures. Similarly, the citizens' grievance procedure embodied in the Police Discipline Code has

no teeth with regard to the RCMP. Perhaps, if the 'openness' strategy adopted by the BCPC has any effect, public pressure will mute the RCMP hard-line approach to policing. In the view of at least one observer, it has not had this effect to date.¹

Whether the BCPC campaign to improve the relationship between the police and the public has succeeded is difficult to discern. There has been a significant drop of over 40 percent in total complaints against the police, according to Hogarth,² but this does not necessarily mean that the attitudes of those generally coming into contact with the police have changed. The police, by the nature of their duties, will always be caught in the dilemma of trying to simultaneously keep order and enforce the law. They are the most immediate and visible symbols of authority to those who feel oppressed or constrained by society's rules and will be held responsible for the sometimes unjust system which they uphold. With the police college in its initial years it is too soon to predict if the 'new' constables will be able to establish a better rapport with the public but the human relations approach to police training has worked in Europe and it may well work in B.C. With the quality of local policing monitored by police boards created by the police commission and with minimum standards for police service established, the likelihood of improved community-police relations also has increased. The reduction in complaints

indicates municipal police now tend to be more conscious of their role while local citizens, by becoming involved with police problems, are beginning to understand that they must themselves play a part in finding solutions to them.

Whether these positive steps have introduced fundamental or incremental police reforms remains open to question. The ultimate test, in any event, is whether the welfare of society has permanently and significantly benefitted as a result of BCPC activities, and judgments of this sort are subjective and debatable at best. However, as J. Doig points out in his study of conflict and change:

...the cumulative impact of a number of relatively small changes may have a considerable impact in improving police-community relations and other aspects of policing. In addition, continuous interaction with the work of such an...organization may increase the value which police officers (and others in the criminal justice system) place on new ideas and experimentation which is internally generated, from the police department's planning bureau and from other sources.³

If as another writer states, "Successful reform is not so readily accomplished by attempts to reform others as by helping others to reform themselves,"⁴ then the BCPC has at least moved in the right direction.

An alternate standard for judging the effectiveness of the BCPC, and one that is perhaps more relevant to this study, is whether the agency secured sufficient authority to prevent its opponents from blocking the implementation of reform proposals. In other words, has the BCPC, as a Downsian special organization, provided the means for programmatic

innovation in the face of bureaucratic resistance? Again, the evidence provided in the previous chapters suggests that the BCPC has been successful in this matter. A brief summary of events and strategy will show how this success was attained.

The systemic obstacles to reform, that is the ossified police organizations themselves as well as all factors external to the individuals making up the police organizations in the province, were first offset by the recruitment of new resources in the form of a police commission staff which was predisposed to reform. The police commission, in turn, participated in the selection of police board members, police committee members and police college faculty. These appointments naturally reflected the police commission's reformist character. The provincial government, meanwhile, provided adequate financial and advisory resources for the police commission to plan its reforms.

Fresh, strong leadership provided by John Hogarth for the BCPC, and by the BCPC to the police forces of the province then allowed the difficult concentration of resources and the allocation of priorities for the application of resources to problems. Through the selection of operating goals the BCPC gained a clear sense of its mission. The tasks involved in their selection also allowed an examination of possible areas for operation and a concentration on those which seemed most promising and urgent. The creation of a workplan further delineated responsibilities and set deadlines. Weekly opera-

tional reviews allowed progress checks and identified trouble spots.

While the assaults on the systemic obstacles to change were directed at factors in police organizations other than the individuals making up those organizations the BCPC also sought to overcome sources of resistance which were primarily a result of individual orientation. Chiefly, this was accomplished by enrolling B.C. municipal policemen in training and retraining programmes where they were exposed to a wide variety of extraorganizational ideas ranging from modern management principles to human relations. Recruiting unorthodoxy also played a part in this strategy as the BCPC encouraged the recruitment of women, minority group members and university graduates into the province's police forces.

In its attempts to introduce reform the BCPC also employed tactics designed to reduce incentives to opposing change. By identifying innovations with such widely accepted goals as a reduction in the growth of the crime rate, a good police-public relationship and better coordination of law enforcement in B.C. the police commission diminished antagonism toward its programmes. The minimization of the disturbance of prevailing practices and relations by the maintenance of a discreet distance from actual police administration also served to reduce opposition to BCPC reforms. Similarly, the utilization of the 'absorption of protest' technique reduced subordination costs as the police commission's client groups had

little cause to feel left out of important decision making or pushed around. Furthermore, the openness with which the BCPC conducted its activities and its conscious attempts at charismatic rather than straightforward legal-rational leadership diminished suspicions concerning its nature and intentions as well as the threat of usurption of operational authority.

Finally, Hogarth's dual role as chairman of the BCPC and vice-chairman of the JDC was a significant factor in overcoming bureaucratic resistance. Like the BCPC the JDC was created in 1974 by the NDP government to facilitate reforms but in a much broader area. The JDC was instructed to undertake a re-examination of the whole field of justice administration in the province and to initiate reforms where necessary. While remaining a part of the Department of the Attorney General the JDC was intended to promote fast changes, unhampered by the red tape of departmental bureaucracy. The JDC became the activist arm of the Attorney General's department and succeeded in implementing a number of reforms. These included improvements in the administration of provincial courts, the creation of a scheme for the provision of legal services to indigent persons and important changes affecting the operation of British Columbia's police forces. In this last area the establishment of the BCPC was one major accomplishment and the formation of the Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) was another.

CLEU was formed to fulfill the perceived need for a

sophisticated and co-ordinated assault upon organized crime in the province. Police members seconded to CLEU from a number of forces operating in British Columbia were instructed to research, investigate and prosecute those individuals involved in organized crime. CLEU was composed of a policy board and three divisions: the investigative, the legal and the policy and analysis division. The seven man policy board, chaired by the Deputy Attorney General assumed the fundamental responsibilities of designating crime target priorities, establishing policy and direction and allotting financial resources.⁵ Vickers' position on the policy board of CLEU and as chairman of the JDC concomitant with Hogarth's leadership of the BCPC and membership on the JDC indicates the possible scope for co-ordination and support which existed between the various divisions of the Attorney General's department. Not only was the BCPC able to plan and co-ordinate its programmes in conjunction with those of other sectors in the justice administration field but it was also able to implement those proposals with the full weight of the provincial government behind it. This considerable political and administrative clout could not be taken lightly by any municipal or police officials opposing BCPC policies.

Some have argued that it has been the advent of a new social climate rather than the efforts of the BCPC which has been responsible for the success of police reforms in B.C. One observer points to the election of the NDP government as

well as the election of a more liberal mayor in Vancouver and the replacement of a traditionally conservative police chief in that city with another more open to change as evidence of this new social climate. He suggests that with such changes voices critical of the police could be heard and once the opposition began listening to their arguments then the relationship between the two sides improved. He also attributes an improvement in the tone of the relationship between civil liberties organizations and the police to the realization by the police that unavoidable changes were on the way after the election of the NDP government. This tone, he suggests, was enhanced by the BCPC which brought the civil liberties organizations and the police together in discussions.⁶ Others might argue that the reforms instituted by the BCPC could have just as easily been carried out by the ongoing bureaucracy of the Department of the Attorney General.

Both arguments contain merit but a closer examination of the facts reveals fairly conclusively that the BCPC was both instrumental and indispensable implementing the police reforms instituted in B.C. since the agency's formation. First, as discussed earlier, the BCPC clearly hardened a general desire for police reform into specific goals and encountered substantial resistance from a variety of sources in spite of any perceived mitigating effects stemming from wide-spread changing social awareness. This resistance was then overcome by strategies developed and utilized by Hogarth and his staff.

Second, as Morley points out in his discussion of the JDC, "there is nothing to suggest that the Department of the Attorney General had been free of the usual anti-novelty bias that characterizes large-scale bureaucracies."⁷ Not only would reform efforts have been difficult to initiate within the ongoing bureaucracy but the hiring of subordinate personnel to assist the instigators of reform would also have been prevented by the provisions of the Public Service Act. Thus, in this case the BCPC provided the expertise and manpower for innovative policy making as well as the necessary structural framework for reform.

Implications of the creation and reforms of the BCPC

Earlier in this paper it was noted that police reform in Europe was accompanied by increased bureaucratization and centralization and that predictions were made in British Columbia that the creation of the BCPC was merely a prelude to the resurrection of a provincial police force. It seems evident that reforms instituted by the BCPC have also increased the bureaucratization and centralization of police services in B.C. and that although no formal proposals to amalgamate municipal police forces into one unit have emerged, if centralization and standardization proceed at the current rate a de facto provincial police force is on the horizon.

First, the BCPC is itself evidence of increased bureaucratization. Its formation placed yet another echelon in the administrative hierarchy descending from the legislature to

the police constable on the street. The Police Discipline Code also reflects increased bureaucratization in that it has replaced informal, independent rules of conduct and grievance procedures with normalized and fixed standards of operation and behavior.

Second, by establishing a police college to train all municipal police recruits in B.C. and by creating a province-wide disciplinary code with appeal procedures designed to operate through the BCPC or the Attorney General important aspects of policing have been centralized. Recruits trained at the same institution in Vancouver by the same faculty will tend to emerge with the same outlook toward policing, while BCPC jurisprudence in appeal cases will over time develop to the point that it will promote operational and behavioral uniformity among the province's police forces. Police uniforms in B.C. as well as crime report forms have also been standardized, and municipalities no longer contract directly with the RCMP for their services but with provincial authorities as a result of conditions laid down in the recent master contract negotiated by Hogarth on behalf of the province with the federal government. Communication between police forces has been emphasized by the BCPC and priorities such as crime prevention planning have been stressed across B.C.

If this trend toward homogeneity in police service persists (indications are that it will. In April, 1977 the BCPC proposed that police constables be not only centrally trained

but also centrally recruited,) the various municipal police departments in the province will soon differ in little but name.

Increased centralization has, according to G. Berkley, brought about certain changes in European police systems which have permitted successful police reform. Berkley cites the recruitment of high quality personnel at the apex of the organizational pyramid, the creation of larger police academies with more comprehensive training programmes, the marshalling of resources for positive work programmes, and a state-wide uniform approach to policing as examples.⁸ These advantages were not lost on the British Columbia provincial government and the BCPC as they initiated the process of bringing the municipal police forces of the province under one roof.

However, there are deficiencies resulting from increased centralization as well. The lack of the requirement to conform to local wishes and the increased distance of command are often blamed for perceived failures of police services.⁹

Yet, the centralization occurring in B.C. appears to be of a balanced sort. Though government appointees exist on municipal police boards and committees to ensure adequate and above board police protection the municipal appointees to these bodies can provide that special local policing needs are met. Moreover, the province has not usurped the control over municipal police but merely encroached upon it. Municipalities still retain a large degree of input into local policing

policies so the problem of distance of command has not materialized.

The Future of the BCPC

The life cycle of the special organization is outlined by Downs. He describes how after a few years of high productivity the special organization loses its 'special' characteristics, "and merely becomes another section of the bureau struggling under the normal weight of rules, regulations, and agonizingly slow decision making procedures."¹⁰

There are several reasons for this degeneration. First, as the special organization deals with its chief client groups it inevitably yields a degree of its decision making power to them, diminishing its isolation and its advantages.¹¹ As the BCPC has progressed with its reforms it has placed an increasing degree of responsibility and decision making power in the hands of the police and the communities in order to encourage them to assist themselves. This process had diminished the necessity to consult with the BCPC and therefore its influence has decreased.

Second, the special organization is never truly autonomous in all respects and this dependence on external factors is a constraint on the full utilization of its special capabilities.¹² The BCPC has been forced to rely upon the provincial government for the provision of operational funds and financial allocations have always been made through regular bureaucratic procedures. The police commission has

thus depended upon the vagaries of provincial priorities to determine the extent of its programmes. In addition, the close relationship between the BCPC and the JDC has meant that Hogarth has had to bring his agency's policies closely in line with those of the provincial government. Both factors have limited the BCPC's independence and constrained the potential scope of its activities.

Third, the dependence of the special organization upon developing events in its external environment which effect its tasks but are beyond its influence also subordinates the agency's activities to procedures it cannot control.¹³ The major event in this area affecting the BCPC has been the replacement of the NDP by the Social Credit party as the government of British Columbia in 1975. The new administration did not actively interfere with BCPC policies but its fundamental precepts of 'no growth' and 'financial constraint' imposed limitations and even setbacks upon BCPC plans. For example, planned advanced police training courses have been cancelled as a result of an insufficiency of funds.¹⁴

Finally, as goals are reached the importance of the issues which prompted the creation of the special organization diminishes over time in relation to that of other more recent problems. As a result, the special organization loses the high priority it once enjoyed and its accompanying special privileges disappear.¹⁵ Since the formation of the BCPC its chief objectives have been attained. Meanwhile, the problems

of unemployment and a wallowing provincial economy have increased in significance, overshadowing the problem of police reform. Budget cuts reached the BCPC in the form of a proposed \$200,000 reduction in allowable expenses for the following fiscal year in November, 1976.¹⁶ Clearly the work of the BCPC had diminished in relative importance, at least in the eyes of the provincial government, and the organization had lost much of its special status.

The BCPC, however, has not reached the end of the Downsian cycle as yet and Hogarth expressed hopes of preventing that eventuality. Speaking of the degeneration of the BCPC in terms of Weber's theory of charismatic leadership Hogarth stated he intended to halt the formalization of the police commission's leadership into a traditional or rational-legal form by turning over its reins to another energetic leader whose enthusiasm would prove infectious and whose own agenda and tasks would restore the special organization to its former stature by stimulating another cycle of innovative policy making.¹⁷ Weber had hypothesized that for charismatic leadership to become more than a transitory phenomenon it must become stabilized or 'routinized'.¹⁸ In this process charismatic leadership is transformed from an unusual purely personal relationship into a traditional or rationalized (or a combination of both) authoritative structure no longer necessarily dependent upon the charismatic qualities of the original leader. Underlying this transformation is the idea

that charisma is an objective transferrable entity that may be disassociated from one person and transmitted to another or even changed into the charisma of office in which charisma is no longer vested in an individual but in his acquired qualities as leader.¹⁹ How authority is passed from leader to leader depends upon the mode of succession. The charismatic leader may designate a successor or a new leader may be chosen by the charismatic followers. In this manner charisma can be depersonalized and it may develop into a hereditary or institutional charisma with its focus in a royal family or an organization like the church. Evidently Hogarth hoped to preserve the charismatic qualities of the BCPC's leadership after his resignation by institutionalizing them through the appointment of an equally vigorous successor.

The fact remains, however, that the major reforms envisioned by the police commission's client groups have been accomplished or are now underway. Further reforms at this time will likely be truly incremental and will lack the necessary impact to draw public and government attention away from current passing issues. Therefore, it is likely the British Columbia Police Commission will run the course of the typical Downsian special organization in spite of any efforts by Hogarth's successor to save it. In any event, the BCPC, like the JDC, will survive as a research and coordination unit for those involved in the policing of British Columbia.

FootnotesIntroduction

¹J.M. Thomas and W.G. Bennis eds., The Management of Change and Conflict, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), p. 355.

²R. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review, (October, 1966), p. 661.

³G.E. Caiden, Administrative Reform, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p. 59.

⁴Ibid., p. 65.

⁵G.N. Jones, Planned Organizational Change, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 7.

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

⁷Caiden, p. 77

⁸A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 191.

⁹Caiden, p. 131.

¹⁰R. Michels, Political Parties, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958).

¹¹H. Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change, (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971), pp. 8-9.

¹²Downs, pp. 160-161.

¹³Ibid., pp. 158-159.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁵Caiden, p. 145.

¹⁶R. Bolt, "Organizations that Serve Several Values," The Management of Change and Conflict, eds. J.M. Thomas and W.G. Bennis, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), pp. 164-165.

¹⁷Kaufman, p. 55.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Kaufman, pp. 76-78.

²⁰Downs, p. 161.

²¹Caiden, p. 75.

²²P.M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 4-5.

²³M. Stein, Public Administration and Policy Development, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1952), p. xxvii.

²⁴P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 12.

²⁵Caiden, p. 157.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷J.Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," The Management of Change and Conflict, eds. J.M. Thomas and others, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), p. 241.

Background and Setting

¹G. Berkley, "The European Police Challenge and Change," Public Administration Review, XXVIII, (September/October, 1968), p. 424.

²See H. Goldstein, "Police Response to Urban Crisis," Public Administration Review, XXVIII, (September/October, 1968), pp. 417-425, for a discussion of North American police attitudes.

³Berkley, p. 426.

⁴Ibid., p. 427.

⁵The information in this section was chiefly drawn from Berkley's thorough examination of contemporary European police systems.

⁶Toronto Globe and Mail, October 19, 1971.

⁷W.R. Lee, "The Ontario Police Commission," Canadian Security Gazette, (October, 1970), cited in W. and N. Kelly, Policing in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), p. 43.

⁸A.K. McDougall, "A New Balance in Policing for Ontario," Canadian Public Administration, XII, (Summer, 1969), p. 244.

- ⁹Ibid., p. 245.
- ¹⁰Ontario, The Task Force on Policing in Ontario, Report to the Solicitor General, February, 1974, p. 68.
- ¹¹W. and N. Kelly, Policing in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 42-48.
- ¹²J.T. Morley, "The Justice Development Commission: overcoming bureaucratic resistance to innovative policy-making," Canadian Public Administration, XIX, (Spring, 1976), p. 123.
- ¹³Ibid., p. 124.
- ¹⁴Report of the Committee Studying the Matter of Policing within the Province of British Columbia, 1972, submitted June 29, 1972, p. 10.
- ¹⁵British Columbia, British Columbia Police Commission Bulletin #3, Table "A", p. 4.
- ¹⁶Report of the Committee Studying the Matter of Policing within the Province of British Columbia, 1972, p. 7.
- ¹⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁸British Columbia, British Columbia Police Commission Bulletin #3, September, 1976, Table "A", p. 4.
- ¹⁹David Vickers interview.
- ²⁰Though sections 40 and 42 of the Police Act purport to give a provincial tribunal the power to review disciplinary proceedings carried out by the RCMP it may be beyond the power of the province to do so. First, the subject of RCMP discipline may be a matter of criminal procedure under S. 91(27) of the B.N.A. Act and therefore within exclusive federal jurisdiction. If this is the case then the provincial legislation is clearly ultra vires. On the other hand, it may be argued that the relevant provisions of the Police Act, when in effect, would subject RCMP officers to different forms of disciplinary proceedings across the country. Not only would this be unfair to the police officers but it would also detract from the administrative uniformity often necessary in a national organization. Thus, provincial interference with internal RCMP matters could be criticized on these grounds as well. It can also be argued that with the passing of the Federal Court Act in 1970 the Government of Canada has occupied the field in which RCMP disciplinary proceedings lie which would mean that if the provincial provisions are not ultra vires then they may be inoperative. The Federal Court Act, in sections 18 and 28 gave the court jurisdiction over any "federal board,

commission or other tribunal." If RCMP discipline proceedings are covered by this definition then, by virtue of the paramountcy doctrine, federal legislation would prevail. Though the Police Act and Federal Court Act are capable of operating concurrently without conflict Parliament has vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Court precluding provincial legal bodies from dealing with matters within the competency of that authority. Moreover, in the Report of the Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends, published in May, 1977 the authors suggest that if the recommendations embodied in the Marin Commission Report (a federal study of procedures to be employed in servicing citizen complaints against the RCMP) were to be adopted, authorities in the four western provinces believe that the present operation of the discipline codes incorporated in the provinces' respective police acts would be negatively affected and the provinces' lack of control over RCMP complaints would be confirmed.

²¹Phil Jamieson interview.

²²Report of the Committee..., p. 8.

²³Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁴Self, p. 155.

²⁵Morley, p. 124.

²⁶See J.R. Hudson, "Police Review Boards and Police Accountability," Law and Contemporary Problems, XXXVI, (Autumn, 1971), pp. 515-538, for a discussion of citizen review boards, their advantages and weaknesses.

²⁷John Hogarth interview.

²⁸John Hogarth to Attorney General Alex Macdonald, October 12, 1973.

²⁹Most of the information in this section was obtained from John Hogarth's Follow-up to One Day Meeting on the Future of Policing in British Columbia, December 11, 1973.

³⁰John Hogarth interview.

³¹Ibid.

The Police Act

¹Vancouver Sun, January 31, 1974, p. 2.

²British Columbia, Statutes of British Columbia, 1974, Police

Act, c.64, s.5.

³Ibid., s.16.

⁴Ibid., s.4.

⁵Vancouver Province, November 15, 1974, p. 29.

⁶Victoria Times, March 26, 1975, p. 8.

⁷John Hogarth to David Vickers, January 11, 1974.

⁸John Hogarth and David Vickers interviews.

⁹J.G. March and H.A. Simon, Organizations, (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 187.

¹⁰David Vickers interview.

¹¹Downs, p. 161.

Consequences of Creating the BCPC

¹Morley, p. 126.

²David Vickers interview.

³H.A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. XVI.

⁴Victoria Times, January 24, 1975, p. 22.

⁵British Columbia Police Commission, Task Force on Training and Personnel Qualifications, Preliminary Goal Statements.

⁶Simon, p. XXXVI.

⁷British Columbia Police Commission, Task Force on Research, Preliminary Goal Statements.

⁸Ibid., Task Force on Police Standards and Performance, Pre-
liminary Goal Statements.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰John Hogarth to all members of the BCPC, Memorandum, August 26, 1974.

¹¹Thomas, p. 13.

¹²John Hogarth interview.

- 13 Vancouver Sun, February 13, 1974, p. 86.
- 14 John Hogarth interview.
- 15 Phil Jamieson interview.
- 16 John Hogarth interview.
- 17 Kaufman, p. 8.
- 18 David Vickers interview.
- 19 Vancouver Sun, April 2, 1974, p. 1.
- 20 David Vickers interview.
- 21 Victoria Colonist, June 14, 1974, p. 4.
- 22 Reg Robson, president of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Attorney General Alex Macdonald, July 5, 1974.
- 23 J.W. Doig, "The Police in a Democratic Society: Police Problems, Proposals, and Strategies for Change," Public Administration Review, XXVIII, (September/October, 1968), p. 404.
- 24 John Hogarth interview.
- 25 John Hogarth, Memorandum, August 26, 1974.
- 26 John Hogarth interview.
- 27 Projects now in operation include: Police and Community Services Project in South Vancouver; Police Family Counsellor Project in Surrey; Domestic Dispute Study in Vancouver; Adult Diversion Program in North Vancouver; Diversion Project in Nanaimo; and Community Diversion Centre in Victoria.
- 28 By September, 1975 approximately 20% of the recruits at the B.C. Police College were women, British Columbia Police Commission, Bulletin #2, September, 1975, p. 9.
- 29 Victoria Times, January 24, 1975, p. 22.
- 30 Vancouver Province, February 14, 1975, p. 18.
- 31 Studies completed by 1976 included: "A Study of Citizen Initiated Telephone Requests for Service from the Police Department"; "Women in Policing in B.C."; "A Survey of Municipal Police Management in B.C."; "Prostitution in Vancouver - 1973-75 - Official and Unofficial Reports"; "Some Factors in the Relationship between the Police and East

Indians"; "Police and the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency"; "An Assessment of the Burnaby RCMP Project 'Operation Identification'".

The Police Discipline Code and the British Columbia Police College

- ¹John Hogarth to Alex Macdonald, April 16, 1975, p. 1.
- ²Ibid., p. 2.
- ³British Columbia, Statutes of British Columbia, 1974, Police Act, c.64, s.40(4).
- ⁴Ibid., s.42.
- ⁵Ibid., as amended by 1975, No. 46, s.38(1), (b) and (c).
- ⁶John Hogarth to Alex Macdonald, April 16, 1975, p. 3.
- ⁷Phil Jamieson interview.
- ⁸Vancouver Sun, April 21, 1975, p. 17.
- ⁹Phil Jamieson interview.
- ¹⁰Chief Gregory interview.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²Ibid.
- ¹³Reg Robson interview.
- ¹⁴Ibid.
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶Ibid.
- ¹⁷John Hogarth interview.
- ¹⁸David Vickers interview.
- ¹⁹British Columbia Police Commission, Bulletin #3, September, 1976, p. 22.
- ²⁰Ibid.
- ²¹John Hogarth interview.

²²Chief Gregory interview.

²³Reg Robson interview.

²⁴David Vickers interview.

²⁵British Columbia Police Commission, Rules, July 15, 1976, Rule #1.

²⁶Chief Gregory interview.

Overcoming Resistance

¹John Hogarth interview.

²Thomas, pp. 17-18.

³John Hogarth interview.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷David Vickers interview.

⁸Reg Robson interview.

⁹John Hogarth interview.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Morley, p. 132.

¹³David Vickers interview.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷In The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), Max Weber theorizes that there exist three pure types of legitimate authority: rational, traditional and charismatic. The first is rooted in the accepted legal right of those elevated to power to command;

the second rests upon the established sanctity of traditions and the accepted power of those who exercise authority under traditional rules; and the third depends upon the character of an individual rather than the legal or traditional framework from within which he governs.

¹⁸John Hogarth interview.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Morley, p. 129.

²¹John Hogarth interview.

²²Ibid.

²³Phil Jamieson interview.

Conclusions

¹Reg Robson interview.

²John Hogarth interview.

³Doig, p. 402.

⁴W.H. Goodenough, Cooperation in Change, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963), p. 17.

⁵British Columbia, Department of the Attorney General, Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit, Initial Report on Organized Crime in B.C., October 1974, p. 3.

⁶Reg Robson interview.

⁷Morley, p. 137.

⁸Berkley, p. 427.

⁹McDougall, p. 256.

¹⁰Downs, p. 162.

¹¹Ibid., p. 161.

¹²Ibid., p. 162.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴John Hogarth interview.

¹⁵Downs, p. 162.

¹⁶John Hogarth interview.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸M. Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 54-61.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 57.

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
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APPENDIX

British Columbia Police Commission - Organizational Chart - 1976



B.C. POLICE COLLEGE

J. Murray
- Administrative Assistant
H. Radford
- Secretary Support Staff Faculty

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT STAFF

A. Terrana
- Administrative Assistant
A. Martin
- Executive Secretary
J. La Fleche
- Public Information
G. MacMurtery
- Secretary

RESEARCH

N. Avison
- Director of Research Clerk
- (Vacant)

CONSULTATION & ADVISORY SERVICES

As required for specific projects

