The Political Praxis of Charles Taylor

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ABSTRACT

Charles Taylor is recognized as one of the world's leading philosophers, but his philosophy is generally considered in abstraction from his political actions in Canada. Taylor the philosopher is also a Canadian social democrat from Montreal. He has been an important figure, both in the politics of the Canadian left and and in the politics of Anglo-French relations in Quebec (and Canada generally). Reading Taylor's philosophical works together with his political works enables a different reading of both. This thesis examines Taylor's political writings during two phases of his career as an activist -- in the NDP between 1961 and 1975, and in the debates over the future of Quebec since 1979 -- and it compares the themes that emerge in his "activist" writing with the ones that he developed in his philosophical work over the same period. As becomes clear, the themes are not only similar, but their meaning becomes more apparent when read across the divide between philosophy and political activism. Taylor is not well interpreted as an American communitarian. On the other hand, the limitations of his political vision become more apparent, once we understand that vision as an effort to understand Canada in neo-Hegelian terms.

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INTRODUCTION

Charles Taylor is Canada's best known political philosopher. He is a distinguished and internationally renowned philosopher who often cuts against the grain of prevailing philosophical outlooks. This also results in him presenting a dissenting voice in the realm of politics. While his philosophical writings have received considerable scrutiny, his Canadian political activity has received far less attention. This activity is an important articulation of his philosophy which adds our understanding of his overall thinking.

Early in his academic career he participated in the founding of the journal *Universities and New Left Review*, which later became *The New Left Review*. His first book, *The Explanation of Behaviour,* was a trenchant critique of behaviourism, which appealed to many social scientists. He continued his critique of social science methodologies in a series of articles which were eventually compiled into two volumes of essays entitled *The Philosophical Papers Vol.1: Human Agency and Language*: , and *The Philosophical Papers Vol.2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. At the same time that he was furthering his critique of the prevailing thought in the social sciences Taylor also presented two highly acclaimed interpretations of the thought of Hegel: *Hegel,* and *Hegel and Modern Society.* Both of these interpretations sustain the relevance of Hegel's thought for contemporary social and political thinking. At the heart of much of this work was the pursuit of a clearer articulation of the nature of modern identity. The goal of greater clarity was pursued in a series of books entitled: *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, The Ethics of Authenticity* (which was first published as *The Malaise of*

Modernity), *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition,* and his most recent, *Philosophical Arguments.* In addition to an impressive academic publishing record Taylor also held the prestigious Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford between 1976 and 1981. He has also been a guest lecturer at numerous universities around North America and Europe.

Taylor's life's work has not been restricted to the academy; he has engaged in the politics of the Canadian state as well. In the early 1960's he participated in the formation of the New Democratic Party. He attained the rank of vice president in the party and participated in the development of party policy. In addition, he was an NDP candidate for Parliament four times, although he was unsuccessful each time. His participation in Canadian politics later focused on the relationship between the province of Quebec and the rest of Canada. During this period he often provided advice to both the Canadian federal government and the government of Quebec, advice suggesting national policies which might be best for each.[1] In the numerous debates which have inevitably surrounded the referenda regarding the status of the relationship of Quebec's *vis-à-vis* Canada, Taylor has

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[1] Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late-Twentieth-Century Canada," in *Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society in Canada,* ed. Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985. This essay was originally presented to the Royal Commission on Economic Union and development Prospects for Canada.; the essay "The Stakes of Constitutional Reform," in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism.* ed. Guy LaForest, Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, pp.140-154. was originally presented to the government of Quebec's Belanger-Campeau Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec.

been a powerful voice for the federalist cause. Still, he does believe that the current federal structure of Canada should be changed in order to accommodate some of the concerns voiced by Quebecers. Throughout this period Taylor's participation in Canadian politics has also taken the form of public discussions presented in magazines, books, academic articles, and on radio programs.[2]

Despite his vigorous personal political activity Charles Taylor is much better known as a philosopher, and most of the commentary and critique of Taylor's thought engages with him on this level. There are several reasons why Taylor has achieved acclaim in this sphere. He has made prescient critiques of several social science theories, and these critiques have been directed at various fields within the social sciences, and presented to several different audiences. Sometimes he writes for specialists in philosophy, sometimes he writes for specialists in particular fields of the social sciences, and sometimes he writes for popular audiences. Regardless of who his audience is, Taylor's writing style is incredibly clear and this has also permitted the presentation of his ideas to numerous audiences. Broad exposure partly explains Taylor's importance for contemporary thought, but it is not a sufficient explanation for the esteem which Taylor has garnered. Even if one

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[2] Charles Taylor's book *The Malaise of Modernity.* Concord, Ont.: House of Anansi Press Ltd.,1991. was originally presented as the 1991 CBC radio's Massey Lecture series.

writes clearly and to several audiences one must also have something relevant and important to say. An academic can achieve a degree of respect based upon cogent critiques of other's ideas, and an academic can achieve some esteem within a narrow field of study based upon an insightful analysis. In Taylor's case he has accomplished both these tasks, but he has done so while presenting an outlook that is broadly applicable to modern society and that applies to several different fields of study. Taylor's writings are quite compelling to many people because they address distinctively contemporary dilemmas as well as perennial dilemmas from the vantage point of a comprehensive world view. In short, an important part of Taylor's eminence comes from his unique and comprehensive philosophy of modern society.

In the realm of philosophy Taylor's major achievements have been his critiques of the application of ideas from the natural sciences to the social sciences; his modern interpretation of Hegel; and the application of his interpretive phenomenology to questions of modern identity. These achievements are not discrete projects; rather, they are part of a coherent body of thought. Taylor's critiques of the social sciences do not just impugn the validity of aspects of this mode of inquiry: they also suggest an alternative mode of inquiry. This alternative mode of inquiry is based upon some ideas found in Hegel's philosophy. From this base Taylor moves on to present what I am referring to as an interpretive phenomenology. It might appear that Taylor's thought is the result of successive moments, but I would argue that it has been a sustained effort to present a coherent set of ideas.[3]

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[3] Guy Laforest makes a similar observation in the introduction to his essay, "Philosophy and

Nevertheless, in order to see what these ideas are, and why they might be compelling for contemporary social and political thought I would like to illustrate briefly these angles of his work, and explain why they are compelling for others. In each one of these undertakings it is possible to find his philosophy being articulated in different situations in ways that demonstrate its broad relevance. This examination will then allow us to begin to explore the relationship between Taylor's philosophical writings and the writings which emerge from his political engagement with the Canadian state. It will become apparent that the continuity of themes and intentions that exists between the various aspects of his philosophical writings also applies to his activist political writings. Consequently, just as one must understand his critique of science in order to understand his Hegelianism or his interpretive phenomenology, so one must also understand his political activism in order to understand his overall philosophy. Phrased another way, the overall coherence of Taylor's philosophy directs us to search for and explore the conceptions of the good life which are articulated in his political activism.

The argument I intend to present extends beyond a simple tracing of the consistent parallels between Taylor's philosophical works and his Canadian political writings. Rather, I will argue that reading Taylor's philosophical work and his political works together enables a different reading of his philosophical work. Obviously such an effort will provide greater understanding of his political career, but the main focus of my argument will be

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Political Judgment in a Multinational Federation," in *Philosophy In an age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question.* Ed. James Tully, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.194-209.

against the tendency to interpret Taylor's philosophy in abstraction from his politics. At the same time I want to argue against contextualizations of Taylor which place him in an American communitarian context. A reading of Taylor that is based upon the coherence of his philosophical and political activities leads to a recognition of the fact that Taylor is Canadian social democrat from bi-lingual Montreal and that this has an important bearing upon his philosophy and his politics.

Certain misinterpretations of Taylor's work are highlighted by this reading. Specifically, Taylor's position on procedural justice is based upon a cultural and political experience where procedural justice is recognized, but is set within a set of institutions which allow citizens the potential, through a particular form of social democracy, to participate in and contribute to larger conceptions of the good life. This, in turn provides the community as a whole with the moral basis to act on questions of justice which might not be recognized or socially mobilized within a procedural justice framework. The absence of an understanding of this cultural and social setting has led to misinterpretations of Taylor's position on procedural justice.

This reading also offers us insights into both the strengths and limitations of Taylor's philosophy. The relationship between the individual and his language, institutions, and community is based upon a Canadian federal state where overlaps between pulls upon identity are mediated by a particular state structure. Taylor transposes his Hegelian conception of dialectics to the Canadian state. Recognizing this allows us to understand how his reading of the actualization modern identity might occur. At the same time,

Taylor's Hegelianism leads him to overemphasize the role of the dialectic in his politics and as a result movements and social groups that fall outside the dialectic have been marginalized in his thought.

CHAPTER 1: TAYLOR'S PHILOSOPHY

1.1 Taylor's Critique of the Social Sciences.

Taylor's objection to the application of the natural science methodologies to the social sciences is based upon the nature of the subject matter of the respective sciences. In the case of the natural sciences the subject matter is the material world and the relationships which occur within that world. According to Taylor, the natural sciences observe entities and their relationships in the natural world, and through these observations explanatory theories on the nature of these entities and their relationships are conceived. Experiments are then designed to demonstrate the validity of these theories. Validity is based upon the ability of a theory to predict a given outcome. When this methodology is applied to social sciences it can make some very powerful predictions. For instance, in the social sciences it is common to make use of complex computer programs to amass large amounts of data which are obtained through survey questions. These questions record the responses of various people to particular questions. This data base is the equivalent of a set of natural science observations. Various theories might then be suggested to explain some sort of social behaviour. For instance it might be hypothesized that people who have attained a high level of education will earn more money. Now, utilizing the information of the data base an explanatory correlation can be derived that will either substantiate or refute the hypothesis. If the correlation was positive then public policy decisions might be made based upon this information. Generally the questions and theories of social science are far more complex than this but the methodology in studies of this sort is basically the same:

observations are used for the formation of explanatory theories, and then these theories are tested through experiments whose observed result will either prove or not prove the theory in question, which, in turn, will provide some sort of explanation for social behaviour. Taylor's initial foil for this argumentation was behaviourism, but cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence have also been foils for this argument against form of inquiry. Taylor analytically draws together these social science outlooks as a "family of theories [that] shares an allegiance to 'naturalism...the view that man can be seen as part of nature...according to the canons which emerged in the seventeenth-century revolution in natural science.'"[4]

Taylor objects to this form of social science because it fails to *properly* account for the actual ideas or values which motivate a person to act in one way or another. In many respects it is anathema to this form of social science to account for the values which motivate human behaviour, because this form of inquiry strives to be value free in the same sense that the natural sciences seek to be objective. Taylor seeks to show that this goal is not achievable and that exercises which purport to be value neutral are in fact value laden. In numerous essays Taylor has approached this task by analytically displaying how certain social science explanations which purport to be value neutral are in fact based upon a set of values.[5] In other words, if you scratch beneath the surface of what is supposed to be the

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[4] Taylor, "Introduction," *Human Agency and Language"* p.2.

[5] Three essays which are exemplary of this position are: "Interpretation and The Sciences of Man," *Philosophy and The Human Sciences: Philosophical papers II.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.15-57.; "Neutrality in Political Science," *Philosophy*

natural state of social affairs you will find a moral outlook, or a set of values. To this end, Taylor argues that the natural sciences are based upon a view of the world as an atomistic compilation of discrete entities. When this view is brought into the social science arena people are seen as atomistic individuals. Individuals are then presumed to have a set of identifiable modes of thinking and interacting in the world. A privileged place is given to a mode of thinking called reason. The faculty of reason allows discrete individuals to adopt a disengaged position towards themselves. This disengaged position occurs when people attempt to observe their own thinking and behaviour in the same manner that one might observe a stone falling from a great height. By adopting this disengaged view of ourselves it is supposed that we will be able to discover how we think and reason. This outlook which asks us to conceive of people as discrete rational atomistic individuals tends to support a liberal political conception of the world. A strong version depicts individuals as metaphysically separate from social arrangements, as a result social facts are complex facts about individuals, and societies are constructs composed of individuals. Consequently, communities and institutions have no reality independent of the individuals who compose them, and so play no constitutive part in the constitution of those individuals. Social science of this variety might support other forms of politics, but the fact that it is based upon a certain assumption about humans (that they are individualistic, rational self-calculators) sustains an important element of the liberal political and moral outlook.

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and The Human Sciences: Philosophical papers II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.58-90; and "Social Theory as Practice," in *Philosophy and The Human Sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.91-115.

In opposition to this outlook Taylor argues that the human sciences should be based upon a different mode of understanding. According to Taylor, humans are embedded within social and cultural frameworks that are fundamental to any understanding of people. For Taylor, these social and cultural frameworks are outlooks which inform the way we think about the world, and it is a chimera to think that we can disengage and separate ourselves from these frameworks. The presumption that we can disengage from the world is itself a product of a particular social and cultural understanding of human nature which is found primarily, but not exclusively, in modern western society. Taylor has a second argument in his quiver. He argues that to be human involves a conception of 'the self', or human agency. Furthermore, he claims that it is *necessarily* the case that human agency is based upon a person being able to formulate a given set of alternatives based upon a conception of what would make or sustain a good life. To be human means that we assent to and pursue certain notions of the good, and these notions of the good form a background for what it means to be human. More importantly these notions of the good also form the background for the way we define ourselves. Hence, the way we live our lives is tied to our conceptions of the good.

Taylor uses the term "moral ontology" to describe the relationship between conceptions of the good and our conceptions of the self. Moral ontologies help us make sense of our lives by providing a background picture for "...identifying what makes something a fit object [of our respect] and correlatively formulating more fully the nature of the responses as well as spelling out what all this presupposes about ourselves and our

situation in the world."[6] This means, according to Taylor, not only that our conceptions of the good are the basis of our actions, but also that our actions are articulations of the good. These actions help us to understand more fully our conceptions of the good and our relationship to it.

In reference to social science, if the aim is to explain and understand human behaviour (particularly social behaviour) then Taylor's argument suggests that we must understand people's conception of the good. However, Taylor argues that conceptions of the good are not simply designated by a word or action. If this were the case, then the natural-science-inspired model of social science, which seeks an absolute objective understanding of behaviour, would be able to discern the conceptions of the good which motivate people. In practice, it is far more difficult to discern what motivates people to act in one way or another. One need only reflect upon one's own life to realize that what motivates us to act is rarely a transparent matter. A person might act in a particular way out of necessity, such as to preserve his or her life, but on many other issues it is not that simple. The feelings, thoughts and emotions which are a part of our lives and motivate us to act are not transparent. For instance, if someone is motivated to act out of shame, then that understanding of her conception of shame will be based upon a cultural and situational interpretation of a conception of good. In this case she would be shamed if she felt that she had failed to act in accordance with a social conception of what is good or proper.

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[6] Charles Taylor, *Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.* Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, p.8

However, this social conception of what is good and proper is very complex and multi-layered. In the case of shame, a situation which is shameful in one culture may not be in another culture. Transposing social activities, such as shame, into a model of social science which emulates the natural sciences would severely constrain or perhaps misconstrue important elements of the experience of shame, because it is not an absolute feeling or expression. Conceptions of the good are complex, and while they might be expressed, it is difficult if not impossible to designate them in an absolute way.[7]

As opposed to the natural science inspired model of social science, Taylor suggests a hermeneutic mode of inquiry. This mode of inquiry follows from the assumption that people are embedded in a society with certain conceptions of the good life. If a person wants to understand how another person organizes his life goals, then he will have to appreciate that person's conception of what would be an appropriate set of life goals. However, because the inquirer is also embedded in a social web with conceptions of the good then she must respect that her own inquiry is situated in a conception of what would be an appropriate set of life goals to pursue. This means that the exercise of understanding the source of another person's motivations is tied up with understanding the source of one's own motivations. This results in a dynamic where one increases one's understanding of another's life goals by relating them in some manner to one's own life goals, but the quest to

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[7] Charles Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol.1,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.215-247; "Theories of Meaning," in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol.1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.249-292.

understand an interlocutor's goals will simultaneously drive the inquirer to try to articulate and/or understand his own socially constituted conceptions of the good life. This form of social science does not assume that one can take a disengaged stance to one's self or the subjects of one's inquiry - other people. In this case the understanding of another is coeval with improved understanding of oneself, which in turn is coeval with understanding our community's conceptions of the good life.[8]

It is important to situate what Taylor is arguing within the general stream of events in the social sciences. When Taylor first embarked upon this mode of critique (in the early 1960's) the social sciences were employing methods adapted from the natural sciences. In fact this trend continues to this day. Taylor's critique demonstrates that this mode of inquiry does not help us understand some essential aspects of human behaviour. According to Taylor there are many important parts of social activity which are expressions of notions of the good life and these expressions cannot be reduced to absolute definitions. Attempts to do so either distort or fail to capture important aspects of human interaction. But Taylor's project transcends the level of critique, and suggests an alternative mode of inquiry for the social sciences. This alternative mode is based in a comprehensive alternative philosophical outlook on the world.

Taylor's conception of human agency takes on increased significance when we consider that the natural science outlook that he critiques is consistent with liberal free

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[8] Charles Taylor, "Hegel's Philosophy of Mind," in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol.1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.77-96.

market economics and the tenets of procedural justice outlooks which we will explore in greater detail in chapters 2 and 3. However, while Taylor argues for a different conception of human nature, it is important to understand that he does not simply discount the atomist outlook rather, he places it within in an Hegelian interpretive framework. Politically this means that the limits of this outlook must be recognized and transcended.

1.2 Taylor's Interpretation of Hegel

In some ways what Taylor is arguing is not new. Taylor situates his own critique of the social sciences within an ongoing philosophical debate between two streams of modern thought: Enlightenment rationalism and the post-Enlightenment response of Hegel.[9] According to Taylor, the Enlightenment was based upon a particular form of dualism. This approach sought to establish truths based upon an individual's clear and distinct ideas.[10] The way to these clear and distinct ideas is supposed to be an objective observation of ourselves. In other words, we employ a disengaged position and analyze ourselves in the same way we might observe an object. The aim is to discern the ideas which cause those actions. However, when we discern these ideas they are not a personal unique expression *per se*, they are the actions of an object which happens to be a human being. Taylor finds in

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[9] Charles Taylor, "Hegel's Philosophy of Mind," in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol.1,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.77-96.: first published in *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey Vol.4.,* edited by G. Flørstad, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983. pp.135-155.

[10] Taylor makes specific reference in, "What's Involved In A Genetic Psychology," in *Human Agency.* The term 'clear and distinct ideas,' while widely used should be attributed to Rene Descartes, "Meditations," originally published in 1637.

Hegel a more complex view of human agency which he calls a qualitative conception of human agency.[11] According to this qualitative view, human agency cannot be understood according to a cause and effect model, because humans are embedded in a set of institutions and practices of a community. In Taylor's extensive reflections on Hegel's complex philosophy it is possible to get a sense of this qualitative model of understanding through his discussions of the terms *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit.*

Taylor explains that Hegel uses the term, "*Moralität*" [to refer] to an obligation to realize something which does not exist. What ought to be contrasts with what exists. And connected with this, the obligation holds for me not in virtue of being part of a larger community life, but as an individual rational will."[12] In contrast, "*Sittlichkeit"* [refers to] the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am a part."[13] *Sittlichkeit* obliges us to sustain the institutions and ideas of my community. This obligation is based, in part, upon the role that these institutions play in contributing to the constitution of my identity. *Sittlichkeit* also appeals to that aspect of the Romantic aspiration often referred to as an expressive unity with nature and society. Taylor interprets the necessity of *Sittlichkeit* as based upon a different conception of human agency than the cause-and-effect model. According to Taylor:

When we think of a human being we do not simply mean a living organism,

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[11] Charles Taylor, "Hegel's Philosophy of Mind," p.80

[12] Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. p.83.

[13] Charles Taylor, *Hegel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p.376.

> but a being who can think, feel, decide, be moved, respond, enter into relations with others; and all this implies a language, a related set of ways of experiencing the world, of interpreting feelings, understanding his relation to others, to the past, the future, the absolute, and so on. It is the particular way he situates himself within this cultural world that we call his identity.[14]

This means that our identity is dependent upon a language and a related way of experiencing and interpreting the world, all of which presupposes a community. Language is not regarded as just a vehicle for communication; it expresses our experiences and feelings as situated in their community. To deny all this is to deny a fundamental aspect of ourselves. We might think of ourselves as self-sufficient individuals capable of forming our own ideas and purposes independent from our community. Such a conception would be in concert with the cause and effect model, because the cause of human agency would be an individual's self-formulated ideas, and the effect would be actions willed by the individual's ideas. Such a conception demands that we abstractly deny some crucial aspects of what makes us human -- we are communal beings. This sort of denial is a form of alienation from the formative experiences which make us who we are. With Taylor's understanding of human agency it becomes possible to, "...think of institutions and practices of a society as a kind of language in which its fundamental ideas are expressed."[15] However, Taylor *qua* Hegel makes the expression of our community's ideas even more significant, because the fundamental ideas are actually expressing the spirit of the community; "they are, to use

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[14] Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society,* p.87.

[15] Ibid., p.89.

Hegel's term, 'objective spirit."[16] For example, the United States and Canada are both democracies, but their democratic institutions are different. The U.S. expresses its ideas of democracy in the from of a presidential democracy. Canada, in contrast, expresses its ideas of democracy in the form of parliamentary democracy. However, according to the concept of *Sittlichkeit,* these variations are not just variations on the theme of democracy, they are in fact expressions of the spirit of their respective communities. This notion of 'objective spirit' is related to Taylor's claim that we must recognize the constitutive notions of the good which sustain our community. Hence, *Sittlichkeit* is larger than just governmental institutions: it refers to a primacy of communal institutions, norms, and ideas of 'the good' which constitute our identity. Furthermore, because these ideas are so fundamental to our identity they cannot be limited; they must be capable of full expression in the form of a self-sufficient community. Taylor tells us that for Hegel this means, "the public life which expresses at least some of our important norms must be that of a state."[17]

As stated previously, the Hegelian term associated to *Sittlichkeit, Moralität*; holds that "we have an obligation to realize something which does not exist."[18] In Taylor's *Sources of the Self, Moralität* is a mature form of radical autonomy, which permits us to adopt a disengaged attitude towards the world.[19] In this case a fundamental part of the

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[16] Ibid., p.89.

[17] Ibid., p.93.

[18] Ibid.p.83.

[19] Taylor, *Sources of the Self.* p.385.

modern conception of the 'self' is that I have an individual rational will. Taylor explains that obligation in Hegel's *Moralität*, "...holds for me not in virtue of being part of a larger community life, but as an individual rational will."[20] This means that because I have the reasoning capacity to see things as they are, and suggest how they ought to be, then it is incumbent upon me to realize what does not exist. *Moralität* is related to the rationality of the Enlightenment, as well as the aspiration for 'radical autonomy,' and is in direct tension with *Sittlichkeit*, which is not radically autonomous, rather it binds the basis of our actions to the community we are a part of. One of the goals of Hegel's philosophy is to try to reconcile the tension between *Moralität* with *Sittlichkeit*. Similarly, Taylor hopes to reconcile the tension between *Moralität* with *Sittlichkeit* in his political philosophy. The key to the reconciliation of *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit* for both Hegel and Taylor comes through the nature of reason. The notion of reason which is associated with *Moralität* is a sense that there is some sort of formal or logical basis for the way things are or the way things should be. Taylor *qua* Hegel claims that:

> because [*Moralität*] remained with a purely formal notion of reason, it could not provide a content to moral obligation. Because it would not accept the only valid content, which comes from the ongoing society to which we belong, it remained an ethic of the individual.[21]

Proponents of *Moralität* often do not clearly explore the basis of their rationality. The Hegelian formulation derives the basis of *Moralitat* rationality through the norms, morals and values of their community. Taylor's own formulation of the reconciliation comes in

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[20] Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society.* p.83

recognizing the notions of the good in our moral frameworks, but the notions of the good and the moral frameworks come to us from our community. In other words, if you scratch beneath the surface of *Moralität*'s rational facade you will find the edifice of *Sittlichkeit's* obligation to the ideas and institutions of the constitutive community.

Taylor's interpretation of Hegel is quite extensive, but what I want to highlight in this brief glimpse is that in his exploration of Hegel can be found the basis of his own views of human agency. This is the same view of human agency which comes out in his critiques of the social sciences where he argues that humans are embedded in the social and cultural outlooks of their given community. These frameworks inform the way we think and interact in the world, and in turn they have an effect upon the way we engage in inquiry about humans. The world view which supports the autonomous rationality found in the social sciences' application of natural science methodologies is *one* of these frameworks, but there are other world views as well. Through Hegel, Taylor situates the plurality of world views within a world view that is enlarged and more comprehensive. The significance of Taylor's interpretation of Hegel is not just that it is consistent with his critique of the social sciences. Taylor's rendering of Hegel is lucid, contemporary, and compelling. Anyone who has read Hegel can appreciate that Taylor's interpretation of Hegel has brought clarity to an important and almost incomprehensible philosopher. Reading Hegel is notoriously difficult, which might lead some to question the worthiness of the exercise. However, if it can be demonstrated that Hegel's comprehensive philosophy

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[21] Taylor, *Hegel,* p.377.

has important relevance for contemporary forms of inquiry then reading Hegel will no longer be just an exercise. In this regard, Taylor relates Hegel to current debates, such as the appropriate modes of inquiry in the human sciences, and the relationship between the people and their communities. In doing so Taylor demonstrates that Hegel is a legitimate part of his own understanding of human agency. Hence, while Taylor argues that it is important to read Hegel, it is his demonstration by way of application of Hegel's ideas which makes the case that Hegel is important for contemporary social and political thought. Taylor's work on Hegel is compelling because he has found an enduring relevance in Hegel's thought which is reflected in his own work. Perhaps the best example of a contemporary application of Hegel's thought comes from Taylor's politics in which, as we will see, he applies Hegel's dialectic to the Canada-Quebec situation to derive a comprehensive political outlook that suggests a way to move beyond the particularities of their respective differences.

1.3 Taylor's Interpretive Phenomenology

In Taylor's interpretation of Hegel we can also find the basis of his interpretive phenomenology. I am using the term interpretive phenomenology to describe Taylor's view of how people interact and become aware of what makes them who they are. Interpretive phenomenology refers to the way that we become aware of the notions of the good which constitute our identity. For Taylor, the modern identity is constituted by conceptions of the good which we hold by virtue of our being embedded in a given community. A community has a number of conceptions of the good life which may motivate us to live our lives in

particular ways. For Taylor, the way that we become aware of our motivations is complex and this is bound up with language. He puts forward the view that our articulations are not just reflections of our motivations; rather, our words, gestures, and actions are articulations of our motivations in their own right. For instance, if we were happy about something we might smile and gesticulate. In this case we are articulating ourselves, and all these gestures and words are intrinsic to the emotion which we are experiencing: the expression of being happy is inherent in being happy. It might be possible to separate them analytically, but not in practice. This means that language must be broadly conceived. Language is a plethora of meanings which are associated with any articulation. This understanding of articulation includes actions such as social phenomena, practices and institutions.[22]

For Taylor, language is not just an instrument; rather, it is a loose web of meanings which are integral to our social and cultural understanding of what is the good life. We might not be able to make a comprehensive definition of what our community's notions of the good life are, but through language we can disclose from a 'web of meanings,' and this disclosure will contribute to our understanding of what the good life is. According to this view language is a combination of creation and discovery which brings us into contact with our community's background understandings. Taylor describes this view of language as

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[22] Charles Taylor, "Language and Human Nature," *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol.1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.215-247.; and "The Importance of Herder," in *Philosophical Arguments.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995, pp.79-99.

dialogical; it is like a conversation with our shared background understandings.[23] In other words, every utterance, articulation, gesture and action has many connotations associated with the conceptions of the good held by our community. The person we are conversing with also expresses nuances of our community's conceptions of the good, and through this interaction we attain greater understanding of the notions of the good which motivate us. Furthermore, the conversation itself is an action which is a communal articulation of notions of the good. This means that the act of perspicuously contrasting positions, which constitutes a conversation, also participates in the constitution of our identity. As we attain greater clarity about the nature and sources of the conceptions of the good life which motivate us then we also achieve greater self understanding. Taylor thinks that it is very important that we understand that this act of interpretation is fundamentally social. A conversation is social -- it requires at least two people. Furthermore, there are many other aspects of our lives which are also fundamentally social. The importance of recognizing that interpretation is social is that this means that not only are the conceptions of the good which constitute our identity embedded in our community, but attaining awareness of them is also communal act. Some people might disagree and argue that it is possible to conceive of ourselves as autonomous beings with our own unique set of motivations. However, according to Taylor, this conception would be something which we derive from our interaction with others in our community. He sees this as a sort of perverse conception of

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[23] Charles Taylor, "The Dialogical Self," in *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture.* ed. David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and Richard Shusterman. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp.304-314.

the good which invites moderns to conceive of themselves as atomistic individuals, despite the fact that this conception is a socially held conception of a community which we become aware of through our interactions with others in our community.[24]

Taylor's interpretive phenomenology is not only logically consistent with his critiques of the social sciences and his interpretation of Hegel it is also an important extension of these projects. His critique of the social sciences suggests that a hermeneutic mode of inquiry is more appropriate for the social sciences. Taylor finds support for this contention in his interpretation of Hegel. But his interpretive phenomenology makes the argument that the interpretative dimension of a hermeneutic inquiry is also indispensable to how we think. He has extended his earlier arguments by claiming that this mode of inquiry is also part of the social act of interpreting our community's notions of the good and that this act of interpreting is fundamental to being human. From this vantage point he is able to offer significant insights into the dilemmas of modern identity and their effects on social and political thought and life in the late twentieth century.

Taylor's later works have been concerned with recognizing and mediating differences. The contemporary differences with which Taylor grapples are experienced by people as personal dilemmas and/or as conflicts between and within communities. Taylor presents the personal experience of modern malaise as an ongoing tension between several

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[24] See Charles Taylor, *Malaise of Modernity*, p.43-53.; and *Sources of The Self,* pp.36-38.; and "Heidigger, Language and Ecology," in *Philosophical Arguments.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1995. pp.100-126.

notions of the good which are available in contemporary modern society.[25] On the one hand these notions of the good can help people make sense of their lives, but on the other hand these notions of the good can be at cross purposes. This is because these notions of the good tend to be partial and none can be a complete or universal articulation of the good life. Similarly, communities can experience conflicts based upon diverging conceptions of the good, and once again Taylor argues that these competing conceptions of the good tend to be partial. Taylor wants us to situate these conflicts within an interpretive framework, because it permits us to move beyond irreconcilable differences by recognizing that alternative points of view can share conceptions of the good.[26] Through perspicuously contrasting alternative points of view, in an authentic manner, Taylor believes that we can achieve greater understanding and more enlightened social and political decisions which will not be based upon an empty negation of opposing conceptions of the good.[27] The importance of this interpretive turn is that it extends beyond the role of simply mediating arguments, by sawing off the differences between opposing views. It is a dialectical movement from partial conceptions of the good to an enlarged understanding of the notions of the good that constitute our identity. There is another reason why Taylor wants us to situate conflicting

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[25] See Taylor's, *Malaise of Modernity;* and *Sources of the Self.*

[26] See Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"* ed. Steven C. Rockfeller, Michael Walzer, and Susan Wolf. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992.

[27] See Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason" In *Philosophical Arguments* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp.36-60.

conceptions within an interpretive framework: he believes this form of interpretation is essential to being human. If we follow Taylor's argument, and accept that an important aspect of what it means to be human is the social act of interpretation, then it is a form of alienation to deny this aspect of our humanity. According to Taylor, the social act of articulating and interpreting the nature of the different notions of the good that motivate us, or could motivate us, is an essential part of being human.

Taylor's interpretive phenomenology is both relevant and compelling for current debates in philosophy and the social sciences because it touches upon two important questions for contemporary social and political thought. First, what is the nature of identity; and second, how can we recognize differences without erasing them? These questions have been approached in different ways. Some turn to theories of procedural liberalism which seek to provide frameworks for the equitable recognition of individual and social differences.[28] There have also been projects, such as that of Jürgen Habermas, which present a discourse ethics that would permit different voices to be articulated in a public space.[29] There have also been arguments that any philosophy, ethic, or procedure for dealing with differences will in fact be creating yet another universal voice which will erase

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[28] See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice.* London: Oxford University Press, 1971; and see Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Kymlicka's discussion develops a contemporary liberal conception of procedural justice with specific reference its application to Canada.

[29] See Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1, Reason and The Rationalization of Society,* Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984; and *Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason.* Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.

other differences with a new sophisticated universal identity.[30] Within this milieu Charles Taylor's interpretive phenomenology suggests a way for dealing with differences, which requires the authentication of differences. His interpretive phenomenology suggests that people have an opportunity to learn from each other's differences, and in so doing achieve a greater sense of self awareness. This idea is even more powerful because Taylor presents a conception of human agency that is an embodiment of this interpretive phenomenology.

1.4 Contextualizing Taylor

By now it might be apparent that Taylor's thinking is thorough and rigorous. His interpretive phenomenology, which builds upon his conception of human nature and his interpretation of Hegel, suggests a strategy for dealing with the tensions which result from the multiple strains of modern society, but the strategy is presented as implicit in how we actually think. In order to refute Taylor an interlocutor could be placed in a position where she cannot offer just an alternative strategy, because she would also have to suggest a different conception of human agency. Consequently, it is no great surprise that many critics of Charles Taylor focus upon his conception of human agency. This presents a problem for these critics because, if they are successful, then they may actually be demonstrating that Taylor is correct: they would be perspicuously contrasting Taylor's view with their own on the road to an enlarged understanding of human agency. More often the

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[30] Jean-Françoise Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.* Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brain Massumi, Forward by Fredric Jameson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

case is that critics of Taylor come from a stream of philosophical thought which Taylor has already situated within his own philosophy. For instance, liberal critics can be seen as expressing variations of the Enlightenment's radical individualism;[31] or postmodern critics can be rendered as liberals, radical Romantics, or neo-Nietzscheans.[32] According to Taylor's philosophy these critics could be seen to be arguing for a conception of human agency which would be considered partial and as such would be a mere moment in a dialectical progression to greater understanding. Alternatively, some critics disagree with Taylor's history of thought and argue that he has either distorted or left out certain important facts.[33] The implications of this form of critique can be that his conception of human agency could be richer, or that the lacunae present the possibility that there may be other views of human agency. Some of these critiques of Taylor's history of thought can also suggest that his history be better, whilst agreeing with the general thrust of his conception of

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[31] See the interaction between Charles Taylor and Nancy Rosenblum in an anthology edited by Rosenblum in *Liberalism and the Moral Life,* ed. Nancy Rosenblum, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. A clear statement of Taylor's position can be found in this anthology in his essay "cross-purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate."

[32] A debate between William Connolly and Charles Taylor regarding the implications of Michel Foucault's philosophy succinctly captures Taylor's position on this question. Taylor argues that Foucault must have some sort of moral framework as a basis to his conception of freedom. See Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," *Political Theory.* Vol.12, No. 2, May 1984, pp.152-183.; William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault and Otherness, *"Political Theory.* Vol.13, No.3, Aug 1985, pp.365-375.; and Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth," *Political Theory.* Vol.13, No.3, Aug.1985, pp.377-386.

[33] See Quentin Skinner, "Who are "We"? Ambiguities of the Modern Self," *Inquiry.* Vol. 34, No. 2, June 1991, pp.133-153.; and Mario Moussa, "Writing the History of "We": The Claims of Practices," *Social Theory and Practice.* Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp.211-229.

human agency. Critics of his history who oppose his conception of human agency have a difficult task. They find themselves critiquing the historical basis of Taylor's conception of human agency as well as developing an alternative view of human agency which is as comprehensive as Taylor's. This is particularly difficult if one is constrained to the length of a scholarly journal article. Despite these difficulties, many critics of Charles Taylor still focus upon his conception of human agency.

It is debatable whether Taylor has been successful in articulating a way to recognize difference which does not also obscure those differences, and many people have engaged with him on this very question. Similarly, while his approach to human sciences offers a different conception of human agency it has been contentious. Mainstream social sciences have not experienced a paradigm shift as a result of Taylor's view of human agency. Critiques from this vantage point often try to qualify social science's conception of human agency or refute his point of view.[34] Often the approach to the critique of Taylor, as well as the application of his ideas, has been to explore the coherence, consistency, or implications of his philosophy in a variety of situations. Those who are sympathetic to Taylor's thinking have generally tried to apply his philosophy to social and political questions. Applications of his philosophy have also resulted in new insights into such diverse fields as literature and

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[34] See James D. Wallace, "Mechanism and Action," *Philosophical Studies,* Vol. 19, Dec.1968, pp.88-92.; George Sher, "Charles Taylor on Purpose and Causation," *Theory and Decision.* Vol. 6, Feb. 1975, pp.27-38.

medical nursing.[35]

Interestingly, very few explorations of Taylor's thought have explored the relationship between his participation in Canadian politics and his philosophical writings.[36] A complete exploration of the consistency and implications of his philosophy would be well served by placing his philosophy in the context of these writings and his political activism. If Taylor's philosophy is correct, that our conceptions of the good are articulated by our diverse actions, then we should expect to find his philosophy breathing in his Canadian writings and his political activism. In fact, his philosophy's credibility seems to demand that his political actions be consistent with his philosophy. It would be deeply problematic for Taylor's project if there were a significant gap between his philosophy and his political practices.

Of course the relationship between theory and practice is an old dilemma. However, Charles Taylor is an example of somebody who has both theorized and practiced politics. He has devoted a large part of his life to articulating a theory of human agency which transcends the dilemma of the relationship between theory and practice by making

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[35] See Mette Hjort, "Literature: Romantic expression or strategic interaction," in *Philosophy In An Age Of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor In Question.* ed. James Tully, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. pp.121-135.; and Patricia Benner, "The role of articulation in understanding practice and experience as sources of knowledge in clinical nursing," in *Philosophy in an age of pluralism: The philosophy of Charles Taylor in question.* ed. James Tully, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.136-155.

[36] A notable exception is the Guy LaForest's, "Philosophy and political judgment in a multinational federation," in *Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question.* ed. James Tully, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.194-209.

political practice intrinsic to political theory, and making political theory intrinsic to his political practice. My critical contextualization of Taylor's philosophy will explore the consistency of his philosophy and will reveal implications of Taylor's philosophy and politics which might not otherwise be apparent. In particular, I intend to argue that certain features of Taylor's personal politics, particularly the fact that he is a Canadian social democrat from bi-cultural Montreal, have an important bearing upon his philosophy that provides important insights into his philosophy. Evaluations of his philosophy which fail to take the milieu of his politics into account lead to misinterpretations his philosophy.

Misinterpretations of Taylor have come from a number of camps. The most significant have been the result of his critical engagements with liberalism. These engagements have resulted in evaluations of Taylor which have focused on particular essays or aspects of his work. This focus is too narrow and has resulted in some serious misunderstanding of Taylor's position. For instance, Amy Gutmann places Taylor in a portmanteau of communitarians who view the good society as "one of settled traditions and established identities."[37] I will demonstrate that Taylor is far more complex than this. Taylor's Canadian political writings reveal that he wrestles with the tensions of identities, established and modern, in a country without a sense of shared history and traditions. Gutmann goes on to include Taylor in a communitarian camp that is "inclined to defend the efforts of local majorities to ban offensive activities in the name of preserving their

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[37] Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," *Philosophy and Public Affairs.* Vol. 14, Summer 1985, p.309.

community's way of life and the values it sustains."[38] The implication is that Taylor is an opponent of civil liberties. He is not. His political writings reveal that his commitment to community and individual rights is a complex articulation of a community's need to live its conception of good while maintaining a commitment to civil liberties. In a similar vein Allen Buchanan groups Taylor with "radical communitarians [who] reject individual civil and political rights out of hand and seek to replace references to individual rights either with teleological talk about the goods of communities or with talk about group rights."[39] The teleological aspect of Taylor's thought is evident,[40]but this does not necessarily make him an opponent of civil rights. In following chapters I will demonstrate that early in Taylor's political career he participated in the creation of an NDP political agenda. That agenda clearly committed the NDP to a recognition of civil rights. Furthermore, his commitment to civil rights has not disappeared since he left the NDP. These simple characterizations of Taylor do not account for his actual political actions which reveal a more complex picture of his understanding of the nature of justice.

There are more sophisticated critiques of Taylor which also misinterpret him. For instance, Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young correctly reflect Taylor's position: he does not believe that there can be a single principle for distributive justice. According to

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[38] Ibid. p.309.

[39] Allen Buchanan, "Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," *Ethics* Vol. 99, July 1989, p.855.

[40] Isaiah Berlin, "Introduction," *Philosophy In An Age of Pluralism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. p.1.

Taylor there can be different principles for distributive justice based upon different conceptions of the good. The political association of our community, where shared understandings of the good are articulated, becomes the setting for questions of distributive justice.[41] Both Benhabib and Young take exception to this position. Benhabib argues that there is not always a single conception of the good in a community and some "publicly acceptable scheme"[42] should exist to arbitrate the plurality of visions of the good. Young, on the other hand, accepts Taylor's criticism of an overarching principle for distributive justice, but does not want to relinquish the idea of justice; rather, she seeks an expanded conception of justice.[43] However, both Benhabib's and Young's evaluation of Taylor would benefit from a reading of Taylor which included his political works. In the case of Benhabib, understanding Taylor's perspective, as a bilingual Montrealer, living in a state with two dominant language groups and understandings of the good, might allow her to understand that more than one publicly acceptable scheme for distributive justice is plausible. In the case of Young, Taylor's political actions reveal that while he is critical of current schemes of redistribution, he does not give up on distributive justice. In fact he shares Young's sense that justice is important, and wants his state to respond to a broader range and scope of distributive justice issues.

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[41] Charles Taylor, "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice," *Philosophy and The Human Sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.289-317.

[42] Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self.* New York: Routledge, 1992, pp.84-85.

[43] Iris Marion Young, *Justice and The Politics of Difference.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp.34-35.

Taylor's political actions also provide us with important insights into the strengths and limits of his philosophy. In particular, his philosophical rendering of the complexity of modern identity suggests a dialectical resolution of this complexity. In practice, this philosophical resolution is based upon a political state that resembles Canada in the sense that it has federal institutions, an appreciation of language, a tradition of respect for institutions of the state, and a citizen identities which exist in tension these social facts. In addition, Taylor's politics is marked by an application of Hegelian dialectics to the Canadian state and this reveals that Taylor in fact overemphasizes the role of dialectics in a manner that results in him marginalizing social movements and groups. As a result, Taylor's politics reveals the concrete overdetermination of his philosophy.

I am going to proceed by tracing Taylor's political involvement in the NDP. His involvement is revealed in documents from the party, as well as debates within the party which were often conducted as exchanges within magazines which were sympathetic to the NDP. I will also trace his political activities subsequent to his involvement with the NDP. This activity has been primarily concerned with the prospect of the province of Quebec separating from Canada. In order to properly understand these actions I will also be situating these activities within the relevant political events of the day. Following an exploration of Taylor's political activities I will explore how debates which occurred within the NDP and Taylor's position on Quebec are related to important aspects of his philosophy. The first debate within the NDP was the question of whether or not the NDP should merge with the Liberal Party of Canada. Taylor's position on this debate closely parallels his

philosophical opposition to the individualistic conception of human agency. The second debate within the NDP occurred when a group within the party called "The Waffle" challenged the party's stated aims and principles. Taylor's position on this debate closely parallels his philosophical opposition to Marxism and postmodernism. For Taylor, these two outlooks deny the moral ontologies which he argues are necessary for understanding ourselves and our community. The last debate is ongoing, and it involves Taylor, the Quebec separatists, and Canadians whose conception of federalism differs from Taylor's. Taylor's position in this debate reflects the influence of Hegel, but it also closely parallels his philosophical conception of interpretive phenomenology as both a strategy and an essential part of human agency. In this case he seeks to transcend cultural and philosophical differences through perspicuously contrasting positions in an effort to transcend differences. In the debates of Taylor's political life there have been a variety of outcomes, and these outcomes will improve our understanding of Taylor's political philosophy.

CHAPTER 2: TAYLOR'S POLITICAL ACTIVISM: The NDP Years

Taylor's political activism in the NDP presents us with an ongoing comprehensive political project which sought to accomplish some far reaching goals. First, he wanted to articulate a Canadian conception of social democracy that was capable of linking Canada and Quebec. In order to do this he formulated a set of broad based principles that were universal in the sense that they could be adopted by both communities, English Canada and Quebec. These principles were placed in a particular federal structure. Secondly, Taylor sought to distinguish this social democratic vision of Canada from the Liberal Party's vision of Canada. Taylor tied this Social Democratic vision to a third goal, linking social democracy with a distinctly Canadian economic nationalism. Finally, Taylor situated the modern strains of citizen identity into a Canadian setting. These far reaching goals reflect Taylor's philosophical moments: his conception of citizenship is based on conceptions of the good which he believed existed in Canadian society; and he distinguished this conception of human agency from liberal conceptions of human agency which are based upon an atomistic outlook; finally he presents a neo-Hegelian conception of citizenship that is reflects the Canadian setting in the sense that it does not draw upon a well formed historically constituted sense of citizenship. Instead, he argues for the construction of a modern Canadian citizenship that will build dialectically upon a set of universal values. What emerges from this presentation is that Canada does not have a shared history based upon culture, language, or race. The time period covered by this chapter was prior to the patriation of the Canadian constitution that also introduced a charter of rights to Canada.

Procedural liberalism in Canada was not then as well defined as in the United States. Taylor did not see the implementation of either of these institutional arrangements as feasible in the Canadian situation. Instead, he tries to create the conditions for a social democratic movement that will provide people with a substantive notion of justice that citizens participate in and contribute to through political action.

2.1 Creation of a Social Democratic Vision Linking Canada and Quebec

The New Democratic Party's predecessor, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, had suffered several setbacks in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. The CCF's percentage of the popular vote in federal elections had slipped from 15.6% in 1945 to 9.5% in 1958.[44] The general political climate for any party calling itself "socialist" had become particularly chilly as the post war period slid into the cold war period. The CCF had tried to distance itself from the socialist label, and this resulted in a gradual shift away from the clarity of the socialist principles upon which the party was founded. This became particularly evident when the party adopted the "Winnipeg Declaration" to replace their original statement of aims embodied in the "Regina Manifesto." The Winnipeg declaration, in contrast to the Manifesto, did not seek to replace the capitalist market system. Instead, the Winnipeg Declaration sought to subordinate "private profit and corporate power... to social planning designed to achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living

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[44] Norman Penner, *From Protest to Power: Social Democracy in Canada from 1900 - Present,* Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Publishers, 1992, p.89.

standards for all Canadians."[45] The reformulation of the CCF's socialism for electoral purposes was also beneficial for its long sought after alliance with organized labour. The task of wooing organized labour into an alliance with the CCF would be much easier if the CCF amended its aims to make them more palatable for organized labour. Despite these moves the CCF's crushing defeat in the 1958 election convinced CCF party leaders and its friends within the Canadian Labour Congress leadership that a new party should be formed which would effect a formal alliance between organized labour and the CCF. The CLC formally initiated the process by passing a motion at its 1958 convention calling for a new party, and the process culminated in the creation of the NDP in 1961.[46]

The NDP was formed as a result of a desire not just to improve the CCF/NDP's electoral results but actually to gain the reins of power. The CCF/NDP alliance with labour was intended to cement what had been a strong relationship, and to broaden the party's electoral base. Organized labour brought financial and organizational strength, but it was also thought that the unions would be able to deliver the votes of their membership.[47] However, the proposal for the New Party (the organizational name for the proposed CCF-organized labour political party) also called for the participation of "liberally minded" people. This reflected the party's recognition that there was a growing group of middle

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[45] Canadian Dimension, Vol. 7, No.8, April 1971, p.18.

[46] See Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour and Politics,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, pp.198-233; and Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, *Crisis, Challenge and Change*, Ottawa: Carleton University Press Inc., 1988, pp.217-261.

[47] Brodie, *Crisis,*p.242.

class workers in Canada who did not identify themselves as "working class." The NDP's founding statement of aims also made an ambiguous recognition of Quebec as one of the founding cultures. This reflected the CCF/NDP's realization that electoral support from Quebec would be essential for any federal victory. Quebec's block of seats in parliament is so large that the possibility of achieving an electoral majority improves if a party has considerable electoral support in that province. The over-all intention was to make the party a truly national party by building upon the CCF's appeal to farmers, BC resource workers, and Ontario factory workers. Still, it was recognized that the New Party would have to go beyond the traditional CCF constituency. This would be achieved through a formal alliance between the CCF and organized labour, and by moderating the party's aims and principles in order to appeal to targeted demographic groups such as the growing group of middle class, or liberally minded people, and Quebecers.

Charles Taylor was not a major figure at the founding convention of the NDP, but his presence was felt at the following convention when the party principles were further modified in order to broaden its electoral appeal. In subsequent conventions, as member of the party council and executive, Taylor became an important figure in the party's attempt to articulate a vision of socialism which would be broad enough to appeal to the various regions, types of workers, and cultural and national groups in Canada. Taylor articulated this language in a number of articles, essays, and actual party position papers. These treatises reflect the Party's electoral strategy as well as attempts to wrestle with the various struggles within the NDP and within Canada. Of particular significance for my project is

the fact that Taylor's later philosophical writings find prior articulation in these writings.

The second "national" NDP convention was held in Regina in 1963. One of the first acts of this convention was the nomination of the policy committee by Terry Grier. Significantly, Charles Taylor was one of the people nominated to the committee. At this convention Taylor distinguished himself in two ways. First, he wrote and co-tabled a resolution of a statement of the objectives and principles of the NDP.[48] Taylor's second notable act was his participation in a debate to strengthen the party's recognition of the equal status of French Canada and English Canada. These were early articulations of two important aspects of Taylor's political thought: the nature of social democracy, and the relationship between two nations in one state. I will trace the development of these two themes in Taylor's Canadian writings. The Canadian writings I will be referring to are a combination of papers he wrote as a member of the NDP executive council, magazine articles, some of his scholarly essays, and books written by Taylor which pertain to Canada.

The resolution which Taylor co-tabled at the 1963 federal convention was a loose definition of the kind social democracy the NDP would pursue. Resolution C9 "pledged to bring about in Canada a new society, more just and more humane, in which the needs of humanity will come before the drive for individual enrichment." This new society would be

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[48] Desmond Morton, *The New Democrats, 1961-1986.* Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986, p.45. See also Neil Bradford, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Social Democracy in Canada," in *Canadian Politics in Transition: Discourse, Organization, and Representation.* edited by Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1989.

guided by "the principles of democratic socialism applied to our time and situation."[49] The first principle stated "that production be for use, not for profit."[50] This principle was qualified by stating that the intention was to control the untrammeled market place through the implementation of comprehensive planning boards which would be answerable to the electorate. The second principle "assured the means to lead a full life."[51] This principle expressed the intention to provide education, health care, and the material means necessary to live and pursue life goals. The third principle affirmed individual rights. The fourth principle pledged "that men's creative potential be liberated."[52] This meant that the 'new society' would try to humanize the work place and also provide opportunities for diverse cultural expression. The fifth principle held that the new society would both "cherish and show respect for diversity."[53] This principle affirmed the conception of Canada as founded by two nations, both of which must be sustained. In addition, it called for respect for the "diversified cultural groups"[54] which had chosen Canada as their home. The sixth and final principle pledged "that the spirit of brotherhood be expressed between nations."[55] This

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[49] New Democratic Party, "NDP Second Federal Convention Proceedings," p.33.

[50] Ibid., p.33.

[51] Ibid., p.33.

[52] Ibid., p.33.

[53] Ibid., p.33.

[54] Ibid., p.33.

[55] Ibid., p.33.

principle committed the 'new society' to pursue social justice on a global scale.

These principles and objectives were subjected to a critique by Walter Young in *Canadian Forum.* Young felt that these objectives were a step towards the NDP becoming a movement as opposed to a political party. According to Young, "movements are concerned with evangelism and the conversion of men's beliefs, and by their nature, they are insulated from defeat."[56] Young, who was also a New Democrat, was concerned that the principles were excessively utopian in nature and would not contribute to electoral success. According to Young, "the tragedy of Regina 1963, is that a political party which initially showed great promise of breaking the hold of the administrative establishment has succumbed to the siren song of the socialist who really doesn't want power as much as they want a platform."[57] Young felt that 'this socialism' came from the "members of the political science department of McGill University."[58] Taylor, being one of the members of the McGill political science department indicted by Young's critique, replied that the NDP's success "will be measured by our ability to break through the vague imagery of 'tendency' - left, right, center - to a more concrete picture in the mind of the electorate which identifies us with certain *programs.* It is this which brings parties power."[59] Taylor felt that the NDP

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[56] Walter Young, "Regina, Thirty Years Later," *Canadian Forum.* Vol.XLIII, No.512, Sept, 1963, p.125.

[57] Ibid., p.126.

[58] Ibid., p.125.

[59] Charles Taylor, "Regina Revisited: Reply to Walter Young," *Canadian Forum,* Vol.XLIII, No.513, Oct.1963, p.150.

had to be clearly identified with progressive social thinking if they were to appeal to the electorate. He felt that the NDP's solutions were also solutions which the "Liberal and Conservative voters believe in."[60] He believed that the NDP's principles of social democracy *would* have broad appeal to voters, precisely because they represented a distinct alternative to the old political parties. He believed that these principles struck a chord with people who had voted for those parties.

As mentioned above, Taylor's presence at the 1963 NDP convention was also distinguished by his participation in a debate to strengthen the party's position on the role of Quebec in Canada. Taylor was one of the major spokespersons in this debate. The party continued to affirm the "two nations" theory which was embodied in the NDP founding statement of aims:

> Our pride in Canada as a nation is enhanced by our consciousness of the two national cultures which form the basis of Canadian life. We are indeed aware that those who have roots in the French-speaking community frequently and legitimately use the word "nation" to describe French Canada itself.[61]

The 1963 convention extended this view in a resolution on bi-culturalism and co-operative federalism which recognized "the equal status of the French Canadian nation and the English Canadian nation."[62] In addition, Taylor and party president Michael Oliver, also

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[60] Ibid., p.150.

[61] Penner, *Protest,* p.107.

[62] New Democratic Party "Proceedings from the Second Federal Convention," p.31.

successfully lobbied the party to promise that Quebec could withdraw from federal programs with monetary compensation.[63]

A year after the convention, in May 1964, Taylor wrote a position paper for the NDP federal council to explain the party's position on the constitution. The federal council felt it was necessary to clarify its position on this matter for a number of reasons. There had been significant discussions during this period between the federal and provincial governments who had been attempting to arrive at an agreement on an amending formula for the Canadian constitution. As a result, the relationship between the provinces, and specifically Quebec, and the federal government was being widely debated across Canada. The Federal Government had established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-culturalism to address some of the aspects of this relationship. In addition, the cost sharing arrangements of the federal and provincial governments were being restructured.[64] Consequently, the place of the provinces in the Canadian constitution, and once again Quebec in particular, was part of the Canadian political discourse of the day. Within this milieu it was important that the party clarify its position on the constitution of Canada.

In his brief to the NDP members Taylor clarifies the party's position on the federal constitution as based upon the concept of co-operative federalism. Co-operative federalism was based upon two considerations; first, the regional nature of Canada's economy

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[63] New Democratic Party, "NDP Second Federal Convention Proceedings," p.31. See resolution C1 - Federalism and Biculturalism.

[64] See Garth Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity 3ed.*, Canada: Gage Educational Publishing Co., 1989, pp.164-165.

demanded some decentralization to the provincial level, and second, "Quebec has a special place in a bi-cultural Canada and is entitled to a certain degree of autonomy."[65] With these two considerations in mind the role of co-operative federalism was to create a federal (not unitary) planning structure, which would give a special place to Quebec. "The point therefore was to outline the special place of Quebec within the general relationship of federal-provincial responsibilities." Further, it must "...limit this special status and show clearly the responsibilities of the federal government for the whole Canadian economy."[66] The guiding principle for this definition of Quebec's status was the view that "Quebec was the centre on this continent of the French culture; if it is to have a chance to develop this, it must be able to plan the external *expression* and the material determinants of culture."[67] It is possible to distill from the idea of co-operative federalism a view of the French culture as a collective entity whose survival depends upon the province of Quebec's ability to express its distinctiveness in a material and institutional manner. In other words, the province of Quebec is a material and institutional expression of the continent's French culture. The institutional and material expressions would include language and culture, but they would also allow Quebec to pursue social planning initiatives in a manner distinct from established federal-provincial guidelines. This would be an expression of the French culture. Outside

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[65] Charles Taylor, "Co-operative Federalism," p.1, from the personal papers of George Home.

[66] Ibid., p.4.

[67] Ibid., p.2, *emphasis added.*

the field of social programs, in areas such as defense and the economy, the federal government would consult and co-operate with the provinces, but the federal government would have the "ultimate responsibility" for economic planning. Under an NDP government economic planning would be based upon a particular vision of social democracy.

The necessity of a distinct constitutional status for Quebec and the goal of social democracy were actually integral for the strategy of the 1960's NDP. The rationale was that Quebec was obviously a distinct society. The attempt to integrate English and French into a single nation had resulted in a displacement of class politics. If the distinct status of Quebec was accepted and accommodated in a manner that would ensure its survival, then Canadian politics could pursue issues such as social democracy.

Taylor was not an unconditional supporter of Quebec nationalism. In an essay entitled "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study,"[68] Taylor saw a certain bourgeois element in Québécois nationalism. According to Taylor's analysis the modernization of the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in a group of well educated middle class intellectuals. These people occupied middle management places in the bureaucracies of government, corporations, and unions. The occupational position of this middle class intelligentsia brought them into contact with the modern international political

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[68] Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study," in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism.* Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993, pp.3-22. first printed in *Queens Quarterly,* Vol.72, Spring 1965, pp.150-168.

economy. This resulted in strains upon their identity. In Taylor's analysis there were two important strains. One was a result of this intelligentsia's recently risen economic status. The other strain was a result of their coming into contact with others in the international economy. The malaise of these two strains resulted in a particular bourgeois expression of modern nationalism. Thus, according to Taylor, "...the more the middle class accepts the values of the advanced economy, the greater is the nationalist emotion."[69] But this nationalism is not the same as social democracy. In this essay Taylor argues that even though the Quebec government's programs may appear to be social democratic in orientation, the programs are actually motivated by a nationalist desire to modernize Quebec. Taylor states that:

> Modern nationalism, will therefore, present a visage often resembling that of the traditional left. But it will differ from it in program, being less sensitive to welfare issues that have been the staple diet of at least Western social democracy,...in a pinch it is political sovereignty of the society wielded by the existing ruling groups that counts more than the reforms."[70]

It is important to situate this argument within the context of both Canadian politics and the politics of the NDP. Quebec nationalism was not a new phenomenon *per se,* but the 1960's articulation of Quebec nationalism was different: it resulted in a far more pro-active state. For instance, the Quebec provincial government nationalized the hydroelectric companies and modernized the education system. These were certainly positive social developments. However, these were also the sort of programs which might have been identified with social

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[69] Ibid., p.21.

democrats such as the NDP, who were attempting to make some electoral advances into Quebec. The NDP wanted to present a position which was sympathetic to the Quebec nationalism, but was also representative of a larger vision -- Canadian social democracy. The larger picture provided by social democratic politics would, in turn, be the unifying element with the rest of Canada. It was important that people understand that what motivated the NDP in Quebec was social democracy, not a sovereignty which looked like social democracy. Hence, although the NDP wanted to find an appropriate constitutional status for Quebec, it was also important for it to do this within a larger vision of Canadian social democracy. Significantly, Taylor's clarification of co-operative federalism placed ultimate decision making for key questions such as the economy and defense with the federal government.

Taylor felt that the principles, programs, and policies of the NDP articulated a different sort of vision of Canada than what was being espoused by the other political parties. Not only did these party statements reflect the NDP's acceptance of the "two nations" vision of Canada, but they were also the beginnings of a blueprint for a new social democratic state. In contrast, the other federal parties were merely power brokers.

2.2 Distinguishing Social Democracy from Liberalism

Taylor felt it was important to uncover the intentions of a political party in order to really understand what it stood for. Just as he distinguished Quebec nationalism from social democracy, he also differentiated the federal Liberal party's brokerage politics from the

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[70] Ibid., p21.

social programs which it borrowed from the social democrats. The federal Liberal party's implementation of social programs appeared to reflect a certain social democratic vision, but it actually reflected a sort of brokerage politics which pragmatically implemented aspects of programs that would insure the maintenance of power that benefited the economic elite. In an article in *Canadian Dimension* called "What's Wrong With Canadian Politics?" Taylor states that "the main purpose of these parties is not to effect a given policy, but to carry a certain leadership to power."[71] Taylor dissuades people from thinking that the Liberal party can be overhauled into a social democratic party. He goes further, by arguing that one can't even use the Liberal party as a vehicle to power, which one could then utilize to implement progressive social policies, because it would require repudiation of certain aspects of the comprehensive social democratic vision in order to achieve a watered down social program. According to Taylor, in the Liberal party "one arises by playing according to the rules, whatever new ones one ultimately wants to establish."[72] Taylor believes that social democratic politics require a different strategy. Rather than modifying the NDP's program and presenting it as a better packaging of the other party's programs, Taylor advocates educating the electorate so that it believes in the NDP's social democratic programs. Taylor states that, "the building of a serious party system in a country requires

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[71] Charles Taylor, "What's Wrong With Canadian Politics?" in *Canadian Dimension.* Vol.2, No.4, May-June 1965, p.10.

[72] Ibid., p.11.

more than the building of a party; it also requires an education of the electorate."[73] Social democracy requires a different approach to politics than visionless brokerage politics; it requires comprehensive programs that the electorate identifies with as a vision of a better way of life.

Once again it is useful to situate this argument within the politics of Canada and the NDP. There was a great deal of electoral instability in Canadian politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s. From 1957 to 1965 Canada had elected four minority governments. In fact there had been only one majority government, John Diefenbaker's 1958 landslide election. During this period of instability the seats of the NDP and Liberal party could have combined to make a parliamentary majority in three of these elections. This simple arithmetic was not lost upon members of both the NDP and the Liberal party. In addition, some prominent members of the NDP, in particular Hazen Argue and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, had defected to the Liberal party during its early years. This resulted in some questioning of the distinction between these two parties. Also, during this time a group called "The Exchange for Political Ideas in Canada" (EPIC), which was composed of Liberals and non-socialist New Democrats, was formed.[74] EPIC was created as a forum for dialogue between liberals and social democrats, from both the Liberal party and the NDP. EPIC had some credibility because it contained some prominent academics associated with the NDP, such

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[73] Ibid., p.11.

[74] See Neil Bradford, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Social Democracy in Canada," in *Canadian Parties in Transition.* eds Alain G. Gagnon and Brain Tanguay, Scarborough, Nelson Canada, 1989, p.88

as Walter Young and Frank Underhill. This group held some forums and invited members of both the Liberal and New Democratic parties to discuss the proposition of a merger between these two parties.[75] The NDP leadership strenuously distanced itself from this movement,[76] but it was important for them to articulate what differentiated them from reform minded Liberals.

Taylor articulated what he perceived to be the difference between liberal and social democratic politics in a published conversation with fellow New Democrat and McGill political science faculty colleague, Gad Horowitz. Taylor argues that a polarized left-right politics in Canada is necessary for a genuine sense of national unity. He thought that it was a chimera that the dominant political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, represented left-right politics. According to Taylor, these parties are a "cocktail covering the whole society,"[77] but they are dominated by an elite leadership. This results in unity amongst a Canadian elite, but not Canadian unity. This, in turn, allowed Canada to appear to be a nation with a neurotic obsession with a search for a formula for national unity. This obsession displaces all other political questions to the periphery. In opposition to this Taylor advocated a "party linking all the regions of Canada on the basis of a left-wing

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[75] University of Victoria Archives, *Personal Papers of George Home.*

[76] Toronto Star, "Douglas Calls Merger Talks Impractical," Dec. 23, 1963, p17, 23.

[77] Gad Horowitz and Charles Taylor, "The End of Ideology or New (Class) Politics?" in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.4, No.1, Nov.-Dec. 1966, p.12.

coalition, made up of workers, farmers and intellectuals."[78] Taylor thought that the mid 1960s presented an ideal opportunity for the creation of this Canadian left-wing coalition. He argued that much of the history of the Canadian state had been dominated by mediation of the division between French and English Canadians by the elite of the two mainstream parties (Conservatives and Liberals). This had resulted in a politics based upon the French-English division, which displaced any other sort of political discourse between the various regions of Canada. For Taylor the mid 1960's held promise of moving beyond this impasse because of the two changes on the Canadian political scene. First, according to Taylor, "the difference between farmers and workers...matters less today." He credits this change to the NDP, which was a coalition of farmers and organized labour. The second momentous event was the modernization of Quebec society, which had resulted in a "tremendous revision of its ideas, of its traditional views."[79] If the people of Quebec came to identify with the goals of the coalition of farmers and workers from the rest of Canada, then there was an opportunity to develop a broad based collective national identity based upon the collective goals of social democracy. Nevertheless, Taylor thought there was also a potentially negative dimension to the modernization of ideas in Quebec. According to Taylor, it could also result in "French Canada [heading] off in a thoroughly in-ward turned nationalistic direction."[80] It may sound contradictory to advocate Canadian nationalism in one breath,

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[78] Ibid., p.13

[79] Ibid., p.13.

[80] Ibid., p.13.

and decry Quebec nationalism in the next breath, but it should be remembered that Taylor thought that Québécois nationalism was basically bourgeois. In other words, the people of Quebec might achieve political independence, but they would actually just be replacing one form of elite rule with another form of elite rule. Taylor's vision was of a political party (the NDP presumably) which would, "bring to fore the type of national purpose which is lying there waiting to be born if there were a link-up between the classes and groups in Canada who are at present disadvantaged."[81] The notion of a 'national purpose' is what differentiates the social democratic vision from the Liberal vision of Canada. For Taylor 'national purpose' is a collective world view from which various political problems can be addressed. This is different from Liberal ad hoc pragmatism, which eschews world views in favour of a supposedly neutral arbitration of a plurality of views. According to Taylor, the orientation of a 'national purpose' should be "an on-going process of collective action to equalize more than the establishment of a baseline from which [citizens] take off."[82] The national purpose is based upon an idea of equality which is "a vehicle of community action."[83] The liberal notion attempts to equalize individuals opportunities, and is based upon "the idea of society as a number of individuals."[84] The liberal view recognizes a

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[81] Ibid., p.14.

[82] Ibid., p.15.

[83] Ibid., p.15.

[84] Ibid., p.15.

plurality of collective beliefs that result in several different outlooks on society. This is foreign to the holistic intention of Taylor's 'national purpose.'

The conception of a 'national purpose' becomes a little clearer in two other articles which Taylor wrote in *Canadian Dimension,* "Alternatives to Continentalism," and "Nationalism and Independence."[85] In these articles Taylor begins by distinguishing between two forms of nationalism. The first kind of nationalism "makes belonging to or pertaining to that nation or its history or its way of life an end in itself."[86] This sort of nationalism is parochial and is based upon a clannish sense of a group, but Taylor does not believe this sort of analysis is applicable to Canadians. The problem with this sort of analysis, according to Taylor, is that "in Canada we have no common culture, and our history, although full enough of great deeds of significance, does not unite us."[87] However, Taylor believed that there are elements of this parochial, or "visceral nationalism" in Quebec nationalism. In opposition to a nationalism which is *particular* in orientation, Taylor advocates a nationalism which is *universal* in orientation. According to Taylor, "a country whose national identity is founded on the sense of the significance of what they are doing together can have a nationalism rooted in universal values."[88] The difference between

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[85] Charles Taylor, "Alternatives to Continentalism," in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.3, No.5, July-Aug., 1966, pp.12-15.; "Nationalism and Independence," in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.4, No.3, March-April, 1967, pp.4-11.

[86] Taylor, *Alternatives,* p.12.

[87] Ibid., p.12.

[88] Ibid., p.12.

these two nationalisms is that the universal values based nationalism cannot and will not draw upon a historically constituted shared identity, rather it seeks to use shared moral conceptions of the good as the basis for social and political projects which when entered into will bind people together into a nation.

Taylor defines the ways that universal values can be expressed in the Canadian situation. First, there should be an economic development program in which all five Canadian regions can progress. Second, Canada should be a place where two cultures (French and English) can develop and coexist together. This would have significance beyond the borders of Canada because it would serve as an example to the world that two nations or cultures could peacefully prosper in one state. Finally, Taylor believes that Canada can play the role of middle power between the wealthy northern countries and the impoverished southern countries of the world. However, Taylor perceives a major obstacle to Canadians adopting this "universal" form of nationalism. He refers to this obstacle as "paralytic Continentalism." This is a feeling that Canada is unable to make these sorts of independent decisions due to the overshadowing presence of the United States, particularly in the Canadian economy. This mood can take the form of an apathetic fatalism about U.S. guidance of Canada's future through the dominance of the Canadian economy by large American corporations. This mood could also take the form of an expectation that eventually Canada would be annexed by the U.S. anyway, and there is nothing that can realistically be done about it. In order to get beyond the obstacle of American corporate dominance of the Canadian economy Taylor advocated a planned economy. There were

three areas of the economy which he singled out for attention. First, the redirection of direct foreign equity investment. Second, a requirement of corporate disclosure of the remittance of profits to foreign parent corporations. Third, an institution (the Canada Development Fund) which could mobilize Canadian investment capital to direct the Canadian economy in ways favourable to Canadians. According to Taylor, "what we need in short is to design our own economy; and we can only do this through our governments (the provinces must also do their part)."[89] This sort of nationalism would contribute to the expression of universal values because it would based upon moral frameworks which can be found, not only in the specific regions of the country, but also in the world in general.

2.3 Social Democracy and Economic Nationalism

The politics of Canada and the NDP have an important bearing on Taylor's economic nationalist position. In the post war period American dominance of the Canadian economy had been increasing dramatically. The Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, chaired by Walter Gordon, had been established in 1956. Gordon had begun to warn Canadians of the dimensions of American dominance of the Canadian economy. This fact was not new to the CCF-NDP. They had called for a planned economy to facilitate independent national economic planning in the CCF's "Winnipeg Declaration" of 1956, and this principle was reiterated in the NDP's founding statement of 1961, and the party's 1963 statement of aims and principles also called for a planned economy to combat economic

[89] Taylor, *Nationalism,* p.9.

dependence on America.[90] But by 1967 economic nationalism had increased in importance for the NDP. In 1967 the party had heeded the advice of McGill economist Kari Levitt, and passed a number of motions at its convention which expressed the firm resolve of the NDP to tackle this problem.[91] Consequently, Taylor's focus on ways to break this economic dependence are not surprising. What he brought to the debate was the notion that the pursuit of economic nationalism according to a social democratic agenda could not only unite the country, but was actually a reflection of universal values which extended beyond Canada. The nature of these universal values becomes clearer in his book *The Pattern of Politics.*

The Pattern of Politics was written in the wake of the 1968 Canadian federal election. The Liberal party won a majority on the strength of the charisma of their new young leader, former New Democrat Pierre Trudeau. In fact, Taylor had run against Trudeau at the constituency level in 1965. In the 1968 federal election Taylor ran against Jean-Pierre Goyer of the Liberal party in the constituency of Montreal-Dollard (he was defeated).[92] Within the NDP there was some concern about the demographics of the Montreal vote because Trudeau had managed to gain the support of the urban, middle class

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[90] Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics,*p.206.

[91] Bradford, *Ideas,* p.91., Levitt's analysis was eventually published as *Silent Surrender,* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1970).

[92] Montreal Gazette. "Results", *Montreal Gazette,* June 26, 1968, p.8. The electoral results of the constituency of Dollard were as follows; Creditiste-284, Progressive Conservative 2,471, NDP (Charles Taylor) 10,373, Liberal (Jean-Pierre Goyer) 33, 588.

'liberally minded' voters. These were supposed to be the NDP constituency.[93] Even prior to this election there had been some discontent expressed with Tommy Douglas's leadership. Stephen Lewis, son of the NDP Godfather David Lewis, made a trip to Burnaby in February of 1968 to give Douglas the ceremonial kiss on the cheek. But Douglas was reluctant to give the party leadership up to David Lewis because he thought that his successor should be a younger person.[94] Taylor, who was still in his thirties, and had had extensive experience in party politics, was a potential successor to Douglas. He could have become the new young charismatic leader of the NDP.[95] However, Taylor was quite opposed to the cult of youth which had emerged in Canadian politics and which was epitomized in the term Trudeaumania. *The Pattern of Politics* begins with his critique of this political phenomenon.

Taylor believed that the new young leader (NYL) phenomenon facilitated a politics of consensus, as opposed to a polarized politics. Consensus politics was a new phrase for brokerage politics, but it sounded better. Brokerage politics sounded too much like decisions made behind closed doors by cigar smoking old men in rumpled suits. In

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[93] Brodie, Jensen, *Crisis,* p.275.

[94] Penner, *Protest,* p.100.

[95] Murray Goldblatt, "The New Leader," *The Globe and Mail,* April 26, 1971, p.3. Goldblatt states that David Lewis "might well have stepped aside for Taylor" if Taylor had decided to run for the party leadership. In conversations with Terry Morley, of the University of Victoria Political Science Department, who was active in the NDP executive's politics he confirms this statement and further states that support for Taylor was so strong that he would have won the 1971 leadership convention. According to Morley, Taylor likely did not run for the leadership out of loyalty to David Lewis.

contrast, consensus politics sounded like all interests were being given a say in decisions. This sounds good in theory, but in practice certain voices sway decisions based upon entrenched structures of power. The NYL was a catalyst for the re-marketing of brokerage politics as consensus politics; it was really a repackaging of brokerage politics. Taylor emphasizes that it is the program which a party stands for which is important, not the fact that the party is led by a swinging leader. According to Taylor, "what is totally missing ...is any inkling that there are important and fundamental structural conflicts in our society which make any claim to consensus specious. It is impossible for one person to represent the whole."[96] Taylor proceeds with an analysis of economic power in Canada, with particular reference to the American domination of the Canadian economy. He restates many of the arguments for economic nationalism which he had made during the 1960s in *Canadian Dimension*. This includes his strategy of transcending the position of Canadian economic dependence upon corporate America through social democratic planning based upon the pursuit of a 'common purpose.' However, he provides a far more comprehensive exploration of the nature of common purposes.

In Taylor's previous arguments he made the case that Canada does not have a single language, culture or a common history upon which to base a sense of identity. It would be anachronistic to project a common identity based upon these sorts of phenomena into the Canadian situation. He proposes to get beyond this dilemma by establishing a number of

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[96] Charles Taylor, *Pattern of Politics,* (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970), p.8.

programs which would reflect a common purpose across the Canadian mix of diversity. In particular, he believes that a program like repatriating the economy could serve to unify the country. This would create a sense of identity for Canadians, but it would be a different sort of identity because such an identity is not particular but universal in orientation. It is an identity that is not like other conceptions of identity, because it is not based upon a common past. Such an identity would be based upon a common purpose of future political and economic action. Still, it is not clear how he and the NDP were going to launch these programs based upon a 'common purpose' through which Canadians were to achieve a new sense of identity. Taylor argued that we do not have a strong sense of national identity based upon some sort of commonalties, and yet he proposes that we can have one by pursuing a program of common purpose. The notion of pursuing a common purpose has an implicit sense that there is an original idea or principle which is capable of uniting Canadians in order to begin the project of repatriating the economy. Otherwise, we would not even be able to begin to formulate this sense of common purpose. At the very least there must be some common idea of standards which might be used to decide what the nation's common purpose would be. In order to achieve a common purpose we must have a form of unity to start with. On a very superficial level Canadians are united by virtue of shared citizenship in the state of Canada, but Taylor has something different in mind. What Taylor has in mind is a national identity which is based upon common universal values which Canadians already embrace. This means that Taylor's projective nationalism, which builds upon existing moral conceptions of what is good, brings into being something which

is already there. In sum, even though Canadians may not be culturally or linguistically homogenous, and even though they do not have a common history which can unite them, they do have an undefined sense of shared universal values. These values are universal in the sense that they are not specific to a particular region or linguistic or ethnic community. The existence of these universal values is a necessity for Taylor's projective nationalism. A precondition for this nationalism based upon universal values is that these 'nationalists' share, in some manner, a set of universal values. In Taylor's book *The Pattern of Politics* the complex nature of the relationship between identity and shared universal values becomes clearer.

2.4 Political Identity and Shared Universal Values

In *The Pattern of Politics* Taylor says, "there is an important dimension of politics that can only be understood in light of the universal human aspiration to be in contact with some larger, fuller, more significant life."[97] This universal aspiration has taken many forms, such as religion or nationalism. This universal aspiration results in a desire to belong to "something which can command their respect and allegiance; just belonging to lesser associations may fulfill a variety of other needs."[98] This desire to belong to something larger gives people an identity. According to Taylor, "I am claiming that we gain an identity and learn who we are by discovering or determining our relations to larger

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[97] Taylor, *Pattern,* p.103.

[98] Taylor, *Pattern,* p.102.

significant realities around us."[99] Taylor also relates identity formation to a lifelong process of maturation where we progress from an identity based on our association with our family, to an identity based upon our association with our community. So we move from a particular identity to a larger, more universal, identity. According to Taylor a person experiences the dynamics of this identity formation as both "donor and recipient." In other words, a person acquires an identity from a larger reality, such as a family or community, but this acquisition occurs through a person's participation in, and their contribution to, this larger reality. The larger reality exists prior to the individual, but the larger reality is in a sense recreated by the individuals' *participation* in and *contribution* to the larger reality.

Taylor's conception of a larger reality which forms our identity is in some ways antithetical to modern society. The traditional communal associations and religions which might be the model for these ideas have been displaced by a secular, highly mobile technological society. In modern society people are treated primarily as individuals. This phenomenon results in people being dislocated from what Taylor calls "public meanings." Public meanings are the ideas associated with a larger reality. People become alienated from society because they no longer see it as a reflection of something which they contribute to and belong to. As individuals, they feel apart from society because it is experienced as something which often imposes upon their private lives. Taylor believes people will often achieve a sense of identity from their association with smaller organizations. The universal desire to participate in a larger reality is assuaged by these

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[99] Taylor, *Pattern,* p.104.

partial associations, but it is not fulfilled. For instance the desire to participate in something meaningful can be satisfied by community groups like parent-teacher organizations. However, this will only provide a limited sense of participation in one's community. Similarly, nationalisms which focus on particular regional, ethnic, linguistic or racial groups are limited in their ability to meet one's desire to participate in a larger reality because their focus is too limited. They are not universal in the sense that they can be applied to all of humanity. Taylor's conception of Canadian nationalism is of a cosmopolitan society whose ideas extend beyond the boundaries of the nation state. Other nationalisms might allow people to achieve a sense of identity which is invigorating but, with limited avenues for participation in and contribution to a larger reality, people will lack an important dimension of identity.

Participation in a larger reality, an important dimension of identity, differs from contribution to a larger reality. One can live and participate in a state where the rules are made by some form of bureaucratic hierarchy. In this case, a person might be participating in the state but she would not be contributing in a substantive manner to the direction of the state. In the case of nationalism, people can achieve a sense of participating in something larger, but, if the nationalism does not permit its constituents to contribute to the direction of this larger reality, then it can degenerate into an alienating experience. As with the principle of 'participation in a larger reality,' contribute to partial associations provide only a limited fulfillment of the need to contribution to a larger reality.

The role of Taylor's neo-Hegelian dialectics, particularly as applied to the

reconciliation of *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralitat*, provides insight into Taylor's conception of the relationship between 'participation in' and 'contribution to' a larger reality. As discussed in chapter 1, *Sittlichkeit* is one's obligation to sustain the existing institutions which constituted them, and *Moralitat* is one's obligation to realize something which does not exist by virtue of one's individual rational will. 'Participation in' a larger reality is consistent with *Sittlichkeit,* and 'contribution to' is consistent with *Moralitat. Sittlichkeit* (participation in) is reconciled with *Moralitat* (contribution to) by recognizing that the notions of the good, the moral frameworks, that are the basis of our individual will and our desire to contribute to our community originate from the institutions that we are obliged to participate in. Alienation occurs when either 'participation in' *(Sittlichkeit)* or 'contribution to' *(Moralitat)* are thwarted. Self realization is based upon the maximization of both 'participation in' and 'contribution to' a larger reality.

According to Taylor, in modern societies the two demands of participation and contribution to something larger, result in an aspiration to some form of democracy. However, if 'participation in' and 'contribution to' are to be genuine, then the institutions of public life should embody these characteristics. For Taylor, one of the major obstacles in 1970 to the establishment of these institutions was the corporate structure. Still, he recognized that it would not be enough simply to implement planning boards to direct the economy. It would also require appropriate democratic institutions. He believes that these institutions must combine the ability to implement complex social and economic planning with the representation and connected-ness which comes from local governance. This

means the appropriate democratic institutions must be a combination of centralization and decentralization. Rather than conceiving of discrete jurisdictions, Taylor believes that efficacy, participation, and contribution will necessitate considerable overlap between jurisdictions. This could be quite complicated, and Taylor recognizes this, but he believes an ethic of open dialogue within the spheres of governance, and between the spheres of governance would be necessary. The openness and transparency of the requirements of dialogue would also unmask the influence of corporate power upon decision making. He extends the role of dialogue even further. He believes that a dialogue ethic, "provides for channels of contact with the larger significant life of society, for participation in the search for meaning in a way that accepts, instead of trying to wipe out or gloss over, the diversity or divisions of society."[100] According to Taylor, in order for this dialogue ethic to come into existence Canadians must first grapple with their collective identity crisis.

Once again Taylor explains that Canadians cannot have a national identity based upon a single language, a homogenous culture, or a shared sense of a unifying history. He suggests that a set of common purposes can unify us by providing us with a projective future, as opposed to a common past. The notion of common purposes is further refined by Taylor. Common purposes are "a set of goals [which] will only do the job of uniting us to the extent that they can command allegiance and enthusiasm in their own right."[101] The common purposes which Taylor believes will command the allegiance of Canadians are:

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[100] Ibid., p.127.

[101] Taylor, *Pattern,* p.132.

first, building a bicultural country, which will enrich each culture through interaction, as well as serve as an example to the world that diversity can be a source of richness; second, acting as a mediator between rich nations and poor nations; and third, creating an egalitarian society.[102] In Canada the third goal would mean equality would be pursued not only on the basis of social classes, but also on the basis of regions. All three of these goals would require Canada to wrest economic independence from corporate America. Taylor admits that these goals would not be embraced by all Canadians. With regards to the bicultural goal Taylor states that "Westerners, New Canadians, and the old are relatively less sympathetic."[103] He also feels that some people such as the elite of politics, business, education and certain professional occupations would likely not be sympathetic to these common purposes. This would mean that the common purposes might create new divisions between people within regions, divisions based upon class, but the common purposes would also unite people by class across regions. This would result in a polarization of politics which Taylor believes "is the only way that certain very meaningful issues can come to the fore, and certain important reforms can be attempted."[104] The meaningful issues are the universal ideas embodied in the common purposes.

It is important to relate the universal aspiration for participation in and contribution

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[102] Taylor, *Pattern,* p.132-133.

[103] Ibid., p.133.

[104] Ibid., p.134.

to a larger reality to the common purposes that Taylor prescribed for Canada. The bicultural goal transcends the particularity of both the English and the French culture. This does not mean that either culture will *simply* be negated; rather it means that each culture would participate in the other culture and in so doing would contribute to the larger reality of the shared relationship of the two cultures. This would allow both cultures to participate in and contribute to their own culture, but also to share in participation in and contribution to the other culture, and in so doing both cultures would be participating and contributing to a larger reality -- a bicultural state. In relation to *Sittlichkeit*, the stated goal of Bi-culturalism would be bringing into fuller recognition something which is already there, a bicultural society. While French and English Canada have coexisted they have done so primarily in relative separation from each other. I use the term 'relative' to reflect the fact that this separation is far from complete. The two cultures have overlapped and shared a great deal as well. As far as Taylor's politics is concerned, French and English Canadians have certain shared experiences in the way that their linguistic and cultural differences have been emphasized by political and economic elites to avoid class consciousness across cultural and linguistic lines. A bicultural politics allows for a hermeneutic fusion of cultures, which would move beyond the particularity of a single culture, but would also permit the recognition of a politics of class.

The logic of the dialectic of *participation* and *contribution* which applies to Taylor's conception of a bicultural state also applies to the common purposes of the foreign policy and the regional/class egalitarian state. In the case of a foreign policy based upon mediation

between rich and poor nations, Canada could participate in and contribute to solving the disputes between these states, but this participation and contribution would also change the relationship between the various nation states. This change would not be one sided: both rich and poor states could be enhanced through this relationship. The rich states could have a stronger sense of security and stability, but they could also be improved in a certain moral sense through contributing to and participating in a just redefinition of their relationship with heretofore poor states. In the case of the egalitarian goal between and within regions, a project which enlists the participation of all regions in their collective general well being could serve as a basis of unity across the state of Canada. This unity could permit farmers in Quebec to appreciate and identify with the problems of prairie farmers. Similarly, miners and loggers in the Maritimes could understand the difficulties of miners and loggers in BC. A project which would enlist the participation and contribution of these various groups and regions would change the nature of their relationships. Their respective lives could be enhanced by the collective pursuit of the good life for all citizens regardless of their region, class, or occupation.

The Pattern of Politics was written at an important juncture of Taylor's personal and political life. The NDP was responding to the 1968 election by trying to articulate its program in a way that would expand its electoral base. The Liberal party had co-opted many of the NDP social and political programs such as Medicare and co-operative federalism. The electorate needed to be informed that even though the Liberal party seemed to implement NDP-like programs, ultimately they did not represent the same sort of ideas

and interests. The NDP needed to differentiate the purpose and scope of their programs from the reformism of the Liberal party. Taylor was a party vice president and long time member of the federal executive council's policy committee and took a leading role in articulating the NDP vision. This came in the form of his essays in *Canadian Dimension*, but these statements were limited in length and breadth. *The Pattern of Politics* was intended to address these problems in a more comprehensive fashion. However, *The Pattern of Politics* also differentiated Taylor and the NDP mainstream from the left wing of the NDP. This left wing element of the party had organized itself during this period under the label of 'The Waffle.' The Waffle also advocated the repatriation of the Canadian economy, but they were far more strident in their calls for the nationalization of resources and of certain industries. They advocated extra-parliamentary action and were deeply suspicious of the role of the international unions in the labour movement. This resulted in the Waffle's desire that the labour movement become more democratic, and less influenced by bureaucratic labourism. This critique was particularly pointed at the international labour unions which were usually branches of larger American unions. The Waffle also had a very strong youth element, and often echoed many of the arguments made by the American New Left Movement. Like the New Left, the Waffle also sought to expand democracy in state institutions, such as universities, which were believed to be a source of profound alienation. The desire for a more democratic society motivated the Waffle's extra-parliamentary activity. The general strategy of democratization called for the creation of an electorate, as opposed to the creation of a party which would appeal to the electorate. There was also a

significant nationalist element to the Waffle's socialism. The Waffle Manifesto stated:

> The most urgent issue for Canada is the very survival of Canada. Anxiety is pervasive and the goal of greater economic independence receives widespread support. But economic independence without socialism is a sham, and neither are meaningful without true participatory democracy... Capitalism must be replaced by socialism, by national planning of investment and by the public ownership of the means of production in the interests of the Canadian people as a whole.[105]

The Pattern of Politics addressed some of the Waffle's concerns, such as American corporate domination, but it responded to these concerns with a different project. In particular, although Taylor and the NDP establishment advocated a planned economy, they said they would resort to nationalization only if the situation clearly dictated this sort of response. They believed that American investors would still be interested in investing in a planned Canadian economy, and that the real issue was social and political control of the means of production, and not the nationality of the investors. This meant that the nationalization of ownership would not necessarily be an issue as long as production was directed towards the general interests of Canada. In contrast, the Waffle had a fairly strong Marxist element which advocated the ownership of the means of production. According to this view it was naive to think that capitalists would let socialists dictate investment: ultimately a conflict between the drive for profit and national priorities would necessitate nationalization anyway.[106] Part of the Waffle strategy was to displace the domination of the

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[105] The Waffle Group, "For an Independent and Socialist Canada, The Waffle Manifesto." 1970.

[106] Cy Gonick, "Roots and Branches," *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.7 & 8, April 1971, p.20.

English-French debate in Canadian politics so that they could concentrate on issues such as capital, race, gender, and the nature of institutions. This displacement would be achieved by going beyond recognizing Quebec as distinct, which was current NDP policy, to recognizing Quebec's right to self determination. The rationale for this was that Quebecers experienced many of the same sources of alienation as the rest of Canadians and if they felt they could escape these shackles by going it alone, so be it. The open ended-ness of this strategy is indicative of where Taylor (and many of the NDP establishment) and the Waffle parted company.

Taylor had initially signed the Waffle Manifesto, but later rescinded his support due to escalating intransigence on the part of the Waffle.[107] It is possible to see many points of agreement between Taylor and the Waffle, such as a shared commitment to participatory democracy, and a desire to repatriate the Canadian economy, but there are also points of significant disagreement as well. In an article written in the wake of the 1969 convention in *Canadian Dimension* Taylor acknowledged the vitality of ideas and debate brought to the convention by the Waffle, but he also criticized what he perceived as the anti-Americanism of their rhetoric. Taylor linked this to the influence of the American New Left's repudiation of the American way of life. According to Taylor, the New Left in America wanted to change society by revolution in the university, because other avenues of change were not available. Taylor thought that there were avenues of change open to Canadians, such as

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[107] Desmond Morton, *Social Democracy in Canada*, 2nd Edition, Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert & Company, 1977, p.93.

involvement in the NDP. He felt it would be a mistake for the NDP to get mired in anti-Americanism because it could potentially split the party as well as the potential NDP voters who may not share these feelings. Certainly, it was a problem for some labour supporters of the party who might be employees of American multinationals and members of international unions headquarters in the US. The essence of this response to the Waffle by Taylor was that it was a set of ideas foreign to the Canadian social democratic situation, and it was potentially detrimental for party unity and electoral success.[108]

The depth of Taylor's opposition to some of the New Left's thinking becomes clearer in a critique he made of Herbert Marcuse in *Canadian Dimension.* Marcuse was also, significantly, a major interpreter of Hegel. Marcuse was a towering figure in American philosophy, and his writings were very influential on the philosophy and strategy of the New Left. Taylor described this role as "philosopher turned prophet."[109] In several books, Marcuse examined the conundrum of societies which have strong allegiance despite the fact that they are oppressive. His examinations of popular culture reflect a belief that intellectual and emotional horizons are narrowing. This facilitates the process of acceptance of repression because without images of alternative ways of life it becomes difficult to effect social and political change. Taylor is sympathetic to these claims, and echoes many of these sentiments in his own writings, but Taylor objects to responses to this problem by

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[108] Charles Taylor, "The 'America' Issue," Canadian Dimension, Vol.6, No.6, p.6, 7.

[109] Charles Taylor, "Marcuse's Authoritarian Utopia," in *Canadian Dimension.* Vol.7, No.3, Aug/Sept. 1970, p.49.

movements influenced by Marcuse. He describes these movements as "'negations' of the existing society." These negations were problematic for Taylor because they "might just lead to a break down of our existing civilization, without giving birth to something higher, so that the gap would be filled by more authoritarian repressive forms of government."[110] In relation to the Waffle, there were some elements who were opposed to the influence of American corporations in Canada, but it was not always clear what their conception of a different Canadian society was. Taylor was concerned that much of their rhetoric was negation without an alternative, or realization of the implications of a politics which remained at the level of negation. Taylor, the NDP's leading academic voice at this time, felt that the NDP's project offered a new vision of Canada which transcended mere negation. This new society was a modern bicultural social democracy.

Taylor's wariness of the politics of negation is consistent with his opposition to the Waffle's position on Quebec. At the 1971 federal NDP convention Taylor spoke out against the Waffle's position on Quebec. As previously stated, the Waffle felt that Quebec should have the right to the self determination of its relationship with the rest of Canada. Contrary to this position, Taylor argued that the party should strive for clarity on its position on Quebec. However, his opposition is also consistent with his concern about a politics of 'negation' which does not have a project of transcendence. If the NDP supported self-determination in Quebec they would be practicing a politics of negation because they would be advocating the negation of the province of Quebec as an institution without concerning

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[110] Ibid., p.50.

themselves with a comprehensive conception of what might replace it. In other words, the Waffle was willing to accept that Canada may have a negative influence on Quebec society in the same way that America had negative influence on Canada's society, and that overcoming this relationship might be achieved by Quebec separating from Canada. The Waffle were making an extension of their argument that if it was necessary to negate American influence on Canada to ensure self determination, then it followed that one must also allow Quebec to negate English Canada's negative influence on Quebec. For the Waffle the need to negate American domination was akin to the need to negate English Canadian domination. Taylor was concerned by what would follow all this negation. A coherent vision of a good life which would not only negate but transcend the Canadian and Quebec situations was not clearly spelled out by the Waffle. In contrast, *The Pattern of Politics* does outline what Taylor believed to be a projective nationalism which would transcend the alienation that was the result of the domination of Canada by corporate America, and the domination of French Canada by English Canada.

The politics of negation has an important relationship to Taylor's political philosophy. The term negation refers to a moment in dialectics where a "thesis" is negated by an "anti-thesis" which reveals an important limitation to the 'thesis.' Hegelian dialectics logically argues that the 'the self' transcends the moment of negation by realizing the necessity of relationship between 'thesis' and 'anti-thesis' and in so doing ascends to a moment of 'synthesis' of the two opposing views. In keeping with a neo-Hegelian outlook Taylor's tends to view the various moments as contradictions rather than as conflicts, and as

a result Taylor's opposition to what he refers to as a politics of negation is really a fear that this politics is either a naive arrested dialectic, or perhaps more simply arises from an un-dialectical analysis. However, the fact that Taylor was part of the NDP federal executive changed his relationship to the politics of negation into a conflict. It was no longer just an intellectual argument against the Waffle: it was an ideological support for its removal from the NDP. The merits of the Waffle's position, whatever they may or may not have been, are not the question here; rather, Taylor's philosophy which in an intellectual forum appears to respond in a sophisticated and sympathetic manner to opposing views, in a political forum is unable to respond to the concrete dynamics of opposing political positions without marginalizing a position which refuses to fall in line with his philosophical position. In this case, the limits of Taylor's philosophy become apparent.

As stated previously, Taylor did not believe that Canadians had the type of nationalist elements which bind other states together, but he did think that we can have some sort of notion of a good life which can unite us. Nevertheless, the vision of the good life which Taylor believed had the potential to animate Canadians, and in so doing create the basis of a sense of unity and identity, is historically constituted. So Canadians do not have a sense of history in the sense that certain events in the past were experienced in a common way, but they do have a shared history of Western conceptions of the good life. However, his emphasis upon a sociopolitical dialectical process for realizing this conception of the good life was problematic for NDP politics in particular and, more generally, for social democratic politics in Canada. As previously discussed he outlined a

conception of citizenship where a universal aspiration to participate in and contribute to a larger reality. According to this outlook, the motivation to fulfill this universal aspiration would be met by a federal state, but for many social democrats the strong regional ties which existed (and still exist) in Canada tended to view the federal NDP party's conception of social democracy in Canada as being excessively centralized.[111] It should be remembered that Taylor was one of the principal authors of this social democratic vision of federalism. The strength of the regional ties in Canada was (and still is) greater than one might expect from a partial association which would, according to Taylor's political philosophy, have been logically transcended in a larger federal state entity. The fact that Taylor's political world was the city of Montreal, where the political problem was (and still is) reconciling the English and the French, also explains this limitation. His formative experiences did not include an experience of regional alienation. As a result, the strains of regional ties upon the Canadian identity were not fully appreciated by Taylor. Indeed, as Taylor thinking progressed through the 1980's and 1990's and he addressed issues of multiculturalism he remained primarily focused on the French-English question.

[111] Norman Penner, *From Protest to Power*, p. 108

CHAPTER 3 TAYLOR'S POLITICAL ACTIVISM: The Post NDP Politics

In this chapter I will discuss Taylor's post NDP politics that began in the mid-seventies. He maintained his commitment to social democracy, but as we will see this commitment changed in emphasis to reflect important changes which were occurring in the world around him. First, globally, social democracy entered in a period of crisis due to changes in global economics. Significantly, the changes in global economics resulted which in an ascendancy of a liberal free market economics and a variety of associated ideas such as the atomistic individual. Taylor's response to this development was a rearticulation of his conception of social democracy. Social democracy remained relevant because its focus was not simply on the redistribution of goods and services, but rather according to Taylor, was based upon a comprehensive philosophical conception of human agency. In Canada, the patriation of the constitution also resulted in adoption of a liberal procedural charter of rights. Not surprisingly, Taylor's focus during this period was less economic and more constitutional-rights based. As a result he develops a Canadian formulation of citizenship that could accommodate elements of a procedural, rights based, conception of justice, as well as the need for citizens to actively participate in and contribute to their community. The links between his political and philosophical ideas remain. Taylor's direct participation in Canadian politics diminished during this period so the harder edges and limitations of his philosophy are less apparent.

3.1 Social Democracy in Crisis

In the 1972 federal election the Liberal Party lost its absolute majority, falling from

155 seats to a plurality of 109 seats. The NDP under David Lewis held the balance of power with 31 seats.[112] This arrangement allowed the NDP to pressure the Liberal Party to pursue nationalist economic policies. For instance, the Foreign Investment Review Agency was established to review foreign investment and if necessary reject investments which did not significantly benefit Canada. In addition, Petro Canada, a crown oil company, was created. This last measure was symbolically significant given the important changes in the global oil market which had profoundly shaken all western nations.

During the 1960's and 1970's newly emerging industrial countries, the growing strength of the European Economic Community, and advances in technology produced significant shifts in manufacturing and trading patterns in the world. These changes were further complicated by changes in the global oil market. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 1973 oil embargo caused world oil prices to rise dramatically. This resulted in a period of rapid inflation in Canada and many other countries. Canada responded with wage and price controls, high interest rates and tight monetary policies. This did little to reduce inflation, but it did manage to increase unemployment and squelch economic growth. This economic phenomenon called "stagflation" confounded states such as Canada which had accepted the truisms of Keynesian economics. Keynes put forward the idea that a capitalist economy would go through cyclical periods of growth and stagnation. During periods of economic growth high inflation would be accompanied by

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[112] Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson, *Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour and Public Policy*, Second Edition, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1990, p.517

low unemployment, and during stagnant economic periods low inflation would accompany high unemployment. State intervention in the form of investment in infrastructure and social programs would stimulate employment and consumer demand during stagnant periods and this would smooth over the natural cycles of a capitalist economy. However, the early seventies saw high inflation accompanied by high unemployment, not low unemployment. State policies to limit the inflation by limiting the supply of money in the economy resulted in increased unemployment; and state investment in the economy to mitigate the pernicious effects of high unemployment resulted in higher inflation. The role of the state in the economy had changed. In the past, social policies favoured by social democrats could be justified as state investment to moderate the negative social effects of the cycles of the capitalist economy. This rationale was no longer a tenable argument for social policies favoured by social democrats.

These economic changes were occurring at the same time as changes in the leadership of the NDP. By the end of 1974 two pioneers of both the CCF and the NDP, Tommy Douglas and David Lewis, had left the leadership of the NDP. David Lewis stepped aside due to health reasons, and Douglas, while still active in the party, took on the role of party elder and played a smaller role in the direction of the party. A leadership convention in 1975 resulted in Ed Broadbent emerging as the new leader of the NDP. Meanwhile, Taylor, also pioneer of the NDP and a friend and colleague of David Lewis, had accepted the prestigious Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was associated with the 1960's generation of NDP leadership and as that

leadership group left he too left to one of the most prestigious positions in academia. He was returning to his Alma Mater in England, but it was becoming a different England than he had known during his doctoral studies.

The United Kingdom, like Canada and many other western countries, was wrestling with the impacts of changes in the global economy. The U.K. Labour Party, like the NDP, was also experiencing troubles articulating a vision of socialism. Part of these problems stemmed from the changes in global capitalism, but they also came from alternative visions of social democracy within the Labour Party. During Labour's periods of power they managed to establish a bureaucratic welfare state which mitigated the worst excesses of capitalism, but did little to alter the economic power relations in the U.K. A vocal left wing emerged in the Labour Party led by people such as Tony Benn. They wanted a far more activist government that would bring in far reaching institutional reforms which would alter the relations of power. The leadership of the Labour Party continued to pursue a more moderate course for electoral reasons as well as to avoid completely alienating capital. As a result the Labour Party had a very muddled vision of social democracy as well as a declining ability to mitigate capitalism's excesses such as inflation and unemployment. The door was open for the U.K. Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher to defeat Labour based upon arguments that Labour's state intervention was the cause of the U.K.'s problems.

The U.K. Labour Party's problems were not unique. Social democrats world wide were facing a crisis. Policies which were favoured by social democrats no longer moderated unemployment and inflation; instead, they came to be seen as a drag upon their nations

economies. Countries with low health and labour standards, little environmental protection, marginal social programs and low wages had increases in gross domestic production and were attracting capitalist investment from western nations. Social democrats had a far more difficult time arguing that social programs were good for the nation when other nations were prospering because they did not have social programs.

Back in Taylor's home province of Quebec, the separatist Parti Québécois had won the provincial election of 1976. They introduced a number of social programs similar to those of social democratic governments such as government auto insurance, targeted corporate nationalization, and labour code reforms. Interestingly, social democratic polices had a certain cachet as an aspect of nation building for the Parti Québécois. They also proved to be popular with the electorate who did not vote for sovereignty association in 1980, but did re-elect the Parti Québécois with a convincing majority a few months later.

Meanwhile, Taylor's academic work was gaining international prominence. His book *Hegel* was well received and was eventually translated into German and Swedish. A second book on Hegel followed, *Hegel and Modern Society,* and it was translated into Japanese, Spanish, Italian, Chinese and Swedish. This second book was intended for wider academic audiences but it also reflected some of Taylor's concerns with the political world around him. For nation states, the nature of freedom, obligation and subjectivity in the late 1970's and 1980's was changing. Capital investment had no nationality. Social programs which promoted communal identities were eroding in the face of the need to attract capital investment. Personal freedom to acquire wealth subverted responsibility to one's

community or nation. Against this political backdrop, Taylor argued that through Hegel we can get a better understanding of conceptions of human subjectivity and the nature of freedom. Using Hegel's philosophy as the basis for his argument, Taylor articulated a conception of subjectivity inextricably tied to community, and a conception of freedom that only makes sense in the context of the language of that community.

3.2 The Rearticulation of Social Democracy in Canada

In 1979 Taylor resigned the Chichele chair and returned from Britain to Montreal to oppose the Parti Québécois sovereignty association referendum which was ultimately defeated. However, the nature of subjectivity and freedom and obligation continued to resonate in Taylor's world through the 1980's as Canada amended its constitution to include a Charter of Rights, and a redistribution of powers between the federal and provincial governments. In addition, the demographics of Canada changed significantly. The prominence of the "two founding cultures," French and English, was being challenged by aboriginal peoples and a variety of growing ethnic communities whose roots were diverse. The notion that Canada was a multicultural state was taking on larger significance.[113] These changes were occurring as Taylor's philosophical writings and his international prominence in the academic world continued to expand. A prominent collection of his essays *The Philosophical Papers Vol.1: Human Agency and Language*, and *The Philosophical Papers Vol.2: Philosophy and the Human Sciences* was published in 1985.

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[113] Colin Campbell and William Christian, *Parties, Leaders, and Ideologies in Canada* Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1996, p.174

This was followed by *The Malaise of Modernity* (which was republished in United States as *The Ethics of Authenticity)* and his magnum opus: *The Sources of The Self.* In these works Taylor continued to articulate his conception of human subjectivity and the nature of freedom and obligation. However, it was his attempt to seek a hermeneutic fusion of divergent cultures, a theme which hearkened back to his early NDP writings on Quebec-Canada and social democracy, which received new attention in United States and Europe as they wrestled with questions of procedural liberalism and its applicability in increasingly pluralist societies. For the Americans the pluralism debate centered on questions such as multiculturalism, feminism, cultural separatism, and moral relativism, but Taylor lived these problems in a modern bilingual cosmopolitan Montreal.

Not surprisingly during this period Taylor also continued to craft political essays which incorporated the themes of his philosophical work but set them in a Canadian context. The relationship between identity, nationalism, and the institutions of the state were important themes in the essays, "Institutions in National Life," "Why Do Nations Have to Become States," and "Shared and Divergent Values," These essays are distinguished by their more complete rendering of the notions of the good life and a greater treatment of practical questions of the role of the state in the relationship of the subject and his community, and freedom and obligation.

A significant political essay from this period is "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late Twentieth-Century Canada." It was originally written as a submission to the *Royal Commission on Economic Union and Developmental Prospects for*

Canada, otherwise known as called the MacDonald Commission after its chair Donald MacDonald. In 1982 MacDonald was charged with the task of recommending "appropriate national goals and policies for economic development."[114] It was a search for a national economic policy that would lead Canada out of Keynesian economics into a new economic era. The commission received briefs from private sector groups, commissioned hundreds of studies from a variety of academics, conducted public hearings across the country, and emerged with the conclusion that Canada's best prospects lay with the pursuit of a market driven development strategy combined with a free trade agreement with the U.S.[115] Taylor's submission did not come to the same conclusion. In fact, in "Alternative Futures" familiar arguments which were originally found in Taylor's NDP writings re-emerged. Only now, the arguments are far more subtle and nuanced by a philosophical rendering of the contemporary dilemmas of modern citizenry. Like his NDP writings he encourages strong local communities capable of sustaining identities by allowing citizens, and these communities, to participate in a larger federal state. As in *The Pattern of Politics* written in 1970, Taylor claims that impediments to participation in and contribution to a 'larger reality' result in a sense of alienation. Not unlike *Pattern of Politics*, "Alternative Futures" published in 1985, approaches this same topic by examining what sort of state can avoid alienation, and in so doing achieve some sort of legitimacy for its citizens. Taylor tells us

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[114] Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Developmental Prospects for Canada, Report, Vol. 1 Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985, p.xvii.

[115] Janine Brodie, *Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism.* Toronto: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1990, p.216.

that legitimacy can be viewed as the ability of the state to deliver the goods. This is a simplistic view of legitimacy as far as Taylor is concerned and he directs our attention to a view of legitimacy based upon conceptions of the good life. In this case a state would be legitimate to the extent that it represents, participates, and contributes to a life which is based upon understandings of the good. He clarifies this when he states:

> I mean the understandings of the good that have helped constitute this society and hence are essentially linked to its development. These conceptions, which I gather together under the loose title of the modern identity, could only have developed within a society with structures, institutions, and practices like ours.[116]

This means that the institutions of our society affect the way we think about our 'selves', and the forms of life which we think would be good and worth pursuing. In turn, the notion of the good which informs the way we live our lives and think of our 'selves,' will constitute the institutions of our society. This might seem like an impossibly circular understanding of society, but if we consider this circularity in relation to Taylor's concern for the participation and contribution of citizens to the polity then it becomes clearer. In this case the ongoing institutions of our society logically precede us, because they were there before

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[116] Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late-Twentieth-Century Canada," in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism,* edited by Guy Laforest, Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993, p.66; First printed in *Constitutionalism, Citizenship, and Society in Canada,* edited by Alain Cairns and Cynthia Williams, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985,. This essay was presented to the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (The MacDonald Commission). Ironically, this commission advocated a retreat from many social and economic policies which Taylor had argued for.

we were born. As we grow and mature we participate in these institutions, but this is not enough because there is also a universal need to contribute to these institutions. So, even though we are constituted by these institutions, we are also driven to both participate and contribute to the constitution of and changes in these institutions. Through this participation and contribution to our institutions we can become aware of and realize our relationship to our conception of the good life.

Taylor tells us that there are many ideas and conceptions of the good which sustain the modern identity, but there are two poles around which many of these conceptions are arranged. The first pole is based upon the conception of society as a group of individuals in which each individual has his own way of realizing the good life. Taylor calls this the atomistic outlook. The institutions motivated by this outlook protect the freedom of individuals to pursue their notion of the good as they see fit. During the early 80's the term the "New Right" was used by Taylor and many others to describe this outlook.[117] The second pole is based upon a recognition that the community and institutions which constitute our conception of the good are directly related to that good. In this case an individual's freedom is linked to her capacity to participate in and contribute to the decisions of her community, but this requires that individuals identify their own fate with that of the of the community. In Taylor's words, "I cannot identify my efficacy with my participation in common decisions unless our common lot, the fate of the community,

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[117] *Ibid.* p.90-91; also ft.nt.15, p.114.

matters a lot to me."[118] The problem with the first outlook, the atomist, is that it tends to undercut the very institutions and ideas which sustain it. For instance, the protection of an individual's rights requires that there be some sort of state that will protect these rights. This means that each individual must contribute in some manner to the maintenance of a rights-based state. However, the ideal of freedom from individual constraint results in a reluctance to contribute to the state, because that would be an impingement upon personal freedom. This dynamic contributes to some of the legitimacy problems which some states experience.

Taylor explains that these two poles result in two models of society. The first pole results in a rights based model of society. This model sees the state as a protector of an individual's right to pursue their life goals as they see fit. This sort of model is the basis of many liberal constitutions which strive to protect the freedom of individuals to pursue their lives as they see fit, with a general proviso that their pursuit of liberty does not unduly infringe upon other individual's rights to do the same. One of the problems with this model has already been briefly stated -- the primacy of individual liberty tends to undercut the collective allegiance required to sustain the institutions which will protect individual liberty. The second pole results in a different model of society, one which is based upon participation. According to Taylor, "what defines this model is the sense of citizen dignity based upon having a say in the laws by which members live."[119] In this case individuals

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[118] Ibid., p.94.

[119] Ibid., p.94.

identify strongly with the institutions of their society and dignity comes from participating in the decisions of their society. In Taylor's words, "special importance comes from the fact that we as a whole, or community, decide about ourselves as a whole community."[120] Taylor qualifies the distinction between these models by explaining that in practice there is usually some element of both models at work in any democratic polity. The participatory model does not totally preclude the existence of a schedule of rights which should not be infringed upon, nor do adherents of the rights model necessarily eschew participation in collective decision making. However, some societies may favour one model more than the other.

Taylor situates his discussion of these models derived from the notions of the good life within the Canadian context. The Canadian respect for government and acceptance for government initiatives leads Taylor to believe that Canada has tended to favour the participatory model. In support for this contention he points to such initiatives as the Canadian Pacific Railway, Medicare, and the National Energy Policy. The existence of strong social democratic parties in several provinces also reflects a proclivity towards the participatory model. At the heart of Taylor's argument is a justification for social democracy which is not based upon the need to mitigate the negative aspects of capitalism. It is based upon a comprehensive outlook of what it means to be a complete person in a modern democratic society. "Alternative Futures" is a finer more subtle justification of social democracy than many of Taylor's early NDP writings, but some of the old NDP

[120] Ibid., p.94.

programs are resurrected in these essays as a response to political problems of the 1980's and 1990's such as national unity, ethnic diversity and Quebec separatism. And Taylor still felt that certain elements of the participatory model are lacking in Canada: specifically, Canadians' identification with their institutions and community is fraught with difficulties. In Canada one of the major difficulties comes from an identification based upon nationality (French Canadian and English Canadian) versus an identification based upon shared institutions. There are further tensions due to regional differences as well as the arrival of immigrants who do not identify with either the English Canadian or the French Canadian culture. In order to get beyond these difficulties Taylor advocates a very decentralized federation. This would allow for the realization of participation while preserving important loci of identification such as language and/or region. Taylor explains that a decentralized state would still have problems because it would need to maintain some sort of unity in the face of increasingly competitive world markets.

It is important to contextualize Taylor's arguments against the backdrop of the global crisis in social democracy. As previously stated, changes in the global economy had defied the Keynesian economic analysis favoured by many social democrats as a justification for social programs. Taylor's arguments were comprehensive arguments for social democracy based upon contemporary problems such as identity, alienation, freedom, and the nature of democracy in a multinational state such as Canada. For example, Taylor did not want the Canadian state's institutions to be decentralized for purely functional reasons. On the contrary, Taylor was (and still is) concerned about the role that institutions

play in the formation of identity. In his essay, "Institutions in National Life,"[121] he expressed this concern that the institutions of the province of Quebec were becoming excessively bureaucratic in orientation. This orientation reduces institutions to instruments for the provision of certain collective or individual needs of citizens. He believes that this will result in a growing malaise with modern society in general. In opposition to this view of institutions, Taylor believes we should recognize the role institutions play in the constitution of a collective identity. He recognizes that identity is a vexing issue for most people, because we can be pulled in several directions by a variety of claims placed upon us in the name of identity. In some cases the solution suggested to this dilemma is a neutral liberal state, whose function is to adjudicate the plurality of claims made. This solution is neither desirable nor plausible as far as Taylor is concerned because it fails to grasp some important aspects of the role institutions play in identity. According to Taylor, "my identity is a moral reality, which is to say that what I define myself in regard to are always normative views of life, conceptions of human life that have moral value."[122] In other words, identity is defined in relation to a conception of the good life -- in relation to a notion of the good. Taylor argues that a notion of the good life is bound up in practices which are necessarily social in nature. These practices constitute institutions. In Taylor's words:

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[121] Charles Taylor, "Institutions in National Life," in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays in Canadian Federalism and Nationalism,* edited by Guy Laforest, Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993, p.120-134.

[122] Ibid., p.122.

> The institution is not the point of application of a morality defined elsewhere; rather, it is the environment in which this morality gets elaborated; and as a vehicle of this vision of life, it constitutes an important pole of identification for those who participate in it.[123]

According to this view, the way we live our lives is an articulation of a notion of the good. Even if the major institutions of our lives, such as the state, purport to be neutral and value free they are in fact an articulation of some sort of collective notion of the good. However, if we view them as neutral instruments and deny their role as moral articulations then we are denying an essential part of our own identity. Certainly, we may hold particular attachments which contribute to our identity, and this can also result in tensions when these attachments place citizens of a state at cross purposes. Nevertheless, when a diversity of people come together and participate in the state they engage in an agonistic articulation of a notion of the good. The democratic negotiation of what the state should or should not do is an articulation of a community's conception of the good. Taylor thinks that the state will have to negotiate a tension between being "a collective instrument for promoting individual ends,"[124] and an articulation of an identity based upon a collective notion of the good. The way the state negotiates this tension will be an articulation of an important aspect of its citizens' identity.

3.3 Social Democracy and Canada-Quebec: Post Charter of Rights

The role of the state in the formation of identity has important implications in a

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[123] Ibid., p.123.

[124] Ibid., p.133.

multinational state such as Canada. Taylor's view of this role is explored in his essay "Why Do Nations Have to Become States."[125] This essay could just as easily have been titled 'does Quebec, as a nation, need to separate from Canada?', because the essay does eventually conclude by asking this question. Taylor answers this question by analyzing the character of Québécois nationalism. Taylor relates the language of this nationalism to aspects of the post-Romantic philosophical movement. According to Taylor, "the language/culture that we need for our identity is one that we always receive from others, from our surroundings, it becomes very important that we be recognized for what we are."[126] Taylor proceeds to argue that in order to preserve an identity, such as a nationality, then some very important aspects of the community which sustains this identity must not only be protected but also recognized. Furthermore, it must have avenues open for expression of this identity. In relation to Quebec, Taylor does not think that these requirements necessitate a separate state, because a federal Canadian state could provide the necessary conditions for the sustenance of the Québécois nationalism. In fact, he argues that the pursuit of an independent Quebec state threatens to displace other aspects of identity which are also important for the citizens of Quebec. According to Taylor, "not only does this breed a willingness to sacrifice everything else on the altar of nation, but

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[125] Charles Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States," in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism,* edited by Guy Laforest, (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993), p.40-58. First published in *Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation,* edited by Stanley G. French, Montreal: L'Association Canadienne de Philosophie, 1979.

[126] Ibid., p.52.

nationalism itself becomes an obsession with power."[127] Instead of this direction Taylor argues that it would be better to build some sort of supranational unity. He believes this would be pragmatic for economic and technological reasons, but it would also be desirable for spiritual reasons. According to Taylor, a supranational orientation could allow for "...not only a wider identification but also a plurality of poles of identification. This can help protect us from the stultifying, repressive obsession with the nation, which is one of the standing dangers in modern civilization."[128] In other words, Quebec's participation in a supranational entity like Canada would allow its citizens to be something more than just Quebecers.

Its interesting to examine a more contemporary essay by Taylor at this juncture. Taylor's essay, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition."* The essay was written in 1992 and has received a great deal of attention in the United States and Europe. His essay's multiple references to the Canadian context clearly indicate that it is written by a Canadian. Briefly, Taylor outlines two conceptions of liberalism which are found in Canada. The first is a procedural liberalism and the second is a substantive liberalism. Procedural liberalism is based upon the atomistic conception of human nature, where individuals are equally accorded certain universal rights, and the state neutrally arbitrates these rights. This stands in contrast to the substantive liberalism which Taylor tells us can

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[127] Ibid., p.57.

[128] Ibid., p.58.

acknowledge some universal rights, but over and above those rights there are certain collective rights. The collective rights are based upon substantial conceptions of the good life. Taylor places these contrasting outlooks into a Canadian setting by describing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as essentially a procedural outlook, and the Quebec government's use of the constitutional "notwithstanding clause" to override the Charter to implement French language legislation. In this case the Province of Quebec has taken action to limit a particular range of freedoms for the collective good of the community. However, it was a limited override of the charter in the sense that it only applied to the particular collective goal of the province, and did not reflect a comprehensive override of the charter as it might apply to other circumstances. Clearly the Taylor trademarks are evident. An individualist conception of human nature competing with a collectivist conception of human nature, with Taylor siding with a modified collectivist conception which can still respect many of the important institutional achievements of the individualist outlook. The key to the collectivist outlook was that it was political in the sense that it allowed people to democratically articulate the goals of a community.[129]

The importance of this later essay is the continued need to argue for participation and contribution in the polity in order to sustain identity. The importance of participation and contribution was first articulated in Taylor's book *The Pattern of Politics*. The context of this was the question of legitimacy of a Canadian state in meeting what Taylor claims to

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[129] Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and' The Politics of Recognition'*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.61.

be a universal demand to participate in a larger reality. This larger reality in these later essays is based upon a conception of the good. This conception of the good is what constitutes our identity, and is constituted not only linguistically but also through the practices and institutions of our everyday lives. This means that any transformative political project must seek to incorporate some aspect of our institutional articulation of the good life. To do otherwise could result in a politics of negation. The problem with this latter politics is that it denigrates important conceptions of the good which inform our identity. Without these conceptions of the good we may encounter not only a profound crisis of identity, but also an inability to act with any degree of confidence. These later essays also point out that the conceptions of the good are in fact multiple, and that to limit ourselves to a particular good or set of goods can be stultifying.

3.4 Taylor's Old and New Versions of Social Democracy

Taylor's earlier vision of social democracy was of a Canadian federal state which could not only accommodate two nations, but also the multiple sources of identity experienced by citizens in a modern state. In his earlier programmatic writings for the NDP his vision of social democracy involved a mixed economy. This meant that the economy could not be left to its own devices. Instead, planning bodies should direct the economy according to the democratic articulation of the community's conception of the good life. He did not encourage the nationalization of the means of production because this would be the negation of an institution of the community. Instead, a mixed economy would build upon certain conceptions that existed across Canada — the good embodied in a limited liberal

market, and communal conceptions of the good which called for the collective provision of some material goods The view that there were conceptions of the good which were shared across the regional and linguistic divisions of Canada was important to Taylor's early writings. The importance of this view does not diminish in his later writings. In his early writings, Taylor acknowledges that Canada cannot sustain a homogenous identity based upon a shared nationalist, culture, language, or shared sense of history. Nonetheless, he does argue that Canadians can participate in a unity of common purpose. This common purpose would build upon existing institutions by creating shared institutions such as the Canada Development Fund, and a reconstituted federal state. Once again, Taylor is concerned about particularistic orientations which threaten to negate existing institutions. On a certain level Taylor's concern for the politics of negation might be read as prudent attention to effective electoral strategy. The NDP wanted to present itself as a viable social democratic alternative to Canadian voters. Some of its programs might have seemed radical to some voters. In order to court these voters the NDP could present itself as building upon the existing accepted social structures, rather than building new social structures *in toto*. If, however, we consider Taylor as a political philosopher as opposed to a party strategist then we are obliged to consider the philosophical basis of Taylor's apparent gradualism. I think Taylor would be uncomfortable with a categorical separation of his 'political self' from his 'philosophical self,' because his philosophy is political and his politics is philosophical. Even though he did play the role of a politician in the 1960's philosophy was never far from his heart. If Taylor had been successful in electoral politics he might have faced a difficult

choice in his life: to continue in politics, or to return to philosophy. The fact, that Taylor dropped out of the NDP limelight after the early seventies may have reflected a resolution of this tension in favour of philosophy. Indeed, Trudeau once remarked that he had saved Taylor from himself by defeating him in the 1965 federal election.[130]

In many ways the impact of the Hegelian conception of *Sittlichkeit* upon Taylor's philosophical thought can explain his political position in the party. *Sittlichkeit,* the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community, holds that the institutions of our community are essential to the constitution and maintenance of our identity. These moral obligations are conceptions of the good which constitute my identity. This obligation results in a commitment to the institutions of my community which are articulations of notions of the good. It follows that my identity is bound up with the fate of my community in a way which requires me to sustain these institutions, but my communally derived conception of the good should lead to a more universal conception of the good.. This explains Taylor's aversion to a politics of negation which might seek to break from these institutions. In opposition to the politics of pure negation Taylor advocates a politics oriented toward the realization of a "larger reality," a "supranational state" and a party which puts "the needs of humanity before individual enrichment." This political philosophy ascends from a particular conception of the good to a more universal conception of the good. If we adhere to an insular particular notion of the good then we will experience a sense of stultification

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[130] Prof. James Tully, Dept. of Philosophy McGill University, personal conversation, November 21, 1995.

which comes from failing to recognize our connection to broader conceptions of the good.

I concluded the previous chapter by examining the harder edges and limitation of Taylor's politics. It may be recalled that I attributed these problems to a political overdetermination of Hegelian dialectics, particularly as applied to political problems which logically appear to adhere to Hegelian dialectics, but in practice fail to fall into step. This resulted in a marginalization of groups and movements, as opposed to a dialectical transcendence. In this chapter we examined Taylor's political activity in his post-NDP years. He remained committed to the same philosophical and political issues during this period. He adapted his political writings to respond to the changes in the world around him and as a result focused more on questions of rights, obligations and constitutions and less upon social democratic economic projects.

CONCLUSION

Serious philosophers tend to eschew participation in the hurly-burly partisan politics of their nation state. Benjamin Barber has commented that notable exceptions to this phenomenon are Edmund Burke and Charles Taylor.[131] In the case of Taylor, this is more than an interesting piece of trivia. The parallels between Taylor's political activism and his philosophy are apparent. He is opposed to social sciences which adopt an atomistic position towards human agency, and similarly he is opposed to liberals who apply a related conception of human nature to the world of politics. Taylor's philosophical arguments against atomism/liberalism gain clarity when they are considered in relation to his political activity. Politically he was a member of a Canadian social democratic party which seemed to be perpetually on the cusp of becoming a major political force in federal politics. Taylor and others in the NDP of the 1960's and 1970's shared the hope that if only more people could see that the NDP's goals and objectives were in concert with the existing institutions and practices of the country, then perhaps the big electoral break through could be achieved. Knowing this allows us to see that his philosophical arguments against atomism are far more political because opposition to atomism is not simply an abstract position, rather it is part of a real political agenda which motivated people to participate in politics in Canada. Furthermore, Taylor's rendering of the human condition continues to be relevant because it is capable of addressing political problems which have emerged in many other nations since the 1970s. In particular, his writings on the strains of the modern identity have drawn

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[131] Benjamin Barber, *The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, p.8.

interest from academics outside of Canada. However, Taylor's solutions to these strains in the modern identity relate most closely to the Canadian context, and the optimism and limitations that pervade these solutions might seem misplaced with some audiences. He urges us in, a very measured manner, to draw upon the diverse voices of our community to arrive at a sense of who we are. In a country like the United States, which has celebrated itself as a melting pot of identities, there might be difficulty in affirming voices that were un-American. But these arguments are understandable within a contemporary Canadian context. Through Taylor and other like-minded Canadians these ideas have become part of the political discourse of Canada.

Politically, Taylor is a also trying to negotiate the tensions of modern life in a cosmopolitan city of a French nation, which is part of a Canadian state, which in turn exists in the shadow of an exceedingly powerful English speaking liberal nation-state called the United States of America. This existential aspect of Taylor's life is important when he reaches junctures of his philosophical reflections which are subject to interpretation. For instance, in the preface to his book *Hegel and Modern Society* he says "I share the widely held intuition that some major problems in our philosophy of language are bound up with those which bedevil our conceptions of the human subject, and particularly of freedom."[132] He then uses Hegel to explore this very dilemma. Nonetheless, to understand the "intuition" which has mobilized his philosophical exploration we need to understand something about Taylor and his politics. His political background, which is explored

[132] Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society,* p.xii.

above, adds more than context to his philosophy, it is an articulation of his formative experiences with language, culture and identity and as such allows us a broader understanding of what these terms mean for Taylor. A brief look at the role of language in the Canadian state and Taylor's politics will illuminate my point.

It is possible to see English speaking Canadians, both inside and outside Quebec, as having a superficial understanding of the importance of the relationship between language, culture and one's identity. Language is often portrayed as simply a medium for communicating ideas, which has little relationship to culture and identity. In keeping with this outlook, English speaking Canadians know that even though they share the English language with the Americans and the British, they aren't American or British. This view of language is consistent with the atomistic world view discussed in chapter one. Language, in this case, appears to have little to do with culture and identity, but Taylor urges us to consider language far more broadly, and for English speaking Canadians the ambiguity of our culture and identity has a certain non-linguistic dimension to it which is experienced, and this is consistent with Taylor's broader conception of language.

Canadians have a history of experiencing America's powerful influence upon Canadian economic and political matters, and large elements of our popular culture, such as television, movies, music, books and magazines also reflect an American outlook. To some extent American sensibilities manage to seep into Canadian culture through American dominance of the economy and important cultural media. Despite this, the experience of American culture provides English speaking Canadians with the sense that they are an

"other"; to , but not the same as, Americans. They come from a different place with different institutions and history. They are less litigious and do not insist upon the right to carry handguns. They have stronger social programs. They enjoy watching hockey on their publicly owned television station. In short, they are not Americans, they are something else, but that something else is a cloudy ambiguous identity. This ambiguity is often expressed as a negation of the American identity. It is an identity that is often expressed as "we are not American," as opposed to "this is what makes us Canadian."

Add to this mix the fact that in the early years of the Canadian state the ambiguous Canadian identity was defined by a post-colonial relationship with England. Indeed a residual element of this outlook remains. Still, Canadians aren't British. We share a language but we are also a polyglot inhabiting a former colony, we are an "other," something similar and yet different, "we are not British." Once again English speaking Canadians share a language, not a culture nor an identity, with other English speaking nations. The result is that we experience a tension between language, culture and identity. This tension has been reflected in the political and social history of the Canadian state, often as a collective negation of the influence of these two other states. For instance, tariffs and trade policies have been used to defend Canadians from economic and cultural intrusion from other countries. An important element of this negation is a collective frustration that Canada has often failed to move to the next Hegelian phase of 'synthesis,' which would precipitate a truly Canadian identity. In keeping with the above example, Canada has structured its trading relationships in reference to the dominance of Britain or America

(through tariffs or trade agreements). An independent, self directed, trading relationship has never been realized, and this frustrates many Canadians. For English speaking Canadians this tension or frustration is part of a shared language of experience that contributes to our culture and identity. This experience of language, as an ambiguity and an experience, allows Canadians to question language in a way that the Americans or British might not because their sense of culture and identity is well defined and articulated. For English speaking Canadians culture and identity have significant non-linguistic elements which are shared and communicated through actions, experiences and institutions.

We haven't even begun to touch upon the obvious language dimension to Taylor's political background. The French-Canadian element of Canada, and in Quebec in particular, has a much stronger sense of the intrinsic relationship between language, culture and identity. They have seen the loss of members of their community due to the loss of a shared language. It is not just due to the lack of access to idiosyncratic words which defy translation. It is the sense that a communally held way of relating to and understanding the world is being lost. The loss of their language alienates Québécois from their community, their family, and their sense of self. In the face of the overwhelming presence of the English language in North America the Québécois have taken a fairly defensive position which at its extreme has been articulated as a desire to negate their relationship with the overwhelming English speaking state they are a part of, Canada. In Canada outside of Quebec the understanding of the relationship between language, culture and identity is far less developed. Nonetheless, English speaking Canadians are brutally aware that language

is so important for the Québécois sense of culture and identity that it might very well result in the dissolution of the state of Canada as they know it. Canadians, French and English, have witnessed the Quebec government's defense of the French language, their forceful arguments that it confers upon them the status of distinct society, and the extreme position that Quebec society must have full sovereignty to protect their language and culture. No matter on which side of these debates Canadians find themselves, they are aware that there is an argument that language is related to culture, and identity. British and American audiences do not have the same experience of politically charged national language debates. This is not to say that the U.K. and the U.S. are linguistically homogenous. The U.S. has a growing Spanish speaking population and the U.K. has Welsh and Gaelic speaking populations; however, neither of these states has been on the verge of dissolution because of the tensions precipitated by the co-existence of two distinct linguistic nations in one state. This political backdrop allows us to understand what Taylor has in mind when he talks about having an "intuition" that language is related to culture, identity and freedom.

Despite Canadians' collective identity crisis, made manifest in the experience of holding together their multinational state, they have excelled in certain collective political projects that have been similarly achieved in America by individual enterprise. For instance, collective national enterprises such as national railways, canals, and airlines are strong part of Canadian political history. In addition to collective enterprises there have been a number of collective social programs which have contributed to the Canadian identity. For example, Medicare has become a modern element of the Canadian identity,

and Canadians are often quick to point out how this reflects the fact that they are a more caring, less individualistic, nation than Americans. While its debatable how inflated such pretensions are, it is certainly true that this outlook is a part of the Canadian identity. It reflects an element of the Canadian identity (as ambiguous as that might be) that is based upon a sense of collectivism. To some extent this is due to the fact that collective enterprises and social programs have received support from political parties and social movements that span the political spectrum. These eclectic collectivist roots are found in; co-operativism (credit unions and other co-operative ventures such as grain marketing); welfare liberalism; the social gospel movement; Red Tories (a unique blend of conservatism that incorporates a critique of capitalism with a collective sense of nationalism); a variety of Quebec political movements which combine collective action with Québécois nationalism; and a politically active trade union movement. This is not an exhaustive list, nor does it reflect the opposite end of the political spectrum, liberal individualist movements, which generally do not support collective enterprises, but it does reflect the fact that collectivism does cross much of the spectrum of political parties and social movements in Canada. This stands in contrast to America where individual rights and the rugged self-made-man myth run much deeper. In Taylor's Canada collective social projects are a larger social and political reality than they are in America and not only because they contribute to a sense of identity. For instance, in Canada universal Medicare has become such an important element of the Canadian identity that the dissolution of universal Medicare would be political suicide for any political party. In America universal Medicare does not even exist.

In Canada support for public radio is an election issue; in America its not even on the election radar. For many Canadians the question is more a matter of what ideology should animate our collective action than whether or not we should in fact have collective enterprises.

Not surprisingly, an examination of Canadian political and social movements reveals a variety of philosophical outlooks that provide different justifications for collective action in Canada.[133] The multiple ideological underpinnings for social action have been a part of Taylor's politics which, like his philosophy, has been an extended attempt to bridge these outlooks. In his politics the solution is a form of a pluralist social democracy initially found in the New Democratic Party. In his philosophical writings, which have an amazing span and depth, the solution he argues for is an hermeneutic fusion of philosophical horizons of meaning which is projective in orientation. But the possible impact and the ongoing tension between outlooks that is a part of Taylor's philosophical project may be perceived differently by Americans than Canadians. Americans might be tempted to see Taylor as a communitarian seeking harmony with liberal democrats. However his politics is more complicated than that; he is advocating an ideal capable of simultaneous hermeneutic fusion that still preserves important elements of individual rights protection. It is true that his politics recognizes the limits of the extreme liberal point of view, but it also recognizes the limits of the extreme left (the Waffle) and separatist movements such as the

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[133] *See* Colin Campbell and William Christian, *Parties, Leader, and Ideologies in Canada,* Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1996.

Parti Québécois. But for Taylor, it's not one or the other, nor is it simply both, it is an ongoing political ethic based upon broad principles of participation and contribution in society. For Taylor participation and contribution in a democratic society should be more than simply voting and paying taxes; rather, they underlie a vibrant community that negotiates the tensions between the individual and his community, but still affirms the virtue of institutional collective action as a formative experience. However, he goes one step further when he recognizes a complex plurality of collective identities and this reflects a Canadian experience as opposed to an American or even British experience. The Canadian political historical context is not of a single dominant linguistic culture. Canada is a plurality of collective regional and linguistic identities that interact and compete within the federal state. Add to this the modern liberal citizen identity and what emerges is a strange complexity that is a formative experience for Canadians. This experience allows them to see with far greater ease that Taylor is criticizing and recognizing the good of procedural liberalism, he is criticizing and recognizing the good of collective action that affirms the good of a community, it's an odd muddled clarity that is a Canadian understanding of the world. Taylor has referred to this dynamic as a "deep diversity" which would allow people to have a plurality of ways of belonging to a state,[134] and readers of Taylor have access to the practical dynamics of this strange complexity through his political writings. The principles that he wrote for the NDP, and his subsequent defense of these

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[134] Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values" in *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* ed. Guy Laforest, Montreal/Kingston: McGill Queens University Press, 1993.

principles, shed light upon his attempt to address differences creatively through social democratic action. These writings also resonate with the experience of being Canadian.

It's an experience that exists for Canadians in ways that do not exist for Americans, and the full impact of the ideas that emerge from that experience might be difficult for Americans to accept. In some cases those ideas would make very little sense at all in the American context. For instance, in Canada collective redistribution of wealth and economic opportunities based upon regional collective disparity, as opposed to individual disparity, is a far reaching conception of participation and contribution that has been a structural feature of the Canadian state since its inception. In the U.S. the federal government does perform redistributive functions, but it is primarily on an individual basis. In Canada collective redistribution ameliorates individual differences, but it also holds two nations and several regions and identities together. In America collective redistribution ameliorates individual differences, but it does not hold together regions or nations because there is only one nation and a few hundred million individuals. Easily the most obvious example of a recognition of a diversity of ways of belonging comes from the relationship between Quebec and Canada. Quebecers befuddled pollsters by voting for separatist parties, but rejecting separatism. Still, this pattern does make sense when one considers the tension of a plurality of ways of belonging. For Quebecers their attachment to Canada has been through their identification with Quebec. By voting Parti Québécois they affirm their Quebec identity, but part of that identity also involves a tense relationship with Canada which they are not willing to relinquish (although that may change). Canada outside of Quebec might not fully

understand Quebec and its separatists, but it does recognize them in such odd ways as allowing them to sit as the official opposition in parliament. In Canada the relationship between the individual's identity, the community and his state has a uniquely complexity to it that seems inconceivable to many Americans. It is definitely incommensurate with the oaths of allegiance which Americans often proudly make. Quite simply, Americans are members of a state where the ongoing tensions between a community and an individual are different. As a result, even when they may be willing to see merit in Taylor's position, the formative experience of a Canadian state that has a plurality of strong collectivist elements and ways of belonging, that has difficulty trying to nurture those elements, while also forging closer universal ties, is foreign to many Americans. Americans have a different political reality. For instance, American academics draw upon John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice,* to understand their world. Rawls sets the problems of political order and social justice as a problem in the relations between individuals to be solved by laying down constitutional principles of justice. This formulation is consistent with an American historical context where the problem has generally been the relationship between individual rights and communal authority. Taylor is writing in a different context and responding to a different set of issues. For Canadians, building upon the conception of participation in and contribution to has been a structural feature of the Canadian state and is expressed in equalization programs which seek to distribute resources more evenly as opposed to just the starting point, and where wealthy communities support poorer communities, the leap to social democratic action is entirely plausible as an affirmation of the peculiar Canadian

identity.

The fact that Taylor first codified many of these political ideas in the objectives and principles of the NDP that he wrote in 1963 is not something that should be regarded lightly. Certain aspects of a spirit of compromise between the left and right, an acceptance or recognition of elements of liberalism, and the complex negotiation of a plurality of collective identities through shared social and political programs are clearly an element of those principles. In true Taylor fashion he manages to reflect upon a complex problem, Canada, and produce a well reasoned articulate answer. These principles that reflect his early search for shared understandings amongst divergent cultures and interests in Canada, Quebec, and within the NDP also add context to Taylor's growing international prominence in the late 70's and 80's when global social democracy was in crisis. "Real existing socialism" in the Soviet Union had become increasingly discredited; it was autocratic and left little room for human expression. In the rest of the world changes in global trading patterns had eroded the nation state's sovereignty. It was easier for capital to flee nations with taxation and labour policies that were consistent with social democratic aims and goals. The wafer thin argument for social democracy, that social democrats were more humane managers of capitalism, was no longer tenable in the late 70's and early 80's. A comprehensive justification for social democratic activity was sought by many. As mentioned previously, Taylor offered a renewed and comprehensive theoretical foundation for social democratic activity based upon a far-reaching understanding of human subjectivity. This understanding of subjectivity could creatively address political problems

such as the emerging nationalist tensions within states with weakened sovereignty. His arguments for an hermeneutic fusion of cultures and social understandings brought important understanding to debates about Multiculturalism. However, when Taylor is talking about multiculturalism, nationalism and the state, his understanding is informed by a different backdrop than British or American audiences. The orienting stars that guide Taylor are a Canadian state that is composed of more than one nation. In his early years his conception of the Canadian state was based primarily upon his home city of Montreal where the two nations were the French and the English. Later he tried to incorporate aboriginal peoples, other immigrant groups and growing regional identities in the rest of Canada. The dynamics of these various identities do not slide easily into his Montreal based conception of the world. For instance, the need for authentication of a western identity within the Canadian state is alienated when Taylor regards it to be parochial partial identity which is somehow not on par with the need to recognize the Québécois identity. While working within the NDP this lacuna resulted in political limitations such as a centralized conception of party politics that failed to address dissident groups and some regional tensions. This problem resurfaces in his writings on multiculturalism. In this case a limited conception of multiculturalism, which uses the Montreal situation as the primary point of reference for questions of identity, fails to account for the political reality of aboriginal, immigrant and regional identities.

Nonetheless, his *intention* is a "multi-nation" state that is based upon communally held identities. This is the starting point for his conception of a multinational state. For

Taylor, it is more than a question of what to do about the new immigrants or people of colour, aboriginal peoples and other groups. The tensions created by new waves of immigration, or emerging claims of identity, are recognized by Taylor, but his project is much larger. For Taylor, in true Canadian style, the linkage between "nation" and "state" is not a given and this allows him to see, in a neo-Hegelian fashion, the state as a political and social expression and realization of multiple claims of identity that citizens might feel. His conception of the state allows people to participate and contribute to that state, while maintaining and building upon their existing collective identities. However, it also demands a recognition of other people's collective identity and the resources that the collective identity needs to protect and nourish the basis of that identity. For Americans such a demand for recognition may be too abstract, but for Canadians it is part of an ongoing public debate that they live with.

I would like to argue that there is one more important reason for situating Charles Taylor's philosophy into the context of his politics — his philosophy insists upon it. Taylor tells us, "The community is ...constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community carries on."[135] In other words, someone like Charles Taylor's self interpretations, which define him, are drawn from the interchanges which occur within his community. This begs the question what sort of community gave rise to Taylor's personal self-interpretations which have informed his thinking? Taylor's community is deeply political: language,

[135]Taylor, *Sources*, p.365.

culture, and identity are all related. Taylor's community is one where politically constituted institutions which contribute to the welfare of the community, and not just the individual, are a reality. He also lives in a modern community which is beset by a sense of malaise that comes when people begin to lose their attachment and place within that community. Taylor's community is also a relatively tolerant multinational and bilingual community which respects peace, order and good government. Knowing these facts about Taylor's community provides a window to view Taylor's personal philosophical anthropology. In other words, his political actions are part of his exploration of his community's notions of the good life, and through observing these political actions we can learn something about Taylor and his community. Using Taylor's own conception of philosophical anthropology takes us one step further: his political actions are an articulation of his philosophy. By examining Taylor's politics we enlarge his philosophical voice, but this enlarged philosophical voice is nonetheless Canadian in origin.

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Appendix I Chronology

1931 Charles Taylor is born in Montreal. His parents are upstanding members of Montreal establishment with deep roots in both the French and English community.

1932 The CCF is established. Two notable participants from Montreal (and McGill University specifically) are Frank Scott and David Lewis.

1944 The first CCF provincial government is elected in Saskatchewan led by T.C. Douglas.

1952 Taylor receives his BA from McGill University

1956 CCF ameliorates it's socialism in the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The words "eradication of capitalism" are removed. Subsequently, the Canadian Labour Council, founded the same year, endorses the CCF.

1956 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects begins to warn of the increased American dominance of the Canadian economy.

1957 Progressive Conservative leader John Diefenbaker forms minority federal government.

1958 Diefenbaker's PC's receive a landslide election victory.

1958 declining electoral fortunes prompts the formation of the National Committee for a New Party which would link the CLC and the CCF with "liberally minded" Canadians.

1960 Taylor publishes. "What's Wrong With Capitalism?" and "Changes of Quality" in the *Universities and New Left Review*. Both articles are a critique of British capitalism and the Labour Party's response to the situation.

1961 Medical Insurance Act is passed by Saskatchewan legislature.

1961 NDP is constituted, Tommy Douglas is elected leader.

1961 Taylor receives his Doctorate from Oxford University. Taylor begins teaching at McGill University the same year.

1962 Taylor runs for federal NDP in Montreal -- defeated. Conservatives win minority government.

1963 Taylor writes and co-tables a statement of and objectives and principles of the NDP these principles are accepted after a debate led by Taylor.

1963 Taylor runs for federal NDP in Montreal -- defeated. Liberal win minority government.

1964 Taylor distributes "Co-Operative Federalism," an unpublished paper, to the New Democratic Party on May 20, 1964.

1964 Taylor publishes "Left Splits in Quebec," in Canadian Dimension, Vol.1, No.7, July/August.

1964 Taylor publishes *The Explanation of Behaviour.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. a work based upon his Ph.D. dissertation.

1965 Taylor publishes "What's Wrong With Canadian Politics?" *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.2, No.4, May/June 1965. and "Creative Politics" also in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.3, No.1, Nov./Dec.,1965.

1965 Taylor runs for the Federal NDP in Montreal -- defeated by P.E. Trudeau. Liberals win second minority government.

1966 Taylor becomes vice president of the NDP.

1966 Medicare Act is made national across Canada.

1966 Taylor, publishes "The End of Ideology or New (Class) Politics?" in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.4, No.1, Nov/Dec, 1966. and "Alternatives to Continentalism," also in *Canadian Dimension.* Vol.3, No.5, July/Aug., 1966.

1967 Taylor, publishes. "Nationalism and Independence," in *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.4, No.3, March/April, 1967.

1967 Canada's Centenary is marked by Montreal hosting the Worlds Fair Expo '67.

1968 Taylor runs unsuccessfully for Federal NDP in Montreal. The Liberals led by Trudeau win majority government.

1968 Federal Liberals led by former Quebec NDPer P.E. Trudeau win national election.

1969 Taylor publishes "The 'America' Issue," in *Canadian Dimension.* Vol.6, No.6, May/June, 1969.

1969 Waffle Movement is founded as left wing faction in the NDP. Taylor initially signs the Waffle manifesto but later rescinds his support.

1970 Taylor publishes "Marcuse's Authoritarian Utopia," in *Canadian Dimension.* Vol.7, No.3, Aug/Sept, 1970.

1970 Taylor publishes *Pattern of Politics.* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.

1970 Quebec nationalist terrorists (the FLQ) kidnap British trade commissioner James Cross, and Quebec provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. Trudeau declares War Measures Act; Laporte is executed.

1970 Taylor publishes "Behind the Kidnappings: Alienation too Profound for the System to Contain" *Canadian Dimension,* Vol.7, No.5/6, Dec., 1970.

1971 Tommy Douglas steps down as leader of the federal NDP. David Lewis succeeds Douglas after a divisive battle with Waffle candidate James Laxer. Taylor steps down as party vice president.

1971 Taylor publishes "The Agony of Economic Man," *Essays on the Left: Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas.* ed. L. Lapierre et al. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971.

1972 The Waffle is declared a "party within the party" and according to the NDP constitution is banned.

1972 Liberals win minority government, NDP holds balance of power.

1973 OPEC imposes oil embargo resulting a drastic increase in oil prices, this in turn results in increased inflation and unemployment.

1974 Liberals win majority government.

1975 Ed Broadbent becomes leader of federal NDP.

1975 Taylor publishes. *Hegel.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

1976 The separatist Parti Quebecois win Quebec Provincial election.

1976 Taylor returns to Oxford to take the Chichele Chair, one of the most prestigious in the entire Anglo-American academic world.

1979 Taylor publishes Charles. *Hegel and Modern Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

1979 Margaret Thatcher elected Prime Minister of Britain.

1979 Progressive Conservatives led by Joe Clark win minority federal government.

1979 Taylor returns to Montreal and McGill University to respond to the threat of separatism.

1980 Part Québécois loses referendum on sovereignty association.
1980, Trudeau's Liberal's elected -- again.

1980 Ronald Regan elected president of the United States.

1981 Parti Québécois re-elected.

1982 Canadian Constitution repatriated, and incorporates a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a re-division of federal-provincial powers. Significantly, Quebec was left out of the final negotiations.

1983 Taylor publishes *Social Theory as Practice.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.

1984 Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives elected.

1985 MacDonald Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects recommends the a general free trade agreement with the U.S.

1985 Taylor publishes *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol 1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

1985 Taylor publishes *Philosophy and The Human: Philosophical Papers Vol 2. Sciences.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

1987 Meech Lake Constitutional Accord signed.

1988 Canada and U.S. sign Free Trade Agreement.

1988 Mulroney Conservatives win federal election fought primarily on the issue of Free Trade.

1989 Taylor publishes. *Sources of The Self: The Making of the Modern.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.

1990 Three years after it had been passed Meech Lake fails to receive the accent of the requisite number of legislatures.

1991 Taylor publishes "The Dialogical Self," in *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture.* ed. David R. Hiley, James F. Bohman, and Richard Shusterman, Ithica/London: Cornell University Press, 1991.

1991 Taylor publishes *Malaise of Modernity.* Toronto: House of Anansi, 1991 republished as *The Ethics of Authenticity.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992.

1992 Taylor publishes *Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition'.* with commentary by Amy Gutmann et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

1992 Taylor publishes "Can Canada Survive the Charter," *Alberta Law Review,* Vol.XXX, No.2, 1992.

1992 Charlottetown Accord, a new agreement on the amendment of the constitution, is defeated in by Canadians and Quebecers in a referendum. Taylor made presentations to the Quebec government's Belanger-Campeau Commission urging them to accept the Charlottetown Accord.

1992 The most prestigious honour of the Quebec government, Le Prix Léon Gérin Award, is presented to Taylor for his outstanding contribution to intellectual and civic life in Quebec.

1993 Taylor publishes *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism.* Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993.

1993 Chretien Liberals win federal election.

1995 Taylor publishes *Philosophical Arguments.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.

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Title of Thesis:

The Political Praxis of Charles Taylor

Autho[redacted]

Michael Martin Lancaster

January 12, 1999