

Spectres of Development:
Corrupted dreams of a chronically emerging Latin American giant

by

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B.A., Western University, 2007
M.A., University of Victoria, 2009

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of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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Latin America has been envisioned, time and again, as home to the semi-civilized. Or so (post)colonial imaginaries continue to impress upon us in developmental renderings of a New World that has yet to take off. Neither backward (in the ways of a ‘dark continent’) or advanced (as guaranteed by the status of a ‘first world’), its giants are, at best, chronically emerging. This in-between position is acutely exemplified by the Brazilian dilemma of an interminable modernization, responsabilized for curing all of our ills. The most wide-ranging projects of development are mobilized within this context, but the closer that we get to their distinct materializations, the more that they appear to us as mirages of what ought to be rather than what is, measured against the incorruptible standards of a modernity realized somewhere ‘out there’. In this study, I look to everyday dynamics in Brazil’s aspiring world-city, Rio de Janeiro, that compose the fields and subjects on which development projects operate, in turn revealing and obscuring ‘successes’, ‘failures’, and ultimately, assorted desires and expectations that (mis)lead a politics of transformation in the peripheries of the modern world. In Part III, I elaborate this history of the present as a way to reorient such grand narratives of arrested development, corruption, and other ‘third world’ problems, by drawing on a range of sites of sociability that nurture particular kinds of relations between (dis)obedient subjects and their governing institutions. To this end, I reconceive the terms of debate for thinking about places of an allegedly incomplete or corrupted modernity, in Part II, where I largely reframe the problems that a developmental ethos appropriates for itself, which situates the third world as the constitutive outside of idealized ways of living. By investigating the predominant developmental archetypes of the last century of Brazil’s promised take-offs, in Part I, I set up the pathways to decondition and recondition how we think about the limits and possibilities of a peripheral politics of transformation. In these ways, I conclude that the standards of political judgement that follow from such idealized ways of living neutralize contentions and negotiations over how we want to live, here and now, making way for confused desires, expectations, and responsibilities more in line with (inter)nationalist paradigms and prescriptions than the politics of everyday life in out of the way places.

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Dedication

*À Vovó Lala,
por me ensinar como amar sem condições,
em um mundo (im)permanente.*

PREFACE

Reader's Guide:
How to encounter peripheries
of undefinable centres

of transformative politics

Sôdade é uma dô que dá,
 mas não é dô de dôe.
 É vontade de lembrá,
 é vontade de esquecê.

É dô de dente,
 machuca,
 mas onde dói não se vê.

E a gente pega, cutuca,
 pra não deixá de doê.¹

Saudade is an ache that arises,
 but it is not an ache that aches.
 It is the will to remember,
 it is the will to forget.

It is a toothache,
 that hurts,
 but where it hurts we do not see.

We poke and prod at it,
 for it not to stop to hurt.

¹ This Portuguese-language folk verse, chronicled and musicalized by Rio de Janeiro-based poets, such as Luiz Peixoto in the early twentieth century, expresses a self-understanding particular to a Brazilian notion of time, (dis)continuity, and trajectory (Peixoto, *Poesia*, 69). As my own grandmother passed on to me, its oral condition brings to light the limits of the written word, which renders some of its knowledge redundant or circular. But when we pause and listen to what is captured by these reflections into Brazil's beloved and bittersweet sentiment of *saudade*, we can grasp a different form of knowing, and of making sense of yearnings for a living present that does not negate the past or its permeations into today and tomorrow. I will henceforth touch in on this guiding concept of *saudade* (in its phonetic folk iteration, *sôdade*) as a means to grasp the multiple and complex orientations of Brazil's developmental dilemmas, as posed and reposed by local, national, and international projects of modernization, of a making modern of our conditions of everyday life.

Saudade: pasts, presents, and futures of third world development

When we allow ourselves to come face to face with the realities of our times, it is not often obvious who or what is navigating whom, how, and to what effects.

Understandably, we tend to rush to readily available explanations and solutions to assure our (un)certainties and (in)securities, with the hopes of effectively orienting ourselves in our day to day lives. In moments of abstraction, it becomes all too easy, then, to mobilize these very standards to judge our surroundings – past, present, and future. As time passes, the categorizations that we make of our worlds solidify into air... The past is remembered to serve certain ends, the future becomes a measure of what is to be, and the present a continual oscillation between the two: to some, a battle; to others, paralysis; to most, likely somewhere in between.

So when called to situate ourselves in relation to the worlds in which we inhabit as well as those of others', our maps are habitually made and remade to get us to certain places. They are predestined. How is it good to live? Who do we want to be? How do we take care of ourselves? In responding to these questions, where – in and through what pathways – we live, matters. Indeed, it ends up dictating much of what we come to expect: be it the guaranteed comforts of a first world, or *gambiarra*² of a third world. What accompanies us, in turn, is the shock (or denial?) of what can and cannot be a problem, followed by what can and cannot be a solution. Corruption, for instance, in a

² A characteristic Brazilian expression, *gambiarra* has come to denote varied forms of alternative designs – an intervention or technique that reappropriates available materials according to contemporary circumstance. A kind of projective reasoning, immediate but not necessarily short-term, this way of doing things is often confused as improvisational or precarious, whereas, in effect, it has a lot more to do with a disposition to differentiate, adapt, and transform so as to put in practice solutions to specific necessities. This non-exclusive mode of operating has come to define a powerful self-image of 'the Brazilian way': *o jeitinho brasileiro*.

so-called advanced country like Canada, is considered to be anachronistic, or, as some may prefer, out of place. Corruption, in the peripheries of the modern world, as professed of a place like Brazil, so my father would say, “we are vaccinated against it”. And illustrations of these opposing yet complementary expectations mark our everyday negotiations, consider how we accordingly respond to: poverty, homelessness, failing health care, poor educational results, crime, domestic violence, gendered disparities in the workplace, racial profiling, gay bashing, among other assorted headlines seemingly ubiquitous. How we perceive these problems shape our social and political imaginations, which, in turn, shape the possibilities for our response(ability).

Whenever embarrassed by our failure to realize what we conceive to be the right way to do things (politically, economically, culturally, etc.), the same three words tend to explain to the self-consciously underdeveloped of Latin America’s chronically emerging giant, the reasons for our delay and disillusionment: ‘isso é Brasil’. This is Brazil. Given that the right way is not always the best way forward, Brazil attends as both subject and object of our (mis)adventures in bringing to fruition a modern civilization in the tropics. Expressive of as much shame as pride, these Brazils of our banalized (self)perceptions promise a coherence of incoherent forces, attuned to the hauntings of a modernity never to have been realized. Struggling with and against standards of measure imposed, inherited, and imagined of places believed to have made it ‘out there’, seldom do we ask: how much of our apparent virtues and vices do we actually want to give up, for what, and at what cost? In whose name are the limits and possibilities of a third world development being drafted?

As a country whose history is celebrated and lamented through the lens of pacification (i.e. a mode of occupation characterized by claims to cordiality, conciliation, hospitality, hybridity, creativity, among other mythical standards of a social or racial democracy), the logic of war vs. peace does not tend to prevail as the dominant mode of our struggles. And yet, fear of chaos and disorder prevails as one of the most powerful weapons for enforcing the good, the bad, and the ugly of our contemporary realities. Not by chance does the caption embroidered in the centre of our national flag read 'order and progress'. More than our streets, what is ultimately being policed in attempts at a third world take-off are our dreams for what can and should be in out of the way places, variously scaled. In the legendary lands of the semi-civilized, in a Latin/America condemned to the timeless and interminable status of 'emerging', the relentlessly menacing force is not of anarchy, but corruption. Within these frustrated (post)colonial imaginaries, what distinguishes the 'delayed' ways of a Latin America in construction from the 'backward' ways of peripheries otherwise located (epitomized by the recounted scrambles for Africa) is that here, in the land of Europe's exiles, escapes, and settlements, we are presumed to be going in the right direction. Shielded from the projections of an absolute otherness and exclusion of the likes of the dark continent, the visions of paradise projected onto the land of the emerging usher in specific and singular challenges regarding which Brazils we are to overcome, and how, given the insidious *potential* for our (dis)qualification into the modern world.

Brazils have been classified and diagnosed in many ways: at its best, envisioned as a Europe in the tropics or America's alternate future, the New Worlds of possibilities here refashioned have externalized desires continually repossessed. Compared to our

continental counterpart to the north (Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and Republican in inspiration), we of Latin, Catholic, and Patrimonial breed, so the story goes, have deviated from the idealized developmental pathways. Otherwise we could have become, by now, the United States of America to the south, given our analogous patterns and scope of settlement, colonization, and migration of enslaved and upwardly mobile subjects whose trails have chronicled the last half-millennium of (inter)national transformations. Of course, not all deviations end up being undesirable or unproductive. Creativity, after all, is born of conflicting forces. To put it otherwise, most foreigners who visit the home of football, carnival, and the enchanted shorelines of (a not-so-virgin!) paradise stumble in identifying it as categorically a third or first world country.

The city that is seen and sees itself as emblematic of this Brazilian Brazil, (in)tense and full of possibilities, remains to this day, Rio de Janeiro. The once capital of the Iberian Empire, today it guarantees itself as a sort of laboratory for what a Brazilian development could look like. Here you may find encrusted layers of Portuguese, French, British, German, and yes, eventually American remodellings of a burgeoning civilization, but you will not find China Towns or Little Italys; not even our Argentinean neighbours have been able to carve out a piece of home away from home in the ‘Marvellous City’. The more ca-Rio-ca one becomes, the more Rio captures our imaginings of the anchors of the good life. Where it is beautiful, it is exuberantly beautiful; where it is ugly, it is horrifyingly so. It is not against a fixed or monolithic reality that we gauge a politics of transformation. Our political imaginations are thus recurrently realigning themselves to our senses of reality, to visions of Rios, Brazils, Americas, and worlds here and beyond that guide us to where we do and do not want to

be. In sum, how we account for our everyday realities, in centres and peripheries continuously redefined, usher in different pathways for what we have come to know as ‘development’. In place, the pasts, presents, and futures of a third world development manifest themselves as orientations for the here and now.

Finding Voice

Some eight or nine years ago, I took refuge in an academic world, seeking space – or, ‘elbow room’, as I quickly came to see it. A space to breathe, a bit more easily, without the weight of immediacy, of urgency...of a world of action and reaction, which forces us to decide the undecidable, putting us face to face with endless moral and strategic dilemmas, as came to be normalized in my political engagement with people and communities, far and wide, struggling to find their way through a world where ‘justice’ is more of a dream than a tangible reality.

I began to navigate this space with no final destination in mind. It was, after all, to serve as the opposite of that urgent orientation of action and reaction. With this no-destination mentality, what I first found, in this academic world, was my own self, made bare. My M.A. thesis was, in all actuality, written by and for: me. Two years of gruelling therapy, one could say. Unable to reconcile morality and politics, I stared down this irresolvable tension, but could not quite look it in the eye.

It took me a number of more years navigating through these academic corridors to find what I needed to find: a voice. Not a position, not a theory, not even an ethos. But a voice. In its manifold ambivalence, what I present here to you, dear reader, above all else, is a voice training itself to speak and be heard. A voice that, instead of seeking

freedom, seeks resonance. This voice does not prioritize an effectuation of critique, as that tumultuous M.A. thesis written by and for me, sought so desperately, so urgently, to bring about. It is not trying to free itself, to claim elbow-room by pummelling people and things out of the way, but, rather, it seeks to amplify the complex and ambiguous dynamics of our inherited conditions, and in and through them, gain an alternate force. To put it otherwise, this voice does not seek to deconstruct, in order to construct anew, in the ways that our tried and tested argumentative method has taught us to vindicate our own truths at the expense of other truths.

So the problem that this dissertation takes on is ultimately one of *political imagination*: a convergence of questions around how we conceive the problems that we are facing in our contemporary political worlds, and the drafting of possible solutions. That is, the question of how to debate our political present, in centres and peripheries constantly in motion. More specifically, my problem regards how we set up the debate about places of an incomplete or corrupted modernity, like Brazil, a site that has come to be known by a sort of arrested development, or, at best, by a kind of chronic emergence. A place that is seen, and sees itself, as failure, with all of the potential in a land of abundance, but a people who simply cannot seem to get their act together. Here, in the land of the future, we are always either running behind or catching up.

Development, therefore, is an instrument or manifestation of this problem, a mode of framing what is at stake. As I take it up here, development is, first and foremost, a problem of qualification and disqualification into the modern world. Whether top-down or bottom-up, of public or private intervention, the corrective measures that a developmental ethos seeks to implement in the land of potential, reduces all of our

shortcomings to problems in our national character. We are not yet modern enough. Ours is a cordial (a person-centred) rather than a civil (a citizen-centred) civilization, as go the predominant patrimonial stories of our delayed development. Education is then offered to us as the solution, to rectify the corrupted ways of our governing institutions, which, depending on your ideological preference, reflects or is reflected by, our ways of living. In brief, developmental discourses and practices have colonized our political imaginations. The task cut out for us, here, is to modernize (rather than, to render contemporary) the conditions of our everyday life .

My argument, as follows, is that the ways in which ‘Brazil’ has been defined as an object of diagnosis and intervention, hinders, more than helps, how we approach a politics of transformation in the peripheries of the modern world. The alternative that I then propose is that if we look to the city, to the everyday dynamics of sociability, to how subjects of development navigate the demands of modern governing institutions, we can get a better understanding of how myths of the ‘Brazilian dilemma’ inform these very limits and possibilities. Instead of looking to what Brazil should be, between the urban and the global, we can see how these myths serve as orientations to help people cope with living in these in-between conditions of an emerging giant, of a chronically emerging giant, neither fully excluded, nor fully included in the ‘modern world’.

So I chose to bring our attention to a sort of backtalk to the grand nationalist theorizing that situates Brazil in international systems of governance in these ways. And yet, the everyday, as I mobilize it here, is not the opposite of these grand claims and generalities of arrested development and corrupted modernities, but rather, the site in which we can appreciate how they gain influence, are inflated and deflated to certain

ends. In this spirit, I am taking seriously, and at the same time, not so seriously, the terms of the game. Instead of asking, “are we there yet?”, we could ask, “where are we and where do we want to be?”

What we are ultimately facing, I conclude, is a *crisis of narratibility*. Hence why the voice that I here rehearse is so important in opening up pathways that are not trapped within the terms of, either, condemning Brazil and its people as not quite modern enough (not quite civil enough to navigate the supposedly formal demands of modern governing institutions, namely, democracy and free markets), or, the alternate pathway that we have available to us, of celebrating and romanticizing the creative and resilient potential that comes out of our seemingly undisciplined ways. With this voice, I can concede space to these nation-building myths – these accounts of what it means to be located on the peripheries of the modern world – allowing us to see how they *inform*, but not necessarily *explain*, the dilemmas of an interminably modernizing and delayed Brazil. And, one step further, to see what this reveals to us about modernity at large, about the fabled third world, as a mirror of the first world and its self-referential institutional models of the good life. About an always already corrupted modernity, about the impossibility of living ‘modern’ lives and the false confidence that it bestows upon any and all of us.

My field research pointed me in this direction. I started to see that this in-between condition, of the chronically emerging, brings about specific challenges and calls for different methodological and political orientations. One way to put it, is that it seemed important to question how the problem of development, as I put it here, is not about how the losers do not know why they lose, but how the winners do not know why they win. Within the middle class, or more precisely, within processes of middle-classification, I

came to find the standard of what it means to be a free and productive citizen of modern systems of governance. And as a space (as sites of sociability, linking state and society, so to speak) whose subjects are, at times, winners, and at others, losers of their enabling systems, the location of the middle class becomes an increasingly neutralized ground, and those of us thus situated need not assume responsibility for how we reproduce these very systems. Processes of middle-classification, as I refer to them here, are processes of capacitating people to live, think, and dream within modern democratic and capitalist structures, based on a certain notion of individual autonomy, meritocracy, and rational self-interest, which pass through specific racialized and gendered conceptions of idealized ways of living. As practices of qualification, discrimination, and legitimation, these processes of integrating or including those precariously situated through formal and informal worlds into modern society, is where, I argue in this dissertation, we need to focus.

While preoccupied with issues of economic growth, we will continue to be unprepared to deal with the problem of inequality, to begin with. If trying to understand a place like Brazil, whose majority is poor, the problem is not only one of exclusion, but one of inclusion. It is not simply a matter of the traditional middle class – the self-appointed translators of modern and worldly values for the disoriented masses – not wanting to give up its privileges, for instance. But that, the ways in which established and aspiring leaders of the middle class have attempted to create an emerging class of people in its own image, following particular codes and conduct of an idealized modernity, precludes its very expansion. As such, those who inhabit and traverse the space of the middle class are my most immediate audience (this ‘we’ that I am calling

forth, that I speak to here), but these narratives, no doubt, cut across classes and life experiences. But here is where we find a moral economy through which these myths come to gain force. It is like a frontier, between the top and the bottom, a battlefield on which dreams, desires, and a range of myths are put into motion. And, as such, it plays off the fears of one side, and the desires of the other: the ultimate in-between position. As a space of emergence, it is actually not about inclusion or exclusion, but constant integration. And development projects rely on the force of these pedagogical reformations of its subjects, into these idealized ways of living, in order to pave the way forward. Yet these universalizing codes and conduct of a dreamed of modernity, which link subjects of development to their governing institutions, distort images from within as much as those from without, and ultimately, end up giving us a confused politics of transformation in the peripheries of the modern world. In turn, we are left asking, what Brazil should be, rather than is (who we ought to be, rather than, how we want to live!), and as such, the game is called for, before it even begins.

Always already delayed, it is not clear to where we are heading. When development is rendered political, it becomes possible to move away from its futuristic bent to ground us in what is possible, here and now.

Mappings and orientations

What follows is a tactical attempt to grapple with these specific processes informing the creation, appropriation, disposal, and recycling of our political standards of judgement – notably with respect to the fabled third world, the constitutive outside of the idealized place and measure of the good life. In places excised, wholesale, from the

codes and conduct of modernity, abstract orders (be they legal, statist, capitalist, or otherwise formalized) are not perceived as guaranteed. These are places of the *makeshift*. As such, more than a spatial demarcation, third-worldliness remains with us as adjective. Hence in moments of third-worldliness, we can more readily grapple with the filters that obstruct our comprehension of the self-referential institutional models of modern governance, and their particular paradigms and prescriptions. Here, we specialize in responding to, and working with, makeshift configurations. Ours is not a problem of precarity, which is reared by fantasies of stable, transparent, and all-consuming orders. Neither do (in)formalities or (im)personalities of modern systems of governance and wealth production explain the conditions of our everyday life and the ensuing panaceas. These dynamics of the insides and outsides, or more precisely, these performative regulations of modernity could very well make sense anywhere, but it is only when we situate ourselves in place that we can effectively seize their powers and vulnerabilities, that is, their political force. To advance such inquiries, the master negotiators of modernity honed in the lands of the semi-civilized may have a lot to teach us. As subjects and objects of modernity, never fully inside or outside, we are always emerging, and so our lines of flight and capture tread in between the obvious categories of ascension. To remap our ways in times of global revisionings, the makeshift may serve, in effect, as the firmest compass, with which to navigate our collective points of departure and return.

In this study, I thus seek to reorient the problem of development as one of qualification and disqualification into the modern world, that is, the latest projections of idealized ways of living. To this end, it will be required of us to take seriously, and not

so seriously, the established terms of the game, which pit culturalist explanations for Brazil's developmental delay against institutionalist accounts that converge around a confused discourse of corruption that delineates the problems and solutions of a take-off that will have been. (Not to mention the tired discourses of international dependency that presume a universally-bound and self-reliant modernity somewhere out there, incorruptible, against which our developmental deficiencies are appraised.) Working within this transitive condition of our modernity, at most what we can detach from is the pride/shame that colour our navigations of a present that tends to live in the past or the future, wherein its dreams are eternally bound. To understand the specificity of this condition of (under)development, we need to recognize that far from nihilist, this sort of negation is, at core, relational. Herein lie the limits *and* possibilities of a third world development, of an interminable process of modernization in which we cannot readily recognize ourselves, always already stuck in between the conventional pathways to success. Either ignorant or corrupted, subjects of development, as such, become inextricably linked, not primarily to the business of helping, as so many (post)colonial imaginaries have impressed upon us, but to pedagogical ventures variously scaled to rectify our allegedly incomplete or corrupted governing institutions that reflect or are reflected by our ways of living. And so it is to this dynamic of chronic emergence that we need to pay attention in hopes of grasping more fully the problems that a developmental ethos has appropriated for itself in remaking our worlds over in its image, time after time.

In the three-fold exposition before you, I chose to begin where we are at, so to speak, with the official state of affairs that tells us of our present condition, that is to say,

with the banalities of globalization. In the shadows of the latest world-transforming project, we can bear witness to the complex and ambiguous ways in which the game of development is played, ultimately unfolding the conditions of (dis)qualifications into modernity in places neither modern or traditional, universal or particular. What is more, between the urban and the international, the politics of development reveals itself and makes way for a resignification of the terms of the game. Beyond the ever-changing rules of engagements, I am particularly interested in querying the effects of these transformative processes, notably regarding how people in out of the way places are being trained to partake in a contemporary global cultural and political economy and what the implications are for how we judge, politically, standards of socio-economic development.

In *Part I*, I thus delve into how fields and subjects of development are composed, resituating projects of development in terms of what they require of us in order to ‘make it’, that is, resignifying development as a way of living. To this end, I trace a Brazilian experience with the two predominant developmental paradigms of the last century, rebuilding (inter)national community since the World Wars’ battles over the soul of civilization and its political options for navigating a modern world. First, I look to a *modernization* project’s strengthening of centralized and endogenous forms of urbanization and industrial growth, with its ensuing lessons for a multiscalar development and the massification of inclusive citizenship practices. I open up these so-called top-down approaches to our first promised take-off by exploring the design of a capital of hope, destined to engineer the ways of a modern people: as nostalgically remembered today, Brasília’s architects of tomorrow, and accompanying programs for urban and

national reform of our collective movements and habits. Second, I look to the subsequent revisioning of a now clichéd project of *globalization*, and its prescribed best practices of decentralized mechanisms of individual and community-based empowerment, actualized within knowledge- and talent-based economies that sanctify entrepreneurial rites of ascension. I open up these celebrated bottom-up approaches to our second promised take-off by exploring the ever-proliferating vocational centres training subjects of development in the preconditions to engage with glocal economies, notably through the mastery of the English language, which promises to open our doors to the world, one by one. These well-worn stories of top-down vs. bottom-up pathways to third world development have promised to usher in, at different times and paces, a modern Brazil and Brazilian citizen, and, in turn, have ‘succeeded’ and ‘failed’ in unexpected ways. Beyond technical renderings of development (e.g. rates of growth and output), these parallel and intersecting trails reveal processes of middle-classification as central to developmental modes diversely conceived, and more precisely, what it means to be a free and productive citizen in the fields of modernity. Reconsidering projects of development, as ways of living, we can thus decondition and recondition how we think about the project of development to-day, which has pre-occupied political imaginaries in peripheries variously mapped.

With a refocused attentiveness to how projects of development have made and remade subjects of a third world in their image, in *Part II*, I move from exploring the dynamics that propel projects of development and continuously rearticulate the terms of the game, to fundamentally grappling with the development project itself, and that which it appropriates into its domain. Looking beyond the grand developmental paradigms that

come and go to rectify the world's problems, I open up how in the land of the emerging, the proposed solution to our underlying development woes seems to be as unanimous as the identification of the problem: *education*, so as to reform the corrupted ways of a not quite modern enough civilization, in need of a discipline and work ethic that engenders respect for the purportedly neutral and abstract principles of modernity, that is, of representative democratic institutions and forms of competition and entrepreneurialism demanded by increasingly privatized capitalist enterprises. Both the modernization and globalization inspired developmental paradigms, as explored in Part I, for instance, hold resonance as disciplinary regimes that have sought to mainstream a modern rationality and value-system (via processes of middle-classification) against the seemingly intimate, affective, and relational sociality of yet-to-be properly organized civil society imagined of an idealized rational and efficient Anglo-Saxon modernity, which has purportedly overcome the anachronistic limits of an imagined rural and familial past projected onto the delayed lands of a person-centred (rather than citizen-centred) civilization. But the problem of an incomplete or corrupted modernity (whether manifested through the failed citizen or state) can be traced back to the much more haunted origins of a modern Western canon, the venerated Greeks and their ancient (mis)guidings around the (dis)qualifications into the modern world. That is to say, how we tell our stories, and effectively draw the line between who is qualified and disqualified to play the game, continues to be oriented by the time-honoured standards of the universal vs. the particular, the modern vs. the traditional, the social vs. the natural, and the democratic vs. the corrupt. These guiding principles, and their operational discourses that give rise to the Brazilian dilemma of modernity, generate a confused politics around the third world,

and its expectations, desires, and responsibilities for development. Whatever the ill plaguing our tropical paradise, the Brazilian dilemma of modernity is reduced to the problems of familialism, cordiality, informality, clientism, and ultimately, corruption. Or so we are told. In hopes of understanding more thoroughly what is at stake in the training of citizen-subjects of development, I examine, in the heart of this dissertation, how modern apparatuses (statist, capitalist, and otherwise oriented) ground themselves in a place that did not pass through the supposed stages of an evolutionary development, so as to shed light on both the specificity of a localized modernity as well as modernities variously construed as our guides. At stake in the education as corrective approach to these lagging behinds of a third world, is the centring of the philosophical and ethical agency of the subject, rather than the politics of everyday life and class struggle. Discourses of corruption belie the complex (inter)dependencies of our inherited slavocratic milieu and its particular constructions of the citizen and labourer, which today serves, in fact, as the terrain on which development works. Instead of paying attention to the reproduction of such fields and subjects through the demands of modern governing institutions (and their requisite currencies of impersonal capital, so to speak), developmental discourses travel through the cultural essentialisms of a patrimonial personalism (i.e. the presumed cause of corruption) defined against the imagined universal subject-position of democracy and free markets. In turn, the available critique of impunity is sterilized as a call to activate institutions always absently present, rather than engaging the instruments that we do and do not have in order to deal with what arises, so often overshadowed by the ways in which the education project legitimates who we qualify, for what, and the myth of impersonal capital that reproduces the institutions

of modernity through the symbolic victories of leading and emerging classes. In sum, education is not the solution to corruption as the problem of the third world.

Once we have faced a range of contemporary discourses and practices of development in Part I (i.e. something of a literature review with exemplary case studies) and their conditions of possibility in Part II (i.e. something of a history of the present), in *Part III*, I move to offer a series of non-argumentative interventions into problems and solutions otherwise foreclosed by developmental stagings. In between projects of development and the development project, we can come to appreciate contemporary manifestations of, and negotiations with, centres and peripheries of modernity – the orientation and regulative measure of our politics to-day. In place of a conclusion that imposes closure and certainty to the inherently open and transitive processes of the everyday, I affirm and amplify these (un)expected manifestations so as to better work with and against them. I pursue these affirmations so as to amplify what works and how, instead of seeking refuge in cures or correctives, out of touch, whose proposed options merely generate more assimilations of or resistances to the latest guide for the chronically emerging. Grappling with the trainings and positionings of subjects of development, so as to reconsider the kinds of political subjectivities available to us in a postcolonial world of the chronically emerging, at best, or backward and delayed, at worst, we may continue to hone our capacity to listen, assume response-ability, and encounter the problems that the development project has appropriated for itself with a richer sensibility for the fields in which they operate. In looking to how we navigate, occupy, host, and resist (extra)ordinary sites of sociability, I begin to develop, in this final section, a sort of museum of today, curating varied accounts and impressions, cross-listed with other

substantive points of the dissertation that together politicize the myths of corrupted modernities that we mobilize as our guides, across time and place. These vignettes (or chronicles as so inspired in Brazil) assume a voice self-conscious of the fabrications of a narrative in the real and imagined peripheries of modernity, a sort of backtalk to the mythical and overarching claims of the project of development (i.e. democracy, free markets, order, progress, education, individualism, prosperity), so as to conceive a state of things not identical to itself, that is, beyond the self-referential terms of the game of development. In indeterminacy, development moves away from its overarching temporal framing to putting it in place, and as such, we can get a much better sense of what we are dealing with. From our collective means of transport, to (de)constructions of rites and rituals; from the staging of our villains, heroes, and saints, to mass-scale mobilizations that reinforce and destabilize their narratives; from schoolings and consumptions of idealized modern conduct and success, to escapes and leisure both on the field and sidelines of the game, we find the possibilities for political (dis)engagement, attuned to the perceptions and sensibilities that effectively (dis)enable a politics of transformation. Facts and figures are inadequate guides, at most, or mere rationalizations after the fact. The city, as follows, serves as a stage on which we can politicize the everyday, and understand the dynamics of the emerging, the downtrodden, and the leading subjects of development. Elsewhere we are left stranded in a crisis of narratibility, caught between the official vs. the mundane, the macro vs. the micro, the old vs. the new. On the streets and sidewalks, in schools and sites of sociability, at large, the wanderings and findings of everyday life can often reveal more about the potentials of a politics of transformation than developmental paradigms drafted at a distance.

Milieu and method

In beginning with the seemingly obvious – with the air that we breathe in, as instrumentally as immediately – it becomes possible to reconsider our assumptions, not at their foundations (a philosophical problem of origins, authenticity, truth and dogma) but through our milieu (that which surrounds us and is within us). Perhaps more naturalized than obvious to our senses, our points of departure and continual return serve to remind us of our political and intellectual priorities and responsibility. This quasi-ethnographic disposition that I assume, and, in turn, invite us to take on here in facing the dynamics of a transformative politics, is qualified by more than the conventions of field research that I undertook in the classrooms of Rio's emerging cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial subjects of development, teaching the world's language and the requisite aptitudes and preconditions with which to make it in and for Brazil's much anticipated ascension within a global cultural and political economy. It is qualified by more than the semester of participant observation, focus groups, and interviews with students, teachers, administrators, and sales representatives engaged at Brazil's training grounds for individual and collective prosperity: private English language learning centres (see appendix for more details). Likewise, this methodological disposition and its guiding priorities are qualified by more than the comings and goings of three years of researching Rio's sites of sociability and modes of living together: from the Rio+20 UN summit and counter-summits that redefined developmental landmarks upon my arrival in the city in June 2012, to the eruptions of mass mobilizations seldom before recorded in Brazilian history that unexpectedly accompanied the Confederation Cup of June 2013, to the hosting of the world a year later at the June 2014 World Cup, to a fallout from national

elections that brought the year to a close with reevaluations of the country's progress, and, in Rio, assessments that took the form of questioning whether or not we are on the right track to become an Olympic City by 2016. Still yet, this methodological disposition is qualified by more than my participation/observation of these *stages* of development (the befores, durings, and afters of exhibitionist trials) and the attending analyses that they instigated (from news to social media to policy briefs to archives to meditations on Brazilian social and political thought). It has been, no doubt, most effectively oriented by my comings and goings to the grocery store and markets on a weekly basis, my bus rides and times in waiting moving about the city, my negotiations with neighbours and landlords, my weekends and pauses otherwise defined in the rush of everyday life (whether on a football field, by the seashores, or in the samba circles), even my travels to (and in!) libraries and research centres (with their myriad gatherings, plenaries, seminars, and workshops) have shown me other ways of organizing everyday life and its accompanying truths and discernments, over the past three years of carrying out this project. Oh, and my political activism, too.

This quasi-ethnographic disposition that I here unfold, which strings together all of these routines, rites, and encounters, is foremost bound by an attentiveness to milieu: as the anthropologically inclined might say, to “all the ways little practices through which people's conduct is directed to which people are in-fact made, which are not necessarily even available to them for reflection and verbalization”.³ That is to say, these methods of

³ At the 2012 academic workshop entitled “Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities”, a range of methodological questions were posed to help us rethink our overwhelmingly monolithic, deterministic, and stagiest accounts of socio-political transformation, by way of ethnographic or quasi-ethnographic methods that begin with everyday dynamics situated in time and place. This specific rendition of the problem,

research are far from spatially bound, within the four walls of a classroom or otherwise designated field of study. They exceed containable laboratories of observation.

Following in Tania Li's words, "So is that what is ethnographic? It is not just relying on the interview and on what people actually say. Rather, it is actually having enough exposure to the milieu that you can see all these other little micro-practices".⁴ In response, at a recent interdisciplinary workshop discussing the methodological challenges of working through ethnographies of neoliberalism, Jonathan responds to Tania's questioning as follows: "Ethnography is to me about how people rationalize the decisions they make, how they carry out those decisions and then how they re-rationalize the results of those decisions. It is a process that keeps going back and forth between the things that happens and the things that people say about it. And that requires an engagement where you have to be *present* in a certain way, beyond a single interview, or sitting in on a meeting".⁵

This presence demands a certain commitment to *place* (to living, feeling, and sensing the movements of a chosen location), while also requiring an attentiveness to how these perceptions move across places, which makes any particular delineation of a space in time impossible. What I offer here comes from a dedicated engagement with the back-and-forths. I have been engaged in this back and forth for much longer than the three years that I spent taking in the movements of my milieu with the explicit purpose of

offered by anthropologist Tania Li, is part of an ongoing discussion transcribed to the similarly entitled Blog (Li, "Discussions"). For an overview of this methodological project, see workshop organizer Michelle Brady's concise summary of this intellectual project (Brady, "Ethnographies").

⁴ To follow these dynamic exchanges, refer to Li, "Discussions", in the *Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities Blog*.

⁵ To follow these dynamic exchanges, refer to Simon, "Discussions", in the *Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities Blog*.

carrying out this inquiry into the spectres of development in the everyday life of an aspiring world city of our emerging giant. It would be intellectually dishonest to not put on the table that these three years, of going out into designated fields of research and coming into the pauses of writing this dissertation, coincided with my long awaited 'return home'. Yes, I am Brazilian. But what is more, I bring with me a well-rehearsed sensibility for the back-and-forths required of someone who has struggled to feel at home in any given place at any given time, and, in turn, assumes a sort of profound lightness regarding how we make home in the world and how these practices accordingly mould our positionings and expectations of how it is good to live. It is from this lightness that I claim this 'we' that might otherwise seem out of place, to situate worlds and conversations never mutually exclusive – a *we* that disobeys the futile impositions of insides and outsides whose power is (only) as forceful as we make it out to be. Far from universal, it is radically particular. Likewise, I invite you to include and exclude yourself from such cataloguings as you see fit, so as to feel out where you are and are not, to try on and discard, to pause, to wonder. It is all too easy to reject (or endorse) grand narratives from no-where. *We*, is a call to (dis)engage. In all honesty, with the myriad denaturalizations of home and reconstructions of authenticity at hand, your guide here has no qualms in declaring that, it is good to be back home after so many wanderings and findings over the years. And it is from this place that I initiate this conversation with you, dear reader, about the bridges that we are constantly called to build, destroy, rebuild, and traverse in our search for a politics of transformation. Because to transform, of course, we must each know our place, and we must learn to take it seriously and not so seriously at one and the same time. Hence my choosing of a Carioca Brazil, the place to

which and in which I can speak. And it is not incidental that the Brazil here fashioned from my Rios variously lived offers perspectives into development that are not so economically rendered, for in having lost its place over the last century as the hub of politics and wealth, the centres and peripheries of Brazil's signature city symbolize alternate struggles for recognition and advancement. This Brazil that I put in conversation with you here, is the site that received the Portuguese Crown, and exemplifies the specificities of an Iberian colonization so often marginalized to its British and French counterparts. This is the Brazil of the lusotropical myths and desires for racial and cultural hybridity, now championed as the key to the kinds of tolerance and adaptability apparently required of a global world. This is the Brazil of our dreams (or at the very least, of our postcards), so I am obliged to avow as a good Carioca subject.

And so, what I hope that the specificity of my location and perspective can offer is a resignification of the problem of (under)development for those whose thinking and dreaming have also been colonized by the now dominant North American framings of progress that have made the world over in its image of what it means to be successful, and what it means to be a loser. As fairly typical of the im/e-migrant trajectory to assimilate to, then resist, then make peace with past and present milieus, the insider-outsider standpoint is a fertile terrain from which to work through the very "process that keeps going back and forth between the things that happens and the things that people say about it" in defining our own realities, wherever placed. Throughout this, my own, process, no better aid turned up than immersion in milieu and the mechanics of field research and observation to offer the checks and balances required for political thinking and strategic intervention. Nothing has been more effective at holding me accountable,

face-to-face, for what I say and its impacts. If it were not for the countless eyes that I had to look into (to gain trust and access) in countless encounters and disencounters in the field while writing and thinking this dissertation, it would have been all too easy to romanticize a third world authenticity, to insist on totalizing critiques and condemnations of the insidiousness of a middle class and processes of middle-classification, to hear only what I wanted to hear, to say only what would be useful for my argument, and so on and so forth. When the temptation would arise to censure the ways of a middle class set to (mis)lead the way to a new Brazil and emerging orders, for instance, my encounters in the field would force a certain kind of humanization, which is not about a caring disposition or something comforting of the sort, but about appreciating, first and foremost conceptually, the complexities and ambiguities that situate us in the ways that they do, and making space for them in our analysis and planning, rather than seeking moralized declarations of the way things should or should not be. These connections, lived in between subjects and objects of the field, tend to be much more important than what exactly is said or omitted, as words are but signs that map our relations to one another.

It cannot be emphasized enough: there is nothing like field research to give us the opportunity to think politically and strategically, to see citizens and classes, variously positioned, as people, and learn to listen to them on their own terms. Yet I am not referring here to a vaunted voice that I will relay to you as the reader. Relatively speaking, few words recorded and transcribed will be recited for you here, out of context, for you to make what you will from them. It is to where they pointed me that I will share, opening up pathways naturalized but not always obvious. The voices that I project here in this text are narratives that I carefully chose so as to bring to life stale political debates

and recycled critical musings. They are not proof for a justificatory and self-referential citational regime of truth-telling. They are simply factual stories that may get us thinking about these problems in different ways, toward respectively modulated interventions and resolutions. Above all, I will argue, this is a work in politics, in what a political study has the potential to bring about. To put it otherwise, being lost in the field helped me be less lost in the literature; on this terrain, a productivist logic does not apply.

Allowing myself to lose and find my way, over and again, throughout this study, my first attempt at orientation was to separate out fields of research as separate spheres and sites of sociability so as to make sense of the modes and effects of the developmental ethos at hand. In writing the three parts of this dissertation somewhat simultaneously, I tried to separate out, upfront, the section on the schools (the conventionally bound field of research), from my researchings into everyday life. The dissertation would not have it. Believe me, I tried. The methodological attentiveness to milieu that gave form to this tripartite division would have its integrity broken by such excision, and so schools and other sites of our collective rearing were integrated into the series of vignettes, collected from my day-to-day over these past three years, that stand in for the conclusion of the dissertation. For one, sites of sociability would not begin and end when I would open and close the door to the classrooms or lobbies of these training grounds. The politics of hope weaved into these pedagogical endeavours, proposed as the solution for the most wide ranging development dilemmas and for solidifying the transition of the emergings into the long desired status of first world country, works on bodies being educated, formed and reformed in corridors far from the teacher's eyes. Not to mention that sites in isolation would then weigh more heavily than a shared milieu in constant (re)formation.

Amid classes and conversations in waiting, this milieu was referenced explicitly, of course; throughout the lessons, often indirectly: “Why are you learning English?”, “What do you want for your life?”, “Who do you want to be”, the teachers would pose in dialogue exercises. To demarcate the bounds of these classrooms of an emerging Brazil(ian) would be to disregard how the terms of the game are set and reset through codes and conduct that are always transitive and in which we seldom recognize ourselves very readily. The ways in which Brazilians see themselves have indeed been identified, time and again, as a limiting and enabling factor of our (under)development – and to grasp their political force we need to take the classrooms to the streets, and the streets to the classrooms. The attentiveness that follows to subjects of development, as it were, comes from the consequent concern with how these project(ion)s work. To better comprehend these developmental projects, I therefore needed to resituate their training grounds in relation to the dynamics of their (dis)enabling milieu, something that I sought to do throughout all of the three parts of this dissertation.

The field of research, however defined, serves as a point of reference and continual return. It reminds us of our priorities and responsibilities, to whom, and at what costs. It puts into effect a back and forth, a work of constant inflection, which is more about how we make sense of what is external to it that is entering in, than what it projects outward, of its students and teachers preparing to open their doors to the world. Perhaps almost as vividly as the participant observation, focus groups, and interviews as points of reference in the research process, post-field transcription work prevails as one of the most effective tools for further honing our capacity to listen: to assume our own pauses, hesitations, stresses, exclamations, and uncertainties, while respecting those of others in

the fallible processes of translation. In the very process of transcription and translation, we are forced to hear and rehear word for word – pause for pause – and in their tone decide how to grapple with what people are trying to say and where they are coming from, in those moments when, even with the best of recordings, words fail. In sum, this three-fold process of field research, transcription, and translation invites us to take our words less seriously, and with them, the truths that they are to express. With this invaluable sensibility, or caveat, for us of academic breed, we are then called to let go of the priority of precision (demanded by science) to respect the importance of clarity (necessitated by politics). It is not an alternative proposed as an abstracted better choice, but as a decision about what seems to offer us more attuned guidance. This is what a political methodology can promise us, and much to the fear of academic orthodoxy, we are talking more of a disposition than of a codifiable method (and yes, the results are tangibly different).

Critique and conversation

To take seriously these methodological challenges, while relinquishing their gravity, perhaps what is required of us is not only a lighter disposition that assumes less of and for itself, but a different way of conversing. The Brazilian registry of narrative forms offers many possibilities for auditative exchanges that prioritize how a story is told and its impacts on those receiving it, perhaps even more than what the story tells and its internal truths. One of the great twentieth-century interpreters of Brazilian modernity, Gilberto Freyre (whose analysis of miscegenation remains with us as the defining feature of our socio-economic and political configuration) puts into practice this self-consciously

intimate form of conversing: between science and literature, we find a voice that seeks to grapple with the imprecisions of our social and political world, more clearly. This voice tells us stories not without an objective, consciously weaving narratives that, more than simply convey historical facts and their contemporary implications, get us to feel the place from which things have come to be the way they are. Through allegorical reconstructions of a living past, Gilberto brings us face to face with a Brazil made protagonist, rather than an object of distanced representations. By way of the greasy hands of a Portuguese child-emperor and the classified beards once designating the status of local mulattos, we come to appreciate how categories help and hinder our understandings toward rewriting our own histories. He em-places us – something that modern scientific traditions struggle to do, through their abstract generalizations and futuristic extrapolations. It is not coincidental that Gilberto's most influential work, translated and taken up in numerous languages as a classic of postcolonial thought (credited with explaining how the Portuguese became Brazilian, so to speak), was first translated into English, from *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (Big House and Slave Quarters: the location of the formation of colonial and postcolonial relations of power in Brazil), to *The Master and the Slaves* (a distancing from a milieu to set up readily generalizable subjects of power, exportable to indefinite contexts). Despite, or perhaps because of, the innumerable critiques of a personalistic mode, and its potential for a romantic conservatism that champions cultural singularity above all else, which we doubtless find in Gilberto's work, this very form poses to us a formidable challenge to not escape from our conditions. And here, I will continue in this challenge, such as in putting into practice the provocative convention within Brazilian social and political thought of using

the more intimate first name to refer to fellow authors.⁶ This is an especially powerful practice in a slavocratic context where, the family name barely explains our descendance, not to mention of our inheritance. If I use the surname of the mythical forefathers of modern Western thought (i.e. Sophocles, Hobbes, Rousseau, Weber), it is because intimacy has been created precisely through their distancing, and in such haunted forms our ways of distancing and approximating become clear.

It is no simple task negotiating our inheritances, with the risk of bad science hanging over us in ways that can render critique impossible. Within these contexts, I attempt a negotiation well posed by postcolonial thinkers time and again. In particular, Naem Inayatullah's challenge to modern social sciences, especially to the disciplinary regime of Political Science and International Relations in which I too have come to find myself in writing through this dissertation, encourages us to put in its place and use mindfully the respective instruments of social science as well as literature. Instead of the ethico-political blackmail of critique, he privileges clarity (over precision) and invites us to take responsibility for the decisions that we make in how we engage with (and distance ourselves from) the worlds around us. In this spirit, I here seek to experiment with another way of dealing with the limits and possibilities of this "epistemological

⁶ Within the postcolonial fields of study entitled Interpretations of Brazil that emerged as an attempt to make sense of a newly Independent nation, the recurrent theme of an intimate or relational personalism (i.e. cordiality) has brought to our attention the ways in which we invoke subjects differently positioned through modern systems of power. The convention of first vs. family names is far from an innocent practice. By here insisting on the use of first names, I hope to make inevitable our need to face the conditions of our modernity, as the self-identified cordiality of a tropical breed is simply one more manifestation of such negotiation, and a key to understanding how Brazil has been constituted as an object of a corrupted and delayed development. For ease of reference, I will make use of the family-name citational schematic in the bibliographic footnotes that accompany this dissertation.

distancing” that Naeem reflects on for us, so important to our much valued practices of analysis and knowledge production:

third world or resisting visions of social life emerge less from proper social theory written by ‘non-Westerners’ – most of whom, like myself, have been epistemologically colonized. Rather, such visions emerge from those who understand the limits of the theory/fiction, politics/art, scientific/mythological, freedom/determinacy dichotomies, and then manage to uncover the overlap between theory, fiction, politics, art, science, and myth. They move to create a holistic intimacy between the reader, writer, character, text, and context.⁷

I here take up Naeem’s challenge. And I invite you, dear reader, to try the same, for indeed, this intimacy cannot be created without your collaboration. It is within this collaboration that I will continue to invoke ‘we’, so as to usher in an upfront conversation between us, which recognizes the multiple we’s at play that defy any neat boundaries of self and other. As follows, I ask for your forgiveness, in advance, for the stories untold, the unauthenticated voices, for the theoretical precision lost at the cost of political clarity – trust me in saying that these were not decisions taken lightly. With this trust, I invite you into a milieu, imagined and reimagined, to introduce you to characters whom I have met, encounters that I have had, voices and noises that I have heard, smells and touches that I have taken in while journeying across cities visible and invisible to our mind’s eye. Through these allegorical reconstructions, I offer us sites in which we can rethink our political possibilities. Creative nonfiction?

Of course, as much as I can seek to convince you of the intellectual rigour and political accountability of these methodological choices, your assessment will depend on what you do with the (dis)comforts that arise at the intersections of prescribed methods of

⁷ These methodological challenges are proposed in Inayatullah’s “If Only You Could See” (2). For further elaboration of the implications of these approaches within the discipline of International Relations, refer to his introduction “Falling and Flying” in the collection on *Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR*.

truth-telling. As much as discomforts may be pedagogically productive (in opening unforeseen possibilities), they may also be moments of simply accepting indeterminacy. So when you pause in frustration, as indeed I continue to do so, at moments of ambiguity to come, feel free to make of them what you will, for, after all, that is what we are always already doing – at least in these moments this constant work of translation is made obvious. If at moments the unfolding of ideas is seemingly poetic, it is but an acceptance of uncertainty and the patience that it requires of us; it need not be a problem to be solved. I may assume varied responsibilities as a guide, but what I am guiding is (y)our own process of making sense of these questions, rather than navigating us to a definite end. The colonial endeavour to impose rights and wrongs would be irresponsible in the context of the politics of transformation that I am committed to developing here. Indeed, it is this manoeuvre, more than any other, which has corrupted our dreams and realities.

What a good Brazilian subject fears more than shame (and the hope that it keeps open for pride), is irrelevance. As an (ex)patriated subject of centres and peripheries variously located, I find it important to pause and recognize the weight that we must carry to justify our points of departure, sites of analysis, and methods in out of the way places, especially in an academic context concerned with knowledge production, increasingly to be useful to certain immediate or marketable ends. Sometimes motivating, sometimes crippling, the imperative to justify within the verifiable terms of science why one should be heard, limits more than enables our ventures to understand our worlds, whose validity or application, beyond the therapeutic, must always prove itself – guilty until proven innocent. In this light, it should come as no great surprise that in the substantive middle section where I most directly take on the project of development itself, I felt compelled to

begin with the heralded cradle of modern Western civilization, the ancient Greeks. Projects of development as a projection of...? Contestable as their status may be within a heterogeneous and hotly contested tradition of thought and study, they carry a certain infectious legitimacy to which it is no great surprise I make reference in my own strategic attempt to legitimize a delegitimizing intervention. Beginning with beginnings, however haunted, the attempt to trail alternative paths (alternative to the commanding projections of the good life that override all other possible forms of living) is not to draw parallel footsteps in the sand, but to make something of the impressions left behind. If a political positioning seems blurry in the pages to come ('but I thought that she was against this?', 'isn't that contradictory?', 'in the end, is this conservative or critical?'), be assured that it is no accident of critique. We need to give up on trying to defend ourselves, on self-referential terms, if we have any hope of transforming our shared impressions and realities. In working with the everyday, my wanderings and findings have convinced me to rescind positions of 'left' and 'right', for instance, which only make sense in a bounded polis, if that. How easily the demand to tell the truth translates into the demand to position oneself in the right. That said, here I do not attempt to map out escape routes, for, indeed, they would only serve as escapes from my-self. Here I seek neither to escape from or indulge in our political conventions, but to impress, to affect political possibilities.

Instead of escaping from or indulging in the way things are or ought to be, there are other possible ways of conversing that may serve as better guides along our journeys together. So often within (post)colonial programs of critique, we tend to focus on either, how the 'West' constructs itself via its 'Other', or, alternatively, in romantically giving

voice to the othered entities. The problem is not simply that we pay much less attention to how the Rest constructs itself with and against this overcharged West; it is more than a problem of the denial of coevality, admittedly muted in the relevant literature. The problem is that more attention is given to the constitution of selves and others than to the conversations between them. At stake is identity, rather than the structural relationships forged between these two self-identified points. And where are *we*? Even though the Iberian inheritance of Brazilian formations may privilege interdependence (as in the spirit of master-slave relationships) over subalternity or like constructions that have often sprung from British or French colonial exploitations, the rhetorical confrontation between the West and the Rest elides the making of modernity's traditions and the possible pathways for today's worlds. The abstraction of academic learning, of a scientific disposition, further exacerbates this distancing, seeking to produce verifiable knowledge on objects of study, rather than assuming itself as an instrument to something beyond itself. In order to realize this transformative potential, a different disposition needs to be cultivated, a kind of sensibility not ruled by right and wrong, and its policing categories. It is not wrong, I here insist, to question or engage our realities, to put them into conversation, in terms of how they serve us (i.e. what they do and to where they guide us), rather than what they are (i.e. right or wrong). This practice of learning is not intellectually corrupt, but arguably the most honest and attuned to our political priorities to-day. We, academics in centres and peripheries alike, need not be enslaved to the fear of corrupting knowledge; integrity must be defined in terms of what is being served rather than by the by-products of a profession.

When we face the limits of our understanding, what can we offer by way of a politically oriented and socially attuned comprehension of our contemporary realities? Instead of working on the limits or edges, from what place can we find cohesiveness, without the need for the false comforts of coherence, in the intellectual or logical sense? A certain humility is called for when we accept that interpretations of our contemporary realities can be logically opposed to each other, *and*, each still offer glimpses into possibly helpful, politically oriented, and socially attuned responses. In holding this humility and its accompanying humiliations, what I have striven to offer here are stories that aim to train us to better respond to our contemporary realities, that open up complementary conversations to (other translations of?) the ones that have colonized our political imaginaries. That is, in between these lines, there is no pretension to capture the truth of our coexistence, and its right and wrong pathways. This disposition, therefore, must be judged by tools not exclusively belonging to the realm of logic, of internal consistency, and other such traditional measures of intellectual rigour. There is a disposition that offers us one of the few freedoms that we can access in our conditioned realities: it is a freedom from the necessity to carry what is not ours to carry. Not a humility from a recognition of our limits, but a humility that recognizes our place. Even the most responsible of anarchists in search of pure spaces of freedom, whether motivated by love or hatred, needs to recognize that freedom ought not be measured by degree, but by weight. What we carry and hold, affects how we respond and to whom. At one and the same time our options become as refined as they are amplified.

Critique has made us fearful to speak. When we orient ourselves to this end, either we feel empowered in the arrogance of superiority or disempowered in silence and

shame. Choice colonized our options. Freedom became a dream, rather than a disposition. How we decide to live, together, is not a matter of science, and yet, we need tools just as rigorous, or more, in order to engage its ways and a/e-ffects. The blackmail of science must be responded to on terms not of its dominion. Morality is the business of right and wrong, ideologies of justification. Ethics, on the other hand, offers us the possibility to decide the spirit in which we want to live. Ethos, reimagined? What the stories and investigations here hope to offer are orientations of this reimagining, in relation to valorized and devalorized worlds, today, yesterday, and tomorrow. Do not take these exercises more seriously than this, for gravity impedes upon practices of reorientation. What we need is to encounter these questions with lightness in order to intentionally orient these spirits in which we want to live together. Lightness, not necessarily openness: we need not build up or tear down fences, we can simply spring over them. They need not be the exclusive tools of our orientations. For, after all, it is not knowledge but sensibility that paves the way forward. It is much easier to detect erroneous ways and correct or discipline them, than to grapple with the place from which these forms of accounting for our everyday life come, and translating them into exchangeable stories – this is the work of conversing.

Today the fragments of our ‘common sense’ in a world self-consciously interconnected serve as pedagogical referents more than defining substance. As has been repeated time and again in the march of modernity, the task of critique is thus not the destruction of codes already incomplete, but rather, accounts of their incompleteness and

possible manifestations.⁸ To this end, we must reread our realities, so to speak, with a clear focus on our orienting priorities. Hence *how* we read, write, think, and converse implicates much more than a technical exercise; the ways in which we construct our narratives are often the most telling. The written codes of a modern civilization have overdetermined the modes of our narration. Critique, after all, is a state of thinking, whether reckoned as an interruption or extension of the accepted terms. It is a particular form of verisimilitude, a different kind of equilibrium and story-telling, a different technique or process of accounting for encounters, events, and experiences, whether true or fictitious. How we have learned to navigate the demands of modernity has been subject to hierarchies that regulate what we take in through impositions of form vs. substance, universal vs. particular, factual vs. opinion, fixed vs. fleeting, and so forth. In this context what may be more helpful is showing rather than telling our shared processes of discovery, instead of steering toward a fixed conclusion. To this end we may need to adventure beyond our professional training, as I sure have here, toward different forms of learning and communication, toward resonance.

More helpful than divulging my personal profile, is the relationship that we forge between us, as distanced writers and readers of the problems here unfolded. If our concern is the politics of orientation rather than the truth of our ways, then a different kind of self-disclosure may be more helpful than the “I am a woman of...”. Even though academic voice may mute the self, the opposite act of recovering the self still plays within the terms of its game. So bracketing the problem of interpretation and its self-centrings, let me ask you: what kind of conversation do we want to have? Rather than

⁸ For a comprehensive account of the possible operations of a critical theory that bridges the philosophical and the practical, see Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* (25).

prioritizing truths or corruptions of right and wrong, a recognition that arrogance is the enemy of intellectual excellence (not to mention of a collaborative ethos) is called for. Form and substance are artifices, tools of our ways of thinking; until we grapple with their power over us, it will be difficult to put them in conversation in intentional ways, to intentional ends. Demystifying our tools for thinking may be a good way forward, to advance more earnest and politically attuned conversations. So let us experiment here together. Beginning with beginnings, let us take a moment now to pause and reflect on the basic practice that we are here mobilizing. Dear reader, let me ask you, how did you learn to read? In these pages, what are you reading for? To be fair, I will respond first.

So here we go... I didn't much like reading when I was a child. I was a curious child, always have been, remain so. But like the fixed covers that would tightly seal the front and back of a book together, reading, as an act, also struck me as fixed. Reading was status, after all. To read was to fix in time...a thought, an idea, a problem, an event, or... Maybe I simply couldn't access the concentration – the fixation of attention within prescribed bounds – for the requisite amount of time. Either way, I didn't much like reading as a child.

I first learned to read for information. Highlighter in hand, I was an archaeologist, digging for the facts or data as they came to me in varied forms. Later on yellow bits would be rearranged into a whole, gluing shattered fragments together to bring something into its rightful form. All I needed was to sense the preexisting contours of this structure, and a hell of a lot of glue. I needed to know what I was looking for. The final product was a testament to my ability to break apart and fasten together prized objects into examinable forms. The final product was a testament to my wit.

Then I learned to read for interpretation. A highlighter would no longer do. I needed a pencil. With a good eraser. I learned to never trust red or blue erasers. With pencil in one hand and eraser in the other, my place was now in the margins. I would capture, extrapolate, and ultimately take *away* from the text. Here was yet another love-hate relationship. At one and the same time, a bit of room to breathe...movement, as opposed to the fixity to which I could not bare clinging for too long, that I could only hold either too tightly or too loosely for my grip. Yet, this movement was also predestined, bound to a hierarchy, neither fully mine or of a world out there to be discovered. I would walk away with chains, of the valorized, of knowledge, of urgency, of what needed to be known, substance muted. A testament to my prudence?

Then I learned to read for insight. That seemed important. My eyes, trained by habit, would glaze over facts, most automatically, especially in number-form. The quantifiable, mere details. Substance muted, once over. What I needed to see was how it all fit together. Neither digging deep or extrapolating away, I would apprehend, and be left in apprehension. The (in)famous appetite, I was left craving revolution, one after another...otherwise, rebellion would do. I was to build up, take down, and build up again, fortresses of knowledge. The wrong proved the right, it was an all out war for truth. Freedom for the victorious, at last? Or, at the very least, a testament to my good judgement?

Across all of these modes, literature (the art of reading?) was an utter waste of time. Later on, more tolerant, I could envy how those thus trained eyes would read faster than mine, with a certain fluidity in pace. Of course, the edge, here, was of convenience (to amplify that which is valuable!), and not of any differentiated relationship to the word

that this disposition may or may not open up. Unimportant. I, the reader of things important in the world, was stuck reading word for word. If not painstakingly slow, then it was skimming. Nothing in between. The academic text, I would later concede, does not tend to seduce other ways of reading. Speed is a skill or technique, not a rhythm or relationship.

In good academic fashion, I learned to read form with/against substance. Whether digging for one at the expense of the other (e.g. in the classic encyclopaedic structure), or subsuming one for the elucidation of something greater (e.g. the use value of the case study), they were separate filters. I would not waste my time on reading stories or even, at the apex of my training, overly-specific cases, and would skip from introduction to conclusion, and when more patient, skim the beginnings and endings of paragraphs, as well. And, irony coming full circle, I would not waste time on quantifiable figures, for they are even more fleeting than the narratives weaved together to move an audience in indirect gestures. I would read for... What do you read for?

At the height of my academic training (hazing?), I would not have taken the time to read what I wrote here. So why should you? The answer, you will find, lies in between the sentences of the pages to come. More than a clever trick to entice you to read what I offer here, in the words of the impatient anthropologist, “your metaphor, my literality”.⁹ Here I seek to experiment in form giving substance, and substance giving form. Within the confines of an academic dissertation, of course, this experiment is tempered, as any endeavour, by its strategic interventions into audiences defined and redefined to certain ends. It was written from bits of napkins travelling back and forth

⁹ For narrative forms that take the ethnographic to its sur-real registers, see Taussig’s *The Magic of the State* (4).

between pages. Never could I spend more than a few weeks on a section without being impelled to move back and forth between the others. In fact, every time that I sat to write, I moved back and forth...back and forth not only between sections, but between worlds, between languages, between audiences. Editing was vicious.

We write like we read. Here, I was not writing for information (however much I needed it). I was not writing for interpretation (however much it was part of the process). Neither was I writing to usher in insight to previously dark corners of knowledge, politics, subjectivity, or what have you. In writing, I was resting in time. I was learning to face and hold conflicting truths no longer at war with one other. And so, in turn, form and substance invaded each others' domains until they could no longer find their ways home. In moments, they bled into one another in a way that I would have likely skimmed over their words, their wounds, not too long ago, for not being able to identify what they had to offer to me so readily. (Yes, every now and again, I am still tempted to skim.) In other moments, they exercised their functions to other ends. In processes of revision, they were justified.

These modes of (re)reading and (re)writing are, of course, incomplete processes of comprehension, or, more accurately, they are always in conversation with subjects and objects of varied kinds. As in the pages bound before you, there never comes an end, just submission. I had to make peace with incompleteness. Page by page...your metaphor, my literality. Between pages written and read, news and gossip filtered, letters exchanged with a Brazilian on a boat, and chatter interlinking everyday routes, this peace had to be rebartered. Between the ensuing annotations forming into a dissertation, vignettes on napkins marked their guiding problematics. When no napkin was nearby, things slipped

the mind, and I would let them slip, with faith that somewhere they would exert their influence. Sometimes I would switch from my cozy round table at the *Museu da República*, overlooking the monkeys climbing about the trees and the friendly smiles rummaging through the stuffy archives of Brazilian histories, windows cracked open at all times...to the cold cubicles surrounded by suits of the institution set up during the first dictatorship to produce the administrators of the new state machineries, yes, *Fundação Getúlio Vargas*...and back again, as measured attempts to respectively open possibilities and impose closure, attempts at creation and completion, and ultimately, a discipline of reading and writing. I only read in the *Museu's* gardens. Everything in moderation, even moderation. In these many back and forths, how, then, do we read incompleteness? How can we hold incompleteness not as suspension, but as a resting in...resting in time. I never had open less than a dozen word documents differently entitled, some two dozen websites per internet browser, and another few dozen PDFs tucked away in the left-hand margin, at ready disposal. I longed for the day when I could close a tab, preferably without opening another. That day never came. Good thing, too.

In the end, what are you reading for? For what conversations do you long to have?

What I can here offer you as guidance, dear reader, are not static representations of my identity (as self and/or other), but the movements of a project that was written amidst many back and forths – to the modern scientific eye, yes, it may seem circular, even redundant, or euphemistically enigmatic – and so it ultimately presents to us exercises in orientation. You can read this dissertation in any order, as this too was the way that it was written. Vignettes of the concluding section cross-reference interventions

scattered throughout the project as a whole. Yes, there may be insufficient contrast, at times, but the divisions of analytic coldness are just as misleading. In editing, I set up guideposts, but they are imprinted in layered rather than linear trajectories. After all, it is not about saying something new (vs. outmoded), this surely is not the merit of this work here in front of you, if myths of critique and originality lead you otherwise. If I make the naturalized obvious, reorganize and reorient what was already present, this will serve as the standard of my object-ivity. It is, in fact, much more difficult, intellectually and politically speaking, to show what is here, than what has been lost. This preface, also written on bits and pieces of napkins over the past three years of field research and writing, attempts to register and amplify such experimentations to come.

Ac-knowledge-ments

For some, here will be found a dissertation into the third world dilemma, of a corruption only curable by education and its panaceas for our final and irreversible take-off. For the less functionalist, here will be found an exploration into peripheral manifestations and negotiations of modernities around centres undefined, undefinable. For others even more loosely conducted, perhaps the cultural politics of identity, lifestyle, language, and other developmental tropes of a citizen or nation in formation will be the focus, whether on international or urban scales, political or economic accounts, sociological or anthropological registers. Whatever you are reading for, this project materialized in conversations much more varied than its words could capture.

As follows, in reading as much as writing, the authorial presence is never clear. Who is reading whom? Who is writing whom? Is the reader writing her truth, or is the

author reading it? Somewhere in between, we realize that it does not actually matter. We are always thinking in collaboration, in unison and in harmony, in melodies and in dissonances. This project has been no exception. I co-authored with so many the ideas here proposed, that if academic structure permitted, I would entitle myself editor rather than author – editor of a collection of ideas that found me, and which I found, living and researching in the shadows and spotlights of the developmental fields of a chronically emerging Latin American giant. Sadly, the citational regime of truth-telling does not make space for these kinds of acknowledgements...to acknowledge the bus driver who articulated the bridging conclusion to Part II; the kids who were playing in front of me on that day when I was working out the problem of the trickster; the activists on the streets and sidewalks trying to make sense of a politics beyond the state, rehearsing alongside me seductive rather than confrontative methods of engagement; the cop who asked me not to record his image on the battle-lines because he lives in favela and identification has implications on all sides; and so many other co-authors of ideas, arguments, and inspirations here registered. In moments of *ac-knowledge-ment* – of a particular way of/to knowing – many processes and outcomes are worked through in elucidating ways, for readers and writers in collaboration (so don't skim past it!). If the preface is the primary place to declare one's motives, perspectives, struggles, intentions, overcomings, and so forth, in order to establish honesty between us, dear reader, here go some final words of guidance, received and inflected...

The disposition in which our judgements cease to become ours and their weight evaporates alongside conditions otherwise centred, is one whose learnings and trainings initiated long before this project, with the woman to whom I dedicate its culmination.

She taught me to trust something that our mind cannot grasp, and surrender to a generosity that frees us from the bounds of a more auto-centred way of thinking and living, without me even realizing that I was being taught. Hayla Fonseca Gill, more than a grandmother, my companion: obrigada. And by her side for the past sixty years, Pedro Paulo, in his own way, showed me that love is not chosen, but may be decided upon. In my journey home, a whole team was cheering me on throughout my readaptations to Rio, even if they were not always able to follow my moves and the why's behind them, and in the front row of these stands I remain evermore grateful to Pedro, meu vascaíno, amigo, e pai, for enabling me to feel patience with “Andréa Terabyte”, and as such nourishing spaces for (mis)guided explorations that hold so much in store for us. My mother, Nadia, for a love that demands so much while demanding nothing at all. My sister, Maitê, for the combined strength of both of these virtues. And to my families spread across the far-reaching corners of the giant, for reminding me that I am not alone, as much as I may seek solitude: Vovô Adão, Neuza, Victor, Thiago, Déborah, Tia Una, Diogo, Otinho, Tia Lala, Tio Cláudio, Claudinha, Arthur, Paulinha, Pedro Henrique, Tio Lino, Lara, Pepe, Ciça, Lininho, Fernando, Regina, Rosa, Roberto, Bernardo, Guilherme, and so many others who have taught me how to accept help.

For the chosen, for showing me how I want to live in overlapping worlds: Bruno de Oliveira, the brother that I always wanted, who knows just how to annoy and love me in all of the right ways, giving me what he thought that I was giving him and what I thought that he was giving me, my official sponsor in interventions of all sorts that composed the ways of this dissertation. The day that we declared truce changed my life, irreversibly. And for the world that we created together in Pleasantville, where I

rediscovered my Brazilian (mis)conducts in breaking ground for the re-search to come: Fabiane Silveira, Mirella Marchese Colagrande, Luciana Camargo, Livia Xavier Carneiro, Clécio Varjão, André Nunes, Celso Filho, Eric Leong, Bruce Giles, Mario Brondani, Glenn Knowles, Lilian Pozzer, Leandro Collares, and the whole company of im/e-migrants who showed me that home can be recreated inauthentically and irreverently, in the best of ways. Marly Lopes and Luciene Almeida, you too at a distance only measurable by time, have been pillars in the creations and recreations of these worlds in which I feel so at home. Our portraits remain on my fridge so as to remind me of who I want to be. Thank you for the journeys that paved the way to this project, and gave it foundation.

On the grounds of these journeys, materialized, my Rio-based team was always cheering me on regardless of the colours on their jerseys: Sílvia Correia, for opening the *Biblioteca Silveira Martins* for me at inopportune moments and showing me what a Portuguese expat makes of a Brazil on the rise, and loving me nonetheless; Marta Fernández Moreno, for her unfiltered generosity and readiness to redefine academic expeditions; Beto Yamato, for his all-encompassing embraces that made it okay to allow the affective as our guide, especially in a dismayed *Gringolândia*; Natália Félix de Souza, for speaking my language; Manuela Trindade Viana, for our shared pursuit of a politics of process, reflection, and the idiosyncratic; Paulinho Chamon, for the laughs; Victor Coutinho Lage, for a discerning rigour only surpassed by a dedicated earnestness; and the host of fellow navigators of academic waters. At the Institute of International Relations at PUC-Rio, I have so many others to thank for their ongoing support of my research, transitions, and translations: Paulo Esteves, my cordial host, and João Nogueira, for

making my engagement with this vibrant intellectual community possible in previously unimaginable ways. As a third reader of this dissertation, Paulo always managed to sense what intervention was called for in our intermittent encounters between field research and writing, creating resonance in conversations far from steady, and as a result, making me feel welcome and encouraged in explorations here attuned. For Nizar Messari, whose first impressions at the Institute in 2006 opened my mind and heart to other possible research sites, commitments, and competencies: I remain so grateful for your solidarity, in letting me know that it is okay to speak many languages and not have any mastered, to incessantly require revisionings as an insider-outsider. Many more collaborators guided my ways through researching in Rio: to all of the students, teachers, parents, administrators, and staff at the schools that I engaged, thank you for your openness, generosity, and trust. To my fellow political activists, on the streets and in the studios, without our experimentations in rethinking and reliving our place, here and now, none of this would have been bearable (I will refrain from naming names here, as some of us are still being persecuted and detained in the preventative measures of a self-assured post-dictatorship state where the disrespect of authority, *desacato*, remains illegal): *Não teve Copa!*

In and across sites variously marked off, my supervisors have been my witnesses. Nomadic as have been my wanderings – never containable to the purely intellectual, political, or personal – they have been some of the most *present* throughout my countless transformations. Eight years we have shared in an academic journey that far exceeds the heavy concrete hallways of the University of Victoria. They have created space for me to find my voice, as student, as teacher, as researcher and writer of our shared struggles in

the world. They have taught me to be more bold where I was not, and less bold where I was. That is, they have put me face to face with the necessity to decide, amidst endless doubts, anxieties, principles, and so many other contraptions that we (ab)use in navigating our everyday – the true work of politics! Each taught me different ways of hearing, not closed off on one’s own terms. I learned clarity and precision with them, with much discomfort and gratitude. Warren, thank you for telling me that my M.A. thesis could have been written by any of the overly-entitled white boys that I was trying to take on at the time. Each step that I get closer to matching form and substance, I think of you. It is a long road ahead. Thank you for letting me come to things in my own time, while simultaneously making me play by the rules of the game, and for, in turn, normalizing the exceptional in my angst along the way. Sorry that it took me so long to realize that ‘demanding’ is not always a compliment in intellectual endeavours. Rob, thank you for the groundless grounds that call forth the most profound form of grounding. And for the respect that comes with the ability to face what we need to face, and assume it as ours. For the responsibility of freedom, and the accompanying decisions regarding just how to use this elbow room that we are constantly struggling for. For showing me that “Canadian Andrea” and “Brazilian Andréa” needed to be reconciled, as my first witness in between – internal consistency, the good and the bad of it. Writing a dissertation is anything but an efficient process: for the patience and support that you have both shown me throughout the years, thank you. In the process, I learned that patience, an acceptance of timing, is perhaps the greatest virtue of writing...of reading?

At the University of Victoria, I have so many more participants to this process to thank: Feng Xu, Scott Watson, Claire Cutler, Jim Tully, Marlea Clarke, Tamaya

Moreton, Rosemary Barlow, Joy Austin, Joanne Denton, Steve Garlick, Bill Carroll, Greg Blue, and numerous others who in crossing my paths, inside and outside of the classroom, opened many doors and windows for me. Daniel Fridman's perceptive engagement with different versions of this dissertation has been essential in encouraging my explorations in Latin American contexts, variously grounded – and so hopeful in its reaffirmations of how invaluable it is for *hermanos* to work together! In conjunction with the fellowship of the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada, the support of the Department of Political Science and Faculty of Graduate Studies have allowed me to prioritize academic pursuit in once inconceivable ways. Fellow graduate students shared so much with me in this process, opening to me ways of thinking and navigating that helped me find my own way through: Caitlin Craven, Joanna Cordeiro, Tim Fryatt, Simon Labrecque, Joëlle Alice Michaud-Ouellet, Renee McBeth, Kelly Aguirre, Christopher Parsons, Adam Molnar, Liam Mitchell, Mark Willson, among countless others. Thank you, Mark Franke, my Honours supervisor, for leading me to these ring roads of the Island campus. On this island, no one has been more reorienting of my ways than Serena Kataoka: it would be impossible to overestimate the spaces that she opened in my personal, political, and intellectual life, giving way to one of the most significant shifts in disposition in all of my consequent endeavours. Without the inspirations that she so generously imparted, to return to something new, this dissertation simply would not be what it is, and what is more, its research sites and methods would be unimaginable.

Off the island, numerous other mentors have inspired me in academic hallways and conference lobbies. Janet Conway has been one of the most (com)passionate of

guides, who gave voice to my early engagement and research within the World Social Forum movements, since 2004, and from this time onward has remained *present* as one of the few women who has shown me what is possible inside and outside of the ivory towers. I have also had the great fortune of the accompaniment of a teacher who specializes in recreating pause – pause, not as a break or suspension, but as a resting in time. Himadeep Mupiddi, your interventions that go more with the flow than against it have always come at the most needed of times. Beyond productive feedback on unwieldy drafts and napkin-notes surrounding the development of this dissertation, in breakfasts, lunches, and dinners in between conferencing and such, what you have offered me is the possibility to sit with whatever arises and narrate its power over us. Admittedly I may have, at times, craved the devastating and deconstructive interventions of an argumentative academic temperament, and yet your interventions have yielded so much more. In pause, I was able to take on that postcolonial rage and shame, not as a way of being or living, but as something that must pass through us. In fact, it is probably one of the few ways that I was able to move forward with the concluding sections of the dissertation in the violent aftermath of Brazil's World Cup.

Pauses come in many forms, and I have had many guides usher me into their illuminating spaces. Most of them do not have names. Some do. Meiten McGuire, you have allowed me to see with my own eyes, to return to a home that not even a Brazil, real or imagined, could contain for me. In these shared pathways, discipline has been resignified as freeing and enabling of pauses in which we can decide how it is good to live. This disposition has been brought to life for me through a faith, to which only Thiago Kobe could have presented me. With you, even *saudade* is confounded with

presence: when the spirit of things is not opposed to the reason of things, our possibilities for responding to how is it good to live, are amplified, and for the synchronicities and shared (im)perfections that make this possible, I remain invariably grateful. The search for the way things are, so to speak, does not need to be at war with a critical ethos bent on deconstructing the foundations and assumptions of our ways of knowing and living. It is through such ac-knowledge-ments, that we can learn what to carry with us, and what to let go of: the space between the natural and the obvious is vast. If we give the same trust over to the spirit of things as we do to the reason of things, something obvious becomes all too clear: to each, their place.

Modern science and the way forward

Modern science gave us a certain kind of precise capacity to render the world legible. By legislating the explainable from the unexplainable, it empowers us to bring resolution to the problems that we identify, as well as recognize our limits, thereby enabling critique. One of Brazil's greatest literary figures, Machado de Assis, aptly captures the dynamics of this interminable quest to draw the line between reason and unreason, and with his guidance I will here conclude the preface.¹⁰

In one of his most renowned, and certainly, one of Brazil's funniest literary works, *O Alienista* (The Psychiatrist, as the time-honoured profession was designated at the time), Machado takes us to a small town of Itaguaí in the interior of the state of Rio de Janeiro, where one of the most important doctors of Brazil and the Iberian

¹⁰ For an insightful introduction to Assis' work, within the contexts of a modernism, realism, and liberalism of an ex-colonial and slavocratic society of the time of such literary interventions, refer to Schwarz's "A Brazilian Breakthrough".

metropolises was said to reside. After extensive training abroad, he returned home with a mission: “The health of the soul, he cried out, is the most worthy occupation of a doctor”.¹¹ So with the support of the townspeople, our noble doctor, Simão Bacamarte, sets up a sort of psychiatric hospital, *Casa Verde*, to study and treat those of unsound mind, previously locked away. He commences by classifying individual characteristics, so as to find the human, rather than divine, explanations of madness: each virtue was attacked at its most solid point; when this method did not work on the most predominant qualities, the doctor attacked other virtues, and always cured the patients. As the years passed, he came to realize that four-fifths of the city’s population had been interned. As a result of this exaggerated proportion of the hospitalized, the noble doctor reworked his scientific theory: “from this examination and statistical fact, it was concluded for him that the true doctrine was not that which he had believed, but the opposite, and thus, that what should be admitted as normal and exemplary is disequilibrium of the faculties and the pathological hypothesis affects those cases in which this equilibrium is interrupted”.¹² He consequently decided to free all of the residents of *Casa Verde* and intern the one-fifth of the city’s population that was outside of the institution, those who were demonstrating so-called normal behaviour all of the time. However determined to discover the truth about madness, his method of inverting qualities and virtues did not reveal the nature of madness, as one by one each of the newly interned were cured of their afflictions. Perplexed, the noble doctor asked himself,

¹¹ “A saúde da alma, bradou ele, é a ocupação mais digna do médico” (Assis, 2, translation mine).

¹² “desse exame e do fato estatístico, resultara para ele a convicção de que a verdadeira doutrina não era aquela, mas a oposta, e portanto, que se devia admitir como normal e exemplar o desequilíbrio das faculdades e como hipóteses patológicas todos os casos em que aquele equilíbrio fosse ininterrupto” (Assis, 28, translation mine).

But were they all mad, and were cured by me? —or what seemed to be the cure was nothing more than the discovery of the perfect disequilibrium of the mind? Digging deeper, he reached this conclusion: the well-organized minds that he had healed, were just as unbalanced as the others. Yes, he said to himself, I cannot claim to have instilled a new sentiment or faculty; both existed in latent forms, but they existed.

Reaching this conclusion, the distinguished doctor had two contrasting feelings, one of joy, and the other of defeat. The joy was to see that, after long and patient investigations, constant work, enormous struggle with the people, he could affirm that truth: there were no crazy people in Itaguaí. Itaguaí did not possess any of unsound mind. But as soon as this idea was refreshing his soul, another appeared that neutralized the first effect; it was the idea of doubt. For what! Itaguaí did not possess any fixed minds? This conclusion was so absolute, would not be so erroneous, and therefore would destroy the large and majestic edifice of a new psychological doctrine?

The affliction of the egregious Simão Bacamarte is described by the chroniclers of Itaguaí as one of the most hideous moral storms that has fallen on a man. But storms only stop the weak; the mighty become stronger against them and stare down thunder. Twenty minutes later a soft light illuminated the doctor's physiognomy. — Yes, it must be, he thought. That is it. Simão Bacamarte found in himself the characteristics of perfect mental and moral equilibrium; it seems that he possessed the wit, patience, perseverance, tolerance, truth, moral force, loyalty, all of the qualities that can ultimately form one of unsound mind. He doubted this, of course, and even got to conclude that it was an illusion; but, being a prudent man, he decided to convene a council of friends, whom he interrogated frankly. The opinion was affirmative — No defect? — None, the assembled uttered in chorus. — No vice? — None. — Everything perfect? — Everything... — It is a scientific question, he said; this is a new doctrine, whose first example is me. In me is brought together both theory and practice.¹³

¹³ “Mas deveras estariam eles doidos, e foram curados por mim,—ou o que pareceu cura não foi mais do que a descoberta do perfeito desequilíbrio do cérebro? E cavando por aí abaixo, eis o resultado a que chegou: os cérebros bem organizados que ele acabava de curar, eram desequilibrados como os outros. Sim, dizia ele consigo, eu não posso ter a pretensão de haver-lhes inculcado um sentimento ou uma faculdade nova; uma e outra coisa existiam no estado latente, mas existiam. / Chegando a esta conclusão, o ilustre alienista teve duas sensações contrárias, uma de gozo, outra de abatimento. A de gozo foi por ver que, ao cabo de longas e pacientes investigações, constantes trabalhos, luta ingente com o povo, podia afirmar esta verdade: — não havia loucos em Itaguaí. Itaguaí não possuía um só mentecapto. Mas tão depressa esta idéia lhe refrescara a alma, outra apareceu que neutralizou o primeiro efeito; foi a idéia da dúvida. Pois quê! Itaguaí. não possuiria um único cérebro concertado? Esta conclusão tão absoluta, não seria por isso mesmo errônea, e não vinha, portanto, destruir o largo e majestoso edifício da nova

Facing this tumultuous affliction, Doctor Simão Bacamarte came to the realization that in his very body he could find that perfectly balanced mind, and so he interned himself in the *Casa Verde*, and there, according to city legend, he died some seventeen months later, without a cure, as Itaguaí's only madman.

The rigour of a scientific method is both its glory and grave: it enables a recognition of our limits, the possibility of critique, and even the noble doctor's own (self)realization of the cause and effect of rational codes and conduct, while simultaneously disabling an acceptance of the ambiguities that bring together and tease apart these very causes and effects. It does not help us to explain why, when dealing with *saudade*, for instance, we would choose (and repeatedly do) to poke and prod at the ache for it not to stop hurting. Why we would choose to live with a toothache out of sight, or a living dead close at hand. And more broadly speaking, how we can hold both the will to remember and the will to forget in an entirely coherent and compatible way. To put it otherwise, it does not help us to explain why we might choose not to go to the dentist.

In deciding how to navigate the past and the future to live how we want to live in the present – the challenge of *saudade* that I will here carry forth – it is not always

doutrina psicológica? / A aflição do egrégio Simão Bacamarte é definida pelos cronistas itaguaienses como uma das mais medonhas tempestades morais que têm desabado sobre o homem. Mas as tempestades só aterram os fracos; os fortes enrijam-se contra elas e fitam o trovão. Vinte minutos depois alumiu-se a fisionomia do alienista de uma suave claridade. — Sim, há de ser isso, pensou ele. Isso é isto. Simão Bacamarte achou em si os característicos do perfeito equilíbrio mental e moral; pareceu-lhe que possuía a sagacidade, a paciência, a perseverança, a tolerância, a veracidade, o vigor moral, a lealdade, todas as qualidades enfim que podem formar um acabado mentecapto. Duvidou logo, é certo, e chegou mesmo a concluir que era ilusão; mas, sendo homem prudente, resolveu convocar um conselho de amigos, a quem interrogou com franqueza. A opinião foi afirmativa. — Nenhum defeito? — Nenhum, disse em coro a assembléia. — Nenhum vício? — Nada. — Tudo perfeito? — Tudo.... — A questão é científica, dizia ele; trata-se de uma doutrina nova, cujo primeiro exemplo sou eu. Reúno em mim mesmo a teoria e a prática.” (Assis, 34, translation mine).

obvious what the best paths forward may be. So before we rush off to cure our ills, with our classifications of what is right, correct, efficient, rational, effective, and so forth, we may want to pause, poke and prod, some more. Instead of venturing into projected futures or negating times past, we may be able to sense, if more tactically perhaps, the possibilities for how we want to live, here and now. Let us hold off on calling the dentist.

Andréa Gill
Rio de Janeiro
2012-2015

PART I

Resetting the Terms of the Game:
Brazil takes off, again

projects of development

BRAZIL
LAND OF THE FUTURE

Stefan Zweig
1941

At first, one is apt to think that this liberating effect is only the result of what the eye sees, of the happy absorption of this unique beauty that seems to greet the newcomer with open arms. But soon one realizes that this harmonious disposition of nature has become part of the attitude of the whole nation. One who has just escaped the crazy destructiveness of Europe first greets the total absence of any hatred in public and private life as something unbelievable, and then welcomes it with infinite relief. The fearful tension that for decades has been ruining our nerves hardly exists here. All contrasts, even social ones, lack the sharp edge, and especially that poison with which we have grown so familiar - nationalism and racial hatred. Here politics, with all their treachery, have not yet become the focal point of private life, not yet the centre of all thinking and feeling. As soon as one enters this country, it is one's first pleasant and ever-recurring surprise to find in how friendly and peaceful a way people live with each other within this immense space. Instinctively one breathes more freely, feeling grateful for having escaped from the stuffy air of race and class hatred to this calmer and more humane atmosphere. Doubtless there is more indolence in the way of living; under the imperceptibly relaxing influence of the climate people develop less impetus, less vehemence, less strong a vitality - in short, less of just those qualities which nowadays are tragically overestimated and praised as the moral values of a nation. But it is we who have experienced the awful consequences of this organization, this greed and lust for power in our own life, who enjoy all the more this calmer and more relaxed form of living and look upon it as a blessing. Far be it from me to pretend that conditions in Brazil today are ideal. Many things are still in their infancy or in a state of transition. The standard of living of a large part of the population is still far below ours. The technical and industrial achievements of these nearly fifty million people can still only be compared with those of a minor European State. The administrative machine is not yet working smoothly, and still produces minor breakdowns. To travel a hundred miles into the interior is to return to the primitive conditions of a century ago. Newcomers to this country will first of all have to become accustomed to small irregularities, inconsistencies, and to a certain laxity in daily life; and many travellers who see the world only from hotel or automobile can still afford the luxury of returning with the haughty feeling of belonging to a superior civilization, and may find many things in Brazil backward and inferior. But the events of recent years have considerably changed our opinions concerning the meaning of the words "civilization" and "culture". We are no longer ready to parallel them with the words "organization" and "comfort". Nothing has favoured this fatal error more than statistics. This materialistic science calculates the national wealth of a country, the share of the individual in it, and the existing number of automobiles, bathrooms, radios, and insurance policies per head. Judging by these figures the most cultivated and most civilized peoples would seem to be those who have the strongest impetus to production, the maximum consumption, and the greatest sum in individual wealth.

An important element, however, is lacking in these figures: they do not include the human way of thinking, which we believe to be the truest criterion for the measurement of culture and civilization. We have seen that the highest form of organization has not prevented nations from using just this power solely in the interest of bestiality instead of humanity. Within a quarter of a century our European civilization has surrendered itself for the second time. And so we are no longer willing to judge a country by its industrial, financial, and military strength, but rather by its peaceful way of thinking and its humane attitude.

In this sense, which I believe to be the most important, Brazil seems to me one of the most worthy of emulation, and therefore one of the most lovable countries of our world. It is a country which hates war; even more, it has hardly ever experienced it. With the exception of the Paraguay episode, which was senselessly provoked by a mad dictator, Brazil for more than a century has settled all border disputes by pacific agreement or through an international court of arbitration. Generals are neither the pride of Brazil nor her heroes; but rather statesmen like Rio Branco, who knew how to prevent war by reasoning and conciliation. Sufficient in herself, Brazil has no desire to expand, nor any imperialistic tendencies. No neighbour can demand anything from her, and she does not demand anything from her neighbours. Never has the peace of the world been threatened by her politics; and even in an unpredictable time such as ours one cannot imagine that this basic principle of its national conception, this wish for understanding and good-will, could ever change - because this desire for peace, this humanitarian behaviour, has not been an accidental attitude of a singular ruler or leader. It is the natural product of a people's character, the innate tolerance of the Brazilian, which again and again has proved itself in the course of history. Brazil was the only Iberian nation never to see bloody persecutions; the pyres of the Inquisition have never flamed here. There is no other country where slaves have been treated with such comparative humaneness. Even her inner upheavals and changes of government have taken place without bloodshed. When her desire for independence drove out two kings and one emperor, they left the country without interference, and therefore without hatred. Since Brazil became independent - the leaders have never paid with their lives. Whoever ruled this country was forced unconsciously to adapt himself to this native tolerance. For decades the only monarchy in American countries, it was not by chance that Brazil had as an emperor the most democratic, the most liberal of all crowned regents. And today, though considered to be a dictatorship, Brazil knows more individual freedom and contentment than most of our European countries. So one of our greatest hopes for future civilization and peace in our world, which has been destroyed by hatred and madness, rests on the existence of Brazil, whose desires are aimed exclusively at pacific development. Wherever ethical forces are at work, our task is to strengthen those intentions. Wherever in our troubled times we find hope for a new future in new zones, it is our duty to point out this country and these possibilities.

* * *

Farewell (Rio de Janeiro): No one who has ever been here wants to leave. At each departure from this enchanting town one longs to return. Beauty is rare, but perfect beauty is almost a dream. This city of all cities makes this dream come true, even in the darkest hour, for there is no city in the world capable of offering more comfort.

¹⁴*Beyond winners and losers: negotiating the wagers of modernity*

Development projects come and go. They cycle through as readily as the seasons, with each passing term bringing new and improved ways to rectify “the state of the world”.¹⁵ That is to say, their operations are designed to help those countries that are otherwise incapable of improving the living conditions of their people, which, after all, whether of a social, political, economic, or environmental nature, have impacts that transgress national boundaries mapped in abstract space. They are, in reality, the world’s problems:

- population and migration control;
- human security and rights;
- urbanization and industrialization;
- health and education;
- environmental protection and natural resource management;
- food and agricultural production;
- gender, family, and social issues;
- science and technology;
- governance and law;
- and of course, economic development – or (in)famously, the wealth and poverty of nations.

And the faded laundry list continues...

The average lifespan of a development project is anywhere from a few months to a few years, depending on how committed its practitioners and sponsors are. Inter-

¹⁴ The literary works of Austrian novelist, journalist, and biographer travelled across the Americas and Europe with widespread resonance, expressing the laments of a world at war (Zweig, *Brazil*, 10-13, 210). Credited with coining the popular expression of Brazil as a “country of the future”, his portrayal of the *potential* of our civilizational forms captures both the optimism and pessimism of national discourses on Brazilian (under)development.

¹⁵ From annual reports on “State of the World’s Children”, to “State of the World’s Cities”, to “State of the World’s Forests”, the United Nations development machinery maps out and ranks nation-states in relation to one another, institutionalizing a classificatory politics of development that continues to shape our imaginaries of first worlds, third worlds, and their struggling in-betweens. See the United Nations Department of Public Information archives for exemplars.

governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, business, universities and research centres all have a stake in the development game. From the position of those who deem themselves capable of dealing with the world's problems, the business of development is assumed as a legacy of the World Wars of the twentieth century, which remains a marker of new endings and beginnings following centuries of the colonial expansion of modern European nation-states. The global visions of the great powers, battling it out on the fields of Europe, its allies and enemies, extended into crusades for civilization against barbarism in arenas near and far. Armed with science and technology, revamped in combat, as in the celebrated words of US President Harry Truman whose inauguration speech spearheaded an era of modern (inter)national development, "for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people".¹⁶ As in 1949, "these people" are, still today, the neighbours to the south, Latin America among other so-called underdeveloped nations.

Escalating fears about the economic prospects and political stability of 'the third world' after decolonization founded development studies, as we know it today. Colonial economics morphed into development economics in the postwar period, and gave rise to a field that following the collapse of the Cold War spread across disciplines and classrooms in the third world and countries otherwise entangled in colonial histories, gravitating around the former hubs of the British Empire as its contested point of origin.¹⁷

¹⁶ For further elaboration of the significance of Truman's Point Four in the context of these transforming conceptions of international relations, refer to Rist's *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (70-72).

¹⁷ For historical situatings of the field of development studies, see Kothari's *A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies* and Abbott's *Theories of Industrial Modernization and Enterprise Development: A Review*. Also helpful is the Institute of Development Studies' report, *From Colonial Economics to*

This scholarly and technocratic inquiry honed its voice at a time when the field of International Relations was mapped almost exclusively along the axis of West/East orientation (oh, the communists!).¹⁸ And along the North/South axis? Special interest in the concerns of underdeveloped regions were reserved to a nebulous space beyond the tenable scope of the unfolding chronicles of great power politics. In due course, so as to explain the success or failure of reform processes in recovering colonies, development practitioners and analysts eventually conceded the need to move beyond the traditional optics of economics and politics, as inherited. Even the World Bank, one of the key funders in the business of development, has gone inter/multi/trans-disciplinary in its diagnoses and treatments. Through its financial and technical services, the capacity to deliver measurable results (i.e. in raising income growth levels of the poorest of the poor) has become tied to participatory methods, knowledge sharing, and correspondingly ‘inclusive’ processes.¹⁹ Far from its origins in postwar reconstruction project financing (with France as its first and until today largest grant recipient), the business of helping is mired in complex histories of colonization and decolonization, as modes of modern governance and wealth production.

Development Studies (Seers), which details shifting foci from a field specialized in the management of colonies, to one with greater emphasis on the structural conditions for or obstacles to progress, economically rendered. Escobar’s “Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World” is also a helpful reference here.

¹⁸ As Darby and Paolini remind us in “Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism”, the structuring of the relationship between the third world with the West or the North implicates not only the ways in which we conceive of third world societies, but also the management of inter-national politics in and of itself, through the establishment of centres and peripheries variously defined (372).

¹⁹ For further details on the ways in which the World Bank promotes foreign investment and international trade in and for the developing world, since the ratification of the Bretton Woods agreements of 1945, refer to its website and associated publications here cited.

The culmination of the Second World War, within this colonial imaginary, has thus come to symbolize a decisive provision that continues to haunt what is at stake in the discourses and practices of development: the question of our political options for navigating the modern world. It is the mythical birth of a new world order, arising as a phoenix out of the ashes of total war, of the invention of modern combat defined by mass and industrial-scale violence, mobilization, and destruction.²⁰ Bretton Woods, for instance, is the institutionalization of a so-inspired architectural redesign of a world economy in response to crisis, a form of (inter)national managerial system whose operational logics of formalization and standardization continue to impress the parallel emergence of development banks variously positioned to entrust governmental institutions with the responsibility of righting the wrongs of anarchical contexts variously assumed. Whether framed in terms of a free world or analogous formulations of the civilized, enlightened, and advanced against the barbaric, fascist, and delayed, the *modern* disposition folds the past into the future in order to map out the best ways to live in the present. Integral to the dynamics and manifestations of this future-oriented disposition of a self-identified Western civilization, is the scientific outlook that modern philosophy has operationalized over time as a certain kind of rationalization of the world, transposed onto the attempt of modern politics at a science of governing, and the many accompanying fields that guide such governance – society/sociology, market/economics, culture/anthropology, nature/geography-turn-environmental science, and so on and so forth.

²⁰ For incisive analyses into the enduring legacies of the cultural politics of the World Wars in the formation of modernities variously defined, see Ekstein's *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, and Chickering's *A World at Total War: Global conflict and the politics of destruction, 1937-1945*.

What it has meant to govern well has formed and transformed our global political imaginaries, time and again. As much as Europe may position itself (and, in turn, has been positioned) as an enlightened guide, 'it' does not offer any uniform model. No matter how much seeking spirits within and beyond its porous boundaries may like to believe, the very fact that its prized treatises in modern philosophy and politics have so desperately sought to defend universal paradigms of civil society, democratic government, and liberal economy, speaks to a much weightier frustration to discipline its own subjects, near or far, always already in excess of the models into which they are to be directed. If Europe indeed offered the universality that is promised, Hobbes would not have needed to go to such great lengths to bring into being a Leviathan to keep the English in check, nor would Rousseau have depended upon an imaginary social contract through which to unite a French nation. The universality of theories of modern politics reveals more than resolves the deep uncertainties about human conduct and how best to govern it. It reveals a fundamental anxiety about our inherent corruptibility, regardless of measures of governance scientifically or mythically generated. So where does this leave us who champion or critique these venerated models as a means to establish mechanisms of a good life, here and now?

Within this lineage that has come to set the terms of debate for contemporary good governance and development, the Second World War brings to life (brings to death?) a traumatic questioning of socio-political priorities. In the laments of Austrian Jewish exile, Stefan Zweig, who fled war-torn Europe and eventually made home in Brazil following Hitler's rise to power, rational and efficient forms of organization do not guarantee or equate to the best ways of living, something that so many modern

philosophical and political ventures have been ostensibly attempting to perfect for centuries, arguably since the death of Socrates in the name of the greater good that the modern state is set to protect.²¹ Yet the dominant modes of judging the forms of a good life remain sealed within this frustrated imaginary. And in turn, the dominant modes of judging the reverse apparitions of the forms of a good life.

As a mirror of the first world, the third world has been judged by, and habitually judges itself, in accordance with this frustrated imaginary that hardly explains the conditions of those who authored its worlds. So much so that attempts to escape these terms often resort to caricatured oppositions poised to make claims to other possible ways of living, of thinking and doing politics. Such is the case of the exiled. For Stefan, in particular, making home in a place where interstate wars and religious persecution do not appear to define the everyday, opens this question of how is it best to live – the vaunted question of ‘the good life’ at the centre of the self-conscious debate that gave form to modern civilization from its Greek cradle onwards, so the story goes. In this search, he saw Brazil with the same kind of foreign eyes through which Brazilians continue to see our own country. From the outside measure, our options are... “conciliation”. As such, we see a “pacific and humane spirit” which, depending on your temperament, either stands uncorrupted by the ravages of modern science and its cumulative quests for power and affluence, or, lingers forsaken as a consolation prize for the undisciplined. Cynical or hopeful, what we see is a country with all of the conditions to prosper, however (un)realized. Or to put it in Stefan’s words, here we can catch a glimpse of a land of “necessary size, cultural diversity, and natural resources to develop a society somewhat

²¹ Refer back to the passage opening Part I, extracted from the Introduction of Zweig’s 1941 publication of *Brazil, Land of the Future*.

differently than that of the so-called Western civilization, of the never knowing when to stop, of infinite growth, of the race forward, of continual destruction”.²² Pushed to its ambitious conclusion, he proffers, “Brazil, within this global framework and pessimistic projections for the future, has all of the conditions to invent a different mode of civilization, a model, a style that is different from that which was brought from Europe to the USA and Latin America and that spread throughout the world”.²³ *Brazil, land of the future*, as he entitled the proposition.²⁴ At a time of catastrophic (de)constructions and the shielding of good neighbourliness²⁵, the travel-guide-cum-manifesto, with its polemical²⁶ concept of Europe and its counter-civilization of a proto-multiculturalism, celebrated a unique Brazilian capacity to adapt oneself and live with(in) difference. After all, here we find a nation-state in formation not through the organizational matrix of war

²² For further context into the interviews that Zweig conceded while in Rio, refer to the archives now stored in his last home, preserved until this day in a mountain town in the outskirts of the city as a museum (*Casa Stefan Zweig*, 4).

²³ Refer to Zweig’s interview collection for more reflections on Brazil (*Casa Stefan Zweig*, 4).

²⁴ Translations vary, some denoting “land”, others “country”; in either case, it remains clear across translations that Brazil is to be interpreted as *a* land or country of the future, not *the* land or country of the future.

²⁵ In the period recovering from the First World War leading up to the Second World War, of the Roosevelt administration, the Good Neighbour Policy (1933) came to symbolize an ongoing struggle to materialize principles of non-intervention and non-interference, namely of the US in the domestic affairs of Latin America. A nineteenth century ideal adapted over time as foreign policy, a seduction full of distrust, this approach to inter-civilizational dialogue in the Americas had as its muse the likes of Carmen Miranda, the exotic beauty who danced with fruits atop her head, and other more Disney-like creations that sought to embody an admiration of Brazilianness and multiculturalism in the exhibitionist terms of Hollywood’s great seduction.

²⁶ Although its initial reception by the Brazilian literary and popular community was indeed polemical, today, what was once considered a romance of an exile welcomed in Brazil, has become central to Brazilian social and political thought as a starting point, however clichéd, for understanding Brazilian (under)development and its orienting myths – in addition to its continued use, yes, as a travel guide for Europeans, notably of the German language.

vs. peace, but instead, one of pacification. In exile, unable to speak one's native (i.e. German) language or avail oneself to universal (i.e. European) vocabularies made senseless in battle, the struggle to find hope for a better world interpolated unexpected and undecided audiences. But like any good romance, Stefan's relationship with Brazil could only end in one way: sui-cide. Just as Stefan killed himself in the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, those who live the periphery with external eyes also have few options with which to navigate the demands of the modern world, for either we are doomed to live in the past or the future. Never in the present. How to live, here and now, when the modes of thinking, judging, governing, and so forth only give us models uncorresponded to a living present?

Dreams of a New World: civilizational reforms in Latin/America

The Americas entered the modern imaginary as the discovery of paradise, of a new world untouched and full of possibilities. An expansion of frontiers, or for the less ambitious of Europe, an escape from undesired realities. The Americas, far from a geographic designation, is a colonial invention. As Argentine postcolonial theorist Walter Mignolo puts it, what we find in the idea of the Americas is “the secular translation of Paradise in Christian cosmology”, which positions it as the foundational origin story of modernity, more thoroughly than the rehearsed verses of the French or Industrial or even American Revolutions.²⁷ Through complex histories of colonization

²⁷ For further elaboration into the means of this “invention”, see Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America* (xiv). It is especially helpful to consider this decolonial argument in the context of Pagden's *The Idea of Europe*, and Davison and Mupiddi's *Europe and Its Boundaries: Words and Worlds, within and beyond*, so as to more fully appreciate the intertwined dynamics of colonized and colonizer relations.

and decolonization, we get further divisions within ‘America’, most notably, North vs. South and Anglo vs. Latin. Identification with *Latinidad* (propagated by French imperial discourses as a civilizational standard in competition with Anglo-Saxon powers and in time taken up by creole/mulatto elites in strategic ways, notably against rising US forces), put in effect external hierarchies, whereby Latin America is continually subjugated to the Anglo-American, while at the same time fracturing such hierarchies internally so as to subjugate or, perhaps even worse, erase, indigenous subjects of Latin America, and later on, migrant and enslaved subjects.²⁸ As Walter cautions us, these classifications of and within Latin America, always already in relation to a no less invented Europe, has set culture (in the civilizational sense) against nature (in an indigenous form) in ways that continue to define the (dis)qualifications of a promised modernity. Throughout this process of the colonization and self-colonization of the Americas, he bares to us, those who are not American enough or not Latin enough are rendered inferior to a mythically monolithic North and Anglo America. In this vein, not only did Latin Americans become second-class Europeans, but we became second-class Americans. The claim to *Latinidad*, within this colonial imaginary of a discovered America, serves as a fragile link to the modern world, derived from a Greco-Roman tradition of thinking, be it scientific or Christian, statist or imperial, or, more accurately put, scientific and Christian, statist and imperial. These tensions persist in moulding a European self-understanding, universal rather than regional, which instead of seeing incompleteness in its civilizational guides

²⁸ For more place-specific articulations of the concepts of *Latinidad* that Mignolo develops, see Láo-Montes and D’avila’s *Mambo Montage: The Latinization of New York City*.

and endeavours, merely sees excess.²⁹ In this instrumentality, we find the operational drive of a modern gaze, routed through the eyes of the other. The role of the other, as such, is exclusively as non-European or non-modern, more broadly speaking. Negation. As critical postcolonial thinkers have shown us time and again, what it means to be part of the modern world is an autonomously produced sense of identity.³⁰ Never relational, this self-referential modern gaze, once assimilated by those who seek access to the avenues of an ever-modernizing world, likewise is trapped within an instrumental logic that demands internal consistency and excludes everyone and everything else that does not fit into its classifications and hierarchies.

The New World is a reflex of the Old World. Whether framed in terms of culture over nature, reason over ignorance, or analogous visions of maturation and progress, the question of how to incorporate new into old is no more a temporal issue than the politics of the development business itself. Few better exemplify the complexities of this civilizational project, mediating a (pre)modern Europe with its land of opportunities, than Christ's Soldiers. The Jesuit missions in the Americas, as they have come to be understood, bridged Europe (many a Europe!) and the Americas in ways that brought out the overlapping tensions and ambiguities within processes of modernizing philosophy,

²⁹ For an insightful explanation of the formation of a European "universal identity", and supporting political cultures, see Davison and Mupiddi's *Europe and Its Boundaries* (85-91). Particularly helpful is the analysis of associated Greco-Roman, Christian and Papal, Enlightenment, statist and imperial inheritances, and the role of non-Europeans vis-à-vis these conditions of possibility and consequent denial of coequality of the excluded or marginalized others.

³⁰ Once again, Davison and Mupiddi's *Europe and Its Boundaries* concisely capture these debates and analyses within postcolonial literature and international relations.

politics, science, and other guiding disciplines of human conduct.³¹ As Europe's first-hand witnesses of the untamed wilds of its 'discovered' lands (at a time when many literate Europeans and governing elites only had access to second-hand information of their promised lands), the Jesuits were crucial to the educational venture in Latin America, and, as such, in creating the conditions for (inter)national communication and socio-political relations, notably for the first couple of centuries of European settlement in the tropics. So much so that the debate over Jesuitism vs. Anti-Jesuitism became central to eighteenth century European political agendas that deliberated the modernization of new and old worlds, most apparent in terms of the commercial implications of the war of Man against Nature.

As the latest wave of Brazilian historians investigating the legacies of an Ibero-America in construction with European Enlightenments and Counter-Enlightenments have recently detailed, Jesuits were a polarizing force throughout Europe, especially in Portugal where they were most harshly punished, when it came to the matter of how best to manage relations within and between colonies and their metropolises.³² Considered by many contemporaries as defenders of the Americas, its native inhabitants and potential for endogenous development, their tutelary colonial presence worked through morally-

³¹ Domingues' *Tão longe, Tão perto: a Ibero-América e a Europa Ilustrada* (So faraway, so close: Ibero-America and Enlightenment Europe) offers us an exciting revision of the role that the Jesuits and Jesuitism played in colonies and metropolises alike in the adaptation of 'traditional' ways of thinking to 'new' times (38), from democratic vs. absolutist claims to government, to the tenets of the Copernican revolution (24). In any case, she highlights for the ways in which nearly all Enlightenment philosophers made reference to Iberian colonization and the missionary and educational work of the Jesuits when seeking to understand questions of the New World.

³² Refer to Karnal's Preface in Domingues' revision of the role of Anti/Pro-Jesuitism in colonial and Enlightenment contexts for a helpful situating of recent and more long-standing research conducted in this area (*Tão Longe*, 14, 20).

oriented armies aligned as “modernizing traditionalists”.³³ Modern, how modern? The task of civil-ization triumphed as a sort of spiritual exercise. Subsumed into nature, the Americas’ presumed inferiority with respect to its metropolises fractured claims of a European civilization to Enlightenment. Not only were predominant British and French currents of Enlightenment rubbed up against Iberian iterations through expressions of revolution vs. reform, natural law revisited, but Christ’s soldiers, bringing an alternate Enlightenment to the dark corners of the New World, drew out internal tensions regarding the role of the state, society, church, and family in the civilizational projects of modernity.³⁴ No doubt the God question posed some serious, albeit not insurmountable, challenges to what many Jesuits came to critique as the excessive rationalizations of modern civilization. As one of its lead historians, Beatriz Helena Domingues, suggests, some variants of the Enlightenment venture have resonated loudly with a sort of “modern paganism”.³⁵ Given its affinity to the Ancients, the movement that spread across Europe coterminous with colonial expansion mobilized uninterpretable interpretations and groundless grounds as an originary source of inspiration for modern politics and philosophy. However expressed, contemporary questions of individual liberty, tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and social change brought out some inconvenient tensions in the constitution of universal and particular laws by which to govern nature and society.

³³ Domingues’ analysis of the ‘New World Polemic’ provides fresh insight with which to rethink so-called Brazilian dilemmas of modernity (*Tão Longe*, 26, 35).

³⁴ Domingues’ analyses of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment implications in the colonial project of the New World (*Tão Longe*, 31-4), and their relative universals, is further enriched by Portier and Mikulás’ *The Enlightenment in National Context*; Gay’s *The Enlightenment: The rise of modern paganism*; McMahon’s *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity*; and of course, the classic, Berlin’s “Counter-Enlightenment”.

³⁵ For more context on Domingues’ provocative analysis, refer to *Tão Longe* (31).

However determinant conflicts of interests with state leaders and critiques of technocratic models of modern institutional governance may have been, Christ's Soldiers were crucial in the selective assimilation of the new and the old in the Americas – even after their exile from Ibero-America (in the Brazilian case, condemned to Portuguese jails rather than to Italian exile as in the case of its Hispanic neighbours). Far from obstacles to Enlightenment and colonial governance, their reputed role in lodging the conditions of the literate city and settlements far from the trading coasts was anything but eclipsing of the colonial project of modernity. With all of the global pretensions of the Society of Jesus, culminating in the venture to concretize utopias in the New World, the selective modernization of the likes of the Jesuit missionaries was perhaps even more Machiavellian (in its strategic effectiveness) than the apparently amoral Machiavellians back home who doubted the possibility of Christian government. Not to mention their competing roles as latifundian proprietors and administrators. In contrast with the Franciscan missions based on alms to the poor, Jesuit interventions in the New World secured a special place for education in the governance of conduct and the (re)production of socio-economic hierarchies. Despite later efforts by the Portuguese Crown to 'save the Indians' from the tyranny of the Jesuit priests in ways that came to symbolize a search for national identity, ruling classes on either side of the Pro/Anti-Jesuitism debate eventually came together in the mission to arouse a singular sense of Americanness and individuated national consciousness. In turn, the New World polemic, as Beatriz reminds us through the interlocution of the Jesuits, not only opened up the question of the presumed inferiority of these othered civilizations in relation to the Old World, but also shed light on what was missing of/to/in a European civilization in search for evolutionary

perfection. And so, the land of the future represents to us the hope of (re)creating our worlds, as opposed to the despair of condemned and forgotten peoples: the task of civilizing the (dis)qualified is primarily one of a pedagogical temperament, of what can or should be developed, against what is.

In the face of judgement of civilizational paradigms, Stefan, years later entangled in a similar matrix of possibilities – invested in the chronically reposed potentialities of a new world, of a promised land, of Eldorado? – expressed the alternative enlightenment of emerging civilizations, as the negation of its oppositional configuration. And within the peripheries of a modern world in motion, stirs the hope that, beyond mundane fascinations with the riches and fortunes of powerful configurations, is the possibility of living in harmony. Bearing witness to the havoc wrought in pursuits for the free world, the question of alternative enlightenments remains trapped within the flexible rigidity of a future-oriented disposition. Whether centralizing God or the State, what revolves around centres continuously redefined is judged by self-same standards, muffling the unease that generates then obscures the question of what kind of development is effectively desired or desirable. At the height of colonial expansions, this question was anything but fixed among the governing, and even more so undecided for its exiles coming to terms with Europe's battles for civilization in faraway lands as (un)welcoming as their own. Listening to the *sambas* of their adopted homes, the outcast could hear how “a mão que construi, polui e destrói”.³⁶ The hand that constructs, pollutes and destroys: Stefan's dilemma, the dilemma of a land of the future.

³⁶As a local musico-cultural expression appropriated as a national symbol, numerous *samba* lyrics reflect these tensions of an in-between, such as this recent Portela samba-enredo that sought to make these connections in a more didactic form. The significance

The politics of peripheral sensibilities: Brazils in balance

So what political options are available to us in a postcolonial world, for navigating the demands of modernity? If the expelled other were to take Europe's self-delusion seriously, then the alternative to emulation would leave us stuck (re)creating ourselves out of ourselves which, in actuality, is the idealized European path to propagating the universalities of modern philosophy and politics.³⁷ The postcolonial sensibility to resignify others so as to resignify ourselves, and vice versa, may enable alternative forms of personhood, citizenship, nationality, knowledge, or identifications otherwise authored. Yet, either way, what the problem of development calls of us, more than the (re)authorings of a series of representations of first vs. third worlds and accompanying identities of self vs. other, is a restructuring of the possibilities of the relationship between centres and peripheries more flexible than geographic ascriptions belie. Namely, it calls upon the qualifications and disqualifications into the modern world. Rather than focusing on corruptions of an imagined universal standard, which distorts images from within as much as from without, we would be led to hold complexities whose challenges cannot be borne by legislative measures of an archetypal civilization.³⁸

of samba, to be further explored as a language of Brazilian (under)development, is most poignantly captured by one of its great lyricist, Caetano Veloso, "o samba é o pai do prazer, o samba é o filho da dor, o grande poder transformador" in "Desde que o Samba é Samba": Samba is the father of pleasure, samba is the son of pain, the great transformative power. See Vianna's *The Mystery of Samba* for further elaboration.

³⁷ For further explication of the formation of European and non-European identities in terms of the colonial project of modernity, see, once again, Davison and Mupiddi's *Europe and Its Boundaries*.

³⁸ For a systematic elaboration of the co-constitution of modernity's 'insides' and 'outsides', which in the context of an international system of nation-states renders

How the first world sees the third world, the third world sees the first, the third world sees the third, and the first world sees itself, cycles through a political repertoire that gives form not only to the problems to be rectified, but ultimately, to the solutions to be implemented. To study a third world, cynically undisciplined or hopefully creative and full of possibilities, that is, to situate oneself in a place like Brazil, a land of the future, is to assume forms of a peripheral sensibility that are perpetually in motion around centres undefined. Undefined. It is to be locked into a dance with invisible partners. These ghostly partners, these spectres of what we are to be-come, are felt when we shuffle left and they are not there to meet us, when we dip right and are left to hang, when we spin around ourselves long enough to feel the absent presences of the partner to be, the partner yet to come. The partner no longer and not yet in place, of a never realized and always to come realization of...? How to dance to this tune?

Otherwise put, grasping for that which solidifies into air, as one of Brazil's great social and literary critics proposed in response to these intangible developmental dilemmas, what do we do when we are left to face "idéias fora do lugar"?³⁹ Ideas out of place. Out of place, not in a sense of failing to pass the reality test, so to speak. But, out of place, in a sense that renders self-critique mute. Hence how Roberto Schwarz finds in literary ventures ironic forms of critique more apt to dealing with perceived out-of-placeness. He cautions us, "Throughout its social reproduction, tirelessly, Brazil sets and resets European ideas, always in an improper sense. It is in this sense that such ideas will

impossible schematics of centre/periphery as mutually exclusive, see Walker's *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*.

³⁹ Schwarz's *Ao Vencedor as Batatas* presents what has now become a central concept in Brazilian social and political thought – how this out-of-placeness is translated, in what contexts, to what ends, is what has remained an open question for interpreters of Brazilian modernity and (under)development.

constitute material and problems for literature. The writer may not know this, nor does the writer need to know this, to use them. But it is only possible to achieve a profound and tuned resonance, if they feel, register and unfold – or avoid – such decentrings and detunings”.⁴⁰ *Desafinações*: as in the dance above, what gives resonance is not harmony, being in tune and in synch, but certain kinds of detuning, the condition of being out of tune. For, indeed, that is the only way to keep up with our ghostly partners – ghostly, of course, in the sense of the living dead.

Dissonance demands much more intimacy than harmonious constructions. First, it requires an acceptance of what Roberto calls a permanent *mal-estar*, the condition of unease or malaise. The kind of *mal-estar* that Machado de Assis’ noble doctor, in his case against madness and unreason, was even able to recognize, in the end, but never incorporate.⁴¹ For a decolonizing world of peripheral imaginaries, the “instinct of nationality”, as Machado calls it, or the attempt to construct a sense of national community and identity, as contemporary interpreters translates for us, does not make good sense through progressions of triumphant externalizations of a nativist interior, which require not only the coherence of the self but also the coherence of the other.⁴²

⁴⁰ “Ao longo de sua reprodução social, incansavelmente Brasil põe e repõe idéias européias , sempre em sentido impróprio. É nesta qualidade que elas serão matéria e problema para a literatura. O escritor pode não saber disso, nem precisa, para usá-las. Mas só alcança uma ressonância profunda e afinada caso lhes sinta, registre e desdobre – ou evite – o descentramento e a desafinação” (Schwarz, *Ao Vencedor*, 31, translation mine).

⁴¹ See Preface of this dissertation (46-50), for elucidation of the chronicle with respect to its methodological implications for dealing with the banalized ‘unease’ or ‘malaise’ of a Brazilian modernity.

⁴² Assis’ “Instinto de Nacionalidade”, originally published in 1873, has served as inspiration for Schwarz’s contemporary revisions of “out of place ideas”, as well as resolutions provided by the likes of one of Brazil’s great living literary figures, Silviano Santiago, whose *O Cosmopolitismo do Pobre: Crítica Literária e Crítica Cultural*

Such a movement would require that the dancing partner catch us on the other end of the spin. Along these lines, nativist salvagings of a third world, as the basis from which to propose and defend the best way forward for our endogenous development, hollows out as an externalization of an inaccessible and inauthentic interior, as Machado and his interpreters recognize in the romances of nation-building projects in out of the way places, in places yet to be-come.⁴³ As another of Machado's influential interpreters, Silviano Santiago, makes explicit from his testimonies of a Brazil in construction (by way of the historic manifesto, "Instinto de Nacionalidade"), "The consciousness of nationality will reside less in the knowledge of one's *interior*, and more in the complex process of internalizing what is exterior to oneself, that is, of what is foreign but not strange as an effect of European valorization".⁴⁴ Machado's task for us, as Silviano passes onto a generation of social critiques of the Brazilian project of modernity, is to "transform the instinct of nationality in form and force conscious of external influx".⁴⁵ In Machado's words, "the external influx is what determines the direction of the movement".⁴⁶ This is what is at stake in the task of thinking the third world. This is the task of assuming forms of a peripheral sensibility so as to render the dissonant readily audible. To you, dear

(Cosmopolitanism of the Poor: Literary Critique and Cultural Critique) provides some clear articulations of the contemporary implications of Machado de Assis' lasting interventions into Brazilian national identity.

⁴³ See Schwarz and Santiago's interpretations, respectively, for further elaboration on how Machado's 'realist' interventions into the romances of nation-building projects, at their infancy, continue to offer us an alternate peripheral sensibility.

⁴⁴ "A consciência de nacionalidade estará menos no conhecimento do seu interior, estará mais no complexo processo de interiorização do que lhe é exterior, isto é, do que ilhe é estrangeiro mas que nao lhe é estranho pelo efeito da volonização européia" (Santiago, *O Cosmopolitanismo*, 17, translation mine).

⁴⁵ "transformar o instinto de nacionalidade em força e forma *conscientes* pelo influxo externo" (Santiago, *O Cosmopolitanismo*, 17, translation mine).

⁴⁶ "o influxo externo é que determina a direção do movimento" (Santiago, *O Cosmopolitanismo*, 17, translation mine).

scholarly reader, please accept this as my qualifier for assuming the object of study henceforth referred to as ‘Brazil’.

How do postcolonial subjects, in turn, live and make sense of such openings of itself to the world? To make peace with the out of tune, or forever find oneself on the brink of sui-cide? *Saudade*.⁴⁷ Comparable to exile, but without the guarantees of home...an eternal pilgrimage. It is the flights and captures within an inherited Eurocentric imaginary. One of the most poignant articulations of this opening to the world was uttered, in French, by Brazil’s leading abolitionist in search for a more humane and (inter)national civilizational spirit in the working fields of a modern world in the making: “On one side of the sea, one feels the absence of the world (worldliness); on the other, the absence of country (fatherland)”.⁴⁸ And herein we find the dilemmas of a new world, the solitude of the Americas – an even more solitary place for the Portuguese-speaking of a Hispanic Latin America, attests proto-humanitarian Joaquim Nabuco. Today, if you ask school children in formation to draw a map of Brazil, what you will see, more often than not laid out on their desks, are drawings of an island country,

⁴⁷ See Preface of this dissertation for an introduction to the Brazilian concept of *saudade*, also explored at length in the final vignette of Part III.

⁴⁸ “De um lado do mar, sente-se a ausência do mundo; do outro, a ausência do país” (Nabuco, *Minha Formação*, 49, translation mine). Refer to Part II of this dissertation (50-51) for an elaboration of Nabuco’s brand of cosmopolitanism that exemplifies the anxieties of a new world, feeling itself as ‘squatters’ on virgin land rather than a young nation in formation. The kinds of syntheses that he offers of particularist vs. universalist tendencies captures the challenges often articulated in modernizing an underdeveloped Brazil, from the time of abolition until today. Santiago furthers these analyses of a doubled exile (19-21) by considering the ways of a governing elite (then and now) who possess but does not inhabit a fatherland, enabled by the mediations of past, present, future of *saudade*. The ways in which the modern Brazilian subjects attaches itself to a sense of worldly citizenship, is profoundly marked by the lack of coequality of centres and peripheries variously imagined, of a doubled exile of an absent presence of both ‘Europe’ and ‘Brazil’.

floating...in relation to, or rather disconnected from, its neighbours. In the often alienating pastiche that lingers from the colonization of our imaginaries⁴⁹, what remains a vital question is how to live within these spaces in-between, which, to put in a more conventional language, passed onto a postmodernity without passing through modernity, as such. For those of us who have never been quite feudal, bourgeois, or neoliberal, how to live with *idéias fora do lugar*?

During the formative years of interpolating a Brazilian nation, it came as no surprise that its governing and intellectual elites were better acquainted with the various countries of Europe than with the various regions of Brazil. Sent back and forth to be educated and bring back education as assemblages for order and progress, they became personified symbols of an absence held open by a doubled exile, of the likes that Joaquim expresses. After all, most of the Portuguese who administered the vast abundant lands had no intention of settling in the tropics, bequeathing a Brazil as an object of *exploração*⁵⁰ for a 'Brazilian' elite who saw themselves as belonging to a global

⁴⁹ See Gruzinski's *A Colonização do Imaginário: Sociedades Indígenas e Ocidentalização no México Espanhol* (The Colonization of the Imaginary: Indigenous Societies and Westernization in Spanish Mexico) for further references into the processes of Westernization, beyond the tenets of Hispanization, that helps us to better understand the complex negotiation of codes, models, techniques, among other political measures that make up and exceed the boundaries of the Iberian península, whether thought of in terms of Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment, the missionary campaigns, etc.. Through the concept of "pastiche", he gets us to think about how tradition refers to what he terms "a Constant process of construction and loss" (411).

⁵⁰ The Portuguese word for 'exploration' denotes the condition of exploring as much as of exploiting: as the action and effect of exploration, it evokes the process of investigation and its application or intention toward determined ends, often speculative or abusive in connotation. As such, this term offers the most accurate depiction of processes of colonial 'exploration' in Brazil.

bourgeoisie, first and foremost, more than a determined national community.⁵¹ Symbols of a European origin always already present, even if in an absent presence. Like the wired citizen of today's global age, these figures attest for us the mobilities of the fixed and the fixity of the mobile. In this spirit, attempts to make sense of modern Brazil are attempts to make sense of a global system where centres and peripheries are drawn and redrawn in ghostly ways through the strides of history. That is to say, there is nothing auto-matic in these relations, and their ensuing (inter)national developments. Indeed, it is a dance, not always elegant. Brazil, as an affirmation of a discursive place that lives and illuminates the modern in a global and decentralized form, in ways uncontained by the unilateral dynamics of centre and periphery, is thus as good a starting place as any.⁵²

From a bifurcated Latin/America, in relation to an imagined Europe and otherwise Iberian neighbours, its entanglement in hierarchies of North/South, Anglo/Iberian, Portuguese/Hispanic, puts it in a position where subalternity simply does not capture the articulation of, or possible responses to, the problem of the third world.

Within these contexts we attempt to understand ourselves, of a periphery knowing itself and the centre, left grasping at solidified air. Left to invoke 'enigmas' of a take-off forever to come, pitting tradition against modernity, nature against culture, ignorance against reason, new against old, and ultimately, universal against particular, we come into a syntax of corruptibilities. Yet the question left open, abandoned, is: corruption of

⁵¹ See Bresser-Perreira's "Identidade e Auto-estima do brasileiro" (Identity and Self-Esteem of the Brazilian) for an analysis of the contemporary impacts of this Nabucian disposition.

⁵² To consider further this sort of postcolonial program that navigates Marxian inheritances within radical social and political theory, refer to Maia's helpful analysis that transcends ready dualisms, in "Pensamento Brasileiro e Teoria Social: Notas para uma Agenda de Pesquisa" (Brazilian Thought and Social Theory: Notes toward a Research Agenda).

what? Of course there is the staid problem of corruption as the subversion of lawful means, but to grapple with the problem, and even more so, attempts at resolutions, we must understand how these modes of political judgement work, which set the terms of the game that regulate departures and deviations. This critical task also has the effect of disavowing Eurocentric standards of assessment, and how helpful they are, or not, in the projected heres and theres, nows and thens.

Ideas live off much more than their defined substance. As a vantage point to think about the present world, the periphery as an intensified experience of the extensive, teaches us to accept this fact, over and again. So much so that ‘contradictions’ cease to be contradictions, as such, and the freedoms of the unrepressed by logic and authorship prevail. Could a free world unconcerned with its freedom, so to speak, allied to the space in-between, nurture an alternate critical spirit that does not take the author at its word, that perfects the art of dancing out of tune? Without the expectation for transparency in intention, we realize modernity in another key, even if not so consciously ventured. A realism⁵³ that captures not reality in and of itself, but the reality that we need so as to live well, like Machado’s noble doctor cautioned those of us unable to live in disequilibrium. As Roberto interpreted within this interventionist spirit of a Machadian irony, “under such conditions, the import of modern ideas and cultural forms to close the gap with the

⁵³ See Schwarz’s “A Brazilian Breakthrough”, for more on this strand of realism exemplified by Machado’s interpretive literary devices, which have come to serve as a central guide in the field of Interpretations of Brazil (whose primary concerns orbit around the problem of Brazilian modernity and so-called developmental delay).

advanced world was a patriotic task of sorts”.⁵⁴ And in what the critic calls “a sort of backyard of the modern world”, we learn to speak and hear “unreliable voice”.

Herein we find the terrain of the development project. Far from universal idealizations of the principles of civility or mandates of prosperity, to grapple with how the game is played, we need to reconsider the terms of qualification and disqualification into the modern world – the integrity and corruptibility of its institutional models of the good life and its (dis)obedient subjects. Circuits of exchange have adapted and readapted to ever-shifting points of reference, moves, and partners, whose axes tend to leave us either centred or decentred, excised or consumed, or, more often than not, stranded in between. How are we thus positioned to-day? Where do these pathways take us? How do we know who is winning and losing the game, to what effects? Today? Tomorrow? According to what logics are these ever-evolving games played?

In the following section, Part II, I will look to how the terms of the game are fundamentally structured and remain vital, and the politico-economic and historico-cultural configurations that give them meaning and consequence in the chronically emerging underdeveloped giant that we have come to know as Brazil. I will show rather than tell a development story through narratives grounded in everyday negotiations, neither universal nor particular, neither modern nor traditional. Within structures neither advanced nor delayed, we will be able to grasp subjects of (under)development and their governing institutions in all of their complexities. But for now, here in Part I, it is

⁵⁴ These central concepts (of a backyard defined by mediations “between civilization at large and this limited and semi-segregated sphere with its colonial imprint, a sort of backyard of the modern world”) are succinctly elaborated in Schwarz’s “A Brazilian Breakthrough” (8); for further contextualization within Brazilian postcolonial thought, see also his, “A Viravolta Machadiana” (The Machadian Turn).

imperative to begin where we are at, or at the very least, where we think we are at.

Following the Second World War, as the story goes, the world was levelled.

‘Modernization’ was the name of the game. The Anglo-American victory opened space for new battles to be fought over civilization’s souls. The era of modern development was to put colonized and colonizers on the same playing field, indeed symbolized by the great triumph of former British colony, the United States of America. With its eventual victory over the possibility of alternative civilizations (or more to the point, civilizational paradigms), the Cold War extended this project into its fullest realization: ‘globalization’. At last, we are one.

With freedom and its civilizational ambitions guarded by the gatekeepers of democracy and free markets, the tickets to these developmental games can be variously played. In the heavy reconstructions of former colonies and the defeated of the great ideological wars of the twentieth century, at first, politics was the way to go. State intervention defined the modernization game, as a form of assistance to those who could not help themselves. Protectionism, a technically rendered paternalism of a state set to make possible the conditions of the good life, paved the avenues to a modern world in the waiting. With the necessary conditions in place, we are then led to believe, economics can take over. The invisible hands of the market are now capacitated to make profitable a globalization of neoliberal character. This is to be especially efficacious within the apparent contexts of increasingly porous national boundaries and trends toward immaterial capital driving the production of wealth through knowledge and talent-based economies, ephemerally located. Before pausing to question, in Part II, how this politics and economics of development is given currency, inflated and devalued, let us linger

within their manifestations in and through worlds situated on the peripheries of civilizational (re)productions. In these ways, we will come to understand how Brazils are produced and reproduced as objects of diagnosis and treatment in developmental fields, with varied prescriptions for overcoming (seemingly undesirable versions of) itself. In Part III, I will go one step further in questioning these Brazils in balance, by harnessing the potential of an urban analysis, which reveals that the question of what Brazil is and can be, may not be the most helpful question to pose when it comes to the prospects for a transformative politics. Moving away from the grand theorizing concerning our nation and national character and focusing on how people live, the Rios that I narrate in Part III will thus ultimately qualify and elaborate these orienting stories of Brazils in Part I and II.

But for now, I will directly take on the dominant culturalist understanding of Brazil's third-worldliness, to show what it does and does not capture of our everyday lives in out of the way places, and politicize its overwhelmingly naturalized hold on us. As such, it will become increasingly clear that (inter)national expectations of Brazil's emergence onto a global scene, which work through patriotic accounts of the likes that our national anthem projects of "Brazil, an intense dream", "Giant by nature", and "intrepid colossus" (who we find: "Eternally lying in a splendid cradle, By the sound of the sea and the light of the heavens, Radiant, Oh Brazil, flower of America, Illuminated by the sun of the New World"), are ultimately misleading.⁵⁵ For at the same time that we can hold onto pride as a unique and creatively abundant civilization, we are routinely left with a shame of our imagined shortcomings that allegedly account for the nation's

⁵⁵ "Brasil, um sonho intenso", "Gigante pela própria natureza", "impávido colosso" ("Deitado eternamente em berço esplêndido, Ao som do mar e á luz do céu profundo, Fulgaras, ó Brasil, florão da América, Iluminado ao sol do Novo Mundo") ("Hino Nacional Brasileiro", translation mine).

developmental delays. Corrupted from the top down. As follows, we take ourselves all too seriously, while not taking ourselves seriously enough, for not following in the civilizational pathways of an idealized Europe or North America. In universities and street corners across the country, it seems that nothing else (other than failures in our individual and national character, our corrupted selves) could explain for our third world problems. This is why it is so important to reconsider how we talk about a place like Brazil, for how it sets the terms of our interventions and the ensuing expectations and responsibilities for our politics, variously scaled. To this end, we must first amplify, then resignify, the terms of the games at hand. From the development project to projects of development, how are the games of development played, and what do they require of us in order to play them well? As a way of living, how are their corresponding fields constructed, for what courses and subjects, and where do they take us? Beginning with the obvious, we can decondition and recondition how we think of development projects to-day, toward reconsidering the project of development, as a way of living.

Learning to succeed: development as a way of living

Nowadays to say that we live in a global village is somewhat behind the times. Taking in foreign-but-not-strange sights, sounds, and tastes as part of day to day routines, we are reminded, virtually without notice, of the planetary scale and scope of potential interconnection, implicating everything and everyone in the common sense condition of our era. Yet amidst the rush of the world becoming our backyard, office, and playground, there tends to be much less talk about how it is that the villagers are being trained to live and prosper in this apparently ever-shrinking world.

Central to nearly all of the marketed training processes is the booming industry of learning, teaching, and using the English language – the claimed currency of global trade, travel, media, science, technology, information, and so forth. English language schools are proliferating all over the world, circulating a language now spoken by three times as many non-native than native speakers.⁵⁶ Particularly in so-called developing regions, these private enterprises promise a world of opportunities, coaching emerging middle classes in out of the way places not only on how to speak in English, but ultimately how to think in English so as to effectively negotiate the supporting structures of a global village, that is, a global cultural and political economy.

At first glance, the ostensible rise of a global language of business seems to indicate a homogenizing, if not hegemonic, process of worldwide transformation. Even the *anti*-globalization resistance of the late 1990s has morphed into *alter*-globalization visions for the new century, embracing the very channels of existing and imagined global relations to reform the constitution of world community.⁵⁷ If we consider more closely, however, everyday sites that actually prepare emerging players for a global cultural and political economy, other stories may be heard. The ways in which people take up seemingly hegemonic projects (for instance, learning English) are not easily explained by choices to either resist or adapt to the demands of globalization, as goes the usual Darwinian story fixated on classifying winners and losers amid the inevitable march of

⁵⁶ Refer to Crystal's *English as a Global Language* (69) for further contextualization of the spread of the English language worldwide.

⁵⁷ For landmark references of this transition, consider the progressive narrative from the 1999 Battle of Seattle “anti-globalization movements” to the World Social Forum “movement of movements”, since 2000 mobilizing open spaces toward realizing manifestations of “Another World is Possible”. See the WSF website archives for an explanation of its “Origins and Aims” as here cited.

progress. Not too long ago, a similarly totalizing and seductive developmental paradigm reigned, whose unexpected negotiations and ultimate ‘failure’ may help us to think through the complex and ambiguous dynamics of contemporary world-making ventures. Like the globalization project, the postwar modernization program promised to bring the world together, rectifying colonial divisions and projecting a level playing field for generations to come.⁵⁸ Even their respective critics, resisting the epochal enchantment, largely came to accept modernization, and now globalization, as the inescapable terms of engagement. Notwithstanding their powerful roles in shaping the prevailing socio-political imaginaries of their times, the ways in which their distinctive modes of development have been managed far exceed authoritative plans or notable pressures. In the sections that follow, here in Part I, I thus explore some of these intricate manoeuvres between the local and global, the macro and micro, and the official and mundane within the changing pathways to the development of the third world, namely through a Brazilian experience with first modernization’s and now globalization’s promised take-offs.

From *modernization’s* centralized forms of sovereign national governance, civil urban designs, and industrial production (as will be here exemplified by the autonomous developmental spirit of Brasília and the new capital’s accompanying programs for territorial integration and political unity) to *globalization’s* neoliberal forms of governance downloaded onto individuals and enterprising associations competing within worldwide democratic and free market structures (as will be here exemplified by the civic and entrepreneurial training of English language schools honing a growing middle class to lead the way to the postindustrial knowledge-based creative economy), Brazil has

⁵⁸ For further elaboration of modernization’s general lessons for the globalization project, refer to Tsing’s insightful analysis in “The Global Situation”.

emerged and reemerged as a model for the developing world. Twice ready for take-off, South America's Sleeping Giant has been heralded as a land of the future – full of potential, as of yet unrealized.⁵⁹ By tracing these two particular encounters with universal governing orders toward opening up histories of the present, I hope to get at questions surrounding what is at stake in prevailing strategies for the socio-economic advancement of the third world operationalized through decentralized networks of self-managing subjects of development. When reconsidering the two predominant developmental paradigms of the last century in this light, we can discern how attempts to construct a new state of orderly citizens (i.e. public culture) and subsequently a progressive nation of entrepreneurs (i.e. private initiative) reveal and obscure the obstacles and possibilities for a third world's take-off into the coveted ranks of (inter)national community. If economic growth (as the statistical management of resources consumed via diffuse networks of global capitalist markets) increasingly calls for something more than prescribed skills or techniques (i.e. behavioural markers of an industrial mode of production), how are emerging players re-creating ephemeral competencies, attitudes, and values as qualifiers for economic success, and hence how are they governed by their effects? Perhaps more to the point, if development projects are less about generating certain outcomes, however measured, and more about fostering *a way of living*, how then do we grapple with the cultural politics of middle-classification

⁵⁹ For a recent revival of the messianic myth of Brazil as an utopian paradise, refer to Austrian exile Zweig's WWII prophecy, *Brazil, Land of the Future* (1941), mobilized repeatedly in popular and academic accounts of Brazil's development prospects, such as currently depicted by *The Economist* issue below. For a more critical and historical analysis situated within Brazil's colonial inheritance, refer to Holanda's 1959 *Visão do Paraíso: Os Motivos Edênicos no Descobrimento e Colonização do Brasil* (Vision of Paradise: The Edenic Motives of the Discovery and Colonization of Brazil).

that reigns once more in the shadows of the great winners and abject losers of the latest world-remaking project?

Looking from below or above, globalization marches onward regardless of who, how, and how many withstand or assimilate its economic logic and cultural force. In the intervals, between the (un)comfortable enclosures of a middle class, a more banal give-and-take stirs up the spectres of a globalizing world in formation. To hear these accounts, it is vital to let go of our social-science fascination with the extremes, either with those in charge at the top or those oppressed at the bottom (internally, externally, or however traced), so as to broaden our political imaginaries. To that end, I begin here by reflecting on two glocal developmental modes which have instigated a modern (inter)nationalist era that promises our final take-off – the one seemingly from above (e.g. Brasília's architects of tomorrow) and the following seemingly from below (e.g. English language schools' everyday training) – that do not necessarily lead us down expected roads, in turn, inviting us to rethink the powers of development. Whom these rites (dis)empower, how, and to what effects, remains an open question.





Figure 1: The head of Juscelino Kubitschek, Brasília's visionary and populist President during the developmentalist "golden years" of the New Republic (1956-61), enframed alongside his renowned statement attesting to the coming dawn of Brazil's great destiny, preserved at the Museu da Cidade in Brasília (photograph mine).

Figure 2: A popular think-outside-the-box advertisement series of You Move English language school franchise found throughout the streets of Rio in advance of hosting the 2014 World Cup, urging Brazilians to take charge of their own futures: "Your world is not this one. Speak English at You Move" (photograph mine).

Changing developmental pathways: Brazil, land of the present?

Brazil is a country (in)famous for its winners and losers. Whether on the football field or by its favelas, legends are made of its stark contrasts. Geopolitically straddling the two ranks in terms of gross measures of socio-economic advancement, the republic of continental proportions is not quite a winner or a loser in and of itself. Since the days of the arrival of the self-acclaimed European explorers, Brazil has been made into a land of opportunities. In eternal spring, the vast fertile greens, pure white sands, and sparkling blue seas blessed by friendly climates and abundant resources cultivate a happy and cordial people, living with open arms amidst spectacular beauty. This Brazilian Brazil image (i.e. *meu brasil brasileiro*) tells the tragically romantic tale of a country naturally rich, condemned to artificial poverty as a result of the corrupt division and administration of its inherent wealth. Or as Stefan recalls the point of departure for European and North

American mediated discoveries and proclamations of the Latin American giant, for once was his own, neither barren or productive, its condition is one of “semi-civilization”.⁶⁰

The myth of abundance, animating a standard of territorial nationalism, celebrates the seizing of natural wealth by subsuming deprivations of all sorts to a commanding patriotic pride in a place where the sun shines twelve months of the year. The legendary Iberian ethos of adventure, in contrast to the idealized pioneering work ethic of a more integrated and sustained Anglo-Saxon colonial project, is said to have conferred hierarchies through the success or failure of such predatory seizures, establishing district properties governed by quasi-emperors overseeing subjugated services (notably of slaves and captives) in the administration of their conquered estates (i.e. *latifúndio*).⁶¹ And so we get the politics of *senhorialismo*: when land-lord-ism is more about the figure of the

⁶⁰ Zweig begins *Brazil, Land of the Future* by citing a series of these clichés or first impressions of a European or North American visitor to Brazil, a sort of “terra incognita”: “I did not expect very much. My ideas of Brazil coincided with those of the average European and North American. It is only with an effort that I can reconstruct them today: it was very difficult to distinguish any one of these South American republics from the other; they all had a hot and unhealthy climate, political unrest, and desperate financial conditions; they were badly governed, and semi-civilized, and only near the coastal cities. At the same time the scenery was beautiful and there were numerous unexplored possibilities – in short, a land for desperate immigrants and settlers, but never one from which to expect intellectual stimulation. Being neither a professional geographer, collector of butterflies, sportsman, nor business man, I presumed that a visit of ten days would suffice. A week, ten days, then back again, I thought; and I am not ashamed to confess to this naïve attitude of mine. I even consider it important, for this is the prevalent idea shared today by most Europeans and North Americans. From the cultural point of view Brazil is still as much the *terra incognita* as it was for the first seafaring men from the geographical point of view” (1-2, translation mine).

⁶¹ For a helpful comparative study of the distinct modes of European occupation in the New World – in Brazil, the predatory explorations for wealth by the *bandeirantes*, and, in the United States, the colonization of land for a new way of life by the pioneers – refer to Moog’s post-war study on *Bandeirantes e Pioneiros* (Bandeirantes and Pioneers). However oversimplified the comparison may be, the parallel between the different forms of exploitation and responsibility continues to inform commonly held accounts of the possibilities for development in Brazil and perhaps most poignantly, of the Brazilian citizen (or what many believe is an inherent deficiency thereof).

lord than the (de)attached bases of his presumed authority, that is to say, a problem of entitlement. In search of easy riches or notoriety (rather than the more methodical, efficient, or long-term settlement outlook for collective prosperity), Portuguese imperial pursuits in the New World are believed to have imprinted the *autonomy of personhood* through a logic of reward and punishment that empowered successions of rural patriarchs managing short-term profits for familial aggrandizement.

According to these predominant stories of a nation-building project, Brazil's attempted pathways to modernity have been profoundly marked by these personalistic inheritances, which have given form to a *cordial* (person-centred) as opposed to *civil* (citizen-centred) standard of sociability.⁶² Contingent on affective bonds and seemingly private relations, the ensuing temperaments of an "amoral familialism", which are said to condition a Brazilian way of doing things, have been lamented time and again as the primary obstacle to the development of a greater social, economic, or political whole (i.e. rationalized civil society, efficient capitalistic markets, and impersonal representative state supported by objective juridical institutions that constitute the prerequisites of the sorts of a Weberian modernity).⁶³ Particularistic rather than abstract or procedural, the

⁶² In Part II of this dissertation, I will grapple more explicitly with the Brazilian nation-building project and its enduring myths, which orient the (mis)adventures of a tropical development, but for now, suffice it to note that Brazilian social and political thought (i.e. Interpretations of Brazil) that rose concurrently with the new republican state of the 1930s set the terms for contemporary sociological and political writings on Brazilian development. Today as much as in the interwar period, there remains an overwhelming preoccupation with explaining why Brazil – with its more abundant resources and longer developmental duration – did not measure up to its comparable entity to the North (of an arguably similar history of colonization, settlement, slavery, etc.), the United States.

⁶³ For a succinct analysis of these modernization dilemmas, refer to Esteves' "Cordialidade e Familismo Amoral: Os Dilemas da Modernização" (Cordiality and Amoral Familialism: The Dilemmas of Modernization", which brings together influential accounts of development such as Banfield's 1958 *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*

cordial myth connecting people across this plentiful terrain has given way to a distinctive meritocracy, derived from seeing one's location as a land of opportunities (where cold and harsh climates do not force people into innovation or hoarding, as the shady spots on the beach always appear so enticing amidst the sweet aromas of fruit trees, or so the story assures us). This meritocratic impulse, in effect, does not necessarily bring about an entrepreneurial drive to succeed, but, more often than not, it means that people know their place. A textbook case of inequality, Brazil's extreme 'gap' between rich and poor has long excused an obscured middle class, which until recently remained relatively minor demographically. The standard cited setback to Brazil's entry into modernity is the 'haves' commanding and exploiting the 'haves-not'. It is not ostensibly with the middle class, sometimes winners, sometimes losers in the game of development. Yet with the rapid growth of the middle class (most recently with Lula's rising C-class of forty million people uplifted over eight years of social development policies)⁶⁴, where do the precarious masses of aspiring or credit-sustained 'haves' fit into this picture?

This inherited dichotomous understanding of wealth and poverty makes it that the middle class is continually excused by the two extremes; expanding, it becomes the increasingly neutral ground. The rich have it easy, the poor take it hard, and so the middle class becomes the true land of opportunities – some seized, some lost, but the pursuit goes on day after day for an imagined security seldom within reach. It is clear enough to see the perverse spoils and corruptions of the wealthy, or the poor's own vices, but the rat race of the middle class is overwhelmed by the ambition for a latent natural

with classics of Brazilian socio-historical thinking such as Holanda's 1936 *Raízes do Brasil* (Roots of Brazil), which will be further explored in Part II of this dissertation.

⁶⁴ For further contextualization, refer to Neri's "Back to the Country of the Future: Forecasts, European Crisis, and the Brazilian New Middle Class" (17).

wealth that mournfully defers one's standing onto the incessant fickleness of nature, social or material. This is where (dis)qualification happens. Within this definitive expression of a nation's tragically romantic saga, it becomes possible to appreciate something more than melancholic Brazilian dilemmas of modernity. Ultimately, these contexts invite us to refocus development as an orientation not principally concerned with generating wealth, but rather with finding the right condition for wealth – within people, their ways and institutions. Apparently, Brazil has now found it:

“Create a new G and Brazil will be in it. There is no country more prepared to find the G spot than Brazil!”⁶⁵

At yet another series of turn-of-the-century hydroelectric megadam openings in Brazil's booming interior, former President Lula (2003-2010) brings to life for a growing middle-class population, alongside his hand-picked successor President Dilma Rousseff (2011-Present), that Brazil's long-awaited take-off is imminent. The populist leader whose charisma came to reflect this global ascension is bearing out, in his own Brazilian fashion, much of the latest hype around the country's rising power in conjunction with prospects for changing global configurations and the coming of a truly postcolonial multipolar world via the widespread embrace of global capitalist and democratic practices, or at the very least, ideals.

To put it otherwise, in the final year of the Lula neoliberalization and internationalization reform project, Brazil surpassed the UK as the world's sixth largest economy, and it is estimated that by 2025 the BRIC newly advanced economic

⁶⁵ See Leijoto's 2010 article to grasp the tone of such political debates (“Lula: Brasil é o Mais Preparado para Encontrar o Ponto G” – Brazil is the Most Prepared to find the G spot, 1, translation mine).

development countries will collectively overtake G6 economies.⁶⁶ The emerging markets of ‘The Big Four’ (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are apparently poised to transform not only their economic output, but also their political alliances, geopolitical influence, consumer cultures, and labour practices, hence ushering in a new postcolonial world order. As projected in the foundational 2003 report “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050”, the Brazilian case, in particular, offers a unique position from which to reimagine the global cultural and political economy, given its capacity (as of yet to be realized) to balance resource supply, manufacturing, and services.⁶⁷ This political edict, propagated by anxious economists and hopeful governing elites, rings especially loud for Brazil’s poorer neighbours, who in being condemned for lagging behind, in turn, bring to bare the ‘emerging economy’ orientation of BRIC and company as a turning of its back on Latin America. To where (from where?) is Brazil taking off? Yet in popular terms of what counts in assessing economic development, “The Economist” came to declare Brazil’s take-off, relative to other BRIC countries, as the best available model to the developing world: in spite of its legendary talent in squandering the potentials of its bountiful land, Brazil’s steady economic growth, accompanied by official commitments to democratic reform with little insurgent threat (i.e. China) or neighbourly hostility (i.e.

⁶⁶ Refer to the Goldman Sachs report, “Dreaming with BRICs” (2) for calculations and analyses developed through the Centre for Economics and Business Research.

⁶⁷ In their projections, despite obstacles to trade, investment, and high foreign and public debts, the report reaffirms Brazil’s “potential” in terms of structural conditions that are in place, together with the progressively stabilizing policy reforms since the Lula administration (Goldman Sachs, “Dreaming with BRICs”, 15).

India), has finally readied its able citizens to thrust the Awakening Giant onto the global stage.⁶⁸ At long last, the time has come – are we there yet?



Figure 3: After much reservation surrounding President Lula’s socialist leanings, “The Economist” and associated researchers at Goldman Sachs announce the rise of Brazil as a global leader in this November 2009 issue.

From the heart of Brazil

(i) Capital of hope: disciplining the past

Yet how exactly are Brazil’s entrepreneurial pioneers leading the way to find this long-anticipated elusive opening to stimulate the coming of a new Brazil, of a new postcolonial world order? The pathways to development have apparently changed from the modernist crusade for order, stability, and progress. The saintly vision⁶⁹ of a place

⁶⁸ Refer to *The Economist*’s exclamatory 2009 article that accompanies the now widely-circulated frontispiece, “Brazil Takes Off”.

⁶⁹ In widespread narratives of Brasília’s history, the origin of the city is traced to the prophetic visions of Saint João Bosco in the 1800s, who is said to have foresaw a promised land located in the heart of Brazil (precisely equidistant to its four geographic anchors) that would usher in a civilization of the future, as documented by the Brazilian

where people were made good by the infrastructure of a city – the total design of an environmental milieu where roads were never to cross, confusion preempted, and orderliness the condition of a peaceably unstoppable progress – may still haunt a Brazilian developmental ethos (especially at times when the violence and crime in metropolitan areas, such as Rio, have provoked declarations of ‘civil war’). Its testing grounds, however, have come and gone. Its ultimate trial, Brasília, the hoped-for heart of the country built out of the barren red soil of an abandoned interior into the form of an airplane, failed to usher Brazil’s post-WWII take-off. The ‘capital of hope’, projected equidistant to the four corners of the vast territory, in abstract equality, failed to make citizens out of people, in the image of a promising nation.⁷⁰ Long feared as a political island, corrupt and disconnected from where (and how!) most people live, the modernist city in and of itself no longer serves as the desired safe haven, the break from a dark past, distant from the country’s previously precarious port capitals, Salvador (1549-1763) and Rio de Janeiro (1763-1960).⁷¹

Notwithstanding the disappointments, Brasília’s move inward – distinct from the administrative centres of colonial and slavocratic trade routes, Catholic missions, plantation economies, and imperial courts – lent confidence to a modern developmental agenda for an internally managed and integrated core. Its Master Plan (i.e. *Plano Piloto*)

government’s timeline of the construction of Brasília in “Portal Brasil: Brasília”. This vision was later enshrined in the new constitution, to which JK was held responsible.

⁷⁰ Perhaps more than a testament to modernism as an artistic and architectural movement, the case of Brasília has been taken up in Brazilian debates about modernization as a barometer for developmentalist practices and government-led social interventions. See James Holston’s anthropological studies on the planned city for a helpful English-language overview of the issues at hand.

⁷¹ Refer to the Brazilian government timeline on the numerous relocations of the nation’s capitals in “Portal Brasil: Épocas”.

strove not only to reform the tumultuous externally-oriented structures of the likes of the port capitals set up for an exogenous (mis)handling of the riches of the New World, but at last, to purge Brazil of its iniquities while simultaneously serving as a monument to its greatness (or at least, its leadership). This collectivist redesign, a bold response to early industrial economic growth paradigms that laid its groundwork under the direction of rural patriarchies, sought a unified national body as its stage, with the modern capital of Brasília commanding a sort of central nervous system. Marshalling in the structures of the anticipated golden years, the populist physician-President leading the city's execution made manifest what a prosperous Brazil could look like, transforming a nothing into an everything in ways that continue to resound, however melancholically, today:

From this Central Plateau, from this solitude that will soon become the mind in which the most high-level national decisions will be made, I look once more to the future of my country and foresee the dawn with unbreakable faith and boundless confidence in its great destiny.⁷²

Between the past, present, and future, President Juscelino Kubitschek's (1956-61) rallying cry for autonomy and integration was made concrete by (or more accurately, in) Brasília.⁷³ Eager to remedy the turmoil of mass industrialization amidst the debris of decolonization, the modernist city aimed to manage the requisite process more carefully than the unplanned growth that wreaked havoc in metropolises and their peripheries. By

⁷² This promise to a modern Brazil, consecrated in Brasília's *Museu da Cidade* (see *Figure 1*, translation mine), exemplifies the optimism and determination of the state-led models of modernist development that swept through third world development ventures in the 1950s-60s.

⁷³ Kubitschek – like Lula more recently – is an especially significant figure in the Brazilian political imagination because of the possibilities that he represented for a democratic spirit, oriented by and for the people (i.e. civil rather than military government!), at a time that came to be known as 'the golden years'. For more on this one of Brazil's most symbolic statesman, and his times, see Vianna's *JK - A Saga de um Herói* (JK - The Saga of a Hero).

way of remodelling space into universally rational and technocratic zones for living, working, and playing, it sought to circumvent the frictions between public and private spheres, and their constitutive segregation of labouring classes. The engineered city sought to tame the undisciplined cordial subject by automizing what previously had been deemed as personal, affective, or patrimonial relations, so as to more efficiently and effectively manage conflict and development.⁷⁴ Instead of gates and barbed wire, expressways were to organically regulate movement and carry people to and from their appropriate functions. Incorporating everything and everyone into an egalitarian public domain, this state-led model of development planned its way to a Brazil of the future, not merely a new city or new public life, but a new utopic spirit of endogenous development. Industrious, optimistic, and self-confident, this landmark embodied the populist developmentalism of the time, with its inventive and speedy construction evidencing the power of the Brazilian people: at last the stars were aligning for the giant's destined take-off into a modern (inter)national system. The radical modernist spirit of Brasília was to spread faster and further afield than smallpox, infecting its architects of tomorrow with this very enthusiasm to start anew. And the harmoniously composed terrain of the city was to be their breeding ground. This is the story, which remains with us until today, of the golden years yet to come, more often than not, putting order before progress in dreams of Brazilian ascension.

Roads now cross in the modernist city of yesterday. The unstoppable force of their original designs that were to drive forward modern-day *bandeirantes* now leaves

⁷⁴ For further contextualization of urban practices and design giving way to the modernist city, and their contemporary implications for political and economic development in Brazil and beyond, see Caldeira's "Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation" (especially pp. 316-319).

them jammed at intersections, while stranding those without wheels between vast stretches of disjointed white space. Informal settlements are made and remade everyday in the cracks of reinforced concrete cells and between monuments orchestrating collective harmony. Evading segregation infrastructurally, the city became one of Brazil's most segregated, with extensive open concrete spaces serving in for guarded gates and cracked glass: a looming state of constant surveillance from all directions. The accomplishment that was its christened 'man-made' lake, projected to surpass the dimensions of the former imperial capital's bay opening to the world (i.e. Rio's *Baía de Guanabara*, memorialized in song upon every discovery) did not readily seduce ruling classes to leave behind the cities of coastal development and make home in the hot and barren, by day, cold and arid, by night, uninhabited and uninhabitable modern city. Beyond difficult transitions, Brasília's *Plano Piloto*, legally preserved as a UNESCO World Cultural and Natural Heritage and enshrined as Brazilian Patrimony, the dead living city (the true testament to the planning of/as politics) remains a place where undesired peripheral developments are referred to as invasions, rather than favelas as auto-constructions in their own right, Brazilianly un-Brazilian.⁷⁵ In practice made possible by the *jeitinho brasileiro* (i.e. 'the Brazilian way', our characteristic negotiation of structures and rules as a creative way of accelerating time and bending space), the improvised Plan now singularly frozen has emptied any of what remains of its radical founding spirit in the name of long gone egalitarian ideals. The modernist contest of improvisation and planning battled out in Brasília, a failure otherwise known as

⁷⁵ For a critical and generous analysis of Brasília's volatile manifestations of an emancipatory modernist ethos, see Holston's "Libertem o Espírito de Brasília" ("Free the Spirit of Brasília"), especially p.6).

corruption, has marked so powerfully the Brazilian developmental imaginary, that even the city's optimistic designer Oscar Niemeyer (who opted to continue living in the imperial capital of a bygone era) has reconsidered its model: "To project Brasília for the Politicians whom you placed there, was like creating a beautiful flower vase for you to use as a chamber pot. Today I see, sadly, that Brasília should never have been projected in the form of an air-plane, but yes, of a patrol-wagon".⁷⁶ Not even reinforced concrete structures were able to remould the ways of the corrupted, of the *jeitinho brasileiro*. The prevailing of the personal or the cordial over the regulatory codes of civility indeed attested to a distrusting relationship between the people and the state, of laws made against customs. And so lives on the myth of Brasília... Can you find the airplane below?

⁷⁶ This statement attributed to Niemeyer on the celebration of his 103rd birthday went 'viral' throughout the country's (social) media networks; although controversially attributed to the radical architect, it perhaps more importantly resonates as the lost faith of many middle-class Brazilians today; its original poetic form reads: "Projetar Brasília para os políticos que vocês colocaram lá, foi como criar um lindo vaso de flores para vocês usarem como pinico. Hoje eu vejo, tristemente, que Brasília nunca deveria ter sido projetada em forma de Avião e sim de Camburão..." (translation mine). For an example of its political mobilization, see the National Network of Veterans website campaign as here cited ("Rede Nacional de Veteranos das Forças Armadas").



Figure 4: This night-time aerial photograph of Brasília shows the unplanned yet regulated extensions sprawling out from the intended contours of the airplane city (spotted on the top-left hand corner of the frame), as seen from the international space station (NASA archives).

The ambition of modernization, not too dissimilar from the globalization vision for a better world, even if more preoccupied with equality than freedom, captured the minds and hearts of so many in centres and peripheries alike. Brazil's especially grand '50 years in 5' road to modernization, symbolized by its futuristic capital of hope, sought to showcase to the world a self-confident reconstruction from the top of an egalitarian utopia capable of moving beyond colonial and military pasts on its own terms. With all of its bittersweet legacies, the airplane-shaped city poised in the geographic heart of Brazil remains an ode to *auto-mobility* – quite literally, to the individual motorcar, the awe of an industrial era and the emblem of a future conceived post-WWII. In the absence of sidewalks, it is the only way to move. This particular faith in progress, driven by Man's aspired mastery over Nature, calls for centralized planning: integrated expressways to enable the movement of auto-mobiles. As the symbolic and logistical

grounds of individual and collective autonomy, expressways are the true monuments to modernity, monuments of the rational and impersonal state whose juridical demarcations make possible civil practices of governance and self-governance. In this sense, Brasília is both the glory and the grave of the modernist dream, a caricature of the drive to make modern elsewhere orchestrated in less monumental ways (e.g. by local hygienist planning, forced evictions and speculative politics, etc.). Domestically and internationally, it did not become obvious that a fraternal community was on its ways, whether in the form of an urban democratic milieu (e.g. Brasília's design failed to withstand the segregation of classes into central and satellite zones of a traditional Brazilian city) or a society of equal nations (e.g. faith in UN-sanctioned principles of national self-determination did not eradicate the power dynamics of colonial times).

Just as globalization's transformatory visions necessarily invoke complex negotiations between the worldly and the parochial, modernization ventures in the emerging giant also tarried with the collective and the individual, the old and the new, the conservative and the progressive in its own ways, with lessons that continue to resound today. Looking inward, Brasília was named as a monument to Brazil, or rather, to what a Brazil could be. Not a capital vestige of colonial trade (Salvador) or imperial decree (Rio de Janeiro), the modernist city represented a commitment to endogenous development, for a Brazil in its own right, unified by the potential for a civic national standard. In the midst of rural patriarchal governance and cordial exchanges, change could not only entail a symbolic relocation of authority, but it required the thorough re-forming of people's habits, values, customs, and above all, a new social way: politics actually required the measured distance that Brasília afforded, notably from the social, in order for both to

become impersonal spheres of free and fair exchange. However seemingly oppressive the ordering from above, at the highest point in the city shines forth a testament to an imagined collectivity – the contested statue of its visionary triumphantly erected as the hammer encircled by the communist sickle (see below *Figure 5*). Indeed, the venerated standard of civility inherited in the days leading up to the postwar reconstructions was no longer quite Portuguese (synonymous with a colonial past) and not yet quite American (evocative of a still fragile future), but largely French in orientation. A mythical civilizational standard, unparalleled, at least in cultural terms, by other Europeanized visions of progress: *Latinidad* at its best. The mass production of destined equal citizens, freed by efficient designs that rendered more vital a fraternal bond, inspired a developmental project neither clearly despotic or emancipatory: *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. The more stern Corbusian of modernist influence on the city's architects – from their utopian urban plans employing architectural forms to combat the troubles of industrial cities, to their simple aesthetic choices fashioning exposed concrete and abstracted appearances for an egalitarian effect – materializes even amidst the added curves, liquidity, and lightness of its tropical manifestations (e.g. settings, colours, materials, contrasts; see *Figure 6* below).⁷⁷ At any rate, the modern subsumed by postwar modernization was universal in character, and continues to haunt how we assess our pasts, presents, and futures to-day, that is, how we assess what counts as modern, traditional, backward, and delayed.

⁷⁷ For further contextualization of Brazilian modernism vis-a-vis European and American standards, refer to Deckker's *Brazil Built: The Architecture of the Modern Movement in Brazil* and the accompanying archives of the 1943 MOMA exhibition by the same title.

As a modernism inspired not only by the sensual and spectacular forms of Carioca scenescapes (e.g. urban beaches, baroque churches, and nature in the form of virgin jungles and not-so-virgin mulattas) but also by the lagging industrialization of a third world, the national postcolonial project of shaping the ‘New Man’, Brazilian and modern, arrived at its own strain of administrative, rather than political, government. Shadowing the modernism of the Old World, even if without the right angles, rationalist measures, and eventual Fordist-Taylorist industrial aesthetics, Brasília’s monolithic structures similarly invited isolation, and in turn, the technocratic imposition from above – the President, the architect, the never-intersecting roads – reveals a dys/u-topian drive to regulate how people move. A space without place, *a ilha da fantasia*, the fantasy island illustrates so clearly where the newness of modernization could be found, in law, not simply by way of contrast to the realities of the poor and disorganized satellite regions that service the airplane, but ultimately, by way of its futuristic industrialism, patriarchal civility, disciplined adventurism, and finally, personalistic collectivity. In constructing a heart out of a hinterland, this developmental project indeed took direction from the visions and mandates of a European modernity, *and*, its particular manifestations on the streets of Brasília, accompanied by the wide-ranging crusade to cast the modern Brazilian Man, far exceeded the ideals or practices of the latest world-remaking project.



Figure 5: On the top left, JK's notorious memorial, projected by Niemeyer in 1981 following the President's death, evokes continual debates regarding Brazilian modernism by way of the statue's abstracted hammer-and-sickle symbolism of the architect's open communist allegiances (photographs mine).

Figure 6: The two reverse images to its right depict emblematic structures of "the pure and white city", where modernist simplicity and collectivist design can be seen alongside the light curves and liquid forms of Niemeyer's and Costa's Brazilian modernism, reflecting JK's functional yet futuristic industrial plans for national development.

Figure 7: Exemplified in the panorama, underneath, of the central Praça dos Três Poderes (Three Powers Plaza), these sculptural series of architectural designs come together to create harmonious spaces, in this case forming a figurative meeting point between the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary in (Niemeyer and Costa's) visions for a morally and pragmatically substantiated democratic foundation.

Within such glocal circuits of exchange, the stakes of this modernization game were overwhelmingly the remaking of a new Brazil-ia-n way, born not out of struggle but of optimism – an abstracted hope for our final take-off into a world of autonomy and

respect, measured through a masculinist political economy of (in)secure authority. Amid all of its lofty ideals radiating out from the heart of the country, Brasília, the epitome of the modernization project, forgot about one thing: ‘the people’. Characteristic of Latin American populisms founded more on a person than on people in their everyday, the physician-President’s push to transform the country from an agrarian-based economy (i.e. ‘the big coffee farm’) to a fully industrialized and technologically networked marketplace (i.e. principally through the advancement of an automobilistic sector) created a dislocated middle class for a new urban environment. With elixirs abounding, the city became the venue for modernization and its enabling promises, with Brasília, the ultimate modernist city only accessible by car, modelling the Brazilian version of a modern aesthetic: graceful yet imposing, the Bossa Nova Republic was born (1956-61).⁷⁸ As called forth in the “Symphony of the Dawn”, commissioned to the architects of the rising bossa nova musico-intellectual movements⁷⁹ of a soul-searching middle class (inamely, Tom Jobim

⁷⁸ Such contemporaneous characterizations of Brazil’s postwar modernization era reveal a certain broad-spectrum push to leave behind republics and empires of a rural, slavocratic past, toward institutionalizing a new Brazilian spirit. As well captured by one of the movement’s main architects, whose name has consecrated the international airport in Rio de Janeiro: “We are not going to sell [Brazil’s] exotic side, of coffee and carnival. We are not going to wheel out the typical themes of underdevelopment. We are going to pass from the agricultural to the industrial era. We are going to use our popular music with the conviction that it does not only have its own character, but also a high technical level”. In the words of Tom Jobim, bossa nova was not to be confused with samba. See Reily’s “Tom Jobim and the Bossa Nova Era” and Inayatullah’s “Gigging on the World Stage: *Bossa Nova* and *Afrobeat* after De-Reification” for more context, as well as Borges’ “República Bossa Nova” for the particular relations of the movement in the construction of the Bossa Nova republic, era, and spirit.

⁷⁹ Popularized in the 1950s and 1960s in Brazilian cities, notably the cultural hub of the time, Rio de Janeiro, bossa nova developed as lyrical fusion between samba and jazz and is today likely one of the best-known Brazilian genre abroad. Literally translated as “the new trend”, it mobilized young musicians, students, and intellectuals in search for a modern Brazilian rhythm and way of life.

and Vinicuis de Moraes), “the city so white and so pure” could only inspire a new way of living, working, moving:

Ah, the white gables! // As white feathers ... // Ah, the great structures! // So light, so pure ... // As if they had been deposited by the gentle hands of an angel on the pungent red earth of the central plain, // amid unrelenting music // the searing music/the mathematical music of human work in progress ... // The human work that announces that fate is cast and action irreversible... (translation mine; see also *Figure 5-6-7* above).⁸⁰

Although too expensive to be played on its borrowed French technology at the inauguration of the city as per the President’s request, the “Symphony” portrayed the emergence of the modernist city to those who had not yet seen the crown of the 50-years-in-5 plan completed nearly two years early, while at the same time, celebrating the coming of a new Brazil, a new Man, a new Brazilian Man. The promise of take-off, anticipated! In the ways that the city’s structures were to express an art of the impossible (never revealing its supports such as in the more technical impositions of industrial forms, rigid and static clamping down onto the earth), a seductive lightness was also to move the New Man. Like the waves of syncopated beats resounding from the contemporaneous experimentations of bossa nova, the new way of the New Man reaffirmed an aesthetics of modernity driving not only the governing order of Brasília, but more thoroughly transforming the organization and management of Brazil’s future prosperity.

Beyond the blueprint of the airplane city, hope lived on in urbanizing districts wired throughout the country on frequencies emitting post-WWII promises of freedom and progress. This spirit of change, which Brasília symbolized as both father and son in a

⁸⁰ For a succinct analysis of the relationship between the musical and political movements of the bossa nova era, as well as for full references to the lyrics of the Symphony, refer to Borges’ “República Bossa Nova”.

compressed evolutionary race, was to materialize through yet another (in)famous *passive revolution* of the former Iberian colony – that is, the self-styled pacific application of statist mechanisms to reform from within as a sort of conservative modernization or liberalization. Rotations within the squad: in the Gramscian vein, it is a socio-cultural program that is less about changing personnel (think Colonel-turned-President) and more about ideological interpolation, as it has been taken up in explanations of Brazilian political history, apparently bereft of genuine revolution.⁸¹ So in evaluating the perennial question of ‘why can’t we get it right?’ (i.e. *o por que não temos jeito, o por que não dá certo*), answers tend to intersect at the (dis)junctures between state and society, and the kind of sociability – the kind of citizen? – that (dis)connects these two regulatory institutions of modernity. And here, in the Bossa Nova Republic, a new relationship was to be forged. To be forged on the terrain of the city, the symbol of a universal modernity set against rural depictions of the patriarchal holdings of an antiquated former colony (i.e. *o sertão brasileiro*), so as to usher not only new ways of living, but ultimately new ways of being. Yet just as bossa nova’s overarching concern with exportation (i.e. the image of Brazil) constrained its force domestically, the idea of a Bossa Nova Republic, of the sense and realization of Brazil’s golden years, also remains constrained to the dusty corridors of historians and nostalgic philosophers, more than to an everyday recognition of Brazil’s possibilities to date. Through like standards that measure what we are, against

⁸¹ For further contextualization of these democratic dilemmas central to articulations of Brazilian (under)development, refer to the works here cited of influential Carioca political sociologist and former political exile, Luiz Werneck Vianna. Most notably in *A Revolução Passiva: Iberismo e Americanismo no Brasil* (The Passive Revolution: Iberianism and Americanism in Brazil), he rethinks the problem of democracy in Brazil, in terms of the relationship between public and private spheres precariously divided, something that will be further explored in and through various cases proposed in Part III of this dissertation.

what we should be, developmental programs of reform continue to be drafted at a distance. Otherwise put, today we only tend to hear bossa nova in hotel lobbies and other ostensibly refined gatherings within its birth city of Rio de Janeiro. Or abroad, of course.

(ii) Moral economies of citizenship: order vs. progress

Measured against the mythical imageries of the French Revolution (of a people, appropriating themselves of a system, violently!), classifications of change and continuity get stuck in political repertoires of macro or micro, institutionalist or popular, pacific or violent, top-down or bottom-up, and ultimately reform or revolution, whereby negotiations between centres and peripheries are denied their complexities, within and between boundaries. Either we are subalterns rising up, or passive objects of public policy, at best, or of dictatorial regimes, at worst – conveniently facilitating an *entreguismo*⁸² to the so-called developed world. Speaking through Weber, not only are we condemned to an immature capitalism, but moreover, to an immature democracy, where the state hovers over civil society, invading and regulating it at every step of the way. Against the presumably more organic dynamics of the domain of a marketplace that socializes us not only for capitalist engagement, but ultimately, democratic participation, we face a hollowed out space of citizenship that appears as a testament to

⁸² In Bresser-Perreira's "Identidade e Auto-Estima do Brasileiro" (Identity and Self-Esteem of the Brazilian, 9), the problem of national identity and self-esteem is directly traced to its impact on developmental policy; through the well-worn Brazilian notion of *entreguismo*, a certain kind of relinquishing or consignment to nations deemed already developed, he gets us to think about the politics of confidence-building, within the context of developmental programs and the need to attract foreign credit. Within the context of neoliberal globalization, this loss of autonomy is confused with the globalization myth of porous boundaries and the weakening of the state. Instead, what is really at play is a kind of "developed nationalism" and an "underdeveloped nationalism", that is, the problem of the postcolonial inferiority complex and the kinds of relations possible between state and society in varying contexts.

the successes or failures of these very forms of (in)direct sociability. It is this sociability, which positions the subject of development vis-à-vis her/his governing institutions, that we must reconsider if we seek to understand the failure of Brasília in realizing modernization's egalitarian project of an efficient development, where roads were never to cross. Of a democratic society to be stabilized by the equality of condition, where citizens were to take the same paths to go to the school zones, the shopping zones, the residential zones, and, of course, the government and administrative zones of the city. As follows, through varieties of Corbusian cells for living, equality was to be realized through an artificial naturalness. How else to live up to ideals so far from our reach?

When encountering development as a (inter)national project, one where an incomplete modernization can be explained by the corruption of a universal ideal (that is, the patrimonial edition of the state and personalistic iterations of private spheres of governance in the image of a fabled rural past), what we are left with are those who get it right and those who get it wrong. We are left with the option of endogenous or exogenous forms of development. The urban serves as a negation of everything seemingly rural, and, in turn, the rural captures our imagination of community and interpersonal intimacy in its varied forms, most notably in the model of the family of times gone by. Hybridities of a selective or superficial modernization map these options out in time, giving us exotic or anachronistic causes for underdevelopment: the problem of the (im)personalisms or (in)formalisms of (pre)modern governance. Unable to grasp the complexities and ambiguities of multiple and shifting civilizational standards (e.g. colonial/imperial/national; slavocratic/bourgeois/neoliberal; Anglo/Latin/miscegenated), the common sense of developmental conceptions of socio-economic and political life

relies on out of place abstractions to understand (trans)formations in peripheries always already mediated through indirect forms, between elites variously positioned in relations of power nothing obvious (for instance, think of the transnational intra-elite struggle between rural slave masters and urban bourgeoisie of an emerging competitive monied social order within the context of abolition movements). Beyond the ensuing limits to the advancement of relatively autonomous hubs of national commercial interests, this in-between condition exposes the (dis)junctures between conceptions of the world and corresponding codes of conduct on the periphery. Whether measured by the successes or failures of a colonial city set for exogenous development (Salvador), an imperial city armed for the administration of territories near and far (Rio), a modern city tasked with neutralizing national spheres of governance (Brasília), or of cities otherwise cultivated from commercial rather than explicitly governmental purposes (as is the success story of Brazil's wealthiest city that apparently got development right by putting economics before politics: São Paulo) – not to mention of places in the shadows abandoned in waiting for interventions coming from the light of these leading metropolitan centres! – the manifold manifestations of a chronically emerging Latin American giant are eclipsed by claims to passive, silent, cloaked, or stunted revolutions where orders and norms are redefined against exceptions as (inter)national guides for our next attempted take-off. Symptomatic rather than diagnostic, what these developmental approaches fail to take into account is how these visions of the world link up, or not, to everyday conduct – in modern terms, mediated by the two predominant governing institutions of the developed world, the nation-state and the market. Development as a way of living. Otherwise put,

how does Brasília's harmonious composition of fields and subjects of development line up with inherited socializations of modern governing logics?

So let us now take a pause, to reflect on the sorts of biosocial mediations between the citizen-subject of development and her/his governing institutions, which is to nurture (and be nurtured by) a particular kind of urbanization and urban culture that is to set the grounds for modern developmental practices and ways of living. Against what standards are we to measure? The positivist claims of a Europe oscillating between republic and empire, reverberating through decolonization processes in its former colonies, prescribed certain kinds of orders as the precondition for progress. As the French philosopher-cum-anthropologist observed, in turning our attention from European civilizational constitutions (i.e. the age-old feud between the English vs. the French, or otherwise put, the Protestants vs. the Catholics) to democratic America, the governance of modern conduct orbits around presumptions of natural law, so to speak, whereas mutability and creativity (and crisis?) is to belong to history – or in more positivist terms, justice can only be accessed by naturalizing the social through the organizational principles of norm vs. exception.⁸³ Natural, not in the sense of the state of things beyond human or divine touch, but natural in the sense of how interpersonal conduct is grounded, among subjects of varying political systems. Enchanted, at least in initial contact, with a British America at the time seemingly unentangled in European-style nationalism and imperialism, Tocqueville discerned a certain moral logic to democracy, in accordance to which religious fervour secures rather than threatens the respect for law, liberty, and rights

⁸³ Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* aptly expresses the tensions between how a modern disposition naturalizes and socializes citizens fit for democratic practice, and as such, remains an insightful reference for putting in check universal philosophies of a presumably generalizable modern Western experience.

(synthesis, at last!), ultimately enabled by sanctified demarcations between the public and the private (ahh, if only Tocqueville were alive today!). Facing the antagonistic relationship between the state and the church in his Catholic France, and later extrapolated to make sense of the twentieth century totalitarian challenge to liberal institutions and the new inequalities produced by industrialization, Tocqueville's often strategically re-membered political sociology comes and goes as reminders to pay attention to our socializations of moral political logics, in service of political projects from the authoritarian to the democratic. The way that an Anglo-Saxon rationality leaves room for, or rather, requires a faith in what is (not) immanent creates complementarity rather than antagonism between the civic and the religious or otherwise rendered ethical codes – a sort of integrated duality with a clear separation of spheres, rather than a catholic universality that absorbs contradictions into its internal logic. In contemporary terms, mediocrity is the price to pay for government of and for the people, with rights and responsibilities predetermined parsimoniously in abstraction. Or as Tocqueville observed in a new world where privileges of birth were never to exist, the manners of society must be softened to support the social condition of democracy. Civility, therefore, is not about education or civilizational advancement, but a form of social conditioning or qualification, be it the celebrated equality of condition attributed to democracy, or the aristocratic airs of an old world regulated by rights of birth. Given this correlation, something that a Weberian evolutionary frame might explain as the emasculations of the celibate civil servant within the bureaucratization and rationalization of a civil modernity, there reigns a certain detachment or disenchantment among subjects of liberal democracy, between themselves (devoid of the connections and inheritances of blood)

and between themselves and their world of professed equal condition.⁸⁴ Among equals, a detached yet humane sensibility (whereby self-sacrifice is out of place), and among non-equals (sub-humans?) insensibility and in certain circumstances, utmost cruelty (such as of the horrors of America slavery that the Frenchman recounted most notably in the South).⁸⁵ The positioning of the aristocratic, of the likes of Tocqueville's own world, displays and conceals its stature as "children of the same family", whereby a certain (a)morality applies to those of the family and another to those outside of its relations – without the risk of rising or falling in one's stature or humanity.⁸⁶ In any case, what we get in these observations of old and new worlds, respectively, is a political articulation of positions relating or separating subjects (i.e. aristocracy), rather than one naturalized by the equality of condition (i.e. democracy). To sum up with Tocqueville's words, in the Americas "there will be more vices and fewer crimes".⁸⁷ Under "the majesty of the laws", he cautions us of democratic America, "the people has learned to despise all authority, but fear now extorts a larger tribute of obedience than that which was formerly paid by reverence and by love".⁸⁸ Against the standard of an ordinary *polis*, of structures of an idealized city-state set to usher in a government of the people (think Platonic republics), the dilemmas of modernity bring out the righteous and the vulgar in

⁸⁴ Refer to Weber's *Politics as Vocation* for an influential account (one of the most influential in modern Brazilian social and political thought!) of the prerequisites for engaging in modern bureaucratic systems of governance.

⁸⁵ Refer to Chapter 1, Volume 3 of Tocqueville's depiction of democratic practices in the US for further elaboration: "That Manners Are Softened As Social Conditions Become More Equal".

⁸⁶ In speaking to the "softening" of manners, Tocqueville here traces the relationship between "civility", the conditions of "equality", and class politics.

⁸⁷ In his introductory words, Tocqueville sets up the manners and beliefs conducive to democracy (*Democracy in America*, 10-11).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

democratic experimentations of new and old worlds. What kind of moral political logic brings about progress? Liberal, how liberal? Beyond the English vs. the French, the legendary contrasts requalify themselves...

Vestiges of an Iberian patrimonial and colonial slavocratic administration, at Independence capacitated to secure the territorial unity of the expansive new nation at a time when conditions resonated with the fragmentations taking hold in Hispano-America, the mythical state has been both the guardian and the enemy of the Brazilian people (perhaps in the analogous manner that masters were over their slaves). Between naturalized (think new world) and politicized (think old world) positionings, far from the orders of an idealized polis, processes of modernization on the periphery are born of such (inter)dependence, creating *mundos legais* and *mundos reais* – the abstractions of ‘legal worlds’, and its oppositional credence to ‘real worlds’ multiply defined. Herein we find an alternate (a)moral political logic that socializes subjects of development. Such (dis)trusting relationships, of master-slave derivations, are exacerbated by intensifying internationalizing processes that further highlight the former colony’s dependence and vulnerability, within and between (inter)national networks. Within an inherited colonial and slavocratic milieu, trust and distrust secure the operational mediation between the governed and the governing. The sociability of a person yet to become citizen, and a citizen forever depersonified. For modernity’s rights to be guaranteed, so the story goes, one must be in the heart of the other, entrusted. One’s freedoms, one’s socio-economic mobility, and such other promises of modernity are perceptibly (inter)dependent, which further exposes the disjunctures between the *real* and *legal*. Faith in equality before the law does not make sense in this context, and arguably in interrelational contexts variously

configured. And more to the point, the battle of order vs. progress, epitomized by Brasília's attempts to civilize the ways of a cordial civilization, surrendered to planning so as to eliminate the need for politics: predictability resignified as order, creativity as progress?

Regardless of the generalizability of the maxim, this (inter)dependent postcolonial sociability takes on a lucid and elucidating role in the land of the (self)branded cordial subject. And how better served than by the Eurocentric myths of discovery⁸⁹, whose flipside positions the Americas as hospitable, at best (cordial and welcoming of the new and foreign) or cannibalistic⁹⁰, at worst. Those of a cordial disposition do not exterminate, but devour. They take in the other: assimilate, digest, and reproduce. They consummate, with them, never fully against them. In intimacy, the cordial gesture creates familiarity out of strangeness and deviation, in turn, giving rise to an emancipatory, anthropophagic source of pride for the mongrel offsprings of Europe. An antidote to the inauthentic, to the doubled exile, to strategies of *convivência*⁹¹ in grounds not ours? To the (post)colonial inferiority complex? With or without a racial or social miscegenation that characterizes new worlds such as the Brazilian, the cordial openness

⁸⁹ For an influential account of the developments and contributions of this inter-civilizational 'contact', see Holanda's *Visão do Paraíso*, whose analyses have been largely responsible for spreading the use of the term 'cordiality' as a way to make sense of a Brazilian civilization vis-à-vis its imagined European counterparts.

⁹⁰ For an alternate conception of a Brazilian experience of 'Europe', the modernist interventions of the twentieth century, of the likes of Andrade's anthropophagy, incorporates, quite literally, Brazil's 'others', rather than instituting parallel accounts of the sorts of a 'cordial' hosting of outsiders.

⁹¹ The Portuguese word *convivência* denotes a sort of sociality, a living together, marked by a necessity to live with certain conditions not of our choosing, and the experience that this constant negotiation brings about. As a mode of living, within the Brazilian context, it is both the practice and effect, a sort of intimate relationship that gives form to the everyday.

eternally returns to allegories of an alternate discovery, of the sorts of an original orgy, whereby we all become related and the unfamiliar becomes familiar evermore. Hence the seductive power of the *jeitinho brasileiro*, rendering racial problems social (i.e. the prized myth of Brazil's racial democracy), alongside claims to an amoral familialism that becomes a mask and fetish in relations between the served and the server otherwise transformed into 'friend', 'brother', 'aunt', as hailed on the streets of Brazilian cities today. As such, to keep it in the family is to absorb in one way or another, be it hospitably or cannibalistically, in the heart: *cor-ação*, the root of the cor-dial.⁹² A fabled inheritance captured by Latinidad, that is imagined and imagines itself against an Anglo-Saxon head, a cold rationality of abstract rights and obligations of the likes that Tocqueville pays tribute for its democratic potential. One that leads to an inability to "conciliation" that Stefan identified as the downfall of a European civilization at war. One that leads to the dynamic of the emerging that validates the Americas, North and South, with worthwhile aspiration: discovery, mobility, redemption.

Offsprings of modernity, the Americas is the continent of the emerging, the new rich, where the aspiration to climb is not vulgar and a sign of aristocratic decay, but precisely the founding motivation, historically and otherwise. Corruption. As a civilizational ethos, the cordial becomes vulgar within the presumed egalitarian matrix of modernity, when divorced from its social functions of (re)producing interpersonal distinction: instead of nurturing social competition, the ostentation of wealth and

⁹² The Portuguese word *coração* (heart) refers to a *ação* (action) from the heart, which is the reference for *cordialidade* (cordiality).

elegance crystallizes distance in the land of the emerging.⁹³ On the peripheries of the Americas, those at the bottom do not even have the conditions to dream, let alone incorporate, the life of the upperly mobile. It is a different moral political logic at work – not quite democratic, aristocratic, or familial. Hence the cordial ethos whereby good and bad is to pass through the body, the heart, in order to make any law or imperative have effect. Perhaps one of the reasons for the failure of Brasília, whose pure and white structures, as flattening as they are distancing, did not make room for intimate interaction: city life, auto-mated?

As one of our most beloved Portuguese poets consecrated for us here in Brazil: “Myth is the nothing that is everything”.⁹⁴ Romancing the real, the cordial myth is the mirror that reflects the image, a living anachronism of a rural, familial, slavocratic milieu, of a discovery of an othered Europe, whose everyday loudness is cancelled out by its systematic silencing. With mass-scale industrial urbanization, cordiality, the passing through the heart, explains so little. And in explaining so little, the images that it produces exhibit the in-between of mismatched sociabilities, of Brasília’s universality in a land where conditional rules are dressed up as abstract laws. Through measures of equality that were to preempt interpersonal negotiation (corruption!), Brasília became the breeding ground of the improvisational as a means to navigate structures in denial of the ground of its supports. Whether the conciliatory spirit, of the sorts of an equilibrium of

⁹³ In Part II of this dissertation, I will elaborate further these classed dynamics, with the aid of Jessé Souza’s studies of Brazilian socio-economic classes.

⁹⁴ This saying adopted from Fernando Pessoa’s epic poem “Ulysses” speaks to the role of myth in the founding of the Portuguese nation, as this mythic hero of the Odyssey is said to have been the founder of its capital of Lisbon (once Ulixbona), and through such stories we can come to appreciate that myths need not be ‘real’ to effect our realities: “o mito é o nada que é tudo” (*Mensagem*, 29, translation mine).

antagonism, empowers or obstructs modernization in its (in)formal realizations⁹⁵, the atemporal dislocations of a universal project of modernity work through similarly decontextualized imperatives of myths, personalized or impersonalized. To compensate, the sense of the exotic, of the excess captured and transmitted by modern systems of communication that (re)produce such orienting myths of national community, tends to serve as cause for self-esteem, based on the virtues of the body in the land of samba, carnival, and football champions. Empowering or obstructing, the intellectual legacy of the conciliatory spirit is creativity, the accolade of the improvisational, set against the self-discipline and politeness of an imagined Anglo-Saxon rationality, most powerfully embodied by the institutional figure of the modern state. To put it otherwise, the anthropophagic devours and consumes, rather than imitates. It has *jeitinho*...

To give life to this cordial way, in cities whose scale transforms capacities for the interpersonal, the *jeitinho brasileiro* makes the impossible possible as often as it makes the possible impossible, hence the corruptions and inefficiencies of the emerging Latin American giant thus defined. So too its creative potential. At the threshold of modernity, as one in the latest generation of Brazilian urban anthropology, Livia Barbosa, reminds us, the *jeitinho* arises in mediation of the encounter between presumably personalistic regimes with those impersonalistic regimes of an individuated modernity.⁹⁶ Whether of a

⁹⁵ For exemplary lines within the debates into interpretations of Brazilian modernity, see Freyre's analyses (in works such as *Casa Grande e Senzala*) for how this conciliatory spirit aids processes of modernization, and Holanda's accounts (such as in *Raízes do Brasil*) for its obstructions.

⁹⁶ For an insightful depiction of the role of this Brazilian mode/myth in development practices, see Barbosa's *O Jeitinho Brasileiro: A Arte de Ser Mais Igual* (The Brazilian Way: The Art of Being More Equal) – an ethnographic review by a student of influential Brazilian anthropologist, Roberto DaMatta, whose work will be further explored in Part II of this dissertation.

colonial origin, slavocratic derivation, Latin or Iberian temperament, Catholic orientation (of the likes of a Jesuit humanist pedagogy set against the technical or pragmatic Anglo-Saxon approach more efficient in methods of problem solving), or of the chaos of decolonizing worlds or corrupted human nature, at large, the folkloric *jeitinho* stands as a bypass of formal or institutional demands of modernity, giving us the problem of disciplining the corrupt(ed).⁹⁷ Practiced by all classes (from the janitor to the president, as Brazilians tend to defend in pride and shame), the *jeitinho* is more than a survival strategy, a dribbling of the out of place. Beyond functionalist explanations, it is either transgressive or creative, treading the tenuous line between corruption and favour in urban contexts that create distance between a mythical familial community of an imagined rural past. As an effective (not necessarily efficient or procedural) form of resolving unexpected problems, the *jeitinho* is at the heart of the problem of a third world, of a Brazilian corruption, by rendering the distinction between public and private null. For the really desperate, “este país não tem jeito”. This country does not have a way, it is hopeless. And yet, the *jeitinho* is also at the heart of what it means ‘to be Brazilian’. That is to say, it is as much a mode of navigating national identifications as statist associations. At the moment of invocation of the *jeitinho*, distinctions of class, race, and so forth are apparently subordinated to this cordial practice that demands the inter-relational: waiters are called ‘friend’, teachers are called ‘aunt’, taxi drivers are called ‘brother’, and so on and so forth. As a homogenizing myth of national identity, as a cordial, conciliatory, good-humoured, and creative spirit, it promotes positive self-

⁹⁷ In addition to Barbosa’s analysis, see Rosen’s “The ‘jeito’ – Brazil’s Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and its Development Implications” for an adaptation of the concept.

esteem in the construction of national identity. Corrupt, it weighs down the self-deprecatory tradition of colonial inferiority complexes. Brasília's pure and white composition of an orderly modernity would have neither of it.

(iii) *Rethinking the state of development*

Ironically, this singular adaptation between the personal and impersonal demands of a democratic and capitalist modernity, of the sociability of modern citizenship, was legitimated at its most official level by our first intimate, televised president: none other than the Bossa Nova President. Even if the structures of his envisaged city were not able to remould the *jeitinho brasileiro* into a healthy modern aesthetic, President Juscelino Kubitschek, our beloved 'JK', modelled for us the ambivalent possibilities of a new way forward. With the dawn of Brasília, we saw the battle of order vs. progress in full rage. Displayed harmoniously on our national flag, these fabled modalities of an Independent postcolonial nation have not been the easiest to reconcile with the *jeitinho brasileiro*, however much their shared birth in a positivist modernity. The flipside of the cordial way is, after all, the question that breaks down the *jeitinho* for those who reject or are rejected by this particularly modern negotiation of postcolonial personalities and individualities: "Sabe com quem está falando"?⁹⁸ Do you know, are you aware, of with whom, to whom, you are speaking? This was the mode of presidential figures preceding

⁹⁸ For further elaboration of this DaMatta's central concept, see his "Sabe Com Quem Está Falando? Um Ensaio sobre a Distinção entre Indivíduo e Pessoa no Brasil" in *Carnavais, Malandros e Heróis: Para uma Sociologia do Dilema Brasileiro* ("Do You Know With Whom You Are Speaking? An Essay on the Distinction between Individual and Person in Brazil" in *Carnivals, Malandros, and Heroes: For a Sociology of the Brazilian Dilemma*, 193).

JK: models of authority, *à brasileira*. President Getúlio Vargas⁹⁹, of the first dictatorship, might have done it in the most lovable of ways, becoming the ‘father of the poor’ (and ‘mother of the rich’), but his interpolation materialized the cordiality of the inhospitable, to be feared. But as defenders of the first dictatorship (who disagree with its classification as such) continue to qualify, Getúlio got things done. Cordially, nonetheless: as Livia opens up in the negotiations of personalities and individualities that cut across real and legal worlds, which define the *jeitinho brasileiro*, the (in)famous ‘Do you know with whom you are speaking?’ question likewise operationalizes the foundational distinction of a conflicted modernity, by appealing to personal relations rather than abstract law. In societies not governed by modern attachments to individualism, anthropologists have tended to affirm, the collective is situated as an end and the life of each person as a means or component within the whole.¹⁰⁰ Yet both of these mythically cordial modes demand one to position oneself within complex (non)institutional matrices; they demand relative negotiation not absolute decrees. As Livia puts it, the *jeitinho* is “the art of being more equal”.¹⁰¹ Whether to bring people further together or push them apart, through the interpersonal, the *jeitinho brasileiro* exposes (in)equality at the heart of the modernity dilemma, creating friction between its *mundos reais* and *mundos legais*.

⁹⁹ Getúlio Vargas is the longest serving President (second in Brazilian governing history only to Emperor Pedro II): from 1930 to 1945 as dictator, and from 1951 until his suicide in 1954 as a democratically elected leader. He is remembered for his nationalist and populist commitments to industrialization, centralization, and social welfare reforms.

¹⁰⁰ See Barbosa’s study for these common articulations of the tension between individualism and collectivism in Brazil.

¹⁰¹ See Barbosa’s manuscript, supervised by DaMatta, for further elaboration of context-specific dynamics of these techniques of sociability.

Embedded in apparently intimate relations, it is not strange to ask a stranger for a favour in modern Brazil: it is the *jeitinho brasileiro*. Of course, this stranger is always already situated through an aesthetic and performative matrix of class, race, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability, and other markers that shape how one can and cannot play the game. That said, gradations, as prevalent in (pseudo)familial contexts as social contexts variously defined, are not primarily based on individuated performance. Here is where Brasília went wrong, in tailoring its urban and (inter)national circuits for a universal subject, civilized in principle, ignoring inherited individualities and personalities of a Brazilian (under)development. This myth of individuality, which gives life to modern promises of freedom and equality, is thus revealed in the peripheries of the modern world without so many of the masks that those who champion their originary and complete modernity are compelled to wear. Today, it is obvious that Brasília will always have been *a ilha de fantasia* – this is no indicator of critical discernment. Be it the individual as a rights-bearing subject of egalitarian universal laws or as a psychological subject of moral and social personality, in the land of a (self)identified cordial modernity, both mobilize the *jeitinho* and put to work the fragile internal logic of individualities variously configured. The preconditions for individuality, unmasked. And this is what is really at stake in the battle of order vs. progress. However, professed cordial subjects who are either proud or ashamed of their *jeitinho*, do not tend to see it quite in this way. Instead of posing the problem to these fragile logics, the problem is projected onto our inability to be disciplined into logics virtually admired for their illusionary nature. It is no surprise, then, that the now banalized expression, *o jeitinho brasileiro*, came to define a nation at precisely the time of this uncertain threshold of a postcolonial (inter)national

modernity: first recorded in written speech in 1943 (and increasingly circulated in newsprint in the aftermath of the Second World War), it is the mark of our modernization forever to come.¹⁰² As follows, the *jeitinho* that links the person and the individual, that is, the interpersonal with the institutional, has its distinct moral ethos, always already indebted to an (inter)national myth of a cordial civilization. At its highest level, patrimonial. Yet explanations of Brazilian underdevelopment that follow from such patrimonial lines of a corrupted state and citizen (to which Brasília's visionaries were responding) do not quite capture the complexity of this (a)moral political logic, in positioning the *jeitinho* as a premodern quality of personhood rather than a modern mediation between personalities and individualities of a conflicted and peripheral sociability of citizenship. Something that Tocqueville's romance of America as land of the emerging would belie. The problem, Livia suggests, is not that we have a negative identity, but low self-esteem. Brasília only served as further testament to this discrepancy: that is, a well-educated people would have been able to live the good life in Brasília. In a Brazil that has no way, *sem jeito*, hopeless, presidential electoral slogans following our traumatic 2014 World Cup home defeat continue to call forth, *Não desista do Brasil* (Don't give up on Brazil!). Whether applied in a positive or negative way, what the *jeitinho brasileiro* does is bring those or that in conflict closer together, to work with rather than against discrepancies, in contrast with the civilized distancing or denial that makes up a depoliticization otherwise than cordial: civil. Opportunity, lost. And in

¹⁰² Barbosa traces the history of the use of 'jeitinho', which only became attached to a national identity at a time when individualist discourses began to define and overwhelm our sense of modernity and modernization.

turn, this question of self-esteem implicates development in unexpected and far-reaching ways.

So how to achieve our long-promised take-off? Of a country abundant in natural resources without propensity for natural disasters, of a country abundant in cultural diversity without propensity for war and persecution...and so the myth of *meu brasil brasileiro* continues to define the paradoxes of Brazilian (under)development. Instead of instilling fear, the prophetic plan of Brasília's 50-years-in-5 was to instill awe. Our Bossa Nova President danced his ways into our hearts. He did not force himself in, but seduced his way through, affirming our place and worth in the reciprocal dance. A stark contrast to his predecessors, JK modelled for us, glamorously, on television sets across the country, a new posture and legitimated a softer, lighter authority – an alternate elegance to the military and imperial ostentation of position and power. He did not need to invoke the 'Do you know with whom you are speaking?' question, officializing the *jeitinho* as an amoral posture of a modern Brazil. Brasília's circular and harmonious structures were to secure the context for such a reformation of personalities and individualities variously positioned. It is no coincidence that the Bossa Nova President is the memorable figure separating the young Brazilian Republic's two recognized dictatorial regimes (1930-45 and 1964-85). And on the other side of the mirror, Getúlio, represented order. His suicide left a nation orphaned, shot through the heart as he triggered into himself in the winter of 1954, leaving a nation who was neither able to depose or cannibalize its martyred father. JK never left us at either end of the gunpoint: his only weapon was dialogue, smooth-talking. Abolishing press censorship and other heavy measures of Getúlio's dictatorship, JK arose as a model of the Brazilian democrat,

memorialized alongside Getúlio himself as two of the great (kinds of) constructors of a modern Brazil (i.e. of the turning to an American-style and -funded industrialization). Caricatured, one ushering in order, the other progress. Both cordial, in their own way. Getúlio would pat you on the head for affection (as in the story that my grandfather proudly recites to me until this day). JK would woo you (as the emerging Hollywood stars taught my grandmother's generation to swoon, and so we remain wooed, bittersweetly). More toward the fraternal than the paternal, JK's commitment to realizing Brasília – a dream dreamt since the Proclamation of Independence for a capital in the forsaken interior of the country, the city of the future mapped out in the original Constitution and to be constructed in synch with the development of the country as a whole – was invoked as a function of constitutional obligation rather than of the goodness of a wise overseer and protector. The Father of the People, Getúlio, on the other hand, sought a relationship with those being overseen by the government unmediated by political parties, and as such, only dead, he foresaw, would he leave the Palace. Whether summoning 'Do you know with whom you are speaking?' or the sweeter invocations of the *jeitinho brasileiro*, both are perceived as cordial in their own way, both welcomed the so-called passive revolutions into a Brazilian modernity, from the top down. Like the dominant partner in the waltz that gives space for the feminized spectacle to shine (by managing every swerve and spin with a light hand on the back), the control that JK came to symbolize is no less forceful, albeit to a different rhythm. To put it otherwise, when things are going poorly, we invoke Getúlio; when they are going well, we invoke JK. Yet either way we are invoking a positivist frame of governance, disciplining a future

into a present, for a former colony where the past is no guide. And the modernization of Brazil, the chronically emerging giant, continues to march along to these rhythms....

Today, following in JK's gaze to the heart of Brazil, presidential candidates tend to play some sort of country-folk music as their campaign jingle to summon the mythical abandon of a rural interior (while sub-national candidates opt for the more typical commercial jingle to sell themselves to the people). Since JK's grand seduction, only Lula's internationalization candidature that boosted our national self-esteem has memorialized a more intimate cordiality (remember how he found the G-spot?). Others tend to remain in the shadows of the figure of order, who was and will have been suicided in modern Brazil. On its flipside, JK gave us a lasting incorporation of the spirit of progress. He tried to gain our trust, at a time when the egalitarian standard of modernity demanded mobility rather than a self-evident and secure standing in socio-political hierarchies. From colony to old states to new states, from old republics to new republics, he remains the paradigmatic New Man, in all of his spectral charm. He had *jeitinho* – of the kind that we like to like. Without shame, shameless. The great democrat showed us, rather than told us, of the potential ways of a modern Brazil. And Brasília remains as the eternal statue to this mythical honour: not heavy, baroque, or brick, but light, clean, concrete...white. Instead of pointing outwards (like our first port capital of Salvador) or upward (as the grandiose structures that welcome the nationalized imperial court in Rio), Brasília points inward.

Taking up once more the call of the *bandeirantes*, who scoured the land, time and again, in search of hidden riches, the New Man was to pave the way for the conquests of a gold-en age that was and will have been in the New World. JK, the archetypal New

Man of a Brazilian modernity, harnessed this aesthetic potential, incarnated on television screens across the previously voiced radio platforms, in the construction of the promise city. Happy, friendly, modernizing, populist, and most importantly, optimistic, the Bossa Nova President was all that Brazilians have loved to love, in a new beat. His style gave life to the idea of a Brazilian modernism, letting go of the diffident slavocratic Brazil where culture was synonymous with playing piano in the afternoon and discussing possessive pronouns in the evening. A new middle class with their new way was on the rise; through their light harmonies and soft lyrics emanating from the noble areas of the city, a modern Brazilianness was in the making. Not of the hills (i.e. favelas) or countryside (i.e. *caipiras*), not samba, it was urban. Distinguished from the imperial musical traditions as well as the communal cacophonies of sound among families and ruralesque communities, bossa nova gained prominence as soliloquies, between one man and his guitar, in the cafés of Rio's beachside neighbourhoods. In a place where familial and cordial relations are believed to have governed how people interact, where laws exist to be violated, the liberalization and modernization of Brazil seemed to require a distanced perspective from above, intellectualist or artistic, legal or architectural, to gift people with new costumes and values suited to a modern urban life. And so it was rehearsed on the stage of Brasília.

To sum up, the modernist developmentalist projects of JK rallied the same audience as bossa nova. What is more, "Bossa Nova is to be president", as Juca Chaves' (in)famous satirical samba turned back the hype in the same year as the release of the

“Symphony of the Dawn”.¹⁰³ This new disposition invites one to fly and see the world from above; it is JK with his guitar, it is the ‘playboy’ out of touch with realities, more in his airplane than feet on the ground. Whether enchanted by the rapid modernization and economic growth captured by Brasília, or disillusioned by the waste of public money and isolation, the bossa nova rhythm was smoothing the transition to new ways of doing things, of managing people and wealth, a new culture of leadership, readying the country for its heralded take-off into the coveted ranks of the modern community of nations. Its spirit of development was not that of the colonial decree, military rigour, or even industrial discipline. Never a statue of himself like preceding presidents, JK, the new civil and accessible man, resolved conflict in conversation – seductively, in song, not in battle. Like its bossa nova voice, an easy near-whisper never operatic or brassy, the Bossa Nova President, who could condemn with a smile, lives on today as a liberalizing modern, if patriarchal and personalistic, managerial style, which elected presidents from Collor to Lula have since sought to emulate only to fail at the impossible.

Also like its bossa nova rhythm, the modernizing projects of Brazil’s golden years¹⁰⁴ took after samba’s side-to-side sway more than the vaunted front-to-back swing of jazz. Repackaged as a dignified cultural export, with more jazz, this new beat did not accompany Brazil’s first heralded (inter)national take-off. The life of the *bon vivant* of an urban(e) and cosmopolitan middle class enchanted by bossa nova, its optimistic

¹⁰³ See the lyrics and music of each piece available on the *Letras* database referenced in the bibliography (under Moraes and Chaves, respectively).

¹⁰⁴ Although many ‘golden years’ have been declared in Brazil’s chronically emerging history, the post-war era gave this iteration a developmentalist slant, with first, second, and third worlds declared, the ‘American way of life’ can to dominate discussions into modern ways of living, emerging out of technological advances to which the World Wars (and ensuing cold wars) gave birth.

president, and modernist city were unable, in concert, to respond to the Brazil that they inherited. The pure and white structures of Brasília's intended new start quickly morphed into sheer screens on which to project the segregation, inequality, instability, and violence that they sought to exclude. Brasília, the rigged patrol-wagon, served as the most effective trap to behold the iniquities of Brazil. After all, JK, our archetypal modern leader, was trained, as a gentleman of the waltz, whose light circular moves could easily move in and through the romances of aristocratic distinction and modern equality: the cordial *Senhor*, our most elegant in conservative liberalization, exhibited the contradictory in avenues and alleyways of the modern city.

Self-confidence quickly reverted into shame. The city failed to make Man good, especially its politicians. The spell of modernization waned, and was in the end revealed as a variety of neocolonial missions to develop one's lot in the world in the image of the "White Man's Burden".¹⁰⁵ Brazilian command turned out to solicit just as much *malandragem* – complex manoeuvres with/against the top-down imposition of an authority that sees what is best for all and manufactures the structural conditions to seduce us into behaving in certain ways (or to put it otherwise, the *jeitinho* gone wrong) – as its Catholic and imperial iterations. Collective in focus, modernist in aesthetic, and industrial at base, the capital of hope did not lead Brazilians to acquiring the bountiful wealth of this great country that so many feel is rightly theirs, from which we have been cheated time and again. Attempting to annul the inheritances of the present for the promises of the future left many staring off into emptiness. Even operational patrol-

¹⁰⁵ Britain's imperial poet, Rudyard Kipling's "The White Man's Burden" (1899) has come to symbolize Eurocentric justifications of colonial rule through seemingly benevolent calls to paternalistic care.

wagons would not change the direction of movements brought down from on high, however noble. Brasília, once a bold inspiration for nationalist efforts to promote third world development in the postwar era of a new promised postcolonial order, came to exemplify all that was wrong with state planning and modernist architecture. The corruptions and inflationary volatilities that followed are often attributed as paving the way for the military dictatorship that came to rule the country once over from 1964 to 1985, further perpetuating an uneasy relationship with the increasingly globalizing economies, representative international institutions, and free market neoliberal platforms gaining hold through rising assertions of American dominance with the coming end of the Cold War.

Global economic instabilities along with 1980s third world debt crisis that coloured modernization's afterglow merely spelled out the obituaries of an already sensed loss. Take-off, stalled. The public and endogenous spirit was dramatically unmasked for its political and urban engineering, distrusted until today as a source of genuinely patriotic, good or just ways forward for an undisciplined third world. The spirit of change that reigned in the aftermath of the Second World War, ostensibly taken up in Brazil as progress in the form of order (or order in the form of progress?), failed to nurture the ways of a modern citizen, on and off the stage of Brasília. Structural Adjustment Programs and the tied aid that followed removed any final doubts that may have lingered amidst subjects of development that the promise of equality and the accompanying gifts of modernity were not materializing under the direction of national postcolonial leaders in the trenches of former colonies, neither by the altruism of Northern development missions that routinely come and go. We were clearly not of the

same promised ranks. And more to the point, subjects of development seemed to lack the necessary preconditions to become citizens of an advanced nation – either we get order or progress, apparently never both...never the qualifications of a first world. Even following the redemocratization processes that marked the end of Brazil's last military dictatorship, the *Constituição Cidadã* of 1988, the Citizen Constitution, would not gain force without citizens educated in its ways.

At any rate, these moments of a liberalizing disposition reveal more of Brazil's promised take-offs than the periods of nationalized dictatorial regimes, I would argue. Otherwise scaled, in the city, military occupations continue in poor peripheries, so what is different about times of national democratization and liberalization is how they reveal the (mis)matches of politics and its legitimizing discourses. That is, moments such as those instituted by the capital of hope show us more clearly the formation and reformation of citizens and nations toward aspired ideals. Dictatorships seldom need to speak to anyone but themselves. In turn, central to (re)democratization initiatives is education. In the Citizen Constitution, more than a social right, educational institutions are massified in ways that take it beyond an assistentialist function (i.e. public welfare), toward a humanistic casting of the citizen and the scientific and technological development of the state.¹⁰⁶ However, such liberal methods and manners of establishing a sort of socio-cultural hegemony, following the Gramscian caveat, can train subjects to

¹⁰⁶ Refer to the *Museu da República* volume, *A Voz e a Letra do Cidadão* (The Voice and Word of the Citizen) for further contextualization of our last redemocratization processes, which were profoundly marked by periods of economic stagnation, high unemployment, inflation, among numerous other governing challenges.

obey the orders of the authority of the day in many different ways.¹⁰⁷ Whether following in the models of literacy inspired by the French Revolution long favoured in Brazil, which endows the state with the primary role in the pedagogical formation of citizens, or in the Protestant-inspired moulds of an American market that aims to eliminate mediation between subjects and authorities toward an individuated incorporation, there remains lingering reservations regarding how the civic spirit is best nurtured, through state or private (read voluntary) institutions.¹⁰⁸

In the face of take-offs variously stunted, the legendary failures of Brasília's socio-political engineering seemed to serve as an irreversible indictment of the first model of a seemingly top-down (re)formation. The structures of order and progress in the idealized city did not effectively socialize the modern Brazilian citizen, of cordial breed, to navigate the allegedly neutral and universal principles of a democratic milieu. Thus the solution to corruption was consecrated in and through a minimal state, and on less institutionalist terms, the educating of citizens into private initiative so as to fill the voids left behind. If the *jeitinho brasileiro* could not be disciplined from the top down,

¹⁰⁷ Such as in (re)formulations of the concept of 'passive revolution', central to Brazilian self-images, processes of institutionalization enable and limit their own pathways to subversion.

¹⁰⁸ If the French Revolution (and ensuing Napoleonic governance) entrusted the democratic state, as the representative of the people, with the task of educating citizens in a universal and nationalist light, the Protestant revolutions, in putting believers in direct contact with God through the study of the Scriptures, is to have entrusted parishes with the task of literacy once discouraged in Catholic institutional (read Vatican) mediations. These mythical points of reference that have guided enterprises and analyses of modernization, however (in)accurate in explaining the conditions that they authored, take on legendary proportions in the New World poised as lagging behind (South) or moving beyond (North) in ways that fail to grasp how the relationship between the state, society, and market are constantly transformed. For further contextualization of French vs. English models of literacy and ensuing state/citizen relations, see *O Exílio do Homem Cordial* (The Exile of Cordial Man, 32).

because it operates on a plane between the (in)formal and the (im)personal, a different game is called for that speaks to these terms. In the battle of a cordial vs. civil civilization, modern institutions are personalized, subjectivized, and simplified as autonomous logics, theatrizing politics as a battle between the honest and the corrupt, rather than ideas and interests in conflict.¹⁰⁹ The patrimonial state is seen as the public manifestation of the *jeitinho* of personalistic cordial subjects, both always already in excess of public/private demarcations of a conciliatory spirit. Its ultimate enemy is the ‘self-made man’ as the contemporary manifestation of an Anglo-Saxon pioneering figure of a Weberian protestant ascetic ethic, who purportedly operates on planes of work rather than adventure and thereby makes explicit mechanisms of a cordial ethos. As such, both patrimonial and personalistic manifestations of political conduct, projected onto macro and micro scales respectively, are rendered in Weberian terms a premodern form of political domination, which captures, in effect, the terms that continue to define the (self)understanding of Brazilian third worlds – the very identifications from which Brasília sought to escape. The cordial subject, subjected to uncontrollable emotions, is charged with crimes of corruption, as if its passions once translated into rationalizable interests would no longer corrupt. It seems that the caveats of the father of political science, played out on the idealized terrains of a Platonic polis, has been lost on us: the form of our political constitutions is what upholds or corrupts the workings of the polis. The state or the market, in contemporary terms, is neither inherently good or bad in and of itself; they are modes of governing. The author of the Philosopher-King even went so

¹⁰⁹ For further development of these analyses into modern governing institutions, see the edited collection on *Corruption* (Avritzer), in which Jessé Souza proposes some important reorientations that I will take up in the concluding section of Part II of this dissertation.

far as to explicate democratic and monarchical forms as the two extremes of excess, situating mixed government as the antidote to corruption.¹¹⁰ The triumphs of democracy and the defeats of fascism in the total wars of the twentieth century are nothing more than the twin sides of co-constitutive forms of governing, based on mobilizing excess to contain the masses.

The matter of how best to conduct the participation of citizens in political life remains an open question. Whether championing British-later-American models of private initiative or universal models of a French Latinidad, the legitimating indices of a national identification mediates the public and the private, that is, brings politics as defined by interests, ideas, and reasons into the hearts of people, making of them citizens apt to work through the operational logics of the state. Or not. To put it in modern social science terms, the manipulation of words and images, the circulation of information, and the production of state-sponsored cultural production (i.e. official attempts at nationalization) are ways of solidifying this relationship between state and society. Distrusted, we get the *jeitinho* that accompanies Brazilian (under)development. Whether in spirits French or British, Latin or Anglo-Saxon, Catholic or Protestant, or their more likely in-betweens, the Brazil wooed by JK's modernization promises was half illiterate, with indices hovering around one tenth of the population in school.¹¹¹ As such, the easy solution proposed to the corruptions and inefficiencies of the *jeitinho brasileiro* have long come around the lack or quality of education. Education as the precondition or

¹¹⁰ See Souza's analyses in *Corrupção* (edited collection by Avritzer) for further historicization (31).

¹¹¹ In the collection *A Voz e Letra do Cidadão* (Santos et al, 97) these profiles are further developed: 1950, 51% of the Brazilian population was recorded illiterate, and in 1960 only 11% were enrolled in school.

instrument for the exercise of citizenship, for equality of opportunity, which makes viable democratic practices, and in whose failures the plague of corruption is incubated by citizens unconscientized to choose wisely their governors. And so the self-esteem discourse is given a palpable explanation, first sociologized then mythologized to render Brazilian (under)development not a problem of national association (collective identity) but of national esteem (evaluation of one's accepted identity).

In places out of the way from the experience of Europe's total wars, optimism and vigour may have transferred from the Old World to the New World in a pre/post-war transference of modernity's vitality, yet in their backyards, the experience was anything but totalizing. If the twentieth century's World Wars gave birth to modern violence through a total mobilization of social, political, economic, and juridical infrastructures, the legacy of the state that it left behind is based on capitalized individuality.¹¹² Fascism, some prefer to say, or national socialism. In the ruins of Eurocentric civilizational standards, as historians of the World Wars have come to recognize, in a Europe embittered by pessimism and regret, "Individualism has lost its social dimension; truth is not to be found in a social reality but in the individual imagination, in Dionysian energy and will....in the modern world the individual was alone, in permanent flight, devoid of footing...Man had been set loose. Freedom was no longer a matter of being at liberty to do what is morally right and ethically responsible. Freedom had become a personal

¹¹² The concept of 'total war' is perceptively elaborated in interdisciplinary terms in Chickering's *A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945*.

matter, a responsibility above all to oneself.”¹¹³ The individual was de-socialized in the wake of war, and this the New World came to exemplify, *par excellence*: America – youth, vibrant, enterprise, magnanimity – land of the brave and free, was successfully “deproletarized”, uplifting its masses by moralism rather than state.¹¹⁴ The losers, whose anti-Semitic ideologies lingered as a mark of “those who felt cheated”, of their own self-doubt and self-hatred more than projections onto an imagined other, were left in an authoritarian anarchy (Nazism).¹¹⁵ Those stuck in-between the first and second world battling out ideologies that were to support specific ways of living, were left with few political options in terms of how to mobilize the state, that is, how to educate and nurture the nation and its citizens.

This was Stefan’s world. This is our world. Peripheral insertions into modernity are conditioned by disintegrated claims to a totalizing national space in which desocialized individuals are left to navigate the excess in between boundaries. Even death became political capital in the wake of total wars. In a world that came neither first or second, the third was a space where nationalism manifests inauthentic and statism corrupt. With nationalism, as a mediator between precariously formed public and private spheres, devouring itself on the battlefields of Europe, other mediators needed to be given force. Enlightenment, institutionalized. Education as mediator, more than ever, accounts for the possibilities and failures of the state-society relationship, that is, for the citizen who actualizes and represents these associations and identifications, day by day.

Disregarding the totalizing mobilization that figured the postwar legacies, or precisely

¹¹³ See Ekstein’s *Rites of Spring* for further development of the (de)constructions of new and old worlds in the context of the World Wars (317).

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

because of them, development became increasingly distant from political or civilizational projects. It is now to be found in the hands of science or morality, an intervention best managed not by heads of state or churches, but by a range of civil society actors invested in making another world possible.

It is thus no surprise that miracle years have coincided with the years of lead in Brazilian (under)development. As Celso Furtado, one of our most preeminent economists of the twentieth century affirmed in the shadows of a Keynesian developmental program, an authoritarian political structure is the condition for the transplanting and acceleration of models of accumulative growth.¹¹⁶ The debts and inflations brought about by JK's 50-years-in-5 industrialization of Brazil were inserted into an (inter)national system of interdependence that degraded the stature of the dictatorship's *Brasil Grande* (Great/Big Brazil), *Brasil Potência* (Powerful/Potent Brazil), or as consecrated in its ultimate political slogan at the time of neoliberal openings (and the arranged taking home of the 1970 World Cup), *Brasil, ame-o ou deixe-o* (Brazil, love it or leave it). China, today?¹¹⁷ With the opening of numerous new sectors simultaneously (i.e. green field market development), development was clearly a political project. Coming to terms with a young republic, in accelerated industrialization and territorial unification, the notion of progress may have once unified classes in opposition,

¹¹⁶ In response to theories of economic backwardness that take on stagiest understandings of a gradual development, Furtado offers a groundbreaking political history of such processes in the Brazilian context, in *Criatividade e Dependência na Civilização Industrial* (Creativity and Dependence in Industrial Civilization).

¹¹⁷ The debates regarding the relationship between democracy/authoritarianism and economic growth continue to solicit varied examples and comparisons, such as recent re-evaluations of BRICS development strategies and Chinese success stories (refer to Caleiro's controversial interview with Ann Lee in "Para Professora Chinesa, Brasil teve Democracia cedo demais", "According to Chinese teacher, Brazil got Democracy too soon").

with promises of social mobility glistening alongside interests of the higher order, but the conciliations of conflicting interests could be even more efficiently neutralized through the financing of growth as developmental model.¹¹⁸

Between empire and republic, between past and future, this is what we got, in and through varied forms. A conciliatory order is what makes progress in a Brazilian third world legible, however much they may appear to be in tension with one another, however much progress may seem less heavy than order in (post)industrial developmental contexts. With pathways paved in and by Brasília, modernities of an urban and cosmopolitan free world made space for individual talent through the valorization of knowledge, creating hierarchies nothing obvious, in a Catholic context where the sin and not the sinner is charged: the classic Catholic banality of the prejudice of prejudice (i.e. *o preconceito do preconceito*). Brasília's more centralizing approach forgot the efficiencies of the decentralized, whereby in capitalist worlds it is precisely this playing off competitors that regulates the whole. Rules, not laws. Yet its New Men, JK and company, were already rehearsing the productive tensions between order and progress. The optimistic vision of the future had to continually make deals with *o longo amanhecer*, the long dawn, whether with new subjects of progress, such as JK, or old figures of order, be it of dictatorial or otherwise overseeing bodies. After all, order and progress are not so oppositional, whether one is the condition of possibility of the other, depends on the interpretation and cynicism of the believer. Either way, they both make manifest the accumulative drive of modern science to control our external world for our

¹¹⁸ See Furtado's *Criatividade e Dependência* for a compelling political history of Brazilian economic development.

betterment. Rereadings of classical Greek origin stories, Renaissance, rebirth, the world is to be moulded in our own image.

Perhaps the greater distinction lies in the lessons that our dear economist, Celso, left for us in the post-miracle interims of Brazilian (under)development: with the backdrop of Cold War ideological contest, the orienting visions of a prosperous future became less and less captured by dreams of progress (in the form of order), and more and more through projections of development (in the form of growth).¹¹⁹ Rhetoric, perhaps? Development, as a (inter)national performance to attract investment in productive forces, rather than the unification of conflicting classes into a solidarious national project that promises social ascension at the same time as disarming threats to the higher interests. Subsumed into the laws of the market, the accumulation of wealth through specialization in an (inter)national system of dependence, development reappears to us as the economic turn. The objective intervention for the betterment of the social whole and its individual members. People, in the end, become productive resources, whose energy should not be wasted by socio-political conflict but channelled into creative and productive force. The (in)famous post-ideological age, declared. At last, freedom?

To the heart of Brazilians

(i) Cultures of development: investing in the future

¹¹⁹ In the context of 1950s surge of economic development research, Furtado (trained abroad in Keynes' shadows) resituated development and underdevelopment as interdependent phenomena, and offered a series of critiques into models of centre-periphery, balanced growth, dual economies, and theories of economic backwardness. For an English-language introduction to the works of one of Brazil's most important economists, see Boianovsky's "A View From the Tropics: Celso Furtado and the Theory of Economic Development in the 1950s."

The spirit of modernization – its strategies, organization, management practices, and supporting cultures – may have been swept aside, but its bittersweet legacies continue to inform the orientations of subsequent programs for a better world. Our political imaginaries have become so much bigger, yet so much smaller as a result. Instead of modernization's drive for integrated, autonomous, self-determining nations, in an age of globalization, the world has become our stage and the human its central actor to be empowered to move across transnational democratic and free market networks. Practically speaking, the Rio-92 Earth Summit, the UN development landmark in and for Brazil and emerging regions beyond, made manifest the decentralization and professionalization of the development project by instituting determinate economic, social, and environmental pillars.¹²⁰ National government maligned almost more strongly than colonial administration, the process was to be managed by ostensibly neutral (i.e. experts) and participatory (i.e. civil society) channels: social inclusion, diversity, and human rights triumphed as the new mantra. People needed to be empowered, not leaders, or, to put it otherwise, we all need to become leaders.

The seemingly top-down, nationalized industrial modes of socio-economic development emulating of an old world were finally proven unsustainable, or at least, anachronistic. Brasília's own monolithic experiment in endogenous development did not remedy the problems of a new world lagging behind. Rio-92 began to acknowledge complexity, quantitative and qualitative, global and local: 'sustainable development' was coined as the new objective. Twenty years later, debates carried on at the Rio+20 follow-

¹²⁰ Refer to "UN Briefing Papers" here cited to get a fuller sense for how global civil society, brought together by the UN Earth Summit, sought to lead governments to rethink economic development and shift contemporary terms of debate.

up conference regarding whether or not to add a fourth pillar to the sustainable development trinity that critically altered the track of modernization: should ‘culture’ be added to the economic, social, and environmental criteria?¹²¹ As the culmination of a neoliberal project, a postindustrial age was to be embraced, or so the development story goes. At the same time that the official UN-led events were recycling old narratives that kept intact its conventional productivist growth formulas, municipal governments, regional authorities, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and community leaders, notably from the city of Rio, were welcoming a different conversation at their parallel conferences.

At the Rio+20 Forum on Culture and Sustainability, the spearheading of the new State Secretariat of the Creative Economy (SEC) was well under way, with palpable excitement bouncing off the exposed metal beams of revitalized industrial ports and bossa nova tunes filling the empty spaces between the seamless series of open panels. In the city recently declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site (the first city, rather than gardens or countryside, to be recognized under the category of “cultural landscape”)¹²², these gatherings were setting the tone for the re-creation of a cultural circuit cutting across the gentrifying neighbourhoods of the once abandoned port areas, now ‘safer than your mother’s bedroom’, as many would anxiously remark during the conference’s showcasing of what the *Porto Maravilha* initiative (i.e. Marvellous Port of the nicknamed Marvellous City) will bring to a place to be prepared for hosting the world at a series of

¹²¹ See “United Cities and Local Governments Agenda 21 for Culture” lobbying guidelines for advocating for cultural development, notably at the Rio+20, among other network initiatives here cited.

¹²² As elaborated in the “UNESCO World Heritage Site” report, Rio’s recognition and protection under the category of “cultural landscape” recognizes the particular relationships between people and their natural environment that have given the place its character and way of life, from an “outdoor living culture” to a “source of artistic inspiration”.

megaevents set to prove its global stature, in 2014, 2016, and years to come. While the UN debates over ‘culture’ raged on twenty years after sustainable development was mandated the new paradigm, cities and regions are pursuing this strategy in faith, attempting to respond to the ever-changing dynamics of an increasingly knowledge-based economy. By focusing on the development of a creative economy, local authorities are investing in enterprising individuals and associations (or what many celebrate as ‘talent’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘creativity’) in order to capitalize on the fleeting opportunities engendered by neoliberal globalization. Newly-appointed state and federal ministers, some only weeks old, giddily congratulated the pioneers of a creative class present for taking seriously this innovative approach that was nowhere taken up in the expansive corridors of the official Rio Centre UN conference meetings. Proud representatives of President Dilma Rousseff’s current government (led by Minister of Culture Ana de Hollanda, Secretary for Creative Economy Claudia Leitão, Head of the Creative Economy Program of UNCTAD and Brazilian representative Edna dos Santos-Duisenberg) avowed again and again that a “Creative Brazil” is the new Brazil.¹²³

Under the auspices of the Rio Ministry of Culture, the SEC is positioning itself as a coordinating node in a creative nexus, working transversally across numerous sectors and ministries (i.e. Development, Education, Science and Technology, Tourism; see below *Figure 7*), and in turn, heralded as a new model for state and federal governments in Brazil and beyond. In contemporary global contexts, where financial recessions top headlines and the precarity of manufacturing and resource-based industries provoke fears

¹²³ Refer to the Secretariat of the Creative Economy 2011-2014 Plan for policies, guidelines, and actions set to spearhead the institutionalization of this new development strategy (Ministério da Cultura).

among economists and environmentalists alike, new models of development are undoubtedly called for. With the rise of a global consumer class, the diversification of national production is no longer enough. New cultures of development appear necessary. As is, the same statist logic applied to the management of the building of bridges continues to be applied to the advancement of innovation, science, technology, and other ventures in excess of a predominantly industrial policy framework. And so proclaimed are the limits of emerging economies, as much as they may be at the helm of contemporary global economic shifts (i.e. green field market development), the lack of innovation and high levels of inequality are repeatedly projected as the primary obstacles to lasting development, to the sustenance of a qualified workforce capacitated in stabilizing a prosperous socio-economic foundation for sustainable growth. Like so, success stories continue to represent a transcendence rather than consequence of one's milieu.

Given Brazil's various failed attempts at take-off, regularly evoked by the dim contours of the static airplane capital, a change in orientation is being called for, once over. Even if the head has not yet turned, where the feet hit the ground in city-regions (notably in the States of Rio, São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Santa Catarina) the powers that be are dancing to a new tune. They are taking seriously the failures of modernization and moving toward decentralized and participatory modes of development by indirectly fostering new cultures and venues for empowered citizens to lead Brazil's take-off. Though creative cities, classes, and economies may not have substantially altered the UN practices of drafting abstract statements for a better world, the cutting-edge paradigm in economic development is taking hold in cities that daily respond to the problems that

Brasília was unable to deal with. A new sociability is to be nurtured, so as to redirect the hollowed out relationship between state and society: a new citizen is to be conscripted.

It appears that some lessons indeed have been learned in the wake of modernization. Not *50 years in 5* (JK) or even a *Brazil for Everyone* (Lula), the new developmental mantra in contemporary Brazil, under President Dilma Rousseff's government, is *A Rich Country is A Country without Poverty* (i.e. "País Rico é País sem Pobreza").¹²⁴ At long last not mutually exclusive, the critiques of postdevelopment may be gaining credence beyond marginalized academic circles, especially in the lobbying and institutionalization of Rio's Creative Economy initiatives (i.e. *Rio Criativo*). From Amartya Sen's human empowerment measure, to critiques of the concentration of power and civilizational hierarchies (e.g. Mia Couto), to the more homegrown plea to regionalize development with regard for different economies of culture (e.g. Celso Furtado), an alternative approach to the macroeconomic development of a modernization bent, centring quality of life and the amplification of individual choice, seems to be slowly winning out, or at least the born-again leaders of a SEC try to convince national and international government bodies alike.¹²⁵ Instituting noble structures and spaces to mould the architects of tomorrow, Brasília's central coordination on high did not lead to a palpable trickling down of wealth, order, and stability. Who to blame? The colonizer – within? The fascist – within? The time has come to find the entrepreneur within.

Through individual creativity, innovation, among other forms of harvested talent, it may

¹²⁴ See "Portal Brasil" 2011 announcement that acknowledges the need to bridge the gap between the country and its people, the rich and the poor, the natural and the social in the launch of the new Government motto.

¹²⁵ See the Ministry of Culture report on the newly founded Secretariat of Creative Economy for further elaboration of its initial conceptualization (Ministério da Cultura, especially pp. 11-12, 76-79, and 91-94).

then become possible to defy gravity and let it trickle up. The taking off of a Creative Brazil seeks to rescue what mainstream economic development and modernization neglected (and at times, as in the case of Brasília’s juridical and urban redesigns, repressed): the creativity of the Brazilian People (consider *Figure 8* below). As Minister Ana de Hollanda reaffirmed in the presentation of the inaugural policies, guidelines, and actions of the 2011-2014 SEC Plan, “the best of Brazil is the Brazilian People”.¹²⁶



Figure 8: As featured in the Rio+20 Forum on Culture and Sustainability, the SEC engages debates about sustainable development by unfolding the guidelines and policies of a Creative Economy as depicted here in this breakdown of their actuation vectors and axes supported by the BNDES.

Figure 9: Also during the Rio+20 activities, numerous other ‘creative’ manifestations of the human and cultural question compelled people to rethink the priorities of development, such as by way of the above legendary image captured of indigenous interventions at the BNDES headquarters in Rio.

Like Brasília’s modernism, this new creative paradigm follows from the latest urban planning models to the North in formulating a particularly Brazilian response to the

¹²⁶ Ibid (p.7).

messiness of industrial and postindustrial development, at times preemptive, at times derivative. Advanced at the start of the new millennium by American social scientist and popular analyst, Richard Florida, its classic iteration is juxtaposed to the archetype of the Industrial Revolution: a mode of development marked by productivity, standardization, specialization, and the division of labour.¹²⁷ In contrast, the rise of the creative class, as its Brazilian champion Ana Carla Fonseca Reis adapts from Richard's popular intervention, is marked by the ephemeral, by intellectual capital and talent, flexibility and diversity, values and innovation, among other forms of human capital essential for mitigating unstable times. Hence, a creative class calls for the micro-level supports of creative cities. It organizes space differently, it consumes differently, and its labour and management practices consequently differ from the discipline of industrial modes. The take-off of a creative economy requires, more than infrastructural support, a far-reaching nexus to attract or nurture talent, investment, and entrepreneurship. To put it otherwise, the massification of basic education that was set up to teach industrial workers to stay put in factories for twelve or more hour days (to the abstracted rhythm of the clock and master, rather than the sun and fields) does not go a long way in preparing creative citizens to successfully engage in a global cultural and political economy. The creative economy of the new century entails more than the privileging of an arts and culture *industry* (e.g. music, theatre, film); it is about how we organize and manage all *sectors*. It is not simply a market, but a new mode of development. It is about cultivating distinctive capacities, attitudes, and identities. It is about transforming work into play, which well suits the adventurous ethos of a personalistic Brazilian inheritance, or at least of a

¹²⁷ Refer to Florida's *The Rise of the Creative Class* and Reis' Brazilian rendition of the creative class thesis in "Cidades Criativas" (Creative Cities).

Brazilian self-conception. Recall the postcolonial inferiority complex? In a land of rules not laws, to capitalize upon, rather than annul, what makes people different, for creative and entrepreneurial pursuits, promises to be a more successful undertaking – although the success of what or whom remains unclear. In any case, what better venue than the marketplace, a rules-based site of exchange, for a take-off so inspired. What is called for, then, is a shift from disciplinary educational structures to more self-initiating entrepreneurial training that is to direct human creativity and knowledge to profitable ends, tapping into preexisting cordial networks that are thought to have rendered impossible the order and civility of the modernist city. For this to become possible, people need to begin to see themselves not as cogs in a machine, but as the very engine.

Instead of putting faith in Master Plans designed by top architects to impose structural conditions for a certain kind of order and progress, an apparently more self-sustaining mode of development has thus gained credence, which in giving agency to developing subjects renders them (everyone!) responsible for their own social, political, and economic transformations. No longer is it simply the work of the colonial or postcolonial state leader (or its outsourced armies of technocrats and philanthropists), but it is a bottom-up approach that begins with how individuals are socialized and educated in their everyday lives. Through the appropriate pedagogies of prosperity, the cordial Brazilian Man (and his self-avowed familial and patriarchal hierarchies) may at last enter into genuine, or at least, authentic modernity, for prior to the liberal affirmation of human equality is the insistence of the superiority of personhood that effectively feeds off the imperial personalistic ethos already in force.

In many ways, this developmental paradigm prides itself on being less about making people fit into prescribed roles and ways of thinking (i.e. Brasília's civil designs), and more so about encouraging people to take control of their own life and think outside the box (see again *Figure 2*). Creativity is not a uniform standard to which all must assimilate (the same roads to be followed!) but something that is always already within you. It is precisely about capitalizing on the ways in which Brasília's order did not get people in line – minus the corruption. This creative paradigm tends to look less to the future (i.e. to starting from nothing and moulding people and places into something new, such as exemplified by Brasília's *tabula rasa*), instead capitalizing on what is already here – the politics of potential. Today, for instance, 90% of businesses in Brazil operate as micro- and small-enterprises and employ 76% of the formal workforce; at the same time, more and more middle-class Brazilians are expressing interest in leaving behind the dream of lifetime employment in a large secure company, and above all, its big boss.¹²⁸ With the support of UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNDP, and numerous European and North American agencies, government-led development initiatives (such as the founding of the International Centre for Creative Economy backed by the British Council) are beginning to set up venues for innovation that promote greater security for precarious creative labour (e.g. health insurance, research and development), with the eventual goal of relinquishing the institutions of a creative economy into private hands.¹²⁹ Their ultimate challenge, however, is not simply to reform the Brazilian bureaucratic ways of doing business and the infrastructures of a top-down industrial mode of development. It is to

¹²⁸ Refer to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor report for further contextualization on entrepreneurship in Brazil (2009).

¹²⁹ Refer to SEC report for more details on these institutionalizing ventures (Ministério da Cultura, especially p. 97).

open up the hearts and minds of Brazilians. Facilitated by the celebrated syncretic spirit of the Brazilian people, it will be about tapping into our fabled creativity without also unleashing our *malandragem*, the less desired forms of our resourcefulness (i.e. *para dar jeito, não jeitinho*).

(ii) Moral economies of citizenship: the creative resolution

At a closer look, these official ventures to promote the growth of a creative economy extend the middle-classification project of the preceding bossa nova movement, which in grappling with colonial, military, and patriarchal inheritances attempt to remake the ways of a modern urban Brazilian subject of development. Or so it positions itself. Ambitiously, such a developmental paradigm prepares itself to go one step further: formalizing the informal. Instead of imposing mismatched form, white and pure, it wages the ultimate synthesis – form and substance, together at last in places out of the way? Exhausted by the self-deprecatory traditions of the mongrel offsprings of Europe, fated to lagging behind, the time has come to accept our inheritance – multiple and hybrid, cannibalized and excessive as it is. Excess, celebrated, on the boundless surfaces of a globalizing world. At last, our multiplicities born of inauthenticity, miscegenated, become resource rather than obstacle. We can finally put our *jeitinho brasileiro* to good use, in a world open to elastic and intersecting modes of living.

In the end, our time-honoured training to craft advantages out of our disadvantages – the *malas artes* of the *malandro* – might actually pay off. In productivist terms, ‘precarity’ can be channelled into flexibilization, and so the lightness or optimism of the dance of the *malandro*, of the hard done-by creatively making ends meet, proffers an alternate freedom. Good humour confounded with conformity. Accepting the failed

guarantees of an abstract order (or in affirmative terms, the interpersonal mediations of the likes of a cor-dial passing through the heart), our way of getting by without disturbing an apparently fixed order of a slavocratic and colonial inheritance, of indirect negotiation, of the *jeitinho brasileiro*, may have empowered us to deal with the volatilities of a global order...or has it? The *malandro*, of the sort of an anti-hero most closely translated as trickster, can depend only on him/herself for the results of the games that are staged: a sort of amoral subversion of order, when done elegantly, the *malandro* can embody the sacred and the profane without becoming vulgar. A foil for evil. Converting disadvantages into advantages, in the absent presence of a guaranteed order, our anti-hero abandons and makes ridiculous out-of-place symbols of power. Revenge – the unintelligible laugh or resistance, outsmarting or unmasking, of subjects in-between spaces of power? Resources of *(sobre)vivência*?¹³⁰ As a model for social ascension, as a moral right, as a pathway to success, the dance of the *malandro*, its *jeitinho*, never puts the social structure in risk. In an order that absorbs its contradictions (of the sorts of the contradictory unit rather than dual systems of public/private demarcations), the exclusive spheres and discriminations of citizenship never quite hold.

To put it otherwise, to render the *malas artes*, the ways of the *malandro*, productive for a formal system of individuated and social ends, is to entrepreneur. Accepting to work within defective, eroding, or porous (global?) systems is to channel this energy of the *malandro* for an economic rather than political project, through which the Creative Citizen appears as the formalization of our anti-hero, whose *jeitinho* is put to

¹³⁰ The Portuguese term for ‘survival’ expresses an ambivalence in regards to how we can live, *vivência – sobre*: over, above, upon, on, of, across; it expresses a kind of movement to live with and above what is given.

productive use and corruption channelled toward entrepreneurial success. Beyond individualities and personalities, rationalities and affect, orders and the unpredictable, more than a personality, it is a mode of living: *malandragem*. Depoliticized, it glorifies an artificial abandonment, not requiring external intervention, of the likes of Brasília's urban and national redesigns, but instead, inviting internal work. Either the authoritarian structure, made to discipline a subject uneducated to discern what is best for oneself, or the art of getting by, is the legacy of a colonial and slavocratic third world. Now of an entrepreneur of a creative postcolonial order. Through these inverted positionings, which the self-made subject of Anglo-Saxon imaginings cannot occupy because of the distrusting relationship between state/society that they demand, the creative subject can thrive by leaving us to fend for ourselves, risking a conservatism far greater than the seductions of paternal (à la Getúlio) or fraternal (à la JK) associations. One more lesson learned: instead of disciplining the informal out, integrating it in, formalizing the informal. Strategic interventions of these revised sorts will continue to mask its origin: like the *jeitinho* gets exemplified by the *malandragem* of the poor, then decontextualized and projected across classes, the creative subject as a productive application of the *jeitinho*, economicized toward singular goals, works in the same way, in a postindustrial key. Definitive of processes of peripheralization variously manifested, the capacity for adaptation, in its evolutionary sense, can integrate as much as it can isolate, such is the case of our amoral and unapologetic *malandro* – the cause, effect, and hope of Brazilian (under)development.

Ironically, we seem to go from a sense of the personal to the impersonal and back to the personal again, as touchstones of modern conduct, within multiple and shifting

civilizational standards (e.g. colonial/imperial/national; slavocratic/bourgeois/neoliberal; Anglo/Latin/miscegenated). And once over, the entrepreneurial has come to represent progress, the strengthening of an internal market. The entrepreneur is the figure of our salvation in a failed state and society – the pilot of our take-off to come! And yet, in an order never guaranteed, claims to individuality are unmasked. Norm and exception become moral justifications after the fact, not so much the basis of action or intention. We need not wait for our annual carnival to see orders inverted, cathartically. Every day they must be inverted so that we can continue to bear the unbearable weight of the demands that they heave onto grounds unmatched. Of orders not ours, so far from our reality that they must be carnivalized to be intuited. The problem of not taking so seriously an abstract order is not merely a function of bureaucratic inefficiencies or corruptions otherwise construed, but more fundamentally, of the quality of the out-of-place. Hence the most unexpected answer that you could give to the demand for self-positioning, ‘Do you know with whom you are speaking?’, is ‘A Citizen!’. This positioning is, of course, moral rather than social or political; it is the fragile and polemical claim to an order purged from our realities...the realities of *João Ninguém*. Citizen John Nobody, as we say here in Brazil. It is not a question of the spontaneous vs. the fixed, of the subversion of order by the carnival, as the carnivalized so too has its own orders and rituals. Creativity (vs. discipline) is not at the heart of the problem, when it is naturalized as the *de facto* mode of operating. If it were so, then truly carnivalized spaces and times, of the likes of the avenues of samba, the fields of football, and the beaches interwoven into city streets, would be, as go the cordial myths, the true spaces of Brazilian democracy, where the socio-political is replaced by an abstract (a)morality

interpersonally mediated as if within an institutional vacuum. What we face is a problem of positioning through (in)direct modes variously brought to life. What the moral economy of a creative order takes as diagnostic is, in actuality, symptomatic of the Brazilian subject of (under)development. The problem is not the need to discipline the corruptibility of a creative subject to render it profitable and legal, to educate for the new civil ways of a hybrid postcolonial political subjectivity, so to speak, forcing fashions as homogenizing as Brasília's corrective launched at subjects of development, of a middle class at peace with its precarity given its creative potential. Herein we find the stakes of a developmental program in an always already lagging behind and inauthentic third world: the formalization of the economy of the city as a solution to (under)development. This is the battle of the *Malandro* vs. the Creative Citizen, confused as rivals, confused as teammates.

In a city no longer at the centre of an imperial or national project, whose claim to the cultural heart of an emerging country comes at a loss of both political stature (to Brasília) and economic prowess (to São Paulo), in a city that prides itself on giving birth to the *malandro* and representing *meu brasil brasileiro*, in all of its advances and deficiencies, creative citizens are to be headquartered in its Marvellous Port to come, the ultimate transformation of the formerly colonial and industrial projects of exogenous development into an exemplary new economy of knowledge and talent, beyond order and progress. Rio de Janeiro, the Marvellous City. These new ways of administering the city and the citizen, in turn, reveal, as much as they obscure, the masks of individualities and personalities variously construed for the productive ends of a global cultural and political economy, of a civic and entrepreneurial spirit. Yet on a global stage, where creative

citizens are to prove their boundless potential, it is not even necessary to look to the third world to unmask the universalities of a modern project of self-managed growth and freedom. Even if there were an original or authentic or even historical instantiation of modernity in the fields of Europe, what we perceive today is its references (e.g. freedom, equality, etc.) parody themselves through a menu of choice (e.g. you are free to choose any of the above, you are equal in opportunity). Imagined equalities of condition justify a freedom circulating around itself, in a culture of consumption that the political economist of postmodernity, Jean Baudrillard, depicts through processes of carnivalization and cannibalization, the spectacle that creates and consumes itself.¹³¹ On these carnivalized stages, the universals reveal themselves as masks, evermore. The mirror of the cannibalized other further reflects this ‘unmasking’ to take place. The masters of universal values are always already caricatures of themselves, “characters taking themselves for their own masks” – carnivalizing and cannibalizing themselves, a self-devouring made bare through a “global play of antagonism”, notably in “turning its worst alienation into an aesthetic, spectacular delight”, a sort of “living parody” of ourselves.¹³² As the theorist of the hyperreal goes on to caution us, by way of processes of colonization and decolonization, the project of modernity, whose very logic requires universal imposition and internal consistency, objectifies itself so as to be seen, felt, consumed, and ultimately, proven and made real. In denying these simulations, it endows the empowered with intelligence, and forgets that to not be dominated is to not

¹³¹ Refer to Baudrillard’s *Carnival and Cannibal, or the Play of Global Antagonisms* for an incisive critique of the (re)production and symbolic exchanges of a globalization project.

¹³² See Baudrillard’s *Carnival and Cannibal* (7-8) for further methodological development of these analyses.

dominate.¹³³ In this call resigned of revolutions to come, he brings us into a world of exhibitionist and seductive truths, whose intelligibility must be rendered unintelligible to lay bare or confess what it represses. And the masters at this exhibition, originally inauthentic: the United States of America. On the stages that it globalizes, we remain spellbound in disenchantment. Yet in its backyards, our relationship with unintelligibility is other. The precarious is not the opposite of the everyday, reality and unreality are always already blurred. At any rate, if there ever were an originary modernity, we could conclude with one of the fathers of the postmodern condition, it had no soul.

With the hyperproduction of information and varied referents spectrally mediated, we get decomposition. The Baudrillardian diagnostic of globalization takes us into this world of blurred realities, in which projects of national or individual sovereignty fail to resonate. Does the third world other finally have an advantage here? Accepting inferiorized self-conceptions of miscegenated varieties, our fears have tended to be much more of sameness than of difference – the other within me, the other to overcome, the other to annihilate...in intimacy, more than in segregation. This is racism *à brasileira*, for instance: the fear of the familiar.¹³⁴ Creativity is thus what distinguishes. Hence the search for truth, authenticity, and ultimately legitimation is fixed ‘out there’ (i.e. the romantically and strategically ambivalent *lá fora*), be it of American or European, of Roman or Greek inspiration, which propagate myths never fully in or out of place. We are used to the in-between; the *malandro* specializes in it. Now that the world is one, this problem appears to nullify itself: the possibility of our own self-creation is, therefore,

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Segato’s *Santos e Daimones* (15) offers an illuminating critique of notions of ‘racial democracy’, as developed here in Brazil, which gives form to particular commitments to solidarity and distinction as practices of everyday life.

liberating in itself. Yet, there remain certain idealizations of human beings, not only in terms of good conduct, but of a moral economy that translates actions into productive ends. So it is, after all, a freedom of escape, the intoxication of the spectacle of self-creation and self-consumption of global capitalist exchanges, to speak through a sort of Baudrillardian carnivalized world. And so the liberal disposition lives on, linking through, withstanding and reproducing varied forms of Europeanization (Portuguese, British, French, etc.) and Americanization of a world bound to be modern. Now, USA-style. How do those in the backyard access this latest civilizational standard, to prove to themselves and others their modern stature? How can the *malandro* become a creative citizen of a postcolonial, postindustrial global order? How do these anti-heroes, the symbols of our underdevelopment as well as of our potential, instruct and lead us to the pathways of success in an increasingly globalized world, whose terms of success are set not by traditions of an old world to emulate, but by the freedoms of a new world always to come?

(iii) Opening to the world

Brazil's latest transition from authoritarian regimes to modern democracy and free markets celebrated 'openings' more than in relation to socio-economic and political institutions. In the midst of the neoliberalization of global markets, in day to day ways not at all abstract, it celebrated an opening to 'the world'. Indeed, the 1980-90s revitalization of democracy was not about bringing Brazil up to the civilizing French ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity as attempted under the modernizing state of the golden years long past, but rather, about enabling Brazilians, with all of their *jeitinho*, to create for themselves a better and richer life (each in accordance to ability or

achievement) in the spirit of the American Dream seducing the world through postwar exhibitions of freedom. Looking out to a world of opportunities, the heart of Brazil registered as less important than the heart of Brazilians. How could the ordinary citizen (not the architect of tomorrow) in underdeveloped regions pursue the aspirations projected onto the scenes of a globalizing world? With faith that starting from nothing one could become rich, the key was not necessarily the American dollar, but a much more powerful currency of inclusion: the English language. Enabling access to global trade, travel, media, science, technology, information, and so forth, the English language was to qualify aspiring citizens of the world to make real for themselves the alluring myths of the American Dream that had been gradually enticing them since WWII's *Coca Cola* Revolution and *Disney's* induction of Zé Carioca...the dynamism and vitality of a New World on the rise.¹³⁵

At the same time that the condition of globalization was increasingly being hailed from fiction to fact, English language schools were proliferating all over the world, assured of the status of English as the global language of business. Capitalizing on the prospects of globalization (and the slow disjointed response of national governments in the 1980-90s), these private schools established a range of strategies and programs to facilitate youth, in particular, to learn how to successfully negotiate the channels of a global cultural and political economy. Emerging middle classes in out of the way places were being taught to see the world as their backyard, office, and playground, and the English language as their own personal jet plane. It was no longer necessary to go to

¹³⁵ For further elaboration on the historical development of the ties between Brazil and the United States, refer to Tota's *O Imperialismo Seductor: A Americanização do Brasil na época da Segunda Guerra* (Seductive Imperialism: The Americanization of Brazil in the Era of the Second World War).

America to discover and realize the possibilities of the American Dream (for indeed, their superior status would only be recognized as such here). Properly equipped, the whole world could be yours:

“Speak English and revolutionize your world!”
 “Escape from the ‘it’s not possible’. Escape from the obvious. *You Move!*”
 “Open new horizons!”
 “The world already is in English. Say *Yes* and be part of it!”
 “Dominate knowledge.”
 “More your life!”
 “Invest in yourself. Speak English. Do *Wise-up*.”
 “Speak English, Welcome the World!”¹³⁶

As daily reaffirmed by the countless mantras broadcast by English language schools set up on nearly every corner of Brazil’s (sub)urban neighbourhoods, learning English is more than about learning a different language or culture. As big business, filling in alleged vacuums amid Brazil’s transformation into a modern democracy and global economy, these schools have served varied functions with respect to: (i) establishing credentializing systems, personal work ethic, and cross-sectoral networking; (ii) nurturing civic engagement, volunteerism, social responsibility, and an accompanying innovative ethos; and (iii) teaching self-improvement, leadership, managerialism, and sustainability – all things that Brazilian society (i.e. a growing middle class) has apparently been lacking, and that can easily be projected as foreign (namely American) qualities. All this they seek to do in innovative ways, through playful (as opposed to disciplinarian) pedagogies, clientist (as opposed to industrial) education structures, and horizontal as opposed to vertical operational modes. As everyday purveyors of civic and entrepreneurial training (much more present in people’s lives than the official meetings

¹³⁶ This survey of advertising slogans can be found on the streets of Rio and most Brazilian cities on any given day, as here documented over the course of 2012; refer to the individual schools’ websites for more on their marketing approach, elaborated below.

and workshops of a ‘Creative Brazil’ of akin aspiration, these schools play a complex and ambiguous role as multi-sited nodes in a creative knowledge and talent-based economy, operating glocally, so to speak.

Constituting one of the leading franchise industries in Brazil, generating billions of dollars a year, English language schools jointly engage more than a third of a national population of some 200 million people.¹³⁷ Largely unregulated by educational policies of any sort, they typically offer a graduated repertoire of multi-year courses for a wide range of target audiences: kids, teens, adults, the university-bound, business professionals, tourism and service providers, educators, among numerous English for Specific Purpose programs. Each school, however, tends to differ in their pedagogical approach and overarching social emphasis; from online learning to personal coaching, from institutional extracurricular activities to corporate contracts, niche markets are continually created and recreated. In order to support their varied approaches, nearly all of the largest companies (e.g. *Wizard*, *CCAA*, *Fisk*, *CNA*, *Cultura Inglesa*) have set up their own publishing houses and research development, television and radio channels, online portals and social networking sites, informational and computing training, international exchanges and tourist agencies, community outreach programs and charitable foundations, merchandise lines and reward programs, testing centres and diploma programs, leadership instruction and self-help guides, among other personal, public, and private capacity-building endeavours.

¹³⁷ This estimate is derived from conversations with the British Council in Brasília, and is subject to further research; no ready data is currently available. Although there are substantial inconsistencies in information regarding these schools, this number represents a widely accepted view of the place of these schools in Brazilian society.

In a place like Brazil, the business of learning, teaching, and using the English language spans across numerous sites, initiatives, institutions, and associations – some explicitly educational, others less so. With a booming middle class seeking to get ahead in glocal economies, the specialized (and well-resourced!) training that schools such as *Wizard* provide has become a necessary long-term investment for anyone who can afford (or credit) it. Mainstream educational institutions are widely perceived as not responding quickly or effectively enough to the demands of a fast-moving and ever-changing global cultural and political economy. The competitive edge that these tailored private schools offer is not only believed to advance individual success, but cumulatively, it has become the *de facto* key to Brazil's prosperity within an increasingly global knowledge and talent-based economy and accompanying strategies of creative development.

With Brazil's most recent take-off to be anointed by its hosting of the World Cup and Olympic Games (the first in South America!), the stage has been set for it to prove to itself and scores of keen observers that it has finally made it. Amidst mounting pressure, many of the most reputable English language schools have begun to receive government subsidies, for the first time, to prepare the country's extensive service sectors for welcoming waves of foreign visitors in 2014 and 2016, with a long-term vision in sight. In order to truly become a global player, the economic powerhouse must then rise from its position among the countries with the poorest English language competency rates in the world: on the eve of these turning-point international events, only 2% of Brazil's population was considered bilingual.¹³⁸ Beyond the express concerns of education or linguistic studies, it thus seems worthwhile to further investigate these processes of socio-

¹³⁸ Refer to Education First "English Proficiency Index" for further contextualization of this internet-based survey now widely used to assess these under-documented markets.

economic and political transformation occurring at perhaps too obvious a level to merit attention.

To begin to appreciate some of the range of ways that people are being trained to talk, think, feel, act, dream, and live in English so as to partake in an ever-globalizing world, one particularly illustrative example shines through, of one man who is on a mission to transform Brazil into a prosperous bilingual country. Carlos Wizard Martins has become one of Brazil's most influential billionaires.¹³⁹ The 'Wizard of Languages' climbed his way out of poverty, so the story goes, by learning and then teaching English, which he developed with foreign Christian missionaries in the south of Brazil, eventually making his way from Church missions to seeking out the American Dream cleaning tables in a Newark restaurant.¹⁴⁰ Well suited to tap into a mainstream Brazilian developmental ethos, the now CEO of the largest network of language schools and vocational training in Brazil, and by all accounts across the world, is a popular inspirational leader appearing on local and national media outlets at opportune times.¹⁴¹ Whether called in to comment on the necessary preparations for the World Cup and Olympic Games; or to offer individual counsel from his motivational bestseller *Como Sonhar e Realizar Seus Sonhos* (How to Conceive and Realize Your Dreams) and previous self-help manual entitled *Vencendo a Própria Crise* (Overcoming Personal Crisis); or to discuss leadership development and financial independence, such as advanced at his schools and detailed in his latest bestseller *Desperte o Milionário que há em Você* (Awaken the Millionaire Within You); these, among numerous other topics that

¹³⁹ See Blankfed's *Forbes* report for an interview with the rising billionaire.

¹⁴⁰ For more interview context, refer to LDS Church News, "Desire is Power for Language Teacher" (1).

¹⁴¹ Wizard Language School, "Wizard - Sobre".

he expounds in his monthly President's blog, have ensured his status as a widely respected guru across various fields. So much so that his rise has come to serve as the emblematic counterpoint to the fall of Brazil's once richest man, oil baron Eike Batista. No longer secure in his position as the world's seventh wealthiest (and "Time Magazine" 100 most influential people in the world in 2012),¹⁴² the lesson that Eike shares with a middle class ambitious to climb, as he once did, is that to invest more than half of your earnings in natural resource economies is no longer a safe way to go. Celebrating the resilience of his disciplined middle-class upbringing, Eike assures us, confidently, that in moving beyond the centring of industrial economy, he will creatively find his way to the top, once anew. How? At one time the largest investor in *Porto Maravilha*, a postindustrial diversification is called for. Meanwhile, the Wizard's rise is comparatively abundant. Limitless. Unbounded by material constraints, the risks that he assumes are other. He invests in what can always be invested in: the human mind.

In these popular stories of conquest and ruin (with the higher the rise, the more striking the fall), Brazil's most famous living entrepreneur is stalked like a celebrity, in curiosities resonant with those outsiders wanting a peak into the life of the once powerful, a peak at what it means to have 'made it'. The rise and fall of Eike, a chief sponsor of Rio's urban and infrastructural development (from the patrimony that is the Maracanã football stadium to the Pacifying Police Unit-UPP to depollution initiatives), got a nation talking about what the trappings of success are.¹⁴³ Queried as genius or playboy, or both,

¹⁴² Rio's Mayor, Eduardo Paes, introduces Eike Batista as a colleague in Time Magazine's *The World's 100 Most Influential People: 2012 – They entertain us, lead us and challenge us. TIME honors the icons who are defining the world in 2012.*

¹⁴³ In 2013, a special was aired on national Brazilian television (Globo) that accounted for the rise of Wizard and the fall of Eike, which showcased their contrasting approaches

Eike's luxury has been as conspicuous in its presentation as enigmatic in its accumulation. Another contrast to the Wizard's ascension through the language and education market, who sees his role as both entrepreneur and educator, and thus positions himself to mentor aspiring entrepreneurs as part of his pedagogical duty (as a once English language teacher). He teaches us how to traverse dark and uncertain pathways, to deal with discomfort and uncertainty so as to guarantee the dream, at a time when the franchising system was being promoted in an emerging giant opening its economies to the world. Increasingly sought after and admired for his humble ways, the Wizard is celebrated for making history in the Brazilian education system, in addition to the financial aspect of his success in securing the largest franchise network within this industry on the planet. In the pedantic tone of primary school teacher, smiling about his failures as much as his successes, he is sure to recount to us how he started, informally, teaching friends out of his home, at night, until he noticed that he was making more money afterhours than at his daytime job. The Wizard strives to resignify failure in a country of the failed. Instead of mystery to his success, he shares with the willing how they too can hone the capacity to make one(self) believe, whereas Eike would display his 24-hour/day work ethic as proof that his green eyes are not the secret to his success. At his height, most intimately, Eike took us into his home and showed to an eager Brazilian public the luxury car on display as the centrepiece to this living room. The Wizard, his first blue beetle car where he made his first sales. Eike represents the inexplicable transcendence of our inherited defective institutional milieu, while the Wizard shines

to generating and sustaining wealth (*Profissão Reporter – Histórias de Sucesso, os Homens Mais Ricos do Brasil*, Reporter Profession – Stories of Success, the Richest Men of Brazil).

forth as exemplary of the pedagogical potential for systemic integration – beyond the realm of investment in productive and innovative firms, the potentials of a step-by-step pedagogy of prosperity. Either way, with the oil baron’s fall, he speaks to the challenges of returning to a middle-class way of living, while romancing the resilience that it has given him: the butt-end of national humour gone viral, on the eve of national elections, we hear simulations of President Dilma Rousseff’s voice, seeking reelection in 2014 through appeals to distinctive social development policies, claiming that “in my government, even Eike Batista entered into the middle class”.¹⁴⁴

In addition to being a model of/for enterprising liberal subjects of development, the Wizard founded the school that trains millions of others to follow the same path. The relentless expansion of *Wizard*, Brazil’s top language school, is the testament to his success and an emblem of more to come.¹⁴⁵ For the past number of years, *Wizard* has sustained an annual growth rate hovering over 20%, with more than BRL\$1 billion in annual global revenue.¹⁴⁶ Top in the field of education, it is the third largest franchise in the Brazilian economy, now incorporating technical schools and competitors variously positioned. Spearheaded in the state of *São Paulo* (Campinas) in 1987, the company has been aggressively internationalizing its brand for the past decade to include branches in the USA, Europe, Japan, China, and across Latin America. This particular franchise has approximately 1.4 million students enrolled each year and employs more than 45,000

¹⁴⁴ Refer to “Humor nas Eleições” (Humour at the Elections) for further contextualization (PoliciaBR 2014).

¹⁴⁵ This more-to-come includes expansions in areas increasingly not related to educational ventures, as well as the potential sales of the language school to Pearson educational groups.

¹⁴⁶ Refer to Cabeça de Cuia reports for more context (1).

people at its 3,500 branches.¹⁴⁷ Although its main slogan in Rio is *Você Bilingue* (“You Bilingual”; previously “English with Leadership”) within a heavy Americanophilic frame (awarding its top students, for instance, the status of translators at *Rock in Rio*), it has grown to offer classes in Spanish, Italian, German, French, Japanese, Chinese, and even Brazilian Portuguese for foreigners. It also advertises itself as the only school in Brazil that teaches English in Braille, opening new markets and engaging diverse actors every year, especially those abandoned by the mainstream social and educational system. This assumes a special force in academic contexts where the majority of scientific publications, as well as popular material more broadly accessed via the internet, is in English, thus requiring language proficiency as a condition of entrance into nearly all university programs. As a hub for TOEIC certification, *Wizard’s* language classes profess the latest neuroscientific pedagogical and developmental approaches. Following this internationally standardized educational model, it offers teaching materials, training and implementation, marketing and administration for the language teaching, vocational education, and information technology markets. It has even developed a M.B.A. program geared specifically for its franchise managers. In addition to its entrepreneurial ventures, it organizes the Wizard National Conference held each year at major theme parks around Brazil to encourage a sense of community among its client-students, who share numerous membership privileges that form extensive social and economic networks throughout the country and beyond.

This multinational corporation operated by the *Multi Holding Group* has furthermore established partnerships with bodies as diverse as tourism associations,

¹⁴⁷ Wizard Language School, “Wizard - Franquias”.

educational organizations, businesses and popular brands, museum associations, airlines and airports, banks, and much more.¹⁴⁸ Since its initial push to internationalize in 2000, *Wizard* has become the first Brazilian school to open a branch in China (Tianjin, 2009) – the next frontier! – now providing language lessons in public schools across various cities.¹⁴⁹ Its vast international networks facilitate inter-branch student exchanges, immersing their client-students in the language of their choice from a few weeks to a few years at a time. As part of its corporate mandate of using education to create social opportunities, it supports several local charities, notably teaching poor and sick children English, so as to meet its goals of social inclusion and responsibility.¹⁵⁰ Over the past 25 years, *Wizard* has spearheaded many of the initiatives that have now become standard in the field, from its launch of the first television channel to its ever-expanding corporate membership programs.¹⁵¹ Within this context, its stated mission is first and foremost to train students for the labour market and for society, while encouraging their self-realization and free expression by developing personal motivational skills in cultural and academic contexts.

What *Wizard* training promises, alongside that of countless other schools with somewhat varied techniques, is to make the individual the site of worldly transformation. Its particularly impressive approach persuades willing believers that prosperity begins with investing in yourself. As mirrored in the CEO's own rags-to-riches story,

¹⁴⁸ See Wizard Language School, “Agreements and Partnerships”, for more information on its partnered corporations.

¹⁴⁹ See interviews, Tormo & Associados, “Carlos Wizard Martins, Presidente da Wizard”.

¹⁵⁰ See Wizard Language School, “Social Responsibility”, for more information on its work with charities such as *Fundação Xuxa*, *Centro Boldrini*, among others.

¹⁵¹ Wizard Language School, “Wizardtv”.

chronicled in his numerous bestselling self-help books, success is within you. It is a function of attitudes and competencies, as much as the seeming naturalness of Brazil's patriarchal oligarchies may lead one to believe otherwise. Through his own underlying Mormon worldview, the Wizard is on a mission to convert a Catholic population to a more productive work ethic that implicitly relinquishes the belief that God's will is static, that the first will be last, that desire is evil, and that we are eternally subordinated by the original sin – but this time, not through churches, but the more effective time-tested means of education. Desire is power, pain need not be suffering, and the universe is friendly. With blame and guilt disabled (together with the popular postcolonial conspiracies of a universe set against you), no victory materializes by chance, miraculously, but as a result of work. Faith is not about the purity of our intention, but the rigour of our action. We cannot sin in ignorance in face of a loving judge, and so we must, as the title of the Wizard's latest bestseller counsels, awaken the good and prosperous within us as the key to personal and collective well-being.

The perfect mediator to the more alerting Protestant capitalist work ethic, the legendary CEO mobilizes English as a means for enterprising citizens to learn how to take control of their lives and their worlds. More than simply reproducing the frontier work ethic or secular meritocratic hierarchies of the American Dream, the Wizard's example bears out a complex series of negotiations between the demands of a Catholic branding of patriarchal authority and a neoliberal responsabilization of the individual, all within the overarching ethos of adventure of an inherited Iberian personalistic politics. Along these inflections, *Wizard* language training is not about learning English, but about

what one does with it. In fact, grammar, as such, is not taught, at any level, in its classrooms.

As the first line of one of the President's most popular blog challenges, "Are we born entrepreneurs, or do we turn into entrepreneurs?"¹⁵² Aside from the obvious technical skills that must be trained, a certain entrepreneurial disposition to overcome difficulties so as to establish yourself on your own merit is what is ultimately necessary, he affirms however ambiguously for *Wizard's* seeking spirits. In the Brazilian context, the obstacle is not simply a Catholic denigration of power or desire secured by paternal benevolence. More to the point, as the Wizard elaborates in his leadership blog, the problem can be found within the disciplinary vestiges of industrial organization and management:

When I received my Bachelor's in Computer Science from the University of Brigham Young, I returned to Brazil and began my career in the corporate world working at a pulp and paper mill. The behaviour of the managers at that time reflected notions of a strict separation between leaders and followers, sentiments of superiority, and the search for the guilty when conflicts arose that challenged a team. I therefore learned to recognize the great difference between managers and leaders. While the former preconize processes and control the activities of a team in search of results, the latter determine what the direction is and inspire his followers by way of his conviction and service, but principally by way of his example. The professionals who know how to break with these managerial clichés of the past and internalize the shared behavioural references of managers and leaders will arrive at great results.¹⁵³

As further expounded in his series of blogs (and accompanying bestselling books and pedagogical materials) on entrepreneurialism, financial independence, auto-sufficiency, professionalism, self-improvement, among others, *the entrepreneurial spirit* that these schools strive to nurture invokes flexibility, teamwork, desire, creativity, and ultimately,

¹⁵² Wizard Language School, "Mensagem do Presidente: Empreendedorismo" (Message from the President: Entrepreneurship).

¹⁵³ Ibid.

leadership by example rather than by mandate. It is not about discipline but self-discipline. It is not about submitting to a fixed authority or managerial control, but about listening, synthesizing, prioritizing, analyzing, and inspiring, for indeed, the source of authority in an increasingly knowledge-based economy is ever-changing, unstable, and secured by expertise more often than by status. No longer operating through self-legitimizing authority, professionals are becoming managed and managers are becoming professionalized.¹⁵⁴ As upheld in his Ten Commandments (see *Figure 10* below), one must thus lead or be led. Success entails transforming your desires into shared plans through both intellectual and emotional intelligence in order to come in first in a competitive glocal market, as evidenced by the Wizard's own journey. By cultivating your critical and creative capacities and instituting teams of diverse experts to implement your visions (letting go of the singularities of a patriarchal authority), it becomes possible not only to think outside the box, but to apply this distinction through skilled entrepreneurship. Instead of being afraid of these uncertainties and insecurities, the entrepreneurial spirit that these schools are trying to nurture follows in the inspiration behind their name: the Wizard of Oz, an indirect model of leadership behind curtains, rather than ostentatiously imposed from above. In ways far more reaching, diffuse and indirect, than SEC-like institutional initiatives set to train cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial citizen-subjects of development, it brings to bear what our Bossa Nova President, in the rhythm of the waltz, tried to teach a country between two dictatorships.

¹⁵⁴ For a provocative analysis of the changing dynamics of management practices, see Whitehead and Dent's study of how professionals, once the modern source of knowledge and authority, are increasingly being subject to market-oriented performance evaluations and how such insecure bases of authority together with the rise of credentialism of the managed subject impact practices of masculinity and relations of power (*Managing Professional Identities: Knowledge, Performativity and the "New" Professional*).

As such, the (post)modern aesthetic of a miscegenated people forever oscillates between orderly impositions of progress, and progressive impositions of order. Not only from the top, but through subjects and venues of development variously situated.



Figure 10: Carlos Wizard Martins, the CEO of the Wizard network of languages schools known for his impeccable suit-and-hair and proper ways, has become an entrepreneurial model to students and a public alike who admire the “Wizard of Languages” humble creation of his ever-expanding “empire” (as exhibited in the campaign above profiling his success).

In its decisive manifestation, creative, playful, team-based learning is a marker of these private schools, where entitled client-students are practicing how to take control of their success, in projects inside and beyond the classroom. This sort of disposition is cultivated through motivational campaigns, multicultural exchanges, professional and financial development, sustainability workshops, as well as civic and corporate social responsibility practices. In fact, the mere weekly exercise of going to these centres to invest in oneself through intimate collaborations with teams of like-minded client-students, is one that has the potential to be carried through even when the charging Father is not hovering over. These places are markedly different from mainstream schools that still tend to operate through those outdated “clichéd” models of organization and management, using discipline rather than desire to get butts in seats, mouths closed rather

than generating ideas, and orders followed rather than projects imagined. Instead of fostering creativity and entrepreneurship as required in today's global cultural and political economy, what many mainstream pedagogies continue to produce is obedience. Through creative pedagogies of prosperity, learning English and training oneself as a citizen of the world at a place like *Wizard* is about awakening your own inner drives and desires, of which the top five recorded by the company are:

1. Up to 80% increase in salary
2. Get to know anywhere in the world
3. Meet people worldwide
4. Understand movies and books
5. 75% of the content on the Internet is in English ¹⁵⁵

Although the explicit reasons for learning English, and its seductive appeals to the new middle class of an emerging economic powerhouse like Brazil, may be overtly pitched as personal satisfaction, it is perhaps the banality of this self-help veneer that leads to it going unnoticed as arguably one of the most powerful sites of today's neoliberal mode of development. Through their personal, private, and public exercises, these schools habituate an emerging middle class to becoming responsible for their own successes and failures. By way of this different breed of self-discipline and creative play, enterprising subjects, willingly or not, become the site of new modes of development on whose victories Brazil's global rise depends, however destabilizing the potential mismatch of expectations and realities of an innovative middle class. In sum, these entrepreneurial subjects of development have become our latter-day saviours (much more effective than any President, new or old, fatherly or brotherly), bridging us to the postindustrial world of a talent-based economy, with Carlos Wizard Martins an exemplary if complex figure:

¹⁵⁵ Wizard Language School, "Wizard – Sobre".



And thus He spake,



Figure 11-12: The President’s Blog leaves us with the following “Ten Commandments of Carlos Wizard”: (1) Every dream begins with a desire; (2) Nobody ever realized anything great alone; (3) We lead or we are led; (4) We need rationality, but it is emotion that takes us to action; (5) Life is a great school; (6) An enterprise is a distinct reflection of the mind of who directs it; (7) More important than speed is to know that you are on the right course; (8) Success consists of anticipating a trend in the market and beginning to practice it immediately; (9) Not always the smartest wins, those who are capable of arriving first win; (10) We cannot wait for the world to come to us. We need to go out to the world (Blog do Presidente, translation mine).

For believers and unbelievers alike, the question is not whether they personally succeed or fail, but ultimately, whether or not these rules, principles, and commandments

define the new terms of the game. What happens to those who are led instead of lead? Under the name of a globalization that promises to open a world of opportunities for one and all who learn to speak its language and play on its terms, this prevailing mode of creative development is premised on the *potential* that we can all be winners. It is not so much about becoming equals in each other's eyes so as to share in the gifts of modernity, but about fashioning oneself to make use of the world that is rightfully ours. No longer troubled by a shortfall of gifts, there can only be an abundance of dreams.

Abundance, not scarcity, is the heart of the creative economy. And as the Wizard himself assures, wealth is within us. So the process of transformation goes as well as we manage it. The state can go so far as supporting the structures and spaces of a creative class – creative cities, networks, and events – as means for nurturing the entrepreneurial subjects of a coming development. And how to deal with the losers? They become the objects not of serious deliberations of socio-economic or political development, but once more of the kind pitying hearts of the charitable few.

However liberating the rush of globalization and the excitement of its boundless promises, fears surrounding instability, change, and crisis indeed abound. More fearful than its novelties, if perhaps less immediately obvious, I would suggest, is its conservatism. At a time when it becomes possible to forget the trickle down theory because success or failure is innate, the seeming emancipations of bottom-up development render platforms more fixed than those raising up the grand monuments to the utopias of modernization. Focusing on developing our inner lives (through entrepreneurial desires and attitudes) more than the ways of a world 'out there' (epitomized by the bold if misdirected redesigns of Brasília), we may become

responsibilized for our own self-management, but only to become de-responsibilized for our impacts in the world. It may hence be timely to reconsider what is at stake in training vast numbers of people into the tastes, dispositions, and expectations of a cosmopolitan entrepreneurial middle class as the new and improved pathway to the socio-economic development of the third world.

From father to son: reconceiving powers of development

In a popular *Wizard* television commercial that enchanted a Brazilian audience some few years back, a little boy lays quietly in bed while his father reads to him a story before kissing him goodnight. Eager for one more heroic tale to wrap up the day, the boy is disappointed when the father is unable to read to him “The Little Red Riding Hood”, perhaps because of his own curiosity for the English story or perhaps because of the revelation of his father’s shortcoming. After spending much of the next day deciphering the book with the aid of his *Wizard* study materials, the following evening the determined boy climbs into his father’s bed and begins to read to him the rehearsed story in English, at that point also happening to awaken his mother. The parents, astonished, lay quietly listening in the stillness of the night.¹⁵⁶

In this simple scene lies the promise of the new pathways to development in an age of globalization. Neither status nor authority determines who emerges triumphantly, what the limits or expectations can be, or how the game is played. Indeed, the son does not follow in the shadows of the father, but initiates his own way through. The entrepreneurial spirit does not live in a patriarchal world, submissive to Father or God or,

¹⁵⁶ Watch the 30-second video clip referenced here under Wizard Language School, “Era Uma Vez no Wizard” (“Once Upon a Time at Wizard”).

more to the point, Boss. The entrepreneurial spirit lives in a *fratriarchal* world, among sons and brothers and multiple contestants. Through diffuse networks of exchange between players and competitors on a self-styled horizontal plane, one's place in the world is not secure. It becomes possible to win and lose, depending on your own moves. Or so we are led to believe. The modern-democracy-and-free-markets approach to development – as the field on which entrepreneurial subjects battle it out in a global cultural and political economy – is, after all, a story about the subordinated sons who deposed their Father. To become their own masters, dependent subjects embrace the rule of 'the people' as opposed to a paternal, monarchical, or divine rule, as goes the triumphant liberal tale. And off with the King's Head! As antiquated (or even forgotten) as this account may seem today, so many of us continue to look for Fatherly or Kingly figures, for The Man in charge, for the elite 1% to explain how globalization works, and to account for its winners and losers.

The Occupy Movement that emerged on Wall Street in response to global economic crises of the new century, and rapidly swept across the business districts and central hubs of cities throughout the world, is a powerful reminder of this tendency, as well as its strategic remembering and forgettings. Claiming a better world on behalf of the 99%, these popular appeals continued in deferring authority and power to an imagined Head, summoning a world managed from above, as from the flight deck of an airplane controlling our every course of direction. The vindications of a 99%-vs-1% discourse of those in power, those with money, parallels the common sense of growth-oriented models whereby increased development is presumed to increase inequality in terms of 'footprints' variously defined (i.e. let the cake grow first before slicing it up in

pieces). And so the zero-sum match between the rich few and the poor masses (the flipside that enables the abundance-for-all take) must be managed through calculations of socio-economic and political priorities. Misleading is the point of departure of poverty (or abundance), rather than inequality, as it were, to trail the fields of a third world.

However seemingly opposed the modernization and globalization pathways to development, as here exemplified by Brasília's avowed top-down collectivist project of national industrial integration and civil urban design alongside private English language school's reputed bottom-up training of entrepreneurial subjects of development, both are negotiated in such complex ways that what it means to be progressive/conservative or emancipatory/oppressive is not so clear. Ultimately, both seemingly distinct developmental modes converge as projects in middle-classification, uneasy in their relationships to both the top and the bottom. They foster, directly and indirectly, projects in character reformation, brought to life through codes of conduct apt for (im)personal systems of governance, universalized by way of a moral economy that dictates what can and cannot make up the ways of the good life. As attempts at peripheral insertions into modernity (whether privileging the explanatory matrices of order and progress, growth and development, or what have you), they differ in the kind of sociability nurtured to link state and society, yet in ways that supersede ascriptions of (post)industrial, (post)modern, and other legitimating myths of a developmental agenda. That said, the latest creative pedagogies of prosperity shaping the self-managing leaders training at Brazil's authoritative English language schools appear to be positioned in such ways as to more effectively carry through this project than the statist redesigns of space and law emanating from the capital, however offbeat its bossa nova restylings of the ways of a

pioneering urbanizing class. They thrive, in measure, by appealing to myths that capture our understandings of who we are and would like to be, in the land of the chronically emerging. Yet successful to what end? Tapping into the legendary personalistic ethos of adventure, via clientist networks cutting through creative rules-based markets, English language schools seem to be doing the work that Brasília's abstracted collectivist and individuated redesigns were unable to do in preparing for a modern Brazil(ian way), abundant in possibilities.

Of course authoritative discourses and practices of development have taken many forms, and meant many things, to different people in different places at different times. In contrasting a modernization to a globalization spirit, we are not able to reach a comprehensive understanding of the chronicles of development of the last century that are said to have inaugurated a new postcolonial world order, or even ask them to explain to us what has actually been happening on the ground, where murmurs may seldom be heard of such grand plans. Like the appeals of the 99%, such abstractions make it difficult for us to grasp the strategies and dynamics moving these glocal encounters. Nonetheless, they can, at least heuristically, methodologically if not historically, facilitate us in becoming more attentive to some of the complex (dis)junctures that may otherwise go unnoticed amidst the all-consuming and seductive demands of the day. In the following section, Part II, I will turn our attention to the underlying conditions that make these, and accompanying, developmental modes work, fracturing them from within and between.

Whether revitalizing ports or drafting an airplane into existence, both the globalization and modernization projects here explored show us different dimensions of

the cultural politics of middle-classification. Through their respective developmental paradigms, they illustrate how, whether conscripted from above or below, the middle class is recurrently sheltered as neutral places, where people need not see themselves as either the top or the bottom. In turn, it is easy to overlook how the ways in which middle classes are managed and self-managed reproduce the day to day of glocal economies, arguably more than the actions of the projected 1%. In context, the members of a middle class are both winners and losers, so to speak. Strategically able to pass between the determined 99% and 1%, those of us aligned to a middle class are not obliged to take responsibility for either positionalities, which, in effect, poses some crucial questions concerning contemporary strategies of socio-economic development whose solutions to the problems of the third world put faith in bringing more and more people into a cosmopolitan entrepreneurial middle class. Beyond statistical oscillations of advances and delays, we encounter development as a way of living. Projects in character reformation, which assume a middle class way of living as the only good way to live, fail to see that not everyone can and wants to live in this way, however much its standards have come to capture what it means to be a free and equal citizen-consumer. The claims of progress, order, or growth do not make way for these encounters, that is, for the possibility of keeping open the question of what kind of development is desired and desirable. What is more, the problem with the meritocratic impulse that takes force through the individualist ideologies of a middle class to be, is not that the losers do not know why they lose, but that the winners do not know why they win. How can we take seriously this tension within the progressivist standardizations of a developmental ethos, and integrate it into our analyses to follow?

On the whole, to become more responsive to the complexities of our worlds, the problem may not be so much about resisting or adapting to modernization, globalization, or the myriad other developmental standards that inevitably come and go. Their varied projects each have their own rhythms, to which we need to learn how to more carefully listen, letting go of the urge to make the world legible, assert our judgements of the good and the bad, and plot out our plans for a better world somewhere in the distance. As the composer of bossa nova who experimented with the rhythms of a transforming Brazil once proposed, “what you do not know even senses”: accepting (celebrating!) the “slightly out of tune”, it becomes possible to grapple with the ways in which the classifications and beautiful melodies of a harmonious stance – with their fixed references and clear, stable frequencies that direct us toward recognizable tunes – deceive and entrap us, again and again (such as in Tom Jobim’s “Desafinado”).¹⁵⁷ Between the measured intervals, we may at last be able to hear the noise bursting through any orchestration of a harmonious world. Instead of looking upon our worlds, we begin to listen to them.

And now, what to listen for? If listening is more than about hearing or not hearing, the trap of the subaltern, in what ways can we become more attuned to the qualifications and disqualifications within the peripheries of the modern world? Declarations of success or failure defined by the particular prescriptions of the latest developmental model confuse the terms of engagement: who is (dis)qualified to do what, and to what end. That is to say, projects of development are confused with the

¹⁵⁷ For the complete lyrics and music to this legendary ‘anthem’ of bossa nova, see *Letras* database here referenced, which offers a fuller appreciation of the movement’s popularization (i.e. vulgarization) of Brazilian music vis-à-vis long-standing colonial standards, as its title, “Slightly out of Tune”, attests.

development project – tensions that I will further explore, next, in Part II. To get at how subjects are (dis)qualified to play the game, we need to grapple with this question and learn to hear its *desafinações* that exceed paradigms of new problems and solutions. For, after all, the terrain of development is one of political judgement: moments and places where we face what counts as success, failure, and how to live in-between. In Part III, I will trace these affirmations, in a series of interventions, amplifying what works and how, instead of seeking refuge in cures or correctives, out of touch, whose proposed options merely generate more assimilations of or resistances to the latest guide for the chronically emerging. Grappling with the trainings and positionings of subjects of development, so as to reconsider the kinds of political subjectivities available to us in a postcolonial world of the chronically emerging, at best, or backward and delayed, at worst, we may continue to hone our capacity to listen, to assume response-ability, and to encounter the problems that the development project has appropriated for itself with a richer sensibility for the fields in which they operate.

PART II

Pedagogies of Prosperity:
Training entrepreneurial subjects of development

the project of development

You must decide whether you will help me or not.
~ Antigone, line 29 ~

I am aware, of course, that no Ruler can expect complete loyalty from his subjects until he has been tested in office. Nevertheless, I say to you at the very outset that I have nothing but contempt for the kind of Governor who is afraid, for whatever reason, to follow the course that he knows is best for the State; and as for the man who sets private friendship above the public welfare, —I have no use for him, either. I call God to witness that if I saw my country headed for ruin, I should not be afraid to speak out plainly; and I need hardly remind you that I would never have any dealings with an enemy of the people. No one values friendship more highly than I; but we must remember that friends made at the risk of wrecking our Ship are not real friends at all.

~ Creon, line 146 ~

There is no happiness where there is no wisdom;
No wisdom but in submission to the gods.
Big words are always punished,
And proud men in old age learn to be wise.
~ Choragos, line 1039 ~

The problem of political judgement: (dis)qualifying citizen-subjects of development

Amidst the rise and fall of development projects variously scaled, the problem of development, in and of itself, continues to evoke images of growth, enhancement, evolution, improvement, support, expansion, change, and ultimately, regeneration.¹⁵⁸ Whether considering international development (issues of concern to developing countries), organizational development (interests in institutional viability and sustainability), personal development (self-help), professional development (competencies and qualifications for career advancement), or the unfolding and revealing of myriad other capacities or possibilities, it tends to delineate a process toward a more advanced, mature, or effective state. For many who deem themselves situated in an already advanced position, the call for *help* resonates through some series of analogous biosocial conditions of a subject in need of assistance, and those capable of providing such assistance, be it immediate or long-term.

Subjects of development have long been remodelled in this assistentialist logic, given the allegedly incomplete or corrupted nature of their governing institutions. Ironically, either they are decontextualized as individuated receptacles of aid, or fated outcomes of particular modes of administering interpersonal relations that must be overcome in order for modern systems of impartial governance and free exchange to guarantee the foundations of the good life. Whether devoid of history or condemned to it (the evolutionary frame at its best!), remedial interventions into the fields of Latin America's chronically emerging giant have, more often than not, positioned its subjects

¹⁵⁸ For a current sense of the available political vocabulary with which to pitch development projects, see World Bank 2014 archives, here cited, that stipulate the conditions for the provision of its services and expertise aimed at uplifting 'underdeveloped' countries.

in terms of their conformity to or disobedience of the proper codes and conduct of modernity, the standard against which we are to measure progress, to measure yesterday against tomorrow. The Brazilian dilemma of modernity, inheriting the guiding principles and apprehensions of a self-identified Western civilization, effectively traces all of our shortcomings against the execution or transgression of such universal codes, which development projects have tended to take on through an array of corrective measures.

Latin America has been envisioned, after all, as home to the semi-civilized. Or so (post)colonial imaginaries continue to impress upon us in developmental renderings of a New World that has yet to take off. Neither backward (in the ways of a 'dark continent') or advanced (as guaranteed by the status of a 'first world'), its giants are, at best, chronically emerging. The most wide-ranging projects of development are mobilized within this context, but the closer that we get to their distinct materializations, the more that they appear to us as mirages of what ought to be rather than what is, measured against the incorruptible standards of a modernity realized somewhere 'out there'. To grapple with what is at stake in this particular developmental ethos of those caught in-between, it will be hence required of us to take seriously, and not so seriously, the established terms of the game, which pit culturalist explanations for so-called Brazil's developmental delay against institutionalist accounts that converge around a confused discourse of corruption that delineates the problems and solutions of a take-off that will have been.

To (dis)engage the terms of debate for thinking about places of an allegedly incomplete or corrupted modernity, I will here reframe the problems that a developmental ethos appropriates for itself, which situates the third world as the constitutive outside of

idealized ways of living. The problematics of development that I will come to trace, in turn, give way to a confused politics of transformation in the peripheries of the modern world. In Part III, I will elaborate this sort of history of the present as a way to reorient such grand narratives of arrested development, corruption, and other so-called third world issues, by drawing on a range of sites of sociability that nurture particular kinds of relations between (dis)obedient subjects and their governing institutions, which I will flesh out on the streets of Brazil's aspiring world-city, Rio de Janeiro. As follows, we will be able to open up spaces in which to reconsider the day to day dynamics that compose the fields and subjects on which development projects operate, which reveal and obscure 'successes', 'failures', and ultimately, a range of desires, expectations, and responsibilities. To grasp these complex political dynamics, it will be first necessary to take in how the performative regulation of modernity's insides and outsides, yesterdays and tomorrows, and like realms, paves the way for developmental interventions thus oriented.

The problem of development, it must be emphasized, is one of qualification and disqualification into the modern world. For too long our approaches to a politics of transformation, in centres and peripheries variously scaled, have been colonized by the inevitable march of time: of the advanced, delayed, and backward agents of predestined socio-economic projects bent on refashioning the world over in their own image. Within this (post)colonial imaginary, the third world has served as a mirror of the first world, reflecting its measures of the good life, that is, the latest projections of the desired and desirable codes and conduct of modernity. Places like 'Brazil' have thus been imagined as an object of diagnosis and treatment, habitually passing through (inter)nationalist

explanations for our failings to fully modernize, as if we were properly educated into modern ways of living, all of our problems would be solved. Yet, as I will contend here, a history of the Brazilian present belies the problematics of development, which, moreover, entrap our possible responses to designated problems and solutions of politics in out of the way places. What is more, the standards of political judgment that follow from such idealized ways of living neutralize contentions and negotiations over how we want to live, here and now. In the fields of a chronically emerging Latin American giant, we can then more readily appreciate the always already corrupted temperaments of a modernity in motion, and what it enables and disenables as the orientation and regulative measure of a peripheral politics of transformation.

Today, our approaches to development remain haunted by these totalizing conventions of authentic and corrupted modernities, because, I will argue, of a confused sense of history and its precluded sensibilities. It may thus be helpful to pause and face head on some of these fundamental historical confusions that give form to the overwhelmingly culturalist explanations and resolutions of Brazil's so-called developmental delay. Our orienting myths – of the modern and traditional, and its myriad evaluative derivations – have indeed led us astray, and, they reveal to us the truths, falsities and (dis)illusions regarding our desired and desirable ways of living. What the modern standard bestows onto us, above all, is a certain self-consciousness about time and trajectory. Those whose conduct cannot be universalized as contributing to these advancements, are dispensable, at best. Modern governing institutions, and their pedagogical, managerial, and supervisory regimes are oriented to these rather technocratic ends. As a refashioning of contemporary modes, the modern temperament

demands that we be constantly brought up to date, and adapt oneself so as to go with the flow of the times. Whether in renunciation or novelty, it is constantly reconceiving itself, with the aim of assuming control over our fortunes. Through a sort of certainty in uncertainty, it convinces itself into believing that what it offers is an analysis of the way things are (think science or realism), rather than a comparative examination against the way things should be (think myth), succeeding in formalizing even conflict into competition or representation. Key is self-positioning. The world can be made over in our image, with the right means: education, discipline, surveillance, and so forth. In actuality, far from charitable or evolutionary, these are the pathways to advancement that animate developmental modes broadly conceived, such as those exemplified in Part I through the archetypes of modernization and globalization – projects aimed at a kind of universalization of available subject positions, through the (dis)qualification of their enabling conduct. However seemingly altruistic, it is within these terms, which are much more about constructing a self than buttressing an other, that the project(ion) of development has taken off. It is within this context that we must face the politics of helping.

Projections of the codes and conduct of modernity have been harboured within mythical origins customarily traced back to the ancient Greek polis, as if deliberations into a democratic consciousness were evermore confined to the political roles and vocabularies set forth by the haunted fathers of modern Western civilization. In conquering Nature, Man gives himself an alternate source and heritage, positioning himself as master of time and cultivator of space – and ultimately, the possibility of constantly starting anew. The concept of citizenship most clearly arises out of the

subsequent conflict between that which is demarcated as public (of the general good) vs. private (of a particular temperament), or to put it otherwise, the city vs. the family, the state vs. the divine, among other realms whose seeming mutual exclusivity makes foreign a citizen who revokes the jurisdictions thus defined. Or so we have been led to believe. Whether by nature or by law, however (in)alienable, the ensuing problem of authority (fidelity?) sets out the contours of possible (dis)qualifications and (dis)engagements with political matters. That is to say, how we are positioned matters.

In confronting Antigone's unsettling call for help, however vivid the contexts of this founding Greek tragedy may or may not be for us followers of the consecrated Western canon, likely some sort of feelings of discomfort have been stirred within us. Perhaps it is the contrasting sense of helplessness that leaves us uneasy; whether it frightens or empowers us, it requires a certain positioning, in relation to others, to which we must own up in one way or another. We position ourselves in relation to others every day, in every encounter and disencounter, often without even realizing it. More often than not, we are not even aware of the impacts of our actions, be they helpful or harmful. Such is the nature of *convivência*. In turn, I would wager that the discomfort predominantly emanates not from the fluid practice of positioning itself, but rather, from how we articulate our positionings vis-à-vis established circuits and relations. After realizing that this help that Antigone is calling for is a highly politicized help (i.e. a call to civil disobedience, invoking her sister to help her bury the abandoned corpse of her brother, who has been deemed an enemy of the state), the traces of this tragic chronicle of ethico-political judgement that I weave together for you here may serve to remind us what is often at stake in practices of helping.

At the heart of discourses and practices of development is a depoliticized help. This likely comes as no surprise to many who engage with development theory and practice today.¹⁵⁹ What is more likely to slip from our attention (especially for those of us who are distant or distanced from the trenches of the third world) is how the problem of citizenship precedes and informs the problem of development in ways that are all too convenient to forget. And at the heart of the problem of citizenship, as King Creon unwittingly brings to our attention, is not necessarily the distinction between friend versus enemy (i.e. those with whom we cooperate and those we oppose), but the *individual* versus the *person*. Prior to positioning subjects for or against a predetermined set of principles or missions, they must be qualified or disqualified in certain ways in order to be judged – be it in accordance with universal terms that fix what is best for the individual and its totality in abstraction, or in accordance with the social terms of a generalizable group, system or tradition. To put it in the King’s terms, the priority of the public over the private is what appears to preserve a modern system of state-based governance. Whether in the structural position of an individual in abstract space, subject to impersonal laws of an imagined state (epitomized by the figure of the citizen, against which Antigone’s position is framed by familial loyalty), or in the structural position of the person in relational contexts variously defined by generalizable norms or customs, the best way to live together is anything but a biosocial imperative. This fundamental antagonism of modern political thinking, heralded back to our fabled Greek origins, that pits modes of relations as either universal or particular, institutionalist or culturalist,

¹⁵⁹ See *The Post-Development Reader* for an exemplary array of critiques to the political constitution and effects of development theory and practice in varied contemporary (inter)national contexts (Rahnema et al).

modern or traditional, democratic or corrupt, and so forth, continues to serve as a compulsory guide, however misleading, with which those who occupy moments of a failed or incomplete modernity must grapple. The citizen is set to exclude, or at the very least subordinate and discipline, the person into acting in accordance with purportedly neutral and fair principles. The citizen is unmired in relations of power, or as we say in Brazil, the citizen is *João-Ninguém*, John-Nobody. It is in accordance with these pillars of a scientific modernity, set against the world of traditional and personal customs, that assistance or solutions are proposed to those who have not realized the former with the aim of dealing with the problem of the latter, always already assumed as an obstacle.

In this sense, Antigone's democratic dilemma is the dilemma of a similarly constructed subject of the third world in need of being disciplined into prioritizing public welfare above all else, or so it seems. Just as much as Antigone's negation of the terms of political engagement is integral to the constitution of modernity, so too the third world, as the reverse apparition of the forms of a good life, is central rather than peripheral to understanding standards of political judgement today. To take on development as a gradual realization or failure to realize a politico-economic architectonic (in a sort of organic unfolding of capacities over time and space, as exemplified in Part I) is to remain confused about why a subject such as Antigone might opt out or prioritize other terms. That is, if our point of departure for thinking about development is biosocial rather than political, we will not understand why development projects succeed or fail, and more fundamentally, how to judge whether they succeed and fail, in what ways and to what effects. The developmental approach, as such – whether politically or economically oriented, whether imposed or adopted, whether collective or individual – renders organic

a process of (self)realization, toward particularly defined ends, in which help ultimately assumes a pedagogical character, however violent or deferential. That is, at its best, help is about ushering, inspiring, conducting, monitoring, modelling, counselling, managing, leading, advising, exhibiting, and otherwise directing subjects of development. It is political.

The individualized subject of a classical tradition of political philosophy, which is at the basis of modern thinking at large, in addition to serving as the self vital to capitalist societies, presumes an internal logical consistency that obscures what does not fit into its terms, escaping from the complexities of the micro to the institutionalizations of the macro. As critiques ranging from feminists to postcolonialists to urbanists of varied stripes have interjected, it negates the place of historical specificities, or relationality, broadly speaking, and so is unable to grasp how individualities and personalities are taken up in singularly multiple ways. In turn, our capacities for grappling with solutions are as restricted as our capacities for grappling with the problems. That is, these inherited terms of debate obstruct not only our ability to speak to the peripheries of the modern world (not as a geographic location but as moments of 'failure'), but fundamentally the standard of modernity itself by which all else is measured as success or failure. Third world as adjective. To engage the third world, therefore, is to hone our capacities to hold, in a singular way, the contradictions that always already make up the conditions of *convivência*, as an everyday practice. Although the interrelational, so to speak, has secured its place as key to understanding the complexities of contemporary (post)modern socio-economic and political life, in and beyond critical circles of analysis, what the third world offers as points of reference is a certain comfort with the makeshift. Not

precarious because it is not in contrast to an everyday normalization, this third world sensibility that I am evoking here remains a shorthand for the (re)appropriations that constitute the means by which people and places respond to conditions beyond individualized choice or coercion. Between the securities of a general or abstract guaranteed order and the particularities confused with chaos, how we are socialized to navigate the (non)institutional demands of modernity (or to put in modern social science terms, between state and society) reveals and obscures figures and scenes of a developmental project, of personalities and individualities that we are and are not to inhabit for our own betterment. Yet more than that, it reveals the groundless grounds of modern mechanisms of good governance and development. It is not a matter of unique or comparative cases to be justified, but of how we are positioned and repositioned to respond, to assume take response-ability, to our milieu, in which we occupy positions never fully consistent in and of themselves. Positions of power and disempowerment, rarely at the top or bottom. Yet how to assume these interrelationalities in systems that demand an individualized subject of internal consistency? Or is this (dis)qualification, in actuality, what we are dealing with?

As Sophocles' tragic tale of democracy reminds us, the founding partition between the universal and the particular, and its multiple orders and (dis)obeying subjects, seldom line up in an easy way, and indeed comes at a high cost: by way of the King's opposition to Antigone's defence of her brother, a declared enemy of the state, in the final scene, Creon, the King's person, is escorted into his home, the supposed private sphere, without his wife and son, both of whom killed themselves on account of the *particular* consequences of the actions brought about by the King's *general* will. And to

close, the representative of the chorus chimes in with a collective voice, cautioning us as to the genuine and transcending source of wisdom. From the personal plea (Antigone) to the official discourse (Creon) to its overarching reflection (Choragos), those following the complex dynamics and appeals of Antigone's trials, which exceed the inherited Oedipal frame for political and ethical judgement (i.e. based on the desire/hatred dyad that gives form to a friend/enemy distinction that secures a certain kind of centralization of power), are left within an ambiguous space of citizenship that renders impossible the demarcation of public from private. An abstract order is upheld – protected against corrupters – while the city is transformed into the living tomb that was to be prepared to punish Antigone's betrayal of the state, made null by her suicide.

Antigone, in refusing her sister's belated gesture of support at the final moment of judgement, is perhaps more aware of the (im)possibilities of these two opposing ethico-political grammars than King Creon himself. "Words are not friends", she explicates in her negation of her disowned sister's reversed offer to help that came too late after the fact.¹⁶⁰ Hers is a position that transcends, or at least moves between, any simple claim to familial loyalty of a yet to be disciplined citizen-subject of modern political dealings. Let us not forget Antigone's polemical dirge that for centuries has incited horror among humanists and antihumanists alike, asserting that she would not conduct herself in such an unlawful way for a replaceable husband or child. Hers is a particular, political negotiation of the structures of power of the day, rather than any categorical claim to martyrdom beyond desire or a universal human vulnerability beyond sociability or

¹⁶⁰ Antigone (Oedipus' daughter, whose name signifies 'opposed to motherhood' or 'in place of a mother') actualizes for us the political stakes of an idealized democratic deliberation, and the role of reason and sentiment in attempts to be heard in varied context (Sophocles, Line 436).

signification. Dismissed as she may be of an undisciplined, emotional, personalistic, familial, and ultimately particularistic positioning vis-à-vis the laws of the state, Antigone does not (self)reference the citizens or its representative (Choragos) for legitimacy, but invokes a logic more firm and consistent than the King's own abstract and impersonal law that changes in accordance with the will and constitution of the citizens. And so, "You smile at me. Ah Creon, Think me a fool, if you like; but it may well be That a fool convicts me of folly".¹⁶¹ However easy it may be to conclude a universal ethics of humanism from Antigone's political logic, as illuminated in Bonnie Honig's feminist re-reception of this founding democratic tale and its checks on the dominant Oedipal terms for theorizing politics, what distinguishes Antigone's intervention is a recognition that these standard questions of modern ethico-political judgement constitute "a vernacular that situates her in a particular form of life".¹⁶²

This sort of *particular form of life* has not been taken very seriously in the authoritative, state-centred, secular-rational, modern Western tradition of thinking and doing politics. Moreover, it is worthwhile to repeat, it has been denied as the uneasy foundation on which mechanisms of good governance and development have been imagined, time and again. In more recent trials, the particular has been relegated to private spheres or translated into quasi-religious humanistic ideals, maternal care, patriarchal loyalty, uncivilized tribalism, among other marginalized iterations of a corrupted general will of a bounded and consenting people (*dêmos*). I would argue not

¹⁶¹'Folly', in some translations, is made into 'madness', highlighting tensions in political discourse and strategy (Sophocles, Line 372-374).

¹⁶² For a critical re-reading (or re-reception, as she terms) of these founding democratic stories, refer to Honig's *Antigone, Interrupted* (56), together with her incisive article, "Antigone's Two Laws".

because it pits a universal morality against the laws of the state (the human versus the citizen), but rather because its forms transcend the universal/particular itself in a way that statist vernaculars are unable to grasp. It pits the person against the individual, in ways that, in the end, leave the King alone, with his words, in his home. Success or failure (of citizens, nations, states, or otherwise rendered subjects of development) simply does not capture the problem: development as a way of living.

Beyond the universalities of the human (natural law), the generalities of the citizen (state law), and the particularities that constitute the exceptions to both, the person lives and navigates at these intersections. The person harbours another perspective, particularistic yet social. The person is not defined by the foundational divide between the civilized (i.e. the Greeks) and the barbarians (i.e. the non-Greeks), hence why Antigone's logic is not merely universal, in the sense of applicable to every human in a uniform way, or conditional on the status of the subject under the governing law of the land. For after all, personalities are individualized, and individualities are personalized in attempts to navigate the (im)personal demands of modern systems of governance. As Bonnie would say, Antigone is "working the intervals" between humanism and antihumanism, politics and antipolitics, and ultimately, between the inside and the outside of "a polis' narrowly defined citizen ideology".¹⁶³ Accepting the dynamic and ambiguous play of her socio-political inheritances, her brother qualifies as both a friend and enemy at the same time, in the same place. More to the point, in her articulations of

¹⁶³Adapting Jacques Rancière's aesthetic approach to theories of democracy, Honig shows us how Antigone works between the infinite of the tragedy and the finite of the city, between dissensus and consensus, and makes a new kind of sense (*Antigone, Interrupted*, 146).

political decisions and positioning, Antigone herself can stand as both powerful and powerless at the same time, in the same place – before and after her suicide.

Our access to the gifts of modernity, qualified by the conditions in which citizenship (dis)places us, is always already conflicted. It may even appear to be contradictory. What is more, though, in the very cradle of a modern Western democracy that promises the conditions of possibility of the good life, even Sophocles' truth remains an unknown, uninterpretable, undecidable. Our Father? Haunting the groundworks of modern political imaginaries, the guides of the higher orders of the day, be they explicitly governmental or not, submit citizen-subjects of development to confused expectations and desires of (self)realization. In the beginning, there was and will have been only inauthentic anchors of a true modernity. And the third world remains the mirror of such inauthenticity.

Between the modern and traditional: Brazil's atraso

These tensions appear to be at the heart of practices of (dis)qualification into the modern world. As the story goes, the failed citizen or state is a manifestation of the limits imposed by tradition in developing an organized civil society, rational political culture, and efficient economic system. The Brazilian dilemma of a modernity forever-to-come finds much of its struggles herein: through convictions of third world inferiority brought to life by an acute sense of the ridiculous, of what is supposed to be, obscuring what is, reducing all of our limitations to the problems of a patriarchal familialism, cordiality, informality, clientism, corruption, and, foundationally, to an excessive

personalism. Brazil, land of the future, of the semi-civilized.¹⁶⁴ To understand this fabled third world dilemma of societies posed as traditional and totalizing coming to grips with the apparently formal and individualist demands of modern capitalism, it is necessary to consider non-technical renderings of development and the myths that orient its multiple and conflicting manifestations. Myths, as I invoke them here, that operate on a plane beyond truth or falsity; myths that define the legendary, and as such, capture visions of the possible and the impossible. It is necessary to go beyond the grand developmental paradigms and prescriptions – defined by modernization, globalization, neoliberalization, or other such moulds, as explored in Part I – in order to grapple with the recurring limits and possibilities of any developmental project or aspiration. Through innumerable complex processes of (de)colonization, first and foremost *obedience* to universalizable laws has come to stand for civility and order, for being enlightened and properly composed (*educado*), rather than a functional indication of a particular adequation between social and juridico-constitutional practice.

Many native interpreters of Brazilian modernity have singled out that the problem of Brazil's delayed development (*atraso*) is that it does not know itself. Arguably a historical and anthropological problem, comparisons within and between national boundaries have legitimated many an intervention, from colonial endeavours to national liberation to global ascension. The romantically banal and strategically undefined 'out there' (*lá fora*) has come to stand in as the ultimate measure of judgement of what is going on 'here' (*aqui*). From Lisbon to Paris to London to Washington and New York

¹⁶⁴ See Zweig's interpretations of Brazil's civilizational and developmental potential, worked through in Part I of this dissertation as one of the enduring orienting myths of our modern dilemmas.

City, what it has meant to be a good modern subject of civilized milieu has continually been defined in relation to external measures. One of our most eminent living anthropologists, Roberto DaMatta, studies Brazil's dilemmas alongside their multiple and conflicting potentials through the differentiation of these two notorious subject positions, the individual and the person, situated in two exemplary kinds of social space, the street and the home, in and across various forms of social time, procession, and relations. Whether resignifying the ancient Greek divisions between civilized and barbarian or contemporary UN human development indices, he invites us to think about how much of the mongrel tradition of self-deprecation, the shame of the ridiculous, the normalized *atraso*, and so forth, comes from this confusion between the individual (i.e. "that subject of universal laws that modernize society") and the person (i.e. "the subject of social relations, which orients itself around the traditional poles of the system").¹⁶⁵ In one of his most definitive works, *What makes brazil, Brazil*, this Rio-based public intellectual teases apart two ensuing modes of constructing a sense of Brazilianness:

According to one, we use precise data: demographic and economic statistics, GDP measures, GNP and *per capita* income and inflation figures, which always alarms and frightens us. We also speak of data pertaining to the political and educational system of the country, only to verify that Brazil is not that country that we would like it to be. This mode of classification allows us to construct a modern social identity according to the criteria established by the European West as per the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. And this is how, we learn and discover to our surprise, some societies are defined. Indeed, England, France, Germany, and above all, the United States are almost exclusively defined by means of this classificatory axis, which is itself of their invention. But in the case of Brazil and other societies, the problem is that there is another mode of classification. Identity is constructed in a double move: by means of the quantitative data, where we are always a collective body that leaves something to be desired; and by means of sensitive and qualitative data, where we can see

¹⁶⁵ "o sujeito das leis universais que modernizam a sociedade" / "o sujeito das relações sociais, que conduz ao pólo tradicional do sistema" (DaMatta, *O Que Faz O brasil, Brasil*, 97, translation mine).

ourselves as something worthwhile. Here, what makes Brazil, Brazil, is no longer the shame of the regime or the galloping and “shameless” inflation, but the delicious food, the engaging music, the *saudade* that humanizes time and death, and the friends who enable us to withstand anything...¹⁶⁶

It is neither in the modern (and its quantitative political and economic measures) nor in the traditional (and its intimate domestic and cordial relations) that we find an underdeveloped emerging Brazil. As Roberto proposes, in ways expressive of a romantic nationalist revalorization of the customarily disparaged, it is in the double move, “the relational capacity of the traditional with the modern” that we find the ways of a miscegenated Brazil, which enables us to “know and live with its political manifestations (negotiation and conciliation) and its economic manifestations (an economy that is statist and at the same time follows the guiding principles of classical capitalism), but in a certain way not discuss its more profound sociological implications” obscured by this very same relational capacity.¹⁶⁷ It is the long-standing myth of the anthropophagy that

¹⁶⁶ “Num deles, utilizamos dados precisos: as estatísticas demográficas e econômicas, os dados de PIB, PNB e os números da renda per capita e da inflação, que sempre nos assusta e apavora. Falamos também dos dados relativos ao sistema político e educacional do país, apenas para constatar que Brasil não é aquele país que gostaríamos que fosse. Essa classificação permite construir uma identidade social moderna de acordo com os critérios estabelecidos pelo Ocidente europeu a partir da Revolução Francesa e da Revolução Industrial. É assim, sabemos e descobrimos com surpresa, que algumas sociedades se definem. Realmente, a Inglaterra, a França, a Alemanha, e sobretudo, os Estados Unidos são quase exclusivamente definidos por meio desse eixo classificatório que é, ele mesmo, invenção sua. Mas, no caso do Brasil e de outras sociedades, o problema é que existe outro modo de classificação. A identidade se constrói duplamente. Por meio dos dados quantitativos, onde somos sempre uma coletividade que deixa a desejar; e por meio de dados sensíveis e qualitativos, onde nos podemos ver a nós mesmos como algo que vale a pena. Aqui, o que faz o Brasil, Brasil não é mais a vergonha do regime ou a inflação galopante e ‘sem vergonha’, mas a comida deliciosa, a música envolvente, a saudade que humaniza o tempo e a morte, e os amigos que permitem resistir a tudo...” (DaMatta, 18-19, translation mine).

¹⁶⁷ “Conhecemos e convivemos com suas manifestações políticas (a negociação e a conciliação) e econômicas (uma economia que é estatizante e ao mesmo tempo segue as

unites us, cannibalizing masked expressions of individualisms and collectivisms, as the author of Brazil's modernist manifesto, Oswald de Andrade, resoundingly affirms of Brazil's multiple singularity – socially, economically, philosophically.¹⁶⁸ Roberto's dialectical vision, illustrative of popular and academic accounts of Brazil's (under)development today, transcends, or at the very least, makes relative both the universal and the particular measures of Brazil's *atraso*, regardless of how much they explain or not everyday realities. Yet these symptomatic articulations of the limits and possibilities of a Brazilian condition remain pre-occupied with where to draw the line between the modern and the traditional, as a propulsive force in our never-ending modern-ization project, rather than recognizing ourselves as always already embedded within modern systems of governance, or, alternatively, recognizing modernity itself as corrupted from the beginning and impossible to realize as such. What we can make out, within this inherited matrix of possibilities, is that creativity is not the upshot of our ways of living, but our acknowledged point of departure. Ideas in their place?¹⁶⁹ Following a series of urban anthropological analysis of the ordinary and extraordinary ways of a modernizing Brazil over the past fifty years, Roberto concludes that, “insofar as we are unable to discern these two sides of the same nation and society, we are bound to a game

linhas mestras do capitalismo clássico), mas de certo modo não discutimos as suas implicações sociológicas mais profundas” (DaMatta, 20, translation mine).

¹⁶⁸ Andrade's 1928 *Manifesto Antropófago* (Anthropophagic Manifesto) served as a historic turning point in conceptualizations of Brazilian modernity. Coming out of theorizations of miscegenation (of the likes of Freyre's *Casa Grande e Senzala*), this approach continues to echo today in prideful celebrations of our creative, adaptive, and resilient spirit, as well as shameful accounts of our inability to execute and formalize plans for our own advancement.

¹⁶⁹ Refer to the elaboration of Schwarz' concept of “out of place ideas” in Part I of this dissertation (17-20), as one of the dominant modes here available for thinking through how we have appropriated colonial and post-colonial projects in Brazil.

whose outcome is already known in advance. For, as with the tossing of coins, or we have at play a ‘brazil’, small and lagging behind the world powers, with Brazil leading us to a discouraging self-flagellation; or we have at play the Brazil of miracles and political and economic authoritarianisms, which periodically enters into crisis”.¹⁷⁰ As follows, it is only within this relationality, if duly suspended, that we can inspire an approach to development, to the third world, to emerging giants that makes room for the illegible, and which might, in turn, help us to reconceptualize the modern and the traditional as our guides. Herein we can continue to define and redefine the terms of the game.

In lands of the future, bound to a developmental agenda that sets self-referential conditions for our entry into modernity, processes of modernization, circulating between centres and peripheries variously defined, always already assume a selective, strategic, and partial temperament. It is not incidental that the archetypal Brazilian response to our delays and advances has been steeped in deliberations into dependency theory, and more recently, the decolonial line, with counterparts in postcolonial imaginings gravitating around subaltern approaches (of the South Asian studies) or alterities (of Africanist revisions). The dialectics of interdependency (alluding back to master-slave dynamics of a latifundian iteration) has been the familiar mode of operating here, and as such, it opens possibilities to reconsider our attachments (affective or otherwise) to the conditions of democracy that delineate our options for living the good life. Both inside and outside of modernity, at the same time, in the same place, Brazilian

¹⁷⁰ “enquanto não formos capazes de discernir essas duas faces de uma mesma nação e sociedade, estaremos fadados a um jogo cujo resultado já se sabe de antemão. Pois, como ocorre com as moedas, ou teremos como jogada um ‘brazil’, pequeno e defasado das potências mundiais, Brasil nos leva a uma autoflagelação desanimadora; ou teremos como jogada o Brasil dos milagres e dos autoritarismos políticos e econômicos, que periodicamente entra numa crise” (DaMatta, 20, translation mine).

(under)development, and the standards of modernity by which it is judged and judges itself, is not, in actuality, a function of imports or exports of models and supplies of the good life. Brazil's attempt to understand itself, so to speak, through the production of national narratives and debates, is not a problem of endogenous expressions of a people's condition, but of the (re)constitutions of the insides and outsides of the modern world (or in more conventional language, of the relationship lived and imagined between Brazil and Europe, in the ways elaborated in Part I via Ibero-America).¹⁷¹ Taking on the question of peripheral insertions into modernity, the ambivalent gatekeepers of modern good governance and development is what is ultimately in focus, imprisoned within (inter)nationalist discourse that impede our abilities to understand the socio-economic and political dynamics that make up the terrain of these developmental projects. Attempts to produce, or rather, perform nationalist narratives from the peripheries of the modern experience end up taking forms that subsume this experience to available vocabularies of a modern developmentalism, the trappings of a future-oriented mode of liberal thinking, full of promises, turning its back onto a dark past. Narratives that vary in their openness, and closure, to the sort of doubled consciousness that Roberto depicts as a condition of our everyday life on the periphery. At stake in these navigations of modern thresholds is the sort of subject positions that we have available to us in a postcolonial world, and at what costs. To listen and respond to this common sense of our conflicted modernity with a firmer grasp on what it demands of us, we need to first understand the sociability that trains us to inhabit these positions, these personalities and

¹⁷¹ For further contextualization of the relationship between the field of Interpretations of Brazil and postcolonial thought, refer to Maia's "Pensamento Social Brasileiro e a Imaginação Pós-colonial" (Brazilian Social Thought and the Post-colonial Imagination).

individualities of a (pre)modern Brazil, which is charged as the cause of our underdevelopment in a land of abundance, where no other explanation can tell us why, development project after development project, the project of development failed to reform the ways of an always delayed Brazil. *Atrasado*. If only we were more educated in the ways of a modern Brazil, then take-off would have us all on board. If only we were...

The colonial endeavour to implant European culture in the tropics depended on particular discriminations between modern virtues and conduct and their traditional or premodern counterparts. It is no surprise, then, that attempts to respond to these inheritances in native interpretations of Brazilian modernity have been haunted by the question of where and how to draw this line, and to what ends. A self-identical Europe, when evoked as a privileged point of reference, a Europe that self-identified Europeans might teach and have taught to non-Europeans, within fractured matrices of civilizational derivations, is given presence in peripheral accounts of modernity not so much because of a contestable truth that they harbour, but because of their currency in places out of the way (and it is in this sense that I here evoke these ghostly continental contours). How do they speak to us, and how do we respond? The three key contributors to modern Brazilian social and political thought – within the burgeoning field of *Interpretações do Brasil* (Interpretations of Brazil) that came to influence following the demise of the Old Republic and the democratization processes of the New State of the 1930s – exemplify three divergent paths: (1) Gilberto Freyre (*Casa-Grande e Senzala: The Big House & the Slave Quarters*), from the historical concept of miscegenation it is possible to see interdependent forms of power, following the particularities of localized and dialectical

master-slave dynamics, in the originary and flexible (and resilient!) organization of the Brazilian family, city, and nation today; (2) Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (*Raízes do Brasil: The Roots of Brazil*), at the foundation of Brazilian manifestations of modernity are the ambiguities of how we negotiate our Iberian inheritances, which have given form to the particular constitution of the modern institutions, the state and the market, that encumber local socio-economic and political advances; (3) Caio Prado Júnior (*Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo: The Formation of Contemporary Brazil*), nationalizing Marxist thought and praxis, we can situate Brazil as part of a larger (inter)national system within the march of an exploitative global capitalism. This holy trinity has made way for the possibilities of thinking the problem of modernity in contemporary Brazilian contexts, of thinking our past as a nation to understand our present and project our future. That is to say, they largely comprise the self-referential basis of thinking modern Brazil as an intellectual, social, and political project today, more often than not, paving the path to culturalist explanations haunted by the corrupted nature of our socio-economic and political formations. In a sense, they have supplied us with the repertoire for both dominant and critical accounts of our national character and deficiencies, based on our relations to externally mediated measures. At different points in this dissertation, I draw on their archetypal reflections so as to bridge understandings of development (notably in the form of democracy-and-free-markets panaceas) between centres and peripheries, but for now, suffice it to say that the problem of the modern and the traditional continues to underpin, misleadingly, our analytical guides that assert what qualifies as civilized/uncivilized, educated/crass, efficient/slow, formal/corrupt, and ultimately, developed/underdeveloped.

Cordial Man vs. Democracy and Free Markets: the tropical (mis)adventures of modernity

In routine ways that continue to resound today, Sérgio gets us to think about how our particular negotiations between modern and traditional obstruct our capacity to understand and feel at home in Brazil today: “we are still today outcasts in our own land”.¹⁷² This predicament is not an upshot of the fast changes and ephemeral mobilities of a globalization project, but rather, a function of the construction of the modern citizen out of the rubbles of a person-oriented Iberian spirit of adventure. For Sérgio, our go-to reference for expressing these common-sense laments of a nation-building project, no one better conveys the ensuing conflict between a tangible, affective order (of the person/family) and an abstract, impersonal order (of the city/state) than Antigone and Creon:

The conflict between Antigone and Creon is of all ages and is preserved in its vehemence today. In all cultures, the process by which the general law supplants the particular law is accompanied by more or less severe and prolonged crises, which can profoundly affect the structure of the society. The study of these crises makes up one of the fundamental themes of social history.¹⁷³

Although for Sérgio the general law and the particular law are in principled opposition – requiring the transgression of the familial order for the birth of the state and the thriving of the citizen – how people, how Brazilians negotiate the ensuing tensions between the

¹⁷² “somos ainda hoje uns desterrados em nossa terra” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 31, translation mine – Note: that a literal translation of *desterrados* would invoke the movement of being un-earthed, without ground, banished).

¹⁷³ “O conflito entre Antigona e Creonte é de todas as épocas e preserva-se sua veemência em nossos dias. Em todas as culturas, o processo pelo qual a lei geral suplanta a lei particular faz-se acompanhar de crises mais ou menos graves e prolongadas, que podem afetar profundamente a estrutura da sociedade. O estudo dessas crises constitui um dos temas fundamentais da história social.” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 141-42, translation mine).

intellectual and the material, the abstract and the corporeal, as well as various naturalized manifestations of the general and the particular, is not always so straight-forward.¹⁷⁴

Historically, this negotiation, whether in the establishment of a modern industrial system and labour regime that divides employee from employer in a previously interdependent slavocratic society in ways that make possible the creation of class and class conflict, or, of a political system of representation that sets up individual accountability under law, has required constant training and retraining to the “overriding demands of the new conditions of life”.¹⁷⁵ At stake is the education project:

According to some pedagogues and psychologists of our times, family-based education should only be a sort of propaedeutic for life in society, outside of the family. And if we consider thoroughly modern theories [theories of modernity], we see that they tend, more and more, to separate the individual from the domestic community, to release him, so to speak, from family “virtues”. It is said that this separation and liberation represent the primary and obligatory conditions of any adaptation to a “practical life”.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Preoccupied with how a privatist or personalist subjectivity (i.e. cordiality) informs and corrupts a Brazilian modernity, the historian seems to overlook some of the complexities caught between the generalized dilemma of a feminized particularity of the likes of a familial private sphere, as mutually exclusive of a masculinized universality or neutrality of the state, which the Antigone/Creon dilemma itself brings to light (141). This regulative opposition is then doubly burdened by the drive to render developmental Brazil’s ‘entry’ into modernity, as if a ‘before’ or ‘outside’ position were accessible within the terms inherited. Nonetheless, these binaric constructions continues to serve as some of the most powerful guides in assessing Brazilian (under)development today, and it is in this role that I assume them here.

¹⁷⁵ “exigências imperativas das novas condições de vida” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 143, translation mine).

¹⁷⁶ “Segundo alguns pedagogos e psicólogos de nossos dias, a educação familiar deve ser apenas uma espécie de propedêutica da vida na sociedade, fora da família. E se bem considerarmos as teorias modernos, veremos que elas tendem, cada vez mais, a separar o indivíduo da comunidade doméstica, a libertá-lo, por assim dizer, das ‘virtudes’ familiares. Dir-se-á que essa separação e essa libertação representam as condições primárias e obrigatórias de qualquer adaptação á ‘vida pratica’” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 143, translation mine).

In his groundbreaking study of *Roots of Brazil (Raízes do Brasil)*, credited with uncovering cordiality¹⁷⁷ as the mythical operational principle of an intimate and relational *convivência* from empire onward, Sérgio goes on to explain that one of the main distinguishing features of a modern scientific pedagogy and premodern educational methods is the approach to *obedience*. The foundation of more traditional pedagogical methods, obedience is only to be stimulated in modern approaches “insofar as it allows for a reasonable adoption of opinions and rules that the proper child recognizes as formulated by adults who have experience in the social terrains in which he is entering. ‘In particular, the child should be prepared to disobey on points that may be fallible in the prognosis of their parents’”.¹⁷⁸ This progressive individualization, which he traces in the formation of the Brazilian nation-state, thus constituted the condition of possibility for adaptation to modern socio-economic and political life, that is, to the individual requirements of modern citizenship and labour market. It effectively enables “the spirit of private initiative and competition among citizens”.¹⁷⁹

Since empire, the educational regimes battled out between the state and the church aspired to serve as a corrective means to reform standards of conduct cultivated

¹⁷⁷ Originally written as an attempt to explain Brazilians to Germans, returning to Brazil in the late 1930s, the historian proposed this text (intended as a first step in a study on Theory of America) as an intervention in Weberian-inspired inspirations of Brazilian (under)development. Cordiality, in this context, is a concept that makes reference to affinities born out of intimacy among primary groups, rather than in the sense of goodness or courteousness.

¹⁷⁸ “na medida em que possa permitir uma adoção razoável de opiniões e regras que a própria criança reconheça como formulados por adultos que tenam experiência nos termos sociais em que ela ingressa. ‘Em particular, a criança deve ser preparadas para desobedecer nos pontos em que sejam falíveis as previsões dos país’.” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 143, translation mine).

¹⁷⁹ “o espírito de iniciativa pessoal e na concorrência entre os cidadãos” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 144, translation mine).

by the familial circle, and the ensuing inconveniences for governing political and economic subjects. Sérgio, as well as Gilberto, Caio, and many interpreters of Brazilian modernity, speak to this historical process of the casting of ‘public men’¹⁸⁰ set to partake in and manage the affairs of the state, which dislocated legions of young boys from their provincial and familial milieu (to boarding schools in burgeoning city centres near and far) so as to capacitate them to “live for and by oneself”, progressively liberating them from traditional domestic ties. This particular “social personality of the student” was about “a revision, at times radical, of the interests, activities, values, sentiments, attitudes and beliefs acquired in the familial milieu”.¹⁸¹ Of course, this regeneration, of sorts, was not always enough to do away with familial affinities, a disposition nurtured by a patriarchal milieu seemingly opposed to the demands of a society of aspiringly free and equal citizens.

For those attached to the promises of the modern ideals of freedom and progress, which Sérgio ambivalently champions in his (inter)national histories of peripheral development, the *azar* (misfortune) of being colonized by the Portuguese, instead of the British, is often lamented as a rallying cry against the deficiencies of today’s Brazil. Both within academic and popular interpretations of Brazil’s (pre)modernities, there seems to be an underlying consensus that, to compound our miscegenated conditions of African and indigenous descent, the Portuguese in and of themselves are a breed of not quite Europeans – quasi-Europeans, serving as a sort of bridge to Europe – given their

¹⁸⁰ The invocation of ‘man’, here, is significant as a particular idealization of masculine subject, imagined as the point of departure for the moulding of individuals, persons, citizens, or subjects otherwise ‘formed’ to pre-determined ends.

¹⁸¹ “personalidade social do estudante”, “uma revisão, por vezes radical, dos interesses, atividade, valores, sentimentos, atitudes e crenças adquiridos no convívio da família” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 143, translation mine).

geographic and cultural connections to African and Muslim worlds, among a series of other projected inferiorizations with respect to alternative Iberian and non-Iberian visions of Europeanness. Among our guiding Trinitarians, we see different degrees of acceptance of the particularity of our fabled Iberian personalistic inheritances (from continuities to discontinuities to something plastic in between), yet what remains central to the varied navigations of Brazil's past/present/future is the definitive contrast between the Iberian and the British and later American standards of modern development (i.e. democracy and free markets), to the point that whenever there appears to be an actualization of a universalizable conduct, it is commonly said in Brazil to be *para inglês ver* ('for the English to see'). The 'cordial man', reared in *terra brasilis* by Portuguese parents – so the story goes in recognizing itself in and against an imagined Anglo-Saxon civil subject – is the embodiment of opposition (or rebellion?) to universal law, *par excellence*. This all-explaining legacy remains with us today as one of the principle points of reference in (re)thinking our prospects for development.

To deal with this apparent gap or opposition between the abstract and the personal, the universalization of education was not enough. And so the site of transformation is constantly reworked through the Brazilian dilemma of corrupted subjects of development. No doubt mass literacy (which in today's Brazil has been acknowledged to include both in Portuguese and English) has been a precondition for many types of engagement, first with the socio-economic demands of industrialization and subsequently with the technocratic demands of an American-inspired model of advanced capitalism. In the context of an imperial and later republican state-building project, the Iberian privileging of *bachelorismo* (of the intellect over practical or manual

labour) was put to select the elite to administer the civil and political mechanisms of a state in development.¹⁸² What is commonly recognized in this Iberian educational approach, transferred to Brazil alongside the nationalized Imperial Court through juridical, Catholic (Jesuitical), and *Casa-Grande* circuits, is the priority of *character formation* (i.e. *o bacharel*, the baccalaureate graduate) through some iteration of a classical humanist virtues and conduct (apparently developed through the privileging of philosophical knowledge, such as by means of rigorous translations of Latin texts containing truths about human existence, knowledge, and conduct; working with modern languages only came to be valued for its scientific and market value in developing a more endogenous (inter)national project of development in the post-republican eras). From this *bacharelismo* we end up getting what Sérgio calls “the patrimonial public servant” (*o funcionário patrimonial*) defined against the idealized “pure bureaucrat” of a Weberian demeanour.¹⁸³ In turn, the selection and formation of public men (i.e. the baccalaureate graduate), prepared to administer the machineries of a state in construction, came to be managed by the operational principle of personal confidence (of the deserving candidates), more so than in accordance with one’s proper capacities. Titles stand in as markers of confidence, following in the custom of loosely-given, non-hereditary, tutelary titles of the nobility of a new world in the making. Because of this more flexible system

¹⁸² For further discussion of this central theme to interpretations of Brazilian modernity, which is said to get at *Raízes do Brasil*, so to speak, see also Freyre’s go-to analysis of “Ascensão do Bacharel e do Mulato” (Ascension of the Baccalaureate and the Mulatto) in *Sobrados e Mucambos*, which details the role of education practices in the insertion of colonized peoples.

¹⁸³ For further contextualization of these processes of re-Europeanizations that allied colonized peoples to statist and imperial values and institutions, in contrast to so-called rural or familial traditions, see Holanda’s revisioning of Weberian interpretations of modernity in *Raízes do Brasil* (146).

of elitization and governance that blurs public from private, *bachelorismo* as a system of credentialization has been self-assuringly conceived as a means of social ascension, especially among emerging mulatto populations. As such, education, as a project of character reformation, has long served as a nodal point around which nationalist discourses of development have been mobilized. It has been the hope and deception of Brazilian (under)development, or so we have been led to believe.

In expectedly unexpected ways, fixity (and many articulations of methodical rigour or ritual) can provoke various forms of distrust, in addition to dampening the creative and prosperous potential of an Iberian spirit of adventure, as Sérgio, Roberto, and other interpreters of Brazilian modernity caution us in ways that continue to resonate today, regardless of their explanatory power. For instance, to ask ‘excuse me’ or ‘pardon me’ (*com licença*) on the streets of Brazil’s emerging world cities is a breakdown of the cordial code, while it is the epitome of the civil code – one ought to be able to negotiate a situation, physically and otherwise, in a more graceful form that does not require the explicit and formulaic articulation. Even our Catholic saints are treated with such apparent intimacy in the cordial Brazilian story, with the use of the caring diminutive of the first name (*-inho*) making them more accessible, and so too the figure of Jesus Christ himself descends into the masses at city festivals to dance, *sambar*, with the people.¹⁸⁴ Such examples of our (self)identified cordial personalism, which Sérgio offers to us to elucidate our infamous (pre)modern predicament, give life to what he refers to as a certain “fear of distance”, which appears to constitute, at least up until now, the most specific feature of the Brazilian spirit: “In Brazil it is precisely the rigour of ritual that

¹⁸⁴ See *Raízes do Brasil* for a range of examples of social rituals that illustrate such ‘cordial’ tendencies (Holanda, 148-49).

loosens and humanizes”.¹⁸⁵ Inter-personal distance obstructs the judgement of character, it is so felt, and the ensuing capacity to trust, distrust, and situate oneself with respect to others. This seemingly affective ethic, supported by cordial practices that alleviate conflict and a *bachearelismo* that constitutes a flexible yet largely predestined system of socio-economic differentiation, centres education as a credentializing system of (re)qualifying elites (via a sort of cultural capital) while affirming a myth of mobility that continues to frame education as the solution to any kind of social, economic, and political problem in today’s stagnating third world. Yet, as a common Brazilian response to codified law such as in the form of prohibitive signs, reveals – ‘Não pode, não leu aí não, quer ser preso?’ / ‘Eish, falo que sou analfabeto’ – education is an amorphous resource for self-positioning. Of course, not any body can use this *jeitinho* (quite literally, the little way) in any context; it depends on a whole set of more extensive resources. Yet the myth of the *jeitinho brasileiro* – as something that bends the rules regulating an educated citizen and universalizable conduct – is so overwhelming in defining a (pre)modern Brazil, that regardless of whether or not it accurately explains ‘what is really happening’, it must be considered for the currency that it does and does not have in orienting the proud and shameful accounts of Brazilian subjects of development.

In concluding his foundational analysis of the cordial man within the seemingly incompatible general/particular terms of reference enframed by the Creon/Antigone dilemma, Sérgio gives an account of the implications of the ambivalent cordial values in Brazilian social, economic, and political life, detailing how “this way of being is so characteristic among us that it does not disappear even in the types of activity that should

¹⁸⁵ “horror às distâncias” / “No Brasil é precisamente o rigorismo do rito que se afrouxa e se humaniza” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 149, translation mine).

normally nurture competition. A businessman from Philadelphia once expressed his amazement to André Siegfried at finding out that, in Brazil as well as Argentina, to win over a client it was necessary to make of him a friend”.¹⁸⁶ These sorts of accounts have often been mobilized to explain the Brazilian dilemma of corrupted subjects of development, long before and after the publishing of his book. Yet its publication in *Roots of Brazil* continues to lend legitimacy to such culturalist explanations of our developmental woes, to which I will next turn. Sérgio’s attempt at capturing the specificity of the Brazilian case made explicit the challenge of peripheral modernities, by seeking to analyse our realities from the inside out, as opposed to the previously dominant explanations looking from the outside in. However limiting the strategy of inversion in leaving intact the terms of the game, indeed, this powerful myth of the *amigo* (the Brazilian manifestation of an Iberian personalism) continues to capture, to this date, I would argue, what is commonly recognized to be the best and worst of the Brazilian spirit. But perhaps what Sérgio missed in his preoccupations to resignify Brazilian (under)development from the inside out is: a friend of every one is a friend of no one. That said, the common sense that is our fabled cordial openness, whether solidarious or strategic,¹⁸⁷ doubtless stands in tension with democratic institutions founded on purportedly neutral and abstract principles, as well as the forms of competition and

¹⁸⁶ “é tão característica, entre nós, essa maneira de ser, que não desaparece sequer nos tipos de atividade que devem alimentar-se normalmente da concorrência. Um negociante de Filadélfia manifestou certa vez a André Siegfried seu espanto ao verificar que, no Brasil como na Argentina, para conquistar um freguês tinha necessidade de fazer dele um amigo” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 148-49, translation mine).

¹⁸⁷ In appreciating this ambiguity, it is noteworthy that the etymological derivation of *amigo* (friend, or *amicus* in Latin) has two debatable yet interlinked meanings/sources: (i) ad + mecum = ad (denoting approximation) + mecum (with me); and (ii) “am”, referencing an approximation with *amar*, to love.

entrepreneurialism demanded by increasingly privatized capitalist enterprises.

Orphans of patrimonial society: at the limits of the educational system

Hence in the applications of a civilized life aimed at disciplining the affective life and relations of the cordial man and *amigo*, many widely circulated modern pedagogues cautioned us that, as Sérgio cites, “‘good mothers likely cause more damage than bad ones, in the most popular and generalizable sense of these terms’”.¹⁸⁸ Another way to put it, in the words of the leading abolitionist and advocate of *uma nação cidadã* (‘a citizen nation’) and a free market to supplant a regime of bondage/protection and its governing rationalities, Joaquim Nabuco, “in our politics and in our society... it is the orphans, the abandoned, who succeed, rise and rule”.¹⁸⁹ Especially revealing in an slavocratic society, where work has been denigrated and conflated with enslaved labour, the implications of a serviced conditioning, represented by the mother and its governmental projections, effectively give way to the production of incompetent masses of middle to upper classes, unable to change their own flat tires or fry their own egg, so to speak. It is noteworthy that, “Between Colony and Empire in Brazil ‘the act of work was imposed as a form of domination (over the slaves) or out of conditions of penury (over the poor). Therefore, the stimulus to work could only be repression’. What is more, etymologically the term work [*trabalho*] has its origin associated with ‘tripalium’ in Latin, an instrument used for

¹⁸⁸ “‘As boas mães causam, provavelmente, maiores estragos do que as más, na acepção mais generalizada e popular destes vocábulos’” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 143, translation mine).

¹⁸⁹ “em nossa política e em nossa sociedade... são os órfãos, os abandonados, que vencem a luta, sobem e governam” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 144, translation mine).

torture”.¹⁹⁰ At one point in Brazilian history, not that long ago, this always already serviced population did not even give themselves the work of walking on the streets with their own legs, being carried on palanquins by enslaved subjects.¹⁹¹ Even today, carrying out the basic tasks of one’s employment is often done and received as a personal favour, so much so that on the streets of Rio, the client asks, ‘how much do I owe you?’, instead of ‘how much is it?’ or ‘what do you charge?’. Echoes of an Iberian invocation of *bacharelismo* and the ever-present privileging of abstract knowledge over productive labour further entrenches this dynamic, setting up scholarly knowledge as status, through a visceral repugnance to the manual, the technical, and the practical. This inherited slavocratic notion of labour continues to play a key role in distinguishing the contemporary working class from the middle class, and accompanying tiered educational systems that (dis)qualify interdependent subject positions as if they were discrete entities. Thus, for example, how on any given day, in the homes and shops of Brazilian cities, one can hear adult men and women call out to their superiors of any kind, of any unknown educational or professional background, as ‘doctor’.

The myths of a pedagogy of prosperity, which has inspired Brazilians since the invention of Brazil, as Sérgio reminds us in tracing the (mis)placed hopes of a new world that education is the key, continually masks an overwhelming disenchantment in face of

¹⁹⁰ “Entre a Colonia e o Império no Brasil ‘o ato de trabalhar era realizado como uma imposição de dominação (aos escravos) ou da penúria (aos pobres). Por isso, o estímulo ao trabalho só podia ser a repressão’. Aliás, etimologicamente o termo trabalho tem a sua origem associada ao ‘tripalium’, em latim, um instrumento usado para tortura” (Souza Coelho, 8, translation mine).

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

our everyday conditions.¹⁹² Otherwise put, are we all to become ‘doctors’? It is not a question, I will argue, of our knowledge of our realities or those of others, but rather of our sensibility to their effects. The default response of large and prevailing segments of Brazilians across various classes – based on the hope that mass literacy will usher in first world realities of the likes of the United States, the fantasized land of opportunity – can thus project blame onto the state (or more precisely, the government as the socialized mother of us all) for failing to provide mass education. Education, transcendent of the latest developmental waves, is what will ultimately correct the ways of the cordial man of a delayed and semi-civilized modernity. Views from the outside, whether of international development workers, NGOs, IGOs, or even postcolonial theorists, further entrench this blind faith in education, strategically forgetting the historical and contemporary role of the educational system in discriminating socio-economic classes, and perhaps even more so the internal dynamics of the production of inequality – individual advances at the cost of? It is a belief that the personal defines the impersonal in some unilateral way. What this popular and academic conviction is really getting at is the hoped-for product of education, which is private initiative: that is, an educated person would take it upon themselves not only to conduct their everyday lives in civilized ways, but also to contribute to their society by building the infrastructures of a great nation. It is the formation of a particular kind of homogenizable person, or to put it more precisely, a particular kind of individuality. All problems are effectively rendered *social*. In the context of our shame of ourselves and our miscegenated biological realities as Europeans

¹⁹² Holanda proposes the term “pedagogies of prosperity” as a way to deal with inherited conditions of a Brazilian (under)development that bring about shame or disenchantment of our contemporary realities, deferring panaceas onto a re-formation of subjects of development, onto education abstractly conceived.

degraded by the tropics, or of our soft (*mole*) and delayed/slow (*atrasado*) sociability, our developmental strategy, within a social field, must come from outside in; it is a problem of (self)recognition, in need of the approval of others, that is, of external approval.

Herein lies the danger of the social. Hence the often-cited third world problem of self-esteem, rehearsed time and again in laments over Brazilian underdevelopment, or as it is more commonly referred to here, ‘the social problem’. Yet the social terrain, as Michel Foucault would remind us, needs to be understood as a style of governmental action, a particular exercise of political power that takes society, a statistically rendered population, as “the point of application of governmental interventions”. It rests on the tension between the contrasting logics of the market and the contract to set up a differentiated relationship of the subject to political power: *homo oeconomicus* as entrepreneur of himself, made possible by a civil society (that is, the formalization of society on the model of the enterprise), which mediates the relationship between the state and the individual in ways that have come to define the place and function of society in the historical traditions of liberal governmental technologies. So to understand the role of education, as an instrument to uplift the masses, it is necessary to situate it within this social context, which in the Brazilian case, serves to mediate between the infamous myth of the *mundo real* vs. *mundo legal* (real world vs. legal world).¹⁹³ Moreover, the social framing evades; it occupies the ambiguous position between the state and the market, and thus its analyses and prescriptions work with, and perpetuate, a certain presumption of impersonality (a certain kind of individual), corrupted by forces not mediated through

¹⁹³ This commonplace Brazilian expression gets at the distinction between an official iteration of reality (codified or not) and how this reality is experienced in context (its ‘reality’) – at stake is the question of propriety, of what ought to be.

one of these institutions, in the ideal, and in the practical, the *de facto* milieu of impersonality, epitomized by the American ideals of freedom, the market.

The vaunted impersonalism of modern institutions is the presumed safeguard against the corruptions of a semi-civilized political animal, rendered more predictable in the moulds of a profit-maximizing economic animal, yet both forms (for instance, whether of the Brasília-inspired redesigns or of the vocationally-oriented English language schools, of the likes explored in Part I) are manifestations of the same problem/solution of character reformation. Or to put it into the terms of the classroom, education is as much about the teacher as it is about the student.¹⁹⁴ More than a unilateral dissemination of values or propaganda of desired conduct, it legitimates impersonal capital as personal in ways that place people in their respective seats in relation to the governing institutions of modernity. Be it via the state (as privileged in Weberian-haunted narratives of modernization), the nation (as so often revindicated in third world movements), the market or society, broadly envisioned, the citizen, entrepreneur of her/himself, rehearses a sociability that mediates the institutions of modernity, especially in the case of Brazil, where, the way to fix the *atraso* of a cordial modernity in the tropics, as is imagined by itself and others, is through certain kinds of individualities, personalities, and subject positions conceived, at large, for (im)personal modes of governance. Yet to what ends?

Aside from the fact that there are many ‘more progressive’ countries, so to speak, that surpass the fantasized United States in statistical terms of educational literacy and so forth, what this distracted faith in education also forgets is the matter of functional

¹⁹⁴ For an incisive elaboration of these dynamics, refer to Sanjay Seth’s *Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India*.

illiteracy, as Sérgio himself warns us in his examinations of the educating of the cordial man: “It should be added that, even independently of this ideal of culture, mass literacy in and of itself does not constitute an unparalleled benefit. Unaccompanied by other basic elements of education, which complete it, it is comparable, in certain cases, to a gun placed in the hands of the blind ”.¹⁹⁵

In the context of blaming the state for the failure to provide mass education of quality to put in check poor familial training, and the consequent failure to address the social question, a whole parallel business of education has been emerging since before Sérgio was even writing about Brazil’s modernization in the hopes and shadows of the post-1930s democratization processes of the New State. Since its gradual and disintegrated inception, its aims have unanimously been to fill the gaps between the apparent *mundo real* and *mundo legal*, a legacy of slavery and *bacharelismo* that values the intellectual over the practical. From industrial training to preparation for public office to remedial programs for the poor, this modality of education, from empire onward, has worked through “institutions that have not required prior knowledge, have prepared for the practice of a craft, were designed for children of the poor or humble orphans and did not articulate itself with the educational system, seen as unnecessary for the exercise of the craft”.¹⁹⁶ Today, beyond the complementary and assistentialist, it has become the *de*

¹⁹⁵ “Cabe acrescentar que, mesmo independentemente desse ideal de cultura, a simples alfabetização em massa não constitui talvez um benefício sem-par. Desacompanhada e outros elementos fundamentais da educação, que a completem, é comparável, em certos casos, a uma arma de fogo posta nas mãos de um cego” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 166, translation mine).

¹⁹⁶ Refer to Souza Coelho’s historical study on the evolution of professional education practices, between the state and civil society for further contextualization: “Tratava-se, em essência, de instituições que não exigiam conhecimentos prévios, formavam para a prática de um ofício, eram destinadas aos filhos dos pobres ou órfãos humildes e não se

facto foundation of nearly every facet of social, economic, political, and personal life of the Brazilian citizen-in-training. Marketed primarily as a means of professionalization, this form of education is squarely situated within the social camp, whose content is largely unregulated by the Ministry of Education. It is about the development of cultural aptitudes and resources, a kind of social as opposed to intellectual character formation, one could say, that gives access to varied socio-economic contexts. Yet instead of through a coherent and integrated title, of the trusted baccalaureate, it produces individuals with a multiplicity of collected certifications, an assortment of titled personal competencies.

In the form of *Cursos Livres* ('free-standing courses'), which make up multi-year programs for language proficiency among other generic skills as much as quick and direct preparation for other qualifying courses and examinations, this certifiable educational modality has become the standard for the development of the necessary aptitudes for a productive life for the lower to upper middle classes. It plays the double role of developing and evaluating these aptitudes, as per the qualifying logic of public tender examinations (*lógica de concurso*), and as such it becomes an idealized means to check the threat of personalisms and seek neutrality in the qualifications of productive citizens. For those who fall through the cracks of public education, most crucially, it serves as a potential means of social ascension; for those more established within the middle class, it has become the invisible prerequisite for their private schooling, presumed by students and teachers alike in the carrying out of everyday classes and programs. The legal classification of 'free-standing' course does not require prior

articulavam ao sistema educacional, visto como desnecessário para o ofício" (9, translation mine).

knowledge or experience, nor the broader contexts provided within the more traditional approaches to the art of a craft (*arte do ofício*). Indeed, it is the ultimate realization of Sérgio's "gun placed in the hands of the blind". The decentralization of the educational field in Brazil (into public and private mainstream systems) as a form of unifying a national system under the pretence of universal access (in the spirit of *to each his own*), played a crucial role in the democratization projects of the New State at the beginning of the last century, and has since been continually reaffirmed by the latest national educational reforms (1996) that sanction the somewhat out-of-place certifiability of professional education. Between the state and civil society, these free-standing courses parallel the mainstream educational system:

professional (or vocational) education at a basic level – independent of prior schooling and technical level – concurrent or sequential to secondary education and to technological formation – are geared toward higher level technical education. The LDB [Law of Directives and Bases that sets guidelines for the organization of the Brazilian educational system], when addressing professional education in its Chapter III, articles 39 to 42, conceives 'professional education integrated with the different forms of education, work and technology' (extension), leading 'to the ongoing development of skills for a productive life' (design) to be 'developed in conjunction with regular education or different strategies for continuous education in specialized institutions or in the workplace' (provision), for the prospect of the full exercise of citizenship.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ "educação profissional de nível básico - independente de escolaridade prévia, de nível técnico - concomitante ou sequencial ao ensino médio, e de nível tecnológico – é voltada para a formação de tecnólogos de nível superior. A LDB, quando trata da educação profissional em seu Capítulo III, artigos 39 a 42, concebe 'a educação profissional integrada às diferentes formas de educação, ao trabalho e a tecnologia' (extensão), conduzindo 'ao permanente desenvolvimento de aptidões para a vida produtiva' (concepção), a ser 'desenvolvida em articulação com o ensino regular ou por diferentes estratégias de educação continuada, em instituições especializadas ou no ambiente de trabalho' (provisão), na perspectiva do exercício pleno da cidadania" (Souza Coelho, 7, translation mine).

This approach to professional education marks a transition from *the art of a craft* to *the productive citizen*.¹⁹⁸ It reposes the relationship between education and work, and the (dis)continuous role that education plays in providing the (pre)requisites of the modern competitive national and international market, as well as questions of self-esteem and social recognition that legitimate privileged points of access to practices of citizenship. To study the production of the administrative elite (and their privileged means and resources), that is, the Brazilian middle classes, is to study an obscured and often subtle form of domination specific to modern society.

In sum, what is really being called for when education is invoked as the solution to the development dilemma is private initiative. As with most panaceas and their secret origin stories, Sérgio cautions their preachers, if on the one hand they seem to reveal a certain “vice of reasoning”, on the other hand they serve to conceal others that we are unable to face.¹⁹⁹ So how do the orphans succeed in a patrimonial society? What is the secret to success, to progress? At stake is a specific kind of adherence to an individualistic ideology – something that discourses of corruption or patrimonialism simply do not get at. It is a particular formation of an individual, capable of socio-economic mobility yet fixed into a homogenizing mould, characterized by a set of disintegrated capacities of an entrepreneurial citizen-subject. It is about a certain will to succeed (*vencer*). Hence one of the underlying reasons why self-esteem emerges time and again as a crucial educational and public policy issue for social development, by

¹⁹⁸ For further contextualization of this process in Brazilian educational and administrative history, see Souza Coelho’s here cited (6).

¹⁹⁹ See Holanda’s elaboration of “pedagogies of prosperity” for further engagement with the “paradoxical” tensions within projects of reform aimed at cordial subjects of Brazilian dilemmas of modernity (*Raízes do Brasil*, 166).

national governments and business as much as by postcolonial critics. The problem is social, not racial, biological, economic, or what have you. In fact, the problem is psychosocial. It is about moulding a certain personality and conduct, a certain way of doing things and living, perhaps more so than the aspired principles to which they are supposedly oriented. What is needed, according to this myth of education as panacea, is a pedagogy of prosperity, in the spirit of the intellectualist traditions to which Sérgio's nationalizing project responds, entrusted to mould the productive-citizen.

The orphan supplies us with a certain idealization of a blank slate, not yet polluted by familial values, on which can be inscribed such abstract civic principles and a drive (a necessity?) to make it on one's own – either adopted by the state, if such a coherent pedagogical project is implemented (as in the case of the juridical schools of the imperial and republican states that removed children from their homes to train them to become public men, or even in the case of the hoped-for children of Brasília, as discussed in Part I), or, as is more commonly lamented today, by the failure of the state, which in turn brings about the need to *se virar* (get by). The figure of the orphan, the inverse or negation of a Brazilian valorization of family, is imagined to be able to think in terms of abstract interests, and, as such, access an untainted bigger picture. We can thus project onto this uncorrupted body a coldness that we, of our Iberian and tropical milieu, are supposedly incapable of conforming to. One myth responding to another. Although proud/ashamed of this warm sensibility, the orphan, ironically, ends up serving the same function as the paternal figure, in making things happen *for us*, discerning what is best for us from the top down (even if in a more seemingly fraternal way). It is, after all, its instrumental flipside: a child. Whether or not the orphan is supposed to lead us

underdeveloped Brazilians to a new morality and prosperity, which empowers each of us, by example or intervention, to live in such a way, remains an open question. At any rate, many popular discourses of an emerging underdeveloped Brazil gesture at this possibility of going beyond the mobilization of these pure figures as leaders and of orphaning our own selves from our patrimonial colonial and statist affiliations in order for each of us to become entrepreneurs in our own right, of our own reality, of our own (self)development. The citizen-subject of development, subject to these experimentations and reformulations, is deposited with the hope, to organize and manage the enterprise of development, that the failed state betrayed.

Yet the orphan symbolizes to us the possibilities of freedom as much as those of abandonment. In the spirit of the great architect of the general will, of a Rousseuian romance with the boundless possibilities of the imagined pre-statist state of nature, we are condemned to be free. Whether in the separation from tradition and domestic communities to exercise our individuality or in the neglect of all who do not invest in themselves to actualize social mobility, the extreme valorization of knowledge, the attribute of progress, be it classical or scientific, at the same time glorifies the upwardly mobile while abandoning the rest. The peculiarity of its Brazilian manifestations resides within the synchronicity of national myths of populism alongside the enduring prejudice against the popular that remains to this day. The widespread lament over the neglect of education as perpetuating third world problems, opening up the quasi-anarchical space of ‘every man for himself’, defers this very same attitude as the outcome of the education system, capacitating people to invest in themselves, and through their personal resources succeed. The educational system is, after all, preparing us for the social, political, and

economic systems already in place out there, so to speak. The freedom of the abandoned, of a sort of feared state of nature, occurs either way, within the educational system or outside it, in its failings. The difference is that within it those who did not previously have ‘perspective for life’ or ‘prospect for the future’ (*perspectiva para vida*) now do have this expectation, for better or worse. They believe, or are told to believe in the belief that education is the only way out, be it of poor, rural, or otherwise undesired conditions or communities.

The flip side of mobility is not fixity (a physiological and philosophical impossibility in a world of impermanence), but abandonment. As in the inspiring quasi-tragic tale of *Central do Brasil* (which garnered extraordinary attention at home and abroad during one of Brazil’s latest redemocratization quests for national identity), the boy who leaves the city for the forgotten interior in search of the father, the nation in search of its roots, with the assistance of a socialized mother (the former government social worker) finds instead his brothers.²⁰⁰ Neither does he devour or kill his father in the *saudade* for an imagined integrated identity (of the person and of the nation). Instead, he leaves the former capital (Rio) and sets up home (in the subsidized habitational complexes of the barren interior) alongside one cynical and one optimistic brother, and we are forever left to wonder what will come of our little boy, of our *brasil-menino* (Brazil-child).

In the face of the absent father – a sociological accuracy of the historical and contemporary Brazil of many (whether we are thinking about the violent practices of miscegenation of slave masters or about the crushing conditions of poverty that split up

²⁰⁰ Refer to *Central Station* 1998 film adaptation, directed by Walter Salles.

families today, geographically or otherwise, that seek to alleviate the desperate conditions of many urban and rural corners of Brazil) – the patrimonial does not make as much sense as it may initially seem: as “In *Central do Brasil*, the so-called ‘delayed’ Brazil (*atraso*) would have a lesson to teach to the ‘false’ modern Brazil”.²⁰¹ In tension with an anthropophagic interpretation that fills with hope the (re)creations of a *brasil-menino* coming into its own right, we find ourselves in what Joaquim the abolitionist observed in transitions to a citizen nation and free market more than a century ago: the dynamic decays of neocracy.²⁰² That is, what he observes, with hope, as the old giving way to the young, tradition giving way to modernity, and an unstable authority that calls into being an entrepreneur of oneself as basis of a developmental plan to action. It is the power of the new, of progress over order. It is an emptying out of the past and arguably present for an imagined future. Or so we are told. Is the orphan forever locked in the body of the child, condemned to a perpetual lack of protective affiliation and stronghold? Is the orphan always coming into one’s own decisions and futures without exogenous distractions or pressures, in ways that children are generally imagined to be undisciplined and the New World a *terra nullius* full of possibilities to reinvent oneself?²⁰³

²⁰¹ For a critical re-reading of *Central Station*’s narratives of nation-building within the context of new Brazilian cinema, see Lippi Oliveira’s analysis of the film in a discussion of “Ordem e Progresso em Gilberto Freyre” (Order and Progress in Gilberto Freyre): “Em Central do Brasil, o chamado Brasil ‘atrasado’ teria uma lição a ensinar ao ‘falso’ Brasil moderno” (12, translation mine).

²⁰² Refer to Freyre’s *Sobrados e Mucambos* for a helpful analysis of this Nabucian malady, expressive of a nation in transition of an Independent spirit (88).

²⁰³ For a provocative analysis of the symbol and function of the child in historical context, see Fass’ *Reinventing Childhood after World War II*, which brings our attention to how liberal notions of freedom and autonomy, epitomized by the figure of the child (notably in a North American ‘new world’ of opportunities, post-WWII), belie the disciplinary and pedagogical structures at work since schooling became the predominant pathway to success modern societies.

The orphan fills us with hope and despair at one and the same time. And as such, it reveals the limits of both personalism and individualism as orienting standards by which to judge Brazil's *atraso*, that is, by which to explain the possible delays and advances of a patrimonial Brazil and the corresponding role of state or social protection therein. Joaquim the abolitionist had a dream, which he cited from the author of Brazil's first national anthem to independence – the dream that Brazilians keep dreaming, the dream dreamt from empire onward of a Brazilian Brazil (*meu brasil brasileiro*), the Brazilian Dream, if you will allow the momentary North/South parallel – that we continue to romantically invoke today and pithily captures these ambiguities embodied by our orphan:

A respected fatherland (*patria*), not so much by the greatness of its territory, as the union of their children; not so much by the laws and codes, as the commitment to honesty and justice of its government; not so much by the institutions of this or that mould, as the real proof of what these institutions benefit, or, at least, do not go against in terms of the freedom and development of the nation.²⁰⁴

And to whom do we charge this task of forging ahead the development of this great nation? To the children, of course; orphaned or not, it is always bestowed to the children of tomorrow, the possible futures in which we invest our hopes for what seems impossible today. The children, imagined in the free and abandoned figures of the orphan, are to charge our way ahead to unknown territory, and become the entrepreneurs of our future. Our *brasil-menino*. By displacing our problems to the past and declaring it

²⁰⁴ Nabuco opens *Que é o Abolicionismo?* (What is Abolitionism?) with this passage and ode to Evaristo Ferreira da Veiga, poet of Brazil's Anthem to Independence (1822), which orients his entire work and serves as a recurrent point of judgement in his arguments for the end of slavery: “Uma pátria respeitada, não tanto pela grandeza do seu território como pela união dos seus filhos; não tanto pelas leis e escritas, como pela convicção de honestidade e justiça do seu governo; não tanto pelas instituições deste ou daquele molde, como pela prova real de que essas instituições favorecem, ou, quando menos, não contrariam a liberdade e desenvolvimento da nação” (9, translation mine).

dead (i.e. neocracy), we defer what can be onto the symbol of the future, the child, harbouring the unrealized promises (of a better future) as well as the feared risks (of a child-subject not yet civilized). As the child holds out as the site of production of normal and desirable citizens (successfully as docile bodies of a middle class at home and at school or failed as the *moleque* of the streets), so too the Brazil of the Brazilian Dream forever holds out as a land of the future, in terms of maturation as well as prophecy. Both the problem of historical and psychosocial development are weaved together through faith in progress, best exemplified by an entrepreneurial spirit, something (of the) beyond. And more precisely, in the interim, in artificial abandonment, we are forced to *se virar* (get by).

So in facing the prospects of *brasil-menino*, we are not dealing with a question of auto-mobility through hard work, which was the now-disillusioned belief of the first generation of precarious workers who built favelas in and around major Brazilian centres, room by room adding to their makeshift homes as conditions permitted – a belief that in relying on one’s own effort it would be possible to improve one’s living conditions, even if only in parallel worlds of informal, peripheral, non-state-recognized, out of the way places.²⁰⁵ It is a question of self-mobility through character reformation. That is, it is not about an internal force or dynamic (*auto*), but a certain positioning outward of one’s packaged and certified *self*, by obtaining the resources and perhaps even more tryingly the attitudes, dispositions, styles, tastes, and distinctions that enable one to move through social settings to one’s advantage. Hence the confounded debate about the ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ Brazilian middle classes (i.e. Lula’s Class C of forty million), whose

²⁰⁵ For a grounded study of these dynamics of auto-construction in Brazilian cities, see Caldeira’s *City of Walls*.

ascension has been largely based on and confined to increased consumption practices rather than a more integrated participation within the socio-economic structures of a Brazilian middle class. Hence the *rolezinhos*, the politicized acts of emerging classes to occupy shopping malls and purchase esteemed brands so as to gain social *visibility* above all else.²⁰⁶ The ideal citizen-subject of development knows how to sell oneself so as to move out and up in the world and to prove its worth and status as a developed citizen of a developed milieu, with the dream of one day no longer needing the proof.

Of course it is important, especially amidst the self-deprecatory conventions of a third world, for people to identify, affirm, and act from a place of self-worth. The interventions of critical pedagogical praxis in the spirit of Paulo Freire doubtless have a vital role in educational practices aimed at empowering individuals to change themselves and their worlds.²⁰⁷ And, this therapeutic belief cannot form the predominant basis for analyzing and responding to the development problems of a third world. However inspirational to individuals, this overwhelming discourse that tells aspiring citizen-subjects of development what they are capable of if only they invest in themselves through education, restricts the terms of debate, both popular and academic, to the actions and intentions of individuals who believe themselves to be free, to be orphans capable of rising above the abject spaces of their third world fatherland²⁰⁸. It furthermore leaves those who do not make it in the dark about how this is so, and those who do similarly ignorant to the conditions of possibility of their ascension and the costs and failed

²⁰⁶ Refer to seventh vignette in the concluding Part III of this dissertation for an engagement with the *rolezinho* movements.

²⁰⁷ See Paulo Freire's *Pedagogia do Oprimido* (Pedagogy of the Oppressed) for approaches to transforming people and their institutions through educational praxis.

²⁰⁸ Refer to the examples of Eike Batista and Carlos Wizard Martins in Part I of this dissertation for personifications of such transcendence (102-04).

ascension of others. For the believers (as indeed, all that we are left with is faith), we must become our own heroes, forging our own ways through, relying only on ourselves, and allying exclusively with those whom we deem to be on the side of good over evil.

The productive citizen: miracles of a peripheral economy

Whether we are to await the coming of our orphaned leaders or to incorporate the freedom of abandonment within each of us, the futures of our patrimonial past are recrafted by something (or someone?) that does not belong to us, by something inauthentic. Ours is a second-class entrepreneur. The widespread image of the Brazilian subject – whether through discourses of miscegenation and hybridity or poverty and resilience – is of *creativity*. However, as is common knowledge in the corridors of Brazil’s business schools as much as on the pages of management and administration analysis at *The Economist* and its local counterparts, Brazil is a creative rather than innovative country. It conceives and improvises, it does not implement and formalize. It does not entrepreneur. It gets by (*se vira*), or so we learn to believe. Beyond revealing a certain informal economic dynamic, recent research on Brazilian entrepreneurialism speaks to the outward precarity (and increasing precarization) of the Brazilian labour market that pushes individuals toward, what is often reconsidered to be, “self-employment disguised as entrepreneurship”.²⁰⁹ Since 2000, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor has ranked Brazil between first and seventh place in a ranking of thirty-seven powerhouses in terms of indices of entrepreneurialism.²¹⁰ So what makes of Brazil an

²⁰⁹ “o auto-emprego travestido de empreendedorismo” (Costa Lemos, 83, translation mine)

²¹⁰ Refer to their “Empreendedorismo no Brasil” (Entrepreneurship in Brazil) report, and Costa Lemos’ analyses here cited.

entrepreneurial people, in the reflection of these indicators? Certainly the main themes circling popular and academic debates about what makes Brazil, Brazil (i.e. paternalism, passivity, patrimonialism, dependence) do not offer any obvious explanations for the rise of self-owned businesses and overall upsurge in Brazilian entrepreneurialism over the last decade, credited with paving the way to our final emergence.²¹¹ As Ana Heloísa da Costa Lemos identifies in her anthropological inquiry into “Entrepreneurship in Brazil: an activity without ‘spirit’”, interpretations of Brazilian modernity continue to be haunted by Weberian evolutionary classifications of what counts as advanced/delayed or modern/traditional, with the paradigmatic measure of democracy and free markets being the idealized United States. As helpful as these sociological interventions that sought to release us from racial or biological explanations of the way things are and have been, in mobilizing such an oppositional contrast with the Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethic as a point of access to the modern capitalist and democratic system, it may help to explain why Brazilians tend to hold a negative image of entrepreneurial activities (in terms of Catholic and Iberian devalorizations of work, profit, and so forth), but it does not help us to explain how we do entrepreneurialism, how we build trusting networks and partnered projects, and how individuals are formed and reformed strategically to certain socio-economic and political ends. That is, how the street vendor who began to sell dental floss with his corn-on-the-cob was nominated as Rio’s entrepreneur of the year alongside the billionaires on TV whom we love to hate giving us advice on how to be as successful as the corn vendor in expanding our ventures and profit margins.

²¹¹ See Costa Lemos helpful mapping of the current literature and debate on the subject, notably with respect to its Weberian hauntings.

However much celebrated figures such as Baron Mauá²¹², the entrepreneur of the Empire and ‘pioneer’ of our processes of industrialization, have been posthumously honoured for their transitional role in bringing about the competitive market, salaried labour force, and technological applications advocated by the abolitionist movements for the modernization of Brazil’s socio-economic systems, they continue to be fixed within popular and academic discourses as exceptions to the norm. Exceptions not too unlike Wizard’s rags-to-riches story, as elaborated in Part I, whose honouring ends up praising more of a Britishness/Americanness than a Brazilianness to their actions and intentions, despite the crest on the passport. Ex-ceptions in the sense of incorporating more from the outside than from the inside. Entrepreneurs in the Brazilian imaginary end up playing the role of anti-heroes – distrusted, in the ways that population’s confidence in Mauá, patron of the Brazilian entrepreneur, decreased in direct proportion with the increase of his profits. And entrepreneurialism by necessity (self-employment rather than calculated and technical exploitation of possible business opportunities) is not deemed to be a real entrepreneurialism. The great advances and mega-infrastructure undertakings of Brazilian developmentalist projects have tended to come from military regimes of dictatorship, and the ‘miracles’ that they have engendered, or at the very least in the grand governmental reorderings, top-down, of the likes of Brasília’s 50 years in 5 plan, among other mega-development infrastructures notably of the post-World War II era.²¹³

²¹² For a biographical and historical study on the “patron saint of Brazilian entrepreneurs”, see Caldeira’s *Mauá – Empresário do Império* (Mauá – The Entrepreneur of the Empire), which documents the Baron’s (dis)engagement from the structures of a slavocratic society that has been acknowledged as giving way to economic liberalization in Brazil.

²¹³ In the former imperial capital, of Rio, it is noteworthy that in the ongoing decommerations of the last military coup of 1964, heated debates about whether or not to

Dependent on miracles, our take-off must be constantly subject to reassessments of whether we are really taking off or not, oscillating between optimistic and pessimistic accounts, as if development were a question of faith:²¹⁴



Figure 13: Within the span of four years (2009-2013), economic analysts changed the tone on Brazil's potential for take-off.

Brazil's take-offs are submitted to an incessant reading of the stars. Miraculous, they are not processual: they just happen. Has it happened yet? As Sérgio explains in his navigations of our Iberian inheritances, here “the adventurer” is the leader who has been valorized for her/his contributions to national development (i.e. *o bandeirante*, as explored in Part I) as opposed to “the worker”: it is the desire “to reap the fruit without

rename the bridge that connects the Bay (once the largest in the world, currently named after President Costa e Silva of the military regime), for instance, reveal the ever-ambivalent relationship Brazilians have in trading order for progress, and progress for order.

²¹⁴ Refer to the articles that accompany these frontispieces of *The Economist* (2009/2013) for an illustration of these continually oscillating accounts of Brazil's successes, failures, and potentials.

planting the tree”.²¹⁵ The Portuguese colonial quest for wealth, within which work was charged to slaves, together with the socializing impact of *bacharelismo* in indignifying the practical, stands out against the worker who “first sees the obstacle to overcome, not the triumph to achieve”, according to Sérgio’s widely adopted explanation of the Brazilian *atraso* within the march toward an efficiently organized Weberian modernity.²¹⁶ So how do we self-styled adventurers of cordial breed succeed and effectively create the conditions for socio-economic advancement in the tropics? To understand the subject positions available in an emerging underdeveloped Brazil, it is vital to account for the particular constructions of the citizen and the labour within historical context, and it is to these (re)formations that I will now pause to reconsider. Here it is helpful to recall Ana Heloísa’s caveat to resist broaching Brazilian entrepreneurship as something that has not been (in contrast to a North American style entrepreneurialism), but as something that is, with all of its particularities and limitations: “if Weber is limiting in helping us to understand our entrepreneurial culture, Marx is the death sentence for any attempt to appreciate this culture”.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ “colher o fruto sem plantara arvore” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 44, translation mine).

²¹⁶ “enxerga primeiro a dificuldade a vencer, não o triunfo a alcançar” (Holanda, *Raízes do Brasil*, 44, translation mine).

²¹⁷ “Se Weber é limitado para entender a nossa cultura empreendedor, Marx é a sentença de morte para qualquer tentativa valorizar essa cultura” (Costa Lemos, 97, translation mine). Notwithstanding, Marxian analytical traditions continue to supply an array of critical tools for critics of Brazilian (under)development. Although Caio Prado Júnior’s leading the way to a more historicized and nationalized account of the economic exploitation of Brazil challenges many stagiest and reductionist leanings of some Marxian-inspired analyses, the terms of our ‘dilemma’ remain caught within nationalist and internationalist economicist conceptions of centres/peripheries that are not often helpful in rethinking the possibilities for a politics of transformation in and through peripheries of undefinable centres.

In her ground-breaking attempt to understand *O Homem Livre na Ordem Escravocrata* (Free men in the slavocratic order), Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco reminds us that the singularity of Brazilian modernization processes is marked by an “absent presence” of the form and function of the slave. Grappling with interpretations of Brazilian modernity (with many of the Greats, including Sérgio and Florestan Fernandes, sitting on the supervisory committee for this 1964 dissertation), she warns us against the dangers of the slavery-feudalism-capitalism schematic, which sets a sort of *tabula rasa* as the starting point from which to modernize Brazil. Facing the foundational divide between the countryfolk (*caipira*) and the civilized (urbane) that defined modernization (notably as manifested through/as urbanization), she traces the coevality between the traditional and the modern in theories of underdevelopment. In grounds far from outcast, she encounters the duality of territorialist discourses of (inter)national development head on, and the dominant notion of rural servilism that remains a key concept in analysing underdevelopment today and is at the base of modernizing politics more broadly. She gets us to think about how slave labour and capitalist enterprise have made up parts to the same system, set up to generate profits in international markets, and as such gives form to a particular set of costumes, affairs, lifestyles, and social differentiation that continue to mark a stratification between people juridically equal, from the colonial farm onward. Taking on visions of a living past, she forces us to reconsider the popular and sociological presumption that slavery (and not capitalism) is the generative cause of Brazil’s *atraso* and violence. The presumed incompatibility of these two systems leads us to believe that whatever transformation away from a slave-based system would necessarily have to pass, dialectically, through the

bourgeoisie, the subversive agent of the previous stage, making way for articulations of citizenship based on an abstracted European experience of class and slave labour.

Maria Sylvia's revisioning of the classics in Brazilian social and political thought takes us one step beyond a doubled consciousness of ideas out of place in the periphery, into a constitutive ambiguity of a contradictory whole, of a peripheral singularity, of a place beyond the (in)authentic.²¹⁸ In this sense, we can begin to let go of the (de)centralizing effects of the narratives of Brazil's *atraso* as measured against Weber's ghosts, seeing the dissonances between nation and modernity, the public and private within statist vocabularies as misleading markers of interpretations of Brazilian modernity. The mythical Iberian pathway that our forefathers are said to have trailed for us, against the (dis)enchantments of an Anglo-Saxon universe, has been the central category for understanding Brazilian modernity and ensuing underdevelopments – not simply as objects of a historiography of ideas, but as modes of articulating the relationship between state and society, risking the constant reproduction of the colonial, or more accurately, colonizing matrix, by placing Brazilian history as a simple derivation of the history of Portugal and Spain, through culturalist arguments about national identity that set up particularist difference against universal standards. And here we find the basis of the national 'shame' of the *atraso*, coming full circle as one of the most powerful limits on the capacity of Brazilian modernization in the hearts of frustrated subjects of development.

²¹⁸ In this methodological spirit, Carvalho Franco's study of the historical formation of modern Brazilian society serves as an antidote to the more well-worn critiques of the likes of DaMatta's doubled consciousness of the modern and the traditional, as well as Schwarz's "out-of-place ideas", as explored in Part I of this dissertation.

Between ancient and modern slavery, Maria Sylvia highlights how salaried labour has constituted the modern world by means of its opposite, slave labour, qualified as an “institution subject to other determinations that has imprinted its meaning”.²¹⁹ It thus becomes possible to conceive a mode of production from the presence of the slave that is not logically or historically anterior to capitalism – the basic presumption of various stagiest theories of development, notably of the Marxian-Weberian tradition. A mode of production within the analytical matrices of a political economy based on free labour, of a modern science of governing. Beyond the provision of a contingent labour force that accelerated and deepened capitalist development throughout Brazil, the slavocratic constituted “a contradictory unit” more so than “an integrated duality”.²²⁰ The modern *latifúndio* can thus be understood as a synthesis, incorporating the direct production of livelihoods together with commodity production. Consequently, even within post-abolition regimes of salaried labour, what we get is “a formation, *sui generis*, of free and dispossessed men, who were not integrated into commodity production – deprived of ownership over the means of production, but not of its possession”.²²¹ Otherwise put, men “in actuality dispensable”: “The purpose for which Brazilian society was primarily targeted has determined, in its entirety, its organization. Although poor, free men remained alienated from market-oriented modes of production, this industry placed them

²¹⁹ “instituição submetida a outras determinações que lhe imprimiram seu sentido” (Carvalho Franco, 13, translation mine).

²²⁰ “uma unidade contraditório” / “uma dualidade integrada” (Carvalho Franco, 11, translation mine).

²²¹ “uma formação *sui generis* de homens livres e expropriados, que não foram integrados à produção mercantil - destituídos de propriedade dos meios de produção, mas não de sua posse” (Carvalho Franco, 14, translation mine).

in the social structure and defined its destiny”.²²² In contrast to the popular and sociological dualistic thesis of “marginal populations” (or “archaic survivals”) either as obstacles to modern capitalist development or as spaces functional of or complementary to it, the implications of a *sui generis* formation demand that we consider the production of citizens and the production of labourers concomitantly in terms of their specific roles within the system in which they are situated, rather than through a *post facto* assessment of modern and premodern projects and modes and development. To recognize how the *latifúndio* is neither “internally feudal” nor “externally capitalist” is to recognize how different social forms of supposedly different eras coexist. Within this paradox, as Maria Sylvia cautions us, we find the possibilities of conceiving, beyond dualistic terms, the so-called *atraso* as no longer an obstacle, but as a functional stimulator of the ‘modern’.

By considering two seemingly incompatible principles regulating economic activity (the direct production of livelihoods and the production of commodities) as a contradictory unity, it becomes possible to rethink the problem of citizenship that delineates the contours of any developmental project in a Brazilian context. It is the creation of parallel, marginal, informal worlds that we continue to deal with today through expropriated and poorly integrated “free men” (as a class of *ralé* without access to the formal means of proletarianization, dissociated from basic social mechanisms while localized exclusively in a social rather than economic sphere), which requires explanations beyond the technical or progressivist. And herein we come up against the limits of a Weberian explanation that gives life to so many interpretations of Brazilian

²²² “O objetivo para o qual esteve basicamente orientada a sociedade brasileira determinou, de ponta a ponta, sua organização. Embora os homens livres e pobres tenham permanecido apartados da produção para mercado, este setor localizou-os na estrutura social e definiu o seu destino” (Carvalho Franco, 15, translation mine).

modernity (as we see through Sérgio's worker vs. adventurer, among other iterations of the civility/cordiality opposition that situates Brazil's modernization dilemma in the oppositional field of statist order vs. familial circle), which conflate the rational with the efficient and distracts us from the forms of effective production that exceed dualistic demarcations of public and private while achieving their stated aims and objectives: beyond mere subsistence or status, the criterion of producing profit.²²³ In brief, the problem is a certain incapacity to deal with the formal and the informal as and within a singular whole. Always already oscillating between official authority and personal influence, Maria Sylvia proposes that we consider how modernity did not simply establish itself, among us in Brazil, by means of a clash with archaic agrarian structures bound to imperialism, toward more rational and efficient means of socio-economic production, as so many developmentalist theories presume. Within the context of a latifundian system (i.e. the amalgam of the household and the firm), we did not witness a simple transition from a patrimonial subject (of a type of inheritance of the state) to a liberal subject (of the type driven by rational economic interests). This dualistic perspective, echoing Sérgio's Weberian distinction between an ethos of the worker opposed to that of the adventurer, neglects the different rhythms of work and organization of production that make up varied place-specific adaptations to natural conditions among other relational adjustments specific to the *caipira* or civilized. Maria Sylvia reminds us that,

Sociologically, the concept of tradition would be of little interest if taken only in the vague sense of transmission, by means of intergenerational contact, of the

²²³ For further contextualization of how agricultural production and exploitation were structured 'rationally' to predetermined ends, refer to the conclusion, especially, of Carvalho Franco's groundbreaking study (243).

elements of life. What differentiates tradition from custom, usage and habit, and makes it that it can constitute itself as a fundamental regulatory principle of behaviour in certain types of social organization, is that it implicates a value judgement about the element being transmitted, in the belief of its sacred and unyielding character.²²⁴

Within this context, when the unifying code of conduct fails to crystallize or is weakened by mobilities, be they urban or (inter)national, we see the creation of parallel worlds, the individualization of poverty, and the internally legitimated use of violence within a certain moral economy. Given that processes of establishing a bourgeoisie and proletariat did not occur in any formal sense in the tropics, the dynamics of a slave-based industrialization mode and work ethic have meant that the formal moralities of a public as opposed to private sphere do not well explain processes of modernization in relation to the formation of the subject, the marginal, and the framework within which we can understand relations of domination. It also makes it rather short-sighted to separate citizen from labourer, and their accompanying codes of conduct. In a place where to be 'humble' is to be poor and to be 'marginal' or 'ordinary' (as go the commonly used insults across classes in Brazil) is to break with a particularly defined ethical code, it is helpful to remember that the invention of rich and poor was only made possible, as a modern organizing principle, by the particular processes of urbanization in Brazil. As opposed to the rigid hierarchies of a feudal system never fully implemented in the New World, a certain constant dynamic of accommodation and antagonism (of the likes of the

²²⁴ “Sociologicamente, o conceito de tradição seria de pouco interesse se tomado apenas no sentido impreciso de transmissão, mediante o contacto entre gerações, de elementos da vida. O que diferencia a tradição do costume, do uso e do hábito, e faz com que possa se constituir como um princípio essencial de regulamentação do comportamento em certos tipos de organização social, é que implica um julgamento de valor sobre o elemento transmitido, na crença seu caráter sagrado e inquebrantável” (Carvalho Franco, 61, translation mine).

the Big House and the Slave Quarters) gave way to non-proletariatized, auto-constructive, flexible and mobile legions of ‘marginal’ workers, not easily explainable within a purely economic rendering of class or a purely political rendering of citizenship. To reiterate an important reorientation (from the conclusion of Part I), inequality, rather than poverty, is a more helpful point of departure for thinking about the problems of development, even if it is not the most helpful for rethinking its resolutions.

Beyond assembling Weber for a functionalist or Marx for a teleological reduction of progress (the two decisive reference points of her work and of interpretations of Brazilian modernity, more broadly), Maria Sylvia considers farmers, slaves, among other figures of seemingly rural economies as bearers of economic categories, rather than creating nostalgic or romantic images of the affairs, lifestyles, ascensions, and declines of a rural community against which to define the urban world of capitalism. Facing the organizational violence of each particular form of life in dealing with the rural/urban divide that gives so much force to interpretations of Brazil’s modernization processes from slavery to capitalism, she breaks with the romance of one or more kinds of human beings, whose trajectories offer any unambiguous understanding the (pre)modernities of a developmental process.

In sum, this inconveniently heterodox study, historical and empirical, now incorporated as a reinterpretation of the classic interpretations of Brazilian modernity, urges us to face the ambiguities of the (pre)modern in ways that look to how violence and personal influence or favour (two key themes that run through Maria Sylvia’s intervention) do not function as an “organizing principle of social and economic relations

opposed to that of an impersonal capitalist rationality”.²²⁵ On the contrary, they are “situated in the expansion of capital, in the productive and financial sector, in the constitution of the state”.²²⁶ Be it in the personalized or depersonalized exercise of power and authority or in the separation between public funds and private resources that define civil service and its accompanying general norms, such qualifications of the modern state did not find conditions here for realization in this idealized form. Whether because of a shortage of qualified employees, a lack of immediate necessity to rationalize or streamline procedures, or an allegiance to the values of an intimate group that delay the separation between official authority and personal influence²²⁷, the entrepreneur is envisioned as capable of managing indirectly the enterprise of (self)development by playing on a third field outside the confines of the trafficking of influences (*tráfico de influências*) that constitute the overarching problem of (state) corruption that follows from such laments over Brazil’s failed or selective modernizations. The figure of the entrepreneur thus embodies the (un)realized possibilities of a non-statist, impersonal field: Brazil, land of the future. To conclude with Maria Sylvia’s words, “The contradiction that we find at the origins of Brazilian society, at the level of the economy – the direct production of livelihoods and commodity production – unfolded, at the level of social organization, as the difficult synthesis of moral associations and constellations of

²²⁵ “princípio organizador das relações sociais e econômicas oposto ao da racionalidade impessoal capitalista” (Carvalho Franco, 18, translation mine).

²²⁶ “alojados na expansão do capital, no setor produtivo e financeiro, na constituição do Estado” (Carvalho Franco, 18, translation mine).

²²⁷ For further elaboration of the implications of such dynamics, refer to Carvalho Franco’s analysis of the administration of the state in slavocratic contexts (*Homens Livres*, 166).

interests, and developed itself, at the level of political organization, in the unity of public life and private life”.²²⁸

It is politically and intellectually irresponsible to think of the problem of Brazil's *atraso* without considering the particular construction of the citizen and labourer within our slavocratic milieu, which shape the kinds of subject formations possible for an emerging underdeveloped Brazil. Our assumed peripheral and dependent international position relies on a kind of supplanting of the (inter)dependencies of our everyday slavocratic realities that cannot be relegated, in any rigorous way, to a problem of domestic or national class conflict for how it explains the internalization of external forces, so to speak, and other myths of the development of our nation on the global scene that is simply incomprehensible if these “particular forms of life” and their specific histories of subjugation are ignored. Citizens of the emerging powers who go out into the world have the convenient possibility of strategic identification as both first and third world, which not only gives way to anxieties about whether or not we are, or can ever authentically be, modern, but more so, elides the very civic and entrepreneurial dynamics that make possible the development project as a whole. Here, disciplinary boundaries help us as little as national boundaries in understanding how Brazilian subjects of development have learnt and relearnt to navigate the demands of modern apparatuses, be they statist, capitalist, or their blurry in-betweens. For those genuinely invested in politicizing discourses and practices of development, I suggest this as our point of

²²⁸ “A contradição que encontramos nas origens da sociedade brasileira, ao nível da economia - produção direta de meios de vida e produção mercantil -, desdobrou-se, ao nível da organização social, na síntese difícil das associações morais e das constelações de interesses, e desenvolveu-se, ao nível da organização política, na unidade da vida pública e da vida privada (Carvalho Franco, 240, translation mine).”

departure and continual return, rather than an ethical or philosophical plea to the agency of the subject, as is the launch pad for believers in the cures of education. As Maria Sylvia urged us to see at one of the many precipices of our take-off, the tenuous line between what counts as morals as opposed to interests, private as opposed to public, and ultimately, means as opposed to ends, is drawn and redrawn through violent codes of conduct particular to historical formations of a place not captured by evolutionary stages of development.

Corrupted enterprises of development: the politics of socio-economic ascension

It is possible to reconsider the patrimonial problem of a (pre)modern Brazil, and, in turn, resignify its implications as opportunities to be more honest about the (ir)rational distinctions used to organize any way of living, instead of as necessary limits on the capacity of/for Brazilian modernization. Is distrust of mechanisms of interpersonal distancing and of an individuated entrepreneurial drive for profit always a bad thing? Is the recognized interconnection between different spheres of life and modes of governing the presumably public or private necessarily an obstacle? Is the appreciation of the limits of universal or general law to be unconditionally condemned as close-minded?

Let us reconsider one potential site of resignification so as to think through some concluding implications, by way of a mundane project(ion) of civility and propriety: cleanliness. Social and physical hygiene projects have come to be a marker of modern cities, especially those aspiring for validation as a global city (or at the very least, tourist destination), ready to host the world, such is the case of Rio. As part of a series of broad-

spectrum beautification campaigns, Rio's *Lixo Zero* ('Zero Waste')²²⁹ initiative, launched primarily in tourist zones less than one year prior to its hosting of the World Cup and in preparation to become an Olympic City a couple of years to follow, captures the spirit in which the city and its inhabitants are measured as modern and generally properly constituted, or not. The usual appeal to the shame of how dirty we are, as an exemplar of our uneducatedness and backward ways, defines both the conceivable and implemented response, in this case, to the problem of urban waste. *Lixo Zero* employs specialized municipal guards to fine litterers; even the Mayor had to turn himself in after being caught on tape littering, and duly paid his symbolic civic fine.²³⁰ Debates and discussions surrounding this urban problem tend to appeal to universal laws of what it means to be civilized and proper, comparing ourselves to the 'out there' of clean urban landscapes and well-educated non-littering citizens. The first world is defined by this enlightened and self-controlling subject, and so eager Brazilian tourists who take the pilgrimage return to incessantly take up the mantle of comparing ourselves to the exotically hygienized and controlled appearance of first world cities. To break with this comparatively self-deprecating tendency, another approach could be taken to this commonplace problem of urban waste management, one that conceptually, and even on the level of outreach and municipal programs, could be of consideration for the fact that somebody else will have to clean up after you, for how we are always already being serviced, and for the largely invisible structures and people that make up the conditions of possibility of our

²²⁹ Refer to the City of Rio's 2013 launch of this municipal campaign for more details (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, "Campanha Municipal de Limpeza Urbana" – Municipal Campaign on Urban Cleaning).

²³⁰ See "Eduardo Paes emite Multa contra si próprio por Jogar Lixo no Chão" (Eduardo Paes emites Fine against himself for Littering) for the humorous 2014 case of political marketing.

convivência. It could be to make visible the largely invisible here and now, rather than resigning to fixed measures of here and there, chaotic and orderly, ignorant and enlightened. Littering need not be a problem of being ‘rude’, as opposed to polite and civilized.²³¹ However seemingly subtle the distinction, the implications would be significant. This alternative approach to interventions such as *Lixo Zero* could get at what is ours and not, what to lay claim to (*exigir*) and not, in the formation of dispositions that do not merely limit themselves to the comparative discourse of the educated and the uneducated, the civilized and the uncivilized, and so on and so forth.

When it comes to the problem of universalization (or more practically speaking, formalization), when we oppose the civil man to the cordial man, one who is disciplined and the other messy, one who is capable of entrepreneurship and the other of corruption, one who relishes in the rewards of work and the other of adventure, one who is committed to institutions (the state, market, or generally, society) and the other to the personal (family, friends, or generally, affective bonds), what is really at stake in the question of disciplining, formalizing, homogenizing the cordial into the civil subject is the question of legitimacy, rather than any genuine sense of what it means to live well here and now. It is the need, arising from a structural insecurity, to affirm oneself and be affirmed as going in the right direction, that is, of progressing. It is the need to sanction, authorize, make absolutely certain and codifiable our capacity for progress as based on a uniform and generalizable type (i.e. individuality), aptly represented by imaginings of the entrepreneur – a figure capable of organizing and administering one’s own

²³¹ The recent Garis garbage strike during the 2013 Carnival season opened such a possibility for rearticulation of how our everyday lives are organized and sustained, and the (in)visibilizations and regulatory codes that exceed the capture of third world pride and shame.

(self)development, ideally, without the need for assistance, *help*, from the state or any other paternal figure. The entrepreneur captures the spirit of progress, as a manifestation, or at least function, of individual initiative and risk. In more ways than one, the problem of citizenship, and its orienting myths of the public vs. the private or the formal vs. the informal, precedes the problem of development in its possibilities for regeneration. These questions continually resurface, especially at times such as the current commemorations of the fifty years of the last military coup, which bring to light the often rearticulated tensions between Brazil's (re)democratization processes and economic growth and stability.²³² That is to say, for many, the military dictatorships of this country continue to define the golden years of what could be, the only form of order to which this unruly country can submit, as we cannot rely on our own good sense, conduct, and initiative to pave the way. Again, if only we were better educated we would not need such imposition, neither would we need to pray for miracles to come from above. Hence to understand the civic spirit one also needs to understand the entrepreneurial spirit, as the blurred zones of confluence in which the formation of the Brazilian subject of development is situated.

Instead of comparing with the idealized North American, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant work ethic and pioneering modes of colonial and statist administration, in hopes of guiding the formation of entrepreneurial subjects in a Latin American context, perhaps it might be worthwhile to consider, for instance, the materialities of the Catholic and Iberian inheritances (e.g. distrust of profit) and the idealizations of the Protestant morality

²³² For example, during the preparations for Brazil's 2014 World Cup, the former dictator, João Figueiredo, was venerated by protestors and critics for having refused the hosting of the 1970 World Cup, for lack of economic priorities, in a country where football is a symbol of victory.

(e.g. profit as ascension, merit, reward) at one and the same time as the more commonplace inversions. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to reconsider the venerated British cum American model against which we are always corrupted derivations, and work within (and against) the problem of the limited adherence to an individualistic ideology to find our own negotiations of the capitalist demands of our (inter)national system (or more accurately, to identify its presence already among us, which I seek to do in Part III). The idealization of a particular individuality as the normative subject of social institutions, which operates from the belief that one is free to make one's choices and defend one's interest, individually, may not be our way forward. Instead of forcing something to be what it is not, another option is to accept our inheritances and work within them. For, indeed, we are not the absolute other (collectivist and traditional), but the Brazilian spirit merges the individualism and impersonalism required by the modern state with the personalism associated with traditional forms of relations. Yet even more to the point, there is always an impersonalism that defines our personalism: it is the milieu that makes legible our personal relations.

So instead of trying to produce an interpretation of (pre)modern Brazil, which ultimately leaves out aspects of a Brazilian experience that do not fit into its predominant patrimonial terms (as what unites so many of the classics of Brazilian social and political thought, to which Maria Sylvia responds), we can face that, for instance, the Brazil that entrepreneurs is as real as the Brazil that lives at the expense of the state, as Ana Heloísa reminds us, and so, rethink our (inter)dependencies. Otherwise, she continues, at a time when a negative image of enterprising activity reigns as strongly as the rise in such entrepreneurial ventures and the formation of entrepreneurial subjects (increasingly done,

and arguably, always done by way of the creativities of our informal economies), “our entrepreneurship ends up being peripheral, shameful, for lack of a symbolic repertoire capable of legitimizing and dignifying it”.²³³ We will always be *se virando*, getting by, improvising, adapting, creating, rather than innovating. This is worrisome, Ana Heloísa concludes, because in a capitalist society like ours, enterprising business activity is the propelling force of economic development. And this self-deception (*auto-engano*) not only leads to the non-legitimation of the social role of business and our inability to engage with corporate practices effectively (e.g. corporate social responsibility and citizenship practices), but ultimately to a mismatch in expectations between the formation of individual and collective aspirations following in civic and entrepreneurial moulds that do not line up. Mutually exclusive ascriptions of modern and traditional, Anglo-Saxon and Iberian, North American and South American, global and local, as captured by guiding myths of the (anti)heroes of Brazilian entrepreneurship, reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the (im)personalisms and internalized external measures of modern institutions and their (dis)abiding citizen-subjects.

The hegemonic interpretive project of a patrimonial personalism, largely propagated by disillusioned nationalist postcolonial intellectuals and later transformed into social, political, and institutional convention, has come to explain Brazil’s social and political *atraso*, that is, the predominant interpretation of Brazilians of themselves (as evidenced in Sérgio and Roberto’s interpretations here elaborated, as well as countless other respected historical and current reference points). Few contemporary voices more

²³³ “nosso empreendedorismo acaba sendo periférico, envergonhado, por falta dum repertório simbólico capaz de legitimá-lo e dignificá-lo” (Costa Lemos, 10, translation mine).

perceptively redefine the terms of debate regarding Brazil's "selective modernization processes" than sociologist and public intellectual, Jessé Souza (elected president of the government-led Institute of Applied Economic Research-IPEA in 2015), and his critiques of a "sociology of inauthenticity" that characterizes the (inter)national fixation of developmental projects, variously scaled. In brief, he shows us how "Brazil is the 'other' or a deviation of modernity, having been modernized for 'the English to see', a modernization epidermal and of facade".²³⁴ This perceived deviance measured by the successful and failed institutionalizations of modern conduct and individuality has given form to a "normative exceptionality of modern Brazil" that has for too long captured the national imaginary of the *atraso*, and what numerous native interpreters refer to as the Brazilian adventure of citizenship.²³⁵ If we understand citizenship as the formalization of civic, political, and social guarantees and obligations among us, at stake is the relationship between values and their institutionalization, and the selectivity of this our process of modernization.

Whether *sui generis* (as in Gilberto's hybrid modernity defined by the internal dynamics of our slavocratic sadomasochistic inheritances), an extension of Iberian influences (as in Roberto's dual modernities), or somewhere in between (as in Sérgio's plasticity at the frontiers of/with Europe), the classic preoccupation with *what makes*

²³⁴ "De acordo com essa concepção, que poderíamos chamar da nossa 'sociologia de inautenticidade', o Brasil é o 'outro' ou um desvio da modernidade, tendo sido modernizado para 'inglês ver', uma modernização epidérmica e de fachada" (Souza, "A Sociologia Dual", 58, translation mine).

²³⁵ For a critical review of Brazilian literature on citizenship through centre/periphery theorizations, see Tavolaro's "Para Além de uma 'Cidadania à Brasileira': Uma Consideração Crítica da Produção Sociológica Nacional" (Beyond Citizenship in its 'particularly Brazilian' form: Critical Considerations on National Sociological Production).

brasil, Brasil is profoundly marked by what Jessé rereads as the “*assimilation of an external will as if it were ours*, an assimilation *socially conditioned* that kills at birth the proper self-representation of the dominated as an independent and autonomous being, which is what the concept of sadomasochism [of Gilberto’s analysis of our interdependencies] is getting at”.²³⁶ Brazilian processes of modernization are thus not easily explainable through centralizations (of the likes of a patrimonial state) or decentralizations (of localisms, associativisms, familialisms, clientisms, or personalisms variously manifested) of our modes of governing. Hence why, I have argued here, the entrepreneurial question brings out some of these complexities in the (self)organization and management of the enterprise of development and the accompanying (re)formations of a socio-economic and political citizen-subject of development. In treading undefined territory, the figure of the entrepreneur brings to the fore diverse tensions in the idealizations of modern conduct and individuality, as well as the sanctioned relations between the individual, the state, the market, and society. It aptly reveals attempts to formalize the informal (i.e. an entrepreneurial spirit), and how the amorphous ‘out there’ continues to serve as a standard for how best to prepare oneself to venture out and engage with the world around us, that is, with a global cultural and political economy. Jessé concisely summarizes this dilemma of the externally internalized measure (or internally externalized measure?) that haunts the relationship between values and their institutionalizations, that is, the informal formalizations of a (self)identified delayed people:

²³⁶ “*assimilação da vontade externa como se fosse própria*, assimilação essa *socialmente condicionada* e que mata no nascedouro a própria auto-representação do dominado como um ser independente e autônomo, que o conceito de sado-masochismo quer significar” (Souza, “A Sociologia Dual, 61, translation mine).

It was the absorption of modernity from the outside in as an absolute value that impeded and impedes both the possibility of critical distance in relation to this project, as well as the naturalness that we find in Western Europeans. The Europeans, and the North Americans of course – after all, we are not talking about geography but cultural rationalities – can afford to give themselves the luxury of developing their own proper and peculiar standard of being modern. The anxiety of being modern, the great galvanizing national desire from the beginning of our re-Europeanization until today, impedes us from being modern in our own way, and moreover, at the limit, from recognizing ourselves as such. A whole range of important questions is revealed from this fact.²³⁷

In the Brazilian context, as Jessé reminds us, at stake in the problem of citizenship is social ascension. It is thus important to remain attentive to the nuanced rules of inclusion and exclusion that this specific formation brings about, especially because of the ways in which the statist modernizing project has come to impersonalize these rules for society, in accordance with the purportedly impersonal values of a European individualism. That is, we need to remain attentive to the slavocratic inheritances (sustained through social differentiations of *bachelorismo* and a continued denigration of labour and the practical) as key to understanding what Jessé puts forward as the “selectivity” of Brazilian dynamics of modernization. Otherwise put, we need to remain attentive to the ways in which the right to citizenship did not pass through the question of labour in order to legitimate one’s place in a defined community to which one is to belong, if we have any hope in understanding the specificity of our society that constitutes citizenship practices

²³⁷ “Foi a absorção da modernidade de fora para dentro como um valor absoluto que impediu e impede tanto a existência de distância crítica em relação a esse projeto, como também a naturalidade que encontramos nos europeus ocidentais. Os europeus, e os norte-americanos e claro — afinal, não estamos falando de geografia mas de racionalismos culturais —, podem se dar ao luxo de desenvolver um padrão próprio e peculiar de serem modernos. A ansiedade de ser moderno, a grande vontade galvanizadora nacional desde o começo da reeuropeização até hoje, nos impede que sejamos modernos ao nosso modo e até, no limite, que nos reconheçamos como tais. Toda uma gama de questões importantes se descortina a partir desse fato” (Souza, “A Sociologia Dual”, 61, translation mine).

and ideals to different ends. In contrast to the orienting notion of citizenship inherited from European centres that did not experience modern slavery in this way, the organization of labour and production in a slavocratic society did not set up the ideal of work as qualifying collective ascension. The ideal of work did not structure the possibilities and limits of citizenship in the same ways that the bourgeois context, of the first leading class that worked in Europe, brought about a sort of “uniformization of an emotional economy” (much more profoundly than a uniformization of rights), which constituted a practice of citizenship that internalized previously external forms of regulation of conduct.²³⁸

The structure of the modern citizen, whether in its rational, normative, or affective organization, demands a particular idealization of a uniform type of human, of an individual. The selectivity of the process of modernization in Brazil, through its multifaceted hierarchies that place and replace people in ways conditional on their commitment and contribution to the means of modernization, manifests particular tensions with formally equalizing tendencies. The productive space in between is where we continue to find today the real possibility of intermittent poverty and social ascension amidst the underprivileged classes, which makes it possible for us to conceive poverty as the result of individual weakness or failure. To sum up, the very structures that were to homogenize such conditions and opportunities, notably the state and the market, also created the conditions of Brazilian inequality and poverty.²³⁹ It is a question of mutual

²³⁸ “a uniformização de uma economia emocional” (Souza, “A Sociologia Dual”, 65, translation mine).

²³⁹ For a detailed analysis of these state-market dynamics, see Souza’s “A Sociologia Dual de Roberto DaMatta: Descobrimos nossos Mistérios ou Sistematizando nossos

adaptation to the demands of the mediating institutions of modernity. Jessé aptly captures the essence of this problem by showing how,

The expression of our *atraso*, poverty and inequality does not require the personalist paradigm to be criticized. This idea, first gestated by thinkers at universities and then transformed into political project and social and institutional practice, encases Brazilians today with a second skin, with deleterious consequences and effects. The political project of personalism, especially in its patrimonial version, is the hegemonic political agenda both of those in power and of those in opposition. For the political project of those in power, the agenda is to rationalize/streamline the state in order to stimulate competition and market efficiency. For critics, the motto is the populist critique of corruption, this structural fact of modern politics, that through patrimonialism is transformed into the common sense contours of Brazilian specificity. The apparent contenders fight in the same shared field of ideas.²⁴⁰

To put it otherwise, as Jessé concludes, politics is confined to an intra-statist activity, as a result of the ‘limbo’ created by the personalist and patrimonialist interpretation of the Brazilian way of development. The public, the social, the economic, and such designated modalities defined in relation to, yet not confined within, the state, thus do not enter into the terms of debate.²⁴¹ Indeed, it is within this limbo that professional education takes place, and the largely unregulated training of productive citizens occurs. While

Auto-enganos?” (The Dual Sociology of Roberto DaMatta: Discovering our Mysteries or Systematizing our Self-Deceptions?, 64).

²⁴⁰ “A tematização do nosso atraso, miséria e desigualdade não precisa do paradigma personalista para ser criticado. Essa idéia, primeiro gestada por pensadores em universidades e depois transformada em projeto político e prática social e institucional, reveste o brasileiro de hoje como uma segunda pele, com conseqüências e efeitos deletérios. O projeto político do personalismo, especialmente na sua versão patrimonialista, é o programa político hegemônico tanto dos ocupantes do poder quanto da oposição. Para o projeto político no poder, o programa é racionalizar o Estado de modo a estimular a competição e eficiência do mercado. Na oposição, o mote é a crítica populista à corrupção, esse dado estrutural da política moderna, que no patrimonialismo transformado em senso comum adquire contornos de especificidade brasileira. Os aparentes contendores lutam num mesmo campo comum de idéias” (Souza, “A Sociologia Dual”, 65, translation mine).

²⁴¹ Ibid.

preoccupied by personalistic modes of conducting social, political, and economic life (the famous *jeitinho brasileiro*) as the cause of all of our third world problems, an even more arbitrary, random, haphazard mode of (re)formulating the citizen is taking place, putting “a gun in the hands of the blind” and providing certifiable skills in highly disintegrated and idiosyncratic combinations. And so, in rethinking the terms of debate into Brazil’s precarious (or more accurately, makeshift) modernization, few make a more powerful intervention than Jessé in calling for an alternative sensibility to the dynamics of the ‘advances’, ‘delays’, and inequalities that inhabit the in-between:

The so-called “sociology of the Brazilian way” [*jeitinho brasileiro*], so dominant in our universities, in the media and in the pubs [*botecos*] throughout Brazil, and that reduces a complex world to personal relationships and friendships, is one of the major causes of the poverty of our public debate, which never reaches the real causes of our problems. In fact, if we think twice, we see, easily, that only those who already have economic and cultural capital to some extent, have access to the “beneficial personal relationships”. Or does the reader know someone with “significant connections” without first already having had economic or cultural capital? The focus on social capital, as the basis of social hierarchy, “hides” the most important question – given that it conditions the very existence of the “who indicates” [the alternate IQ quotient] as valued “capital” – of differential access, determined by class position, to “impersonal” economic and cultural capital. As the main question of the “origin of all inequality” is left to the shadows, it is therefore possible to imagine Brazil’s problems as being produced by the “corruption of the state” – undoubtedly harmful, important to be combatted, but far from a Brazilian specificity – while the market is perceived as the “realm of all virtues”. The false opposition between virtuous marketplace versus corrupt state takes the place of all social conflicts silenced for centuries among us – some of them discussed above – and is the major contribution of our intellectuals to the invisibility of Brazilian inequality. Frustratingly, however, is that whoever rehearses this fragile and conservative view of our reality comes off as critical, as if unveiling and denouncing troublesome aspects of our reality. It is this that confers a whole “sophistication, aura of virtue and power of persuasion” to a kind of anachronistic, fragile interpretation, completely at odds with the dynamism of various aspects – the competitive market, for example, which assumes the greatest importance with regards to the impersonal criteria over the people for which a

dynamic economy exists – of Brazilian modernization.²⁴²

Perhaps the overarching problem is not so much what we are left to believe by (inter)nationalist discourses of third world corruption as the primary obstacle to the development of our people. Perhaps it is not primarily a problem of the way in which, personalistic or not, one conducts oneself, but to what ends, according to what priorities and objectives. In rendering particular the universal or general laws of conduct set to mould the modern individual, as I have been working through here in this section, it is possible to fathom that the same trust lent to these particular universal or general laws could be lent to other modalities. The problem, then, is not so much the giving of trust to

²⁴² “A tal “sociologia do jeitinho brasileiro”, tão dominante nas nossas universidades, na mídia e nos botecos do Brasil inteiro, e que reduz um mundo complexo a relações pessoais e de amizade, é uma das causas principais da pobreza de nosso debate público, que jamais chega às causas reais de nossos problemas. Na verdade, se pensarmos duas vezes, perceberemos, facilmente, que só tem acesso a “relações pessoais vantajosas” quem já possui capital econômico ou cultural em alguma medida. Ou o leitor conhece alguém com “ligações importantes” sem, antes, já ter tido capital econômico ou cultural? O olhar concentrado no capital social, como base da hierarquia social, “esconde” a questão mais importante – posto que condiciona a própria existência do “quem indica” como “capital” valioso – do acesso diferencial, determinado pela posição de classe, aos capitais “impessoais” econômico e cultural. Como a questão principal da “origem de toda desigualdade” é deixada às sombras, então se pode imaginar os problemas brasileiros como sendo produzidos pela “corrupção do Estado” – sem dúvida nociva, importante de ser combatida, mas longe de ser uma especificidade brasileira –, enquanto o mercado é percebido como “reino de todas as virtudes”. A falsa oposição mercado virtuoso vs Estado corrupto ocupa o lugar de todos os conflitos sociais silenciados há séculos entre nós – alguns deles discutidos acima – e é a maior contribuição dos nossos intelectuais à invisibilidade da desigualdade brasileira. Irritante, no entanto, é que, quem repete essa visão frágil e conservadora de nossa realidade “tira onda” de crítico, como se estivesse desvelando e denunciando aspectos incômodos da nossa realidade. É isso que confere toda a “sofisticação, aura de virtude e poder de convencimento” a um tipo de interpretação anacrônica, frágil e em completo desacordo com o dinamismo de diversos aspectos – o mercado competitivo, por exemplo, que pressupõe a maior importância dos critérios impessoais sobre os pessoais para que exista uma economia dinâmica – da modernização brasileira” [Souza, “A ‘classe média verdadeira’”, 4, translation mine – Note: the Brazilian expression, *QI - Quem Indica* (Who Indicates), is a play off *QI - Quociente de Inteligência* (Intelligence Quotient)].

a particular set of established values that shape our expectations and understandings of what is to be. The problem need not be the seemingly personalistic mode of giving-trust, but to which values, priorities, and principles we choose to give trust to so as to inform our conduct, for it is *trust*, in an universalizable or generalizable conduct imagined of a first world out there, that is also at play. The problem is not the corruption of the formalized. Of course, it is too often easy to be unfaithful to established values, but the prior question that begs our attention and is obscured by the popular and academic discourses of corruption is: corruption of what? In displacing the binaric measure of the personal and the impersonal, it may become possible to de-decentre trust as a functional principle in regulating modern life, after all. For is not what makes impersonal norms and such have currency, a certain fidelity to established values, be they personal or impersonal or what have you? A trust in something defined by a reciprocal fidelity to themselves, in the face of temptations to be unfaithful for other gains?

Indeed, when in the streets and homes of Brazilians cities, we ask, ‘please’, *por favor*, what we are asking for, quite literally, is for something to be done ‘by favour’ – the favour, the exemplary practice of dependence on the other, to which the response, ‘thank you’, is, naturally, ‘much obliged’, *obrigado*. And ‘you’re welcome’, sweeps it all away with a *de nada*, of or from nothing. Of course, these fabled cordial modes risk masking the violence of any system of production and exchange, through the play of esteem and self-esteem that has preoccupied interpreters of Brazilian modernity since the foundings of the new nation. Yet, its depoliticizing potential is largely activated through relations of power that far exceed the culturalist forms of a (self)identified cordial civilization. At most, it remains a fertile ground for the neutralizations of middle-classification, and its

standardized codes and conduct for the (under)developed, that is, its moral economies of citizenship practices. Whether these developmental dilemmas are accounted for by way of “passive revolutions” or “selective modernizations”, the self-same standards of modernity are always already implicitly strategic. In reorienting our critiques of corrupted modernities, Jessé fosters for us a more grounded appreciation of the singularity of peripheral processes of modernization, which displaces the long-standing preoccupations with centres or masters, variously defined, that have been most common in interpretations of the Brazilian *atraso*, over the past century or more.

The overwhelming attention given to the personalistic modes of third world *convivência* distracts us from the more fundamental problems and dynamics of Brazilian development. Often by looking to personal relations, that define the *jeitinho brasileiro*, our attention is drawn to the *malandro*, the *Zé Pelintra*, the average poor Joe, who makes do by taking advantage, seducing, swindling, deceiving to his advantage, as explored in Part I. This mythical figure (the epitome of a second-class entrepreneur) is the originary and archetypal subject position defining the Brazilian imaginary of the *jeitinho*, who absorbs the blame for the great ills of our delayed country. Legitimated or not by a situation of deprivation or crisis, the *jeitinho* is decontextualized and projected across classes as a naturalized mode of living, of getting by in the third world. It becomes everyone’s presumed starting point. In this decontextualization, the crucial enabler of such a legitimation is forgotten. As Jessé reminds us in his study on “Race or Class? On Brazilian Inequality”, “one’s class explains one’s income and not the contrary”.²⁴³ What enables the reproduction of a social class and social differentiations of varied sorts,

²⁴³ “a classe de alguém explica sua renda e não o contrario” (Souza, “Raça ou Classe?”, 43, translation mine).

notably in the Brazilian contexts that I have been tracing here, is a certain milieu – a family of class, a servicing of basic needs, with adequate stimulus to concentration, abstract thinking, and other preconditions for engaging successfully in the educational system, and later on, the more privileged sectors of the labour market toward which it is geared. With the lowest classes of abject and precarious workers (*ralé e batalhadores*) lacking most of these preconditions to learn, and the upper class possessing a more stable propertied capital to reproduce its privilege, the ever expanding middle class is where cultural capital, such as “scientific knowledge, post-graduate education, foreign languages, knowledge that has economic value”, plays the most decisive role in reproducing the capitalist market and the state.²⁴⁴ No class better captures the dreams of social ascension than the middle class, not merely as a question of social distinction, but more importantly in expressing what it means to be “individuals who are free, are consumers, citizens”.²⁴⁵ Everyday is a battle to be won or lost – the entrepreneurial spirit, *par excellence*. A consecrated sum of economic capital, however precarious or credited, buys the free time for the children of the middle class to study, accruing what is often believed to be a form of impersonal capital that serves to reproduce its privileges. In Brazil, the numbers are rather small: the traditional middle class constitutes approximately 15% of the population, with a rising ‘C class’ of precarious workers comprising the largest and growing number of 53% of the population, however their differentiated cultural capital and precarious economic capital (largely dependent on social assistance programs and special credit) makes it erroneous to include them within

²⁴⁴ “saber científico, pos-graduacao, línguas estrangeiras, um conhecimento que tem valor econômico” (Souza, “Para a Classe Média”, 1, translation mine).

²⁴⁵ “indivíduos que são livres, são consumidores, cidadãos” (Souza, “Para a Classe Média”, 2, translation mine).

the established middle class.²⁴⁶ So how are these social differentiations of the value of each person sustained? It is thus worthwhile to repeat here, education is the means by which the middle class reproduces its privileges, and proffers a certain stability to the notion of impersonal capital that reproduces the capitalist market and state. And it does so at a certain cost. The valorized cultural capital that opens doors, individually one by one, perpetuates both the function and myth of the (im)personalities of the state and the market. Jessé specifies for us what this cultural capital entails, in teasing apart the causes of inequality and prioritizing the role of class over race within the particular dynamics of Brazilian development:

the control of reason over emotions and irrational impulses, the progressive interiorization of all sources of morality and meaning, and the concomitant exaltation of the virtues of self-control, self-responsibility, free and decontextualized will, and freedom conceived as self-remodelling in relation to heterogeneous purposes. What is at stake here is a historically constructed and culturally contingent notion of personality and of the conduct of life that separates and unites, through ties of solidarity and prejudice, people and social groups into superiors and inferiors, according to criteria that owe their indisputable objectivity to the fact of being inscribed in the opaque and nontransparent operating logic of the state and the market.²⁴⁷

This specific emotional economy, of a kind of adapted Bourdieuan habitus, is made up of a set of dispositions that serves as the objective standard, to which Jessé is referring, in differentiating one's social value in "opaque and nontransparent" ways. It substantiates

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "controle da razão sobre emoções e pulsões irracionais, interiorização progressiva de todas as fontes de moralidade e significado e entronização concomitante das virtudes do autocontrole, auto-responsabilidade, vontade livre e descontextualizada e liberdade concebida como auto-remodelação em relação a fins heterônomos. O que está em jogo aqui é uma noção historicamente construída e culturalmente contingente de personalidade e de condução de vida que vai separar e unir, por vínculos de solidariedade e preconceito, pessoas e grupos sociais em superiores e inferiores, segundo critérios que passam a dever sua objetividade incontestável ao fato de estar inscritos na lógica opaca e intransparente de funcionamento de Estado e Mercado" (Souza, "Raça ou Classe?", 49, translation mine).

our lived experiences and understandings of citizenship while naturalizing inequality or what he terms “the mass social production of sub-citizenship”, definitive of societies peripherally modernized like Brazil.²⁴⁸ The generalization of this emotional economy, based on the homogenization of a type of human, transforms “economic behaviour into the model of all dignified human behaviour worthy of respect and recognition”.²⁴⁹ The concept of class as Jessé defines it (as linked to a particular “conduct of life” and pre-reflexive attitude in relation to the world) is thus central to understanding the problem of development, as it gets at how socio-economic and political systems are reproduced in everyday ways, in ways that technical or rationalist explanations cannot get at: “*Habitus* of class, perceived as a non-intentional learning of dispositions, inclinations, normative schemes that enable its possessor to perceive and classify, in a pre-reflexive dimension, opaque signs of the legitimate culture”.²⁵⁰ This methodological approach that Jessé adapts is helpful because it does not require us “to appeal to intentionalist and subjectivist explanations, as in the personalist or patrimonialist paradigms, which are obliged to defend the existence of a pre-modern nucleus for these societies in order to explain their social ills”.²⁵¹ Moreover, it allows us to engage with the ways in which “it is precisely the dynamism of impersonal institutions, which reproduce an implicit hierarchy of the

²⁴⁸ “produção social massificada da subcidadania” (Souza, “Raça ou Classe?”, 55, translation mine).

²⁴⁹ “o comportamento econômico em modelo para todo compartimento humano digno de respeito de reconhecimento” (Souza, “Raça ou Classe?”, 53, translation mine).

²⁵⁰ “*Habitus* de classe, percebido como um aprendizado não intencional de disposições, inclinações e esquemas avaliativos que permitem ao seu possuidor perceber e classificar, numa dimensão pré-reflexiva, signos opacos da cultura legítima” (Souza, “Raça ou Classe?”, 52-3, translation mine).

²⁵¹ “apelar pra explicações intensionalistas e subjetivistas, como nos paradigmas personalistas ou patrimonialistas, que são obrigados a defender a existência um núcleo pré-moderno para essas sociedades de modo a tematizar suas mazelas sociais” (Souza, “A Sociologia Dual”, 54, translation mine).

differential value of human beings, which allow us to understand the secular naturalization of an abyssal inequality like that of Brazil's".²⁵²

Jessé spells out for us the crucial political implications of these methodological and conceptual reorientations: "The market and the state are not merely grand material entities regulated by criteria of formal efficiency, but yes materializations of 'conceptions of the world' with a peculiar material hierarchy, and that is the specifically modern form of constructing social distinctions".²⁵³ So the profound challenge that we are left with is, in Jessé's words, "to identify what conception of the world this is, which is imported from the fundamental institutions of the modern world to the periphery".²⁵⁴ How do we conceive of processes of modernization in Brazil, in a place that did not pass through the supposed stages of modernization, (neo)liberalization, and so forth? This is the challenge that I will take up next. It requires a detailed delving into the ongoing and long-term dynamics of development, not the short-term results but the training of its subjects to carry out the enterprise of development. It requires us to journey into these conceptions of the world, with all of their (dis)orienting myths, brought to life through the institutional logic of modern capitalism and an (inter)national state system, instead of

²⁵² "é precisamente o dinamismo de instituições impessoais, que reproduzem uma hierarquia implícita do valor diferencial dos seres humanos, que permite compreender a naturalização secular de uma desigualdade abissal como a brasileira" (Souza, "Raça ou Classe?", 56, translation mine).

²⁵³ "Mercado e estado não são apenas grandezas materiais regidas por critérios de eficácia formal, mas sim materializações de 'concepções de mundo' com uma hierarquia material peculiar, e que esta é a forma especificamente moderna de construir distinções sociais" (Souza, "Raça ou Classe?", 56-7, translation mine).

²⁵⁴ "identificar que concepção de mundo é esta, que é importada das instituições fundamentais do mundo moderno para a periferia" (Souza, "Raça ou Classe?", 56, translation mine).

being caught in the cultural essentialisms of a patrimonial personalism that elide the always complex negotiation between values and their institutionalizations.

Are we there yet? orientations and sensibilities for/against development

To face the diverse, multiple, and contradictory Brazils, we may need to experiment with inversions of the standard question driving interpretations of Brazilian modernity: “what makes Brasil, brasil?”. So in the analyses to come, which this historically reattuned and conceptually politicized context enables, I seek to grapple with what is at the heart of the mismatch of desires and expectations – caught between the modern and the traditional, the individual and the collective, the personal and the impersonal, and generally what is ours and what is not, that is, the problem of the external internal measures and its orienting myths (*auto-enganos*) – as it is propelled by the (re)productions of official and commonplace stories of a Brazil that resonate, capture, and delimit, in everyday ways, what is desirable and possible for an emerging underdeveloped Latin American giant. This methodological move is not simply a function of a substitution or inversion to prioritize the everyday over the official, the internal over the external, or other such standards of judging the advanced and the delayed within a Weberian evolution toward modernity. It is more so a call to appreciate the “back and forths”²⁵⁵, to appreciate the processes by which such exemplary navigations, between myriad general and particular anchors, take place, holding at bay the demand and desire to make it all fit in the image of a modern Brazil. It is to decentre the grand call to coherence, to decentre Brazil as the symbolically exhausted point of

²⁵⁵ For further elaboration on this methodological orientation, see Simon’s counsel on an ethnographic disposition in the Preface of this dissertation (16-7).

reference (i.e. *isso é brasil*) for brasil, Brazils, and Brazilians, which given how they have been overinvested socially and politically (rather than through any *a priori* status for clarification), may enable us to listen to the person as much as the individual. Indeed, it may enable us to listen to the person's negotiation with the individual, and the individual's negotiation with the person.

Otherwise put, we may at last be able to face Antigone's challenge to the foundations of modern politics, and take seriously the particular forms of life enabled by and within these inheritances. To get at such particularity, we need to consider the (re)constructions of this individuality, with their complementary virtues and codes of conduct, as enablers of development, while recognizing that mutually exclusive myths of personalism and individualism, for instance, distract from our capacity to understand the impersonal (such as cultural and economic capital) as conditions of possibility of the personal. In the notes from the field that accompany these sections, I thus remain focused on this navigation at the intersections of the individual and the person, that is, on the particular ways in which the training of subjects into recognizable personalities and individualities make possible the functioning of modern systems of governance, and their developmental ideals, aspirations, and expectations. While honing our capacities to listen to inconvenient stories in excess of our guiding theories of development, we will come to appreciate how varied sites of sociability shape the limits and possibilities of any (non)institutional map that projects our ways forward.

In hopes of understanding more thoroughly what is at stake in the training of citizen-subjects of development, beyond the universal principles and easy prescriptions of developmental paradigms (such as those of a modernization and globalization bent,

explored in Part I), we need to continue to push beyond technical explanations of development. We need to consider how modern apparatuses (statist, capitalist, and otherwise oriented) ground themselves here, in a place that did not pass through the supposed stages of an evolutionary development, it is worthwhile to repeat, so as to shed light both on the specificity of a localized modernity as well as modernities variously construed as our guide. Once more, we need to focus on the problem of the limited adherence to an individualistic ideology, such as wrapped up in the discourses of progress embodied by the entrepreneurial subject of development, instead of measuring the successful and failed realizations of abstracted ideals imagined to exist in fullness somewhere out there. By listening to tales from the training grounds of such entrepreneurial subjects of development, charged with leading our way forward, we may get a richer sense for how modernity and modernities come into play, by way of a sort of allegorical reconstruction of our standards of judgement. With distanced intimacy, it may become viable for us to reconsider our political possibilities, and put in check the imagined ideals against which we measure ourselves and others. It may become viable for us to put in check our political standards of judgement, notably with respect to the third world, the negation of the idealized place and measure of the good life. This is the two-way (three-way?) conversation that I seek to open up within the vignettes that follow in Part III, a series of non-didactic arguments that invite us to face different elements of how the rituals of modernization (of making Brazil modern) ground themselves in a place, real and imagined, that did not pass through its supposed stages of development. Such fabulations of development, in time and place, require a grounding in urban contexts that can speak back to the arresting narratives of a nation-state perpetually on the

brink of take-off. To grapple with these self-referential dynamics, Brazil's signature city, Rio de Janeiro, will serve to ground and inspire these revisionings of the Brazils mobilized to orient our developmental aspirations. In turn, Rios, visible and invisible within these registers, will unfold manifold pathways to (un)desired and (un)desirable Brazils.

The inventions and reinventions of 'Brazil', as the site of an arrested development and corrupted modernities, have assembled a range of accounts of what it means to live a good life. Yet, this is not a dissertation into third world development or corruption, as such, or like markers of the peripheries of the modern world. These are but modes of framing the problem that reveal as much as they obscure about everyday life in out of the way places. No doubt, development projects are ultimately enabled or disabled by (and within) these broader contexts, but it is to the terms of the game that unite the most disparate developmental projects that I have been focusing our attention here. Whether top-down or bottom-up, institutionalist or culturalist, or otherwise classified, projects of development and their justificatory narratives of the problem of Brazil are manifestations of how we think about centres and peripheries continuously redefined to fit into the political standards of judgment of the day. Otherwise put, how we think about Brazil as a political project. In this sense, I am not judging which grand narrative best captures the spirit of the so-called Brazilian dilemma, neither am I critiquing the one that is most far off or obscuring. I am engaging how the debate is set up in ways that constrain even the most seemingly oppositional accounts of development (such as that of modernization and globalization, explored in Part I). Hence why my engagement with both the breadth and depth of the relevant literature is fairly superficial and selective.

These predominant modes of making sense of our most (extra)ordinary problems are only some of the currencies that circulate within the sites in which developmental or corrective projects operate. They are accompanied by many other seemingly contradictory forces. If we are unable to hold these forces in an integrated way, we have little chance of understanding what is at stake: both the problems and solutions, to our (extra)ordinary political challenges, will be set out in advance of our engagement with whatever we are attempting to deal with at hand (be it poverty, inequality, violence, or myriad other forms of deprivations). So my focus here has been on the framing of the problem, that is, on a crisis of narratibility. The grand narratives that I have been rehearsing for you here have a certain power over us, but not as much as we may tend to think. The problem is one of political imagination. How to engage this problem? By mobilizing the everyday to inflect these grand narratives, and grapple with the power that they do and do not have over us. The everyday, more often than not, has been set as oppositional to the grand claims and generalizations, but in fact, it is the site in which we can appreciate how they gain influence, are inflated and deflated to certain ends. Grand narratives do not come from the top-down; they are grand because they are heavy not because they are at the top. The question that pushes all of this forward regards how we debate our political present – a politics of transformation in places that are seen and see themselves as ‘failures’, or at best, corrupted.

In this sense, I am speaking to how Brazil constitutes itself and is constituted through an overwhelmingly comparative lens that makes out what we are not at the expense of what we are, subsumed by a modernization that does not recognize our modernities, that is, how we have been constituted through modern systems of

governance and accompanying individualities, personalities, and so forth (such as via the classic articulation of Sérgio's we-are-not-civil-we-are-cordial proposition). The grand narrative of Brazil is the narrative of the *is-not*: at independence, we-are-not-Portuguese, then at the progressions at end of the nineteenth century, we-are-not-French, and from the mid-twentieth century onward, we-are-not-American, for instance. What thus distinguishes the approach that I have been elaborating here, from the many debates within Interpretations of Brazil and Brazilian Modernity, is that, I hope, in seeking to reorient the terms of the game, we need not succumb to the blackmail of deciding between what Brazil is and is not, but rather, we can explore what it might look like to take seriously the circulation of (pre)modern myths, of culturalist explanations of Brazil's delays in terms of how Brazil constitutes itself (rather than what it is or is not), in effect, disarming the grand narratives by taking them on, *wearing them* out.

Embracing these influences, we need to navigate in between the ready categories of our socio-economic and political repertoires. We need to stop surrendering ourselves to projections of corrupted modernities, as the literal and metaphoric problem of a Brazil, for this particular multiscalar iteration of 'failure' (as contrasted with the question of anarchy or simply evolutionary incompleteness) is based on a perversion or debasement of an idealized and regulative standard, a problem of integrity that denies our own sense of wholeness. Hence why I have here embraced the makeshift, where the in-between is not stuck but mobile. Beyond the dualities of success and failure, what does it mean to be chronically emerging? What would it look like to engage in a politics of transformation by taking into account the conditions of the in-between?

The predominant stories of a delayed Brazil, which I have been offering up in Parts I and II, illustrate the challenges in encountering (or avoiding) this challenge. In Part III to come, I will further illustrate and complicate the ways in which we seek to make claim to a place that is always running behind or catching up. I have argued that there is no straightforward way of representing Brazil, but even more, I have attempted to show how the representations that we have developed inform (yet certainly do not explain) the challenges that we face in the peripheries of the modern world. The vignettes that bring this dissertation to a close will put us face to face with these challenges, with this undecidability. And so we must decide. That said, these myths of a chronically emerging Latin American giant, which I have hereto extended and critiqued, are seductive for a numerous reasons. It is not without a reason that we have come back to them time and again in attempts to account for the in-between conditions of a Brazilian way of living. They are seductive because they work through moves that turn seeming disadvantages into advantages [i.e. via the (in)famous *jeitinho* and *malandragem*], thus opening up more possibilities than they close down, which is a tremendous resource for those invested in a politics of transformation. They are seductive because, as grand as they may be, they make room for their own ‘contradictions’, for the possibility to decide how to respond, here and now.

Unlike the stages mounted in the spaces of world events (of the variety increasingly conferred to emerging giants such as Brazil, chosen to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics), which are recurringly invoked on a daily basis to assess proud and shameful accounts of third world progress, the space of the back-and-forths renounces the ‘gap’ between the *mundo real* and *mundo legal* that is charged with

provoking *malandragem* as a symptom of a society in which the laws are not in tune. This gap tears apart the ligaments that make any society work in the ways that it does, and from its point of negation, formalization becomes the only viable solution to taming the void, as the upshot of a particular valorization of what is good here as much as an external disciplining of what is not. Here we find the same kind of blindspots that manifest when we look to the top or the bottom to explain the workings of power, instead of processes of middle-classification, for instance, as opened up in Part I, that bring our attention to how the problems appropriated by development projects (i.e. poverty, inequality, corruption, etc.) are reproduced in everyday ways. The gaps generated by our disposition to look to extremes obscure, rather than clarify, the problems of development.

In the spaces of a third world, this gap gives way to an unhelpful and infantilizing inferiority complex: we need to be better educated. For the mongrel people of a delayed country, where we survive off of our creativity, education is the solution, that is, the site of the production of normalized and productive citizens. As follows, we need to invest in ourselves. Development becomes therapy. It is geared to address the self-esteem issues arising from our self-deceptions, which end up calling for either an authoritarianism (*mandonismo*), of the side of the elites, or, a messianism, of the side of the masses, trapping the possibilities of ‘help’ within the terms of either assistentialism or populism.²⁵⁶ If the father or the orphan has not proven to be the best of guides, the avenue for help need not also maintain the all-powerful or pitied subject as a basis to develop oneself. So instead of following through with the circularity of our self-deceptions, it is possible to intervene in such ways that would play off other terms, and work otherwise than as

²⁵⁶ Refer to Souza’s provocative conclusion in “Raça ou Classe?” for further elaboration of these political implications.

therapy, self-help, and inspiration to the downtrodden, for whom, by mere testament to continued perseverance in the face of adverse conditions, resilience is not what is lacking. Indeed, our beautiful game (yes, football, err, soccer) taught us not only how to win, but also how to lose.

In the spaces of a first world, facing the fullness of the ‘gap’ may remind us of the lessons that Antigone taught us, or at least tried to in her chronicles of the founding (mis)adventures of modernity. Just as her uprising was far from outside of the boundaries of the modern world, mobilizing sentiment and particularity against reason and the codified, so too the third world is not the negation of modernity, but one more manifestation of it. And so, we must face all of the beauty and ugliness of our shared conditions. This is not a dissertation into an othered modernization, tropical and exotic, deviant and inauthentic. As such, for those critically-oriented within the Western tradition, do not come here looking to find in the cordial man and *amigo* the ally rebel against the universal and sovereign ways of a legal-rational mode of modern politics that you so abhor. In (y)our very cradle, revered as the Greeks are in giving birth to modern democracy, you find it all. In facing the fullness of the gap, we need not, then, run to the origin or the margins, but inhabit the in-between, the intervals, as Bonnie would say. The complex and ambiguous manifestations that I will continue to draw out here blur the categories always already blurred, be they modern/traditional, civilized/uncivilized, urban/rural, impersonal/personal, formal/corrupt, rational/inefficient, Anglo-Saxon/Iberian, North/South (American), and other such measures that we use in making sense of us/them. Or to be more accurate, these series of non-argumentative interventions, which make up the concluding Part III, will bring into focus the always

already blurred categories and measures of our modernity, for your consideration. The dilemmas of a peripheral modernity are the dilemmas of what will have been of the reason and spirit modernity.

If the absurd is routine in the third world, it is because the magical is still possible. More precisely, it is because there is a mode of being in the world through which it makes sense to not take so seriously the so-called sense of reality, and does not allow itself to be intimidated by a certain rationality that is normatively relative to other priorities. It reveals the circularity of the time of the modern that its rationalist apparatuses attempt to conceal. Indeed, modernity can only be considered rationalist because it is compensating for much greater sentiments, as in the coming together of joy and suffering amidst other absent presences of an incurable *saudade*. If tragedy such as that of the Greeks is still possible of illumination in the hyperrationalist infrastructures of today's respectable modernity, it is in the time and places of a third world, not found geographically but by way of its excision from what should and should not be valorized nowadays. It is not about archaic, provincial, or exotic recoveries of places capacitated as antidotes to the sterilizations of a modernity that seeks to explain everything and everyone. In exaggeration, as any good Brazilian subject would tell you, we find ourselves through an alternate clarity.

In turn, what is called for is a sensibility, which Mia Couto poetically reveals in his narrations of the miscegenated realities of his native Mozambique and akin colonies of the former Iberian empire, that "looks upon this category called reality in another way

and does not create friction between what is right or *not right*".²⁵⁷ In the fullness of the gap, friction is not felt (*não se fricciona*). It is an inquiring disposition, of a concurrent trust and distrust, synchronically: "there is a different way of looking upon this frontier between what is true, what is false, what is magical, what is real".²⁵⁸ Because the dominant modern gaze of an Anglo-Saxon rationality so values this category called reality, as Mia pushes up against, it was necessary to invent for itself the possibility (and classification!) of 'magical realism' to explain these alternate sensibilities and realities. For those whom magic or the unexplainable is exceptional, it must be separated from reality, sterilized and neutered. Yet how we tell our stories, of the comic and the tragic, of the ordinary and the extraordinary, guides where we go and how. Following in the wisdom of the bus driver who responded to the lost foreigner's request for the time and trajectory of our voyage, to the body of the outsider, of late, standing lost in front of us and nervously assessing whether or not the chosen route across the bay would take more than an hour to get to the city: "we will get there within your hour *if the bridge does not fall* (*se a ponte não cair*)".²⁵⁹ The space of the (not) fallen bridge is neither magical nor realistic, and, it is. Depending on our response, like that of the bus driver, how we narrate our stories take us to different places, in different times. In this 'gap' that is

²⁵⁷ Refer to Rodrigues' interview with Couto for further elaboration: "olhassem essa categoria chamada realidade de outra maneira e não fizesse a fricção entre o que é certo ou não certo" (1, translation mine).

²⁵⁸ "têm uma diferente maneira de olhar essa linha de fronteira entre o que é verdadeiro, o que é falso, o que é mágico e o que é real" (Couto, 1, translation mine).

²⁵⁹ On one of my routine trips on the 7500 bus line in Rio, I bore witness to this exchange, which, academic convention has difficulty in registering through its citational regimes of truth-telling. Here is my factual account of an unplanned and undocumented everyday encounter in my wanderings throughout the city in the last month of 2014.

neither magical nor real, in the space of the (not) fallen bridge, we will face the possibilities and impossibilities of a third world development.

PART III

Yesterday's Future, Tomorrow's Past:
Interventions in place

museum of today

Imagina tu, leitor, uma redução dos séculos, e um desfilar de todos eles, as raças todas, todas as paixões, o tumulto dos impérios, a guerra dos appetites e dos ódios, a destruição recíprica dos seres e das coisas. Tal era o espetáculo, acerbo e curioso espetáculo. A história do homem e da terra tinha assim uma intensidade que lhe não podiam dar nem a imaginação nem a ciência, porque a ciência é mais lenta e a imaginação mais vaga, enquanto que o que eu ali via era a condensação viva de todos os tempos. Para descrevê-la seria preciso fixar o relâmpago.

Imagine you, reader, an abridgement of the centuries, and a parade of them all, all of the races, all of the passions, the turmoil of empires, the war of appetites and hatreds, the reciprocal destruction of beings and things. Such was the spectacle, the bitter and curious spectacle. The history of men and of the earth has so had an intensity that could not be given over, neither to the imagination nor to science, because science is slower and the imagination is more vague, while what I saw there was the living condensation of all times. To describe it, it would be necessary to fix the lightning.²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ As one of Brazil's most celebrated literary figures, Machado de Assis bore witness to a country in transformation, from Empire to Republic, and offered to us a different kind of realist narrative and orientation through which to grapple with the conventions of our everyday lives, as glimpsed in this passage in one of the opening chapters ("O delírio" – The delirium) of his 1881 masterpiece, *Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas* – The Posthumous Memoirs of Bras Cubas (25, translation mine).

– “All aboard!”

The brass notes of an expedition march fill the platform, trains to each side chugging away from their central station to suburbs folded into freeways, clogged beyond reach...

We sit, blindfolded. The troops guiding the voyage otherwise ordinary invite us to listen to the sounds of our everyday routes. Listen. Vulnerable, we would be, if it were not Sunday, a Sunday afternoon of theatre, of a planned unplanned urban odyssey.²⁶¹ Passengers destined home, stare. We can't see or know where we are heading, but at our first stop, we are invited to remove our blindfolds and bear witness to our surroundings.

– “Will you accept a machine devised to glimpse the future?”

Time-travel? Promptly, we are presented with individuated machines meant to protect us in moving forward, while we take in what is left behind. Our anachronistic guides, one by one in unmatched costumes, place adapted blue construction helmets on our heads: in place of eyes, mirrors. Awkwardly, we walk forward, and yet, can only see back.

– “What do you see?”

²⁶¹ How do we navigate, occupy, host, and resist within the spaces of our everyday lives? How to describe a city? This question inspires the guided voyages to come, and, is inspired by one particularly staged voyage in the Rio winter of 2013. As urban intervention, the performance-arts group from the Maré favela complex invited passers-by to embark on their everyday routes on the (inter)municipal trains, in a new light. And this vignette here follows such a journey... For further contextualization of their projects and accounts of life in the peripheries, productions based on the direction of Joana Levi and Isabel Paoni, see *Cia Marginal do Complexo da Maré*.

– “I see a hill, out in the distance.” The favela stares back. *Complexo do Alemão*.

The German Complex, pacified, occupied, urbanized since 2011. Or so the stories go. Devolved from slum to neighbourhood, it stands before us, behind us, in front of us, as one of the most violent. Number 126, it is iconic, with its claim to Rio’s lowest ranked in the metropolitan indices of human development.²⁶² A site representative of a civil war gone by, laying dormant, it has never been a place of anarchy, but of opposition of competing orders: one recognizably statist, and the other, err, of organized crime, as some would have it. Captured and recaptured, in excess, today it is starved of leadership.²⁶³ Urbanizing, with widening streets the official governors of the land open passageways for policing, mapping, cataloguing, hygienizing, curing, charging, selling. Forests and thickets of escape, continue to thin. Unequal topographies remain. Here we find the plots of the false German who once made claim to the productive outskirts that were to service a city emerging into the promises of the twentieth century. Later home to migrant workers of industrializing trades, the extensive lands, bought off and obliquely named after the, *de facto*, Pole, was occupied in the hope of national Brazilian development – and now, in its despair?²⁶⁴ Extensive, no doubt, even though not the most

²⁶² According to the 2010 census of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), the *Complexo do Alemão* ranked 126th, Rio’s worst ranked municipal district, with a human development index of 0,711 (Instituto Perreira Passos).

²⁶³ One of the most common accounts related by residents of occupied territories in Rio (of the UPP experience, 2010 onward) is that in the dispute over authority between “the state” and the “traffickers”, residents have been living in abandonment. Many accounts describe that the forms of governing prior to the occupations made more sense (“they treated us better”) because traffickers and company, having grown up in the favelas, “they know how to talk to us, they know where we are coming from”. See archives of *Museu da Maré* for more accounts (Cia Marginal do Complexo da Maré, 2013).

²⁶⁴ Refer to the UPP archives for more histories of the transformation of this land from an agricultural zone, of the Polish farmer and propeiter, Leonard Kaczmarkiewicz, in the

populous of its zoned off areas, gated and militarized, some 60,555 of Rio's 6.5 million inventoried inhabitants live amidst its widening streets and thinning forests.²⁶⁵ Look up! The lift glides along cables, from the train platform beneath our feet to the single station towering at large over the subdivisions of the German's Complex below. Will it prove itself as the latest attraction of the Marvellous City's²⁶⁶ theme park, charted off terrains ready for consumption... For the poor, of the poor? Perhaps, if, of course, all of this is first baptized by the foreigner. Make way for hungry locals, our devouring elites. I see a German flag cresting that final peak, out in the distance. Do you see it?

— "I see transport stations of all sorts, integrated." Look left, we make out more platforms being built and rebuilt. *Bilhete Único*, a single fare, is celebrated for giving us access, to travel across the city, by any collective means, the latest campaign of our benevolent governor. Trains, busses, vans, ferries, cable-cars, motor-taxis and more: "A one-way voyage, whatever it takes, all for the low, low price of R\$25.50", announces one of our guides. Do we laugh? Uprisings in 2013 over the 20-cent fare increase from \$2.75 to \$2.95 solicited, no doubt, a varied response. Premonitions, are they, intuitions of a past or future to come? Laughter irrupts when all else is repressed, let free. Millions across the country took to the streets – by foot, of course, with other modes congested, costly, co-opted. Movement, stalled – by credit cards of access. The city, at its best, dreamt to

1920s, to its accelerated industrialization from the 1950s onward, when it began to be populated by workers of nearby factories (Instituto Perreira Passos, 2010).

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ For more of a sense for how Rio gained its nickname of *cidade maravilhosa* (marvellous city), refer to accounts of its urbanization processes in the midst of 'natural' exuberance, in the edited collection *A Cidade e as Formas de Vivier* (The City and Forms of Living, Castro et al).

function as...a shopping centre. Options would abound. Corridors connecting platforms of a marketplace for one and...?

— “I see the stadium, in formation of a flying saucer.” *Maracaña*, our public patrimony, stands below. Ready for take-off! To showcase the future of a new nation to come, venues are reassembled to raise up our champions. This is where we win. This is where the beautiful game is not measured in goals, alone. To host the world in its stands, so that it can gaze upon us, evaluate and judge us, cheer and jeer for us. We belong. Who do you see, within and beyond those spaceship walls?

— “I see scaffolds of a city, in construction.” Frameworks, suspended. Cranes, swinging. Platforms, elevated. Yet what is being constructed, for whom, and how, lies beyond the horizon of the naked eye. Or does it? Disengage the machine of the future. Without the mirrors, now: Look, what do you see? Listen, what do you hear? Touch, what do you feel? Smell, what do you take in? Taste...wait, maybe not...

At our next stop, we huddle. Enclosed within makeshift structures of waiting, waiting, a-waiting the unknown intervals of our coming train, we listen to stories of odysseys, mythologized.

— “Arriving strangers may be dangerous or harmless: residents are wise to be prepared for trouble.”

These cautionary words I hear, crouched on the hot concrete platform of a station legendary for its assaults. *Estação Triagem*, the screening station. As the voice of our guide softens, this Homeric line is re-membered in a hospitable gesture:

— “Stay, I will eat you last”.

Waiting, it strikes me. Ahh, now I finally get what is at stake in hospitality. How it is that we, cordial figures of a tropical oasis overcoming itself, in search of order and progress toward a future of promises, can be so trusting and distrusting at the same time, in the same place. In the land where to cheat is to betray, *trair* lies beyond winning. How it is that every time that I get into these trains, in my everyday, the fortunate ones who claim a seat hold our bags and heavy belongings, for us. How every time that I get into these trains, my senses are alert and ready for battle, against me. Offenses of every kind. How it is that contradictions are possible. The conditioning of the unconditioned, is where the lessons of the out of place reside. Hence the recourse to epic formulations of banal voyages, so as to reveal to us what we would otherwise fail to see? Perhaps it is in this sense that hospitality is intended as a condition for peace, for the peaceable?²⁶⁷ A giving that short-circuits cycles of exchange, as species of counterfeit money?²⁶⁸ Wherein debt is annulled, or at least, deferred or transferred? To assume or forge the form of

²⁶⁷ Whether in the meditations of epic Greek poems attributed to Homer in origin stories of Western modernity, or in their more philosophical formulations refined through its Enlightenment gestation such as through the classic references of Kantian inspiration, journeys to unknown lands have defined our sense of place and identity. The Homeric inspiration of this particular voyage may be perceptively grasped in meditations of the sorts of a Derridean engagement with the Kantian premise of conditioned and unconditional hospitality, of a relative and absolute ethic that informs our navigations with others, with the other. A good starting place here may be Kant's essay on *Perpetual Peace*, and its elaboration of the conditions of a universal hospitality, and Derrida's readings in *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*.

²⁶⁸ In particular, Derrida's exploration of the paradox of the gift in *Given Time*, serves as a good starting point to reconsider notions of giving and helping, central to problematizations of development, poverty, justice, and so on, that mark centre/periphery relations, variously scaled. He gets us to ask, is it possible to give in ways that do not work through circles of exchange that turns the gift into a debt to be returned? His response, for the gift to be received as a gift, it must not manifest as such, since its mere appearance as gift puts it in the circle of repayment and debt. If, or where, the paradox is normalized, in traversing multiple orders not easily reducible to quantifiable standards, the political economy of development takes different turns...

giving, once given, must we repay? What other forms could it take? If the conditioned is indeed constitutive of the unconditioned, and vice versa, then what we are left with is the need to respond. Hospitality: the disposition within which a stranger is not to be treated as an enemy. To receive: hold, bear, contain. The embrace of worldly citizens? Refuge for the exiled, for figures cast out or caught in between? In the problem of hospitality we find the problem of how to incorporate you in me. How to live with... Neither public nor private, both public and private, we face the practical, the unfounded: what must, and cannot, be responded. Stay, I will eat you last.

In transit, we in-corporate the skin that must be as sensitive as it is anesthetized, to guard, to guide.²⁶⁹ Our train chugs along, now veering in the direction of home. From my open window, I hear the soundtrack of naturalized fictions, of our collective transportation. The obligation to come and go, the myth resounds. On track, places made to traverse. Non-spaces, or at best, in-between. Listen. Here we sit, with the (extra)ordinary capacity to read the city in silence and hear the thoughts of others. Caught in habit, congested, a Sunday afternoon of theatre transforms our time in waiting into time of senses. Opportunity, lost.

On this, our voyage, we travel accompanied by guides: actors of a third world periphery, who help us to create the necessary distance to look anew, for a new look. With actors who live the city, through scenes of our everyday, we receive stories of people and places as fiction, staged, revealing the bearable and unbearable of that reality.

²⁶⁹ Gloria Anzaldúa's "Speaking in Tongues: A Letter to Third World Women Writers" elaborates this tension in provocative ways, in the edited collection *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Colour*.

In transit, we recreate experiences of a laboratory, exploring contours, central and peripheral, and their relations with the preconstructed images. Cities of desire, of fear, of memories. Here, with good fortune, our voyage is literal, and not an estranged metaphor of the interiority of the spectator.²⁷⁰ We are the actors, the audience. There is no script awaiting our interpretation, no stand-alone background to be expressed or reflected off... There are only times in transit.

In places of passage, all travellers are invited to undertake a Homeric odyssey, and so our guide cautions us. Between the timeless and the debased, between truth and falsity, between the legendary and the authentic, in the myth of all voyages, in odysseys of places real and imagined: “He saw the cities and came to know the thoughts of many men”²⁷¹. In turn, we too can embark on odysseys, whose mark is both travel and wandering, as well as its narration – of adventures, encounters, and events, un/fore/seeable. Investigation, redefined.

At our final stop, weary passengers disperse across platforms that designate destinations, known and unknown. From across the interspace, we face opposing stations.

– “Speak into the mic: what do you see?”

²⁷⁰ For lived accounts of this voyage, see the reflections that the performance-arts group produced before, during, and after our shared explorations (Cia Marginal do Complexo da Maré). Italo Calvino’s *Invisible Cities* and *Why Read the Classics* become important references in this context of grappling with the forms and desires that constitute our experiences of the centres and peripheries of cities, ours and theirs.

²⁷¹ These Homeric words are reconstructed, *In_Trânsito*, and elaborated in the original and interpretive texts, most notably in Calvino’s *Why Read the Classics* that poses the question to us: what cities? what thoughts? (17).

Observations, amplified. Passengers in waiting, passengers on automatic, speak *to* each other from across the platforms, describing the images that they receive, give, consume. Scenes are staged and restaged, in playback.

– “I see...an old man, furrowed brow, resting his chin on the palm of his withered left hand, tired of the world around him...most certainly homeward bound...or, maybe, banished, unable to return...return to...”

– “I see...a couple, burying themselves in one another’s shoulder creases, avoiding my glances...disguising through distance something that...”

– “I see...a kid in uniform, backpack in one hand and skateboard in the other...ready for action...dreaming of ...”

I see. You see. We see. The oracular voyage comes to an end, passing the turnstile we return to the foreseeable routes that take us home.

Here, we have two patrons, two patron saints.

One officialized through the corridors of sacred and official assemblages, via churches and governments of a land in discovery: since January 20th of 1565, *São Sebastião*.²⁷² In imperial ambition, defending itself against undesired invasion and insurrection, the City of the Rivers of January of Saint Sebastian was founded, otherwise known as Rio de Janeiro. Protected against hunger, plague, and war, the port city was fortified amidst apparitions of our guardian on the battlefields of a Portuguese triumph over French forces, the final securing of an Iberian Empire.

And the other warrior-saint, of the undesired and undesirable, broke into officialdoms galloping steadily on his white horse: *São Jorge*. Not the Saint George²⁷³ brought by the Portuguese as advocate of their own nation and that of other civilized neighbours (with the stewardship of the English being the example of excellence), but the martyr of dubious records later demoted by the Catholic Church to optional tribute, to be revindicated as a pillar of faith by those seeking alternate routes and reliefs.

The Rios de Janeiro of (dis)enchanted natives is home to authorizations of myriad kinds. Between the sacred and profane, it is extra-vagant. Its ways transgress mere

²⁷² See the City of Rio's "Um Olhar no Tempo: 1565-2011" (A Look in Time) for official accounts of the founding of the city, and its wide-ranging interpretations (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 2011).

²⁷³ For a detailed elucidation of the official and non-official sagas of the figure of Saint George, within the Brazilian context that takes into account his 1969 demotion to a non-obligatory honouring status, due to lack of 'historical' (as opposed to 'traditional') registering of his role in the Church, see Marília Lamas' *São Jorge: A Saga do Santo Guerreiro* (Saint George: The Saga of the Warrior-Saint).

formalities. It boasts, after all, of the protection of not one, but two, guiding and tutelary spirits. Built to be the imperial capital of a romance civilization, a new world of the (in)authentic, it now claims for itself the standing of laboratory, for what a Brazilian Brazil could look like. No longer the envisioned *economic* heart, it clings to redeeming identifications as the *cultural* heart of a modern nation.²⁷⁴ Not the biggest or wealthiest (although it prides itself as the richest), the city's awe-inspiring coastlines offer perspective into ways of living that escape from the repertoire of good and bad of metropolitan centres, near and far. In this sense, it centres around itself, consumed with reproductions of a modern alternative, abundant, or at the very least, creative. It is Brazil's signature city. Or so Cariocas (ca-Rio-cas) like to say, and hear.

Rios' doubled patronage demands peace between its formalities and informalities. War is occupation. Resistance is occupation. Violence is not a function of evil, but a mode of engaging the world. Instead of norm and exception, we face excess, everyday. Pacification is its mode of politics. Protection, confounded with security. Patronage, not sponsorship but investment.

Allegories of a city in construction abound. Like the paradoxical imaginings of chosen family, São Jorge is related to us by way of (un)conventional means, by pressures from within as much as from without. Against the figure that gave us our name and birthright in battle on that fateful day in January some 450 years ago, the warrior of the white horse is rogue, having been adopted indirectly into circles of recognition.

Unoriginal, our chosen patron is nonetheless derived from the same source. Extra-

²⁷⁴ For further elaboration of the urban history and distinguishing mark of Rio de Janeiro, notably in contrast to archetypal cities of a Brazilian modernity, like São Paulo, see the edited collection, *A Cidade e as Formas de Viver* (The City and Forms of Living, Castro et al), which thinks the Brazilian nation in and through its former imperial capital, today.

official, perhaps, but far from non-institutional. The same channels that gave São Sebastião currency, have circulated, inflated, and deflated São Jorge's beloved patronage over us, that is, over our faith in ourselves, in who we want to be and how we want to live. To each their place, the unofficial patron conquered, at long last, official entitlement via the corridors of city government at the turn of the new millennium.

On the 20th of January, we pay tribute to the original founder in processions of a fortified city. On the 23rd of April, since the municipal government's decree in 2002, Rios' streets are filled with the formal and not so formal processions of our othered patron. On both days, and during unprompted invocations in between that interlink the everyday with its moments of reflection, Rios explodes in fireworks.

As the legends go, both martyrs reveal (their) faith onto others, in sacrifice, as exemplary figures of a Roman army, who prevailed in making known God's truth to soldiers and prisoners alike in the glory days of old. Beyond good and evil, they help, guide, and inspire. Ultimately, they bring to light the tensions between law and faith, inverting inquiries into who qualifies, indeed, as enemies of the people. The believers or the unbelievers? Emperors threatened by conversions (crimes against the pagan gods of bygone standards), sentencing our warrior-saints to arrows and beheadings, chronicled the problem of trust and betrayal in the in/consistencies of a governing logic. Canonized, as founding myths of a city to be built up, our martyrs epitomize the channelling of protective and civilizing forces against the corruptions of nature, demons, contrarians, and public enemies at large. Beware, enemies of the urbe. In this sense, the city of São Sebastião, in its primordial manifestation, is a material and spiritual conquest, against

barbarians. It evolved as a politico-theological construction of the Company of Jesus against infidels of all sorts (Protestants!), through Catholic idealizations of a city home to universal precepts and definite pathways (gateways?) for life, today, yesterday, and tomorrow. Conquered, in battle, in death, *ad infinitum*. And what of the city of São Jorge?

Over and above the founding role of patrons charged with guarding the city that we want and summon, a martyr testifies. Such representatives of the people suffer torments, tortures, and death in sustaining faith, until the end, in turn revealing their inner and outer worlds, belief and cynicism, trust and betrayal, us and them. Modelling life's journeys, they give life to identifications of ourselves and our place in this world. One of ours, so the stories go, was martyred in crucifixion with arrows to the chest, and the other by torture and beheading. One hailed from Italy, and the other from modern-day Turkey. One was sanctified by the colonial decree of the Portuguese Crown, and the other by the twenty-first century orders of municipal government through pressures by syncretic Afro-Brazilian spiritual followers who saw in the marginalized and demoted saint a warrior spirit of the oppressed. One has assumed the forms of a contemporary elite, and the other of popular mobilization. One tends to be celebrated in and around the centre of today's city, and the other more toward the suburbs. Yet the recent decree to officialize the patron saint of the people, so it seems, not only incorporates the guardian of the oppressed, São Jorge of the downtrodden, but also, of the oppressor. São Jorge's warrior spirit belongs as much to the oppressed (circulating, after all, through circuits of the repressed and syncretic) as to the oppressor (or more precisely, the enforcers of those in power, the military and its policing institution in Rio and Brazil, at large).

Syncretized as guardian of the hunters, São Sebastião reigns over the (im)productive and cultivations of varied kinds (following in the forms of Oxóssi). São Jorge, syncretized as warrior whose means, often supernatural and prophetic, can turn against that which it is to serve, is sought after to help people fight for what responds to one's needs, opening possibilities for the constructive as well as the destructive (following in the forms of Ogum). Both forces, taken up through masculinized syntaxes of power, however diversely staged, emerge from and respond to a shared scenario. They are different forms of going to battle, whose spirits often cross (and whose syncretizations and symbolizations vary, in fact, depending on context). These are struggles to develop the kind of city that we want, which can defend itself against the undesirable. Both, on balance, are of a hunting spirit. They dramatize for us conflicts over values and orientations of living – the cultivated and the forceful, the recognized and the disempowered – *metonymic* rather than metaphoric. Both focal points of citywide holidays, they are celebrated as processions other than ordinary, yet not at all extraordinary. In these processions, the everyday is suspended (e.g. no work) and made conscious (e.g. in rite). They give another name to the confrontations of our day to day. Not a function of literality or estrangement, these symbols of a particular kind of faith in our city need not transfer or carry over that which it renames.

As limit points of (in)formality, appeals to our guarding spirits are neither strictly ceremonial (i.e. the secular rendering of the ritual), nor do they compose festivities of disorder or spontaneous eruptions. These moments of reverence express the same raw material of the mundane world and its rites, perhaps with more vigour or coherence. Self-consciously, in these (re)enactments of our faith, we face modes that stress aspects of

daily life – whether by reinforcing, neutralizing, or inverting. Differences in degree rather than quality? “The message is not the code”, we have heard more than once.²⁷⁵ That is, we cannot take phenomena of any nature by their constitutive elements. It is necessary to de-ritualize rites of our everyday, so as to make out what they are doing for us, here and now. What the peaceable co-existence of our two patrons reminds us is that, between the cosmic and the historical, between authority and the masses, between routine and ritual, between the planned and the spontaneous, between order and disorder, between the official and the non-official, and ultimately, between the formal and the informal of our (extra)ordinary processions, we can narrate our worlds with a tighter grasp – precision, redefined.

What are we home to? Who is welcome, on what grounds? A place, lived and perceived and conceived, need not be coherent to exhibit coherence.²⁷⁶ The reproductions of inhabited space, whereby the past is brought into the present, is not reducible to form, (in)formalisms – to a form imposed upon things, people, and (im)materialities variously grasped. Neither transparent nor opaque, spaces are overlaid in the imagining and construction of a place, of particular locations and qualities, and the saints who guide us to their different yet interacting worlds. Far from a closed or logical system, codings and

²⁷⁵ For a grounded elaboration of these modes of approaching the guiding myths and rituals of a modern nation, refer to Carioca anthropologist, Roberto DaMatta’s *Carnavais, Malandros, e Heróis: Para uma Sociologia do Dilema Brasileiro* (Carnivals, Malandros, and Heroes: For a Sociology of the Brazilian Dilemma) – notably the first chapter on social processes and meaning-making in urban context.

²⁷⁶ For a conceptual elaboration of urban forms of analysis capable of grasping such coherence, refer to Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space*. Also helpful are the contemporary renditions of Actor Network Theory, of the likes of Bruno Latour’s “Paris-Ville Invisible”, which integrate inter-subjective and inter-objective relations in a coherent analysis of the urban experience.

decodings signal to the interaction between subjects and their surroundings, wherein objects similarly in-form how we are guided through places of our inhabitancy.

Our patrons' battles, indeed, may be fought on different terrains. The battle of officialdom is one over people's bodies and souls – pandemics of the healthy and the sick, over which São Sebastião reigns. São Jorge's battle is against the Dragon. Dragons conjure as much threat as they do vigour, worshipped and feared as they are. Supernatural battles of that which, and those whom, we exclude and marginalize, become symbols of everyday realities.

Traversing the city, any and all of its residents is always called to be *na batalha*, 'at battle', with an attentive walk. Invoking São Jorge we are concurrently invoking the Dragon, which ultimately is an invocation to overcome the battles of everyday life, never foreseeable in a city of multiple and overlapping authorizations. So unforeseeable that the logic of friend and enemy is seldom of help here. There is a lived and urgent sense that, at any moment, anyone can be your friend. So too, at any point, anyone can line up along enemy lines. So we face constant conquest, seduction. What Cariocas want *to be comes* about in this context – not from an innate self, but identities constructed and reconstructed in battle. This is not a one-time battle, hence why the Dragon is never depicted dead within effigies and illustrations depicting their intertwined struggle. Integrated, never negated or eliminated, the dragon puts us in our place, vigilantly. The place where we want to be (and yet may not always be). The other half of our reality, of our selves, finds harmony, not in an absence of conflict, but in its dynamic equilibrium – a learning to live with. And in this open confrontation, of the Dragon with São Jorge, we

find the idealized codes of conduct and self-fashionings in a city like Rio. Rios. Perhaps one of the principal reasons why so many Brazilians, especially those whose city compelled the beloved patron into official non-official status, hold such respect for São Jorge, comes from this necessity for a warrior-saint who is a winner (*vencedor*), alongside São Sebastião, our warrior-saint, full of arrows and ornamenting his wounds, who won (*vencido*).

In cities of (in)formalities elsewhere inconceivable, the Dragons of this world and beyond, of battles won and lost, call us to navigate, occupy, and resist multiple (in)visible orders in (extra)ordinary ways. And São Jorge's official non-official stewardship prevails in showing us the way, when the obvious is anything but natural...

*Eu estou vestido com as roupas e as armas de Jorge
Para que meus inimigos tenham mãos
E não me toquem
Para que meus inimigos tenham pés
E não me alcancem
Para que meus inimigos tenham olhos
E não me vejam
E nem mesmo pensamento eles possam ter
Para me fazerem mal²⁷⁷*

I am clad with the clothing and arms of Jorge
So that my enemies have hands
And do not touch me
So that my enemies have feet
And do not reach me
So that my enemies have eyes
And do not see me
And not even thoughts they may possess
That do me wrong

²⁷⁷ See Lamas' study on *São Jorge: A Saga do Santo Guerreiro* for further contextualization of this guiding prayer, which has served as inspiration for many popular symbols, music, and expressions in contemporary Brazil.

Once upon a time, in a land far, far away... There was a city, a peculiarly happy city, happy not in the sense of without sadness, but happy in the sense that its sadness was integral to the whole, the means and end and ultimate enabler of its happiness. Here the father of pleasure, is the son of pain.²⁷⁸ Messengers and travellers afar have told stories of such cities – of discoveries, marvels, and yearnings for the footings of the good life. One, Marco Polo, brought forth myriad living accounts of cities visible and invisible to our mind's eye...

No one remembers what need or command or desire drove Zenobia's founders to give their city this form, and so there is no telling whether it was satisfied by the city as we see it today, which has perhaps grown through successive superimpositions from the first, now undecipherable plan. But what is certain is that if you ask an inhabitant of Zenobia to describe his vision of a happy life, it is always a city like Zenobia that he imagines, with its pilings and its suspended stairways, a Zenobia perhaps quite different, a-flutter with banners and ribbons, but always derived by combining elements of that first model.

That said, it is pointless trying to decide whether Zenobia is to be classified among happy cities or among the unhappy. It makes no sense to divide cities into these two species, but rather into these two: those that through the years and the changes continue to give their form to desires, and those in which desires either erase the city or are erased by it.²⁷⁹

Like Zenobias, real and imagined, Rios de Janeiro is, in legend, a happy city. Or at the very least, the city reflects to its inhabitants visions of what a happy life could be, was, is. Normalized as syntax (rather than mood), this disposition makes of us self-styled cordial

²⁷⁸ “O pai do prazer, O filho da dor” (The father of pleasure, The son of pain) is what we learn of a Brazilian way of life, from Caetano's Velosos' exemplary samba-song, “Desde que o Samba é Samba” (Since Samba is Samba, 1993).

²⁷⁹ In Calvino's *Invisible Cities*, we hear of paradigmatic accounts of a dying empire, from a traveller to its ruler, in which cities are re-membered, desired, and designed, such as through this description of Zenobia in “Thin Cities” (35).

subjects, masters in the art of lightness. So happy is Rios, that its sadness can be nothing other than tragic. Doomed, only by fate's interceptions.

Only here are the poor, humble. Only here are the ordinary, criminal. Brazilianly unBrazilian, these cordial praises and insults bind, blind.

Inversion, a turning in upon itself, gives the city's form to desire. In moments of carnivalesque escape, every year, the ritual that fills the streets and actualizes democracy as a flattening of a society's rules, positions, and norms, gives the city's form over to desire. It renders the street the self-conscious stage of everyday interactions. Men transform into women, the poor into nobilities, the rich into the humbled: at large, what lies suppressed or degraded becomes the raw material for fantasies of all sorts...²⁸⁰ Far from exceptional, it amplifies.

Desires, projected outward, othered or overturned, erase the city or are erased by it. In the carnivalesque reorientations, we also find festivities of order, of reinforcement and neutralization that generate desires that belie the city's forms in masqueraded processions of inverted flights (and captures) from the norm. If the desire is communion, it highlights the divisions traversed. If the desire is escape, it leaves us in abandon, hung-over. We find ourselves in landfills of things lost and forgotten that we wish we could remember, and things committed to memory that we wish we could forget. If the desire is freedom, it exhausts us in self-negation. Erasing its own desires, the desires that brought into being this very realization, the city remains fortified as an open stage of self-surveillance.

²⁸⁰ See DaMatta's ethnographic accounts of the carnivalesque form in Brazilian context, for a symptomatic depiction of the role of these moments of order and disorder in contemporary Brazil (*Carnavais, Malandros e Heróis*).

In order to keep up with the actors on the stage, it is not a matter of detecting the visible and invisible (places, people, things, or what have you), but a question of perceiving (dis)guise, assumed appearance and conduct – not a masking of, but a fashioning of. Processes nothing (un)intentional, neither individual nor social, our interpreters go nowhere if their critical spirit is one of unmasking, of unveiling structures or truths otherwise configured. The guise is not the obstacle to, but the revelation of. It is about giving audience. Giving audience to actors and interpreters, always already im-
part-ial.

Within or beyond festivities and commemorations of (dis)order, we need not discover, uncover, recover cities of desire, or desired cities, as all-encompassing structures of a good life, of a happy and well-disposed society. The will to recreate the world in our image, a modern disposition to engineer harmony and functionality for our everyday, exhibits to us proper composition and free circulation as rules and norms for occupation and displacement, which necessarily require vigilant and disciplinary approaches to movement, that is, a hygienist politics. Everything in its place, becomes the desire of control. Navigating the city, we encounter worlds in which inconsistency is the rule, and the rule is the exception. Even more, we encounter excess. Sciences of the city that reproduce knowledges and practices of rational-ized modellings of a place, may or may not pass through totalizing structures of a society, state, or the inter-institutional imaginings of coherence, of a coherent place.²⁸¹ Against conventional conceptions of

²⁸¹ For historical accounts of these attempts at urban management and analysis, see José Cláudio Sooma Silva's study of turn of the century Rio in "Cidade Maravilhosa: Encontros e Desencontros nos Projetos de Remodelação Urbana da Capital entre 1902 e

totalizing units, society or what have you, here in the city we can trace what orders and locates, what brings together and pushes apart, that is, what gives rhythm and pace to the everyday.²⁸² Our eye to the surface of things need not be superficial. What we see does not totalize what is seen, takes are always retaken. Layers can be thin. The many actors on the city's stages are not all on board the same project, with or without intention. To ally ourselves exclusively with what and whom is honest (transparent?), is to perpetuate the problem of corruption. We must learn to accept what is given, at its surface. We must learn to play with the terms of the game, rather than escape into worlds otherwise defined.

Even in the most seemingly democratic of spaces (i.e. carnival, beaches, football fields, and other festive sites dreamt liberatory, or at least transcendent of everyday divisions) access may be less restricted, but the management of these spaces of democratic interchange is far from free and open. There is a moral-ized management over spaces juridically democratic, yet that in practice bring about a certain kind of appropriation of the city. Our myths of democracy as open to all, exemplified and trained for in moments of carnivalesque escape and other commemorations of order, propagate a dangerous mystification of spaces of social harmony. Social cleansing becomes the response to preempted threats to such imagined orders. In fact, the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) that has become the standard of politics in today's Rios, and its reflections and

1927" (Marvellous City: Encounters and Misencounters in Urban Remodelling Projects in the Capital between 1902 and 1927).

²⁸² For further development of the methodological implications of an urban point of departure, neither individualistic or social in bent, see Latour's "Paris: Ville Invisible" project, alongside local attempts to think inter-subjectivities and inter-objectivities of city life in the "assymetrical" contexts of Rio's divided and unequal centres and peripheries, in *A Cidade e as Formas de Viver* (Castro et al).

reproductions of our privileged modes of urbanization, show us the (dis)guises of such exclusivity, in a discourse of (re)capturing the city.

What's at stake? When we respond to threat, our responses are based on self-protection, from the apparent need for certainty, closure, consistency, familiarity, and other comforting semblances of order. A threat-oriented politics, intolerant of ambiguity, may be easier to satisfy, to content with, yet its conservatism impedes a fuller comprehension that goes beyond the problem of aversive stimuli. To train ourselves otherwise, it is necessary to face politics as not primarily a problem of the argumentation of ideas (of the likes of the for/against debates of truths and principles), but as a function of perception and sensibility. The operation of politics – and its deliberations in media, networks, and classrooms – remains largely premised on if and how minds can be changed, by the best facts and arguments and such. More often than not, the result is gridlock. Yet what if it is a matter of different ways of perceiving the world? In any case, the injustices of this world that so often come out of a place of hatred, even though passing through rationalizations of myriad sorts, call for responses that come out of a similarly emotive place. If the problem is fear, for instance, it is fear that must be confronted.

Orders are not invoked as complete totalizations, and disorders and resistances as a break to the whole. Such rationalizations of society, public but unseen, built for the generic citizen, instates peripheries as states of exception, of partial totalizations and breakdowns of order – unruly, illegal, informal, and asymmetrical. The problem of the third world is then conceived through such asymmetries (of milieu). In fear, conditions of insecurity are applied to re-establish an idealized order, whose counterpart is hospitality

in a hostile and dangerous world, in function of peace. In these ways, we tend to prefer to face violence as an act of exception, as a deviation from the civilizing process, when, in effect, much of the violence made manifest (whether through wars or policing of varied sorts) is in the name of civilization and the preservation of its humanistic values. If we think of violence as a function of evil, and disorder as malady or escape, we are simply unable to grasp how these moments work. How it is that excess is contained. Yet orders are, in fact, guides to a governmental logic of (dis)trust. They are a matter of in whose authority we place our trust, when, where.

Another way to put it is that the chief difference between uniforms and costumes – in processions of orders variously imagined, for discipline or escape – are their staging. What breaks out of the ordinary, if ritualistic, moralized, or otherwise protected by games of recognition, does not necessarily enter the extraordinary. Between the routine and the extraordinary, between work and play, the unforeseen (however explicitly subversive or not) takes us to a middle ground between the planned but uncontrolled. This is the realm of the carnivalesque, that is, the spontaneous. And it is the politics of the (extra)ordinary that polices our desires and expectations, the stuff of politics.

To put desire to form, we thus need to ask... In which Rios de Janeiro do we live? How are they inhabited, constructed, and fabulated? Beyond the containments of policing and social cleansing, what effects, standards, and intermediaries do we use to assess these Rios? Which pathways, competencies, and forces do we invoke to accompany these navigations? What kind of urban politics do we stage, toward recreating what kind of city? Ultimately, what can these Rios do? *Poder*: the Portuguese word whose noun

signifies power and whose verb designates to do, the capacity, authority, or possession of what is necessary to make things happen. This is the problem of power.²⁸³

The power of desire, the desire of power. What the city's order seems to promise is a site of civilizational work, of the urbane. Tracing the city, we find the bases of affirming enlightenment and civility, that is, that which illuminates the path, against the shadows of rural, superstitious, or delayed worlds variously defined. Subjected, the verticality of the city evokes imaginaries of ascension and progress, the modern (dys)utopic project. From these spaces of integration and segregation, we find the fields in which to face the problems otherwise captured by developmental projects, scaled at a distance. We find the politics of transformation.

The (dis)ilusions of the carnivalesque are not about an escaping from reality into an unreality, about normalized and disciplined (generic!) citizens enacting their repressed personalities or imprisonment within hierarchical positions and relations. What we see, more often than not, is an internal inversion, a play with different positionalities, on the same stage, not a different one. This is the stage on which negotiations that assume unfixed orders compose our everyday games, spaces not of institutional vacuums (or otherwise anarchic), but of inter-institutional navigations. Herein we can face the ambiguities of the carnivalesque as limit points of informality, and the ceremonial as the limit point of formality. A putting into focus of mediations, otherwise.

To tease apart layers of (super)impositions, of cities of desire, of desired cities, we need maps not in space, but that trace orientations and disorientations of the a/e-effects of a good life. In this way, we can affirm how we want to live, where, as goes, all the world

²⁸³ To follow these pathways in the Rio-context, see the groundbreaking edited collection series, *A Cidade e as Formas de Viver* (Castro et al).

is a stage – where what we dis-play makes way for transforming our realities, where fantasies as much as realities are the stuff that gets us to where we want to be. More than a victory of illusion, it is a coming to terms with its infiltration, via the carnivalesque spotlight on lines always already blurred. The politics of sensibility implicates far more than industries and sciences organized around the politics of knowledge. Otherwise the dictatorship of reason would have conquered all by now.

Living at the edge of the largest urban landfill in the world – that made way for one of Latin America’s largest urban parks, preserved as a UNESCO cultural heritage site²⁸⁴ – it is virtually impossible to refuse taking in the illusions and disillusion of a modernity never to be realized, day after day. Freeways – the monumental groundwork of a promised auto-mobility – separate the city from nature. In one direction, we see jungles of greens and blues, and in the other, jungles of concrete. Standing at its crossroad, either you look out onto the Bay, which gave birth to Rio de Janeiro as the second of three failed attempts to set up an orderly capital from which to usher in the country of the future, or, you turn your back to the waves crashing endlessly on the shore so as to look out onto the barricade of skyscrapers, which, opens before us, comparably epic, as some of the southern hemisphere’s first testaments to (inter)national growth. From a preserved nature, spectacular to behold, both the city and its counterpoint become theatres of opposing forces.

Even within these limits, within the frontiers of the park baptized by its condition of embankment, *a-terro*, out of sight is never out of mind. It is precisely the containment of chaos as much as order that the landfills of modernity attempt to preserve. The *aterro* that filled in and pushed out (pushed in?) the meeting of land and sea along the opening of Rio’s Bay, made real this dream of modernity. Its cultivated backdrop and manicured

²⁸⁴ The *Aterro do Flamengo*, administered by the City of Rio as a leisure complex of 1,200,000 square metres, was inaugurated in 1965 during Brazil’s military regime, and later enshrined in 2012 as patrimony and historical greens to be internationally protected (Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional, 2012).

frame only accentuates the exuberance that breaks through the otherwise landscaped greenway that monopolizes the coastline of the city.

As in the dreams that stir our nights, we have little control over their myriad possible manifestations. Indeed, dreams all too readily turn into nightmares, distinguished one way or another when we awake and make sense of impressions marked onto our sweaty bodies. Just because we may not be ready to classify our dreams one way or another in our sleep, does not make them any less real. And so, too, the dreams of a modernity in search of order and progress exceed the orientations of a tropical civilization poised for self-realization, evermore. Always looking beyond, we incessantly ask, are we there yet? It seems more time may be spent in the future, envisioned to regulate the present of peripheries longing to live the dream.

The *aterro* turns from dream to nightmare to dream again at every dawn and dusk. In the light of day, it becomes a vision of paradise, an oasis of spectacular beauty, insulated from the cars rushing by its boundaries and city noises at large, via rows of imperial palm trees swinging tall from left to right. On the grass, we picnic on blankets metres from the freeways, yet worlds away. On the boardwalk that holds in the beach, couples stroll, bikes are for rent, and everything that you could wish to consume comes your way. On the sand, joggers and teams playing football and foot-volley, encircled by kiosks selling coconut water, beer, and salty and sweet accompaniments. To top it off, basketball courts line the park, as symbols of alternative conquests in the land of football. Perhaps the dream is made real – pinch, pinch – in the ocean that extends beyond, where the pollution of the Bay keeps the health-conscious away. The sewage treatment plant that cuts across the park also leaves its stench. Yet, on the whole, in our little piece of

paradise, we get to experience a place where things work, where we got it right, neat and orderly with everyone and everything in its place, a place where even first-worlders would be impressed, where simulation surpasses reality. Beauty, on display. Contained, it offers us glimpses of what a Europe in the tropics could look like.

In the darkness, abundance turns into abandonment. The freeways that mark off nature from the city create an isolation that gates, in themselves, could never institute. Looking up, we catch a glimpse of one of the brightest lights in the city's dimmed horizon, our north star, for all extents and purposes, the statue of Christ Our Redeemer with that lone gaze out to the Bay, arms stretched wide to embrace a city, back turned to the suburbs. When the sun sets over his mountain pedestal, the *aterro* lives in its shadows. With lightposts simulating moonlights, the entirety of the park stands deserted.²⁸⁵ Cut off from urban life, not even the police enter upon request, the many requests coming from one of the city's foremost points for assault and robbery. The hundreds of stray cats that prowl through heavily bushed nooks and crannies under sunlight, have full range at night, with few disturbances or prompts to share their territories with others. Aside from the few courageous men who take the risk of abandonment over that of exposure, below the rock at the queer hook-up spots by the sea, few adventure into the paradise at night.

How quickly the same space transforms in sunlight as opposed to moonlight, in rain as opposed to shine, on weekdays and weekends. The sun dictates. On rainy days, you see more orange jumpsuits, brooms in hand, than bodies otherwise disposed.

²⁸⁵ See the 2013 film release of *Flores Raras* (Rare Flowers, adapted in English as *Reaching for the Moon*) for romanticized accounts of the park's coming to be, narrated from the perspective of its designer, Lota Macedo Soares (Barreto).

Cariocas, after all, do not venture out in the rain. The threat of orders undone, inundated. Perhaps herein we find one of the best definitions of the third world: at the first drop of rain, state of emergency is declared. Visitors beware.

The imposition of order – whether under the threat of rain, darkness, or perils humanly authored – unearths a governmental logic of dis/mis/trust. Faith, doubt, certainty, suspicion, diffidence, among its other markers, is the stuff that politics channels. What to occupy, how. How to conduct, whom. Confidence, or the lack thereof, in one’s own ability or worth, and that of others, drives the dynamics of (inter)dependence. Who is entrusted, when and where. What kind of citizen to nurture, in spaces thus tailored?

When the French were our guides, we remodelled the city in the image of an unpolluted civilization, archetypically open for circulation of a hygienist politics. Large boulevards framed by luxuriant treetops and rounded off by public squares, decorated city centres. There were vaccine revolts and, as always, transport riots, with mass expulsions, demolitions, and invasions. With engineers as mayors, functionality, harmony, and discipline were the standards of the everyday.²⁸⁶ The modernity of the times, responding to the demands of capital at the turn of the century, applied vigilance to aspects of daily life that until then were ruled by a circumstantial logic of occupation and dislocation of a new urban environment. Favelas consolidated.

²⁸⁶ For a historical overview of changing urban management practices in Rio, refer to Sooma Silva’s “Cidade Maravilhosa: Encontros e Desencontros nos Projetos de Remodelação Urbana da Capital entre 1902 e 1927”.

When the Americans became our predominant guides, landfills created spaces to be otherwise zoned. Grandiose passageways and narrow corridors were contained. Management for growth, for self-directing citizens. Upright citizens began to wear cotton, not wool. Standards were readapted to convenience. Favelas disintegrated. Hope and despair governed attachments to auto-mobility, with the fixed forgotten.

Now, going back a bit, when the Portuguese were our guides, when the city of Rio, the imperial capital, depended on the resources of the Iberian Crown, resources and functions were concentrated in the core of the city, for centuries leaving a fragmented interior, sparsely populated, only later to be occupied with coffee plantations. Based on slave labour, such development did not readily lend itself to the formation of networks in the city. The metropolization of Rio moved along lines and points, whose concentration of wealth, services, and populations continues to render the city dependent on federal resources, increasingly limited at present.

Rios de Janeiro, un/excavated...dis/mis/oriented.

The dreams of modernity of an ex-imperial capital do not lend themselves with much ease to the demands of efficiency of today's projections. They end up requiring that a lot of things be dug up, buried, extended. Cities constructed as landing posts (for territorial integration), as engines (for growth), as monuments (to greatness), manifest themselves in and against nature. Our nature, their nature...whose nature? Rio now comes in second place.²⁸⁷ Not São Sebastião, nor São Jorge, São Paulo got it right. A city that grew, organically, economically, via coffee investments, not by imperial decree and bureaucratic entanglements. Today, our professed economic locomotive, symbol of

²⁸⁷ For a comparative study of two distinctive processes of metropolization, Rio vs. São Paulo, see the edited collection, *A Cidade e as Formas de Viver* (Castro et al).

financial success and entrepreneurial spirit, by excellence, our concrete jungle, offers models of what our way out could be, hope to become an advanced nation, at last.

Economic Man vs. Political Man? When the city whose reign gave us visions of paradise, like those captured at the shores of the *aterro*, lost its status as capital, to Brasília, what remained of its unfocused machine was a bureaucratic engine that became obstacle rather than resource for development, or so we tend to complain. Monuments left behind attest to the scale of inefficiencies.

In any case, the city is to be distrusted. Markers of twentieth century Brazilian modernization – accelerated urbanization in metropolitan centres, with an interventionist central government – rendered local representatives synonymous with colonels, despised figures of an anachronistic past, at best, manipulated by central powers. And so we get the devaluation of local administration, that is, an interventionist legacy motivated by distrust of colonelism.²⁸⁸ And so we get the suppression of the training grounds of democracy, so to speak, the city and its varied sites of sociability (e.g. neighbourhoods, communities, schools), where we find the most proximity between voters and the elected, between the representatives and the represented. That is, if democracy is to be more than referrals to national or juridical solutions. As follows, the Brazilian dilemma, the dilemma of societies seen as victims (in the shadows of corruption discourses) reinforces a kind of city-blaming, where local officials are deemed to be necessarily inefficient, ideological, delayed or anachronistic, and ultimately incapable of responding to the

²⁸⁸ For a cotemporary analysis of these dynamics, from an urban management perspective of three-time Mayor of Jundiaí, see Miguel Haddad's *Coisa de Paulista: No Interior um País que dá Certo* (A Thing of São Pauloites: In the Interior a Country that gets it Right).

challenges of economic development and the construction of a national future in an era of networks, geopolitical and virtual. Yet if new valorizations of local power, management, and innovation increasingly called for in visions of decentralization, according to which democratic progress does not depend on the enlightened guidance of great leaders but on each and every one's visions (e.g. neoliberalism?), where does that leave us, (un)guided?

Orientalized are the misguided of a Europe in the tropics. People, subjects of tyranny. Populism, subjugating immediatism. Thus to induce individuation for representation and competition for growth, architectonic restructuring is required.²⁸⁹

Planning as politics. To effectively free ourselves, once and for all, of underdevelopment, and rise to the status of a developed country, we must remould the pathways of the third world, of citizens-to-be. Delegate. Is Brazil the new China? China, the old Brazil? Take-offs, abound.

The strong state and the weak state are different sides of the same coin: assuming a certain kind of autonomy of the state, institutional reform will keep things in order. The belief that only a science of interests can do away with the outdated customs and traditions of a delayed Brazil relies upon an apolitical rupture on an institutional plane.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹ Explanations of the Brazil's developmental 'delay' rely heavily on Weberian renderings of a politically oriented capitalism (as if other forms were apolitical), depicted as authoritarian and transposed from an Orientalist discourse: the quasi-Oriental character of the neo-patrimonial Brazilian state, set against the legal-rational manifestation of idealized modern systems of governance, remains our starting point of analysis. In this context, the *Aterro*, as an offspring of Brazil's second dictatorship (1965), brings to light these (de)politicizations of modern developmental planning. See Maria Silvia de Carvalho Franco's classic critique, *Homens Livres na Ordem Escravocrata* (Free Men in the Slavocratic Order), discussed in Part II of this dissertation, for further (dis)engagement with these Weberian hauntings.

²⁹⁰ See Carioca sociologist and political scientist, Luiz Werneck Viana's "Caminhos e Descaminhos da Revolução Passiva à brasileira" (Pathways and Missed Pathways of the Passive Revolution in Brazil) for a politicizing analysis of the universal and particular

In passive revolutions, as they have come to be known, what is being altered is the relationship of (dis)trust between state and society. Not too unlike society vs. the state or state vs. society, the dilemma of sociability (that is, the mode of socializing properly equipped and disposed citizens) aligns itself with the problem of public/private. These two problems/solutions, often translated into institutional reform vs. character or moral reform are unearthed, in the *aterro*, as the same problem: at stake is not the problem of separating out nature from the city, people from institutions, as modes of planning, but dealing with the governmental logic of des/trust that binds them.

More interesting, still, than its revelation of a model of poor urban planning, the *aterro* is a model of urbanity, redefined. The Carioca urbanity is moving, layered, staged, with each dynamic working differently as modes of occupation. Instead of treating the city as a homogeneous whole, in which centres and peripheries are demarcated – something in which the *aterro* does not fit (shifting night and day, rain and shine along demarcated zones of the city – we need to pay attention to stagings and multiple forms and functions that zoning and juridical demarcations do not capture. We would need to tear up the freeways that cut across and divide city from nature, and weave them through other paths. Free circulation is not the answer. At night, in the *aterro*, for instance, there are few impediments, other than violence. Violence is the response of circulations freely and authoritatively structured. This mode of planning as politics, this political ethos, leaves us few other options with which to respond. When even the police will not enter into the *aterro* at night, armed and trained in the syntax of violence, something went wrong. The *aterro*'s paradisiacal gates of soaring and swinging palm trees need to be

tensions in processes of democratization, that is, in the separation of spheres and modes of governing in contemporary Brazil.

revealed for what they are: divisions more fixed than barbed wires could ever impose.

The dreams of modernity generate its nightmares. Inequality is what happens when we go for equality. Other measures are needed to deal with problems that arise. We need to look to what the milieu asks for, rather than aiming to contain spaces of order, and spaces of chaos. To put it otherwise, the *aterro* is begging to be dug up. This is what happens when basketball courts are built up in the land of football. We are left within fields that, in their disguise, show us what it means for a third world to orient itself to be-come the first world: excess, contained.

My first time, at gunpoint, I was treated like a princess. I even got to be – I was chosen as – his girlfriend. That way we drew less attention from the cops who prefer to be stationed at posts nearer to the shopping hubs. Some eight or so lanes of sombrous freeways separated us from them. Me, a family of five (mom, dad, three girls under the age of ten), what to a passerby could look like my suitable pair (matched in height, gender, and classed aesthetics), and the man with whom I was to be, in fact, paired.

– “I don’t want any documents”, muttered the thin but steady voice coming up behind us. The menacing figure was short in stature, and on this balmy summer night, was fully clad in a beige jacket, pressed and zipped to the collar. With a straight face, he repeats himself, volume unaltered. Cash and cell phones are passed along, discretely. Let’s not frighten the children.

“The Brazilian crime is cordial: it does not keep its distance, but prefers to pass through the body.”²⁹¹

As time slowed, we continued to sort through our belongings for valuables. After being reprimanded for my initial mistake of handing over the backpack in its entirety, I began to sort more carefully. Slowly, ever so slowly, so as not to raise suspicion of an interaction other than normal. Confrontation, elicits immediate re-action: it is of crisis mode. Negotiation is deliberative and tense: it is of everyday frictions. Negotiation is

²⁹¹ In reflections on the lived endurance of the classic (self)perception of Brazilian (under)development – that of the cordial civilization – the groundbreaking edited collection, *Cordialidade à brasileira: Mito ou Realidade?* (Cordiality à brasileira: Myth or Reality?) offers the following polemic for us to contemplate, in context: “O crime brasileiro é cordial: ele não guarda as distâncias, prefere passar pelo corpo” (Rocha et al, 39, translation and italics mine).

when questions of strategy, of right and wrong, and so forth come to the fore. What to hand over? In crisis, much of this is decided for you. Hand it all over. All I wanted to do was hand it all over. But I had to decide. I had to engage and disengage, with care.

This is no place for heroes. Now it was time to confer our honesty and judgement. By this point, my recently avowed boyfriend lost confidence in me, and so got real close to be of better judge. With beige-suited arms wrapped around my shoulders, I negotiated my fare home, followed by other negotiations that were to demonstrate my empowerment and disempowerment, at one and the same time. Respect.

— “I’m not so shameless to leave you fareless without your *Bilhete Único*”, I hear to the backdrop of cars dashing by. Between the occasional words of guidance, the gun is flashed, and authority foreclosed.

You only need to be nervous if you are hiding something, so they say. Why did I hand it all over so hastily, at first reaction? With distrust, negotiations intensify.

— “See what you are making me do now?” A more banalized form of *machismo* we could not find within the four walls of any Brazilian home.

He walks away, with a smirk glancing back. We wait.

“The Brazilian crime is cordial: it does not keep its distance, but prefers to pass through the body.”

After a mugging or comparable assaults, what is taken from you is your capacity to trust and distrust, your power of judgement. You react to the abrupt, the rest is negotiated.

“The Brazilian crime is cordial...”

Negotiations come in varied forms.

Banalized discourses of crime, both academic and popular, tend to delve into questions of the psychological [i.e. the age-old dispute of passion vs. reason and (un)calculated motives] and the social (i.e. nature vs. nurture), and at its most sophisticated, the problem of moral judgement, questions of power and privilege, and so forth. Origin stories, and their individualized and socialized causes (that is, schemes of causality), will often relate back to the constitution of the governing institutions of the land. Our socializations (what binds the individual to society, conceptually speaking) end up serving as indictments of good or bad institutions, concerned with what is provided, lacking, and enforced across formally demarcated private and public spaces. Whether violated or corrupted, laws are the measure. “Why”, we are left asking?

When the problem is individual (such is the favourite, psychopathy), it is depoliticized through practices of medicalization and juridical exceptionalism. When the problem is social (for instance, poverty or inequality), we lose ourselves in tautologies, whereby the deprivation or injustice is seen as generating crime in ways that fail to distinguish how forms of crime that require fewer resources and technical capabilities (e.g. theft, robbery, and minor trafficking) are easier to prove and process than more complex forms of crime (e.g. embezzlement and corruption). Not to mention the interest of the powerful in keeping certain kinds of people behind bars and not others. In Brazil, for instance, 80% of those incarcerated are locked away for theft, robbery, and minor trafficking (not incidentally, the statistics that represent the proportion of poor and black incarcerated populations reach nearly the same levels).²⁹²

²⁹² For further contextualization of the latest statistics on crime in Brazil, refer to Pitts’ overview of the *Direito* 2012 study.

Theories of controls, proliferated by criminologists and taken up by interested parties both within and beyond government corridors, habitually privilege: (i) self-control, a process of negotiating internal and external commitments, most notably aligned along legitimated social rules and norms; (ii) fear of punishment, whose major inhibitive force mobilizes more so the certainty of punishment than its extent; and (iii) informal social control, that is, uncodified social norms and moral principles, such as shame.²⁹³ In Brazilian cases, the latter is often cited as one of the primary perpetrators, within cultural contexts that apparently celebrate the most creative and resourceful ways of taking advantage of inherited conditions and situations. Of making do. The trickster, and the ways of *malandragem*, are idealized modes of conduct projected onto our national identity, often reduced as juxtapositions to ideal types of honesty and work ethics presumed to reign in civilized nations afar. In a slavocratic milieu where to follow the law can so often be experienced as absurd, nonsense, unwise, or at the very least, conservative and square, how to navigate our priorities for ourselves and beloved is anything but obvious. So much so that in Latin America, the legendary land of the semi-civilized, the archetypal criminal is, in the end, the politician. Outlaws? At large, criminals are ‘marginals’, that is, within our own, not outside society, as the calls for wars on crime seem to indict.²⁹⁴ The violence that precedes the decision to follow, break,

²⁹³ For a physiognomy of crime, as it is so often referenced, see Rio-based anthropologist and political scientist, Luiz Eduardo Soares’ analyses in “Segurança Pública: Presente e Futuro” (Public Security: Present and Future), as well as key points in the popular 2012 interview, “A Origem da Criminalidade no Brasil” (The Origin of Criminality in Brazil, Vergara).

²⁹⁴ For a provocative analysis of criminality in Rio, and the dynamic of practices of disorder and social control, see Vera Malaguti Batista’s 2003 *O Medo na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro: Dois Tempos de Uma História* (Fear in the City of Rio de Janeiro: Two Times

or bend the law, is what, since colonial institutions of governance, has given force to practices and attempts to produce standardized bodies, desirable and disciplined.

Crime, as we know it today, is not exceptional to, but a product of, modern conduct, a way of doing things. In fact, it is more often than not a way of doing business. Within modern individualist ideologies that link valorizations of freedom to an authoritarian conception of power and an ethos of virility, the resources with which to resolve conflict, lack, or provocations of mixed sorts are, by default, violent. The ways in which individuals are mobilized, in-dividuated from their varied affiliations, trigger modes of self-regulation that are founded on values of self-preservation, brought to life through particular performances of (dis)empowered selves.²⁹⁵

Within modern logics of the self, a criminal disposition thus functions in ways strikingly similar to that of an entrepreneur. Both are oriented to seek profit by analyzing risk and even the cost/benefit of penalties and punishments, broadly defined. Both are about a channelling of (a lack of) ambition, of a concentration and commitment often occasioned through educational regimes, that is, pedagogical and disciplinary regimes of subjectification. Different sides of the same coin, these modalities circulate as a sort of modern currency, at its best, hedonistic and consumerist. Criminologists, in bars and universities alike, tend to say that people who normally commit property crimes do not like to work, are averse to routine and discipline, and have too much ambition, however

of One Story). Also helpful here is her 2011 *Introdução Crítica á Criminologia Brasileira* (Critical Introduction to Brazilian Criminology).

²⁹⁵ For further development of these notions of “a culture of violence” and its enabling “normalizations”, see Carolina Christoph Grillo’s “O ‘Morro’ e a ‘Pista’: Um Estudo Comparativo de Dinâmicas do Comércio Ilegal de Drogas” (The Hill and the Asphalt: A Comparative Study of the Dynamics of the Illegal Drug Trade – Note: in Rio, “the hill” is a common way of revering to a favela, a presumably less urbanized, i.e. asphalted, place).

interpreted. These criminal figures of our modern imaginary live off risk, motivated by self-assessments of superior intelligence or tact by which to maximize profits through circuitous or illicit activities. Hence the circle comes full round to the politician or entrepreneur, unveiled as economic animal in their downfall. Whatever the gain, both ambitions mischannelled, in ways that subvert norms and laws, be they juridical or functional, are indictments of the state. We are then left to believe, that a rational and well-functioning state prevents crime, in and of itself, whether at gunpoint or through frauds authored at a guarded distance.

And so proliferate roadmaps to formalization, the preferred policy prescription at large. Security is a state without impunity. Economic growth is to lead to the disappearance of the informal sector. These are the ways to the status of advanced, civilized, and developed nation. Informals are a reserve army, criminals are just an army – us against them. Yet as many economists and UN development experts have been increasingly acknowledging, even with the rise of global trade (after all, trade = growth) more than 60% of employment in developing countries remains in the informal sector.²⁹⁶ There is no margin at which the benefits of formal and informal activities are equalized. Could we not say the same about crime as a breaking of laws? Thus if we are truly interested in dealing with the problem of crime, it is not about disciplining subjects into the law, but addressing a host of other questions around power and distribution, engagement and visibility, and so on and so forth. Informality is thus not an outcome of a well-defined choice theoretic framework. To follow the economic logic, most informal participants are not in there because they feel that the formal sector is too restrictive. So

²⁹⁶ Refer to the 2014 UNIDO Working Paper for a landmark revision of economic thinking on the relationship between formal and informal economies” (Gibson, 49).

much so that formal producers can only stop informal activity through extra-market means, primarily through government capture and subsequent politico-legal pressure. The outcome of informality is more closely aligned with biological constraints since the opportunity cost is not the formal sector's activity, but rather, leisure, as economists like to say, or to put it otherwise, a matter of how we spend our time doing what, a way of living. Until we grasp this key point, we cannot grasp the problem nor solution, of a third world constantly on the brink of take-off. We need to look to what all of this does, rather than is or is not.

The idea that losers or the dejected, more broadly (as exemplified by the poor, as economist reductions would have it) retreat into the informal sector or resort to crime, relies on and perpetuates the myth that illegal activity would be irrational in a well-functioning political system, since the incentives to obey the law are to be built into the system in order for it to qualify as well-functioning. Herein we find the hauntings of the first-world standard. This much-debated question of better institutions is increasingly put in check at a time when flexibilization is the cure-all of the latest world-remaking projects; even the World Bank is suggesting that we apply uncoded norms and practices not only to tolerate and integrate informal sectors, but to adapt informal norms to the formal sector.²⁹⁷ At best, more inclusive (non-extractive) economic and political institutions are being called forth in an age of neoliberalism. Tolerating informality is equivalent, in this sense, to export subsidy, given that the economic structure implies that some producers will have to operate informally. So the question of informals choosing to be informal on the basis of costs and benefits is misleading. It is a matter of different

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

linkages, as both produce output, employ labour, generate savings, make investments, and even export occasionally.

Of course criminality and informality are not to be equalized. Not even their respective umbrellas aptly capture so-classified instantiations (for instance, violent crime vs. property crime, or functional vs. juridical informality, corruption from within vs. parallel or underground markets). But the opting out of the primary institutions governing society is what is at stake, which exceeds questions of survival or rational choice. It is a question of conduct, of values, of desired and desirable ways of living. When we do not pay attention to the ways of livings implicated in (extra)institutional designs, we will remain baffled or otherwise outraged at the problem of crime, and disobedience thus conceived.

The Brazilian crime is, therefore... An (extra)institutional negotiation of inherited conditions. When we become princes and princesses of such exchanges, we are empowering ourselves within certain regimes, presuming their exclusivity to others. Otherwise put, the problem is not anarchy vs. government, or the statist politics of (dis)obedience. Neither is the problem, as such, so much about equality or inequality that presupposes a certain subsumption under a singular and coherent system, dilemmas of internally consistent positionality. The problem is what divides us, and how. The less that we give weight to what divides us, the more that we can integrate a responsive approach, which is not based on pity, shame, guilt, anger, or other short-term reactions to our (dis)illusionments. Otherwise, we are left only with claims to what entitles us to do what,

and are unable to deal with overlapping entitlements, disentanglements historically produced, and contemporary negotiations of such inheritances.

Thus, we do not need to ask why (why, for instance, crime occurs, rises, or falls), but what it does. Why, is for divination. If we wish to feel our feet on the ground, when robbed of all certainty, of the power of judgment in its absolute or relative instantiations, we can ask, what does an assault effect? On that balmy summer night cut off from the policing of official and non-official eyes, on the other side of the freeways, what power did it give me, what power did it give him? What power did it take away? What was robbed, exactly? We could fathom that, the encounter gave him, with its successful execution, a power that he may not otherwise have access to, at first, as a calculative expert, ambitious, and later, for his cleverness and negotiation beyond. It gave me a sense of the vulnerability that comes with mobility, of varied negotiations. How can we respond to these doings? Sensations come and go, passing through our bodies impermanently, yet what stays with us afterward is the clarity of what comes with each role played, that is, of what is in our respective backpacks.

Recognizing these limits and possibilities, we reencounter the politics of (in)security that provides the conditions of development and advancement, as it is dreamt and feared in semi-civilized lands. This is the politics of *sobre-vivência*: survival, of/on/above living, at par. And wherein lies the hope for solving the problem of crime? Until we assume for ourselves the reproduction of these roles, and the visibilities and invisibilities, vulnerabilities and resources, given to each, we will not know what to hand over, when, and where. When we remain preoccupied with drawing the line between good and bad – the heart of the classificatory discourse that is crime and processes of

criminalization, more broadly – we become stuck on frontiers mapped in space, in centres and peripheries as opposed to the multiple orders produced in tension with one another that generate sensations of (in)security, that is, of reevaluations of our place in the navigations of everyday life. Within static geographies of the city, we remain locked in a negotiation of threats and incentives, and as such, can only respond to things outside of ourselves, projected and externalized, rather than relational. Victimized, we can only prevent or react.

It is no coincidence that in Brazil, ‘criminal law’ is called ‘punishment law’. What is lost is always measured against what we presume to have and ought to have: the problem of crime is the problem of entitlement. If we were better able to face entitlement for what it is, and is not, our battle (the interminable war against crime!) would be much simpler, and more effective. It would take classifications, formalities and informalities, as guides, as means rather than ends in themselves. We would be able to ask ourselves the ultimate question of, how do we want to live, together, rather than the question of the chronically insecure, how is it right to live? To put it otherwise, as the problem of crime constantly evokes, morality need not be confused with ethics. Ideologies of good/evil and right/wrong fail in providing us with ethical orientations that can bring to the fore the call to decide the spirit in which we want to live. And this ethos cannot be policed, nor easily taught or imposed; it must be negotiated. It requires an acceptance of the way things are, to begin with, rather than an obsession with the ways that things ought to be – the true obstacle to a third world development. It is in this spirit that we will sense the (im)possibilities of our ways of living together. How it can be most effectively nurtured, however, remains an open question.

You could be waiting in your doctor's office, or hanging around the lobby of your gym. Behind the pallid reception that welcomes you, the café in blue and red is open for your convenience – thank goodness, as you had to skip lunch today to get here on time. Now you just need to find that friendly custodian who manages the bar, to order your sandwich. As you wait for the BLT, you flip through the flyers assorted on the counter that offer you special deals and memberships to an array of timely bargains. And then you remember, you are past due for this year's dental check-up... could this place be trustworthy? And maybe you should consider signing up for some of these yoga and meditation classes...who knows, they might help you deal with all of the stress that has been weighing on you lately, with so much on the go.

As you glance around the clean and open foyer, so modern, your eye catches the display case off to the corner with the latest in branded merchandise. Ahh, the perks of choosing a reputable establishment. You buy the sleek trademark pen and notepad and begin to log your inspired to-do list and self-care ideas, between folded flyers that earmark your priorities. You eat your BLT while checking your email alongside a handful of noisy children, chatty grown-ups, and mute teenagers milling around the internet lounge, yet another perk of association.

You could be waiting in your doctor's office, or hanging around the lobby of your gym, but then you notice a large framed poster on the wall behind you: "LEADERS DON'T WAIT, THEY ACT". You move quickly up the three flights of stairs and enter your classroom.

What your doctor's office or gym has in common with these private centres of vocational learning²⁹⁸ that are progressively taking over Brazil's cityscapes, are varied practices of care of the self. As sites of sociability, here, we fashion ourselves into the kinds of people we want to be, should be, are told to be. Here, we learn English – the language of the world. Well-equipped and properly disposed, we are positioned to lead the way to... Ready for take-off?

Yours is the 'USA'. Last semester, the sign outside the door and four walls within your classroom were French in inspiration, and before that, British. But none of them had the Hollywood stars below your feet. The teacher is yet to come, so you grab a seat, near the back of the U-formation, knowing very well that this would not defer her from calling on you to speak. But one can hope.

Within the dozens of classrooms of these vocational centres, here mapped out by nationality, client-students make up a collective unit of individuals not too unlike the state form. Wherever we take our seat, we can be seen. Indeed, general rules and policies

²⁹⁸ Refer to Appendix for an overview of the field research conducted in these private language learning centres in Rio. I have chosen to integrate these narratives here reconstructed in ways that attempt to withstand falling prey to a false sense of representability of the subjects whom I observed and with whom I conversed over the course of the final semester of 2013. All of the vignettes here sketched, and that weave together the dissertation as a whole, depend upon an attentiveness to milieu, which is what I have brought to this site, as much as to the spaces of the busses and trains that took me to it, amidst other moments of everyday life registered in the museum of today that I seek to offer you here. As I propose in the Preface of this dissertation, what is more important than the vaunted words of objects of analysis positioned as such, is to where these exchanges directed me in a contemplation of one of Brazil's most widespread training grounds for socio-economic ascension, for our individual and collective triumph, for our final worldly take-off. And this is what I share with you here, dear reader. The (citational) form that follows in this vignette is thus out of a respect for this spirit of methodological attentiveness, anonymized and politicized to these ends.

from on high are moved by the collective spirit that forms and reforms effectual conduct between those variously positioned. Given how daily evaluations have come to take the place of the periodic examinations directly applied, we must be seen. And this way, too, we get a sense of proximity with the person in charge, our guide, our teacher, while at the same time remaining connected with our equals in more apparently natural ways. Gone are the days of the dictator standing at the front – at least in these private training grounds for success. And if a particularly didactic figure is tempted to reenact the days of old, the small whiteboard off to the corner of our classrooms preempts extended scribblings and recitations.

Teachers of the modern classroom are oriented to remain in positions equidistant to each and every student. As several students put it, they are like “older brothers” in and against a patrimonial scene. Here we live fratriarchal relations. It is outmoded to give grades, alternatively, one e-evaluates. If in the classrooms of Brazil’s mainstream school system this apparent intimacy remains an impossibility, surely it is not only a lack of resources that obstructs these differentiated pedagogical leanings. The objectives are what differ, first and foremost. Anachronistic classrooms of the big blackboard are configured to pass on material. In the parallel systems that have become both prerequisite and certification of the necessary skills of a glocal marketplace, the objectives are, at once, much more targeted and much more ambiguous. Yet as one teacher cautions, “the student has to know what he wants...because it seems that it [the vocational courses] prepares them for everything, but it’s not for everything”.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ “O aluno tem que saber o que ele quer...porque parece que prepara pra tudo, e não é pra tudo” (teacher and manager, 37 years old).

The modern (postmodern?) approach is to comfortably stimulate a naturalized artificial environment for learning out of the ordinary. As anyone who has occupied a position of authority with force or discipline can likely relate, the minimum condition of being relaxed induces a much more sustainable form of assimilation and conformity than that of being unnerved – when, on the fearful flip side, we tend to come up against the infamous fight or flight response, variously manifested. Here, in classrooms adorned for our global ascension (or at the very least, assimilation), facing each other, in the U-formation rather than bodies ordered in rows, we affirm instead of correct. Teachers speak not of errors, but model the apt and proper ways. Flipping through the pages of the slim lustrous textbook, searching for today’s input/output lesson, you come across...

10 Principles of Success

1. Small decisions make a difference.
2. I make the best investment, I invest in myself.
3. If I don’t believe in myself, nobody will.
4. I do whatever is necessary to increase my value.
5. English is the most spoken language in the world.
6. English will open many doors in my future.
7. English is the international language of business.
8. Bilingual professionals earn twice as much.
9. More important than starting is finishing.
10. A quitter never wins, a winner never quits.

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– “At school, in the first year one studies the verb ‘to be’; in the second year, the verb ‘to be’; and in the third year, the verb ‘to be’”.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ This excerpt is taken from the Intermediary Level learning materials of one of the English language learning centres that I visited in Rio in October of 2013.

– “Because beyond poor conditions, English is treated as if it were something optional; it is compulsory to be taught, right, but it doesn’t have that importance...English is seen as more like leisure in the public school”.³⁰²

– “Yeah, the English of schools and the English of the [private centre] courses is different”.³⁰³

– “I found it very strange the first time that I came here [entered the classrooms in U-formation], my first class, because you, when you are at school, you learn the numbers 1 to 10, and then, let’s go, until 100, and then let’s learn the colours, and then, in this way, learn some verbs, principally the verb ‘to be’. [Everyone laughs] Here it’s a lot different, because you start with already made sentences, with expressions. This I found so strange, get it, but after a while you start getting used to the method, you know, and it makes sense, and the sense in it. Although I think that [the private centre] is more oriented toward business, right, for commerce, I think it is more for professionals, in these areas, but I don’t know, I like it, I think that the teachings have been valid”.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ “Na escola, no primeiro ano se estuda o verbo ‘to be’, no segundo ano, o verbo ‘to be’, no terceiro ano, o verbo ‘to be’” (teacher and administrator, 23 years old).

³⁰² “Porque além de falta de condições etc., o inglês é como se fosse algo opitativo; é obrigatório de ser ensinado, né, mas não tem aquela importância...o inglês é tido como algo mais de lazer na escola pública” (teacher, 28 years old).

³⁰³ “Ehh, é diferente o inglês da escola e o inglês do curso” (teacher and administrator, 23 years old).

³⁰⁴ “Eu achei bem estranho a primeira vez que eu estive aqui, [entrei na sala de aula com esse formata de U], a minha primeira aula, porque você, quando tá no colégio, você aprende vamos aprender os números de 1 até 10, depois vamos até 100, depois vamos aprender as cores, aí vamos, assim, aprender alguns verbos, principalmente o verbo ‘to be’ [risos]. E aqui é bem diferente, porque você já começa com frases feitas, com expressões, isso eu achei estranhíssimo, entendeu, mas depois você vai se acostumando com o método, sabe, e o sentindo nisso, né. Embora eu acho que [esse curso] tá mais voltado pra business, né, pra negócios, acho que é mais para profissionais, ligados a essa parte, mas não sei, eu gosto, eu acho que o ensino tem sido válido” (student, 63 years old).

– “It’s a lot of cowardice. Because who doesn’t like English (as in the way that there are people who don’t like math, and people who do), who does the course and likes it, okay. Who doesn’t do the course because they don’t like it, because they can’t, end up getting screwed, *in* school because the teachers know that the world outside is more advanced because of the courses and they will play the same way. Therefore who doesn’t do it, will have to get by just like those who do it, inside and outside the classroom”.³⁰⁵

Freestanding vocational courses, as they have been designated, are intended to supplement the lacks of an underdeveloped educational system. We see them on nearly every street block of Rios, developed and developing. Yes, and increasingly so in the favelas. Virtually unregulated by the Ministry of Education, massified to the point of non-recognition, they have become strange rivals. Amidst varied provisions of “vocational skills”, language-learning centres have become the place, *de facto*, where the world’s language is learned. Where citizens are capacitated – qualified, certified, professionalized – for entrepreneurial and civic duty, for Brazil’s rise in a global future.

Most language-learning courses within Brazil’s booming educational markets, work between the *communicative* approach (by which meaning is visualized and derived from a shared context) and the more *translation*-based method (that sets up parallels and equivalencies between the native Portuguese and English for reproduction and drilling). Yet as one branch manager qualified in lamenting the declining quality of “the pedagogical experience” in which the student is to live “an English environment”, the

³⁰⁵ “É muita covardia. Porque quem não gosta de inglês (como tem gente que não gostem de matematica, e gente que gosta), quem faz curso e gosta, tudo bem. Quem não faz curso porque não gostam, porque não podem, acaba se ferrando, *na* escola, porque os professores sabem que o mundo fora já tá mais avançado por causa dos cursos e vão jogar do mesmo jeito. Então quem não faz vão ter que *se virar* igual aqueles que fazem [dentro e for a da sala de aula]” (student, 15 years old).

English language market has been increasingly demanding, over the past three decades, intensive rather than extensive training, notably for adults aged 18 and up, “and so for us to offer something of short duration, it can only be in the audio-lingual approach, because it is a behaviourist methodology (with lots of drills), and so for you, it is a training”.³⁰⁶ Otherwise, the average duration of full qualifying courses range from 5 to 8 years, and for the younger client-students many more options are available, from tots to kids to teens to advanced, as well as specialized trainings and areas of interest.³⁰⁷ The more popular repetition- and reproduction-based methodologies are fairly strict, in comparison with the more open communicative approach, and, as such, enable a wider range of teachers to carry out its step-by-step curriculum. With curricular standardization, little to no training in pedagogy or languages is required, as one teacher reflected, what is required is for the instructor to be “a good user of the language”.

In the mainstream school system, the objective, as students and teachers recurrently testify, is “to pass the course”. So the teacher passes on the material, to define success. Yet the student who does not undertake the multiyear programs offered by these private freestanding courses cannot keep up. These centres set the point of departure, not

³⁰⁶ “E pra gente oferecer algo de curta duração, seria no autolingual, porque é uma metodologia mais behaviorista (com bastante drills), então pra você, é um treino” (teacher and manager, 37 years old).

³⁰⁷ “A gente resolveu inserir esse curso (autolingual) no nosso cardápio porque no mercado existia uma necessidade, esses cursos de curta duração entram no mercado (para adultos) com muita força, você tem outros concorrentes...com esse perfil de 18 meses...e pra gente oferecer algo de curta duração seria no autolingual, porque é uma metodologia mais behaviorista (com bastante drills), então pra você, é um treino...pra você usar um comunicativo approach em 18 meses, você precisa de um curso mais extensivo e não intensivo” (teacher and manager, 37 years old).

the regular school system, be it private or public³⁰⁸. For the well-off, the courses become, as one teacher commented, “one more available channel” for improvement.³⁰⁹ For the less secured middle classes, it becomes the basis not only for their English language education in their regular schools, but whatever educational endeavour that they embark on, where English is the language of access, of science, of business. From university programs to technical trades, in these realms, *to be* is never enough.

Either way, the communicative approach as much as the translation-based methodologies aims to naturalize the student’s relationship with the foreign language and content, whether by the call and responses of contextualized dialogues or by the repetition of pre-formed expressions in translation. As another teacher put it, “the most efficient methodology tries to approximate the mother tongue to the English language”, by giving students modes of reproduction (input-repeat, output-contextualize, or the other way around) rather than grammatical classifications of structures.³¹⁰ Removing mediation and blockages of varied forms, each in their own way, the objective is to induce the most efficient assimilation possible, which is believed to occur at some unperceived (less regulated) level of consciousness that allows for a more free entry of material.

With the language, comes a whole host of accompanying structures of thought, belief, values, and so forth, seldom owned up to in any explicit way, as indeed, this goes

³⁰⁸ Refer to Vera Lúcia Menezes de Oliveira Paiva’s study on *Ensino de Língua Inglesa: Reflexões e Experiências* (English Language Teaching: Reflections and Experiences) for further contextualization of the English language industry in Brazil, elaborated in Parts I and II of this dissertation.

³⁰⁹ “É mais um canal de disposição” (teacher and administrator, 23 years old).

³¹⁰ “O método mais eficiente é aquele que tenta aproximar a língua maternal á língua inglesa” (teacher, 25 years old). So much so, he continues, that “the students don’t understand the ‘why’ of the methodology” (“os alunos não entendem o porque da metodologia”).

beyond the stated professional, rather than pedagogical, *raison d'être*. After all, teachers are role models in so far as they are “good users”. In such a position, as one exemplary testament reflects, “The teacher wants the student to speak, that the student speaks *a lot* of English. It doesn't matter if it's truths or lies, we want them to speak, to gain fluency”.³¹¹ For students struggling to express themselves in an English of their dreams and screens, even well into their advanced training, as one fluent student reflects after 10 years of enrolment, caught in hesitations and delays, “when speaking English I just can't be totally me”.³¹²

Within these spaces, configured by franchised businesses with tens of thousands of locations across the country, millions of aspiring citizens of emerging economies, from the upper lower classes to the lower upper classes, are being trained to talk the talk and walk the walk. At stake, is what will be-come of them. It is a certain kind of individualization at work: an idealized conduct, based on economic projections of what it means to be a good and productive citizen. As is so often rehearsed inside and outside the classroom walls, the chief problem of Brazilians is the lack of self-exigency, so here, on foreign terms not of our choosing, we learn to ‘run or chase after’ (*correr atrás*). Always already running behind (*atrasado*), hope is deposited in the dis-position of these aspiring cosmopolitan and entrepreneurial citizens investing in themselves at Brazil's booming English language learning centres.

³¹¹ “O professor quer que o aluno fale, que o aluno fale *muito* ingles. Não importa se é verdade ou mentira, quer que o aluno fale, para ele ter essa fluencia” (teacher and coordinator, 24 years old).

³¹² “Quando falo ingles, não consigo ser totalmente ‘eu’” (student and administrator/sales representative, 28 years old).

Through these spaces of circulation, language becomes more than a currency. For some, learning the language of the world in its peripheries is to face a “seven-headed monster”, for others, more advanced in their training, it becomes a “second brain”.³¹³ For the businesses themselves, it is about certification. Yet how does this sociability of success implicate the civic ethos of an emerging Brazil? One of our most beloved artists, the architect of the Bossa Nova movement after which Rio’s international airport has been named, Tom Jobim, once said that success in Brazil is a personal offense. So what does it mean to equip oneself for success in the land of the emerging?

In the ‘Brazil’-themed classroom, covered in wallpaper exhibiting monkeys leaping through jungles overhead, a meek teenage boy struggles with a rolled tongue.

– “Just say it”, urges a more confident older student, with a blend of impatience and encouragement harshening her otherwise upbeat voice. “Say it like an Indian!”

As goes the standard Brazilian expression of civility, our relationship with standards of modernity and global belonging is one of love-hate. Bittersweet. And so continues the Question and Answer dialogue...

– “Have you been to the USA this year?”, the questioning student reads aloud.

Our Indianized student fumbles to find some ready-made response to reproduce. In moments of hesitation, before he has a chance to try his luck, another cuts in with a response:

– “3 timeshhh”. Everyone laughs.³¹⁴

³¹³ “Um bicho de sete cabeças” / “Um segundo cérebro” (teacher, 25 years old).

³¹⁴ This dialogue exercise made up the last half of a Beginner Level class that I observed in Rio in December of 2013.

I have never met a Brazilian who likes, or even remotely tolerates, the signature Brazilian accent spoken in English, uniquely identifiable within earshot of any compatriot. When a mistake is made in Portuguese, we are ‘like children’: the Portuguese language is a space of possible civilization. When a mistake or off intonation or pronunciation is uttered in the idealized English language, we are speaking ‘like Indians’. *Me no likey*. Outside the realm of civilization, our perceptible inability to finish off a word with a consonant, always adding a ‘shhh’ or ‘ch’ or ‘ey’ to follow the abrupt endings is a constant reminder of the shame of not being able to pull things off, quite in that way, quite so cleanly or efficiently or definitively. (As if. As if-fey. God forbid you have to pronounce the dreaded ‘th’ – no mercy without vowels!) Projected from national to international contexts, the transmutations between civility and incivility, between who qualifies and who does not, is primarily marked in oral culture, yet encoded with the apparent fixity of the written. In moments, encounters, and exchanges of such presentations of the self, laws are reinscribed somewhere out there, and out of respect for them our possible access points are articulated, in the ways that disruption perpetuates consistency. Like the Brazilian pop star so many of the students love or hate, quoting before, after, and during class, Maria Gadu, has tattooed on the back of her neck, after her first world tour, ‘Made in Brazil’, in English. It is a question of who sets the terms of the game.

Virtually every student interviewed identified shame, *vergonha*, as their primary obstacle to learning English. And in this shame is felt something much more profound than the often culminated act of making a mistake. Children, from lack of experience, can make mistakes, naturally (this is the realm of embarrassment!). The aspiring comedian

who cut in on the otherwise addressed question of the students' exercises, may not have been called on to respond to that travel dialogue, but he may have provided a timely answer to another key question in understanding what is at stake in this process of learning English. Forcing a heavy Brazilian accent onto "times" transformed into a stretched out and softened "timeshhh", typical of the Brazilian way of speaking, he gives our fictional character, who has thrice been to the USA this year, the status of money (that is, in being able to afford the trips) but not the status of respect. Grace, still lacking. Our world traveller becomes the ultimate figure of the inferior superior, of a subjugated superiority, or insecure authority, if you will – an always already complacent subalternity, never innocent of an ambiguous third world positionality, whose internal mobility is externally measured. The transposition of the external to the internal encumbers the emerging subjects qualification into the respected ranks; being noble or savage does not qualify oneself. The nobility or savagery is measured externally (for internal resonance) and as such, only money can buy his way in. But being 'in' does not guarantee respect. Like the emerging precarious working classes finding their place in the middle strata of an emerging Latin American giant, consuming and being consumed by promises of prosperity does not ensure their integration into the socio-political and cultural milieu of the middle class. The 'emergings' are forever emerging (i.e. coming out of), distinct in appearance, tastes, speech, and other such distinctions that naturalize one's place in the ruling orders of the day. The accent, in all of its fluid fixity, is the mark of something forever outside of our reach. The accent is the internal measure of the external. As symbol, it marks distinctions of myriad sorts. As practice, it indicates differential stress, difficulty, and ease.

For many Brazilians, notably of the up and coming generations, “to speak English is to speak like an American”, as one teacher and branch manager put it.³¹⁵ From not standing to hear one’s own accent, Brazilian students of English spend years studying American movies or resigning in advance, alternatively they become “veterans of the courses”, promiscuous, jumping from course to course and method to method, waiting for the key to unlock...³¹⁶ It is a demand for perfection seldom witnessed within the mythically easy-going Brazilian spirit. As another teacher came to conclude, “Brazilians are our own worst enemy in learning English”.³¹⁷

Only 2% of the population was recorded as fluent speakers in our last national survey – the great lament of a chronically emerging Latin American giant, in search of panaceas to success.³¹⁸ Perhaps because of this (self)identified easy-going nature, the precondition for us ‘to let ourselves go’ (*se soltar*) is dominance. As many gringos trying to get by in Brazil would likely agree, when you do not know the codes that cohere everyday interactions in the land of dreams and nightmares, there is nothing easy-going at all about Brazilian way of life. We always already begin from a place of structural insecurity, exacerbated with this idealization of a non-maternal language. Perhaps the easy-going is not so easy-going after all. The seemingly personalistic codes that work in accordance with other rhythms and priorities demand so much, and in a rigorous method. It demands presence. It demands connection. The disconnected only have access to polite codes, which can be recited without so much as looking some one in the eye. Much more

³¹⁵ “Falar inglês é falar como americano” (teacher and administrator, 23 years old).

³¹⁶ “Veteranos do curso” (teacher, 30 years old).

³¹⁷ “Os brasileiros são os seus próprios, piores, inimigos” (teacher, 30 years old).

³¹⁸ Refer to Education First “English Proficiency Index” for further contextualization of this internet-based survey now widely used to assess these under-documented markets, as developed in Part I of this dissertation.

than a problem of conjugating verbs, at stake in this training for the preconditions of success is something beyond perfection vs. making mistakes, a problem of propriety. After all, success is relational to failure, as pride is to shame. As so many students would mutter between choking on their words, “If they had to speak our language too, then I could...”.

Let us not forget that the base Brazilian measure of being well-articulated and positioned, or not, is to speak *like* an Indian and not to speak *as* an Indian, or from this imaginary vantage point. The inherent flexibility of the positions that we occupy amidst the precarities of an emerging underdeveloped giant, chronically delayed, makes it that among us, *how* the subaltern speaks can be much more important than what one can and cannot say (or what the imagined other can and cannot hear). Between knowing and not knowing are accented pronouncements.

Even within the contexts of the chronicled untranslatability of othered discourses and the ensuing problematic of muting (yes, muting, rather than silencing!), there is a space in which the aporetic structure of knowing is overshadowed by what we claim, where, and how.³¹⁹ A space relatively unencumbered by the structures of knowledge, where the aporetic is unproblematic, in effect, normalized. In the circuits of a political economy of noise, that which does not create harmony, delegitimized as noise rather than music, can be filtered out, but those producing it hear it, through the reverberations of their own bodies and the lived experience of its effects.

³¹⁹ What would a postcolonial critique look like if, instead of concerned with the silencing of subalterns, we traced the strategic mutings inherent to the relationship between centres and peripheries, variously scaled? Gayatri Spivak’s provocative “Can the Subaltern Speak?” continues to inspire numerous debates, and its import in Latin American contexts remains to be traced in more comprehensive ways.

Why do the theorists of language concern themselves with mediums of knowledge, subjectivity, and objectivity, through a presumed transposition of the logic of written language onto the oral? Why do we not speak of accents? The accented can often reveal so much more than what the content that it is charged with producing, receiving, and modulating.³²⁰ Beyond the hauntings of logocentrism, a political economy of noise alerts us to that which does not create harmonies [the equivalent of the problem of (il)legibility in auditative terms], is still heard. In the auditative exchanges that characterize a Brazilian mode of communication, we need to reconsider how the dominance of an oral culture within a written civilization, such as of Brazil's negotiations with modernity, the accented is what marks our pauses, hesitations, efforts, stumbles, and even silences.

To understand what is heard, by whom, to what effect, to understand the limits and possibilities of a subalternity always already incomplete, we need to decentre the encounter with the other that defines what we can and cannot say. This has particularly poignant implications within Brazilian contexts, where articulations of oppression are something that is often said that the hard-off cannot afford. As heard on any given street corner on any given day, "only the rich can afford to be depressed". Ahh, the complexities of the happy and cordial man reveal themselves once over...

The voice reveals strategies more thoroughly than a logic of (dis)empowerment belies. The problem is not one of (il)legibility. Somewhere in between, in between hard

³²⁰ Whether through vowels that allow for a freer flow of air or consonants produced by occluding with or without release (p, b, t, d, k, g), diverting (m, n, ng), or obstructing (f, v, s, z) the flow of air from the lungs, our attentiveness to speech sounds and their production, transmission, and reception, as well as their classification and transcription, allows us to appreciate the lived experience and impact of producing speech, its tensions and releases.

and soft, in between delays and stretches, the mark of where we stress can carry more weight than words themselves.

Too often when we seek to understand language, we transpose, wittingly or not, the written form onto the oral. As such, we only get right or wrong ways of speaking, rather than accented gradations of expression. Language does not reside within abstract rationalization nor within the bodily experience alone. Especially so in an auditative culture in which oral modalities profoundly shape our knowings and doings, how we tell our stories for effect rendering more weight than content. Within the auditative, the impact on the receptor is what matters the most, neither a purely intellectual nor aesthetic venture.³²¹

That words are not neutral needs virtually no justification in today's multiple and overlapping worlds. Yet what is the space of circulation in which words of a foreign language, the language of the world, the language of business, the language of science, the language of the movies, gain meaning? Otherwise put, who are the grammaticians and who are the people in the symbolic exchanges of the world's language? And what does this mean for how it is received, produced, and heard?

Languages with explicit accenting are inherently sonoral. They are sensitive to the production of sound, and not only, the production of meaning. The Portuguese language makes use of accents. Brazilian students of the English language are thus left in an abandoned space, so to speak. Without accents to guide their pronunciations, their

³²¹ For a rich development of the implications of auditative cultures on language, processes of learning, knowledge practices, and authority, refer to Luiz Costa Lima's refashionings of literary and social critique in Brazilian contexts (*Intervenções – Interventions*, 2002). Roberto Schwarz's development of "idéias fora do lugar" (out of place ideas) is also a helpful reference in this struggle to reattune critical (dis)engagement in the so-called peripheries of the modern world, as proposed in Part I of this dissertation.

affective relation with the language is developed through circuits of foreign cultural production. Hence it is no surprise that within this glocal milieu, the notion of global citizenship (as produced out there) is emptied of its affective cosmopolitan content to be filled, instead, with its differentiating but by no means opposing professional content. To become a global citizen is to succeed – a literal ascension.

When we think of communication in linguistic terms, education in terms of knowledge, and so on and so forth, we miss how voice and performance breaks with the logocentrism of power that the written form imposes onto the oral, to its constant disillusionment. That is, (post)colonial stories of mimesis, of the subjugated learning to speak and be heard in the language of the dominant other, is not so much about imitation as adaption. The dreams sold of success are not the same ones that are bought.

Education promises to reveal the limits and possibilities of human nature. It is the key to materializing modern governing institutions. Within this context, English language schools are vital as projects in character reformation and qualification that enable Brazil's desired modernization. The long-lost key has been found to Brazil's future prosperity and global rise. While citizens-to-be are learning to dream the dream, what they are learning are codes and sociabilities of success. What to obey, value, imitate, adapt to, run after, and resist. Ultimately, they are being en-title-d: they are learning what to demand, and how. Herein lies the hope for Brazil's long anticipated take-off.

In the ways that grappling with language requires a systemic reconstruction of the fields within which it is produced and received, politics itself is not simply an extension of socio-economic realities, but must be considered in its place. It demands historical and

empirical inquiry. Words uttered map ourselves in relation to others more so than get at any definite truth (of the definitional game of form). Of course both form and sense are always at play. Yet the demand for transparency is mundanely forfeited in the use of our own language, and exaggeratedly so in the foreign. In this forfeit, imprecision becomes as revelatory as the defined. Otherwise put, “not every difference is a perceptible error and not every error is a problem”.³²² With and against the scientific inheritances of modernity, critique thus needs to be reconsidered.

Indeed, the Brazilian dream is to speak like an American, not to become one, for if one were to become one the specificity of advantages in the Brazilian context would be radically different. English as a legitimizing language within a Brazilian context indeed makes up the particularities of a system of educational qualification and entry into particular labour markets. But more than a language, it is a resource, a sort of socio-economic and cultural capital. Between competence and performance, the activity of speaking in particular positions us. What it means to be educated is closer to being polite than knowledgeable; that is, to know what to do, when, and how. It is about (self)positioning. Much more advantageous is the capacity to produce expressions appropriate for particular situations. It is in the symbolic exchange that the practical strategies embedded in speech are adjusted to relations of power between speakers and

³²² For example, often times the use of colloquial language can serve as a sign of foreign language fluency, and as a performance, in the streets, classrooms, and boardrooms of an emerging Brazil, can lend confidence and mastery to its speaker. See Luiz Percival Leme Britto’s “Língua e Ideologia: a Reprodução do Preconceito” (Language and Ideology: A Reproduction of Prejudice – Note: the literal translation of *preconceito* would imply preconception) for further development of the complex relationship between language, power, and authority.

hearers.³²³ Beyond encoding and decoding grammatically well-formed messages, beyond truth and falsity, perhaps even beyond the felicitous and infelicitous, these processes of learning and training orient the reproduction of citizens for ascension. Yet for all of this to work in and across interrelated fields not contained by the inter/trans/sub-national, participants must believe in the game that they are playing, and in the value of what is at stake in the struggles that they are waging. Hence why the education project is so crucial to legitimating any mode of development, in forming and reforming consensus, perhaps even more than the production of proper citizens in terms of their internal aptitudes.

This matters because power, as we tend to understand it, is seldom enforced in overt ways. Passing through the symbolic, its most efficient legitimations are weakened when rendered visible, made vulnerable to be undermined – between the natural and the obvious is where our political struggle is at. In turn, it is misleading to invest in the idea that education or a particular pedagogical methodology will empower students to succeed academically and professionally. Ideas, linguistically formulated or not, need not be clearly defined or oriented to be meaningful. Never neutral, mine, or theirs, our modes of communication are historical. Globalization has not changed this shared reality. Open or

³²³ Britto's study on "Language and Ideology" adapts many of these Bourdieun-inspired approaches to language as speech acts and performative utterances in the Brazilian context, tracing the politics of entitlement (to speak and to be heard) without attempting to make it all fit within the French sociologist's systematicity of individual and societal development. In addition to Bourdieu's landmark *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), other helpful references, to think through processes of individualization and subjectivation of the likes of these English language trainings, include *Pierre Bourdieu and Literacy Education* (Albright et al, 2010) for an international taking up these thoughts, and in the Brazilian context, Jessé Souza's *A Construção Social da Subcidadania: Para uma Sociologia Política da Modernidade Periférica* (The Social Construction of Subcitizenship: Toward a Political Sociology of Peripheral Modernity) for some provocative revisions on the role of recognition in practices of author-ization and critique.

closed, simple or complex, modern or traditional, what is deemed inside or outside is not marked in time nor space, and yet, its effects live with us everyday. What it therefore means to become a prosperous Brazilian citizen or aspiring global citizen cannot be accounted for by principles of corruption and correction, against Anglo-Saxon standards of a complete modernity contrasted with the delays of a chronically emerging Latin American giant. *Lá fora*, out there, only makes sense 'in here'. And this is where we need to focus our attention if we wish to grapple with what kinds of citizens we are nurturing, for what kinds of communities.

After class, on the way out of the USA-themed classroom, I ask a veteran teacher, at one of these leading learning centres, what is at stake for her in these trainings of Brazil's emerging citizen and nation. Virtually therapeutic, between laughs and cries, she tells of tales of citizen-training. How one student learning to (re)claim, complained that the toilet paper in the bathroom was not 'Premium' to match the learning centre's designation. Or how her more well-off client-students read and analyze the centre's written contracts and interact without fear with the centre's administration, while others will not even look in the eyes of the manager...let alone, say, a political representative of the state. Which ideals to aspire to? How to entitle the up and coming?

We sweat. It was a hot midsummer afternoon. Craving something to cool us off, I suggest an *açaí*. Too many calories, she complains of this latest Amazonian wonder-fruit smoothie, as it has been enthusiastically exported, out there. We end up at a McDonald's, instead, eating burgers and fries and chatting about the hopes and despairs of a developing people, of a people and nation in formation. Calories, after all, are units of energy – they may be equalized in calculations of varied sorts, so as to measure output,

but they are ultimately of different qualities and intensities. What we consume, and what consumes us, sets the table for different kinds of feastings. The kind of calories matters. That is to say, the kind of energy that we expend matters.

There is one time of the year when we are each called to embrace love, giving, solidarity, forgiveness, and general good will toward others. Working hours are to be reduced, and family is to reign as the organizing feature – a sort of redemptive public affair. From every angle, we are reminded, incessantly through song and moving image translated into the most sentimental forms, to take time to recognize what and whom is most valued in our lives, and the necessity (the obligation!) to express this, by way of gift-giving.

On the eve of yet another green Christmas season in the tropics, with streets and dwellings hot and stuffy all around, one place is always guaranteed to be bursting with emotion. More than the idealized homes of Brazilian families reunited, or churches singing praise to our collective faith naturalized to the point that its institutionalization is virtually unnecessary, the congregations of most force can be found in shopping centres. Across Brazil's major metropolises, 2013 was no different in this regard. Perhaps the only substantive difference, on this particular iteration of the festival of merriment and consumption, was who was occupying these spaces, how, and to what effects.

At the end of a historic year of mass mobilizations in the largest Catholic nation of the Americas, a different mass descended from the hills. Not to the city centres, to the symbolic streets of capitalism and government, not to protest or reclaim, but to wander: “we just want to take a stroll”. And so these strolls, from peripheries to shopping centres across the country, these enclosed encounters neither completely organized or spontaneous, *rolezinhos*, became a movement, or so it appeared to those of us on the

outside. Perplexed, observers bore witness to a mobilization of youth from the peripheries in search of recognition and visibility, in search of acceptance within the established terms of a society dominated by the circulation of money, in search of space in the city...

The streets are dangerous. This we are accustomed to hearing. We, who? Dangerous for whom, when, where...who causes this danger...what kind of danger? At any rate, the sons and daughters of the abandoned and emerging also feel this danger. Fear is not a white, middle-class phenomena. Hopeful, they, the detectably excluded and marginalized, organize themselves. On Facebook, thousands confirm participation in concerted strolls through shopping centres nearest to them. MCs and muses animate and invite friends, not fans, to meet, at the same time, at the same place. Often, these masses of youth make their entrance singing *Funk Ostentação*, with crowds parading along behind and beside them to these beats of Ostentation Funk.

“Where I arrive I stop everything”, we hear from MC Boy dos Charmes.³²⁴ “Let’s sponsor audacity”, echoes the declarations of MC Bola.³²⁵ Glamourized through circuits of Afro-American freestyles from the 1970s onward, this musical genre privileging rhythmic (over melodic) compositions made its ways out of Rio’s favelas in the early 2000s, to São Paulo’s ghettos, where it gained this particularly exhibitionist bent, and then back again to Rio, garnering national success.³²⁶ Instead of narrating lives of suffering and criminality, on the peripheries of the modern world, *Funk Ostentação* exalts the ambition to get out of the favela, to conquer and consume, and ultimately, flaunt it.

³²⁴ “Onde eu chego eu paro tudo” (França, 2011, translation mine).

³²⁵ “Patrocina a ousadia” (Santos Ramos, 2013, translation mine).

³²⁶ For an ethnomusicological study on the ‘glocal’ circuits and dynamics of such practices of cultural production, see Cristina Magaldi’s “Cosmopolitanism and World Music in Rio de Janeiro at the Turn of the Twentieth Century”.

For those who do not have it made, hope lies in (un)expected places. Promises of wealth mean different things to different people in different places. From *Funk Proibidão* (romanticizing the prohibited) to *Funk Ostentação* (legitimizing the coveted), we hear of transforming dreams of ascension:

And in my vocabulary
 Being economical doesn't exist
 We invest in power
 And take advantage of the revelry
 It's not fantasy
 It's reality
 It's a thing of the past
 Misery, necessity
 It doesn't bring happiness
 But abates sadness
 And maybe my humility
 Is my greatest wealth³²⁷

From criminality to consumption, when these odes to emergence came back to Rio, the seductive appeal was secured by the maxim: “trickery is being a living trickster”, as MC Menor do Chapa redeems for us.³²⁸ Commemorating that “I’m the boss, not the employee”, the first Carioca MC who made it in Ostentation tells us of the funk of self-esteem, of the new voice of the favela, of the alternate mirror of the downtrodden, put into sceneries in which they never imagined themselves, of what it would be like to live within social classes to which they do not belong. Sitting on his red and golden throne, crowned, nearly-naked women adorned as trophies to each side, he sings to shots of the favela below:

³²⁷ “E no meu vocabulário / Não existe economia / Nós investe no poder / E usufrui da putaria / Não é imaginação / É a realidade / Já virou passado / Miséria, necessidade / Não traz felicidade / Mas afasta a tristeza / E talvez minha humildade / Seja minha maior riqueza” (França, 2011, translation mine).

³²⁸ “Malandragem é ser malandro vivo” (Souza Batista, 2012, translation mine).

To make your name you have to survive
 To be called chief or boss, for real
 How many tough tricksters I have seen die in this life
 Without enjoying the taste of victory
 Come, sing, and look here to the winner
 With a lot of money and humility we got here
 To celebrate open the champagne
 Toast with me
 Trickery is being a living trickster³²⁹

And so, *malandros*, tricksters of modern breed, and those aspiring to outsmart, outlive, and outdo the system, against all odds, those aspiring not so much to power and wealth but to what it enables (visibility or invisibility when respectively strategic), fill in masses shopping centres across the country at one of the most esteemed times of year. Bodies marked by poverty, by racialized aesthetics of privilege, by excesses of masculinity or femininity, hypersexualized to the uncontrollable, occupy spaces not designed for them. If theirs were bodies otherwise marked, might the *rolezinho* be confused with a flash mob, cheered instead of jeered?

In any case, the streets are dangerous.

In these wanderings, do we behold appropriation or resistance in the temples of capitalism? Are these subversions or socializations of a consumerist society, where recognition depends on material markers of extrinsic value and hierarchies of self-worth?

They stroll. They sing, they flirt, they look, they are looked at.

Then come the bombs of moral effect. Pepper spray, detentions, beatings.

Random searches, store doors slammed shut, crowds running panicked. Parking lots

³²⁹ “Pra fazer seu nome tu tem que sobreviver / Ser chamado de chefe ou de patrão por merecer / Quantos malandros brabos na vida eu vi morrer / Sem desfrutar o gosto da vitória / Passa, canta e olha aqui pro vencedor / Com muito dinheiro e humildade nós chegou / Pra comemorar abre a champanhe / Brinda comigo / Malandragem é ser malandro vivo (Souza Batista, 2012, translation mine).

outside of shopping centres turn into mobile police stations. Out with anyone who ‘looks poor’ (*com cara de pobre*). The Christmas headlines of 2013 read: “Shopping centres seek injunctions to prohibit rolezinhos”, “Fearful of youth gatherings, shopping centres appeal to Facebook to take down invitations to rolezinhos”, “Are luxury brands used in rolezinhos harmed?”, “Funkeiros say that rolezinhos happen for a lack of spaces”, “The new vandals of Brazil”, and “Muse of the rolezinhos reveals all”.³³⁰

In response, the left laments the force of informal apartheid in Brazilian cities and celebrates the acts of resistance. The right accuses vandals of provoking chaos, trawling for assaults, and tells the delinquents to go take a stroll in libraries and theatres. Are we dealing with subordination or adherence to ‘the system’? Charges abound of communism or elitism, either you support the right to free circulation or defend private property – yet another conservative revolution on its way? *Rolezinhos* are idolized and demonized, as movements for liberation and inclusion, or, for the corruption of youth and family-oriented society. Moralized, either way.

Are participants in the *rolezinhos*, in effect, villains, victims, or heroes of an unequal society? Is capitalist society finally tasting its own poison? medicine?

Consumerist means to recognition, identity, love, and fulfilment of varied sorts, are far from an invention of these youth on the periphery. Neither are masculinized conceptions of power figured by the desire to possess, as reconstructed through *funk ostentação* – be it of material goods or of other bodies. In fact, as a space of affirmation,

³³⁰ “Shopping centres procuram liminares para proibir rolezinhos”; “Com medo dos encontros de jovens, shoppings recorrem ao Facebook para tirar do ar convites para rolezinhos”; “Mascas de luxo usadas nos rolezinhos saem prejudicadas?”; “Musa dos rolezeiros revela tudo”.

the relationships forged between people and things reveal criminality and consumption as two sides of the same coin, within and beyond sites of sociability of the up and coming on the periphery. The pursuit for self-realization through consumption activates a/e-effects and dispositions of a kind of egocentrism that encourages a subordination of concern for others to one's own pleasure and self-fulfilment. Such blockages to sentiments of solidarity, to perspectives of a bigger picture, are exacerbated by a resultant subjectivity guided by instant gratification, by that which readily comes and goes. If things are more than representations or results of social interaction, we need to reconsider how things in themselves implicate certain kinds of sociabilities, that is, how the most desired of things in contemporary capitalist society (e.g.) propel an uninhibited, irrational, and egocentric form of consumerism, as much as seductions into criminal modes of living.³³¹

In the context of the *rolezinhos*, perhaps what frightens the anxious middle class, protected by the security guards of shopping centres as well as justifications of criminalization on television, is the possibility that those mobilized by the *rolezinhos* are stealing their exclusive right to consume and relate to these objects of desire and prestige in their own way? Or, do they simply deem themselves to know what is better for them, censuring the irrational consumption of the poor, who should save instead of spend on things that are inappropriate for their socio-economic level? Either way, what does this clarify for us about the dynamics of the egalitarian and sustainability discourses propagated by the same folks to promote their own lifestyle as the standard of development? The McDonald's experience for one and all continues to reign in developmental fields, near and far. To put it otherwise, the relationship between crime

³³¹ For a provocative proposition of this sort of inter-objectivity, see Latour's renditions of Actor Network Theory, as played out in "Paris: Ville Invisible".

and consumption must be mediated through idealizations of the middle class, of what it means to be a good and productive citizen. Far from being about lack or deprivation, it is about excess.

No doubt these wanderings in shopping centres are a product of a capitalist system, which inextricably links affect and consumption. Yet without the cultural capital and other means to work the ostentation, the *rolezinhos* and the accompanying subcultures of funk of the emergings will retain a certain ambiguous posture, in relation to the hierarchies that connect people (codes and conduct) and things (sites and markers of sociability), be they purchased, consumed, stolen, or inherited.

As an extension of the everyday, the *rolezinhos* unfold the obvious: the informal segregations of a class system, in denial. The act of the poor going to shopping centres is never an ordinary practice, always politicizable, as bodies in appropriation of things and spaces denied to them on a day to day basis, however brashly they claim the space for themselves in encounters and *rolezinhos*, or however quietly they slink to bathrooms on the way between home and work hoping to pass unnoticed. Comfort does not have to be comfortable.

As one of the original *rolezinho* organizers made obvious, in response to so many attempts to classify and channel a movement in formation: “It would not be a protest, but a response to oppression. You can’t stay locked away at home”, he declared foreboding his eventual detention and subjection to police investigation.³³² The twenty-year old

³³² “Não seria um protesto, seria uma resposta à opressão. Não dá para ficar em casa trancado”, are the words of Jefferson Luís, one of the organizers of the *rolezinho* in the Shopping Internacional de Guarulhos, in an interview with Elaine Brum on the eve of Christmas, in “Os Novos ‘Vandalos’ do Brasil” (The New Vandals of Brasil, translation mine).

continues to enlighten us: “The middle class accepts that we want bread and even fridges, gets uncomfortable when we crowd airports, but enjoy ourselves – and in the shopping centres? I’m going to occupy the space that is denied to me and where I’m not wanted”.³³³

Contending with symbols of power (be they name-brands or security guards), herein we do not find any ready languages of resistance. Between appropriation and subversion is anything but void. Overshadowed by discourses of violence, confused with concerns for private property, the *rolezinhos* have come to politicize everyday codes and conduct, the socialization and exclusive markings of bodies for particular occupations. *Rolezinhos*, desperately repressed, preempted, and criminalized, are an extension of this (extra)ordinariness. Mimesis? Within hegemonic structures of legitimation, the pleasure of being seen, alongside comforts and affirmations of varied sorts, traverse complex glocal centres and peripheries.

As modern spaces of leisure and convenience (inclusive of the coveted McDonald’s experience!), shopping centres are private spaces of public access. Followers of the *rolezinhos*, offsprings of the emerging classes (the oh-so-celebrated ‘new middle class’) rehearse hope, for performances of recognition and ascension, elsewhere blocked. Yet, when ostentation of wealth and elegance is separated from its social function, as is promulgated in consumerist ideologies that attempt to equalize citizenship through

³³³ “A classe média até aceita que queiram pão, que queiram geladeira, sentese mais incomodada quando lotam os aeroportos, mas se divertir – e nos shoppings? Vou ocupar o espaço que me é negado ou onde não me querem” (Brum, translation mine).

consumption (i.e. the credit-approach to expanding the Brazilian middle class), instead of opening horizontal space or even nurturing social competition, it congeals distances.³³⁴

Marks of progress, of ascension, come in varied forms, within peripheries and centres alike. Whether you listen to rock or rap, samba or funk, distinctions, identities, and branding, of varied kinds, are a way of navigating life. To understand peripheries that revolve around multiple and overlapping centres, to deal with poverty, we need to understand attempts at their insertion into the governing institutions of modernity, modelled after socio-economic subjects of middle-classification. In places under profound transformation and with possibilities for social mobility, the reaction to disruptions such as those provoked by the *rolezinhos* is much simpler to analyze than the phenomenon itself. We can make out more about our contemporary condition than that of thousands of teenagers who organized public festivities in one of the only secured spaces close to their homes, often in poor and violent neighbourhoods. When spaces of seemingly democratic access are thus defined, we must pause and question this democracy and its aspired ideals of citizenship and community. This is especially the case in the land where the world's record has been set for McDonald's consumption.³³⁵

Making sense of centres and peripheries alike, what becomes obvious in the *rolezinhos* that stroll in between them is, that to deal with inequality, it is not a matter of simply redistributing or raising income levels or credit access, as much as these may serve as intermediary measures. What is required are social infrastructures of health,

³³⁴ See Contardo Calligaris' "Do Homen Cordial ao Homen Vulgar" (From the Cordial Man to the Vulgar Man) in *Cordialidade à brasileira* for an elaboration of these dynamics of the so-called modern Brazilian dilemma (Rocha et al, 51, translation mine).

³³⁵ See Aliana Freitas' 2014 overview of such consumption patterns in "Brasil bate Recordes Mundiais de Venda de McDonald's, Outback e Hooters" (Brazil beats World Records in McDonald's, Outback, and Hooters sales).

education, transportation, culture, leisure, and such other references that are functional and accessible to each and every one, that do not close themselves to certain mouldings of individuals and conduct that end up pre-selecting access, and when pre-selection fails, the only thing that we are left with is to call the police. The *rolezinhos* denounce these tensions with the democratic projects of modernization: when our socially disqualified do not have to either become like us or be banished; when the humbled need not impose respect and the entitled feel threatened by difference; when self-confidence, self-esteem, and other recognitions are not exclusively modelled after economic rationality and conduct; when *rolezinhos* expelled from shopping centres to precarious out of the way places need not make the resignation that, as one organizer put it, “for now we will keep trying to find alternate spaces for our *rolezinhos* until one day we will get to do it in the shopping centre and be well received” ...³³⁶

Practices of citizenship operationalized as social inclusion through consumption (i.e. purchasing power) and rights (i.e. juridical standing) reveal themselves as crutches more than aids, creating formal and informal cities, worlds, and desires. This economicist reduction not only blames the poor for their own social abandonment, but moreover, explains much of the contempt or indifference of large sections of middle classes, who end up neglecting any and all responsibility for a collective political condition, and, who are ultimately blind to their social privilege.

What we tend to hear from the fields of the underdeveloped is that we, on peripheries mapped globally and locally, live an ‘incomplete citizenship’, which remains as one of the major obstacles to broader socio-economic transformation. Those of us on

³³⁶ See interviews and associated analysis in the Globo special on “Rolezinhos do Funk” (Rolezinhos of Funk, 2014).

the peripheries are explained for as not knowing our rights and which institutions to appeal to in order to administer conflict. In fact, we distrust of them. We know when we are being treated as second-class citizens, most clearly through the provision of basic services in the city. Whether denied or abandoned, peripheries of irregular and illegal ways of occupying and navigating the city reveal, more than the lack of individual rights, a negation of the right to the city. Citizenship has an address. In divided cities, where you live will have a lot to do with what you do and do not have access to. Hence the recourse to urbanization as a tool of citizenship promotion.³³⁷

This politics of formality and informality, of hills and asphalts, captures how we tend to identify the problems and solutions to the third world. If only we could...they could... If only those in *rolezinhos* could adapt themselves to the proper conduct, in the proper place, at the proper time, all of these problems could be avoided. Insurgent citizens?³³⁸ Those who ‘just wanted to take a stroll’ in places not theirs, regardless of their explicit discourse around hegemonic relations, may not provoke resistance, but, at the very least, will doubtless provoke dissonance within hierarchies otherwise legitimated. The form of participation (‘inclusion’) demands much reflection, to be sure, yet the discomfort reveals segregationist practices of othering and selfing essential to the neutralizations of a middle-classification bent on modernizing a stable and prosperous society.

³³⁷ For a grounded of analysis of the production of citizenship and subcitizenship practices in Rio, see Fabiana Luci de Oliveira’s 2012 *UPP, Direito, e Justiça: Um Estudo de Casa das Favelas Cantagalo e Vidigal* (UPP, Rights, and Justice: A Case Study on the Cantagalo and Vidigal Favelas).

³³⁸ See James Holston’s anthropological study of the emergence of urban peripheries in Brazil, as a way to reconsider the formation of citizen and citizenship as tied to the occupation of urban space (*Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil*, 2008).

The cry of the quasi-excluded? A flash mob of the periphery? Affirmative action taken into one's own hands? A protest against or parade of capitalist society? Or simply, a stroll? Although certainly not a political movement or policy in the partisan moulds that we know how to do politics, the ensuing criminalization of the *rolezinhos*, and accompanying discomforts put in focus, may certainly be politicizable, opening pathways for encounters otherwise staged.

Our traditional ways of thinking and doing politics simply do not capture what was new or old about Brazil's 2013 Christmas season. Conservative or revolutionary? The feared vandals of the emerging giant stole something much more valuable than merchandise from the well-composed and properly-comported middle class: the illusion of democracy, cordiality, or however else we hope to frame our modern stature and civility. Christmas 2013 will be remembered (or forgotten?) as the time when poor, mostly black, youth were treated like criminals for daring to amuse themselves in shopping centres across the country, where the respectable middle class were to purchase their expressions of love and good will toward others. In the marvellous city, full of enchantments of natural and monumental features, it is no surprise that shopping centres were voted, in the very same year, as the most popular hangout spots in the city, replacing, in the ranking, the endless kilometres of urban beaches that once defined luxury and abundance.³³⁹ The streets are a dangerous place...for the projected others as much as for our guarded selves. Yet what dangers they behold for us remain an open question.

³³⁹ See 2013 release of *Revista Rio Show* for the citywide surveys that became a reference point in (social) media outlets (“Shopping é no.1”).

“Salty or sweet?” – A familiar refrain, we hear, on the downtown streets of Rio. For R\$2, we walk away with a small paper bag of freshly popped popcorn, and in mid-June of 2013, this was no different. Except for the brief interruptions of tear gas, bombs of moral effects, and crowd control measures of varied sorts, we occupy the streets in the ways that we know how. With the right to popcorn and all of its condiments.

Some say that a giant was awoken in those days that we hosted the 2013 Confederation Cup, our trial run for world stages to be mounted over and again in the spotlight of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, the anticipated turning points of Brazil’s long fantasized take-off. The time is always nearing to prove, to ourselves and the world, that we have finally joined its coveted ranks. And yet, amidst rising hopes, affirmations, and football championships, millions across the country poured into the streets in discontent – your mathematics depending on your politics, of course. Was it the twenty-cent increase in transport fares that mobilized the mass demonstrations that rebutted the proliferating promises of an emerging nation? Was it the ostentatious way that the elaborate funding of megaevent infrastructure measured up to the neglect of healthcare, education, and other basic provisions? Was it that our team was not playing the beautiful game so beautifully? At any rate, Brazil won the 2013 Confederation-Cup rehearsal. But it did not win the real-deal at the World Cup one year to follow. Or did it?

Black blocs, yellow blocs, and flags of every hue coloured the streets of Rio on those balmy June afternoons. The Journey of June, as it has come to be re-membered, may have taken on monolithic proportions, but its wanderings never did end up at any

definite destination. In the heat of the moment, with a Brazilian flag in hand, one could be accused of fascism or other short-forms for dreams of dictatorships of old, of military coups envisaged to institute order in a place of the lost and confused. With a red flag in hand, communists lurked. There were the protesters and there were the vandals, as mass media outlets staged in a scramble to redeem themselves in oscillations of support. At first we were all vandals, and then the police repression intensified, and, as if by pity or by the vicarious externalization of daily violences, popular support swelled for the almost daily protests that marked that historic month of June. Reporters in helicopters even came to declare 80% approval at its heyday. That support went as quickly as it came.

The division between the legitimate and illegitimate within the protests was as clearly drawn as the classifications of violence were unclear. Property confounded with bodies. Vinegar to relieve our teary eyes, banned – the Revolt of the Vinegar, or perhaps more appropriately, the Salad Revolution, it came to be dubbed at different points in its progressions. Preventative imprisonments made up some of the spectacles to be performed in the name of megaevent policing known world over. The ‘masked ones’ (*os mascarados*) threatened order, and fear began to prevail, not so much of the police, as it was in the beginning, but of the demonstrators themselves, protecting nose and mouth and other orifices from assault. Banks awakened permanently shielded in makeshift wooden planks, later to be painted in their institutional colours and branded months following the previously unimaginable precedence of June. No one anticipated such irruptions in a country well on its way to first-world status, and so, the persecution swelled alongside its enabling confusions. Mainstream support for the Journey would only return about one year later, on the eve of national elections when interested media

outlets reminded us that we were demanding change not too long ago. Change from the current Workers' Party (PT) reign, we were seduced into believing at this point. The mantra of 2014 electoral slogans, *change*, was even incorporated into the appeals of the abiding party: "PT: more changes, more future". Is this the change that was being called for on the colourful and clamorous streets of those days when we ate popcorn between flying rubber bullets and military-police barricades?

For a country whose historians tend to agree has never experienced revolution – only passive, pacific, or conservative reforms, at best – a call for party change does not seem to explain how it came to be that millions occupied the streets to dispute just about every petition imaginable, and then retreated almost as quickly. One month of outbursts across the country (in Rio we tried to extend it for another two) was followed by months of debates muted by overproduction.

Confusion reigned. Why at a time of inter/intra-national emergings did millions manifest themselves politically on the streets of Brazil's major urban centres? Was it that the new middle classes and actors on the rise readapted their entitlements, as a developmentalist narrative would have it: we go from having less and needing less to having more and needing more? Did the increasing formalization of labour relations alongside policies of income redistribution and social credit make way for a new kind of practice of active citizenship?

With one year in the interim, the stage of the World Cup became evermore feared. Now that we had witnessed the capacity for mass mobilization never before recorded, would the mayhem repeat itself at yet another championship of our national sport? Had we finally begun to learn the ways of democracy, to abuse it, like naïve or oblivious

children whose outbursts need to be channelled into the proper means? Are we yet to learn that protests are no place for barbeques, carnival masks, or football jerseys? Amidst propagating predictions, the manifestations that made history in June of 2013 did not repeat themselves in the trials that followed. Not in this form, any way: the journeys of June 2014 were other. But occupying the street is no foreign act for Brazilians of formal and informal worlds. The conditions of its politicization are what changes.

With political parties expelled from this seemingly new way of doing politics, what we saw on those historic streets filled with students and teachers of a traditional middle class alongside demonstrators of an emerging and precarious working class searching for their place within the Brazilian socio-political scene, was a war of imaginaries, of images or memes (summoned, as it was, on Facebook) more than a war of left against right. So-called right-wing parties that appropriated themselves of strategic moments of protest in attempts to oust the Workers' Party as much as self-styled left-wing parties and unions, were all but excommunicated in a crisis of representation that was cried out in waves of people in yellow, red, and black. Yet in the land of the cordial civilization, where personal relations are believed to govern impersonal decrees, were the mystified boundaries between public and private spheres confounded once more? Or were we dealing with the limits of partisan modes of politics, more broadly? The logic of the multitude is nothing foreign to us: carnival, samba, and spaces of our democratic trainings such as beaches and football fields are where we train to live together and play by the rules of the game at hand. Myths of racial democracy founded on the pacifism of miscegenation colour, once over, our possibilities for political (dis)engagement. Or in

more functional terms, as we tend to say here in dead-ends literal and symbolic, “if you run, the beast will catch you, if you stay, the beast will eat you”.³⁴⁰ The streets are a place not of signalling but of navigation. Even to cross at an intersection of a Brazilian city, pedestrians need to communicate with drivers; one is not to trust signs.

When signs do not aptly correspond to or arbitrate uncertain realities, in what do we trust? In moments of mass mobilization, one is to read the tides. Objections and demands may be varied (health, education, minority rights, political reform) or united (against corruption), as evidenced on those June streets of 2013, but the signs, whether calling for ‘FIFA-standard’ schools and hospitals at the verge of international takeover or exposing politicians and their militias or public-private partnerships, ebb and flow, that is, they only say so much. Beyond the signs, yes, the yellow, red, and black placards, much more was said and heard on that Journey, for those who awakened with the giant, starry eyed, or those who strategically inserted themselves in more readily translatable political discourse and action – left, right, or wherever the money trails lead.

What was in dispute on those streets in June, any popcorn vender could have identified before, during, or afterwards. It was a certain confluence of everyday grievances (particular complaints, demands, aspirations, expectations, etc.) and their generalizable implications.³⁴¹ The battle of the universal vs. particular rages in a new key. For a left whose struggle over hegemony pays more attention to human rights than basic sanitation, and so on and so forth, the everyday banalities seem to be a problem of

³⁴⁰ The popular Brazilian expression goes: “Se correr o bicho pega, se ficar o bicho come” (translation mine).

³⁴¹ For a rich elaboration of such dynamics in the context of the 2013 protests, see Carlos Henrique Pissardo’s “A Politização do Cotidiano, a Classe Média, e a Esquerda” (The Politization of the Everyday, the Middle Class, and the Left).

administration – technocratic, we should focus on systemic change and the rest will fall into place. It seems that this self-identified left has learned something from the myths of the right and their invisible hands, but not of their political strategies and interventions. Let us not forget that the Journey began with the twenty-cent fare increase. Public transportation has tended to serve as the ultimate catalyst, historically speaking, perhaps because gradual changes in almost any other sphere we adapt to like the frog in boiling water. But the means by which we get from here to there and carry all of this out, carry out the business of our everyday, has sparked more than one journey to the heart of politics. Buses are not lit on fire because they are the closest things to us on the street. That too.

In looking forward, our political options and alternatives are not captured by the strategic question of new left vs. old left, and their respective (im)patience in assuming state power. It is a matter of politicizing the everyday. And in order to carry this out effectively, it is imperative to politicize the middle class, the point of reference for what it means to be a free citizen and consumer nowadays. This does not imply a fetishization of the particular, nor its universalization or translation into abstract rights and such. It is about harnessing the potential of site-specific struggles, punctual as they are, so as to shed light on day to day processes and operations. Through a dialectic of the particular and the universal, as philosophers would have it, we journey from localized demands for sewage, for instance, to relations of power within a neighbourhood to urban configurations to regional to national and otherwise scaled political struggles. This lesson, the left and critics across spectrums have had to learn and relearn: without mass mobilization the fight against oppressive forces, so to speak, does not gain force.

Protests are often perceived as a barometer for compliance, or at the very least, submission, to the dominant orders of the day, especially by up and coming generations. Legitimacy lies beyond the mere institutionalization of rules, norms, and the more obvious signs of conformity. A sort of socio-cultural recognition of the terms of the game is required.³⁴² In the lead-up to the wanderings and discoveries of the Journey of June, we had a traditional middle class, demoralized by discourses of ‘the hard life’ and ‘being at battle’ of those who sustain handouts to the lower classes. As a matter of fact, contemporary developmentalist policies do privilege the two extremes: social policies for the poorest and emerging, in conjunction with support for big business without which no government could retain its influence. Within an ensuingly stagnant context of increased competition and precaritization (whether seen as a result of affirmative action programs or the formalization of labour such as domestic service), we saw a simultaneous abandonment and depoliticization of the traditional middle class, the point of reference for having made it in society. It was the political orphans of this ‘old middle class’ that we saw, in the largest number, on the streets of June. In these ways, the manifestations revealed the tensions within contemporary political configurations, and possibilities for the easy manipulations of a depoliticized middle class.

Demands on the streets remained, correspondingly, abstract – emptied of both specific articulations and lived reflections of current systems of governance. They were anti-institutionalist, at most, often repeating buzzwords disseminated by corporate media outlets bending discourses of corruption to delegitimize opposition and the undesirable at

³⁴² Refer to Rio-based political scientist and former political exile, Vianna’s analysis of the “paradoxes of democracy” in “Caminhos e Descaminhos da Revolução Passiva à brasileira” and accompanying commentary on the 2013 protests.

large. What is more, anti-globalization discourses only deepen these tendencies toward the abstract and disoriented. Petitioning for more investment in health, education, public services, and so on, can be coloured conservative or progressive. In and of itself, there is nothing conservative about defending more response-ability in state spending, as the tone on the streets overwhelmingly urged. Yet the incapacity to articulate these appeals in more concrete ways curbs the possibilities for furthering political engagement from then onward. Deserted on an abstract level, with the question of class reduced to income rather than more specific needs and demands, the signs and rallies will always have been sterile.

Far from utopic, to bet on the confluence between the particular and the general as a means to advance political struggle is what enabled *and* limited the uprisings that followed fare increases across the country in that historic month of June. Without the politicization of the everyday, the middle class and its traditional points of reference will remain indifferent to struggles variously situated along this spectrum, either escaping into self-indulgence or isolating itself as martyrs: the politics of hunters and preys.

Rather than swinging between extremes, which pass over the complexities of our everyday relations, it might be helpful to pay more attention to the dynamics *on the field* – of the Confederation Cup, World Cup, or local pickup match around the corner – than to the battle of left vs. right, whose placard-carrying interventions are channelled into partisan political imaginings of the ways that we occupy the streets, especially on those fateful June days of protesting, barbequing, playing, cheering, and eating popcorn. At stake is how we play the game.

The first time that we hosted the World Cup, at the precipice of modernization's promised take-off, we learned this lesson in our traumatic final loss on home turf. Escapism comes in varied forms. As hosts, we get to see how they see us. We get to see how we see ourselves, that is, what we choose to amplify, censure, and hide. Humiliation happens when we can no longer find a place to hide: it is a dead-end. Some 50 years later, in the revitalized original stadium, now cultural patrimony however unrecognizable, we needed to learn this lesson again. When put on the stage, to prove to the world what we are and want to be, we are always doomed to fail. When translating realities and necessities into signs, we are left with the option of demanding FIFA-standard schools. When "there will not be the Cup" placards turned into "there was no Cup", when forgetting became more important than legacies, when the logic of containment that had policed manifestations revealed itself as more strategic than dispersion as a way to deal with excess, the barometer test of the World Cup that followed that Journey of a discontented people reminded us of what happens when we do development 'for the English to see'. In the country where football players not only turn into our idols but also our politicians, we failed to remember what we have always learned and relearned in fields far from those hot concrete streets of June...

In June of 2014, within and around the football fields of World Cup exhibitions, we were reminded, once over, of these very lessons assimilated and forgotten. That is to say, above all, the beautiful game has taught us not only *how* to win, but also *how* to loose. For a chronically emerging Latin American giant, perfecting the art of dribbling our ways through the good and the bad and the ugly of our not quite first world, not quite third world conditions, is a matter of everyday survival. Regardless of where we find

ourselves situated in the Brazilian social stratum, everyday life is a game. In spite of, or precisely because, its results tend to be known in advance, how we play the game is often as crucial as the results themselves.

The space of the World Cup prevailed as more than the site where dreams (or nightmares) are to come true for a Latin American football giant that is celebrated and celebrates itself as the unbeatable five-time world champion. It was self-consciously created, by local officials, and recreated, by the masses, as a space of carnivalesque escape. No amateurs at this ephemeral art of living, revellers of an emerging underdeveloped Brazil are quite conscious of the power of the spectacle, and what it enables and disables in our everyday. So what did the World Cup taking place in the land of the beautiful game bring that is different from the routine extraordinariness that makes up the banalized condition of our everyday life? A stage. It mounted a self-conscious stage on which to project ourselves to the world, to the world that we imagine is paying attention and cares about us. The world to which we appeal to measure whether we are advancing or not, to measure what is of worth here and what we ought to be ashamed of. The world that we invoke, and that sometimes invokes us, to measure whether we have finally taken off to join its coveted ranks, or not. Yet who is listening, and what are they hearing?

Brasil X Brasil: Amongst ourselves, the World Cup transformed into yet another force wielding the pride/shame pendulum that is the inheritance of a so-called third world. Chronic positions of structural insecurity – economic, social, political – bring about this supple way of dealing and not dealing with our realities. It is never black or white. I remember standing outside an alleyway pub at the debut of our national team,

filled with people trying *not* to watch what was happening on the field. At the third goal against Croatia, in the final moments of the game, the elderly man standing beside me walked away, backwards, muttering to himself, “it’s never going to change anyway...”. The table of three behind me, drinking beer and chatting about motherly life, reared their heads long enough to yell out in response, “Brazil, stop stealing!”. I am still baffled by how they actually saw the mechanics of the penalty goal well enough to come to this conclusion, later to be widely shared among Brazilian commentators and viewing publics alike. The first game and its symbolic kick-off goal, which Brazil marked against itself, set the tone that persisted throughout the matches, and as it so happens, before and afterwards as well. In this sense, it was, in actuality, the heralded Cup of Cups, as the national government tried to rally, pitting Brazil against itself, on and off the field.

Being on our turf, innocence could only be found in the tragic. And this we got. Seven times over. Off the field, there were black blocs and there were yellow blocs. Those cheering against and those cheering for...for, Brazil? The traumatic implosion of the 7X1 semi-final game against Germany made very clear this ambiguity. We may have lost the Cup, but we won the World, or so we attempt to console ourselves. Tragedies were confined to the field. Or were they? Against the string of catastrophic predictions projected during Brazil’s delayed and tumultuous preparations, airports did not melt down and war did not erupt on the streets. We may have lost our messianic leader, in an accident that later saved him from our collective disgrace, but like forward Neymar, either all-powerful or pitied, our hope and despair can be channelled onto yet another stage to be mounted later that year, for our diversion and continual amusement: national elections. On the shores of Copacabana, on that rainy night of the 7X1 national tragedy,

within and beyond the gates of the FIFA Fan Fest, the feeling on that beach of nightmares – with wave after furious wave of shock, despair, and sadness – was something of a New Year’s Eve where the new year just does not come. Whether we want this new year to come, when, and how, is still very much an open question.

Brazil X World: From here to there, this division between football (or soccer, as some *gringos* prefer) and the Cup becomes even more clear. After all, both the sport and the event are imports that we have had, from the outside in, to make our own. In competition, here we are *torcedores* – we cheer as if we were spinning around ourselves to gain force to propel ourselves forward, as the associated Portuguese verb denotes. The closest translation would be *fans* – followers of a team who choose one over another to admire from a distance, from the bleachers. Here, we cheer *for*, rather than become fans *of*. We see ourselves on the field, at every twist and turn. Try to watch any football game with a Brazilian, and soon enough you will notice that we put ourselves right in the middle of the field, as judge, as coach, as player. It is not an admiration or loyalty from afar; we are the game.

Yet just as we are capable of supple moves and unions of varied sorts, off the field the famous (infamous?) cordial spirit kicks in as a way to deal and not deal with realities not of our choosing, with *torcedores* not of our team, with conflict and difference and what have you. How can we switch so smoothly between these two seemingly opposing modes? Easy. A friend of every one is a friend of no one. The mythical lightness and beauty of the Brazilian game translates both on and off the field. It must. How else to deal with our precarious positions in a global marketplace, here and now? Football, unlike many of the more popular sports among a North American crowd, is not

composed of a series of attacks and defenses. What the good American sees as tedious dribbling we see as the emotions of the everyday.

World X Brazil: From outside in, we hear a different story. How do we measure up to FIFA standards? At first, we were chided like disobedient children for delays and improvisations out of the standard. So much so that even our protesters against the megaevent began to demand FIFA-standard schools and hospitals, in their questioning of local and national priorities and ways of doing things.

As the matches neared, the tone began to change. Evictions, militarized repression of dissent, deaths on construction sites, FIFA tax exemptions and corruption scandals, billions in public spending when the promise 7 years back was not even 1. Our temple of football, the *Maracanã*, erected in 1950 for our first time hosting the Cup, had seat numbers decrease while ticket prices increased. We would not see, once over, a tenth of our city jammed between its spaceship walls, but instead, VIP boxes alongside *torcedores* in yellow and green, seated in orderly rows, pallid faces, put to shame by neighbouring cheers yet to be disciplined. We saw that the boundaries separating outside from inside are not as clear as we may have initially thought. We saw that FIFA standards came to mean profit, and that on and off the field, there is a big difference between profits and gains.

And so, for those of us who continue to make home in the land of football (err, soccer), the beautiful game, on and off the field, is our poison medicine.³⁴³ When one component fails to counteract the other, then we have a problem. The problem is not that

³⁴³ For a rich analysis of this complex relationship between football and a Brazilian “cultural singularity”, and its ensuing methodological orientations for mobilizing critique from within our inherited fields, refer to José Miguel Wisnik’s *Veneno Remédio: O Futebol e O Brasil* (Poison Medicine: Football and Brazil).

there is a good and a bad to everything – this, we Brazilians, know and live rather well. This, perhaps, the manifestations of June 2013 forgot in its appeal to signs and languages otherwise externalized. That is to say, the problem is not that there are costs and benefits to Brazil's World Cup, as a microcosm of the stage that we mount everyday to judge our advances and delays as an emerging giant. The problem is how they balance each other out, that is, how we play as a team and who is keeping score. Since the June uprisings at the Confederation Cup, the always already precarious balance has been increasingly precaritized, with more poison than medicine in effect. 2013 has been re-membered as the year when we went to the streets, 2014 as the year of playback, with hosting and persecution, elections and political repression, together with myriad wins and losses...and now what? In the lead-up to the 2016 Olympics, our city has been patented; quite literally, Rio became the first city in South America and one of few cities in the world to purchase its very own domain name, *.rio*. In the direction of becoming an Olympic city, transformations abound, yet little conversation is supported to reflect on what kinds of transformations are desired and desirable, outside the prism of (inter)national proofs of our soon-to-be first world status. In the rush of it all, perhaps, the best legacy of the 2014 World Cup games, for those of us who play on its terrain every day, would be a forfeit of the 2016 Olympic Games.

In any case, to acknowledge the ground with which and on which we are living and imagining the good life, politics cannot simply be about positioning oneself, for or against. To play the game on fields never of our choosing, never of our rules, one of our best guides, perhaps, has been what we have learned from the beautiful game itself, not always so beautifully played. Indeed, the sentiment of defeat has long haunted us.

Solidarity has been about equalization, the fantastical erasure of opposition in a place where we have prejudice of prejudice. Where we are one because we cannot be many. At stake in this match, is how we define and redefine the terms of the game, with and against which we navigate any situation or struggle. When so much else is inherited and beyond our tangible reach, this is the struggle that gives us space to manoeuvre. So how do we give ourselves over to the game, rather than be ruled by externalization of what should or should not be?

In reconsidering football as a manifestation of a Brazilian socio-political singularity, what is at play, above all, is our capacity to live *and* think our own cultures, to express passion and critique at the same time, in the same place, within the same body. Taking football as a language or modality of our everyday dynamics, we face the narratibility of culture, represented by a national passion or obsession, as some prefer, that is so omnipresent that its (in)visibility elides any easy classification in the constitution of a Brazilian identity, sense of itself and its place in the world. That is, what Brazilians think of themselves plays a major role in how the terms of the game are set and reset to certain ends. As such, two paradigms have surfaced, time and again, to think the game: prose, of a European identification, and poetry, of a Brazilian spirit, as distinct languages of football.³⁴⁴

Beyond caricatured accounts of prose as a banal communication of content and poetry as a sort of lyrical soul, the prosaic can be beautiful or bureaucratic, yet linear and finalist in contrast with poetic irruptions of the non-linear and unforeseeable. Following or dribbling the linearity of the English game, the two modes converge in the universal

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

delirium of the goal, when the opposition is, arguably, suspended, in reaching their extreme manifestations, in paroxysm. The temporality of the game, of passion, demands of the enamoured a suspension of reason, procedure, and intention. It reaffirms a real passion without affection or moral restriction, even when simulated and spectrally-mediated as is the condition of today's football.³⁴⁵ These (self)perceptions of the more technical and romantic of our game leave open the question of the possibility of political engagement in the face of our beloved football. If to live and to think the game were, in fact, oppositional experiences, as is so commonly held, perhaps the intuition of constituents of the Journey of June, around the Confederations Cup, found its way: on the street in simulating the cheers and jeers in a way reminiscent of the *torcedor* experience inside the stadium, a possibility for political engagement, via (with and against) the language of football, may actually be possible.

As such, in between the 'poison' of critique and the euphoric 'drug' of the masses, on the fields in which the game is played, we may find inspiration for how we approach our possibilities for political engagement. The challenge left for us – players and interpreters, lovers and critics of the game – is how to remain both within and outside (culture, football, and our object of critique), effectively breaking away with the for/against that animates the logic of football itself. Yet, to hold onto positionings of prosaic vs. poetic or technical vs. romantic plays, to a European vs. a Brazilian spirit, we fail to recognize what it is that gives life to this challenge of living passion and critique, here and now. The tired critiques of a Brazilian cultural scene dominated by the frivolities of football (or as it may be, carnival, samba, beaches, telenovelas, and other

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

distractions or opiates of a poorly-educated people), launched against more pressing issues and necessities, overlook the broader contexts that put into play these languages of football. Perhaps what forces 'the Brazilian spirit' to communicate in the form of poetry, on and off the field, has more to do with the so-called European standard of how a language is constituted, than with a free or unobscured soul of an authentic people. Perhaps the central question has to do with the way that a language is heard, more than with how it is produced or articulated. We who live football also think football, for one, so the challenge may be to learn how to hear these forms and expressions, neither prosaic nor poetic, of thinking our own game, our own sense of who we are and our place, broadly speaking. On this terrain, we may begin to resignify our ways of thinking and doing politics, as immersive in, rather than transcendent of, the games of everyday life.

Let us eat popcorn!

Since Independence, the dream of Brazil(ians) has been, and remains, to realize itself as a first world country. It has been a bumpy road, to say the least. Whether first-world status comes with laws obeyed, crises preempted, or more ephemeral codes of conduct that harmonize everyday practices, one definition looms large: as a country whose majority is poor, we imagine a place where a broad-based middle class would be the most numerous constituent of a civilized society. Our hope cycles and recycles through distinctions believed to characterize the ways of a properly educated, self-consciously rational, relatively emancipated, profit-maximizing, self-disciplined, and forward-thinking consumer-citizen of a modern democracy and free marketplace.

Accounts of modernization have captured our dominant understandings of what it means to develop and be developed. Post-WWII visions of progress, vitality, and renovation, which have longed to incorporate peripheries into a global system of good governance and wealth production, continue to set the terms of an (inter)national common sense, defining the virtues and vices of places like Brazil as if the character of modernness were ahistorically new and yet to be critiqued or overturned.³⁴⁶ Development lingers synonymous to maturation, as a process measured in time. This modern disposition of what it takes to be on the right path, both in the cognitive sense of intelligent design as well as the moral sense of being deserving of the fruits of progress,

³⁴⁶ For an in-depth analysis of how commitments to ‘modernization’ (as processes of making modern) have haunted Brazilian understandings of its incomplete development and corrupted modernity, in ways that travel across ‘glocal’ circuits of socio-economic ascension, neither straightforwardly liberal or conservative, see Jessé Souza’s *Os Batalhadores Brasileiros* (The Brazilian Fighters – Note: the fighter or struggling agent here made reference is a precarious class of emergents in Brazil).

reigns in the shadows of developmental paradigms variously expressed. In the same ways that such virtues and vices are oriented to reprimand and infantilize third world countries and their citizens on an international scale, within these so-called peripheries of a global modernity, parallel (and intersecting!) dynamics are at play: the ruling classes, the domestic minority, so to speak, are capacitated to lead a country where the popular classes, the domestic majority, are not even deemed capable of voting with a rational comprehension of their own interests, always already easy prey to the statist and populist seductions of the day. The patrimonial state, as the tired discourse is so rehearsed within political debates at bars and universities across the country, is the problem of the poorly governed lands of the semi-civilized. As such, Brazil remains an eternally premodern country, corrupted and unfaithful to its own interests and commitments, relegated to interpersonal and improvisational negotiations of confidence. Or so we are led to believe. Who, then, to guide us through this our perpetual emergence, toward the dreams of first-worldness?

The condition of emergence mobilizes past, present, and future into a monolithic program for destined (inter)national transformation. In this light, its instruments of implementation, which contain their own justification for why and how the enlightened are to lead the way, legitimate the dominion of some countries over others in ways analogous to the dominion of the self-avowedly cultured classes over the popular classes of an underdeveloped nation. In a Brazil (self)represented as a tropical oasis of sense and sensuality (through which everything from exotic sexual fantasies to dreary bureaucratic tales of corruption are accounted for), the spirit of a calculative and productivist rationality is venerated against the dictatorship of emotions, which apparently reign over

interpersonal relations alone. Even for morality to be justifiable it must not be enslaved to our affective capacities and relations. It seems that only the rational can look out for our own good. These instruments-turn-weapons are used against the peripheries of a global modernity, and at the same time modulated within local, regional, and national contexts, broadly projected.

More than legitimating the domination of a governing elite variously scaled (whose political parties and media outlets set the terms of the game), what we are dealing with are attempts at legitimating the direction and guidance of processes of socio-economic development. Mirrored, are the self-referential discourses of a people or a class who has yet to come into, or trust, the freedoms of the market against the oppressions of statist politics, to begin with. More often than not, this way of perceiving (inter)national dilemmas as affirmations or deviations of fated standards of freedom and prosperity (i.e. modern constructs of well-being) rests on an understanding of power and domination economistically rendered. To put it otherwise, class is conflated with income, and as such, artists and retail workers, new professors and mechanics, and other professions with more or less the same income levels are deemed to belong to the same class.³⁴⁷

Individuals are thus seen as delinked from broader circuits and relations, and as such, the politics of domination is made into a question of poor conduct, guidance, or work ethic. These prophecies become especially confusing at a time when multiple modes of capitalist development are at work, from the fordist surveillance of work and industrial production lines to the informalities and flexibilities of so-called post-fordist knowledge and talent-based economy. We increasingly face invisible and impersonal bosses under a

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

logic of financial capitalism, which confounds the individual and the social even further. Within this context, developmentalist politics that work on the level of income distribution and social credit (i.e. poverty alleviation), as necessary as they are, leave us celebrating the rise of new middle classes in the peripheries of modernity's systems of governance, without ever pausing to investigate how, and to what end, processes of development are being guided.

The vaunted question of the 'new middle class' that has preoccupied political debates within and beyond our boundaries accordingly prevails as the most significant transformation of the last decade or so of Brazilian development. It has come to embody the hope for the socio-economic advancement of the country, defining the future of development in peripheries variously mapped. These inspirational figures exemplify for us a new Brazilian self-confidence. Following triumphalist interpretations that have predominated, here and abroad, faith in the emergings, in the new middle class, as the pathway to our ordained first-world status elides the tensions and ambiguities of this so-classified social class, and the limits and possibilities that it exemplifies of modernization processes in Brazil and beyond. At the very least, the dispositions and distinctions of this elite of the poor masses, capable of social ascension given opportunity and qualification that enable their productive insertion into a competitive market, illuminate alternate paths for development (depending, of course, on their political cooption and patronage).

While the left and right continue to look to income to define class so as to understand the dynamics of poverty and underdevelopment, they remain blind to what is really 'new' in the changing configurations brought about by the emergings, variously scaled. These forty million or so Brazilians who entered the formal market over the past

decade, for instance, do not tend to move themselves to reputedly better neighbourhoods as their financial conditions improve.³⁴⁸ So investing the possibilities for Brazil's ascension on this apparently rising class overlooks how the cultures of class inspire affective identifications with divergent values, outlooks, and ways of living. What Brazil will these emergings usher in? What worlds will these giants recreate? These questions are far from economic in nature. And yet, the labour market as much as its training grounds (i.e. vocational and educational institutions) presuppose a certain 'incorporation' of a uniform set of dispositions and tastes, naturalizing the character of success.³⁴⁹ We remain perplexed by who makes it and who does not when we fail to look to familial inheritances of immaterial capital and reproductions of class, by universalizing the codes of conduct of an idealized middle class and mistakenly calling the emergings by the same name. This, too, explains why so many foreigners visiting the land of tomorrow struggle with calling Brazil a third or first world country. If only second place had not been taken already by ideology...

At stake are certain ways of living and perceiving the world. Played out on the developmental terrain, we are left with the option of either rescuing or glorifying the oppressed. The emergings and their dynamic interventions into capitalist circuits complicate this picture. At one and the same time that they revitalize hope in a system that enables personal freedom and mobility (if you just work hard enough!), often labouring through modes of production that overlap with new and old, their spirit is other. Closer to or coming from the lower classes, their modes of distinction are more popular

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

than bourgeois, so to speak, forging different relations between personalities, individualities, and collectivities broadly inherited. For the traditional middle classes, work ethic comes out of study ethic, one as a natural extension of the other. For the so-called new middle classes, euphemized as such, the development of an effective work ethic comes through other means, often via double shifts and a differentiated relation to work, investment, and interpersonal relations. The key dispositions necessitated by the modern workplace (e.g. discipline, self-control, prospective thinking) are not inborn, but trained in particular contexts and relations. Ultimately, one's relationship with *time* is the distinguishing feature of modern standards of success.

The will to plan a life and think the future (as even more important than the present) is far from a universal practice of everyday life. Prospective thinking, as it has often been theorized, is a privilege of classes of people who are not held hostage to the urgent demands of day-to-day survival, locked in a sort of prison of the present, as it has come to be known.³⁵⁰ Through economic and cultural capital, so to speak, privileged classes have a different dominion over time, a dominion then projected as a regulative principle of society and collective development as if everyone shared in such temporal ways of living. Between these two extremes of futurist and presentist temporalities, the emergings work through different modes of living. It is no surprise, then, that the sort of employment in which many within these sectors specialize, through this particular pedagogical and moral relation to time, is technical, pragmatic, and linked with direct necessities of labour markets so projected. Schooling has never been a singular

³⁵⁰ For a study on the role of “prospective thinking” in development and Brazilian modernization practices, see *Cenários Prospectivos: Como Construir um Futuro Melhor* (Prospective Cenários: How to Build a Better Future, Santos Grumbach et al).

occupation, and so too their relationship to learning to live in the present and the future.

The banalities of the ‘school of life’ serve up more than inspirational clichés; they capture a different kind of disposition to pedagogies of prosperity, broadly situated.

How are out of the way places training and qualifying such emergences, citizen by citizen, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, city by city, and upwards we go? Rio’s municipal government has been laying such groundwork for a soon to be Olympic city. *Escolas do Amanhã*: Schools of Tomorrow are the solution.³⁵¹ Lines of production are set up in factory-organized learning venues where a study ethic is to be linked to a work ethic for managing professions and professionalizing managers. Blurring lines, hundreds of public schools are being built in the year leading up to Olympic exhibition that are to solidify this sort of outlook between presentism and futurism for the emergings, let the qualified and disqualified continue in their respective containers. Schooling for the work ethic of emerging classes and nations is anything but straight-forward. In a sense, the fordist factory is imploded (in a global capitalist system) to transform the whole world into a giant factory, with franchises on every corner, within flexible networks of (auto)management.³⁵² This desired progression does away with class struggle and their legal, political, and syndicalist instruments, maximizing individual profit (and risk!). This desired world of financial capitalism has more invisible and impersonal bosses than

³⁵¹ For an overview of this municipal program that seeks to integrate education as the social and economic engine for national growth, see the official City Website profile (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro: *Escolas do Amanhã*, 2013), as well as Maria Luisa Barros’ covering of the 2014 inauguration of the project in “Prefeito inaugura Fábrica para Produzir 136 Escolas” (Mayor inaugurates Factory to Produce 136 Schools).

³⁵² Refer to Souza’s analysis of the tensions of material and immaterial capital, in the context of formal and informal economies in Brazil, in *Os Batalhadores Brasileiros*.

incorporated ones, with countless imperceptible exploitations in the name of self-aggrandizement.

With all of these (dis)qualifications of subordinate, emerging, and leading classes of consumer-citizens of a modernizing periphery, science is incapable, that is, it is scientifically impossible to predict the future of a class or a people, variously scaled. Will the emergings be mobilized as hope for the downtrodden or otherwise coopted? Have we found the pathway to redefining the political future of Brazil and socio-economic development practices, more broadly? Herein lies the political importance of the new middle class debate, which sheds more light on the politics of the development than the usual attention to the extremes and margins of society. How are past, present, and future conjugated within peripheries of modernity?

Amidst so much doubt and vindication, one particular story enchanted a Brazil on the verge of perpetual take-off. A story that blurred the line between justice and revenge, as forms of reconciling past, present, and future. A story that responded to a crisis of narratibility in the land of the chronically emerging. In the year that Brazil was declared the world's sixth largest economy, the first telenovela to set the celebrated 'new middle class' as protagonists stopped the country.³⁵³ *Avenida Brasil*, named after Rio's emblematic freeway that links the centre of the city to the suburbs, forced the national electricity system to put in place reinforcements to avoid blackouts, postponed Presidential and most official events, brought about mandatory suspensions in local

³⁵³ For a sense of its reception, refer to Émerson Maranhão's interview, with Brazilian specialists in teledramaturgy, in "A Novela que Parou o Brasil" (The Telenovela that Stopped Brazil, 2012).

airports, and emptied out city streets on the verge of its finale, and all of this within the boundaries of a country where to make a phone-call on any given day but Sunday, at the sacred 9pm time-slot, is the epitome of disrespect – disrespect for the moment of pause where joys and struggles of everyday life are narrated, reflected, and reinvented. Any foreigner could easily confuse a telenovela character with a personal friend or family member by the way that we refer to them and their stories on any street corner. At any rate, *Avenida Brasil* became the most exported production in Brazil's television history.

For half of a year, 6 days a week, we tuned in attentively, and discussed at length in the intervals of our daily routines, discourses of social ascension, mobility, and mixing between classes, reflecting on costumes, tastes, conducts and their varied distinctions. “The C-Class ascended to my penthouse”, we would hear of those people who now mix eggs with caviar. Whether narrating elite vulgarity or humble pride, the suburban stage became the site in which authenticity could be realized. The noble areas of the city were peripheral in function, and the landfill dumps contained all of the secrets. That is, an imagined sub-urban world was staged to serve our needs and desires in today's cultures of spectacle and (self)consumption. In between the pressures of survival of the downtrodden and the excesses of filters of the elite and aspiring-elite, the new middle class, ‘middle’ only because of recently acquired financial (rather than cultural) capital, expressed the values that ought to bring a country together. There, we (anyone!) eat for real, love for real, live for real. There, sense and sensuality give way to the sterile etiquette of the well-educated of a bourgeois morality (of the traditional middle class and up). Romanticized as more pure (by being less corrupted by dominant socializations) or demonized as impure (by being less refined, closer to nature on the margins of society),

the new middle class represents the discipline (hence how they ascend by their own efforts against all odds) and lack of discipline (in not conforming to what it means to be a middle class) of a third world. They test our values: what really matters to us, when, where, and at what cost. We are left questioning what to do with the afflictions of our lives and how to find justice in our everyday, as the characters of the telenovela mirror for us in rises and falls and assimilations of dominant values, navigating complex interpersonal relations that led the two enemy protagonists to battle it out for a good and evil that is never black and white: of a girl's abandonment and revenge for her father's murderer, for families that rose through football and betrayals, through couples that had to lose everything to find themselves, of the strategic blurrings of homosociality and the politics of love, and other such ordinary dramas on and off screen. Yet amidst the ordinariness and a finale that gave way to political correctness in the triumph of good over evil through the reconciliatory power of forgiveness, we felt a collective catharsis. A letting go of all that divides, a revalorization of our systems of judgement, and a questioning of what the good way to live is. More is not always better, or at least, the question was reopened at a time of ascent. In the final scene of *Avenida Brasil*, hope is christened by one more goal in the football nets of the suburbs, yet what emerges victorious is not so clear.

At a time when Hollywoodesque narratives increasingly dominate screens and imaginaries over and above our most enduring form of storytelling, the telenovela of ascendance that captivated a country seeking socio-political orientation did more than romantically reappropriate the authenticity of those in between, of those not at the top nor the bottom who showed us, in a country of extremes and contrasts, that progress can

mean many things and come from many different places. It showed us that what we long for is a measure of what has been left behind, what is always already with us (even if in an absent presence). *Saudade*. To translate more than four words certainly need to be mobilized: remembrance, love, grief, and longing.³⁵⁴ There is a way of relating to the world that is more oriented toward existence than history.³⁵⁵ Neither presentist nor futurist, it is the present of the past.³⁵⁶ *Saudade* does not trust in a modern temporality that turns its back on the past and looks forward to the future as a mode of planning our day to day lives, as a mode of development. The time of the clock, of industrial automation (i.e. time is money: Anglo-Saxon, by excellence, linear and deterministic, scientific and cumulative, chronometric and capitalist, valued for itself) governs our present for a future, predicted and feared and never to come. If the modern is the inheritance of this disposition, self-consciously concerned with the relation between past, present, and future, can we not resignify its ways of relating these modalities in our everyday lives?

Cause and effect are not historical, at least not in the chronological sense. They are a/e-ffective modes of making sense of our present. History is composed of stories that we tell ourselves of our collective imaginations. We need to face this work of the

³⁵⁴ One of our pioneering cosmopolitans, abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco, translated the notion of *saudade* with the use of these four English words in a 1909 conference at Vassar College – for further contextualization, see DaMatta’s exposition of this key concept in Brazilian self-understandings, in “Antropologia da Saudade” (Anthropology of Saudade, 69).

³⁵⁵ For an English-language introduction to these Brazilian notions of temporality, refer to one of our great interpreters of Brazilian modernity, Gilberto Freyre’s “On the Iberian Concept of Time”.

³⁵⁶ To sense how “a present of the past” could serve us, see the similarly entitled concluding chapter in Costa Lima’s groundbreaking study on social and literary criticism in *Intervenções* (2002).

imagination for what it is, with a clearer orientation for what it does and can do, for us, here and now. As is often repeated in the homes and streets of a chronically emerging nation, time is the servant, not the master, of people.³⁵⁷ Another way to put it, as one of our greatest lyricists of the ‘the new way’, Bossa Nova’s Vinicius de Moraes, put it: the time is when.³⁵⁸

In *saudade*, we are both inside and outside of time. It is a mode of temporality, of relating past, present, and future, as lived, reversible, qualitatively didactic, and collectively given. So much so that it is possible to have *saudade* of *saudade*. It is a relational space, that is, it is the place from which we live and reflect our everyday lives. It knows the place of the present. It knows the time of laws and desire, faith and excess, routines and rituals, waiting and passage, triumphs and losses, leading and following, fight and flight, and ultimately, hope and despair. The time of the nation – as is consecrated in the Brazilian national anthem, where “peace in the future” and “glory in the past” can be realized – incrusts the (pre)modern worlds of our desire.³⁵⁹ Yet in the relational space of *saudade*, we can hold it all, not in opposition or competition, but as a mode of living in the world.

The time of development is subsumed by a metaphysics of the nation-state, where the battle of order (of a spatial dominance) vs. progress (of a temporal dominance) rages over bodies yet to be-come. Institutionalizations of modern programs of reform, through the massification of citizenship that promises the democratic insertion and active

³⁵⁷ Freyre reminded us of the import of this popular saying in “On the Iberian Concept of Time”.

³⁵⁸ “Meu tempo é quando” (Vinicius de Moraes, “Poética”, translation mine).

³⁵⁹ See DaMatta’s “Antrpologia da Saudade” for further analysis of this orienting phrase in our national anthem (65).

transformation of the peripheries of modernity, are oriented by ruptures from the past and dreams of a future that perpetually wait for the social to catch up with the political. The properly-educated and law-abiding citizen is to pave the way. Growth may liberate us from underdevelopment, it would follow, but it does not ensure our capacity to reach first-world status. Always already delayed, it is not often clear to where we are heading. The training grounds of our modernity may appear to channel our aspirations in a particular direction, but this is, in practice, the art of politics. When development is rendered political, it becomes possible to move away from its futuristic bent to ground us in what is possible, here and now. There is a political economy of *saudade* that holds out for us the possibilities of living in tune with past, present, and future. After all, as another chronicler of Brazil's (under)development reminds us, "saudade...is the happiness that stayed".³⁶⁰ It is only from this place that we will be able to grasp the limits and possibilities of a third world development, that is, the hauntings of a modernity never to have been.

From the legacies of colonialism to the interventions of post-WWII modernization projects, the problem of development has been overwhelmingly defined in temporal terms. Whether evoking progressive images of planes taking off (i.e. Rostow), successive battles determining who advances and who dies off (i.e. Darwin), or some teleological variation on the theme of maturation (i.e. Kant/Hegel), the march of development has mapped pathways in time. As shown over and over again by the failures of countless macro-development plans in the third world, development is not so much about generating

³⁶⁰ As DaMatta continues to analyze, in the words of our great poet, Manuel Bandeira: "Choras sem compreenderes que a saudade / E um bem maior que a felicidade. / Porque é a felicidade que ficou!" ("Antropologia da Saudade", 75, translation mine).

certain outcomes (e.g. GDP), but a *way of living*. To take seriously this wholesale reorientation, a heightened attentiveness to *place* is vital – a sensibility that encompasses past, present, and future in a simultaneous manifestation. In place, we become attuned to the complexities and ambiguities of systems of governance, with all of their poison medicines. In an age of the hyperproduction of information, addicted to numbers and figures to measure the good life, the challenge is not to find certainty and impartiality, but to assume our partialities and work within their nexus – an otherwise oriented object-ivity that focuses in on how we narrate our everyday lives.

For too long our dreams have been corrupted by forces otherwise oriented. In the myriad distinctions of the downtrodden, the emerging, and the leading, within peripheries variously scaled, we face a crisis of narratibility. Instead of asking, are we there yet, we can ask, where are we and where do we want to be? Detaching from the pride/shame blackmail, we may be able to navigate the particularities of our modern condition with a clearer sense of orientation. What the emerging, in turn, lead us to make out is that in the fields of a third world – of that and those excised from the codes and conduct of modernity – *duality* (e.g. wealth/poverty and other derivations of empowering/disempowering measures) manifests itself as *trinity*: there may well be that which oppresses and that which is oppressed, and, that which arises out of these dynamics is its own entity, with its own integrity, expressing its own spirit. And herein lies the power of transformation. Our trusted guides of shades white and black do not help us much in navigating such recreations. That from which we descend is not our inheritance. Our qualities and entitlements are appointed, and as such, can be reappointed. With a bit more room to breathe, we may come to appreciate that our

possibilities for political (dis)engagement are more vast than imagined, and remembered. How to account for the new and old; how to connect past, present, and future; and ultimately, how to decide the ways in which we want to live together, here and now, is the question that will always have been opened. And so it stands before us to-day.

*De manhã escureço
De dia tarδο
De tarde anoiteço
De noite ardo.*

*A oeste a morte
Contra quem vivo
Do sul cativo
O este é meu norte.*

*Outros que contem
Passo por passo:
Eu morro ontem
Nasço amanhã
Ando onde há espaço:
– Meu tempo é quando.*

*Vinicius de Moraes
“Poética”*

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Appendix
Interviews, Focus Groups, and Participant Observation
in English Language Learning Centres
Rio de Janeiro, 2013-14

<i>Interviews*</i>	<i>Number of Interviewees</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Students ---individual interviews ---group interviews	5 16 (via 5 groups)	3 hours 5 hours
Teachers	9	8.5 hours
Administrators & Sales Representatives	8	6.5 hours
	<i>Total:</i> 38 individuals	<i>Total:</i> 23 hours
<p><i>*All individual and group interviews were conducted in open-ended, semi-structured settings, undertaken in the Portuguese language, before or after classes, at 6 different English language learning centres across the city of Rio de Janeiro, over the span of two semesters, between October 2013 and February 2014. Conversations were loosely guided around the following themes: (i) background and objectives; (ii) the experience of learning/teaching the English language; (iii) the experience of training/developing the language and skills; (iv) promises and expectations.</i></p>		

<i>Participant Observation (in-classroom)*</i>	<i>Number of Cohorts</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Beginner Level (teens and adults)	5	10 hours
Intermediary Level (teens and adults)	6	18 hours
Advanced Level (adults)	2	4 hours
Cross-Levels (teens and adults)	4	11 hours
	<i>Total:</i> 17 cohorts	<i>Total:</i> 43 hours
<p><i>*All participant observation was undertaken in one English language learning centre located in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro, where I was integrated as a non-intrusive member of classroom activities for the final semester of the 2013 school year (October – December 2013).</i></p>		