

"JEDWAY TOWN IS GOING TO BOOM":

The Failure of Twentieth Century Settlement
in the Southern Queen Charlotte Islands, 1899-1948

by

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Abstract

The southern part of the Queen Charlotte Islands, on the north coast of British Columbia, was the site of a copper-mining rush in the early twentieth century. This in turn led to a pattern of regional development and settlement in the South Moresby Island region, centred around two mining towns, Jedway and Lockeport. In spite of plentiful resources and economic opportunities in the region, the settlement pattern established in the copper rush had disappeared by the 1930s. For the purposes of this study, this failure of settlement is considered synonymous with the region's underdevelopment.

To attempt to explain this underdevelopment, the three leading models which have been used to analyze unequal regional development in Canada are examined. These are the staples theory, the dependency theory, and the various post-dependency theories. Aspects of each of the models have been adopted, particularly from the post-dependency theories, which emphasize specific conditions in the region being examined. The local factor of most significance in South Moresby was the lack of a pre-existing society or industrial base in the region. This meant that the production systems established in the twentieth century brought associated social systems, which in turn would determine settlement viability. This has led to analysis

based on modes of production, within a framework of the four classes of ventures, based on the origin and intent of the entrepreneur or organization initiating them. These classes are: 1. local entrepreneurs, based in South Moresby and utilizing their own capital; 2. regional entrepreneurs, urban-based and acting to mobilize foreign capital into resource industry; 3. Japanese entrepreneurs, containing representatives of the first two classes, but distinguished as part of an ethnic enclave; 4. corporate entrepreneurs, with capital raised and decisions made outside the region, and often outside the province. It would be expected that local entrepreneurs would have the strongest linkages with local society and corporate entrepreneurs the weakest.

Applying this analytical framework to the ventures active in South Moresby and resulting settlement patterns tends to confirm this impression. The pattern of development and settlement was determined primarily by local, regional and Japanese entrepreneurs in the first years of the copper rush. Diversification into other extractive industries by these three classes of entrepreneurs focused on the settlements formed in the initial period. At the same time, corporate ventures were initiated, which operated without significant linkages to the existing development.

By the 1930s four large plants, one Japanese and three corporate, were still operating in the region. They were

based in remote plants with associated camps, and although viable commercially, did not support the overall settlement of South Moresby. The two villages in the region, which by the late 1920s were sustained by a combination of local mining speculation and corporate salmon canning, disappeared in the depression of the 1930s with the end of the copper mining and the closing of the two canneries.

Successful businesses were operated by each class of entrepreneur in South Moresby, but settlement was determined and supported primarily by local and regional ventures. There was also a Japanese enclave society, with extremely strong internal linkages, and some extending to the broader community. On the other hand, corporate ventures were generally based in camps, with minimal economic or social linkages to the rest of South Moresby. Even when they were commercially viable, their effect on the settlement viability of the region was minimal. With the end of the "independent" towns of the local and regional entrepreneurs, and the Japanese enclave society, South Moresby's underdevelopment was assured.

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For Kerry,
with all my love

Introduction

With the exception of a few fairly large centres, today the central and northern coast of British Columbia is nearly devoid of non-Native settlements. In the early years of this century, there were many small communities scattered along the coast, supported by economies based on fishing, logging, or mining. Eventually most of these communities disappeared as corporate resource industry tended to centralize its ventures. For myself, an early childhood in Kemano, a corporate town on the north coast, left a positive memory of life in such a coastal community. Later, while working on the coast as a logger and then as an archaeologist, the number of abandoned resource extraction communities became more evident. In retrospect, most former inhabitants of these coastal communities consider them pleasant places to have lived, as an alternative to the dominant urban centres.

This raises the question of why the coast of British Columbia, which at one time supported a substantial part of the province's population in such communities, is now nearly deserted. While doing background research for the Canadian Parks Service on the new *Gwaii Haanas* National Park Reserve, in the South Moresby Island region of the Queen Charlotte Islands, it became evident that it served as a particularly clear example of the resource-based settlement of a region, and its consequent disappearance.

In the case of South Moresby, there was a *tabula rasa* existing at the end of the nineteenth century. The region was known to have abundant mineral, forest and marine resources. However, the only use that had been made of them was small-scale fishing and some whaling off the coast, with no land-based development or settlement. Not only was there no non-Native activity in the region, but the traditional inhabitants of the region, the southern and east coast Haida people, had consolidated their remaining village populations in Skidegate, on southeast Graham Island. By the 1880s many of the Haida people of Moresby Island had died after contracting introduced diseases.¹ Under pressure from missionaries, the remaining village populations were consolidated in two new Methodist villages in the 1880s, and then moved into Skidegate in the 1890s.² At the turn of

1. The Haida mortality in the region was dramatic. A Hudson's Bay Company census of the Queen Charlotte Islands done in about 1839 gave a population of 1,292 people in Tanu, Skedans and Ninstints, the three main Haida villages of South Moresby; British Columbia Archives and Records Service [hereafter cited as B.C.A.R.S.], B/20/1853, Private Papers of Sir James Douglas, Second Series, pp.27-28. The 1891 Canadian census listed 90 people in the village of New Clew, which contained the remnant population of the earlier villages; B.C.A.R.S., GR 288, film B7040, District #2, New Westminster, Coast, B.C., Q.C.I., Division 33, pp.73-77.

2. These villages were New Gold Harbour and New Clew, with most of the east and south coast people in the latter. The founding of New Clew in 1888 was described in *The Missionary Outlook*, Vol.VIII, No.6 (June 1888), pp.94-95 and Vol.VIII, No.12 (December 1888), p.191. The move from New Clew to Skidegate was noted in 1897; Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs*, 1898, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1898, pp.86,360.

the century, there were no permanently occupied Haida villages in the region.

This meant that there was a nearly total absence of pre-capitalist society in the region. South Moresby serves as an almost ideal environment in which to study resource-based development because of these initial conditions. Not only was imported resource industry responsible for the development and settlement of the region, but also was the only economic or social factor responsible for its eventual underdevelopment. The reasons should be found strictly in the actions of the resource extraction ventures, without the complicating factor of a traditional or pre-capitalist society. In this respect it serves as an exemplar of how extractive industry does or does not support non-urban settlement on the coast of British Columbia.

The area's settlement developed in response to the economic opportunities presented by the resources of the region. In particular, it was the 1905-1909 copper rush which attracted a population, which in turn led to the development of new communities. The most significant of these settlements were Jedway and Lockeport, each of which served as the focus of a mining district, and later for the diversification of extractive industry. The geographic scope of this study is defined by the informal "districts" which were served by these towns. Although there was other development on Moresby Island in the period examined,

extractive industry and settlement were both concentrated within a ten to fifteen kilometre radius of these communities. During the boom years, Jedway was the government seat for the Queen Charlotte Islands, and the largest centre of non-Native population. The area to be examined covers the east coast of Moresby Island and the various islands off that coast, between Logan Inlet in the north and St. James Island to the south [Figure 2.1].

The absence of an existing pre-capitalist population in this region eliminates many of the intangible social reasons relating to the permanence of settlement. Instead the focus here will be on the direct relationship between economic viability and settlement viability. In South Moresby, as elsewhere on the coast, the non-Native settlements have been established, and remained viable, as adjuncts to resource extractive industry. Following the introduction of a resident population, entrepreneurs diversified into industries besides copper mining, focusing on the forest and ocean resources of the area. These activities were concentrated geographically around the copper mining settlements. However, South Moresby's settlements failed, in some cases in spite of the continued economic viability of these industries. The intent of this study is to determine what factors may have contributed to the lack of successful settlement in the region.

Settlement viability will be equated with

"development", in the sense used by sociologist Alejandro Portes. He suggested three aspects which comprise a working definition of development: first, economic, the existence of a growing, autonomous economic system; second, social, enactment of egalitarian principles and social services; and third, cultural, the presence of group identity or pride.³ Portes also offered three explanatory models for the development process. First, social differentiation, or evolutionary theory, emphasises the organic evolution of trends in societies. Second, enactment of values, which suggests that individual changes in attitude change society in turn, and third, liberation from dependency.⁴

Portes' three models may be equated to the three most prominent models which have been used for analyzing unequal regional development in Canada. Social differentiation suggests evolution brought about by pressures imposed on the society, a thesis which resembles the economic and environmental determinism of the staples theory. Liberation from dependency relates directly to the dependency theory of underdevelopment, which also is based on the imposition of economic conditions from outside. Enactment of values relates well to post-dependency Marxian theory, with the central emphasis on internal social relations and their

3. Alejandro Portes, "On the Sociology of National Development: Theories and Issues", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.82, No.1 (July 1976), p.56.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.61-74.

consequent manifestations. These three models for analyzing development or the lack of development have been applied to various Canadian cases, particularly in the case of outlying commodity-producing communities. In the first chapter of this thesis, these three models will be examined, to determine their applicability to explaining the underdevelopment of South Moresby.

Chapter 1: Models for explaining unequal regional development

Staples theory

In Canadian historiography, the leading early model used to address the unequal socio-economic development of the country was the staples theory, largely developed by Harold Innis in the 1920s. The staples thesis suggests that the "migrant" European culture in Canada relied on manufactured products from the homeland to maintain societal norms. This meant that high-value staple commodities desired in Europe had to be produced in Canada to exchange for manufactured goods. This trade relationship with the metropolitan area determined the economic development of the hinterland. In turn, the geographic and technical factors encountered in production of each staple determined a specific pattern of economic development and social organization in different regions of Canada.¹

This "technico-materialist" view of production, suggesting that industry and society were both shaped by environment and technology, along with the effect of the centre-margin economy, was developed from the models of earlier writers, including Adam Smith, but particularly

1. Harold A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970 [first edition 1930], pp.383-392.

Thorstein Veblen.² Until the 1970s, Innis' staples theory provided the framework for most examinations of Canadian development.³

Much of the literature dealing with mining booms and corollary settlement has a theoretical base analogous to the staples theory or Portes' "social differentiation". Typically, these works use evolutionary models for the development of local society, assuming a zoomorphic development and decline based on the factors of market and resource. An example is the explicitly economic study of the Michigan copper industry by William B. Gates Jr., in which he suggested that every extractive industry has a "lifespan".⁴ He offered a four-stage model, with establishment, substantial growth, maturity, and decline, when attempts are often made to diversify the business to lessen reliance on one product.⁵

Clark C. Spence employed a similar model to describe an

2. Ian Parker, "Harold Innis, Karl Marx, and Canadian Political Economy", *Queen's Quarterly*, LXXXIV, No.4 (Winter 1977), pp.547-554; David McNally, "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism", *Studies in Political Economy*, No.6 (Autumn 1981), pp.42-45.

3. For instance, O.F.G. Sitwell and N.R.M. Seifried, *The Regional Structure of the Canadian Economy*, Toronto, Methuen, 1984, who basically accepted the staples model to explain historical regional development, with some modifications taken from Donald G. Creighton's Montreal-based mercantile thesis.

4. William B. Gates Jr., *Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining Industry*, New York, Russell & Russell, 1969 [first edition 1951].

5. *Ibid.*, pp.viii-ix.

1880s lead-silver boom in Idaho. His four stages were location, rush, capitalization and intensive exploitation, and decline.⁶ Resource depletion and low world prices were given as the reasons for the decline, and consequent desertion of some of the towns in the region. The surviving towns diversified their economic base to agriculture, invoking Gates' observations on his decline stage.⁷

Donald R. Abbe described a nineteenth century silver mining boom in Nevada using an evolutionary model. Most of the towns in the area failed with the end of the boom, but Austin, the service and transportation centre for the district, survived. The failures were attributed to factors such as the size of the ore body and the lack of economic diversification.⁸ Abbe attributed Austin's survival to its "fortuitous location" in the centre of a mining area and its "shrewd and tenacious citizens". The economic base of mining was replaced by farming, mercantile activity, and government.⁹

Both Spence and Abbe seem to have assumed a mix of classical economic theory and environmental determinism to

6. Clark C. Spence, "The Boom of the Wood River Mines", *Idaho Yesterdays*, Vol.23, No.2 (Summer 1979), pp.3-12.

7. *Ibid.*, p.12.

8. Donald R. Abbe, *Austin and the Reese River Mining District: Nevada's Forgotten Frontier*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1985, p.85.

9. *Ibid.*, p.86.

explain why some mining towns survived and others did not. Added to this, particularly in Abbe, is an element of "pioneer virtue", where the will of the population was seen as a major factor in maintaining the community.

In the Maritimes, Kris Inwood applied neo-classical economic theory to the issue of underdevelopment. He suggested that the economy of the region declined because of the marginal character of local resources, the inability of smaller industries to take advantage of scale economies, low productivity, and low per capita incomes.¹⁰ Stephen Hornsby concentrated on the interface between staple trades and agrarian settlement, both of which produced distinctive patterns, to explain the "socially and economically fragmented" culture of Cape Breton Island.¹¹

In each of these examples, a lack of development was attributed to factors such as resource, technology, and market opportunities. This explanatory framework is consistent with the staples theory, and also relates to Portes' "social differentiation", with industries or

10. Eric Sager, "Dependency, Underdevelopment and the Economic History of the Atlantic Provinces", *Acadiensis*, Vol.XVII, No.1 (Autumn 1987), p.133, citing Kris Inwood, "Local Control, Resources and the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company", *Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers* (1986), pp.254-282 and Kris Inwood and John Chamard, "Regional Industrial Growth during the 1890s: The Case of the Missing Artisans", *Acadiensis*, Vol.XVI, No.1 (Autumn 1986), pp.101-118.

11. Stephen J. Hornsby, *Nineteenth-Century Cape Breton: A Historical Geography*, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.

settlements developing and failing in an evolutionary way.

Dependency theory

In the 1970s, in search of new models for analysis of the development of the Canadian economy, more writers turned to Latin American dependency theory as expressed by Andre Gunder Frank. In the 1960s Frank articulated his "development of underdevelopment" thesis, which refuted the assumption that underdeveloped countries were simply at an earlier stage of development than developed countries. Rather, the economic and social features observed in an underdeveloped country were the result of the influence of the world capitalist system. Frank argued that diffusion of capital, institutions and values from developed to underdeveloped countries would not result in development of the latter, but that any such development has to be independent of the metropole.¹² Theotonio dos Santos defined dependency as "a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected."¹³ The metropolis-satellite relations extend

12. Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", in James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale Johnson, editors, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy*, Garden City, Anchor Books, 1972, pp.3-5.

13. Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence", *American Economic Review*, LX (May 1970), p.231, cited by Eric Sager, "Dependency, Underdevelopment and the Economic History of the Atlantic Provinces", *op. cit.*, p.118.

beyond the international level to the regional or provincial level within a country creating a "chain of constellations of metropolises and satellites" connecting all parts of the system worldwide.¹⁴

The concept of the "world system" as a basis for analysis was developed in the 1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein, who separated the nations of the world into the categories of "core", "semi-peripheral", and "peripheral", comprising the elements of the capitalist world system.¹⁵ Daniel Chirot adopted this model to relate "changes in the highly developed world with those in less developed societies" in the twentieth century.¹⁶ Chirot left unanswered the question of whether the prosperity of the core was dependent

14. Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", *op. cit.*, pp.5-6. Besides Frank, a number of other authors used this concept of internal dependency, particularly Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, with "internal colonialism", Klaus Jurgen Gantzel with his "intrastate imperialism" and Ernest Mandel, who argued that the basis of regional disparity rests in unequal exchange between regions; Kenneth Campbell, "Regional Disparity and Interregional Exchange Imbalance", in Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, Allan Turowetz, editors, *Modernization and the Canadian State*, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1978, pp.116. Dale Johnson, starting with Casanova and Stavenhagen, defined these "internal colonies" as regions comprised of populations who provide a source of cheap labour to produce primary commodities for markets in metropolitan centres, in "On Oppressed Classes", in James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale Johnson, editors, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy*, *op. cit.*, p.277.

15. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York, Academic Press, 1974.

16. Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977, p.6.

on the domination of the periphery.¹⁷

Application of the dependency theory to Canadian development would seem natural, although Frank argued that North America was a distinct case not subject to super-exploitation like Latin America.¹⁸ Similarities to Innis' home-grown staples thesis include the core-periphery dialectic, the emphasis on foreign trade of commodities, the shaping of economic and social institutions adapted to commodity export, and the dependence on imported goods. In the 1970s a number of Canadian writers, such as R.T. Naylor and Wallace Clement, noted the similarities between Canada and Latin America in terms of dependency, and applied the Frankian model to domestic issues.¹⁹

For instance, in the late 1970s Wallace Clement was quoting Frank verbatim, with emphasis on intra-regional

17. *Ibid.*, pp.14-15,24. Canada fell into the latter category, anomalous due to its wealth, but partially dependent on core power, and with an economy that was a "colonial adjunct" of the core. In 1913 foreign investment in Canada was roughly double the gross national product, or twelve times the relative level in the United States. This investment was dominated by the United Kingdom, at 70%, and the United States, at 26%; *ibid.*, pp.32-33.

18. Andre Gunder Frank, *Lumpen Bourgeoisie: Lumpen Development*, New York, 1972, p.19, cited by Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class", *Studies in Political Economy*, No.5 (Spring 1981), p.10.

19. Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class", *op. cit.*, p.10. The works concerned are T. Naylor, "The rise and fall of the third commercial empire of the St. Lawrence", in G.Teeple, editor, *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, Toronto, 1972, pp.2,24; and W. Clement, *Continental Corporate Power*, Toronto, 1977, p.129.

dependency.²⁰ Clement suggested that regionalism was produced by human "actions and institutions", distancing himself from Innis' geography and resource-based determinism.²¹ Naylor followed Innis more closely, and both authors attempted to integrate class factors with dependency, focusing on the differences between mercantile and industrial capital. Other Canadian writers trying to integrate the staples and dependency theories included Mel Watkins, Ian Parker and Kenneth Campbell.²² Although dependency theory has been described as a revolutionary departure from the staples thesis, both involve systems of unequal exchange which determine the development of the exploited country. Certainly the nuances and rhetoric differ between the two models, with the staples theory focusing on environmental factors and the dependency theory on human factors, but they both stress the structuring power of mercantile relations.

Some of this theoretical overlap was evident in Keith Warriner's attempt to apply dependency theory to the British Columbia fishery in order to account for regional

20. Wallace Clement, "A Political Economy of Regionalism in Canada", in Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, Allan Turowetz, editors, *Modernization and the Canadian State*, *op. cit.*, pp.89-92.

21. *Ibid.*, p.89.

22. Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class", *op. cit.*, pp.9-10; David McNally, "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism", *op. cit.*, pp.36-37; Kenneth Campbell, "Regional Disparity and Interregional Exchange Imbalance", *op. cit.*, pp.114-116.

differences. Within the dependency model he referred to the draining of capital from the hinterland, and the lack of regional economic expansion due to the unwillingness of local investors to risk their capital in an underdeveloped and volatile regional economy. Dependence on world prices and resource availability were also noted as explanatory factors in the economic viability of a region. Although noting these factors, he concluded that the nature of the resource was the single most important determinant:

While many things influence capture and processing - including the demands of a dominant socio-economic system and world markets - in fishing it has been the nature of the resource that above all has determined the regional patterns just reviewed.²³

Warriner saw the changes in the B.C. industry, particularly the 1914-1930 emphasis on the north coast, as unique within "the dependency model of regional development", due to the relocation of capital investment. He concluded that the "behaviour of processors and fishers" in shifting "productive focus to a new region" was a successful response to market and resource factors.²⁴

This conclusion demonstrates the ambiguity inherent in applying the dependency theory to an industry such as the

23. Keith Warriner, "Regionalism, Dependence, and the B.C. Fisheries: Historical Development and Recent Trends", in Patricia Marchak, Neil Guppy, John McMullan, editors, *Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-processing Industries in British Columbia*, Toronto, Methuen, 1987, pp.327-331.

24. *Ibid.*, pp.335-337.

B.C. fishery. Although analyzing the data within the framework of dependency theory, Warriner arrived at a conclusion which seems more consistent with the staples theory. As he wrote, in this case "the nature of the resource...determined the regional patterns". This suggests that dependency theory alone is not adequate to explain the resource-based development on the B.C. coast.

Post-dependency theory

Dependency theory has provoked much discussion, and many critiques, primarily from Marxist theorists. In general, hard-line Marxists have rejected dependency theory outright, maintaining the necessity of returning to one aspect or another of classic Marxist theory as an analytic device for explaining underdevelopment.²⁵

25. A number of essays expressing this view were collected in Ronald H. Chilcote, editor, *Dependency and Marxism: Towards a Resolution of the Debate*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1982. John Weeks considered dependency theory a misreading or even a misuse of Marxian theory. He saw the former as descriptive, as in noting but not explaining why a surplus was generated in the hinterland, and as more a predictive than analytic model; John Weeks, "The Difference between Materialist Theory and Dependency Theory and Why They Matter", in *ibid.*, pp.118-123. Norma Chinchilla and James Dietz thought that modes of production analysis was the correct approach, while Colin Henfrey preferred examining internal social formations in the context of classic imperialist theory; Norma Stoltz Chinchilla and James Lowell Dietz, "Toward a New Understanding of Development and Underdevelopment", in *ibid.*, pp.138-147; Colin Henfrey, "Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of Latin America", in *ibid.*, pp.17-54. James Petras thought that the model should be based on examination of the global framework of class and state relationships, combined with social relations of production; James Petras, "Dependency and World System Theory: A Critique and New Directions", in

Marxist writers in Canada followed the same pattern, and also attacked the staples theory and attempts to integrate it with dependency theory. David McNally argued that Innis' "commodity fetishism", based on geographic, economic, and technical determinism, was incompatible with the Marxian view of the commodity as "the expression of a social relation of production."²⁶ Leo Panitch and Ray Schmidt both saw a weakness in Naylor and Clement stressing the "nebulous" distinction between merchant and industrial or entrepreneurial capital.²⁷ Robin Neill simply denied that Canada's development was shaped by the export of staple products, but rather that the chain of causation ran from politics to economics.²⁸ Carl Cuneo suggested that all regional disparities in Canada were the result of "class struggles and conflicts" resulting in a corporate monopoly

ibid., pp.148-155.

26. David McNally, "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism", *op. cit.*, pp.42-51.

27. Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy", *op. cit.*, pp.10-11,28; Ray Schmidt, "Canadian Political Economy: A Critique", *Studies in Political Economy*, No.5 (Spring 1981), pp.73-75,87. Panitch attributed this distinction to Joseph Schumpeter, who had claimed that only indigenous local entrepreneurship resulted in development.

28. Robin F. Neill, "Imperialism and the Staple Theory of Canadian Economic Development: The Historical Perspective", in William H. Melody, Liora Salter, Paul Heyer, editors, *Culture, Communication, and Dependency: The Tradition of H.A. Innis*, Norwood, Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1981, pp.152-153.

in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery.²⁹ Like the hardline Latin American Marxists, the recommendations were to forget about the dependency theory and concentrate on one aspect or another of "real" Marxian theory. These doctrinaire approaches have problems, in that each one has a slightly different view of the correct Marxian approach to analysis. Interpretation of a different sort, that of adapting materialist theory to the problem of underdevelopment, could affect applications, as the desire to focus on one aspect may overpower the data.

Those theorists who have attempted to synthesize elements of various approaches have produced the most flexible, and hence powerful models. Norman Long thought that Frank's model was too simplistic, and included some unwarranted assumptions, such as the denial of the dual economy and equating capitalism with commodity exchange rather than relations of production. Long believed it was important to specify the conditions under which dependency existed.³⁰ He explored two other approaches; modes of production, and "economic brokerage", preferring a combination of these models to dependency theory:

29. Carl J. Cuneo, "A Class Perspective on Regionalism", in Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, Allan Turowetz, editors, *Modernization and the Canadian State*, op. cit., pp.132-156.

30. Norman Long, "Structural dependency, modes of production and economic brokerage in rural Peru", in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, editors, *Beyond the sociology of development: Economy and society in Latin America and Africa*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975, pp.260-261.

Whilst a mode of production analysis explains how certain social relations of production function for the extraction of economic surplus, the study of brokers analyses how particular individuals acquire positions of economic power and attempt to maintain their pre-eminence. It also shows how sets of relations deriving from different modes of production and from different institutional contexts can be combined for entrepreneurial profit.³¹

Long and other moderate Marxist theorists suggested that dependency was a useful concept, but was too simplistic and linear to serve as a real explanatory device to account for underdevelopment. Geoffrey Kay generally agreed with Long, while Alejandro Portes described dependency theory as a "theoretical strategy" which could provide a framework under which more specific hypotheses may be articulated.³² Philip O'Brien echoed Portes in concluding that dependency theory could serve as a general hypothesis which could clarify "lower level explanations".³³ Joel Edelstein and Dale Johnson admitted that dependency theory had weaknesses but, like Portes and O'Brien, recommended it as a "perspective". Their primary focus was on internal social

31. *Ibid.*, p.278.

32. Geoffrey Kay, *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis*, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1975, pp.103-105; Alejandro Portes, "On the Sociology of National Development: Theories and Issues", *op. cit.*, pp.74-79. Kay and Portes both used the example of Canada, profoundly dependent, yet with most of the characteristics of a developed country, to point out weaknesses in dependency theory.

33. Philip J. O'Brien, "A critique of Latin American theories of dependency", in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, editors, *Beyond the sociology of development: Economy and society in Latin America and Africa*, *op. cit.*, pp.7-27.

structures, with the external chain of dependency providing context.³⁴ This approach did not treat dependency theory as an explanatory agent, but rather as an interpretive device, which would seem to admit that as a model dependency could not account for underdevelopment.

Norman Long and Bryan Roberts emphasized modes of production analysis in their 1984 study of development in the mining district of central Peru. They were trying to establish whether integration into the international capitalist economy resulted in stagnation or economic growth for an underdeveloped economy. In the area studied the dominant economic forces were enclave businesses with few local linkages, which would suggest stagnation. However, Long and Roberts found that economic growth had occurred, due to informal exchange between the enclaves and the local society.³⁵ Their analysis focused on pre-capitalist forms of production, how these existing forms interacted with the capitalist system and government, and the effects on both forms of production.³⁶

34. Joel Edelstein, "Dependency: A Special Theory within Marxian Analysis", in Ronald H. Chilcote, editor, *Dependency and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1982, pp.103-107; Dale L. Johnson, "Economism and Determinism in Dependency Theory", in Ronald H. Chilcote, editor, *Dependency and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate*, op. cit., pp.108-117.

35. Norman Long and Bryan Roberts, *Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the Central Highlands of Peru*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.1.

36. *Ibid.*, pp.4-9.

Long and Roberts concluded that a system of production "acquires its specific characteristics from the socio-political context in which it evolves". Technical and environmental constraints did have an effect, but primarily on the scale of production; if technical complexity was low, and resources abundant, it was possible for smaller enterprises to be viable.³⁷ Long and Roberts accepted the concept of "social disarticulation" suggested by Alain De Janvry and C. Garramon.³⁸ This refinement of dependency theory suggests that exclusion of the producer group from the social and economic infrastructure and consumer goods that accompany the capitalist mode of production results in a lowering of labour costs. Therefore a region's production and its domestic consumption are unrelated, as opposed to "socially articulated" economies where production and consumption are closely related.

Long and Roberts saw the greatest threat to the coherence of regional systems of production in concentrated industrial development in urban centres. These are usually more attractive for labour than regional enterprises, and linkages tend to be more formalized, with less connection to

37. *Ibid.*, pp.240-242.

38. A. De Janvry and C. Garramon, "The dynamics of rural poverty in Latin America", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.4, No.3, pp.206-216. The concept was refined in Alain De Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

subordinate forms of production.³⁹

Cynthia Taft Morris and Irma Adelman examined economic and institutional change in twenty-three countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and came up with three central theses which correspond closely to those of Long and Roberts.⁴⁰ They concluded that domestic institutional change was the single largest factor affecting economic development; that the initial institutions were the most important; and that there were no unique institutional prerequisites for development.⁴¹

In Canada, Wallace Clement, like the Latin American moderates, was expressing a more class-driven approach in his work, suggesting that the "dynamic social relationship between capital and labour" was central to Canada's development.⁴² In Clement's "class approach", as in Long and Roberts, the focus was on the transition from petty commodity production to capitalist production.⁴³ In the 1980s Clement used a model based on his "central dynamic of

39. Norman Long and Bryan Roberts, *Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the Central Highlands of Peru*, op. cit., p.245.

40. Cynthia Taft Morris and Irma Adelman, *Comparative Patterns of Economic Development*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.

41. *Ibid.*, p.3.

42. Wallace Clement, *Hardrock Mining: Industrial Relations and Technological Changes at Inco*, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1981, pp.15-19.

43. *Ibid.*, pp.19-26.

capitalism"; the capitalist imperative is to expand "or die", and the labour imperative is to sell labour power.⁴⁴ In *The Struggle to Organize: Resistance in Canada's Fishery* Clement applied this model, focusing on the "proletarianization" of petty bourgeois producers, and defined five modes of production in Canadian fisheries. These included subsistence production, capitalist (or proletariat) commodity production, and then three other varieties of commodity production defined by markets; independent, dependent, and co-operative.⁴⁵ The curious aspect of this is that the actual production process of the fishers in the latter three categories could be identical, but their market opportunities are different. This would tend to suggest that the analysis still is focused more on exchange than production and class transformations.

In 1987 Eric Sager noted the shortcomings of Frankian dependency theory, paralleling the Latin American theorists. He criticized its identification of capitalism as profit-motivated production for a substantial market rather than as a mode of production, its emphasis on exchange rather than production, and its view that development in one region must

44. Wallace Clement, *Class, Power and Property: Essays of Canadian Society*, Toronto, Methuen, 1983, p.193.

45. Wallace Clement, *The Struggle to Organize: Resistance in Canada's Fishery*, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1986, pp.61-66.

occur at the expense of development in another region.⁴⁶

He noted the new emphasis on the relations between pre-capitalist production and capitalist production and how, for example, Clement now subsumed the "concept of dependency within the social relations of production".⁴⁷ Sager, like the Latin American theorists, noted the descriptive rather than analytical nature of dependency theory, as applied to Maritime data. The region's underdevelopment simply is attributed to dependency, rather than examining causal factors within the society of the region.⁴⁸

Sager cited some strong analytic models, resembling that of Long and Roberts, including the one developed by Steven D. Antler. Antler explained economic stagnation in nineteenth century Newfoundland using modes of production

46. Eric Sager, "Dependency, Underdevelopment, and the Economic History of the Atlantic Provinces", *op. cit.*, pp.118-119.

47. *Ibid.*, pp.119,121, citing Wallace Clement, *The Struggle to Organize: Resistance in Canada's Fishery*, *op. cit.*, and Peter R. Sinclair's *From Traps to Dragnets: Domestic Commodity Production in Northwest Newfoundland, 1850-1982*, St. John's, 1985 as examples of the new approach.

48. *Ibid.*, pp.121-129. Books and articles cited as examples included Ralph Matthews, *The Creation of Regional Dependency*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983; Robert J. Brym, editor, *Regionalism in Canada*, Toronto, Irwin Publishing, 1986; Robert Brym and James Sacouman, editors, *Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada*, Toronto, New Hogtown Press, 1979; and Michael Clow, "Politics and Uneven Capitalist Development", *Studies in Political Economy*, No.14 (Summer 1984), pp.119-129. The Clow article suggested that concentration of capital in Montreal resulted in "de-industrialization" in the Maritimes; Sager showed empirically that industry actually grew in the Maritimes in the period concerned.

and class relationships for analysis.⁴⁹ Ian McKay used an effective model, which focused on the relationship between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, industrial enclaves and disarticulated economies, and the transition from merchant to industrial capitalism, with attention paid to the "dependency" context as well. McKay advised against applying dependency theory as a formula in favour of examining pre-existing internal structures which resulted in "retarded capitalist development".⁵⁰

Sager concluded that a "post-dependency Marxist" model should be used to analyze Maritime underdevelopment. The nature of the resources, low productivity, etc. were all part of the "internal preconditions for underdevelopment" in the region. The model advocated resembles that used by Long and Roberts or McKay, emphasizing the "interaction of production systems in the social formation of the Maritime provinces", particularly between externally-directed

49. Antler found that the merchant class was able to gain control of the fishing economy because of the region's class structure and the relations of production in the fishery. It was the consequent exploitation of the fishers which resulted in the stagnant economy, not dependency on another region; *Ibid.*, pp.130-132, citing Steven D. Antler, "Colonial Exploitation and Economic Stagnation in Nineteenth Century Newfoundland", PhD dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1975.

50. *Ibid.*, citing Ian McKay, "Industry, Work and Community in the Cumberland Coal Fields, 1848-1927", PhD dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1983, and "The Realm of Uncertainty: The Experience of Work in the Cumberland Coalfields, 1870-1930", *Acadiensis*, Vol.XVI, No.1 (Autumn 1986), pp.3-57.

capitalist production and pre-existing regional production.⁵¹

Latin American and Canadian post-dependency theorists agree on the primacy of institutional and social factors in development. Dependency theory did not account for many of the independent variables observed, nor did staples theory, although both were noted as having some relevance in interpretation. An interesting aspect of the post-dependency models, both in Latin America and Canada, is their narrower focus compared to the earlier staples and dependency theories. The new models do not attempt to be universal, but rather to account for underdevelopment by establishing initial conditions in the study area. In part this is due to the emphasis on social analysis, which is a more complex subject than geography, resources or technology. Relationships within a society are also by nature more complex than simple mercantile relationships developed through the sale of commodities in foreign markets. It may also be seen that the newer approach relates back to the Portes models for development, as the emphasis tends away from evolutionary and dependency explanations to one that relates more to "enactment of values", with the individuals in the society assuming larger parts than previously acknowledged.

51. *Ibid.*, pp.135-137.

Application of post-dependency theory to settlement
viability

Institutional and social factors have been identified as paramount in the viability of marginal and frontier communities by writers from various perspectives. Howard Lamar, discussing approaches to interpreting the American frontier, suggested that the role of merchants on the frontier "cannot be exaggerated". He saw this role extending to formal and informal government, and linking merchant capitalism with industrial capitalism. Companies tended to be identified with regions, starting as simple traders, and progressing into higher stages of regional capitalism through time.⁵² Lamar also suggested that more attention be paid to social structures; that family units and "larger social and economic units" should be examined as agents which held society together on the frontier.⁵³ Lamar's suggestions fall within the post-dependency context. Like Norman Long, he identified one group as a critical link between modes of production in a underdeveloped region.

Cole Harris applied a similar emphasis on the role of merchant capital in examining a mining boom and corollary settlement in the Kootenay region of British Columbia. Essentially, he used Innis' theory to explain the patterns

52. Howard R. Lamar, "Persistent Frontier: The West in the Twentieth Century", *The Western Historical Quarterly*, Vol.IV, No.1 (January 1973), pp.12-15.

53. *Ibid.*, pp.15-18.

of development and settlement, but then took this a step further by adding "commercial economies" to the equation. These were said to develop "around the edge" of staple economies, but to have an independent existence, with weaker links to the outside than the staple economies. Harris saw the staple and commercial economies as the "two basic constituents of the economic geography of early Canada". Their juxtaposition on the mining frontier was seen as an integral part of economic and social development.⁵⁴

Like Harris, Rosemary Ommer extended the staples approach to emphasize how linkages from the staple trade acted to affect both the hinterland and the metropolis. Ommer suggested that these linkages can lead to diversification and self-sustained growth, within a socio-economic structure determined by the type of staple production. She concluded that her test region, the Gaspé, remained underdeveloped because the dominant staple trade was controlled by a single firm "whose purpose was profit, not regional development". This led to a "theft" of linkages, whereby the metropolis assumed the benefits which otherwise could have supported the development of the hinterland.⁵⁵

54. Cole Harris, "Industry and the Good Life around Idaho Peak", *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol.LXVI (1985), pp.340-343.

55. Rosemary E. Ommer, *From Outpost to Outport: A Structural Analysis of the Jersey-Gaspé Cod Fishery, 1767-1886*, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991,

Harris and Ommer follow the staples theory in attributing socio-economic conditions to the requirements of production. However, they incorporate aspects of post-dependency theory, with Harris' emphasis on the commercial economy and Ommer's on the linkages and social systems of production.

Although identified with dependency theory, Ralph Matthews emphasized two classes of "community social vitality" in his examination of communities in Newfoundland which were unwilling to participate in government resettlement programmes. His "informal level" was a sense of commitment to the community, while his "formal level" comprised "institutions of socialization" such as family, church, and school, and the "institutions of social control", ranging from gossip to a formal community council. Matthews suggested that both levels of social vitality were needed to maintain a community, as people would not remain unless they had a sense of commitment, as well as basic institutions, such as a school.⁵⁶ Although aligned with dependency theory, Matthews saw social rather than economic factors as the most important in sustaining a town. It was not a chain of externally-conditioned economic relations,

particularly pp.107-140 and 192-199.

56. Ralph Matthews, "Economic Vitality vs. Social Vitality in Regional Development", in Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, Allan Turowetz, editors, *Modernization and the Canadian State*, *op. cit.*, pp.199-200.

but internal social conditions which were viewed as central. Donald Abbe also acknowledged these social factors within an evolutionary framework in explaining the continued existence of a mining town.

Arne Selvik took a more analytical approach to the factors contributing to the viability of marginal communities, based on Norwegian examples. Selvik offered a concise definition of such a community, which is equally applicable to British Columbia:

A marginal community is a locality that performs functions in the periphery of the economic, social and political life of the society. It is usually geographically isolated, with poor and/or costly communication with the rest of the country. It usually carries out simple, low-skilled production based on natural resource extraction or processing. It often lacks the social and political institutions that constitute the foundation for communities in general, and it consequently has a marginal power base.⁵⁷

Selvik offered causal factors in the creation of such communities, including concentrated remote availability of resources in demand on the world market, active corporations, and a non-interventionist state. He also used an evolutionary model in describing the development of such towns.⁵⁸ Selvik noted that most of the literature dealing with resource towns was descriptive, rather than analytic.

57. Arne Selvik, "The State of Marginal Communities: Past, Present and Future Developments", in T.B. Brealey, C.C. Neil, P.W. Newton, editors, *Resource Communities: Settlement and Workforce Issues*, Melbourne, CSIRO, c.1988, p.22.

58. *Ibid.*, pp.20,26.

As such, he offered three "theoretical directions" for research; transaction cost theory, local corporatism, and community mobility.⁵⁹

The first of these, transaction cost theory, is based on the motives and mechanisms of corporations operating in marginal areas. Selvik followed O. Williamson's model in defining firms as "governance structures", which operate within the behavioural assumptions of "bounded rationality" and "opportunism". This cynical but realistic view of corporate actions suggested that in remote areas these institutions had high specificity in means of production and labour, so would want long-term guarantees of resources, by lease or licence, but would abandon an area immediately based on outside factors such as commodity price shifts.⁶⁰

Selvik's second model, local corporatism, focuses on the situation where lobbying by special interest groups may influence the policies of a democratically elected government. Selvik argued that this is horizontal interest representation, creating a different mechanism for affecting the market, and implies "neo-mercantilism" - government intervention on the behalf of specific regions or

59. *Ibid.*, pp.31-32.

60. *Ibid.*, pp.32-33. Selvik based his model on that of O. Williamson, "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes", *Journal of Economic Literature*, December 1981, pp.1537-1568.

industries.⁶¹

His final model, community mobility, involves examination of the factors required to maintain the socio-economic status of a community over time, or in other words to become less dependent on the dominant industrial base. Selvik suggested that community size is central to this, with a "critical mass" required to have an effect within political organizations and company boardrooms.⁶²

Selvik's thesis uses two external and one internal factor as explanations for the continued existence of a community. The first external factor is the attitude of the corporations operating in marginal regions. A parallel may be drawn between this factor and dependency theory; the region is acted upon by forces relating to markets, resources and labour, all of which are beyond the control of the regional population. His local corporatism is essentially a refinement of this, with government becoming another factor in the control of the hinterland by the metropole. However, Selvik's internal factor, community mobility, relates more strongly to Portes' enactment of values, where the local society is able to have an effect on determining its development. Selvik's approach here is again somewhat more economically-controlled than other authors such as Matthews. Selvik contends that in the

61. *Ibid.*, pp.33-34.

62. *Ibid.*, p.35.

absence of a substantial base of socio-economic power, the community is helpless to affect its existence.

Aspects of post-dependency theory in British Columbia historiography

Much of the literature dealing with the economic expansion of British Columbia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has acknowledged the existence of factors other than regional dependency. Barry Gough suggested that the character of the British Columbia frontier was shaped by geography, resources, and the hinterland-metropolis dichotomy, but also also emphasized the role of British colonial society and politics in determining the development of the region.⁶³ Patricia Marchak suggested that class, institutions, and region comprised the factors contributing to social conflict. Frankian dependency was given similar weight to class or institutional analysis to explain how B.C.'s social structure developed.⁶⁴ Later, Marchak examined the social structure of the B.C. fishing industry, which was established in the absence of a previous pre-capitalist system, hence without pre-established social relations. In

63. Barry M. Gough, "The Character of the British Columbia Frontier", *B.C. Studies*, No.32 (Winter 1976-77), p.40.

64. Patricia Marchak, "Class, Regional and Institutional Sources of Social Conflict in B.C.", *B.C. Studies*, No.27 (Autumn 1975), pp.30-49.

this situation, the canning companies were seen as the primary determiners of the system of production.⁶⁵ They imported shore labour through Japanese and Chinese labour contractors, or "captured" local Native labour. The companies also controlled fishers, either directly, as on the north coast, or indirectly, due to the lack of market options for independent fishers.⁶⁶

John McMullan also attributed the form of these "social relations of production" in the B.C. fishery to the processors and the problems they faced.⁶⁷ McMullan offered an example of race interest taking precedence over class interest, in the case of the lobbying of government by white fishers to eliminate Japanese licences on the coast. This

65. Patricia Marchak, "Uncommon Property", in Patricia Marchak, Neil Guppy, John McMullan, editors, *Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-processing Industries in British Columbia*, op. cit., pp.20-22.

66. *Ibid.*, pp.22-25. Marchak, like Wallace Clement, found that fishers were primarily labour, although with some of the appurtenances of capital. Shoreworkers were unequivocally labour. On the north coast the majority of the fishers were tied to the canneries through licencing or share arrangements in a clear labour role. Elsewhere, there was the phenomenon of the independent fishers, basically simple commodity producers who assumed the risks of capital in the place of the companies, but had relatively few market options.

67. John McMullan, "State, Capital, and the B.C. Salmon-Fishing Industry", in Patricia Marchak, Neil Guppy, John McMullan, editors, *Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-processing Industries in British Columbia*, op. cit., p.107. The problems he noted as contributing to the system of production were: competition with American producers both for the resource and markets; overcapacity, or the tendency to set up canneries to handle the maximum load at the risk of overcapitalization; and the need for a large but seasonal labour force.

sanction by one group of labour was directed at another group of labour, contrary to the interests of the capitalists.⁶⁸

A number of writers have acknowledged the importance of B.C.-based entrepreneurs in the development of the province. Keith Ralston noted the central role of Victoria commission merchants in the B.C. salmon canning industry in the late nineteenth century, both capitalizing canneries and marketing the product.⁶⁹ He also refuted the hypothesis that San Francisco was the metropolis for pre-railway B.C. Ralston described a "triangle of trade" which included

68. *Ibid.*, pp.111-112. The issue of race and class was debated in *B.C. Studies* by Peter Ward and Rennie Warburton, with the former questioning the concept of class in defining social structures and boundaries in pre-WW II British Columbia. Ward suggested that most individuals working as labour did not feel collectively that they were the working class, but rather that cleavages were based on race; W. Peter Ward, "Class and Race in the Social Structure of British Columbia, 1870-1939", *B.C. Studies*, No.45 (Spring 1980), pp.17-35. Warburton, on the other hand, claimed class was paramount, and that the degree of racial segregation documented was in response to the exploitation of Asians and Natives by the employer and landholder classes; Rennie Warburton, "Race and Class in British Columbia: A Comment", *B.C. Studies*, No.49 (Spring 1981), pp.79-85. Probably the demarcation was not as clear as suggested by either of the authors above; Asians, in the form of employers and labour contractors, were documented as exploiting people of their own race in enclave situations. In peripheral areas, where Asian or Native labour was more important, the population smaller, and social restrictions weaker, the attitudes were often more liberal than where large populations were competing for jobs.

69. H. Keith Ralston, "Patterns of Trade and Investment of the Pacific Coast, 1867-1892: The Case of the British Columbia Salmon Canning Industry", in J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston, editors, *Historical Essays on British Columbia*, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976, pp.171-172.

direct and independent links with the United Kingdom, as well as cross-connections between San Francisco and B.C.⁷⁰ This interpretation not only limits the usefulness of simple dependency in Frankian terms, but introduces merchant capitalists as key players in the development of the coastal economy.

Robert McDonald reiterated the importance of the Victoria commission merchants in all the leading resource industries in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.⁷¹ The decline of these merchants, and Victoria as an economic centre, was attributed to the construction of the railway, and the subsequent development of Vancouver, with greater eastern involvement.⁷² This change, at the end of the nineteenth century, could have signalled the start of a clearer core-periphery relationship between central Canada and the coast of British Columbia.

D.G. Paterson suggested that in B.C. in the 1890-1914 period, the small population, lack of infrastructure, propensity to import, and abundant natural resources meant that resource extractive industry had to import capital,

70. *Ibid.*, pp.173-175.

71. Robert A.J. McDonald, "Victoria, Vancouver and the Economic Development of British Columbia, 1886-1914", in Peter Ward and Robert McDonald, editors, *British Columbia: Historical Readings*, Vancouver, Douglas and McIntyre, 1981, pp.371.

72. *Ibid.*, pp.371-380.

primarily from London.⁷³ He examined the role of "regional entrepreneurs", who were active in mobilizing this foreign capital to supplement domestic funds. Their success seemed to relate to their previous links with external capital; an example cited was Alvo von Alvensleben [active in the Moresby Island fishery], who raised all his capital from a narrow, aristocratic social group in Germany.⁷⁴ Although direct investment was also an acknowledged factor, this article supports the strength of the local entrepreneurial class in the development of the coastal economy. Rather than a clear dependency situation, there is a local aspect at work; the capital was foreign, but the control and assignment of the capital was local.

Conclusions: a model for the development of South Moresby

Although each of the theoretical models reviewed has some relevance in explaining the underdevelopment of the South Moresby region, none of them seem to provide an entirely appropriate analytic framework. The staples theory or classical economic theory has been applied to many resource industries and related settlements. However, there are some difficulties in applying it to South Moresby. The island location made transportation to markets difficult but

73. D.G. Paterson, "European Financial Capital and British Columbia: An essay on the Role of the Regional Entrepreneur", *B.C. Studies*, No.21 (Spring 1974), p.33.

74. *Ibid.*, pp.35-46.

not impossible, especially given government-subsidized shipping. Technology and markets remained the same for South Moresby as for any other extractive resource-based area in British Columbia, so would not be a variable. Classical economic theory would suggest that a paucity of resources, the small scale of industry, or market factors resulted in the economic failure of the region. However, ventures ranging from petty producers to major corporations proved to be sustainable in South Moresby, and settlement failed in spite of the continued operation of at least four large businesses in the 1930s. Although technology, markets and geography all helped to shape the development of the region, they would not provide an explanation for the particular pattern of development in South Moresby. While the evolutionary model used for analyzing various resource booms and related settlement is useful, it seems most applicable where there is only one viable resource. In South Moresby the plentiful resources made diversification easy, if there was the will and the capital to do so. Therefore, although some aspects of the staples theory are relevant, it does not seem to form an inclusive analytical framework.

Some aspects of dependency theory and its "development of underdevelopment" premise are applicable, such as the core-periphery relationship existing between the urban areas of B.C. and the coast. As suggested by the post-dependency

theorists, this theory is probably best used to provide a broad economic context, with the development of a region determined more by internal conditions. In the case of South Moresby, the commodities produced were sold on markets outside the region. Although this linkage was essential to the overall economic existence of the region, thus rendering it dependent, it does not seem to have been as important to the region's development as internal factors of production and society.

The various post-dependency models seem to offer the strongest analytical frameworks in this case, with their emphasis on internal conditions in a region. In the case of South Moresby, there was no pre-capitalist enterprise existing, with the exception of Native subsistence activity, and consequently no pre-capitalist society, in the sense used in Latin America or the Maritimes. This means that the post-dependency focus on the relations between production systems does not really apply. Also, the issue of pre-existing social conditions relating to class and race is largely irrelevant, in the absence of a pre-capitalist society. In essence, all the social development in the area was determined by introduced capitalist enterprise.

However, there were distinct differences in the modes of production exhibited by these various capitalist ventures. By analyzing the differences between the systems of production employed in the various extractive industries

in the region, it may be possible to determine to what extent each enterprise contributed to settlement viability. The systems of production and consequent development in the region owed something to the resource being exploited, the environment, institutional factors such as government, and market conditions. However, in the absence of any pre-existing systems, the primary determiners of the systems of production were the entrepreneurs who initiated them. As such, the analysis will focus on modes of production, based on the origins and intent of the entrepreneurs active in the region.

Development of the South Moresby region involved the participation of a wide range of individuals. Because the Native population had left the area in the latter part of the nineteenth century, there was no pre-industrial population base, and no permanent settlements. The people involved in the development all came in from elsewhere, in response to economic opportunities. It was the copper boom of the early twentieth century which first attracted a non-Native population, and led to the development of other industries. In general, the responses to these opportunities fell within one of four overall classes of enterprise.

The first class included those ventures which were initiated by South Moresby-based entrepreneurs, generally using their own or locally-generated capital. These local

entrepreneurs may be defined by their residence. These were the people who actually staked claims, dug ore, packed fish, or otherwise worked in the region as petty producers. In some instances they were also merchant or industrial capitalists, speculators or agents. The common factor was their presence, and their desire to make a living in the region.

The second class comprised those businesses which were established by urban-based merchant capitalists. These entrepreneurs equate to D.G. Paterson's "regional entrepreneurs" or Norman Long's "economic brokers", serving as links between peripheral industry and core capital. Although fewer in number, the impact of these ventures was often greater, given the greater capital that could be brought to bear.

The third class, which could also be considered a subgroup of the first and second classes, was made up of the various Japanese business initiatives in the region. In some cases these were of significant size, capitalization and longevity, but in other cases were small scale ad-hoc ventures carried out by Japanese fishermen, miners, or labourers when not occupied with their regular jobs. Although this group could be included in the preceding two, there was an ethnic enclave aspect present. The Japanese origins of the entrepreneurs meant that their social and business connections were strongest with the rest of the

Japanese community, both in South Moresby and the province as a whole.

The fourth class included those corporate entities which operated camps or plants within South Moresby, usually as a component of a larger network. The ownership and control of these corporations was always extra-regional and often extra-provincial. Rather than an individual working in the region, or an entrepreneur bringing development capital to the region, the actions of this class of enterprise were determined in board rooms elsewhere.

It would be expected that each of these groups would relate to the South Moresby region in a different way, and that commitment to the area and impact on development would vary substantially. Although factors other than economics could contribute to the viability of a community or region, in South Moresby there were few institutional entities [Matthews' formal level of community social vitality] above the level of the family or the small enterprise. This meant that it was primarily the presence of some economic opportunity which sustained development. Once the local or regional entrepreneur was replaced by the core-based corporate entity, the economic linkages to the settlements of South Moresby were replaced by linkages to the metropolis, and the underdevelopment of the region was assured.

Chapter 2: Copper mining and the initial conditions for non-
Native settlement: 1899-1929

Introduction

From the end of the maritime fur trade period until the First World War the focus of non-Haida activity in the South Moresby region was copper mining. In the early 1850s there was an abortive gold rush to the northwest coast of Moresby Island, which brought a number of miners to that area. A decade later, attempts were made to locate and mine copper in two areas on the east coast of Moresby Island. One of these ventures was on Cumshewa Inlet, north of the subject area, but the other, that of Francis Poole and the Queen Charlotte Mining Company, focused on the islands of Skincuttle Inlet, near the southern end of Moresby Island. Poole's mining efforts lasted less than two years, and were unsuccessful in terms of establishing a viable industry, but pointed the way for future activity.¹

The venture of the Queen Charlotte Mining Company remained unique for almost forty years. By the end of the nineteenth century a number of factors had changed, creating the conditions which supported copper exploration and the

1. Francis Poole, *Queen Charlotte Islands: A Narrative of Discovery and Adventure in the North Pacific*, Vancouver, J.J. Douglas Ltd., 1972 [first edition 1872]. Poole's lack of success was due to a variety of factors, primarily related to production. Prominent among them was antagonism from the still sizable Haida population in the region, and labour problems with his imported work force.




Figure 2.1 - The Jedway and Lockeport mining districts.
 Key: 1. Copper Island group 2. Copper Queen group
 3. Ikeda Mines 4. Swede group
 [////] mining district

eventual "copper rush" in the region. First, on a global level, the advent of large-scale electrical power and machinery created a huge demand for this essential conducting metal. The presence of the copper ore resource in the South Moresby area had been established by Poole in the 1860s, and was confirmed by the 1878 explorations of George Dawson, carried out for the Geological Survey of Canada.² By the late 1880s the southern and east coast Haida populations had moved their permanent villages out of the copper mining areas. This meant that Native opposition to mining, which had created difficulties for the Queen Charlotte Mining Company, was no longer a factor.

As with the other resource extraction activities in the region, twentieth century copper mining ventures were initiated by four classes of enterprise; class 1, local entrepreneurs; class 2, regional entrepreneurs; class 3, Japanese entrepreneurs; and class 4, corporations. Most of the initial claims were staked by local entrepreneurs, who were veterans of mining in other districts, such as the Kootenays or the Klondike. With the easing of the nineteenth century labour shortage in British Columbia, many of these individuals, familiar with prospecting and mining techniques, were at loose ends. The fading of the Klondike

2. Dawson's findings were published in George M. Dawson, "Report on the Queen Charlotte Islands", in Geological Survey of Canada, *Report of Progress for 1878-79*, Montreal, Dawson Brothers, 1880.

gold rush left a group of such men on the Alaska and northern British Columbia coast, near the Queen Charlotte Islands. This provided a population of local entrepreneurs, who were attracted to speculative mining ventures.

Such efforts were viable in South Moresby, due to a resource which could be located and extracted with minimal capital, and a market for small ore shipments. Most of the early locations were surface finds, where ore was exposed on or near the shore. Prior to the introduction of diamond drill exploration, inland strikes were usually based on surface exposures along the beds of streams followed up from the shore. If copper ore was found some adjacent stripping would be done to determine the boundaries of a mineral claim.

Besides easily-procured ore, the other necessary factor was a viable market. On the northwest coast, there were regional smelters which would either purchase small lots of ore or process it at a per-ton cost. Sometimes Moresby Island ore was shipped as far away as Tacoma, Washington, for processing.³ The Tyee smelter, in Ladysmith on Vancouver Island, was the most common destination in the boom years. In 1909 it was charging \$3.25 per ton freight

3. Abe Heino was described as sending out a few tons each year in his own boat to Tacoma. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1926*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1927, p.A67. It was noted in 1913 that the copper mine at Cumshewa was sending ore to Tacoma as well; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, June 16, 1913, p.2.

and smelting on the general run of ore from Moresby Island. It took two days for the ore to reach Ladysmith, and on the following day the miner would receive 75% of the value of the ore, with final settlement within fifteen days.⁴ It was this quick turnaround and full service which made it possible for even small producers to realize some profit. In 1913 Abe Heino, on Copper Island, was said to net about \$9.00 on each ton of ore shipped, although the profit would fluctuate widely based on the copper percentage in the ore and current market price.⁵

Often more lucrative than mining copper was the practice of mining capital. Speculation in claims was prevalent among local entrepreneurs, who would locate a property, do some preliminary development, and then attempt to sell or bond it to investors of classes 2, 3, or 4. Often the local resident would be retained by an absent owner to manage on-site development. In the pre-WWI period this practice could pay large dividends, with bonding prices on desirable properties often in the \$50,000 to \$100,000 range.⁶ Relative to the value of the ore, these were high

4. Prior to this, the cost of smelting copper ore had been \$4.00-\$6.00 per ton, without shipping; *Queen Charlotte News*, February 20, 1909, p.3.

5. British Columbia, Ministry of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1914*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1915, p.K101.

6. Rumoured prices were sometimes much greater than actual prices, such as in 1908 when it was suggested that the Granby Consolidated Corporation had bought the Swede group on Klunkwoi Bay for \$1,000,000; *Queen Charlotte News*, October

prices, and a few locators became comfortable, if not rich, by selling or bonding their claims. Additionally, continued employment as mine managers provided an economic incentive for some of these local entrepreneurs to remain in the district after disposing of their interests.

The "copper boom" in South Moresby lasted from approximately 1905 to 1909. It was part of a broader phenomenon in the Queen Charlotte Islands, which also saw copper mining activity in the neighbouring areas of Tasu Inlet and Cumshewa Inlet. However, the two primary copper mining districts in the Queen Charlotte Islands were the Skincuttle Inlet/Harriet Harbour/Huston Inlet/Ikeda Bay/Collison Bay region, towards the southeast end of Moresby Island, and the Klunkwoi Bay/Apex Mountain region, midway up Moresby's east coast. In each case, a town developed as a service and residential centre for the mining district. At the south end it was Jedway, which developed on Harriet Harbour, and further north Lockeport grew up on Klunkwoi Bay.

Although activity declined after 1909, a substantial part of the population of the region remained dependent on copper exploration or mining until the 1920s. The activity remained concentrated in the two mining districts established around the towns of Jedway and Lockeport in the 1905-1907 period. The mining population was made up of

17,1908.

those individuals who had been attracted to South Moresby in the copper boom, and who for various reasons had decided to remain in the region and in the industry. The majority of the mining population after 1909 fell within the definition of "local entrepreneur". They were resident in the region, usually in Jedway or Lockeport, and were working on their own claims or managing development for regional entrepreneurs, using outside capital.

Copper mining in the Jedway and Lockeport districts: 1899-1929

The tables below provide an overview of the pattern of mining activity in the southern or Jedway district and the northern or Lockeport district of the region from the first locations on Copper Island in 1899 to the final activity on Huston Inlet in 1929-30.⁷ The tables are laid out geographically, with the various centres of copper mining activity listed across the top, and the activity analyzed in

7. The data in these tables is summarized from the Department of Mines annual *Reports of the Minister of Mines* from 1900-1931 inclusive, British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, surveyors' fieldbooks relating to Queen Charlotte Islands mining claims, and newspaper reports in *The Empire* [Prince Rupert] 1907-1909, the *Queen Charlotte News* 1908-1913, and the *Queen Charlotte Islander* 1911-1914. The variables listed include whether new claims were staked, and the date of the first location in an area, the class of entrepreneurs involved, whether the claims were bonded or sold, whether development occurred and which class of entrepreneur was responsible, investment, and production. In many cases data such as investment and production are not available, so there are some gaps in the table.

five year periods, with the exception of 1920-29, when copper mining was abandoned in the region. The mining areas are arranged chronologically, based on the date of first locations, with the Jedway district table preceding the Lockeport district table.

Table 2.1: Summary of copper mining activity in the Jedway district: 1899-1929

	Copper Island	Skincuttle Inlet	Burnaby Island	Harriet Harbour
1899:				
-new claims	yes [first 1899]	-	-	-
-venture class	1	-	-	-
-bonded/sold	-	-	-	-
-development/class	yes/1	-	-	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	-	-	-	-
1900-1904:				
-new claims	-	yes [first 1903]	yes [first 1903]	-
-venture class	1	1	1	-
-bonded/sold	-	-	-	-
-development/class	yes/1	yes/1	yes/1	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	25 tons [1903]	-	-	-
1905-1909:				
-new claims	yes	yes	yes	yes [first 1905]
-venture class	1	1	1,2	1,2,4
-bonded/sold	-	-	-	yes
-development/class	yes/1	yes/1	yes/1,2	yes/1,2
-\$ invested	-	-	-	\$1,000,000 ¹
-production [year]	yes [1908]	-	-	-
1910-1914:				
-new claims	-	yes	yes	yes
-venture class	1,2	1	1,2	1,2
-bonded/sold	yes	-	-	-
-development/class	yes/2	yes/1	yes/1,2	yes/1,2
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	-	yes [1912]	-	-
1915-1919:				
-new claims	-	-	-	yes
-venture class	1,2	1	1,2	1,2
-bonded/sold	yes	-	-	yes
-development/class	yes/2	yes/1	yes/1	yes/2
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	40 tons [1917]	yes [1917]	-	42 tons [1916-1920]
1920-1929:				
-new claims	-	-	-	-
-venture class	mining ended	1	1	mining ended by 1929
-bonded/sold	-	-	-	-
-development/class	-	yes/1 [to 1923]	yes/1 [to 1921]	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	-	-	-	-

	Ikeda Bay	Collison Bay	Huston Inlet	Carpenter Bay; Kunghit Island etc.
1905-1909:				
-new claims	yes [first 1906]	yes [first 1906]	yes [first 1907]	yes [first 1908]
-venture class	3	1,2	1,2,4	1,2,3,4
-bonded/sold	-	yes	yes	yes
-development/class	yes/3	yes/1,2	yes/1,2,4	yes/1,2,3,4
-\$ invested	\$1,000,000 ²	\$500,000 ³	-	-
-production [year]	10,700 tons [1907-1909]	-	-	-
1910-1914:				
-new claims	-	-	-	-
-venture class	2/3	1,2	1,2	-
-bonded/sold	yes	yes	yes	-
-development/class	yes/3	yes/1,2	yes/1,2	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	80 tons [1914]	15 tons [1913]	-	-
1915-1919:				
-new claims	-	-	-	-
-venture class	2/3	1,2	1,2	-
-bonded/sold	-	yes	yes	-
-development/class	yes/3	-	yes/1,2	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	2,974 tons [1915-1919]	-	-	-
1920-1929:				
-new claims	-	-	-	-
-venture class	mine shut 1920	ended by 1925	ended by 1930	-
-bonded/sold	-	yes	yes	-
-development	-	-	-	-
-\$ invested	-	-	-	-
-production [year]	-	-	-	-

1. This was the total investment in mines sold and developed around Jedway in 1908-1909, including the Jedway sawmill. It may have included the surrounding Skincuttle Inlet and Huston Inlet regions; *Queen Charlotte News*, October 30, 1909, p.2.

2. This was the total invested in mines sold and developed around Ikeda Bay in 1908-1909; *Queen Charlotte News*, October 30, 1909, p.2. However, a little later Ikeda Mines was reported to have sold for \$200,000, and the original capitalization was given as \$75,000; *ibid.*, December 18, 1909, p.1.

3. This figure summarized investment in mines sold and developed on Collison Bay in 1908-1909, and may have included the more southerly Carpenter Bay and Kunghit Island areas as well; *ibid.*, October 30, 1909, p.2.

Table 2.2: Summary of copper mining activity in the
Lockeport district: 1907-1929

	Klunkwoi Bay	Anna Lake and Apex Mountain
1907-1909:		
-new claims	yes [first 1907]	yes [first 1908]
-venture class	1,2	1,2
-bonded/sold	yes	yes
-development/class	yes/1,2	yes/1,2
-\$ invested	\$1,000,000 ¹	-
-production [year]	-	-
1910-1914:		
-new claims	-	-
-venture class	1,2	1,2
-bonded/sold	yes	yes
-development/class	yes/1,2	yes/1,2
-\$ invested	-	-
-production [year]	-	-
1915-1919:		
-new claims	-	-
-venture class	1,2,4	1
-bonded/sold	yes	-
-development/class	yes/1,2,4	-
-\$ invested	-	-
-production [year]	-	-
1920-1929:		
-new claims	-	-
-venture class	ended by 1928	ended by 1926
-bonded/sold	-	-
-development/class	-	-
-\$ invested	-	-
-production [year]	-	-

1. This figure summarized investment in mines sold and developed around Klunkwoi Bay in 1908-1909, and may have included the Anna Lake and Apex Mountain areas as well; *Queen Charlotte News*, October 30, 1909, p.2.

The copper rush on Moresby Island seemed to follow an evolutionary pattern, as suggested for other mineral booms, with location followed by rush, capitalization and intensive exploitation and decline. However, the form of the copper mining activity, and its continued viability, was determined primarily by the class of entrepreneur that established the enterprise. The earliest locations, around Skincuttle Inlet, were initiated by local entrepreneurs or petty producers. From the table it may be seen that much of the activity on Copper Island, Burnaby Island, and around Skincuttle Inlet remained at this level. Although there was some development by regional entrepreneurs, the majority of the mining from 1899 to the 1920s was done by petty producers, who occasionally shipped a few tons of ore. The next mining districts, Harriet Harbour and Ikeda Bay, represented capitalization and intense development, carried out by regional and Japanese entrepreneurs respectively. The later-arriving petty producers and regional entrepreneurs found these districts largely tied up, so moved south to Collison Bay, west to Huston Inlet, and south to Carpenter Bay and beyond. The mining around Collison Bay involved small groups of claims, with lower capitalization and less intensive development than Harriet Harbour or Ikeda Bay. The other areas stayed peripheral. Although there was some corporate activity in the region at this time, such as the Tye Copper Company assembling a group of claims between

Harriet Harbour and Huston Inlet, corporate entrepreneurs played no direct role in the copper boom.

Besides Harriet Harbour and Ikeda Bay, the other centre of development capitalized through a regional entrepreneur was on Klunkwoi Bay. Activity there began as prospectors moved north up Moresby Island as claims were taken in the Jedway district. This led to intense mining activity in the Lockeport district, with over one hundred and thirty claims staked by August 1908.⁸ The copper mining-based development of the region had taken its final form, centred around the two regionally-capitalized enterprises at Jedway and Lockeport, and supported by the Japanese-capitalized Ikeda Mines.

As shown in the tables, little ore was shipped from South Moresby copper mines, with the exception of Ikeda Mines. The copper boom ended with the closing of Ikeda Mines in 1909, and the failure of the Jedway or Lockeport mines to come into production. Although there were various attempts for the next twenty years to revitalize the industry, they were unsuccessful. Ikeda Mines produced again in the years 1914-1920, but on a much smaller scale than before. In the decline period, local, regional, and Japanese entrepreneurs all remained active in South Moresby, with the latter group again the most successful. Although some corporate exploration was done in the Lockeport

8. *Queen Charlotte News*, August 29, 1908.

district by the Granby Company, no development was ever carried out. The rise and fall of the mining-based development of South Moresby was based on the efforts of the other three classes of entrepreneurs.

It will be useful to examine the activities of the representatives of these three classes of copper mining entrepreneurs who played the largest part in determining the development of the region. Serving as examples of local entrepreneurs will be Abe Heino, who staked the first copper claims in the region, and the partners Ike Thompson and L.T. Watson, who staked the Jedway claims and started the copper rush. Two of the leading regional entrepreneurs were J.S. McMillin, responsible for the development of Jedway, and Johann Wulffsohn, who played a similar role in Lockeport. Finally, the Japanese entrepreneur Arichika Ikeda was the owner and operator of the only commercially successful copper mine in the region.

Local entrepreneurs

The first locator in the region was the Klondike veteran Abe Heino, who staked the *Skincuttle Entrance* claim on Copper Island in 1899.⁹ It and two other claims made up the *Skincuttle* or *Copper Island* group. By 1903 a first

9. This was in the area examined by Poole almost forty years earlier; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.8, fieldbook 1587/1912, L.I.7227/12.

trial shipment of about 25 tons of ore had been made.¹⁰ Heino worked his claims on a small scale for the rest of the decade, shipping limited quantities of ore.¹¹ As a typical class 1 miner, he lived on his claim, and produced ore himself. Given the nature of the resource and the market, Heino provided an example of the viability of this option. By taking out a few tons of ore at a time, and with minimal cost of production, such a petty producer could survive economically on small-scale copper mining in the region.

In 1911 Heino began a more intensive phase of operations which continued for the next two years, bringing in machinery and a ten man crew to his Copper Island holdings.¹² This development may have been enabled by outside investment, as in 1913 the property was said to be

10. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1904*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1905, p.H210. The other claims were the *Trust*, located in 1901 by Albin Hendrickson, and the *Golden Gate*, located by Heino in 1908; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.8, fieldbooks 1588/1912, 1589/1912, L.I.7227/12.

11. For instance, British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1909*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1910, p.J60, described a small shipment being prepared in 1908.

12. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3; *ibid.*, February 5, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, April 8, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, July 8, 1912, p.1; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1912*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1913, p.K76; *ibid.*, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1913*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1914, p.K110.

under bond to English capitalists.¹³ By 1925 mining on Copper Island was described in the past tense.¹⁴

The rush attracted another sort of local entrepreneur, exemplified by L.T. Watson and Ike Thompson, who concentrated on the claims as commodities. Their first claims, *Togo*, *Copper Queen*, *Reco*, and *Modoc*, were located around Harriet Harbour in December 1905.¹⁵ Thompson was a veteran of the Klondike gold rush, while Watson came to the Queen Charlotte Islands in 1905 as part of an Alaskan venture prospecting for oil claims on Graham Island.¹⁶ When Arichika Ikeda of the Japanese firm Awaya, Ikeda & Company came to the Queen Charlotte Islands in early 1906, Watson and Thompson tried to sell him the *Copper Queen* group, but the high asking price encouraged him to search

13. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, April 14, 1913, p.1. This may explain a single 1917 reference to the "owners of the *Quinitsa* claim, on Copper Island, just outside of Jedway harbour" shipping forty tons of copper ore to the Anyox smelter; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1918*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1919, p.F74. The description seems to fit Heino's claim. Perhaps *Quinitsa* was a name assigned by the "English capitalists" while they held the bond on the property.

14. *Ibid.*, *Report*, 1924, p.A44; *ibid.*, *Report*, 1926, p.A67.

15. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 1078/1908; *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 242/1908; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1130/08; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1131/08.

16. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., pp.57,184.

for other copper deposits.¹⁷ This attempt to sell the claims immediately after staking them suggests that Thompson and Watson were interested in the properties as commodities rather than as mines.¹⁸

This approach could be lucrative financially. Thompson realized substantial profits on his exploration and resale efforts around Jedway. In the fall of 1907, after selling the *Copper Queen* group to McMillin, he was referred to as "Lucky" Ike Thompson, and a 1910 newspaper article noted his wealth, acquired through his efforts in the region.¹⁹ Watson and Thompson's success in locating claims led to a more general rush in the spring of 1906. At first this was centred on Harriet Harbour, then spread to the surrounding Ikeda Bay, Collison Bay, and Huston Inlet areas.

Regional entrepreneurs

The local entrepreneurs found the primary market for their claims among regional entrepreneurs, who could assemble more substantial capital to develop a property. The second phase of mining development around Harriet

17. Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, Jedway, Jedway, B.C. Commercial Association, c.1909, p.37.

18. However, Watson did continue to develop his remaining Harriet Harbour property, spending about \$600 in 1908 on the *Togo* and two other claims; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J60.

19. *The Empire*, September 21, 1907, p.4; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 4, 1910, p.4.

Harbour was largely conditioned by John S. McMillin, a Seattle capitalist and Washington State senator.²⁰

Although American, he was typical of the class two urban-based regional entrepreneurs active on Moresby Island. In the summer of 1906 McMillin purchased his first Harriet Harbour claim from the locator, A.E. Knapp, when the latter visited Seattle.²¹ Knapp returned to Harriet Harbour in the fall of 1906, accompanied by Paul H. McMillin, who located the *Pine Log* claim, later the site of the town of Jedway.²²

By 1907 Watson and Thompson had bonded their *Copper Queen*, *Reco*, and *Modoc* claims to McMillin.²³ He reputedly had paid a total bond of \$125,000 on the property, with \$40,000 cash in advance.²⁴ McMillin's *Copper Queen* group took in most of the southern part of the shore of the inlet, and extended into the hills around it. Mining focused on

20. *Queen Charlotte News*, February 20, 1909, p.5.

21. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.2, fieldbook 243/1908. Knapp was actively staking claims on Harriet Harbour throughout the summer of 1906, sometimes with L.T. Watson; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1310/08; *ibid.*, P.H.11, fieldbook 2665/1913.

22. *Ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 243/1908; *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 892/08. Paul McMillin was presumably related to John McMillin; he seems to have served as the latter's field representative.

23. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, *op. cit.*, p.L67; *ibid.*, *Report, 1909*, p.J60.

24. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, p.2.

the *Copper Queen* claim, where an ore deposit was exposed by an open cut in 1907.²⁵ The following year six men were working, and a substantial quantity of ore was placed on the dump.²⁶ In spite of this the mine did not become a commercial producer. Initially, this was explained as a holdup due to a 1907 lawsuit over boundaries between one of McMillin's claims and Watson's *Tait* claim.²⁷ However, even after this was resolved, the anticipated intensive development never occurred.²⁸ More significant than McMillin's mine was the ancillary development on the shore of Harriet Harbour. In 1907 the "Copper Queen Company" erected a wharf, cabins, and a retail store on the *Pine Log* mineral claim.²⁹ This shoreline complex, which formed the nucleus of the new town of Jedway, was paid for with the regional entrepreneur's capital.

From 1908 until the late 1920s, only the assessment-work required to keep the claims active was done on McMillin's property on Harriet Harbour.³⁰ In 1928 the

25. *Ibid.*, June 15, 1908, p.2; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908, op. cit.*, p.L66.

26. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1909*, pp.J59-J60.

27. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1908*, p.L67.

28. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1910*, p.K71.

29. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, p.2. The *Pine Log* claim was District Lot 88.

30. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, pp.J59-J60; *ibid.*, *Reports, 1910 to 1929*, various pages.

renamed *McMillin* group included the "*Reco, Modock, Sandwich Fraction, Copper Queen, Magnet, Moresby Island, and Eagle Tree*" claims. The ore on the dump was visually estimated to have higher copper concentrations than earlier assay results had suggested, but no ore had been shipped, or further development occurred.³¹

In spite of his failure to develop a shipping mine, *McMillin's* intent with the *Copper Queen* group seemed to be to establish a working mine. The acquisition of claims, the development on the claims, and the establishment of a shoreline complex in support of the mine all provide evidence of this purpose.

In contrast were the actions of the regional entrepreneur *Johann Wulffsohn* in the *Lockeport* district. Mining activity around *Klunkwoi Bay* began in January 1907 when local entrepreneurs *Nels Larsen, Nels Pearson, and Alexander Rogers* located the eight claims of the *Swede* group on the south side of the bay. Initial work revealed a large low-grade deposit of copper ore, assaying from 2.0 to 2.9% copper, with traces of silver and gold. Although concentration of the ore would be required, it was thought that easy mining and shipping would allow a viable

31. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1929*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1930, p.C60.

operation.³² Almost immediately Wulffsohn, a Vancouver-based entrepreneur and the former German consul in that city, took an option on the property for \$160,000, and attempted unsuccessfully to re-sell it.³³ In 1908 Wulffsohn had a crew working, which confirmed a "vast tonnage of low grade ore".³⁴ Various rumors circulated concerning the sale of the Swede group. In June 1908 the Tye Copper Company was said to be interested in the property, and in October the Granby Consolidated Mining & Smelting Company was rumoured to have paid a million dollars for it. However, Wulffsohn was still bringing in engineers and capitalists to promote the group in the spring of 1909.³⁵

In 1910 Wulffson exercised his option on the Swede group and purchased the claims, offering each of the locators \$15,000 cash and 100,000 \$1.00 shares in a proposed company capitalized at \$2,000,000. Each of the owners made and registered bills of sale, but only received \$1,000 cash and the offer of 100 shares worth £1 each in an English company capitalized at £10,000. Wulffsohn allowed his Free

32. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908, op. cit.*, pp.L69-L70.

33. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 3, 1913, p.2; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, p.2.

34. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J61.

35. *The Empire*, June 27, 1908, p.6; *Queen Charlotte News*, October 17, 1908, p.1; *ibid.*, May 10, 1909, p.5.

Miner's Licence to expire, losing his rights to the claims. Larsen, Pearson, and Rogers, who had kept up the assessments on the property, restaked the claims. In 1913 the locaters sued Wulffsohn, now of London, "for the return of thirteen copper claims known as the Swede group." The sale to Wulffsohn was rescinded and the property restored to the local plaintiffs.³⁶ In 1916 the Swede group was under bond to a class four corporation, the Granby Consolidated Mining & Smelting Company, which carried out substantial exploration.³⁷ Granby did not pursue any development, and from 1918 to 1926 the original owners performed the minimal work to keep the claims active. Then the claims were allowed to lapse, to be restaked as four new claims; *Dana*, *Gladstone*, *Stanton*, and *Lincoln*.³⁸ Assay results were given in 1927 and 1928, but after that the Swede group disappeared from the annual Reports of the Minister of Mines.³⁹

In the case of the Swede group, the regional entrepreneur made an immediate attempt to resell the

36. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 3, 1913, p.2.

37. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1914*, op. cit., p.K99; *ibid.*, *Report, 1915*, p.K162; *ibid.*, *Report, 1917*, p.K87.

38. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1919*, p.K40; *ibid.*, *Report, 1921*, p.N44; *ibid.*, *Report, 1922*, p.G39; *ibid.*, *Report, 1924*, p.A43; *ibid.*, *Report, 1927*, p.C59; *ibid.*, *Report, 1928*, pp.C65-C66.

39. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1928*, pp.C65-C66; *ibid.*, *Report, 1929*, pp.C57-C58.

property, and the emphasis was on establishing the value of the resource rather than developing the infrastructure for a working mine. This suggests that Wulffsohn intended to make a profit through speculation in the property rather than through mining it. This also suggests two categories of regional entrepreneurs as well as local entrepreneurs; one which wanted to produce commodities for export and another which treated the properties themselves as the commodities for speculation.

Japanese entrepreneurs

The one mine which was more than a petty producer in this period was Ikeda Mines. This was a class three venture, with Arichika Ikeda a classic regional entrepreneur from Japan with strong linkages to Japanese capital. In the spring of 1906, after rejecting Watson and Thompson's *Copper Queen* group on Harriet Harbour, Arichika Ikeda and his crew prospected the adjacent inlets.⁴⁰ Ikeda was the British Columbia-based vice-president of Awaya, Ikeda & Company of Osaka, Japan. A 1908 directory described the company as "Manufacturers, Exporters and Importers", with an office in

40. The company was reported to have come to the Queen Charlotte Islands pursuing fishing interests. The paddlewheel steamer *Dawson*, later used as a bunkhouse for the mine, was "equipped as a fish packing boat" when it brought Ikeda and thirteen fishermen north; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908, op. cit.*, p.163; Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated), op. cit.*, p.37; Jutarō Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", *The Charlottes: A Journal of the Queen Charlotte Islands, Vol.3, 1974, p.22.*

Vancouver, a fish saltery at Departure Bay [near Nanaimo], and the mine at Ikeda Bay. The president of the company, Shinazo Awaya, was based in Osaka, and there were branch offices in four other Japanese cities.⁴¹ The prospecting was successful, and through the summer Ikeda and his men staked claims all around Ikeda Bay [or Ikeda Cove], about 3 kilometres east of Harriet Harbour.⁴² A mine and camp was developed, using over \$60,000 of Japanese capital.⁴³ The majority of the workforce, possibly more than seventy men, was brought from Japan as mine labour, "under government permission".⁴⁴ In 1907 thirty-four Japanese workers were employed in actual mining activities, while of the eighty-three men working in the spring of 1908, the only non-Japanese was the white superintendent.⁴⁵

In 1907 the Ikeda venture was the only commercially

41. *Henderson's City of Vancouver Directory, 1908*, Vancouver, Henderson Publishing Company, Ltd., 1908, pp.368,668.

42. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, op. cit., p.L63; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.2, P.H.8, etc.

43. Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", op. cit., p.22. The cost of the initial development, including the wharf, miners' camp, and the *Dawson*, hauled on shore as a bunkhouse, was said to have been \$60,986; *Queen Charlotte News*, April 4,1908, p.2. A later report gave a figure of \$75,000 for the original Japanese capitalization of the company; *ibid.*, December 18,1909, p.1.

44. Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", op. cit., p.22; Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, op. cit., p.39.

45. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, op. cit., p.L64; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15,1908, pp.1,5.

viable producer in the South Moresby area.⁴⁶ Shipments of copper ore went from 700 tons in 1907 to 6,000 tons in 1908, all sent to the Tye Smelter at Ladysmith.⁴⁷ Of this total, 2,000 tons was high grade ore, worth about \$30 to \$35 per ton.⁴⁸ The mine operated for the first six months of 1909, shipping about 4,000 tons of ore, but by July had shut down, and was reported to be under bond of sale to a large unnamed British Columbia smelting company. The overall production for 1907-1908 was now said to be 8,000 tons.⁴⁹ Another conflicting set of production figures came after the closure, noting that in its first 22 months of operation,

46. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908, op. cit.*, p.L63.

47. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J59. A compressor and air drills were installed to replace hand drilling, increasing production, although not tenfold as anticipated. The new machinery required the hiring of a white compressor crew; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, pp.1,5.

48. The high grade ore contained 14% copper, \$6 worth of gold, and \$2.50 worth of silver per ton, while the rest averaged 6% copper, \$4 worth of gold, and \$2 worth of silver per ton; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J59. The 1908 value for the high grade ore is from Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, p.52. Calculating from the copper percentage and value of gold and silver per ton gives a copper price of approximately 8¢ per pound at the time. This would give a value of about \$15 per ton for the lower grade ore, suggesting a gross production totalling something over \$120,000.

49. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1910, op. cit.*, pp.K71,K81-K82. The ore shipped was said to average 4% copper, \$2.25 gold and 2.2 ounces of silver per ton, much lower concentrations of copper and values of gold and silver, and hence per-ton values, than given in earlier Department of Mines Reports.

the mine had shipped 5,915 tons of ore, with a gross value of \$63,664.50 and a net value of \$58,822.81.⁵⁰ Although the gross value of ore produced is much lower than suggested in the 1909 *Report* of the Department of Mines, the return was still substantial, particularly given the extremely low cost of production.

J.R. Anderson spent four hours at Ikeda Bay in May 1909 as part of a "townsite excursion" to Queen Charlotte City and described the facility shortly before it shut down:

The Ikeda Mine is named after the discoverer a wealthy Japanese who resides at the little village. The company is composed of the discoverer & a number of white shareholders; the ore I understand is medium grade & about 1000 tons are shipped every month to the smelter at Ladysmith on Vancouver Island. The ease with which the ore is conveyed to the shipping point, the proximity of the mine, the excellent harbour ... combined with the low water rates are all factors towards making this mine, even with the comparatively low grade ore, one of great value & a profitable investment.⁵¹

In the fall of 1909 Ikeda Mines was bought by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Trail for \$200,000, and a new manager was sent in.⁵² The shutdown

50. *Queen Charlotte News*, January 7, 1911, p.5. The quantity of ore shipped seems far short of that reported in the Department of Mines *Reports* for the same period; some 5,900 tons as opposed to 10,700 tons. The per-ton value of about \$10 was lower than those noted in the 1908 and 1909 *Reports*, but more in line with that in the 1910 *Report*.

51. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1912, Box 11, File 3, J.R. Anderson Papers, "Trip to Queen Charlotte Islands, May 1909", p.5

52. *Queen Charlotte News*, September 4, 1909, p.2; *ibid.*, December 18, 1909, p.1.

and subsequent sale of the mine was attributed to the total lack of exploration done. When the first vein of high-grade ore was exhausted, there was no alternative vein available, so the Japanese got in financial trouble and were forced to close.⁵³

In March 1910 S.J. Castleman of Vancouver formed a syndicate to purchase Ikeda Mines at a cost of \$250,000.⁵⁴ This syndicate operated the mine from April to July of 1910, with a "small force of men" preparing to open it on a larger scale.⁵⁵ In November 1910 Ikeda Mines Ltd. was formed, capitalized at 850,000 \$1.00 shares, to purchase the assets of the company from W.H. Armstrong, apparently acting for the earlier syndicate. The purchase price was 460,000 shares in the new company, as well as \$42,325.50 in cash.⁵⁶ By the spring of 1912 Armstrong had distributed the shares to the various members of the earlier syndicate, with a block of 150,000 going to the individuals formerly in Awaya Ikeda & Company. The largest individual shareholder after this distribution was Shinazo Awaya of Osaka, with 84,377 shares, followed by Castleman, with 36,750. A group of

53. *Ibid.*, January 7, 1911, p.5.

54. Castleman and his syndicate were also involved in the Queen Charlotte Islands with the Graham Island Development Company; *Queen Charlotte News*, March 19, 1910, p.1.

55. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1911, op. cit.*, p.K84.

56. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5119, File 148, Ikeda Mines, Ltd., pp.1,9-10.

directors and major shareholders, including Armstrong, W.C. Nichols, R.P. McLennan, W.R. Phillips, W.B. Ditmars, G.P. Graub, and J.H. Ross, each held 28,500 shares. Jutaro Matsumoto held 25,000 shares, while Arichika Ikeda held 19,765, with various other smaller Japanese and white shareholders. The directors of the company in May 1912 were noted as McLennan, Nichols, Phillips, C.J. Peters, J.H. Ross, and Awaya Ikeda & Company.⁵⁷

Ikeda Mines Ltd. intended to ship 100 tons of ore daily, and an engineer was sent in to examine the mine.⁵⁸ The exploration programme, including diamond-drilling, was emphasised by the new company in its prospectus, to avoid the problems which led to the mine shutting in 1909.⁵⁹ However, these plans were delayed for several years. Instead a little work was done, including acquiring Crown grants for the core properties, maintaining assessments on the non-Crown granted claims, accompanied by rumors of new ownership.⁶⁰ These rumors were fueled by an "eastern

57. *Ibid.*, pp.39-46,38. S.J. Castleman was described as the head of the new company, with R.P. McLennan, W.H. Armstrong, George Harrison, W.C. Ditmars, W.R. Philips, F.W. Lantz, all of Vancouver, John F. Galt of Winnipeg and Senator J.H. Ross of Ottawa as associates; *Queen Charlotte News*, September 17,1910, p.1.

58. *Queen Charlotte News*, September 17,1910, p.1.

59. *Ibid.*, January 7,1911, p.5.

60. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1913*, *op. cit.*, p.K110; *ibid.*, *Report, 1914*, p.K103; *ibid.*, *Report, 1915*, p.K162.

company" taking an option on the property in 1913, which was never exercised.⁶¹

In November 1914 Ikeda Mines Ltd. re-opened the mine on a small scale, with 8-10 men working, shipping about 40 tons of ore per month to the new Granby smelter at Anyox.⁶² Arichika Ikeda continued as the resident manager of the mine for the re-opening.⁶³ In 1915, the workforce was up to 15-20 men, and 355 tons of ore was shipped to Anyox, averaging 15.87% copper, with 0.284 ounces of gold and 4.28 ounces of silver per ton. Some 400 tons of lower grade ore was produced as a byproduct of sorting out the high-grade ore, and was stored in a dump.⁶⁴ Employment doubled again in 1916, to 30-40 workers, and shipments to Anyox rose to 1,060 tons of ore, averaging 7.43% copper [157,619 pounds total], 0.15 ounces of gold and 2.1 ounces of silver per ton. About 1,600 tons of lower-grade ore was stored at the mine, and plans were noted to build a concentrating mill the next year.⁶⁵ The company balance sheet showed a net profit of \$693.77 for the period of operation from November 1, 1914 to

61. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, April 28, 1913, p.1.

62. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1915*, *op. cit.*, p.K162.

63. Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", *op. cit.*, p.22; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1912*, *op. cit.*, p.K76; *ibid.*, *Report, 1915*, p.K162.

64. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1916*, p.K74.

65. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1917*, p.K87.

May 31, 1917. Granby Consolidated owed Ikeda Mines \$7,878.84, which approximated the net value of some 900 tons of ore, consistent with what was being shipped. The board of directors still was comprised of the participants from the formation of the company in 1910, McLennan, Armstrong, Ditmars, Peters, and Ikeda.⁶⁶

Production in 1917 remained stable, with 1,000 tons of copper ore shipped, yielding 7.64% copper [152,883 pounds], 0.15 ounces of gold and 1.79 ounces of silver per ton. Also, another 50 tons of ore was shipped, without returns noted. The proposed concentrating plant had not materialized, but rumors of such a facility, and a new power plant persisted.⁶⁷

Production fell off sharply in 1918, with 358 tons of copper ore shipped to the Granby smelter at Anyox, averaging 11.65% copper [83,384 pounds at about 22.4 cents per pound, or \$18,666 total], 0.22 ounces of gold per ton [77 ounces at \$20 per ounce or \$1540 total] and 2.76 ounces of silver per ton [987 ounces at 97.9 cents per ounce or \$966 total]. A variety of reasons was offered for the decline, including the "prevailing shortage of labour" during WW I, and the declining quality of ore, which made it difficult to hand-

66. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5119, File 148, p.50.

67. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1918*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1919, pp.F74,F447.

sort to a shipping grade.⁶⁸ It was concluded that hand-sorting was no longer viable, and that a small, 50 ton flotation mill was required to process the 5,000 tons of second-class ore on the dump and the estimated 7-8,000 tons of low grade ore easily available in the mine, and that some new strategy should be employed in the tunnel layout.⁶⁹

In 1919 the mine "operated in a small way", with production declining to 151 tons of copper ore shipped to the Anyox smelter, returning an average of 12.9% copper [38,990 pounds total], 0.34 ounces of gold and 4.78 ounces of silver per ton. A concentrating plant and "extensive development" was considered necessary if the mine was to continue to operate. Arichika Ikeda travelled to Japan seeking capital, bringing back mining engineers who inspected the operation and then returned home to report.⁷⁰

When he returned to Japan in 1919, he negotiated the start of a twenty-five million dollar company with 47 leading financiers of Japan. Named the Canada Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Canadian Industrial Co. Ltd.), the firm had as its aim the purchase of mines and forests in Canada for eventual operation of mines and smelters, also paper mill, sawmill and pulp mill.

Japanese engineers were dispatched to British Columbia, and their work report was hopeful. But when the company began to put its plan to work, world-wide depression set in, causing the firm to

68. *Ibid.*, Report, 1919, pp.K39,K105.

69. *Ibid.*, pp.K38-K39.

70. *Ibid.*, Report, 1920, p.N39.

halt its undertaking.⁷¹

Although it was hoped that with the "return of financial conditions to normal" this Japanese-funded venture would re-activate the mine, it never happened. The mine closed at the end of July, 1920, after shipping 141 tons of copper ore to the Anyox smelter. The returns averaged 7.5% copper [21,088 pounds total], 0.19 ounces of gold and 2.16 ounces of silver per ton. In spite of the closure, the future looked promising in 1920 for the development of more low-grade ore bodies and the installation of a concentrating plant to produce shipping-grade ore.⁷² Ikeda Mines was mentioned in the provincial mining reports in the early 1920s, but a concentrating plant was never built, and the reports ended. The Department of Mines attributed the demise of the venture to the exhaustion of the small vein of high-grade ore and subsequent failure to develop the lower-grade ore deposits.⁷³

Declining production and demand, combined with a lack of capital to develop new resources, led to the failure of the mine. After the small profit returned for the period November 1914 to May 1917, Ikeda Mines showed consistent and

71. Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", *op. cit.*, p.22.

72. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1921*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1922, p.N44.

73. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1922*, p.G87; *ibid.*, *Report, 1923*, p.N42; *ibid.*, *Report, 1924*, p.A44.

rapidly increasing losses through 1921. The loss to September 1918 was \$1,587.19, to October 1919 it was \$4199.44, to September 1920 it was \$16,913.35, and the last filing of December 1921 showed a loss of \$24,442.86.⁷⁴ Ownership and management of the company had remained constant through this period; the board of directors was the same in 1921 as in 1917, and the major shareholders continued to hold the same percentages of the stock. Besides the three large Japanese shareholders, there were nine other Japanese holding between 100 and 5,819 shares, so a strong ethnic bloc still existed.⁷⁵

The initial success and subsequent failure of the Ikeda Mines seems to have owed a great deal to the richness of the resource and the cheapness of the labour available. The ore produced over the life of the operation averaged between 6% and 16% copper, with significant quantities of gold and silver. This contrasted with normal South Moresby copper ore, which averaged about 1% to 2% copper. The richer ore allowed for cheap hand-sorting, rather than requiring a concentrating plant to produce shipping-grade ore. The low labour costs were due to the importation of Japanese labour and establishment of an essentially feudal Japanese

74. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5119, File 148, pp.54, 58, 62, 69.

75. *Ibid.*, pp.65-69.

community to perform the mining.⁷⁶ When the high-grade ore was exhausted, the plant already established on Ikeda Cove was not enough of an inducement to bring in capital, considering the overall depressed state of the world's economy after the First World War, and the declining value of copper in particular. Without high concentrations of copper in the ore, it simply was no longer viable.

The impact of copper mining on the development of South Moresby: 1899-1929

Copper mining, and in particular the copper boom of 1905-1909, brought a new population to the essentially unpopulated southern archipelago of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The impact of this population on the development and consequent settlement of the region was determined by the modes of production established, which in turn was dependent on the class of entrepreneur initiating a mining enterprise.

The initial locations and development were made through the efforts of local mining entrepreneurs or petty producers. These individuals were further divided into two groups; one which actually produced a commodity [copper ore] for sale to processors, and another which was more concerned

76. In Dr. Nogero's publication boosting the Moresby Island area, he stated that Ikeda Bay was "known locally as 'Little Japan'"; Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, p.36.

with establishing the value of their claims, which could then be sold or bonded to other investors. Both of these sub-groups contributed to the development of the region. The first group of petty producers established the viability of subsistence-level mining in the region, whereby they could earn a living by mining and selling small quantities of ore. The active marketing of the second group acted to attract outside capital to the region, which in turn encouraged development.

In both cases, the local entrepreneurs remained in the region, either focusing on mining or exploration. A few petty producers continued to mine on a small scale through the 1920s. The lure of speculation, the possibility of selling or bonding a claim for a fortune, also acted to keep a remnant mining population in the region until the depression struck. There may have been as many as ten or twelve miners in each of the settlements until the end of the 1920s, when listings of South Moresby claims disappear from the annual *Reports* of the Department of Mines. Typical of these old miners was Ike Thompson, who with his wife stayed on at Jedway as the local mining sub-recorder, agent for McMillin, and owner of several claims of his own, at least through 1928.⁷⁷

The regional entrepreneurs who became involved in the region's copper mining may be divided into two parallel

77. *Ibid.*, *Report*, 1929, p.C58.

groups, with one intending to produce a commodity and the other focusing more on the exchange value of the groups of claims. Clearly the former group would contribute more to the ongoing economic viability of a region. However, both groups served to mobilize outside capital and direct it at ventures in South Moresby. This provided for the intensive development of claims, the construction of camps, and the introduction of wage labour, providing a new resource for the local population. Both of the independent settlements in the region, Jedway and Lockeport, grew around a core of intensive development capitalized by regional entrepreneurs.

In general, these periods of development were brief, and although small quantities of ore were sometimes shipped, none of the regional entrepreneurs' ventures resulted in a shipping mine. Besides the *Copper Queen* and *Swede* groups, developed in the 1905-1909 copper boom, most of the regional ventures were in the 1911-1920 period, on properties bonded from local entrepreneurs. Besides the work on the *Copper Island* group [1911-13], there was a brief but intense period of development on the *Apex, Montana* and *Copper Belle* groups near Lockeport [1911-12], and regionally-capitalized work on the *Thunder* group on Collison Bay [1913-14] and the *Producer* group east of Harriet Harbour [1916-18].⁷⁸ The exception

78. The *Copper Island* development is discussed above. The *Apex, Montana* and *Copper Belle* development was English-backed, the *Thunder* group development was capitalized in Vancouver and Seattle, and the *Producer* group development was funded from Seattle. In each instance local residents were managing the

to the rule of intense but brief involvement by regional entrepreneurs was J.S. McMillin, who retained ownership of his Harriet Harbour claims until the late 1920s.

The only significant Japanese mining entrepreneur was Arichika Ikeda, who developed and operated the only successful shipping mine in the region. However, the ethnic enclave nature of the enterprise meant that it had only an indirect effect on regional development, in spite of the scale and duration of the operation. In this instance the conditions established were largely independent of the rest of the region and British Columbia as a whole. The capital, the labour power, and the social structure were all imported from Japan. The primary linkage with the dominant economic system or economy was in the market the mine sold to; initially the Tyee smelter, and later the Granby smelter. Even with the formation of the nominally Vancouver-based Ikeda Mines Ltd. in 1910, the mode of production and consequent social factors were determined by Arichika Ikeda. There were informal linkages with general South Moresby society, but the primary effect on broader development was due to the successful example provided by the mine. This acted as an inducement to others to establish a venture in

development; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3; *ibid.*, January 29, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, June 10, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, July 8, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, July 29, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, September 2, 1912, p.2; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1912, op. cit.*, p.K76; *ibid.*, *Report, 1914, op. cit.*, p.K103; *ibid.*, *Report, 1917, op. cit.*, p.K87.

the region, in the hopes of emulating Ikeda and "striking it rich".

The regionally-capitalized *Copper Queen* and *Swede* groups were the primary factors in determining the form of early twentieth century development in South Moresby. These properties were the first locations in their respective districts, and were acknowledged as having substantial economic potential. They also formed the focus of development by regional entrepreneurs, using outside capital. As such, they became the centres of district settlement. Ikeda Mines served as a secondary factor; it remained an enclave, but was an Horatio Alger story which served to attract would-be miners to the region. The *Copper Queen* and *Swede* groups were both retained by their original regional and local owners until the late 1920s. Ironically, these groups, which had played such a part in determining the development of the region, remained strictly speculative ventures throughout the copper mining period in South Moresby.

Chapter 3: Copper mining settlements and the development of social infrastructure: 1905-1929

The copper rush of 1905-1909 determined the initial conditions for settlement by a new population of prospectors and miners in the South Moresby region. This population was accommodated in two types of settlement. The first type was the traditional mining camp, where the mining crews would be housed by their employers. The second type developed out of mining camps into "independent" settlements, whose existence was not tied as directly to the activities of a particular company or capitalist.

Mining camps

Some settlement occurred at each of the groups of mining claims where development was carried out. Copper mining required a stable, resident workforce; the progress of clearing ore veins and sinking tunnels was slow, and tons of ore were required to give shipping quantities. In the climate of the Queen Charlotte Islands, the work was not seasonal in the same way as logging or fishing; mining could be carried out year round. This meant that each developed claim required some form of year round residential facility for the men working on it. Often this was nothing more than a rough cabin housing the two or three men working on a claim. However, in some instances, the population, and

consequent ancillary development, was substantial.

Class 1: Local entrepreneurs

These petty producers, working their own claims with no more than two or three partners or employees, represented the lower end of the settlement spectrum. A single cabin located on or near the claim was typical accommodation for this group.

Class 2: Regional entrepreneurs

The intensified development allowed by the greater capital resources of regional entrepreneurs required more workers, and elaboration of residential facilities. In the case of the two most prominent groups, the *Copper Queen* and the *Swede*, on Harriet Harbour and Klunkwoi Bay respectively, the regional entrepreneurs' developments led to the independent settlements of Jedway and Lockeport. These were the exceptions; in South Moresby, most of the camps never achieved independent viability. Most of the ventures involved intensive exploration and development for a brief period, requiring a camp, but seldom the stable ongoing mining which would support long-term settlement.

In the 1905-1909 copper boom period, the most extensive residential and commercial development other than that in Jedway and Lockeport was on Collison Bay, as described by Kathleen Dalzell:

In 1908 Mr. M.W. Young opened a small store among the cluster of cabins nestled near the head of the bay and built a good float. In 1909 the C.P.R. listed Collison Bay as a regular port of call. A branch telephone line connected Collison Bay to the Jedway - Ikeda Bay line. And Joe Tritheway [sic] put in an "eating house."¹

The storekeeper may have been one of the Young brothers active on Carpenter Bay, just to the south, while the "eating house" was the bunkhouse and mess put in by the Tretheway brothers in 1907.² Although Dalzell made the Collison Bay development sound like an independent settlement, it seems that it remained a short term camp, directly tied to specific mining activity.

In the post-boom period, from 1911 to 1918, there were a number of properties developed under bond to regional entrepreneurs, which would have had camps associated. These included Heino's *Copper Island* group [1911-13], the *Apex*, *Montana* and *Copper Belle* development near Lockeport [1911-12], the *Thunder* group on Collison Bay [1913-14], and the *Producer* group east of Harriet Harbour [1916-18]. At its peak in 1912, the *Apex* camp housed between 30 and 60 men,

1. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2*, *op. cit.*, p.171.

2. In the fall of 1907 the *Meal Ticket* group on Collison Bay was under bond to the Tretheway brothers, who carried out substantial development, and had at least a dozen people working for them; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J59; *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4. In 1908 the Young brothers were working on a group of claims on Carpenter Bay, just to the south of Collison Bay; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909, op. cit.*, p.J59.

while the other three mines each had about 10 men working.³ None of these developments resulted in a commercially viable mine, so the camp populations were only present for the brief periods of exploration and development.

Class 3: Japanese entrepreneurs

The largest concentration of mining population in South Moresby in this period was at Ikeda Mines. More than seventy men were brought in from Japan, and reputedly up to one hundred and fifty were employed at times.⁴ In the spring of 1908 there were eighty-three men working, all Japanese with the exception of the white superintendent.⁵ In an 1908 publication boosting the Moresby Island area, Jedway-based Dr. Nogero stated that Ikeda Bay was "known locally as 'Little Japan'".⁶ The infrastructure and settlement that grew up as a result of the mine's operation was substantial. A visitor in May 1909 described the Ikeda Mines settlement as a "little village" where the "wealthy

3. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3; *ibid.*, January 29, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, June 10, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, July 8, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, July 29, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, September 2, 1912, p.2; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1912, op. cit.*, p.K76; *ibid.*, *Report, 1914, op. cit.*, p.K103; *ibid.*, *Report, 1917, op. cit.*, p.K87.

4. Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", *op. cit.*, p.22; Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, p.39.

5. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, pp.1,5.

6. Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, p.36.




Figure 3.1 - Mining settlements and camps
 Key: 1. Ikeda Mines 2. Jedway 3. Lockeport
 4. Copper Island 5. Thunder 6. Apex
 7. Producer

Japanese" Arichika Ikeda resided.⁷ By that time some of the workers were housed in a bunkhouse at the workings, with the rest in the converted sternwheeler *Dawson*, which Ikeda had brought to the Queen Charlotte Islands in 1906, and hauled on shore as a bunkhouse.⁸ Besides the physical plant related directly to mining, such as ore bunkers, wharf, blacksmith shop and powerhouse, and the residential buildings, there was a cemetery, suggesting long-term social commitment to the community.⁹

In 1907 Arichika Ikeda attempted to purchase the waterfront lots [Lots 74,75,76] on Ikeda Bay where the development was centred.¹⁰ Apparently the purchases were

7. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1912, Box 11, File 3, J.R. Anderson Papers, "Trip to Queen Charlotte Islands, May 1909", p.5

8. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, Plan 14T3; B.C.A.R.S., Visual Records, photographs 32566 and 95578; Jutaro Tokunaga, "The Exploits of a Pioneer Issei", *op. cit.*, p.22; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2*, *op. cit.*, pp.172-173.

9. When Joseph Marco, the superintendent, was killed in 1909, he was buried at Ikeda Bay. Two Japanese miners killed some three months earlier also were buried locally; B.C.A.R.S., GR 1323, British Columbia, Attorney General, Correspondence, Film B2062, file 1095/09; *ibid.*, Film B2063, file 2649/09; Izo Arima, "Four Years at Ikeda Bay: Memories of Hunting and Fishing", *The Charlottes: A Journal of the Queen Charlotte Islands*, Vol.3, 1974, p.29.

10. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.7, fieldbooks 340/1908, 341/1908, 342/1908, L.I.4605/08. The application to purchase Lot 75 [for "Agriculture"] was in the name of John R. Watson of Vancouver, merchant, with Ikeda acting as his agent. The application to purchase Lot 74, in Ikeda's name, stated that it was required "in connection with development of adjacent mineral claims."

disallowed, as the same properties were granted to Awaya Ikeda & Company as leased mineral claims [Lots 93-99] the following year.¹¹ The mineral claims he was allowed were Crown-granted to the later company Ikeda Mines Ltd. in 1913, but this tenure only extended to mineral use.¹² In 1910 these lots were reserved for the provincial government, and were gazetted as such. On the survey fieldbooks "Awaya Ikeda Co." was crossed out and "B.C. Gov^t Reserve" substituted.¹³ This would suggest that although Japanese mineral claims were acceptable, there was a disinclination on the part of government to allow any more permanent tenure on the land, and to discourage settlement.

Whether or not this only extended to Japanese interests is unknown, in the absence of any other similar applications to purchase in the immediate area at this time. G.A. Huff's purchase of the Rose Harbour whaling station site in 1909 was allowed by the government, although this was only

11. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbooks 956/08, 957/08, 958/08, 1044/08, 1045/08, 1046/08, 1047/08, L.I.18154/08, L.I.19013/08.

12. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbooks 956/08, 957/08, 958/08, 1044/08, 1045/08, 1046/08, 1047/08, L.I.18154/08, L.I.19013/08; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1914, op. cit., p.K423.*

13. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.7, fieldbooks 340/1908, 341/1908, 342/1908, L.I.4605/08.

intended for industrial purposes.¹⁴

The Ikeda camp was maintained through the 1909-1914 shutdown. Ikeda resumed operations from 1914 to 1920, with a maximum number of 30-40 workers in 1916-1917. There was little change from the earlier period of operation, with a Japanese workforce occupying the 1907-1908 camp facility.

Independent settlements

The South Moresby copper mining boom concentrated in two districts, based on where the resource was located, and where miners staked their claims. This in turn led to the development of a settlement and service centre for the miners in each of these districts. These settlements served as a focus for various non-mining ventures in support of the mining activity, such as retail stores, transient accommodation, and transportation. They also served as residential centres for the service industry population, as well as for many of the miners when they were not actually working on their claims.

The two service centres in South Moresby turned into the villages of Jedway and Lockeport. These settlements served as the social, cultural, and economic focii of the copper mining region. The lack of a pre-existing infrastructure meant that these villages grew and faded in

14. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.4, fieldbook 1369/09, A.P.854.

direct response to the copper mining in the region. They were created by the miners and merchants who came as a result of the copper mining rush, and their form was dictated by the requirements of this imported population.

Jedway as a mining town: 1907-1925

Jedway, on the west and south shores of Harriet Harbour, was the first of the two villages to form, and was the largest "independent" settlement in South Moresby. The core of this village was the wharf, store building, and cabins built by regional entrepreneur J.S. McMillin's "Copper Queen Company" in 1907.¹⁵ Although this development paralleled that on Collison Bay, and was smaller than the Ikeda Mines complex, it continued to grow beyond the requirements of a mining camp. This growth was supported by Harriet Harbour being the site of the earliest claims, its location in the centre of the district, and the core development funded by a regional entrepreneur. Additionally, the presence of a retail store should not be underestimated in creating a regional centre. Jedway was described in 1907:

The townsite of Jedway, with a wharf, store, Post Office, and several cabins, has been located on the south-west end of Harriet harbour, and here the office of the Mining Recorder of the district is situated. It was on the shores of this bay that the first of the more recent mineral discoveries of the district were staked, by Watson

15. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, p.2.

and Thompson, in 1905. These discoveries may be considered the origin of the present activity in Moresby Island.¹⁶

The "townsite" was concentrated on the shoreline mineral claims of McMillin's *Copper Queen* group. Development in 1907-1908 took the settlement up the west shore, and along the south and east shores of the harbour. Although the residential core remained on the McMillin claims, the business district of the town moved north onto Watson's *Togo* claim.¹⁷ As these claims were held as mineral leases, with limited proprietorial rights, the holders did not realize substantial cash income from the development. However, there were some benefits, such as Watson's partnership in the sawmill company for providing the site for the mill.¹⁸

Thompson and Watson still were living on Harriet

16. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908, op. cit.*, p.L66.

17. In 1908 the most northerly of the claims on the west side of the inlet with settlement development was L.T. Watson's *Togo* claim, Lot 140, which had five cabins, the sawmill and associated bunkhouse, and the "Hotel Jedway" on it; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 1078/08. The next claim was McMillin's *Pine Log*, Lot 88, which in 1908 had most of the *Copper Queen* development on it, including the wharf, store, superintendent's house and office, and as many as nine other structures, mostly residential; *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 892/08; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1079/08; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1161/08. Along the south shore of the inlet was the *Ouray* claim, Lot 84, which in 1908 had a cabin, a bunkhouse and the original "Recorders Office" on it; *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 824/08; amended, *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 878/08.

18. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B4426, File 2009(1897), *Jedway Lumber and Development Company Ltd.*, p.37.

Harbour, along with various other local entrepreneurs involved in copper mining. Regional entrepreneurs such as McMillin were occasional visitors, and also employed resident managers.¹⁹ In October 1907, there were about fifty "of the boys" in Jedway waiting for the arrival of the steamship.²⁰ Besides the resident population, there was also a constant stream of transients, including miners, speculators, government functionaries, fishermen, and others passing through Jedway in the boom years. As a scheduled stop on the coastal steamship routes, tourists also came through the area.²¹ Sealing ships were also regular visitors; a resident in the 1908-1911 period noted them "taking shelter from storms" frequently at Jedway.²²

This new resident and transient population provided the commercial opportunity for the first non-mining economic activities. These took the form of retailing, hospitality,

19. *The Empire*, September 21, 1907, p.4.

20. An informal election was held by the group, and Thompson was voted mayor, George Fairburn the magistrate and judge, and D.B. Sullivan the police officer; *ibid.*, October 26, 1907, p.4.

21. For example, in 1909 J.R. Anderson was a member of a "townsite excursion" to Queen Charlotte City which visited Jedway and the other regular ports of call en route; B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1912, Box 11, File 3, J.R. Anderson Papers, "Trip to Queen Charlotte Islands, May 1909", p.6.

22. Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway", *op. cit.*, p.32. Some specific sealers which called at Jedway included the *Markland*, from which three sailors deserted in 1908, and the *Vera*, which Anderson saw in 1909; *The Empire*, June 27, 1908, p.6; B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1912, Box 11, File 3, J.R. Anderson Papers, "Trip to Queen Charlotte Islands, May 1909", p.6.

lumber production, and transportation. In late 1907 the store was stocked with goods, an hotel and a sawmill were under construction, and a fleet of boats for local transportation appeared.²³

Mr. and Mrs. N.R. Sivart opened the general store in the Copper Queen building in 1907, and operated it until its closure in 1912.²⁴ An advertisement in a Prince Rupert newspaper in early 1908 stated that the store carried general merchandise, but also a good stock of "Mining and Logging Supplies".²⁵ Although a post office was noted in the 1907 description of the town, A. Seivart [sic] was identified as Jedway's first postmaster in 1909, combining the government function with the merchant function.²⁶

The hotel was built by Marsh English of Port Essington, a noted British Columbia salmon canner, and was managed for him by a failed miner.²⁷ The hotel was completed by November 1907, and immediately was doing a booming business,

23. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4.

24. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., p.119; Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", op. cit., p.31; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., p.199. Sivart was sometimes spelled "Seivart".

25. *The Empire*, March 21, 1908, p.4.

26. Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, vol.2, Masset, Senior Citizens of the Queen Charlotte Islands, 1982, p.113.

27. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1907, p.4; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., p.119.

with a liquor licence and a buffet among the attractions.²⁸ J.C. Keith of Vancouver bought the hotel sometime prior to June 1908, and the business continued to thrive.²⁹ In October 1908 Ben Metcalfe purchased the hotel, and employed a manager and a Chinese cook. Metcalfe and his wife were soon joined by his family from England.³⁰

The other business established in 1907 was a sawmill, initiated by the Sivarts, their son-in-law, and L.T. Watson, one of the original locators.³¹ The sawmill was cutting by December 1907, and not only supplied local demand, but was responsible for a building boom in Jedway; in the first six weeks of 1908 seven new cabins were built.³² The mill required labour, and a Japanese crew was brought in, which

28. *The Empire*, November 23, 1907, p.1.

29. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1908, p.6. J.C. Keith was earlier mentioned as wanting a residence in Jedway after the mill was producing, *ibid.*, September 21, 1907, p.4; he may have been involved in the town and ventures as a capitalist, explaining his flipping of the hotel.

30. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1908, p.6; *ibid.*, November 7, 1908, p.6; Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", *The Charlottes: A Journal of the Queen Charlotte Islands*, Vol.3, 1974, p.31. The omnipresent Ike Thompson was managing the hotel in the summer of 1908, but by October "Mr. Lee" had assumed his duties, *Queen Charlotte News*, August 1, 1908, p.2; *ibid.*, October 31, 1908, p.2.

31. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, p.119; Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, p.31; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2*, *op. cit.*, p.199. A fuller discussion of the sawmill business may be found in Chapter 4.

32. *The Empire*, November 23, 1907; *ibid.*, February 1, 1908, p.1.

was housed in a bunkhouse associated with the mill.³³ As well as mining and milling interests Watson had a "flotilla" of gasoline launches based in Jedway to provide transportation for miners, to tow logs to the mill and take lumber to markets. Besides his "captains" running the boats, Watson also had to bring in a man with his family to maintain the fleet.³⁴

The mines, sawmill, and burgeoning population led to other economic opportunities in support of the industrial and community growth. An assayer moved in to serve the miners, along with logging contractors to supply the mill. A building contractor came in early 1908 during the construction boom, and a doctor arrived in the fall.³⁵ In 1908-1911 about twelve families were permanently resident around Harriet Harbour.³⁶

The British Columbia directory for 1910 listed forty-four names in Jedway, with thirty-two of those miners. Besides the people and businesses already discussed, the directory noted two carpenters, two loggers, a millwright,

33. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 1161/08, pp.1,3; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 19,1909, p.2.

34. *Ibid.*, February 1,1908, p.1; *ibid.*, June 27,1908, p.6; *ibid.*, July 18,1908, p.6. As has already been discussed, Watson had a financial stake in the mill as well.

35. *The Empire*, June 27,1908, p.6; *ibid.*, August 22,1908, p.6; *ibid.*, September 5,1908, p.6.

36. Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, p.31

and a butcher.³⁷ To feed the growing population Ambrose Jones had established a truck garden on Burnaby Island, across from Jedway. Between 1908 and 1911 he provided the settlement with produce, and had a contract to supply the steamers which visited Jedway.³⁸ The spiritual needs of the inhabitants were met by visiting ministers, who held services in the Sivarts' store on Sundays.³⁹

As the centre of what promised to be a substantial copper boom, Jedway became the provincial government's administrative headquarters for the Queen Charlotte Islands. The presence of the government offices would have had a profound effect on supporting the development of the village as a regional service centre. In late 1907, E.M. Sandilands had been appointed stipendiary magistrate and deputy mining recorder, based at Jedway.⁴⁰ His "Recorders Office" was in a building erected by the government on Lot 84, the Ouray

37. *Henderson's British Columbia Gazeteer and Directory for 1910*, op. cit., pp.452-453.

38. *The Empire*, August 22, 1908, p.6; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3.

39. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4.

40. *The Empire*, December 21, 1907, p.1. Sandilands had assumed his duties at Jedway by December 5, 1907, when he witnessed the declarations of Arichika Ikeda on applications to purchase land, British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.7, fieldbooks 340/1908, 341/1908, L.I.4605/08.

mineral claim.⁴¹ In the spring of 1908 a new Queen Charlotte Mining Division, with headquarters at Jedway, was detached from the Skeena Mining District.⁴² With the creation of the new district, Sandilands assumed the more senior position of recorder, and by May 1908 was recording claims at Jedway.⁴³ In October 1909 he was promoted again, to Gold Commissioner of the Queen Charlotte Mining Division.⁴⁴

A provincial constable, Walter Prescott, was assigned

41. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.2, fieldbook 824/08, pp.9-10; amended, *ibid.*, P.H.2, fieldbook 878/08; Dr. C. Nogero suggested the earlier structure dated from late 1907, when Sandilands was assigned to Jedway. A photograph of this building in Nogero's book shows that it was probably a prefabricated structure; Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, pp.75,13.

42. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, *op. cit.*, p.L57.

43. *Ibid.*; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.5, fieldbook 748/10, etc.; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1046/08, etc. are stamped "Jedway" over Sandilands' signature. Previously, the claims were registered at the district office in Prince Rupert.

44. *Queen Charlotte News*, October 16, 1909, p.2. As well as overseeing mining, Evelyn M. Sandilands was the notary public, and *de facto* government agent for the Queen Charlotte Islands; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 1046/08, etc. have "Notary Public for B.C." with Sandilands' signature. "Sandy" had served in such capacities as constable, mining recorder, and justice of the peace in the Kootenay mining district starting in 1893, prior to coming to the Queen Charlotte Islands; *Queen Charlotte News*, September 18, 1909, p.1.

to the Queen Charlotte Islands in 1907.⁴⁵ In 1909 Prescott was touring the rest of the archipelago from his base in Jedway.⁴⁶ Sandilands and Prescott, as the sole representatives of the provincial government in the region, made Jedway the administrative centre of the Queen Charlotte Islands. In March 1908 the provincial government reserved an 825 acre lot on the east side of Harriet Harbour for its own use. The government reserve took in some pre-existing mineral claims and structures, and a three block townsite was laid out.⁴⁷ A new provincial building containing offices and a "lock up" was constructed on the government townsite in the spring of 1908. Apparently the earlier building remained in use as well.⁴⁸ When a miner was killed on Huston Inlet in 1908 Sandilands "set aside" a

45. The first constable, C.L. Cullin, only remained in Jedway for a month before Prescott replaced him in December; *The Empire*, December 21, 1907, p.1.

46. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 5, 1909, p.2.

47. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 1468/08; *ibid.*, plan 10T1; *ibid.*, plan 49T2. The government lot was Lot 105.

48. B.C.A.R.S., GR 54, British Columbia, Department of Public Works, Vol. 36, contracts and specifications, file 514, "Jedway Lockup"; B.C.A.R.S., Visual Records, Ministry of Mines Albums, 1908, p.32, #894, showed the townsite "Government Building at Jedway - E.M. Sandilands - Gold Commissioner". At the same time Dr. C. Nogero, editor, *Queen Charlotte Islands (Illustrated)*, *op. cit.*, pp.9, 75, showed the other "Mining Recorder's Offices, Jedway" at the south end of the inlet, and mentioned two government buildings. Possibly Prescott operated out of the new building, with its jail cells, while Sandilands worked out of the older one.

cemetery, presumably in the government reserve.⁴⁹ In the 1908-1909 period, it seems that little or no residential development occurred on the government reserve, although there were some pre-existing cabins.⁵⁰

By the end of 1909, the copper boom that led to Jedway's development was fading. The *Copper Queen* mine was not producing, Ikeda Mines had closed, and the sawmill venture had ended. The local copper boom seemed to have failed, the Ikeda success story had ended, and the most successful local business with strong linkages to the community was gone. All of these factors had a profound impact on the economic and settlement viability of Jedway. The barometer of this viability was the government office. In 1910 the intention to move it to Queen Charlotte City was noted, with Prescott assuming the duties of local deputy mining recorder as well as constable.⁵¹ The formal decision to base Sandilands in Queen Charlotte City was made in the fall of 1911, and the move, taking fixtures and

49. B.C.A.R.S., GR 1323, British Columbia, Attorney General, Correspondence, Film B2060, file 3329/08.

50. On the southeast shore of the inlet, the *Della* claim, Lot 85, had six structures on it in 1908; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.3, fieldbook 891/08. This claim was later assumed into the provincial government Lot 105; *ibid.*, P.H.3, fieldbook 1468/08.

51. *Queen Charlotte News*, July 16, 1910, p.1.

supplies from the Jedway office, was made in May 1912.⁵² Although the move of the government headquarters signalled the end of Jedway's pre-eminent administrative role, a mining sub-recorder's office was maintained through the 1920s, with the ubiquitous Ike Thompson assuming the duties.⁵³

With fading retail prospects in Jedway, and the failure of their industrial ventures, the Sivarts closed the general store in 1912.⁵⁴ However, the post office remained until 1931, operated by remaining residents of the town.⁵⁵ The younger Ben Metcalfe left Jedway in the summer of 1911, leaving the operation of the hotel in the hands of his father.⁵⁶ A "season's rush" to the hotel was expected in 1912, and it operated at least through the winter of 1913-1914 with the widow MacFee as the hotel owner or manager.⁵⁷

In spite of the dissolution of the copper boom town of

52. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, November 20, 1911, p.1; *ibid.*, May 20, 1912, p.2; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1913*, *op. cit.*, p.K109.

53. British Columbia, Ministry of Mines, *Report, 1925*, *op. cit.*, p.A9; *ibid.*, *Report, 1929*, p.C34.

54. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, p.119; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, *op. cit.*, p.199.

55. Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", *op. cit.*, p.113.

56. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3.

57. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, April 8, 1912, p.2; Izo Arima, "Four Years at Ikeda Bay: Memories of Hunting and Fishing", *op. cit.*, p.26.

Jedway, a portion of the mining population remained. In 1911-1912 this included Ike and Mrs. Thompson, Mr. and Mrs. Hall, Mrs. Armitage, Walter Dass, P.C. and Tom Daykin, Hugh McEachern, Dick Harbin and William Campbell.⁵⁸ By 1913 Jedway was described as "practically deserted, having been in its day a prospectors' town."⁵⁹ In June of the same year a satirical poem by "The Optimist" appeared in the *Queen Charlotte Islander* which started with the line "Jedway town is going to boom", and ended with "I may just add that I'm insane, That is why I here remain."⁶⁰ This suggests that the popular as well as the government perception was that Jedway's day was over. A British Columbia directory from 1918 described Jedway as a "post office and mining camp", with Ike Thompson the only listing, as mining sub-recorder.⁶¹

Due to changing economic and social factors, Jedway declined in favour of Queen Charlotte City, on Skidegate Inlet. The permanent Haida villages of Masset and Skidegate were both on Graham Island, and served as a focus, both as markets and sources of labour. Additionally, the provincial

58. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, September 11, 1911, p.2; *ibid.*, September 18, 1911, p.3; *ibid.*, January 15, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, April 8, 1912, p.2.

59. British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report, 1914*, *op. cit.*, pp.R112-R113.

60. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, June 2, 1913, p.2.

61. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1918*, *op. cit.*, p.228.

government was attempting to encourage agrarian settlement, for which the South Moresby area was not as suitable as Graham Island. Queen Charlotte City had an active booster in D.R. "Windy" Young, an entrepreneur as well as the publisher and editor of the *Queen Charlotte News*.⁶²

The general failure of the copper mining boom and the closure of the Jedway mill took away the economic base of the community, and with a growing population on Graham Island, it made more sense to move the provincial offices to Queen Charlotte City. The outbreak of World War I was probably the final element in Jedway's disappearance, as many men from the north coast enlisted, and many never returned. Without the previous economic opportunities, little available land for homesteading, and the lack of the permanent Haida villages, Jedway as a viable community had disappeared. A remnant mining population remained, with Ike Thompson, one of the original locators, a central character. As late as 1929 the mining potential of the claims around Harriet Harbour was still noted in the *Report of the Minister of Mines*, with Thompson, now the mining recorder, apparently living in the government building on the east side of the inlet.⁶³ This continued marginal existence

62. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands, op. cit.*, discussed the agrarian settlement of Graham Island and the Sandspit area, and on pp.257-259, described the start of Queen Charlotte City, and the role of the mill and D.R. Young.

63. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1929, op. cit.*, p.C58.

contributed to the decision of the Millerd/Somerville canning companies to establish a plant in Jedway in 1926, briefly revitalizing the community [see chapter 7].

Lockeport as a mining town: 1907-1917

The town of Lockeport developed slightly later than Jedway, in response to the 1907 copper excitement around Klunkwoi Bay. By January 1908 there were about twenty-five men prospecting or developing claims around the bay.⁶⁴ Most of the town's early inhabitants were miners, like Alex Rogers, Nels Pearson and Nels Larsen, the owners of the Swede group, or "Uncle Bill" Harris, Joe Davis, D.R. Bell, and Alex Paterson, the owners of the Apex group to the west of Lockeport.⁶⁵ Other claim-holders in the area in the 1907-1908 period included J. Matheson, D. Bowser and Mr. Steves [Surprise group], Messrs. Wintermute, McEachern and A. Jones [Last Chance group], and Macguire and Langill [Copper Belle group].⁶⁶ One of the most prominent miners

64. *The Empire*, February 1, 1908, p.1. The name Lockeport, first used in 1908, reportedly came from Captain Louis Locke of the Canadian Pacific ship *Amur*, which served the area, who advocated naming the new settlement after his home town in Nova Scotia; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, p.129.

65. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, *op. cit.*, pp.L69-L70; *ibid.*, *Report 1909*, p.J61; *ibid.*, *Report 1912*, p.K77; *ibid.*, *Report 1914*, p.K99; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, January 29, 1912, p.1.

66. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1908*, *op. cit.*, pp.L70-L71; *ibid.*, *Report, 1909*, p.J61. Some of these people may have lived outside of Lockeport proper, such as in

was Henry L. Beresford, who with his partner L.E. Becher was a major claim-holder in the area.⁶⁷

As well as the residents, there were many transients through the area, but no facilities for them. The problem of accomodation in 1908 led to the "Lockport [sic] Club", which as a community initiative built a log structure to serve as a "temperance hotel" where visitors could stay.⁶⁸ For these transients Lockeport's equivalent to Watson and his Jedway-based fleet of boats was Captain Irving Wintermute, one of the co-owners of the *Last Chance* group, whose launch *Maple Leaf* was used for local transportation.⁶⁹

As with Jedway, the store in Lockeport served as a focus for the existence and vitality of the community. W.H. Thompson had opened a general store in Lockeport by the

a satellite community on McEchran Cove. On its east side there was a cabin and a "Japanese cabin" on the *Surprise* group. At the south end of the cove there were three cabins on the *Cupid Fraction* claim, which may have included those of Wintermute and McEchran [or McEachern], as a trail led directly to their *Last Chance* group; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.10, fieldbooks 89/1913, 90/1913, 4545/1912, 4546/1912, L.I.3059S.

67. *Queen Charlotte News*, August 29,1908, p.1 mentioned the Becher-Beresford group; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 5,1912, p.2 described Beresford placing a monument on Becher's grave. Beresford was apparently also known as Charles or Charlie.

68. *The Queen Charlotte News*, September 12,1908, p.1; *The Empire*, October 31,1908, p.6.

69. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2*, op. cit., pp.221-222.

summer of 1908.⁷⁰ The store changed hands, and was re-opened in May 1909 by Mr. E. Marshall, the son-in-law of E.M. Morgan, a prominent miner in the region.⁷¹ A post office started operating in Lockeport in August 1908, with Marshall, the storekeeper, as the first postmaster.⁷² This repeated the Jedway example, of the post office being incorporated into the retail store, and the merchant acting as postmaster. The other government service in Lockeport began in June 1909, when Beresford was appointed as deputy mining recorder, reporting to Sandilands.⁷³

The 1910 British Columbia directory, based on 1909 information, listed 26 names in Lockeport, of whom 19 were

70. *Queen Charlotte News*, July 11, 1908, p.4 has an advertisement for Thompson's store; *The Empire*, August 8, 1908, p.6 noted the presence of the store. It has been suggested that J.M. Stark was a partner in Thompson's venture, which was purchased by the Morgans and Marshalls in late 1908; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2, op. cit.*, pp.218-219.

71. *Queen Charlotte News*, May 10, 1909, p.5 reported E. Marshall opening an "excellent store". Elbert M. Morgan came from the Kootenays to South Moresby with his sons Henry and Harry in September 1907. They prospected in the Jedway area, then came north to Klunkwoi Bay, where in the spring of 1908 they staked claims around Anna Lake; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2, op. cit.*, pp.218-219; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.5, fieldbook 748/10, for Lot 690 [Rossland], etc.

72. Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", *op. cit.*, p.113. This supports Dalzell's assertion that Marshall purchased the store in 1908.

73. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 5, 1909, p.2.

miners.⁷⁴ Many of these men had arrived in the early days of the copper boom, and were to remain for years. They included the owners of the Swede group and the Apex group, two of the more prominent claims.⁷⁵ Beresford bought the Lockeport Trading Company in early 1911, becoming the local merchant as well as mining recorder, and by August 1911 was described as the postmaster.⁷⁶ Beresford remained at Lockeport at least through 1913 or 1914, presumably continuing in his various capacities.⁷⁷ He established the pattern of the local merchant assuming all the official duties for Lockeport, as well as his commercial role. In 1913 Lot 2353 [*Longfellow* mineral claim], extending along the west shore of the bay, was Crown granted to Beresford.⁷⁸ This lot contained most of the structures in the settlement, so he became not only the main functionary

74. *Henderson's British Columbia Gazeteer and Directory for 1910*, op. cit., p.478.

75. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, January 29, 1912, p.1; *ibid.*, February 5, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, April 21, 1913, p.1; *ibid.*, June 16, 1913, p.2; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1912*, op. cit., p.K77; *ibid.*, *Report 1914*, p.K99.

76. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 18, 1911, p.1; *ibid.*, August 24, 1911, p.3. The Lockeport post office operated until October 1914 before closing briefly, with Beresford serving as the third postmaster; Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", op. cit., p.113. It appears that the storekeeper was the postmaster by default in this period.

77. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, June 16, 1913, p.2 noted his expected return to Lockeport. The October 1914 closure of the post office may have corresponded to his eventual departure.

78. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1914*, op. cit., p.K423.

of the town, but its owner. With the failure of the copper rush, and the start of the First World War, mining activity in the area declined. Although a federal government wharf was built in 1913,⁷⁹ development in the town came to an end until the construction of a cannery in 1918, which replaced mining as the main economic enterprise. However, some of the old mining population remained in Lockeport through the 1920s, including R. Morrison, Rand McDonald, and W.H. Watson, the owners of the old Apex group, now called the Star group, and Rogers, Pearson, and Larsen, the owners of the Swede group.⁸⁰ The latter partners were still present three years later.⁸¹ Mining was still important enough for Lockeport to retain a mining sub-recorder. In 1918-1925 this position was filled by William Morgan, the storekeeper, and in 1929 by James S. Edkins.⁸²

Government infrastructure in support of settlement

The primary government presence in the South Moresby

79. In 1912 a \$1,200 federal appropriation was made to construct the wharf, then rescinded, with a \$4,000 appropriation replacing it the following year, *Queen Charlotte Islander*, January 29, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, June 10, 1912, p.2; *ibid.*, July 29, 1912, p.5; *ibid.*, June 2, 1913, p.2.

80. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1926*, *op. cit.*, p.A67.

81. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1928*, *op. cit.*, pp.C65-C66.

82. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1918*, *op. cit.*, p.266; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1925*, *op. cit.*, p.A9; *ibid.*, *Report, 1929*, *op. cit.*, p.C34.

region was in the form of the provincial government mining recorder and provincial constable. These positions were intended to keep the mining claims and the behaviour of the miners in order. Most of the other government activity in the region was directed at expediting transportation. A wireless station to serve shipping traffic was constructed at the mouth of Ikeda Bay in 1910, and a large lighthouse was built on Cape St. James in 1913-1914.⁸³ There were also a number of beacons and buoys installed along the east coast of Moresby Island between 1907 and 1914.⁸⁴ Although the wireless station and lighthouse both had small crews [1-2 men and their families], they had no real linkages to the South Moresby community at large.

For extractive industry and settlement to be viable in South Moresby, effective communication with markets and sources of supply was essential. Until WWII, nearly all the transportation into the region was by water. The settlements and mines in South Moresby were dependent on commercial steamers for most transportation of supplies, commodities, and people. Chartering a ship or boat was not unusual, but most of this transportation was by scheduled

83. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 2393, W.J. Bowerman, "Early History of the Government Wireless Service on the British Columbia Coast", pp.28-29; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 25, 1914, p.1.

84. *The Empire*, November 23, 1907, p.1; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Government Reserves, Various Districts, P.H.71, fieldbook Coast 1154/1915, L.I.31510.

carrier.

During the first years of the twentieth century South Moresby was served by the Canadian Pacific Steamship fleet. The ships which seem to have most commonly run to the area were the *Amur* and the *Princess Beatrice*. Both of these ships carried passengers as well as freight, the latter including ore deliveries from the copper mines. In 1908 the scheduled South Moresby ports of call of the *Amur* were Collison Bay, Ikeda Bay and Jedway, en route to the ports further north in the Queen Charlotte Islands.⁸⁵

In 1909 the competing Grand Trunk Pacific Steamship line was granted the federal government's mail contract to serve the Queen Charlotte Islands. This subsidized the run to the Islands at the rate of \$200 per trip, and allowed G.T.P. to take over the route.⁸⁶ This company used a number of their "Prince" ships on the run, including the *Prince Albert*, the *Prince Charles*, the *Prince William*, and the *Prince John*.⁸⁷ The federal government subsidy made it possible for the coastal steamships to provide regular biweekly service to the settlements and mining camps in the

85. B.C.A.R.S., Visual Records, photograph #69843, for example, shows the *Princess Beatrice* being loaded with ore at Ikeda Mines in 1907; *Queen Charlotte News*, August 29, 1908, p.2, October 24, 1908, p.1.

86. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., p.289.

87. Agnes L. Mathers, "Memories of the Prince John", in *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, Vol.1, Masset, Senior Citizens of the Queen Charlotte Islands, 1979, pp.7-8.

region. This regular and economical service assisted greatly in allowing industry and settlement in the region.

Grand Trunk Pacific Steamships, and its successor, Canadian National Steamships, maintained the Moresby Island route until 1941, when it was taken over by Union Steamships. The ship most identified with this route was the *Prince John*, which started on the run in 1911.⁸⁸ Union Steamships renamed her the *Cassiar*, and she remained on the route until 1951, when she was scrapped.⁸⁹ In the 1920s the *Prince John* made the round trip between Prince Rupert and Vancouver every two weeks, calling at Queen Charlotte City and Sandspit, along with Lockeport, Jedway, Ikeda Bay and Rose Harbour, on both their north and south-bound trips. During the summer a weekly service to Prince Rupert was maintained.⁹⁰ Although the ports of call changed through time, depending on what settlements, camps, or stations were operating, this pattern of transportation in remained essentially stable from the period of the copper rush through the 1950s.

While the federal government subsidized marine

88. Agnes L. Mathers, "Memories of the Prince John", in *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., pp.7-8. The *Prince John* arrived at Jedway for the first time in August 1911, *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3.

89. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., p.290.

90. British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report, 1924*, op. cit., p.F87; *ibid.*, *Report, 1925*, p.D111.

transportation to the region, land transportation was the responsibility of the provincial government. Various trails were built under government contracts during the copper boom, connecting the different mining districts in South Moresby. The trail building programme started in the winter of 1907, centred on Jedway.⁹¹ In 1908 the development of these government trails reached its peak. Trails were put in connecting Jedway to Collison Bay by way of Ikeda Bay, from Collison Bay to Huston Inlet, and from Huston Inlet to Jedway, while another was started from Collison Bay to the south.⁹²

In the same year, a foreman and four men were assigned to cut a trail to Tasu Harbour, on the west coast of Moresby Island, from Lockeport.⁹³ In 1909 development focused on the trails in the Jedway district, with over \$1,050 spent. The same amount again was spent on a bridge and sidewalks for the town of Jedway.⁹⁴

In 1910-1911 more than \$900 was spent on the Jedway/Ikeda Bay/Collison Bay trails, and an additional

91. *The Empire*, December 21, 1907, p.1.

92. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1909*, op. cit., p.J63.

93. The ten miles of trail cost \$372.00 to construct, but had not produced a "packing trail"; *Ibid.*, p.J61; *Queen Charlotte News*, September 12, 1908, p.1, October 31, 1908, p.1; British Columbia, Department of Public Works, *Report of the Minister of Public Works, 1908-09*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1910, p.F38.

94. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1909-10*, pp.H47-H48.

\$1450 the following year, with some new small-scale trail development on "George Bay near Jedway" and Huxley Island. Additionally, some \$1590 was spent on the "Lockspur - Tasso" trail; presumably referring to the Lockeport trail.⁹⁵ This new work was intended to upgrade this trail to a "packing trail", which could be used to haul supplies.⁹⁶

By 1912-1913, and the functional end of the copper boom, the expenditures on trails in the South Moresby region were down to \$42 for the Collison Bay/Ikeda Bay route.⁹⁷ The provincial trail building programmes were tied directly to the mining activity, and when access was no longer required to various properties, the expenditures ended.

As well as facilitating transportation within the copper mining districts, the provincial trail-building programme served as an economic resource in the area. Miners or other labourers who were not working would be able to hire onto a trail building crew, receive pay, and make a living in the region, rather than having to travel out to urban centres or other mining districts when they were "between jobs". These trails served as a local economic

95. British Columbia, Department of Public Works, *Report of the Minister of Public Works, 1910-1911*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1912, pp.J39-J40; *ibid.*, *Report of the Minister of Public Works, 1911-12*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1913, p.P45.

96. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, June 10, 1912, p.2.

97. British Columbia, Department of Public Works, *Report of the Minister of Public Works, 1912-13*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1914, p.S49.

resource as well as a means of transportation.

Conclusions

In South Moresby the first form of settlement was mining cabins or camps, with their form determined by the entrepreneurs who established them, within the functional requirements of geography and copper mining technology. This settlement determined by staple industries is consistent with classical economic theory and the staples thesis. However, two of these settlements, around the *Copper Queen* and *Swede* groups, turned into the independent towns and district service centres of Jedway and Lockeport. The parallel camp on Collison Bay, and the much larger development on Ikeda Bay did not result in independent settlements in the same way.

Both Jedway and Lockeport were the sites of the first locations in their areas, and remained at the geographic centres of their respective copper mining districts. In both instances, the early substantial development was capitalized and determined by regional entrepreneurs. However, perhaps the most important factor in their development as independent settlements was the presence of resident merchant capitalists. Cole Harris identified these "weak commercial economies" that developed around the edge of staple economies as the second "basic constituent of the economic geography of early Canada". He noted how these

economies often outlived the staple economy, and "nurtured much of the early Canadian population".⁹⁸ In the case of Jedway and Lockeport, the impact of local merchant capitalists may not be overemphasized. The general stores, other service industries, and especially the Jedway sawmill all contributed to the economic and settlement viability of the towns. This also relates directly to Howard Lamar's stressing of the importance of merchants on the frontier.⁹⁹ In Jedway, the assumption of the role of government seat for the Queen Charlotte Islands also played a major part in the vitality of the community. The presence of the government offices and the sawmill helped Jedway support a population roughly double that of Lockeport in this period.

In the absence of the "commercial economy", and more particularly the locally-based merchant capitalists, the much larger camp at Ikeda Bay remained a camp, directly tied to the mining activity.¹⁰⁰ Jedway served as the service centre for Ikeda Mines as well as for all the smaller mining camps in the district. Ikeda Mines was the only commercial producer of copper ore in South Moresby in this period, had the largest resident population, and substantial industrial

98. Cole Harris, "Industry and the Good Life around Idaho Peak", *op. cit.*, pp.341-343.

99. Howard R. Lamar, "Persistent Frontier: The West in the Twentieth Century", *op. cit.*, pp.12-15.

100. The enclave nature of this Japanese venture may have also acted against its integration into the broader South Moresby economy and society.

and residential development, carried out by a [Japanese] regional entrepreneur. However, unlike Jedway and Lockeport, there was no government presence, no "commercial economy", and no population of local merchant capitalists; these latter factors appear to have been the primary determinants of a viable independent community.

Chapter 4: Local entrepreneurs in South Moresby diversify:
1907-1910

The introduction of a non-Native population into the South Moresby region focused attention on the plentiful forest and marine resources of the area, and presented industrial possibilities beyond copper mining. The first non-mining businesses were merchant capitalist ventures which addressed the needs of the new resident and transient population attracted by the copper boom [see Chapter 3]. In each instance the proprietors of these businesses were based in the towns of Jedway and Lockeport, so may be defined as local entrepreneurs. Some of them, such as Jedway's L.T. Watson, had come to the region as prospectors; Watson was one of the locators who had initiated the copper rush. By the beginning of 1908, presumably using the capital gained through selling or bonding claims, he was diversifying his business interests to include a "flotilla" of gasoline launches.¹ Watson's shift from industrial capitalism to merchant capitalism was contrary to the more usual shift from merchant to industrial capitalism in the region. Other local entrepreneurs, such as the Jedway storekeeper, N.R. Sivart, and Ben Metcalfe, who purchased the Jedway hotel in 1908, were attracted to South Moresby by the market

1. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907; *ibid.*, February 1, 1908, p.1; *ibid.*, June 27, 1908, p.6.




Figure 4.1 - Local ventures in South Moresby
 Key: 1. Jedway sawmill
 2. Bag Harbour clam cannery

presented by the mining population. The primary intent of these merchant capitalists was to address this market opportunity, rather than producing commodities for sale outside the region. In some cases, such as the Jedway sawmill, the distinction is slight. It was established in response to the immediate market demand, but soon became a commodity-exporting industry, serving markets up and down the coast.

Eventually, these merchant capitalists became involved in copper mining, and also led the way into new resource extractive industries.² This early diversification does not correspond to the evolutionary mining boom models of Gates, Spence or Abbe, where such efforts were intended to maintain economic viability in the face of a declining mining industry.³ Around Jedway, the diversification of merchant capital occurred in the early stages of the copper rush. This invokes Howard Lamar's thoughts concerning the importance of merchants on the "frontier", and the

2. Sivart was a co-owner of property on Huston Inlet with Ike Thompson in the spring of 1908; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 15, 1908, p.2. Metcalfe was developing the Togo claim the hotel was located on by 1914, and previously may have "had an interest in a copper mine"; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1915*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1916, p.K162; Bertha Metcalfe, "My early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, p.31.

3. William B. Gates Jr., *Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining Industry*, *op. cit.*; Clark C. Spence, "The Boom of the Wood River Mines", *op. cit.*; Donald R. Abbe, *Austin and the Reese River Mining District: Nevada's Forgotten Frontier*, *op. cit.*.

identification of firms with regions, starting as "simple traders" and progressing into other forms of regional capitalism.⁴ Lamar's suggestions about the central role of the family and other social and economic units in maintaining frontier society also apply to these early merchant capitalists. The Lockeport storekeeper was the son-in-law of one of the more active miners in that area, the Sivarts' son-in-law was their partner in the Jedway sawmill, and Metcalfe brought his parents and sister to Jedway along with his wife. For these local entrepreneurs, there seemed to be an imperative to expand their exploitation of local resources, and also to include their families in such ventures. Given the environment, it was inevitable that the focus of these new resource extractive industries would be on the forest and ocean resources of the southern archipelago. The diversification into other extractive industries started in the fall of 1907, when Sivart chartered a ship to bring in not only stock for his store, but the machinery for the Jedway sawmill and the components of a clam cannery.⁵

The Jedway sawmill: 1907-1909

As suggested in Chapter 3, this venture was initiated

4. Howard R. Lamar, "Persistent Frontier: The West in the Twentieth Century", *op. cit.*, pp.12-15.

5. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4.

in 1907 largely to supply lumber to the mining and related development in the region.⁶ However, due to the size of the business and the scope of its market, it may be classed as an industrial rather than as a merchant venture. Construction started in October, with the machinery arriving soon thereafter, and the mill was operating by December 1907.⁷ The mill was owned by Lewis Tucker Watson, the original locator at Jedway; Annie Sivart, N.R. Sivart's wife; Walter L. Johns and Clayton A. Bourne, "millmen" from New Westminster; A.N. Wastell, a boxmaker from New Westminster; and the Winnipeg Lumber Company Ltd., of Vancouver. In April 1908 these owners sold the mill to the Jedway Lumber and Development Company Ltd., in exchange for shares. Of the 200 \$100 shares available, Watson and Sivart got 15 each, Johns, Bourne and Winnipeg Lumber got 10 each, and Wastell got 5. The declared intent of the new company included not only sawmilling and box making, but also logging, fish canning and reduction, and general merchandising.⁸

6. Tibor Jando, "Logging and Sawmilling 1907-1970", *The Charlottes: A Journal of the Queen Charlotte Islands*, No.1, 1971, p.17.

7. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4; *ibid.*, November 23, 1907, p.1; *ibid.*, February 1, 1908, p.1.

8. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B4426, File 2009(1897), Jedway Lumber and Development Company Ltd., pp.2-4,20. Bourne was described as Sivart's son-in-law. For instance; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands, op. cit.*, p.119; Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Life in Jedway, 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, p.31. Bourne was described as the

The mill was described in the spring of 1908 as having a cutting capacity of twenty to thirty thousand board feet of lumber per day, and supplying the "long-felt need of the islands."⁹ The business flourished, with production ordered three months in advance. Logs totalling 600,000 feet of lumber were towed to the mill in August 1908, and pilings were being driven for a new wharf.¹⁰ In September 1908 a \$17,000 chattel mortgage was registered against the company in favour of Annie Sivart. The assets included "all interest in application for a lease made to Provincial Government of townsite on Jedway Harbour and all interest in agreement made between Company and L.T. Watson as to part of said property occupied by Companies [sic] mill".¹¹ A change in company ownership occurred in March 1909, when Watson, Johns, Wastell and J.G. Blanchfield [a Vancouver "speculator"], each with 10 shares, were bought out. They were replaced by: Lewis Allen Lewis, a New Westminster millman, 15 shares; Harry A. Bourne, a Vancouver barrister, 15 shares; and Francis M. Dockhill [?], a broker, 10 shares.¹²

manager of the mill, and Johns as the foreman, *The Empire*, November 23, 1907, p.1.

9. *Queen Charlotte News*, April 4, 1908, p.6.

10. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1908, p.3; *ibid.*, August 1, 1908, p.2.

11. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B4426, File 2009(1897), Jedway Lumber and Development Company Ltd., p.37.

12. *Ibid.*, p.40.

Although the manager, foreman and bookkeeper of the sawmill were white, most of the employees were Japanese. In 1908 a Japanese crew arrived to work at the mill, complete with a ton of rice as provisions, and the crew was still described as Japanese the next year.¹³ In June 1909 the mill was operating at full capacity, with a contract to supply wooden cases to the Skeena salmon canneries as well as regular work.¹⁴ In its first year and a half the sawmill was a successful venture, and J.R. Anderson's description of Jedway in May 1909 suggests its importance to the settlement:

Jedway itself is a village with two wharves, a store, hotel, & various residences of the employees of the sawmill, its principal industry, of fishermen & others who are employed by a copper mine whose buildings stand prominently in view high up the mountain side.¹⁵

In spite of Anderson writing during the copper boom, he described the mill, and not the mining, as the "principal industry" of the town.

Towards the end of June 1909 a fire destroyed the mill, with a loss of \$37,000, partially covered by insurance.¹⁶

13. *The Empire*, September 12, 1908, p.6; *Queen Charlotte News*, June 19, 1909, p.2.

14. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1909, p.2.

15. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1912, Box 11, File 3, J.R. Anderson Papers, "Trip to Queen Charlotte Islands, May 1909", p.6. The trip Anderson was on was a "townsite excursion" organized by the promoters of the new town of Queen Charlotte City.

16. *Ibid.*, June 26, 1909, p.1.

Generally this has been accepted as the end of the venture, in spite of the stated intent of the owners to rebuild immediately. However, as late as November 1909 Jedway Lumber was advertising in the *Queen Charlotte News*, suggesting that the company, if not the mill, was still in operation.¹⁷ The Jedway sawmill was still listed in the British Columbia directory for 1910, with two loggers and a millwright also resident in the town.¹⁸ However, the directory was based on 1909 information, and the mill does not seem to have existed past the end of that year.

One of the reasons for this company's failure may have been the formation of the Moresby Island Lumber Company, which began construction of a 30,000 board foot per day capacity mill in Queen Charlotte City in 1908. The provincial government granted substantial timber leases around Skidegate Inlet to the new company in exchange for the mill venture. This new mill, located closer to the remaining Haida villages and growing non-Native communities on Graham Island, started production in 1909, the year the

17. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands, op. cit.*, p.125 and Tibor Jando, "Logging and Sawmilling 1907-1970", *op. cit.*, p.17 both suggested the fire ended the business. *Queen Charlotte News*, June 26, 1909, p.1 stated the intention to rebuild immediately, and the November 6, 1909 edition, p.3 advertised lumber for sale. With the demand described, it seems unlikely that enough stock would have survived the fire to sell for more than four months.

18. *Henderson's British Columbia Gazeteer and Directory for 1910*, Vancouver, Henderson Publishing Company Ltd., 1910, pp.452-453.

Jedway mill seems to have shut down.¹⁹ The combination of the government concessions to the new mill, its proximity to markets, and the devastating fire probably combined to overwhelm the Jedway sawmill business.

As the earliest example of a viable, non-mining local enterprise the Jedway mill was interesting. The property for the venture came from Watson, one of the first of the local mining entrepreneurs in the area, the capital seems to have come from Sivart, the storekeeper, and the expertise and technology was supplied by C.A. Bourne, a millman who also happened to be the Sivarts' son-in-law. Strong market demand made this business possible, and within two years it overshadowed the mining as the "principal industry" in a mining town. However, its distance from growing markets, unfair government intervention, and a fire all led to its eventual failure.

The Bag Harbour clam cannery: 1908-1909

Besides the documented industry at Jedway, references have been made to a clam cannery in the settlement.²⁰ Machinery for such a plant was received in October 1907 on Sivart's chartered ship, but there is no evidence that it

19. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., pp.257-259.

20. *Ibid.*, p.119.

was installed at Jedway.²¹ Surveys of Harriet Harbour in 1908 showed no sign of such a plant, but in the same year a clam cannery had started operation on the north shore of Bag Harbour.²² The nearby clam beds of Burnaby Narrows were a traditional resource for the Haida people of the region, and continued to be used as a seasonal resource even after their relocation to Skidegate. This must have been observed, and made Bag Harbour a logical site for such a venture. As with the Jedway sawmill, the local entrepreneur's appreciation of an exploitable commodity meant that only expertise and specialized machinery was required, both imported from the metropolis with the capital of the merchant and his local partners.

The clam cannery was another of the ventures of the locally-based partnership headed by Sivart. Its largest business was the sawmill, which seems to have prospered initially, before fading away in 1909 in the face of destruction by fire and strong competition. By this time, the mining prospects around Jedway were beginning to seem less promising than at first thought, Ikeda Mines had failed, and miners were beginning to move elsewhere. All of these factors contributed to the decline of commercial prospects in and around Jedway, and in particular those of

21. *The Empire*, October 26, 1907, p.4.

22. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., p.192.

the Sivart partnership. It is likely that the cannery only operated for the 1908-1909 clam season under this ownership, before closing in the face of the Sivart partnership's economic problems.

The Miyar/Metcalf saltery proposal: 1910

In 1910 two attempts were made to establish salmon salteries in the Skincuttle Inlet region. One of these was successful, and led to the long-lived Jedway Bay Saltery, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. This was an initiative of a Vancouver-based fishing company and Japanese fish curers. The unsuccessful attempt was made by George I. Miyar, a naturalized Japanese Canadian, who was backed by the Jedway hotelier Ben Metcalfe.²³ In the spring of 1910 Miyar applied for a salting licence and a seine licence and erected a building [possibly on George Bay, where he had applied for the seine licence]. As a seine licence for Skincuttle Inlet had already been granted to the other applicant, Miyar's licence was denied. He intended instead to use his facility to produce dogfish liver oil, for which no licence was required. The \$125.00 advanced for licences [\$100.00 for the salting licence and \$25.00 for the fishing

23. The Jedway hotel was said to be originally constructed in 1906 by Marsh English, a prominent early canneryman, active both on the Fraser and on the northern rivers. With his background, it is possible that he may have been the first to appreciate the potential of the chum and pink runs in the South Moresby area.

licence] was to be forwarded to Ben Metcalfe.²⁴ This suggests that Metcalfe provided the capital for Miyar to make his application, and provides another example of local merchant capital diversifying. Like Sivart and Watson, with their various enterprises, Metcalfe apparently put up the capital for an experienced Japanese fisher and fish curer to establish a new extractive industry in the area. Although the effort was not successful, it repeated the pattern of attempting to diversify the economic base in the region.

The effect of locally-based industrial diversification on settlement

Of these three Jedway-based attempts at developing commodity-exporting industries, only the Jedway sawmill had a significant impact on settlement. Immediately after it started production, it enabled a building boom in Jedway; in the first six weeks of 1908 seven new cabins were built.²⁵ As a source of building materials, the sawmill allowed the elaboration of the built environment.

A new population group was attracted to Jedway to work in and for the mill. This included the managers, such as Bourne, Johns, and the bookkeeper W.A. McLeod, and the crew

24. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 14, file 118, W. Prescott to J.P. Babcock, May 31, 1910; *ibid.*, Prescott to Babcock, June 13, 1910; *ibid.*, Prescott to Babcock, August 1, 1910.

25. *The Empire*, February 1, 1908, p.1.

of Japanese labourers brought in to run the facility.²⁶ There were also logging contractors providing logs to the mill, at least one of whom brought in his family to Jedway.²⁷ The mill was responsible for increasing the resident population of the town, as well as creating a Japanese enclave.

There was also a "trickle-down" effect for the merchant capitalists of Jedway, who ironically owned the mill. In early 1908 Watson was using some of his fleet of boats to tow logs to the mill. Sivart's store was advertising "Logging Supplies" in the same year; the only local market for these would have been the contractors supplying the mill.²⁸ The existence of the mill and the increased population it brought made for new retail and service business opportunities.

When this "principal industry" of Jedway shut down in 1909, it would have had a profound effect on the local economy and population. The mill's failure occurred when the mining boom in the region was ending, and Ikeda Mines was also shutting down. The sawmill formed a core business for the Sivart partnership. Its closing, and the fading of the boom, probably explain why the Bag Harbour clam cannery

26. *The Empire*, August 22, 1908, p.6; *ibid.*, September 12, 1908, p.6.

27. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1908, p.6.

28. *Ibid.*, February 1, 1908; *ibid.*, March 21, 1908, p.4.

had a short existence under this group's tenure. Likewise, the mill was the most viable business venture in the town of Jedway, and probably the largest employer by some margin. When it failed, there would have been nothing to replace it. The employees who had come to Jedway specifically to work at the mill would have been forced to move out of the region in search of new jobs.

Chapter 5: Regional entrepreneurs in South Moresby:

1910-1927

Non-mining regional entrepreneurs were attracted to the Jedway and Lockeport regions by the fishery resources of the southern archipelago. The first such ventures had connections with the Jedway based initiatives of Bag Harbour clam cannery and the Miyar/Metcalfe saltery proposal. The clam cannery was taken over by the Standard Fish Company, while the salmon saltery was foiled by the similar venture of H. Mukai and Malcolm, Cannon & Company. In both cases, the successful company was a fishing firm, and integrated its South Moresby plant into a network of processing plants. Although the companies funding the new ventures were based in Vancouver, they were both dependent on foreign capital.

The Standard Fish Company was one of the holdings of Alvo von Alvensleben, a Vancouver-based entrepreneur of aristocratic German origin. In 1910 Standard Fish established a major fish processing plant, which included canning and freezing plants, at Pacofi, on the northeastern coast of Moresby Island.¹ Alvensleben was cited by D.G. Paterson as a typical example of a "regional entrepreneur", who served as viaducts for channeling foreign capital into the resource extractive industry of British Columbia. All

1. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., p.192; *Queen Charlotte Islander*, April 8, 1912, p.2.



Figure 5.1 - Regional ventures in South Moresby
 Key: 1. Bag Harbour clam cannery
 2. Jedway Bay salmon saltery
 3. Lockeport salmon cannery

of Alvensleben's capital was raised within a narrow, aristocratic social group in Germany, where he had originated. Paterson considered these regional entrepreneurs essential to the development of the resource industries, and also saw them as relatively autonomous. Although the capital they worked with was foreign, the control and assignment of the capital was local.²

A similar pattern existed with Malcolm, Cannon & Company. This was the private inheritor company of the earlier United Canneries of British Columbia Ltd., a small combine which had been formed in 1899 to run three canneries and related businesses. By 1906 the newer company had moved to the north coast, and established the Dominion Cannery on the Skeena River.³ In 1908 Malcolm, Cannon & Company was described as "Salmon Cannery", who owned the Gulf of Georgia and Scottish-Canadian canneries on the Fraser and the Dominion Cannery on the Skeena. A salmon saltery was included in the operations of the Dominion Cannery.⁴ Although Malcolm, Cannon & Company was based in Vancouver,

2. D.G. Paterson, "European Financial Capital and British Columbia: An Essay on the Role of the Regional Entrepreneur", *op. cit.*, pp.33-47.

3. B.C.A.R.S., GR 1438, Register of Companies, Film B.4417, file 384(1897), United Canneries of B.C. Ltd.; Cicely Lyons, *Salmon: Our Heritage*, Vancouver, B.C.Packers, 1969, p.260. United Canneries of B.C. had also been known as Malcolm, Cannon & Company for some years, after its largest shareholders.

4. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 75, folio 705, Malcolm, Cannon & Co. to J.B. Babcock, October 21, 1908.

many of the owners, including the principal shareholder, O.M. Malcolm, were in England. This trend towards English ownership had started a few years earlier, under the United Canneries of B.C., and continued under the private company.⁵

The Bag Harbour clam cannery: 1910-1913

Apparently the Standard Fish Company took over the Bag Harbour facility at the same time that it built the Pacofi plant. With the fortunes of Jedway and the Sivart partnership waning, the Bag Harbour facility was an obvious target for Alvensleben's company, with a new plant near his primary holding in the region. Standard Fish continued to operate the clam cannery at least through 1913. By that time it seems that the company had some operational and financial problems. These, combined with its German ownership, meant that Standard Fish wound up its operations, including the cannery, at the start of the First World War.

The Bag Harbour cannery's output for the three winter

5. B.C.A.R.S., GR 1438, Register of Companies, Film B.4417, file 384(1897), pp.22-23,65, etc. lists the ownership of United Canneries of B.C. in the 1901-1904 period, and the trend of increasing British ownership. In the salmon canning industry, the British capital was a natural development of the fact that British Columbia canned salmon was almost exclusively exported to and marketed in England or Scotland. For instance, in 1905 with the exception of "stock left on hand" in British Columbia, all of the pack of Malcolm, Cannon & Company was shipped to Liverpool or London. British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report of the Fisheries Commissioner for British Columbia, 1906*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1907, p.H13.

canning seasons of 1910-11, 1911-12, and 1912-13 was 1,100, 1,200 and 1,900 48 pound cases respectively. Both little-neck clams and butter clams were packed. The cannery employed about fifteen people during the season, including some Japanese men and Haida women.⁶ The clams were dug by Haida and Japanese people, primarily in Burnaby Narrows and Island Bay. The diggers received 20¢ to 25¢ per bucket, with the highest production for one digger 25 buckets in a single low tide. The clam beds, on the east or Burnaby Island side of the narrows, were described as small but incredibly rich. A number of "Indian summer shacks" were located to the north of this clam bed, presumably for the use of the diggers.⁷ The Haida people had traditionally taken their food from these clam beds, and had continued the seasonal pattern after moving their permanent homes out of the region. As they were digging clams for food purposes in any case, it would have been a simple matter to capture their labour for the cannery. By 1910 the Japanese labour noted may have been brought in from Vancouver, but may also have been recruited from the local Japanese fishing and mining population. Ikeda Mines was shut down from 1910 to 1913, and may have provided a pool of local labour, and there were also many Japanese involved in fishing and small

6. British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report of the Commissioner of Fisheries, 1914*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1915, p.R112.

7. *Ibid.*

scale processing in the region, some of whom may have been at loose ends during the clam packing season.

In this way the cannery served as an economic opportunity for a small number of Haida and Japanese people, and a focus for seasonal settlement. Up to fifteen people were employed in the plant in the winter canning season, in addition to the clam diggers. Some of the workers may have lived in the "Indian summer shacks" in the vicinity of the clam beds. Presumably there was some bunkhouse space provided at the plant as well. This seasonal settlement related closely to traditional Haida use of the area, which had followed a resource-based yearly round. It is less clear how this related to the Japanese population in South Moresby, which was tied more to specific industries.

The Jedway Bay saltery: 1910-1911

The Miyar and Metcalfe attempt to establish a salmon saltery in the Skincuttle Inlet area was beaten out by that of Malcolm, Cannon & Company and its Japanese fish curer. In 1909 the Dominion Cannery on the Skeena, with its saltery, was sold to the British Columbia Packer's Association.⁸ In 1910 Malcolm, Cannon & Company sent Y. [or H.] Mukai to the Queen Charlotte Islands "to establish a Salmon Saltery for them on these islands", perhaps as a replacement for the Skeena facility. The two parties

8. Cicely Lyons, *Salmon: Our Heritage*, op. cit., p.275.

acquired the seine licence for Skincuttle Inlet, which foiled the Miyar licence application for the same area.⁹ The Mukai saltery, the first to be documented in South Moresby, was constructed in April 1910 on Jedway Bay, also known as Lizzie Cove.¹⁰ Mukai, in conjunction with Malcolm, Cannon & Co., received a licence [#76] in late 1910 to salt salmon on Skincuttle Inlet for the year 1911.¹¹ Malcolm, Cannon & Company disappeared from the list of producing canneries in the 1911 season.¹² With the demise of this firm the Jedway Bay saltery assumed a more independent, Japanese-controlled aspect, although still using white front men to expedite licencing and other regulatory aspects. This meant a change in the definition of the venture from a class two regional entrepreneur to a

9. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 14, file 118, Prescott to J.P. Babcock, May 31, 1910.

10. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, p.3, Williams, Manson & Rae to N.A. Watt, Government Agent, Prince Rupert, September 10, 1937. This suggested that during the copper rush Y. Mukai had staked the Taizi mineral claim on this site, and later constructed the saltery on the claim. However, the Taizi mineral claim was located in 1912 and lapsed in 1926, contradicting the order suggested by the letter above, *ibid.*, p.43, memo from Deputy Minister of Lands, August 31, 1938. This is also at odds with the 1910 correspondence cited above which states that Mukai was sent to the region specifically to establish a saltery.

11. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 14, folio 118, W. Prescott to H.J. Davis, December 1, 1910; *ibid.*, folio 126, Malcolm, Cannon & Co. and Y. Mukai licence application, 1911.

12. British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report of the Fisheries commissioner for British Columbia, 1912*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1912, p.N60.

class three Japanese enterprise. The significant aspect of the original operation funded by a Vancouver-based company was its introduction of a large-scale Japanese fish-processing industry to the region.

Regional entrepreneurs and salmon canning in South Moresby:
1918-1927

Salmon canning consistently comprised the core of the provincial fishing industry, representing about 70% of total fishery products. Unlike salmon salting or shellfish canning, by the twentieth century salmon canning was a capital-intensive and highly regulated industry. After starting on the Fraser River, this industry had spread up the coast, with many plants established in productive fishing areas, such as the Skeena and Nass Rivers, and Rivers Inlet. However, in the the rapid expansion of the 1890s, the canning industry concentrated on sockeye salmon, which the British market demanded. This meant that Moresby Island, with predominantly pink and chum salmon runs, was ignored in this expansion.

A disastrous 1913 slide into the Fraser compromised the sockeye run in that river, shifting more of the canners' efforts to the north coast. The market for the spring and fall varieties of salmon more prevalent on the north coast was also expanding. This trend was accelerated by the First World War, and its corollary demand for high quality

preserved food such as canned salmon of any species. These factors brought the salmon canning industry to the southern archipelago in 1918. In this area, there were generous resources of pink and chum salmon, also known respectively as humpbacks and dogs, based on their appearance when spawning. The canneries were established in areas where these fish were plentiful; the salmon run in Klunkwoi Bay is still notable.

The Lockeport cannery: 1918-1927

The first salmon cannery in the South Moresby area was that of the Lockeport Canning Co. Ltd., established in 1918 at the old mining town by Eugene H. Simpson and associates in response to the demand for canned salmon in WW1. Simpson had been active as a fish buyer for American interests in the area for some two years prior to establishing the plant. Ironically, in 1918 he also operated the freezing plant at Pacofi, built in 1910 by Alvo von Alvensleben's Standard Fish Company.¹³ Simpson serves as yet another example of a regional entrepreneur or economic broker, linking the capital of outside interests to the resources of South Moresby.

In May 1918 Simpson and W. Shruballs sold all their

13. Sam L. Simpson, "Adventures in the Crab Trade", in *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, vol.2, Masset, Senior Citizens of the Queen Charlotte Islands, 1982, p.87; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., p.221.

fishing equipment, including the gasoline boat "Wigwam", nets and fishing gear, scows, and seine boats, their licence to operate at Lockeport, and their interest in the Lockeport cannery site, to the Lockeport Canning Company Ltd. The consideration was 125 "fully paid [\$100.00] shares" each, of the 500 total in the latter company, capitalized at \$50,000. The other two shareholders, Edmund Herne and W.E. Green, held one share each, and a \$25,000 mortgage was held by the Bank of Nova Scotia.¹⁴

The cannery was built at a cost of some \$30,000, and operated for the fall 1918 season, during which 8,500 cases of pink salmon and 13,000 cases of chums were canned.¹⁵ In spite of this promising result, the business went under. A variety of reasons have been offered for this failure. The consensus was that the market for pink and chum salmon was glutted with the end of the war, and the production could not be sold.¹⁶

14. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 036682, p.52, part of statement of J.W. Dickie[?], departmental solicitor.

15. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5146, File 3747, Lockeport Cannery, p.55; University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections [hereafter cited as U.B.C. Special Collections], Henry Doyle Papers, Box 6, file 8, "Statistics - B.C. Companies". A "case", the standard measure of cannery production, normally was comprised of 48 one-pound cans of fish.

16. Simpson's son suggested there were no buyers at the time; Sam L. Simpson, "Adventures in the Crab Trade", *op. cit.*, p.87. Kathleen Dalzell reported that with the end of the war "the American firm backing the operation was caught by an embargo placed on all sales to the States"; Kathleen E.

Sam Simpson described his father making a "hasty departure" to avoid seizure of the firm's assets, and taking a "quantity of canning equipment" to Langara Island, where he operated a small cannery in the 1919 season.¹⁷ This is inconsistent with the Lands Branch observation that the company had been "wound up voluntarily" in April 1920, with a liquidator appointed the following month.¹⁸ Claims were filed by various creditors, including the Union Bank of Canada, and Chong Sat, [probably a Chinese labour contractor], one of the largest creditors. The boat had been seized by the unpaid engine supplier. Apparently the cannery was still fully operational after the winding-up, as the creditors wanted to lease or sell it as a going concern.¹⁹ This suggests that most of the assets were

Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, *op. cit.*, p.221. William Green, one of the minority partners, referred to the "drastic ending of the Salmon Canning business" as demand died with the end of the war; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 036682, p.17, W.E. Green to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, received Lands Branch March 6, 1922. The Register of Companies confirmed that the markets for pink and chum salmon, the predominant species packed at Lockeport, were glutted, and the product could not be sold; B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5146, File 3747, pp.55-56.

17. Sam L. Simpson, "Adventures in the Crab Trade", *op. cit.*, p.87

18. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 036682, p.52, part of statement of J.W. Dickie[?], departmental solicitor.

19. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5146, File 3747, Lockeport Cannery, pp.55-56. Green, the former partner initially named as liquidator, tried to strike a deal whereby a H.J. Bradbury would lease the facility for a fee of 25¢ a

seized, and that Simpson did not escape with much of the equipment from the plant.

Presumably Simpson had been attracted to the Lockeport site by the settlement that already existed there, as well as the local salmon run. Some of the copper boom buildings could have been used, and there was still a remnant mining population in the area. Simpson had built his plant in trespass on Crown land. In December 1918, after the first pack was put up, Simpson initiated the lease process for the cannery site.²⁰ The lease details were finalized by January 1920, but with the company wound up, no payments were made, so the lease was disallowed in November 1921.²¹ The liquidator claimed "all movable property on this land" as property of the estate, but the Lands Branch stated that because the cannery was built without government authority, anything put on the land in trespass belonged to the Crown. This took away the liquidator's rights to the estate, and complicated the dispersal of the plant and assets.²²

case, with a minimum of 20,000 cases, and the boat for \$30.00 a day; *ibid.*

20. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.15, fieldbook 652/1919, L.I.010268, A.L.1010; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 09114, pp.1-19.

21. *Ibid.*, p.19, Superintendent of Lands to Government Agent, Prince Rupert; *ibid.*, p.29, Superintendent of Lands to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, November 29, 1921.

22. *Ibid.*, p.33, R.D. Dinning, Liquidator, The Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association Limited, to Superintendent of Lands, July 17, 1922; *ibid.*, pp.53-54, statement of J.W. Dickie(?),

In December 1921 Green, Simpson's former partner, applied to purchase the cannery property, supposedly as a "Shingle Mill Site".²³ This proposal was rejected, but by November 1922 Green's application to lease the lot was accepted.²⁴ At the same time, W.C. Splan was attempting to acquire the lease and assets of the cannery. His lawyer argued that it would be unfair if Green got the lease without first purchasing the assets from the creditors. Taking this approach, Splan was attempting to buy the company's assets from the liquidator, and then to acquire the lease from the government.²⁵ Splan was a Vancouver-based salmon broker; someone who would buy from independent producers and then transport and market the commodity, usually in the United Kingdom.²⁶ This places him solidly in the regional entrepreneur or economic broker group.

Splan was successful in his attempt to get the plant, and was granted the lease on the Lockeport cannery site.²⁷

Departmental Solicitor; *ibid.*, p.31, Superintendent of Lands to R.D.Dinning, Liquidator, November 29, 1922.

23. *Ibid.*, pp.1,13,14.

24. *Ibid.*, pp.53-54, statement of J.W. Dickie[?], Departmental Solicitor

25. *Ibid.*, pp.70-71, W.B. Farris, representing W.C. Splan, to Superintendent of Lands, January 26, 1923.

26. Cicely Lycns, *Salmon: Our Heritage*, *op. cit.*, p.329.

27. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.15, fieldbook 356/1924, L.I.053462.

He was also successful in operating his cannery, which was turning out about 1,500 cases per day in 1924.²⁸ The same year saw a good run of humpback or pink salmon:

This season saw a very heavy run of Humpback salmon, the canneries at Lockeport and Lagoon operating to full capacity, the purse-seine boats had to lay off for periods to avoid catching surplus quantities.²⁹

Apparently the cannery operated for the fall season, from August to October, with a workforce of "British, Chinese and Indians."³⁰ The Haida people by this time were "congregating around Skidegate Village except during the fishing season when some of them go to Lagoon and Lockeport."³¹ Henry Doyle reviewed the salmon canning industry in British Columbia in the later 1920s, with regard to possible consolidation, and summarized the Lockeport Canning Co. Ltd.:

The Lockeport cannery was built in 1918 but after operating one season the company went into liquidation and was lost to the original investors. In 1923 the plant was operated under

28. W.J.H. Holmes, "Moresby Island Triangulation Control Surveys", in *British Columbia, Report of the Minister of Lands, 1924*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1925, p.F88.

29. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O53462, p.109, A.S. Musgrave to Surveyor General, October 15, 1924. This reference also confirms seining as the primary technique for fishing pink salmon in South Moresby.

30. U.B.C. Special Collections, Maps Mss Collection, 1A0 - B.C., F9-8, file Canneries Nos. 31-40, No.31, fire insurance survey 1923.

31. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O53462, p.113, A.S. Musgrave to Surveyor General, October 15, 1924.

lease. It can be purchased at a very reasonable figure.

The cannery is located at Lockeport, near the southern end of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The waters in its vicinity contain good quantities of salmon of the Chum and Pink varieties, although Pinks only run every second year. The location is much better than the packs obtained in past years would indicate. Under proper management the property could be made a good and profitable investment.³²

Doyle also reviewed the "Annual packs secured since formation" of the Lockeport cannery. No red or white spring, sockeye, or "S.H." [steelhead] were packed at this cannery, but the total number of 48 pound cases per year was substantial:

Year	Cohoes	Pinks	Chums	Total
1918		8,500	13,000	21,500
1923		332	10,797	11,129
1924	77	18,950	5,169	24,196
1925	130	2,640	32,342	35,112
1926	87	8,779	28,471	37,337 ³³

Splan's success with the independent Lockeport Cannery

32. U.B.C. Special Collections, Henry Doyle Papers, Box 6, file 8, "Statistics - B.C. Companies". Doyle's "very reasonable figure" for the value of the Lockeport plant was estimated c.1926-27 at \$48,000, which was relatively high compared to other coastal operations; *ibid.*, Box 6, file 3, "Statistics, Canadian Fishing Company Etc."

33. 1918-1925 figures; *ibid.*, Box 6, file 8, "Statistics - B.C. Companies"; 1926 figures; *ibid.*, Box 6, file 23. These packs were fairly large compared to other canneries on the coast. Doyle noted the average annual pack per cannery c.1923 as 17,641; *ibid.*, Box 6, file 22. Doyle listed comparative statistics, and the percentage of provincial pack put up by individual canneries. In 1923, Lockeport packed a negligible percentage of the total pack, and in 1924 1.38% of the total pack. In 1925 it was in eighth place overall in total pack at 2.07% of the total, and was the largest producer with only one cannery. In 1926, although the pack was up, Lockeport slipped to eleventh place at 1.8% of the total; *ibid.*, Box 6, file 23.

attracted the attention of the Canadian Fishing Company Ltd., which purchased the plant in the spring of 1927 rather than building new canneries proposed for the Moresby Island region.³⁴

The construction of the Lockeport cannery in 1918 revitalized the old mining town. A directory that year described Lockeport as a post office and fishing settlement. Simpson's cannery was noted, and William Morgan had inherited Beresford's mantle as postmaster, deputy mining recorder, storekeeper, and hotelier.³⁵ The 1913 federal government wharf was in bad condition by 1918, when it was turned over to the cannery, and incorporated into the plant complex.³⁶ The cannery only operated for one season before going out of business. When it reopened under Splan in

34. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O69827, pp.2-3,22, Davis, Pugh, Davis, Hessie, Ralston & Lett to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, June 30,1927; *ibid.*, correspondence file O69828, pp.3,16, Canadian Fishing Company Ltd. to Government Agent, January 11,1927, 20, Davis, Pugh, Davis, Hessie, Ralston & Lett to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, March 30,1927.

35. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1918, op. cit.*, p.266.

36. In 1912 a \$1,200 federal appropriation was made to construct the wharf, then rescinded, with a \$4,000 appropriation replacing it the following year, *Queen Charlotte Islander*, January 29,1912, p.2; *ibid.*, June 10,1912, p.2; *ibid.*, July 29,1912, p.5; *ibid.*, June 2,1913, p.2; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O36682, p.17, W.E. Green to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, received Lands Branch March 6,1922.

1923, the federal government rebuilt the wharf.³⁷ The settlement was described in 1924:

Lockeport is a small harbour in the north-west corner of Darwin Sound, and here is a small salmon-cannery capable of putting out about 1,500 cases a day, owned and operated by W.C. Splan. Besides the cannery and its office buildings, there is a store and post-office and a few shacks - nothing more; so the place can hardly be described as a settlement. The Canadian National S.S. "Prince John" calls here weekly on her way either to Vancouver or to Prince Rupert.³⁸

In 1925 the "townsite", Lot 2353, was forfeited for unpaid taxes, and the lease was taken up by the local merchant, William Morgan.³⁹ He was described by a visitor as the genial "local Notary Public, Postmaster, and storekeeper".⁴⁰ In 1926, Lot 2353 was leased in turn by Pete McLeod of Lockeport.⁴¹ The post office had re-opened

37. *Ibid.*, p.93, Assistant Chief Forester to District Forester, Prince Rupert, May 8, 1923; *ibid.*, correspondence file O53462, pp.41,43,44, J.P. Forde, District Engineer, to Surveyor General, July 12, 1924.

38. W.J.H. Holmes, "Moresby Island Triangulation Control Surveys", in British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report of the Minister of Lands, 1924*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1925, p.F88.

39. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O51074, p.9. The lot had reverted to the Crown for non-payment of taxes in 1923, and an E.T. Woodley of Vancouver wished to purchase it at that time; *ibid.*, pp.2-4.

40. British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report, 1925*, *op. cit.*, p.D114.

41. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O51074, p.16. Kathleen Dalzell suggested that Morgan operated the store until the business went under in the depression, some years later; Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, p.130.

in April 1915, with Morgan and McLeod noted as later postmasters.⁴² This maintained the pattern of the local storekeeper assuming responsibility for other official duties.

As well as the "full time" inhabitants of Lockeport, in 1925 a seasonal population of Haida was noted, who would come to work in the cannery during the fishing season.⁴³ They were housed in the cabins of the old mining village, now referred to as "cannery houses". There was also a "China House" built as part of the cannery complex to house the Chinese labour crews.⁴⁴ Until the Canadian Fishing Company takeover, the ongoing operation of the cannery, with some attempted speculation on the remaining copper claims in the area, provided an economic base for the continued existence of Lockeport.

The effect of regional entrepreneurs on settlement

These three ventures initiated by regional entrepreneurs had varying impact on settlement in the region. The Bag Harbour cannery provided a seasonal

42. Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", op. cit., p.113.

43. A.S.G. Musgrave, "Triangulation Survey, Moresby Island, Queen Charlotte Islands District", in British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report of the Minister of Lands, 1925*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1925, p.D116.

44. U.B.C. Special Collections, Maps Mss Collection, 1A0 - B.C., F9-8, file Canneries Nos. 31-40, No.31, fire insurance survey 1923.

economic opportunity for a small group of Haida and Japanese clam diggers and cannery workers. The "Indian summer shacks" at the clam beds may have related to a seasonal residential community with some linkages to the cannery. This could have supported a continuation of traditional patterns of Haida resource utilization and seasonal settlement. However, the primary linkage of the Bag Harbour cannery was to the larger Pacofi facility of the Standard Fish Company. This contrasts with the cannery's beginnings, with its strong linkages to the community of Jedway as one of the Sivart partnership's businesses.

The Jedway Bay Saltery, although initiated within the framework of a regional entrepreneur, functionally was a Japanese enclave business. With the demise of the Vancouver-based, British-capitalized founding company, the venture changed status to become a Japanese venture. In this initial stage, the impact on settlement was minimal. However, as the first, and one of the most successful, Japanese fish processing ventures in the region, its very establishment was significant.

Through its first five seasons of operation the Lockeport Cannery was more representative of regional entrepreneurs' ventures than either of the preceding ones. It was constructed and operated by individuals already involved in the fishing industry, who were clearly examples of "regional entrepreneurs" or "economic brokers", acting as

conduits for foreign capital. For both Simpson and Splan, this plant formed the central activity of their business, rather than part of a conglomerate of plants. As the only source of the commodity dealt in, there was a clear interest on the part of the operators to keep the plant productive. Given the levels of production attained under Splan's direction, this was a viable plan, and the Lockeport Cannery was a significant economic factor in the region, and even provincially. Economically, this venture was a success under the control of a regional entrepreneur.

Although there was still a remnant population from the pre-World War I copper rush, the cannery was the primary economic force around Lockeport. Much of the former mining village was owned formally or controlled economically by the cannery. Most of the population of the settlement worked in some capacity for the cannery, and the population was swollen by Haida people who came during the canning season to provide labour in the plant. The 1923 fire insurance plan of the Lockeport cannery and village showed that most of the former mining village was serving as "Indian Houses" for the seasonal cannery workers.⁴⁵ Throughout this period of independent operation the plant was not only viable as a business but formed an economic and social base which supported the existence of the community of Lockeport.

45. U.B.C. Special Collections, Maps Mss Collection, 1A0 - B.C., F9-8, file Canneries Nos.31-40, No.31.

Chapter 6: Japanese entrepreneurs in South Moresby:
1910-1942

The presence of large numbers of Japanese workers and entrepreneurs in the industry of the southern archipelago has been noted. The most prominent venture, and largest single population, was at Ikeda Bay. Many of the other businesses in the region were either operated by Japanese entrepreneurs, or were dependent on Japanese labour crews. These Japanese people came to the region in a variety of circumstances, from members of contract labour crews to the major capitalist Arichika Ikeda. Once in the area, many of the Japanese initiated business ventures, ranging from Ikeda's major industrial effort down to small ad-hoc fishing or fish processing efforts pursued by Japanese labourers to supplement their regular jobs. Within this range of business were entrepreneurs who may be termed local, and others who may be termed regional. However, a distinguishing factor was their origin, and a sense that there was an identifiable community of Japanese businesses and workers in South Moresby. As such, these Japanese entrepreneurs will be treated as a group.

Although there was Japanese participation in the copper rush, and Ikeda was the only successful commercial copper producer in the region, the focus of Japanese enterprise was

on the fishery.¹ It was fish that first attracted Ikeda to the Queen Charlotte Islands, and all the other Japanese-operated businesses in the region prepared fish or fish products for export, usually to an Oriental market.

Although Japanese workers formed an important part of the industrial labour force in non-Japanese businesses, the Japanese ventures formed something of an ethnic enclave. Linkages were strong, both between entrepreneurs in the region, and to the Japanese business community in Vancouver. Until 1920, the focus of this enclave in the southern archipelago was Ikeda Mines.

Salmon salteries

Prior to World War II Japanese entrepreneurs dominated the fish salting business in British Columbia, packing both herring and salmon. A number of Japanese owned and operated salteries were located in the South Moresby area, attracted

1. There were some "independent" Japanese copper claims besides those of Ikeda and his employees. In 1913 J. Uniaka located the *Copper Coin* claim on the east side of High Island, just off the east coast of Kunghit Island. Uniaka also had the *Sakai* claim, reputedly at Moore Head, the extreme northeast tip of Kunghit Island; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report of the Minister of Mines, 1914*, Victoria, King's Printer, 1915, p.K102. The Jedway Bay saltery was on the *Taizi* mineral claim, owned by M. Mukai; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, coorespondence file O130278, pp.2,37-39. One of Ikeda's employees recalled a Mr. Kaminaka, who operated a boat in Jedway, holding a mine on Rose Harbour for ten years, and selling it for \$35,000, which provided capital for establishing a herring slatery; Izo Arima, "Four Years at Ikeda Bay: Memories of Hunting and Fishing", *op. cit.*, pp.26-27. In no instance did these claims become shipping mines.




Figure 6.1 - Japanese ventures in South Moresby
 Key: 1. Jedway Bay salmon saltery
 2. Huston Inlet salmon saltery
 3. Rose Inlet salmon saltery

by the chum salmon runs in the region. The fish were packed during the fall run, in October, November and December. The process was simple, with the fish cleaned and headed, then packed in dry salt, rather than brine. When cured, the fish was placed in 500 pound boxes for shipment. In Japan, the salmon was sold as a luxury item at \$12.50 a box, which netted the producers a little less than \$10.00 a box.² The "dry salt chum salmon" were marketed exclusively through the British Columbia Salt Fish Board, an agency of the B.C. Manufacturers Association, which also served as the sole agent for B.C. salt herring. While the herring was all for the Chinese market, sold through Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the salmon was marketed only in Japan.³

A salting operation required much less capital and equipment than canning. Besides the fish, all that was needed was a crew, a supply of barrels, salt, wood for boxes, and a roof to pack under. As well as making it easier for entrepreneurs to enter the business, the low financial requirement made salting less susceptible to crises of capital. Essentially the 1929 depression eliminated the canning industry in South Moresby. By the 1931 season operating capital was sufficient to operate only a few major plants, so marginal canneries were left idle,

2. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 154, memo, Hugh Dalton to L.S. Glass, October 14, 1937, p.1.

3. *Ibid.*, Hugh Dalton to G.J. Alexander, September 23, 1939.

with those in South Moresby never to reopen. However, the salteries only shut down for the 1932 season before recovering to substantial production levels.⁴ By the later 1930s the total yearly production of the thirty licenced B.C. "salmon dry salteries" was about 30,000 boxes.⁵

The Jedway Bay saltery: 1910-1942

As discussed in Chapter 5, white regional entrepreneurs were responsible for the establishment of the Jedway Bay saltery, but within a short time it had assumed a more Japanese look. The form of capitalization and relationship with the South Moresby area had not changed significantly, but the ethnic aspect had, taking the venture into the third class of business.

In 1920 Moresby Island Fisheries Ltd. was incorporated, and held operating licences from 1923-1935, except 1932. From 1936-1938 its successor company, Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd., held licences. The named directors of the first company were Alfred S. Arkley, Arthur J. Blackwell and Tresham [?] Andrew, all of Vancouver, and of the second Alfred S. Arkley, Jack M. Arkley, and Heileman O.

4. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O127688, p.182.

5. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 154, Hugh Dalton to L.W. Patmore, September 4, 1937, p.1.

Arkley, again of Vancouver.⁶ In 1938 the provincial government identified the company as Japanese controlled although all the directors and shareholders were listed as white men.⁷ Until the mid-1930s Moresby Island Fisheries Ltd. operated both the Jedway Bay saltery and a herring dry saltery on North Galiano Island. For some reason the facilities split into two new companies, and the older name went with the herring saltery, while the new name was assigned to the Jedway Bay saltery.⁸ In the early years of the Jedway Bay plant, it packed salt herring, and probably salt abalone, although the 1930s licences were strictly for salmon.⁹

The Jedway Bay saltery remained the most permanent and

6. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, pp.59-60, memo. A list of "Salmon Dry Salter Licences 1934" gave a slightly different management profile for Moresby Island Fisheries Ltd. A.S. Arkley was the president, and S. Tanaka, R. Tanaka, T. Tanaka, and S. Shiosaki were the directors, B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 154, licence #472. Arkley was also one of the managers of Malcolm, Cannon & Co. at the time they were involved with Mukai in the saltery, *ibid.*, Box 75, folio 705, Malcolm, Cannon & Co. to J.B. Babcock, October 21, 1908 [signed by Arkley].

7. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, p.43, Williams, memo from Deputy Minister of Lands, August 31, 1938.

8. *Ibid.*, Box 154, "Salmon Salteries 1934", etc.

9. When the herring were running in Harriet Harbour, about twenty Japanese used a beach seine to "bring a mass of fish to shore", Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Years in Jedway: 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, pp.31-32; Izo Arima, "Four Years at Ikeda Bay: Memories of Hunting and Fishing", *op. cit.*, pp.26-28. These sources relate to the period 1908-1911 and 1913-1917 respectively.

productive in the region. In the 1930s it was one of the two largest salmon dry salteries in the province. In 1934-35 it produced 2,151 500 pound boxes of salmon, and in the following year was assigned a "Class A" quota of 2,000 boxes with one other plant; the majority of salteries fell into classes "D" to "F", with quotas of 1,200 to 900 boxes per year.¹⁰ In 1937 the Jedway Bay saltery was said to realize about \$25,000 per year, and was assigned a similar production quota of 2,250 boxes for the 1937-38 season.¹¹ However, market conditions were changing as the Japanese government imposed stringent limits on non-essential imports and money sent out of the country. These restrictions first appeared in 1937-38, when \$375,060 was allotted for purchase of B.C. salt salmon, decreasing to 600,000 yen, or \$168,000 in the 1938-39 season. As the price per box remained stable, this halved the provincial exports for the season, to 14,401 boxes. In turn, this reduced the number of licences granted to producers, and lowered their production quotas. Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd. was granted one of only seven licences for 1938-39, but output fell to

10. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 154, R.M. Tomislow to G.J. Alexander, February 4, 1935; *ibid.*, G.R. Clark to G.J. Alexander, September 30, 1935.

11. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, p.4; B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 154, R.M. Tomislow to G.J. Alexander, February 4, 1935; *ibid.*, G.R. Clark to G.J. Alexander, October 8, 1937.

1,641 boxes, fifth among the listed producers.¹²

In September 1939 Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd. was sent licence reapplication information, but later the same month it was decided to withhold all salmon dry saltery licences for the 1939-40 season.¹³ With the disappearance of the Japanese market, initial efforts were made to establish new markets, particularly in South America. However, it seems that no viable alternative market was developed.¹⁴

In 1938 Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd. applied to the province to lease the property it and its predecessor companies had been operating on since 1910. The company was in good standing with the Register of Companies. Its "Jap Saltery" was listed on the tax roll as having improvements worth \$7,900, while a land classification report assessed the plant and camp to be worth \$25,000.¹⁵ Although taxes had been paid, they were only for the improvements, not the land. The Department of Lands insisted on payment of over

12. *Ibid.*, Hugh Dalton to L.W. Patmore, September 4, 1937, p.2; *ibid.*, British Columbia Salt Fish Board Annual Report 1938-39 season, May 16, 1939, pp.2, 5-6.

13. *Ibid.*, Hugh Dalton to G.J. Alexander, September 23, 1939.

14. *Ibid.*, Hugh Dalton to L.S. Glass, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Rio de Janeiro, October 14, 1937.

15. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, pp.2, 39; *ibid.*, pp.37-38, Land Classification Report, June 29, 1938. On the tax roll the company was identified as "Moresby Island Fisheries, Ltd., c/o T. Matsuyama & Co., Ltd., 467 Powell Street, Vancouver, B.C."

\$5,000 for 29 years of back rent since the "date of occupation" as a condition of granting a lease.¹⁶ In October and November 1938 the company rejected the government's terms, arguing that it only required the saltery site proper, and had only been associated with the occupation of the site for three years. The negotiations ended on December 19, 1938, when the lease application was disallowed by the Minister of Lands, without a reason offered.¹⁷ Several explanations suggest themselves, including anti-Japanese sentiment at the time, the unwillingness of the government to accept the legal fiction of the "new" company, and the company's unwillingness to pay back rent. The withholding of salmon dry saltery licences the following season would have rendered the issue irrelevant in any case.

In 1941 the company still kept a watchman in the plant, although it was in trespass and no licences were available.¹⁸ The directors of the company were still noted

16. *Ibid.*, p.42, Williams, Manson & Rae to Deputy Minister of Lands; *ibid.*, p.43, Williams, memo from Deputy Minister of Lands, August 31, 1938; *ibid.*, p.46, Superintendent of Lands to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, September 13, 1938; *ibid.*, p.47, Government Agent, Prince Rupert to Superintendent of Lands, September 13, 1938.

17. *Ibid.*, p.52, Government Agent, Prince Rupert to Williams, Manson & Rae, October 17, 1938; *ibid.*, pp.54-55, Williams, Manson & Rae to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, November 15, 1938; *ibid.*, p.67, Minister of Lands to Williams, Manson & Rae, December 19, 1938.

18. *Ibid.*, p.79, Sergeant A. Dunbar to G.W. Cripps, September 6, 1941.

as the three Arkleys, but the office had moved next door, to 469 Powell Street. This address was listed in the 1941 Vancouver directory as that of the Union Fish Company Ltd., fish and grocery merchant, E. Maruno manager.¹⁹ Formal notice to the company to abandon the saltery was served in October 1941, on the basis of illegal possession.²⁰

In 1942 Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd. was declared an enemy company, and was to be wound up.²¹ The Japanese Evacuation Section of the federal Secretary of State and the Lands Department split the facility into two lots; one comprising moveable assets and the other "buildings and fixtures" for disposal.²² Eventually the buildings disappeared, and the property remained Crown land.²³ The company itself was wound up and a liquidator appointed after the war, in 1947-48, leaving a deficit of

19. *Ibid.*, p.82, memo, September 22, 1941; *The British Columbia and Yukon Directory 1941*, Vancouver, Sun Directories Ltd., 1941, p.1085.

20. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, p.83, memo, October 2, 1941.

21. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5325, File 15279, Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd., p.60.

22. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, p.112; *ibid.*, p.108, K.W. Wright, Counsel to the Custodian, Secretary of State [Canada] to Deputy Minister of Lands, February 4, 1943; *ibid.*, p.109, Deputy Minister of Lands to K.W. Wright, February 9, 1943; *ibid.*, p.113, P.S. Ross & Sons to Deputy Minister of Lands, September 28, 1943; *ibid.*, p.114, Deputy Minister of Lands to P.S. Ross & Sons, September 30, 1943.

23. *Ibid.*, pp.119-134.

\$9160.24.²⁴

This company had been one of the largest producers in its field through the interwar period. Its eventual failure was due to its dependence on a sole foreign market for its product. When that market dried up, as a result of Japan's preparations for the Second World War, the company's production reduced accordingly. The decision of the Department of Fisheries to eliminate all salting licences in 1939 sealed its fate, rendering the problem with land tenure and declaration of enemy status almost redundant. In this instance, a viable commodity-exporting business was eliminated by a combination of Japanese and domestic government intervention, which first compromised the market, then took away the licence to produce, the means of production, and finally the company itself.

Like Ikeda Mines, the Jedway Bay saltery was an ethnic enclave business. In spite of the nominal white administration, it was obvious that the business was capitalized and controlled by Vancouver-based Japanese merchant capitalists. The fishing and shore labour was also Japanese, and the market was exclusively Japan. The primary linkage with the British Columbia economy came in the 1930s, with the establishment of the Salt Fish Board, which marketed the commodity, set production quotas, and generally

24. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5325, File 15279, Moresby Island Fisheries (Jedway) Ltd., pp.61-65.

managed the provincial industry.

The work force of this plant was probably about twenty to thirty people; in 1911 twenty employees were fishing herring in Harriet Harbour, and the plant seemed to increase in size after that.²⁵ This large and long-lasting facility had improvements valued at \$25,000, which included the saltery itself and a "camp", which included various residential buildings ["shacks"] and a bunkhouse and mess house building.²⁶ The settlement remained as a camp for the life of the plant, with room and board supplied for the employees of the company, in an ethnic enclave environment.

Other Japanese salmon salteries

In the 1920s some other Japanese salmon salteries were established in the South Moresby region. As with the Jedway Bay operation, these were organized, capitalized, and operated by Japanese, but used white front men to expedite licence and lease applications. In each case, these ventures were initiated by Vancouver-based Japanese companies which were involved in the production and marketing of fish products. These salteries were intended

25. Bertha Metcalfe, "My Early Years in Jedway: 1908-1911", *op. cit.*, pp.31-32.

26. The structures on the property are described in more detail in; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, PH17, fieldbook 161/38; *ibid.*, fieldbook 162/38; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O130278, pp.128-134.

to supply the Vancouver merchant capitalists with the commodities they were already exporting to Japan, presumably at lower cost than existing plants. The linkages were primarily with Vancouver, although it seems that there was also some common ownership between the Jedway Bay saltery and one of the newer operations.

With these salteries, as with other small enclave processing facilities, it is difficult to trace their existence and production. The facility required was minimal, as the process involved catching, cleaning, and salting the fish. Most of the rivers and streams in South Moresby had a run of chum, the preferred salmon for this process. The remoteness of the area discouraged regular fisheries inspections, and with Japanese producers selling to a Japanese market, sometimes the legalities of leases and licences would be overlooked. After the formation of the British Columbia Salt Fish Board as a marketing agency, it became possible to monitor the producers more closely, but by that time Moresby Island Fisheries was the only firm salting salmon in South Moresby. Two of the Japanese salteries operating in the region in the 1920s are described below.

The Huston Inlet saltery

In 1928 on Huston Inlet, near the Jedway Bay saltery,

there was a "salmon-saltery owned by Japanese".²⁷ Robert M. Currie applied for the lease on this "Saltery & Cannery" property in December 1926, but approval was not given by the provincial government until August 1928. A 21 year lease was granted, with the proviso that the property would be occupied, a cannery and saltery "of suitable dimensions" would be built within a year which would be operated in a "diligent and reasonable" fashion.²⁸

In April 1929 Currie assigned his lease to the Huston Inlet Packing Company Ltd. of Vancouver, for a consideration of 1,998 \$10.00 shares in the latter company. Huston Inlet Packing paid rent on the lease in September 1931, to cover operations through the next season. The firm was identified as "Salt-Fish Packers", located at Suite 12, Royal Bank Chambers, 208 East Hastings Street, Vancouver.²⁹ The Vancouver directories of 1928 and 1933 identified this address as that of S. Tanaka and Company Ltd., Fish Packers.³⁰ S. Tanaka also was noted as one of the directors of Moresby Island Fisheries Ltd. in 1934 [footnote

27. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1929, op. cit.*, p.C61.

28. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O74136, pp.4-12,16-24,29,43. The leased property was Lot 2748, and the rent was \$151.50 per year.

29. *Ibid.*, pp.50-51,65.

30. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1928*, Vancouver, Wrigley Directories Ltd., 1928, p.651; *Wrigley's Greater Vancouver and New Westminster Directory 1933*, Vancouver, Wrigley Directories Ltd., 1933, p.800.

24 above], so the proximity between the two salteries may have been more than geographic. As the facility was described as Japanese in 1928, prior to Currie "selling" it, probably he acted as a white figurehead or agent to expedite the lease process, with the Japanese involved from the start.

Huston Inlet Packing Company Ltd. dissolved in May 1933, and their lease on the saltery lot was voided in July 1934.³¹ It may be that in addition to the saltery, abalones also were canned for a short time at this location.³² Whether these were produced in the Currie/Huston Inlet Packing plant or by another independent venture is difficult to determine. The report may also be a result of confusion with the other ephemeral processing plants in the area.

The Huston Inlet saltery serves as another example of a Japanese business in the region. It may have been an independent venture, or a short-lived affiliate of the larger Jedway Bay saltery. In any case, it serves as another, slightly clearer example of how Japanese merchant capital established resource extraction companies in the area.

31. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O74136, pp.71,77.

32. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., pp.181-182.

The Rose Inlet saltery

In January 1929 W.T. Miller applied to lease a saltery site on Rose Inlet. A lease for a "Fish Saltery" was granted in April 1929, with a 21 year term and rent of \$44 per year for the first five years.³³ Rent was paid the first year, but the request for the second year's rent was returned by the post office, after which Miller's correct address was sought.³⁴ It was given as "c/o M. Furuya Co. Ltd., 46 Hastings St. W., Vancouver, B.C."³⁵ The 1933 Vancouver directory described this company [Ukon Higuchi, Manager] as "Importers of Japanese Merchandise and Products and Exporters of Canadian Products". In an advertisement in the 1941 directory, it was said to have been founded in 1910, and to be exporters of "Salted Fish, etc."³⁶ For two more years rent requests were sent to Miller, by which time the lease was subject to cancellation. The 1932 request was sent back by Furuya with the annotation "return He is not with us anymore", and the lease was cancelled in November

33. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O85402, pp.5,17.

34. *Ibid.*, p.27, Superintendent of Lands to T.J.P. Baillie, May 14,1930.

35. *Ibid.*, p.28, T.J.P. Baillie to Superintendent of Lands, May 17,1930.

36. *Wrigley's Greater Vancouver and New Westminster Directory 1933, op. cit.*, p.372; *The British Columbia and Yukon Directory 1941*, Vancouver, Sun Directories Ltd., 1941, p.2082.

1932.³⁷

The same comments apply in this case as to the Huston Inlet saltery, although it is unclear if the Rose Inlet facility ever produced a pack, or was even constructed.

Abalone canneries

Typical of the small Japanese processing operations initiated by local petty producers were the abalone canneries or drying stations documented in the pre-World War I period. These small temporary plants produced exclusively for the oriental market, without the benefit of licences. The area considered best for abalone fishing was south of Lyell Island, including Ramsay and Faraday Islands. Reportedly a substantial amount of dried abalone had been prepared by Japanese in this region, on Murchison Island. The Japanese abalone canneries were said to be fitted with equipment "of the very crudest sort", although the process was not observed. Such a cannery was reported abandoned at the mouth of Rose Harbour in 1913. A number of cases had been packed in a rough shack, with an oil barrel used as a boiler. Some abalones had also been canned at Lizzie Cove, later known as Jedway Bay, where the large salmon saltery

37. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O85402, pp.31,41, Superintendent of Lands to W.T. Miller, May 13,1931, May 13,1932; *ibid.*, p.43; *ibid.*, p.51, Deputy Minister of Lands to W.T. Miller, November 28,1932.

operated.³⁸

Linkages between Japanese entrepreneurs and the South
Moresby community

Two of the more successful business ventures in the southern archipelago, as well as many smaller and ephemeral ones, were established and run by Japanese entrepreneurs. The Japanese were attracted to the Queen Charlotte Islands by fishing, but Ikeda's successful participation in the copper rush seems to have served as impetus for other Japanese ventures. At some periods in the interwar period probably about half of the labour force in the region was Japanese, divided between the larger Japanese businesses, the various camps which employed Japanese crews, and the petty producers, such as fishermen and miners, of Japanese origin. The two largest Japanese businesses, Ikeda Mines and the Jedway Bay saltery, were clear examples of enclave ventures. Although after 1910 there was Canadian capital invested in Ikeda Mines as well as Japanese, the largest shareholders were still Japanese, the mine was still managed by Arichika Ikeda, and the workers were still Japanese. Ikeda Mines sold its commodities to a Canadian corporate buyer, Granby Consolidated, but the Jedway Bay saltery did

38. British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report of the Commissioner of Fisheries, 1914*, op. cit., pp.R128-R129.

not even have that linkage with the dominant economy. It was backed by Vancouver-based Japanese merchant capitalists, had an exclusively Japanese workforce, and exported all of its production to Japan. Other than the initial licence application and use of white front men for licencing and administration, it was a true enclave business.

Linkages between these Japanese ventures and mainstream British Columbia industry were present, but not strong. On the other hand, it seems that a clearer relationship existed between the various Japanese businesses in South Moresby, with Ikeda Mines and the Jedway Bay saltery at the core. It has been documented that there was social contact between the mine and the saltery in the pre-WWI period. However, business ties are not beyond imagination, as Awaya, Ikeda & Company originally came to the Queen Charlotte Islands to fish, and continued to operate a herring saltery at Departure Bay.³⁹

In the early years of the Jedway Bay saltery [1913-1917], the plant was closed from January to April, when the herring run started. The presence of an internal Japanese economy in South Moresby in the First World War period is supported by the reminiscences of one of Ikeda's employees concerning Mukai's workers:

Just off Jedway there was a fish plant owned by Mr. Mukai. The plant was closed during the month

39. *Henderson's City of Vancouver Directory, 1908, op. cit., pp.368, 668.*

of January to April until herring season starts. During that period of time no unemployment insurance existed; therefore when the plant was closed during the winter those who worked at the plant used to come to our mine.⁴⁰

The saltery workers performed various tasks around the mine in return for their room and board, and some of them were noted as former employees of Ikeda Mines. The Ikeda employees also borrowed nets from Mukai in August when the salmon were running.⁴¹ It is possible that there was simply some sense of cultural solidarity between the various Japanese enterprises, and that Ikeda Mines, as the largest centre of Japanese population served as a focus. However, it may be more than coincidence that the Japanese saltery initiatives started soon after Ikeda was established in the region, and there may have been substantial formal or informal business ties between these enterprises.

The Jedway Bay saltery and Ikeda Mines, as the largest Japanese businesses in the region, naturally served as a focus of the Japanese community. The "floating" Japanese workers in the area have already been suggested in respect of the Bag Harbour clam cannery. The saltery shutdown period also coincided with the clam canning season, presenting another potential source of labour for the Bag Harbour cannery. The conclusion is that there was a

40. Izo Arima, "Four Years at Ikeda Bay: Memories of Hunting and Fishing", *op. cit.*, p.26.

41. *Ibid.*, pp.26-28.

substantial pool of Japanese labour resident in the South Moresby area throughout the year, which would move from facility to facility depending on the season and the level of activity in the various enterprises. Some of these people, such as Ikeda's miners, had been brought in from Japan specifically as labour, while others had entered the country as members of labour crews, or as independent immigrants.

The majority of the immigrants were involved in the fishing industry in one way or another, and most of the smaller Japanese ventures in the southern archipelago related to fishing and fish processing. As with George Miyar's dogfish oil plant, many of these operations were not licenced. Also, most of them seem to have been ephemeral, often operated for only a season or short period. Probably the majority of these small ventures were run by petty producers who were in the area already, either as fishermen or as employees of one of the larger companies. The major companies, such as Ikeda Mines or the Jedway Bay saltery, all had periodic or seasonal shutdowns, which would have allowed their employees to pursue these independent efforts.

This created something of an ethnic enclave economy and society. There were a number of opportunities available to work for larger Japanese ventures, or as crew members in non-Japanese plants. During times of shutdown, there were ample opportunities to become petty producers, either mining

or producing marine commodities for sale. In this way, a Japanese population could support itself economically without leaving the southern part of the Queen Charlotte Islands.

Some of the Japanese workers in South Moresby attempted to settle in the region. In 1914 there were three Japanese pre-emption applications, with non-industrial intent. The first of these was initiated in September by Moichi Kosaka, the Japanese crew foreman at the Rose Harbour whaling station. He applied for 160 acres on the north side of Houston Stewart Channel, straight across from Rose Harbour. He was a British subject, applied in English on company stationery, and gave his occupation as farmer. His application was cancelled in 1916 on the basis of no evidence of occupation or improvements on the property.⁴² The other two applications, in October 1914, were from Hyosaku Iwasaki and Torazo Iwasaki, of Jedway. They were both naturalized Canadians, married, and listed their occupation as farmer. Their applications were for two adjacent lots on Luxana Bay, Kunghit Island. The Prince Rupert government agent wrote to the Deputy Minister of Lands in January 1915 asking if these applications would be considered, as a number of earlier applications from

42. B.C.A.R.S., GR 286, Government Agent, Prince Rupert, Pre-emption Files, Box 2, File 426/14.

Japanese were not allowed.⁴³ There is no further evidence of these applications, so presumably the informal policy of disallowing Japanese applications continued.

43. *Ibid.*, Box 5, Files 527/14, 530/14.

Chapter 7: Corporate entrepreneurs in South Moresby:
1910-1948

The Rose Harbour whaling station: 1910-1942

Although Yankee whaling ships hunted in the grounds around the Queen Charlotte Islands throughout most of the nineteenth century, the opportunity for 20th century land-based whaling was created by new technology for steam whaling and shore reduction. The Norwegians developed an industry based on small steam chase vessels, which would hunt the whales and take them back to a shore plant. There, the blubber was rendered for oil, sperm oil was extracted, and the offal rendered, then dried as animal feed and fertilizer.

This elaborate technology was extremely capital-intensive compared to other marine processing, such as salteries, or even canneries.¹ The sheer cost meant that local or even regional entrepreneurs were excluded from this industry, and that some sort of heavily capitalized corporate initiative was required. The shore whaling stations in the Queen Charlotte Islands were established in the early twentieth century by the Pacific Whaling Company, which acquired licences and leases up and down the coast of

1. While the Lockeport cannery was said to have cost about \$30,000 to build, typical of a one-line plant, reputedly the construction of the Rose Harbour whaling station cost \$270,000.




Figure 7.1 - Corporate ventures in South Moresby

- Key: 1. Rose Harbour whaling station
 2. Jedway cannery and saltery
 3. Lockeport cannery

[////] Logging 1917-1948

British Columbia. This company was controlled by Sprott Balcom, a Victoria-based sealing captain, and Dr. Ludwig Rissmuller, the developer and patent-holder of extremely effective shore processing technology. In 1910 the company built stations at Naden Harbour, at the north end of Graham Island, and Rose Harbour, on the north end of Kunghit Island.² G.A. Huff visited the Queen Charlotte Islands in the summer of 1908 looking for sites, and in early 1909 purchased the lot on Rose Harbour, on the north end of Prevost Island [Kunghit Island].³ Rissmuller had already licenced his patents to the Queen Charlotte Whaling Company, and agreed to supply the company with skilled labour from Newfoundland. Besides the Rissmuller licence, the company's assets included the site on Rose Harbour and a whaling

2. Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest: commercial whaling in the Pacific Northwest, 1790-1967*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1988, pp.145-189.

3. *Queen Charlotte News*, August 29, 1908, p.2; *ibid.*, September 12, 1908, p.2, *ibid.*, October 24, 1908, p.2; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.4, fieldbook 1369/09, A.P.854. Huff was a partner with Balcom in the Pacific Whaling Company, and likewise Balcom was a partner in Huff's Queen Charlotte Whaling Company; Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest*, *op. cit.*, p.173. There was extensive corporate manipulation between these companies, apparently with the goal of acquiring all the whaling licences and rights to the Rissmuller system on the British Columbia coast. For instance, the Queen Charlotte Whaling Company bought the Page's Lagoon station from the Pacific Whaling Company Ltd. of Nova Scotia for \$45,000 in March 1910; B.C.A.R.S., GR 1438, British Columbia, Attorney General, Register of Companies, Film B4432, file 2734 (1897), Queen Charlotte Whaling Company Ltd., pp.34-35. The machinery from this station was taken to Rose Harbour the same year.

licence.⁴

In 1910 the Rose Harbour station was built, at a reputed cost of \$270,000. It was said to employ 150 men, and to have processed eighty whales in the first six weeks of operation.⁵ In the same year Mackenzie and Mann, the builders of the Canadian Northern Railway, became involved with the enterprise as capitalists. One of the reasons suggested for their interest was to control the production of another commodity which could be shipped across the continent on their railway. The Queen Charlotte Whaling Company, Pacific Whaling Company, and Prince Rupert Whaling Company were incorporated into the Canadian North Pacific Fisheries Limited, with local operations under the control of Balcom and Rissmuller.⁶ In the early years returns were satisfactory, in spite of some labour problems. In 1911 over 300 whales were processed at the Rose Harbour station

4. B.C.A.R.S., GR 1438, British Columbia, Attorney General, Register of Companies, Film B4432, file 2734 (1897), Queen Charlotte Whaling Company Ltd., pp.26-31. Rissmuller was paid \$68,500 for rights to his patents and to supply the East Coast labour.

5. Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest*, *op. cit.*, pp.187-189.

6. *Ibid.*, pp.178-180. The application to purchase a nearby lot on Rose Inlet was originally in the name of Canadian North Pacific Fisheries Limited, but was changed to Queen Charlotte Whaling Company Ltd., suggesting some manipulation of corporate identities and presumably licences, British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.7, fieldbook 3764/1911, A.P.32507/10.

for oil and guano.⁷ The oil produced was normally sent to Glasgow, Scotland.⁸

Overexpansion and overhunting depleted whale stocks in the North Pacific, and the company's returns diminished, leading to its failure by 1915. The assets were purchased by an American insurance agent, William Schupp, who reorganized them as the Victoria Whaling Company. Schupp streamlined the organization of the firm, and with the start of World War I the future looked promising, with healthy ongoing sales of oil, bonemeal, fertilizer, and a new food market developing in response to wartime meat shortages. In 1918 Schupp reorganized his whaling companies into the Consolidated Whaling Corporation, with working capital of about \$2,000,000.⁹ The total Rose Harbour catch in 1918 was 140 whales, less than half the 1910-1911 catch.¹⁰

The plant operated most years in the 1920s and 1930s.

7. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, September 11, 1911, p.2. At the start of the 1912 season eight whales produced 100 barrels of oil and 24 tons of guano, suggesting about 12 barrels of oil and 3 tons of guano per whale on average; *ibid.*, April 29, 1912, p.2.

8. Joan Goddard, "Reminiscences of Life on the Shore Whaling Stations of British Columbia 1905-1918", *op. cit.*, pp.9-10; Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest*, *op. cit.*, pp.156-160.

9. Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest*, *op. cit.*, pp.193-194, 222-235.

10. The other Consolidated Whaling Company stations, Naden Harbour and Kyuquot caught 114 and 246 whales respectively in the same year, British Columbia, Department of Fisheries, *Report of the Commissioner of Fisheries*, 1919, Victoria, King's Printer, 1920, p.X15.

The Depression, combined with problems with aging ships and machinery and the labour force, had a negative impact on the business. All Schupp's whaling stations were shut in 1931 and 1932. Rose Harbour alone re-opened in 1933, and processed 418 whales.¹¹ In 1937 C.W.C. was said to be catching some 200 whales per year, generating revenues of about \$110,000.¹² All the B.C. stations were shut down in 1939, with Rose Harbour re-opened for the 1941 season.¹³ The station was averaging about 300 whales per year in the early 1940s. In the 1942 season Rose Harbour was the last of Schupp's Canadian stations to operate. Wartime restrictions on maritime activity, increased salaries, and worn-out equipment made the operation marginal. The internment of Japanese-Canadians, who by this time made up most of the skilled work force, was the final blow to the operation.¹⁴ In 1946 there were plans to reactivate the Rose Harbour station under British Columbia Packers ownership, but the Coal Harbour station on Vancouver Island was developed instead.¹⁵

During its active years, the Rose Harbour station

11. Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest, op. cit.*, pp.240-241.

12. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, p.4; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 0127688, p.179.

13. Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest, op. cit.*, p.254.

14. *Ibid.*, pp.254-255.

15. *Ibid.*, pp.256-260.

operated seasonally, from April to October. Three groups of employees were brought in each season to run the plant; managerial, skilled workers, and labourers. The latter comprised a Japanese and a Chinese crew of about fifty men each, sent in from Victoria by labour contractors. Most of the management and skilled labour groups came from Newfoundland, where other Rissmuller plants were operating.¹⁶ By the 1930s and 1940s, much of the Newfoundland skilled labour was replaced by Japanese workers.

In spite its long-term economic viability and its large labour force, the Rose Harbour whaling station never served as a focus for permanent settlement. The workers, comprised of the Japanese and Chinese crews, and a primarily white management and skilled labour group, was sent in from Victoria, and returned there at the end of the season. While at the plant, the workers lived in company-supplied accommodation. The Oriental crews lived in Chinese and Japanese bunkhouses supervised by a foreman/interpreter, and were fed by the urban labour contractors who assembled the crews. The management class had separate houses. Problems with alcohol, gambling, and violence were not uncommon in

16. Joan Goddard, "Reminiscences of Life on the Shore Whaling Stations of British Columbia 1905-1918", Paper for Symposium: *The Maritime Tradition of Bay and Shore Whaling: Pioneering Implications and Economic Development*, Society for Historical Archaeology/Conference on Underwater Archaeology annual meeting, Sacramento, Session Number 9, January 9, 1986, pp.15-16.

the bunkhouses, with their almost exclusively male populations.¹⁷ The camp environment, and lack of independence of the work force, militated against any sort of permanent settlement.

The Jedway cannery: 1926-1930

Compared to the Rose Harbour whaling station the Jedway cannery on Harriet Harbour was an insignificant venture. Despite its small size, and its brief period of operation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it was more a corporate than a regional enterprise. Although initially family-controlled, the Millerd/Somerville company which established it had a number of plants, with the South Moresby plant a minor part of a network. There also seems to have been limited use of the plant by the founding company, perhaps only one season. The role of the Jedway cannery was that of a component of a conglomerate, rather than that of a core enterprise.

The Jedway plant was built by Frank Millerd's Somerville Cannery Company Ltd. in 1926.¹⁸ It operated for a one month season that fall, from September 5 to October 5,

17. The social conditions of life in this camp are described in Joan Goddard, "Reminiscences of Life on the Shore Whaling Stations of British Columbia 1905-1918", *op. cit.*, pp.12-20.

18. The Somerville Cannery Company was formed in 1924. Cicely Lyons, *Salmon: Our Heritage*, *op. cit.*, pp.358,368; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 073158, pp.3-8.

packing chum salmon.¹⁹ In 1928 Somerville assigned the cannery to its "Successor", the Millerd Packing Company Ltd., for a consideration of \$1.00.²⁰ Millerd Packing already had been granted the lease on the foreshore lot adjacent to the plant.²¹ In June 1928 half of Millerd Packing, including the "Jedway Cannery", was sold to British Fisheries Ltd. of Vancouver for \$150,000.²² This left Somerville with 1184 shares and British Fisheries with 1142 shares of Millerd Packing. In 1928 British Columbia Packers bought British Fisheries, and also purchased Somerville's shares in Millerd Packing.²³ Millerd Packing maintained a corporate identity until it was wound up in October 1934.²⁴ B.C. Packers paid the rent on the Jedway lots from 1929 to

19. B.C.A.R.S., GR 435, Box 189, file "1927", Francis Millerd to Provincial Fisheries Department, May 23, 1927.

20. Millerd Packing was incorporated in December 1927, with Frank Millerd as president. Somerville Cannery owned just over half of Millerd Packing, suggesting that the older company served as a sort of holding company for the newer one. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5217, File 9236, Millerd Packing Company Ltd., pp.1,141-142; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 073158, pp.35,40-44.

21. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.16, fieldbook 331/28; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 079141, p.25.

22. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5217, File 9236, pp.28-29.

23. *Ibid.*, pp.140-146. B.C. Packers bought the 2326 shares of Millerd for 10,000 common shares in the former company.

24. *Ibid.*, pp.128,8-9. The company's board of directors were B.C. Packers appointees.

1932. The cannery did not operate after 1932, and the leases were abandoned on both lots in October 1934.²⁵

The cannery's only assets in 1928 were the real estate, valued at \$1,105.00, and the building, valued at \$2,180.04. The \$2,000 insurance carried on the facility supports the presence of the building and nothing else. This lack of machinery suggests the cannery was inoperative, although given the nature of the resource, it is possible that machinery was moved in for the run of chum salmon every two years. Probably this plant only operated for a few seasons between 1926 and 1931, and never produced a large pack. Herbert Carmichael described the area around Harriet Harbour in 1929, and did not mention a cannery, but rather a saltery and wharf, which corresponded to the Millerd/B.C. Packers facility. This suggests that B.C. Packers had converted the plant to a saltery, a lower-capital option for processing chum salmon.²⁶ This is consistent with the 1928 statement of assets, which did not include any canning equipment. For salting salmon, no machinery was required, just a crew and salt and barrels for packing the fish. The Jedway cannery was taken over by one of the major conglomerates in the late

25. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 073158, pp.55,63,71,72,85,89-91; *ibid.*, correspondence file 079141, pp.34-37,42,70. The date of abandoning the lease was consistent with the winding-up of Millerd Packing by the parent organization.

26. Herbert Carmichael, "Queen Charlotte Islands", in British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1929, op. cit.*, pp.C58-C59.

1920s, and apparently turned into a saltery. Presumably it was a victim of the depression and the closures of the disastrous 1931 season, as well as the corporate drive to rationalize operations. In light of the small output of a plant such as this, either as a cannery or a saltery, the corporate decision to shut down would not have been difficult. Although it was never a major producer on the provincial scene like the Lockeport cannery, it was in a location with a reliable resource, and with decent transportation links to markets. The continued financial viability of the Jedway Bay saltery demonstrated that even in the depression, a salmon salting operation in the region was viable. However, as with Lockeport, a crisis of capital in a major fish processing corporation resulted in many of the smaller and more remote plants simply closing down, in favour of increasing the scale of operations in larger centralized plants, mostly on the Skeena and Fraser Rivers. As components of corporations, rather than independent operations, these plants were subject to decisions based not on individual economic performance, but on overall strategies designed to maximize the profits for the entire corporation. This is consistent with Selvik's model of corporate behaviour in marginal resource areas.

The Jedway cannery contributed in a small way to the continued existence of the settlement of Jedway. A number of "cannery houses" were developed along with the cannery

itself, and presumably seasonal labour would have been brought in during the salmon run.²⁷ However, the facility was operated by Millerd and B.C. Packers for only a few seasons from 1926 to 1930 as a cannery and saltery.²⁸

Herbert Carmichael described the area around Harriet Harbour as he found it in 1929:

Jedway is the Indian name for this bay and is used to designate the saltery and collection of houses situated on the south side of the harbour. ...

There are several small houses and shacks around the harbour in which shelter can be found, ...²⁹

A plan and sketch of Harriet Harbour included with Carmichael's report located the major groups of mineral claims, and also showed some of the development around the shore, including the saltery and wharf, the store, government building, a nearby house, and a bridge over Harriet Creek. On the west side was a "Saltery and Wharf", which appeared to correspond with the B.C. Packers complex, and to the south of that the "Store (Jedway)".³⁰

The Jedway cannery/saltery was a minor, seasonal operation, and would not have resulted in the level of

27. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, P.H.16, fieldbook 610/27, L.I.073158.

28. See Chapter 8.

29. British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1929, op. cit.*, p.C58.

30. *Ibid.*, p.C59.

activity found twenty years before in Jedway. However, its influence, combined with the remnant mining activity led by Ike Thompson, seems to have contributed to the continued existence of Jedway into the late 1920s.³¹ However, the effect of the depression on both the B.C. Packers operation and mining speculation seems to have ended the economic vitality of the community, and consequently its social vitality.

The Lockeport cannery: 1927-1930

Splan's success with the Lockeport Cannery in 1923-1926 attracted the attentions of the Canadian Fishing Company Ltd., which purchased the plant in the spring of 1927.³²

The Canadian Fishing Company Ltd. was the Canadian subsidiary of the New England Fish Company. Initially established as a halibut fishing enterprise, it branched into salmon canning in 1918, with great success.³³

Capital-rich by 1923, the Canadian Fishing Company initiated

31. For example; British Columbia, Department of Mines, *Report, 1929, op. cit., p.C61.*

32. The Canadian Fishing Company Ltd. had been considering construction of new plants in the area prior to the decision to acquire the Lockeport facility. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O69827, pp.2-3,22, Davis, Pugh, Davis, Hessie, Ralston & Lett to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, June 30,1927; *ibid.*, correspondence file O69828, pp.3,16, Canadian Fishing Company Ltd. to Government Agent, January 11,1927, 20, Davis, Pugh, Davis, Hessie, Ralston & Lett to Government Agent, Prince Rupert, March 30,1927.

33. Cicely Lyons, *Salmon: Our Heritage, op. cit., pp.271,328.*

a major programme of plant acquisition, which continued until the start of the depression.³⁴ This rapid growth left it as B.C. Packers' primary competitor in the salmon canning industry of British Columbia.

The Canadian Fishing Company may have operated the Lockeport cannery for two or more seasons; a 1927 appraisal was updated in 1930, suggesting the plant was still active.³⁵ However, in the depression, and particularly in the 1931 season, canneries were left closed due to a lack of operating capital. In the Queen Charlotte Islands, no salmon was canned south of Skidegate Inlet in the 1931, 1932 and 1933 seasons.³⁶ Some salmon was canned in 1934 in this district [probably at the Canadian Fishing Company's Lagoon Bay cannery], but never again at Lockeport. By 1937 the cannery was deserted and in a "very derelict state", with some materials being salvaged to take to the Lagoon Bay cannery.³⁷ In 1942 the only remnant of the cannery was the brick boiler foundation, and the government reservation on

34. *Ibid.*, pp.356-365 etc.

35. U.B.C. Special Collections, Canadian Fishing Company Limited Papers, Box 10, file 2, Lockeport Appraisal 1927, updated 1930. Dalzell wrote that the Canadian Fishing Company abandoned Lockeport in favour of the Lagoon Bay cannery after the 1928 season, Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, op. cit., p.221.

36. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O127688, p.182.

37. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O36682, p.220, plan of holdings, William C. Splan; *ibid.*, p.208, report of J.B. Scott, Ranger, September 24, 1937.

the wharf lot was abandoned, due to lack of traffic.³⁸ In 1943 the Canadian Fishing Company leased the cannery lots again, intending to construct a new plant. However, this never happened, and the leases on the three lots were abandoned in 1954.³⁹

Under the auspices of the Canadian Fishing Company, the role of the Lockeport cannery changed radically from its earlier role as Splan's core business. Within the larger organization, it was only one of many plants, and one with a fairly ephemeral resource. The influence of the depression of the 1930s probably led to the decision to rationalize the company's Moresby Island activities at Lagoon Bay. This meant closure of the Lockeport plant, and ultimately the end of the community as well.

The end of salmon canning in South Moresby seemed to relate to the industry's crisis of capital in 1931, when in spite of good runs, many plants were left shut due to a lack of operating capital. Many of the ephemeral or remote north coastal plants were never reopened after this closure. Contributing to this was the takeover of most of the canneries, including those in South Moresby, by a few major companies such as the Canadian Fishing Company and British Columbia Packers. The multi-plant structure of these

38. *Ibid.*, correspondence file 057941, pp.10,12.

39. *Ibid.*, correspondence file 036682, pp.269,317; *ibid.*, correspondence file 057941, pp.20,86.

companies made it easier for them to shut down and rationalize plants within their corporate framework. Again, this tends to support Selvik's analysis of the motives and mechanisms of corporations operating in marginal areas. In the absence of a large enough population to sustain an independent community, and given the essentially self-serving nature of corporate decision-making, it was inevitable that a formerly viable processing plant such as the Lockeport cannery would be shut down in favour of larger centralized plants.

With the closing of the cannery in 1931, the town began its decline, with the end signalled by the closing of the post office in July 1938.⁴⁰ By 1942 the cannery and wharf had disappeared in ruins, although a visitor thought the village had not changed much otherwise:

Lockeport village has not changed very much during the last ten years. There are one or two more shacks and some of the old ones have disappeared and it looks practically the same as when we first saw it in 1928.⁴¹

As with Jedway, when the corporate decision to eliminate the operation at Lockeport was made, the economic base of the community was also eliminated. Coming at the same time that the remnant copper mining activity was

40. Doris Leary, "Post Offices Past and Gone", *op. cit.*, p.113.

41. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file O57941, p.12, W.W. Trotter to P.E. Paulson, January 8, 1943.

eliminated by the depression, there was little incentive for a population to remain in the town. Its continued physical existence through 1942 may relate to its location, nearer the logging which was continuing throughout the 1930s and 1940s. It is possible that the buildings of the old town were used for some purpose by the logging companies in the region.

Logging in South Moresby: 1910-1948

Corporations entered the forest industry in South Moresby with the establishment of the Moresby Island Lumber Company. In 1908 this company began construction of a sawmill in Queen Charlotte City with a capacity of 30,000 board foot per day. The provincial government granted substantial timber leases around Skidegate Inlet to the company in exchange for the mill venture.⁴² In 1909-10 much of the best timber land along the east coast of Moresby Island, Tanu Island, Richardson Island, and Lyell Island was surveyed and granted as timber leases by the Moresby Island Lumber Company.⁴³ This new corporate mill, located closer to the centre of development in the Queen Charlotte Islands

42. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, pp.257-259.

43. British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, Legal Surveys Branch, Prince Rupert District, Pre-emption Record, Queen Charlotte Islands, pp.118-119,160. Also in 1910 some timber leases were staked around Atli Inlet, Lyell Island by M.J.G. White, *ibid.*, pp.74-75.

than the Jedway sawmill, started production in 1909.⁴⁴ This may have been the factor responsible for shutting down the latter sawmill. In 1913 the Moresby Island Lumber Company was sold to North American Timber & Holdings Company, of Chicago.⁴⁵ It is unclear if any logging took place on these leases prior to W.W.I, but the areas intensively logged in the future were determined by these early surveys.

From 1917 to 1948, the logging in South Moresby was carried out by contractors. These firms provided wood to feed corporate pulp and paper mills or sawmills on the mainland coast. The exception to this pattern was during the First and Second World Wars, when the logging companies produced high grade aircraft spruce, under contract to government. The W.W.I demands of the British Imperial Munitions Board had a profound impact on the Queen Charlotte Islands as a whole, with nine mills and numerous logging contracts established to meet its needs. The Moresby Island headquarters of the I.M.B. was at Thurston Harbour, on the north side of Talunkwan Island, where a major logging, milling, and transportation complex was built. In the study area, logging operations were concentrated on Lyell Island and the Logan Inlet to Juan Perez Sound section of the east

44. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, *op. cit.*, pp.257-259.

45. *Queen Charlotte Islander*, February 17, 1913, p.1.

coast.⁴⁶

One of the larger I.M.B. contractors was the Queen Charlotte Spruce Company, which logged leases owned by the Heming family of Victoria. In early 1918 this company logged Shuttle Island, and had contracts on leases around Sedgwick Bay, which later were taken over by Jeremiason and Hanson Logging.⁴⁷ Other contractors included Thulin Brothers & Walters, on Sedgwick Bay, Century Logging and Lumbering Company, on Atli Inlet and Tanu Island, and Lane & Crawford, on Beresford Arm.⁴⁸ The largest operation, on Shuttle Island, had up to sixty men working through 1918.⁴⁹

The airplane spruce logging did not have a profound effect on the forest resource as a whole, but did establish the limited areas in South Moresby which had stands of high-quality timber, and which would be subject to future exploitation. Surveys of the area after the war confirmed that the best timber was very localized, with poor quality

46. Vancouver City Archives [hereafter cited as V.C.A.], Add. Mss 69, "Aeroplane Spruce Logging Under the Supervision of Department of Aeronautical Supplies Imperial Munitions Board", blueprint plan of activities; B.C.A.R.S., GR 939, British Columbia, Department of Lands, Forests Branch, Spruce Permits, Boxes 1, 10, 12, 13, 14.

47. B.C.A.R.S., GR 939, British Columbia, Department of Lands, Forest Branch, Spruce Permits, Box 1, file 6; *ibid.*, Box 12, file 256; *ibid.*, Box 13, file 302.

48. *Ibid.*, Box 12, file 246; *ibid.*, Box 13, file 285; *ibid.*, Box 13, file 288; *ibid.*, Box 13, file 294; *ibid.*, Box 13, file 296; *ibid.*, Box 14, file 309.

49. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1918*, Vancouver, Wrigley Directories Ltd., 1918, p.266.

wood more common.⁵⁰ In 1924 it was noted that the east coast of Moresby Island was typified by deep inlets, which formed "natural booming grounds" for assembling Davis rafts.⁵¹

Some of the companies which had entered the South Moresby region as I.M.B. contractors continued their operations after W.W.I. Whalen Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. was formed in May 1917 to take over the assets of three earlier companies.⁵² After the war, it took over much of the I.M.B. infrastructure, including the Thurston Harbour headquarters, and operated five camps in the district by 1923. Logs were rafted and taken to the company's pulp and paper mill at Swanson Bay.⁵³ Whalen Pulp and Paper was using float camps as well as I.M.B. land camps; in 1923 there was one on the east side of Beresford Inlet.⁵⁴

50. British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report, 1924, op. cit.*, p.F88.

51. *Ibid.*, *Report, 1925, op. cit.*, p.D113. Davis rafts, invented in the early 20th century, were large cigar-shaped bundles of logs, arranged in the water and then bound with cables. They were stronger and easier to tow in rough water than typical log booms. Their construction at one of the Moresby Island camps was described in 1946; V.C.A., Add. Mss 197, Morgan Family, "Account of a trip taken by Owen Livingstone 20 June to 11 August, 1946", p.17.

52. B.C.A.R.S. Add. Mss 1996, Western Forest Products Ltd., Box 2, files 1,6.

53. British Columbia, Department of Lands, *Report of the Minister of Lands, 1924, op. cit.*, p.F88.

54. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names, op. cit.*, pp.206-207.

Whalen Pulp and Paper went into receivership by September 1923, and in 1925 its assets, including the Moresby Island logging operation, were taken over by the British Columbia Pulp and Paper Company Ltd.⁵⁵

Most of the logging in South Moresby between the wars was carried out by two contractors, T.A. Kelley and J.R. Morgan. Tom Kelley had worked as a timber cruiser in the South Moresby area prior to WWI.⁵⁶ By January 1917 he had acquired a number of the former M.J.G. White timber licences around Atli Inlet, and set up the T.A. Kelley Logging and Lumber Company Ltd. to purchase these licences and log the properties.⁵⁷ The new company was to pay a royalty on timber cut to the "Graham and Lyell Islands Timber Syndicate of Dawson, Yukon Territory", suggesting capital was coming from Kelley's Yukon contacts.⁵⁸ In 1918 Kelley Logging

55. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1996, Box 2, files 1,6; *ibid.*, Box 7, file 5, "Chronological History of Rayonier Canada Limited", p.1.

56. For instance, he was timber cruising in the vicinity of Lockeport in 1911, *Queen Charlotte Islander*, August 24, 1911, p.3. Kelley's obituaries in the *Vancouver Sun* and *Vancouver Province*, June 20, 1955, pp.18 and 8 respectively, reported him coming to B.C. in 1907, after spending some years in the Klondike.

57. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5142, File 3294, T.A. Kelley Logging and Lumber Company Ltd., pp.3,31,39.

58. *Ibid.*, pp.43,1,42. The purchase price paid to Kelley was 600 of the 1,000 \$100 shares in the company, as well as a royalty on timber cut. The company was to cut a minimum of 5,000,000 feet of timber per year, and the payments to the vendor ranged from 50¢ to \$1.00 per 1,000 board feet depending on species.

employed 150-200 men in three camps, respectively six, twenty, and thirty miles south of Lockeport.⁵⁹ Kelley was now under contract to supply Whalen Pulp and Paper, and was in conflict with the larger company. By early 1919 Whalen stopped all advances to Kelley Logging, and was seeking control of the latter company.⁶⁰ Kelley Logging went into receivership in the spring of 1919, and J. Henry, who seems to have been associated with Whalen Pulp and Paper, purchased its assets for about \$13,000.⁶¹ Kelley Logging may have continued as a subsidiary of Whalen until that company's demise in 1923. In that year Kelley "made arrangements to ship pulpwood in barges from Moresby Island to the Powell River Pulp and Paper Company".⁶² This relationship was to continue throughout the existence of Kelley Logging, which became a subsidiary of the Powell

59. *Wrigley's British Columbia Directory 1918*, op. cit., p.266. This does not correspond with the timber leases noted above on Lyell Island.

60. B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1996, Box 2, file 1, Minute Book, Whalen Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., p.91, August 28, 1918; *ibid.*, p.106, March 1919.

61. B.C.A.R.S., Register of Companies, Film B-5142, File 3294, T.A. Kelley Logging and Lumber Company Ltd., pp.65,70,73. Whalen also acquired a lot of Kelley logs at a sheriff's sale in Prince Rupert in the summer of 1919, B.C.A.R.S., Add. Mss 1996, Box 2, file 1, Minute Book, Whalen Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., p.005, January 5, 1920.

62. *Canada Lumberman*, August 1, 1923, p.71. In 1923 Kelley was proposing to build a sawmill on Takelley Cove, a project which never materialized. It may have been an alternate to the deal arranged with Powrivco; British Columbia, Ministry of Crown Lands, correspondence file 051599, pp.1-6, 8, 13-14, 17; *ibid.*, correspondence file 051605, pp.1-25;

River Company. In 1926 Kelley employed about 70 men in camps on Logan Inlet, and the operation was moved to Selwyn Inlet the following year.⁶³ In 1930 Kelley Logging produced about 40,000,000 board feet of wood.⁶⁴ The 1937 Forest Service survey of the Moresby Forest found Kelley Logging based on Lagoon Inlet and Murchison Island, but operating in various locations, including Sedgwick Bay and Windy Bay. By this time Kelley Logging employed about 100 men, and produced about 30,000,000 board feet of timber per year.⁶⁵ By 1941 Kelley Logging was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Powell River Company. The Queen Charlotte spruce supply was essential to the latter company's newsprint operation. Another branch, Kelley Spruce, produced high grade spruce for the Vancouver market, and after 1941 for the British Timber Control, for aircraft construction.⁶⁶

The other major operation in South Moresby was the J.R. Morgan Logging Company Limited. This company was linked to

63. Neill McTavish, "Reminiscences of the Prince John", in *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, vol.1, Masset, Senior Citizens of the Queen Charlotte Islands, 1979, pp.38-39.

64. Tibor Jando, "Logging and Sawmilling 1907-1970", *op. cit.*, p.18.

65. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, pp.20,21,57,63.

66. Stephen Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957", PhD dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1989, pp.101-102.

Pacific Mills, Ltd., in the same way Kelley was linked to the Powell River Company. In 1922 Pacific Mills paid about \$1,500,000 for the Moresby Island timber leases of the North American Timber Holding Company, to provide raw materials for the company's paper plant at Ocean Falls.⁶⁷ Apparently Morgan was the primary logging contractor producing this pulpwood. J.R. Morgan Logging had its main float camp on the west side of Sedgwick Bay in the 1930s, before moving it to Talunkwun Island in 1936.⁶⁸ In 1935 the company had been working on Hutton Inlet, and in 1937 its headquarters was at Thurston Harbour [Talunkwun Island].⁶⁹ Morgan was also logging on Cumshewa Inlet, before moving his main camp to Huxley Island sometime prior to 1943.⁷⁰ The Morgan operation employed 120 men in 1937, and produced about 40,000,000 board feet of wood per year.⁷¹ By 1941 Morgan was sending low grade wood to Ocean Falls for pulp and paper

67. *Canada Lumberman*, July 15, 1922, p.52.

68. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands Book 2: Of Places and Names*, *op. cit.*, p.206; *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, vol.1, *op. cit.*, p.22, photo from Elmer Palmer, Q.C.I. Museum, Phillips-Dalzell collection.

69. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, pp.20,55, Compartment 18.

70. Viv Williams, "A Gyppo Logger on the Queen Charlotte Islands", *Tales from the Queen Charlotte Islands*, vol.2, *op. cit.*, p.15.

71. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, p.20.

production, while high grade spruce went to the Sitka Spruce Lumber Company in Vancouver for airplane lumber.⁷²

These two companies continued to operate in the same way for the interwar period. The pattern was one of sporadic localized logging from 1917 to 1932, turning into more intensive logging of the same areas, in the later 1930s.⁷³ Usually the areas logged were near the shore, to simplify dumping the logs into the "natural booming-grounds" of the area. After 1935 both Kelley and Morgan had concentrated their logging around Sedgwick Bay and the north shore of Murchison Island, considered to be excellent booming and rafting locations.⁷⁴

Once the logs were in the water, it was still a major job to get them to the processing centres. The distances were huge, and the weather and ocean conditions were treacherous. Towing charges to Vancouver were \$3.00 per thousand board feet, and both of the contractors

72. Stephen Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957", *op. cit.*, pp.101-102.

73. From 1917 to 1937 19,130 acres had been logged in the Moresby Forest, of which 10,900 acres was cut in the previous five years, averaging 2,180 acres or 80,000,000 board feet per year. In 1937 105,000,000 feet of lumber was cut, broken down into 60% spruce, 30% hemlock, and 10% cedar; B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, p.19.

74. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, p.61, Compartment 21, Sub-compartment 4.

experimented with ocean transportation. In 1937 Kelley tried a log carrier based on the hull of an old sailing ship as an alternative to the Davis rafts normally used.⁷⁵ In the mid 1930s Morgan purchased the 232 foot ex-Canadian National coastal steamer *Prince Albert*, which he renamed the *J.R. Morgan*, to use as a tow boat for his Davis rafts. Morgan also did some contract towing for the other companies in the Queen Charlotte Islands.⁷⁶

Of the wood produced, 38% of the total was towed to Powell River, 36% went to Ocean Falls, 23% went to Vancouver for milling, while the remaining 3% was exported directly.⁷⁷ With W.W.II the demand for airplane spruce increased again, and by 1941 Kelley and Morgan, together with Pacific Mills and A.P. Allison Logging, who ran camps on northern Moresby Island, ran nine camps employing between 600 and 800 men. The total wood production was now up to 228,000,000 feet, of which 66,000,000 was high grade

75. *Ibid.*, p.20.

76. Kathleen E. Dalzell, *The Queen Charlotte Islands*, op. cit., pp.289-290,304; V.C.A., Add. Mss 197, Morgan Family, "Account of a trip taken by Owen Livingstone 20 June to 11 August, 1946", p.17.

77. Kelley Logging shipped its pulp wood to Powell River, while J.R. Morgan Logging sent its pulp wood to Ocean Falls. High grade spruce was rafted to Vancouver and Powell River for milling into lumber, including a small quantity of airplane spruce, while the cedar was rafted to Vancouver for processing; B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, p.19.

aircraft spruce.⁷⁸

In general, the pattern of logging in South Moresby remained consistent from 1917 to 1948. Contractors produced low grade spruce and hemlock to supply corporate mainland pulp mills, with secondary activity on high grade airplane spruce and dimensioned lumber. The activity tended to be concentrated on the areas which were first surveyed in the pre-W.W.I period, and had been acquired by the corporations operating the pulp mills. The logging was usually near the water, where the "natural booming-grounds" could be used. Getting the logs to the mills was a major expense, so the construction of Davis rafts and attempts to use alternative transportation were significant. Both Kelley and Morgan concentrated their operations on the South Moresby area until after the Second World War. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s logging in the Queen Charlotte Islands moved from the South Moresby area to the northeastern corner of Moresby Island and Graham Island. From 1948 to 1974 there was no large-scale commercial logging in South Moresby, although a little handlogging was done.⁷⁹

In the Kelley and Morgan operations, the readily-available resource, near the water on corporate timber leases, was limited. Both of the corporations which were

78. Stephen Gray, "Woodworkers and Legitimacy: The IWA in Canada, 1937-1957", *op. cit.*, p.101.

79. South Moresby Resource Planning Team, *South Moresby Land Use Alternatives*, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 1983, p.104.

fed by the contractors had timber leases available elsewhere, both in the Queen Charlotte Islands and on the mainland. This, combined with the easy mobility of the contractors' operations, meant that when the wood which could be logged for the least expense was used up, the operations could easily move to other locations with ample stocks of wood near the water. This transience and dependence on convenient timber leases was typical of the logging in the area, and tends to support Selvik's analysis of the motives and mechanisms of corporations operating in marginal areas. The commitment of the corporation was not to a region, or to the labour force they employed, but to providing the inputs, in this case pulp wood, to their production facility in the cheapest way.

At their peak, the T. Kelley and J.R. Morgan logging companies employed between 200 and 250 men in the South Moresby region. In the 1930s they were operating from March to December, with a winter shut-down.⁸⁰ Both companies maintained a variety of camps in and around the region. The determining factors were the localized nature of the resource, the need for access to the water and a booming ground, and the need to move camp frequently as the forest was consumed. The logging camps in the region were temporary shore camps, such as Kelley Logging's Windy Bay

80. B.C.A.R.S., GR 943, British Columbia, Forest Branch, Box 9, File R49, "Moresby Forest: Survey and Preliminary Management Plan", 1937, p.20.

camp, or float camps. A 1946 visitor to the Morgan Logging operations noted described the float camp as an "aggregation...roughly a thousand feet long. ...When they have finished logging one area and want to move the camp, they get their heavy ships in action and tow the aggregation to a new location."⁸¹ As with the Rose Harbour whaling station, the linkages from these camps were strongest to the outside. The crews wintered in Vancouver or Victoria, and were transported in for the start of the season each year.

Linkages between corporate entrepreneurs and the South Moresby community

These corporate ventures were diverse in scale and intent, but had some common elements as well. In each instance, the operating decisions were made far away from the region. Economic and social linkages were not local, but extended to urban centres such as Vancouver and Victoria. The Rose Harbour whaling station operated as a branch of the Victoria branch headquarters of the Consolidated Whaling Corporation and its predecessor companies. Capital came from the United States, labour was imported each season as crews from Victoria, and all the production was shipped out of the region on company ships.

81. Vancouver City Archives, Add. Mss 197, Morgan Family, "Account of a trip taken by Owen Livingstone 20 June to 11 August, 1946", pp.14-15.

Following the staples thesis, the location and operation of this station was determined by geography, the nature of the resource, and the technology required to produce the commodity. The location of the whaling station was decided by the availability of a suitable harbour with easy access to the whaling grounds already known to exist in the Anthony Island area. The linkages were not to South Moresby, but to the means of production.

The Rose Harbour whaling station was one of the first of the large non-mining camps in the region. There was no local community beyond what was required for the operation of the plant, and due to the distance from Jedway and Lockeport, limited communication between the station and those communities. In spite of its length of operation, and its economic viability, this establishment never progressed beyond the level of a resource extraction camp. There was a sense of community, but the identity was as part of the whaling fraternity rather than as part of the region. In this instance, in a framework provided by a corporate entity, the region was incidental to the economic goals. The plant was located there because the resource was there, and it was not in the corporation's interest to create more than an effective camp for exploiting that resource. Ultimately, this venture had little or no impact on the economic growth or permanent settlement of South Moresby.

The Jedway and Lockeport canneries had stronger

linkages with the region due to their locations in the old mining towns. However, in each instance, their existence under corporate ownership was brief, and their operation intermittent. In the case of the Lockeport plant, what had been a major producer and focus of the economic and social life of the community under a regional entrepreneur was quickly closed by the corporation. Copper mining had come to a standstill by the late 1920s, so when the corporations shut down their operations, the other economic support of the communities, it signalled the end of the towns' existence. Without a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial population base, there was little motivation for residents to stay in the absence of any economic incentive.

The logging contractors also had limited linkages with the South Moresby community. In part, this related to the emphasis on this industry in the 1930s, after the villages of the region were largely deserted. The nature of logging in South Moresby required a highly-mobile operation, which could be moved from timber lease to timber lease as each one was logged off. This meant that mobile camps were the most suitable sort of settlement for the labour force employed. As with the Rose harbour whaling station, these camps had stronger economic and social links with the urban centres where the workers came from, and where the corporations which determined the form of development had their headquarters.

The effect of corporate whaling and logging in South Moresby on settlement viability was minimal, due to the lack of integration between the two systems. However, the actions of the fishery corporations in eliminating the Lockeport and Jedway canneries had a definite negative effect on the economic and settlement viability of the region. It had been proved by the success of the Lockeport cannery when operated by a regional entrepreneur, and that of the Jedway Bay saltery, that the marine processing industry could be viable. However, decisions based on the profitability of a corporation as a whole, rather than individual plants, eliminated most of the remaining economic base of Jedway and Lockeport.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The pattern of twentieth century development in South Moresby was determined by the copper rush of 1905-1909. At the end of that period settlement was concentrated in the two "independent" towns of Jedway and Lockeport, the large Japanese mining camp of Ikeda Mines, and a number of smaller mining camps with less than ten workers. The copper boom was centred around two core properties, the *Copper Queen* and *Swede* groups, at Jedway and Lockeport respectively. Neither of these mines began production as envisioned in the 1908-1910 period, and the one successful shipper in the region, Ikeda Mines, failed in spite of its high grade ore and cheap labour. Although development and speculation continued on various properties, including these three, the pace of the copper rush definitely slowed, and miners and speculators began to look elsewhere.

Economic responses to this came in the form of diversification into other resource extractive industries, as predicted in the model offered by various writers on mining booms. However, many of these new initiatives were determined by outside regional, Japanese, or corporate entrepreneurs rather than local residents. The common factor was that they were all resource extractive industries. The pattern of settlement occasioned by these ventures was determined by the location of the resources,

modified by functional requirements such as safe moorage and fresh water. With the exception of mining, which was nearly year-round, the majority of these industries were seasonal in nature. In marine processing plants, normal practice was to establish a facility in an area with plentiful resources, and then bring in a crew to process the catch in that facility for a period ranging from a few weeks to a few months of the year. Logging followed a similar pattern, with operations extending through more of the year, but with greater camp mobility required, to shift to new timber leases as the resource was consumed in one area. Besides the new camps, the settlements of Jedway and Lockeport remained in use, at first as remnant mining towns, and later revitalized to some extent with the coming of the canneries in the 1920s. Under corporate economic dominance, the old towns effectively became camps as well.

The various industrial camps, and by the late 1920s, towns, had no existence independent of the plants with which they were associated; when the business ended, the camp closed. The camps were enclaves in the true sense, without linkages to the region they were located in. However, the continued existence of the camp-based industries throughout this period raises the question of why independent settlement failed. Although settlement viability was dependent on economic viability, economic viability of the region did not assure permanent settlement. Factors other

than a lack of economic viability contributed to South Moresby's underdevelopment.

Classical economic theory and the staples thesis suggest that the course of development is determined by factors such as geography, the nature of the resource, the technology required for producing a commodity, and the market for the commodity. In the case of the South Moresby industries, these factors did not change substantially through time, and were no different than those existing elsewhere on the coast of British Columbia. The region was remote, but no more so than others, and there was a relatively effective and inexpensive government-subsidized transportation system. The land and marine resources were plentiful, and the technologies for exploiting them were established elsewhere, and readily available. Markets were variable throughout the period under consideration, but again, this factor was common to all regions.

The evolutionary model used to describe various mineral booms, assuming a finite lifespan for extractive industry and related towns, is most appropriate in those cases where there is only one major resource. In South Moresby, a wide range of resources was available, most of the extractive industries had relatively low initial capital requirements, and many of them proved financial successes. This should have facilitated diversification into new ventures to support settlement, if the will existed. The staples theory

also suggests that the factors of geography, resource, technology and market shape the form and sustainability of settlement. This implies that settlement viability would automatically follow economic viability, which did not apply in this case.

The one area of settlement in South Moresby that may be addressed most effectively by the staples theory was the camps. In this instance, the mandate was clearly defined by the primarily corporate operators. The narrow range of activity, and dependence on a specific resource and imported labour crews produced a pattern of settlement that did relate directly to the factors of geography, resource and market. However, the staples theory cannot explain why regional settlement would fail in spite of the continuing economic success of commodity producers in the region.

In spite of the core-periphery relationship existing between the various urban centres in British Columbia and Washington and South Moresby, dependency theory does not adequately address why the region remained underdeveloped. As suggested by the post-dependency theorists, this model provides a broad framework or context for regional analysis. A situation of profound dependency existed, in that the market for the commodities produced in South Moresby was almost exclusively outside the region. None of the ventures described, with the possible exception of the Jedway sawmill, could have operated without such a market.

However, dependency theory's central concept of "development of underdevelopment" does not seem to apply to South Moresby. The concept of draining capital from the periphery hardly applies when all the venture capital and labour was brought from outside the region. In the absence of a pre-capitalist society which could be conditioned by an invading economic system, the dependency theory is probably better retained as a framework rather than an analytical method. As with the staples theory, this model seems to apply the most in the case of the corporate entrepreneurs and their industrial camps, where the lack of economic or social linkages with South Moresby society was determined by outside forces, in this case corporate management. However, even in this case there was no attempt to condition local society, as the workers and systems of production were imported from urban centres.

The various post-dependency models, with their emphasis on initial social conditions, production systems, and the interaction between different modes of production provide the most promise of explanation. In South Moresby there was no pre-capitalist society existing, as in South America or the Maritimes. All the development in the region was determined by introduced capitalist enterprise. The significant difference between various systems of production, and the societies of production, were determined by the origins and intent of the entrepreneurs who initiated

them. This is consistent with the conclusions of Patricia Marchak and John McMullan, who stated that the processing companies determined the "social relations of production" in the absence of a previous pre-capitalist system.¹

The interests of the four classes of entrepreneur defined as active in South Moresby, and their systems of linkages with local and outside capital and society, clearly varied. The strongest linkages to the South Moresby community were found among the local entrepreneurs, merchant or industrial capitalists who diversified into various service and extractive industries in the region. These individuals relate back to Howard Lamar's stress on the importance of frontier merchants and their diverse role in the development of society.² They also relate to Cole Harris' "commercial economies", which paralleled the staples economies, but often proved more resilient and more permanent.³

The levels of local linkages steadily declined as the distance of the entrepreneur from South Moresby, and the size of the business, increased. While local entrepreneurs had an interest in keeping the profits and social benefits

1. Patricia Marchak, "Uncommon Property", *op. cit.*, pp.20-22; John McMullan, "State, Capital, and the B.C. Salmon-Fishing Industry", *op. cit.*, p.107.

2. Howard R. Lamar, "Persistent Frontier: The West in the Twentieth Century", *op. cit.*, pp.12-15.

3. Cole Harris, "Industry and the Good Life around Idaho Peak", *op. cit.*, pp.340-343.

of their enterprise in South Moresby, corporate entrepreneurs just wanted to ensure profits for the corporation; the viability either of individual plants, or settlement in South Moresby, was beside the point. Regional entrepreneurs fell somewhere in the middle. Extractive industry could be economically viable under any of the systems of production; petty copper ore producer to Rose Harbour whaling station. However, without some linkage to the community, this economic viability would not ensure settlement viability, but only the existence of a camp while the industry was operating. Although economic viability was required for settlement viability, it did not ensure the latter in the absence of some form of commitment to social vitality. This relates to Rosemary Ommer's conclusion that underdevelopment was not the inevitable result of a staple trade, but rather was due to the way that the entrepreneurs operated the trade.⁴

The capital available to the various classes of entrepreneur increased as their local linkages decreased. Local entrepreneurs were able to muster limited capital, while corporate entrepreneurs had access to major investment. The form of development in South Moresby was determined by the initiatives of local entrepreneurs, and elaborated by the capital of regional entrepreneurs. The

4. Rosemary E. Ommer, *From Outpost to Outport: A Structural Analysis of the Jersey-Gaspé Cod Fishery, 1767-1886*, op. cit., p.199.

commitment of the local residents, and the greater capital mobilized by the urban entrepreneurs, combined to produce the settlements of South Moresby. Although some of the corporate ventures, such as the Rose Harbour whaling station, were heavily capitalized, the consequent development did not contribute to the settlement of the region, due to the enclave nature of the plant and camp.

The Japanese population of South Moresby may have been able to sustain permanent settlement in the region, with an economy based on marine industry, augmented by mining and other ventures. There seems to have been an enclave Japanese economy and society in the 1910-1930 period, which may have been sustainable. This society did have some linkages with the settlements in the region, but stronger linkages with the Vancouver-based Japanese community. In this case, it was government intervention which eliminated the possibility of permanent settlement. The Japanese attempts to pre-empt or purchase land in South Moresby were all refused, and the successful Jedway Bay saltery was eventually shut down as an enemy company. If the Japanese interests had been allowed to acquire land tenure and diversify, while maintaining the fishery as an economic base, they could have potentially developed a permanent community in South Moresby.

The failure of twentieth century settlement in the South Moresby region may be related to a variety of factors.

This work has focused on local conditions to explain the region's underdevelopment, and how different types of ventures did or did not support settlement. However, there are other issues which could be explored, primarily in relation to the economic success or failure of enterprises in the region. For instance, the broader context of extractive industry on the coast of British Columbia could be examined, to suggest if overall changes in patterns of capitalization and production may have affected the viability of South Moresby industries. Changing demand for commodities and market fluctuations could also be used to suggest why industries rose and fell. In each instance, these factors relate best to explaining the economic viability of staple trades. The strategies of various levels of government in relation to both ventures and settlement in the region could also be examined more closely. In the case of Japanese settlement and in the timber industry, government actions seemed to have a profound effect on the pattern South Moresby's development assumed. A broader study of overseas Japanese businesses may provide a clearer idea of how the Japanese ventures in South Moresby related to this society as a whole.

Within the factors examined in this study, the staples theory can be used to account for a failure of a commodity export economy, and the form of development of industrial camps. However, in this case settlement disappeared while

the commodity-based economy still operated. The dependency theory provides an economic context for the industry and settlement in this peripheral region. Its strongest application to the development of the region relates to the externally-imposed corporate decisions determining the systems of production in enclave plants. The post-dependency theorists' emphasis on modes of production provides the best explanatory framework for the failure of settlement. The variables in the introduced capitalist systems of production seem to have had the most profound effect on determining the development of the region. The intent of the entrepreneur relative to the region, in other words the linkages to the region, and the capital which could be mobilized, were the two most significant factors.

The depression of the 1930s hit the South Moresby region more or less concurrently with the end of the copper mining activity. The latter factor removed the economic hope of the remnant mining population which had stayed in Jedway and Lockeport since the copper rush, and led to it leaving the area. The crisis of capital brought by the depression led to the corporate decisions to abandon their facilities in the same centres in favour of other plants. Without strong linkages to the region, the corporate decisions were based strictly on potential returns on investment for the corporation as a whole. The same shortage of capital meant that, in spite of the potential

for resource extractive industry in the region, regional entrepreneurs were unable to move in where the corporations had left.

The remaining corporate logging and whaling camps were strictly enclaves, which did not act to support regional development, but only corporate ends. The remaining Japanese venture was thriving, and may have still served as the focus of an enclave society, but government intervention, in the form of blocking land tenure and eventually shutting the operation down, eventually removed the Japanese presence from the region.

Once the local, regional and Japanese entrepreneurs of South Moresby had been replaced by corporate entrepreneurs, the economic and social linkages with the economy and society that had developed in the region ended. This meant that the various systems of production were replaced by a single system, determined by corporate entrepreneurs. In turn, this would bring economic and corollary settlement viability under the effect of the factors defined by the staples or dependency theories; settlement form and occupancy was determined strictly by the requirements of a particular venture. In these circumstances, if a corporate decision was made to close a plant, the camp would be abandoned, and the failure of settlement was assured.

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