

On the Limit of the State:
Gilles Deleuze and the Politics of Space and Time

by

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B.A., University of Victoria, 1993

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science (CSPT)

We accept this thesis as conforming
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
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ABSTRACT

The object of this thesis is to determine whether or not Gilles Deleuze has a theory of the State. A contemporary theory of the State is one which enables one to say something about the "limits" of modern statist politics. In this thesis, the example of global refugee flows is taken as an example of such a limit. This thesis concludes that Deleuze does in fact articulate a theory of the State, but one which is exceptionally difficult to articulate in the traditional statist and spatial language of conventional forms of political theory. It is in this sense that the relationship between thought and the State is so important. This relationship has the concepts of space and time as its core—the spatial framing of modern post-Cartesian thought is analogous to the spatial framing of modern politics in general and the concept of the State in particular. Deleuze, drawing upon the work of Bergson and Nietzsche, employs a temporal image of thought which allows him to articulate a theory of the State which does not construct absolute spatial interiors and exteriors, but instead sees inside and outside, macro- and micro-political processes as coexisting and interacting on a perpetual field of interaction.

Examiners:




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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A number of individuals offered support and encouragement without which I could never have completed this thesis. I would like to thank my supervisory committee for useful comments and criticisms. In particular, I would like to thank Rob Walker whose insights, encouragement, and direction over the years has made this project all the more challenging and enjoyable.

I am greatly appreciative of my many wonderful, caring, and funky friends who offered both balanced perspectives and tons o' fun during the writing of this thesis. Thanks to: Melanie Banas, Ruben James, Naomi Johnson, Mijin Kim, Dreyfus Lamont, Kelly Mannix, Oona Padgham, the late Chandra Padgham, Matt Pollard, and Paul Shrimpton. And to Shawn Walsh, who likes to see his name in print.

I consider myself particularly fortunate to have entered graduate studies at the time I did. The many discussions and debates I enjoyed with a group of especially bright students has had a profound impact on me. I would especially like to thank Steen Hume, Sandra Kahale, Michael Lancaster, and Debbie Lisle.

Finally, the support and encouragement of my family—Frank, Katalin, and Christina Nyers—is greatly appreciated.

Gilles Deleuze: The Politics of an Enigma

A special 1972 issue of the French journal *L'Arc* opens with a conversation between two of France's foremost philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Foucault begins the discussion with a recollection of a conversation he once had with a French Maoist:

A Maoist once said to me: "I can easily understand Sartre's purpose in siding with us; I can understand his goals and his involvement in politics; I can partially understand your position, since you've always been concerned with the problem of confinement. But Deleuze is an enigma."¹

Foucault, a great admirer of Deleuze, quickly expressed his "shock" and dismay at this characterization. For Foucault, Deleuze's position in relation to politics was unquestionably clear and his importance was not to be understated. It was Foucault, after all, who declared the possibility that one day "this century will be known as Deleuzian."² And yet, the Maoist's opinion should not be dismissed too quickly. The view of Deleuze as a rather enigmatic figure, one who is difficult to place, pin-down, or categorize, must be addressed as it continues to be the predominant view today.

With the profound and often disruptive impact French post-structuralism has had in the social sciences and humanities in North America in recent years, the works of Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Francois Lyotard, Jacques Lacan, and Jean Baudrillard have received critical attention in an impressive—some may

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice*, Donald F. Bouchard, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 205.

² Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Ibid.*, p. 165.

say excessive—number of books, collections, articles, and conferences. Despite the considerable impact post-structuralism has had, there has been a comparatively small amount of critical commentary focusing on Deleuze's work. While it is not unusual to see Deleuze's name mentioned—and often recognized as being of some importance—his works are rarely subjected to detailed analyses or employed for the purposes of critical analysis. A curious silence seems to surround Deleuze.³ A recent review of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's final collaboration, *What is Philosophy?*, raises precisely this point: "Though the many translations over the last five years have scattered the spores, Deleuze (with or without Guattari) has yet to infiltrate American critical theory with the virulence of Foucault, Derrida, or Baudrillard."⁴ To a large degree Deleuze remains as he was to the Maoist—an enigma.

At first glance, this characterization of Deleuze as an enigma seems rather ill-placed. A quick look at his professional biographical details seems to suggest a somewhat conventional—Deleuze would call it a molar, segmented line—career of a French academic. Deleuze attended the *Lycée Carnot* in Paris and began studying philosophy with Ferdinand Alquié, Georges Canguilhem, and Jean Hyppolite at the *Sorbonne* in the mid-1940s. In 1948, he passed his *agrégation* in philosophy at the age of twenty-three. These early academic experiences were ones steeped in the history of philosophy, with a particularly strong emphasis on the rationalist tradition. "At the Liberation," Deleuze relates

³ There are some notable, but for the most part only very recent, exceptions. A number of journals have devoted special issues to the work of Gilles Deleuze: *Semiotext(e)* 3:2 (1977), *The University of Warwick Journal of Philosophy* (1992), *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 24:1 (1993), and *Substance* nos. 44/45 (1984) and no. 66 (1991). Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski have recently edited a collection of essays on Deleuze in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994). In addition there exist at least three book-length commentaries on the work of Deleuze: Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

While all these studies are of exceptional quality, the point still stands that the work of Gilles Deleuze receives considerably less attention than his French post-structuralist colleagues. This is not a point to bemoan or complain about, but is rather a curious fact that must be investigated. This is at least partially one of my motivations for devoting a thesis to the work of Deleuze.

⁴ Erik Davis, "After the Deleuze: The Excellent Adventures of Two Philosophical Frogs," *Voice Literary Supplement* no. 128 (September 1994), p. 29.

to Claire Parnet, "we were still strangely stuck in the history of philosophy. We simply plunged into Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger; we threw ourselves like puppies into a scholasticism worse than that of the Middle Ages."⁵ After publishing a series of monographs on figures in the history of philosophy—Hume,⁶ Nietzsche,⁷ Kant,⁸ Bergson⁹—Deleuze submitted his principal thesis for the *Doctorat D'Etat, Différence and Repetition*,¹⁰ in 1968. *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*¹¹ was the accompanying secondary thesis. His academic posts have followed a progressively prestigious pattern: *Professeur de Lycée*, *Professeur de l'Université en Provence*, researcher at the *Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques*, and finally *Professeur de l'Université de Paris VIII*, first at Vincennes, and then at Saint Denis where he remained until his retirement in 1987.

Despite the relative orthodoxy of his professional positions, Deleuze has maintained a steady involvement in political issues. He has consistently made himself available for interviews on a variety of social and political issues as well as submitting numerous commentaries and articles for popular mass-circulation magazines and journals.¹² While he never joined the French Communist Party

⁵ Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 12.

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, Translated by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).

¹⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

¹¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990).

¹² Many of Deleuze's interviews and articles have recently been collected and published in book form: Gilles Deleuze, *Interviews: 1972-1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, translation forthcoming).

(an unusual trait for a leftist student of his generation), Deleuze actively supported the Maoists and other "revolutionary" groups during the events of May 1968 in France. Deleuze has also been a vocal defender of alternative lifestyles, of drug experimentation, of the women's movement, of migrant workers, of prisoners, of ecological movements, and of the French gay liberation movement. In the 1970s Deleuze participated in a *gauchiste* research centre studying urbanism and was one of the first to join Foucault's *Group d'Information sur les Prisons*—a social movement which criticized and demonstrated against the French prison system. The 1970s also saw Deleuze begin his lengthy and extensive collaboration with Félix Guattari—a life-long political activist and practicing psychoanalyst at the experimental psychiatric clinic, *La Borde*.¹³

The image of Gilles Deleuze presented here is thus composed of three elements—*philosopher, political activist, and yet always an enigma*. It is Deleuze's enigmatic status that I find most compelling. Indeed, it is the confusion and uncertainty, and the resulting silence, surrounding Deleuze's relation to politics that has driven me, at least in part, to devote a thesis to investigating his work. What is it about Deleuze as a philosopher and as someone who is interested in politics that makes him an enigma? This, I believe, is an important question because to say that Deleuze is an enigma in relation to politics is a serious charge. It is not, however, a dismissive one. Foucault's Maoist is not saying that Deleuze is a mere philosopher with nothing to say of political consequence or importance. Instead, an enigma implies that there is a mystery to be solved, or a puzzle to be put together. In the case of Deleuze, I argue that his political significance is puzzling and difficult to determine only when one employs the usual categories by which the "political" is understood. Deleuze approaches political theory from a perspective informed by a temporal or "nomadic" form of thought. Consequently, Deleuze's politics is exceptionally difficult to express in the traditional spatial and statist language that dominates political theory. This, in essence, is the difficulty facing the Maoist.

¹³ Until Guattari's death in 1992, Deleuze and Guattari had collaborated on four book-length publications: *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, Translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); *What is Philosophy?*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Let us, for a moment, forget Deleuze and imagine the perspective the Maoist utilizes to understand the political world. What categories, what distinctions, what form of thought informs his or her political judgments and analysis? The Maoist is presumably speaking from his or her standpoint as a Marxist. As a political theory, Marxism takes the social relations of capitalism as its analytical point of departure; its core concerns are those of historical materialism, the importance of relations of production, the centrality of class struggle, and so on. While Marxism may have informed some of the most important and revolutionary political transformations of the twentieth-century, when assessed in terms of its relation to the tradition of Western thought, its radicalism and novelty are severely diminished. Marxism is consistent with and, indeed, relies upon the dominant values of Western rationality—that is, the principles of unity, hierarchy, transcendence, and foundation. The difficulty with Marxism, therefore, is not so much its commitment to historical materialism as its reliance on certain meta-theoretical assumptions about knowledge. Foucault makes this point in a famous and often quoted passage in *The Order of Things*:

At the deepest level of Western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity; it found its place without difficulty, as a full, quiet, comfortable and, goodness knows, satisfying form for a time (its own), within an epistemological arrangement that welcomed it gladly (since it was this arrangement that was in fact making room for it) and that it, in return, had no intention of disturbing and, above all, no power to modify, even one jot, since it rested entirely upon it. . . . [Marxism] may have stirred up a few waves and caused a few surface ripples; but they are no more than storms in a children's paddling pool.¹⁴

The Maoist's charge that Deleuze is an enigma is, therefore, one which is informed by a political philosophy which is consistent with the dominant principles of Western rationality. This may be one of the reasons why Marxism has been able to procure such a secure place in the canon of political thought. If one accepts John Gunnell's account of the "myth of the Tradition"—that the canon of political thought exists as a retrospective construction created in order

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p.p. 261-262.

to rationalize the past and legitimate the present¹⁵—then Marxism's place in the Tradition is secured as it relies on the dominant mode of Western rationality and treats the modern State as the site in which politics can occur. This latter trait perhaps explains why the Maoist felt a measure of commonalty with Foucault. Foucault's works on prisons, hospitals, and other institutions of confinement and control are, to the Maoist, analogous to the problem of resisting the bourgeois State.¹⁶

Throughout Deleuze's writings, by contrast, there is a consistent resistance to this dominant form of rationality. The logocentrism and phallogocentrism of the traditional image of Western thought has resulted in a sense of urgency in Deleuze's writings—an urgency to rethink and reinvent the theoretical enterprise. This urgency has, of course, been shared by many other post-structuralist thinkers. Derridean "deconstruction" is perhaps the best known and the most influential.¹⁷ Whatever the debates surrounding the "true" meaning of deconstruction, it is, at base, a thoroughly critical operation which seeks to make that which is held as certain, uncertain, and that which is understood as commonplace, disconcertingly strange.

Deleuze, too, participates in this critical mode of thinking to the extent that he approaches seemingly straightforward concepts or ideas and attempts to make them *strange*. This practice can be seen in his early works on figures from the history of philosophy. While Deleuze was immersed in classical philosophy as a student, his relation to this tradition was hardly conventional. From the earliest years of his career he cultivated an interest in authors who constituted something of a "counter-tradition" to the dominant rationalist authors and texts. Lucretius, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Bergson, and Nietzsche—these were figures "who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it in

¹⁵ John G. Gunnell, "The Myth of the Tradition," *American Political Science Review* 72:1 (March 1978), p.p. 122-134.

¹⁶ Foucault's relationship with French Maoists is well represented in a 1972 interview, "On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists" in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p.p. 1-36.

¹⁷ An excellent example of Derrida's writings being applied to political analysis can be found in William Corlett, *Community Without Unity: A Politics of Derridian Extravagance* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989).

one respect, or altogether."¹⁸ These were figures in whom Deleuze would find "a secret link which resides in the critique of negation, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power, etc."¹⁹ When subjected to Deleuze's perspective, all of these relatively familiar figures in the history of philosophy are made virtually unrecognizable, and yet their words are never twisted or taken out of context. This talent for taking what seems normal and making it strange is one Deleuze possessed as early as his *lycée* days in the early 1940s. His contemporary, the novelist Michel Tournier, comments on Deleuze's capacity in this regard:

A power of translation, transposition: the whole wornout school of philosophy went through him and came out unrecognizable, with an air of freshness, undigestedness, raw newness, utterly startling and discomfiting our weakness and laziness.²⁰

Deleuze is an expert in excavating and bringing to light the monstrosities that reside within the seemingly normal. Some may find this perverse. Deleuze considers it a necessary, joyous, creative act.

While Deleuze holds some sympathy for the deconstructive move, he insists that, above all, the activity of thinking must not simply be reduced to a reactive critique. For Deleuze, thinking is a practice; it is a productive, assertive, constructionist, and thoroughly creative activity. A theory must be as useful and functional as a "box of tools."²¹ Rosi Braidotti sums up the productive element of Deleuze's image of thought: "Thinking is life lived at the highest possible power—thinking is about finding new images, new representations. Thinking is about change and transformation."²²

This project of reinventing what it means to think should not be interpreted as an attempt to replace one mode of thought with another. Deleuze has no

¹⁸ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.p. 14-15.

¹⁹ Gilles Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit," Translated by Janis Forman, *Semiotext(e)* 2:3 (1977), p. 112.

²⁰ Quoted in Colin Gordon, "The Subtracting Machine," *I & C* 8 (Spring 1981), p. 29.

²¹ Deleuze and Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," p. 208.

²² Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 101.

such foundational aspirations. Indeed, it is of crucial importance when reading Deleuze to remember that he does not try to explain the way things *are* so much as to provide a different perspective, a different way of looking at things. Deleuze is not attempting to posit the *true* way of understanding politics or anything else. Hence, to say that Deleuze is "arguing" for one position or another is to seriously misrepresent his philosophical and political project. One cannot say that Deleuze is trying to "prove" anything in the sense of traditional approaches to philosophy or political theory. To say that one "argues" something implies that one has secure initial premises from which a final solution can be derived. Such an understanding is problematic when applied to Deleuze because he is a thinker who problematizes all firm foundations, all forms of teleological thinking, and all forms of thought that establish and fix artificial and limiting parameters and borders. Thus, it is more accurate to refer to Deleuze's "perspective"—an artistic term more appropriate for his creative thought.

The act of reinventing thought is, therefore, not a transcendent activity. Deleuze does not attempt to step "outside" Western metaphysics, principally because he recognizes that any such attempt is already accounted for in the tradition's spatial and dualistic logic. The outside is only conceivable through the logic of the inside. Deleuze's approach is, by contrast, thoroughly immanent. It is an immanence, moreover, which does not conceive of thought in a purely hegemonic or univocal fashion. For Deleuze, the activity called thinking is composed of a multiplicity of "lines," all of which are immanent, always intermingling, crossing over one another, and transforming themselves and each other.²³ The most significant of these lines are, on the one hand, the molar line of rigid segmentarity and, on the other hand, the line of flight. The former sedentary form of thought corresponds to the hegemonic form of Western rationality with its dualisms, hierarchies, and emphasis on the *logos*. The latter "nomadic" form of thought corresponds to a kind of minority consciousness which "unfixes and unfastens the fortress of subjectivity and truth, thereby opening the way for revolutionary potentialities [and] the affirmation of positive

²³ For a more detailed discussion see Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.p. 124-134.

differences."²⁴ In many ways, Deleuze's philosophical (and political) project is to think, write, and act in accordance with this nomadic form of thought.

The political implications of this attempt to bring a nomadic style of thought to the forefront are numerous. As Paul Patton has commented: "The style of rationality with which we operate will determine the range of intellectual strategies available to us, which in turn will set the limits of our political practice as intellectuals."²⁵ In other words, there is a crucial connection between theoretical and philosophical modes of thought and the form in which political activism and movements may take place. This is why Deleuze does not concern himself solely with criticisms that are based on ideology. For him, politics is not just a matter of the contents of thought, but also that of the form it takes. The political implications of this are brought to the forefront when Deleuze argues that the molar line of thought is complicit with the State: "Thought as such is already in conformity with a model that it borrows from the State apparatus, and which defines for it goals and paths, conduits, channels, organs, an entire *organon*."²⁶

Deleuze introduces a crucially important concept here: the State form of thought. For Deleuze, the relationship between thought and the State is an immanent, mutually reinforcing one. Far from being separate, distinct domains, the two are involved in a mutually intertwined, symbiotic relationship. It is my intention in this thesis to investigate this relationship between thought and the State. This relationship has the concepts of space and time at its core—the spatial framing of modern politics is analogous to the spatial framing of modern (i.e. post-Cartesian) thought.

Political scientists usually understand space in one of two ways—either as territorial or structural. The first perspective sees space as a "series of blocks defined by state territorial boundaries." The second sees space as "geographical entities of some sort or another, nodes, districts, regions, etc., [having] spatial effects that result from their interaction or relationship with one

²⁴ Rosi Braidotti, *Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary Philosophy*, Translated by Elizabeth Guild (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 115.

²⁵ Paul Patton, "Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization" in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 124.

²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 374.

another."²⁷ Both of these perspectives tend to efface any consciousness about the cultural, historical, and geographical particularity of this view of spatiality. Similar assumptions about spatiality are made in the realm of political theory. The concerns of political theory—questions of freedom and obligation, rights and responsibilities, domination and resistance, liberty and justice, and so on—presuppose a territorially enclosed community. Rights and responsibilities, for instance, only have meaning within such a community. Power, moreover, is generally understood to be exercised through centralized political institutions which, in turn, require the existence of some form of territorial enclosure in order to be effective. Such a territorially enclosed community, whether it is the *polis* of the ancient Greeks or the nation-State of the modern era, provides the necessary conditions of possibility for the traditional concerns of political theory to be articulated. Political theory is therefore a domestic(ated) endeavor, concerned with activities which occur inside spatial communities.

This emphasis on the spatial, moreover, is not just limited to the practicalities of political organization, but also extends to (or, rather, from) the realm of thought itself. Gaston Bachelard's famous question—"if a metaphysician could not draw, what would he think?"²⁸—attests to the thoroughly spatial character of Western philosophical and political thought. Consequently, it becomes very difficult to conceive of a temporal (or any other alternative) understanding of politics, one free from the ties of spatial notions of community or identity. John Gunnell's influential book, *Political Philosophy and Time*, is a recent example of this tendency. Gunnell introduces the ancient Hebrews as a culture which insisted on the political impossibility of any point of fixture and instead lived as a "community existing in time." As quickly as it is introduced, however, the Hebrew model of community is rejected in favour of the "authentic" politics of the Greeks. Gunnell argues that political theory was founded by the Greeks as an attempt to create a sphere of order (the polis) in order to avoid the

²⁷ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.p. 79-80.

²⁸ Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, Translated by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 1994), p. 212.

disorder and confusion caused by living in historical time. Gunnell articulates a familiar axiom in political theory: time is the problem; space, the solution.²⁹

The work of Gilles Deleuze offers a radical rethinking of the categories of space and time and their relation to thought and socio-political processes. If modern politics is about situating a "here" and a "there," Deleuze is important because he radically rethinks what it means to be "here." He does this, I will argue, because he insists on thinking in terms of time rather than space. The nomadic form of thought he employs is one which is temporal as opposed to the spatial character of the molar form of thought that informs the traditional form of Western rationality. Since the "here" in conventional understandings of politics and political life is defined as being the modern territorial State, this temporal mode of thought opens a whole new perspective on how to think of the State and act in relation to politics.

What are the political implications of following Deleuze's example and approaching thought in a temporal rather than a spatial fashion? What new ways of thinking about politics would result? These are the questions that, broadly speaking, inform my thesis. I intend to address these questions by focusing on one aspect of Deleuze's work in particular. My central concern in this thesis can, therefore, be posed as a question: Does Gilles Deleuze have a theory of the State? By framing the question in this manner, I believe that the intimate relationship between thought and politics will be heightened, as will the political implications of thinking temporally rather than spatially.

Asking whether or not Gilles Deleuze possesses a theory of the State assumes a prior question of what a contemporary theory of the State would look like. What would it mean to have a theory of the State today? What would it have to enable you to say about the modern political condition? These are important questions because the temporal accelerations and flows which characterize the modern world have, to a large degree, undermined many of the traditional and largely uncontested assumptions that have informed how the nature and function of the State are understood. In Chapter One I will outline the conditions of the problem through a reading of the dominant theories of the State. My intent here is not to provide an absolutely thorough and

²⁹ John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 1987), especially chapter three.

comprehensive account of these contending theories. Such an enterprise is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, my approach will be to highlight some of the most common and often unarticulated principles which inform the various theories of the State. I am adopting this approach because the central argument of this chapter will be that a contemporary theory of the State is one which enables one to say something about the limits of the modern State and modern statist politics. By "limits" I am referring to those processes and practices which regularly transgress or pose a serious challenge to the fundamental principles that inform conventional theories of the State. If the State has traditionally been understood as a spatial container of sorts, what spills out, what slips through, and what regularly transgresses the bounds of the State is of considerable theoretical and practical importance.

I will discuss the contemporary refugee crisis as a timely example of a political process which effectively constitutes a limit of modern statist politics. The refugee crisis problematizes and challenges both the conventional understandings of citizenship and State sovereignty. Take, for instance, the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees which established guidelines for how refugees were to be dealt with. These guidelines maintain that the most desirable solution is to achieve voluntary repatriation to a refugee's community in his or her country of origin. If this cannot be achieved, then the solution of asylum and integration into a community in another country is pursued. The 1951 Convention, however, never established the principle of asylum as a human right, but instead left it to the discretion of the governments of sovereign States. In addition, the right to determine who qualifies as a refugee was from the very beginning left to sovereign States and not the agency established to deal with refugees—the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. The principle of State sovereignty places the crucial decision of controlling who may or may not enter a particular State's territory in the hands of that State. Nicholas Xenos states the implications of this situation forcefully: "The problem of refugees, their identity, and their fate is...a complicated problem that has the question of sovereignty as its core."³⁰

³⁰ Nicholas Xenos, "Refugees: The Modern Political Condition," *Alternatives* 18:4 (Fall 1993), p. 422.

Chapter One outlines what a contemporary theory of the State would have to enable one to say about the limits of the modern State. The following two chapters will outline the relationship between thought and the State. For Deleuze, the State is composed of a multiplicity of intersecting molecular lines. It should, therefore, not be understood as being purely molar, singular and universal, a totality in and of itself. Rather, the State coexists on a conceptual field with other lines and consistently interacts with them. In this sense the State corresponds to one of Deleuze's key concepts, an "assemblage." An assemblage, simply put, is a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects whose only unity is that they function or work together.³¹ In Chapter Two I will argue that the conditions of possibility of this core concept of Deleuze's theory of the State results from a certain temporal or nomadic image of thought.

An assemblage is a concept which is defined by its functional capacity. As such it corresponds to the creative and productive element that Deleuze assigns to thought. This productive element is important as one of my primary intentions in this thesis is to explore the conditions that allow Deleuze to articulate a qualitatively different and innovative theory of the State. An assemblage is also characterized by its temporal character. Consequently, in addition to the creative element of Deleuze's nomadic image of thought, the temporal character of this line of thought will also be explored. Deleuze's 1966 work on Henri Bergson, *Bergsonism*, and his 1962 book on Nietzsche, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, are excellent examples of this attempt to articulate a creative, temporal image of thought which stands in stark contrast to the representative, spatial image of thought which has enjoyed hegemonic status in Western philosophy. In Bergson, Deleuze finds someone who struggles to think in terms of time rather than in the spatial forms of thought that have dominated Western metaphysics. For Deleuze, Bergson's writings on intuition, duration, and memory are indicative of a philosopher concerned with the dynamism of becoming rather than the stasis of being. Similarly, in Nietzsche, Deleuze finds one of the most sustained and incisive critiques of dialectical thought, as well as a theory of difference and of becoming. I will focus on Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return in order to highlight the ethical and ontological consequences that result from engaging in a temporal mode of

³¹ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.p. 69-76.

thought. The importance of all this, I shall argue, is not merely limited to philosophical debates. On the contrary, the will to think in terms of time rather than space has profound political implications for Deleuze's work, and especially for his attempt to develop a theory of the State.

It should be stressed by way of qualification that the role Hegel plays in the development of Deleuze's thought will not be directly addressed in any extended fashion in Chapter Two. Of his early days as a student of philosophy, Deleuze identified Hegel as his philosophical nemesis: "What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic."³² While he excludes Hegel from any extended study or analysis, much of what constitutes Deleuze's early philosophical work (i.e. his monographs on Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, etc.) can be read as an attempt to make a complete break from the Hegelian paradigm that dominated philosophical studies in France. An argument can thus be made that to understand Deleuze's thought and his relation to Western philosophical traditions, one has to bring to light the shadows of Hegel which reside in the recesses of Deleuze's texts. I will not pursue this form of analysis principally because my intention in dealing with Deleuze's writings on the history of philosophy is to highlight how the image of thought he develops *affects* his future writings on the State. As Nietzsche states: "By doing we forego."³³—by carefully choosing one area of investigation, other, perhaps equally important, areas of inquiry must be left aside. My concern in this thesis is thus not so much to accurately situate Deleuze's writings in terms of the history of philosophy as to assess how the image of thought he develops functions with regards to his theory of the State.³⁴

In Chapter Three I will outline the theory of the State that Deleuze has developed in collaboration with Félix Guattari. The principal texts to be analyzed here are the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980). While for most State-theorists the State is

³² Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit," p. 112.

³³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 244, aphorism 304.

³⁴ It should also be added that the project of analyzing Deleuze's early philosophical studies in relation to his anti-Hegelianism has already been taken up in Michael Hardt's *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*.

viewed as a spatial entity *par excellence*, Deleuze and Guattari's analysis builds upon the temporal mode of thought developed earlier in texts such as *Bergsonism* and *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. As Paul Patton has noted, the concept of the "State-form" developed in *A Thousand Plateaus* is an assemblage that refers primarily not to a specific historical entity, but rather to an abstraction that is realized in varying degrees in concrete situations.³⁵ The State-form is defined not so much by its concrete spatial reality as by its abstract temporal character. This is not to say that Deleuze and Guattari ignore the issue of space. They recognize that the State is, after all, a territorial entity. But space is a concept like all others and so is one which has been created and is subject to continual re-creation. From Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, the State cannot be conceived without reference to its Outside—an assemblage referred to as the "war machine." The assemblage of the war machine is an attempt by Deleuze to provide a novel perspective on the politics of resistance. Consequently, how the assemblages of State and the war machine constitute and relate to political space is of critical importance. For Deleuze and Guattari, the State attempts to striate space in order to constitute a milieu of interiority through the capture and regulation of all manner of practices, processes, and flows; the war machine, by contrast, resists the State's attempts at capture by constituting a "smooth" space and occupying a milieu of exteriority.

Finally, in the Conclusion I will return to my initial question: Does Deleuze have a theory of the State? I will argue that he does have a theory of the State, but one which is exceptionally difficult to articulate in the spatially organized discourse of conventional social and political analysis. It is in response to this difficulty that Deleuze employs in his writings on the State a temporal, nomadic, or, to some, "enigmatic" mode of thought, one intent on creating and experimenting with new concepts. It should be stressed, moreover, that making the claim that Deleuze has a theory of the State may answer my thesis question, but it by no means enacts any sense of closure. On the contrary, it only opens a whole range of new questions. What are the implications of Deleuze's theory of the State? Does his theory of the State have anything relevant to say to or about the limits of modern statist politics I outlined in Chapter One? What effects, for

³⁵ Paul Patton, "Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in *Mille Plateaux*," *Substance* 44/45 (1984), p.p. 71-73.

example, would a "Deleuzian" reading of the contemporary refugee crisis have on how concepts such as State sovereignty and citizenship are understood? What new ways of thinking about politics would result? What are the political consequences of post-structuralism in general and of Deleuze's thought in particular?

In considering such questions it is important to stress that while Deleuze never specifically addresses issues such as the refugee crisis this by no means invalidates the choice of analyzing this limit of modern statist politics or Deleuze's work. On the contrary, Deleuze's own position toward his work would seem to justify such a choice. Deleuze encourages readers to lift a dynamism out of his work and apply it to their own specific political concerns. After all, a theory, Deleuze says in a conversation with Michel Foucault, "is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself."³⁶ What Deleuze means here is that he is not limiting a reader to use his theories in the ways in which he uses them. On the contrary, he explicitly invites readers to lift ideas, concepts, or strains of thought from his work and transfer them to altogether different contexts.

This, in essence, is what I will strive to achieve in this thesis. Deleuze is, after all, a theorist of multiplicities. As such, it is not very useful or productive to approach his work looking for his definitive political approach. For Deleuze, it is never one but many, never being but always becoming. His is a *rhizomatic* approach, as he states in sharp rhetorical fashion in the introduction of *A Thousand Plateaus*:

Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don't sow, grow offshoots!
Don't be one or multiple, be multiplicities! Run lines, never plot a
point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when
standing still!³⁷

Looking for *the* political position that results from a reading of Deleuze's texts will never be very fruitful. It is more appropriate to ask: What can be made of Deleuze? What does his work offer? Deleuze is a provider of "toolboxes;" he encourages his readers to experiment, to be creative, to test a variety of conceptual tools for their usefulness, and see if they are functional for their

³⁶ Deleuze and Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," p. 208.

³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 24.

specific purposes. It is always up to the particular reader to decide which tools are useful for his or her specific political concerns. In this respect, Brian Massumi suggests a practical and creative approach to Deleuze work: "The question is not: is it true? But: does it work? What new thoughts does it make it possible to think? What new emotions does it make it possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?"³⁸

My purpose in this thesis is to utilize some of Deleuze's conceptual tools in order to assess what a contemporary theory of the State would be. By doing so I hope that some of the political implications of Deleuze's texts will emerge. The importance and relevancy of this project should not be understated. Investigating Deleuze's radical rethinking of the concepts of space and time, and assessing its implications for modern statist politics is, I believe, a first and necessary step for thinking (and acting) otherwise about politics. Writing a thesis which strives to realize this goal is something I would count as a considerable accomplishment.

³⁸ Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p. 8.

On the Limit of the State

Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world.
— Martin Heidegger¹

Rethinking the State

Does Gilles Deleuze have a theory of the State? The question seems simple enough; it begs for a response in either the affirmative or the negative. Questions and answers, however, are always mutually implicated. An uncritical acceptance of what it means to have a theory of the State would necessarily limit and frame the acceptable parameters of any answer I would wish to provide. Like any theoretical enterprise, theories of the State have their own explicit history and their own conditions of possibility. Consequently, the first and necessary step in this thesis, and the focus of this chapter, is to determine what a contemporary theory of the State would look like. What are the necessary conditions such a theory would have to fulfill? What would it have to enable one to say about modern politics? It is in this sense that this chapter is essentially an exercise in framing and a means by which I can begin to assess whether or not Gilles Deleuze has a theory of the State. It is only after this initial and critical step that any meaningful assessment of Deleuze's writings on the State can be undertaken.

To question what it means to have a theory of the State is a serious matter for it necessarily means to question the location and nature of politics itself. The study of politics, after all, has traditionally been understood to be the

¹ Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, David Farrell Krell, ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1977), p. 219.

study of the State. Aristotle, for instance, conceived the purpose of "political science" to be the study of the nature and function of that "naturally good" community, the ancient Greek city-State. Indeed, the very term "politics" finds its etymological roots in the name for these city-States, the *polis*. Other competing forms of association are generally considered non-political and unable to provide the necessary conditions for the "good life" that the geographically-bounded *polis* offered. The assumption that a spatially-enclosed community is necessary to provide the conditions for politics to occur continues today in contemporary theories of the State. Indeed, the very etymology of the word "State"—from the Latin *stare*, "to stand"—gives away its spatial and foundational pretensions.

The idea that politics can only legitimately occur within a spatially-enclosed community has several important implications. These implications become especially apparent when one considers modern social and political processes—ICBMs, military and civilian surveillance satellites, international terrorists, telecommunication webs, environmental movements, transnational human rights efforts, to name only a few²—which seem consistently and stubbornly to defy, transgress, and even ignore the forms of political association and identity which have been organized according to those spatial assumptions. If a contemporary theory of the State is to have any currency or relevance to modern political life, it must somehow enable one to say something about these social and political processes and practices. My purpose in this chapter is to outline the necessary conditions for such a theory of the State to be developed.

My approach in this chapter will be to provide four readings of the problems associated with developing a contemporary theory of the State. In the first section I will consider the contemporary problem of global refugee flows in order to highlight the challenges these movements pose to traditional understandings of subjectivity, the modern State, and to the concept of State sovereignty. In particular, I will argue that (post)modern theories of subjectivity must take into account the conditions that allow the subject to exist—that is, the modern State and its spatiotemporal assumptions. In the second section I will

² This list is by no means exhaustive, but it does demonstrate the wide range of processes and phenomenon which currently challenge the spatial assumptions of the modern state and the concept of state sovereignty. The list is James Der Derian's. See his "Lenin's Wars, Baudrillard's Games" in Gretchen Bender and Timothy Druckrey, eds., *Culture on the Brink: Ideologies of Technology* (Seattle: Bay Press, 1994), p. 269.

focus on the first of these conditions for subjectivity—the modern State—and provide a brief account of traditional and influential theories of the State. In this section I will also argue that these traditional theories of the State are insufficient to adequately account for practices such as global refugee flows. These criticisms will lead me to a discussion of the spatial and temporal assumptions made by most theories of the State. I will investigate these historically constructed spatial and temporal assumptions in the third section through a reading of the work of Galileo and Hobbes. The fourth and final section will be more positive in orientation as I will present an argument for how a contemporary theory of the State should be approached and formulated. In this section I will focus on how the spatial nature of both thought and political community creates profound problems for articulating alternatives to the modern State. Consequently, I will emphasize how a contemporary theory of the State must be more temporal in its approach and must see the State not as a static thing to be explained, but as a historical practice to be performed.

Refugees, Subjectivity, and the State

The existence of worldwide refugee flows is one of the premier and most pressing problems currently facing modern political practice, analysis, and theory. The recent and continuing refugee flows emanating from Haiti, Rwanda, China, Bosnia, and other sites of turmoil have been the subject of considerable coverage by the news media.³ Indeed, the number of refugees is staggering and continues to increase. In 1951, the year the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established, there existed 1.5 million refugees in the

³ One article on refugees co-authored by noted Yale historian Paul Kennedy is of particular interest for two reasons. First, Kennedy focuses on the current and potential future problems associated with population flows. What is interesting about the theme of his article is that Kennedy focuses not on how refugees are a problem for non-Western states, requiring at best the West's humanistic sympathy, but rather how it is increasingly a *global* problem, one which has the potential for threatening the West's power and privilege as well as the modern state system. It is poor, unarmed, underprivileged people, not guns, bombs, and tanks that pose the greatest "threat" to the West's hegemony according to this analysis. The second interesting aspect of Kennedy's article is a symbolic one. That the influential *Atlantic Monthly* would place as its cover story an article by a prestigious Ivy League scholar symbolically attests to the scope and severity of the contemporary refugee crisis. Paul Kennedy and Matthew Connelly, "Must It Be the Rest Against the West?" *The Atlantic Monthly* (December 1994), p.p. 61-91.

world. At the time, the UNHCR was considered to be only a temporary organization, meant to deal specifically with refugees caused by the disruptions resulting from the Second World War and particularly with émigrés from the communist governments of central and eastern Europe. With this mandate, the UNHCR was given a projected life span of approximately three years. The number of refugees, however, continued to grow at a seemingly relentless rate and so the UNHCR was required to continue and, indeed, expand its operations. By 1980, the number of refugees existing in the world had increased to 8.2 million. By 1992, this figure had jumped to an estimated 18.2 million refugees.⁴ In Canada, the number of asylum applicants has experienced a corresponding increase. In 1979, Canada received 1,165 refugee claimants. By 1992, this figure had jumped to approximately 37,700 claimants for refugee status.⁵ The amount of funds dedicated to handling the refugee crisis has similarly increased. In 1991 the UNHCR had a budget in excess of \$550 million—a vast increase from its original \$300,000 budget of 1951.⁶

The problem of refugees, however, does not lie in their numbers alone. It is a problem which poses a significant challenge to many of the conventional understandings of politics and political concepts which inform the discipline of political science, as well as the actions of policy-makers and those engaged with social and political issues. In his article, "We Are All Refugees," Daniel Warner explores how refugees relate to debates concerning understandings of subjectivity and community. The standard approach to the refugee problem for both policy-makers and academics, Warner argues, has been to start off with a simple classification scheme: there are refugees and non-refugees. According to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the term "refugee" applies to any person who

⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 157. See also, Gillian Creese, "The Politics of Refugees in Canada," in Vic Satzewich, ed., *Deconstructing a Nation: Immigration, Multiculturalism & Racism in '90s Canada* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1992), p.p. 123-143.

⁶ Alex Cunliffe, "The Refugee Crisis: A Study of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees," *Political Studies* 43:2 (June 1995), p.p. 278-279.

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality but being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.⁷

The definition was later augmented by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are usually classified as examples of "narrow" definitions of refugees. "Broad" definitions, by contrast, are exemplified by those formulated at the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention as well as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. The comparative advantages and disadvantages of these definitions are usually assessed in terms of the relative number of people that qualify for protection and the quality of the protection that can be supplied. As Warner states: "The narrow definition affords a limited group maximum protection, the broader definition allows a wider group limited protection."⁸

What is common to both definitions is that refugees are consistently understood as individuals uprooted from their homes and in a continual search for roots, for some form of community. Non-refugees, it is assumed, have the benefit of possessing a community, a place which they can call home. Consequently, the focus of attempts to resolve refugee movements has been to find refugees a community. This process usually takes one of two forms: (1) the most desirable solution is to achieve voluntary repatriation to a refugee's community in his or her country of origin; (2) if this cannot be achieved, then the solution of asylum and integration into a community in another country is pursued.⁹ While there are many important practical and legal reasons for formulating the "solution" to the refugee crisis in this manner, Warner insists that there are much deeper issues involved with this policy solution.

⁷ Quoted in Leon Gordenker, "The United Nations and Refugees," in Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ed., *Politics in the United Nations System* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 299, note 4.

⁸ Daniel Warner, "We Are All Refugees," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 4:3 (1992), p. 367.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

The act of distinguishing between refugees and non-refugees implies that refugees possess characteristics which can be contrasted to a "normal" state of affairs. The refugee is made Other, something unusual and exterior to the normalcy of life within a State. An inside and an outside is created with its corresponding insiders and outsiders. In this schema refugees are securely located on the outside. While there may be some very important legal reasons behind this categorical construction, the classification of refugees/non-refugees obscures the similarities between these two seemingly polar opposites. Focus on solutions for refugees—that is, either voluntary repatriation or asylum—works under the assumption that the state of affairs the refugee experiences is an aberration from a "normal" way of life. Moreover, once a refugee has been placed into a community, it is assumed that a situation of normalcy has returned.

While it is generally agreed upon that the best solution for refugees is repatriation, Warner makes what seems like an argument for the contrary: "the search for a home is infinitely more complex than a territorial integration. The search for a home and shelter in refugee language is usually a physical problem. But the search for a home is a more profound search, that is not necessarily tied to a specific place."¹⁰ What Warner is trying to highlight is that the assumed disjuncture between "normal" life and the existence of the refugee is an extremely problematic position. Warner draws upon William Connolly's reading of Nietzsche to suggest that after the "death of God" and the collapse of all absolute foundations, the human condition has been suffering from an acute case of "homesickness." In relation to the problem of refugees, Warner suggests, what becomes apparent is that the

disjuncture between self and "home" existed before flight and will exist after flight, whether there is voluntary repatriation or asylum. It is this disjuncture which causes the refugee and non-refugee to be similar. If the refugee is searching for a "home," so are we all, "we" being those who have not been forced into exile.¹¹

Questioning the categorical distinctions between refugees and non-refugees, therefore, has the effect of problematizing what it means to have a "community"

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 369.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 370. See also, William E. Connolly, *Political Theory & Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.p. 137-175.

at all. Warner's position is that the manner in which refugees have been categorized effaces the important similarities between "refugees" and "non-refugees," or the way in which "we are all refugees."

Warner, of course, is not suggesting that the anxiety of "homesickness" faced by non-refugees is completely comparable to the hardships associated with the homelessness of refugees. His essay is intended to be provocative rather than definitive. What is stressed is how the figure of the refugee radically puts into question political concepts which are often left unquestioned. Take, for instance, the problem of responsibility. How would traditional understandings of responsibility be transformed if, say, a UNHCR field officer recognized that the condition of the refugee is ontologically not too dissimilar to his or her own? How would responsibility be understood if one's "home" could no longer be understood completely in territorial terms? Most crucially, how would one enact or perform such a "deterritorialized" form of responsibility?¹² The answers are not, of course, readily forthcoming or easy to determine. To the extent that the figure of the refugee allows for a radical reassessment of basic political categories and concepts, however, asking the questions is of crucial importance.

The issue of ethics and responsibility in relation to calls for the protection of refugees is usually situated within a discourse of human rights, a discourse which may also be situated in a broader debate concerning the nature of modern subjectivity. This debate becomes especially complicated and politically difficult when one accounts for the Nietzschean-inspired poststructuralist critique of the modern subject. Put simply, if the deconstruction of the modern liberal self-same thinking subject is a *fait accompli*, then whose rights are being defended against abuse? If the discourse of rights assumes the modern self-identical unitary self and this self can no longer be said to exist (if it ever did), then in whose name can individuals be defended against the violent excesses of the modern State?

These questions are not being ignored, but are on the contrary subject to an intense amount of debate. For instance, the 1992 Oxford Amnesty Lectures, sponsored by Amnesty International, invited a prestigious and influential group of scholars to discuss the following problem:

¹² For an excellent discussion of this issue, see David Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics After the End of Philosophy" *Alternatives* 19:4 (Fall 1994), p.p. 455-484.

Our lecturers are being asked to consider the consequences of the deconstruction of the self for the liberal tradition. Does the self as construed by the liberal tradition still exist? If not, whose human rights are we defending?¹³

The resulting book, *Freedom and Interpretation*, consists of a collection of essays addressing this topic by many of the leading literary theorists today: Hélène Cixous, Frank Kermode, Wayne Booth, Paul Ricoeur, Terry Eagleton, Julia Kristeva, and Edward Said. Many of the essays approach the problem of subjectivity by positing what might be called a temporal image of the self. Wayne Booth argues that each individual has his or her own life *story* with its own plot line: "What is essential about the self is not found primarily in its difference from others but in its freedom to pursue a story line, a life plot, a drama carved out of all the possibilities every society provides."¹⁴ Thus, according to Booth, the self can be defended against torture because torture would be an illegitimate interruption and violation of an individual's life plot. Similarly, Paul Ricoeur confronts the dilemma that results when the problem of human rights is raised after the deconstruction of the self. Such a dilemma, Ricoeur argues, is predicated on a confusion between the self as *idem* and the self as *ipse*: "It is the self as *idem*—identity, sameness over time—that has been deconstructed. The self as *ipse*—the merely quantitative marking of 'itself' as subject of its actions and utterances—has not been touched."¹⁵ According to Ricoeur, the self as *ipse* requires no secure point of ontological fixture, but only requires the capacity to make a promise at one point in time and keep it at another. The self thus takes on an ethical dimension when he/she is accountable and responsible for his/her actions and utterances, especially in terms of those made to others.

Both Booth and Ricoeur attempt to defend the notion of human rights without appealing to the liberal self-identical unitary subject. Instead of conceiving the subject in spatial terms, they posit a temporal form of subjectivity in their arguments for the "plot line" and the "self as *ipse*," respectively. This

¹³ Barbara Johnson, ed., *Freedom and Interpretation* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

temporal perspective on subjectivity is a popular one in poststructural theories. It usually appears under the guise of "nomadic," "hybrid," or "mobile" subjectivities, versions of which can be found in the theories of subjectivity presented by Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, and others. It is a perspective, however, which is not without its difficulties. These theorists, as well as all of the authors in *Freedom and Interpretation*, begin their analyses with the subject. What is absent is any indication of the conditions under which the subject is at all possible. This is an extremely important omission because modern forms of subjectivity are only possible under the conditions provided by the modern State. The formation and consolidation of the modern subject has, historically and theoretically, gone hand in hand with the formation and consolidation of the modern State. This interdependence can be seen in such paradigmatic texts such as Hobbes' *Leviathan*, as David Campbell has noted:

The state is not the author of "man" and "man" is not the author of the state. Neither agency nor structure are prior or determinant. "Man" and the state are simultaneously constituted; each is constitutive of the other and cannot be without the other.¹⁶

It is a cruel irony that while the theorists writing in *Freedom and Interpretation* have as their explicit purpose to somehow make an argument for the "rights" and "freedoms" of individuals suffering from the violent excesses of the modern State, the State never plays a prominent role (or in most cases even a minor role) in their analyses.

The political implications which arise from the absence of the State in analyses which begin with the deconstruction of the modern liberal self are especially notable in those analyses which posit a temporal "mobile" subjectivity. For instance, the temporal understanding of the self posited by Booth and Ricoeur, among others, may only be possible under the safety provided by the *spatial enclosure* of the modern State. The implicit statism of the temporal subject makes it difficult to see how, by itself, it can possibly serve as an ethical or political defense against the violent excesses of the modern State.¹⁷ All this is

¹⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 64.

¹⁷ It should be added that this way of conceptualizing subjectivity may be complicit not only with the violence of the State but also with the violence associated with the colonial enterprise. Robert Young has recently suggested that much of what constitutes contemporary cultural and post-

not to say that the reconceptualization of the modern subject, temporal or otherwise, is an inappropriate endeavor. On the contrary, I would maintain that it is of crucial importance. The logic of my argument, however, insists that it cannot be accomplished in any *political* sense without a corresponding reconceptualization of its condition of possibility—the modern State. The impact this has on refugee politics is, I believe, crucial: to talk about the refugee problem is, therefore, necessarily to talk about the State. A short history of how refugees have been constructed as a problem for modern politics clearly demonstrates the important connections between the State and refugees.

The problem of refugees is in many ways a particularly twentieth century political problem. This is not to say, however, that the mass displacement of people has not been a common occurrence throughout recorded history. The term "refugee" was first applied to the French Huguenots who fled to England after Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Before the twentieth century, however, the migration of people was left largely unregulated. The passport—that legalistic device allowing people to exit and enter States—only became a common requirement for inter-State travel in the 1910s. Individuals leaving their home country because of political persecution were regarded as exiles, not refugees. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the political climate had changed to the extent that it was no longer individual exiles fleeing political persecution, but masses of refugees whose ranks included those escaping from the violence of the Balkan wars, Jews fleeing the pogroms, overpopulation, and depressed agricultural conditions of Eastern Europe, Armenian survivors of the Ottoman massacre, and those displaced by the German wars of unification.¹⁸

By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the collapse Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires had caused such a mass displacement of peoples that the drafters of

colonial theory relies on a mode of thought which reproduces the distinctions which defined culture and race in the nineteenth century. Consequently, despite their best intentions, many cultural theorists unwittingly reproduce *colonial* distinctions when they posit a *post-colonial* or "hybrid" form of subjectivity. See Robert J.C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

¹⁸ Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter one.

the peace treaties that ended the First World War saw it necessary to formally recognize these refugees. The French referred to these people as *apatrides*, while the Germans called them *Heimatlosen*. Nicholas Xenos has traced the etymological roots of these words. The French term *apatrides* translates into "Stateless." With regards to the German term, Xenos found that

Heimat connotes both home and a native place. It is related to the English word "hamlet" and survives in the English suffix "ham," as in Nottingham or Birmingham. In fact, in its earliest, fourteenth-century usage, the word "home" originally referred to a native place in the form of a collection of houses, or a village. In other words, to be *heimatlose*, or homeless, could signify to be without a native place, understood to be a community. That this community should be conceptualized as a state tells us a great deal about the social and political situation that forms the general background to the emergence of refugees as a modern phenomenon.¹⁹

Xenos' point is therefore a crucial one: in both the French and German languages the term used to designate refugees makes reference to the refugee's home and equates this home with the State.

The association of the refugee's home with the State is transformed into a major theoretical and practical difficulty when one considers how the principle of State sovereignty—integral to theories of the State—operates in practice. Even if a particular State is a signatory of the 1951 UN Convention, the guidelines which "guarantee" asylum are only that—guidelines. The UN has no overriding authority to enforce any individual State to guarantee the right of asylum.²⁰ Indeed, although both the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN's 1967 Declaration of Territorial Asylum declare that everyone has the right

¹⁹ Nicholas Xenos, "Refugees: The Modern Political Condition," *Alternatives* 18: 4 (Fall 1993), p. 423.

²⁰ In response to those analysts who maintain that the adoption of the UN Charter after World War II represented a break with the Westphalian logic of international governance, David Held has argued that, on the contrary, the UN merely reflected and accommodated the international power structure as it existed in 1945. Held points to the special veto accorded to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as to Article 51 of the Charter which authorizes autonomous actions by states if they are in "self-defense." In sum, Held argues that the UN "failed effectively to generate a new principle of organization in the international order—a principle that might break fundamentally with the logic of Westphalia and generate new democratic mechanisms of political coordination and change." See David Held, "Democracy: Past, Present, and Possible Futures" *Alternatives* 18:3 (Summer 1993), p.p. 266-267.

to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, the sovereignty of States continues to impose severe limits on these alleged "universal rights." "Asylum remains...an attribute of State sovereignty and the right to be granted, as opposed to seeking asylum, has not been translated into a binding international legal norm."²¹ The principle of State sovereignty places the crucial decision on controlling who may or may not enter a particular State's territory in the hands of that State. Other transnational organizations besides the UN have also interpreted the refugee and migration crises as a problem of national standards set by States. For instance, the OECD's 1973 Continuous Reporting System on Migration attempts to encourage "the signing of bilateral treaties and the reinforcement of national capabilities to regulate migration movements."²² The principle of State sovereignty is, consequently, of critical importance for understanding the problem of refugees in modern politics. Xenos states this predicament forcefully: "The problem of refugees, their identity, and their fate is...a complicated problem that has the question of sovereignty as its core."²³

The principle of State sovereignty not only informs how the refugee problem is currently framed, but also creates the very conditions under which refugees become a problem in the first place. Sovereignty, after all, is a particular but historically powerful resolution of the conflict between claims to citizenship and claims to humanity. Andrew Linklater, for instance, has characterized the development of international relations in terms of this moral conflict. Does one place an obligation toward humanity and strive for ethical universality, or does one place an obligation toward one's fellow citizens in a

²¹ Edward Lawson, "Refugees," in *Encyclopedia of Human Rights* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991), p. 1279.

²² André C. Drainville, "Of Social Spaces, Citizenship, and the Nature of Power in the World Economy," *Alternatives* 20:1 (January-March 1995), p. 69.

²³ Xenos, "Refugees," p. 422. The determining role sovereign States play with regards to refugees may help explain why the UNHCR has experienced so many difficulties in recent years. Indeed, in 1989 member States refused for the first time to approve the UNHCR budget. It is estimated that throughout the 1990s the UNHCR will experience a \$150 million shortfall in funds and resources. These financial difficulties have also affected the UNHCR's ability to secure stable leadership. In October 1989, High Commissioner Jean Pierre Hocke resigned with his successor, Thorval Stoltenberg, resigning only 13 months later.

political association and therefore settle for ethical particularity?²⁴ Thomas Hobbes provides the paradigmatic resolution of this conflict when he simply gives priority to claims to citizenship in the particular political association of the State. Hobbes resolves the conflict between the universal and the particular by positing a theory of State sovereignty which allows for one international system with many particular States. Within States, individuals can strive toward universal standards of Justice, Truth, and Beauty; outside States, however, there can only be relations.²⁵ The effects this resolution has had for the conflict between claims to citizenship, on the one hand, and claims to humanity, on the other have been of profound importance for how both the modern State and modern politics have been conceptualized and put into practice:

As a response to questions about whether "we" are citizens, humans, or somehow both, the principle of State sovereignty affirms that we have our primary and often overriding political identity as participants in a particular community, but asserts that we retain a connection with "humanity" through our participation in a broader global—international—system.²⁶

To the extent that contemporary responses to the refugee crisis cannot rely on the category of citizenship and instead make an appeal to the concept of humanity or human rights, the problem of refugees presents a profound challenge to, or rather, represents an important crisis in this understanding of State sovereignty. If modern politics, as Linklater argues, is a conflict between obligations to citizenship and to humanity, solutions to the overwhelming flows of refugees that characterize the contemporary era may perhaps only be adequately articulated if claims to humanity are privileged. As we have seen, however, claims to what exactly constitutes "humanity" are by no means clear or uncontested. To the extent that refugees defy traditional forms of political

²⁴ Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1982).

²⁵ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Murray Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the External Relations of States," *British Journal of International Studies* 5 (October 1979), p.p. 196-209.

²⁶ R.B.J. Walker, "Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations," in V. Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 189.

classification they thus represent a profound challenge to modern politics and the traditional State-centric understandings of identity and power. Rethinking those aspects of State theory which are undermined by global refugee flows is, therefore, of particular political importance.

The Modern State: Approaches and Criticisms

One of the most important debates currently concerning the State is one which generally follows a dualistic logic of presence and absence: Is the State the central authoritative actor in domestic and international politics, or is it becoming obsolete?²⁷ Consider excerpts from two recent articles on the nature of modern politics:

1. Against claims to the contrary, the popularity of states and their seemingly insatiable appetite for intervention at home and abroad stand among the more pronounced trends of the 20th century...[C]ontrary to reports of its imminent demise, the state appears to be thriving.²⁸
2. Everywhere the state is being disabled and disempowered. Its integrity is in decline and its legitimacy in doubt...The simultaneous effects of internal democratization and external colonization appear to be weakening the state as we know it.²⁹

While the arguments of both authors are sufficiently sophisticated to account for the other's opinion, what is at stake for each can be reduced to a rather simple question: Should the State remain the key and central category for political analysis, or should it be set aside to allow for analyses which stress the multiplicity of power locations in the modern world?

²⁷ On this theme of the logic of presence and absence and the spatial imagery and ontological assumptions that inform this logic, see Walker, *Inside/Outside*, chapter six.

²⁸ Tom Keating, "The State and International Relations," in David G. Haglund and Michael K. Hawes, eds., *World Politics: Power, Interdependence & Dependence* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), p. 16.

²⁹ Rajni Kothari, "The Yawning Vacuum: A World Without Alternatives," *Alternatives* 18:2 (Spring 1993), p. 126.

The difficulty with this debate over the relative importance of the State is that the two options—either the State continues to be the predominant site of politics or it has or is rapidly being replaced—constitute a false dichotomy. To say that the State is not the sole authoritative centre of politics is not to say that it is not a site of politics. On the contrary, it continues to be a crucially important as well as extremely powerful one.³⁰ The more sophisticated analyses which stress the growing multiplicity of politically important sites of power do not ignore the State and declare it irrelevant. There is a world of difference between "de-centring" the State in order to expand the scope of political analysis and declaring that the State is no longer an important and relevant site of politics. As one commentator has noted:

The call for decentring the State in our politics is not a suggestion that we ignore it or refuse to act within it. Indeed, the idea that we can somehow get outside the State or the State system is part of the problem. It is simply an inversion of the assumptions that constitute the State as a privileged field for politics.³¹

A further danger with the dualistic logic of presence and absence that informs the debate concerning the relative merits of the State as a centre of political analysis is that it has the potential of creating a corresponding dualistic division in the research being conducted on the State. One either continues one's political analysis or practice with the assumption that the State is the central authoritative unit of modern political life, or one pursues research or political programs which strive to demonstrate that this is not the case and that other sites of power exist. What is also required, however, and which is somehow cast aside by this either/or logic of presence and absence, is a reconceptualization of what the State is or coming to be given the growing multiplicity of sites of power. A curious silence seems to surround the role of the State in this situation.

³⁰ For an argument which insists that arguments which declare that the State has or is in the process of "withering away" are merely confusing the dissolution of civil society with that of the State, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

³¹ Warren Magnusson, "Decentring the State, or Looking for Politics," in William K. Carroll, ed., *Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1992), p.p. 74-75. See also Warren Magnusson and Rob Walker, "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy" *Studies in Political Economy* 26 (Summer 1988), p.p. 37-71.

To begin re-thinking the meaning and role of the State it is first necessary to assess how the modern State has been traditionally understood. While it would be inappropriate to equate the ancient *polis* of Plato or Aristotle with the contemporary modern State, it would not be inaccurate to say that the idea that politics requires as its condition of possibility the existence of a spatially-enclosed community is still persistent today. Politics, properly understood, may only be said to occur within the confines of such a community. Hence, just as with Aristotle, the concerns of the contemporary discipline of political science largely revolve around the nature and functions of the State. This sentiment can be seen in the writings of one of the "founding fathers" of the discipline, J.K. Bluntschli, whose 1895 work, *The Theory of the State*, defined political science as "the science which is concerned with the state, which endeavors to understand and comprehend the state in its fundamental conditions, in its essential nature, its various forms of manifestation, its development."³² The sub-field of international relations, moreover, also stresses the centrality of the State, treating it as one of its basic units of analysis. Martin Wight, for instance, has characterized international relations theory as "a tradition of speculation about relations between states."³³

The centrality of the State is also reflected in the texts included in the canon of political thought: Plato and Aristotle represent an early account of the prehistory of the State in their discussions about the *polis*; Machiavelli writes with a renewed sense of the virtues of republicanism; Hobbes presents a powerful theory of State sovereignty; Locke articulates the important relationship between property accumulation and the State; Marx and Mill represent two rival interpretations of the nature of the modern State. Political theory, therefore, is dependent upon the existence of the State. Rights and responsibilities, for instance, have meaning only within the confines of the State. Consequently, irrespective of whether one believes this canon genuinely articulates timeless and universal principles or is merely a retrospective construction meant to rationalize the past and legitimate the present State-centric world of political

³² Quoted in Frederick M. Watkins, *The State as a Concept of Political Science* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934), p. 1.

³³ Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 17.

scientists,³⁴ the State has been conferred and taken on such a central role that it becomes difficult to conceive of life—political or otherwise—without it. Andrew Vincent stresses precisely this point:

Statehood not only represents a set of institutions but also a body of attitudes, practices and codes of behaviour, in short civility, which we associate correctly with civilization....We begin and end our lives within [the state's] confines. Thus, as well as being a complex concept, it is also an everyday reality that we cannot ignore.³⁵

To consider the nature of politics, then, is to necessarily confront the nature, role, and location of the modern State.

While the discipline of political science treats the State as the privileged site of politics—indeed, as providing the very conditions of possibility for politics to occur at all—establishing a clear definition of the State is a rather arduous task. The State is an extremely complicated and elusive concept. Predominant amongst most State theories is some version of the definition of the State offered by Max Weber in his essay, "Politics as a Vocation." For Weber, the State is "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."³⁶ This definition of the State, as Michael Mann has noted, is comprised of four principal elements:

1. a *differentiated* set of institutions and personnel, embodying
2. *centrality*, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover a
3. *territorially demarcated area*, over which it exercises

³⁴ John Gunnell is a leading and influential proponent of this latter view. According to Gunnell, the Tradition of political thought is best understood as a "myth." It does not exist in the sense that it is so often assumed—that is, as a common genre of "great works" produced by authors consciously aware that they are participating in a timeless tradition of political philosophy. Instead, Gunnell argues that academic convention chooses a body of classic texts, "arranges them chronologically, infuses them with evolutionary significance, and treats them as a preconstituted tradition which, for better or worse, culminates in modern political theory and practice." See John G. Gunnell, "The Myth of the Tradition" *American Political Science Review* 72:1 (March 1978), p.p. 122-134.

³⁵ Andrew Vincent, *Theories of the State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p.p. 2-3.

³⁶ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. Emphasis in original.

4. a monopoly of *authoritative binding rule-making*, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.³⁷

Mann draws upon this definition in his many influential works.³⁸ Similar definitions of the State inform other recent discussions of the nature and function of the modern State. For example, in their recent study of competing theories of the State, John Hall and John Ikenberry provide a composite theory of the State that closely follows Weber's definition.³⁹

Another approach to making sense of the nature of the State can be found in Andrew Vincent's influential book, *Theories of the State*. Vincent begins his study with a question: What is the State? While the definition provided by Weber and his followers is a tempting one to emanate, Vincent maintains that key factors to Weber's definition, such as territory and the monopoly of force, while important, are often indicators of Statehood that are vague and contestable. According to Vincent, the most crucial formal feature of the State, and the one that has the most continuity and applicability, is that it is a "continuous public power." This defining feature, Vincent maintains, is one which is distinct from both ruler and ruled and which provides "order and continuity" to the polity.⁴⁰

While Vincent maintains that he has identified the most crucial formal feature of the State, he also recognizes that his definition requires a substantive elaboration on the meaning of this "continuous public power." Vincent is very careful not to mistake an ideological account of the State as an absolutely objective description of the State. Rather, he treats ideological theories of the State as perspectives which purport to explain the nature of the continuous public power of the State. Vincent identifies and elaborates on five of these substantive theories: the absolutist, constitutional, ethical, class, and pluralist theories of the State. While it is not my intention to outline the details of these

³⁷ Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 112. Emphasis in original.

³⁸ See, for instance, Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

³⁹ John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, *The State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p.p. 1-2.

⁴⁰ Vincent, *Theories of the State*, p. 21.

various substantive theories of the State—Vincent does an exemplary analysis of each—I do intend to critically examine the methodological approaches and epistemological assumptions that make these theories of the State possible. I am more concerned with how theories of the State work, with what they *do*, than with their substantive content.

Vincent argues that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the substantive answers to the nature of "public power" have followed two broadly-defined and often overlapping approaches: the juristic/normative and the sociological/historical approach. I will consider both of these approaches in turn. Juristic/normative theories, Vincent maintains, seek to

characterize the nature and ends of the state. These theories are usually wide-ranging. They make assumptions about human nature, fundamental values and human needs, and try to link these with institutional structures. The state embodies fundamental human values and aspirations, and most classical political theorists believed that they were articulating the essence of the state when describing these values.⁴¹

While juristic/normative theories of the State have been of considerable historical importance and influence—the work of Thomas Hobbes for example could, with some qualification, be included in this category—this approach presents itself with numerous difficulties. As both Montesquieu and Rousseau were quick to emphasize, it is quite possible that a State theorist such as Hobbes merely abstracts certain characteristics about human behaviour he finds *in* political society and then reads them back into a fictitious State of nature. Furthermore, that there is anything that could be labeled as "human nature," universally applicable to all people irrespective of time, place, culture, gender, sexual orientation, and so on, is itself a highly contentious claim. It is no surprise, therefore, that theories of the State which rely on such transcendental claims are becoming increasingly difficult to entertain.

One method of salvaging these theories of the State that has become influential in recent years is not to analyze them in absolute terms, but to instead re-establish the context in which the texts were written as well as the authorial intentions behind each work. This approach is advocated by the so-called

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

Cambridge School of political analysis, and especially by the political theorist Quentin Skinner.⁴² Skinner argues that to understand political theory, one must recover the intentions of authors by recovering the discursive context of the age in which the specific texts were written. This approach emphasizes the view that texts should not be viewed as mere books or documents, but rather as objects intimately linked to their creators. The author's rationale for writing thus becomes of crucial importance for understanding a particular text.⁴³ Theories of the State, according to this view, should be understood as actions, constituted by the intentions within them. This approach, as one of its proponents has put it, is "simple, powerful, and attractive."⁴⁴

It is also extremely problematic. Separating an author's intention for a work and his or her particular feelings toward it is a very difficult endeavor as not all authors may be conscious of the implications of their work. In addition, this focus on authorial intentions assumes a rather straightforward and linear author-reader relationship, one which places all responsibility for the production of meaning on the author. The reader in this relationship is at best an excavator of authorial intentions, at worst a passive receptor. What is absent is the idea that the act of reading is always a creative and productive endeavor, over which the "original" author of the text has no control. "Author" and "reader" are always mutually constituted. In this sense, as Timothy Luke has commented: "This text, that text, every text is a plural/multivocal/contradictory project. Not everyone will agree, but no one can evade these guidelines. Every work is 'by Author *et al.*'"⁴⁵

The emphasis on the author, moreover, may be an overemphasis. After all, contemporary understandings of the "author" are, historically speaking, relatively recent. In his essay, "What is an Author?", Michel Foucault traces this

⁴² Quentin Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8 (1969), p.p. 3-53.

⁴³ Arlene Saxonhouse, "Texts and Canons: The Status of the 'Great Books' in Political Science," in Ada Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), p. 12.

⁴⁴ Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Enlightenment & Despair: A History of Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 266.

⁴⁵ Timothy W. Luke, "Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order," *Alternatives* 18:2 (Spring 1993), p. 229.

socio-historical process which has led to the "formulation of the fundamental critical category of 'the man and his work.'"⁴⁶ The great irony that lies latent within this approach is that the attempt to historicize a text by re-establishing authorial intentions may have an *ahistorical* effect by virtue of the fact that the concept of the "author" is taken as self-evident and unproblematic. The concept of the "author" is like any other concept in that it has its own history and its own conditions of possibility. The search for authorial intentions tends to mask and naturalize the historically constituted nature of "authorship." Theories of the State which purport to ground themselves in authorial intentions thus face serious epistemological difficulties.

An alternative to the problems associated with juristic/normative theories of the State is the sociological/historical approach. Sociological and anthropological accounts of the development of the State generally see the State as but one element within the broader category of society. Similarly, historical approaches offer highly detailed and meticulous accounts of the growth and consolidation of the modern State through the analysis of various historical and economic factors. While, as Vincent notes, there is "some truth to the claim that history is usually more complex, messy and pragmatic than philosophical ideas and theories would have us believe,"⁴⁷ the sociological/historical is not entirely unproblematic. On the contrary, because history is not impartial and relies to a large extent on the heuristic capacities of the historian, there is the ever-present problem of imposing or reading one's own views and subject position(s) into past events. The search for the origins of the modern State is, consequently, a practice which is inherently problematic.

The politics of origins has many important implications for how the modern State is conceptualized and understood. The act of looking for origins is thus a practice which must be given some consideration. The very act of identifying a particular point as a beginning is to classify it after the fact; a beginning is something which had once existed in the past, but has now been left behind. In order to classify a point of origin, both the mind and language must engage in a process of reversal—from the present, to the past, and then back to the

⁴⁶ Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Donald F. Bouchard, ed., *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 115.

⁴⁷ Vincent, *Theories of the State*, p. 219.

present.⁴⁸ Beginnings can thus be understood as being identifiable points in the past in which the present has its origins. A beginning is a point in time and space from which the present can be understood as evolving; it gives a starting point from which a retrospective understanding of an entire undertaking can be obtained. In this way a beginning implies the end or at least provides a way for the end (i.e. the present) to see itself legitimized in the past.⁴⁹ Beginnings are, therefore, rarely sought after and conferred eminency unless the present they allegedly produce is believed to be of significance. As Edward Said notes: "It is my present urgency, the here and now, that will enable me to establish the sequence of beginning-middle-end and to transform it from a distant object—located 'there'—into the subject of my reasoning."⁵⁰ To invoke a beginning is, therefore, to make a transition from nothing to something. When such a move is made, the beginning ceases to be merely a starting place or a point of origin, but is infused with ontological status and becomes an existing actuality. Richard Bernstein has identified this as the Cartesian Anxiety—that is, a desire "for some fixed point, some stable rock upon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantly threaten us."⁵¹

The politics of origins has many profound implications for how the modern State and modern statist politics are conceptualized. In international relations literature, to give but one example, the rise of the modern State is usually presented as a narrative composed of several important elements: the rise and fall of Christendom, the eventual replacement of medieval understandings of political community, the formation of absolutist States, and the corresponding centralization and intensification of political control within the State. This narrative is usually teleological in nature in that the existence of autonomous sovereign States is presented as a natural and inevitable outcome. For instance, in his work on the concept of sovereignty, F.H. Hinsley takes a teleological stance toward the development of the State: "All evolution from

⁴⁸ Edward Said, *Beginnings: Intentions and Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 29.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.p. 41-42.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.42

⁵¹ Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 18.

primitive pre-state methods has been inexorably towards the establishment and consolidation of the state."⁵² The specific point of origin of the modern State system is, above all others, usually identified as the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which concluded the Thirty Years War. This peace treaty is understood as having established the principle that religious affiliation would be determined by the secular ruler and not by any external authority. The Peace of Westphalia thus established the principle of autonomous territorially-bounded sovereign States operating in a multistate system. This point of origin is a necessary condition of possibility for most of what constitutes international relations theory. For instance, Kenneth Waltz's influential theory that international politics can be understood in terms of structure and States and without reference to the economic, social, or cultural spheres, only makes sense within a discipline which emphasizes the primacy of the narrative of the rise of the modern State and States system.

Like all narratives, however, the one that describes the rise and consolidation of the modern State attempts to control any and all ambiguity that might lend itself to a proliferation of alternative interpretations as to the nature of the modern State. Richard Ashley has commented on the political consequences of taking a standard narrative approach to describe the existence of political forms of association such as the State:

a narrative reasserts closure by imposing a central ordering principle whose categories and standards of interpretation are taken to express the essential and timeless truth integrating all of the historical times and places among which it discriminates. It constructs a story in which all time, all space, all difference, and all discontinuity are cast as part of a universal project in which the ordering principle is itself redeemed as necessarily, timelessly, and universally true.⁵³

To the extent that all narratives require a point of departure, one of the difficulties with the narrative of the modern State is that its beginning must necessarily circumscribe and define a topic area. All beginnings are thus predicated on the

⁵² Quoted in Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 46.

⁵³ Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War" in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 264.

principle of exclusion. The Peace of Westphalia is no different in this regard. As a point of origin the Peace of Westphalia is also a point of power, a point where a variety of inclusions and exclusions take place.

The effect of this point of origin is that other points of origin, perhaps equally valid or invalid, but which would lead to a different framing of the problems of international politics are excluded. The numerous critical social movements that formed and coalesced in 1992 over the symbolic importance of the 500 year anniversary of Columbus' "discovery" of America provide an interesting counter-origin to the Peace of Westphalia. What implications to how "domestic" and "international" processes are understood would arise if "1492" were taken as the point of origin for international relations theory? This date marks a fundamental break in the organization of economic, cultural, and theological life in Europe and, of course, the rest of the world. For Europe, 1492 marks the transition from a world dominated by feudal hierarchies to a world puzzled by fragmentation. If 1492 were taken as the point of origin for a theory of international politics, Kenneth Waltz would find himself at the front of an unemployment line of dismissed, ridiculed, and soon to be forgotten IR professors. The idea that structure and States are adequate to explain international politics would no longer make any sense. The crucial variable for understanding international politics would not be the State system, but rather the rise of the modern West, including the dynamics of modernity, capitalism, as well as the modern State that accompanied them. Indeed, "international politics" would be a rather anachronistic term. Perhaps "global politics" would be a more suitable substitute for conveying the diverse and complex processes that constitute modern politics. The point here is not to argue that starting with 1492 would be a better or worse theory, but rather to suggest that the choice of a symbolic point of origin for a theory establishes the foundations on which all subsequent analyses are based.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ This point may also be applied to those scholars who maintain that the Peace of Augsburg (1555) had already anticipated the main principles of the Peace of Westphalia by almost one hundred years. For the purposes of my argument here, the validity of this claim is not so important as it is indicative of the importance conferred upon points of origin. For a more detailed discussion on the politics of origins in international relations literature, see Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p.p. 26-31.

It should also be stressed that not all accounts of the rise of the modern State and the multistate system are as decidedly ahistorical and simplistic as those found in international relations literature. The historical sociology found in the work of Michael Mann, for instance, provides a much more detailed and textured account of the growth and consolidation of the modern State, one which does not invoke a sharp and clear break between Christendom and sovereign States. Nonetheless, the difficulty with such an approach is that all too often it leaves such basic concepts as State sovereignty uncontested. Sovereignty, after all, is one of, if not *the*, central concepts which upholds the integrity of the modern State and modern statist politics. In this sense sovereignty can be viewed as a foundational concept for the State and as such it is taken as self-evident and unproblematic. State sovereignty, therefore, is a concept which is crucial for coming to terms with as well as rethinking the nature and limits of the modern State. Like any other concept, moreover, it has its own history and its own conditions of possibility. Crucial in this history is the work of one of the first and ultimately most influential theorists of sovereignty, Thomas Hobbes. As sovereignty is a concept which assumes an understanding of space and time which is essentially Galilean, the work of Galileo is of importance as well. Confronting the spatiotemporal conditions of possibility for the concept of State sovereignty is of crucial importance as it is the first and necessary step for thinking otherwise about the State and about politics.

Galileo and Hobbes: State Sovereignty and Spatiality

To begin a discussion of modern understandings of space and time with the work of Galileo and Hobbes might initially be considered a rather unusual choice. Standard accounts of the history of philosophy view the work of Descartes as articulating modern understandings of space and time in their most influential and philosophically rigorous forms. As Henri Lefebvre states in the opening passage of his influential work, *The Production of Space*:

The thinking of Descartes was viewed as the decisive point in the working-out of the concept of space, and the key to its mature form. According to most historians of Western thought, Descartes had brought to an end the Aristotelian tradition....With the advent of Cartesian logic...space had entered the realm of the absolute. As

Object opposed to Subject, as *res extensa* opposed to, and present to, *res cogitans*, space came to dominate, by containing them, all senses and all bodies.⁵⁵

While Descartes' considerable philosophical importance cannot be denied, his work is less interesting from a political point of view. The importance of Galileo and Hobbes, by contrast, resides in the fact that the understandings of space and time which they developed have largely informed contemporary understandings of political community and subjectivity. To the extent that the hegemonic forms of political community and subjectivity are respectively identified with the State and citizenship, their work and ideas continue to be of profound political importance. Indeed, the principle of State sovereignty and Galilean understandings of space have come to inform or at least become tacitly accepted by all subsequent substantive theories of the State.

It was the constitution of an infinite space during the Scientific Revolution of seventeenth-century Europe which stimulated the concern regarding the politics of space and of time. As Ernst Cassirer writes: "One of the most important tasks of Renaissance philosophy and mathematics was the creation, step by step, of the conditions for a new concept of space."⁵⁶ It is for this reason that the work of Galileo is of such great philosophical and political concern. As Michel Foucault argues:

The real scandal of Galileo's work lay not so much in his discovery, or rediscovery, that the earth revolved around the sun, but in his constitution of an infinite, or infinitely open, space. In such a space

⁵⁵ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 1.

⁵⁶ Ernst Cassirer, *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, Translated by Mario Domandi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 182. Cassirer's phrasing is significant. A new conception of space was not simply "discovered." Galileo, for instance, did not merely point his telescope into the sky and declare the "closed world" was now an "infinite universe" (Koyre). Such an act of discovery implies that the nature of the thing discovered was already known to the finder. In this sense, infinite space was not *discovered*, but as Cassirer suggests, it was the result of an act of, or rather, a continuing process of *creation*, a slow, meticulous, "step by step" historical process of invention. The conditions of possibility for infinite space had to have been established before any act of discovery could take place. Thus, it is more accurate to talk of the *infiniteization* of space than any absolute shift from the finite to infinite.

the place of the Middle Ages turned out to be dissolved, as it were.⁵⁷

Whereas the medieval scholastics emphasized the importance of quality, potential, and the Great Chain of Being, Galileo articulated an alternative which emphasized quantity, form, and direct physical relationships. The universe was not to be read in relation to Aristotle, but rather in the "language of mathematics," with its geometrical characters of triangles and circles. Unfamiliarity with this language, Galileo declares, would leave one to "wander about in a dark labyrinth" of ignorance and delusion.⁵⁸ The significance of this is perhaps put best by E.A. Burt when he notes that Galileo was one of the first who distinguished himself from the medieval scholastics who asked *why* heavy bodies fall and, instead, raised the question of *how* they fall.⁵⁹ Medieval concerns about ontology are replaced with a new modern obsession with epistemology, with *how* we know. For Galileo, falling objects are inanimate, in possession of neither goals nor purposes, and so could not have any "natural place" in the universe. Falling bodies only have behaviour, observable and measurable, and which is atomistic, mechanistic, and quantitative. To understand the "how" of falling bodies and other phenomena Galileo employs the "resolutive-compositive" method which breaks down a complex problem to its simplest component parts. Once the behaviour of these simple components is determined, they can be logically reassembled to explain the behaviour of the complex composite whole.

Hobbes applies this understanding of the world to his political philosophy; *Leviathan* is written with the belief that things that happen in the world can be explained by mathematical laws of dynamics. Consequently, Hobbes continually searches for mechanical causes, which, once found, allow him to analyze their component parts and work out their logical sequences. For instance, Hobbes begins *Leviathan* by taking human consciousness apart: "Concerning the

⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," Translated by Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics* (Spring 1986), p. 23.

⁵⁸ Galileo Galilei, "The Assayer," in *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, Translated by Stillman Drake (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), p. 238.

⁵⁹ E.A. Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, 2nd ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1932), p. 73.

Thoughts of man, I will consider them first *Singly*, and afterwards in *Trayne*."⁶⁰ He sets out to explain how human beings operate by going through the mechanisms of sense, imagination, train of imagination, speech, reason, and passions. What Hobbes does here is reduce all mental states to physical states; things that are non-material (e.g. dreams) are direct consequences of physical reality.⁶¹

The logic of Hobbes' argument relies on an important passage in Galileo's essay "The Assayer" which distinguishes between two kinds of qualities attributed to bodies. John Locke later characterized this as a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities. Galileo expresses the impossibility of conceiving of any material body without its geometrical, mathematical, and mechanical properties:

Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many.⁶²

For the mathematically-minded Galileo, the universe was geometrical and so the only ultimate and objective knowledge is that which expresses itself mathematically. All other qualities are secondary, mere *effects* of primary qualities. The universe, consequently, becomes ordered into two realms: the absolute, objective, and mathematical primary realm where true knowledge is possible, and the relative, subjective, and sensible secondary realm where there is only opinion and illusion. As Burt comments: "The secondary qualities are declared to be effects on the senses of the primary qualities which are alone real in nature. As far as the object itself is concerned they are nothing but mere names."⁶³ The dualistic logic of the split between primary and secondary

⁶⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Edited by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 85.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁶² Galileo, "The Assayer," p. 274.

⁶³ Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, p. 84.

qualities is, of course, not unique to Galileo. Indeed, such a logic had informed Western philosophical thought for over a thousand years. But whereas human beings had traditionally been placed within the primary realm, occupying a privileged status within the world, what was new with Galileo, and thus constituted an important and influential difference, was that human beings were expelled from the primary realm altogether. With human beings no longer an organic part of the world, distinctions between subject and object became solidified and human beings could begin a process of *discovering* the world. In the case of Hobbes, for instance, by splitting the world into two, he can distinguish between the world and the human body. The objective world gives off physical pressures causing objects to have an impression on human senses: "The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object."⁶⁴ Thus, Hobbes articulates the spatial distinction between the knower and the known that comes to dominate epistemic practices in modern thought.⁶⁵

Galileo's and Hobbes' break from Aristotle and their belief that the language of reason (mathematics, geometry, logic) gives them special access to an observable and real world leads to a view of space and time that has many important philosophical and political implications. Whereas the medieval scholastics believed a state of *rest* to be natural, as things strove to realize their own inner quality, Galileo's law of inertia held that all things were in *motion* until something else stopped them. Galileo's material world was one in which atoms were always colliding, causing physical and mechanical reactions with other

⁶⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 85.

⁶⁵ Two additional points should be stressed here. The first is one of qualification. I do not mean to imply that Hobbes was the first to initiate the epistemic split. Ernst Cassirer, for one, has traced this split to Descartes and to Augustine. Hobbes is important, however, because, as we shall see, he gives this split powerful political currency. The second point is that the epistemological move made by Galileo, Hobbes, and their contemporaries was not only rational and scientific, but also aesthetic. At the time, music was still considered to be a special branch of mathematics. Galileo himself was an accomplished musician and his father, Vincenzo Galilei, was a music theoretician interested in the problem of ratios and tones. This aesthetic consciousness meant that the beauty and elegance as well as the qualities of harmony, symmetry, and proportion of mathematical proofs was of great importance for their acceptance as being true. On this theme, Fernand Hallyn has recently argued that the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus and Kepler needs to be understood not only in terms of a history of science, but also in relation to the wider epistemological, theological, and aesthetic imperatives of the sixteenth century. See Fernand Hallyn, *The Poetic Structure of the World: Copernicus and Kepler*, Translated by Donald M. Leslie (New York: Zone Books, 1990).

atoms. Under these conditions causality could only be understood as residing in the motions (i.e. mathematical changes) of the atoms themselves. Similarly, Hobbes argues that the actions of human beings are caused by various appetites and aversions (e.g. hunger, thirst, hope, despair, etc.) that are continually present in human beings.⁶⁶ Human beings, in short, are desiring-machines. The idea that something *causes* something else constituted a rejection of Aristotelian teleology and was, therefore, one of the major intellectual moves of the early modern period. In addition, as Burttt has noted, since the real world for Galileo was one of bodies in mathematically measurable motions, this meant that the real world was a world of bodies moving in space and time.⁶⁷ Space and time, categories of very little importance in the Aristotelian world of quality and potentiality, suddenly became a fundamental scientific and philosophical concern.

The metaphysical assumptions of the subject/object dichotomy, articulated in Galileo's distinctions between primary and secondary qualities, are reproduced at the level of space and time: space is privileged; time is only understood in relation to space. The emphasis on geometry—the science of space—results in a corresponding emphasis on spatiality. Hobbes' geometric reality necessitates the denial of time ("the *Present* onely has a being in Nature"⁶⁸), or rather, has the effect of spatializing time. This process can be seen when Hobbes refers to "time" as a measure of distance, something which can be divided up into equal spatial parts: "distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us."⁶⁹ When time is thought of as a mathematically measurable continuum, the present alone exists, but this is a present which has no temporal quantity, but is only a dividing line between past and future. Time becomes the fourth dimension which is essentially spatial and can be represented as a straight line. Thus, for Hobbes, a psychological function such as memory is defined as "decaying sense." The memory of a past event is difficult to recollect in the same way the streets of a far off city are difficult to see:

⁶⁶ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.p. 118-130.

⁶⁷ Burttt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, p. 93.

⁶⁸ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 97.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

"after a great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets."⁷⁰ One important philosophical and political result of space becoming the condition of possibility of time is that the modern subject becomes frozen into a mathematical frame.

With a mechanistic view of the world, the prediction of future events once the motions of the present are sufficiently controlled became possible.⁷¹ The political consequences of this were numerous. The belief that the language of mathematics held the key to rationally and aesthetically explain the motion of bodies is taken up by Hobbes to order the actions of human beings. For Hobbes, humans are driven by their irrational passions into rationally uniting into a commonwealth. They thus create a situation in which the modern State replaces the role God played in the medieval world for ordering human lives: "This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather...of that *Mortall God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortal God*, our peace and defence."⁷² Hobbes associates the instability and danger of the state of nature with the temporal realm. As all Commonwealths are ultimately artificial and provisional arrangements, time is understood as something which works to sweep away order and return people to the type of "Warre" which exists in the state of nature.⁷³ Time, untamed by the State, is something to be feared; time is synonymous with disorder, anarchy, and danger. Consequently, one of the primary duties of the Sovereign is to abolish the fears and anxieties that result from the vicissitudes and insecurities of temporal existence. Through an act of will and a corresponding rational ordering of society, time can be tamed in order to provide some sense of history. But this life in time, it should be stressed, can only occur within the spatial enclosure provided by the State. Time only has meaning, indeed, it can only exist, within the State.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89. Compare Hobbes' spatial understanding of memory with Henri Bergson's temporal or durational conception of memory as developed in chapter two.

⁷¹ Burt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, p.p. 95-96.

⁷² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 227.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

What results from this privileging of a secure spatial realm over an insecure temporal realm is a political ontology of fear. Fear is something which arises in individuals *outside* the safety of a spatially-enclosed community. Fear is symptomatic of a condition of pure temporality. Indeed, the etymological roots of the word *fear* is closely tied to the relation between spatial and temporal realms:

Fear is a word rooted in the experience of being in transit. It shares a common root with the word *fare*, and in Teutonic languages it shares a root with danger, the word *fahren* expressing their common meaning as early as the ninth century. The word *far*, distant, is also associated with these words. *Fare* originally meant travel, and then came to mean the *price* of travel. The price of travel is removing oneself from protection...and can be thought of as fear, fear of calamity, of sudden disaster.⁷⁵

Fear is thus the experience of moving from one spatially-enclosed or protected area to another. That which is not spatial (i.e. temporal) must be feared. Similarly, for Hobbes, fear of the temporal realm creates a condition in which humans are both ordered by the sovereign *and* by themselves in order to maintain the security provided by the spatial realm: "The fear of death pulls the self together. It induces subjects to accept civil society and it becomes an instrumentality of sovereign control in a civil society already installed."⁷⁶

The privileging of the spatial realm has another important consequence for political community. By defining community in terms of space, Hobbes can simply assume that obligation, authority, freedom, and necessity all occur inside the borders of the State; anything outside these borders is of no real philosophical concern. This understanding of space allows Hobbes to solve one of the perennial problems of political organization—that of the relationship between the particular and the universal. For medieval theologians, this problem took the form of the relationship between the finite and infinite, between humans on earth and God in heaven. Hobbes, among others, solves, or rather, accepts the modern solution to the infinite/finite problem by positing a theory of State

⁷⁵ Thomas L. Dumm, *Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 148. Emphasis in original.

⁷⁶ Connolly, *Political Theory & Modernity*, p. 29.

sovereignty which allows for one international system with many particular States. Within States, individuals can strive toward universal standards of Justice, Truth, and Beauty; outside States, however, there can only be relations. Within States there is History; outside States there is only contingency.⁷⁷ The finite/infinite debate continues inside the State as well, between the needs of the many (i.e. individuals) and that of the one (i.e. the State). Pushed to its limit, this debate is usually resolved in favour of the needs of the State, a conclusion which is particularly clear when one considers the importance placed on matters of "national security." The concept of sovereignty then is a powerful means whereby the State can delineate and appear to account for both identity and differences. As Timothy Luke comments:

Sovereignty follows from an almost mythic power of geographic authority, writing and drawing lines of identity and antagonism on earth. States, in turn, are those legitimate monopolies charged with enscribing, discursively and coercively, writs of difference—in money, religion, markets, ideology, and militaries—from what transpires within and without the geopolitical spaces framed by international borders by endogenizing various disciplines of monopolistic order inside, and exogenizing diverse practices of free-for-all anarchistic conflict outside, of those borders defining each nation-state's in-stated place on the planet's terrain.⁷⁸

In the end, what is at stake with Hobbes as well as the scientific and rational ideas resulting from what Max Jammer has called the "emancipation from Aristotelianism," is the legitimacy of modern State sovereignty, and the philosophy of space and time it presupposes. The State provides the only place in which one can have political identity because the State comes to dominate all conceptions of what political community can be and mean. The principle of State sovereignty formalizes the historical practices of States which have worked to marginalize and deny legitimacy to any other form of community—be it in a cosmopolitan or local form—as the site of serious political life.⁷⁹ Rather, it

⁷⁷ R.B.J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," *Alternatives* 15:1, p. 11.

⁷⁸ Luke, "Discourses of Disintegration," p. 235.

⁷⁹ For a discussion of this process, especially in terms of the local as a site of political community, see Warren Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community" in R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *Contending Sovereignties* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p.p. 45-60.

promotes a belief that to be involved in politics is to be involved with the State. To be effective in the political realm means to pay attention to, or better yet, seize the centre of power—the State.

Most centres, however, spend much of their energies claiming they are the one and only centre precisely because they are not, or because they are only so provisionally. The same can be said of the principle of State sovereignty which claims that the centre of power lies with the State. Despite Hobbes' claim that his "Doctrine admitteth no other Demonstration," the doctrine of State sovereignty he advocates, and the conceptions of space and time it assumes, have proven to be extremely problematic. While the modernist framing of spatiotemporal options continues to be taken for granted, there are increasingly more and more signs that this framing is inadequate. Global flows of capital, peoples, and cultural commodities have largely ignored State boundaries and the principle of sovereignty Hobbes believed to be so necessary. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, power centres "are defined much more by what escapes them or by their impotence than by their zone of power."⁸⁰ In the case of refugees, it is no small irony that those people who must face the hardship of transversing the outermost physical limits of the modern State are also those who reveal the limits of the modern State and, as I shall argue below, allow for its theoretical reconceptualization.

The State as Practice

If on the level of both theory and practice the foundations of the modern State are subject to a fundamental challenge, how does one speak of this most fundamental category of politics—the State? In terms of State theory, "Where do we go from here?" is the natural question to ask at this point. It is a question, however, which is deeply implicated in the problem. The assumption that one can simply move from a problematic "here" to an unproblematic "there" itself relies upon a spatial form of thought derived from the problematic "here" (i.e. Galileo, Hobbes, *et al.*). Thus, "Where do we go...?" is a spatial option informed

⁸⁰ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 217.

by the very metaphysics it is attempting to escape. This problem of deriving alternatives, it should be added, exists regardless of whether or not the spatial forms of thought and political association developed by Galileo and others are "factually correct." Indeed, it is not difficult to show how Galileo, for one, is mistaken in many of his theories and propositions. For instance, Einstein's theory of relativity and Heisenburg's indeterminacy principle undercut Galileo's theories on space and time and on causality. What is at stake, however, is not the validity of the logical form of any theory, nor its truth value. The truth or falsity of any particular theorist is not of concern here, but rather the conditions that allow distinctions between truth and falsity to occur. The problem lies not in the extent to which thought is too conformist, but rather in the *form* of thought itself. The form of thought left by the legacy of Galileo is spatially organized, based on a linear line between subject and object, knower and known. This legacy is perhaps best demonstrated by Gaston Bachelard's famous question: "If a metaphysician could not draw, what would he think?"⁸¹

The problem of formulating alternatives, it should be noted, extends beyond competing truth claims and into the realm of competing forms of identity. For instance, it would not be difficult to demonstrate how a text such as *Leviathan*, far from being universally applicable, merely articulates and legitimates the interests of a certain hegemonic group, whether it be the bourgeois class, white heterosexual male privilege, or the West. The dualistic, or more accurately, *phallogocentric* nature of Western thought has been pointed out by many commentators, and the hierarchical binary oppositions of master/slave, man/woman, same/other should be familiar enough. To be sure, criticisms invoking the problems associated with these dualisms, whether they be found in Marxist, feminist, post-colonial, or other forms are necessary as they articulate how, specifically, the texts of the "tradition" (e.g. political theory) exclude the concerns, needs, and experiences of these groups from their theories. However, to merely flip the hierarchy, to, for example, posit non-Western conceptions of time and space and the resulting forms of identity and political association over traditional Western forms, may have some localized political currency, but by no

⁸¹ Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, Translated by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 1994), p. 212.

means constitutes a radical alternative.⁸² On the contrary, it is an "alternative" which relies upon a spatial cross-over, or a reversal of one side of the binary in favour of the other. As such, the dualistic logic, one corresponding to Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, remains intact. A serious tautological dilemma arises when one confronts the fact that such "alternatives" have been anticipated by a mode of thought which has formed the very manner in which "alternatives" can be thought of.

A similar problem of alternatives exists with regards to the modern State and State sovereignty. The idea that the State can somehow be ignored or transcended is part of the problem. As I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, this problem exists at both the level of thought (how we conceptualize the State) and of practice (how these concepts congeal into institutional practices). Any "solution" to this problem must confront the conditions that make the "problem" possible in the first place. I have argued that the concepts of space and time which inform theories of the State have been of crucial importance for both how the State is understood and for how alternatives to it can be formulated. The challenge now becomes to formulate spatiotemporal concepts which do not replicate the exclusions of the Same and the Other, or to give a more concrete example, of citizens and refugees. This is, of course, no small task. Given the poststructural critique of foundational forms of thinking and practice how should one understand the nature and role of the State? What, in other words, would it mean to have a theory of the State today? What would such a theory have to enable one to say about modern politics? Answering these questions requires a two-fold approach.

⁸² Articulating such alternatives becomes particularly problematic and difficult when one accounts for what Ashis Nandy has referred to as the "imperialism of categories." A conceptual governance through the hegemonization of the conceptual domains of the West often persists long after the formal withdrawal of overt colonial political governance. In the case of the politics of religion in modern India, Nandy insists that distinctions between secular and religious spheres enact a form of conceptual colonialism to the extent that they impose spatial dualistic distinctions on a Hindu culture of temporal immanence which previously recognized no such distinctions. Realizing the religious tolerance India has traditionally maintained in pre-colonial times becomes an increasingly difficult endeavor. Ashis Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," in Walker and Mendlovitz, *Contending Sovereignties*, p.p. 125-144; Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Syed Farid Alatas, "On the Indigenization of Academic Discourse," *Alternatives* 18 (1993), p.p. 307-338.

The first part of this approach consists of an initial but crucial refusal—that is of trying to "solve" the question of sovereign Statehood. A theory of the State which draws upon poststructuralist insights must refuse to buy into the foundational logic that it is so critical of. The attempt to fix *the* meaning and reach a definitive description of the State is to enact closure on a concept which is continually changing. Canvassing the literature or providing a genealogy of the State and choosing the best or most useful definition will, consequently, not be an approach pursued in this analysis. Indeed, as Cynthia Weber has argued, it has been precisely because theorists as well as those engaged in politics have referred to States and State sovereignty as if they possessed clear and firm foundations that these alleged foundations have taken on a reality of their own.⁸³ Nietzsche presented this insight in *The Gay Science* when he insisted on the importance of realizing that

what things *are called* is incomparably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for—originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their nature and even to their skin—all this grows from generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns into its very body.⁸⁴

Consequently, as describing a definitive theory of the State will give that theory a certain reality of its own, the sovereignty of States must instead be posed as a question. Weber, for instance, provides an historical analysis of the changing nature and understanding of intervention in order to analyze the meaning of State sovereignty not for its "truth" value, but for how it affects and forms historically specific understandings of the State.⁸⁵

⁸³ Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 27. Weber draws upon the work of Jean Baudrillard to develop a theory of the "alibi function" of intervention discourse. According to Baudrillard, one way to say something exists is to insist that its opposite exists. Thus, to speak about intervention is to necessarily imply the existence of sovereign states. A similar argument could be made with respects to the "problem" of refugee movements.

⁸⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p.p. 121-122, aphorism 58. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁵ Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty*, p. 9.

The second component to approaching the question of what a contemporary theory of the State would look like follows from the first. If the meaning of the State and State sovereignty varies according to one's particular time and place, then States are best understood not as reified unchanging *things*, but as a set of *practices* which differ according to the nature of the specific historical contingencies. Thus, those criticisms which charge that theorizing the State is merely an academic and abstract matter fail to recognize that theories of the State are, in fact, very slow practices—practices which have congealed so much that their material roots have vanished from sight and so appear abstract. Weber stresses this point when she writes: "It is not possible to talk about the State as an ontological being—as a political identity—without engaging in the political practice of constituting the State."⁸⁶

Understanding the State as a practice to be performed is stated in a slightly more enigmatic fashion by Warren Magnusson when he characterizes "statism" as a social movement. The modern State, he argues, did not emerge out of nowhere to suddenly take on ontological status. On the contrary, the modern State is an historical construct, created and sustained through continuous political activity. It is only because this activity has been so powerfully successful that the State has become normalized as the only authentic community that can serve as a site for political activity. It is not that there are no other ways of being or acting politically, but rather that the success of statism as a social movement has made these alternatives either unacceptable or unthinkable. As Magnusson states: "Such effacement of the past is not a sign of *lack* of movement, but rather of the overwhelming success of the statist movement. Like capitalism, the State just seems like a part of normal life, and people enact its routines—and hence re-create the State—day by day."⁸⁷

The poststructural approach to developing a contemporary theory of the State is, therefore, one which refuses to take a transcendental perspective or ground its claims in any firm foundation. Further, it is a perspective which refuses to adhere to a general interpretation or to espouse a set of rigid

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸⁷ Warren Magnusson, "Social Movements and the Global City," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23:3 (1994), p. 639

principles which claim to transcend the limits of other perspectives or theories of the State. Rather, as Richard Ashley has argued, the poststructuralist perspective has the advantage of expanding the scope and agenda of social and political theory by "posing questions that other discourses must refuse to ask if they are to affirm their foundations and sustain *the limits that define them*."⁸⁸ It is to these "limits" which define the foundational principles of traditional theories of the State which poststructural social and political theory is drawn to. The task of formulating what a contemporary theory of the State should look like requires one to pay particular attention to the limits of the modern State. Indeed, as Jean-Luc Nancy has argued, communication, including the communication and development of alternative perspectives of the State, requires the exposure of limits: "But writing is the act that obeys the sole necessity of exposing the limit: not the limit of communication, *but the limit on which communication takes place*."⁸⁹

Given the problems associated with formulating alternatives to the State which rely on a spatial organization of knowledge, focusing and reflecting upon limits provides a useful means of critique. A contemporary theory of the State in this view would not be one which merely sought to impose itself *within* conventional theories of the State. This is to say, it does not seek to build upon and refine already existing theories of the State—a conservative move at best—with the aim of adding to the accumulation of a sacred body of knowledge. Nor do criticisms which focus upon limits attempt to project themselves *outside* established theories and try to start on new ground, only to theorize according to an identical foundational logic as previous theories.⁹⁰ The manner of critique emphasized here is instead inclined toward that which Foucault proposes in his essay on Kant and the Enlightenment: "it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the

⁸⁸ Ashley, "Living on Border Lines," p. 259. Emphasis added.

⁸⁹ Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, Translated by Peter Connor, *et al.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 67. Emphasis in original. For an excellent exegesis of Nancy's concept of the "limit" see Peggy Kamuf, "On the Limit," in *The Miami Theory Collective*, ed., *Community at Loose Ends* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p.p. 13-18.

⁹⁰ Ashley, "Living on Border Lines," p.p. 271-272.

same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibilities of going beyond them."⁹¹

To theorize "on the limit" is not to occupy a position within a hierarchy that reproduces and reaffirms a static and unchanging relationship to an alleged "centre." Rather, focusing on the limit has the benefit of taking the core values and assumptions of a "centre" and making them unnatural and unusual. What was once familiar suddenly becomes strange. By investigating the theoretical and practical limits of traditional understandings of the modern State, the conditions of possibility of the State as well as their historically constituted nature become exposed. Situating oneself at the margin shows not the core or timelessness of the State, but its historicity, its constructed nature. What is more, the relationship between the margin and the centre is revealed to be not a static and hierarchical relationship, but a creative, productive one. Theorizing on the limit of the modern State reveals the manner in which as well as the conditions that allow the State to produce and continually reproduce itself.

In this chapter I have tried to show how one limit of the modern State—that of global refugee flows—has demonstrated that modern Galilean conceptions of space are no longer tenable as a basis for either political thought or political forms of practice and association. In the following two chapters I will assess Gilles Deleuze's writings of the nature of thought and of the State. Deleuze, I shall argue, approaches these two topics temporally rather than spatially, according to a logic of productive affirmation rather than one of representation. Whether or not this is sufficient to constitute a contemporary theory of the State will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

⁹¹ Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 50.

Nomadic Thought

The less people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with what the State wants.

— Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari¹

State Philosophy

The relationship between philosophy and politics, between a certain image of thought and a certain mode of political practice and organization has always been an intimate and mutually reinforcing one. It was Plato, after all, who argued that the proper ordering of the *polis* was analogous to the proper ordering of the human soul. Indeed, in the Western tradition of political thought this symbiosis has been of particular significance in the relationship between thought and the State: "For philosophy was born in and through the Greek *polis*, and politics always seeks its grounding and articulation through thought. It follows that modern reason and the most significant and powerful of modern political subjects, the state, are critically interdependent also."² The nature of this critical interdependence is thus of profound importance for the project of re-conceptualizing the nature and function of the State. Providing a new perspective on the nature of thought as it relates to the nature of the modern State is especially important in order to account for activities and processes (e.g. global refugee flows) occurring on the limit of the modern State.

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 376.

² David Campbell and Michael Dillon, "The end of philosophy and the end of international relations," in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 3.

In the work of Gilles Deleuze, the relationship between philosophy and politics, between thought and the State, is readily apparent as an immanent, mutually reinforcing one. Deleuze stresses this point in a conversation with Claire Parnet:

For thought borrows its properly philosophical image from the State as beautiful, substantial or subjective interiority. It invents a properly spiritual State, as an absolute State, which is by no means a dream, since it operates effectively in the mind. . . .Philosophy is shot through with the project of becoming the official language of a Pure State.³

Philosophic discourse, Deleuze argues, has historically been complicit with the State; its practitioners, moreover, have assumed the role of "bureaucrats of pure reason."⁴ It is in this sense that Brian Massumi, to my mind one of the most erudite and sophisticated interpreters (and practitioners) of Deleuze's philosophy, gives the name "State philosophy" to the representational thinking that has dominated Western metaphysics since Plato.⁵ The State exists and operates *in here* as much as it does *out there*. For Deleuze, as we shall see in greater detail in the following chapter, the State may be understood as a force territorialization. As such, the State is defined by its apparatuses of capture—that is, by the processes by which it territorializes land, people, money, labour, and so on. Similarly, the image of thought that has dominated the history of philosophy in the West is one which operates according to a principle of *theoretical capture* which "defines the limits of the rationally acceptable and precludes the possibility of different objects, let alone different styles of thought."⁶

³ Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 13.

⁴ Gilles Deleuze, "Nomad Thought," in David B. Allison, ed., *The New Nietzsche* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 149.

⁵ Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), p.p. 4-5.

⁶ Paul Patton, "Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization," in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), p. 128.

How the micro-State of the mind operates is thus of crucial importance when addressing the macro-State of national and international politics. To provide a thorough and comprehensive account of Deleuze's understanding of the nature of thought, however, is far beyond the scope and limited confines of this chapter. Such a task would be enormous even if I were to choose to limit my analysis to a relatively small number of texts. What justice could I do to an author who in just one of his books (*A Thousand Plateaus*) attempts to create an entirely "new classification system"?⁷ Tracing the lineage of the multiplicity of new concepts created in just this one book—lines of flight, planes of consistency, flat multiplicities, fuzzy aggregates, continuums of intensity, pragmatics, de- and re-territorializations, to name but a few—would be far too great a task. It is also, however, unnecessary for my purposes. Deleuze, like Michel Foucault, considers a theory to be like a "tool box;" the concepts provided by a theory must be as useful and functional as any other tool.⁸ Consequently, for my project of assessing whether or not Deleuze possesses a theory of the State, I will focus on that concept which is most useful for understanding Deleuze's writings on the State. This concept is one which Deleuze refers to as the "assemblage."

An assemblage, simply put, is a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects whose only unity is that they function or work together.⁹ More will be said about the particular character of assemblages in the following chapter. In this chapter I want to stress the connections between thought and the State by tracing the necessary conditions of possibility of the concept of the assemblage in Deleuze's work. In doing so I will first discuss the important distinction between "noology" and "ideology" with respects to Deleuze's work. This will clarify, in general terms, Deleuze's perspective on systems of thought as well as offer some advice on the manner in which Deleuze's texts should be "read." Next, I will focus on the image of thought that makes a concept such as an assemblage possible, and thus the theory of the State that utilizes it. This image of thought is one which I argue is composed of a number of mutually reinforcing elements. An

⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 347.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice*, Donald F. Bouchard, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 208.

⁹ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p.p. 69-76.

assemblage is a concept which is defined by its functional capacity and so requires a form of thought which is productive and creative, not reflective and descriptive. It also requires a form of thought which is characteristically affirmative, not one which operates according to a principle of negation. In order for Deleuze's concept of the assemblage to be productive and affirmative, I believe that what is required is a form of thought which is temporally organized. An assemblage is, therefore, a concept which relies on a temporal or "nomadic" image of thought, not the spatial image which has dominated Western metaphysics.

While the concept of the "assemblage" is primarily developed in Deleuze's "mature" works such as *A Thousand Plateaus*, the temporal image of thought which provides the necessary conditions of possibility for the articulation of the concept is already largely developed in his early philosophical studies of Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche. For Deleuze, both Bergson and Nietzsche form part of the "counter history" of philosophy. They, along with Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, and Leibniz, are enigmatic figures "who seemed to be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it in one respect, or altogether."¹⁰ In *Bergsonism* (1966), Deleuze reads Bergson as a philosopher who thinks in terms of time rather than space, as someone who is concerned with the dynamism of becoming rather than the stasis of being. My treatment of Deleuze's treatise on Bergson will focus on the sections dealing with intuition and memory in order to highlight this aspect. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), Deleuze reads Nietzsche as a critic of dialectical thought and as a theorist of difference and of becoming. I will focus on Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return in order to highlight the ethical and ontological consequences that result from engaging in a temporal mode of thought.

Nology

The nature of thought is a persistent and continuous theme that runs throughout Deleuze's many works and collaborations, be they literary analyses, cinematic studies, philosophical commentaries, or political tracts. The study of

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.p. 14-15.

images of thought which identify the specific historicity of these images, Deleuze calls "noology." The questions enabled by noology are separate and distinct from those traditionally associated with the problem of ideology. Ideology is concerned with specific thought *contents* and with the means by which these thoughts come to be naturalized, universalized, and legitimated. These thought contents, moreover, are usually assessed in relation to how adequately they conform to standards of truth and falsity or how sufficiently they represent some external reality: "His thought is redneck, yours is doctrinal, and mine is deliciously supple."¹¹ For Deleuze, by contrast, the specific contents of thought are of relatively little importance: "Thought contents are sometimes criticized for being too conformist. But the primary question is that of form itself."¹² It is the *form* an image of thought takes, not its particular contents, that is of crucial importance for Deleuze. The noological model, Deleuze and Guattari write in *A Thousand Plateaus*, is concerned with

the form, manner or mode, and function of thought, according to the mental space it draws and from the point of view of a general theory of thought, a thinking of thought.¹³

Consequently, when Deleuze writes about the State, he does not concern himself so much with specific ideological theories of the State (e.g. the liberal or class theory of the State) as with the particular *form* the State has consistently maintained throughout various historical epochs and eras.

An example of this emphasis on the importance of questioning the usual distinctions made between form and content can be seen in the very style and structure of Deleuze's books. Deleuze strives to disrupt the distinction between form and content in his writing. He maintains that the two are closely and indeed inextricably intertwined: "there is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made."¹⁴ With regards to Deleuze's work, Michel Foucault has

¹¹ Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 4.

¹² Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 374.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.p. 499-500.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

stressed the performative or theatrical quality of Deleuze's texts.¹⁵ Such a quality can be seen, for instance, in Deleuze's 1968 book, *Difference and Repetition*. The third and middle chapter of this book, "The Image of Thought," is concerned with the problem of beginning in philosophy. "Where to begin in philosophy," Deleuze writes, "has always—rightly—been regarded as a very delicate problem for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions."¹⁶ The placement of a chapter concerning the problem of beginning in the middle of a work may initially seem to be a rather odd choice, but for Deleuze this organization of the text takes on a very important performative quality: the problem of beginning has a temporal aspect in that it must somehow release itself both from the past (i.e. the history of philosophy as articulated in the first two chapters) and the future (i.e. Deleuze's own theory of ontology as developed in the final two chapters).¹⁷ Thus, beginning with beginnings in the physical middle of the book highlights and intensifies Deleuze's argument on this point.

For Deleuze, Nietzsche's use of the aphorism serves as an early and powerful example of an attempt to subvert traditional distinctions between form and content. The aphorism is not at all like the maxim. The maxim strives for universality, for applicability in all times and places. It attempts to achieve this, moreover, through its self-contained nature, its very *interiority*. The aphorism, by contrast, is open-ended, always awaiting to be utilized and transformed by some exterior force. The *exteriority* of the aphorism provides it with the ability to "transverse the frame" that nominally contains it. Nietzsche's utilization of aphorisms, Deleuze suggests, indicates the possibility of writing "a new kind of book," as well as the possibility of a new "nomadic" way of thinking.¹⁸

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, p.p. 165-196.

¹⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 129.

¹⁷ For a more elaborate discussion of this point in particular and of the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition* in general, see Timothy S. Murphy, "The Theater of (the Philosophy of) Cruelty in Gilles Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*," *Pli: The University of Warwick Journal of Philosophy* (1992), p.p. 105-135.

¹⁸ Deleuze, "Nomad Thought," p. 144.

This performative, creative quality can further be seen to be at work in the very form Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* is written. The book is composed not of chapters, but of "plateaus" (a term culled from an essay by Gregory Bateson on Balinese culture). The differences between these two modes of organization is significant and not one of mere semantics. A book arranged into (successive, linear) chapters is logically organized to reach the final and definitive point of a book. The book becomes a box of sorts, inviting the reader to discover its inner contents. Reading here becomes a matter of looking for the signified. The book's contents become open to all forms of judgment through various commentaries and interpretations. Plateaus, by contrast, may be read, in whole or in part, in any order: "A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end....We call a 'plateau' any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome."¹⁹ Reading here has no concern with the signified or even the signifier. Its only concern is with its functional capacity:

"Does it work and how does it work? How does it work for you?" If it doesn't function, if nothing happens, take another book. This other way of reading is based on intensities: something happens or doesn't happen. There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret.²⁰

This manner of reading does not pull the reader into the depths of the book, but instead functions by relating the book to the "outside." This also explains why it is so difficult to determine what *A Thousand Plateaus* is "about." Read in conventional terms, the book does not seem to follow any single obvious line of argument. Indeed, the book covers a wide range of topics: music, language, desire, politics, literature, myth, war, psychoanalysis, mathematics, craft-work, metallurgy, bird songs. . .the list could go on and on. Despite this impressive heterogeneous array of topics, *A Thousand Plateaus* is not entirely without any

¹⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.p. 21-22. In the "Conclusion," the authors do provide a possible way of connecting the various terms, concepts, and plateaus. This should not, however, be read as a definitive interpretation, only one among a multitude of possible connections. For Deleuze and Guattari it is the *process* of making connections and making a text work for a particular "reader" which is important, not some definitive end-point.

²⁰ Gilles Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit," Translated by Janis Forman, *Semiotext(e)* 2:3 (1977), p. 114.

structure or unity. As Paul Patton has noted: "The unity of this book lies in the fact that it theorizes a succession of assemblages, while assuming itself the form of a particular kind of assemblage, a rhizome."²¹ As distinctions between form and content break down it becomes clear that the authors intend not to argue a point so much as invent a new perspective, a new style of "rhizomatic" or "nomad" thought.

"Rhizomatic" thought is best understood when contrasted against the "arborescent" image of thought that Deleuze and Guattari argue has achieved hegemonic status in the Western philosophical and political tradition. Arborescent thought corresponds to an image of thought which Deleuze and Guattari associate with the State. It is an image, moreover, which is marked by a form of interiority: "The State gives thought a form of interiority and thought gives that interiority a form of universality."²² This classical image of thought is one which is characterized by its interiority, be it the soul or the self-conscious self-identical subject. This image of thought, moreover, is systematic, logical, and methodological in the sense that it situates itself as a closed system. Thought becomes a spatial activity: "I think therefore I am." Thought can begin and end; it can draw a linear line from one point to another. The political implications of this image of thought become clear once Deleuze and Guattari establish its intimate and historical relationship with the State. As the standard texts of political theory teach us, the goal for realizing the "good life" is to have individuals strive for universal ideals of Truth and Beauty as rational citizens of particular States. Indeed, it is the very particularity of States as self-enclosed entities that provides the necessary conditions for the realization of universal principles.

Arborescent thought, Deleuze and Guattari contend, may be represented by the familiar metaphor of the tree. This form of thought is linear, progressive, and centred according to a principle of unity (trunk); it is systematic, hierarchical, and dualistic (branches); it is rooted in firm, albeit hidden and unseen, foundations (roots). As Best and Kellner put it, this image of thought allows "arborescent culture to build vast conceptual systems that are centred, unified,

²¹ Paul Patton, "Metamorpho-Logic: Bodies and Powers in *A Thousand Plateaus*," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 25:2 (May 1994), p. 157.

²² Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 375.

hierarchical, and grounded in a self-transparent, self-identical, representing subject. The leaves that flower on such trees have names like Form, Essence, Law, Truth, Justice, Right, and Cogito. Plato, Descartes, and Kant are arborescent thinkers who seek to eradicate temporality and multiplicity in universalizing and essentializing schemes."²³

Deleuze and Guattari, however, declare their opposition to this image of thought: "Many people have a tree growing in their heads, but the brain itself is much more a grass than a tree."²⁴ Against the interiority that marks the image of thought of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari present one which is defined by its exteriority. The term "against" may, however, be misleading for Deleuze and Guattari by no means wish to imply that this image of thought is one which stands in stark opposition to the image inspired by the State. The relationship between the two is not one of negation; nor, despite the terminology, is it a dualistic one in the sense that the image of thought-as-exteriority is merely an inversion of its binary pair, thought-as-interiority. Deleuze and Guattari understand the exteriority of thought not as a static entity, but rather as a dynamic force: "It is...a force that destroys both the image *and* its copies, the model *and* its reproductions, every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc.)."²⁵

Deleuze and Guattari present the metaphor of the rhizome to describe the image of thought which is defined by its exteriority. In contrast to the binary and hierarchical logic of organization of the tree metaphor where radicals split in a one-two fashion, the rhizome is marked by its heterogeneity—any point in a rhizome can be simultaneously connected to any other. The unity the metaphor of the tree provides the objects which populate the world or which it divides into subjects is likewise contrasted to the flat, horizontal, and non-hierarchical multiplicities of the rhizome. In contrast to the stasis and structure of the tree metaphor of thought, which is defined by a set of points and positions, the

²³ Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: Guilford, 1991), p. 99.

²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 15.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 377. Emphasis in original.

rhizomatic image of thought is decidedly non-structuralist and dynamic as it is composed of lines, dimensions, and offshoots. In short, rhizomatic thought is not one concerned with the problem of *being*, operating according to a dualistic logic of either/or, but one which is always *becoming*, always both/and another (and another...). Rhizomes, Deleuze and Guattari contend, "know how to move between things, establish a logic of AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings."²⁶

Deleuze's Bergson: Temporal Critique of Western Metaphysics

In the conventional accounts of the history of philosophy, Henri Bergson is portrayed as a rather enigmatic figure, one which is (at best) identified with the philosophical movement of vitalism or (at worse) regarded as a mere "irrationalist." Neither of these categories, however, does justice to Bergson's philosophical project. Bergson is one of those curious figures in the history of philosophy that seem to defy conventional forms of categorization, be they friendly or unfriendly. This was a truism that was realized by many of Bergson's contemporaries. For instance, writing in 1913, G.R. Dodson expressed his exasperation at the difficulty of classifying Bergson, confessing that Bergson was "neither an idealist, realist, pragmatist, nor eclectic."²⁷

Bergson's concept of "intuition" is one which Deleuze maintains is often misunderstood and yet critically important. Indeed, the concept has had a mixed reception and has been subject to a variety of different interpretations. Bertrand Russell, for instance, was largely unsympathetic towards Bergson's concept of intuition: "Intellect is the misfortune of man, while intuition is seen at its best in ants, bees, and Bergson."²⁸ Bergson's intuition, by contrast, is of great importance for Deleuze, who opens his *Bergsonism* by called intuition "one of

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁷ Quoted in Paul Douglas, "Deleuze and the Endurance of Bergson," *Thought* 67: 264 (March 1992), p. 51.

²⁸ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 793.

the most fully developed methods in philosophy."²⁹ For Deleuze, Bergson's concept of intuition, and the accompanying critique of spatialization, is crucial for developing a methodological and interpretative strategy which does not reproduce the spatial character of Western metaphysics. As a method, Deleuze argues, intuition is characterized by three principles: it is a method which *problematizes, differentiates, and temporalizes*. I will consider each of these three aspects in turn.

First, intuition serves as a cutting critique of the spatial nature of Western metaphysical and philosophical thought:

We tend to think in terms of more and less, that is, to see differences in degree where there are differences in kind. We can only react against this intellectual tendency by bringing to life, again *in the intelligence*, another tendency, which is critical. But where, precisely, does this second tendency come from? Only intuition can produce and activate it, because it discovers differences in degree, and conveys to the intelligence the criteria that enable it to distinguish between true and false problems.³⁰

For Bergson, "false problems" such as "disorder" and "non-being" arise out of a confusion of time with space. Consequently, the intellect has a tendency to spatialize and quantify problems (to see difference in degree) when the problems are actually temporal and qualitative (differences in kind).

This first principle of intuition is closely tied to the following two. In contrast to the logic of traditional philosophy, the second principle of intuition emphasizes how intuition *differentiates* in a very different manner. Put simply, intuition places greater emphasis on temporal as opposed to spatial differentiations. Differences in kind (i.e. durational differences) are held as more important than differences in degree (i.e. spatial differences). An example of such a differentiation can be seen in the familiar opposition between the One and the Many. Deleuze focuses on this example to emphasize how Bergson can serve as an alternative to dialectical resolutions of this problem: "We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the

²⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 13.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

multiple (synthesis). Or else we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming."³¹ The difficulty with such a resolution, Deleuze suggests, is that it relies upon concepts (e.g. the One in general, the Multiple in general, etc.) which are too large, too general, and too abstract; when assessed to the specificity of reality, these concepts hang "like baggy clothes."³² For Bergson, the opposition between the One and the Many constitutes a false problem. The real problem consists of differentiating between two types of multiplicities: "discrete multiplicities" (spatial multiplicities of exteriority) and "continuous multiplicities" (durational multiplicities of interiority).³³

The third and final aspect of intuition is that, as a method, it *temporalizes*. The image of time at work here, however, is not the standard spatialized time that has been so dominant since at least the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Time, for Bergson as well as for Deleuze, is not merely a fourth-dimension of space. Rather, both authors see a fundamental difference between space and time, between matter and duration. While space can only realize differences in degree, time can realize differences in kind: "The division occurs between (1) duration, which 'tends' for its part to take on or bear all the differences in kind (because it is endowed with the power of qualitatively varying with itself), and (2) space, which never presents anything but differences of degree (since it is qualitative homogeneity)."³⁴

Intuition, then, allows one to think in terms of time or duration, which, in turn, allows one to identify and differentiate between real and false problems. Bergson's rethinking of the nature of space and time is further developed in his analysis of how duration forms the specific character of memory. For Bergson, memory does not present itself as a series of moments spread across a linear continuum. Such an understanding would constitute a false problem in that it

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44. A Hegelian might well object that Deleuze's characterization of the dialectic is crudely reductionist and does not fully appreciate Hegel's emphasis of the dynamism of being. Deleuze, however, does not claim that the dialectic does not appreciate that being is a dynamic or process, but rather emphasizes that the type of movement which characterizes the dialectic is in fact a false movement. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p.p. 10-13.

³² Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p. 44.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.p. 38-39.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

tries to represent a durational phenomenon in spatial terms. This is the case with Hobbes, who defines memory as "decaying sense." The memory of a past event is difficult to recollect in the same way the streets of a distant city are difficult to see: "after a great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak, and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular streets."³⁵

Bergson's understanding of memory is starkly different from spatial understandings of memory. As Deleuze notes: "There must be a difference in kind between matter and memory, between pure perception and pure recollection, between the present and the past."³⁶ The past, however, is not something which merely follows the present, but coexists with it. After all, the past could never exist unless it was constituted at the same time it was present. This is one of the great paradoxes of memory: the past coexists with the present that it has been. The present is "contemporaneous" not only with the immediate past (i.e. the immediately preceding moments) but with *all* of the past. Memory constitutes a fullness in which all moments coexist in varying degrees of "contraction" and "relaxation." The immediately preceding moments are generally quite distinct—they are "contracted." The further back one recollects, the more "relaxed" the past is because it is not focused so intensely on one particular moment. This distinction between the contraction and relaxation of memory has consequences for Bergson's understanding of space. For Bergson, spatial sensation is a matter of contracting "millions of vibrations or elementary shocks into a felt quality."³⁷ As a result of these contracting vibrations, "space becomes temporalized through passing into memory. Thus space can be seen as a dilated or relaxed past that contracts through sensation to become duration."³⁸ If we remember how the present coexists with the immediate past, then it is clear how the spatial present is a "contracted" point between two memories, and is thus temporalized. What results from this reading of Bergson

³⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Edited by C.B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 89.

³⁶ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p. 55.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁸ Todd G. May, "The Politics of Life in the Thought of Gilles Deleuze," *Substance* 66 (1991), p. 26.

is a rejection of the dualism between space and time and the promotion of a form of temporal monism: "*a single Time, one, universal, impersonal.*"³⁹

What are the implications of such a reassessment of the nature of thought? Bergson's critique of the spatial form of differentiation that has dominated Western philosophy has important implications for how *difference* is understood. In Deleuze's reading, with Bergson there exists a fundamental difference between duration and matter, between time and space. For Bergson, space can only realize variation in quantities (differences in degree). Time, however, is capable of making quantitative variations and distinctions (differences in kind). Difference with time or duration is, therefore, an internal difference, an internal ontological movement. Spatial difference is merely one of repetition. In the spatially informed political realm this form of difference recognizes many States or many citizens, but does not offer much in terms of substantive differences in community or identity, respectively. As Deleuze states in a 1956 article on Bergson: "Everything that Bergson says always comes back to this: duration is *what differs with itself*. Matter, on the contrary, is what does not differ with itself, what repeats."⁴⁰ The spatial form of conceiving difference which has been hegemonic in Western thought is only capable of conceiving difference in space, in seeking a new location, in providing a different form of *being*. The temporal manner of conceiving difference which Deleuze finds in the work of Henri Bergson, by contrast, is capable of recognizing difference within, of seeing difference as a movement, a process, a dynamic, in other words, a form of *pure becoming*.

An important qualification must be introduced at this point, one which has significant consequences for how a Deleuzian text should be "read." While Deleuze considers Bergson to be a formidable philosopher, the arguments and views of the two thinkers should not be taken as identical. Deleuze is not Bergson and Bergson is certainly not Deleuze. This, in essence, is the basis of Gillian Rose's critique of Deleuze in her book, *The Dialectics of Nihilism*. In Rose's reading of *Bergsonism*, the position(s) of Bergson and Deleuze are conflated. The statements and ideas of the two philosophers are treated as if

³⁹ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, p. 78. Emphasis in original.

⁴⁰ Gilles Deleuze, "La conception de la différence chez Bergson," *Les études bergsoniennes* 4 (1956), p. 88. Quoted in Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. 15. Emphasis in original.

they were interchangeable. It is in this sense that Rose calls Deleuze's work "The New Bergsonism."⁴¹ Much of the criticisms Rose levels against Bergson, consequently, are ones which she also levels against Deleuze. These criticisms, however, are often ones which she finds *in* Bergson's writings and not necessarily in those by Deleuze.

The difficulty with Rose's critique, and others like it, is that it fundamentally misinterprets two crucial elements in the methodological approach Deleuze utilizes in his early monographs on figures in the history of philosophy. The first misinterpretation is the assumption that Deleuze is attempting to provide a comprehensive account or summary of the work of a particular philosopher. Deleuze's early philosophical studies, however, are by no means exhaustive, nor was it ever his intention that they be so. On the contrary, Deleuze approaches figures in the history of philosophy with particular questions in mind, questions that will provide a positive contribution to his own project. Thus, for example, if Deleuze is interested in developing an image of thought which is organized temporally rather than spatially, he will approach figures in the history of philosophy such as Bergson and Nietzsche with this particular problem in mind and assesses their work according to the criteria of how they might positively contribute to this problem. Michael Hardt addresses this issue in relation to reading Deleuze's early writings on Nietzsche and Spinoza:

As Nietzschean or as Spinozist, Deleuze does not accept all of Nietzsche or all of Spinoza. If a philosopher presents arguments with which Deleuze might find fault, he does not critique them but simply leaves them out of his discussion. Might it be said then that Deleuze is an unfaithful reader? Certainly not. If his readings are partial, they are nonetheless very rigorous and precise, with meticulous care and sensitivity to the selected topics; what Deleuze forfeits in comprehensiveness, he gains in intensity of focus.⁴²

From this first principle of selectivity in Deleuze's approach follows a second principle that Rose's critique does not recognize: this is the principle of productivity. This principle is crucial for understanding what it means to make a

⁴¹ Gillian Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), chapter 6, especially p.p. 99-108.

⁴² Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. xix.

"Deleuzian claim." For Deleuze, philosophy is not about contemplation, reflection, or even communication. "What we must do," Deleuze states, "is take away from philosophers the right to reflect 'on' things. The philosopher creates, he [sic] doesn't reflect."⁴³ But what does the philosopher create? In their final collaboration, *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy is fundamentally concerned with arranging, rearranging, but most importantly, always creating concepts:

Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator's signature.⁴⁴

Philosophy, then, is a matter of conceptual creation, not of reflection. Through the creation of new concepts, moreover, new perspectives are also continually made possible. It follows that the object of philosophy is not to determine a single, unchanging Truth; concepts are not evaluated by their correspondence to any "objective" truth-claim or even by the accuracy of their representation. Indeed, for Deleuze, a concept "has no *reference*; it is self-referential; it posits itself and its object at the same time as it is created."⁴⁵ A concept does not refer to anything external to itself; it is immanent. Concepts reside as points on a conceptual field Deleuze and Guattari call a "plane of immanence." In this sense, philosophy is understood to be a practice—it introduces new concepts onto a plane, thereby rearranging the plane, creating a new plane, or causing otherwise distinct and separate planes to intersect. As a practice, therefore, philosophy is evaluated in terms of its *effects*, not by any criteria of truth. Consequently, by conflating Deleuze's position with that of Bergson, Rose's critique is one which misunderstands the productive strategy Deleuze maintains throughout his early philosophical studies.

⁴³ Gilles Deleuze, "Mediators," in Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, eds., *Incorporations* (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 282.

⁴⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Deleuze's Nietzsche: The Eternal Return and an Ethics of Affirmation

The relationship between the thought of Deleuze and that of Nietzsche is mutually supportive and reciprocative. On the one hand, the influence Nietzsche has had on Deleuze's philosophy is unrivaled by any other thinker (with the possible exception of Spinoza). From his early studies of the history of philosophy through to his collaborations with Félix Guattari as well as his more recent writings, the presence of Nietzsche, acknowledged or not, is always noticeably present.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Deleuze is credited for playing a large role in instigating the renewed interest in Nietzsche in France in the 1960s—an interest, it should be noted, which has had profound implications for the development of French poststructuralism. While Nietzsche had previously been introduced into France by such thinkers as Gide, Bataille, Klossowski, and Blanchot, Deleuze's 1962 work *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is credited for being one of the first in France to treat Nietzsche as a coherent philosopher.⁴⁷ "For Deleuze," Ronald Bogue has remarked, "Nietzsche is not a mere rhapsodic aphorist, but an intellectually consistent philosopher with a profound understanding of the history of philosophy, whose responses to Plato, Hegel, and Kant delineate the fundamental problems of modern thought."⁴⁸

Deleuze begins *Nietzsche and Philosophy* by carefully situating Nietzsche in relation to Kant. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's work is best understood as an attempt to complete the task of *critical* philosophy begun by Kant: "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values."⁴⁹ To the extent that Kant excluded values such as Truth, Goodness, and Beauty from critical analysis, his critical philosophical project was left

⁴⁶ For an account of the many different ways Nietzsche has been utilized in Deleuze's works see Petra Perry, "Deleuze's Nietzsche," *boundary 2* 20:1 (1993), p.p. 174-191.

⁴⁷ For a discussion of the impact Deleuze's work on Nietzsche has had for French post-structuralism see James A. Leigh, "Deleuze, Nietzsche and the Eternal Return," *Philosophy Today* 22: 3/4 (Fall 1978), p.p. 206-223, especially p.p. 206-209.

⁴⁸ Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 15.

⁴⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p. 1

unfinished. Deleuze remarks: "Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves."⁵⁰

For Nietzsche, values arise from and, indeed, are created through ways of being, through modes of existence which are either high or low, noble or base, or, in Deleuze's terms, "active" or "reactive." The critique of values, therefore, can never be a neutral process, but instead expresses a way of life. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's project as one which is opposed to the negative and reactive form of thought which has dominated Western philosophy. However, as Nietzsche points out: "We can destroy only as creators."⁵¹ Nietzsche, therefore, articulates a new image of thought, an affirmative and active form of thought, one that will create new positive values and destroy negative values.

In Deleuze's reading, what distinguishes these ways of being is the manner in which they perceive and realize differences to themselves. These two ways of making differences can be categorized according to the familiar distinction between "master" and "slave." The master affirms her difference from the slave by labeling herself "good" and, seeing the baseness of the slave, labels the slave "bad." The slave, by contrast, resents the master and so calls her "bad" and only afterwards labels herself "good." Deleuze characterizes the formula by which the slave speaks of difference as: "You are evil; I am the opposite of what you are; therefore I am good."⁵² In this formulation it is the "therefore" which is crucial for it indicates that the slave affirms herself only as a negative reaction to her perception of the master. Whereas the master positively affirms difference, the slave's understanding of difference is merely reactive, derivative, and negative.

The slave's resentment of the master, it should be noted, is based on an inability to comprehend the concept of "mastery" as understood by the master. The slave's idea of mastery is one characterized by a desire for power, for

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 122, aphorism 58.

⁵² Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 122.

mastery, and for this power to be recognized by the slave. The master, by contrast, neither comprehends desire as a form of lack nor power as a form of oppression represented and recognized by the slave.⁵³ The master is only concerned with affirming her difference from the slave. But as Deleuze notes, neither affirmation nor negation should be understood as simple static acts. They are, rather, dynamic processes. "Affirmation," Deleuze remarks, "is not action but the power of becoming active, *becoming active* personified. Negation is not simple negation but a *becoming reactive*."⁵⁴ This notion of "becoming"—crucial to both Nietzsche's and Deleuze's thought—will be developed below through a discussion of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return.

The idea of the eternal return is one of the most important and crucial elements of Nietzsche's work. It is, as Nietzsche writes in *Ecce Homo*, the "highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable."⁵⁵ The idea of the eternal return is also an important supplement to Bergson's theories on memory and intuition. As Constantin Boundas remarks: "Bergson's memory/repetition, without the time of the eternal return, would tend to immobilize past and present and to disempower the intuition of the irreducible multiplicity that, nevertheless, animates Bergson's texts."⁵⁶

In spite of the eminence Nietzsche confers upon the idea of the eternal return, it is a concept which has nonetheless been subject to much confusion and misinterpretation. Walter Kaufmann, for instance, has interpreted the eternal return to mean that "all events are repeated endlessly, that there is no plan nor goal to give meaning to history or life, and that we are mere puppets in an absolutely senseless play."⁵⁷ Such a characterization assumes that what

⁵³ For a sustained critique of the idea that desire is best understood as lack rather than a form of productive activity, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

⁵⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 54. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 295.

⁵⁶ Constantin V. Boundas, "Editor's Introduction," in Constantin V. Boundas, ed., *The Deleuze Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 7.

⁵⁷ Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Fourth edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 327.

Nietzsche had in mind was a circular conception of history in which all events merely repeated themselves. The eternal return in this sense is a return of the Same, a return which implies the principles of Identity and of Unity. To interpret the idea of the eternal return in such a fashion, Deleuze argues, is to "replace Nietzsche's thought with childish hypothesis."⁵⁸ By contrast, in Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, the idea of the eternal return is understood altogether differently and has important consequences for how we understand time, thought, and the relationship between the two. This relationship, mediated through the eternal return, has two moments to it—one which reveals itself as an *ethics* and the other which reveals itself as an *ontology*. I will deal with each of these aspects in turn.

While it is generally considered that the eternal return is most fully developed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, it is in *The Gay Science* where the idea is first introduced. It is also in this latter text that the ethical implications of the idea of the eternal return can be most readily explicated. Near the end of Book Four (the last section of the first edition of *The Gay Science*) Nietzsche presents the image of a demon proposing the idea of the eternal return in a dream. Nietzsche identifies two possible responses to this proposition. The first is one of anger, nausea, and fear in which the demon is cursed. To curse the demon, Nietzsche implies, is to curse life as well. The second response sees the demon thanked as a god. Such a reaction implies that the idea of the eternal return is a form of selective thought. "If this thought gained possession of you," says Nietzsche, "it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight."⁵⁹ The idea of the eternal return is thus a test to determine if one is a strong life-affirming human being. The life-effacing individual will view the idea of the eternal return as a form of utter nihilism because it denies the possibility of linear time and progress and thus leads to a situation where nothing is ever definitely achieved. The life-affirming individual, by contrast, will affirm life entirely because in a situation where nothing can be definitely achieved every moment becomes equally precious and

⁵⁸ Gilles Deleuze, "Preface to the English Translation," in Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. xi.

⁵⁹ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, p. 274, aphorism 341.

important. Existence becomes a matter of affirming each moment of life fully.⁶⁰ This ethical and selective function of the eternal return, Deleuze maintains, is also a creative function: "The thought of the eternal return eliminates from willing everything which falls outside the eternal return, it makes willing creation, it brings about the equation 'willing = creating'."⁶¹

The ethical selection function of the idea of the eternal return, however, constitutes only the first half of Nietzsche's understanding of the eternal return. The selective thought principle, Deleuze says, "is content to eliminate certain reactive states, certain states of reactive forces which are among the least developed."⁶² What is required is an additional selection, one which expresses itself as an *ontology*. The question of the ontological implications of the eternal return is crucial for understanding the temporal nature of thought Deleuze later utilizes in his many writings. According to Deleuze, the thought of the eternal return is not a return of the Same, but of Difference. It is becoming, not being, which constitutes the "return" of the eternal return. Nietzsche stresses the being of becoming of the eternal return in *The Will to Power*: "That *everything recurs* is the closest *approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being*."⁶³

This notion of becoming, moreover, should not be confused with that traditionally associated with Plato. Plato replaces the pre-Socratic classification system of the four-fold distinction between fire, earth, air, and water with a binary scheme of Being and Becoming. For Plato, the objective and true reality of the realm of Being is privileged over the constant flux and change associated with the realm of Becoming. It is true that in *Timaeus* Plato has Timaeus introduce

⁶⁰ Nietzsche's belief in the life-affirming ethics of the idea of the eternal return can also be seen in the two aphorisms that border *The greatest weight*. In aphorism 340 (*The dying Socrates*) Nietzsche presents Socrates as a negative figure who saw life as a "disease." Death, for Socrates, was a cure for his endless suffering. According to Nietzsche this attitude is indicative of someone who is against life. The presentation of the idea of the eternal return in the following aphorism (341) is thus appropriate. In aphorism 342 (*Incipit tragoedia*), Zarathustra is presented as someone who realizes that life is not about solitary existence in the mountains, and decides to return to the everyday world and thus doing, chooses to affirm life. *Ibid.*, p.p. 272-275.

⁶¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 69.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁶³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), #617, p. 330. Emphasis in original.

the possibility of Becoming serving as a model separate and distinct from that of Being and not simply a secondary and derivative component of this latter model. This possibility, however, is introduced only to be rejected, with Socrates' full agreement. To do otherwise would undermine Plato's entire ontology as dualistic distinctions between model and copy, Form and Thing, could no longer be sustained.⁶⁴ Deleuze considers Nietzsche's project (and his own) to accomplish a reversal of this relationship through an affirmation of becoming. It is in this sense that Deleuze declares in *Difference and Repetition*: "The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism."⁶⁵

The concept of becoming has important implications for how time is to be understood in Nietzsche's work as well as that of Deleuze. In the West,⁶⁶ temporality in its hegemonic forms is perceived spatially. Time is a linear line whereby the present moment is separate and distinct from the past and the future. If, however, the present moment is understood in terms of becoming, then the distinctions between past and present, present and future, lose their rigidity. The present as a moment of becoming loses its singular spatial identity and instead simultaneously becomes the past-becoming-present and the present-becoming-future. As Deleuze states: "The present must coexist with itself as past and yet to come."⁶⁷ Thus, the ontological component of the eternal return is realized when an individual recognizes and affirms that all moments are moments of becoming, that being itself is becoming: "Return is the being of

⁶⁴ Plato, *Timaeus*, Edited and Translated by John Warrington (New York: Dutton, 1965), p.p. 13-15, # 28-29. Deleuze provides a detailed account of this argument in "Plato and the Simulacrum," in Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, Edited by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.p. 253-266.

⁶⁵ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 59. Rosi Braidotti further notes that Deleuze's understanding of becoming is also deeply anti-Hegelian: "Becoming is neither the dynamic opposition of opposites nor the unfolding of an essence in a teleologically ordained process leading to a synthesizing identity. The Deleuzian becoming is the affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant process of transformation. Both teleological order and fixed identities are relinquished in favor of a flux of multiple becoming." Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 113.

⁶⁶ For a substantive account of how time and temporality are perceived by various non-Western cultures, see Ákos Östör, *Vessels of Time: An Essay on Temporal Change and Social Transformation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), especially chapter two.

⁶⁷ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 48.

becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming. The eternal return as law of becoming, as justice and as being."⁶⁸

To the idea that the thought of the eternal return is an ontological condition of becoming must be added an important caveat: *the eternal return only produces a becoming-active*. Deleuze stresses the importance of this point because otherwise the reactive forces of the slave morality could will the eternal return of negativity. In such a situation, humankind would be condemned to eternally be in a process of becoming-reactive. Such an understanding of the eternal return, however, would be contradictory. As Deleuze notes: "The eternal return teaches us the becoming-reactive has no being. Indeed, it also teaches us of the existence of a becoming-active. It necessarily produces becoming-active by reproducing becoming."⁶⁹ Consequently, the ontological aspect of the eternal return—that is, the being of becoming—cannot be affirmed without the simultaneous affirmation of becoming-active.

Is the affirmation of the being of becoming that results from the thought of the eternal return a radical reassessment of the nature of thought? Space and time, after all, are familiar dichotomies in the history of Western philosophy. Given the dualistic character of Western thought, moreover, space and time are not presented as asymmetrical absolutes, but rather as hierarchically arranged binary opposites. As such, they are arranged in a pattern of unequal dependence which Jacques Derrida has referred to as *logocentrism*. Derrida argues that Western forms of conceptualization and categorization work according to a logic of Identity, a metaphysics striving for Unity. It is a way of thinking which describes the world, or aspects of it such as social life, as an ontological whole. This desire for unity, ironically, generates a logic of separateness, or hierarchical oppositions. Logocentrism is a system of self-constitutive thought which gives primacy to the *logos*—Thought, Reason, Truth. The *logos*, moreover, is understood to exist purely in and of itself. It also provides the orientation for all meaning. This is to say that logocentric interpretations of binary oppositions such as space/time always involves hierarchy: "the superior term belongs to the *logos* and is a higher presence; the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

inferior term marks a fall."⁷⁰ In the history of philosophy space has been understood as the superior term in the space/time binary. In political theory, where so much stress has been placed on realizing a good, just, and properly organized community which will withstand the vicissitudes and uncertainty of time, it is almost axiomatic that time is the problem and space is the solution.⁷¹

Is the privileging of the realm of becoming over being, of time over space, a mere reversal of two of the most familiar dualisms in the history of Western philosophy? Does the act of reversing this dualism, that is, of privileging time over space, not only leave the logic of logocentrism untouched, but, in fact, work according to a *spatial* logic? Is Deleuze guilty of reproducing a dualistic and spatial logic and form of thought in his analyses of Nietzsche? Is it in fact a spatial form of thought which provides Deleuze with the necessary conditions of possibility for thinking temporally? I would like to argue against this characterization. Deleuze, after all, is above all a thinker who is very much aware of the dualistic character of Western thought, and of the problems that result from it. This is true even though in works such as *A Thousand Plateaus* the number of oppositions that are invoked are too numerous for classification. These oppositions are not, Deleuze and Guattari insist, logocentric in nature. As the authors explain: "We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models."⁷² Dualisms are invoked not in any absolute sense, but

⁷⁰ Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 93.

⁷¹ This is a position which I think is most evident in Thomas Hobbes' account of State sovereignty, an account which has had profound implications for all forms of modern political organization. I do not, however, wish to convey the impression that the received accounts of the tradition of political theory, accounts which stress the primacy of space over time, are unproblematic. On the contrary, there are "recessive" elements *within* the tradition which point to alternative ways of conceiving political communities. The example of Machiavelli is of particular interest, if not only because hegemonic accounts of the tradition characterize him as a cynical arch-realist. A minority of scholars have, however, argued that Machiavelli is someone who, *contra* the received accounts of the tradition, privileges the temporal realm over the spatial. The *virtu* of the Prince comes from the struggle to generate a lasting and stable order in the midst of contingency of *fortuna*. See R.B.J. Walker, "The Prince and 'The Pauper': Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory of International Relations" in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p.p. 25-48 as well as the sources cited on p. 47 note 18.

⁷² Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 20.

rather for their disruptive and de-stabilizing effects. With regards to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, I would like to reject the charge of dualistic thinking within this work for two reasons.

The first reason is, I hope, fairly evident in my discussion of Deleuze's treatment of Nietzsche. I have taken particular care to demonstrate how, in Deleuze's reading, Nietzsche does not begin his analysis assuming an unproblematic understanding of time. To think temporally instead of spatially first requires an understanding of temporality which is not another version of spatiality or a mere "fourth dimension" of space. The being of becoming found in Nietzsche's discussion of the eternal return is thus a sincere attempt to work through the problem of thinking in a temporal fashion which is not merely a spatialized version of time. Indeed, Deleuze takes pains to stress the conditions under which conventional distinctions between time and space are possible and how they are problematic.

The second aspect of my defense of Deleuze as a thinker who attempts to avoid absolute spatial dualistic distinctions wherever possible focuses on his (non)status as a "postmodern" thinker. While Deleuze is often rather haphazardly lumped together with Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudrillard, among others, under the label of "postmodernism," the applicability of such a label to his writings (or any of the other theorists for that matter) is not at all unproblematic. As a critical approach, postmodernism takes the form of celebrating time over space, contingency over certainty, representation over reality, and diversity over the hegemonic form of unity. It is a politics of opposition which privileges one side of binary opposites over the other. To the extent that postmodernism does not critique the categories and the form of thought that make the distinction between unity and diversity possible, however, postmodernism remains a thoroughly *modern* enterprise.

Deleuze, however, does not simply celebrate diversity, difference, and temporality. Rather, he attempts to rethink the meaning of these concepts as well as the dualistic oppositions that make such distinctions possible in the first place. Moreover, Deleuze's choice to develop a temporal image of thought through a reading of Nietzsche is significant. Unlike the radical split with modernity that is signified by the "post" of postmodernism, Deleuze is careful to stress the radical alternatives found *within* the Western philosophical tradition. For Deleuze, the history of philosophy should not be characterized in a singular

or univocal manner. Michael Hardt has commented on the problems of misrepresentation that come with understanding Deleuze's work in stark opposition to a dominant and hegemonic view of Western metaphysics or "State philosophy." To simplify the history of philosophy in such a manner, Hardt argues, has the consequence of exaggerating

the marginality of the opposing tradition that is dear to Deleuze; in other words, even if Lucretius, Duns Scotus, Spinoza, et al. form a "minority" in the sense that they are partially eclipsed by the contemporary political-academic hegemony of "State philosophy" (Plato, Hegel, etc.), nonetheless this "minority" constitutes some of the highest and most central moments of Western metaphysics. My point is that we should not minimize the coherence and the enormous power of this alternative tradition. In any case, Deleuze's opposition to "State philosophy" should not be conceived as an opposition to Western philosophy *tout court*, but rather as an affirmation of its most powerful and most lucid elements.⁷³

It is when Deleuze's opposition to much of the history of philosophy (in this case, those elements which conceive thought spatially rather than temporally) is taken as an absolute opposition that Deleuze is mistaken as a "postmodern" thinker. The image of Deleuze's philosophical approach I have tried to stress here is one which is marked by its immanence rather than any sharp disjuncture.

Principles

Deleuze's early philosophical analyses of the work of Bergson and Nietzsche can thus be interpreted as an attempt to work out a temporal image of thought. This project, as I have stressed above, is an immanent one which works *within* the tradition of Western philosophy by highlighting and providing a new perspective on some of its "minor" figures, or, as Deleuze states, "by loving authors who were opposed to the rationalist tradition of that history."⁷⁴ While it is

⁷³ Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze*, p. 124, note 2. For an interesting contrast on Deleuze's (non)status as a postmodern thinker, compare Ronald Bogue, "Gilles Deleuze: Postmodern Philosopher?" *Criticism* 32: 4 (Fall 1990), p.p. 401-418; Best and Kellner, "Deleuze and Guattari: Schizos, Nomads, Rhizomes" in *Postmodern Theory*, p.p. 76-110. It is of relevance to note that Guattari himself has criticized postmodernism and does not apply that label to his writings: Félix Guattari, "The Postmodern Dead End," *Flash Art* no. 128 (May/June 1986), p.p. 40-41.

⁷⁴ Deleuze, "I Have Nothing to Admit," p. 112.

true that Deleuze develops this temporal image of thought in many other studies, not least the ones on Spinoza, Leibniz, the Stoics, and the cinema, my reading of his works on Bergson and Nietzsche has nonetheless highlighted a number of important characteristics of this image of thought. Indeed, a number of "principles" emerge from my reading of *Bergsonism* and *Nietzsche and Philosophy* which are common to almost all of Deleuze's subsequent works.

The first principle that emerges from this temporal image of thought is that of *critique*. Deleuze reads Bergson's concept of intuition as providing a means to critique and problematize the spatial character of the classical image of thought. The temporalizing function of intuition, moreover, provides an alternative way of understanding difference. In Deleuze's reading, the temporalizing function of intuition allows one to differentiate between spatial differences in degree and durational differences in kind. Thus, difference is not a matter of either/or, or *x* and *not-x*, but both/and, or *x* and *y*.

The second principle of the temporal image of thought concerns *the nature of time* itself. The logic of Deleuze's arguments in both the study on Bergson and that on Nietzsche is one which rejects the familiar dualism between space and time and instead formulates a kind of temporal monism. For instance, Deleuze's reading of Bergson's theory of memory is one in which the present is understood as being contemporaneous not only with the immediate past, but with all of the past. Similarly, Deleuze reads Nietzsche's concept of the idea of the eternal return as articulating the principle of the being of becoming. The spatial character of the familiar linear continuum of past-present-future is replaced by a temporal past-becoming-present and a present-becoming-future.

The third principle of the temporal image of thought is that of *ontology*. This principle emerges in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return. According to Deleuze, the thought of the eternal return is not a return of the same, but of difference. It is becoming, not being, which constitutes the "return" of the eternal return. It is in this sense that the being of the world is one of becoming.

The ontology of the being of becoming is one which is marked by its affirmation of life. Thus, the fourth principle of the temporal image of thought is that of *affirmation*. Deleuze reads Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return as a test to see if one affirms each moment of life equally.

Finally, the fifth principle of the temporal image of thought is that of *productivity*. Philosophy is no longer (if it ever was) an enterprise concerned with revealing or reflecting on predetermined truth(s). Rather, philosophy is a creative and productive process of creating concepts which will be evaluated not according to their "truth value" but according to their effects.

The implications of this temporal image of thought to the discipline and activity of philosophy are numerous and wide-ranging. My concern, however, is with the possible *political* implications of this image of thought, or rather, with the political implications made *possible* by this image of thought. What are the consequences for our understanding of the State and, indeed, the entire category of "the political" when one thinks in terms of time rather than space, in terms of becoming rather than being? These problems will be addressed in the following chapter.

Chapter Three

Assembling State and War Machine

I would not build a house for myself, and I count it part of my good fortune that I do not own a house. But if I had to, then I should build it as some of the Romans did—right into the sea. I should not mind sharing a few secrets with this beautiful monster.

— Friedrich Nietzsche¹

At the Sea

Nietzsche understood the importance of attempting to conceive of life as a creative process of pure becoming. In this sense, Nietzsche considered it one's "good fortune" not to own a house. A house requires solid foundations; its existence is predicated on the desire to keep things out; it is a spatial resolution of the desire for protection, for maintaining a safe, comfortable life. The Nietzschean artist, being a "posthumous being" who must live in her own time, is sometimes forced to build a house. In such a contingency, Nietzsche suggests that she should make her home not on firm spatial foundations, but instead attempt to make connections with a dynamic temporal medium which continually moves in unpredictable ways, requiring a certain amount of risk-taking and a degree of balance. In short, she should build her house "right into the sea."

Nietzsche does not underestimate the difficulty of this project. God may indeed be dead, but his shadows continue to live among us. The foundational aspirations of the modern State may be declared invalid, but life goes on as if they still existed. Borders are still drawn and refugee flows are still controlled and regulated. Spatial interiors and exteriors are set-up, policed, and regulated

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 214, aphorism 240.

even as poststructural critics theorize about "mobile" temporal subjectivities. The space/time dualism still remains intact to the extent that space continues to be the necessary condition of possibility for time. It is in this sense that those who feel qualified to call themselves "homeless" in a "distinctive and honorable sense" often do not recognize that they do so within the safety (i.e. keeping the "outside" out) provided to them by the State.² The temporal condition of homelessness is always in danger of assuming an implicit spatial statism.

Gilles Deleuze's writings on the State are predicated on the temporal image of thought which was elaborated in the previous chapter. Deleuze resists the spatial interiority of traditional Western metaphysics by attempting to connect with the temporal exteriority theorized by thinkers such as Bergson and Nietzsche. Similarly, in his writings on the State, Deleuze resists reproducing the traditional spatial distinctions between inside and outside which are so powerfully present in traditional understandings of the State and its sovereignty. Instead, he carefully situates the State in relation to its "outside"—the war machine. In this configuration, inside and outside are not spatial opposites, but interact in a temporal field of mutual immanence. Deleuze approaches the problem of theorizing the State from a perspective which perceives thought as a creative process of becoming, not an attempt to secure an accurate representation of some static form of being.

In this chapter I will provide an account of Deleuze's understanding of the State first by addressing the problem of the "origin" of the State. In the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and his collaborator, Félix Guattari present the *Urstaat* hypothesis to undercut "evolutionary" accounts of the "rise" of the State: The spatial understanding of the social realm that informs such evolutionary accounts is inconsistent with the temporal conception Deleuze and Guattari, present. The second section of this chapter will address this conception of society as composed of intersecting immanent lines of desire and power. With this background established, the following two sections will describe Deleuze and Guattari's understandings of the State and the war machine, respectively. Finally, a brief discussion of the nature of power assumed by these two models will be offered.

² *Ibid.*, p.p. 338-340, aphorism 377.

Origins: The *Urstaat* Hypothesis

The world, Michel Foucault writes in "The Order of Discourse," is not the open book we have traditionally been led to think it is. There is no universal interpretive key, no Rosetta Stone as it were, to make it a ready and willing accomplice to our knowledge. Instead, we must think of discourse as a practice, an act of violence through which the objects, behaviours, and actions that constitute the world may be regulated and controlled, categorized and evaluated. Every discourse, moreover, organizes itself externally and internally. *External procedures of exclusion* such as taboo and prohibition mark off the kind of language which can be excluded. The Western tradition of rational thought is characterized by discursive moves which oppose reason to madness, truth to falsehood, and so on. *Internal procedures of control* occur as discourses organize the world into disciplines. The disciplining nature of disciplines control which objects, propositions, and forms of behaviour are acceptable and which are not.³ The effect of these discursive forms is to make it virtually impossible to think outside of them without being labeled mad, incomprehensible, or beyond the threshold of reason.⁴

Within each discourse, moreover, a secure point of origin—a beginning—is established in order to mark off discursive limits, to assign positions, and to police boundaries. A crucial political concept such as the State, for instance, is provided with an account of its origins by the discipline of political science. The relationship between the concept and the discipline is reciprocal: the concept of the State serves to legitimate the forms of political analysis that are utilized by the discipline. For the sub-discipline of political theory, concerned with the proper ordering of relations *inside* the spatially-enclosed community of the State, this origin is usually traced back to the ancient Greek *polis*. For students of international relations, concerned as they are with those relations, processes, and power dynamics which are *external* to States, the point of origin of the State

³ Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in Michael Shapiro, ed., *Language and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p.p. 109-114.

⁴ Robert Young, *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 48.

system is usually taken to be the Peace of Westphalia.⁵ Origins may be artificial and vary across the sub-disciplines, but disciplinary procedures nonetheless effectively naturalize and normalize this artificiality. Beginnings are problematic and yet are somehow rendered unproblematic; they are artificial and yet they are made real. Indeed, as Foucault argues, institutions exist precisely to convince people not to be afraid of beginnings. They exist to show that "discourse belongs to the order of laws" within which "a place has been made ready for it, a place which honours it but disarms it."⁶

The desire to secure a firm point of origin, a foundation on which one can orient oneself, is an intensely political act: "the problem of the beginning is the beginning of the problem."⁷ To evoke a beginning is to impose severe restrictions on alternative ways of thinking. It is an attempt to understand how the present "here" was arrived at by vanquishing all ambiguity surrounding some past "there." The spatial language of here/there is similarly reinforced by a spatial image of thought which conceived the problem of history as a linear line with uncertain origins that must be brought to light. What is interesting about Deleuze's theory of the State is the manner in which he confronts the politics of origins. While Deleuze does give an account of the "origin" of the State, he does so in a decidedly anti-foundational sense. Deleuze's account of the origin of the State is one which refuses here/there dualisms and so disturbs and disrupts all claims to origins which are predicated on a spatial form of thought. Deleuze's analysis is informed by a temporal mode of thought: Nietzsche's Becoming, not Plato's Being.

Even the most cursory look at Deleuze's theory of the State cannot fail to recognize how radically it differs from "evolutionary" accounts of the State—that is, from analyses which carefully and meticulously document the slow formation, growth, and eventual consolidation of the State. In place of the evolutionary approach to State theory, Deleuze and Guattari boldly offer the *Urstaat*

⁵ For a discussion of the philosophical assumptions and political implications of the distinction between an *inside* where politics can occur and an *outside* which recognizes only relations between states, see R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

⁶ Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," p. 109.

⁷ Edward Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 42.

hypothesis: the State is not the result of a long processes of evolution, but rather comes about suddenly, ready-made, and serves as the model for all sedentary, or "molar" forms of organization. "The State," the authors insist in *Anti-Oedipus*, "was not formed in progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke executed all at once; the primordial *Urstaat*, the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires."⁸ This claim is reasserted and further developed in *A Thousand Plateaus* when Deleuze and Guattari declare that the State "dates back to the most remote ages of humanity,"⁹ arising among Paleolithic hunter-gatherer communities.

To support their *Urstaat* hypothesis, Deleuze and Guattari draw heavily upon the work of the late French ethnologist, Pierre Clastres. One of Clastres' principal projects, one which runs throughout his many writings, is to provide a cutting critique of evolutionist accounts of the formation of the modern State. Societies labeled "primitive" by political anthropologists, Clastres argues, are usually characterized as such because they are seen as lacking the authentic form of political order provided by the State. According to this view, primitive societies lack the sufficient complexity and differentiation in their productive and political forces that eventually result in the formation and consolidation of the State. Clastres regards such arguments as containing an ethnocentric bias¹⁰ as they set up a value-laden hierarchy between what is a "normal" society and what is a "deviant" society. To say that primitive societies are defined by the absence of the State, Clastres suggests, is to say that "those societies are *incomplete*; they are not quite true societies—they are not *civilized*—their existence continues to suffer the painful experience of a *lack*—the lack of a State—which,

⁸ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 217.

⁹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 360.

¹⁰ For a critique of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* which insists that traces of ethnocentrism still exists to the extent that the authors rely on anthropological theories such as Clastres', see Christopher L. Miller, "The Postidentitarian Predicament in the Footnotes of *A Thousand Plateaus*: Nomadology, Anthropology, and Authority," *Diacritics* 23:3 (Fall 1993), p.p. 6-35.

try as they may, they will never make up."¹¹ Evolutionist accounts of the "rise of the State" thus work according to a logic of presence and absence: the presence of the State constitutes a normal, civilized, historical, and adult society, while the absence of the State condemns a society as deviant, primitive, ahistorical, and childlike.¹²

In opposition to evolutionist accounts of the State, Clastres insists that primitive societies are not societies without a State, but are, on the contrary, counter-State societies with complex forms of social and political mechanisms which simultaneously anticipate and effectively ward off the State and keep it and its apparatuses from coalescing. The institution of chieftainship, for instance, is a powerful example of a collective mechanism of anticipation-prevention. In an analysis of the institution of chieftainship in indigenous societies of North and South America, Clastres emphasizes the collective mechanisms which curtail the chief's authority: "In a sense, the tribe keeps the chief under a close watch; he is a kind of prisoner in a space which the tribe does not let him leave."¹³ Among the Jivaro people, for instance, the chief's principal duty of settling disputes, of arbitration, is achieved "not by employing a force he does not possess and which would not be acknowledged in any case, but by relying solely on the strength of his prestige, his fairness, and his verbal ability."¹⁴ The chief is neither a despot nor a figure of entrenched power, able to effect a hierarchy of governor and governed. The "technical" aptitudes and talents of the chief are never allowed to be transformed into *political* power. The chief possesses no power of coercion and is not the locus of the society's power. Rather, the institution of chieftainship contains *within* it collective mechanisms

¹¹ Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Urizen, 1977), p. 159. Emphasis in original.

¹² This primitive/civilized, childlike/mature logic is similarly evident in colonialist discourse and practice. See Edward Said's groundbreaking work, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). For an excellent and important analysis of this logic with specific reference to the "discovery" of the Americas, see Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, Translated by Richard Howard (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

¹³ Clastres, *Society Against the State*, p. 175.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

which prevent the chief from attaining a centralized form of authority which is associated with the State.

There is, of course, the special case of war which must be considered when discussing the institution of chieftainship. The chief's lack of power and authority (if such terms can even be used) is largely unique to times of peace. During military expeditions the chief amasses considerable and at times absolute power and authority over the warriors he is commanding, as Clastres acknowledges with specific reference to the Cubeo people and the tribes of Orinoco. Although this authority quickly dissipates once peace is restored, an important question must be asked: Does the special case of war undermine Clastres' overall argument? Is the temporary attainment of authority by the chief during times of war a significant enough exception to have the effect of undermining Clastres' general argument that the institution of chieftainship is meant to anticipate and ward off the formation and consolidation of the State? Clastres does not think so; his reasons are of particular significance for understanding why Deleuze and Guattari find him such an attractive figure from which to draw upon in developing their theory of the State.

Clastres maintains that it would be a mistake to interpret the temporary attainment of authority by the chief as an exception which somehow undermines his general principle that the institution of chieftainship is meant to ward off the formation and consolidation of the State. On the contrary, Clastres argues that it is in fact *war* which serves as the primary mechanism to prevent the formation of the State. This thesis is especially striking when contrasted to Hobbes' theory of the State which argues, to the contrary, that the state of war, "where every man is Enemy to every man," is a defining condition of the state of nature. For Hobbes, it is everyone's right of nature to ensure their self-preservation. It is the fear and desperation caused by the perpetual state of war found in the state of nature, moreover, which drives human beings to enter into a commonwealth—that is, to establish the sovereign State. While it could be said this understanding of the state of nature is merely an abstraction, without reference to some concrete reality, Hobbes himself entertains the possibility that the state of nature as he understands it is a condition which existed among the indigenous people of the Americas of his day:

It may be a preadventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many place of *America*, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.¹⁵

According to Hobbes' logic, the lack of any recognizable form of "State society" among the indigenous peoples of the Americas during his time attests to the under-developed nature of these societies. Their difference is not understood and respected as *difference*, but is interpreted according to a logic of identity which negatively understands these societies as lacking the rational and authentic form of political and historical community, the State.

For Clastres, by contrast, war is understood as having an altogether different function among these societies. While the chief desires war because the successful completion of military campaigns increases his prestige, standing, and level of respect, he is always limited by the desire of the collective. A society wanting peace, Clastres suggests, cannot be forced to conduct a war. The chief who cannot control his desire for war in this situation is forced to go alone. This, says Clastres, was the fate of the South American warrior Fousiwe: "He saw himself deserted by his tribe for having tried to thrust on his people a war they did not want. It only remained for him to wage that war on his own, and he died riddled with arrows."¹⁶ The chief's desire for war is never allowed to successfully transform into a will to wield power over his people. It is in this respect that war in these societies has a double effect: the segmentarity of groups is maintained and warriors wishing to counteract this segmentarity through the consolidation of military power are exiled or otherwise cut off from their community. In short, for Clastres, war in indigenous American societies has the following function: "To assure the permanence of the dispersion, the parceling, the atomization of the groups. Primitive war is the work of a *centrifugal logic*, a logic of separation, which is expressed from time to time in armed conflict. War serves to maintain each community's political

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Edited by C.B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 187.

¹⁶ Clastres, *Society Against the State*, p. 178.

independence."¹⁷ The major effect of this centrifugal force is to maintain a logic of dispersal and of the multiple and to resist the logic of unification, the logic of One. "What is the other name of this One that primitive society by definition refuses?" Clastres asks. "It is the State."¹⁸ Clastres thus achieves an interesting reversal of Hobbes: war in Hobbes' state of nature results in the establishment of the State; war in Clastres' account simultaneously anticipates and wards off the formation of the State.

The *Urstaat* hypothesis maintains not only that the State appeared all at once and ready-formed, but also that it was acting in specific historical conditions even before it materially appeared. Deleuze and Guattari understand the importance of Clastres' thesis to be that collective institutions among indigenous people of North and South America simultaneously warded off *and* anticipated the formation of the State. Deleuze and Guattari augment this thesis with the principle of "reverse causality" which they draw from recent studies in the physical and biological sciences. This is a principle, they argue, which testifies "to an action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past...which [implies] an inversion of time. More than breaks or zigzags, it is these reverse causalities that shatter evolution."¹⁹ Consequently, it becomes possible to argue that in hunter-gatherer societies the State

was already acting before it appeared, as the actual limit these primitive societies warded off, or as the point toward which they converged but could not reach without self-destructing. These societies simultaneously have vectors moving in the direction of the State, mechanisms warding it off, and a point of convergence that is repelled, set outside, as fast as it approached. To ward off is also to anticipate.²⁰

This is a crucially important point for understanding Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of evolutionary accounts of the "rise" of the State. It is a criticism, moreover, which applies not only to social institutions, but also applies to the

¹⁷ Pierre Clastres, *Archeology of Violence*, Translated by Jeanine Herman (New York: Semiotext[e], 1994), p. 164. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 431.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

realm of political economy. For Deleuze and Guattari, the thesis that the State arose from agricultural communities with their already established forms of production—agriculture, animal raising, metallurgy—is an implausible and ultimately untenable proposition: "we do not see how the State can be explained by what it presupposes, even with a recourse to dialectics."²¹ Rather, they contend that it is the State that creates these forms of production; it is the State which makes large-scale macro-projects, surpluses, and public institutions possible. The State, therefore, is already in existence in hunter-gatherer societies: "the State is established directly in a milieu of hunter-gatherers having no prior agriculture or metallurgy, and it is the State that creates agriculture, animal raising, and metallurgy; it does so first on its own soil, then imposes them upon the surrounding world."²²

The *Urstaat* hypothesis can, therefore, be understood as not only a rejection of the progressive evolutionary accounts of the origin of the State, but also of the spatial mode of thought which informs these accounts. The spatial and linear conception of time which is implicit in such evolutionary approaches is rejected in favour of a temporal synthesis of becoming which sees the past, present, and future in a form of coexistence. The linear time of evolutionary approaches trace progressive social and economic developments. For instance, the dispersed and loose associations of local groups is understood to lead to the formation of small villages, which are in turn consolidated into cities which, finally, coalesce into States. This evolutionary manner of explaining the formation of States spatially separates the different stages in a strict segmentary fashion, with an identifiable beginning and end. Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, emphasize the coexistence, the "contemporaneousness" of these "stages" with one another. The societies existing "before" the State are contemporaneous with those which exist "after" the State. Historical accounts of the "rise" of the State which assume a spatialized understanding of time (i.e. as linear and progressive) merely translate this temporal coexistence into progressive and spatial succession toward the realization of the State. Indeed, it is the spatial logic of linear time which makes the whole notion of "historical

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

²² *Ibid.*, p.p. 428-429.

stages" at all possible: "All history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession."²³

Immanent Lines

An objection might be raised against Deleuze and Guattari's *Urstaat* hypothesis on the grounds that it is far too abstract to be of any use in the "real" and nasty world of statist politics. But abstractions are often powerful means of explaining the concrete. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari understand abstract theories as practices which participate in the realization of the concrete: "Practice does not come after the emplacement of the terms and their relations, but actively participates in the drawing of the lines."²⁴ While Deleuze and Guattari identify three different broadly-defined historical forms of the State,²⁵ the State which is referred to in the *Urstaat* hypothesis refers primarily not to specific historical entities, but rather to abstractions that are realized in varying degrees in concrete situations. At this level of abstraction it is perhaps more appropriate to make a distinction between the *State-form* and the *State*. In any case, how these abstractions coalesce into specific concrete situations is an important question that requires an elaboration of how Deleuze and Guattari understand society in general to be composed.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari introduce a two-fold distinction between *molar* and *molecular* processes. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, this distinction is replaced with one of "lines" of power and desire of varying degrees

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 430.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁵ "We distinguish three major forms: (1) imperial archaic States, which are paradigms and constitute a machine of enslavement by overcoding already-coded flows (these States have little diversity, due to a certain formal immutability that applies to all of them); (2) extremely diverse States—evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies—which proceed instead by subjectification and subjection, and constitute qualified or topical conjunctions of decoded flows; (3) the modern nation-States, which take decoding even further and are models of realization for an axiomatic or general conjugation of flows (these States combine social subjection and the new machine enslavement, and their very diversity is a function of isomorphy, of the eventual heteromorphy or polymorphy of the models in relation to the axiomatic)." *Ibid.*, p. 459.

of segmentarity (rigid to supple) as well as the line of flight. From this perspective it becomes important when discussing the nature and function of the State to resist the temptation to solely analyze macro-processes or molar entities. What is crucial is to comprehend how molar entities such as the State are, in fact, composed of the intersection of smaller, *molecular processes*, or "lines."

In *Dialogues*, Deleuze discusses with Claire Parnet three different lines of power and desire which compose individuals and groups. First, the *molar line*, or rigid line of segmentarity, is composed of well-determined segments. The segmented progression of family—school—army—factory—retirement is a typical example of how a molar line operates in the lives of individuals. Such a line is socially determined and is over-coded by the institutional structures of the State apparatus. Its rigid segments, moreover, depend on a spatial dualistic logic; it acts as a "binary machine" which hierarchically orders and classifies gender into male and female, age into child and adult, sectors into private and public, and so on. The logic of the molar line is not, however, purely dualistic, but rather operates diachronically: if not x or y, then z; if not man or woman, then transvestite. The *molecular line*, or line of supple segmentarity, is, by contrast, composed of segments which are at times ambiguous, tracing unusual detours, and acting like quanta of deterritorialization. It is a fluid line which maps processes of change, movement, and reorganization. It is connected to a multiplicity of "becomings" (becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-child, etc.) as opposed to the binary machines and stable forms of identity (being) associated with the molar line.²⁶

The distinction between molar and molecular lines should not, however, be interpreted as a spatial form of binary opposition. The lines are not distinct processes, but are, on the contrary, immanent to one another; they coexist on a single field of interaction. The lines intermingle, always crossing over one another, transforming themselves and each other. "No one of them is

²⁶ For a discussion of the nature and functioning of these lines, see Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.p. 124-134. See also Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.p. 192-207. For a further elaboration on the significance this molecular form of becoming has on Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the subject, see Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Plateau #10, "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...", p.p. 232-309.

transcendent, each is at work within the others. Immanence everywhere."²⁷ The implications this has for how the social field is understood and for how political analysis should be conducted is of significant importance. As Deleuze and Guattari state: "Every society, and every individual, are thus plied by both segmentarities simultaneously: one molar, and other *molecular*. If they are distinct, it is because they do not have the same terms or the same relations or the same nature or even the same type of multiplicity. If they are inseparable, it is because they coexist and cross over into each other."²⁸

The distinction between molar and molecular lines is not a distinction between "bigger" and "smaller," or a "whole" and a "part." The distinction is not one of scale, but rather one of composition; a qualitative distinction is at work, not a quantitative one. The molecular line enacts local connections which are supple in nature, with continually shifting and fluctuating boundaries. With the molar line these molecular processes become rigid, stable, homogenized, with well-defined boundaries. It is for this reason that molar lines are *identified* as a unity. This unity, however, should not distract one from remembering that the molar line can only be conceived in relation to other, variable, molecular processes: "A molarity remains a multiplicity—only a disciplined one."²⁹ It is in this sense that Deleuze's politics can be labeled a "micropolitics" only with serious qualifications. Conventional (although highly contentious) readings of post-structuralist thought often associate it with "new" forms of molecular- or micro-politics arising in response to an already constituted molar politics or macropolitical State. Deleuze and Guattari are highly resistant to offering such a dualistic conception of politics. Such a framing of the problem relies on a spatial form of thought; the opposition between a molecular politics on the one hand and a molar politics on the other relies on a binary logic of "here" and "there" which is itself spatial. Because the lines that compose the molecular and the molar are immanent to one another, micropolitics can hardly be understood as a new or

²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 205.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 213. Emphasis in original.

²⁹ Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations From Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 55.

novel phenomenon. As Deleuze and Guattari state: "everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*."³⁰

From this perspective, any discussion of the form and function of a molar or macro-organization such as the State must pay careful attention to how macro- and micro-processes intersect, intertwine, and interact with one another in any given situation. The immanence of the molar and molecular lines should be stressed in order to emphasize that there is nothing about molecular or supple segmentarity which necessarily makes it "better" than the molar line. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari stress this immanence in order to highlight how together the two lines actively create and reinforce such totalitarian and destructive forms of political regimes as fascism. To equate fascism with the National Socialist State and its apparatus, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is to understand it only in macropolitical terms. What is missing is an analysis of processes occurring on the molecular level; micro-fascisms of the family, the school, the factory, and the neighbourhood all interact together independently and prior to the formal institutional consolidation of fascism in the macropolitical realm. "But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, *before* beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State."³¹

The problem of resisting fascism should not only be directed at its historical and institutional forms (i.e. the fascist States of Hitler and Mussolini) but also the microfascisms that lie within all individuals. As Michel Foucault asks in his preface to *Anti-Oedipus*:

How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behaviour?³²

³⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 213. Emphasis in original.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 214. Emphasis in original.

³² Michel Foucault, "Preface," in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. xiii. It is with these questions in mind that Foucault calls *Anti-Oedipus* "a book of ethics" and suggests that the book could have been alternatively titled "Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life."

How, in other words, does one respond to Wilhelm Reich's famous question: "Why do men [sic] fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?"³³ For Deleuze and Guattari, the answers to these questions do not lie in blaming individuals for possessing a "false consciousness." The idea that individuals are merely passive receptors easily duped by ideological trickery is a position Deleuze and Guattari refuse to accept. In addition, the authors refuse to subscribe to the notion that some unconscious masochistic tendency resides within individuals to make them actively "want" their own repression and so passively submit to power. Instead, from the perspective of noology, the spatial and dualistic image of thought which has held hegemonic in the West can be said to emphasize space over time, macro over micro, molar over molecular. Consequently, it becomes difficult to conceptualize domination or resistance in a non-dualistic form. It becomes difficult to see how these alleged binary opposites are, in fact, immanent to one another and how domination and resistance can then be conceived in terms of the specific interactions between macro- and micro-processes, between molar and molecular lines: "It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective."³⁴ What is of paramount importance to Deleuze and Guattari is not—or rather, not only—how individuals become oppressed by external powers or circumstance, but how individuals actively participate in their own oppression, even when they are attempting to escape or resist it.

Despite the temporal nature of the molar and molecular lines, one might raise the objection that what Deleuze and Guattari are proposing is a structural condition which is spatial and static. Such an interpretation would see the immanence of the lines as evidence of a closed system which prevents any form of escape. To prevent such an interpretation, it is necessary to introduce a third line, a "pure abstract line," without form, and yet one which is just as real as the other two. This is the line of flight, a line which does not tolerate segments and instead acts like a vector of absolute deterritorialization. For Deleuze and Guattari, the stability of any line of segmentarity (rigid or supple) always has its

³³ Quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 29. Emphasis in original.

³⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 215.

limits: "Stability is not fixity. It is variation within limits."³⁵ A structure, a body, the composition of line, the State—all of these are defined by their limits, by their thresholds, by what escapes them. The line of flight intersects with the molar and molecular lines (which it is also immanent to) only to break down their segmentarity, appropriate some of it, and transform it into something else. It is a line of mutation. Molar "unities," such as the State, are continually trying to capture and harness the productive power of the line of flight. This is never, however, an absolutely successful endeavor. There are always cracks through which the line of flight might slip. This subversive and productive element of the line of flight is perhaps why Deleuze and Guattari privilege it over the other two lines. Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, the Marxist proposition that society is defined by its contradictions only makes sense on the macro level of the great unities of State, economy, and class. Focusing on the molecular level, however, leads Deleuze and Guattari to an altogether different conclusion: "We would rather say that, in a society, everything flees and that a society is defined by its lines of flight which affect masses of all kinds (here again, 'mass' is a molecular notion)."³⁶

While the line of flight is distinguished by its disruptive effects, for its ability to create "runoffs" in the social field in which it operates, it is not, it should be stressed, a means by which to "escape" from society. Such an interpretation would counter the immanence and productive character of the line of flight. "The great and only error lies in thinking that a line of flight consists in fleeing from life; the flight into the imaginary, or into art. On the contrary, to flee is to produce the real, to create life, to find a weapon."³⁷ In its immanence, the line of flight escapes *within*, rather than *from* the social field it occupies. Consequently, the line of flight should not be read as a means of "resistance" in the conventional sense—that is, working to overthrow or bring about the destruction of an existing system. The line of flight has no such negative or purely reactive function. It is rather concerned with working positively to create a new reality, one which

³⁵ Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p. 57.

³⁶ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 135.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

subverts and transforms the rigid segmentary lines of the State which attempt to capture and control the flow of all lines.

In addition, while the line of flight can be characterized as a Nietzschean form of joyous creation, Deleuze and Guattari warn that there are great dangers specific to the line. The apparatus of capture of the State is continually working to recoup, to capture and control these lines. There is also the possibility that the line of flight will revert on its own to either the rigid or supple segmentary line. For instance, versions of the gay rights movement which focus on legal equality for sexual "minorities" may be understood as a line of flight as conventional norms of sexual behaviour are subverted. The danger involved here, however, is that "equality" is a State-defined, or molar concept. Consequently, what is realized is not a process of becoming-other, but rather one of becoming-the-same.³⁸ In this view, focusing one's political energy exclusively on macropolitical concepts or fields of action—through, for instance, reform or oppositional movements—becomes extremely difficult, even problematic. As Brian Massumi has commented: "Reform politics favoring gradual change runs the risk of slow death by creeping molarity. Oppositional politics intent on head-on confrontation at all costs carries other dangers: sudden death on an ill-prepared battleground, or through instantaneous molarization."³⁹

From a political point of view, and especially from one which is sensitive to debates surrounding the nature and function of the State, what is important about the functioning of these lines is that, together, they constitute what Deleuze and Guattari call "assemblages."⁴⁰ The importance of the concept of the assemblage to Deleuze and Guattari's work should not be understated: "All we know are assemblages."⁴¹ An assemblage is a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose only unity is that they function or work together. There are, moreover, two elements to an assemblage. First, there are *states of things or bodies*. For Deleuze and Guattari, a body can be anything—a human, an

³⁸ See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.p. 350-351.

³⁹ Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p. 106.

⁴⁰ "Any assemblage necessarily includes lines of rigid and binary segmentarity, no less than molecular lines, or lines of border, of flight or slope." Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 132.

⁴¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 22.

animal, a technology, a State—but what defines it is its capacity to function with other bodies. The authors employ Spinoza's term "affects" when referring to these functional capacities:

We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its *affects* are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body.⁴²

The second element of an assemblage is *regimes of signs or utterances*. This element should not be interpreted epistemologically; regimes of utterances do not purport to *explain* the states of bodies. The only relationship between the two elements is a functional one: "The only unity derives from the fact that one and the same function, one and the same 'functive,' is the expressed of the utterance and the attribute of the state of body."⁴³ Within every assemblage, moreover, there coexist two types of movement: one is a movement of reterritorialization, where a "territory" of codes is established; the other is a movement of de-territorialization, where a line of flight disassembles an assemblage and transforms it into something else. Assemblages can thus be characterized in two ways: according to a static *form* and to a dynamic *function*.⁴⁴

The importance of this discussion is that Deleuze and Guattari understand the State to be an assemblage.⁴⁵ The implications which result from understanding the State to be composed of a multiplicity of immanent lines of power and desire are enormous. From the outset, the State, as a political concept, can no longer be seen as being purely molar, singular and universal, a totality in and of itself. Rather, the State coexists on a conceptual field with other lines and consistently interacts with them. It is in this sense that while the State already always exists (*Urstaat*), it exists only in relation to an *Outside*: "the State

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 257. Emphasis in original.

⁴³ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.p. 69-71. For an excellent discussion of the concept of the assemblage, see Paul Patton, "Notes for a Glossary," *I & C* 8 (Spring 1981), p.p. 41-48.

⁴⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 513.

itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship."⁴⁶ This is not, however, a relation of spatial externality; the Outside cannot be reduced to that which is conventionally offered in international relations theory—that of other States, mediated through foreign policy. Such an Outside is merely the repetition of the Same. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari see the outside as simultaneously constituted in two directions:

huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire *ecumenon* at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the "multinational" type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.); but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power.⁴⁷

"These directions," the authors insist, "are equally present in all social fields, in all periods. It even happens that they partially merge."⁴⁸ The Outside, therefore, is not another physical place—that would be a molar spatial characterization—but is rather composed of lines which escape the State's attempts at incorporation. It follows that inside and outside are immanent to one another and cannot be conceived otherwise.

What is most important about the Outside, however, is that it attests to the existence of the *war machine*. "What becomes clear is that bands, no less than worldwide organizations, imply a form irreducible to the State and this form of exteriority necessarily presents itself as a diffuse and polymorphous war machine."⁴⁹ From Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, the war machine is an assemblage which stands for that which is *identified* as Other to the State. This form of otherness, however, should not be conceived negatively: $x = x = \textit{not } y$. As an assemblage, the war machine has its own distinct form and function and so constitutes a positive form of difference. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

this pure form of difference: "In every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus."⁵⁰ As assemblages, both the State and the war machine coexist in a perpetual field of interaction. Any discussion of the State must, therefore, appreciate this coexistence.

Assembling Order: The State-Form

The *Urstaat* hypothesis, it will be recalled, maintains that there is only one State which has always existed: "We are compelled to say that there has always been a State, quite perfect, quite complete."⁵¹ At this level of abstraction—that is, analyzing the State as an assemblage—the State can only be conceived in relation to its Outside, the assemblage Deleuze and Guattari call the war machine. As abstractions which exist prior to any concrete realization, assemblages may be characterized by their principles of construction and their modes of functioning.⁵² The State and the war machine, as distinct and separate assemblages, may be distinguished by their respective *form* and *function*. Comparing and contrasting the State and the war machine from this perspective will provide a useful means by which to assess the meaning of such familiar political concepts as domination, resistance, political space, and so on.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the essence of the State and, indeed, the political power of the State, is sovereignty: "The State is sovereignty."⁵³ As a form of political power, sovereignty is concerned with all manner of *appropriation*. Power here is linear and quantifiable; the State is always striving to increase its capacity to incorporate all that which it comes into contact with. "Sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally."⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

⁵² Patton, "Notes for a Glossary," p. 43.

⁵³ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 360.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

The political power of sovereignty, therefore, attests to the form of the assemblage of the State—that of a milieu of interiority. One of the principal characteristics of such a form, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is that the State tends to reproduce itself in identical forms. While it is true that States may be classified by their numerous ideological variations (e.g. socialist, democratic, authoritarian, etc.), Deleuze and Guattari instead emphasize the consistent form of interiority that is common to all States. Indeed, this aspect of interiority, as the constitution of a secure and stable *inside*, is the necessary condition of possibility for distinctions between different ideological forms of governing to be made at all. It is through the State's form of interiority, moreover, that distinctions between identity and difference may be made: the world is composed of sovereign States (identity) which are distinguished by internal forms of composition such as nationality, culture, language, forms of governing, and so on (difference). These differences, however, only exist by virtue of a prior logic of Identity. It is the Sameness of the form of the State, of its milieu of interiority, that allows differences between States to occur. The uniformity of the principle of construction of all States exists prior to any possible differences between States.⁵⁵

As with all assemblages, with every form (in this case interiority) there is a mode of functioning. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the State exists in a milieu of interiority only by virtue of its function of *capture*: "If it can help it, the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc."⁵⁶ The milieu of interiority is *created* by the function of capture. Capture is made possible through the constitution of striated space—that is, an absolute or "empty" space between nodal points which is enclosed by walls, borders, boundaries, and roads, and which is then regulated and controlled. In this way the State can create for itself "fixed paths in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in detail the relative movements of subjects and objects."⁵⁷ Indeed, historically, one of the most

⁵⁵ "There is a unity of *composition* of all States, but States have neither the same *development* nor the same *organization*." *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

fundamental tasks of the State has been this striation of space in order to control all manner of flows (capital, populations, commodities, etc.). China's Great Wall is a stunning example of the State's capacity to striate space. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge their debt to the work of Paul Virilio in this regard. They quote a suggestive passage from Virilio's *Speed and Politics* to support their position:

the political power of the State is *polis*, police, that is, management of public ways....[T]he gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against the fluidity of the masses, against the penetration power of migratory packs.⁵⁸

The importance of the constitution of an enclosed and striated political space through the control and regulation of movement should not be underemphasized. The historical case of the medieval city-as-fortress is illustrative in providing a concrete example of the constitutive nature of the function of capture. The fortified walls of the medieval city were so effective in constituting and controlling the relationship between "interior" and "exterior" that, as Michael Shapiro has commented, it was "less appropriate to ask about policymaking *in* the city than to think of the city itself as a policy."⁵⁹

Capture has two moments to it: the constitution of a *general space of comparison* which allows differences in qualities to be comparable to one another, and the establishment of a *mobile centre of appropriation* which provides the necessary condition for comparison to occur.⁶⁰ Take, for instance, the example of population flows. States are confronted with all manners of human traffic at their borders every day. The constitution of a general space of comparison allows for the establishment of categorization schemes to distinguish between immigrants, tourists, migrant workers, illegal aliens, refugees, and the like. Centres of appropriation are established to capture, regulate, and control these flows. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, for example, outlines in thirty-three

⁵⁸ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 386. See Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics*, Translated by Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext[e], 1986).

⁵⁹ Michael Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 86. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.p. 441-444.

categories those individuals excluded from admission into the United States.⁶¹ The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is responsible for ensuring that categories of admission and control are maintained. Indeed, the abbreviated term "INS," like so many other abbreviations, corresponds to what Marcuse called a "cunning of Reason" in that it helps deflect and repress undesired questions—in this case, the meaning implicit in the term "Naturalization."⁶² The naturalization function of the INS is to take individuals from the "outside" into the interiority of the State and make them conform to various regulative apparatuses: labour laws, citizenship requirements, conditions of visas, etc. The idea that the United States is the great "Melting Pot," always ready to take in a great variety of peoples, is an illustrative example of the States' function of capture. The "pot" has its own (albeit historically contingent) predetermined form. Not everyone can be included, but those who are must be melted down, stripped of their previous identities, and, within certain historically variable limits, accept the identity that comes with admission into the United States. In short, the purpose of the INS is quite simple: when confronted with strangers, turn them into friends or enemies. If they are friends, take them in and make them into the Same. If they are enemies, then at all costs keep them out and treat them as Other. The binary machine of the molar line which dominates the assemblage of the State ensures that all difference is framed in terms of a logic of Identity. Consequently, the function of capture does not need to effect the inclusion of *all* peoples at the borders of the State in order to enact control over them. The function of capture can institute order through a "naming" function—that is, by controlling how identity and difference are framed.

Evidence of the State's creation of a milieu of interiority through the establishment of an apparatus of capture can also be readily drawn from the established canon of political theory. Hobbes' theory of sovereignty is an

⁶¹ Some of the more interesting exclusions include individuals who are "feeble-minded" or polygamists. The list has since been substantially revised with many of the exclusions based on political ideology altered or removed altogether. Among those still barred entry by the Act, however, are the "insane," individuals who are mentally retarded or inflicted with a "sexual deviation," and members of a communist party or any other "totalitarian" party. Individuals inflicted with any "dangerous contagious disease"—including, since Senator Jesse Helms amendment to the Act was unanimously adopted in 1987, the HIV virus. See Marion T. Bennett, *American Immigration Policies: A History* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p.p. 145-147.

⁶² Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 94.

obvious example but one in risk of being dismissed as the product of an overly "nasty and brutish" society. Other, more "humane," examples persist, however. Take, for instance, Thomas More's *Utopia*. Generations of theorists and social activists have invoked the name of More's well-ordered polity to describe political communities which seek to institute the most humane, just, and well-ordered society. Yet even this "utopian" society is characterized by the form of interiority and function of capture which Deleuze and Guattari describe as characteristic of the assemblage of the State. More begins his account of Hythloday's recollection of Utopian society by situating the island geographically—a spatial placement which, it should be stressed, is marked by enclosure. The island itself takes on the appearance of a crescent moon—it has a maximum breadth of 200 miles, with tapering ends which amount to a circumference of 500 miles.⁶³ The shape of Utopia keeps the island protected from the wind, keeping the internal bay of the island "quiet and tranquil" for Utopian and friendly visiting ships. This *constructed* shape of the island, it should be added, ensures the strict control of those who may enter and exit the island. This is a crucial element to the theme of spatial enclosure and capture that runs throughout *Utopia*. The processes for determining inclusion and exclusion are worth quoting at length:

The entrance to this harbor, with shallows on one side and rock on the other, is terrifying. Almost in the centre of this inlet, on the one rock that rises above the water, the Utopians have built a tower manned by a garrison. The other rocks are hidden and treacherous. Since the Utopians alone know the channels, it seldom happens that any foreigner penetrates to the inner coast without a Utopian pilot. Even these pilots would not be able to enter the harbor, without the aid of certain navigational marks on

⁶³ This, of course, is a mathematical impossibility. This may have perhaps been a minor slip-up on More's part, or perhaps it was meant to call attention to the fact that Utopia is not historically situated. It is rather like its founder and creator, Utopus, whose name translates into "nowhere" or "no place." Just as Utopus, the ideal autocrat who legislated himself out of existence, Utopia, as described, constitutes a mathematical contraction, and so cannot exist. It may also be that More, a great ironist, wished to highlight that what may seem to be the most "perfect" State still relies on the same series of exclusions that characterized English society of his day. This reading of *Utopia* is particularly suggestive when read in context of the "enclosure movement" of More's England as well as the passages in *Utopia* which deal with the enemies of the Utopians, especially the Zapoletans.

the shore. If these marks were shifted, the Utopians could easily lure an enemy fleet, no matter how well prepared, to destruction.⁶⁴

This passage illustrates the geographical means by which the "outside" can either be warmly received into the "inside" as worthy visitors, or rejected wholesale as undesirables. The physical construction of the island allows for a relationship between Utopia and the world which places a great deal of emphasis on ensuring a secure and stable, beautiful and ordered *inside*, one which is protected from the dangers and threats, the undesirable and historical contingencies of the *outside*.

Assembling Resistance: The War Machine

The function of capture demonstrates that the State is always a reactive and secondary entity; it relies on the existence of primary processes that it may capture and control: "States cannot effect a capture unless what is captured coexists, resists in primitive societies, or escapes under new forms, as towns or war machines."⁶⁵ It is in this sense that the State can only be conceived in relation to its Outside—the assemblage of the war machine. The primary flows which the State strives to capture and regulate within its milieu of interiority are of the war machine. Before the specific characteristics of the assemblage of the war machine are discussed, it should be noted that, at the level of political thought, Deleuze and Guattari's work should be placed in context of the political climate of leftist individuals in post-1968 France. Their work, as Paul Patton has suggested, "needs to be read in the context of an attempt to redefine what constitutes 'revolutionary' politics and to rethink the terms in which we evaluate social movements."⁶⁶ In terms of resistive actions, Deleuze and Guattari have, independently and together, directed their support toward "minority" movements—that is, social movements which articulate the concerns of women,

⁶⁴ Thomas More, *Utopia and Other Essential Writings*, James J. Greene and John P. Dolan, eds. (New York: Signet Classic, 1967), p. 53. For an excellent discussion of More's work in relation to the history of the concept of sovereignty, see Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.p. 121-127, 134-136.

⁶⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 435. Emphasis added.

⁶⁶ Paul Patton, "Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in *Mille Plateaux*," *Substance* 44/45 (1984), p. 63.

prisoners, migrant workers, gays and lesbians, the environment, and so on. In this context "minority" is used in a qualitative, not a quantitative sense. These movements deviate from dominate social codes of behaviour; they resist the molar line, as it were. But the term "resistance" here demands quotation marks. It is neither reform nor revolution in the conventional sense; it is neither an adjustment of the code nor is it a struggle to establish a wholly new code. Rather, "resistance," from Deleuze and Guattari's perspective, is an endless process of *becoming-minor*, of maintaining one's distance from the norm, of using one's minority status, one's own particularity, to assemble a war machine in creative opposition to the hegemonic codes of the State.⁶⁷ It is in this sense that while the relationship between the State and the war machine is one of two distinct assemblages, their distinct natures should not be interpreted to mean that they are radically independent in any atomistic sense: "It is in terms not of independence, but of coexistence and competition *in a perpetual field of interaction*, that we must conceive of exteriority and interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity, bands and kingdoms, megamachines and empires. The same field circumscribes its interiority in States, but describes its exteriority in what escapes States or stands against States."⁶⁸

While the concept of the war machine could be described in abstract, philosophical terms, Deleuze and Guattari stress the multiplicity of concrete historical examples that attest to its existence. They argue that the concept of the war machine can be readily culled from a variety of authors from a number of different disciplines and domains: myth (Dumezil), literature (Kleist), anthropology (Clastres), the history of science (Serres), and noology (Nietzsche). The thesis of the war machine can also be demonstrated by contrasting different games (chess vs. Go) and different ways of fabric-making (weaving vs. felt-making). The principal means by which the authors demonstrate the war machine thesis, however, is through a discussion of the historical conditions of existence of nomads. The war machine, Deleuze and Guattari contend, has

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁶⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.p. 360-361. Emphasis in original.

historically been associated with the process of becoming-nomad.⁶⁹ This position should not, however, be interpreted as essentialist; Deleuze and Guattari do not suggest that the figure of the nomad is the universal subject of *the* revolution. Indeed, they concede that the nomad is largely an anachronism in the present day situation.⁷⁰ In the contemporary era perhaps the environmental movement or queer activism would serve as exemplars of the war machine. The purpose of developing the concept of the war machine through the historical example of nomadism is merely an attempt by the authors to demonstrate how there have always existed real historical forces which have somehow managed to function in and, indeed, constitute the very "outside" of the State.

The war machine is constituted by processes which resist the attempts of capture by the State and so do not reside within its milieu of interiority. Consequently, as an assemblage with a distinct form and function, the war machine is defined by its milieu of exteriority which it creates through its function as a line of flight. The essential characteristics of the war machine can be illustrated by the nomad's relation to space. Whereas the State creates a "striated" space of walls, enclosures, and borders in order to preserve its form (that of interiority), the war machine creates and occupies a "smooth" space to maintain its own (that of exteriority).⁷¹ Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the

⁶⁹ A certain distinction in terminology should be introduced here. Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis of the *process of becoming-nomad* is distinct and separate from any call to *become a nomad*. The first is allied with a temporal image of thought which emphasizes the being-of-becoming while the latter is consistent with the dominant tradition in Western metaphysics which insists that the realm of being be emphasized over that of becoming.

⁷⁰ It is in this sense that the dates that accompany every "plateau" of *A Thousand Plateaus* are important: "The date corresponds to the point at which that particular dynamism found its purest incarnation in matter, the point at which it was freest from interference from other modes and rose to its highest degree of intensity....Section 12, for example, the "Treatise on Nomadology," is dated 1227 A.D. because that is when the nomad war machine existed for a moment in its pure form on the vacant smooth spaces of the steppes of Inner Asia." Brian Massumi, "Translator's Foreword," in Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. xiv. For a discussion of the contemporary relationship between nomads and State-societies, see "Nomads at the Crossroads," a special issue of *The New Internationalist*, 266 (April 1995).

⁷¹ The distinction between "smooth" and "striated" space is one which Pierre Boulez first made to distinguish between two kinds of space-time in music. See, Pierre Boulez, *Boulez on Music Today*, Translated by Susan Bradshaw and Richard Bennett (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Deleuze and Guattari provide a detailed discussion of the differences between

occupation of smooth space as one of the primary characteristics of the nomad: "The primary determination of nomads is to occupy and hold a smooth space: it is this aspect that determines them as nomad (essence)."⁷² The nomad's relationship to space is best describe as a fluid one. They do not merely move from one point to another—such is the movement of migrants, transhumants, tourists, and business travelers. For these groups it is the points of the journey that matter, the point of departure and the point of destination. For the nomad, by contrast, it is the journey itself which is of crucial importance: "every point is a relay and exists only as a relay."⁷³

The relationship between smooth and striated space can be further distinguished in geometric terms: "In striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another. In the smooth, it is the opposite: the points are subordinated to the trajectory."⁷⁴ For sedentary peoples, or peoples otherwise captured by the State apparatus, it is the points of any particular journey which are important; for nomadic peoples it is the *particular* line. The particularity of these lines is important to stress because, unlike the State, the war machine makes no claims to unity and possesses no common model of composition. The nature of lines also differs in smooth and striated space. Whereas with striated space the line is a metric determination or a spatial dimension, with smooth space the line is better understood as being a vector, a direction, a topological form of space. Smooth space is one of distances and directions, not the measures and properties of striated space: "Smooth space is filled by events or haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties."⁷⁵

The nomad's productive relationship to smooth space is important to stress. The relationship between the two is symbiotic: the nomad does not merely occupy smooth space, but also actively creates it. Space is not a

these two ways of understanding space in the final plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "1440: The Smooth and the Striated," p.p. 474-500.

⁷² Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 410.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

"natural" phenomenon; it is something which is created. Deleuze and Guattari recognize this active relationship, noting that "it has been established that the nomads make the desert no less than they are made by it. They are vectors of de-territorialization."⁷⁶ As the war machine is the invention of the nomads it follows that this mutually productive relationship between nomads and smooth space applies to the war machine as well: "we have seen that the war machine was the invention of the nomad, because it is in its essence the constitutive element of smooth space, the occupation of this space, displacement within this space, and the corresponding composition of people: this is its sole and veritable positive object (*nomos*). Make the desert, the steppe, grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary."⁷⁷

Unlike the State, which strives for public recognition of its unity of composition, the war machine exists in many varied and diverse forms. Some variations of the environmental movement or feminist politics can be understood as constituting a modern day war machine. This diversity is the result of the primary function of the assemblage of the war machine—that of the line of flight. Indeed, the form of the war machine—that of exteriority—is possible only because the object of the war machine is "the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and the movement of people in that space."⁷⁸ Lines of flight have a disruptive effect, creating "runoffs" in the social field in which they operate. They are lines of mutation, of transformation, of creation. They are also, however, potential lines of danger, of destruction, of abolition:

the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, *turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition.*⁷⁹

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 229. Emphasis in original.

Whether or not a particular line of flight will become a line of life or a line of death⁸⁰ depends upon whether it successfully connects with the Outside or whether it connects with and is appropriated by a molar line. The danger inherent in the line of flight becomes particularly acute in its interaction with the State apparatus. The apparatus of capture of the State is continually working to recoup, to capture and control lines of flight: "One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus."⁸¹

Despite its name, the war machine is external to and has no necessary relationship to war. The same holds for the State: "*The State has no war machine of its own.*"⁸² This is not to say that the State is fundamentally peaceful, passive, or benign. On the contrary, the State possesses its own form of violence—that of *capture*—in the form of prisons, police, immigration authorities, and so on. These are, however, forms of violence that exist within the domestic realm, within the State's milieu of interiority. To explain the appearance of external forms of war, Deleuze and Guattari invoke Clausewitz's theory of pure, unconditioned, "absolute" war, where war is understood as a pure Idea without any goal—political or otherwise—except the total annihilation of an enemy. From this perspective, war is external to States. States merely try to utilize and control this Idea to the best of their ability; they attempt to act as reasonable "conductors" of the Idea of pure war in concrete situations. Deleuze and Guattari seize Clausewitz's insights only to build upon them by arguing that the pure Idea is not that of war, but of the war machine: "The pure Idea is not that of the abstract elimination of the adversary but that of a war machine *that does not have war as its object* and that only entertains a potential or supplementary synthetic relation with war."⁸³ The war machine is always attempting to increase smooth space and the State is continually attempting to striate this smooth

⁸⁰ To call a particular line of flight a "line of death" is not to imply that lines of flight possess some latent death drive: "There are no internal drives in desire, only assemblages. Desire is always assembled; it is what the assemblage determines it to be." *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 355. Emphasis in original.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 420. Emphasis in original.

space. According to Deleuze and Guattari, war is the result of the interaction of these two distinct and incompatible assemblages.

Powers

Understood as assemblages, the State and the war machine constitute two opposite poles of a shared single field of perpetual interaction. The Identity of the State is contrasted to the Difference of the war machine. The State takes a form of interiority, constant and stable, which reproduces itself in recognizable identical forms. Hence, political theory is able to involve itself with the concerns and processes which occur within the milieu of interiority of the State, and international relations theory can assume the essential unit which constitutes international politics is that of the State. The war machine, by contrast, exists in a milieu of exteriority which it creates by virtue of its function, the line of flight. The consistency and stability of the interiority of the State is contrasted by the heterogeneity of the exteriority of the war machine—"it exists only in its own metamorphoses."⁸⁴ In contrast to the State, which always seeks public recognition of its status and its legitimacy, the war machine may be imperceptible. The war machine may exist as a peace movement, a technological innovation, a commercial circuit...all of which are continually at risk of being appropriated or captured by the State. The decorated General is always seeking to usurp the masked Zorro.

While the war machine is opposed to the State, it does not enact this opposition in a dualistic fashion. The opposition between the State and the war machine is asymmetrical. The binary pair of domination/resistance, although accurate to a degree, does not sufficiently convey the relationship between the two assemblages. The power of the war machine should not be understood negatively; it is not a reactive form of power. The war machine is not defined by any form of "lack" *vis-à-vis* the State. It is not simply resisting the State in order to take control of its apparatus. Nomads do not want to become sedentary. Assemblages are above all else distinguished by their functional capacities, and the assemblages which compose the State and the war machine are of entirely different natures and origins in this regard. "It is not enough to affirm that the

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

war machine is external to the [State] apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority."⁸⁵ Thus, the war machine, as a distinct assemblage, possesses its own form of *positive* power.

The power of the State, represented by its apparatus of capture, is a *power of appropriation*. The State continually strives to capture all that it possibly can, including processes associated with the war machine. Power, here, is a quantitative measure; it is concerned with spatial accumulation. The power of the war machine, by contrast, is a *power of metamorphosis*.⁸⁶ The war machine uses its power not for spatial accumulation, but for temporal transformation, for producing something wholly different. The war machine's power of metamorphosis allows for it to be captured by the State's apparatus of capture only to slip through the bounds of that capture to rise up again in another form. As Patton has noted, the war machine engages in a "creative process of increase or enhancement in the powers of one body, carried out in relation to the powers of another but without involving appropriation of those powers."⁸⁷

Contrasting the war machine's power of metamorphosis with the State's power of appropriation should not, however, be interpreted as an open invitation to valorize the former over the latter. There is a great deal of danger associated with the power of the war machine. The war machine's line of flight always presents alternative possibilities. It is always unstable, unpredictable, equally capable of realizing joyous creation or reverting into a segmented, conservative molar line. Line of life. Line of death. Since all lines are immanent, continually intersecting and crossing over each other, there is never absolute closure: the State may always work to striate space, but in the course of this striation lines of flight always escape, constituting new smooth spaces. This does not mean, however, that the State is incapable of controlling smooth spaces of its own. The sea, for instance, is an exemplary smooth space, and one of the first smooth spaces to be striated by the State. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that one of the

⁸⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 354.

⁸⁶ The distinction between these two types of power appears in *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁸⁷ Paul Patton, "Metamorpho-Logic: Bodies and Powers in *A Thousand Plateaus*," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 25:2 (May 1994), p. 167.

reasons for the global hegemony of the West has been its capacity to striate the sea. One of the surprising results of this, however, has been the State's reconstitution of the sea as a smooth space, as is evidenced by the fleet-in-being:

As Virilio emphasizes, the sea became the place of the *fleet in being*, where one no longer goes from one point to another, but rather holds space beginning from any point: instead of striating space, one occupies it with a vector of deterritorialization in perpetual motion. This modern strategy was communicated from the sea to the air, as the new smooth space, but also to the entire Earth considered as desert or sea. As converter and capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it reimparts absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated.⁸⁸

A politics which recognizes the mutual immanence and interaction of assemblages of the State and the war machine understands the risks and dangers inherent in such a relationship. "[S]mooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment."⁸⁹ "Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 387. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 500.

Conclusion

Politics Precedes Being¹

This thesis began with a question and a puzzle. The question: Does Gilles Deleuze have a theory of the State? The puzzle: Why is Gilles Deleuze viewed as something of an enigma when he is read as a political theorist? I hope by now that it is fairly evident that the answers to both of these queries are critically and intimately dependent upon one another. Deleuze, I would like to suggest, does indeed articulate a theory of the State, but one which relies upon enigmatic political concepts and distinctions. These concepts and distinctions, moreover, have as their necessary condition of possibility a nomadic or temporal image of thought. Whereas traditional understandings and approaches to political theory have relied on the spatial and representational form of thought that has dominated Western philosophy, Deleuze approaches political theory from a temporal perspective which understands the world as a dynamic process of pure becoming. In this sense, *politics precedes being* because "being" is a molar concept which is nonetheless composed of a multiplicity of molecular lines. Molar concepts such as being are identified as unitary and absolute, but only after a prior political struggle on an immanent field of perpetual interaction with a multiplicity of molecular lines. Politics is the process of determining how these lines are assembled, organized, and controlled. Politics is always a matter of asking: "What are your lines (rigid, supple, and lines of flight) and what are the dangers on each?"²

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 203.

² See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.p. 124-147.

With regards to developing a theory of the State, Deleuze similarly refuses to "solve" the question of sovereign Statehood. He resists all temptations to employ a foundational logic to fix *the* meaning of the concept of the State. It is when the principle of sovereignty is left uncontested and the State is taken as the fundamental unit of political analysis that so much difficulty arises around social and political processes and practices which demonstrate a large degree of independence to the principle of State sovereignty. This is why global refugee flows constitute such a problem in modern State-centric politics. Refugees are not mere hic-cups in an otherwise harmonious order; they constitute a very real and very profound disruption to how both the location and nature of "politics" is to be understood. Without problematizing the spatial foundational logic of State sovereignty, all that can be expected are cries of confusion lamenting the imminent disappearance of the State or a stubborn insistence that the State is here to stay, at least for the moment.

Deleuze effectively side-steps debates intent on demonstrating that sovereign States are on the decline or insisting that they are alive and well. The spatial logic of here/there, presence/absence does not enter into Deleuze's temporal perspective. Instead, Deleuze understands the State as molar concept composed of a multiplicity of temporal molecular lines. Once assembled, these lines take on a specific form of interiority which is constituted by their function of capture. This function of capture, moreover, attests to the prior existence of an Outside which the State is continually trying to harness, control, and regulate. Indeed, the State only exists in relation to this Outside—a temporal assemblage Deleuze and Guattari call the war machine. From this perspective, it makes no sense to understand the State as a reified thing or entity; the spatial categories which have long defined the State in its many historical formations are no longer tenable. Understood as an assemblage of immanent lines of power and desire, the State must instead be conceived as a dynamic process. Indeed, as a practice, the State's primary function is to striate space in order to create a milieu of interiority (a "domestic" political space) which, from a macropolitical perspective, gives the State the *appearance* of stability and stasis. And as every magician knows, the appearance of reality is often enough for it to be taken as "reality" as such.

While the State is continually attempting to capture all that which is external to its milieu of interiority, those processes and practices which elude its

grasp constitute the assemblage of the war machine. In contrast to the appearance of stability and fixity of the State, the war machine is indeterminate, polymorphous, always changing, always emerging in unexpected sites in unusual, even imperceptible forms. Despite the State's continual attempts at capture, at striating the smooth space of the war machine, it is never completely successful. The war machine only exists in a milieu of exteriority which it creates by its lines of flight. Consequently, there is *always* a limit to the State. There are always processes and practices which escape the State's best efforts at capture. As Deleuze says to Claire Parnet: "The mistake would be to say: there is a globalizing State, the master of its plans and extending its traps; and then a force of resistance which will adopt the form of the State even if it entails betraying us, or else which will fall into local spontaneous or partial struggles, even if it entails being suffocated and beaten every time."³ The State has its limits and it is on these limits that one can simultaneously assess the nature and function of both the State and the practices of resistances to it. Consequently, theorizing "on the limit" allows one the sensitivity to temporal processes which are often left unaccounted for when a spatial, representational perspective is employed.

If both the assemblages of the State and the war machine are composed of a multiplicity of intertwining lines which are immanent to one another, it follows that what were once perceived as spatial and absolute interiors and exteriors are no longer tenable positions to maintain. Inside and outside must be re-conceptualized as immanent to one another. The disciplinary effects this argument has for how "foreign" and "domestic" politics are to be understood by academics, politicians, and social activists alike are enormous. In the first place, the disciplinary division of labour between political theory and international relations theory, as the investigation of life *within* and life *between* States, respectively, is critically undermined. The image of States as self-contained containers or units only makes sense from a spatially informed perspective. The temporal perspective Deleuze and Guattari employ in their discussion of the State shatters this image. The State and its Other, the war machine, are not spatially symmetrical. They are asymmetrical and yet immanent to one another, existing on a single field of interaction.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

Employing a temporal perspective, a nomadic form of thought, has important effects for how the "tradition" of politics is to be understood. Deleuze views philosophy as a creative activity of conceptual creation and so he creates a number of new concepts for his project of theorizing the State: assemblages, smooth and striated space, lines of various degrees of segmentarity...these are but a few. Nonetheless, Deleuze does not wipe the slate of previous political analysis completely clean; he does not wish to build a "new" form of political analysis in any absolute or foundational sense. Deleuze is adamantly resistant to outline a general political program. He places no predictive value on his theories. His is not a political *science*; he is not concerned with the systems, foundations, or final conclusions that drawing up a general political program implies. "There is no general prescription. We have done with all globalizing concepts."⁴ For Deleuze, to be seduced by the "general" will only bring out the General in you (who is authoritarian, hierarchical, and aligned with arborescent forms of thought and action). A "Deleuzian" politics is one which is particular, specific to the lines of a social field: "we have no system, only lines and movements."⁵ In this sense, politics is not about general prescription, but about "active *experimentation*, since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn."⁶

This commitment to experimentation can be seen in how Deleuze employs both familiar and unfamiliar political concepts. Although the received political theoretical traditions may articulate the prejudices of a white, patriarchal, heterosexist, Western culture, these prejudices have congealed through various historical practices into powerful political institutions and practices (e.g. the State). Consequently, while "new" concepts certainly have their place, "old" concepts, to the extent that they have created and continue to inform who "we" are and "what" politics is, must still be addressed. How these familiar and long-standing concepts are employed, however, is an entirely different matter. While Deleuze *speaks* of familiar terms such as the "State," he nonetheless insists that they must be *heard* altogether differently. We not only have to learn to write

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 350.

⁶ Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 137. Emphasis added.

differently by creating and employing new concepts, but we also have to learn to hear familiar concepts differently. As Nietzsche states: "We are looking for words; perhaps we are also looking for ears."⁷ Deleuze is someone who *stutters* when he talks and writes—he makes the easy flow of language, of familiar distinctions, harsh, unpleasant, and strange to the ear.⁸ Similarly, when read in relation to the disciplinary arrangements of the political science, Deleuze's temporal perspective makes him a conceptual political agitator *par excellence*. His writings on the State make the once familiar and seemingly obvious distinctions between foreign and domestic, between political theory and international relations, between inside and outside become very strange indeed.

The implications of Deleuze's temporal perspective on the State go far beyond disciplinary debates within the field of political science. They extend to, for instance, the problem of how ethics and responsibility are framed in relation to such political processes as global refugee flows. Deleuze's perspective on the State is important in this regard because how one conceptualizes a political community is integral to how responsibility is to be understood and enacted.⁹ The received accounts of international relations theory which understand the world to be composed of sovereign States in an anarchic realm insist that the application of ethics constitutes something of a problem. Generally speaking, the principle of State sovereignty ensures that ethical debates are something which political theorists concern themselves with within the spatial enclosures of particular States. Hence, policy on refugee flows may be developed by "global" institutions such as the United Nations, but the decision whether or not to enact such policy is up to particular sovereign States to decide. In this view, the anarchical realm which characterizes the "outside" of States allows only for "power politics" or relations between States, not ethical responsibility.

⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), p.p. 285-286, aphorism 346.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, "He Stuttered," in Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, eds. *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.p. 23-29.

⁹ For an excellent introductory discussion of this theme, see Daniel Warner, "An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations and the Limits of Responsibility/Community," *Alternatives* 18:4 (Fall 1993), p.p. 431-452.

This understanding of responsibility draws upon an analogy to the liberal self-identical self which views ethics and responsibility as external to subjectivity; ethics here is understood as an external body of rules, norms, and principles which merely await application. Critics of such analogies may take the position that, on the contrary, ethics and responsibility are integral to subjectivity. David Campbell, for instance, draws upon the work of Emmanuel Levinas to show how individuals are already always responsible to others because "being" is a condition of interdependence; the Other is always already constituted within the self.¹⁰ Such criticisms, however, have their own limits. In the case of Levinas, his account of subjectivity still tacitly assumes the existence of the State to provide the necessary conditions for distinctions between self and other to occur. What is required is a supplementary discussion of how the State is, in fact, in a condition of critical interdependence with its Other. If the spatial categories which separate the political world into separate and distinct States are replaced with temporal categories that understand political processes as existing in a field of immanent interaction, then the notion that citizens of a particular State cannot be held responsible for problems existing "outside" their community is no longer tenable in any absolute or foundational sense. Instead, it is the violence associated with the State's apparatuses of capture that gives the appearance that spatially enclosed communities are natural, normal, and inevitable. Capture, however, can only occur in a condition of *prior* processes and flows. The State is, thus, always a secondary entity. Consequently, responsibility can no longer be framed as a problem of spatial entities, but rather as a problem of making connections and enacting responsibility between peoples caught in a condition of temporal immanence. This is a position that follows from Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of the State and the war machine.

In closing, it should be noted that while many commentaries on Deleuze find it useful to contrast his work to either that of Hegel¹¹ or the various strains of Marxism,¹² I have chosen to play Deleuze off of Hobbes. To the extent that

¹⁰ David Campbell, "The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics After the End of Philosophy" *Alternatives*.19:4 (Fall 1994), p.p. 455-484.

¹¹ See, for instance, Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

¹² See, for instance, Paul Patton, "Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization," in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago:

Hobbes provides the paradigmatic account of modern State sovereignty and the spatiotemporal conditions such an account assumes, he remains a figure that must be addressed when assessing any contemporary theory of the State. In developing his theory of the State, Hobbes articulates a political ontology of fear. Etymologies of the word "fear" suggest that it once referred to a condition of transit, of being *between* spatial sites of safety and protection.¹³ Fear is thus associated with a condition of temporality. The logocentrism of Western thought which emphasizes the spatial over the temporal is utilized in Hobbes' work when he identifies the state of nature as a temporal condition which all rational individuals wish to escape. For Hobbes, the inevitable outcome of this condition of fear is the constitution of a spatially enclosed community which will protect individuals from the vicissitudes of temporal existence. This spatially enclosed community is, of course, the modern State.

For Deleuze, it is precisely this spatial resolution to the problem of fear that constitutes a problem. As the etymologies suggest, a situation of fear is not a situation of psychological fixation, but of movement. From a temporal perspective, Hobbes' spatial resolution of the problem of fear is not one which arrests movement. In Deleuze's terms, the molar line is still composed of a multiplicity of molecular lines. Similarly, Hobbes' State is not one of stasis and fixity, but a (controlled) fluid process of identity formation, of making-the-same. The paradigmatic identity in Hobbes' State is that of citizenship. Citizenship is a concept which attempts to resolve the problem of the relationship between the one and the many, between the universal and the particular. It allows for individuals to direct ethical and political obligation toward one another as citizens of a particular State. Other forms of possible of obligation which claim to speak for a universal humanity are of secondary importance. Citizenship is thus a concept predicated on the ability to make spatial distinctions between self and other, between "us" *here* and "them" *there*. There are Canadians in Canada and Hungarians in Hungary. Non-citizens (e.g. refugees) simply fall through the

University of Illinois Press, 1988), p.p. 123-139. It should be noted, however, that Deleuze considers himself a Marxist and is currently writing a book on "the greatness of Marx." His status as a Marxist is, not surprisingly, the subject of a great deal of contention and controversy.

¹³ See Thomas L. Dumm, *Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 148. For an interesting discussion of the role "fear" plays in the constitution of (post)modern subjectivity and community, see Brian Massumi, ed., *The Politics of Everyday Fear* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

cracks in this schema. Deleuze's valorization of the temporal realm through his insistence of the being-of-becoming allows for an alternative to Hobbes' resolution of the problem of fear. Deleuze's resolution is one which allows identity to engage with the temporal realm in a continual process of *becoming-other*. With this understanding of temporality, life is a continual process of joyous creation and self-transformation. The violence implicit in the State's spatial logic of inclusion and exclusion is side-stepped. Despite this joy, fear is not altogether vanquished. There is always the danger that becomings will be co-opted by the molar lines of the State. A Deleuzian politics is one which recognizes the powers of appropriation of the State and attempts to resist co-optation through the utilization of the productive powers of transformation and metamorphosis of the war machine: "We should dream no more about the disappearance of the State; we should rather choose...between becomings or endowing ourselves with a war machine and making ourselves nomad."¹⁴

¹⁴ Quoted in Constantin V. Boundas, "Editor's Introduction," in Gilles Deleuze, *The Deleuze Reader*, Constantin V. Boundas, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 14.

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Title of Thesis:

On the Limit of the State: Gilles Deleuze and the Politics of Space and Time

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September 13, 1995