

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONISATION

by

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## ABSTRACT

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Topic: Australia and the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation.

As an Administering Power and founding member, Australia has been intimately involved with the process of decolonisation since the formative years of the United Nations. Not only has she been responsible for the administration of four external territories but also in accordance with Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter, she has been held accountable for the transmission of information on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of these territories towards the goal of independence.

Furthermore, Australia has been active in a supervisory role. As an Administering Power administering two trust territories, Nauru and New Guinea, she has been and still is a member of the Trusteeship Council. She was also a member of the U.N. Special Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories from its inception in 1946 until it was dissolved in 1962. It was to this Committee that she was required to submit information on her other two external territories, Papua and Cocos Islands. More recently

Australia was a member of the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonisation created in 1962 to implement the Declaration on Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 1514(XV) in 1960.

The primary purpose of this study is to examine Australia's participation in the Special Committee on Decolonisation not only as a member but as an Administering Power with specific reference to Papua and New Guinea.

On January 28, 1969, the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Patrick Shaw, informed the Secretary-General of the intended resignation of his country from the Special Committee on Decolonisation. Mr. Shaw stated that Australia would continue to furnish information to the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council in accordance with obligations under the Charter and would attend meetings of the Special Committee on invitation but would give information to the Special Committee only when asked. What did this reflect?

This study concludes that Australia's resignation can be attributed to two factors: the criticisms of and ideological differences with the anti-colonial critics who were dominant in the Special Committee. However, not all criticisms from the Committee were ill-conceived and unfounded; some were valid and constructive. But when there was little or no official acknowledgement in the Committee's reports of the progress being achieved in the development of Papua and

New Guinea, it was understandable that the Administering Power should fervently defend her policies and feel resentment for uninformed and irresponsible remarks.

Indeed, the Australian government took measures during the period under study that would drastically alter the tempo of advancement in practically all fields in the Territory. Although both the Administering Powers and the U.N. Visiting Missions to New Guinea testified to these developments in their reports, the conclusions reached by the Special Committee in its resolutions invariably stated that progress was still "slow". Consequently, although Australia was not the first member to resign from the Special Committee, it is significant that it was the first Administering Power to do so. As such, the decision had important implications for the role the Administering Powers would play in the Special Committee with regard to the implementation of resolution 1514(XV).

Although the Special Committee had little direct influence on Australian policies, it did spur on the process of decolonisation in Papua and New Guinea. Most members were concerned about an increased participation in the political process by indigenous people through fully representative political institutions. Similarly, there was the concern that the economy was still largely controlled by expatriates. In social advancement, many members were concerned for the total elimination of racial discrimination

in the Territory while education was seen as the key to providing the skilled and trained personnel necessary to sustain a viable and independent nation in Papua and New Guinea. But by urging "the speedy end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations," often in the most uncompromising terms, the Special Committee alienated the membership of one of the less intransigent and more co-operative of the Administering Powers.



## PREFACE

As an Administering Power and a founding member, Australia has been intimately involved with the process of decolonisation since the formative years of the United Nations. Not only has she been responsible for the administration of four external territories but also in accordance with her obligations under the Charter, she has been held accountable for the transmission of information on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of these territories.

Furthermore, Australia has been active in the actual supervisory role of the United Nations in various capacities. As an Administering Power administering two trust territories, Nauru and New Guinea, she has been and still is a member of the Trusteeship Council. She was also a member of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories from its inception in 1946 until it was disbanded in 1962. It was to this Committee that she was required to submit information on her other two external territories, Papua and Cocos Islands, as non-self-governing territories. In the more recent past, Australia was a member of the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonisation created in 1962 to implement the Declaration on Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the

General Assembly as resolution 1514(XV) in 1960.

It is primarily the purpose of this study to examine Australia's participation in the Special Committee on Decolonisation not only as a member but more importantly as an Administering Power with specific reference to Papua and New Guinea, the largest and most important of the territories under her administration.

In the completion of this study, I am greatly indebted to the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Administration in Ottawa on whose scholarship I have been able to pursue my studies at the University of Victoria and <sup>d</sup>on whose grant I was able to make a special two week trip to New York both to observe first hand, the Special Committee in operation and to collect data. My gratitude is also due to the Australian Mission to the United Nations and in particular to the Deputy Permanent Representative and Minister, Mr. C. R. Ashwin, and the Third Secretary, Mr. R. Rowe, who greatly assisted to make my two week stay with the Special Committee at the United Nations a success. They, along with the Mission's librarian, Miss Helen Godwin, kindly helped me in procuring relevant materials. I further wish to extend my thanks to those members of the Special Committee who generously responded by granting me an interview. Their co-operation was much appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank the members of my Supervisory Committee, Dr. Robert J. McCue and Mr. Charles

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Decolonisation has always been of special concern to the United Nations. With its supervisory powers and powers of accountability, the organisation has played a prominent role in guiding the process of decolonisation since its formative years. As Wainhouse puts it:

The United Nations' most important contribution has been the creation of a climate of opinion which has given the decolonisation movement a considerable impetus.<sup>1</sup>

In the quest for international peace and security, it was realised from the outset that dependent territories constituted one of the major threats.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the United Nations Charter was adopted embodying specific provisions set out in Chapter XI for non-self-governing territories and Chapters XII and XIII for trust territories.<sup>3</sup> These Charter provisions evidenced the concern of the United Nations for the threat to world peace emanating from dependent

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<sup>1</sup>David W. Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire: The United Nations and the End of Colonialism (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), p.4.

<sup>2</sup>Inis L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares (New York: London House, 1971), p.349.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix A for Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the U.N. Charter.

territories. Thus the question of decolonisation, especially since World War II, is inextricably linked with the United Nations. But in the attempt to expedite the process of colonial disengagement, the provisions embodied in the Charter have proven to be inadequate, particularly to the anti-colonial critics.

The year 1960 marked a significant point in the postwar history of decolonisation but more importantly for the United Nations it was a year which wrought major changes in the debate on the question.<sup>4</sup> The attitudes of many Administering Powers and non-Administering Powers were changing quickly. In the same year at a joint session of the South African parliament, Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made his famous "wind of change" speech, essentially calling for the recognition of the burgeoning nationalist aspirations of dependent peoples in Africa:

In different places it may take different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through the continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it.<sup>5</sup>

Considering her colonial history, South Africa may not have been the right place to utter these words but the repercussions were far and wide. The "wind of change" became a symbolic phrase signifying the tempo of events which later that year resulted in seventeen dependent territories

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<sup>4</sup>Wainhouse, Remnants of Empire, p.9.

<sup>5</sup>London Times, February 4, 1960, p.14.

acceding to independence and subsequently admitted to the United Nations. Out of the seventeen newly independent states, all but one were born in Africa. This phenomenal growth in membership produced a new set of circumstances for the world body because "the new nations first became a significant component of the United Nations."<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, the debate on decolonisation was removed from the relevant appropriate subsidiary bodies to the main forum of the General Assembly where it was easier for the anti-colonial critics to muster support.<sup>7</sup> The culmination of the frequently acrimonious debate resulted in what has been hailed as a remarkable major victory for the anti-colonial critics. On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by a roll-call vote of 89-0-9, the famous "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."<sup>8</sup> An official United Nations pamphlet described the Declaration in these terms:

That historic Declaration marked an important milestone in the efforts of the United Nations to bring colonialism to an end.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p.2.

<sup>7</sup>Harold Karan Jacobson, "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal," David A. Kay, ed., The United Nations Political System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p.304.

<sup>8</sup>See Appendix B for the provisions of the Declaration, also known as resolution 1514(XV).

<sup>9</sup>United Nations, "The Special Committee of 24" (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1969), p.1.

Australia was among the member nations that abstained. In fact, save for Costa Rica, all the abstentions were cast by Administering Powers.

This historic document solemnly proclaimed inter alia "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." To this end it declared seven major principles:

1. that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights and therefore was not only contrary to the Charter but was also an impediment to the promotion of peace and co-operation;
2. all people have the right to self-determination and as such were free to determine their own political destiny;
3. the inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational unpreparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence;
4. all armed repression directed against dependent peoples should cease for the people concerned to determine their own future and their territorial integrity should be respected;
5. immediate steps should be taken to grant independence to both trust and non-self-governing territories without any conditions or reservations in accordance with the wishes of the people regardless of race, colour or creed;
6. any attempt at either partially or totally disrupting the national or territorial integrity of a country would be contrary to the principles of the United Nations;
7. and finally it called on all member states to observe faithfully the UN Charter and the Declaration.

These statements, more than anything else, reflected the universal desire of member states concerned for the welfare of the remaining territories and their wish to see these

territories accede to independence. But as the nine abstentions indicated, the Declaration was not adopted unanimously. Like similar resolutions before, the Declaration contained recommendations that "sometimes were difficult to implement and other times only strengthened the intransigence of the colonial powers."<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, the Declaration was adopted with the view that the Administering Powers would take due note of it and accordingly formulate policies that would hasten the demise of colonial rule in their respective territories. Moreover, the Administering Powers were urged to implement the Declaration bearing in mind the principle that "all peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The debate on the Declaration that year and the following year would shed a lot of light on the attitudes of the Administering Powers. Generally, their attitudes were a mixture of reluctance, intransigence, or outright repudiation of the Declaration.

It must be said at this point, however, that the Declaration was not the first attempt by the anti-colonial critics to have a greater say in the supervision of the

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<sup>10</sup>Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p.214.

remaining colonial territories. The attempt to achieve parity in the discussion of dependent territories regardless of whether they were non-self-governing or trust territories had become by this time a perennial feature of United Nations debates. There had been considerable disagreement over the provisions relating to dependent territories dating back to the Atlantic Charter first enunciated by the two wartime Allied leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill.<sup>11</sup> Although the Charter of the United Nations was finally adopted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 after numerous amendments and modifications to accommodate the divergent views of the delegations, the differences of opinions were never fully mitigated. In essence, the Charter was a compromise artificial in its nature and super-

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<sup>11</sup>Point 3 of the Atlantic Charter declares, "Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." See Ruth B. Russell and Jeanette E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945 (Washington, D.C.: McBrooking Institution, 1958), Appendix B.

There was also disagreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill over the word "independence." The word is conspicuously absent in the Atlantic Charter. It was revealed later by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, that he had brought up the issue of "independence" several times with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden but "the Foreign Secretary said that, to be perfectly frank, he had to say he did not like our draft very much. He said it was the word "independence" that troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire system, which was built on the basis of Dominion and colonial status." In Ralph A. Austen, ed., Modern Imperialism: Western Overseas Expansion and Its Aftermath 1776-1965 (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath & Co., 1969), p.119.

ficial in its effectiveness.<sup>12</sup> This became manifestly evident in the subsequent years when the campaign for the amelioration of dependent peoples from the colonial system took on new dimensions not quite envisaged at San Francisco.

On the other hand, the first fifteen years of the United Nations were marked by mixed success as far as the crusade to liquidate colonialism was concerned. The record was "modest."<sup>13</sup> In a sense, the inception of the United Nations on October 24, 1945, began the official liquidation of colonial empires but the symptoms of nationalism in the colonies had begun to flourish long before the United Nations was founded. In many parts of the world, the Second World War greatly influenced the movement towards independence. With new nations emerging, international relations and particularly relations with the Western world began to change dramatically. Of Asian-West relations, for instance, Brecher writes:

In a dozen years the great drama of the coming of independence unfolded on a vast stage. The historic relations between Asia and the West had been transformed.<sup>14</sup>

The great empires of the pre-war era had surely begun to disintegrate to be replaced by the colonial legacy of

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<sup>12</sup>Ernst B. Haas, "The Attempt to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System," in Kay, The United Nations Political System, pp.281-301.

<sup>13</sup>Harold Karan Jacobson, "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal," in Kay, ibid., p.325.

<sup>14</sup>Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.46.

European political and religious institutions, albeit in Asia particularly and in parts of Africa, most of the great religious institutions still remained intact. By 1960, exactly the same words used by Brecher could have been said of African-Western relations. Before 1960, only two territories south of the Sahara had become independent.<sup>15</sup> But by the end of 1960, African membership in the United Nations had increased by sixteen. Jointly the Asian-African nations constituted a formidable group that presented a new voting dimension to the United Nations. The influence of the Administering Powers was adversely affected in the sense that it began to decline accordingly. The stage was elevated to a new position where the non-administering powers would have more participation in the supervision of dependent territories. The Declaration opened up a new era.

But there were other problems that had helped to spur on the debate on decolonisation. The Algerian question was a cardinal case in point. The French were losing their grip on the retention of this heretofore "overseas department" of France and were also faced with similar problems in Indochina. To the anti-colonial states, the South African policy of Apartheid and the question of Southwest Africa were reminiscent of colonialism of the worst kind. They were determined to exert pressure on South Africa to abandon

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<sup>15</sup>Ghana (1957) and Guinea (1958).

her policy of Apartheid. With regard to Southwest Africa, they asserted that since the territory was a former mandate territory, it should be placed by South Africa under the Trusteeship system of the United Nations. Both attempts failed. But the anti-colonial critics did not give up. If there was anything clear by 1960, the differences in the constitutional provisions embodied in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter had been narrowed considerably. This was borne out by the fact that the Declaration was stipulated to apply to both non-self-governing territories and trust territories.

As early as 1946, the General Assembly had created the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories in accordance with Article 73e of the Charter. Its three year tenure was renewed despite vehement opposition from the Colonial Powers and it was empowered only to discuss non-self-governing territories that came under the jurisdiction of Chapter XI but not trust territories which came under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council.<sup>16</sup> But like the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Information was empowered to make recommendations on the social,

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<sup>16</sup>A good political analysis of problems and other issues on non-self-governing territories under Chapter XI of the Charter is provided by Usha Sud, United Nations and the Non-Self-Governing Territories (Delhi: University Publishers, 1965). Also an excellent analysis of problems and issues of the Trusteeship system is provided by George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A Study of Political Behaviour (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964).

political, economic and educational advancement of non-self-governing territories. The recommendations, however, were not binding on the Administering Powers nor was the transmission of information on non-self-governing territories obligatory as in the case of the Trusteeship Council. Australia was appointed to the Committee on Information and she remained a member till the Committee was dissolved in 1962. The Committee had great bearing on the successful adoption of the Declaration. In a sense it served as its precursor.

At the same time, even though the Declaration of 1960 had been adopted by an overwhelming majority, the Administering Powers were still reluctant to accept the recommendations in toto. This general reluctance could be attributed largely to the increasing suspicion towards the Soviet bloc and the general reluctance to concede to the increasing demands of the newly emerging nations. It also reflected the general desire of the Administering Powers to adhere strictly to their interpretation of the Charter which, by and large, recognised them as the ultimate authorities in their territories and anything proposed by the General Assembly was only recommendatory and not binding. Essentially, the Administering Powers adopted a line of argument which for all practical purposes left them with the prerogative to ascertain, in consultation with the people concerned, when a territory was ready for self-government or indepen-

dence. By this time also it had become apparent that the anti-colonial powers were more prone to making criticisms without granting the Administering Powers any due credit for what they had contributed to the advancement not only of existing dependent territories but also to former territories that were now independent. True, not all the Administering Powers deserved credit but it was also true that most of them were pursuing policies which would eventually lead to the attainment of independence. For some of them it was a case of either domestic jurisdiction or of legitimate claims over territories.<sup>17</sup> In the case of Southwest Africa, for instance, South Africa had always argued that the territory was acquired under the Mandate System of the League of Nations and per se would only be administered under that system.<sup>18</sup> For Spain and Portugal, their territories were irrevocably "overseas provinces" of the metropolitan countries. As such it was within their domestic jurisdiction to administer their territories at their own discretion without interference by the United Nations.

Notwithstanding these objections, however, it was the Soviet Union through her top spokesman, Premier Nikita Krushchev, who first brought the Declaration to bear in the

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<sup>17</sup>Edward T. Rowe, "The Emerging Colonial Consensus in the United Nations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII (1964), 218.

<sup>18</sup>This was despite the fact that the Mandate System was now obsolete and had been superseded by the Trusteeship system.

United Nations. On September 23, 1960, a letter signed by the Premier requested as "an urgent matter," the inclusion in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." The letter was accompanied by an "Explanatory Memorandum" which expounded the guiding principles of the Declaration in the most uncompromising Marxist and revolutionary terms. At the same time, the Soviet Union characterised herself as "being guided by the lofty purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, by the noble, human ideals of equality and self-determination of nations and peoples...."<sup>19</sup> The memorandum went on to elucidate how in the previous fifteen years 1.5 billion people, more than half the world's population, had "cast off the chains of colonial oppression." It called for the "final and complete liberation" of peoples still under colonial bondage. It exhorted the United Nations not to be "indifferent" to more than one billion people who were still under "colonial oppression and exploitation." It called for the immediate and total elimination of the colonial system "in all its forms and manifestations."

In an address to the General Assembly, on October 12, 1960, Premier Krushchev reiterated the Soviet request to include the "Declaration" on the agenda of the annual session

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<sup>19</sup>A/4501, p.2.

of that year. At the same time he recapitulated the memorandum.<sup>20</sup> The address was strong in semantics, in general a support for the "poor oppressed" peoples of the remaining territories. Had it been all, the Administering Powers might have been more sympathetic. As it was, Krushchev went into a lengthy exposition of how the West was manipulating the colonial situations to their own ends. He also alluded to problems that would normally be regarded as being within the domestic jurisdiction of the particular countries concerned. He referred specifically to a number of Western leaders including Britain's Harold Macmillan and assailed them for "oppressive rule" in their territories. Even Australia's Prime Minister Robert Menzies was implicated for the "oppressive treatment" of the aborigines; the United States for "harsh treatment" of the Negroes and Indians. He accused the Secretary-General, Dag Hammerskjold, for further-<sup>21</sup>ing the interests of the colonialist and imperialist powers. He accused Belgium of having been primarily responsible for the Congo crisis. In his concluding remarks, he appealed to the Afro-Asian nations for support of the Declaration in these words:

For centuries the colonialists have been sweating and bleeding your peoples, exploiting them mercilessly and crushing everything that was vital in your countries. Now that they can no longer pursue

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<sup>20</sup>A/4500, pp.1-20.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p.12.

their policy of robbery, oppression and murder in your countries, they pretend to be your benefactors; they now pose as magnanimous Christians and are not even averse to censuring oppression and colonialism; they say that by their participation in the colonial system they were merely creating the necessary conditions in which to prepare your countries for independence and self-government. But those are the lies of robbers who know that they are robbers. They now wish to erase their crimes from the memory of the peoples they have been oppressing for centuries. That is why they are now courting you, giving receptions and making honeyed spectre.<sup>22</sup>

According to the Soviet leader, only through the end of colonialism could an international detente be achieved and the dependent peoples freed. He referred to Indonesia, Indochina, Lebanon, Algeria and the Congo as paradigms of "imperialist wars."

After much procedural wrangling and haggling, the Soviet proposal was finally included in the agenda of the General Assembly. The debate on the subject was opened by the Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Zorin. Most of the speech was platitudinous, almost a facsimile of the memorandum and Mr. Krushchev's speech, presented in the most intemperate terms. He repeated the Soviet appeal to liquidate the colonial system. He condemned the social practices of racial discrimination and the suppression of freedom fighters perpetrated by the Colonial Powers against colonial peoples. These practices he claimed were essentially insulting and degrading to the dignity of

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<sup>22</sup>A/4500, p.20.

man. He declared optimistically:

The fifteenth session will become a historic landmark on the road to the complete and final liquidation of colonialism and that 1960 will rightly be recalled not only as the "year of Africa" but also the year of the liberation from colonial slavery of all peoples wherever they live--in Africa, Asia, Latin America, anywhere in the world.<sup>23</sup>

Since Mr. Zorin's speech echoed much of the memorandum and Mr. Krushchev's speech, it can reasonably be suggested that the Soviet Union's policy towards decolonisation was one that was committed to the total abolition of colonialism in all forms.<sup>24</sup> In their attempt to champion the cause of the dependent peoples, the Soviet Union representatives had to express the Declaration in the strongest anti-colonialist terms possible to attract the support particularly of the Afro-Asian and Latin American states likely to give support. Whether the Soviet Union's statements reflected a genuine concern for the plight of colonial peoples or not is of course another matter. The fact was that the Soviet Union was just as interested in courting countries of the Third World, so to speak, as the Western Powers. This point was particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Afro-Asian states did not necessarily have to adhere to voting together as a bloc in the General Assembly. Most of them

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<sup>23</sup>United Nations General Assembly Official Records (hereinafter U.N.G.A.O.R.) 15th Session 925th Meeting, p.14.

<sup>24</sup>Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into the Soviet Motives and Objectives (New York: Praeger, 1962), p.119.

had adopted a neutralist posture. In short, their attitudes towards major issues in the United Nations, except for those that directly impinged on their national interests, were "ambivalent ones."<sup>25</sup>

The Declaration, however, was one of those issues in which they were specially interested. As it became clear from the debate, most of the Afro-Asian states were in favour of the fundamental principles of self-determination for colonial peoples but were circumspect in their approach. The Permanent Representative of Ghana, for instance, delivered a lengthy but meticulously researched exposition of the iniquities of colonialism. His remarks best reflected the attitudes of the Afro-Asians:

The solution of the colonial problem has thus become the most urgent problem of our time, and it is upon its solution that the peace, stability and orderly progress of our world depend.... Secondly, we prefer complete independence with danger to servitude with tranquility....<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, most of the Afro-Asian states had been under colonial rule of one form or another, and from their past experiences were now most anxious to abolish the system once and for all. They had participated in various conferences to discuss how this could best be achieved. The most important of these conferences, the Bandung Conference held in 1955, was

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<sup>25</sup>Norman D. Palmer, "The Afro-Asians in the United Nations," Franz B. Gross, ed., The United States and the United Nations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p.125.

<sup>26</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 926th Meeting, p.67.

initiated formally by the Heads of State of India, Burma, Pakistan and Indonesia. Representatives were invited from Africa, including Arab states, and Asia, many of which were still under colonial rule. By 1960, it was quite feasible that by their sheer numbers, the Afro-Asian states would at last be able to use the General Assembly to assert what they had jointly proclaimed five years before, namely "that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end."<sup>27</sup>

As for the Administering Powers, the repudiation of the "slanderous" Soviet charges was led by Britain's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Ormsby-Gore. He sarcastically referred to the colonial situation in Eastern Europe for which the Soviet Union was primarily responsible, and yet no one among the anti-colonial critics was prepared to impugn the Soviet Union for this situation. At the same time, he pointed out that there were now approximately 500 million people represented in the United Nations who were formerly under British administration. It was still the policy of the British Government to pursue that paramount objective of ultimately bringing the remaining British territories to the stage where they too would be independent.<sup>28</sup> He continued:

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<sup>27</sup>"The Bandung Asian-African Conference, 1955," in Austen, ed., Modern Imperialism, p.138.

<sup>28</sup>For Britain's attitudes and policies towards the colonial question at the United Nations, see Geoffrey Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1957), Chapter 9.

There is no word of the responsible and constructive aspects of the work of those Powers that have had the responsibility for administering colonial territories, no word of the achievements in bringing to stable independence the many new countries in Asia and Africa, no word of seriousness of the problems involved or of the different circumstances in the various territories concerned.<sup>29</sup>

On the whole, the British representative was disturbed, as were most Administering Powers, by the immoderate and ideological implications of the Declaration, an exposé of principles that did not account for the realities of the situations in each particular territory. On the other hand, he was sympathetic towards the wish of the Afro-Asians to speed up the achievement of self-determination but urged them to have a closer and more objective look at the problems. He made two crucial points to exemplify these problems. Firstly, he enunciated the special problems of small territories especially with regard to their meagre economic resources on which they could not sufficiently sustain themselves without outside assistance. Secondly, he pointed out a basic risk involved when a country was not properly and adequately prepared: that it could face political turmoil to be followed by civil war and economic chaos. In short, Ambassador Ormsby-Gore believed in rapid but peaceful, orderly and humane transition to independence.<sup>30</sup> Events in some newly independent states after 1960 were to prove him

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<sup>29</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 927th Meeting, p.33.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p.53.

not far from being right. In particular, "U.N. experience in post-colonial countries so far has not been very encouraging."<sup>31</sup> But the anti-colonial critics persisted with their strategy.

Britain was not alone in her stance. Several supported the Declaration but with cautious notes. The Representative of New Zealand, for example, acknowledged the contribution rendered by the United Nations towards the process of colonial disengagement. Nevertheless, he saw the Declaration in these terms:

The Declaration is a belief in the individual worth and dignity of all human beings--a belief which allows for no distinction on grounds of race, of colour or of nationality and which cannot be fully vindicated as long as the people exercise any form of hegemony over another.<sup>32</sup>

To this his country subscribed wholeheartedly. But he warned that colonialism should not be equated with "evils," for the Administering Powers had voluntarily assumed the obligations of administering the territories and these obligations carried very heavy responsibilities. Although his country subscribed to the principles of the Declaration, he did not see the Declaration as a treaty to be binding on the Administering Powers. On the other hand, the Portuguese representative categorically rejected the Soviet charges and brushed them aside as "outrageous slanders" and added

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<sup>31</sup>Nina Heathcote, "United Nations and Nation-Building," in Kay, ed., The United Nations Political System, p.356.

<sup>32</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 932nd Meeting, p.3.

emphatically that Portugal was doing her best for her "over-seas provinces."

Australia's position on the Declaration was clearly set out by Ambassador James Plimsoll, who traced the origins of the Charter provisions for dependent territories and said that both New Zealand and Australia were in the forefront in working out the substance of the Chapters at the San Francisco Conference. They were among those "that were pressing for a clear recognition and acceptance of wider responsibility and accountability than had existed before the war."<sup>33</sup> He declared that colonialism was a human institution with varying degrees of conditions, an obvious preface to what was said next with regard to the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. In an attempt to state his country's position vis-a-vis the actual administration of the territory, the substance of the speech was not new. The hardships, the difficulties, the special linguistic, cultural and geographical problems that the Territory presented, he contended, made Australia's tasks peculiarly more acute than the tasks of the other Administering Powers.

As it was, the Declaration was received rather coldly by the Administering Powers; for the anti-colonial critics, it pledged a "new deal" for the remaining dependent territories. The Soviet original draft was defeated

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<sup>33</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 933rd Meeting, p.53.

essentially because of its rather harsh language and quixotic demands while the final draft of the Declaration was sponsored by forty-three Afro-Asian states. The draft closely resembled the Bandung Manifesto in principle and wording, thus bearing out a principal point. It would suggest that when the Declaration was in its drafting stage, the Bandung Manifesto rather than the Soviet original draft had undoubtedly "become the cornerstone of the policy of independent countries of Africa and Asia towards the colonial countries and peoples," as the Ethiopian representative divulged in the debate.<sup>34</sup> The draft was introduced in the General Assembly by Cambodia and, after some amendments, it was adopted overwhelmingly as resolution 1514(XV).

In August, 1961, the Soviet Union requested by cable the inclusion of the Declaration in the 16th session of the General Assembly. The cable was accompanied by another Explanatory Memorandum and on September 25, 1961, the General Assembly decided to include on the agenda the item, "The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."<sup>35</sup> This time the Soviet Union alleged that the Administering Powers had failed to take the necessary practical steps to implement resolution 1514(XV) of

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<sup>34</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 928th Meeting, p.10.

<sup>35</sup>A/4859, Explanatory Memorandum.

December 14, 1960. The Soviet Union repeated the charges of the previous year and condemned the Colonial Powers for their stubborn attitudes. The Soviet Representative stated in the debate:

A year has passed since the adoption of the Declaration on the abolition of colonialism and it has now become abundantly clear that the Colonial Powers, in abstaining from voting at last year's session, were calculating that they would succeed, to put it bluntly, in disregarding the General Assembly resolution and in keeping their freedom of action as regards colonial countries.<sup>36</sup>

The Soviet delegate went on with the aid of statistics to accuse the United States of supplying her NATO allies with arms and other military equipment to suppress liberation movements in French, British, Portuguese, Spanish and Belgian territories. Moreover, he called for a target date which he suggested should be 1962, to be set by the General Assembly for the remaining territories to attain independence. Again the Soviet Union was supported by most of the Afro-Asian nations, although the Afro-Asians gave support only to the issues pertaining to the Declaration--in general the failure of the Administering Powers to implement it and not the Cold War implications enunciated by the Soviet Union. Nor were they prepared to agree that a target date should be set. Basically, most states stressed the need for immediate steps to prepare the colonial peoples to assume the responsibilities that must come with independence. At the same

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<sup>36</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1048th Meeting, p.48.

time some critics praised the Colonial Powers for the measures that were being taken to bring the peoples of territories such as Western Samoa, Tanganyika, Sierra Leone, and Ruanda-Urundi to independence. Other critics dismissed as myths the notions that preparedness and economic viability were necessary prerequisites to independence. The Ceylonese Representative, for instance, stated:

My delegation refutes, as both untenable and illogical, any argument to the effect that so-called economic maturity is the prerequisite for the granting of independence. It is untenable because of its unethical and opportunist implications and it is illogical because the Colonial Powers have not done so in the long period they have been there.<sup>37</sup>

The Soviet allegations drew strong response from the Administering Powers. The strongest attack on the Soviet Union came from the United States Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, in a statement circulated as an official document.<sup>38</sup> Mr. Stevenson dismissed the Soviet proposals as "hypocritical propaganda" and charged that the Soviet Union was deliberately using the colonial issue by means of distortions and words to manoeuvre the triumph of Communism in the world. The strongest condemnation was made in four points: that the Sino-Soviet bloc embraced the largest colonial empire which has ever existed in history; the Communist Empire was the only empire that was not liquidating itself; the Soviet

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<sup>37</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session, 1048th Meeting, p.109.

<sup>38</sup>A/4985.

colonial system was the most cruel and oppressive, and finally that the Soviet Union was the only modern empire that did not offer self-determination to her colonial peoples. With these remarks, the Ambassador argued that his country had always been against colonialism wherever it occurred and adduced as evidence the fact that the United States was the first republic to produce a successful revolution against colonialism. He went on to repudiate flatly the charges that the United States was collaborating with the NATO allies in aiding colonial repression of colonial peoples. It was argued further:

Wherever the influence of the Soviet armed forces could be brought to bear, independent countries, many of which had just been liberated from Hitler's terror, were absorbed and their national aspirations savagely repressed by a state bent on the eradication of the national identity of all peoples within the Soviet Union.<sup>39</sup>

The Cold War issue, submitted Mr. Stevenson, was the result primarily of Soviet hunger for expansion and further suggested that the Soviet proposals were essentially a vilification of the Administering Powers based on distortions of facts.

In the case of Australia, Ambassador James Plimsoll reiterated much of what he said the year before. The peculiar problems of Papua and New Guinea were again heard. He further emphasised that Australia had always co-operated

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<sup>39</sup>A/4985, p.6.

with the United Nations in the discharge of her international obligations and responsibilities in Papua and New Guinea. At the same time he maintained that Australia had other treaty obligations which she had always observed. Australia had continued to furnish information on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Territory and this information was available in reports transmitted annually to the United Nations including the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Information and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. He referred to the Soviet call for target dates as "impractical and unrealistic." Australia's policy in Papua and New Guinea was still self-determination. He alerted the General Assembly with this cautionary note:

The choice of a political future cannot take place in a vacuum. It must be related to economic, social, political and educational development.

The consequences of hasty and ill-informed judgments may be disastrous for the peoples concerned, and we cannot allow their future to be fixed by attitudes based largely on emotion or on political expediency or on false or misleading analogies.<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, this probably best illustrates the Australian approach to the administration of Papua and New Guinea. Unfortunately, the platitudinous nature of the speech made it sound more like an alibi for the Territory not having reached a stage of development comparable to that of most other dependencies than a statement of facts to bear out the

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<sup>40</sup>U.N.G.A.O.R., 16th Session 1055th Meeting, p.21.

special problems of the Territory.

On November 27, 1961, a draft resolution submitted by thirty-eight Afro-Asian states was adopted by the General Assembly by a roll-call vote of 97 in favour with no negative votes and 4 abstentions recorded. Interestingly enough, of the Administering Powers that abstained on resolution 1514(XV) the year before, five including Australia, Belgium, the United States and Portugal had switched positions to vote for what became resolution 1654(XVI).<sup>41</sup> Noting with regret that the Administering Powers had not implemented the Declaration embodied in resolution 1514(XV), resolution 1654(XVI) essentially called for, inter alia, the establishment of a special committee to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly. Its most important function was to examine the applicability of the Declaration and make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent to which the Declaration was being implemented and to report back to the General Assembly in the following year. In addition, the committee was empowered to draw up procedures and modalities through which it could discharge its functions. It could meet elsewhere than at the United Nations and was to be assisted by the Trusteeship Council and other U.N. agencies. The resolution also called upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide the facilities and

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<sup>41</sup>Costa Rica, abstaining on resolution 1514(XV) the year before, voted for resolution 1654(XVI) this time.

personnel necessary for the committee to execute its functions.

Hence, the Special Committee on Decolonisation was born. In January, 1962, the President of the General Assembly announced that pursuant to resolution 1654(XVI), he had nominated seventeen member states including Australia to the Special Committee.<sup>42</sup> The members included both Administering and non-Administering Powers and they were chosen to represent major geographical regions of the globe. The following December, 1962, the General Assembly at its 17th session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee as formed under resolution 1654(XVI), adopted resolution 1810(XVII) on December 17, by which it decided to enlarge the committee to twenty-four.<sup>43</sup>

Although both Administering and non-Administering Powers were represented on the Special Committee, the balance was still overwhelmingly in favour of the non-Administering Powers. Only Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States as Administering Powers were nominated. Of the non-Colonial Powers, the anti-colonial critics were overly represented. Of the twenty-four members of the Special Committee, eight had become independent only since World

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<sup>42</sup>The other members were: Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., U.K., Uruguay, Venezuela, Italy, Malagasy and Afghanistan.

<sup>43</sup>The additional members nominated by the President were: Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone.

War II and of the eight, four only since 1960. In essence, the Special Committee was dominated by the non-Colonial Powers and more importantly by the Soviet bloc and the newly emergent Afro-Asians whose representatives formed the majority of the Committee.

Some further developments took place. Firstly, the Special Committee was vested with powers that would make the functions of other bodies almost redundant. The result led inevitably to the duplication of functions as it became manifestly evident not long after. On December 16, 1963, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1970(XVIII) leading to the dissolution of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Consequently, the Special Committee on Decolonisation was authorized to absorb its functions. At the same time, resolution 1970(XVIII) called on the Administering Powers to continue transmitting information on non-self-governing territories, only this time to the Special Committee on Decolonisation. Papua had been classified as a non-self-governing territory while New Guinea as a trust territory came under the scrutiny of the Trusteeship Council. With the formation of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, Papua and New Guinea came jointly under its purview as one territory for the first time.

Nevertheless, the changes did not guarantee a smooth operation of the Special Committee at first. As it was to be expected, there were problems relating to procedural and

substantive matters emanating, by and large, from the dichotomous positions of the Administering Powers and the non-Administering members. The Administering Powers in the Special Committee were unwilling to be subordinated to their non-Administering counterparts in which case it took some time to find compromise solutions.<sup>44</sup> The problems were further exacerbated by the fact that the Committee's attention was from the outset focussed primarily on the vexatious areas of Southwest Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Eventually, the non-Administering members won their way. Their view was "intended to make this Committee of 17 an active body working for a real and speedy decolonisation--planning positive steps to hasten decolonisation."<sup>45</sup> To this end they suggested that the Special Committee pass resolutions, form working groups and send visiting missions to dependent territories if necessary. Under these conditions the Special Committee on Decolonisation began functioning.

More changes took place in the years immediately after the Special Committee began its work. Since it had

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<sup>44</sup>The first Chairman of the Special Committee, Taib Slim (Tunisia) set out some of the main problems in "The Work of the Committee of 24," in Richard N. Swift, ed., Annual Review of U.N. Affairs 1963-1964 (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1964), pp.1-12.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p.2. See also H. E. Gertham Collier "Committee of 24," in Richard N. Swift, ed., Annual Review of U.N. Affairs 1964-1965, pp.33-42.

paid little attention to territories outside of Southern Africa, the Special Committee decided to create three main sub-committees delegated with powers to examine and report on territories within three main geographical regions, namely, Sub-Committee I for Africa, Sub-Committee II for Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Committee III for the Caribbean. Papua and New Guinea came under the jurisdiction of Sub-Committee II of which Australia was nominated a member.<sup>46</sup> It was primarily to Sub-Committee II that Australia was held accountable for the transmission of information on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of Papua and New Guinea. It is largely in relation to this Sub-Committee that this thesis will examine the participation of Australia as an Administering Power with regard to the administration of Papua and New Guinea.

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<sup>46</sup>The other members of Sub-Committee II were Cambodia, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Poland, Sierra Leone and the United States.

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is crucial to the study of Australia's role as an Administering Power and as a member of the Special Committee on Decolonisation to understand the different status and historical evolution of the two territories before 1960. Papua and New Guinea comprise the eastern half of the island of New Guinea including the main islands of New Britain, New Ireland and Manus in the Bismarck Archipelago, Buka and Bougainville. The main island itself was discovered in the sixteenth century as "the inevitable outcome of rivalry between Spain and Portugal for trade in the Molucca Islands less than 200 miles west of the bird's head."<sup>1</sup> It was first sighted by the Portuguese, Jon Jorge de Meneses, Governor of the Moluccas, who being driven off course landed on the North coast of the island in 1526. He named the people Papuans meaning "frizzy haired" in Malay. In 1545, another Portuguese, Ortiz de Retes, sailed along the coast of the island and noting that the inhabitants bore close resemblance to the people of the Guinea Coast of Africa, named the island New Guinea. In 1606, a Spanish navigator, Torres, discovered

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<sup>1</sup>Gavin Souter, New Guinea: The Last Unknown (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1963), p.18.

for the first time that New Guinea was separated from Australia. The strait bears his name today. A similar discovery was made in 1700 by the first Englishman to sail along the New Guinea coast, buccaneer and pirate, William Dampier, when he discovered the passage between New Guinea and New Britain, and afterwards the strait was given his name. During the next 170 years, much of the coastline of the New Guinea mainland and the adjacent islands had been explored, mostly by British and Dutch navigators, but little was known of the country or its inhabitants until late in the nineteenth century.

At about the same time that the struggle for Africa was taking place, New Guinea was divided up by the Dutch, the German and the British governments, under differing circumstances. The Dutch extended their empire in the East Indies by including West New Guinea to 141 degrees east longitude in 1848. Bismarck's Germany, spurred on by German economic interests in the Pacific, was prompted to take possession of the northeastern half of the island and the islands of New Britain, New Ireland, Manus and Bougainville and Buka on November 4, 1885. Almost simultaneously, Britain's claim to the southeastern half of the island was proclaimed by Commodore Erskine on November 6, 1885, primarily at the urging of the Australian colonies. An abortive attempt had been made two years earlier at the instigation of the Queensland Government when H. M. Chester prematurely

proclaimed a protectorate over what was to become British New Guinea. But the action was disowned by Lord Derby, British Colonial Secretary, on the grounds that it was not authorized nor was it deemed necessary despite claims by the Australian colonies that their security and commercial interests were in danger of being jeopardized by the presence in the area of foreign powers.<sup>2</sup>

Subsequently, New Guinea fell into three main spheres of influence. West New Guinea was ruled as part of the Dutch East Indies. In the case of German New Guinea, the Imperial Government decided to leave the administration of the territory to the Neuguinea Kompagnie (New Guinea Company), the commercial consortium that had carried out the proclamation on its behalf. Its Charter to rule was granted by the Kaiser on May 17, 1885. The nature of the Charter has been described by J. A. Moses in this way:

The essence of the Charter was that the Company became virtually the agent of the Reich in the area, exercising full jurisdiction and the right to occupy further unclaimed land in the name of the Reich. It would negotiate with the inhabitants and conclude treaties with them, but not of course with other foreign powers. In return for these privileges and the protection of the Reich, the Company had to meet the cost of and maintain government institutions including the cost of an "adequate" legal system. In short all this meant that the Company exerted a sovereignty over the area on behalf of the Reich which reserved to itself the supreme sovereignty.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Donald Craigie Gordon, The Australian Frontier in New Guinea 1870-1885 (New York: A.M.S. Press, 1951), p.170.

<sup>3</sup>J. A. Moses, "The German Empire in Melanesia, 1884-1914:

The Charter suited the Company so well that for the next fourteen years Company rule prevailed much to its own advantage and the advantage of other commercial interests.

The New Guinea Company was not the first to arrive in the Territory. Even before annexation, a Hamburg-based firm, Godefroy and Sons, whose Pacific headquarters was in Samoa, had arrived to establish its first base on Mioke in the Duke of York Islands off the coast of New Britain. It was followed by the Methodist Mission of Australia on whose behalf Dr. George Brown and a group of Samoan and Fijian missionaries founded the first mission at Molot also in the Duke of Yorks. Other missions to arrive later included the Catholic and the Lutheran missions. At the same time the commercial prospects had attracted a number of other trading interests, among which were another Hamburg firm, HERNSHEIM and ROBERTSON and the famous Queen Emma establishment both of which arrived in the Duke of Yorks in 1879. In fact, the New Guinea Company's desire to take full advantage of the Charter was clearly illustrated when it decided in 1888 to absorb Godefroy and Sons and HERNSHEIM while still under the name Deutsche Südsee- Handels- Und Plantagen Gesellschaft (the two had merged to form the company known by its initials as D.H. & P.G.). Trading involved two main components.

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A German Self-Analysis," in University of Papua and New Guinea and Australian National University, The History of Melanesia (Second Waigani Seminar) (Canberra: 1969), p.48.

Firstly, it involved trading in copra. For this commodity to be produced, coconut palms had to be planted. Thus began the establishment of a plantation economy owned and operated largely by German commercial interests. Consequently, large areas of land, particularly in the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain and neighbouring islands, were alienated either through individual transactions with the indigenous inhabitants or through the Administering Authority. The second principal component of trading was concerned with the well-known exploits of "blackbirding." Indigenous men and some women were taken away almost forcefully by ruthless and unscrupulous traders and sold to plantation owners in Fiji, Samoa and Queensland where they were used as labour to work on sugar cane plantations. Although the Company did try to set up an administrative system in the territory, it could only be anticipated by virtue of its primary motive that the administration would not only be of secondary importance but also would be utilised to further its interests. J. A. Moses writes further:

The New Guinea enterprise was not the expression of national enthusiasm, but rather one of over-optimistic capitalism.<sup>4</sup>

Hence in 1899, the Imperial Government was impelled to assume the administration of the territory itself.

During the Imperial administration, commercial

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<sup>4</sup>Moses, "The German Empire in Melanesia," p.49.

trading was still allowed and encouraged to play its part, but at the same time the indigenous inhabitants were brought increasingly into the realm of the administration. Imperial policies were formulated and implemented for the most part by a governor appointed by the Reich. The best known of the governors was a young and able man, Dr. Albert Hahl, appointed in 1902 to succeed the only other governor of the German administration, Rudolf von Benningsen. Dr. Hahl, a man of strong humanitarian conviction, believed in "fair play" and devised policies fair to both natives and foreigners. He learned the language of the area and was also interested in the culture of the people. His administration, which ended with the outbreak of the First World War, was marked by an increasing amount of indigenous involvement in the administration and the economy. By the time war broke out, German New Guinea was not only a thriving commercial enterprise benefitting coconut plantation owners and other traders, but also one in which the indigenous people were encouraged to participate.. This, however, did not mean that the total population was engaged in commercial activities. In fact, most of these activities were confined to those areas which had been pacified and subjected to administrative control. A substantial part of the territory was still unexplored and untouched, despite sporadic attempts to open up the country as much as possible. By virtue of its nature, the opening up of the territory proved to be a most difficult

and formidable task indeed. The German administration was handicapped from the outset by geographical, tribal, linguistic and climatic barriers.

Nevertheless, Dr. Hahl succeeded in building up a foundation upon which the territory's administrative, judicial and legislative institutions were established and governed from the capital in Rabaul, New Britain. The territory was divided into nine main administrative districts loosely co-ordinated under trying circumstances.<sup>5</sup> Because of the diversity of interests, there inevitably developed conflict between the different interest groups, but Dr. Hahl, through skilful and shrewd means, kept them under control. Above all, writes the historian, Peter Biskup, "Hahl's name is also associated with the beginning of a native policy in the real sense of the word. It consisted of, firstly, the introduction of what is sometimes (wrongly) described as indirect rule; secondly, a series of measures intended to draw the native more closely into the growing commercial economy; and thirdly, protection of native lands."<sup>6</sup> Indirect rule was facilitated by the appointment of indigenous officials, called luluais, who were not merely intermediaries

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<sup>5</sup>The nine administrative districts were all given German names and the main centres were surrounded by areas of economic importance.

<sup>6</sup>Peter Biskup, "Dr. Albert Hahl: Sketch of a German Colonial Official," The Australian Journal of Politics and History, XIV, 3 (December, 1968), 348.

between the administration and the indigenous people but were men entrusted with limited magisterial and administrative functions to promote road building, to assist in enforcing law and order and finally to arbitrate in local disputes. Apart from this institution, the indigenous people were kept virtually out of the main decision-making process which was left almost entirely in the hands of Dr. Hahl.<sup>7</sup>

In the fields of social and educational development, the German administration provided health services and limited education offered by a few schools albeit still only at the rudimentary level. The bulk of the education was left to missions. Apart from the encouragement of the indigenous people in the economy and the administration, the Colonial Power also introduced a head tax of five marks in 1907. But the lion's share of the financial burden was still borne by the Imperial Government. At the same time, the local economy was increasingly being developed, so by 1911 the Imperial subsidy dropped from 900,000 marks to 716,000 marks. Export earnings rose from one million marks in 1902 to eight million marks in 1913.<sup>8</sup> At the outbreak of the First World War, German New Guinea became a prime target in the Pacific for the Allies because of its strategic and

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<sup>7</sup>Dr. Hahl was assisted by a council appointed every two years and meeting four times yearly but the appointment of membership was never extended to the indigenous people.

<sup>8</sup>Biskup, "Dr. Albert Hahl," p.356.

naval importance, and communications linkage with other German colonies in the Pacific and with the Mother Country.

After a brief encounter between German and Australian forces in the Gazelle Peninsula in 1914, Australia claimed victory over the territory. At the end of the war, German New Guinea was placed under Australian Military Administration until the principles of the mandate system had been worked out and until an agreement was arrived at by the League of Nations and the Australian Government. During the Military Administration, German economic interests were preserved while some German personnel were repatriated. The commercial and trading activities were gradually taken over by Australians (mainly ex-servicemen) and Chinese who had been brought there by the Germans but allowed to remain after the war. It was doubtful if the indigenous inhabitants knew what the war was all about but they soon learned who their new masters were. Since the Military Administration was acting only as a caretaker government, policies were directed initially at maintaining a garrison to keep law and order and to familiarise the indigenous people with the new Colonial Power. Lacking colonial experience and personnel, the Australian Military Administration was faced with acute problems of staff shortage and of adjustment to the new situation. To carry out its tasks, the Military Administration retained the German administrative system but it soon became evident that successive military administrations were

concerned primarily with the affairs of the white and business community. The advancement of the indigenous people was not considered to be of paramount importance.<sup>9</sup>

Military administration of German New Guinea was replaced by civilian control in 1921 with the adoption by the Australian Parliament of the New Guinea Act. New Guinea was transferred to the Commonwealth of Australia as a class C mandate under the Covenant of the League of Nations.<sup>10</sup>

Article 22 paragraph 1 states:

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late War have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant.

The mandate system was administered by a Permanent Mandates Commission but its functions were purely advisory. As a class C mandate, New Guinea was one of the least developed territories listed by the League of Nations but whose "well-being and development...a sacred trust of civilisation" was to be carried by the Australian government. As such, Australia had full control of the territory, accepting advice from the Permanent Mandate Commission only if it was

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<sup>9</sup>C. D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea 1914-1921 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1958), p.21.

<sup>10</sup>The Mandate Territories were divided into three main categories: A, B, and C, according to the extent to which they were developed and their ability to stand on their own feet.

consonant with its policies.

The Australian administration continued with the exploration and pacification of new areas. Indeed, it was during the 1920's and 1930's that the greater part of the country was opened up for the first time. Exploration and pacification were followed closely by the setting up of government patrol posts to introduce the concepts of law and order into newly contacted areas and to bring the people under government control. In some cases, the exploration of new areas was incidental to a booming activity, such as gold mining, that attracted a sudden rush of white settlers.

Indeed, it was in the economic field where the civilian government was most active. It continued the expropriation of German property. Government policy was still heavily geared towards encouraging and protecting Australian and other economic interests. The indigenous inhabitants continued to be of secondary importance despite the principles of and criticism from the League of Nations. The main purpose as far as the Australian administration was concerned, was to provide labour for plantation owners through an indenture system. The belief supporting such a system was that only through these means could the indigenous people learn the ethics of hard work and the values of western civilisation.<sup>11</sup> In a sense it worked, but only to a

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<sup>11</sup>Linden A. Mander, Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), p.240.

limited extent. Although the administration devised rigid control and regulations to govern the treatment of native labour, labour practices continued to be harsh and exploitive. At any rate, the advancement of the indigenous people could not be predicated just on hard work. A necessary concomitant of any development is, of course, education. In the time preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, education was practically ignored not only because of the paucity of funds, but also because it was opposed by a white community interested in maintaining its superior position and felt threatened even by the slightest suggestion of educating the native. The little education offered was provided mainly by the missions. Even then, the missions were more interested in turning out good Christians and training personnel to help propagate their work than in educating the native people about modern western institutions essential to the development of the territory and its inhabitants.

Despite these pitfalls in the fields of economic and social development, some lukewarm efforts were made to promote political development. The Luluai system introduced by the German administration was retained by the Australian administration, although the powers of the luluais were curtailed so that their functions were confined to administrative duties. No Legislative Council was created until 1933. Even then the indigenous people were left entirely

out of its membership which was comprised of administration officials and representatives of the white community. At any rate, its role was purely advisory which meant that the Australian government only accepted advice agreeable to its policies.

On the whole, therefore, Australia as a Mandatory Power failed terribly to fulfil her obligation according to the mandate system. This was due to a number of factors. In a study of Australia's position, Dr. W. J. Hudson suggested that even though Australia was criticised and urged by the Permanent Mandate Commission to change her approach to the administration of New Guinea, she remained adamantly aloof and unamenable to recommendations. Hudson writes:

It is clear that Australia was constantly alive to the domestic jurisdiction barrier beyond which she would not tolerate League encroachments. It is equally clear that Australia did not merely accept criticism; she showed some aplomb in ignoring it and going her own way.<sup>12</sup>

But there were other factors. Since it was Australia's policy to make New Guinea pay for as much of her development as possible, the limited financial resources of the territory simply could not afford to do it despite lucrative rewards from the copra and gold mining industries. Another factor was that Australia herself was only a young country in need of money and skills. New Guinea only added an extra

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<sup>12</sup>W. J. Hudson, "Australia's Experience as a Mandatory Power," Australian Outlook, XIX, 1 (April 1965), 47.

burden both in terms of finance and skilled manpower. In addition, Australia's experience as a colonial power was minimal. The country also suffered greatly from the great depression of the 1930's resulting in adverse repercussions on the New Guinea economy. Because of the continuing indifference and lack of concern among those entrusted with the task of promoting the "well-being and development" of the territory, the Australian administration offered so little in terms of comfort and remuneration that it failed to attract or secure the necessary skilled personnel essential for its colonial undertaking. This was accentuated further by the fact that "there were too few people in the Territory with a continuing interest in the constructive policy side of native policy."<sup>13</sup> In the final analysis, New Guinea was treated primarily not as a humanitarian undertaking but as a possession necessary to realise Australia's strategic and economic motives.<sup>14</sup> The Second World War came to the rescue.

On the other hand, the Territory of Papua followed a path that was slightly more humane and advanced. It was first proclaimed in 1888 as a British Protectorate and remained such until it was transferred to the Commonwealth of Australia and renamed Papua with the enactment in 1905 by

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<sup>13</sup>Heather Radi, "New Guinea Under Mandate 1921-1941," W. J. Hudson, ed., Australia and Papua New Guinea (Sydney: University Press, 1971), p.82.

<sup>14</sup>Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p.282.

the Australian Parliament of the Papua Act. The task of administering the British possession was first attempted by Sir Peter Scratchly, Special Commissioner appointed by the Colonial Office in 1885. Although he did succeed in laying down the skeleton of the first administration, he died after three months in office. He was succeeded temporarily by H. M. Romilly and finally by the Honourable John Douglas, a former Premier of Queensland, on February 27, 1886. As the first task was to establish a framework for the administration, financial backing was essential. It was rather ironical that after all the agitation from the Australian colonies for Britain to annex southeastern New Guinea, and their promise to contribute £15,000 towards its administration, only Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria were willing to share the cost with Britain "to exercise joint control for ten years, with Queensland exercising a supervisory role."<sup>15</sup> The administration of the Protectorate proceeded with two main objectives: exploration of the country and pacification of its people. But it was not until 1888 when Douglas was replaced by Sir William MacGregor as Governor that the administration of the Protectorate was put on a firm footing.

MacGregor had come to British New Guinea from Fiji

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<sup>15</sup>John Mayo, "The Protectorate of British New Guinea 1884-1888: An Oddity of Empire," The History of Melanesia, p.28.

where he had served as Chief Medical Officer under the Governor, Sir Authur Gordon. He arrived with a more positive and humanitarian attitude towards the administration of British New Guinea than his predecessors and has been described by a biographer, R. B. Joyce, in this way:

Like Gordon, he saw Australians, because of their treatment of the aborigenes, as the leading opponents of primitive peoples. Consequently so that Papuans should be protected, he was determined that Britain should dominate the colony.<sup>16</sup>

Toward this end, MacGregor continued with exploration and pacification to be followed closely by the establishment of law and order. The Protectorate was divided up into eight major administrative divisions to which were assigned Resident Magistrates to act as official representatives of the government.<sup>17</sup> Yet, as was the case in German New Guinea, effective administration was impeded from the outset by geographical, tribal, linguistic and climatic barriers. Nevertheless, by the end of MacGregor's rule, which lasted ten years, law and order had been established. On the other hand, much of the country was still unexplored and wild. To assist with the establishment of law and order, MacGregor created a Police Force to be staffed initially by men recruited from Fiji and the Solomons, although, in due course,

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<sup>16</sup>R. B. Joyce, "William MacGregor: The Role of the Individual," The History of Melanesia, p.36.

<sup>17</sup>The eight administrative divisions were the West, Delta, Gulf, East, Southwest, Northwest, Northeast, and Central.

Papuans gradually assumed police duties from them. In many cases MacGregor himself would lead patrols to explore and pacify the country and its people.

In the field of economic development, the indigenous people were gradually introduced into the monetary economy. But as was the case in German New Guinea, land and labour were seen as concomitant parts of development. Although white settlers were allowed to take up residence in the Protectorate, MacGregor was chary in his approach to allowing ruthless and unscrupulous treatment of the people and the alienation of their land. Indeed, Papuan welfare influenced much of his rule. R. B. Joyce writes further:

He [MacGregor] protected their lands, forbade labour recruiting for outside the colony, as well as restricting European plantation owners from exploiting their labour inside the colony. He closed much of the colony to private explorers.<sup>18</sup>

Education was left mostly to the missions. As happened in German New Guinea, the missionaries were among the first to settle in British New Guinea. The first missionary organisation to arrive was a group of Marist Brothers but their mission failed due to tropical diseases and the lack of support. The first to succeed in establishing its activities was the London Missionary Society which had been active elsewhere in the Pacific before arriving in 1874.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Joyce, "William MacGregor," p.36.

<sup>19</sup>The London Missionary Society had been active in Rarotonga, Tahiti and Thursday Island.

It was followed by Catholic, Anglican and Methodist missions. Conflict inevitably developed among these various missions; consequently MacGregor had to intervene to settle the disputes and avoid any further conflict by dividing the Protectorate into four main spheres of influence.<sup>20</sup> When Sir William MacGregor left British New Guinea, he was replaced for a brief period by George Le Hunte. Until then, the Australian colonies had been assisting Britain financially to administer the Protectorate but when it was transferred Australia, which had just become independent in 1901, assumed full financial and administrative responsibilities.

As a consequence, British New Guinea became an Australian territory with the Papuans as Australian citizens according to the Australian Constitution. For the next era, British New Guinea, now renamed Papua, was to be under the control of a man whose record of over thirty years of being colonial ruler is still unprecedented in the history of the Territory. The man to be appointed to the more prestigious position of Lieutenant-Governor had first arrived in the Territory to become Chief Judicial Officer in 1904. His name was Hubert Murray, a second generation Australian of Irish descent, educated at Oxford, and one-time British heavyweight boxing champion. Murray's administration from

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<sup>20</sup>The London Missionary Society was allocated the area around Port Moresby, the Catholic Mission the area west of Port Moresby, the Methodist Mission southeast Papua and the Anglican Mission the northeastern part of the Protectorate.

1908 until his death in 1940 had considerable impact on the Territory. His rule was characterised by a dual policy of development and protection. Officially, development essentially meant the exploitation of resources in the Territory and the introduction of the Papuans to civilisation. But the exploitation of resources had further connotations. A biographer of Murray, Francis West, clarifies the term in these words:

Allowing for the different shades of emphasis, by development was meant the exploitation of the resources of the colony by Europeans; and as one of the two main ends of Australian policy it rested on two assumptions common to the men of that day and generation. The first was that private Europeans had the right to go into uncivilised countries and to reap the rewards of their pioneering enterprises, and that their presence was a financial asset to the government which had a positive duty to assist and protect them.

The second assumption was that Papua was potentially a rich and profitable possession, that it had resources which could be developed by the Europeans, that it could be made attractive to white settlers and entrepreneurs exercising their undoubted rights with the encouragement and protection of the Government.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, as was the case in the Mandate Territory of New Guinea, the advancement of the Papuans was of secondary importance according to official Australian policies, but not according to Murray. Although Murray favoured development, he did so on the condition that it would be carried out in partnership by the white settlers and the Papuan people to benefit both

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<sup>21</sup>Francis West, Hubert Murray: The Australian Pro-Consul (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.122.

groups and, in the final analysis, the Territory.

The other aspect of Murray's administration was protection designed to protect the Papuans from "any ill-effects, especially of the land and labour policy which might flow from development."<sup>22</sup> Equally important, Murray considered it his duty to introduce the Papuans to the fundamental concepts of western political institutions. The proliferation of tribal political institutions made it impossible for the government to adopt traditional indigenous political organisations as means to carry out its administration. Consequently, Murray was led to create the office of village constable. The village constable was an appointed Papuan official whose duty was to familiarise his people with the government aims. But as was the case in the Mandate Territory, the involvement of the Papuans in the policy and legislative processes was virtually nil. Papua did have a legislative council that was purely advisory and was comprised entirely of Australian government officials and representatives of the white community. Yet, it was evident that Murray's administration was still humanitarian and progressive in the sense that Murray believed in change for the good of the Papuans. As West further points out: "Murray's native policy, as he defined it in the nineteen-twenties, was designed to promote change slowly and to achieve such

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<sup>22</sup>West, Hubert Murray, p.144.

change so far as he could with native custom."<sup>23</sup> Toward this end Murray introduced two other institutions to be called village councillors and native assessors. Village councillors were appointed Papuan officials whose duty it was to ascertain public opinion but whose opinion was ignored if it proved contrary to government's views, in essence Murray's views. Native assessors were appointed to undergo training qualifying them to eventually preside over native courts.

As it was, the advancement of the Papuans was gradual and slow. But the worst part of it was that because of Murray's strong influence on government policies, his administration was far too paternalistic and benevolent. This was perhaps desirable in the short run, but in the long run unsatisfactory if the Papuans were to be "able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," to quote the League's Covenant. It was, however, doubtful if Murray ever thought about independence for the Papuans, or if he did, he saw it in the far distant future. In any event, although the Papuans were better protected than their New Guinea counterparts by labour regulations, a system of taxation was instituted which exempted plantation labourers from paying tax. This meant essentially that non-plantation labourers, being forced to find money by some means, were induced to learn the ethics of hard work.

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<sup>23</sup>West, Hubert Murray, p.235.

At the same time, education was left largely to the missions who could only provide the most elementary education aimed primarily at turning out graduates to help spread the "Good News about God." Health services were introduced but they were barely sufficient, with Native Medical Assistants being trained to help carry out health services by 1922. In 1933 the first group of young men was sent to Sydney University to study medicine for six months. The practice was discontinued after the third group because, among other reasons, there was strong opposition from the white population of both Papua and the Mandate Territory.<sup>24</sup> These groups of Papuans were the only people ever sent out of the Territory by the administration to study during the entire period before World War II. Although Murray's policy of development and protection was well-meaning, its success was limited since only lip service was paid to the essential elements of progress, namely education and health. In fact, these two important aspects were not even considered to be central to Murray's native policy.<sup>25</sup> Yet, Murray was not to be totally blamed, for he was genuinely concerned for the welfare of the Papuan people. "But welfare policies," explains one historian, "were necessarily restricted, especially since the indifference of successive Commonwealth

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<sup>24</sup>H. Nelson, "The Educated Papuan and the European Response Before 1940," mimeographed, 1970, p.26.

<sup>25</sup>West, Hubert Murray, p.256.

governments to the needs of the territory prevented more than a minimum subsidy being made available to plug the gap between revenue and expenditure." <sup>26</sup> As was the case of the Mandate Territory, the coming of World War II opened up a new era paving the way for a more positive and vigorous approach by the Australian government to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Papuan people.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, civil administration in both Papua and New Guinea was suspended. It was superseded by military control under the supervision of a unified Australian-New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) formed in 1942. ANGAU was authorised by the Australian government to plan strategy for the territories as well as to direct the administration of the two territories. For the first time in history, Papua and New Guinea came under joint control as one entity. ANGAU's roles were threefold: <sup>27</sup> operations, administration and production. Its operational activities were concerned with the provision of transport for army supplies, the construction of airstrips and roads, and the procurement of guides for troops as well as intelligence information. Its administrative roles were aimed

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<sup>26</sup>J. D. Legge, "The Murray Period: Papua 1906-40," in Hudson, Australia and Papua New Guinea, p.55.

<sup>27</sup>Peter Ryan, "The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU)," in The History of Melanesia, p.532.

primarily at maintaining the normal activities of administration. Its production tasks were directed at maintaining the copra and rubber industries. Above all, its chief task was to protect Papua-New Guinea from invasion by the Japanese.

In some parts of New Guinea, the Japanese were in control and Japanese entry into Port Moresby, the administrative capital of Papua, was only prevented by joint Allied Forces (mainly American and Australian forces) across the Kokoda Trail. As was the case in the First World War, it was doubtful whether the indigenous people ever fully comprehended the causes or the significance of the war, but many fought with both Allied and enemy forces.

Despite its devastation, the aftermath of the war had far-reaching consequences on Australian policies as well as on the people of Papua and New Guinea.<sup>28</sup> Change in policy was also enhanced by the return to power during the war of the Australian Labour Party which traditionally saw as suspect the imperialist overtones imminent in the colonial system.<sup>29</sup> ANGAU remained at the end of the war with the prime purpose of rehabilitating and reconstructing Papua and New Guinea, until such time as the federal government was ready to re-establish civilian control. The first move toward this end was initiated with the enactment of the

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<sup>28</sup>J. D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1956), p.186.

<sup>29</sup>Norman Harper and David Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1959), p.182.

Provisional Papua and New Guinea Act by the Australian Parliament in 1945. It provided for the first time joint civilian control and temporary union of what was to become the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. War damage compensation was paid out to Papuans and New Guineans for property destroyed during the war. While in Australia, ideas for what the first postwar Administrator called "the formulation of a Rooseveltian [sic] new deal for Papua and New Guinea,"<sup>30</sup> were being sought by the Department of External Territories. In 1945 a training school was established in Canberra to train ANGAU officers. This school was transferred in 1947 to Sydney and transformed into the present-day Australian School of Pacific Administration, a school designed largely to recruit and train officers to serve in the administration of Papua and New Guinea.

At the same time, Australia was involved with other nations in the universal effort to establish an international organisation in the quest for international peace and security. Indeed, at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations in 1945 Australia played a prominent part in the formative discussions on the United Nations Charter and particularly on the provisions for non-self-governing and trust territories.<sup>31</sup> Her position was greatly influenced by several

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<sup>30</sup>J. K. Murray, "In Retrospect--Papua-New Guinea 1945-1949 and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 1949-1952," in The History of Melanesia, p.177.

<sup>31</sup>Harper and Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, pp.182-183.

factors. The Second World War had proven the vulnerability of Australia to external attacks. In fact, Papua and New Guinea provided a useful buffer zone between Australia and Japanese forces. Thus the willingness of the Labour Government to place Papua and New Guinea under international accountability was reflective of Australia's recognition of the security significance of the Territory. Australia was also influenced by the burgeoning nationalist movements towards independence espoused by Asian neighbours to the north. These factors as well as the fact that the Labour Government was represented by an extremely able and prominent Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, made the government's position at San Francisco more favourable towards greater international supervision of dependent territories. Consequently, Australia reached an agreement with the United Nations in 1946 to transfer the Mandate Territory of New Guinea to the United Nations as a Trust Territory, while Papua was submitted as a non-self-governing territory.

The provisional administration of Papua and New Guinea as one entity was established permanently with the approval by the Australian Parliament of the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949. Although some reservations were expressed in the United Nations about the desirability of such a move, in the end it was endorsed. The move was considered desirable by the Australian government for a number of reasons. It was believed that a joint administration was necessary

because of the geographical contiguity of the two territories, the homogeneous racial composition of the inhabitants, the desire for common services, the need for greater efficiency in a unified administration, and the prospects for better trade relations. In fact, the unification of the two territories had been recommended as far back as 1919 by Governor Murray and again in 1939, but on both occasions it was rejected on the grounds that there were important differences between the territories in their administrative structures and status.<sup>32</sup>

Nevertheless, with the amalgamation of the two territories and the obligations toward the people under the U.N. Charter, Australia began in earnest to embark on a new era characterised by a more positive approach to the advancement of the indigenous people. Fully cognizant of the lack of progress before the war, the Minister for External Territories, Mr. E. J. Ward, had this to say in the House of Representatives during the debate on Provisional Administration Bill:

This Government is not satisfied that sufficient interest had been taken in the territories prior to the Japanese invasion or that adequate funds have been provided for the development and the advancement of the native inhabitants.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>L. P. Mair, Australia in New Guinea (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1971), p.14.

<sup>33</sup>Quoted by Gavin Souter in New Guinea the Last Unknown, p.244.

The first Administrator appointed to head the first postwar administration was Colonel J. K. Murray, a former Professor of Agriculture at the University of Queensland and at the time of his appointment, Chief Instructor at the ANGAU training school in Canberra. Together with the Minister for External Territories, they laid down the foundation of a postwar administration more sympathetic towards the advancement of the people of Papua and New Guinea. Included in the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 were provisions for a legislative council of seventeen appointed official members to represent the government, three each appointed to represent the private sector of the economy, the missions and the indigenous people and three non-official members elected by the white community. For the first time the indigenous people were to be represented on a national level, but still only on a small scale. Another significant step was the provision for local government councils to promote political education at the grass-roots level. Other changes in policy included modifications in labour legislation which abolished the indenture system. A more daring approach to education was adopted with the creation of a Department of Education in 1946. Health programmes were expanded into as much of the Territory as possible and a new emphasis was placed on the encouragement of cash-cropping and the formation of co-operative societies at the village level.

However, before the efficacy of these policies could

be fully realised by the government that formulated them, the Labour Party was toppled from power in the 1949 federal elections by the Liberal-Country Party coalition. Papua and New Guinea lost not only a government more sympathetic to its cause but one of its staunchest champions, the Minister for External Territories, Mr. E. J. Ward. Colonel J. K. Murray, reminiscing years later about his term as Administrator, wrote of the minister in these words:

He was approachable, a good listener, humanitarian in outlook and was responsible for the basic policy that was to last from 1945 to the present day which was, and is, that the interests of the native people are paramount and that priority be given to their educational, social, economic and political development.<sup>34</sup>

As Administrator, J. K. Murray was entrusted with the powers to implement this policy. Like Ward, Murray was a man of strong convictions; he carried out his job honourably but not without opposition from the white community and particularly from the business community who "rather expected that, with the Liberal-Country Party in power, the 1945 policy would be revised in their favour."<sup>35</sup>

In any event, the Liberal-Country Party coalition did not make any substantial changes in the policy formulated by the Labour Government. But it did succumb to pressure from those who despised Labour policy by retiring Colonel

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<sup>34</sup>Murray, "In Retrospect....," p.178.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.179.

J. K. Murray. The official reason given to remove him from office was that his age rendered him unfit to continue. In fact, Murray was removed because of his close association and identification with the Minister of External Territories and the Labour Government whose liberal ideas about the advancement of the people he shared. It was also significant that the man appointed to succeed him was a man who had been Quarter-Master General in ANGAU, and before his appointment as Assistant Administrator under Murray had been Federal Director of the Liberal Party in Australia. Brigadier D. M. Cleland took over in 1951 and his administration was closely identified with the new government. The Territories portfolio was headed briefly by Mr. Percy Spender and later assumed by Mr. Paul Hasluck (now Sir Paul and Governor-General of Australia).

Notwithstanding these changes in the government, the Legislative Council was inaugurated for the first time in 1951 and its disproportionate number of official members appointed to represent and defend the interest of the Administering Authority remained until 1960 when the Papua and New Guinea Act was amended. There was no doubt as to who was to be in command. Participation by non-official members was carried out mostly by white members, while the participation by indigenous members was even less significant.

At the same time, the first local government councils were established but only in what was considered by the

administration to be more advanced areas in terms of contact with the outside world, literacy and development and efforts were made to introduce the institution throughout the Territory during the decade. The councils were designed primarily as experimental grounds for the introduction of democratic principles to bridge the gap between the administration and the indigenous people. Thus they were set up to encompass several villages in which the villagers were given the right to vote on the basis of adult franchise. The councils were given taxing powers and limited authority to formulate and implement programmes, but with the advice and approval of the Administering Authority. Between 1951 and 1960, thirty-nine councils representing about 300,000 people were set up, which meant that the great majority of people were still without any form of political institutions at least at an officially recognised level. Nor were the councils having any great success in providing political education. As a political scientist, R. S. Parker, put it:

Basically, however, the system as it has developed reflects the Australian conception of local government as mainly an administrative instrument of central government, rather than as an arena for experiencing or resolving important clashes of community opinion, which is the essence of politics.<sup>36</sup>

Despite these pitfalls, it was still true that the

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<sup>36</sup>R. S. Parker, "The Advance to Responsible Government," in E. K. Fisk, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold (Canberra: Australian National University, 1966), p.25.

Administering Power was devoting more effort and more money to the Territory than ever before. Throughout the decade, as councils were being introduced into some areas, efforts were also being put into the encouragement of indigenous participation in the economy, but still only to a limited extent and mainly by two means: through cash-cropping and co-operatives. Such crops as coconut, cocoa, coffee, and rubber were commercially planted. Co-operatives were set up at the village level but still to be closely supervised by the Central Government. This activity was received with a great deal of enthusiasm at first but interest diminished as co-operatives began to function. In the meantime, the government adopted as one of its main policies the encouragement of foreign investment which it believed was necessary not only to help develop the Territory but to create employment and stimulate domestic capital formation.

The most significant effort in social advancement was directed at health problems. Hospitals were built and eradication campaigns launched to alleviate such diseases as malaria, tropical ulcers, and tuberculosis. At the lower levels, health services were provided by aid posts and health centres staffed mainly by locally trained medical orderlies under the supervision of District Health Officers who were mainly Australians. Although the administration adopted a more daring approach to education by creating a Department of Education, it would only go so far as to provide elemen-

tary education. Technical schools were also established in the main centres of Port Moresby, Lae and Rabaul to provide training in basic technical skills such as carpentry, motor mechanics, plumbing, welding and draftsmanship. Secondary education was not introduced by the administration until 1957, although some secondary education had been provided by the missions in the Territory. A few selected pupils had been sent to Australia to acquire elementary and secondary education. Higher education had no place in the government education policy although a few were sent to train as Assistant Medical Practitioners at the Suva Central Medical School in Fiji. There were no university graduates till well into the mid-sixties.

By the same token, the Administering Power was still evolving a strong administrative set-up to effectively implement its policies. Even after the war, there were parts of Papua and New Guinea that were still unexplored and where the indigenous people had never had any contact with the outside world. In fact, the opening up of new areas to bring them under government control was to continue well into the sixties and even today there are still isolated pockets that are either restricted to outside interference or yet to be brought under control. Nevertheless, with the exploration and pacification of new areas, new administrative districts were created.<sup>37</sup> The Highlands area where the bulk

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<sup>37</sup>The Territory has eighteen administration districts.

of the Territory's population lives was divided into three new districts in the early fifties, two of which were incorporated into New Guinea and one into Papua.

In the United Nations, Australia was kept under constant scrutiny with regard to her international obligations to develop the Territory towards independence. Before 1960, the United Nations sent out four visiting missions to the Trust Territory of New Guinea but the debates on their reports were regarded by the Administering Power with strong reservations.<sup>38</sup> Over a period of fifteen years, Australian personnel and financial grant-in-aid to Papua and New Guinea rose to new highs each year. In 1939 Papua received a grant-in-aid of a mere A\$90,000. The Australian grant to both Papua and New Guinea in 1946/1947 was A\$4,000,000, and by 1960 it had climbed to over A\$29,000,000. But figures can be very deceptive. The Papua and New Guinea Public Service was, by and large, dominated by whites. Papuans and New Guineans were not even allowed into the Public Service as officers until 1957 when the first effort was made to set up an Auxilliary Division exclusively for selected Papuans and New Guineans for training and preparation prior to appointment as officers of the Public Service. By 1960 there were still only a small number of Papuans and New Guineans in the Auxilliary Division. This disparity was not rectified until

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<sup>38</sup>Harper and Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, p.197.

after 1960.

Indeed, despite the increasing expenditure by the Australian government and the growing number of expatriates entering the Territory's Public Service, Papua and New Guinea was treated with no great sense of urgency. In the light of the policy of gradual development, this was understandable. As the Minister for External Territories, Paul Hasluck put it before a seminar on Papua and New Guinea organised by the Australian Institute of Political Science in Sydney in 1958:

It is clear that the development is intended to be progressive and not sudden; that during the period of advancement the Administering Power has to take on itself the responsibility for deciding what actions are in the best interests of the people and to ensure justice and protection for them; that their progressive development towards self-government or independence has to be appropriate to the freely expressed views of the people concerned and hence is limited by the necessity for prior change which place the people in a position where they have the capacity as well as the right to express their views freely.<sup>39</sup>

Besides showing the government's policy of gradual development, the statement also clearly evinces the ubiquitous way in which the government treated the indigenous people--very patronisingly, as children. Yet, the Australian government's attitude towards the indigenous people of the Territory was just that--patronising and paternalistic.

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<sup>39</sup>Paul Hasluck, "Present Tasks and Policies," John Wilkes, ed., Australia and New Guinea (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1958), p.80.

Undoubtedly Paul Hasluck, as Minister for External Territories, left the greatest imprint on Australian colonial policy in the Territory and he wielded enormous influence in the Australian government until 1964 when he left to assume another cabinet post. A former university history lecturer, journalist and diplomat, Mr. Hasluck had participated in the San Francisco Conference as a member of the Australian Delegation to the United Nations and remained a member until he entered a political career in the 1949 federal elections. A man of strong will and personality, he personally took charge of the Department and the Territory administration with great interest and close supervision.<sup>40</sup> Mr. Hasluck was of the firm conviction that the creation of an elite would be detrimental to the future of the Territory. He believed that an elite could be prevented by providing education on a broad basis. Moreover, universal elementary education would provide the key to development, and only by extending this process to the mass of the population could they be prepared adequately to take on higher responsibilities and be exposed to Western civilisation. The minister defined this policy.

I feel that primary education in the Territory has to take a very simple and elementary meaning, close to that of the old village school, where reading, writing and arithmetic were almost the whole of the curriculum.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Sir Donald Cleland, "An Administrator Reflects," The History of Melanesia, p.214.

<sup>41</sup>Hasluck, "Present Tasks and Policies," p.97.

This policy failed simply because elementary education was not sufficient to qualify many Papuans and New Guineans for higher and more responsible positions in the administration. Consequently, the administration was faced with the rising costs of recruiting qualified officers from Australia and elsewhere to keep up with the pace of development. In short, education was the key to the development of the Territory; unfortunately it had an educational system based essentially on the wrong premises. This policy was not corrected till after 1960.

## CHAPTER III

### POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT

The aftermath of the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" was inevitably greater concern for the remaining dependent territories not only from the United Nations but also from some Administering Powers. Australia was no exception. Her position with regard to her territories was becoming increasingly vulnerable to external pressure, particularly from the anti-colonial critics. In Papua and New Guinea itself, there was a growing but still only incipient amount of political consciousness among the indigenous inhabitants. There was no rabid nationalistic movement advocating independence as was the case in many parts of the world. But no doubt spurred on by the "wind of change" as more and more territories acceded to independence, the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, announced on his arrival in Sydney from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in 1960, that he would rather see Australia leave Papua and New Guinea sooner than later.<sup>1</sup> This announcement was significant

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<sup>1</sup>This statement was made in response to a question at a press conference when the Prime Minister said: "Whereas at one time many of us might have thought that it was better to go slowly in granting independence so that all the con-

not only because it was the first major indication of the need for a policy change in the Territory but also since only in the recent past, Mr. Menzies had been a firm believer in the adage that Australia was in Papua and New Guinea to stay.<sup>2</sup> Hitherto, the Australian administration was based on the policy of gradual development but at a rate which made self-determination in the foreseeable future inconceivable. There was also a belief prevalent in the fifties about several possibilities through which the Territory could attain self-determination. One of these, held especially by the white business community in the Territory, was the possible integration into the Commonwealth of Australia as a state. This possibility also found some sympathy in official circles, particularly with regard to the strategic importance of the Territory to Australia.

Whether these views were ever shared by Papuans and New Guineans is not easily detectable nor were they openly expressed. This was understandable for only a few Papuans and New Guineans had, by 1960, grasped the political significance of the Territory, nor were there many with sufficient

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ditions existed for a wise exercise of self-government, I think the prevailing school of thought today is that if in doubt you should go sooner, not later. I belong to that school of thought myself now, though I didn't once.... I would apply that to any country." Quoted by Francis J. West, "Papua-New Guinea, 1961-1965," in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965 (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire Publishing Pty. Ltd., 1968), p.445.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.444.

political awareness to articulate their views on the future of their country. Since education is essential to breeding political awareness, the policy of gradual development by 1960 had produced only a handful who could claim to have any tertiary education. These were trained at the Suva Central Medical School in Fiji as Assistant Medical Practitioners. Otherwise, tertiary education in the Territory was non-existent. Secondary education was introduced for the first time in the mid-fifties, and even by 1960 it was still inchoate. The government policy, providing for universal elementary education, militated to an important extent against the promotion of political as well as economic, social and educational advancement. In essence, what was needed was the introduction of higher education and the creation of an elite--a suggestion made by Dr. F. West in 1961 in one of a series of lectures on The Independence of Papua-New Guinea at the Australian National University.<sup>3</sup> But the creation of an elite was the antithesis of the policy of gradual development.

Nonetheless, the mounting sensitivity of the Australian government to external pressure was clearly shown when on August 23, 1960, the Minister for External Territories, Paul Hasluck, delivered a major policy statement in the

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<sup>3</sup>F. J. West, "The Political Development of Papua-New Guinea," The Independence of Papua-New Guinea (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1962), p. 51.

Australian House of Representatives with the aim of clearing up misunderstandings and distortions of Australian policies in the Territory.<sup>4</sup> Loaded with statistical evidence and a comprehensive review of the government's accomplishments in the preceding decade and five years, the statement was indicative of the propensity of the Australian government to stand firmly on its record rather than pursue a policy which would pledge greater consideration of outside criticisms and suggestions on their merits. Some criticisms were valid and some of the suggestions made as alternatives to existing policies were sound, having been made by men who had had considerable colonial experience and had witnessed at first hand the process of decolonisation in their own countries. True, there were some criticisms that were unwarranted, but to use these as a pretext to leave unheeded valid and constructive criticisms was not only being entirely wise. For instance, the Australian government was criticised throughout the fifties for the lack of indigenous participation in the political, economic, social and educational development, for its refusal to set target dates and to include indigenous members in its delegation to the Trusteeship, for racial discrimination and for its policy of gradual development. Criticisms such as these transpired for the most part from

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<sup>4</sup>The Hon. Paul Hasluck, M.P., "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea," Statement in the House of Representatives, Canberra, by The Minister for Territories, Tuesday 23 August, 1960.

the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee of the United Nations. These criticisms were not taken seriously partly because there was "a tendency to nation self-assertion and some impotence at a great deal of uninformed and inexperienced political criticism from the anti-colonial bloc."<sup>5</sup>

Thus, as Mr. Hasluck's speech indicated, the government's basic policy of gradual development would remain as before despite criticisms. He said:

We defend the wisdom of building a broad base for future progress. We repudiate the ill-founded criticism that we have gone too slowly. Such limits as may appear are set by policy but exist in the nature of the situation itself. Every bit of this achievement is solid and there are no shams about it. On this foundation we will see even greater progress in the next few years.<sup>6</sup>

There was no doubt that a great deal of progress had occurred by 1960 and the Minister for External Territories was right in defending the government's position. But fifteen years of progress in the Territory would have been grossly inadequate if Australia were to adhere strictly to the Declaration and terminate its administration immediately in favour of independence. The Territory would have been totally unprepared for it despite the principle that "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." Austra-

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<sup>5</sup>Harper and Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, p.204.

<sup>6</sup>Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea," p.6.

lia's position to delay independence was, therefore, not only prudent but also politically desirable in the vicissitudes of the time. The result otherwise, as many believed, would have been another Congo. Yet, it was precisely for this reason that a change of policy was essential. Moreover, where it was becoming increasingly imminent that "the wind of change" was blowing at a rapid rate, any recalcitrance to accept and consider United Nations recommendations was only inviting more criticisms.

It was under these circumstances that the Australian government realised that the policy of gradual development was outmoded and a new attitude towards the administration of Papua and New Guinea was necessary. No sooner had Mr. Hasluck made his major policy statement in the House of Representatives than he announced that the Australian government had decided to reconstitute the Legislative Council, the main decision-making and advisory body in the Territory. The policy guiding political advancement hitherto had been "to promote and foster among the indigenous population an understanding of and competence in the operation of democratically elected representative institutions and the administrative machinery of government so as to bring them as quickly as possible to the stage where they will be able to manage their own affairs and decide their political future as a people."<sup>7</sup> Ironically, the only representative

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<sup>7</sup>Commonwealth of Australia, Report to the General Assembly

institutions then were the local government councils. Ever since Australia assumed responsibility of Papua and New Guinea, little emphasis had been placed on either representative institutions at the national level based on popular suffrage or on indigenous participation in the main decision-making process. Even after World War II with the introduction of local government councils and the inclusion of non-official members including indigenous members in the Legislative Council, the political machinery was still overwhelmingly administrative with tight control by the Australian government. The changes envisaged by the Minister for External Territories, however, would not only increase the membership but would also allow for the first time a non-official majority. Moreover, for the first time too, indigenous membership would not only be increased but six of them would be elected though not on the basis of adult universal suffrage but through an electoral college system. Thus a tradition had been broken where not only would the indigenous people have a little more say but also where the Legislative Council would project a desirable image of being a little more political rather than a strictly administrative body. Even so the Australian government still had overriding authority over legislation and policies.

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of the United Nations: Administration of the Territory of New Guinea, 1960-1961 (Canberra: W. G. Murray, Government Printer, 1961), p.25 (hereafter to be known as the New Guinea Annual Report).

8T/1646, paragraph 212.

In inaugurating the new Legislative Council in 1961, the Administrator of the Commonwealth of Australia, Sir Dallas Brooks, had this to say in his opening address:

The Government and the Territorial Administration will continue to promote, to encourage and to assist in all possible ways political advancement in the Territory. These efforts will be exerted in many spheres--in local government, in public administration, in the functioning of various agencies of government, and in general education--and will find apex in the membership of this council. We trust that in this council the leaders of the people will never fail to find their opportunity and that, as the political aspirations of the people expand, this council will give them the means of shaping their own future until eventually they reach the goal of self-determination.<sup>9</sup>

The Administrator further stated that after one full term or about five years later, the newly constituted Council and the Australian government might have to consider what the next steps forward should be. Despite the Administrator's emphasis on the new Council and its potential as a harbinger of future constitutional and political reforms, the Council was still essentially a vehicle for the Australian administration represented by fourteen appointed official members and the expatriate community represented by thirteen members. The limited number of both nominated and elected indigenous members, nine in all, could hardly have been called representative of the people, particularly in view of the fact that the indigenous inhabitants numbered over some 1,500,000

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<sup>9</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report, 1960-1961, reported on p.26.

by 1960. In any case, as Professor Colin A. Hughes points out, the differences in the new Council and its precursors were merely quantitative rather than qualitative and added, "To the writer's knowledge in no colonial legislature did the abolition of the official majority produce so small a change in style."<sup>10</sup>

Nevertheless, there was a sense of urgency in the way the changes were introduced and although the Legislative Council was still far from being fully representative, it presaged a new era in the direction of the Declaration. Yet, while the Australian government was willing to introduce constitutional and political changes, it was not prepared to promote one aspect of development at the expense of others. This policy had been reiterated again by Mr. Hasluck in his major policy statement when he said:

We should ensure that political advancement leads to the welfare and happiness of the people by making sure that it is accompanied by measures for social, educational and economic advancement.<sup>11</sup>

He was particularly emphatic on the importance of economic viability as a necessary prerequisite to self-determination. This policy, however, underwent considerable change throughout the sixties when it became apparent that political

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<sup>10</sup>Colin A. Hughes, "The Development of the Legislative: The Legislative Councils," D. G. Bettison, C. A. Hughes, and P. W. Van der Veur, eds., The Papua and New Guinea Elections 1964 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1965), p.27.

<sup>11</sup>Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea," p.11.

change especially was essential for the indigenous people to express their views on the overall development of their country.

Evidently, the Australian government took further steps to look at other aspects of political advancement in the Territory. In the same year that Mr. Hasluck announced the constitutional reforms, he also announced the appointment of Professor D. P. Derham, Professor of Jurisprudence at Melbourne University, to carry out an examination of the administration of justice in the Territory. The Derham Report on the whole was critical of the justice system so strongly entrenched in its Australian framework and personnel but also made recommendations to correct these anomalies. The report particularly emphasised the need for a clearer separation of judicial powers from executive powers and the need for the training of indigenous legal officers and personnel as well as the simplification of the system to suit the conditions of the Territory. By 1960 there were no fully trained indigenous judges or legal officers although a few were employed mainly as interpreters. By 1961 the Administering Power reported that it had implemented some of Professor Derham's recommendations and was considering others.<sup>12</sup>

It was not until 1962, however, that the Australian government made an all-out effort to overhaul its policy of

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<sup>12</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report 1960-1961, pp.27-29.

gradual development. This action was due to a number of factors. In 1961 the Trusteeship Council had passed a resolution calling on Australia to set target dates for Papuan and New Guinean independence. Across the border in what was then West New Guinea, the Dutch and the Indonesians were involved in a confrontation which subsequently decided the fate of the Territory in favour of the Indonesians in 1962. In the same year the fifth United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea embarked on a two-month tour of the Territory. It was headed by a man of considerable colonial and diplomatic experience, Sir Hugh Foot of the United Kingdom. The other members of the Mission were Dr. Carlos Salamanca (Bolivia), Mr. Ashak Bhadkarnkar (India), and Mr. Delmas H. Nucker (United States). Thus the Mission's membership was fairly evenly divided between the Administering Powers and the non-Administering Powers. Although the Mission travelled extensively throughout New Guinea, its report was received with mixed feelings and skepticism in Canberra and by the administration and the expatriate community in the Territory because of its highly critical approach and drastic recommendations. Nevertheless, it provided an impulse for more sweeping reforms thereafter. Never before had the pitfalls of the Australian policies in the Territory been laid bare so efficaciously as by Sir Hugh Foot who, despite his criticisms, could not so easily be

brushed aside by the Australian government because, first of all, he was British, and secondly, he was a high ranking official of the British government.<sup>13</sup> In fact, as Dr. Healy points out, the Foot report resembled to some extent what might have been expected from the Afro-Asians only that it was "essentially empirical, not doctrinaire."<sup>14</sup> The report submitted three principal propositions: a full economic survey by the World Bank of the Territory's resources; a new programme of university and higher education for the Territory and the immediate preparation for the election of a representative parliament. It concluded:

We are convinced that there should be no delay whatever in pressing on to achieve these purposes. Then the way will be cleared for increasing the pace and momentum of progress towards the declared objective of self-determination.<sup>15</sup>

It is noteworthy that the Mission's terms of reference were formulated in the light not only of the functions of the Trusteeship Council but also of the Special Committee on Decolonisation.

In the meantime, the Minister for External Territories announced the formation of a Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Constitutional Development of the

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<sup>13</sup>Sir Hugh Foot had had considerable experience in the British Colonial Service and had served in British territories in various capacities.

<sup>14</sup>A. M. Healy, "The Foot Report and East New Guinea," The Australian Quarterly, XXXIV, 3 (September 1962), 17.

<sup>15</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, paragraph 268.

Territory. It was to be headed by the Assistant Administrator for Services and Senior Official Member in the Legislative Council, Dr. J. T. Gunther, and was comprised of six other members of the Council including three indigenous members. The Select Committee was to examine and prepare for consideration by the Legislative Council and the Australian government a set of proposals on the constitutional development of the Territory. Whether the Select Committee was formed to be in keeping with the words of Sir Dallas Brooks is not clear. But it is evident that Sir Dallas had predicted another five years before a general election. It was still only two years since he opened the Legislative Council. It was also noteworthy that several non-official members of the Council had been suggesting changes in the constitutional provisions for the Territory. It has been contended that the Select Committee was created at the pressure of the Foot Mission but this assertion has been repudiated by both the Administrator of the day, Sir Donald Cleland, and the Chairman of the Committee, Dr. Gunther. They also deny that the Foot Mission had any great influence in the final report of the Committee. In the words of Dr. Gunther:

I suppose there will always be argument as to whether the Select Committee was influenced by the Report. Would the Select Committee have reported as they did if Foot had not reported as he did on behalf of the Visiting Mission? I think the Select Committee would maintain they were not influenced. They certainly stopped short of the Foot recommendations.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>J. T. Gunther, "Background to the House of Assembly,"

Whatever the case, it was clear from the final report that its recommendations were along lines proposed by the Foot Mission although short of what that Mission suggested.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, the report of the Select Committee was finally approved by the Legislative Council and the Australian government in 1963 as a result of which the epoch-making establishment of the House of Assembly was to be elected for the first time in 1964.

The inauguration of the House of Assembly in 1964 was an historic milestone in the political advancement of Papua and New Guinea. For the first time, the main decision-making body had an elected indigenous majority. Sixty-four seats were provided for, of which forty-four were open seats contested by candidates regardless of race, nationality or sex. Another ten seats were reserved specifically for the some 28,000 expatriates (mainly Australians) living in the Territory and ten more reserved for nominated official members appointed by the Minister for External Territories to represent the Australian government. After the elections, the House of Assembly was comprised of thirty-eight indigenous members, ten white official members representing the

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The University of Papua and New Guinea, the Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Marion W. Ward, ed., The Politics of Melanesia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), p.423. (Hereinafter to be called The Politics of Melanesia.)

<sup>17</sup>The Foot Report recommended a one hundred member parliament while the Select Committee recommended sixty-four members including ten official members.

government and sixteen other expatriates representing the ten special seats as well as six open seats. It was also a significant departure from previous practice when ten indigenous members were appointed by the government to fill quasi-ministerial positions as Under-Secretaries. The President of the Legislative Council had been the Administrator but now a position was also provided for a Speaker which was subsequently filled by an elected member of the House. In addition five of the Under-Secretaries were appointed members of the Administrator's Council which previously had been dominated by officials of the administration. These were drastic reforms but still did not meet all the recommendations of the Foot Report which had suggested inter alia a parliament of one hundred members elected on the basis of adult universal suffrage.

Besides the House of Assembly, there were two other important events. Firstly, after having served the Liberal-Country Party Coalition since 1951 as Minister for External Territories, Mr. Hasluck was elevated to Minister for External Affairs in 1964. The Hasluck era had come to an end but the policies were to be continued by a man whose only qualifications apart from being a member of the House of Representatives were that of a farmer and a breeder of racing horses. Unlike Mr. Hasluck, who had served with the Australian Mission to the United Nations, Mr. C. E. Barnes had had little experience with colonial questions. Before Mr. Hasluck

stepped down, he announced government plans to reorganise the Public Service in Papua and New Guinea in late 1963. The plans resulted partly from the Foot Report which felt that the Public Service was "overcentralised and over-<sup>18</sup> complicated" and too cumbersome for the country to afford. In 1961 a committee appointed by Mr. Hasluck to look into higher education had recommended, among other things, an administrative college. The college was finally inaugurated in 1963 and was intended "to give special emphasis to the development of higher management and administrative education for the public service, and has embarked on the first stage of a scheme of combined formal education and planned experience intended to qualify a number of indigenous officers for senior executive posts within a period of ten years."<sup>19</sup> But the changes for the reconstruction of the Public Service were not introduced until 1964 when the Special Committee on Decolonisation met for the first time to consider Papua and New Guinea and other Australian territories.

Since its inception, the Special Committee had been engaged primarily with the more controversial areas of South West Africa (now Namibia), Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola. During this time Australia

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<sup>18</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, paragraph 227.

<sup>19</sup>R. S. Parker, "The Growth of Territory Administration," E. K. Fisk, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1966), p.212.

had been involved in the proceedings of the Committee as a member and was familiar with the procedures of the Committee and the positions of the members on the question of decolonisation. When Papua and New Guinea came up in the Committee in 1964, Australia was, therefore, prepared to defend her position on the basis of her record since the Declaration was adopted in 1960. There was no question that the political advancement of the Territory had come a long way in so short a time. It was another question whether it went far enough to satisfy the principles of the Declaration or for that matter the majority of the Special Committee. It was in the light of the latter question that the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Territory was considered by Sub-Committee II and then by the full Committee before it submitted its final report to the General Assembly. The Committee's proceedings were facilitated by a working paper prepared by the Secretariat based on annual reports submitted by Australia to the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council and its visiting missions. Supplementary information was provided for by the appearance before the Sub-Committee and the full Committee of the Australian representative.

The examination of Papua and New Guinea by the Special Committee on Decolonisation came just after the inauguration of the House of Assembly. Most members of the Committee welcomed the establishment of the House of Assembly

but some with reservations and qualifications as it still fell short of being a fully representative body. This argument was based essentially on a number of salient features of the House including the provisions for special seats for expatriates, for nominated official members, the inadequacy of powers of the House and the roles of the parliamentary Under-Secretaries. The argument was legitimate but was devoid of the stage of development reached by the Territory up to that point.

The fact was that in 1964, the special provisions were necessary. Although there was no question that the House of Assembly was the beginning of the terminal phase of the Australian administration, it was also a palpable fact that the Territory had not reached what E. P. Wolfers has called a "political take off."<sup>20</sup> This was due largely to the neglect of the past. The dearth of parliamentary experience and education of most of the indigenous members as well as the absence of any effective political organisations prompted some observers to characterise the House of Assembly as "a leap into the dark" or as a classic example of "instant democracy for a thousand tribes." For the most part, the only experience of participatory democracy that many indigenous members had had was in local government councils.

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<sup>20</sup>Edward P. Wolfers, "Social and Political Assumptions," John Wilkes, ed., New Guinea--Future Indefinite (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1968), p.35.

Only a few had any education beyond elementary level while many were completely illiterate. For these reasons, a seminar had been organised before the opening of the House of Assembly by the administration and the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University with the latter providing most of the staff. The seminar was organised to familiarise the members (both expatriate and indigenous) with democratic principles and the essentials of parliamentary procedures.<sup>21</sup> Even then it was still a difficult task. It was doubly hard for those members who could not read or write in English. Sessions in the House itself are conducted in English and two local languages, Melanesian Pidgin and Police Motu, with simultaneous translations provided. But it was even more difficult, as Professor Norman Meller points out, when the nature of parliamentary language and procedures were directly adopted from the Westminster parliamentary system and needed to be simplified in order to make the legislative process more comprehensible to the indigenous members.<sup>22</sup> The administration realised this situation and it organised political tours for members of the House of Assembly to visit Australia to gain first hand experience of the

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<sup>21</sup>For a description of the seminar, see David G. Bettison, "The Parliamentary Seminar at Sogeri," Bettison et al., eds., The Papua and New Guinea Elections 1964, pp.430-444.

<sup>22</sup>Norman Meller, "Papers on the Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly," New Guinea Research Bulletin, No. 22 (January 1968), pp.18-21.

Australian parliamentary institution at the federal and state levels.

Thus the special provisions in the new House of Assembly were adopted to meet these deficiencies in political development. In essence, special seats for expatriates and for ten nominated official members, among other things, had been adopted because the people had wanted them. Yet, it was these kinds of argument that some members of the Committee were not prepared to accept. The Indian representative reportedly said:

The recent establishment of the House of Assembly was a landmark in the constitutional evolution of the Territory, but as long as that body was not entirely representative of the people and contained reserved seats for officials and non-indigenous persons, it was open to criticism.<sup>23</sup>

The representatives of Iraq, Chile, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Poland all expressed similar sentiments although in the case of Poland, some criticisms seemed unduly harsh. At the same time the Polish representative endorsed the constitutional reforms but asserted that they still did not meet the requirements of resolution 1514(XV). He termed "discriminatory" the provision for the ten special seats to represent 28,000 expatriates while two million indigenous people were represented by thirty-eight members. This, he suggested, was contrary to the recommendations of the Foot Report. Nor was he impressed with the powers of the House of Assembly

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<sup>23</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.5.

since, in the final analysis, the Administrator, the Australian government and the Governor-General still retained overriding control over the Territory. He further asserted that "the Australian Government had made no attempt to ascertain the real wishes of the indigenous inhabitants on the basis of a referendum or any other means of popular consultation, and considered that they must be given the earliest possible opportunity to exercise freely their rights to self-determination and independence."<sup>24</sup> He urged the Australian government to invite the Special Committee on Decolonisation to visit the Territory. The ten special seats did appear superficially to be "discriminatory." That the Australian government still had full control over Territory matters despite the House of Assembly was true particularly with regard to financial and constitutional powers. But to claim that the people had not been consulted was not wholly correct because the fundamental purpose of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council had been to furnish a report on the constitutional development of the Territory based on the views of the people. These views were ascertained when the Select Committee travelled throughout the Territory meeting with people from all sectors of the community. The Polish suggestion for a visiting mission was not the first nor the last, for the question came up again and again over the

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<sup>24</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.7.

period and it was not until two years after Australia left the Special Committee for Decolonisation that members were invited to visit the Territory. Had the suggestion been taken up earlier, both the Australian government and members of the Committee would have benefitted greatly with a greater exposure of the members to the realities of the conditions in the Territory.

In any case, the criticisms reflected vividly the essentially doctrinaire positions and idealism of the anti-colonial critics on the one hand and the basically conservative and pragmatic approach of the Administering Powers on the other. This dichotomy was evident throughout the period Australia was a member. Thus Australia found that quite often the only support she got in the Sub-Committee was from the United States. In replying to the criticisms, the Australian representative pointed out to the Sub-Committee that "the role of the ten nominated official members was not to extort any Australian influence on the work of the House of Assembly, but simply to provide the knowledge and experience which the other members still lacked in some fields."<sup>25</sup> He added that the ten official members would be assisted by the ten Under-Secretaries. These statements seemed sound on the surface but what were they in substance? The role of nominated official members in the first four years of the

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<sup>25</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.3.

House of Assembly was not entirely without any influence nor was the vagueness surrounding the roles of the Under-Secretaries ever fully obliterated.<sup>26</sup> In supporting the Australian position, the United States representative praised the government for undertaking the "gigantic task" of bringing the people of the Territory into a single society with the aim of ultimately granting independence. He concluded by suggesting "that Australia's administration of its territories was both progressive and far-sighted; the steps being taken to prepare Papua and New Guinea for meaningful political and economic independence were particularly impressive." For these reasons he added that "The Australian Government deserved a vote of confidence from the Sub-Committee."<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, despite the pitfalls of the Australian administration, policies were directed at inducing further political changes. For instance, in 1960 there were thirty-nine local government councils covering a population of over 260,000 but by 1964 the number of councils had increased to eighty-nine covering a population of over 900,000, or about half of the total population. Since the early sixties the administration had also provided for indigenous participation in town and district advisory councils. These bodies gave some opportunity to the indigenous people to gain

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<sup>26</sup>"New Guinea Stocktaking," Current Affairs Bulletin, XLI, 11 (April 22, 1968), 169.

<sup>27</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.4.

political experience but their contribution was still less significant than their contribution to local government councils and the House of Assembly. Moreover, the membership of town and district advisory councils was nominated by the Administrator and not elected. As statutory bodies, they lacked real legislative powers since their functions were merely advisory and not binding, deficiencies which had been detected by some critics including the Foot Mission and again by some members of the Sub-Committee. It was remarkable, however, that these bodies should now have indigenous members when only in the recent past they had been exclusively expatriate in membership. With the flurry of changes in Australian policies after 1960 it was probably inevitable, because the changes affected virtually every aspect of the political development of the Territory including the Public Service.

The government's plans to reorganise the Public Service came into effect in 1964 when, at the recommendation of the Foot Report, an integrated Public Service was introduced for the first time, but with a two salary and wage differential system. Until then, the Public Service had been segregated into a predominantly expatriate Public Service on the one hand and an indigenous division on the other. Through the differential system, expatriates were to be paid according to one system while in the other the indigenous public servants were to be paid about forty per cent of what

their expatriate counterparts earned. The Auxilliary Division set up in 1957 had a membership of 350 by 1960 but there were no indigenous persons in the Upper Divisions. By 1964 the number of indigenous officers in the Upper Divisions had increased to 172 while those in the Auxilliary Division increased to 1,040. These were modest increases but they were indicative of change which the Foot Report among others had recommended not only to improve and strengthen the Public Service but also to enable Papuans and New Guineans to become full-fledged officers in the service of their country.<sup>28</sup> Despite the change, the Public Service was still disproportionately staffed by expatriates. Policy formulation was still largely in the hands of the Australian government while their implementation was executed by the Territorial Administration departments directed exclusively by Australian officials. Apart from those Papuans and New Guineans in the Auxilliary Division and the few mainly in the Third and Second Divisions of the Public Service, the bulk of Papuans and New Guineans employed by the administration were in the lower echelons serving as clerks, drivers, assistants, labourers, or as servants.

Papua and New Guinea came under the scrutiny of the Special Committee on Decolonisation when it would have been too early to assess the overall impact of political changes

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<sup>28</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, paragraph 228.

since 1960 and particularly on the House of Assembly. Unquestionably the House of Assembly offered the indigenous members the first real opportunity to articulate their similarities and differences in the effort to represent the interests of their local constituencies as well as to search for and discuss matters of national interest. Another departure from previous legislatures was the attempt to organise the elected members in the House of Assembly into a cohesive bloc to act as an opposition to the administration represented by the ten official members. The group was short-lived for it folded up soon after and as one member explains, "lack of experience and lack of understanding in the major issues on the part of many of the less sophisticated members were the main reasons."<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, it became quite clear after the first session of the House of Assembly that the Australian government was not the only one sensitive to external pressures. Just before the first session of the House of Assembly and before the first session of the Special Committee on Decolonisation on Papua and New Guinea, two members of the Committee, Dr. M. Naravi (Iran) and Mr. Natwar Singh (India), paid an unofficial visit to the Territory. The reported views of the two men (apparently misreported) not only shocked the press but drew

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<sup>29</sup>D. Barrett, "Rubber Stamp or Parliament?", The Politics of Melanesia, p.433.

serious attention from the House of Assembly.<sup>30</sup> A resolution sponsored by the elected group and introduced by the Deputy Leader was passed overwhelmingly in retaliation:

We, the elected representatives of the people of Papua and New Guinea, desire to convey to the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations the expressed wish of the people that they and they alone be allowed to decide when the time is ripe for self-government in Papua and New Guinea and the form that such government will take.

We want to record the people's further conviction that the road to self-government can best be travelled with one guide--the Administering Authority. Undue pressure from without can lead only to that disruption, chaos and bloodshed which the people have observed with great alarm in certain newly independent countries.

Although the resolution was well-meaning and obviously directed at what was considered undue pressure from the United Nations, the House of Assembly failed to realise that by virtue of its Trusteeship obligations in New Guinea and its moral obligation in Papua, Australia had international responsibilities which the United Nations was entitled to examine. The Special Committee on Decolonisation was formed to implement resolution 1514(XV) and that Declaration applied to every territory for which an Administering Power was held accountable to the United Nations. Papua and New Guinea were among these territories as the Indian representative pointed out so succinctly and cogently in the Sub-Committee:

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<sup>30</sup>Paul W. van der Veur, "The First Two Meetings of the House of Assembly," Bettison et al., eds., The Papua and New Guinea Elections 1964, p.473.

While not disputing the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination, his delegation could not subscribe entirely to the view that Papua and New Guinea were not the concern of the Sub-Committee or of the United Nations. While the House was at liberty to pass any resolution it wished, so long as Papua and New Guinea were respectively non-self-governing and trust territory, the United Nations, under its Charter, not only had the responsibility but also the duty to discuss the Territory and make recommendations.<sup>31</sup>

This view was shared by most members of the Sub-Committee although not by the Administering Powers including Australia. In fact, the Australian representative, in replying to the Indian representative and other critics, made a statement that probably best exposed why from its inception in 1968, when she withdrew from the Special Committee, she was skeptical about resolution 1514(XV) and may well have been one of the main reasons for her withdrawal:

He was afraid that resolution 1514(XV) was being used indiscriminately as a pressure point on Administering Powers where the size, physical condition, economic factors and, most important, the wishes of the people themselves demanded that development should be a steady progress and not a precipitate rush towards a theoretical conclusion.<sup>32</sup>

That resolution 1514(XV) was being used as a pressure point on the Administering Powers was obvious. But the pressure was not always "indiscriminate" but rather the result of observations and reports on the conditions of the territories.

Despite the House of Assembly resolution and the

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<sup>31</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.5.

<sup>32</sup>A/A.C. 109/S.C. 3/S.R. 33, p.18.

cautionary note by the Australian government, the Sub-Committee submitted a report to the full Committee with a resolution urging the Australian government to speed up the development of the Territory and fulfil the principles of the Declaration. In essence, although it was only the first time that Papua and New Guinea came under the searching light of the Sub-Committee, there was no question as to where the anti-colonial critics stood; they had the numbers to have the resolution passed. They were committed to ensuring that the principles of the Declaration were being implemented. The Australian government, on the other hand, was committed to a policy where the people's wishes transcended the principles of the Declaration. Basically, both the anti-colonial critics and the Australian government were in agreement as to the principle of self-determination. Where they differed was essentially a matter of degree. The majority of members persisted with the principles of the Declaration urging a "speedy end to colonialism" while the Australian government persisted with the line that the end of colonialism would be contingent upon the will of the people of Papua and New Guinea to have self-determination. The Committee adopted the report of Sub-Committee II including its conclusions and recommendations which, among other things, asserted that the Administering Power still had not fully implemented the principles of the Declaration and urged it to do so immediately.

By and large, the consideration of Papua and New Guinea by the Special Committee in 1964 set the tone for the next four years. The attitudes of the Special Committee towards the Australian government remained basically the same as reflected by the reports it adopted between 1964 and 1968. These reports all concluded that progress was still slow because the Administering Power had not fulfilled the objectives of resolution 1514(XV). For this reason Australia was urged to take the necessary steps to achieve the aims of resolution 1514(XV) in the Territory as soon as possible. Despite these resolutions, however, the attitude of Australia towards the Special Committee also remained largely unchanged. It was one of coolness, suspicion, reluctance and often retaliation to what was considered to be intemperate and unrealistic conclusions and recommendations from the Special Committee. At the same time, during those four years, Papua and New Guinea experienced further political changes. These changes were attested to not only by the reports of the Administering Power but also by the working papers prepared by the Secretariat and reports of United Nations Visiting Missions to New Guinea during the period. But even though the reports of the Visiting Missions provided first hand information on the rapidly changing situation, they would also testify that there were still serious deficiencies in the political and administrative systems that needed to be rectified immediately. Thus after the seventh United

Nations Visiting Mission toured New Guinea in 1965, it reported that a number of recommendations of the Foot Mission on political advancement had been implemented. But it also expressed concern that there were still gaps in the development of representative institutions, in the participation of Papuans and New Guineans in the organs of government and administration and in the development of national unity.<sup>33</sup>

Yet the mission was comprised of three representatives of the Administering Powers, Mr. Andre Naudy (France) as Chairman, Mr. Dermot Swan (U.K.), Mr. Dwight Dickinson (U.S.A.), and only one representative of the non-Administering Powers, Mr. Nathaniel Eastman (Liberia). Moreover, the mission submitted a report that was critical but objective, just as the Foot Mission had done three years previously. As such, its recommendations carried more weight and were given more serious consideration by the Administering Power.

But were these recommendations any different from those of the Special Committee? Fundamentally, they were not. Both the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee were concerned primarily with expediting the process of decolonisation with independence as the paramount goal as resolution 1514(XV) had spelled out. But whereas the Trusteeship Council was composed of a majority of Administering Powers, the Special Committee was not. Here lay the essen-

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<sup>33</sup>T/1646, paragraph 201.

tial difference, a dichotomy between the Colonial Powers and the non-Colonial Powers in a bipolar world of power politics. This unfortunately had to be an important factor in the process of decolonisation.

Nonetheless, in 1963 the Local Government Ordinance had been repealed but it did not come into effect until 1965. With the repeal, local government councils were no longer to be confined only to the indigenous inhabitants but would provide for the establishment of a variety of councils including mono-racial, multi-racial and rural councils. This was seen by the Administering Power "as the next step in developing the understanding of responsible government already achieved through native local government councils."<sup>34</sup> This policy was endorsed by the 1965 Visiting Mission but it also made four major propositions.<sup>35</sup> It proposed that not only should more councils be established throughout the Territory as quickly as possible but that the councils be given more varied and extensive powers. In addition, it proposed that ways be studied to make greater resources available to councils, either by increasing the subsidies from the central government or by increasing revenues obtained from taxes levied by the councils themselves. Finally, the Mission proposed that the supervisory powers of the

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<sup>34</sup>T/1646, paragraph 324.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

administration be adapted to the changing circumstances so that as councils acquired more experience, the role of the administration should gradually diminish to being advisory.

Similarly, the Mission recommended that the House of Assembly and the Australian government should come to an agreement whereby the former "would actually be able to exercise the prerogatives to which it is entitled."<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, it suggested that the district advisory councils be used fully by the district commissioners in seeking advice before making relevant decisions. Since the town and district advisory councils were not elected bodies, the Mission proposed that a system of municipal and representative councils be established to replace them.<sup>37</sup> Where the need for representation based on adult universal suffrage was seen as necessary to the goal of self-determination, this was desirable. It also noted that there were still only a few Papuans and New Guineans in high posts of the Public Service and none in key posts.<sup>38</sup> To remedy this situation would involve not only intensive training but a modified system of classification and recruitment. Since the recruitment of expatriates was alarmingly high, it would essentially require a corresponding deceleration of overseas officers over a period of time.

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<sup>36</sup>T/1646, paragraph 325.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., paragraph 326.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., paragraph 232.

Hence, by 1965, many obstacles to self-determination still existed in Papua and New Guinea. One of the greatest obstacles pointed out by the Mission was the lack of national unity.<sup>39</sup> The geographical nature of the Territory rendered it difficult to establish an effective communication system. The problem was further exacerbated by the absence of a common language, albeit by 1965 there were two apart from English that were gaining rapid usage as means of common communication but were still greatly inhibited by the lack of printed literature and the lack of acceptable linguistic criteria since both had pidgin origins with eclectic sources of vocabularies.<sup>40</sup> Obviously, education remained the major stumbling block but it was also encouraging that there was an increasing amount of indigenous political awareness. These problems had been left for the most part to the Administering Power and the missions to tackle, a task made no easier by the absence of any real and effective indigenous political organisations at the national level. There were still no entrenched political parties. Several attempts had been made to form political parties but their success was ephemeral due mostly to the lack of organisational experience, leadership and support from both the people and the

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<sup>39</sup>T/1646, paragraph 238.

<sup>40</sup>See S. A. Wurm, "Language and Literacy," setting out some of the basic problems relating to language and literacy in Papua and New Guinea, in Fish, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold, pp.135-148.

administration.<sup>41</sup> There were trade unions and welfare organisations but their potential as a political force was impeded by the lack of experience and their primary aim of seeking better working conditions and better wages. In the latter part of 1965, Mr. Oala Oala Rarua, a Papuan and Secretary of the Port Moresby Workmen's Association, formed the New Guinea National United Party, the first indigenous-led party, and although it got off the ground it never mustered enough popular and financial support to sustain a viable and lasting political organisation.<sup>42</sup>

It was under these circumstances that the 1965 Visiting Mission made its recommendations. The views of the Mission were not only shared by most members of the Special Committee but most members also fully endorsed the Mission's recommendations. In essence, both the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee were concerned with two fundamental factors: time and increased and more effective and meaningful indigenous participation in the political process. It was precisely for these reasons that Australia was the constant target of criticisms in the Special Committee from 1964 to 1968 for the progress being made to achieve these ends was "still too slow." Time was running out on the Administering

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<sup>41</sup>See E. P. Wolfers, "A Short History of Political Party Activity in Papua and New Guinea," in The Politics of Melanesia, pp. 439-488.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 444-445.

Power in which case the promotion of greater indigenous participation in the political and administrative systems was not only urgent but absolutely imperative if they were to exercise control over their own destiny. The Soviet representative, for instance, was prompted to state before the Special Committee that as the House of Assembly was limited by constitutional powers from Canberra, it was "no more than an empty shell" and "a powerless body." He added: "The same could be said of local government councils and other organs of local government."<sup>43</sup> The report of Sub-Committee II in 1965 helped lay the basis for one of the strongest resolutions on Papua and New Guinea ever adopted by the General Assembly when on December 21, 1965, it adopted resolution 2112(XX) with an overwhelming majority of 86-0-22. Australia abstained. Nevertheless, the resolution declared "that the Administering Authority had not taken sufficient steps towards the full implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement and resolution 1514(XV)." Consequently, it called on Australia "to fully implement General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and, to this end, to fix an early date for independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people." It was paradoxical that if a target date for independence were to be set, it probably would have been rejected by the majority of Papuans and New Guineans as was revealed by the

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<sup>43</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.160.

report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development created by the House of Assembly in 1965.

The Select Committee was appointed mainly at the instigation of a Papuan member of the House, Mr. John Guise, who had served in the first Select Committee while a member of the Legislative Council.<sup>44</sup> He subsequently became Chairman of the second Select Committee. Its terms of reference were "to draft for consideration of the House of Assembly a set of constitutional proposals to serve as a guide for the future constitutional development of the Territory."<sup>45</sup> The first interim report of the Select Committee was presented to the House of Assembly in November 1965, thus setting a tentative outline for changes in the House of Assembly to be elected in 1968. This interim report was communicated to the House of Representatives on March 31, 1966, by the Minister for External Territories, Mr. C. E. Barnes, who in the same statement expressed the government's policy towards further constitutional changes in these words:

The Government has no desire to press constitutional changes upon the people of the Territory which they do not want or for which they think they are not ready; nor will the Government refuse to make changes if there is strong and widespread support for changes in the Territory. This is the Government's attitude to the possibility of changes in the House of Assembly which the Select Committee referred to in its report, and it applies also to

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<sup>44</sup>A. L. Epstein, R. S. Parker and Marie Reay, eds., The Politics of Dependence: Papua New Guinea 1968 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), p.35.

<sup>45</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.149.

possible changes in the form of executive government, i.e., in the arrangement for the administration of the Territory after the next elections for the House of Assembly. Subject to these considerations the Government would regard transitional steps towards eventual responsible ministerial government as appropriate at this stage. Without taking away from the Commonwealth Government's final policy responsibility that is exercised through the Administrator and the Minister for Territories, arrangements could be made for certain responsibilities of a ministerial character to be passed to an initially limited number of elected members and for changes to be made in the arrangements per the Administrator's Council to the same end.<sup>46</sup>

This statement is quoted at length because not only did it demonstrate the growing flexibility of the Australian government towards the growing political aspirations of the people of Papua and New Guinea but also evidenced the growing efforts towards the goals of resolution 1514(XV). It also revealed, however, that Australia had not entirely abandoned its basic premise that self-determination would only come when the indigenous people asked for it and would not be imposed upon them.

Indeed, the final report of the Select Committee, submitted in 1966, reflected that Papuans and New Guineans were increasingly recognizing the need for more constitutional change but at a gradual rate. Views were sought from all over the Territory and discussions were held with

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<sup>46</sup>Hon. C. E. Barnes, "Invitation to Select Committee on Constitutional Development," Statement in the House of Representatives, Canberra, 31 March 1966, in Meeting the Challenge: Selected Statements on Papua and New Guinea During 1966 (Canberra: A. J. Arthur, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1967), p.6.

members of the Australian Cabinet. After these discussions, the Select Committee and the Commonwealth Government found that there were a number of problems which could not be easily resolved. The Minister for External Territories in a speech to the House of Representatives on April 21, 1966, reiterated, however, that the basic policy was still self-determination and "should the people wish to remain in association with Australia after self-determination this would require the agreement of the Australian Government of the day."<sup>47</sup> The government's lack of confidence in the indigenous people themselves and the continuing dependence on Australia was still pretty much evident even from the Report of the Select Committee:

This report recognised the proposition that until the people of the Territory determine their own political and constitutional future, the duty and responsibility of administering the Territory rests with the Administrator acting on behalf of the Australian Government.<sup>48</sup>

In any event, the Select Committee did make proposals to increase not only the membership but also the powers of the House of Assembly. In October, 1966, the Minister for External Territories introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to amend the Papua and New Guinea Act to make way for the changes.<sup>49</sup> Generally, the Minister accepted

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<sup>47</sup>C. E. Barnes, "Invitation to Select Committee on Constitutional Development," p.7.

<sup>48</sup>Quoted in Territory of New Guinea Annual Report 1966-67, p.20.

<sup>49</sup>Hon. C. E. Barnes, "Changes in Composition of House of

the recommendations of the Select Committee but expressed some reservations relating particularly to the financial powers of the Administrator's Council. He stated:

The principle that the...elected representatives should take an increasing share of responsibility for decisions is accepted by the Government. Arrangements to give practical effect to this principle must, however, pay regard to the ultimate responsibility which must remain finally responsible for example for constitutional arrangements and for decisions on the public service and the machinery of administration. The Australian Government must retain responsibility to this parliament for the way in which the Australian grant is being spent.<sup>50</sup>

In effect, what was to be withheld from the House of Assembly were crucial constitutional powers vitally essential for it to operate in a more meaningful way. Thus, although the Australian government was prepared to consider the Select Committee's recommendations, it was not yet willing to transfer all constitutional and financial powers which would only imperil its position as the ultimate Administrating Authority.

For this position, the Australian government was criticised by many members of the Special Committee on Decolonisation. The gradual transfer of constitutional and financial powers was not fast enough. The representative of Sierra Leone said, for instance, that more rapid progress was necessary for independence to be attained. The Indian

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Assembly," speech moving the second reading of the Papua and New Guinea Bill in the House of Representatives, Canberra, 20 October 1966, in Meeting the Challenge, pp.22-26.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p.25.

representative was gratified by the constitutional developments "but the general progress seemed unduly slow."<sup>51</sup> He pointed out that the Foot recommendation for a one hundred member elected parliament was still not fulfilled. Moreover, since 1964, the powers of the House of Assembly had not been expanded nor given executive powers as the Visiting Mission of 1962 had proposed. He hoped that the Australian government would give favourable consideration to the Select Committee's recommendations as well as consider giving more powers to local government councils to review their budgets without too much interference from the administration. The Chilean representative agreed that the recommendations of the Select Committee and the extension of local government councils "were signs that those territories were rapidly advancing towards self-government and independence."<sup>52</sup> In the full Committee, the Soviet representative not only agreed with the Sub-Committee's conclusion that the implementation of resolution 1514(XV) was "still slow" but that the Administering Power had done "practically nothing" to implement the recommendations of the General Assembly. "Since six of the ten members of the constitutional review committee were Australians including three highly placed colonial officers," he asserted, "it was not surprising that the Committee had

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<sup>51</sup>A/6700/Part 1, p.163.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p.165.

been unable to work out specific measures for bringing the Territory to self-government or to recommend a specific date for the granting of independence."<sup>53</sup>

The recommendations of the Special Committee in 1966 were aimed to a significant extent at increasing the role and powers of Papuans and New Guineans in the political process. The Special Committee urged the Australian government "to take immediate measures whereby the House of Assembly can function as a fully representative and effective body." It recommended that a visiting mission from the Special Committee be invited by the Administering Power to the Territory to assess the political climate and aspirations of the people. It called for the abolition of the special reserved seats in the House of Assembly. The local government councils, the Special Committee recommended should be strengthened "in order to give the population the possibility of exercising self-government in municipal affairs."<sup>54</sup> Partly on the basis of these recommendations, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2227(XXI) on December 20, 1966, with an overwhelming majority of 81-8-24. Australia voted against. Among other things, the resolution called for the removal of "all discriminatory electoral qualifications," the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage "with

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<sup>53</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.160.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p.164.

a view to transferring power to the people of the Territory and again for the fixing of an early date for independence."

These recommendations were not unduly unreasonable and yet, in the 1967 session of Sub-Committee II, the Australian representative categorically rejected them because he claimed that they were not in keeping with the facts.<sup>55</sup> He pointed out that there were no electoral discriminations and that independence was for the people to decide. He also outlined changes envisaged for the House of Assembly. In a speech in late October 1967, the Minister for External Territories informed the House of Representatives about further developments on the recommendations of the Select Committee. He stated:

All the recommendations of the Select Committee are acceptable to the Government with a single exception which is a matter of terminology not of substance. Since the proposed ministerial offices will not be exercising full executive responsibility and authority which is the universal characteristic of those who elsewhere are designated Minister, the Government's view is that it would be misleading to call them Ministers.<sup>56</sup>

Instead, the Minister proposed that they would be called "Ministerial Member" and "Assistant Ministerial Member" but pointed out that this would not imply any reduction in the

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<sup>55</sup>A/6700/Part 1, p.156.

<sup>56</sup>Hon. C. E. Barnes, "Constitutional Development of Papua and New Guinea," Statement in the House of Representatives, Canberra, 26 October 1967, in Planning for Tomorrow: Selected Statements on Papua and New Guinea During 1967 (Canberra: A. J. Arthur, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1967), p.28.

responsibilities and duties which the Select Committee had considered appropriate for them. Whether this applied in actual practice is debatable especially when the "ministerial members" were put in an anomalous position of having to be retained in the new House.<sup>57</sup>

Needless to say, most members of Sub-Committee II questioned the position of Australia on resolution 2227(XXI). The Polish representative, for example, was disappointed that the Administering Power had rejected "the practical methods" of the resolution.<sup>58</sup> He further argued that the Administering Power had failed to supply information to show that the recommendations had been carried out. The Indian representative welcomed the constitutional changes outlined by the Administering Power but they still fell short of the Foot recommendations and resolution 2227(XXI).<sup>59</sup> Both Poland and India were supported by the representative of Sierra Leone who was also disappointed that progress was still slow since the Declaration was not being fully implemented. To them, as to most other members, not only was a target date necessary but a greater devolution of powers from Canberra to Port Moresby and the establishment of fully representative institutions based on adult universal suffrage was also

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<sup>57</sup>"New Guinea Stocktaking," in Current Affairs Bulletin, p.167.

<sup>58</sup>A/6700/Part 1, p.158.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p.163.

essential. On the other hand, the United States representative supported Australia by arguing that the measure of control by Australia was justified until Papua and New Guinea was self-governing. "The essential question was whether the Australian Government used its power to inhibit New Guinea legislation; the Australian representative had presented factual information indicating it had not done so."<sup>60</sup> It was evident, therefore, that by 1967, criticisms aimed at the Administering Power had by no means subsided even though further constitutional changes were being introduced. Partly based on the report of the Special Committee, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2348(XXII) on December 19, 1967, with a vote of 85-16-18. Australia was among the sixteen voting against. Essentially the resolution urged the Administering Power to apply the General Assembly resolutions of 1965 and 1966 without delay.

The last year of Australia's membership in the Special Committee was also probably the most significant year with regard to the political advancement of the Territory. The recommendations of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development resulted in a number of important changes to the House of Assembly.<sup>61</sup> Not only was the member-

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<sup>60</sup>A/6700/Part 1, p.171.

<sup>61</sup>For the major recommendations of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, see Territory of New Guinea Annual Report, 1966-67, p.20. For the recommendations of the Select Committee accepted by the Administering Power, see Barnes, "Constitutional Development of Papua and New Guinea,"

ship to be increased from sixty-four to ninety-four members, but the House of Assembly was given increased powers including provisions for an appointed quasi-ministerial government. Despite the changes, however, the new House of Assembly was still not fully representative although the ten reserved seats for expatriates were now replaced by fifteen regional seats. Of the ninety-four members, ten were appointed official members to represent the administration. The Administrator's Council was renamed the Administrator's Executive Council signifying the fact that it had become for the first time "the principal instrument of policy of the executive government of the Territory." Its membership included the Administrator, three official members, seven Ministerial Members and an additional member nominated by the House. The additional member, an expatriate, subsequently became the Chief Spokesman of the Council--in essence, leader of an embryonic cabinet.

Moreover, by 1968, six political parties had emerged to contest the elections. Hitherto, political parties had been considered to be premature not only by many indigenous people but even by the Administering Power.<sup>62</sup> The results of

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in Planning for Tomorrow, pp.26-29.

<sup>62</sup>Reflecting the government's attitude after the first effective steps to form political parties were taken in 1967, the Minister for External Territories, Mr. C. E. Barnes, told newspapers: "At this stage of its development the Territory would be better off without parties. Parties should form naturally [sic]. They should not be force-fed. However, it is a free country." Quoted in A. L. Epstein, R. S. Parker,

the elections illustrated this feeling clearly when of the parties contesting the elections, only two, the Pangu Party and the All Peoples Progress Party, won seats, gaining twelve and two seats respectively, while the rest of the elected members selected to remain independent members without party affiliations.<sup>63</sup> Of the two parties that won seats, only Pangu chose publicly to play a party role in the House of Assembly becoming in the process the House's Parliamentary Opposition with a leader and policies aimed at seeking early internal self-government for Papua and New Guinea by 1972.<sup>64</sup>

These were positive developments in the direction of the Declaration and in eight years the Administering Power could claim to have achieved substantial progress in political advancement. Apart from the constitutional and political changes, the number of councils by 1968 had grown to 132 covering a total of over 1,750,000 people out of just over 2,000,000. Although there were yet no qualified indigenous lawyers, a scheme started in 1965 had produced twenty-four

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and Marie Reay, eds., The Politics of Dependence: Papua and New Guinea, p.30.

<sup>63</sup>Epstein, Parker and Reay, eds., The Politics of Dependence: Papua and New Guinea. Gives an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the 1968 House of Assembly elections with reference to the performance of party candidates.

<sup>64</sup>After the 1972 House of Assembly elections, the Pangu Party succeeded in forming, with three other parties, the first indigenous-led government in the history of Papua and New Guinea. Pangu is the senior partner in the National Coalition Government.

indigenous magistrates. Since the reconstruction of the Public Service in 1964, the number of indigenous officers had grown to 7,747. At the same time, in 1965, the Minister for External Territories had appointed a committee of five members (four from the House of Assembly and a fifth from his own department), "to examine the Territory's Public Service and to report on what changes, if any, should be made consequent upon constitutional and other changes that occurred in the Territory; and to consider ways and means of accelerating advancement of local officers to positions in the public service."<sup>65</sup> Consequently, it was decided to abolish the dual salary classification and all future positions were to be based on local officer salary structure but with expatriate allowances paid separately as well as equal pay for women. A Public Service Board recommended by the Committee and which had previously been suggested by, among others, the Foot Mission, was to be set up to manage and administer public service affairs.

For the most part, these developments were welcomed by the eighth United Nations Visiting Mission to New Guinea in 1968. The changes were seen more as long overdue and not dramatic changes to be showered with laudatory commendation in the form of a resolution from the United Nations. If resolution 2427(XXIII) was any indication, then the prevail-

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<sup>65</sup>A/A.C. 109/L. 492, paragraph 54.

ing feeling was that the Administering Power still had not yet fully implemented the provisions of resolution 1514(XV) and other relevant resolutions. Adopted by the General Assembly with a convincing vote of 72-19-24, resolution 2427(XXIII) made two major recommendations: to fix an early date for self-determination and to hold free elections under United Nations supervision on the basis of adult universal suffrage in order that more effective power might be transferred to representatives of Papua and New Guinea.

However, to suggest that the resolution 2427(XXIII) reflected only the anti-colonial critics would not be entirely fair to the 1968 United Nations Visiting Mission which was comprised of Mr. J. M. McEwan (New Zealand) as Chairman, Mr. P. H. Gaschignard (France), Mr. W. P. Allen (U.K.), and Mr. A. Caine (Liberia). In spite of the fact that there was a majority of representatives of the Administering Powers, the Mission not only came to some of the strongest conclusions on the Territory but also made some of the most extensive recommendations.<sup>66</sup> Like the 1965 Visiting Mission, it found three years later that a sense of nationhood had still not developed in Papua and New Guinea to any marked degree. Toward this end, it recommended that agreement on a national flag, a national anthem and a single name for the two terri-

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<sup>66</sup>For a summary of the Mission's recommendations, see United Nations Information Centre, Trusteeship Council: Recommendations on New Guinea, 1968, 1969, 1970 (Port Moresby: Papua and New Guinea Printing Co. Pty. Ltd., 1970), pp.11-22.

tories was essential. In addition, it suggested constructive programmes of public education through the media should be undertaken by the House of Assembly and the Administering Power "to instil in the people a sense of nationhood."<sup>67</sup>

Furthermore, although the constitutional changes were welcomed by the Mission it felt that the members of the House of Assembly had been "a little timid in their approach to constitutional progress." It added, "It is the view of the Mission that until the elected representatives have a more positive role in financial matters there can be little real growth of responsibility."<sup>68</sup> It attributed the lack of financial responsibility to the reluctance of the Australian government to surrender financial powers to the House of Assembly. Nor was the Mission too impressed with the continuing heavy reliance on Canberra for policies:

The Mission received the impression that matters within generally established policy are still required to be referred to Canberra for decision and that the Administration does not have the scope to exercise its discretion and initiative. Similarly, at the district level, the Mission noted that officials feel obliged to refer to Port Moresby questions including day-to-day problems which could be better left for decision at the district level, given its more intimate knowledge of local conditions.<sup>69</sup>

It therefore proposed a greater decentralization of the political and administrative machinery and less control from

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<sup>67</sup>United Nations Information Centre, Trusteeship Council: Recommendations on New Guinea, 1968, 1969, 1970, p.12.

<sup>68</sup>T/1678, paragraph 143.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., paragraph 157.

Canberra. It endorsed the 1965 Visiting Mission's recommendations for elected municipal and district institutions to fill the gap between the House of Assembly and local government councils. As to the Public Service, it approved of the government's decision to set up a Public Service Board but suggested a fixed date for no new expatriate officers to be appointed. Even though magistrates were being trained, it was imperative for the judiciary to have more indigenous fully qualified and trained officers.

The Special Committee on Decolonisation did not consider Papua and New Guinea in 1968 "due to lack of time." In the light of General Assembly resolution 2427 (XXIII) and the report of the Visiting Mission, however, it would be superfluous to conjecture where most of the Special Committee stood at this critical stage of the Territory's political development. To them, progress was never too fast. To the contrary, it was always "too slow." But from early February 1969, Australia would not have to face them across the table any more in her capacity as a member to hear what had become an over-used and uncompromising commonplace.

## CHAPTER IV

### ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT

"Economic policy," declared the Australian administration in 1960, "aims at developing the resources of the Territory to provide a rising standard of living for the whole population and ultimately to create a viable economy." It added, "In the achievement of this objective all sections of the community, especially the indigenous people, are encouraged to play their part."<sup>1</sup> This policy underlined two crucial aspects of the Australian government's overall attitude towards independence. Firstly, it was believed that preparedness towards self-determination must take in to account the extent to which economic viability was feasible. Secondly, it was believed that economic viability could only be achieved through the encouragement of a multi-racial society in which the indigenous people would not necessarily mingle with the expatriates but would work with them in partnership. This, of course, was evident in political advancement as in other fields of development. The reasons were not hard to see. The paucity of indigenous capital and

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<sup>1</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report, 1960-61, p.53.  
(Emphasis my own.)

skilled personnel rendered it necessary to rely to a considerable extent on overseas capital and personnel. But this was only part of the problem. By 1960, Papua and New Guinea also relied very heavily on financial grants from the Australian government. In the financial year from June 1960 to June 1961, this reached a new high of over \$29,000,000 accounting for over 70 per cent of the total administration working budget. Internal revenue increased over the previous year but still only accounted for less than one-third of the Territory's budget. The rest was made up for by capital outlays incurred by Commonwealth departments operating in the Territory, and by loan. The problems were further exacerbated by a terribly precarious imbalance in trade with imports outstripping exports. These problems continued to exist in the period under study.

By 1960, therefore, control and ownership of the economy was largely in the hands of expatriates and the Administering Power. Indigenous participation in the economy was growing but still only meagrely, not only in terms of ownership and control but also in terms of their contribution towards internal revenue and exports. The economy continued to be based essentially on agricultural products while the majority of Papuans and New Guineans were engaged primarily in subsistence farming. The main exports were copra, cocoa, coffee and rubber. Gold had been a major earning export but never again reached its production peak after World War II.

Basically, then, the economic policy was the government's version of the orthodox laissez-faire philosophy grafted to an essentially Third World situation with foreign investors and the government playing the leading role while the indigenous people were being introduced putatively into the mechanics of the system according to the Hasluck policy of gradual development. In short, it was an economic situation still resonant of nineteenth century imperialism where for the most part, the major exports were produced by foreign investors for markets in the Western World while the most significant contribution of the indigenous people remained that of providing unskilled and cheap plantation labour.<sup>2</sup>

One of the basic principles of resolution 1514(XV) stated among other things that the inadequacy of economic preparedness "should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." At the same time, in his major policy statement of 1960, Mr. Paul Hasluck described at some length the government's achievements in the economic infra-structure, in the growth of trade, in the encouragement of co-operatives and cash-cropping and in the increasing number of trained indigenous personnel.<sup>3</sup> But there was no sign that Australia would relinquish her position in the Territory in favour of independence. One of the main reasons was that despite the

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<sup>2</sup>Hank Nelson, Papua New Guinea: Black Unity or Black Chaos? (Blackburn, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1972), p.90.

<sup>3</sup>Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea," pp.5-6.

achievements of the government, the Territory was still by all possible economic indicators simply economically backward. Mr. Hasluck's statement, of course, was made in the wake of external pressures. So was the famous public announcement by the Prime Minister in the same year. Although the Prime Minister's statement did not have any immediate effect on government policy towards economic advancement, the sense of urgency which it engendered coupled with the aftermath of resolution 1514(XV) drew public debate over the whole question of economic preparedness.

In a series of lectures on the prerequisites for The Independence of Papua and New Guinea at the Australian National University in 1961, the question of economic viability was dwelled upon by two prominent Australian economists from the same institution.<sup>4</sup> Both contended with varying qualifications that some degree of economic viability was necessary for independence to be effective and meaningful. E. K. Fisk stated that by a viable economy, he meant an economy "that is sufficiently independent to be able to refuse external aid without catastrophic economic and social consequences if the terms on which that aid is offered are politically unacceptable."<sup>5</sup> He further suggested that the goal of economic viability could not be reached without

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<sup>4</sup>The Independence of Papua and New Guinea, chapters II and IV.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.25.

massive external aid. He argued, therefore, that not only was Australian aid essential but the attraction of foreign investment was also necessary for the exploitation of the Territory's natural resources. Professor J. G. Crawford (now Sir John) concurred with these views but he also recognized the importance of external pressures. Not that he considered it a threat to the Australian position but he urged that neither should the Australian government be entirely aloof from its repercussions. In order to forestall these repercussions, Professor Crawford emphasised three main propositions: the need for economic planning, the need for greater indigenous participation in the decision-making process and the economy, and the acceptance of foreign aid from sources other than Australia and Particularly from the United Nations.<sup>6</sup> In doing so, Professor Crawford further stressed that the act of self-determination would take place not when economic viability was achieved but when the political machinery and the economic structure had been built up to a stage where the indigenous people would have a greater degree of participation. Thus, both E. K. Fisk and Professor J. G. Crawford

detached economic viability or readiness from the unconscious assumption, which lay behind much official and unofficial consideration of Papua-New Guinea, that these words meant somehow self-sufficiency of independence of any external aid, and doing so they

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<sup>6</sup>The Independence of Papua and New Guinea, p.64.

helped to produce a shift in the thinking which had tied any political progress automatically to economic readiness.<sup>7</sup>

In the vicissitudes of the time, the shift in official thinking was desirable not merely to placate the anti-colonial critics but since there was a real and urgent need for it as the Foot Mission of 1962 pointed out.

One of the major recommendations of the Foot Report was for an economic survey of the Territory's resources with a view of preparing a balanced development plan.<sup>8</sup> The Mission further recommended to the Australian government that the World Bank should be invited to carry out this survey. Consequently, the Australian government accepted the proposal and in 1963, the World Bank dispatched a team of experts. It was composed of Kenneth R. Iverson as Chairman and included experts on agricultural production, education, industry, mining and power, livestock, public health, transport, and communications. The ten members of the team came from six countries while four of them were from the permanent staff of the World Bank and one borrowed from the World Health Organisation. Spending from June to September 1963 in the Territory and Australia, the World Bank Mission presented a draft report to the Australian government in June 1964. "The basic objective of the Mission, as agreed by the

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<sup>7</sup>West in Greenwood and Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965, p.447.

<sup>8</sup>T/1597, p.134.

Government and the Bank," stated the Report, "was to undertake a general review of the economic potentialities of the Territory and to make recommendations to assist the Australian government in planning a development program designed to expand and stimulate the economy and thereby raise the standard of living of the people."<sup>9</sup> More importantly, this objective was to be carried out with the prime purpose of aiding the Territory towards achieving economic viability and independence.

The Mission proposed a development plan initially covering the five year period from 1964 to 1969. It laid the greatest emphasis on the expansion of the agricultural and forestry sectors of the economy not only because they were the most important areas of the economy but they were also areas with the greatest potential for substantial economic growth within the five year period.<sup>10</sup> The international markets, the Mission believed, were good for all major crops except coffee. There were good prospects for such new crops as tea and pyrethrum. In forestry, it was believed that the industry was not only capable of expansion but that the market for export was promising. The Mission stressed, however, that for this expansion to take place, the need for trained

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<sup>9</sup>International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p.vii. (Hereafter to be known as the World Bank Report.)

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.32.

and skilled staff, in both the indigenous and expatriate sectors were absolutely essential. It recommended, therefore, that such incentives as land availability and tax concessions would be necessary to induce more expatriates to the Territory to assist in the execution of the proposed development plan. At the end of the plan, it was estimated that the export earnings would double and economic growth substantially increase.<sup>11</sup>

The Mission's report stated:

The Mission also believes that with education and training the indigene can be motivated and is capable of taking an expanding role in the economy and in government. But the molding of the indigene and the resources into a modern economy will not be an easy task. It will take great effort. It will be expensive. It will take time.<sup>12</sup>

Thus it was obvious that for meaningful indigenous participation, education was not only essential but urgent. This problem, the Mission suggested, could be stepped up with the expansion particularly of secondary, technical and higher education. This would involve making available a full elementary education at the fastest rate possible for the expansion of secondary and technical education and the establishment of higher education at the tertiary level. But this programme, the Mission recommended further, should be accompanied by the concentration of effort by the government, the

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<sup>11</sup>West in Greenwood and Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965, p.461.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p.31.

selection of standards suitable to the Territory and the need to foster greater responsibility among the people.<sup>13</sup>

In the first instance, the Mission felt that to obtain the maximum benefit from the developmental effort, expenditures and manpower should be concentrated in areas and activities where the prospective return was highest. Although it realised the political factors involved, the Mission in essence was proposing a set of priorities as an alternative to what it called "across-the-board policy" which distributed scarce manpower and finance throughout the Territory regardless of the benefits they would derive. The Mission was particularly critical of the escalating expenditures on programmes such as health and on general administrative costs which could be curbed to make available more money to more prospective programmes. To help achieve this goal, standards appropriate to the Territory should be applied whereby administrative facilities and services, wages and salaries should be related to what the Territory could afford from its own resources in the long run. The Mission was disturbed about the continuing policy of the government to construct facilities such as houses, hospitals and courthouses which would likely be beyond the means of an independent Papua and New Guinea. It stressed, therefore, that the use of local building materials would be necessary for any substantial savings

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<sup>13</sup>West in Greenwood and Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965, p.35.

in the expenditures. Thirdly, the Mission was of the view that the government had been following a largely benevolent and paternalistic approach towards the indigenous people. A shift in emphasis towards giving greater responsibilities to the indigenous people was therefore needed. This could be done by granting more responsibilities to local government councils and the establishment of urban government, in such matters as education, health, road construction and other services so that they could become more self-supporting and self-sufficient. Payment in kind in the government and the private sector should be replaced gradually by the payment of full cash wages. Greater responsibilities should also be assumed by the indigenous people towards meeting the costs of education and health services.

These recommendations, however, were subject to certain limitations. One of the greatest barriers to development, the Mission concluded, was the land tenure system.<sup>14</sup> In Papua and New Guinea land tenure is by and large based on group rather than individual ownership. This not only made the demarcation of land ownership difficult but also inhibited the extent to which land could be utilised for industrial or commercial purposes. As such the Mission urged the Administering Power to press on with the objective of determining and registering individual titles. The Mission

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<sup>14</sup>World Bank Report, p.39.

suggested, however, that the greater responsibility of ascertaining land rights should be left to the people and local government councils. But since more land was needed, the Mission suggested that the government acquire more land to be made available on a leasehold basis and stipulate conditions for the improvement of land already held by expatriates. Moreover, for the programme to be effective it would be essential to have skilled manpower; but it was also essential to reorganise the administration's departments formulating and executing the policies. Credit and banking facilities must be provided for both the indigenous and expatriate sectors of the economy. Towards this end the Mission recommended the creation of a Development Bank and a Territory Development Finance Company to provide credits for the development programme on terms and conditions which met the requirements.<sup>15</sup> Hitherto, all banking and credit facilities were provided for by Australian banks and other financial institutions whose lending policies were geared not towards conditions in the Territory but towards conditions in Australia. This hardly made it conducive to the indigenous people with little capital or skills to meet the conditions when applying for credit.

In any event, the five year programme was estimated to cost the Australian government money absolutely unheard

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<sup>15</sup>World Bank Report, p.381.

of before. One observer even wondered if the Australian government could do it alone, in which case he suggested that if the programme were to be successful, not only should the Federal Government be involved but the state government as well.<sup>16</sup> Of the projected \$502,150,000 for the first five year period, local revenue would supply \$138,100,000 and the Commonwealth Government and public borrowing about \$364,050,000 or about 72.5 per cent of the total.<sup>17</sup> In view of the Mission's emphasis on the agricultural and forestry sectors, another observer wondered if in the light of fluctuating prices for most of the commodities on the world market, the prospects for market prices were all that good. This could only be seen when the plan began to have any impact on the economy which could only be seen in the long run. In fact, the effects of the programme he maintained, would not be felt till the early 1970's.<sup>18</sup> These observations were, of course, made on the assumption that the proposed five year programme was in the best interest of the Territory and its people. Not everyone agreed with this assumption. One critic reviewing the plan criticised it for not adequately treating the political and social implications inherent in

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<sup>16</sup>Eric Russell, "Can Australia Do It?", New Guinea, I, 3 (September/October 1965), 47.

<sup>17</sup>West in Greenwood and Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1961-1965, p.462.

<sup>18</sup>R. T. Shand, "Trade Prospects for the Rural Sector," in Fisk, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold, p.80.

its effects.<sup>19</sup> To him, the Mission's emphasis on the greater involvement of expatriates in the plan was contradictory to the Mission's emphasis on greater indigenous participation in the economy. Nevertheless, in May 1965, the Minister for External Territories announced in the House of Representatives that the government endorsed the objective of the Mission's programme, accepted the proposed production programme as a working basis for planning and accepted numerous other proposals in the report as guides for policy and action.<sup>20</sup> For the first time, economic planning received close attention unprecedented in the history of the Territory and what was once an anathema to the Australian government because of its socialist tendencies, became an accepted concept to be adopted and implemented. Although the proposed plan was able to cover the period from 1964 to 1969, the first formal five year development plan was not introduced until 1967 to cover the second five year period.<sup>21</sup>

In 1964, Sub-Committee II was informed by the Australian representative, Mr. J. D. McCarthy that not only had an economic survey been carried out by the World Bank on the recommendation of the Foot Report but that its report was

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<sup>19</sup>Bernard Schaffer, "Thoughts at Goroka," New Guinea, I, 2 (June/July 1965), 72.

<sup>20</sup>Barnes, The Years Ahead, p.3.

<sup>21</sup>Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Programmes and Policies for the Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea (Port Moresby: V. P. Bloink, Government Printer, 1968). (Hereafter known as The Five Year Plan.)

being given "serious consideration" by his government.<sup>22</sup> In fact, throughout the period under study, the Australian government laid considerable emphasis on the World Bank Report before the Special Committee. This was significant because it was a survey carried out at the recommendation of the United Nations through the Foot Report. It was also significant because it divulged the increasing amenability of the Australian government to heed outside advice. Moreover, where economic preparedness was a matter of great importance to the Administering Power in achieving the objectives of resolution 1514(XV), the emphasis on the report was a good diplomatic instrument especially since it received approval from most members of the Special Committee. It became apparent, however, during those four years, that most members were not going to be convinced merely by reports and figures about the efforts of the Australian government to improve economic conditions in the Territory. The fact that between 1964 and 1968 virtually all resolutions adopted on Papua and New Guinea by the Special Committee would conclude that overall progress was "still slow" would bear out this point.

There were several economic questions that most members of the Special Committee were continually concerned about. A vexing question that had posed difficult problems for the Administering Power and which received close attention

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<sup>22</sup>A/AC.109/PV.309, p.6.

from the 1962, 1965 and 1968 Visiting Missions and the World Bank Mission, was land. It was a matter that kept coming up in the Special Committee. But it was also a matter for which the Administering Power was commended. In 1964, the Australian representative pointed out that only 2.46 per cent of the entire land area in the Territory had been alienated from the indigenous owners. He further pointed out that of this proportion, "a substantial part had been acquired by the Government for public purposes and for the establishment of facilities of common benefit to all people of the Territory."<sup>23</sup> What was never mentioned was that the 2.46 per cent also included some of the best arable land in the Territory used largely for the establishment of huge coconut, cocoa, coffee and rubber plantations, owned and operated for the most part by expatriates. Considering the ruggedness of the country and the acute shortage of land in some areas resulting from rapidly growing populations, arable land for agricultural purposes was vital to the survival of indigenous subsistence farmers. It was also an important factor in the redress of social and political grievances emerging as a result of what was often construed by various indigenous groups to be unfair and misguided alienation of land in the past. Because of this lack of total disclosure of facts by the Administering Power, it was invariably prone

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<sup>23</sup>A/AC.109/PV.309, p2.

to allegations of 'exploitation' from members of the Special Committee.

By 1968 the question of land ownership was a question still largely unresolved as the 1968 Visiting Mission indicated.<sup>24</sup> This was despite the fact that a Land Board and Demarcation Committees had been set up to probe the whole question of land tenure. It was disclosed to Subcommittee II in 1964 by the Australian representative that indigenous members would be appointed to the Board. This appeared more as a token gesture than a genuine attempt to let the indigenous people have a greater say in a question which was largely for them to resolve, as the World Bank had clearly advocated. In view of the government's policy to encourage individual ownership of land which was distinctly contrary to customary practices in Papua and New Guinea, it was not surprising that the Administration was anxious to see to it that individual tenure would be expedited consciously as a matter of policy without examining the social and political implications. Legislation to enable individual titles to land had been introduced in the Legislative Council in September 1962.<sup>25</sup>

One of the most salient issues emanating from the 1960 and 1961 debates on the Declaration related to the

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<sup>24</sup>United Nations, Trusteeship Council: Recommendations on New Guinea 1968, 1969, 1970, p.18.

<sup>25</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report 1962-1963, p.59.

allegation that the territories and their peoples were being exploited by the Administering Powers for their own economic aggrandizement and not for the benefit of the colonial peoples. This argument was pushed most fervently in classic Marxist-Leninist terms by the Soviet Bloc. Thus it was not at all surprising that this argument would quite frequently permeate the Special Committee. In the 1964 session of the Committee, for instance, the Soviet Union accused Australian companies in Papua and New Guinea of exploiting the Territory and its people.<sup>26</sup> This was done, they further asserted, through cheap labour provided for by the indigenous people. Those companies that were especially guilty of these malpractices included the three largest trading companies in the Territory--Burns Philp, Steamships and Carpenters. In their view, most of the Territory's budget went towards the upkeep of Australians in the Territory and not the indigenous people. As well, the Soviet representative alleged that the only crops grown in the Territory were crops not grown in Australia.

The response of the Australian delegate is worth quoting for it illustrates clearly the sensitive position in which the Administering Power often found itself throughout the period:

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<sup>26</sup>A/AC.109/PV.308, p.28.

But these companies, in all their operations, are very carefully watched and very carefully controlled in many respects by the Government and the Administration and these companies at the same time are putting a great deal into the Territory.<sup>27</sup>

He further claimed that his government was already trying to develop cash crops, to diversify the economy and was co-operating with the World Bank in establishing businesses in the Territory. Australia was supported by the United States delegate.

The Administering Authority was making notable efforts to diversify agriculture and to ensure, generally, that when Papua and New Guinea become politically independent they would not be economically dependent.<sup>28</sup>

These statements demonstrate two fundamental aspects of the debate on the colonial question. Firstly, at least superficially the Soviet allegations can be dismissed as mere anti-capitalist Marxist rhetoric. The simple fact, however, was that similar arguments, although more moderate semantically, were raised by other members of the Special Committee whether or not they were socialist states. On the other hand, for the Australian government as for the United States, economic development was viewed from a pragmatic approach where foreign investment was necessary for development if economic viability was to be achieved. Moreover, where indigenous capital was scarce, it was necessary to generate domestic capital accumulation.

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<sup>27</sup>A/AC. 109/PV. 308, pp.13-15.

<sup>28</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 98/Add. 1-3, p.4.

Yet, it was also a palpable fact that economic policy in Papua and New Guinea was by no means without pitfalls. Essentially, most anti-colonial critics were concerned not merely with the acceleration of economic advancement but, more importantly, with the extent to which the indigenous people were participating in the process. And although the Administering Power made it explicit to the Special Committee that it was already implementing some of the recommendations of the World Bank Report and considering others, it was revealed by the 1965 United Nations Visiting Mission that the Australian government had not endorsed all the conclusions of the report. It stated further that the conclusions of the World Bank had coincided "with the wishes frequently expressed by the inhabitants."<sup>29</sup> It supported both reports of the World Bank and Foot Missions in advocating balanced planning and urged:

...the subsistence economy will have to be transformed to the greatest extent possible into a market economy and the indigenous inhabitants will have to be given greater encouragement to play an effective part in the development of the Territory.

Means should be sought to ensure that a fair share of the profits made by external investments to be reinvested in the Territory as recommended by the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-first session, and that New Guineans be invited to acquire shares in foreign companies in the Territory.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, it was evident from the Visiting

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<sup>29</sup>T/1646, paragraph 256.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., paragraph 260.

Mission's report and from the report of the Administering Power that by most economic indices, progress was being achieved in increasing the training of Papuans and New Guineans, in the encouragement of indigenous participation in the economy, in the diversification of economic activities, in increasing both the Australian grant and public expenditures and in the attempt to narrow the trade deficit. In accordance with the World Bank recommendations, an economic adviser was appointed in October, 1965. In November, the House of Assembly passed a bill to establish a Development Bank.<sup>31</sup> The Bank was to be controlled and managed by a Board of Directors including representatives of the indigenous producers. These developments were welcomed by members of the Special Committee but with some reservations.

Thus the representative of Sierra Leone said that while the percentage of labour potential was still low, he hoped that the development of new industries would lead to rapid increase in employment.<sup>32</sup> The Indian delegate welcomed the appointment of an economic adviser and the creation of a Development Bank but also expressed concern about the continuing reliance on Australia. "The Administering Power," said the Indian delegate, "had an obligation to reduce the economic dependence of the Territories and, to that end, to

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<sup>31</sup>For other recommendations of the World Bank Mission accepted by the Administering Power, see The Five Year Plan, p.2.

<sup>32</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, paragraph 130.

provide the development of local manufacturing industries and employ a larger proportion of the adult male indigenous population."<sup>33</sup> At the same time, the Soviet Union charged in the full Committee that the economic situation in the Territory was still "discouraging." He asserted that the Australian government was using figures to deceive and cover up the deficiencies in economic policies.<sup>34</sup> These charges were repudiated by the Administering Power.

If there was one thing clear by 1966 it was that the Australian government was more willing to consider external advice on economic matters but quite often only if it came from expert and authoritative sources such as the World Bank Mission and the Visiting Missions. In 1967, Sub-Committee II was informed by the Australian representative that his government was now accepting aid from the United Nations Development Programme and from specialised agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO.<sup>35</sup> This development was specially significant since previously Australia would rather "go it alone" than accept external aid for the Territory from other sources. But this was not all. The Australian representative further outlined the economic progress that had been achieved

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<sup>33</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, paragraph 171.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., paragraph 157.

<sup>35</sup>A/6700/Add. 13, paragraph 156.

especially in diversifying the economy. Manufacturing industries continued to be of minor though of growing significance. Special taxation concessions were provided to encourage the establishment of new industries, and complete exemption from Territory income taxes was to be granted to companies engaging in approved new pioneer industries for their first five to six years of operation. In 1967 also, another mission of the World Bank arrived in the Territory "to examine current development projects, some of which about to qualify for loans from the Bank or its affiliate, the International Development Association."<sup>36</sup> These developments were impressive and the Special Committee, by and large, endorsed them although not generally acknowledged in the Committee's resolutions.

A number of significant events also took place in 1967. On July 6, the Development Bank was formally inaugurated. In his opening address, the Minister for External Territories, Mr. C. E. Barnes, not only stressed the achievements of the government and its role in the economy but also stressed the increasing role played by the indigenous people. He stated:

The Administration's role in this process is to provide expert guidance and encouragement to both expatriate and indigenous private enterprise. It acts through agricultural research and extension services, through the provision of basic needs

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<sup>36</sup>A/6700/Add. 13, paragraph 144.

such as roads, communications and electric power, and through taxation and other incentives. The Administration also aims by its financial and economic policies to create a climate favourable to private initiative and investment.<sup>37</sup>

It was interesting, however, that the government was gradually modifying its views on economic development. In the same statement, Mr. Barnes announced that for the Territory to have more effective participation in the economy, the government was securing a 20 per cent equity in Conzinc Rio Tinto, a gigantic Australian mining company about to embark on a multi-million dollar copper project on Bougainville. The government had also purchased a 50 per cent equity in a new oil palm industry to be established by Harrison and Crossfield, a British firm, on New Britain. This new policy involvement was to be extended to other industries as the opportunities arose. Apart from these developments, other industries that had been or were being set up included a new tea industry in the Highlands and the expansion of the cattle and tourist industries. A new Five Year Plan to cover the period from 1967/1968 to 1972/1973 was also approved by the House of Assembly that year. These developments were again outlined in the House of Representatives by the Minister for External Territories in a speech on the Budget Debate, in which he stated, among other things, that the value of exports had doubled in ten years.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Barnes, Planning for Tomorrow, p.11.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p.23.

Although the Special Committee did not consider Papua and New Guinea in 1968, economic development in the Territory was further attested to by the United Nations Visiting Mission of that year.<sup>39</sup> The Australian grant to the Territory for the financial year ending June 30, 1968, had increased to over \$A77,000,000 from \$A56,000,000 for the financial year ending June 30, 1964. Internal revenue had also risen accordingly. The Mission reported that the balance of payments had been improving and the Gross National Product (excluding the subsistence sector) had been enjoying a 12 per cent growth rate for the previous three years. Exports were found to be increasing at a rate of 8.8 per cent per annum, and in the timber industry growing by 12 per cent per year. The number of wage earners had grown to 123,000 by 1967 although the majority of the indigenous people were still subsistence farmers. But despite these developments, the Mission also made a number of recommendations towards the objective of increasing indigenous participation and surmounting a number of problems that were still hampering economic development including the land tenure question.<sup>40</sup>

In effect, therefore, economic advancement in Papua and New Guinea by 1968 was by no means "slow." Nor was it by any means adequate to achieve economic viability. Never-

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<sup>39</sup>T/1678, paragraphs 72-88.

<sup>40</sup>Summary of recommendations on economic advancement in United Nations, Trusteeship Council: Recommendations on New Guinea 1968, 1969, 1970, pp.17-19.

theless, the means to achieve this goal had been set and were being improved all the time. The direction of economic policy had undergone profound change since 1960 and this could be ascribed to a substantial degree to the World Bank Mission. But the part played by the Visiting Missions was also important. The part played by the Administering Power was considerable. At the same time, although the Special Committee tended to be more critical in its deliberations, its contribution towards spurring on the Administering Power to speed up economic advancement was not altogether insignificant.

## CHAPTER V

### SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT

This chapter will be focussed primarily on two crucial social issues: racial discrimination and education in New Guinea. More than any other aspects of social advancement, these two issues were of greater concern to the Special Committee.

At the same time, it was during the period under examination that considerable progress was achieved in such areas as health and the trade union movement. Indeed, the health programme had made such impressive progress that even to the 1968 United Nations Visiting Mission, the success of health services was "everywhere apparent."<sup>1</sup> In fact, the major problem with the health programme related not to the extent of its success but to the amount of money being expended on it. Both the Foot and World Bank Missions had wondered if the standard particularly of hospitals would not impose too heavy a burden in recurrent expenditure on the Territory's financial resources in the future. Yet, although health services were being improved substantially, the main diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis were still endemic.

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<sup>1</sup>T/1678, paragraph 302.

The most staggering result of the health programme, however, arose basically out of the increasing upsurge in the birth-rate. It had not yet caused a national crisis but already it was causing acute demographic problems in some parts of the Territory. With regard to the trade union movement, some members of the Special Committee had expressed concern at the lack of encouragement of the trade union movement. To remedy this situation, action was taken in 1965 by approving legislation to establish the rights of employers and employees in industrial relations. Hence, New Guineans were enabled for the first time to form trade unions and to conduct industrial bargaining with their employers for better working conditions and better wages despite strong opposition from the business community which was of the view that trade unions were uncalled for.<sup>2</sup>

Denominational bodies and their adherents had also grown considerably throughout the Territory during this period. However, by and large their adherents were caught in a predicament where they were being persuaded to become Christians on the one hand, while on the other, they tenaciously held onto their traditional magico-religious beliefs. At least nominally the number of indigenous Christians had risen to an impressive figure of about one and a half million in 1968 out of a total population of just over

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<sup>2</sup>David Bettison, "The Expatriates," New Guinea, I, 6 (June/July 1966), 66.

two million. Wage earners were also growing numerically, although the majority of them were still unskilled. The status of women was changing in spite of the fact that their traditional roles in society were still deeply rooted.

Racial discrimination has perhaps been the most trenchant social issue permeating the discussion of decolonisation ever since the formative years of the United Nations. It has engendered a number of important resolutions including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its elimination was again stressed emphatically by resolution 1514(XV). With regard to New Guinea, it was an issue that invariably came up in the Special Committee during the period under study and about which the Administering Power has become more sensitive, particularly in the last decade.

Australia has become more conscious of the question not merely because of its significance in the United Nations, but also as an Administering Power she has become more wary about being linked closely with the white majority regimes of Southern Africa.<sup>3</sup> The expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961 relieved in many ways the anxiety of many Commonwealth countries including Australia to purge the association of the last vestiges of institutional racism albeit the Rhodesian question was still unresolved to

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<sup>3</sup>Geoffrey Sawer and W. J. Hudson, "The United Nations," in Greenwood and Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965, p.239.

a large extent. But the fact that the White Australia Policy remained a landmark of Australian immigration policy did not lessen the suspicion that many anti-colonial critics had towards her colonial policies in her territories. In New Guinea, there was no question that racial discrimination still existed despite the pronouncement by the Administering Power that "all elements of the population are secure in the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms with no discrimination as to race, sex, language and religion...."<sup>4</sup> It was not so humiliating while the majority of New Guineans were illiterate and inarticulate, but the growing number of educated indigenous people, especially in the period under discussion, led inevitably to rising resentment towards such practices. In fact, the Foot Mission attested to the problem its greatest disapproval in its report. One of the most consistent subjects raised at the meetings the Mission attended was the desire of the people of New Guinea "to see all types of discrimination alienated."<sup>5</sup> Towards this end, the Mission was of the opinion that there should be no discrimination whatever on the basis of colour.

As a result, shortly before the Foot Mission left the Territory, the Administering Power announced that it would set up a Commission to review liquor restrictions and

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<sup>4</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report 1960/1961, p.103.

<sup>5</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, paragraph 106.

to recommend any changes. Up until then, New Guineans were legally prohibited from the consumption of any form of alcohol. Later that year, the Commission recommended that liquor restrictions be rescinded and, consequently, liquor was made available to the indigenous people for the first time towards the end of 1962. Of course, this was only one issue which the administration took prompt action to abolish. Other issues such as wage discrimination and conditions of employment could not be resolved easily. But there were other social matters where legislative action was subsequently taken culminating in the adoption by the Legislative Council of the Discrimination Ordinance in 1963. Consequently, racial discrimination in such places as cinemas, clubs and housing was outlawed. This did not mean, however, that racial discrimination was therefore completely alleviated from these areas. In fact, to some extent more subtle forms of discrimination in public places were attempted.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the concern of the Special Committee for the elimination of racial discrimination in the Territory was quite legitimate although at times the basis upon which charges of racial discrimination were made by members was not valid. In some cases it appeared hard for the members of the Special Committee to comprehend the social realities in the Territory since there was only scanty mention of them

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<sup>6</sup>D. G. Bettison, "The Expatriate Community," in Fisk, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold, p.224.

in the working papers prepared by the Secretariat and the reports submitted by the Administering Power. This lack of information resulted in suggestions especially in the early years from members like Chile that there should be "more complete information" provided on social conditions in the Territory.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, however, this was not entirely fair since the annual reports submitted to the United Nations and reports of the Visiting Missions did provide substantial information about social conditions in New Guinea. Of course, there were always reservations about how much and to what extent should information transmitted by the Administering Power be accepted as prima facie evidence of social conditions or of any other conditions in the Territory.

Nevertheless, in the first session of Sub-Committee II, several members saw fit to make laudatory remarks on the racial situation in the Territory. The Indian representative was gratified "to note the absence of racial friction in the Territory and that the Australian government, with the cooperation of the people was aiming at a multi-racial society."<sup>8</sup> The delegate of Sierra Leone was even more complimentary when he said that although the wage structure and the working conditions created inequalities, "the absence of racial

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<sup>7</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.9.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.5.

strife and discrimination and the maintenance of equal justice and opportunity for all could serve as an example to the other Colonial Powers of the world."<sup>9</sup> These remarks reflected to some degree the acceptance of the Australian administration's policy of creating a multi-racial society and the elimination, at least legally, of all discriminatory restrictions. Whether these policies meant "the absence of racial discrimination" is, of course, highly questionable. It was even less credible when in Australia itself, the White Australia Policy stood guard against all colours not white.

In any event, the 1965 United Nations Visiting Mission, for instance, observed that although some causes of racial discrimination had been lifted, "social clubs, in the Territory appeared to be composed in each instance of a single group of persons, either expatriates, indigenous persons, or persons of mixed race."<sup>10</sup> It also reported that a large number of complaints were heard relating to the disparities in public housing, in which case it recommended to the Administering Power that it review its policy to ensure that there was no discrimination in housing available to expatriates and indigenous public service employees.<sup>11</sup> Yet,

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<sup>9</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 136/Add. 3, p.12.

<sup>10</sup>T/1646, paragraph 284.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., paragraph 341.

under Territory circumstances, these disparities were unavoidable although not necessarily desirable. They were unavoidable largely because of the cultural and economic differences between the metropolitan power and the Territory. Not only did the standard of living of expatriates in the Territory have to be adjusted to conditions in Australia but also with it adjustments of salaries and conditions of employment. This situation was even more accentuated by the fact that the economy was by and large in the hands of expatriates. This raised a number of questions about the assumptions behind the policy of creating a multi-racial society. Could a multi-racial society really be viable in view of these great economic and social disparities? Could an expatriate minority that was largely white with a high rate of conspicuous consumption and economic power be integrated successfully with a black majority that was by and large subsistent without much economic power and with social conditions vastly different from those of expatriates? It was in relation to this anomalous situation that charges of racial discrimination transpired from the Special Committee. The situation was even more vulnerable when the white minority was also personified by an Administering Power that was European oriented with a western type economy exercising political hegemony over a territory with an essentially Third World economy. Of course, even these differences still do not negate the fact that racial discrimination

based primarily on colour was actually practised. In most instances racial discrimination was even more aggravated by the disparate cultural and economic conditions. These conditions were not only recognized by the Administering Power but also to a considerable extent considered in policy making with regard to social as well as political, economic and educational advancement.

Thus, the Soviet representative was in many ways right when he asserted in the Special Committee that racial discrimination still existed. He went on, "The Administering Authority claimed that it was doing everything possible to eradicate such discrimination, but the laws in force in New Guinea and Papua testified to the fact the Administering Authority itself was to a certain extent responsible for the existence of racial discrimination in these countries."<sup>12</sup> He cited the 1964 salary decision to pay a two salary differential scale as further evidence of this. Indeed, resolution 2227(XXI) adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 called on the Administering Power to remove all discriminatory electoral qualifications and abolish all discriminatory practices in the economic, social, health and educational fields. It was even more significant that this resolution was adopted just when race relations in the Territory were probably at their lowest ebb. One of the major factors contributing towards

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<sup>12</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.157.

this situation was, as the Soviet Union had rightly pointed out, the 1964 wage decision to cut indigenous public servants' wages and salaries.

After the change of policy in 1964, the Public Service Association lodged an application for higher remuneration for indigenous officers. "The Association felt that the inadequacy of salaries had changed relations between Europeans and New Guineans."<sup>13</sup> The Association's application was opposed by the administration and in October 1965, hearing of the case began before a Commission chaired by the Public Service arbitrator, Mr. L. G. Mathews. It was reported that about a hundred witnesses appeared before the Commission. On May 1967, the arbitrator announced that he had granted indigenous public servants salary increases ranging from \$A40 to \$A600 per annum.<sup>14</sup> The minimum starting wage for indigenous public servants was raised from \$A40 to \$A80, with annual increments of \$A40 and from this figure rising to \$A600. The decision was subject only to the approval of the Governor-General of Australia. In Port Moresby, Mr. Mathews' decision drew protests where it was believed that the inadequate wage increases would impel indigenous public servants to resign and go into private enterprise. A Papuan member of the House of Assembly and Parliamentary

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<sup>13</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 492, paragraph 82.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., paragraph 83.

Under-Secretary for Trade and Industry, Mr. Lepani Watson, was heard to have said that race relations had suffered because of the wage cuts, and would become worse. He added:

I think industrial unrest will come as a result of this decision. The unrest will come first in the middle range of workers and this will affect the workers in the lower ranges. This decision does not concern itself with the cost of living in the Territory. A lot of evidence given on the cost of living has been completely ignored.<sup>15</sup>

In a protest meeting against the decision in 1967, more than 200 indigenous public servants resolved that the Governor-General be asked to disallow the judgement. They also demanded the dismissal of the arbitrator. Meanwhile, in the Australian Parliament, the Minister for External Territories, Mr. C. E. Barnes, made a statement saying the new wages represented "a very substantial increase."<sup>16</sup> He stated further that the government's policy was to ensure that the Territory was not burdened with wages it could not afford out of its own resources. In another statement in Parliament, he defended the decision in these words:

This is a problem which has existed in other under-developed countries. In those places the expatriate lives in better standards than local people could ever afford. We must face the situation that if we require the skills of people from overseas to aid in the development and advancement of the community, we must attract them from places such as Australia. To attract them to the Territory they must be given standards and rewards far greater than they would get if they were to be based on local standards. In

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<sup>15</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 492, paragraph 85.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., paragraph 87.

any case of public servants or other wage or salary earners, the reward must be at least equal to that which they would receive in the country from which they come. In most cases added incentives are necessary in Papua and New Guinea.<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Barnes went on to emphasise that the localisation programme would provide for more New Guineans to fill positions as they become available in terms of experience and educational standards. In December 1967, the Public Service Association lost its final appeal through the Industrial Court of Australia. The Public Service arbitrator ruled that the Territory's arbitration structure prevented him from seeking outside review of the salary and wage rates he had fixed.<sup>18</sup> It was precisely this kind of decision that vitiated against the policy of multi-racialism. But there were other factors.

Race relations had deteriorated to such an extent by this time to cause public concern in the Territory. Dr. D. G. Bettison, a sociologist and Director of the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University in Port Moresby, warned in 1965 that apart from relations with Indonesia, "the future of the expatriate community in Papua-New Guinea over the next ten years rests to an important extent on its handling of relations with native people."<sup>19</sup> In

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<sup>17</sup>A/AC. 109/L. 492, paragraph 88 reported.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., paragraph 89.

<sup>19</sup>Bettison, "The Expatriate Community," p.222.

another article, in 1966, Dr. Bettison would outline some of the problems relating to race relations in private enterprise and suggested that the private sector had equal obligations in maintaining harmonious relations with the native people. He therefore urged that the private sector should give more thought to providing opportunities to the native people in training, management and ownership.<sup>20</sup> His successor at the New Guinea Research Unit, Dr. R. G. Crocombe, an anthropologist, suggested in the same year that race relations in New Guinea were worse than anywhere else in the Pacific.<sup>21</sup> He further maintained that even though whites in the Territory did not generally believe in racial discrimination or caste privileges, they did in fact generally practise them. "The most important differences for race relations in Papua and New Guinea today," said Dr. Crocombe, "are not related nearly so much to language, or dress, or custom, or race as they are to property, to power and to privilege."<sup>22</sup> He also maintained that even though the government advocated non-discrimination, it did not practise it in any significant sense and its policies on wages, housing and other privileges were all in the direction of widening the gap rather than closing it.

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<sup>20</sup>Bettison, "The Expatriates," pp.63-67.

<sup>21</sup>Ron Crocombe, "Race Relations," New Guinea, I, 6 (June/July 1966), 69.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p.69.

Nor were Bettison and Crocombe alone in these observations. Dr. Ruth Fink, another anthropologist conversant with the Territory's situation, pointed out the dilemma of the white minority and white prestige and the policy of the administration to outlaw all forms of discrimination. She advocated not merely a legalistic approach but a more positive approach at lessening the socio-economic disparities and a broader sharing of economic privileges, and above all a change in white attitudes not to regard natives as inferior beings.<sup>23</sup> The growing awareness of the indigenous people towards the problem was probably best expressed by a prominent Papuan trade union leader, Mr. Albert Maori Kiki, when he urged "Go home [some] Australians." He qualified this statement in these terms:

What we stand against is not the white man, but the obnoxious practice of subordinating New Guineans and Papuans to European interests so that they [New Guineans] become things to be manipulated by the whims of his temper. We want to be accepted as men by men of other races. Most people conceive the plausible but erroneous idea that in general our hatred is aimed at the white people. The average white man in Papua and New Guinea equates his existence with white domination. He seems convinced that he can only thrive in New Guinea on domination. In other words, domination and white men have come to be regarded by the white man himself, as two sides of the same coin.<sup>24</sup>

It was evidence such as this that would add consider-

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<sup>23</sup>Ruth A. Fink, "Moresby's Race Relations," New Guinea, I, 2 (June/July 1965), 46.

<sup>24</sup>Albert Maori Kiki, "Go Home [Some] Australians," New Guinea, I, 6 (June/July 1966), 73.

able credibility to criticisms by the anti-colonial members of the Special Committee of social conditions in the Territory. As long as discriminatory overtones were evident in the electoral system, in the preferential treatment of expatriates in such matters as land, loans, education, wages and clubs, as the Polish representative pointed out in the 1967 session of Sub-Committee II, criticisms would continue to be expressed against the Administering Power.<sup>25</sup> In actual fact, more land and more loans were often given to expatriate than to indigenous applicants. There were special "A" (for Australian) schools for expatriate children while there were separate "T" (for Territory) schools for indigenous children. On both accounts, the Australian representative pointed out to Sub-Committee II that the difference between "A" and "T" schools was that "A" schools were for native speakers of English while "T" schools were for New Guineans whose mother tongue was not English. He added:

It is therefore unjust to criticise the Administering Authority, on the one hand, for adopting a curriculum to the needs of the Territory on the ground that the students were not being given the best kind of education the Administering Power could provide.<sup>26</sup>

To Poland's suggestion that loans to ex-servicemen, for instance, was based on discrimination, he said:

The loans were granted in recognition of valuable service, and the amount of loan was divided on the purely objective criteria of ability to repay the capital and managerial capacity.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>A/6700, p.161.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p.165.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p.166.

Both explanations seemed logical at least superficially, but they were also indicative of the kinds of contradictions inherent in the policy of multi-racialism. In fact, multi-racialism was not only a nebulous concept but a misnomer. It would have been more correct to characterise it as 'separate development' in disguise in a largely intolerable social milieu. For the policy of multi-racialism to be established successfully and harmoniously would require drastic changes in the fundamental social and economic institutional structures and in the attitudes of the white minority. It would also require greater rapport between the white minority and the indigenous community. The social and economic barriers were further widened by the communication gap. To subdue these obstacles, a basic element in development was required: education.

As it might have become apparent by now from preceding chapters, the most vital factor in the political, economic and social advancement of the Territory was without doubt education. In his major policy statement in 1960, Mr. Paul Hasluck listed education as one of the most pressing problems.<sup>28</sup> He also stated that by then, there were 400 European teachers and 5,400 indigenous teachers at work in 4,100 schools attended by 196,000 pupils. These schools were mainly elementary schools and a greater proportion of them

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<sup>28</sup>Hasluck, "Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea," p.12.

run by the missions in the Territory. Secondary education was still minimal and higher education virtually non-existent. The missions were subsidised to some extent by the administration, but only if their standards in schools met stipulations laid down by the government. Expenditure on education had risen from \$A607,000 in 1950 to \$A8,300,000 in 1963/64. At the same time, the policy of gradual development had not only created an educational imbalance (despite the policy of balanced development) but also an immense shortage of qualified and trained indigenous personnel to fill positions in both government and private enterprise. The positions were occupied mainly by expatriates who by 1960 numbered over 20,000. Even after 1960, when the Administering Power overhauled its policy towards self-determination, educational advancement did not immediately assume a central position in government policy although it, more than anything else, needed to be greatly modified to become commensurate with the rapidly changing circumstances in the Territory.

Nevertheless, as a result of continuing United Nations criticisms, recommendations and assistance, as well as the growing domestic concern for education, the Administering Power was impelled to begin in earnest with the task of building up an educated and skilled cadre. The first indication of government concern for tertiary education came in May 1961 when the Minister for External Territories, Mr. Paul

Hasluck, appointed a committee consisting of Senior Officers of the Prime Minister's department, the Department of Territories, ASOPA and the New Guinea administration "to investigate the whole problem of tertiary education and higher training in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea."<sup>29</sup> The committee made five major recommendations. It proposed that a central administrative college should be established in Port Moresby as soon as possible to cater to the training needs of the administration and private enterprise. It further proposed that a university college linked with an Australian university be established in Port Moresby no later than 1966. In addition, it recommended that a multi-racial, full standard teachers' college be set up in the Territory as soon as possible. It also recommended that plans be made for the provision of the higher technical training institution. Lastly, it proposed that secondary education throughout the Territory be expanded to bring more indigenous people to university entrance standards. The committee submitted its report to the Minister for External Territories in August 1961, and subsequently the recommendations were accepted as a basis for detailed planning.<sup>30</sup>

But it was not until after the Foot Mission of 1962 that the government took serious steps to implement the

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<sup>29</sup>Territory of New Guinea Annual Report 1962/1963, p.130.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

committee's recommendations. Indeed, the Foot Mission gave the final push for not only was it instrumental in making constructive criticisms on the educational system but also submitted proposals as to how the paucity of the indigenous educational output could best be approached. The Mission felt that the administration's educational programme for mass literacy was commendable but in terms of the Territory's needs it was "inadequate."<sup>31</sup> In fact, this was an understatement. The programme providing for a broadening of the literacy base was in more ways than one a futile effort for it was aimed at achieving the goal of mass literacy at the elementary level which could not conceivably be accomplished in the time available. Time was running out on the Administering Power. The programme did produce a number of indigenous teachers, mostly without any secondary education for primary schools and for workers for the most part at the unskilled and semi-skilled levels. It did not provide for education at the university level; it failed to produce New Guineans capable of replacing expatriates in jobs above those at the unskilled and semi-skilled levels. It did not give the required knowledge necessary to exercise responsibility in the fields of industry and commerce. Nor did it provide for senior administrative and professional staff in the administration. Finally it did not adequately generate political

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<sup>31</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, p.191.

confidence and leadership. In short, it was simply a bad programme. For precisely those reasons the Foot Mission proposed that the kind of programme needed "must be approached with greater imagination and boldness."<sup>32</sup> It further recommended that one hundred or so of the most promising students in the Territory be selected each year and prepared for matriculation in Australia. Above all, among the Mission's three principal propositions, it felt that the time had arrived "to complete the structure of earlier effort, and to provide the apex of the pyramid by a new policy of selection for and encouragement of higher and university education."<sup>33</sup>

Consequently, a Commission on Higher Education was appointed by the Minister for External Territories, Mr. Paul Hasluck, in February 1963. It was comprised of Sir George Currie (originally an agricultural scientist who successively became Vice-Chancellor of the Universities of Western Australia and New Zealand) as Chairman, Dr. J. T. Gunther (Assistant Administrator for Services in the Territory administration) and Professor O. H. K. Spate (Professor of Human Geography at the Australian National University). The commission's terms of reference were wide: to report on the numbers of students then and prospective students for tertiary education, upon the establishment at the earliest possible date

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<sup>32</sup>T/1597/Add. 1, p.200.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p.201.

practicable of an institution or institutions to provide tertiary education, upon the functions of schools for medical, agricultural, administrative and teacher training and upon the relationship with universities in Australia or any institutions or institution recommended by the commission. It was also instructed to present detailed statements for the first trienium of any institutions it might recommend and general ones for the second trienium. The proposals and estimates were to be related to the needs and conditions of the Territory.

The Currie Commission met for the first time in March 1963 and began work by collecting and studying relevant published material on the Territory, books, reports of commissions and other documents about educational programmes and problems in other developing regions, particularly in Africa. As the Administering Power was now committed to a policy of developing the Territory towards self-determination, the assignment was clearly an important and urgent one dealing with a complex educational problem which had inadvertently become critical at the tertiary level.<sup>34</sup> There were still no university graduates by 1963. In any event, the Currie Commission sought evidence from interested persons and organisations in the Territory, Australia and elsewhere. A special effort was made to seek the views of New Guineans. In addi-

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<sup>34</sup>O. H. K. Spate, "Education and its Problems," in Fisk, ed., New Guinea on the Threshold, p.117.

tion, the Commission visited all universities and university colleges and several technical training institutions in Eastern Australia. Its report was submitted to the Minister for External Territories in 1964.

The financial implications of introducing university education in the Territory were just as great as that of the Five Year Plan. At the same time, university education was seen by the Commission as absolutely imperative for the economy and for the development of the Territory. Primary education was necessary but tertiary education could no longer be postponed until universal literacy had been achieved at the elementary level. The expansion of secondary and tertiary education at the university level was therefore deemed by the Currie Commission not only as urgent, but as an investment expenditure and a 'producer' good.<sup>35</sup> Trained and skilled indigenous personnel were needed to fill a wide range of technical and professional positions in both government and private enterprise. It was primarily towards this end that the Currie Commission made its two major recommendations: the establishment of a university and an Institute of Higher Technical Education in the Territory.<sup>36</sup>

Both the University and the Institute were to be fully autonomous and not affiliated with a university in

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<sup>35</sup>Report of the Commission on Higher Education in Papua and New Guinea (Canberra: 1964), p.12.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp.57-59.

Australia as colleges as had been recommended to the Minister for External Territories in 1961. This proposal was not only desirable but it was also necessarily a prudent one if the courses offered were to be oriented towards the needs and conditions of the Territory. Direct replicas of courses offered in Australian universities may or may not have any relevance to New Guinea. The Commission recommended, however, that the standard must be related to those of other universities.<sup>37</sup> To ensure this was maintained, it recommended the use of external examiners, Australian representation on the University Council and Professorial Board and the formation of an academic advisory committee modelled along lines used by new universities in the United Kingdom. The Vice-Chancellor of the university was to be the first appointment and was to be a member of the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee. The University and the Institute were to be residential and to be located in Port Moresby, and the staff to be drawn basically from Australian universities.

Moreover, since several colleges had by this time been established or were being proposed, the Commission thought that some of them should eventually be incorporated into the University. Specifically, it was thought that the Administrative College established in 1963 should be integrated into the university as an Institute of Administration.

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<sup>37</sup>Report of the Commission on Higher Education in Papua and New Guinea, p.60.

Similarly, the Medical College set up in 1962 should become the Medical Faculty while the Vudal Agricultural College to be opened in 1965 should be associated through a Faculty of Agriculture and a Forestry School through the Buldo Forestry School. The Commission recommended that teaching should begin initially in education and arts to be followed as soon as possible by science and then by the 'planning' of faculties in law, agriculture and medicine.<sup>38</sup> Departmental chairs proposed included education, English, agriculture, anthropology, geography, history and political science, economics, mathematics, biology, chemistry, law and medicine. The cost of the University and Institute was estimated at \$A10,686,000 for the years from 1964 to 1970 plus a recurrent expenditure of \$A2,006,604 in the first trienium, 1968-1970.<sup>39</sup> A liberal scholarship also proposed was estimated to cost \$A247,600 in the first trienium and would rise to \$A1,463,800 in the second trienium, even though it was difficult to forecast the number of prospective students. In addition the Commission recommended that high priority should be given to teacher training and subsequently estimated that it would cost \$A3,029,890 for the years 1965-1967 and \$A5,339,400 for 1968-1970. The Commonwealth Government was to bear the burden of the funds necessary but the Commission also suggested that

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<sup>38</sup>Report of the Commission on Higher Education in Papua and New Guinea, summary of recommendations, pp.274-288.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p.66.

outside sources should be explored and sought.

In 1965, the Commonwealth Government finally decided to act on the recommendations of the Currie Commission when it was announced by the Minister for External Territories that both a University and a Higher Technical Institute were to be established in June Valley near Port Moresby. The recommendation to set up a Higher Technical Institute was first accepted by the government. The delay in making a final decision on the university was due to a number of factors. It had to be considered in relation to other priorities. Already the Commonwealth Government had made decisions that would profoundly affect economic and political developments. Education introduced a third element.<sup>40</sup> Not only was it a luxury item but the creation of a university-educated elite involved a significant departure from the policy of gradual development. Thus the Commonwealth Government was caught in a predicament which was resolved when the Minister for External Territories announced in May 1965 that a decision had been made to go ahead with the University. It was also decided that the Territory administration would have to bear the financial burden of establishing both the Institute and the University out of its own budget and not by the Commonwealth Government through the Australian Universities Commission as the Currie Commission had suggested.

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<sup>40</sup>West, "Papua-New Guinea 1961-1965," p.466.

In 1966, the Higher Technical Institute and the University accepted their first students but had to operate initially from temporary facilities located in Port Moresby. Although the proposals for the Institute and the University were accepted by the Territory's House of Assembly, the proposed location of both institutions was not favoured unani- mously by members of the House. Members of the House of Assembly particularly from the Trust Territory of New Guinea were opposed to the location of both institutions in Port Moresby in Papua. As a result the House of Assembly resolved to set up the Institute of Higher Technical Education in Lae in New Guinea.

The decision by the Commonwealth Government to adopt the major recommendations of the Currie Commission was not only hailed but fully endorsed by members of the Special Committee. The majority saw the decisions not only as long overdue but as urgent. The Administering Power had been criticised from time to time in the United Nations for its lack of concern for secondary and tertiary education. But Australia had always maintained that she was promoting the educational advancement as quickly as she could. Indeed, she was, but according to the policy of gradual development she was too preoccupied with providing mass literacy at the grass roots level which meant essentially that elementary education was the overriding and paramount aim of government educational policy. In essence, therefore, the decision to

set up tertiary education at the university level was a dramatic transformation of policy, a proposition which, without external pressure, could not have attained the same sense of urgency that it did.

In spite of these developments, however, education was perceived by many members of the Special Committee in the perspective of the other aspects of development. Resolutions passed by the Special Committee in the four years Australia was a member would suggest that educational advancement like other aspects of development was still "slow" and the Administering Power was exhorted to speed it up.

Yet, the 1965 United Nations Visiting Mission was much impressed with the progress made in the field of education since 1962.<sup>41</sup> It was also impressed with the enthusiasm shown by parents and children for education. But while the Mission agreed with the Currie Commission and the World Bank Mission on their recommendations, it was also disturbed by the perpetuation of the separate school system for the same reasons that many members of the Special Committee were concerned. It drew charges of discrimination. Three years later the 1968 Visiting Mission found that the school system had not changed and concluded that separate schools were not the answer to the education system.<sup>42</sup> It recommended that

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<sup>41</sup>T/1646, paragraph 342.

<sup>42</sup>T/1678, paragraph 289.

the "A" schools be abolished and incorporated into the "T" schools. It stated, however, that where justified by numbers there could be a modified programme provided for those children whose first language was English and who could be expected to complete their education in Australia. It made two further recommendations.<sup>43</sup> Firstly, it proposed that special texts and teaching materials prepared in all subjects should be oriented towards and drawn upon New Guinea sources and culture. Secondly, it recommended that the preparation of textbooks and courses be on New Guinea itself, its origins, history, traditions, culture and peoples, as well as courses concerning the history and peoples of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, particularly the related Melanesian and Polynesian areas. Up until this time, the educational system in New Guinea was modelled upon that of Australia and the teaching materials were almost entirely Australian. In 1967 an educational research unit was set up at the University and a dramatic step was taken towards the recommendations of the Visiting Mission when an experimental school was set up on campus in 1969 with an enrolment that was half black and half white and a modified syllabus oriented towards the needs and conditions of the Territory.

Indeed, it was particularly significant in 1968 for the Visiting Mission to observe for the first time at first

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<sup>43</sup>T/1678, paragraph 293.

hand the progress being made in the field of tertiary education. The most noteworthy advance, reported the Mission, was the growth of tertiary institutions including the Medical College in 1962, Bulolo Forestry College in 1964, Vudal Agricultural College in 1965, the University of Papua and New Guinea and Institute of Higher Technical Education in 1966, and the new Administration College in 1967. Enrolments at the elementary and secondary levels had also increased as had the members of elementary and secondary schools. By 1968, chairs filled at the University of Papua and New Guinea included English, history, education, social anthropology, political studies, geography, law, mathematics, and biology, leading to degrees in arts, law and science, although facilities were still being shared with the Administrative College. The Institute of Higher Technical Education had initiated courses leading towards a diploma in surveying, civil engineering, architecture, building science studies, accounting, electrical and mechanical engineering. A modern Teachers' College, opened at Goroka in 1967, had been financed partly by the United Nations Fund which would contribute \$A1,500,000 towards its cost and operation over a period of five years. The college was designed to train elementary as well as secondary school teachers.

Never before in the Territory's history had educational advancement been promoted at such a magnitude in so short a time. Yet, it was precisely for the reason of time that

members of the Special Committee were strongly critical of the Administering Power. In 1966 the representative of Sierra Leone said in the Special Committee that it was encouraging to hear about the university "since an increase in the number of trained people was essential to economic growth."<sup>44</sup> The Indian delegate expressed similar sentiments when he stated: "The establishment of the new university and the Institute of Higher Technical Education in Papua and New Guinea would undoubtedly make an important contribution to the training of indigenous personnel."<sup>45</sup> But in 1967 the Polish representative said that after over half a century of Australian rule there were still only two graduates. Both had graduated from Sydney University with degrees in Agricultural Science and Economics in 1965 and 1966 respectively. Thus although laudatory tributes were paid to the Administering Authority between 1964 and 1968 by members of the Special Committee, criticisms also continued to be made on the progress in educational advancement which, according to the major resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, was still "slow."

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<sup>44</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.169.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p.171.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

On January 28, 1969, the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Patrick Shaw, officially informed the Secretary-General, U Thant, that he had been instructed by his government to submit his country's resignation from the Special Committee on Decolonisation. There was no official explanation or official reason given for the decision to withdraw although special mention was made of the fact that Australia had been a member since the inception of the Committee in 1962. Since then a number of changes in membership had taken place. At the same time, Mr. Shaw stated that his government would continue to submit information in accordance with its obligations under the Charter and would also be prepared to attend meetings of the Special Committee at the Committee's invitation when such information on territories under its administration was being discussed. This statement was significant, for what it implied essentially was that the Australian government would continue to honour its obligations in accordance with Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter but the principles of the Declaration only when it was invited by the Special Committee. What did this reflect?

The Administering Powers have always argued that the obligation to furnish information on the political, economic, social and educational advancement on territories under their administration had been agreed to voluntarily when those territories were placed under the supervision of the United Nations. In the case of the Australian government, this had been consummated when it agreed to conclude a Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations relating to the Trust Territory of New Guinea under Chapters XII and XIII and when Papua was placed voluntarily under United Nations supervision as a non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the Charter. As such the United Nations was only entitled to send Visiting Missions to the Trust Territory. But since both territories were administered as one entity by the Administering Power, it was inevitable that the examination of New Guinea by the Trusteeship Council invariably overlapped with the discussion of Papua. In both instances, however, it was implicit that recommendations made by the United Nations on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Territory would be merely recommendatory and not binding on the Administering Power. It was at the discretion of the Administering Power to adopt and implement United Nations' recommendations as it saw fit.

The adoption of the Declaration of Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples added a new dimension not only to the debate on decolonisation but also to the Charter.

It was not provided for by the United Nations Constitution and yet the Administering Powers were required to transmit information on their territories (both trust and non-self-governing) not out of their own volition but at the mercy of the Special Committee on Decolonisation. Consequently, whereas previously the Administering Powers had been required to submit information within the conceptual framework of the Charter, with resolution 1514(XV) the constitutional differences between trust and non-self-governing territories were virtually obliterated. As such, territories like Papua and New Guinea came under the scrutiny of the Special Committee not as separate legal entities but as one territory.

What this meant essentially was that non-Administering Powers, by their greater membership in the Special Committee, were able to play a greater role in the supervision of dependent territories than had previously been conceived under the Charter. But more importantly for the anti-colonial critics, the Special Committee was used as an instrument to expedite the demise of colonialism "in all its forms and manifestations" as quickly as possible regardless of consequences as long as the remaining territories achieved independence. "Inadequacy of political, economic, social and educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence," resolution 1514(XV) had declared in 1960.

Yet, it was exactly for the reason of preparedness

that Australia was to defend its administration of Papua and New Guinea in the period under study. Australian policies were aimed at creating the conditions necessary for the act of self-determination to take place but when that time had arrived could only be ascertained not by the Administering Power or any external bodies but by the people of Papua and New Guinea themselves. Although Australian policies in the Territory had been based primarily on gradual development even after the Declaration had been adopted, the Administering Power quickly realised that a new approach towards the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Territory was imperative if it was to be prepared adequately for the goal of independence.

Thus the Administering Power was prepared to be more flexible and conciliatory towards United Nations' recommendations and resolutions. It voted for resolution 1654(XVI) which created the Special Committee; it was more prepared to consider recommendations of the Visiting Missions. Recommendations of the Foot Mission, for instance, contributed greatly to the establishment of an elected parliament with an elected indigenous majority, to the economic survey carried out by the World Bank Mission, to the Commission on Higher Education and to the abolition of discriminatory laws in the Territory. The Visiting Missions of 1965 and 1968 not only testified to further progress being made in the political, economic, social and educational advancement of

the Territory but also made further proposals to improve conditions and the participation of the indigenous people in those fields. But by virtue of the composition of the Trusteeship Council, the Administering Powers were always sufficiently represented on the Visiting Missions. As such, despite their radical recommendations and critical conclusions, the Australian government was more willing to heed their reports.

On the other hand, while members of the Special Committee welcomed and endorsed changes that were being introduced in Papua and New Guinea by the Administering Power, the conclusions of the Special Committee invariably stated that progress towards the attainment of the goals of resolution 1514(XV) was still "slow." Of course, some of the recommendations made on the political, economic, social and educational advancement were sound and valid but there were others that were made purely on ideological grounds. When there was little or no official acknowledgement in the Committee's resolutions of the progress being achieved already in many fields in the Territory, it was understandable that the Administering Power should fervently defend its policies and feel resentful towards what often "seemed to be uninformed and irresponsible Committee comment on Papua and New Guinea."<sup>1</sup>

Australia was not the first member to withdraw from

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<sup>1</sup>Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations, p.176.

the Special Committee but it was the first Administering Power to do so.<sup>2</sup> As such it was a decision that had significant implications for the role the Administering Powers were to play in the future implementation of the Declaration by the Special Committee.<sup>3</sup> But it was a decision that was lauded and well publicised by the press throughout Australia. Despite the fact that there was no official explanation for the decision to withdraw from the Special Committee, the reports in the Australian press shed a lot of light on the attitude of the Administering Power. It was inevitably reported by the press that Australia's resignation had been caused primarily by "emotional and illogical attacks" by the "black and red" members of the Special Committee, as a reporter of the leading national newspaper, The Australian, put it. This particular report was entitled, "Why Australia Quit.... How repeated savage criticism forced Canberra into leaving the United Nations Committee on Decolonisation."<sup>4</sup> In another leading Australian newspaper, The Sydney Morning Herald, the report was headlined "Australia Quits U.N. Body Over N.G. [New Guinea] Critics."<sup>5</sup> A reporter for the Canberra Times

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<sup>2</sup>A precedent had been set in the earlier resignation of Denmark, Finland, Chile, and Uruguay.

<sup>3</sup>Following the resignation of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States as the only other Administering Powers in the Committee also decided to withdraw in 1970.

<sup>4</sup>The Australian, February 6, 1969.

<sup>5</sup>The Sydney Morning Herald, February 6, 1969.

wrote:

Australia's resignation from the U.N. Committee of [sic] Decolonisation is a result of the constant criticism of its administration of Papua and New Guinea by Afro-Asian representatives.<sup>6</sup>

It is then clear from these reports where the Administering Power stood in relation to the majority of members of the Special Committee. The "black and red" members were allegedly responsible for Australia's withdrawal.

Yet, Australia's decision to withdraw was not totally unexpected. Two years earlier, in 1966, the Australian representative had stated before Sub-Committee II:

The Special Committee might well consider how advisable it was to press for greater speed in implementing the absolute objectives laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV). In the opinion of the Australian government, the hasty achievement of these goals was less important than the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms which the population of the Territory already possessed in contrast to other territories being considered by the Special Committee, where the main problem was the denial of human rights and freedoms. The Australian government was not prepared to abandon judgement on all subjects except speed. The end of a journey was not only a matter of going faster but also of arriving safely.<sup>7</sup>

This statement was noteworthy for it revealed the growing frustration of the Administering Power with the Special Committee urging a speedy implementation of resolution 1514(XV) when it was obviously thought, and quite rightly, that progress in all fields of the Territory's development was

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<sup>6</sup>The Canberra Times.

<sup>7</sup>A/6300/Add. 9, p.168.

rapid enough already. It also revealed the government's position that because all discriminatory laws had been lifted and there were no political prisoners that Papuans and New Guineans were already enjoying more "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" than many other territories. Moreover, the statement divulged that even though the Australian government was prepared to accelerate the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Territory, it was not prepared to produce "another Congo."

It was indisputable that Australia had been criticised unduly at times, especially in view of the great strides being made in the Territory's development as the study shows. But it was also true that not all attacks were "emotional and illogical." Nor were they made solely by "black and red" members of the Special Committee. In the political field, what most members were concerned about was increased indigenous participation in the political and administrative process through fully representative political institutions with diminishing control by the Administering Power. Similarly, the economy was still largely in the domain of expatriates, in which case it was essential to encourage more indigenous participation, control and ownership. In social advancement, members were concerned for the total elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations while education was seen as the key to providing the necessary skilled and trained personnel needed to

sustain a viable and independent nation in Papua and New Guinea. For these reasons the Special Committee was instrumental in spurring on the process of decolonisation in the Territory but in the process also alienated the membership of one of the less intransigent and more co-operative members of the Administering Powers.

APPENDIX A

## Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter

## DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73. Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- c. to further international peace and security;
- d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
- e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74. Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

## Chapter XII

## INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75. The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the people of the world; and
- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77. 1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

- a. territories now held under mandate;
- b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78. The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79. The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80. 1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81. The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82. There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83. 1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84. It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85. 1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

## Chapter XIII

### THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

#### Composition

Article 86. 1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

- a. those Members administering trust territories;
- b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
- c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

#### Functions and Powers

Article 87. The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

- c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88. The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

### Voting

Article 89. 1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

### Procedure

Article 90. 1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91. The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

APPENDIX B

## DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE

On 14 December 1960, the General Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

In solemnly proclaiming the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the General Assembly declared that:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation;
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development;
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence;
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected;
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom;
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

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