

**Appraising the CIDA-DFAIT Amalgamation:  
From Consolidating Organizations to Building a Collaborative Culture**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Objective**

In recent years, organizational change has become an increasingly regular occurrence in the everyday workplace, and the Canadian federal public service has not been exempt. On March 21, 2013, it was announced as part of the Canadian federal budget that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) would be amalgamated to create the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), now called Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Since the amalgamation was announced over three years ago, the department has taken various steps to bring together employees from the two former organizations, which were considered to have “disparate” organizational cultures.

This report is an exploratory study that reviews the organizational change process undertaken to bring together CIDA and DFAIT, examines the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged since the 2013 amalgamation of the two organizations, and provides options to assist in the further development of a collaborative organizational culture.

### **Methodology and methods**

This report utilizes several qualitative research methods that include a literature review, a web-based employee survey, a review of internal documents, and a review of other jurisdictions. The literature review examines the broad themes of organizational change and organizational culture, and identifies factors that contribute to the success of organizational changes. The literature review also identifies a wide spectrum of models and best practices to guide organizational change. The web-based employee survey informs the research question through employees’ descriptions of their experiences of amalgamation, and the internal document review sheds light on approaches used to manage the amalgamation process, as well what senior officials may consider to be an “ideal” departmental organizational culture. The examination of other jurisdictions serves as a basis for comparison.

This report employs an analytic framework that integrates the main factors and considerations that contribute to a successful organizational change process. The analytic framework begins with the announcement of an amalgamation, progresses through factors that contribute to a successful organizational change, considers best practices for merging organizational cultures, and results in the desired state.

### **Findings and analysis**

A review of internal amalgamation initiatives demonstrates that the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT has been approached incrementally. While some amalgamation initiatives have been completed successfully, others are only beginning, such as the changes involved with Amalgamation 2.0 in the Americas Branch, meaning that many employees have cycled through various stages of amalgamation “completion” in various aspects of their work. Survey responses from employees of the former CIDA and DFAIT organizations indicate that many employees have become increasingly supportive of the amalgamation over time; however, some feel the opposite. Employees indicate that barriers to the development of a collaborative organizational culture within GAC remain, and most employees indicate that the amalgamation is not yet complete.

This research has identified a number of barriers to the development of a collaborative organizational culture that remain within GAC:

- employees' general lack of knowledge of the work that is undertaken in other "streams" of the department;
- the existence of staffing classifications that create feelings of unfairness and inequity between employees of the three streams; and,
- employees who lack competencies that support of the development of a collaborative organizational culture.

### **Options and recommendation**

Options and recommendations that will support the further development of a collaborative organizational culture are proposed. Options are weighed against the criteria of time, cost, effort, support, evidence, achievement of objectives, and integration of factors identified as contributors to successful organizational change processes. Options are rooted in the information and opinions provided by survey respondents and are supported by best practices identified in the literature review, as well as by information found in departmental documents and remarks from departmental officials.

Option 1 is to conduct an employee survey, and draws directly from best practice literature on merging organizational cultures. Option 2 is to focus on employee competencies, to identify and develop competencies in employees that would support greater collaboration, and the further development of a collaborative organizational culture within the department. Option 3 is the recommended option, and is to implement a tri-stream development program that would give new recruits and experienced employees the opportunity to undertake assignments in all three streams of the department.

### **Conclusion**

More than three years after the announcement that CIDA and DFAIT would be amalgamated, the early development of a collaborative organizational culture at GAC is apparent; however, distinct organizational cultures from the former organizations do still exist, and barriers to the emergence of one departmental organizational culture remain. Furthermore, what would constitute an "ideal" GAC organizational culture has not been explicitly defined. With multiple factors to consider, senior officials at GAC are in a position to make decisions that could support the further emergence of a collaborative organizational culture from the previously "disparate" organizational cultures.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

On March 21, 2013, the Canadian federal budget announced that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) would be amalgamated to form the new “Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development”, or “DFATD”. While the work of CIDA and DFAIT had been related in a number of ways, the two organizations had operated independently for decades. On November 4, 2015, when a new government was sworn in, the Department was renamed “Global Affairs Canada (GAC)”, though the structure remained intact (Privy Council Office, 2015).

The purpose of this exploratory study is to take stock of the large-scale organizational change that created DFATD, now GAC, to determine the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged since the 2013 amalgamation of two organizations with significantly different organizational cultures. It will describe the initial reactions of employees, external stakeholders, and the media to the amalgamation announcement, and examine the justification provided by the government for making such a change. Additionally, the project will look at the ways in which employees of the two organizations were brought together in the weeks, months, and years following the announcement. The project will also examine changes in the work of employees since the amalgamation, and look at how foreign policy, trade, and international development work has been united within a single department, focusing on changes made within the Americas Branch of GAC. However, the primary focus of this research will be to assess the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC since the 2013 amalgamation.

The client for this project is the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of the Americas Branch at GAC. The Americas Branch is one of five geographic branches, and one of twenty branches that make up GAC. Following the initial, departmental amalgamation, each geographic branch was instructed to undertake its own measures to implement amalgamation at the branch level. On July 1, 2016, “Amalgamation 2.0” was implemented in some bureaus of the Americas Branch to provide benefits in areas such as more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, and coordination and consultation across “streams”. The changes associated with Amalgamation 2.0 affect employees working in the Latin America and Caribbean Bureaus, as well as GAC employees who work on international development at missions in countries with an international development presence. A web-based survey asked select employees from these groups about their general opinions of the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, about the benefits and drawbacks of amalgamation and Amalgamation 2.0, about ways in which employees could be supported as Amalgamation 2.0 is implemented in the Americas Branch, and about the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC.

This project relies on a multifaceted research approach and has several deliverables. First, a literature review was undertaken, focusing on organizational change and organizational culture, examining factors that have been associated with successful organizational change processes. The literature review also identified models and best practices for bringing together organizations with different organizational cultures, which were used to assess the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC. Next, a web-based survey was undertaken by select Americas Branch employees regarding various aspects of the amalgamation process. Finally, after reviewing the findings, options and a recommendation were identified that have the potential to assist in the further development a collaborative organizational culture as the amalgamation process progresses.

This report begins with Section 2, which presents background information on the two organizations, the client, the amalgamation process, and outlines media coverage and stakeholder reactions.

Section 3 reviews the methods used in this study, including primary and secondary data collection, and reviews the project's strengths, limitations, and risks. Section 4, the literature review, examines general concepts and definitions and presents models and best practices that have been developed to lead organizational change. This section lays the foundation for the analytic framework guiding this study.

Section 5 provides information and findings on the internal steps taken to bring together the two organizations, examining departmental messaging and announcements, initiatives and reports. Section 6 examines other jurisdictions and the structure of their foreign affairs and international development departments. Survey findings are presented in Section 7. Section 8 brings together and assesses the findings from the web-based survey, the literature review, findings from other jurisdictions, and from the review of internal documents and internal amalgamation steps taken. Section 9 sets out three options for the consideration of the client, including one recommendation and an implementation strategy. Section 10, the conclusion, reviews the principal findings, provides a recommendation, and suggests further research.

Such suggestions for further research include an in-depth review of the success of competency-based management methods in the public sector, research on the impact of individual personalities to the success of organizational change processes, research on the existence of "sub-cultures" within large organizations, a discourse analysis of public sector organizational change processes that involve merging organizational cultures, and an in-depth review of literature on other jurisdictions in which foreign affairs and development departments have been combined.

## 2. BACKGROUND

This section provides background information regarding the former CIDA and former DFAIT organizations, describes the conditions leading up to the amalgamation of the two organizations, and outlines media coverage and stakeholder reactions following the amalgamation announcement. A brief background on the client for this project is also included in this section.

### 2.1 History: CIDA, DFAIT, and change in the government of Canada

CIDA was created in 1968 with a mission to “lead Canada’s international effort to help people living in poverty” (Levitz, 2013), and while its approach to poverty reduction has changed significantly over the years, its organizational structure remained relatively stable until 45 years later, when it was amalgamated with DFAIT. DFAIT, however, was created in 1909 as the “Department of External Affairs”, with a small group of employees working in a “poky office above a barbershop in downtown Ottawa” (DFATD, 2014), and has gone through various smaller-scale changes since its creation until its amalgamation with CIDA more than 100 years later. Some of these changes included multiple mergers and separations of the diplomatic and trade functions of the Government of Canada (DFATD, 2014). When the two organizations were amalgamated in 2013, CIDA had approximately 1,600 employees, while DFAIT had close to 4,600 (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2015; see Appendix A, Population of the Federal Public Service by Department).

Since its inception in 1968, CIDA was the lead Canadian organization dedicated to international development, and managed the majority of the billions of dollars of Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocated by Canada annually (CIDA, 2014). Prior to its merger with DFAIT, CIDA had one strategic outcome, which was to reduce poverty. Five programs contributed to this strategic outcome, which included working in fragile states and crisis-affected communities; working in low-income countries; working in middle-income countries; engaging globally and in strategic policy development; and engaging Canadians in development (CIDA, 2014; see Appendix B, CIDA & DFAIT Program Alignment Architecture). In its last few years as an organization, CIDA’s projects focused on securing the future of children and youth, increasing food security, and stimulating sustainable economic growth, while integrating gender equality, governance, and environmental sustainability considerations. CIDA’s organizational structure aligned with the various types of programming it supported: its branches included a Geographic Programs Branch, Partnerships with Canadians Branch, Multilateral and Global Programs Branch, and Strategic Policy and Performance Branch, as well as Information, Financial, Communications and Human Resources Branches (see Appendix C, CIDA Organizational Structure).

Before the amalgamation with CIDA, DFAIT was responsible for Canada’s international affairs, including international trade and global commerce (DFAIT, 2014). DFAIT had three strategic outcomes: to shape the international agenda to Canada’s benefit and advantage in accordance with Canadian interests and values; to ensure Canadians were satisfied with commercial and consular services; and to maintain a network of missions to enable the Government of Canada to achieve its international priorities. Seven programs contributed to these strategic outcomes, including focusing on international policy advice; diplomacy and advocacy; international commerce; consular services and emergency management; passport provision; governance, strategic direction and common service delivery; and Government of Canada benefits (DFAIT, 2014; see Appendix B, CIDA & DFAIT Program Alignment Architecture). DFAIT’s organizational structure reflected these outcomes, with Branches that “support[ed] comprehensive oversight of programs and the alignment of resources with priorities” through geographic and thematic concentrations (DFAIT, 2014; see Appendix D, DFAIT Organizational Structure).

The creation of DFATD in 2013 was the largest departmental change made by the government since the Conservative Party had been elected in 2006, but many smaller changes had been made during that time, due in part to the addition or deletion of cabinet positions, and the shuffling and reorganization of files (Warzecha, 2015). Similar changes under both Liberal and Conservative governments had become commonplace in the preceding decades (Parliament of Canada, 2015). Prior to the creation of DFATD, one of the largest changes to Canadian federal government departments began in 1993, with “a comprehensive, fundamental re-design of the structure of the Canadian government [that affected] not only the size and operation of Cabinet, but also the size and portfolios of a host of departments” (Lindquist, 2014, p.1). This re-design impacted over 20,000 federal public servants, and when finally completed many years later, was characterized as a difficult and stressful process. Numerous obstacles were faced, the changes took years to accomplish, and despite considerable advanced planning resulted in “many psychologically bruised employees” (Lindquist, no date, c.1996, p.6). Upon announcement of the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation, many wondered if employees of CIDA and DFAIT would have a similarly bumpy ride (Swiss, 2014).

## **2.2 March 2013: The federal budget and amalgamation announcement**

While the work of the former CIDA and former DFAIT was related in various ways, until March 21, 2013, the two organizations had operated separately for decades; however, it was no secret that the idea to merge the two organizations had been “kicking around [Ottawa] for more than 15 years” (Gilmore, 2013; Westhead, 2013). The rumour came to be seen as an even more likely possibility in 2006 when the Conservative government re-merged the foreign affairs and international trade functions of the public service, a move the government asserted would help “foster natural synergies between the two portfolios” and create “improved outcomes for Canadians” (DFATD, 2015; Blanchfield, 2013).

In the years before the amalgamation was announced, many in the public sector, including employees of CIDA and DFAIT, were impacted by the government’s “Deficit Reduction Action Plan”. This Action Plan aimed to create at least \$4 billion CAD in savings by 2014-15 through budget reductions of 5-10% in various federal departments (Deficit Reduction Action Plan Office, 2014).


### *CIDA & DFAIT: mandate overlap?*

The overlapping priorities of CIDA and DFAIT before amalgamation meant that employees of both organizations worked together on a number of tasks. For example, both organizations prioritized democratic governance abroad through various projects and advocacy initiatives (Petrou, 2012). Furthermore, “whole of government” task forces brought together CIDA and DFAIT employees, alongside other departments such as National Defence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), to address issues such as Canada’s work in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, and Haiti (CCIC, 2007; Gilmore, 2013). Additionally, the offices of CIDA and DFAIT representatives abroad were often located within the same buildings or embassy complexes; however, the level of integration and collaboration in their work varied greatly from country to country.

CIDA and DFAIT worked together through their reporting on international commitments, for example, the United Nations *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (United Nations Human Rights). DFAIT had named “the promotion and protection of women’s rights and gender equality” as central to Canada’s foreign policy, so reported on its projects that contributed to this policy (DFAIT, 2014). CIDA programming included gender equality as a “cross-cutting theme” and similarly reported on its projects (CIDA, 2014).

The delivery of Canada’s ODA was the main area of overlap in the work of CIDA and DFAIT. While almost two-thirds was delivered by CIDA (63% in 2012-13; approximately \$3.5 billion CAD), DFAIT was also responsible for a significant amount (8% in 2012-13; \$431 million CAD; see Figure 1, above), primarily funding small projects working in fragile and conflict-affected states, and providing international humanitarian assistance. However, as many as thirteen other Canadian federal departments, agencies, and arm’s length institutions were also responsible for ODA. The Department of Finance, the International Development Research Centre, Export Development Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Environment Canada and the RCMP all delivered ODA programming in 2012-13 in amounts ranging from \$35 million to \$600 million (see Appendix E, Official Development Assistance disbursements in FY 2012-13). The high administrative costs associated with delivering ODA through multiple organizations left some arguing that Canada’s aid delivery system was in need of reform (MacCharles, 2013; Westhead, 2013; Ingram and Bhushan, 2014). In the years leading up to the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation, some other donor countries cited cutting costs and “streamlined” aid delivery as the justification for merging their foreign affairs and international development departments (Troilo, 2015).

**Figure 1: Distribution of Official Development Assistance by source**



Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (2015). *Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s Official Development Assistance – 2013-2014.*

*Conditions leading up to the announcement*

Freezes and cuts to aid spending between 2010 and 2013 were widely interpreted as indicative of the government’s lack of interest in and commitment to international development. Indeed, some observers wondered if “CIDA’s demise” was imminent (Swiss, 2014; Schwartz, 2013; Levitz, 2013). Concerns linking cuts to aid with the future of CIDA were dismissed by the head of the Conservative government’s 2006 transition team leader as “nonsense” and “typical whining from the NGO community” (Blanchfield, 2013). During 2010-13, a handful of CIDA’s bilateral programs were revised to pursue projects partnering with the private sector, specifically mining companies. Some viewed this move as Canada providing “needless subsidies” to profitable corporations working in countries in which Canada had economic interests (Leblanc, 2012; York, 2013).

While both CIDA and DFAIT were instructed to reduce their budgets by 5-10% through the DRAP, more CIDA than DFAIT employees lost their jobs due to this process. By mid-April 2012,

approximately one-third of CIDA employees had received letters indicating that they would be “affected” by “workforce adjustment” (“Federal job cuts”, 2012; TBS, 2015). In the end, approximately 300 positions at CIDA and 450 positions at DFAIT were eliminated, many due to attrition (“Federal job cuts”, 2012; “Almost 11,000 federal jobs cut so far”, 2012).

During the same period, DFAIT employees felt budget cuts in other ways. Fewer jobs were lost than at CIDA; however, travel and expenditures budgets at DFAIT were slashed or eliminated, and the government took the rare step of selling government-owned homes abroad, including “Official Residences”, replacing them with less-expensive homes, or rental units (“Feds eye sale of 40 official residences abroad”, 2012). DFAIT had gone through two organizational changes in 2003 and 2006: to first separate and then bring back together the political and trade functions. While the changes did pose a challenge in terms of “trying to form a cohesive work environment” (Foster, 2013), they were smaller moves, implemented quickly and quietly (DFATD, 2014).

### *The Merger: Announcement and Reaction*

The amalgamation of DFAIT and CIDA was announced with little fanfare on March 21, 2013, as part of the 2013 federal budget, “buried [on page 241 of] the 433-page document in a chapter entitled ‘supporting families and communities’” (MacCharles, 2013). Similar to many changes by Canadian governments, the amalgamation was announced suddenly – it was a surprise to most, leaving no time for employees to be informed, or prepared. Furthermore, the amalgamation process began almost immediately, impacting most of the almost 6,200 employees of the two organizations. The government’s justification was to “promote greater international policy coherence and to achieve improved outcomes for Canadians” (CIDA, 2014). On June 26, 2013, the amalgamation was legally finalized when the *Budget Implementation Act*, Bill C-60, received Royal Assent.

Reactions to the amalgamation announcement, “one of the few items that drew anger in a relatively cautious 2013 budget”, were swift and overwhelmingly critical (“CIDA Shutdown”, 2013). Most reactions focused solely on the future of CIDA and barely touched upon the impact on DFAIT (CCIC; 2013). Journalists, Canadian aid agencies and NGOs publicly questioned whether CIDA’s mandate would be “swallowed by a bigger entity”, DFAIT (Foster, 2013). Several heads of Canadian NGOs and aid agencies penned op-eds, outlining their concerns about the amalgamation and its impact on Canada’s ability to deliver ODA (Scoggins and Toyce in Levitz, 2013; Sanchez in Munson, 2013; McCort in Ravelo, 2013). Many of those voicing concerns emphasized that the three “streams” of international development, foreign policy, and international trade had “competing aims and ideologies” (Munson, 2013). Others highlighted the clashing time frames within which the three streams work, pointing out the relatively short life cycle of international trade and foreign policy work versus that of international development, a “long-term effort” that “does not lend itself to short-term, one-off projects” (Smillie, 2013).

Those questioning the motivation behind the amalgamation wondered if DFAIT’s work to support the Canadian private sector in developing world economies would overshadow CIDA’s work on global poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance. They questioned whether or not a “donor country seeking its own economic gains may make different decisions than one focused more on basic humanitarian assistance, human rights, democratic governance or environmental protection” (“Federal budget folds CIDA into Foreign Affairs”, 2013). Critics of the amalgamation pointed out that humanitarian aid and development assistance in the developing world is not always compatible with the trade or political agendas of developed countries, and stated that the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT was “a troubling reflection of ...commercial self-interest, trumping the humanitarian value governments once placed on poverty alleviation” (Troilo, 2015).

The media's ability to "fuel or constrain anxieties depending on the journalistic perspective presented" was demonstrated in the days and weeks following the amalgamation announcement, which was covered heavily in the local and national news media (Schneider and Dunbar, 1992, cited in Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.516). Government of Canada messaging referred to the change as an "amalgamation" of two government organizations into a new, larger organization. Then-CIDA Minister Julian Fantino maintained that the amalgamation would "produce better results for both Canada and developing countries" (Berthiaume, 2013), and would "put development on an equal footing with trade and diplomacy" (Veenstra, 2013). Despite this message, many were informed via the media that CIDA was "being folded into DFAIT" (CCIC, 2013). The media continued to refer to the amalgamation as "doing away with CIDA", the "official disappearance" of CIDA, "CIDA's demise", "elimination", "takedown", "eradication" and "absorption" into DFAIT (Berthiaume, 2013; Wells, 2013; Levitz, 2013; Troilo, 2015; Munson, 2013; Mackrael, 2013). Some coverage focused on how difficult the amalgamation would be due to differences in the organizational cultures of the two "disparate" (Swiss, 2014) organizations – CIDA's organizational culture having been described as "idealistic", "values-based" and "dominated by leftists" (Bueckert, 2015; CIDA, 2009; Marten, in James, Michaud and O'Reilly, 2006), and DFAIT's organizational culture described as "cloistered", "conservative" and "risk averse" (Copeland, 2012 and 2014).

A minority remained optimistic about the change. In general, supporters believed that the amalgamation had "the potential for making a real difference", particularly in Canada's work abroad (Axworthy in Zilio, 2013; Berthiaume, 2013). Some argued that development assistance could play a critical role in the growth of emerging economies, and that fostering a closer link between international development and international trade could further that goal (Ingram, 2013). Another supporter compared CIDA and DFAIT employees to athletes, explaining that "if the teammates need to coordinate better, putting them in the same locker room is a logical step" (Gilmore, 2013). Some supporters argued that development assistance would gain a higher profile, given that the Minister responsible for international development would have his or her powers enshrined in law ("Federal budget folds CIDA into Foreign Affairs", 2013; Ravelo, 2013). However, others argued against this, highlighting that previously CIDA "enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy...because of its executive structure", while going forward the Prime Minister's Office would have "far greater control over the way development work gets done" (Mackrael, 2013).

Some commenting on the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT simply provided cautious warnings, indicating that the move could "tarnish Canada's international reputation" (Smillie, 2013), and reminded those in power how crucial it was "that long-term plans for development dollars not be trumped by business and diplomatic interests" (Takacs, 2013).

### **2.3 Client background**

The client for this project is the ADM for the Americas Branch at GAC (see Appendix F, Americas Branch organizational structure). The Branch is one of five geographic branches, and one of twenty branches that make up GAC (see Appendix G, GAC organizational structure, and Figure 2).


#### *Amalgamation 2.0*

Following the amalgamation announcement in March 2013, a new organizational structure was created, shared with employees in October 2013, and brought into effect on November 4, 2013. Within this structure, each geographic branch was instructed to undertake its own measures to implement amalgamation at the branch level. Most geographic branches organized in a way similar to that of the Americas Branch, which was to maintain separate Director Generals (DGs) based on streams: some DGs would focus on international development, while others would focus on foreign

policy and trade. However, the Africa Branch divided its parts geographically, with DGs for one region responsible for the work of all three streams. Over time, the Africa Branch model was shown to be more efficient and effective, encouraging coherence at a lower working level. The Americas Branch decided to implement changes to create a structure similar to that of the Africa Branch, and on July 1, 2016, “Amalgamation 2.0” was implemented, involving several adjustments aimed to further consolidate work within the political, trade and development “streams” of the branch.

The stated objectives of Amalgamation 2.0 are to provide benefits in areas such as more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, and coordination and consultation across streams. Changes associated with Amalgamation 2.0 affect employees working in the Latin America and Caribbean Bureaus and GAC employees who work on international development at missions in countries with an international development presence. Employees who work in the North America Bureaus of the Americas Branch are not affected by Amalgamation 2.0.

Figure 2: GAC organizational chart with project focus area highlighted



Source: GAC intranet

*The focus of this project*

This project will review and assess the Amalgamation 2.0 organizational change alongside various aspects of the larger, departmental amalgamation process to determine the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC. The project will be guided by an analytic framework, introduced in Figure 3, and presented in greater detail in Section 4. The analytic framework begins with the announcement of an amalgamation, progresses through factors that contribute to a successful organizational change, considers best practices for merging organizational cultures, and results in the desired state. The analytic framework is intended to be reviewed from left to right, in order to align with the time frame of organizational changes that occur in the public sector.

**Figure 3: Basic analytic framework guiding research**



### 3. METHODOLOGY

This research project is an exploratory study that utilises several qualitative research methods including a literature review; a review of organizational documents, messages, and webpages; a web-based survey that asks employees about various aspects of amalgamation and organizational culture within the department; and a review of other jurisdictions. The findings from these sources inform the options and recommendations that will be presented to the client. This section concludes with a review of methodological strengths, weaknesses, and risks.

#### 3.1 Secondary data collection

Secondary data collection includes two reviews: a literature review; and a review of internal documents, messages, and webpages relevant to the amalgamation process underway at GAC. The literature review includes books; journal, newspaper, and magazine articles; and research examining mergers that have brought together organizations with different organizational cultures. The purpose of the literature review is dual. First, it examines the broad spectrum of existing literature on organizational change and organizational culture, closely examining factors that have been associated with successful and unsuccessful organizational change processes. Secondly, the literature review identifies models and best practices for merging organizational cultures. This information is used as a basis to assess the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC.

##### *Internal documents*

The majority of information regarding internal steps taken on amalgamation is available on the departmental intranet. The most widely used methods of communication are “Broadcast messages”, which are short, written updates that provide information to employees; blog posts by Deputy Ministers; and an internal employee social networking site called “Agora”.

Reviewed internal materials include transcripts from in-person, departmental all-staff information meetings on Budget 2013 and the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation; transcripts of general information and update meetings held on amalgamation; general “Amalgamation Update” Broadcast Messages; and blog posts written by Deputy Ministers at various times throughout the amalgamation process.

Other internal documents reviewed include Corporate Risk Profiles from 2014-15 and 2015-16, and the “Jolicoeur report”, a third party assessment of the amalgamation that was drafted in March 2015 and released to employees in April 2016.

Various GAC intranet pages are devoted to amalgamation processes, such as an “IM/IT Amalgamation” web page that provides updates on the amalgamation of technological platforms used within the department, as well as a “GAC Workplace Integration” web page that focuses almost entirely on the relocation exercise that moved employees from 200 promenade du Portage in Gatineau, QC, the former headquarters of CIDA, to 125 Sussex Drive in Ottawa, ON, the former headquarters of DFAIT, or vice versa. Additionally, an internal employee social networking web site called “Agora” was thoroughly reviewed. Agora was launched in November 2013, eight months after amalgamation was announced, and was used to moderate employee discussions and debates in “groups” such as the “Voice-up and engagement” group, the “Departmental Consultative Group”, and the “Transition Team Messages” group. Topics such as a new departmental vision statement were discussed via groups in this platform.

*Publicly-available documents*

Publicly-available departmental documents that were reviewed include CIDA Departmental Performance Reports, DFAIT Departmental Performance Reports, and DFATD Reports to Parliament on Official Development Assistance.

**3.2 Primary data collection**

GAC Americas Branch employees working in the bureaus affected by Amalgamation 2.0 were invited to respond to an online survey via Survey Monkey for one week in June 2016. Only “Canada Based Staff” (i.e. Canadian employees of GAC located in Ottawa and abroad) were invited to participate in the survey. Approximately one-hundred employees impacted by Amalgamation 2.0 meet the criteria for those employees who were asked to participate in the survey (from entry-level political analysts, development officers and trade commissioners to Deputy Directors); two-thirds are former CIDA employees and one-third are former DFAIT employees. Two-thirds of those employees were asked to participate; purposive sampling was utilized to ensure that equal numbers of employees from the former CIDA and the former DFAIT were invited to participate (67 employees in total, or 44 of 64 eligible former CIDA employees and 23 of 37 eligible former DFAIT employees). All potential participants received an email in both French and English inviting them to participate. The email (see Appendix H, Email to potential research participants) included a description of the research project and information about anonymity and consent.

The survey (see Appendix I, Survey questions) included fifteen questions. Two multiple choice questions determined whether respondents had been employees of either CIDA or DFAIT before the amalgamation was announced, and the approximate length of time the employee had worked for either organization. Respondents were not asked to indicate their substantive level. Thirteen open-ended questions asked employees about their opinion on the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, about the benefits and drawbacks of amalgamation and Amalgamation 2.0, about ways in which employees could be supported as Amalgamation 2.0 is implemented in the Americas Branch, and about the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC. Neither names nor identifying information were requested in the survey.

Informal discussions with employees who were involved in employee-led initiatives to address organizational culture within the department were important in that they provided non-documented information and insight into “grassroots” and parallel approaches taken to address organizational culture in the amalgamation process.

Additionally, informal discussions with employees from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) informed the information included in section 7, Findings: Other Jurisdictions.

**3.3 Strengths, limitations, and risks**

A strength of this research project is its use of multiple sources and perspectives to review the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, which span a three-year time period: examining media coverage from the days, weeks and months following the announcement; reviewing internal documents, messages and web pages devoted to the amalgamation process; and gathering opinions of employees of both former organizations through an online survey and informal discussions.

The online survey was chosen as the most effective method to collect primary data and input from GAC employees in Ottawa and abroad as it ensures a wide range of employees’ opinions are heard and multiple organizational perspectives are represented, from those working in both Canada and in

the field; it minimizes the time commitment required of employees to participate; it allows employees to respond at a time that is convenient for them; and it ensures anonymity. The option to complete the survey in either French or English allowed employees to respond in the working language in which they feel most comfortable. Additionally, the various methods of data collection selected complemented each other and filled gaps in data received through other methods. For example, internal departmental documents and information found on the intranet complemented information and anecdotes provided in employees' survey responses.

A limitation of the use of an online survey as the primary data collection method is that follow-up questions cannot be asked of participants, which potentially limits depth of responses and eliminates the ability to "delve deeper", as could be done in an interview setting.

Any risk or potential harm to research participants or GAC was explored by the client and The University of Victoria's Human Research Ethics Board.

#### 4. FINDINGS: LITERATURE REVIEW & ELABORATED ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

This section provides a review of literature on organizational culture and organizational change. It also lays the foundation for the analytic framework guiding this study, which focuses on the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture is emerging at GAC between employees of the former CIDA and DFAIT organizations. Key areas of research that will be examined include the general concepts and definitions of “organizational culture” and “organizational change”, alongside various aspects of organizational culture and organizational change, including factors associated with successful and unsuccessful organizational change processes, and models or strategies that have been developed to assist organizations in successfully completing organizational change processes. Organizational change in the public sector versus the private sector will be examined, and best practice literature on bringing together organizations with different organizational cultures will be reviewed and discussed.

Research on organizational change demonstrates that between two-thirds and three quarters of mergers fail (Burnes, 2004, cited in Lundy and Morin, 2013, p. 47; Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.18), and some speculate that the “real reason” for such high failure rates could be “the failure to successfully integrate corporate cultures” (Stanwick, 2000, p.7). Literature on organizational change often examines various factors that contribute to both successful and unsuccessful organizational changes. Successful organizational changes are said to be implemented incrementally (Kotter, 1996, p.23), with “warming” or “readiness” periods (Armenakis, Harris and Mossholder, 1993, p.682) and well-informed employees who are given ample time to prepare (van den Heuvel, Schalk and van Assen, 2015, p.2), alongside the opportunity to provide input on or contribute to the change process (Lewin, 1961, and Coch and French, 1948, cited in Waddell and Sohal, 1998, p.546; Andersen, 2006, p.224; Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.516). Unsuccessful organizational changes, in general, are implemented in an opposite manner. In the literature review that follows, these factors will be presented against the organizational change undertaken to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT, with a particular focus on organizational culture during times of change.

This section begins by asking “what is organizational culture?” and “what is organizational change?” Following that, factors associated with successful and unsuccessful organizational change processes are examined. Next, organizational changes in the private sector versus the public sector are compared and contrasted. Then, various models of organizational change are presented, and finally, a detailed analytic framework that will guide the study is presented.

##### 4.1 What is organizational culture?

Organizational culture is a complex concept, with multiple and sometimes contradictory definitions. The term “organizational culture” was first used in 1979 by Andrew M. Pettigrew (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders, 1990), who suggested that organizational culture was not a unitary concept, but “the source of a family of concepts” such as symbol, language, ideology, belief, ritual and myth (Pettigrew, 1979, p.574). The ongoing study of organizational culture has contributed to literature and knowledge on the topic having acquired authority; however, the relevance and necessity of the notion of organizational culture is still, at times, questioned (Riad, 2005, p. 1534).

Research on organizational culture widely supports the *integration perspective*, the idea that organizational cultures exist and can be managed (Peters and Waterman, 1982, and Martin and Frost, 1996, in Parker and Bradley, 2000, p.127; Cavanaugh, 1996, p.46); however, most research examines organizational culture as static, not something that is “fluid, constantly being recreated and negotiated by participants” (Riad, 2005, p.1531). The primary contrast between varying definitions of organizational culture is with regards to the origin of culture within organizations.

Most definitions suggest that it is the individuals in an organization who create an organizational culture, while fewer suggest that it is actually an existing organizational culture that affects the way group members think, feel, and act (Smircich, 1983; Coghlan, 1994, p.19; Walsh, 2004, p.303). Organizational culture has been described as “the way members make sense of their experiences in [an] organization, [and] the way they define and interpret the situations they are in in order to be able to act in a meaningful way” (Bijlsma-Frankema. 2001, p.194). Other definitions reference deeply-embedded group assumptions, and assert that “culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual” (Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.512).

**Table 4: Three components of organizational culture**

Component	Definition	Examples
Assumptions	Taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, feelings	behaviours, usually unconscious
Values	Conscious strategies, goals, philosophies	rules of behaviour; how members represent the organization to themselves and others
Artifacts	Visible organizational structure and processes	clothing style, architecture, furniture, office jokes

Schein, E. (1987). *Process consultation, volume 2: Lessons for managers and consultants*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Schein (1987)’s model of organizational culture, referenced widely, describes three components of organizational culture: assumptions, values, and artifacts. *Values* are the aspect of organizational culture referred to in research most frequently, are said to constitute the organization’s philosophies and attitudes, and are consciously observed by members of an organizational culture (Schein, 1987; Parker and Bradley, p.127; Brown, Waterhouse and Flynn, 2003, p.239; Howard, 1998). *Assumptions* are the “taken for granted” aspects of a culture that become embedded and eventually disappear from awareness, while *artifacts* are described as the less significant and more easily altered aspects of a culture, for example, a typical clothing style. For the purposes of this research project, all three components will be considered under the broad heading of “organizational culture”.

The organizational cultures of CIDA and DFAIT have long been cited as vastly different by those inside and outside of the organizations, both before and after the organizations were amalgamated. The organizational culture of CIDA has been referred to as “idealistic”, “values-based”, and “dominated by leftists” (Bueckert, 2015; CIDA, 2009; Marten, cited in in James, Michaud and O’Reilly, 2006), while DFAIT’s organizational culture has been referred to as “cloistered”, “conservative”, and “risk averse” (Copeland, 2012 and 2014). Employees of the two organizations felt similarly; in an internal exercise conducted shortly after amalgamation was announced, employees brainstormed words and stereotypes they associate with the organizational cultures of the two former organizations. The organizational culture and employees of CIDA were described as “tree-huggers”, “disorganized”, “grassroots”, “self-righteous”, and “socially aware”, while the organizational culture and employees of DFAIT were described as “elitist”, “conservative”, “secretive”, “stuffy”, and “arrogant” (DFATD, 2015, Agora “corporate culture sub-group”).

Research recommends that those managing organizational changes to well-established work environments first understand the culture of the organization to consider whether the existing organizational culture should be maintained, and asserts that an understanding of the culture will assist in developing an appropriate change management strategy and help counter negative reactions to change (Kanter, 1992, in Parker and Bradley, 2000, p.126). During organizational change processes, changes to organizational culture normally lag behind structural changes, which can

contribute to friction between subcultures (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2001, p.193; Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.S81). Additionally, organizational change processes are said to be more difficult to complete successfully if pre-merger organizations have noticeably different organizational cultures (Cavanaugh, 1996, p.49), with Buono, Bowditch and Lewis claiming that “the full potency of organizational culture can be seen during a merger or acquisition when two divergent cultures are forced to become one” (1985, p.482). Various stakeholders involved in the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT estimated that the structural changes involved would take approximately one and a half to two years to complete, but that it would take anywhere from five to ten years for a new culture to form (Foster, 2013; Troilo, 2015; Jolicoeur Report, 2015).

#### 4.2 What is organizational change?

Organizational change is a phrase that defines a broad range of actions with varying degrees of impact. It includes changes that are relatively quick and easy to implement, or ones that can take place over years. An organizational change can involve one small adjustment to the way that one section of an organization functions, with little impact upon the functions of the larger organization, or can comprise massive and multiple changes to the mandate, vision, and daily work of all employees of a large organization. The organizational change process undertaken to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT is closest to the latter: it was announced as part of the 2013 federal budget, was a surprise to most employees, and was to be implemented almost immediately, impacting most of the almost 6,200 employees of the two organizations.

The majority of literature on organizational change focuses on best practices to prepare employees for change, and provides explanations for why change either succeeds or fails. Less of that literature focuses on changing an organizational culture, or of the impact that a change may have on organizational culture. Though some exists, even less literature examines the process of bringing together different organizational cultures to create a new organizational culture. Such literature that does exist primarily examines the impacts of organizational change upon organizational cultures during private sector mergers or acquisitions (Walker, 1998, p.83). There has been a recent and strengthened interest in examining human and cultural aspects of mergers to examine why they so often fail, since “traditional explanations are falling short in providing adequate explanations for phenomenal organizational change failure rates” (Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.19; Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.511). This research has begun to include an in-depth analysis of the culture or cultures of an organization.

Despite the high failure rate associated with organizational change, it is considered by some to be “a 21<sup>st</sup> century reality”, with many organizations in a state of constant change, adjusting to the newest technology or best way of operating, aiming to be the most efficient, and amending their work in response to the results of internal evaluations (Hornstein, 2010, p.4). Drawbacks to frequent or constant change include work environments characterized by poor cohesion, conflicts, bullying, and heavier than normal workloads (Andersen, 2006, p.216).

Coghlan’s (1994) research on organizational change identifies aspects of organizational life that require attention during change processes. *Public aspects* refer to what is concrete, planned and often obvious, such as the hierarchical structure or regular functions; and *informal aspects* refer to intangible features of an organization, such as the relationships between employees, the attitudes employees have about their work, and the culture of an organization (Coghlan, 1994, pp.18-19).

Employee reactions to the announcement of an organizational change can be “immensely varied”, ranging from enthusiasm to shock to grief (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.490; Cavanaugh, 1996, p.47). When change is announced, employees often develop stereotyped views of themselves

and selectively highlight the best aspects of their group, while perceiving only the worst parts of other group (Coghlan, 1994, p.20). Relevant to the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation process is Kavanagh and Ashkanasy (2006)’s observation of organizational changes that involve the merger of organizations of significantly different size. Their research demonstrated that when a size difference exists in organizations being merged, the organization with a smaller size pre-merger is more likely to respond negatively to change. This negative response can extend beyond the initial merger period and contribute to “them and us” feelings simmering between employees of the two organizations (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.86; Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.22).

**4.3 Organizational change: Failure and success factors**

Much of the existing research on organizational change delves into the various factors that contribute to both successful and unsuccessful organizational changes. Such factors include the “readiness” level of employees (Holt, Armenakis, Feild, and Harris, 2007, p.234; Armenakis et al., 1993, p.682); employee involvement in the change and level of support and information provided to them (Coch and French, 1948; van den Heuvel et al., 2015, p.2; Hornstein, 2010, p.1); employee trust in those leading and managing the change process (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.490); the amount of planning dedicated to the change process (Kotter, 1996, p.23); the amount of employee resistance to the change (Szabla, 2007, p.526); the personality of employees going through the change process (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.501; Andersen, 2006, p.218); and in cases of organizational change such as the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation, the compatibility of organizational cultures (Riad, 2005, p.1531).

Employees’ general readiness level for change and their initial reactions to a change process are often cited as important factors early in a change process, in that they can impact upon the outcome of other factors later in the process. Holt, Armenakis, Feild and Harris (2007, pp.236-237) define readiness for organizational change as a state that is “influenced by beliefs among employees that they are ready to implement a change, the change is appropriate, the leader provides support and is ready for the change, and the change is beneficial to the organization and its employees”, and posit that “a state of readiness” may reduce resistance to change, given that readiness for organizational change can be a precursor to resistance or support (p.234). Employees’ initial reactions to the announcement of a change are said to be influenced by factors such as whether or not they believe they have the key skills and competencies for their new role (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.490), as well as the extent to which they believe they will personally gain or lose from an organizational change (Erwin and Garman, 2010, p. 42).

**Table 5: Hypothetical readiness programs for various combinations of system readiness and urgency**

Conditions	Program	Salient characteristics
Low readiness/ low urgency	Aggressive	Persuasive communication. Active participation. External information. Change agent attributes.
Low readiness/ high urgency	Crisis	Persuasive communication.
High readiness/ low urgency	Maintenance	Persuasive communication. Active participation. External information.
High readiness/ high urgency	Quick response	Persuasive communication.

Armenakis, A. A., Harris, S. G., & Mossholder, K. W. (1993). Creating readiness for organizational change. *Human Relations*, 46(6), 681-703.

Armenakis et al. (1993, p.693) suggest that decisions about how and when to implement change should be guided by two considerations, employee readiness and the urgency of the change (see Table 5), and based on these two factors, a type of “change program” is recommended. In changes where employees have a low level of readiness, but there is “great urgency in implementing needed organizational changes”, Armenakis et al. suggest implementing a “crisis” change program, with persuasive and in-person communication techniques identified as the best ways to implement necessary changes (p. 693). They suggest an “aggressive” change programs for low readiness/low urgency situations, which includes persuasive communication, active employee involvement and participation, and the use of external information and personnel to guide the process (p.693).

Trust in leadership and management is a complex factor often cited as crucial to the success of an organizational change process. Research suggests managers must be skilled in change management processes to obtain employee trust (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.82), and should focus on “creating a supportive and trusting organizational culture” to gain change recipients’ support and cooperation in times of change (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.490; Shirley, 1973, in Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.516). Bijlsma-Frankema (2001, p.193) advises those managing change to follow a well-designed plan for cultural change alongside a well-designed plan for structural change, citing the former as a critical factor in the success of an organizational change process. Cavanaugh (1996, p.49) demonstrates leading organizational change is a major managerial challenge, but merging organizational cultures is a greater challenge.

Providing relevant and timely information presents a huge challenge to those managing change, as it is difficult to provide appropriate and sufficiently detailed information suitable for all staff needs, particularly in the midst of change (van den Heuvel et al., 2015, p.4). Furthermore, social supports and communication systems that are normally present within an organization are often put on hold until changes processes are completed (Andersen, 2006, p.218). Research demonstrates that a positive correlation exists between information received about change and openness to it (Erwin and Garman, 2010, p.45). It also shows that receiving information about a change process can alleviate resistance to it (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.516). Furthermore, Schraeder and Self (2003, p.516) and Schweiger and DeNisi (1991, p.110) explain that it is sometimes the lack of communication and uncertainty that causes stress for employees during times of organizational change, not the actual changes. Peterson (1991) believes that it is “virtually impossible to over-communicate” about change processes, and if “employees do not receive the information they need, they will simply make it up” (p.428). Effective methods of communication with employees during times of change can take many forms. Armenakis et al. (1993, p.688) recommend that the type of information provided should depend on the level of readiness of change recipients. Methods range in “richness” from “in-person” being the richest medium, to “written media” such as newsletters and annual reports being the least rich (p.688).

Coch and French (1948) argue that employee involvement is the most important factor in ensuring successful change, in that it significantly increases commitment to change and lowers employee resistance (Waddell and Sohal, 1998, p.546). Others suggest that active employee participation in an organizational change process results in an increased feeling of control over the change (Andersen, 2006, p.224), and that early employee involvement in a change process can assist in “forming mindsets [that bind] individuals to a course of action” (Hornung and Rousseau, 2007, p.404). Furthermore, consideration of employee inputs during organizational change processes is strongly correlated with employee perceptions of fairness, increased commitment to the decision and enhanced trust of change leaders (Schraeder and Self, 2003, p.516).

A less-easily managed factor associated with successful change processes is employee personalities; however, personalities that are deemed to be resilient have been found to be more “change oriented” (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.501).

Resistance is often cited as the “main obstacle to organizational change achievement” (Erwin and Garmin, 2010, in Lundy and Morin, 2013, p. 47, Szabla, 2007, p.526); however, it is highly unpredictable, as the same organizational change may evoke different reactions and oftentimes different types of resistance from different people. Lundy and Morin identify types of resistance to change such as active opposition, stubbornness, visible frustration, passive aggressiveness, complaining, saying one thing and doing another, and making oneself unavailable (2013, p.57). Coghlan (1994, p.19) demonstrates how teams can unite to resist change, and become stronger as a result. Some research on organizational change recognizes the potential benefits and opportunities presented by resistance to change, and suggests that it can play a crucial role in drawing attention to change that is inappropriate, not well-thought through or wrong (Waddell and Sohal, 1998, p.543). Research that highlights the useful aspects of resistance suggests that managers treat critical perspectives as constructive feedback rather than resistance (van den Heuvel et al., 2015, p.18).

**Table 6: Unintended consequences of organizations undergoing cultural transformations**

Unintended consequence	Description/example
Behavioural inversion	Preserving the status quo without the appearance of doing so; new behaviours become absorbed into the old
Disappointment and blame	Finger-pointing at others; when the “vibrant vision” articulated at the beginning of a change does not translate into reality
Polarized images	The “old” that is being discarded is demonized, not recognized as a blend of good and bad
Ambivalent authority	Managers’ power is “undermined by their own rhetoric”, encouraging a collaborative change process but still seeking authority to define change outcomes

Gilmore, T.N., Shea, G.P., Useem, M. (1997). Side effects of corporate cultural transformations. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 33(2), 174-189.

Regardless of the level of planning involved in organizational changes, unintended consequences can result. Gilmore, Shea, and Useem (1997) identify four negative and unintended consequences associated with organizational changes that involve cultural change, which include behavioural inversion, disappointment and blame, polarized images and ambivalent authority (see Table 6). More generally, negative outcomes of change processes are numerous, and include reduced loyalty, trust; cynicism, fatigue, burnout; turnover or intention to leave the organization; counterproductive work behaviour; anxiety and stress (Doyle, Claydon and Buchanan, 2000, p.71; Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, pp.496-500).

**4.4 Organizational change: Public sector vs. private sector**

Some research asserts that the public sector experiences greater difficulties in implementing change than the private sector, and attribute this to several interconnected reasons. Changes in the public sector often involve a larger numbers of employees and are implemented suddenly, with little or no readiness or “warming” period, which is more likely to encounter resistance (Kotter, 1996, p.20). The unique environment of the public sector, which includes the high level of pressure to succeed, perform, and quickly return to ‘business as usual’, with little time to reflect and adjust, also makes organizational change in the public sector more difficult to implement. Additionally, public sector

organizational changes can be far more complex, with changes that alter the status quo and imply “a shift in paradigms”. Such changes are more complicated, require a greater time investment, and are more likely to face hostility (Hornstein, 2010, pp. 3-4; Lundy and Morin, 2013, p.46). For public sector employees, organizational changes can create stress and confusion between their known way of being a “good” public servant, and what is expected of them after the change, which is often unknown (McDonough and Polzer, 2012, p.357).

Furthermore, changes made in the public sector are less well-monitored and coordinated than in the private sector (Doyle, Claydon and Buchanan, 2000, p.S66). Table 7 outlines results from a survey of managers, differentiating between responses of public sector managers and private sector manager. Managers from the public sector have more negative feelings toward organizational change than do managers from the private sector, often do not perceive change as beneficial, are not given adequate time to learn from past change processes, believe that they are not provided adequate time to adjust to organizational changes, and are “just tired of constant change” (Doyle, Claydon and Buchanan, 2000, p.S68). Such additional pressures mean that public organizations are more likely to lose valuable knowledge and experience when frustrated employees leave (Schuler and Jackson, 2001).

**Table 7: Survey results of management organizational change experience**

Statement	Private sector % agree	Public sector % agree
We have a senior manager responsible for monitoring the many change initiatives running at any one time.	46	23
Middle managers in my organization are disillusioned with constant change.	34	57
We think of ourselves as a learning organization in which lessons from change are captured to inform future decisions.	73	51
Change has encouraged us to develop more explicitly defined procedures for learning from our experiences.	58	39
We select managers to handle change on the basis of ‘who’s free’ rather than on track record and change experience.	22	49
We tend to repeat our mistakes in implementing change because there was no time to learn from what happened in the past.	41	61
The people we have lost as a result of change have taken much valuable knowledge and experience with them.	46	57
We don’t have the luxury of time to pause and reflect on what we’ve done in change.	39	65
The pace of change is ‘burning out’ many middle managers in my organization.	27	65
Change has been perceived as so widely beneficial that people are expecting more.	39	14
When introducing major changes, we give the people affected adequate time to adjust.	29	6
‘Flexibility’ has simply meant ‘work harder’.	34	71
Lots of people are just tired of constant change.	46	80

Doyle, M., Claydon, T., & Buchanan, D. (2000). Mixed results, lousy process: The management experience of organizational change. *British Journal of Management*, 11(1), S59-S80.

**4.5 Models of organizational change**

A wide spectrum of models, guidelines, and approaches to organizational change exists; some consider the broad topic of organizational change, while others are much more specific, proposing best practices for merging organizations with different organizational cultures. Some outline

detailed, multi-step processes that managers must follow for organizational change, while others describe in general terms the key factors (such as those discussed in the sections above) that contribute to the success or failure of an organizational change, and how to include or avoid them.

The primary difference observed between general models of organizational change and models that focus on merging organizations with different organizational cultures is the presence of a pre-planning or pre-assessment period. This step is recommended for changes that involve merging organizations with “disparate” organizational cultures (Swiss, 2014); suggested pre-planning or pre-assessment tools include baseline surveys and organizational assessments or “cultural audits”. Kurt Lewin’s (1952) model of change is often referred to as “the origin of the planned change approach” and includes the general steps of “unfreeze, transition, refreeze” (Lundy and Morin, 2013, p.45). While Lewin’s model has been used as a basis for more recent organizational change models, later research on Lewin’s model determined that it was appropriate for small, predictable organizational change processes and less appropriate for large, complex changes. In 1961, Chin and Benne presented three fundamental strategies for leading planned change (cited in Szabla, 2007), all of which consider the underlying assumptions about how society functions, and from that identify selection factors to determine the most useful strategy. Szabla’s review of various organizational change strategies developed since 1961 demonstrates that the “theory behind each identified strategy could be linked back to one of Chin and Benne’s initial strategies” (2007, p. 529).


Kotter’s (1996) popular “Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change” has been cited frequently since the mid-1990s as a process that has guided various organizational change processes. It instructs change leaders to “establish a sense of urgency; create the guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision, empower broad-based action; generate short-term wins; consolidate gains and produce more change; and institutionalize new approaches in the culture” (1996, p.21).

Walker (1998) focuses specifically on organizational changes that bring together different organizational cultures in his “8 Critical Steps to Success” model. This model instructs change leaders to “create a clear, compelling rationale for the merger, acquisition, consolidation or restructuring; communicate how it will be implemented; identify ingrained behaviours that might be obstacles to change; learn and leverage strengths from the consolidating companies; involve employees in helping manage the process; take appropriate opportunities to honour the past; celebrate small victories; and measure progress at regular intervals” (Walker, 1998, p. 87). He also stresses the importance of conducting an organizational assessment before the change process begins, or, “if it’s already in progress, before beginning the serious, hands-on work of integration” (p.84). Stanwick (2000) recommends that a similar “cultural audit” be undertaken before organizational cultures are merged (p.8), which he claims will help to identify areas of agreement and conflict between organizations before they are brought together. Similarly, Schweiger and DeNisi (1991) recommend that a baseline survey be administered to all employees before a change process is announced (p.116).

#### **4.6 Theory and elaborated analytic framework**

The analytic framework presented in Figure 8 integrates the main factors and considerations involved in a successful organizational change process. It begins with the announcement of an amalgamation, progresses through factors that contribute to a successful organizational change, considers best practices for merging organizational cultures, and results in the desired state. The analytic framework is intended to be reviewed from left to right, in order to align with the time frame of organizational changes that occur in the public sector.

**Figure 8: Analytic framework of desired state**



**4.7 Conclusion: Analytic framework based on literature review**

The reviewed literature identifies seven factors that contribute to a successful organizational change process. These factors include information provision and communication; leadership and trust in leadership; employee input and participation; employee readiness; pre-planning; cultural compatibility; and employees’ personalities. Some of these factors and their impact on organizational change success have been studied comprehensively, while other factors, in particular employee personalities, have been studied to a far lesser extent. Based largely on these identified factors, models or guidelines for creating successful organizational change processes have been developed, some of which consider the broad topic of organizational change, while others are much more specific and outline detailed, multi-step processes.

The analytic framework derived from the reviewed literature provides a basis against which findings in Sections 5, 6 and 7 will be compared. These findings will then be summarized in Section 8, which reviews all of the findings together.

## 5. FINDINGS: INTERNAL AMALGAMATION INITIATIVES

This section provides background information on internal amalgamation steps taken to date to bring together the former CIDA and former DFAIT to create DFATD, now GAC, from shortly after the amalgamation was announced on March 21, 2013, to present day. Most information provided to employees regarding the process of amalgamation has been posted to the departmental intranet. Communication via the intranet takes various forms, the most widely-used being “Broadcast messages”, which are short, written updates that provide information to employees; blog posts by Deputy Ministers; and an internal employee social networking site called “Agora”. Another important communication tool has been the all-staff meeting. Transcripts of these meetings have been made available on the departmental intranet.

As of early June 2016, no information about the amalgamation process remained on the main intranet landing page; however, a search of “amalgamation” returned 381 results and a wide range of materials.

**Table 9: Internal amalgamation initiatives**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Amalgamation initiative</b>
March 2013	Amalgamation announced
March 2013	Information session/all-staff meetings on CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation
March 2013	Senior officials undertake “Amalgamation Study Tour”
April 2013	Creation of External Advisory Group
May 2013	Creation of Transition Team
June 2013	Departmental intranet launched
October 2013	All-staff meeting; organizational chart and mission statement released
November 2013	New structure, announced in October 2013, comes into effect
November 2013	Agora launched
November 2013	Departmental Consultative Group formed
January 2014	Transition Team concludes work; submits report
April 2014	External Advisory Group meets for the final time
April 2014	Amalgamation update provided; Change Management Plan released
spring 2014	Departmental Consultative Group presents findings to Deputy Ministers
October 2014	Deputy Minister blog post update on amalgamation
May 2015	Updated organizational chart released
March 2015	Jolicoeur Report drafted (released in April 2016)
December 2015	“Bold ideas fund” launch (Blueprint 2020 initiatives)
April 2016	“Culture wall” launch (Blueprint 2020 initiatives)

### 5.1 Internal amalgamation steps

From early on in the process, departmental communication on the amalgamation referenced the different cultures of CIDA and DFAIT. Later communication often referenced the importance of a collaborative culture to an organization. Additionally, a number of internal initiatives undertaken throughout the process of amalgamation have focused on organizational culture, or have recognized organizational culture as an important aspect of the amalgamation process. No explicit definition has been provided as to what an “ideal” organizational culture would look like at GAC; however, senior officials have frequently made reference to the importance of the three main areas of work of the department, and “drawing on the coordinated talent” and “leverag(ing) the assets” of all three streams of the department (DFATD, 2014, “From the Deputies’ Desks”).

*Immediate steps taken*

Shortly after the amalgamation was announced, senior departmental officials embarked on an “Amalgamation Study Tour”, visiting countries that had amalgamated their foreign affairs and development department in order to review the experiences of these countries and to help guide Deputy Ministers through the change processes required (Jolicoeur report, 2015).

On March 27, 2013, less than one week after amalgamation was announced, all Deputy Ministers from both former organizations hosted two all-staff “Information Session(s) on Budget 2013 and (the) CIDA/DFAIT Amalgamation” – one at CIDA headquarters and one at DFAIT headquarters. Very little specific information on the amalgamation process was provided, but transcripts show that Deputy Ministers disputed information that had been presented in the media, stressing that the amalgamation of the two organizations was “not a takeover of one department by another...it is intended to be a coming-together of two organizations to create a new department” (Rosenberg in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Budget 2013”). At this meeting, Deputy Ministers also identified what would be important as the amalgamation progressed, such as “respect for traditions and cultures which are quite different but need to be valued”, and “respect for the strengths, the best practices, [and] the excellence that these two departments can leverage and bring to the new equation” (Biggs in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Budget 2013”).

In late April 2013, Deputy Ministers announced the creation of an External Advisory Group, a group of experts brought together to provide advice and guidance on the amalgamation process (Jolicoeur report, 2015). In May 2013, Deputy Ministers announced the creation of an internal Transition Team, a group of employees from the former CIDA and the former DFAIT, from various substantive levels, who would identify and lead on departmental issues related to amalgamation (Jolicoeur report, 2015).

*Steps taken within year one*

In June 2013 a new departmental intranet was launched, and in November 2013, the internal employee social networking site, Agora, was launched (Jolicoeur report, 2015). Agora soon became the primary online location for employees to discuss amalgamation. Around the same time that the new web platforms were launched, the amalgamation of human resources and information management and technology processes began.

All-staff meetings were held at both CIDA and DFAIT headquarters in late October 2013 and provided significantly more, detailed information that had not been available during the first all-staff meetings held in March 2013. At these meetings a DFATD organizational chart and vision statement were presented, documents that Deputy Ministers announced “highlight the collaborative work culture that (they are) intended to foster” (DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Amalgamation”). During one of those meetings, a Deputy Minister identified that “the biggest challenge... (of amalgamation is) forging an open, collaborative culture of working together” (Boehm in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Amalgamation”), while another Deputy Minister highlighted that the key to amalgamation success is “to work in a very cooperative manner (and) to build a culture whereby we basically learn to value the inputs of ...the three very broad streams that now make up this department” (Rochon in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Amalgamation”).

Two weeks later, on November 4, 2013, the new DFATD organizational structure came into effect (DFATD, 2014). Later that month, a Departmental Consultative Group was formed, which was comprised of approximately one hundred employees from both former organizations (Jolicoeur

report, 2015). Sub-committees within the group were assigned specific areas of study, such as “the organizational culture sub-group” (Agora, 2016; information gathered during informal conversation). Before the group met for the final time in spring 2014, they presented their findings and recommendations to the Deputy Ministers, one of which was to focus on employee collaboration over the short- to medium-term as a way in which to encourage a departmental organizational culture. The sub-group defined collaboration as sharing information broadly; working alongside others with diverse views; adopting multidisciplinary teams and approaches; undertaking effective consultations; and proactively supporting each other’s work in line with shared departmental goals and vision (Agora, 2016; information gathered during informal conversation).

Between January and April 2014, the Transition Team concluded their work and issued a final report on their amalgamation recommendations, and the External Advisory Group met for the last time (Jolicoeur report, 2015). Final reports from these teams were not shared with employees.

#### *Steps taken after year one*

An April 2014 Broadcast Message from Deputy Ministers to employees reinforced the Deputy Ministers’ stated end goal of a “truly collaborative corporate culture” within the department. The message indicated that employee input and contributions since the October 2013 meeting had been “central to the progress” made to date on amalgamation. Alongside the message, an “Amalgamation Change Management Plan” was released (see Appendix J, DFATD amalgamation change management plan), outlining how “tools”, “processes” and “people” will be amalgamated to realize the new departmental vision. The message also announced that an updated organizational chart, which included “refinements” made to it since its original release in October 2013, would be issued imminently; however, the release of that organizational chart was delayed significantly and not shared with employees until the spring of 2015 (DFATD, 2015).

In October 2014, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs provided updates on amalgamation in an informal way in a blog post entitled “Amalgamation and restoring ‘normality’” (DFATD, 2014, “From the Deputies’ Desks”). He outlined progress on various stages of the amalgamation, and discussed how the department is “learning to integrate and leverage all the assets that are now at our disposal to deliver on our many priorities”. This blog post also made reference to the challenges of bringing together the work of the three streams of the department, indicating that “we must also be honest that bringing...coherence to the various vectors of foreign affairs, international trade and development requires more than putting the right amalgamated structure in place and a few months of cohabitation”. He mentioned the importance of being able to “draw on the coordinated talent of our new amalgamated department to make a difference”, and discussed the “relevant expertise and history of achievements” that each stream has brought to the new, amalgamated department. The Deputy Minister summarized his message indicating that there remained a lot of work to be done: “if amalgamation is a journey, we are still at an early stage, but thanks to you, we have been able to both run the trains on time during a rather intense period and still make inroads with regard to how best to advance Canadian interests in our new amalgamated world” (Jean in DFATD, 2014, “From the Deputies’ Desks”).

Throughout the amalgamation process, Agora was utilized by many interested employees; however, the majority of employee comments on amalgamation were posted in 2013. Agora groups were created that focused on amalgamation questions, concerns, discussions, and initiatives, such as the “Voice-up and engagement” group, the “Departmental Consultative group” and a group dedicated to providing “transition team messages”. The most-discussed thread in the “Voice-up and engagement” group focused on the new vision for the department, which was put up for discussion

among employees. Employees proposed additions and changes that they felt would better reflect the departmental vision. A summary of employee consultations on amalgamation was also posted on this group. “Culture” emerged as a main topic of discussion, and employees commented that “improving the culture of collaboration is critical”, and that leadership, protecting values, trust, and communication are important aspects of organizational culture in the department (Agora, 2016).

In March 2015, a third-party assessment of progress on amalgamation called the “Jolicoeur report” was completed; however, the report was not shared with employees until April 2016. The report was drafted by a former senior federal public servant, and informed by 24 interviews with mostly senior level departmental employees, alongside a review of internal steps taken on amalgamation. The report indicates that a “very deep integration”, which might create a completely new organizational culture, is not being pursued, rather, a less-deep integration is being pursued given the complexity of work undertaken in the department. The report explains that deep integration can occur in some areas of the department, in particular geographic areas, while other areas of the department require less-deep integration, due to the “lack of symmetry between different parts of the organization (Jolicoeur Report, 2015).

The report breaks down the amalgamation process into four phases. The first phase focused on the first few months of amalgamation, where early concerns about amalgamation from “the CIDA side” were highlighted (Jolicoeur report, 2015). The second phase focused on the creation of internal and external groups to assist with amalgamation processes. The primary amalgamation activity of the third phase was the physical relocation of employees. The report was written during the third phase, which was estimated would continue until the fall of 2015. The report suggests that the fourth phase “will involve the more difficult cultural change and will easily take five to ten years” to complete; however, recognizes that cultural change occurs more rapidly at the senior levels. In the section entitled “The remaining challenges”, recommendations for future work are presented. “The most important next step” identified in the report is to “consider the use of a single classification group for most of [the department’s] operational positions”. The other recommendations are to explore the “possibility of innovation offered by the development and trade theme” and to put a mechanism in place “to maintain the focus on cultural change” (Jolicoeur Report, 2015).

Departmental Corporate Risk Profiles for 2014-15 and 2015-16 identified amalgamation as a “limited” but “likely” risk. The 2014-15 report identified that “challenges in developing a new corporate culture and adapting to new roles and responsibilities could affect the department’s effectiveness” and the 2015-16 report stated that “DFATD’s amalgamation brought about a changed environment that continues to require managers to...develop a new corporate culture in order to effectively achieve the new roles and responsibilities of a fully amalgamated department” (DFATD, 2015 and 2016).

#### *“Blueprint 2020” initiatives*

While not directly linked to departmental amalgamation initiatives, internal activities undertaken in the winter of 2015 and spring of 2016 as part of the Government of Canada’s “Blueprint 2020” have focused on organizational culture, collaboration, and innovation. Blueprint 2020 is an initiative devised by the Privy Council Office to consult federal public servants on how to improve performance and value of the public service to Canadians, with a vision of creating a “world class public service” (PCO, 2016, “Harnessing the power of Blueprint 2020”). In December 2015, a departmental “bold ideas fund” was announced as part of Blueprint 2020 (GAC, 2015). Employees were asked to submit creative project ideas that would help “foster collaboration across streams, missions and regional offices, and government departments and agencies” to help the department “modernize its approaches, be an awesome place to work, and engage across the Government of

Canada and with Canadians” (GAC, 2015). In April 2016, a “culture wall” was created at GAC headquarters, providing a space where employees could write words or ideas on a wall to “creatively express the organizational culture they want to see in [the] department” (GAC, 2016). Instructions for the culture-wall explained that the contributions would be analysed, common themes would be shared with senior management, and a “meaningful dialogue” would be pursued regarding how to advance a collectively-envisioned culture (GAC, 2016).

#### *Definition of a collaborative organizational culture?*

While the issue, importance, and challenges of “forging an open, collaborative culture of working together” has been raised frequently by senior officials since early on in the amalgamation process, officials have been less clear with regards to what an “ideal” GAC organizational culture would look like (Boehm in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Amalgamation”). Since the amalgamation was announced, a number of internal initiatives have focused on organizational culture, or recognized organizational culture as an important aspect of the amalgamation process. However, these initiatives and communications have not defined what a GAC organizational culture could or should look like. Senior officials have, however, frequently referenced the importance, differences and complementary value of each of the three streams of the department.


#### *Links to change models & analytic framework*

Throughout the amalgamation process, neither an explicit timeline nor a model for organizational change has been provided to employees; however, the reviewed internal communications have provided insight into the organizational change model potentially being followed by those leading the change. The internal amalgamation steps taken thus far bear a similarity to Kotter’s (1996) popular “Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change”, which does not consider organizational culture until the final step of the process. Additionally, the changes implemented to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT have been undertaken incrementally, which is in line with the majority of best practice literature on accomplishing successful organizational change (Kotter, 1996, p.23).

Incremental implementation has meant that many internal initiatives of the greater amalgamation process have followed their own timelines and experienced stages similar to those outlined in the analytic framework, beginning with an announcement, which meets support or resistance, and then encounters factors that will contribute to the success or failure of the initiative. Incremental implementation has contributed to a cycle in which some amalgamation initiatives have been completed successfully, while others are only beginning, such as the changes involved with Amalgamation 2.0 in the Americas Branch. Such slow and steady changes mean that many employees have cycled through various stages of amalgamation “completion” in different aspects of their work (see Figure 10).

Specific amalgamation initiatives such as Amalgamation 2.0, as well as employee perceptions regarding “completeness” of amalgamation, will be discussed further in Sections 7 and 8, Survey Findings and Discussion.

**Figure 10: Recurring cycle of amalgamation “completeness”**



## 6. FINDINGS: OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In the years before and after the Canadian government chose to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT, other countries merged their foreign affairs and international development departments, some citing cost savings and “streamlined” aid delivery as the justification for doing so (Ingram and Bhushan, 2013; Troilo, 2015; “DAC members”, 2015). This section reviews the integration of Australia’s Agency for International Development (AusAID) into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and derives key lessons from that experience. Requests were made to obtain information on similar structural changes with other jurisdictions, Germany and the Netherlands; however, requests for information were not acknowledged.

### 6.1 Australia’s amalgamation of AusAID into DFAT

In October 2013, AusAID was integrated into DFAT, just seven months after the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT was announced. Australia’s approach to the “integration” was to split up existing AusAID structures and “sprinkle (their) component parts” throughout the larger DFAT structure (White in Troilo, 2015).

Two weeks after being elected Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott indicated that integration of the two organizations would proceed to avoid Australia’s “diplomacy going in one direction and...aid program going in another direction” (Abbott in Troilo, 2015). Australian international development experts quickly expressed “concern” and “dismay” about the potential negative impacts the change could have on the delivery of aid abroad, citing the competing objectives of international development and foreign policy, and calling the amalgamation a “short-sighted decision” that would “have massive and devastating effects on Australia’s aid program and on...people living in poverty” (“AusAID to be absorbed into Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade”, 2013). Employees voiced concern that their jobs would be cut, particularly given that the Prime Minister had also indicated that the integration was being undertaken to “cut ‘duplication and waste’ across the public service” (“AusAid absorbed into DFAT”, 2013).

Before the integration of DFAT and AusAID, the two organizations were described as having significantly different cultures. In 2013, DFAT was described by a long-time employee as a “monastic brotherhood” of primarily white male employees. AusAID had a much more diverse workforce of individuals, many of whom were led by ideological pursuit of “making the world a better place”. Before the integration, the workplace atmospheres of the two organizations were regarded as quite different: AusAID’s budget had grown and the organization had placed a focus on staff well-being, whereas DFAT had been instructed over consecutive years to “tighten their belts” and identify ways to save costs (informal conversation with DFAT employees, 2016).

The integration announcement came as a surprise to employees of both organizations, yet work to integrate the organizations began almost immediately. Their respective leads brought all employees together and candidly informed employees that the integration was happening, and described how it would take place. Soon after the announcement, a “change management and integration task force” was struck, with various focus areas led by senior departmental officials. Operational changes in HR, payroll and IT began immediately. Because former DFAT and AusAID headquarters had been located in two different Canberra neighbourhoods, employee relocation began within a few months, and was completed in just over one year (informal conversation, 2016).

Approximately two years after AusAID was integrated into DFAT, an Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey was undertaken by the Australian National University’s Development Policy Centre, which sought input on perceptions of Australia’s aid policies from international development stakeholders.

The results of the survey were contrasted against results from 2013, and showed that 75 per cent of those surveyed indicated that the merger with the DFAT has negatively impacted aid effectiveness, and believed there had been a decline in aid effectiveness from 2013 to 2015 (“Perceived decline in Australia’s aid program”, 2016). However, public service employee surveys showed contrasting results. AusAID employees surveyed immediately after the integration announcement indicated they were initially upset about the integration and associated changes to their work, and only 33% felt “part of the (DFAT) team” (Troilo, 2015), yet results from later surveys suggested that former AusAID employees’ opinions had changed and were more generally content as employees of DFAT (informal conversation, 2016).

Since shortly after integration was announced, DFAT’s “change management and integration task force” worked to integrate the two organizations by championing various initiatives that aimed to improve upon weaknesses within the department, which had previously been identified through an Australian Public Service review of organizational capabilities. Each of the seven areas identified as requiring improvement, such as “leadership”, “communication”, “collaboration and engagement”, and “organizational culture”, is led by a senior official who ensures that initiatives focus less on the former organizations and more on collaborative improvement of all employees of the new DFAT (informal conversation, 2016).

## **6.2 Other foreign governments’ departmental structures**

Similar to Canada, most major donor countries do not deliver aid through one organization or channel. French, Spanish, and American international development assistance is delivered through six, seven, and fifteen different departments, respectively. Until recently, Germany’s international development assistance was delivered by three large agencies. In 2011, those agencies were merged into one larger agency, with the goal of “driv[ing] efficiencies and increas[ing] the profile of international development” (Ingram and Bhushan, 2013).

The Danish aid agency, or DANIDA, had operated independently for decades, but in 1990, it was brought into Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990. Similarly, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) is a government agency located within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“DAC members”, 2016).

Despite reorganizations, integrations, and amalgamations, cost savings are not always guaranteed when international development and foreign affairs departments are combined. Since it was brought into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the amount of money spent on Danish aid has increased, as have the administrative costs of delivering aid (Ingram and Bhushan, 2013). Furthermore, the administrative costs of delivering development assistance are not lower in other donor countries whose international development departments work within their foreign affairs departments, such as in Canada, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland. Those countries that have aid agencies separate from foreign affairs departments, such as the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and France, all spend less on the administrative costs of delivering aid than do those countries whose international development departments work within their foreign affairs departments.

## **6.3 Australia-Canada comparison**

Several similarities and differences exist between the Canadian and Australian examples. Media accounts of the AusAID-DFAT integration demonstrate that the justification to amalgamate the organizations was similar to that of Canada (Abbott in Troilo, 2015; “AusAID absorbed into DFAT”, 2013). Additionally, international development experts in Australia quickly expressed

“concern” and “dismay” about the potential negative impacts the integration could have on the delivery of aid abroad (“AusAID absorbed into DFAT”, 2013).

In the lead up to the amalgamation and integration announcements, the described workplace atmospheres of Canadian and Australian organizations were different. CIDA had experienced job losses, which left many employees concerned and stressed, and both CIDA and DFAIT budgets had been cut. In the lead up to the integration of AusAID into DFAT, AusAID’s budget had grown, employees had been hired, and AusAID had placed a focus on staff well-being; however, DFAT had been instructed over consecutive years to “tighten their belts” and identify ways to save costs.

Different from the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, the integration of AusAID into DFAT started with all employees belonging to the same staffing classification. Also different was that early written and verbal communication provided DFAT and AusAID employees with candid information regarding the integration, describing how it would take place. Shortly afterward, a “change management and integration task force” consisting of senior departmental officials was struck to implement the changes, and 14 months after the announcement, all former DFAT and AusAID employees were relocated to work within the same building as their new teams. Such information was provided to CIDA and DFAIT employees at a later stage in the amalgamation process.

Finally, while the changes to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT have taken an incremental approach, most major and structural changes to integrate AusAID into DFAT took place all at once. Thus, the recurring cycle of amalgamation “completeness” outlined in Figure 10 does not apply as easily to the Australian experience as it does to the Canadian experience. Section 9, Discussion, will outline in greater detail the general sense within DFAT that the integration of AusAID into DFAT is complete, and that a collaborative organizational culture has emerged.

## 7. SURVEY FINDINGS

This section reports on findings from a web-based survey distributed to select employees of the Americas Branch of GAC affected by Amalgamation 2.0. First, the survey sample is described to put findings in context. Next, main topics and themes from the survey responses are highlighted, and comparisons of the responses of former CIDA and former DFAIT employee are described (see also Appendix K, Summary of key survey findings, and Appendix I, Survey questions). Many survey questions asked employees for their personal opinions, so the summary of survey responses may not be generalizable to all GAC employees affected by Amalgamation 2.0.

### 7.1 Survey sample

Approximately one-hundred employees impacted by Amalgamation 2.0 meet the criteria for those employees who were asked to participate in the survey (“Canada Based Staff” [i.e. Canadian employees of GAC located in Ottawa and abroad], from entry-level political analysts, development officers and trade commissioners to Deputy Directors), two-thirds being former CIDA employees and one-third former DFAIT employees.

The survey was distributed to 67 of those approximately one-hundred employees (44 former CIDA employees and 23 former DFAIT employees), and the sample includes 36 surveys completed surveys. Of the approximately one-hundred eligible employees, the survey was not distributed to those who were away from the office for various reasons (on official travel, holiday, or other leave). Of the remaining eligible employees, a proportional amount of employees were selected from each country or regional program, and from each level of employee whose inputs were sought. Response rates from former CIDA and former DFAIT employees were similar: 23 of 44 former CIDA employees responded (52 %), while 13 of 23 former DFAIT employees responded (57 %) for a 54% overall response rate. Respondents were not asked to indicate their substantive level, but were asked about the length of time they had been working for either organization when the amalgamation was announced.

**Table 11: Survey respondents by previous length of employment**

<b>Length of employment pre-amalgamation</b>	0-5 years	5-10 years	10-15 years	15+ years
<b>Per cent distribution of respondents</b>	23%	27%	38%	12%

Just over a third of respondents had worked for either CIDA or DFAIT for ten to fifteen years when amalgamation was announced in March 2013; followed by twenty-seven per cent who had worked for one of the organizations for five to ten years. Almost one quarter of respondents had worked for one of the organizations for zero to five years, while twelve per cent had worked for one of the organizations for fifteen or more years. Respondents described in Table 11 are proportionally split among former CIDA and former DFAIT employees (i.e. approximately two-thirds of respondents in each group were employees of the former CIDA, while approximately one-third of respondents in each group were employees of the former DFAIT).

### 7.2 Key survey findings

Survey responses provide detailed accounts of respondents’ lived experiences of and their opinions regarding the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT to date. Responses describe the successes and challenges that employees have faced during the general amalgamation process, as well as during

specific amalgamation initiatives. They also outlined the benefits and drawbacks of working in an amalgamated department. Finally, they provided suggestions about how amalgamation and Amalgamation 2.0 can be supported going forward, and suggestions for developing a collaborative organizational culture within the department.

#### *Employees' early reactions to amalgamation*

Survey responses indicate that former CIDA and former DFAIT employees had significantly different reactions to the amalgamation announcement. Thirteen of twenty-three respondents from the former CIDA described the amalgamation as a “shock”, and expressed that after the amalgamation was announced, they experienced feelings of surprise, sadness, and apprehension. Several respondents discussed their concern about the “loss of the CIDA brand”. Over one-third (eight of twenty-three respondents) indicated they were worried that CIDA would be “swallowed by DFAIT” and that international development would “take a back seat” to foreign policy and trade. While a few former CIDA employees expressed excitement about the change and felt that it had the potential to create “increased collaboration” and “new employment experiences”, approximately one-quarter of respondents from the former CIDA (six of twenty-three respondents) referenced other stresses they were experiencing associated with the 2012 Deficit Reduction Action Plan (DRAP). One respondent indicated that employees “were still reeling from the (job) cuts” of DRAP when amalgamation was announced.

The survey responses of former DFAIT employees described more positive and optimistic reactions to amalgamation. Seven of the thirteen respondents described the amalgamation as a “good idea” or “great idea”; others indicated that it was “long overdue” and that it “could facilitate even greater alignment” of the organizations’ work, “harmoniz[ing] our action and break[ing] the silos”.

Eight of thirteen respondents from the former DFAIT indicated that there had been no change to their work or workplace atmosphere following the amalgamation. In contrast, twenty of twenty-three respondents from the former CIDA indicated that their work changed significantly following the amalgamation announcement, and that the atmosphere at their workplace was negative, with employees who were “worried”, “depressed”, “concerned”, “anxious”, and felt “betrayed”.

Approximately two-thirds of respondents from both the former CIDA and the former DFAIT indicated that the reasons for amalgamation were understood by employees, but were not necessarily well-communicated. Employees who described their understanding of the justification for amalgamation indicated that the change was undertaken to “increase synergies”, to “create efficiencies”, “increase policy coherence” and to encourage “better collaboration abroad”. Three of the thirteen respondents from the former DFAIT indicated awareness that the organizational change process could be challenging. Four former CIDA employees and three former DFAIT employees indicated change fatigue, suggesting that they were tired of constant change.

#### *Benefits and drawbacks of amalgamation*

Former CIDA employees indicated that one drawback of amalgamation was the changes made to their commonly used technological systems and processes in the months after the announcement. Six of twenty-three respondents from the former CIDA referenced constantly changing IM/IT platforms and a “slow evolution that favoured ex-DFAIT systems over ex-CIDA”. Former DFAIT employees did not express the same frustrations regarding early amalgamation changes. The majority of former DFAIT respondents indicated that there were very few immediate changes to their work, and noted that the former DFAIT employees impacted most by amalgamation measures were those working in geographic areas.

One aspect of amalgamation was identified by employees of both former organizations both as a benefit and a drawback: the increased amount of consulting and collaboration required in day-to-day work, alongside the increased amount of time to do so. A former CIDA employee indicated that in the first few months following amalgamation, “senior management became obsessed with amalgamation and whole-of-department angles to everything”. Ten of twenty-three respondents from the former CIDA and five of thirteen respondents from the former DFAIT indicated frustration with the “increase in the amount of consulting to the point of too much consulting”. However, some employees did note that the increase in consultation has led to new working relationships and increased collaboration, seen as positive. Former CIDA employees indicated that increased collaboration on files has led to the “integration of development considerations into foreign policy and trade”, noting that all “GAC employees are starting to ‘speak the same language’”. Former DFAIT employees mentioned the benefits of a larger “pool of resources and knowledge to learn from” and mention how this improves GAC’s ability to “engage more holistically abroad”. Employees from both organizations note that office relocations in the spring, summer and fall of 2015 increased not only the amount of collaboration being undertaken, but the increased ease with which it was completed.

The drawbacks of amalgamation outlined by employees of both former organizations are varied. One former DFAIT employee indicated that the “time and resources spent on amalgamation (moving, meeting, discussing, etc.) has been exhausting.” Another referenced the “unnecessary frictions and misunderstandings” that sometimes occur between employees of the two former organizations. One former CIDA employee indicated that a new sense of competitiveness exists between streams, and that people who work together from different streams “are using information as power”. A former CIDA employee expressed frustration about “being pulled into the short-term chaos of political work to the detriment of long-term development programming”. Over one-quarter (six of twenty-three respondents) of respondents from the former CIDA mention in their responses that their immediate supervisor has a lack of knowledge or understanding of the core principles of international development, describing this as a major concern and drawback of amalgamation. Relatedly, another former CIDA employee indicated that the “failure to recognize and validate the specific expertise of development professionals [has led to] weaker and less evidence-based decision-making”.

Despite initial worries and the identification of multiple drawbacks to amalgamation, the majority of former CIDA employees (fifteen of twenty-three respondents) indicated that their opinions of the amalgamation have shifted over time from being unsupportive of amalgamation to supportive, while more than half of former DFAIT employees (seven of thirteen respondents) expressed the opposite, indicating that their opinions of the amalgamation have shifted from supportive to unsupportive. One former DFAIT employee expressed that he or she “thought it could be great, now find[s] it difficult to work together”, while another respondent’s “thoughts have become more negative over time”. Another former DFAIT employee stated that “we have tended to incorporate the worst aspects of each other’s departments”.

With regards to Amalgamation 2.0 in the Americas Branch, respondents from both former organizations provided a range of responses regarding whether or not the associated changes were well-communicated, some indicating the changes were “not well-communicated” and other indicating the changes were “well-communicated”. Approximately half of respondents from both former organizations indicated that a lack of working-level consultations took place, the details of implementation remain unclear, and a lack of information was provided or made available to those working in the field. While some mentioned that it was unclear why some Amalgamation 2.0 changes were made, others indicated that they felt positive about the changes, one respondent mentioning that it “makes sense in how the positions have been shifted”. More than half of

respondents from both former organizations indicated that in order to comment on the benefits or drawbacks of Amalgamation 2.0, they will have to “live it to see it”. However, a handful of employees from both former organizations who did comment were positive about the reorganization, indicating that the changes have the “potential to clear up management structure and uncertainties” and “will lead to deeper integration” at the working level.

When asked about measures or support that could help employees in the implementation of Amalgamation 2.0, six of thirteen former DFAIT employees did not provide a response, three of thirteen said they did not know, and the remaining four made suggestions such as providing more training opportunities, encouraging exchanges in different streams, and providing more information to employees on a regular basis about the changes. Former CIDA employees had significantly more input with regards to measures and support that could assist them in the implementation of Amalgamation 2.0. Suggestions ranged from organizing meetings between colleagues from different streams who will work together in reorganized division, holding “transition meetings” with new teams on a regular basis, providing documents outlining a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities, providing information and training opportunities on all of the streams working within the newly reorganized divisions, and holding full-day retreats six months after Amalgamation 2.0 comes into effect. Five of twenty-three respondents indicated that it would be useful to learn more about the work style and expectations of their new Director General.

#### *“Completeness” of amalgamation process*

While a handful of respondents indicated that they feel the amalgamation is “complete” (three of twenty-three former CIDA employees, and one of thirteen former DFAIT employees), most respondents from both former organizations believe the amalgamation is “not complete” or “somewhat complete”.

In response to what is required for amalgamation to be “fully complete”, the majority of respondents from both the former CIDA and former DFAIT indicated that greater employee knowledge of the broad work of all three streams of the department is required. A former DFAIT employee indicated that the “final step” necessary to complete the amalgamation process is “getting to really know each other’s work”. A former CIDA employee believes that those working in international development have been reluctant to learn about the work of the former DFAIT and “need to learn more about other streams”, while another former CIDA employee expressed that “people are still holding on to ‘turf’, which shows that there is still an us and them mentality”.

Despite the expressed need to learn about the other areas of work within the department, a few employees of both former organizations expressed concern regarding the potential loss of stream-specific expertise. One employee warned that the future organization could become full of “watered down generalists” if at least some employees do not “remain within their stream as ‘experts’”.

#### *Extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged*

Survey respondents from both the former CIDA and the former DFAIT generally recognized that creating a new organizational culture and “feeling comfortable working together” will take more time. No respondents indicated that a collaborative organizational culture exists in either the department or in the Americas Branch. Those survey respondents who outlined their estimate in years suggested it would take five to ten years post-amalgamation announcement for a new organizational culture to emerge at GAC. One respondent suggested that a change in culture within the organization “will probably take a generational change”.

The impact of individual personalities on successfully completing an organizational change and on creating a collaborative organizational culture was a topic raised in response to several questions by a handful of survey respondents from both former organizations. The former CIDA employees who raised the topic indicated that “personalities matter; some individuals are naturally collaborative, [while] others are not”; that “success often depends on the individuals”, and that “it is up to people to make an effort” to develop a collaborative organizational culture. A former DFAIT employee indicated that a collaborative organizational culture “has more to do with the personalities involved rather than corporate or administrative requirements and incentives”. Another former DFAIT employee contended that a collaborative organizational culture does not exist in the Americas Branch or in the department because he or she receives “hardly any communication from the development stream”, while another employee referenced an “instinct” to consult with development counterparts as evidence that a collaborative organizational culture is emerging at GAC.

A handful of employees from both former organizations suggested that geographic work areas should jointly develop country strategies in order to encourage the development of a collaborative organizational culture, indicating that in doing so, all three streams would “feel ownership” of the results. Additionally, those who proposed this idea indicated that all employees would then know the work objectives of employees from other streams, and understand more clearly how it contributes to their individual work, which would make it easier to support one another.

One topic raised frequently concerned various staffing classifications in the department. Before they were amalgamated, CIDA employees were primarily from the “Program and Administrative Services” (PM) and “Economics and Social Science Services” (EC) staffing classifications, while DFAIT employees were primarily from the “Foreign Service” (FS) staffing classification. Nine of twenty-three former CIDA employees and six of thirteen former DFAIT employees cited staffing classifications as an issue. This was raised in responses to questions regarding “completeness” of amalgamation (question 9), as well as in responses to questions regarding the communication of Amalgamation 2.0 to employees, and support that could be provided as Amalgamation 2.0 is implemented (questions 10, 11 and 12). The topic was raised most frequently in response to questions that asked participants about the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC and in the Americas Branch, and what steps could be taken to further develop a collaborative organizational culture (questions 13 and 14).

Employees suggest that disparity in staffing classifications (i.e. different rates of pay, ability to apply for foreign postings) “is a major cause of tension and frustration”, “creates feelings of unfairness”, “makes some groups feel over/under valued” and “lowers morale”, and respondents cite the existence of various classifications as a barrier to the creation of a collaborative organizational culture. Employees from both former organizations expressed that “it will take people moving between streams and better understanding each other’s roles to move to the next level” of creating a collaborative organizational culture. Employees indicated that “exploration of cross-stream job opportunities” and “encouraging exchanges in different posts” will help to “break mental barriers” that remain.

In general, survey responses indicate that many employees have become increasingly supportive of the amalgamation; however, some have become less supportive. Responses also demonstrate that new working relationships are emerging, but point to a concern among many employees about the general lack of knowledge about international development, particularly at the manager level. Additionally, many employees indicated the barriers they believe remain to the development of a collaborative organizational culture within GAC: the existence of different staffing classifications deemed to be unfair, individual personalities that do not support the development of a collaborative organizational culture, and the lack of cross-stream knowledge that exists within the department.

## 8. DISCUSSION

The following section brings together and discusses principal findings from the literature review, the web-based survey, information gathered about a similar integration process undertaken in Australia, and the review of internal documents and internal steps taken to amalgamate CIDA and DFAIT. The examination of these deliverables informs the options and recommendation presented in the following section.

### 8.1 Disparate organizational cultures

Highly applicable to the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, research demonstrates that strong cultures are more difficult to change, and organizational change processes involving mergers are more difficult to complete successfully if pre-merger organizations have noticeably different organizational cultures (Cavanaugh, 1996, p.49). Buono, Bowditch and Lewis assert that “the full potency of organizational culture can be seen during a merger or acquisition when two divergent cultures are forced to become one” (1985, p.482). Before they were amalgamated, many considered the organizational cultures of CIDA and DFAIT to be significantly different, to the extent that they were referred to as “disparate” (Swiss, 2014). Shortly after the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, a group of employees brainstormed the stereotypes they associated with the two organizational cultures, referring to CIDA employees as “tree-huggers”, “disorganized”, “grassroots”, “self-righteous” and “socially aware”, while DFAIT staff were described as “elitist”, “conservative”, “secretive”, “stuffy” and “arrogant” (DFATD, 2015, Agora “corporate culture sub-group”). Similarly, different organizational cultures existed at DFAT and AusAID before integration; AusAID had long been recognized for its diverse workforce of passionate international development professionals, whereas DFAT was characterized as being staffed by conservative and primarily white male employees, described by one employee as a “monastic brotherhood” (internal conversation, 2016).

While the web-based survey did not ask participants about their perceptions of the organizational cultures of CIDA and DFAIT before the amalgamation, most respondents indicated in their responses that a collaborative organizational culture does not yet exist at GAC, suggesting that different organizational cultures did indeed exist before the two organizations were amalgamated. One respondent indicated that the workplace atmosphere in the months following the amalgamation was marked by a “shock of cultures and a clash of egos”, while another expressed that most employees believed that those from “the other department” would be “unable to perform the duties” of those employees of their department.

To date, employees of GAC continue to refer to the three “streams” of the department, as well as to the two “sides” of the department: one side being “the development side”, and the other “the political and trade side”. The “sides” are commonly referenced by all levels of employees in the department, referring back to when CIDA headquarters was located on one “side” of the Ottawa River, in Gatineau, Quebec, while DFAIT headquarters was located on the other “side” of the Ottawa River, in Ottawa, Ontario. Its common use continues even though the majority of employees who work together have been located in the same building and on the same “side” of the Ottawa River for at least one year. Similar to the Canadian experience, names have emerged within Australia’s DFAT to refer to members of the former organizations: those who previously worked on trade are referred to as “trade-ees”, those who previously worked on foreign policy are referred to as “pre-FATer”, and former AusAID employees are referred to as “was-AIDers”. While these references do not necessarily indicate the persistence or existence of different organizational cultures, they do indicate a certain lack of connection to, or “othering” of, the work being undertaken by other employees in the same department.

Based on the messages delivered by senior departmental officials, alongside concerns raised by employees in their survey responses, it is possible that a future, ideal, collaborative organizational culture within the department would combine many complementary features. It would likely integrate the best aspects of the organizational cultures of the former departments; would recognize the importance of the work of all streams and include a strong understanding of the different work and capabilities of all employees of the department, and include a three “lens” view of the organization; and also place an importance on employee competencies within the department that would foster and encourage collaboration as required.

## **8.2 A surprise announcement**

The way in which the amalgamation was announced, as a surprise to most of the almost 6,200 employees of the former CIDA and former DFAIT, did not allow for an “organizational assessment” or a “cultural audit” to be undertaken before the change process took place. Such a step may have been beneficial to the change, particularly given the different organizational cultures of the two organizations, and the assertion that organizational change processes involving mergers are said to be more difficult to complete successfully if pre-merger organizations have noticeably different organizational cultures (Cavanaugh, 1996, p.49). Integration of Australia’s AusAID into DFAT also came as a surprise to the 4,245 employees of those two organizations, and evoked reactions similar to those of Canadian stakeholders to the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT (Abbott in Troilo, 2015). International development experts in Australia voiced “concern” and “dismay” about the potential negative impacts the integration could have on the delivery of aid abroad (“AusAID absorbed into DFAT”, 2013).

Models from the private sector that focus on merging organizations with significantly different organizational cultures emphasize the importance of undertaking an organizational assessment or a cultural audit before an organizational change occurs. Walker’s model (1998) of “8 Critical Steps to Success” stresses the importance of conducting an organizational assessment early on, or, “if [the change is] already in progress, before beginning the serious, hands-on work of integration” (p.84). Stanwick (2000) recommends that a similar “cultural audit” be undertaken before attempts are made to merge organizational cultures (p.8). Stanwick claims that such an audit will help to identify areas of agreement and conflict of both organizations before they are brought together, so that potential issues can be identified and addressed. Organizational change researchers also recommend that those managing organizational changes to well-established work environments first have a strong understanding of the cultures of the organizations being merged to be able to consider whether or not the existing organizational cultures should be maintained. Such an understanding can assist in developing an appropriate change management strategy and help counter potential negative reactions to change (Kanter, 1992, in Parker and Bradley, 2000, p.126).

While the overseers of the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation did not announce the adoption of a particular model of organizational change, the steps taken bore many similarities to Kotter’s (1996) popular “Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change”. This model instructs change leaders to “establish a sense of urgency; create the guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision, empower broad-based action; generate short-term wins; consolidate gains and produce more change; and institutionalize new approaches in the culture” (1996, p.21). With “culture” highlighted as the final step in the process of “creating major change”, this model is at odds with models from the private sector that instruct those leading organizational change to place a strong emphasis on organizational culture from day one, or even before.

Various organizational change researchers cite employee readiness as critical to change success: it can impact upon the outcome of other factors later in the process. However, similar to conducting

an organizational assessment or cultural audit, creating a state of “readiness” among employees of CIDA and DFAIT prior to the amalgamation would likely have been impossible (Holt, Armenakis, Feild, and Harris, 2007, p.234; Armenakis et al., 1993, p.682). Armenakis et al. (1993, p.693) suggest that employee readiness and the urgency of the upcoming change should determine what approach is taken to implement the necessary changes. In changes where employees have a low level of readiness, but there is “great urgency in implementing needed organizational changes” (p. 693), it is recommended that a “crisis” change program be implemented. This type of change program places a focus on the use of persuasive and in-person communication techniques to provide information on the necessary changes.

Such a change program may have been adopted by those leading the change at CIDA and DFAIT, as much of the information provided to employees about amalgamation was provided during in-person meetings with Deputy Ministers. However, actual changes were implemented relatively slowly and incrementally and not with “great urgency”, particularly in comparison to the Australian experience. In fact, many amalgamation processes are still taking place to date. It is possible that an “aggressive” change program may have been more appropriate for the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation, as is suggested for low readiness/low urgency situations. This type of change program includes persuasive communication, active employee involvement and participation, and the use of external information and personnel to inform and guide the process (Armenakis et al, 1993, p.693).

### **8.3 Reaction to the change**

The majority of employees whose initial reactions to the amalgamation were negative, as well as those who indicated in their survey responses that communication of the amalgamation changes was poor, were employees of the former CIDA. Similarly negative reactions were expressed by AusAID employees upon the announcement that their organization would be integrated into DFAT (Troilo, 2015; informal conversation, 2016). At the time of amalgamation, DFAIT had 4,573 employees compared to CIDA’s 1,595 (almost 3:1) (TBS, 2015), and when the Australian organizations were integrated, DFAT had 2,521 employees compared to AusAID’s 1,724 (approximately 3:2) (Troilo, 2015). Stronger initial reactions from the employees of the former international development agencies are not surprising, as both were smaller than the organizations with which they were being merged. Research demonstrates that changes involving the merger of organizations of significantly different size are likely to face more negative responses from staff in the smaller organization (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.86; Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.22).

Research on reactions to organizational change also indicates that negative responses can extend beyond the initial merger period and contribute to “them and us” feelings simmering between employees of the two organizations (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.86; Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.22). Survey responses of employees from both the former organizations suggest that such feelings persist among some employees, more than three years after the amalgamation. Relatedly, employee reactions to the announcement of an organizational change are often difficult to predict and can be “immensely varied”, ranging from enthusiasm to shock to grief, and are frequently compared to a model of bereavement (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.490; Cavanaugh, 1996, p.47). While survey respondents from the former DFAIT indicated that they were relatively unaffected by the change early on, the majority of respondents from the former CIDA felt deeply impacted. Multiple respondents from the former CIDA used the word “worried” to describe their reaction to the announcement of amalgamation, while others cited “depression”, “concern”, “anxiety”, “betrayal”, and “uncertainty” about the change.

The reactions of over half of survey respondents from the former DFAIT are surprising, and not in line with findings presented in literature on reactions to organizational change. These respondents indicated that their opinions have shifted over time from being supportive of amalgamation to being unsupportive. Most research on reactions to organizational changes demonstrates that members of larger organizations pre-merger generally find it easier to adjust to organizational changes (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006, p.86; Marks and Mirvis, 1992, p.22). Negative feelings about the amalgamation, normally attributed to those from the smaller organization pre-merger, have developed in more than half of survey respondents who had been employees of DFAIT before the amalgamation. One former employee observed that he or she “thought it could be great, now find[s] it difficult to work together”, while another respondent’s “thoughts have become more negative over time”.

#### **8.4 Communicating the changes**

Research that examines communication during organizational change suggests a positive correlation exists between information received about change, and openness to it (Erwin and Garman, 2010, p.45), and shows that receiving information about a change process can alleviate resistance to the change (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.516). Furthermore, Schraeder and Self (2003, p.516) and Schweiger and DeNisi (1991, p.110) explain that it is often the lack of communication and uncertainty that causes stress for employees during times of organizational change, not the actual changes being implemented. The majority of survey respondents from both the former CIDA and the former DFAIT indicated in their survey responses that the justifications for the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT were understood by employees, but information about the associated changes was not well-communicated to employees. A range of responses were provided by survey respondents regarding how well more recent changes were communicated to employees, specifically those associated with Amalgamation 2.0. Some respondents indicated that the changes were “not well-communicated” and other indicated that the changes were “well-communicated”.

Peterson (1991) believes that it is “virtually impossible to over-communicate” about change processes, and if “employees do not receive the information they need, they will simply make it up” (p.428, indicating that effective methods of communication during change can take many forms. Armenakis et al. (1993, p.688) recommend that the type of information provided should depend on the level of readiness of change recipients. Methods of information provision range in “richness” from “in-person” being the richest medium, to “written media” such as newsletters and annual reports being the least rich (p.688). Greenberg (1987) and Greenberg and Folger (1983) demonstrate that “even people who are unhappy about the outcome of a [change] process will have less dissatisfaction and fewer dysfunctions...if they understand the process through open communications and see that it was fair” (in Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991, p.128).

Almost immediately after the announcement that AusAID would be integrated into DFAT, the leads of both organizations brought all employees together and candidly informed them that, despite any resistance they may have, the integration was happening, and that AusAID employees would be relocated within the DFAT structure, which would remain intact. Organizational leads then described how the change would take place, and written communication followed the in-person messages that had been delivered. Operational changes to HR, IT and payroll began quickly, and within months, employees of both former organizations began a physical relocation process, which was completed in just over one year. An informal conversation with DFAT employees in July 2016 revealed that AusAID and DFAT employees felt that messaging about the change was direct, to the point of being abrupt; however, the communication style was appreciated as it was considered to be honest, and employees knew what to expect. Furthermore, the level of information provided and style of communication used to deliver it prepared employees for the worst, which included

redundancies (informal conversation, 2016). The methods employed to inform employees about the changes seem in line with Greenberg (1987) and Greenberg and Folger (1983): not all employees were pleased with the changes that were about to take place, but communication was open and the upcoming changes were understood.

It is possible that a disconnect exists between GAC senior departmental officials and the information they provided about the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, versus what type of information and how much information employees expected to receive. The review of internal documents and steps taken on amalgamation demonstrates that *in-person* communication to employees via senior departmental officials took place regularly, particularly in the first year following the amalgamation announcement. Additionally, employees were provided the opportunity to ask questions and offer opinions (i.e. at all-staff meetings) and participate in the change process themselves (i.e. through contributing to the departmental vision on Agora). However, employees were provided little *written* guidance or information on the change for more than one year following the amalgamation announcement. Furthermore, the assessments, conclusions, and final reports of the External Advisory Group and the Transition Team were not made available to employees. The only written document on organizational change – the “Amalgamation Change Management Plan” – was not shared until April 2014, more than a year after the amalgamation. Other than that Plan, no clear departmental guidelines for amalgamation implementation or monitoring were provided. Additionally, and to date, no definition has been provided to employees with regards to what an “ideal” collaborative organizational culture at GAC would entail.

The majority of survey respondents from both the former CIDA and the former DFAIT indicate that the justifications for the amalgamation were understood by employees, but information about the associated changes was not well-communicated to employees. One employee noted in his or her survey response that “for a long time we had no idea what was going on, who we were supposed to work with, or what we were supposed to be doing”. The perceived poor communication by employees may have meant that they “simply made up” information, as Peterson (1991) indicates employees do when they do not receive the information that they need, potentially contributing to the “depression”, “concern”, “anxiety”, “betrayal”, and “uncertainty” referenced by many former CIDA employees.

### **8.5 A state of acceptance**

Although many employees feel the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT is not yet complete, the survey indicates that many employees have accepted the amalgamation. Furthermore, survey responses demonstrate that a large number of employees’ opinions have changed, and many have slowly adapted to identify the benefits and opportunities associated with amalgamation. However, many concerns raised early on in the amalgamation process persist, as do barriers to the emergence of one departmental collaborative organizational culture. Surprisingly, the majority of survey respondents from the former DFAIT feel less positive about amalgamation now than they did when it was announced.

In general, negative outcomes of change processes are numerous, and can include reduced loyalty, trust; cynicism, fatigue, burnout; turnover or intention to leave the organization; counterproductive work behaviour; anxiety and stress (Doyle, Claydon and Buchanan, 2000, p.71; Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, pp.496-500). Change fatigue is one negative outcome mentioned in survey responses by employees from both the former CIDA and the former DFAIT; many former CIDA employees also referenced the DRAP or “workforce adjustment” cuts as a stressful change that impacted hundreds of CIDA employees shortly before the amalgamation was announced. Furthermore, Doyle, Claydon and Buchanan’s (2000) comparison of private sector versus public

sector organizational change experience shows that public sector employees in general have more negative feelings toward organizational change than do private sector employees. In greater numbers than private sector employees, public sector employees believe that they are not provided adequate time to adjust to organizational changes, often do not perceive change as beneficial, are not given adequate time to learn from past change processes, and are “just tired of constant change” (p.S68).

Survey responses reveal that the overall process of amalgamation was more difficult for employees from the former CIDA, and impacts of and memories about the change still linger. For example, even though messaging from senior departmental officials indicated that the amalgamation of the two organizations was “not a takeover of one department by another, [but was] intended to be a coming-together of two organizations to create a new department” (Rosenberg in DFATD, 2013, “Information Session on Budget 2013”), many CIDA employees did not believe that was the case. In their survey responses, some former CIDA employees demonstrated concern that the amalgamation would mean that international development priorities would be “overshadowed” by foreign policy and trade priorities, similar to how many media outlets reported on the amalgamation. Additionally, survey respondents from the former CIDA felt that they had to “give in” more than did DFAIT employees, for example by adopting the latter’s technological platforms. Specific memories of the behaviour of new colleagues remain. One former CIDA employee had been working abroad when amalgamation was announced, and described how “a young colleague from the political section of the Embassy came over to the development section to announce the ‘take-over’ in a gloating way...taking the opportunity to rub it in, even though he was trying to soften it with humour”.

Even though the AusAID-DFAT integration began after the CIDA-DFAIT amalgamation, there currently exists a greater acceptance of the change process in the Australian context than in the Canadian context, and a general sense in DFAT that their integration process is complete. Informal conversations with DFAT employees indicated that the feeling within the department today is that “if you’re still walking the halls grumbling about the changes, then [DFAT] probably isn’t the place for you.” The observed differences that may have contributed to the different stage in the process include the time period within which changes took place, differences in amount and type of communication that occurred with employees about the changes, and a single staffing classification among AusAID and DFAT employees pre-integration.

Amalgamation changes undertaken thus far at GAC have been implemented incrementally, and employees often find themselves in different, smaller change processes (see Figure 10, “Recurring cycle of amalgamation ‘completeness’”). Comparatively, all of the changes to integrate AusAID into DFAT were implemented shortly after the announcement was made. Additionally, amount and type of communication with employees about the changes were different in the two jurisdictions. Written and verbal communication to AusAID and DFAT employees was received almost immediately, but considered by many employees to be blunt and direct. While verbal information was provided to employees of CIDA and DFAIT, written information was much slower to come, and a final organizational chart not received until the spring of 2015.

### **8.6 Barriers to a collaborative organizational culture**

Survey responses indicate that some employees believe that a collaborative culture at GAC has begun to emerge; however, the distinct organizational cultures from the former organizations do still exist, and barriers to the emergence of one departmental organizational culture remain.

Employees of both the former CIDA and DFAIT identify the lack of an understanding of each other's work as a barrier to the development of a collaborative organizational culture. A former DFAIT employee indicated that the "final step" necessary to complete the amalgamation process is "getting to really know each other's work". Both former CIDA and former DFAIT employees believe that "it will take people moving between streams and better understanding each other's roles to move to the next level" of creating a collaborative organizational culture. Employees identify that "exploration of cross-stream job opportunities" and "encouraging exchanges in different posts" will help to "break mental barriers" that remain within the department. Employees from both former organizations suggested that geographic work areas should jointly develop country strategies, indicating that in doing so, employees would have a better understanding of the work of the other streams, which would make it easier to support one another.

Despite the demonstrated need to learn about the other areas of work across the department, employees of both former organizations were concerned about the potential loss of stream-specific expertise. More than one-quarter of respondents from the former CIDA indicated that their immediate supervisor had a lack of knowledge or understanding of the core principles of international development, and describe this as a major concern and drawback of amalgamation. One employee indicated that the "failure to recognize and validate the specific expertise of development professionals [has led to] weaker and less evidence-based decision-making". The importance of striking a balance between maintaining areas of expertise while learning and exploring new employment opportunities was shared by employee responses of both former organizations.

Another barrier to the creation of a collaborative organizational culture at GAC is the perceived inequality and lack of fairness and balance between employment classifications of departmental employees. The survey revealed that classification disparities (i.e. different rates of pay, ability to apply for foreign postings) are "a major cause of tension and frustration", "create feelings of unfairness", "make some groups feel over/under valued" and "lower morale". The Jolicoeur report identifies that "the most important next step" of amalgamation as "consider[ing] the use of a single classification group for most of [the department's] operational positions". The challenge of staffing classifications was not one faced during the integration of AusAID into DFAT, as most Australian Public Servants belong to the same "Australian Public Service" or "APS" classification.

Finally, the impact of individual personalities on creating a collaborative organizational culture was raised in the survey responses of participants from both former organizations. Personalities are considered to be a factor associated with successful organizational change processes; however, are the least-discussed factor and are identified as the least-easily managed factor. Still, personalities deemed resilient have been found to be more "change oriented" (Oreg, Vakola and Armenakis, 2011, p.501). In their survey responses, former CIDA employees indicated that "personalities matter; some individuals are naturally collaborative, [while] others are not"; that "success often depends on the individuals" and "it is up to people to make an effort" to develop a collaborative organizational culture. A former DFAIT employee indicated that a collaborative organizational culture "has more to do with the personalities involved rather than corporate or administrative requirements and incentives".

### **8.7 Current state and strategic challenges for Amalgamation 2.0**

More than three years after the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT, employees' satisfaction with the change process and their perceptions regarding the level of completeness are hugely varied. While a handful of employees indicated in their survey responses that amalgamation is "fully complete", most indicated that they believe the amalgamation is "not complete" or "somewhat

complete”. While some employees cite increased collaboration with colleagues from other streams, others describe increased frustration with new and lengthy processes and perceived lack of willingness on the part of colleagues in other streams to work collaboratively and share information.

It is difficult to pinpoint where GAC is “at” in terms of amalgamation completeness, particularly given that the larger process has been comprised of many smaller amalgamation processes, all of which have followed their own timelines and experienced stages similar to those outlined in the analytic framework. This has meant that while some amalgamation initiatives have been completed successfully, others are only beginning, such as the changes involved with Amalgamation 2.0 in the Americas Branch, resulting in many employees cycling through various stages of amalgamation “completion” in various aspects of their work. Furthermore, departmental officials have pointed to the importance of forging an open, collaborative culture of working together, but have yet to specify what such a culture would look like.

It is difficult to predict the impact that a recurring cycle of amalgamation could have on the emergence of one collaborative organizational culture at GAC; however, survey results do indicate that seemingly constant change has contributed to frustration, change resistance, and change fatigue among some employees. Conversely, some employees feel quite the opposite, and are more positive about and confident in the changes associated with amalgamation now than they were when it was announced in March 2013.

With multiple factors to consider, senior officials at GAC are in a position to make decisions and take action that could encourage a more collaborative organizational culture to emerge from the three distinct streams and previously “disparate” organizational cultures that once existed. The following section will provide three options for consideration, and one recommendation.

## 9. OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

This section proposes three options for the client to consider that could support the further development of a collaborative organizational culture. The three proposed options are weighed against various criteria, are rooted in the information and opinions provided by survey respondents, and are supported by best practices identified in the literature, as well as by information found in departmental documents. All options incorporate various factors identified as contributors to successful organizational change processes. While the three options provided are not mutually exclusive, all three do require different levels of input and support from both working level employees who would “live” the change, as well as the senior managers who would be responsible for implementing the change.

Each option assumes that the barriers that remain to the emergence of one collaborative organizational culture at GAC are employees’ general lack of knowledge of the work that is undertaken in other streams of the department; the existence of staffing classifications that create feelings of unfairness and inequity between employees of the three streams; and the absence of employee competencies supportive of a collaborative organizational culture.

### 9.1 The options

- **Option 1: Conduct a comprehensive employee survey.** This option is drawn directly from best practice literature on merging organizational cultures, and would assess the current state of amalgamation in order to identify remaining issues to be addressed as amalgamation proceeds.
- **Option 2: Focus on employee competencies.** This option would focus on the identification and development of employee competencies through annual performance reviews in order to encourage the development of competencies that would support greater collaboration, and the creation of a collaborative organizational culture.
- **Option 3: Implement a tri-stream development program.** This option would focus on the design and implementation of a tri-stream development program within the department to give new recruits and experienced employees the opportunity to undertake long-term assignments in all three streams of the department.

A brief description of all three options follows. All options will be reviewed and weighed against the following criteria, outlined in detail in table 13. All options will also be weighed against the various factors identified as contributors to successful organizational change processes, as outlined in the literature review and the centre section of the analytic framework (Figure 12).

- **Time:** amount of time required to implement the option;
- **Cost:** total cost to implement and maintain the option;
- **Effort:** total level of effort required to implement the option;
- **Support and evidence:** existing internal or external support for the option, and whether internal or external support is required to implement the option; evidence of support for the option in other contexts or jurisdictions;
- **Achievement of objectives:** whether the option is likely to contribute to the stated objectives of Amalgamation 2.0, and to the further development of a collaborative organizational culture.

**Figure 12: Contributing factors to successful organizational change processes**

Based on the comparison, a recommended option will be identified for consideration of the client, and an implementation plan will be presented for the recommended option.

*Option 1: Conduct a comprehensive employee survey*

This option is drawn directly from best practice literature on merging organizational cultures, and would assess the current state of amalgamation, identifying remaining issues to be addressed as amalgamation proceeds. Models from the private sector that focus specifically on merging organizations with different organizational cultures emphasize the importance of undertaking such a survey before attempts are made to merge organizational cultures, claiming that it will help to identify areas of agreement and conflict of both organizations before they are brought together, so that any issues can be identified and addressed.

Such models, however, recommend that an employee survey be completed either before the change takes place, or early on in the change process, “before the serious hands-on work of integration” begins (Walker, 1998, p.84). Conducting such a step could have been more beneficial to the amalgamation at an earlier stage of the process, particularly given the different organizational cultures of DFAIT and CIDA, and the assertion that organizational change processes involving mergers are said to be more difficult to complete successfully if pre-merger organizations have noticeably different organizational cultures (Cavanaugh, 1996, p.49).

While this option could give employees the opportunity to voice their concerns regarding remaining amalgamation needs and challenges, it could also face resistance from employees given that it may be perceived as “all talk and no action”. Furthermore, it may be perceived as similar to other research already undertaken on amalgamation, such as the Jolicoeur report, or this report.

*Option 2: Focus on employee competencies*

This option is to focus on employee competencies, in order to encourage the development of competencies that would support greater collaboration, and the creation of a collaborative

organizational culture. Such a program would utilize the existing annual performance review process, where employees and their managers set annual objectives on which they are assessed at various times throughout the year. The existing annual performance management system identifies desired competencies of the public service and assesses employee performance on these competencies. Implementation of this option could be timely, as a “Competency Based Approach” is being developed at GAC to “create a coherent framework that will enable the department to manage the whole workforce in alignment with its business needs and to give employees the tools to choose a career that meets their aspirations” (GAC, 2016).

This option would require that suitable competencies be identified and key objectives and activities be developed for employees to work toward in order to build on those competencies. Such a process would have to be framed in a positive way. For example, if framed as identifying or targeting those employees who lack the desired competencies, it could be viewed as problematic, which may result in employees feeling targeted or singled-out.

### *Option 3: Implement a tri-stream development program*

This option is to implement a tri-stream development program within GAC. It would give new recruits and experienced employees the opportunity to undertake assignments in all three streams across GAC. This option is most closely in line with the responses and recommendations provided by employees through the web-based survey regarding ways in which a collaborative organizational culture could be further developed. In their survey responses, employees indicated that the existing different employment classifications within the department, as well as the lack of knowledge regarding other work streams of the department, are the main barriers to the development of a collaborative organizational culture.

The “most important next step” identified in the Jolicoeur report is to “consider the use of a single classification group for most of (the department’s) operational positions”. A tri-stream development program would utilize a single classification group, and would allow employees to move more easily across the streams. Such a program would also allow employees to gain a deeper and better understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities. This program would have an application process for new recruits and current employees, and include a learning plan and required courses.

While an application process may discourage unsuccessful applicants, such a long-term development program would create the opportunity for employees to gain a deep understanding of all three streams of the department while working among vastly different teams and employees. The application aspect would also allow those not interested to remain in their work areas of choice, maintaining their stream-specific expertise, something that had been a major concern of a number of survey respondents.

## **9.2 Comparing the options and recommended option**

The three options presented are compared in table 13 against the outlined criteria. As illustrated in the table, option 1 could be most quickly implemented; however, it runs the risk of duplicating initiatives that have already been undertaken, and being undertaken too late in the amalgamation process to be effective. Furthermore, employees demonstrated through their survey responses that they are getting tired and frustrated with reports that assess “where we are at” and want concrete action taken on final amalgamation steps. Option 2 could be implemented in a moderate amount of time, and has the potential to support the development of individual competencies that could increase collaboration among streams and contribute to the emergence of one collaborative organizational culture; however, if employees believe that they are being targeted for not possessing

the desired competencies, it may actually lower morale and encourage further resistance to the amalgamation process. Option 3 demands a significant resource commitment, including a significant amount of time to implement; however, it responds to the primary issues identified by employees in the survey, and it aligns with recommendations from the Jolicoeur report. Options 1 and 2 each integrate two factors associated with successful organizational change processes, while option 3 integrates six of these factors.

**Table 13: Comparison of options based on criteria**

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Option 1: Employee survey</b>	<b>Option 2: Employee competencies</b>	<b>Option 3: Tri-stream development program</b>
<b>Time</b> Amount of time to implement the option	Limited amount of time to implement; would require internal decision making and internal resources. Potential to complete within one year, i.e. by summer-fall 2017.	Moderate amount of time to implement; would require both internal and external decision making, as performance management process is led by TBS. Based on required decision-making steps, potential to implement within next reporting cycle, i.e. by March-April 2018.	Significant amount of time to implement; would require internal and external decision making and internal and external resources, particularly with regards to developing a new staffing classification (TBS). Would require development of a comprehensive training program, which could be based on existing courses currently offered. First tranche could begin training/first rotation by September 2018.
<b>Cost</b> Total cost to implement and maintain the option	None or minimal: could be undertaken with internal resources; potential to hire a graduate or doctoral student to conduct the survey.	Moderate: potential to be undertaken with internal resources; could require hiring competency-based performance management consultants or experts.	Moderate: potential to be undertaken with internal resources, but would require human resources and learning centre employees dedicated to the program. Likely to involve hiring new employees.
<b>Effort</b> Total level of effort required to implement the option	Limited amount of effort required to implement the option; would require internal decision-making only, and few internal resources to undertake.	Significant: external consultations and approvals and research to determine new competencies labour-intensive and time-consuming; a labour-intensive process to educate and involve all employees and managers in new aspect of performance management assessment.	Significant: labour-intensive to develop and launch internal and external staffing competitions and manage human resources aspects, as well as to develop and deliver training.
<b>Support and evidence</b> Existing internal or external support for the option; evidence of support for the option in other contexts, jurisdictions	Limited: success cited when such an approach has been utilized in the private sector; however, no evidence of success at such a late stage of a merger process.	Moderate: competency-based management proven to be successful in the public and private sector and in various jurisdictions; however, no evidence that supports the existence of competencies that encourage the development of a collaborative culture. Employees identify individual	Significant: Jolicoeur report identifies the use of a single classification group for GAC operational positions as “the most important next step” of amalgamation. Employees identify the existence of multiple staffing classifications and lack of knowledge of the work of

		personalities as an occasional hindrance to the development of a collaborative organizational culture.	other streams as a barrier to the existence of a collaborative organizational culture. When integrated, Australia’s DFAT and AusAID employees had the same staffing classifications.
<b>Achievement of objectives</b> Whether the option is likely to contribute to the further development of a collaborative organizational culture and to the stated objectives of Amalgamation 2.0.	Limited: would give employees the opportunity to voice their concerns regarding remaining amalgamation needs and challenges, and has the potential to get at the “root” of remaining amalgamation issues; however, it is potentially too late in amalgamation process to implement and is similar to research already undertaken on amalgamation (Jolicoeur report, this report). Limited ability to support the development of a collaborative organizational culture, more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, or coordination and consultation across streams.	Moderate: employee competencies are the least manageable aspect of organizational change. Could be integrated into existing annual performance management process, but has the potential to be problematic if it is perceived as targeting individuals without desired competencies. Moderately likely to support the development of a collaborative organizational culture through indirect means, but unlikely to support more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, or coordination and consultation across streams.	Significant: would respond to feedback provided by employees regarding their opinions of what barriers remain to the development of a collaborative organizational culture, and has the potential to encourage deep employee understanding of all three areas of departmental work. Has the potential to discourage unsuccessful employees with an application process. Ensures stream-specific expertise is maintained as those employees who wish to maintain a focus in one stream would be permitted and encouraged to do so. Likely to support the development of a collaborative organizational culture, more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, and coordination and consultation across streams.
<b>Integrated contributing factors to successful organizational change processes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information provision, communication</li> <li>Employee input and participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Employees’ personalities</li> <li>Cultural compatibility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information provision, communication</li> <li>Employee input and participation</li> <li>Employees’ personalities</li> <li>Cultural compatibility</li> <li>Employee readiness</li> <li>(Pre)-planning</li> </ul>

All options have the potential to contribute to the further development of a collaborative organizational culture within the department; however, option 3 is recommended in that it constitutes the most comprehensive option with the most potential to encourage the development of a collaborative organizational culture. Of the three options, it integrates the most factors associated with successful organizational change processes. Furthermore, it best supports the objectives of Amalgamation 2.0, which include more coherent policy and programming, streamlined decision-making and approvals processes, and coordination and consultation across streams. Additionally, it best represents employees’ input regarding what barriers remain to the development of a collaborative organizational culture, and it supports employees’ articulated needs to learn across

streams and work in all departmental areas. Also, option 3 could be integrated into the current mobility cycle of the department. Finally, option 3 would respond to the broad concern that stream-specific expertise could be lost over time as the department becomes more amalgamated, as it would be developed as a non-mandatory program to which employees applied. Those employees who wish to maintain a focus or area of expertise would be permitted and encouraged to do so.

The primary concern about the implementation of option 3 is the level of effort and amount of time it would take to implement, estimated at approximately two years minimum. Within two years, more than five years will have passed since the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT was announced. Since the announcement in March 2013, both senior managers and working-level employees have estimated that it would take anywhere from five to ten years for a new culture to form, meaning that before this option is implemented, one collaborative departmental organizational culture could have already formed (Foster, 2013; Troilo, 2015; Jolicoeur Report, 2015; survey responses, 2016).

### **9.3 Implementation plan**

This section provides an implementation plan for recommended option 3. It includes six phases: an assessment and planning phase, which can begin immediately, followed by a consultation phase that will take place with internal and external stakeholders. The next phase involves the presentation of the tri-stream development program alongside necessary approvals. After approvals are received, the development phase will occur, which will be followed by the implementation phase. Finally, an evaluation and maintenance phase will occur annually, and will be used to implement recommended suggestions for improvement that have been gathered throughout the process.

Implementation of this option will require the involvement of internal and external resources. For the creation of a new staffing classification, information from and participation of employees of TBS would be required. Significant input would be required of GAC human resources to develop and launch internal and external recruitment processes, and to integrate employees of the development program into the current mobility cycle. Dedicated human resource employees would be required, and a “champion” senior official could help to promote and raise the visibility of the program. Additionally, the development and delivery of a comprehensive training program would require dedicated employees from the learning centre be assigned to the task. It is estimated that six full-time employees would be required to undertake all associated tasks.

Implementation of the various phases may overlap with each other, or take longer than outlined in Table 14. This implementation plan outlines the “best case scenario” in terms of time required to implement the program (two years); however, due to lengthy internal processes, it may take as many as four years for the program to become operational.

**Table 14: Implementation plan**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Timeline</b>
<b>1. Assessment and planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Request meeting to present findings and recommendations of this survey/report with Deputy Ministers</li> <li>Request and obtain approval for preliminary consultations with employees regarding option 3</li> <li>Explore requirements for the creation of a new staffing classification with TBS</li> </ul>	September - December 2016
<b>2. Consultation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inform employees about potential opportunity</li> <li>Gather employee input on option 3 via Broadcast message, in-person meetings, and online forum</li> <li>Consult again with TBS regarding the creation of a new staffing classification; assess options</li> <li>Consult with HR advisors regarding the integration of the process into annual rotation cycle</li> <li>Consult with learning centre managers regarding the development of required training materials for program</li> </ul>	January - February 2017
<b>3. Presentation and approvals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If employee feedback is positive, request a meeting with Deputy Ministers to present findings for program approval</li> <li>Assess potential barriers to success; propose mitigation strategies</li> <li>Determine level of effort required to develop program</li> <li>Present findings and a detailed implementation plan to Deputy Ministers</li> </ul>	March 2017
<b>4. Development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If decision is made to move forward, assign senior official as program champion</li> <li>Create team to develop program, which will require the human resources of approximately six full-time employees</li> <li>With employees from the learning institute, develop learning materials for both cohorts (new recruits and existing employees)</li> <li>With HR, develop external and internal recruitment process, and determine how participants will be integrated into mobility process</li> </ul>	April - August 2017
<b>5. Implementation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Launch external recruitment process (program to begin in September 2018)</li> <li>Launch internal recruitment process (for program to begin in September 2018)</li> <li>Assess candidates, conduct tests, interviews, and reference checks; integrate program participants into annual rotation cycle</li> </ul>	September 2017 - September 2018
<b>6. Evaluation and maintenance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop monitoring and evaluation tools</li> <li>After year one, request feedback on learning aspects of program; conduct course evaluations</li> <li>After year one, conduct interviews and focus groups with program participants, managers</li> </ul>	September 2019  Annually, once program is operational

## 10. CONCLUSION

The organizational change process that brought together CIDA and DFAIT was unique in many ways: it was announced as part of the Canadian federal budget, came as a surprise to most employees, and was to be implemented almost immediately, impacting upon most of the almost 6,200 employees of the two organizations. To date, the changes involved with the amalgamation have been implemented incrementally, with many aspects of the change process still being undertaken today.

This exploratory study has determined that more than three years following the amalgamation announcement, the development of a collaborative organizational culture at GAC is apparent; however, distinct organizational cultures from the former organizations still exist, and barriers to the emergence of one departmental organizational culture remain. While employees cite increased collaboration across streams, they also demonstrate frustration with lengthy and confusing processes, classification systems deemed to be unfair, and a lack of knowledge about the areas of the department in which they do not work. Furthermore, some employees are less positive about the amalgamation now than they were when it was announced. The implementation of a process that would consolidate classifications and encourage deep cross-stream learning and development could address many of the issues associated with amalgamation that persist. Additionally, while the unique work of the three streams has frequently been highlighted as an important feature of the department, the further and deeper development of a collaborative organizational culture within the department is seen by many to be the next, necessary step in the amalgamation process for it to be considered “fully complete”.

One main gap that exists in this project is the lack of research undertaken on the impact of individual personalities on the success of organizational changes. The topic emerged during the literature review research process as the least easily managed factor associated with successful organizational change processes, and was not pursued further due to its unpredictability. Later on, the impact of individual personalities upon the emergence of one collaborative organizational culture was raised by multiple survey respondents. Due to time constraints, in-depth further research was not conducted.

Further research that has the potential to support the options provided in this paper include an in-depth review of the success of competency-based management in the public sector, with a particular focus on the competencies that contribute to collaborative organizational cultures; research on the impact of individual personalities to the success of organizational change processes and on organizational culture; research on the existence of “sub-cultures” within large organizations; a discourse analysis of public sector organizational change processes that involve the merging of organizational cultures; and an in-depth review of literature on other jurisdictions in which foreign affairs and development departments have been combined.

With multiple factors to consider, senior officials at GAC are in a position to make decisions that could enable a strong and collaborative organizational culture to emerge from the three distinct streams and previously “disparate” organizational cultures that once existed. The recommendation included in this report, to implement a tri-stream development program that would give new recruits and experienced employees the opportunity to undertake assignments in all three “streams” of the department, is an intensive process that will require significant resources to implement; however, this option has the potential to assist in the creation and solidification of one strong and collaborative organizational culture among employees of GAC.

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## APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Population of the federal public service by department

Federal Public Service: Annual Population by Department																
Departments and Agencies	Year															
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Canadian International Development Agency	1,337	1,406	1,504	1,626	1,633	1,626	1,691	1,773	1,917	1,930	1,953	1,980	1,843	1,595	0	0
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada	4,216	4,641	4,973	3,911	3,967	4,002	4,066	4,305	4,530	4,815	5,015	4,921	4,859	4,573	6,027	5,973

The following information applies to the above table:

- Source of Information: Regional Pay System as of March 31st of each year.
- The Federal Public Service (FPS) consists of two population segments: the Core Public Administration (CPA) and Separate agencies (SA).
- CPA departments and agencies are named in schedules I and IV of the Financial Administration Act. The Treasury Board is the employer of this segment of the FPS.
- Separate agencies are named in Schedule V of the Act. Separate agencies conduct their own negotiations with and set their own classification levels for their employees.
- Included in this information are:
  - o Active employees of all employment tenures (Indeterminate, Term, Casual and Student)
  - o Governor-in-Council appointees
  - o Deputy Ministers
  - o Federal Judges
- Excluded from this information are:
  - o Inactive employees (i.e. employees on leave without pay)
  - o Ministers' exempt staff
  - o Employees locally engaged outside of Canada
  - o RCMP Regular Force members
  - o RCMP temporary civilian Force members
  - o Canadian Forces members

Source: Treasury Board Secretariat (2015). *Population of the Federal Public Service by Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/psm-fpfm/modernizing-modernisation/stats/ssa-pop-eng.asp>

**Appendix B: CIDA & DFAIT Program Alignment Architecture (PAA)**


**DFAIT PAA**

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada - Program Alignment Architecture							
Strategic Outcome	Canada's International Agenda		International Services for Canadians			Canada's International Platform	
	The international agenda is shaped to Canada's benefit and advantage in accordance with Canadian interests and values.		Canadians are satisfied with commercial and consular services.			The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade maintains a mission network of infrastructure and services to enable the Government of Canada to achieve its international priorities.	
Program	International Policy Advice and Integration	Diplomacy and Advocacy	International Commerce	Consular Services and Emergency Management	Passport Canada	Governance, Strategic Direction & Common Service Delivery	Government of Canada Benefits

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2014). *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Departmental Performance Report 2012-2013*. Retrieved from [http://www.international.gc.ca/departement-ministere/plans/dpr-rmr/dpr-rmr\\_1213.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/departement-ministere/plans/dpr-rmr/dpr-rmr_1213.aspx?lang=eng)


**CIDA PAA**

**Strategic Outcome**



Source: Canadian International Development Agency (2014). *Canadian International Development Agency 2012-2013 Departmental Performance Report*. Retrieved from [http://www.international.gc.ca/departement-ministere/plans/dpr-rmr/dev\\_dpr-rmr\\_1213.aspx?lang=eng](http://www.international.gc.ca/departement-ministere/plans/dpr-rmr/dev_dpr-rmr_1213.aspx?lang=eng)


**Appendix C: CIDA organizational structure**



Note \*: Includes Human Resources, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Communications and Strategic Policy & Performance



Source: Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2009). *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 8: Strengthening Aid Effectiveness - the Canadian International Development Agency*. Retrieved from [http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl\\_oag\\_200911\\_08\\_e.pdf](http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_200911_08_e.pdf)

**Appendix D: DFAIT organizational structure**



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2014). *Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2012-13 Integrated Corporate Business Plan*. (internal document)


## Appendix E: Official Development Assistance disbursements in FY 2012-13

Department/Source	International assistance	of which		
		Programs funded by the IAE	ODA: ODAAA (Statistical Report) 	ODA: OECD-DAC 
<b>Departments reporting under the ODAAA</b>				
Canadian International Development Agency	3,446.32	3,440.31	3,445.56	3,445.56
Department of Finance	604.85	604.85	544.57	544.57
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada	431.35	427.78	333.53	333.53
International Development Research Centre	254.59	254.59	254.59	254.59
Export Development Canada (Official Bilateral Debt Relief)	197.43	-	197.43	197.43
Health Canada	11.87		11.87	11.87
Public Health Agency of Canada	11.74		11.74	11.74
Environment Canada	52.61	29.85	52.61	52.61
Royal Canadian Mounted Police	34.19	34.19	34.10	34.10
Natural Resources Canada	3.57	3.57	3.57	3.57
Parks Canada	2.16		2.16	2.16
Employment and Social Development Canada	1.90		1.90	1.90
Industry Canada	0.87		0.87	0.87
Transport Canada	0.29		0.29	0.29
Citizenship and Immigration Canada	112.51		112.51	112.51
Services received by CIDA from other government departments	25.18	9.85	25.18	25.18
<b>Subtotal - Departments reporting under the ODAAA</b>	<b>5,191.42</b>	<b>4,805.00</b>	<b>5,032.49</b>	<b>5,032.49</b>
<i>% of international assistance</i>		93%	97%	97%
<b>Other departments/sources</b>				
Cost of refugees in Canada (provincial)	97.44			97.44
Foreign student subsidies	165.32			165.3
Provincial and municipal assistance programs	28.99			28.99
<b>Subtotal - Other departments, sources</b>	<b>291.74</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>291.74</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,483.16</b>	<b>4,805.00</b>	<b>5,032.49</b>	<b>5,324.23</b>
<i>% of total international assistance</i>		88%	92%	97%

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (2015). *Statistical Report on International Assistance 2012-2013*. Retrieved from <http://international.gc.ca/development-developpement/dev-results-resultats/reports-rapports/sria-rsai-2012-13.aspx?lang=eng#fnbt1>


**Appendix F: Americas Branch organizational structure**

**Pre- Amalgamation 2.0**




**Post- Amalgamation 2.0**

**LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN – NGM\***



Source: Global Affairs Canada intranet

Appendix G: GAC organizational structure



Source: Global Affairs Canada intranet

### **Appendix H: Email to potential research participants**

You are invited to participate in a research project entitled “Building a Collaborative Culture: The CIDA-DFAIT Amalgamation” undertaken by Jane Harley as part of the requirements for the Masters of Public Administration program at the University of Victoria.

The purpose of this research project is to take stock of the large-scale organizational change that created DFATD, now GAC, to determine the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged since the 2013 amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT. This research project endeavours to learn about the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC since the 2013 amalgamation, what steps could be taken to further develop a collaborative organizational culture within the department, and what types of support would be useful as Amalgamation 2.0 is implemented in the Americas Branch.

You are being asked to participate in this research project because of your employment in the Americas Branch. If you agree to voluntarily participate, your participation will involve completing a web-based survey, which will take approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. You will have one week to complete the survey. Point form responses are welcome.

Participation in the survey may cause some minor inconvenience to you in the time required to participate; however, there are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this survey.

A benefit of your participation in this research project includes the potential to contribute to options and recommendations provided in the final report regarding steps that could be taken to further develop a collaborative organizational culture at GAC, as well as provide input on useful types of support that may enhance the implementation of Amalgamation 2.0.

Your participation is completely voluntary. If you do decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time without any consequences and any explanation. If you do withdraw your data will not be used in the research project and will be destroyed.

To protect your anonymity and the anonymity of others, no names will be used in the final report, and any identifying information you may provide will not be used. Only the researcher will have access to the raw survey data – your confidentiality and the confidentiality of the data will be protected by storing all information in password-protected files on locked computers. Data collected from your survey will only be used for this research project and after project completion, data will be disposed of through shredding and the deletion of electronic files.

The results of this survey will be shared with Faculty of Human and Social Development at the University of Victoria Public Administration’s Department and Americas Branch senior managers via a final report; whether or not the final report will be made public will be decided upon at a later date.

#### **Contacts:**

Individuals who may be contacted regarding this study include:

<b>Jane Harley</b> (Researcher),	343-203-3281, jane.harley@international.gc.ca
<b>Dr. Evert Lindquist</b> (Supervisor),	250-721-8416, evert@uvic.ca
<b>Isabelle Bérard</b> (on behalf of David Morrison, client)	343-203-4591, isabelle.berard@international.gc.ca

In addition, you may verify the ethical approval of this study, or raise any concerns you might have, by contacting the Human Research Ethics Board Office at the University of Victoria (250-472-4545 or ethics@uvic.ca).

To participate in this study, please follow the Survey Monkey\* link below. If you submit this survey, it will be understood that you consented to participate. Please keep a copy of this email outlining the consent process for your records.

**CLICK HERE TO ENTER SURVEY**


*\*Please be advised that this research study includes data storage in the U.S.A. As such, there is a possibility that information about you that is gathered for this research study may be accessed without your knowledge or consent by the U.S. government in compliance with the U.S. Patriot Act.*

**Appendix I: Survey questions**

## Survey Questions

1. Were you working for either the former CIDA or the former DFAIT when their amalgamation into DFATD, now GAC, was announced?
2. For how long had you been working at CIDA or DFAIT?
3. What were your first thoughts upon hearing about the amalgamation of CIDA and DFAIT (N/A if you were not an employee of CIDA or DFAIT in March 2013)?
4. If you were an employee of CIDA or DFAIT, describe the atmosphere in your workplace in the initial few months after amalgamation was announced (N/A if this does not apply).
5. Has your work changed since amalgamation was announced in March 2013? If so, how soon after the announcement did your work change? Describe the change process that took place, and describe what you remember of the transition (N/A if you were not an employee of CIDA or DFAIT in March 2013).
6. Why do you believe the former CIDA and the former DFAIT were amalgamated? Were the reasons for the amalgamation well-communicated (N/A if you were not an employee of CIDA or DFAIT in March 2013)?
7. Have your thoughts about CIDA and DFAIT being amalgamated changed over time (i.e. did you go from unsupportive to supportive, or vice versa)? What did you think at the time vs. what do you think now?
8. In your opinion, what is the primary benefit of amalgamation? What is the biggest drawback of amalgamation? What is the primary benefit of Amalgamation 2.0? What is the biggest drawback of Amalgamation 2.0?
9. In your opinion, how complete is the departmental amalgamation process (not complete, somewhat complete, fully complete)? If not fully complete, what do you think is still required to become a “fully amalgamated” department?
10. Amalgamation 2.0 will come into effect on July 1 in the Americas Branch. To what extent have changes associated with Amalgamation 2.0 been well-communicated (not well, well, very well)? If there are changes to your job, will those changes contribute to a more amalgamated Branch? Please describe.
11. Have you been given the opportunity to provide feedback on the changes being implemented in Amalgamation 2.0? If yes, what feedback have you provided? If no, is there feedback you would like to provide?
12. Are there any measures that could be taken or types of support that could be provided to facilitate your transition into the Amalgamation 2.0 structure? If yes, please describe.
13. Describe with examples the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has developed within the department since amalgamation was announced. If applicable, describe what could be done to (further) develop a (more) collaborative organizational culture at GAC.
14. Does a collaborative organizational culture exist in the Americas Branch? If yes, please provide examples. If applicable, describe what could be done to (further) develop a (more) collaborative organizational culture in the Americas Branch.
15. If you have any comments on amalgamation, Amalgamation 2.0, or the extent to which a collaborative organizational culture has emerged at GAC since March 2013, please provide those here.

**Appendix J: DFATD “amalgamation change management plan”**



Source: Global Affairs Canada intranet

**Appendix K: Summary of key survey findings**

Q#	Context	Findings	
		Former CIDA: responses	Former DFAIT: responses
3	First thoughts upon hearing about amalgamation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-concern re: loss of CIDA brand; “end of an era”; fear that international development would take a lesser role</li> <li>-post-DRAP<sup>1</sup>; “CIDA employees were still reeling from the cuts”</li> <li>-“swallowed by DFAIT” a phrase used by multiple respondents</li> <li>-shock, surprise, sadness, apprehension</li> <li>-opportunity; excitement; “potential for increased collaboration” and new employment experiences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-generally positive responses</li> <li>-“great idea, long overdue”; “great way to harmonize our action and break the silos”; “could facilitate even greater alignment of work</li> <li>-awareness that it could be challenging</li> <li>-too much change in the workplace</li> </ul>
4	Workplace atmosphere in months following amalgamation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-“worried” used by multiple respondents; depression; concern, anxiety; uncertainty; betrayal; worry about more job cuts</li> <li>-resigned to move forward</li> <li>-tired of constant change</li> <li>-many questions, a lack of information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-shock of cultures and clash of egos</li> <li>-many respondents indicated that they were “not impacted”</li> <li>-uncertainty, confusion</li> <li>-“most employees from both departments believed that employees from the ‘other department’ would be unable to perform their duties”</li> </ul>
5	Change in work since March 2013. How soon? Memories re: change process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-large range of responses</li> <li>-references to constantly changing IM/IT platforms; “slow evolution that has favoured ex-DFAIT systems over ex-CIDA”</li> <li>-“senior management became obsessed with amalgamation and whole-of-department angles to everything”</li> <li>-reluctance from development employees to try to understand work of other streams</li> <li>-closer relations, more collaboration with trade and political colleagues</li> <li>-increase in amount of consulting, to the point of too much consulting</li> <li>-more competitiveness between streams; people using information as power</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-majority of respondents say “not much”</li> <li>-respondents impacted the most were working in geographic areas</li> <li>-multiple references to frustrations around more consultation, time requirements</li> </ul>
6	Reason for amalgamation? Was it well-communicated?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-increase synergies; to create efficiencies; better collaboration abroad</li> <li>-ideological reasons</li> <li>-responses range from “well-communicated” to “not well-communicated”; was a surprise</li> <li>-“what was poorly communicated was the how and what impact it would have...on the prioritization of the various aspects of foreign policy”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-no, don’t remember, arguments weren’t convincing</li> <li>-came as a surprise</li> <li>-“streamlining” Canada’s presence abroad referenced multiple times</li> <li>-former government wanted more control over aid</li> </ul>
7	Thoughts re: amalgamation; have thoughts changed over time?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-some respondents went from unsupportive to supportive, and can now see the benefits more clearly</li> <li>-some indifferent from the beginning – a long process – “hopefully there is a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-more than half of respondents went from supportive to unsupportive</li> <li>-“thought it could be great, now find it difficult to work together”; “went from indifferent to unsupportive”; “thoughts have become more negative over</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Deficit Reduction Action Plan; also commonly referred to as “workforce adjustment”

		<p>commitment to complete the process and not leave it at the halfway mark”</p> <p>-a few respondents “strongly believed in the amalgamation” from the beginning and still do; “it is clear that programs can support each other strategically”</p> <p>-small minority feels negatively, recognizing it may be a personal experience</p>	<p>time”; “we have tended to incorporate the worst aspects of each other’s departments”</p> <p>-“I’m supportive of amalgamation but a better job could be done to communicate it and encourage cross-stream collaboration”</p>
8	<p>Primary benefit and drawback of amalgamation and Amalgamation 2.0.</p>	<p>-employees who work together now located together</p> <p>-increased coordination, more/better communication; integration of development considerations into foreign policy and trade; all GAC employees starting to “speak the same language”</p> <p>-being pulled into short-term chaos of political work at the detriment of long-term development programming</p> <p>-“failure to recognize and validate the specific expertise of development professionals, leading to weaker and less evidence-based decision making”</p> <p>Amalgamation 2.0</p> <p>-immediate supervisors who don’t understand development</p> <p>-one DG instead of two</p>	<p>-feeling like a cohesive team; better communication; pool of resources and knowledge/ability to learn from development practitioners; merge international priorities and engage more holistically abroad, can “compare notes” and have a better picture; development can influence foreign policy and trade perspectives; ability to work in a new stream; new colleagues</p> <p>-time and resources spend on amalgamation (moving, meeting, discussing, etc.) has been exhausting; unnecessary frictions, misunderstandings; long and confusion consultation processes</p> <p>Amalgamation 2.0</p> <p>-potential to clear up management structure and uncertainties; will lead to deeper integration, streamlined chain of command</p>
9	<p>Completeness of departmental amalgamation. If not ‘fully complete’, what else is required?</p>	<p>-majority of respondents think it is ‘not complete’ to ‘somewhat complete’</p> <p>-“It will take people moving between streams and better understanding each other’s roles to move to the next level”</p> <p>-“people are still holding on to ‘turf’ which shows there is still an us and them mentality”</p> <p>-development people need to learn more about other streams, they have a lack of knowledge and poor understanding of each other’s work</p> <p>-“classifications with similar roles and responsibilities being paid at different levels is a major cause of tension and frustration”</p> <p>-“Will require some people remaining within their own stream as “experts” or else the whole department will become watered-down generalists”</p>	<p>-Majority of respondents think it is ‘not complete’ to ‘somewhat complete’</p> <p>-Final step is getting to know each other’s work</p> <p>-Need a better system to determine equivalencies, as current classifications and rates of pay make some groups feel over/under-valued in the organizational structure</p> <p>-Recognition that creating a culture and feeling comfortable working together will take time</p> <p>-Change in culture will probably take a generational change</p>
10	<p>Have Amalgamation 2.0 changes been well-communicated? Will changes contribute to</p>	<p>-“Unfortunate that the first org chart was released with little consultation, then there was a long pause, and then the second org chart was released”</p> <p>-Responses ranging from “not well-communicated” to “adequately communicated”. Working-level consultations did not seem to take place</p>	<p>-“Changes were communicated adequately; not discussed, but communicated”</p> <p>-Changes have been explained but not particularly well</p> <p>-Makes sense in how positions have been shifted</p>

	more amalgamated Branch?	-Details of implementation remain unclear -Communication was difficult because it was done by surprise -Lack of information provided or available to those in the field	-Not clear why some units will be better merged than others -An “extremely exciting challenge” for one manager who is now responsible for staff from three streams
11	Opportunity to provide feedback on Amalgamation 2.0? What feedback?	-No, but we should wait and see how it works first -No, please consult working level employees more; no, those at missions have received little information and are concerned support may decrease -Take away classifications – feelings of unfairness exist re: pay, rotationality, who does what; i.e. no field postings for ECs – lowers morale -increase the number of analysts in the Americas Branch -yes, but I did not provide comments	-No – work still seems siloed and hope that changes from Amalgamation 2.0 will help to eliminate those -Was poorly communicated; “lack of notice seemed unfair and disappointing” -“Yes, I explained my experience with unclear reporting and approvals systems; I believe these will be solved with 2.0”
12	Any measures/support that could help with Amalgamation 2.0?	-multiple respondents indicated they want to learn about the style and expectations of their new DG -produce an FAQ document explaining the upcoming changes; provide more information in writing -Protect development positions at HQ -Hold “transition meetings” with team manager and director to air issues, which would provide time to discuss distribution of files; would also provide an opportunity to learn more from management team and new colleagues -Provide a better explanations on how this is supposed to work in practice, a clear division of roles and responsibilities -Provide better info for development personnel re: ex-DFAIT programming to better understand potential for interaction, common priorities and programs	-Most respondents did not answer -Meetings at a divisional level or smaller so the information about a specific employee’s work is targeted -Encourage exchanges in different streams – shadowing or short term exchanges
13	Extent to which collaborative org. culture has developed within the department. Steps to further develop one?	-Obvious changes where there is a presence of all three streams in a certain country or area of work -A lot of opportunities to learn if you have time; it is the responsibility of individuals to branch out, learn more, to “make an effort to better communicate and share appropriate information when needed” -New structure will help some learn more about other streams’ work; officers from all three streams reporting to one manager -personalities matter: some individuals are naturally collaborative, others are not -Develop country strategies together, so everyone knows what the other stream is working on, and they can support one another	-Take time to learn the work and objectives/priorities of colleagues’ files -Encourage exchanges in different posts -Example: consulting and communicating with dev colleague has become regular/instinctive -“break mental barriers by encouraging exchanges in different posts” -Individuals should hold full day retreats within six months of amalgamation 2.0 -Implement social activities – i.e. lunches – social interaction helps! -All three streams should develop country strategies together

<p>14</p>	<p>Collaborative organizational culture in Americas Branch? Steps to further develop one?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Yes, but mostly in places where employees from all three streams interact</li> <li>-Exists more so in larger missions than smaller ones; due to people being located together</li> <li>-Personalities are a huge part of this; some managers encourage increased collaboration and coordination simply in the way they act and treat their employees</li> <li>-“success often depends on the individuals”; “it is up to people to make an effort”</li> <li>-Collaborative culture often comes after working hard on something together, i.e. a visit</li> <li>-Provide learning opportunities; Americas management forum is a good example of collaboration</li> <li>-Provide opportunity for working-level officers to contribute ideas; “they are responsible for putting this into practice”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Yes, and amalgamation 2.0 will enhance it</li> <li>-At the personal level people are nice and collaborative</li> <li>-“has more to do with the personalities involved rather than corporate or administrative requirements and incentives”</li> <li>-Provided example of an ex-CIDA person who was brought into a traditionally team of ex-DFAIT employees and acted as an “interpreter”</li> <li>-A work in progress; “I think we are on track”</li> <li>-A few respondents said ‘no’; “hardly any communication from the development stream”</li> </ul>
<p>15</p>	<p>Other comments on amalgamation, Amalgamation 2.0, collaborative organizational culture at GAC.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Exploration of cross-stream job opportunities; downside to this as maintaining expertise is necessary</li> <li>-Lack of balance under new 2.0 bureaux regarding numbers of development managers in the field vs. at HQ</li> <li>-Hope that geographic proximity and new colleagues from different streams will help build organizational culture</li> <li>-Ex-CIDA staff need to ask hard questions re: what they need to hold on to, what they can give up</li> <li>-Provide regular and more consistent information about the changes, i.e. via email, the intranet, a wiki; highlight concrete examples of change successes or failures; create annual calendar and timelines for reporting</li> </ul>	<p>-no respondents added anything further</p>