Framing the Climate Change and Human Mobility Nexus in Canada: From Discourse to Policy?

by

Nicole Bates-Eamer

B.A., University of Memphis, 2001

M.A., Carleton University, 2006

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We acknowledge and respect the lək̓ʷəŋən peoples on whose traditional territory the university stands and the Songhees, Esquimalt and W̱SÁNEĆ peoples whose historical relationships with the land continue to this day.

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Abstract

My dissertation examines how media and policy actors in Canada frame the intersection of climate change and human mobility. I address two gaps in the literature: (1) how the nexus of climate change and human mobility is emerging as an issue at the national and sub-national level in Canada; and (2) the conceptual connections and contradictions between internal mobility and global mobility in the context of a changing climate. I examine and compare how policy actors and newspapers frame the issue and related policies in Canada at multiple governance levels and in four newspapers (two local, two national) by drawing on discourse and frame analysis. My research reveals that policy makers and newspapers frame the intersections of climate change and human mobility differently depending on where the mobility takes place (within Canada or beyond) and the context in which the framing occurs. These different framings reflect different representations of the problem (or problem definitions) and therefore require different policy options or responses.

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Dedication

For my nephews and all the special youngsters in my life: you all strengthen my resolve to try to make the world a more just, inclusive, and resilient place.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Introduction

Lytton, Paradise, Fort McMurray, Bangladesh, Philippines, Tuvalu, Ida, Maria, Harvey… The names of these towns, countries, and storms have become synonymous with the devastating impacts of climate change. It is somewhat unnerving and humbling (not to mention difficult) to study a phenomenon which transpires in real time. During the course of my PhD studies, British Columbia (B.C.) had three of its most devastating wildfire seasons, as did California (on the heels of its longest drought in history). Hurricanes destroyed millions of homes in the Caribbean and the southern United States. Floods and storms wreaked havoc on densely populated communities - particularly in Asia. Sea-level rise increasingly inundated low-lying nations and coastal regions. Extreme weather internally displaced 111.5 million people around the world, 263,200 people in Canada (IDMC 2021), all while I was studying this topic in the relative comfort and safety of my home. These numbers do not include the millions of people who chose to move pre-emptively when climate change is making their livelihoods untenable or their neighbourhood undesirable. Nor does it include the millions of people who were unable to get out of harm's way or those who lost their lives in extreme weather events. So, while this dissertation is largely focused on narratives, discourses and the meaning ascribed to the connection between climate change and human mobility, and the implication of such meaning on policy, it is ultimately about people and the impacts of climate change on where they live.

This dissertation addresses a paradox: the mounting evidence of climate impacts on the habitability of communities and the lack of responses by governments around the world and here

in Canada.[1] Human (im)mobility, a potential response to climate impacts, has the potential to impact Canada; for example, in terms of people coming to Canada, but more likely where Canadians live, and the disruption from and costs of responding to and preparing for climate events such as storms, floods, and wildfires. Yet scholarly and policy communities primarily frame climate mobilities as an issue of global governance, international security, or of vulnerabilities and adaptation *in the Global South.*[2] This means that climate mobilities within and beyond Canada and their impacts on Canadian society have been largely overlooked in climate migration debates.[3] I address these gaps in literature and explore the development of policies concerning (*sub*)*national* responses to people on the move in a changing climate. More specifically, my dissertation is about "climate mobility" as an emerging (policy) issue – and how the media and policy makers in Canada frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility – both within Canada and beyond. How actors represent and give meaning to the relationship between climate change and human mobility could influence the types, and very existence, of responses. And yet, while "climate migrations" emerge as a phenomenon through the practices, research, policies and media that render it visible (Farbotko 2017), it is also a complicated and complex material reality. My starting points are thus that the intersection of climate change and human mobility is a complicated and complex material reality, Canada needs to address it, but how Canada addresses it depends on how Canada understands the problem. I situate my belief that Canada needs to address climate mobilities in the concept of climate justice

[1] HABITABLE – *Linking Climate Change, Habitability and Social Tipping Points: Scenarios for Climate Migration* – employs this concept of habitability which is "the capacity/capability of a socio-ecological system to sustain and support the lives and livelihoods of its constituent population(s)" (Gemenne et al. 2021). Habitable is an EU-funded project advancing the understanding of climate impacts on migration and displacement.
[2] I acknowledge there are vast differences between countries in the "Global South" and such a term blurs those differences. Nonetheless, I use the term throughout this dissertation geopolitically to refer to those areas of the world negatively or unequally impacted by globalization and economic development relative to other areas (Clarke 2018, Mahler 2018).
[3] Robert McLeman's work on drought migration in the Prairies is an exception that comes to mind.

which animates much of the discussion on climate mobilities and was a starting point for this study.

The Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC) published several articles with titles such as: "Why Canada needs to think about accepting climate change refugees," (May 2021); "Could Canada be a safe haven for climate refugees?" (June 2019); "Does Canada have a 'moral and legal obligation' to allow climate migrants" (February 2020). To many (myself included), the injustice of climate change is that those who caused it are not those who will suffer the most from its consequences, nor those who will bear the costs of mitigating and adapting to it. The impacts are disproportionately borne out on countries of the Global South and marginalized communities in the Global North, or more specifically, on communities that are already vulnerable to climate risk and on individuals who are already living in poverty and precarity. Furthermore, there is an intergenerational injustice in that current (and previous) generations are not taking action thus imposing hardships on future generations. Canada, from my perspective, has a responsibility to respond to the nexus of climate change and human mobilities with a range of policies that consider both migrant and climate justice. The lens of justice not only reveals Canada's responsibility, but it also shifts the debate away from technocratic or scientific foci to the social, political and economic systems that produce injustices. What is rendered visible in approaching a concept such as "climate migration" through a justice lens are fundamental questions about how humanity can flourish on a planet with political and ecological boundaries.

In Canada, the intersection of climate change and human mobility as a discrete policy domain is nascent. While the federal government engages in several international efforts addressing climate displacement, Canada does not have policies *defined as such*; although there are several policies that deal with the intersection, just not under the guise of "climate

migration." On the one hand, the lack of existing policies provides an excellent case for study because the issue is yet to be concretized; on the other, it poses several challenges as a topic of inquiry. First, I had to continuously remind myself to check my assumption that climate migration *should* become an issue worthy of policy makers' attention. Mobility in a changing climate is not necessarily a new phenomenon given that the climate has always been changing and people have always been moving.

Second, and methodologically, whereas policy analyses generate insights from mature subsystems with identifiable policy actors, jurisdictions (and venues) and substance (Ingold, Fischer and Cairney 2017, 1), these elements are not yet present in the realm of climate mobilities. Actors are just beginning to emerge; several policy venues mention the intersection of climate change and human mobility, but without impetus for action nor with a coherent or consistent understanding of what the issue is. I often questioned what exactly the "it" was that I was exploring and would I be able to identify a good policy response if it even existed? In this regard, and third, "climate migration" might best be considered as a "wicked problem" because "the formulation of the problem *is the problem*" (Rittel and Webber 1973, 161).[4] Related to the challenge of wicked problems is that they "involve causes and effects at multiple scales of time and space" given their multi-dimensionality and interconnectedness (Termeer, Dewulf and Breeman 2012, 28). I noticed this multi-scalar conundrum as soon as I started exploring the issue within Canada and thus sought to explore the issue across scale and with a focus on problem definition.

[4] I would also argue that the intersections of climate change and human mobility meet Rittel and Webber's other three criteria as summarized by Termeer, Dewulf and Breeman (2012, 28-29): wicked problems are symptoms of other problems, they are resistant to solutions, and they overwhelm governance actors because of their messiness, uncertainties, interconnectivities, and ability to become worse in attempts to solve them.

I started my PhD from the naïve assumption that if policy-makers could see the impact of climate change on human populations, they would surely adopt better policies. I therefore focused my admissions' proposal on global governance mechanisms addressing "climate migration". After realizing the attention such questions already received in the literature, I pivoted to an empirical research project about the role climate or environmental change played in newcomers' decisions to come to Canada. As I began to pursue that project, I quickly encountered problems linked to issues of feasibility and methodology, as just referenced above. Doubt about the value in focusing on *why* someone moved or why I was focussing on climate change as a driver of migration over many other possible factors troubled me; also, why were displacements from floods and wildfires in B.C. (or the United States or Australia) largely absent from the climate migration literature. What emerged, as the problems embedded in my own assumptions about the topic revealed themselves, was a much different project. My thinking, and my research project, evolved substantially since I began my PhD. This evolution in my thinking transpired from the training I received in my political science courses, through my comprehensive exams, and my research, although the seeds were planted long before.

In 2006-2007, while having the privilege to work with Tanzanians, Burundians and Congolese in UN refugee camps in Tanzania, I saw first-hand the injustice of global inequality, the pitfalls of international development, and the corruption in refugee governance. Disenchanted with international development, I returned home to Canada. I have the passport, skin colour, and able-bodiedness that enables me to move with little or no confrontation from border, custom or immigration officials. In a world emerging from a global pandemic, I now also have the right vaccines. I am aware that this is not the reality for most people around the world, and I am attentive to my own positionality in terms of what it means for someone to move or leave their

home. Despite my travels, or perhaps because of them, I also have a profound sense of place—which happens to be on Vancouver Island, specifically the traditional territories of the Lekwungen, K'ómoks, Snuneymuxw, and Nuu-chah-nulth peoples. While climate change will impact where I live, and Canada is warming at twice the global average, Vancouver Island has the infrastructure, resources, and ability to adapt much more readily than other places on the planet. My research reveals that the intersections of climate change and mobility are as much about people within Canada as they are about people beyond Canada, but within Canada, the material reality of these intersections plays out disproportionately in Indigenous communities.

As a white, cis-gender settler, I do not proclaim to speak for or on behalf of people from Black or Indigenous communities or people from other marginalized communities, communities which long have suffered outsized impacts from climate change, development, colonialism, and public health inequities—as the COVID pandemic laid bare. I acknowledge that I have a settler colonial understanding of concepts like mobility, the state, the environment, climate change, and governance—just to name a few. I further acknowledge that I use "Canada" and other colonial names of places problematically in the context of Indigenous claims on sovereignty. In doing so I both reinscribe "Canada's" authority over the peoples living on "its" territory and represent "Canada" as if it were a unified nation in the international realm. Finally, I am also aware that the very act of exploring the intersection of climate change and human mobility, speaking to policy actors about it, and publishing papers on the topic (even if no one reads them), contributes to its constitution as an issue for consideration by policy actors.

Research Objectives and Questions

The main objectives of this research are scholarly, but in addition to being a dissertation-writing student, I am also a Canadian and a human being gravely concerned with the future of

the world. There are impacts of climate change that cannot be prevented. What does it mean to accept that and start thinking about how societies will live through a climate changing faster than ever before? While this dissertation looks at the issue in Canada, it is motivated by the dire situation of people around the world for whom climate change will make circumstances worse. Canada's reputation as a nation that welcomes people in need of protection and Canada's own interests in preparing for climate change also informs my research. Ultimately, this project aims to contribute to research advancing a more nuanced understanding of the intersections between climate change and human mobility, as well as issues of justice, tolerance, equality, and human rights—for people at home, on the move, and abroad.

My dissertation contributes to the growing body of critical scholarship on climate mobilities. My study has the specific aim to address two gaps I have identified in the literature: (1) how the nexus of climate change and human mobility is emerging as an issue at the national and sub-national level in Canada; and (2) the conceptual connections and contradictions between internal mobility and global mobility in the context of a changing climate. This project examines and compares how the issue and related policies are framed in Canada at multiple levels of government and in the (newspaper) media. My research reveals that policy makers and newspapers frame the intersections of climate change and human mobility differently depending on where the mobility takes place (within Canada or beyond) and the context in which the framing occurs. For example, actors frame mobility abroad as an issue of migration, protection, humanitarianism, and / or security; whereas actors frame mobility within Canada as an issue of disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, and community resilience in relation to social issues such as housing, vulnerability and jobs. This dissertation thus demonstrates the importance of narratives, framing and institutions in defining *climate migration* as a "policy problem." I am

also attempting to demonstrate that the terms of such a "policy problem" are still open to debate in Canada so as to provoke proactive and thoughtful climate and mobility policies across levels of government. Finally, while I am interested in the existence of such policies, I am not convinced that they do not *already* exist, albeit in a way that is not framed in terms of *climate migration* or *climate displacement.* For instance, protection policies for migrants abroad, as well as community resilience, adaptation planning, labour mobility and land-use planning policies at home, all correspond to climate change and human mobility intersections.

In an effort to better understand how the intersection of climate change and human mobility is being framed as an issue (warranting attention or not) in Canada, the overarching questions driving my research are:

(1) How do newspaper media and policy actors frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility in Canada?
(2) How do these framings shift or persist in reference to the location of the relationship and at different sites (media / policy actors) of discourse?
(3) What are the implications of these framings for policy development in Canada?

While I take up these questions in my empirical chapters, I revisit them in my conclusion to offer insights on the cumulative effects of my research.

Dissertation Outline

I organize the rest of my dissertation to explain why and how I approach my research questions (chapters 2, 3, 4) and what I find (chapters 5,6, 7). Chapter 2 lays the context and material realities of human mobility in a changing climate. I discuss current trends in human mobility and climate change around the world and what is being done to address the intersections by way of global governance mechanisms. I then zoom in on Canada to discuss the realities, particularly in B.C., and the relevant policies for both movement abroad and within Canada. This sets up chapter 3 which reviews the literature on climate migration including empirical

knowledge and political debates regarding how it is framed and to what effect. Chapter 4 presents my analytical framework. Climate justice informs my interest in the topic, but I situate my study in interpretive policy studies to draw specifically on scholars who emphasize discourse and framing in how problems are defined and how issues get on agendas. Methodologically, I use frame and discourse analysis to examine how the issue is framed in local and national Canadian newspapers (media) and by policy actors with domestic and international mandates. I look across levels and sectors of government, in order to ensure my analyses are attentive to the role of context and the distribution of power across multiple policy making levels.

In chapter 5's media analysis, *The Use and Abuse of Climate Mobilities in Canadian Newspapers,* I explore how climate change and human mobility come together in Canadian news print media. I am particularly attentive to how this relationship appears in local versus national news, and how it is framed for mobility within Canada compared to mobility beyond Canada. I conduct a text analysis identifying themes, topics, and representations of the problem, before shifting to a discourse analysis to reveal the framing strategies that structure the relationship between climate change and mobility. I present my methods and then divide a detailed results section into several subsections that include quantitative and qualitative findings on how the issue is framed (framing strategies). The discussion/conclusion presents some themes coming out of the results and the implications of the themes for future policy development in Canada. In both local and national papers, the intersections of climate change and human mobility come together in stories about climate change, migration and refugee issues, and disasters; very few stories focus specifically on climate mobilities directly. Papers frame movement beyond Canada as assumed and abstract, over long distances, and in large flows of people who are collectivized victims or threats; whereas in Canada, papers frame the relationship as concrete, observable,

localized, and temporary, and the people have agency, contribute to response efforts, and share individual stories. The papers analyzed reluctantly link disasters in Canada to "climate change," especially in the local newspapers where the stories on floods and wildfires in B.C. rarely use the term "climate."

In chapter 6, *Constructing "Climate Mobilities" as a Policy Problem in Canada,* I examine the ways in which Canadian policy actors across government levels and sectors frame the links between climate change and human mobility. I draw on interpretive policy analysis, specifically related to problem definition, and discursive institutionalism which stresses the role of discourse, ideas, and concepts in framing policy and institutional change. I devise a framework for analysing the discourse which draws on Bacchi (1999), Hajer (1995), and Schmidt (2008). I use qualitative data from key-informant interviews to see how (both conceptually and institutionally) the nexus between climate change and human mobility is emerging (if at all) as a discrete issue in Canada. What my analysis reveals is that there is a conceptual disconnect between mobility within Canada and mobility beyond Canada in the context of a changing climate. This disconnect results from the policy levers available to the actors who are involved in defining the problem of "climate migration." Actors, unsurprisingly, appear to define the problem in a way that will allow their institution to address it. For Canadian policy actors engaged beyond Canada, "climate migration" is a complex and political topic that they are trying to better understand empirically. Furthermore, for displacement from floods, wildfires and storms in Canada the concept of climate displacement has little salience given that people have always been displaced by such events. In this domestic domain, actors define the problem in terms of resilience, vulnerability and the ability to remain in place, which in turn relates to jobs, housing, and safety; whereas in the international domain, actors draw on

humanitarian and responsibility narratives that align with their institutional or organizational mandates.

In chapter 7, the concluding chapter, I summarize the findings from my empirical chapters by discussing them in relation to one another. I propose some theoretical, policy and practical implications from my research before discussing future research directions and then offering some concluding remarks.

Chapter 2 - Current Trends in Migration, Displacement and Climate Change

This chapter presents some current trends around the world, and in Canada, related to human mobility, climate change, the intersections of the two, and the relevant governance mechanisms and tools to address these intersections. I begin my discussion with the international in order to situate Canada in the global context, and because what is happening globally is part of my analysis. I then review the various governance arrangements both proposed and actually created to trace the political developments in addressing climate migration as a discrete form of movement. The final sections zoom in on Canada to look at how climate change is impacting British Columbia (B.C.), and the mechanisms being used by both federal and B.C. governments to address the intersections of climate change and human mobility within and beyond Canada.

Human Mobility and Climate Change

International Mobility Trends

The vast majority of people around the world live in the country where they were born.[5] The number of people living outside their country of birth, however, is on the rise. This is a result of simple factors such as population growth; but also, more complex factors such as the integration of the global economy. Globalization created new and more mobile pools of labour that in turn created stronger networks across the globe and opened up even more avenues, pathways, and opportunities for migration (Sassen 1988). De Haas (2021, 2) conceptualizes migration as "a function of people's capabilities and aspirations to migrate within given sets of

[5] Country of birth, however, undercounts mobility because of how many people no longer live in town/city/region where they were born. For example, in Vancouver in the 2016 Census, 43.8 percent of the Vancouver population (~2.426 million) had moved in the last five years (including within the city), and 21.4 percent had moved *to* Vancouver in the previous five years (Statistics Canada 2016).

perceived geographical opportunity structures." More simply, migration decisions reflect people's ability to choose where they live. Climate change impacts will alter where people can live because it will make some places inhospitable or impact the viability of livelihoods in certain locations.

In 2020, there were 280.6 million international migrants at mid-year (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2021). According to several sources, the proportion of international migrants has remained relatively stable since 1960 at about three percent (Czaika and de Haas 2015; European Union 2017), but in recent years, the rate of international migration seems to be increasing: from 2.8 percent in 2000 to 3.6 percent in 2020 (IOM 2021). Since 2000, the world's population has grown from 6.114 billion people to 7.753 billion people, or an increase in about 27% percent; while the number of migrants has grown over that same period from 173.2 to 280.6 million people or an increase in sixty-two percent (IOM 2021, author's calculations). While more people than ever are living outside their country of birth, the vast majority of this international migration is considered safe, orderly and regular—for those on the move and for the sending and receiving societies.

Millions of people migrate across borders every day, and the majority are welcomed upon arrival (Nanopoulos et al. 2016). Migrants are seen for their potential and as agents of change, with the skills and abilities to improve living standards; for their precarity, as victims of capitalist global relations forced into precarious work and life conditions and exploited by the international system (Porst and Sakdapolrak 2018, 36); and as a threat to security (sometimes imagined and constructed), by security actors seeking to control bodies and people to legitimize their own existence (Bigo 2002), but also because migration was historically detrimental to many Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies around the world. The rhetoric about the "migrant

crisis" or "climate refugees" plays on the idea of migration as a threat to global security. As noted by Sonia Shah, however, humans have always, and will always, be a mobile species; mobility is a natural and ancient process of social change (Shah 2020). What is gravely concerning, however, is the increasing number of migrants who are forcibly displaced or whose movement erodes well-being.

Figure 1. Forcibly displaced people, 2020 (UNHCR 2021)



In 2020, there were 82.4 million people "of concern" to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR 2021). This includes refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people (IDPs) of UNHCR concern, stateless persons, and "others of concern" (UNHCR 2021a). Relative to world population and the overall number of migrants, the number of people forcibly displaced has grown considerably in recent years; the number basically doubled in the last ten years. In 2010, there were 41 million people of concern, and now over 80 million. A large proportion of this increase is those who are internally displaced: this number grew from 25 million people in 2010 to 48 million people in 2020 (UNHCR 2021).[6]

[6] It is simultaneously remarkable and heartbreaking to have to update these figures every time I give a presentation or include them in a paper. They have increased dramatically every year since I began this project.

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), created in 1998 as part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, tracks new internal displacements from conflicts and violence and disasters. Whereas the data IDMC provides focuses on *new* displacements, they also now attempt to report on the number of people in protracted displacement at the end of the year. These protracted displacements contradict IDMC's previously held assumption that people return home shortly after being displaced. IDMC's assumption underpinning displacement data was based on a scarcity of time-series data regarding how long people remain displaced, it misrepresented the complexity of displacement, and it led to the erroneous conclusion that the needs of displaced people are short term (IDMC 2021, 15). In 2020, conflicts (9.8 million) and disasters (30.7 million) internally displaced 40.5 million people in 149 countries and territories around the world, as illustrated in Figure 2 (IDMC 2021). For the last 10 years, disasters displaced more people than conflicts annually (Figure 3); although the total number of people who remain displaced from conflict (48 million) exceeds those who remain displaced from disasters (7 million). The IDMC just started tracking the figure of those who remain displaced in 2019, and as such, they warn that it is likely a gross underestimate (IDMC 2021, 2). Furthermore, disaster displacements vary significantly from year to year depending on where and how many "mega-events" occur (events that displace at least one million people) (IDMC 2019, 7). The majority of displacements occur in South and East Asia in densely populated areas (such as India, China, Philippines, and Bangladesh) most frequently hit by hazards such as storms and floods (IDMC 2020, 14). Although extreme weather events have always displaced people, experts anticipate that climate change will make extreme weather events more intense and more frequent.

Figure 2. New Displacements by conflict and disasters 2020 (IDMC 2021)



Figure 3. New Displacements by conflict and disasters 2011-2020 (IDMC 2021)



Global Climate Change

Human influence is unequivocally warming the planet (IPCC 2021). Emissions from greenhouse gases are causing the world to warm faster; and experts anticipate that the planet will reach and exceed the 1.5°C of warming since the base period by mid-century (IPCC 2021a). But climate change refers not just to temperature change. Physical changes in sea-level rise and

flooding, precipitation patterns, water availability, permafrost thawing, extreme weather events, and ocean acidification have profound impacts for societies and ecosystems (IPCC 2021a). Researchers agree that sudden-onset events—storms and floods, droughts, and other extreme weather—will increase in strength and frequency because of climate change and have adverse impacts on human rights and on human settlements through losses of housing, livelihoods, and social and cultural resources (IOM 2014; IPCC 2018; Piguet, Pécoud, and Guchteneire 2011). While we cannot attribute the cause of any one extreme weather event to climate change (although scientists are currently improving their ability to make this link), climate change increases the likelihood and intensity of such events and leads to changes in the ranges of what is historically observed (IPCC 2012).

Slow onset events occur gradually and incrementally over time but with significant impacts on resources, livelihoods, human rights, and well-being (United Nations 2018, 5). These effects include increasing temperatures; desertification; loss of biodiversity; land and forest degradation; glacial retreat and related impacts; ocean acidification; sea level rise; and salinization (UNFCCC n.d.). Research identifies four general categories in which climate change might impact mobility patterns either directly or indirectly: (1) *changing precipitation patterns* that create longer-term drying trends that impact resources such as water and affect the sustainability of livelihoods including agriculture, forestry, and fishing; (2) *rising sea levels* that make low-lying coastal areas uninhabitable in the longer-term, (3) *increased frequency and severity of natural disasters* such as floods, hurricanes/typhoons/ cyclones, destroying infrastructure and communities; and (4) *competition over natural resources* that exacerbate local pressures (inciting conflict) (Martin 2014, 216). But there are multiple mobility (including immobility) outcomes in the context of a changing climate; and those mobility outcomes, in turn,

could have positive or negative consequences on communities, households, and individuals (de Sherbinin et al. 2011; McLeman et al. 2021). What is generally heard in the media, and what is somewhat intuitive given the state of the climate, is that climate change is going to increase or make displacement "worse." Unsurprisingly then, there are efforts affront to recognize and address the impacts of extreme weather events and climate change impacts on the mobility of people. The following section provides an overview of such efforts.

Development of Global Climate Migration Governance

The ambiguity between the forced and/or the voluntary mobility of people in the context of changing climate, not to mention the inability to isolate climate as *the* driver of movement, creates challenges for policy-makers. International law does not recognize extreme weather, environmental degradation and/or climate change as a cause for international protection, and as previously discussed the majority of movement is within countries, not across borders (thus implicating states and not the international system). Nonetheless, there are existing mechanisms and frameworks that seek to provide protection for those on the move in a changing climate; there is also a sentiment amongst those working in humanitarian and migrant and refugee sectors that some form of protection is required. Mayer (2016, 26), on the other hand, points out that although climate change may affect any migration scenario, it does not create any *unfamiliar scenarios – or any new forms of human distress that could create distinct governance needs, except sinking islands*.

This section will discuss the evolution of various policy proposals from the literature and then present what currently exists that is applicable to those on the move in a changing climate. Sarah Nash (2018, 2019) traces the emergence of the climate change migration nexus in the UNFCCC to demonstrate that the relationship is contingent and such policies are historically,

socially, politically, and institutionally situated. By analysing the policy making process—and the actors involved—Nash reveals the political work being done in the name of "climate migration" and how the boundaries erected in defining the issue foreclose what is politically possible. Nash's analysis makes visible how the UNFCCC understands migration as a depoliticized issue to be managed by technical expertise, reinforces the primacy of nation states in managing migration, and sees migration as tool of market capitalism. As Nash shows, analyzing the emergence of policy issues thus makes intelligible the underlying assumptions, structures, and processes shaping the policy. What Nash's (2019) work reveals at the international level, and what inspired my own investigation at the national and sub-national level in Canada, is that how the problem of "climate-migration" is constructed predetermines the policies for addressing it.

Expanding the Refugee Convention

One of the early suggestions to protect those forcibly displaced by climate change was to amend the Refugee Convention. In 2006, the government of the Maldives hosted an international meeting with governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and UN agencies on the protection and resettlement of "climate refugees." Delegates at this meeting proposed an amendment to the 1951 Convention so the definition would include those displaced by the climate, not just persecution (Biermann and Boas 2008). The Bangladeshi Finance Minister, Abul Maal Abdul Muhith, also supported this approach, stating in 2009 "The convention on refugees could be revised to protect people. It's been through other revisions [the 1967 Protocol extended protection beyond WWII (European) refugees], so this should be possible" (cited in McAdam 2012, 190). Leaders from other low-lying states disagreed.

The Heads of State from Tuvalu and Kiribati have adamantly rejected the label of "refugee" because of the lack of empowerment and dignity it evokes. As explained by the former President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, "when you talk about refugees—climate refugees—you're putting the stigma on the victims, not the offenders" (cited in McAdam 2012, 41). Pacific Islanders, do not want to end up as "refugees"—in their view, the term implies a lack of dignity or agency, and suggests they are unable to protect or provide for their family (McAdam 2012, 40-41). Instead, they want to hold emitters to account and to increase climate mitigation efforts. They also want options to migrate elsewhere, voluntarily in a sense; they do not want to wait until their country is uninhabitable. The Maldivian and Bangladeshi governments' early proposal was not supported by scholars who pointed out the disingenuity of these governments' actions. For example, Kothari (2014) traced how the Maldivian government used climate change and arguments around "climate refugees" to push for resettlement policies which have more to do with economics and the tourism sector than the environment or citizens' well-being.

There are several pragmatic reasons for the opposition to expanding the Refugee Convention. First, the implications of expanding the convention for refugees are not operationally or politically inconsequential. The number of climate "refugees" has the potential to dwarf the number of traditional or political refugees. In 2021, the UNHCR was responsible for 82.4 million people who qualify as "of concern"—this extends beyond refugees to include IDPs displaced by conflict and violence and asylum seekers. The IDMC (2021) estimated that in 2020, conflict and violence displaced 9.8 million people, but disasters displaced 30.7 million people internally.[7] As such, extending the Convention beyond the cause of persecution could include huge numbers of people.

[7] These numbers refers to *internal* displacement, there are no estimates for cross-border displacement from disasters.

Although the scale of the problem is potentially massive and potentially international, the fact that the UNHCR is completely overwhelmed and underfunded in regard to the current state of political refugees, adding a new (and much larger) category of "refugees" could be disastrous. Every year, the UNHCR reports on its underfunding. In August 2020, the UNHCR had a $4.803 *billion* funding gap, or less than half of the funding required for its programs (UNHCR 2021b). While the COVID-19 pandemic no doubt exacerbated funding problems, before the global pandemic, UNHCR reported similar funding gaps and shortages: in 2017, they reported having less than half its operating budget available. In this context, the UNHCR, despite its increasing concern and attention to climate change, is unlikely to support an amendment to include a population that would overwhelm its capacity. States also lack the political will to put a greater burden on an already taxed system; not to mention states would have to finance the scaling up of funds. An amendment to the Refugee Convention may also force trade-offs between political refugees and climate refugees when there is limited financial and operational capacity (Biermann and Boas 2010, 74). Finally, amending the convention is an inappropriate approach because displacement is more likely to be internal (not international) and there may not be any animosity between governments and citizens (as implied in the Refugee Convention). While the popularity of the term "climate refugee" persists in the media, there was never substantial support for a Convention amendment. In a 2020 paper prepared for the UNHCR, Weerasinghe (2020) explores regional discrepancies where refugee law and the 1951 Convention might apply in the context of climate change, conflicts and disasters. While the Convention remains unchanged as of today, changing norms regarding the provision of protection in such circumstances may shift international law in the future.

International legal agreements for climate migrants

Instead of amending the Refugee Convention, legal scholars proposed international legally binding agreements for the protection of climate migrants. Proposals came from Biermann and Boas (2010), Docherty and Giannini (2009), Hodgkinson et al. (2010) and Williams (2008). Many sought to address the rights or funding gaps in international protection (Wyman 2013). Biermann and Boas (2010) put forth a comprehensive proposal to address these gaps in their "Protocol on the Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees." The authors argue for a "sui generis regime for the recognition, protection and resettlement of climate refugees…tailored to the needs of the climate refugees and…appropriately financed and supported by the international community" (Biermann and Boas 2010, 74). Their Protocol focused on five governing principles: planned relocation and resettlement programs; permanent residence in new regions or countries; collective rights of groups of peoples from entire villages, communities, cities, regions, or even entire nations; international assistance for domestic relocations; and international burden-sharing (Biermann and Boas 2010, 76). The authors situate this Protocol within the institutional framework of the UNFCCC, suggest its own executive committee that would maintain a list of areas of concern, and endow it with a *Climate Refugee and Protection Resettlement Fund.* The funds would be provided as grants, be new and additional, in the case of sea-level rise reimburse the "full agreed incremental costs" of protection, and be determined both in amount and type by the list of those in need who would in turn "take on all other measures related to the governance of the fund" (Biermann and Boas 2010, 82). Although Biermann and Boas are only one such example, other followed similar but less comprehensive approaches. While ambitious in principle, critics note several problems with such proposals (McAdam 2014; Mayer 2013).

Those who challenge an international treaty as the best approach for addressing the

needs of climate-induced migrants focus on the lack of a clear definition of the concept, the nature of displacement, the complexity of the climate-migration relationship, and the geopolitics of the issue (Betts 2010). First, unlike the narrow definition in the refugee convention, there is no legally agreed upon definition of those displaced by climate change, nor are those displaced by climate change an undifferentiated group; as such, a protocol cannot be operational unless it is clear on who is or is not included. Second, nascent empirical studies show that in terms of the migration, the majority will be temporary, within borders or regional, gradual, and will not be characterized by mass migration from the Global South to North. An *international* approach, developed in the abstract, is premised upon the assumption that climate change is a global problem and therefore climate-induced migration requires global solutions, essentially ignoring the very different ways in which it manifests itself locally and regionally.[8] Local, national and regional responses based on empirical evidence are more appropriate for climate-induced displacement.

Third, and feeding into the first two issues, a new protection agreement focusing on climate-induced migration ignores our inability to unpack drivers of migration, and it also overlooks the linkages between poverty, conflicts, development practices, and vulnerabilities to climate change—all of which determine (im)mobility patterns with or without climate change. Finally, state performance with existing treaties raises concerns. On one side of the coin, states neither always fully implement their obligations under *existing* treaties or human rights instruments, nor do they seem willing to take on additional legal obligations and financial burdens through a new treaty. On the other side, another international treaty perceived to be imposed by powerful states could be an example of neo-imperialism; climate migration has the

[8] This is not to suggest that climate change is not a global program or that it does not *also* require internationally developed solutions, but just that not all responses need to be negotiated at the international level

potential to be yet another realm in which powerful states establish policies and practices to maintain their international financial and political interests. Nonetheless, in July 2019, Tuvalu tabled a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly, titled "Providing legal protection for persons displaced by the impacts of climate change," which called for the development of an "internationally legally binding instrument to create appropriate protections for persons displaced by the impacts of climate change" (UN General Assembly 2019, 4). A change in government leadership two months later (which ousted the president and champion of the resolution), however, has effectively left that resolution without an advocate.

In 2011, the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, who had taken a keen interest in climate displacement (McAdam 2012a, 171), suggested a set of global guiding principles for cross-border displacements from climate change and natural disasters (McAdam 2012, 238). These principles were to be modeled on the soft-law framework of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. Guterres, in acknowledging the complexity of climate change and forced displacement, was attempting to position the UNHCR's work in a more holistic understanding for human movement (Betts 2013, 77). In 2011, however, Guterres was unable to gain support. According to Walter Kälin (2012, 49), resistance came from states that were unwilling to engage with the issue writ large "whether from reasons of sovereignty, competing priorities or the lead of UNHCR in the process". Indeed, in recent years, anti-immigrant, nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes combined with increasing restrictive border and migration policies have challenged progressive migration and refugee policies (see Bates-Eamer 2019). In response to the failure of the UNHCR to engender political will, Norway and Switzerland, supported by Costa Rica, Germany and Mexico launched an intergovernmental process outside the realm of the United Nations system. Created in 2012, the *Nansen Initiative*

on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement was better suited to navigate states' concerns and political sensitivities than an international treaty system or an UNHCR-led process.

Inter-governmental initiatives on climate displacement

The Nansen Initiative was an inter-governmental consultative process; it prioritized consensus building across governments on key principles and elements for "a Protection Agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change" (Nansen Initiative 2015). There were consultations in South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, Central America, and the Pacific to better understand the complexity, causes, scope and scale of cross-border displacement. The initiative concluded by putting forth the Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda which "consolidates effective practices by States and (sub-) regional organizations" and "presents a toolbox of potential policy options" that includes: 1) preventing people from being displaced in the first place; 2) helping people move in a safe, regular and planned manner before disasters make forced movements inevitable; and 3) providing protection when displacement cannot be avoided and people are forced to move (UNHCR 2015, 10). In October 2015, 109 states endorsed the "Protection Agenda," a non-binding document outlining priority areas and recommendations for future work—this concluded the work of the Nansen Initiative.

The *Platform for Disaster Displacement* (PDD), launched in May 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit, assumed responsibility for the Protection Agenda and the work initiated by the Nansen Initiative (Platform for Disaster Displacement n.d.). The PDD promotes measures to protect people in the face of disasters, brings together partners, frames and feeds key messages about disaster displacement into global policy processes, facilitates regional efforts, addresses gaps in data and knowledge, and builds awareness about disaster displacement (Platform for

Disaster Displacement n.d.a). The Platform strategically focuses on the domestic and regional levels to deliver research and analysis to policy-makers for law and policy development, to consolidate and promote good practices and policy coherence, and to coordinate and complement other processes and initiatives (McAdam 2016, 1533). According to the Platform website, the PDD has emerged as the coordinating entity for harmonizing, complementing, and supporting existing initiatives on climate displacement within other entities such as the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and states implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the IOM and the UNHCR (both are Standing Invitees to the Platform's Steering Group), and the United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In addition to these institutionalized efforts, several other initiatives—in relation to sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, and/or the rights migrants and refugees—also intersect with climate mobility concerns. In the realm of development, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set an action plan across 17 domains for reducing poverty, inequality and vulnerability, and achieving *a better and more sustainable future for all*. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction complements the SDGs by focusing on making countries safer and more resilient to disasters and advocates for the "substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries" (UN Disaster Risk Reduction n.d.).

In the realm of migration governance, where Canada perceives itself as a leader, the Global Compacts for migration and refugees include climate related displacement and migration. Canada is a "champion" of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) which means they are part of an initiative to advocate for and support the implementation of the GCM. The *Global*

Compact on Refugees acknowledges that "climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements" (UN General Assembly 2018), and the *Global Compact for the Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* recognizes the same for migrants and includes a section on natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation (UN General Assembly 2018a). The UN frameworks, including the SDGs, Sendai, the Compacts, and the Paris Agreement (see below) are interreferential – all importing references to disasters and climate change and reflecting the truly complex, comprehensive and all of society nature of the nexus between climate change and human mobility. The UNFCCC, however, is the forum for *binding* decisions (the Paris Agreement) regarding international climate policy; and so far, the only entity for binding decisions related to climate-induced migration. As such, the next section provides a detailed account of how human mobility emerged in this domain and the politics of its emergence.

Climate displacement in the UNFCCC

The Paris Agreement, the successor to the *Kyoto Protocol*, was the outcome document of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) that sought to get a global legally binding agreement on reducing greenhouse emissions and reducing the threats of climate change. The world viewed COP21 in Paris as the moment in which it would become evident if world leaders and governments were taking climate change seriously.[9] In terms of climate displacement, there were high hopes.

Prior to COP21, there were two decisions on climate-induced migration, displacement and planned relocation; one in a decision on Adaptation adopted in Cancun and another decision on Loss and Damage adopted in Doha in 2012. The *Cancun Adaptation Framework* in 2010

[9] Five years (and five more years of increasing emissions) later, the same is being said in anticipation of COP26 in Glasgow.

represented an international agreement to "enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels" (UNFCCC 2010, 5). This was the first formal recognition of climate-induced migration as a technical cooperation issue and formally placed climate-migration within the adaptation framework (Wilkinson et al. 2016). Instead of building upon this framework, however, two years later in Doha the language was less assertive and switched to a loss and damage framework to "advance the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage", including "[h]ow impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility" (UNFCCC 2012, 22-23). To this effect, COP19 in Warsaw in 2013 created the *Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts* to "address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change" (UNFCCC 2013, 6). In advance of the Paris COP, a group of "least developed countries" (LDCs) attempted to translate these disparate statements into a binding commitment in Paris for the creation of a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility. The first draft of the Paris Agreement included text for the creation of such a facility to "provide measures for emergency relief, assist in providing organized migration and planned relocation and establish procedures for coordinating compensation measures" (UNFCCC, 2015: Article 5 Option II para 3). Several countries supported this language but the Australian government, determined to maintain sovereign control over their migration policy and concerned for how such a facility might affect them, demanded the text be removed before final agreement (Wilkinson et al. 2016).

The Paris Agreement mentions climate migration and displacement twice: first in the Preamble in reference to the "vulnerability of migrants"; and then in the section on Loss and Damage, where it calls for a Task Force to "develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change" (UNFCCC 2015, 8). These two statements have been hailed as a "breakthrough" for getting the language of human rights and migration into the UNFCCC (Schade and Manou 2017). However, this ignores the politics and power structures of the entire process in which the concrete, detailed and well-supported proposal from the LDCs for the climate displacement facility could be so easily watered-down and then excluded. Furthermore, the use of terms "avert, minimize, and address" ignores the positive potential of human mobility, framing it as only something to avoid. There is no detail in the Agreement on how the task force will operate, its decisions will be implemented, or how it will be financed, although since its inception, it has produced several documents and held several meetings, and is working through a workplan.

Since 2015, the UNFCCC has included the issue of climate-induced migration in their decisions and institutionalized the issue through the Task Force for Displacement. COP24 in Katowice (Poland) in 2018 adopted the early recommendations from the Task Force and created a five-year workplan which it now implementing. This workplan is focused on increasing awareness of displacement in the context of climate change, plus enhancing understanding of it and the capacity to address it (for more see UNFCCC n.d.*a*). Despite progress on the workplan, one can easily scrutinize the effectiveness of this institution (given the increasing negative impacts of climate change (IPCC 2021)), which does not provide much optimism for progress on climate-induced migration in this forum. While there are now working groups, task forces, and dedicated entities within international organizations working on climate displacement (as

discussed above), the most vulnerable are rarely included in these arrangements. The example from the Paris preparatory process, when Australia essentially vetoed the LDC's proposal for creating a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility, brings into question the legitimacy of the very institutions employed to resolve the issue.

These institutions often marginalize the vulnerable (in this case those who are most impacted by climate change) as exemplified by powerful states mollifying of the LDC proposal in the run-up to Paris. Nonetheless, a long-standing sentiment in policy development is the need to include those affected by the decision in decision-making (Wagenaar 2011, 20). Instead, the institutional nature of the UNFCCC has ensured the development of an epistemic community (Haas 1992) comprised of knowledge-based experts who control the knowledge, nature, and tenor of the debates. In Sarah E. Nash's recent book, *Negotiating Migration in the Context of Climate Change,* which traces the era of policy making on climate change and migration in the UNFCCC, she problematizes such power-knowledge dynamics to illuminate their normative implications for the policy-making process (Nash 2019, 20).

At the global level, the nexus of climate change and migration has emerged as a policy priority despite substantial critique of this nexus and its conceptual challenges. The UNFCCC set up the Task Force for Displacement in Paris in 2015 to "help countries avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change" (UNFCCC 2015, 27). Operationalized by the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Executive Committee (WIM Excom), the Task Force is working to enhance understanding and capacity related to climate displacement and support countries to incorporate mobility into their adaptation plans (UNFCCC n.d.). In this regard, the Task Force conducted several mapping exercises to see if/how efforts to "avert, minimize, and address displacement" appear in national

and international frameworks, processes, and policies, as well as in UNFCCC bodies (UNFCCC 2018). These frameworks illustrate that there are several established best practices, frameworks and principles that are applicable for climate mobilities in general and climate displacement in particular. The establishment of such governance mechanisms and frameworks, however, does not take place in a political vacuum, and how each entity understands the problem of climate migration influences the potential solutions they envision.

Taken together, the major efforts to develop policy on "climate migration" or "climate displacement" have transpired at the scale of global governance. New Zealand and Australia, however, have developed policies related to "climate migration" and Joe Biden advanced the issue in an Executive Order in February 2021 calling for a report addressing the impact of climate change on migration (US Government 2021). Kayly Ober from Refugees International made this statement following the release of the report, "The *White House Climate and Migration Report* offers a strong and valuable assessment of policy challenges, but it falls short on the provision of detailed and robust recommendations that will be critically important in the years ahead" (Ober 2021). Not only do global governance arrangements, frameworks, and mechanisms need to be interpreted by states implementing them, but for climate policy to be effective, local strategies must be integrated with global and national scales of climate action (Sovacool and Brown 2017). Thus, a subnational exploration of how the issue is taking shape in Canada is a novel approach in this scholarship.

The Canadian Case

Climate change affects every region on earth. Canada, however, is warming faster than the global average; its winters will get more rainfall but less snow, its summers will be hotter, and flooding on Canada's coasts will increase with sea level rise (Zhang et al 2019). Canada,

along with Australia, the United States and Japan, is one of the few countries in the Global North to experience major internal displacements because of climate impacts in recent years. From 2009 to 2020, damage and losses from extreme weather and wildfires in Canada – increasingly linked to climate change – cost an average of $2 billion per year; this is six times the annual average over the previous 25 years (Adriano 2021). In 2017, wildfires displaced 65,000 people in British Columbia alone (Abbott and Chapman 2018) and in 2019, floods, storms, and wildfires displaced 41,000 people across Canada (IDMC 2020). During the summer of 2021, a wildfire scorched the entire town of Lytton B.C. displacing every resident; thousands of people across the province were forced from their homes; and tens of thousands more were on evacuation alert. In November 2021, a series of atmospheric rivers brought record-breaking precipitation causing massive flooding, wiping out roadways, displacing tens of thousands, and, tragically, causing numerous deaths. While the exact number of people displaced in 2021 is currently unknown, there were likely more than one hundred thousand people affected by evacuations over the year, many of whom were displaced more than once (Emergency Management B.C. 2021). Each year the sudden impacts of climate change, such as floods and wildfires, displace (both temporarily and permanently) tens of thousands of Canadians (Public Safety Canada n.d.).

Canada is also a unique case in terms of migration. While not without its flaws, countries around the world respect Canada's immigration system and Canada has a reputation for welcoming refugees (Cheatham 2020). Furthermore, the increased anti-immigrant sentiment and general anxiety about immigration around the world is not (yet) as prevalent in Canada, where there are generally positive attitudes towards immigrants and refugees according to global surveys (Connor and Krogstad 2018, IPSOS 2020). A 2018 IPSOS survey, however, found that many Canadians were becoming more nervous about migration since 2017 (Bricker 2019). A

2020 survey of Canadians revealed attitudes towards refugees were mostly positive: sixty-nine percent thought that refugees "make Canada better by bringing cultural diversity" (IPSOS 2020, 4). Furthermore, Canada, with a foreign policy committed to multilateralism and a rules-based international order, is also active in several relevant international institutions that are currently developing policy on the intersections of climate change and human migration. For example, Canada is a "Champion" of the Global Compact on Migration and on the steering committee for the Platform for Disaster Displacement. Whereas how the relationship between climate change and human mobility is framed by these organizations affects Canada's own perception of the issue,[10] Canada has its own experiences to influence the framing, the narratives, and the emergence of policy.

Existing Policies in Canada

Canada does not have policy on "climate migration" or "climate displacement" defined as such. But people and communities in Canada have been adapting to climatic changes and dealing with extreme weather for centuries, this includes Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities (Mercer 2010). Therefore, various areas of government do have policy levers to address dimensions of such an intersection, although they are not framed explicitly as addressing "climate migration."

In response to disasters abroad, Canada has used immigration and humanitarian policies to accommodate people displaced beyond Canada. For example, following the 2010 Haitian earthquake,[11] Canada adopted policy directives to expedite immigration applications for Haitians with family in Canada and did the same for people in the Philippines in the aftermath of

[10] See chapter 6 – policy actors in the federal government frequently deferred to global policy making and how Canada engaged with that process.
[11] An earthquake is a geophysical event and has no correlation to climate change, although they are responded to in a similar manner to extreme weather and other climate-related events.

Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 (see Omeziri and Gore 2014). Similarly, Global Affairs uses international development policies to attempt to build community resilience so people are less vulnerable to climate hazards. In this policy realm, Canada's Humanitarian Assistance Fund responds to sudden onset events, allocating funds to agencies that work with displaced populations—as they did in response to cyclones in Timor-Liste and Mozambique (2021) and flooding in Cambodia and Vietnam in 2020 (Government of Canada n.d.). In the realm of national security, Canada's defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* frames climate change as "a security challenge that knows no borders" and a driver of forced migrations (Department of National Defence 2017, p 52). Canada's *Disaster Assistance Response Team* (DART) sends Canadian Armed Forces and expert civilians to disasters or emergencies in other countries when so requested by local authorities (Government of Canada 2018). Canada does not, however, have any specific or established policies that specifically target people displaced by sudden or slow onset events under a distinct policy domain of "climate displacement" or "climate migration."

For mobility within Canada, Public Safety Canada has a new (2017) *Emergency Management Strategy* focused on strengthening resilience across Canadian society which incorporates principles from the UN Sendai Framework and sets out Canada's approach to disaster risk reduction. This strategy informs provincial, regional and local action on emergency management including responding to displacements and evacuations from floods, wildfires, and storms. There is also an inter-governmental Task Force on Flood Insurance and Relocation which considers relocation for residents living in high-risk areas that recurrently flood (Public Safety, n.d.). In the 2021 report, *Adapting to the impacts of Climate Change in Canada: An Update on the National Adaptation Strategy, "*climate migrants" are named as one of several

groups requiring particular attention regarding community well-being, resilience, and capacity (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2021).[12]

More generally, references to the intersection of climate change and human mobility (usually framed as displacement or forced migration) appeared in the 2019 *Speech from the Throne* (Government of Canada 2019), in Ministers' 2018 and 2019 speeches on the *World Day to Combat Drought and Desertification* (Global Affairs Canada 2018, 2019), and in the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) *Minister's Transition Binder* (IRCC 2019). The climate mobility nexus also appears in several Policy Horizon reports. These reports scan emerging trends of concern for Canada; two reports mentioned "climate refugees" directly: in a 2014 on climate change and displacement in Asia (Policy Horizons 2014), and in a 2016 sustainabilit*y* scan which stated that Canada has the opportunity to become a preferred destination for climate refugees (Policy Horizons 2016). A 2018 report frames mass migration, along with security and conflict, as a consequence of climate change (Policy Horizons 2018).

In the province of British Columbia, there are many actors and policies whose work relates to intersections between climate change and human mobility (Bates-Eamer 2021). The BC government has two related processes underway that pertain directly to displacement in a changing climate: the modernization of the Emergency Program Act (EPA), and preparing a climate preparedness and adaptation plan. The former involves incorporating best practices from international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The implementation of Sendai requires a focus on disaster risk

[12] "The framing of a National Adaptation Strategy should centre on advancing community well-being and capacity, including through holistic and equitable approaches that integrate different themes, perspectives and solutions. The Strategy should build resilience and deploy capacity at the community level, particularly for Indigenous Peoples (First Nations, Métis and Inuit), northern communities, and populations of youth, women, elderly, homeless people, climate migrants, and biodiversity."

reduction (DRR) and strengthening the mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery phases of emergency management. The priority of DRR is on mitigation and preparation, which provides economic savings compared to the costs of recovery (Shreve and Kelman 2014), although paradoxically, funding most often aligns with response and recovery. While the EPA considers climate risks such as wildfires, floods, droughts, the province is also developing a broader strategy for how residences, businesses, Indigenous peoples, and all levels of governments need to prepare for a changing climate. The forthcoming *Climate Ready BC Strategy* will build on a 2019 assessment of climate risks in BC to develop appropriate adaptation measures for dealing with our current and future climate risks. Climate adaptation policies and plans align closely with the mitigation and preparation side of DRR, they are just framed differently. Given how broad the issue is and how many segments of society climate displacement reaches, the forthcoming adaptation plan might include local or regional policies about development and land-use permits, transportation, health and wellness, jobs and the economy, housing and social services, as well as climate change adaptation and community resilience.

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This chapter laid out the global and Canadian context in which discussions of climate migration or climate displacement take place and the existing policies which address it – either as a distinct policy domain as in the international case, or through other existing policy domains in the Canadian case. In doing so, I have attempted to lay out the problem: a lack of policy development on the intersection of climate change and human mobility in Canada that serves as the point of departure for this dissertation. The next chapter presents the academic literature on "climate migration" with a specific focus on the critical literature analyzing how it has been framed and how that contradicts what has been found by scholars empirical studies.

Chapter 3 – Literature Review

This chapter reviews the literature on climate migration, tracing its recent evolution in the context of increasing concerns about both climate change and international migration. I begin with an overview of the key terms and concepts related to mobility. The next section presents the recent empirical research on the intersections between climate change and human mobility and then focuses briefly on research in Canada. I then present literature specific to how climate change and human mobility has mainly been framed as a humanitarian or protection, security, or most recently, adaptation issue. I review several media analyses that perpetuate these frames and tend to represent climate migration as a future, abstract, mass movement of victims across borders, particularly from countries of the Global South. These media representations contradict the findings presented in the empirical literature earlier in the chapter. I include a small section on some relevant media analyses in Canada, although none of which focus specifically on the intersection of climate change and human mobility.

Mobility Terms and Definitions

> "IRCC, we're a law based department and everything we do flows from the IRPA [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act], and the first pages of IRPA are our definitions; and everything we do…is based on how we interpreted all of those definitions." - FM7, 2021[13]

One of the main challenges in exploring the relationship between climate change and human migration (both abstract concepts on their own) is identifying who and what exactly is being talked about. There are lengthy debates about the definitions and terminology used for those on the move; indeed, IOM's *Glossary* is a "living document" which is constantly updated (IOM 2019). This document frequently updates terms with new adjectives to address and

[13] This alphanumeric reference corresponds with the coding system I used for my interviews. See Chapter 3.

describe those on the move from environmental factors. Furthermore, while I am not applying the concept of "climate migration" to a large number of case studies, I am, nonetheless, attentive to the conceptual stretching that happens with concepts in different contexts (Sartori 1968). My analytical lens, however, focuses on the meaning given to those concepts, not the material reality of the concepts themselves.

Mobility terms traditionally function around a binary distinction between forced and voluntary types of movement, but the agency of those on the move actually falls on a continuum. This distinction is important because of legal implications under international law, and because it can be a matter of life and death for some (Fitzgerald, Scott, and Arar 2018, 389). "Migration," while an umbrella term for all kinds of movement, generally refers to movement by choice, often for economic or family reasons, and "migrants" are not entitled to international protection or assistance. "Displacement," by contrast, refers to forced movement, with low levels of agency often in the context of conflict, violence or disasters.[14] In simple terms, if someone is forced to flee their home country because of conflict, violence or fear of persecution, international law provides them with humanitarian protection and a special legal status as a "refugee" or an "asylum seeker".

Critical scholars from several disciplines increasingly use "mobility," instead of migration, to refer to all forms of movement. Mobility includes voluntary movement, involuntary or survival displacement, and interventions by governments or other entities to influence where people live (e.g., "managed retreat") (McMichael 2020). This is a distinct analytical perspective – longstanding in human geography, sociology and many other disciplines – that moves our

[14] I note that there are many causes of displacement that extend beyond conflict, violence and/or disasters. A question that I grappled with throughout this dissertation was why is displacement in the context of changing climate any different from displacement caused *by* capitalism, development, extractive industries, land grabs, colonialism, etc…

understanding beyond the false binary of forced/voluntary, includes considerations of immobility, and better captures the dynamic nature of human mobility. It also views human mobility not as something to be managed or governed (from the perspective that social life is sedentary (Sheller and Urry 2016)), but as important in producing, reproducing and being produced from social relations across scale (Urry 2007). In this regard, the mobilities perspective provides a more pluralistic and diversified analytical lens for understanding how people respond with or without mobility to mobility pressures (see Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019; Cundill et. al 2021; Gesing, Herbeck, & Klepp 2014; Wiegel, Boas and Warner 2019). Mobility, particularly in the context of a changing climate, reflects the multitude of ways that people react (in historically produced contexts) and respond to multiple factors affecting mobility decisions; it also animates how to rethink movement as one of many conditions, not the norm nor the exception, of social life (Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019, 290). The IOM uses the term "human mobility in the context of climate change" in the *2020 World Migration Report* to broadly refer to movement that includes migration, displacement and planned relocations (Oakes, Banerjee and Warner 2020, 284), although as a migration governance organization, they do not entirely align with critical scholars using this same term.

Many people use the term "climate migrant", "climate migration", "climate displacement", or "climate refugee" to refer to the process or people who move *because* of climate change. But any one driver of mobility cannot be isolated, even in a changing climate (see next section). Moreover, the complexity of the relationship between climate change and human mobility makes the oversimplified sociological distinction between migrant and refugee even more problematic in the context of a changing climate. Climate change blurs the lines between voluntary and involuntary movement and reveals the shortcomings in using these terms.

Nonetheless, throughout my work, I often use the term "displacement" to refer to the forced movement of people in response to sudden-onset disasters while recognizing that such a term does not adequately reflect the complexity of the relationship nor the degree of agency of an individual (see "disaster displacement" below). Furthermore, I prefer wordier, but less catchy, terms that do not imply a causal link between climate change and human mobility, such as migration or displacement in the context of climate change or the climate change human mobility nexus. Finally, while several scholars use environment(al) instead of climate change or climate, I deliberately use climate. I do this because I want to make visible the economic, social, political, and anthropogenic (human) factors that have contributed to environmental changes; I believe "climate" more directly encompasses these factors compared to "environment." Given that one of the underlying premises of this dissertation is that language matters, I note that I am attentive to the shortcomings of the terms, including climate change, and acknowledge that people have forever been displaced by extreme weather and environmental factors (long before climate change had the political salience it does today). When discussing other literature or works, I often use the terms that those authors use.

"Disaster displacement" is increasingly used to refer to those displaced by extreme weather events caused by climate change. It is "the movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of an immediate and foreseeable natural hazard" (IOM 2019, 51). Disaster displacement displaced three times more people than conflict did in 2020 (IDMC 2021). A "disaster" is "an event that results when a hazard impacts a vulnerable community in a way that exceeds or overwhelms the community's ability to cope and may cause serious harm to the safety, health or welfare of people, or damage to property or the environment" (Lacroix 2012,

26). In the context of climate change, a disaster is when the character and severity of climate extremes produce widespread damage and severely alter the normal functioning of communities or societies (IPCC 2012). While it is difficult to attribute the cause of any one disaster to climate change, climate change increases the likelihood and intensity of such events, and over time, climate change will lead to changes in the ranges of what is historically observed (IPCC 2012). Climate change also intersects with a complex array of causal factors that influence the severity of any given hazard, including, but not limited to land-use planning, development decisions, forest management practices, and human behavior. Those working in disaster risk reduction are quick to note that disasters are not the climate hazard or extreme weather event itself. Instead, disasters emerge from the interaction of physical events (hazards) with the contextually produced exposures and vulnerabilities of human societies and communities.

Pre-emptive evacuations, a technique for reducing risk, refers to moving individuals out of the way of such hazards, and accounts for many of the 30 million disaster-related displacements in 2020. While often thought of as short-term, the extent of destruction can transform such evacuations into prolonged displacements (IDMC 2021, 21). Jurisdictions also use planned relocations (also called planned or managed retreat or resettlement) to permanently move people away from areas of high climate hazards risk or risk from environmental degradation. Some have argued that planned retreat is distinct from climate migration and they should not be used interchangeably (Ajibade, Sullivan, Haeffner 2020), others have argued for its value as a preventive and responsive measure to disaster risks and displacement (Ferris and Weerasinghe 2020). The terms used to refer to people on the move matter because they carry with them legal, sociological and political meanings that extend beyond the intended definitions.

Overview of Recent Climate Migration Research

Concerns about climate change and human mobility materialized through narratives about "environmental refugees" (El-Hinnawi 1985, 4). Experts produced wide ranging estimates warning that 50 million, 200 million, or even one billion "climate refugees" would be fleeing locations of environmental stress in the Global South threatening stability in Europe and North America (Christian Aid 2007, Homer-Dixon 1999, Myers 1993 & 2002). While researchers argue there have yet to be such mass movements of people, and the methods for these estimates were suspect, the academic research on the intersections between climate change and migration has grown exponentially in recent years. McLeman and Gemenne (2018), editors of the 2018 *Handbook of Environmental Migration and Displacement* (EMD), claim there are two key characteristics of the scholarship: (1) an increasing engagement between researchers interested in how environmental phenomenon affect migration and those working on refugees and migration in terms of socio-economic causes; (2) and the expanding number of disciplines now dealing with environmental migration and displacement (McLeman and Gemenne 2018, 12). Given the diversity of the topic, this subsection could be arranged in a number of ways: by discipline (climate science, migration and refugee studies, geography, security studies…) (see Ferris 2020), category (empirical, theoretical, legal, policy…) (see Veronis et al 2018), or geography (see Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat 2018). Instead, I take more of a chronological approach starting from the relatively recent emergence of the issue of "climate migration," present the empirical work and then discuss the limitations of that work before transitioning into the following section which focuses on the debates and literature on how climate change and mobility are framed in relation to one another.

Migration is a common response to environmental stress. Environmental disasters such as floods, storms and wildfires (related to climate change or not) have frequently displaced people

throughout human history. In a review of literature on the environment and migration, Piguet (2013) notes the prevalence of the natural environment in early understandings of migration dating back to Semple (1911) and Huntington (1922) who argued that the natural environment and climatic change influenced historical migrations. However, Piguet (2013, 150) concludes that "migration studies lost sight of the natural environment during the twentieth century." Towards the end of the twentieth century, in the context of climate change, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report brought the environment dramatically back into focus for migration scholars.

The term "environmental refugees" first entered public discourse as the title of a 1985 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report by Essam El-Hinnawi; although Lester Brown of the WorldWatch Institute had used the same term in the 1970s (Faist and Schade, 2013). El-Hinnawi (1985, 4), writing in the context of the environment-development-conflict nexus, defined climate refugees as "those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life." Jacobson (1988) later applied the term to displacement due to development projects (Jacobson 1988), and Lonergan (1998) used it to include those fleeing environmental degradation in the context of conflict. The first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 referred to "environmental refugees" as "people displaced by degradation of land, flooding or drought" (IPCC 1990, 5-10).

In the more than three decades since the term entered public discourse, there has been a discursive shift from "environmental refugee" to "climate refugee". While "climate refugee" speaks to the urgency of the issue, includes dimensions of justice, and rhetorically or

sociologically refers to those who are forced to flee their homes, legally it is misnomer. The 1951 Refugee Convention narrowly defines "refugees" as people forced to flee across an international border for fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or membership in a certain social or political group who are unwilling to seek protection from their country of origin (UNHCR 2001). Those fleeing climate impacts do not fit this definition. While millions of people are in need of protection, the current refugee regime simply does not apply to them—as demonstrated when the UN Human Rights Commission denied a claim from a Kiribati family for deportation from New Zealand for climate-related reasons in January 2020. Furthermore, the term misrepresents the nature of most movement in a changing climate.

In addition to international organizations using the term, the media also propagated concern about climate refugees fleeing rising seas, abandoning low-lying islands, escaping droughts, and relocating after horrific disasters. For example, articles in popular media, such as Kaplan's (1994) piece in *The Atlantic,* entitled "The Coming Anarchy", heightened policy-makers' and the publics' concern around the issue. Kaplan conflates migrants with criminals and paints a doomsday image of the future, mobilizing the idea that environmental scarcity (e.g., water) will drive conflict, particularly in fragile states such as Sierra Leone. The media continues to use such alarmism. In 2020, several reputable media outlets including *The New York Times, Propublica,* and *The Guardian* published stories warning of up to a billion "climate refugees", in effect ignoring the empirical and scholarly achievements from the previous ten years. The sensationalized and alarmist discourse about "climate refugees" isolates the environment as *the* push factor (ignoring established migration knowledge – see below), envisions mass movements, and securitizes scholarly and political debates. The securitization of migration (by security actors and audiences (Salter 2008, Watson 2012)) has led to restrictive migration policies and

heightened border controls, which instead of deterring migrant journeys, makes such journeys more dangerous and deadly and fosters illegal networks of human smugglers, as evidenced by the migrant "crisis" in Europe in 2014-2015 (Bates-Eamer 2019, Hintjens 2019).

Critical of the alarmist discourse, scholars (re)integrated environmental change into traditional migration literature to explore the interactions between the cultural, economic, political, social, and environmental drivers of migration more systematically (Black et al. 2011; Brettell and Hollifield 2015; Castles 2010; Foresight 2011; IOM 2014; Lonergan 1998; McLeman 2014; McLeman & Smit 2006; Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014; Piguet 2013). In studies examining drivers of migration, migrants themselves rarely cite environmental or climate change as the primary driver of migration even in climate hotspots (Cundill et al. 2021, 2; Veronis and McLeman 2014). Instead, migrants are much more likely to present economic and social factors as influencing their migration decisions (Safra de Campos et al., 2020; Mezdour, Veronis and McLeman 2014; Veronis and McLeman 2014). Studies show that "intersecting social determinants", and households' vulnerabilities and capabilities are crucial in determining mobility in the face of climate change (Cundill et al 2021, 1). In a 2020 review of empirical studies, Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer (2020) conclude that the climate-mobility explanation pivots on the impact of climate risks on households' capabilities to move or vulnerabilities in staying.

Empirical studies have not (yet) found evidence in support of a large influx of people from Global South to Global North because of environmental changes (see reviews from McLeman and Gemenne 2018; Obokata, Veronis and McLeman 2014). While this may be explained by containment strategies designed to restrict such movement (see Baldwin, Fröhlich, and Rothe 2019; Chimni 1998) it is supported by the empirical studies that show that the majority of migration in the context of a changing climate is within national borders or regions,

short-term or temporary, from rural to urban areas, and often tracks pre-exiting social networks (Black et al. 2011, Findley 1994, Gray 2009, Klepp 2017, McAdam 2014, McLeman 2013, Wrathall 2014). Climate migration scholars also show that although intuitive, if migration is truly a multicausal phenomenon connected to historical, social, economic, and environmental dimensions, the concept of "climate migration" is ontologically problematic to observe.

Migration—the movement of a person or group of persons—is a complex phenomenon; it can be forced or voluntary, temporary or permanent, across borders or within states. These are not either / or conditions but occur on a continuum (Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne 2017).[15] The decision to move or stay is usually taken at the individual and household levels, and in response to a complex, intertwined set of drivers. In an effort to better understand this complexity, the Foresight Report, *Migration and Global Environmental Change,* produced by the United Kingdom (UK) Government Office for Science in 2011, proposed a model that describes how environmental[16] drivers interact with other—cultural, political, economic, social— factors of migration (Foresight, 2011). Robert McLeman (2014), a Canadian and leading scholar in the field, adapted the Foresight model, Figure 4, for understanding how climate change influences the calculation of migration decisions.

[15] Volition and coercion exist on a spectrum (Betts 2009, 4). Forced migration does not negate full agency and voluntary migration does not assume full agency: one can be forced to move, but make a decision about that move.
[16] Environmental factors exist independently of climate change. Although climate change usually works through this factor, it works through other factors as well, and these are not mutually exclusive.

Figure 4. Migration within an Adaptive System. Adapted by McLeman (2014) from Foresight (2011).



McLeman emphasizes the relationship between adaptation and migration in the face of climate variability and vulnerability. Given that migration is one form of adaptation, migration (M) in the context of climate change is a function of the exposure (E) to a climatic stimulus, the sensitivity (S) of the population to that stimulus, and the *in-situ* (in place) adaptation (A) options (other than migration). McLeman (2014, 67) refers to this as the *MESA* model, represented by M = *f* (E,S, (A-M)) (67). There are various scales at which adaptation can occur, macro, meso and micro levels, corresponding to national, local and household levels. Climate change interacts at these various levels and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and stressors.

Adaptation is one of two approaches for addressing climate change (the other is mitigation which deals with prevention). Adaptation refers to the resilience and adaptability to changing climate conditions. Scholars and policy-makers claim that the migration-as-adaptation framework conceptualizes migration not just as a failure to adapt in-situ (as public discourse often portrays it), but as a form of adaptation itself (McLeman 2016, McLeman and Smit 2006, Tacoli 2009). This approach, reticulating the influence of climate change on the interaction

between environment, social, political, economic and cultural factors (see Figure 4 above), has provided the conceptual framework for much of the empirical research on environmental migration in recent years. Furthermore, policymakers are increasingly concerned with migration and displacement as a consequence of climate change, and climate migration scholars see climate (versus migration) policy as a venue for addressing such movement.[17] Scholars involved in the forthcoming IPCC Sixth Assessment report recently proposed a conceptual framework which situates climate migration in climate *risk* framings to enable a shared vocabulary across these domains (McLeman et al. 2021). This framework recognizes that even when mobility is carried out as an adaptive response to climate change, the outcomes are uncertain. As such, understanding climate-migration processes must consider migrant agency and well-being, risk and vulnerability reduction, and broader development and sustainability concerns (McLeman et al. 2021, 7).

Whereas the migration as adaptation approach better accounts for the environment and environmental change in relation to other contextual factors influencing migration—specifically compared to the simplistic linear causal frame implicit in the "climate refugees discourse"—it does not necessarily account for structural factors that produce local contexts. Faist and Schade (2013) situate the vulnerability to environmental conditions in the context of the structures of inequality across the globe. Gila, Zaratiegui, and de Maturana Diéguez (2011) and Bogardi and Warner (2008) find that rural populations are more vulnerable and more exposed to environmental changes than urban residents. The disaster risk reduction literature documents that countries in the Global South are much more vulnerable to environmental change than others because of social, political, economic and environmental reasons (Blaikie 1981; Haslam, Schafer

[17] It doesn't take an economist know that global funding for climate mitigation and adaptation policies grossly outweighs funding for migration and refugee policies combined.

and Beaudet 2012; Hewitt 1983; Pyles 2016). These global injustices and inequalities are foundational to understanding the complexity of migration, but they are difficult to account for in empirical studies.

This absence or silence of the broader context or social and political histories which produce the context where migrations take place, as well as the problem of isolating the causal connection between climate change and mobility, led me to more critical scholars, such as Baldwin, Bettini, Farbotko, Mayer, and Nash. These scholars question the epistemological and conceptual origins of the climate-migration nexus and the implications of such origins for policy. As noted by Oliver Bakewell (2008), when researchers prioritize the concerns of policy-makers over broader concerns, they limit their inquiry to certain categories or worldviews and omit certain questions. Critical scholars, however, explore some of these otherwise silenced issues such as race, power, and colonialism (Baldwin 2012, 2013, 2014, 2020; Farbotko 2010, Farbotko and Lazrus 2012), securitization and biopolitics (Bettini 2014, 2017; Boas 2015), questions of political economy and labour migration (Felli 2013, Gray and Mueller 2012), and policy and legal interventions (Hartmann 2010; McAdam 2014, 2016; Ober and Sakdapolrak 2017; Mayer 2013, 2014, 2016).

Critical scholars illustrate the ways in which epistemology affects knowledge production: what can be known about climate migration, by whom and for what purposes (Baldwin 2014; Bettini 2012, 2014; Kelman 2014; see also Veronis et al 2018). Such scholars critique the securitization of climate change and migration (Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014; Bettini 2014), and the preoccupation with causal links between climate change and migration (Baldwin 2020, Boas et al. 2019). They also question the depoliticization of climate migration (Bettini 2019, Kelman 2014) or its validity as a concept (Nicholson 2011, 2014). In Veronis et al.'s 2018

review of the literature, the authors note that the growth of the critical scholarship signals a response to Baldwin's (2014) call to pluralise the study of climate change and migration. In effect, this pluralizing has opened up debates about the meaning given to the intersection of climate change and human mobility and the opportunity for reimagining the politics of such an intersection (Baldwin and Bettini 2017, Nash 2019). Furthermore, these scholars challenge the assumption that climate migration or displacement is a Southern issue; this illuminated the opportunity to explore these kinds of questions in the Canadian context.

Climate Migration Research in Canada

There is little existing literature on the climate change and human mobility nexus in Canada. Robert McLeman (with Luisa Veronis, Jamie Liew, and Nadia Abu-Zahra) led a project examining, empirically, how environmental factors influenced newcomers' migration to Canada (see https://www.environmentalmigrationtocanada.org/) and published several articles in 2014 and 2015; but there is no critical scholarship on how the issue of "climate migration" is emerging in policy. Furthermore, a 2018 review of the "uneven" geography of "environmental migration"—which builds on a 2014 review linked to McLeman's project (see Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014)—finds that case studies have a particular geography (Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat, 2018). The authors find that of 463 case studies in 106 countries, the most studied are the United States (62), Bangladesh (50) and Mexico (27) (Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat 2018, 370). Their findings contradict the tendency for climate *science* to focus on countries in the North and instead demonstrate the majority of environmental migration studies (except those on the US) are on countries of the Global South (but by authors based at institutions and funded in countries of the Global North) (Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat 2018, 372). They explain this through post-colonial and securitization theories which draw attention to "environmental migrants" as both

racialized victims (Baldwin 2013) and security threats to richer countries (Boas 2015; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). Furthermore, the authors draw on scholars (Neumayer et al 2014) who explain that not only are Southern countries more adversely affected by climate change hazards (IPCC 2014), but economic inequalities exacerbate their risk to such hazards. They end with a call for more research on Northern countries—exactly what this study does; not only to better understand the issue in Canada, but also because the construction of an "environmental migrant" (as a threat and a victim) which relies on North-South global dynamics, potentially becomes a problematic starting point within a country like Canada.

Framing Climate Migration

I am interested in the dynamic dimensions of framing (van Hulst and Yanow 2016). This involves not only identifying and describing the dominant frames in the Canadian media but also the process of how these frames come about and the texts and discourses in which they are embedded. I am interested in how the issue is being framed in Canadian news sources and by policy actors, as I believe these are sites where problems are defined and rendered salient or visible and thus eligible for policy responses or solutions (see Chapter 4).

The IOM claims academics, media, civil society and policy actors use three main framings regarding the intersection of environmental change and migration (Oakes, Banerjee, and Warner 2020, 254). These three framings imagine the interactions between climate change and human mobility in very different ways. First, the securitization frame understands climate change as a threat multiplier and environmental migration as an issue of irregular migration related to environmental change and resource shortages. Migrants are a threat to instability, particularly for areas of destination and as such border and migrations controls are the policy levers to be deployed. Second, the protection frame understands environmental migration to be

about human rights and the required protection of vulnerable environmental migrants. Migrants (or "refugees") are victims, without agency and require policy frameworks to enable and protect safe and dignified conditions of movement. Third, the adaptation / risk management frame, understands environmental migration as an issue of adaptive capacity. Migrants are mobile labourers, adaptive and able to send remittances to fund adaptation in the places they left . The "migration as adaptation" frame emphasizes efforts to augment resilience in place so as to "avert, minimize, and address" displacement; this frame enables alignment with climate policy.

The two competing perspectives that have dominated the climate migration debates use these frames for distinct purposes (Gemenne 2011). As discussed above, alarmists tend to isolate environmental change as the push factor for movement and anticipate mass movements of "climate refugees." Politically, the alarmists used the image of "climate refugees" to advocate for (1) securitizing borders and restricting migration policies (security) (White 2011), (2) expanding the refugee convention (to include those displaced by climate change) or developing a unique protocol for "climate refugees" (protection) (Biermann and Boas 2010, McAdam 2014), or (3) implementing progressive climate policy (adaptation). Skeptics or minimalists critique the alarmist position and highlight the multicausality of migration and the complexity of climate change intersecting with other drivers of migration (Black et al. 2011, Brettell and Hollifield 2015, Castles 2010, Foresight 2011, Klepp 2017, Veronis et al. 2018). The skeptics emphasize the internal, complex and context-specific dimensions that mediate migration decisions in relation to climate risk, exposure and vulnerability (McLeman et al. 2021). The adaptation frame has become a dominant frame in both international migration and climate politics. Whereas the adaptation frame gives more agency to migrants and those vulnerable to climate change than the trope of the "climate refugee", it simultaneously displaces politics, questions of justice, and

notions of responsibility (Bettini, Nash and Gioli 2017, 349). For example, migration as a form of adaptation can download responses from states to individuals where responsibility for adapting to climate change rests with migrants themselves instead of with institutions and states (Bettini, Nash and Gioli 2017, 349). Furthermore, the adaptation discourse doubles down on the neoliberal notion of a migrant as a unit of labour, who by moving out of harm's way, will achieve their earning potential (Felli and Castree 2012), and will be able to send money home. Scholars from multiple disciplines informed by critical epistemologies have examined how these frames appear in various sites of discourse including the media, policy and academic debates. Given the focus on media in Canada, I present the findings of media analyses on climate migration framing in other locations, and then briefly discuss related analyses in Canadian media.

Climate Migration in the Media

The number of stories reporting on climate-related migration has exploded in recent years. A quick search on Google News of "climate migration" or "climate refugees" or "climate migrants" reveals a steady increase over the last 10 years (see Figure 5) (the slight decrease in 2020 might be attributable to COVID-19 coverage dominating the news cycles).

This coverage often sensationalises, oversimplifies and over-assumes direct and unmediated causality between the impacts of climate change and migration. This contradicts what scholars observe empirically. In response to the role that the media play in shaping and drawing attention to the debates, several scholars have examined how media, specifically newspapers, frame climate migrants or climate refugees. Carol Farbotko (2010, 2012, 2005), Dreher and Voyer (2015), and Russo (2017) explore the issue in the South Pacific, including the low-lying island nations, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, and also Australia and New Zealand.

Sakellari (2021), Randall (2017) and Høeg and Tulloch (2019) focus on the press in the United Kingdom. Many others have focused on framing in the media following specific hazardous events such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires in the United States and elsewhere. Given that I am specifically interested in analyses conducted on climate migration, I will focus on those here.

Carol Farbotko, a human geographer, has led empirical research in the South Pacific, where low-lying island nations provide the visual imagery for the urgency of climate change, including media analysis. Farbotko (2012) examines three dominant discourses – skillful seafarers (apt navigators), oceanic drifters (adaptive survivalists) and climate refugees – and their salience in different locations. While arguing that the production and contestation of meaning related to climate mobility is culturally situated, Farbotko finds that "climate refugees" has the greatest news value in New Zealand and Australia. In this way, the low-lying island nations provide the narrative for the "first climate refugees." Climate refugees are victims of sea-level rise, but they are also implicated as threats by the politics of fear that permeates the discourse on political refugees (Farbotko 2012, 136). But such a story ignores how those impacted by climate change are actively resisting this narrative. Farbotko finds news media in Australia and New Zealand marginalize the discourses of skillful seafarers and oceanic drifters (with a greater emphasis on agency and historical and cultural understandings of mobility) which is more prevalent among the Pacific Islanders.

Russo (2017) in a linguistic discourse analysis of news media in Australia finds that media focuses on the humans (migrants) versus the process (migration), but does so in a collective, generic, and anonymous manner while using exaggerated and imprecise quantifiers (millions/billions). Dreyer and Voher (2015) speak with people in Small-Island Developing States (SIDS) to discern their responses to media's treatment of SIDS and climate change. The

media use SIDS as "proof of climate change," or as a tool to drive tourism, e.g., a "place to see before its gone," and discuss the people as "victims" or "refugees." In contrast, the people impacted prefer narratives regarding justice, active agents, human rights and dignity (Dreyer and Voher 2015). Collectively, media analyses in the South Pacific reveal that if media were to amplify the stories of those impacted or living on the front lines, the narrative would be very different from what it has been.

Sakellari (2021) analyzed six UK newspapers' online platforms to find 45 articles (identified by using the search words: climate change; migration; climate migrant or climate refugee) of which 24 articles specifically discussed climate migration. Sakellari identified four discourses in UK news media: catastrophe, crisis, adaptation and uncertain future (2021, 68). Catastrophe and crisis discourses both frame climate migration as an emergency issue characterized by mass migration, chaos and instability. These discourses differ in that catastrophe focuses on the threat to destination countries because of conflict and mass waves of climate refugees, while crisis focuses on the desperation and vulnerability of people, and needs for global governance. The media frames the people themselves as climate victims: collectivized, othered, divested of context and complexity – a tactic used by securitizing discourses which can transform this victimization into a threat (Watson 2011).

The adaptation discourse in the UK news media also uses the disempowered and "climate refugee" victim narrative, but it does so to purport that the action required is the West's leadership in planned relocation: moving people to (work in) less vulnerable areas. This is a somewhat more simplistic reading of the adaptation frame discussed above (IOM 2020) which also includes adaptation in place – implicating development assistance, resilience building and adaptive capacity – and not just relocation (McLeman 2016). The uncertain futures discourse,

although rarely featured, focuses on the individuals, telling human-interest stories in a manner that contrasts the collectivizing and securitizing tactic of the previous discourses. The articles portray climate migration, geographically, as something that occurs in Global South countries or in underprivileged or Indigenous communities in the United States – creating both a cultural and geographical distance between reader and subject.

Also examining UK media, Høeg and Tulloch (2019) examine the representations of climate refugees in two transnational media outlets (the BBC and Al Jazeera) to find that in both outlets climate refugees are aggregated, collectivized, made generic and "deagentialized". Like Farbotko (2005) and Sakellari (2021) who note the media's use of "climate refugees" as both victims and threats, these authors find the most dominant discursive frames of "climate refugees" to be that of victim, aggressor, activist, or vague abstraction; and all of them, except activist, reinscribe traditional power relations between the Global North and South (Høeg and Tulloch 2019, 244). These authors also note the imposition of distance from the original cause of climate change both through the discourse and the imagery used. Randall (2017) takes a slightly different approach in a media analysis of the UK news. Instead of looking at how the issue or impacted people are framed, he examined the actors and sources and how they talk about the issue of climate-linked migration. He notes that news stories that use affected individuals as news sources (forty out of 120 articles) do so almost exclusively when talking about sea-level rise (in Kiribati and Alaska); provides a very narrow understanding of human mobility in a changing climate. Furthermore, Randall finds that the journalists inaccurately report on the link between climate change and human mobility and often misrepresent expert's conclusions (Randall 2017, 332), thus failing to present readers with an accurate story of current research and empirical evidence.

Beyond the media, other scholars have examined how actors frame the issue. Bettini (2013) examines the "apocalyptic" narratives regarding "climate refugees" used by different discourses (connected to different sectors, epistemic communities, and power structures). Bettini's concern is that conflicting discourses (capitalist, humanitarian, radical, and scientific) all converge on the same narrative which contributes to a closing of the (otherwise open) debate with implications for the possible responses and solutions for addressing climate migration. He astutely notes in his conclusion, "the dramatization of the issue does not automatically ignite any struggle against it" (Bettini 2013, 70), an apt reminder for the many journalists implicated in the media analyses regarding how they frame the issues and to what effect. Ransan-Cooper et al. (2015) examine how different actors and different sectors frame the environmental migrant and the implications of those framings for policy actions. The authors identify four framings of the environmental migrant: victim, security threat, adaptive agent, and political subject, although these can appear hybridized and are used inconsistently across and by the same actors (Ransan-Cooper et al. 2015). Unlike Sakellari (2021) who links the construction of victims to the creation of threats in the catastrophe and crisis discourses, Ransan-Cooper et al (2015) note that these two framings (victim and threat) share the pessimism and sensationalism but result in the emergence of different policy visions. They conclude that, of the actors they examined, journalists are particularly captive to both the victim and threat frames, but that these frames are dynamic, evolve over time and respond to other dominant frames.

Distilling from scholars who have conducted media and discourse analyses, there are several trends related to framing the intersection between climate change and human mobility. Table 1 summarizes how media can frame the people and process in discrete ways.

Table 1 Common frames in climate migration

People are "climate refugees" who are:	The **process** of "climate migration" as:

moving across borders	long-distant and permanent
a problem for destination countries	a consequence of sea-level rise
threats linked to instability and potential terrorism	disconnected from the original causes of climate change (fossil fuel use, consumption)
victims from the Global South need assistance from the Global North	abstract
without agency	something that needs to be controlled, restricted, discouraged
rarely heard in the telling of stories	linked to global stability, conflict, violence
third world "others"	a way to "other"
collectivized and dehumanized	an exceptional event

Climate Migration in the Canadian Media

While there is little research examining the Canadian media's treatment of the intersection between climate change and human mobility, there are Canadian media analyses on framing of migrants (Lawlor 2015; Lawlor and Tolley 2017; Tyyskä, Blower, DeBoer, Kawai, Walcott 2017; Bauder 2005, 2008), of climate change as an environmental problem (Hatch 2021; Howe, Stoddart, Tindall 2020; Stoddart, Haluza-Delay and Tindall 2016; Young and Dugas 2011), of floods as a policy problem (Thistlethwaite, Henstra, Minano and Dordi, 2019), of internally displaced people from wildfires (Mongibello 2017) and on wildfires and health (Walker, Reed, and Fletcher 2020). Beyond Master's theses from Stumpf (2019) and Mann (2009), and the above, I found only one media analysis directly on the intersections between climate change and human mobility, framed as such, in the Canadian press.

Mongibello's piece on internally displaced persons (IDPs) is one of the few articles that looks at internal displacement in Canada (or the Global North). Mongibello conducts a discourse analysis of Canadian news media covering the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire to identify the discursive strategies, frames and patterns in the narratives. Mongibello (2017, 54) finds that the media characterize IDPs with different patterns of language compared to the discourses on climate migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, instead of framing those affected as

threats or victims, or characterizing them as internally displaced persons (which are associated linguistically with refugees and asylum seekers) the documents focus on evacuees' agency, strength and resilience, and the orderly fashion of their evacuation and the role of industry in facilitating it (Mongibello 2017, 74). A linguistics scholar, Mongibello conducts her discourse analysis through close scrutiny of text and language (in the style of Wodak or van Dijk), whereas the discourse analysis I employ analyses the language and texts but also the underlying practices, assumptions, and normative implications of such use (Hajer 2006).

Conclusions

The ways in which two of the more politically divisive issues of our time – climate change and human migration – intersect has been a topic of analysis for scholars for some time. While concerns about environmental degradation and "environmental refugees" emerged from the United Nations Environment Programme in the 1980s, the field of environmental migration and displacement as a phenomenon requiring analysis has gained prominence in the last ten to fifteen years (see McLeman and Gemenne 2018). Security actors and environmentalists began to use the concept of "climate refugees" to illustrate the risks of climate change and generate concern for the potential mass movements of people. Scholars critical of the security framing, questioned the construction as an issue requiring security responses (White 2011; Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe; 2014). These scholars have also highlighted the discursive and narrative dimensions of the topic and the implications for policy (Baldwin, Bettini 2013, Hartmann, Mayer, Nash, Ransan-Cooper et al), challenged the causal dimension between climate change and human mobility (Boas et al. 2019, Boas and Wiegel 2021, Zickgraf and Nash 2020), and questioned the validity of the concept as worthy of study at all (Nicholson 2011, 2014).

Nonetheless, as climate change causes seas to rise, storms to increase in intensity, droughts to ravage crops, and a host of other environmental damages, people – with the will and the capacity – may move (mediated by many factors) to cope with these impacts. Those with significant resources (and family connections) are the most likely to move long distances, some will move within countries, and others will be without the capital to move at all (Zickgraf 2018). What is absent from the literature on "climate migration" is a discussion of what is happening in countries in the Global North, such as Canada. Canada, as discussed, is a unique case not only because of its reputation as a leader in migration governance, but also because recent storms and wildfires have displaced tens of thousands of Canadians, particularly in British Columbia. Yet, at the time of my research, there was little discussion (or policies) addressing the intersections of climate change and human mobility. The next chapter sets up the analytical framework for exploring how Canadians are framing the intersection of climate change and human mobility in two sites: newspaper media and among policy actors.

Chapter 4 – Research Approach

Introduction

My research approaches the issue of climate change and human mobility from an interpretive policy perspective, broadly conceived, which prioritizes framing and discourse in meaning making. Interpretive policy analysis rejects the world exists independent of people's knowledge of it and that people have access to that world independent of the ways it is perceived (Hajer and Waagenar 2003, 17). Instead, meaning of the world is informed by social practices and rules that influence how people interpret social reality. Language and discourse are important for shaping social reality and for framing problems which are historically and culturally produced (Hastings 1998). Framing is thus a process that can identify the perceived causes of policy problems, or how a policy problem is defined and problematized.

My research draws on scholars whose starting point is interrogating how problems are represented before turning to how they might be rationally solved (Bacchi 1999, Colebatch 2006). For an emergent issue such as climate migration or climate displacement, such a lens is useful because it focuses on problem definition and agenda-setting as a discursive process embedded in a historical context where power and politics play a crucial role in the construction of the problem (Barbehön, Münch, and Lamping 2015, 243). While much of the policy agenda-setting literature looks at how issues get on the agenda (the list of issues that receive attention from policy actors), I am interested in agenda setting that emphasizes problem definition and framing (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Soroka 2002, Kingdon 1995, Schneiner and Ingram 1993, Pralle 2006). More simply stated, I am interested in what the issue is and how it is represented. How problems are framed or represented matter because it determines the range of solutions or policy responses to such problems (Rein and Schön 1993, Bacchi 1999), it also

affects how they get on the policy agenda in terms of the issue attributes (Soroka 2002). The literature on the construction of policy problems is also attentive to the construction of target populations, and which populations are 'deserving' or 'undeserving' (see Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Levac and Gillis 2021, 99-100); this is integral to the impossible question of who is a climate migrant. Fundamental to my research is the concept that agenda-setting is a crucial dimension of the policy process, although I follow interpretive scholars who challenge the idea that the policy process is linear or cyclical and agenda-setting a distinct phase. Finally, unlike much of the agenda-setting literature that looks at the relationship between the media, public, and policy spheres in setting agendas, I instead focus solely on the media and the policy contexts but I disaggregate across scale of media and mandate of policy actors.

From this perspective, I look at newspaper media and policy actors as two sites where the problem is being defined. I explore how actors frame the issue at different sites to provide insights into how policy actors and the media understand the relationship between climate change and human mobility. As such, the questions that drive the research are the following: (1) How do the media and policy actors frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility in Canada? (2) How do these framings shift or persist in reference to the location of the relationship and at different sites (media / policy actors) of discourse? (3) What are the implications of these framings for policy development in Canada? In order to answer these questions, I develop, for each site, a specific framework rooted in discourse and framing analysis. The rest of the chapter first presents how I understand discourse and framing, then lays the framework for the newspaper media and policy actors analyses, and then discusses some methodological limitations. The conclusion reviews how my empirical chapters are connected to the theories that informed my analyses.

Discourse

Scholars use discourse analysis in many disciplines to explore many different social domains on many different topics. What they all share, however, is the notion that language and the ways of using language actively create the world and the relations within it. Furthermore, discourse theories and methods are intertwined and based on a shared commitment to critical research. As noted by Robert Cox (1981, 128), "theory is always for someone, and for some purpose." Those who use discourse analysis, myself included, are thus interested in investigating and analysing power relations in society in order to critique such relations in the interest of emancipatory or social change (Jørgensen and Philips 2002, 2).

Scholars who use discursive approaches to examine environmental issues informed my approach to discourse theory (Dryzek 2005; Hajer1995, 2006; and Liftin 1994). Dryzek (2005,12) states that "Just because something is socially interpreted, does not mean it is not real… people make different things of such phenomena and – especially – their interconnections, providing grist for political dispute." Similarly, and much earlier, Liftin states that it is possible to prescribe to an interpretive philosophy of inquiry and a realist ontology or a commitment to the actual existence of problems (Liftin 1994, 26-7, and quoted in Dryzek 2005, 12). Similarly, Hajer (1995, 2006), who examined discourse on acid rain and environmental policy, claims that the question is not whether or not dying trees are real, but the meaning that we ascribe to such a process or how we make sense of it (Hajer 2006, 66).

In addition to Maarten Hajer (1995, 2003, 2006), I also draw on Vivian Schmidt (2008, 2010) and Daniel Béland (2009, 2019) in order to understand the role of ideas, discourse and meaning in policy change. I use these scholars for their attention to the underlying contexts that shape policy actors' actions which provides a more complete perspective than other scholars in

policy studies who focus more on policy actors' strategic actions. For Schmidt (2008, 321-22) ideas are the substantive content of discourse but discourse is also the interactive process of conveying ideas. Discourse takes a coordinative form through interactive coordination among policy actors, and a communicative form between political actors and the public in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of those ideas. For Hajer (1995, 55), whose work has been particularly influential in my thinking on this project, his interest in discourse analysis of environmental problems is to "observe how seemingly technical positions conceal normative commitments." Discourse – an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations – is "internally related to the social practices in which it is produced" (Hajer 1995, 44). Storylines, with a beginning, middle and end, frame what an issue is about (Hajer 2006, 69). This matters in defining policy problems because language, knowledge and power are intimately linked in meaning making and have performative effects. Performativity, according to Judith Butler (1993, xxii), "must be understood not as a singular or deliberate 'act'…but, rather, as the reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains." The meaning of "climate migration," hence, is created by how it is talked about, the language used in specific contexts and in reference to other issues, and underlying social practices that shape knowledge and power. Frame analysis is a tool for exploring that meaning creation.

Framing

Language and discourse are important for shaping social reality and for framing political problems. Generally speaking, frames are about the creation of meaning; they organize ideas and give salience to some elements of issues over others. Erving Goffman (1974), credited with mobilizing the use of frames in scholarship, defined frames as the basic element of an individual experience through which a situation is interpreted; he uses the term "schemata of interpretation"

which enables people to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences or information. Robert Entman (1993) went beyond frames to explore how they come about or are embedded in news texts and influence thinking (51). In this regard, framing defines problems, diagnoses their causes, makes moral judgements related to causal agents and their effects, and suggests remedies to these problems (Entman 1993, 52). As such, framing goes beyond just the identification of frames, it is a dynamic and political process to identify how dominant frames come about, who does the framing, and the power dynamics and political implications with such framings (Bacchi 2009, Carragee and Roefs 2004, van Hulst and Yanow 2016). When looking at actors, a crucial aspect of framing is who is speaking about whom and to whom (audience). In this regard, representations of race, gender, ethnicity, age, class and other social markers become relevant.[18] Framing analysis includes attention to how frames are used and how meaning-making occurs. Framing is closely related to priming and agenda-setting, all three of which are used in media, communications, and policy studies.[19]

Those interested in policy agenda-setting or how issues get on political agendas often look to framing in the media. In choosing which stories appear (and which stories do not), the media both select and reflect what is important to the public (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sheufele and Tewksbury 2007), and signal a sense of urgency to political actors (McCombs 1997). In the realm of disasters, Birkland (1997,1998) builds upon Kingdon's (1995) idea of policy windows to claim that "focusing events" shift the attention of the media and allow for new issues to enter the agenda or old issues to be reframed in a way that enables policy change. Framing aligns with second-level agenda setting which focuses on not which issues get on an

[18] While beyond the scope of this research, because some scholars mention the racial undertones of climate migration, I discuss this briefly in my empirical chapters and come back to it in my conclusion.
[19] Priming studies focus on the effects of media agenda setting on public opinion; this is beyond the scope of this research.

agenda, but on the attributes of those issues (Weaver 2007). While the media may not tell people (including policy-makers) what to think, they do influence what they should think about (Cohen 1963, 13); and how to think about it (McCombs and Ghanen 2001, 69). Scholars who probe the relationship between media, public opinion, and politics have arrived at various and contested conclusions, but as stated by Anna Carvalho (2008, 174), "despite these ambiguities in research, it is undeniable that the media are the main arenas for citizens' understanding of political struggles in our times." My research explores how the research is framed at two different sites. Based on the conceptions above, I assert that framing and frames not only influence the meaning given to the intersections of climate change and human mobility, but they are capable of determining who is responsible, who is affected, and thus what the policies will be. Framing also draws attention to how people and issues are represented and is thus useful for exploring the understanding of an emergent issue.

Figure six presents my research approach. It starts from the problem laid out in chapter 2, acknowledges my normative influence (climate justice) (see chapter 1) and then situates the conceptual approach (discourse and framing) as informing my research question. I present my methodology and approach to the research: content, discourse, and frame analyses on two types of data (newspaper texts and policy interview texts) – informed by both agenda-setting research and Schmidt's distinction between coordinative (media) and communicative (policy) discourses. Multi-level governance's attention to different levels of government in framing policies led to a further disaggregation of policy actors (see below). For the media, I looked at national and local newspapers (which contain stories about domestic and international mobility); and for the policy actors, I interviewed those with international mandates and those with domestic mandates. Each of the empirical chapters contains a detailed methodology and methods section which further

elaborates on how I approached each analysis for the media (Chapter 5) and for policy actors (Chapter 6).

Figure 6. Research Approach



Methodology

In order to answer my research questions, this project adopts a qualitative methodology. I begin from the now pervasive perspective that our understandings of political phenomena are socially constructed. From this standpoint, I take Canada as a case study to explore how policy actors and the media frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility and the implications of this framing. I choose these two sites where the problem is being defined - in the media and among policy actors – to understand problem definition in these different settings.

These two sites are an attempt to examine what Vivian Schmidt (2008, 308) referred to as the communicative discourse between policy actors and the public (including the media), and coordinative discourse which takes place between policy actors or within "epistemic communities" (Haas 1992). This approach recognizes that discourse is not just what you say, but also considers who says it and where; this includes the idea that institutions both constrain actors but also are constituted and changed by actors (Schmidt 2008, 314; see also Béland 2009). However, within these two sites, I also compare across scale in the media (national and local) and across location of policy actors' mandates (international or domestic) in order to understand how actors construct meaning in different contexts.

To start, I collected qualitative data from speeches, public statements and reports, grey literature and news releases, and policy reports to see if and where the issue arose. The intersection of climate change and human mobility appears in very few policy documents in Canada. Following the analysis of these original documents, I decided to refine my empirical analyses to media and interviews with policy-makers, informed by the broader scope of documents I analysed. I present each approach briefly here and then detail it in each chapter.

Discourse and frame analysis of Canadian newspapers

The media construct, produce, reproduce, transform, include and exclude particular frames, and as such, frames do not exist independently from their social, political, and cultural context—or the context in which the audience processes them (Stoddart et al 2016). Indeed, the audience, as consumers, also select which media they consume and there is therefore an interpretive relationship[20] between media content and audience (Hackett 2001). The media also define public problems. They are an integral actor in linking issues to policy both by selecting

[20] The nature of the audience-media relationship is beyond the scope of this research.

which issues to cover (Gamson and Modigliani 1989) and by framing how media covers those issues – which can drive collective action (Benford and Snow 2000, Entman 1993).

With these considerations in mind, I focused on two national and two local newspapers. I chose newspapers because they are accessible and offer a diversity of views (Carvalho 2008), and also because they are place-based which I required to compare between local and national levels (see chapter 5). I develop an analytical framework drawing on Dryzek (2005), Carvalho (2000), and Brown and Doulton (2009), which sets up a series of questions for analyzing the newspaper texts in an attempt to reveal how climate change and human mobility are framed. These questions include: (1) what are the basic entities of the discourse; (2) what are the assumptions about natural relationships between different entities; (3) who are the agents and actors; and finally, (4) what are the linguistic tools (rhetoric and metaphor) used to tell the story in a particular way (Dryzek 2005, 19). Doulton and Brown (2009), while analyzing discourses of climate change and development in the UK press, took this framework one step further by incorporating surface descriptors and normative judgements from Carvalho (2000). Normative judgements precipitate the questions of what should be done and by whom. I used the software NVivo for analysing the 119 newspaper articles in my corpus and coded for where, when, how, and with what topic the media discusses climate-mobility links.

Discourse and frame analysis of Canadian policy actors

For the analysis of policy actors' framing and discourse, I conducted thirty-one interviews with thirty-three policy actors at various levels of government. I conducted the key-informant interviews, analysed in chapter 6, in two stages. The first stage involved interviewing people in British Columbia between February and October 2020 whose work I interpreted to intersect with potential connections between climate change and/or mobility. The second stage

began in October 2020 and focused on federal-level actors who worked mainly in immigration and refugee policies, but included those in global affairs, development, and federal emergency management. For actors with an international mandate, I recorded the interviews and used the transcripts as my data; for the actors in British Columbia, the data was a collection of my notes and summaries from the interviews, as well as notes from an online workshop to discuss knowledge gaps and needs in British Columbia related to "climate displacement."

Susan Bacchi's methodology "What's the problem represented to be?" or the "WPR approach", provides a tool to examine how meaning is created in policy discourses (Bacchi 1999, 2009). According to Bacchi, the "'WPR' approach serves as a much-needed interruption to the presumption that 'problems' are fixed and uncontroversial starting points for policy development. It reminds us that the banal and vague notion of 'the problem' and its partner 'the solution' are heavily laden with meaning" (Bacchi 2012a, 23). In the realm of climate change and human mobility, how these two issues are imagined together or represented as a 'problem' (Bacchi 2009, 2012), is a political decision that is shaped by the social, historical, cultural and political context (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 176). In this regard, my analysis is concerned with how meaning shifts across site and sector given that different actors use different language and discourse to make sense of phenomenon. Methodologically, content, discourse and frame analyses allow me to deconstruct the text and language in different settings to explore how meaning is ascribed to "climate migration" in these domains. I explore different themes in the actors text (causality, terminology, timing, location, responsibility) and influences on those themes (political, international, individuals, events, and media) to better understand how policy actors are starting to define the problem.

I am interested in how and why this issue is framed (differently) at different policy scales in Canada. The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) is useful in this case because it goes beyond the federalist focus on the federal / provincial distribution of power. Instead, the approach pluralizes the locations of power beyond the central states to include international organizations, regional, municipal, and local governments and non-state actors (Hooghe and Marks 2003). I do not, however, presuppose that there will be coordinated action across policy levels nor that MLG is the best approach for policy-making in this realm. Nonetheless, MLG provides a framework for looking at issue attention and problem definition formation at different scales (Scholten 2012), and how different levels of policy provide different opportunity structures for framing policy problems (Princen 2007).

Methodological Limitations

There are a few methodological limitations that warrant discussion. These include some issues related to data collection of newspaper articles, frame analysis with interview data, and the lack of policy development against which to test the impact of framing on policy.

First, and in regards to the news media and the search terms I used to collect the data. The local papers contained very few articles when I used the search parameters from the national newspapers, so I changed the search terms to get more results. In effect, I moved down the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1968) by changing "climate change" to "wildfire" or "flood" and expanded the mobility terms to "evacuation". While this obviously skewed my local sources to address evacuations in the face of floods and wildfires, the fact that there were no articles using the original terms was a finding in itself, and I was attentive to this when conducting the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, at the national level because the search parameters resulted in so many results, while scanning for articles that included some kind of relationship between

the climate and the mobility dimension, I could have excluded an article that was otherwise relevant. As such, I take my full corpus to be representative of these media sites, but not exhaustive.

Second, for the policy chapter, given that there is no discrete policy on climate migration or climate displacement framed as such, I chose interviews as the data for analysis. Interviews provide rich data, allow the research to probe the data to greater depths and breadth, and is a valuable method for exploring the construction of meanings (Alshenqeeti 2014). There is a risk that my own framing of the issue in the interviews influenced how my participants responded; plus, as noted by Hajer (2006, 69), the meaning of what the audience hears is not always what the speaker intended. While I was attentive to these risks, the scope of my research inevitably created a frame around what I am discussing. This may explain the lack of participants who mentioned the causes of climate change compared to those who mentioned the consequences (impacts). Furthermore, given that Canada does not have a policy on "climate displacement" or "climate migration" per se, it is impossible to link the impact of media framing on policy development, either directly or through mediating factors. Nor do I seek to imply that framing is a linear process preceding policy development, as I believe it is an iterative and constantly evolving process. Nonetheless, drawing on the agenda-setting literature, and Schmidt's distinction between coordinative and communicative discourses, the purpose of examining the media is to look at what issues are covered and how they are covered at this moment in time.

In terms of overall research design, I chose to look at the framing of climate change and human mobility in a discrete period of time. Perhaps a more robust approach would have been to conduct a longitudinal study of how the narratives and framing have changed over time in relation to policy changes. The challenge with such an approach is that, although there are

relevant policies that appear in other areas, sectors, or agencies that speak directly to the intersections of climate change and human displacement, there is not policy developed under the "climate migration / displacement" rubric per se. As a discrete policy area, which may or may not persist as such, climate migration is an emergent and nascent policy area in Canada, particularly for federal actors looking globally and thinking about potential immigration and refugee policies. This limits my ability to link how the framing in the media and amongst policy actors affects the development of policy. As mentioned, my dependent variable is the framing and not the policy. However, if Canada were to develop a policy, for example, on resettlement for low-lying islanders, it might be possible to cast backwards to see how and why narrative shifts and framings led to such a policy. This is why I like so much the image of cloud watching in a storm as a euphemism for studying emerging policies—what are we observing if it is always changing and not concrete? Despite these limitations, however, I believe my research documenting how the issue is emerging is insightful for understanding the future formulation of potential policies (should they develop) in Canada.

Conclusion

This chapter presents the broader theoretical and conceptual influences informing both my research questions and how I seek to answer them. Discourse and framing analyses focus my attention on how different actors, in this case Canadian newspaper media and policy actors, talk about the intersections of climate change and human mobility. Closely related is agenda setting which prioritizes what issues are talked about and the attributes of those issues, which as mentioned above, closely relates to framing.[21] Framing reveals what is included, excluded,

[21] Agenda setting research often focuses on voting behaviour / perception vis a vis media representation of candidates. This is not a study of agenda setting in this regard. Instead, I am simply using agenda setting to refer to issues increasing in salience and how actors draw attention to issues.

emphasized or downplayed in a story and allows analysts to understand the elements of an issue that are most important. Media texts, as sites of stories and information, have the power to shape knowledge and meaning. Meaning is not fixed (Hall 1997); how the media represent people and events through text influences that meaning and can be explored through an examination of framing.

This dissertation provides the first study of Canadian newspaper media's and policy actors' framing of climate mobilities. While dominant frames influence public perception and policy, my analysis, premised upon this link, stops short of it. The policies do not (yet) exist to make a causal argument about how the media are influencing policy in this domain, but the frames and framings of the issues, events, and people related to climate mobilities will reveal the meaning(s) as it/they develop. As such, my empirical chapters are two distinct sites of inquiry where the issue is emerging. My conclusion then posits reflections on the cumulative impact of my analytical strategies and empirical case studies, to which I now turn.

Chapter 5 - The Use and Abuse of "Climate Mobilities" in the Canadian Press

Introduction

In order to explore how "climate migration" is understood in Canada, in this chapter I conduct a media analysis to understand how different Canadian newspaper sources frame the intersection of climate change and human mobility. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the media play a role in selecting which issues to cover and how those issues are framed. Media framing has implications for how issues are understood by the public and policy makers. While scholars have conducted media analyses of newspaper coverage of "climate migration" elsewhere, there is little research examining the Canadian newspapers' treatment of the intersection between climate change and human mobility.

This chapter explores how national and local newspapers frame the intersection of climate change and human mobility within and beyond Canada and the topic of the stories in which this framing appears. I find that very few articles actually focus on the intersection of climate change and human mobility; instead, the intersection is mentioned or implied in stories about the impacts of and responses to climate change, the plight of migrants and refugees around the world, and, most frequently, disasters such as floods, storms or wildfires. The data also shows a discrepancy between how newspapers frame movement beyond Canada compared to how they frame it within Canada. For movement beyond Canada, in the context of climate change, mobility is assumed, abstract, and in the future; will occur on a large scale, all at once and across international borders or over long distances. The newspapers describe people beyond Canada as victims and collectivized, occasionally using the term "climate refugees." For movement within Canada, the intersection is concrete and linked to specific events (floods or

wildfires) that are already occurring; people move locally and temporarily – they are "evacuated" – and they have agency. Of note, in reference to flooding and wildfire displacements within Canada, the media rarely use the term "climate." These findings indicate that there is a conceptual disconnect in the link between climate change and human mobility depending on where it occurs.

I begin by detailing my research approach including my data collection, coding, and the analytical framework and the questions guiding my analysis. The results and discussion section is divided into several subsections including both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the content, frames and framing devices. The conclusion presents some themes coming out of the results and the implications of the themes for future policy development in Canada.

Methods and Methodology

I use two methods of analysis for this chapter: qualitative analysis inductively coding to explore the framing in Canadian media related to how climate change and human mobility come together, and quantitative analysis examining the number of articles containing various types of content. Because I am interested in how the discourse and narrative present at different scale and in different outlets, I collected articles from national and subnational media outlets. I chose newspapers over other forms of media because I wanted to be able to compare across scale, hear perspectives from various journalists, and because newspapers are agenda-setting for other media and the public (Carvalho 2007, 226). I recognize that different audiences consume different media; how media outlets frame issues is thus also a reflection of the salience of such frames with specific consumers or target audiences. I also recognize that corporate-owned newspapers are limited in their range of stories and storytelling and are not perfect proxies for public discourse.

For the subnational level, I focus on two local communities in British Columbia that have recent experiences with displacements from floods and wildfires. As discussed above, media analyses exist on internally displaced peoples and the 2016 Alberta wildfires (Mongibello 2017), intersectionality and health implications of the 2015 Saskatchewan wildfire (Walker, Reed, Fletcher 2020) and flooding disasters and risk (Thistlewaite et al 2020). This paper focuses specifically on how human mobility is represented across disasters and in relation to climate change more generally in the Canadian newspaper press.

The timeframe for analysis is January 2015 to December 2020; I chose this timeframe for several reasons. First, it includes the lead-up to and signing of several international agreements and frameworks: the Paris Agreement, the international agreement on climate change; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; the Sustainable Development Goals; and the global compacts on migrants and refugees. These are inter-referential international frameworks addressing climate change, disaster risk reduction, sustainable development, and migrants and refugees. Second, 2015 was when the current federal government came into office in Canada; the Liberal Government had an explicit commitment to leadership on climate change *and* migration as articulated in the Throne Speech (Government of Canada 2015).[22] Finally, there have been several large-scale displacements from wildfires and floods in Canada since 2015 including the wildfires in Alberta (2016) and B.C. (2017 and 2018), and major floods and storms in eastern Canada (2018, 2019).[23] This succinct timeframe does not, admittedly, allow for analysis of

[22] Previous studies on government priorities demonstrate that the issues in the Speeches from the Throne are a "robust aggregate-level measure of policy making attention" (Foucault and Montpetit 2014, 211; John and Jennings 2010).

[23] I concluded my data collection, coding, and analysis for this chapter in March 2021 – thus the extreme weather events of 2021 in B.C. are outside the timeframe of this dataset.

changing discourse over time, but given the dynamism of the topic, this analysis could provide a baseline for comparison with future analyses.[24]

Data Collection

I selected two national and two local news sources to capture the potentially differing media frames that exist across scale and proximity to disasters (Öhman, Nygren, and Olofsson 2016; Ploughman 1997). Starting with the national media, I selected the *Globe and Mail*, owned by Woodbridge Media, and the *National Post*, owned by Post Media. In terms of politics or ideology, the *Globe* is considered more centrist than the *Post* which is known for being more conservative (Stoddart, Haluza-Delay, and Tindall 2016); readers' politics tend to correspond with the media messaging in the outlets they consume. As of August 2020, *The Globe and Mail* was first and the *National Post* was sixth of Canadian newspapers by circulation (Agility Solutions 2020). To complement these national newspapers, I also collected articles from two local papers in British Columbia, the *Grand Forks Gazette* and *Kamloops This Week*. Black Press Media owns *The Grand Forks Gazette* while Aberdeen Publishing Inc., a corporate partner of Glacier Media Group, owns *Kamloops This Week*. While Kamloops is a midsized British Columbian city with a population of 103,000, Grand Forks, built in the floodplain of the Granby and Kettle rivers, is a small town of approximately 4,000 (Statistics Canada 2017). I selected these two locales because both have experienced significant displacements and impacts from climate-related events (floods and wildfires) in recent years. Kamloops was affected by and also served as the hub for many of the wildfire evacuees during the 2017 wildfire season that displaced 65,000 people across B.C. Grand Forks had substantial freshet flooding in 2018 and

[24] The "heat dome" that blanketed B.C. in the summer of 2021 and subsequent wildfires is outside the timeframe of the data collected for this analysis, but B.C. residents can already see substantial reporting in the media on the wildfires and displacements and many of these are including discussions of "climate change."

2020 that caused many evacuations and launched a home buyout program to resettle people away from flood prone areas. As such, these locales present as most-likely cases for where news or stories of the intersections between climate change impacts and human mobility should appear. I followed different search methods in building my corpus for the two scales; as such, I present each in turn below.

National Sources

In building this dataset, I used the search database ProQuest for the *National Post* (*NP*) and the *Globe and Mail* (*GM*). I followed an iterative approach whereby I selected articles based on their relevance to my research question: how climate mobilities are being framed in Canada, and I modified my approach based on my findings. To start, the initial search terms I used – *climate refugee/s, environmental refugee/s, climate migrant/s, environmental migrant/s, climate migration, environmental migration* – yielded too small of a sample size (see Table 2). While I included the twenty-nine articles with these terms from after 1 January 2015 in the final corpus, I expanded the search to include before 2015 (the database includes coverage since 1977 for the GM and 1998 for the NP) to see what the results would be. The search results are interesting on their own. They show a downward trend in the frequency of these terms over time and a shift from "environmental" to "climate" as a qualifier after 2015, particularly in the GM. Furthermore, the articles with such search terms did not address displacement *in* Canada.

Table 2. Initial Search Terms and Results

Initial Search Terms	**Globe & Mail (pre/post 2015)**	**National Post (pre/post 2015)**	**Total**
Climate refugee/s*	30 (15/15)	16 (12/4)	46 (27/19)
Environmental refugee/s*	44 (43/1)	8 (7/1)	52 (50/2)
Climate migrant/s	2 (0/2)	1 (1/0)	3 (1/2)
Environmental migrant/s	4 (3/1)	2 (1/1)	6 (4/2)
Climate migration	5 (1/4)	0	5 (1/4)
Environmental migration	0	0	0
Totals	83 (60/**23**)	26 (20/**6**)	109 (80/**29**)

* some articles included both terms, so the total of the column is less than the sum of each cell

Given the low number of articles for the period of interest, I expanded the search string to include various terms that could capture the climate change dimension and the human mobility dimension for the desired time frame. Instead of using terms such as "global warming" or "environmental change" in place of "climate change", I decided to use terms representing different climate impacts that Canada experiences and that are commonly connected to displacement: floods, wildfires, storms. I conducted a new search with the following search parameters: ["climate change" OR wildfire OR flood OR storm] AND [migration or migrant OR displace OR refugee] (see Table 3). This approach also allows for a more representative sample of how the issues come together (instead of using predetermining search terms) and provided a larger sample for the time-period of interest. I screened out obituaries, then restricted the date range to January 1 2015 to December 15 2020. I then manually filtered out irrelevant articles by skimming the full text. I excluded articles that focused on non-human movements (e.g. bird, fish or caribou migrations); I also excluded those that mentioned both a climate dimension and a migration dimension but in isolation or without relationship, causation or correlation between the two dimensions (e.g. The government is working on climate change, economic recovery, and migration issues.). I also excluded articles in which the terms were used as a figure of speech (e.g. "a flood of migrants", "the political climate", or "firestorm"). I input the remaining articles into the software program NVivo for coding and organizing, and then screened additional articles out after multiple readings in NVivo. As you can see in Figure 7, despite a large sample of articles that contain the search terms, because I am interested in how climate change and human mobility are represented *in relation to one another,* the final national dataset was small but sufficient for analysis. Agenda-setting suggests that the amount of attention the media give to an

issue correlates with the importance of that issue by mass audiences (McCoonbs and Shaw 1972). The lack of attention (number of articles) on climate mobility implies this is not an issue of public concern.

Table 3. Final Search Results for National Papers

Final National Search Parameters	Globe & Mail	National Post	Total
("climate change" OR flood OR wildfire OR storm) AND (migration OR migrant OR displace OR refugee)	2,982	1571	4,553
2015-01-01 to 2020-12-15	**749**	**710**	1459
Final Sample transferred to NVivo	70	34	75
Final Sample after re-readings in NVivo	**42**	**20**	**62**

Figure 7. Search process and results for Globe and Mail and National Post

Local Sources

To search the local newspapers, which do not appear in the ProQuest database, I used a combination of the advanced search feature on Google.com and the search box (no advanced feature) on the newspapers' websites. Like with the national sources, I started with search terms

(in Table 2) that automatically linked climate change to human mobility. These terms, however, limited only ten results total in *Kamloops This Week (KTW)*, six since 2015 (included in my sample), but none in the *Grand Forks Gazette (GFG)*. Gwynne Dyer, a freelance journalist who writes a weekly column on international affairs that regularly appears in newspapers across the country, wrote seven of these ten articles in *KTW* (five included in the analysis). To expand the sample, I used the terms in Table 3 in various iterations and received several articles when using the root displace* with wildfire* and flood* and storm*. However, I still had too few articles, so I decided to change the mobility word to evacuation*, evacuee*, or evacuate* which was much more relevant in the local context and yielded many more articles.

There are several reasons to include "evacuation" when exploring human mobility in a changing climate. Evacuations are increasingly used proactively, around the world, to get people out of harm's way when an extreme weather event is imminent (IDMC 2020). Although evacuations are a recognized form of displacement, they are largely absent from the literature on forced displacements and disasters and from the literature on climate change and displacement, migration and managed retreat (McAdam 2020). In the case of British Columbia, wildfires displaced 65,000 people in 2017 and the media discusses these as "evacuations." Not including them as a form of mobility when examining the links between climate impacts and human mobility potentially misses a huge subset of human movement.

For Grand Forks, I used flood* with evacuation and for Kamloops I used wildfire*. Following this method, I scanned and downloaded thirty articles from the Grand Forks Gazette and twenty-nine articles from Kamloops This Week and imported them into NVivo. I filtered out two of the Kamloops This Week articles after rereading in NVivo (see Appendix I for a bibliographic list of all articles in the corpus).

The final corpus contained 119 news articles (Table 4) disproportionately distributed across years and sources. I am attentive to this distribution in presenting the results. While the number of articles is not extensive at either scale, it does provide a substantial enough sample from which I can make observations about the framing in Canadian news media. I explored expanding the sample to include more articles in the national papers by using "evacuation" with (flood OR wildfire) AND ((Grand Forks) OR Kamloops). The result was fifty-one articles in the *Globe and Mail* and one in the *National Post*. I did not add them to the sample, but instead draw on them selectively when making comparisons to the local articles.

Table 4. Total number of selected articles by date

Source	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Globe & Mail	7	6	2	11	11	5	42
National Post	4	4	6	2	1	3	20
Grand Forks Gazette	0	0	2	16	5	7	30
Kamloops This Week	0	2	7	8	6	4	27
Total Count	**11**	**12**	**17**	**37**	**23**	**19**	**119**

Coding

Although I am aware of the dominant frames in media analyses of climate migration, I coded inductively to see if the Canadian context offered different frames. I manually and iteratively coded in NVivo with attention to author, date, title, article topic, word choice, dimensions of causality, explicit and implicit terms and rhetorical devices used to describe climate and mobility dimensions, the types of sources used, and the locations mentioned (Table 5).

Table 5. Coding structure for analysis (adapted from Brown and Doulton 2009)

Analytical element	Codes
Surface descriptors	Source, section, date, title, author, author info
Basic entities (ontology of the discourse)	Topic, focus, global/local connections

Assumptions about relationships	Pos/neg/no relationship, climate+mobility phrase, direct / indirect causality, duration,
Agents and motives	Sources, references, how are they represented
Metaphors and devices – language choice	Terms used: for people, movement, physical change
Normative judgements – who should do what?	Tone, action suggested, recommendations, implicated parties

I constantly updated my coding structure throughout the process and to ensure reliability, I revisited articles that I had previously coded for consistency with the updated coding structure. I did not conduct an inter-coder reliability check and I am the only person who coded the data.[25] I chose NVivo for the data management capacity as much for the analytical capacity. I did most of the coding in NVivo and then I exported my NVivo codes to excel where I was able to clean and organize the data for cross comparisons and quantitative analyses.

To understand the dominant discursive frames in two Canadian national papers and two Canadian local papers, this analysis queries the texts for the following questions:

- What is the topic of the article in which climate change and human mobility intersect?
- How is the relationship between climate change and human mobility represented?
- How are people affected by climate change represented?
    - Explicitly
    - implicitly
- Is there a connection between domestic displacement and global displacement?
- Are sources used, if yes, who / what sources are used?
- How many articles that denote a relationship are actually about the relationship?
- What might the policy implications be from these findings?

Results and Discussion

Drawing on my analytical framework and the questions just presented, I analyzed my data to determine the frames and framing strategies that the different papers used and how that produced different understandings of the intersection between climate change and human

[25] For forthcoming publications, I would conduct such a reliability check.

mobility. I present and discuss the results in two main subsections: the first looking at the surface descriptors and basic entities and the second exploring the framing strategies. The first section includes some quantitative findings on the number of articles by year, by actor (author and source), by geographic area, and by topic areas, whereas the second section describes how articles frame the climate dimensions, and the mobility dimension—both the movement and the people.

A limitation of the dataset is the low number of articles (thirteen) that actually engaged directly with the relationship between climate change and human mobility. Most of the articles present the relationship somewhat tangentially to the focus of the article. This, however, is a finding in itself and suggests this issue has little salience in the Canadian newspaper media. Because of the selection methods, the local papers focused on the impacts of flooding and wildfires. Local papers deliver information to readers that could be useful during the event such as: evacuation routes, the location of reception centers, and who/where the evacuation orders and alerts affect. This presents an imbalance when comparing the content of the national papers with the local ones and as such I focus first on the national papers and then include information from the local sources when relevant. The subsection on framing strategies is more analytical than the first descriptive subsection, and it gets into the implicit and explicit framing and discursive

dimensions. I use excerpts from the articles to demonstrate the findings. A conclusion follows this extensive section.

Surface descriptors and basic entities

Articles – How many and what section

Figure 8. Number of articles by newspaper by year

The 119 articles in the corpus appear somewhat randomly across the years and sources (see Table 4 / Figure 8). In the national sources, 2017 was the only year when *National Post* had more articles than the *Globe and Mail;* and in 2018 and 2019, the *Globe* had significantly more articles than the *National Post.* There does not appear to be an increase in articles across the years as the Liberal government – with their commitment to climate change and migration – continued to govern; nor does the federal election in 2019 seem to have led to an increase in articles from the more conservative *National Post.* Given that the media is often event-driven (van Dijk 2011; Howe, Stoddart, Tindall 2020) one might have expected a greater number of articles over this period. In fact, as a methodological concern, media analyses often avoid timeframes that include major events because such events might skew the sample (Wahl-Jorgensen, Berry, Garcia-Blanca, Cable 2017, 788). The emergent nature of this issue and the

fact that it is not a major political or public issue or item on policy agendas in Canada may explain the low sample number.

The fifty-seven articles in the local papers demonstrate a much closer clustering around events than the national sample. The *Grand Forks Gazette* had the most articles relative to other years in 2018 and 2020, as these were the years with destructive flooding and evacuations. *Kamloops This Week* had several articles in 2017 and 2018, reflecting evacuations from wildfires and flooding respectively.

According to McCombs and Mauro (1977), page and section placement within newspapers reflect the importance of the article and the likelihood people will read it. For example, articles located in the front section of a paper are more likely to be read and imply a higher degree of importance than articles located elsewhere in the paper. The *Globe and Mail* spread articles across sections of the newspaper with twenty-three in the front section, twelve appearing in the Opinion section, and seven occurring in a section other than the front section. As for the *National Post*, fifteen appeared in the front section and five in the Financial Post section. Thus, in both papers, the importance of the articles containing stories bringing together climate change and human mobility appears comparable based on their location in the paper.

Actors: Authors and sources

While there are many actors in the media, I focus here on the authors and the sources. I acknowledge am not talking about owners, editors, and others with influence inside a media organization, nor am I talking here about actors as objects (for that see below) or the audience. Carvalho (2000, 22) points out that certain actors, such as journalists, have framing power which gives them control on the "discursive construction of social, political and environmental issues."

Thus framing draws attention to who yields that power which important for understanding how issues are represented and why they are represented that way.

Of the 119 articles, 107 identify authors, 12 do not. In the national articles, fifteen of the twenty articles in the *NP* name authors while five are newswire or without authors; white men wrote twelve of the fifteen authored articles. In terms of professions, thirteen of the authors are journalists and the other two are scholars. Similarly, in the *Globe and Mail*, forty of the forty-two articles identified authors and of those twenty-three are written by journalists, six by former diplomats and six by scholars / academics. A citizen, identified only by their initials wrote one article in a response to an Opinion piece. One activist and three novelists wrote the other four articles with authors listed. White men wrote twenty-eight of the forty authored articles in the GM, white women wrote seven, and people of colour penned two articles.

In the local papers, the same journalists author several of the articles. For example, in the *GFG*, one person penned seven of the thirty articles, while another person authored six; in *KTW*, the same appears: one journalist authored five articles, and another wrote three. At community papers with a small staff, this is expected. For the local papers, the populations of both Grand Forks and Kamloops are overwhelmingly white,[26] but I did not check the race or ethnicity of the reporters. One article in the *GFG* listed the Canadian Press as the author while four in *Kamloops This Week* listed a "staff writer" rather than someone by name. However, the *GFG* listed nine articles authored by the Canadian Press – written by people outside Grand Forks. *KTW* listed one article as coming from PostMedia wire service (the author appears to be in the Greater Vancouver area) and the five articles written in their "World Watch" section are by Gwynne Dyer, an independent journalist based in the UK.

[26] The Kamloops census agglomeration area has 7.3% visible minority in 2016, while Grand Forks population centre has 4.1% (Statistics Canada 2017).

The voices journalists employ in structuring their stories influences the construction of debates and problems. As above, it also reflects who has power to define the issues (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2013, 2016). Van Dijk (1991) claims that the media tends to rely on elites' "preformulations" of concepts and categories while silencing the opinions of migrants. Other research shows that some media are less likely to quote women and visible minorities than others, thus "stories are told about them, rather than by them" (Tolley 2016, 57). In analyzing the use of sources in the sample of national media articles in the corpus, this appears to be true.

Of the sixty-two national articles, forty used direct citations from sources, which is about sixty-five percent of all articles and a near even distribution by newspaper. As shown in Figure 9, there is not a huge discrepancy between the two newspapers related to the use of sources, except to say that the *National Post* faired significantly better relevant to the *Globe and Mail* in using non-white sources. Of those forty articles using sources, however, twenty-three articles (fifty-eight percent) relied on comments from government representatives, and sixteen articles (forty percent) relied on input from experts (such as scientists or scholars). Like other media analyses which find migrant and refugee voices left out or sidelined (Høeg and Tulloch, 2019; Gemi, Ulasiuk, and Triandafyllidou 2011), only two articles (five percent), one from each newspaper, used direct quotes from migrants or refugees. One article, presenting the experience of a Guatemalan woman and her children migrating north, does not quote her directly even though she is named and the entire article centers on her story. Given that there are twenty-three articles which focus directly on either the relationship between (1) climate change and human mobility or (2) migration and refugee issues more broadly, the two articles represent about nine percent of such articles. This nine percent compares to results (on the use of migrant voices) in a major

media analysis conducted on five European countries' coverage of the 2014-2015 "migrant crisis" (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, Moore 2015).

Figure 9. Percentage of the types of sources used in articles using quotations, by newspaper

The voices of those impacted by climate events (but not described as "migrants" or "refugees," I refer to as "person affected") appear in eight of the forty articles (twenty percent) using direct quotations. The greater use of these voices, relative to those of migrants and refugees, is perhaps not surprising given that seven of these eight articles featured quotations from those impacted by floods or wildfires in Canada or the USA (another featured the voice of a Brazilian woman who lost her daughter in a flood-triggered landslide).

The local media used direct quotations in thirty-four of the fifty-seven articles (sixty percent), slightly lower than the national sources overall. In the local papers, which mainly focus on wildfires and flooding, the media were much more likely to incorporate the voices of those impacted. The local media used the voices of those evacuated or impacted directly by the floods and wildfires in fifteen of the thirty-four articles (forty-four percent) using direct quotations. While perhaps a factor of proximity to the local community, plus the topical focus of the local

dataset, this is significantly higher than the national articles that used such voices in only ten of forty sourced articles (twenty-five percent).

Taken together, it appears that those with framing power in these articles are white male journalists, and then government officials and experts (also often white men) when the reporting on the issue abroad, and occasionally those impacted by floods and wildfires when reporting on the issue at home. While a race-based analysis is beyond the scope of this research, there also appears to be a racial dimension in that the experts and authors are white and the subjects, particularly those abroad, are racialized.

Geography – Where are the articles about?

The geographic focus of the articles in the national papers is of interest given the global media's fixation with "climate refugees" as the human face of climate change (Gemenne 2011). This narrative implies the movement is international (across borders) because legally speaking, refugees must cross an international boundary to be entitled to refugee status under international law. Empirical studies find that in terms of the actual movement of people in a changing climate, most takes place within countries (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer 2020, Boas et al 2019, Nash and Zickgraf 2020, UNHCR 2021). Whereas the term "refugees" indicates notions of global humanitarianism, justice and responsibility, securitization and post-colonial theories offer other understandings. These theories account for how "climate refugees," presented as racialized, poor, victims of climate change in the Global South, thus frame the issue as a security risk to those in the Global North (Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat 2018; Baldwin 2013; Gemenne et al 2014). From this perspective, the geographic focus on the Global South by researchers from the Global North (Piguet, Kaenzig, Guélat 2018), is perhaps of no surprise.

However, because I am in specifically interested in exploring the disconnect between the framing of displacements in Canada with displacements beyond Canada, I included search terms and media outlets that would provide Canadian content for analysis. As a result, eleven of the sixty-two national articles are about the movement of people (represented mainly as evacuations and temporary displacements) in Canada (if I had included the articles with "evacuation" in the sample, this number would have been significantly higher); another nine are about the United States. Of the eleven articles focusing on Canada, I categorized all but two to the "disasters" topic. Nonetheless, almost two-thirds of the articles point to or imply the Global South. Eighteen articles represent the climate change and mobility nexus as an abstraction with no reference to a geographic location. Eight articles discuss Africa as the place where climate will disrupt the lives of people and force them to move –some cases mention a specific country and in other articles the reference is to the broader region. Seven articles list multiple regions of the Global South as locations of displacement and four other articles focus specifically on Central America. The focus of articles on Central America is the "migrant caravans": the Globe and Mail published all four in 2018 and 2019. Finally, five mention or focus on an "other" single country – also in the Global South (Bangladesh, Brazil, Haiti, Marshall Islands, and Syria).

What perhaps is most striking about the breadth of geographic focus of the articles are (1) the abstraction of the places or lack the specificity, and (2) the framing that the movement will be global as opposed to internal. This framing contradicts the empirical research finding otherwise, which only one article in the sample acknowledges. If the media is involved in constructing or giving meaning to problems, leaving the problem at a level of abstraction that precludes concrete solutions, policies, or responses and misrepresenting the nature of the problem seems like an unproductive contribution to the framing of the problem.

Figure 10. Number of articles by geographic focus area, by newspaper

Regarding the division across sources (see figure 10), the *GM* was much more likely than the *NP* to talk about the issue in the abstract or by multiple regions simultaneously as shown statistically – almost half of their articles (twenty) did this. The NP, however, was more likely to focus on the United States, as thirty percent of their articles addressed wildfires, flooding, or the costs of and decision-making related to climate change in the United States.

The articles from the local sources represent a case study in actual displacement during a disaster in B.C.; the articles imply that mobility (evacuations) are temporary and localized and as such, I have not included these articles' geographic focus in the above discussion of the national sources. However, in the five articles in *KTW* by Dyer that mention "climate refugees", like the national sources, he provides no specific location, except in one case where he mentions Africa and the Middle East as sites of droughts and changing food production patterns causing displacement.

Article topic – What are they about?

I coded the full dataset by topic area to identify the basic entities of the discourse (Dryzek 2005) and because I wanted to know the thematic frames within which newspapers referred to the relationship between climate change and human mobility. Figure 11 shows the distribution across the two national newspapers by topic. The main topics in the national papers were climate mobility (eight articles, thirteen percent) which explicitly focused on the connections between climate change and human mobility, climate change (eighteen articles, twenty-nine percent) which focused on the political and / or physical dimensions of climate change, migration and refugees (fifteen articles, twenty-six percent) which presented stories about the movement of people around the world, disasters (seventeen articles, twenty-seven percent) which focused on specific floods, storms, and/or wildfires, and "other" (six articles, five percent). As Figure 11 shows, the *Globe and Mail* had more stories than the *National Post* on climate migration, climate change, and migration and refugees. I coded two articles, one from each newspaper to two topics, climate mobility and disasters, because they were making an explicit link between disaster (compared to climate change) and human mobility, which inflates by two the total sum by topic. The local newspaper articles mainly focused on disasters (forty-one of fifty-seven articles or seventy-two percent), although I coded the five articles on the Grand Forks home buyouts to climate mobility, eight to climate change, and three to the migration and refugee topic. In all sources (local and national), there were forty-seven articles on disasters in Canada, the majority on floods and wildfires in B.C. in the local papers.

Of note, the corpus lacks articles on displacement from Indigenous communities. Of the displacements that took place in Canada in 2019, about thirty percent of them were in Indigenous communities (Indigenous peoples comprise about five percent of the Canadian population) (IDMC 2019, 53). Disasters disproportionately impact Indigenous communities for various

reasons including a community's relative remoteness, isolation in fire-prone areas (dense forests), and a lack of emergency services or technical capacity (Mihychuk 2018, 1). In addition, the legacy of colonialism affects trust, coordination, and collaboration during emergency responses; results in a failure to utilize local and traditional knowledge; and has left deep social and health inequities that render some communities more vulnerable to mental or physical health impacts (National Collaborating Centre for Aboriginal Health 2019).

Figure 11. Topic of articles, by national newspaper

The articles coded to "other" included stories on tax havens, UN spending, housing provision, increasing social and political tensions globally, and Canada's UN Security Council bid. In these articles, authors connect climate change to mobility by using the term "climate refugees" or by assuming a growing number of future migrants and refugees driven by wars, conflict, failed states and climate change. The superficial engagement with the relationship resulted in their exclusion from the discussion in the next section on framing.

This section on surface descriptors and basic entities has presented the findings across multiple dimensions. The number of articles at the local level reflected the timing of local events, whereas the number of national articles appeared somewhat randomly across the six years of the sample. When national papers do cover the issue, they often do so in the front section implying a

degree of importance. There are limited types of actors in terms of who wrote the articles and who authors quoted. The geographical focus of the articles illustrated that climate change links to mobility often in the abstract rather than in reference to specific places. However, when articles do mention specific places, they present regions and countries of the Global South as the sites of global displacement. Finally, the topics or thematic frames revealed that there are very few articles directly about climate mobilities and most of the local papers' articles were about disasters. The next section goes beyond the surface descriptors to look at how the articles represent the issue based on their representation of the climate, the movement, and the people.

Framing the climate mobility relationship in Canadian news

Compared to the previous section, this section takes a more qualitative analysis across the newspapers. I present my findings on how the local and national sources frame the relationship between climate change and human mobility and the framing strategies they use to do so. There are several findings that are unique to scale across local and national articles which mediate discourses on both domestic disaster displacement from floods and wildfires and climate change and human mobility beyond Canada. Although the scale of the source is representative of the scale of displacement (e.g. local sources mainly report on local displacements), there are some general findings across the corpus. First, authors rarely make the link between sudden-onset events such as floods and wildfires and climate change. Of the 119 articles, 61 articles use the term "climate" but only eight articles on disasters use the term. Second, and already discussed in (and determined by) the methods' section, the local papers refer to the type of mobility as evacuations, and they present these evacuations as temporary and assisted by government agencies. Local articles never use "migration" to describe the mobility; even in the articles that discuss the buyouts in Grand Forks, authors never use migration discourses – not even "planned

relocation" or "managed retreat" as the climate migration literature would (although not without dispute, see Ajibade, Sullivan, and Haeffner 2020). Finally, when reporting at the local level on who is on the move, authors rarely victimize people, instead reporters highlight people's agency and individual responsibility for assisting with emergency management efforts in their communities; this does not hold at the national level. I discuss each of these three framing strategies in turn. Taken together, the Canadian local newspapers disconnect narratives on evacuations from floods and wildfires in Canada from the mobility of people beyond Canada in a changing climate and from climate change itself.

Framing the physical environment: climate change vs record setting anomalies

There is a high degree of existing variability in weather and climate extremes in which anthropogenic climate change occurs. The scientific community agrees that a changing climate will change "the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of weather and climate extremes" (IPCC 2012, 111). This physical science is independent from the fact that poor development, land-use planning, and forest management decisions have also produced and exacerbated risk (in terms of vulnerability and exposure) to wildfires, floods, storms and other hazards. As such, while there may be many causes for any given flood or wildfire, they occur in the context of a changing climate.

What is striking about the coverage on disasters is the framing related to climate change. Of the fifty-eight articles in all four newspapers on disasters (anywhere), only eight (fourteen percent) of them mention "climate change" – four in the national papers and four in the local papers (but three of these were from the Canadian Press wire services). Of the forty-seven stories on disasters in Canada, only three articles (six percent) use the term "climate change." This corresponds to another Canadian study that found a low connection between climate change and

flooding in media coverage. Thistlethwaite et al (2018, 2603) found that only six percent of 1,108 articles on floods in Canada mention climate change; and when they do, they either link, confuse, or deny the relationship.

The eight disaster articles that do mention climate change, did so in a variety of ways. Of those focussing on Canada, two articles discussed published reports that link climate change to wildfires and floods, while the third is unequivocal about the connection in a story on flooding in Montreal: *Let's call this one what it is: the first climate disaster to hit Canada in 2019* (GG14). Five stories were about the United States: two on wildfires in California make the link (published by the GG but provided by the Canadian Press); two in the NP challenge the link, providing alternative explanations for flood and hurricane destruction; and one makes the link explicit, the title is: *We should start treating floods and fires like migration crises* (GG38). Besides the story on Montreal flooding mentioned above, the articles that do mention "climate change" never do so while reporting during a disaster in Canada. The local articles on other topics that mention "climate change" do so in a report about glacier melt; and in articles by non-local contributors: Gwynne Dyer about future immigration "problems" and Tom Fletcher who challenges the climate link to wildfires. Fletcher's (2020) discussion of other causes for wildfires does not, in itself, dismiss the role of climate change as a causal factor in wildfires. Climate change – which affects precipitation and temperature – intersects with a complex array of causal factors that influence the severity of any given hazard. Negating the conditions that climate change creates, obscures the full picture when trying to construct the problem. Examples of explicit uses of climate change in local papers:

> *GG7:* ***Climate change is causing glaciers atop Mount Meager in British Columbia to shrink, increasing the chances of landslides*** *and even a new eruption, says an expert studying the volcano.*

GG 20: ***Drought, warmer weather attributed to climate change and home construction deeper into forests have led to more destructive wildfire seasons*** *that have been starting earlier and lasting longer.*
*GG24: Under models released by the B.C. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy****, flooding events are projected to become more frequent and more widespread over the next few decades***
GG27: They are only the latest examples of what a half-dozen ***fire experts agreed is more extreme fire behaviour driven by drought and warming temperatures they attribute to climate change.***
GG29: ***Both*** **[wildfires in AB and B.C.]** ***have been connected to climate change in two separate research papers*** *published earlier this year by scientists with Environment and Climate Change Canada.*
KTW21 Abbott said the current flooding situation is evidence that 2017 wasn't an anomaly, and ***climate change is not about to go away****.*

Several articles in my corpus, however, do frame the events as anomalies or outside the expected norm—especially in the local papers. The following quotations demonstrate the use of other language to frame the event as exceptional even if they are not using the term "climate change."

GG1: ***Boundary rivers have reached and surpassed the highest levels since 1948.***

GG12: The Central Okanagan's emergency response centre said there had been localized flood and ***record creek flows*** *in the area including Kelowna.* ***Mission Creek reached a record flow rate overnight*** *on Wednesday*

GG12: Frances Maika of the regional district said ***the flood is "in the range" of a once in a 200-year occurrence.***

GG19: The water is starting to recede in Grand Forks and the Boundary ***after record breaking flooding on May 11****, but the forecast shows there may be more in store later this week.*

GG20*: Sheriff's investigators have begun the agonizing task of scouring through the wreckage of* ***California's most destructive fire on record…*** *California emerged from a five-year drought last year* ***but has had a very dry 2018.*** *Much of* ***the northern two-thirds of the state, including where the fire is burning, is abnormally dry,*** *according to a U.S. government analysis.*

GG21 In early May 2018, Grand Forks residents were ***dealt the most severe flooding the region had seen since 1948****, sparking a state of emergency which would last more than a month.*

GG22: It was a sleepless night for many on Thursday ***in what is turning into a record-breaking flood in Grand Forks****…*

GG26: Temperatures throughout the Boundary ***are tracking well above seasonal averages****, precipitating snowmelt in higher elevations.*

GG27: When it comes to California wildfires, ***it now takes days, not decades, to produce what had been seen as a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence****.… Fire officials said they'd never seen a fire move so fast in forestland…*

KTW 1 "We've ***had more fires this year*** *[but] they haven't been as large as what we were dealing with in 2017," chief fire information officer for the B.C. Wildfire Service, Kevin Skrepnek, told KTW.*

*KTW5: **The 2018 wildfire season in B.C. is more widespread and has involved more fires than last year's record-setting fire season, according to provincial officials.***

*KTW20: A larger snowpack than last year and rapid snow melt **from higher-than-normal temperatures** has led to flooding around the province…*

*KTW20: In Kamloops, the forecast for Tuesday is expected to be **a record-setting 33 C**. The hottest May 15 on record is 32.8 C in 1971. The local forecast for this week calls for highs of 29 to 33 C through the Victoria Day long weekend, **which is up significantly from the average high for the same dates**, which is about 21 C, according to statistics from Environment Canada.*

"Without a doubt, this is an extreme weather event," he said, noting it comes at a time when river levels are already high.

*KTW20: He said the South Thompson tends to peak later, but given the current heat wave, **the river forecast centre is expecting that to occur about four weeks earlier than usual,** which would indicate it cresting by the end of the month… Around the province, **temperatures have been about six degrees above normal during the past three weeks and a fourth consecutive week is in the forecast.***

*NP5: But the experience of Fort McMurray should remind us all that even safe countries have known catastrophe. Emergency Preparedness Week **does not normally unfold against such a horrific background**, but the lesson should not be lost.*

*NP9: **Vast swaths of Africa are being submerged by once-in-a-lifetime floods**… **Some places recorded the heaviest rains in a century**, according to Seleshi Bekele, Ethiopia's water and irrigation minister.*

GM2: But the fire was already out of control, and wildfire officials knew they were on the edge of an exceedingly dangerous fire season. All the conditions for a catastrophic wildfire were present: Hot dry weather, high winds and low humidity, set within a dense boreal forest primed to burn.

Beyond the framing of climate change in the fifty-eight disaster articles, the specific focus of the articles is also indicative of how Canadian newspapers represent disasters. The media plays a crucial role before, during and after disasters in relaying and conveying essential information to the public. While social media and web-based sites such as Twitter play an increasing role in quickly relaying information to people (Ulvi et al 2019, Bowen 2019), mainstream media continues to serve a role, framing, communicating and reporting on events as they unfold. As such, perhaps it is not surprising that several of the articles in this dataset are merely reporting the physical attributes of wildfires and rivers, the location of the activity, the efforts underway to minimize damage, and the areas affected by evacuation orders and alerts. The purpose of this kind of reporting is getting information to people and alerting people to the

problem. The problem, however, is that the articles frame wildfires or floods as disconnected, not only from the broader context in which they are occurring, but also, from their potential impact on communities and people. Six of the national articles report in this way and thirty-three local articles contain this kind of reporting (this is seventy percent of all these stories). Seven national articles and four local articles report on the lived experiences, personal stories, and the impacts on residents, evacuees, and communities; and four other local stories incorporated such personal stories into their reporting on the parameters of the floods and fires. Victoria Herrmann (2017, 211), writing on visual imagery and storytelling in climate relocation in the United States, argues that such imagery omits the actual causes of intense storms and rising seas—large-scale emissions and fossil fuel extraction—and as such shifts the culprit away from carbon-intensive societies to the abstract image of the ocean. Following this logic, the culprits in B.C. are the rivers and forests. The invisibility in the narratives of the original causes for climate change—CO_2 emissions—precludes the potential for including this in the definition of the problem.

If the media indeed has a role in agenda-setting (Soroka 2002), or at least drawing attention to issues (Weaver 2014), then the framing by these newspapers that excludes climate change from the frame is notable. A further exclusion is that the authors' focus on the physical elements of the events (the data-driven reporting on wildfires size and streamflow, and efforts to fight fires or sandbag riverbanks) ignores the human impacts. This framing omits climate change and human impacts from the frame, therefore limiting the meaning given to evacuations from floods and wildfires in Canada.

Framing the type of movement: temporality, assisted, distance

The representation of the climate dimensions with mobility dimensions varies across sources and by the focus / topic of the article. As previously noted, very few articles make this

connection directly, and few frame it as “climate change”. Nonetheless, exploring how these articles represent the mobility dimension in these articles does provide insight on the framing of the relationship to the climate dimension and thus who is responsible. Regardless of whether the focus is domestic or global, authors framing strategies include elements of assistance, duration, and distance in framing mobility.

The articles in the local papers overwhelmingly represent the relationship between climate change and human mobility as one of disaster displacement or evacuations in the face of disasters. The national articles on disasters also reflect this. An evacuation is “the planned and supervised movement of people, animals and/or materials from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas to a safe place” (Lacroix 2012, 36). In terms of duration, evacuation implies a temporary move, but many people can lose their homes during evacuation, thus resulting in a much longer displacement. Therefore, framing the movement as “evacuations” misrepresents the actual outcomes of these events. The Canadian media, however, frame wildfire and flooding displacement and evacuations as temporary by how they describe the physical attributes of the floods or wildfires, the duration of the services provided, and the intent of those they interview:

> *GG1: Officials there say **river levels in the region have already started to recede**, but that many evacuation orders will remain in place until a second surge of water from melting snow has passed through local watersheds. That means a majority of those evacuated will have to **wait until Sunday and into early next week**, the regional district said.*
>
> *GG4: Last Tuesday, **evacuation orders were rescinded** for North Ruckle and **residents were allowed to re-enter the area***
>
> *GG6: **Residents could begin returning early next week,** but only if the wet weather doesn’t hinder efforts to clear roads and restore power, Sheriff Kory Honea said Wednesday.*
>
> *GG10: Those evacuated are being directed to the Cache Creek Community Hall, where an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) has **been set up to help provide them with food and accommodation.** ...She adds that accommodation has not been an issue, with those evacuated able to stay locally**….“High water in Cache Creek normally lasts three or four days, she notes, and hopes that the creek simmers down soon.”***
>
> *GG12 “Residents under evacuation order are being directed to reception centres in Grand Forks and Midway, **but Maika said the surge of water should pass quickly.”***
>
> *GG16: There are two evacuation centres set up and **currently staffed by Red Cross volunteers** in the Boundary.*

> *KTW1: The reception centre is where evacuees have been asked to go to register, receive information and be provided with food, clothing and lodging.* ***The women expect to be housed on the university campus until they can return home.***
>
> *KTW1: "I'm almost 100-per-cent mine is gone," she said of her home, as tears ran down her face. "I've never seen flames like that." … "I don't know if the house is there or not," she said…****The women expect to be housed on the university campus until they can return home.***
>
> *KTW16: People affected could register at the* ***Emergency Social Services reception centre at the Cache Creek Community Hall, 1270 Stage Rd., and receive vouchers for accommodation and meals.***

However, in articles that report one or two years after the event (which are rare!), they discuss the more permanent nature of such evacuations and that such displacements are not temporary. For example, during the 2018 floods in Grand Forks the reporting focused on evacuation orders and alerts, as demonstrated above; however, beginning in the fall of 2018, Grand Forks Gazette began reporting on the city's buyout plans for residents in flood-prone areas, suggesting a more permanent outcome of their original evacuation. There is no data in British Columbia on the duration of evacuations, and the 2021 report by the IDMC states that after the emergency phase of a disaster, little data is collected (IDMC 2021, 43). Anecdotally, some people are still not in their homes since the 2017 / 2018 floods and wildfires, and the lack of data perpetuates the misconception that evacuations are short-term. Furthermore, the media frames movements as "evacuations" in the moment despite the obvious longer duration of the mobility. The articles on Paradise, California demonstrate this tendency. The same can be found in the reporting on Fort McMurray where the movement is called an "evacuation" but accompanied by references to the loss of homes and entire neighbourhoods. Several excerpts imply the movement is not, in fact, short-term:

> *GG6: Paradise has been under mandatory evacuation orders for nearly three weeks since the firestorm killed at least 88 people* ***and destroyed nearly 14,000 homes…*** *"Everywhere you go* ***you're talking to people who have lost everything*** *and it's just tragic," Word said.*
>
> *GG9:* ***As many as 100 homes could be receiving flood-related buyouts*** *after a landmark City of Grand Forks council decision made public Tuesday night.*
>
> GG21: *A number of families and businesses who saw the worst of water damage* ***are still receiving help from the Canadian Red Cross, one year since heavy flooding devastated areas of Grand Forks.***

> *GG20: He has lived in Paradise for nearly 80 years...**MacGregor said he probably would not rebuild: "I have nothing here to go back to."***
>
> *GG28: Stone did **ask evacuees who may have family elsewhere**, especially in the Lower Mainland, **to see if they can stay with them instead**. Most evacuees are not staying in group lodging, Stone added, **but are staying with friends and family or have found accommodations with local families.***
>
> *KTW1: After they registered, they planned to go and stay with family **until they're allowed to return home. They haven't been told when that could be.***
>
> *K27: **Some knew they have lost their homes**. Some assumed there would be nothing but ashes when they are allowed to return.*
>
> *GM2: By week's end, 80,000 residents had been evacuated, many fleeing for their lives. **More than 1,600 structures were confirmed to be lost, whole neighbourhoods gone in the city… There is currently no timeline for residents to re-enter the city, and officials have said it will not be safe for people to return for "a significant amount of time."***
>
> *GM18: Now, **her parents may be part of the outward migration caused by the fires. They are packing, deciding whether to return to Fort McMurray - their home for 35 years - or return to Newfoundland and Labrador, where they grew up.***
>
> *GM20: Currently, evacuees outside a reception centre in Lac La Biche, Alta., talk about their desire to at least get a look at their houses to gauge how much work might be in order…Still, many are realistic that officials have to take the necessary time to make sure it is safe to do so. Indeed, an explosion in the city on Monday **destroyed several homes**, raising fresh concerns…*
>
> *NP13: But he fears "the worst is to come" as the shock of the evacuation wears off and the trauma of losing a home sets in. He worries people will grow frustrated **living as evacuees for many months.***

So, while the media chooses mobility terms that are explicitly framing movement as short-term, paradoxically, they do so while alluding to the long-term nature of the movement. The media's representation of such local movement as mainly temporary and localized not only contradicts the reality for many, but also contrasts with their discussion of climate related movement in the abstract. One way the media does this is by using "climate refugees" in conjunction with "migration" which usually implies a longer duration than displacement (Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne 2017). What is also notable in the temporality of the framing, is that the media use "climate refugees" when discussing slower-onset events such as droughts, desertification, and sea-level rise abroad, whereas the media only cover the mobility in Canada linked to sudden-onset "disasters", such as floods and wildfires. Furthermore, the term "refugee" itself implies the person is crossing an international border. As the section above on geography indicates there is an inconsistency in using the term "refugee" in reference to those on

the move locally in response to floods and wildfires (see next section), and then using it in the global context to imply the response is crossing a border.

Framing those on the move: agents, victims, threats

The articles framed people affected by floods and wildfires as agents, victims, and/or an abstraction. The threat frame, present in several other media analyses on climate migration (Bettini 2013, Farbotko 2005, Hartmann 2010, Høeg and Tulloch 2019, Ransan-Cooper et al 2015, Sakellari 2021), did not appear in the local sources about those evacuated or displaced, but does, to a limited extent, in articles about those on the move abroad. Newspapers explicitly describe people on the move as people, refugees, migrants, evacuees, and victims. The majority of the articled used the neutral term "people," but disaggregating by topic shows that climate mobility and migration and refugee articles also use the term migrants and refugees; climate change articles predominantly use "refugees" (eighty-three percent of these articles); and disaster articles are the only topic to also use "evacuees" and "victims" along with "migrants," "refugees," and "people."

I also coded for the implicit framing of people. I looked beyond the terms themselves to how the newspapers framed the people, their situation and their degree of agency; I used the codes: agential, victim, threat, abstract, collective, individual.

The dominant framing of people in the local papers was that of agential—people with the capacity to help themselves and their neighbours, to contribute to the emergency efforts underway, and to advocate for themselves. This frame was evident in the case with the residents' reaction to the initial buyout plan in Grand Forks (see below) and connects to what others affected by climate change (and perhaps all people) want. For example, South Pacific islanders, often referred to in the foreign press as the world's first "climate refugees", reject being

victimized and assert their adaptive capacity and historical use of mobility in response to environmental change (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012). While the articles in the local sample are not directly speaking about climate migration, the articles mainly depict residents of Grand Forks and Kamloops and surrounding communities impacted by floods and wildfires as active and agential people. Furthermore, when referring directly to those impacted, the articles almost always used the terms "residents," "people" or "evacuees." The articles almost never used the term "victims" or "refugees" despite its colloquial use for people forcibly displaced, instead focusing on their agency and efforts:

> *GG4: "It was impressive,* ***the community effort … we managed to [sandbag] the whole dike****," Enns said. "****We were stacking bags faster than the river was coming up, so in our minds we were winning, we were getting it."***
>
> *Response efforts have been great, they said, from the volunteers, people bringing food, search and rescue teams and officials at last week's public meeting.*
>
> *GG5: Some downtown businesses sandbagged their buildings' most vulnerable points, while a* ***legion of volunteers heaved sandbags seemingly non-stop at the Grand Forks arena****, filling thousands for residents who needed them.*
>
> *GG10:* ***Many people, including Village crew members, Cache Creek firefighters, and volunteers, have been working to safeguard the fire hall and adjacent properties with sandbags, noposts, and gabions*** *(wirework containers filled with rocks that can act as a dam).*
>
> *GG12:* ***"It's been truly amazing," she said. "I was just downtown and there are tons of people down there helping all the businesses sandbag their places as best they can."***
>
> *GG15: "****We're not flood victims," read Ruckle resident Dave Soroka's sign, the flip side reading, "We're not asking for favours."***
>
> *GG19: Officials are asking residents to keep sandbags in place, and, if the water came close to breaching sandbags you had in place, add more as a precaution.* ***Groups are still actively sandbagging at both the arena and the airport in Grand Forks****, most days beginning early morning and going to late evening.*
>
> ***GG 24 Property owners who will receive buyouts for last year's flood say the amount of money being doled out by the provincial government isn't enough…Now residents are circulating a petition that will be presented to B.C. Minister of Public Safety…***
>
> *KTW2: And we evacuated so quickly that we realized* ***we have to help our friends and neighbours****." **Help they did**. As bombers and firefighters arrived on scene, Chisholm and Harder told friends and neighbours about what was happening and* ***helped them evacuate***
>
> *KTW5: Wilcox-Oakes is no stranger to nearby fires. Although her farm has never been evacuated,* ***she took on evacuees and livestock during last year's wildfires near Monte Lake.***
>
> ***"We don't unpack our go-bags anymore****. If I want to wear some of my nice jewelry, I go dig it out of the go-bag," she said.*

> ***KTW 16**: Normally, Cache Creek would have a sandbagging work bee around this time, but due to COVID-19-related gathering restrictions, it has instead left bags and sand piles at various locations around town and **left people to fill their own**.*
>
> *Coomber said **a few residents, however, are "going nuts and helping others" by filling more than they need, leaving readymade sandbags that can easily be picked up by others**.*
>
> *KTW21: He said **farmers**, **First Nations and others attempted to contain these blazes before firefighters were able to attend**. "To be clear, most people should evacuate when there's an evacuation order, without a doubt, **unless you are able to contribute in some way to the fight against a dangerous wildfire,**" Abbott said, noting those who choose to stay can be eyes and ears on the ground for B.C.WFS.*
>
> *KTW26 **While about half of the town had left prior to the evacuation order coming down**, the remaining residents were instructed to go south to Kamloops and other communities*
>
> *KTW29: "We will hope to follow in the shadow of Slave Lake in our perseverance and resolve," Blake said. "**And as we look to the future, this is still a place of incredible strength, resiliency and vibrancy. We'll come back some day**."*

The national papers also almost always spoke of people in the collective and in the abstract, rarely telling personal stories or speaking of individuals. The national sources were less likely to employ the agential frame and across all topics of article, and I coded to the victim category more often than the agential category. The agential code, however, does appear in articles reporting on Canadians responding to wildfires and floods, and in one article in the National Post on flooding in Brazil:

> *GM2: From the safety of a friend's house in Morinville, north of Edmonton, Kwame Osei said **he was confident his community will rebuild**, and may even grow closer, after the disaster.*
>
> *GM14: **"The moms" have friends and family to help them, enough savings that they're not going to end up in a soup kitchen or a camp for internally displaced persons.***
>
> *NP15: One displaced woman in Belo Horizonte, Bárbara Ferrarezi, told The Washington Post that a metre-high flood swept through her house, destroying nearly everything. **"We are going to try to recover**," she said, explaining that she didn't have any insurance.*

While the agent frame dominates the local media, the authors do also deploy metaphors and other rhetorical devices to tell the story in another way (Dryzek 2005). In some articles, authors shape the story in relation to forced displacement and frame those impacted as victims. Forced migration and displacement literature and policy often use the verb "to flee." While it is not verbatim from the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugee agencies, scholars, and organizations,

including the UNHCR use it colloquially. For example, the UNHCR webpage states: "Our primary purpose at UNHCR is to safeguard the rights and well-being of people who have been forced to flee" (UNHCR n.d.). Authors make both rhetorical and explicit references to refugees throughout the articles; they also use other devices that frame those impacted as victims. This includes references to urgency, chaos, uncertainty, volume, and destruction. Whereas the articles might also speak to people's resiliency and agency elsewhere in the document, they retain language that implies victimhood:

> *GG6: After **fleeing** a wildfire that came dangerously close to his Northern California home earlier this month, Dale Word evacuated again when flash floods inundated roads and trapped motorists and residents.*
>
> ***GG18: "Half the town is under water, more or less, thousands of people have been displaced,"** Cannings said. "They have a thousand volunteers sandbagging, trying to repair the dykes that were damaged. **They're completely burned out and they've been working around the clock. They're at their wits end."***
>
> *GG29: In May 2016, a wildfire near Fort McMurray **forced more than 80,000 people to flee the northern Alberta city,** destroyed 2,400 buildings and burned nearly 6,000 square kilometres of forest.*
>
> *K27: **They came streaming into the arena** on McArthur Island in Kamloops **by the hundreds** on Friday night… They were the **shell-shocked and weary residents** of Cache Creek and Ashcroft, **forced to leave their communities as a massive wildfire, whipped up by strong winds, roared on.***
>
> *KTW29 At a camp about an hour north of Fort McMurray, Kamloops resident Ryan Saucier **spent the night sleeping on the floor** to make room for a few of the tens of thousands of people evacuated from the city.*
>
> ***KTW29 Within hours, however, her daughter, Melissa, was fleeing** the Suncor Energy plant an hour away to get back to Fort MacMurray after officials called for the evacuation of the northern Alberta city of 80,000…As of Wednesday, **Prevost's family was split up**: **her son-in-law evacuated to a camp in the north, while her daughter managed to borrow a car from a neighbour who was at the shelter so she could flee south to Athabasca**, where she and her son are staying with friends…"They were both at work ,so **they've got nothing other than what they had on them**," Prevost said.*

The victim frame creates a storyline that people require the assistance and humanitarian intervention of others. In the local context, this includes emergency management services, financial assistance, and necessities such food, water, shelter. The news often use the victim frame to generate awareness, to provoke policy action or to sell news (Baldwin 2014, Ransan-

Cooper et al 2015, Felli and Castree 2012, Hartmann 2010). Labeling people as "refugees" is also an efficient way of representing them as victims, often to evoke humanitarianism given that refugees are in need of help (and entitled to international protection). The term "refugee" appears in forty-three articles, and of those occurrences, thirty of them are in stories about climate change or disasters (not climate mobility or migration and refugees). In a 2017 media analysis done on the Fort McMurray fires, Anna Mongibello (2017, 59) finds the term "refugees" occurs fifty-two times in eighty-nine local and national news articles. While the term "refugee" only appears in three of the forty-one local articles in this dataset on the floods and wildfires, notably it appears in conjunction with language elucidating an individual's capacity, heroic efforts, or the efforts of authorities.

> *KTW2: And with nowhere else to go,* ***the couple's front yard became a pseudo-refugee camp, housing RVs, evacuees and what was thought to be the last of their family's worldly possessions.***
>
> *GG28: Turner said that Kamloops* ***authorities are doing their best to handle the influx of refugees.***
>
> *KTW29: Fire* ***refugees*** *were recounting tales of* ***narrow escapes.*** *"I didn't have time for nothing. I literally drove through the flames. I had ashes hitting my face and the heat from the fire was that bad," he said. "Everything was jammed. It was nothing but the* ***biggest chaos*** *I'd ever seen."*

The media use the term "climate refugees" when referring to those beyond Canada's border. "Climate refugees" appears in sixteen articles in this corpus, only once regarding displacement in Canada. Although academics and policy-makers rebuke the term, climate justice advocates and climate activists continue to use this framing. The impetus is to drive progressive climate policy and or international assistance for those most vulnerable to and thus most impacted by climate changes. The Canadian media, however, discuss "climate refugees" alongside conflict, war, killing, death, violence, instability, and indeterminate numbers. This maps onto the findings in existing literature and media analyses that even if framed as victims,

the way in which the framing takes place is negative. As such, the frame simultaneously mobilizes the threat narrative that the mass migration of climate refugees is disastrous, catastrophic and/or a crisis (Sakellari 2021, Høeg and Tulloch 2019). This appears across the corpus:

> *KTW7: Yes, we are heading for the "never exceed" average global temperature of +2C. Yes, that means there will be famines,* ***huge waves of climate refugees****, and a lot of* ***killing*** *at the borders – and then it will get really serious.*
>
> *KTW8: That's when* ***the pressure of migration will really take off, and the rich countries are simply not going to let the climate refugees in.***
>
> *KTW9: The same applies* ***to the migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe****, even though thousands of them are drowning in the attempt****. They are fleeing*** *poverty or dictatorial regimes,* ***or even climate change*** *– but they are not fleeing war.*
>
> *KTW10:* ***Many countries can't grow enough to feed their own people now and intense heat and semi-permanent drought will make the problem far worse… There will be tens of millions of refugees*** *and their destination will be the relatively developed and well-fed countries of Europe (and, in the case of refugees from central and southern Africa, South Africa as well)…****Similar waves of climate refugees will be washing up against the southern border of the United States and the northern coast of Australia.***
>
> *KTW11: "Not in front of the children" is still the rule for* ***governments when it comes to talking about the mass movements of refugees and the civil and international wars that will erupt when the warming cuts into the food supply.***
>
> *GM4: The* ***number of climate refugees would soar****, exerting even greater pressure on an already* ***strained global capacity to manage the forcibly displaced****.*
>
> *GM5: Beaches disappear, climate refugees – "the coastal displaced" are forced to haul their families and whatever possessions they can into the centre of the continent.*
>
> *GM14:* ***Soon, it'll be the climate refugee next door****. The* ***United Nations*** *predicts that there will be up to* ***200 million such refugees by 2050****.*
>
> *GM19: The iron law of climate change is that the less you did to cause it, the quicker and harder you're hit by its effects. Which means, expect lots of human beings on the move.* ***The United Nations estimates that we could see a billion climate refugees over the course of the century.***
>
> *GM22: Joining this endless exodus are the world's first (official) climate change refugees, who are fleeing the sinking Marshall Islands for Tyson Food factories in Arkansas,*
>
> *GM 24:…the new analysis pointed to profound changes* ***in the Earth's*** *water resources that should serve as a wake-up call for policy makers. "There are implications in that map for food security, for water security and for human security in terms of things like conflict and* ***climate refugees****," he said.*
>
> *GM34: The* ***world is failing in its effort to avert catastrophic climate change****, a United Nations panel warned on Monday, and the result will be* ***more*** *deaths and* ***climate refugees*** *due to extreme weather and rising seas, a greater rate of species extinction and reduced economic growth.*
>
> *GM35: In the* ***Indian subcontinent****, population movements, now and in coming years, reveal the plight of those fleeing religious persecution as well as that of the many economic and* ***climate refugees****.*
>
> *GM41****: I am afraid of resource wars and further militarized borders*** *to keep out the estimated 143 million people who will be forced out of their homes in the next 30 years by food scarcity, drought and*

> ***rising sea levels. Climate refugees are already on the move**. Most are people of colour from poor countries and regions –the people least to blame for the crisis*
>
> *KTW18: What they don't enjoy is the thought of living in a **world** ravaged by desertification, ocean acidification and **mass migration of climate refugees**.*
>
> *NP8: They are in fact closely linked via the claim that "climate refugees" will eventually be moving **across the globe** in vast numbers.*

As the excerpts illustrate, the newspapers simultaneously present refugees as victims and threats. They do this by employing language that refers to "climate refugees" as helpless or in distress and moving in large numbers from places of the Global South, thus implying a threat to the stability of receiving nations in the Global North. Furthermore, the papers frame those abroad in terms of refugees, forced movement, and large flows of people; whereas they frame those at home as agents who contribute to disaster responses.

Conclusions

The findings reveal several insights about how the media frame climate mobilities, as well as provide answers to the questions I posed to organize the analysis of the data. The first question was about the topic of articles in which climate change and human mobility intersect. Topically, articles about consequences of climate change, stories of migrants and refugees, and, most frequently disasters, dominate how the media bring climate change and human mobility together. This is not to suggest that the issue does not also appear in other topics, and this was apparent with the "other" category in the national sample. Very few articles focused specifically on the intersection of climate change and human mobility.

I explored the second question, how news media represents the relationship between climate change and human mobility, by looking at explicit and implicit word choice, storylines, and what articles discussed as the main topic. For movement beyond Canada, the relationship is assumed, abstract, under interrogated, and simplified. This finding contradicts what the climate

migration literature empirically tells us about how and why people move in the face of climate risks. The articles claim or imply that climate change will drive migration (often described as "mass" or with descriptors indicating large volumes of people), this will occur all at once, and it will be international or across borders. For movement within Canada, the relationship is concrete, observable, increasingly a challenge to Canadian communities, but also localized and temporary. Displacements and evacuations frame the mobility side, but authors are careful to represent "climate change" through the specific climate impacts (floods and wildfires) rather than naming "climate change" directly. This framing creates conceptual distance from climate change, but more importantly from its causes.

The Canadian media represents people affected by climate change in different ways, depending on where they live. People who live in Canada have agency, contribute to response and recovery efforts, and, while likened to victims, the news never only represents them as such. Reports on floods and wildfires occasionally include the voices of those displaced. Indigenous Peoples, who climate change and disaster displacements disproportionately impact in Canada, are largely absent from the coverage on Canada. Beyond Canada, the media more often explicitly describes people as victims, collectivized and in the abstract, rarely using the voices of those with the lived experiences. The media uses "climate refugees" to refer to people beyond Canada, and while doing so, they oversimplify the connection between climate change and human mobility.

There is a clear disconnect between domestic and global mobility demonstrated by the discourses and framings of the phenomenon within and beyond Canada. Human mobility in the context of a changing climate takes on a very different meaning depending on where it occurs, who is talking about it, and who it concerns. This observation does not intend to imply that local

context does not matter for how climate change intersects with human mobility, but rather to problematize the assumptions that "climate migration" or "climate displacement" is something that happens beyond Canada and to make visible what happens when we make that assumption. The disconnect also perpetuates the notion of climate change as a distant problem that happens to "other" people. The construction of climate change as a distant problem – temporally, socially, spatially – with a high degree of uncertainty partially explains policy inaction and the inability of humanity to act in a timely manner to mitigate the physical impacts (Spence et al. 2012, Tvinnereim et al 2020). "Spatial optimism" or the tendency, particularly in wealthy industrialised nations, to perceive climate change as a greater risk to distant locations than to oneself is a psychological explanation for this (Tvinnereim et al. 2020). In the Canadian context, climate change already displaces Canadians. A more accurate depiction in the media of climate impacts on Canadians would provide an alternative narrative to counter the spatial optimism and overcome barriers that prevent timely action on climate change.

The media coverage, framing and discourses of the floods and wildfires in Canada construct the issue in a way which has knock-on effects as a policy problem. Canadian national news media rarely (if ever) define an explicit policy problem associated with climate mobilities, which is the first step in generating solutions or policy options (Entman 1993). Given that one of the roles of the media is to augment public awareness, how the media frame and cover the issue matters. This framing also suggests what editors and authors assume about their readers both in terms of the issues they are interested in reading about and how they understand the relationship between climate change, disasters, and mobility. The discrepancies between *National Post* and *Globe and Mail* coverage (both in volume and substance) reify the existing ideological perspectives of their readers and perhaps contribute to the polarization of society along political

lines. For instance, centre/left leaning readers of the *Globe and Mail* have those beliefs reflected back to them, whereas more conservative readers consume the *National Post*'s perspectives on the validity of climate change and on Canada's responsibility (or not) to those beyond our borders.

The media cover displacement within Canada in the face of record-setting floods and wildfires as a series of short-term evacuations of people who are agential and non-threatening, assisted by neighbours, local organizations, and governments. The framing of human mobility in the face of climate change beyond Canada is a tool for making the case about the severity of climate change or about the plight of migrants and vulnerable people from the Global South. This implicates very different policy levers and mechanisms. The next chapter explores "climate migration" as a discrete policy issue in Canada to see if and how it appears as an issue on policy agendas at various levels in Canada. It starts with a review of existing and related policies in Canada before then turning to key-informant interviews with policy actors.

Chapter 6 – Constructing Climate Migration as a Policy Problem in Canada

Introduction

Despite extensive analyses of climate migration discourses and policies at the global level (see Nash 2018, 2019; Baldwin 2020; Hartmann 2010; Bettini 2013; Bettini and Gioli 2016; Methmann and Oels 2015; Wiegel, Boas, and Warner 2019), there have been few policy analyses at the sub-state level (except in New Zealand and the United States), and none specifically in Canada. This is perhaps remarkable given it is states that implement international frameworks and policies, and it is states that negotiate their formulation.

The current Canadian government purports to be committed to both climate change issues and migration issues. Indeed, Canada serves as a Champion of the Global Compact on Migration and is on the Steering Committee of the Platform for Disaster Displacement. Canadian migration policies and programs and refugee resettlement are often exemplars for others around the world (Cheatham 2020, OECD 2019, IRCC 2020) and a source of pride for those working for the IRCC (as I heard from several interviewees: FM3, FM1, FM7, FM2).[27] In terms of climate change, despite Canada's actual performance or the realities of our climate policies, the government repeatedly purports to be a leader in this space. In 2015, Canadians elected a majority Liberal government committed to leadership on climate change and migration issues. In the 2019 *Speech from the Throne*, following re-election, the government laid out bold plans to fight climate change, which included to "provide help for people displaced by climate-related disasters" (Government of Canada, 2019). Previous studies on government priorities demonstrate that the

[27] I used a coding system for my interviews to ensure participants' anonymity and their confidentiality. The codes following quotations in this chapter are a combination of letters which correspond to their level of government and sector, and numbers to indicate which interview number it was. See Results and Discussion below.

issues in the Speeches from the Throne contain information about the issues on which government intends to act (Foucault and Montpetit 2012, 654; John and Jennings 2010). Moreover, as previously discussed, extreme weather displaced thousands of people in Canada in recent years. In this context, I investigate the ways in which Canadian policy actors conceptualize the climate mobility nexus as an issue of concern (across government levels), what shapes their concern with the issue, and the implications in terms of future policy trajectories with how it is conceived. I focus on how actors define the "problem", both in substance and process, and the assumptions that are implicit in such a definition.

In the broader context, given Canada's reputation as a nation that welcomes people in need of protection and our experiences with climate change impacting our own population, this chapter provides an illuminating case for how this issue plays out at the national and subnational level. What my analysis reveals is that there is a conceptual disconnect between mobility within Canada and mobility beyond Canada in the context of a changing climate. This disconnect results from the policy levers available to the actors who are involved in defining the problem of "climate migration" – actors, unsurprisingly, appear to define the problem in a way that will allow them to address it. For Canadian policy actors engaged beyond Canada, "climate migration" is a complex and political topic that they are trying to better understand empirically, it is an issue of international protection, humanitarianism and often framed in reference to low-lying island nations. In the international domain, actors draw on humanitarian and responsibility narratives that align with their institutional or organizational mandates. In contrast, for those focused within Canada, given that floods, wildfires and storms have always displaced people, the concept of "climate displacement" has little salience. In the domestic policy domain, actors

define the problem in terms of resilience, vulnerability, disaster risk reduction and emergency management, which in turn relates to jobs, housing, infrastructure and safety.

This chapter begins by building on the research approach I laid out in chapter 4 and further elaborates on my approach to analysis. My detailed discussion of my methods and methodology sets up the results and discussion section. In the results and discussion, I present my analysis of qualitative interviews I conducted during 2020 and 2021, and I discuss the findings in relation to existing knowledge and literature. I inductively coded my transcripts and present the findings along the themes that emerged: causality, terminology, timing, location, responsibility; and then influences: political, international, individuals, events, and media. The final section offers some conclusions on how this issue is being framed in Canada and the implications of those framings.

Methods and Methodology

The objective of this analysis is to understand how national and subnational levels of governments in Canada frame the connection between climate change and human mobility. To do so, this paper analyzes qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants involved in sectors that relate to the nexus of climate change and human mobility (referred to as climate mobilities for simplicity below). I employ frame and discourse analyses to explore how the "problem" emerges, linking problem definition to agenda-setting. I coded my data inductively, identifying themes and subthemes as they emerged.

The empirical data for my analysis are transcripts and summaries of thirty-one interviews which I conducted with thirty-three individuals between March 2020 and June 2021 whose work in some way intersected with the nexus of climate change mobility abroad or here in Canada (specifically in British Columbia). In 2020, I received funding from the Pacific Institute for

Climate Solutions (PICS) at the University of Victoria to work with the Climate Displacement Planning Initiative (CDPI) an NGO in Vancouver, to map the issue of climate displacement in B.C. I conducted un-recorded interviews, conversations, and hosted a virtual workshop as part of this project (with the guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality). As this project focused on B.C., following these interviews, I identified gaps in the data I had and then conducted additional interviews with those looking beyond Canada, mainly those working in the federal government.

My method for identifying and recruiting participants started with participating in the Adaptation 2020 Canadian Conference in Vancouver (February 2020). I also gained access to an existing list of individuals, created by CDPI, who had started to identify people in Canada working on "climate displacement." In some cases, I used internet searches for individuals working with organizations involved in the 2017-2018 flood/wildfire response and recovery efforts in British Columbia. I also received names from the B.C. Government's Climate Action Secretariat who knew of individuals working in specific regions of the province. It is important to state here that of those with whom I spoke, no one self-identifies as a "climate migration" or "climate displacement" expert, and CDPI is the only organization in Canada with such a focus. As an abstract concept, as opposed to a designated policy domain, I used my own judgement, in addition to the generous suggestions I received from those with whom I spoke (snowball sampling), to identify individuals until no new names emerged. This method identified relevant individuals from several policy domains including climate adaptation, emergency management and disaster risk reduction, community and international development, (im)migration policy, and integration services. I conducted interviews with the guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality, as established in my Ethics Protocol (#19-0159) (see Appendix II for information about interviewees and interview methodology).

While interviews provide the opportunity to access rich data and information that may not be available through other methods or other sources (Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight 2006, 172), the interviews were inevitably shaped by the questions I asked and to whom (I did not interview security actors, for example, because none of them responded to my requests for interviews), parameters on what policy actors can say (I was twice asked what my security clearance was), the amount of time we had, and the participants' perception of the questions (Hammersley and Gomm 2008, 100). As summarized by Alshenqeeti (2014, 43), the disadvantages of interviews are that they are time-consuming, limited in number, never totally anonymous, and there is the potential for subconscious bias and inconsistencies.

I used several strategies to overcome these limitations and increase the validity and reliability of my findings. I received feedback from two committee members on my interview questions. I listened to my recorded interviews several times; I read the transcripts several times. I sent a summary of each interview to the participant asking for corrections of my interpretations. I kept conducting interviews until I stopped hearing new information (i.e. I reached "saturation" (Saunders et al. 2018)). I conducted pilot interviews before beginning. I checked statements made by interviewees when they referenced publicly available documents. I conducted follow-up interviews with several participants and emailed back and forth with several others.

My interviews all took place during the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, all my interviews were conducted through videoconference or telephone. While this might not have been as much of an issue during another time, during the pandemic, almost all participants connected from their home "offices" (sometimes with young children wandering in and out of the room). I conducted the interviews while everyone was doing much of their work via Zoom (thus Zoom fatigue), and in various degrees of "lock-down" depending on where they were located. The

strain of working from home and the impact of the pandemic on people's well-being in general could have affected both my participants' and my own intellectual acuity (Fiorenzato, Zabberoni, Costa, Cona 2021; Ro 2020). Additionally, the unprecedented scale and magnitude of COVID-19 overwhelmed the public service, shut down borders and migration flows, and could have shifted how people felt about the priorities of their work in sectors such as climate adaptation, community development, and migration and refugee policies relative to health. Some participants spoke with a much greater enthusiasm about their work than others. At the provincial and federal level, five potential interviewees (working in Emergency Management and Security) denied my request for an interview citing pandemic-related work(over)load, several others never responded.

Individuals represented local, provincial, federal and First Nations governments; civil society, universities, and international organizations. The positions of those interviewed included policy analysts and directors, diplomats (retired and current), program coordinators and directors, scientists and academics, consultants, and community service providers. In terms of policy areas, individuals worked in areas related to climate change (adaptation), migration, global affairs and development, and emergency management or disaster risk reduction. I provided a list of sample questions in advance of each interview (See Appendix II). These questions focused on how their work relates to the intersection of climate change and human mobility, how they understood the intersection, how it had emerged as an issue of importance, how it relates to existing policies or priorities, and difficulties in working with / on it.

I followed Rubin and Rubin's (2012) responsive interview technique. This style of qualitative interviewing emphasizes a friendly and supportive tone, a flexible pattern of questioning, and a relationship based on trust and reciprocity that sees the participant as a partner

in exploring the research questions rather than as a subject (Rubin and Rubin 2012, 36-37). In one interview individuals prepared responses in advance, although the actual discussion followed a more responsive and interactive format and deviated from the order of the questions. Videoconference platforms auto generated transcripts which I then rechecked against the video recording for accuracy and to "stay close to my data" (Rubin and Rubin 2012, 210). I also annotated the text with notes about body language, intonation, and other clues to meaning that are invisible in transcriptions

Before analysis, I reread my transcripts several times for immersion in the data (Green et al. 2007), and I wrote summaries organized by thematic questions of each interview. I also wrote up and emailed participants a two-page summary of the interview which contained the key points plus follow-up questions; this provided them the opportunity to make amendments and / or add additional information. As some of the data collection took place in the context of a specific research project for which the analytical approach was narrower than this chapter, elsewhere, I identified key issues that emerged from the different interviews and plotted them against the sector of the individual (see Bates-Eamer 2021, 50). This map of key issues by sector was a deliverable for the CDPI project and aided me in identifying gaps in the data. I used this mapping exercise to identify other sectors and levels not yet represented in my data. A such, nine interviews took place after this initial CDPI project concluded, but all interviews provided data for understanding how the issue is emerging.

How issues are represented affects possibilities for policy change (Bacchi (2009, 12). As such, who, how and where the nexus of climate change and human mobilities emerge provides insight into what Canadian responses might be. Although this approach to policy analysis, developed by Carol Bacchi, usually works back from a policy position, in this analysis, I will

take the discourse of policy actors as the proxy for the policy position because there are no publicly available policy proposals in Canada. A limitation of such an approach, as any approach studying an emergent policy issue, is its potential to be misguided or miss what the issue ends up being about. In an introduction to a special issue on the emergent policy issue of charter schools, Henig, Brown, Holyoke, and Lacireno-Paquet (2004) state "studying emergent policy regimes is like cloud watching in a hurricane." Nonetheless, the value of such studies resides in their ability to inform public deliberation and decision making while there is still space to influence how the issue is conceived, and to examine how and why institutions, processes and contexts form and interact before issues coalesce into concrete policy and the ability to examine the interplay of these factors is lost (Henig et al 2004, 1076).

Bacchi's approach is based on a series of questions (see Table 6). Because Canada has yet to develop policy at the national or subnational level explicitly on "climate migration" or "climate displacement" my analytical framework diverges from hers because I focus on actors.

Table 6. Bacchi's Guiding Questions (Bacchi 2009)

1. What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?
3. How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? What are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?
5. What effects (discursive, subjective and lived effects) are produced by this representation of the 'problem'?
6. How and where is this representation of the 'problem' produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?

There is a fundamental problem of ontology with using Bacchi's approach in analysing interview data. For Bacchi, who takes a Foucault-influenced poststructuralist perspective, discourses construct political subjects, they are not independent of them (Bacchi 2015). Instead, problematizations are ways of thinking that emerge from practices, not from people. As such, my

analysis better aligns with an interpretivist ontology which understands actors as problematizing agents (Bacchi 2015, 3). Furthermore, Bacchi predicates her approach upon the existence of a policy (proposal) that contains implicit problem representations; policy actor's opinions are not a substitute for such representations (Bacchi 2021). As such, I adapt Bacchi's approach to better fit an interpretive analysis of how *actors* understand the "problem" of climate mobilities and not problematization as a method or process in and of itself. This shift applies most directly to the first questions where I align more closely with those interested in ideas and discourse in policy change (Hajer 1995, 2006; Schmidt 2008, 2010); but the shift also maps onto questions two and three aimed at assessing the narratives and the underlying discourses with which actors define political problems. In this regard, Hajer's discourse analysis approach reveals the terms of the debate, and it includes both the discursive production of meaning and the socio-political context from which actors construct such meaning. I adapt Bacchi's subsequent questions to illuminate what is made invisible, but drop her final question because responses are, to a certain extent, predetermined by those with whom I spoke (see Table 7). I anticipate finding various representations of the "climate migration" phenomenon, particularly across scale. I also anticipate finding various assumptions underly these representations that silence specific dimensions of the policy debate, leaving some issues unproblematized.

Table 7. Analytical Framework – inspired by Bacchi (2009), Hajer (1995, 2006), Schmidt (2008)

Guiding Questions	**Level of Analysis**	**Site of Analysis**	
1. How is the link between climate change and human mobility discussed and framed? Where/when do the interviewees imply this link is realized?	Content, text of interviews	Policy actors with an international mandate (12)	Policy actors with a domestic mandate (21)
2. How has the issue emerged or come about? (substance and process)			
3. What assumptions underlie how "climate mobilities" are emerging as an issue for policy?	Discourse, ideas, concepts, institutions, and structuring context/practices		
4. What is left unproblematic in this issue emergence? What are the silences?			
5. What effects are produced by this understanding of the 'problem'? What are the unintended consequences of this understanding? Who is implicated from this understanding?			

My analytical framework allows for two levels of analysis: both an explicit and an implicit interrogation of the interview data. My framework enables me to present my findings in my interviewees' own words, but also to identify the discursive practices and contexts that illuminate the roles of ideas, power, knowledge and language in the construction of policy problems. As such, I organize this next section around the explicit responses from interviewees regarding questions one and two and is then followed by a deeper analysis and discussion that relates to questions three, four, and five. For questions one and two, five themes inductively emerged for each. For question one, I cluster the data on the climate-mobility nexus thematically: causality, terminology, timing, location, and responsibility; and for question two, I cluster the data regarding how the issue has emerged around the following themes: political, international, individuals, events, and media. I also divide the findings in terms of the geographic focus of the interviewees, giving primacy to those working in federal agencies with an international mandate (beyond Canada) and directly on the intersections of climate change and human mobility. I then present findings from those whose work intersects with the issue within Canada, but who do not necessarily identify as working on the issue of climate change and human mobility specifically.

Results and Discussion

I have divided this section into subsections based on level of analysis, the first two sections present the content from my interviews (questions 1-2 Table 7), while the final section explores the underlying discourses, ideas, and contexts in which actors discuss the problem (questions 3-5 Table 7). I organize the first subsection by starting with responses from those with an international mandate followed by those with a domestic mandate because how actors discuss and frame the link differs widely across mandates. I have included excerpts from interviews with

internationally focused actors who I interviewed later in the project even though I do not balance these with direct quotations from domestic actors. The second subsection identifies the factors affecting the emergence of the issue (domestic, international, individuals, events, media) for those with an international mandate. I did not ask domestically mandated participants what was shaping the emergence of the issue, and as such there are no quotations for these actors. The codes after the quotes refer to the participant; I coded people by their level of government (Federal, Provincial, Local, First Nation), sector (Migration, Climate, Emergency Management), and by number when there were multiple people from the same level and sector. I often use multiple quotes from the same people to demonstrate a specific framing. The third subsection explores, at a higher-level, the underlying structures, assumptions and silences that frame the issue of climate mobilities.

I have two disclaimers to make about the data used in this section. First, the policy actors in the domestic sphere are predominantly from British Columbia, although not exclusively. Second, I did not record many of the discussions with these domestic-focused actors. I also hosted a workshop during the CDPI project, and some of the domestic actors' data comes from that. Instead of transcripts, my data from these actors consists of notes of conversations and summaries of discussions. As such, I do not include transcript excerpts in the data presented below from the interviews for the CDPI project.

Linking climate change and human mobility: how, where, when?

As mentioned, examining policy emergence is a tricky business, likened to "cloud watching in a hurricane." The actors with whom I spoke, are, to a certain extent, aware of their role in the problem definition phase of policy-making and that *how* they define or frame the problem matters. As put by one participant: "I think generally speaking, there is a willingness to

frame this and frame it correctly**.** But this is why, you know, it takes time and it takes consultation" (FM5). To be crystalline on this point: the participants, particularly those working in migration and refugee policies on the issue beyond Canada, stated many times that they were still in the process of understanding the issue. Nonetheless, how this meaning is beginning to take shape is evident in how, who, and where actors discuss the issue. The five themes discussed below demonstrate how actors' framing of the issue illuminates different dimensions.

Causality – How do actors frame the link between climate and mobility?

Migration is complex, multi-causal and context specific. As such, isolating climate change as *the* cause of migration is problematic (de Sherbinin 2020). Participants were sensitive to this complexity and this difficulty when asked about the link between climate change and migration. They expressed genuine concern with making a direct causal relationship; and they also noted the need for more data or research.

…what we know is that you cannot isolate a single driver of migration because they are all so interconnected, so actually looking for that does a disservice to the complexity of migration decisions. FM6

I think that everybody agrees that climate change is a real thing. Everybody agrees that mobility/migration is happening, and we want to kind of make it as smooth as possible and as effective as possible. But putting the two together is a question…. FM3

…it's like we've got two parallel things [climate change and migration] *and I think it just seemed natural to try to bring them together, but that doesn't fit so nicely…*

…we know that there's an issue, but, you know, there's not enough empirical evidence…and we can't prove that the driver is climate change. FM3

There's definitely no "causal" linkage between the two [uses fingers to put "causal" in air quotes]. FM3

A link between slow onset events and mobility is more difficult to make than between sudden onset events and mobility (Zickgraf 2021, IDMC 2021). Participants made distinctions between slow and sudden events by framing causality in reference of the voluntary (slow) or forced (sudden) nature of movement. However, some mentioned that movement is both

voluntary *and* involuntary, while others mentioned that the voluntary / involuntary binary is a continuum. The (contested) idea that there is a forced/voluntary binary in terms of someone's degree of agency also mapped onto specific policy actors who might be responsible. For example, those working in refugee affairs spoke more about "displacement" (forced from sudden onset events), whereas those working in immigration spoke more about proactive or voluntary movement (voluntary from slow onset events).

Our team would be responsible for policy development around climate migrants, meaning people who are…[pauses] *there's an element of (…) voluntariness to their movement. And so, part of this would be in response to longer onset events, though not necessarily. And there are a lot of blurred lines between the two. For Refugee Affairs colleagues, it's more about sudden onset events and disasters, or another natural event that has displaced people across borders.* FM4

…in the context of…sudden onset natural disasters - because that's a lot of what we'll see - people [are] displaced by hurricanes. FM2

…slow onset doesn't need to be responded to the same way as sudden onset. FM2

…we have these discretionary mechanisms to respond to things like sudden onset disasters (…) that target a specific group. But there was nothing in terms of the conversations that we were having, that we are really looking at the long term here (…) I would say it was a little bit frustrating to see the consistent focus on the short term, and the lack of desire to develop things that do look as far in the future as our international partners were suggesting that we should all be looking. FM2

…so my hope is that we do start talking more about human mobility, because it's a continuum, and that way we're not stuck. We're working with migration / displacement for now to get us started…but there is a continuum, there are all kinds of people moving and for different reasons; and what I want to know, at the end of the day, is who is deserving of protection under the international regime as it exists today for refugees? FM1

…what we've decided in-house… is…you can voluntarily move in anticipation… And then there's going to be involuntary displacement, and we're not calling it "forced displacement." We're kind of open, or just saying "displacement" for now, but we know that it's going to evolve, we know that it will, and part of that evolution is going to come from international discourse. FM1

The causal chain, however, begins with the *consequences* of climate change on humans and society, not with the *cause* of climate change itself. Indeed the "root causes" are mostly invisible in the conversations I had with people, none making the link directly to greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, or other causes of climate change. There was also no mention of

Canada's contributions to climate change, for example, our fossil fuel use or oil industry. Only one participant actually made a reference to the root causes and hinted at Canadians' role:

> *…in the Refugee protection regime, we often forget to talk about root causes. [Waving hands and speaking loudly]: TALK ABOUT THE ROOT CAUSES because otherwise you're always fighting a fire that never goes out…. You know climate change has roots in what we did, in our actions, in what we do. FM1*

Those working in integration and settlement services in British Columbia are less concerned with causality than those working in Ottawa. *Why* an immigrant comes to Canada is less concerning for these actors; instead these participants are most concerned with newcomers' needs such as finding a job, housing, access to transportation, etc. once in Canada (PM3). In some cases, cause of movement does matter, but only if/when the cause of the movement impacts the needs of the incoming populations (for example, their requirement for health or mental health services) (PM2) or the numbers of people coming as was the case with the Syrian resettlement program (PM1). All participants from this sector, however, did comment on the increasing visibility of "climate migration" as a topic of discussion (not an empirical reality) in the sector.

Although none of the individuals I interviewed working in the domestic sphere considered themselves or their organizations to be working specifically on the intersections of climate change and mobility, compared to the actors with an international mandate, these actors were *less* abstract in how they discussed the interaction. In terms of causality, on the climate change side they spoke explicitly about disasters, floods, wildfires, and sea-level rise or coastal erosion; on the human mobility side, they spoke about evacuations or displacements. They also discussed managed retreat, planned relocations or home buyouts in relation to moving households out of harm's way before or after impacts (FC1, FE1, LC1). Some individuals spoke of how wildfires displaced people directly, but also had a 'domino effect' displacing people

indirectly when mill closures resulted in people moving elsewhere in search of employment (LE2). Almost every actor with a domestic focus mentioned four issues of concern when speaking indirectly about the intersections of climate change and human mobility within Canada: jobs, housing, equity, and vulnerability.

My data also reflects an "ontological contradiction" whereby actors note we cannot identify climate migration as a phenomenon discrete from other forms of movement but then proceed to discuss it as if we can (Nicholson 2014, 3). Respondents acknowledged that the nature of the relationship between climate change and migration is too complex and too arbitrary to make any truth claims regarding the linkage. However, these same actors then proceeded to discuss or make reference to "climate displacement" or "climate migration" as something to address – as if they had not just declared that they cannot ever identify either the person or the process as analytically or empirically different from other forms of migration (Nicholson 2014, 3). Furthermore, almost all participants stressed the need for more science, data, or consultation with partners to better understand it – having already made clear that they can never actually observe the "it." Of note, those working on the issue beyond Canada, talked about science and data coming from outside of Canada; they never mentioned data coming from displacement or mobility within Canada in the context of a changing climate.

Terminology – What words do actors use to describe climate mobilities?

One of the most contested and debated elements of the climate migration literature is around the terms used to refer to those on the move in a changing climate. Who are we talking about and are they "migrants" or "refugees" or something else? The issue arises because actors use "refugee" simplistically or sociologically to refer to those forced to move, but, as discussed, the term "refugee" has specific meaning in international law and places legal obligations on

states. Furthermore, a binary understanding of agency (either forced or voluntary) is inadequate in the context of a changing climate with sudden and slower-onset events impacting people. Canadian policy actors looking globally are attuned to the political implications of calling someone a climate "refugee" and the responsibility it places on states; almost every one of these actors mentioned the newly established commitment across government to avoid the term, some including why. Several also said that we need to start with a definition, despite the trouble in establishing one.

I mean we spent hours just figuring out, language…vocabulary…what we want to say…There are certain people that were completely insistent about not using "refugee" and…were the most consistent about using "mobility" which was great. FM3

So what our team does versus Refugee Affairs (…) involves sensitive definitions around 'climate migrants' and 'climate-induced persons' and not 'climate refugees' FM4

Everybody has been working on it [definitions] *for years and years. And they have come closer, but we're still in need of a lot more dialogue… What we're trying to do is take out the words that everybody has agreed will not work. So, we will not use "climate refugee".* FM6

I think one of the problems...is that if you start defining what a climate migrant is, and if you call them "refugees", which of course people in my department or, you know, in most [Global] *North countries are terrified of, they don't want people defined as "climate refugees", because that'll open the doors.* FM7

all I'm trying to do…is not lock us into anything. So, I don't want us to say "climate refugees" …it's erroneous, but also it communicates the idea that… automatically a solution [is] *required. There's mitigation, there's development, there's a lot anyway…I'm trying to keep the language open and neutral enough to allow the government to do whatever it wants to do in the end.* FM1

…how do you define "refugee" and "migrant" on the spectrum, when it's a moving spectrum? There are 20, 30, 40 different factors involved [in people's movement]. FM7

Despite the federal government's position not to use the term "climate refugees," it did creep into a respondent's narrative:

…countries like Bangladesh, with potentially millions and millions of climate refugees, while they are all being resettled internally… they have some really wonderful programs that are run by the government, by cities, by NGOs. There's a lot of Bangladeshi kind of answers to their own internal issue. FM7

None of the individuals with whom I spoke who work in the domestic space used terms such as “climate migration,” “climate refugees,” or “climate displacement.” Instead, they see such movement as an extension of historical and existing displacements and evacuations in the face of disasters; and disasters have always been a reality for people living in Canada. Furthermore, participants who worked directly with people affected by disasters, spoke about the disconnect between “climate change” as a concern and the impacts of floods and wildfires. This is especially true during or in the immediate aftermath of the disaster because people have more immediate concerns (than climate change) such as where to go, how to feed their families, and what has happened to their homes (INE1, LE1, LE2).

While “climate displacement” had little salience in 2020 when I conducted the interviews, I did hear from participants in the B.C. Government that they were interested in developing an action around “climate displacement” in their forthcoming adaptation strategy (PC1), and others spoke to the increasing concern from communities regarding displacements from floods and wildfires (LC1, LC2). The release in May 2021 of the B.C. Government’s *Climate Preparedness and Adaptation Strategy* does include an action to: “Improve and promote understanding of the disproportionate effects that climate change has on distinct human populations, including the potential for displacement, and integrate this knowledge into government initiatives, including climate risk assessments and adaptation plans” (BC Government 2021, 28). The extensive evacuation orders, displacements, and the complete destruction of the town of Lytton, B.C. in the summer of 2021 from wildfires, may be a critical juncture for terms like “climate displacement” in B.C. and their narrative fidelity. Narrative fidelity is closely linked to issue salience, and is the ability of the story to represent the world as

people understand it and thus be successful in affecting judgement and decision-making (Policy Horizons 2017).

Timing – When do actors frame the climate mobility nexus as taking place?

Timing refers to when the "problem" of "climate migration" takes place; this matters in the problem definition because it relates to the urgency of defining the issue and developing policy responses. For example, a problem that takes place in the future requires less urgency for developing solutions, whereas a problem that is already occurring or occurring in the near future must be defined in a way that allows for immediate action. The way in which participants spoke about timing varied drastically across scale.

Forecasts of both the future impacts of a changing physical world and the implications of such impacts on society characterize climate change and climate mobilities (Ooman, Hoffman, and Hajer 2021; Baldwin 2014; Baldwin, Methmann, and Rothe 2014). Baldwin (2014, 518) notes how grammatically, actors represent the relationship between climate change and human mobility in the future conditional tense with the assumption that it will increase. Ooman, Hoffman and Hajer (2021) argue that actors "bring the future to the present" by using imaginations of the future that are socially performative, with the possibility to mobilize current actions and structure decision-making. Participants looking at mobility beyond Canada generally spoke about the 'problem' as a future event; they spoke about movement as something that was longer-term, but there was also mixed sentiment regarding the urgency and the status of the issue in their departments:

> "*and it's still way early* [for policy development] *because this is only still at the working level and it's nowhere near any kind of approval, or any kind of research or answer to any kind of analysis as to the impacts... For the time being or for the immediate future, it's really more of the same because we do not have a new direction that we can solidly go forward on.* FM6.

> "*I do know there will be climate change displacement…but I agree with you, it's already happening. I think* [a] *prime example is the migrant caravans…Honduras is going through*

drought…and their farmers are just…You can't survive in Honduras a farmer. So, you're going to join the migrant caravans." FM1

…but we are going to get to a time where mobility increases to the point where not having a policy response to it is unreasonable, it's imprudent… FM2

Some towns are doomed or will be destroyed in the coming years from sea-level rise and salinization of water systems – these people will need a solution. FM7

The futuristic framing of climate mobilities abroad contrasts the current reality of climate mobilities in Canada. Domestic actors described displacements from floods and wildfires not just as a future possibility but more so as something that had already affected individuals, households and communities directly. In terms of duration, participants described it as often short-term or temporary. In some cases, however, actors spoke about the prolonged or protracted displacement that individuals experienced in Grand Forks (following the 2018 floods) and around Kamloops (following the 2017 wildfires) (LC1, INE1, LE2). Emergency Management B.C. reports that wildfires displaced 65,000 people in 2017, 6,000 people in 2018, and at the time of writing this section (the halfway point of the 2021 fire season), B.C. is already significantly over the 10-year average for number of fires, area burned and evacuation alerts and orders (CBC 2021).[28] Participants working on what is happening in Canada know that displacements from extreme weather and wildfires already occur and they are not a future conditional; they are a current reality to which they are already responding.

Location – Where do climate mobilities take place?

Location refers to where "climate mobility" takes place. The international mandates and focus of participants looking beyond Canada predetermined the issue as an international one.

[28] At the time of writing revisions in October 2021, this year was the third worst wildfire season in history in terms of the areas burned. We do not know the exact number of people affected by the evacuation orders and alerts, although in email correspondence, a B.C. Government employee told me that there were 16,441 total properties on evacuation order and 59,813 properties on alert over the season. EMBC uses a model of 2 person per household to estimate people affected by the alerts and orders, but in some cases, the province put properties on alert or order more than once.

None of these participants mentioned displacement or mobility within Canada. Participants made references to certain countries and regions more than others – particularly the Caribbean and the South Pacific. While a degree of abstraction persists in the discourse, the specificity of implications on low-lying island nations appears to have narrative fidelity with Canadian policy actors, despite the distance from this region to Canada. (In addition to these excerpts, there are references to location in other quotes that I do not include here.)

So, each country is going to be uniquely impacted by this because of geographic realities. FM4

Every country on the planet is affected by climate and therefore climate migration, to some degree. FM7

our focus [is] *on Latin America and the Caribbean, because we understand those to be our source countries, more so than countries in the South Pacific that are threatened by similar kinds of issues…* [Our department is] *looking at this issue in the context of sudden onset natural disasters because that's a lot of what we'll see… people displaced by hurricanes.* FM2

We have had quantum events like the various hurricanes that have struck the world in the last five years. Look at the Bahamas a couple years ago, that certainly got people thinking. FM7

It could be in a different form for every country on the planet in a way. Because in West Africa, it's so intermingled with customary migration flows, with drought; in the Pacific, it's related to sea level rise. FM7

Participants raised sea-level rise in the South Pacific in three ways: as an existential question for international relations, in reference to a specific resolution tabled by Tuvalu at the United Nations in 2019; or with interest in the policy responses by New Zealand and Australia for neighbouring low-lying island nations. Participants spoke of Tuvalu or Kiribati as a site of displacement, and/or New Zealand or Australia as a site of reception. The country of Tuvalu tabled a resolution at the UN in 2019 addressing climate migration, and in January 2020, the UN Human Rights Commission ruled on a case regarding Ionane Teitiota from Kiribati seeking refugee status in New Zealand. Both events were frequently mentioned by participants, perhaps unsurprisingly, given that movement from low-lying island nations is likely the only scenario in

which climate change will create new forms of mobility (Mayer 2016, 27). The inundation of low-lying island nations thus presents a fascinating legal issue with the "disappearance" of a modern state.[29] Participants also hinted at a sense of trepidation that someone from the South Pacific would claim asylum in Canada based on climate change and the government would not be ready to respond.

You've probably heard of this UN resolution on climate migration that was formulated by Tuvalu back in July 2019. FM7

You may have already heard Tuvalu tabled a resolution at the UN, right? That resolution is dormant; but it's not dead, and it's not gone. If they revive it or if someone else revives it, or if another resolution comes along with the same sort of ideas, what's the kernel in that? FM1

Not only when there are certain moments that arise, but also the anticipation of moments somewhere in the future. A couple that come to mind are the draft Tuvalu resolution at the UN... FM4

I would say that as things progressed, we started looking more and more toward New Zealand, because New Zealand has experience actually adjudicating these kinds of claims. So, there is relevant case law which is always relevant, especially in another common law jurisdiction. There was a point where they were considering doing a visa program which has since been put on pause indefinitely. But there was a lot of looking at their work and understanding that in the South Pacific - just because we're seeing a lot more urgency on this file - countries like New Zealand and Australia are engaging with it a lot more directly than countries like Canada. [Canada] *would be likely to see an influx of migration from the Global South at a far later time than Australia and New Zealand who are traditional receiving countries for a lot of these states.* FM2.

But, but we certainly do look to other countries experiences to see what we can learn, what's applicable to us and perhaps not. New Zealand is the example that I would have raised, because they were considering a humanitarian visa, and then instead moved towards focusing on interventions more at the other side of the spectrum [adaptation in situ]. *I think Canada also approaches the issue by, first, this is one adaptive option, a lot of times people do want to stay in their homes so how do we make that possible. How do we support that?* FM4

Climate displacement has been on the radar, and there has been reporting done on it, especially from colleagues, based in the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. We've had to deal with a number of climate-related disasters elsewhere in the world…But there are some places, particularly in the South Pacific, where the existence of some of these islands is really under threat, and they won't have an internal place to displace to in so many years. So, what happens then? These people will need to go somewhere, somehow. So, this is the big question that is

[29] I recognize that this is legally intriguing for international relations' and legal scholars, while also acknowledging the severity, consequences and lived experiences for the people, culture, and islands.

being asked. And that's why we are especially focused on what is going on in New Zealand and Australia, because it is right on their doorstep. FM6

Kiribati had a president who was really proactive and was doing things like reaching out to regional states with the basic plan of getting his people the skills they required so they would get labor permits to then move off of Kiribati when the time came. Like really forward thinking. I was all excited about it…They had agreements with an Australian network of colleges and they were getting people into colleges! FM1

Along with terminology, location is perhaps the starkest difference between those looking internationally and those looking domestically. The intersection of climate impacts and human mobility playing out in Canadian communities does not register as relevant or of concern for those looking internationally. While perhaps unsurprising, given that internationally mandated actors are interested in better understanding how climate change intersects with human mobility through the lens of migration and protection policies, failing to learn from communities in Canada is a missed opportunity. The concern for domestic actors is almost entirely on internal movement within rural areas, between rural and urban areas, between cities, and on evacuations and managed relocations from areas of higher risk to areas of lower risk.

Responsibility – Who is responsible for responding to climate mobilities?

Responsibility refers to who is responsible for the policies related to the intersections of climate change and human mobility. The actors working at the federal level on mobility beyond Canada articulated uncertainty about the potential responses and stressed the need for further deliberation, consultation, and collaboration. As discussed above, there was a recognition of the complexity of the issue and the need for a better understanding of what exactly the issue is. Furthermore, actors' reluctance to use the term "refugee" acknowledges that if they do, it places the responsibility on the state. Some actors stated the need to develop policy, whereas others – one quite confidentially – challenged the need for any new policy at all.

I think it's just because it [the topic] *is hot, because it brings the two major issues that they* [Canadian politicians] *feel comfortable with together; but there doesn't…it doesn't need to be together, is kind of where I think we're thinking in terms of our policy work…* FM3

where are we artificially putting something into the minds of people, because it tends to fit some sort of agenda, and at the end of the day (…), *once we've done the research, the policy thinking is not actually appropriate at all.* FM3

Several respondents mentioned the ways that Canada already responds to disasters and sudden-onset events abroad through humanitarian responses, and as discussed above regarding causality, there appears to be a split between policy development for sudden-onset events and slow-onset events.

I could not find a specific moment where climate migration / displacement was handed over to us (…) but in the grand spectrum of international assistance, Canada has always supported development and humanitarian projects and so it's something that clearly over time, kind of develops as part of certain projects on adaptation, mitigation and so on… FM5

Canada supports humanitarian development projects at the outset, and some of these have been linked to slow onset or sudden climactic events. And so, it starts before climate migration itself becomes an issue. There are already a number of programs that deal with adaptation, in certain areas, and mitigation of certain problems related to climate, agricultural projects and so on doing things differently in order to adapt to drier conditions or whatever else it might be. FM5

A lot of the longer-term positioning of Canada is: let's make sure we understand this very well and let's make sure that we understand what the implications for Canada might be, before we get ahead of ourselves. So, it's really that improved coherence and collaboration and further study. Then at the same time we continue to engage internationally on these issues. So, we can't wait for the moment that we're ready with a position, we continue to engage with others to influence them, to hear where others are at. We find that in all areas people are grappling with this issue, whether it's other states, international organizations or civil society here in Canada. So, we are continuing to have conversations with them and to hear others speak about the issues from different perspectives. FM4

Some participants also felt that Canada should develop a new policy, and that we need to develop it urgently—before it becomes a problem that we do not have a policy.

… and I put these reports to my colleagues in headquarters and said you know "what are we doing about it, where is our policy, because sooner or later this is going to… you know… this issue is going to jump up and bite us on the nose." FM7

… but we are going to get to a time where mobility increases to the point where not having a policy response to it is unreasonable or it's imprudent, and it will end up biting us in

the ass because we're not going to be prepared to respond to the kinds of questions that a lot of our partners will be responding to. FM2

From project participants who worked at the local or provincial level but in immigration services or policy – or in large urban centres – there was consensus that international immigration is at the discretion of the federal government. They noted their work is more affected by volumes and flows than the reason for movement, so long as the reason does not impact immigrants' needs once in B.C. communities (CC2, PC2, PM1). One participant remarked that one way in which climate change impacts migration is through B.C.'s need for skills and expertise in clean technology so B.C. can transition to a more climate friendly economy (PM1). This is a unique and rarely discussed connection between climate change and human mobility and its possible implications for B.C. (and the role of provincial labour recruitment actors). Another surprising perspective that I heard several times related to American migrants: that wealthy Americans will move to Canada because they are growing tired of living through the California wildfires or the Texas storms.

Finally, domestic actors described displacements from floods and wildfires as a problem that required policies related to emergency management, disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation and /or community development. For these participants, the idea that climate change would impact displacement was neither abstract nor a concern for the future; but part of ongoing efforts to develop climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts in the province. In this context, provincial agencies, local governments and community actors are responsible (and are aware of that responsibility) for mobility in the face of disasters.

Evolution of the issue

After asking actors to discuss how the issues of climate change and human mobility came together or were coming together in their work (if at all), I asked internationally mandated

participants how they came to pursue the issue or what was affecting policy development or attention to the issue. I coded their responses along five themes: political, international, individuals, events, and media which emerged inductively through (re)reading and analyzing my transcripts; I noted that the same actors referred to many different themes in their responses.

Political

Political considerations refer to the domestic political climate. I interviewed people in policy positions to understand the process behind the evolution of "climate migration" as an issue, but I naïvely understood these people to represent the views of the government. Several respondents, whether implicitly or explicitly, reminded me that they serve the government of the day; they made a distinction between the government and its decision makers, and themselves as public servants.

> *what I need to do to be a good public servant here is to report back on these calls for normativity and normative responses to climate change. To report back and then let Canada make its decision, you know, do we join that? Do we not? What do we do with respect to that? … My role would be just to provide as much information and advice as I can on how things are shaping internationally and then laying out options for government…. I'm not suggesting policy for the Government of Canada as to how we should enter those discussions or what we should be saying in those discussions; they* [international efforts] will *evolve with or without our policy direction here at home.* FM1

> *And at those points I think ministers and decision makers at the top of the political pyramid are going to have to take some decisions, and the issue will crystallize around those decisions.* FM7

> *I meann it's not like an NGO; NGOs are completely driven by the charisma of the leader. And that's how they get money and that's how they get their work done. But it's not the same at government at all. It's what is driven politically and then how we, as loyal and faithful public servants, can help drive that.* FM3

As such, these participants mentioned the "colour of the government" as the reason for their unit's interest in the topic (FM1). In Canada, the Liberal (red) party has been in power since 2015. They have organized their governing agenda with mandate letters which lay out their priorities, key areas of focus, and responsibilities. Issued by the Prime Minister to each ministry,

the mandate letters reflect a commitment to leadership on climate change and migration issues, and feature prominently in explanations for how the issue emerged or evolved in the participants' unit.

It's the government of the day that directs my interest…if they were not interested in doing any of this, I'd be doing something else. I think it was mentioned in his [Prime Minister's] *Speech from the Throne and for our minister - there's climate displacement in his mandate letter*[30]*… It is the political call of the government to do this…It comes from the government's mandate…it's a political call as to what we do.* FM1

So, I think when Prime Minister Trudeau came in, there was a sense of okay we can renew our engagement on these issues; and it would be interesting to get more work done, especially because it's such a politically charged topic. Between different governments [ruling political parties]*, there would likely be different priorities.* FM2

… because it is completely in line with the liberal government's principles and what they want to achieve…but at the end of the day, it's political. We have to go with what is in the mandate letter, we have to hear what PCO [Privy Council Office (the Prime Minister's strategic office)] *says.* FM3

I became much more aware of it in that, for example, the Speech from the Throne, both in 2019 and 2021 had a definite emphasis on climate change in general, so not necessarily climate migration, but climate change, but that that was echoed also in many of the mandate letters. FM6.

I also heard several times that this Liberal government is also interested in multilateralism. I include this here, instead of the next subsection, because it refers to domestic politics positioning the acting government in the international space.

So right now, we have a government interested in multilateralism… The next government we don't know, obviously, but this one, definitely a belief in multilateralism. That's why I am tending my ear to what's happening internationally, because I have a government that is interested. FM1

International (frameworks, expectations)

I asked policy actors about processes affecting how the issue was taking shape. Participants spoke of international dynamics involving or affecting Canada. These included international frameworks such as the global compacts on migration (GCM) and refugees (GCR),

[30] Following up on this comment, I noted that there is nothing in the Minister's mandate letter, but the link between climate change and mobility was in the transition binder which staff prepared for a new Minister.

the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD), the Paris agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR); but also, informal institutions and networks related to Canada's role in the world and the expectations of Canada in these spaces or on these issues. In this regard, policy actors spoke specifically about the international calls and activities for the protection of people displaced by climate change, and alluded to pressure from others for Canada to develop policy in this space. When asked about other countries that Canada was looking to for insights, advice, or as an example, New Zealand featured heavily in responses (see above).

Participants mentioned Canada's commitment to multilateralism and specific institutions at the international level:

We are attending the [international] *meetings and we are asking questions. We have regular or frequent encounters with both the IOM and UNHCR leads on climate change, they're familiar with us, we're familiar with them. They are also part of the PDD, and along with the PDD there are other nations that have been very engaged on this, have been very much in the forefront on climate change and displacement. For example, Norway, Switzerland, but we're part of the steering group of the PDD.* FM6

I would say that normally speaking, we have to be very aware of our international commitments and our place in multilateralism, in international responsibility, burden sharing and all that. We have committed to certain documents, the GCM for example, the GCR and so on. And even though those are not legally binding, we have become quite invested in them, and we are GCM champions. So, there's a certain amount of responsibility that you kind of take on. And whether that will go so far as legislative change, if that's required, that's a very long process. It's hard to predict. FM6

*But the PDD is just a fountain of knowledge, and they constantly keep us in touch with all the other key platforms and processes that speak to a larger range of activities on climate change, like COP 26, Sendai Framework, Paris Agreement…GP20 (Global Protection Cluster). [*laughs*] It's like alphabet soup!... DRR, the 2030 Agenda* [SDGs]*….they keep us linked in to all these*…FM6

My focus, and the reason it's coming up in my files … is because I'm keeping an eye on the international protection regime and there are calls out there or musings or discussions that perhaps there should be some sort of protection for those who are displaced by climate change, environmental degradation, and disasters…. The primary organization that I'm following is the PDD. So, I'm following those discussions - we are a member of their steering group. FM1

My colleague is very involved on the GCM. We also have a team that's involved with the Global Compact for Refugees which recognizes climate, environmental degradation, natural

disasters, and that they interact with drivers of refugee movements…there is the Champion role that we've taken on in within the GCM, which gets Canada some, some influence and a central role. FM5

I also heard that Canada understands itself as a leader in the migration space and that this reputation has a direct impact on policy development in Canada.

And one of the things that we actually heard quite often, from the people working in New York for instance, was: well, Canada is a leader on immigration. Canada is also a leader on climate change. It makes perfect logical sense that we would become a leader on climate related mobility. FM3

This perception by the policy people [that Canada is a leader in this space] *is actually quite beneficial to policy development because, I would say, that it is something that is often brought up in meetings, and it serves as kind of an impetus for people to say "oh well, we do want to continue being leaders on this so we might as well work on it."* FM3

Well I think that it [the need to develop a position] *stems from the Global Compact on Migration, and the fact that we are 99% in alignment. And I think that basically, we have been expressing ourselves and other countries have been seeing us as leaders in migration management generally.* FM3

I think there's a couple of drivers, I think that on the international stage based on our expertise in migration management and in climate change people are seeing us as a natural fit. And people are looking at Canada to have some sort of position FM3

Participants also spoke of the importance of networks in thinking about issues:

our networks are not just those that we have at headquarters and in Canadian society but we work so closely with our staff at missions and then they have networks that they established while they're at posting that we can also benefit from. FM4

So, again, I would say that everyone is struggling to understand this issue better, and we have a lot of channels of dialogue and, and we want to expand them and deepen them. And we engage internationally regularly with organizations such as the IOM and its environment division, and if they are meeting, Canada is there. And because we're in a learning and exploratory phase, our hope is that we can engage with those in the international community further to understand how they're understanding the issue, and what some of the considerations are. And part of this is, can we meet with other countries such as New Zealand to understand their experiences? And, we very much expect that we will continue to field more requests from civil society organizations to meet with us and to hear about their findings. FM6

The degree to which actors spoke of formal and informal international networks, institutions and frameworks influencing the Canadian process connects to international relations' scholars who prioritize the role of networks, norms (and norm entrepreneurs), and institutions on

domestic behavior. For example, Slaughter (2004, 162) argues that global governance networks build trust and establish relationships among their participants that then create incentives for (state) actors to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad one. Participants demonstrated this in mentioning Canada's reputation as a reason for developing policy in this space. Finnermore and Sikkink (1998, 887) explore the relationship between international law and international relations to stress the role of norm entrepreneurs in the emergence and adoption of new norms. Barnett and Finnemore (1999 and 2004) build on this to argue that international organizations, such as the IOM or UNHCR, have a rational-legal authority which gives them both power and authority (independent of the states that comprise them) to identify and categorize problems, fix meaning, and define new interests, norms, principles, actors and tasks. This is apparent in several of the participants' deference to the expertise and agendas of these organizations and their experts as they relate to climate migration. Haas (1992) argues that "epistemic communities" are networks of experts with specific expertise in a particular domain with shared principles and causal beliefs, validity and policy enterprises which influence policy. Participants and policy actors with whom I spoke appear to be part of such a community (at the global level) in the realm of climate mobilities.

As such, although bureaucrats in Canada may still be exploring the issue, they are attentive to the transnational networks and epistemic community seeking to influence a certain understanding of the climate mobility phenomenon. To a certain degree, these formal and informal international institutions' understandings of the issue are either as an issue for migration, refugee, and humanitarian policies as represented in, for example, the Global Compacts, or as one of adaptation in the UNFCCC.

Individuals

In some interviews, participants hinted at specific individuals championing the issue. When this was the case, I probed specifically about individuals' or leaders' ability to raise the issue or provoke discussion or progress on it.[31] In some cases, participants rejected this in favour of the former two themes; whereas in other cases, participants mentioned the interests of superiors or specific individuals committed to raising the profile of the issue. Actors always referenced individuals alongside other factors, and this theme is also not entirely independent of the political theme.

So, as the lead on my file, I got to be present at those meetings and there was kind of a sense that we want to get people who are a little bit higher up involved because, while a lot of the nitty gritty policy work happens at the analyst level, the agenda for the policy work is really director driven. And those are the people that we absolutely need in the room for those conversations, those are the people who often liaise directly with other departments and other branches and so we wanted to build those relationships up. FM2

And then at the same time, there has been interest within the department, so we had heard when minister [X] *came into office, that it was a priority for them. So that also drives our exploration of the issues.* FM4

…but I do know that our director general wants to see it, they want us to keep talking about it, they want us to do something on it… Which is fair because at any moment the ministry is going to say to us, "Okay, where do we stand?" So, we were constantly ready. FM3

I think there is an alternative to the crisis approach, and that is the personality approach. We have an extremely dynamic Ambassador now…and they're open to these kinds of humanitarian refugee issues and they're the kind of person who has the personality, the respect from the experience, the speaking ability, the connections to actually put these issues on the front burner. FM7

Policy champions push policy development. Scholars refer to these people as policy entrepreneurs, brokers, advocates or champions and there is a substantial literature exploring their impact (Kingdon 1995; Gladwell 2000). Kingdon (1995, 179-183) defines policy

[31] Part of my interest in the role of specific individuals relates to my own previous employment experience working with former high-ranking federal government officials. These retired officials, who were trying to engage governments on various global challenges, were adamant about using their networks to find individuals in different agencies or ministries or departments willing to champion an issue. They would often tell me "it is people who drive policy, so we just need to find who wants to move it."

entrepreneurs as advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy and reputation, money—to push their pet proposals or their conceptions of problems, and they are responsible not only for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling both problems and solutions to politics. While respondents often returned to the importance of political factors, the role of individuals' interest in the topic, does seem to also be a factor affecting how the issue is emerging. Furthermore, in some of my interviews, it was apparent that the person with whom I was speaking was perhaps a policy champion themselves; while in other interviews, policy actors spoke of other participants as championing the issue. The evidence for this was in how they spoke about having advanced the issue or implemented policy structures (e.g., working groups) for advancing issues in specific areas, thus demonstrating the role of policy champions in advancing an issue.

Incidents / Events

Like my direct probe regarding individuals, I also specifically asked about the role of events or moments in affecting the policy process. In response, participants often responded that the political mandate of the government was most important, but then also referred to specific disasters or events that raised the profile of the issue (often through media coverage, discussed next).

...But there are also these things that happen. If you remember, the Syrian refugee boy who washed up on the shores that just horrified people in Canada and all around the world, and it really galvanized the movement regarding Syrian refugees. So, you can't discount that kind of thing, but mostly it is due to our commitments and our responsibilities. FM6

We have had quantum events like the various hurricanes that have struck the world in the last five years. Look at the Bahamas couple years ago, that certainly got people thinking…. my instinct tells me that we're going to get it right, you know, between the eyes with this, when we get a refugee claim and asylum claim at the IRB related to climate migration - it's already happened in so many countries…New Zealand went to the Human Rights Commission. FM7

I would say that over the course of my tenure, the biggest influx of inquiries about this happened in the wake of last January's Human Rights Committee decision in relation to

Teitiota's case. And so, a lot of the questions were sort of framed around what does this mean for Canada? How would this play out if someone like Mr Teitiota were to come to Canada, as opposed to New Zealand? Legally and policy speaking, what do we have in place already to respond to this? And do we need anything further? …Yeah so that definitely kind of lit a fire under us. FM2

I think the most relevant place to start in terms of recent developments in this space is that domestically, we've seen nonlinear increases in our disaster impacts over the last 25 or 30 years that are fairly stark. The combination of those trends and our ability to quantify those trends and put them in front of decision-makers has had a major impact on some of the advances we've been able to make in Emergency Management. FE1

So I would say in 2013 when we got this luck of geography, which was the Calgary flood happening in the Prime Minister's constituency, along with 20 years of pressure building up and quasi intelligent narratives about the nature of the problem. That led us into a big shift towards flood risk management in Canada over the last five or six years. So that was just like the right pieces in place, along with the right circumstance, the right focusing event which occurred that allowed us to get traction finally and make some of this go. FE1

Several scholars reference the occurrence of 'focusing events' in determining whether or not something gets on the agenda (Birkland 1997, 1998; Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Focusing events are dramatic events that attract attention to public problems. As discussed by Thomas Birkland (1998, 54), who studies disasters, social mobilization and agenda setting, focusing events are sudden, relatively uncommon, harmful or indicate future harm, and are known by policy makers and the public. Such events do not, however, necessarily determine how, or with what meaning, a policy issue gets on the agenda. Nonetheless in the excerpts above and in other interviews, interviewees often referenced a specific event when discussing how issues emerge: the "migrant crisis" in Europe, the "migrant caravans" coming out of Central America, hurricanes in the Caribbean, the Calgary floods or the B.C. wildfires. A key element in the focusing events literature, however, is the existence of policy communities or interest groups, referred to as "advocacy coalitions" by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), who seek to mobilize in the aftermath of an event to push for change (Birkland 1998). In the case of climate mobilities in Canada, the lack of a well-organized policy domain or a policy community ready to take advantage of a focusing event and push the issue

suggests that until such groups exist the issue may have trouble moving up the institutional agenda. As climate creates more severe and intense weather events, however, given that focusing events can also mobilize groups, the likelihood that such groups translate focusing events into a mobilizing issue may increase.

Media

As with individuals and events, I directly asked some interviewees about the role of the media. I heard that they would both get questions directly from the media and respond to coverage that was in the media. The media's role in defining problems relates to their roles in both giving attention to issues and how they frame the issues (see chapter 5). Nonetheless, the policy actors presented the media as a somewhat secondary factor in affecting the issue emergence and several pointed to the media's alarmist or inaccurate reporting on climate change and human mobility, which corresponds to my chapter 5 findings.

> *This is a file that the department received a lot of questions on from media, from interested academics, just because it's kind of a hot topic issue; it combines a lot of things that people are interested in: international migration, regular migration, and climate change.* FM2

> *I do think that as is the case with a lot of policy development, it is motivated by looking at public engagement on these issues. And so, if you do see that something's a hot topic issue, if you see that you're getting a lot of questions about it from the media, usually COMMs* [the communication office] *would contact the people who lead on the files on the policy level...* [and ask for] *any bullet points prepped on this, or if you have a response that we can give to these kinds of questions, with the understanding that we couldn't speculate - as to the future of what that policy would look like - in the media.* FM2

> *The media is certainly a useful source for keeping apprised of climate migration-related developments, such as by highlighting useful reports or for tracking responses in other countries. However, given the difficulties in forecasting climate migration flows, the narrative sometimes appears overly alarmist as there is not sufficient context when data is used on what it means, what the limitations are, etcetera.* FM4

> *...the media isn't necessarily reporting on this accurately but there's a sense that in the future we're going to have to respond to this a little bit more directly because this* [someone claiming asylum for climate reasons] *could happen here.* FM2

> *And then it's all over the media, right, I mean* The New York Times Magazine *article but, again, that had a lot to do with migration happening within a country or mobility within a country.* FM3

There was also a lot of media monitoring, so I would occasionally get these kinds of inquiries that were like: hey, I read this article that speculates that the Government of Canada is doing X on this issue, can you look into this? are we doing this? FM2

...In my team, my manager was frequently sending me articles that they had read in the media or even just journal articles and they would sometimes just say: Can you summarize it and explain how this is relevant to our policy process. FM2

...the impact of media on say UNHCR or IOM, in that they will have press releases in response to disaster flooding in Mozambique, or this sort of thing, to generate greater aid... But, otherwise not so much - and of course the whole media attention around that Teitiota case. But otherwise, I would not say that media comes through first and foremost [as a factor driving the issue]... FM6

The responses I heard from participants varied regarding the impact of the media on policy development and the emergence of the issue in general. While some individuals referred to the news media as a site where the issue gets attention, others mentioned the role of the media as an actor influencing public opinion or asking questions of the government on specific cases. Like my probing questions around individuals and events, the media is only one of many factors that influences how and why policy actors give this issue attention. Furthermore, the ways in which policy actors process, engage with, and interpret the media varies across individuals.

Underlying structures, assumptions, and silences

The above responses, taken together, illuminate that the definitions of the 'problem' take place in the context of existing political, institutional, and international dynamics which shape both the ability for new issues to gain traction and how actors frame those issues. Actors mobilize the same narrative storyline—climate change is causing people to move—to different effects depending on the context. For example, actors looking at B.C. understand the problem of "climate displacement" as one of emergency management and climate resilience; actors looking beyond Canada understand the problem of "climate migration" in terms of humanitarian and protection policies. As discussed by Hajer (2006) and Schmidt (2008, 2010), what matters are the underlying structures in which the definition, ideas, or concepts of a particular problem are

discussed. While there is not yet discursive structuration (Hajer 1995) or one dominant definition of the problem (there are several), actors mobilize the emerging frames and narrative storylines in specific contexts to give different meanings to climate mobilities.

The interviews with actors working in sectors concerned with movement beyond Canada reveal the ideas and concepts underpinning their approach to the climate change–mobility nexus. First, they acknowledge the complexity of the issue and that it involves several sectors, not just those from migration and refugee policy. They also frame the issue in terms of existing narratives regarding Canada's reputation as a leader in multilateralism and migration governance. In this regard, actors do not frame it as a security issue as so often occurs at the international level (White 2011, Boas 2015) – although in some cases, the imply security implications. Instead, actors frame it more broadly as an issue of development, protection, and/or humanitarian action. Second, participants spoke of past disasters and Canadian responses to demonstrate that this is not a new phenomenon, while at the same time acknowledging that slower-onset impacts (such as sea-level rise) may warrant unique or new responses or policies. Third, and related, these actors all mentioned the low-lying island nations in the South Pacific, implying the performative effect of an imagined future in which territory no longer exists. This is somewhat surprising given that these cases represent such a small scale of the potential for displacement from climate impacts; but it does reflect the novel dimension of such movement. Finally, while some challenged the assumption that the climate migration nexus required new policy, others stated or suggested that Canada needed to be developing new policies. Thus, for Canadian international migration and refugee protection actors who acknowledge the problem is much broader than their mandate, the policy levers at their disposal constrain their actions. These levers align with the migration and humanitarian narratives that prioritize policy related to

protection gaps, and the rights of refugees and migrants. In effect, they give meaning to the problem in a way that is compatible with the instruments available to them and their own goals, metrics, and objectives. This understanding of the problem (a problem of migration and protection (both of people, but also of Canada's immigration and refugee regime and reputation)) assumes that movement will be across borders, that movement in one region (or state) is the purview of another, and that these movements are distinguishable from other forms of movement. It ignores the root causes of climate change and Canada's own climate policies as possible solutions, silences the voices of those displaced (both within Canada and beyond), and perpetuates a Global North-Global South dynamic regarding international migration. In terms of who is implicated from this understanding, we see in the creation of the interdepartmental working group on climate migration that the policy actors are trying to broaden the reach of the issue, but the working group is largely populated by actors from IRCC and Global Affairs, leaving domestically focused actors and affected populations outside the discussions.

Participants working in the domestic sphere frame the issue as one of climate adaptation; the humanitarian, migration, and security frames, more prevalent at the international scale, are largely absent. For actors working within Canada, 'climate displacement' as a concept has little salience even though their work relates through climate adaptation; community development; and emergency or risk management, hazards, exposures and vulnerabilities. These actors also used narratives regarding climate justice, social equity, and communities' and individuals' resilience. Again, the discourse relates to the institutional setting in which they work. For example, those in emergency management draw on disaster and risk frames, while those in community development sectors talk about the issue with reference to adaptation efforts, resilience, and mitigation efforts—and there are multiple frames even within these sectors (see

Dewulf 2013 or Adger et al 2011). This maps onto Schmidt's argument that institutions are both given and contingent for actors in that they both provide the context in which actors speak, think and act, but that actors' thoughts, words and actions also create institutions (Schmidt 2008, 314).

Actors whose work related to displacement in B.C. had a much more pluralistic understanding of the issue than those looking beyond Canada, perhaps because I interviewed people from a more diverse set of sectors. These actors included the disproportionate impact of climate events in and on Indigenous communities in their narratives and they were also vocal about issues of equity, justice and socially produced vulnerabilities. Participants spoke of the impacts of displacement on human health and the health of communities. They understood the problem as neither new nor novel, although they anticipated it worsening with increased intensity and severity of climate impacts. A phrase often heard in B.C. in the aftermath of the 2017 and 2018 floods and wildfires is that displacements from such events represents a "new normal" (Chapman and Abbott 2018).

With the actors focused beyond Canada, there were several striking assumptions and silences underlying how they talked about climate change and human mobility. First, there was an emphasis on the consequence versus the cause of the problem, or in other words, the problem was the potential movement of people not the greenhouse gas emissions that are driving climate change or local vulnerabilities to climate change. Second, and related, the potential policy responses lie outside of domestic policy levers and there was no talk of how Canada's own fossil fuel consumption or production was a factor in the problem. Third, there was an absence of talk about including the voices of those impacted in the exploration of the issue. Instead, actors made mention of international working groups, scholars and experts, and published literature as the source of information for better understanding the issue. In this regard, Canadian actors are

integrating themselves into the existing epistemic community at the global level that has already created boundaries around problem definition and excluded a range of voices (Nash 2019). Those working within Canada did not share these same silences.

Those working in Canada explicitly discussed the need to use the voices of those displaced by the 2017 and 2018 floods and wildfires to augment attention, action, and funding for climate adaptation efforts within Canada. Furthermore, actors developing additional research in this realm within BC could do so in close partnership with affected communities or be Indigenous-led if working with Indigenous communities. Regarding the second silence on Canada's own climate policies, domestic facing actors talked about how climate displacement considerations could be incorporated into existing mitigation efforts such as shifting to a low-carbon economy and B.C.'s climate act on reducing emissions and greening the economy. Finally, actors perceived the problem to be the impact of displacement on people and places, not the movement itself. Participants spoke about how to facilitate proactive movement to get people out of harm's way, while also ensuring that when climate events force people to evacuate, their well-being is protected by the systems and processes in place.

Conclusion

My findings reveal that the discourse, framing, and narratives shift dramatically across scale and policy sector when referring to the intersections of climate change and human mobility. As such, there is not (yet) a single problem definition in Canada when it comes to the intersections of climate change and human mobility. For those grappling with the intersections of climate change and human mobility beyond Canada they are doing so mainly in relation to existing international efforts on migration and development. They are attuned to the complexity of the relationship and are therefore taking their time in trying to better understand the issue

before developing a policy position. For those thinking about the intersection between climate change and human mobility within Canada (mainly in B.C.), the relationship manifests through narratives and experiences of disaster displacement: floods, wildfires and storms causing evacuations and temporary displacements. In this realm, the dominant frames focus on community resilience, climate adaptation planning, emergency management, and mitigating the impacts on jobs, housing, and the well-being of people forced from their homes.

What my analysis reveals is that there is a conceptual disconnect between mobility within Canada and mobility beyond Canada in the context of a changing climate. What I mean is that actors frame the "problem" of the intersection of climate change and human mobility in entirely different ways depending on their institutional setting. This maps onto the literature on problem definition and institutional fit whereby institutions adapt to better fit the problem (Young 2002, 2008), or actors attempt to change the institutional venue to better fit the problem (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Guiraudon 200; Pralle 2003, 2006). The disconnect in the framing across government levels and sectors results from the policy levers available to the actors who are involved in defining the problem of climate mobilities; actors, unsurprisingly, appear to define the problem in a way that will allow them to address it. To a certain extent, this suggests a hybridized model of institutional fit and venue shopping. In this case, when the formal institution or venue is static (for example IRCC), instead of changing the institutional constraints to fit the problem, actors frame the problem to fit the institutional venue. IRCC frames the problem through migration and protection policy. Global Affairs frames the problem through humanitarian and development policy. Canada Public Safety and Emergency B.C. frame it through disaster risk reduction. BC's Climate Action Secretariat frames it through climate adaptation and resilience. Local and regional governments frame it as an issue for housing and

jobs. Given the emergent nature of the issue, however, in time, the institutional constraints may adapt or change to better fit the problem as the definition evolves through deliberation and maturation.

While I examined the issue in Canada, place also impacts the meaning given to different phenomenon. Canada, at the federal level, has its own historical, political, and cultural context which influences its approach to issues; I can say the same for each level of governance in which the interviewees operate. Other studies have revealed how climate adaptation policies are dependent on underlying beliefs and perceptions of a society (Tynkkynen 2010), how a sense of place frames what we do or do not do in terms of climate adaptation (Lyth et al. 2016, 745; Adger et al. 2013), or how state traditions (Vink et al. 2014) or state society relations influence approaches to climate adaptation (Adger et al. 2013a). For Canadian policy actors engaged beyond Canada, "climate migration" is a complex and politicized topic that they are trying to better understand empirically. For these actors, to a certain extent, they have inherited a pre-defined problem (drawing on humanitarian and responsibility narratives) from the officials and advocates working at the global level where policy formulation has already taken place. This shows both how epistemic communities channel ideas across contexts, and the ways in which international organizations work to develop and contribute to the emergence of new norms and rules (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Haas 1992). In contrast, for those looking internally at Canada, the concept of "climate displacement" has little salience given that floods, storms, and wildfires have always displaced people. In this domain, actors define the problem in terms of resilience, vulnerability and the ability to remain in place, which in turn relates to jobs, housing, and safety. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, while I did not use excerpts from transcripts to

support these findings for domestic actors, it was evident in my notes and summaries from my discussions and the workshop I hosted with these actors.

Chapter 7 - Synthesis and Conclusions

Media, politicians, academics, advocacy groups, and climate activists increasingly discuss climate change and human mobility in relation to one another. While climate change will certainly influence people's ability and desire to live and work in certain areas of the world and certain areas of Canada, the connection between climate change and (im)mobility are complex and contextual. From a policy perspective, the meaning ascribed to those connections are tantamount to understanding the options for approaching such a phenomenon. Even from the well-intentioned position of raising awareness about climate change (its consequences and injustices) to drive progressive climate policies, the language of in(security) often frames the idea of "climate migration". But this framing stems from understanding the intersection as something that takes place in the Global South and from assuming climate change will force masses of people from their homes causing them to seek refuge elsewhere (in the Global North). By exploring the issue in Canada, a country of the Global North, I hoped to problematize those underlying assumptions to reveal different meanings and thus different political possibilities.

This dissertation focused on how policy actors and news print media in Canada frame the intersection of climate change and human mobility. I wanted to understand how actors framed the issue both in terms of the substance, attributes and characteristics of the issue; but also in terms of the processes, discourses, and politics in which that framing took place. Issue framing reveals how actors define the problem and thus what the responses might be. The results of my empirical chapters provide theoretical insights into how discourse and institutions contribute to the framing of issues across scale and the validity of the climate mobility concept.

This concluding chapter summarizes the answers to the questions driving my research: (1) how do discourses, narratives and policies frame the relationship between climate change and

human mobility in Canada; (2) how do these framings shift or persist at different scales and at different sites of discourse; and (3) what are the implications of these framings for policy development in Canada? The chapter begins by summarizing the findings from the empirical chapters which I present by putting them in dialogue with one another to demonstrate what a comparison across, instead of within, sites of discourse reveals. I then expand on the theoretical insights before discussing the policy and practical implications of my research. I reflect on some of the avenues that I would pursue were I to continue with this research. I end with some concluding remarks.

Summary of empirical findings

The empirical chapters focused on data collected from newsprint media and policy actors. The news media consisted of two leading national newspapers, *The Globe and Mail* and *The National Post,* and two local papers the *Grand Forks Gazette* and *Kamloops This Week* from two communities in British Columbia. The media chapter engaged literature that links media to policy in terms of its ability to draw attention to and frame policy agendas (Thistlethwaite, Henstra, Minano, Dordi 2019, 2604). The policy chapter used data from interviews with individuals working in or on: climate adaptation governance and policy, community development and climate resiliency at the local and regional level, emergency management and disaster risk reduction services and policy, immigration integration and settlement services and policy; immigration and refugee policy, Indigenous governance organizations; international affairs and development policy, as well as retired diplomats involved in migration and refugee or climate change advocacy work. Because policy making occurs across and at different scales, particularly in a country like Canada, I intentionally selected local and national media outlets and spoke with people from the local to the national level. The findings across the two settings

(media and policy actors) reflected the themes (media) or sectors (policy) where the issue appeared and the location of mobility (domestic or international). This maps onto broader divisions in the discourse around the disaster displacement, evacuations, and disaster risk and reduction literature and "climate migration" literature. I see several trends in how actors frame the intersections of climate change and human mobility in Canada depending on where the mobility takes place, and as such, I summarize these here, comparing across international mobility and domestic mobility.

International mobility

The newspapers and the policy actors framing mobility beyond Canada demonstrated several similarities and several differences in their approach to the concept. In the media, much of this coverage was in the national papers and in wire service articles in the local papers. First, there was a propensity to speak about the people and the process of climate migration / displacement in the abstract. Second, the framing of such movement was that it was long-term, permanent, across international borders and with low-agency. Both media and policy actors articulated concern for Canada's responsibility towards such movement, although rarely in reference to specific policies; notably this reference to Canada's responsibility was based on the consequences of climate change and Canada's humanitarian obligations, not Canada's contributions to the causes of climate change. In the discourse on the movement of people beyond Canada, actors rarely centre the voices of those most affected and the predominant tendency in both media and policy circles is to rely on international experts or officials for information. Finally, the understanding of the intersections of climate change and human mobility abroad had no connection to the intersections of climate change and human mobility within Canada; neither the media nor policy actors indicated they understood climate mobilities

within and beyond Canada as the same phenomenon, nor did they discuss them in relation to one another. While migration literature makes clear that mobility decisions are complex and context specific, the ways in which climate change intersects with risk factors (hazard, exposure, and vulnerability) and subsequent mobility responses are similar (McLeman et al. 2021) regardless of where climate impacts occur. While the trends in my data indicate similarities across the different sites of discourse, there were also some stark differences.

Whereas the media had, for the most part, a simplistic view of the impact of climate change on mobility (i.e. climate change causes migration without consideration for mediating factors), policy actors had a much more nuanced understanding of the complexity of migration decisions in the context of climate change and were hesitant to isolate climate change as a driver of mobility. The media used the term "climate refugee" to refer to those displaced by climate change, while those in policy acknowledged the problems with this term. Several policy actors disclosed the Government of Canada's intentionality to refrain from using it, although some did use it colloquially. The policy actors' sentiment was that not only was it legally erroneous and simplistic, but using the term "refugees" imposed obligations on Canada. For policy actors, discourses drawing on humanitarianism, protection, and multilateralism informed the framing of climate mobilities. Although the media used these discourses, they did so to a lesser extent. Instead, the media used more negatively framed discourses of security, conflict, instability, and political and economic disruption. In this way, I found the policy actors much more neutral and nuanced in their discussion compared to the media which was more negative in terms of their language choice and their willingness to frame the issue as a policy opportunity versus a policy problem. This tone also mapped onto the media's and policy actors' framings related to domestic mobility.

Domestic mobility

Policy actors and the media frame the movement of people within Canada from climate impacts quite differently. While overall, both understand the connection as one of disaster displacement, evacuations, and an issue of emergency preparedness and response, the similarities end there. Perhaps a function of the media's tendency to cover "bad" news or newsworthy events, the media limited their coverage of displacements in B.C. to the short-term impacts on communities, households and individuals. An exception were stories about the home buyouts (managed retreat) in Grand Forks. These stories demonstrated the longer-term impacts of climate change on displacement.

The narrow scope of the articles and unwillingness to situate these news stories in the broader discourse on climate change contrasts how the policy actors understand displacements from floods, storms, and wildfires. The policy actors, none of whom consider themselves to be working directly on "climate displacement," situate flood and wildfire displacement in Canada in broader discussions about climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction strategies, community resilience or development. These discussions include concerns around colonialism and reconciliation, well-being, mental health, and social cohesion. The media almost never included "climate change" in their coverage of floods and wildfires, although they did include the abnormality of the severity of the physical impacts. In contrast policy actors are explicit about the worsening impacts of climate change. At the same time, these policy actors recognize that extreme weather has always displaced people in Canada, that such displacements are not always short-term (especially in Indigenous communities), and that much could be learned from people who have been historically or previously displaced. Furthermore, policy actors spoke about existing programs, policies, and frameworks that need to be implemented or made more

accessible, especially to vulnerable individuals and communities, to be better prepared for future climate impacts. Policy actors working domestically recognized that Canada's climate displacement connects to what is happening internationally through frameworks such as Sendai, the UNFCCC, and the SDGs which are applicable at both the local and global scale. The media, however, made almost no connection between what is happening locally to what is happening globally.

Finally, whereas both policy actors and the media used "displacement" over "migration", policy actors recognized that "mobility" better captures the full range of movement and provides space for indirect movement related to job scarcity / opportunity. For instance, mobility is more nuanced in cases where people make decisions to move out of fire prone areas because they are tired of the smoky summers (but not moving to avoid imminent harm).

Across all sites of discourse in Canada (that I examined) where the media and policy actors discuss climate mobilities within or beyond our borders, there does not yet appear to be a dominant frame or discourse coalition as Hajer (1995) terms it. Instead, the framing, and along with it the problem definition, shifts depending on where actors discuss it because formal and informal institutions shape the discourse. Policy actors and the media do, however, employ a dominant storyline (Hajer 2006). This storyline truncates the beginning of the story: the actions causing climate change are absent across all sites of discourse regardless of where the mobility takes place.

Theoretical Insights

My exploration of climate mobilities framing in Canada makes several contributions to our understanding of emerging issues, in particular regarding critical perspectives on problem definition, agenda-setting and framing. Although problem definition, agenda-setting, and

framing are part of the policy process, the lack of policy formulation in Canada in the realm of climate mobilities limits my contributions. However, my study does demonstrate the value of frame analysis in uncovering how actors construct policy problems. More broadly, this case study contributes to the literature which focuses on the role of discourse and institutions in constructing issues, and opens the conceptual understanding of where and how climate mobilities take place.

My results demonstrate that Canadian news media and policy actors advance certain representations of the climate change mobility nexus and thus the range of possible policy responses. This contributes to existing research on frames and framing in the construction of climate migration as a policy issue (Bettini 2013; Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Hartmann 2010; Mayer 2013; Ransan-Coooper et al. 2015), but with an explored case (Canada). There appears to be a recursive and mutually reinforcing relationship between the media's and the policy actors' framing strategies. In both sites, the discourse and framing strategies construct the issue of climate migration abroad as a problem for elsewhere, the subjects are racialized and victimized, and the movement is long-distance and permanent; whereas at home, the issue is about agential white evacuees who floods or wildfires temporarily displace. These dominant frames prevent development of coherent and cohesive climate policies and ensure that different institutions and policy organizations tackle the problem as they define it. This case illuminates how actors (with different roles, interests, perspectives and agendas) use language to constitute meaning and define problems differently because, as stated some time ago by Schön (1971, 210-2011), "the nature of the public problem appears to different actors in different and often incompatible ways."

Problems are not something that exist "out there;" rather, problem definition is "a discursive process – part of the construction of a political world – and agenda-setting [is] a specific part of problem definition that attributes responsibility to a political actor or institution" (Barbehön, Münch and Lamping 2015, 243). According to Birkland (1998, 77) agenda setting is "a function of the issue itself, the actors that get involved, institutional relationships, and, often, random social and political factors that can be explained but cannot be replicated or predicted." Thus, the process of issues getting on agendas links to how the issue is defined as a problem worthy of solving. Indeed, as illustrated in my empirical chapters, not only does how actors define the issue influence its appearance on agendas, but also on *which* agenda (in which formal institution) it appears. This is something that is underexplored in the literature which usually points to institutional fit; where institutional arrangements match "the defining features of the problems they address" (Young 2008) or where actors shift the definition to better fit a specific venue for policy making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pralle 2003, 2006). This is also perhaps a feature of studying emergent issues before institutional change or actors develop policy responses.

The issue of causality features prominently in discussions of climate change and human mobility. Deborah Stone (1989) introduced the concept of causal stories to link problem definition and agenda-setting. Political actors use causal stories to define problems (a process of image making) by constructing cause, blame and responsibility (1989, 282). According to Stone (1989, 282), "Conditions, difficulties, or issues thus do not have inherent properties that make them more or less likely to be seen as problems or to be expanded. Rather, political actors deliberately portray them in ways calculated to gain support for their side." Stone's identification of causal stories in problem definition, particularly stories of decline, in which the issue must be

understood as being under human control, builds on the work of social movement theorists who focus on framing and frames (Benford and Snow 1992). As discussed in chapter 4, Entman (1993) argues that framing is a way to define problems, diagnose their causes, make judgements about causal agents and their effects and suggests remedies to the problems. Benford and Snow (1992) propose collective action frames which have punctuational, attributional and articulation functions to drive / inspire human action. The causal story of climate mobility serves as a collective action frame which are "accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but tolerable" (Benford and Snow 1992, 137). The climate mobility frame, however, is malleable across context so that who is to blame, what is to be done and by whom, shifts along with the problem definition.

The role of institutional context was instrumental. Taken together these findings offer broader insights into the role of the institutions in problem definition and framing of policy issues. For Schmidt (2008), institutions are not just the external rule-following structures. Institutions are simultaneously the external constraining structures and the enabling constructs of meaning which are internal to sentient agents. Agents 'background ideational abilities' explain how they create and maintain institutions while their 'foreground discursive abilities' enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change (or maintain) them (Schmidt 2008, 322). This includes both formal institutions or organizations that are political venues for policy making, but also the rules, principles, norms and discursive practices that structure behavior. About the former, the framing of climate mobilities aligns with the institutions in which actors discuss them, reinforces the domestic/international binary and prohibits the whole-of-society approach that is required for such a complex and systemic challenge. Thus, my

analysis reveals that institutional features, with implications for how problems are framed, work against coherent climate policy because different understandings are incommensurate with collaborative action.

For example, policy actors in Immigration Refugee Citizenship Canada (IRCC) inherit the issue of climate mobilities as a problem of migration or protection, not as one of climate adaptation or resilience from the international community. In this way, the discursive practices that produce the image of climate mobilities influence not just what the problem is, but the suite of possible sites where that problem could be addressed in the first place. While much of the agenda-setting literature looks to rational agents with varying degrees of power and how they reconstruct the issue or the attributes of the issue, in this case, the discourse of that institution constrains its agents or actors. In this sense, there is a certain degree of path dependence. This does not dismiss the role of ideas, power and discourse, but rather demonstrates that discursive and ideational factors precede the uptake of the issue within a specific institution and then continue to affect the image and meaning of that issue in that institution. As this is a nascent issue and much of the policy literature looks at mature policies, the struggle over meaning making that occurs in an institution such as the IRCC between actors on the migration versus the protection files will likely play out in time. The point here, is that the international and transnational community had already defined the problem for IRCC. While international institutions and transnational networks are central to policy transfer to national institutions, this transfer occurs through the existing institutional and ideational legacies (Campbell 2004). In the case of climate mobilities, the actors at the federal level, almost all of whom spoke about Canada's commitment to multiculturalism and desire to be a leader in international migration governance, filter the ways in which they interpret policy ideas from the international realm.

Similarly, the current B.C. government's commitment to climate action provides the underlying socio-political context, or the cultural repertoire as Beland (2009) calls it, to shape the discourse.

The way in which actors frame differently the intersections of climate change and human mobilities across scales and sectors of government reinforces the insights from those looking at the role of discourse and narrative in shaping policy. As Hajer claims (1995, 2006), the discursive practices, meanings and concepts shaped the meanings that the issue of climate migration could take in different institutional settings. In other words, when the issue emerges among policy actors in migration and refugee institutions, those institutions shape its meaning and content. Alternatively, when it emerges in climate adaptation institutions, the discourses of those institutions shape it another way. My analysis also supports insights on problem definition in multi-level governance and agenda setting. These insights suggest that problems at one level may not be relevant problems at another level or may be framed or defined in very different ways (Hoppe 2011, Scholten 2012). Furthermore, local policy actors can initiate policy innovation that can affect the national level (Scholten 2012). While this may not be a novel finding, it reveals space between discursive and agent-centric theories. For instance, that discourse shapes policy through framing issues in particular ways (Hajer 1995 and Schmidt 2008) could be explored in relation to the "venue shopping" literature that looks at actors' agency in how issues end up at different scales or captive to different discourses in the first place (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Guiraudon 2000; Howlett 2002; Pralle 2003, 2006).

According to Pralle (2006) political actors use a political strategy called venue shopping to shift policy arenas or reframe problems to fit the institutional discursive context. Pralle (2003) argues that this is not always intentional or deliberate, and the ways in which nascent issues travel between venues (vertically and horizontally) requires further exploration. With a nascent

issue such as "climate migration," I think current theories on venue shopping overstate the agency and rationality of Canadian policy actors who are, to a certain extent, inheriting the issue of "climate migration" from the global level and thus framing it through their existing discourse structures and practices (Hajer 1995) that are both external and internal to actors (Schmidt 2008).

The theoretical implications from my research on the climate migration literature relate to new questions about the connections between how experiences with internal displacement in countries in the Global North inform the conceptual understanding of mobility and displacement abroad. This is an entirely underexplored area of climate migration and displacement scholarship, and one which upends several of the current assumptions in the literature particularly in regards to Global North / South dynamics. It also challenges the notion that climate migration is a new problem requiring new solutions—as scholars such as Mayer (2016) have already articulated.

Practical and Policy Implications

This research revealed several practical and policy implications. First, the complex intersections of climate change and human mobility and the variety of ways in which those intersections acquire meaning require complex responses from policy actors across scale and sector. This is not simply an issue of international migration or internal displacement or climate mitigation and adaptation. Climate mobilities are about the intersections of risk and (socially and historically produced) vulnerabilities, but also broader concerns about development, sustainability, well-being, and human rights—simplistic narratives about climate migration risk losing these broader concerns. As such, this research illustrates policy responses must be integrated across sectors, be proactive, and targeted to the scale with the best chance for transformative change. I do not presuppose, however, that framing climate migration as a

particular kind of policy problem means that actors will develop solutions; defining the problem demarcates the suite of possible solutions, but it not does mean solutions will get on the policy agenda or ever be implemented. Furthermore, the complexity of the issue may be working against policy development.

Second, because of the complicated nature of how the impacts of climate change affect people and their decisions to move or stay, the process of problem definition must include the voices of those most affected by climate impacts. This builds on an extensive body of policy literature which demonstrates the benefits of inclusive policy-making. This involves including in policy development those targeted by the policies (OECD 2015, Vlachou 2004). Better yet, community-led initiatives or policies that start from the local level where the understandings of local vulnerabilities and risks are greatest and the ability to accurately define the "problem" would be a good place to start, although this starting point may not adequately address the structural and root causes. In the aftermath of the 2021 wildfires and heat dome in British Columbia, citizen groups and community advocates are speaking out about how these events affected the elderly and low-income individuals, and they are providing recommendations on how governments can better support them (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Third, federal policy-makers who insist on understanding the intersection of climate change and human mobility abroad, could look within Canada at displacements from floods, wildfires and storms and the factors underpinning those displacements. This perspective could be telling for sudden-onset displacements elsewhere. A pragmatic place to start would be including colleagues working on internal displacement in Canada in the Interdepartmental Working Group on Climate Change, Migration and Displacement which is currently populated with

internationally mandated actors.[32] However, these same policy actors should be careful with narratives relating to intersections of climate change and human mobility because of the potential for actors to frame them in a way that enables restrictive migration or border policies. The expanded use of border and migration control measures to restrict people's movement raises concerns for those approaching human mobility from a position of compassion and empathy, rather than fear and security, as well as those who approach the issue in the interest of human well-being and respect for human rights.

Furthermore, the climate is a rapidly changing and unstable; this is the context in which all social, political, and economic processes occur. We do not necessarily need a new policy problem with new solutions. Instead policies should focus on building resiliency in place when/where possible and facilitating movement and protecting human well-being when necessary. Finally, the tendency to frame climate mobilities in reference to the unique case of low-lying island nations such as Tuvalu and Kiribati (with small populations) obscures the overwhelming potentiality of 216 million people moving within their countries from slow onset climate impacts across six regions, including 17 million in Latin America by 2050 (Clement et al. 2021).[33]

Fourth, for provincial and local policy actors in the Canadian context, where the security framing has no recourse to policy, policy actors can use the climate displacement narrative to drive climate preparation, adaptation, and mitigation efforts. There are multiple barriers to climate change adaptation, beyond risk perceptions, and adaptation efforts must take into

[32] I obtained a copy of the Terms of Reference for this Working Group from one of my interviewees.
[33] Note that this is the only forecasted number I use in my research. While many dismissed the early estimates and forecasts of "climate refugees" for methodological reasons – Francois Gemenne described them as "basically full of crap", Alex de Sherbinin calls them "back of the envelope estimates…using crude approaches" (Tempus 2020) – scholars and experts claim the World Bank estimates are "methodologically defensible." As I hoped to make clear in my literature review, the number of factors and amount of data influencing this intersection make such estimates exactly that: estimates!

consideration the social and cultural context that produces vulnerabilities to climate events (Wolf et al 2009; Wolf 2011, 29). Fortunately, while we may not be able to mitigate the hazards, we can alter the ways in which we are creating risks to climate change and thus having to manage them (Beck 1996). The narratives to do so must expand the storyline to begin with the use of fossil fuels and not start with the impacts of climate change. Disaster displacements and evacuations from floods and fires are a reality for people in British Columbia and these will only increase as temperature and precipitation events become more intense and more severe. While most issues change incrementally (Leech et al. 2002), the "heat dome" and wildfires, as well as the flooding, were potential "focusing events" (Birkland 1997). Such events have the possibility to provide a window of opportunity to overcome the usual impediments to issue change and policy inertia. Unfortunately, there will be many more such "focusing events."

Fifth, for media actors at all scales, there is an opportunity to frame what happens beyond Canada in relation to what happens within Canada. This framing should include linking the causes of climate change as it matters for people's daily lives. According to a 2021 study of print media in Canada, less than 30 percent of stories on climate change spoke of its impacts on people; the study also labelled climate change coverage "sterile" and "without urgency or as a moral imperative" (Hatch 2021, 13). The author also noted that abstractions that disconnected readers from the causes of climate change filled Canadian news coverage (Hatch 2021, 8). Findings by Chater (2018) suggest that the public is more willing to act when actors frame climate change in terms of its impacts on humans. The media has an important role in framing issues for public awareness and as policy problems. The power to shape these issues comes with a responsibility to frame them in a way that is true to their complexity.

Finally, for climate advocates, or those pushing for more progressive climate policies, they do not need to use the potential for displacement or migration abroad to demonstrate the urgency of climate change. As discussed, this narrative has the potential to be framed in the discourse of (in)security which may not lead to climate policy, but rather to increased border and restrictive migration policies. For movement within Canada, there are no such policy levers. Advocates could mobilize the narrative around displacement and climate impacts *in Canada* to overcome the "spatial optimism" that social psychologists attribute to climate inaction in wealthy countries where people perceive climate change as something happening elsewhere and in the future (Tvinnereim et al 2020).

Future Research

My research explores the (possible) emergence of a discrete policy realm related to the intersections of climate change and human mobility within and beyond Canada. I reveal the disconnect across scale in terms of how the media and policy actors frame the relationships between climate change and human mobility. Media frames influence public opinion and the understanding of issues. There is a plethora of issues to explore in the media including how race, gender, ethnicity, age, class and other social markers operate in the media's construction of the issue and how frames and framing strategies shift over time. With any emergent issue, the possibilities for future research are extensive, but given my interest in applied policy (over theoretical) research, the ideas for future research fall much more in the former versus the latter category.

BC experienced another devastating wildfire season in 2021, thus emphasizing the need for a greater understanding of the dynamics affecting population displacements in the face of floods, storms and wildfires. This could include addressing the lack of data regarding the

duration, location, and impacts of evacuations and displacements as well as exploring the way in which (climate) risk and mobility reciprocally relate in specific communities (McLeman et al. 2021). A case study in BC looking at past displacements could also centre questions of equity, justice, gender, and structural inequalities that effect the differential impacts of climate displacement on communities of colour, Indigenous communities, the elderly, as well as women and girls, people with disabilities, and other marginalized groups already facing economic and social challenges. The *BC Climate Preparedness and Adaptation Strategy* prioritizes partnerships with Indigenous peoples and an equity-informed approach; how this plays out in relation to climate displacement, however, requires further applied and community-based research. Inversely, we need a better understanding how communities can draw on the resources of a place, including built, natural, social, cultural, and institutional elements to advance their climate resilience, future viability and habitability.

Building on the above implications regarding the use of internal climate displacement to mobilize progressive climate policy, how can actors mobilize the framing and narratives regarding climate displacement in B.C. to drive support (and funding) for climate adaptation efforts? The majority of political will and funding in B.C. has been for mitigation or cutting our emissions. Although this is essential, climate change already impacts B.C.. Mitigation efforts may affect the speed and magnitude of climate change, but we need to prepare for its unavoidable impacts. The B.C. 2021 Budget declared $2.2 billion over five-years to fund *CleanBC*, B.C.'s climate plan; of this, the budget earmarked $6 million, less than half of one percent, to support B.C.'s Climate Preparedness and Adaptation Strategy (Government of B.C., 2021). This funding is insufficient in a year when a wildfire destroyed the entire community of Lytton B.C., Emergency Management B.C. issued over 580 evacuation orders during wildfires

(Government of B.C. 2021a), and a record-setting heat wave killed at least 569 people and hundreds of thousands of farm animals (Labbeé 2021). Governments are augmenting climate mitigation efforts 30 years *after* global leaders committed to cutting emissions, let us not make the same mistake with climate adaptation efforts.

Thinking a little further outside the box, my encounter with and application of the "spatial optimism" concept to the climate mobilities narrative revealed a set of perspectives from social and cognitive psychology that were previously beyond my political science conceptual toolbox (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979). I am curious about the ways in which the psychology of risk and risk perception connects to the literature on discourse, ideas, and institutions in policy formulation and problem definition. I anticipate that this might provide further insights for explaining how *and why* the meanings of issues evolve over time in different institutional settings, and how the public interpret such meanings. This would build on research exploring individual and social dimensions of climate adaptation (Adger 1999, 2001, 2003; Wolf et al 2009, Wolf 2011), but look at how climate displacement experiences in *developed* countries shift perceptions of risk and policy change.

Questions also remain about the conceptual disconnect between domestic and global displacement in Canada. What does this mean for established theories about international versus internal migration? How does this compare to concepts such as poverty, gender equality, human rights, community resilience and so on which Canada mobilizes both abroad and at home? How does this unsettle the perception of mobility in a changing climate as an issue framed and discursively and politically structured by assumptions about the Global South? What is the mobilizing potential, if any, of unsettling this disconnect?

Finally, as climate impacts increasingly wreak havoc on countries in the Global North, comparative case studies could explore if/how responses to external displacement shift in relation to internal displacement, how (dis)connections across policy scale and sector evolve and how policies emerge for internal displacement. Potential comparative cases emerge from countries with their own experience with climate displacement such as Australia, Canada, the United States, and Belgium and Germany (in the aftermath of the deadly July 2021 floods). Furthermore, forced displacement in the context of climate change in these countries unsettles the current conceptual understandings of forced displacement which has traditionally applied to countries in the Global South; what does this mean for how we have traditionally thought of forced displacement or forced mobility?

Final Reflections and Conclusions

When actors discuss climate mobilities abroad, the underlying discourses and assumptions of Global North/South relations influence what that means. Thus far it has meant mass movements of people. But when we talk about climate displacement in Canada, the discourses, assumptions and institutional context here produce a very different meaning. As the summer of 2021 so dramatically revealed, the impacts of climate change are already a reality for British Columbians: people are dying, people are being displaced, people are losing their homes and livelihoods, and people are being confronted with where they want to live in an era of extreme wildfires and atmospheric rivers. The policy levers available to actors addressing climate displacement in Canada are very different to those addressing climate displacement beyond Canada. The risk of the narrative of climate displacement in the wrong hands is the further securitization of migration, stricter border and immigration controls, and another excuse to "other", but those same tools are not applicable at the local or regional scale.

The narratives and frames actors employ to make sense of the world have political consequences. Language creates boundaries around issues and determines what is visible or invisible thus foreclosing the range of political possibilities. I believe my research has shown that different actors can define the same concept very differently and with different consequences. Within Canada, addressing climate displacement is about resilience; why is that not the story elsewhere? Why is Canada not rapidly investing in climate resilience projects, addressing the underlying structural injustices and inequalities that produce vulnerabilities, and augmenting individual, household and community resilience around the world? Such an approach does not have to inherently be about keeping people in place or restricting movement. It can be about making people and places as resilient as possible, while at the same time, creating policies for people who do move (for whatever reason) so that such movement does not erode their well-being or the well-being of the places they leave or the places they arrive. Given the 2021 climate events in British Columbia, the cost of responding to such events dwarfs the costs of preparing for them.

This is an issue of climate justice. Those who are least responsible for causing climate change are the most impacted. This applies within Canada too. We know that marginalized and low socio-economic communities are more vulnerable to climate risks – this includes racialized, newcomer and homeless populations (Dossa et al. 2016). Geographically, communities in flood plains, in low-lying coastal areas, and homes built on the urban-wildfire interface are also at greater risk, but vulnerability and resiliency are instrumental. A hazard or climate risk has very different outcomes depending on the vulnerability of those impacted. While we cannot control the hazards, we can control decisions that affect risks and vulnerabilities. Although incorporating justice and equity concerns into policy making is hugely complex (see Stone 2002), developing

resilience, disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, or mobility policies in an inherently inequitable and unjust system will not ensure climate justice.

Perhaps one thing learned from the COVID-19 pandemic is the benefit of having robust and prepared systems for mitigating damages when disasters strike—as well as the cost of not having them. Proactive policies regarding displacement (for any reason) are more cost effective, reduce risk, and improve the psychosocial well-being outcomes of affected populations. In a rapidly changing and unstable climate, Canada and B.C. need to look holistically at where the risks are, who are most vulnerable to those risks and why, and policy actors need to ensure that those voices and experiences are included when thinking about how to address climate change. If policies are actions to solve problems, ensuring an accurate understanding of the problem is imperative; including the voices of those most affected can help ensure that. For climate displacement, this requires working with (or enabling and empowering) people and places to build communities that are resilient and inclusive with adaptive capacity to face a changing climate. This then is about community-led development, human rights protections, equity, justice, food and livelihood security, health and education, poverty, urbanization—essentially it is about all our social systems, not just about climate change and not just about migration. In some cases, however, movement is going to be inevitable – indeed movement is an adaptation strategy itself and a natural element of social change. People have always moved in response to environmental change. Canada should be planning for such movement.

Over the course of this dissertation, the urgency of addressing the impacts of climate change on where people live and the disruptions caused by displacements have shifted from a future concern to a current and recurring reality. For Canada, climate displacement abroad is not going to mean a flood of "climate refugees" at our border, most displacement is going to be

within borders. Ultimately, Canadians determine the meaning of the intersection of climate change and human mobility; and how Canadians define the problem, will determine the responses.

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Appendix II – Interview Details and Methodology

Interviewee coding, scale, employer, mandate - Information withheld to protect anonymity and confidentiality

#	Code	Government Scale	Employer / Employer Type	Mandate
1	FC1	Federal	Think tank	Within Canada
2	FE1	Federal	Public Safety Canada	Within Canada
3	FM1	Federal	IRCC	Beyond Canada
4	FM2	Federal	IRCC	Beyond Canada
5	FM3	Federal	IRCC	Beyond Canada
6	FM4 FM5	Federal Federal	IRCC Global Affairs	Beyond Canada Beyond Canada
7	FM6	Federal	IRCC / UN	Beyond Canada
8	FM7	Federal	IRCC / UN	Beyond Canada
9	LC1	Regional	Consultancy	Within Canada
10	LE1	Local – Rural	Civil Society	Within Canada
11	LE2	Local – Rural	Community Services	Within Canada
12	PC1	Provincial, BC	Think tank	Within Canada
13	PE1	Provincial, BC	Emergency Management BC	Within Canada
14	PM1	Provincial, BC	Immigration Policy	Beyond Canada
15	PM2	Provincial, BC	Immigration Settlement Services	Beyond Canada
16	PM3	Provincial, BC	Immigration Settlement Services	Beyond Canada
17	INC1	Indigenous	BC Assembly of First Nations	Within Canada
18	CC1	Local – Urban	King County (Seattle)	Within Canada
19	CC2	Local – Urban	Metro Vancouver	Within Canada
20	FC2	Federal	Natural Resources Canada	Within Canada
21	FC3	Federal	Indigenous Services Canada	Within Canada
22	IC1	International	Retired, former diplomat	Beyond Canada
23	ICM1	International	Think tank	Beyond Canada
24	ICM2	International	Think tank, former diplomat	Beyond Canada
25	INE1	Indigenous	First Nation Government	Within Canada
26	LC2	Regional	Think tank / Consultant	Within Canada
27	LCM1	Local - Rural	Civil Society	Within Canada
28	LE3	Local – Rural	Regional District	Within Canada
29	PC2	Provincial, BC	Climate Action Secretariat	Within Canada
30	PC3	Provincial, BC	Climate Action Secretariat	Within Canada
31	PC4 PC5	Provincial, BC Provincial, BC	Think Tank Think Tank	Within Canada Within Canada

Sample Questions

The exact questions depended on the participants' role and organization, but these are the types of questions that were explored in the interviews. I followed an unstructured or semi-structured approach to the interviews, conceived of as a conversation about the following types of questions, rather than adhering strictly to these questions.

Context

- What is your position / affiliation?
- How long have you been working on this intersection and how did you come to start working on it?
- How, from your perspective, do climate change and human mobility intersect?
- What are the key priority areas related to the intersection on which you are working?
    - How were these priorities identified?
    - Do the priority areas differ across departments?

The next questions are about what, from your perspective – are the key factors that are influencing policy development in this area.

- Is this an emerging issue? If yes, in what ways; if not, why not?
- International / national / subnational actors or events?
- Are there key moments that influenced this work?
- Are there other "best practices" or examples from other countries on which you draw?
- In general, which countries, if any, are you looking to for examples?
- What role does the media play, if any, on framing the issue or on discussions within the government?

The next set of questions pertain to how you understand the history of how and why climate change and human mobility have emerged as an issue of importance in your department

- How has this issue evolved over time?
- What sources of information do you rely upon?
- What is the internal research capacity related to the intersection of climate change and human mobility?
- Has there been any institutional change related to this policy area?
- Do you engage with colleagues in other departments on this? If yes, when, why, and how?
- In your estimation, what is the likelihood that the federal government will have policies/programs related to this policy issue in the future?
    - What impacts this likelihood?
    - What types of policies/programs would these be?
    - Who would be involved in implementing them? (other agencies? Entities?)
- What role does the media / public opinion / concern play in this space?

The final questions pertain to how Canadian efforts on climate mobility engage with other jurisdictions

- Are there existing policies, institutional frameworks and programs/initiatives address the intersections of climate change and human mobilities?
    - If yes, how?
    - Are they influencing your team's policy development on this?
- What organizations / individuals is the government working with to explore this issue further? (Int'l / domestic)

Are there other dimensions of the intersection between climate change and human mobility that we haven't spoken about, that you would like to share or you think it pertinent to discuss?