Meditations on the (Im)possibility of Regicide: Foucault, Government and State Sovereignty

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the sovereignty problematic and its implications for (re)articulating the political in the absence/presence of the state. Specifically, I sketch three stances. First, I historicise the practices of state sovereignty and government. Second, I retrace Foucault's studies in governmentality as a reply to the sovereignty problematic. Third, I examine how the sovereignty problematic unfolds in post-Foucauldian readings of the political, given the processes of movement and change.

I argue that post-Foucauldian theorists are unable to resolve Foucault's "incomplete" attempt at regicide. This incompleteness reveals the main stake of (re)articulating the political in the absence/presence of the state: the line of inside/outside. Ultimately, what is needed is an interrogation of the ubiquitous role of the statal political community as a measure and model for understanding political life. The politics of inside/outside remains a political fiction that moderns are not prepared to give up.

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Despite the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune and a young man's wandering flights of fancy, this thesis is humbly submitted towards the investigation of political knowledge.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

How does one think about politics with or without the practices of the state and state system? And more importantly, how is the relationship between sovereignty, state and territory being (re)articulated? The anticipated "decline" of the state has highlighted a central tension in modern debates about the nature, location and future of political life between state sovereignty and government.[1] In particular, the state once sustained an apparent harmony between sovereignty and government by dividing the political into an outside space of relations between the macro subjects of other states and an inside space of governance and legitimacy between the macro and micro subject of state and individual. This symmetry enabled and located the discourse of government inside the state and in turn, the sovereign state was located in the "outside" anarchic sphere of relations. With the world drawn in this way, the best hope for understanding the outside rested on abstracting from the only place where politics is/was possible: inside. As Walker (1993) argues, this world of inside and outside is experienced in two narratives about the political: international relations theory and political theory. However, the harmony between sovereignty and government, outside and inside, international relations and political theory is widely believed to be unravelling especially in relation to temporalities and differentiations said to be brought on by

contemporary processes of "globalisation," social movements, ecological degradation, information technology, the mass migrations of peoples, nationalisms and citizenships.

The most notable response to the sovereignty problematic lies in the work of Michel Foucault and post-Foucauldian theorists.[2] Foucault's dissatisfaction with sovereignty's grip on the political imagination prompted him to historicise sovereignty in an attempt to debunk its preeminence as well as study the phenomenon of government. In the past three decades, Foucault's studies in governmentality have "exploded" discourses of political theory and to a certain extent, the discourse of international relations. Governmentality describes the discourses, practices and rationalities that (have) enable(d) the governance of subjects. More precisely, the art of government is about the disciplinary, normalising and productive micro/macro processes of power that shape both the individual's and the population's capacities and conduct. Foucault's genealogy of the multiple and productive practical systems that govern and produce the individual and population challenges the preeminence of a juridical sovereignty by historicising its constitutive premises: power conceived as domination and the existence of a universal subject. However, in *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault* (1996), Barry Hindess contends that Foucault's genealogy of sovereignty is, in a sense, incomplete.

Hindess contends that Foucault's regicide is incomplete in two ways. First, despite Foucault's powerful argument that

the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic are a fiction, "Western political thought nevertheless continues to make use of that world" (Hindess 1996: 157). Second and more importantly, "it is not only the problem of sovereignty that we (another fictional community) need to free ourselves from, but also the problem of political community" (Hindess 1996: 158). Put differently, to complete regicide, one must also address the practices of division and containment through which sovereignty constitutes, and is in turn constituted by, an account of a bounded political community.

The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis investigates the sovereignty problematic and its implications for (re)articulating the political in the presence and the assumed absence of the state. Specifically, I sketch three stances through which to work through the stakes of the dialogue and the possibilities for a conception of political life that does not rest on the conditions of sovereignty. After this introduction, Chapter 2 historicises the practices of state sovereignty and government to root out five political corollaries that represent the features of theorising within the sovereignty problematic. I develop Hindess's understanding of sovereignty by examining the spatiotemporal or "outside" conditions of sovereignty so as to present a more comprehensive picture. In this respect, I use the work of R.B.J. Walker to expand Hindess's picture of sovereignty. Taken together, Walker and Hindess provide the sharpest sketch of sovereignty

and its role in international relations theory and political theory.

In Chapter 3, I retrace Foucault's studies in governmentality as a reply to the sovereignty problematic. Foucault has a very specific understanding of the sovereignty problematic that involves rereading historical conceptions of power and governance. Although Foucault addresses conventional theories of politics and as such, does not write directly in response to the sphere of international relations, no analysis of the sovereignty problematic would be complete if it did not examine Foucault's crucial contributions to modern (re)articulations of the political. That is, Foucault's studies in governmentality have provided a fertile point of departure for a multitude of contemporary conceptions of the nature and location of modern political life and contemporary global phenomena. Thus, it is in the post-Foucauldian use of governmentality where the tension between government and sovereignty is most apparent.

As such, the stance sketched in Chapter 4 examines how Hindess's and Walker's claims about the nature of political life unfold in post-Foucauldian readings of sovereignty, governmentality and a "global" political. Specifically, I explore the post-Foucauldian meditations of Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1992), Timothy Luke (1996), and Michael Dillon (1995). Their work is indicative of the "deterritorial" and "non-sovereign" attempts to increase and establish the analytic purchase of governmentality over and against sovereignty in

understanding the "world." I argue that all four theorists are unable to resolve Hindess's two claims of incompleteness against Foucault and consequently, they also remain short of regicide. However, Miller, Rose, Dillon and Luke's incompleteness reveals the main stakes of (re)articulating the political in the absence/presence of the state: the line of inside/outside.

Ultimately, I contend that the stakes of understanding the practices of state sovereignty, and the (re)articulation/(re)territorialisation of political life, given a multiplicity of global challenges and a general anticipated demise of the integrity of the state and state system, rests on the line that contains and divides the political, a line that is currently read as both a necessary and an unnecessary condition of contemporary political life. Specifically, I argue that the idea of the political community of the state and its politics of inside/outside remains a political fiction and practice that moderns are not prepared to give up.[3]

CHAPTER 2

THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMATIC

Overview

The problematic of sovereignty unfolds as a tension between an analytic predicated on government against an analytic predicated on state sovereignty. This problem is especially acute given the (global) dynamics of change and the anticipated "decline" of the state's powerful harmonisation of sovereignty and government. Put succinctly, there are two complications: one in political theory (inside) and one in international relations (outside). In political theory, the problematic unfolds as an ambiguous and agonic relationship between the unitary, singular authority of state sovereignty and the multifaceted exercises of political power in government. In *Discourses of Power*, Hindess frames this tension as a series of slippages between the idea of political power as a capacity and political power as a right. The corollary of power as a right is the idea that power prevents or inhibits the realisation of some good. In relation to political theory, the problematic of sovereignty involves determining the relationship between government and the state in the face of change.

The second complication is that the contentious relationship between government and sovereignty spills over into the realm of "international" politics. The claim is that political theory is the nesting ground for articulations about

the "world." As such, international relations theory is the ethical grafting of politics onto the sphere of relations as it grapples with the anarchic dynamics of "global" phenomena. Given the complexities of mediating the relationship between government and the state in political theory, it follows that articulations of international politics shift between the supremacy of the state or the juridical and governing practices of government. Put in this way, global politics is less a picture of the world, and more an expression of the limits to the political imagination as all political possibility is nestled within the boundaries of the state.

Given these two complications, the problematic of sovereignty is particularly worrisome when one attempts to (a) understand change; (b) propose alternative articulations of the political; and/or (c) deterritorialise politics.

The constitutive postulate and mediation of inside and outside is the elegantly crafted (ir)resolution of the state. The demarcation of inside and outside by the state produces corollaries affirming specific assumptions about space, time, exclusion, politics and subjectivity. In this chapter, I will examine the slippages and tensions between government and state sovereignty. My aim is to lay out the conditions and features of the sovereignty problematic as it will play out in contemporary articulations of the nature, location and future of political life.

Origins and The Early Modern Problem

At root, given a struggle of authority between church and communities in the early modern period, state sovereignty emerges as a tenable theory regarding the location, legitimation of authority and administration of a given community:

> It was only when political rights, obligations and duties were no longer closely tied to religious tradition or property rights that the idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order – a legally delimited structure of political power - could predominate. Similarly, it was only when human beings were no longer thought of as merely dutiful subjects of God, an emperor or a monarch that the notion could begin to take hold that they, as 'individuals', 'persons', or 'a people', were capable of being active citizens of a new political order - citizens of their state (Held 1995: 37)

For Hindess, the problematic of sovereignty unfolds as a tension regarding the exercise of power given the conflict between secular and religious sites of authority. The subsequent answers to the problem of authority in political theory revolve around sovereignty and government and specifically, around understanding power as a quantitative capacity and power as a legitimated capacity. Power, as a quantitative capacity, is the notion that a thing can be put to work for a variety of purposes. Power in this sense means that

those with more power can prevail over those with less; thus, this suggests that power as a simple capacity means that "there will be an unequal relation between those who employ power for their own purposes and those who are subject to its effects" (Hindess 1996: 2).

However, the second conception of power is more significant insofar as its expansion of power as a quantitative capacity lays down the conditions of possibility for political power and governance. There is the understanding of power as "...a right to act, with both capacity and right being seen to rest on the consent of those over whom power is exercised" (Hindess 1996: 1). In this sense, power operates on the basis of legitimacy in which the relationship between capacity and legitimacy is intimately related to the conception of power as a function of consent. Power as a right to act is related to the political constitution of society and the proper relations between rulers and ruled. Given these two conceptions of power between sovereignty and government, political theory then is about determining the proper scope of, and limits to, the exercise of political power. The underlying premise in the discourses of power is the idea of a community of autonomous persons being ruled by consent.

For Walker, sovereignty in international relations theory is, in part, a complex answer to the problem of time, given the bankruptcy of ecclesiastic and empire hierarchies to make transcendental appeals to eternity and the unchanging being of God. The problem of time is to make sense of change. It is

the general problematic of identity and difference: "all things become other than they were, yet remain somehow enduring" (Walker 1993: 113).[4] The difficulty is to make sense of the world and one's place in the world if that conception is in flux. Articulations of political life (be it grounded in God, reason or the state) offer a comprehensive theory of politics and subjectivity that can solidify understandings of the world and conceptions of politics and the subject. In other words, the objective is to offer a positive vision of human existence in time. Thus, in part, sovereignty enables a sustainable and self-identifiable conception of an autonomous subject in time and space.

The resolution of the antinomy between universalism (identity) and pluralism (difference) provides the most fundamental criterion for understanding politics, subjectivity and Western conceptions of "truth and error, reality and illusion, beauty and ugliness, or good and evil" (Walker 1993: 113). The location of political life within the flat, bounded space of the state demarcated and mediated a line between inside (society and order) and outside (relations and anarchy). The antinomy between universal/particular and identity/difference was resolved in that state sovereignty enabled subjects to be citizens of a particular political community which affirmed plurality and difference, while retaining meaning as members of a universal humanity and condition. In this sense, politics only occurs within the spatially differentiated world and the instability of

subjectivity (as a tension between membership to some overarching universal identity and membership to a particular and different political community) is resolved in citizenship. Walker argues the following:

> In the struggle to reconcile the claims of men and citizens, of a universalist account of humanity and a particularist account of political community, early modern political thought both affirmed the primacy of the particular - the statist community, but also the individual - and attempted to legitimise accounts of political authority within particular communities through a reinterpretation and secularisation of claims to universal reason and natural law (Walker 1993: 62)

Walker contends that as citizens "we may aspire to universal values, but only on the condition that we tacitly assume that the world out there is in fact a realm of particular states, of other communities each aspiring to some notion of goodness, truth and beauty" (Walker 1993: 154). In short, the conditions of possibility for state sovereignty rest on its role as the primary resolution of

> the late-medieval and early-modern struggle to free accounts of political life from hierarchical incorporation of particularity into an overarching universalism - while preserving the possibility that particularity might still be reconciled with a reconceptualisation of what universality entails

(Walker 1993: 62)

However, given the specific historicity of sovereignty and especially its resolution of space/time, universal/particular and identity/difference, sovereignty is challenged by the emergence and accelerations of "chronopolitics"[5] and the anticipated decline of the state. The popularity of the emergence of a chrono-global and the absence of the state highlights a tension between sovereignty and government as claims to understand the "world" and its dynamics rest on models found in the ethical ground of political theory. International narratives range from cosmopolitan, feminist, historical materialist, juridical, neorealist models to extensions of charity under an universal ethic of humanity.[6]

The early modern problem provides three expressions: (a) it expresses the limits to the contemporary political imaginary in the face of claims about change; (b) it is the site at which attempts to think otherwise about political possibilities are constrained by categories; and (c) it illustrates the assumptions that contemporary political analysis takes for granted. The framing of the early modern problem by both Hindess and Walker and the consequent tension of sovereignty and governmentality outline the conditions of possibility for Western conceptions of the political.

The Problematic of Sovereignty: Hobbes and Sovereignty

Two theorists set in motion the tension between sovereignty and

government: Hobbes and Locke. Both Walker and Hindess read Hobbes as the theorist who articulates the harmony of sovereignty as an answer to all problems of space, time, identity and political power. For Walker, the elegance of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, begins with Machiavelli.

Machiavelli sets up an account of political life occurring in time that repudiates the universal/eternal claims of Christianity. That is, Machiavelli reverses the Augustinian valorisation of eternity/God by prioritising politics over eternity. Machiavelli's understanding of time as cyclical, full of contingency and unpredictability undermined the prevailing Christian doctrine that downgraded "...political life as merely temporal, as at best a preparation for the universal kingdom of God" (Walker 1993: 39). Machiavelli solidifies political life in time with the importance of *virtù* - the recognition, management, negotiation and preparation for *fortuna*. As such, Machiavelli does not solidify the contingencies of time with an appeal to Being/eternity, rather, he reverses the Augustinian valorisation of time and eternity to read the possibility of establishing a community of *virtù* in time and onto the spatial form of the principality and republic.

Walker argues that Hobbes stabilises the contingency of Machiavelli's political life with the structure and architectonics of the *Leviathan*. That is, Hobbes stabilises politics and subjectivity with a spatial account of both the

state and the universal, secular guarantees of geometrical reason. Hobbes wanted to negotiate the contingency of time that was articulated in the form of strife and conflict among human beings. He solidifies the contingency of time and the conflict of difference by fusing the unchanging character of scientific reasoning and the spatial regularities of Galilean-Euclidean geometry with the language of social explanation to create a "firm foundation of precise definition" (Walker 1993: 95). The idea is to contain political strife within the established universal reasoning of science. For Hobbes, properly conducted reason issues in science because of science's insistence on precise definitions while "on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui;* and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt" (Hobbes 1996: 36). Ultimately, Hobbes argues for a doctrinal unity to demarcate a legitimate, singular authority and form of knowledge:

> And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, of Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by nature (Hobbes 1996: 32-33)

The claim is that in the absence of certainty, the resolution of conflict and competition of civil discord must involve

submission to an absolute, singular authority that would be able to provide rightful and peaceful political rule. In sharp contrast to Machiavelli's reworking of the community of *virtù* as a response to the problem of time, Hobbes answers change by abandoning the seduction of time for the spatial and structural consciousness of "the geometrical method, the appeal to reason and to artifice based on reason, the concern with order and the archetechtonic impulse...[of] the *Leviathan*" (Walker 1993: 112).

The *Leviathan* enables politics by demarcating a line between political possibility inside and anarchy outside. Hobbes argues for absolute submission to the flat, bounded territory and authority of the Leviathan to tame the slings and arrows of chaos. That is, Hobbes's location of political community within spatial, "timeless" coordinates solidifies the processes of historical change; time is disciplined by space. As such, contemporary understandings of state sovereignty emerge from a historically specific conceptual context. Walker argues that Hobbes's division between inside and outside has provided a powerful model for understanding politics and power in international relations; most, if not all conventional international relations theory involves being for or against the state and state system. The most influential models for understanding the world have been the discourses of realism and idealism. It becomes particularly worrisome when one recognises the finitude of historically specific categories

attempting to understand and address contemporary phenomena.

Hobbes plays a similar and influential role in the development of political power and authority in Western political theory. For Hindess, Hobbes creates a singular, unitary entity by fusing power as a capacity and power as a right into a sovereign whose authority rests on the "consent" of its subjects. For Hobbes, the preservation of liberty was necessary, but at the same time, Hobbes knew that liberty must be subject to limits to preserve order. Through Hobbes, sovereignty is constituted "...through numerous presumed acts of consent, in each of which an individual agrees to transfer the right to govern his or her behaviour to the sovereign" (Hindess 1996: 139). Put in this way, sovereignty is the sum of the powers of many autonomous individuals who then form a community. Sovereign power may be exercised over all subjects, including those who dissent, in virtue of consent being a condition of its existence. As such, liberty and order are preserved in a reciprocal relationship between the sovereign and the sovereign people; thus, identity is resolved with difference and universal is resolved with particular.

Although Hobbes seems to write less about power and more about the constitution of society, *Leviathan* presents three central assumptions about what political life is or ought to be. First, sovereignty is conceptualised as a central, unitary authority and "is seen as the single most important power operating in a society" (Hindess 1996: 39). Because sovereignty is the totality of the powers of its subjects and

its collective power is to protect its subjects, sovereign power is seen as the *primary* power. Second, the most significant activity of sovereignty is the making of decisions and the enactment of laws; put differently, sovereignty operates through ruling and its monopolisation and absolute exercise of power. Because sovereign power is constituted through a multiplicity of acts of authorisation, it "...operates primarily by means of that right; that is, by commanding the obedient behaviour of its subjects and by calling on the use of their powers" (Hindess 1996: 42). And last, subjects who jointly constitute the sovereign power are regarded as having been formed as personalities independently of the activities of government. Hobbes puts forward the fullest articulation of state power in that through Hobbes, the state is understood to be at once singular and many; there is the sovereign and the sovereign people. Thus, *Leviathan* articulates a powerful conception of political life that unifies difference.

The Problematic of Sovereignty: Locke and Government

Locke makes a significant contribution to the discourse of sovereignty set in motion by Hobbes. Locke assumes the conditions of possibility for politics articulated by Hobbes, but Locke develops the conceptual ground for "rightful" government. That is, Locke is significant because he enables, in a sense, a discourse of political legitimacy and critique

taken up by theorists such as Steven Lukes, critical theory, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas.[7] Like Hobbes, Locke contends that subjects consent to forming both the commonwealth *and* the government of that commonwealth. According to Hindess, Locke establishes two kinds of contracts in his account of political power as a right. Unlike Hobbes's argument that subjects have no right to withhold their allegiance or to replace one sovereign with another, Locke contends that the sovereign has definitive obligations towards its subjects. Specifically, Locke argues that the commonwealth has the right to dissolve the sovereign should it act "contrary to their Trust" (§221 1988: 412). As Hindess contends, Locke is significant to the sovereignty problematic because he introduces a measure of political critique. That is, Locke poses questions of political legitimacy in terms of an ideal model of community governed by the civil law: a system of laws laid down and maintained by a power which is itself sustained by the rational consent of the governed. Thus, consent acts as a marker of legitimacy in that it measures "...whether those who exercise political power have a right to its possession, and whether they employ it for legitimate ends" (Hindess 1996: 58).

Locke's introduction of political legitimacy recognises the ways in which subjects are shaped through enforcement, punishment and reward. Specifically, Locke's conception of the Divine Law, the Civil Law, and the Law of Opinion or Reputation acknowledges the insidious and radical powers that govern the

social body.[8] Because the Civil Law is the legitimate exercise of political power by the government, it shapes moral conceptions through "...juridical regulation and punishment" (Hindess 1996: 59). However, the Law of Opinion or Reputation operates through non-juridical means in that it regulates subjects through the praise or censure of actions according to community practices. Hindess cites the following passage from Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*:

> For though Men uniting into politick Societies, have resigned up to the publick the disposing of all their Force, so that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-Citizen, any farther than the Law of the Country directs: yet they retain still the power of Thinking well or ill; approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst (Locke §10 1957: 353 cited in Hindess 1996: 59)

As such, for Hindess, these three laws and morality are significant because (a) they provide the basis for questions of political legitimacy and (b) they furnish the rationale for a variety of instruments intended to reform, regulate and normalise subjects. Thus, Locke's articulation of government presents a different conception of politics from Hobbes: political life is predicated on the legitimate contractual relationship between rulers and ruled rather than through the constitution of a singular sovereign power. Furthermore, the legitimate exercise of power rests not only on the juridical practices of government, but also on supplementary "laws,"

> social conditions; (2) an image of the autonomous individual which provides an ideal against which the present can be measured; (3) the claim that such an ideal could be realized in a realm of social existence that is not structured by the illegitimate effects of power (Hindess 1996: 95)

Likewise, these non-juridical conceptions of power are located "in the context of a normative framework that arises from the primary conception of power as based on consent" (Hindess 1996: 140). That is, the arguments of Lukes, Marcuse, critical theory and Habermas emerge from a normative framework in which subjects can be liberated towards a utopic society in which "social life may be properly governed on the basis of their consent" (Hindess 1996: 140). Thus, one can read Lukes, Marcuse, critical theory and Habermas as within the Lockean framework of measuring and rectifying (il)legitimate exercises of power through legitimate governance.

Although Locke works within the Hobbesian idealised sovereign community, his work in political legitimacy does attempt to pluralise Hobbes's more singular conception of sovereignty. Locke is significant because he lays the ground for more developed challenges to the singularity and prominence of state sovereignty. For Hindess, the Lockean stream of government eventually leads to Foucault in that Foucault takes issue with the juridical development of sovereignty and its grip on political theory. However, it is important to note that Foucault does not fall within the Lockean stream of

political critique. Instead Foucault rereads the development of sovereignty through the middle ages onwards and to identify the conceptual undercurrents in Western political theory that have enabled, to a certain degree, the juridical practice of sovereignty. Foucault's most notable "undercurrent" is his study of governing.

Five Features of the Sovereignty Problematic

The sovereignty problematic unfolds as a tension between sovereignty and government, given the temporality of global flows, movement, change and difference. From the "outside," the state acts as a singular container of political life that is embedded in a network of relations. The line of the state enables politics "inside" and specifically, the (ir)resolution of political power and governance. However, the problematic works as a confusion of clear analytic focus: How does one (re)articulate the relationship between sovereignty, states and government, given the "global" dynamics of change?

Given Walker and Hindess's reading of sovereignty and government, I want to summarise the sovereignty problematic into five political corollaries. These corollaries outline the ways in which conceptions of the political lie within the tension between sovereignty and government. Accordingly, these features of thinking within the sovereignty problematic present "test" questions for (re)articulating political life in the apparent "absence" of the harmonisation of sovereignty and government by the state.

One feature of the sovereignty problematic is that its singular claim to subjectivity harmonises the politics of universal/particular and identity/difference. Specifically, state sovereignty resolves the antinomy of citizen and human in the concept of citizenship. "Our" primary self-understanding of being part of a particular community is held over, and often against, membership to some universal humanity. Citizenship enables subjects to hold a primary political identity as participants in a particular community, but retain a potential connection with "humanity" through participation in a broader international system:

> [As such,] we are the peoples of the United Nations. As citizens, we may aspire to universal values, but only on the condition that we tacitly assume that the world out there is in fact a realm of particular states, or other communities each aspiring to some notion of goodness, truth and beauty (Walker 1993: 154)

In addition, alternate conceptions of subjectivity that attempt to decentre the spatiality of the state are masked or marginalised by the conditions of possibility laid out by the state and the state system. Social movements attempt to challenge the spatialised subject by mobilizing people in ways that are "[p]lural...[i]mpermanent...[i]nchoate...[i]nclusive ...[and] [u]nbounded" (Magnusson 1990: 52). However, Walker argues that "once one crosses the official boundaries of the established conceptions of politics, the boundaries of the

modern state, it becomes very difficult to speak about any kind of politics at all" (Walker 1994: 697). Social movements involve mobilising claims of a particular sort in the name of some overarching universalism, but they remain movements that occur within societies whose conventions can only exist in the political structures of the state and state system. Walker contends that "...like it or not, modern political discourse still largely equates all political identities, whether of class, race, gender, religion, humanity or planet, with citizenship, with the fusion of universality and particularity in the legitimate authority of the sovereign state" (Walker 1994: 675). Although alternative subjectivities challenge state sovereignty and its mode of subjection, these conceptions of the subject must address sovereignty's structuralisation of difference/particularity. Specifically, the mobilisation of coherent claims of subjectivity rest on the negotiation of universal and particular, identity and difference. Thus, to articulate a progressive politics for race, gender or ecology requires that subjects "here" resolve the difference/particularity of subjects "there" under some universal aspiration and condition. In summary, one political corollary of the sovereignty problematic is its model of legitimacy for understanding subjectivity. That is, the resolution of the universality of identity or humanity with the particularity and difference of citizen in the conception of citizenship sets up the conditions of possibility for grounding articulations of the modern subject.

A second corollary of the sovereignty problematic is its location of political life in space. The space for politics must be both (a) flat and contained and (b) absolute and homogenous. The necessity of a flat and contained political space emerges from the dissolution of medieval and feudal hierarchies. In the absence of a singular site for political life and as an answer to all questions about universal/particular, identity/difference, state sovereignty redraws the line and hierarchy between the finite earth and infinite heaven as a horizontal dualism between subject and object, human and world. The flattening and enclosure of space creates a clear division between the political life inside the state and the absence of political life outside. As such, sovereignty's demarcation between inside and outside produces a spatial metaphysics of exclusion between same and other, citizen and enemy. The flat, contained political space sets up the conditions of possibilities for political theory and international relations theory. Political theory concerns negotiating the pluralistic claims of government with the universalistic claims of state sovereignty. As such, the sovereignty problematic "oscillates both between unrestrained power and legitimate authority and between the primacy of the people and the primacy of the state as the locus of power and authority" (Walker 1993: 63). International relations theory and other disciplines such as anthropology or comparative politics, are concerned with making sense of the Other and difference. More clearly,

> [t]he other part of the puzzle concerns the paradoxical dependence of all claims of universality within states upon the explicit but often silent recognition that such claims to universality are in fact particularistic, are made on behalf of a particular group of citizens, rather than of people as members of a common community (Walker 1993: 63)

That is, international relations theory et al. involve the problem of comparison, of knowing difference in relation to the same and the problem is usually resolved through "a theory of temporal process, or rather of Progress and its subsequent articulations in the theory of development" (Walker 1993: 66).

There is a second part to the spatial corollary of the sovereignty problematic: political space is absolute and homogeneous. In this sense, the resolution of universal/particular and identity/difference takes the structure of a spatial extension and hierarchy. The claim is that the political categories of the sovereignty problematic are informed by a Euclidean-Newtonian geometrical homogenisation of space.[10] According to Walker, Euclidean-Newtonian spatial constructs influence Western articulations of the "world" in that political life is predicated on the conception of an inviolable, bounded space.[11] That is, the constitutive dualism of universal/particular, identity/difference (or subject/object, knower/known, finite/infinite, autonomous individuals/external world) is resolved by the possibility of drawing a straight,

undifferentiated line from here to there. The framing of difference as an extension in space rests on the claim that autonomy, beauty, order, universality, identity is possible here and inside, while difference, anarchy, chaos and particularity occurs unadulterated beyond the border. One example of the understanding of difference as extension is the discipline of anthropology. The examination of other peoples is enabled by the claim that their difference is defined in relation to and extended from "our" sameness. As such, difference and the Other are marginalised spatially; it unfolds in the distance of out there and not here. Thus, the absolute, homogenous sense of space has enabled the state to be the necessary answer to all questions regarding political life; alternative conceptions of political life are made incoherent.

Furthermore, the conception of political space as homogeneous assumes that the scale of politics and subjectivity is constant such that articulations of the political can be abstracted from inside to out; put differently, the politics within political theory can be grafted onto the "world." A political space that is homogenous means that the dynamics of the macro world/globe/state are simply a reflection of the micro world/subject/individual; the only distinction is scale. Walker contends that this "Theme of Gulliver," opens the possibilities for a universal global condition. However, cosmopolitan/global attempts to transcend or dispense with the state remain caught within the horizons of sovereignty if such "alternatives" are simply variations of the state writ large.

Given the conditions of a homogeneous political space, change and difference are resolved as structural rearrangements of spatial distributions such as the ideology and model of the United Nations. In summary, a second corollary of the sovereignty problematic is its location of political life in a conception of space that is both (a) flat and contained and (b) absolute and homogenous. This conception of space has enabled the division of the political into the sphere of international relations and political theory and the resolutions and proposals for resolutions of universal/particular, identity/difference in the "world."

So far, the features of the sovereignty problematic and specifically, the space of the state sovereignty, have provided the forum for debate between sovereignty and government. However, there are a further three political corollaries that follow from the sovereignty problematic and specifically from the narratives of government: autonomy, consent and community. These corollaries concern constitutive "fictions" that guide negotiations of the political and set up a measure of political critique. Autonomy is understood either as a constitutive feature of subjectivity that can be realised through the institutions of government or as a measure for the illegitimate powers that prevent subjects from realising their autonomy or inner "Truth." In Hindess's review of Western political thought from Hobbes to Habermas, the conception of the subject as an autonomous agent plays a constitutive and constituting role. Thus, the idea(l) of the autonomous subject acts as a

measure of the illegitimate effects of power or as the constitutive condition of subjectivity. Put differently, the subject ought to be able to realise his/her inner "Truth." This view of the subject plays out in most, if not all Western discourses of the subject.

The political corollary of consent follows from the idea(l) of autonomy in that the practice of consent stabilises the oscillation between autonomy and governance, authority and legitimacy. For Hindess, the slippage between sovereignty and government involves a special type of capacity to act that calls upon the performance of pre-existing obligations. The claim is that the sovereign subject sustains her state of autonomy through a multiplicity of acts of consent. Because consent alone is hardly sufficient to constitute a political community, it is usually "... supplemented by other powers if it is to be effective" (Hindess 1996: 140). However, the claim is that consent based politics remains a constitutive feature of the modern political imaginary in its capacity to determine and measure conditions of legitimacy. As such, consent plays a constitutive role in most, if not all Western theories of politics.

The last feature of the sovereignty problematic is the location and equation of political life in and with a community. That is, the idea(l) of a community of autonomous subjects who consent to be governed by their fellow members emerges from the flat, contained space of politics. And in its modern articulation and (ir)resolution, the centred political

community is made synonymous with the spatiality of the state. As such, a constitutive condition of possibility for politics is the constitution of some arrangement between community, autonomy and consent. Indeed, the idea(l) of community surfaces in the "language and institutional framework of democratic government, in the provision of norms for social policy intervention...in diverse moral critiques of political power...[and in the work of] radical critics [and defenders] of current practices" (Hindess 1996: 157). As such, a fifth corollary of the sovereignty problematic is the location of the autonomous subject within the bounded space/state of a community of such persons who agree to be governed by fellow members.

In Sum: The Sovereignty Problematic

According to the reading of sovereignty and government by both Walker and Hindess, it is possible to summarise five political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic. First, sovereignty masks and disciplines all claims to subjectivity through its resolution of universal/particular, identity/difference in citizenship and the state system. Second, sovereignty locates political life on/in a flat, bounded, absolute and homogeneous conception of space. The politics of inside/outside structures both the "world" and alternative ways of understanding the "world." This conception of space enables an additional three political fictions in Western understandings of the political: the conception of the person as autonomous, the

resolution/realisation of autonomy through consent and the location/equation of modern political life in the bounded community of such persons. According to Hindess, Western social and political theory is mostly about the enduring and constitutive fiction that a community composed of autonomous persons can and should be governed by the consent of its members (Hindess 1996: 157). Because of the state's (ir)resolution of the relationship between sovereignty and government, the bounded political community of government is made synonymous with the state. As such, the state remains a powerful ideal for conceptualising politics and subjectivity.

In summary, the sovereignty problematic,

> both affirms a specific resolution of philosophical and political options that must be acknowledged everywhere and sets clear limits to our capacity to envisage any other possibility. As both a resolution and limit, it enters into the practices of states, the categories of those who analyse states and even the aspirations of those who would like to dispense with states. As a practice of states, it is easily mistaken for their essence. As a category of analysis, it is easily treated as the silent condition guaranteeing all other categories. As a source of inspiration, it affirms that the only alternative to it is a return to the same, albeit on a larger - global - scale (Walker 1993: 176)

The tension between sovereignty and government provides

political corollaries that express the limits to political possibilities. This becomes particularly worrisome in the attempts to understanding global phenomena such as economic globalisation, nationalism, warfare, ecological degradation or change and mass migration. Any "alternative" or contested reading of the nature and location of modern political life must take seriously what is at stake in engaging with the conditions of possibility set out by the sovereignty problematic. The (ir)resolution of sovereignty and government by the state is a historically specific answer to questions/contradictions of who "we" are arising from problems of time and the collapse of God in early-modern period.

CHAPTER 3

FOUCAULT, THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMATIC AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Overview

This chapter presents two interpretations of Foucault's work. First, it presents a reading of Foucault's historical analysis of the discourses and practices of the sovereignty problematic. And second, it offers an interpretation of Foucault's governmentality as a way of thinking about political life that contests the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic.

Foucault presents a philosophical ethos or modern attitude that consists of the permanent critique of ourselves through the engagement with the conditions of possibility of the present. This attitude of modernity involves a critical-ontology of the self "...in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault 1984d: 50). As such, Foucault's project embodies an attitude that simultaneously "respects" and "violates" regimes of truth. In his writings, Foucault presented two critical ontological strategies: archaeology and genealogy. "Archaeology" refers to the "instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say and do" (Foucault 1984d: 46) and as such, it examines the formation of discursive practices or games of truth articulated

through the concepts of episteme and archive. Archive is the totality of discursive relations in which "heterogeneous regions are differentiated or deployed in accordance with specific rules and practices which cannot be superposed" (Foucault 1972: 128). Episteme can be described as a specific set of discursive relations "that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalised systems" (Foucault 1972: 191). Archaeology is concerned with how regimes of truth are determined by the discursive practices of the human sciences and disciplines.

Genealogy examines the relationship between games of truth and

> the ways in which we conceptualise the real (discursive practices), and the conducting of our conduct (power and ethics), that is, the ways in which we govern the real (non-discursive practices), which is articulated through the concept of dispositif (Owen 1998: 14).

Put differently, genealogy analyses the material regimes of practices that operate on the subject and more specifically, along three axes of knowledge, power and ethics. Foucault argues that genealogy analyses

> programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done (effects of 'jurisdiction') and codifying effects regarding what is to be known (effects of 'veridiction') (Foucault 1991b: 75)

The genealogical approach is a tripartite acute historical-ontological investigation ("erudite knowledge") of the micro-practices ("local memories") that determine the conditions of possibility of a given mode of subjection/regime. There are three types of historical-genealogical perspectives:

> First, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field or power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, an historical ontology in relation to ethics which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (Foucault 1984b: 351)

Put differently, Foucault's historical analysis investigates the bodies of knowledge ("scientific inquiry"), forms of power ("dividing practices") and modes of subjectivity ("the way in which a human being turns him- or herself into a subject") (Foucault 1982: 208). In short, the task of a Foucauldian approach would be to investigate the conditions of possibility for who "we" are and the possibilities of how we can be different:

> But, then, what is philosophy today - philosophical activity, I mean - if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already

> known?...The object [is] to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently (Foucault 1990b: 8-9)

The Emergence of the Sovereignty Problematic[12]

Foucault does not take a "for or against" stance in his problematisation of the sovereignty problematic, rather Foucault historicises the sovereignty problematic to open alternative possibilities of "no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think" (Foucault 1984d: 45-46). Foucault wants to subvert the main roles that the discourse of sovereignty and government has played in Western political thought in two ways. First, Foucault problematises the universalist reflection of the juridical by giving a non-metaphysical account of subjectivity and to free the reflective universalisation of a juridical mode of subjection. Foucault's objective of complicating the assumed primacy of sovereignty is part of his larger project to displace the concept of a sovereign subject. That is, Foucault argues that there is no universal sense of subject; the claim is for a shift from a transcendental, ahistorical discourse in exchange for contingent, historical and localised practices.

Second, Foucault wants to "explode" the sovereignty problematic's reliance on and masquerade of processes of normalisation. That is, he wants to show how sovereignty legitimates disciplinary systems and hides the forms of

power/knowledge/ethics of normalisation that have developed beside and underneath the production of the juridical. For Foucault, the corollaries of sovereignty and government provide an inadequate way to understand modern relations of power. Foucault argues that to think in the language of the sovereignty problematic is to continue to think about politics and subjectivity under conditions of the pre-1789 age of European monarchies and popular opposition to them. As such, according to Foucault, the political categories of sovereignty and government do not provide a realistic understanding for how the practices of power are actually exercised under modern conditions nor of the dynamics and rationalities characteristic of modern political life:

> Political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty. What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done (Foucault 1980a: 121)

In this respect, Foucault's historicisation of sovereignty addresses the practices of government within the discourse of political theory and as such, it does not explicitly address international relations theory. However, Foucault did write indirectly on the status of the state and

state system arising from his meditations on sovereignty and government. According to Foucault, the reason of state produced great ensembles of political knowledge and technology. Given a competition of survival between states, Foucault contends that one ensemble was

> a diplomatico-military technology that consists in ensuring and developing the forces of a state through a system of alliances, and the organizing of an armed apparatus. The search for a European equilibrium, which was one of the guiding principles of the treaties of Westphalia, is a consequence of this political technology (Foucault 1994a: 69)

Foucault did not expand much more on this aspect of international relations theory, in order to concentrate on the processes that constitute and govern the subject. It is Foucault's later work in government in which he replies directly to the sovereignty problematic and presents an alternate reading of the political. Although Foucault's analysis of international relations theory is incomplete, his general ethos has been and continues to be a point of departure for addressing the sovereignty problematic. As such, no analysis of the sovereignty problematic would be complete if it did not examine Foucault's crucial contributions to modern (re)articulations of political life.

According to Foucault, the sovereignty problematic is rooted in an understanding of power as something that prevents, distorts, constrains or negates the truth and consequently, the

exercise of power requires mechanisms of legitimation. The claim is that the tension between government and sovereignty is a contest between differing political models of truth predicated on fixing limits to rightful power. Thus, for Foucault, the sovereignty problematic begins with the negotiation of power between the singularity of sovereignty and the legitimation of government.

Specifically, the tension between sovereignty and government begins with the democratisation of monarchical rule by theories of right. Monarchical rule emerges as a reply to the conflict between feudal monarchies over and against feudal particularities by establishing a central authority over a territory and the subjects who inhabited that space. The unitary spirit of the King "presented itself as a referee, a power capable of putting an end to war, violence and pillage and saying no to these struggles and private feuds" (Foucault 1980a: 121). Specifically, the King allocated "itself a juridical and negative function...that formed a system of representation of power which was extended during the subsequent era by theories of right" (Foucault 1980a: 121). The fusion of political life with the juridical and executive institutions and apparatuses of the state presented mechanisms of interdiction and sanction that operated according to law, taboo and censorship. A main idea in the sovereignty problematic is that "the constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange" (Foucault 1980b: 88). As such, questions of power

are posed either "...as the legitimate rights of sovereignty...[or] as the legal obligation[s] to obey it[;]... [sovereignty] is therefore designed to eliminate the fact of domination and its consequences" (Foucault 1980b: 95). In short, the sovereignty problematic is concerned with the negotiation of power and right to realise the truth and maintain an autonomous subject.[13]

The sovereignty problematic's representation of power as dominating solidified itself in the political imagination through its role as an organising principle and ideology in the major legal codes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Foucault, the theory of sovereignty has been "...a permanent instrument of criticism of the monarchy and of all the obstacles that thwart the development of disciplinary society" (Foucault 1980b: 105). At the same time, the theory of sovereignty and the organisation of legal codes centred upon the problematic

> has allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to the guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights. The juridical systems - and this applies both to their codification and to their theorisation - have enabled sovereignty to be democratised through the constitution of a public right

> articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the same time this democratisation of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion (Foucault 1980b: 105)

Thus, the preeminence of the sovereignty problematic in modern political landscape rests on its ability to be a juridico-consensual tool of criticism and legitimation of political power, while at the same, it rests on the multiplicity of political rationalities and disciplinary coercions that assure the cohesiveness of political life.

Foucault's Reading of Sovereignty

Given Foucault's reading of the historical emergence and solidification of sovereignty, the sovereignty problematic can be characterized by five features. First, there is the assumption of a constitutive sovereign rather than a constituted and constituting notion of sovereignty. As such, autonomy is equated with sovereignty or government in that autonomy is realised as the negotiation and limiting of power. Second, there is the assumption that legal codes are the only way to legitimate the exercise of power. Third, there is the assumption that consent is an essential feature of the legitimate exercise of power; this follows from the conception of the subject as autonomous or possessing an inner state of truth. Fourth, there is the assumption that prohibition, exhortation and civic rituals is how power operates to the

exclusion of the productive or constitutive role of power in forming and shaping forms of thought and action (or modes of subjection). And last, there is the assumption that freedom is freedom from some law or law-like structure that blocks the expression or liberation of some thwarted truth, good, nation, authentic identity or human nature. For Foucault, the mark of thinking within the sovereignty problematic is to understand political life as the consensual resolution of power and right.

Contestation: Governmentality

Foucault's dissatisfaction with the preeminence of sovereignty in modern political thought prompted him to unmask other forms of power and practices in an attempt to spin the political question. He contends that the negotiation of power through state or government apparatuses and institutions does not adequately describe the multiple techniques of subjection that pervade the social body; juridical power is simply one practice among a multitude of practices of power. Foucault claims that juridical promises of autonomy and liberation rest on a "closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of the social body" (Foucault 1980b: 106). As such, Foucault contends that analyses of power and political life must

> avoid this question [of legitimacy], central to the theme of right, regarding sovereignty and the obedience of individual subjects in order that [one] may substitute the problem of domination and

> subjugation for that of sovereignty and obedience (Foucault 1980b: 96)

To this end, Foucault presents an alternative conception of power, politics and subjectivity that allows for a modern understanding of political life. For Foucault, power is more dynamic and expansive than the repressive conception of power in the juridico-discursive. He contends that to understand power,

> we must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between liberties - strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others - and the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And between the two, between games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies... the way you govern your wife, your children, as well as the way you govern an institution...In my analysis of power, there are three levels: the strategic relationships, the techniques of government, and the levels of domination (Foucault 1988c: 19)

As such, Foucault diversifies the conventional conception of power. By "strategic relationships," Foucault means to describe power in a general sense. That is, power ought not to be understood as dominating or limiting, but as "...an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future" (Foucault 1982: 220). Thus,

power is the conduct of actions and the ordering of the field of possibilities for action. In this sense, power is analogous to a game or strategy in that it is the play of structuring a field of possible actions to achieve an objective. Foucault's concept of power moves away from the idea that the exercise of power is dominating or inhibiting. According to Foucault, power plays out in a multiplicity of ways; it is "...everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere... it is permanent, repetitious, inert and self-reproducing... unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable and tense [set of] force relations" (Foucault 1990a: 92).

Foucault makes a key distinction between power in an ideal sense and states of domination. He contends that "[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (Foucault 1982: 221). That is, for power to involve a field of possibilities, subjects must have the capability to act in reaction to or against the actions brought to bear on their actions. States of domination are those relations in which subjects are constrained from playing with the possibilities of acting differently or resisting. For Foucault, a state of domination is when "...the relations of power are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited" (Foucault 1988c: 12). But, as Hindess outlines, the situation is never entirely one-sided. Foucault states that

> [e]ven though the relation of power may be completely unbalanced or when one can truly say that

> he has 'all power' over the other, a power can only be exercised over another to the extent that the latter still has the possibility of committing suicide, of jumping out of the window or of killing the other. (Foucault 1988c: 12, cited in Hindess 1996: 103)

The ability to achieve an ideal reciprocal and strategic relationship or the ability to avoid domination all together is ambiguous in Foucault's work. That is, given Foucault's epistemic commitment against a universal subject, it is not at all clear what "freedom," "truth" or autonomy could possibly mean. This point has been the point of departure for lively debate.[14] However, with respect to this thesis, Foucault's most significant expansion of power is to bring to light the rationalities, technologies, techniques and orchestrated systems of government.

Government is an art that involves a specific way of knowing and doing things "oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way" (Foucault 1988a: 60). According to Foucault, the sovereignty problematic and its conception of juridical power concentrates too much on legitimating institutions and apparatuses rather than on the practices that enable governance. The idea is that the governance of people has played a significant role in understanding political life; to a large extent, government concerns how it is that subjects understand themselves and their relations with others. For Foucault, a significant

development in the history of government emerges with the discourse surrounding Machiavelli's *The Prince*. In particular, the art of government emerges in contrast to the theory of sovereignty in anti-Machiavellian literature. Foucault contends that the anti-Machiavellian literature distinguished a multitude of ways of understanding government. That is,

> whereas the doctrine of the prince and the juridical theory of sovereignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince and any other form of power, because its task is to explain and justify this essential discontinuity between them, in the art of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards direction (Foucault 1991a: 91)

In general, for Foucault, the term "government" has both a very wide and narrow meaning: government is the conduct of conduct. It is the calculated directing and ordering of others and of oneself "...according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict...[but] within a more or less open field of possibilities" (Foucault 1982: 220-221). As Mitchell Dean states:

> Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite

> but shifting ends and has a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (Dean 1998: 3)

For Foucault, government encompasses "the way in which you govern your wife, your children, as well as the way you govern an institution" (Foucault 1988c: 19). Put simply, government is how ways of doing things are organised by oneself and by others.

Underneath and beside of the sovereignty problematic, the art of government emerges from the early modern conflict between secular and ecclesiastic sources of authority. Specifically, the art of government is rooted in the doctrine of reason of state: "...government in accordance with the state's strength...within an extensive and competitive framework" (Foucault 1988a: 76). Distinct from Christian or juridical models of political life that concentrated on justifying a relationship between sovereign and subject with ecclesiastic or juridical laws, the reason of state emphasises the maximisation of the strength of the state. That is, unlike the invocation of ecclesiastic or secular "virtué" such as "reason, wisdom and prudence" (Foucault 1988a: 76), the reason of state, understood as rational government able to increase the state's strength, relies on a specific type of knowledge grounded in the precise measurement of the state's strengths. Foucault contends that

> [t]he art of governing, characteristic of reason of state, is intimately bound up with the development

> of what was then called either political *statistics*, or *arithmetic*; that is, the knowledge of difference states' respective forces. Such knowledge was indispensable for correct government [emphasis in original] (Foucault 1988a: 77)

Eventually, governmentality makes a seminal departure from reason of state and the sovereignty problematic, given particular developments in the practices of governing. One development in the emergence of a modern art of government is illustrated by the role of police in seventeenth and eighteenth century literature. The claim is that the police had a much broader meaning and role than in its current understanding. He contends that the role of the police ranged from the administration of the state to managing men in their relations to all sorts of things such as security, work, health, production, travel, religion, etc.. The departure of the art of government from reason of state and the sovereignty problematic is rooted in the policing of the population and its related knowledges. Specifically, the art of government is directed towards the "statistics" of the population and having "its own regularities, its own rate of deaths and diseases, its cycles of scarcity, etc" (Foucault 1991a: 99). The claim is that a specific art of government emerges parallel to the growing importance of the population and its related datum. To this end, governmentality is aimed at the welfare of the population and not the territorial unity of the state or the legitimation of the disjuncture between sovereign and subject.

For Foucault, the population

> comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of government. In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; and the means that the government uses to attain those ends are themselves all in some sense immanent to the population (Foucault 1991a: 100)

As such, the modern art of government emerges from the reason of state as an attempt to establish a continuity between sovereign and subject that is both individualising and totalising. More clearly, the art of government is about conducting the conduct of the individual and of the population in such a way as to establish a cohesive governing unity between the two.

We can outline the governmentality analytic with four critical-political corollaries. These critical-political corollaries illustrate the constitutive features of post-Foucauldian applications of the art of government. First, governmentality is that it is a rational, calculated process of differentiation and disposition in a general politics of truth. That is, by "rational" and "calculated," I mean to say that government is about the arrangement of "...things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved" (Foucault 1991a: 95). Specifically, opposite to

the juridical aim of the sovereignty problematic, the art of government is concerned about managing and fostering "the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.; and the means that the government uses to attain those ends are themselves all in some sense immanent to the population" (Foucault 1991a: 100). In short, the art of government is a relation of self to self employing "...very specific 'truth games' related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves" (Foucault 1988b: 18). A second feature of governmentality is that it understands power as productive and dynamic rather than as something that must be restrained or that is dominating. The exercise of governmental power is a practice that manifests itself in various relationships, techniques, technologies and systems. A third feature of governmentality is that its "truth" and direction of subjects/population involves a multiplicity of practical systems or "blocks." The claim is that the practices of government involve a multitude of "...'blocks" in which the adjustment of abilities, the resources of communication, and power relations constituted regulated and concerted systems" (Foucault 1982: 218-219). Put differently, governmentality is an orchestrated system of subjection directed at both the population and individual. It describes "the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other" (Foucault 1988c: 19).

A final feature of governmentality is its management of a macro/micro subject that is not territorial or unitary in conception. Foucault contends that what "government has to do with is not territory but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things" (Foucault 1991a: 93). The art of government is not predicated on the imposition of law over territory or a singular transcendental subject. Specifically, governing is the calculated differentiation of

> men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in the relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly men in their relation to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death etc. (Foucault 1991a: 93)

In addition, Foucault argues that these

> ...relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State. In two senses: first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far form being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations (Foucault

1980a: 122)

Thus, the practices of the state, according to Foucault, necessarily rest on other relations of power such as government.

In Sum: Reflections and Projections

Governmentality illustrates an intersection between politics and ethics in modern western social and political thought by asking the following question: what does it mean to talk about how we think about governing and politics in general? To this end, governmentality gives a critical-historical reading of western concepts of government from the middle ages onwards. Specifically, Foucault's studies in governmentality describe three historical-practical aspects of government. First, the art of government describes the ensembles of institutions, analyses, tactics and calculations of government and specifically, Foucault investigates six historically located rationalities of government: discipline, pastoral power, police, reason of state, liberalism, social government. Second, governmentality describes the rise of government technologies and the production of governmental knowledge. Put differently, it marks the emergence of a modern art of government and a distinctly new form of power. And third, governmentality describes the governmentalisation of the juridical state. By "governmentalization," Foucault means the elaboration, rationalisation and centralisation of power relations in the form of or under the auspices of the state.

In short, the governmentality analytic offers a conception of political life that renders the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic suspect.

In the wake of Foucault's studies in government and power, what is left of the sovereignty problematic? Has Foucault taken political theory to task by cutting off the King's head? One important point to note: Consistent with his critical ethos, Foucault does not reject the practices of sovereignty and government all together. Although Foucault's studies in governmentality are written in contention to the overvaluation of the state in political analysis, his work attempts to minimise, limit and question the taken-for-granted role of the state in social and political thought. The claim is that state and government institutions are not the basic unit of politics nor do the state and government institutions present a cohesive unity. Foucault's project was to show that sovereignty and government have a contested history. Accordingly, Foucault's work questions the role and importance of the state in Western political thought. He contends that

> the state [ought to be]...no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity - that is, for our present - is not so much the *étatisation* of society, as the 'governmentalization' of the state (Foucault 1991a: 103)

CHAPTER 4

Post-Foucault: The (Non)Fiction of Inside/outside

Overview

So far, I have set up the conditions of the sovereignty problematic which reads as an analytic tension between state sovereignty and government. State sovereignty is a harmonised, spatial practice of inside and outside that unfolds as the state and state system. Government is the juridical discourse involving the legitimation and location of political power. The two analytics compete over the proper understanding of the "world" and changes to that "world" - this tension is especially acute, given a general anticipated "decline" of the harmonizing state. From the stream of government, Foucault emerges as a challenge to state sovereignty and the juridical discursive of government. Foucault historicises juridical concepts of power and the analytical preeminence of the state to show that the state ought not to be taken for granted. In effect, Foucault expands the political imaginary through critical practice.

However, as Hindess claims, Foucault's regicide can be considered incomplete in the sense that he does not fully address the fiction of political community. This is not to say that Foucault's studies in power and government take the concept of political community for granted. Foucault shows the history of certain concepts of community (such as "population"

and "society") through which governmental rationalities govern human beings to reveal the possibilities of how the political landscape could be otherwise. As such, Foucault questions the practices of the government analytic, but there is a sense in which his studies on state sovereignty are incomplete. But to make the claim that social and political thought has been uncritical of the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic, as Foucault appears to do, is misleading. To fully address the problematic is to realise two things. First, while acknowledging that the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic as a fiction, "Western political thought nevertheless continues to make use of that world" (Hindess 1996: 157). And second, "it is not only the problem of sovereignty that we (another fictional community) need to free ourselves from, but also the problem of political community" (Hindess 1996: 158). In other words, how is it that political life, despite critical readings of the bounded political community is situated within the territorial state? As such, complete regicide must also address the (un)necessary division and containment of the modern political landscape by the lines of inside and outside. As Hindess contends, the task is to "...find a way to think about politics in the absence of its defining, constitutive fiction: [political community;] something far easier to suggest than it will be to effect" (Hindess 1996: 158). In its most powerful and modern articulation, political community takes the form of the state. This issue affects how politics is being (re)articulated, given

the dynamics and challenges of "global" change/phenomenon.

Although Foucault does not specifically address Hindess's challenge, there are many post-Foucauldian theorists who take Foucault's studies in governmentality as a significant point of analytic departure in speculating on the sovereignty problematic and the future possibilities of political life. More specifically, the post-Foucauldian ethos appears to "deterritorialise" or "desovereign" politics to increase and establish the analytic purchase of governmentality over and against sovereignty in understanding the "world." The underlying premise is that Foucault's work provides a more congruent and conceptually more empowering understanding of the tensions and dynamics of change. To this end, I am interested in how Foucault's legacy unfolds in contemporary investigations of the sovereignty problematic. I argue that beyond providing some innovative conceptual purchase, post-Foucauldian meditations on the nature and location of political life are unable to resolve Hindess's two claims of incompleteness against Foucault and consequently, they remain short of regicide. This "incompleteness" reveals the main stake/tension/fiction in (re)articulating the political in the absence/presence of the state: the fictitious line of inside/outside and its political corollaries.

I would like to investigate the post-Foucauldian meditations of Peter Miller, Nikolas Rose, Timothy Luke and Michael Dillon. These theorists represent three significant threads of speculation.[15] First, Miller, Rose, Dillon and Luke

attempt to increase and establish the analytic purchase of governmentality over and against state sovereignty. Second, all theorists try to make sense of the dynamics of contemporary "global" flows. And third, Miller, Rose, Dillon and Luke rearticulate the conditions of political life in the wake of a "declining" state.

Three Meditations and Three Threads

In "Political power beyond the State: problematics of government," Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller argue for the analysis of political power in terms of a problematics of government and against the overvaluation of the state in understanding the political. Their claim is that the language of the state and particularly its political dualisms of "state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy and like" (Miller and Rose 1992: 174) do not provide the proper conceptual tools to comprehend contemporary transformations in the exercise of political power. Following Foucault's criticism of the juridical discursive, Rose and Miller argue for the relocation of " 'the State' within an investigation of *problematics of government*" [emphasis in original] (Miller and Rose 1992: 174). By "problematics of government," Rose and Miller mean to describe the analysis of contemporary exercises of political power in terms of their political rationalities and governmental technologies. That is, following Foucault's work in governmentality, political power is better understood

through the rationalities and technologies of conducting conduct rather than through juridical practices.

There are two parts to Rose and Miller's argument. First, Rose and Miller present a dialogue on the ways in which one can better understand the exercise of political power inside the state. In this sense, they present a series of meditations on how liberal democracies "govern at a distance" through political rationalities and governmental technologies and specifically, they apply their analysis to the discourse of welfarism and its modes of subjectivisation. For Rose and Miller, government is the domain through which programmes of administration, calculation and assertion conduct a multitude of authorities, individuals and groups. They contend that one ought to understand that "[i]t is through technologies that political rationalities and the programmes of government that articulate them become capable of deployment" (Rose & Miller 1992: 183).

The second part of "Political power beyond the State" is more significant because it attempts to explain and make contingent the apparent preeminence of the state as the basic unit of politics. In a sense, this is Rose and Miller's exploration of the relationship between political theory and international relations. Their post-Foucauldian resolution of the tension between sovereignty and government and the politics of political community is to subsume the state within the problematic of government. The claim is that the practice of state sovereignty is a rationality and technology of

governmentality:

> Within the problematics of government, one can be nominalistic about the state: it has no essential necessity or functionality. Rather, the state can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a 'political sphere', with its particular characteristics of rule, from other 'non-political spheres' to which it must be related and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another (Miller and Rose 1992: 177)

From this perspective, the state is subsumed by the activities of government and consequently, one ought to examine the ways in which the practice of the state and state system enables the conduct of conduct. Put succinctly, in geo-political relations, "the state should first of all be understood as a complex and mobile resultant of the discourses and techniques of rule" (Miller and Rose 1992: 178).

As such, the geo-political/national security issues of international relations ought to be understood as a military-diplomatic complex that

> empower[s] particular agents and forces to speak and act in the name of a territory...[this complex] establish[es] the limits and coherence of the domains of political authority, demarcate the

> geographical and conceptual spaces of political rules, constitute certain authorities as able to speak for a population, and place them in particular 'external' configurations with other 'states' and internal relations with events in particular locales (Miller and Rose 1992: 178)

In short, the claim is that the rationalities and technologies of government demarcate the conceptual and spatial domains of a "global" political.

However, Rose and Miller's argument reflects the problematic tension between sovereignty and government. Although Rose and Miller present an "alternative" picture of the political, their analysis resembles a conventional theory of international relations. That is, the state continues to demarcate the realm of the politics and relations. Rose and Miller's argument to subsume the practice of sovereignty as a technology and rationality of government can be read as not only grounding the statist line of political community, but also as a tacit endorsement of state sovereignty's absolute and homogenous political space via Rose and Miller's projection of inside to outside or in other words, from politics to relations. The power/knowledge of the military-diplomatic and its institutions affirms the structuralism and subjectivity of a state *writ large*. As such, Rose and Miller's problematics of government can be read as a variation on the state and state system - albeit in a more politically congruent language. Rose and Miller give a governmental reading of the juridical state,

but less is said by Rose and Miller about the politics of inside/outside and political theory's continued use of the state as the basic unit(y) of global politics, identity/difference, universal/particular and space/time. My claim is that the complexity of the tension between sovereignty and governmentality requires a deeper examination of the political conditions enabled by the sovereignty problematic and its harmonisation of the problem of time. Specifically, how is it that the political community of the state remains grounded in the political imagination? In response to this question, Rose and Miller's work could be read as reifying the presence of the state in international relations, rather than speculating on its decline. Thus, the problematic tension in "Political power beyond the State: problematics of government" stems from trying to reconcile that which has enabled and divided the political into political theory and international relations. This problem weighs heavy if one attempts to address the complexities of global flows such as nationalism, terrorism, ecology and mass migration with a tacit affirmation of inside/outside.

In "Governmentality and contragovernmentality: rethinking sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War," Timothy Luke presents a second post-Foucauldian meditation on the relationship/tension between sovereignty and government. Although Luke's arguments are similar to Rose and Miller, Luke understands the Foucauldian triad of sovereignty-discipline-government as a practice that solidifies the territorial state,

and not as something that ought to be subsumed by the practices of government. Luke contends that statecraft is a governmental technique in that the "disciplinary articulations of sovereignty and territoriality centre upon establishing and enforcing 'the right disposition of things' between human populations and their primary habitat - territorially defined statal space" (Luke 1996: 497). However, the unity of the "sovereignty-discipline-government triangle appears to be gone" (Luke 1996: 492).

Given contemporary global dynamics and movement, Luke argues for an alternative and politically more congruent analytic of global/local "sovrantees" and "contragovernmentalities." In a sense, like Rose and Miller, Luke wants to offer a more symmetrical conceptual language for understanding the processes of change, movement and speed. By "sovrantees" and "contragovernmentalities," Luke refers to political/social movements that deterritorialise and denationalise "...stable systems of international territorialization...toward more unstable subnational/supranational deterritorialization" (Luke 1996: 492). Luke's claim is that the modern "world" is characterised by non-statal forces that fracture the unity of the state and its governmental practices of territoriality. Luke contends that political space is no longer a Euclidean solid or plane, but a surreal fractal net that webs "...out into many un-stated autonomous spheres of sovran power exertion where sovereigns cannot determine for themselves what laws will be for whom, and

why" (Luke 1996: 504). Luke contends that political space is cracked into overlapping and multifarious fractals of meaning whose pluralisations create "multiorialities." For Luke, "Multiorialities" are non-statal actions/movements that unfold from unstable political "isotopes." The claim is that the territorial state attempts, unsuccessfully, to contain essentially dynamic and unstable entities such as

> transnational firms, trading blocs, religious revivals, media networks, international organizations - are constantly refusing their energies and materials inside and outside country borders with reactions of on-going nuclear fision as innumerable local, regional and subnational entities...divide in chaotic clots of symbolic exchange, military conflict, material enterprise and ideological communication (Luke 1996: 500)

Luke argues that

> [w]ithout shifting between registers of governmentality and contragovernmentality...we may not be able to reinterpret how Chechnya, Palestine, Bosnia, Angola, Afghanistan, Columbia or Kaliningrad, Beirut, Sarajevo, Lagos, Singapore and Mexico City actually work...we must more rightly write about how these new realities are wrighting societies and spaces today. Doing so will require us to surrealize the realist political writs of stabilizing order inherited from the past in stories

> about sovereign governmentality by identifying the wrights of chaotic disorder among products of sovran contragovernmentalities in the present (Luke 1996: 494)

In short, Luke argues that the political imaginary of the state and state system is an inadequate way to understand the rapid and complex interplay of change in the global/local system. In response, Luke presents an alternative language to make sense of a "New World Disorder" which is rooted in the recognition of "nuclear" instability, polyarchies and multioralities. Luke contends that one ought to recognise the dynamics of un-stated forces where sovran contragovernmentalities challenge and crack the apparent unity of a governmentalised state sovereignty.

Luke's exploration of sovereignty and governmentality attempts to capture the dynamics and speed of global processes that dissolve the unity of the territorial state. He presents a sharp rearticulation of the political as a fractal web of instability and sites of multiple sources of authority. However, Luke's meditation raises two issues that reflect the problematic tension between sovereignty and government. One issue is that Luke's conception of subjectivity appears analogous to the subjectivity of social movements. That is, Luke's identification of the forces of non-statal "isotopes" reflects the dynamics of social movements and particularly, the apparent appeal to a singular, universal subjectivity. Although Luke plays with the ideas of polyarchies and multioralities to create "fractured" subjects, the subjective

movements of fracture do articulate a conception of subjectivity that exists within state sovereignty's reconciliation of universal/particular and identity/difference through citizenship. Citizenship enables subjects to hold a primary political identity as participants in a particular community, but retain a potential connection with "humanity" through participation in a broader international system. Luke's non-statal, social movements involve mobilising claims of a particular sort in the name of some overarching universalism, but they remain movements that occur within societies whose conventions can only exist in the political structures of the state and state system. Although alternative subjectivities challenge state sovereignty, Luke's conception of the fractured subject must address sovereignty's structuralisation of difference/particularity and its role as a legitimate source of authority in the international system. Specifically, the mobilisation of coherent claims of subjectivity rest on the negotiation of universal and particular, identity and difference by a political community.

The second issue involves Hindess's challenge that one must also address the practices of division and containment through which sovereignty constitutes, and is in turn constituted by, an account of a bounded political community. Given that Luke's conception of subjectivity follows state sovereignty's resolution of universal/particular and identity/difference, Luke does not engage with the role that political community plays in framing conceptions of

subjectivity. That is, Hindess's observation that one must subject the fictional necessity of inside/outside to interrogation remains unresolved in Luke's post-Foucauldian meditation on the nature and location of political life.

A third post-Foucauldian meditation on the sovereignty problematic is Michael Dillon's article "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order." Like Rose and Miller, Dillon is significant for his examination of the potential insights that Foucault's work has to offer towards understanding contemporary "(inter)national" politics. Dillon develops Rose and Miller's argument for the subsumption of the state as a rationality and technology of government. His project involves the investigation of the "...*conjunction* [and torsion] between sovereignty and governmentality as a way of posing both the problematics and the ethics of the order of modern power" [emphasis added] (Dillon 1995: 327). Dillon contends that what is interesting about sovereignty and governmentality is its complementarity. Specifically, the practices of sovereignty - "juridical power and balance of power, state interest, raison d'état, realpolitik, and so on" (Dillon 1995: 328) - furnishes the practices of government.

Dillon traces the production of state practices and the solidification of the state through governmental technologies, given the collapse of the Christian ecclesiastic world order. He contends that in the absence of a unifying order, the principles of conduct were relocated in the emerging practices

of modern statecraft and state rule. Dillon claims that sovereignty and governmentality were intimately linked through the processes of subjectification practised by state sovereignty and its politics of inside/outside. He contends that "[s]ubjectifying and securing the state necessarily entailed subjectifying and securing the subjects that comprise its population" (Dillon 1995: 338) in addition to that which was against its population. As such, the practices of statecraft necessarily entailed the technologies and rationalities of the conduct of conduct and government necessarily entailed the solidification of the state.

Given the recognition of a constitutive relationship between sovereignty and government, Dillon suggests that one ought to read (inter)national politics from the perspective of a twinned sovereignty-governmentality analytic. Such a perspective means three things. First, it means understanding (inter)national relations as a complex overlap of multiple practical systems. Not only is the state "an ensemble of governmental practices more or less suspended within and between (inter)national juridical and territorial boundaries" (Dillon 1995: 339), the very understanding of juridical/territorial practices are discursive productions of power/knowledge that order the "world." Second, he contends that the dominant theories of realism and neorealism of international relations can be refigured as aspects of governmentality. Dillon argues that such discourses are integral discursive components of the production of

power/knowledge that order and make "thinkable" the (inter)national world. Dillon contends that the

> governmentalization of the state and of the system of states - the codes, protocols, and regimes of knowledge of (inter)national relations - has been the principal device by which the technologization of the political (and the democratic) has been disseminated globally in the modern age (Dillon 1995: 343)

And third, Dillon contends that there is a complex torsion between sovereignty and governmentality that plays out as a macro-micro tension of universal/particular, identity/difference, totalisation/individualisation and furthermore, this torsion is produced by the mutable and polymorphous nature of the state's signifying spatial and juridical practices. Put succinctly, Dillon argues that there is a significant complexity in an analytic marriage between governmentality and sovereignty, given the way in which sovereignty has placated the problem of time. However, Dillon contends that the complementary conjunction of sovereignty and government enriches the political imagination by providing a more congruent and empowering understanding of global phenomena. He applies this perspective towards understanding the mass movement of peoples and the (inter)national political and ethical issues of migration, refugees and modern understandings of political community. Specifically, Dillon historicises, via the twinned discourse of sovereignty and

governmentality, the modern exclusionary practices of a bounded political community and the dynamics of modern (inter)national politics. For Dillon, governmentality in conjunction with sovereign claims to nationality, community, ethnicity, subjectivity or identity provide the grounds for exclusion, historical uniformity and a singular identity. Such (inter)national dynamics indicate that the problem of the political is

> not staged by the dissolution of the Christian imaginary, but by the radical mutation of the resolutions (political modernity) that succeeded it. That, in turn, now sets the scene for the contemporary study of international relations, because it is an (inter)national issue with global implications (Dillon 1995: 363)

Dillon concludes that international relations must rethink its role and scope of discourse as it becomes a site of ethico-political contestation, given the challenges and flows of contemporary global phenomenon.

Dillon offers a very sharp understanding of the stakes involved in understanding the relationship between sovereignty, governmentality and claims about the "world." His suggestion to historicise, via a twinned understanding of sovereignty and governmentality, the ways in which "we" understand and resolve the "world," political community and global phenomenon strikes to the heart of the problem. However, there is a sense in which Dillon's work can be considered "incomplete." Similar to

Hindess's claim about Foucault, Dillon doesn't address why the fiction of the statist political community, despite its violent politics of inside/outside, continues to act as a political surrogate for the present. Dillon's governmental/sovereign reading of the (inter)national system and its modern mutations does not address the reappearing phantom of the sovereignty problematic in the political imagination. As Hindess claims, it would be mistaken to assume that political theory/international relations has not addressed the violent practice of inside/outside, as Dillon appears to do.[16] But it is also the (un)necessary line of inside/outside that requires meditation; that is, how is it that the nature and location of political life lies within the boundaries of the state? How is it that "we" return to the fiction of political community and its political corollaries? Nonetheless, Dillon provides an excellent reading of the sovereignty problematic by engaging in some of the main stakes of the problem.

The Fictitious Necessity of Inside/outside

So far, the work of Rose, Miller, Luke and Dillon, map the analytic of governmentality onto contemporary "global" phenomenon. Rose and Miller argue that the political ought to be understood as a technology and rationality of governance. Although Luke takes the triad of sovereignty-discipline-government as granted, he argues for the recognition of the dynamics of sovrans and contragovernmentality which fragment the governmental state into polyarchies and multioralities. And

last, there is the work of Dillon. Dillon contends that one ought to recognise the twinned relationship of sovereignty and governmentality to root out the ethical stakes of political community.

Given these post-Foucauldian speculations on the political and their incompleteness, it seems to me that the audition of governmentality in or against the sovereignty problematic reveals three complex issues. One issue is that a global governmental perspective is a reply to the same early modern problem to which state sovereignty has provided an elegant (ir)resolution: to reconcile the problem of time given the collapse of God. However, the modern dilemma stems from the anticipated collapse of the state as the answer to all and the multiple explorations of how the political ought/is/will be rearticulated/reterritorialised. In a sense, the post-Foucauldian work of Rose, Miller, Luke and Dillon moves to affirm the priority of time/difference over space/identity by rearticulating/challenging the conditions under which it is possible to establish a self-identifiable subject or "political community" in time. But, as I have argued earlier, the centred political community of the state clings onto the political imagination by setting out particular conditions for discourse. Specifically, political community brings with it the spatiotemporal dynamics of inside/outside and the (ir)resolution of identity and difference, universal and particular in a bounded, flat, absolute and homogenous political space. As such, central to debates about a "post"-

sovereignty-governmentality "world" is the future of political community.

A second issue, as Hindess has so perceptively stated, is how is it that political discourse continues to make use of the concept of political community/state as a surrogate and measure for the present? Put differently, how is it that the boundary of politics appears to be a constitutive condition for (re)articulations/(re)territorialisations of the political - despite the multiple challenges to and a generally anticipated "demise" of the state and state system? One possible response is that the line of inside/outside is a necessary condition of modern politics. And as such, the modern "tension" rests with the intuition that the politics of the line is being redrawn in ways that are not necessarily coherent. That is, many lines are not being drawn territorially/spatially (i.e. straight and clear) and the drawing of lines is done by agencies that are not tied to structures of accountability (i.e. governmentality). Although it seems that the absolute and homogeneity of sovereign political space is being affected by the dynamics of time, the proliferation/bending of lines rests, in part, on the scale of politics and subjectivity being constant such that sources of globalisation can be made larger (universal) or smaller (particular). Thus, the attempt to proliferate lines into a multiplicity of sources, spaces, and levels remains partly in the sovereign discourse insofar as it assumes the anarchy/order dualism of relations/society. Put differently, identity/difference remains extended in space;

difference lays extended from sameness in articulating a coherent conception of subjectivity. A "globalised" governmentality transgresses lines and reveals the contingency of the location of lines, but the line remains. I am sympathetic to Rose, Miller, Luke and Dillon as they prod the political imagination for ways to think about the political without its defining fiction.

In addition, a third issue raised by post-Foucauldian responses to sovereignty, is the subtle incompatibility of Foucault's governmentality and the sovereignty problematic. Although Foucault, Rose, Miller, Luke and Dillon argue for some resemblance of complement between governmentality and sovereignty, on my reading, there is an essential difference between government and sovereignty: the scale and understanding of the subject. The sovereignty problematic assumes a universal macro subject that makes micro processes almost incoherent. That is, the state lays out the conditions of possibility for understanding all in a discourse of inside/outside, presence/absence and the resolution of identity/difference, universal/particular. On the other hand, the point of departure for governmentality and indeed, for Foucault's work, is the constitution of the particular micro subject. From this perspective, the preeminence of the macro practices of the state and state system appears doubtful; the practice of sovereignty is simply one among a multitude of subjective systems that constitute the subject. This subtle difference of scale between government and sovereignty raises

the issue of not only how does one understand the contemporary global phenomenon, but from what point on the political scale.

I take it that the stakes in regicide and the stakes in the possibilities of the political imagination are much higher than making lines contingent or multiple. In addition to addressing the three issues raised by government and sovereignty, it seems to me that one possible step is to interrogate what enables the conditions of possibility for the imagination - i.e. what enables the line that keeps being drawn (although not necessarily drawn in the likeness of a centred political community). At the moment, the line remains a constitutive condition of political life. It would not be easy to see what "politics" would look like if the king's head were indeed completely removed. Foucault himself is ambiguous on the possibilities of going beyond lines. He prefers to question how is it that we arrive at the line of political community and thus, he places less emphasis on moving beyond:

> [I]t is also necessary to determine what "posing a problem" to politics really means. R. Rorty points out that in these analyses I do not appeal to any "we" - to any of those "we's" whose consensus, whose values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated. But the problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a "we" in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is

> not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a "we" possible by elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the "we" must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result - and the necessarily temporary result - of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates it (Foucault 1984c: 385)

There are a few possible ways of getting one's head around the problem of sovereignty. One can lose "all sense of limitations and all claim to truth in [the] unavoidable sacrifice of the subject of knowledge" (Foucault 1984a: 96). Conversely, one may advocate redrawing a line congruent to one between heaven and earth under some universal, cosmopolitanism.[17] But this may not be a step that moderns are prepared to take not least because of the consequences of redrawing the line. But given the continued threats and movements of genocide, ecological degradation, mass migration, nationalism, capitalism or globalisation, rethinking the lines of the political are entirely on ethico-political ground.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I examined the possibilities, consequences and stakes of thinking an answer to the following questions: how does one understand the practices of state sovereignty? How is politics being reterritorialised? How is the relationship between sovereignty, states and territory being articulated? I contend that the anticipated decline of the state has highlighted a central tension between state sovereignty and government in modern debates about the nature, location and future of political life. Indeed, what is at stake in this sovereignty problematic is the contested ground and language for (il)legitimacy in understanding freedom, equality, democracy, globalisation, social movements, ecological degradation, mass migration, citizenship and models for global governance.

To interrogate the tension in the sovereignty problematic, I sketched three stances to work through the stakes of the dialogue and the possibilities for political life. First, I historicised the practices of sovereignty and government and rooted out five political corollaries that represent the features of theorising within the sovereignty problematic:

- Sovereignty masks and disciplines all claims to subjectivity through its resolution of universal/particular, identity/difference in citizenship

and the state system.

- Sovereignty locates political life on/in a flat, bounded, absolute and homogeneous conception of space. The politics of inside/outside structures both the "world" and alternative ways of understanding the "world."
- This conception of space enables an additional three political fictions in Western understandings of the political: the conception of the person as autonomous, the resolution/ realisation of autonomy through consent and the location of modern political life in the bounded community of such persons.

The second stance retraced Foucault's studies in governmentality as a reply to the sovereignty problematic. For Foucault, the sovereignty problematic is rooted in the understanding of power as something that prevents, distorts, constrains or negates the truth and consequently, the exercise of power requires mechanisms of legitimation. The claim is that the tension between government and sovereignty is a contest between differing political models of truth predicated on fixing limits to rightful power. As such, the sovereignty problematic begins with the negotiation of power between the singularity of sovereignty and the legitimation of government. However, Foucault argues that there is a disjuncture between the picture of political life provided by the juridical model of the sovereignty provides and the modern dynamics of the political.

To this end, Foucault writes a genealogy of the modern

conception of governance to illustrate the history of political life. Foucault's studies in governmentality give an account of the discourses, practices and rationalities that (have) enable(d) the governance of subjects. For Foucault, the art of government is about the disciplinary, normalising and productive macro/micro processes of power that shape both the individual and population's capacities and conduct. Put succinctly, the governmentality analytic can be outlined by four critical-political corollaries:

- First, governmentality is the rational, calculated process of differentiation and disposition in a general politics of truth.
- Second, power is understood as productive and dynamic rather than as something that must be restrained or that is dominating. The exercise of governmental power is a practice that manifests itself in various relationships, techniques, technologies and systems.
- Third, the direction and constitution of the individual/ population towards the "truth" involves a multiplicity of practical systems or "blocks." That is, the practices of government involve a multitude of "...'blocks" in which the adjustment of abilities, the resources of communication, and power relations constituted regulated and concerted systems" (Foucault 1982: 218-219).
- And fourth, the management of the macro/micro subject is not territorial or unitary in conception. Foucault contends that "government has to do with is not territory

> but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things" (Foucault 1991a: 93). As such, the art of government is not predicated on the imposition of law over territory or a singular transcendental subject. The art of government is the calculated differentiation of "men in their relations, their links, [and] their imbrication" (Foucault 1991a: 93)

Although Foucault's genealogy of sovereignty and government gives a rich and sharp reading of the ways in which modern power is exercised, Foucault's regicide of sovereignty, could, in a sense, be considered in an incomplete project. According to Hindess, what is needed is an interrogation of the ubiquitous role of political community both as a measure for modern (re)articulations of the political and as the (necessary) situation of the political onto a flat, contained, absolute and homogenous conception of political space.

Foucault's studies in governmentality provide a fertile point of departure for investigating the nature and location of modern political life and contemporary global phenomenon. The third stance examined how Hindess's claim regarding the nature of political life unfolded in post-Foucauldian readings of sovereignty, governmentality and a globalised political. Specifically, I explored three post-Foucauldian meditations indicative of the attempts to increase and establish the analytic purchase of governmentality over and against sovereignty. Rose and Miller argue that the political ought to be understood as a technology and rationality of governance.

Luke takes the twinned relationship of sovereignty and governmentality as granted, but he argues for the recognition of the dynamics of sovrans and contragovernmentality which fragment the governmental state into polyarchies and multioralities. And Dillon contends that one ought to recognise the twinned relationship of sovereignty and governmentality to root out the ethical stakes of political community. However, all projects do not bypass Hindess's claim regarding the constitutive role/fiction of political community in imagining the nature, location and future of political life.

Three issues are raised by the work of Rose and Miller, Luke, and Dillon. First, (re)articulations of the political are, for the most part, in response to the same early-modern problem to which state sovereignty has provided an elegant answer. Second, despite a general anticipated decline of the state, contemporary political discourse continues to make use of the concept of political community/state as a surrogate and measure for the present. A third issue is the subtle incompatibility between governmentality and sovereignty. Each reading of the political subject operates on a different scale (universal/macro - particular/micro) that makes the other understanding incoherent or at best, doubtful.

The stakes of understanding the practices of state sovereignty and (re)articulating/reterritorialising political life, given a multiplicity of global challenges and a general anticipated demise of the state and state system, revolve around the necessity to draw a line around the political. What

follows from the necessity of the line, are the political corollaries of the sovereignty problematic and its politics of inside/outside. The tension rests with the modern intuition that the line is being redrawn in ways that are not necessarily coherent and the option of doing away with the political imagination's constitutive fiction may not be a choice that moderns would want or are prepared to take. The necessity of the line of politics rides on a peculiar benign feeling that the line itself may not be a problem per se, but how and who (re)draws the line.

The current conflict in Kosovo provides a good illustration of the tension between sovereignty and governmentality and the stakes of the line of politics. In one sense, Kosovo displays the persuasiveness of state practices to resolve the situation. A conflict over sacred territory has recruited the "world" into establishing a peaceful resolution - the affirmation of an unadulterated political community. As such, there is the production of the (real) violence of state craft and state *writ large* responses. Likewise, there is the governmental production of the (imagined) violence of state craft.[18] That is, in addition to the actions of war, there is a multitude of practical systems that constitute subjects as humans, enemies, refugees, soldiers, reporters, peace keepers, diplomats, Serbs, Albanians etc.; it is through a governed lens that the situation in Kosovo is understood by the "world," but it is through the practice of states that the situation unfolds.

To interrogate the tension between sovereignty and governmentality and what enables the line of politics is key to understanding contemporary "global" phenomena; it means (re)examining "our" understandings of the political and how it is that "we" conduct politics. Given the (violent) acceleration of global processes from movement, communication and migration and the grip of state, the nature, location and future of political life will continue to oscillate between sovereignty and governmentality. As such, although I am informed by critical possibility, progressive political practice and the fictive contingency of the line, I remain confronted with the ambivalence and complexity of the project/challenge/condition of sovereignty and governmentality.

END NOTES

1. This anticipation emerges from a wide range of disciplines and theorists. See Arjun Appadurai (1997), *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Hayward R. Alker and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.) (1996), *Challenging Boundaries, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota;* Thom Kuehls (1996), *Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota; Warren Magnusson (1996), *The Search for Political Space*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Not only is state sovereignty thought to be challenged by global processes and movements, some theorists argue that the state is problematic because of its ethnocentricity. See Taiaiake Alfred (1999), *Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto*, Don Mills: Oxford University Press and James Tully (1995), *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. In relation to Foucault, see (1980b), "Two Lectures"; (1982), "The Subject and Power"; (1988a) "Politics and Reason"; and (1991a) "Governmentality." Post-Foucauldian works include Barry Hindess, (1996) Discourses of Power; Jens Bartelson, (1995), *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cynthia Weber, (1995), *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, The State and Symbolic Exchange*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3.This paper arises from my ongoing interest in the possibilities for the political imagination to envision critical and alternative forms of politics and subjectivity. By "critical and alternative," I reveal my Foucauldian conceptual commitments. That is, I mean the ways in which politics and subjectivity can be (re)created to fashion, subvert and violate particular regimes of Truth. My underlying objective is to contribute to a discourse of thinking and acting differently to overcome a given mode of subjection. This self-overcoming is not to take a "for or against" stance against a mode of subjection. Rather, it involves a critical ontology to turn what has been given as universal into a question; such questions can open the possibilities for a multiplicity of solutions and responses. The best articulation of the ethos which guides me can be found in the following works by Foucault: "What is Enlightenment?" and "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" and the introduction to *The History of Sexuality Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure.*

4. For Walker, the problem of identity, raised in terms of time and change, is inherited from the philosophical ethos of classical Greece. Presocratic attempts to understand the "world," such as Heraclitus's obsession with stabilising or measuring change by resolving opposites with an underlying

universal, set up Plato's reply. For Plato, there are "metaphysical universals and a realm of becoming, between being and being-in-the-world, the latter having identity and reality only through participation in the former" (Walker 1993: 113-114).

5. "Chronopolitics" describes the (late) modern experiences of temporality, speed, velocity and acceleration in the "collective experiences of a global economy, a planetary ecology...a technology specially designed for species suicide" (Walker 1993: 21) and the "popular culture of freeze-frames, instant replays and video simulations...of a rapidly changing world of speed and contingency" (Walker 1993: 5). He contends that the dynamics of (late) modernity cannot be disciplined or understood in the geopolitical practices of international relations.

6. See Hayward R. Alker and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.) (1996), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*; Robert O. Keohane (ed.), (1986), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press; Michael Walzer, (1983), Sphere of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and Sandra Whitworth (1994), *Feminism and International Relations*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

7. I take up how Hindess reads these theorists as following within Locke's development of political legitimacy on page 20.

8. James Tully provides an excellent examination of the regulative powers of the Divine Law, Civil Law and the Law of Opinion and Reputation in (1993), *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also see Duncan Ivison (1997), *The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

9. Hindess cites Lukes's (1974), *Power: a radical view*, London: Macmillan; Marcuse's texts (1955), *Eros and Civilization*, Boston, Mass: Beacon Press and (1972), *One Dimensional Man*, London: Abacus; and Habermas's texts (1973), "Wahrheitstheorien" in H. Fahrenbach (ed.), *Festschrift für W. Schulz*, Pfullingen: Neske, pp 221-65; (1989), *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Oxford: Polity; (1984), *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press; (1987), *The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason*, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press; and (1990), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge: Polity.

10. According to Walker, there are five postulates of a Euclidean/Newtonian conception of space:

> The first postulate, which requires the possibility of drawing a straight line between any two points, assumes the homogeneity of space. The second postulate, by which it is always possible to extend a finite straight line, assumes the limitlessness of space. The third postulate removing any restriction on the size of a circle assumes the continuity and infinitudes of space. The fourth postulate on the quality of all right angles is a direct consequence of the principle of the invariability of figures. The fifth postulate admits the possibility of constructing similar figures on any scale of magnitude (Walker 1993: 129)

11. Walker further claims that the Euclidean-Newtonian conception of space plays a constitutive role in modern Western philosophy. He contends that one possible reading of modern Western philosophy is as "a sequence of attempts to live with or to overcome a metaphysic of distance, a dialectics of here and there, the delineation of presence and absence in the stately measures of eternal geometry" (Walker 1993: 128).

12. One complication in reading Foucault against the sovereignty problematic is that Foucault's critical historical approaches provide two different readings of the tension between sovereignty and government. If we take Foucault's texts, *An Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) and *The Order of Things* (1994b)as points of departure, the sovereignty and government is read in relation to the "metaphysical" epistemic systems characteristic of three major epochs in Western thought: the Renaissance, the Classical Age and Modernity - the most significant epoch being the modern age and the analytic of finitude. This line of thought originates with Kant and his limitation of human knowledge as the possibility for knowledge in the idea of maturity. For Foucault, the analytic of finitude marks the start of the Age of Modernity when it resolves the problem of man in the "ambiguous position as object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator" (Foucault 1994b: 312). In a sense, the Age of Modernity begins when man replaces and determines God. Foucault lays out three ways or "doubles" in which man's finitude is distinguished from and equated with the conditions that make knowledge possible. There are three ways in the analytic of finitude in which the problem of man has played out in the human sciences. There is the empirico-transcendental doublet that marks the assimilation of two conflicting positions on truth in the analysis of actual experience. Second, there is the cogito/unthought doublet that represents the tension between being and the reflection on being and the discovery of a deep, complex and taken for

granted background in which being is situated. And last, there is the doublet of the retreat/return of origin. In this double, "Man is cut off from the origin that would make him contemporaneous with his own existence: amid all the things that are born in time and no doubt die in time, he, cut off from all origin, is already there" (Foucault 1994b: 332). Consequently, man temporalises himself such that time and history becomes possible; man becomes the "opening from which time in general can be reconstituted, duration can flow and things, at the appropriate moment, can make their appearance" (Foucault 1994b: 332). In short, these doubles represent different modes of discourse in the analytic of finitude; all three doubles are

> concerned with showing that the foundation of those determinations is man's very being in its radical limitations; it must also show that the contents of experience are already their own conditions, that thought, from the very beginning, haunts the unthought that eludes them, and that it is always striving to recover; it shows how that origin of which man is never the contemporary is at the same time withdrawn and given as an imminence: in short, it is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same (Foucault 1994b: 339 as cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 31)

Dreyfus and Rabinow contend that for Foucault, the three doubles negotiate the slippage between factual limitations (same/identity) and the conditions that make knowledge possible (other/difference). To this end, the analytic of finitude marks the start for critical reflection on the emergence of "Man" and the constitution of the subject by a humanist will to truth.

In this sense, Foucault's work in sovereignty and government is an example of the modern ethos: Critical-historical reflection on the limits of the present. As such, sovereignty and governmentality must be read in relation to discursive possibility; that is, it ought to be read against a background archaeology of knowledge. Such a reading is taken up by Jens Bartelson in (1995), *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Bartelson presents an excellent retracing the production of sovereignty in relation to the arrangement of the field of discursive possibility.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, I am interested in a "late" Foucauldian, genealogical reading of sovereignty and government that examines discursive *and* material practices. I do not want to dismiss the central role that the analytic of finitude plays in Foucault's later work, but I believe that the contemporary use of Foucault's work, especially in relation to understanding political life, relies

on reading the discursive *and* material practices that constitute the subject. Although relevant, the examination and reconciliation of potential disjunctures and moments of compliment between an archaeological reading of the sovereignty problematic in Foucault's earlier works and a genealogical reading of such a topic in Foucault's later works would not be done justice in this thesis. I would like to take up this theme in another paper. Although not in direct relation to sovereignty and government, David Owen (1998) examines the relationship between archaeology and genealogy in "Michel Foucault: Power, Knowledge, and Ethics."

I concentrate on a mainly genealogical reading of the sovereignty problematic and a late Foucauldian analysis of government for three reasons. First, Foucault's explicitly refers to the sovereignty problematic as a juridical discursive that attempts to legitimate power according to legal and consensual codes. In addition, Foucault's work in the art of government takes its point of departure from a genealogical reading of sovereignty and government. An archaeological reading of the sovereignty problematic rooted in *The Order of Things* and *An Archaeology of Knowledge* departs from Foucault's explicit understanding of contemporary political life found in his works post *Discipline and Punish* and especially in his work on government.

A second reason why I am interested in genealogy and "late-Foucault" rather than archaeology and "early-Foucault" is because of Foucault's shift of emphasis from archaeology towards genealogy in his work. In his later writings and lectures, Foucault rethinks the importance of a transcendental or metaphysical mode of subjection that is characteristic of his examination of the discursive formation of knowledge in texts such as *The Order of Things*. Foucault's shift towards the importance of genealogy and the critical examination of historical frameworks moves away from fabricating a transcendental subject that evolves through the course of history. Specifically, Foucault moves away from a phenomenological subject that is postulated by the totalising discursive analysis of the human sciences presented in *The Order of Things*. Foucault's later epistemological stance of genealogy examines not only the organisation of discursive practices but also the constitution of discursive and material practices:

> One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc.,

> without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault 1980a: 117)

As such, insofar as Foucault makes an epistemic shift towards a genealogy as critique, I am interested in Foucault's genealogical reading of sovereignty problematic and Foucault's later work in government.

The last reason why I use late-Foucauldian-genealogical work is that I read Foucault as a "multiplicity" theorist in relation to understanding the conditions of political life. That is, unlike archaeology's analysis of totalising discursive practices, a late-Foucauldian-genealogical ethos is interested in the play of a multiplicity of modes of subjection and localised practices in understanding the political. The claim that the practice of the sovereignty problematic is analogous to the totalising epistemic conditions of the Age of Modernity conflicts with Foucault's late multiplicity stance. That is, Foucault's later analysis of political life and government open the possibilities for multiple regimes of truth; for Foucault, the political is an open ended question with no overarching continuity. As such, Foucault as a "multiplicity" theorist presents the following task:

> [A]scertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth [to challenge]...the political, economic, institutional régime of the production of truth. It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness of ideology; it is truth itself (Foucault 1980a: 113)

In short, I present one reading of the relationship between sovereignty and government from a late-Foucauldian stance.

13. The representation of power in the sovereign-discursive grounds Foucault's notion of the repressive hypothesis: that in terms of sexuality, the Western world has moved from a period of "shameless discourse" and openness about the body towards a regime of increased repression and hypocrisy. This discourse posits the idea that the effects of power are such that an inner, essential, authentic self is prevented from being realised. As such, the premise of the repressive hypothesis is to limit and resist power to provide the

> opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation and manifold pleasures; to pronounce a discourse that combines the fervor of knowledge, the determination to change the laws, and the longing for the garden of earthly delights (Foucault 1990a: 7)

Foucault's claim is that the repressive hypothesis produces an endless discourse of resistence and liberation that, as Owen states, "calls for ever deeper and more refined confessional techniques, where it is precisely these techniques for constituting ourselves as authentic beings which enable the normalisation of our conduct through 'scientific' norms" (Owen 1998: 200). This reflects Foucault's notion of the analytic of finitude presented in *The Order of Things*.

14. See the debate between Paul Patton ((1989)"Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," *Political Studies*, vol. 37(2): pp 260 - 276)) and Charles Taylor ((1989) "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom: a Reply," *Political Studies* vol. 37(2): pp 277-281)).

15. In addition to Rose and Miller, Dillon, and Luke, there are other post-Foucauldian theorists who argue that governmentality presents a more symmetrical account of the political. See Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (eds.) (1996), *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-Liberalism and rationalities of government*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Thom Kuehls (1996), *Beyond Sovereign Territory*. I use Miller, Rose, Luke and Dillon because their work captures main applications of Foucault's studies in governmentality on understanding the political, given the dynamics/challenges of (global) change.

16. For some contemporary non-Foucauldian takes on the practices of inside/outside, see David Held in *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* and Andrew Linklater (1998), *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Cambridge: Polity.

17. See the work by David Held and Andrew Linklater listed in note 16.

18. For related literature, see James Der Derian (1992), *Anti-Diplomacy: Speed, Spies and Terror in International Relations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Edward Said (1993), *Culture and Imperialism*, London: Chatto and Windus.

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