David Harvey: Space, Limits and the Politics of Movement

by

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Abstract

There is a trend towards thinking about movement in contemporary social and political thought. However not all movement is the same. I focus on one dominant attempt to think about movement of which David Harvey's dialectic and his relational metaphysics are exemplary. I argue that although Harvey is attentive to movement, his politics remain caught within a spatial discourse that he claims to avoid. This discourse is based on an Euclidian, Newtonian and Kantian conception of absolute space and spans the work of Kant, Hegel and Marx. As such, I argue that this discourse has grave implications for David Harvey's project in particular and progressive politics in general. Specifically, the discourse condemns any attempt to think about movement and change within an eternally recurring infinite form. Change and movement are only possible within this form since the latter acts as their condition of possibility. Therefore, Harvey is caught within this discourse and thus working at odds with the revolutionary goals of his project.

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Introducing David Harvey: Space, Limits and the Politics of Movement

Several currents of contemporary political and social thought suggest that a multiple and fluid worlds have overtaken, or more accurately explains, what was previously thought to be a static, contained, homogeneous world of forms. As a result, theorists in this stream argue that there is a need to pay greater attention to both the heterogeneous, dynamic and fluid character of contemporary human affairs and the widespread tendency to analyze and reify this dynamism and fluidity in categories that privilege forms which enclose and restrict heterogeneity.

Many have formulated variants of this thesis: Virilio (1971 and 1997) attempts to understand a world of stasis and speed; Deleuze and Guattari (1986) view the world in terms of the logos and the nomos; Lefebvre (1970) contrasts the age of the city with the age of the urban; Walker (1993) contrasts geopolitics with chronopolitics; Magnusson (1996) characterises the world as expressions of old and new social movements or the old and new left; Rose (1993) contrasts masculine and paradoxical space; and to end what could be an endless list, Harvey (1989a, 1990) characterises the world in terms of spatial fixes and space/time compression. Nevertheless, it remains difficult for many theorists to think about politics as movement. Even those who have begun to theorize a dynamic and fluid world continue to reproduce the very status-quo systems which privilege the eternal form. This problem clearly represents one of the greatest challenges to theorizing and engaging in contemporary critical politics.

Two important questions can be extracted from the literature on these themes. First, what might a politics of movement look like? Second, how are politics continually theorised and enacted in conformity with a privileging of a world of eternal forms? In

order to approach the first question it is imperative that the second question receive adequate treatment. The second question is therefore the central topic to be examined in this thesis. Specifically, I will focus on David Harvey's struggle to come to terms with the reifying tendencies of modern social, geographical and political theory. Harvey, I will suggest is exemplary of the continued failure of contemporary theorists to rethink political action and resistance in a changing and dynamic world.

There are many reasons for focusing exclusively on the work of David Harvey. He is a provocative contemporary geographer who has taken a path from logical positivism to a more reflexive and critical approach to "doing geography." In fact, the modern development and diffusion of geographic thought can roughly be mapped by illuminating Harvey's publications (see Paterson. J., 1984 and Castree. N., 1995).

However, Harvey's work also transcends disciplinary boundaries. His analytic project is driven by a desire to escape the disciplinary boundaries which, he believes, allow the state to "divide and rule" (Harvey. D., 1972 cited in Paterson. J., 1984). For Harvey, "reality has...to be approached directly rather than through the formulations of academic disciplines. We have to think in non-or meta-disciplinary terms..." (Harvey. D., 1973: 149). As such, geography, sociology and political and cultural studies have all influenced, and have been influenced by, Harvey's academic contributions. He has demonstrated an uncanny ability to target key moments in the development of contemporary social, political and geographic thought and maximize the explorative leverage that each insight provides.

Harvey's career can be read as a series of markers which plot the development of

an Anglo-American critical community. For example, Harvey's definitive text, Explanation in Geography (1969), went on to mark a crucial foothold for a behaviourialist and positivist revolution in geography. He also wrote the explicitly normative text, Social Justice in the City (1973), which attempted to spatialize sociology and socialize geography. Rarely had the issue of social justice and societal change been so forcefully articulated in Anglo-American geography. This book situated Harvey as a central player in the debate about relevance, which in turn, opened up and modified the landscape of geography forever. In The Limits to Capital (1982), Harvey's spatially sensitive reading of Marx's Capital proved to be a significant piece for Marxist theorists across disciplinary fences. It opened an avenue to return to a "classic" reading of Marx and it opened "Marx" up to spatial theory. In The Condition of Postmodernity (1990), Harvey's arguments had the dual effect of challenging the *momentum* of postmodern arguments and revitalizing the *position* of historical-materialism in geography, cultural studies and sociology.

It is reasonable to suggest that the reason why Harvey's work has so often marked crucial points of rupture and innovation and established novel academic trends for contemporary critical studies, is that Harvey tirelessly endeavours to plot "new" directions. Harvey's Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (1996) is exemplary of this endless pursuit. This text is framed as an eco-socio-political-economic manifesto for the turn of the millennium. Furthermore, the text is representative of both a synthesis of the key arguments of his career and the debates which have occupied, and continue to occupy, the attention of a loosely demarcated critical community. More

specifically, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference focuses on debates about discourse, metaphysics, social justice and contemporary issues like environmental degradation, urban politics and late, or flexible, capitalism. As a site, this text creates a panoramic snapshot of contemporary events and debates in the social sciences and humanities.

Harvey's ability to weave a tapestry of narratives from geography, sociology, economics and political thought has situated him as an innovative and exciting contributor to a diverse and expansive contemporary community of critical thinkers. Harvey is interesting because he somehow transcends the authority of any single community. He is debated across political and intellectual cleavages and continually sets new directions for critical inquiry and action. Given the centrality and exemplary nature of David Harvey as a contemporary theorist, I submit that Harvey in general and his Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference in particular can be used to evaluate the struggles contemporary theorists face when rethinking political action and resistance in a changing and dynamic world.

I will argue that Harvey is sensitive to contemporary drives to conceptualize the world in terms of movement. He argues that much of academic scholarship is caught within what he terms "status-quo theory." Harvey defines "status-quo theory" as

> a theory which is grounded in the reality it seeks to portray and which accurately represents the phenomena with which it deals at a particular moment in time. But, by having ascribed to a universal truth status to the propositions it contains, it is capable of yielding prescriptive policies (politics) which can result only in the status-quo (Harvey. D., 1973:150).

A central preoccupation of Harvey's has been "`bringing us (theorists and practitioners)

up to date' with the realities we seek to understand..." (Harvey. D., 1973:150).

However, it is not clear that Harvey evades his own definition of status-quo theory. This "trap" was posed as a question by Michel Foucault, who asks "did the critical discourse that addresses itself to repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that operated unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces..." (Foucault. M., 1978: 10)? I will argue that Harvey's politics remain trapped in a world view which privileges eternal forms, and not movement, as universally desirable norms.

The implications of the argument presented here, and represented in Foucault's question, can be drawn out further. Many, including Harvey, have argued that the status-quo is in fact "counter-revolutionary." There is no neutral ground; the status-quo always signals an acceptance of a particular dominant socio-economic, eco-political geography. Harvey defines counter-revolutionary theory as

> a theory which may or may not appear grounded in the reality it seeks to portray, but obscures, be-clouds and generally obfuscates (either by design or accident) our ability to comprehend that reality. Such a theory is usually attractive and hence gains general currency because it is logically coherent, easily manipulable, aesthetically appealing, or just new and fashionable; but it is in some way quite divorced from the reality it purports to represent. A counter revolutionary theory automatically frustrates either the creation or the implication of viable policies [politics]. It is therefore a perfect device for non-decision making, for it diverts attention from fundamental issues to superficial or non-existent issues. It can also function as spurious support and legitimation for counter revolutionary actions designed to frustrate needed change (Harvey. D., 1973:150-1).

As can be inferred from the above, counter-revolutionary and status-quo theory work within an accepted (spatial) discourse of political action. They continue to appeal to a world of eternal forms and thus prescribe a politics which both conforms to and

strengthens this conviction.

In this thesis I turn to the question of *how* Harvey continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics and prescribing political action. Through this argument, I seek an understanding of the risks and implications associated with Harvey's (and more generally modernity's) political program. Caught within an intellectual tradition which has a history of structuralism and reductionism, Harvey attempts to navigate his politics away from absolute and relative metaphysical foundations. He proposes that dialectics and relational metaphysics, exemplified in a classic reading of Marx and a reformed version of Leibniz and Whitehead, can illuminate a path beyond the relativism versus absolutism crisis. However, I argue that Harvey's conception of movement is implicated in the absolute metaphysics that he is attempting to escape. Harvey's Marxist and relational conception of movement is plagued with definite limits (made obvious by Hegel) that emerge from the logical unfolding of the Kantian spatial dialectic between content and form. Harvey is situated within a tradition which builds on Marx, who builds on Hegel and who, in turn, builds on Kant. I name this lineage a spatial discourse. Harvey fails to challenge this discourse. As a result he continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics and prescribing political action: (1) he assumes an external reality framed within a geopolitical and chronopolitical system of eternal forms (sovereign state and world-history); (2) he continues to imply that the contained space within the eternal form, though multiple and existing at various scales, is the proper place for politics to unfold; and (3) the above two results are not simple oversights, they are representative of the logical unfolding of a spatial discourse which

assumes an ontology, epistemology and, more precisely, a politics which deems form as *a priori* to content (even when "set" in motion). As such, Harvey continues to endorse a mode of political action and organization which contradicts the "revolutionary" impulses and/or goals of his project. Said differently, while in Harvey's project there is a solid attempt to conceptualize a world where change is imaginable, he remains caught within a spatial discourse which denies that change is possible and, furthermore, eliminates the possibilities of thinking anew a politics of movement. A number of steps are required to articulate this immanent critique.

In Chapter One I will show how Harvey attempts to make a contribution to the literature on movement. While Harvey himself admits that he started out in a logical positivist and behaviouralist vein, he has made substantive attempts to reflect, undermine and move beyond these frameworks of inquiry and action. Such is the impulse of what he calls "revolutionary theory" (Harvey. D., 1973:120-130 and 147-152).

However, many have argued that Harvey has moved from a form of structural positivism to a form of structural marxism. That is, he maintains concepts like *necessity* and *need* to drive his description of capitalism (Tilly. C., 1988; Castree. N., 1995; Paterson. J., 1984; Folch-Serra. M., 1993). Others suggest that Harvey retains a Cartesian subjectivity in his system of inquiry and effaces other loci of knowledge production and change (Rose. G., 1993a and 1993b; Folch-Serra. M., 1993). Although these critiques are somewhat similar to my own, they fail to fully explore the spatio-temporal assumptions in Harvey's project. Instead of neglecting the complexity of Harvey's use of space and time, I want to use Harvey's project to show the continued failure of contemporary

theorists, including many of Harvey's critics, to theorize politics in terms of movement.

In Chapter One, therefore, I turn to Harvey's work to show that he does indeed think in terms of movement. Simplistic characterisations of Harvey as a static theorist, neglect his relational metaphysics and dialectical method which produce a world of process. First, I reconstruct Harvey's relational metaphysics and his understanding of dialectics. Then I show how these concepts lead to Harvey's historical-geographic materialist account of environmentalism, urbanism and capitalism. I argue that each of these accounts are portrayed in terms of movement and in terms of their global scale.

In Chapter Two I step back from Harvey's immediate project and begin to examine Harvey's claim that his intellectual tradition evades a world view which privileges eternal forms. As I will have argued in Chapter One, Harvey suggests that a relational metaphysics and an ontology of movement and change (dialectics) are Marx's privileged domain. Harvey makes similar claims about his own project. Contrary to his explicit claims, however, I argue that Harvey remains caught within a spatial discourse that contradicts this avowal. This discourse makes possible a politics and a system of understanding which is static, formal and even oppressive.

In order to pursue this argument, I turn in Chapter Two to the roots of Harvey's critical project. I argue that a relational metaphysics, a dialectical method and most importantly a marxist political project fails to evade the absolute metaphysical project of the state and geopolitics. More specifically, I argue that Marx is contained within an absolute metaphysics -- inherited from Kant and Hegel -- which suggests that change, fluidity and movement are possible at one level, and yet denies that they are possible at

another. I argue that those moments of change, fluidity and movement, which both Marx and Harvey highlight, are accommodated or contained within the forms of a geopolitical system of sovereign states and a chronopolitical system of world-history. This spatial discourse enabling his analysis eludes Harvey's attention.

I start by identifying the dialectical relationship between content and form that is established in Kant's epistemological search for solid, metaphysical foundations. Then I trace how this dialectic manifests itself in Kant's fluid meditations on the enlightenment, cosmopolitan history and perpetual peace. Next, I show how Kantian metaphysical assumptions, and here I pay special attention to the role of Hegel's dialectic, are actualised in the development of Hegel's ethical state and in his conception of world-history. I argue that the teleological nature of Hegel's system denies that one can act beyond the state and think of a future outside world-history. Finally, I reconnect this spatial discourse with Marx's political project. Marx is exemplary of the problems that emerge by remaining rooted in the spatial discourse. I conclude this Chapter wondering whether Harvey, in addition to Marx, fails to escape the dilemmas evident in this critical tradition and spatial discourse.

In Chapter Three I argue that Harvey does indeed fail to articulate a politics that evades the spatial discourse outlined in Chapter Two. Harvey mirrors Marx in this respect. I focus on three sites in Harvey's text, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, in order to demonstrate this argument. Specifically, I look to his treatment of global issues like: 1) the urban, 2) capitalism and 3) the environment (each outlined in Chapter One) to show that Harvey returns to the restrictive, controlled and contained

politics of the sovereign form in a world of geopolitics and world-history.

Since Harvey continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics, he remains caught within a spatial discourse which denies that change is possible and eliminates the possibilities of thinking anew a politics of movement. In the concluding Chapter I set out some implications of this thesis. I argue that Harvey's project is incapable of matching the speed of the world he describes. Harvey's politics will always be left in the wake of the problems he attempts to confront and be confined behind the forms he assumes. In a world of movement, a politics of eternal forms is both ineffective and, more often than not, oppressive. Harvey not only supports a status-quo project but also promotes one which can be read, according to his own definition, as counter-revolutionary.

Chapter One: Harvey as a Theorist of Movement

Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference represents Harvey's latest attempt to engage with his critics. In general, Harvey responds to his critics by re-entrenching his analysis in a more detailed explanation of the complexities of a "classic" Marxist-Hegelian tradition. Furthermore, Harvey suggests that his own open-ended historical-geographical-materialism can incorporate and satisfy many of his critics' concerns. He attempts to demonstrate to his feminist, postmodern and poststructuralist critics (see Folch-Serra. 1993) that his system can recognize, explain and value multiple axes of power and diverse subject positions without falling into the trap of crude structuralism. Harvey also attempts to demonstrate to liberal and philosophical critics that his project escapes reductionist readings of the world. Thus he suggests that his project works against static, formal, absolutist, reductionist and structuralist tendencies identified by his critics. Harvey instead embraces a politics of movement and process exemplified by a Marxist-Hegelian tradition.

Before the promise of Harvey's defence can be judged (which will be taken up in Chapter Three[1]) the particulars of Harvey's project must first be examined. Thus I work against the impulse to critique in this Chapter. Instead I will explore the merits of Harvey's effort to think about a world of movement. I make this earnest gesture in part because I think that Harvey continues to contribute valuable insights to contemporary debates and in part because I am trying to understand how it is that Harvey continually

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[1]I will strategically make use of footnotes to flag important foundational moves in Harvey's project and mark critical moments that will be taken up in later Chapters.

arrives at the same space/time coordinates. What makes Harvey interesting is his attempt to contemporize a Marxist-Hegelian tradition so as to save Marx's (r)evolutionary ideal of change.

In the first section, I argue that he introduces two "foundational concepts" that are sensitive to movement. In particular, I reconstruct Harvey's thoughts on relational metaphysics and then his meditations on dialectics. These foundational concepts allow Harvey to dismiss rash critique by distancing his project from an absolute metaphysics. Thus, they establish his framework for a relational, fluid, changing, dynamic and temporary understanding of the world. These concepts also allow Harvey to theorize a politics of movement without losing "politics" in the process. Harvey rescues "politics" from relativism by introducing a concept of social time, particular to a Marxist-Hegelian dialectical tradition, into his metaphysical mix. In the second section, I argue that these foundational concepts facilitate the construction of historical-geographical-materialist pictures of environmentalism, urbanism and capitalism and I examine each phenomenon in turn. I suggest that static characterisations of Capitalism, the Environment or the Urban are not present in Harvey's project. Instead, each phenomenon is inter-related and constantly in process. In addition to showing how each phenomenon is constructed as a system of movement, I will also demonstrate how Harvey frames each issue as "global" in order to expedite a discussion, in Chapter Three, about international relations and the geopolitical limits of Harvey's work.

Relational Metaphysics

The absolute metaphysical assumptions which are implicit in modern political and epistemological projects are increasingly scrutinised. Integral to this return is the realization that a Newtonian, Kantian and Euclidian conception of absolute space and time are foundational enabling conditions for a Cartesian epistemology and sovereign politics. Harvey brings this realisation into the fabric of Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Harvey revisits two modern metaphysicians, Leibniz and Whitehead, in order to build a relational metaphysics which is consistent with his "classic" reading of Marx. I will reconstruct his analysis of each theorist in turn.

Harvey suggests that Leibniz argued against Newton's absolute space and time by appealing to an idea of internal relations. Therefore, *against* Newton's thesis that space and time exist as absolute, external and neutral containers, Leibniz is held up by Harvey as the theorist who argued that space and time are "nothing from the things `in' them" (Rescher quoted in Harvey. D., 1996:251). For Leibniz, space and time are not absolute, they are contingent.[2]

Harvey argues that Leibniz's metaphysical program enables two accounts of space and time (Harvey. D., 1996:251). The *first account* states that there is an actual universe which can be known through a multiplicity of spatial and temporal perspectives. The *second account* suggests that there are multiple universes and therefore multiple spatio-temporalities. Harvey contends that the latter account is unacceptable; he labels such a

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[2]This marks Harvey's first foundational move. He distances Leibniz from an absolute metaphysics by constructing a separation which holds Leibniz *against* Newton.

position "Leibnizian Conceit" - a self-referencial, postmodern, idealist hell (Harvey. D., 1996:Chapter 3). Thus, by setting out three virtues of Leibnizian metaphysics (Harvey. D., 1996:252-253), he argues for the first account and against the second.[3]

First, Leibniz's metaphysic does not privilege time over space or space over time - they are coordinate and contingent to each other. Second, Leibniz's metaphysics allows for a plurality of spaces because it does not privilege a single all encompassing SuperSpace. Third, Harvey argues that if one secularizes Leibniz, space and time are viewed as ordering systems inherent within social practices and are therefore arrived at (chosen) as opposed to given (by god). It is this third virtue which Harvey claims can lead either to a relativist (second account) or to a relational world view (first account). The "third virtue" is an important site so I will walk through it more slowly.

In order to resist the trap of Leibnizian conceit and a relativistic world view, Harvey makes a series of moves to stabilize the third virtue and establish the basis for a relational world view (first account).[4] By appealing to Leibniz's own distinction between possible (infinite) and compossible (somewhat restricted because of past social practices) worlds, Harvey sets out an argument which favours the stable, compossible, produced, relational account of space and time (Harvey. D., 1996:254). He states that

while the social choice with respect to spatial and temporal ordering is potentially

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[3]This is Harvey's second foundational move. He distances Leibniz from relativism and steers it along a trajectory of (relational) absolutism.

[4]This is Harvey's third foundational move where he accepts an absolute reality but sets it in motion. Paraphrasing Marx, we make (produce) history but not in the circumstances (reality) of our choosing.

> infinite, the actual *social choice* once made, (eternally) condemns all "mutually related and connected" members of that social world to an existence within a common experiential framework of public space and time (Harvey. D., 1996:254, emphasis and remark added).

In other words, Harvey secularizes Leibniz's third virtue by introducing social choice. Here social choice can be read as "social time." Each social choice is materially produced in relation to previous social choices. Social choice has the effect of circumscribing a "spatio/temporal" reality which can either persist or be changed (Harvey. D., 1996:255). Social choice "condemns" the present to a defined, given but fluid reality. Change can occur only in relation to social time and therefore to past social choices. As such, Harvey circumvents a relativistic idealist path by appealing to material circumstance and ends with a reading of Leibniz which supports an argument for a relational metaphysics based in a materialist account of history and positions the possibility of (r)evolutionary change (as will be examined further in Chapter Three).

In sum, in Harvey's quest to revisit theorists who resist or offer an account of space and time which is not absolutist, Harvey is compelled to deal with Leibniz. He proposes that Leibniz can be read as a relational theorist. To make this claim, Harvey must counter the Leibnizian tendency towards relativism and idealism, in the second account, by revitalising and secularising the first. Therefore, by replacing Leibniz's (absolute) concept of god with a relationally produced, but given, conception of social time, Harvey produces Leibniz as a relational (absolutist) metaphysician.

Harvey suggests that Alfred Whitehead (an absolutist religious fundamentalist, but, relational theorist none the less) can be used to support the addition of Harvey's

social time into Leibniz's metaphysics. Harvey's objective in introducing Whitehead is clear. He states,

> [t]he effect is to convert the multiplicity of possible spatio-temporal worlds proposed by Leibniz (first account) into an empirical problem of how to unravel the multiple spatio-temporalities at work *within* a variegated world of intersecting processes (second account) (emphasis added, Harvey. D., 1996:261).

Harvey suggests that Whitehead's conceptualisation of relational metaphysics is both more advanced and more analogous to both his and Marx's projects (Harvey. D., 1996:249-250). As was the case for Leibniz, the starting point for Whitehead's realist account of relational space and time is a rejection of Newton's absolute time and space.[5] While both Whitehead and Leibniz reject Newton's conception of absolute space and time, Whitehead emerged from within the Newtonian tradition (Harvey. D., 1996:260). Harvey situates Whitehead's relational metaphysics as a synthesis of the relative/absolute dichotomy. Whitehead argues "things" do not interact in Space. Rather, there is space only because "things" interact. Space is an expression of "things'" interactions, it is not an external reality (Harvey. D., 1996:256). Therefore, without slipping into a Leibnizian examination of relative, infinite possible worlds, Whitehead studies "the relational possibilities of *actual* processes at work in *nature*" (Harvey. D., 1996:260, emphasis added).

In order to bolster his argument for a relational metaphysics, Harvey revisits three components of Whitehead's argument (Harvey. D., 1996:258-260). First, individual

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[5]Here Harvey distances Whitehead from Newton and therefore creating a spatial boundary between them. See footnote # 2

"things" or "totalities" (permanences) are in process. Permanences may seem stable; however, according to Whitehead they are always becoming (note: not being) generated and dissolved. "Things" and "events" are relations derived from processes (Harvey. D., 1996:256). Consequently, nature (read: everything; see Harvey D., 1996:Chapter 6) is in process (Harvey. D., 1996:257). Because everything is in process, everything is simultaneously separated and bound together through the space they produce. The concept of permanences enables Harvey to examine and explain things which appear to be static and stable (i.e., money, the city and capital) and focus on their relations.

Whitehead's second point affirms Harvey's rejection of Leibniz's second, relativist account of space-time and his embrace of its relational alternative. Whitehead argues that processes, which are evident in everything, have the effect of producing concretely different space/times. The totality of these space/times constructs a version of "space(-time)," nature and/or the world. Harvey states, "we can through observation and reflection understand which of the multiplicities of spatio-temporalities is primarily at work both in *nature* as well as in the experiential *world* of a moving observer" (Harvey. D., 1996:260, emphasis added). This quote is revealing because it affirms that a unity of *nature* or the *world* is made up of a multiplicity of processes or spatio-temporalities. Differences and processes, some primary and others secondary, make up a unity or totality. Multiple processes flow into a coherent system (superstructure) of "space(-time)," nature or world. Hence Whitehead affirms the given, but fluid, world that Harvey

reads from Leibniz.[6]

Third, Whitehead's metaphysics makes possible a separation between space and time. This separation enables thinking about evolution and change. This possibility also vindicates Harvey's decision to replace Leibniz's absolute god with a relational conception of social choice (time). Harvey does not need to go through the mental gymnastics associated with secularizing Leibniz's third virtue. Whitehead has this evolutionary allowance built into his metaphysics. We exist *within* "a" world of processes. Whitehead formulates a reality which is produced by social processes and if this reality is produced by social process, social choice and social time, it can also be changed.[7]

In sum, Whitehead's metaphysics enable a new type of question. Instead of asking absolutist questions which demand "what are things?," alternative relational questions like "how do "things" appear stable?" can be asked. His metaphysics affirm a relational, non-relativistic "world" by allowing for a mode of inquiry which assumes that the world is in motion. The unity of the world and its constitutive pieces is constantly being destroyed, changed and produced. That which drives this process, evolution and revolution can only be revealed, assessed or initiated through a mode of inquiry which is itself sensitive to motion (as defined by Harvey's relational metaphysics). Harvey scripts dialectics for this role. I will turn to Harvey's dialectical mode of inquiry next.

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[6]See footnote # 3

[7]See footnote # 4

Dialectics:

Harvey dedicates an entire Chapter to dialectics. Dialectics are central to his understanding of a world of movement and to prescribing how it can be changed. A dialectical project "not only has a transformative effect upon the terrain of theory, but also opens up a terrain of political possibilities" since it is capable of integrating space, place and the environment (Harvey. D., 1996:46). Harvey points both to misinterpretations of dialectics and to different conceptions of dialectics. Harvey makes clear that he does not accept all versions of dialectics; he holds that while some are fruitful others are harmful (Harvey. D., 1996:47). While some dialectics lead back to Leibnizian relativism or Cartesian and positivist absolutisms, other (Marxist-Hegelian) dialectics can lead to emancipation.

In general, Harvey argues that dialectics evade absolute conceptions of space and time and instead mirror the relational space and time set out in his examination of metaphysics. He quotes three authors to illustrate the fluid nature of both dialectics and the world it interrogates. He quotes Whitehead (1985) who states that "nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process" (Harvey. D., 1996:47). Harvey quotes Bohm (1983) to show that

> not only is everything changing, but all is *flux*. That is to say *what is* is the process of becoming itself, while all objects, events, entities, conditions, structures etc... are forms that can be abstracted from this process (Harvey. D., 1996:48, original emphasis).

Finally he quotes Ollman (1993), who significantly influences Harvey's theoretical project, to illustrate his understanding of Marx's dialectics. Ollman states that

> [d]ialectics restructures our thinking about reality by replacing the common sense notion of "things," as something that *has* a history and *has* external connection with other "things," with notions of "processes," which *contains* its history and possible futures, and "relations," which *contains* as a part of what it is its relations with other relations (Harvey. D., 1996:48, original emphasis).

Harvey sets out eleven propositions (Harvey. D., 1996:49-57) from this general description that affirm both the ideas in these quotes and his relational metaphysics. I will only draw on those propositions which demonstrate the link between Harvey's relational metaphysics and his dialectics.

The dialectic is itself a process and not a thing. It does not examine things, but the processes which produce them. Harvey states that "dialectical thinking emphasizes the understanding of processes, flows, fluxes and relations over the analysis of elements, things, structures and organised structures" (Harvey. D., 1996:49). Therefore, on the one hand, the ontology of dialectics puts processes, flux etc. prior to the elements, structures etc. which create, sustain and undermine them (Harvey. D., 1996:49). The epistemology of dialects, on the other hand, temporarily inverts this process. It tentatively focuses on "things" or "permanences" in order to understand that which is in flux (Harvey. D., 1996:49). Flux's pivotal importance is therefore always maintained.[8]

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[8]The suggestion that a Marxist-Hegelian dialect assumes movement is challenged in Chapter Two where I argue that the dialectic assumes, at the level of ontology, a spatial discourse of separation and inclusion and content and form. Harvey's analytic strategy, as osculating between epistemology to show a fluid ontology is identified in my reconstructions of his environmentalism, urbanism and capitalism.

In a dialectical view, "things" are understood as parts constituted out of processes and relations that themselves constitute structures, systems and wholes (Harvey. D., 1996:50). These parts and wholes are mutually constitutive of each other, though not in the sense of negative feedback loops as reductionist or holistic accounts might suggest. Instead Harvey argues that dialectics reveal processes of constant creation and constant transformation - a positive feedback loop. The "loop" is never the same (Harvey. D., 1996:54). Both creativity and transformation arise from the contradictions within "things" themselves and the contradictions within the systems that influence these "things" (Harvey. D., 1996:54). All "things" have internal contradictions by virtue of the multiple processes that constitute them (Harvey. D., 1996:51).[9] Dialectics therefore betray common sense; they expose "change" to be the norm and "stability" to be the exception (Harvey. D., 1996:54-55).

Furthermore, a dialectical perspective enables an *ad infinitum* decomposition of "things" to be understood (Harvey. D., 1996:51). There are no fundamental building blocks to "things." Since a dialectical view enables one to endlessly decompose "things," Harvey suggests that "bounded fields of relevance or immediacy" (like social time) need to be constructed (Harvey. D., 1996:53). The dialectic allows the processes and the relations they contain to be exposed (Harvey. D., 1996:52). However, since there are no *a priori* boundaries inherent to dialectics, the processes of determining these boundaries

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[9]The idea of contradictions (or separations see footnote # 8 and Chapter Two) is central to Harvey's hope for an anti-capitalist revolution and to explaining the driving force of capitalism.

become themselves a matter of strategy. These decisions inevitably influence the theories, concepts and (as I will emphasize in Chapter Three) the politics of any project (Harvey. D., 1996:53).

The fact that dialectics are strategic reveals that they also produce their own "permanences." For example, dialectics produce concepts, abstractions and institutionalized structures of knowledge (Harvey. D., 1996:55-56). Harvey argues that a dialectical view must recognize its mode of inquiry as always already implicated in what it reveals, creates or destroys. He warns that dialectics must not be granted ontological status; dialectics must not be understood as the "way" of nature if dialectics are to remain an open process (Harvey. D., 1996:56).[10] Dialectics explore possible worlds, changes, self-realisations, social orders and totalities. They investigate and produce ethical, moral and political options (Harvey. D., 1996:56). Therefore, for Harvey, the dialectic is a (r)evolutionary political program.

In review, Harvey maintains that a dialectical view holds that all things are in motion (ontology). However, to elucidate this world of progress, a dialectician must start

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[10]However Harvey also endorses, in the pages which directly follow his "eleven propositions," a "strong view" of dialectics, which he admits has the tendency to lead towards mechanical unfolding of teleological assertions (which I pick up in Chapter Two); he subscribes to a view that nature is inherently dialectical, thereby contravening his warning against "ontological dialectics;" and he also blatantly warns that the "negative side of (dialectics') flexibility and openness is that it appears to have little chance of providing anything except a vast panoply of insecure and shifting concepts and findings" and, therefore, suggests that dialectics must search the security of those common generative principles, relations and orders (Harvey. D., 1996:57-59). These contradictions imply that fluidity is only tolerated within certain defined parameters or conditions of possibility. This is not the time to expand on Harvey's contradictions since they will be discussed in later Chapters.

with what appears to be self-evident "permanences" (epistemology). Behind a self-evident, static world appears a relational world where parts make wholes and wholes make parts. As such, change is a characteristic of all systems and totalities. Therefore, a dialectical view is itself a process. One is always already situated in what is being examined. Therefore, what is important is how one draws the line(s) between the observer and the observed. These are all strong statements and each bolsters Harvey's defensive claim that dialectics can incorporate the contributions of both situated and fluid subjectivities and perspectivalisms. Harvey, as such, remains poised to dismiss rash critique since both his relational metaphysics and his dialectics are based on an attempt to understand the world in terms of relations, processes, flux, change and movement. His relational metaphysics are built "against" an absolute account of space and time and his reconstruction of dialectics shows a relational way of examining "reality." These theoretical gains enable Harvey to depict and examine a world of movement.

In the three sections which follow, I show that Harvey's historical-geographical-materialist reading of environmentalism, urbanism and capitalism are all conducted in the same spirit of movement and change. I will also demonstrate that Harvey describes each of these "phenomena" as global. The order of presentation is important. While all three are considered to be key sites in Harvey's understanding of the world, each is related to the other. His attention to the environment as a social phenomenon feeds into his understanding of urbanism as a spatio-temporal process within a continuity of a shifting, changing and crisis laden capitalist world.

Environment

Harvey would likely accept that there are ecological systems which are teaming with biodiversity and brimming with processes of competition and/or cooperation. However, he spends little time dealing with the nature of ecology in these terms. There is a fundamental difference in the way that Harvey conceptualises the environment and the way that a natural scientist or wilderness activists might. I will reconstruct Harvey's portrayal of the environment as a social phenomenon in order to demonstrate that he is sensitive to issues of movement and that the environment is global.

The "environment" for Harvey is always a social product. Harvey suggests that "all proposals concerning "the environment" are necessarily and simultaneously proposals for social change..." (Harvey. D., 1996: 119). The realm of eco-politics, as defined in terms which imbue conflicting meanings to different people, intrigues Harvey (Harvey. D., 1996:118). He proposes that because an "'environmental issue' necessarily *means such different things to different people*, that in aggregate it encompasses quite literally everything there is" (Harvey. D., 1996:117, emphasis added). The environment, therefore, includes the urban sprawl of New York City and the old growth temperate rainforests of Vancouver Island. Meaning is ascribed in accordance with one's social-geographical position in the world. His concept of the environment also values process. Implicit in a recognition that the environment is intrinsically social, lies an acknowledgment that humans are constantly changing, sculpting or destroying the natural landscape. The environment is always implicated in socio-political struggles. Harvey works his way towards the conclusion that environmental struggles must be understood in

relation to socio-political processes by examining the following question: How does one understand the domination of and the move to protect nature? Harvey presents a two-fold strategy to address this question. First, Harvey attempts to eliminate static critiques about the causes of environmental destruction; and second, he attempts to brings these critiques into a system which is sensitive to process.

In the first component of Harvey's response, he argues that the enlightenment project[11] is capable of recognising the harm done to the natural environment. The enlightenment project, including scientific rationality and human betterment is not necessarily to blame for environmental destruction. Harvey argues that the point is not to label the enlightenment project "good or bad," but rather to see how environmentally destructive actions have emerged and been justified. He strategically quotes Foucault to support this claim. Foucault argues that to suggest we should

> refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism ... ; or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen ... as good or bad). And we do not break free from this blackmail by introducing "dialectical" nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have been in the Enlightenment (Foucault. M., quoted in Harvey. D., 1996:130).

To which Harvey later concludes,

> [t]he genius of eighteenth-century political economy was this: that it mobilised the human imaginary of emancipation, progress, and self-realization into forms of discourse that could alter the application of political power and the construction of institutions in ways that were consistent with the growing prevalence of the

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[11] In line with Harvey's textual strategy, Harvey starts with the position that is most devastating to his project (in this case postmodern critiques of *modernity*) and works it over to an "acceptable" position (hence the introduction of Foucault below).

> material practices of market exchange. It did so... (by) subsuming the cosmic question of the relation to nature into a technical discourse concerning the proper allocation of scarce resources...for the betterment of human welfare (Harvey. D., 1996:131).

Therefore, as the above suggests that, single critiques of the enlightenment project can lead to simplistic, static and dualistic (good/bad) forms of argumentation and analysis.

Second, Harvey's dialectical examination both emphasises and undermines these positions. He carefully distils the "heterogeneity" (Harvey. D., 1996:124) of enlightenment thought down to a pendulum between eco-scarcity driven pessimism and emancipation driven optimism that can be manipulated according to the whim and betterment of class privilege and power (Harvey. D., 1996:149). In order to explore the complexity of environmental discourses, he displaces the pendulum and with it environmental critiques based on culture/nature or society/nature dualisms. By doing this, Harvey is able to bring these critiques into a relationship with other critiques. His strategy sets what once were static positions into motion by removing their pillars of authority and giving them dialectical relations of complexity. Harvey argues that

> [t]he diverse arguments on the matter ["how human beings have *valued* their natural world" (Harvey. D., 1996:150, emphasis added)] that now preoccupy many segments of society...form a discursive point of potential leverage from which to break out of that capitalist-imposed pendulum-swing between optimism and pessimism (Harvey. D., 1996:150).

Harvey focuses on value in general and money in particular, in order to expose the complexity of the environment and to break out of static reasoning. He examines money, which appears to be "[i]tself dead and inert" (Harvey. D., 1996:152) and science, which appears to reveal value inherent in nature, in order to show that social process underlay

both methods of socially *valuing* nature.

The symbol of money, in one place, has the negative effect of levelling multiplicity and diversity to common denominators. In another place, the symbol of money can be used as an analytic tool to uncover the complexity of the world ecosystem. Harvey follows the second strategy in order to emphasize the first (see comments on epistemology on p.20). As an analytic site, value and money can be used to disclose "a wondrous multidimensional ecosystemic world of use values, of human desires and needs as well as subjective meanings..." (Harvey. D., 1996:151). Harvey reveals his own sensitivity to the flux and complexity of nature by examining the "negative benefits" of using money to judge nature's value.

Harvey argues that the symbol of money in everyday use tends to hide underlying social processes. Money imposes a static ordering onto a shifting, diverse and contradictory "phenomenon." At one level the property assumptions in money replicate the way

> we conceive of *entities* as if they can be taken out of any ecosystem of which they are a part. We presume the value of fish, for example, independently of the water in which they swim (Harvey. D., 1996:153, original emphasis).

Whereas money encourages this, Harvey suggests that, on the contrary, we must understand these "entities" by their relations. He states that the

> pursuit of monetary valuations commits us to a thoroughly Cartesian-Newtonian-Lockeian... (absolute) ontology of how the natural world is constituted...(and effaces the) multiple and nonlinear notions of time which attach themselves to different ecological processes... (Harvey. D., 1996:153).

Non-linear and dynamic processes are forced into a system which ascribes only linear

meaning. The value of a pond or a wetland, for example, is compared against certain costs of purifying water, building dikes or revenue generating development. The pond is therefore redefined according to the linear logic implicit in money (see Harvey. D. 1985a:Chapter 1).

However, in addition to imposing social orderings, like linear time, on a world of change and process, money also imposes power relations and institutional assumptions onto the environment. Harvey argues that an

> [a]ppeal to money valuations condemns us...to a world view in which the ecosystem is viewed as an "externality" to be internalised in human action only via some arbitrarily chosen and imposed structure or regulatory regime...which cannot escape from the confines of (their) own institutional and ontological assumptions...about how the world is ordered as well as valued (Harvey. D., 1996:154-155).

The value of money itself (it is after all only a piece of paper) and the way the market is deemed as an adequate method of determining value are examples of institutional assumptions (Harvey. D., 1996:152). These assumptions contain asymmetries of power (Harvey. D., 1996:155). For Harvey,

> money does indeed become the community [the common ordering system that we can all understand (Harvey. D., 1996:152)]; but a community emptied of any *particular* moral passion or of human meaning... (Harvey. D., 1996:156, emphasis added).

Money, therefore, is one way to define what is a just community and what is a fair and equitable way of understanding the place and relations of humans in the world. Money also ascribes a linear social ordering to a diverse, heterogeneous and dynamic environment.

Aside from money, there are other ways that the environment has been valued.

Money assigns social values to nature, but many have suggested that "values inhere in nature" independent of humanity and independent of society. Harvey rejects this proposition. Harvey immediately identifies the epistemological obstacle: "how can we know what they (nature's intrinsic values) are?" (Harvey. D., 1996:158). Since humans are both social and human, all meditations on this subject must be bound by social influences and are necessarily anthropocentric. Harvey argues that "the knowing subject has a creative role to play at least in translating the values inherent in nature into humanized terms" (Harvey. D., 1996:158). Harvey quotes Capra as saying "[w]e can never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves" (Capra. F., 1975 quoted in Harvey. D., 1996:164). Such a position runs counter to claims of objectivity (and biocentrism).

Harvey shows that diverse social values are imported into "neutral" science by recalling three typical scientific metaphors and their critiques: he appeals to a feminist critique [here Harvey refers to Merchant. C., (1983); Haraway D., (1989); Martin. E., (1991)] and to show how nature has been socially coded as passive; he appeals to Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid and cooperation (an anarchist critique) to counter Darwin's thesis on competition, thereby implying that each is socially contingent; finally, Harvey argues that notions of animal territoriality have been "socially" interpreted through geopolitically cut lenses (Harvey D,. 1996: 157-162). Harvey concludes that "if values reside in nature we have no scientific way of knowing what they are independently of the (social) values implicit in the metaphors deployed in mounting specific lines of inquiry" (Harvey. D., 1996:162, see also Harvey. D. and Haraway. D., 1995).

Money and scientific (or independent) valuations are therefore both problematic ways of determining the diverse and fluid values in nature because they import social assumptions which are not examined. Hence, Harvey suggests that one must examine the diverse and fluid ecological discourses within society in order to fully understand what the term "environment" can mean (see Chapter Three for a reconstruction of Harvey's examination). He states

> [t]he heterogeneity of discourses about "nature" has to be accepted as not only... inevitable (given the diversity and fluidity of both nature and society) but also a very constructive and creative feature of ecological argumentation... (Harvey. D., 1996:172).

Furthermore, in order to examine and understand this discursive diversity, Harvey implies that one must return to a dialectical reading of social and ecological change.

The diversity of ecological discourses, Harvey argues, become "less confusing when taken as moments in a social process in which conflicting forms of social power struggle to gain command of institutions, social relations and material practices for particular purposes" (Harvey. D., 1996:174). This type of examination can reveal that: (1) examinations of nature are examinations of society;(2) the tendency towards diversity and contradiction in ecological discourses has had a sustaining effect on hegemonic discourses (like reading the value of nature in monetary or scientific terms) thereby protecting capitalist and societal relations of power; and finally, (3) a dialectical reading of social and ecological change points to the fundamental task of finding "a language to make radical ecology truly radical" (Harvey. D., 1996:174-175).

In the spirit of Harvey's dialectical sensitivity to discourse, there are two otherb

trends which reside in eco-discourses that should be examined in this Chapter (a closer examination will be undertaken in Chapter Three). On the one hand, the environment is understood as a local issue (i.e., bio-regionalism); and on the other hand, it is understood as a global phenomenon (i.e., Lovelock's Gaia Hypothesis) (Harvey. D., 1996:204). Harvey rejects this static dichotomy between simple holistic (global) and simple specific (local) accounts of the environment (Harvey. D., 1996:190). He is suspicious of the tendency to collapse all specificity into an apocalyptic global environmental crisis (Harvey. D., 1996:195). At the same time, Harvey is also suspicious of the move towards isolated and localised environmental standpoints at the cost of larger cartographic affinities[12] (Harvey. D., 1996:118). The abuse of the natural environment is both a localized and a globalized problem; it is produced at a series of different scales which vary from the local to the regional and the global (Harvey. D., 1996:203). The constant geographical production of scale results in a nested hierarchy of different political-economic spaces (Harvey. D., 1996:203-4). Therefore, the geography of different environmental scales must be understood as always being mediated by overarching processes of social production (i.e., cartographic affinities like urbanism and capitalism).

This dialectical approach does not indicate an abandonment of the global. The global environment is an important scale. For Harvey, the global scale is particularly

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[12]Harvey uses the metaphor "cartographic affinities" on p.290 (1996). As I read it, cartographic affinities is a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) metaphor. GIS can take disperse points and build a map based upon that single variable (or take multiple variables and create a highly complex map) in order to show cartographic affinities. Harvey uses it to describe how one might unite in an anti-capitalist strategy against a superstructural system that has become incredibly complex (see p.40 of this thesis).

salient because: (1) a public consensus about the environment has been framed in terms of the health of the biosphere (Harvey. D., 1996:118); (2) it is generally accepted that a global ecology or biosphere is being altered by human activities (Harvey. D., 1996:119); (3) the environment has been situated as the material conditions (i.e., air, water and natural resources) for a global human population to survive (Harvey. D., 1996:118); and (4) the global environment has the effect of revealing universal conditions. The environment provides a site of universal identification (planet Earth), it reveals human processes of world creation and it identifies the universal material conditions for human endeavours. Therefore, Harvey strategically embraces the framing of environmental problems as global (Harvey. D., 1996:372). However, since the environment is understood to be (a) constantly produced and (b) neither strictly global nor strictly local, the degree to which Harvey scripts capitalism and urbanism as global phenomenon determines how environmental issues are to be understood (see below).

In sum, in the spirit of dialectics, Harvey contests static interpretations of ecological domination, by focusing on "permanences," such as money, and suggests that they should be brought into dialogue with other environmental critiques. Harvey suggests that environmental struggles must not abstract ideas from an "environment" out there; instead, they must be concerned with real material conditions which allow for certain ecologically destructive ways of life to be justified and perpetuated (Harvey. D., 1996:187). Harvey, in some respects, supports the view that the environment, as a social phenomena, is also a global problem/issue/condition. Whether this gets translated into a global political strategy rests in part on how Harvey relates environmental struggles to

political-economic struggles. Since every political-economic struggle is at the same time an environmental struggle (Harvey. D., 1996:182), the discursive diversity in society must be examined in order to understand the complexity and the scale of the processes which underlay and produce the environment. These processes, namely urbanism and capitalism, will be examined next.

Urbanism

Within Harvey's argument, the urban plays an important intermediary role between the environment and capitalism. The majority of the world's human population is increasingly working, living and playing in urban centres. Built environments or created spaces result, Harvey argues, because "society must of necessity create a physical landscape" (Harvey. D., 1985a:36). Harvey argues that urbanism is a process. It is a process whereby capitalism transforms the world into its own image (Harvey. D., 1985a:36). Capitalism is realised in the world through urbanism. Urbanism represents the site where the clash between physical environments and social processes is most apparent. Harvey argues that

> capitalism these last two hundred years has produced, through its dominant form of urbanisation, not only a "second nature" of built environments even harder to transform than the virgin [*sic*] nature of frontier regions years ago, but also an urbanised human nature, endowed with a very specific sense of time, space, and money as sources of social power and with sophisticated abilities and strategies to win back from one corner of urban life what may be lost in another (Harvey. D., 1985a:35).

Therefore, at one level, the urban holds a strategic site within an anti-capitalist politics, although, at another level, it is also the place where anti-capitalist politics find their

greatest frustrations.[13] It acts as a space/place where the situated qualities of a geographic or environmental location meet the dialectical development of conflicting social/capitalist processes - as Marx said "it is the workshop of civilisation." The urban therefore provides the obvious link between the preceding section on the environment and the following section on capitalism. In keeping with the general aims of this section, I work through some of Harvey's writings on urbanism while paying attention to his sensitivity to movement and to its increasingly global nature.

Harvey makes a distinction between the built environment of the city and the process of urbanism. He states that

> we cannot answer that the urban is a "thing" in the ordinary sense of the word (whereas) the city as a built form can, it is true, be regarded as a set of objects arranged according to some pattern in space (read: objects arranged to produce a pattern of space) (Harvey. D., 1972:303, remarks added).

Nevertheless, he goes on to argue that "there are few who would agree that cities are just that...the city has to be regarded as a functioning totality (Harvey. D., 1972:303)." The city is always changing. There is something else at work in the city which also needs to be identified. Harvey suggests that this *something else at work* is urbanism: "a set of social relationships which reflect the relationships established throughout society as a whole" (Harvey. D., 1972:304).

While others, such as Lefebvre (1970), are open to considering a free standing

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[13]I argue in Chapter Three that Harvey fails to mobilise the urban (or the money economy) as potential sites for radical action. However, to the extent that he does (in the abstract) is underpinned by a spatial framing (provided by the spatial discourse in Chapter Two) which situates the urban as one form within a multi-scaled political strategy.

urban narrative, Harvey is compelled to place the process of urbanism within larger processes of capitalist ephemerality. Harvey accepts Lefebvre's assertion that the urban is heterogeneous, diverse and increasingly global. However, Harvey insists that the urban is a system within a larger set of capitalist processes and does not constitute a separate system of its own. And in contrast to Lefebvre, Harvey argues that the urban has not become hegemonic and overtaken capitalism. If anything, it is a nexus of all of capitalism's conflicting processes, which only few will be examined here.

In general, Harvey argues that urbanism is the spatial configuration of capitalist spatial production (Harvey. D., 1985a:xii). The ephemeral, the changeability and the openness, are the defining qualities of the urban experience under capitalism (Harvey. D., 1985a:2). The urban is a site where different drives to define, produce and create spatio-temporalities (according to whatever ideology) meet in a celebration and contestation of heterogeneity and multi-dimensionality. Three capitalist processes or drives which constitute the urban are examined below.

First, the urban is a process which, by embodying a tension within capitalism, produces uneven-geographical development. Harvey's capitalism manifests itself as the spatial maxim: "where someone wins, somewhere else others lose." As Harvey states,

> [c]apitalism does not develop upon a flat plain surface endowed with ubiquitous raw materials and homogeneous labour supply with equal transport facility in all directions. It is inserted, grows and spreads within a richly variegated geographic environment which encompasses great diversity in the munificence of nature and in labour productivity... (and) capitalism also `encounters barriers within its own nature,' which force it to produce new forms of geographic differentiation (Harvey. D., 1982:416).

Since capitalism is marked by processes which concentrate capital in some areas and

remove it from others, the urban is also marked by uneven patterns of geographic development and forms of spatial segregation (Harvey. D., 1982:417). The concentration of a reserve army of labour in urban centres requires the constant production of reproductive and consumptive infrastructure (Harvey. D., 1982:418). The resulting concentrations in some areas encourage dispersal to others. This encouragement, in part, results from rising rents, increasing congestion, rigidity in infrastructure and the propensity for urban unrest. Hence the urban is marked by conflicting processes which "develop" some areas and "underdevelop" others. As barriers are overcome, new barriers of geographic differentiation are also erected.

Second, Harvey suggests that the urban landscape is constantly thrown into a process of "creative destruction" whereby old investments are replaced with more efficient and prosperous ones. Processes of temporal displacement and spatial fixing, processes like technological change and shifts in capitalist modes of regulation and regimes of accumulations (see below), demand that fixed capital and created spaces be destroyed so that new forms of fixed capital and new spaces can be created. For Harvey, created spaces can only be produced once former spaces (pre-capitalist or capitalist) are destroyed. He states that "space can be overcome only through the production of a fixed space, and turn-over time can be accelerated only by fixing a portion of the total capital in time. The fixed spaces and times can be overcome only through the (process) of creative self-destruction" (Harvey. D., 1985a:28). Hence, the ever-changing face of urbanism.

Third, the urban is one site where "temporal displacements" and "spatial fixes" take place. Temporal displacement and spatial fixes are the processes which enable

capitalism to avoid periodic crises and explain how "creative destruction" and "uneven-geographical development" become manifest in the material world of the urban. Both processes require further unpacking.

In essence, temporal displacement moves over-accumulated capital from the present and spreads it into the future. As such, present day capitalism avoids recurring crises of over-accumulation. Temporal displacement takes shape as competition, driven by an increasing turn-over time of social production, and is shifted into long term projects like social and physical infrastructure (i.e., highways) and fictitious capital (i.e., credit) (Harvey. D. 1985:135-141). Hence, the urban environment is constantly being produced by processes of temporal displacement. New structures, infrastructures, factories, housing developments and "permanences" are always being erected and, as will be shown later, destroyed.

The need for a spatial fix also stems from a desire to stave off crises associated with capital over-accumulation and thus to avoid stagnation. Within an urban context, spatial fixes have essentially the same function as temporal displacements. They temporarily stave off crises which emerge from the internal contradictions in capitalism. Harvey's concept of "spatial fix" is inspired partly by Hegel's recognition of an internal contradiction within civil society which can be solved by commercial expansion and overseas colonisation (Harvey. D., 1982:414); in part by Marx's similar conclusion with respect to foreign trade (Harvey. D., 1982:415); and in part by Lenin's meditations on imperialism (Harvey. D., 1982:440). Not only can capital be geographically exported overseas and into other countries, but capital can also be fixed within urban centres.

Over-accumulated capital can be reinvested in long term infrastructure projects, such as improved transportation, information and communication links. The net result is a reordering of the spatial landscape of the urban. As interconnections are built, the urban ceases to be a local environment and increasingly becomes a regional, national and even global space. Within urban environments raw materials, products etc. are exported to other regions in order to maintain steady growth.

Harvey's spatial fix also has a geopolitical dimension. Harvey argues that capitalist states are *inevitably* drawn into the ultimate form of devaluation and spatial reorganisation, namely global war, by urban competition for new markets and new resources at the geo-limits of capitalism (Harvey. D., 1985:157-163 and Harvey. D., 1982:442-445). Again, the urban experience under capitalism is constantly changing and evolving into new temporal and spatial formulations. At one moment it might change the landscape of a neighbourhood; at another moment, it may change the face of the planet.

All three of these examples indicate the fluid and dynamic nature of Harvey's urbanism. The urban is neither a free standing, self-related entity, nor is it a static site of a capitalist system. Instead, it is in constant creation and destruction and influences other processes which constitute it and which it constitutes. Harvey also recognises that the urban is increasingly a global phenomenon. While Harvey is not prepared to go so far as to concede that there has been an urban revolution, whereby urbanism is understood to be the hegemonic structure wherein all others (like industrial capitalism) are subsumed, he is prepared to recognize urbanism as a global movement. In 1972 Harvey stated that

> the evidence suggests that the forces of urbanisation are emerging strongly and

> moving to dominate the centre state of *world history*. Urbanisation has become *global* in scope. Urbanisation of the countryside is proceeding apace. Created space is replacing effective space (Harvey. D., 1972:313).

In 1990, as I outline below, Harvey argued that the break within capitalist modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation signalled a shift from that which is ordered and rigid to that which is diverse and ephemeral. As capitalism becomes increasingly global, the urban, which instantiates capitalist processes, also reaches global proportions. The global nature of urbanism can be identified further in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (1996). Here Harvey moves to consider whether the future of urbanisation is determined by "globalization" (Harvey. D., 1996:420). The twentieth century for Harvey is "*the* century of urbanisation...we are embroiled in a global process of capitalist urbanisation or uneven spatio-temporal development (Harvey. D., 1996:403-414, original emphasis). This does not equal an acceptance of the inevitability of globalization; instead it is a recognition that urban centres are now, through changes in capitalist organization, spatial fixes and temporal displacements, operating in an interconnected global web of urban-capitalist relations. The bottom line is that "we" now live in a "rapidly urbanizing *world* of uneven-geographical development" (Harvey. D., 1996:438).

Therefore, I have reconstructed how Harvey's urbanism is a dynamic and evolving process which is constantly changing the physical landscape or space in which it produces "for" itself. Urbanism as a process within capitalism (though capable of being otherwise) is characterised by processes of uneven geographic development, temporal displacements, spatial fixes and constant creative destruction. The urban is not a thing, as one might want to call the city; instead it is that which constantly transforms the city to

make it greater than "just" a city. I have suggested that Harvey has increasingly accepted the urban as a global process.

Capitalism

Traditional critiques of Marxist analyses point to a singular and rigid focus on economic issues. Harvey has always claimed to be sensitive to other axes of power and has become more inclined to be so in his recent work. Harvey argues that, having become far too multifarious for simple economic projections, capitalism requires a more complex analysis. Nevertheless, a complex examination of capitalism can still be static. Such an analysis might assume that there is a thing called "capitalism" that can effect change in the external world. Harvey evades this critique as well since his sensitivity to movement and change, as demonstrated in his relational metaphysics and his dialectics, is also evident in his examination of capitalism. Capitalism, for Harvey, is a changing system of diverse and conflicting processes (Harvey. D., 1996:63). Consequently, Harvey's analysis presents a multifaced capitalist system which has characteristics of change, dynamism, innovation and embodiment in other processes. By way of demonstrating how Harvey is sensitive to a world of capitalist movement, I will turn to Harvey's reconstruction of capitalism's histories. Specifically, I turn to The Condition of Postmodernity to identify the dynamic and then the global nature of Harvey's capitalism(s).

Since capitalism is prone to undergo fundamental shifts and transformations, Harvey constructs the history of capitalism as a series of different eras (i.e., Fordism and

post-Fordism). He retrieves the "regulation school's" language to explain these shifts and the resulting moments of stability between shifts (Aglietta. M., 1979). In order to help explain how there are "semblances of order" in a "highly dynamic, and consequently unstable, capitalist system" (see comments on epistemology p.20) Harvey introduces two concepts: "regime of accumulation" and "mode of regulation" (Harvey. D., 1990:122). Specifically, he focuses on two moments of instability which have posed the greatest challenge for capitalism and the semblances of order which have resulted.

Capitalism has worked on the assumption that, if stability is to be achieved in an unstable world, then the instabilities caused by the "anarchic" quality of price-fixing markets and labour power must be controlled and regimented. Modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation provide the stability *necessary* for capitalism's survival. For example, since price fixing markets do not guarantee stable growth, organisational interventions via the state or workers are required. Effectively these interventions alter "capitalism's dynamic" and "shape its trajectory" (Harvey. D., 1990:122-3). Similarly, capitalism is required to "habituate" (a Hegelian term, see below p.75) the labour force because labour power is also diverse and chaotic. Harvey calls the process of "habituation," labour control (Harvey. D., 1990:123). These forms of "habituation" occur in the work place and in society in general. The state, the media, religious organisations, time-clocks, assembly lines etc. all act as ways to educate, train and persuade labour and potential labour to think and act in line with the requirements of capitalist survival (Harvey. D., 1990:123).

By focusing on the modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation, which

provide or "habituate" the stability *necessary* for capitalism's survival, disjunctures between these modes and regimes can be used to explore the volatile nature of Harvey's capitalism(s). Two moments of economic volatility are revealed. The first moment is the chaotic era preceding the birth of Fordism. The second moment is the period preceding the birth of flexible accumulation (post-Fordism).

Harvey argues that *rigid* forms of control and management exemplify the Fordist response to chaotic shifts in capitalism. Harvey argues that the Fordist mode of regulation was principally based upon the central tenets of Henry Ford's revolutionised work place. Utilizing Taylor's scientific principles of management, Ford attempted to create an ordered, regimented and efficient work environment (Harvey. D., 1990:125-6). In addition to regulating the work place, Ford experimented in social welfarism and social control. Harvey, using quotes from Gramsci, suggested that

> Ford's puritanical and social control initiatives had the purpose of "preserving, outside of work, a certain psychophysical equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the workers, exhausted by the new method of production." Workers had to spend their money "rationally, to maintain, renew and if possible increase (their) muscular nervous efficiency." The fierce attack on alcohol and sexual activities was also a part of the comprehensive effort to inculcate "the habits and customs necessary for the new system of working and living." (Harvey. D., 1985a:50).

Furthermore, "Fordism created `a new type of worker and a new type of man [*sic*][14]'

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[14]I have been advised to remove "[sic]" from all the quotations in this thesis. I therefore ask that <u>you</u> recognise the importance that a gendering of language (both masculine and feminine) can have on the meaning of a quote and on the quality and implications of a theoretical proposition. I leave the original gendered use so as not to change the concious or unconcious intent of the author. Please insert "[sic]" at your (and my) will.

suited for a `new type of work and productive process'" (Harvey. D., 1990:126). These experiments in social habituation inevitably proved too burdensome for Ford and his followers. Hence, the state assumed responsibility for this social role via the "new deal" (Harvey. D., 1990: 126-28). The "new deal" enforced, with greater effectiveness, the experiments that Ford had initiated.

The state assumed responsibility for creating *stable* economic markets and programming social reproduction. At one level, the state was required to curb over-zealous competition between firms and monopolistic trends. At another level, the state was expected to provide provisions for social reproduction like health care, welfare and public housing (Harvey. D., 1990:135). The "new worker" emerged from this mode of regulation as a distinct unit within a macro-planned system of production. Harvey argues that "post-war [F]ordism has to be seen less as a mere system of mass production and more as a total *way of life*" (Harvey. D., 1990:135 emphasis added).

In contrast to Fordist rigidities, post-Fordism was marked by its *flexible* mode of regulation. Harvey identifies some general features of a post-Fordist regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. A post-Fordist mode of regulation mirrored the volatility and flexibility revealed during periods of crisis. Harvey argues that in

> the social space created by all this flux and uncertainty, a series of novel experiments in the realm of organization as well as in political and social life (began) to take shape. ... [A]n entirely new regime of accumulation (emerged and was) marked by a direct confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism (Harvey. D., 1990:145-7).

Bankruptcies, plant closures, deindustrialization and restructuring became the new reality that all businesses, workers and state representatives *had* to accept. Different strategies

were used in the business sector to adjust to the change of economic climates. At one end of the spectrum huge mergers created towering powerful edifices and at the other end of the spectrum small businesses mushroomed. As a shift to more ephemeral types of organization (such as sub-contracting) became entrenched, traditionally organised businesses were jeopardised (Harvey. D., 1990:153-155). As economies of scale fell to economies of scope, a new era of "just-in-time" delivery systems and small niche markets was ushered in (Harvey. D., 1990:155-157). Furthermore, new (and already redundant) commodities came onto the market. For example, information, knowledge and up-to-date data became valuable products to be bought and sold (Harvey. D., 1990:159). Harvey points out that while these trends are not uncommon to history, they still need to be seen as fundamentally new, reworked manifestations of themselves (Harvey. D., 1990:159).

In addition to businesses finding the transition difficult, Harvey argues that the state was also caught in a precarious dilemma. He states that the

> state (was also placed) in a much more problematic position. It (was) called upon to regulate the activities of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time it (was) forced, also in the national interest, to create a 'good business climate' (Harvey. D., 1990:170).

Therefore the state was forced to be non-interventionist *on behalf* of corporations by being interventionist *upon* it citizens; while at the same time, it had to refuse to be interventionist *on behalf* of its citizens by being interventionist *upon* corporations. All this occurred *on behalf* of the "national interest." Harvey suggests that states became more like businesses than ever before. Climates, balanced deficits and low debt ratios were the state's commodities to be traded and sold. As was the case for businesses, the

state also had to demonstrate its abilities to be innovative and flexible, to shed the legacies of Keynesian-Fordism, "to act as an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital, and to deter (by means other than exchange controls) capital flight to greener and more profitable pastures" (Harvey. D., 1990:170).

Again, a new *way of life* and a "new worker" were produced in the post-Fordist era. Rampant individualism replaced the collective climate of civil society and a flexible worker replaced the factory worker who knew how to stay in line. This "new worker" was increasingly forced to accept the burden of marketability, relocation and helplessness associated with a capitalist mode of organisation geared to meet the increasingly individualistic and myopic consumer. Just as the consumer is taught to value "difference, ephemerality, spectacle (and) fashion" (Harvey. D., 1990:156) so too is the worker. Therefore, in addition to a flexible economy and a flexible state, post-Fordism also marks the "habituation" of the flexible worker.

Harvey adds some notes of caution to his examination of post-Fordism. He suggests that what he is calling flexible accumulation might well be only a temporary phase. In other words, since capitalism regularly enters crises of over-accumulation and is eternally forced to adapt to these periods of ephemerality, a future stability (a new form of regulation through time) could be on the temporal horizon (Harvey. D., 1990:180). As was explored in the last section, Harvey submits that the spatial and temporal strategies (spatial and temporal fixes) in the urban environment may be fruitful for predicting the longevity and future trajectories of a post-Fordism.

But where do these crises and shifts come from? Harvey suggests that the global

nature of capitalism can provide some clues (Harvey. D., 1990:186). In the case of Fordism, while the state could provide degrees of stability inside its territorial boundaries, it could not guarantee stability in the chaotic world outside its geo-economic reach. Fordism, with a limited degree of success, had established a "new-world" economic system. It had, after all, become institutionalised in Japan and European countries by means of the Marshall Plan. It had also made headway into "southern" countries by means of U.S. foreign direct investment and thus resulted in setting up what is now labelled the new internationalism (Harvey. D., 1990:137). However, the crises associated with the demise of Fordism emerged out of this dynamic global capitalism, or more precisely, from the capitalism beyond the reach of the Fordist mode of regulation. The oil crisis, Eurodollar recycling, international competition and weak "labour control" in southern countries provided yet a new dimension to capitalism's processes (Harvey. D., 1990:141). Simply put, it became more dynamic. Since the only flexible tool that Fordism had at its disposal was monetary policy, in the form of printing money to keep the economy rolling, inflation led to the break down of Bretton Woods and ushered in a new era of volatile exchange rates and currency speculation (Harvey. D., 1990:141-142). The rigid elements of the Fordist mode of regulation were helpless against the economy's flexibility. The rigidity of the Fordist system led to its demise. A new mode of regulation and a new regime of accumulation was the necessary result.

In the case of post-Fordism or flexible accumulation, Harvey suggests that these too need to be characterised, perhaps even more so, by terms like global capitalism, globalization, world economy etc. Industry has been freed, Harvey argues, from the

geographic shackles of location. He states, "[i]ndustry that had traditionally been tied by locational constraints to raw material sources or markets could become much more footloose" (Harvey. D. 1990:165). The boundaries which traditionally symbolised the world economic and political map have increasingly become porous. The boundaries between public and private, rural and urban as well as the boundaries of the most powerful administrative bodies (including the most advanced capitalist states) are readily transgressed or ignored. Trans-national corporations, global financial markets and global regulatory bodies (i.e., GATT, IMF and MAI) have come to characterize a historically dynamic force which continually reshapes the nature of the world and the globe (Harvey. D., 1990:186). Harvey reminds us of Marx's argument that capital "'must strive to tear down every spatial barrier to...exchange, and *conquer the whole earth* for its markets,' it must 'annihilate this space with time' in order to reduce the turnover time of capital to 'the twinkling of an eye'" (Marx. K., quoted in Harvey. D., 1982:377, emphasis added).

In order to underscore his view of capitalism as an ever changing and dynamic process, Harvey points to modes of regulation and regimes of accumulation, which are themselves dynamic and under perpetual change. It is in the disjunctures between the relative stabilities of capitalism's temporary regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation that Harvey's volatile capitalism is revealed. In accordance with Harvey's dialectical mode of inquiry outlined above, he looks to the stabilities in order to reveal its processes. Moreover, by demonstrating that capitalism exceeded the reach of the state at the demise of Fordism and continues to do so in an increasingly globalized world economy, Harvey also suggests that capitalism has become a global process. Thus,

capitalism for Harvey is both a global and dynamic system.

The central aim of this Chapter was to reconstruct how Harvey's contemporization of a Marxist-Hegelian tradition so that its attentiveness to movement can be fully understood. Harvey must be read as reacting against absolute readings of the world (i.e., structuralist Marxism or Marxist reductionism). To assert the reverse is to seriously neglect the important steps that Harvey has taken to develop the Marxist-Hegelian tradition, by introducing a sensitivity to space and time. I have argued that he demonstrates that relational metaphysics and dialectics can be used to construct "a" conception of movement. This means that Harvey's historical-geographical materialist accounts of the environment, the urban and capitalism are constantly evolving and changing. Each phenomenon is a relational component of an ever-evolving global reality. What remains to be seen, however, is how Harvey proposes to act in this ever-changing world. I leave this question to Chapter Three. I will argue in Chapter Two, that, although Harvey values a concept of movement and process, he appeals to a Marxist-Hegelian tradition that is grounded in a spatial discourse that both defines and contains the movement that Harvey attempts to value.

Chapter Two: A Spatial Discourse of Separation and Inclusion

In this Chapter I explore how "movement" is always already contained within a prior set of spatial limits, within a spatial discourse. This discourse privileges conceptions of space and time championed by Euclid, Newton and Kant and spans the collective works of Kant, Hegel, Marx. I demonstrate that there are implications to accepting this spatial discourse. At one level, the limits associated with this spatial discourse enable types of movement. As was shown in Chapter One, Harvey's Marxist-Hegelian tradition affords him the ability to think about movement in certain well known ways. "Things" are not static and permanent; they are changing, shifting and conditional. I therefore focus on a second set of implications.

The second set of implications act to constrain movement within a prior form. I argue that the spatial discourse enables movement within a set of infinite forms and as such form can never be escaped. The spatial discourse is based within an absolute metaphysical conception of space that is endlessly divisible (content) yet remains eternally whole (form). Content, for example, is made intelligible by its form; and form is characterised by its content. This discourse can be understood in terms of motion. Namely, it is driven by an eternal dialectical process of spatial separation and inclusion. This process continually produces (or respects) the infinite and eternal quality (or limit) of form. Thus, the infinite and eternal form remains sovereign. This is particular salient in relation to political theory. Form is the boundary where content is included inside. Different contents are included within other spatially separate sovereign forms. Although change happens between and within sovereign forms, the infinite form, as a boundary,

eternally remains. Form acts as the condition of possibility of content. In accordance with the spatial discourse, political theorists tend to understand the world as eternally produced within a series of sovereign separate forms (states) and within a geopolitical and chronopolitical teleological, infinite and eternal form of world-history (or space-time).

A set of paradoxes illustrate the limiting implications of the spatial discourse: how can individuals resist if the enabling conditions of resistance, liberty, freedom, politics etc. are also being resisted? More specifically, how can one think and act "outside or beyond" the state, if it is the state that enables one to think and act "outside or beyond"? Are *we* constructed as nothing outside the state; are *we* unable to act outside the state; and are *we* left without a future beyond the state? Furthermore, if one wants to think about something "other" than what is the "same" how does one go about doing so? Since Harvey continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics, he remains caught within this spatial discourse which denies that change is possible and eliminates the possibilities of thinking anew a politics of movement.

I argue that these paradoxes are made possible by the spatial discourse that riddles the collective works of Kant, Hegel, Marx. In order to identify this discourse, space must be left nowhere to hide. The spatial assumptions at work in this tradition must be singled out and tracked down so that it becomes possible to follow where they lead and the world which they map.

I will examine the spatial discourse at the heart of Harvey's intellectual tradition in three sections. First I focus on Kant. I argue that he provides the framework for the

spatial discourse by grounding his search for solid epistemological foundations in a metaphysical ontology of absolute space and time. Kant's spatial metaphysical ontology sets up the fundamental tension between content and form and this can be traced into Kant's political writings. Since form is ascribed *a priori* status, the content of Kant's political writings can be read as being sensitive to movement. Kant's meditations on the enlightenment process, the course of cosmopolitan history and perpetual peace establish many of the directions that Hegel later develops. Hegel makes Kant's spatial metaphysical ontology manifest. This is examined by bringing to the foreground three spatial limits or boundaries from Hegel's Philosophy of Right and his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. These limits, I argue, develop through four moments of Hegel's philosophy: the dialectic, the ethical state, world-history as geopolitics and the future as world-history. This dialectical development makes apparent a series of paradoxes or conditions of possibilities which act to maintain the status-quo. I argue that resistance and futures outside and beyond the state are deemed impossible by definition. In the final section, I argue that Marx attempts to challenge Hegel's political system by privileging content over form. Recognising this contribution, I also argue that, because Marx maintains the supremacy of the dialectic, in the last instance, he reproduces a politics which privileges form over content. The Kantian-Hegelian discourse of spatial separation and containment is imported unchallenged into Marx's politics (and his system of understanding). Therefore, I demonstrate how Marx's dialectical development leads into an accepted (Hegelian) view of both a geopolitical world of sovereign states and a politics contained within the state as form. Marx's appeal to a future beyond the state

replicates Hegel's illusory hopes built into the world historical movement. Since Harvey draws heavily from Marx, the Chapter ends wondering whether Harvey's sensitivity to space and time (and his relational metaphysics) allows him an escape from the spatial discourse that Marx assumes. This is examined in Chapter Three.

Kant: Spatial Groundings

Kant pays considerable attention to both space and time. Kant uses space and time to both stabilize and write a possible world and know this world. Since the fundamental aim of this Chapter is to establish a reading of a spatial discourse in the tradition which Harvey situates himself, Kant's meditations on space are fundamentally important. I want to pay particular attention to the spatial relationship between content and form in these meditations. This relationship, within Kant's metaphysics of space (and time), makes possible a certain version of politics. Therefore, after exploring Kant's meditations on space, I also explore two of his political directions. The first is concerned with the perpetual state of critique (content) that defines and drives enlightenment and human evolution. The second direction leads towards a cosmopolitan purpose (form). What is perhaps most interesting, is how Kant's political writings can be read so that they appear to be attentive to temporal flux, while at the same moment, they require a set of directions or forms on the horizon of world politics in order to provide navigational bearings of intelligibility.

Metaphysics, Content and Form

In order to understand or substantiate empirical sensuous intuition, Kant suggests that pure intuition must first be understood; hence the key distinction between *a posteriori/a priori*, phenomena/manifold and content/form divisions that inform the basic framework of his analysis. He states,

> In a phenomenon, I call that which corresponds to the sensation its matter but what causes the manifold matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I call its form. ... The matter only of all phenomenon is given us *a posteriori*; but their form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemüth) *a priori,* and must therefore be capable of being considered as separate from all sensations. ... The pure form therefore of all sensuous intuitions, that form in which the manifold elements of the phenomena are seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind *a priori* (Kant. I., 1966:21-22).

For Kant things or phenomena exist in space and space exists prior to the objects and events which occur within it. "It is within space that their form, size, and relative position are fixed or can be fixed" (Kant. I., 1966:21-22). In the Critique of Pure Reason[15] space is "not an empirical concept...(instead) external experience becomes possible only by means of the representation of space" (Kant. I., 1966:23-24). Kant suggests that, while it is possible to think of empty space, it is impossible to think of no space at all; "space is therefore regarded *as a condition of possibility* of phenomena, not as a determination produced by them; it is a representation *a priori* which necessarily

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[15]It should be noted that debates about whether space is subjective or intuitively known and debates about whether Kant's conception of space can accommodate relational concepts of space exist. The point of contention seems to revolve around the paradox that space is ontologically prior to time; yet, time is epistemologically prior to space. These disjunctures, Garnett (1965:chapter 9) suggests, can be found by contrasting Kant's earlier and later writings on space and time.

precedes all external phenomena" (Kant. I., 1966:24, underline added). Space, for Kant, is not a relation between things. Places and smaller spaces may exist within space, but they are always already space themselves. They are not parts which make up the whole, it is the whole which is given and place which is abstracted. Each place or smaller space, therefore, is always space and thus has the same characteristics of infinite and absolute space. As Kant states,

> we can imagine only one space and if we speak of many spaces, we mean parts only of one and the same one all-embracing space and, as it were, its component parts out of which an aggregate is formed, but they can be thought of as existing within it only. Space is essentially one; its multiplicity, and therefore, the general concept of spaces in general, arise entirely from limitations (Kant. I., 1966:24).

Space is not a relation between things therefore

> because space is nothing but the form of all phenomena of the external senses; it is the subjective condition of our sensibility without which no external intuition is possible...the form of all phenomena may be given before all real perceptions, may be, in fact, *a priori* in the soul, and may, as pure intuition, by which all objects must be determined, contain(ed), prior to all experience, principles relating to their relations (Kant. I., 1966:26).

Perhaps the most important detail for the argument which unfolds in this Chapter is Kant's suggestion that space as form is a constant and is a necessary condition of all relations in which external objects can be perceived. Kant states

> The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensitivity, is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects, as without us, can be perceived; and when abstraction is made of these objects, what remains is that pure intuition which we call space (Kant. I., 1966:26).

This is essentially Kant's transcendental conception of space.

To speak about *a priori* conceptions of space in the general works of great thinkers and in the general activity of everyday life is, to say the least, difficult.

Metaphors inform or reveal as much as they conceal. They can be used to map out the spatial assumptions of a thinker. Spatial and geometric metaphors (i.e., the form, the circle, the sphere, limits, boundaries, points and directions etc.) are littered through political texts. Yet they are more than simply convenient metaphors.

These metaphors are grounded, though not exclusively, in Kant's concept of space and geometry as a synthetic *a priori*. Geometric metaphors operate within a discourse in which these metaphors are ascribed authority by drawing from the immutable status of Kant's *a priori* space. It is generally accepted that Kant's conception of *a priori* space is Newtonian and Euclidian (see for example, Garnett. C., 1939; May. J., 1971; Earman. J., 1989; Unwin. T., 1992; Harvey. D., 1996). For Kant, Space is flat, absolute, homogeneous, absolute, infinite and three dimensional. The certainty of all geometrical (Euclidian) principles, Kant argues, follows from an *a priori* space (Kant. I.,1966: 24). Simple propositions like, two sides of every triangle will always be greater than its third, contain a mark of certainty. This conception of space lends to a easy acceptance of geometry as an *a priori* synthetic science. Geometry is *a priori* because "it is impossible from a mere concept to deduce propositions which go beyond that concept, as we do in geometry" (Kant. I., 1966:25). Geometric and spatial metaphors therefore ease speaking about *a priori* conceptions of space in the general works of great thinkers and in the general activity of everyday life.

As will be seen in the rest of this Chapter, these geometric metaphors continually reappear. They are littered throughout the works of Kant, Hegel and Marx and they provide cursory evidence that spatial assumptions may be operating in these projects.

More important, however, is the reoccurrence of the *a priori* spatial framework which distinguishes content/form, *a posteriori/a priori,* etc. This framework facilitates the logical flow of argument in all the texts that will be explored.

Critical Politics

This section strategically reads Kant's writings as being sensitive to temporality. It is important to remember, however, that the foundations for his political writings originate from his spatial assumptions. Namely, the spatial relation between content (enlightenment) and form (cosmopolitan purpose and the state) act as the condition of possibility for Kant's world. As such, there are two spatial tendencies in Kant's political writings. On the one hand, Kant is sensitive to movement. Kant's notion of enlightenment is built from the content of the public use of reason, open questioning and conflict. On the other hand, Kant argues that this driving force follows a hidden hand of nature and leads towards a specific teleological form. Kant argues that, through temporary stages of independent commonwealth states and international conflicts, the end of his political world is a state of perpetual peace. Therefore, while Kant can be read as valuing temporal flux, the latter is always already implicated within a larger direction or form.

"It is so convenient to be immature!" Kant exclaims; "[h]ave the courage to use your *own* understanding!" he pleads. He asserts that "[d]ogmas and formulas...are the ball and chain of...permanent immaturity. And if any one did throw them off...he would be unaccustomed to free movement..." (Kant. I., 1991b:54). These are strong words from

one of the most influential thinkers of the western intellectual tradition. But what can they mean?

Many have embraced a Foucauldian reading of these words. Such a reading suggests that life must be lived in a way that values constant flux, continuous debate and, more generally, temporality over spatiality. Kant suggests that enlightenment demands that freedom to be vigorously pursued - a "freedom to make *public* use of one's reason in all matters" (Kant. I., 1991b:55). Humans must be able to make judgement on those things which are important to their lives and humans must be able to make these judgements known in public. To restrict free debate and the use of one's understanding is a crime against humanity. He argues that

> [o]ne age cannot enter into an alliance on oath to put the next age in a position where it would be impossible for (the next age) to extend and correct its knowledge, particularly on such important matters (social contracts, imperial diets and peace treaties), or to make any progress whatsoever in enlightenment. This would be a crime against human nature, whose *original destiny lies precisely in such progress* (Kant. I., 1991b:57, emphasis added).

Because enlightenment is a slow process of constant debate and revision, and bound to occur over many generations, Kant suggests that it is impermissible to make *permanent decisions* which would restrict future generations from revisiting these decisions in the wake of new discoveries or knowledge. We do not live in an enlightened age, Kant argues, "we have a long way to go...before man as a whole can be *in* such a *position*" (Kant. I., 1991b:58). However "we do live in an age of enlightenment" (Kant. I., 1991b:58). The age of enlightenment - points to the enlightenment as movement from "here to there." The age of enlightenment denotes movement between consecutive points

on a path. Unfolding in (social) time, from one generation to the next (Kant. I., 1991a:43), the age of enlightenment is a process which is cumulative and not instantaneous. We have the enlightenment flu which spreads and increases in intensity with time: Kant states that

> this spirit of freedom is spreading abroad (and) ... once the germ on which nature has lavished most care - man's inclination and vocation to think freely - has developed within this hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually become increasingly able to act freely (Kant. I., 1991b:59).

Thus Kant argues that enlightenment is characterised as the ability to freely use one's reason and to make such judgements publicly known and reject permanences (i.e., dogma and formulas) in favour of a societal momentum or progress towards an age. In this age, one would be free to shed the convenience of immaturity and use one's own understanding.

In On First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space (interpreted through May. J., 1971) Kant argued that while we carry the heavens in our minds, if we do not know where north is on the map, the map itself is useless. Without a set direction or a scripting of a north "we cannot orient ourselves (meaning situate ourselves in relation to the known and the unknown) to this chart, or derive directions..." (May. J., 1971:70-71). So what is the direction or the *north* implicated in Kant's political writings and how is it that humanity is to arrive there?

For Kant conflict is the driving force of human evolution. Conflict can be read as a dialectical tension between ideas and the general "antagonism within society." Individuals go about their own business, in their own directions and go on to develop the

> unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas. He therefore expects resistance all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others (Kant. I., 1991a:44).

Kant argues that without this conflict and resistance, humanity would never overcome its tendency towards laziness and immaturity. Kant suggests that although society would likely be pastoral, harmonious, self-sufficient and brimming with mutual love, "all human talents would remain hidden...(and) [t]he end for which they were created, their rational nature, would be an unfulfilled void" (Kant. I., 1991a:45). This antagonism, then, must be encouraged; *we must have the courage to use our own understanding*. We must embrace the enlightenment as the engine of humanity's original destiny.

Humanity does not descend into chaos because "whatever the conception of freedom of the will ... the will's manifestations ... are determined in accordance with natural laws..." (Kant. I., 1991a:41). Like the chaotic, inconsistent weather which sustains the birth of organised life forms and systems "[i]ndividual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature" (Kant. I., 1991a:41). Out of humanity's own efforts, "the highest purpose of nature" is fulfilled "only in society." Kant suggests that this society must maintain a balance between particular and universal interests therefore maintaining the greatest amount of freedom. It must be a *commonwealth* society. Within this society humanity may grow tall, "*beautiful and straight*," as opposed to "stunted, bent and twisted," therefore "developing completely the germs which nature implanted" (Kant. I., 1991a:46). However, Kant warns that nothing straight can be made of the twisted wood

humanity is made from. If a society must also have a *master* to keep the universal flame alive, then the central question for Kant becomes whom is to be *master* (Kant. I., 1991a:46)?

Regardless of whom it is that is to be master, two elements must be kept in mind. First, the people, as a mass of subjects and as citizens belong to the sovereign. It is through this supreme ownership, as an idea, that civic union can proceed (Kant. I., 1991e:147). Second, "[s]ince the land is the ultimate condition under which it is alone possible to posses external objects as one's own...all such rights (individual rights) must be derived from the sovereign as *the lord of the land...*" (Kant. I. 1991e:147, original emphasis). The sovereign, as *lord of the land* and subject to immanent direction (nature) leads directly to the problem of external relations with other states.

As the driving force of human destiny, conflict is also evident at the level of international relations. Kant states,

> the same unsociability which forced men to do so (form a commonwealth) gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e., states in relations with other states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced them into a law-governed civil state. Nature has thus again employed the unsociableness of men...as a means of arriving at a condition of calm and security through their inevitable *antagonism* (Kant. I., 1991a:47, underline added).

Therefore the same conflict which led to the development of the commonwealth state, is also present at the level of independent commonwealth states. Humanity is again in a state of antagonism, resistance and conflict. Thus, humanity is again forced, by nature's

hidden hand, to face the question whom is to be *master of the masters*?

Similar to the way in which conflict and antagonism lead to calm, security and harmony within the state, Kant suggests that calm, security and peace will prevail at the international/global level as well. Kant argues that "all the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end...(this is the) teleological theory of nature" (Kant. I., 1991a:42). Kant suggests that these ends and nature's original intentions are not realised in the individual but in the species and therefore the process is slow and takes many generations to be realised or actualised (Kant. I., 1991a:42-43). Kant states that the

> history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely (Kant. I., 1991a:50).

For Kant this is the "great world-drama" (Kant. I., 1991a:42). Upon its stage, the world will be forced by *necessity* into perpetual peace and, therefore, into "a great political body of the future" (Kant. I., 1991a:51). In the way that "a germ of enlightenment (has) always survived, developing further with each revolution, and preparing the way for a subsequent higher level of improvement" (Kant. I., 1991a:52), a global alliance or commonwealth of states will also unite in the interest of peace.

All this sounds well and good, however, the similarities between this reconstruction of Kant and Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History is striking. As will be examined in the next section, both theorists maintain that there is a

natural driving force of their systems (antagonism and rational dialectic) and both maintain that their systems are teleological (perpetual peace as great drama and world-history as great drama). But how are Kant and Hegel different? An important difference is that in contrast to Kant, Hegel suggests that the end is inter-state conflict - there is no beyond the state and there can be no perpetual peace. Hegel takes up Kant's spatial metaphysics and the relationship between content and form and carries it to a more logical conclusion. In other words, Hegel makes apparent Kant's spatial framework and acknowledges its spatial limits. Since the state as a form is sovereign, what can be more sovereign than sovereign? Hegel forces his audience to come to terms with these assumptions and recognize them as limits which *cannot* be transgressed. Perpetual peace will always be a hope that remains in the impossible future.

Hegel: The Spatial Discourse

I argue in this section that Hegel's position makes apparent a certain set of Kantian spatial limits which act to construct the guiding paradox of this Chapter. Since Hegel does not stray from a dialectical path and if it can be shown that Hegel's dialectic is dependent on spatial moves and limits, then it logically follows that Hegel's state and world-history contain the same spatial moves and limits. Yet the stakes in reading Hegel is such a way are quite high. The trick of the colourful weed is to make the gardener forget that the weed is rooted in the ground. If we are dazzled by the colours of the state and world-history, we forget that Hegel's philosophical project is rooted to a particular conception of space. Failing to see this, attempts to think outside or beyond the state

either fail to evade the state's spatial limits or become further tangled in world-history's spatial moves (time). Hegel and the weed survive, vibrant as ever.

As such, I use a non-traditional textual strategy to map out Hegel's project. I trace and map the text's residues and shadows. In contrast to looking at the landmarks in Hegel's text and drawing lines between them as a geographer might, I attempt to rummage at the foundations and in the shadows of these landmarks to trace where they lead. Instead of the geographer's tools of pencil, light and paper, the tools used here are more akin to a spy's radio transmitter and listening device. I map the dialectic, the ethical state and world-history by recording how the traces inscribe their own limits.

In the first part, I will focus on the two spatial moves involved in the Hegelian dialectic. The first move is based "on" an ontology of spatial separation and the second move is based "in" a moment of inclusion. In order to show this, I will treat the development of the subjective will in Philosophy of Right as a site. The rest of the section on Hegel is dedicated to the implications of the dialectic's spatiality. In the second part, I begin to identify the guiding paradox in Hegel's text. By continuing to examine Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I argue that the state acts as the enabling condition of the modern individual. I maintain that this enabling condition stems from Hegel's spatial dialectic. In the third part, I focus on the disabling limits of the state. Again using the Philosophy of Right, I pose the question - "what can outside the state mean?" To answer this question, I first set out the development of the ethical state and map its geopolitical boundaries; secondly, I argue that world-history is an account of the development of state boundaries through time. For Hegel, there is nothing outside the

state except other states. In the fourth part, I pose the question - "what is *beyond* the state?" By examining Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, I argue that world-history is beyond the state. However, because Hegel's history (time) is built from the spatial dialectic, I argue that any move beyond the state is always simultaneously situated within the state. The logic of world-history is designed to contain and exclude. World-history is geopolitics. As such, given a certain set of unchallenged Kantian metaphysical assumptions, I argue that there is no escape from the paradox exemplified by Hegel's state. Moreover, I push the paradox further. I argue that world-history denies the modern individual a future.

The Spatial Dialectic

In his introduction to Philosophy of Right,[16] Hegel states that there are two "essential moments" in the development of the subjective will. The first moment is the

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[16]Hegel. G. (Trans. Knox. T.), Philosophy of Right, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). References to this text will appear in the following style. Reference to the paragraph number will appear as (§x). References to Hegel's additions will appear as (Add. §x). A quick note to the reader about the style of textual analysis being used in this paper is necessary. I will attempt to use Hegel's words where possible. I have two reasons for this, first I fear that converting Hegel's words into approximations can end in unintentional misunderstandings. Secondly, words like sphere, circle, separation, distinct, unit, unity, whole etc. are treated as important spatial metaphors. In my analysis, I paraphrase Hegel while, at the same time, attempting to stick as closely as possible to his choice of language. As such, I will only use quotation marks to indicate that a certain string of words is taken directly from Hegel's text, all other "key words" are used as permitted by the paragraph cited. However, I do plead for leeway in order to develop a flow of argument in the thesis. In essence, I do not invent terms like "sphere of morality" or "circle of ethical life." They are to be found in the text; however, I ask that I be allowed to move these terms around when needed.

concept. The concept is that which gives actuality to itself (§1). I will show that this same concept assumes an ontological foundation of spatial separations. Hegel's second essential moment is also spatial. He argues, this moment occurs through "[t]he shapes which the concept assumes in the course of its actualization (and these shapes) are indispensable for the knowledge of the concept itself" (§1). I will show that this second moment is characteristic of spatial inclusion. Both of these moments make up the dialectic. In keeping with Hegel, I will maintain his dialectical development, while at the same time attempting to trace its two spatial moments.

Separation is the driving force in the sphere of abstract right. As moments, the abstract will (itself to itself), the immediate individual (mind to body) and the person (itself to its will in property and things) reveal an ontology of spatial separation. However, these moments also mark stages of inclusion. At each new stage the will produces a more inclusive sphere of existence.

Hegel starts the section of abstract right with the abstract will in its immediate form. This form automatically reveals a prior separation. At this stage, the abstract will is universal, but, only in so far as it contains a simple relation of itself to itself. The abstract will is in a stage of negative actuality. It has knowledge of itself as pure, infinite and free thought; yet, it is contentless (§34-35). In order to realize its inherent universality, the abstract will must have *content.* The will must have an external existence.

Hegel argues that an individual is alive in a body, and therefore, at the most basic level, has an external existence. The individual is an immediate inclusive entity (or form)

(§47). However, through reason, the inclusive will can disengage its mind from its body. It can invest itself into other things (§48). The will must further realize the separation between itself and itself, by investing itself in an external world beyond its body. Personality is that which struggles to rise above the separation between itself and itself and give itself reality by claiming the external world as its own (§39). This is the birth of the sphere of the person (§41).

A person must translate its freedom into an external sphere for the person to exist in accordance with the Idea (§41). The person must enter into relations with other things. A thing, for Hegel, is that which is not capable of "becoming" through the mediation of the will (i.e., anything which is not human[17]) (§43). The abstract will invests itself into things by (a) grasping it, (b) giving it *form* and (c) marking it as "owned" (§54). Property is what has one's will invested into it. In essence, as the sphere of the abstract will moves through space and time (Add. §42) it invests itself into everything it touches. As things are possessed and used, they are brought and included into the sphere of the abstract will.

Alienation is a cathartic moment in the development of the subjective will. In alienation both separation and inclusion are again present, yet, it also signals a move which absolves earlier spheres. Since taking possession is positive and the use of the thing is negative, both moments must be mediated through the alienation of property (§59). Hegel states that "the reason why I can alienate my property is that it is mine only in so far as I put my will into it" (§65). Hence, I can abandon it or yield it to the will of

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[17]This is a moment of exclusion which I will return to later.

another (§65). Yet, at the same time alienation is also the realization of my will in property (Add. §65). It proves that I can separate things from myself; and through this separation, I become whole.

On the one hand, alienation only applies to things which are external. The constitutive qualities of the individual's universal essence are inalienable. The conditions which make alienation possible cannot be alienated.[18] On the other hand, the individual has the power to alienate its property (things and products of parcels of their time) and is required to do so by the concept. The concept compels the individual to alienate their property in order for the will to take on an objective quality to itself (§73).

The separation of the self from the self in property, is required for the development of the concept to continue (§71). This is achieved through contract. Contract is the process in which the separation of the "I" and the "my" is revealed and mediated. First, the contract requires that I separate myself from my property. The contract brings into being the external side of property - the individual's will (§72). Because I separate my property from myself, through alienation, I am made "partially" whole. The first separation is mediated by a second separation. The particularity of one will is, therefore, held separate from the particularity of another. The contract enables my(self) to become whole, by making an(other) visible.

Who is this "other?" In the state of nature humans are separate and different whereas in contract humans are separate and equal. Humans become equal through

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[18]There are some exceptions to this which I will return to later.

property (§49). Contract presupposes that each property holder recognises the other as an equal (§71). Hence, this "other" is a separate will who will also mediate the separation between itself and itself. In the end, the contract leaves two particular wills separate and yet whole. Furthermore, the contract prepares them for the eventual mediation and movement into the universal. This mediation develops through the punishment of wrong (§73).

A separation between right and wrong begins the next stage. The mediation of different wills, through the contract, poses the possibility that two wills could look on the same property as their own. Hence, there is the potential for a clash between two parties which could view the same thing as "mine." Rightness is bound up in one's particular view, and hence, the other's view is understood to be wrong (§84-85). This clash between two particular wills needs to be mediated by a universal. When the principle of the particular will is at odds with the universal, it comes against the principle of "rightness" - it can be seen to be wrong (§81). The negative, which is present in the principle of the will, becomes visible. The negative exists in the principle of the will because negation, force and coercion are rights of the will (§94). As such, the wrong must be made right (Add. §81). In other words, the separation between right and wrong, between universal and particular is mediated through punishment. The separations are brought under and included in the (partial) unity of the subjective will. Because of its importance, the role of punishment needs to be explained further.

Hegel argues that we must not get caught up in a superficial view of punishment. The point is not whether something is good or evil, the issue is the wrong and the process

of righting of it (§99). Crime is to be annulled, not because it is evil, but because it is an infringement of right (§95 and 99). Through punishment, right is actualised and made positive because both the infringement of right and the annulment of wrong are external (§97). Punishment is the negation of a negation, and therefore, it makes right positive (Add. §97). Right is shown to be necessary. The punishment which falls on the will is the recognition of the individual's right. It is a recognition of the freedom and the universal right of the individual. A punishment is, therefore, made possible by the criminal and for itself. The act of crime is an act of creating a law against which the criminal's actions should be judged (§100). Punishment is the recognition of the will's right to freedom. Therefore, through punishment the will takes freedom as its object. Once the subjective will has taken itself (freedom) as its object and made the universal will explicit (§104), the subjective is infinite in itself and for itself (§105). The subjective will, therefore, emerges as a whole. It has taken the universal back into itself. As such, we arrive at the threshold of a moral standpoint (§104).

In review, two spatial moments of the dialectic can clearly be seen at each stage in the development of the subjective will. The dialectic requires an initial separation for the concept to be mediated. At an ontological level, the dialectic works from a separation between the will and itself. This is indicative of the first spatial move. Further into the development, the spatial separation of the will is made real by investing itself in other things and by recognising others. Both are assumed to be separate from the individual. However, these separations need not be read as empirical facts; instead, they can be read as *a priori* assumptions about the way the world "is." For Hegel, the world first consists

of series of spatial divisions (i.e., itself from itself, human from things, self and other etc.). These lines indicate a thing's separateness and it could be argued that they are simply assumed to be unproblematic and apolitical.

The second spatial moment of inclusion mediates Hegel's prior ontological separations. In the context of what has been outlined above, Hegel's world of separations are mediated, or included into the human world, through the dialectical development of the Idea. While the second moment requires the first, it also creates the conditions for possibility for further separations. It provides separate wholes to continue the next moment in the dialectical development. The Idea enables all further spheres to emerge. Each new sphere (i.e., the abstract will, the individual, the person and the subjective will) is assumed to be both a whole and the next pole of differentiation and separation. This reproduces the Kantian relationship between content and form that is made possible by a specific metaphysics of space. In the sections which follow, I trace the limits of this spatial relationship. As such, we can begin to understand the implications of Harvey's continued privileging of the eternal form when theorizing politics.

The Spatial Limits of the State

The individual, the family, civil society and the state are all exemplary of the temporary stages of glory in Hegel's dialectical process. I will therefore return to Philosophy of Right and the tracing of the spatial logic of the dialectic. This will allow the spatial boundaries of the state to emerge. These boundaries construct the first moments of Hegel's (geo)political map. I will begin this section by outlining the

transition between the sphere of the subjective will and the circle of the state. I will sketch out the sphere of morality. Next, the map of Hegel's state will be navigated. I will trace the development of the state through the family and through civil society until I reach the first cartographic boundary of the state. I will then retrace the individual's development in order to reveal its enabling conditions. I argue that freedom, epistemology and ontology are all enabled by the project of the state. It is here that the guiding paradox identified in the introduction begins to take shape. This section ends with the assertion that the modern individual is enabled by the spatial limits of the state.

The transition between the subjective will and ethical life is made through the realm of morality. The sphere of morality contains the same spatial moves identified in the sphere of the subjective will. For Hegel, the development up to this point is characterised as the "cultivation of the ground in which freedom is now set..." and it is in the second sphere (morality) where "...the Idea acquires its genuine realization" (§106). In the sphere of morality, the task for the subjective will is to develop an objective self by investing the universal into the external world. The development again has two repetitive moments (a) the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity (separation) and (b) the action of making them identical (inclusion) (§109). These two moments are worked through at three successive stages: (1) purpose and responsibility, (2) intention and welfare and (3) good and conscience. The driving force compelling movement from one stage to the next is the void between separate units and the complementary desire to collapse this void (§130). The good is the universal substance of all freedom, yet, it is still abstract. It must become concrete in the "circle" of ethical life (§141). As Hegel summarises,

> [s]ubjectivity is the ground wherein the concept of freedom is realised. At the level of morality, subjectivity is still distinct from freedom, the concept of subjectivity; but at the level of ethical life it is the realization of the concept in a way adequate to the concept itself (§152).

The concept of the will in the sphere of morality is separated into the subjective and the objective. It is through the ethical life of the state that this separation is made whole.

Ethical life is the concept of freedom developed into the existing world (§142). Its objective order is a system of distinctions which constitute its rationality (§145). These distinction are laws and institutions which take the place of morality's abstract good (§144). When the will takes universal laws and institutions as its object of knowledge, the subjective order can be seen (§146). Both laws and institutions are made possible within the circle of ethical life (§141).

There are three *stages* of the ethical order: the family is the immediate phase; civil society is the external stage; and finally, the state is the mediation of the first two (§157). I will briefly trace the development of the ethical state below.

The family brings together two parties who have "different" physical (§165), behaviourial (§166) and social (§168) qualities. These differences find inclusion and unity in love and marriage (§158). The subjective personality of the family, as a single person, invests and finds its real external existence in family capital (§169). The family unit, represented by the husband, is distinct and separate from its clan and from other families (§171-172). In children the objective existence of the family manifests itself. The family's unity and its dissolution comes once the children have been educated in freedom and can be recognised as persons in society (i.e. they can be property holders or

wives) (§177). The dissolution of the family shows that there is a necessity for an external world of ethical appearances (§181), namely, civil society.

The family's subjective persons (i.e., sons) enter the sphere of civil society with the dissolution of the family. However, from a slightly different angle, it is civil society which tears an individual away from its family ties. Civil society makes all individuals, as members, separate from each other (§238). Each member has particular wants and needs, and therefore, must come into relations with other members (§182). Civil society is the stage of difference in the development of the state (Add. §182). In civil society, the individual finds itself in an external world of others. Particularity is the "whole sphere of civil society," yet, it is also "the territory of mediation" (Add. 182). Therefore, civil society contains two different tendencies (separation and inclusion) which are developed within an infinitely complex system of systems (§201). Within each moment of the dialectical development of civil society [system of needs, administration of justice and the police and the corporation (§188)] there is a dialectical development. For example, within the administration of justice there is the development from right as law (immediate), law determinately existent (external) and finally, the court of justice (mediate) (§209-229). The same is true for the other two moments in civil society's development. Each moment is a dialectic of its own and logically acts as a stage within a larger dialectic. This larger dialectic is working itself out at another level.[19] Generally,

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[19]I will not trace out each of their developments here. There are three items of interest: (1) each development is governed by the spatial logic of separation and inclusion; (2) a (a) relative and (b) limited (because it is within civil society (§256)) meditation of the universal and particular is arrived at in the moment of the (i) police and

civil society is a world of separate particularities while, at the same time, its end always must be the state (universal) (Add. §183).

This is the last state of the development of the individual. I say "individual" because a crucial disjuncture emerges in this final section. The individual drops out of sight and Hegel begins to speak specifically about the state as the *state*. The *first key boundary* makes itself evident. A new life has emerged from the shadow(s) of the development of the individual in ethical life (see above, footnote 19). This new life is the state as the actuality of the ethical Idea (§257). The state, as the ethical Idea, emerges as a spatial organism of its own; it emerges in its own right. Before reflecting on the emergence and implications of this boundary, I will trace the final stage of the individual's development.

The final stage of the individual's development is marked by the individual passing through the state's constitution and into patriotism. While the constitution and patriotism can be read as the immediate moment in the development of the ethical Idea of the state, it is also the mediate moment in the development of the ethical individual. Hegel argues that the individual gains explicit recognition in the state, not because it is the individual's right (as in family and civil society), but, because the individual passes into the universal and takes the state as its own (§260). Through the constitution, the unity of right and duty is actualised (§261). The institutions (in civil society and the

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(ii) corporation; and (3) a higher unification develops at the level of the state. There are three key levels of dialectical development at work in this section. I will return to what this differentiation might mean when I begin the process of mapping and it will make itself clear in the subsequent sections.

family) are the components of the constitution. Institutions are both the foundations of the state and also of the citizen's trust in the state (§265). It is in the constitution that the individual takes the universal, embodied in institutions, as its own (§260). It is here that the individual can truly be said to be free.

This unity is expressed through patriotism. Hegel is clear that patriotism and the state, as an organism, are distinct phenomena (§267). Patriotism, as a political sentiment, is an expression of "assured conviction with truth as its basis" and "volition which has become *habitual*" (§268, emphasis added). Furthermore, "it is simply a product of the institutions subsiding within the state" (§268). In contrast, the state, as an organism, is the mind on earth. With the actualization of the individual will, the mind on earth is born from the mass of human minds (§264). This disjuncture marks the end and actualization of the individual and it is also the birth of something new.

This disjuncture enables two analytic directions. On the one hand, it is possible to return to the textual trace and re-read how the state as form is always already present. The state is implicated before Hegel's patriotism. Patriotism may express an individual's "assured conviction with truth as its basis" and may be a process through which "volition...has become habitual;" however, this is just the tip of the iceberg. The state, as an expression of the actualization of the ethical individual, is also the very enabling condition required for the ethical individual to develop. The state as form is present at the beginning of Hegel's philosophical project. The second direction, on the other hand, maps the boundaries of this new spatial entity in its imminent and present forms. I will leave the second direction until part three (geopolitics as world history) and will take up

the first direction below.

Hegel makes some important revelations at the end of civil society's development. Hegel argues that "the philosophic proof of the concept of the state is (the) development of the ethical life from its immediate stage (as the family) through civil society (as) the stage of division (and ending with) the state" (§256). The state "reveals itself as the true ground of these phases" (§256). It is both the result of Hegel's philosophical concept and the beginning. He states, "the state is not so much the result as the beginning" (§256). The concept of the state, therefore, lies imminent and immanent in the development of Hegel's philosophical project. The concept of the state is both the limit and the enabling condition of societal institutions and the individual.

In order that the individual's enabling conditions can be traced, a return to ethical life is required. In it, the role of education is crucial. Hegel argues that in order for individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom they must belong to an ethical order, since it is here that the individual possess its own essence and its own inner universality (§153). Hegel quotes a pythagorean (a symbolic gesture if one is attempting to think about the limits of Euclidean space) response to a query about the best method of educating a son in ethical conduct. The pythagorean response to the query reads, "[m]ake him a citizen of a state with good laws" (§153). There is a grave paradox at work in the pythagorean response. The term citizen denotes a prior requirement. There is a distinction between the process of making an individual a citizen and simply placing an individual within the territory of a state which has good laws. The difference is a process of socialisation or education. Therefore, while it is revealing that Hegel admits that an

individual can only be ethical and realize its destined freedom within the boundaries of the state, further investigation about what Hegel means by education is required.

Education for Hegel comes at different stages of the development. At one stage, the family has responsibility to provide education for its children. It is only when the child has been "educated in freedom" (meaning knowing its duties within society) can he (women become wives) enter into civil society as property owners (§177). At a second stage, civil society has a responsibility to educate. Civil society acts as a universal family (§239) and it substitutes its soil for the family's soil of paternal authority (§238). Therefore, in addition to further educating the individual in freedom, as the family has done, civil society also provides theoretical and practical education. Theoretical education requires a quick and flexible mind and practical education develops the *habit* of needing something to do and the desire to always be busy (§197). We can see here that Hegel is not unfamiliar with the role education plays in habituation. Habituation, as such, is not solely a function of patriotism (see above, p.74). Civil society and the family have important roles to play in the actualization of the individual and these institutions exist on the true ground of the state (§256).

The implication of this is that the state, by working through the educative functions of its institutions, also constructs the ontological and epistemological foundations of the modern individual. A return to the educative function of the ethical order is required to substantiate this claim. In the first instance, the ethical order must be understood as a system of institutions and laws which constitute the objective order (§144-145). These institutions and laws act to regulate individuals' lives (§145). The

extent to which institutions and laws regulate individuals' lives is revealed in the subjective order. Laws and institutions are not only regulative, they also work to construct the ontological and epistemological foundations of the human consciousness. I will examine the ontological and epistemological foundations in turn.

Hegel argues that these laws and institutions "just are" to the individual. They appear to be real in that they exist in the individual's mind. They constitute the way the individual views the world (§146). For Hegel, a parallel can be drawn between the way a human views the moon, the sun, the mountains etc. and the way a human views the ethical order. Both just are. However, Hegel argues that the authority of laws and institutions is infinitely higher than that of nature (§146). Life within these institutions and laws does not solely become "their general mode of conduct" (§151). There are additional implications to this way of life. Individuals in the ethical order treat the world of the ethical life as their second nature (§151). Therefore, the individual experiences a type of pedagogical habituation at the ontological level. Individuals are taught to assume the way the world "is." Individuals are unquestionably surrounded by mountains, planets and even more so by the laws and institutions of the state. The ethical order is similar to the Aristotelian way of the heavens. Behind each lies the unmoved mover. In the case of the ethical order, it is the state which is the universal end. It is the state which moves, yet, remains itself unmoved (§152 and §258). Furthermore, the parallel between an individual viewing an external and separate nature reveals the spatial qualities of these ontological foundations. By consciously and rationally accepting that the world is an external reality, the individual (demonstrated here by Hegel himself) adopts the ontology

of spatial separation required for its development.

What about epistemology? Just as patriotism provides an "assured conviction with truth as its basis (§256)" so the state provides the foundations for what is knowable and how the individual knows what it knows. Throughout the development, the state provides the objects for the individual will to take in to itself and know as itself. Through the state the individual can know the universal, the state's laws and institutions, the duties and rights of society, the potential items of property and the objects of nature, as it knows itself. The working out of the concept demands that these things be brought into the self. This is indicative of an epistemology of spatial inclusion. It is through the process of knowing that things are included into the world of the individual, and hence, in the sphere (form) of the state. However the role of the state can also be seen at a more insidious level. By approaching epistemology as a topic of philosophical inquiry, Hegel's assumptions about the connection between reason and human essence can be explored. Through this exploration, the state's role in drawing the lines between human/animal and reason/unreason can be traced.

In order to understand how reason and human essence are synonymous for Hegel, I will return to his section on abstract right. Within this section, Hegel makes an initial line of exclusion. This line of exclusion demarcates the birth of the form or sphere of inclusion and separation. It is in this sphere that Hegel's subjective will etc. is destined to develop. This initial exclusion is based on the separation between humans and animals. Humans have a natural existence partly in themselves and partly because they relate to an "external world" (§43). However, what distinguishes humans from animals is their

ability to will (Add. §47). Humans, therefore, have the innate capacity to reason and the ability to be free. Other examples to support this can be found scattered through Hegel's text. In his "Introduction," Hegel argues that the slave, for instance, does not "know his essence, his infinity and his freedom; he does not know his human essence...he does not think himself" (§21). And elsewhere, Hegel argues that animals are restricted to the "realm" of particularity. They exists, as humans do, on instincts, but, animals cannot "overstep" these natural limits (Add. §190). Because humans have the ability to rationally think the world around them, they create their world, a world of spirit, which is distinct from the natural world. Humans can overstep these natural limits. The way that humans know enables the creation of a world which they accepted as their true second nature. I have already shown that this ontological second nature is enabled by the state (see above, p.74), and that it is only within the state that humans are in essence free (see above, p.76).[20] However, how is an individual known to be human? Who or what draws that deciding line?

An individual cannot draw that line itself. Hegel flatly rejects the view that an individual might have the ability to decide whether s/he is human or not. For Hegel, human essence is imprescriptible (§66). An individual can decide to become a slave and can retreat to a "pre-Human" category; but, as humans, they will always have the potential to be free and rational (§21). If human essence cannot be taken away by an

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[20] As I have argued in section one (the spatial dialectic), the individual takes freedom as its object at the moment of punishment. The question that must be answered is who administers the punishment if it is not the state? Especially, if Hegel's warning about revenge through the generations is to respected.

external authority, if it is imprescriptible, then who or what draws this deciding line? The simple answer is the original author - in this case Hegel's state.[21] The abstract will may have the potential to be free, but this freedom can also only be realised within the ethical sphere of the state and through relations with other free beings. This sphere is built upon the precarious line of exclusion (between humans, animals and things). The ethical form or sphere of the state is, therefore, already present when the abstract will creates its first sphere of inclusion. All other spheres or forms of existence develop on the premiss that Hegel's state alone can draw and has drawn the line between what is included and excluded in/from the state.

By recognising the constitution as the end of the development of the individual and by retracing how the state is always already present in the individual's development, the state can be seen as the enabling condition for human freedom, human thought and human beliefs about the nature of the world. In language closer to Hegel's, the argument reads, the modern state's strength lies in its allowance of the principle of subjectivity to go to the extreme and while at the same time maintaining the principle of subjectivity's

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[21]My logic for this answer unfolds as follows. First, one could have answered that Hegel (or Socrates [see footnote 25]), as the author, makes human essence imprescriptible. It is therefore, only Hegel (or Socrates) who can erase the line which he has drawn. Second, one could also have answered "Geist" - as the ultimate author. If one is to take Hegel's conception of Geist seriously then one would have to argue that, because Geist on earth is the state, a preference for Geist over the state is tautological. However, what needs to be stressed is that it is the state as Geist which draws this line. Therefore, it is actually world history which makes the exclusion. I will call this Hegel's state and return to this in greater detail in the third section (geopolitics and world history). (I would have little disagreement with the first argument, since, I am attempting to untangle Hegel's *a priori* assumptions. For now, however, I will stay with option two.)

substantive unity (§260). Hegel states that the individual's "supreme duty is to be a member of the state...(since) it is only as one of its (the state's) members that the individual has objectivity, genuine objectivity and an ethical life" (§258). Freedom, epistemology and ontology are all tied up in the project of the state. The modern individual firmly exists within the limits of the state. The state is the individual's *enabling* condition. Now it is possible to map the limits that the state imposes. Only then is it possible to contemplate the full severity of the guiding paradox, which poses questions like, "how can the individual be free to act outside the state if the state creates the conditions for freedom?", or "how can the individual think outside the state if the state creates the conditions for thinking?", or "how can an individual imagine anything outside the state if the state creates the conditions for the imagination?" The question I take up in the next section is, "what can outside the state mean?" when a politics of eternal forms, like Harvey's, is privileged.

Geopolitics and World-history:

In order to pursue the meaning of "outside" and map the limits the state imposes, I must return and take up the second analytic direction that the *first key boundary* makes possible (see above p.74). This direction involves mapping the spatial limits of the organic entity of the ethical Idea. This involves examining the emergence of a parallel spatial dialectic which reaches beyond the individual, yet, is integral to the individual's actualization (as seen in the last section). I therefore take up the same textual strategy used in the previous section; I will trace the development of the ethical state until I reach

the *second key boundary*. This boundary is the geopolitical limits of Hegel's ethical state. From here I begin retracing how world-history is always already present in development of the ethical state. I argue that world-history is the account of the development of state boundaries through time. Put slightly differently, I argue Hegel's history can be read as the account of states changing spatial scales. This Chapter ends with the modern individual trapped within the geopolitical limits of the ethical state. It is here that it is possible to fully view the guiding paradox.

The end of the individual's development marks the birth of a new entity. This new entity is the ethical mind revealed to itself. It is as the state that the mind knows itself, and therefore, "the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea" (§257). The state is mind or spirit on earth (§270). The state is absolutely rational because it is the actuality of the subjective will (§258); it is the building of reason into the real world (§270). The development of the state proceeds in three stages and unfolds according to the two spatial moments (separation and inclusion) of the dialectic. The ethical state knows itself immediately through the customs, institutions and laws represented in the constitution. The state passes into a realm of relations between separate states and is actualised in the inclusive moment of world-history (§259).

Within the constitution (at the *first key boundary*) the state emerges in its abstract form and begins the development towards self-consciousness. At the level of the constitution two moments are present. The constitution is the internal organization of the organic state. And it is the stage where one state differentiates itself from other states (§271). Hegel labels these two moments internal and external sovereignty. Sovereignty

in its internal form is the development of the actuality of the organization of the state. It is here that the state becomes a subjective entity that is capable of expressing itself in its external form to the world around it. I will deal with the internal first.

The state, as a political entity, contains three divisions. They are the crown, the executive and the legislature (§273). These three divisions are again governed by the (subjective to universal) development. Yet, because the constitution acts as the connecting stage between the end of the dialectical development of the individual and the beginning of the dialectical development of the ethical state, Hegel is compelled to write forwards and backwards at the same time. For instance, he both ends and begins the development with the subjective sovereign. As such, it is useful to read the role of the executive and the legislature as intermediary spheres of translation. I will outline the moments of the crown and then move to the executive and the legislature as spheres of translation.

The development of the subjective, self-determining, individual crown passes through three stages. The state at this level is abstractly unified (§278). Particular interests within the state are dissolved into components of the whole (§276). As such, the universality of laws and institutions are brought into the whole (§275). In peace, these institutions pursue their own directions (remain particular); however, in times of crisis these institutions unite under the sovereign form (§278). The crown is rooted in the universality of its citizens and it is through the councils of the executive that the interests of the citizenry are related (translated) to the crown (§275 and 279). In the last instance, the ultimate single self is contained in the immediate individuality of the crown (§280).

The sphere of the executive is commissioned to execute and apply the will of the crown (§287). It translates the particular (crown) into the universal (masses). Citizens' interests must be subordinate to the interests of the state (§288). The executive, therefore, has control over the police and the judiciary (§287). The reverse is also true. Within the executive, the heads of the higher advisory councils and the heads of the civil servants advise the crown of the interest of the masses (§289 and 275). Therefore, the executive also translates the particular (citizenry) into the universal (crown).

The same translative role can be outlined for the legislature. The legislature has three moments of power. Its power comes through the crown, the executive and the estates (§301). In general, the legislature passes the particular wishes of the populace to the crown, as the universal. The legislature also passes the subjective interests of the crown to the universal estates. Estates (classes or corporations of civil society) stand in between the government and the particular interests of the nation. The legislature must be aware of the particular interests of the estates, yet, maintain the universal direction of the ethical state (§302). The legislature, therefore, also has the dual translative function.

Within the constitution, and through the immediate individuality of the crown, the ethical state begins Hegel's second moment of state sovereignty - its external moment (see above, p.84). Internal sovereignty is the mind knowing itself, however, this is a negative actuality (§321). It is a relation to itself; it is a single and immediate individual (§321). The concept requires that this whole manifest itself as separate from others since individuality is the awareness of oneself as a unit which is separate and unique (§322). The negative moment of state sovereignty enables the state's external relations with

others (§323). However, this destiny is also the state's positive moment (§324). It is in external relations that the state takes itself back into itself, and so realizes its distinctiveness and its uniqueness. The spatial separation between itself and other states is, through a moment of spatial inclusion, an affirmation of the state as a unit.

Therefore, war can be seen to be an ethical moment (§324). War, as an external relation, has the highest significance because it maintains the health of the state (§324). It acts as a disincentive to corruption and stagnation. Instead, war creates an identity for the nation, which in turn becomes the identity of its citizens at home (patriotism) (§324). War is the health of the state. Due to the hidden ethical significance in external relations, like war, there is a tendency to revert to peace (§326 and 338). Citizens who take up the courageous role within a standing army are nothing but pure movement of mind in action (§328). These actions belong, not to the courageous citizens, but to the full subjective power of the Crown (§329).

The full subjective power of the Crown represents the state as the actuality of the ethical Idea. In the realm of international relations all actions are related back to the unified (external and internal) sovereign state (§333). All states are unqualifiedly sovereign (§331): they reside in a state of nature with each other (§333). International relations exist without foundations; it will always be infected by contingency (§333). Disagreements between states can, therefore, only be settled through war (§334). The state exists as a separate entity and lives in a condition of fear and violence (§335). Its infinity and honour are at stake in every relation (§334). If war is to be avoided, the line between states must be held as non-traversable. The domestic affairs of one state are "off

limits" to all other states (§331). International relations then is a theatre in which agreements between states, like international laws, remain as "oughts" (§330 and 333). Therefore, proposals like Kant's "perpetual peace" (see Kant. I., 1991c) are impossible because the state (as a nation in world-history) is always the final arbitrator. What can be more sovereign than sovereign? What can outside the state mean?

It is here that we arrive at the *second key boundary*. What is outside the state is other states. For Hegel, the world consists of separate units interacting in a geopolitical "anarchy." State sovereignty is the geopolitical limit between other states; it is that which distinguishes us from them and one state from another. The ontology of spatial separation is obvious. The world is comprised of independent, separate and sovereign forms. The second moment of the dialectic, that of spatial inclusion, needs some historical context in order that it become more obvious. I will therefore trace how the world historical development has always already been present and how its presence is an inscribed geopolitical map of inclusion.

Earlier in a Hegelian (Kantian) conception of time, immature states and state forms had the Idea veiled within them (Add. §260). World-history is the necessary development of the Idea as the actualised world mind (§342). At each progressive stage in the development a boundary of inclusion is inscribed. The development starts in the realm of the Orient and the boundary of its form was the family limits. In this realm the state was not a fixed entity (§355). Instead it existed as an outward movement (§355). An inside and an outside existed; however, it was not static. In the Greek realm there was the creation of a solid sphere or form of freedom. This sphere was restricted to a select

few (§356). In the Roman realm, the sphere of freedom begins to develop internal differentiations (i.e. civil society) (§357). In both the Greek and the Roman realms, the spheres of inclusion are marked by definite boundaries between each sphere of freedom. In its final phase, the Idea becomes visible in the modern state; and therefore, earlier state forms are assigned a finite actuality within the modern state and transcended (§262). These earlier boundaries exist within the modern state as institutions. The boundaries between public, private and individual remain. The same is true for spatial entities like community, nation and class. In history, each realm in the development of the Idea is a sphere or form of inclusion which is later transcended by a greater sphere or form of inclusion. World-history maps this development through time.

Running concurrently to the development of the abstract right, the sphere of morality, the circle of ethical life and the ethical state, an overarching dialectic is always already at work. Each development takes place within the theatre of world-history. Therefore, the modern individual and the modern state both have an overarching limit built into their existence. The enabling conditions of the individual may be the state, however, the state also requires certain conditions to exist. This boundary is the demarcation of what is inside and outside states. This boundary is again an expression of the spatial dialectic's two moments. The world of sovereign states is an expression of an ontology of spatial separation. Yet, the world of sovereign states is also the expression of a moment of spatial inclusion as the theatre of world-history. It is therefore impossible to move outside the state.

The full force of the paradox can therefore be understood. The modern individual

is not only limited by the modern state (as I showed in part two of this section), but the modern state also represents the limits of the individual. The same can be said for anything which resides inside the state. For example, if one attempts to harness internal spatial entities, like class, nation, identity, culture, citizen, to move outside the state one faces the problem that these "entities" can only exist within the state; they cannot exist without it. These are important problems for Harvey and his contemporaries. Moreover, how might one think of confronting phenomenon, like environmental problems or world hunger, which take place outside one state's control? Someone like Harvey is likely to have to come to terms with this type of question if he is attempting to theorize global political actions. Are the only avenues open to dealing with these types of problems interstate agreements which can never amount to anything more than "oughts"? Because Hegel's geopolitical map is a map of containers, limits and forms it precludes escape, the modern individual is trapped within the limits of the sovereign state. I argue in Chapter Three that Harvey's politics remains caught within precisely these paradoxes and questions because he continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics.

World-history and the Future:

While there may not be anything outside the state, is there a beyond? Is there a future for the modern individual, a new space of potentiality on the horizon? In order to pursue the question of beyond, a return to the geopolitical line between states is required.

I have shown that a new space, a higher space, emerges at the geopolitical line.[22] This space beyond the state is what Hegel calls the theatre of world-history and it is here that the universal mind gains consciousness of itself (§342-343). World-history is both exclusive and inclusive because it is the world's final court of judgement (§340). In this component I will map world-history's exclusive edge first. World-history is the author of the edge between what will and will not be included in the history and the state. Second, I will map the final boundary of world-history. This is the beyond. I argue that the beyond is not an escape from the state at all. This beyond is a process which includes and brings things back into the state. All that lies in the future is safely included into world-history and the state's limits. I conclude in this section that the modern individual has no future outside world-history as geopolitics.

There are two sites where world-history is revealed to be exclusionary. The first site is located on the line drawn between human/animal and reason/unreason. I argued in part two that Hegel's state, as a world historical nation, draws the deciding line. Instead of repeating this exploration, I will focus on the second site. I will examine what the "world" means in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.[23] In these lectures, Hegel constructs a typology of historical methods. I read this section as Hegel

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[22]World history is the third level of dialectical development (see above, footnote 19). Hegel argues in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History that world history moves on a higher plane (p.141)

[23]Hegel. G. W. (Trans. Nisbet. H.B.), Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) As there are no paragraph numbers, all citations to this text will be made to the page number (i.e., p.X).

setting out the parameters of his world.

According to Hegel, there are three types of history. There are original, reflective and philosophical histories (p.12). The three types of history should be understood dialectically. Hegel argues that original history is the history as experienced by a particular individual. Mere experience is transformed into the realm of intellectual representation through writing (p.12). Poems, legends and traditions cannot constitute history because they are representations of a nation whose consciousness is still obscure (p.12-13). Hegel states that "the real objective history of a nation cannot be said to have begun until it possesses a written historical record. A culture which does not yet have a history has made no real cultural progress" (p.13). Hegel concludes that this type of history is narrow in scope. The scope is defined by the personal experience and environmental conditions that an individual can write about (p.13).

In the second type of history the written historical record is expanded. In original history, the author does not rise above and reflect on their experiences (p.13). Reflective history, however, enables the author to disengage personal experiences and reflectively write about history as a whole (p.15). Thus, the author can write, without the prerequisite of personal attendance, about current and past events. (p.15). Reflective histories (complete surveys, pragmatic, critical and selective) are expected to give way to the next type of history (p.22). Complete surveys are closest to original history and selective history is closest to philosophical history (p. 16 and 23).

Philosophical history is the completion of the dialectic movement. In this stage, history is concrete and absolutely present (p.23). The Idea, which is present in this type

of philosophical historical investigation, can be seen to direct the events of world-history (p.24). It is in philosophical history that this can be comprehended. Hegel argues that the task of the philosophy of history is to uncover the ultimate design (the process of reason) of world-history (p.28). The task is, therefore, to show history as the logical unfolding of reason (p.25 and 74), to show that reason, as with the Idea and the spirit, is absolutely sovereign (p.43) and finally, to show that in the unfolding of the spirit, the Idea or reason in history follows a dialectical development.

Hegel's world-history excludes that which is not written, just as animals were excluded because they lack reason as their essence. Both are excluded by an author, in one case the historian and in another case s/he who sets the parameters of inclusion (i.e. Geist or Hegel). Therefore, in the same way that animals are excluded from the development of the ethical state,[24] those without a written record of their "history" are excluded from Hegel's world (history). The theatre of nature is separate and excluded from Hegel's theatre of world-history (p.36). They can be seen as direct opposites (p.47). Hegel's justification for what is excluded from world-history (i.e., pre-history) is precise. Just as it is only in the state that humans have a rational existence (p.94), it is only within

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[24]The exclusionary line drawn between human/animal and reason/unreason is also developed in Hegel's lectures on world history. He argues that the difference between human and animals is their ability to reason (p.25). Hegel later argues that the only thought which is imported into the philosophy of world history is that of reason (p.27). Hegel argues that this can be proved speculatively, yet, his argument unfolds as circular logic. His argument essentially runs: reason is reason because we know it through reason. We know through reason because we are human. Therefore, reason is proved by appealing to the category of human and the category of human is proved by appealing to the idea of reason (see p.27). Hegel states that it was Socrates who drew the first line since it was he who made reason the ruling principle of philosophy (p.34)

the state that a nation can have a history (p.134 and 136). The state is the enabling condition for history to be written (p.137). World-history is the (written) record of the spirit's attempt to gain knowledge of itself (p.53). Pre-history, therefore, resides outside world-history (p.138). These exclusionary lines between human/animal, reason/unreason and history/pre-history set the conditions for the theatre of world-history. Upon these prior exclusions, the scale of Hegel's world increases as the sphere of knowledge, through reason and reflection, is expanded. It is to this inclusive moment that I now turn.

Each moment in history is a necessary moment in the development of the Idea and that world-history is the mapping of the successive scales of the Idea. World-history is the record of the spirit's attempts to gain knowledge of what it is in itself (p.54). World-history is a theatre, a space in which all of history unfolds (p.150). In this way, world-history is an ever expanding cycle. It is a dialectical process of inclusion. World-history always leads back to the state, as the supreme form of inclusion. Any move beyond the state, beyond the geopolitical line, is brought back and contained behind the line defined by world-history. The individual, therefore, cannot appeal to world-history (time) as something beyond their enabling conditions because world-history is governed by the same spatial logic which governs the geopolitical order of states. World-history is, therefore, geopolitics. I will set out this argument in greater detail below.

World-history is a sphere of inclusion and it brings everything back into the state. This can be seen through the dialectical development. The realization of the sprit is not randomly determined. The rational logic of the dialectic is the spirit's own destiny (p.126). Again there are two moves (see part one) in the development of history. The

spirit first rises and divides itself against itself (spatial separation) and then transcends this division (spatial inclusion).

The moment of inclusion comes through the spirit's destruction of the earlier stage and the birth of a new stage or form. Hegel argues that this new stage is not a new shell; instead, it is a larger stage which manifests itself out of the ashes of an earlier stage. Therefore, a new larger stage emerges by growing out of and including its earlier sphere (p.31-33). The dialectical process's final end is not "being," as a sphere of inclusion. The end is the dialectical process of separation and inclusion itself (p.33). This is the "march of the world spirit" (p.64). Each step forward is a process of further inclusion and separation. World-history as such is not a strict circle, like the circle of ethical life, it is a cyclical *movement* which reaches beyond the state in order to create a new boundary or form (p.61 and 128).

At one level, the world spirit is a universal which operates above the state; it safely sits back while particular states fight it out. This is the cunning of reason (p.89). The health of a nation and the health of the spirit is maintained through war and resisting habit (p.59-60). Though particular nations or forms may perish the world of the spirit persists (p.53). However, if a nation begins to decay, it is because the spirit has moved to another nation (p.61-62). All the deeds and aspirations of nations are done for the spirit in world-history (p.56). The idea, the spirit, the rational and the dialectic are all supreme. National spirits are only moments in one all-embracing inclusive universal formal totality - the world spirit (p.65). Everything is governed and serves the world spirit. The state requires the medium, space or theatre or form of world-history. World-history can be

read as geopolitics, since, world-history acts as the theatre in which states interact. World-history, therefore, exists beyond the state line.

At another level, however, the final stage in world-history always becomes the beginning of the next moment in the development (p.47). Change in history presupposes a medium or form for change to takes place within (p.93). This medium is the state. The beginning of every new movement beyond the state is premised on a return to the state. The start and the end of the dialectical development of world-history is a world of separate states. Each national spirit is separated in time and space (p.152). This separation is required for continual development of the world spirit. Hegel states that it is only Zeus, the god of politics and boundaries, who could control the power of Chronos, the god of time and change (p.145). In world-history each change is brought back within the boundaries of the state as form. A world of separate state forms are the content of world-history and world-history's form is defined by the limits of the world historical nation. The final boundary, therefore, is always in the future; yet, it is a statist promise which is the same as the present.

The individual requires the state. Hegel argues that everyone is a "son" of their age, a person cannot escape its nation just like a person cannot escape the earth's gravity (p.81). Individuals are both bound to the state as form and bound to their age as form. Any attempt to move into the future will always lead back to the state. An individual is born into an actual world (social time). This world is already firmly and completely established: one's duty is to assimilate oneself into this reality (p.58 and see section two). "Man" owes his entire existence to the state (p.94). While the world historical nation can

transcend its age (or move the boundaries of its form), the individual cannot (p.103). The individual can not separate itself from the spirit of the nation at all (p.52). The duty of the individual is to recognize and submit to the laws of a particular state (p.79-80 and 96-97).

The implication is that, at one level, the nation cannot be escaped. At another level, the spirit (world-history) cannot be escaped. Any appeal to world-history is brought back within the logic of the form. The modern individual is trapped within its conditions of possibility and cannot escape to the future, since the future is also implicated in the process which makes the individual's enabling conditions possible.

In review, I have argued that Hegel's dialectic is a spatial phenomenon. I argued that the implications of this can be seen in the development of the modern individual, the modern state and in world-history. The modern individual is, therefore, both enabled and trapped within the spatial confines of the form of Hegel's state and world-history. Any attempt to exercise individuality or collectivity in order to resist, is confronted with the paradox that it is one's enabling conditions that are being resisted. Any attempt to *move* beyond or outside the state, undermines any attempt to *move* beyond or outside. Form is the condition of possibility for content. In other words, Hegel uses Kant's spatial metaphysics in two ways: First it is the basis for his dialectic. The relationship between separation and inclusion mirrors that between content and form. Each movement of the dialectic starts with separate forms and then becomes content within a larger mediated form until we reach the ever-denied limit of world-history. Second, drawing on this last point, the logical development of Hegel's system leads to an infinite limit which always

rests in the impossible future. World-history is both implicated in geopolitics and chronopolitics. It is implicated in the final arena of spatially separate forms (geopolitics) and in the hopes of temporal movement beyond these forms. Why? World-history is Kant's space-time. Endless divisions of space-time (world-history) are possible (the individual, the family, class, the state etc.), but space remains an eternal, infinite, absolute whole. The final form of mediation, therefore, is through world-history as geopolitics (i.e., Kant's space as separate but whole.)[25]

I have suggested that if one accepts the metaphysical assumptions at work in Hegel's project then there is no escape from the paradox. The state, freedom, ontology, epistemology, civil society, the family, nationalism, reason, space and time are all implicated in the paradox of Kant's *a priori* form. The next section attempts to understand how Marx's writings are implicated in Hegel's (Kantian) system explored above. Since, Harvey draws most overtly from Marx, it is important to show either how Marx evades the spatial discourse or how he fails. I show how he fails.

Marx: Demonstrating the limits

Essential to the question "does Marx reproduce the spatial discourse made obvious by Hegel?" is the issue of Kant's relationship between content and form. It is in

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[25]The problem with this, however, is that space does not end at the "level" of the globe. Hence the importance of studying extra-terrestrial relations (as I will do in the future) and the cosmopolitan attempt to move the sovereign spatial scale of the state to the level of the globe (an impossibility if it remains at the level of the state). Such a move, nonetheless, replicates the spatial discourse of separation and inclusion (which has oppressive tendencies at each "stage" of the dialectical development).

the debate surrounding this issue that Marx both critiques Hegel's system and suggests that it is possible to move beyond it; and yet, it is immanent in this debate that I suggest Marx's project is contained within the same spatial discourse he critiques. My objective in this section is not to fully critique, investigate or reconstruct Marx's position; instead I simply attempt to create a point of entry into Marx's project. Specifically, I attempt to identify a spatial relationship between content and form, a relationship which I have been calling a spatial discourse and which I have shown has certain political limits. I will make three moves in this examination. First I will briefly reconstruct Marx's reading of Hegel's philosophy. I think the reader will find certain similarities between the reading presented above and Marx's reading of Hegel. At this level, although Marx does not explicitly name them "spatial," he seems remarkably attuned to the "spatial patterns" and "spatial relationships" between content and form in Hegel's work. Second I will reconstruct Marx's critique of Hegel's system in general and of his state in particular. It is in this critique that Marx poses the (r)evolutionary possibility of moving beyond the state and into communism. I suggest that this "possibility" emerges from Marx's privileging of content over form. Third I pose a re-reading of Hegel. In this reading, I submit that Marx has misread Hegel in one fundamental way. I argue that although Marx suggests that form is produced by content, he maintains a privileged *a priori* form. As such, the sovereign state and geopolitics are always already present in Marx's project. I have suggested that this is the pervasiveness of the spatial discourse. To support these claims I re-reconstruct Marx's development with special attention to the three boundaries identified in Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Lectures on the Philosophy of World

History. I also cite examples where Marx gives *a priori* status to a certain form as the state and geopolitics. I assert therefore that Marx maintains a concept of form, sovereignty and space which will always dominate over content, democracy and time. Marx reproduces the spatial discourse he claims to critique.

Marx's Hegel

Marx provides a succinct and coherent reading of Hegel's system. Most importantly Marx recognises that Hegel constructs a totalising system from the dialectical development of the actual Idea. The family and civil society, for example, emerge as stages in the development of the ethical state. In Hegel, the state's components have no essence or life processes of their own; instead they owe their existence to "another spirit", a "third party" or the "actual ideal." Marx states that in Hegel's words

> The actual idea is spirit which separates itself into the two ideal spheres of its concept, the family and civil society, which are its finite phase' -- thus (for Marx) the separation of the state into family and civil society is ideal, i.e. necessary, is part of the essence of the state; the family and civil society are real parts of the state, real spiritual instances of the will, they are the modes of being of the state; family and civil society make themselves into the state (Marx. K., 1977a:26).

He states further that in Hegel's system

> the actual idea only lowers itself to the "finitude" of the family and civil society so as to transcend them and enjoy and produce its own infinity; thus (in order to attain its aims) it is to these spheres that the spirit bestows the material of this its finite actuality... . (Marx. K., 1977a:27)

Marx argues that the singularity of this system can be characterised as monarchial as opposed to democratic. The monarchy, Marx contends, should be understood as a system where "one part determines the character of the whole" (Marx. K. 1977a:27). All parts

are related, subsumed and faced towards one fixed point - the sovereign. A monarchy therefore is "only *form*, but (it) falsifies the *content*..., the whole is subsumed under its mode of being, the political constitution (Marx. K., 1977a:27-28, emphasis added). For Hegel the state, as the spirit on earth, developed itself; Marx suggests, "as universal reason over and against the other spheres, as something beyond them" (Marx. K., 1977a:29). Marx describes the movement from sphere to sphere as a process of supersession, he states

> in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, private right superseded equals morality, morality superseded equals the family, the family superseded equals civil society, civil society superseded equals the state, the state superseded equals world history (Marx. K., 1977f:107).

Marx suggests that each form or sphere in Hegel's development is simply a "phase" in the movement towards an end moment of supersession. In Marx's words, "supersession," for Hegel, is "an objective movement *absorbing externalisation"* (Marx. K., 1977f:108, emphasis added). Marx identifies Hegel's refusal to grant each sphere the capacity of autonomous movement (Marx. K., 1977f:107); instead each "phase" is the logical working out of the actual idea and the becoming of a teleological trajectory. Each sphere, circle, phase, form etc. logically leads through a process of separation (*externalisation*) and inclusion (*absorption*) into a higher sphere, circle, phase, form etc. and ends in the immovable moving form of the state in world-history.

Marx further identifies both the movement of spatial separation and inclusion and the immovable moving paradox of an inescapable form in his comments on bureaucracy. These comments mirror an analysis of the functions, which Hegel assigns, to the

sovereign state. More importantly they indicate that Marx recognises the paradoxical spatial discourse which I have attempted to identify in Hegel's system. Notice, for example, Marx's precision in identifying the role that form (the circle) plays in shaping and limiting the epistemological potential of those who reside within each "circle" and how each circle is positioned below or within a grander enabling and constraining circle. Marx states that

> [b]ureaucracy is a circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The apex entrusts the lower circles with the insights into the individual while the lower circles leave insight into the universal to the apex, so they deceive each other reciprocally (Marx. K., 1997a:31).

He goes on to argue that the

> spirit of bureaucracy is secret, mystery, safeguarded inside itself by hierarchy and outside itself by its nature as a closed corporation. Thus public political spirit and also political mentality appear to bureaucracy as a betrayal of its secrets. The principle of its knowledge is therefore authority, and its mentality is the idolatry of authority. But within bureaucracy the spiritualism turns into a crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, faith in authority, the mechanisms of fixed and formal behaviour, fixed principles, attitudes, traditions (Marx. K., 1997a:31).

Marx further recognises the logical limits of the state and the process of policing of these limits. He states

> it is precisely in this last form of state of bourgeois society that the class struggle has to be fought out to a confusion--even it towers above this kind of democratism which keeps within the limits of what is permitted by the police and not permitted by logic (Marx. K., 1977c:566).

Marx therefore can be understood to outline three key moments in Hegel's system. First, Marx identifies Hegel's privileging of a totalising form - monarchy. Second, Marx identifies Hegel's use of the actual Idea, as a dialectical relationship between separation

and inclusion, as the driving force in the development of the form. Finally, he identifies the form of the state as inscribing a set of logical limits that act as both the enabling and disabling conditions for (r)evolutionary action.

Marx and (R)evolution

Marx suggests that a materialist analysis, which starts from the material requirements for human survival, posits a (r)evolutionary potential which can transcend the intrinsically teleological quality of Hegel's spatial system. I will first look at how Marx reformulates Hegel's dialectical development so that it is based in a materialist account of history. Second, I will examine how this challenges the necessary path or the teleological nature of Hegel's dialectical development. It leads to a reformulation of the relationship between civil society (content) and the state (form) and reposes the possibility of (r)evolutionary movement beyond the enabling condition of the state form.

Marx reformulates the Hegelian dialect so that "mystical results" are understood in terms of their concrete beginnings (Marx. K., 1977a: 27). Marx states, in the German Ideology, that the premisses from which an analysis of society must begin can not be arbitrary. Instead an analysis must start with "real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity" (Marx. K., 1977e:160). For Marx, humans may be distinguishable from animals because of consciousness, religion, reason etc. however the overriding moment when humanity, as a species, distinguishes itself from animals is when they begin to produce their means of subsistence (Marx. K., 1977e:160). In

contrast to Hegel, Marx argues that it is the latter which is more important. Thus an analysis must start not with "fictions" like the state (Marx. K., 1977c:564), the abstract right or human reason; but with the means of production: with "*what* (humans) produce and...*how* they produce (it)" (Marx. K., 177e:161). Therefore, "in direct contrast to German philosophy (Hegel) which descends from heaven to earth, here we (historical-materialists) ascend from earth to heaven. ... Where speculation ends -- in real life-- there real, positive science begins" (Marx. K.,1977e:164-165).

Marx suggests therefore that historical-materialists have to start with the first premise of all existence, that humans make history because they are in a position to satisfy their needs and produce material life and a material world (Marx. K., 1977e:165). Humans produce their material world from "the soil (and this, economically speaking, includes water) in the virgin state in which it supplies man with the necessities or the means of subsistence ready to hand, exists independently of him, and it is the universal subject of human labour" (Marx. K., 1977m:456, original remark). Marx states further that a human "opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a *form* adapted to his own wants" (Marx. K., 1977m:455, emphasis added). It follows from the first proposition that in the creation of a materialist life world, humans also create new needs that must be satisfied. Parallel to this development Marx suggests that humans "who daily remake their own life, began to make other (humans), to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents, children, family" (Marx. K., 1977e:166). In addition, an understanding of the material

conditions which enable the formation of these societal relationships further licenses an understanding of ideal phenomena like consciousness, language, ideology etc. Consciousness, language and ideology themselves are grown in the soil of material relations, from "the immediate sensuous environment" (Marx. K., 1977e:167). It is in these ideal moments that humans are able to discern that they are *actually* living in societies at all. Humans live in societies which have been produced by humans and to fulfil human needs. This recognition marks the revolutionary potential of species being; it is here humans come to understand that they are not like animals at all. For Marx, animals do not create their world around them and they are not conscious of the fact that they live in societies. Humans therefore differentiate themselves from their "nature beings" and realize their "species being" by creating their means of survival, a society and societal institutions like the family, the state etc. (Marx. K., 1977e:167). A human is

> a species being not only in that practically and theoretically he makes both his own and other species into his objects, but also, and this is only another way of putting the same thing, he relates to himself as to the present, living species, in that he relates to himself as to a universal and therefore free being (Marx. K., 1977f:81).

Therefore, from the starting point of material conditions, the above social relationships (production, reproduction, consciousness, ideology and society itself) are formed (Marx. K., 1977e:166). These relationships grow in complexity as needs spawn new needs and create further means to meet those needs. Humanity therefore progresses, evolves and develops a more and more complex material world for itself.

Yet this progression occurs under the auspices of a *universal lack.* Marx identifies the process of alienation involved in the production of material life and a

material world. This alienation leaves the producer incomplete, immediate since s/he has invested her/his essence into that which has been produced. "The realisation of labour is its objectification...as externalisation" (Marx. K., 1977f: 78). A grand mediation or realisation has yet to occur. It is in the realization of individual species being, by overthrowing a system of alienated labour mediated through private property, that Marx suggests individuals united can mediate this *universal lack.* (R)evolution can occur.

Marx holds out the possibility for (r)evolution by challenging the necessary path of Hegel's dialectical development and therefore reformulating the relationship between civil society (content) and the state (form). Marx implies that content, as a productive force, prevails; while form is always that which is produced. The infinite produces the finite.[26] For Marx this amounts to a privileging of content over form. For example, it is the components of civil society which creates the state and not the other way around. In other words it is the state (form) which is produced by the processes at work in civil society (content). As Lefebvre states of Marx,

> according to Marx, then, the state does not express some transcendental rationality, superior to social life, nor is it inherent in society, an expression of its immanent rationality. (The) state and the interests of the state are rooted in an irrational, immature social reality. The state is but a fragment of society itself above society, adding to the functions which are socially indispensable at a given epoch. ... Setting itself above society, the state has interests of its own and its own support ... but it cannot be entirely separated from the actual society on which it is based ... (it) is not autonomous (Lefebvre. H., 1968:124).

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[26]Both Hegel and Marx would agree with this wording. However, each would have a completely different understanding of its meaning. Hegel would see the infinite as Geist; whereas, Marx would see the infinite as the material conditions of life. What remains intact, therefore is the dialectical relationship between them.

Marx argues that "freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it" (Marx. K., 1977c:564). This conversion requires changing the way that the relationship between state and civil society is thought about. It involves a "demand to give up the illusions about their (citizen's) conditions (and therefore) to give up a condition that requires illusion (Marx. K., 1977b:64). Thus, for Marx, there exists the possibility of moving beyond the state, beyond the present age through revolution and into a new day of communism.

This movement beyond is the mediation of the *universal lack*. It involves moving beyond the immediate organs of society, as illusionary forms, and moving into a mediate communism of content (Marx. K., 1977f:92). Therefore, content as processes produce forms or permanences, not the other way around. If content is privileged then the enabling conditions are reversed and form can be logically transcended by content. (R)evolution is possible.

Although Marx holds that (r)evolution becomes possible with a reformed relationship between content and form, he does not abandon form and make an unmediated rush for content. The eventual realization of communism is only achieved through the absolute mediation of immediate illusory forms by content. As such, immediate forms must be recognised, examined, harnessed, taken as one's own and realised so that the illusions of form can be transcended. Marx's argument demands that one <u>not</u> simply toss away the illusions of immediate form (i.e., the state, philosophy, religion etc.). Marx states that

> [i]t is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their productive forces--

> which are the basis of all their history--for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity. The productive forces are therefore the result of practical human energy; but this energy is itself conditioned by the circumstances in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already acquired, by the societal *form* which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the preceding generation (Marx. K., 1977j:192, emphasis added)

Instead one must realize the immediate forms in order to transcend and move beyond them (Marx. K. 1977b:68). This argument can be identified in Marx's analysis of the situation that the German nation finds itself in:

> Germany has not scaled the intermediary stages of political emancipation at the same time as modern peoples. Even the stages that she has passed beyond theoretically have not yet been reached in practice. How can she with one perilous leap not only go beyond her barriers but also beyond the barriers of modern peoples, barriers which must in reality appear to her as desirable liberation form her real barriers. A radical revolution can only be a revolution of radical needs, whose presuppositions and breeding-ground seem precisely to be lacking (Marx. K., 1977b:70).

To pull ideals from other revolutions, while exciting, comforting etc., ignores the fact that one's society or state may not be ready to move to the next stage in the development of communism. Marx states, "[h]istory is thorough and passes through many stages when she carries a worn-out form. The last stage of a world historical form is its comedy" (Marx. K., 1977b:66). Although Marx furthers this comedic theme in his essay "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (Marx. K., 1977d:300-325) the important thing to note here is the progression from stage to stage and from form to form as time passes. Therefore, transcendence, revolution, evolution and generally moving beyond a present situation, develops from the real needs, the material basis and through the immediate forms which are embedded in society at any particular time. How does this process of

mediation occur -- what is the driving force?

Counter Hegel, these changes, leaps, revolutions, evolutions etc. do not stem from what Marx calls the "mystic womb of the absolute idea" (Marx. K., 1977j:193), but instead from the real material conditions which constitute the nature of society. Marx challenges Hegel's development by arguing that

> [t]he social power, i.e. the multiple productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these (Marx. K., 1977e:170).

Instead of using Hegel's absolute idea as the driving force of the dialectical development of history, Marx suggests that inherent in the means of production is a *division* of labour. Originating in a sexual division of labour in particular and in the material conditions of life in general, subsequent divisions naturally become evident in society at large (as moments of separation and inclusion). For example, classes and regions recognize divisions between themselves and other classes and regions. As such, divisions between material/mental, town/country etc. become recognisable phenomena in society. Yet, further, they also become indicators of historical modes of production, societal changes through time and potential moment of future revolution. Marx's analysis shows that

> history does not end by being resolved into 'self-consciousness' as 'spirit of the spirit,' but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also, on the other, prescribes for its

> conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances (Marx. K., 1977e:172-173).

The divisions of labour, the conflict which exists between them and the sum of productive forces are the "conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, decide whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary convulsions will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire existing system" (Marx. K., 1977e:173). In this way, Marx has little problem with the dialectic and the dialectical development of society (through stages of separation and inclusion) as such; instead Marx points to the inverted relationship given to the ideal and the real, to form and to content and to the spatial and the temporal. Marx simply reverses the emphasis that Hegel places *within* the dialectical development of society.

The implication of this emphasis is important, in contrast to Hegel's argument that humans simply be good citizens who do not challenge the status-quo, Marx suggests that the proletariat (as content) can "overthrow the basis of the entire existing system." In relation to the age that Marx is examining and in relation to the geography of the German condition, Marx suggests that it is the proletariat which has the special role of realising the transition to communism. Marx suggests that

> this class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. ... Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a *position* to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities (Marx. K., 1977e:178, emphasis added).

The proletariat, Marx suggests, maintains a certain position from which the leverage is strong enough to force the overthrow of the present age. Marx envisions a basis of struggle in which each class competes with the class below it (Marx. K., 1977b:72). The proletariat must organize, not in one-sided opposition, but in

> total opposition to its presuppositions. It is, finally, a sphere (so basic in the hierarchy of classes) that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating these other spheres themselves. In a word, it is the complete loss of humanity and thus can only recover itself by a complete redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society, as a particular class, is the proletariat (Marx. K., 1977b:73).

"When all the interior conditions are fulfilled" (Marx. K., 1977b:73) the proletariat (as content) can lift itself from its actual conditions, realize itself in the state, transcend the form of the state and the present and drag itself and humanity into an age of communism. Marx states in the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" that

> while the refugee serfs only wished to be free to develop and assert those conditions of existence which were already there, and hence, in the end, only arrived at free labour, the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, will have to abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to the present), namely, labour. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State... (Marx. K., 1977e:182).

Marx states further in the "German Ideology" that communism

> differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all natural premisses as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals. Its organization is, therefore, essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, in so far as

> reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves (Marx. K., 1977e:179).

The inevitability of communism as a process which seeks to create a world in and for itself, but by and for man, is summarised as

> [t]he whole movement of history, therefore, both regards the real engendering of communism, the birth of its empirical existence, and also as regards to its consciousness and thought, is the consciously comprehended process of becoming. On the other hand, the communism that is still incomplete seeks an historical proof *for itself* in what already exists by selecting isolated historical formulations opposed to private property. It tears isolated phases out of the movement...and asserts them as proofs of its historical pedigree (Marx. K., 1977f:89, emphasis added).

Therefore Marx envisages a dialectical process which, if understood as rooted in the material conditions of society, can transcend the condition of possibility of the state. This is a reading which counters the reading of Hegel presented above. The ability to move beyond the present and into a future era of communism is provided by Marx's re-reading of the relationship between content/form and civil society/state. It leads to the (r)evolutionary potential of the proletariat as content.

In review, at one level Marx rejects the state as the condition of possibility. The state is only one among many forms in society. However, at another level, Marx identifies a need to harness the state, as immediate illusory forms, so that it may be transcended, realised or superseded and a society based on content (communism) can over take it. This whole progress is made possible because of the tensions inherent in the division of labour and therefore in society. These tensions, at one level, are created in the realization of humanity's species being and, at another level, are specific to the mode of production of a particular era. As a driving force in the *whole* movement of history, Marx

suggests that, this division enables a progression beyond the state and an erasure of the enabling limits of the present. For Marx, content can supersede form.

Furthermore, the complexities of two key points have been highlighted. First Marx understands Hegel in a similar manner to what was presented in the last section. Marx recognises the spatial moves between separation (externalisation etc.) and inclusion (absorption, supersession etc.) within Hegel's system. Both examinations also suggest that Hegel constructs a teleological system which ends in the ethical state of world-history. Second, Marx suggests that a reformed dialectic, based in a materialist (as opposed to an idealist) account of history, enables one to think about moving beyond Hegel's system of forms. It is possible, therefore, to move beyond the monarchial ethical state (form) into an future era of communism (content). This materialist position forces the relationship between content and form in Hegel's system to be revisited. And according to Marx, a revision of Hegel's dialectic posses the (r)evolutionary possibility of moving beyond form into an era of content. Specifically, the content of civil society itself, the working class, can create the form[27] of communism. In other words, because Marx suggests that the state is one form *in* society and not *of* society, an alternative content can be used to provide the conditions of possibility for new and future forms. But what of this *form*?

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[27]I justify calling communism form in the next section.

Re-reading Marx's Hegel

Marx's theoretical project seems convincing. Marx poses a formidable challenge to the content of Hegel's system and therefore appears to pose a challenge to the immutability of Hegel and Kant's form. However, with a sensitivity to spatiality, it is arguable that Marx reproduces the forms which he critiques by simply changing their appearances. It will be shown that Marx's dialectic is painted in the colours of modes of production and divisions of labour, the state is tinted to resemble society and, finally, world-history is dyed to resemble communism. Specifically, I argue that Marx maintains a concept of sovereignty and hence a concept of international relations in his work. In other words, at the level of content, Marx downgrades the importance of the state by separating the state from sovereignty. *Within* this hidden, given and preserved form (sovereignty) it becomes possible to transcend the state etc. because it is reformulated as an added stage in the development of the actual Idea. The development through and yet into a sovereign form of world-history (as communism) therefore seems new and revolutionary. However, in terms of spatial moves and the limits associated with this spatial discourse, it will be shown that, such a project is always already implicated in the spatial discourse outlined above. The spatial weed survives. Communism becomes the infinite point on the horizon which can only be seen through the lens of the sovereign form yet never be reached.

This argument unfolds as follows: So as to remind the reader of the forms that I am attempting to identify, I will recast Hegel's argument in relation to Marx's reconstruction. From this *re*-reconstruction it becomes possible to recast Marx's

argument in terms of content and form. This *re*-reconstruction exposes Marx's underlying framework and re-examines the priority given to content. Second, I argue that this *re*-reconstruction allows the possibility of returning to the text and retracing the spatial developments within Marx's project. The actual idea of communism develops through the spatial forms of separation and inclusion associated with Hegel's dialectical development and the sovereign state. Specifically, I will map Marx against Hegel's three boundaries. I show that Marx is intimately connected with Hegel's subjective individual within the sovereign state, the future as world-history and world-history as geopolitics. The content in Marx's analysis is always already implicated within the spatial discourse's *a priori* form. I argue in the Chapter Three that Harvey too remains caught within this spatial discourse and therefore remains caught within a politics of eternal forms.

Re-casting Hegel:

I have suggested above that Marx characterises Hegel's state as a monarchial form (see above p.99-100). In contrast, Marx argues that one must view the state in terms of its democratic content (Marx. K., 1977a:27). For Marx, therefore, a democratic state represents the relations between its components (content). The state's evolution is not guided by a form which makes internal content possible. This is a very important moment in Marx's reconstruction since, as shown above, it holds out the possibility of moving beyond the state. However, it is fundamentally flawed.

As Kant suggests in relation to his discussion about space, the form is not understood because of its characteristics (i.e., its colour or its texture) (Kant. I., 1966:28).

What is important to both Kant's meditations on space and Hegel's meditations on the sovereign state is the *a priori* status given to form. It follows that the state as form cannot be understood according to its democratic or its monarchial characteristics. For Hegel the form is sovereign, but it is not necessarily (just ideally) monarchial. In other words the form is immutable, unquestionable, sovereign, *a priori* -- it is always already implicated in questions of epistemology, ontology, agency etc. More importantly sovereign form or space is always already given before questions of content can be considered. Marx asks, in his letter to Annenkov: "What is society, whatever its *form* may be?" (Marx. K., 1977j:192, emphasis added). In the examination which follows I seek to explore precisely this question and show how Marx, immanent to this question, gives *a priori* (Kantian-Hegelian) status to form.

I have suggested that Hegel gives form, in particular, and the spatial dialectic of separation and inclusion, in general, sovereign status. This status logically leads into the development of three stages or what I called boundaries in Hegel's text. The first is the subjective individual within the form of the state, the second is the future as world-history and the third is world-history as geopolitics. Marx's summary of his contribution to the understanding of the development of communist society in a letter to Weydemeyer on March 5, 1852, loosely parallels the three boundaries identified in Hegel's text. Marx states,

> [w]hat I did that was new was to prove (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariate, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society... (Marx. K., 1977i:341).

I will unfold each of these boundaries below with the aim of making the relationship between Hegel's boundaries and Marx readily apparent. I will pay special attention to the importance that form plays in Marx's development.

Individuals in the Sovereign Form:

Marx's analysis of society and of history is based in a materialist reading of the individual. Individuals create their conditions within the context of a social space created by past generations in "particular historical phases in the development of production" (Marx. K., 1977i:341). Individuals make history, but not in the conditions of their own choosing (Marx. K., 1977d:300). I have illustrated Marx's argument that individuals experience a *universal lack* in the creation of their world. They experience a context of alienation in the actual world that must be mediated. But how? Hegel argued that there is a constant process of mediation in the development of the ethical state and the absolute spirit on earth. Marx, in contrast, leaves the individual in a state of *universal lack* and in a state where the species potential is unrealised in each individual. However, Marx suggests that the individual can potentially mediate this *universal lack* within politics. For Marx humans are essentially political beings. He states that

> [t]he more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan (stamm); then latter in the *various forms* of communal society arising out of the *antithesis* (separation) and *fusions* (inclusion) of the clans. ... The human being is in the most literal sense a ζῶον πολιτικόν (a political animal, see footnote 29), not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only *in the midst* of society (Marx. K., 1973:84, emphasis added).

Humans therefore are not simply social beings.[28] They must exist within or *in the midst* of a form (political society - state) or earlier spheres of separation and inclusion so as to begin the process by which the individual can mediate her/his existence. Marx ascribes to form the role of fulfilment and determination of an individual's or humanity's species potential. He states,

> It is here in the *sphere* of the political state, that the individual elements of the state relate to themselves as to the being of their species, their `species being'; for the *political state is the sphere of their universal determination*, their religious sphere. The political state is the mirror of truth for the different elements of the concrete state... (Marx. K., 1977a:32, emphasis added).

Therefore not only can humans only find their individual paths *within* the political *form* of society (read state), but also the species potential of humanity can only be realised within this form as well. The *universal lack* can begin to be mediated within the *political state as the sphere of their universal determination*. Marx suggests that individuals must join together, take lower spheres as their own, (i.e., recognize their class consciousness) and mobilise politically against their oppressors within the form of the state. The mediation of a class movement's combined *universal lack* is therefore realised *in and through* the state form.

Marx observes that workers are fragmented. Their interests are diverse and their directions are particular. As he states, "labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country (Germany or England), and broken up by their mutual

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[28]McLellan's translation of this last sentence reads: "Man is in the most literal sense of the word a *zoon politikon* (political animal), not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society (Marx. K., 1977h:346)."

competition" (Marx. K., 1977k:228). He suggests that forms of union and unity often result, not from an internal energy found in the mass of labourers, but instead "[i]f anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but the union of the bourgeoisie..." (Marx. K., 1977k:228). Modern communications facilitate the centralisation of local struggles and act to minimize tensions (Marx. K., 1977k:228). Marx states therefore that workers must look past their differences and unite into a political organisation, into a political party, to achieve their future goals. He states "[t]his organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, (and) mightier" (Marx. K., 1977k:228).

Marx argues that the diversity of political strategies must be united or enforced within the confines of a general form. For example, Marx highlights examples of two political strategies (non-state and state) and then rolls both strategies into one encompassing form. He states, in his letter to Bolte on November 23 1871,

> [n]evertheless, what history exhibits everywhere was repeated in the history of the International. What is antiquated tries to re-establish itself and maintain its position within the newly acquired form. ... The political movement of the working class has as its ultimate object, of course, the conquest of political power for this class, and this naturally requires a previous organisation of the working class developed up to a certain point and arising precisely from its economic struggles. ... For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even in a particular trade to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand the movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., law, is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a movement of the class, with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially

coercive force (Marx. K., 1977g:588-589).

Movements therefore must also flow into and become united *within* a general form capable of mediating universal and particular interests. In the development towards universal mediation, where humanity as a whole steps over the threshold into communism, Marx resists ascribing to an unmediated leap to communism (see above p.106). Instead, in the hopes of a future communist, classless, stateless society, Marx prescribes a movement which evolves through the immediate form of the proletariat state. Marx states that

> [i]t follows from this (that the state represents the interests of the communist versus the interests of the individual) that all struggles *within* the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc. etc. are merely the illusory *forms* in which the real struggles from of the different classes are fought out among one another (Marx. K., 1977e:169, emphasis added).

This statement can be read in at least two ways. First, it suggests that all struggles must unfold within the forms of the state regardless of the illusory content (democracy, aristocracy and monarchy) which decorates that form. Second, it also suggests that all struggles must unfold within the state regardless of the form (democracy, aristocracy and monarchy) it takes. In both readings an important point remains: all struggles must take place *within a form*. Marx suggests that the workers must take the state as their own. There must be a dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx states

> [t]his socialism is the declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariate as the necessary *transit point to the (future)* abolition of class distinctions generally, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all ideas that result from these social relations (Marx. K., 1977L:296).

Therefore the individual finds her/his path within the society *whatever form that may be* and begins mediating the *universal lack* by realising their species potential within the political form of the state. This realisation partially takes shape in class organisations, yet more importantly, contains the ambition to take the state as its own. Marx states "[t]o conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working class" (Marx. K., 1977k:536). Taking the state as its own, in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the working class (and as such humanity as a whole) can pass through the *transit point* and into the *future*. This future will be examined as world-history below.

Future as World-history:

Through the state as a form, the proletariat might have world historical existence and communism might be a world historical form. Here communism inevitably produces its own form, as the logical working out of the dialectic would predict (i.e., form-content-form... or content-form-content...). Marx suggests that

> [t]hese various conditions, which appear first as conditions of self-activity, later as fetters upon it, form the whole evolution of history a coherent series of *forms* of intercourse, the coherence of which consists in this: in the place of an earlier *form* of intercourse, which has become a fetter, a new one is put, corresponding to the more developed productive forces and, hence, to the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals--a *form* which in turn becomes a fetter and is then replaced by another (form). ... It follows from this that within a nation itself the individuals , even apart from their pecuniary circumstances, have quite different developments, and that an earlier interest, the peculiar *form* of intercourse of which has already been ousted by that belonging to a later interest, remains for a long time afterwards in possession of a traditional power in the illusory communist (State, law), which has won an existence independent of the individuals; a power which in the last resort can only be broken by a revolution (Marx. K., 1977e:181).

Therefore Marx identifies the paradox of the dialectical relationship between form and content and suggests that the only escape is through (r)evolution. Yet, further, this future (r)evolution is an appeal to communism as world-history. Marx states "the world has long possessed the dream of a thing of which it only needs to possess the consciousness in order really to possess it" (Marx. K., 1977p:38). Again, the "proletariat can only exist world-historically, just as communism can only have a 'world-historical' existence" (Marx. K., 1977e:171). Therefore Marx appeals to the future from the threshold of the state with the *hopes* that an anti-form-form or a stateless-state can be delivered. Marx suggests that communism must bring unity to disunity, "its organisation...turns existing conditions into conditions of unity" (Marx. K., 1977e:179) in an anti-form-form or a stateless-state. Communism gives form to that which is formless and content takes a place within space. The fruit of the proletariat's political labour resides in the *mediated* future. Marx states that "[t]he social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future" (Marx. K., 1977d:302). Marx argues further that "[n]ow and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate results, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers" (Marx. K., 1977k:228).

World-history as Geopolitics:

There are sites in Marx's works where considerable frustration about the programme he develops becomes apparent. I will identify some of these frustrations and then provide examples of world-history as geopolitics. I am therefore arguing that

Marx's frustrations identify the limits of the spatial discourse. His frustrations identify an eternal return to the limits of past and present forms which denies moving into a future of content. I am also suggesting that Marx here is (perhaps unconsciously) speaking to the assumptions at work in his own project.

In his essay "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" Marx directs his frustration towards movements which find themselves in the eternal return of past and present limits. His greatest comment on world-history is that in history's repetition the first time is tragic and the second time farce (Marx. K., 1977:d:300). The comedic quality of finding oneself back where one started (perhaps like the circular metaphor of a revolution?), Marx suggests, stems from

> [t]he tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. ... [J]ust when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service...(Marx. K., 1977d:300).

In relation to the situation of the revolutionary potential in France, Marx states that,

> [a]n entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution it had imparted to itself an accelerated *power of motion*, suddenly finds itself back into a defunct epoch and, in order that no doubt as to the relapse may be possible, the old dates arise again, the *old chronology*, the old names, the old edicts... (Marx. K., 1977d:301, emphasis added).

Marx focuses on the curious phenomenon of always finding oneself, in any move beyond the state and into the future, back behind the limits of the state form. He states "[i]nstead of society having conquered a new content for itself, it seems that the state only returned to its *oldest form...*" (Marx. K., 1977d:302). He argues further that "[r]evolution is conjured away by a cardsharper's trick, and what seems overthrown is no longer

monarchy (read Hegel's sovereign form) but the liberal concessions that were wrung from it by centuries of struggle (read: content)" (Marx. K., 1977d:302). The state under Bonaparte seems to be totally independent of civil society as if the state towers over it even though, as Marx points out, "the state power is not suspended in mid air. Bonaparte represents a class..." (Marx. K., 1977d:317). Marx suggests that "[a]ll revolutions perfected this (state) machine instead of smashing it" (Marx. K., 1977d:316). Thus Marx is identifying a trend in the "progressive contemporary politics" of his day which is scared by the eternal return of the spatial form of the state. This return particularly reveals itself when movements attempt to move into something which is other than the same, something which exists on the horizon of (r)evolutionary politics, something which exists in the future.

In fact Marx seems to Marx tracks down the limits which frustrate his own project. He suggests that "[t]he fight for...a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working class" (Marx. K., 1977n:537). Marx states that the working class has the duty to master themselves the mysteries of *international politics*..." (Marx. K., 1977n:537, emphasis added). We must understand what Marx calls, in his letter to Weydemeyer on December 19, 1849, the "sphere of foreign relations" (Marx. K., 1977i:340). It is in Marx's meditations on international relations that his assumptions about the sovereign state (form) can be identified. Since it is most apparent here that for Marx, as it was for Hegel, world-history is geopolitics.

Marx provides little specific analysis of international relations. Instead, his understanding must be stitched together from his empirical examples and from the

shadows of his texts. Marx warns that there is no master key to history; however, he implies that there is a master key to geography and geopolitics. He states that "[b]y studying each of these *forms* of evolution separately (states) and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this (historical-materialist) phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical" (Marx. K., 1977o:572). Marx, as revealed in his own condemnation of historico-philosophical reductionism, reveals a prior acceptance of a master key - form. Marx assumes a historico-philosophical theory of a world of geopolitical *forms* - separate states. He traces the development of a world of sovereign states as an evolution which

> takes place naturally, i.e. is not subordinated to a general plan of freely combined individuals, (instead) it proceeds from various localities, tribes, nations, branches of labour, etc. each of which to start with develops independently of each the others and only gradually enters into relations with others (Marx. K., 1977e:181).

Therefore, Marx assumes the existence of a world of sovereign states. And because of this assumption, Marx flips from national example to national example with ease. Marx cites examples which pertain to Germany, for example, assuming that along side it (in international relations terms not geographical terms) exists a separate and distinct England, France, Russia, Canada, Australia, The United States, Brazil, Ireland etc. In relation to Germany, Marx states that its citizens are beginning to

> recognise the interior sovereignty of monopoly by according it an exterior sovereignty. Thus we are now starting in Germany when (where?) France and England are beginning to end. ... So if developments in Germany as a whole did not go beyond German political development, a German could no more take part in contemporary problems than can a Russian. But if the single individual is not bound by the limits of his nation, the whole nation is even less liberated by the

liberation of an individual (Marx. K., 1977b:67).

Marx does not only assume a world of sovereign state forms, he also subscribes to this ontological position; in fact he prescribes it! In his analysis of the situation in Ireland Marx suggests that the first step is Irish independence from England. Marx states that what the Irish need is:

> (1) Self-government and *independence from England*
> (2) An agrarian revolution....
> (3) Protective tariffs *against England*... (Marx. K., 1977g:590, emphasis added).

He says the same thing in the Communist Manifesto. Marx states, "[t]hough not in substance, but in *form*, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at *first* a national struggle. The proletariat of *each* country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its *own* bourgeoisie" (Marx. K., 1997k:230, emphasis added).[29] He states that although "working men have no country... (they) must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word" (Marx. K., 1977k: 235).

In his empirical examples and in his concrete prescriptions, Marx assumes a *form* in international relations (geopolitics) which, according to Hegel, denies the possibility, of what Marx calls, *international politics*.[30] The process by which Marx examines the

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[29]This quote also implies that Marx further contains his counter-narrative of Capitalism, replacing Hegel's Geist, to the framework of Hegel's geopolitical containers and thus undermining the status of his critique.

[30]As Walker suggests an international relations built on the assumption of sovereign states makes international politics impossible by definition. Politics can only

(r)evolutionary path of each country, presupposes a sovereign form, a world of independent states. Their differences are given. The general and the particular is made possible by the presupposition of the universal - content is examined with the master key which reveals a prior international system of sovereign states, forms and space. Outside the state are other states and any attempt to move beyond the state leads into relations with other states: any attempt to appeal to world-history is a game of geopolitics. Marx sits at Hegel's final boundary with nothing but hope for communism.

The implication is that inherent in Marx's calls for "Proletarians of all *countries*, Unite! (Marx. K., 1977n:537, emphasis added)" and "WORKING MEN OF ALL *COUNTRIES*, UNITE! (Marx. K., 1977k:246, emphasis added)" is a set of sovereign limits which deny the possibility of realising Marx's goal. The latter phrase contradicts his often (mis?)quoted "Workers of the World, Unite!" since it inscribes a set of impassable formal limits; it inscribes the impossibility of realising a future world.

Therefore, Marx cages his project within the spatial discourse made possible by Kant's meditations on space and made obvious by Hegel's teleological system of spatial separation and inclusion. I have argued that Marx misses the importance that: Kant places on, what I am calling, sovereign form or sovereign space; Hegel places on form in writing the state as the conditions of possibility of its content; and that Hegel places on form in writing "the future as world-history" and "world-history as geopolitics." Marx

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exist within the sovereign form and the sovereign space of the state (see Walker. R.B.J., 1993; especially p. 160)

simply paints Kant and Hegel's forms the colours of revolutionary red and in the end must hope for the best.

I have focused on three of the key Modern political thinkers. I have argued that in the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx a spatial discourse is present. I argued that within this discourse, movement is valued, but only within a set of *a priori* limits, as spatial forms. These forms deny moving beyond these limits. As such the world is eternally produced as a series of sovereign states (forms) within a geopolitical and chronopolitical teleology of world-history (space-time). I argued that Kant's meditations on space, and specifically the relationship between content and form, are carried into his political writings. Although Kant can be read as a theorist of change and process, I suggested in contrast that Kant's concept of space contains certain limits. These limits are made obvious in Hegel's Philosophy of Right and in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Specifically, I argued that Hegel's system is constructed as a series of spatial stages, circles, spheres or forms that enable thinking about the beyond the sovereign form, however, at the same time they deny the possibility of moving beyond the sovereign form. In other words, any attempt to move beyond is always already implicated in a sovereign form which denies the ability to move beyond. Therefore, by focusing on the spatial dialectic, as the driving force of the development of Hegel's teleological system, I have suggested that there are three key boundaries of inclusion. In addition, world-history must also be read as a final geopolitical boundary of impossibility. With this analysis in mind, I turned to Marx's writings. I argued here that

although Marx understands and attempts to critique Hegel's teleological system, he reproduces the spatial discourse. Specifically, Marx maintains the logical development of the spatial dialectic while simply emphasising different components. Thus I argued that Marx works within the spatial discourse and hence reproduces the boundaries that were made obvious in Hegel's philosophy. They accumulate in his use of an international system of sovereign forms. I offer, by way of concusion, that Marx remains within the logical limits of Kant's spatial meditations and within the political limits of Hegel's system. The question remains, does Harvey's contemporized Marxist-Hegelianism escape its traditional limits? In the following section I argue that Harvey also returns to a politics of eternal forms and therefore fails to escape the spatial discourse and its political limits.

Chapter Three: Global Issues and the Political Containment of Movement

In this Chapter I focus exclusively on Harvey's final section in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. In his final section dedicated to radical politics, Harvey asks the question: "So what kind of Utopianism *is* possible or, put more directly, how can the human imaginary concerning a just society play any creative role in *anti-capitalist* politics" (Harvey. D., 1996:332, underline added)? Harvey's answer to this question is complex and wide ranging. He proposes that contemporary issues should be understood within a dialectical and historical-geographical materialist analysis. As I have shown in Chapter One, this type of analysis enables Harvey to emphasize the fluid and global aspects of capitalism, the environment and the urban. This emphasis allows Harvey to imply that his politics also reflects a sensitivity to movement; as he says

> [t]he implication (of a project based in a historical-geographical materialist analysis)...is that a Utopianism of processes looks radically different from a Utopianism of form. The implications of a dialectical/relational view is that the former deserves to be pursued with all the intellectual powers at our command while the latter must...be rejected as self-negating (Harvey. D., 1996:333).

Harvey draws from a tradition which, as I argued in Chapter Two, assumes a spatial discourse which promotes a politics and a "Utopianism of form." What remains to be examined, therefore, is whether Harvey succeeds in challenging this spatial discourse and presenting an argument for a politics of movement. In this Chapter I argue that Harvey continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics. He remains caught within a spatial discourse which denies that change is possible and eliminates the possibilities of thinking anew a politics of movement.

The sovereign spatial discourse continues to act as both the subject of Harvey's critique and the condition of possibility for his politics. Harvey wraps contemporary issues characterised by change into a discourse of spatial politics which denies that change is possible. This becomes most evident with Harvey's treatment of global issues, specifically capitalism, the urban and the environment. Harvey, emulating Marx, returns to a statist politics and a politics of form in order to deal with concrete issues which are *beyond* the state. Harvey's political prescriptions contradict his desires to think and act in terms of movement. I argue that in the final instance, Harvey prescribes a statist politics and a geopolitics which gives priority to form over content, stasis over change and space-time over alternative space/time(s). I re-examine Harvey's treatment of capitalism, the environment and the urban to show how he contains his politics back within a politics and "Utopianism of form."

Harvey's dialectical historical-geographic materialist analysis of capitalism, the environment and the urban demands that each issue not be treated in isolation. It is impossible to weed out a single politics specific to each issue; they are all inter-related and demand an inter-related politics. Thus, Harvey's political program is articulated as a series of meditations on a similar spatial theme. This theme is the relationship between universal and particular.[31] Harvey casts this relationship as a development which evolves from concrete circumstances to an abstract articulation of what a "politics of movement"

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[31]Elsewhere Harvey labels this theme space/place, absolutism/relativism, modernism/post-modernism and the like. I read this theme as a *spatial relationship* between content and form.

might look like. Although Harvey moves from the concrete to the abstract in his final section, I will examine this development in reverse. I do so in order to show that, while important gestures toward thinking anew are made in the abstract, Harvey's concrete politics "smuggles (back) in" a set of spatial limits which are assumed to be apolitical. As I argued in Chapter Two, these spatial assumptions and limits are intensely political since they create a world of predefined, spatialized and status-quo options.

My objective is to show how Harvey's abstract reasoning leads to a "Utopianism of form" prescribed by the spatial discourse identified in Chapter Two. Harvey's abstract articulation of problems associated with *spatial relationships* are examined first. In his section dealing with the urban Harvey recommends that new ways of thinking politics must be pursued. This is exciting. However, I suggest that Harvey leaves the reader in a political crisis of direction. His prior concrete forms leave his abstract words feeling like an illusory spectacle. They demand that one return to his "practical," "concrete" and "material" examples to discern what exactly is implied by his politics. Specifically, I argue that, by following the logic of the spatial discourse, Harvey returns to and/or has already assumed a geopolitical world of sovereign states. By focusing on this return, I demonstrate how form is always already implicated in Harvey's concrete political exploration of justice. Furthermore, I also demonstrate how Harvey's concrete eco-politics leads him back to a world of *a priori* spatial forms. Harvey does not offer the contemporary reader, activist and theorist anything that is new. Instead he offers what has been offered before: hope. Unfortunately, Hegel's system of sovereign forms and world-history as geopolitics in general, and spatial discourse in particular, implies that

hope for a future "other than what is the same" is a logical impossibility.

(Im)possible Urban Politics:

Harvey's Chapter on "possible urban worlds" is both inspiring and, in the last instance, baffling. Harvey identifies many of the problems associated with the spatial discourse developed in Chapter Two. Specifically, Harvey argues that, in an urbanising world of movement and change, contemporary theorists must resist the tendency to think in terms of a politics of form. He therefore articulates a relational politics which emphasizes a dialectical development. However, Harvey leaves the reader on the last sentence of Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference with no sense of what this means. This final sentence instills a sense that key assumptions have passed unannounced and unchallenged and will eternally re-emerge in any contemplation of a future. I will trace the development below.

Harvey argues that cities are "things" which are produced by a process called urbanisation (Harvey. D., 1996:418). Failing to understand this argument has led many urban theorists into the "persistent habit of privileging things and spatial forms over social processes...they in effect propose a fixed spatial order that ensures social stability by destroying the possibility of history and containing all processes within a fixed spatial form" (Harvey. D., 1996:419). Using Marx's language, Harvey states further that the "dead weight of conventional spatio-temporal thinking and actual spatio-temporal forms weighs like a practical nightmare on the thoughts and material possibilities of the living" (Harvey. D., 1996:419). Harvey, therefore, is impressed by the tendency of a politics of

spatial forms to reappear in contemporary accounts of political possibilities.

Harvey also argues that an unbridled focus on content poses difficulties for thinking about political action as well. He suggests that there is a "veritable ferment of anti-capitalist opposition within the interstices of the uneven spatio-temporal development of capitalism" (Harvey. D., 1996:430). The uneven spatio-temporal development poses considerable problems for a coherent and international anti-capitalist strategy. Particularistic struggles fail to see beyond their own immediate circumstances and lack "coherence and a unified direction" (Harvey. D., 1996:430). Harvey suggests therefore that the particularities of struggles have to be synthesized without replicating a Utopianism of form.

Harvey recognises that the state has been the traditional object of socialist strategies and the traditional site where a synthesis of particularistic struggles is thought to occur. He resists this simplistic strategy in his abstract examination of possible politics. For Harvey the state is

> insufficient for (anti-capitalist's) purpose (since) ... uniting different factions can never mean suppressing socio-ecological difference. (Instead) the socialist movement has to find ways to be just as flexible - in its theory and its political practice - over a space of volatile uneven development as the capitalist class has now become (Harvey. D., 1996:431).

Similarly, Harvey again resists the traditional strategy of using an avant-garde *political party* because it has

> often led to the superimposition of a single aim, a singular objective, an abstract socialist goal upon diverse anti-capitalist movements holding a multiplicity of objectives appropriate to different historical conditions (Harvey. D., 1996:432).

Instead Harvey suggests that there is an need for an avant-garde *movement* which can

express socialist alternatives. This movement must resist and move beyond the outdated elements of traditional Marxist strategies, like the state and the party, which can act as dogmatic barriers to action.

Harvey suggests that the work of synthesis must be the constant ambition of a *Marxist movement*. The *Marxist movement* must always be sensitive to the particularities of the material conditions of localities while at the same time illuminating the systemic patterns of capitalist uneven spatio-temporal development (Harvey. D., 1996:431). To do this, Harvey suggests that alternative

> [o]rganizations, institutions, doctrines, programs, formalised structures and the like simply have to be created. And these political activities must be firmly grounded in and transformative of the concrete historical and geographical conditions through which human action unfolds (Harvey. D., 1996:433).

Therefore, Harvey implies that a Marxist politics must resist (spatial) forms like the state and political parties and take up a politics of movement. Specifically it must be a *Marxist movement* which relationally and dialectically negotiates universal and particular goals within alternative "permanences." How can these alternative permanences be understood?

Harvey makes ten key statements about articulating a "Utopianism of process" as a new way of thinking about a relational, dialectical, process based, radical politics. Common to all ten statements is a relational and dialectical understanding of the relationship between "process and form." First, Harvey suggests that urban politics has to be about "modes of transformation of nature related dialectically to modes of *self-realization of a particular form of human nature"* (Harvey. D., 1996:435, emphasis

added). Society, the urban etc. must not be thought of as outside nature. Second, Harvey rejects the myth that "socio-ecological change can be controlled by finding the right spatial form" (Harvey. D., 1996:436). Third, Harvey adds that pure process cannot simply replace pure form. He defends this statement by arguing that "the dialectics of the imaginary and the material, of spatial forms and temporal processes, *constitute the fundamental and inescapable metabolic state of all human beings*. Becoming without being is empty idealism while being without becoming is death" (Harvey. D., 1996:436, emphasis added). Fourth, innovative strategies for dealing with urban problems must come from the possibilities within the city and not from imposed ideas about technological, economic or population fixes (Harvey. D., 1996:436). Sixth[32], economic solutions must emerge from cooperative ventures and not competitive market forces (Harvey. D., 1996:437). Seventh, Harvey rejects the stance that the strength of globalization demands a global revolution for anything to change. Instead he proposes that there must be a way "to respect the qualities of different "militant particularisms"...while *evolving strong spatial bonds* and *a global socialist politics of internationalism"* (Harvey. D., 1996:437, emphasis added). Eighth, Harvey demands that "community" be understood as a process so that it does not acquire the status of an exclusionary and oppressive spatial form (Harvey. D., 1996:437). Ninth, Harvey counsels that the "tensions born of heterogeneity cannot and should not be oppressed (by an authoritarian state order). (These tensions) must be liberated in socially exciting ways

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[32]Harvey's fifth statement was lost in some Nth dimensional tesser from the publishers and does not appear in the text.

- even if this means more rather than less conflict..." (Harvey. D., 1996:437). Harvey offers that "defining a politics which can *bridge* the multiple heterogeneities, including most emphatically those of geography, without repressing difference is one of the biggest challenges of the twenty-first century urbanization" (Harvey. D., 1996:438). Finally, Harvey concludes that we must not await some political revolution but that the "transformation of socio-ecological relations in urban settings has to be *a continuous process* of socio-environmental change (an urban based revolution) should have the exploration and *construction of alternative social processes and spatial forms* as its *long-term goal* albeit through short term and often place based movements and actions" (Harvey. D., 1996:438).

The very last line of Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference is baffling and it suggests that there might be something amiss at work in Harvey's "alternative politics" in general and in his ten (nine) statements in particular. Harvey states, "[h]ow to translate from this purely discursive moment in the social process to the realm of power, material practices, institutions, beliefs and social relations, is, however, where practical politics begins and discursive reflection ends" (Harvey. D., 1996:438). How can Harvey as a Marxist have this as the last line of his book? Or better yet, how can Harvey as a Marxist not have this line as the last line in his book? What can Harvey mean in his ten (nine) statements by "the dialectics of the imaginary and the material, of spatial forms and temporal processes, constitute the fundamental and inescapable metabolic state of all human beings?" How does this ontological position (see above, footnote #8 and #10) influence how a socialist movement might imagine "bridge(ing) the multiple

heterogeneities" through the "continuous process of... (the) construction of alternative social processes and spatial forms as its long-term goal?" Furthermore, what is a "a global socialist politics of internationalism" and how is it the "self realisation of a particular form of human nature?"

What I am asking here, is how are these statements different from Hegel's political development of the spatial dialectic examined in Chapter Two? Both Harvey and Hegel assume that the world unfolds dialectically. As he states "the dialectics of the imaginary and the material, of spatial forms and temporal processes, constitute the fundamental and inescapable metabolic state of all human beings." Harvey also states that "the world is inherently dialectical....there is as much evidence for...(this than) any alternative proposition" (Harvey. D., 1996:57-58). For both authors, this leads logically into the development and mediation of particular interests or "bridge(ing) the multiple heterogeneities." Hegel calls this the ethical state (what I called the first key boundary see p.84); whereas, Harvey calls it the "construction of alternative social processes and forms." The dialectical development further leads, in both cases, through the self-realisation of a particular form at the level of internationalism (what I called the final boundary for Hegel). In what follows I hammer out this affinity. I argue that Harvey has already prescribed or assumed an *a priori* realm, terrain, space and form for his relational politics or *Marxist movement* to unfold. I further suggest that hope and a call to faith for an (im)possible *future* are the only logical conclusions produced by the development of a relational-dialectical historical-geographical materialist political program at the brink of a geopolitical world of sovereign states.

As seen above Harvey constructs his vision of a relational politics of movement inside a set of dialectical relationships. At one level, Harvey attempts to deal with particular struggles and universal strategies. At another level, he is attempting to deal with local versus global scales of political action. At a third level, Harvey is attempting to negotiate the dialectical relationship between process and form. In order to understand what is potentially going on "beneath" the colours of process, movement and change in Harvey's abstract politics, an examination of Harvey's "practical politics" is required. I suggest that Harvey fails to challenge the ontological and epistemological status given to these *spatial relationships*. As such, his "practical politics" reproduce both the spatial discourse and its limits identified in Chapter Two.

In the following sections, therefore, I return to Harvey's meditations on anti-capitalist politics of justice and his meditations on an eco-political strategy. The latter is a further mediation on the former. Here I trace Harvey's development of these *spatial relationships* back into his examples of practical concrete politics. From these tracings, I suggest that the sovereign form of the state and geopolitics are always already present. The state and geopolitics are always assumed to be both the final forms of mediation between these *spatial relationships* and the beginning point of any inquiry. It is in these concrete and material examples, therefore, that Harvey "smuggles (back) in" the sovereign form and dictates a limited conception of politics. If assumed, Kant and Hegel's spatial discourse emerges as a politics of eternal forms which dominate and deny a politics of change or movement. The limits of Kant's metaphysics, as shown by Hegel's state, geopolitics and world-history, deny the possibility for change.

Capitalism, the State and Justice:

Harvey suggests that politics can lead towards a "'socially just' social order." Two dominant positions are encountered in his argument. At one level, Harvey confronts relativist and particularistic critiques of justice. At another level, Harvey attempts to distance his project from universalist determinations. Harvey therefore walks a relational line *between* these two created poles in order to produce a *dialectical* but *spatial relationship* as the basis of his politics. Harvey's argument unfolds as follows:

Harvey acknowledges some important contributions made by postmodern scholars. He suggests that particularist conceptions of justice which have been written as universals, by certain interest groups, have inflicted considerable harm throughout history. An example of a particularist conception of justice which has been universalised is "market justice." In market justice, Harvey argues, a typically legalistic response is filtered through the values of a market mentality (Harvey. D., 1996:344). Hence "systematic violence towards workers is translated into a question of individual culpability and negligence..." (Harvey. D., 1996:345). Therefore issues which demand that an entire system be held accountable are reduced to the shoulders of the liberal individual. As a parallel within this universal trend, oppositional discourses of justice (like worker's rights and class struggles) have also tended to reproduce the very universal strategy which they critique (Harvey. D., 1996:345). Harvey states,

> [c]oncentration on class alone is seen to hide, marginalise, disempower, repress and perhaps even oppress all kinds of "others" precisely because it cannot and does not acknowledge explicitly the existence of heterogeneities and differences

> based on, for example, race, gender, sexuality, age, ability, culture, locality, ethnicity, religion, community, consumer preferences, group affiliation, and the like (Harvey. D., 1996:345).

However, Harvey suggests that the postmodern critique of universalisms has left a politics of justice in a problematic position (Harvey. D., 1996:342).

Harvey therefore seeks to negotiate definitions of justice by appealing both to particular conditions of a specific place and to processes across space which make these specific moments intelligible. The question for Harvey is "*which* theory of social justice is the most socially just" (Harvey D., 1996:342)? and not how can all discourses of justice be demobilised. He contends that there must be a resurrection of social justice so as "to *build a bridge* between supposed universalisms of modernism (meaning particularisms like market justice) and the fragmented particularities left behind by poststructuralist deconstructions (Harvey. D., 1996:346). Responding to Iris M. Young (1990), Harvey suggests that one must understand how "relationships between individuals get mediated through market functions and state powers. And we have to define conceptions of justice capable of operating across these multiple meditations (Harvey. D., 1996:349)" as particularistic and resistance based conceptions of justice do, without also "smuggling back in" a universality of place.

Harvey therefore sets out to "break out of the local" so that the "objective of reform or revolutionary transformation of contemporary capitalism as a whole (which) has been given up on, even as a topic of discussion, let alone as a focus of political organisation (Harvey. D., 1996:348)" can be put back on the political agenda. He

identifies two dominant particularist[33] strategies. First, Harvey states that "we find ourselves invited to a veritable feast of geographically fragmented notions of justice that frequently take on territorial expression through the institutions of the state..." (Harvey. D., 1996:351). And in contrast we find a politics of justice which simply emphasizes "place based" or "particularistic" definitions of justice and thus runs the risk of "advocating a politics which would effectively freeze geographical structures of place for evermore... (or) dissolve rather than respect...social categories (permanences) upon which a recognition might be bestowed" (Harvey. D., 1996:352). Both particularist strategies are equally damaging. Harvey argues that the "contemporary emphasis on the local, while it enhances certain kinds of sensitivities, totally erases others and thereby truncates rather than emancipates *the field of political engagement and action"* (Harvey. D., 1996:353).

Harvey therefore turns to the concept of scale, as opposed to simply embracing the state, as a way to negotiate competing place bound definitions of justice. Harvey states that

> [s]omewhere *between* the vulgar essentialist view and the potentially infinite fluidity of multiple shifting identifications there has to be sufficient permanences established (however contingent) to give direction (for a time and in a place) to political action (Harvey. D., 1996:357, emphasis added).

Hence Harvey appeals to different scales. Harvey suggests that there is a

> hierarchy organization of places (permanences) within which we have our being

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[33]It is interesting that Harvey is so very concerned with the evils of particularisms and therefore fails to consider the implications of universal arguments except in single statements.

> (existence). Neighbourhood, city, region, nation, the globe refer to quite different processes of socio-ecological interaction occurring at quite different spatio-temporal scales. Individuals have membership in them all (Harvey. D., 1996:353).

Harvey's relational politics emerge as a way to mediate these different scales on the universal/particular hierarchy (Harvey. D., 1996:358). However, it is not clear how Harvey proposes to mediate these tensions to form a concrete prescription for political action? It could be argued, as I do below, that his solution simply appeals to more ubiquitous universals.

Harvey states that "it is hard to discuss the politics of identity, multiculturalism, "otherness," and "difference" in abstraction from the *material circumstances of a political project"* (Harvey. D., 1997:334, emphasis added). However, it is precisely in these material conditions that one can identify how the state and the sovereign form are always already implicated in Harvey's politics. Specifically, the presence of the state and the sovereign form is assumed in Harvey's understanding of the way the world *is* and in the natural teleological hierarchy of scale. I will examine the first below and leave the second to be taken up in the discussion of eco-politics.

Harvey's "material conditions of a political project" are situated within "the context of a particular problematic...within the particular material circumstances prevailing *in the United States"* (Harvey. D., 1996:334, emphasis added). The reference to the *United States* seems innocent; however, it instigates a chain or hierarchy of assumptions that indicate where and within what Harvey assumes politics to unfold.

Harvey examines the historical-geography of a "cataclysmic industrial accident"

at a chicken farm in Hamlet, North Carolina, *United States*. He carefully examines the economic conditions which lead to the accident. He explains how "broiler chicken has become big business" and how the characteristics of uneven spatio-temporal development favour the small towns of the deep south - the broiler belt (Harvey. D., 1996:334). He explains how, for instance, the "recent transformations in industrial organisation, flexible locational choices, and deregulation have been turned into a totally unsubtle form of coercive exploitation which is pre-rather than post-Fordist in its organisational form (Harvey. D., 1996:337)" lead to examples of a "'friendly business climate'" (Harvey. D., 1996:336). For example Harvey quotes that in "North Carolina 'has only 14 health inspectors and 27 safety inspectors (ranking) lowest in the nation in proportion to the number of inspectors (114) recommended under federal guidelines'" (Harvey. D., 1996:336). And on top of it all, Harvey also identifies a relationship between the "biggest chicken producer in the world" who "provided suspicious support and advice to various influential figures within the Clinton administration" (Harvey. D., 1996:335). Harvey's analysis is impressively thorough.

Harvey also considers the "history of workplace safety and of regulatory practices and enforcements *in the United States"* (Harvey. D., 1996:338). He examines, for instance, the implications of the New Deal in the *wake* of a Democratic Party whose interests resided in class issues and universal legislation. He points to the Republican Party's class interests and how they are mobilised "against all forms of government intervention...as well as against the welfare state" (Harvey. D., 1996:339).

Harvey expresses his amazement at the "lack of political response to this

cataclysmic event (Harvey. D., 1996:337)" *in the United States*. He wonders why there was such an uproar over the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nominational hearings and the Rodney King beating which are expressions of *oppression* but so little attention was garnered for an incident of clear and brutal *exploitation* (Harvey. D., 1996:338). Where was the critical community when these victims needed them? Harvey states that the "outcome was predictable enough. When a relatively coherent class force (represented by the Republican Party) encounters a fragmented opposition which cannot even conceive of its interests in class terms, then the result is hardly in doubt" (Harvey. D., 1996:340). It was an "'accident waiting to happen' at Hamlet, North Carolina (Harvey. D., 1996:340)," *United States.*

Harvey laments the fact that an "effective working-class politics would have better protected the *rights* of men and women, whites and Afro-Americans in a situation where those particular identities, rather than those of class, were not of primary significance" (Harvey. D., 1996:358). By class Harvey means a process; it is a relational concept whereby class is a "*situatedness or positionality in relation to processes of capital accumulation"* (Harvey. D., 1996:359, original emphasis). But classes also create certain "permanences" which yield political effectiveness (Harvey. D., 1996:359). In some cases they create the Republican Party in others they create Trade Unions etc. As a result, Harvey asserts that the type of working class politics that he supports emerges "[o]nly through critical re-engagement with political economy, with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation (read: class), (only then) can we hope to re-establish a conception of social justice as something to be fought for as a key value within an ethics

of political solidarity *built across different places"* (Harvey. D., 1996:360, emphasis added). What "space" is meant by Harvey's phrase "*built across different places*?"

Although Harvey warns against utilising statist strategies (see above p.133) his own earlier work points in just such a direction. For instance, in The Condition of Postmodernity, Harvey readily accepts that in a post-Fordist era state invention is needed. He states that the

> state is now in a much more problematic position. It is called upon to regulate the activities of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it is forced, also in the national interest, to create a 'good business climate'...state intervention(ism) has changed substantially since 1972 throughout the capitalist world.... this does not mean, however, that state interventionism has generally diminished...state interventionism (in some respects) is more crucial now than it ever was (Harvey. D., 1990:170).

He does not depart from this position in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Harvey consistently appeals to a discourse of rights (Harvey. D., 1996:358), to a discourse of legislation (Harvey. D., 1996:339), to a discourse of government intervention (Harvey. D., 1996:339) and to a discourse of federal guidelines (Harvey. D., 1996:336) all of which are made possible by the state. What can these examples mean? At one level they simply signal an acceptance of the state as a component in an overall strategy. More importantly, however, they point to Harvey's use of an *a priori* sovereign form. This form is both the logical beginning and the logical outcome of the spatial discourse that Harvey assumes. Harvey begins with the United States as the material circumstances of his analysis and ends, as it will be demonstrated later, with the United States in a world of other sovereign forms. His politics begin and end with a politics of form.

In the last instance, Harvey tempers any radical possibility of a politics of movement with retractions like: "universality (form) can never be avoided...(it) must be constructed in dialectical relation with particularity (content);" "in any society certain principles of exclusion have to operate;" and finally he is forced to identify his ideal politics as "a far more united politics (which) can flow from a determination to check *that* (capitalist) process" (Harvey. D., 1996:365).

I suggest that the above retractions can be read as: universal forms are always given (permanences, united directions, community, state etc.); there is always a sharp line between inside/outside and inclusion/exclusion; and this universal form (regardless of the label it is given) is the only way to combat, challenge and act politically in a world of (capitalist) movement! Harvey assumes the state to begin with, so as to "smuggle back in" the role of the sovereign form in the last instance: as something universal, something which excludes and something which can check process.

Harvey states, at the beginning of his Chapter on anti-capitalist politics and justice, that

> *it is hard to discuss the politics of identity, multiculturalism, "otherness," and "difference" in abstraction from* the material circumstances of a political project. I shall, therefore, situate my discussion in the context of a particular problem...within the particular material circumstances prevailing in *the United States* (Harvey. D., 1996:334, emphasis added).

My response is blunt: Indeed! It may very well be impossible to speak about the politics of identity, multiculturalism, "otherness" and "difference" in <u>any</u> other way. In line with Kant's reasoning on space, in order for these political issues (content) to have meaning at all an *a priori* sovereign form is necessary. Harvey's demands for an alternative "way" of

mediating universal and particular interests (Harvey. D., 1996:357, 437) are situated within an assumption about the "way" the world already *is* and a "way" that these interests are always already mediated. A world of sovereign states as *a priori* forms is assumed.

Any discussion of politics is made possible by assumptions about where and within what form politics can exist and have meaning. Harvey states that "reclaiming the *terrain* of justice and of right for progressive politics purposes appears as an urgent theoretical and political task" (Harvey. D., 1996:361). Terrain here must be understood as existing "*in* certain situations, such as the contemporary *United States*, as a basis for political action" (Harvey. D., 1996:361).

Progressive politics must furthermore be understood as a result of a "broader struggle over ideological hegemony between conflicting groups *in society"* (Harvey. D., 1996:361). Society, for Harvey, can mean both a society defined by money (capitalism) or a society defined by the state (progressive politics?). Harvey argues that against a money society "[t]he task of progressive politics is to find an equally powerful, dynamic, and persuasive way of relating the universal and particular at different scales in the drive to define social justice from the standpoint of the oppressed" (Harvey. D., 1996:362). Harvey constructs his *anti-capitalist* politics as a movement which must understand "[h]ow to *translate from this purely discursive moment* in the social process *to the realm of power, material practices, institutions, beliefs and social relations"* (Harvey. D., 1996:438, emphasis added). For Harvey the translation is always already given and the "in" is always implicit. The *realms of power*, the *terrains of justice*, the space *between*

different places, the field of political action and the form of *society* are always already given in Harvey's analysis. The state, for example *the United States*, is always already implicated in Harvey's historical-geographical materialist examination. The prior acceptance of the form of the state as a constitutive component of the way the world *is* is implied from the start of Harvey's project. His anti-capitalist politics must *check process* by mobilising, overtaking or creating a form which contains the objects of Harvey's desire: *a terrain of justice, a realm of power*, and *a socially just social order* etc.

However, a question remains: if universality can never be avoided, if principles of exclusion are always necessary and if process must be checked, then where do the lines between enlightened forms get drawn and by whom? This question is particularly important if one is attempting to articulate (an illusion of) a politics of movement. I suggest that this is where scale comes in. Harvey's hierarchy of different scales, namely "[n]eighbourhood, city, region, nation, the globe (Harvey. D., 1996:353)" gives some indication of where Harvey is likely to draw the lines. The question of scale leads directly to the problems of international relations, to global issue like the environment and the spatial discourse. In what follows, therefore, I argue that the lines between forms are drawn and maintained in Harvey's conception of international relations and geopolitics. The sovereign state is the mediating form between scales like the global and the national and implied as enabling for scales like neighbourhood, region and individual. Harvey's analysis of an eco-politics demonstrates this argument. Thus, I will again trace Harvey's abstract development of *spatial relationships*, this time in relation to eco-discourses, so as to demonstrate how a dialectical relationship develops into a

geopolitical world of sovereign states and *a priori* spatial forms.

Eco-(geo)politics:

As was the case with Harvey's examination of justice, the tension between different environmental scales must also be translated into some form of political action. As different socio-ecological scales are produced, the political structures corresponding to these scales must also be constructed to "arbitrate and translate between them" (Harvey. D., 1996:204). Harvey examines two distinct political scales in environmental discourses. On the one hand, the environment is situated as global (i.e., acid rain, ozone depletion, loss of planetary biodiversity etc.; and on the other hand, it is situated as local (i.e., water quality, point pollution etc.) (Harvey. D., 1996:204). Harvey names four eco-discourses on political action: the standard view, ecological modernisation, wise use and environmental justice. As examples of political action these eco-discourses provide various ways of translating or meditating the particularities of the local and the universalisms of the global. I will reconstruct each in turn.

The *standard view* is presented by Harvey as the capitalist discourse on eco-political action. Harvey acknowledges that environmental successes in advanced capitalist countries have resulted from capitalism's limited ability to recognize market failures as the causes of environmental destructions (Harvey. D., 1996:374-6). When problems are recognised, "after-the-fact" actions are initiated and designed to obstruct the way of economic progress (Harvey. D., 1996:373). Such actions, therefore, occur on a place by place, event by event basis and are regulated or initiated by the state. These

interventions and regulations depend on a bureaucratic and remedial scientific rationality. The state uses a zero-sum model to conduct cost-benefit compromises and usually favours the interests of corporations and the state (Harvey. D., 1996:374-5). Harvey argues that the limitations of the standard view reside in its refusal to challenge the basic tenants of contemporary life. It maintains the privileged position of capital accumulation, private property and scientific rationality (Harvey. D., 1996:374-6). Therefore, for Harvey, the standard view is capable of recognising a limited number of specific environmental problems and incorporating them within the universal political-economic assumptions of capitalism in general, and through institutions like the market and private property in particular.[34]

Harvey argues that *ecological modernisation* (eco-modernisation) emerged as a counter-hegemonic discourse to the standard view. Eco-modernisation attempts to understand, predict and prevent ecological destruction and is more amenable to a dialectical reading of socio-ecological change (Harvey. D., 1996:376-7). Against the standard view's *ad hoc* regulation, eco-modernisation seeks systematic regulation, litigation and legislation (Harvey. D., 1996:377-8). Eco-modernisation suggests that regulation can provide "win-win" solutions because it does not ignore, like the standard view does, alternative financial incentives and models of growth. An eco-modernisation

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[34]In contrast, I might suggest that the basic institutions of the liberal state (property, the market, science) are not challenged precisely because the liberal model of the state is assumed as the condition under which a challenge (regulations, interventions and meditations between the environment and the market) is possible in the first place. Capitalism is only a secondary consideration. Nevertheless...

strategy of "sustainability" balances growth, distributive justice and ecological preservation (Harvey. D., 1996:379).

Harvey argues that the state is no longer the primary political agent in the eco-modernisation discourse. International organisations and local governments are key players in its regulative, legislative and legal actions (Harvey. D., 1996:379). Harvey argues that the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) marked the final embracement of international organisations (i.e., United Nations and World Bank) and local governments. For Harvey, UNCED celebrated "non-state" actors and awarded them new gifts of power (Harvey. D., 1996: 379). Harvey also suggests that UNCED made way for the involvement of civil society institutions in global environmental politics. As a result the number of eco-public-interest groups, NGOs and debates about ecological ethics have increased (Harvey. D., 1996:379). In general, Harvey argues that UNCED marked a new direction towards global justice and global ecological management (Harvey. D., 1996:380). UNCED provided the type of multi-scale hierarchy of power and agency that Harvey celebrates for representing the diverse nature and scales of ecological problems (Harvey. D., 1996:379).

Harvey is, however, also critical of rashly celebrating UNCED's move to the global. First, he questions the failure of "less developed countries" to keep pace with global standards (Harvey. D., 1996:381). Second, he is wary of the possibility that corporations and dominant states could monopolise these new global avenues. He argues that it is <u>not</u> impossible to imagine a world where global corporations, global governance and global science dominate (Harvey. D., 1996:382). There is considerable room for

global co-optation precisely because eco-modernisation does challenge property rights (Harvey. D., 1996:381). This challenge opens the possibility that eco-modernisation could turn into a world resource-property grab by both multinational corporations and dominant states. Third, Harvey is also sceptical of the neo-Malthusian discourse of "natural limits" which accompanies the current push to global regulation. Harvey argues that the Club of Rome and the Brundtland Commission failed to identify the role of capitalism (and instead focused on "the population problem") in the creation and perpetuation of the environmental crisis (Harvey. D., 1996:381). Finally, Harvey recognises that, while there has been a discursive shift away from the "nation state," little in terms of alternatives have been worked out in practice (Harvey. D., 1996:379). This final point will be taken up when Harvey's endorsement of the environmental justice movement is examined.

Therefore Harvey suggests that eco-modernisation has been constructed as a counter-hegemonic discourse against the standard view and that it represents a discursive shift away from the "nation state" to international organisations and local governments as mediums for particular and universal interests to be translated. Harvey suggests that because eco-modernisation lacks a radical, anti-capitalist edge it deserves modification.[35]

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[35]In contrast, I might suggest that this section also reveals the conditions of possibility to Harvey's prescriptions. Harvey seems correct to argue that there is a discursive move away from the state. However, it is not clear that he has identified any non-state actors which correspond to this shift. The move to international organisations and local governments are the logical unfolding of the sovereign logic at different scales and not alternatives to the state. Both international organisations and local governments are enabled by the sovereign authority of the state (see Walker. R.B.J., 1993: Chapter Six). I continue this line of argument below.

Harvey shifts from the two dominant discourses outlined above, which tend to be mired by universal sentiments, and examines two reactionary movements. He examines the *wise-use movement* and the *environmental justice movement.*

Harvey argues that the *wise-use movement* is inspired by right wing, libertarian ideology and rooted in a Lockean theory of the state (Harvey. D., 1996: 383). This movement is based on both the return to individual private property rights and an opposition to all government and collective interventions (Harvey. D., 1996:383). Wise-use movements hold that the right to invest one's labour into the land (property) is inalienable. They argue that there is no need for state intervention since private property guarantees that a well maintained and healthy investment (environment) will be passed down to future generations (Harvey. D., 1996:383-5). Since it theorises political action in terms of non-intervention the wise-use movement is an apologist for corporate interests and an anti-state movement.[36]

Harvey suggests that the *environmental justice movement* is a mirror reflection of the wise use movement (Harvey. D., 1996:383). As such, it is the eco-discourse and eco-politics that Harvey endorses. Harvey argues that the discourse of environmental justice is not likely to be co-opted by corporate and government agents because: (1) it recognises tangible inequalities; (2) it rejects sovereign "expert" discourses; (3) it is anthropocentric; (4) it is inclusive of marginalised voices; and (5) it demonstrates symbolic purchase

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[36]In contrast, I might suggest that the wise-use movement is not anathema to the state; it is a statist movement. It seeks to maintain the liberal state in its most theoretically pure form. Property and local control are only possible within the protective boundaries of the state. Nevertheless...

which can undermine competing discourses (i.e., the standard view and the wise use movement) (Harvey. D., 1996:385-7). On this last point, Harvey argues that environmental justice movements do not to appeal to monetary systems of valuation. Instead they tend to appeal to "neo-medieval" discourses of morality and justice and a cosmology of spiritual interconnectedness (Harvey. D., 1996:388-9).

The environmental justice movement receives Harvey's endorsement as a political program worth pursuing because it is capable of translating between two key scales. At one level, the environmental justice movement values cultural autonomy and self-determination (particular); at a second level, it carries a message which unites particular forces under a universal moral order of justice (universal). It translates the slogan "not-in-my-backyard" into "not-in anyone's-backyard" (Harvey. D., 1996:391). Due to the increased scope of environmental justice, an eco-political terrain which is multi-layered and more apt to deal with the complexity of social production (capitalism) is produced. The movement provides an example of the type of politics that Harvey attempts to think about in the abstract. This discourse therefore merits closer examination.

I argue that the environmental justice movement is only capable of negotiating the particular and the universal by appealing to a "practical politics" based within a "radicalized" eco-modernisation program. It maintains the state and geopolitics as its conditions of possibility. Although Harvey recognises (but only in passing) that the "nation-state" remains the privileged translative agent and at the same time makes no political-ecological sense (Harvey. D., 1996:204), in the last instance, he endorses a state-centric environmental project. Harvey fails to negotiate these different scales in new and

exciting ways (like the urban) and instead returns, as Hegel's development predicts, to the political agent of the state in a world of geopolitical forms as a representation of Kantian space-time.

Harvey argues that the environmental justice movement must step away from the powerful, yet limited, discourse of neo-medieval morality (i.e., the spiritual inter-connectedness and the purity of Mother Earth) and instead utilize a discourse of social justice. Due to Harvey's insistence on justice as counter meta-discourse to capitalism (see above), he is forced to define what justice might actually mean. Harvey rejects a foundational, eternal understanding of justice (universal) (see Harvey. D., 1996: Chapter 12) and he rejects an *ad hoc* discourse of justice (particular) (Harvey. D., 1996:398). Therefore, Harvey argues that environmental justice must find a way to transcend or mediate the particularistic views in society yet distance itself from "ready made" universal doctrines of justice. He quotes Marx's thoughts on this subject. Marx argued that social justice is not eternal; it is "something contingent upon the social processes operating in *society as a whole"* (Marx quoted in Harvey. D., 1996:399, emphasis added). Harvey recognises the difficulty in thinking of terms of "society as a whole" and he recognises the tendency to think simply in particularistic terms. Nevertheless, Harvey encourages those in the environmental justice movement to

> treat the contradiction (of particular struggles) as a fecund nexus to create *a more transcendental and universal politics* ... to transcend the narrow solidarities and particular affinities shaped in particular places ... and adopt *a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space*, across the multiple environmental and social conditions that constitute the *geography of difference in a contemporary world* that capitalism has intensely shaped for its own purpose. And it has to do this without abandoning its militant particularist base. (Harvey.

D., 1996:400).

The question of how Harvey proposes to create a *more transcendental and universal politics, a politics of abstraction capable of reaching out across space*, across both *society as a whole* and a *geography of difference in a contemporary world* remains to be explored.

Harvey argues that the environmental justice movement "will have no option, as it broadens from its militant particularist base, but to reclaim for itself a non-coopted and nonpreverted version of the theses of ecological modernisation ... it has to *radicalize* the eco-modernisation discourse" (Harvey. D., 1996:401, emphasis added). Eco-modernisation must be "radicalized" by focusing on the underlying processes which give rise to the ecological destruction that it aims to transform (Harvey. D., 1996:401). For Harvey this means struggling against capitalist processes (Harvey. D., 1996:401). He states that environmental justice must become, but already is, "fundamentally a class project" (Harvey. D., 1996:401).

However, Harvey's revisionism is not necessarily "radical." It must be remembered that eco-modernisation is a statist project (see above). While Harvey attempts to weed capitalist interests out of eco-modernisation, Harvey does not challenge the *roots* of modern politics. He does not challenge the state-centrism which underpins eco-modernisation's conception of political action. On the contrary, since it is the sovereign state which solves the riddle of what justice can mean for "society as a whole" in the Modern age, Harvey has little choice but to return to the sovereign state to mediate universal and particular conceptions of justice. Again the state is "smuggled back in."

Eco-modernisation provides the environmental justice movement with this assumed form. Eco-modernisation, as a reminder, suggests that the state must be the vehicle of political change in at least three ways. In order for issues like environmental degradation and human suffering to be confronted, the state, firstly, must be the regulative body which keeps corporations in line. Secondly, the institutions of the state (i.e., local government, class or civil society) must be mobilised to confront other state institutions (i.e. market justice or private property rights). Finally, those problems which transcend the authority of the state are left, according to Harvey's own admission, to the troubling, uncertain and politically difficult waters of international relations. The sovereign state remains.

In relation to a *geography of difference in a contemporary world*, and taking up the third point further, Harvey returns to traditional state-centric conceptions of international relations exemplified by Hegel (realism) and Kant (idealism). Harvey's assumptions about international relations are revealed when he attempts to deal with phenomena which transcend the authority of the individual state, like global environmental problems. Two assumptions are revealed. At one level, Harvey assumes a realm of international anarchy that is required to be negotiated. At a second level, Harvey still positions the state as the privileged agent which must negotiate this anarchy and secure agreements.

For Harvey, action on global issues must be funnelled through the state in the hopes that international agreements can be secured and internal environments can be regulated. He states

> cooperation is required to gain support for proactive environmental initiatives so

> that the question of environmental justice has to be intergraded into the search for long term sustainablity, partly as a pragmatic adaptation to the internationalism of several key contemporary ecological issues: sovereign nation states, including those of the poor, have to agree to certain regulatory environment ... (and) enforce its provisions Harvey. D., 1996:379).

He argues that collective action will require negotiations between individual states and he recognises the traditional problem of securing binding agreements between sovereign states. He states that "[n]egotiating with China and India is politically quite different from negotiating the location of a hazardous waste site in Mississippi" (Harvey. D., 1996:379). Therefore Harvey gestures towards an idealist theory of international relations by appealing to international organisations and international law as desired ends to *bridge* the "anarchic" space between sovereign states.

Perhaps, at best, Harvey has in mind some cosmopolitan "neo-medieval"[37] entity which both transcends and encourages the production of different scales. Harvey states that the benefit of a discursive shift towards justice

> is that environmental management is no longer seen to be the exclusive providence of governments or the nation state. The nation state, while clearly still important, should be supplemented by strong international organisations as well as local governments. ... Many layers of government operating at many different scales should be implicated as partners in the search for better paths of environmental management. This move to construct some sort of hierarchy of powers tactically recognises the diverse spatial scales at which environmental issues can arise (Harvey. D., 1996:379).

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[37]Harvey makes numerous reference to the medieval nature of environmental justice, I wonder if this is does not mark the beginning of a relationship between Harvey's Marxism and say the cosmopolitanism of David Held (See Held. D., 1995). This would not be too far fetched, one can easily read Murray Bookchin's "radical," "anarchist" "confederalism" as a brand of liberal cosmopolitanism or neo-perpetual peace. See Whitehall. G., "Decloaking the Wizard: (Inter)national Relations, Cosmopolitanism, Confederalism and Social Movements" (Carleton University: unpublished paper, 1995)

As stated earlier, Harvey assumes that Rio (UNCED) marked a moment when states divested powers to international organisations. However, Harvey's turn to UNCED is seriously misguided. He misreads the success of UNCED in particular and the potential of similar initiatives in general. For example, UNCED did not represent a move towards international co-operation; rather it represented the solidification of the role of the state in global debates. What was important about UNCED was what was left UNSAID. While Harvey refers to Sachs' (1993) reading of UNCED, he fails to understand the implications of Sachs' critique has for his own project. Sachs argues that UNCED and eco-modernisation are not innovative and inspiring; to the contrary, he argues they are discourses of the status-quo (perhaps Sachs might have used Harvey's language and called them the *standard view*) (See Sachs. W., 1993:13). More importantly, UNCED represented business as usual in more ways than just capitalist interests.

UNCED, in addition to endorsing what Harvey identifies as potential capitalist dangers, also made a universal endorsement of the state's sovereign authority to control its own internal, external and future destiny. As Matthias Finger argues in Sachs' edited collection,

> UNCED was an outright failure. This failure can be explained largely by the fact that UNCED was an almost perfect remake of the UN Conference on the Human Environment 20 years earlier. ... (This repetition) merely illustrates to what extent nation-states continue to consider themselves to be the most pertinent actors when it comes to dealing with the challenges of global ecology. ... Above all, the UNCED-process must be seen as an attempt by nation-states and their governments to rehabilitate themselves as pertinent and legitimate actors.... (Finger. M., 1993:38-39).

Both UNCED and eco-modernisation represent the key problems of contemporary politics, not its solutions. In this regard, there is no option of "radicalisation;" UNCED and eco-modernisation are status-quo by definition.

In addition, Harvey also reveals the limits of the political system that he assumes. For example, the difficulty of negotiating with China and India (assuming that the United States is US) cannot be minimized. In fact, it is predictable. International organisations and international law, as Hegel argued, remain "oughts" in a world of sovereign states (Hegel. G., 1967:§330-333). Difficult indeed: what can be more sovereign than sovereign? International relations theory is a meta-narrative in which peace, security, justice, politics and stability are relegated inside the state, while outside the state, anarchy, violence and relations of instability prevail (see Walker. R.B.J., 1993). The impossibility of collective action, justice and politics outside the state is predetermined by the assumption of state sovereignty and modern statist politics. At best, hopes that democracy, politics and justice can be enforced and enacted beyond the "sovereign state" assume that the spatial scale of the sovereign line is simply increased (Walker. R.B.J., 1993:Chapter Six). Cosmopolitan attempts, what Harvey might call politics at multiple geographical scales, either maintain individual sovereign states or propose some form of global state. In both cases, *a sovereign form* is maintained (see above footnote #26). An alternative way of conceptualizing politics is lost in the practicality of (form)al politics.

At best Harvey offers a "Hegelian Hope" or a "Kantian Purpose" to a future which the development of his own logical commitments denies. But there is nothing new about that or Harvey's conviction that,

> [o]nly through critical re-engagement with political economy, with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation (read: class), can we *hope* to re-establish a conception of social justice (as the "construction of alternative social processes and spatial forms") as something to be fought for as a key value within an ethics of political solidarity built across different places (Harvey. D., 1996:360, emphasis added).

Upon what basis does Harvey offer hope? I argued in Chapter One that Harvey introduces the concept of "social time" into his examination of Leibniz and highlights this in his analysis of Whitehead. As a reminder, social time condemns all that is possible in the future to the material conditions of the present and past (see above p.15). Furthermore, Whitehead's allowance of a differentiation between space and time enables the possibility of evolution and change.

Harvey's hope lies in (r)evolutionary processes attributed to his conception of time. Harvey makes some important statements about evolution. In his examination of a dialectical view of socio-ecological change, Harvey proposes that four concepts (competition, adaption, collaboration and transformation) be used to describe the process of change (Harvey. D., 1996:190). Although Harvey is attempting to create, "if not a common language, then (a) means to translate across discursive domains (Harvey. D., 1996:190)" he also holds out the promise that "each facet of the overall process (evolution) internalizes a great deal of heterogeneity..." (Harvey. D., 1996:191). He submits the radical view that agents of change are literally everywhere; scallops for instance are not passive objects of a fisher's design (Harvey. D., 1996:192). This recognised, the question of process and trajectory still needs to be examined. How does Harvey understand the passing of time which avoids, escapes the dilemmas posed by the

spatial discourses in general and it politics of form in particular? If the scallop is an agent of change, which I do not doubt, then how does Harvey suggest it act politically? The crux of the matter is that Harvey, as I have argued above, leads the poor dear scallop, ripe with potential, to the doomed discourse of the state and geopolitics. Harvey's hope lies, and it is no more clear than in the following quote, in a way "to respect the qualities of different "militant particularisms"... while *evolving strong spatial bonds* and *a global socialist politics of internationalism"* (Harvey. D., 1996:437, emphasis added). Harvey's concept of time is already implicated in his spatial assumptions.

This is all quite predictable. As was demonstrated in Chapter Two, the intellectual tradition that Harvey mobilises is rooted in a spatial discourse which defines what politics can mean. Kant's metaphysical assumptions about the nature of space ascribe certain limits, shown by Hegel in particular, that doom any hope of a future beyond the geopolitical boundaries of a politics of form. Hegel reads the future as world-history and world-history as geopolitics (as a representation of Kant's concept of absolute space-time). Since Harvey continues to privilege the eternal form when theorizing politics, his hopes must be funnelled back into the statist politics of an eco-(geo)political project. He remains caught within a spatial discourse which denies that change is possible and eliminates the possibilities of thinking anew a politics of movement.

I have argued in this Chapter that while Harvey's abstract meditations on politics seem to emphasize process, movement and change because of their relational and dialectical formulation, Harvey has already implicated this form of movement within the

limits of a spatial discourse which denies that change is possible. Implied therefore is that inherent in the spatial dialectic or a relational politics is a future which is less liberating than might be suggested. Specifically, the dialectical treatment of universal/particular, process/form, place/space, local/global requires a prior form and a specific conception of space in order to make intelligible what politics must look like. I argued that this politics, in accordance with the spatial discourse examined in Chapter Two, leads into the sovereign form of the state in particular and a world of geopolitical forms in general. Harvey's examinations of global issues like capitalism and the environment were used to demonstrate how the ghosts of Hegel and Kant are found at the beginning and end of Harvey's political project. Even Harvey's offer of hope is doomed to the limits inscribed by his spatial assumptions.

Conclusions and Beginnings...

I have suggested that although there has been an increased sensitivity on the part of contemporary theorists to the difficulties of examining, without reifying, movement in particular, and alternatives to static spatialized conceptions of politics in the world in general, there remains a tendency to privilege a politics of form. I have used David Harvey is exemplary of this trend. What has remained the central preoccupation of this thesis is how Harvey continually returns to a politics of eternal forms even though he, more than many, earnestly attempts to theorize contemporary politics in terms of movement, process and change. Restated, despite Harvey's gestures rejecting a political and philosophical tradition which roots itself in ideal conceptions of space and solid, eternal and formal political structures, Harvey fails to deracinate his project from the tradition he critiques. He embraces movement yet neglects the metaphysical conditions of possibility specific to that conception of movement.

Let me provide a paradoxical example of the power of spatial assumptions. This paradox reads as a static version of Zeno's paradox. Assume that you are standing one hundred meters from a fence. You are told that you may move half the distance between you and the fence each day. Thus, each day you move increasingly closer. However, it is a logical (spatially) impossibility to surpass the fence. Your approach leads you infinitely closer to the fence; but the ontological assumptions at work, deny the possibility of a future beyond the fence.

This paradox resembles purely static attempts to think about politics (i.e., liberal political theory). Harvey's contemporarisation of the Marxist-Hegelian tradition clearly

rejects (as I have shown in Chapter One) this static reading of the world. For Harvey things are in process, the goal of the approach is moving. However, I have argued that Harvey's conception of movement continues to maintain Kantian spatial assumptions.

A second paradox can be used to explain the spatial discourse particular to Harvey's assumptions. Take a fluid version of Zeno's paradox as the classic example of how one's assumption can prescribe a limiting condition of possibility within a system of movement.[38] Zeno's paradox poses the problem of how spatial limits continue to operate while process, flux and movement are valued. The paradox is set between three actors: a hare, a tortoise and a finish line. Because tortoises are relatively slow, the tortoise is allowed to go first. When the tortoise reaches point "A" the hare begins the race. The hare races off to catch the tortoise at a pace that resembles the zest and energy of an avant-garde political movement and far surpasses the speed of its slower, mired opponent. When the hare reaches point "A," however, the tortoise has already moved onto point "B." And, when the hare arrives at point "B" the tortoise has already moved onto point "C." This process continues *ad infinitum*. With the goal of surpassing the tortoise, the hare is doomed to logical frustration.

In relation to Harvey's project, as the hare (read: content, class, the environmental justice "movement") moves toward the tortoise (read: the state, future as world-history or world-history as geopolitics) her/his goal has already moved on. As Kant reports, perpetual peace is an impossibility, as such, one must be content with the (never ending)

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[38]I am loosely following Ray's (1991) articulation of Zeno's paradox.

approach. He states

> [i]t naturally follows that *perpetual peace*, the ultimate end of all international right, is an idea incapable of realisation. But the political principles which have this aim, i.e. those principles which encourage the formation of international alliances designed to *approach* the idea itself by a continual process, are not impractical (Kant. I., 1991e: 171).

Hegel too suggests that world-history as his philosophical goal is an ever- approaching process; since,

> when philosophy paints its grey grey, then it has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its winds only with the falling of the dusk [Hegel. G.W.F, 1967:preface (p.13)].

Marx points with frustration to the eternal recurrence of the past,

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under the circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weights like a living nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they *anxiously* conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from the names, battle-crises, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in the *time-honoured disguise* and this borrowed language (Marx. K., 1977d:300, emphasis added).

And Harvey, as a contemporary theorist, stands at the threshold of the future possessing only the tools of hope,

> [o]nly through critical re-engagement with political economy, with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation (read: class), can we *hope* to re-establish a conception of social justice (as the "construction of alternative social processes and spatial forms") as something to be fought for as a key value within an ethics of political solidarity built across different places (Harvey. D., 1996:360, emphasis added).

Zeno's paradox works on an assumed conception of space, one that is both infinite and

endlessly divisible (Ray. C., 1991:Chapter 1). By working within these assumptions it becomes logically impossible, even though we all know that it is possible, to think about over-taking the tortoise. The modern state and geopolitics as world-history, function on the immutable status given to spatial (and temporal) assumptions. These assumptions deny the possibility of thinking and acting in a "political" way that is capable of matching the speed of the opponents it wants to overtake.

Strategies that have attempted to deal with this paradox have oscillated between endlessly chasing after the tortoise and positioning the fence as a "static" entity on the vanishing point of infinity. I have argued that Harvey *anxiously* recalls the spatial ghosts from the past to reconstruct the *time-honoured disguise* of what politics might mean. His oscillation conjures up spatial assumptions of the past in a hopeless hope for a future different from the past. He creates the illusion of movement within the spatial assumptions of a contained politics.

As a result, the practical prescriptions of Harvey's Marxist politics resembles a form of cosmopolitan liberalism. His politics of multiple scales has a tight affinity with cosmopolitan attempts to think of a neo-medieval global order. Harvey accepts a fictional reality [as a reminder Marx stated that "'the present day state' is, therefore, a fiction" (Marx. K., 1977c:564)]. But in the hope of catching that which exists beyond its limits, Harvey expands the basic spatial logic of said fiction to multiple scales.

There is violence in this strategy. Since we all know that the hare can overtake the tortoise and we know that it is *possible* to move beyond a fence, Harvey's analysis and political prescriptions can be read as an erasure of ways of moving which do not conform

to the assumption about Kant's *a priori* space. Space is contested territory and different conceptions of space might enable other possibilities (such as moving beyond the fence). Instead, Harvey returns to a politics of eternal forms which conforms to his definition of status-quo. As a reminder, Harvey argues that status-quo theory is

> a theory which is grounded in the reality it seeks to portray and which accurately represents the phenomena with which it deals at a particular moment in time. But, by having ascribed to a universal truth status to the propositions it contains, it is capable of yielding prescriptive policies (politics) which can result only in the status-quo (Harvey. D., 1973:150).

I have argued that Harvey's politics lead to a future which is logically the same as the present. Specifically he grounds his theory in a reality of sovereign states and ends in the same spatial container. However this argument must be taken further. Harvey states that counter-revolutionary politics are

> a theory which *may or may not appear grounded in the reality* it seeks to portray, but obscures, *be-clouds and generally obfuscates (either by design or accident* [Harvey's addition]*) our ability to comprehend* that reality. Such a theory is usually *attractive and hence gains general currency because it is logically coherent, easily manipulable, aesthetically appealing, or just new and fashionable*; but it is in some way quite *divorced from the reality it purports to represent*. A counter revolutionary theory automatically *frustrates either the creation or the implication of viable policies* (politics). It is therefore *a perfect device for non-decision making*, for it diverts attention from fundamental issues to superficial or non-existent issues. It can also function as spurious support and legitimation for counter revolutionary actions designed to frustrate needed change (Harvey. D., 1973:150-1, emphasis added).

Is the sovereign state a reality or a fiction? Harvey's politics *may or may not appear grounded in reality*. The state can be read as being produced and maintained through the colonisation of alternative ways of life and jailing thoughts of them in social fictions and abstract philosophical ideals laden with power and politics. While it is true that it is

possible to view the world in static and formal terms (and in some instances might prove useful), Harvey presents an *attractive ... logically coherent, easily manipulable, aesthetically appealing, or just new and fashionable argument* that it is more fruitful to view the world in terms of movement. Coupled with this, he offers a hope of theorising politics in terms of movement.

However, Harvey's sensitivity to movement *be-clouds and generally obfuscates (either by design or accident) our ability to comprehend* the actuality of Harvey's prescriptions. The hare can over take the tortoise and it is possible to surpass the fence, despite the logical limits assumed in the spatial discourse the Marxist-Hegelian tradition embraces. Harvey presents one way to view movement which, ironically, is stuck! Harvey sinks his analysis and his politics into the solid ground of the prior form. In fact his politics are *divorced from the reality it purports to represent.* As such, he *frustrates either the creation or the implication of viable policies* (politics). For example, his attacks on anyone doing anything "different" on the grounds that they do not accept the authoritative truths of dialectics and "Marxism" or because they deny the possibility for "foundational politics," *either by design or accident* frustrate projects designed to think about and act-out! new and "revolutionary" "politics." He states, in his introduction to Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference,

> what troubled me was the thought that when a political group armed with strong and unambiguous foundational beliefs confronts a bunch of doubting Thomases whose only foundational belief is skepticism towards all foundational beliefs, then it is rather easy to predict who will win. Which led me to the following reflection: the task of critical analysis is not, surely, to prove the impossibility of foundational beliefs (or truths), but to find a more plausible and adequate basis for the foundational beliefs that make interpretation and political action, meaningful,

creative, and possible (Harvey. D., 1996:2).

Harvey writes off different versions of "politics," deeming them ineffective, because they do not conform to a Politics of form, in general, and a Politics which leads to winners and losers, in particular. Instead, Harvey holds out the illusory hope for over-taking the tortoise. Yet he does so within a system of thought and politics which denies that possibility. Losing is the always the result in system which competes to get US to win at the cost of them (sort of like running in a nuclear arms race). US chases them *ad infinitum* instead of taking a second to realize the race is fixed -- simulacrum anyone?

As such, Harvey's counter-revolutionary approach to politics is *a perfect device for non-decision making*. The activist, theorist or "theorisis activus" are all lulled and "erased" into status-quo and counter-revolutionary formulas for "how to do politics" and "where politics takes place." To the legislature! To the United Nation(s)!- is this revolutionary, status-quo or counter-revolutionary?[39]

As has been suggested many times before, epistemology and ontology are more than simple assumptions. They are conditions of possibilities which are intensely political. Harvey's search for foundations is implicated in a set of political limits from the beginning. Hegel is at every fork in the road, but perhaps only because it is Kant that

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[39]I offer but one contemporary example - the Multi-Lateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). In an attempt to challenge corporate rule, Marxists, Liberals and Conservatives alike have united, under the auspices of global *citizens* (an impossibility by definition), to protect the sovereign rule of the state: Revolutionary, status-quo or counter-revolutionary? (See Magnusson. W. and Walker. R.B.J., "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy" in Studies in Political Economy Vol. 26, Summer, 1988 for a similar set of questions related to the Canadian Left's attempt to mobilize against NAFTA).

defines the meaning of the road. To use Hegel's (and later Harvey's) language, "habituation" makes Kantian space (and its limits) apolitical and assumes the way of the world. Yet, to the contrary, these assumptions may very well be what "politics" are about. Harvey is exemplary of this "habituation."

In terms of "practical" politics, the implications are that without an understanding of international relations and without removing international relations from a privileged domain of the assumed, politics logically reproduce a set of paradoxes which eternally reign. The conclusions are forgone. In terms of international relations, "India" and "China" (Harvey uses ironically timely examples [see above p.157]) may continue to prove more difficult to negotiate with than an internal political institution (i.e., Manitoba or Iowa).

In terms of internal politics, a politics which deems the state as the site where politics must unfold is also implicated within a set of ready made answers about how, for instance, the universal and the particular are to be mediated. Marx's insight into the functioning of the state, as shown in the reconstruction of his critique, is that he removed the veil of secrecy about the particular nature of so called "universals" (i.e., the bourgeois state). The next logical step, therefore, is to recognise that the *universal* is always already given. In other words form is *a priori* to content. Perhaps this is where Harvey's bourgeois interests lie? Change the content of the state form to revolutionary red and it is still the state form. The mediation of particularities is a forgone conclusion.

The implication is that mobilising different scales or forms is implicated in a politics which maintains a Kantian metaphysics as a condition of possibility for politics.

The modern individual, community, region, nation, bloc, empire, globe etc. are all implicated in a spatial discourse which defines where politics can take place and how politics are likely to eternally unfold. To say the least a politics of eternal forms is not all that helpful when attempting to think about a world of flux, change and movement.

If the dialectic, as a reproduction of a politics of form, is supposed to provide or act as radical politics, and I am suggesting it fails, then what is one to do? Perhaps politics may be about drawing, accepting and contesting lines or it may be about living life in ways which inherently undermine the dominant assumptions (see Whitehall. G., 1996 and 1997). What may be "political" may actually be what is not Political. Therefore, along with feminist, poststructuralist, (an)archists, marxists, post-colonial, environmental, postmodern, theorists and activists alike, I offer the displacement of said space as "a" site of radical politics. Tactically embracing and fostering environments and moments that value diverse ways of living "politically," might be a more strategic offering to contemporary theorists and activists who, acting at the bleeding edge, have nothing in our pockets except the hope of embracing a politics which displaces and enables new possibilities, instead of shutting and shouting down "others", in these troubling times...

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