

THE FRAMING OF GREENPEACE IN THE MASS MEDIA

by

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B.A., University of Victoria, 1990

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Political Science

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ABSTRACT

Groups which engage in environmental activism are often faced with a dilemma - that of offering a radical challenge to the existing social order while at the same time trying to be "effective" politically. Since environmental groups usually lack financial resources, they often depend on the mass media to convey their views in order to attract public attention. But while such groups may succeed in attracting media attention, newsgathering routines which have arisen out of a corporate structure often result in media frames which submerge the radicalism of environmental organizations.

In trying to understand how the interaction between the mass media and radical environmental groups both constrains and offers openings for fundamental challenges to the existing system, the case of Greenpeace is examined in the thesis. Greenpeace is an interesting case because it has been successful in attracting prominent and often sympathetic coverage while at the same time advocating a fundamental challenge to the existing economic and social system.

Greenpeace's so-called ability to "manipulate" the media, however, does not necessarily mean that the

organization has been able to challenge the engrained assumptions of economic growth and technological progress upon which the existing system is based. Instead, my analysis shows that in early campaigns such as the seal hunt, Greenpeace obtained coverage through its dramatic actions which often resulted in superficial coverage discouraging connections between environmental degradation and its root causes. And although the increasing institutional development of Greenpeace and a heightened environmental awareness in society have created openings for the organization to bring issues like pulp mill pollution "on the agenda", the coverage of these issues is usually framed within a discourse of incremental regulation and "environmentally sensitive" economic growth. Radical messages are also further constrained by Greenpeace's fears of "scaring off" support and industry's skill in coopting environmental concerns to market their various products.

Therefore, as Greenpeace enters into the 1990's it appears that the organization is outgrowing its initial media orientation because of the change of tactics needed to move into the third world and to take on more complex environmental concerns. Greenpeace is reducing its dependence on the media because it wants to activate an environmental revolt and not reinforce the belief that citizens can only be spectators to the political process.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Jeremy Wilson for his patience in reading the many drafts that I gave him and in helping me to complete my thesis within a reasonable time frame. I would also like to thank Warren Magnusson and Bill Carroll for their advice and Duncan Taylor for his time sitting on my committee. Norman Ruff also helped me extensively in his capacity as the Graduate Advisor.

In terms of the interviews I conducted I would like to thank Louise Blight, Jim Bohlen, David Garrick, Diane Goulet, Lynn Jamieson, Brian Killeen, David Kraft, Bruce MacKay, Michael M'Gonigle, David Peerla, Tamara Stark and Bob Hackett for their time and openness in answering my questions.

I would also like to express my appreciation to my colleagues Bernie Hogan, Terry Clark, Kate Leishman, Don MacLean and Tim Maki for the humour and friendship which they offered me throughout the graduate program.

Finally, I owe immense gratitude to my partner David MacDonald for the help and support he gave me during the many frustrating moments which arose during the writing of this project.

FOR DAVE

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

In a variety of shapes and forms, fundamental challenges to the existing economic and social order have been made by groups called "new social movements".¹ These groups question current ways of thinking about the world and offer radical alternatives to existing priorities which oppress or deprive certain sectors of society.² They are also interested in challenging hierarchical social relations - an

¹Jo Freeman explains that one of the difficulties in analyzing new social movements is in coming up with a concise definition. She explains that since movements are so diverse, it is hard to find commonalities between them. In general, however, they are groups concerned with opening up new spaces for political action and can be seen as existing on a continuum between spontaneity and structure. Freeman also explains that movements exist when there is an identification among members that they are part of a collective consciousness, when there is a desire to spread the message of a collective, when a group is able to identify a problem while at the same time having a vision of a better future, and finally when there is a continuity of people or objectives. For a further discussion on the progressive and oppositional nature of social movements see Freeman (ed), Social Movements of the Sixties and the Seventies, (New York: Longman Inc., 1983); Molotch, "Media and Movements", in Zald and McCarthy (eds) The Dynamics of Social Movements (Massachusetts: Withrop Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp.71-93; and Cunningham et al (eds), Social Movements/Social Change (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1988).

²Wood and Jackson are opposed to this definition and maintain that social movements are not always progressive. They explain that although many movements are focused on improving the conditions of those who are deprived, other groups attempt to maintain the existing order or try to improve their already favourable status in society. For a further discussion see Wood and Jackson, Social Movements: Development, Participation and Dynamics, (California: Wadsworth, Inc., 1982), Chapter 1.

interest which steers them away from formal political channels and geographic boundaries such as the state.³ But because such groups try to avoid mainstream political channels and therefore have limited resources, their "success" in changing attitudes and behaviour depends to a large extent on how effectively they can disseminate information about the problems they perceive with the current economic and social system.

Molotch notes that this pressure to communicate with a large audience prompts movements to try to access the mass media. According to Molotch, "for them [social movements], the mass media represent a potential mechanism for utilizing an establishment institution to fulfill nonestablishment goals: communicating with movement followers, reaching out to potential recruits, neutralizing would-be opponents, and confusing or otherwise immobilizing committed opponents".⁴ But by using an "establishment institution to fulfill nonestablishment goals", new social movements are faced with a paradox - the mass media are to a great extent privately owned and depend for their existence on capital accumulation

³For a discussion on how new social movements defy geographic boundaries see Magnusson and Walker, "Decentering the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy", Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review Vol. 26., Summer 1988, pp. 37-51 and Warren Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community" in Walker and Medlovitz (eds) Contending Sovereignties (1989), pp.45-59.

⁴Molotch, "Media and Movements", p.71.

- the very economic structure that many of these social movements oppose. Since the media are powerful participants in the enterprise of accumulating profits, one would expect that they would attempt to legitimize, or at least not challenge, the interests of the existing power structure in society.⁵ We might, then, expect the media to treat new social movements negatively.

One social movement in particular which could be expected to be covered negatively by the media is environmentalism. Since environmentalism stems from the recognition that resources on earth are finite, it

⁵Although there is no consensus in media studies about the role of the mass media in a capitalist system, theorists who perceive inequalities in society as being constructed by oppressive social relations and not as the fault of individual ability or apathy begin with the assumption that the mass media operate to legitimate the existing social order. This assumption takes a variety of theoretical forms, however, which range from "conspiracy" theories which probe the extent to which elites censor coverage critical of the status quo [see Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Bagdikian, "Lords of the Global Village", The Nation, June 12, 1989; Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly 2nd Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), Chapters 1 and 2.; Murdock, "Large corporations and the control of the communications industries" in Gurevitch et al, Culture, Society and the Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982); Murdock, "Patterns of Ownership: questions of control", Media Organizations (Great Britain: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1977)] to approaches which see media coverage as being a result of a more complex interaction of journalist routines, audience demands and organizational constraints [see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Gans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1988); and Tuchman, Making News (New York: The Free Press, 1978)].

challenges a fundamental assumption behind the existing social and economic system - expansion of production and consumption.⁶ In order to understand the relationship between the environmental movement's challenge of the existing order and the media's coverage of such opposition, the group Greenpeace has been chosen as a case study.

Although it is not clear that Greenpeace is representative of new social movements as a whole or even of the environmental movement, Greenpeace has been chosen as a case study because its budget, membership and international orientation make it a major player in the development of a widespread ecological consciousness.⁷ Greenpeace is also an appropriate choice in trying to understand movement/media interactions because of both the fundamental challenge it offers to existing economic and social processes and the extent to which it has been skillful in attracting media coverage. Although some activists within and outside the organization question the extent to which Greenpeace is a

⁶For an examination of the different assumptions behind environmentalism see Gorz, Ecology as Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980); Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990); and Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985).

⁷Glenn Bohn notes that "Greenpeace now boasts a fleet of seven ships, offices in 24 countries, 900 staff, four million members and more than \$100 million in annual revenues", in "A stormy voyage: twenty years of Greenpeace", The Vancouver Sun, September 14, 1991, p.B8.

radical environmental group,⁸ it attempts to be on the cutting edge of environmental activism by pushing for structural change instead of incremental regulation,⁹ by adopting an uncompromising stance towards polluters,¹⁰ and by involving itself in a wide variety of issues.¹¹

⁸Radical is viewed as a problematic term within Greenpeace. In my interview with David Garrick, an early Greenpeace activist involved in both the whaling and seal hunt campaigns (Telephone Interview, November 14, 1991), he did not want to label Greenpeace as a radical organization because the term had been misused by people for so long. The CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years (a co-production of Screenlife Incorporated and the National Film Board of Canada, copyright 1991, aired on September 10, 1991) also points out that Greenpeace activists do not call themselves radicals and prefer the term conservative because they are conserving a common environment. Bruce MacKay, the person who started the Greenpeace Office in Montreal in 1984 and now works for Greenpeace International, states that he doesn't think Greenpeace is a radical organization because it does not challenge the unequal distribution of wealth within society, economic growth and the ability of science to solve all our problems (Telephone Interview, October 21, 1991). Louise Blight, media coordinator for the Vancouver office maintains that Greenpeace is not that radical an organization because it does not always push for the ideal (Interview, July 26, 1991). Paul Watson, a former Greenpeace activist, explains that Greenpeace is not radical because it is big and bureaucratic and spends too many resources fundraising and not enough on environmental activism (see Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant", The Georgia Strait, Sept 13-20, 1991, pp.7-10).

⁹Michael Manolson notes this aspect of Greenpeace philosophy in his telephone interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

¹⁰The CBC Documentary The Greenpeace Years notes that Greenpeace's uncompromising stance over the years has given the organization its radical edge.

¹¹Michael M'Gonigle (telephone interview July 28, 1991) notes that Greenpeace has become more radical over time because of its change from campaigning on one issue to many - a change which enables Greenpeace to link different environmental problems to the economic structure and

Greenpeace's goals can subsequently be considered radical because they are aimed at challenging the root causes of environmental degradation and attempt to offer a holistic or systemic critique of polluting practices. Instead of undertaking isolated ecological concerns, Greenpeace attempts to relate particular issues such as pulp and paper pollution or the seal hunt to a wider range of unsustainable production and consumption processes upon which the existing system is based. The environmental group, therefore, is vulnerable to marginalization and disparagement because of its role in oppositional politics and its historical dependency on the mass media to raise public consciousness.

One cannot just assume, however, that the corporate and centralized nature of media enterprises will lead to the denigration of Greenpeace or any other new social movement. In fact, when looking at Greenpeace's historical relationship with the media, it seems initially that fears about "co-optation" or "marginalization" of the environmental group are somewhat misplaced.¹² Greenpeace's

subsequently offer a more radical critique.

¹²Michael M'Gonigle (a Director of Greenpeace Canada) maintains in a telephone interview on July 28, 1991 that often the media are one of the best ways to get environmental messages across because journalists are often sympathetic to environmentalists' concerns and suspicious of the claims of politicians. Greenpeace Forestry Campaigner David Peerla (interview October 18, 1991) notes that journalists are often to the left of public opinion and Toxics Campaigner Brian Killeen (interview September 26, 1991) maintains that overall the media's relationship with Greenpeace is very good because most of the things that the

success is largely owed to its interaction with the mass media,¹³ and the subsequent twenty years of extensive¹⁴ and sympathetic¹⁵ coverage it has received. Also, partly because of this widespread media coverage, environmental issues are "on the agenda" like they never have been before¹⁶ and have consequently sparked a great deal of

group does are considered newsworthy in the environmental field.

¹³One of the founders of Greenpeace, Jim Bohlen, who is presently a Director of Greenpeace Canada, maintains that the existence of the environmental movement is largely due to the media and the visual media especially. He explains that television has allowed people to understand environmental destruction in their living rooms (telephone interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991).

¹⁴In a telephone interview with Jeremy Wilson on November 20, 1990, Michael Manolson, Executive Director of Greenpeace Canada notes that Greenpeace is now quite used to extensive coverage and therefore one of the main concerns the environmental group presently has is ironically the *oversaturation* of coverage about environmental issues and Greenpeace in the mass media.

¹⁵Often this tendency to treat environmentalism sympathetically has been seen by conservative critics of the mass media as evidence of its "liberal bias". For example, The Fraser Institute claims that journalists use "advocacy" rather than "objective" criteria when covering environmental issues and are liberal in the sense that they blame corporations and stress governmental rather than individual responsibility. For a further discussion see Miljan, "Network Coverage of the Environment: Objectivity or Advocacy", On Balance, October 1989, pp.1-7.

¹⁶There have been studies of how the environment became part of the government agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s but environmentalism then was not perceived as being at such a state of "crisis" as it is today. In the 1970s environmental issues subsequently faded when the recession hit and economic concerns became prominent [see Sandbach, Environment, Ideology, and Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) and Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology - The Issue-Attention Cycle", The Public Interest 28, (1972), 38-50].

public concern, if not a large governmental response.¹⁷

The degree to which the media coverage of Greenpeace is "sympathetic" and "prominent", however, does not ensure that the group's concerns are portrayed in a manner offering a fundamental challenge to the existing order.¹⁸ In order to understand how Greenpeace and its messages are covered, it

Tamara Stark, Media Coordinator for Greenpeace Canada notes that at present environmental issues are one of the top public concerns even in a time of recession (Telephone Interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991).

¹⁷Steve Sawyer, Executive Director of Greenpeace International, notes that the largest signs of hope are found in present levels of public consciousness and not from the actions of governments or international organizations. He maintains that governments have mostly just adopted the rhetoric of the environmental movement and that international organizations, while recognizing the massive threats to the environment, do not have the power to effect change "in the face of recalcitrant national and corporate interests". Steve Sawyer, "Greetings from Greenpeace International", Stepping Lightly on The Earth - Greenpeace 20th Anniversary Gala Concert (Greenpeace, 1991), p.3.

¹⁸Although "the existing order" is a problematic phrase, it is used in this thesis to refer to the powerful position of business interests in society, priorities such as economic growth, and the extent to which environmental concerns are submerged into a discourse of consumption, production and technological progress. For example, although concerns about recycling are prominent in the media, such concerns do not challenge the hegemonic practices of consumption and production and even depend on such practices to exist. Also, recycling, like the rise of "Green" products, does not essentially challenge business interests in that it will eventually become a money making venture. I do not mean to say that recycling is not worthwhile, only that media concentration on recycling will depoliticize environmental issues because increased recycling efforts by individuals will be thought of as "solving" environmental problems when many of the structural problems inherent in environmental degradation - such as industrial concentration and control - will be ignored.

is necessary to ask how the group and its forms of environmental activism are "framed" by the media.

MEDIA FRAMES

Stuart Hall et al. point out that the delimitation of events or issues in the mass media is not self-evident or "natural".¹⁹ Instead, particular issues are selected as important and are structured in certain ways. This structuring and selection of events has often been referred to as a "media frame".²⁰ Gaye Tuchman underlines the problematic nature of media frames by comparing them to views through windows. She notes that

the view through a window depends upon whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few, whether the glass is opaque or clear, whether the

¹⁹Journalists often claim that framing is a necessary consequence of time and resource constraints, which while simplifying and encapsulating events, does not distort "the facts". The assumption of journalists is that "the facts" exist outside their frame of reference - an assumption which is disputed by theorists who see journalists as selecting and shaping particular "facts". For a further discussion see Hall et al., "The social production of news: Mugging and the media", in Cohen and Young (eds), The Manufacture of News (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 1981), pp.335-367.

²⁰Analyzing media coverage in terms of "media frames" was first featured in Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). His analysis has been followed by Tuchman, Making News (New York: The Free Press, 1978); Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Hackett, News and Dissent (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing, 1991). For a further discussion on the definition of media frames see Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies (London: Methuen & Co., 1982).

window faces a street or a backyard. The unfolding scene also depends upon where one stands, far or near, craning one's neck to the side, or gazing straight ahead, eyes parallel to the wall in which a window is encased.²¹

In other words, the concept of the "media frame" takes into account two processes in the structuring of information - selection and interpretation.²²

Although the analysis of media frames has been made by theorists beginning with very different ideological assumptions,²³ most studies of media selection and interpretation assume that frames are related to the unequal distribution of power within society. Such an assumption finds its roots in the observation that the mass media are largely a corporate institution producing information to attract large circulations and the substantial advertising

²¹Gaye Tuchman, Making News. p.1.

²²For a further discussion of this process see Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, (London: The MacMillan Press, 1978), p.57.

²³For an example of a neo-conservative viewpoint of media selection and interpretation see the Fraser Institute's monthly analysis On Balance. In the case of environmental coverage, The Fraser Institute argues that the framing of environmental issues is often found to have a left wing bias because journalists are sympathetic towards ecological concerns and therefore use "advocacy" instead of "objective" journalism. For a further discussion see Miljan, "Network Coverage of the Environment: Objectivity vs Advocacy", On Balance October 1989, pp. 1-7. For an example a pluralist view on framing see Edwin Diamond, Good News, Bad News (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980). Diamond maintains that framing occurs but that it is the result of a multiplicity of interests and does not reflect and reinforce the unequal distribution of power within society.

revenues flowing from the recruitment of these massive audiences.

Asssuming a relationship between the corporate nature of the media and media frames, however, has often led to a concentration on the extent to which media owners shape content to promote their own class interests²⁴ - an approach often criticized for being too narrow in scope.²⁵ Gitlin and the Glasgow University Media Group explain that there

²⁴For example, Ben Bagdikian notes that media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch and Robert Maxwell have in the past censored stories which do not support their political beliefs (see Ben Bagdikian, "Lords of the Global Village", The Nation, June 12, 1989, pp.806-820) and that the increasing concentration and conglomeration of media institutions have led to instances where articles critical of a parent company or subsidiary have been censored because corporate interests might have been jeopardized [see Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), chps 1 and 2]. For other accounts see Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); and Murdock, "Large corporations and the control of the communications industries", in Gurevitch et al (eds), Culture, Society and the Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp.118-150.

²⁵The idea that owners use their own media organizations to promote their class interests is often associated with theorists who see the media as a producer of "false consciousness". This view has been largely rejected for being either arrogant or simplistic [see Fred Inglis, Media Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990), Chapter 4]. It has been considered arrogant for thinking that audiences would not be sophisticated enough to recognize such tactics and simplistic in ignoring the complex priorities that the media have which include attracting an audience, being "objective" and so on. For a further discussion on the development of Marxist studies of the media see Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, "The study of the media; theoretical approaches" in Gurevitch et al (ed) Culture, Society and the Media, (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp.21-28.

are many kinds of control over media content in a capitalist society of which the influence of owners is only one aspect.²⁶ Other forms of control include constraints on newswriters (time, resources, recruitment and training), the delimitation of what is considered "newsworthy",²⁷ and "the cultural air that we breathe, the whole ideological atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and others had best not be said".²⁸ Taras also points out that the increasing concentration and conglomeration of media organizations have led to a change from family ownership to control by shareholders - a change which has increased the power of journalists and editors relative to media owners.²⁹ More sophisticated studies of media frames, therefore, must take into account both the

²⁶Gitlin has developed his perception of the different kinds of control over content from Herbert Gans', Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979). For a concise explanation of Gans' approach see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp.249-251. For a discussion on the types of control over media content by the Glasgow University Media Group see Bad News (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp.ix-xiii.

²⁷The Glasgow University Media Group notes that the rise of television viewing has made the visual nature of news play an increasingly important role in what is defined as newsworthy. For a further discussion see Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p.x.

²⁸Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p.x.

²⁹For a discussion see David Taras, The Newsmakers (Scarborough; Nelson Canada, 1990), pp.41-69.

autonomy of newswriters from elites and the relationship between the media and its wider social, economic and institutional context.³⁰

This complex nature of the production and reproduction of ideas in society has been addressed by Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and has recently become popular in studies of the mass media.³¹ Instead of looking at the overt attempts by media elites to control information, theories of hegemony analyze the more unconscious and subtle ways in which the ideas of the powerful are produced and reproduced by the media and society as a whole.³² And although hegemony recognizes the necessity of coercion in maintaining the consent of the dominated or underprivileged

³⁰The placement of the media within a larger institutional context was developed initially from the work of Louis Althusser who saw the media as part of an "ideological State apparatus". Media studies have tended to look beyond Althusser, however, because he perceived media discourse as being particular and autonomous instead of within a larger historical and social totality. For a further discussion, see Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, "The study of the media: theoretical approaches", in Gurevitch et al. (eds) Culture, Society and The Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp.21-28.

³¹See Tony Bennett's, "Theories of media, theories of society", in Gurevitch et al (eds), Culture, Society and the Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp.30-55 for a discussion of the historical development of integrating ideology into studies of the media.

³²For a discussion of this process see Hackett, Pinet and Ruggles, "From Audience-Commodity to Audience Community: Mass Media in B.C.", in Magnusson et al (eds) After Bennett (Vancouver: New Star Books Inc., 1986), pp. 267-283.

in society,³³ consensus is more often achieved through shaping the ways in which people think about themselves and the world,³⁴ or in other words, by shaping citizen's perceptions of "common sense".³⁵

In explaining how dominant ideologies are produced, reinforced and challenged by the mass media, theorists using the concept of hegemony to understand the framing of issues

33Although Gitlin maintains that coercion is only applied during "disruptive movements" (such as the 1960's) where hegemonic routines are inadequate, Hall et al recognize the more pervasive coercive functions of the state in maintaining law and order in society - a function which is readily apparent to certain racial groups who are discriminated against. For a discussion see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, p.12 and Hall et al, "The social production of news: mugging and the media", in Cohen and Young (eds), The Manufacture of News, Second Edition (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 343.

34Hall maintains that it is the ability of the theory of hegemony to take into account consent in society which makes it so attractive. He explains that the weakness of earlier Marxist positions was their inability to explain the "free consent" of those who remain subordinate in the capitalist system. And it was the pluralist theorists capacity to explain this consent which gave their arguments value even "though it gave to it a highly idealist and power-free gloss or interpretation". For a further discussion see Hall, "The rediscovery of 'ideology'", in Gurevitch et al (eds) Culture, Society and the Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), p.85.

35For a further discussion on the media's role in shaping perceptions of "common sense" see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Hall et al, Policing the Crisis (London: The MacMillan Press, 1978); Hackett, Pinet and Ruggles, "From Audience-Commodity to Audience-Community: Mass Media in B.C.", in Magnusson et al (eds) After Bennett (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1986); and Hackett, News and Dissent (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co., 1991).

point to the routines of workers in the media industry.³⁶ Since journalists' and editors' work practices have both developed out of and exist within a market system, they usually take for granted existing economic and social relations and the legitimacy of government officials and other "experts" in promoting these relations. Gitlin and Tuchman argue further that journalists' legitimating role is also engrained through their socialization in the newsroom, the ways in which they are rewarded and promoted, and through their interactions with sources.³⁷ Hackett also

³⁶Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Gans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Tuchman, Making News (New York: The Free Press, 1978); and the Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).

³⁷See Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, pp. 249-282 and Tuchman, Making News, pp. 82-103. Journalists and Editors are socialized by their sources because they are heavily dependent on them to substantiate (and therefore make legitimate) the information which they report on. Taras explains that government officials can punish journalists who are too critical of them by denying them access to interviews. (see Taras, The Newsmakers, pp. 125-131 for a discussion of how politicians can influence the coverage they receive). The media are also heavily dependent on the business community because of their support through advertising dollars. Bagdikian notes that editors and journalists are often careful not to offend corporations which advertise in the newspaper or network for whom they work [see Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, Second Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), Chapter 1 and 2]. Therefore, journalists and editors are more likely to receive and take seriously "flak" from powerful officials and CEO's than from activists in new social movements. For a recent examination of the interaction between journalists and government officials in the Reagan administration see Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee (New York: Schocken Books, 1989).

points out that because the media are structured around the purpose of selling audiences to advertisers, audiences are positioned as consumers and political spectators - a move which reinforces the legitimacy of the economic system and electoral politics.³⁸ The intervention of elites in the production of media frames is therefore often not necessary because the practices of journalists and editors, as well as the structure of the media itself, usually ensures the legitimation of existing social relations.³⁹

Perceiving the social and institutional constraints on newswriters as pervasive, however, does not mean that they are monolithic. Theories of hegemony recognize the extent to which the boundaries of the dominant ideology are often disputed and stretched. Hackett explains that there are two reasons why dominant ideologies can be contested in the mass media: the first is that there are often contradictions present within the existing system; second, audiences do not just absorb information passively. They actively engage with and often contest media messages. Hackett points out that although framing is a practice of power which favours

³⁸For a further discussion on this aspect of the commercial nature of the media see Hackett, News and Dissent, pp.67-71.

³⁹Although Gitlin maintains that usually the intervention of elites is unnecessary, he notes that there are certain "disruptive moments" when routines break down and elites use direct control over coverage. For a further discussion see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1980), pp. 12-13.

certain images and ideas over others, it is also an active process which results in a "struggle" for meaning when dominant frames are challenged.⁴⁰ Those groups which are posing a challenge to existing social and economic relations are able to open up spaces for dissent by using both the contradictions within journalist routines and the sympathy of audiences to their own advantage.

One such struggle which has resulted in stretching the boundaries of "common sense" is the increasing prominence and legitimacy of the environmental movement within the mass media and society. Although the philosophies and goals of environmental groups are on a fundamental level antithetical to the corporate structure of the mass media,⁴¹ the contradictions within mass media priorities⁴² and the

⁴⁰Hackett, News and Dissent (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co., 1991), pp.18-19.

⁴¹Although green philosophies such as deep and social ecology challenge existing economic and social relations, it is important to recognize that certain environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund and Pollution Probe position themselves within the existing system by accepting corporate and government funding. This source of funding provides problems for such groups because it makes them beholden to the very interests they are trying to oppose. For example Pollution Probe initially supported the Loblaws chain of "Green products" and was subsequently publicly embarrassed when it came out that the group accepted funding from Loblaws. For a further discussion of this controversy see "Loblaws criticized for 'Green' Products", Toronto Star, July 5, 1989, p.A11.

⁴²In his article "Media and Movements", Molotch explains that the priorities of news organizations are often contradictory which enables oppositional movements to obtain recognition. For example, media organizations will not want to criticize certain corporations in the fear of losing

liberal-capitalist system⁴³ as well as increasing audience interest⁴⁴ have allowed environmental issues to be at the forefront of present concerns. Newspapers and television networks now hire environmental reporters and classify the environment as a newsworthy category through specific pages or cover stories. Schoenfeld et al. also note that many reporters are themselves environmentalists which has added to the movement's legitimacy and prominence in the media.⁴⁵

Even though it is apparent that the environmental movement has become "newsworthy", it is still necessary to examine whether environmental groups are able to get radical

advertising revenues but such criticism is often necessary for the media to maintain their legitimacy as a "watch-dog" for the public. For a more detailed discussion see Molotch, "Media and Movements" in Zald and McCarthy (eds) The Dynamics of Social Movements (Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 82-84.

⁴³Increasing environmental awareness exposes a contradiction between industry's ability to supply consumers with "what they want" while at the same time encouraging increases in consumption. The "want" of consumers to decrease pollution significantly, and subsequently consumption, would contradict with the expansionary nature of capitalism.

⁴⁴In the CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years, Don Harker, ex-Director of the Environment for the Kentucky Government maintains that environmental groups such as Greenpeace are becoming the mechanism through which people suffering from the adverse effects of pollution depend on to address their grievances. Therefore, the more people who experience the problems associated with pollution, the more sympathy environmental groups such as Greenpeace can acquire from media audiences.

⁴⁵Schoenfeld et al, "Constructing a Social Problem: The Press and the Environment", Social Problems, Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1979, pp.51-52.

stances out in the mass media. Gitlin explains that radical messages are disadvantaged in the mass media because social movements are more likely to be covered extensively and favourably if their objectives are compatible with those of the status quo.⁴⁶ Also, the primacy of business and economic concerns on television and in newspapers makes it likely that environmental issues will be looked at in terms of how they can be "fit" into existing priorities.⁴⁷ For example, the promotion of "environmentally friendly" products in the media has been one way in which ecological concerns have been submerged into the the hegemonic discourse of a market based system. Furthermore, the development of the "environment beat", although reflecting the legitimacy of environmentalism, has also had the effect of putting ecological issues in one section while business concerns are placed in another.⁴⁸ This division separates

⁴⁶Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.284.

⁴⁷Diane Goulet, pulp and paper campaigner for Greenpeace in Montreal notes that the primacy of economics can be seen by the number of environmental journalists compared to business reporters. According to Goulet, for every one environmental journalist for a large newspaper there are at least ten business reporters. Telephone Interview, October 30, 1991.

⁴⁸David Peerla, Forestry Campaigner for Greenpeace Canada, believes that his most successful stories have been the ones which appear in the business section. He points out that stories which are placed in the business pages are hitting and critiquing their real targets - company executives and government decision makers. Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

environmental issues from the very economic structure which they are challenging.⁴⁹

The framing of Greenpeace and its messages in the mass media, therefore, is not a predetermined process. Although the corporate structure of the media and the economic priorities within society disadvantage Greenpeace's ability to fundamentally challenge existing practices, the organization's skill in using the contradictions within the existing system and the increasing environmental awareness of audiences to its own advantage will give it opportunities to stretch the existing boundaries of debate.

THE FRAMING OF GREENPEACE

When one looks at the coverage of movements, it is important to see framing as an interactional instead of a top down process. In the case of Greenpeace, this interactional process has often led to accusations that the organization "manipulates" the media. Such accusations stem from Greenpeace's historical use of the media to achieve its goals and the subsequent perception that the organization's activists are "publicity mongers" and only interested in

⁴⁹For a discussion of the difficulties surrounding developing a "beat" for the environment see Fletcher and Stahlbrand, "Mirror or Participant: The News Media and Environmental Policy", in Robert Boardman (ed), Canadian Environmental Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.183-5.

seeing themselves on television.⁵⁰

The historical media orientation of Greenpeace was entrenched early on because four out of twelve men on the first voyage to Amchitka were journalists.⁵¹ Two of these journalists, Ben Metcalfe and Bob Hunter, even went on to become Presidents of the organization.⁵² Although Metcalfe understood the importance of attracting media attention,⁵³ nowhere was the influence of journalistic expertise in promoting Greenpeace more apparent than with Bob Hunter's involvement in the organization. Bob Hunter was a columnist for The Vancouver Sun during the first few years he worked for the group and his experience as a reporter made him aware of the importance of the media in raising concerns about environmental degradation. Hunter was greatly influenced by Marshall McLuhan and believed that the "global village" created by the media had the power to produce a

⁵⁰Interview with Louise Blight, July 26, 1991.

⁵¹For a discussion of this voyage see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989), pp.6-15 and Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Winston and Rinehart, 1979), pp.3-114.

⁵²Ben Metcalfe was president from 1972 to 1973. Bob Hunter remained the leader of Greenpeace from 1974 until mid 1977.

⁵³For a discussion of Metcalfe's role in the organization see Webb, "Protest in Paradise", Maclean's, June 1973, pp.38-77.

widespread environmental consciousness.⁵⁴ Hunter's dual role as a reporter and an activist also enabled him to push the organization's early campaigns on the agenda by exaggerating, distorting and sometimes even inventing Greenpeace activities.⁵⁵

Despite Greenpeace's historical ability to "manipulate" the media, it is also important to recognize that Greenpeace and the media have different priorities when interacting with one another. Lynn Jamieson,⁵⁶ the pulp and paper campaigner for the Vancouver Office, explains that this manipulation is a two way process; Greenpeace presents itself in certain ways to improve the quality and quantity of the coverage it receives while journalists shape their stories of Greenpeace to make them marketable to audiences. Newswriters, therefore, will report Greenpeace's activities only if they consider them to be "newsworthy" or "interesting".

Molotch notes, however, that the selection of events does not occur because events are "objectively"

⁵⁴For a discussion on Hunter's perception of media see Cocking, "Mind Bombs on the Pacific: The McLunanesque war to save the whales", Weekend Magazine, September 6, 1975, pp.9-12.

⁵⁵For a discussion of Hunter's manipulation of the media during the whaling campaign see Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.178.

⁵⁶Interview with Lynn Jamieson, September 25, 1991.

newsworthy.⁵⁷ Instead, selection and interpretation are influenced by what he refers to as the "class bias of interesting".⁵⁸ Politicians and officials have more access to the media not only because their activities are seen as having important repercussions; they also can gain access through their news value as celebrities.⁵⁹ The inherent newsworthiness of politicians ensures that they will be covered even when involved in the most trivial activities.⁶⁰ People and issues which are denoted as important, therefore, enter the news routinely because of

57The Fraser Institute makes this claim when it makes a distinction between "objective" and "advocacy" journalism. According to the Fraser Institute, there are some environmental issues which "occur" and are therefore in the realm of "objective" coverage. But there are environmental problems which journalists construct or exaggerate which is advocacy journalism. What the Fraser Institute fails to recognize is that all reporting is advocacy journalism because it is based on what journalists see as important. For a further examination of the Fraser Institute's argument see Miljan, "Network Coverage of the Environment: Objectivity or Advocacy", On Balance October 1989, pp.1-7.

58For a discussion of this point see Molotch, "Media and Movements", pp.75-77.

59For a discussion of the role of politicians as celebrities see Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp.71-93.

60Gitlin, "Blips, Bites and Savvy Talk", Dissent, Winter 1990, p.22.

their position within society.⁶¹

In contrast to the assumed importance of politicians and officials, movements find it difficult to access the media because they are outside the realm of electoral politics and oppose existing social practices. Molotch maintains that movements are not seen as being inherently newsworthy because

A social movement takes its form, is indeed defined in terms of its juxtaposition of the normal functioning and structural characteristics of the society at large. A social movement is 'abnormal' rather than normal, episodic rather than continuous, extraordinary rather than routine, illegitimate rather than legitimate, and powerless rather than powerful. This is the position from which a social movement ordinarily begins its struggle for access.⁶²

Although Greenpeace is not completely consistent with Molotch's view of a new social movement,⁶³ it is still engaged in oppositional politics which places it outside the

⁶¹Gitlin notes that the most obvious example of the news routinely covering people who are considered important is the case of celebrities. Celebrities are important just by being who they are and not by anything that they say or do. For his discussion on celebrities see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, pp.147-179.

⁶²Molotch, "Media and Movements", in Zald and McCarthy (eds) The Dynamics of Social Movements (Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishing Co., 1979), pp.77-78.

⁶³Ostertag notes that Greenpeace has become an international organization of substantial clout. It has also become increasingly powerful throughout its twenty years of existence. Therefore, it is hard to characterize Greenpeace as either "powerless" or "episodic". See Ostertag, "Greenpeace Takes over the World", Mother Jones, March/April 1991, pp. 12-13.

media's usual frame of reference - i.e. coverage of the economy, political institutions and foreign affairs. Also, despite the fact that Greenpeace has been criticized for abandoning its activist roots,⁶⁴ Michael Manolson notes that Greenpeace's underlying philosophy is still to move governments by changing public consciousness.⁶⁵ Since the group does not accept either government or corporate funding, it is still largely dependent on the mass media to achieve widespread public recognition.⁶⁶ Greenpeace, therefore, must find ways of making its messages "interesting" to the mass media.

64 Critiques of Greenpeace outside of the organization stem from the observation that the group is becoming increasingly bureaucratic and uses direct actions less. One of Greenpeace's harsher critics is Paul Watson. Watson initially worked for Greenpeace but was fired and moved on to found the Sea Shepherd Society. Watson also uses direct actions but does not have the same ideas as Greenpeace about nonviolence and avoiding the destruction of property - a difference which often makes Watson think his actions are more radical than Greenpeace's. For a discussion of Watson's views on Greenpeace see Sea Shepherd: My fight for Whales and Seals (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1982), Chapter 8 and Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant", The Georgia Strait, Sept. 13-20, 1991, p.7.

65 Telephone Interview between Michael Manolson and Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

66 Michael Manolson explains that despite Greenpeace Canada's budget (around ten million dollars in 1990) and membership (around 350,000 in 1990) the environmental group is quite limited in its resources considering the amount of campaigns it is involved in (Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990). David Kraft (Telephone Interview, November 4, 1991), Nuclear/Energy Coordinator for Greenpeace Canada, also notes that in terms of large multi-national corporations Greenpeace must be about number 3,000 on the list.

Molotch notes that movements are able to make themselves interesting by being considered "anti-routines"⁶⁷ by the media - that is, using the contradictions in journalist routines in "providing acts and utterances that generate its [the media's] curiosity".⁶⁸ The way Greenpeace has used its position as an anti-routine to obtain coverage has been through engaging in direct actions. Direct actions are non-violent⁶⁹ but confrontational ways of trying to expose people and processes which harm the environment and are based on the principle of "bearing witness".⁷⁰ The "interesting" nature of direct actions, however, does not stem from their critique of polluting processes; instead, it is the drama provided by these actions which makes them so newsworthy.

⁶⁷Molotch explains in a similar way to Gitlin that movements gain access to the media not by their perceived importance or legitimacy. Instead, they are covered because they seem unusual or novel. For a further discussion see Molotch, "Media and Movements", pp.77-82.

⁶⁸Ibid, p. 80.

⁶⁹Patrick Moore, past president of Greenpeace Canada explains that Greenpeace shies away from violence more for practical reasons than moral ones. He explains that he does not think that it is wrong to ram a ship which is killing whales, it is only that the group will be perceived in a negative light by the public if it does so. For a further discussion see Gillian Shaw, "Paul Watson: A Warrior for wildlife", The Vancouver Sun, March 22, 1984, pp.B1 and B2.

⁷⁰Dave Greenway of Greenpeace International states in the CBC Documentary The Greenpeace Years that bearing witness is the principle that if a person sees something happening he or she doesn't agree with, that person has an obligation to act to try to stop it in a nonviolent way.

Although direct actions have been hailed for their ability to attract media attention and to put out powerful images,⁷¹ David Peerla,⁷² Tamara Stark,⁷³ and David Kraft⁷⁴ point out that direct actions are also problematic because they are a difficult method of getting out in-depth commentary on environmental problems. In other words, the media tends to concentrate on the "stunt" rather than the issue behind the action. Direct actions also make Greenpeace vulnerable to disparaging frames because dissent occurring outside institutionalized channels can be easily labelled as criminal, irrational or irresponsible.⁷⁵

⁷¹Michael M'Gonigle (Telephone interview, July 28, 1991) notes that direct actions have enabled Greenpeace to take complicated ideas and change them into simple and powerful messages through their vivid imagery. Tamara Stark (Telephone interview, October 21, 1991) and Peter Bahouth (cited in The Greenpeace Years) note also that the images of direct actions are effective because they are empowering. They explain that standing up to authorities is frightening for people and seeing Greenpeace engaged in direct actions encourages citizens to challenge authority. Furthermore, Louise Blight (Personal Interview, July 26, 1991) and Jim Bohlen (Telephone Interview, October 16, 1991) point out that direct actions strike deep chords with audiences because they show that Greenpeace activists are risking their lives to stop environmental degradation.

⁷²Interview October 17, 1991. David Peerla is the Forestry Campaigner for Greenpeace Canada.

⁷³Interview, October 21, 1991. Tamara Stark is the Media Coordinator for Greenpeace Canada.

⁷⁴Interview, November 4, 1991. David Kraft is the Nuclear/Energy Coordinator for Greenpeace Canada.

⁷⁵Hartley notes that the tendency to label groups which oppose existing social relations outside "official" channels as deviant is based on the media's assumption of a consensual model of society. Such a model assumes that in

Greenpeace's use of direct actions, therefore, tends to reinforce what W. Lance Bennett refers to as "information biases".⁷⁶ According to Bennett, information biases - the media's tendency to concentrate on drama and personalities, to fragment information and to "normalize"⁷⁷ coverage - have the effect of making political debate and action difficult because issues are simplified, distorted and separated from their historical and social context. Although Bennett does not explicitly point out the ideological implications of

industrial democracies, unlike totalitarian states, institutionalized channels exist for everyone to influence the system. Those who oppose these social practices outside the realm of electoral politics, therefore, are not seen as people who have had to resort to these measures because they have been denied access. Instead they are considered disruptive, irrational, hooligans or at worst terrorists. For a further discussion see Hartley, Understanding News (London: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp.81-86.

⁷⁶See Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1988), Chapter 2.

⁷⁷Bennett explains that normalization is the tendency of coverage to reassure audiences that any disruptions or problems in the existing order can be "solved" by government officials. For a further discussion see Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, (New York: Longman Inc., 1988), pp.52-53.

information biases,⁷⁸ Gitlin outlines them very clearly.

According to Gitlin,

when the frame has been chosen, the reporter does not, in general, want to confront or complicate it by adducing other more complex material. Extending the news story would entail hard and unaccustomed work outside normal newsgathering routines, going beyond the given scene, the given press conference, and the given press release. *The crucial, unintended ideological effect is to undermine whatever efforts movements may make to present a general, coherent political opposition; the effect is to reinforce the image that reform movements focus, and in the nature ought to focus, on single grievances which the system, however reluctantly, can correct without altering fundamental social relations* [Gitlin's emphasis].⁷⁹

It is because of the vulnerability of the direct action approach to information biased coverage that Greenpeace has tried to make its interactions with the media more strategic. David Kraft⁸⁰ points out that direct actions are presently coordinated with other Greenpeace activities such

⁷⁸Bennett explains that he wants to avoid an exploration of the ideological implications of these biases because they often result in futile arguments which only reaffirm the ideological biases of those who are arguing. He does, however, recognize implicitly that information biases reinforce the existing order because he states that "the news should be given an award for 'best supporting role' in the daily dramatic series 'Maintaining the Status Quo'". For a further discussion see Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1988), pp. xiii and 2.

⁷⁹Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.35.

⁸⁰Interview, November 4, 1991.

as research, lobbying and public education. Tamara Stark⁸¹ maintains that this coordination makes it more likely that journalists will be informed about certain environmental problems and cover a direct action less superficially.

Besides attempting to increase the quality of coverage it receives, the increasing strategic nature of Greenpeace's activities has also helped the organization to find other ways to access the media. Although direct actions are Greenpeace's most visible activity in the media, the organization's increasing scientific expertise has also made it a "legitimate" environmental source for journalists.⁸² David Peerla maintains that the research aspect of the organization is now so prominent that Greenpeace is changing from an image corporation into an information corporation.⁸³ Institutional development, therefore, has also aided Greenpeace's relationship with the media because it has improved its credibility and subsequently its ability to access the media through being considered a routine as well as an anti-routine source.

Although this increase in scientific expertise has obvious benefits in terms of improving Greenpeace's access

⁸¹Telephone interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991.

⁸²For a discussion of Greenpeace's increasing expertise see Cherfas, "Greenpeace and Science: Oil and Water?", Science Vol. 247, March 16, 1990, pp. 1288-90.

⁸³Interview, October 18, 1991.

to the media and the quality of coverage it receives, some studies of movements suggest that increasing institutionalization may reduce their ability to pursue radical alternatives.⁸⁴ Therefore, Greenpeace's increasing resource base and bureaucracy may compromise the organization's goals by making it elitist,⁸⁵ less radical,⁸⁶ and slow to respond to environmental problems.⁸⁷ David Kraft,⁸⁸ also mentions that the historical direct action orientation of Greenpeace continues to affect the media's perception of the organization. According to Kraft, even

⁸⁴See Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); Hackett, News and Dissent (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Co., 1991); and Ferree, "Equality and Autonomy: Feminist Politics in the United States and West Germany", in Katzenstein and Mueller (eds) The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), pp. 172-195.

⁸⁵Steve Sawyer notes that Greenpeace is above all a pragmatic organization - it chooses issues that it knows it can win. Cited from Pearse, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.40.

⁸⁶Lynn Jamieson (Interview, September 25, 1991) notes that since Greenpeace is now a credible organization it has to be careful not to alienate its base of support. This means being very careful when putting out radical messages so as not to scare people. Michael M'Gonigle (Telephone Interview, July 28, 1991) also points out that when one talks to the media, the idea of radical changes to the economy have to be explained very cautiously so that Greenpeace activists are not labelled as "kooks".

⁸⁷Pearse notes that Greenpeace's scientific orientation made it much slower than many other organizations in its efforts to campaign against global warming. Pearse, Green Warriors, p.285.

⁸⁸Telephone Interview with David Kraft, November 4, 1991.

though Greenpeace has produced an incredible amount of research on environmental issues, many journalists continue to think of the organization as being primarily engaged in providing stunts for the media.

Therefore, Greenpeace's initial direct action approach and increasing strategic relationship with the media both have benefited and disadvantaged Greenpeace's ability to put out radical messages. In this thesis, the benefits and problems associated with Greenpeace's institutionalization are examined through empirically analyzing the coverage Greenpeace has received throughout its development.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

In order to understand the factors which are involved in the framing of Greenpeace in the mass media, the coverage of the organization in The Vancouver Sun is examined over twenty years of the group's existence. Chapter Two consists of a general overview of the coverage Greenpeace has received from 1971 to the end of 1990.⁸⁹ In this chapter, coverage

⁸⁹1971 has been chosen as the starting point of the organization although it was formally known as the Don't Make a Wave Committee (a branch of the Sierra Club) until the beginning of 1972. 1971 was chosen because the Amchitka voyage was important to both the perception and evolution the Greenpeace Organization. The positive response of the public to the voyage also reinforced the organization's belief in the effectiveness of direct actions and a mass media orientation in general. For a further discussion of the effects of the Amchitka voyage on the organization see Bob Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, (New York: Holt

is analyzed in terms of general categories to understand the extent to which Greenpeace's position outside of newsgathering routines reinforces information biases in the media and subsequently affects the group's ability to put out radical messages. Since the analysis comprises twenty years of coverage, the extent to which the framing of the environmental group has changed over time will also be examined.

In Chapters Three and Four, a more in-depth examination of specific Greenpeace campaigns is undertaken. The analysis of specific campaigns is necessary because each environmental issue has a particular history which will affect how Greenpeace's activities and messages are portrayed in the media. This in-depth analysis also allows a more extensive analysis of the different tactics Greenpeace uses to improve the quality and quantity of coverage it receives and enables us to more clearly understand the effects of institutional development, environmental awareness and industrial clout on the framing of Greenpeace.

In order to understand how the specific factors of campaigns, Greenpeace's institutional development, media priorities and environmental awareness interact in the framing of the organization, the coverage of two dissimilar

environmental issues at different stages in Greenpeace's institutional development are examined.⁹⁰ The two campaigns analyzed include the organization's protest of the seal hunt in 1976 and 1977 and its opposition to pulp mill pollution from 1987 to 1989.⁹¹

The examination of the framing of Greenpeace is also limited to only one newspaper - The Vancouver Sun. This paper has been chosen largely for practical reasons. It was the only paper available on microfilm appearing both in the British Columbia Newspaper Index and the Canadian News Index. Referencing by both catalogues was important in order to reduce the margin of error in the quantitative analysis.⁹² Although it is recognized that the reliance on

⁹⁰Two campaigns within Canada have been chosen to make the cases more comparable. Louise Blight (interview, July 26, 1991) notes that although many factors affect how actions are covered, those affecting industries in other countries (for example driftnets) tend to be viewed more sympathetically by the Canadian press.

⁹¹Besides their tremendous contrast in terms of institutional development, these campaigns were also chosen because they both attracted a large amount of coverage and have been influential in how Greenpeace has been perceived by the media and the public.

⁹²The quality of indexing in the Canadian News Index is so poor that any conclusions about a paper in this index alone would be suspect. During my research I found that for every seven articles indexed in the B.C. index only one would appear in the Canadian News Index. The indexing of Greenpeace in the B.C. Newspaper Index was also found to be inaccurate - a problem which has been combated to a certain extent by cross referencing articles about Greenpeace with others concerning Greenpeace leaders and campaign areas. Despite such efforts, it is recognized that inaccuracies persist due to the bias towards articles which are completely about Greenpeace versus those which just quote

one paper must lead to a cautious approach,⁹³ The Vancouver Sun should provide an excellent basis for generalization about media coverage. It is a good example of a standard, big city, "something for everyone" paper which carries a full wire service and is owned by one of the two big Canadian newspaper chains, Southam.

Analyzing the coverage of Greenpeace in The Vancouver Sun in terms of general categories and specific campaigns, therefore, allows a comprehensive examination of the framing of the organization. Both a general and in-depth analysis forms a starting point in comprehending how Greenpeace's position outside media routines affects its ability to put out radical messages, and the extent to which such coverage can be changed through institutional development, campaign strategy, and environmental awareness.

the organization as a source.

⁹³It will be especially difficult to make generalizations about the regional interests affecting media coverage. An examination of Molotch's conclusion that corporate interests in a particular region tend to make coverage more critical further from home would be very interesting but goes beyond the scope of this thesis. For a further discussion of this tendency of the media see Molotch, "Media and Movements", p.83. It is recognized as well that the thesis' Western bias will be further reinforced because most of the research on Greenpeace has taken place out of Vancouver and not Toronto.

CHAPTER TWO - INFORMATION BIASED COVERAGE AND THE FRAMING OF GREENPEACE

It was noted in Chapter One that the commercial nature of the media and its reliance on official sources makes coverage susceptible to what W. Lance Bennett refers to as "information biases". Information biased coverage is especially problematic for those new social movements advocating a fundamental change to the social and economic system. Since these movements oppose existing social practices and are outside the realm of electoral politics, they are not thought to be inherently interesting or important and are subsequently passed over by the newsgathering routines of media organizations. Instead of being perceived as routine sources like Government officials, movements must capitalize on their position as "anti-routines" and create dramatic spectacles and concentrate on specific issues to obtain coverage.⁹⁴ Although spectacles can be an effective vehicle for putting problems "on the agenda"⁹⁵ and may help maintain movement

⁹⁴The one instance where it becomes necessary for politicians to sensationalize their activities in order to access the media is during election campaigns. For a further discussion see Gitlin, "Blips, Bytes and Savvy Talk", Dissent, Winter 1990, pp.18-26 and Taras, The Newsmakers, pp. 197-227.

⁹⁵Howard Canon (media coordinator for Greenpeace U.S.A.) notes that direct actions are effective in raising public consciousness because the danger that they involve impresses upon audiences the importance of environmental problems. Canon argues that since Greenpeace members are

activism,⁹⁶ they also often exacerbate information biased coverage through concentrating attention on dramatic activities instead of on the roots of social problems. Information biased coverage, therefore, makes it more difficult for Greenpeace to put forth radical messages in the mass media.

In order to overcome its position outside newsgathering routines, Greenpeace has historically structured its activities as "anti-routines" by engaging in direct actions. Although such actions have been very successful in attracting media attention, they have also been problematic because their dramatic nature often produces frames concentrating on the stunt rather than the issues behind the action. Despite the fact that such framing does not

risking their lives to save the environment, people watching these spectacles are more likely to understand the serious nature of environmental degradation (cited in Harwood, "Daredevils for the Environment", The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1988, pp.72-73). Michael M'Gonigle (Interview, July 28, 1991) and Jim Bohlen (Interview, October 16, 1991) also point out that spectacles are effective because they transform complex problems into powerful images which audiences can immediately understand.

⁹⁶Brian Killeen (Interview, September 26, 1991) and David Peerla (Interview, October 18, 1991) maintain that the direct action orientation of Greenpeace has helped the organization keep its radical edge through attracting activists who are suspicious of authority and detest bureaucracy.

predetermine the perceptions of audiences,⁹⁷ focusing on Greenpeace stunts encourages a simplified reading of environmental problems by dramatizing and fragmenting the organization's radical environmental messages. Direct actions also use dangerous maneuvers and civil disobedience to attract media attention - activities which "normalize" coverage by portraying Greenpeace's dissent to the existing system as irresponsible, irrational or even criminal.

Greenpeace, however, has recognized the extent to which the direct action approach has reinforced information biased coverage and has subsequently made its actions more strategic over time. This strategy has been made possible by the organization's institutional development since Greenpeace's initial lack of resources and structure made it impossible to plan campaigns carefully in advance.⁹⁸ As Greenpeace expanded into other countries during the 1980's,

⁹⁷Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald Shaw note in their article on media agenda setting that many studies of "media effects" find that coverage is often interpreted according to the preconceived ideological biases of audiences. They also point out, however, that "the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about". See McCombs and Shaw, "The Agenda Setting Function of the Press", in Doris A. Graber (ed), Media Power and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1990), p. 75.

⁹⁸Greenpeace at this time was also based largely in Vancouver and was chronically in debt. This lack of resources prevented Greenpeace from being involved in other issues besides its nuclear and ocean ecology campaigns. An in depth look at this phase of Greenpeace's development is provided by Bob Hunter in his book Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1979).

however, its increased membership and resource base⁹⁹ enabled the organization to become thoroughly institutionalized.¹⁰⁰ Increased resources meant that Greenpeace could more clearly oppose environmentally destructive practices through developing expertise in scientific research, community education and lobbying.

In order to understand the extent to which Greenpeace's increasing strategic nature has enabled the organization to counteract information biases and to present its radical messages more completely in the mass media, the coverage of the organization in The Vancouver Sun will be examined over a twenty year period in this chapter.¹⁰¹ Because Greenpeace's transition from an ad hoc group in the 1970's to a more institutionally developed and strategic organization in the 1980's did not occur smoothly,¹⁰² three

⁹⁹The most substantial growth in Greenpeace occurred after 1985 and can be explained by the outpouring of public sympathy towards the organization after the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 as well as the increasing credibility of Greenpeace and the rise of environmental concerns more generally throughout the industrialized world.

¹⁰⁰For an examination of Greenpeace's institutional development see Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant", The Georgia Strait, September 13-20, pp.7-10, 40.

¹⁰¹The Boundaries of January 1, 1971 and December 31, 1990 have been chosen because 1971 is the first full year which Greenpeace (or the Don't Make a Wave Committee as it was then called) was operational and 1990 was the last full year which had been completed when the thesis was started.

¹⁰²Although Greenpeace was expanding into Europe and the United States in the late 1970's and early 1980's, this period of time was plagued by continuous internal bickering. This bickering came to a head in 1979 when the Vancouver

different stages in Greenpeace's evolution can be discerned. Until halfway through 1977, Greenpeace was based almost exclusively in Vancouver and was organized largely by the actions of charismatic leaders such as Bob Hunter and Paul Watson. The middle of 1977 marked a turning point for the organization because its campaigns began to become more internationally oriented. This surge of international growth, however, led to internal dissention because the organization did not have the structure, expertise or experience to manage this expansion.¹⁰³ Michael Manolson¹⁰⁴

Office tried to sue Greenpeace San Francisco for using the organization's name without compensation. Although David McTaggart was able to diffuse the tension between national offices by setting up an International Board of Directors, infighting and disorganization continued to plague Greenpeace Canada. For a discussion of this infighting see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, pp. 65 and 68. Internal problems were especially prevalent in Greenpeace Canada, which took longer to become strategic and to develop scientific expertise than the European organizations (Telephone Interview between Jeremy Wilson and Michael Manolson, November 20, 1990). For a further examination of Greenpeace Canada's relative lack of strategy see Pearse, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.36 Greenpeace was also in a state of confusion because of the expanding number of issues that it was dealing with. The organization was now opposing issues as diverse as uranium mining, supertankers, acid rain, the exploitation of antarctica, and the dumping of nuclear wastes at sea. For an examination of this phase up until 1983 see Ouston and Fitterman, "Eco-business is out to save the world", The Vancouver Sun, August 6, 1983, p.A1 and A10.

¹⁰³Although an International Board of Directors was set up in 1979, Jim Bohlen (Interview, October 16, 1991) notes that this structure lacked power and subsequently the national offices tended to follow their own agendas.

¹⁰⁴Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1991.

notes that it was not until 1985 that Greenpeace became fully coordinated internationally.¹⁰⁵ The latter part of the 1980's was also distinguished by a tremendous surge of growth which was sparked by the Rainbow Warrior bombing. The profile and resources Greenpeace obtained after the bombing allowed the organization to increase its scientific expertise, begin long-term projects and to expand into the third world. In order to understand the effects of Greenpeace's institutionalization on information biased coverage, therefore, articles have been divided into three sections to roughly coincide with the organization's structural development - from 1971 to May 1977, June 1977 to July 1984, and August 1984 to the end of 1990.¹⁰⁶

Although this examination of the three phases of coverage is based mostly on information about Greenpeace Canada, the quantitative analysis has not separated out articles about Greenpeace Canada from other Greenpeace

¹⁰⁵This coordination was shown when Greenpeace U.K. began an anti-trapping campaign. When other national offices complained that the campaign would hurt their credibility with Native groups David McTaggart forced the U.K. office to abandon their initiative.

¹⁰⁶Since the coverage does not include the newspaper strike from November 1978 to June 1979, a total of 19 years and 4 months of articles will be looked at. When divided into three equal sections, each phase of development represents six years and five months of coverage. Coverage has been divided up into three equal sections to make the data comparable across time. Appendix One shows both the number of total articles (940) and the breakdown of stories according to the campaign subject in each phase.

organizations. Such a separation has not been undertaken because the coordination of the different organizations¹⁰⁷ as well as the inability of journalists to distinguish between separate national Greenpeace offices makes it difficult to draw the line between Greenpeace Canada and other Greenpeace organizations¹⁰⁸ in this kind of general analysis.

The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to try to understand in a general sense how Greenpeace's position outside newsgathering routines has led to information biased coverage and affected the ability of the organization to put out radical environmental messages in the mass media. We also want to assess the extent to which Greenpeace's institutional development has led the organization to change its tactics to counteract these biases. In this chapter it is recognized that the relationship between Greenpeace and the media is constantly in flux. Media coverage is constantly changing in response Greenpeace's evolution and because the biases of news organizations are evolving over

¹⁰⁷Different organizations share both information and resources. Articles about the campaigns of Greenpeace Canada often refer to research done in Europe and all organizations contribute funds to campaigns such as Antarctica. Therefore, it is very difficult to separate out which articles involve strictly Greenpeace Canada.

¹⁰⁸Journalists also do not recognize the boundaries between Greenpeace Canada and the other organizations. Because of their scarce time and resources they often quote representatives from the Canadian organization when doing a story on an international campaign.

time. As well, Greenpeace transforms its own tactics in order with to adapt to the changing manifestations of these media biases. In order to understand if Greenpeace has been able to put forth radical environmental messages in The Vancouver Sun, the extent to which the evolving interaction between the environmental group and the mass media has resulted in dramatized, fragmented and normalized coverage is examined in the following sections.

THE DRAMATIZATION OF COVERAGE

A major problem that Bennett points to in media coverage is the bias towards those events which are dramatic.¹⁰⁹ Bennett explains that the tendency to select dramatic stories is the result of journalist routines which assume that audiences want to be entertained instead of informed.¹¹⁰ Bennett notes that in their attempts to entertain the public, articles revolve around simple plot formulas and emphasize conflict, adventure, and events which are perceived to be novel.¹¹¹ According to Bennett,

¹⁰⁹For a more complete discussion on drama and the news see Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1988), pp.35-44.

¹¹⁰For a discussion of this point see also Taras, The Newsmakers and pp.95-115; Hackett, News and Dissent, p.76.

¹¹¹Bennett points out that news programs now often hire "news doctors" to turn their programs into "eyewitness" or "action" news. These news programs try to increase their ratings by making audiences feel like they are actually

dramatic coverage helps reinforce existing power relations by encouraging audiences to concentrate on sensational activities instead of on the complexity of social problems and their solutions.

One would expect the coverage of Greenpeace to be especially prone to this information bias because the group has intentionally made its direct actions dramatic to attract media attention. Although the hope was to use spectacles to draw public attention to wider environmental issues, direct actions have been problematic for Greenpeace because their dramatic nature often overshadows environmental messages and leads journalists to concentrate on the stunt rather than the issues behind actions. To counteract this problem of dramatization, Greenpeace has made its campaigns more strategic to challenge more deeply environmentally destructive practices. This strategy involves attempting to educate journalists about the problems which direct actions are trying to expose. Greenpeace also undertakes other activities such as research, lobbying and public education to help the organization raise public awareness, pressure industry and governments, and to be seen as a legitimate source in the

experiencing the event covered and bring a faster pace to stories. The concentration of the "action" of the news, however, virtually ignores the context out of which the events covered arose. For a further discussion see Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, pp.38-40.

mass media.

The media's attraction to dramatic events, however, would lead one to expect that Greenpeace's direct actions would receive more coverage than its increased involvement in research, community organizing and lobbying. Killeen¹¹² notes that Greenpeace classifies actions as either primary, secondary or tertiary because the organization recognizes that each kind of action varies in its appeal to the media. Primary actions are seen as the most appealing and dramatic because they actually try to physically stop environmental degradation. Such actions include campaigns which block discharge pipes, shield animals from being killed or place activists in areas about to be exposed to pollution. Secondary actions are less dramatic than primary ones because they don't actually attempt to physically stop environmental degradation. They are still a form of spectacle politics, however, because they try to access the media through dangerous or confrontational activities. Secondary actions include activities such as demonstrations,¹¹³ sit-ins, banner hangings and the

¹¹²Interview, September 26, 1991.

¹¹³Halloran et al note that the media often dramatizes even peaceful demonstrations because there is an expectation that they may become violent. For a further discussion see Halloran et al, Demonstrations and Communication: a Case Study, p. 192. One can also argue further that the term "peaceful demonstration" is based on the assumption that demonstrations as a rule are violent.

disruption of press conferences. Tertiary actions, on the other hand, are the ways in which Greenpeace draws attention to pollution "behind the scenes" and are consequently believed to be unappealing to the media. These actions include releasing reports, lobbying Governments, grass-roots coalition building, encouraging boycotts, and acting as a "legitimate source" for the mass media.

In order to understand the extent to which the coverage of Greenpeace has been dramatized, the previous categorization has been slightly altered. Primary and secondary actions have been combined into a single category entitled "spectacular actions" because they both try to attract media attention through creating dramatic spectacles.

When one looks at the quantitative analysis of spectacular and tertiary actions in Table 2.1, four trends

TABLE 2.1 - COVERAGE OF SPECTACULAR AND TERTIARY ACTIONS (in numbers of articles)

Type of Action	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
Spect. Actions	340	210	108	658
Tert. Actions	56	83	99	238
Miscellaneous	21	20	3	44
Total	417	313	210	940

are significant: 1) spectacular actions were initially very

prominent in the coverage of Greenpeace; 2) the numbers of these actions have decreased over time; 3) the coverage of tertiary actions have increased substantially; and 4) the numbers of articles concerning Greenpeace have declined over time in The Vancouver Sun. The reasons behind these four trends are examined in this section.

The data in Table 2.1 can be explained by a complex interaction between evolving media biases, Greenpeace's increasing institutionalization, and the growing environmental awareness in society. The large percentage of spectacular actions covered initially in The Vancouver Sun, therefore, only partially reflects the media's bias towards drama. Because of Greenpeace's lack of institutional development in the early 1970's, the organization was especially vulnerable to dramatized coverage because it lacked the resources and expertise to be perceived as a legitimate source or to engage in other activities besides spectacles. Furthermore, the low level of environmental awareness during the early years of Greenpeace made it especially difficult for the organization to access The Vancouver Sun other than through spectacles. Greenpeace's ad hoc nature and the lack of environmental awareness during the period from 1971-77 also led to the large coverage of initial spectacular actions because these early actions contained three dramatic criteria: danger and confrontation, vivid imagery, and novelty.

Patrick Moore,¹¹⁴ Bob Hunter,¹¹⁵ David Peerla¹¹⁶ and Louise Blight¹¹⁷ maintain that one of the major factors of direct actions which makes them attractive to the media is that they are dangerous and confrontational. It was the danger and non-violent confrontational nature of the Quaker led protest against nuclear testing in the South Pacific during the 1950's which gave the founders of Greenpeace in 1970 (then known as the "Don't Make a Wave Committee") the idea of sending a boat up to Amchitka to protest an upcoming nuclear test.¹¹⁸ Jim and Marie Bohlen were both frustrated working for the Sierra Club because the protests of the test were not getting covered by the U.S. media. Marie Bohlen remembered that the Quaker ship had acquired a large amount of media coverage by sailing into the test zone at Bikini Atoll. It was hoped that the same amount of attention could be focused through a similar action at Amchitka.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴Cited in Inside T.V. News.

¹¹⁵Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 417.

¹¹⁶Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

¹¹⁷Personal Interview with Louise Blight, July 26, 1991.

¹¹⁸For a further discussion of the Amchitka voyage, see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), Chapters 1 and 2.

¹¹⁹For a discussion of the Bohlens' motivations behind sending a ship into the test zone at Amchitka see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, p.8.

The action to Amchitka was considered to be very dangerous both because of the possibility of radioactivity being released by the blast and the powerful storms expected during the voyage. In fact, Jim Bohlen notes that many crew members thought that they might not be coming back alive.¹²⁰ There was also the possibility of being confronted and arrested by the U.S. Coast Guard, a factor which added to the newsworthy nature of the voyage.¹²¹ Although Greenpeace did not actually make it to Amchitka, the amount of media attention raised by the voyage,¹²² (65 articles in The Vancouver Sun alone), as well as the effectiveness of the direct action in forcing the U.S. Government to act,¹²³ reinforced the environmental group's initial direct action

¹²⁰Cited in The Greenpeace Years.

¹²¹The crew in fact did encounter resistance from the Coast Guard and were arrested on September 30, 1971 for not notifying customs officials upon their arrival in Akutan. For a further discussion see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, p.14.

¹²²For a discussion of the appeal of the Amchitka voyage to the media see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, pp.12-15; Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, pp.17-18; MacDonald, "Whoops of joy welcome return of Greenpeace crewmen", The Vancouver Sun, October 30, 1971, p.33; and Bob Hunter, Column in The Vancouver Sun, November 12, 1971, p.21.

¹²³The U.S. gave up nuclear testing at Amchitka after the Greenpeace Voyage for "political and other reasons". For a discussion see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, p.15 and Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, p.114.

orientation.¹²⁴

Although the voyages against nuclear testing were initially popular in the media because of the likelihood of danger and confrontation,¹²⁵ the decline of coverage during 1974¹²⁶ indicated that these voyages were lacking in the two

¹²⁴The factor of danger and confrontation also made the two voyages of David McTaggart against nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll a media success. The bias favouring danger and confrontation was especially prevalent in the 1973 campaign since David McTaggart's boat, the Greenpeace III, was boarded by the French Navy and McTaggart was severely beaten. For a detailed account of these two voyages see McTaggart, Greenpeace III: Journey into the Bomb (London; William Collins and Sons & Co., 1978). The violent nature of this voyage was picked up by The Vancouver Sun because during 1972 there were only 38 articles about Greenpeace while in 1973 the organization accumulated 73. For a discussion of the success of these two voyages in the media see "Greenpeace 'hit purposely'", The Vancouver Sun, July 6, 1972, p.17; "Bob Hunter", The Vancouver Sun, July 6, 1972, p.35; "French navy 'told to lay into us'", The Vancouver Sun, August 30, 1973, p.37; and "Skipper of Greenpeace 'abandoned by Canada'", The Vancouver Sun, April 11, 1975, p.3.

¹²⁵Jim Bohlen also explains that the successful coverage of Amchitka was fueled both by the participants commitment to the cause and the ability of the protest to garnish anti-American sentiment. Bohlen notes that it was ironic that Greenpeace's initial success was helped along by anti-American sentiments when the organization was founded by three Americans - himself, Paul Cote and Irving Stowe (Interview, October 16, 1991). Although David McTaggart's voyage was not able to acquire the support of anti-American sentiments since he was protesting against the French, the fact that he and his crew were beaten by French sailors helped to make his second voyage Greenpeace's most newsworthy at 78 articles. For a further discussion of McTaggart's ordeal see Greenpeace III - Journey into the Bomb (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 1978).

¹²⁶While Greenpeace only attracted 13 articles in 1974, the organization accumulated 65 stories in 1971, 38 in 1972 and 73 in 1973.

other prerequisites needed for drama - visual imagery and novelty.¹²⁷ It also was becoming apparent that the public¹²⁸ as well as many Greenpeace activists themselves were becoming disenchanted with the issue of nuclear testing¹²⁹ because, as Jim Bohlen puts it, "nuclear testing didn't make any money".¹³⁰

Whaling, however, rejuvenated the coverage of Greenpeace in The Vancouver Sun.¹³¹ Unlike the campaigns against nuclear testing which repeatedly involved people passively exposing themselves to radiation, Greenpeace's efforts to stop whaling were "new" and involved activists actually trying to shield whales from being harpooned. The

¹²⁷Whereas Greenpeace was only able to attract 13 articles in 1974, Nuclear testing had previously generated 65 stories in 1971, followed by 38 in 1972, finishing with 73 in 1973

¹²⁸For a discussion of the public's lack of interest in Greenpeace's nuclear testing campaign in 1974 see Musgrove, "The Greenpeace Benefit: McTaggart 'embarrassed'", The Vancouver Sun, April 16, 1974, p.7 and "Bob Hunter", The Vancouver Sun, June 21, 1974, p. 30.

¹²⁹Bob Hunter notes that a cleavage occurred in the organization between those activists who wanted to continue with nuclear testing and members like Hunter and Paul Spong who thought that whaling had more long lasting appeal. For a discussion of this cleavage see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, pp. 123-142.

¹³⁰Jim Bohlen notes that this lack of interest was largely due to the fact that the U.S. had stopped testing at Amchitka and the French had moved their tests underground. Telephone Interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991.

¹³¹In 1975 the organization was covered by 96 articles, while in 1976 it accumulated 77 and 88 articles were recorded in 1977.

whaling campaign also had the advantage of opposing a process which had an immediate destructive and visual result. The killing of whales was bloody and happened in minutes unlike the largely invisible and long-lasting effects of nuclear testing.¹³² A harpoon flying over the heads of Greenpeacers in a zodiac was also an image that could be captured in a thirty second clip - an image which helped Greenpeace to raise funds¹³³ and public awareness¹³⁴ and still remains a symbol for the organization even today.¹³⁵

Although Tamara Stark¹³⁶ and David Garrick¹³⁷ point out

¹³²For a discussion of the importance of visuals in attracting media coverage see Hackett, News and Dissent, p.64 and Taras, The Newsmakers, pp.109-110.

¹³³In the CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years Vicky Monreham (Greenpeace U.S.A. Fundraiser) explains that successful fundraising must appeal to emotions and bring out the protective instincts of people. Such strategic fundraising was very important to Greenpeace because it remained heavily in debt until the late 1970's.

¹³⁴After the whaling campaign was embarked upon, coverage in The Vancouver Sun also started to pick up. 1975 generated 98 articles while 1976 incurred 89 and 1977 consisted of 99.

¹³⁵Tamara Stark notes that messages about ocean ecology are easier to get out in the mass media in that they provide a powerful image. Interview, October 21, 1991.

¹³⁶Interview, October 21, 1991.

¹³⁷Interview, November 14, 1991. David Garrick was one of the original activists who worked for Greenpeace. He was involved in the early whaling and seal hunt campaigns. Although Garrick now works for Jim Fulton, the Federal NDP environment critic, he still communicates with many people still involved in Greenpeace.

that campaigns such as whaling are appealing to the media because the images of mammals dying evokes strong emotions,¹³⁸ direct actions can also help "package" polluting processes which are long lasting and invisible. For example, an issue like the Greenhouse effect would be disadvantaged by journalist routines because it is a complex problem occurring over a long period of time and is caused by a wide variety of mostly invisible processes.¹³⁹ The direct actions of Greenpeace, however, transform these complex issues into immediate and exciting visuals. A smokestack discharging toxins into the air is subsequently made "newsworthy" by a Greenpeace activist parachuting off the top. This action only takes a minute - the right amount of time to be "packaged" into a news clip.

Despite a greater understanding of how to "package" issues, the coverage of Greenpeace dropped off again after 1979.¹⁴⁰ This second drop in coverage indicates the

¹³⁸Vicky Monreham, fundraiser for Greenpeace U.S.A. notes in The Greenpeace Years that the organization often sends material in its mail outs designed to bring out the maternal instincts in its members.

¹³⁹For a discussion on the extent to which events resulting from complex processes which unfold over a long period of time are disadvantaged by journalist routines see Galtang and Ruge, "Structuring and selecting news", in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds), The Manufacture of News (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 52-63; Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, pp.23-24; and Hackett, News and Dissent, pp.78-79.

¹⁴⁰Greenpeace received 46 articles in 1980, 44 in 1981, 31 in 1982, 32 in 1983 and 22 in 1984.

importance of novelty in obtaining coverage.¹⁴¹ The media's attraction to novelty is recognized by many Greenpeace activists. Diane Goulet¹⁴² remarks that when she first started working for Greenpeace in Montreal, the media would show up to each talk she gave no matter how small. She explained that this excessive media attention was due to the fact that Greenpeace had just started up in Montreal and subsequently journalists considered the organization to be "exciting".¹⁴³ Bob Hunter also encountered this intense initial interest of journalists towards Greenpeace during his first visit to Australia to save the whales. According to Hunter, reporters waiting for their arrival "obviously expected something more romantic than this handful of bleary-eyed gypsies stepping out of a couple of cars, dragging several boxes of junk out after them. One reporter admitted afterward: 'I'd read all about you guys. I thought you were gonna pull up in a convoy and all jump out in green

¹⁴¹The criteria of novelty also ensured that the campaigns receiving the largest amount of coverage would be within the first three years of Greenpeace's existence. Therefore, although whaling was an ideal campaign in terms of danger, confrontation and vivid imagery, the issue attracted only 84 articles in Phase 1 as opposed to 192 stories about nuclear testing campaigns.

¹⁴²Interview, October 30, 1991.

¹⁴³Interview with Diane Goulet, Pulp and Paper campaigner for the Montreal Office, October 30, 1991.

uniforms, screaming: 'Give me whales or give me death!'"¹⁴⁴

The criterion of novelty, however, also illustrates the problematic nature of trying to attract the media over a long period of time. Although Louise Blight,¹⁴⁵ David Peerla¹⁴⁶ and Michael Manolson¹⁴⁷ explain that the shelf life of drama can be extended by continuously thinking up new activities in order to attract the media's attention, journalists will eventually become tired of the whole genre of direct actions.¹⁴⁸ As Hall et al point out,

the news value of 'novelty' is eventually expended; through repetition the extraordinary eventually becomes ordinary. Indeed, in relation to any one particular news story, 'novelty' clearly has the most limited life span of all news values. At this point in the 'cycle' of a news story, other, more enduring news values are needed in order to supplement declining newsworthiness,

¹⁴⁴Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.424

¹⁴⁵Interview, July 26, 1991.

¹⁴⁶Interview, October 18, 1991.

¹⁴⁷Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

¹⁴⁸Jim Bohlen maintains that one of the most disturbing forms of control the media has is to decide when something is no longer news. Bohlen explains that a good example of the media's ability to decide when an event is no longer news is the case of East Timor. He notes that there has been a war going on in East Timor for the last twenty years but the media doesn't cover it. Anytime there is a burp in Haiti, however, journalists are falling over one another to cover the story. When Bohlen asked journalists to explain why uprisings in Haiti are news while East Timor remains uncovered, reporters replied that the war in East Timor was in a stalemate and therefore nothing "new" was happening. Telephone Interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991.

and so sustain its 'news-life'.¹⁴⁹

It seems, therefore, that although the danger and confrontation, visual imagery and novelty of direct actions initially helped Greenpeace tremendously in gaining access to the media, the appeal of drama is limited over a long period of time - a limitation which partly explains the decrease in spectacular actions shown in Table 2.1. Despite Jim Bohlen's point that the media have never refused the opportunity to cover a Greenpeace action,¹⁵⁰ David Peerla¹⁵¹ and Brian Killeen¹⁵² point out that the media are becoming increasingly jaded towards dramatic activities¹⁵³ - a disenchantment which affects not only the quantity but the quality of coverage.¹⁵⁴

The jaded attitude of journalists towards Greenpeace is

¹⁴⁹Hall et al., "The social production of news: Mugging and the media", pp. 358-9.

¹⁵⁰Interview, October 16, 1991. Bohlen attributes this continued coverage of actions to the fact that there is tremendous competition between the different media outlets to obtain stories.

¹⁵¹Interview, October 18, 1991.

¹⁵²Interview, September 26, 1991.

¹⁵³The media's jaded attitude towards direct actions is also mentioned in Edwards, "Spirit of outrage", New Statesman & Society, July 1988, p.18.

¹⁵⁴Bob Hackett also notes in his study of the coverage of peace groups that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get the media to cover demonstrations because their novelty has worn off. For a further discussion see Hackett, News and Dissent, pp.112 and 153

likely to hamper the quality of coverage because reporters are more likely to concentrate on the stunt rather than the issues behind the action. Furthermore, the concentration on Greenpeace tactics is likely to increase over time because journalists want to avoid the perception that they are being manipulated by staged events.¹⁵⁵ To highlight their "impartiality", journalists subsequently focus on the media-oriented nature of Greenpeace's direct actions with statements like "the incident was a well-organized publicity event. There were about a dozen press, radio and television people on board the cruise ship, all of whom had prior knowledge of the demonstration";¹⁵⁶ "Greenpeace had lured the news media to Diachem's Richmond plant by announcing an

¹⁵⁵Gitlin notes that a similar process is happening with journalists' coverage of election campaigns because reporters want to maintain an adversarial stance and prevent politicians from using them for their own political gain. Rather than discussing the issues involved in elections, journalists are increasingly resorting to what Gitlin refers to as "handicapping coverage". He explains handicapping coverage as "stories about campaign tactics, what the handlers were up to, how the reporters felt about being handled: in short, *How are the candidates trying to do it to us, and how are they doing at it?*". According to Gitlin, "handicapping coverage was a defensive maneuver, and a self-flattering one: the media could in this way show that they were immune from the ministrations of campaign professionals". Gitlin, "Blips, Bites & Savvy Talk", Dissent, Winter 1990, p.19.

¹⁵⁶Lyon, "Cruise ship runs blockade", The Vancouver Sun, May 14, 1977, p.2.

unspecified 'direct action' was about to take place";¹⁵⁷ and "Callies [a Greenpeace campaigner] began the carefully orchestrated protest Tuesday morning by distributing news releases...".¹⁵⁸ This focus on Greenpeace's media orientation disadvantages the organization's ability to raise the public's consciousness about environmental problems because audiences are encouraged to concentrate on the tactics of the group rather than the environmental issues being raised. Gitlin also maintains in his article "Blips, Bytes and Savvy Talk" that the tendency of journalists to emphasize manipulative tactics has problematic consequences for political action. According to Gitlin, the more audiences are encouraged to pick apart the strategies used to "bamboozle" them, the more they are positioned as political spectators and become disenchanted with all aspects of politics.¹⁵⁹

Besides the media's concentration on Greenpeace's stunts, Peerla¹⁶⁰ also notes that the media is less likely

¹⁵⁷Bohn, "Chemical firm admits jumping gun in providing highly toxic product", The Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1985, p.A3.

¹⁵⁸Bohn and Smith, "Greenpeace protesters chain themselves at plant", The Vancouver Sun, September 18, 1985, p.A11.

¹⁵⁹See Gitlin, "Blips, Bytes and Savvy Talk", Dissent, Winter 1990, p. 25.

¹⁶⁰Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

to be positive towards the organization the longer a particular tactic is carried out. He gives the example of when Gord Perks, the toxics campaigner for the Toronto Office, was challenging politicians about their stance towards environmental problems during the 1990 Ontario Provincial election. Peerla notes that although these confrontations were regarded positively by the media at first, after a few repetitions they were referred to as a Greenpeace activist "harrassing" a politician.

The need to counteract a jaded media has led Greenpeace to use its direct actions more strategically. Manolson explains that "in the early years the action was the campaign, now the action is a component of the campaign, or is a tool, is a tactic in the context of a broader campaign strategy".¹⁶¹ Brian Killeen¹⁶² notes that direct actions today are so sophisticated that a single action can unfold over two years - one year to educate the players who are involved and another year to follow up the action with new research, education and lobbying efforts.¹⁶³ In fact, Greenpeace's tertiary actions have become so prominent that direct actions are currently used only as a last resort. As

¹⁶¹Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

¹⁶²Interview, September 26, 1991.

¹⁶³Michael Manolson also points out that it took almost two years of study before Greenpeace became involved in the rainforest issue in 1990. See Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant" The Georgia Strait, September 13-20, pp.7.

David McTaggart explains, "we would always prefer *not* to do actions, because of the money and the risk. We try to get the situation clear in our own heads first, do the science, then have quiet conversations with lots of people, from companies to presidents of countries. If they do whatever, that's all you'll hear about it. If nothing happens, then you go to the action".¹⁶⁴

Besides trying to counteract a jaded media, Greenpeace's need to be more effective in pressuring for environmental sustainability has also led to a more strategic use of direct actions. Tamara Stark¹⁶⁵ explains that when Greenpeace first began its campaigns it was satisfied just by the fact that it had attracted media attention. Today, with the increasing sophistication of Greenpeace and the prominence of environmental concerns in society, the organization is not content to have the media only concentrate on the "stunts" it performs. The issues behind the actions need to be brought out in order for them to be worth the time and resources. Peerla also notes that direct actions need to be coordinated with community education in order to be empowering because dramatic activities on their own make audiences feel that they do not

¹⁶⁴Quoted in Horton, "The Greenpeace Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p.112.

¹⁶⁵Telephone interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991.

have the resources to equal the large spectacles of Greenpeace.¹⁶⁶ Finally, Tamara Stark¹⁶⁷ points out that direct actions need to be accompanied by research and lobbying because they are a difficult medium to get messages across about solutions to environmental problems. She explains that when an organization becomes institutionalized and develops a large base of support it is not just enough to say "stop pollution". One also has to provide alternatives and solutions to the problems one is criticizing.¹⁶⁸

The increasing strategic nature of Greenpeace, therefore, has meant that direct actions are used less often and are visible for a much shorter period of time - a change which further explains the decline in spectacular actions revealed in Table 2.1. While direct actions such as the whaling voyages or the seal hunt campaigns took place over several days, current direct actions are completed in an

¹⁶⁶Ostertag notes that community activists often resent Greenpeace's involvement in issues because they do not feel they can follow the act of such a large organization with so many resources. For a further discussion see Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the World", Mother Jones, March/April 1991, p.84.

¹⁶⁷Interview, October 21, 1991.

¹⁶⁸The CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years points out that the need for Greenpeace to become part of the solution and not just a critic has sparked recent projects such as funding a cancer hospital to help the children suffering from the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

afternoon.¹⁶⁹ Tamara Stark notes also that direct actions today are often less exciting than they used to be. For example one direct action done in 1991 consisted of throwing paper airplanes made of unbleached paper in the B.C. legislature to support zero discharge. She explains that in the past that kind of action would not have been perceived as being brave or daring enough.¹⁷⁰

Besides reducing the coverage of spectacular actions, Greenpeace's response to a jaded media, its desire to attract more in-depth coverage, the need to activate supporters and to pressure industry and Governments has also resulted in an increase of tertiary actions covered by the

¹⁶⁹David Peerla (Personal Interview, October 18, 1991), points out that smaller environmental groups have the advantage of sustained coverage because they are able to block environmental destruction for long periods of time. Greenpeace, on the other hand, stays only until the journalists can get their coverage because its large assets make it vulnerable to fines and other punitive measures. Jim Bohlen explains that the best example of Greenpeace's resources being used against it was in Great Britain when the British Nuclear Fuels got a one million pound injunction against Greenpeace. When they tried to enforce the injunction they sent out twenty or thirty Gendarmes and seized everything in the Greenpeace Office. Telephone Interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991.

¹⁷⁰Telephone Interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991. Jim Bohlen notes that direct actions have become less dangerous because of the increasing division of labour within Greenpeace. Bohlen explains that although the level of commitment is still high, there is no longer as great a willingness to risk life and limb. This reluctance stems from the fact that the campaigner is not always the person who does the action so there's a certain reluctance on the part of the campaigner to put an action person into a situation that he or she is not going to be participating in. Telephone Interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991.

media. This increasing strategy explains in part why Table 2.1 shows an increase in the coverage of tertiary actions over time. Tertiary actions have increased from 13% of Phase 1 stories to 27% of those in Phase 2, and to 47% of Phase 3 articles. Therefore, although the coverage of tertiary actions only accounts for 238 out of 940 articles (25%), they came close to equaling the amount of coverage given to spectacular actions in the third phase.

Besides reflecting Greenpeace's increasing involvement in activities besides spectacles, the data in Table 2.1 also indicates Greenpeace's changing relationship with the media. Greenpeace's credibility has increased substantially in the media because of the organization's considerable scientific expertise. Manolson¹⁷¹ points out that Greenpeace's expertise allows the organization to challenge environmental claims and sometimes even to provide new environmental information. Such expertise has made it possible for Greenpeace to be perceived as a legitimate source by journalists and not just a group involved in performing "stunts". David Peerla¹⁷² notes that one is more likely to be phoned up by journalists for reaction quotes now that the organization is well known. Peerla explains that Greenpeace has reached an important stage in its development because

¹⁷¹Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

¹⁷²Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991

its name receives instant legitimacy.¹⁷³ Jim Bohlen¹⁷⁴ maintains as well that Greenpeace's increasing prominence had led the organization to acquire an abundance of very well researched "leaks" from government sources which has also increased the coverage of the group's tertiary actions.

The decreased dramatization and increased credibility of Greenpeace in The Vancouver Sun have not, however, been achieved without cost. As Table 2.1 points out, the coverage of Greenpeace has decreased from 417 articles in Phase One to 313 stories in Phase Two, followed by 210 in the third phase. This decline could be due to the proliferation of other environmental groups¹⁷⁵ or the reduced attempts of Greenpeace to obtain coverage but we believe it indicates that the group's institutional

¹⁷³Killeen notes that this increasing legitimacy can also be seen by the large number of Universities and Government Departments which phone Greenpeace up for information on different environmental subjects. Interview with Brian Killeen, September 26, 1991.

¹⁷⁴Interview, October 16, 1991.

¹⁷⁵The increasing credibility of environmentalism in general might also have caused Greenpeace's activities a loss in visibility. Although the increasing prominence of the environmental movement on the national agenda through the 1970's and 1980's has made Greenpeace's actions appear more legitimate, the organization also has to compete for coverage with other groups springing up all over the world. The rise of other environmental groups also diminishes the coverage of Greenpeace because many have copied the organization's tactics; while Greenpeace's direct action approach was initially quite unique, many other groups such as the Environmental Youth Alliance also engage in civil disobedience.

development and longevity are making it progressively more difficult for the organization to access the media.

Manolson notes, however, that although the increasing strategic nature of Greenpeace makes the organization less visible, it is necessary in order to maintain the organization's credibility and to attack the roots of environmental problems.¹⁷⁶ Greenpeace, therefore, has reached a dilemma in its relationship with the media - in order to maintain its credibility the organization has sacrificed its high profile in the media.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF COVERAGE

Another problem with media coverage that can be linked with Greenpeace's position outside newsgathering routines is what Bennett refers to as "fragmentation".¹⁷⁷ Bennett explains that fragmentation occurs when

events resulting from the same political or economic forces are often treated as though they were independent. Long-term trends and historical patterns are seldom made a part of the news because they are hard to tell as simple stories...in place of seeing a coherent world anchored in clear historical, economic and political tendencies, the public is exposed to a world driven into chaos by seemingly arbitrary and

¹⁷⁶Cited in Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant" The Georgia Strait, September 13-20, pp.7.

¹⁷⁷For an in depth discussion of this information bias see Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1988), pp.44-51.

mysterious forces.¹⁷⁸

Gitlin explains that fragmentation is deeply embedded within journalists' perception of what is "newsworthy" because "news concerns the *event*, not the underlying condition; the *person*, not the group; *conflict*, not consensus; the fact that '*advances the story*,' not the one that explains it".¹⁷⁹

According to Gitlin, the concentration on the unfolding details rather than the historical, social and institutional factors causing events is due to the time and resource constraints of newswriters. These constraints have journalists scrambling for deadlines and confine them to specific "beats" which rarely enables them to undertake a historical analysis of longterm or widespread problems. The event-centred nature of news, therefore, reinforces hegemonic relations because it makes it difficult for oppositional groups to link problems and make a widespread challenge to existing economic and social relations.¹⁸⁰

Fragmentation is an especially serious problem for environmental groups such as Greenpeace because their philosophies are based on holistic rather than

¹⁷⁸Ibid, p.46.

¹⁷⁹Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.28.

¹⁸⁰For a discussion of Gitlin's views towards the causes and consequences of fragmentation see The Whole World is Watching, pp. 34-35.

anthropocentric or human centred assumptions about society. Viewing human beings as part of nature instead of dominating the planet leads Greenpeace to express statements such as "all life is interdependent"¹⁸¹ and "we are all strands in the web of life and what happens to one strand affects the other strands".¹⁸² This holistic perception leads to a radical analysis which traces environmental problems to their roots in economic and social practices instead of solely concentrating "cleaning up" the harmful effects of pollution. A fragmenting media, therefore, makes it difficult for Greenpeace to convey this radical analysis.

In order to understand the extent to which The Vancouver Sun has fragmented Greenpeace's involvement in environmental issues, articles will be analyzed to see if discrete environmental problems or polluting events were covered while the roots of these problems were ignored. To indicate the degree to which journalists have been able to avoid the event-centred nature of news production and to put polluting effects within a wider environmental framework, articles will be examined to see whether the coverage of

¹⁸¹"All life is interdependent" is the first law of ecology which Greenpeace has based its actions on. The other two laws of ecology are that 1) the stability of all ecosystems is dependent on their diversity and 2) that all resources are finite and there are limits to the growth of all living systems. These laws are stated in The Greenpeace Chronicles, Winter 1977, p.2 and on a sign at the entrance of the Vancouver Greenpeace Office.

¹⁸²Peter Bahouth quoted in The Greenpeace Years.

particular environmental problems has been linked to more than one polluting process.

The Vancouver Sun's coverage of Greenpeace has been designated as fragmented in two instances: 1) when articles do not connect polluting effects with the social and economic processes which produce environmental degradation and 2) when the coverage does not take into account the full extent of an environmentally destructive production process. An example of the first instance of fragmentation is the case of oil spills. Although oil spills are often covered in the media as being a specific "environmental problem", Greenpeace sees this problem as being only one effect within a larger polluting process - the extraction and consumption of oil.¹⁸³ Besides the possibility of spills, the production and consumption of oil pollutes the air and land through its contribution to such environmental problems as the greenhouse effect and acid rain. The trade of oil has also fueled the excessive production and consumption patterns in the industrialized world, creating a greater and greater need to exploit the earth's resources. If the media's coverage of Greenpeace's opposition to oil spills

¹⁸³Greenpeace refused to join the popular boycott of Exxon after the Valdez spill. The organization maintained that the boycott ignored the main problem - our addiction to oil. As an alternative Greenpeace ran ads with a picture of Captain Hazelwood saying "IT WASN'T HIS DRIVING THAT CAUSED THE ALASKAN OIL SPILL. IT WAS YOURS." For a discussion see Horton, "The Greenpeace Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p.109.

does not mention any other problems associated with the production and consumption of oil, therefore, the article has been denoted as fragmented.

Besides separating out polluting effects from their source, articles which do not alert audiences to other environmentally destructive aspects of a production process were also designated as fragmented. Greenpeace maintains that to fully understand the polluting nature of production processes one must look at the full life cycle of a product. For example, although Greenpeace notes that uranium leaves behind radioactive tailings and causes adverse health effects among workers when mined, the organization also stresses that mining is only one segment of the product's production process; uranium mining is also environmentally destructive because it is a key ingredient in the manufacture of nuclear power and weapons. Nuclear power and weapons in turn, raise questions about the resources needed to produce nuclear technology, the release of radioactivity into the air and the storage of nuclear waste.¹⁸⁴ The coverage of an issue such as uranium mining, therefore, has been designated as fragmented if the article does not bring out the polluting nature of the nuclear fuel cycle.

¹⁸⁴For a further discussion of Greenpeace's critique of Uranium mining from the standpoint of its position within the life cycle of nuclear products see Dykstra, "Institutions: Greenpeace", Environment, July/August 1986, Vol. 28, No. 6, p. 45.

When looking at the extent to which the coverage of Greenpeace has been fragmented in Table 2.2, two results are

TABLE 2.2 - ARTICLES REFERRING TO ONLY ONE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE OR PART OF A PRODUCTION PROCESS (in numbers of articles and percentage of phase)

Fragmentation	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
# of Articles	368	261	184	813
% of Articles	88	83	88	86

significant. The first is that the coverage of Greenpeace has been susceptible to a large amount of fragmentation - 813 out of 940 articles (86%) failed to link environmental problems to their root causes and to alert audiences about the variety of polluting processes involved in the production of goods. Table 2.2 also shows that the percentage of fragmented articles has stayed relatively constant over time with 368 out of 417 (88%) articles fragmented in phase one, 261 out of 313 (83%) in the second phase, and 184 out of 210 (88%) in phase three.

The evidence that the number of fragmented articles has not declined over the twenty year period suggests that Greenpeace's institutional development has had little effect in helping media messages link polluting effects with their causes and to illuminate the full environmental costs of production processes. The consistency of fragmented

coverage over time is especially significant because Greenpeace has increasingly widened the scope of issues it has become involved in¹⁸⁵ and has expanded its campaigns to publicize the polluting nature of certain production processes.¹⁸⁶

This inability to lessen fragmentation can be explained in part by the pervasive journalist routines which mandate an emphasis on events and not on issues.¹⁸⁷ David Peerla¹⁸⁸ maintains that the fragmentation of news coverage is one of the hardest problems to work against because reporting is so geared to particular events. Fletcher and Stahlbrand support Peerla's claim by pointing out that "the scope and implications of the environmental crisis mean that it does not fit neatly into the normal framework of journalism...the holistic nature of environmental issues makes them hard for

¹⁸⁵Michael M'Gonigle maintains that Greenpeace's increasing radicalism has been aided by its opposition to a wider variety of environmental issues. Telephone Interview, July 28, 1991.

¹⁸⁶Peerla notes that the forestry campaign was initiated in part in order to bring attention to all the forms of pollution that are involved in the production of paper. This is also called the cradle to grave approach. The cradle here being forests and the grave being landfill or recycling. Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991. Greenpeace also transformed its opposition of nuclear testing to include a more widespread critique of the nuclear fuel cycle.

¹⁸⁷For a discussion of the problem of the media's emphasis on events rather than issues see Tuchman, Making News, pp. 134-136.

¹⁸⁸Interview, October 18, 1991.

journalists, used to presenting reports on small fragments of reality, to deal with".¹⁸⁹ Hackett also points out that the problem of fragmentation is inherent within journalist routines. He maintains that the media's tendency to define issues in terms of discrete events disadvantages the messages of more radical peace groups which do not see nuclear weapons as an isolated issue.¹⁹⁰

Besides the prevalence of journalist routines which lead to a concentration on discrete events, the continuity of fragmented coverage is also explained by the fact that Greenpeace has developed out of and must pressure for change within an individualistic and compartmentalized society. Greenpeace, therefore, often must exacerbate this information bias in its attempts to transform society through its direct action approach, increasing bureaucracy, and desire to present issues in a manner which "makes sense". Manolson¹⁹¹ explains that one of the most useful purposes of direct actions is to expose specific corporations which pollute or individual politicians who do not respond to such pollution.¹⁹² Such an approach

¹⁸⁹Fletcher and Stahlbrand, "Mirror or Participant? The News Media and Environmental Policy", in Boardman (ed), Canadian Environmental Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.183.

¹⁹⁰Hackett, News and Dissent, p.33.

¹⁹¹Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

¹⁹²Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

increases fragmentation because it focuses attention on a particular environmental problem rather than the entire economic system which is inherently polluting.¹⁹³ Although the increased strategic nature of direct actions has the potential to decrease fragmentation by educating journalists and different groups about the interconnected nature of environmental problems, Bruce MacKay¹⁹⁴ points out that the organization's institutional development has also created factors which reinforce fragmentation. For example, MacKay notes that institutionalization has created an increased division of labour within the organization which makes it difficult for Greenpeace to link different environmental issues with one another. He maintains that fragmentation is further increased by time and resource constraints which diminish the contacts between different campaigners and the tendency of some organizers to build empires for themselves.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³Hackett also notes this reinforcement of fragmentation in the media relations of peace groups. According to Hackett, the media's concentration on single issues "encourages disarmament groups themselves to emphasize single issues, such as Canada's agreement to test U.S. Cruise missiles, and to organize around spectacular but short-term events, such as large demonstrations". For a further discussion see Hackett, News and Dissent, p.33.

¹⁹⁴Telephone Interview with Bruce MacKay, October 21, 1991

¹⁹⁵This is disputed by Louise Blight who argues that campaigners read about the activities that others are involved in (Interview, July 26, 1991). In the Vancouver Office, clipboards are hanging up on the walls which contain all the recent news articles around the world about

Diane Goulet¹⁹⁶ and David Kraft¹⁹⁷ also point out that Greenpeace needs to present fragmented messages in order to be understood and to create pressure for change. Diane Goulet explains that although she sees a need to connect different environmental issues, she does not explicitly state this in her interactions with the media because she believes that one has to target specific issues in order to get governments and industry to commit to change.¹⁹⁸ David Kraft also notes that there is a tension between trying to raise a mass environmental consciousness and attempting to implement change. According to Kraft,

what I would like to see is us develop an energy campaign which then highlights at different times, different sets of issues, always tying things back to some of the more general questions. Yet it's tough because we want to get that general message across and yet we want to give people something they can do or grasp as a simple straightforward choice which they can make".¹⁹⁹

Therefore, Greenpeace's messages are to a certain extent

different campaign areas and Greenpeace activities. Campaigners and Greenpeace activists are encouraged to study this information.

¹⁹⁶Telephone Interview with Diane Goulet, October 30, 1991.

¹⁹⁷Interview, November 4, 1991.

¹⁹⁸Goulet notes that in the European countries campaigners are able to interconnect issues more easily because the environmental consciousness of industry and governments in these countries is more pervasive and advanced.

¹⁹⁹Interview, November 4, 1991.

boxed in by the way in which audiences and journalists understand the world; Greenpeace must present a fragmented message to the media in order to be comprehensible and in order to mobilize the public and Government's to fight against environmental degradation.

THE NORMALIZATION OF COVERAGE

Besides dramatization and fragmentation, Greenpeace's position outside newsgathering routines also makes the organization susceptible to what Bennett refers to as "normalization".²⁰⁰ According to Bennett, normalization is the tendency of the media "to seek out the reassuring, authoritative voices of officials who offer *normalized* interpretations of the otherwise threatening and confusing events in the news. *Official responses to the mysterious crises and problems of society tell us that things will return to 'normal' again, if only we will trust those officials to act in our interest [Bennett's emphasis]*".²⁰¹ Although Bennett notes that the normalizing reassurances of officials are challenged in the media by coverage given to groups critical of the status quo, the oppositional messages of these groups are diffused through 1) a concentration on

²⁰⁰For a more in depth discussion of normalizing coverage see Bennett, The Politics of Illusion, pp. 51-63.

²⁰¹Ibid, p. 24.

lawbreaking or distasteful behaviour; 2) balancing the utterances of oppositional groups with comments from official sources and 3) by implying that the goals of these groups were of little consequence.²⁰² In order to understand the extent to which the coverage of Greenpeace is normalized, the number of articles in The Vancouver Sun concentrating on Greenpeace's lawbreaking activities, deviance, and ineffectiveness will be examined in the following paragraphs.

In looking at the extent to which articles in The Vancouver Sun concentrate on Greenpeace's lawbreaking activities, it is important to recognize that the environmental group often deliberately uses civil disobedience in its direct actions to attract media attention and to challenge authority. Gitlin notes that movements use civil disobedience to attract media attention because crime stories are one of the most newsworthy "beats". Arrests resulting from the protests of movements such as Greenpeace, therefore, are newsworthy because

arrests are dramatic; yet they can be reported routinely. They have around them the aura of human interest, since there are particular people arrested; they take place sharply and clearly on a given day, and in numbers at least are unequivocal; thus they can be assimilated to the publishing timetable. Not least, they are unusual; people are *voluntarily getting*

²⁰²Ibid, pp. 52-53.

arrested.203

Gitlin also notes that the media's concentration on the lawbreaking activities of social movements is ideological because it often obscures the fact that getting arrested is often the only way in which the powerless can make the news and draw attention to their plight. The ability to report on civil disobedience favourably requires recognizing that existing political institutions are not "open" to all interests within society - an attitude which would delegitimize the official sources which journalists depend on for information.

In terms of examining the extent to which there is a bias towards selecting events involving lawbreaking, however, the criminality of both Greenpeace and those opposing the organization will be tabulated. The criminal acts of those who oppose Greenpeace are also counted because the mere association of Greenpeace with illegal activities leads to confusion about the organization itself. For example, the documentary The Greenpeace Years notes that it is common for people to think that it was Greenpeace which bombed the French Navy and not vice versa. Steve Sawyer explains that the Rainbow Warrior coverage "focused attention in such a way that we are caught up with a political scandal, sabotage, terrorism and murder, words

203Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p.42.

which we would definitely prefer not to have associated with our name".²⁰⁴ In this section the categorization of criminal activities includes articles which mention the possibility of criminal behaviour as well as actual arrests, court cases, the seizure of Greenpeace property and fines.

As table 2.3 indicates, a substantial proportion of articles on Greenpeace (approximately one third) are about lawbreaking activities. The findings, however, are even more significant when one sees that the percentage of articles about illegal activities has actually *increased* with Greenpeace's institutional development. Although the large number of articles about criminal activities in Phase Three

TABLE 2.3 - ARTICLES NOTING CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR, ARRESTS, COURT CASES, INJUNCTIONS AND FINES (in numbers of articles and percentages of total coverage)

Crime Story	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
# of Articles	112	106	93	311
% of Articles	27	34	44	33

²⁰⁴Cited in Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1991), p.38.

can be explained by the Rainbow Warrior bombing,²⁰⁵ an explanation is also needed for the increase in the percentage of crime stories in Phase Two. This increase can be explained by Greenpeace's shift from confrontations at sea to direct actions on land. Jim Bohlen²⁰⁶ explains that in its early years Greenpeace confined all of its actions to confrontations at sea because they took place in international waters and subsequently avoided both fines and arrests.²⁰⁷ With the rise of Toxics issues in the 1980's and Greenpeace's concentration on source reduction, however, the organization has needed to increase its confrontations on land. The problematic nature of conducting direct actions on "private property" was first realized when Greenpeace tried to plug a pipeline from a British Nuclear Fuels plant discharging nuclear effluent. In response to Greenpeace's action, British Nuclear Fuels applied for a sequestration of all Greenpeace assets in Britain and

²⁰⁵The coverage of the Rainbow Warrior bombing received a substantial amount of coverage in Phase Three - 51 out of 210 articles. This coverage concentrated on the "spy story" angle of the event almost completely ignoring the issue of nuclear testing. For a further discussion of the "spy" angle see Shears and Gidley, The Rainbow Warrior Affair (Great Britain: Irwin Publishing Inc., 1986).

²⁰⁶Interview, October 16, 1991.

²⁰⁷This strategy of carrying out actions in international waters to avoid legal sanctions did not work in some cases. For example, in 1972 and 1973 the French Navy disobeyed international law and boarded and seized the Greenpeace III.

overseas. Greenpeace was eventually found to be in contempt of court and was fined 50,000 pounds plus costs.²⁰⁸ In addition to taking its actions to land, Greenpeace is also susceptible to legal sanctions because the increasing orientation of campaigns such as Toxics and Atmosphere/Energy to push for structural change makes it necessary for Greenpeace to take on major players in the global economy - the people who are most able to limit movement access by coercion.²⁰⁹

Besides the journalist routines which favour crime stories, movements are also disadvantaged by the tendency of the media to denigrate their forms of protest because they oppose the existing order.²¹⁰ Because Greenpeace is positioned outside "legitimate" forms of political activity it is vulnerable to disparagement because its challenge of established institutions may be interpreted by the media as

²⁰⁸For a discussion of these sanctions against Greenpeace see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, pp. 95-96.

²⁰⁹Peter Bahouth (Executive Director of Greenpeace U.S.A.) in The Greenpeace Years recalls a recent event where activists were protesting the shipments of mercury waste to Africa by American Cyanamid. He explained that protesting was acceptable to authorities as long as activists stayed at a rally in a nearby field. But when activists attempted to take a petition to the company they were beaten with clubs and arrested.

²¹⁰For a discussion of this tendency of the media see Hall et al., Policing The Crisis (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), p. 225.

unrealistic, deviant or dangerous.²¹¹ Gitlin also explains that movements are susceptible to negative coverage because the media finds deviance newsworthy. According to Gitlin, "the media routinely present performers who are deviant - that is, unrepresentative of the values, opinions, passions and practices of the larger society. Deviance constitutes their very 'news value' - unless they are legitimate authorities, of course, in which case precisely the opposite rule applies, and their official status is what makes them newsworthy".²¹² Molotch also points out that the media oriented activities of movements in general lead to denigration. Molotch explains that to observers unsympathetic with the goals of movements, "...coverage is seen to display 'merely' the 'politics of kicks,' or the 'politics of masturbation,' or the politics of people who

²¹¹Molotch notes that movements are disadvantaged when the existing system is perceived to be legitimate because activists are "crimeless victims". Molotch notes that because only certain forms of injustice are recognized as "crimes" while others are not (e.g. mugging versus racism), only the victims of recognized crimes have instant legitimacy as victims. To the extent to which society is considered legitimate, those who are victims of oppressive social processes which are not denoted as "criminal" have an "unrecognized grief" and subsequently must "bear the burden of showing that they themselves are not incompetent, irrational, or otherwise dangerous". For a further discussion of this concept of "crimeless victims" see Molotch, "Media and Movements", pp. 78-79.

²¹²Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1980), p.152.

'just want to see their names in the paper'".²¹³

In looking at the coverage of Greenpeace, articles were deemed to denigrate the organization if they emphasized the problematic appearance or personalities of Greenpeace members (whether activists were noted as untidy, egoistic etc.), noted unsound motives of the organization (terrorism, harrassment, disruption, publicity mongering, exploitation of issues, etc.), stressed internal cleavages within the organization (bitter feuds, etc.) or emphasized the ineffectual nature of the environmental group.

In contrast to the experiences of movements noted by Molotch and Giltin, Table 2.4 shows that denigration has not been much of a problem for the organization. Only 159 out of 940 articles (17%) contained negative comments about the organization. The lack of denigrating coverage in Phase One can be explained by the media's attraction to novelty explained earlier and the subsequent ability for Greenpeace to enjoy a honeymoon period in the media during its early

TABLE 2.4 - ARTICLES NOTING THE PROBLEMATIC APPEARANCES/PERSONALITIES, UNSOUND MOTIVES, INFIGHTING AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS (in numbers of articles and percentages of total coverage)

Denigration	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
# of Articles	54	72	33	159
% of Articles	13	23	16	17

²¹³Molotch, "Media and Movements", p.73.

years.²¹⁴ Although Greenpeace suffered an increase in negative coverage during Phase Two due to its internal bickering and involvement in unpopular campaigns,²¹⁵ the number of denigrating articles decreased again during Greenpeace's later years. The lack of denigrating coverage in the third phase can be explained by two factors: 1) Greenpeace's increasing institutional development and 2) the ability of Greenpeace to use symbols to promote itself and its environmental concerns.

Greenpeace's institutional development has helped the organization to avoid denigrating coverage in two ways: by reducing the prominence of personalities within the organization and by becoming a more credible organization both to journalists and political elites. Although it was

²¹⁴This honeymoon period can be explained by the media's sympathy towards Greenpeace's non-violent approach and because its campaigns at this time only opposed outside economic or military interests (i.e. American, French and Japanese interests). Although the seal hunt campaign occurred in Canada, it took place in a region far away from The Vancouver Sun and a large amount of the economic gain was syphoned off by Norway.

²¹⁵The two unpopular campaigns included the later seal hunt campaigns in Newfoundland and opposition to Trophy Hunting in Spatsizi National Park. Although the problems with the seal hunt campaign will be examined in Chapter 3, for a discussion of the unpopularity of the Trophy Hunting campaign see, "Greenpeace fails to sway Swedish hunters", The Vancouver Sun, October 2, 1979, p.B11; "Greenpeace gets slap over causes", The Vancouver Sun, October 9, 1979, p.A14; "Greenpeace settles suit over hunting", The Vancouver Sun, November 8, 1985, p.A1 and A2.

noted earlier that the increased scientific expertise of the organization has helped it to counter dramatization, this credibility also decreases negative coverage because the hiring of scientists and lawyers reduces the ability of the media to call Greenpeace members "deviant". Furthermore, through its increased ability to lobby governments and educate communities, Greenpeace can make alternatives to polluting processes known and avoid accusations that it is "unrealistic" or "ineffective". For example, Diane Goulet²¹⁶ points out that the increasing strategic nature of direct actions helps Greenpeace avoid being labelled as simply "boys playing with toys".²¹⁷ She maintains that community organizing and lobbying are essential to ensuring that lay-offs and plant closures are blamed on the polluting nature of industries and not on the "irresponsible" actions of Greenpeace .²¹⁸

The institutionalization of Greenpeace has also helped the group to reduce negative coverage by preventing the media from concentrating on personalities within the organization. Although Hackett notes that the media's

²¹⁶Interview, October 30, 1991.

²¹⁷Goulet maintains as well that the prominence of direct actions in the organization was due to the the patriarchal influence within Greenpeace.

²¹⁸For an in depth examination of the problems with Greenpeace's direct action approach see Pearse, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.20.

concentration on a particular person can benefit the coverage of a movement by improving their access and credibility in the media,²¹⁹ Molotch maintains that the personalized coverage of movements can be harmful because of the media's preoccupation with the "deviance" of leaders. He explains that "the media become preoccupied with the personal biographies of the dissidents - how they went wrong; their sexual mores, personal cleanliness, and physical attributes; and their potential threat to the system".²²⁰

As expected, Table 2.5 shows that the personalized coverage of Greenpeace²²¹ has decreased over time. The decrease of personalized articles over time points to the role of the group's institutional development in preventing the promotion of celebrities.²²² Gitlin notes that the new

²¹⁹Hackett explains that prominent peace activists for the anti-nuclear movement such as Helen Caldicott and Jim Stark enabled the peace movement to communicate more effectively with the public. For a further discussion see Hackett, News and Dissent (New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1991), p.22.

²²⁰Molotch, "Media and Movements, p.79.

²²¹Articles were deemed to be personalized when the coverage of Greenpeace activists concentrated on his or her personality or achievements. This stipulation is used for the purpose of separating out articles which are merely quoting particular Greenpeace personnel from those which actually concentrate on a particular person within Greenpeace.

²²²This view is disputed by Michael Palmer, a wildlife lobbyist for the Sierra Club who maintains, "It's very much an organization of personalities and not of structure". Quoted in Brand, "Cutting his own path", Time August 21,

left in the 1960's was susceptible to personalized coverage

TABLE 2.5 - ARTICLES CONCENTRATING ON THE PERSONALITIES OF GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS AND LEADERS (in numbers of articles and percentages of total coverage)

Personalization	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
# of Articles	67	12	3	82
% of Articles	16	4	1	87

because of its inexperience and inability to develop controls for the advancement of leaders.²²³ Greenpeace's expansion into other countries, its increasing bureaucracy, and the influence of David McTaggart,²²⁴ however, has made the organization conscious of the need to control activists and has limited the ability of a single person to speak for

1989, p.60.

²²³For a discussion of these lack of controls see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, pp. 156-166.

²²⁴David McTaggart notes on The Greenpeace Years that he made a conscious decision not to allow himself or anyone else to speak for the organization. McTaggart could very easily have become a celebrity in the media's eyes because of his history as a champion badminton player and a millionaire "playboy" who had lost his fortune in the real estate business. For a further discussion of McTaggart's influence on the organization see Brand, "Cutting his own path", Time, August 21, 1989, pp. 58-60.

the organization.²²⁵

Institutional development has further prevented Greenpeace from being subjected to negative personalized coverage by increasing its control over activists. The CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years shows a training camp in which activists receive instruction on how to present themselves to the media. David Peerla points out that actions are carefully orchestrated to prevent activists from acting in a spontaneous manner.²²⁶ Greenpeace's growing controls over the behaviour of activists is evident in the Phase Three results of Table 2.6 which shows a complete absence of personalized frames denigrating the organization. The role of institutionalization in preventing the negative

²²⁵The increasing institutionalization of Greenpeace might also discourage people who seek personalized coverage from joining the organization since more and more of Greenpeace's campaigning is done unobtrusively and away from the eyes of the media.

²²⁶Peerla explains that actions can become very dangerous if they are undertaken spontaneously. According to Peerla, the classic case of such a danger occurred in a Tsitika protest where Dan Lewis on the spur of the moment poured gasoline around a truck which had another protester chained underneath it because he just "lost it". Peerla maintains that this kind of impulsiveness would never happen in the case of Greenpeace because everything is planned out beforehand and activists are controlled by an experienced Media Coordinator. Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991. Michael Manolson notes that it is really quite amazing that, considering the number of people who work for Greenpeace through volunteering or canvassing, there have been no problems with a person going off half cocked and speaking out negatively against the organization. Manolson notes that just in the year 1990 over two thousand people were hired to door-to-door canvass. Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

portrayal of Greenpeace activists is also illustrated by the

TABLE 2.6 - ARTICLES DENIGRATING THE PERSONALITIES OF GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS AND LEADERS (in numbers of articles and percentages of total coverage)

Personalization	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
# of Articles	9	7	0	16
% of personal	13	58	0	20

high percentage of personalized articles involving denigration in Phase Two (58%) - a period of time in which Greenpeace was undergoing an organizational crisis.

In addition to limiting personalized coverage, Greenpeace has also avoided denigration by successfully using symbols to promote itself and its messages. One of the main symbols that Greenpeace uses is the "David and Goliath" imagery illustrated in cases where small zodiacs have confronted large polluting machines. Patrick Moore maintains that this imagery immediately brings sympathy to the "David" image while drawing support away from the "Goliath".²²⁷

Greenpeace also incorporates powerful national symbols into its direct actions. For example, it hung a banner from the Statue of Liberty with the caption "Give me Liberty from Nuclear Weapons", and fitted the The Little Mermaid in

²²⁷Cited in Inside T.V. News.

Copenhagen with a harpoon through her chest while covering her eyes with a U.S. flag. A bloody Japanese flag is draped beneath her with the inscription "She too tried to save the WHALES".²²⁸ The documentary The Greenpeace Years also shows a scene where a Greenpeace activist presents polluted water to a chemical company in a glass while wearing a Mark Twain costume - a powerful symbol of the Mississippi River before it became polluted.

Of course, industry as well has developed its own symbols to counter the damage done by organizations such as Greenpeace. Peerla²²⁹ and Killeen²³⁰ note that companies now hire public relations firms to boost their "environmentally friendly" image in the media. Peter Dykstra²³¹ and Tamara Stark²³² also point out that corporate officials have coopted environmental language to sell their products and to refute claims about the polluting nature of their industries. Industry also has been able to use symbols against Greenpeace itself by labelling it as an illegitimate organization. For example, a "crisis

²²⁸Pictures of these two actions are shown in Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp.99-100.

²²⁹Interview, October 18, 1991.

²³⁰Interview, September 26, 1991.

²³¹Cited in The Greenpeace Years.

²³²Interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991.

management plan" prepared for the Clorox Corporation (which was subsequently leaked to Greenpeace) encourages business leaders to label environmental activists as "terrorists".²³³

Although Brian Killeen²³⁴ explains that such labelling can be challenged best by convincing audiences that protesting is not a fringe or illegitimate activity but a positive and fundamental right, Jim Bohlen²³⁵ and Lynn Jamieson²³⁶ maintain that criticism of Greenpeace is not always harmful and can even have positive repercussions through activating public debate.

CONCLUSION

It has been shown above that the evolution of Greenpeace has enabled the organization to overcome certain information biases and subsequently to remove some obstacles to putting out radical messages in the mass media. Through its increasing global presence and tremendous mobilization of resources Greenpeace has supplemented its direct actions

²³³See Action - Greenpeace Canada, Vol. 2, No. 3, July/August/September 1991, p.4. For another example of the labelling of Greenpeace activists as terrorists see Shackley and Oatman, "Enviroterrorism", Chief Executive, No.60, Jul/Aug 1990, pp.34-36.

²³⁴Personal Interview with Brian Killeen, September 26, 1991.

²³⁵Interview, October 16, 1991.

²³⁶Interview, September 25, 1991.

with other activities such as research, public education and lobbying. Greenpeace's increasing involvement in other activities has made it possible for the group to be more effective in challenging existing social relations because it has the ability to analyze the roots of environmental problems and to be more strategic in exposing the structural causes of environmental degradation. Its increasing scientific expertise has also enabled Greenpeace to become a more credible organization in the media's eyes and to develop a profile with certain journalists as a "legitimate source". Increasing institutionalization, therefore, has enabled Greenpeace to get away from the perception that it is only an organization involved in performing "stunts" and to develop controls over activists to reduce denigration.

On the other hand, the increasing institutionalization of Greenpeace has also created some problems for the organization. An increasing number of supporters has forced Greenpeace to become more accountable to its membership base. This accountability means being very careful in putting out radical messages which might scare off future members and support - an approach which can alienate the sort of member whose energy was so important in the early stages of the movement.²³⁷ Accountability also means trying

²³⁷Michael Manolson notes that he left Greenpeace for a while in 1986 disillusioned because the organization was growing so fast and subsequently didn't seem able to bring in a new age of environmental thought. Paul Watson also maintains he was glad to leave Greenpeace because of its

to formulate alternatives which will be taken seriously - an exercise which often leads to reforming rather than radically changing the existing system. Furthermore, increasing insitutionalization has meant a heightened division of labour. Dividing its activities into different campaigns makes it more difficult for Greenpeace to link environmental issues and to subsequently offer a radical challenge to the existing order in media messages. Finally, Greenpeace's growth has meant an accumulation of substantial assets. An increase of assets makes it risky for Greenpeace to take an uncompromising stand on pollution for fear that the organization may be subject to injunction and fines.

In order to understand in more detail the constraints and openings for Greenpeace's challenge to existing social practices, two specific campaigns will be examined more closely in Chapters Three and Four. In the next chapter, the 1976 and 1977 seal campaign will be examined to further understand the how the unique aspects of an environmental issue, along with a lack of institutional development, has affected the framing of Greenpeace.

increasing bureaucracy and more compromising nature. For a further discussion see Dunphy "The Greenpeace Giant", The Georgia Strait, September 13-20, pp.7-8.

CHAPTER THREE - THE FRAMING OF GREENPEACE DURING THE SEAL HUNT CAMPAIGN OF 1976 AND 1977

Whereas Chapter Two provided a general overview of the extent to which Greenpeace's institutional development was able to overcome information biased coverage, the third and fourth chapters will examine the framing of Greenpeace and its messages in more detail. In order to understand more completely the effects of movement evolution on Greenpeace's interaction with the mass media and its ability to put out radical messages, the coverage of two campaigns taking place at different stages in the organization's development are analyzed. For the purpose of examining the early interaction between Greenpeace and the media, the campaign against sealing in 1976 and 1977 has been chosen. The coverage of the campaign against pulp mill pollution from 1987 to 1989 is examined in Chapter Four to understand how the organization's increased resources and scientific expertise has affected Greenpeace's relationship with the media. A comparison of these two campaigns allows a greater understanding of how the characteristics of specific environmental issues, the organization's institutional development, and different levels of environmental awareness in society have helped and hindered Greenpeace's ability to put out messages which challenge the existing social and economic system.

The protest against the seal hunt, therefore, has been selected as a case study first and foremost because it allows an in-depth analysis of Greenpeace's interaction with the media during the organization's first phase of institutional development. The seal campaign has also been chosen over other Phase One campaigns because it was the first campaign to take place in Canada and therefore offers greater insights into the Canadian organization's interaction with the mass media. The fact that the seal campaign was the first environmental issue that Greenpeace took on in Canada also enables observations to be made about media reactions to a Greenpeace challenge of Canadian economic interests.²³⁸ The seal hunt is also of particular interest because it stands out as one of the most well known Greenpeace campaigns. The international attention it gathered and its eventual success in helping to persuade the European Community to adopt a directive prohibiting imports of seal skins greatly increased Greenpeace's profile.²³⁹

²³⁸Molotch notes that the media are more critical of protests which threaten their economic base. He points out examples such as the Santa Barbara oil spill which was given a larger and more sympathetic amount of media coverage in Newspapers outside the area than within Santa Barbara itself. For a further discussion see Molotch, "Media and Movements", The Dynamics of Social Movements (Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, 1979), pp.83-84.

²³⁹For a further discussion of the events leading to the EC directive see Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission Vol 2, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), pp.106-148.

Greenpeace's actions against sealing, therefore, have helped to initiate the view that the organization's activists are "masters at using television news to communicate their message".²⁴⁰

My examination is also limited to the 1976 and 1977 expeditions because Greenpeace was still based in Vancouver, lacked financial resources and was relatively unorganized during this period of time. The post-1977 campaigns, on the other hand, started to move into the United States²⁴¹ and Western Europe²⁴² and were subsequently organized by a more powerful and internationally oriented organization. Such campaigns moved away from the control of Bob Hunter, Patrick Moore, Paul Watson and David Garrick and became more carefully planned out and researched by David McTaggart and Alan Thornton. Fred Pearce explains that

in place of the off-the-cuff assertions that

²⁴⁰Peter Desbarats, Dean of the School of Journalism at Western, cited in Inside T.V. News.

²⁴¹In the 1978 campaign, the major tactic was to bring two U.S. politicians - Californian Democratic Congressman Leo Ryan and Vermont Republican Jim Jeffords - to witness the seal hunt. For a further discussion on the U.S. centred nature of the 1978 campaign see Allan Fotheringham's column in The Vancouver Sun, March 4, 1978, p.B1. In 1980, the seal hunt was based in Massachusetts in order to maintain secrecy. An account of this move is chronicled in the article by Moira Farrow, "Secret action planned to disrupt Newfoundland sealing", The Vancouver Sun, Mar 1, 1980, p.A9.

²⁴²The 1981 campaign against the seal hunt involved the organization's international flagship The Rainbow Warrior and the 1982 action included lobbying the European Parliament to ban the importation of seal pelts - a tactic which eventually destroyed the sealing industry.

comprised the analysis of Watson and Moore on the seals issue, Thornton went off to the library of the Canadian High Commission in London and wrote a position paper on the economics, ecology and trade in seals and the seal hunt. It was the first time anybody had done such a thing in the eight years of the organization's existence, and was a considerable break with the Moore and Hunter school of campaigning".²⁴³

As well as providing insights into the problems and benefits which an organization in its early stages of development finds in interacting with the mass media, studying the seal hunt also allows an examination of the aspects of media coverage which are specific to this particular campaign. It is important to realize that the coverage of Greenpeace has always been constrained to some degree by the history and nature of the issues with which it becomes involved. When Greenpeace became involved in the anti-sealing campaign, therefore, Peter Lust,²⁴⁴ Briton Cooper Busch²⁴⁵ and Brian Davies²⁴⁶ had been protesting the hunt since the mid 1960's. In addition, the position of

²⁴³Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.37. For a further discussion of the leadership of Bob Hunter, Paul Watson, Patrick Moore and David Garrick see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979) and Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982).

²⁴⁴See Lust, The Last Seal Pup (Montreal: Harvest House Ltd, 1967).

²⁴⁵See Busch, The War against the Seals (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

²⁴⁶See Davies, Red Ice (Great Britain: Methuen London, 1989).

Greenpeace toward the hunt was also influenced by the attractiveness of seal pups and the dilemma of confronting economically disadvantaged sealers, some of whom depended on sealing for a large proportion of their yearly earnings. The unique aspects of the anti-sealing campaign, as well as the effects of Greenpeace's lack of institutional development on the organization's ability to put out a radical message in The Vancouver Sun, therefore, are examined in this chapter.

OVERVIEW OF GREENPEACE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST SEALING

The idea of opposing the seal hunt in 1976 was the brainchild of Paul Watson and David Garrick.²⁴⁷ David Garrick²⁴⁸ explains that their opposition to sealing developed around concerns that there had been a dramatic decline of the seal herds - from 10 to 15 million at the beginning of the twentieth century to about a million in the 1970's. Concerns were heightened by the fact that of those one million seals left, about one third were pups and almost all were taken. This meant that there was a huge depletion of a particular segment of the seal population in a short space of time.

²⁴⁷Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.248.

²⁴⁸Interview with David Garrick, November 14, 1991.

Although the campaign concentrated on the conservation of seals, Paul Watson also points out that it was meant to be a symbol from which to understand the many forms of exploitation of ocean ecology taking place around the world.²⁴⁹ David Garrick²⁵⁰ maintains as well that since seals played a key role in moving nutrients, seals and fish were thought to be very much in balance, even though seals were eating the fish. It was this balance between the seals and the whole ecology of the ocean that Greenpeace wanted to preserve.²⁵¹ The dramatic decline of the seals as well as an elimination of a large proportion of seal pups each year, therefore, was seen as having disastrous consequences for both the seal population and the whole ecology of the oceans.

Similar to other campaigns in Greenpeace's initial years, its activities against sealing were almost exclusively for the purpose of attracting media attention and subsequently direct actions made up almost the entire campaign. The direct action orientation was prominent both because of Greenpeace's lack of resources and its ideas

²⁴⁹Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982), p.80 and "1977 Harp Seal Campaign", The Greenpeace Chronicles, Special Edition, Spring 1977, p.1.

²⁵⁰Interview, November 14, 1991.

²⁵¹See also Moore, "The Slaughter of Seals must Stop", The Greenpeace Chronicles, Special Edition, Spring 1977, p.2.

about how to bring about social change. In Bob Hunter's eyes, in order to change processes you first had to change ideas. And the only way Greenpeace could communicate with large numbers of people was through the media. According to Hunter,

in my own mind, it seemed crystal clear that awareness itself is the cure. If a mass awareness developed about the seal problem, the problem would be solved. If crazy stunts were required in order to draw the focus of the cameras that led back into millions and millions of brains, then crazy stunts were what we would do. For in the moment of drawing the mass camera's fire, vital new perceptions would pass into the minds out there that we wanted to reach. Mass media is a way of making millions bear witness at a time. If we use our brains, we can trigger a revolutionary change in the consciousness of humanity.²⁵²

Greenpeace's concentration on changing public awareness through the media was also due to the organization's lack of resources. At this stage in its development, Greenpeace did not have the money or expertise needed for alternative strategies such as lobbying governments, researching the seal issue, or organizing and educating communities in Newfoundland. Greenpeace, therefore, was almost entirely dependent on the media to interpret its opposition to the hunt.

In order to draw the media, the tactics of the campaign initially centred around the idea of spraying organic green

²⁵²Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp.252-3.

dye on seal pups to make their fur commercially worthless. But because Greenpeace lacked resources and experience in its early years, it was unable to consult Newfoundlanders or the Federal Government about its upcoming protest and subsequently underestimated the hostility of sealers and Ottawa's opposition to the dye campaign. This hostile response, as well as the Federal Government's decision to make spraying dye illegal, forced Greenpeace to give up its dye tactic. Instead, activists decided to confront only the commercial ships by shielding pups with their bodies and by physically blockading ships to prevent them from landing men on the ice.

As well as avoiding the certainty of legal sanctions, abandoning the dye tactic also had another advantage: it allowed Greenpeace to oppose a specific sector of the sealing industry - the large commercial vessels instead of Newfoundland Landsmen or Inuit sealers. Greenpeace decided to concentrate on commercial sealers for two reasons; the first was that Bob Hunter sensed there was antagonism in Newfoundland towards the large Norwegian owned ships which were seen as taking profits away from Canadian fishermen. Hunter saw the compromise of going after commercial ships as a way to make alliances with Newfoundlanders. Hunter recognized that

there was nothing from our point of view to be gained from getting caught in a trap that pitted us against the workers. If, by the simple expedient of handing over the dye, which was now

illegal to use, we could manage to get a whole lot of local people on our side, then the government would be faced with the spectre of having to deal not just with the eco-freaks from the mainland but outraged Newfies, who were angry with the way the present hunt was being conducted. The hope was to outflank Ottawa and pull off a worker-conservationist alliance that would dumbfound everybody.²⁵³

Or, put another way by Hunter, "as any general knows, if you drive a wedge between your opponents, you are that much closer to winning the battle".²⁵⁴

The second reason why a decision was made to concentrate on the commercial ships was that many Greenpeace activists were sympathetic to the plight of Landsmen²⁵⁵ and Inuit sealers.²⁵⁶ They saw that the Inuit and Landsmen only took a minority of pups and that hunting was mostly used for subsistence purposes where almost all of the seal was used for food, blubber and clothing. The commercial ships, on the other hand, were thought to be exploitative, both to the Newfoundlanders they hired and in the volume and method with which they "harvested" seals. Greenpeace recognized that Norwegian companies paid hunters only a small proportion of

²⁵³Ibid, p.263.

²⁵⁴Ibid, pp.261-2.

²⁵⁵The term Landsmen referred to those sealers who hunted seals at sea from small boats. They did not make trips out to the front ice to kill infant seals.

²⁵⁶Interview with David Garrick, November 14, 1991. See also Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Winston, and Rinehart, 1979), p.261.

what the pelts were worth and therefore most of the profits were not reaped by the sealers but by furriers who resided in other countries.²⁵⁷ Furthermore, commercial ships took only the pelts of seals in order to serve the European fashion industry. They left the rest of the carcass on the ice to rot.²⁵⁸

Although the campaign against sealing in 1976 did not succeed in ending the hunt or even lessening the quotas of seals killed in 1977,²⁵⁹ the protest was deemed to be a success by Greenpeace because of the large amount of media attention it received both internationally and nationally.²⁶⁰ Bob Hunter was also pleased at the alliances Greenpeace had made with the citizens of St. Anthony and the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food, and Allied Workers Union. According the Hunter, "if we had, in fact, saved any seals, it would only have been a handful. But we had made

²⁵⁷Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.261 and Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1982), p.75.

²⁵⁸Interview with David Garrick, November 14, 1991; Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.261; Moore, "The seal hunt - two views", Nature Canada Vol 7, April/June 1978, pp.36-37.

²⁵⁹The quota in 1977 was actually increased to 170,000 pups from 127,000 pelts in 1976. For a further discussion of the rise in the quota see "Seal hunt quota 'risks serious damage'", The Vancouver Sun, December 16, 1976, p.10 and Farrow, "170,000 seal quota 'somewhat dangerous'", The Vancouver Sun, December 17, 1976, p.23.

²⁶⁰See "Greenpeace plans in secret for next hunt", The Vancouver Sun, April 1, 1976, p.10.

political inroads inside Newfoundland, acquired allies, divided the opposition, and brought the great glass eyes of the mass-communication system to bear with more intensity than ever before".²⁶¹

These fragile alliances made in 1976, however, were largely crushed by Paul Watson, leader of the expedition in 1977. Watson had never been in favour of giving up the dye scheme and making alliances.²⁶² He had wanted to save as many seals as possible and felt that Hunter had "sold out" in 1976. He was therefore determined to be uncompromising in 1977. Bob Hunter notes that

the first act of the new Seal Steering Committee was to make sure that I was excluded from the crew. They were determined to run a 'pure' campaign, which meant that there would be no further talk of negotiations or compromises with the Newfoundlanders. The fragile alliance we'd initiated during the first anti-sealing campaign with the fishermen's union and the outport landsmen, in league against the big commercial hunt, was thrown out the window. Greenpeace's official policy was now absolutely rigid: no seals were to be killed by anybody, not even by Eskimo or Indians. Watson had whipped up most of his support in the new offices around the argument that I had 'sold out' to the sealers the previous year, and was therefore basically a traitor...the anti-sealing expedition was coming together in North America around the desire to go further, to

²⁶¹Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 296. See also "Greenpeace plans in secret for next hunt", The Vancouver Sun, April 1, 1976, p.10.

²⁶²See Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982), p.87 and 122.

be more radical, to take a hard line...".²⁶³

As well as a break up of alliances, the 1977 campaign was distinguished by being even more of a media event. Franz Weber, a Conservationist and Swiss toymaker was promising to airlift 600 journalists (only about 50 arrived) and actress Brigitte Bardot to witness the hunt.²⁶⁴ Proponents of the hunt also were becoming more organized and vying for media attention. Churches, citizen's groups, politicians and the Fishermen's Union all spoke out more angrily than ever against protesters.²⁶⁵

But although no one can dispute that the 1976 and 1977 campaigns against the seal hunt were successful in terms of the volume of media coverage that they generated, the nature of this coverage was such as to raise questions about the extent to which it benefited Greenpeace's longterm goals. Michael Manolson notes that the seal hunt has had a negative impact on Greenpeace's credibility in Canada for years.²⁶⁶

²⁶³Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.368.

²⁶⁴See Farrow, "Massive airlift of newsmen organized for annual seal kill", The Vancouver Sun, January 13, 1977, p.37.

²⁶⁵For a discussion of the organization and development of the counter-protest see Coish, Season of the Seal (St. John's: Breakwater, 1979), pp.200-236; Candow, Of Men and Seals (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989), pp.125-128; and Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission, Volume 2, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), pp.83-85.

²⁶⁶Quoted in The Greenpeace Years.

This decline in credibility can be explained by two problems in the quality of coverage Greenpeace received. First, the media did not convey that Greenpeace was opposing the hunt because it threatened ocean ecology. Second, the media portrayed Greenpeace as being blanket anti-sealing instead of just opposing the commercial hunt. But before discussing the problems which the coverage of the seal hunt created for Greenpeace, it is first necessary to examine the reasons behind the visibility of the campaign.

THE VISIBILITY OF THE SEAL CAMPAIGN

Greenpeace's campaign against sealing in 1976-1977 became a major media event (especially in 1977). Journalists flew in from Western Europe and the United States to cover the imminent confrontations. The media's attraction to Greenpeace's seal hunt campaign in 1976 and 1977 is illustrated by the coverage it received in The Vancouver Sun. Out of 417 articles in the First Phase, Greenpeace's activities protesting the seal hunt received 79 articles. These articles accounted for 19 percent of Phase One stories and 8 percent of the total coverage Greenpeace received in The Vancouver Sun.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁷The 1976 and 1977 campaigns received almost equal coverage. The 1976 campaign received 42 articles and the 1977 actions 37.

One of the main benefits of the the seal hunt campaign to Greenpeace's development, therefore, was that it became gave the organization a large amount of access to the mass media. David Garrick²⁶⁸ points out that this large amount of media attention enabled Greenpeace to develop a tremendous international profile and to become a large and powerful organization very quickly. The large amount of media attention given to the campaign by The Vancouver Sun can be explained by three factors. First, in 1976 and 1977 Greenpeace's methods of direct action were still considered to be quite novel and and interesting to the media. Second, the reaction of Newfoundlanders to Greenpeace's planned actions promised conflict and possible violence. Finally, the tactic of bringing women celebrities or sex symbols to the ice gave an interesting angle to the media - sealers who were proving their manhood on the ice²⁶⁹ versus women trying to protect pups from being pulled from their mother's side and clubbed. The extent to which these three factors influenced the quantity of coverage in The Vancouver Sun will be examined in the following paragraphs.

Although the large amount of media attention given to the seal hunt is often attributed to the photogenic

²⁶⁸Interview, November 14, 1991.

²⁶⁹For a discussion of the chauvanistic mythology surrounding the seal hunt see Lamson, Bloody Decks and a Bumper Crop (St.John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979).

appearance of baby seals and the bloody nature of the hunt,²⁷⁰ the coverage in The Vancouver Sun indicates that it was Greenpeace's involvement in the hunt which the paper found newsworthy. The assertion that the paper found Greenpeace to be the interesting part of the hunt can be illustrated in two ways. First, Greenpeace's actions are covered much more than those of other groups protesting the hunt. Although 79 articles were about Greenpeace's involvement in the 1976 and 1977 campaigns, there were only five articles about Brian Davies of the International Fund for Animal Welfare and three about Franz Weber. Second, coverage of the hunt increased dramatically after Greenpeace became involved. Before Greenpeace became involved in the hunt there were only 11 articles about the seal hunt in The Vancouver Sun. Therefore, the mushrooming of coverage from 11 articles in the period from 1965 to 1975 to 87271 in the 1975-1977 time frame suggests that factors associated with the campaign of Greenpeace attracted the attention of The Vancouver Sun.

The prominence of the coverage of the seal hunt after

²⁷⁰Some sources attribute the large amount of media attention to the brutal nature of the hunt and the photogenic nature of seal pups. For a further discussion see Seals and Sealing in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), p.67; Gwyn, "The media go to the seal hunt", Saturday Night, May 1977, pp.26-29; and Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982, p.80.

²⁷¹Eight out of 87 of these articles did not mention Greenpeace.

Greenpeace's involvement can be explained by two factors. First, The Vancouver Sun would still have found Greenpeace to be an "exciting" group because direct actions were novel to the media at this point in time. Second, this interest in Greenpeace as an organization would have been especially prevalent in The Vancouver Sun because the paper was more familiar with the organization's tactics and activists since Greenpeace was based in Vancouver during the campaign. The Vancouver paper was subsequently more likely to write what Hackett refers to as "folksy" articles about a "local boy or girl winning international attention".²⁷² Furthermore, Bob Hunter had just quit his job as a columnist for the Sun, giving him more access than other anti-sealing groups. Hunter's knowledge of journalism gave him the expertise needed to cultivate reporters who were covering the seal hunt extensively.²⁷³ On the other hand, The Vancouver Sun would have had little direct knowledge of the activities of Franz Weber (who was from Switzerland) or Brian Davies (who was based out of the Maritimes). In addition, the distance of the Vancouver paper from the seal hunt both geographically and culturally made the paper more likely to

²⁷²For a discussion of these kinds of articles see Hackett, News and Dissent, p.279.

²⁷³Maira Farrow wrote the largest number of stories - 14 out of the 79 - about Greenpeace's activities in the 1976-77 seal campaign.

view Greenpeace's actions positively.²⁷⁴

The Vancouver Sun's interest in Greenpeace is illustrated by the access the organization enjoyed in the paper's articles and the general positive tone in which journalists presented the organization's activities. Although many theorists of the media note that official sources enjoy more access than oppositional movements,²⁷⁵ the opposite occurred during the 1976 and 1977 seal campaign in The Vancouver Sun. Out of the 79 articles in The Vancouver Sun, 56 (71%) gave more than fifty percent of their space to Greenpeace's point of view. Six (8%) articles devoted equal space to proponents and opponents of the hunt and only 17 (22%) devoted less than half their space to Greenpeace and other opponents of the hunt. In addition, out of the 56 articles which gave more than half their space to Greenpeace's side of the story, 36 gave exclusive coverage to the views of groups protesting the hunt. This can be contrasted to only 4 articles which gave no access to the point of view of anti-sealing groups.

²⁷⁴It is no coincidence that the most critical article of Greenpeace in The Vancouver Sun is written by a Newfoundland journalist. The article refers to Greenpeace members as "noxious twits" and recommends they should stay home with colouring books instead of protesting the hunt. For a further discussion see Murphy, "Greenpeacers 'noxious twits'", The Vancouver Sun, November 25, 1975, p.6.

²⁷⁵See Tuchman, Making News; Molotch, "Media and Movements"; Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching; and Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion.

The access Greenpeace enjoyed can also be seen by the positive tone of the two editorials and four columns concerning the 1976 and 1977 seal campaign. In the first editorial entitled "A surface of red", the article supports Greenpeace actions and criticizes Ottawa because it claims the federal government has mismanaged the seal herds.²⁷⁶ The second editorial, "Green is Beautiful", notes that Greenpeace has won the publicity battle over the hunt and that the campaign is "a worthy cause, too, if it brings us a step closer to the day when man no longer finds it necessary to kill his fellow creatures for fun or profit".²⁷⁷ Similar to the editorials, the columns about the seal hunt in the Vancouver daily were also all positive towards Greenpeace. All columns pertaining to the hunt were written by Christopher Dafoe. In his columns, Dafoe refers to the organization's activists as "heroic men and women"²⁷⁸ and fears for their safety.²⁷⁹ He also criticizes Ottawa's seal protection act for protecting sealers instead of helping Greenpeace save seals²⁸⁰ and notes that Greenpeace

²⁷⁶See "A surface of Red", The Vancouver Sun, November 7, 1975, p. 4.

²⁷⁷The Vancouver Sun, March 4, 1976, p.4.

²⁷⁸See The Vancouver Sun, March 5, 1976, p.29.

²⁷⁹See columns in The Vancouver Sun on February 6, 1976, p.33 and March 5, 1976, p.29.

²⁸⁰See The Vancouver Sun, March 3, 1976, p.39 and March 23, 1977, p.43.

is a "serious minded organization".²⁸¹

Besides the positive tone of editorials and columns, only 9 articles used terms which inadvertently put Greenpeace in a negative light. These articles explained Greenpeace's actions as "disrupting" the hunt or "harassing" the sealers.²⁸² Therefore, only 9 out of 79 articles (11%) reflect the tendency of journalists in The Vancouver Sun to put Greenpeace's actions in a negative light.

The access given to Greenpeace and the positive tone of editorials, columns and articles in The Vancouver Sun can be contrasted with articles which were reprinted from other news organizations and the denigrating comments received from Central and Eastern Canadian sources found in the Vancouver Paper. Of the four articles which gave no access to Greenpeace, three were reprinted from other media organizations and were extremely negative towards Greenpeace.²⁸³ The first article is written by Rex Murphy,

²⁸¹The Vancouver Sun, March 23, 1977, p.43.

²⁸²The accusations of Greenpeace's "disruption" or "harassment" was also influenced by the organization's presentation of itself to the media. Paul Watson claimed that Greenpeace was going to either disrupt the hunt or harass sealers in 3 out of the 12 articles. See "Brigitte Bardot on the side of seals", The Vancouver Sun, August 28, 1976, p.49; "Seal quota risks serious damage", The Vancouver Sun, December 16, 1976, p.19; and Farrow, "Massive airlift of newsmen organized for annual seal kill", The Vancouver Sun, January 13, 1977, p.37.

²⁸³Although it is difficult to generalize about the attitudes of Central and Eastern Canadian journalists from three articles, these articles were significant because they were much more negative than any of the stories written by

a freelance broadcaster and writer from St. John's. It is entitled "Greenpeacers 'noxious twits': They should stay home with coloring books" and gives some idea of what the media in Newfoundland must have thought of Greenpeace's activities. Murphy sees Greenpeace as a group of West Coast "do-gooders" who have decided to get involved with the seal campaign because of their prejudice towards Newfoundlanders and their inability to find employment.²⁸⁴ The second article is an editorial reprinted from the Ottawa Journal entitled "Baby humans come before baby seals" and criticizes Greenpeace activists of being "zealots" or "do-gooders". It also maintains that Greenpeace is guilty of manipulating human emotions and of forcing its bourgeois morals on poverty stricken Newfoundlanders.²⁸⁵ The final article is written by CBC producer Mike Halleran and is critical of Greenpeace's motives for saving seals. He maintains that Greenpeace's involvement was sparked by the attractiveness of young seals and not because of ecological principles. According to Halleran, Greenpeace should involve itself in issues which challenge patterns of consumption such as habitat destruction rather than those which ease middle

reporters from The Vancouver Sun.

284See The Vancouver Sun, November 25, 1975, p.6.

285See The Vancouver Sun, April 1, 1976, p.5.

class guilt.²⁸⁶

The hostility of Easterners towards the organization also can be illustrated by the high degree of denigrating comments Greenpeace received from Government officials in Ottawa and from unions and community groups in the Maritimes. Out of the 79 articles about Greenpeace, 15 contained comments from eastern sources denigrating the organization (19% of articles on the seal hunt). Combined with the three negative articles written by journalists outside of the Vancouver paper, 23% of articles denigrated Greenpeace. This is in contrast to the 13% average of articles denigrating Greenpeace in Phase One noted in the previous chapter.

Besides The Vancouver Sun's perception of Greenpeace as a newsworthy and interesting group, the second factor which made the sealing campaign a very appealing story was the danger and confrontation which it evoked. Bob Hunter notes that although the media initially thought of the dye spraying tactic as a joke, the story suddenly became important when Newfoundlanders threatened to confront Greenpeace members if they carried out their plans.²⁸⁷ Such

²⁸⁶See Halleran, "Saving the seals is silly: 'Mother Nature has no favorite animals'", The Vancouver Sun, March 24, 1977, p.6.

²⁸⁷Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1979), pp.250-251.

threats included the possibility of shooting²⁸⁸ and clubbing Greenpeace activists.²⁸⁹ The news angle of conflict between Greenpeace and sealers was reinforced further when environmentalists drove into St. Anthony. Greenpeacers were met by a crowd of angry citizens who tried to tip over their van and threatened to lynch them with a noose tied to the back of a pick-up truck.²⁹⁰

The seal campaign was also considered dangerous because of the weather conditions Greenpeace activists would face. Watson announced to the media that the seal campaign would be much more dangerous than the whaling expeditions because ice tended to break up and protesters could be swept out to sea on ice floes.²⁹¹ The danger to Greenpeace was further enhanced by their plan to set up a base camp on Belle Isle to prevent their helicopters from being grounded by the

²⁸⁸See "Greenpeace force faces shooting", The Vancouver Sun, February 2, 1976, p.6.

²⁸⁹See "Chrisopher Dafoe", The Vancouver Sun, March 5, 1976, p. 29 and "Seal ice 'hazardous'", The Vancouver Sun, March 5, 1976, p.10.

²⁹⁰Interview with David Garrick, November 14, 1991. For a further discussion of the tense moments faced when arriving at St. Anthony see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.247-256 and Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1982), pp.85-88.

²⁹¹See "Anti-sealing project set", The Vancouver Sun, October 20, 1975, p. 31 and "Prosecution threat fails to deter Greenpeace", The Vancouver Sun, March 3, 1976, p.39.

authorities.²⁹² Although the base camp was helpful strategically, it was also completely isolated and vulnerable to severe storms. This isolation and vulnerability greatly endangered activists in 1976 when food and fuel were late and in 1977 when their tents were not packed with the other supplies.²⁹³

The extent to which the media found the danger and conflict surrounding the seal campaign newsworthy is shown by the coverage in The Vancouver Sun. 29 out of 79 articles mentioned either threats of physical violence towards Greenpeace or the possibility of the group being endangered by weather conditions. 37 out of 79 articles stressed confrontations between Greenpeace and those who favoured the hunt (sealers, politicians, labour leaders, or concerned citizens).

The media's concern with danger and confrontation is also evident in the kinds of tactics which were covered in The Vancouver Sun. 69 out of 79 articles (87%) covered those tactics which physically tried to stop seals from

²⁹²It was thought that Belle Isle would prevent the grounding because the area was only approachable by helicopter and therefore Greenpeacers occupying the base camp would need the use of the machines to supply them with food and supplies. For a further discussion see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.269-70.

²⁹³For a further discussion of these incidents see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.282-3 and pp.372-3.

being clubbed or involved confrontations with people who were responsible for the hunt.²⁹⁴ The media's tendency to cover situations which involved conflict or the possibility of violence can also be seen in the lack of attention to Greenpeace's tertiary actions. Tertiary actions consisted of only 10 out of the 79 articles.²⁹⁵

The last factor which made the seal hunt interesting to the media was the tactic of bringing women sex symbols or celebrities to protest the hunt. Attractive women protesting the hunt fascinated the media both because female sexuality is a prominent news value²⁹⁶ and the presence of women at the hunt was novel. Although Brian Davies brought

²⁹⁴Of the 69, 65 were primary actions and 4 were secondary. The primary actions consisted of Greenpeace's planned actions to dye seals, to protect pups with their bodies, to stand in front of sealing ships and Watson's attempt to stop pelts from being taken aboard a ship by handcuffing himself to a cable. The 4 articles about secondary actions consisted of demonstrations or confrontations with politicians.

²⁹⁵Of the ten articles about tertiary actions, 5 concerned Greenpeace's attempts to lobby the Government, 2 referred to Greenpeace's criticism of those who were in favour of the hunt, 2 were about public meetings and 1 concerned Greenpeace's research.

²⁹⁶For a discussion of the newsworthiness of sexuality see Butcher et al., "Images of women in the media", in Cohen and Young (eds), The Manufacture of News (New York: Sage Publications Inc., 1981), pp.317-325.

stewardesses out onto the ice to witness the hunt in 1976²⁹⁷ and actress Yvette Mimieux in 1977, Brigitte Bardot was the most newsworthy female appearance.

Although Franz Weber was the person most responsible for recruiting Bardot, Greenpeace became involved by giving Brigitte a helicopter ride out to their base camp. The decision to get involved with the celebrity was largely made by Patrick Moore (then Vice-President of Greenpeace) because he felt she would be able to attract a large amount of media attention towards the hunt. Besides, it was well understood that the media was going to concentrate on Bardot no matter what Greenpeace did and Moore felt that the publicity acquired by being associated with the actress was better than none at all.²⁹⁸ According to Bob Hunter,

if the objective was to focus attention in the mass media on sealing, there could scarcely have been a better way - at the level at any rate of sheer volume of coverage - than to bring the world's most famous 'sex kitten' into action on the side of the milky-furred pups. Whatever clout or fame Greenpeace might have earned in the previous years, it was a drop in the bucket compared with the publicity tidal wave that was automatically displaced by her mere presence. Until her arrival, the seal-hunt 'story' was all blood and death, but now it was blood and death and sex. No more potent combination could be put

²⁹⁷Davies brought the stewardesses to provide the message that it was fashionable for attractive women to reject the idea of killing animals for their fur. For a further discussion see Davies, Red Ice (Great Britain: Methuen London, 1989), pp.148-9.

²⁹⁸Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.380-1.

together".299

Coverage in The Vancouver Sun shows that Bardot's appearance in Newfoundland was found to be newsworthy in the 1977 campaign considering that she did not arrive until halfway through the hunt. Out of the 37 articles concerning the 1977 campaign, 9 articles (24%) mentioned Bardot. Of the nine articles, five focused almost completely on the actress while four mentioned her only briefly.

It seems apparent, therefore, that The Vancouver Sun's interest in Greenpeace itself, the danger and conflict surrounding Greenpeace's actions, and the involvement of celebrities such as Brigitte Bardot all played a part in making the seal campaign a "success" in acquiring publicity. But although these factors made the campaign a newsworthy story, it seems that the quantity of coverage often sacrificed quality. In fact, the media's preoccupation with the tactics of Greenpeace instead of its reasons for opposing the hunt created problems for the organization far into the future. The two main problems with the quality of coverage in The Vancouver Sun were that 1) it misrepresented Greenpeace's critique of sealing and 2) there was a tendency to portray the organization as being completely opposed to the hunt. These two problems will be discussed below.

299Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.381.

CONFUSION ABOUT GREENPEACE'S CRITIQUE OF SEALING

One of the main problems with the coverage of the seal hunt campaign was that Greenpeace's critique of sealing was simplified and distorted. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Greenpeace's criticism of the hunt was based on the assumption that it was harmful not only to the seal population but to the whole ecology of the oceans. Because of its ocean ecology foundation, the seal campaign was very much related to other issues such as whaling which Greenpeace was opposing. As Bob Hunter explains,

On this point - the integrity of the ecology of the seas - the whale issue and the seal issue became one. Both were marine mammals near the top of the food chain who were being eliminated, thereby punching a gaping hole in the chain of life. The oceans themselves had greater need of the whales and seals than the men who hunted them. It was not just that whales and seals ate fish: ultimately, it was the fish who ate the remains of the whales and seals, and without that nourishment the fish themselves could not survive".³⁰⁰

But because the coverage of the sealing campaign was largely a discussion of the tactics of Greenpeace - the plans of dyeing seals green, the imminent confrontation with sealers, Bardot's presence in Newfoundland, Watson handcuffing himself to a cable - the radical nature of the organization's message became lost in the details of these

³⁰⁰Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.250.

events. Instead of recognizing Greenpeace's stance that a dramatic change in the way people interacted with the world was needed to sustain the ecology of the oceans, journalists such as Mike Halleran would remark: "if the Greenpeace seal campaign served to broaden the public's awareness of declining environmental values it might, as a tactical process, be forgivable. But there are no signs of that. There is no indication of intent to alter the consumer lifestyle, or to give up something to preserve a wilderness or a wildlife population".³⁰¹

The submerging of Greenpeace's radical message by the media can be illustrated by the coverage of the 1976 and 1977 campaign in The Vancouver Sun. In looking at the coverage of the seal hunt campaign in 1976 and 1977 only 26 out of 79 articles (33%) stated Greenpeace's reason for opposing the hunt. Of the 26, extinction was the main reason cited (21 articles)³⁰², cruelty and the beautiful appearance of seals accounted for two articles each, and one article stated that Greenpeace was opposed to the hunt because seals were killed for fun and profit. No articles

³⁰¹Halleran, "Saving the seals is silly", The Vancouver Sun, March 24, 1977, p.6.

³⁰²Of the 21 articles, 4 cited other reasons besides extinction but these were only pointed out at the end of the articles. These secondary reasons included the waste of meat, the small economic gain of the hunt to Newfoundland and cruelty.

stated that Greenpeace was opposing the hunt because it was symptomatic of an approach which threatened the ecology of the oceans.

The inability of the media to convey that the sealing issue was connected to other ocean ecology issues was also caused by what has been described earlier as fragmentation. Fragmentation was a tremendous problem in the coverage of the seal hunt both because of the severe time and resources constraints on journalists³⁰³ and the confusing nature of the events taking place in Newfoundland.³⁰⁴ Many protest and counter-protest groups and officials were in Newfoundland and all were clamoring for media attention. There were also large numbers of journalists all competing with one another for sources and footage. The focus on trying to unravel the different events unfolding in

³⁰³The atmosphere in St. Anthony and Blanc Sablon in 1976 and 1977 can only be described as chaotic. This was especially true in 1977 when Franz Weber flew many journalists from all over the world to witness the hunt. When the journalists arrived they found that there was not enough transportation for all of them to witness the hunt. This lack of transportation sparked intense competition among journalists to obtain "scoops". Bob Hunter relates that one German film crew was so desperate for footage that they borrowed a stuffed toy seal and hired a local man to pretend he was about to kill it. For a further discussion of this chaotic atmosphere see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, (New York: Holt, Winston, and Rinehart, 1979), pp.273-274 and pp.370-372.

³⁰⁴For a discussion of this confusion see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.371 and Coish, "The Battle over the Harp Seal", Atlantic Advocate, April 1978, p.13.

Newfoundland as well as the large number of journalists competing with one another left reporters little time or incentive to think about how the sealing issue was related to a wider environmental context.

The extent to which journalists' were absorbed with the chaotic events happening in Newfoundland is illustrated by the coverage in The Vancouver Sun. The event-centred nature of coverage is shown by the fact that only 16 out of 79 articles mentioned other issues that Greenpeace was involved in. Of these 16 articles 11 mentioned whaling and 4 noted overfishing while only 1 pointed to both whaling and overfishing. The mentioning of other issues besides sealing, however, was not used to help readers understand the exploitative processes connecting environmental destruction. Other issues were mentioned to compare the tactics of the seal campaign with Greenpeace's efforts against whaling and nuclear testing.

The lack of discussion of Greenpeace's reasoning behind its opposition to the hunt and the fragmentation of sealing from other environmental issues resulted in Greenpeace's campaign being associated with the historical criticism surrounding the hunt.³⁰⁵ This criticism was based on the belief that the hunt was inhumane and not that sealing posed

³⁰⁵For a more detailed examination of the history of anti-sealing protest see Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission, Volume 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), pp. 66-101.

a threat to the ecology of the oceans. Ironically, the large public outcry against sealing occurred during the 1960's after a film produced by Artek Industries to promote the industry was aired.³⁰⁶ This film showed hunters skinning seals alive which horrified audiences and led the journalist Peter Lust to write an article entitled "Murder Island" condemning the hunt.³⁰⁷ The Artek film also sparked the involvement of Brian Davies who created the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) in 1969 to fight the hunt³⁰⁸ on the grounds that it was inhumane.³⁰⁹

The framing of the sealing protest in terms of its inhumanity, however, was problematic because it led critics to question why the seals had been selected as a target. Politicians such as Federal Fisheries Minister Romeo LeBlanc,³¹⁰ Newfoundland Fisheries Minister Walter

³⁰⁶Lust, The Last Seal Pup (Montreal: Harvest House, 1967), pp. 42-51.

³⁰⁷See Lust, The Last Seal Pup (Montreal: Harvest House Ltd., 1967).

³⁰⁸For a discussion of Brian Davies' efforts to end the seal hunt see Davies, Red Ice (London: Methuen London Ltd., 1989).

³⁰⁹For a discussion of Davies' opposition to the hunt see Brian Davies, Red Ice (Great Britain: Methuen London Ltd., 1986), chapter 7.

³¹⁰See "Prosecution threat fails to deter Greenpeace", The Vancouver Sun, March 3, 1976, p.39.

Carter³¹¹ and Opposition Leader Joe Clark³¹² used the claim of anti-sealing groups that the hunt was inhumane to discredit protesters. After all, critics pointed out, many other animals are killed by methods which can be considered much more inhumane than the clubbing of seals. The humane/inhumane debate was harmful for Greenpeace to become associated with because it subsequently led to accusations that protesters of the hunt were guilty of "bambifying nature"³¹³ - i.e. they were only interested in the seals because they were attractive.³¹⁴ The debate also reinforced criticism that Greenpeace activists were people from urban centres who were taking out their bourgeois guilt on Newfoundlanders trying to earn their livelihood.³¹⁵

Besides being associated with the existing debate about whether the hunt was inhumane, Greenpeace found it difficult

³¹¹See "Protester stays in room as sealers take 3,000", The Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1977, p.22.

³¹²See "Greenpeace challenges Clark", The Vancouver Sun, January 27, 1977, p.22.

³¹³See Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), pp.42-43.

³¹⁴For criticism of the opposition to the hunt based on its inhumanity see Rex Murphy, "Greenpeacers 'noxious twits'", The Vancouver Sun, November 25, 1975, p. 6; "Baby Humans come before baby seals", The Vancouver Sun, April 5, 1976, p. 5; Mike Halleran, "Saving the seals is silly; 'mother nature has no favorite animals'", The Vancouver Sun, March 24, 1977, p.6; and "Seal Hunt: Lambs are cuddly too", Canada & The World, February 1978, pp.4-6.

³¹⁵See "Baby humans come before baby seals", The Vancouver Sun, April 5, 1976, p. 5.

to counteract the charge that its interest in seals was due to their appearance for three other reasons. First, Greenpeace was unable to coordinate its activists to pursue one line of criticism of the hunt. Second, Greenpeace used fundraising material which emphasized the appearance of seals because it was effective. Finally, the tactics which the organization used to stop the hunt emphasized individual seals rather than its opposition to the destruction of ocean ecology.

During the early phase there was little coordination of socialization and recruitment in the organization. Since the resources at Greenpeace's disposal at this time were small, it would recruit people just because they were willing to give up their time and energy and not because of any special skills or expertise they could add to the organization. This meant that Greenpeace often took on activists who were only interested in ending the "killing of baby seals" because the intensity of their feelings towards this single issue made them eager to spend the time and energy on the campaign.³¹⁶ Their emotional involvement in the seal campaign, however, made it difficult for them to place the campaign within Greenpeace's wider environmental framework because they were so focused on the issue of

³¹⁶See Bob Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.249.

sealing.³¹⁷ Furthermore, since Greenpeace was unable to spend much time teaching its activists about Greenpeace principles or training them on what to say to the media, people within the organization often relayed to the media their own personal views towards the hunt rather than the official line of Greenpeace.³¹⁸

Confusion over the stand to take on the seal hunt within the organization was exacerbated even more by the way Greenpeace used the hunt to raise funds. Greenpeace wanted the credibility a scientific approach against sealing would offer but it also felt the need to raise public consciousness and resources through emotional appeals. Bob Hunter explains this tension:

It was an issue that brought out the worst forms of anthropomorphism and yet at the same time the highest forms of compassion. We knew we would have to walk a tightrope between a balanced 'scientific' analysis that the hunt itself was simply bad for the ecology of the ocean - since it removed the seal entirely from the nutrient cycle upon which all life in the sea ultimately depended

³¹⁷For example, Bob Hunter notes that activists Bonnie MacLeod and Henrietta Neilson became angry with him because he planned to give Claude Francolon, a photographer from France, a helicopter ride to the ice even though he was wearing sealskin boots and a fur lined parka. Bonnie argued with Hunter, "'But he's a murderer'". Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.274-275.

³¹⁸This can be seen in the comments made by Paul Watson and Al Johnson. Watson said to the media "Greenpeace abhors the clubbing to death of baby seals" ("Greenpeace challenges Clark", The Vancouver Sun, January 27, 1977, p.22), and Al Johnson commented that the hunt was cruel and brutal ("Seal protester's helicopter seized", The Vancouver Sun, March 6, 1976, p. 2).

for food - and the depths of emotion that the killing of 'babies' generated in the breasts of millions of urban people, who, otherwise, with their cars and swimming pools and electric gadgets, were the worst environmental destroyers of all.³¹⁹

But since Greenpeace lacked the resources for research, emotional appeals became prominent in Greenpeace's mail outs.³²⁰ As the Royal Commission on Sealing points out,

anti-sealing material emphasizes the analogies between seals and humans, through use of words that are generally used of humans such as a 'baby seal', 'murder', 'innocent', or by attributing human properties to seals, for instance in ascribing tears to sadness. Tears are a normal biological function that keep the eyes of harp seals moist, and they are not related to grief. Some groups have so often charged that seals are skinned alive, or that mother seals weep over the bodies of their babies that many readers unquestioningly accept these charges as facts.³²¹

The use of emotion and visual imagery to raise funds made Greenpeace vulnerable to criticism that it was using the seal campaign to make money at the expense of impoverished Newfoundlanders. In The Vancouver Sun 5 articles out of 79,

³¹⁹Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1979), p.249.

³²⁰One example of such a mailing was Greenpeace's "Adopt-A-Seal Program". The mailing reinforces the campaign's anthropomorphic tendencies by encouraging supporters to donate money so they can save the life of a seal. The material is very similar to that sent out by famine relief organizations which encourage supporters to adopt children in the third world to save or enhance their lives. Greenpeace even offered to send supporters a picture of the pup they had "adopted".Royal Commission on Seals and Sealing, volume 2, p.75.

³²¹Royal Commission on Seals and Sealing, Volume 2, p.71.

refer to Greenpeace's use of the seal campaign to make money. These accusations were made by Tom Hughes, head of the Ontario Humane Society,³²² Richard Cashin, head of the the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers Union (NFFAWU),³²³ a sealer by the name of William Dobbins,³²⁴ and by Paul Montreuil, a Federal Fisheries Official.³²⁵ The fact that Greenpeace was made up almost exclusively of volunteers and was always in debt often was not noticed.³²⁶ The perception that Greenpeace was involved in the seal campaign for fundraising purposes was further reinforced by

³²²See "Greenpeace rapped for 'exploiting' in seal campaign", The Vancouver Sun, April 24, 1976, p. 41 and "Greenpeace members naive, humane society chief says", The Vancouver Sun, April 26, 1976 p. 17.

³²³"Greenpeace chief blasts sealers' head Cashin", The Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1977, p. 16.

³²⁴Moira Farrow, "Money and meat not murder sealers say" The Vancouver Sun, March 17, 1977, p. 1 and 10.

³²⁵Moira Farrow, "Seal hunt protesters, reporters, leave villagers happy", The Vancouver Sun, March 21, 1977, p. 7.

³²⁶Bob Hunter notes in The Vancouver Sun article on April 24, 1976, p.41, "Greenpeace rapped for 'exploiting' in seal campaign" that he makes only \$250 per month and that Greenpeace is having to struggle for every penny they spend. The Vancouver Sun article on March 22, 1977, p.12 "Greenpeace ends protest after money runs out" notes that at the end of the 1977 campaign Greenpeace had only three paid staff - an office manager making \$1000/month, a bookkeeper being paid \$800/month and the President Bob Hunter taking \$600/month. David Garrik (Interview, November 14, 1991) notes that Greenpeace was plagued by large debts during this period and often volunteers had to survive by doing odd jobs or collecting welfare.

its association with Brian Davies³²⁷ and its feuds with Paul Watson.³²⁸

Besides Greenpeace's lack of control over activists and its tendency to use emotional appeals to raise funds, the organization was perceived to be concerned with the barbaric or inhumane nature of the hunt because the tactics it used concentrated attention on individual seals rather than the relationship of seals to wider ecological principles. Since Greenpeace members were shielding pups with their bodies and marking infant seals, it was assumed that the organization was trying to protect individual seals instead of being concerned about the whole seal population. Shielding pups also had the effect of diverting activist attention away from Greenpeace's larger purpose. Since they were protecting individual pups, activists began to see saving

³²⁷Davies relatively high salary also proved problematic for Greenpeace since all protest groups were branded as exploiting sealing in order to make money for themselves. Davies admitted to making \$35,000 a year compared to the \$10,000 average of most sealers. For a critique of Davies' financial standing see Worth, "Fighting the seal hunt is BIG business", The Financial Post, March 26, 1977, pp. 1 and 4. For criticism of Greenpeace's fundraising for the seal campaign see Coish, Season of the Seal (St. John's: Breakwater, 1979), p.125.

³²⁸After he had been fired from Greenpeace, Watson claimed that Greenpeace was only involved in the seal hunt because it made more money than any of the foundation's other activities and accused Patrick Moore of saying that he didn't care if all the seals were killed only if Greenpeace's name was spelled right. For a further discussion see Candow, Of Men and Seals (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989), pp.129-30.

those particular pups as their purpose on the ice.³²⁹ Bob Hunter notes on his second trip to the ice that "the pup before me was obviously utterly useless in terms of taking care of itself. It could neither swim nor run, nor even waddle. All it could do was wiggle at roughly the speed of a turtle, like an animated pillowcase. Yet it faced me and perhaps as its one and only defense, it cried to me for help..."³³⁰

Another tactic that reinforced the criticism that Greenpeace was only interested in seals because of their appearance was its decision to bring Brigitte Bardot to the ice to publicize the seal hunt.³³¹ Bardot's arrival at the hunt on a Lear jet surrounded by her entourage added fuel to the criticism that the campaign consisted of rich environmentalists imposing their morals on impoverished sealers. Bardot was also not very well informed as an environmentalist. Moira Farrow noted at the time that "if she really wants to protest the seal hunt she must know what she's talking about. This year all that Bardot wanted to do

³²⁹Paul Watson carried a pup out of the way of an oncoming sealing ship and did not want to leave the seal because he felt that he and the seal had got to know one another and were friends. See Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, p.281.

³³⁰Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, p.288.

³³¹For a discussion of the problems Bardot posed for Greenpeace see Christopher Dafoe, The Vancouver Sun, March 23, 1977, p.43.

was cuddle a cute little baby seal well out of range of the hunt itself".³³²

The decision to involve Bardot had in fact caused considerable dissent within the organization. Bob Hunter notes that the decision was especially unpopular among the women in the group because they did not think their gender's position within the organization would be enhanced by welcoming the world's most famous "sex-kitten" into their ranks. As Hunter explains,

the decision to exploit Brigitte's presence by putting the two helicopters at her disposal was not reached without there being a blood bath of another order. On Belle Isle, there was outrage - especially from the young women involved. The Greenpeaceers were all very much caught up in their own drama, suffering already from a degree of tent fever, and quite thoroughly isolated from the rest of the world. Media coordinator Cummings argued that we would 'look bad by associating Greenpeace with Bardot'. Watson and the rest of the steering committee did not much feel like being upstaged by the forty-four-year-old actress...".³³³

In fact, Moore only got his way through overruling the steering committee and alienating almost all the people involved in the campaign.³³⁴

³³²Moira Farrow, "On the floes with Bardot", The Vancouver Sun, March 31, 1977, p. 6.

³³³Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.381.

³³⁴For a further discussion of Greenpeace's problems over the decision to become involved with Bardot see Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982), pp.139-140; Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp.379-82; and Farrow, "On the floes with Bardot", The Vancouver Sun, March 31, 1977, p.6.

The problems which Greenpeace faced when trying to place the seal issue within a wider perception of ocean ecology also created difficulties on another front. It was mentioned earlier that Greenpeace initially wanted to oppose only the commercial hunt for strategic reasons and because they were sympathetic to subsistence hunters. But because the campaign was not very well coordinated, coverage tended to brand Greenpeace as being blanket anti-sealing and subsequently it was very difficult to form alliances in Newfoundland. The reasons behind why Greenpeace was perceived as being completely anti-sealing and the effects this perception had on the organization's image will be discussed in the following section.

THE CONFUSION OVER GREENPEACE'S GOALS IN THE MEDIA

The second problem in the media coverage of the seal campaign which affected Greenpeace's image was that The Vancouver Sun did not accurately convey the goals of the organization. Although it was mentioned earlier that Greenpeace originally wanted to oppose only the commercial hunt, the media first publicized the group as wanting a complete ban. The perception of Greenpeace as opposing all sealing made Newfoundlanders hostile to Greenpeace at the time and also harmed the reputation of the organization for years to come. The reasons behind why the media perceived

the organization to oppose the entire hunt and the effects this perception had on the organization will be discussed in this section.

The labelling of Greenpeace as being blanket anti-sealing was extensive in The Vancouver Sun's coverage of the organization's activities. Of the 79 articles examined, only 9 articles (11%) noted that Greenpeace's opposition to sealing remained largely with the commercial sealing fleet and not with Inuit sealers or Newfoundland landmen. Of these 9 articles, however, only two occurred before Greenpeace was met by hostile Newfoundlanders in St. Anthony. The lack of initial articles stating Greenpeace's sympathy towards Landmen and Inuit was significant because it had the effect of tarnishing the organization's image both to its supporters and opponents. Supporters thought Greenpeace's decision to give up the green dye meant that the organization had "sold out" to pressure from Newfoundlanders. Proponents of the hunt, on the other hand, felt that "the sudden swing to the side of the landmen seemed like a desperate attempt by Greenpeace to counter the unexpected hostility of the Newfoundland sealers"³³⁵ and "the Greenpeace change of heart seemed to be an indication that, as Walter Carter and Premier Moores had said earlier, the group's protest was based on misinformation and

³³⁵Coish, Season of the Seal (St. John's: Breakwater, 1979), p.126

misdirection".³³⁶

The tendency of the media to ignore Greenpeace's initial goal of opposing only the commercial hunt can be explained by three factors: first, the media associated Greenpeace's actions with the historical opposition to the seal hunt which had advocated a complete ban; second, the media's concentration on Greenpeace's tactics and its interest in conflict caused the coverage of the seal hunt to develop a momentum which proved hard for activists to control; third, Greenpeace's inexperience and inability to coordinate its members and activists made certain sectors of the organization hostile to the compromise which was made with Inuit sealers and Landsmen - i.e. many activists within the organization wanted to see all the killing of seals halted. These three factors will be examined in the following paragraphs.

Similar to the confusion surrounding Greenpeace's critique of sealing, the interpretation of the organization as opposing the entire hunt was in part due to historical approach taken by others protesting the hunt. The two main protesters of the hunt in the 1960's, Peter Lust and Brian Davies, felt that the hunt should be completely banned. Peter Lust felt that the hunt should be banned because it

³³⁶Ibid, p.132

was cruel, endangered the species and was immoral.³³⁷

Brian Davies argued that the clubbing of defenseless baby seals in front of the eyes of their mothers was inherently inhumane and therefore the slaughter should be completely ended.³³⁸ Davies points out that he is still trying to end the killing of seals by Landsmen because "all of us in the protest movement represent the desire of the seals not to be killed by man. Period. That means *no* seal hunting at all...".³³⁹

The history of protesters pushing for the hunt to be banned meant that Greenpeace needed to make its intention to oppose only commercial sealing extremely clear to the media. The choice of the green dye tactic, however, disadvantaged Greenpeace's ability to communicate its selective opposition to the hunt. To begin with, the tactic was contradictory to Greenpeace's sympathy to non-commercial sealers because it was indiscriminate and many landsmen feared that the seals

³³⁷For a discussion of Lust's opposition to the hunt see The Last Seal Pup (Montreal: Harvest House, 1967), pp. 13-15. Lust felt that the hunt was immoral because seal pelts were used for luxury products such as fur coats. For a detailed examination of the opposition of the seal hunt on the grounds of morality see Sumner, "The Canadian Harp Seal Hunt: A Moral Issue", Alternatives, Vol. 12, Winter 1985, pp.15-22.

³³⁸For a discussion of Davies struggles to save the seals see Davies, Red Ice (Great Britain: Methuen London, 1989).

³³⁹Davies quoted in Mowat, Save The Earth (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), p.159.

which they caught would be marked.³⁴⁰ Furthermore, David Garrick³⁴¹ notes that Greenpeace's plans to use the green dye led the media to concentrate on the tactic and not on the reasons behind the organization's opposition to the hunt. The media's focus on the green dye tactic started a chain of events which proved very difficult for the organization to control. Since the media initially concentrated on the matter of the dye, the responses of sources in Ottawa and Newfoundland to Greenpeace's plans assumed that stopping the whole hunt was the organization's aim. According to Garrick,

media people ended up obtaining responses from Ottawa at the time, the fishermen's union in Newfoundland, the various sectors of society which thought that they had some involvement in the issues, all began to comment and because the media initially portrayed us as being blanket anti-sealing the kind of responses coming back tended to be very irrational and misinformed basically, but that only fed this momentum which was picking up in the media on its own steam...by the time we got to Newfoundland, we literally had people ready to lynch us.³⁴²

Garrick notes that because the media developed a momentum which was based on a false understanding of the organization's goals, Greenpeace was never able to inject back into the debate its analysis of sealing and what the

³⁴⁰Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.261.

³⁴¹Interview, November 14, 1991.

³⁴²Interview, November 14, 1991.

organization's concerns were really addressed to.

The simplification of Greenpeace's initial opposition to the hunt was also exacerbated by the media's tendency to emphasize conflict instead of consensus. Garrick³⁴³ explains that the media took no notice of his success in striking an agreement with residents in a nearby town to oppose the commercial hunt. He attributes this lack of coverage to both the logistics of the media and its interests in conflict and danger. First of all, it was easier for journalists to cover the conflicts between proponents and opponents of the hunt. Since every journalist was situated in St. Anthony, s(he) would have had to sacrifice time and expense to travel to the outlying communities to report on Greenpeace's successful efforts at community organizing. Second, the threat of violence in St. Anthony made journalists unlikely to leave the village to cover Greenpeace's coalition-building efforts. The angle of conflict was a much more "sexy" story to the media.

The labelling of Greenpeace as being blanket anti-sealing was also reinforced by factors within the organization itself. Since Greenpeace was relatively undeveloped organizationally in 1976 and 1977, the group found it difficult to articulate its opposition to the hunt and to understand the long term implications of campaign

³⁴³Interview, November 14, 1991.

choices.³⁴⁴

Garrick³⁴⁵ notes that at this time in Greenpeace's institutional development the organization found it difficult to formulate and coordinate its opposition to the hunt. He notes that coordination was difficult because there was a large turnover in activists before the seal campaign began. This turnover occurred because some people did not support the campaign and others were either burnt out or too busy with other environmental projects.³⁴⁶ He explains that although this turnover had the benefit of injecting new faces and enthusiasm into the organization, the new recruits also produced cleavages as to how Greenpeace should protest the hunt. According to Garrick, some people in the organization were amateurish and running on adrenalin while others tried to think things through more clearly. People who tried to be strategic, however, didn't have the resources to back up their knowledge properly and had to rely on the media to interpret information rather than being able to directly communicate with people.

The inability to articulate a clear opposition to the hunt was also hindered by the organization's lack of

³⁴⁴These two organizational problems of the seal campaign are noted by Michael Manolson in The Greenpeace Years.

³⁴⁵Interview, November 14, 1991.

³⁴⁶This point is also noted by Jim Bohlen in an interview on October 16, 1991.

structure. Greenpeace's ad hoc nature during the seal campaign meant that it did not have the processes in place to develop unity within the movement and therefore it was difficult to make its statements to the media consistent. This lack of an organizational framework allowed activists like Paul Watson who were completely opposed to the hunt to gain media access.³⁴⁷ The situation became even worse after Watson became expedition leader in 1977 because he was able to seize control of the expedition and rescind Greenpeace's commitment to support sealing by Landsmen and Inuit. In effect, this cancelled Greenpeace's policy of specifically opposing the commercial hunt, making Greenpeace's opposition to the hunt even more confused.³⁴⁸ Coish explains this confusion: "at times the organization gave a semblance of a unified effort. At other times it seemed in total disarray. Sometimes, certain members didn't know what other members were up to. Some members didn't know what the objective of the whole protest was. Others staged their own personal protests, often in direct opposition to the organization's

³⁴⁷For examples of statements of activists totally opposing the hunt see "Ban could cancel anti-sealing plan", The Vancouver Sun, November 4, 1975, p.14; "Brigitte Bardot on the side of seals", The Vancouver Sun, August 28, 1976, p.49; "Greenpeace challenges Clark", The Vancouver Sun, January 27, 1977, p.22; and "Determined band leaves to battle seal hunters", The Vancouver Sun, March 8, 1977, p.2.

³⁴⁸For a further discussion of Watson's role in 1977 see Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982), pp.121-150.

stated purposes".³⁴⁹

Besides Greenpeace's inability exert control over its activists, the organization's uncompromising stance in 1977 was also brought about by its lack of direct communication with supporters. At this phase in Greenpeace's development the organization had few resources and subsequently relied on journalists instead of its own media to communicate with supporters.³⁵⁰ And because journalists were covering Greenpeace's tactics instead of the reasons for its selective opposition to the hunt, the organization was unable to explain to supporters why they did not oppose sealing by Landsmen or Inuit. The inability of the organization to educate its members properly led supporters to perceive that Greenpeace had "sold out" by giving up the dye. Hunter understood that members might react negatively to Greenpeace compromising with Newfoundlanders but felt that such a reaction could be overcome. According to Hunter,

I knew that a lot of our supporters back in the big cities would not be able to fathom the political subtlety of it all, and that we would have a few bad days in the media when it appeared we had 'given up.' But with luck, so long as we could get the choppers out to the ice, we would recover, and, if everything went perfectly, we

³⁴⁹Coish, Season of the Seal (St. John's: Breakwater, 1979), p.157

³⁵⁰Greenpeace produced a periodical The Greenpeace Chronicles at this time but it was sent out sporadically. The organization had nothing like the complex mail-out system Greenpeace has today.

might yet emerge with a formula for bringing the environmentalists together with the grass-roots people in Newfoundland against the government and the handful of fur barons who had so successfully exploited both seals and sealers for centuries.³⁵¹

After the meeting, however, many members were not understanding. Hunter explains that "back home, there was shock, dismay, confusion. By the next day the switchboard in our Vancouver office was lighting up with people demanding their donations back. In Toronto, a newly formed Greenpeace group crushed all their Greenpeace buttons under their heels and mailed them in a brown bag to me personally in St. Anthony".³⁵² Alan Thornton, founder of Greenpeace U.K. who was a volunteer in Vancouver manning angry phone calls at the time maintained that Greenpeace should never have made the compromise. According to Thornton, "it was a bad strategy. They surrendered their power with the dye".³⁵³

Besides Greenpeace's inability to control activists and to socialize members, Michael Manolson explains that

³⁵¹Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 263.

³⁵²Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p.265. For a further examination of the controversy surrounding giving up the green dye see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, Inc, 1989), p.46.

³⁵³Cited in Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.29.

Greenpeace's lack of institutional development during the seal campaign also made it very difficult for the organization to understand the implications its actions would have in the long term. According to Manolson, "there wasn't a sense of the organization back then [during the seal campaign] as there is today...we were totally in the moment. We didn't have a feeling that the organization would even be around a year later".³⁵⁴ This lack of strategy during the seal campaign led to Watson's rise to power in 1977 and his subsequent decision to end the alliances with Newfoundlanders. At the time, activists were frustrated both by the reaction of members to their compromise in 1976³⁵⁵ and to the Federal Government's refusal to lower quotas after the first seal campaign.³⁵⁶ These two "failures" of the 1976 campaign were seen as reasons to become more uncompromising in 1977.

Greenpeace's about face in 1977, however, made Newfoundlanders mistrust the organization further, which has harmed Greenpeace in making alliances even up to this

354Cited in The Greenpeace Years.

355See Watson, "We did our best", Victoria Times, April 28, 1976, p.5 and Gwyn, "The media go to the seal hunt", Saturday Night, May 1977, p.28

356See "Brigitte Bardot on side of the seals", The Vancouver Sun, August 28, 1976, p.49 and "Seal hunt quota 'risks serious damage'", The Vancouver Sun, December 16, 1976, p.10

day.³⁵⁷ The seal campaign especially affected Greenpeace's ability to gain support from Natives.³⁵⁸ The uncompromising strategy also reinforced the perception that the group was white and middle class and therefore unsympathetic to impoverished people who are often the most affected by pollution.³⁵⁹

The organization's ability to make alliances was further hampered by the insensitive attitudes of some Greenpeacers towards minorities. Greenpeace at this stage of its development was unable to recognize the importance of making alliances with Native groups and therefore some activists tended to be openly unsympathetic to their position within society. For example, Moore made the comment

the politicians of the North in their polyester suits perpetuate the myth of traditional culture. They are taking advantage of the noble savage syndrome. The tragedy is that the average Indian people think they are living a traditional

³⁵⁷The Greenpeace Years notes that Greenpeace was unwelcome in the Maritimes until very recently. The Royal Commission on Sealing also notes that people in Newfoundland have continued to be suspicious of any environmental organizations because of the seal hunt campaign. For a further discussion see, Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission Vol 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1986), p.85

³⁵⁸Interview with Michael M'Gonigle, July 28, 1991. See also Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, March/April 1991.

³⁵⁹The Greenpeace Years notes that the organization had difficulty getting support from blacks in the United States because it was felt to be ignorant of issues facing people of colour.

lifestyle. At public meetings they tell you that their people are eating seal meat in their homes that night. But if you go to the Hudson Bay supermarket they've got their shopping carts filled with instant pizza mix. Sure, natives should have a place in the wilderness, but should they be allowed to bring their rifles and snowmobiles with them".³⁶⁰

Paul Watson also contended that Greenpeace was insulting towards Newfoundlanders. According to Watson, "the extent of their knowledge about Newfoundland is that they have been briefed that 'Newfies' speak funny English. In fact Newfie jokes are the rage in the Greenpeace offices down the Pacific Coast".³⁶¹ Watson, however, was known himself to throw insults at Newfoundlanders. Hunter notes that when Peter Ballem (the lawyer for Greenpeace) asked a sealer whether he was from Norway or Newfoundland, Watson replied, "well, can't you tell he's a Newfie; only a newfie would wear a sticker on his sunglasses".³⁶²

Greenpeace also did not see the need to make alliances at this point in time because its power to affect change was relatively small. The ad hoc nature of the organization as well as its lack of substantial political clout during 1976 and 1977 made it unnecessary for the organization to

³⁶⁰Cited in Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p.43.

³⁶¹Quoted from Candow, Of Men and Seals (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1989), p.129.

³⁶²Cited in Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p.374.

formulate practical alternatives to the sealing industry.³⁶³

Greenpeace, therefore, tended to just dismiss the hunt as being economically insignificant to Newfoundland. For example, in The Vancouver Sun, Paul Watson notes that "the seal hunt is just like trapping to them - it's just a little extra money on the side because the hunting license only costs a dollar. These Newfoundlanders like to picture themselves as starving but their pubs are open seven days a week and they are always full".³⁶⁴

Greenpeace's increasing strategic nature in the 1980's, however, prevented a similar cleavage between subsistence hunters and environmentalists from happening again by cancelling its anti-trapping campaign in 1985. Although the campaign against trapping was initiated by Greenpeace U.K., Greenpeace Canada pressured the International Board of Directors to stop the campaign because it would reinforce the criticism that Greenpeace was insensitive to aboriginal

³⁶³Paul Watson recommended that the hunt be ended and that tourism should replace the industry. He recommended taking tourists out to the front ice to see the pups. This plan, however, was impractical because the weather conditions out on the ice would make it almost impossible to transport people safely. Watson also supported Franz Weber's proposition to build a synthetic fur factory in Newfoundland. For a further discussion of Watson's views see "Toy business offered Newfoundlanders", The Vancouver Sun, February 1, 1977, p.16.

³⁶⁴Moira Farrow, "170,000 seal quota somewhat dangerous", The Vancouver Sun, December 17, 1976, p.23. See also "Ban could cancel anti-sealing plan", The Vancouver Sun, November 4, 1975, p.14.

peoples.³⁶⁵ The ban on seal products by the European Community had destroyed many Inuit communities in the North and Greenpeace was determined not to let these areas be hurt further for both humanitarian and strategic reasons.

CONCLUSION

The 1976 and 1977 Greenpeace seal hunt campaign is notable for its visibility. Journalists from many different countries came to cover the hunt and the campaign subsequently gained international as well as national noteriety. This large amount of visibility can be explained by the media's perception of Greenpeace as an interesting organization and the danger, conflict and sex symbols involved in the campaign.

Although the seal campaign received a large amount of media attention, this coverage was also problematic for Greenpeace. Greenpeace's reliance on the media as a messenger caused two misperceptions about the campaign which have continued to plague the organization until very recently. Because the media concentrated on the tactics of

³⁶⁵Although the fur trapping campaign was stopped, it was not ended without a struggle. In fact, Greenpeace U.K. refused to withdraw the campaign leading David McTaggart to fire most of the staff and replace its director Bryn Jones. Staff members were told that they could reapply for their jobs but under a new leader, Lord Melchett. For a further discussion see Pearce, Green Warriors (Great Britain: Methuen London, 1991), pp.44-47.

the organization instead of the reasons surrounding its opposition to the hunt, it was not conveyed that Greenpeace was concerned about the ecology of the oceans and that it only opposed the commercial part of the hunt. These distortions of Greenpeace's motives and goals left the impression that Greenpeace was only interested in "trendy" environmental issues and was insensitive to minorities and the poor.

Greenpeace's lack of experience and resources also contributed heavily to the problematic coverage it received. The ad hoc nature of the organization made it impossible to back up its direct actions with research, lobbying and community organizing and therefore Greenpeace was unable to articulate its opposition to the hunt properly and to understand the importance of making alliances.

With its increasing institutional development, however, Greenpeace has become much more strategic in its attempts to achieve radical goals and to improve the quality and quantity of coverage it receives. Much more time is now spent prepping the media and educating communities about the reasons behind direct actions. Such a strategy makes it less likely that the media will misunderstand its motives and communities will be hostile towards its actions. In order to understand the effect of this strategy on the ability of Greenpeace to put out radical messages in the mass media, Chapter Four will examine the 1987-89 pulp campaign.

CHAPTER FOUR - THE FRAMING OF GREENPEACE DURING THE PULP AND PAPER CAMPAIGN OF 1987-1989

In order to understand more clearly the extent to which Greenpeace's institutional development has improved the organization's ability to put out radical messages in the mass media, the coverage of the pulp and paper campaign from 1987 to 1989 will be analyzed. By late 1986 Greenpeace's resource base had expanded dramatically and it had acquired significant international support. Once based almost entirely in Canada, Greenpeace now had offices in seventeen countries. Membership had also surged after the Rainbow Warrior bombing, and exceeded one and a half million in the beginning of 1987. Such an increase in membership meant a large budget for the organization - eleven million dollars for 1986 alone.³⁶⁶

The increased resources and international growth of Greenpeace enabled the organization to become much more strategic in its later campaigns. Such an increase in strategy raised the credibility of the organization because it began to be seen as an expert source by the media. Greenpeace's research efforts meant it was no longer perceived as an organization solely involved in performing

³⁶⁶For a discussion of Greenpeace's membership, budget and international scope during 1986 see Dykstra, "Institutions: Greenpeace", Environment Vol.28 No.6 July/August 1986 pp.5,44-5 and Knippers Black, "Greenpeace: The Ecological Warriors", USA Today November 1986, pp.26-9.

stunts. The time and resources Greenpeace put into coordinating its activities, building coalitions, and lobbying politicians also had the effect of widening its support throughout the community. This support made it possible for the organization to articulate its opposition to environmental degradation more clearly in the media.

The institutionalized nature of Greenpeace, however, has also created problems for the organization's interaction with the media. Spending more time coordinating its activities and less on direct actions has made the organization less visible. This decreased visibility has led to difficulties in exerting control over the framing of issues in the media. A large supporter base also might make it harder for the organization to put out radical messages for fear of alienating some of its membership.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, the clout of Greenpeace places added pressure on the organization to provide "realistic" alternatives to polluting processes - alternatives which would have to make sense economically as well as environmentally. Greenpeace's decrease in visibility, its reluctance to alienate supporters, and the need to provide economically viable alternatives, therefore, has made the task of opposing the existing system very difficult for the organization.

In looking at the relationship between the

³⁶⁷This problem would be dependent on the level of environmental awareness in society at the time.

institutional development of Greenpeace and its ability to put out radical environmental messages in the mass media, the pulp and paper campaign has been chosen because of the sophistication³⁶⁸ and historical importance³⁶⁹ of "Toxics" issues to the organization.³⁷⁰ The sophistication of the organization's opposition to pulp and paper provides an interesting contrast to the relatively unorganized nature of the seal campaign. The historical importance of toxics issues to Greenpeace also provides insights into how the organization has evolved in one particular campaign area.

Besides the major role which it plays in Greenpeace's toxics campaign, the Pulp and Paper issue has also been

³⁶⁸Michael M'Gonigle maintains that the most sophisticated work of Greenpeace has been done in its toxics campaigns. Interview, July 28, 1991.

³⁶⁹Greenpeace's involvement in toxics issues started as far back as 1978 with its involvement in opposing the spraying of the spruce budworm in Vancouver. For a discussion see Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow, pp.395-7. The modern toxics campaign began with Greenpeace's activities internationally opposing the dumping of toxic wastes at sea in the early 1980's. For a discussion of these international toxics campaigns see Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, pp.68-69, 76-77, 83-85.

³⁷⁰The "Toxics" campaign consists of Greenpeace's opposition to the transportation, dumping, incineration and production of toxic substances. Although Killeen notes that the main focus of the campaign has been chlorine bleaching in the pulp and paper industry and the incineration of hazardous materials he also comments to the media on a wide variety of issues including sewage, ocean dumping, the transportation of hazardous goods, air quality and the effects of a wide variety of toxic pollutants. Personal Interview with Brian Killeen, September 26, 1991. Pulp and Paper is now becoming such a large issue that it is a campaign in itself.

chosen specifically because of its importance to British Columbia. The case study of this campaign, therefore, provides an interesting contrast to the coverage of the seal hunt which involved a Vancouver paper reporting on an industry which was far away and economically insignificant to its readership. Furthermore, unlike the seal campaign which was looked upon as "sensational" and "exploitative", the amount of pollution put out by a pulp and paper industry making record profits ensured that Greenpeace was perceived to be taking on a "serious" and "legitimate" environmental concern. But although these huge profits made it easier to attack the industry, the economic clout of the pulp and paper industry in B.C. made it possible for companies to wield their power and resources to refute the claims of Greenpeace more effectively than was possible by sealers in Newfoundland. The prominence of the industry in B.C. also ensured that The Vancouver Sun was made aware of the economic costs and job losses involved in the funding of pollution controls by its union and corporate sources. Greenpeace, therefore, needed to present its opposition to pulp mill pollution in a very convincing manner to avoid having its claims about the toxicity of mill effluent dismissed as purely "speculative" and its goals denigrated for being perceived as economically unviable.

In order to examine both the effects of Greenpeace's institutional development and the influence of the nature of

effluent and organochlorines (especially dioxin). The report also showed that the Environmental Protection Agency had played a role in shielding the corporations responsible for dioxin pollution from regulation and public scrutiny.³⁷²

The pulp and paper campaign also differed from the initial opposition to sealing in that Greenpeace's new strategies were influenced by its expansion internationally. Because of its international scope Greenpeace knew that labs in Sweden had much more sensitive equipment for testing dioxins than those present in Canada. Therefore, after the release of "No Margin for Safety", Greenpeace collected samples of effluent from MacMillan Bloedel's Harmac mill and sent them for analysis in Sweden. The results of the lab tests enabled Greenpeace to refute the claims of forest companies that dioxins were not being released. Greenpeace's knowledge of the effects of pulp mill pollution in Sweden and the United States also allowed the organization to predict that dioxins would be found in shellfish and seafood near mills. Furthermore, Michael Manolson³⁷³ notes that pulp and paper campaigners in Scandinavia were able to share research about the advanced nature of pollution controls in their country. This research enabled the Canadian wing of Greenpeace to challenge the claims of forest companies that

³⁷²See Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, p.142.

³⁷³Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

pollution free technology was an impossibility.³⁷⁴

Unlike its opposition to the seal hunt, the background work Greenpeace had done previously on pulp and paper allowed the goals put forth by the Canadian organization to remain constant over time. From the very beginning of the campaign Greenpeace called for an end to chlorine bleaching by 1993. Engaging in background work also meant that direct actions were only one tactic used in the organization's opposition to pulp mill pollution. Whereas opposing the seal hunt had meant spending almost all the organization's effort and resources on getting to Newfoundland to confront sealers, direct actions in the pulp and paper campaign were carried out as a tool in a wider campaign strategy. Therefore, although two direct actions occurred in the period from August 1977 to May 1989, they were on a much smaller scale than the organization's protests against sealing both in terms of people involved and the duration of the actions.

Although the goals of the pulp and paper campaign have remained the same over time, Killeen³⁷⁵ notes that the tactics used in opposing pulp mill pollution have constantly

³⁷⁴This advantage of Greenpeace's international nature is also noted by Jeremy Wilson in his article "Green Lobbies" in Boardman (ed) Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics, and Process (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.113.

³⁷⁵Interview, July 26, 1991.

been in process. These tactics have changed over time to keep abreast of the increasing public awareness of pulp mill pollution and to ensure Greenpeace's effectiveness.

Initially, the toxics campaigns centred around alerting the public that pollution was being dispersed into the air and water and concentrated on how to treat or "clean up" this pollution.³⁷⁶ After public awareness about the nature and effects of pollution had risen, the pulp and paper campaign evolved from this "end of the pipe approach" into the more radical stance of "source reduction". Greenpeace's advocacy of source reduction led the environmental group to pressure for a change in processes to prevent pollution from being formed in the first place - i.e. to treat the disease of pollution rather than its symptoms.³⁷⁷

The issue of source reduction in the pulp and paper campaign was raised by Greenpeace in two ways - by putting pressure on the producers of pulp and by educating the consumers of paper. The producer centred approach was the most prominent between 1987 and 1989 when Greenpeace was pressuring politicians and industry to phase out chlorine bleaching. After 1989, however, Peerla³⁷⁸ points out that

³⁷⁶Interview between Jeremy Wilson and Michael Manolson, November 20, 1990.

³⁷⁷See Dykstra, "Institutions: Greenpeace", Environment vol.28 no.6 July/August 1986, p.45.

³⁷⁸Interview, October 18, 1991.

the campaign expanded to include forestry practices to draw attention to the whole cycle of polluting processes involved in the production of paper. Killeen,³⁷⁹ Jamieson³⁸⁰ and Goulet³⁸¹ also note that the campaign shifted from pressuring officials in Canada to an approach trying to push for change through altering the consumption patterns in international markets. Greenpeace, therefore, was trying to educate consumers in Europe to only buy Canadian paper products if they had been made by environmentally friendly processes. This change in approaches had been made because it was felt that the organization was in a deadlock with government and industry. This deadlock began in November 1988 when the industry had decided to convert all mills to chlorine dioxide instead of oxygen bleaching.³⁸² The changeover to chlorine dioxide was seen by Greenpeace as trading in one environmental problem for another since the process would eliminate only dioxins and not all

³⁷⁹Interview, July 26, 1991.

³⁸⁰Interview, July 25, 1991.

³⁸¹Interview, October 30, 1991.

³⁸²See Bohn, "B.C. pulp mills plan to eliminate dioxin", The Vancouver Sun, November 4, 1988, p.B7.

organochlorines.³⁸³ The organization also expressed concern that chlorine dioxide would actually increase the discharge of other pollutants such as chlorophenols and chlorates.³⁸⁴

The decision to turn to pressuring consumers to buy unbleached or oxygen bleached products also was based on Greenpeace's perception that the public was more capable of accepting fundamental change than governments or industry. Similar to the seal hunt campaign, Manolson³⁸⁵ notes that Greenpeace in the late 1980's still believed that social change occurred through changing public consciousness. Governments, on the other hand, were thought to be too constrained by their close ties with industry and subsequently were more interested in incremental regulations

³⁸³Renate Kroesa notes that dioxin accounts for only a small percentage of organochlorines in pulp mill effluent. In fact dioxin is only one of approximately 1,000 different organochlorines formed in chlorine bleaching. For a further discussion see Kroesa, The Greenpeace Guide to Paper, p.18.

³⁸⁴See Pynn, "Dioxin plan not good enough, Greenpeace tells pulp mills", The Vancouver Sun, January 31, 1989.

³⁸⁵Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

rather than structural change.³⁸⁶

Greenpeace's belief in the need for structural change rather than incremental regulations is reflected by the two main philosophies behind the pulp and paper campaign.

Killeen notes that these two philosophies include the ideas of clean production and the precautionary principle.

According to Killeen,

clean production is a way of manufacturing goods in a system specifically designed to avoid the use of toxic substances and to prevent the generation of toxic waste. Inputs of raw materials, water and energy are renewed, reused and conserved. Such systems are also planned to take into full account worker and community health and the unique natural, economic and cultural aspects of localities and regions.³⁸⁷

The philosophy of clean production led the organization to promote alternatives to chlorine bleaching and to encourage industry and individuals to see the production of products in terms of life cycles. Taking into account the life cycle of paper would mean making other production processes besides bleaching environmentally benign; how forests are

³⁸⁶Killeen notes that these linkages are especially prevalent in British Columbia where industry acts like the senate. He points out that before Government imposes regulations it first seeks the advice of industry as to whether these regulations are appropriate. According to Killeen, Premier Vander Zalm's squashing the proposed regulations of his cabinet after a call from industry is a perfect example of linkages between the B.C. government and industry. Interview with Brian Killeen, September 26, 1991.

³⁸⁷Brian Killeen quoted in O'Rourke, "Toxics", Greenpieces, a Greenpeace newsletter produced by the Vancouver Office, May 13, 1991.

cut and how paper is dealt with after use - i.e. recycling or landfill - must also enter into the equation.³⁸⁸

Clean production also touches on the idea of reducing consumption and phasing out disposable products. The idea of reduction recognizes that the production of paper is not only harmful because of the toxic chemicals it releases; its use of resources such as wood, water and electricity also affects the environment. Although some of these resources can be conserved through more efficient production processes, not using a product is the only way to totally eliminate pollution. As Renate Kroesa points out, "developing...clean paper production technologies...is only one aspect of creating a sustainable pulp and paper industry. Other requirements are sustainable forestry practices; sustainable consumption habits including drastic reduction of the overall consumption rates in the Western World; and efficient and maximized recycling systems".³⁸⁹

The second philosophy that Killeen points to is the precautionary principle. According to Killeen, this

³⁸⁸See Kroesa, The Greenpeace Guide to Paper (Greenpeace Books, 1990) p.51 for a discussion of the different factors involved in environmentally friendly paper.

³⁸⁹Kroesa, "Sustainable Paper Production - Specific actions for environmental compatibility", Submission to the B.C. Roundtable on Environment and Economy, April 24, 1991, p.12. See also Kroesa, The Greenpeace Guide to Paper, p.52 for a further discussion of the relationship between reducing consumption and clean production.

principle holds that the onus should be on polluters to prove that the chemicals they use are not harmful rather than on the public to prove that they are being harmed. As Kroesa points out, the precautionary principle

places the burden of proof on technological and industrial developments to show beyond doubt that new technologies, products, waste emissions or land management practices are ecologically benign, before installation. Today's practice of waiting for scientists to prove that the environment has indeed been harmed irreversibly before governments can place restrictions on the technology or industrial development in question only leads to further environmental degradation.³⁹⁰

In terms of the pulp and paper campaign, the precautionary principle means that pulp and paper companies should stop pouring organochlorines into the ocean until it has been proven that these chemicals are not harmful. Throughout the campaign, industry has claimed that there has been no proof that dioxin causes health effects in humans despite lab tests which show that the chemical causes cancer, birth defects and immune irregularities in animals.³⁹¹ Government has largely backed up the claims of industry by saying that dioxin's health effects are unknown and that more studies are needed before industry can be forced to make significant

³⁹⁰Kroesa, "Sustainable Paper Production", April 24, 1991, p.3.

³⁹¹See Bohn, "Paper mills to speed up dioxin research", The Vancouver Sun, December 10, 1987, p.E; Bohn, "Dioxin in seafood charge disputed", The Vancouver Sun, January 6, 1988, p.A3; and "Off-white paper said a dioxin beater", The Vancouver Sun, May 2, 1988, p.C5 for examples of industry's claims.

changes.³⁹²

The philosophies of clean production and the precautionary principle make Greenpeace's opposition to pulp mill pollution quite radical. Besides an assumption of structural change instead of incremental regulation, Michael Manolson³⁹³ maintains that Greenpeace's calls for zero discharge are also radical in that they reflect an uncompromising stance towards pollution. In addition, Lynn Jamieson³⁹⁴ argues that the organization's philosophy of clean production leads to a perception of sustainability and community control which provides an underlying critique concerning the unequal distribution of wealth both within Canada and on a global scale. Kroesa notes this underlying critique as well: "almost always, serious degradation of ecological processes occurs when people are poor and seeking to survive. An equitable society, apart from the moral and ethical considerations, is less likely to see people under the kind of stress that leads to the degradation of the community's stock of natural resources".³⁹⁵ Related to

³⁹²See Bohn, "Dioxin in seafood charge disputed", The Vancouver Sun, January 6, 1988, p.A3; and Bohn, "Minister wants B.C. dioxin study", The Vancouver Sun, January 13, 1988, p.B1 for examples of Governments response to dioxin pollution.

³⁹³Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

³⁹⁴Interview, July 25, 1991.

³⁹⁵Kroesa, "Sustainable Paper Production", April 24, 1991, p.4.

Greenpeace's critique of social inequity, David Kraft³⁹⁶ points out that Greenpeace campaigns such as pulp and paper are looking towards a system which is less capital intensive and more labour intensive, less competitive and more cooperative. This perception of a less competitive global economy is intertwined with Greenpeace's challenge of priorities involving the assumption of quantitative economic growth. According to Kroesa,

if economic growth means growth along historic patterns of economic activity, i.e. ever-increasing resource throughput, then this is clearly inconsistent with ecological sustainability. The great majority of the planet's resources, upon which our modern society is based, are finite and there can be no such thing as sustainable exploitation of finite resources...ecological sustainability must emphasize the qualitative aspect of development as opposed to the more traditional emphasis on quantitative growth".³⁹⁷

The maintenance of the organization's radical stance towards environmental issues alongside its institutional development makes the pulp and paper campaign an interesting case to study in the mass media. Initially one would think that Greenpeace's increased expertise and coordination would enable the organization to articulate a radical message more effectively than was possible during the seal campaign. But this credibility has not been earned without cost. An

³⁹⁶Interview, November 4, 1991.

³⁹⁷Kroesa, "Sustainable paper production", April 24, 1991, p.2.

increase in credibility in the mass media has meant a decrease in the organization's visibility which has led to a view of pulp mill pollution shaped by official sources. The relationship between the rise of Greenpeace's credibility in the media, its loss of visibility and the extent to which it has been able to put out radical messages will be examined in the following paragraphs.

GREENPEACE'S CREDIBILITY IN THE MASS MEDIA

The institutional development of Greenpeace and the specific nature of the pulp and paper industry have benefited Greenpeace's interaction with the media in many ways. Greenpeace's increasing expertise allowed the organization to gain credibility in the media and to be viewed as more than an organization which only performed "stunts". The credibility of the organization was also enhanced in the mass media by Greenpeace's ability to coordinate its activities and to build coalitions with other groups. Building coalitions enabled the organization's messages to be seen as having widespread support while coordination among Greenpeace offices and campaigners made it possible for the environmental group to put out a consistent message in the mass media.

The specific nature of the pulp and paper campaign also helped the coverage of Greenpeace in many ways. First of

all, the pulp and paper industry was known as a major polluter and subsequently Greenpeace's opposition to current production processes was seen as legitimate. Second, the industry was accumulating large profits and therefore seemed irresponsible and greedy for not investing in pollution controls. Finally, there was a great deal of criticism from other political elites of the B.C. government's inability to impose pollution controls on industry. This enabled coverage citing only "official" sources to be critical of the pulp and paper industry. How both the institutional development of Greenpeace and factors unique to pulp and paper issues helped the group's credibility in The Vancouver Sun will be examined in this section.

One of the main aspects of Greenpeace's institutional development which helped the organization's credibility in the media was its increasing scientific expertise. This expertise enabled the organization to refute many of industry's claims with groundbreaking research and benefited the coverage of the group in two ways; first, it made the media see Greenpeace campaigners as "experts" in the details of pulp mill pollution; second, journalists became suspicious of the claims of Government official and industry spokespeople.

The media's view of Greenpeace as a legitimate source can be illustrated by The Vancouver Sun's coverage of the pulp and paper campaign. Unlike the seal hunt campaign in

1976 and 1977, the coverage of the pulp and paper campaign from 1987 to 1989 contained very few articles about direct actions. Out of 37 articles, only four were about the dramatic activities of Greenpeace. Furthermore, in two out of the four articles a banner hanging was also accompanied by Greenpeace's collection of effluent samples which it intended to send to a Swedish lab for analysis. These two articles, therefore, concentrated only partially on the "stunt" since Greenpeace's research abilities were noted as well.

The increased credibility of Greenpeace in the media stemming from its growing expertise in research, lobbying and public education, therefore, has led a news organization like The Vancouver Sun to see the environmental group's activities as being interesting for reasons other than the drama they might create. In fact, 25 out of the 37 articles involving Greenpeace were concerned either with organization's role in research or its comments as an environmental source. Out of these 25 articles, Greenpeace's research received 9 articles³⁹⁸ and its role as

³⁹⁸In terms of the 9 articles about Greenpeace research 2 were about its report "No Margin for Safety", one noted its report concerning effluent contaminating the Georgia Strait and 6 concerned its sending effluent samples to Sweden for analysis.

an environmental source acquired 16.399 The large percentage of articles using Greenpeace as an environmental source (43%) is especially significant because it shows that Greenpeace campaigners had built up a profile in the media.⁴⁰⁰ In addition, the credibility of Greenpeace as a source was enhanced further because the media often referred to the expertise of the organization's spokespeople. Out of 37 articles 12 referred to Greenpeace members either as scientists⁴⁰¹ or as toxics specialists.⁴⁰²

Greenpeace was also able to refute the claims of forest companies by using the knowledge of Greenpeace offices in other countries. Most notably, Greenpeace used information

³⁹⁹The remaining 8 articles consisted of 3 noting Greenpeace's efforts at community organizing (two were about Greenpeace's involvement in a coalition of 31 groups against pulp mill pollution and one was about a public forum Greenpeace attended on pulp mill pollution), 2 were about a federal government document which was leaked to Greenpeace, and 3 concerned Greenpeace's support of mills which decided to adopt chlorine free technology.

⁴⁰⁰This profile in part may have been due to Greenpeace's ability to cultivate Glenn Bohn (The Vancouver Sun's environment reporter) since Bohn wrote 22 out of the 37 articles about Greenpeace's opposition to pulp mill pollution. David Peerla (Interview, October 18, 1991), however, felt that Bohn had done a poor job in reporting forestry issues.

⁴⁰¹These experts included Renate Kroesa who was an industrial chemist and biologists Brian Killeen and Michael Earle.

⁴⁰²Renate Kroesa was quoted as Greenpeace's toxics specialist in the article "Victoria issues pulp-mill order: use cleaner oil", The Vancouver Sun March 21, 1989, p.A17.

acquired about European pulp and paper processes from its international offices to critique the industry in Canada. In The Vancouver Sun 6 articles out of the 37 mentioned that Europe was using technology which eliminated organochlorines, one of which was completely devoted to the views of Swedish Professor Knut Kringstad. In the article, Kringstad explained that Swedes were now using technology which completely eliminated dioxins.⁴⁰³ Two other articles mentioned that dioxin free and unbleached products were now available in Sweden.

The group's ability to refute industry's claims led reporters to become suspicious of the views of forest companies. The Vancouver Sun's suspicion towards industry and government can be seen in the one editorial mentioning Greenpeace's involvement in the pulp and paper campaign. The editorial starts with the question "Who is the poor layman to believe in trying to judge the likely effectiveness of the dioxin cleanup promised by British Columbia's pulp mills?" and concludes with the statement "given the industry's record, and the failure of both governments to enforce anti-pollution regulations in the past, it's far too soon to start applauding the

⁴⁰³"Swedes claim 'dioxin-free' pulp production", The Vancouver Sun, September 10, 1988, p.B14.

disappearance of pulp mill poisons from the environment".⁴⁰⁴

Besides enabling Greenpeace to be seen as a legitimate source and increasing its ability to embarrass industry and government, the institutional development of Greenpeace also enhanced the organization's credibility because it enabled the group to be much more consistent in its statements about the goals of Greenpeace and to avoid being accused of "selling out" to industry by supporters. Unlike the seal hunt where Greenpeace had very little control over activists, the organization in 1987 had thoroughly developed forms of movement socialization. Tamara Stark⁴⁰⁵ notes that these forms of socialization include the development of Greenpeace's own media and the green link - a data base which connects all of the organization's offices and keeps them informed as to what other Greenpeace groups in Canada and the world are doing. This socialization and coordination has allowed Greenpeace's goals to remain consistent over time. From the very beginning of the campaign Greenpeace was able to state that it wanted an elimination of chlorine bleaching by 1993, had presented the alternative of oxygen bleaching and showed that such an alternative was possible because it was presently used by other countries. The first article citing Greenpeace's

⁴⁰⁴"Don't hold breath", The Vancouver Sun, February 9, 1989, p.A14.

⁴⁰⁵Interview, October 21, 1991.

involvement in the pulp and paper campaign states that "Greenpeace wants pulp mills to switch to a safer, alternative process using oxygen instead of chlorine to make brown paper white. Oxygen technology is already used in mills in Sweden, West Germany and Japan, as well as in one Ontario mill".⁴⁰⁶ Similar to this first article, the eight other stories which noted Greenpeace goals all called for an elimination of the use of chlorine, although only 4 of these 8 noted alternative processes for bleaching and only 2 mentioned a timetable for elimination. These same goals are still called for by Greenpeace today.⁴⁰⁷

Greenpeace's enhanced abilities to coordinate its activities also enabled the organization to put more effort into building coalitions. These coalition-building efforts resulted in more favourable coverage because other interest groups and movements were much less likely to be critical if they had been informed about Greenpeace's goals. In contrast to the seal campaign where Greenpeace received criticism from unions as well as environmental and community groups, the pulp and paper campaign received only one article in which Greenpeace was criticized by groups other

⁴⁰⁶Bohn, "Deadly dioxin alert sounded for B.C. mills", The Vancouver Sun, August 21, 1987, p.B1.

⁴⁰⁷See "Great lakes chlorine-free by '93", Action Vol.2 No.2 April/May/June 1991, p.1 and 3.

than pulp companies and government.⁴⁰⁸

Besides Greenpeace's institutionalization, the organization's credibility was also raised because of factors specific to the pulp and paper industry. The first factor was that the pulp and paper industry was known to be a major polluter. Secondly, industry and government attempts to curb pollution were easy to attack because forest companies were reluctant to invest in pollution controls at a time when they were making record profits. Finally, the continuous granting of variances to mills in non-compliance with regulations called into question the ability of politicians to impose pollution standards. The visible irresponsibility and greed of the major forest companies, along with government negligence in enforcing regulations, caused elites within government as well as oppositional groups to be critical of industry. These cleavages among elites gave credibility to Greenpeace's opposition to pulp mill pollution and also enabled the environmental group to obtain leaked documents from Government officials who were angered by the reluctance of

⁴⁰⁸In the article, two spokespersons criticized Greenpeace's warning that dioxins were in seafood. Betty Fitzsimmons, the Fisheries Council of B.C. spokesperson, maintained that a single sediment sample testing positive for dioxins didn't warrant Greenpeace's warning. Peter McLellan, the owner of Nanoose Bay Oysters remarked that he was skeptical of Greenpeace charges because the group had "an axe to grind". For a further discussion see Bohn, "Greenpeace claim of pulp-mill dioxin alarms oyster farmers", The Vancouver Sun, January 7, 1988, p.A11.

industry and the Social Credit government in B.C. to reduce pollution. The extent to which these factors increased Greenpeace's credibility in The Vancouver Sun will be examined in the following paragraphs.

In contrast to Greenpeace's opposition to the seal hunt in 1976 and 1977, the organization's interest in pulp mill pollution could not be dismissed as a marginal environmental concern. Whereas opposing the seal hunt was regarded by many environmental groups as sensational or superficial, pulp mills were Canada's third largest polluter and were responsible for almost half the water pollution in Canada.⁴⁰⁹ Furthermore, the industry used a tremendous amount of Canadian resources such as electricity, water and forest products.⁴¹⁰ Finally, the campaign is particularly relevant in Canada since Canadian citizens consume large amounts of the world paper production.⁴¹¹ Renate Kroesa notes that Canada is the third largest consumer per capita

⁴⁰⁹Kirk Dawson, regional director of conservation and protection for Environment Canada notes that the pulp and paper industry is the source of about half the water pollution in Canada. Cited in Bohn, "Battle raging over pollutants", The Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1988, p.B1.

⁴¹⁰See Sinclair, Controlling Pollution from Canadian Pulp and Paper Manufacturing - A Federal Perspective (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1988), pp.62-66 for a discussion of the different forms of pollution involved in the production of pulp and paper.

⁴¹¹Sinclair, Controlling Pollution From Canadian Pulp and Paper Manufactures: A Federal Perspective (Ottawa: Environment Canada Conservation and Protection, 1988), p.63

of paper and the amount of paper we use is expanding each year.⁴¹² Greenpeace, therefore, was now taking on major players in the production of pollution as well as trying to change the consumption habits responsible for environmental degradation.

The nature of the pulp and paper campaign also put Greenpeace in a positive light because the organization was not confronting impoverished sealers but an industry dominated by large corporations which were making record profits in 1987 and 1988.⁴¹³ Furthermore, at the same time the forest companies were making these profits, they were reluctant to invest in non-polluting technologies; only 120 million out of 3.1 billion of industry investment was designated for pollution controls and these investments in environmental technology were heavily subsidized by taxpayers. The Federal Government contributed 276 million and Provincial Governments 241 million to industrial

⁴¹²This consumption has risen from 423 lbs per year per capita in 1980 to 465 in 1987 to 543 in 1988. Kroesa also notes that the recovery rate of used Canadian paper for recycling is lower than in Sweden and the U.S. at only 20 percent (the U.S. recovers 29 percent and Sweden recovers 40). For a further discussion see Kroesa, The Greenpeace Guide to Paper, p.41.

⁴¹³See "MB has record third quarter profits", The Vancouver Sun, November 5, 1987, p.B5; "MB sets earnings, sales records", The Vancouver Sun, February 10, 1988, p.C1; "MB posts record profits", The Vancouver Sun, February 10, 1989, p.D5.

improvements in the industry.⁴¹⁴

Besides the fact that the pulp and paper industry was a major polluter during a time when it was making record profits, Greenpeace's credibility in the media was also helped by criticisms of the industry coming from elites.⁴¹⁵ In contrast to the seal campaign where all political parties backed the sealers, Federal Government officials and the NDP in British Columbia were critical of the inability of the Social Credit Government to impose regulations on the industry. Furthermore, cleavages among elites enabled Greenpeace to obtain leaked documents exposing that shellfish had been found with high levels of dioxin⁴¹⁶ and giving evidence of the extent to which the Social Credit Government was unable to enforce its own pollution laws.⁴¹⁷ One editorial discussing a leaked report doesn't mention Greenpeace but exclaims that "the secret Environment Canada

⁴¹⁴For a discussion of industry's reluctance to invest in pollution abatement see Bohn, "Study reveals majority of pulp mills break law", The Vancouver Sun, March 15, 1989, p.A1 and A6.

⁴¹⁵Both Gitlin and Hertzgaard maintain that because the media relies on "official" sources for the news, criticism of a policy is unlikely unless there are certain politicians opposing it. For a further discussion see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, pp. 206-209 and Hertzgaard, On Bended Knee, pp. 119-120.

⁴¹⁶Ward, "Shellfish analysis eases dioxin fears", The Vancouver Sun, February 9, 1988, p.A10.

⁴¹⁷Bohn, "Victoria's control of dioxins in doubt", The Vancouver Sun, December 8, 1988, p.A1 and A2.

report obtained by Sun environment reporter Glenn Bohn, detailing the extent of the pollution of Canadian waterways by pulp mill effluent, is an appalling story of industrial irresponsibility and government negligence".⁴¹⁸ These cleavages among elites, therefore, helped to keep the issue of pulp mill pollution "on the agenda" even when Greenpeace's views were not covered.

Industry irresponsibility and Government negligence also prevented Greenpeace from receiving denigrating comments from official sources. Only 3 articles out of 37 had government and industry sources making disparaging comments about Greenpeace and its activities. Two denigrating comments were made by industry. One called a Greenpeace statement "alarmist"⁴¹⁹ and the other referred to a direct action as "misguided".⁴²⁰ The third disparaging comment was made by Bruce Strachan, the B.C. Environment Minister at the time, who said that Greenpeace's use of the word dumping was "inflammatory".⁴²¹ This lack of

⁴¹⁸"Hiding dirty linen of the pulp mills", The Vancouver Sun, March 18, 1989, p.B4.

⁴¹⁹Hume, "Dioxins in fish spark a warning by Greenpeace", The Vancouver Sun, May 17, 1988, p.A8.

⁴²⁰The criticism of Greenpeace's actions as misguided was weakened because it was written with delegitimizing quotation marks. Farrow and Hunter, "Injunction brings mill protesters down", The Vancouver Sun, May 9, 1989, p.A1.

⁴²¹Bohn, "Dumping of dioxins into ocean denied", The Vancouver Sun, November 2, 1988, p.A6.

denigration by official sources can be explained by the fact that industry and the B.C. government were on the defensive because they, not Greenpeace, were being investigated. When it became apparent that industry and government could not meet the standards put in place by the existing system they fell under intense scrutiny.

It has been shown in the preceding paragraphs that Greenpeace's credibility in The Vancouver Sun was heightened by its strategic nature and because of factors particular to pulp and paper issues in British Columbia. This rise in Greenpeace's credibility, however, was achieved at a cost to other aspects of coverage. Notably, Greenpeace's credibility made the organization less visible in the media and hindered its ability to put out a radical message. These two problems with the media coverage of the pulp and paper campaign will be examined in the following sections.

THE DECREASE IN GREENPEACE'S VISIBILITY IN THE MEDIA

Although the previous section showed the role of institutional development in improving the organization's credibility in the coverage it received, this institutionalization also had the problematic effect of reducing Greenpeace's visibility in the media. Even though the coverage of the pulp and paper campaign was looked at over a longer period of time than the seal campaign of 1976

and 1977, the number of articles about this later campaign was much lower. The seal campaign consisted of 79 articles while pulp and paper attracted only 37. Aside from the fact that Greenpeace was sixteen years old at this time and therefore no longer considered novel, this decrease in coverage can be explained by jaded attitude of journalists towards direct actions and the strategic nature of the campaign.

Although the jaded attitude of the media towards dramatic spectacles can be illustrated by the mere four articles that Greenpeace's two direct actions against pulp mill pollution attracted, the changing nature of Greenpeace campaigning can also explain this lack of coverage. Whereas the protests during the seal campaign took place over several days, David Peerla⁴²² notes that Greenpeace actions today only last for a short period of time because the organization is afraid that disobeying an injunction will put their large assets at risk. Greenpeace's fear of opposing injunctions is shown in the direct action it carried out in May 1989. The article describing the action states that "a court injunction obtained late Monday brought down Greenpeace volunteers who had chained themselves to a pulp mill dock in Howe Sound, forcing a temporary halt to chlorine shipments to Western Pulp's Woodfibre plant...the

⁴²²Interview, October 18, 1991.

four protesters who attached themselves to Woodfibre's loading ramp had hoped to remain there until the mill ran out of chlorine, Stewart [Greenpeace's Regional Director] said".⁴²³

In contrast to the seal campaign, direct actions against pulp mill pollution were also far more orchestrated. Whereas Paul Watson spontaneously handcuffed himself to a cable in Greenpeace's 1977 expedition to Labrador, Jim Bohlen⁴²⁴ and David Peerla⁴²⁵ note that more recent actions are carefully gone over in advance with a media coordinator to ensure that no one gets hurt.⁴²⁶ Although this orchestrated approach towards actions is much safer,⁴²⁷ it also takes out a main element of media attraction - danger.

Besides the reduction of danger and the fear of injunctions, the visibility of Greenpeace has also decreased

⁴²³Farrow and Hunter, "Injunction brings mill protesters down", The Vancouver Sun, May 9, 1989, p.A1.

⁴²⁴Telephone Interview with Jim Bohlen, October 16, 1991.

⁴²⁵Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

⁴²⁶The CBC documentary The Greenpeace Years notes that Greenpeace now runs an "action camp" to train all its activists in civil disobedience and relations with the media.

⁴²⁷Peerla notes that police react differently to Greenpeace actions than they do to the more spontaneous protests of other groups because they know that Greenpeace activists are professionals and therefore they don't have to worry about Greenpeace activists losing control of their emotions. Interview, October 18, 1991.

because of the time that it now spends on coordination. The increased growth of Greenpeace has meant that this coordinating role takes more and more time.⁴²⁸ Killeen⁴²⁹ notes that much of the work Greenpeace now does is behind the scenes - community organizing, research and lobbying. In order for these events to gain visibility they must be seen as "interesting" by the media. Peerla⁴³⁰ explains that making behind the scenes work at Greenpeace interesting to the media entails much work in acquiring the attention of journalists and thinking up new ways to present issues.

In addition to a decrease in the number of articles about Greenpeace, the organization also received less space for its point of view within the stories themselves. Therefore, despite Greenpeace's credibility in the media, the pulp and paper campaign depended to a much greater extent on official sources than was found in the organization's protest of the seal hunt in 1976 and 1977. Only 13 out of 37 articles (35%) devoted fifty percent of the article or more to Greenpeace's point of view.

It is important to point out, however, that this reduced visibility can also be read positively as a signal

⁴²⁸In The Greenpeace Years Manolson notes that so much coordination is now needed among the different international offices that he is often surprised that anything gets accomplished.

⁴²⁹Interview, September 26, 1991.

⁴³⁰Interview, October 18, 1991.

of the organization's inclusion into the "rational political discourse" of The Vancouver Sun. Compared to the coverage of the seal hunt from 1976-77 where Greenpeace was only able to attract attention through spectacles, the placement of the organization as responding to official sources indicates that the media was taking environmentalism seriously as a reasoned discourse which centred on the issues associated with pulp mill pollution.

This concentration on environmental issues instead of spectacles allowed the group to challenge the existing system more directly. The increased ability of Greenpeace to challenge the existing system can be shown by the rise in articles about the pulp and paper industry which were taking into account pollution in their coverage. From 1981 to mid 1987 there were 59 articles indexed under "pulp wood industry" and of these 59 articles, only 2 were about pulp mill pollution. After Greenpeace released its report "No Margin for Safety", however, pollution in the industry became a major concern of the The Vancouver Sun. Besides the 37 articles involving Greenpeace, 62 other articles were indexed about pulp mills from August 1987 to May 1989. Of these 62 articles, 41 concerned pollution in pulp mills.

Although the coverage of the initial pulp and paper campaign shows that Greenpeace is now more able to confront those responsible for pollution more directly, Greenpeace's position as a "legitimate source" is also problematic

because it often places Greenpeace in the context of reacting to the claims of others. Only 12 articles were framed directly around a Greenpeace claim or activity. In the 25 other articles Greenpeace was merely responding to claims or initiatives made by Government or industry.

The prominence of Government and industry sources in the coverage of pulp and paper can be explained by many reasons. First, unlike the seal hunt, pulp and paper is a major industry in British Columbia and Canada as a whole. Sinclair explains that pulp and paper "is Canada's most economically important industry. It stands first among all Canadian industry in value of production and total wages paid. It ranks second only to the steel industry in exports. It ranks third in terms of total value of shipments, and is among the top four in total capital investment".⁴³¹ He also notes that in 1984 the pulp and paper industry was estimated to generate 79,000 direct jobs and between 275,000 and 300,000 indirect jobs in Canada as a whole.⁴³² The Council of Forest industries maintains that in 1986 B.C. produced about \$4 billion in products and employed 17,400 residents.⁴³³

Considering the importance of pulp and paper to British

⁴³¹Sinclair, 1988, p.15.

⁴³²Sinclair, 1988, pp.21-22.

⁴³³Cited in Bohn, "Battle raging over pulp mill pollutants", The Vancouver Sun, January 11, 1988, p.B1.

Columbia, The Vancouver Sun could be expected to be more aware of the economic costs of imposing strict pollution controls and would have had greater historical interaction with industry and Government officials than was the case in sealing. This greater media awareness of the importance of the pulp and paper industry was illustrated by the fact that, unlike the coverage of the seal hunt, there were a large number of articles written about the pulp and paper industry in The Vancouver Sun before Greenpeace's involvement. Whereas only 11 articles were indexed under "sealing" in the ten years before Greenpeace's involvement, 59 articles were found under the heading "pulp wood industry" six years before the organization began its pulp and paper campaign.

The economic importance of the pulp and paper industry in B.C. could also explain the reduced coverage of Greenpeace's point of view because of the likelihood that The Vancouver Sun would receive "flak" if it did not give access to the point of view of industry or the B.C. Government.⁴³⁴ The likelihood of receiving flak for

⁴³⁴An example of "flak" being given to the media industry occurred recently when David Suzuki's CBC program "The Nature of Things" was very critical of the forest industry. After the program was aired, the Bank of Commerce withdrew its advertisements from the CBC. For a further discussion of this incident see Parfitt, "Bank pulls ads after CBC show on forestry", The Vancouver Sun, March 8, 1991, p.B3 and "Bank pulls ads from CBC show", The Globe and Mail, March 9, 1991, p.C2.

downplaying industry's point of view in coverage would be especially great in the case of MacMillan Bloedel because Southam (a subsidiary which owns both The Vancouver Sun and The Province) and this forest company are both owned by Noranda. Furthermore, Adam Zimmerman, the chairman of MacMillan Bloedel, also sits on the board of Southam.⁴³⁵

Although many Greenpeace activists interviewed recognized that this linkage between industry and the media probably had some effect on coverage, they also note that this linkage is a grey area and difficult to prove.⁴³⁶ They

⁴³⁵Zimmerman's presence on both Southam's and MacMillan Bloedel's Board of Directors was noted by Independent M.L.A. Jack Kempf who claimed Zimmerman prevented Vancouver newspapers from printing the truth about the forest industry. Kempf was Forest Minister until March 1987 when he resigned due to irregularities in his campaign funds. For a further discussion of Kempf's allegations see Barrett, "Newspapers accused of not printing truth about forest industry", The Vancouver Sun, July 14, 1987, p.B8. For another examination between the interconnections of the media and the forest industry in British Columbia see Marchak, Green Gold (1983), pp. 65-67.

⁴³⁶Greenpeace activists who were interviewed were very cautious about saying that this connection had an effect on coverage. The only exception was Diane Goulet, the pulp and paper campaigner for the Quebec Office who notes these linkages exist between industry in Quebec and the local media. She claims that the media is "bought" and often takes industries claims as "truth". While Jim Bohlen (Telephone Interview, October 16, 1991) maintained that these linkages between industry and media organizations had little effect on their coverage of environmental issues, Michael M'Gonigle points to the case of Nick Hills, an editor of The Vancouver Sun who was fired after an article in the National Geographic condemning B.C. forest practices was reprinted in his paper. He notes that although one can speculate that the reprinting of the article and Hills' dismissal were related, this relationship is impossible to prove (Telephone Interview, July 28, 1991). Brian Killeen maintains that he has noticed that MacMillan Bloedel's mills

maintained that a more important obstacle to Greenpeace's messages was the increasing sophistication of forest companies in improving their image as "environmentally friendly". Tamara Stark⁴³⁷ notes that five years ago Industry was often unaware that they were discharging organochlorines into the ocean or even that these toxic chemicals existed. Over the last few years, however, Stark points out that industry has gained enough knowledge to use the right environmental buzzwords to counter Greenpeace claims. Peter Dykstra points out that "what has changed is not that the bad guys have changed their stripes or changed the way they behave or changed what they produce or changed what they dump. They've changed what they package themselves in. And right now they're wrapping themselves in the green flag and it makes our job a little bit harder".⁴³⁸ A good example of this "greenwashing"⁴³⁹ in the pulp and paper industry is the labelling of paper as "recycled". According to Kroesa,

the downside of this popularity of recycled paper is that many products now marketed as 'made of

tend to be criticized less often than those belonging to other companies in Southam owned newspapers, but again, the linkage is hard to prove. Personal Interview, September 26, 1991.

437Interview, October 21, 1991.

438Quoted in The Greenpeace Years.

439For a discussion of this often fraudulent trend towards "green" products see Johnson, "Eco-Hype", The Financial Post Magazine, May 1991, pp. 17-18 and 20-23.

recycled fibres' have very little to do with true recycling, simply because most of the recycled content is 'pre-consumer' wastes; paper wastes that were never disposed of by the end-consumer. At the same time, landfills are continuing to fill up because of an ongoing lack of capacity to recycle truly post-consumer paper".⁴⁴⁰

The sophistication of the pulp and paper industry in convincing the public that was environmentally sensitive has been helped by the amount of resources it was able to tap to improve its image. Sinclair notes that the profits of the industry in 1984 were 667 million dollars.⁴⁴¹ Even if only a small proportion of these earnings were used for improving the industry's image, it would be far more money than Greenpeace would have at its disposal.

The significance of the pulp and paper industry's resources in promoting its image can be seen in the money it was able to use for advertising in The Vancouver Sun. Between August 1987 and May 1989 thirteen full page advertisements appeared in The Vancouver Sun promoting MacMillan Bloedel's "environmentally friendly" efforts in the forest industry. The industry's advertising campaign was brought to new heights in 1990 when the forest companies

⁴⁴⁰Kroesa, "Sustainable Paper Production", April 24, 1991, p.11 For a further discussion of the pulp and paper industry's attempts to mislead the public through advertising see Armstrong and Scott, Whitewash (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, 1992), pp. 117-129.

⁴⁴¹See Sinclair, Controlling Pollution from Pulp and Paper Companies, 1988, pp.24-33 for an examination of the industry's economic structure.

hired Burson-Marsteller to improve their image in the media. As the Greenpeace magazine Action points out, "rather than alter unsustainable forestry practices, the industry in Canada has chosen to focus on its corporate image. One group of forest companies has become so worried about their reputation that they recently banded together to form the B.C. Forest Alliance, and hired Burson-Marsteller, the public relations outfit, to clean up their image".⁴⁴²

Although Greenpeace is considered to be a legitimate voice in the debate over pulp mill pollution, the economic importance of the pulp and paper industry and the increasing strategic nature of Greenpeace have made it difficult for the organization to access the media. Furthermore, Greenpeace's position as a legitimate source has also created difficulties for Greenpeace's ability to put out a radical message in the mass media; placing the organization in the position of reacting to official sources would make it difficult for Greenpeace to frame the debate around the environmental concerns that it considered to be important. This inability of Greenpeace to frame the debate surrounding pulp mill pollution will be examined in the following paragraphs.

THE CONSTRAINTS ON RADICALISM

⁴⁴²"B.C. Logging Threatens Forests", Action, Vol.2 NO.3 July/August/September 1991, p.1.

The decreased visibility of Greenpeace in articles about pulp mill pollution made it difficult for the organization to put out a radical message. Since a large proportion of articles were quoting Greenpeace as an environmental source, the organization was often reacting to claims made by industry or officials. Greenpeace's role as a source disadvantaged the group's promotion of the more radical goals of clean production and the precautionary principle because officials would promote the regulation of existing processes instead of structural change and advocated further studies instead of making decisions to end toxic discharge.

Although research done by Greenpeace and Environment Canada refuted industry's claims that pulp mills were not discharging dioxin (only five articles centred on whether pollution was actually present), Greenpeace was never able to overcome the problem of articles stressing regulation instead of source reduction. Out of the 37 articles analyzed, 19 mentioned Government's role in regulating pulp mill pollution while only 11 discussed using oxygen instead of chlorine bleaching. Of these eleven articles only 5 noted that Greenpeace's goal was a zero discharge of toxins.

Besides the media's reliance on official sources, its concentration on regulation rather than structural change was also aided by Greenpeace's reliance on Government

reports to attack industry. Killeen⁴⁴³ notes that he uses information gathered by Environment Canada to give more credibility to his data because reports put out by Greenpeace are susceptible to charges of "bias". Although this approach does increase the organization's credibility and ability to embarrass industry or government, it also reinforces the structure of the debate around issues which are considered important by official sources.⁴⁴⁴

Lynn Jamieson⁴⁴⁵ also noted that the stress on regulations rather than clean production processes has led to the media's concentration on dioxin rather than organochlorines. 30 out of the 37 articles examined concentrated on dioxin, whereas only 6 stories focused on organochlorines. The prominence of the media's coverage of dioxins can also be illustrated by articles in The Vancouver Sun which were found in the British Columbia newspaper index. While 68 articles were indexed under the title "dioxin" between August 1987 and May 1989 in The Vancouver

⁴⁴³Interview, September 26, 1991.

⁴⁴⁴For example, an Environment Canada report by William Sinclair was leaked to Greenpeace and subsequently embarrassed Federal and Provincial Governments because it showed that eighty-three of 149 pulp mills in Canada were not complying with regulations. The release of this report to the media, however, tended to shape the debate even more around the issue of regulations and enforcement rather than clean production. For the media's coverage of this report see Bohn, "Study reveals majority of pulp mills break law", The Vancouver Sun, March 15, 1989, pp.A1 and A6.

⁴⁴⁵Interview, September 25, 1991.

Sun, only 3 articles were indexed under "chlorine". Articles indexed under "organochlorines" were nonexistent until September 1990, at which time only one story was recorded. Jamieson maintains that this concentration on dioxin was due to the fact that industry and government focused on this particular family of toxic chemicals. This focus occurred because it required less investment to implement the chlorine dioxide technology which would eliminate dioxin than the oxygen bleaching process which would phase out organochlorines. A Greenpeace pamphlet explains that

industry support for this idea [changing to chlorine dioxide] was strong as it allows them to resolve dioxin discharge problems without making the more costly investments necessary to completely eliminate toxic organochlorine discharges. Industry continues to fight against laws that would force them off chlorine, and into more environmentally friendly technologies such as bleaching with oxygen or hydrogen peroxide. After some initial tough talk, governments now appear to be knuckling under to the well-financed industry lobby".⁴⁴⁶

David Peerla⁴⁴⁷ further points out that the media's concentration on dioxin was due to historical constraints. According to Peerla, unlike organochlorines, the problem of dioxin has been historically tied to protests surrounding 2,4,5,T and Agent Orange and therefore "it had a long

⁴⁴⁶"No time to waste", Toxics/Forests, Greenpeace pamphlet, (Canada: Bowne, undated), p.1.

⁴⁴⁷Interview, October 18, 1991.

discursive history in public awareness before we had connected it to the paper campaign".⁴⁴⁸ Whereas the problem of organochlorines noted in The Vancouver Sun was largely due to Greenpeace's education of journalists,⁴⁴⁹ 6 articles were indexed under "dioxin" before Greenpeace became involved in the campaign against pulp mill pollution.

Peerla also maintains that the prominence of dioxin in coverage was because Greenpeace initially tried to focus public attention on dioxin. This initial concentration on dioxin is reflected by the banner of Greenpeace's first action which stated "Dioxin Kills".⁴⁵⁰ According to Peerla, dioxin was focused on because the public awareness of the compound enabled it to be very effective in raising public concerns about pollution and getting Governments to act.⁴⁵¹ The public concern was largely sparked over the findings that dioxins were present in chlorine bleached cardboard

⁴⁴⁸Interview, October 18, 1991.

⁴⁴⁹No articles about pulp mills mentioned organochlorines until after Greenpeace's report "No Margin for Safety" was released.

⁴⁵⁰See "Greenpeace urges pulp mills to change to dioxin-free technology", The Vancouver Sun, September 23, 1987, p.D11 and Bohn and Parfitt, "Dioxin found in B.C. shellfish", The Vancouver Sun, January 25, 1988, p.A1 for a discussion of this action.

⁴⁵¹Peerla also notes that the discursive history of the destruction of rainforests in Brazil was also used in the forestry campaign. Through calling B.C. "Brazil North" or "Amazon North" the campaign was able to raise awareness through using previously perceived images of what a forest crisis looked like.

cartons and were subsequently leaching into milk. According to Peerla, the presence of this historically well known carcinogen in a commonly consumed product put out the powerful message that pulp mill pollution posed a danger to the human body.

After the initial concentration on dioxin was successful in raising public, industry and government awareness about the seriousness of pulp mill pollution, Greenpeace became concerned that this focus was leading the debate in the wrong direction.⁴⁵² Although Greenpeace had always wanted the elimination of all organochlorines and not just dioxin, it needed to change its tactics so that the problem of organochlorines would be focused on. This change of focus is illustrated by the second direct action which was blocking a chlorine shipment and hung a banner stating "Stop Chlorine Use Now".⁴⁵³ The initial concentration on dioxin, however, created the problem of momentum which was present in the seal campaign. Since initial actions and lab tests centred around dioxin, and official sources responded to concerns about these particular pollutants, it became difficult for Greenpeace to turn the media's attention

⁴⁵²See Pynn, "Dioxin plan not good enough, Greenpeace tells pulp mills", The Vancouver Sun, January 31, 1989, p.A14.

⁴⁵³See "Injunction brings mill protesters down", The Vancouver Sun, May 9, 1989, p.A1 for a discussion of this action.

towards organochlorines.

Besides the concentration on regulations and dioxin, Greenpeace's radical environmental message was also inhibited by the media's focus on disputes about whether dioxin was harmful to human health. Sixteen out of 37 articles marginalized the seriousness of dioxin pollution by saying either that no proof existed showing that dioxin was harmful or that such pollution did not exist in significant quantities to pose a threat to human health. Furthermore, only four articles emphasized the view that pollutants should not be released unless their effects were known not to cause health problems. The prominence given to statements concerning the unknown effects of dioxins over sources recommending the precautionary approach can be attributed to industry's success in getting their point of view across⁴⁵⁴ and to the centrality of industrial activity in our society. Such industrial activity is taken as the norm only to be diminished when there is "proof" that such activity is harmful. This centrality of industrial activity in media discourse disadvantages Greenpeace's message because, as John Liedman the Toxics campaigner in Louisiana states "one of the hardest things to prove in the case of

⁴⁵⁴For a discussion of the tactics which industry uses to minimize the effects of dioxin see Armstrong and Scott, Whitewash, pp. 17-19.

chemical contamination is cause and effect".⁴⁵⁵

As well as causing a concentration on regulation and the disputed nature of health effects, the media's reliance on official sources also meant that the more radical goals of Greenpeace such as reducing consumption and making the whole life cycle of paper sustainable were ignored. One reason why oxygen bleaching was covered prominently relative to other Greenpeace goals was that it is based on the philosophy that technological progress can solve environmental problems - a philosophy upon which the existing system is based. Reducing consumption and making all aspects of the life cycle of paper production environmentally sustainable, on the other hand, would entail major structural changes not only to pulp mill processes but to the whole manner in which society operates.

Greenpeace maintains that in order to make paper production environmentally sustainable one needs to examine resource extraction (forestry), pulping/bleaching, paper production, paper processing/printing, paper use/consumption and disposal/recycling.⁴⁵⁶ In the 37 articles covering Greenpeace's pulp and paper campaign, however, only 1 mentioned other aspects of the paper cycle besides

⁴⁵⁵Cited in The Greenpeace Years.

⁴⁵⁶Kroesa, "Sustainable Paper Production - Specific Actions for Environmental Compatibility", Submission to the B.C. Roundtable on Environment and Economy, April 24, 1991.

bleaching.⁴⁵⁷ This concentration of articles on only the pollution caused by bleaching downplays the widespread nature of environmental degradation caused by the production and consumption of paper and ignores the huge structural changes which are needed to combat pulp mill pollution.

The concentration on the bleaching part of the cycle can be explained by many factors. First, it was noted earlier that the media have a tendency to fragment issues. Whereas Lynn Jamieson⁴⁵⁸ notes that Greenpeace's focus on bleaching was meant to highlight the many forms of pollution caused by chlorine, no other forms of pollution associated with the use of chlorine (such as the depletion of the ozone layer) were mentioned in the coverage. The media's focus on the events unfolding in the campaign rather than the issues surrounding pollution in modern society, however, ensured that journalists like Glenn Bohn would find it difficult to step back and see pulp mill pollution in terms of its wider environmental context.

The fragmentation of bleaching from other parts of the life cycle and from environmental issues in general was also

⁴⁵⁷This article notes the leaked Sinclair report and how it reports that the pulp and paper industry uses 35 percent of Canada's annual forest production. Bohn, "Study reveals majority of pulp mills break law", The Vancouver Sun, March 15, 1989, pA6.

⁴⁵⁸Personal Interview with Lynn Jamieson, September 25, 1991.

reinforced by Greenpeace's pragmatism. Diane Goulet⁴⁵⁹ explains that fragmentation often occurs in media coverage because Greenpeace needs to put out specific demands in order to accomplish its goals. She maintains that if the campaign had originally focused on the life cycle of pulp and paper and the harmful nature of chlorine it would have been too general and getting the elimination of chlorine bleaching on the agenda would have been much more difficult. She maintains that Greenpeace can only move on to a more widespread challenge of existing polluting processes after the problem of chlorine bleaching has been tackled.⁴⁶⁰ The focus on chlorine bleaching in the media, therefore, can also be attributed in part to the relatively unadvanced nature of the pulp and paper campaign in the 1987-1989 time period. David Peerla notes that Greenpeace's forestry campaign arose out of the need to bring more attention to all the environmentally damaging processes involved in the production of paper. However, Greenpeace did not start the Forests part of the pulp and paper campaign until late 1990.

Besides a lack of coverage about Greenpeace's concern with the life cycle of products, the organization's interest in reducing the consumption of paper was also ignored in The

⁴⁵⁹Interview, October 30, 1991.

⁴⁶⁰Goulet notes that this more integrated approach is now taking place in Europe because the phase out of chlorine bleaching is more advanced than in North America.

Vancouver Sun. In the 37 articles none mentioned the problem of overconsumption or the need to phase out disposable paper products. In fact, 5 articles had the contradictory message of advocating a reduction in pollution yet supporting the environmentally unsound practice of expanding the pulp and paper industry. For example, one article notes "this week Canfor unveiled a \$1 billion plan to boost pulp production and build a newsprint mill at Port Mellon. Bill Hughes, Canfor's vice-president for pulp and paper, promises state-of-the-art technology that would dramatically reduce the quantity of pollutants released into the air and water".⁴⁶¹

The neglect of the goal of reduction in The Vancouver Sun is also reinforced by Greenpeace's reluctance to state this aim directly to the media. Although the goal of reduction seems to be a prominent concern within the organization,⁴⁶² M'Gonigle⁴⁶³ notes that Greenpeace must often be careful when putting out radical messages in the mass media. This reluctance in putting out the message of

⁴⁶¹Bohn, "Exec says Howe Sound mill to use Greenpeace-pushed pollution-fighter", The Vancouver Sun, December 9, 1987, p.C6.

⁴⁶²Diane Goulet was the only campaigner who seemed to be cautious in advocating the reduction in the pulp and paper industry. She maintained that increasing efficiency in the industry might make reduction unnecessary. Interview, October 30, 1991.

⁴⁶³Interview, July 28, 1991.

reduction is once again due to Greenpeace's pragmatic nature. Since the goal of reducing consumption has the radical implications of challenging processes such as economic growth, Jamieson⁴⁶⁴ notes that the discussion of this goal in the media could take away Greenpeace support. She also points out that reduction is a difficult goal to present because it is negative; reduction denies people the endless flow of consumer goods which have been "promised" to them by advertising. She maintains that the pulp and paper campaign has tried to be positive by suggesting alternatives such as unbleached or oxygen bleached paper unlike the seal campaign which attempted to deny people products made from sealskins.

Greenpeace's reluctance to put out the message of reduction can be illustrated by the seven articles in The Vancouver Sun which show Greenpeace's comments to be contradictory to the goal of reduction. In three articles, Greenpeace is cited as supporting the expansion of a Canfor pulp mill at Port Mellon because of its plans to change to oxygen bleaching technology. In three other articles Greenpeace pushes for retailers to stock dioxin free products while not mentioning stopping the production of disposables (in one of these three articles a Greenpeace campaigner even supports the production of dioxin free

⁴⁶⁴Interview, September 25, 1991.

disposable diapers).⁴⁶⁵ In the seventh article Kroesa reinforces the competitive economic system of expanding markets by encouraging companies to switch to dioxin-free technology. Kroesa states: "if they [forest companies] really want to keep their market share, they should be worried about chlorine usage and dioxins - it's a big concern regarding diapers, tampons, paper towels and coffee-filters".⁴⁶⁶

The pulp and paper campaign, therefore, illustrates the paradox in which Greenpeace finds itself; although the organization believes in structural and fundamental change it is also a very pragmatic organization. In order to enact change without reducing the credibility it needs to push for such change Greenpeace must often propose measures which are obtainable within the current economic and social system. This pragmatic approach means that its messages often reinforce the existing system because it downplays its more radical goals of reducing consumption, zero growth and the redistribution of wealth so as not lose the support it has worked so hard to acquire.

The paradox Greenpeace faces in being both a pragmatic and radical environmental organization is illustrated by

⁴⁶⁵See Bohn, "Dioxin-free pulp products urged", The Vancouver Sun, October 26, 1988, p.A10.

⁴⁶⁶"\$240-million mill plan bid to meet competition", The Vancouver Sun, February 26, 1988, p.B4.

Greenpeace's switch from lobbying governments and industry to educating consumers. Although only 3 articles out of 37 mention Greenpeace's education of consumers, Killeen points out that this approach did not become dominant until 1989.⁴⁶⁷ Diane Goulet⁴⁶⁸ notes that this switch was made because it became apparent that forest companies were too powerful for Greenpeace to challenge directly. The influence that forest companies had over government policy made it impossible to force politicians to implement legislation. The switching away from an industry centred approach, however, led to a focus on individuals rather than the structure of industry -a focus which David Kraft notes is a major problem in the media coverage of environmental issues.⁴⁶⁹ For example, in one article Renate Kroesa is quoted as saying "the problem is the consumer so far prefers whiter-than-white toilet paper and coffee filters. This has to change...white is normally associated with hygiene. But once they (consumers) know that white is associated with dioxin, I think they will change'".⁴⁷⁰ By concentrating on the individual consumer, such a statement draws attention away from the message that a fundamental change in the

⁴⁶⁷Interview, September 26, 1991.

⁴⁶⁸Interview, October 30, 1991.

⁴⁶⁹Interview, November 4, 1991.

⁴⁷⁰"Off-white said a dioxin beater", The Vancouver Sun, May 2, 1988, p.C5.

structure of the economy is needed to address environmental degradation. It also reinforces the idea of consumer sovereignty - an idea which ignores the extent to which industry has created our "needs" for certain paper products through advertising.⁴⁷¹

Therefore, although the philosophies of clean production and the precautionary principle invite radical critiques of the existing order, they are often presented in a way which actually reinforces the present market driven system. Campaigners try to convince industry to use clean production technologies so they can increase their market share and avoid further costs at a later date when pollution becomes more unacceptable to the public.⁴⁷² For example, in critiquing the forest industry a Greenpeace pamphlet states: "anxious about Canada's declining share of the world market, governments are committing us to a course of expanding mill capacity and increased logging, which is not only bad ecology but bad economics...industry analysts are predicting a 35% decline in pulp and paper prices as the ongoing expansion in world capacity, the largest increase since the

⁴⁷¹For example, industry has created the need for certain feminine hygiene products by convincing women that they are in a perpetual state of uncleanliness. See Armstrong and Scott, Whitewash, pp.45-49 for a further discussion.

⁴⁷²See Christensen, "Analysis of Pulp Bleaching Practices", Greenpieces, May 13, 1991.

1960's, comes on stream".⁴⁷³ Michael Manolson⁴⁷⁴ also notes that in the future, pulp and paper campaigners for Greenpeace will begin meeting with stockbrokers to persuade them that investing in chlorine technology is bad business because consumer tastes are changing towards more environmentally friendly products. Diane Goulet⁴⁷⁵ maintains that the most pressing need in the pulp and paper campaign is to develop a better economic analysis of the industry. This way Greenpeace can counter industry's claims that they are unable to afford environmentally friendly technology.

Although critiquing industry in terms of economic criteria is effective because it is taken seriously by forest companies, this form of criticism makes it difficult for Greenpeace to put out messages which advocate structural changes. Bruce MacKay⁴⁷⁶ maintains that this emphasis on economic analysis and technological fixes to environmental problems is taking Greenpeace in a direction that it should be avoiding.

CONCLUSION

⁴⁷³The Giveaway of our National Forests (Canada: Mitchell Press Ltd., 1991), p.5.

⁴⁷⁴Interview with Jeremy Wilson, November 20, 1990.

⁴⁷⁵Interview, October 30, 1991.

⁴⁷⁶Interview, October 21, 1991.

The coverage of the pulp and paper campaign from 1987 to 1989 provides an interesting contrast to Greenpeace's opposition to the seal hunt in 1976 and 1977. This contrast shows that Greenpeace's institutional development both benefited and harmed the coverage it received. Coverage was improved by institutional development because increased resources and organizational expansion meant that Greenpeace could spend much more time and money on research and community organizing. Greenpeace's increasing scientific expertise enabled the organization to successfully challenge the claims of industry and subsequently to become a credible source in The Vancouver Sun. The organization's experience in coordination and community organizing also increased Greenpeace's legitimacy because it was able to cultivate alliances with other groups and present a consistent message to the media throughout the campaign.

Greenpeace's legitimacy and credibility in the media was also aided by factors specific to the issue of pulp and paper pollution and the organization's increasing campaign strategy. Unlike the seal campaign, Greenpeace was now perceived to be taking on a major polluter instead being involved in a superficial or sensational concern.

Greenpeace also benefited from the fact that it was no longer opposing impoverished workers. Between 1987 and 1989 forest companies were making huge profits and not investing

these profits in controlling pollution. Industry was also unable to meet government regulations resulting in the fact that Greenpeace received much more support from political elites than it did during the seal campaign.

The nature of the pulp and paper industry and the increasing strategy of Greenpeace have also created problems for the coverage the organization received. The increased time Greenpeace spent on coordination meant that the organization's visibility in the media decreased. Although the media's coverage of Greenpeace as a legitimate source meant that the environmental concerns were taken seriously as a "reasoned discourse", this coverage also positioned the environmental group as mostly responding to the claims of industry and government officials. This "reactive" position was exacerbated by the historical importance of forestry in B.C. Whereas the seal hunt was far away and largely unimportant to the economic well being of British Columbians, the location of The Vancouver Sun and the economic returns from pulp and paper ensured that forest companies and government officials were given more access. This less visible role of Greenpeace, along with the increased access of industry and government spokespeople, would make it very difficult for the environmental group to put out a radical message in the mass media.

Along with the media's jaded attitude towards Greenpeace and the powerful nature of the pulp and paper

industry, the organization's ability to put out a radical message was also hindered by factors within the group itself. As Greenpeace broadened its support base it began to present its opposition to issues in ways which would not "scare off" its membership.⁴⁷⁷ The responsibility brought on by increased political clout also made Greenpeace see the need to present alternatives to polluting processes. This need to both increase its membership and provide "realistic" alternatives meant that the goals Greenpeace articulated most often were those such as the elimination of chlorine bleaching. Although ending chlorine bleaching would mean a major change in industrial processes, such changes could be made without a widespread change to the economic and social system because they do not challenge goals such as economic growth and technological progress. To publicly push for its more radical goals of reducing consumption or decreasing industrial competitiveness, on the other hand, would have risked a loss in public support and the suspicions of journalists. The coverage of the pulp and paper campaign, therefore, highlights a fundamental problem which movements must face in using the media to disseminate radical messages; in order to "make sense" or seem credible in their challenge of the existing order, movements such as

⁴⁷⁷Peerla notes for example that Greenpeace's opposition to the Gulf War caused a large decrease in donations. Interview, October 18, 1991.

Greenpeace often end up reinforcing the very system they wish to oppose.

CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION

After an examination of the framing of Greenpeace over time in The Vancouver Sun, it is apparent that the organization's quest to fundamentally challenge the accelerating destruction of the planet has transformed the environmental group's initial direct action orientation. The organization now only engages in actions within a wider campaign strategy and tries to avoid spectacular confrontations until all other means of pressuring for change have been exhausted. This transformation in the organization's direct action approach can be seen as resulting from the interaction of three factors: the changing media attitudes towards actions, Greenpeace's attempts to be more effective in pressuring for change, and an increasing public awareness of environmental issues.

Greenpeace's interaction with the media in the early 1970's was influenced by the low level of environmental awareness in society at that time. The lack of recognition of "the environment" as an important issue in the mass media placed Greenpeace almost exclusively outside newsgathering routines and made it necessary for the organization to engage in spectacles to obtain coverage. The direct action approach was very effective in raising awareness because the danger and confrontation, vivid imagery and novelty inherent in these spectacles attracted a great deal of media

attention. The images and confrontations produced by direct actions transformed complex problems into simple messages and encouraged audiences to challenge authority. As Harwood points out, "when Greenpeace's confrontational images first appeared, they represented a new and powerful way of attacking environmental problems. Resonant with echoes of Vietnam protests and civil disobedience, they were a major departure from the gentlemanly, legal-channels approach taken by established conservation organizations".⁴⁷⁸ Although the direct action approach allowed Greenpeace to obtain the sympathetic and prominent coverage needed to put environmental issues on the agenda in its early years, by the late 1970's the media was becoming increasingly jaded towards the organization's activities. The media's cynicism towards Greenpeace was sparked in part by the fact that the organization had existed for several years. Since Greenpeace was no longer considered "new" to the media, the organization found it difficult to attract coverage based on its "unusualness". Greenpeace's actions were also becoming more orchestrated which made journalists suspicious that they were being manipulated and reduced the amount of danger activists were exposed to.

Greenpeace was also encountering an increasingly unsympathetic media because of its involvement in

⁴⁷⁸Harwood, "Daredevils for the Environment", The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1988, p.74.

contentious issues like the seal hunt. Although the seal hunt was an inherently problematic issue for Greenpeace to become associated with since it was grounded in dubious scientific findings and involved sentimental urban emotions about furry creatures, the organization's lack of skills and resources made the campaign even more damaging to the group's reputation. Because Greenpeace was still an ad hoc group at this time, it lacked the ability to engage in community organizing and lobbying and subsequently encountered a great deal of criticism from other movements and political elites. Greenpeace's lack of institutionalization also made it difficult to coordinate its own activists and to control organizational infighting which led the media to see the group as disorganized and ineffective.⁴⁷⁹ Greenpeace's ability to destroy the sealing industry because of its increased power also meant that journalists expected the group to outline alternative industries to sealing in Newfoundland. But since the direct action approach was an inherently negative form of protest - i.e. activists were trying to "stop" the killing of seals -

⁴⁷⁹Journalists also became more cynical of Greenpeace during its period of infighting between the Vancouver and San Francisco offices. This infighting led to a more negative view of the organization because journalists found it ironic that a group trying to promote peace could not even achieve this goal among themselves. Headlines appeared such as "No peace in Greenpeace" and "Not so green, not so peaceful". See M'Gonigle, "No peace in Greenpeace", The Vancouver Sun, August 18, 1979 and Roberts, "Not so green, not so peaceful", Macleans, October 29, 1979, p.44b.

it was difficult for Greenpeace to outline alternatives. The inability to provide economically viable alternatives to sealing made Greenpeace vulnerable to being labelled unrealistic or uncaring.

The need to make alliances, control activists, provide alternatives to existing processes, and improve the quality of the coverage it received led Greenpeace to make its actions more strategic. The organization also recognized in the late 1980's that it needed to develop processes which pressured those in power directly because an increased environmental awareness in society was not being matched by a commitment of Governments to legislate against polluting processes. Greenpeace, therefore, began to develop other activities including research, public education and lobbying. This more strategic nature of campaigning was illustrated by the pulp and paper campaign in 1987-1989. Greenpeace improved its credibility enormously through its groundbreaking research on the release of organochlorines by pulp mills. This research enabled the organization to put pulp mill pollution "on the agenda" and to raise the suspicions of reporters towards official sources by refuting the claims of industry and government officials. Through its public education and lobbying Greenpeace was also able to make alliances with unions, Natives and other environmental groups and to gain support from political elites. This increased credibility in turn enabled the

organization to become a legitimate source for the media and to have more input into the policy process.

Besides improving its credibility in the media, institutional development also has had beneficial effects for Greenpeace itself. In this respect its experience was different than the case of the new left in the 1960's which Gitlin outlines in his book The Whole World is Watching. In his analysis, Gitlin outlines a process whereby the spotlight of the mass media completely transformed the movement by catalyzing a surge of militant support and by making it necessary for the new left to inflate rhetoric and to transform leaders into celebrities to attract coverage.⁴⁸⁰ Gitlin points out that the spotlight of media coverage on Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in fact destroyed the movement because its membership entered into a "mass mediated reality" in which all that mattered was how many minutes the group received on the television news. The media spotlight speeded up the movement's growth and activities to such an extent that the organizational structure of the group disintegrated and SDS essentially

⁴⁸⁰Gitlin points out that the media's tendency to focus on violence and movement leaders encouraged the new left during the 1960's to escalate violence and attract activists who were adept at posing for cameras. The increasing violence and certification of leaders led to the eventual destruction of the movement because the violence caused authorities to crackdown and the creation of celebrities caused internal cleavages and animosity. For a further discussion see Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), Chapter 5 and 6.

burnt under the glare of the media's attention.

Greenpeace's institutional development, on the other hand, has prevented the organization from entering into this destructive cycle. Although Greenpeace began escalating rhetoric during the seal campaign when Paul Watson threw a sealers club and pelt into the ocean, the organization's roots in the Quaker principles of non-violence and respect for property led to the firing of Watson. Greenpeace was also run by older and more established members in its early years which led the organization to be suspicious of egoistic individuals.⁴⁸¹ Furthermore, Greenpeace's attempts

⁴⁸¹Steve Sawyer, Executive Director of Greenpeace International (cited in The Greenpeace Years), mentions that the organization has made a significant effort to prevent the group from becoming overwhelmed by personalities or egos. The one case where a leader was transformed into a celebrity was the case of Paul Watson. Watson was initially embraced by the organization because of his bravery and intensity about environmental issues. Watson, however, proved to be too arrogant to work well as a team player. Watson was fired from the Board of Directors because he threw a sealer's club into the water - an action which breached Greenpeace's code of non-violence and avoidance of destroying property. Watson then went on to form the Sea Shepherd Society, an organization which has become renowned for its more violent forms of direct action. Watson's case continues to haunt Greenpeace because of the conflicts which continue to arise over the circumstances of his departure from Greenpeace. Watson continues to critique Greenpeace even today and although Greenpeace's break with Watson occurred over thirteen years ago, the association continues to plague the organization because Watson's actions are often perceived to be supported by Greenpeace. For a discussion of this point see Pearse, Green Warriors, p.32. For his latest criticisms of Greenpeace see Dunphy, "The Greenpeace Giant", The Georgia Strait, September 13-20, pp.7-8. For a further discussion of Watson's exploits and break with Greenpeace see Watson, Sea Shepherd (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1982); Robert Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1979), pp.

at lobbying, public education and research in the late 1970's gave Greenpeace an "anchor" and prevented the organization from defining itself solely in terms of the amount of media coverage it received. The more time Greenpeace campaigners began to spend doing meticulous work "behind the scenes" the less the organization would appeal to militant elements and people seeking the limelight which ended up destroying SDS.

Although the increasing strategic nature of direct actions have saved the organization from self destructing, the environmental group's survival has also created a dilemma in its relationship with the media. A heightened credibility arising from the organization's increased strategy has meant a decrease in dramatic actions and subsequently less coverage in The Vancouver Sun. Although the pulp and paper campaign showed that Greenpeace's role as a legitimate source led the media to position the organization as a participant in a reasoned environmental discourse and to concentrate attention on pollution rather than the group's spectacles, Greenpeace's comments were also framed within a context initiated by government officials and industry spokespeople. This context has made it difficult to put forth the organization's radical goals of reducing consumption and making the whole range of

production processes of paper sustainable. Therefore, although its credibility has increased, power to frame debates is still constrained and the coverage of the organization has dropped. Hackett refers to this kind of dilemma in his study of peace groups as the "counterproductive temptations" of the media. According to Hackett,

to the [peace] movement, journalism holds out counterproductive temptations: Gain media attention by turning leaders into celebrities, staging disruptive spectacles, and escalating tactics and rhetoric; or alternatively, gain media respect by abandoning radical critiques, accepting the dominant terms of debate, and promoting only specific and manageable reforms.⁴⁸²

Greenpeace's institutionalization has also added to this dilemma because the organization now has to be careful about how it states its radical messages for fear of losing support.⁴⁸³ Because although Peerla⁴⁸⁴ notes that Greenpeace has a large base of support, this support is quite fragile and can fluctuate quite substantially if Greenpeace takes an unpopular stance on an issue.

Because Greenpeace wants *both* to maintain its credibility and communicate effectively with supporters, it

⁴⁸²Hackett, News and Dissent, p.275.

⁴⁸³For a discussion of this point see Harwood, "Daredevils for the environment", The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1988, p. 74.

⁴⁸⁴Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

has begun to circumvent and reduce its dependency on the media. Greenpeace has reduced its dependency by developing its own communications network - the Greenlink - and by increasing its direct mail and door-to-door canvassing. Through these other forms of communication Greenpeace is better able to diversify the range of messages it is able to put forth. It is able to reach its members with more radical and detailed information while at the same time not "scaring off" or confusing future supporters with too disruptive or complicated a message. Greenpeace, therefore, tends to have a public and a private face in order to get around the constraints inherent in putting out radical messages in the mainstream media. Internally, Greenpeace expresses the need to see environmental problems holistically and structurally while it takes the more palatable stance in the mainstream media of advocating technological change and focusing on single issues.

Peerla⁴⁸⁵ points out that Greenpeace's development of communication technologies is so advanced that it is subsequently changing from an image to an information corporation. The organization has transformed the initial ability of its direct actions to create outrage⁴⁸⁶ and to

⁴⁸⁵Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

⁴⁸⁶David Kraft (Telephone Interview, November 4, 1991) notes that Greenpeace's success has been due to the fact that it has become a mythical organization in the most positive sense of the world. Greenpeace has been able to

put issues on the agenda⁴⁸⁷ into the resources and structures that it believes will form a starting point in transforming awareness into public action and fundamental change. Ironically, therefore, Greenpeace has used the resources largely obtained through its exposure in the media to reduce its reliance on mainstream journalism.

THE FUTURE OF GREENPEACE

David McTaggart notes that the largest problem facing Greenpeace in the past has been apathy; today the difficulties lie in trying to channel the huge growth of environmental awareness in the right direction and to "focus it on a handful of make-or-break issues in the next decade".⁴⁸⁸ Peerla⁴⁸⁹ notes that with increased

tap into the current cynicism with the existing political leadership and supporters appreciate that there is an organization which is willing to really "stick it" to polluters and the authorities who condone pollution.

⁴⁸⁷Jim Bohlen (Telephone Interview, October 16, 1991) maintains that Greenpeace's success can be illustrated with a quote from Jack Webster "Greenpeace is popular for two reasons, the people either hate you or they love you". Bohlen maintains that these two emotions sparked by Greenpeace create dialogue and interest. For a further discussion of this point see also Dykstra, "Institutions: Greenpeace", Environment, Vol. 28, No. 6, July/August 1986, p.5.

⁴⁸⁸Quoted in Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, p. 14.

⁴⁸⁹Personal Interview with David Peerla, October 18, 1991.

environmental awareness actions have become a relatively bankrupt form of protest because the media has become jaded towards spectacles and it is difficult to empower audiences through actions. Greenpeace now wants to use the awareness initially brought out by direct actions to empower the public to push for change. This desire to mobilize the public is beginning to shift Greenpeace's activities in three ways: 1) to prioritize a few all-encompassing campaigns; 2) an expansion from the first to the third world; and 3) a change from its research and direct action orientation to the role of community organizing.

Michael Manolson⁴⁹⁰ notes that as Greenpeace moves into the 1990's it is trying to put its resources and expertise into a few specific areas where they will have the most effect. For the 1990's, the priority campaign has become atmosphere and energy. This priority is based on the seriousness of the threat associated with the current environmental problems in the atmosphere - global warming and depletion of the ozone layer. It also is a campaign which involves major structural changes in production and consumption patterns because it encompasses a wide variety of polluting processes including the burning of fossil fuels, the production of CFC's and global deforestation. The campaign also entails taking on very large players in

⁴⁹⁰Telephone interview between Jeremy Wilson and Michael Manolson, November 20, 1990.

the global economy including the oil industry and car manufacturers.⁴⁹¹

The decision of Greenpeace to take on the roots of environmental degradation in all-encompassing campaigns such as atmosphere and energy has created the need for Greenpeace's second trend in the 1990's - its entry into the Third World. David McTaggart maintains that besides trying to channel environmental energy, a major challenge for Greenpeace is to combat nationalism.⁴⁹² Since environmental problems have no boundaries, and it is apparent that the major environmental struggles of the future are going to take place in the third world,⁴⁹³ Greenpeace has begun to expand into Latin America. Entering into poor countries is a major challenge for Greenpeace because the group has

⁴⁹¹David Kraft (Interview, November 4, 1991) notes that in Canada the atmosphere and energy campaign is confronting significant mega-projects including James Bay II in Quebec and nuclear power in Ontario and is subsequently taking on large energy suppliers such as Hydro Quebec and Ontario Hydro. In Canada, the campaign is generally aimed at trying to prevent the expansion of all forms of environmentally destructive energy supply which involves making this supply more efficient and reducing consumption.

⁴⁹²Cited in Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, p.33.

⁴⁹³For a discussion of some of these struggles see Pearce, Green Warriors (London: The Bodley Head, 1991) and Schneider (ed), Deforestation and "Development" in Canada and the Tropics (Nova Scotia: City Printers Ltd., 1989).

historically been perceived as white and middle class.⁴⁹⁴ As Greenpeace has "come of age", however, David Kraft⁴⁹⁵ points out that the organization is increasingly recognizing that it cannot convince the south or the poor in the north to take on a program of environmental change without there being some kind of a restructuring of society and a redistribution of wealth.

Expansion into the third world is also problematic because as Ostertag points out: "as Greenpeace's weight grows, so does the chance that it could take a misstep, and inadvertently stomp on the very people it needs on its side".⁴⁹⁶ This problem has occurred historically with Greenpeace in the anti-sealing and trapping campaigns. Because of the destruction campaigns against fur products caused to Northern communities, Greenpeace still finds it difficult to make alliances with Natives today. Greenpeace's expansion into the third world, therefore, means that it must make another adjustment - changing to a

⁴⁹⁴For a discussion of this point see Horton, "The Green Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p.109 and Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, pp. 86-87.

⁴⁹⁵Telephone Interview with David Kraft, November 4, 1991.

⁴⁹⁶Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, p. 14.

focus on public education and community organizing.⁴⁹⁷ As Ostertag notes, "to exercise its power effectively will require skills that have not so far had top billing in the Greenpeace circus: constituency mobilization, coalition building - in a word, politics".⁴⁹⁸ Tamara Stark⁴⁹⁹ and David Kraft⁵⁰⁰ both note that a major change within Greenpeace has been the hiring of Greenpeace personnel from different social movements. This shift in hiring practices has occurred because Greenpeace is trying to tie itself to a larger social base and to activate its supporters. In the first world Greenpeace is able to activate supporters through its direct mail and door-to-door canvassing by encouraging people to express their views to polluting corporations and the politicians who condone pollution. In the third world, on the other hand, the process is much more

⁴⁹⁷This adjustment was shown when Greenpeace decided not to endorse a boycott of tuna not designated to be "dolphin-free" after it talked to community groups in Latin America and discovered that the boycott was largely a tool by U.S. tuna canneries to squeeze Latin American countries out of the market and retain a monopoly over the industry. For a further discussion on this Greenpeace decision see Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, pp.84-85 and Horton, "The Green Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p.48.

⁴⁹⁸Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the world", Mother Jones, April 1991, p.84.

⁴⁹⁹Telephone Interview with Tamara Stark, October 21, 1991.

⁵⁰⁰Telephone Interview with David Kraft, November 4, 1991.

time consuming because of the suspicion towards western middle class movements. McTaggart sees Greenpeace's world-wide communications network and global non-partisan support as having the ability to provide structure or to be a catalyst for a "planetary environmental revolt".⁵⁰¹ Ostertag points out, however, that "such stay-in-the-background sentiments will run strongly against the grain of an organization with a reputation for using glamour and high tech to hog the spotlight".⁵⁰²

Greenpeace's increasing emphasis on providing the structure, expertise and resources for a global revolt, therefore, is likely to be played out mostly through other channels besides the mass media. This declining interest in the media is partly because Greenpeace activists recognize that less visible and all-encompassing forms of environmental destruction like the Greenhouse effect are difficult to package for the media. Furthermore, Greenpeace's movement into the third world and its "behind the scenes" attempts to empower the public cannot co-exist comfortably alongside mass media priorities; media organizations are regionally based and subsequently do not portray the international vision that Greenpeace is

⁵⁰¹Harwood, "Daredevils for the environment", The New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1988, p.76.

⁵⁰²Ostertag, "Greenpeace takes over the World", Mother Jones, April 1991, p. 87.

pursuing.⁵⁰³ In addition, the media's purpose of selling consumers to advertisers places audiences as political spectators and subsequently works against Greenpeace's attempts to empower citizens. Finally, the coercive regimes in third world countries,⁵⁰⁴ as well as the increasing need to take on major players within the global economy, makes it almost impossible for Greenpeace to mobilize change through dramatic and confrontational actions.⁵⁰⁵

How these changes in priorities will affect Greenpeace's ability to fundamentally change exploitative social practices will depend on how imaginative the group is in countering the challenges of the powerful which will be raised against it. Right now Greenpeace has suffered a major setback from its opposition to the Gulf War. Greenpeace U.S.A., a major fundraiser for the international campaigns, suffered a decline in support after it opposed

⁵⁰³For a discussion of how the First World dominates the flow of information in a global media network see Boyd-Barrett, "Cultural dependency and the mass media" in Gurevitch et al (eds), Culture, Society and the Media (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp. 174-195.

⁵⁰⁴For a discussion of the problem of media-oriented actions in coercive regimes see Levy-Willard, "The Greenpeace Saga", World Press Review, December 1985, p.55.

⁵⁰⁵Jim Bohlen explains that entering into escalating confrontations with the authorities is a very dangerous game because the authorities are much more effective at coercion than movements. As Bohlen puts it, "Never start a pissing battle with a skunk". Interview, October 16, 1991.

the war.⁵⁰⁶ On the one hand, this decrease in support indicates how careful Greenpeace will have to be in its future campaigns if it is to survive. On the other hand, however, a careful approach may be the opposite of what is needed in a world where the environmental crisis is deepening with each passing day. David McTaggart points out that risk is at the heart of what Greenpeace is about. According to McTaggart, "we were never made to be a bureaucracy...I hope we're big enough and strong enough now to take on some issues big enough to maybe shut us down, or at least a part of us".⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶For a further discussion of the decrease in support for opposing the Gulf War see Horton, "The Green Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p. 109.

⁵⁰⁷Quoted in Horton, "The Greenpeace Giant", Rolling Stone, September 5, 1991, p.112.

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APPENDIX

COVERAGE OF GREENPEACE CAMPAIGNS (number of articles)

Article Subject	1971-77	1977-84	1984-90	Total
Nuclear/Disarm	204	45	93	342
Ocean Ecology	186	182	25	393
Toxics	3	11	70	84
Atmos/Energy	1	1	0	2
Forests	0	0	1	1
Wildlife	0	38	7	46
Greenpeace	22	33	7	61
Consumer Habits	0	0	6	6
Miscellaneous	1	3	1	5
Total	417	313	210	940

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16/07/1992

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