

Banishing The Past:

An American Perspective of 'Renazification'

in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949

by

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ABSTRACT

When reviewing the existing literature regarding the occupation of Germany after World War II, one word consistently appears—denazification. The Americans were very committed to denazifying their zone in Germany. Whether it was media, films, the military, economics, government or the schools, the Americans aimed to denazify all aspects of German life. The Americans attempted to change a culture.

It also became clear that most historians felt the program was ill-conceived and a failure. A small group believed the program should never have been attempted and a few felt that the program was not prosecuted with sufficient vigour.

Because re-education at the German universities had been almost entirely ignored by historians—and German resistance to foreign occupation and re-education even more so—I chose to study the attempt to re-educate the Germans at the universities, taking into account the complications that denazification created. The thesis explains how the German people reacted to this

alteration of their institutions. What was found was that many aspects of the occupation had received little discussion or research.


The documents collected from the U.S. National Archives provided a great deal of information. When this fresh material was considered in conjunction with insights from the diary of the most respected education officer, Edward Hartshorne, and a comparison of university faculty lists after the occupation, it became clear that denazification had failed and a 'renazification' had taken place. As well, there was evidence of a growing resistance to the American occupation and its programs.

When the entire story is considered, it was found that most historians, for whatever reasons, had failed to take note of a large body of relevant material. Historians had viewed 'reorientation' as the alteration to re-education that spelled success for American policy in West Germany. I found quite the opposite, that there was no re-education or denazification success. The evidence established that 'renazification' had occurred at the universities and that conservative, nationalistic and Nazi trends were prevalent at such institutions, often being supported by sinister groups. I concluded that denazification should have been more aggressively applied. Based on such a conclusion it seems that the extra costs and troubles to run a successful denazification program would have been warranted, and that the resources were available. At the very least, this work

provides a launching pad for further study. The repercussions of 'renazification' for West Germany is only briefly discussed in this study (or in any other).

However, if this hypothesis is accepted, the history of the Federal Republic of West Germany may need amending. Those who have warned that West Germany was not decentralized, nor decartelized, nor denazified (especially at the universities) will now have a firmer foundation to stand on.


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Gordon Argyle

November 30, 1995

Dedicated To
Frances & George Argyle

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM

On January 1, 1946, Dr. Edward Y. Hartshorne ended an article on the perplexing problem of re-education in American Occupied Germany by observing that, "One cannot simultaneously enslave and educate for freedom."¹

The problem Dr. Hartshorne was addressing was that more than one purpose had been assigned to the re-education effort in American-occupied Germany. Re-education was burdened with the job of rebuilding and reopening German educational institutions, and with establishing a program that fostered democracy, and making certain that all aspects of Nazism were eradicated: that is, to 'denazify' the institutions.

An analogy that hopefully assists the reader in understanding the Allied dilemma can be found in considering the problem that our society faces with its own judicial system. (The same paradox of placing a criminal in prison for punishment and then expecting him or her to exit the facility 'rehabilitated' was the problem confronting the Allies.) Military Government (MG) was ordered to

¹U.S. National Archives, Section RG 260, Office of Military Government (U.S.) for Germany, RG 260, File 23, Section 1821, Box 700, Hesse. (Hereafter all Military Documents cited under OMGUS, with box and file no.)

punish an entire people, presumed guilty, for waging an aggressive war and committing the other crimes of the Nationalist Socialist regime. While millions lost their jobs and homes either as punishment, or for security purposes, they were expected to accept American propaganda exalting the virtues of freedom and abandoning many of the old cultural realities of militarism, conservatism, and nationalism, which were believed to foster Nazism. There are those who might argue that there is no analogy between the individual criminal and the collective guilt applied to the German people. However Professor Röpke, in The Solution of the German Problem, emphasizes that the Nazi regime always claimed to be acting for 'das Volk'; therefore, guilt was not personal and consequently Nazi crimes were communal crimes.² At least that was how the Allies interpreted the situation, especially after witnessing the atrocities of the concentration camps. Placing criminals in prison, and the corresponding degradation of such a situation, has been shown to do little to convince them that society wishes them to become 'rehabilitated'.³ Similarly, the idea of fostering an acceptance of American democratic ideals, or restructuring an educational system while simultaneously applying to almost all the German people a 'guilty until proven

²Wilhelm Röpke, The Solution of the German Problem (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1947).

³Herbert Gamberg & Anthony Thompson, The Illusion of Prison Reform (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1984), pp. 47-49.

innocent' label, and definitely tarring as such all members of the National Socialist Party, left the German population unconvinced, dispirited and distrustful of their conqueror's sincerity.

Similar to the situation in our prisons, there was no incentive for a criminal to change. A prisoner might pretend to change in order to obtain freedom, in the same way as many Germans said what they believed the Allies wished to hear in order to be rid of them and regain control of their lives. In Germany, the pretense of accepting American democratic values was the means of being successfully denazified. In the universities the teaching of democratic values was expected to be embraced by the denazified faculty and students. Realistically, it was expected that many students and faculty would only offer a pretense of accepting democratic principles and abandoning National Socialist ideology.

Once denazified, the Germans expected to take control of their lives back from MG. Control, for many, meant having the right to embrace a right wing or Nazi ideology. However, American denazification policies made the Nazi Party illegal and all political activities had to be authorized by the MG. To many Germans these restrictions by MG suggested that the rhetoric of American democracy was blatantly hypocritical. Freedom of choice was to be available from a select group of MG authorized political entities.)



To understand the title of this thesis some explanation of denazification, and consequently 'renazification', is necessary. Denazification was not just the removal of the leaders of the Third Reich or the disbanding of the National Socialist Party. Denazification was a purposeful plan to create a "revolution by decree," as suggested by former Special Branch 'denazification' officer and author, William Griffith.⁴ This revolution was intended to change the thinking and the very soul of the German people; in short it was an attempt to alter a culture. Many American politicians and military commanders believed that the task of denazification could be accomplished through re-education. What better place to change the hearts and minds of a people than through a new educational system stressing the supposedly correct way to think and act.

The title therefore reflects the thesis of this paper. It is proposed that denazification efforts failed for a variety of reasons. This failure is not fresh news. However, this thesis proposes to establish that, not only was denazification a failure, but that American MG and domestic political factors led to active renazification. Renazification does not mean that National Socialism thrived as a large, active, organized political movement. Many people who believed in the

⁴William E. Griffith, "Denazification in the U.S. Zone of Germany," Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 67. Dr. Griffith's denazification experience was extensive, culminating with his appointment as head of Special Branch's Denazification Board in Bavaria District.

fundamental precepts of National Socialism, and who therefore saw the Americans as enemies, were involved in this renazification. These people gained or regained positions throughout the German government, bureaucracy, police forces and, of specific importance to this thesis, the universities, both as faculty and as students.⁵

Historians have disagreed about denazification and its application through re-education since late 1945. There are three broad schools of historiography into which the historians and their works can be grouped.

The first and most popular interpretation was that denazification was an immense burden put upon a small group of educational specialists and military men. Supposedly, the program of re-education would have been better served if tempered and if less severe denazification guidelines had existed. This first interpretation of the evidence has been endorsed by most historians, and if a basic 'paradigm' exists, it is based on this foundation. The second school of thought holds that denazification was a completely wasted effort. This theme has received little support and has never threatened the traditional paradigm. The third school, which claims that denazification and re-education efforts should have

⁵Figures from Dr. E. Hartshorne's Personal Diary, May-November 23, 1945, pp. 40-72 show an average of 60% of the faculty fell into the mandatory removal category as severe offenders.

been more aggressively pursued, has received some attention and is the one that this thesis endorses.

Marshall Knappen, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Education and Religious Affairs Branch (E&RA), wrote an early book based upon the first viewpoint.⁶ Published in 1947, Knappen's work reflects a sullen and cynical attitude regarding American efforts. Knappen believed that Military Government had to be pragmatic, even if this meant that Nazis regained positions, at all levels, in the universities.⁷ Knappen believed that reopening institutions of learning should have been done as rapidly as possible. He saw the need for 'vetting' only the top Nazi offenders and utilizing the skilled faculty and administrators who, though Nazis, were not 'Major Offenders', mainly because he desired to expedite the reopening of the schools. Because of his desire to get on with the job of rebuilding schools, supplying texts and repairing living quarters, Knappen viewed the Germans as posing little risk, even if they had a Nazi past. In his review of Knappen's book, George N. Schuster agreed that MG officers faced a task unimagined by the MG planners, which contributed to an early frustration on

⁶Marshall Knappen, And Call It Peace (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1947), pp. 119-135.

⁷Ibid., p. 136.

Knappen's part.⁸ Another explanation of Knappen's attitude was that he viewed the Germans not only as a beaten and non-threatening people, but as one whose fundamental character was unlikely to be changed through re-education.

Knappen believed this fundamental character was one that would gravitate to authoritarian government and aggressive nationalist sentiment. Consequently Knappen remained unconvinced that the German 'nature' could be altered by denazification and re-education.

Knappen was not alone in holding this psychiatric view of the German people.⁹ The Menasha group also saw the Germans as a distinct race with schizophrenic problems related to inferiority and "parental issues." The so-named Menasha group was a gathering of prominent psychiatrists, behaviorists and intellectuals, with a mandate by the US government to explain why the Germans apparently were so aggressive and to provide an answer as to what an occupying force could do to reduce this German characteristic. The Menasha group believed there was an imbalance in the German family unit. They suggested that German fathers were overly stern and remote, while the mothers were typically docile and offered little solace to the male child. It was believed that these parental

⁸George N. Schuster, Review of And Call It Peace by Marshall Knappen, Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. 19, 1949-50, pp. 368-369.

⁹Knappen, Call It Peace, pp. 94-119.

insecurities led to problems such as bed-wetting by male children, and in adulthood resulted in a withdrawn, paranoid male with aggressive tendencies. The Menasha group believed fundamentally that in order to succeed, re-education should involve a restructuring of the German family, accomplished by offering parenting courses throughout the American zone.¹⁰ Such an anthropological view of the Germans was often expressed by British politicians and Military Government officers in the British zone as well.¹¹

Working with the optimistic Lieutenant Colonel John Taylor, head of E&RA, and often with the most important education officer, Dr. Edward Hartshorne, Knappen tended to find himself at odds with the efforts of these two men. Knappen's morose and uninspired execution of what was admittedly a huge job caused him to be overlooked by Taylor, Hartshorne and the Commander of Public Health, Major General Stayer, who were busy attempting to reopen the

¹⁰Menasha Roundtable, "Germany After The War," The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, vol. 15 (July 1945), pp. 375-415.

¹¹Arthur Hearnden, ed., The British In Germany (London, England: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1978), entire collection. Articles by Education Chief Birley and local Education Field Advisors are consistent in their recommendation that the German nature could not be changed and rendering Germany demilitarized was of greater importance. Combat commanders in 1945 were of the opinion that the British should denazify aggressively.

university medical faculties in the summer of 1945 and still provide a mechanism for satisfactory denazification.¹²

As mentioned earlier, Knappen viewed the reopening of the universities as a job that could have been accomplished by August 1945, with only denazification of the worst faculty offenders needed.¹³ Rather than Nazi influence, Knappen was concerned with the influence of the Churches in German education. He did not agree with many occupation officers that the 'Confessional' Church was a stabilizing influence. Knappen saw elements in the Church which preached reactionary viewpoints favouring conservatism and right-wing politics.

Harold Zink fostered this same view in his first written work on post-war Germany, published in October 1946. In this article Zink also recognized the need for a quick denazification of the top "bad" Nazis; but he was also the first historian to question the fact that American officers had an overly trusting reliance upon the German Catholic Church.¹⁴ Historians have reasoned that the

¹²Dr. Edward Y. Hartshorne, Personal Diary entries for July 1945. This diary is unpublished and was obtained through a surviving family member, Professor Robin Hartshorne of Berkeley University.

¹³Knappen, Call It Peace, p. 105.

¹⁴Harold Zink, "The American Denazification Program In Germany," Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3 (London, England), October 1946, pp. 229-235. Zink was on leave from Depaul University and worked as a consultant to the Control Council of the occupation forces.

officers were looking for a stable group to assist in restructuring the German administration; many were comfortable in viewing the Church as that stable influence.

Knappen fathered the notion that denazification put excessive demands upon the time of Military Government officers in the field. Zink supported Knappen's hypothesis, and favorably reviewed Knappen's book in the American Historical Review. In fact, he expanded the hypothesis in order to help explain why denazification ultimately fell short of fulfilling its mandate. Both authors agreed that Law No. 8, the expansion of denazification investigations, was a disastrous initiative. Law No. 8 was the brainchild of Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, and extended denazification from German government positions to management levels in the economy. Both Knappen and Zink believed the additional burden of more denazification investigations effectively curtailed the possibility of any constructive work occurring in occupied Germany.¹⁵

Zink became the accepted authority on the occupation with the publication in 1957 of The United States in Germany, 1944-1955. Zink argued

¹⁵Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-55 (Westport CT: Greenwood, 1957), pp. 201-211. Law No. 8 was issued September 26, 1945. In July 1946 the German Länder Ministers were forced to issue a decree on the *Laws for the Liberation of Germany*. These laws stipulated that all known National Socialists or affiliated organizations were to be terminated from employment until they had been vetted.

that education as a whole suffered dramatic setbacks as a result of Law No. 8. He offered as evidence the fact that 80% of the teachers were dismissed in the school system, causing overcrowding and necessitating the hiring of either old, traditional, nationalist instructors, or young 'suspect' teachers, often tainted by exposure to 'Hitlerite' teachings. Zink's work was well received. In reviews by Elmer Plischke¹⁶, Helen Liddell¹⁷, and Marshall Knappen¹⁸, Zink's conclusions were generally supported. Each reviewer offered the mild criticism that Zink could have used a wider range of documentation. Each also suggested that Zink successfully covered a wide array of topics, including education. Everybody acknowledged that Zink was foremost a political scientist, and that he offered a thoughtful and detailed analysis of the evolution and implementation of MG as a political entity. They all agreed Zink's work lacked any insight into the difficulties of the day-to-day operation of MG in Germany. The reviews also pointed to the lack of any substantive discussion of re-education policies at the university level. As far as a discussion of the universities was concerned, Zink and

¹⁶Elmer Plischke, Review of United States In Germany: 1945-55 by Harold Zink. The American Political Science Review, vol. III, (1958), pp. 549-551.

¹⁷Helen Liddell, Review of United States In Germany: 1944-55 by Harold Zink. International Affairs, vol. 34 no. 1 (January 1958), pp. 231-232.

¹⁸Marshall Knappen, Review of United States In Germany: 1944-55 by Harold Zink. Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. 18 (July 1958), pp. 216-217.

Knappen stated only that little attention was paid to reopening these institutions. Both subscribed to the idea that some denazification was needed but that the job became an obsession of Military Government. The lack of discussion of the universities is noticeable in all the historiographical work until 1982, when James Tent's book Mission on the Rhine, was published.

Zink believed that under the circumstances existing in the first eighteen months, Knappen and his fellow E&RA officers did as fine a job as possible. Both men subscribed to the belief that the new policy of 'reorientation' was the catalyst for success in changing the German 'nature'. (Reorientation was introduced in 1948 and meant bringing instructors from abroad for brief visits and lectures and, at the same time, sending chosen German students and faculty abroad. Thus it was hoped the German character could be influenced by exposure to new orientations. This program was believed to be the salvation of the re-education and democratization effort.¹⁹ At the same time MG had proposed ending the American involvement in denazification. They believed the policy was causing severe retardation of German economic and scholastic recovery. Reorientation was seen as a 'constructive' policy that would gain the support of the German people. Surprisingly it was local Germans and the British

¹⁹Zink, German Occupation, 1944-55, pp. 211-225.

military that objected to the ending of denazification at this time.²⁰ They still believed that the Germans, as a whole, were not ready to administer their affairs and that many important Nazis were still at large.

Another important work also published in 1957, was John Montgomery's Forced To Be Free. While Montgomery agreed with Knappen and Zink that denazification was an ill-conceived program, he also noted that all German political parties divorced themselves of any responsibility for the program's failure. Montgomery argued that German politicians realized that the public wanted the ex-Nazis treated fairly. To this end, the elected Länder officials hired back denazified bureaucrats. Montgomery argued that the politicians did this in order to prevent a large, poor, disenfranchised, nationalist group from forming.²¹

Eugene Davidson's The Death and Life of Germany (1959), supported the contentions made by Zink and Knappen, namely, that denazification had been overly zealous and destructive. (Davidson further argued that the Soviets used the poor American denazification record as propaganda against the Allies) he was able to point to numerous cases of high-level Nazis regaining positions in

²⁰James F. Tent, Mission On The Rhine (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1982), pp. 82-84.

²¹John D. Montgomery, Forced To Be Free (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1957), pp. 62-69.

government and industry. The Soviets argued that the denazification program purposefully slowed down economic and educational recovery in the British and American zones by chasing 'nominal' or unimportant Nazi Party members. In common with Zink, Davidson suggested that only when the Americans softened their approach to denazification was any constructive work in Germany possible.²²

By 1961 it can be argued that the paradigm had evolved, and that this was palpable to both American and German historians. For Americans recognized that out of a difficult four year period some constructive work was accomplished and an ally in West Germany had been established. West Germans could feel vindicated. The ending of denazification resolved the question of collective guilt. American and German historians appeared to agree that the worst criminals should have been the focus of denazification, and that the first two years had been poorly planned and ill-advised. The leniency that ensued in 1948 legitimized the Nazis who had evaded the Spruchkammern and had regained positions of authority throughout the German bureaucracy, in police forces and university faculties.

²²Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life Of Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 152.

Eugene Davidson's book also focused attention on an additional reason for ending denazification. His book down-played the apparent foibles of the program and focused upon the conflict that had developed between the Soviets and Americans. Davidson believed the Americans had, by late 1945, outlined a deliberate strategy against the Soviets.²³ As John Gimbel pointed out in his book review, Davidson lost sight of the implications of the original mandate of the Americans, which was to denazify, demilitarize, democratize and decentralize German society. Gimbel criticized Davidson for not fulfilling his original intent to portray the effects of the occupation upon the common German civilian.²⁴

Ronald F. Bunn of Texas University found similar fault with Davidson's book. Bunn suggested that Davidson used the issue of American/Soviet relations as a "scape-goat" for the failure of denazification. Bunn believed that the period in Germany from 1933 to 1955 could be seen as analogous to the French Revolution, and he argued that Davidson unwittingly made this argument.²⁵ The German Nazi revolution, too, comprised a necessary purging of reactionary

²³Davidson, The Death And Life, pp. 82-130.

²⁴John Gimbel, Review of The Death and Life of Germany by Eugene Davidson. South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 59 (1960), pp. 291-293.

²⁵Ronald F. Bunn, Review of The Death and Life of Germany by Eugene Davidson. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 2 (September 1959), pp. 277-279.

and autocratic forces. Bunn's observation was welcomed by many German historians as they wrestled to make some sense of the excesses during the Nazi regime. For some German historians then, the Nazi regime made historical sense and had served a purpose, and they consequently saw the denazification program as unnecessary and overly harsh.

It would appear that Gimbel was intrigued by Davidson's methodology, the use of surveys, interviews with both MG officials and German bureaucrats as well as the use of available Office of Military Government / United States (OMGUS) files, and this led to important work by Gimbel.

In the 1960s John Gimbel added to the literature supporting Zink's and Knappen's main arguments, as well as developing new ideas on the effects of the occupation. In 1961 he produced an intensive study of Marburg, entitled A German Community Under American Occupation.²⁶ This work was highly effective because of the anecdotal information it contained. Gimbel's interviews with Germans in Marburg, as well as a select group of Military Government personnel, provided a sense of realism and specificity that earlier works lacked.

Gimbel agreed with Knappen and Zink that the first months of occupation were devoted to the pragmatic matters of rebuilding infrastructure and forming

²⁶John Gimbel, A German Community Under American Occupation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961). Gimbel was one of the early historians to utilize records from the German city files.

local administrations, and that scant attention was paid to denazification.

Gimbel argued that when the Americans insisted upon intensifying denazification procedures, Germans eager to side with the Americans became disillusioned.²⁷

The anti-Nazis felt left out of MG organizational plans. They saw nominal Nazis being dismissed from many positions and high ranking Nazi members evading MG efforts. To many, MG appeared much the same as the tyranny that had just been overthrown by war.

Robert McNeill's review pointed directly to this dilemma that American denazification policy had created. However, McNeill questioned whether Gimbel's choice of Marburg was representative of Germany. As McNeill pointed out, Marburg was a conservative city with a university dominated by nationalist professors. McNeill's uncertainty was shared by others who believed Gimbel's case study suffered from its narrow sampling. McNeill also questioned Gimbel's conclusions and speculated that they were too broad when obtained from such a small sample.²⁸ John Conway said Gimbel believed American denazification would only be successful if implemented in a similar fashion as was done in the Soviet Zone. This would mean imposing a specific political system and denying

²⁷Ibid., p. 35.

²⁸Robert J. McNeill, Review of A German Community Under American Occupation by John Gimbel, Midwest Journal Of Political Science, vol. 6 (1962), pp. 219-220.

participation to anyone unwilling to accept the new political doctrine. This argument did not accurately reflect Gimbel's thesis. Gimbel had argued against aggressive denazification and suggested that the Russian method would ultimately fail. Conway agreed, for the same reasons as Gimbel, that denazification did not lead to the liberalization of the German bureaucracy or educational institutions. As with Zink, Knappen and Gimbel, Conway contended that the policy was conceived "cavalierly."²⁹

In 1968 Gimbel added to the literature a well documented book about zonal problems in occupied Germany. Gimbel's second major work, The American Occupation of Germany, argued that the French were to blame for obstructing many of the American and British efforts at re-establishing German economic, health and government autonomy.³⁰

Gimbel also took the case against denazification a step further. At one point he suggested that an Education Officer who was a "sociologist from Harvard had supported the idea that a rapid annihilation of the Nazis by German

²⁹John S. Conway, Review of A German Community Under American Occupation by John Gimbel. International Journal, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1961-62), pp. 74-75.

³⁰John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 54-78.

opponents would diminish opposition to reconstruction."³¹ Gimbel could have been referring to Dr. Edward Hartshorne, who was a historian as well as a sociologist from Harvard, and was working on re-opening Marburg University. However, it is probable that he was referring to James Warburg, a Harvard professor who had written a book in 1947 suggesting that many Germans were prepared for a 'revolution'.³² Gimbel dismissed the whole idea as overly optimistic since the best MG estimates suggested that only 1% of the population were active anti-Nazis. As it was, Hartshorne was working to reopen the university and develop an applicable mechanism to denazify the faculty at the same time. Of all the American E&RA officers, he was known to have the deepest understanding of German culture and the educational system.³³ Unfortunately, Gimbel makes no comment about the work of Dr. Hartshorne. The first-hand information Gimbel did have was severely biased and came either from people consumed with an anthropological view of the Germans as a breed

³¹Ibid., p. 54.

³²James P. Warburg, Germany: Bridge or Battleground (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 266.

³³Edward Y. Hartshorne, German Universities and National Socialism (London, England: George Allen and Unwin, 1937). Dr. Hartshorne gained some of his expertise as a Ph.D. student in Germany studying the effects of National Socialism on the German educational system.

who could never change, or from Germans who regarded the Americans as the enemy, attempting to indoctrinate German youth with American values through the schools. All this resulted from Gimbel's excessive exposure to the German Communists in local government positions in Marburg, or the influence of popular British opinion about the 'unchangeable' and militant nature of the German.

Such biases permeated Gimbel's work. Gimbel took a position similar to Zink; namely, that denazification was a job the Americans were ill-prepared to do, and further, that it resulted in many nominal Nazis being summarily thrown out of work. The ironic result of this was that they prospered more than the anti-Nazi Germans, as they had the entire day free to manipulate the black market.³⁴ Writing at the height of the cold war, Gimbel suggested that the local governments were dominated by vengeful Communists.

Many of the sources in The American Occupation of Germany, were previously used by Knappen and Zink. By this time, the nature of the historical research had begun to mature; Gimbel had read Clay's work on the occupation and had gained access to some State Department documents. With this information at hand, Gimbel, in agreement with Knappen and Zink, laid the blame for the escalation of denazification at General Clay's feet. Gimbel

³⁴Gimbel, American Occupation, p. 150.

portrayed Clay as a man who could not admit that the policy of denazification was failing and was detracting from the efforts of MG in other areas.³⁵

The work that is undoubtedly considered the best historical account of denazification and re-education is James Tent's Mission On The Rhine, published in 1982. The difference in Tent's approach was a complete devotion to the topic of denazification and its effects upon re-education efforts in the American zone. Tent has gained substantial recognition for this work and he is about to publish a new book, devoted entirely to the re-opening of the German universities and the people involved in that effort.³⁶

Mission On The Rhine falls within the same school of thought as the first group of historical perspectives. While Tent's book has over eighty pages devoted to a discussion of the reopening of the universities and the problems of denazification that arose, there is a familiar resonance throughout his discussion.

Tent's perspective was an improved version of work that Zink or Gimbel could have written, had they had Tent's access to newly declassified OMGUS documents. Tent made use of such files to illustrate similar points to those made by Zink and Gimbel. He discussed a denazification program that was initially

³⁵Ibid., pp. 54-78.

³⁶James Tent, Personal Correspondence, Dec. 18, 1994. Professor Tent provided me with a vivid account of Dr. Hartshorne's early life and career in the military.

small but was thought to be effective by contemporaries such as Taylor, Hartshorne and other E&RA officers. Tent stated, similar to Zink but speaking with greater clarity and conviction, that intensified denazification worked against German acceptance of the principles behind the re-education effort.³⁷ German acceptance of denazification diminished because they perceived, correctly, that nominal Nazis were being unjustly prosecuted, while Major Offenders had their trials delayed, or intimidated the Spruchkammern to their advantage. Tent believed that German students and faculty rejected democracy because of irregularities and the apparent injustice of denazification. To the disappointment of many anti-Nazis, Major Offenders were rehired or kept in current positions at many of the universities in the American zone during 1945 and early 1946. As these occurrences accumulated, they detracted from MG's credibility.

Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of Tent's work it failed to support his hypothesis. He dismissed the fact that many faculty and students were charged in 1946 because of findings that they were pro-National Socialist. Tent argued that the newspapers, in particular the New York Times, created a political stir that caused MG to overreact.³⁸

³⁷Tent, Mission On The Rhine, pp. 50-70.

³⁸Ibid., p. 28.

At no point did Tent deal with the inconsistencies in his argument. He overlooked the fact that the man he heralded as the most incisive and fierce workhorse of the E&RA, Dr. Edward Hartshorne, was the very man assigned to denazify the universities in 1946. If denazification was not a pressing issue, why was the top US expert assigned to coordinate the program? Hartshorne had commented upon the excessive number of Nazis still in teaching positions at Erlangen, Würzburg and Munich universities.³⁹ Tent did not acknowledge that MG was already aware of 'discrepancies' at several university campuses, at least according to records in the OMGUS files, even before the newspaper articles were printed. Such an admission would have unraveled his theory that denazification was excessive.

In a review of Mission On The Rhine, Edward Peterson was impressed by the amount of Tent's research, but was critical of the limitation of his overall analysis. Peterson believed Tent had focused on the tensions and operations of the MG apparatus, but had neglected to comment upon the German reaction to MG machinations.⁴⁰

³⁹Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982), p. 165.

⁴⁰Edward. N. Peterson, Review of Mission On The Rhine by James Tent. The American Historical Review, vol. 89, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 154-155.

For Tent to maintain that the attempted breadth of denazification was the culprit behind the failure of re-education, he had to overlook evidence not available to Knappen, Zink or Gimbel. Though Tent had access to new evidence in OMGUS files declassified in 1975, which discussed growing German opposition to the American occupation, he failed to use it.

A second school of historiographical thought suggested that a denazification program enforced by the occupying powers was never a good idea. It recognized that re-education and the promulgation of democratization could not succeed until the program was ended, and would have succeeded earlier if the program had never begun.

Historians thinking along such lines suggested that denazification was really a political matter, best handled by the Germans themselves. The first proponent of this idea was James Warburg, whose Germany: Bridge or Battleground, suggested that General Clay was in an impossible position. Warburg agreed with other historians in noting that Clay had an undermanned, untrained and mediocre group to command. He echoed the idea that the planning for the occupation was poorly orchestrated.⁴¹ Considering the inability to carry out the original American mandate, Warburg suggested that Clay had

⁴¹Warburg, Bridge or Battleground, pp. 215-220.

used his resources to encourage the Germans in rebuilding their own institutions. He felt that MG could act best in an advisory capacity.

Louis Snyder, in his review, agreed with Warburg that denazification was not the instrument to foment a cultural revolution in Germany. Further, Snyder pointed out Warburg's suggestion that any plan to impose the American style of democracy amounted to political arrogance. Warburg argued that Germany would have to be a country with a unique government, formed from its own traditions and institutions. Only then could Germany be a bridge between the Russians and Americans, not a future battleground.⁴²

Not until 1978 was there another addition to this second school of historiography. In 1978 Peterson published his work The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat To Victory, an attack on many aspects of American policy and in particular on denazification. Not since Warburg had denazification come under such criticism.

Not only did Peterson hold firm the views of Zink and Tent, i.e. that denazification was a project pushed by General Clay, that Law No. 8 was a disaster, and that reorientation was the path to success, but he also believed that the entire program began with advice from people wearing "blinkers." By this he

⁴²Louis L. Snyder, Review of Germany-Bridge Or Battleground by James Warburg. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 63 (1948), pp. 295-297.

meant politicians who saw Nazis everywhere; men such as Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.⁴³

Peterson believed that the Occupation was distorted by fighting amongst the upper echelon of command, particularly between Washington and the military. These men presumed that re-education addressed a people antagonistic to, and unfamiliar with, democracy. Peterson maintained that OMGUS misunderstood the German people's desires and their culture.⁴⁴ He remarked that a German democracy would retain the authoritarian flavour of past regimes, and that only the restoration of nineteenth-century humanistic values would restore the education system. The Peterson school of historiography suggested that when German wishes coincided with those of MG, there would be success.

There are problems with this school of historiography. While it may be true that co-operation from the German participants would have sped up the work, Peterson does not show that leftist reformers actually had any more of a popular following than the radical right, which would gladly have welcomed policies of nonintervention by the occupying powers. To allow National Socialist or older streams of nationalist, militarist teaching at the universities may have

⁴³Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat To Victory (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 140.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 160-165.

been the wish of the people: however, this did not make the proposition a correct judgement for MG. The object of re-education was to change the desires of the German people, and to cleanse the campuses of Nazi or nationalistic fervour. The re-education program was not supposed to accept the path of least resistance, even if this was the 'wish' of many German people at that time.

Another proponent of the idea that denazification was a failed, mistaken policy was Lothar Kottetracker, a Professor from Frankfurt. In "The Planning of Re-education During The Second World War," Kottetracker suggested that a "demilitarized Germany was best left to administer re-education."⁴⁵

Kottetracker suggested that the German people did not regard a return to Hitlerism as desirable, and were also aware that militarism and misplaced nationalism were the real menace to future peace. Therefore, the efforts of OMGUS and the British Education Branch were ill-advised from the beginning, particularly in their focus on routing out Nazis, while not concerning themselves more with the curricula of the universities. The Nazis were gone, according to Kottetracker, and the problem lay in non-party faculty being permitted to foster and teach old ideas of German nationalism and militarism.⁴⁶ Therefore the role

⁴⁵Lothar Kottetracker, " The Planning of Re-education During The Second World War," The Political Re-education Of Germany And Her Allies, Nicholas Pronay and Kieth Wilson, eds. (Kent, UK: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985), p. 71.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 72.

of American officers should have been to watch and advise on curriculum. This argument represents much of the modern German opinion on the American denazification and re-education programs.

A professor from Kiel took a similar view. Kurt Jurgensen, in his article "The Concept & Practice of Re-education in Germany," reflected on his work as advisor to the head of the British Re-education Branch.⁴⁷ Working closely with Education Advisor James Birley, Jurgensen saw a policy that attempted to remove top Nazis from positions of authority, for example rectors of universities, and thereafter left it to the German faculty to rebuild the institutions. The British believed, as did the Americans, that re-education would aim to democratize the German people. To this end, Jurgensen argued that the British and Americans should have remained in an advisory capacity until the German nation had joined the community of western democracies.⁴⁸

Boyd L. Dastrup, in his 1985 work Crusade in Nuremberg, took the same approach. Dastrup believed that denazification prevented any re-education from

⁴⁷Kurt Jurgensen, "The Concept & Practice of Re-education in Germany," The Political Re-education Of Germany And Her Allies, Nicholas Pronay and Kieth Wilson, eds. (Kent, UK: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985), pp. 84-86.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 84-86. Jurgensen is included in this discussion to show the similar aims of the British and Americans.

taking place until late 1946, and that the need to utilize National Socialists was indispensable to a successful reconstruction of the universities.⁴⁹

A review by Akira Iriye offered a careful commentary on Dastrup's book. Similar to earlier criticisms of Gimbel's work, Iriye admonished Dastrup for extrapolating a broad picture of the occupation from one city's experience. Dastrup saw denazification as an unnecessary burden in Nuremberg. Iriye believed that Dastrup had an idealized vision of the German desire to be rid of Nazism. He acknowledged that Dastrup was correct in assuming that most Germans were glad to be rid of Hitler and the military but, as Iriye points out, Dastrup did not understand the support that still existed for National Socialism as a political doctrine.⁵⁰

Peterson, Dastrup and Jurgensen have each contributed to an understanding of the emotional sentiment in the occupation Zones run by the United States and Britain. However, none of these authors took advantage of the evidence available to them, both in American and German archives. Like Tent, Bower and Gimbel, these authors could have availed themselves of the OMGUS

⁴⁹Boyd L. Dastrup, Crusade in Nuremberg (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 15-74.

⁵⁰Akira Iriye, "The United States As An Occupier," Review of Crusade In Nuremberg by Boyd L. Dastrup. Reviews In American History, vol. 16, no. 1 (March 1988), pp. 65-70.

records, State Department documents and available files in West Germany. They all ignored press stories that were available. If they had made full use of such material, they might have tempered their condemnation of the denazification programs. A review of the evidence shows that denazification was imperfect, yet necessary.

Historians in a third school of thought came to conclusions opposite to those of the second school. This group argued that the denazification program should have been extensive from the beginning of the occupation period. They also blamed denazification for adding to the failure of re-education, not because denazification involved a prohibitive degree of effort, but because it was an incomplete and poorly executed plan. In other words, too little was done rather than too much.

The first proponent of this view was Irving Wolfson. In May 1946 Wolfson published an article, "The AMG Mess In Germany," in which he speculated that the denazification effort was turning into a renazification.⁵¹ While not a historian, Wolfson worked in MG from the end of the war until early 1946. During his tenure in occupied Germany, he recorded the errors as he saw them. He recounted numerous instances of German Church officials arguing on

⁵¹Irving Wolfson, "The AMG Mess In Germany," The New Republic, vol. 14, no. 9 (May 1946), p. 310.

behalf of documented Nazis, in many cases convincing the occupiers with their pleas for leniency. In Wolfson's opinion, the Catholic hierarchy only opposed Hitler in so far as he discriminated against them.⁵² Wolfson was also amongst the first to point out that MG received information that the police forces, bureaucracies, universities and other public institutions were either retaining Nazi Party members, or were rehiring Nazis and Wehrmacht officers.⁵³ Wolfson agreed with Zink, Knappen and Tent that the MG staff was ill-prepared and insufficiently manned to handle the problem; however, in contrast to most historians, he believed that the problem was solvable and he supported the more aggressive vetting that began in June 1946.

Another former MG officer who wanted a tougher program was William Griffith. Griffith had spent his time in Germany as a Special Branch officer and he eventually headed denazification efforts in the US Zone. While Griffith supported the idea of denazification, he did not believe it was a task for the military to administer, and neither did he believe that it was prudent to engage Germans to adjudicate the procedures. Rather, he supported the notion of a large

⁵²Ibid., p. 311. Wolfson was referring to Cardinal Faulhaber, Father Panzelt and other clergy who found themselves having to defend themselves for their actions during the Nazi regime.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 312-314.

American civil authority mandated and funded by Congress, a civilian corps he thought would do a thorough job of denazification.⁵⁴

Griffith discussed these ideas at length in his dissertation "Denazification in the U.S. Zone of Germany." He agreed with Wolfson that the denazification crackdown of 1946-47 was necessary, and further he believed that MG failed to complete the job and that insufficient officers, of dubious quality, "caved in to German demands for more autonomy."⁵⁵

It must be noted that Griffith, like most Special Branch officers, wanted denazification to focus on those in positions of power or in posts that could influence the future affairs of Germany. Griffith believed that the crackdown focused on small Party members and allowed many important Nazis and supporters to regain positions at universities throughout Germany.⁵⁶

While Wolfson and Griffith were soon forgotten, Tent's Mission On The Rhine renewed interest by historians in the American occupation. Elmer Plischke, in a 1984 article, "Denazification In Germany," argued that Clay

⁵⁴William E. Griffith, "Denazification in the U.S. Zone of Germany," Ph.D. Thesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 68.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 72.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 73.

ignored the pleas of E&RA for more men with better skills.⁵⁷ Only when re-orientation became a popular and a high profile aspect of re-education, in late 1947, did Clay offer his full support to the Education Branch of MG. Other historians began to question the traditional historiography of the first school. There was an awareness that specific questions had not been answered—in particular, what happened to the Nazis and what effect had they had on post-war Germany?

In 1989 Ralph Willett continued the questioning as to why denazification had ended and whether it had succeeded. He discussed the problems of denazification of the German universities in The Americanization Of Germany, 1945-49, and he developed some themes in the Wolfson-Griffiths tradition. Willett suggested that the universities were resistant to American influence and denazification. He discovered reports, dating as late as 1948, which stated "that scandalous conditions exist in Germany's nationalistic universities." Willett suggested that denazification had been incomplete due to a need to convert Germany into an ally by 1948.⁵⁸ With this renewal of interest, the paradigm

⁵⁷Elmer Plischke, "Denazification In Germany," Americans As Pro-Consuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Chicago, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 198.

⁵⁸Ralph Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-49 (London, England: Routledge, 1989), pp. 24-29.

established by Zink, Knappen, Davidson, Gimbel and Tent, and accepted for so many years, began to show signs of wearing thin.

The most dramatic support for this third historical school came from Tom Bower, a BBC reporter and author of The Pledge Betrayed. Bower's book was a detailed study of the Allies' failure to denazify Germany in any substantive way. From the training of over-aged men for positions in MG in 1942, none of whom saw any service in Germany, to the question of Clay's suitability for his job, Bower detailed a story of failure.⁵⁹ He described an inability to fulfill the mandate that came with victory after World War Two; a failure to do justice. Bower offered the names of Americans and Germans who had allowed ardent National Socialists to regain positions of authority. In particular, he pointed out that denazification was, at best, inadequate at the universities, and that it usually never occurred.⁶⁰

Bower has had his critics. James Rowe applauded Bower's exhaustive research, but simply believed Bower underestimated the challenges that faced the Americans and British.⁶¹ J. P. Stern accused Bower of being sensationalistic. He

⁵⁹Tom Bower, The Pledge Betrayed (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982).

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 165.

⁶¹James Rowe, "Postwar Justice," Review of The Pledge Betrayed by Tom Bower. New York Times, 1982.

believed that Bower attempted to prove theories and conspiracies with little evidence.⁶²

In considering the historiography discussed above, it is apparent that although historians have used many of the same sources, they have arrived at very different conclusions. This thesis is another voice in the debate, adding to the historical literature by revisiting some familiar sources, and also by covering new material.

Utilizing several secondary and primary sources, particularly the detailed private diary of Edward Hartshorne, OMGUS archival records, State Department correspondence, media reports and university faculty lists (matched against MG lists of dismissed faculty), we propose that American Military Government, often unwittingly, often in frustration, and sometimes deliberately looking the other way, oversaw a renazification of American occupied Germany. In particular, we shall focus upon the situation at universities in the US Zone.

If this hypothesis is accepted, our understanding of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany must be amended. Historians who suggest that the Western zones were not democratized, nor decartelized, nor denazified (especially at the universities) will now have a firmer foundation to stand on.

⁶²J. P. Stern, "How To Punish A Crime Beyond Belief," Review of The Pledge Betrayed by Tom Bower. New Statesman, vol. 102 (October 9, 1982), pp. 18-22.

The next four chapters will discuss, in detail, how renazification occurred. In chapter two the focus will be upon the evolution of re-education and denazification, as separate policies, and also on how re-education changed when officers running the program were charged with denazifying the universities. We will also discuss the differing opinions on how American occupation policy was constructed and by whom.

Chapter three will establish that American denazification, or vetting (a British word for examining German citizens and purging those with Nazi histories), was neither as comprehensive nor as thorough as the often maligned British efforts. In chapter three there is also a discussion of the growing problems on universities, as documented by the press and MG. Also, claims are substantiated that MG officers were under tremendous burdens in fulfilling numerous command decisions, that their time was consumed in executing these diverse tasks, and that many duties were undertaken prematurely, such as the reopening of universities, which occurred in 1945. The history of these reopenings needs further investigation. Also scrutinized are the methods involved in reopening the universities and the adequacy (or inadequacy) of denazification procedures. We question the conventional wisdom which suggested that the denazification of 1945 was a heroic effort. In this and following chapters, the resistance of the Germans to American plans, and to the occupation itself, will be

documented. The importance of this resistance has rarely been discussed by historians.

In chapter four there is a discussion of the allegedly intense denazification that occurred from mid-1946 through 1947. Specifically there is an examination of the claims of many historians that MG ordered the increased vetting in response to hysterical, inaccurate, newspaper reports. To the contrary, it is proposed here that MG was aware of inadequate denazification, but perhaps not the depth of the problem, and that the newspapers were accurate in voicing concern.

The second thrust in this chapter will be to question standard historical accounts of German-controlled Tribunals, the Spruchkammern. The entire question of a hands-off policy by MG in denazification after June 1946 will be re-examined. This decision was a key to opening the doors to renazification at the universities.

In chapter five, the thesis challenges the long-held view that the shift to reorientation was a signal of re-education success. Here it is proposed that 1948 was the year of defeat for American policies in Germany. It is also suggested (as others have) that denazification did not end because it culminated in success, but rather that it was consciously abandoned as the consequence of a perception that Soviet Russia now posed a greater threat. Germany changed from an enemy into

an ally. Furthermore, it will be shown that German resistance by students, faculty and the German Ministries became organized, and did not diminish in intensity.

The full effects of renazification on contemporary Germany is the work of another study, although this thesis speculates on what renazification meant to the new West German Republic of the 1950s. The eventual problems that reunification created, and the nature of Germany's recent and present role in Europe are topics that are more properly the work of journalists and political scientists, and not historians—at least not yet.

CHAPTER 2

"DE' PROGRAM"¹

Franz Neumann once noted, "It is difficult to educate, it is more difficult to re-educate, and it is downright impossible to re-educate a whole foreign nation."² The occupation of Germany would test Neumann's contention.

The first year of American occupation has been described as a period of direct control. The time from surrender in May 1945 to the handing of denazification to German administered Tribunals on June 1, 1946, was a crucial and confusing time for American MG in Germany. Historians have written little on this period and even less about re-education during its turbulent first year.

In order to provide an understanding of why such confusion existed for those initial twelve months, we examine the American planning for occupation as the war raged on. Also, we will attempt to identify the source of the directives

¹Plischke, "Denazification In Germany," Proconsuls, p. 199. Dr. Plischke coined the term 'de program', to describe the American efforts as Military Governors. This was Plischke's way of summarizing, humorously, demilitarizing, decentralizing, denazifying, etc.

²Carl G. Anton, "Re-education for Democracy," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 262.

MG labored under. We will review the first year of MG denazification policies to show their impact upon re-education. Finally, we will examine how historians to date have described the evolution of MG policy, and then we will suggest what and who actually developed education policy.

MG was supposed to serve two masters, which it did with great discomfort. It was answerable to the military command and to the shifting opinions of politicians in Washington. Firstly, MG was to provide forces to relieve tactical troops for combat and redeployment after the cessation of hostilities. Secondly, MG was to implement a national policy, defined vaguely as maintaining stability and encouraging 'appropriate change'.³ Along with numerous military jobs, MG was expected to assist in punishing the Germans, who most Americans believed were collectively guilty. At the same time MG was expected to spread an appreciation for American democracy and assist the Germans in re-establishing an orderly government, judicial system, and some sort of industrial structure while wiping out all vestiges of militarism.

Historians have criticized the American and British governments for not preparing an adequate occupation plan, and not providing a force to implement such a plan before the war's end. In the immediate postwar period, historian

³Earl Ziemke, "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Chicago, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 52.

Frederick Cramer attacked American MG for arriving in Germany ill-prepared. Journalist Irving Wolfson issued a similar complaint, believing MG was "set up to aid the military."⁴

The problems that arose for MG regarding policy development can be traced back to President Roosevelt. Historians have speculated about the reasons for Roosevelt's decisions and the role that Treasury, State and the War Departments played in making occupation plans. The first High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, believed that Roosevelt had fond memories of a youthful time spent in Germany and looked back kindly on his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War One, which led to an attachment for the German people. McCloy argued that Roosevelt, in 1942, had an enlightened approach regarding the future treatment of Germany. McCloy also believed that Roosevelt was pre-disposed to treating Germany fairly after the conclusion of the war.⁵ James Tent has argued the opposite viewpoint. Tent suggested that Roosevelt disliked his youth in Germany and found the people militaristic and high-handed. Further, Tent argued that during a meeting with

⁴Frederick H. Cramer, "Re-education Of Germany," Forum, vol. 104 (October 1945), p. 114 and Irving Wolfson, "The AMG Mess in Germany," New Republic (1946), p. 312.

⁵J. McCloy, "From Military Government to Self-Government," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 114.

Churchill, in 1941, Roosevelt labelled the Germans as the "destroyer of peace"; and again in 1943, at Casablanca, he demanded an unconditional surrender, meaning that some form of occupation was inevitable.⁶ Compelling as Tent's argument is, there is a possibility that the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was the guiding force behind these proclamations. Churchill was preoccupied with satisfying Stalin that the British and Americans were committed to a victory over Germany. Churchill attempted to alleviate Stalin's fear that the western Allies wanted German and Russian forces to destroy each other. Edward Peterson supported Tent's argument. Peterson found documentary evidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked Roosevelt to relent on demanding an unconditional surrender. Roosevelt replied, "Please note that I am not willing at this time to say that we do not intend to destroy the German nation." However, Peterson noted that Roosevelt had a "whimsical" attitude about affairs after the cessation of hostilities. Roosevelt suggested that each major power would have its sphere of influence. Russia would have continental Europe, Western Europe and Africa were for Britain, China was to get the Far East, and the United States the Pacific area.⁷ Francis Spellman mentioned to Peterson that Roosevelt believed

⁶Tent, Mission, p. 62.

⁷Peterson, Retreat To Victory, p. 21.

Russia could have all of Europe if it so desired, as Britain and the United States would not fight Russia.

In the end Roosevelt appears to have stood in the way of professionals who were equipped to develop an occupation policy. At best he blundered into an obscure hard-line position. The evidence suggests that from 1941 through 1943, he paid little attention to prospective post-war problems.

As to the role of re-education and the idea that democracy could be taught, these had been ideas introduced by educational philosopher John Dewey. Dewey had written volumes on what he believed were the potentials of education. In Democracy and Education, Dewey argued that for a democratic society to grow into a modern, industrialized state, access to all levels of education had to be equal. Impeding class stratification was an important aspect of education, if the process was to serve as a guide towards democracy. The population as a whole, said Dewey, must feel a common bond of mutual dependence and yet also believe that society is allowing individuals to remain independent. Only in this way could a group of individuals form a society without fear and coercion.⁸

Secretary of the War Department Henry Stimson, had read and believed Dewey's ideas on the potential of education. Stimson thought that the Nazi

⁸John Dewey, Democracy and Education (London, England: Collier-Macmillan, 1916), pp. 61-94.

regime functioned by coercion and fear.⁹ This being the case, if the victorious Allies were to remove oppressive elements in Germany and provide democratic, co-operative alternatives, mainly through the media and appropriate educational institutions, democracy would then have a chance to take hold and grow in a new Germany.

Along with Stimson, Cordell Hull was the Secretary of State, and Henry Morgenthau was the Secretary of Treasury. These three made up the occupation planning board that advised Roosevelt and later Truman. A clue to Stimson's view of the Germans can be garnered from the story that around his waist he wore a belt from the first German soldier that he had killed in World War One. Stimson had learned from his father to "Mistrust the Prussian, admire the French." As noted above, Stimson intended to institute reforms that would end the cycle of adventurist militarism he believed existed in Germany. By 1940 he had brought in John McCloy, Robert Lovett and Harvey Bundy in order to restructure a lackluster War Department. The State Department had the best qualifications to draw up occupation policy but lacked a dynamic voice in Hull, who was unable to command attention. The Civil Affairs Division of the War

⁹Peterson, Retreat To Victory, pp. 28, 29.

Department was supposed to make up a policy for implementation, but did no more than open a school for MG training.¹⁰

Military Government planning was undertaken by the Office of Provost Marshall General of the War Department. Officers were recruited, some of fine stature, although many were looking for a posting that promised "wine, women and song." Misfits were to be expected since tactical units had priority as long as the war lasted.¹¹ However, this early failure to secure sufficient men with qualities for the job was to prove a large hurdle to overcome.

In 1942, the University of Virginia's MG training school was established. In England, at Shrivenham, a Civil Affairs Centre was formed. Here the Americans and British worked together in developing guidelines for the future occupation. While Earl Ziemke does not believe that the majority of trainees were misfits, the press and the President felt the military were inappropriate people to conduct the occupation. Considering this fact, these schools found little support from the higher echelons of either the State or War Departments.¹²

Many historians have considered the fact that in 1943 and 1944, major political and military leaders were so pre-occupied with the war that planning was

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 24-28.

¹¹Zink, The United States in Germany, p. 8.

¹²Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," Proconsuls, p. 53.

left to relatively low-level men, however capable they were. Ziemke points to the success of the Army Specialist Training Program in Shrivenham. Here, officers received 9 months of language training and a background in German culture. Under Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which was organized in 1944, the German Country Unit developed a handbook outlining the fundamental policies of what they believed would constitute an effective and efficient MG for occupied territory.¹³ The British and Americans worked together, developing constructive occupation guidelines. Denazification did not pre-occupy this program. The hallmark of the Shrivenham Handbook was an approach stressing reconstruction of the infrastructure and the placement of anti-Nazis as administrative heads. At Shrivenham an effort was made to attempt to understand the German university under National Socialism and before. Many of these lower-level occupation planners questioned the supposition that only during the Nazi era had the universities in Germany become bastions of nationalism and militarism. There was historical evidence available then, and now, to support a healthy degree of skepticism.

¹³Marshall Knappen, And Call It Peace, p. 54, and Earl Ziemke, "Improvising Stability," Proconsuls, pp. 54-55. These are but two of many historians who believe that up until 1944 the approach of MG would be best if developed along "soft" lines, i.e., limited denazification and a constructive occupation, not a punitive one.

Recent research has asserted that the professors of Imperial and Weimar Germany were either 'unpolitical' or supported the formation of a new Reich under a new Bismarck.¹⁴ Alice Gallin, in Midwives to Nazism suggests an analogy between the German professorate of the 1920s and midwifery. While the midwife is not responsible for the conception of a child, just as the professors were not responsible for the creation of National Socialism, both facilitated and assisted the birth of the entity at a critical time.¹⁵ Gallin argues convincingly that the professors made it easy for Nazism to gain control of the university elites by putting up no political resistance. As well, she contended convincingly that the professors actively urged the students to seek a path that would lead to a new glorious German nationalism. Finally, Gallin suggested that during Weimar the professors failed to take advantage of the opportunity to change the curriculum and alter the elitist attitude at the universities.¹⁶ Of course it was to be discovered that the professorate itself, was anxious to continue the elitist model at the universities. Jeremy Noakes penned an article "The ivory tower under Siege"(1993), which agrees with Gallin's overall assessment of the German

¹⁴Alice Gallin, Midwives to Nazism (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), p. 7.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

Ordinarien (full professors) as non-supportive of the Weimar government, and as a group vocally advocating a desire for a new Bismarck and a German Reich with an appropriate level of prestige in world affairs. Another problem was racism. Evidence supported contentions that the universities were anti-semitic long before the Nazi seizure of power.¹⁷

If the Allied officers at Shrivenham had developed an understanding of the deep cultural roots to German nationalism, militarism and anti-semitism at the universities, occupation and re-education plans may have been extremely different from what actually was implemented in 1945.

There are those who have argued that the Nazis had little influence on the professorate. Noakes claimed that the Ordinarien were not as affected by the Nazi regime as many have believed. He acknowledged that there was a purge of 756 professors between 1933 and 1934, but he maintains that the professorate was unlikely to join the National Socialist Party or other affiliated organizations. Noakes argues that the Nazi regime needed the professorate's expertise, especially in the sciences, to assist in the war effort.¹⁸ As well, he suggested that hiring or promotion did not depend on political allegiance as much as on academic

¹⁷Jeremy Noakes, "The ivory tower under siege: German Universities and the Third Reich," Journal of European Studies, vol. XXIII, 1993.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 389.

credentials. If such was the case then the denazification of the professors at the universities was not needed.¹⁹

However, there were indisputable changes at the universities. It has been proposed that the Privatdozenten (non-professorial lecturer) underwent the most dramatic change under the Nazis. The Nazi Education Ministry had these lecturers paid a salary and took direct control of their selection process. This process no longer stressed academics but eugenics, physical fitness and the value of hard labour. However, the new Dozentur exam, administered by the Education Ministry, appeared to scare away more applicants than had the test under the old regime controlled by the professors.²⁰

Noakes also questioned the number of students who were National Socialist supporters. It was his contention that only a "tiny" number of students were voluntary Party members. According to Noakes, the vast majority of students were politically apathetic and never became 'the new breed' of student that the leaders of the Third Reich had hoped for.²¹ While actual Party membership may have fallen short of Nazi leaders' desires, this study will

¹⁹Ibid., p. 389.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 390, 392.

²¹Ibid., p. 392.

establish that there was an overwhelming support for the ideas and aspirations of National Socialism.

If the officers at Shrivenham had held Noakes' view—that the professors were apolitical and lackluster Nazis—then denazification of these institutions would have appeared pointless. On the other hand, as Gallin and Hartshorne have pointed out, the professors, whether Party members or not, gave rhetorical and tangible support to the National Socialists. Noakes also agrees that the professors longed for a new Reich. The question then that is raised by this thesis is whether denazifying the universities was a sufficient process, or whether the Americans, perhaps unwittingly, were attempting to alter a cultural phenomenon that had been developing for over a century, and presumably could not be reversed in one fell swoop.

There was evidence that the Nazi regime did attempt to alter the university structure and influence the political thinking of the students and faculties. The Nazis utilized the universities as training grounds for new generations of politically indoctrinated Aryans. On April 7, 1933, the Career Public Service Act was passed. This legislation demanded the allegiance of the faculty and condemned those who criticized new policies.²² The professorate was caught

²²Gallin, *Midwives*, p. 91.

between National Socialist students and a new Nazi regime. A final problem was space. Since 1840 the population had doubled in Germany, but student enrollment had increased by ten-fold. Nationalist, elitist professors blamed the democratic Weimar governments for allowing undesirables and unqualified students to enroll in the 1920s.²³

Hartshorne's study established how many of the faculty were dismissed, and how many retained their positions after pledging loyalty to the Nazi regime. In 1933, 6.5% of the professors were dismissed; by 1935, 12.9% had been removed. The two dominant reasons for dismissal were ethnic, affecting faculty with "non-Aryan" roots or those who were definitely Jewish.²⁴ A third large group simply disappeared. It is quite possible they had emigrated or were early prisoners of the concentration camps, such as the one outside Dachau.

These were the problems, then, with which American wartime planners had to contend. While the Nazi regime had influenced those who would be allowed to teach and what the curriculum would contain, it appears that the professorate did not change dramatically. The fact seems to be that the Nazi regime found the bulk of the professorate supportive and sympathetic to many of

²³Edward Y. Hartshorne, The German Universities and National Socialism (London, England: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), pp. 45-52, 77.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 88, 89.

the regime's aspirations. If this was true then any preparation for denazification would need to consider the fact that German expansionist nationalism and racism was a deeply rooted cultural problem. However, we believe that, given support from their superiors and sufficient resources it was probable that a strategy could have been formulated which considered the scope of the task. Unfortunately the implementation of MG's re-education and denazification procedures does not appear to have considered the cultural roots of National Socialism. Those who finally decided on the direction of the occupation appear not to have consulted with informed experts on the German people and their institutions.

The first opportunity for the Civil Affairs Division to undertake measures similar to the Shrivenham plans had been in North Africa. In the Mediterranean theatre the Civil Affairs Division functioned with the aim of handing administration back to occupied peoples as rapidly as possible. The very fact that the civilians welcomed the American forces made turning over control to the defeated plausible. Very few people thought that either the French in North Africa or Italians posed any further threat. From these early experiences it was expected that future occupations would be of a short duration.

Captain John Taylor was a veteran of the Charlottesville school and had experience in the North African occupation. Taylor's training and experience suggested that he would possess a soft attitude towards denazification. The

experience Taylor had gained in North Africa made him the most likely candidate to head the German Country Unit of MG. He was assigned in 1944 and upon the dissolution of the German Country Unit he and Marshall Knappen became heads of the E&RA, a sub-branch of Civil Affairs. The occupation of Germany was to prove quite different from that of North Africa. The German population was at least potentially hostile and any chance of successful educational rebuilding would take a long period of time. The State and War Departments had developed no long-range plans for education during the North African/Italian occupations, and since they had this experience as a precedent, there were no cohesive long-range plans for occupied Germany either. The reality appears to have been that by VE day in May 1945, the United States Group Control Council (USGCC) counted a total of 10 education officers for 13,000,000 people.²⁵

A policy did evolve, however, although it was quite different than anything Taylor or Knappen had trained for. It was announced suddenly. As John Gimbel stated, "The roof fell in at the Quebec Conference," meaning that a key memorandum altering policy on Germany had been signed at the Second Quebec Conference by Churchill and Roosevelt. In this agreement Roosevelt took a hard-line approach to the treatment of an occupied Germany. Many historians have suggested that his good friend, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau,

²⁵Tent, Mission, pp. 62-93.

influenced Roosevelt's agreement to the terms of this memorandum; some have speculated that Churchill's influence, or the influence of his scientific advisor, Lord Cherwell, was decisive. In either case the agreement outlined a harsh plan for the occupation of Germany, specifying that only resistance fighters or ardent anti-Nazis could participate in a new German administration, and that the industrial area of Germany would not be rebuilt.²⁶

Much has been written about the influence of Henry Morgenthau. John Backer has shown that there was no single 'Morgenthau Plan'; that indeed, over time, Morgenthau drafted three separate proposals. There was evidence that Morgenthau obtained the idea for his hard-line approach from General Eisenhower. Eisenhower believed that occupied Germany would be a desolate, hostile land, and that any 'soft' approach would founder due to lack of German infra-structure and co-operation.²⁷ Whatever the reasons, Morgenthau devised several plans. The first divided Germany permanently into three states; the second dealt specifically with deindustrialization of the Ruhr area of Germany; and the third was concerned with turning Germany into a permanently pastoral land. Whatever version Roosevelt heard, he was persuaded to reject the fourth

²⁶J. McCloy, "From Military Government," Proconsuls, p. 115; Zink, The United States In Germany, p. 2.

²⁷Carl J. Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart, 1948), p. 36-37.

draft of the 'Handbook of MG in Germany', which advocated a constructive approach to occupation. The handbook had come from the German Country Unit, courtesy of Morgenthau. This Unit was subsequently disbanded and American and British forces developed their own individual plans for the occupation. The American section was renamed the USGCC. The rationale for such a division was to allay fears that the Russians had of postwar Anglo-American intentions.²⁸

As the end of the war neared in 1944 and early 1945, it was evident at the Yalta Conference that Treasury and State agreed on sweeping economic proposals (except deindustrialization), on the disarming of Germany and on the disbanding of the Nazi Party. On denazification there was still silence. The President showed little interest in providing leadership on this question. It was also evident that Germany would be organized by zones, administered by the victors. This meant that American policy was now designed unilaterally.²⁹

Secretary Morgenthau exerted all his personal influence to have the "Guidelines for the Military Occupation of Germany" removed from tactical and MG units in August and September of 1944. Succeeding at having the handbook

²⁸John H. Backer, "From Morgenthau to Marshall Plan," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 132; Zink, The United States In Germany, p. 15.

²⁹Plischke, "Denazification in Germany," Proconsuls, p. 203.

withdrawn, Morgenthau and the President briefly left American forward-occupation troops without any effective policy. The handbook was reissued with a fly sheet attached. This document outlined the new hard-line proposals and instructions for MG units to follow. The order that would be issued in the spring of 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 (JCS 1067), was still being written; this order was designed specifically for post-surrender.³⁰

On March 31, 1945, President Roosevelt announced that General Lucius D. Clay had been chosen as Deputy Military Governor, under General Eisenhower. Clay also became Commander of MG in Occupied Germany, US Zone. Whatever his strengths or failings, Clay, upon reading drafts of JCS 1067 a mere 10 days before VE Day, developed some doubts. In fact, he subsequently fought against the stringent economic controls in 1067. However at this time he paid little attention to the needs of the Education and Religious Affairs (E&RA) sub-branch, and was committed to carrying out the denazification proposals. Not until the Potsdam Agreement in August of 1945 did Clay succeed in obtaining some economic relief. Studies such as the Calvin Hooper Report and the Byron Price Report were used by Clay as arguments for easing the economic restraints

³⁰Ziemke, "Improvising Stability. . ." Proconsuls, pp. 54, 55.

put on Germany.³¹ Hooper had argued that the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement would return Germany to a depression-level economy. As well, with the territorial loss and import costs of one billion dollars, without some industrial rebuilding, the economy would collapse beyond repair. Price, commissioned by Truman, wrote that German industry had to be raised to a level of sufficiency to both supply itself, and to provide exports. This would enable Germany to purchase needed medicines and foodstuffs.³²

As the initial euphoria of victory over the Nazi forces ebbed, Allied public interest waned. Millions of parents and loved ones waited anxiously for their menfolk to return home. Left behind were troops who were generally reluctant participants in tactical jobs or in setting up and administering MG.

The New York Times proposed that an institute be established to devise a strategy for re-educating Axis nations. It suggested that upon complete denazification Germans be allowed to re-establish educational facilities on a probationary basis, and that any apparent sign of incorrect behaviour would result in immediate closure of these institutions. Facilities would be given greater autonomy as they proved themselves sufficiently democratized and students

³¹Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Come As A Conqueror (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 46-49.

³²Peterson, Retreat From Victory, p. 63.

showed signs of embracing a new humanistic philosophy. However, a panel of United Nations advisors would remain to provide guidance in developing individuality and re-orientating German militaristic attitudes.³³

The reality was that a mere ten officers under Captain Taylor could not fulfill the dreams of the New York Times. The Times may have made some astute suggestions, but the needs of tactical units, combined with redeployment, were leaving E&RA largely ignored by OMGUS. Other problems plagued re-education. Within the small branch itself there was a large turnover of men. Amongst the personnel who remained in Germany, many questioned the viability of re-educating an occupied people. But where Taylor believed that his job was the most important single task for the long-term recovery of Germany, Knappen approached re-education as a job to be given back to the Germans as quickly as possible. Harold Zink argued that it was to E&RA's advantage to be small and ignored. Under these conditions it could operate free of the pressures of a general's ego and the scrutiny that high profile areas received.³⁴

Zink's argument is quaint but does not address the shortcomings of a section that would eventually be considered, in his own words, as a "major

³³Associated Press Release, "Plans for Re-educating Germany," New York Times (June 24, 1945).

³⁴Zink, American Occupation 1944-55, pp. 194-196.

division of OMGUS by '47." Zink ignored the perils of an undermanned, overworked E&RA. If the school system, especially the universities, should prove a bastion of National Socialist thought and rhetoric, or even a bulwark of conservative nationalism, a small E&RA was liable to prove inadequate for successful denazification.

Whether denazification was desirable had yet to be established, but as Elmer Plischke and Harold Hurwitz had stated, the way to achieve a "revolution by legal means" or "a revolution by decree" in Germany was by altering a hierarchical educational system based on class and committed to fostering fervent nationalist and racist sentiments.³⁵ This belief was echoed by the great German historian Friederich Meinecke. Meinecke stressed the need for a re-education in Germany that would reach back to a heritage of humanistic teachings. Meinecke also suggested that this rebirth of national pride and spirituality would be led by both the Protestant 'Confessional' and Catholic Churches. He believed that most Germans approved of re-education and stated as much in Deutsche Katastrophe. Denazification was a proposal Meinecke worried about. He thought that the Allies would need assistance in only charging those who were responsible for the excesses of 'Hitlerism'. Similar to many elderly professionals, Meinecke had a

³⁵Plischke, "Denazification in Germany," Proconsuls, p. 199; Harold Hurwitz, "Mass Media and the School System," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 323.

respect for the 'values' of the military and he believed that the Allies should allow Germany to rearm for self-defense.³⁶ Meinecke's image of a 'revolution' in Germany was a return to 19th-century values and morality.

The revolution, of any sort, that MG was supposed to effect was not occurring, either in education or in any other area of German life. An edited version of the Country Unit Handbook was issued, along with JCS 1067, which specifically demanded that the Re-education Branch denazify, demilitarize and democratize while at the same time reopening German schools. This broadening of the mandate for Education officers, without any increase in the manpower available to the group, proved a major error. Rules were specifically aimed at Nazis who might still be in administrative roles or other bureaucratic positions. In truth the order to denazify was largely ignored. In Aachen and other cities initially occupied, MG officials kept Nazis in positions of authority. For the most part the officers' desire to get things up and running, i.e., restoring electric power, water, food distribution and medical assistance, took precedence over ambiguous orders regarding denazification.³⁷ Believing that reopening the school system was of paramount importance, Education officers reacted similarly, allowing Nazi instructors to remain in their positions. This was such a common practice that

³⁶Carl. G. Anton, "Re-education," Proconsuls, p. 261.

³⁷Ziemke, "Improvising Stability. . .," Proconsuls, p. 56.

anti-Nazis, who once believed that when liberation occurred American MG would place anti-Nazis in positions of authority, became suspicious of a victor who retained National Socialists in positions at all levels.

Another erroneous expectation of early MG was a belief that the administration would be handed over to American civilian experts very shortly. President Roosevelt had stipulated in early 1945 that a short military administration, which would turn over operations to civilian authorities, was the order of the day.³⁸ It is not surprising to discover that many MG officers performed their duties sporadically or not at all, while eagerly awaiting demobilization back to the United States. According to Gimbel's interviews with low and high-ranking officers, the Army viewed the myriad of MG duties with reticence. Clay rapidly lowered his MG staff from 12,000 to 6,000 by February 1946, while keeping a large tactical force in the US Zone. When subordinates questioned the wisdom of such reductions, Clay pointed to the Potsdam Agreement. He believed that Potsdam entailed a mandate to inculcate American democracy in Germany, and he felt that the best way to achieve this was to involve Germans in the operations of MG and self-government as quickly as

³⁸Ibid., p. 60.

possible.³⁹ He also argued that thousands of German replacements would be utilized and he expected civilian replacements from the United States as well. Simultaneously, the State Department admitted its reluctance to the idea of taking over MG. Thus, there would be no civilian help coming, at least not in any substantial numbers.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, as the winter dragged on Clay's forces continued to decline both in quantity and quality. As Clay began to realize that MG's stay could be lengthy, he devoted his energy to enforcing the principal clauses of JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Agreement. As the magnitude of his task began to sink in he searched for alternative methods to successfully implement the stipulations of 1067. He also looked for ways to circumvent what he considered the impractical aspects of 1067.

Historians have typically divided the policies embodied in American directives into negative and positive programs. The negative policies were demilitarization, depoliticization (the removal of all Nazi government officials of high rank and dismissal and/or arrest of members of the secret police), decentralization, deconcentration (of industry), deindustrialization, decartelization and denazification, (the elimination of all Nazi influence and

³⁹John Gimbel, "Governing The American Zone," Americans As Proconsuls, Robert Wolfe, ed. (Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 92-94.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 96.

suppression of Nazi written work and tainted school books). The positive policies were democratization and self-determination.⁴¹ Encompassed in the idea of democratization was re-education, which was envisioned as the instrument to reverse the effects of twelve years of Nazi indoctrination. Whether these policies were negative or positive was irrelevant for Clay in late 1945. Passages in 1067 stifled any hope of recovery for a self-sustaining German economy. Clay finally listened to his advisors and utilized a clause which allowed for side-stepping the programs if "epidemic disease or serious unrest" was imminent. While this meant providing some food, clothing, medicine and capital for small production, it had no effect upon the denazification stipulation and thus the burden for re-education was not alleviated.

Although it appeared that JCS 1067 was more severe than the Truman administration wanted, Clay persevered with implementing denazification as widely as possible. Clay had a Fragebogen or questionnaire printed by the millions. Each small MG detachment was to have a Special Branch officer who would collect and review the applications. Guilt was taken for granted; 13,000,000 Germans were to prove their innocence by answering the 131 questions of the Fragebogen.⁴² Considering the declining numbers of MG

⁴¹Plischke, "Denazification in Germany," Proconsuls, p. 199.

⁴²Zink, The United States In Germany, pp. 90-92 & 158-159.

officers and enlisted men all historians have agreed the program was doomed to fail. As well, Frederick Cramer has suggested that MG officers were impressed by German efficiency and forgot their denazification mission, a view also accepted by most historians. After twelve years of Nazi rule, many qualified technicians had strong Nazi Party affiliations and did not pass the denazification test. Irving Wolfson criticised this hiring of Nazis, regardless of qualifications.⁴³

The question was, should the program have been abandoned as some desired, should it have been modified to suit the number of available troops, or was there an alternative that was foregone for lack of will? One option was for many officers to turn to the German churches as institutions of stability. Here again, Wolfson believed that the churches were intent on poisoning the German people against the Americans.⁴⁴ Not all clergymen were so inclined, but the suspicions of some US officers made this option problematic.

If Clay was short of personnel, as many historians suggested, was he not partially responsible for such a situation? While Clay would eventually travel to Washington and request civilian assistance, he did not put up a stiff argument that he was stripped of manpower. Many writers have been certain that Britain's

⁴³Cramer, "Re-education of Germany," *Forum*, 1945, p. 114; Wolfson, "The AMG Mess," p. 30.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 31.

commitment to the occupation was soft and limited. Looking at the numbers, however, Britain allocated 25,000 men to the British Control Commission while Clay reduced his force from 12,000 to 6,000.⁴⁵ Clay could draw support from tactical troops when necessary, American forces far exceeded the British overall. On the other hand, tactical forces were not trained for anything other than the provision of security or manual labour.

By July 1945, the Americans believed that Law No. 5, demanding the dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations, had been so thorough that no underground existed. MG detachments reported removing 94% of the administrative officials. MG officers did not report how many Nazis were rehired as manual labour, and then permitted to continue unofficially performing their specialized work. After instructing all local MG officers to use non-Nazis and anti-Nazis in assisting with denazification, MG anticipated untainted Germans taking over all important functions.⁴⁶

In August 1945, the Allies discovered a large cache of educational records at Bad Salzungen, Thuringia. Included were teacher's records (that were added to information stored at Kassel), intelligence reports, German newspaper accounts

⁴⁵Zink, The United States in Germany, 1957, p. 29.

⁴⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Bavaria, July 1945, Intelligence Division, pp. 13, 15, 16-17.

from the Nazi era and German foreign office files. MG planned to use this information to assist in evaluating the level of Nazi activity amongst university faculty.⁴⁷

The reality of work in the field and at the individual universities was disquieting. In the field, the information gathered either was incomplete, the officers did not bother to utilize it, or there was simply no screening process in place at some of the universities. Only a few officers provided the guidelines that MG would eventually formalize as directives. The collection of data intended to assist in decisions about whether to maintain, fire or hire university personnel was an idea spear-headed by Dr. Edward Y. Hartshorne.

Dr. Hartshorne will be referred to frequently in this study, partly because his detailed diary is an excellent source, and partly because he eventually headed the program of denazification at the universities. He was one of the few well-trained, knowledgeable education officers that MG was fortunate to have. The judgment that he was a superb education officer is general. Tent and Bower both made detailed reference to the fine effort he brought to his work.

Hartshorne's academic interests and military background would equip him to be one of the ablest education officers. His career at Harvard and Chicago

⁴⁷OMGUS, RG 260, August 1945, Intelligence report to Military Government, Bavaria.

Universities included time spent in the Soviet Union in 1932, studying its new society under communism. In 1935-36 he spent a year in Germany gathering information on the transformation of the universities under Hitler. His subsequent dissertation was published as German Universities Under National Socialism.

From the United States, Hartshorne monitored events in Europe. He became a prominent interventionist, working together with Talcott Parsons, the famous Harvard sociologist, in publishing anti-isolationist articles. With his father-in-law, Sidney Fay, Hartshorne worked with and interviewed German refugees. The things he heard made him especially sensitive to the excesses of the Nazi regime.

Wanting to serve his country, Hartshorne joined the Research & Analysis (R&A) Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1941. He specialized in analyzing educational institutions. However, Hartshorne found the R&A Branch a confused and restraining work environment, and he soon joined the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the Office of War Information (OWI). Here he trained recruits in psychological warfare. A man who enjoyed action, he volunteered to serve in North Africa with OWI.

He worked preparing Allied propaganda in Tunis and followed the advancing troops into Italy. He kept in close contact with the Secret Intelligence

(SI) Branch of OSS, interrogating German prisoners. Over 1943 and 1944 he honed his skills as a relentless and talented interrogator.

After a brief leave he returned to active duty with the PWD unit in Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Hartshorne worked screening and interrogating the staff of prominent German newspapers that had operated during the Nazi era.

After a brief trip to Marburg in May 1945, he realized he could offer more by assisting in the reconstruction of German higher education. On May 8, 1945 he requested a transfer from PWD to the new E&RA Branch. As arguably the leading US authority on German universities, everything Hartshorne did and said is important to this discussion.⁴⁸

By August 1945 Hartshorne had spent two months formulating initial plans for reopening the universities. MG reports show that Hartshorne had made recommendations for the faculty of medicine at Heidelberg. He had personally recommended the acceptance of seven professors, four others were conditionally approved, and three were actually removed. The acting Dean had recommended approving twice the number that Hartshorne vetted. He physically had to collect the records from the university Kuratorium. Special Branch (SB) officers did not

⁴⁸Tent, "A Historical Sketch: Edward Y. Hartshorne, Jr., 1912-1946," Introduction, as yet unpublished manuscript.

collect this data, for reasons unknown, and orders to the contrary. One factor behind such confusion was that MG orders were often at cross-purposes. There was a recognition of growing unrest, with so many idle juveniles and young adults, but if an officer went ahead and provided these people a school or university class, he suffered a reprimand.⁴⁹ Hartshorne commented on the dire need for more competent men and a U.S. propaganda officer, Captain Jolas, "agreed that the horrible aspect of life in MG is the possession of great power by incompetent people."⁵⁰

By July 22, 1945 Hartshorne had passed on to the political division of MG suggested criteria for allowing scientific research at German universities. These criteria would see the light of day as MG directives. They stipulated that no military research be done unless authorized by OMGUS, that ongoing research be maintained, and that politically acceptable, private scholarly enquiries be allowed to continue. As well, Hartshorne urged that faculty receive salaries and that pensions for those awaiting screening not be stopped unless they were removed as Class I offenders.⁵¹

⁴⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Intelligence Report, MG, Bavaria, August 1945, p. 2; Edward Y. Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 20, 1945, p. 50.

⁵⁰Hartshorne, Diary, July 21, 1945, p. 51.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 52.

As Hartshorne painstakingly and tirelessly vetted each faculty member, MG allowed the reopening of the Theological faculties at Heidelberg, Erlangen, Munich and Würzburg. These faculties were purported to have been vetted by their own Church authorities.⁵² As has been noted, Irving Wolfson took exception to this close relationship between church authorities and MG. Wolfson realized that MG files showed that the Church leadership was reluctant to purge their clergy of known Nazi collaborators. He worried that MG was allying itself with men who had worked with and supported Hitler.

E&RA officers Hartshorne, Colonel Taylor, Colonel Reinmuth and Lieutenant-Colonel Knappen were not alone in worrying about the need for a large, comprehensive re-education plan. Several New York Times reporters were quick to recognize the need for greater re-education planning. On July 5, 1945 they encouraged the American government to re-educate 370,000 German prisoners-of-war (POWs). The paper urged the teaching of American democratic values and the merits of the capitalist system.⁵³ This plan was actually implemented. Unfortunately the POWs had been sheltered from the horrors of defeat in a devastated Germany and still held on to many Nazi ideals. The

⁵²OMGUS, RG 260, Intelligence Report to MG, July 1945, p. 3.

⁵³Associated Press Release, "Plan To Re-Orient Captive Germans," New York Times, July 8, 1945.

majority of participants were vocal in their opposition to the teaching of 'enemy' values.⁵⁴

In November a former economic advisor to MG predicted that there would be a need for an increased effort by the American government to provide sufficient civilians to fill the MG role by June 1946. This date was crucial because many reporters, politicians and MG officers worried about turning over vetting to German tribunals on this date. That same week, the new Commander in Chief of the U.S. forces in Germany, General Joseph T. McNarney, stated that the occupation could last 10 years. McNarney promised strict denazification and maintained that the military was the appropriate force to carry out the job.⁵⁵ Therefore, it was apparent that even among high-level members of MG there was confusion over policy.

Many observers have suggested that one of the major turning points in the direction of MG was the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945. The prevailing interpretation of the document is that JCS 1067 was softened. An August 1945 intelligence report to Clay reflected this sentiment. The German people saw Potsdam as a sign that they could begin rebuilding, although MG stressed that

⁵⁴Zink, The United States In Germany, pp. 48-49.

⁵⁵Associated Press Release, "More Training Urged," and "10 Year Occupation," New York Times, November 25, 28, 1945.

this must be done on a democratic and peaceful basis.⁵⁶ In the same report it was admitted that the security classification of Nazis was being downgraded, in order to keep them on staff at institutions where their skills were needed. This down-grading tactic by field officers was prevalent on the university campuses, particularly in the medical and supporting science fields.

New York Times reporter Gladwin Hall painted a different picture of the effects that policy shifts were having in late 1945. Hall's interviews with local MG officers showed that redeployment had compromised MG. The need to use Germans, and often Nazis, in local positions of authority was increasing, and even at the district level Germans were being given back positions of authority. Many committed American officers stayed on as 'liaison' workers. In this capacity they could perform their assigned duties and still be able to report to the higher echelon what was actually taking place in the American zone.⁵⁷

During this time orders were drawn up to reopen the universities, or at least the medical faculties at Heidelberg, Marburg and Erlangen. Along with the Potsdam announcement, a MG report suggested in September 1945 that American forces were running a "carefully prepared denazification program."

⁵⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Report to MG Bavaria, August 1945, p. 4.

⁵⁷Gladwin Hall, "Rule of Germany Hit By Dual Blow," New York Times, November 30, 1945.

Rapid completion of the program would enhance the chances of MG, achieving success overall. One paragraph later, the same report acknowledged that Nazis 'often' occupied positions when they were 'difficult' to replace.⁵⁸ While there appeared reason to celebrate, the inherent contradictions within field reports arriving at Berlin were enough to cut the celebrations short. After victory over Japan (VJ), the denazification program came under more scrutiny by the press.

The success of denazification was being gauged by reporters. Anne O'Hare McCormick wrote an article which compared the American program unfavorably with the British. The British were portrayed as victors, pragmatic and confident in applying their denazification policy. The Americans were painted as a judgmental conqueror who blamed the Germans for the war. Americans were being goaded into unrealistic policies by Washington politicians.⁵⁹ McCormick was not alone in her criticism of MG policy. Quite likely she was attacking Law No. 8, implemented on September 26, 1945. This measure has been considered a colossal error by most observers. Law No. 8 banned from management any employee who had had any Nazi membership or affiliation. Thousands of bureaucrats and clerks had joined the Party and its

⁵⁸Zink, *The United States In Germany*, 1957, p. 95; OMGUS, RG 260, Intelligence Reports to MG Bavaria, July 1945, p. 14.

⁵⁹Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Abroad," *New York Times*, November 17, 1945.

affiliated associations in order to retain their jobs. These people now faced denazification procedures. Their numbers were so numerous that the program was paralysed.

However it was not just sympathy for so-called 'nominal' or small Nazis that moved the Germans (and many Americans). While most Germans wanted top Nazi party officials punished, they did not believe the punishment of SS (Schutzstaffel) officers, Gestapo personnel, SA (Sturmabteilung) members, or other veterans of elite guard units was warranted. This sentiment is understandable; it was a rare middle-class or upper-class family that did not have a member or a friend in one of these notorious groups. German intellectuals led the protest. At the University of Heidelberg, Professor Freudenberg feared war crimes trials would only increase the world's hatred of Germans. Professor Faulk, of the same university, believed that wartime atrocities were old news and that attention should be paid to rebuilding Germany.⁶⁰

By January 1946 education at the universities was attracting attention outside the confines of the E&RA offices. Edward Hartshorne's father-in-law, Sidney Fay, the famous Harvard historian, wrote about potential problems in the program. Fay, who undoubtedly garnered information from his son-in-law,

⁶⁰Associated Press Release, "The Guilt of a Nation," New York Times, January 2, 1946.

discussed the difficulty of rehiring aging Weimar professors, steeped in traditional German nationalistic ideals, and young professors, who were likely indoctrinated with Nazi sentiment.⁶¹ Both groups he saw as posing a problem in democratizing the universities.

At the same time, Clay ordered Charles Fahy to establish a program with the German Länder Ministers in order to hand over denazification to the Germans. Clay saw Law No. 8 burdening his American-staffed denazification boards; not only could denazification be accomplished faster, he believed, but by involving the Germans they would feel included in organizing their own rehabilitation. Drew Middleton agreed with the concept, but considered the implementation much too early. Middleton pointed out that denazification had progressed, albeit very slowly, and that the Fahy concept could lead to abuses by Nazis wishing to avoid prosecution.⁶²

The reason for Clay's growing dilemma was that the 'civilianization' of education branch was failing. In theory, officers were to be demobilized, and then rehired as civilians. In a memo from Colonel Taylor to Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, Taylor complained that men were reluctant to join his sub-

⁶¹Sidney B. Fay, "Our Responsibility for German Universities," Forum, vol. 105 (January 1946), pp. 396-402.

⁶²Drew Middleton, "Germans Control of Nazis Outlined," New York Times, January 19, 1946.

branch because civilianization could lead to a substantial loss of benefits. Officers could lose leave pay, status at a U.S. university, a \$500 tax exemption, and cut-rate life insurance. As well, their contract with MG was not binding. However, a change in policy whereby Germans would come to handle the bulk of denazification work, was not a simple procedure. The vast array of different forms each MG department demanded created a denazification procedure that was complex, and therefore for a layman could prove difficult to administer. Hartshorne had developed a set procedure for trained MG personnel, a system that included inspection of SHAEF files, MG Fragebogen, questionnaires from the universities, Hochschulen Fragebogen (a special university questionnaire), MG Special Branch files, personal records, Nazi party district files, the black, white and grey list of the E&RA, and U.S. Group Control Council files of the Aerztekammer (medical association).⁶³

Not only was it unlikely that MG would find many Germans capable of assembling such a dossier on an applicant; not even many MG officers found the

⁶³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 680, File 12, memo Colonel Taylor to A'sst. Sec. of State W. Benton; OMGUS, RG 260, Intelligence Report, September 1945, p. 1. The black, grey and white list was initially used by MG officers in classifying German respondents after a preliminary investigation. Black was a mandatory removal category, grey meant discretionary removal with further investigation necessary, and white gave the respondent a status as, at worst, a nominal member with no advantages gained from party membership.

job practical. A reading of Hartshorne's diary sheds new light on how the Clay directives were formulated by men working against extreme difficulties.

In June 1946 Hartshorne was named the official MG university officer, a role, he had been fulfilling to all intents and purposes since late June 1945. As an education officer, he roamed between universities and assisted the stalled reopening program. He reported to both Colonel Taylor of E&RA and Major-General Stayer of the Public Health Branch, E&RA's parent division at this time. Between July 23 and 31, 1945 Hartshorne formulated a plan to create a central student registry. He realized that the vast numbers of returning soldiers and refugees would overwhelm any local screening board. Throughout his diary, Hartshorne complained of arriving at institutions and finding no work done on collecting data, and officers in charge who were either untrained or were simply not there, having been reassigned.⁶⁴

After completing his work at Heidelberg, Hartshorne left a team behind to administer the vetting and reopening of the university. The team was comprised of Lieutenants Emmett and Maxwell from CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps), Lieutenant Kaufman from the Document Centre, Sergeant Hofer from MG, and three German secretaries. It surveyed the recommendations of the existing faculty university planning committee (UPC). Tent has suggested that Hartshorne

⁶⁴Edward Hartshorne, Personal Diary, Heidelberg, July 23, 1945, pp. 55, 56.

obtained his idea for the UPC from the British model of vetting the universities.⁶⁵ It is impossible to ascertain for certain, but it was probable that the opposite occurred.⁶⁶ The noticeable feature was that MG relied on Germans to restructure and join in the vetting process at the universities, long before Fahy's plans for German Tribunals.

Equally important, much of what Hartshorne did went well beyond his job description. He would seize documents, and requisition men to assist him in carting boxes of faculty and student files to the safety of his team's office. He was impatient at what he perceived was the waste of good officers re-vetting 'old standbys', professors who were tainted by National Socialist sentiment, but who to Hartshorne posed no threat.

There was a clash of personalities and ideas in these early days. Major Reinmuth ignored Hartshorne's memoranda, with their recommendations on opening universities, and began to assume authority for reopening the institutions before denazification met Hartshorne's standards. Reinmuth and Knappen accepted on faith the UPC faculty recommendations. Hartshorne realized that a

⁶⁵Tent, *Mission*, p. 96.

⁶⁶It appears that Hartshorne's September visit to a German university in the British zone was the first time Hartshorne witnessed British procedures. At this time Hartshorne was already using his own version of the UPC format in assisting in vetting faculties in the American zone. Therefore it would appear he did not borrow this idea from the British.

showdown was inevitable with Reinmuth. On August 10, 1945 Reinmuth, Knappen and Hartshorne met. Hartshorne won his main point, namely that there had to be a universal policy drafted for reopening universities as soon as possible.⁶⁷ Hartshorne's victory was a result of the support he got from Major General Stayer of the Public Health and Safety Branch. Stayer was initially in charge of reopening the universities in order to access their medical facilities.

By August 12, 1945 Reinmuth was showing the strains of the job and Knappen openly complained that denazification was slowing down the reopening of the universities. On August 15, 1945 the Heidelberg Medical Faculty and supporting services were reopened. However the work had just begun. At Giessen, Brenner, the E&RA officer, issued a very unpopular Fragebogen (questionnaire), and the faculty felt that Brenner's attitude was biased on religious lines, favoring Catholic faculty. Hartshorne intervened and rewrote an acceptable Fragebogen. At each stop Hartshorne noticed good men were growing disgusted with incompetence from superiors. Hartshorne strove to keep qualified men at Erlangen and Marburg. Toombs, the new Chief of Intelligence, was blamed by Hartshorne for a lack of understanding.⁶⁸ Toombs would pull qualified men

⁶⁷Ibid., August 9-12, pp. 60-62.

⁶⁸Ibid., August 22-24, pp. 65-67

from university screening details in order to work on war crimes investigations. As well, Toombs ignored Hartshorne and many other officers in their warnings that vetting was not thorough before reopening the universities, and that future problems lay in store. On September 3, 1945 Hartshorne visited Göttingen and discussed vetting strategy with Colonel Bird of British MG. Somewhat dismayed, Hartshorne noticed three faculties had opened while denazification remained to be done. That same day he visited Dahlem and found out that Reinmuth had asked to be discharged. On September 12, 1945 Hartshorne visited Heidelberg. Lieutenant Bauer was re-hiring and protecting Nazis at the university. Hartshorne expressed in his diary a sentiment that turned out to be prophetic, "God help us if his indiscretions ever get out of hand and we have to 'crack down'."⁶⁹ Less than a year would pass before such a crack down would be demanded across the zone.

On September 18, 1945 Reinmuth, Lichty and Taylor approved Hartshorne's universities directive, and it was passed on to Stayer and Clay. The thoroughness of Hartshorne's plan and the fact that he utilized 'trusted' German faculty for advice set his plan apart from alternatives which suggested either that the Americans denazify all the faculty from scratch and delay opening the universities, or that they rapidly reopen based solely upon German faculty

⁶⁹Ibid., September 3-12, pp. 71-75.

recommendations. Finally, the bureaucratic evolution of the policy was complete. On October 26, 1945 Brigadier-General F. C. Meade, Adjutant to Eisenhower, issued a directive for reopening universities and other institutions of higher learning, such as the Darmstadt Technical School. Clay approved it after a recommendation to this effect from Assistant Chief of Staff, General Bryan Milburn.⁷⁰ (See attached appendices A.)

By November MG was again claiming that Germans were responding positively to denazification. Reports still attributed disorders to displaced persons (DPs) and black marketeers, not organized German resistance. In December 1945, MG claimed that denazification had ended its "initial phase" and that in the U.S. Zone all civil government had been purged of Nazi placeholders. By the close of 1945 the University of Heidelberg had revived faculties of law, philosophy, natural science, medicine and theology; Würzburg had reestablished philosophy, natural science, medicine and theology; Erlangen had reopened law, natural science, philosophy and theology; and Marburg had revived medicine and theology.⁷¹ The work of Hartshorne, Taylor, Knappen, Reinmuth and 35 other

⁷⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 650, File 12.

⁷¹OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Intelligence Reports, November and December, 1945, pp. 4, 20-22.

dedicated officers and enlisted men was supposed to have accomplished a great deal.

Early in January Colonel Newman transferred the responsibilities of E&RA to the Länder Ministries. The reopening of universities would be processed by the Education Ministry in each Land and then passed on to MG Headquarters for final approval.⁷² Time would tell if the removal of supervision by American officers would prove to be an error.

On March 5, 1946 the "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism" was signed by the Minister-Presidents of the three Länder in the American Zone. New Ministries of Political Liberation were created to administer and enforce the law.⁷³ This ordinance, worked out by Charles Fahy, mandated the hand-over of denazification to German tribunals (Spruchkammern).

As of June 1, 1946 the Germans had 219 Tribunals ready to operate. Outward appearances and MG rhetoric claimed a denazification success. However the facade cracked rapidly. There were reporters and officers in the field who were not convinced that denazification was being carried out in a thorough manner. There was a German population that worried about the future as the

⁷²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 680, File 12, January 3, 1946.

⁷³OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Intelligence Report, February 1946, p. 42.

Tribunals began their work. How effective would they be, who would suffer the most from their scrutiny, and was Nazism eradicated or was there activity being ignored and covered up? A turbulent year followed these early policy decisions, and proved of dire consequences.

CHAPTER 3

RE-EDUCATION: FRUSTRATION TO FAILURE

Re-education posed many difficulties for the E&RA officers, and since they had to act as agents of denazification, this only compounded the difficulties. MG believed that denazification of educational institutions was the hope of securing a 'changed' Germany for the future. John Montgomery, John Gimbel and James Tent have all intimated that Nazis viewed the universities as 'safe' institutions in which they could escape scrutiny from MG during the first year of the American occupation.¹

This chapter explores the troubles that occurred when MG attempted to reopen certain university faculties. The role of re-education and denazification was to prove a frustrating experience. Utilizing secondary and a variety of primary sources, we will analyze the first year's effort at the universities. Part of this analysis will challenge the long-held interpretation that the reopening of the universities in 1945 was 'heroic'. In reality, the intelligence section of MG realized that Nazi and militaristic influences were present at the universities, but did little

¹Montgomery, Forced, p. 144; Tent, Mission, pp. 64-66; Gimbel, Retreat To Victory, p. 252.

to address this problematic situation. It appeared that they ignored all the signs of a growing crisis. Finally, we will provide evidence of passive and active resistance by the faculty and students, reacting to re-education, denazification and the occupation. Noticeable in the secondary literature is the omission of a discussion of German resistance to many aspects of the occupation. The most detailed histories, by Tent and Gimbel, conveniently fail to take into account evidence of student and faculty resistance. To have included references to such problems would have weakened their arguments in favour of less denazification and a hands-off policy towards education.

Universities proceeded differently from bureaucratic institutions and public schools in their reopening procedure. When a government agency or business was given permission to operate it was typically to have completed a careful screening process. MG orders demanded the involvement of both G5 intelligence officers and local MG officers. Special Branch officers (personnel chosen from the Public Safety Division to attend to denazification details in heavily populated areas), and local MG officers, were supposed to screen all personnel before any reopening was approved. While these screenings at the public schools and civil service were not always complete, they were better than at the universities, which had had no systematic screening.

The whole process of reopening the universities began when Major-General Stayer, AMG head of Medical and Public Health, took advantage of a loophole in JCS 1067. This was a stipulation that justified circumventing orders for humanitarian relief or to prevent epidemics. Stayer declared an emergency and decided to reopen the medical faculties at several universities. Stayer borrowed Hartshorne from PWD on June 20, 1945, and Intelligence officer A. Muccio from CIC, all three men toured the Zone in order to decide how to reopen quickly the faculties of medicine at various schools.² At this early juncture Muccio expressed a concern that no vetting at the universities had been undertaken, or even proposed.

Heidelberg was virtually undamaged from Allied bombing. Hartshorne was on hand in the town on June 26, 1945 to study the feasibility of reopening the medical faculty. Upon his arrival he was met by Johannes Hoops, an 80-year old Professor of English and Philology, and Dr. Karl Bauer, a surgeon from the war-time faculty. Hartshorne found these scholars ready with a plan to reopen the medical faculty and other faculties as well.³

²Hartshorne was actually in the midst of being transferred to E&RA at this time; officially he was still under PWD command.

³Hartshorne, Personal Diary, p. 43.

A local MG officer pointed out to Hartshorne that if vetting of the faculty was planned, then MG should consider the possibility of professors surviving the Nazi era without compromising themselves. Therefore, the argument that "we had to join" was not an adequate explanation for National Socialist affiliation or support.⁴

Hartshorne, who was often one step ahead of his peers, sent a rough draft of guidelines to Taylor at E&RA headquarters in Berlin. It included suggestions that AMG establish a protocol for employing persons who would fall into the mandatory removal category. It was deemed necessary to rehire established offenders in reopening the medical faculties, as the need for the doctors and medical professors was acute. The draft specified that there had to be proof that the position was essential and that there was no other suitable replacement. The classification of the faculty member was then registered as a 'nominal' Nazi. Records would be forwarded to the E&RA headquarters with a completed Fragebogen, a summary of Special Branch's investigation and any available service records.⁵ This hiring of known Nazis was a departure from JCS 1067's guidelines. Up to this point, an objective classification had established whether a person was to be employed or dismissed. The first months of occupation had seen

⁴Ibid., p. 53.

⁵OMGUS, Hesse, RG 260, Box 55, File 1, September 4, 1945.

80% of the elementary and secondary faculties dismissed; and 95% of the civil bureaucracy was also laid off because individuals were tainted by membership in the Nazi Party or affiliated organizations. The rehiring of Nazis at the universities was a significant departure in procedure. Need was deemed to supercede the immediate denazification directive. This new policy of administrative or irreplaceable need was to become a common practice throughout MG in 1945 and the first half of 1946.

Impressive as Hartshorne's orders sounded, he strayed from his own plan in order to keep open important faculties, or at least what he determined were important faculties. Hartshorne had Dr. Bauer replace ardent Nazi supporter Johannes Achellis as Dean of Medicine, but he then immediately rehired Achellis as director of the Physiologisches Institut. Any serious investigation of Achellis was impossible. Hartshorne began work on July 1 and rehired Achellis on July 4. He admitted in his diary that he had rehired Achellis upon the recommendation of a loosely formed UPC which included Dr. Bauer, Dr. Eppingshaus and several other faculty members. These men had taken it upon themselves to form a committee that would point out desirable and non-desirable personnel.⁶ While this was no excuse, it illustrates the frustrating decisions that Education officers

⁶Hartshorne, Personal Diary, p. 44. The creation of a University Planning Committee was suggested by Hartshorne when he first arrived.

had to make. Along with their duties of studying the curriculum for 'Nazi content, and deciding on what texts and library material were appropriate, they had to attempt not only to denazify the faculty but to ascertain the ideological leanings of potential students. Those cognizant of their responsibility to denazify were disturbed when they were expected to reopen facilities simultaneously. This issue would only grow worse.

Part of the problem was that Hartshorne was expected to supervise activities at several universities, so his time was at a premium. His whirlwind schedule is evident from his diary. For example, between July 9 and 20, 1945, he travelled and met UPC representatives and E&RA officers (when present) at Munich, Erlangen and Marburg universities. Each stop usually meant that important decisions on faculty removal or restitution had to be made. At Erlangen he approved the rehiring of Nazi physicians. Special Branch officers had vouched for their necessity and suitability.⁷ Hartshorne often appeared to rely on the work of others, a situation he regarded as regrettable. At times he was reminded of the order to remove 'Major Offenders'. At Marburg in July, a Captain Bentley made such a comment and Hartshorne suggested that the rehired faculty be vetted in August.⁸

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 54.

MG was also aware of broader problems with the reopening of the universities. While at Würzburg, Lieutenant Colonel Henderson was told that Captain Nuce and his Special Branch detachment noticed that religion was playing a large role in UPC recommendations for employment. The UPC appeared to be avoiding the vetting system set up by Hartshorne and his superiors.⁹ Depending upon the location of the university, rehiring was based on a potential applicant being either Protestant or Catholic. By December, Taylor issued a directive seeking to clarify apparent discrepancies in the application of denazification policies. The fact that the head of Education and Religious Affairs Branch was consumed with denazification issues points to the difficulty this department had in fulfilling its mandate of re-education. Taylor had so few detachments that by December 10, 1945, he ordered Special Branch officers to work as inspection teams at the Land (Province) level, and E&RA officers to work with Germans at the city level. The officers were directed to concern themselves with inspecting intelligence reports on staff and students, when available, and 'influence' them in a positive fashion.¹⁰

Education officers began reporting ominous signs at the universities. In October 1945, reports suggested increased violence and the presence of organized

⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 51, File 1.

¹⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 680, File 12, Minutes of E&RA meeting in Berlin.

gangs at the institutions. The MG higher echelon refused to believe that any organized resistance was developing.¹¹ Early in the occupation American authorities had hoped that an 'anti-Nazi' resistance group, the Edelweiss Piraten, would prove useful against Nazis and isolated Wehrmacht resistance. However, the group showed no fundamental resistance to the concepts of National Socialism.¹² While the group was known for its opposition to the Hitler Jugend, it had generally accepted the tenets of the authoritarian Nazi regime. Ironically, by January 1946, MG had reports that the Piraten were engaged in acts of violence against the Americans. By March, youth who had originally been viewed as anti-Nazi were showing hostility and a reluctance to co-operate with the broad denazification program instituted at some of the universities by MG.¹³

The idea that the Catholic Church was a stable, beneficent partner for the Allies was recognized by the senior echelons in MG as a fairy tale. The powerful Bishop Wurm admitted to Clay that both he and many of the clergy had joined the Nazi Party and had supported Hitler as a man who might "produce a religious

¹¹OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Reports, Bavaria, October 1945.

¹²Perry Biddiscombe, " 'The Enemy of Our Enemy': A View of the Edelweiss Piraten from the British and American Archives," Journal of Contemporary History (London, England: SAGE vol. 30, 1995), pp. 37-38.

¹³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 5, & Box 51 File 1, A Weekly Summary from Administration District Frankfurt.

revival in Germany." The E&RA black-listed 351 Nazi clergymen, although the ecclesiastical establishment refused to remove mandatory cases. By October of 1946, only 3 clergy members had been dismissed.¹⁴ (See Appendix B.)

E&RA, Special Branch officers and CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) investigators were overwhelmed by the numbers involved in denazification. By December 1945, morale was very low and redeployment had depleted the ranks further. There seemed no alternative but to implement Clay's plan to use Germans to assist with re-education and denazification.¹⁵

Historians have generally accepted this as a necessary and a productive move by MG. However, the records show that Clay's chief negotiator with the German Länder Ministers, David Robinson, reported that "Germans revealed a complete absence of any intention to apply a vigorous program of denazification in Germany."¹⁶ The argument made by MG, and accepted by historians to date, was that MG were not aware of potential problems in handing over denazification and re-education to the Germans. This conclusion however, has been invalidated by Bower's research, and his revelation that MG turned a blind eye to the facts.

¹⁴Bower, Pledge Betrayed, p. 150.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 151.

The British laboured under the same problems as the Americans. They realized that handing over denazification to the Germans was premature in 1946. Both American and British officers whose politics were 'left wing' argued for an ambitious re-education and denazification policy. Against orders from Whitehall, the British Deputy Military Governor, Brian Robertson, and Air Vice-Marshall H. V. Champion de Crespigne, limited the participation of the Germans.¹⁷ Like the Americans however, the British found that redeployment of their men left little alternative to using Germans. In the British Zone Church leaders again argued against denazification and Bishop Wurm told the British MG that criticizing American and British policies was a method to win back his flock.¹⁸ Wurm would later demonstrate his allegiance to Nazi influences in Germany, defending SS concentration camp guards against prosecution by the American war crimes tribunals.

In both the British and U.S. Zones the gaping holes in the program and the obvious escalating problems pointed to a program that was incapable of fulfilling all the demands put upon it. First, orders were given for ambitious, thorough denazification, before re-education could begin at the universities; however, MG

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 155-158.

¹⁸Ian Connor, "Denazification in the British Zone," *The British In Germany*, Arthur Hearnden, ed. (London, England: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p. 398; and Arthur Hearnden, "Education In The British Zone," p. 13.

wanted the universities opened as fast as possible. As well, MG did not provide the resources to carry out the assigned task. Military Government documents show an awareness that this was a treacherous road, but Clay would not alter his plans. Clay's commitment to carry out the denazification portion of JCS 1067 was firm. He believed that by having the Germans participate in this program through the Tribunals and Land Ministries for Political Liberation, he would expedite the democratizing aspect of re-education. Consequently, re-education worked under enormous burdens.

A constant problem for the E&RA was the lack of manpower. There were 41 officers in E&RA by June of 1946, including the Bremen enclave and Berlin. Taylor requested civilian replacements and had the authority to rehire discharged officers, but although MG did rehire many men, it typically assigned them to 'higher profile' duties, such as war crime trials or economic and financial tasks.¹⁹

The attitude of the Germans was another burden. They viewed American re-education efforts as propaganda, no better than Nazi propaganda. They believed that teachers were forced to stress an American viewpoint on all political and historical issues. To many Germans, the American re-education effort was a contradiction of the free speech that American victory supposedly promised.²⁰

¹⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 680, File 12.

²⁰Dastrup, Crusade in Nuremburg, p. 71.

German students were often rude or purposely inattentive when their own history was criticized, or when American-style democracy was promoted.

Hartshorne commented upon the foolishness of MG. He found MG's attempts at converting the German educational system unwise, at least at this point in time. As de facto Education Officer for the universities, Hartshorne demanded that all dismissals first pass his inspection. He did not want to lose qualified teachers or students that he felt posed little threat.²¹ A stern and dedicated man, he had an understanding of German educational tradition and culture. He was eager to play a role in re-establishing German education as a cultural strength, not a weakness. In carrying out such a task he did not believe that the German system needed to be reformed into a copy of the American, but that German universities needed to redefine their goals and accept new ideas on teaching the humanities and promoting liberal political viewpoints.

A further hurdle mentioned by Hartshorne, and later commented on by historians, was the competition between local authorities and MG officers regarding hiring and firings of faculty.²² Often, friendship between faculty members would lead to approved staff vouching for others of a dubious background.

²¹Hartshorne, Personal Diary, August 4, 1945, p. 58.

²²Ibid., p. 60.

Hartshorne attempted to put the best face on a bad situation. In his diary he suggested that the German UPCs would work best with limited supervision, but must have some overview. He did not have much choice, since there were only two university education officers for all of Bavaria. Hartshorne defended the denazification record of the UPCs. They were given access to the volumes of files that he attempted to accumulate on individual faculty members.

Dr. Walter Dorn, advisor to Clay, ordered Special Branch officers to administer Fragebogen to all faculty, although MG never had sufficient officers for such an undertaking. The rapid turnover in men left Special Branch and E&RA with new, often incompetent, ill-prepared officers.²³

Hartshorne attempted to convince his superiors that foreign academics should be brought in to assist the German UPCs in vetting both the staff and students at the universities. German Land Ministers complained strenuously, and Clay rejected the idea.²⁴ Any outside influence, even expatriated Germans, was looked upon with suspicion by German academics. The denazification of the universities and implementation of re-education received high praise verbally from the United States Government and MG command, but in reality they received little assistance. Good ideas were rejected without explanation. There

²³Zink, The United States In Germany, pp. 158, 193.

²⁴Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 23, 1945, p. 53.

was a lack of fortitude on Clay's part to enforce his orders, especially if it meant creating an incident with the German elite who were regaining limited political power.

MG was aware of the burdens in the educational field. Efforts to recruit German assistance were failing. A constant fear that the occupation was nearing completion scared many Germans away from assisting. Germans believed that an early American withdrawal would lead to reprisals against people who had aided the Americans. Even anti-Nazis feared reprisals from a population largely unchanged ideologically, a population that viewed the Americans as the enemy.²⁵ It was apparent then that the idea of using Germans to assist in vetting procedures and to take over administrative jobs was proving frustrating.

Hartshorne's difficulties with the limited vision of MG's re-education plans was given voice in a 1946 review he did of an article by Harvard sociologist M. Richter. In reviewing this article for use by MG intelligence and propaganda authorities, Hartshorne supported the conclusions of Richter (and his own father-in-law, Sidney Fay), that the real obstacle to a German cultural "rapprochement" would not come from the results of denazification, but by dealing with "continued German conservatism, complacency, stubbornness arising from cultural

²⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 5, January, 1946, Monthly Report of Military Governor, Bavaria.

isolation."²⁶ Evidence of German unwillingness to reject the past and forget established traditions was found in a memo from the Ministry of Culture to the Military Governor in Württemberg. The minister suggested that the 1936 Olympics, the occupation of the Rhineland, re-armament, and the bloodless conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia all inferred that Hitler's policies were correct; therefore, a growing fascination with National Socialism was to be expected. Hitler, he argued, had salvaged Germany from the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty of 1919.²⁷ These attitudes added to the burden confronting the 41 E&RA officers in 1945/46. The job of denazifying and inculcating new values, virtually attempting to reshape a culture, were met with arrogance and hostility. We can suppose that any society would react with hostility to a foreign power attempting to change long-held cultural beliefs, and many Germans used this argument as a defense for defying MG directives. The challenge then was how to eradicate sympathy for the ideals of authoritarian government, such as embodied in the Nazi regime, but encourage the great and civilized aspects of German culture. In fact, it appeared that many Germans were not convinced of the wrongness and brutality of National Socialism.

²⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 700, File 23:1821, Reprint of Harvard Education Review article, vol. 16, no. 1, January, 1946.

²⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 917, File 39, Denazification General.

A final frustration for these few officers and enlisted men was the difficulty in adjudicating appeals. Cases such as Margaret Webber's were the norm. Mrs. Webber got Professor Martin of Würzburg to substantiate her claim that her husband, a professor at Würzburg, was falsely accused. An earlier adjudication had found him guilty of being an 'Offender'. However, the records that might have helped to resolve the issue were missing, and many who originally testified against both him, and other suspect individuals, had been "asked" by Nazi resistance groups to retract their testimony.²⁸ Consequently, American officers were faced with half of the picture. Professor Webber was exonerated for lack of evidence and Professor Martin rehired him at Würzburg University.

Despite the obstacles placed by MG and the indifference of the Germans, E&RA reopened the universities. The next question is whether this was a valiant and heroic effort or a gesture that was foolish and premature?

There were both competent and incompetent men involved in the reopening of the universities. There is no doubting the dedication of Hartshorne. He personally reopened three universities by January of 1946.²⁹

This man, who Tent has said "did the work of nine men," was serious about his duties. On July 13, 1945 he wrote, "Screening must be done

²⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Box 57, File 3, December 20, 1945.

²⁹Tent, Mission On The Rhine, p. 12.

assiduously. I should read all the Hochschul-Fragebogen and write an opinion."³⁰ While this sentiment was admirable, in reality Hartshorne could not read the Fragebogen, plus the volumes of other material he was committed to collecting on all the prospective faculty and students in southern Germany. Nor could the small number of other officers accomplish this great task for him. German Rektors and Deans were urging a rapid reopening; MG was urging the same, and this left Hartshorne and his handful of counterparts in a very difficult position.

Moreover a controversy was brewing among German scholars. The famed anti-Nazi and philosopher, Dr. Karl Jaspers, urged a speedy reopening of the universities in order to bring youth off of the streets and into an organized university life. Jaspers believed that such an action would prevent large idle groups of youths from organizing into criminal or resistance groups. Other scholars like Bauer and Weber worried that the universities had not changed sufficiently from National Socialist days, either in curriculum content or faculty. Many scholars wanted to see a new emphasis placed upon a forgotten German tradition of humaneness and self-determination.³¹

³⁰Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 13, 1945, p. 46.

³¹Ibid., July 10, 1945, pp. 46-48.

Tent has noted that Hartshorne was impressed by British methods of re-education and denazification, and he has argued that Hartshorne believed the British method of overseeing the UPC screening process was the best method, given the available manpower. As stated earlier, all available evidence leads us to believe that Tent was incorrect and that Hartshorne established his own unique screening policy. However, Tent was correct in surmising that Hartshorne's idea for a youth amnesty was something he borrowed from the British.³² Overall, Tent's interpretation of Hartshorne does not seem to portray the same person who kept Hartshorne's diary. The man in the diary was committed to complete screening, and only compromised when he felt certain that any future problem could be redressed. Tent portrayed Hartshorne as similar to many other re-education officers, such as Knappen, Reinmuth or Bentley. Such a portrayal was useful in helping him argue that there had been a unified and heroic effort toward reopening the universities. However, when Hartshorne's accomplishments and efforts are held up against those of his counterparts, we realize that Tent was mistaken. Heroism was in short supply. Hartshorne was a singular example of excellence, whereas Knappen, Reinmuth and Bentley were examples of the type of pragmatic and easily frustrated officer characteristic of the American occupation.

³²Tent, Mission On The Rhine, p. 67.

Hartshorne's valiant efforts may have been in vain, but he did his level best. He developed a faculty vetting procedure and had Special Branch accept the draft. Hartshorne recommended the development of a special Fragebogen for the universities; he wanted an early check on members of the UPCs; he insisted on the veto right of MG, with doubtful cases having a second screening, and only then final action being recommended. By August 3, 1945 he had delivered to each Headquarters his 'Guidance Notes on Steps Preparatory to the Opening of Higher Education Learning'.³³

However, it appeared that heroism often ended with Hartshorne's individual efforts. Reports and interviews obtained by the New York Times established that 22% of MG and tactical officers were willing to absolve Germans and permit them back into previous positions. These same 22% believed the Germans had had good reason to persecute the Jewish population.³⁴ As if these discoveries were not discouraging enough, Dr. Pollock, while working for CIC, found that most officers had expediency as their main motive—and a desire to be done with the occupation as soon as possible.³⁵

³³Hartshorne, Personal Diary, pp. 49-58.

³⁴Associated Press, "Some GI's Justify German Attack," New York Times, January 25, 1946.

³⁵Adams Schmidt, "U.S. Speeds Return of German Rule," New York Times, July 20, 1945.

Some men worked hard at their assigned tasks and put up a valiant effort, but there was simply too much expected of them. Many others were normal men who wanted a quick end to the matter and justifiably desired to go home. There was a significant group who never tried and could never be described as having done their work. With such human material on hand, why did MG pursue such a difficult course? Did they have warnings that the program was in trouble?

Drew Middleton suggested that re-education had been betrayed. High profile departments of MG like those dealing with demilitarization, deindustrialization and the war crimes trials absorbed the best men available.³⁶ While Middleton was suggesting that any celebration of what had been accomplished by March 1946 would be premature, C. L. Sulzberger pointed out several areas of MG concern. Sulzberger found that MG officers were not clear on how to carry out their orders. On the one hand they were to 'step on the Germans and at the same time to democratize them'. Officers were ordered to stifle any German criticism of MG, while they were handing over more control to the same complaining Germans. Officers admitted the urgent need for several thousand more men.³⁷

³⁶Drew Middleton, "Only A Start in Re-educating the Germans," New York Times, March 31, 1946.

³⁷C. L. Sulzberger, "Flaws Seen In Rule In Germany," New York Times, April 1, 1946.

These were not fantasies invented by the press. Hartshorne had informed his superiors in July 1945 that the proclivity of German professors for aiding their friends, regardless of National Socialist activity, was a depressing reality of post-war Germany.³⁸

MG was not ignorant of the failure of re-education and denazification policies at these early dates. According to a Special Branch report in January 1946, German leaders admitted that a free election at this time would have brought a 'modified' Nazi government to power.³⁹ The highest commanders of MG acknowledged that restraints were necessary in Germany, as a return to militarism was a possibility.⁴⁰ In the face of mounting evidence suggesting problems, MG plunged ahead, with plans to hand re-education, and the denazification procedures involved, back to the Germans.

As MG was planning to hand over the bulk of denazification to German tribunals, German anti-Nazis clamored for increased denazification efforts. The mandatory removal list, with its arbitrary cutoff date of May 1 1937, came under a scathing attack by anyone who understood the growth of National Socialism.⁴¹

³⁸Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 23, 1945, p. 63.

³⁹Bower, Pledge Betrayed, p. 133.

⁴⁰Dastrup, Crusade in Nuremburg, p. 72.

⁴¹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 917, File 39, Monthly Reports, September 1945.

MG believed that those who joined the Nazi Party before 1937 had been true believers, while those who joined after probably did so out of necessity or coercion. Many anti-Nazis came forward to point out that quite often the opposite was true. Many who joined the Party early had been caught up in the ideal of changing Germany peacefully, while those who joined after 1937 had been exposed to years of propaganda and were impressed with the Party's all too obvious impulses toward conquest and racism. MG wanted to simply reduce the number of people to vet; they did not listen to the rational arguments of people who knew better. At the universities many of the faculty deans had been appointed after 1937 as a reward for their loyalty to the Party. At every campus recent converts to National Socialism were considered a low risk, and those who had been duped in the early days, when there still appeared a promise of a positive change, were dismissed by MG officers. Such an approach only led to the entrenchment and control of the UPCs by Nazi sympathizers who looked to rehire fellow Nazi supporters.

Periodic pronouncements by MG to the effect that Nazism was eradicated and that the German people were prepared to accept new responsibilities were fiction. Violence against MG was palpable as angry Germans began targeting Americans for fraternizing with German women. While such violence was not directly attributable to Nazism, the German citizen or student, according to

American publications, showed no signs of interest in new political ideas. Thousands of returning soldiers joined covert groups such as the Edelweiss Piraten or the new "Notgemeinschaft Party."⁴² These groups were committed to reestablishing authoritarian rule in Germany and were committed to attacking occupation forces both verbally and physically.

Newspaper reporters were often visited by officers who gave testimony different from the sort of analysis that MG was sending back to the War Department in Washington. In December an article in the New York Times implied that MG believed there was still a dangerous element at loose, and a growing boldness in the sabotaging of denazification efforts.⁴³ Konrad Adenauer, the Mayor of Cologne, went to the press to complain of Nazi meetings taking place. Adenauer blamed British MG for failing to establish a policy that would address the apparent rise in Nazi activities, and when a policy was announced Adenauer complained that British MG failed to carry it out.⁴⁴

⁴²Drew Middleton, New York Times, August 23, 1945, p. 12. The Notgemeinschaft was a party dedicated to representing returning soldiers, war widows, the maimed and other displaced persons. The party attracted many who were dismissed from jobs as a result of denazification procedures.

⁴³Associated Press, "Nazis Still Shining," New York Times, December 2, 1945.

⁴⁴Associated Press, "Nazi Meetings Reported," New York Times, June 30, 1945.

German reluctance to take responsibility for the actions of the Nazi regime was a constant problem. The majority of people blamed their plight on leaders who had failed. For most Germans the Nuremberg Trials were sufficient denazification. The German youth at the universities still looked forward to a future with a strong leader at the head of a new authoritarian government.⁴⁵

Resistance groups were reported organizing in Frankfurt on the Main—groups resentful of the American occupation. MG received warnings from their own officers. William Bauer at Heidelberg suggested that MG underestimated the influence that the Hitler Jugend and the Nazi Party had had on students. Upon closer inspection the apparent student apathy regarding politics revealed a large number of students looking for opportunities to re-establish the prestige for Germany gained under National Socialism.⁴⁶ The silence and apathy only meant that students were staying quiet about their political beliefs. They realized that to express anti-democratic or pro-Nazi sentiments could result in an end to their education.

Throughout February 1946 MG received notification that the universities were alive with Nazi sentiment and that active resistance to American

⁴⁵Drew Middleton, "So What Say Germans To Nuremberg," New York Times, December 2, 1945.

⁴⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 968, File 10, Memo to Major Crumm, February 4, 1946.

re-education efforts was increasing. Increased acts of violence were reported from Heidelberg. The Edelweiss Piraten and the Freies Deutschland were active in recruiting SS and Wehrmacht members at the universities. Reports included testimony that ex-soldiers were taking over control of most police forces. The main focus of complaints from these groups was the belief that denazification procedures were being applied unfairly, and re-education policies were an imperialistic intervention into internal German matters. Many ex-soldiers wanted the senior Party officials punished, and some actually wanted to extend the process to other VIPs who, though not Party members, had profited greatly from supporting the regime's policies.⁴⁷ Along with news of these facts came warnings to take such problems seriously.

At the universities there was an increasingly open forum for anti-Allied diatribes. At Göttingen, Professor Baumgarten delivered an anti-American speech which was reported as 'very dangerous'. All of these reports went to the Chief of Intelligence, Major Toombs, a man regarded by many who served with him as completely useless at his job.⁴⁸ In early April 1946, David Robinson sent a lengthy bulletin to Toombs. This report suggested that while students were opposed to their elders on account of the horrors that they had brought upon the

⁴⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 5.

⁴⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Chief of Intelligence, March 14, 1946.

younger generation, they still believed National Socialism had many good features. They desired a one-party system, they were strong German nationalists, and they recognized the need for society to provide work. They had no interest in a multi-party system, thus their support tended to go to the Liberal Democratic party because of its nationalist leadership. In the 1920s and 1930s the National Socialist Party had drawn considerable support away from liberal parties, and now this support began to flow back in the opposite direction. . Students disliked American democracy, and they questioned the need for the Fragebogen and MG censorship strictures.⁴⁹

Most historians have claimed that the press was hysterical, and that in seeming to respond, MG had reacted to pressure from Washington and engaged in a needless escalation of denazification at the universities. The evidence of unrest available to Toombs—with which he did nothing—gives credence to the work of the contemporary journalists, and diminishes the claims of various historians.

By mid 1946 the CIC records showed that the Edelweiss Piraten were collecting remnants of the National Socialist Party. In 1946 evidence was found that they were plotting acts against the occupying powers, and various constituent

⁴⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 126, File 9, Hesse, Political Intelligence Report, April 13, 1946.

groups demonstrated a firm belief in the "leadership" principle (Führerprinzip).⁵⁰

Wishing to deflect mounting criticism of its apparent failings, MG did not give due attention to organized resistance groups and belittled the newspaper reports. Instead of accurate reports, MG issued drafts to Washington suggesting that increased lawlessness, violence and black market activities were a result of "longer daylight hours, a cut in food rations and activity by displaced persons."⁵¹ A blind eye was turned to incoming warnings about more sinister elements at work.

The vetting of students—an issue quite apart from the vetting of faculties—posed an immense logistical problem, since there were hundreds of thousands of applicants for scarce spaces. To date the vetting process had been haphazard and differed widely between institutions. There were occasions when large numbers of students were dismissed from universities: for example, Major Crumm recommended the removal of a large number of compromised students in early 1946, utilizing a Fragebogen system and background investigations of university applicants. (See Appendix C.) However, most of these students had their slates wiped clean by the youth amnesty, declared March 5, 1946, which exempted from denazification any person born after 1919. While this removed millions of cases from the files, it also deemphasized the importance of people

⁵⁰Biddiscombe, "Enemy of our Enemy," Contemporary History, pp. 41-44.

⁵¹OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Reports, April 1946, p. 3.

who had grown up under the influence of the HJ (Hitler Jugend), and then carried on into the military. These were the young men and women who needed the closest watching of all, especially as resistance to MG policies was growing. The idea of large blanket amnesties made little sense other than expediency.

While faculty and students participated in 'renazifying' the universities by intrigue and a stubborn refusal to pay attention to American instruction, there was also a growing resistance to the occupation. This resistance movement wished to restore the control of the Nazi Party, and the members viewed the Americans as an enemy.

Resistance often meant a group of professors confronting a local education officer and demanding either the end or the 'softening' of denazification at a university. Hartshorne noted such incidents more than once in his diary. In each case a UPC confronted him, angered at the number of dismissals that Hartshorne himself believed were necessary. Hartshorne would typically threaten to review all the faculty, disband the UPC and to use Americans to denazify the university.⁵² The German faculties grew bolder. They realized that MG put little effort or manpower into university denazification. Each time they confronted Hartshorne or another university officer, their demands grew. The Catholic Church joined in this call for increased leniency. Bishop Wurm and

⁵²Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 10, 1945, p. 44.

Bishop Meiser were outspoken critics of denazification. They especially took affront at any interference in the vetting of ecclesiastical school faculty.

Students showed overt signs of supporting National Socialist leaders. When Axel von dem Bussche gave a speech at Göttingen on his role in an assassination plot on Hitler, he was heckled and jeered by hundreds of students.⁵³

Often faculty and students joined in acknowledging that society would return to 'normal' once the Americans left. Gregor Ziemer witnessed a case where a professor pledged allegiance to the American MG, then complained about how he was told to teach that Bismarck had been an evil influence on Germany. He stated from his lectern, that he would teach this as long as the Americans were in Germany. The class laughed. Such situations were not isolated. Dr. Anton Fingerle mentioned an exchange he had had with a youth. The young man had stated that "we had the war because we love war," and blamed Hitler for losing the conflict. When asked what he would have done differently, he answered, "I would have surrendered much earlier to save the German army and use it again." He believed it was Germany's destiny to be great again.⁵⁴ Dr. Fingerle believed

⁵³Geoffery Bird, "Universities," Britain In Germany (London, England: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), p. 54.

⁵⁴Gregor Ziemer, "Our Education Failure In Germany," American Mercury, June 1947, pp. 726-728.

the re-education effort would require generations to alter the influence of such indoctrination.

Even the suggestion that Germans, as a people, carried a collective guilt for the war was an unpopular theory, and today is still a controversial topic. Pastor Niemoeller said as much in a speech at Erlangen University; but before he could finish the students shouted him down.⁵⁵ It was not just the students who could not accept that the Nazi Party was a vehicle for tyranny. Hartshorne's German secretaries believed that the removal of Nazi leaders was warranted, but that otherwise, whatever MG-licensed papers printed about concentration camps must be lies. Dean Fraudenberg of the math faculty at Heidelberg stated, "it is an honour to be deprived of one's rightful position by an occupying power."⁵⁶

Resistance even began to take on more frightful and violent forms. On August 28, 1946, Hartshorne himself, the central figure of our story, was shot and killed while travelling on the autobahn. MG considered the incident an act of economic violence, and historians have attributed the murder either to thieves or to a random shooting. Circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that Hartshorne was targeted because of his work over the past year in re-education

⁵⁵Drew Middleton, "Only A start In Re-educating," New York Times, March 31, 1946.

⁵⁶Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 30, 1945, p. 49.

and denazification. Hartshorne had reopened seven universities by this time. During the summer he had been ordered to investigate the faculties and student bodies at these campuses. There was growing evidence that many strong Nazi supporters were either working in the U.S. Zone or were enrolled at Munich, Erlangen, Würzburg and Marburg. Hartshorne had submitted lists recommending the removal of 33 professors from Munich and 78 from Würzburg, and he anticipated that there would be further removals. Considering these facts, and that his murderers were dressed as American MPs, in an American jeep, and that neither his wife nor his driver were harmed, it seems possible that an organized group wanted Hartshorne, the single most effective education officer, stopped.⁵⁷ One indisputable fact is that MG had lost an amazing man, and re-education never recovered from this loss.

⁵⁷The information gathered here is from different reports: Tent, Mission On Rhine, p. 97 (at that time he believed the shooting was random and had not read newspaper reports); Tent, Unpublished Manuscript, Introduction, pp. 2-3; Associated Press, "Education Officer Shot," New York Times, September 3, 1946; Press Release, "Two Girls Questioned In Hartshorne Slaying," Washington Post, September 3, 1946, p. 8 (these girls establish that there were two men in the jeep at the time of the murder); Press Release, "Dr. Hartshorne's Alleged Slayer Trapped, Killed By U.S. Troops," Washington Post, September 4, 1946, p. 8B. (This established that Hartshorne's wife was a witness and also establishes that the men were dressed in MP uniforms and were in an American jeep.)

In any case, monthly reports to Clay continued to deny that any organized resistance existed, even though acts of violence were increasing.⁵⁸ There were thousands of Wehrmacht and SS officers returning to Germany, unemployed, hungry and desolate, a violent life of crime directed at their oppressors was to be expected. Today we might understand many of these soldiers activities as a product of delayed battle syndrome. That many of them organized into effective resistance groups was very likely.

Despite MG denials to the public, they were aware of organized resistance groups. The 'Deutsche Revolution', led by Bernhard Gericke, had a large and dangerous network of supporters. As early as the fall of 1945, Christof Naumann, an ex-SS Brigadeführer and SD (Security Service) Chief, was helping high-ranking ex-SS officers flee Germany or regain positions at home.⁵⁹ Klaus Barbie, a former SS Hauptsturmführer, posed as a student at Marburg University, seeking to recruit members into this new Nazi organization. Naumann made successful attempts at establishing contacts with nationalist professors at Göttingen University. It could have been members of one of these groups that assassinated Hartshorne. Killing was not a tactic that embarrassed

⁵⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Monthly Report, Bavaria, October 1946.

⁵⁹P. Biddiscombe, "Selection Board: 'The Growth and Suppression of the Neo-Nazi Deutsche Revolution', 1945-47," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 11, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 61-63.

them. Klaus Barbie had planned the assassination of a Spruchkammer Chairman, Dr. Wilhelm Schilling.⁶⁰

The resistance took on familiar tones. The Piraten attacked black American soldiers who fraternized with German women. Black soldiers replaced Jews as the new group to look down upon. At Marburg and other universities, neo-Nazis spread rumors that MG was using black troops to procreate a diluted race in Germany.⁶¹

The argument, as far as violence and Nazi activities taking place at the universities, by historians, some of whom had access to reports of such activities, was that MG was unaware of the severe problems. We have shown MG was aware that problems were brewing at the universities and that the traditional history was in error.

The research of Robert Ericksen has established a pattern of renazification at the faculties in the British Zone as well. This work is worth noting, since it was well researched, and reveals that the same events described by Ericksen often

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 65-66.

⁶¹USFET G-2 "Weekly Intelligence Summary" #19, 21 Nov. 1945, p. 59; #42, 2 May 1946, p. c13; #45, 23 May 1946, p.c12; #56, 8 Aug. 1946, p. c4; #62, 19 Sept. 1946, p. c12; #72, 28 Nov. 1946, p. c14; all in State Dept. Decimal File 1945-49, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Constabulary G-2, "Weekly Intelligence report" #12, 3 Sept. 1946, Annex 1, p. 2; #19, 18 Aug. 1946, p. 2; and #20, 25 Oct. 1946, Annex 1, p. 3, both in WWII Operations Reports 1940-48, RG 407, NA.

occurred in the American Zone. In fact, the Americans had originally occupied Göttingen and had helped to set in motion the denazification program undertaken there. Ericksen focused his attention on Dean Emanuel Hirsch, of the Theological faculty at Göttingen. While there is no doubt about the strong support Hirsch gave the Nazi regime, it was what occurred after the war that is pertinent. Hirsch, conveniently, retired because of medical reasons two days before the Allied troops arrived. Retirement guaranteed Hirsch a 75% salaried pension; removal would have left him having to find work.⁶² Hirsch retained his pension even though he was on a list of Nazis who were to be dismissed and arrested. He demanded reinstatement in the early 1950s, although he was denied reappointment at that time. His 'medical condition', listed as blindness, did not affect his work, and he actually produced the bulk of his written work after his resignation. Hirsch wished to be officially retired and have 'emeritus' recognition at Göttingen. Finally in 1961, never having recanted his strong Nazi sympathies, he was given 'emeritus' status. Hirsch was considered rehabilitated by former staff who knew of his work for the Nazis, and were kept on by the British vetting system. This case points to the old boys network that continued to exist in West Germany for many years after the war.

⁶²Robert P. Ericksen, "The Göttingen University Theological Faculty: A Test Case in Gleichschaltung and Denazification," Central European History, vol. 17 no. 1, March, 1984.

MG reacted to similar revelations that poured into their command centres by largely ignoring the problem. In late 1946 Dr. Walter Dorn, historian and legal advisor to Clay, glossed over the collapse of the university re-education and denazification programs, even as MG reports illustrating this collapse passed his desk. Historians have reported that increased denazification in the summer of 1946 came in response to hysterical newspaper articles which caused an American public to demand action from their government.

However, the truth was that MG was aware of problems before reporters got wind of such difficulties, and that the universities were in need of further denazification before re-education could hope to succeed. A June 1946 memo to Hartshorne from E&RA headquarters suggests an agency engaged in damage control. Acting Chief V. DeLong asked Hartshorne for, "a statement of previous and immediate goals for discussion with reporters and superior officers."⁶³ Hartshorne had much to reveal, and wrote in his diary for July 23, 1945: "I plan on writing a book soon, 'German Universities After National Socialism: The Autopsy of an Academic Class.'"⁶⁴ As we have seen, he never got a chance to put pen to paper.

⁶³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 680, File 12, Directives from HQ, June 7, 1946.

⁶⁴Hartshorne, Personal Diary, July 23, 1945, p. 53.

CHAPTER 4

IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED

Re-education was in a state of crisis, and MG was aware of it. Out of a perceived necessity, MG turned the process of denazification over to German Tribunals. Against the advice of some of his closest aides, Clay decided in June 1946, to press on with reopening the universities and have the 'Spruchkammern' denazify the faculty again. Along with the denazification of other cultural areas such as the cinema and the media, it was believed that re-education would be part of the force for democratizing Germany.

"Democracy will never take root in Germany until the Germans are taught disobedience," Gertrude Stein once said.¹ She did not mean disobedience in the sense of physical aggression that was detailed in earlier chapters; she was pointing to a need for the German militarist, duty-and-country-first mentality to change. MG was aware of the need for renewed denazification efforts at the universities. It was believed that any hope for re-education would first require intensified and

¹John Herz, "Fiasco of Denazification," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 63 (1948), p. 436.

thorough denazification. Re-education was to be a major tool in inculcating democracy in Germany. The Zook Mission's report of September 1947 stressed such an idea, quoting from the Potsdam Agreement, " that German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazis and militaristic doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas."² The purpose of denazification was re-emphasized by the Adviser to the Chief of the Office of Denazification in mid-1946. The program was to "prevent the continuation of Nazi methods rather than punish individual National Socialists."³ Ironically, the program had appeared to the German population, and to many in MG, as attacking individuals. With this 'renewed' mandate an increased number of cases was to be heard; now, however, they would be heard by German Tribunals, not American. MG believed that German adjudicators would implement a denazification policy as intended and keep personal motives apart from their decisions.

The eighteen months of what Tent has called 'the second purge', forms the focus of this chapter. Tent used the term to reflect a renewed effort by MG to

²*Ibid.*, p. 429. The National Socialist was considered a person committed to the Party ideology and a totalitarian state. A Militarist was a person who the Allies believed, regardless of type of government, was motivated by the tradition of Prussian military efficiency and legendary invincibility. The militarist saw the use of the military as a natural tool in foreign discourse and diplomacy.

³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 8, File 6, Advisor to the Office of DNZ, Bavaria.

ferret out Nazis who had escaped a small initial screening. This second purge was intended to remove sufficient numbers of Nazis and militarists so that re-education could begin and, subsequently, democracy could be taught successfully at the universities.

Central to this issue is evidence provided by historians such as Tent, who sought to criticize these new efforts to denazify the universities. Also, the role of MG during these months deserves further scrutiny. As noted, MG had handed denazification over to the Spruchkammern. The results of this decision and the subsequent actions of MG will be discussed in this chapter. Particular focus is directed toward how much MG knew of the success or failure of denazification and re-education, and what subsequent steps they took, if any.

In what follows, the German Tribunals emerge as failures, sometimes purposely allowing a 'Major Offender' to be 'rehabilitated' and thus reinstated at a university. Similarly, because of outside intimidation of Tribunal officials, offenders escaped punishment, or they were rehabilitated simply because of confusion over evidence and lack of testimony. Thus the failure of the Tribunals contributed to the renazification of the universities in significant measure.

Of fundamental importance is a significant body of evidence concerning growing resistance and the outright refusal to obey MG directives. As will be shown, this occurred not only amongst students and faculty, but also amongst

Churchmen, and amongst Land Government officials responsible for education and denazification. The resistance was sometimes passive: misbehaviour and verbal abuse of instructors and Americans; sometimes it was violent opposition. Gradually, resistance became organized nationally into political groups with Nazi and nationalist, undemocratic agendas. We shall show that MG was aware of this rebirth of Nazi and right-wing organizations, but instead of stamping out such groups, MG preferred to use high-ranking Nazis to spy on the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) and pro-French separatists who advocated the partitioning of the Rhur area to France. This chapter will conclude with the 'second purge' exhausted and denazification equally tired.

Historians have largely ignored the fundamental changes that occurred during this period or they have viewed it as part of a whole, often referred to as "the JCS 1067 years, 1945-47." Zink suggested that the re-education and denazification programs failed and that it would have taken thousands of education officers or civilian equivalents to have done a thorough job. He fails to mention the escalating violent resistance, or any of the problems connected with Nazi professors or sympathizers maintaining powerful positions at the universities. This is excusable in Zink's case since many documents were still classified while he was compiling his data. Historians working more recently, such as Gimbel, Peterson, Davidson and Tent, have had no such excuse.

Tent's, Mission On The Rhine has been acknowledged as an excellent discussion of re-education and denazification in occupied Germany. He blamed the intensity and the initiation of the denazification effort in mid-1946 on 'hysterical' articles by Tania Long and Raymond Daniell.⁴ He believed that public pressure, aroused by these articles in the New York Times, was sufficient to convince the politically powerful in Washington to demand a new, aggressive round of Nazi hunting. He also believed that reporters like Drew Middleton offered a more accurate and less inflammatory picture of conditions in occupied Germany. Tent has also argued that MG had no reason to pursue a new round of denazification.

The evidence to the contrary is compelling. Tent, we believe, was quite wrong; MG knew several months before Long or Daniell wrote a word that the universities were experiencing an escalation of Nazi and militaristic activities. British MI-14 issued a report in December 1945 detailing the discovery of Nazi student movements in Hanover. There were many ex-officers among the student body and they exercised a marked influence over the younger students.⁵ Again in January 1946, British intelligence reported a German 'Aryan' student association

⁴Tent, Mission On The Rhine, p. 87.

⁵Mitropa, No. 11, Dec. 1945, Foreign Office (hereafter cited FO) 371/55630, PRO, p. 5.

forming. American intelligence added "that pro-Nazi professors were cheered by student groups."⁶

The existence of these reports adds credence to Tania Long's article in April 1946. Long wrote that Dr. DeMoll, then a Bavarian government official in charge of universities, made no secret that any German who assisted the 'enemy' (Americans) was not acceptable as a faculty member. In the same article Long reported on students and professors verbally attacking the Americans. Tent stated that Long's inclusion of one innocuous piece of graffiti—"Please God bring us the 5th Reich, the 4th is worse than the 3rd"—meant little. Tent has not included the seven other graffiti comments from the original intelligence report viewed by Long and Tent himself. The comments range from a desire for the return of the Führer to a declaration that Germany would one day be free.⁷ The point is that Tent was selective with his choice of evidence; he appeared to use only the slogan that served his conclusions. Long also described a student society, the 'Academic Political Discussion Club', which was made up of former officers and discussed committing violent acts against Ministerpräsident Hoegner. Speeches to club members were often given by ex-soldiers such as Freiherr von

⁶Ibid., p. 7.

⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 27, Subversive Activities, To: The Chief, Political Affairs Section, ICD, August 8, 1946.

Stengel, a former Freikorps and Black Reichswehr member.⁸ Tent may have believed Long was using hysterical headlines, but the indisputable fact was that 80 former officers were arrested at Munich University for plotting the assassination of Ministerpräsident Hoegner.

Tent denied Long's assertion that a course on racial theories was still being taught by a Nazi professor, Prinz Wilhelm Karl von Isenburg, and that Baron von Gueldenstuebben was still teaching anti-Slav and anti-Russian courses.⁹ Long's accusation was quite accurate. The language utilized by the two professors was subtle, but it often insinuated that Eastern Europe had a need for the economic guidance of Germany and perhaps a 'civilizing' effect from occupation by German people. Chauvinistic and anti-Slav ideas had a thriving constituency in German academia. At German universities before and after the Second World War, Ostforschung, the study of German superiority and Slavic inability to keep their affairs orderly, was smiled upon by the state. Michael Burleigh's Germany Turns Eastward (1988) gave a detailed account of how a large group of renowned German academics rationalized the 'duty' of Germany to rule Eastern Europe and how they offered the National Socialists academic

⁸Tania Long, "Munich University Hotbed of Nazism," New York Times, April 22, 1946.

⁹Ibid., p. 8.

underpinnings for such ideas. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, Burleigh pointed out that the academic community felt an obligation and a 'sense of duty' to correct the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam, which they felt showed a lack of understanding of German history. Under the veil of bringing "economic development, cultural improvement and political order to the East the tradition of German chauvinism and the legacy of the past was barely concealed."¹⁰

Tent also dismissed the reporting of Raymond Daniell, who had written that race theories were still being taught, that students spoke of revenge against collaborators, and that any derogatory comments regarding Hitler or National Socialism were greeted with displeasure. Daniell found that Nazis and their friends were still in a position to persecute the anti-Nazi minority at the universities. As well, Daniell described the growing resistance organization Edelweiss Piraten, which was active in surrounding villages and in the universities.¹¹

Tent contended that these two reporters stood alone in producing biased work. However, Tent's exemplar of an unbiased reporter was Drew Middleton, who in July 1945 had written an article regarding MG's concern with active

¹⁰Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastward (Cambridge, England: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988), pp. 8, 9, 314-316.

¹¹Raymond Daniell, "Nazi Virus Thrives in American Zone," New York Times, April 23, 1946.

German ex-soldiers and had reported that the Americans had discovered buried arms caches. Middleton reported on several sniping incidents, including one incident where two MPs were killed.¹² Middleton also reported on a new nationalist spirit among former Wehrmacht soldiers at Erlangen University, and described MG's discovery of a 'soldier's party' aimed at wresting control of Germany from "old men and traitors."¹³ Tent also omitted press reports about a MG raid of 200 towns in March 1946, in which the Americans arrested 1,000 suspected Nazis for plotting against MG and German authorities.¹⁴

What historians have ignored is the MG documentation on organized Nazi groups. Intelligence reports show that Americans were continually infiltrating SS underground groups and using members to spy on the KPD and the French occupation authorities. The memoirs of former CIC agent Erhard Debringhaus attest to such activities. By early 1946 CIC had placed informants within neo-SS groups led by ex-SS and SD officers Naumann, Barbie, Wenzel and Ellersiek.¹⁵

¹²Drew Middleton, New York Times, July 25, 1945.

¹³Ibid., February 18, 1946, pp. 1, 3.

¹⁴Associated Press Release, "200 Towns Raided in Hunt for Nazis," New York Times, April 1, 1946.

¹⁵Biddiscombe, "'Selection Board'," pp. 73-74.

Historians do not have to look far to find other sources of evidence that there was a growing problem. Kathleen Maclaughlin reported that ex-officers enrolled at university still 'cherished' the "Führer Prinzip" (leadership principle).¹⁶ Weekly Intelligence Summaries from American occupation forces exposed the need for further denazification at the universities. For instance, at Frankfurt University it was reported that former HJ were organizing and wearing their uniforms on campus. It appeared that similar activities were occurring at Darmstadt as well.¹⁷ If Tent and his fellow historians refused to believe mounting evidence compiled by American sources, then they could have looked to neutral Switzerland, where Der Tag published an article about Nazi cliques forming in Frankfurt and about underground organizations forming at the universities. The aim of these groups was to persuade Nazi judges to release Major Offenders and implicate anti-Fascists in crimes.¹⁸ We have shown that Tent and other historians were incorrect in labelling Long and Daniell as hysterical headline seekers, and they were highly selective in the evidence that they chose to include in their research.

¹⁶Kathleen Maclaughlin, "Round-up of Nazis Only A first Step," New York Times, April 7, 1946.

¹⁷USFET, RG 59, G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary, #36, March 21, 1946, State Dept. Decimal Files, 1945-49, 740.00119.

¹⁸OMGUS, RG 260, "Alleged Nazi Activities in U.S. Zone," March 30, 1946.

Even amongst the new German Land Governments, concerned voices were heard. Daniell reported Ministerpräsident Hoegner of Bavaria suggesting that a 'special police' might be necessary for 'political cleansing'. Hoegner envisioned this force protecting denazification employees, tracking down treasonous Nazis and running work camps for Nazis who were caught spreading 'lies' about the Government.¹⁹

Orders went out from MG Headquarters in response to the intelligence reports of Nazi activity at the universities. MG wanted an analysis of the situation at Munich University, a study was launched in May 1946. Of 7,511 students three groups were targeted for further investigation: the first group consisted of 928 former officers; the second group of 1864 former Nazi Party members, and the third group of 2600 former soldiers. The faculty also came under fire. The Rector, Albert Rehm, was removed, but was still permitted to lecture. Reports came back to E&RA that the average age of the faculty was 50 and that they tended to be undemocratic and nationalistic. When asked to compare the nationalistic and violent students of 1946 to the Weimar students, the newly appointed Rector, Professor Vossler said "that they weren't so good before

¹⁹Raymond Daniell, "Germany Asks Law to Combat Nazism," New York Times, April 12, 1946.

1933. He remembered in 1926 that students had refused to march in their traditional colours and uniforms if Jews were allowed to march."²⁰

MG also received a report from Dr. Blanckhagen of Marburg University about an error by MG officials. MG had believed that the critical remarks made by some young people about the Third Reich meant that they were anti-Nazi. Blanckhagen pointed out, however, that they were displeased with the Reich leadership and the defeat, but remained proponents of National Socialist ideology. The students disliked their 'liberators' and were often intoxicated by the nationalistic rhetoric of some of the clergy and their professors.²¹ Reports such as these illustrated the need for a great deal of careful inspection at the universities.

The first two post-war years of renazification in Germany, particularly in the universities, were not motivated by the desire to alter the political ideology of the students and faculty. The MG consensus was that not many Nazis were recreating specifically neo-Nazi political organizations at the universities. MG allowed former Party members to help one another regain either university teaching positions or a place as a student. In other areas such as police

²⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 55, File 19, Intelligence Division, Bavaria, May 2, 1946.

²¹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28A.

officialdom and government bureaucracies, local residents often preferred the old Nazi officials to new refugee officials. What political activity there was showed the Nazis either obtaining local government positions, or joining the CSU (Christian Social Union), the FDP (Free German Party), the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), or the KPD. By 1947, MG Intelligence Division believed that these ex-Nazis were not spreading Nazi ideas inside the new parties.²²

When MG looked to the established Church authorities for assistance in winning the German people's support, they met a stubborn resistance. Church officials, of all denominations, found themselves in a painful position. They claimed to have prayed for the defeat of the German armies, but the breadth of destruction that Germany had endured left them feeling that their prayers went unanswered. Their growing distrust of MG authorities led to a suspicion by all Church leaders that "The Gestapo was back again."²³ MG was reluctant to allow the Church officials a prominent role in the ruling of a new Germany. After an initial flirtation, when the Church was trusted as a focal point of stability, MG soon realized that within the clergy there were numerous Nazi sympathizers. Church leaders displayed a reluctance to purge their own institutions, and by late

²²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 25, File 89, Hesse.

²³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 278, File 29, February 28, 1946, Hesse.

1946 MG found the Church often providing defense evidence for known Nazi offenders involved in denazification court cases.

The arrival of Hartshorne at Munich as Head of University Education on June 1, 1946, signalled the beginning of an investigation into Spruchkammer failings. While Tent mentioned Hartshorne's work, he refrained from passing on any details of Hartshorne's early findings at Munich, Erlangen and Würzburg. Bower suggested that Hartshorne concurred with Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Browning's view that "Würzburg was being run by a clique of Nazi-sympathizing professors, and that the 'esteemed' Rector Martin was reluctant to dismiss undesirable faculty."²⁴

MG issued a directive on June 25, 1946 in which they warned all German schools that anyone spreading Nazi, militaristic or nationalistic doctrines would be subject to dismissal.²⁵ True to the sloppy reputation that MG had earned, the directive contained no definition of terms and the directive was therefore not followed with any more precise announcements on denazification. Taylor attempted once again to explain the re-education plan. In August he announced that MG would need to make long-range plans, and that MG was entering a

²⁴Tom Bower, Pledge Betrayed, p. 165.

²⁵United Press Release, "Allies Warn German Teachers," New York Times, June 26, 1946.

second phase of re-education where new MG initiated programs would be introduced into the German educational process. He admitted that it might be generations before any signs that the re-education efforts had been successful would be evident.²⁶

At Würzburg, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Browning reported that on paper many Major Offenders and Offenders had been dismissed. Upon closer inspection he found they had been rehired as class three and four employees. This meant some were on 'probation' and others were exonerated. Browning urged E&RA to conduct additional investigations soon.²⁷ In early August, Browning still found Würzburg full of Nazi faculty and students. The medical clinic were all Nazis rehired out of necessity. Browning had them dismissed and within one week their positions at the clinic were filled by rehabilitated personnel.²⁸ Of course the rehabilitation label did not guarantee that these people were free of Nazi or nationalistic attitudes. Many offenders had been labelled rehabilitated after they had provided false evidence to the Tribunals, or had intimidated the Tribunals into exonerating them.

²⁶United Press Release, "Re-educating of Germans Held Task of Generation," New York Times, August 14, 1946.

²⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 59, File 15, Policy Enforcement Branch.

²⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Box 54, File 15, September 23, 1946, Policy Enforcement Branch.

Hartshorne's work at Würzburg confirmed Browning's findings. Later in August Hartshorne wrote a report contending that compromised, dismissed medical staff had been rehired on the pretext of being laborers. This was a common practice not only at universities, but in many institutions, both public and private, where special technical talents were needed, and such skills appeared to be possessed by Nazis alone. Hartshorne recommended that Würzburg have a permanently assigned university officer from MG.²⁹ As far as he was concerned Würzburg was a year behind in denazification and was a bastion of conservative and nationalistic forces.

Thanks to the work of Browning and Hartshorne, four regional offices were set up to oversee progress that denazification had made at the universities in the American zone. Lieutenant-Colonel Cate was given Marburg, Giessen, Frankfurt and Darmstadt; Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was given Munich, Weihenstephan and Pasing Teachers College; Major E. J. Emerick was given Mannheim, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe and Stuttgart; and Major C. M. Emerick was given Würzburg, Erlangen and Hohenheim.³⁰ As well as universities, these men had colleges and technical schools to oversee.

²⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 55, File 19, August 21, 1946. Report by Hartshorne to E&RA Headquarters.

³⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 54, File 15, September 23, 1946, Policy Enforcement Branch.

It should be remembered that Hartshorne was assassinated on August 28, 1946. All observers acknowledged that E&RA had lost the best man they had in Germany. Hartshorne's final report led to the dismissal of 95 Munich clerical and laboratory assistant staff and 33 teaching staff. He had suggested that they lacked positive political or moral qualities that would assist with the introduction of democracy.³¹

The process involved in deciding whether a student or faculty member should be dismissed was not easy. Few men would pursue the truth like Hartshorne had done. A good example was the case of astronomy Professor von Lang at Munich University. He had a half-Jewish wife, a fact which had slowed down his advancement in 1935 and 1936. However, in an effort to prove his loyalty, von Lang had joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and had been recruited into the SA in 1934. He had failed to mention these facts on his Fragebogen, as well as not mentioning that he had been a Freikorps member in 1919. His Fragebogen only mentioned that he had tried to join the Party but his wife came first and he had suffered to save her. On October 20, 1946 an investigation team headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kelly found von Lang a Class II, or an Offender in

³¹United Press Release, "95 Ousted at Munich University," New York Times, November 14, 1946.

Spruchkammer terminology. He was dismissed shortly thereafter.³² The Americans and Spruchkammern used classification systems that were similar. For the Americans, Nazis were categorized as follows: Class I, 'Non-employment mandatory'; Class II, 'Employment discretionary with an advisor recommendation'; Class III, 'Employment discretionary with no advisory'; Class IV, 'No evidence of Nazi activity'; Class V, 'Evidence of anti-Nazi activity'. Under the Tribunals the categories were: 'Major Offender', mandatory removal; 'Offender', removal until appeal heard; 'Lessor Offender', to work on probation; 'Follower', able to work with supervision; 'Exonerated', not chargeable due to lack of evidence and 'proceedings quashed'.³³

By December, Clay was pleased by early reports. General Adcock, Clay's Chief of Staff, had made a special effort to make certain that Colonel Browning's findings at Würzburg were not repeated to Clay.³⁴ Adcock wished to be able to report that denazification was nearing completion. Clay held a press conference in January 1947 in which he stipulated that not only Nazis would be dismissed but non-party members who had profited from or supported the Hitler regime. Clay

³²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 146, File 13, Case No. 1776, October 29, 1946.

³³OMGUS, RG 260, Report to the Military Governor from Chief of Intelligence, Hesse, October 1946, p. 7.

³⁴Tent, Mission, pp. 102-105.

rebuffed reporters who reminded him that the program had foundered badly only several months earlier. Clay was confident both about his oversight groups and the German Tribunals; besides, he said, "The Americans could take over the entire procedure again, if necessary."³⁵ This was sheer bravado. The forces at his disposal for re-education and denazification were fewer than ever. There was no evidence that the American Government or military was prepared to escalate MG's numbers.

As 1946 ended, MG frequently found itself in a state of confrontation with the German Land officials. Reports to MG pointed to high-level officials assisting the Nazi cliques at the universities. In December, the Bavarian Intelligence Branch interviewed Dr. Zibble, the Minister of Education, Dr. Meinzolt, the State Secretary for Education, and Dr. Pfeiffer, the Minister of Political Liberation. Special Branch officers had reported that Meinzolt and Zibble were actively supporting Nazis in faculty positions and that this facilitated the teaching of traditional themes of nationalism and militarism at Munich University.³⁶ As a result of their investigation Special Branch recommended the dismissal of Meinzolt. E&RA opposed the dismissal.

³⁵Delbert Clark, "Clay Emphasizes War on Nazi Spirit," New York Times, January 23, 1947.

³⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 268, File 10, Weekly Intelligence Report, Bavaria, December 6-12, 1946.

This growing antagonism between different MG branches was to prove a benefit for Nazis and sympathizers who wished to retain their positions. Records collected by MG intelligence and Meinzolt's own Fragebogen left no doubt that the Minister himself had collaborated with the Nazi regime. As an Evangelical Minister, Meinzolt had held mass prayers in which he asked the nation to pray to God to assist Hitler. However, E&RA officials argued that he was co-operative and appeared to be supportive of re-education ideas. Special Branch countered that denazification must come first, that Meinzolt would leave tainted professors in positions of authority, and that consequently re-education would prove a failure. General Muller sided with E&RA, and Meinzolt stayed.³⁷ Whether or not this decision was correct the tension evident inside MG was important in itself. Numerous reports of Nazi and nationalistic activity on the campuses received a different appreciation, and a different outcome for accused suspects, depending on whether the denazification officers of Special Branch or an E&RA officer handled the case. E&RA was committed to implementing a re-education policy and found the constant replacement of faculty a serious impediment. On the other hand the Public Safety officers in charge of denazification had orders to make certain the universities were cleansed of the reactionary forces that had dominated German academia for over a century.

³⁷Tent, Mission, p. 99.

There were other incidents of MG branches working at cross-purposes. At the Graf Zeppelin School, CAD (Civil Affairs Division of the War Department) officers found that 22 staff had not filled in their Fragebogen. CAD demanded that the faculty immediately fill in Fragebogen. The staff refused and stated that local E&RA officers had 'promised' them that they were exempt. If these had been only nominal members of the Party there might have been an excuse, but the cases were potentially grievous. To name but a few of the faculty, Hermann Neidhart had been a Party member since 1934; Hermann Strobel had been a Party member since 1933, and a factory informant and member of the SA since 1934.³⁸ This lack of a consistent single policy by MG at such a late date was a formidable obstacle for the officers in the field.

While the field groups laboured on, often at odds with other MG branches, the bulk of denazification and the instituting of new education policies was left to the German Tribunals and to the various university administrations and the Ministries of Government to which they were accountable. These groups became the last hope for a 'real' denazification of the university system. On examining at how they responded to this responsibility one finds a massive number of cases resolved. The question remains— whether these resolutions were

³⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Box 330, File 176, Public Safety Branch CAD, June 9, 1947.

matters of convenience or were actually part of a thorough and successful program. What these Tribunals, university leaders and Government Ministers actually did during the 'second purge' is revealing.

Two problems confronted the German authorities. First, evidence of Nazi activism was often destroyed during the war; frequently such evidence was only known orally and necessary witnesses were dead or the evidence was not where one expected to find it. Also, 'friends' of 'offenders' sometimes removed incriminating documents. Second, most professors were not National Socialist Party members. These professors made up part of the elite upper class in Germany, and to join a party which stood for 'socialism' or 'the workers' was unappealing. However, elements of the Nazi Party's ideology of Germanic strength and excessive nationalism attracted support from students and professors. For the Tribunals, the difficulty lay in proving whether a student or professor supported the Nazi Party to such an extent that he could be considered a 'Major Offender', 'Offender' or 'Follower'. The Tribunals had to ascertain whether previous support for National Socialism had been merely to maintain one's job or whether a professor gained professionally from supporting the Party.³⁹

³⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 66, File 19, Bavaria, April 1947, Report to TREND.

Another important consideration was the question of granting amnesties. On March 5, 1946 when the Länder Ministers and MG had agreed to the 'Law for the Liberation from Nazism and Militarism', an amnesty was granted to those born after December 1, 1919. This was to apply to everyone except proven War criminals or prominent Nazis.⁴⁰ This "August Youth Amnesty," as it was called, reduced by at least 1,000,000 the number of cases to be adjudicated. The obviously disturbing feature about this amnesty was that the age group affected were those who had spent their teen years in the HJ and their early manhood either serving in the military or supporting the Nazi Party in other domestic capacities. These young adults had not experienced any form of government other than a totalitarian regime during their adolescent and adult life. This reality meant that the bulk of students at the universities during the occupation had previously been indoctrinated with Nazism, militarism and imperialistic nationalism. While some scholars question the effectiveness of Nazi indoctrination, German youth were exposed to a brand of expansionist imperialism and devout nationalism under almost all post-Bismarckian governments. This 'traditional German' background, compounded with Nazi indoctrination, made the job of re-education officers difficult. The chances of the students responding positively to American ideals of democracy and showing

⁴⁰Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification," p. 573.

respect for the rights of others were minimal. Therefore, while the German Tribunals could produce impressive early numbers of rehabilitated Germans, it was difficult to ascertain whether high-ranking Nazis and committed nationalists were slipping through.

Yet another interesting matter involved classification procedures. As the Spruchkammern increased their role there was a noticeable change in the categorization of those who had been indicted. The first such case arose when 1258 men whom Special Branch had classified as mandatory non-employables were reclassified. The Tribunals decided that 12 were 'Major Offenders' and thus non-employable and indictable; 82 were 'Offenders', to be dismissed from current responsible positions; 203 'Lesser Offenders', to be employed on probation; 814 as 'Followers' or only members from necessity; 106 were exonerated; and 41 not charged at all. By September 1946, 6298 of 8182 Special Branch mandatory cases had found their restrictions removed.⁴¹ As Special Branch officers began to complain, new orders were received from MG Headquarters; the Special Branch would act only as an observation force and its members would serve only as liaison officers.⁴²

⁴¹OMGUS, RG 260, Report to the Military Governor, Hesse, by Chief of Intelligence, July 1946, p. 3, and September 1946, p. 4.

⁴²OMGUS, RG 260, Report to Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, October 1946, p. 5.

When an adjudication was necessary, the German Tribunals were faced with possibly three further obstacles. First, Nazi and nationalistic forces in the Government and at the universities would often purposefully interfere with the Tribunal's adjudications. For example, at Würzburg, Hartshorne interviewed Rector Martin and asked why a Nazi physician, Dr. Hoede, was still on the staff. Martin answered that Lieutenant McIntosh of E&RA had ordered Hoede's continued employment. As well, Dr. Martin had had the physician's classification moved from 'Major Offender' to 'Lesser Offender'. Asked by Hartshorne if Martin had fired this known 'Offender', Martin replied, "yes, but he was hired to work as head of the Venereal Disease Centre."⁴³ Hoede returned to the professorate during the years of the Federal Republic.

Amazingly, Martin remained Rector for two years, when finally he resigned under pressure and was rehired as a professor. He later followed Otto Graf as Education Ministry Supervisor of Universities. As Rector one of his most outrageous acts was to appoint Dr. Althaus as head of the Medical Clinic. Althaus was well-known to MG as a Nazi who had worked for the Gestapo and been a member of the Air Force High Command. These were facts he concealed on his Fragebogen. A clinic employee, Dr. Wolfe, reported him to the authorities.

⁴³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 56, File 16, University data, Public Safety Branch, August 12, 1946.

A similar case was that of Doctor of Medicine Louise Friedrich. The Doctor was a strong anti-semitic who said under questioning, "I hope it will soon again turn otherwise, then such people as Wolfe and the half-Jew Dr. Balza will be hanged for their treachery." By July 1946, it was Wolfe of all people, who was dismissed.⁴⁴ If not for the work of Colonel Browning and Hartshorne at Würzburg this sad state of affairs would not have changed. The Tribunals had been warned off by the powerful interests at Würzburg. We can judge their effectiveness here as negligible.

Frequent interference occurred elsewhere as well. At Munich, the Dean of the Women's Clinic was Amandus Hahn, an SS member. Hahn kept Jews and anti-Nazis out of any key positions. He and his 'friends' contrived evidence against non-Nazis to have them dismissed by the Tribunals. Other cases involved the suppression of evidence. A nurse sent in a report to MG claiming that former SS lieutenant (and now Professor Heyde) had destroyed documents showing a certain Dr. Stoessel had once received funds from the SS. At that time the evidence would have clinched the case against Stoessel. As things turned out he was reclassified as a 'Follower'.⁴⁵

⁴⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 56, File 16, University data, Public Safety Branch, October 1946.

⁴⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28A, Bavaria, April 1947.

MG censors learned a great deal from listening to phone calls and opening the mail of suspicious personages. One case illustrates well the kind of purposeful intervention and tampering with testimony that could occur. "In Munich, a Dr. Kerz called a fellow professor at Munich University. The conversation centered around the respondent, a senior professor, lamenting how the timing of his Spruchkammer appearance had come at the worst possible moment. Kerz advised his friend to 'find' witnesses for his exoneration. The Munich professor was unsure, but Kerz suggested there was a Mr. E. who, although hostile towards Nazis, for a price would mislay the files, giving the professor time to build a 'credible' defense. Kerz then admitted that the professor was not the only one concerned, but that an informant had named 170 faculty and government members as Nazis, and as former SS, SA or Gestapo agents. Kerz suggested that Dr. Meinzolt would be the best person to assist the professor."⁴⁶ At the very least, this conversation establishes that Special Branch was correct in their judgement of Meinzolt. If Meinzolt was as involved as this call implied, he should have been removed. The fact that he was untouched left him on hand to play a key role in permitting and aiding the renazification of the universities.

⁴⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 161, File?, Bavarian Civil Censorship Division, May 13, 1947.

The second problem that confronted the Tribunals was intimidation.

When the tactics of conniving and obstruction were insufficient, many professors, students and Government officials would resort to intimidating Tribunal officials into reclassifying a 'Major Offender'. In March 1947 a Tribunal official, known for his denazification zeal, had his home broken into as he slept, and was shot dead. Police said the incident was the result of a bungled robbery.⁴⁷

At Darmstadt it was discovered that Prosecutor Rohsbach had changed sentences and lowered the classification of numerous 'Major Offenders' before these men ever appeared before the Tribunal. It was also discovered that the prosecutor had received threatening letters and that a fellow prosecutor had been beaten by a former SS officer for testifying against other Nazis.⁴⁸ It was understandable that Tribunal officials were not prepared to stand up to the vestiges of Nazi brutality. Actually, by 1947 it was becoming difficult to find sufficient Germans to man the Tribunals. Not only was the job dangerous but intimidating; after it was over the official was bound to be viewed by many as a collaborator with the 'enemy'. The worst act of intimidation occurred in the spring of 1947, once again at Darmstadt, when the secret votes of the

⁴⁷United Press Release, "Denazifying Aide Slain In Germany," Washington Post, March 23, 1947, p. 8.

⁴⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Chief of Intelligence Lieutenant James O'Steen, January 1, 1947.

Spruchkammer were made public. One of the prosecutors was coerced into revealing the results. The number of Germans that came forward to work on the Tribunals dropped to a trickle.⁴⁹

The incidents mounted. In case after case students and professors would hoot and distract the proceedings. Tribunal officials received threats on a regular basis. Often the threats came from their own Government officials. American and German enthusiasm for the program ebbed quickly. Press coverage in the U.S. was becoming more concerned with a potential threat from the Russians, and in Europe even the Swiss press was calling for the end to denazification.⁵⁰

The third and possibly greatest hurdle for a German Tribunal, or an American Special Branch investigation, was the conflicting and confusing evidence and testimony that was often heard when a case was being adjudicated. Dr. Barnett complained frequently to E&RA Headquarters that ascertaining the truth about a case was often quite impossible. One case, that of Dr. Karl D'Ester, appeared to be particularly difficult. The MG files said D'Ester had been dismissed December 11, 1945, but had been reinstated by another E&RA officer March 14, 1946. D'Ester claimed he had helped Jewish students at Munich

⁴⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Weekly Intelligence Report, June 12, 1947.

⁵⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, James O'Steen, April 18, 1947.

University, but he was forced to admit that he had also denounced a Jewish journalist, Maritz Saphir, and had done the same to another named Arthur Schnitzler. Journalist Association records showed that D'Ester was an avid supporter of the Nazi regime and that he had engaged in much anti-semitic rhetoric.⁵¹ The surprising fact was not that Dr. D'Ester was dismissed as an 'Offender' but that the excuse he used, "I helped the Jews," was used by thousands of defendants. If so many doctors and professors had really helped the Jews the concentration camps would have been half empty. Many professors would pay or coerce a German Jew to come to a Tribunal hearing and give evidence to the fact that the professor was a 'good' Nazi.

Without relying on too many individual stories to prove the difficulties of the program, another classic example will suffice; the dismissal, rehiring and rehabilitation of Professor Heinrich Eymer. Professor Eymer was the head gynecologist at Heidelberg University, and his Party membership was well documented. He had joined the SS in 1934, the NSDÖB (University Instructors League), the NS Lehrenbund in 1933 (Teachers League), and the Nazi Party in 1936. He was a known anti-semite. On July 30, 1946 MG classified Eymer as a Class II offender, demanding his dismissal. Three Jewish doctors had testified

⁵¹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28A, Bavaria ICD Intelligence Branch, September 12, 1946.

against him at the hearing. These witnesses were themselves arrested the next day for performing abortions, and were jailed. With these three German Jews unavailable to testify, a second hearing in Munich on August 2, 1946 reclassified Eymer as Class III, a 'Lessor Offender'.

The testimony of the three physicians had been devastating. According to their written account, Eymer had dismissed them in 1926 and, when forced to rehire them after the war, had locked them up in the basement and fed them scraps. According to the doctors, their rations were given to passing ex-SS officers and soldiers that Eymer aided. The testimony of one of Eymer's nurses corroborated this story. She was also unavailable to testify at the second Tribunal. By August 16, 1946, Intelligence Branch believed further investigation was necessary, with the date set for a new hearing, questions arose as to how Eymer had managed a second Tribunal so quickly in early August? Why had the Jewish doctors not shown up to testify? By law the prosecutor had to inform them of the new trial date. Upon learning they were in jail the prosecutor would have had to delay the Tribunal proceedings.

A further complication was that Otto Graf, Minister for Education and Culture, had informed the press that he planned to testify against Eymer. After a meeting with Ministerpräsident Hoegner, Graf declined to appear, saying he really had no actual evidence. Graf's subordinates, however,

Dr. Faudt and Dr. Meinzolt supported Eymer at the trial. At this second hearing not only were witnesses absent but the Tribunal gallery was filled with students and professors from Munich University. The vast majority chanted Nazi slogans and applauded Eymer.

In the end, MG found the situation so full of contradictions that no third Tribunal was held and Eymer retained his position. The Jewish Doctors were fined for performing illegal abortions and were fired from the university.⁵²

The manpower shortage for the Tribunals became critical when the KPD began withdrawing their members. It was calculated by MG in late 1947 that if all KPD officials pulled out of the program, there would be 890 fewer officials, or 30% of the total. By December 12, 1947, 85% of the KPD members had withdrawn their services.⁵³

In answer to the escalating Tribunal problems, reclassification became a quick-fix. By late 1947, the German Länder Minister-Presidents had asked for and received an amendment to Law 54, known as Law 58, which moved over 2,500,000 offenders from classes I and II down to III and IV, or even exonerated them completely. The only stipulation was that MG had to approve the changes.

⁵²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 146, File 15, Bavaria, Heidelberg History Branch, September 15, 1946.

⁵³OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, James O'Steen, December 12, 1947.

This small impediment to complete German autonomy in denazification matters would disappear soon as well.

The 'second purge' was ending. Military reports suggested that any hope of German co-operation in other constructive and democratizing programs was being destroyed by the continuation of the program. The German populace believed that denazification had gone on far too long. For most Germans the Nuremberg Trials were an appropriate scope to denazification by MG. Other Germans complained that because of the way that the Tribunals were now operating, the high-profile Nazis were escaping punishment. However, re-education—the supposedly more positive approach to changing the German mentality—finally gained the attention of Clay. Regardless of how it had been achieved, Clay could claim on paper that only 'Lesser Offenders', 'Followers' or exonerated students and professors were now on the campuses. The question remained as to whether the purge had cleansed the universities sufficiently. Were they at a point where the American desire to teach democracy would be well received? Here a discussion of German attitudes among the students, faculty, and the Länder governments is critical. Evidence offers a disturbing picture about German attitudes and receptiveness to democratic modes of thinking.

Some opposition appeared to be nothing more than youthful pranks. On an agricultural technical school wall was sketched a picture of a Hitler Jugend

member, arm boldly raised in a Nazi salute and standing over a fallen soldier's grave. Written underneath was the motto, "What the Americans don't discover we can plead ignorance to."⁵⁴ However innocent such a drawing might appear, other evidence revealed that a hardening of the German spirit was taking place. Disregard for MG rules was on the rise. In contravention of Ordinance 57 (banning the formation of military, duelling or nationalistic organizations), new 'Student Korps' were forming. The Minister for Education in Munich looked upon Ordinance 57 as only an advisory bulletin.⁵⁵ Resistance pamphlets appeared on the Frankfurt campus. The pamphlets were reported as being expertly organized, and utilized a Nazi symbol as an identifying signature. The text conveyed a 'stab in the back' theory similar to the stories told after World War One.⁵⁶

Intelligence intercepted many letters between students which expressed similar opinions. For example, a letter from a female MA student at Göttingen to a male PhD student at Marburg stressed the need for the students to maintain

⁵⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 674, File 2, Hesse, April 24, 1946.

⁵⁵Omgus, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Bavaria, Intelligence Division, CCG, November 15, 1947.

⁵⁶State Department, RG 54, Decimal File 740.00119, Control N4, Weekly Review #20, April 19, 1947, pp. 13-14.

their National Socialist values, even against all outside influences. As well, she said, committed Nazis should work to convince others to join the cause.⁵⁷

Students at Marburg and Giessen boycotted classes of dismissed 'Offender' professors. Students would refuse to testify at Tribunals against incriminated professors. At Marburg a highly organized and nationalistic group called ASTA (Allgemeiner Studenten-Ausschuss—General Student Committee) was formed.⁵⁸ Students members of ASTA were openly impressed by soldiers at the universities. The few anti-Nazi professors lamented that the students admired National Socialist doctrines and an authoritarian style of government. Gathering dust, police reports told of pro-Nazi views expressed at secret night meetings. Themes such as German superiority, the need for expansion of German territory, and a hatred of MG, Americans and the denazification boards, were all discussed.⁵⁹

The rhetoric at such gatherings often advocated violence against denazification board personnel. A letter from the 'Association of National Socialist Students-Resistance Group, Hesse-Palatinate' bragged of influence

⁵⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 127, File 7, Political Intelligence, February 7, 1947.

⁵⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, February 7-March 21, 1947.

⁵⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, May 5-July 11, 1947.

across the different occupied zones, and claimed for the group a membership of students, professors and senior technical staff.⁶⁰

Support for Hitler's failed regime was offered at every opportunity. At the sentencing of Hitler's photographer, Hoffman, over 600 students showed up to demand a reversal of the sentence. Moving off to cafes, the students yelled 'Heil Hitler' at the departing MPs. Fourteen of the students began a march down the main street in Offenbach, singing Nazi songs, and as they marched their numbers grew.⁶¹ No one in authority tried to interfere.

The German disapproval of MG and their policies escalated. At Giessen five American soldiers were killed and a jeep was shot at.⁶² At Munich a small group of anti-Nazi professors wrote a letter to MG, saying that they believed students would be receptive to democracy, but that the majority of the Nazi or pro-Nazi faculty stood in the way.⁶³

Resistance also stiffened among the clergy. During Sunday sermons, certain Protestant clerics distributed Nazi literature which spoke of the cruelty of

⁶⁰OMGUS, Savingram, Political Division, Berlin, October 20, 1947.

⁶¹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence James O'Steen, February 2, 1947.

⁶²OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Chief of Intelligence, August 29, 1947.

⁶³OMGUS, RG 260, Box 66, File 19, Bavaria, Report to TREND, April 1947.

denazification and complained bitterly of Nazi offenders being removed from welfare organizations.⁶⁴ There were a few clerics, such as Dr. Eugen Kogon, who spoke out against the German clergy. He believed that the Church should have stood up against the Nazi regime as a moral obligation. Kogon was chastised by his counterparts. Excuses and explanations poured out from the pulpit. The church had done its best to defend Christian doctrines; what good would a clergyman have served his parish from prison. Finally, Bishop Fulder and Cardinal Furing argued that all nations were capable of developing a society where "might makes right."⁶⁵ It was not odd for religious figures to hold political office. One such important figure was Dr. Meinzolt, State Commissioner of Education in Bavaria, who was also Vice-President of the Evangelical Church Council.⁶⁶

Former Nazis regained their footing in the political sphere. While MG had encouraged local and Land political development among licensed democratic parties, small anti-American political groups were forming as well. Generally,

⁶⁴OMGUS, Box 674, File 2, Hesse, Captain R. W. Holmstedt to Commanding Officer, May 6, 1946.

⁶⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Box 165, File 5, Bavaria, Public Opinion Review No. 9, August 30, 1947.

⁶⁶United Press Release, "Bavarian Schools Dominated By Nazis," Washington Post, March 28, 1947, p. 4.

politicians acted as if the occupation no longer mattered. For instance, banned texts were found at the University of Munich depicting blood-spattered German soldiers accompanied by a text extolling the virtues of the history of the German military. Such pictures and the stories they told were forbidden by JCS 1067.

When Alois Hundhammer, the Minister of Culture, was confronted with the text by anti-Nazi school Superintendent L. Weismantel who was threatening to resign if nothing was done, Hundhammer replied "So What?"⁶⁷ Many students and professors supported the LDP, which (name aside) spoke out against the denazification Tribunals and MG military presence.⁶⁸ The LDP platform was very right-wing and nationalistic, and therefore attracted many former Nazis to this 'new' party. Many ex-Party members sought local office, often running under the banner of new right-radical fringe parties. Dr. Bernhard Gericke, a historian and known Nazi, was elected to a local council. He went on to form the Deutsche Revolution underground Nazi movement and later was a prominent member of the neo-Nazi SRP (Socialist Reich Party).⁶⁹

⁶⁷Delbert Clark, "German Textbook Hails Militarism," New York Times, January 18, 1947.

⁶⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Box 115, File 5, Hesse, Report to the Military Governor, Chief of Intelligence, James O'Steen, May 24, 1947.

⁶⁹Biddiscombe, "Selection Board."

The Americans contributed to their own failure. As representatives of democracy most average Germans saw men who cheated, stole, looted from German homes, and indulged in the black market. Germans often said that if this was what democracy had to offer, they were better off under National Socialism. Also, Americans were responsible for attempting to dump democracy on the Germans from above. The alternative of developing support among the local Germans by supporting those whom previous elites had kept out of power, was not attempted. The probable reason for this was that the Socialist Party was usually the most popular amongst the working and lower middle-class. They tried to control who could form political parties and dictated what sort of organizations were permissible. Although they had reasons for such a strict, authoritarian approach, a failure at the grass-roots level left most Germans comparing the autocracy of MG with that of Hitler's regime.

There were some who felt that the American mistakes were even greater. They believed that the American failure to denazify thoroughly or re-educate in any substantive way meant that the German people could not be trusted with self-rule, even at the local or Land level, as early as 1946. In July 1947, Field Horrine, an intelligence officer collecting data on the Spruchkammern, resigned from his position on precisely these grounds.⁷⁰ He believed that the Americans were

⁷⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 44, File 2, Bavaria, January 20, 1947.

handing back to National Socialists the universities, the bureaucracies and the governments of Germany. In his opinion the Americans were allowing a renazification of the German nation.

The 'second purge' was running out of gas by the end of 1947. There loomed on the horizon new threats that were to play a decisive factor in altering MG's role in Germany in 1948. With that new role came a new approach to denazification, and even more importantly, towards re-education.

CHAPTER 5

FROM ENEMY TO ALLY?

Historians and other observers have frequently commented that there was no single purpose or theme to the American Occupation. This lack of a cohesive policy has been identified as a major reason for the apparent failure of most of the 'de' programs. Re-education was one area that historians have belatedly pointed out as having been hindered by poor American planning and even worse execution.

This thesis has documented the efforts of MG re-education during the first two years of the Occupation, and how the task was complicated when E&RA officers had to also denazify the faculty and students. It has also been shown that German opposition to the policies of MG was aggressive. By late 1947 the programs, including re-education, appeared to be in a state of exhaustion and there was extreme tension between German government officials and MG.

As Ralph Willett has pointed out, re-education was to assume a 'strong ideological tone'. According to Willett, the United States was an 'ideological nation', and its ideologies were democracy and capitalism. He believed Germany, from 1947 onward, experienced a new turn in U.S. policy. Willett has argued that

American policy aimed at converting West Germany into a 'clone' of the U.S. Willett believed that MG, under pressure from a Republican Congress, was determined to rebuild the German economy and put in place a 'democratic' government that would serve as a bulwark against Communism. He recognized that politicians in Washington desired a transformation in MG emphasis. He also believed that the U.S., after 1947, was committed to creating an 'American style consumer society in West Germany'. Whatever one may think of Willett's claims about 'Americanization—and they are highly debatable—he does effectively pinpoint the major change in American education policy. Originally re-education was supposed to have had the purpose of inculcating democracy and broadening the methods utilized in achieving such goals. According to Willett, in late 1947, a decision was made to alter the strategy of re-education. The agencies of change would no longer necessarily be the schools and universities. Re-education would now be known as reorientation, and its aim would be to expose German professors, students, government officials and industrial leaders to American culture.¹ Willett stands out from most historians in his contention that the

¹Ralph Willett, The Americanization Of Germany, 1945-1949 (London, England: Routledge, 1989), pp. 10, 11.

transformation from re-education to reorientation had serious consequences for Nazis, nationalists and militarists in occupied Germany.²

This chapter explores the transformation from re-education to reorientation. The paper will look at the methods used to bring about this change, as well as discussing the limited effects of the new policy of reorientation. In attempting to bring about a transformation in education MG altered its focus and approach to the problem.

First, the chapter will discuss the transition re-education went through coming to be known as reorientation, and how education became a war of propaganda, with the Americans selling their system of government versus the Soviet Communist system. MG abandoned hopes of changing traditions at the universities and ignored many odious developments at the institutions of learning. They devoted their efforts towards the so-called grass-roots of the population. MG aimed reorientation towards the population in general and encouraged the development of 'democratic' ideals in the work-places and streets of Germany. They believed that such a policy would address the problems that had cropped up over the past two years. This is an example of yet another illusion that lured MG,

²D. W. Ellwood, Review of The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 by Ralph Willett, Journal of American Studies, vol. 25 (1991), pp. 113, 114.

similar to Clay's belief that the German Tribunals had succeeded in denazifying the universities.

Secondly, the chapter will discuss how the entire program of MG became one of 'Americanizing' the Germans. By Americanizing it was meant that the emphasis of re-education was now to be based upon accepting American political values and a belief that Germany's future was a part of the evolving Atlantic alliance. 'Acceptable' political values were defined as the establishment of a party system in Germany dominated by conservative, pro-west, pro-capitalist parties. Americanizing meant ensuring that there was no place for Communism in West Germany. If reorientation fulfilled these goals then the program could be called a success by Clay, Washington, and the new E&RA command. As part of achieving such a goal MG no longer treated Germany as an enemy to control, but as a friend to help back onto its feet and bring into the western alliance.

Next the chapter addresses something most historians have ignored, namely the 'conclusion' of denazification. The paper explores what happened to the program, and looks at the means that were used to wind down a project plagued by problems from the outset. In so doing it is necessary to examine the numbers of people who went through the denazification system and to question the 'success' that was claimed by MG and German Spruchkammer officials.

Finally, the chapter will comment on the relationship between MG and the German Länder governments. There was a great deal of stubbornness and lack of compromise by both groups. In the end German nationalists, many of whom were either former Nazis or supporters, utilized the American pre-occupation with the perceived Communist threat as an opportunity to reestablish themselves in government, in the police forces, and at the universities.

The impetus for a radical change in American policy dated back to the 'Education Commission to Germany', which issued a report on October 12, 1946. Led by George Zook, a former professor of European history, this group had earlier toured the American Zone. The report has often been referred to as the 'Zook Report'. Along with Zook the entourage included Earl McGrath, a specialist on education administration; Helen White, a professor of English who became responsible to UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization); as well as two union representatives and Catholic school advisors. What had originally been planned as a three-man commission eventually blossomed into a body of fourteen people.³ E&RA head Taylor had not planned for such a large group. Arranging vehicles for transporting such a large party proved troublesome and consequently the Commission did not see all that it had planned on.

³Tent, Mission Rhine, p. 115.

Members arrived with their central concern being the 'revitalization' of democracy in Germany. To this end they found the efforts of E&RA wanting. The consensus of the Commission was that the two-track system at the elementary and secondary levels of education in Germany must be ended. Perhaps echoing Dewey's influence, Commission members believed that the two-track system was perpetuating an elitist attitude amongst students of the college-preparatory stream who eventually reached the German universities. The Commission suggested that democracy should be taught as a subject at the universities and could be inspired by example with the adoption of a new American, unitrack school system. This thinking was naive, members of the Commission had not understood that they were dealing with a people who took great pride in their educational system, and a culture that did not look to schools and universities as a means of inculcating people with American ideals of democracy. Without thought to the German reaction, the Commission recommended that the universities be made centres of democratic thought and that they offer courses in general humanities, social sciences and American-style political science.⁴ These recommendations were a departure from MG's decision to allow the Germans to rebuild their own system with only American supervision.

⁴Ibid., p. 117.

A controversy raged for the next year. The question of who controlled re-education had become a divisive issue. On one side, Taylor and other E&RA officers recognized MGR (Military Government Regulation) Title 8, 'Control and Supervision of Education', which Clay had issued on January 10, 1947. Under this regulation E&RA believed it had a mandate to encourage, suggest and demand changes to the German educational system. However, John Parkman of CAD ordered "that the military be satisfied with German Education Ministries' decision to maintain the two-track system."⁵ Parkman noted that Clay's handing back of local government to the Germans a year earlier was a clear signal not to intervene in the German educational structure. The question of how large a role the U.S. should play in guiding the restructuring of German education became a popular topic among politicians and in MG circles.

At a February 12, 1947 meeting, called by Colonel Taylor and attended by his soon-to-be replacement, Richard Alexander, as well as the Bavarian, Württemberg-Baden and Hesse Minister-Presidents, Taylor announced that, "Our goal is the democratization of Germany."⁶ This idea in itself was not new, though the means of implementation were. Taylor apparently signalled that re-education would now be changing its focus. As well, he gave a strong

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 125, 126.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 126.

indication that denazification procedures were now of less importance to MG. Finally, Taylor hinted that MG was planning to interfere with the reconstruction of German educational systems to achieve 'democratization'. The press pushed the new line. Kathleen McLaughlin wrote of the need to send the "shrewdest and best propagandists to overcome Russian appeals to Germans." It appears McLaughlin had forgotten her warning of Nazi influences, issued only a few months previously, and she now supported the buildup of the German economy, the recovery of the social structure and the restoration of governmental independence. Germany, according to McLaughlin, was going to be the "Whip hand in Europe and she had better be on America's side."⁷

On March 20, 1947, Richard Alexander took over as E&RA Chief from the exhausted John Taylor. On June 10 Alexander introduced a basic new MG directive for the reorientation of German education. Directive No. 54 outlined the "Basic Principles for Democratization of Education in Germany," and not surprisingly the document echoed the Zook Report.⁸ One aspect of reorientation was to demand from the Land Education Ministries detailed plans for the remodelling of their school systems, based on an American blueprint. No one had

⁷Kathleen McLaughlin, "Re-education Held Germans Big Need," New York Times, January 9, 1947.

⁸Ibid., pp. 126, 131.

considered that the German Education Ministers were bitterly opposed to any further intrusion into education. Earlier American denazification and re-education efforts had proved troublesome but manageable for the Germans; now wholesale changes to their system were proposed. MG had illusions of a bright new direction, but once again huge obstacles were placed in their path.

Propaganda was considered a major method for spreading democratic ideals. This barrage of information came through different media, such as radio, American movies, 'American Houses' (which were drop-in centres where Americans and Germans could meet, and Germans could take out American books and play American games), and lectures on the value of democracy. One of the major tools of reorientation was an exchange of students and professors between Germany and appropriate 'democratic' countries. It was believed that this exposure would demonstrate to the Germans the error of their past ways and expose students and professors to new, democratic ideas for the operation of their school and university systems. In September 1947, international summer courses were held at Heidelberg and Marburg Universities; 130 German students and 13 foreign students attended. Unfortunately only 2 foreign students showed up at the Marburg sessions, where the faculty placed less emphasis on the venture. The new Reorientation Branch, operating out of the Pentagon's CAD offices, distributed thirty-two 16mm film and sound projectors at the two universities,

and MG distributed propaganda films heralding the virtues of the American way of life.⁹

A second reorientation method was to insist that secondary teachers be trained at universities or special teacher training colleges. The Americans thought that this created a union of the public school system with the universities, and that the process would aid in breaking down the isolation and elitism that had traditionally bred in the universities. At Weilburg in Hesse, in October 1947, was the location of the first teacher training college where American designed methods of instruction were introduced.¹⁰ Weilburg had traditionally prepared all of its courses to fit the two-track German system.

A new radio propaganda strategy was also adopted in December 1947. The approach outlined the new school reforms that Allied Control Council Directive No. 54 entailed. Broadcasts were serialized so as to follow, step by step, the implementation of the reforms. Broadcasts also focused on the evils of Communism and the need for Germans to support political parties that advocated democracy. As well, in Berlin university authorities and MG personnel

⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, September 1947, p. 35.

¹⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, October 1947, p. 31.

agreed on American legal instruction being instituted.¹¹ Reorientation appeared to be the answer to MG's years of frustration.

In January 1948 the Association of Swiss Students hired 200 German university students to work on Swiss farms. As well as earning money towards supporting their education, the German students were given a week to travel in Switzerland. At the same time the University of Chicago announced that over a period of three years, six of its professors would teach at Frankfurt University, offering one week courses in American studies.¹²

There were additional funds for capital expenditures. In Hesse, a library for an advanced school of politics was established at Frankfurt University. Reconstruction of the Agriculture College was undertaken at Giessen, and at Marburg archives were established for documents on the history of German youth movements and books and papers pertaining to the history of Central Europe.¹³ It is noticeable that Hesse was one Land that was not antagonistic to American proposals at this time. Previous to the Nazi era Hesse had debated and

¹¹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, December 1947, p. 32.

¹²OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, January 1948, p. 26.

¹³OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, February 1948, p. 27.

begun to incorporate some of the reforms advocated by MG. The same could not be said for Württemberg-Baden or Bavaria.

By 1948 and 1949 a major voice for broadening the role of education was Richard Tilden. As head of the Reorientation Branch in Germany, Tilden spoke of the need for education to become a concern of the masses; for people to be aware of their 'duty' to make intellectual decisions.¹⁴ By July of 1949 Tilden was emphasizing the exchange program. He arranged for 200 people per month to obtain exit visas. Of these, 63 were students visiting U.S. universities. The rest were attending conferences on establishing democratic government, financial symposiums and union organization meetings. At this time MG records boasted of over 900 cultural visits to Bavaria. However, MG counted the individual arrival of American propaganda films as a 'cultural exchange'. The movies were well received when the propaganda was subtle and the show entertaining.¹⁵ MG believed that exposure to American films, showing the benefits of American style democracy, was an important ingredient of reorientation.

The entire role of the University Officer was now in question. Under reorientation the emphasis on denazification was ebbing. At most, the University

¹⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 501, File 37, Stuttgart, Education Branch.

¹⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Box 5, File 62, Bavarian, E&CR Progress Report, July 1949.

Officer was to offer support and suggestions on university reconstruction and operations. He no longer had a mandate to intrude on curriculum structure or the choice of learning materials. At Bad Nauheim in July 1949, the future function of the officers was discussed with the British in the hopes of agreeing on a common policy, although the talks failed to arrive at a resolution. Finally, in late 1947, after two years struggling with a handful of personnel, E&RA was given a higher profile and renamed the E&CR (Education and Cultural Relations), and even General Clay admitted that more personnel and funds might be well spent on re-education. However, this new interest was not connected with the execution of the original JCS 1067 orders. MG's positive attitude towards education did not translate into large numbers of personnel. The rebuilding of the German economy was now paramount, due in no small measure to an increased profile back in the U.S., especially in Congress. Aside from a growing fear of Russian intentions Congress wanted Germany to be able to support herself financially, thus ending the drain on the American Treasury.

A new spirit was felt throughout the zone, and the upper echelons of MG command were pleased with their new approach. It was not, however, always a democratic approach. Media were controlled to such a point that, even when legitimate papers from the Weimar period requested approval to publish they were refused if they had supported the Communist Party. Religious papers that

had been published uncensored in 1946 and early 1947 now fell under close scrutiny by MG intelligence officers. By mid-1948, CAD had formed the Reorientation Committee, which issued a new handbook. This book was not intended to assist MG field personnel, but was rather a work of propaganda stressing the value of the American way of life, especially the American standard of living. This handbook was intended to convince a German audience that new MG plans were in everyone's best interest. Alonzo Grace, the E&CR Chief by 1949, claimed that reorientation had accomplished more than anything in the previous 31 months.¹⁶

Clay's advisor Adcock and E&CR Chief Alexander, claimed that MG and the various Education Ministries were getting along well and negotiating educational reforms in Germany. Minor agreements which led to the Evangelical Church's not publicly attacking denazification or other MG programs were heralded.¹⁷ Meanwhile, of course, the position of Nazis and militarists in the universities was forgotten.

By May of 1948 there were 156 exchange programs. Actually only 40 Germans had departed for visits to the United States for holiday courses. The bulk of trips involved in the exchange program were brief visits by West European

¹⁶Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

and American professors and weekend junkets by financial advisers. At Marburg University a conference on establishing a new emphasis in social sciences was held; 150 German professors and the same number of German students attended.¹⁸ This conference garnered a great deal of attention from MG officials and was considered the most successful of the reorientation events. Other university seminars and conferences drew small German crowds.

By April 1948 the student exchange program had affected 1% of those enrolled at the universities. In actual numbers this amounted to approximately 240 students who had participated in an exchange program or had attended a conference or seminar put on by visiting professors. The number was low, particularly as many of the same students attended a variety of reorientation functions. In fact, these reorientation exchange activities appealed to young people already converted to democratic ideals, and were dismissed by the bulk of students. This apparent lack of interest derived from strong antagonistic feelings toward the subject matter, or was a reflection of the fact that many students could afford neither the time nor money to travel to these events.

By June 1948 the new enemy had become apparent. The Western Zones announced a currency reform on June 18, 1948 (which incidentally, proved a

¹⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, May 1948, p. 25.

hardship for students in Western Germany, whose savings were devalued). In response, the Soviet authorities on June 24 stopped all rail and road communications with Berlin.¹⁹ Russia had made it clear that it felt the currency reform was aimed at aiding large industrial organizations aligned with U.S. companies. This blockade had an impact on re-education. In the first place, it helped to convince West Berliners that they would need their own institution of higher learning. Humboldt University in the Russian sector was becoming an establishment committed to teaching Communist ideology.

In Berlin a new 'Free University' was planned to counter the overt Communist influence at Humboldt University. This was an opportunity for the Americans to become involved in organizing the structure of a German university from its inception. The curriculum would include West European and American history, and not just German history. To qualify for enrolment, the Americans suggested a 12-year elementary and secondary program based on the American model, and the elimination of the two-track system. Berlin was an opportunity to

¹⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, June 1948, p. 8.

implement the Zook Commission's recommendations. The major concern was in keeping out Communists as students and professors.²⁰

Meanwhile, the KPD attacked the MG currency reform, stressing the destruction of savings and shortage of money for welfare. In actuality, the influence of the KPD was over exaggerated. The KPD garnered only 9% of the Ländtag votes in 1948. Whereas the NPD (National Democratic Party), a right-wing Party led by M. Leuchtgeus had gained 14% of the vote in Land Hessen.²¹ In Bavarian bars, former SS officers, now NPD members, would spread stories of secret weapons that Hitler gave to the Americans and Russians so that they could annihilate each other.²² Preposterous as these stories were, the German people wondered why MG did nothing to stop the spread of these lies. Many Germans voiced the opinion that the Americans were going soft on the growing right-wing in Germany. The New York Times commented that the United States was committed to bringing a "speedy, yet stable, economic revival to Germany." The War, State and Navy Departments endorsed a new plan calling for a "just and

²⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Berlin, June 1948, pp. 27, 28.

²¹Kurt Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, vol I (Middleton CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1967), pp. 74-75.

²²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 14, File 21J, Nazi Publications Bavarian; OMGUS, RG 260, Box 128, File 1, Monthly Intelligence Report, Bavarian, May 1948.

lasting peace in Europe in co-operation with a disarmed and demilitarized German society."²³ The New York Times was on board with American policy, agreeing that inter-exchange would assist in overcoming the "National Socialist heritage of the intellectuals."²⁴ MG, the State Department in Washington and the press, were all convinced that the problems at the universities would be corrected by reorientation. However the interest shown by students in reorientation was minimal. Students at the 21 institutions of higher learning in the American Zone ranked American Studies 15th out of a possible 17 choices.²⁵

So much did MG believe the illusion of reorientation's successes, and so deeply were they pre-occupied with the Soviets, that many departments were closed and personnel were redeployed to work either in the economic field or the growing anti-Soviet intelligence network. The new E&RC Division assumed responsibility, from the Internal Control Division, for all cultural supervision. Moreover, on July 21, 1948, the Denazification Branch, Civil Affairs Division and Special Branch were all dissolved. This reorganization by E&RC meant that the entire denazification program was to be administered by the German Länder

²³Bertram D. Hulen, "New U.S. Order Ties Germany To Plan To Rebuild Europe," New York Times, July 16, 1947.

²⁴Special to NYT, "US States Policy On German Education," New York Times, October 8, 1947.

²⁵Willett, Americanization of Germany, p. 19.

governments. MG retained only Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Garder as Denazification Advisor, in order to supervise the German Government and theoretically assure accountability regarding previous agreements.²⁶ The Americans hoped that reorientation would help create a new ally in Germany, and they were determined to remake this ally in the American image in order to assist in confronting the spread of Communism.

The records show that concerns remained as the program unfolded. Many of the visiting specialists and professors stayed in Germany only a few days, as most spent the bulk of their time in France and England. The visit to Germany was of minor importance in the itineraries of visiting scholars. However, they were paid to make an appearance and MG personnel were available to provide service to the visitors. While in Germany they expected limousine service and personal tours. What little staff E&RA/E&CR now had, diverted energy to entertaining these visitors. Taylor was but one prominent figure who questioned the wisdom of this aspect of the new program.

A second negative facet of the reorientation project was the insult it cast upon German politicians, throwing doubt on their commitment to democracy. According to Alonzo Grace, the last Education Branch Director, reorientation

²⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 157, File 13, Bavarian Political History, General Order No. 15, August 19, 1948.

appealed to the mass of Germans through movies, Amerikahaus drop-in centres and exchange programs, and was aimed at people outside of the universities, the bureaucracies and the old-guard politicians. Therefore, reorientation implied that those who had come to power during the Occupation and who made up the nucleus of the eventual West German Government were not democratic. In fact reorientation was an admission that all the 'de' programs had failed.²⁷ According to Grace, reorientation was committed to a democratic conversion of the German populace through a revolutionary missionary effort.²⁸

The major shift in policy was driven by a need to create a continental buffer against the Soviets. MG and the Truman Administration increasingly believed that Russia posed a threat. Russia had sent weapons to Communist insurgents in Greece during the 1947 elections and had not lived up to their agreement at Yalta to allow free elections in Poland and Romania. The witch-hunt for Communists in the U.S. had spread to Europe. American MG authorities were concerned with student groups, except now it was not because of Nazi tendencies but because they feared the groups had "fallen under the influence of the Communist government of Poland." One such group was Brotherly Help, a club of Polish DPs (Displaced Persons) at Frankfurt University suspected of

²⁷Zink, The United States In Germany, pp. 193-218 & 252-253.

²⁸Ibid., p. 253.

supplying couriers to Warsaw.²⁹ Another report from Munich suggested that Communist student groups were designed to train future members for the KPD.³⁰ By 1948, MG was committed to the reconstruction of Germany and was preparing for the Cold War.³¹ There was no longer any reference to the renazification problems that had plagued MG only several months earlier at the universities.

Changes in the economy were to play a pivotal role in Americanizing Germany. The Hoover Report of 1947 criticized decartelization and the socialist tendencies of the current Land governments, and pushed for a reindustrialization of Germany and an early entry into the Atlantic Community. Early in 1948 The Saturday Evening Post referred to the West Germans as "our friends."³² The results of a MG survey in late 1948 went a long way towards establishing that Germans were concerned with their wallets. Of those who answered, 60% said that a rising income was more important than democratic freedoms. The 'de' program might have failed, but the three Ms were succeeding: mass production,

²⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 120, File 72, CIC Reports, pp. 92-103, February 1948.

³⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 33, File 25, Report On Communist Student AT Munich, Bavarian, April 1949.

³¹Willett, Americanization of Germany, p. 27.

³²Ibid., pp. 11, 17.

materialism and gradual militarizing.³³ 'Militarizing' refers to the role increasingly played by such groups as the IP (Industrial Police). Industrial Police were private forces hired by industrial complexes to protect property from black-marketeers and often were used to keep the work-force in line. LSO had reported that over 75% of the ranks of these private security armies were ex-soldiers, SS officers or Nazi Party members.

The American media did not let up on the swing from anti-Nazi to anti-Communist rhetoric. Clay was quoted as stating that "he hoped to defend American principles of democracy and attack those which we don't believe in."³⁴ He broadcast these sentiments over the radio, utilizing a new signal that had the range to reach all of occupied Germany. Since the new signal could be picked up in the Soviet Zone, Clay's comments came under close scrutiny by officials of all the occupying powers. The Soviets were suspicious that the Americans were planning to wage an escalated war of propaganda aimed at creating discontent and opposition among Germans, in the Eastern sector. U.S. State Department officials were not anxious to antagonize the Russians and quickly produced an innocuous interpretation of Clay's remarks. The day after Clay's broadcast a

³³Ibid., pp. 11-12.

³⁴Associated Press Release, "Munich Radio Expanded," New York Times, November 1, 1947.

clarification was issued stating, "that what Clay had meant to say was that there would be no physical attack on the Soviets and that the radio would broadcast a 'positive approach re: democracy as outlined under Directive No. 40'." However, it was doubtful the Soviets or many Germans believed this explanation. German newspapers printed stories suggesting an impending Soviet/American clash.³⁵ Students who were ex-soldiers and officers speculated about whether they should fight for the Allies in the event of another war. The prevailing sentiment was that a German army should only fight for a free Germany, not as a puppet of the Allies.

Reorientation affected life at the university as well. At Heidelberg University there was a weekly offering of lectures taught in English entitled "The American Point of View."³⁶ At the new American Service Centres, where any German could drop in and soak up American culture, one might find a Black quintet singing gospel or balladeers harmonizing on a folk song. A long series of American cultural entertainments was planned for the German people. As well as bringing in movies and musical groups, the Service Centres provided appropriate

³⁵Delbert Clark, "Clay Aides Fear Propaganda Curbs," New York Times, November 2, 1947.

³⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Report, To The Military Governor, Hesse, April 1947, p. 27.

American reading material in their libraries and hosted regular lectures on the 'wonders' of life in a democratic America. An 'English Week' was sponsored in order to aid Germans in learning responsibility and good citizenship through the study of American and British language and literature.³⁷

By 1948 the KPD was striking back at American efforts. The KPD criticized the Marshall Plan as an effort by American and German financiers to establish a centralized, cartel economy in the American Zone. Communist students reportedly attacked a Catholic youth after he had finished entertaining the Bishop of Limberg.³⁸

While MG felt it was important to lash out against Communist activities, their rhetoric did not always comfort the German people. One especially observant MG field officer noted that Germans complained of hearing only negatives about Communism; instead, they wished to hear about how American democracy would benefit them. Furthering German anxiety, Clay announced in April that "Communism must be halted at the Rhine."³⁹ To most Germans this

³⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, April & June 1949, pp. 51, 47.

³⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, February 23, 1948.

³⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, April 9, 1948.

meant that the Americans were willing to sacrifice the bulk of Germany to the Russians in the event of a conflict. At one point, Pieck of the KPD, Muschke of the CDU, and Kastner of the LDP all joined in criticizing the currency reform as a plan to split Germany permanently.⁴⁰ However, the Soviet move to blockade Berlin confirmed fears of alleged Soviet aggressiveness. The question of German allegiance if an East-West conflict occurred did not seem a moot point. The prospect of West Germans having to fight East German troops was a point of great consternation for people on both sides of the Elbe.

Many Germans also observed, and complained, that MG used undemocratic methods to gain the desired result. In the Bundestag election of 1949 the Notgemeinschaft was not licensed. Notgemeinschaft candidate Kurt Butz was forced to run as an independent in Württemberg, although he gained over 13,000 votes. In a speech after his defeat Butz warned that if "a man like Hitler were to appear the German people would follow, gladly."⁴¹ MG Intelligence infiltrated these groups and reported on their activities. They went to great lengths to discredit the KPD and groups similar to the Notgemeinschaft. True to the new plan, MG supported the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic

⁴⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Office Of The Military Governor, Chief of Intelligence, May 28, 1948.

⁴¹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 2, Württemberg-Baden, September 2, 1949, p. 4.

Union/Christian Socialist Union) alliance, a centrist coalition committed to free elections and capitalism. During the next decades the CDU/CSU was the party that the United States implicitly supported.

Clay announced in July 1948 that the purpose of the American Occupation "was to establish and maintain democracy, American style," and to establish "mass education through the use of a silver shower," an allusion to propaganda messages transmitted by various radio services.⁴² The point most overlooked by the Americans was that they utilized MG as an example and promoter of democracy. As Edward Peterson noted, "Generals can scarcely command a society to be more democratic."⁴³ But command they did.

Even after the exuberant reorientation policy got underway there was still unfinished business from two years before. MG had universities filled with Nazi and nationalistic professors and students. As they relinquished more powers to the Tribunals and local Länder Government, what were the results of these earlier problems?

As reorientation gripped the imagination of MG as a possible new approach to democratizing the German people, the original policies, now

⁴²Associated Press Release, "Clay Discusses Purpose," New York Times, July 4, 1948.

⁴³Willett, Americanization of Germany, p. 27.

frequently referred to as negative measures, attracted less attention. In fact, concerted efforts were made by MG to distance itself from denazification and to find a method to end the program with honour, a familiar sounding rationalization of failure. Historians have ignored the dilemma that an unfinished denazification program posed. They have been caught up in describing the successes of reorientation and the 'victory' of turning occupied Germany into a bulwark against Communism. This neglect entailed a failure to report on available evidence. It must be granted that at one time the evidence was not accessible in volume, but it was available to later researchers such as Tent, Gimbel and Peterson.

In February of 1947 the Bavarian Ministry of Culture asked that both the nominally incriminated and the charged 'Lesser Offenders' be permitted to accept re-employment in their pre-occupation jobs prior to any Spruchkammer decision. The Ministry described this as "positive denazification."⁴⁴ MG agreed to these demands as this fit into their new 'positive' and 'constructive' approach to Germany. No one said a word about the reappointment of Nazis and militarists on university campuses. In June the German Länder governments proclaimed that the final stages of applying the Law for the Liberation from National

⁴⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 17, File 21, School Reform, February 11, 1947.

Socialism and Militarism were at hand. It was declared that only the "heavily incriminated" were yet to be tried.⁴⁵

Unsatisfied with the results over the next few months, the German authorities asked in February for MG to amend the Law for Liberation to "speed up denazification." MG and the U.S. Congress expected denazification to be completed by June 1948. In order to accommodate the Allies, the German authorities asked for further measures to assist in speeding up the process of rehabilitation. There were three points of the program that were amended. First, mandatory charges against 'Major Offenders', 'Offenders', and 'Lesser Offenders' became discretionary if suspects belonged to groups not recognized as criminal by the International Military Tribunal. Secondly, 'Followers' were allowed to resume pre-occupation positions until their tribunal appearance. And third, the German Tribunals were given discretionary powers in setting the length of probation for 'Lesser Offenders'.⁴⁶ The problem in all such measures seems apparent. If in February 1947 only the heavily incriminated remained to be tried, were not these amendments going to be applied to them? If this was the case then 'Major Offenders' would obtain benefits denied the thousands of 'Nominal

⁴⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Hesse, June 1947, p. 9.

⁴⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Bavarian, September 1947, p. 11.

Offenders' tried over the previous eighteen months. In fact this was the claim made by thousands of Germans as these amendments were instituted. To the amazement of many Germans, they witnessed high-ranking Nazis, financiers, and the most ardent supporters of the Party either go free or suffer a minimal punishment.

The effects of these amendments quickly became evident. Prior to December 1947, the average number of cases was reduced by 50,000 per month. In December, 177,213 cases were adjudicated; of these 107,224 were amnestied without any trial process, 80% of these as a result of the amendments. There remained 614,265 in the chargeable categories, of which 233,926 had already been selected for an expedited process by the application of the amendments.⁴⁷

Finally, reports had also begun arriving regarding the denazification of public agencies and private enterprises. Under article 58 and MG Order No. 8, 2/100ths of 1% in the public sector were incriminated and 5/100ths of 1% in the private sector. Without any calculation of the thousands who had been amnestied or not even charged, these numbers were used to show that Law No. 8 had had no crippling effect upon industry. Initially, however over 40% of the public sector and 20% of the private had lost their jobs in late 1946 and early 1947. It was only

⁴⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Office Of The Military Governor, American Zone, December 1947, p. 7.

a year later that they were cleared and re-employed.⁴⁸ Whatever the implications to production, the fact is that many of these people were reinstated after suffering penalties for their minor role in the Nazi regime. Now they watched as their bosses and other leading Nazis walked away unpunished.

In March 1948 MG was concerned about finishing with denazification by May 31 of the same year. Under the pressure of this timetable, MG allowed prosecutors to exonerate suspects in cases where they believed no evidence existed warranting a trial. In such instances, former Nazis were tried by a written procedure, whereby suspects were asked by mail to send in affidavits from witnesses, plus their own claims of innocence. Without ever cross-examining the suspects or the witnesses, the Tribunals could then decide whether or not to reduce the classification of the charged persons or whether or not to exonerate them. As well, 'Offenders' were permitted to assume their former positions. Many newly-appointed university professors found themselves released as former Nazi-sympathizers and nationalists, claiming tenure, came back.⁴⁹

As of June 1948 it was announced that everybody affected by denazification had been adjudicated: in all 12, 375,000 persons. There were only

⁴⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Office Of The Military Governor, Hesse, January 1948, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Bavarian, March 1948, p. 5.

20,000 criminal cases left, as well as the matter of any future appeals. In the last month of the trials, June 1948, 351,958 cases were adjudicated and 242,106 'expedited'. The total number of sentences and fines imposed during that final month were:

Labour over 1 yr.	--	2,359
" 1-5 yr.	--	4,539
" 5-10 yr.	--	364
Special Labour less 180 days	--	1,248
" up to 1 yr	--	314
" over 1 yr	--	187
Fined less 1000 DM	--	28,910
" 1000 DM or more	--	3,441
Permanently unable to hold political office	--	1,050
Only ordinary Labour 5 yrs.	--	1,030
" " probation	--	5,410
Property Confiscated	--	1,076 ⁵⁰

⁵⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Berlin, May 1, 1948, pp. 7-8.

(In actuality the number of sanctions was considerably less than suggested by these figures as many sentences had been cancelled before enforcement ever could take place.)

Thus out of the total of 3,330,630 charged 2,373,115 had no trial. In total 865,808 trials were actually held. Relatively few people were ever sentenced or suffered severe penalties. This brief analysis illustrates that denazification was in no way the huge nightmare that some historians have complained about for decades. What was lacking were resources for a project that was quite feasible.

The glowing picture of success pictured by MG summaries was not echoed in all MG departments. Other disturbing reports were being submitted but largely ignored. For example, in Darmstadt the expediting procedures were categorized as "most discouraging." Intelligence officers found highly incriminated Nazis being placed into the 'Follower' category. As well there was evidence that former SS and Gestapo agents were terrorizing Tribunal officials. In May 1948, the 574 cases left were all SS and Gestapo agents.⁵¹ These reports originated from the LSO (Länder Special Officers), Germans working with MG as liaison personnel.

⁵¹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, June 11, 1948.

In Untertaunus the public prosecutor of the Tribunal was a prison guard fired for drunkenness, inefficiency and corruption. In Wetzlar the LSO reported strong anti-democratic/pro-Nazi sentiment. At stores, Nazis received preferential treatment, while Pastor Knees refused to dismiss Nazi clergy and had undermined the Tribunal in Eschweg, accusing the prosecutor of committing adultery. According to the LSO, denazification was slowing down. At the Freidberg Tribunal, proceedings stopped. Prosecutor Lirsch was found incapable, while another member, Schreiber, was discovered to have been a Nazi, and a third, Krause, was discharged for attending sessions intoxicated. The court usually degenerated into quarreling and explosions of jealousy. However, they did manage to exonerate several Wehrmacht generals.⁵²

After gaining an appointment as the local government personnel chief of Darmstadt, the local head of the SPD was appalled to find that 70% of the government employees in the Bergerstrasser District were Nazis. In Darmstadt itself former Class III or 'Lesser Offenders' were being nominated for political office. In defiance of MG, Landrat (District Official) Mueller of Usingen ordered that no section of the local government furnish information to the Tribunal. In Wiesbaden eight of 20 candidates were NPD members who had falsified their

⁵²OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, February 23, 1948; January 30, 1948; February 20, 1948.

Fragebogen.⁵³ In the local elections for mayors and councilmen there was a noticeable number of former Nazis elected. In four Landkreis elections held in July 1948, ten of 36 winners in Wolfhagen were former Nazis, in Hofgeismar 20 of 49, in Giessen 37 of 82, and in Melsungen 14 of 63.⁵⁴ Along with this development jobs were taken back by dismissed National Socialist teachers at all levels. LSOs reported that young pro-democratic teachers were being removed.⁵⁵ The results of reorientation might be to exchange a handful of students between countries and bring in specialists to advise the converted but, at the same time, MG had apparently given up on eradicating overt nationalism or making certain the universities were as free as possible from Nazi influences.

Church opposition to denazification was increasingly outspoken. The Evangelical Church in Wiesbaden informed the Denazification Branch that it was not going to comply with MG orders. The Church planned on letting Class II offenders preach, contrary to the law.⁵⁶ During the reorientation era Bishop

⁵³OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, March 12, 1948; April 1, 1948; April 23, 1948; April 30, 1948.

⁵⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Hesse, Chief of Intelligence, June 1, 1948.

⁵⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Office of the Military Governor, Hesse, August 13, 1948.

⁵⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Office Of The Military Governor, Hesse, November 1948, p. 18.

Wurm became much more forthright in his opinions. He argued that denazification was too automatic and that people were incriminated without any inquiry into the circumstances of their involvement with the Nazis. Wurm assured MG officials that SS men at Dachau could not all be held accountable for atrocities. At one point Wurm wrote John Foster Dulles regarding hangings at Dachau. He accused the Americans of using illegal and inhumane methods of interrogation and of hanging the innocent. Certainly, the Americans had mistreated the accused at Dachau. However, there was no doubt that many of the accused were guilty of war crimes. Wurm used the issue to attack MG procedure. He thought Germany under MG was the same as under the Nazis. The Communists offered an appropriate response, asking where Wurm had been when Nazi atrocities took place.⁵⁷

There was concern about the fate of the denazification program in some quarters. As Chief of Denazification for CAD, William Griffith was concerned at the expediting process. He calculated that there would only be 60,000 people excluded from holding office, and that was only for as long as the Americans were on hand; once they left it appeared that few would be denied redemption and employment. Griffith advocated the removal of former Nazi incumbents and the

⁵⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 341, File 39, Reply To Bishop Wurm from Edward Litchfield, Director, CAD, June 24, 1948. & Box 1296, File 1 & 2, Intelligence Reports, February 11, 1948.

"re-establishment of key positions of American occupation"; by this he meant the reintroduction of an American presence in education and the media.⁵⁸ Griffith asked MG to return to a program of thorough denazification, as established by JCS 1067. In so doing he hoped that Nazi politicians, police and university professors would be removed and politically appropriate Germans could replace them.

Griffith was right in worrying about the rapid effort underway to legitimize former Nazi Party members. In a speech in the Ländtag the CDU leader announced that National Socialists could be convinced to embrace democracy. While Nazi policies were not adopted by the CDU, their welcoming of Nazis into the fold was another reason that Griffith worried about the future chance of success for democracy in Germany. Griffith did not believe that numerous ex-Nazis brought into the CDU or restored to government positions would aid the cause of democracy in Germany, and if anything, they could act in such a manner as to undermine democratic procedure. Even the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pre-occupied as it was with Communism, made

⁵⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Box 160, File 9, Denazification Branch of CAD, May 1, 1948. It is interesting that this report was filed as MG and German authorities were celebrating denazification accomplishments.

note of a resurgence in National Socialism in Germany, as well as the reemergence of anti-semitism and militarism.⁵⁹

By March 1948 the various Länder were turning over denazification to their Ministries of Justice or Labour and were abolishing the Ministries for Political Liberation. With the easing of denazification and increased freedoms granted German governing bodies and universities, did reorientation turn around the population and actually garner support for a democratic Germany? In truth, the evidence shows that lack of attention to the difficulties that seemed so important in 1946 and 1947 led later to problems with nationalistic outbursts and a furthering of renazification throughout occupied Germany, especially at the universities.

To be sure, reorientation experts wrote plenty of reports about positive changes taking place in student behaviour. At Munich, the student council in late 1948 invited 91 foreign students to attend their university. As a bonus to the students, the State Department provided over 1/2 ton of new textbooks and scientific magazines which arrived as part of the cultural exchange program.⁶⁰ So successful was the visit by American students in September 1948 that a junior

⁵⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 1, Monthly Reports to Military Governor, Württemberg-Baden, September 1949.

⁶⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Bavarian, September 1948, p. 26,

year in Munich was established for 40 Americans. The students were to be supervised by American personnel.⁶¹

The highlight of the American reorientation effort in education was the opening of the Berlin Free University. The city council, which because of a constant struggle for ideological control between Communist and pro-democratic members had held up acceptance of the Berlin University Constitution for over a year, finally acquiesced on November 8, 1948. However, the council retained the right to hire the professors and other personnel. This was a move to appease pro-Communists on the council. While the university was fashioned after the American model there was still a concern that Communist professors might gain a dominant position in the university.⁶² One problem admitted by reorientation officials was the background of the enrollees at the universities, which suggested a perpetuation of the traditional ruling class in Germany. The student body broke down thus: 39% were children of political and public officials, 34% were children of professionals, 17% were children of white collar workers, 7% were offspring of

⁶¹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Bavarian, May 1949, p. 54.

⁶²OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Berlin, November 1948, p. 46.

farm families and 3% were the children of manual laborers. One positive sign was that 20% of the student body were female.⁶³

While monthly reports gave relatively glowing accounts of the universities and their positive reaction to reorientation, there was a great deal of detail omitted. The Liaison and Security Office mentioned that professors who were interviewed were curious to see how American propaganda would differ from Hitler's. The professors believed that if MG urged the Germans to oppose the Russians, this line would sound familiar and ridiculous. American anti-Soviet propaganda served to support the claims of ex-Nazis that the Soviets were the enemy, and thus the professors felt that the Americans were acknowledging the correctness of Hitler's eastern policy. The academics also reported that students may have lost their chance for freedom but most were more interested in having food and material goods. As well it appeared that the students believed the Russians had accomplished more in their zone. Most students who were questioned commented that the major feature of American democracy was an availability of cigarettes.⁶⁴ This callous and disinterested attitude showed a side of the students that reorientation reports ignored.

⁶³OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Berlin, August to September 1949, p. 49.

⁶⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 157, File 5, Bavarian, November 24, 1947.

The situation at the universities continued to deteriorate. The Berlin Document Centre found 326 discrepancies while scrutinizing 1,975 Marburg student Fragebogen. The students were dismissed, but Rector Frick readmitted them immediately. MG failed to support the Education Branch's decision to expel students from the institution. The Americans were apparently losing control of many areas of German administration. However, it was not the dreaded Communists that many Germans were concerned about, but the increasing organization and violence of former Nazis. Students were still capable of a hostile attitude. In Munich, the students planned to go to the Jewish centre and "tear it apart." Old habits and prejudices still existed. Five Munich University students were arrested for painting on the road "Germans do not become slaves, vote for the withdrawal of Occupation forces."⁶⁵ These activities occurred while a handful of students reached out to invite American students to visit. The question, of course, was which tendency prevailed at the campuses? Habermas and Tauber have established that only 9% of the university student body expressed strong allegiance to democratic principles, whereas 17% were members of 'Corps' or 'Fraternities' committed to radical nationalism.⁶⁶

⁶⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28A, Bavarian, Report to Chief of Research Branch from General Birlauf, June 23, 1948.

⁶⁶Tauber, Eagle and the Swastika, pp. 452-456.

LSO reported groups of students visiting Bavarian taverns and singing Nazi and SA songs. The purpose was to intimidate any Communist sympathizers present.⁶⁷ A letter intercepted by the Civilian Censorship Division had a Professor Schroeder of Würzburg complaining that since Hitler had been so popular outside Germany before 1939, penalizing enthusiastic Germans was hypocritical. Such a harsh program only slowed progress towards democratization in Germany.⁶⁸ Schroeder believed this energy could be harnessed to rebuild a strong Germany.

Student unrest did not appear to abate. At Frankfurt, mass student protests ensued when three law professors were retried as 'Offenders' in 1948. The Tribunals in the university towns found it extremely difficult to find personnel. Students returning from the movies were heard singing the Horst Wessel song.⁶⁹ Many adults felt the fear they had known in the early days of National Socialism when marauding bands of SA troops marched through the streets spreading terror.

⁶⁷OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1296, File 1 & 2, Monthly Report, Württemberg-Baden, p. 37.

⁶⁸OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Württemberg-Baden, June 13, 1947.

⁶⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Office of Military Governor, Bavarian, Chief of Intelligence, January 30-February 8, 1948.

On the campuses themselves the resurgence of right-wing organizations came out into the open during the period of reorientation. The Jung Deutscher Orden was re-licensed in the British Zone. This group was originally formed during the Weimar era and was reestablished under the same pre-war Nazi leader, Arthur Marten, as it spread to universities in the U.S. Zone.⁷⁰ At Munich University the Deutscher Jungenbund became a vindictive and chauvinistic club, guided by a Nazi agenda. The inner circle of leadership produced an address to all officers and soldiers to prepare to fight Russia. The group distributed the poem "Forgotten," a lament suggesting that the great German past was never to be forgotten, nor should one forget the heroes who had fallen on the battlefield. The main plea was for men to "fight only in a German army for a free Germany."⁷¹

The newspaper Stuttgarter Nachrichten received a letter from a new student resistance group named after the anti-Nazi group 'White Rose'; the 'White Rose Movement II' differed from its predecessor in its anti-democratic demeanour. Though anti-Nazi, the group's members claimed to feel betrayed by MG and had lost faith in democracy. They believed that their mission was to

⁷⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Chief of Intelligence, February 26, 1948.

⁷¹OMGUS, RG 260, Bx 500, File 26, Education and Cultural Relations, Bavarian, August 1949, p. 8.

fight with justice and God on their side for an authoritarian state that would represent German interests.⁷² The renewal of the 'Corps' and military style fraternities on the campuses had been expressly prohibited during earlier phases of the occupation, but such groups secretly formed and, by 1948, were congregating openly. Two such groups were the yacht club Hanse at Munich and the climbing group Rheinplatz at Erlangen. These organizations advocated duelling with uncapped swords and fostered old Imperial ideals of nationalism, German military supremacy and racial superiority.⁷³

When Minister President Erhard spoke to a student crowd at Munich University in 1949, he mentioned that whenever he broached the subject of democracy he was met by silence, and that the moment "he wondered [aloud], if there was doubt regarding democracy," the students cheered enthusiastically. An Intelligence officer who was present at the address noted that the audience response was reminiscent of National Socialist days.⁷⁴

One aspect of the Nazi influence that MG ignored in their monthly reports was the encouragement of right-wing groups and professors attempting to get

⁷²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297 File 2, p. 32.

⁷³Ibid., p. 34.

⁷⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28D Bavarian-Würzburg, Weekly Intelligence Report, Student Forum, 1949.

students to vote for the KPD. The students received such urging as there was no credible right-wing party to vote for in 1949. However, the professors typically made it clear that the vote was in protest to the occupation.⁷⁵ Organizers from the right supported these tactics with the desire of creating instability and problems for the democratic parties, and hoping that Germans would look to the nationalists for a stable authoritarian replacement.

Basking in the glow of exchange programs involving 40 to 100 students, MG ignored reports of Nazi controlled 'Korps' taking control of the ASTA (Allgemeiner Studenten-Ausschuss—General Student Committee) at Munich and throughout the American Zone. The zonal president of ASTA in 1949, was Heinz Friedrich, a Nazi Party member of 11 years.⁷⁶

The newspapers recognized that there was a problem in shifting MG policies while known Nazis still dominated government positions that influenced re-education. Delbert Clark pursued this trail in a story about Dr. Hans Meinzolt, the State Secretary working under Education Minister Hundhammer in Bavaria. Meinzolt still signed his correspondence as a Lieutenant-Colonel. In

⁷⁵OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Intelligence Report, March 26 & 23, 1948.

⁷⁶OMGUS, RG 260, Box 16, File 28A, Bavarian, Intelligence Report, 1949.

chapter four it was established that Meinzolt was using his position to protect and reemploy Nazis.⁷⁷

In the Bavarian Ländtag a year-long debate raged over American interference in the German educational system. As well, Cardinal Faulhaber announced that Catholic schools would "assert their will" over American policies.⁷⁸

Disenchantment was evident with reorientation and re-education. At local theatres there were belittling responses to the movie Hunger, showing American aid measures. When former Nazi officials or generals were shown on the screen in brief news-reels the crowd would break into applause.⁷⁹

Student boldness increased. At Frankfurt 300 students protested the intervention of the state in the autonomy of their university.⁸⁰ Like so many arguments at this time, the issue was resolved in the court's, to the university's satisfaction, but the attacks were very personal. Always the Länder Governments

⁷⁷Delbert Clark, "Bavarian Schools Dominated By Nazi," New York Times, March 28, 1947.

⁷⁸Kathleen McLaughlin, "Bavarian Protest Over School Reform," New York Times, January 29, 1948.

⁷⁹OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Bavaria, March 18, 1948.

⁸⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Report To The Military Governor, Intelligence Report, June 18, 1948.

were accused of being American puppets and dictating an American agenda. Growing nationalism among the students was evident. The CDU 'Junge Union' dissolved as student members were unhappy that the German point of view was not expressed strongly enough against the Western Allies. The leader Justers Kurz had a long Nazi past and believed that further support for the mother party was untenable. Kurz and the defecting students sought membership in organizations that expressed their beliefs and were ready to agitate against the occupation forces.

Tent has done an admirable job in discussing the confrontation between Alois Hundhammer and MG over school reform. The Bavarian Government took the lead in opposing the dream of reorientation and the desire of the Zook Commission to see an American-style school system adopted. Hundhammer delayed in providing plans to reform the school system as the Americans wished. He missed meetings, he misplaced documents and he dragged out the debate over reform for 14 months. Over this period he returned to MG authorities plans which incorporated almost none of the American suggestions. Eventually his agreement to allow the government to pay for 50% of tuition and an increasing

amount over the next two years was accepted by MG as the most it was likely to get. All ideas of a one-track system were abandoned.⁸¹

A final epitaph to the abandonment of a tough MG policy was the case of Dr. Moeller, leader of the CSU. When it became apparent that he was wanted for trial for past Nazi offenses, Clay intervened directly and had the case dropped.⁸² Like nothing else, this signalled that the American approach was now to treat Germany as an ally, and that the antagonisms of the war were over. World War Two had resulted in an overwhelming military victory for the Allies, but the renazification of German institutions and, the maintenance and restoration of nationalistic and militaristic influences at the universities, in particular, had not been checked.

⁸¹OMGUS, RG 260, Box 159, File 3, Bavarian, E & RA Branch, February 24, 1948, Subject: Non-Compliance of Dr. Alois Hundhammer & Tent, Mission on Rhine, pp. 110-164.

⁸²Delbert Clark, "Nazis' Retention in Two Land Groups," New York Times, January 15, 1947.

CHAPTER 6

THE LEGACY

The events at universities are vitally important for any society, for as Kurt Tauber explained: "What those at university think, their values, their political outlook, their insights and knowledge, will determine what the man in the street thinks."¹

From 1948-49 the 2% of Germans who attended university subsequently proceeded into positions of importance in government, business, or academia. It is therefore critical to understand who attended the universities in post-war Germany, for these students would have an impact reaching many years past 1949. Equally important is an understanding of the ideology of many of the faculty. This worldview can be shown to have inspired the continuation of traditional nationalist and authoritarian trends. As each year passed, the graduating alumni grew in number and reinforced the promulgation of an unaltered German nationalistic elite, respectful of authority and unimpressed by democracy. They themselves eventually came to serve in business, government, police and as the faculty at the universities.

¹Tauber, Eagle and Swastika, 1967, p. 435.

The 'legacy' of the American failure to denazify successfully and to influence re-education policies at the universities needs to be summarized. First, we observe what the three main schools of thought, identified in the introduction, have concluded about re-education and denazification. Historians have ignored some evidence and missed other material. History is a selective process which undoubtedly accounts for some omissions. It also appears that the traditional historiography of this period, as developed by people such as Zink, has been maintained and perpetuated by more recent historians. Thus old interpretations were accepted and passed along through more recent studies. By introducing new MG documents, this chapter supports the argument that denazification was incomplete, and that many MG officials worried about the abuses of power that took place. Historians who have ignored this evidence have failed to consider the impact renazified universities had on the evolving West German republic. Nationalist and authoritarian trends played an important role in the newly united West Germany, and universities were an important factor in the continuing growth and influence of these trends.

Another area that has been largely ignored was the infiltration of ex-Nazis and members of radical right-wing groups into the student bodies at the universities. Nationalists, Nazis and conservatives encouraged the rebirth and

growth of conservative/nationalist 'Corps', which had an important place in German universities.

There is a common shortcoming found in the various historiographical perspectives on denazification. Regardless of an author's opinion about the necessity or value of denazification, few historians have developed any analysis or delivered any commentary about the outcome of the program in general. The final Chief of E&CR (E&RA) Division, Alonzo Grace, believed that the E&RA officers had performed no work worthy of mention until reorientation had been introduced in 1948.² As has been shown earlier, only Bower and Biddiscombe have reported growing and increasingly organized resistance in Germany.

Historians have offered sparse commentary on education in their discussions of the occupation. The first history of any importance was by Zink. Zink appeared to recognize that any hope for the success of re-education by MG demanded the need for more well-trained education officers. He commented on the failure of MG to convince either the Executive or Congress in Washington to provide additional resources. He supported reorientation, but admitted that re-education suffered from resources being diverted to the exchange programs.³

²Alonzo Grace, "Education," Governing Postwar Germany, Edward Litchfield, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 456.

³Zink, The United States in Germany, pp. 209-218.

He offered no further comment on what MG's failures meant to education in occupied Germany, or to a future united Germany. Like other historians, Zink failed to make an effort to discover how the Germans felt about re-education and denazification. He did not discuss or acknowledge German resistance to the American presence, nor did he mention the fact that German resistance became increasingly organized during the occupation. As for any direct comment about re-education at the universities, Zink made none.

In Beyond the Eagle and the Swastika, Tauber briefly mentioned that American re-education lacked "intellectual planning" and that a "military government was inappropriate to administer civilian affairs. Military Government could not make a persuasive case for democracy."⁴ However, Tauber provided neither evidence nor explanation for these broad conclusions. Tauber's detailed study of the political reconstruction of West Germany failed to appreciate the role of the German academics other than in their direct contribution to the politics of Germany. Like other historians, Tauber ignored the many consequences of renazification on the German campuses. Most historians appeared to note the enormous importance of re-education in Germany, but after a brief discussion of the matter they typically moved on to other topics such as war crimes, financial issues, or German political struggles.

⁴Tauber, Eagle and Swastika, p. 26.

There seemed a reluctance to dig below the surface, especially with regard to education. In many of the early histories this was probably due to the unavailability of classified records, yet we cannot ignore a certain intellectual laziness. Personal accounts, newspaper records and available documentation would have provided early historians of this period with many details they have omitted. Information was available about the German resistance and the organization of such resistance. With some effort, early historians could have explored and discussed the nationalistic atmosphere at the universities. These are two of many areas ignored by many historians.

Gimbel's two books in the 1960s offered fresh insights into the realities of the German reaction to MG directives and the occupation in its entirety. Gimbel noted that Bavarian Minister-President Erhard wondered how Americans expected to foster the growth of democracy in Germany when, "MG slapped democratic men in the face."⁵ Erhard was referring to the MG practice of ordering the removal of locally elected officials who were known Nazi criminals and the fact that such people were forbidden from holding office by Tribunal decisions. Erhard, perhaps naively, believed that allowing former Nazis to participate in the political process would have a rehabilitative effect.

⁵Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, p. 243.

Gimbel also noticed the evasive tactics different Länder ministers used to avoid implementing MG re-education policies. For instance, in Hesse the Land Minister-President agreed to utilize American education models but silently altered the school year to begin in April of 1949 instead of September of 1948. By 1949 re-education efforts were partially undone by the 'Basic Law' (Grundgesetz), which was the legal frame-work of the new West German state. Hesse gained an unwarranted reputation as being co-operative about re-education matters when, in reality, they avoided the issue as vigorously as any other Land.⁶

Gimbel believes that American efforts were never eagerly pursued until 1948. By then Gimbel believed that the German mind was "closed, and vested interests had been created . . . occupation influence dissipated."⁷ Gimbel, however, absolved the Americans for their lack of success at re-education for two reasons: first, he suggested that they made a bureaucratic mistake in not planning sufficiently in advance for the occupation; and secondly, he believed that re-education officers were hampered by the denazification instructions. Gimbel's disdain of denazification and its purposes left him inattentive to the rapid renazification of German politics and the educational system. Gimbel considered denazification procedures as pointless tasks, but he suggested no alternatives.

⁶Ibid., pp. 240-242.

⁷Ibid., p. 249.

Apparently Tent agreed with Gimbel's overall conclusion regarding re-education. Despite viewing declassified documents that were previously unavailable to Gimbel and in many instances shone a different light on the denazification and re-education efforts of MG, Tent continued to argue that American policy was naive and that German re-education suffered from denazification. Tent omitted MG reports that showed the desperate need for a review of American policies at the universities. While Tent admitted renazification took place, he chose to believe that the Germans would choose appropriate alternatives to out-dated university practices and curriculum. Despite all the documentation that he reviewed, he insisted that Clay and MG officers were unaware of renazification at the universities.⁸ Tent joins the long list of historians who have ignored OMGUS intelligence reports and field reports from the various levels of MG. In his conclusion, he agrees with the conventional wisdom suggesting that reorientation was the salvation of the American program in Germany.

Bower, a journalist, created a stir with his research. Bower showed that General Burness, Assistant Chief of MG Staff, wrote General McNarney about the same Tribunal difficulties that we have documented in earlier chapters, and noted the fact that many 'Major Offenders' were remaining in Germany and

⁸Tent, Mission, pp. 313-314.

reorganizing politically and in the professions. The main belief of that time was that many 'Major Offenders' were escaping to South America and other distant regions. Clay rejected Burness' warning. However, it was Clay who told John Hildring at the War Department in March of 1946 that successful denazification and re-education efforts would require the work of 10,000 American personnel.⁹

Bower aside, there have not been any historians who have accurately discussed what occurred on the German campuses, and it appears that when information became available, it was distorted or ignored so that historians could fit their work into the traditional historiography of the period. Generally, historians have confirmed exchanges of wishful thinking that were common during the occupation between the top officers of MG and established German politicians. No one, other than Bower and Gimbel, has focused upon the active German resistance to re-education and denazification of the universities.

The documentation needed to draw different conclusions was available. Late in the occupation period, leading officers warned of the renazification of German politics, business and especially the universities. In February 1948, Albert Schweitzer, Director of Civilian Administration Division, wrote to the MG Land Director that "turning over governmental politics and other responsibilities to German authorities does not seem to have advanced the development of

⁹Bower, Pledge Betrayed, pp. 163-166.

democracy, decentralization or denazification in Bavaria."¹⁰ Further it was noted that "individual rights were not safeguarded and denazification had not reduced Nazi sentiment or nationalist spirit." Such trends were noticed most in the Education Ministry, as positions opened and ex-Nazis were hired.¹¹ Even Clay's calm facade slipped in early 1949 when he commented to Intelligence Division Director Donald Shea that the "Germans had to overcome old-fashioned nationalism . . . and offer evidence to the world of their desire and understanding for a secure Europe."¹² What was possibly worrying Clay, and has been ignored by Tent and other historians, was the constant stream of communications such as the Monthly Report to the MG of Württemberg-Baden, which ". . . acknowledged the increase in renazification in government, mostly in Education, Finance and Religion, especially in upper and superior brackets."¹³ In addition, and apparently to no one's surprise, the few anti-Nazis hired in 1945 and 1946 were

¹⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 15, File 3, Bavaria, Civilian Administration Division, February 28, 1948.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²OMGUS, RG 260, Box 14, File 210, Report to Intelligence Division, February 12, 1949.

¹³OMGUS, RG 260 Box 1296, File 1& 2, Monthly Report to Military Governor, W/B, June 6, 1948.

fired as rehabilitated Nazis claimed back positions at all levels of German professional life.

This thesis is not the first to conclude that re-education and denazification had failed and needed a review in 1948. MG was made aware that a segment of the German people were concerned with their future. In the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Otto Faerber questioned the wisdom of handing back power to many Germans. Faerber was concerned that many of his countrymen had not "cleared their vision of right and wrong. . . that many still had a veneration for Prussian power politics, which had been glorified by the Nazis." Faerber worried that these dominant attitudes led to an indifference to human law and to the rights of others, and that the cause of democracy in Germany would be correspondingly diminished.¹⁴

Faerber and many at MG headquarters did not worry without cause. As early as 1945 the NP (National Democratic Party) had formed in the Frankfurt area. Originally committed to a restoration of the monarchy, the party was taken over by radical right-wing influences. In 1949 the NPD joined with the conservative FDP (formerly the Liberal Democratic Party) and captured 25% of

¹⁴OMGUS, RG 260, Box 1297, File 1, Monthly Report to Military Governor of Württemberg-Baden, p. 17.

the vote in the Hesse Land elections.¹⁵ Earlier, in Bavaria, the nationalistic WAV (Economic Reconstruction Association) captured 7.4 % of the votes and elected 13 members in the Ländtag. The leader, a former Nazi named Alfred Loritz, was named Minister for Denazification in 1947.¹⁶ Loritz gained this position as he had lost favour with ex-Nazi groups. The Bavarian administration felt that he could now be trusted. Nonetheless, he was later accused of protecting Nazis.

The democratic parties were not only influenced by agreements such as the NPD and FDP union, but were also penetrated by outright subversive groups. In the early 1950s, wanted-Nazi Werner Naumann began working closely with a former SA Major-General and a Hesse Ländtag deputy for the FDP, Ernst Achenbach. The latter believed that the Nazis could slowly take over the FDP and then persuade the populace of the need for a reformed National Socialist Party.¹⁷ The resurgence of former Nazis took place in all the democratic parties. While there is no evidence that the Nazis tried to turn the direction of the CDU or SPD, there were instances where former members of the Nazi Party gave preferred treatment to other ex-Nazis in obtaining jobs or promotions.

¹⁵Tauber, Swastikas and Eagles, pp. 72-75.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 74-106.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 132-141.

In the cities of Eschwege and Weilburg various polls and studies showed the limited impact of democratic thinking. David Rodnick's work found that students, and youth in general, did not mind the idea of democracy as long as it did not interfere with the rebuilding of Germany. His research, dating from July 1948, was based upon 1500 middle-class families, which included 362 university and Gymnasium students. Most students interviewed thought that the political parties should unite in 1948 to form a "cleansed National Socialist Party."¹⁸ A 'cleansed' movement would not be as racist or expansionist as Hitler's Nazis, but would be authoritarian and would commit itself to resurrecting Germany's position economically and politically in the world.

Other evidence that the universities were renazified and were growing bastions of authoritarian nationalism can be seen by the rapid growth of the 'Corps' (or Buende). These were not the traditional Corps of the early nineteenth century, which had espoused liberty, democracy and a revolutionary tradition. These new 'Corps' were havens of nationalism and militarism. By 1955 over 30,000 students, or 25% of the post-war graduating classes, were alumni of 800 'Corps' in West Germany. The trademark of the postwar 'Corp' was an anti-liberal and anti-democratic orientation. While members of the 'Corps' were not

¹⁸David Rodnick, Postwar Germans: An Anthropological Account (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. x-xi, 93-95.

committed National Socialists, there was also a large League of National Students (Bund National Studenten, BNS) who were.¹⁹ With each passing year and each graduating class, the alumni of such groups increased their presence in the professions. In post-occupation Germany, the universities continued to be the breeding ground of new Nazis, nationalists and militarists. It would take an act of law in 1961 to make these new 'Corps' illegal.

If students were attracted to the anti-democratic 'Corps' and BNS, one must wonder if there was any encouragement towards such activities from the rehabilitated faculty. As noted earlier, many professors retained their positions because they had never belonged to the Nazi Party, even though they had sympathized with the movement. In many cases faculty were former members of the right-wing DNVP (German National People's Party). Most historians have attempted to show that as university enrollments increased each year after the war, the new staff was vetted by Tribunals and/or MG Public Safety Officer groups. However, there is proof that the universities rehired faculty members who had been dismissed by the Policy Enforcement Branches established by Hartshorne and Browning.

Lists from Würzburg and Heidelberg (presently stored at the Suitland Archives) give the names of faculty members dismissed in 1946, and not supposed

¹⁹Tauber, Eagles and Swastikas, pp. 435-443.

to be rehired, as well as faculty rehired as 'ordinary labour'.²⁰ Comparing these lists with faculty lists for the same universities, circa 1951 and 1952, provides some interesting revelations.²¹ At Würzburg, out of a total teaching faculty of 166 in 1951, there were 31 names from the Policy Enforcement Branch's dismissal documents. As well, there were 22 professors and physicians rehired as 'ordinary laborers'. As has been shown, these 'ordinary laborers' were quickly placed back in their old positions at the universities. Of the 31 rehired, 7 were from Theology, 6 from medicine (14 of the rehired 'ordinary laborers' were also from the medical faculty), 14 were reinstated philosophy professors and 4 were from Natural Sciences. At Heidelberg University a total of 50 former Nazis and sympathizers dismissed by Major Emerick's Policy Enforcement Branch were reinstated by the summer of 1951. Total faculty at that time numbered 235. Of the 50 rehired, 28 were from the medical faculty, 8 from philosophy, 6 from mathematics, 3 each from Law and Theology, and 2 from Catholic Theology. Major Emerick had

²⁰OMGUS, RG 260, Box 54, File 15, Colonel Browning Commission & Report by Major C. M. Emerick to Lt. Colonel Browning, September 23, 1946, Office of Military Governor For Germany (U.S.) Civilian Administration Division, Policy Enforcement Branch, 1946 & OMGUS, RG 260, Box 912, File Heidelberg University—General—Office Of Military Governor For Germany (U.S.) Civilian Administration Division, Policy Enforcement Branch, November 15, 1946.

²¹Ruprecht-Karl-Universität Heidelberg, personal-Und Vorlesungs-Verzeichnis Sommer-Semester, 1951 & 1952, printed: Dr. Johannes Horning (personnel and lecture registry for the summer semesters), & Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg.

recommended 76 faculty be dismissed. It is possible that the other 26 not rehired found work in the British Zone. Rector Martin of Würzburg admitted that travelling to a different zone was a common practice to escape university-level denazification. The British were less aggressive in administering the policy.

These numbers suggest that about 20% of the faculties in the early 1950s were comprised of academics formerly dismissed by the Americans. Considering the likelihood that similar rehiring practices occurred at Munich, Erlangen, Marburg and Darmstadt, a great deal is explained about the ideological outlook that existed at German universities during and after the occupation. The rehabilitation of faculty was a farce. Those who slipped through the Tribunals spread nationalist and Nazi ideology, as has been suggested in earlier chapters. There can be little doubt that these men renazified the universities, encouraged the 'Corps', and even turned a blind eye to the BNS. As each graduating class took its place in business offices and government bureaucracies they brought with them, at the very least, a desire for a brand of conservative and semi-authoritarian 'democratic' government. As alumni they continued to support the causes and teachings of the nationalist professors under whom they had studied. It must not be forgotten that almost all these students had undergone Nazi indoctrination either as Hitler Jugend members or in the military, and that as a result, the nationalist and Nazi rhetoric at the universities was comfortable and familiar. It

was not until the 1960s that a generation untainted by National Socialism would arrive at the nation's universities. This cohort would ask embarrassing questions and the accountability of the professorate would be challenged.

This thesis has been critical of the history that has been written of re-education and denazification, as well as the wretched attempts at implementing those policies, and the false claims that were made by the upper echelon of MG. Although no one can rewrite the work of Zink, Knappen or Tent, it is suggested that the standard account be amended. While historians have traditionally believed that re-education and denazification were ill-advised, there are now grounds for believing that these policies could have been successful.

Observers of the occupation agree that planning for an extended stay by MG was never satisfactorily laid out. The redeployment of men was very rapid and left MG undermanned. Clay felt compelled to pass denazification over to German Tribunals in early 1946. This was a crucial error. Great burdens weighed down these Tribunals and their accomplishments were suspect. Clay had choices. Although he did not receive the men he requested, he could have opened the universities at a slower pace, and he could have chosen Tribunal members with greater care, perhaps through use of a screening mechanism. It was noted earlier that he requested from Hilldring at the War Department 10,000 men and women to assist in MG administration. These 10,000 could have been either

armed forces personnel or civilians with specialties that MG needed. It was clear that the process of reforming German higher education required many more trained personnel. It could not be expected that all these people would have been as accomplished as Hartshorne, but even several hundred more trained specialists would have enabled the proper vetting of the universities. Further, an extra 1,000 American Tribunal officers (or civilians) would have strengthened the vetting agencies and ensured the delivery of appropriate sentences and penalties. Non-Germans in these positions would not have been as susceptible to intimidation, black-mail or sympathy with Nazi elements. Some people might argue that such a large degree of interference would have aroused increased resistance from the populace. However, there would have been many, if not a majority, who would have responded favourably. Certainly, many Germans would have reacted positively to seeing 'big' Nazis receiving appropriate penalties and nominal Nazis rehabilitated rapidly, and others would no doubt have bowed before the authoritarian inclinations of MG had it had the resources and men to enforce its will.

There are some people who will argue that the universities would have opened slower with such a program of thorough scrutiny. While not necessarily true, this would not have been a catastrophe. Most students were ex-soldiers and Hitler Jugend members who could have been put to work in reconstruction, with

payment going towards their future education. While working, their denazification status could have been determined. Secondly, delay did not have to last very long. At both the universities and in the restructuring of the local governments, the Americans could have offered a great deal more support to Germans who had been anti-Nazi. While it was, and is, difficult to identify how many Germans were anti-Nazi, we can safely use the figure of 1% without exaggerating the situation. This means there were 130,000 people in the American zone eager to help in the rehabilitation of Germany.

Somewhat more ambitious would have been a program to transfer several thousand German students, businessmen, politicians and professors to England or the United States for a thorough training in democracy, a stressing of German humanitarian values from the past, and a lesson in competitive market economics. As a matter of record the British took 4,000 Germans to Wilton Park for such training. The program proved successful but ended prematurely for a lack of funding.²² While criticism of the small exchange programs involved in reorientation was justified, this would have been a program of a major magnitude involving thousands outside the university. If such a program had been pursued while denazification and educational reforms were earnestly implemented, the

²²Benjamin Wells, "Germans Trained in British School," London Times, February 24, 1948, p. 16.

outcome of the occupation may well have been different. Not as successful were attempts at rehabilitating POWs (prisoners of war). Many of the POWs had not experienced the military defeats of 1944-45 and consequently still believed the indoctrination that they had undergone during the Nazi regime.

Historians have always argued that poor allocation of resources and lack of money were two major reasons for the failure of the occupation in achieving its goals. However, this argument was and is suspect. Once views changed and the Soviet Union was supposed to have become a threat, it seemed necessary for Germany to become a bulwark of capitalism against Russia. At this point, circa 1947-48, the United States developed several expensive programs, notably the Marshall Plan, which provided partial funding for the restoration and rapid reconstruction of Western Europe's battered economies.

Aside from the rhetoric about 're-education being the best method to change the very souls of the German people', there was no commitment to providing the funds for sufficient civilian manpower which, quite likely, could have achieved the goals of denazification and the development of a suitable educational program at the universities.²³

If anti-Nazis had been given American support and if 10,000 American civilians had assisted MG and vetted the university faculties, several of the aims of

²³Griffith, "Denazification in the American Zone," Ph.D. Thesis, p. 53.

JCS 1067 and the Potsdam agreement could have been reached. The initial benefits would have been at the universities, where students would have been given the chance to receive a balanced liberal education, and where nationalism and the glorification of German superiority would have been minimized. The rebirth of the nationalist 'Corps' and the BNS would not have had faculty support. The dominant influence would have been neither old, conservative dons nor young, Nazi-indoctrinated professors. Vetted, truly rehabilitated academics, augmented by anti-Nazi professors fired during the Third Reich, would have ensured a more democratic bias within the faculty. In such a situation, the rehiring of a few pro-Nazi professors who slipped through a much better vetting system would have had little impact.

The consequences for the development of West Germany can only be imagined. The topic most avoided by historians, German resistance to the occupation, would have been at least partly stymied. With all the Klaus Barbies and Werner Naumanns behind bars, plus bankers and industrialists who had profited from supporting the Hitler regime properly tried and imprisoned, the German middle class would have not have become cynical and disenchanted by unfair treatment at the hands of the Spruchkammern.

Perhaps such a vision was expecting a great deal from the Allies. The atrocities that they had recently witnessed undoubtedly left them in a mood to

punish and created a situation where, to return to our opening analogy, it became impossible to rehabilitate while simultaneously expecting to exact retribution.

There was a moment of hope when the officers of the German Country Unit were putting the German Handbook together in England. Their approach would have offered the right mix of punishment and guidance. It would have been a program of reconstruction and careful persuasion aimed at bringing Germany back into the family of civilized nations. However, politicians from Morgenthau to Roosevelt, and military men from Clay to Knappen, had different agendas.

To end on an optimistic note, it can be reported that there is currently great interest in this topic in Germany, and several studies are underway there which run roughly parallel to this one. This is a good sign—Germans are becoming more comfortable reviewing this era in a critical frame of mind and with a readiness to learn from omissions of the past. In so doing the challenges of the future can be faced with honesty and a better chance of peaceful resolution. One of the issues facing a unified Germany is the question of appropriate methods and strategies for ‘de-stasifying’ and removing communist influence from East German universities. Perhaps historians of the future will conclude that Germans profited from their experiences during the 1945-49 period, and were more successful in dealing with a similar problem 45 years later.

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APPENDICES

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Appendix A

FOR INFORMATION

(CORRECTED COPY)

to accompany Directive on

REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING

(The term "universities" throughout includes all institutions of higher learning)

25 October 1945

314.1

1. Authority

The reopening, supervision and control of German universities in the US Zone of Occupation is the responsibility of the Director, Office of Military Government, US Zone. He may delegate this responsibility to the Mil. Gov. Officer whose sphere of authority most closely corresponds to the German administrative level from which a given university was controlled prior to 1933. To the Office of Military Government named for each university he will assign an additional Education Officer whose primary duty will be the supervision of that university.

2. University Planning Committee

The Education Officer to whom this responsibility has been delegated, will proceed, on the receipt of this directive, to name a faculty member who has been found acceptable under current denazification directives to serve as chairman of a University Planning Committee. The chairman of the UFC will submit five to ten names of present and of former teachers of that university to act as members of this committee including, where acceptable candidates are available, a representative from each faculty of that university. When these persons have been investigated and found acceptable, they will constitute the University Planning Committee.

3. Sub-Committees of UFG

The chairman of the UFG may propose sub-committees, the members of which may or may not be members of the UFG. Before any such sub-committee is officially constituted, each member will be screened and the sub-committee approved by the responsible Education Officer.

4. Minutes and Reports

Minutes of the proceedings of the UFG and its sub-committees, together with all reports and papers prepared by them, will be submitted to the Education Officer concerned, who will forward one copy to Education Section, IA Branch, Office of Military Government, US Zone, and one copy to Education Section, P H & F Branch, IA & C Division, Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S.

5. Function of UFG and Sub-Committees

It is the function of the UFG and its sub-committees to formulate for submission to the responsible Education Officer plans covering:

- (a) a constitution for the university; (b) an operational plan for the administration of the university, until a constitution is approved;
- (c) educational policies and objectives, both general and for separate faculties; (d) nominations of teachers in the various faculties whom

File #28: Directives for the reopening of Universities (1945)

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they consider academically and politically acceptable; (e) a list of the university personnel who have been excluded for political reasons; (f) curricula; (g) selection and admission of students; (h) supervision of student affairs, housing and extra-curricular activities; (i) university property; (j) examinations, degrees, and professional licenses; (k) control and financing of the university, including payment of salaries and pensions; (l) such other matters concerning the university as may be required by the responsible Mil. Gov. authority.

6. Additional Duty of the Education Officer

The Education Officer concerned will require the submission of Fragebogen for all personnel to be employed by the University as required by current directives on exclusion of Nazis and militarists and will carry out the personnel screening expeditiously.

7. Request for Permission to Reopen a University or a Part Thereof

Pending the establishment of a constitution for the university, a request will be submitted by the UFG to the Office of Military Government, US Zone, through the Education Officer concerned, for the reopening of any or all faculties or parts of the university. A statement showing approval of the German Civil Government authorities concerned will accompany the request. This request to reopen any faculty or part or all of the university will include: (a) nominations for an Acting Rector, Acting Dean (for a faculty), Acting Director (for institutes or similar parts of the university), teachers and administrative staff; (b) a detailed operational plan; (c) curricula; (d) standards for the selection and admission of students, and their supervision; (e) a list of buildings and major equipment which are available for use; (f) the number of students who can be accommodated, from the standpoint both of university facilities and of student housing; (g) a proposed budget and how it can be met.

8. Procedure for Nomination of Acting Rectors, Deans, or Directors

The UEC will organize an electoral body made up of the professors and such representatives from the Docenton of the whole university as they deem advisable, and who are found to be acceptable (EGR 8-321) to nominate the Acting Rector mentioned above. The UEC will organize similar electoral bodies from among separate faculties and parts of the university to nominate the Acting Deans and Acting Directors mentioned above.

9. Appointment of Acting Rectors, Deans or Directors

The Education Officer concerned will appoint the Acting Rectors, Acting Deans or Acting Directors nominated in this manner or may in exceptional instances appoint others.

10. Permission to Reopen a University or Part Thereof

When such a request (see par 7 above) has received the approval of the Office of Military Government, US Zone, an order will be issued permitting the reopening of the university or part thereof, the Acting Rector bearing the responsibility for current operations, subject to the approval both of the UEC and the University Education Officer. In granting permission to reopen universities or parts thereof, priorities will be given to the medical and theological faculties. The issuance of this order will constitute the legal reopening of the university.

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11. Constitution

When a university constitution has been submitted by the UFG and formally approved by the Office of Military Government, US Zone, the university from that time forward will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of its constitution, subject to the continued control and supervision of Mil. Gov.

12. University Personnel

In the investigation of persons proposed by UFG for teaching or administrative positions at universities, use will be made of all possible sources of information including Fragebogen, CIC records, university records, German Ministry of Education records, and personal interviews. In all discretionary or petitionable cases weight will be given to the over-all estimate of an individual by the UFG. The Education Officer concerned, when necessary, will request specialist screening personnel from higher headquarters.

No one will be appointed to a university teaching or administrative position who has not been found acceptable under current directives on exclusion of Nazis and militarists. Anyone found unacceptable will be removed from all positions and appointments which he may hold in connection with a university or a part thereof. For example, unacceptable members of medical faculties will be removed both from their teaching positions and their positions in university clinics or institutes.

13. Sources of Personnel

Vacant positions may be filled by qualified replacements from among those dismissed by the Nazis, from faculties of unopened educational institutions, from among displaced or other academic personnel now in the US Zone of Occupation, or from abroad.

14. Appointments

All appointments in the organizational stage will be subject to review at any time by the appropriate Education Officer. Appointments regularly made under the constitution will be subject to Mil. Gov. approval.

15. Libraries

University Libraries will be subject to the same control and supervision as other public libraries.

16. Clinics, Hospitals and University Health Agencies

Clinics, hospitals and other health agencies which are operated by universities will receive the same treatment as other health agencies.

17. Curricula

No course or lecture which in whole or in part violates MGR 8-450 will be permitted.

The Acting Rector or Rector in accordance with MGR 8-437 will submit to the appropriate Education Officer, in advance of any public announcement or publication, a list of the courses-to be offered during a given semester in the university or any part thereof, together with a brief description of their content and the names of the instructors. Only after the Education Officer has given his approval may the proposed courses or lectures be announced.

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18. Preparatory Courses

Subject to the responsible Education Officer's approval, universities will be permitted to arrange courses of study, which are preparatory to regular university courses, in order to make up the deficiencies in training during the war period. There will be included in every preparatory program, a reorientation course which will be compulsory for every student enrolled in such program and which will give factual presentations of world thought and of history within the last ten (10) years and will stress particularly Germany's relations to the world, politically and economically.

19. Research

a. In general, research or scholarly activity in the humanities will be considered as part of the curriculum. The Acting Rector will be required at the end of each semester to submit a report on such activities to the Education Officer.

b. Scientific research which contributes to Germany's war potential, or which furthers Nazi or militaristic ideology will be prohibited in accordance with current directives. Whenever, in the opinion of the Education Officer, any research project appears to violate these directives, he will require the Acting Rector to forbid continuation of such project and it will be reported to the Office of Mil.Gov. (U.S. Zone)

20. Students

a. Admission and Expulsion

The university authorities will decide which students may be admitted, subject only to the power of Mil.Gov. to remove such students whom it may discover, upon investigation, to be or to have been seriously compromised with the Nazi party or otherwise unsuitable for university studies. No student will be excluded from a university on grounds of race, sex, creed, nationality or because he has given aid to the Allied Forces. Nor will any student be excluded on the ground of political opinion or affiliations except as provided by these instructions or by order of Military Government.

b. Fragobogon

All students will be required to fill out Fragobogon at the time of registration, but admission will not depend upon immediate clearance. The Acting Rector or Rector will be required to form a representative committee composed of reliable students together with an approved faculty member to make a preliminary examination of the Fragobogon and such other evidence as they may deem necessary, and to submit recommendations for exclusion to the Acting Rector or Rector who will be responsible for excluding all students who fall in a mandatory removal and exclusion category. Admission of students falling in a discretionary category will be decided on the merits of each individual case. All Fragobogon together with complete reports of action taken will be transmitted promptly to the Education Officer.

21. Scholastic Requirements

Scholastic Requirements for admission will be the responsibility of the Acting Rector or Rector through his delegated authorities, except that priority will be given to those candidates with the highest scholastic qualifications and those who have most nearly completed their course of studies.

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22. Student Housing

The Acting Rector or Rector will be responsible, subject only to Mil. Gov. approval, for adjusting the number of students admitted to the available housing facilities, for the supervision of student living conditions, and the maintenance of suitable living standards.

23. Student Organizations

All National Socialist organizations in universities are abolished and are not to be revived. The revival of other student associations (especially Vereinigungen, Burschenschaften, Korporationen, and their Altherrenbunde) of a nationalistic reactionary or para-military character will not be countenanced. Student associations for self-help, religion, recreation, games, sport and social purposes will be encouraged. Proposals to form new student associations giving full particulars of the purpose, membership and contemplated constitutions, will be submitted to the university authority designated by the Acting Rector, or Rector, who will then submit the proposals with his recommendation to the Education Officer concerned for final action. Any youth organization which is permitted under the provisions of MGR 8-700 to 8-759 may have chapters or branches at a university. The Education Officer concerned will keep informed on current student political tendencies and the activities of student associations.

24. Financing of Universities

The financial administration of each university will be the responsibility of the German civil government or governments which had this function prior to 1933. In cases in which a civil government has been abolished by Military Government, next in authority will assume the responsibility. Financial operations will be continued through the customary treasuries of the university and its controlling governments. Each individual responsible for the receipt or disbursement of funds must be screened for political acceptability by Mil. Gov. prior to being authorized to assume his authority. In presenting financial statements of plans for future operations, university officials or Planning Committees must first obtain the concurrence of the financial officials of the civil governments whose public funds will be obligated by the proposals.

25. Salaries

The determination of the amounts of salaries and other similar compensation owed to politically acceptable faculty members and other employees and the payment of such amounts are the responsibility of each university and the civil government which controls it.

the Terms of Reference of the Committee had been approved by the Directorate, subject to minor amendments. The Committee agreed and recommended to the Directorate that facilities for inter-zonal travel should be granted to Archbishops, Bishops, and Ecclesiastical Officials of corresponding standing. Detailed recommendations for the control of German religious affairs were also forwarded to the Directorate for their consideration and approval.

Appendix B

DENAZIFICATION OF CLERGY

First returns from the field on the denazification of clergymen are shown below:

DENAZIFICATION OF CLERGY

	TOTAL	Eastern Military District	Western Military District
Kreise In Area	245	161	84
Kreise Reporting	78	42	36
Fragebogen Distributed	2,750	1,008	1,742
Fragebogen Returned	1,766	885	881
Fragebogen Evaluated And Processed By CIC/Special Branch	1,092	501	591
Clergymen Recommended For Removal Through Church Channels	26	11	15
Clergymen Suspended Through Church Channels	3	0	3
Clergymen Removed Through Church Channels	s/ 22	s/ 6	s/ 16

NOTE: s/ In some instances church authorities appear to act on their own initiative in the matter of removal of clergymen.

THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS

The following theological institutions, all located in Land Bayern, have been inspected and their applications for reopening have been approved:

A. SEMINARIES FOR BOYS

Name And Location	Denomination	Super- vising Authority	Estimated Enroll- ment	Number On Faculty
TOTAL			740	23
Knaben-Seminar, Bamberg	Catholic	Church	70	2
Knaben-Seminar, Eichstaett	Catholic	Church	150	8
Knaben-Seminar, Freising	Catholic	Church	180	5
Knaben-Seminar, Regensburg	Catholic	Church	300	5
Knaben-Seminar, Traunstein	Catholic	Church	40	3

SEPTEMBER 1945

SEPTEMBER 1945

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
 Appendix C
 Enforcement Branch Final Decision On Student Application

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
 FRAGEBOGEN / ACTION SHEET

MG-PSIG:10a
 (Rev. 1 July 1945)

Detachment No. G-43

Location Heidelberg

Territorial
 Jurisdiction

<p>I. Identifying Data <u>Rudolf</u> <u>BRACHT</u> NAME <u>BRACHT</u> <u>Staber</u> <small>(Last) (First)</small> ADDRESS <u>bei Schrienshain/De</u> <small>(City)</small> <u>12-1-20</u> <small>(Street) (House No.)</small> Date of Birth _____ Place of Birth _____</p>	<p>Fragebogen No. _____ Is Person on Applicant for Employment <input type="checkbox"/> or Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ? Position <u>Student</u> Position Wanted for: (Insert exact title) Governmental, Department, Agency or Firm (in which person is employed or to be employed): _____</p>
---	--

II. Recommendations or Remarks Concerning Findings

PSIGTB applicant
 RAB 38
 Army 41-05

23.3.45

DATE _____

Sgd _____



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945 O-23-09

III. Findings

- Non-Employment Mandatory
- Employment Discretionary (Adverse Recommendation)
- Employment Discretionary (Some Nazi Activity -- No adverse Recommendation)
- No Evidence of Nazi Activity
- Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity

IV. Action Taken By Supervising Military Government Officer

Remarks

- Employee Retained
- Employee Removed
- Applicant Employed
- Applicant Not Employed

DATE May 7, 46 Sgd. _____
Supervising Mil Gov Officer Functional Title

Important! Action Sheets must be returned through Functional Officer to Special Branch with action noted.
Wichtig! Action Sheets müssen über den Funktionsoffizier mit dem Durchführungsvermerk an Special Branch zurückgegeben werden.

Evidence of Student. Lettering page A.

5 Submits reported.

CIV

RG 260 OMGUS
Box 93

Apparatus 2 22

File 21 correspondence concerning Student matters

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
FRAGEBOGEN / ACTION SHEET

MGPS/G/10a
(Rev. 1 July 1945)

Detachment No. G-43

Location Heidelberg

Territorial
Jurisdiction

<p>Identifying Data</p> <p>NAME <u>B a l z, Marie</u> <small>(Last) (First) (Middle)</small></p> <p>ADDRESS <u>Heidelberg</u> <small>(City)</small> <u>Kaiserstrasse 60</u> <small>(Street) (House No.)</small></p> <p>Date of Birth <u>9.10.23</u></p> <p>Place of Birth _____</p>	<p>Fragebogen No. _____</p> <p>Is Person an Applicant for Employment <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> or Employee <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Position Veted for: (Insert exact title) <u>student</u></p> <p>Governmental Department, Agency or Firm (in which person is employed or to be employed): _____</p>
---	--

II. Recommendations or Remarks Concerning Findings

NSDAP 41-45
HJ 38-41
NSDStB 42-45
RAD in 1942
automatically taken into Party

DATE 22.3.1946 JR.Sgd. _____
Special Branch Officer

III. Findings

- Non-Employment Mandatory
- Employment Discretionary (Adverse Recommendation)
- Employment Discretionary (Some Nazi Activity -- No adverse Recommendation)
- No Evidence of Nazi Activity
- Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity

IV. Action Taken By Supervising Military Government Officer

- Employee Retained
- Employee Removed
- Applicant Employed
- Applicant Not Employed

Remarks

Military Government Office
Heidelberg - University
Earl L. Crum

Maj. MGO AUS

DATE

Sgd

Supervising Mil Gov Officer

Functional Title

Important! Action Sheets must be returned through Functional Officer to Special Branch with action noted.

Wichtig! Action Sheets müssen über den Funktionsoffizier mit dem Durchführungsvermerk an Special Branch zurückgegeben werden.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
FRAGEBOGEN / ACTION SHEET

MGFS/G/10a
(Rev. 1 July 1945)

Detachment No. *G-43*Location *Heidelberg*Territorial
Jurisdiction

Identifying Date Brookmann, Ruth NAME <small>(Last) (First) (Middle)</small> ADDRESS Avonstraße-Mitte 179 Kr. Guterloh / Neustadeln <small>(Street) (House No.)</small> Date of Birth 8.4.23 Place of Birth	Fragebogen No. _____ Is Person an Applicant for Employment <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> or Employee <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Position held for: (Insert exact title) student Governmental Department, Agency or Firm (in which person is employed or to be employed):
--	--

II. Recommendations or Remarks Concerning Findings

NSDAP 42-45
 HJ 36-42 office; M-Schaftführerin
 NSDStB applicant since 43
 RAB 41-42
 automatically taken into Party

DATE _____

Sgd. _____

Sgt. _____
 Officer

III. Findings **25.3.1946 JR.**

- Non-Employment Mandatory
 Employment Discretionary (Adverse Recommendation)
 Employment Discretionary (Some Nazi Activity -- No adverse Recommendation)
 No Evidence of Nazi Activity
 Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity

IV. Action Taken By Supervising Military Government Officer

- Employee Retained
 Employee Removed
 Applicant Employed
 Applicant Not Employed

Remarks

Military Government Office
 Heidelberg - University

Earl L. Crum
 Maj. AUS

DATE Sgd
Supervising Mil Gov Officer Functional Title

Important! Action Sheets must be returned through Functional Officer to Special Branch with action noted.

Wichtig! Action Sheets müssen über den Funktionsoffizier mit dem Durchführungsvermerk an Special Branch zurückgegeben werden.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MG/PS/G:10a
(Rev. 1 July 1945)

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

FRAGEBOGEN / ACTION SHEET

Action Sheet to:

Detachment No. *G-43*Location *Heidelberg*Territorial *Land- und Stadtkreis*
Jurisdiction *Heidelberg*

I. Identifying Data NAME <u>F r a n k e</u> <u>K a r l</u> <small>(Last) (First) (Middle)</small> ADDRESS <u>Heidelberg</u> <small>(City)</small> <u>Görriesstr. 12 a</u> <small>(Street) (House No.)</small> Date of Birth <u>27/12/20</u> Place of Birth _____	Fragebogen No. Is Person an Applicant for Employment <input type="checkbox"/> or Employee <input type="checkbox"/> ? <hr/> Position Velled for: (Insert exact title) <u>student</u> Governmental Department, Agency or Firm (in which person is employed or to be employed): <u>Heidelberg University</u>
---	---

(II. Recommendations or Remarks Concerning Findings

Not NSDAP
HJ 34-36
NSDStB 38-39
Deutsche Studentenschaft 38-39
RAD in 36
Army 36, 1st Lt.

DATE 27/3/46 KSgd. _____
Special Branch Officer

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY FRAGEBOGEN / ACTION SHEET

MG-PS/G10a
(Rev. 1 July 1945)Detachment No. *G-43*Location *Heidelberg*Territorial
Jurisdiction

I. Identifying Data

NAME **G l o c k n e r, Elisabeth**

(Last) (First) (Middle)

ADDRESS

Worms**Friedrich Ebertstr. 37**

(Street) (House No.)

Date of Birth

14.5.22

Place of Birth

Fragebogen No.

Is Person an Applicant for Employment
or Employee ?Position Voted for: (Insert exact title)
studentGovernmental Department, Agency or Firm (in which
person is employed or to be employed):

ii. Recommendations or Remarks Concerning Findings

MCDAR 41

EJ 34 - 41

MLEDtB - Applicant 43 - 44

DAF 40 - 43

Deutsche Studentenschaft 43

IFK 39

RAD 40 - 40

DATE

23.3.46 Be

Sgd

Special Branch Officer

III. Findings

- Non-Employment Mandatory
 Employment Discretionary (Adverse Recommendation)
 Employment Discretionary (Some Nazi Activity -- No adverse Recommendation)
 No Evidence of Nazi Activity
 Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity

IV. Action Taken By Supervising Military Government Officer

- Employee Retained
 Employee Removed
 Applicant Employed
 Applicant Not Employed

Remarks

Military Government Office
 Heidelberg - University
 Earl L. Crum

DATE..... Sgd.....
Supervising Mil Gov Officer Maj: AUS
Functional Title MGO

Important! Action Sheets must be returned through Functional Officer to Special Branch with action noted.

Wichtig! Action Sheets müssen über den Funktionsoffizier mit dem Durchführungsvermerk an Special Branch zurückgegeben werden.

VITA

Surname: ARGYLE **Given Names:** GORDON STEVEN

Place of Birth: Victoria, B.C.

Educational Institutions Attended:

University of Victoria 1987-1993

University of Victoria 1993-1996

Degrees Awarded:

B.A. 1993

M.A. 1996

Honours and Awards:

R. Roy Military History Award 1993

Canadian Paraplegic Association Women's Auxiliary 1995

The Leslie & Kaye Jowett Graduate Scholarship 1994-95

Publications:

n/a


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BANISHING THE PAST: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE OF
'RENAZIFICATION' IN OCCUPIED GERMANY: 1945-1949

Author:


Gordon Steven Argyle

April 26, 1996
(Date)