



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


A History of Fort Sullivan  
Eastport, Maine

DAVID ZIMMERMAN







# COASTAL FORT

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A History of the Fort




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Battery and blockhouse  
by Quincy Kilby


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- No. 2—*Eastport and Passamaquoddy: A Collection of Historical and Biographical Sketches*. Compiled by William Henry Kilby. (1888, rpt.; Eastport: Waterfront Research Committee, 1982). Hardbound. 542 pages. Illustrated. Forward and new appendices, including index.
- No. 3—*Coastal Fort: A History of Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine*. By David Zimmerman. (Eastport: Research Committee, 1984). Hardbound. 208 pages. Illustrated. Forward.
- No. 4—*Beneath the Barracks: Archaeology at Fort Sullivan*. By Neill DePaoli. (Eastport: Research Committee, 1984). Softbound. 80 pages. Illustrated.


# COASTAL FORT

## A History of Fort Sullivan Eastport, Maine



DAVID ZIMMERMAN

RESEARCH COMMITTEE  
BORDER HISTORICAL SOCIETY  
EASTPORT, MOOSE ISLAND, MAINE  
1984



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Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1959, David Zimmerman was raised in Toronto, Canada. He received his B.A. in history at the University of Toronto in 1981. In that same year, he was awarded a Beaverbrook Scholarship in Maine-New Brunswick relations at the University of New Brunswick at Fredericton. There he completed his M.A. in 1983 with the finishing of his thesis on the history of Fort Sullivan. He is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of New Brunswick where he is working on his Ph.D. thesis on the history of the introduction of high technology into the Royal Canadian Navy during the Second World War.

To my parents  
For all their love, care and understanding

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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

NEW BRUNSWICK BICENTENNIAL, 1984

With enormous pleasure, the Border Historical Society of Eastport, Moose Island, Maine publishes *Coastal Fort* and its companion volume, *Beneath the Barracks*, as the Society's contribution to the 1984 bicentennial celebration of the Province of New Brunswick. For four years, the Society has worked to bring this contribution to reality.

Two hundred years ago, New Brunswick came into formation as a separate colony within British North America. In 1867, New Brunswick joined with three other provinces to create the Dominion of Canada. The Province's history is a rich history, drawing on the strength of two cultures (British and Acadian).

The history of Eastport and the American side of Passamaquoddy Bay is inextricably bound with that of New Brunswick. Indeed, without the construction of Fort Sullivan in 1808, Eastport might be part of New Brunswick today. During the four years of British occupation of Moose Island (1814-1818), Eastport *was* a part of New Brunswick, even though the town was administered by British military authorities rather than provincial governmental authorities. British Lieutenant Brandreth's 1815 plan for fortifications at Moose Island is titled *Plan of Moose Island in the Province of New Brunswick*.

The research and publication of *Coastal Fort* and *Beneath the Barracks* have been a cross border affair. *Coastal Fort* was first written as a master degree thesis at the University of New Brunswick at Fredericton by an American citizen who grew up in Canada. Half of the crew involved with the 1983 archaeological season at the site of Fort Sullivan were students from the

University of New Brunswick. The editing and publishing of the volumes occurred in the United States.

The Border Historical Society's *Border History/Fathom Series* is now firmly established. Suggestions for future publications are welcome. In the efforts to publish these newest two volumes, the publisher particularly wishes to note the help of Robert Bradley of the Maine Historic Preservation Commission and the support of the non-profit organization, Salt, Inc. An index was originally planned to be a part of *Coastal Fort*, but constraints of time and the desire to include additional illustrations precluded it.

The Society extends its warmest CONGRATULATIONS and HAPPY BIRTHDAY to the Province of New Brunswick and the border towns of Deer Island, Campobello Island, Grand Manan, St. Andrews, St. Stephen, St. George, Black's Harbour, Beaver Harbour and Back Bay! May the next two hundred years be as rich in history as these first two hundred years!

## FORWARD

Numerous books and articles have been published over the past century dealing with Maine's fortifications, ranging from the 17th century stockades to the massive granite structures of the Civil War. Some of these writings are brief descriptions and histories of particular sites, while others have been general surveys of the evolution of Maine's defensive works from the beginning of European settlement to the 20th century. Few have made use of archaeological data to supplement documentary sources and observations of above-ground features.

David Zimmerman's *Coastal Fort: A History of Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine* and Neill DePaoli's *Beneath the Barracks: Archaeology at Fort Sullivan*, are pioneering companion volumes. For the first time an individual Maine fort is the subject of an exhaustive documentary history, making use of archival sources in Maine, Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., Canada, and England. The combination of this history with a detailed archaeological site report, while not unique nationally, is very much a first for our region.

Fort Sullivan amply deserves such treatment. America's "Second System" of coastal defense, begun in 1808 in anticipation of the War of 1812, involved federal forts or batteries in Kittery, Portland, South Portland, Phippsburg, Boothbay, Edgcomb, St. George, Castine, Machiasport, and Eastport. Supplementing these federal works was a network of militia forts and batteries dating from 1814 in York, Kennebunkport, Portland, Harpswell, Phippsburg, Westport, Boothbay Harbor, and Camden. Anchoring the eastern end of both systems—indeed the northern end of our nation's entire Atlantic coast defenses—was Fort Sullivan.

Unlike most of America's Second System forts, which never saw action, Fort Sullivan had a remarkable history. Its occupation by the British from 1814 to 1818 is no mere historical footnote, but rather is an important episode in the tangled boundary disputes which plagued the infant United States. Along with the simultaneous British presence in Castine, it was the last time in which a foreign enemy occupied United States territory (save for the brief seizure of a couple of rock Aleutian islets by Japanese forces in 1942).

Because most of Fort Sullivan lies below ground and because most of the site has not been open to the public since the 19th century, it has not received the recognition which other forts of its period have enjoyed. Much can be done to rectify this. Additional archaeological excavation would yield increased scientific information and would be a valuable forum for public education. Surviving barracks, moved downhill into the town in the last century, might be returned to their original site and used to display artifacts relating to the fort. On-site interpretation might guide visitors on walking tours of Fort Hill.

No one knows whether any of these steps will be taken, but the publication of these two volumes is an essential prelude. In 1981, I wrote in *The Forts of Maine, 1607-1945: An Archaeological and Historical Survey*, "To deal with the forts of Maine in the minute detail which they deserve would take many volumes." Happily, Fort Sullivan is the first to be struck from this long agenda.

April, 1984

Robert L. Bradley, Ph.D.  
Maine Historic  
Preservation Commission  
August, Maine

## PREFACE

*Coastal Fort* is intended to be as definitive a history of Fort Sullivan at Eastport, Moose Island, Maine as possible. The fort's activities are followed over more than 100 years of development—from the early days of suppressing the smuggling trade (1808–1814), the British occupation (1814–1818), the middle years (1818–1860) and the period from the Civil War (1860–1865) to the present. In doing so, the study outlines the fort's significance not only in the history of Eastport, but also in the history of Maine, the United States and New Brunswick.

A recent article in *The American Historical Review* by R. H. Kohn states that much more work needs to be done in American military history.\* *Coastal Fort* begins such work, providing a valuable case study of the American (and to a much lesser extent the British) army. It shows the usefulness of detailed garrison studies in filling in gaps of our knowledge on the social structure of the American army before 1900.

Just how valuable the study will prove in this regard over time, must await the fulfilling of the clear need for more studies on American civil-military relations in the nineteenth century, for it is uncertain if the relationship between the Fort Sullivan garrison and Eastport was typical. Furthermore, more work remains to be undertaken on Eastport's social and economic history.

There are many, many people who helped me write the history of Fort Sullivan and it is difficult to single out just a few. My warmest

\*R. H. Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus for Future Research," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. LXXXVI, No. 3 (June, 1981), pp. 553–567.

appreciation goes to Professor D.S. Graham, for his invaluable patience and guidance, and to Hugh French, whose kindness and knowledge made this study possible. Also special thanks to Ed Jordon, Ruth McInnis, John Pike Grady, the rest of the members of the Border Historical Society, and all the other citizens of Eastport who helped me along the way.

Professor Alaric Faulkner, Professor Robert Babcock, and Dr. Robert Bradley helped me in establishing contact in Maine and for this I owe them a great debt. The assistance of the staffs of the various archives I made use of was invaluable, and although I cannot single out all of them, I would like to make special note of the help of Charles Shaughnessy of the National Archives.

Several members of the University of New Brunswick history department and of the staff of the Harriet Irving Library (University of New Brunswick) assisted me during the twenty months of the project and for this I thank them all.

Finally, my thanks to Heather Blake for her unsurpassed efforts in typing the manuscript, often from handwritten drafts. She accomplished a near miracle.


April, 1984

David Zimmerman  
Fredericton, New Brunswick

# CHAPTER ONE

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## INTRODUCTION





Fort Sullivan survives only as a memory to the people of the city of Eastport. Of its extensive collection of buildings, only one partially survives on the site—the empty, roofless shell of the powder magazine. Two more buildings survive in the city itself, where they were moved after being auctioned off in 1877. Today it takes a vivid imagination to picture the fort's significance to the city in which it stood and to recall that it represented an historically important type of American military installation.

Military fortifications have unquestionably played an important role in American history. The picture of a small frontier fort, consisting of a collection of barracks, stables and storehouses surrounded by a wooden picket, is a familiar one. These frontier forts, while clearly important in their own right, were not considered by most senior American military officers during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be vital for the security of the nation. They were much more concerned with what is today a little known series of more permanent and costly fortifications built along the coasts to protect the country from European invasions and raids. A total of eight distinct systems of coastal fortifications were constructed from 1794 until the Second World War.<sup>1</sup>

Fort Sullivan was one of the smaller coastal fortifications constructed. It entered service as part of the "Second System" of fortifications first authorized by Congress in 1808.<sup>2</sup> It was situated to defend the town of Eastport, which is itself located on Moose Island in Passamaquoddy Bay—the easternmost point along the American Atlantic coast before one enters Canadian territory.

The fort was built on Clark's Hill, which enabled it to dominate the harbor in such a way that the small battery could fire on a ship approaching from any direction. First time visitors to Eastport were impressed by the fort, although perhaps more by its geographical situation than its military strength:

After a run of sixty miles along an iron bound coast, we arrived at Eastport, in Maine, one of the United States. . . . The first object, which is supereminently apparent from the deck of a vessel, is the huge star-spangled banner, which rivalling a ship's topsail in capaciousness, floats above the red

roof and glaring white walls of the barracks, on a rocky hill overlooking the town.<sup>3</sup>


It is not surprising that a military post was built at Eastport. The town was a growing trading community in 1808, and its proximity to British North America, in fact on land still claimed by the Crown, demanded some military presence, particularly because of the growing tensions between the two nations. Throughout the active history of the fort, until its gradual decommissioning (which began in 1873)\*, it played a major role in the day-to-day life of the town.

The fort went through several distinct periods, from its controversial construction on disputed land, until today when certain people in Eastport are considering restoring at least part of the site to its former stature. In its earliest years Fort Sullivan was involved in the effort to suppress the widespread smuggling that developed after the imposition of the Embargo Act of 1807, and in the center of the active naval war in Passamaquoddy Bay and the Bay of Fundy during 1812-14. The second period began with the capture of Moose Island by an overwhelming British force, in July 1814. Because of a delay in settling the boundary dispute, the island remained in British hands for four years of military occupation. In the years between the area's return to American control and the Civil War the fort became a convenient place to quarter troops in peacetime and a fully accepted, although still distinct, part of the town. The Civil War marked the beginning of the last phase of military occupation of the fort. There was a brief flurry of activity during the war, and during the Fenian trouble of April 1866, but thereafter there were seven more years of peaceful garrison life. The period after 1873 saw the fort's slow decline to its present state.

All these periods will be covered in the ensuing chapters. Yet, before the details of the fort's history can be discussed it is necessary first to consider briefly the importance of coastal fortifications in general, and in particular the importance they had in national defense policy during the nineteenth century.

George Washington believed that most of the money that would be

\*The troops were removed from the fort in 1873, the first building would be sold in 1877 and the land finally disposed of in 1884. From various issues of the *Eastport Sentinel*.



NOVA SCOTIA TO MASSACHUSETTS

allocated for the new nation's defense should be spent on the navy and on the building or reconstruction of coastal fortifications. The backbone of American military power would be the local militias that would man the forts in times of war and provide the troops for any required field army. Only a small, inexpensive professional army would be raised to provide the necessary permanent garrisons for frontier outposts.<sup>4</sup>

Washington's idea became official policy during his presidency. In January, 1791 Secretary Knox asked Congress to authorize a small professional army composed of a battalion of artillery consisting of 240 men, to provide experienced artillery men to assist and train the militia at the coastal forts, and two regiments of infantry, each of 700 men, for the frontier.<sup>5</sup> In 1794 Congress passed an act that authorized the building of the "First System" of fortifications. This involved the construction or repair of the defenses around twenty key harbors.<sup>6</sup> Significantly, this same act also approved the construction of the first six frigates of the recreated American navy.<sup>7</sup>

This concept of defense proved to be peculiarly suitable to not only American military needs and resources, but also to less tangible, yet existing fears of both European military aggression and the possible tyranny of the central government backed by a powerful professional army. James Madison wrote in *The Federalist* that coastal forts "happily" provide the necessary security but are ". . . such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties."<sup>8</sup>

Except during times of war, this policy developed by Washington was to dominate American military planning for over a century. It lasted for such an extensive period of time because the requirements of national security remained essentially unchanged. The following passage, from an 1843 Army report to Congress, is indicative of American military thought on the subject throughout the century:


When once constructed they [coastal forts] require but little expenditure for their support. In times of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from useful occupations of life. Of themselves, they can never exert an influence dangerous to public liberty; but as a means of preserving peace and as an obstacle to an invader, their influence and power are immense.<sup>9</sup>

CHAPTER TWO

---

BUILDING, EMBARGO,  
AND WAR

1807-1814





Settlement began in earnest on Moose Island, later to be known as Eastport, immediately after the Revolutionary War. The population of the island grew quickly as its collection of Massachusetts fishermen and farmers prospered on this new frontier.\* In 1790 two hundred and forty-four people lived in the area, and by 1800 the population had more than doubled.<sup>1</sup>

Being located at the mouth of the St. Croix River, the inhabitants found their immediate neighbors across the water to be Loyalists or Tories who had fled the thirteen colonies after their defeat by the rebels. For many years the people of the area lived with the uncertainty over the location of the boundary between New Brunswick and Maine. It was not until 1798 that the St. Croix was established as the dividing line. Most of the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay were acknowledged to be British possessions, but both countries claimed Moose Island and two nearby smaller islands. American civil authorities administered Eastport, but in 1785 the sheriff of Charlotte County crossed the Bay and arrested the Massachusetts collector of customs for charges of debt. The collector was held for three days and released after refusing to recognize British authority. For the next nineteen years New Brunswick's claim to the island existed only on paper.<sup>2</sup>

At the beginning of the last century, Moose Island's economy went through a tremendous boom period as the first of its famous associations with smuggling began. Eastport became the center of the illicit trade in gypsum from British North America to the United States. The island's strategic position as a sort of "no man's land" made it ideal as a depot for merchants attempting to avoid obeying Britain's restrictive trade laws. In ten years the population of the town nearly tripled to fifteen hundred.<sup>3</sup>

The origins of the building of a fort at Eastport must be traced back to the international political situation in the autumn of 1807. Relations between the neutral United States and the two great warring powers of Europe, France and Great Britain, were tense. Britain particularly an-

\*Maine was part of Massachusetts until 1820.



*A. Map & Chart*  
 of the Bays Harbours, Poll Roads and Settlements in  
**PASSAMAQUODDY & MACHIAS**  
 With the Inland Island of



noyed Americans by refusing to lift the orders-in-council of January and November, which effectively closed continental Europe to American shipping, and by the Royal Navy's frequent search of American merchant vessels and the impressment of their crews.


In June the *Chesapeake* incident occurred, in which the British frigate *Leopard* fired at and seized several members of the crew of the American warship. Numerous other violations of American "rights" were perpetrated that summer by the Royal Navy, at least two of which took place in Passamaquoddy Bay.

In 1807 the plaster trade was still flourishing in Eastport, and the British made few attempts to suppress it. There were too few warships available to provide adequate revenue patrols, but in June and July a small British brig of four guns, H.M.S. *Porgey*, commanded by Lieutenant J. Flintoph, entered the waters around Moose Island.

On June 5th, the *Porgey* came into Friar's Roads and crossed into American-claimed waters. Several ships were seized and shots were fired at those that attempted to escape. Several of these shots landed among the houses of Eastport. Louis Frederick Delesdernier, the American collector of customs at Passamaquoddy, wrote:

[Flintoph] fired his guns promiscuously, and in every direction; even among the houses. The shot is in my possession that rolled between innocent children, to the great alarm of the peaceable inhabitants of both governments of the vicinity.<sup>4</sup>

Four weeks later, on July 6th, Flintoph once again entered into the Roads, this time taking one British and three American vessels, removing the master and two seamen off another American ship, and firing upon and damaging the rigging of a sixth. Delesdernier, the only American official in the area, was powerless to do anything except to row over to the *Porgey* and protest to Flintoph in the strongest terms that at least one of the vessels had been taken in the waters clearly within the jurisdiction of the United States. Flintoph refused to recognize the American's authority and unceremoniously removed him from the ship.<sup>5</sup> Delesdernier thought that the British captain acted "like one insane or mad", and was happy to get back to Eastport in one piece.<sup>6</sup>



EASTPORT HARBOR AND APPROACHES

Britain's acts of aggression and her continuing refusal to respond to American complaints had begun by the fall of 1807 to motivate the Jefferson administration and Congress to take some concrete action to improve the nation's defense and to punish the aggressor. President Jefferson recalled Congress early:

The love of peace so much cherished, in the bosom of our citizens, which has so long guided the proceedings of our public councils, and induced forbearance under so many wrongs, may not ensure our continuance in the quiet pursuit of industry.<sup>7</sup>

Congress immediately began to consider measures to improve the nation's defenses. The importance played by coastal fortifications in American peace-time military thinking in the nineteenth century has already been discussed, and it should be of no surprise that, despite a small increase in the size of the regular army, most of the money allocated was to be spent building and rebuilding these installations. In late November, the House committee reported to Congress that to protect the harbors and ports of the United States, fifteen places of major, and thirty-two places of minor importance should be fortified. Included in the list of minor locations was a fortification to be built at Passamaquoddy Bay.<sup>8</sup> On December 3rd, the Senate committee reported in greater detail, suggesting that the defenses at Passamaquoddy should consist of two batteries and a blockhouse, aided by an unspecified number of gunboats.<sup>9</sup>

Within a few days of the Senate report, the House began considering the allocation of funds, with its committee suggesting that \$874,000 be spent, including \$135,000 for Old Massachusetts, New Hampshire and the District of Maine.<sup>10</sup> This was no time, however, for half measures, and when Congress passed the actual appropriation, \$1,000,000 was allocated.<sup>11</sup> This sum was unusually large, four times larger than any single previous appropriation and the largest until 1836.<sup>12</sup>

In Maine a total of nine installations of the Second System of fortifications were authorized. All of which, excepting those around Portland, were to be small, simple forts consisting of a wooden blockhouse and one or more small batteries protected by earth or earth faced with stone. The fort at Passamaquoddy would be a typical Second System fortification of the District.<sup>13</sup>

The scope of the Second System of fortifications was huge, not only in terms of monetary expense but, also, in the sheer physical size of the project. There were not enough engineers in the regular army to do the work. In fact there were only twenty officers in the entire Corps of Engineers, and those that were available were employed in the more important sites.<sup>14</sup> To supervise the construction of the other works, non-engineering officers, even those not then currently in the regular army, were to be employed. These inexperienced men were asked to design, plan and build the forts with minimal guidelines and advice from the professional engineers.<sup>15</sup>

The man chosen to look after the construction of the fortifications at Passamaquoddy and Machias was Major Lemuel Trescott, a fifty-seven year old Revolutionary War veteran and long time resident of the area. Trescott was already employed by the federal government as the collector of customs at Machias, and agreed to take on this new task without pay. In April, 1808 he received his formal instructions which authorized him to construct two fortifications at Passamaquoddy and a smaller work at Machias.<sup>16</sup>

Trescott decided to concentrate his immediate efforts on the construction of the first fortification at Passamaquoddy, and determined that Eastport, being by far the most important American settlement in the area, should receive it. By the middle of May he had purchased land and was ready to begin work.

The site Trescott picked was an ideal one. Located on three acres of land just west of the center of town on top of a high hill, it was so situated as to give any gun emplaced there complete command of the harbor below. Trescott had arranged to pay the owner of the land, John Clark, the rather high price of sixty dollars an acre. He considered it, however, to be in the best interests of the United States to meet Clark's exorbitant demands because of the site's unparalleled situation. This would not be the last time that John Clark would attempt to squeeze as much money as possible from the government for his land.<sup>17</sup>

By the first of June, Trescott had cleared the land and laid out an area at the eastern edge of the site for a crescent-shaped gun battery and for a blockhouse located directly behind. A construction crew was hired, led by several citizens of Eastport whose names would be associated with



Lemuel Trescott. (From the *Eastport Sentinel*, April 20, 1892).

the history of the town for the next fifty years. John Peavey was given the position of chief engineer, and his brother Charles and Jerry Burgin were appointed foremen. Masons were hired in Massachusetts and brought to Eastport. The building began in earnest and Trescott hoped to be done by the end of the summer season.<sup>18</sup>

While the walls of the gun battery began to rise on the hill overlooking Eastport, another action arising from the Congressional Session of 1807-08 came to have a profound effect on Moose Island and its fledgling fort. In December, the Embargo Act was passed, with the hope to "win respect by peaceful means" from Great Britain.<sup>19</sup> This Act, and supplements to it which followed, forbade all trade with the warring European powers, including their colonies.<sup>20</sup>

Most merchants of New England objected to the embargo because it placed the burden of America's response to Great Britain squarely on their former business. So many did so that smuggling became a major problem to the federal government. The customs service, charged with enforcing the new laws, was totally inadequate for the purpose and soon lost all control of some popular smuggling havens, including Eastport.<sup>21</sup>

Eastport proved to be just as ideal a center of smuggling goods into British North America, as it had proved to be in smuggling plaster out. Situated within half a mile of the British islands in the bay, accessible to legal coastal traders, and dotted with numerous inlets and coves suitable for the safe and secret transshipment of goods, the town proved the perfect place for circumventing the law.

The situation was made even better for the smugglers by the policies of the governments of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. In two stages starting in May, Sir George Prevost, the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, acting on his own initiative and quite illegally, opened the doors for free trade for certain enumerated articles, including food stuffs and naval stores.<sup>22</sup> British warships were sent to Passamaquoddy to ensure that there would be no interference with the trade in British-claimed waters.

By the beginning of May, Andrew Gallatin, the secretary of the treasury, "felt positive alarm" at the situation in Eastport. The revenue boat had been fired upon, customs' officers had been bribed, and viola-

tions of the embargo laws were carried out right in the open. Between the second and seventh of May alone, ships carrying 19,000 barrels of flour, 4,000 of pork and 4,000 of naval stores entered Eastport.<sup>23</sup>

The customs service needed major reinforcements and on May 6th a company of fifty U.S. artillerymen, under the command of Captain Moses Swett, sailed from New York to Passamaquoddy on board the U.S.S. *Wasp*. This company was destined to eventually form the first garrison of the Passamaquoddy battery.<sup>24</sup>

The *Wasp's* arrival in Eastport Harbor and the beginning of the construction on Clark's Hill had not gone unnoticed on the British side of the Bay. On May 22nd, Sir John Prevost received urgent dispatches from Lieutenant-General Hunter of New Brunswick, and the commander of a British warship, H.M.S. *Squirrel*, concerning the American military upsurge on and around Moose Island.<sup>25</sup> Prevost was placed in a delicate political situation by these events. Technically the crown still claimed all of the islands of Passamaquoddy, but for the last twenty years the British had been content to allow American officials to administer Eastport. In fact, in the last few months, as Eastport became a prime smuggling center, it had become an outright advantage to allow the Americans to believe they owned the island. The military presence on the island was, however, a completely different matter. Not only could the new fort, troops and ships exert more sovereign control, and prevent the contraband trade, they also presented a serious strategic threat to New Brunswick if and when war broke out.<sup>26</sup>

Prevost, along with the acting naval commander at Halifax, decided to send a letter to the American officers on Moose Island, requesting that they state the official American position on the exact location of the demarcation line between New Brunswick and Maine. The letter made no specific claim to the island, but when Sir John Warren, the commander of the North American station, returned to Halifax from his winter sojourn in Bermuda, a much stiffer note was sent. This letter stated that Moose Island was ". . . a possession clearly defined as a part of the British territory acknowledged and settled by the treaty of 1783 . . .".<sup>27</sup>

The two British notes were received by Captain Swett by June 21st. Swett felt the matter beyond his authority to deal with and sent them both on to Washington. In the capital the British claim to Eastport was

considered a serious matter indeed, and no less an authority than President Jefferson wrote the American response. Jefferson totally denied the British claim:

I found the facts to be that Moose Island has ever been in our possession, well before and ever since the treaty of peace with Great Britain; that in the convention formed between Mr. King and the British government about four years ago, wherein our limits in that quarter were mutually recognized, Moose Island acknowledged to belong to us and tho' on account of an article respecting Louisiana the convention has not yet been ratified, yet both parties have acted on the articles of the limits as if it had been ratified.<sup>28</sup>

Prevost, faced with the American *fait accompli*, had no choice short of war but to accept the battery rising at Eastport.

While the diplomatic arguments dissolved into an unhappy stalemate, both Trescott and Swett went about their respective responsibilities. Throughout the summer, work continued at the fort. At first quick progress was made, delayed only by Trescott being occasionally forced to write to his superiors asking for assistance on several difficult problems relating to the design and placement of the battery.<sup>29</sup>

The first description of the new battery comes from reports sent by Captain Gustavus Nicolls, the commander of the Royal Engineers at Halifax, who had been sent to the area by Prevost to report on the military situation.<sup>30</sup> On June 19th he wrote:

I had an opportunity of observing at the time, some men at work at a Battery on a height above the town which I understood is to mount four Guns—it was laid out about a month ago by Major Trescott, late of the American Army, acting Engineer at Eastport, collector at Machias, who is now superintending its construction.

From the nature of the materials of which this battery is building/stone/ it would not appear that it was solely for the purpose of enforcing the late embargo acts of the United States but with a view of creating a certain respect and protecting whatever vessels may come under the range of its guns.

From its situation it is not of any consideration in the Land Side. . . .

. . . I have learnt that the battery is about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a circle—the walls 4 feet thick and at present about three feet high.<sup>31</sup>

A week later Nicolls added to his account, saying that the battery is to mount either thirty-two or forty-two pounder cannons, and that,

“. . . its Parapet of Masonry 5 ft. thick . . . is to be inclosed by a Blockhouse at its Rear.”<sup>32</sup>

In July, progress on the works was slowed by the loss of the masons, who for some unexplained reason quit the project. By the first of August, however, the cannons were ready to be mounted on the newly finished battery.<sup>33</sup> The gun battery as originally completed was crescent shaped and built “of stone mason work, laid in lime, eleven feet thick, and, including the sods on the top, six and a half feet high, with platforms for cannon.”<sup>34</sup> The armament of four 18 pounder guns was mounted by the beginning of December.<sup>35</sup>

The blockhouse was also nearing completion at about the same time. It was a two story structure thirty-two feet square, built of solid pine logs. The logs made the walls fourteen inches thick.<sup>36</sup> Internally little work was done, with the exception of the construction of a small powder magazine—“built of brick, ten feet square, with an arch, the wall being two feet thick . . .”—located on the ground floor.<sup>37</sup>

Hasty modifications to the building became necessary, however, in order to make it suitable for quartering Swett’s troops during the upcoming winter. The artillerymen had been unable to find suitable quarters and were, by the end of July, living in tents.<sup>38</sup> A single stove was set-up to heat the entire upper story, and an out kitchen constructed. Finally in January, the roof was shingled and, “. . . for the honor and the interest of the U. States,” the whole structure was painted.<sup>39</sup>

This completed the first stage of construction at Fort Sullivan, which is interesting particularly for this change in function that took place in modifying the blockhouse. Congress had originally intended that Trescott build the fort as a rallying point for the local militia in case of further British raids in the area. No consideration was given to quartering a regular garrison. At best, the hasty modifications to the blockhouse were a stopgap measure, with the troops’ proximity to the magazine making it a highly dangerous habitiat. Yet, from this moment on, men of the regular army would be stationed at Fort Sullivan for most of its active history. In the next summer the status of the fort as a regular army post would be more firmly established with the building of permanent barracks for Swett’s company.

The soldiers that arrived on the *Wasp* in May, however, were not originally ordered to Eastport to garrison the fort, but instead to suppress the illicit trade with New Brunswick. The attempt by any military establishment to enforce civil order on its own population is an onerous one, even for the best trained and most loyal soldiers. The men under the command of Moses Swett were neither, and were simply not up to the task at hand.

Soldiers of the regular American army, in the period immediately preceding the War of 1812, were thought to be the dregs of society. A private received the minimal pay of five dollars a month. He was subject to the harsh discipline of the service, and was sent to some of the most inhospitable places on the continent. Considering that the average day laborer could make nine dollars a month, it is not surprising that the typical enlisted soldiers were destitute foreigners, often deserters from the British Army, or criminals.<sup>40</sup>

The artillerymen on Moose Island were no exception to this rule. Nicolls observed that of the fifty men of the company, ". . . there are not above 5 or 6 native Americans, the remainder, English, Irish, or Scotch."<sup>41</sup> With large sums of money to be made on each successful journey across Passamaquoddy Bay, particularly as prices rose with the arrival of the military, it was not hard for the smugglers to bribe the men. Fourteen men had deserted by the end of June, most after having accepted the equivalent of several months' pay in bribes.<sup>42</sup>

Swett managed, however, to stem this exodus by the clever expediency of returning to the British two deserters of the 101st regiment, who had escaped from the garrison at St. Andrews, New Brunswick. In return for this "handsome" gesture, three American deserters from Swett's company were returned under the British. After this, it was much harder to convince one of the artillerymen to accept a bribe.<sup>43</sup>

Despite the best effort of Swett's company, the collector, and the navy, smuggling went on almost completely unchecked throughout 1808. With a barrel of flour being worth five dollars on the American side, and twelve across the line, who could hope to stop it?<sup>44</sup> Lorenzo Sabine believed that at least 150,000 to 160,000 barrels of flour arrived at Eastport in that year, where they were dumped in caches spread along the shore from Prince's Cove to Todd's Head to await transshipment across the line.

The *Wasp's* brief appearance in May and June in Passamaquoddy did a great deal of damage to the illicit trade, but its only long term effect was to drive up prices and to force the end of the open smuggling that Gallatin had found so alarming. The trade still carried on in a discretionary manner—either at night, in some out-of-the-way cove, or under the cover of the frequent fogs the area is so famous for. In one day, soon after her arrival, the *Wasp* had seized fourteen ships caught smuggling openly in broad daylight. But this achievement could not be repeated and by the middle of June she had been called back to Boston. This left only two inadequate "Jefferson" gunboats, sent to the area in June, to provide all the naval patrols.<sup>46</sup>

The artillerymen, few in number, could do little more than patrol the shoreline and fire on any vessel trying to make an unauthorized crossing with a small six pounder field piece placed on Todd's Head.<sup>47</sup>

During the summer the situation, if anything, grew worse and Swett was forced to write to Washington on July 26th:

. . . The people are nearly in a state of rebellion. They are guilty of the meanest acts for the purpose of evading the embargo laws. . . . I shall exact the utmost of my abilities in assisting the collector to enforce the embargo act.<sup>48</sup>

He went on to place the blame for the situation on Delesdernier, as Swett claimed that if the collector had been more vigilant in the beginning, the smuggling business at Eastport ". . . would not be half the trouble."<sup>49</sup>

The British naval presence in the bay only added to the difficulty of enforcing the embargo. At one time as many as three British warships lay in the Roads, and at least one was anchored right on the boundary line.<sup>50</sup> These ships were ordered to prevent any American violation of British waters.

On several occasions American and British forces came close to firing on each other. The most serious of these incidents occurred in October after U.S. Gunboat 42 seized the British merchantman *Eliza*, after the latter had drifted into American waters. When Captain R. Ramsay of H.M.S. *Eurydice* demanded the ship's return, the gunboat's young commander replied in the best traditions of his service, ". . . that she [the *Eliza*] was in his possession and that nothing but bloodshed and hard

fighting should induce him to give her up."<sup>51</sup> The matter was settled only when Delesdernier and Swett determined that there was no proof that the *Eliza* was engaged in smuggling and released her.<sup>52</sup>

The garrison of the island not only was unable to fulfill its assigned task, but it also was forced to live under the harsh economic conditions brought about by the success of the contraband trade. Run-away inflation was the norm, as a result of an abundance of money and the shortage of goods and services offered by the small town. The cheapest accommodations that could be found for the soldiers rented at the rather high price of thirty-five dollars a month. Swett felt compelled to move his men out into tents by the end of July. He then asked Trescott to make the blockhouse suitable for the quartering of his men in the upcoming winter.<sup>53</sup> Provisions and other necessities were also correspondingly high, in fact, about three times more expensive than at Boston. Swett was forced to make a special appeal to Washington to get extra allowances to cover these inflated prices.<sup>54</sup>

After spending the winter of 1808-09 in the blockhouse, consideration was given to build more suitable quarters for Swett's men, and to turn the fort into a permanent military garrison. In May 1809, a strong cedar picket fence was erected around three sides of the post, the battery side being protected by the steep rock face in front.<sup>55</sup> Final authorization for the barracks was not received until late in the summer and once again the troops had to spend most of the winter in the blockhouse.

Two barracks were begun in August, one to house the officers and the other the non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. They were ready for occupation by the beginning of February, 1810. The two new buildings were placed 150 yards to the west of the blockhouse on the opposite side of the post, leaving a large sloping open area in between. This space would later become known as the parade ground. Both barracks were built of wood and were one story high. The officers' quarters were placed at the southern edge of the hill, next to a steep rock face, giving its occupants a magnificent view of the town below. The soldiers' barracks were constructed twenty yards directly to the north of the officers' quarters.<sup>56</sup>

Trescott described the soldiers' barracks as being:


. . . 47 feet by 21, one story, which exclusive of the chimney in the centre, will leave two rooms in each Barrack of twenty feet square—and each will contain fifty men.<sup>57</sup>

This building, and others later to be built next to it suffered from Trescott's faulty engineering. As situated the structure was unsound, as it had been placed in an area where the bedrock took a sudden dip downward. In the future it would be a terrible maintenance problem because the foundation kept on shifting. While the front was securely on bedrock, the rear of the foundation floated in the mud at the top of the water table.<sup>58</sup>

The officers' quarters, later to become known as the commander's house, were, ". . . 40 by 18 [feet], one story, with two small rooms and a kitchen in the backside."<sup>59</sup> Both this building and the soldiers' barracks were similar to those Trescott was building at the same time at Machias, but the officers' quarters at Passamaquoddy were built slightly larger because, ". . . a captain at that time commanded."<sup>60</sup> These two structures were to be the last addition to the fort until the war broke out in June, 1812.

The years between 1808 and 1812 were quiet ones for the soldiers at Moose Island. The repeal of the Embargo Acts on March 1, 1809, and their replacement by the less severe Non-Intercourse Act, cooled things considerably on the frontier. Swett's biggest problem during 1809 was the reemergence of widespread desertion from the garrison. One soldier managed to get as far as Windsor, Nova Scotia, before being spotted by a local magistrate. Swett tried to arrange for an exchange of prisoners, but when an American federal judge ruled in a similar case in Baltimore that no foreign military deserters could be forced to leave the country, the deal fell through. This effectively ended Swett's attempt to stop his men escaping across the line.<sup>61</sup>

The garrison was allowed to dwindle. No replacements were sent. In 1810 Swett was himself transferred and the command devolved upon his second in command, Lieutenant Samuel Maclay.<sup>62</sup> Just before the declaration of war, the force had been so reduced that only twenty or thirty men remained on strength.<sup>63</sup> By the winter of 1813, after the



MAP OF FORT SULLIVAN IN 1812  
 (Based on various later maps)

original five year enlistment had expired, Maclay commanded a grand total of one corporal and four privates.<sup>64</sup>

When news arrived in Eastport on June 25, 1812, that continuing poor relations with Britain had finally resulted in Congress declaring war, panic reigned. The inadequate garrison provided no comfort to the population, and an invasion was expected at any moment. The morning after the arrival of the dispatches from Washington, a town meeting was held at "The Old South Tavern". At it, steps were taken to secure peace along the frontier, and if that failed, to provide for the more effectual defense of the district.<sup>65</sup>

A Committee of Safety was formed, consisting of twelve leading citizens, including as its chairman Lemuel Trescott, now collector at Eastport. A resolution was unanimously passed to keep up good relations with the people of New Brunswick, and a guard was established to patrol the town and to watch for the first sign of invasion.<sup>66</sup>

These measures did not allay the fears of the inhabitants of Moose Island. The old women and children were evacuated to safer regions to the westward. Their fears were heightened by the arrival of British warships at Passamaquoddy, and by the failure of the state and federal authorities to provide any immediate military force on the frontier.<sup>67</sup>

It was fortunate for the citizens of Eastport that the British were themselves ill-prepared for a war in North America. British forces were forced to play a holding action, rarely, and only if necessary, going on the offensive. Almost all of their resources were destined for the European war. This situation was to last the first two years of the war, in which time, due to bungling, incompetence and intrigue, no effective defense was ever provided by the Americans for Eastport.

Initially, the failure to provide an adequate force on Moose Island was the result of the attitude of Massachusetts to the war. Alden Bradford, in his history of that state, wrote:

. . . Three-fifths of the citizens, perhaps, a greater portion were opposed to a war with Great Britain, both before and after the formal declaration of it by Congress. The people generally believed wars improper, which are not necessary for maintaining the liberty and independence of the country.<sup>68</sup>

This attitude was generally followed by those in the highest echelons of

the state's society, for after all, it was the merchants of New England who once again suffered the most from this federal action. This was reflected in the state government, where Governor Caleb Strong, a Federalist, bitterly opposed the war. He would minimize and delay to the maximum, any request from federal officials to assist in the defense of the commonwealth.

As early as June 8th, before declaration of war, Trescott wrote the secretary of war concerning the defenselessness of the frontier. He asked that there be a large increase of troops and of the number and strength of the fortifications of the area.<sup>69</sup> Federal officials were well aware of this need, and on June 22nd General Dearborn, in charge of seacoast defense, asked Governor Strong to call into federal service fourteen companies of the state's artillery, and twenty-seven of infantry. One artillery and four infantry companies, all to be commanded by a major, were designated to serve at Passamaquoddy.<sup>70</sup> Strong initially declined to raise any of those troops, and it would not be until August that he partially acceded to Dearborn's demands and raised a small number of militia companies for detached service.<sup>71</sup>

To fill the gap in the defenses of Eastport and vicinity while Strong procrastinated, the committees of public safety at Robbinston and Eastport placed pressure on local state officials to take some immediate action. On July 15th General John Brewer, the local commander of the militia, called into emergency service the units of the entire frontier. These consisted of Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver Shead's Third Infantry and a company of militia artillery recently formed in Eastport. They were mustered "for the purpose of defending the lives and property of the inhabitants, . . . and repelling any invasion of the enemy."<sup>72</sup>

While adequate for immediate purposes, the calling into military service of almost every able-bodied man in the area must have been a terrible burden. They would be forced to carry on their business as best they could until the beginning of September, when outside help finally arrived.

Bowing to pressure exerted by Dearborn, Strong authorized Major-General Henry Sewall to raise units of the militia for temporary federal service. On August 5th, Sewall was ordered to dispatch three companies of artillery, under the command of a major, to Passamaquoddy.<sup>73</sup> Two companies were detached from General John Blake's Brigade,

located around the Penobscot, for service in Eastport. They were commanded by Captains Joshua Chamberlain of Orrington and Thomas George of Brewer. A third company, commanded by Captain Thomas Vose, Jr. of Robbinston, was ordered to stay in service in the defense of its own community.<sup>74</sup> Major Thomas Low of Deer Isle was placed in command, but soon after was excused for health reasons. Major Jacob Ulmer of Lincolnville was put in his place.<sup>75</sup>

The Eastport that greeted Jacob Ulmer was, at the beginning of September, a quiet one. For over two months the town's people had expected that war would come to their doorstep, but instead all that flowed from the other side of the border were overtures of peace. The British, aware of their military weakness, decided that the best way to preserve the peace along the Maine-New Brunswick frontier was to encourage the free intercourse of goods with the American border towns. They also hoped to do damage to the enemy by encouraging greater New England hostility to the war.<sup>76</sup>

The declaration of war had been shortly followed in Congress by the passage of an act to limit trade with the enemy. The bill made it illegal to export stores and provisions to British possessions.<sup>77</sup> In short, it was the Embargo Act repeated, and if ever history repeated itself it did so in Eastport from September, 1812 till July, 1814, as once again the town became a smuggling haven.

Unpopular in New England, the new trade restrictions once again led many merchants to turn to the contraband trade. By the middle of September the people of Eastport had reverted to the practices of four years before, as fears along the border slowly subsided.

By the beginning of August, copies of a decree by Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope Sherbrooke, Prevost's successor in Halifax, had arrived in the town. It pledged peace along the frontier:

It is therefore my wish and desire that the subjects of the United States living on the frontier, may pursue in peace their usual and accustomed trade without molestation, so long as they shall act in a similar way to the frontier inhabitants of this province of New Brunswick.<sup>78</sup>

Other letters to the inhabitants of Eastport pledged ". . . that a system of neutrality would be observed towards them . . .".<sup>79</sup>

As early as August, American officials realized that Eastport would

once again become a problem, but no reinforcements for the town's garrison would be forthcoming till the middle of November. By this time it was too late to stem the rising tide of illicit trading.


Jacob Ulmer's small detachment, like Swett's, was in no position to curtail the smuggling. While the traders grew rich again in Eastport as prices for provisions skyrocketed across the border, bureaucratic bungling left the militiamen destitute of clothing, shoes, food, and even, in some cases, shelter. A detachment on guard behind the fort was forced to live with only an old army tent lent to them by Lieutenant Maclay. Trescott proposed the building of new, more extensive barracks, but enough funding was approved for the construction of only one new building.<sup>80</sup>

This new building was probably built to serve as a hospital for the large number of troops soon expected on the frontier. It was constructed directly adjacent to the north wall of the soldiers' quarters and except for being two stories high, was similar in size to the latter. The building still stands today on Orange Street in Eastport, where it was moved in 1877.<sup>81</sup>

The new soldiers expected at the garrison were to be part of a regiment of one year United States volunteers which was long delayed in getting to the frontier. As early as July, steps were being taken to provide an adequate force in the border areas. At first there was a great deal of difficulty in finding a suitable colonel to lead the unit. Secretary of War Eustis preferred appointing the venerable Lemuel Trescott to the command, wishing a local resident, familiar with the people of the area, to be charged with stopping the smuggling that was to break-out. Trescott refused the offer several times, stating that his duties as collector made it impossible for him to accept.<sup>82</sup>

After six weeks, the command was finally offered to Major-General George Ulmer of Lincolnville.<sup>83</sup> It would be for Eastport the most precipitous decision of the war, bringing to the garrison of Moose Island perhaps the most enigmatic and interesting figure in its long history.

The oral tradition of Eastport, which Lorenzo Sabine examined in the mid-nineteenth century, speaks of Ulmer as a tyrant who inflicted on the inhabitants, ". . . the most wanton and unprovoked injuries."<sup>84</sup> Draconian decrees and rigid enforcement of the trade laws, combined



Middle section of Officers' Barracks today on Orange Street, Eastport.

with a quarrelsome temperament, were responsible for this unfortunate impression. There is, however, another side of the story, probably more truthful, in which Ulmer can be viewed as a capable man placed in an impossible situation by the people of eastern Maine, and by the incompetence of his superiors.

Ulmer arrived at Eastport in mid-November, 1812, with only three of the nine companies intended to form his regiment. He was under orders "to stop all communication between the enemy", but also scrupulously to avoid any action that might be viewed as hostile by the British. No provisions were made to provide gunboats, without which his task would be impossible.<sup>85</sup>

On Moose Island, Ulmer found two hundred merchants and traders, almost half of whom were British subjects, engaged in the illicit trade with New Brunswick. He took rigorous action to curtail the smuggling and, as a result, generated a great deal of hostility against him in the

town. Ulmer was threatened with tarring and feathering if he did not stop his interference, but he did not heed these threats until he was ordered to discharge Jacob Ulmer's three companies of detached militia at the end of December. Faced with garrisoning both Machias and Robbinston, as well as Eastport, Ulmer could keep only eighty men at the latter. His forces were now effectively outnumbered by the hostile elements in the town.<sup>86</sup>

Ulmer decided that harsh measures were necessary to maintain any semblance of control, and on January 8, 1813, he issued a decree which virtually placed the entire frontier from Machias to the St. Croix under martial law. All foreign nationals were given six days to swear an oath of loyalty to the United States and if not, they could either voluntarily leave or become prisoners of war. Anyone entering enemy territory or trading with the enemy without Ulmer's permission would be considered a traitor and dealt with accordingly. All letters sent to the British colonies had first to be opened and inspected to make sure no unnecessary information went to Ulmer's opposite number in St. Andrews.<sup>87</sup>

The decree was effective in stopping the worst of the illegal trading. Within the allotted six days about seventy British subjects took the oath, and another twenty-five fled across the border. For the first and only time of the war, smuggling was reduced to minimal levels. So pleased was Ulmer with the results that he asked permission to go on the offensive to take St. Andrews and Campobello, in order to secure the entire frontier.<sup>88</sup>

Ulmer's immediate military superiors and pro-war newspapers wholeheartedly supported his actions, but when news of the decree reached Washington a completely different attitude was taken.<sup>89</sup> The Madison administration took less interest in the illegal trade with British North America than in trying to win the hearts and minds of New England. The secretary of war ordered Ulmer to rescind his new measures. Instead, he was told simply to enforce the existing laws and follow existing legal procedures. This was to be the beginning of the end of Ulmer's success in controlling the border area.<sup>90</sup>

Ulmer accentuated his difficulties by the numerous quarrels he had with other officials of the district. He had such a tremendous disagreement with the collector of customs at Machias, Jeremiah O'Brien, over the salvage rights to the wreck of the British ship *Diligence*, that the

dispute ended up before the courts. The haul from the ship, which was forced aground in a storm on Beals Island in mid-January, 1813, was a rich one. Ten long 24 pounders, fifteen 12 pounders, and two 9 pounder cannons were recovered, along with twenty-five tons of shot. A company of Ulmer's men worked for over a week in deplorable conditions saving this valuable cargo, but O'Brien's men transported the fruits of the troops' labor to Machias and claimed the prize for themselves.<sup>91</sup>

Ulmer had another longstanding dispute with Lieutenant Maclay, who still commanded the fort. For a time Maclay, upset at having to take orders from a militia officer, refused to accept Ulmer's authority, and even refused to allow him to quarter inside the garrison. In one of the few battles he won, Ulmer was finally able to get Maclay transferred in March on the grounds that a regular army officer did not know how to deal with volunteers.<sup>92</sup>

During his entire tenure at Eastport, Ulmer fought a losing battle with the military bureaucracy over supplies and reinforcements for his command. Desperately short of troops after the discharge of the detached militia, Ulmer received only three more companies, bringing his total strength to no more than three hundred men. Ulmer estimated that only the entire regiment of five hundred men could fully suppress the smuggling trade. Of the three remaining companies, two were never raised, and the other languished at the fort in Castine, as no equipment, not even muskets, had been provided for them.<sup>93</sup>

The companies that Ulmer received were little better equipped than the one at Castine, being given little more than their guns and cartridge boxes. Ulmer wrote in despair to General Boyd in Boston:

They [the men] have no knapsacks, camp kettles, canteens, drums, pipes, nor colours. Their officers are obliged to borrow pots and kettles for cooking, and axes to cut the wood. There is not an ax furnished by the government, nor money to buy . . .<sup>94</sup>

There were also no clothes provided—sentries risked freezing at their posts through the entire winter. No pay was sent for either officers or men. The only things that arrived on time were rations, supplied by an independent contractor, but a good proportion of it was rotten. Rye flour alone was issued for bread. Ulmer himself went heavily into debt trying to keep his command in one piece.

Despite constant promises made to him by his superiors, no gunboats were sent to Passamaquoddy. Ulmer could watch British ships loading and unloading their cargo just out of cannon shot, but could do nothing to stop them. Even when on occasion a British ship drifted within range of the fort's battery, Ulmer was prevented from firing by his strict orders forbidding any offensive action.<sup>95</sup>

Ulmer's volunteers did their best with the resources at hand, waging a losing battle with the smugglers. Ulmer managed to get hold of some small boats to provide his own naval patrols and met with some success, only to be thwarted not only by the cleverness of his opponents, but the weakness, if not traitorous behavior of the civil authorities.

In late February, Ulmer's boats seized four vessels with goods worth \$10,000, but he was forced by the district attorney to hand them over to Lemuel Trescott, the collector. Trescott, following standard procedures, allowed the ships to go free after providing a bond of one-tenth their value. The goods were later sent across the line and still made a considerable profit for their owners despite the increased cost.<sup>96</sup>

While Trescott was never accused of complicity in illegal trade, Ulmer, with very good reason, suspected the deputy collector, a man named Coney, of being an associate of many of the smugglers.<sup>97</sup> The smugglers also bribed many of Ulmer's troops with both liquor and money.<sup>98</sup> If peaceful measures failed, violence was not unknown.

On one occasion a small guard boat of Ulmer's men patrolling off Robbinston captured another small boat engaged in smuggling. Two privates were placed on board as escort, but they were overpowered, one being knocked unconscious, and the smugglers rowed back to St. Andrews. The two privates were handed over to the military authorities, and one, found to have been born in New Brunswick, was sent to St. John in chains to await trial on charges of treason.<sup>99</sup>

The smugglers in Eastport, despite their success, found Ulmer to be a very tough man to beat, and they searched for more subtle and ingenious methods to get rid of him. They collected a number of executions against Ulmer that existed because of the tremendous debt he had been forced to go into. He was arrested by the sheriff and sent to the county jail in Machias.<sup>100</sup> He remained there only two weeks because he rightfully insisted that civil authorities had no power to arrest a serving officer in times of war.

When this failed, the smugglers began a campaign to discredit Ulmer. Vicious rumors were circulated about Ulmer's tyrannical behavior, and petitions were sent to any official that would listen. Eventually this campaign would bear fruit.<sup>101</sup>


Although Ulmer's stay in jail was brief, it marked the turning point in his struggle with the people of Moose Island. In the spring and summer of 1813 Ulmer steadily lost control of both the area and, even his own troops. On April 14th he had issued a decree which illustrates how bad the situation had become. Ulmer was now on the defensive and he knew it. The decree forbade any civilian from entering the grounds of the garrison at Machias and Eastport, made illegal any attempt to encourage a soldier from leaving his post, and stated that any person found on the grounds without authorization would be held for questioning. It also clearly stated that civil authorities had no power over military personnel, and that complaints on the soldiers' behavior must be made through the officers of the regiment.<sup>102</sup>

The British added to Ulmer's difficulties by increasing their naval presence in the area to such an extent that it became impossible to ship supplies past Machias via water. The coast was under effective blockade and consideration was given to abandoning Fort Sullivan. One supply ship dispatched from Boston, decided not to risk the blockade and sailed directly to St. John where she sold her cargo at a tidy profit to the enemy.<sup>103</sup>

To add insult to injury, in May, Ulmer's own superiors added to his troubles by issuing commissions to three disaffected officers of Ulmer's command in the Thirty-fourth U.S. Infantry then being raised in Maine. These officers in turn recruited at least twenty-five volunteers and then wished to march off not with the men, but all of their equipment. A dispute followed between Ulmer and the officers over this, the outcome of which is uncertain, but whose effects would later be disastrous to Ulmer.<sup>104</sup>

By July, Ulmer was forced to admit that he could not prevent the illicit trading. The smugglers had won. Any attempt to stop them resulted in the civil authorities arresting the soldiers trying to carry out their duty. The smugglers finished Ulmer off when their campaign of slander finally found receptive ears.<sup>105</sup>

In the spring of 1813 General Boyd, Ulmer's immediate superior at



SKETCH OF FORT SULLIVAN IN 1812

(Based on later views and maps)

Boston, was replaced by General Thomas Cushing. Cushing decided that an investigation was necessary in order to determine the validity of the charges against Ulmer. He sent Major Thomas Vinson of the Thirty-fourth Regiment, the same unit that Ulmer had quarrelled with in May, to report on the situation. Vinson condemned Ulmer's Volunteers, and Cushing was of the opinion after reading Vinson's comments, ". . . That they ought to be immediately discharged or relieved."<sup>106</sup> So severe were the findings against Ulmer, that he was ordered to be immediately relieved of command and placed under arrest.<sup>107</sup>

Ulmer was to languish in prison until his enlistment ran out in December. No formal charges were ever laid against him, despite frequent pleas to Cushing to let him stand trial so that he could clear his name. Cushing refused all of Ulmer's requests and even denied him any of his back pay. Ulmer, destitute, went to Washington seeking redress, but it would not be till November, 1814, that he finally received his pay, a total of \$1,581.54 for his year on the eastern frontier.<sup>108</sup>

The regiment of volunteers without its commander wasted away, doing little of any significance until it was discharged at the end of December. During the entire winter of 1814 no American military force was stationed along the entire frontier.<sup>109</sup>

Ulmer had gone from the fort, but he had left one important legacy—its name. Prior to 1813 the fort at Eastport was referred to as the battery or garrison on Moose Island. Ulmer wrote the first surviving letter which referred to the post as Fort Sullivan in March, 1813. It is uncertain who the fort was named after, but Lorenzo Sabine believed that the most logical person was Major-General John Sullivan, a revolutionary war veteran and close friend of General Dearborn, who died in 1795.<sup>110</sup> Until other evidence comes to light this analysis must stand.\*

\**Editor's Note:* Robert Bradley of the Maine Historic Preservation Commission reports that Ken Thompson of Portland, Maine is convinced that Fort Sullivan was named for John Sullivan's brother, Governor James Sullivan who died in 1808 and who was a close personal friend of the secretary of war, General Dearborn. Thompson has noted in his research of other Maine and United States Second System fortifications that these forts were often named for friends of Dearborn, particularly if the friend had recently died. Personal communication from Robert Bradley, September 11, 1984.

No attempt was made to replace Ulmer's men until late March, 1814, when two companies of the recently raised Fortieth U.S. Infantry under the command of Major Perley Putnum were ordered to Eastport. As a result of the British blockade, the troops were forced to march all the way from Boston in the middle of the spring flood season. It was not until the end of April after "a most fatiguing march" that they reached the frontier.<sup>111</sup>

During this movement of the 40th to Eastport the only armed clash between British and American forces in the area took place. It was decided that while the troops could march to Eastport, the supplies for the infantrymen had to be sent via the water. A ship was dispatched under the guard of Lieutenant Enoch Manning and twelve enlisted personnel of the regiment. On arrival near present day Lubec, Manning discovered two British men-of-war, H.M.S. *Bream* and *Fantome* in the Bay. He decided to make a desperate dash for the safety afforded by the guns of the fort, but was spotted by the cutter of the *Fantome* which gave chase and forced him to run the supply ship aground on the south shore of Moose Island. Manning removed his detachment from the vessel, lined them up in battle formation on the beach, and sent to the fort for reinforcements. The British dispatched the *Fantome's* cutter, now reinforced by the gig, which opened fire with a swivel gun mounted on her bow.

By this time, however, Manning's small force had been augmented by another detachment of fifteen men. Both sides exchanged fire repeatedly, and the Americans were able to drive the cutter off after inflicting injuries on two members of her crew. The *Bream* then came up and fired on the American vessel, but after two and a half hours of ineffective bombardment she was recalled by the Captain of the *Fantome*. Manning was then able to salvage most of the supplies from the schooner.<sup>112</sup>

The rest of the Fortieth's brief stay at Eastport was spent in the familiar role of repression of the smuggling trade. So open had the trade become since Ulmer's departure that Jacob B. Varnum, a captain of the regiment, rather ironically believed that the previous commander of Fort Sullivan had ". . . rather winked at the state of affairs, or let it go unmolested."<sup>113</sup> He and his fellow officers would, however, soon discover just how difficult a task it really was.

A day or two after arriving, Major Putnam ordered a gun of the battery fired across the bow of the small smuggling schooner that had been observed crossing into British waters. This forced the schooner to return, but this action raised such hostility against the garrison that they were compelled to confine themselves within the pickets of the fort and to their government supplied rations. For nearly two and a half months the soldiers were forced to live under a virtual state of siege, being only able to stop the most blatantly open smuggling.<sup>114</sup>

The men and officers of the Fortieth sat out their siege in peace until July 11, 1814, when something happened that not only dramatically affected the fort and Eastport, but the entire district of Maine itself. Jacob Varnum's observations on that fateful day tell the entire story:

Nothing worthy occurred up to this date, when, as we were sitting on our piazza in the morning enjoying a cool breeze from the ocean, suddenly the reach or strait inside of Grand Meuan [sic] became whitened by the canvas of a large fleet of vessels making directly for our harbor. It was a beautiful sight but rather ominous.<sup>115</sup>


It was ominous because the ships all wore the colors of men-of-war of His Majesty's Navy.

CHAPTER THREE

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CAPTURE AND  
OCCUPATION

1814-1818





The warships Captain Varnum saw entering Eastport Harbor were heading toward a target that British military planners had long coveted—Moose Island. As early as May, 1812, a month before the war began, General Prevost, in his *Report on the Defence of British North America*, had advocated the taking of the strategically situated island:

In the event of hostilities with America it would be an advisable measure to take possession of Moose Island, in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, improperly occupied by a small American Garrison, where we should derive great advantage and should remove the scene of warfare to the American frontier.<sup>1</sup>

After the declaration of war, even with the realization that British military resources were spread too thin for anything but defense, the taking of the island was still considered necessary, both to ensure the control of the Bay of Fundy and to restore British territorial rights usurped by the building of Fort Sullivan. Only the demands of the war in Europe and the critical nature of the situation in Upper Canada (Ontario) delayed action on Prevost's recommendation for two years.

Napoleon's abdication in April, 1814, ended the European conflict, thus freeing all of Britain's vast military resources. Immediately, plans were formulated in London intended to bring the war with the United States to a victorious conclusion. On almost the same day that the Fortieth Regiment arrived at Eastport, the Earl of Bathurst, the British secretary of war and for the colonies, dispatched orders to North America that were to seal the fate of the new garrison at Fort Sullivan.

Bathurst ordered the 102nd Regiment of Foot, then doing garrison duty in Bermuda, to be transported to Passamaquoddy Bay. Lieutenant-Governor Sherbrooke was instructed to provide from the Halifax garrison all other troops and supplies necessary for the successful capture and occupation of Moose Island.<sup>3</sup>

The orders reached Bermuda on June 10th and Sir Alexander Cochrane, in command of the island, began the complex task of loading an entire regiment aboard two transports. He also arranged the nucleus of the naval squadron that was to protect the transports while at sea and to provide support for the troops during the invasion. Cochrane chose

Captain Sir Thomas Hardy, best known as Nelson's flag captain at the Battle of Trafalgar, to command the naval forces. With Hardy went his ship H.M.S. *Ramillies*, a seventy-four gun ship-of-the-line, and H.M.S. *Terror*, a ten gun bomb ketch or mortar vessel. Loading of the transports began on June 21st and two days later Hardy ordered the ships to sail for an expected rendezvous with the forces from Halifax at Shelburne, Nova Scotia.<sup>4</sup>


When Hardy's flotilla left Bermuda the Halifax garrison was still unaware of Bathurst's orders. For some inexplicable reason the original dispatch never reached Sherbrooke. Knowledge of it was not received in Halifax until June 30th when a copy, forwarded by Cochrane, arrived. Quickly the necessary preparations were made and within five days the needed troops and supplies were loaded into two transports.<sup>5</sup>

A company of fifty Royal Artillerymen and a small detachment of engineers were sent to support the 102nd. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Pilkington, the deputy adjutant general at Halifax, was given overall command of the invasion forces. Hardy was to act as naval commander. Gustavus Nicolls, the same Royal Engineer officer who visited Passamaquoddy Bay in 1808, now a Lieutenant-Colonel and still commander of the Royal Engineers at Halifax, volunteered to give his expert assistance. On July 5th the transports, escorted by the eighteen gun sloop *Martin*, left Halifax. When they arrived at Shelburne on the seventh, Hardy's force was awaiting their arrival.<sup>6</sup>

The next day the fleet, now a respectable force left Shelburne Harbor. On the morning of July 11th they arrived off Grand Manan, where H.M.S. *Borer*, a fourteen gun brig joined.<sup>7</sup>

As finally assembled the force sent to capture and occupy Moose Island was impressive. The 102nd Regiment alone consisted of 571 privates, 23 musicians, 84 non-commissioned officers, and 26 officers. In support were the artillery company and engineers from Halifax. The four warships had at their disposal 116 guns and 909 men, of whom 152 were Marines.<sup>8</sup> Opposing them were the 80 men and four guns of Fort Sullivan, and approximately 250 ill trained militia men of dubious loyalty and value.<sup>9</sup>

Hardy and Pilkington planned to surprise the Americans in order to prevent the militia being called out and the fort's garrison escaping to the mainland. The main fleet, consisting of the four transports, *Ramillies*



Sir Thomas Hardy. (From collection of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England).


and *Terror*, proceeded along the east shore of Campobello Island and entered Friar Roads through the Eastern or Ship's Passage at about twenty of three in the afternoon of the eleventh.\* Consequently it was hidden from the Americans until it was within two or three miles of Eastport.<sup>10</sup> The *Martin* sailed ahead of the main body and arrived off Eastport flying a flag of truce just as the fleet appeared round Campobello.<sup>11</sup> A few minutes later the *Borer* entered the Bay through the much more treacherous West Passage (Lubec Narrows). She then proceeded to the west side of Moose Island in order to cut communications and prevent escape.<sup>12</sup>

As the men of Fort Sullivan raced to man their small battery and the general alarm was given in the town, a gig was dispatched from the *Martin* carrying Lieutenant Oates, Pilkington's aid-de-camp. Oates proceeded to the fort and demanded to see the commanding officer. He was escorted to Major Putnam of whom he requested the surrender of the fort under the terms laid down in a document that he presented.<sup>13</sup> The articles of capitulation were simple. The British required the surrender of the garrison and all government property. In return the men of the Fortieth would be entitled to the full honors of war, the men to become prisoners of war and the officers to be paroled home as soon as possible. The British also guaranteed that, "Every respect will be paid to private property found on the Moose Island belonging to the inhabitants."<sup>14</sup>

Oates gave Putnam five minutes to reply to the terms, but the American insisted that he needed more time. Oates replied that, while he must immediately return to the *Martin*, if Putnam lowered the flag of the fort he would consider the garrison to have surrendered and the British terms accepted. Without having obtained Putnam's surrender, the British officer then returned to the harbor.<sup>15</sup>

Oates' arrival at the fort had not gone unnoticed in the town. While the British officer issued his ultimatum several leading inhabitants, including Samuel Wheeler, Solomon Rice, and Aaron Hayden, arrived. After Oates' departure the citizens pleaded with Putnam to accept the terms offered and to avoid futile loss of lives and property. Putnam refused to commit himself and ordered the citizens to leave. The Major

\*All times are from the Captain's Log of H. M. S. *Ramillies*, Public Record Office (London), Admiralty 51/2027.



ROUTES OF BRITISH ATTACK

then called his officers into a council of war.<sup>16</sup> Captain Varnum described the meeting that followed:

Our opinion was asked, each one separately, beginning with myself as the second in command. I was for giving them a round or two from the battery and then retreating, if practicable to a narrow part of the strait where there was usually a ferry boat to the mainland. This scheme was not relished, for some of the officers had noticed one of the vessels going around to guard the pass. [This was the *Borer*.] The other officers successively thought it would be followed by an unjustifiable sacrifice of life and preferred surrender, asserting there was no immediate chance of escape.<sup>17</sup>

Putnam considered his officers' opinions and the hopeless situation. At about three-thirty, after observing the *Ramillies* with all her guns out lying directly in front of the battery, and one of the transports beginning to land troops, Putnam ordered the flag struck. Thus began the four year military occupation of Moose Island.<sup>18</sup>

Within an hour of the surrender most of the 102nd was ashore and spreading out over the island to secure their position from any attack from the mainland. Colonel Pilkington received Putnam's surrender and the seventy-three rank and file of the garrison were sent to one of the transports to await transfer to Halifax. A few days later the seven American officers were paroled and allowed to sail westward in a small schooner.<sup>19</sup>

From a strictly material standpoint the British appear to have won a hollow victory. Considering the magnitude of the forces involved the rewards were puny indeed. Besides the garrison, the fort contained only a small amount of ordnance and supplies:

- 4 18 pounder cannon (the battery)
- 8 Field pieces (4 of which were unserviceable)
- 960 pounds of gun powder
- 3,376 musket balls
- 911 rounds of shot
- 100 muskets with bayonets
- 6 swords
- 72 tents
- 1 ensign<sup>20</sup>

The militia surrendered an additional two 6 pounders and approximately

100 muskets.<sup>21</sup> Also seized from the collector were \$64,580 in duty bonds, \$9,000 in unsigned and nonnegotiable treasury notes, several lots of confiscated merchandise, the revenue boats, and several pieces of real estate which had been forfeited to the United States to pay off debts.<sup>22</sup>

Several American newspapers claimed that the capture of Eastport was, in fact, an American victory, as all the British had really captured was an island inhabited by traitorous smugglers.<sup>23</sup> Sighting the immense cost of the operation versus its gain, *The Boston Patriot* sarcastically wrote:

. . . when the people of England learn that this expedition has cost John Bull more than half a million dollars and has resulted in the capture of 48 [actually 80] full blooded Yankees and 6 [actually 10] pieces of cannon, no doubt they will think it a glorious victory.<sup>24</sup>

*The Boston Patriot*, however, was not privy to British plans and intentions. Hardy and Pilkington appeared to have been well apprised of the strength of the American garrison, and there may be some validity to American claims that spies were present amongst Eastport's smugglers, but the 102nd had come for the dual purpose of both taking and permanently retaining the island. The use of such an impressive force was to emphasize that Moose Island would irrevocably become part of the British Empire. The British saw themselves not as conquerors but as liberators of part of New Brunswick illegally usurped by the United States with the construction of Fort Sullivan in 1808.<sup>25</sup>

Symbolically, one of the first acts of the British was to rename the fort after Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke of Nova Scotia. Also, for the entire period of British rule the name Eastport, a designation created by a post-revolutionary act of the Massachusetts legislature, ceased to exist. In official documents only the term Moose Island was used.<sup>26</sup>

Hardy and Pilkington feared that within two months of the capture an expedition would be launched by the Americans to recapture the island. Ill informed on the size and effectiveness of the district's militia, and of the ability of troops from Massachusetts to come to the aid of the easternmost town in the commonwealth, the British expected to be hard pressed to retain their prize. As yet, no one in the area knew of the British plans, then being finalized, to take Castine and Machias and thus make any American attempt against the island impossible.<sup>27</sup>

Nowhere can the strength of this mistaken belief in an American counterattack be seen more clearly than in the magnitude of the military defenses planned and built by the British. Colonel Nicolls played a minor role in the invasion as a technical advisor, but he came with orders from Sherbrooke, ". . . to put Moose Island into a respectable state of defence, as soon as it is in our possession . . .", and authorizing him ". . . to construct such field works or other defences as he might think necessary for its security."<sup>28</sup>

Nicolls, a master of his craft, undertook a complete survey of the island. He formulated a grandiose plan that would result in the most extensive development of fortifications in the island's history. The American fort was judged to be almost useless for British purposes, as it only provided defense from seaborne attack while an attack from the mainland was perceived by the British as the primary threat. Nicolls determined that not only were major additions needed to Fort Sherbrooke, but so was the construction of several completely new installations:

. . . it would be inadvisable to attempt to provide defence for every point of approach or debarkation, which would cause too great a subdivision of the forces, the latter may be considerably aided by field works and for this purpose I consider the high ground in the rear of Fort Sherbrooke as the most favourable position against troops landed to the southward and the hill on the south side of the carrying place, about two miles distant, against the same to the northward, the force at either place to support that attacked and to act in combination against a landing made between them, also that a small intermediate point and battery on the high ground above Dog Island would assist in protecting the east side of Moose Island, as well as defend the passage between Indian and Deer Islands, and serve as a lookout post in that quarter. . . .<sup>29</sup>

Work began on Nicolls' scheme soon after the invasion. Soldiers were kept on fatigue duty without stop, including Sundays. As many civilian carpenters as could be found were hired and put to work under the supervision of Jerry Burgin, a foreman at the building of the American fort in 1808.

The first work was done to strengthen and expand Fort Sherbrooke. The area of the garrison was more than doubled, going as far west as the present high school and as far north as present day Adams Street. Two bastions, one in the northwest corner and the other in the north-

east corner, were constructed. In each a blockhouse was placed, both to improve the defenses and to provide barracks. An earthen parapet, six feet high, connected the bastions and protected the fort on the three sides not defended by the steep slope of the hill. Trees taken from Holmes' Hill, the hill overlooking the carrying place and soon to be the site of a new battery, ". . . were brought to the fort whole, and placed around the whole breast work, butts inward and tops outward, to act as a stockade to prevent the Yankees scaling the walls."<sup>30</sup>

The two blockhouses were somewhat smaller than the American blockhouse structure. They were two stories high and built entirely of hardwood logs. It was intended to mount two 12 pounder garrison guns on the roof of the northwest blockhouse and two 4 pounder iron guns on the other. Both were completed in the fall of 1814.<sup>31</sup>

The British constructed one other building at the fort, a powder magazine built to replace the American magazine that had been so dangerously placed in the lower floor of the American blockhouse. It was constructed of stone, with walls three feet thick, and had an arched roof of brick. It was twenty-four feet long by eighteen feet wide, capable of holding 200 barrels of powder. A wooden superstructure was put up around it to camouflage it as a storage shed. The remains of the magazine still stand as a mute reminder that a fort existed on Clark's Hill.<sup>32</sup>

After this work was completed, construction began on three of the four field works intended by Nicolls. These works were supervised by another Royal Engineer, a Lieutenant Brandreth, who replaced Nicolls after the latter's departure from the island in September. The largest of these fortifications was built on Holmes' Hill, which overlooked the carrying place. A large tract of land on the top of the hill was cleared and an earthwork thrown up enclosing a rectangular area approximately 300 feet long by 250 feet wide. It was intended that a blockhouse would be constructed in the center of the area to provide quarters for the garrison. It was to mount two 18 pounders on the roof. Another 18 pounder and two 12 pounders were to be mounted along the walls, and a picket fence was to provide further protection. All work stopped for the winter with only the walls and the foundation of the blockhouse completed. Named Prince Regent's Redoubt, after George, prince of Wales (later King George IV), the earthen walls still partially survive


and the hill is to this day called Redoubt's Hill.<sup>33</sup>

Brandreth also began work on two small fortifications on the high ground to the rear of Fort Sherbrooke. Located 240 yards northwest of the fort, they were built, ". . . to be occupied by infantry in order to command the hollow ground that shelters the approach of the enemy."<sup>34</sup> Only the walls were finished when this work, too, was interrupted by the onset of winter.

In the spring, Brandreth intended to finish Nicolls' plan. Circumstances, however, prevented any further work on the island's defenses. As early as September, 1814, the Earl of Bathurst had expressed concern over the cost of fortifying the island, and the need to continue the work vanished when Castine and Machias fell to the British in that same month. In December, the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, and the fate of the island was now to be decided by negotiation. On April 5, 1815, as an economy measure, all work on non-masonry military fortifications in New Brunswick was suspended. No more military construction was to be undertaken during the British occupation, which was just as well because by the spring of 1815 there were not enough men left in the garrison to man the existing fortifications.

When the entire 102nd Regiment came ashore shortly after the American surrender, the garrison of the island consisted of slightly over 750 men—the largest military force ever assembled in the Passamaquoddy district except during the brief Fenian crisis of 1866. For the first few months most of the garrison was employed in construction. A strong guard of eighty men was stationed at the carrying place and at night, in order to ensure the safety of the inhabitants from soldiers just released from four weeks of confinement at sea, a forty man patrol watched over the town. Other smaller detachments looked for any sign of military activity on the mainland.<sup>36</sup> A week after the invasion a small detachment crossed over to Robbinston to force the last element of the Fortieth Regiment in the area, a thirty man strong unit under Lieutenant Manning, to retreat to Machias.<sup>37</sup>

The invading force, however, stayed together only briefly. Within two weeks Hardy had sailed with the *Ramillies* and *Terror* to the coast of Massachusetts and by September 1st the artillery company had been moved to Saint John. In August a sizable unit of the 102nd, consisting of



Section of a Plan of Moose Island in the Province of New Brunswick [1815], copied from a plan drawn by Lt. Brandreth of the Royal Engineers. (Courtesy of Public Archives of Canada).


153 officers and men, had taken over garrison duties at St. Andrews.<sup>38</sup>

The number of men stationed at the island remained at around 600 until May, 1815, when over half the regiment was ordered to garrison various towns in New Brunswick that had been left defenseless after the 99th Regiment's departure from the province. From this date, till the 102nd's disbandment in August, 1817, approximately 300 men made up the garrison of the island. They were replaced by a two company size force of 100 men from the 98th Regiment, which remained on the island until the island's return to the United States in June, 1818.<sup>39</sup>

In contrast to previous periods of occupancy by American forces, enough historical records, in the form of muster roles and monthly reports, have survived to give us a reasonably good picture of the men who made up the British garrison. The 102nd was an atypical line regiment. Being an Irish regiment, it is of no surprise that the majority of the men (56.9 percent) were from Ireland. This contrasts with English regiments, in which thirty to forty percent of the soldiers were Irish. The next largest component was a mixed group of 179 continental Europeans (23.6 percent). They came from a variety of European countries including Russia, Poland, Nassau, the Palatinate, Westphalia, Holland and Luxemburg and were recruited from prisoner of war camps or as refugees or deserters from Napoleon's armies. In the British army as a whole, only around one in eight men (12.5 percent) were foreigners. Small components of English (12.3 percent) and Scottish (7.2 percent) soldiers made up the rest of the regiment.<sup>40</sup> The majority of the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were also Irish (55.1 percent), with a larger percentage of both English (23.0 percent) and Scots (10.0 percent). There were proportionally few foreign NCOs (12.9 percent).<sup>41</sup>

Evidence of the soldiers' occupational backgrounds is much more scanty. The occupations of fifty-eight of the soldiers that deserted from the 102nd were recorded in official reports. Of them, twenty-nine (50.0 percent) were common laborers. The rest belonged to a variety of trades, the most numerous being weavers (7 or 12.0 percent), carpenters (4 or 7 percent), and shoemakers (4 or 7 percent). The majority of the foreigners were laborers, while the majority of the skilled workers were Irish.<sup>42</sup>

The men lived tightly packed within the three blockhouses at the fort and a large store on the waterfront. One hundred and forty men crowded into the American blockhouse and seventy into each of the two



Detail of Fort Sherbrooke from Brandreth map (1815).

British blockhouses. Other men were billeted in houses that had been owned by nonresidents and had been confiscated by the British.<sup>43</sup> The soldiers were kept busy performing drill, building the fortifications, doing guard duty and other mundane tasks of garrison life. After the suspension of work on the fortifications, road gangs were rented out to the town at the rate of two shillings per man per day. Middle Street and the first bridge across Shackford's Cove were built by the men of the 102nd.<sup>44</sup>


Little was done to provide for the entertainment of the enlisted personnel. A lucky few had been allowed to bring their families.\* The rest had either left their families at home or were forced to remain single. Camp followers are said to have been plentiful, but the most common companion appears to have been alcohol.<sup>45</sup>

To ensure discipline amongst this diverse group, any minor infraction of regulations was dealt with severely, particularly if one was suspected of infringing on the rights of the inhabitants. A list of the punishments given to the men of the 102nd during the first few months on Moose Island has survived and records in vivid detail the rigid discipline of the British army. Typical is the list of punishments dealt on July 20, 1814:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Charge</i>	<i>Sentence</i>	<i>Result</i>
Thos. Sullivan	For being drunk, entering a house of an inhabitant on suspicion of plundering the house.	200 lashes	Sentence carried out.
John Tucker	For neglect of duty on post when sentry.	300 lashes	25 given.
William Burke	Drunk & Absent when on duty.	100 lashes	Sentence carried out.
Thos. Morgan	For being drunk on guard.	300 lashes	150 given <sup>46</sup>

There was no legal escape from the army, other than a medical discharge, for the majority of the men because over seventy percent had accepted an extra five guineas in bounty money to sign lifetime enlist-

\*British army regulation allowed 6 wives for every company of 100 men.



Detail of Prince Regent's Redoubt from Brandreth map (1815).

ments.<sup>47</sup> With the United States being in such close proximity, it is not surprising that desertion once again plagued the island's garrison. One hundred and one men (14.3 percent) of the 102nd and a further fifteen men of the 98th deserted from Moose Island during the British occupation.<sup>48</sup>

On several occasions entire guard detachments simply swam across the narrow body of water that separated them from freedom. Officers were said to have stood guard over their own men. In the worst month, May, 1815, just after the return of northeastern Maine (with the exception of Moose Island) to the United States, and while half the 102nd regiment was being transferred, thirty-eight men deserted. In that same year the problem had become so serious, with a desertion rate of over three times that of the rest of the Nova Scotia command, that questions were raised about the fitness of the 102nd for active service. Efforts were made to replace the regiment with the more reliable 104th

(New Brunswick) Foot, but the 104th was disbanded before a transfer could be arranged.<sup>49 & 50</sup>

Ethnic background appears to have been a factor in desertion. Of the men of the 102nd who deserted, approximately the same proportion of Irish as formed the entire regiment attempted to desert—they made up well over one-half of the total (58.5 percent), while the English and Scots of the regiment were by far the most reliable (6.4 percent of the total). The foreign soldiers were the most likely to attempt desertion, they made up over one-third of the total (35.1 percent).<sup>51</sup>

Not all the soldiers were successful in their attempts to escape. In October, 1814, a man was shot dead while trying to escape from a small detachment based at Machias. Two months earlier four would-be deserters were washed up on the beach of Moose Island after having drowned. Approximately ten percent of the men that made an attempt to desert were caught and faced increasingly severe punishments.<sup>52</sup> In September, 1815, Lieutenant General Smyth, the military commander of New Brunswick and president of the Legislative Council of New Brunswick, wrote to his superiors to ask the legality of a punishment of 500 lashes and limited solitary confinement for three convicted deserters of the 102nd.<sup>53</sup>

Americans actively encouraged desertion. In May, 1815 an American infantry officer, Lieutenant Moss, stationed at Machias, was accused by the British of "bribing" two privates and a sergeant to desert. East-portsers recorded in vivid detail the whipping of two local men 200 times, one while his mother and sister were forced to watch, for their assistance to one supposed deserter.<sup>54</sup> No matter how severe the punishments, however, nothing seemed to deter the men from attempting to escape or some of the inhabitants from assisting them.

While the rank and file led incredibly harsh lives, their officers existed in a totally different world. Over half the officers of the 102nd (59.3 percent) were Irish and the rest were either English (25.9 percent) or Scots (14.8 percent).<sup>55</sup> There were no foreign officers. They tended to come from much higher socioeconomic backgrounds than their men and many were independently wealthy. Lieutenant Villars was well known on Moose Island for his impressive collection of silver plate. What really differentiated the officer class from the ranks, how-

ever, was that all those holding commissions had to be literate.<sup>56</sup>

Most of the officers resided in town in houses which had either been confiscated from nonresident owners or rented. Other officers resided in spacious accommodation at the fort or at the store on the waterfront. Several kept elaborate households. Lieutenant Colonel Gubbins lived with his wife and family at the Bucknam House, one of the finest and largest houses in the town, where he ". . . maintained a large establishment and kept eleven fires."<sup>57</sup> Many other officers brought their families to reside with them on the island and within eighteen hours of the invasion a school had been established to educate their children.<sup>58</sup>

As a result of their position and wealth, the officers became the social magnets of the town. An officers' mess was established which proved to be a daily gathering place for the most important personages on the island. Often townsmen were given the high honor of attending these meals.<sup>59</sup> A theater was organized in the "Old South School" in which the officers and enlisted men put on a variety of plays. Attendance was open to all, and the profits from the ticket sales were given to charity. The theater only survived till the moving of half the 102nd to New Brunswick, but other forms of entertainment were organized by the officers throughout the occupation. Balls were frequently held. Every summer horse races were organized at which the "British bloods" were usually beaten by the "Yankee scrubs".<sup>60</sup>

Provision was made to provide for the souls of the officers and their families by the appointment of an Anglican chaplain to the garrison. On October 26, 1814 the Reverend Roger Aitken was appointed to the post at an annual salary of £100. A church was provided by moving the formerly nondenominational meeting house from its location just outside town to the corner of High and Boynton Streets. For the first time in Eastport's history an organized service was held every Sunday.<sup>61</sup>

The senior officer of the garrison, carrying the title of Commandant of Moose Island, was much more than a military commander. He was also in charge of the civilian administration. For the four years of British occupation the citizens of Eastport lived under martial law. Martial law began as soon as the Americans surrendered. The articles of capitulation had provided only one guarantee to the civilian population of the island—that of the safety of their private property. Any private

property, however, owned by nonresident Americans was confiscated as being prizes of war.<sup>62</sup>

There were few restrictions placed on the lives of the inhabitants of the island. The most onerous demand was contained in a decree issued on July 14, 1814 by Captain Hardy which ordered the citizens to swear on oath to pledge allegiance to the king of Britain or to leave the island within a week. In an attempt to mollify any ill feelings amongst the civilians, Hardy, in the same document, guaranteed that American municipal law would continue to be in effect.<sup>63</sup>

Hardy's decree did generate a great deal of distress amongst the majority of Eastporters. Most had no choice, but reluctantly to betray the United States and take the oath, in order to safeguard not only their property, but also the safety and security of their families. Others, however, took the oath willingly, quite content to become subjects of the crown. In all, 161 men, about three-quarters of the male population of Eastport, took the oath.<sup>64</sup> Besides the oath, the only other restriction of any note that was imposed on the inhabitants was that, while the war lasted, a pass was needed to leave the island.<sup>65</sup>

The British established a simple and direct system to administer the island. The commandant acted as both chief administrator, judge and jury. He was assisted by two officials: the town major, who performed the function of chief of police; and the garrison and barrack quartermaster sergeant, who acted as the town constable. The townspeople were allowed to continue to elect their own selectmen and tax assessors, as long as they recognized that final authority rested with the commandant. Such a system, with limited checks and balances, was open to abuse, and it is a tribute to the British soldiers who took these positions that the citizens of Eastport would have many more pleasant memories than bad of the martial law administration.<sup>66</sup>

There were a total of five commandants of Moose Island. The first was Lieutenant Colonel Herries, the senior officer of the 102nd. Herries was the only one of the men to hold this post who was universally disliked by the citizens.<sup>67</sup> He was succeeded in October, 1814 by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Gubbins, the inspecting field officer of militia in New Brunswick. "Colonel Gubbins," wrote Jerry Burgin, "had seen but little actual service, and was thought to be rather arbitrary and partial, and in a few cases perhaps he was so, but on the whole he was

very fair."<sup>68</sup>

Gubbins, the longest serving commandant, remained on the island till May, 1816 when he requested a leave of absence in England. He was replaced both as commandant and as inspecting field officer by Lieutenant Colonel Hercules Renney. Renney was a town favorite, well remembered as a courteous and kind officer, who became so attached to the island that he named a son born there, "Moose Island Renney."<sup>69</sup>

Renney was forced to retire in January, 1817 and was replaced by Major Robert Anstruther of the 102nd. Anstruther was best remembered for his physical size, standing some six feet four inches tall, but he, too, was considered to be fair and courteous.<sup>70</sup> Anstruther was replaced after the 102nd's disbandment by Captain Richard Gibbon, of the 98th Regiment, who was also praised by the inhabitants. Gibbon was the last commandant and arranged the transfer of the island back to the United States in June, 1818.<sup>71</sup>

The post of town major was originally given to a twenty year old subaltern of the 102nd, Lieutenant R. Williams. He served until his regiment's departure from the island and seems to have been generally disliked, as some of his actions were described as verging on being tyrannical. Williams was only kept in check by his superior officers.<sup>72</sup> After Williams, the post was filled by a series of officers from the 98th.<sup>73</sup>

The town garrison sergeant throughout the occupation was Corporal Peter Crook of the Royal Artillery. Well respected and liked, the leading citizens of Eastport sent him a letter of tribute just before his departure in 1818. It was Crook, more than any other man, who kept relations between the governors and the governed relatively happy.<sup>74</sup>

The civil and judicial administration worked to the general satisfaction of all concerned. Justice was swift and sure. In civil cases the commandants as often as possible tried to act as arbitrator and, when possible, allowed the citizens to settle disputes out of court.<sup>75</sup> The British scrupulously ensured that all local taxes were used to improve the island's road system, and in most other ways ensured that the inhabitants would be treated as fairly and properly as possible.<sup>76</sup>

At the end of the occupation forty-three of the leading citizens of the town sent Captain Gibbon a letter expressing their appreciation of the good conduct of the martial law administration:

. . . we should do injustice to our own feelings were we to be unmindful of

the tribute of respect so justly due yourself and other officers, who have presided over us; and who, in discharge of their official duties, have had the magnanimity and uprightness to refrain from all oppression and to overcome the temptation "*to feel power and forget right.*"<sup>77</sup>

While Moose Island remained under martial law the expressed intention of making it an integral part of New Brunswick never materialized. In fact, the island never became more than a quasi-independent state within a state, as the commandant was responsible only to the military commander of the province. On August 13, 1814 the Legislative Council of New Brunswick decided, ". . . that it is not expedient at present to extend to them [the inhabitants of Moose Island] all of the rights and privileges of British subjects."<sup>78</sup> It appears that the overriding fear of an American counterattack was initially the deciding factor in maintaining the martial law administration. After the fall of all of Maine south to Castine, however, other factors prevented the full integration of the island into New Brunswick.

The Treaty of Ghent did not establish the final status of the island and it may be that the British after the war did not want to offend the Americans by changing its present situation. It is more likely, however, that the overriding factor in the maintenance of the island outside the civil administration of New Brunswick was the large financial gains made by those who served on the island and their immediate superior in the provincial capital of Fredericton.

The commandant of the island, starting with Colonel Gubbins, received a daily allowance in addition to his normal salary of ten shillings.<sup>79</sup> They also shared with the town major and Lieutenant-General Smyth the court revenues and the fees from licensing the local ale houses. The amount raised from these two sources was not inconsiderable. The court made £40 per session and General Smyth alone made £30 2s. from the licence fees in the first two years of occupation.<sup>80</sup>

As the result of the financial benefits of a posting to Moose Island,

(Following Page). Painting of Passamaquoddy Indian Princess inside one of the Fort Sherbrooke buildings during the British occupation. Inscription on painting reads, "Dena [Francis Joseph] daughter of Francis Joseph—Governor of Passamaquoddy, Eastport Sept. 18th 1817." Painting is believed to have been done by Lt. Villars, a British officer stationed at Fort Sherbrooke. (Photograph of painting courtesy of Nina Fletcher Little).



there was on occasion competition for the various positions. Colonel Renney, after being forced to retire, pleaded to no avail to be allowed to retain the command and simply live off the island's revenues.<sup>81</sup> When Lieutenant Williams left, both Sir John Sherbrooke, then governor general of Canada, and his successor at Halifax, the Earl of Dalhousie, nominated friends to the post.<sup>82</sup>

The commandants of the island jealously guarded their domain. Major Anstruther ordered the sheriff of Charlotte County, New Brunswick, back across the bay when he arrived to arrest an island merchant. The major warned the sheriff that if he returned he would end up in the fort's jail or "black hole".<sup>83</sup> General Smyth supported the commandants until he was ordered by Earl Dalhousie in September, 1816, to stop participating in the division of the island's spoils.<sup>84</sup> After this he supported attempts to bring the island under at least partial civil control. He approved of attempts to enforce custom regulations and issued a strong protest to Halifax when Dalhousie approved of Captain Gibbon's decision that the collector of Saint John had no authority in Eastport.<sup>85</sup>

As a result of being neither true British subjects nor American citizens, the inhabitants of Eastport were placed occasionally in the middle of disputes between the two governments. The worst of these incidents forced the exile of five of the leading merchants of the town and the founding of the village of Lubec.

When the British fleet appeared off Eastport on July 11, 1814, the collector of customs, Lemuel Trescott, was placed in a very difficult situation. In his possession were \$64,580 in duty bonds and \$9,000 in nonnegotiable treasury notes which he attempted to remove to safety on the mainland. After finding his escape blocked by the *Borer*, he hid the documents and returned to town. But a smuggler named Rogers had observed Trescott's actions and informed the British of their location.<sup>86</sup>

The bonds were sent to the Admiralty Court in Halifax, where they were condemned and the obligors ordered to pay the crown. Six Eastporters shared a considerable proportion of the debt, but they refused to pay the British because the American government also insisted on collecting the debt. The merchants were faced with the difficult choice of paying twice or of being in default to one or the other governments.

In the spring of 1815 an official from Halifax secretly arrived to

enforce payment and five of the merchants, having been informed of the danger by friendly officers of the garrison, fled across the bay to Lubec Point. Here they found an ideal place to sit out their difficulties. They were out of British controlled territory, and were far enough removed from American officials to ignore pressures to pay. At Lubec they established themselves, building houses, stores and wharves, and by 1818, after the return of Eastport to the United States, they were able to compete effectively for the trade of the district.

The legal squeeze on these Eastporters, however, continued for a year, with the British being able to collect half the debt by threatening to confiscate the merchants' private property in Eastport, and with several American officials appearing in Lubec to demand payment on penalty of the seizure of their new property. Finally Congress was petitioned and in 1816 an act was passed granting them full relief from all American claims, and shortly thereafter the British responded in kind.<sup>87</sup>

The residents of Eastport ran other grave financial risks because of their peculiar status. While the British collected all taxes, the government of Massachusetts still insisted on the payment of state taxes. In 1817 at the annual town meeting, the sheriff of Washington County arrived to collect for the state, but the people of Eastport refused to pay their taxes twice. It was not until January, 1819, that a bill was finally passed by the Massachusetts State legislature granting the people of the island a reprieve from state taxes for the years 1814 through 1817.<sup>88</sup>

Of all the financial difficulties faced by the people of Eastport during the years of occupation, the worst was the ending of the great days of smuggling. For almost twenty years the town's economy was dominated by this illegal industry. But the removal of the border to Castine in September, 1814, the ending of the War of 1812 with the subsequent ending of the embargo, and the decline of the plaster trade, resulted in a dramatic change in Eastport. The town was now dependent on more normal trade with Portland and Boston, as well as on acting as a service center for the surrounding areas of Washington County. There was no market for Eastport's fish products in British North America and the citizens of Charlotte County used St. Andrews as their trading center.

Eastport was linked to the economy of the United States and was in no sense a possession of Great Britain. The commandants of the island

realized this and did not allow the enforcement of British customs law over their domain. It is perhaps because of this economic reality that the people of Eastport were so overjoyed when the island finally reverted back to the United States.<sup>89</sup>

The return of the island to American control was, however, long delayed and the citizens of the town would continue to live this precarious existence for almost exactly four years. In fact, Moose Island was the last piece of American territory occupied by the British as a result of the War of 1812. British insistence that Moose Island remain part of New Brunswick was the only point of dispute between the delegates at Ghent in December, 1814. Albert Gallatin, the leader of the American delegation, decided that the question of the permanent sovereignty of the island was not important enough to risk the peace treaty and left the matter to be decided at a later time.<sup>90</sup>

The fourth article of the Treaty of Ghent outlined the procedure that would decide the final status of the island. It called for the establishment of an impartial committee of two, one to be appointed by the British, the other by the Americans, to hear all the evidence related to the respective claims.<sup>91</sup> It took almost two years to appoint the commissioners and it was not until September 23, 1816, that the first hearing was held at St. Andrews. Finally on November 24, 1817, at New York, a compromise agreement was reached, in which Moose Island reverted to American control, while the Americans surrendered their claim to all the other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay and Bay of Fundy.<sup>92</sup>


A further seven months of bureaucratic haggling ensued, but on June 30, 1818, a delegation led by Brigadier-General James Miller, representing the United States, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Sargeant, representing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, received the island from Captain Gibbon, Lieutenant Merchant, commanding a company of U.S. Artillery, once again raised the stars and stripes over Fort Sullivan, and the inhabitants greeted it "with six hearty cheers!!"<sup>93</sup>

## CHAPTER FOUR

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# THE MIDDLE YEARS

1818-1860





The years between the British occupation and the Civil War form a completely new era for Fort Sullivan and Eastport. The return of a regular U.S. Army garrison to the fort in 1818, marks the period's beginnings. For thirty-one of the next forty-three years, soldiers were stationed at the fort. The changes wrought during these years to the structure and function of the fort reflect the diminishing strategic importance of Eastport and the evolution of the entire American army.

The garrison's relationship with the town underwent dramatic change as well. In previous years, the garrison was the agent of an outside authority trying, with various degrees of success, to impose control over an unwilling population. It was involved in what were strictly speaking civil police matters, and as such, represented a force that was unwanted by the community and alien to it. This changed in the immediate postwar era, and the soldiers of Fort Sullivan became an integral, although distinct, part of the community.

The garrison continued to represent outside authority. But it was at worst a benign force—acceptable to the citizens of Eastport, if not much liked and respected. In fact, the fort developed into a ghetto\*, becoming a separate element within the community. Not only was the garrison walled off from the town by the picket fence surrounding it, but it was also separated by the peculiar social and cultural distinctions that distinguished the professional soldier from the ordinary citizen. The fort remained a ghetto within Eastport for the rest of its history, even after the final departure of the garrison in 1873.

During the time the garrison had ceased to be an agent of the civil government, its role as part of the nation's chain of seacoast fortifications was called into question. The strategic importance of Eastport greatly diminished in the year following the end of the War of 1812. In 1808, the fort represented more than a rallying place for militia and

\*For the purpose of this chapter, ghetto is defined as: "1. A quarter of a city in which members of a minority, racial or cultural group live, esp. because of social, legal or economical pressure. 2. An isolated or segregated group." Source - *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1976), p. 650.

more than the center of efforts to suppress smuggling. Fort Sullivan was also America's easternmost outpost along the possibly volatile frontier with British North America. Further, during the war, the fort was the potential stepping-off place for any American invasion of New Brunswick, and as such was considered to be, at least by the British, of first importance.


In 1818, the fort was again made part of America's first line of defense. A sizeable garrison of two companies was maintained until 1820, when the American army's strength was drastically cut from 10,554 to 5,773 men. Despite being strained to the limit, the army kept one company at Eastport until 1836 when the entire garrison was sent to fight the Seminole Indians in Florida.

Until the late 1820's only two places in Maine, Eastport and Portland, were normally provided with a regular garrison. The settlement of the interior along the Maine-New Brunswick border frontier, however, shifted the focus of military planners away from the coast. To place troops closer to the undefined border, barracks were constructed at Houlton in 1828. And until the ending of the border dispute with the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, the Houlton garrison remained considerably larger than Fort Sullivan's.

The border crisis, actually, involved very few regular troops. From 1836 to 1840, the army, thoroughly tied up in the Seminole War, was able to maintain only two small garrisons in Maine: one at Houlton and the other at Portland. These military constraints partially explain Washington's position on the border conflict—its reluctance to confront the British and its attempts to moderate the demands of the government of Maine. In 1838, at the height of the border crisis, the so called Aroostook War, the Maine and New Brunswick militia almost came to blows. The American government dispatched General Winfield Scott, one of the most senior officers in the army, not to lead the troops, but to seek "peace with honor." Scott managed to negotiate a truce, which more or less held until the final settlement of the border dispute.\*

The War Department, however, did plan for a possible military confrontation with the British. In 1838, Major James D. Graham prepared a

\*For a full account of the border dispute, see W. S. MacNutt's *New Brunswick* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1963), pp. 208-212, 265-273, 308-313.



Profile and plan of Fort Sullivan, 1820. (From National Archives, Record Group 77, Drawer 134, Sheet 4).

report on the defense of Maine which clearly illustrates the declining strategic importance of Fort Sullivan. Graham recommended that in case of war only one company of artillery and one of infantry be located at Eastport, while a full regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery defend Calais at the mouth of the St. Croix River. Calais was to replace Eastport as the center of the military efforts to defend Washington County because of its far superior strategic position. Troops at Calais could defend the main road between the sea and Houlton and could close the St. Croix to British shipping. Soldiers at Fort Sullivan could not directly support the garrison at Houlton, nor could they close the St. Croix, as the Letite Passage was beyond the range of the guns of the battery. Fort Sullivan was only useful ". . . to defend Eastport against the occupancy of a maritime enemy . . .".<sup>2</sup>

The end of the border tensions mark a further decline in the strategic importance of Fort Sullivan. In fact, no American capital investment was made to the defenses of the post after the construction of Trescott's original battery in 1808. Never was the battery more than a means to deter raiding frigates. But it remained the only form of seaboard defense long after it had become obsolete. In 1845, the four 18 pounders of the battery were removed to storage, never to be replaced. No guns defended Eastport's harbor again until well into the Civil War.<sup>3</sup>

In 1851, General J. G. Totten, in his *Report on The Subject of National Defences*, recommended that Fort Sullivan be maintained as a military post and that it eventually be replaced by a new post, estimated to cost \$132,000 and to mount thirty-six guns. But the new building was placed in the category of "works to be commenced last of all" and was never considered to be more than military wishful thinking.<sup>4</sup> Like many other obsolete military posts, the fort evolved into simply a place to provide accommodation for troops during peacetime and to be abandoned when the army was required to fulfill a special commitment. In 1836, the Seminole War drew the garrison away; in 1845, it was the war with Mexico; and in 1853, the need to provide troops in new and more important fortifications in California, once again saw Fort Sullivan left vacant.<sup>5</sup>

Nowhere is this gradual change in function from coastal fortification to barracks more evident than in the alterations made to the fort's

structure between 1818–1860. In these years the officers and occasional caretakers attempted to obtain enough money to maintain the existing structures and to build more suitable accommodation. Every year just enough funds were provided to do the necessary repairs, and it took nearly fifteen years (1818–1832) to make the fort habitable. According to J. D. Foner, this pattern was common to many American military posts throughout the nineteenth century:

. . . military posts were constructed to meet the demands of the moment, little attention was paid to those features which might make them more habitable for the men. The commanding officers, responsible for the choice of sites and construction of the posts were, as a rule, neither architects nor engineers. As a result such items as ventilation, sewage, sanitary conveniences and even ordinary comforts were largely ignored.

. . . As they were subjected to the ravages of weather and time, the defects in material and construction soon became obvious, the foundation supports and floors warped and rotted, and large cracks developed in the roofs and walls providing ready access to rats, insects, dust, rain, and snow. Under these conditions the men were easy prey to colds and other illnesses.<sup>6</sup>

When General Miller inspected the fort after its return to the United States in 1818 he found that, ". . . although the barracks do not appear to be wantonly injured, yet the internal police of them, has been so bad that they are considerably out of repair."<sup>7</sup> Miller also discovered that all of the British additions to the fort, including the two blockhouses, the magazine and the earthen ramparts, were built on land confiscated without compensation to its owners, and that they thus reverted to private ownership. No money was available to purchase the British structures, and with the exception of the magazine, none were ever permanently incorporated into the fort. The two blockhouses were destroyed by fire in the 1850's and the earth that made up the walls was carted away to improve the town's roads in the 1820's. The magazine was rented after tedious negotiations with John Clark, the same man Trescott had so overpaid in 1808. Eventually Clark settled for \$50 a year, less than a third of his original request.<sup>8</sup>


Little or no repairs were undertaken by the immediate postwar garrison. Leonard Pierce, the caretaker of the fort between May 1820 and June 1821, found the post in such a bad state that emergency repairs were necessary to prevent its "total destruction." When Pierce was

relieved by Captain Milo Mason, who arrived with his company of artillery in June 1821, the fort was found to be almost uninhabitable.<sup>9</sup>

Mason began the first major renovation of the fort since 1814, in order to provide for the safety and comfort of his command. Two buildings were rented, including the most northwestern of the ex-British blockhouses. Leased at \$100 per annum, it provided space for a carpentry shop and storeroom in the lower story, and for enlisted men's families in the upper story. The second building was a small blacksmith shop near the blockhouse which was rented for \$24 per year. The old American blockhouse was repaired and housed the company barracks in the second story. The downstairs was used as the men's mess and the commissary of subsistence's storeroom. The officers' quarters at the southwest corner of the fort were converted into a one family structure to house the commanding officer, and the former company barracks to the north were altered to serve as quarters for the subalterns and their families. The building adjacent to the latter was maintained as a hospital. Directly to the north of the hospital a small 15 feet square building, erected by the British, acted as the guardhouse. Two other buildings were constructed: a one story gun house, 17 by 32 feet, located to the south of the blockhouse; and a barn, 20 by 36 feet, placed on private ground about 100 feet west of the magazine.<sup>10</sup>

Although Mason and his immediate successors realized that his alterations were at best a stopgap measure—there was not enough room for the officers and their families and the blockhouse was too large, damp, and uncomfortable for quarters—no major additions were undertaken until 1827. In 1822, the guardhouse was moved to a site twenty-five feet east of the magazine, and the post sutler, John Kelly, was allowed to construct a house next to the hospital. It was a two story structure, 44 by 21 feet, divided into four rooms. The building survives today on Washington Street, where it was moved in 1877, and now serves as the local museum.<sup>11</sup>

In 1827 the Kelly house was purchased and converted into officers' quarters. As an economy measure, a small strip of land just north of the post road (now McKinley Street), and the powder magazine were purchased from John Clark. Approximately 100 feet due east of the magazine a building was constructed as a general maintenance shop to replace the now decrepit guardhouse. It was described as a



Northern section of Officers' Barracks today on Washington Street, Eastport.

. . . building erected 55 feet long and 23 broad, one story high and divided into four compartments, a guardroom and prisons, a carpenters shop and blacksmith shop, with two chimneys and a spacious cellar . . .<sup>12</sup>

A small clothing store, 31 by 20 feet, one story high, was purchased and moved on to the fort site approximately thirty feet to the west of the magazine. It was originally converted into a office for the commander of the post. All these additions were intended to replace the rented buildings whose leases had been allowed to expire in 1826, and they did so except for the failure to provide new accommodation for the men's families.<sup>13</sup>


Despite all of these additions, when Captain Thomas Childs arrived at the post in November, 1827, he still found the post unfit for his company. Childs and his men had been transferred to Eastport from Charleston, South Carolina, and he found the blockhouse a completely unsuitable barracks. Childs insisted that an entirely new building be constructed

to house his company. The present accommodation, he complained to the quartermaster general, consists ". . . of one room and only one stove, and in this climate season . . . is not fit for the convenience of fifty-five men (when the company is full)."<sup>14</sup> Childs also demanded that new quarters be found for the women and that a well be dug, as at that time a well was rented at \$10 per month one-quarter of a mile away.<sup>15</sup>

Funds were not provided to Childs until late 1828, and work could not commence on the new barracks until the next year. The contract was eventually given to Charles Peavey, the chief engineer in 1808, and he completed the structure by the middle of August. It was erected between the new maintenance building and the magazine. The structure was one story high, 90 by 21 feet, and was subdivided into four rooms, three for barracks and the fourth as a kitchen. Childs then moved the hospital across the parade ground into the upper story of the blockhouse. And the former mess on the lower story of the blockhouse was converted into quarters for the company's wives. The former hospital was converted into further officers' quarters. In addition, a new well was dug between the commander's house and the southernmost officers' quarters. It provided fresh water to the garrison until the garrison's final departure in 1873, and to other inhabitants on Fort Hill until it was filled in for safety reasons in the 1950's. The last part of the 1829 construction scheme was the addition of a veranda along the front of the commander's house.<sup>16</sup>

In 1830, several major changes were made to the three officers' quarters and the commander's house. Out kitchens were constructed onto the rear of all four structures and a portico was placed along all three of the subaltern houses. The portico was ". . . 5 feet wide, 120 feet long . . . with a floor, railing and shingled roof."<sup>17</sup>

Childs' alterations, with one major exception, finally made the fort a reasonably comfortable station. His one major error was in moving the hospital to the blockhouse. If the blockhouse was an unhealthy barracks, then it was an even more unsuitable hospital. In December 1831, the Surgeon-General of the army insisted that it be replaced. As no money was forthcoming for a new structure, Captain Childs converted the maintenance shop into a hospital. The building was jacked up and turned into a two story structure, with the lower story housing the surgeon's office, dispensary and examining room; and the upper story, a



The parade ground with the southern and middle sections of the Officers' Quarters in the background, circa 1870. (Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society).


large ward. A veranda was constructed, which due to the slope of the hill, connected the upper story of the hospital with the company barracks. The maintenance functions and guardhouse were moved into the blockhouse and two houses 100 yards due west of the magazine, along the post road, were rented for the men's wives and families.<sup>18</sup>

In the 1830's, four separate land purchases extended the fort's land well beyond the original three acres, and made it even larger than Fort Sherbrooke had been. In 1830, a strip of land 815 feet by approximately 50 feet, running beneath the southern edge of the hill, was bought from Jonathan Bartlett for \$3,300. Four years later a lot running behind the officers' quarters, south of the post road, north of the hill's edge and back to High Street was purchased from E. Richardson for \$3,300. In 1835, \$3,000 was paid Judo Dana for almost all the land not already owned by the government between the post road, the eastern edge of the hill, and High and Adams Streets. The ownership of this parcel of land was completed twelve months later when the women's quarters were purchased from Jesse Gleason for \$750.20.<sup>19</sup>

In the years up to the Civil War, only one more structure was constructed. This was a one story building, 26 by 20 feet, erected in 1842 between the powder magazine and the commander's office. It was designed to house the post's new fire engine and the quartermaster's office.<sup>20</sup> One year later, on the insistence of the fort's assistant surgeon, Leonard Sprague, major work was undertaken on the post's sewage and drainage systems. Not surprisingly, Sprague found conditions that adversely affected the health of the garrison. He noted:

In the spring of the year the cellar of the hospital, situated on the range with the men's quarters, receives from three to four feet of water, and is there obliged to remain for a long time. Having lately visited a cellar under the soldiers quarters, I found the bottom of it completely wet, and the mud several inches deep—it receives every spring from two to three feet of water and is not dry in any part of the year—There is consequently a constant evaporation which has rotted the floors and timbers of quarters, and issuing through every crevice, subjects the men to a moist and unhealthy atmosphere.<sup>21</sup>

All of these conditions and alterations were attempts to provide adequate housing for the fort's small garrison, which between 1818 and 1820, comprised a company of the Corps of Artillery and one of the Eighth Infantry.<sup>22</sup> After the 1820 reduction of the army, there was never



Map (1886) showing Fort Sullivan property purchases. (From National Archives, Record Group 77, Drawer 134, Sheet 4).

more than one company of artillery stationed at Eastport. In 1821, Company G of the First Artillery Regiment, under the command of Captain Milo Mason, arrived at the fort. Company G was stationed there, under various commanders, until November 1827, when there was a general shifting of artillery regiments. The First was replaced in New England by the Third, and in late November 1828, Captain Thomas Childs arrived with Company A of the latter regiment. Childs remained in command of the post for most of the next ten years until the garrison's transfer to Florida.

In September 1840, Company G of the First Artillery returned once again to Fort Sullivan, under the command of Brevet Major R. M. Kirby. Several officers commanded the company until its replacement by Company E in September, 1843. This force remained at Eastport up to the commencement of the Mexican-American War in 1845 and the temporary abandonment of Fort Sullivan.

The end of the war with Mexico resulted in the return of the army to the fort, and in November, 1848, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Martin Burke's Company I of the Third Artillery arrived in Eastport. Burke's men remained at the post until October, 1853, when the regiment was sent to California. Soldiers would not again occupy the grounds until the Civil War was well under way.<sup>23</sup>

Less is known about the garrison in this period than the previous British garrison. Muster roles do not survive and the only reliable evidence is contained in an almost complete set of monthly post returns from 1821 to 1853. They only provide, however, raw numerical data on such things as the number of men of each rank, the number ill, and the number of those in prison or that deserted. Virtually no information is available on the immediate post-occupation garrison (1818-1820), knowledge of which survives only in advertisements looking for deserters in early editions of *The Eastport Sentinel*. There is little data on the background of the men and on specifically who deserted and why, or who ended up in the prison or hospital. Fortunately the information that does survive indicates that the garrison represents a typical group of American soldiers in this period, and thus, it is possible to draw on information contained in more general histories of the army.


Like many other posts in this era, the garrison of Fort Sullivan was

always quite small. Its yearly average strength did not vary greatly between 1821 and 1853, fluctuating to a low of 39 enlisted men in 1825 and a high of around 68 men in 1841, with an average over the entire period of just over 50 men.<sup>24</sup> In addition, there were normally two or three officers, usually a captain, commanding the post, and one or two first or second lieutenants, and an assistant surgeon.<sup>25</sup>


The rank and file of the garrison enlisted for five years (except between 1833 and 1846 when enlistments were for three years). Privates were paid \$5 per month till 1833, \$6 until 1845, and finally received an additional \$2 per month. At all times, the soldiers were also provided with free rations valued at \$6 per month. Noncommissioned officers received somewhat more: sergeants \$8 per month before 1838, and afterwards \$13 and their ration allowance.<sup>26</sup> Both the enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers received substantially less money than civilian workers. In 1850, the average salary of a day laborer in Eastport was \$1 per day, and even farmhands were paid \$14 a month plus board.<sup>27</sup> This meant in practice that only the most economically desperate or those trying to escape civilian life tended to enlist.<sup>28</sup>

Other factors also inclined to reduce the quality of recruits. Discipline in the American army, although nowhere near as brutal as, for example, the British army, was strict and could result in severe hardships for the men. Flogging was banned in 1812, but in 1833 it was restored expressly to combat desertion. Instead of flogging for minor offences, men could be held up to a month in the garrison jail.<sup>29</sup> At Fort Sullivan this was not an uncommon occurrence and on average 5 percent of the company languished in the guardhouse.<sup>30</sup> For serious crimes, including repeated desertion or striking an officer, a soldier could be sent to another garrison to serve sentences of up to life imprisonment. In February, 1826, nine privates out of thirty-three assigned to Fort Sullivan languished in the prisons at Fort Independence (Boston Harbor) and Fortress Monroe (Virginia). Throughout the period for which records survive (1821-1829), an average of 7 percent of the garrison was serving prison sentences. On several occasions other garrisons sent prisoners to serve their sentences in the fort's guardhouse.<sup>31</sup>

The most frightening element of the military justice system was that the men were subject to the often arbitrary discretion of their officers, who acted as police, judge and jury. Historians have chronicled numer-



Plans of the Public Building at Fort Sullivan, Maine, c. 1840. (From National Archives, Record Group 92, Drawer 120 Sheet 25).



Detail of Officers' Quarters from plan of c.1840.

ous flagrant abuses of soldiers' rights, but the account of only one incident survives from the records of Fort Sullivan.<sup>32</sup> In September, 1823, Captain John Eastman, in command of the post, was brought to a general court martial on seventeen different charges. Included in these were two offences committed against enlisted personnel. One involved the beating of a private at Fort Independence. The second was Eastman's sending of three privates from Fort Sullivan to Boston to stand trial even though the charges against the prisoners were "so trifling and minor offenses beneath the investigation of a General Court Martial."<sup>33</sup> Eastman was found guilty on both of these charges. Just how many other soldiers suffered abuse without having their complaints heard in open courts remains unknown.\*

The army, however, did provide a certain measure of security for the enlisted personnel. There was a steady, although bland and insubstantial, daily ration, consisting of salted pork or fresh beef, bread and beans. Until 1838, whiskey was also part of the daily issue, and after its suspension coffee and sugar were added to the rations. The diet could be supplemented by the purchase of small amounts of fresh fruit and vegetables financed from a company fund created by deductions from the monthly rations. Army regulations also permitted the men to grow their own produce on a small garden plots, although there is no evidence of this activity at Fort Sullivan.<sup>34</sup>

Along with a steady diet, the men enjoyed the benefits of reasonably good medical care. While medicine in the nineteenth century was nowhere near as effective as it is today, it would be wrong to belittle the efforts of the doctors who served Fort Sullivan. Twice major structural alterations were made to the fort at the insistence of the army medical staff in order to improve the health of the garrison. Until 1845, there was almost always an assistant surgeon assigned to the post, and from 1848 to 1853 a civilian doctor was hired to look after Colonel Burke's company. To assist the surgeon while men were confined to the hospital, one or more soldiers were detailed to serve as orderlies, and in 1829 a full time matron was hired.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the best efforts of the medical staff, an average about five percent of the garrison was confined to the hospital. Deaths were not

\*More on Eastman's trial will be found later in this chapter.



Painting of Washington Street, with flag and buildings of Fort Sullivan in background. Painting is thought to date from the 1840's.


infrequent—a total of 38 men died while serving at Fort Sullivan. These statistics, however, hide the sometimes dramatic changes in the health of the garrison.<sup>36</sup> During 1828–29, Captain Childs' company, transferred in November, 1827 from South Carolina, suffered terribly from the change in climate. In their first winter an average of eight men per month were hospitalized, a figure four times higher than that of the previous garrison a year before. The rate of illness is not surprising since Childs' company expected winter coats to be awaiting them in Eastport only to discover that, through a bureaucratic mix-up, the First Regiment had taken these coats with them to Charleston. Climatization took some time and in the winter of 1828–29 more men fell ill than at any time in this period of the fort's history. It is probably no coincidence, therefore, that 1829 was the year in which the most men died—nine in total or 18.5 percent of the garrison—and that subsequent years saw many discharges from disability. The high rate of illness suffered by Childs' company did not diminish until the completion of the new barracks in the fall of 1829.<sup>37</sup>

Little is known about the daily lives of the soldiers, but it is possible to provide a vague sketch of their typical routine. Every day, except Sunday, began at daybreak with the firing of a small signaling gun and the unfurling of a large American flag. There was a morning meal and afterward the men were kept busy at a variety of duties including drill and other training tasks, as well as performing general repairs and maintenance. A great deal of infantry training was undertaken, since even the artillery served almost exclusively as foot soldiers until 1838 when a light mobile battery was furnished to each of the four artillery regiments. No midday meal was served, and the men enjoyed their second and final meal of the day in the late afternoon. At dusk a signal gun and the lowering of the flag marked the end of another day.<sup>38</sup>

Besides this daily routine several other tasks were required of the soldiers. One of the most tedious and onerous of these was guard duty. A watch was maintained over the post day and night, both to keep unwanted visitors out, and, more importantly, to prevent the soldiers from leaving. Guard duty was frequent in a small garrison like Fort Sullivan, and as a result interruptions of sleep often occurred.<sup>39</sup>

Periodically, soldiers could be called on to perform a special duty. Officers received \$16.50 a month for servants and often employed the enlisted personnel. Other jobs, such as hospital steward or stable hand, or particularly vigorous work like construction, entitled the soldiers to an additional 15¢ per day extra-duty pay. This was little compensation considering that these soldiers were still required to fulfill their normal daily routine.<sup>40</sup>

The army provided very little for the comfort and leisure of the men while they were off duty. Until the 1870's, ". . . soldiers slept in pairs in bunks constructed of rough wood—bedding consisting of a blanket and a bed sack filled with straw and hay."<sup>41</sup> The living quarters were otherwise sparsely furnished with only a few chairs and tables, and at night a minimum number of candles.<sup>42</sup> To entertain themselves, the troops often turned to alcohol and prostitutes. Contemporary sources speak of frequent drunkenness and the loose morals of the enlisted personnel. The garrison at Eastport appears to have been no exception.<sup>43</sup> All three men sent to be tried by Captain Eastman in 1823 were charged with alcohol related offences. In 1829, Captain Childs wrote of the dangers of a nearby grogshop (see below), and in that same year



Drawing by Quincy Kilby—probably a copy of a painting. (From Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, 1888).

temperance minded state legislators passed a law forbidding the sale of liquor to federal soldiers.

At least one brothel and grogshop opened to serve the garrison. The Bell Tavern began operation in 1826 in the recently vacated British blockhouse located just 150 yards up the post road. It was this grogshop and brothel that Childs complained of in 1829. He requested that the building once again be rented, this time to serve as women's quarters, in order to remove this all too available temptation from the immediate vicinity of the men. Childs' request was denied and the tavern continued to operate until the mid-1830's.<sup>44</sup>

A few fortunate men were allowed to have their wives and family on the post, and they were provided with quarters and rations at the government's expense. Normally two or three women were allowed on the post, and they were usually called laundresses, a term which refers to the services they were expected to provide to the garrison. In return for doing the laundry they each received one monthly ration, valued at \$6, and whatever accommodation was available. On the whole the women were treated as second-class citizens—they were given the lowest priority in housing. On occasion no separate quarters were

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of their future patronage. Eastport, May 19.

# \$90 Reward.

**D**ESERTED from Fort Sulli-  
van, Eastport, Me. on the 25th  
ult. the following described private  
Soldiers : CHARLES BARKER, GEORGE  
GRANTHAM and DANIEL HALNAN, be-  
longing to the U. States Corps of  
Artillery. The said *Barker* is 27  
years of age, 5 feet 11 inches high,  
light complexion, dark eyes, brown  
hair, and born in the county of Som-  
erset, Mass. ; *Grantham* is 19 years  
of age, 5 feet 8 inches high, light  
complexion, blue eyes, brown hair,  
born in the county of Green, North  
Carolina : *Halnan* is 28 years of age,  
5 feet 6 inches high, sallow com-  
plexion, hazle eyes, sandy hair, born  
in Ireland. Any person who will ap-  
prehend and deliver the said De-  
serters at this, or any other Military  
Post, in the United States, shall re-  
ceive the above reward and all rea-  
sonable expences, or \$30 for each  
man.

**R. C. BRENT,**

LIEUT. COM'D

Fort Sullivan, May 5, 1819.


This advertisement and others like it are the only documentary evidence of the garrison from 1819-1821. *Eastport Sentinel*, May 15, 1819.

provided and from 1827 to 1829 the women were forced to live with the entire company in the upper story of the blockhouse. The only concern expressed over this situation was that the soldiers' morals might be corrupted by the women's continuing presence.

Between 1829 and 1832, when permanent quarters were finally rented, the women occupied the lower part of the blockhouse, while the rest of the building was used as the hospital. In 1832, two buildings, located 100 yards west of the magazine, were provided for the women. The westernmost structure was a fine two story house consisting of four identical rooms 17 by 12.6 feet, each heated by a separate fireplace. The second building was a one story structure divided irregularly into four rooms, only two of which were heated. In 1834, this building was in such a bad condition that it was stated to be, ". . . suitable for campwomens' quarters only."<sup>45</sup>

There is no question that most of the enlisted personnel were dissatisfied with the army. Poor pay, harsh discipline and virtually no chance of promotion, along with the complete absence of a pension resulted in only a very small percentage of the men staying for more than one or two terms of enlistment.<sup>46</sup> One can only wonder what happened to the 42 men discharged for disability from the garrison and left destitute without a pension.<sup>47</sup> A very high annual turnover of personnel was a constant problem in the American army throughout the nineteenth century. The garrison of Fort Sullivan clearly illustrates this problem. An average of 38.5 percent of the garrison left each year and on four separate occasions the annual rate was over 50 percent. In only one year (1843—9.7 percent) did less than 25 percent of the garrison leave. Hampered with figures like these, it is amazing that the American army did so well in the Seminole, Mexican, and Civil Wars.<sup>48</sup>

After ordinary discharge for expiration of service, the most common means of leaving the army was the now familiar scourge of desertion which plagued the military. One historian has described the problem as being so serious as to become "ludicrous."<sup>49</sup> A total of 202 men deserted from Fort Sullivan between 1821 and 1853, or a yearly average of just over seven (approximately 14.4 percent of the fort's soldiers).<sup>50</sup> There are few patterns in the yearly desertion rates except that more men




Panoramic view of Fort Sullivan, circa 1870, as seen from the top of the Washington Street Baptist Church, with Commander's House at left, blockhouse at right.

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went absent without leave in the spring, when seasonal employment was available. There is no indication that the rate of desertion fluctuated with the economy since the two major economic collapses of the era, in 1837 and the late 1850's, occurred when there was no garrison at the fort.<sup>51</sup>

A study of the officers stationed at Fort Sullivan, like that of the men, serves to illustrate the makeup of the American army between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. This era is marked by growing professionalism amongst the members of the officers corps, as evidenced by the rise of West Point, under the supervision of Sylvanus Thayer, to be the finest school of engineering and science in the land. Almost all of the officers stationed at Fort Sullivan were Academy trained, and although several graduated in the years prior to 1818, when it was possible to finish the



The above scene is composed of three stereoscopic views in sequence. (Courtesy of the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities).

program in one year, most had some form of post-secondary education.<sup>52</sup> As the century wore on many of the graduates made long term commitments to the army, which resulted in an increasing stability amongst the officer class. In 1873, the median career length of those on the army register was twenty-two years and in the 1830 list more than 59 percent of the serving officers had been in the army twenty years or more.<sup>53</sup>


While stability in the officers corps compensated to a certain extent for the fluidity in the ranks, it caused one major problem for the officers—stagnation. Promotion was determined almost exclusively by seniority within the regiment, and without a retirement system to encourage older officers to leave the service, there was little chance to rise into the senior echelons of the army. An article in *The Army and Navy Chronicle*, in 1834, estimated that a twenty year-old West Point cadet

graduating in that year would be fifty-four before attaining a captaincy and would never live long enough to become a major.<sup>54</sup>

There are several examples at Fort Sullivan of this stability and stagnation. Captain Childs commanded the post with one brief interruption from November, 1827 until June, 1836. Captain R. M. Kirby, who commanded the post between July, 1826 and November, 1827, returned to it from September, 1840 until his death in September, 1842, still technically a captain although he had received the honorary or brevet rank of major. Promotions occurred very rarely to those stationed at the fort—only three times in the 28 years of occupancy for which records survive. Twice there were promotions for brevet second lieutenants, a rank specially created for newly graduated cadets awaiting a vacancy to second lieutenantcies. In September, 1842 as a result of Kirby's death, First Lieutenant J. H. Winder advanced to the vacated captaincy.<sup>55</sup>

This stagnation, combined with a comparatively low rate of pay and the general harshness of the service, caused many young officers to resign and to try to make a living in the civilian world. Captains received monthly, in total wages and benefits, \$71.50, including \$40 in salary, three monthly rations worth \$6 each, and \$13.50 for the employment of a servant. In 1838, the number of rations was increased to four dollars and the allowance for servants by \$2, bringing the total monthly income to \$79.50. First lieutenants were paid just \$10 less than captains, and second lieutenants made \$5 less still. Both junior ranks were entitled to the other benefits of a captaincy.<sup>56</sup> These incomes were not substantial, but when one considers the fact that most of these men held degrees from the finest school of mathematics and science in the nation, it is amazing that so many made a career of the army. It was not uncommon for a former officer to receive two or three times his previous salary soon after leaving the service.<sup>57</sup> A total of nine officers, all lieutenants, resigned while attached to Fort Sullivan, the most famous of whom was Lieutenant, later General, William T. Sherman.<sup>58</sup>

Although Sherman was assigned to the garrison for nearly two years in the early 1850's, he never actually visited Fort Sullivan. This unusual situation was the result of the practice of drawing staff officers from the regiments. While there were usually only two or three officers at Fort Sullivan at any given time, there were normally five officers: a captain, two first lieutenants, and two second lieutenants assigned to any




Detail of panoramic view of fort from Powder Magazine to Blockhouse.

given artillery company. The discrepancy in strength at the post was the result of having two or three officers away serving with divisions like the departments of the ordnance and of the quartermaster general.<sup>59</sup>

The majority of the officers assigned and actually stationed at Fort Sullivan were married and they raised their families on Fort Hill. Little evidence survives of the officers' families except for the mundane chronicle of the frequent births and deaths on the post. Highlights of these include the birth on April 15, 1822 of Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, later to be a Civil War major general. Dana's father was a young subaltern stationed at the fort. One of the most melancholy events in the fort's history, and one that illustrates the sudden tragedies that sometimes befell families in the last century, was the death of every member of Lieutenant George Greene's family in a one month span in the winter of 1832-33. Two children were struck down by an unidentified disease in the third week of December 1832, and on the 26th of December Mrs. Green died in childbirth. The infant born on the 26th survived its mother less than one month, passing on January 22, 1833.<sup>60</sup>

The garrison of Fort Sullivan did not exist in a vacuum and no study of any military post would be complete without an examination of the interrelationship with its surrounding community. Several historians have completed general studies examining the complex problem of civil-military relationships in this period. All of them attempt to reconcile a paradox that has the regular army seen both as an unnecessary evil and as a needed and vital element in American society. Marcus Cunliffe's book, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865*, contains the most complete account of the conflicting role.

Cunliffe argues that the difficulty facing the regular army in gaining acceptance dates back to the age of Cromwell in the seventeenth century and the English mistrust of standing armies. Mistrust of the military can be seen in America's preference for coastal fortifications and militia as the primary means of defense, with the regular army kept as small as possible to avoid it becoming the means to establish tyranny, and to prevent the creation of a European-like aristocracy. "The regular soldier,"



Detail of panoramic view of fort from Commander's House to Powder Magazine.

writes Cunliffe, "was still thought of as an idle and possibly sinister figure, not fully American."<sup>61</sup> C. Robert Kemble in his 1973 study, *The Image of the American Army Officer*, adds to Cunliffe's account by showing that the so called "Age of Jackson" saw the rise of a new dimension in popular hostility to the regular forces:


As the expanding nation became increasingly committed to equalitarianism, the description of America's officers corps as reprehensible aristocrats—wealthy, effete, lazy, and immoral—became a common caricature.<sup>62</sup>

West Point, as the school that had created this aristocratic class, came under constant fire and there were several serious attempts to abolish the school and stop providing free education to this un-American element. Any measures to increase the army passed only after much debate in Congress and, as much as possible, commissions in new regiments were given to civilian volunteers.<sup>63</sup>

The hostility towards the army was often the product of the army's physical isolation from the American people. Many Americans had never seen a regular soldier, and could not visualize the need for the force in the unknown frontier and in coastal fortifications, particularly in an age in which the image of the frontier volunteer, such as James Fenimore Cooper's Natty Bumppo, was fostered and developed to its greatest degree. The extent of the dislike of the army was also likely exaggerated by the officers themselves, who were still insecure in an as yet unestablished profession. This perspective has been largely ignored by historians.<sup>64</sup>

The paradox is that of the army survived and was, in fact, gradually increased in size as its commitments grew along the ever expanding frontier and coasts. In 1820, the army was reduced to just under 6,000 men and grew steadily until by 1860 there were around 17,000 regular soldiers.<sup>65</sup> Cunliffe writes on this contradiction:

Prowess in arms became an integral feature of patriotic pride. Though their object lessons could be interpreted in very different ways, there is no doubt that the fairly frequent succession of wars and campaigns provided occupation for regular units and a cumulative record of gallantry, fidelity and efficiency. Though the country as a whole might be only half aware of this old yet replenished claim to recognition, men who held national office or were close to the centers of power had a more conscious sense of what was at stake. Among such men existed a real sentiment in favor of a standing army. Few of



## ~~\$~~24 Bounty.

**A**N extra BOUNTY will be given for a good FIFER and BUGLER, if they can come well recommended for sobriety.— Eight or ten respectable Young Men are likewise wanted as non-commissioned Officers. Apply at Fort Sullivan. March 7.

A rare example of attempts by Fort Sullivan at local recruitment. Advertisement in the *Eastport Sentinel*, March 7, 1829.

them held or at any rate upheld this view unequivocally. Some favored regulars in certain circumstances—notably war time—but not in others. Some continued to believe also in the militia ideal. Some, while privately contemptuous of the militia, or of volunteer regiments, knew that it would be politically disastrous to declare their contempt in public. In covert, qualified ways the argument for an American standing army was maintained—successfully.<sup>66</sup>

Success was certainly evident in the American army. Even in the bitter, confusing, and almost disastrous Seminole War, the army emerged victorious. Winfield Scott's campaign on Mexico City ranks as a great classic in military history, made possible only by the skill of his regular and volunteer officers and men.<sup>67</sup> West Point survived bitter attacks against it partly because of its ability to graduate not only superb officers, but equally able engineers, academics, and businessmen.<sup>68</sup> The dark image of an army officer was countered, according to Kemble, by the countervailing picture of the technician soldier and of the military gentlemen, as a refined, but virile patrician.<sup>69</sup>

The study of civil-military relations within Eastport answers some of the questions left by the general histories. Clearly shown is that a great deal of the animosity directed at the regular army resulted from its physical isolation. In Eastport, a town very familiar with the professional army, there is no hint of any ill will towards the officers or properly disciplined soldiers. The only complaints were directed at off-duty enlisted personnel because of their abuse of alcohol and irreligious attitudes. The army was a fully accepted, although distinct part of the Eastport community. The final answer, however, to the paradoxical problem of civil-military relations in nineteenth century America lies beyond the history of Fort Sullivan. Fort Sullivan is only a piece of a much larger puzzle, a puzzle which can only be solved when more detailed research is undertaken on the U.S. Army in this period.

The best surviving evidence of Eastport's relations with the garrison is found in the pages of *The Eastport Sentinel* which began publishing weekly issues a few months after the British evacuation and continued to serve Eastport until after the Second World War. Copies of the paper survive for the years between 1819 and 1832 and from 1853 onwards, along with a few scattered issues between 1832 and 1853. They provide



Water Street, c. 1860.

numerous articles on the garrison and its relationship with the community.

The articles create an almost idealistic picture of the civil-military relationship. But the paper's coverage of community activities and concerns was hardly broad or thorough. There are no negative articles on the garrison even at times when scandal must have strained the fort's contacts with the town to the breaking point. *The Sentinel*, while full of stories of scandal and wrongdoings in other communities, rarely attacked its own readers, and the garrison was considered an integral part of the town. Disreputable incidents almost without exception went unreported in the paper's effort to provide a virtuous image of its community. The fort was part of the community and as such was immune to public attack from the local citizens.


An example of *The Sentinel's* blind eye was its complete lack of coverage of the trial of Captain John Eastman in 1823. Eastman's case must have

been a sensation in Eastport, for he was charged with seventeen different offences, ranging from the theft of government property to using "disrespectful and insubordinate language" towards General Winfield Scott, commander of the Division of the East. While most of Eastman's crimes occurred at other posts, several took place at Fort Sullivan and one involved some of Eastport's leading merchants. On August 23, 1823, Eastman illegally sold a garrison flag and several spades and shovels to the store of Deering and Boyes and had the proceeds credited to his personal account. Found guilty on this and thirteen other charges, he was drummed out of the service. Despite the nature of the trial, *The Sentinel* contained not one single reference to it and did not even mention his replacement as commander of the garrison.<sup>70</sup>

While part of the community, there is a clear indication that the fort was a separate entity—a ghetto—walled off from the town by the social and cultural differences that made the professional soldier unique amongst the egalitarian American population. Crowded within the picket fence surrounding the post, the officers, soldiers, women and children of the garrison lived and worked, separated from the community by more than the long steep wooden steps down the hill to Sullivan Street. *The Sentinel* pointedly singles out the soldiers, identifying them unlike any other citizen, as being from a distinct part of the town. The records of the Washington Street Baptist Church reveal the same attitude—soldiers alone were singled out as coming from a special location within Eastport. Sarah Connell Ayer's diary, the only extant one concerning Eastport in this period, also leaves the feeling that the garrison was a peculiarly unique element within the community.<sup>71</sup>

While a ghetto, the garrison forged strong links with the local community, by both social and economic ties and by the necessity of coexisting in a small community where cooperation often makes life much more bearable. The officers forged the strongest social links with the upper echelons of Eastport society. This was primarily the result of their leading role within the garrison and also their educational background. In Eastport there is no indication that the officers were considered aristocratic. Instead, the image of the technician-soldier and of the military gentleman dominates. Eastport was noted by travellers as

# Eastport Sentinel



price:

"HERE SHALL THE PRESS THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS MAINTAIN---UNAWED BY INFLUENCE, AND UNBRIED BY GAIN."

EASTPORT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, MAINE,---TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 1853.

{ Establish

OCK OF DRY GOODS,  
At Cost!

subscribers, about closing up their bus-  
ness, offers till the 1st April, their

Selected Story.

THE

at which his fits of coughing came on.-- I derstand my pleasures. He arose and pleasures! A slight blush up  
After the fashion of Fontenelle, he sought bolting the door, drew close a curtain of cheeks attested the fineness of the  
to economise the vital action, and concen- old tapestry, and returned to his seat. the countess, yet the brown circles  
trate all feelings and sentiments in self.-- 'This morning,' resumed he, 'I had her eyes were more distinctly  
'than usual. But nature had suff

Eastport in 1853 sketch with Fort Sullivan at right. (From the nameplate of the *Eastport Sentinel*, April, 12, 1853).


being a place that welcomed men of refinement and education. A British army lieutenant, E. T. Coke, who visited the town in the early 1830's while on furlough, commented on the bookseller's shop, ". . . which made a far greater display than any I had seen in Montreal, Quebec, or Halifax, supplying not the immediate neighborhood only but a great part of New Brunswick with literature."<sup>72</sup> *The Sentinel* was the second oldest newspaper in the state of Maine, the Lyceum was active, and an excellent library was maintained by the Athenaeum.<sup>73</sup>

As West Point graduates, the officers were probably accepted by the inhabitants who could not help but be impressed by their technical knowledge and worldly sophistication, unmarred by snobbish disdain or inflated egos. Unlike their British counterparts during the occupation, the American officers never became the center of social attention, though they were certainly given a great deal of respect by the citizens. A visit up the hill to tea with the commander and his wife was a social necessity, and a ball was considered incomplete without a splash of color provided by the officers in full dress uniform.<sup>74</sup>

The social importance of the fort was not missed by visitors to Eastport, and virtually every important personage to come to the town was entertained by the officers at their quarters in the fort. The naturalist, John J. Audubon, visited in 1832 and was, ". . . most kindly received by Captain Childs."<sup>75</sup> Other dignitaries to pay a visit to the fort include Sir Howard Douglas, the lieutenant governor of New Brunswick, who came both in September 1825, and August 1828; and Sir Hilgrove Turner, the governor of Bermuda, who arrived in the United States for reasons of his health.<sup>76</sup>

The citizens of Eastport, like the rest of the country, became increasingly nationalistic in the years after the War of 1812, and the garrison became a local center for national celebration and mourning. Salutes were fired at the fort marking the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans and of Washington's Birthday. Not all celebrations were joyous, and *The Sentinel* recording the events of one particularly gloomy day in 1826, noted:

In conformity with the order issued by General Brown, funeral honors were said to JEFFERSON and ADAMS at the military post in this town under the command of Major [actually Captain] Kirby. At dawn 13 guns were fired, one gun at 30 minute intervals between the rising and setting sun, and at the



Painting showing a view of Fort Sullivan from the base of Fort Hill. The scene is thought to be circa 1860. (Courtesy of Peavey Memorial Library).

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close of the day twenty-four rounds. The flags were displayed at half mast by the various shipping in the harbour, and bells were tolled from 12 til 1 o'clock as an additional mark of respect for these great men.<sup>77</sup>

The Fourth of July became the most important civic holiday during the years immediately following 1818, developing into the traditional celebration of national and local spirit that continues to this day. It appears to date back to the ceremonies and festivities that marked the return of the island to the United States. On June 30, 1818, the day of "liberation" was passed in "national festivity," followed by a town dinner presided over by General Miller, Colonel Sargeant, and other military officers.<sup>78</sup> In 1819, a similar program was arranged although the date was moved to the nation's birthday.

The garrison played a major role in every celebration in which it was present, firing salutes and participating in the town's parades. The first recorded display of fireworks in Eastport's history was organized by Captain Kirby in 1827, and while there was a garrison at the fort the fireworks attracted the citizens to spend the evening on the hill. At frequent civic dinners, toasts were offered by the leading citizens, in order of importance, and the officers were always among the first to

speak. During Captain Child's tenure a reception was held at the commander's house between the dinner and the firework finale.<sup>79</sup>

These social ties were reinforced by the strong economic links between the fort and town. Unfortunately, without a complete economic survey of the town it is impossible to assess the impact that the fort had on Eastport's economy. It certainly had one of the largest payrolls, comparing quite favorably with those of the largest shipbuilding concerns in the town.<sup>80</sup> In addition to wages, every year there were contracts issued to local merchants to supply fresh beef and wood to the garrison.<sup>81</sup> Repairs were also an annual event and although most of the labor was performed by the enlisted personnel, supplies and skilled services were purchased from the inhabitants. The construction of all buildings at the garrison appears to have been let to local contractors. In 1829, Charles Peavey built the soldiers barracks and in 1842, William Lincoln, another local builder, was hired to erect the firehouse.<sup>82</sup>

Other interaction between the town and the garrison was the result of the needs of any community of the period. The threat of fire was one of the strongest bonding forces in communities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In crowded towns built almost entirely of wood and without the protection offered by hydrants and modern fire apparatuses, the threat of a conflagration forced the citizens to respond without hesitation to the smallest fire. Eastport was particularly susceptible to disastrous fires due to the high winds that occasionally blow off the bay. Three times in the nineteenth century—1839, 1864, and 1886—the downtown area was substantially, and once entirely, leveled. Eastport relied on its volunteer fire companies and the full cooperation of every inhabitant to prevent part of this unpredictable peril.

The garrison was highly valued for maintaining a twenty-four hour watch and for providing a trained disciplined body of men whose services often proved indispensable. The 1822 regulations for the constables watch stated, ". . . in case of fire, notice thereof shall be immediately given to the guard at Fort Sullivan and the inhabitants."<sup>83</sup> In January 1828, *the Sentinel* wrote that Captain Childs ". . . very generously offered to discharge one or more guns at the discovery of fire at night." And added, "The people will be more readily alarmed in this way than the



Water Street in ruins after fire of October 22, 1864. (Courtesy of Ruth McInnis).

bell, which at all times cannot be heard throughout the town."<sup>84</sup>

*The Sentinel* has many accounts of fires in which the part played by the soldiers in fighting them was crucial. Typical is one contained in the April 19, 1828 edition:

On Saturday evening last, about 11 o'clock our citizens were alarmed by the cry of fire which was found to be in the two story by Mr. G. J. Track. . . . [the fire] was not discovered till it was bursting out the eaves, about which time a gun was discharged from Fort Sullivan, agreeable to the arrangement made with Capt. Childs, by the selectmen and several minutes before the bell commenced ringing. . . . A lane was formed to the nearest pump, as soon as possible but not without difficulty, and Capt. Childs is deserving of much credit for the assistance he rendered the Fire-Wards in forming the lane. Had it not been for the soldiers under his command, whose conduct on this occasion is highly praise worthy, much time must have elapsed before the lane could have been completed.<sup>85</sup>

The garrison had also to rely on the community for its own security from fire. There were several near disasters at the fort, the most serious of which was the near total destruction of the men's quarters on

the February 5, 1857. Only joint efforts by the citizens and garrison prevented wide spread ruination.<sup>86</sup>

Along with fire fighting, an added sense of security was provided to the citizens by the garrison with regard to civil order. The soldiers were rarely involved in dealing with any matters of civil policing, a factor that probably did more to develop ties with citizens than any other. When they did get involved it was always at the explicit request of the selectmen. The fact that they were available in an emergency did furnish certain security for the inhabitants and their value in this regard was something noted more often during the garrison's absence. In 1855, a clerk wrote to *The Sentinel* complaining of a recent outbreak of vandalism and violence by school children and he stated that, "If there were soldiers at the fort now, as there used to be when you and I went to school we should be safe."<sup>87</sup> A year later the editor of the newspaper, while chastising the local militia for a night of rowdiness, asked if there was a necessity for ". . . a company of U.S. soldiers at the fort to keep the two volunteer companies from disturbing the town."<sup>88</sup>

In the late 1820's there was a great influx of Irish immigrants into Eastport from New Brunswick, and for a few weeks they swamped the civil authorities by sheer numbers alone. The garrison came to the rescue of the inhabitants. The representative to the state legislature from Calais praised the soldiers, but warned that this was only a temporary measure and that the civil authorities must be reinforced:

Such was their [the Irish] annoyance to the citizens, that they could not in safety walk the streets in the evening, were it not for the protection which their garrison affords them. On what principle should the garrison be required to secure the culprits who violate our law? It was exacting of them a service which they were not bound to perform. It was an accommodation, but on the permanency of which the citizens had no right to rely. Yet our whole shore to the head tide, has no other security.<sup>89</sup>

Throughout most of the 1820's the commanders of the garrison agreed to allow the civil authorities to lodge prisoners in the fort's guardhouse until they could be transported to the county jail at Machias. In 1827, in a spirited debate in the state legislature over the authorization of funds for the construction of a jail in Eastport, the validity of lodging debtors and petty thieves in a military prison was seriously questioned. After this debate, other accommodation was found for the

tax.

Office of the A. A. Qr. Master, }  
Fort Sullivan, April 6, 1829. }

## PROPOSALS

**W**ILL be received until Tuesday, the 14th instant, 3 o'clock, P. M. for the Carpenters, Masons and Plasterers Work of an entire new BARRACK of ninety feet in length. Likewise for the thorough repair of all the public Quarters at the Post, either by the job or by the established prices at Portland or Boston, as can be agreed on. Those disposed to contract will be furnishd with the necessary specifications on application to this Office. The work to be done is of considerable magnitude and well worth the attention of master Carpenters, Masons and Plasterers.

WM. S. NEWTON,  
Lt. & A. A. Q. M.

Ap. 8. 1

A typical advertisement showing how garrison relied on community for supplies and services. *Eastport Sentinel*, April 8, 1829.

prisoners and the soldiers would hereafter only occasionally be asked to get involved in civil disputes.<sup>90</sup>


It would be wrong to leave the impression that the town and fort had a perfect relationship. The garrison played no part in local politics—one of the most important things in any community. This aloofness was the result of the professionalization of the army, which created an apolitical

officer corps. It was in this period (1814-1860) that the military removed itself from politics and accepted its political masters.<sup>91</sup>

The garrison also had virtually no contact with the Eastport militia. The records of the Eastport Light Infantry, a militia unit that existed from 1812 to 1842, reveal no official involvement of the regular soldiers with the citizens army. It is possible that stronger ties existed between the garrison and the local militia artillery company, the Eastport-Washington Artillery, but it is more likely that if the records of this unit had survived they would reveal a similar story of noninvolvement. Apparently even in Eastport, a town intimately familiar with the regular army, the typical attitudes held by the professional and amateur soldiers of each other kept them apart. The regulars seemed to the militia to be no better soldiers than themselves, particularly when they considered the low standing of the enlisted personnel. Popular belief held that volunteers and militia won the Revolution and the Battle of New Orleans. To the regulars, the militia was an unruly mob, useless on the battlefield, and more of a social club than a military force. Marcus Cunliffe writes:

The dislike of regulars and volunteers for each other is to be found in other countries and in other periods. In the United States its lineage stretches at least as far back as Braddock's defeat in 1755, with the American regulars inheriting the role of the British redcoats. The charges levelled by both sides are hoary with age. The regular is a tender foot, a dude, a snob; the amateur is a comic or vicious ignoramus. One is too clean, the other too dirty. One has an unreal vision of discipline and precision; the other, greedy and unscrupulous, is probably selling guns to the Indians.<sup>92</sup>

The enlisted personnel were never fully a part of the community. When under the control of their officers they were regarded highly, but as individuals they were segregated from the town. While officers and their families attended civic functions, their troops entertained themselves at the garrison. Even on the Fourth of July the soldiers were kept separate, having a dinner by themselves in the mess.<sup>93</sup> The law passed in 1829 banning the sale of alcohol to regular soldiers met no opposition in Eastport where the citizens were familiar with the soldiers' frequent drunkenness.<sup>94</sup> The enlisted personnel were also considered to be religious untouchables. No army chaplain administered to the needs of the garrison, and while the officers regularly attended church, it appears



Fort Sullivan as seen from Eastport Harbor, 1855. (Illustration on 1855 map of Eastport).

the men rarely did. Sarah Connell Ayer, a devout Baptist, was pleasantly surprised to learn that some of the soldiers had finally "found" religion. This revival led to the baptizing of three of the men and one of their wives into Ayer's faith. It was a rare event and as far as known not repeated.<sup>95</sup>

There were surprisingly few cases of a member of the garrison marrying someone from the community. In fact, only once did a soldier exchange vows with an Eastporter. On June 23, 1829 Sergeant Thomas F. Macdonald was married by a Reverend Beddie to Marg Bell. The probable explanation for this lack of intermarriage is that most of the officers were married before arriving at Eastport, and that the men were actively discouraged from getting married.<sup>96</sup>

Still, at least the officers and citizens made strong and lasting friendships. On several occasions, when an officer left the garrison *The Sentinel* printed glowing letters of tribute to the officer from the leading citizens. In 1820 the paper defended the reputation of the departing commander of the post, Lieutenant Robert Brent, who had the misfortune to have been slighted by the Inspector-General for the poor state of his company.<sup>97</sup> *The Sentinel* also kept its readers informed of the happenings in the lives of officers long after they had left the garrison. They had become adopted citizens of Eastport and were remembered not as outsiders, but as friends.<sup>98</sup>


Thus, when Martin Burke's company abandoned Fort Sullivan in October 1853, the town was saying good-bye to old friends. No one was certain at that time whether soldiers would ever again return to the garrison. The fort was left in charge of a caretaker, an ordnance sergeant named William Williams who looked after it as best he could with limited funds. Despite Williams' best efforts the fort gradually decayed. By 1856, the blockhouse was "an empty shell," and no effort was made to repair the soldiers' barracks after the disastrous fire of 1857.<sup>99</sup>

Fort Sullivan appeared destined to be permanently abandoned. It was no longer needed as barracks space and was functionally obsolete as a coastal fortification. But the Civil War interrupted and brought about the fort's renewal for one last brief, vigorous period of military activity.

CHAPTER FIVE

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THE CIVIL WAR  
AND AFTER  
1860-PRESENT



the South, the Reconstruction era was a period of great change and growth. The South had been devastated by the war, and the North had emerged as the dominant power. The Reconstruction era was a period of great change and growth. The South had been devastated by the war, and the North had emerged as the dominant power. The Reconstruction era was a period of great change and growth. The South had been devastated by the war, and the North had emerged as the dominant power.

## CHAPTER FIVE

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## 1860 PRESENT

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In the presidential election of 1860 Eastport, like the rest of Maine, overwhelmingly voted for Abraham Lincoln. In the ensuing months South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas seceded, and the nation headed toward what some historians have dubbed "The Irrepressible Conflict."<sup>1</sup> The news of the opening of hostilities with the firing upon Fort Sumter reached Eastport on April 14, 1861 and was greeted with a display of patriotic zeal by the citizens. Flags were hoisted all over town and young men spoke of their willingness to join the struggle against the rebels.<sup>2</sup>

Within a month the Sixth Maine Infantry Regiment was being raised throughout the eastern half of the state, with the troops congregating at two depots—one at Bangor, and the other at Fort Sullivan under the command of Major Aaron Hayden. Interestingly to note, only here in the first few months of the Civil War did Fort Sullivan fulfill its original purpose of a rallying point for the local militia.<sup>3</sup>

In the next four years, 403 Eastporters enlisted in various regiments of the state and regular army. An additional 300 or so served with the federal navy. Of these, 60 men were killed or missing in action. This is not an untypical sacrifice by a town the size of Eastport (3,850 people in 1860).<sup>\*</sup> Fort Sullivan had little to do with the town's efforts to support the war. After 1861 all recruiting took place in town and the fort had nothing to do with the actual fighting of the Civil War. Instead, the fort became the center of the state and federal governments' attempts to alleviate the fear of the residents of a British invasion and of attacks by Confederate raiders.<sup>4</sup>

The Sixth Regiment remained at Eastport only long enough to receive its equipment and uniforms. On June 27, 1861 the unit departed on board the steamer *Eastern City* for Portland, and from there onto war. In August, Captain W. B. Pease of the Seventeenth U.S. Infantry set up shop at the fort and attempted to recruit men into the regular army. His campaign was unsuccessful, the citizenry being more inclined to serve

<sup>\*</sup>For more on Eastport's participation in the war, see Charles T. Eldridge's "Eastport in the War of Rebellion" in W. H. Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy* (Eastport, Me.: E. E. Shead & Co., 1888), pp. 356-433.

with the state regiments. After recruiting only six men Pease left. The regular army would not be seen again at Fort Sullivan until well after the end of the war.<sup>5</sup>

In the late fall of 1861 the seizure of two Confederate agents from a British ship, the *Trent*, brought fears of war with Britain. The coastal settlements of Maine found themselves to be virtually defenseless as almost all the regular and militia forces had been sent to the war. In December, the legislature authorized the formation of a home defense force, the First Regiment of Maine Coast Guard Artillery. Two Eastport citizens, George W. Sabine and Leonard L. Potter, received first and second lieutenant commissions respectively in the Guard and were instructed to recruit a company of men to be stationed at Fort Sullivan. Forty men, mostly from Eastport, enlisted and began active service at the end of January, 1862. They were to stay at the fort only until the war scare had passed. On May 23rd, Sabine was asked by Governor Washburn if his company wished to volunteer for active Civil War service as part of the Eighteenth Maine Infantry (later the First Regiment of Maine Heavy Artillery). Sabine and all but nine of his company offered their services and on August 1st departed for Portland.<sup>6</sup>

While at Eastport Sabine's company and civilian employees restored the fort after its long period of neglect from 1853. Sabine found the blockhouse an unrepairable shell, the soldiers' barracks a burnt out ruin, and every other building in need of repair. In May authorization was received to spend \$3,000 to undertake the necessary repair work. By the beginning of September, a month after the garrison had departed, the repairs were completed. Although the blockhouse remained useless, the soldiers' barracks was reconstructed, and every other structure was put into order. All were ready to receive the next garrison.<sup>7</sup>

The arrival of Sabine's troops did more than renew activity, albeit briefly, at the fort. It also began a serious debate in Eastport and the vicinity on the defensive needs of the area. In *The Sentinel* there was a spirited series of letters from a citizen, identified only by the pen name "H", who praised the arrival of the Guard Artillery as a necessary first step in securing the town. Others were not so sure. *The Machias Union* stated in an editorial that unless new and effective fortifications were built, the presence of troops simply would encourage a British attack. Both *The Union* and "H" thought at least two new batteries should be


constructed to defend the town. Numerous letters and petitions were sent to Augusta and Washington demanding that action be taken to make the town safe. The clamor for new batteries reached a frenzied peak during the winter and spring of 1863 as Confederate raiders, such as C.S.S. *Alabama*, took an increasingly large toll of Union merchant shipping. There were acute fears that a coastal town would be attacked. By the summer, the agitation in Maine forced the federal and state governments to take action.<sup>8</sup>

On July 8th, Captain Thomas Lincoln Casey, the head of the U.S. Army Engineer's office at Portland, was ordered to design and arrange the construction of new batteries to defend five Maine towns—Eastport, Rockland, Belfast, Castine and Machias. Casey, although already busy supervising work on five western Maine fortifications (Forts Knox, Gorges, Prebble, Scammel and Popham), quickly completed a survey of the eastern sites.


On August 19th, Casey visited Eastport and determined that two batteries would provide the best possible defense of the harbor. One was to be located at Todd's Head, a small rocky point located just under half a mile north of the town. It would command the Eastern or Ship's Passage. The other would be placed on Treat's Island, a small island located approximately midway between Eastport and Lubec, a position that would enable it to control the West Passage. Any ship that managed to enter the harbor would be subject to a deadly cross fire by both batteries.<sup>9</sup>

Fort Sullivan was to accommodate the soldiers manning the batteries. No guns were to be placed on the fort site because of what had become accepted practice that cannons were best placed as close to sea level as possible. Such placement allowed the guns to fire directly at any enemy vessel, an angle considered to give the best chance of disabling the ship's propulsion machinery. The new batteries were also far enough away from town so that they could engage an attacker without placing Eastport in direct jeopardy from return fire.<sup>10</sup>

As designed, all of the new batteries in eastern Maine were intended to be temporary. They were to repel Confederate raiders and to be of limited use against a full scale invasion. Casey decided that the batteries would follow a set pattern—all were to be identical in armament and




Plan of Todd's Head Battery, 1863. (From National Archives, Record Group 77, Drawer 134, Sheet 51).




Todd's Head Battery in bird's eye view of 1879.

general appearance. Each consisted of a timber-revetted earthwork, measuring between one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet on the perimeter, protecting the guns on the seaward side. The armament was to be made up of five cannon, all old second class pieces. On either end of the earthworks were mounted *enbarbettes*, rifled 24 pounders, and between them three 32 pounders firing through embrasures in the wall. One of the 32 pounders on Treat's Island was rifled but the rest of these guns were considered too worn to be modified and were left as smooth bores. There were two structures at each battery: one a small gabled roof storehouse, fourteen by ten feet, which stood behind and slightly to the north of the guns; the other a magazine built of wood, composing a chamber nine by six feet, only five feet high. Each magazine was designed to hold 50 barrels of powder. On top of the magazines was erected a protecting pyramid shaped mound of earth approximately twenty-five feet high. The magazine at Treat's Island was located directly in the center of the battery, only twenty-five feet behind the middle 32



Plan of Treat's Island Battery, 1863. (From National Archives, Record Group 77, Drawer 134, Sheet 51).



Treat's Island with Treat's Island battery on left, circa 1900. Campobello Island, New Brunswick is in background. Photograph by Charles Brown. (From Alice Otis Collection)

pounder. At Todd's Head the magazine was placed just north of center, around thirty feet behind the most northerly 24 pounder.<sup>11</sup>

Construction on both batteries began in earnest by the end of August under the supervision of Horace Crosby, a civilian assistant to the Corps of Engineers. All went according to plan although not without incident. In November, William Rose, a worker at the Todd's Head battery, was killed when a faulty fuse he was inspecting ignited and exploded a charge which he received straight in the face.<sup>12</sup> By the middle of November the guns were mounted and the magazines were completed, but no troops were provided to man them for another six months.


This delay caused a great deal of concern in Eastport. In January 1864, "H" wrote to *the Sentinel*:

As the matter at present stands we are actually in more danger than before the works were built. The protection of the public property that has been placed here, calls for prompt action.<sup>13</sup>


Still no troops were authorized until the spring and it took till May 16th for a company of the recently raised First Battalion of Maine Coast Guard Infantry to be mustered in at Fort Sullivan. Only then were Eastport's fears quelled.<sup>14</sup>

Company C of the Coast Guard Infantry, under the command of Captain Thomas Hutchinson of Machias, arrived at Fort Sullivan in the last week of April and was mustered in two weeks later. Although the fort and new batteries were ready to receive them, it was soon found necessary to construct a small barracks to house troops stationed on Treat's Island. Unfortunately, almost nothing is known about the structure except that it was built somewhere near the battery and was able to house about fifty men. It was completed sometime in the summer of 1864.<sup>15</sup>

Company C was stationed at Eastport for the rest of the Civil War. It was finally mustered out of the service on September 10, 1865. The company was a very different unit from the army regulars stationed at the fort in the 1850's. Numbering about one hundred strong, including three officers, most of the men came from within or in the immediate vicinity of Washington County. They came from a variety of different backgrounds which reflected the social makeup of the area. Captain Hutchinson was a Machias milkman; First Lieutenant Andrew Gibson,



Front of Officers' Quarters showing from left to right, the south, middle and north sections. Circa 1870. (Copy of a print made from a glass negative by Cecil Greenlaw. Courtesy of Sally Greenlaw).



Fort Sullivan, circa 1870, with left to right, Powder Magazine, Soldiers' Quarters and Hospital (long building), and Guard House. (Copy of a print made from a glass negative by Cecil Greenlaw. Courtesy of Sally Greenlaw).



Looking northeast from Commander's House at Fort Sullivan, with former Powder Magazine, Soldiers' Barracks, and Hospital at center. Photograph taken during 1900 survey of Fort. (From the National Archives).



Looking northwest to Fort Sullivan from top of Quoddy Hotel on Washington Street. Photograph taken during 1900 survey of Fort. Dotted line is property boundary of Fort. At left is Commander's House and at right, Soldiers' Barracks and Hospital. (From the National Archives).



Looking northwest to east end of Fort Sullivan from top of Customs House. Photograph taken during 1900 survey of Fort. Dotted line is property boundary of Fort. (From the National Archives).

a Perry clerk; and Second Lieutenant Joseph Hughes was a Loringville carriage maker. The largest occupation groups among the men were farmers (36 percent), sailors (20 percent), and lumbermen (10 percent). The men served their country faithfully as only three deserted in the entire sixteen month period of service—a far better figure than for any regular force that had ever been stationed at the fort.<sup>16</sup>

On April 9, 1865 the Civil War was effectively ended when General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to General Grant at Appomattox Court House. The Guard Infantry continued to serve for five months until they were replaced by various units of the Veterans Reserve Corp—a reserve formation of experienced soldiers. They served at the fort until December, 1865 when they too were discharged. In November of that year the regular army, in the form of Company L of the Third Artillery, under the command of Captain (Brevet Colonel) Dunbar R. Ransom, returned to Fort Sullivan. For the next eight years the fort, with one exception, would act as tranquil peacetime quarters for various regular companies.<sup>17</sup>

The one break from the peacetime routine occurred in April, 1866 when the so called "Fenian Raid on New Brunswick" took place. If not for the fact that this incident was important to the eventual confederation of British North America as the Dominion of Canada in July 1867, the raid would be considered a farce rather than a serious threat to New Brunswick. But the raid was a catalyst that, by helping to bring pro-confederation governments into power in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, made possible the merging of these colonies with Quebec and Ontario.<sup>18</sup>

The Fenian movement was founded in New York in 1858 by Irish expatriates seeking to free their native country from British rule. By the end of the Civil War several factions within the movement decided that an attack on British North America would be the best way to damage their enemy. The group led by John O'Mahomy and his "vigorous" lieutenant, Bernard Doran Killian, developed a plan to seize Campobello Island in New Brunswick, and to use it as a base for Irish privateers and a center to launch an eventual invasion of Ireland. Killian, the primary proponent of the plan, operated on the incorrect assumption that the American government would remain passive, and not attempt to en-



View from Fort Sullivan in 1866, looking east to New Brunswick islands with Indian Island in center. (Copy of original by E. A. Warren, sketch artist for *Harper's Weekly*. Courtesy of Sally Greenlaw).

force the U.S. neutrality laws.

On March 17th, at a meeting of the Fenian executive council, Killian's plan was approved and within two weeks between 300 to 500 supporters of the movement arrived in the towns between Eastport and Calais. They came in plain clothes armed only with knives and pistols, awaiting the arrival of rifles to be shipped separately.

The arrival of the Fenians caused a great deal of consternation in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Some residents of Campobello fled across the border to Treat's Island and lodged in the then vacant barracks. The British and Canadian military forces in the area were, however, well prepared as news of Killian's plan had been leaked by December, 1865. By the middle of April, 5,000 troops were ready to repel the Fenians and several Royal Navy warships, including the 81 gun flagship of the Halifax squadron, H.M.S. *Duncan*, cruised in Passamaquoddy Bay.

The British forces, however, did not have to face the Fenians because after some delay American officials decided to enforce the neutrality laws. On April 17th, a small vessel, *The Ocean Spray*, carrying 129 cases of Fenian owned rifles, arrived at Eastport Harbor and was promptly seized by the Collector of Customs, Washington Long. Two days later General George Meade, the victor of the Battle of Gettysburg, arrived to take over the American handling of the situation. Meade made it clear to the Fenians that they would not be allowed to launch a full-scale invasion. To back him up he brought an additional three companies of the Third Artillery, and stationed one each at Fort Sullivan (along with Ransom's men), Treat's Island, and Calais. The rifles were moved off *The Ocean Spray* into Fort Sullivan and placed under twenty-four hour armed guard. Without the guns the Fenians realized their cause was hopeless. In the first week of May most returned to New York and Boston with solely the flag of the customhouse of Indian Island, New Brunswick, seized in the only actual crossing of the border, to show for their efforts.<sup>19</sup>

Besides lodging an additional company and the Fenian guns, Fort Sullivan played an important role in the events of April, 1866. When the Fenians first arrived, the garrison patrolled the streets of Eastport at night to ensure the safety of the inhabitants. The fort acted as General Meade's command center during his brief stay and the garrison watched over the Fenian departure in May. Captain Ransom negotiated the

release of the rifles once the Fenians were safely back in Boston and New York.<sup>20</sup>

By mid-May the soldiers at the fort once again settled down to enjoy peaceful garrison life. Company L of the Third Artillery remained stationed at the fort until March, 1869 when, in a general shifting of regiments reminiscent of 1827, it was replaced by Company K of the Fifth Artillery. This was the last military unit to be stationed at the fort. When it left on October 9, 1873, its departure marked the end of an era for both the fort and Eastport.<sup>21</sup>

This last garrison at Fort Sullivan was remarkably similar to those of 1821 to 1853. In fact, the entire professional army had changed very little because of the Civil War. The postwar garrison was slightly larger than the previous regular garrison, averaging around sixty enlisted personnel over the eight years. Pay had been improved somewhat for the men, privates receiving sixteen dollars a month between 1864 and 1871, and thereafter it was reduced to thirteen dollars. Despite these increases the pay was still less and the conditions harsher than those found in civilian life. Desertion was once again a major problem, particularly just before and after the pay reduction of July, 1871. In that year over a third of the entire army, including 34 percent of the garrison, deserted. The overall turnover rates were higher in this period than in the years prior to 1853, averaging just under half of the garrison leaving the army every single year.<sup>22</sup>

In the officer corps there had been some changes since 1853 to help alleviate the stagnation problem with promotion. Officers could now be forced to retire if unable to perform their duties and could voluntarily retire with a pension after thirty years service. Although it is hard to judge the effectiveness of these measures in the eight years of the postwar garrison, there are some indications that they did improve an officers' chance of advancement. There were a total of three promotions at the fort between 1865 and 1873, a number equal to the total given in the twenty-eight years of occupation between 1821 and 1853. This figure is even more remarkable when one considers that at the time the total strength of the army shrank from a high of 57,000 in 1866 to a low of around 25,000 in 1873.

The only other noticeable change to the officers of the garrison was

the return of all the subalterns of the company from staff assignments elsewhere. During the Civil War an effective staff system was developed, and in the postwar years all four or five officers assigned to the garrisoning company were stationed at the fort.<sup>23</sup>


Just as the army changed little, so was there a continuity in the relationship between the garrison and Eastport. *The Sentinel* shows that the garrison and town of the postwar period were still closely linked in very much the same way as in 1853. The officers were still considered among the leading citizens. The fort continued to be the center of national celebrations and mourning. Soldiers and civilians once again fought fires. And the mutual economic attachments were as strong as in any previous period.

New information comes to light in the post-war era concerning the town's difficulties with off-duty enlisted personnel. In the years after 1853, *The Sentinel* began reporting local crime and from 1866 onwards the paper reported several serious incidents between the soldiers and civilians. Alcohol was at the root of all the trouble. On more than one occasion drunken soldiers wakened citizens in the area along Washington and Sullivan Streets between the center of town and the fort.<sup>24</sup> Sometimes violence broke out. In one incident an inebriated soldier knocked the town constable to the ground and fairly seriously cut his hand.<sup>25</sup>

In February 1867, a near riot occurred between some citizens and soldiers during a concert in Trescott Hall. Both sides were said to be at fault, but according to the account in *The Sentinel* a contributing factor was that some of the soldiers who had just been paid were, "as usual on such occasions," intoxicated. The fort's guard arrived to end the fight, but it too almost became involved. Only the fortuitous intervention of Captain Ransom averted a major incident. The soldiers had been roughly treated in the fight and the next day they sought revenge. Once again disaster was averted by the narrowest of margins. *The Sentinel* reported:

Quite an excitement was caused last Thursday forenoon by a number of soldiers from the fort passing along Water Street displaying knives and pistols and endeavoring to create a disturbance with citizens when they were arrested by a guard from Fort Sullivan. The soldiers were intoxicated and hadn't forgotten the rough usage of the night before.<sup>26</sup>


While there still appeared to be a wide gulf separating the enlisted




Trescott Hall. Drawing by Quincy Kilby—probably copied from a photograph. (From Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, 1888).

personnel from the town, several new contacts between the two that developed from 1865 suggest that this gap was narrowing. Some of the first baseball games played in Eastport were between a team of soldiers and a town team called the Dirigos. The fort team won the first recorded contest in Eastport's history 19 to 13 and the second by the remarkable score of 73 to 24.<sup>27</sup> In 1870, a group of soldiers formed a band and until the final departure of the garrison they played at numerous parties and benefits. The citizens were so impressed by the band that they helped pay for the instruments.<sup>28</sup>


The band and the garrison it was part of were not to remain at Fort Sullivan for long, as the army left the post for the last time three years later in 1873. There are several reasons why the fort was finally abandoned by the military, reasons which relate both specifically to the fort and to general factors that saw nearly 150 military posts abandoned



A bird's eye view of Eastport, 1879. (Courtesy of Ruth McInnis).



Plan of Fort Sullivan, Eastport, Maine, c. 1869. (From National Archives, Record Group 92, Post and Reservation File, Map 122 A-1).



Fort Sullivan from a bird's eye view of Eastport, 1879.

between 1869 and 1892. Of particular concern to Fort Sullivan was the poor condition of almost all the buildings, particularly the three officers' quarters, which due to their poor construction and situation were gradually falling into ruin. Except for the recently rebuilt soldiers' barracks, and the well constructed commanding officer's house, none of the structures were considered worth repairing. In 1867, officers of the garrison recommended that if the post was to continue to be occupied, most of the buildings had to be replaced by completely new structures. For this purpose the War Department hired an architect who prepared an elaborate set of blueprints for a "new" Fort Sullivan.<sup>29</sup>

The only part of this scheme to regenerate the fort that was ever carried out was the major reconstruction of the commander's house in 1870, at which time a new mansard roof and bay windows were added. The new roof essentially turned the building into a two story structure and, as a result, almost doubled its effective living area. This was the last structural improvement done to the fort by the military.<sup>30</sup>



Looking north on Soldier's Lane, across Sullivan Street, to Fort Hill and Commander's House. Photograph taken during 1900 survey of Fort. (From the National Archives).

The poor condition of the buildings was not, however, the deciding factor in the final abandonment of the fort. Instead, it had to do with the general reduction in the size of the army and the desire of senior officers and politicians to consolidate the force into larger, more economical units. Because of expanding commitments in the South during the Period of Reconstruction following the Civil War and in the last great campaigns against the Plains Indians, the reduced army also found itself unable to garrison any post that was not absolutely vital to the nation's security. There were simply too few men and too little money for the military to keep Fort Sullivan. And the fort, like so many other posts, passed into history.<sup>31</sup>

Although the military kept control of the post until the mid-1880's, the citizens of Eastport realized in 1873 that the chances that troops would ever return to the town were very unlikely. In September of that year, there appeared in *The Sentinel* a long editorial pleading for the troops to stay. Of particular interest is that the editorial reveals the

strong attachment felt by the town for its fort:

Fort Sullivan is an appropriate place for the exhibition of national authority —as appropriate as Fort Niagra where a rifle company of artillery is stationed; as appropriate as any place where there are no Indians or disorderly people.


. . . The citizens and the soldiers harmonize here, the soldiers are happy and orderly and healthy here and the citizens are happy to have them in their midst. The fort as an animate object adds greatly to the appearance of the town in all respects and as a ruin will be a very great draw-back on its appearance and consequence.

. . . It is a beautiful site on Independence Day to see the foreign excursionists make their enthusiastic pilgrimage here from the neighboring provinces to enjoy the pleasure of that noblest of flags swaying itself by authority of the nation in answer to their demonstrations. It is worth the whole cost of the repairs the quarter need for that one day.


. . . One thing is certain a great deal more reason can be given for the occupation than for the abandonment.<sup>32</sup>

*The Sentinel's* plea fell on deaf ears. On February 1, 1877, the government began disposing of the fort's buildings. At a public auction the still standing shell of the blockhouse was sold for \$28 to Captain A. Michener. Michener leveled the building for the salvage value of the wood. The three officers' quarters were auctioned off at the same time for \$110 and a few weeks later were moved off the site. Two of them survive. The northernmost (the ex-sutler house) stands on Washington Street where it now acts as the local museum, and the middle structure (the former hospital) lies a short distance away on Orange Street.<sup>33</sup> At this time all the other buildings on the fort site were rented. They were not finally sold until August 1, 1883. A total of \$1,450.10 was received for the buildings and public property. The largest single amount paid was \$300 for the commander's house, the lowest a mere \$28 for the magazine. The new owners were allowed to keep their buildings on the fort site, although they were warned that they would have to move them if the army ever again decided to reactivate the fort.<sup>34</sup>

One year after the sale of the buildings, the land, along with the land of more than a hundred other obsolete military posts, was turned over to the Interior Department of the federal government for eventual disposal. The sale of the land was delayed for fifteen years by several attempts by Maine congressmen to make the fort useful to the entire town. An effort to have the site turned over to Eastport as a public park



Plan of Fort Sullivan, 1879, after removal of several buildings. Drawing is based on plan of 1879 at National Archives, Record Group 153, Number 1.




Sketch of proposed National Guard battery for Fort Sullivan. (From *The Eastport Sentinel*, April 20, 1892).

did not pass either house of Congress, and another effort to build a National Guard training battery near the site of Trescott's original work was finally turned down in 1894.<sup>35</sup>

In 1900, it was finally considered possible to survey the land and divide the land into twenty-eight town lots. On September 4, 1901 the land was sold at public auction. Owners of the buildings were allowed to buy the lots on which the buildings stood for the evaluated price. All other land was sold to the highest bidder. The entire site, evaluated to be worth \$3,380, was sold for \$3,770.<sup>36</sup>


The fort site was not empty in the years between the troops' departure in 1873 and the final sale of the land twenty-eight years later. From the time the buildings were rented in 1877 an interesting compact neighborhood began to emerge. Some of the buildings such as the fire engine house were converted into single family dwellings. The commander's house was bought by D. C. Murphy, the first chief meteorologist of the Eastport weather station. In the house he raised his family of eleven children, nine of whom were born within its walls. The hospital and soldiers' barracks were each divided into four separate apartments. All told at the neighborhood's height around the First World War,



Southwest part of Fort Sullivan near High Street. Photograph taken during 1900 survey of Fort. On right is relief building thrown up after great Eastport waterfront fire of 1886. At center is City of Eastport's water tower. The long building with three peak roofs on its long side, located to the left of the tower and on the west side of High Street, is the southern section of the Officers' Quarters. The section was sold and moved off its fort site to this location in 1877. In the 1920's, the building was torn down. (From the National Archives).



The community on the hill, circa 1910. Children are outside former Soldiers' Barracks. The right end section of the long building is the former Hospital. At left is the powder magazine in partial ruins. (From Border Historical Society Collections)




Survey of Fort Sullivan land into property lots for public sale. Surveyed by A. W. Barber, November, 1900. (Courtesy of City of Eastport).



Commander's House after becoming Murphy family residence, circa 1915. (Courtesy of Mrs. Bernard O'Neil).

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Old Powder House, Eastport, Me.



Powder Magazine, circa 1900.

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seventeen families lived on the hill. Tommy Henderson ran a store out of the former commanding officer's office. The neighborhood was an almost self-contained little community.<sup>37</sup>

Within fifteen years, however, the community on the hill was no more. Most of the former military buildings were condemned and torn down in the 1920's. For many years previously the owners of the buildings had not invested any money in repairs, and as electricity and running water became available few people wished to live in the old fort buildings. In 1928, a spark from a fire at the Blanchard factory on the waterfront landed on the Murphy house, and the building was gutted before anyone noticed the fire. By 1933, except for the powder magazine, not one of the military buildings remained standing on Fort Hill. The magazine itself gradually fell into ruin. Today it is a collection of unrecognizable stone walls.


In the year of 1984, one hundred and seventy-six years after Fort Sullivan's beginnings, the fort site lies virtually empty. Only three small houses and a garage, all built in this century, still stand on the site that Trescott purchased so many years ago. Only the remaining walls of the

powder magazine, the foundation hole and front steps of the commander's house along with a nearby filled in well, and a few stones of the battery (now largely covered with earth) in front of the blockhouse, hint that there was ever anything more substantial on the hill.<sup>38</sup>

## CHAPTER SIX

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# EPILOGUE






There are few reminders now in Eastport of Fort Sullivan and its garrison. The few remains on Fort Hill, coupled with the Washington and Orange Streets barracks, are the only structural ones. A few gravestones in the city's cemetery, most from the period after 1849, are the only indications that American soldiers once lived and died in Eastport. Two stones in the Masons' corner of the cemetery mark the graves of a lieutenant of the 102nd regiment and a Royal Navy non-commissioned officer.\* Of the various outerworks of Gustavas Nicolls' plan to defend the island only the earthen walls of the Prince Regents Redoubt are still visible. The Treat's Island battery survives remarkably intact, but its sister battery at Todd's Head was long ago bulldozed by its owner who feared that the site would be turned into a public park.

In the last sixty years there has been much discussion and some action on preserving or restoring part of the fort. In 1925, a letter appeared in *The Eastport Sentinel* calling for the preservation of the powder magazine. The writer, whose father was stationed at the fort, wanted this important part of Eastport's history saved for future generations.<sup>1</sup> More recently, in the 1960's, the Border Historical Society of Eastport was active in preserving memory of the fort. The Society acquired the deed to the powder magazine and adjoining property lot on the hill, and an historic marker (since removed by vandals) was placed on the site. In 1965, the Washington Street barracks were bought by the Society and its restoration was begun as a museum open to the public. A few years later, this building and the fort site were placed on the Register of National Historic Sites.<sup>2</sup>

In the last two years, several major steps have been taken toward the preservation of Fort Sullivan, of which this study is one part. The Orange Street barracks have been purchased by a member of the Historical Society and there are hopes that this building, too, can be preserved. In the spring of 1982, the first archaeological excavation of the fort was undertaken on the site of the officers' quarters. A second excavation of the same site occurred in the spring of 1983. The results of this

\*These graves were moved to their present positions by the masons in the 1850's.



Graves at Hillside Cemetery in Eastport of two British officers stationed at Fort Sullivan during the British occupation.


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archaeological work are contained in Neill DePaoli's excellent book, *Beneath the Barracks: Archaeology at Fort Sullivan*.

One hopes that *Coastal Fort* will rekindle the memory of the people of Eastport, Maine and New Brunswick in this fascinating aspect of their history. Fort Sullivan's significance is clear and it is the wish of this author that all the readers of the history be left convinced of this and of the need to see the fort at least partially restored to its former glory.

# APPENDICES

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Map of the British Empire in 1848, showing the extent of British rule at the time.

The map shows the British Empire in 1848, with the United Kingdom, India, and various territories in Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific. The map is a historical representation of the extent of British rule at the time.

APPENDIX A

COMMANDERS AND UNITS  
AT FORT SULLIVAN (SHERBROOKE), 1808-1873

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Units</i>
May 1808	Captain Moses Swett	Corps of Artillery
? 1810	Lieutenant Samuel Maclay	" " "
March 1813	Colonel George Ulmer*	Ulmer's Regiment of Volunteers
<i>No troops at the fort January to March, 1814</i>		
April 1814	Major Perley Putnam	40th U.S. Infantry
<i>British capture Moose Island July 11, 1814</i>		
July 1814	Lieut. Colonel Herries**	102nd Foot
Oct. 1814	Lieut. Colonel Joseph Gubbins	" "
May 1816	Lieut. Colonel Hercules Renney	" "
Jan. 1817	Major Robert Anstruther	" "
July 1817	Captain Richard Gibbon	98th Foot
<i>Island returned to the United States June 30, 1818</i>		
July 1818	Lieutenant Merchant	Corps of Artillery
? 1819	Lieutenant Robert Brent	" " "
<i>Fort abandoned while the army reorganizes May, 1820 to June, 1821</i>		
June 1821	Captain Milo Mason	Comp. G. 1st Artillery
Jan. 1823	Captain John Eastman	Comp. G. 1st Artillery
Oct. 1823	Lieutenant M. A. Patrick	" " " "
May 1826	Captain R. M. Kirby	" " " "
Nov. 1827	Captain Thomas Childs	Comp. A. 3rd Artillery

\*Maclay did not officially surrender command of the fort until he was transferred in March, 1813.

\*\*All British commanders of the fort carried the title of Commandant of Moose Island.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Units</i>
Aug. 1835	Major Sylvester Churchill	" " " "
June 1836	Captain Thomas Childs	" " " "
<i>Fort abandoned due to Seminole War July, 1836 to August, 1840</i>		
Sept. 1840	Capt. (Bvt. Maj.) R. M. Kirby	Comp. G. 1st Artillery
Oct. 1842	Captain H. Winder	" " " "
Oct. 1843	Lieutenant John Hatheway	Comp. E. 1st Artillery
Nov. 1843	Capt. (Bvt. Maj.) Henry Saunders	" " " "
April 1844	Lieutenant John Hatheway	" " " "
Oct. 1844	Captain David Van Ness	Comp. H. 1st Artillery
<i>Fort abandoned due to Mexican War August, 1845 to October, 1848</i>		
Nov. 1848	Capt. (Bvt. Lieut. Col.) Martin Burke	Comp. I. 3rd Artillery
<i>Fort abandoned September, 1853 to March, 1862</i>		
Apr. 1862	Lieutenant George W. Sabine	Comp. C. Maine Coast Guard Artillery
<i>Fort abandoned August, 1862 to May, 1864</i>		
May 1864	Captain Thomas Hutchinson	Comp. C. 1st Battalion Maine Coast Guard Inf.
Sept. 1865	Lieutenant William Baldwin	Comp. C. 3rd Reg. Veterans Reserve Corps
Oct. 1865	Lieut. (Bvt. Maj.) H. Hayden	Comp. L. 3rd Artillery
Dec. 1865	Capt. (Bvt. Lieut. Col.) Dunbar Ranson	" " " "
Mar. 1867	Lieut. Col. (Bvt. Maj. Gen.) Henry Hunt	" " " "
Mar. 1869	Major George Andrews	Comp. K. 5th Artillery
Jan. 1872	Captain Edmund Brainbridge	" " " "

*Fort abandoned for the last time October, 1873*

## APPENDIX B

## THE JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN J. B. VARNUM

Capt. Varnum of the U.S. Fortieth Regiment of Infantry was stationed at Fort Sullivan in 1814 until the British occupation that same year. His journal, an excerpt of which follows below, is in the possession of the Chicago Historical Society.

1813. Time wore away, and so did my patience, in my present state of idleness. I needed some employment to relieve the monotony of my present mode of life. In this state of feeling I wrote to my father, who was still in Washington, requesting his assistance in procuring a situation in the army. If there was no situation of a non-combative nature, I would accept a Lieutenancy. In reply he obtained me a position as Captain in the 40th RegT. of Infantry—one of the five regiments first authorized by congress for the defence of the seabord. My commission was at the head of that grade and dated July 19, and I reported for service July 19. immediately on August 4th, and was ordered to open a recruiting station at Concord, which I did on Sept. 7th.

1814. After a few weeks at Concord, my success did not come up to the hopes of Col. Loring or myself, and I was ordered to Watertown, where I continued to Jan. 31 following, meeting with fair success. After which I was ordered to headquarters of the regiment at Boston. On the 20th March I received an order to organize my company of 100 men, and with Capt. Fillebrown's company to march immediately to Eastport, Maine, under the command of Maj. Perley Putnam and from thence to furnish detachments for the military posts at Castine, Machias and Robinstown. We reached Wiscasset late in April after a most fatiguing march, most of the distance ankle deep in viscous clay, for which Maine, particularly in March and April, can boast a plentiful supply. Eastport is a famous place for illicit

traffic. We soon found any measures for its suppression would be unpopular and bring the garrison into conflict with the lawless population. Our predecessors had rather winked at the state of affairs or had let it go unmolested. I was made a part of our business to suppress it. The smugglers had a small schooner which was kept plying between our port and St. Andrews, a British Island, about 1-½ miles away. Seeing her going out a day or two after our arrival, our Commander sent a 32 pound ball ahead of her, which soon brought her into port again. This unlooked for, and as they thought, rather harsh proceedings, so soon after our taking charge, together with other energetic measures, soon produced the desired effect, and the smuggling, if done at all, was in such a clandestine way not easily detected: but it produced an intense feeling of hostility against us while we remained in town. The inhabitants brought every species of annoyance to bear on us while we remained on the Island. Officers boarding in the town were notified to leave forthwith and we were compelled to confine ourselves to the garrison and to our rations.

July 11. Nothing worthy of note occurred up to this date, when, we were sitting on our piazza in the morning enjoying a cool breeze from the ocean, suddenly the reach or strait inside of Grand Meuan become whitened by the canvas of a large fleet of vessels making directly for our harbor. It was a beautiful sight but rather ominous. We were immediately ordered to man our Battery which consisted of four 32 pounders placed in barbette over a half circular parapet about three feet high, leaving all enclosed above. Our garrison at this time consisted of between 70 and 80 men fit for duty, barely sufficient to man the four guns. We soon made out a sloop of war ahead bearing at mast head a white flag. She approached within a half mile, when a boat full manned shot out from her side, also bearing the white flag of peace. She soon touched the shore and an officer sprang out and quickly made his way to the fort. I was directed to receive him outside the gate. On demanding his business, he asked if I was the commanding officer. "No", I replied, "but I am authorized to receive your communications."

"I can only treat with the commanding officer" he replied, and with that made toward the gate with the characteristic hauteur of his nation. He was quickly brought to a stand, and I left him under the surveillance of the guard, while I reported to the Major. He authorized me to conduct him to his headquarters, and when introduced, he verbally demanded the surrender of the fort with the men and munitions of war. The Major was not then prepared to answer but would take the terms into consideration. The officer then drew from his pocket proposals signed by Com. Hardy and Col. Pilkington, demanding unconditional surrender, but stipulating in the event of compliance that the commissioned officers would be paroled, the men to be exchanged. Our Major called the officers for consultation and laid the demand before us, asking that we each deliver our opinion. Meantime the officer became restive and demanded an immediate answer or to be permitted to retire. The Major became somewhat angry at his pertinacity and made a harsh reply saying that he was not to be bullied into a hasty decision in a question of so much importance, that he might return to his ship and if the flag of the fort was lowered it might be regarded as a surrender. Our opinion was asked, each one separately, beginning with myself as the second in command. I was for giving them a round or two from the battery and then retreat, if practicable, thro' the Island to a narrow part of the strait where there was usually a ferry boat to the main land. This scheme was not relished, for some of the officers had noticed one of the vessels going around to guard that pass. The other officers successively thought it would be followed by an unjustifiable sacrifice of life and preferred surrender, asserting that there was no possibility of escape. This opinion agreeing with that of the Majors, he ordered the flag lowered and thus passed without resistance Fort Sullivan into the hands of the enemy. It was mortifying circumstance to us to be thus compelled to give up our command but no censure was imputed by the Govt. and under the circumstances we took the only wise and safe course. Subsequent information proved if we had taken the course suggested by myself, that it would have been

attended by a fearful loss of life, the only course of retreat being enfiladed by a sloop of war. The post was fully invested by 10 ships of war, the line of battle ship *Ramalies* at their head. Their land forces consisted of two regiments of infantry with a battery of artillery to which force we had to oppose only about 80 men. It was too desperate a chance for any show of success for us.

Our men were immediately transferred to a transport for Halifax and nothing remained for us but to execute our parole, secure our passports and to embark for Boston. After vexatious delays and a good deal of trouble, we at length were permitted to take a small schooner which the enemy had seized in the harbor and fit it for our voyage. We engaged a skipper, laid in our small stores and put to sea. The following day we were chased by a small British Privateer and a ball thrown ahead of us, but from ignorance or wilfullness on part of our skipper, he did not come to as required, when the fellow rounded to at a half gun shot's distance and gave us a full broadside of grape. All sails and rigging suffered but fortunately not a man was hurt. This brought our skipper to his senses and the sails came down by the run and we were peremptorily ordered on board. Our passports were critically examined by a gruff looking booby, who expressed some doubts as to its genuineness but after a short detention concluded to release us. This was our first trouble. Our next was in Portland, where we put in to land a passenger or two. There our schooner was seized by a

- July 18. man claiming to be her owner and rather than contest the point with him and be subject to the delay consequent upon the same we gave it up and performed the remainder of our journey  
 July 20. by land, arriving in Boston July 20.

## APPENDIX C

## A TRAVELLER'S ACCOUNT OF EASTPORT, 1851

From (M. C. S. London), *Adventures in Canada, Being Two Months on the Tobique*, New Brunswick (London: Smith Elder & Co., 1851), pp. 37-38.

We ran along the coast for two or three hours before we reached East Port [sic], at about 11 A.M. on the 9th, and I must say I was very much struck, even delighted by some parts of it. It is a kind of scenery new to me—rocky promontories and little ragged isles crested with pine trees, like pictures of Norway. I took a walk on shore with my divinity friend, and went up to the Yankee barracks, where I saw some young lads walking about dressed in badly made clothes of coarse blue cloth which looked like a gaol uniform, but which was in fact the uniform of the U.S. Army—and these mere boys soldiers. Nine in ten are Irish, I am assured—the Yankee being too good a judge to risk his life for a trifle. Moreover the army in America is hated with whole heart, as being composed of the idelest and most worthless rascals of the country.

## APPENDIX D

## LETTER—BOYD TO CUSHING, 1813

*From National Archives - George Ulmer's Service Record.*

E District Head Quarters  
Boston January 25 1813

Sir,

I have the honor to represent to you for the information of the Honorable Secretary of War, that Colonel Ulmer, Commanding at East Port, has adopted the most vigorous measures for the suppression of all illicit intercourse with the enemy, having directed all the Aliens who refused to take the Oath of Allegiance, to depart within a specified time,—forbidding all passing from shore to shore, except through such channels as he has established,—and notified the British commandent, that all persons /British/ who should not conform to these regulations, should be considered as spies, but he states his force to be inadequate to the purpose of fully effecting these objects.

The volunteers ordered there by Genl. King are tardily concentrating, and instead of a Regiment of Colonel Ulmer has now but 150 effective men under his command and Genl. King requested to expedite the movement of those troops. Colonel Ulmer writes that the enemy has lately been reinforced, & is now greatly his superior in numbers—in the event of an attack he fears the issue, & strongly urges the expedience of some naval assistance.

Your commands of the 18 Instance have the attention required.

With much consideration

I have the honor to be

Sir

your obd. ser.

Jn. P. Boyd  
Brig Genl.

[To]

General J. H. Cushing  
Adj. Gen. U.S.A., Washington

## APPENDIX E

## MESSAGE—BATHURST TO SHERBROOKE, 1814

*From Public Records Office (London), CO 218/29, p. 42.*

Downing Street

28 April 1814

Sir J. C. Sherbrooke Sir,

(SECRET) I have the honour to acquaint you that the necessary shipping has been appropriated & is now on the point of sailing from this country to the Bermudas, in order to convey the 102d Regt. from thence to Halifax. This Corps has been placed under your orders for the purpose of enabling you to occupy & maintain possession of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, & I am to signify to you the pleasure of H.R.H. The Prince Regent that you should make the necessary arrangements in conjunction with the officer commanding His Majesty's Naval Forces for carrying into effect His Royal Highness's intentions upon this subject as soon as you shall receive the reinforcements before mentioned.

I have the honour,

Bathurst

## APPENDIX F

## LETTER—SHERBROOKE TO BATHURST, 1814

*From Public Records Office (London), CO 217, V. 93.*

Halifax, Nova Scotia  
July 9th 1814

To Earl Bathurst

My Lord,

Your Lordship's dispatch of the 28th April (marked secret) did not reach me until the 30th ultimo. It was forwarded by Sir Alexander Cochrane and accompanied by a letter from him dated 10th June informing me that the 102nd would sail in a few days afterwards from Bermuda and that Sir Thomas Hardy, who would take part of the regiment on the *Ramilies*, and would convoy the remainder in Transports, should have orders to rendezvous at Shelbourne.

Since the receipt of this communication I can assure your Lordship, that no time has been lost in embarking at this place, a detachment of Royal Artillery, with such ordnance and stores as might be required to carry His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's commands, conveyed to me by your Lordship, into effect, and I have now the honour to report the necessary arrangements having been completed, the Transports with what appears to me requisite on board sailed Tuesday the 5th inst. under convoy of His Majesty's Ship *Martin* to join the troops coming from Bermuda at the rendezvous fixed upon by Sir Alexander Cochrane.

As the success of the service for which this force is intended must depend in a great degree upon the officer who has the direction of it having local knowledge of the places where the operations are intended to be carried on I have accepted the voluntary offer of Lt. Colonel Pilkington (who has been for many years Dt. Adjt. General here) to command the Expedition. That officer has in consequence received the necessary instructions from me, and has gone wind to Shelbourne in the *Martin* to assume the command accordingly and from the knowledge

I have of his zeal and ability, I have no doubt that Lieut. Colonel Pilkington will execute his orders in a manner perfectly satisfactory to your Lordship.

From the Troops being collected at Shelbourne no suspicion will I hope be entertained by the Enemy of our real intentions which would in all probability have been suspected had the force destined for this service been assembled in New Brunswick, as any movement there would have excited immediate alarm at Moose Island (the only one where any resistance is expected, as there is a work of some importance upon it) and in that case all the American militia along shore might have been called in to assist in its defence.

As your lordships orders to me are "to occupy and maintain the possession the Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy" I consulted Lt. Colonel Nicolls, the Commanding Royal Engineer in these provinces, upon the steps necessary to be taken for carrying the latter part of these instructions into effect, and Lieut. Coln. Nicolls having volunteered attending the Expedition I have allowed him to do so, as from that officer having been upon Moose Island, his local, as well as professional knowledge may be of service.

I have consequently given the Commanding Royal Engineer instructions to use his Endeavours to put Moose Island into a respectable state of defense as soon as it is in our possession and have authorized him to construct such field works or other defences as he may think necessary for its security.

I have just learned (tho'not officially) that Sir Thomas Hardy arrived upon the coast the same day that the *Martin* with her convoy sailed from hence. I conclude that the Expedition will before this time have proceeded to its ultimate destination, and I shall hope very shortly to have it in my power to report that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's commands, conveyed to me in your Lordships dispatch of the 28th April have been carried into execution.

I have honour to be with great respect,

My Lord,  
Your obedient, humble servant  
J. C. Sherbrooke

P.S. As I conclude those Islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy that we are to take possession of, will eventually belong to New Brunswick, I shall place them, (when in our possession) under the Government, until I can be made acquainted with your Lordship's pleasure upon this subject.

Having reason to think it probable that our occupying these Islands will induce the Americans to make an attack upon New Brunswick, I trust your Lordship will perceive the expediency of sending more troops out here. Sir George Prevost has applied to me for the 98th Reg. but on the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch of the 28th April, I sent off an Express to inform him, how we are situated, and to submit to his consideration, whether it might not be more prudent to keep the 98th here until we see how matters turn out.

J.C.S.

## APPENDIX G

## LETTER—SPRAGUE TO WINDER, 1843

*L. Sprague was Assistant Surgeon at Fort Sullivan in the 1840's. From National Archives, Record Group 92, Box 1091.*

Fort Sullivan, May 13 1843

Sir,

Recent enquiries made by me respecting the health of this garrison have lead me respectfully to submit to you the following remarks.

This post is situated on an incline plane, and owing to imperfect drainage, is constantly subjected to extreme moisture after every considerable rain—and in the Spring and the Fall of the year to complete inundation. There being no drains of a right construction or sufficiently capacious to receive the water as it rushes in from the back ground, a part of it is diffused over the surface of the earth; and the remainder forcing its way through narrow inadequate drains, is, in its course conducted under the buildings, carrying the water into the cellars. In the Spring of the year the cellar of the Hospital, situated on the range with the men's quarters, receives from three to four feet of water, & is therefore obliged to remain for a long time. Having lately visited a cellar under a part of the soldier's quarters, I found the bottom of it completely wet, and the mud several inches deep—it receives every Spring from two to three feet of water and is not dry in any part of the year—there is consequently a constant evaporation, which has rotted the floors & timbers of the quarters, and issueing through every crevice, subjects the men to a moist and unhealthy atmosphere. The floors of the remainder of the quarters, being two-thirds of the whole, are not more than two feet above the subjacent earth over which the water rushes, and from thence is spread over the whole range of the buildings. I have very recently viewed the main or principal drain, on which is placed the chief dependance for the draining of the post, and have found that its situation and size, do not answer its wants. This drain, after leaving the enclosure, owing to the rocky nature of the land outside of the pickets and in the rear of the soldiers quarters, does, in its present course, conduct the water under the building—it cannot be directed in any

other course until another passage is made through the rocks in the other direction. In consequence of the constant state of moisture to which the buildings are subjected, there is generated beneath the floors an unhealthy atmosphere, charged with deleterious exhalations from the decomposition of vegetable matter washed in and collected there, which issueing through every crevice, has been (in my poor opinion) the principal cause of the Ophthalmia which raged the last year as an epidemic, and was exclusively confined to the soldiers barracks—not a case originating in any other place at the post. The only remedy (in my opinion) for all this evil, is the formation of an ample drain, through the rocky obstructions in the rear of the soldiers quarters, adequate to the exigencies of the post. If rightly located, and of sufficient capacity, it will receive and conduct from the post all the water which has proved so destructive to the buildings and injurious to the health of the soldiers.

I have the honor to be most respectfully

Your obdt. Servt.

(signed) L. Sprague  
Ast. Surg.

Col. J. H. Winder  
Command Post  
Fort Sullivan

## APPENDIX H

## NOTICE—PROHIBITION OF ALCOHOL, 1829

Notice of legislation prohibiting sale of alcohol to regular army enlisted personnel. From *Eastport Sentinel*, 1829.

**An act in addition to the several Acts for the regulation of Innholders, Retailers and common Victuallers.**

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in Legislature assembled,*  
**That, no Innholder, Retailer or common Victualler, shall sell or furnish to any person knowing him to be a non-commissioned officer or soldier in the service of the United States, any spirituous liquor, or any liquors, part of which are spirituous, within five miles of any fort, barracks or Military post within this State, or to any non-commissioned officer or soldier in said service, who may at any time be on duty beyond the distance of five miles from any such fort or barracks, without a permit from the commanding officer of the corps to which such soldier may belong, under penalty of forfeiting the sum of ten dollars for every offence: Provided, such commanding officer shall cause to be posted in the office of the town or plantation Clerk, wherein such Innholder, Retailer, or common Victualler, resides, a list of the names of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers belonging to his corps.**

[Approved by the Governor, Feb. 25, 1829.]

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## ABBREVIATIONS TO NOTES

Adm.	Admiralty
CO	Colonial Office
HQ	Head Quarters
JAG	Judge Advocate General
<i>JAH</i>	<i>Journal of American History</i>
Let. Rec.	Letters Received
MG	Manuscript Group
NA	National Archives
<i>NASPMA</i>	<i>New American State Papers: Military Affairs</i>
PAC	Public Archives of Canada
PANB	Provincial Archives of New Brunswick
PANS	Public Archives of Nova Scotia
PRO	Public Records Office
QMG	Quartermaster General
QMG, Let. Rec.	Quartermaster General's Office, Letters Received
RE	Royal Engineer
RG	Record Group
RS	Record Series
RUSMP	Returns United States Military Posts, National Archives, RG 94
WD, SO, LR, R	War Department, Secretary's Office, Letters Received, Registered
WD, SO, LR, Un.R	War Department, Secretary's Office, Letters Received, Unregistered
WO	War Office

## NOTES

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1. Emanuel Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History* (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1970), pp. xi, 139-141.
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, 10th Cong., sess. 1, ch. 7
3. E. T. Coke, *A Subaltern's Furlough*, vol. 2 (New York: J. and J. Harper, 1833), pp. 133-134.
4. Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1956), p. 43.
5. James R. Jacobs, *The Beginnings of the U.S. Army: 1783-1812* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972), p. 68.
6. Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, pp. 139-141.
7. Millis, *Arms and Men*, p. 55.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

### Chapter Two: BUILDING, EMBARGO AND WAR

1. Harold A. Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix, 1604-1930* (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1950, reprint, 1974), p. 309.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
3. Gerald S. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), pp. 167-169.
4. Delesdernier to Madison, June 24, 1807, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 6, 1907, p. 4.
5. Delesdernier to Madison, July 14, 1807, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4; Flintoph to Admiral Blake, July 27, 1807, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 497.
6. Delesdernier to Madison, July 14, 1807, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4.

7. Jefferson to Congress, Oct. 27, 1807, *The Journal of the Senate*, 10th Cong. 1st sess., p. 9.
8. U.S. Congress, House, *Fortifications and Gunboats*, 10th Cong. 1st sess., 1807, *NASPMA*, v. 3, p. 68.
9. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Fortifications and Gunboats*, 10th Cong. 1st sess., 1807, *NASPMA*, v. 3, p. 69.
10. U.S. Congress, House, *Fortifications and Gunboats*, 10th Cong. 1st sess., 1807, *NASPMA*, v. 3, p. 72.
11. U.S. Congress, *An Act for the Fortifying of the Ports and Harbours of the United States and for Building Gunboats*, Statute 1, ch. 7, 10th Cong. 1st sess., 1808.
12. Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, p. 25.
13. Robert Bradley, *The Forts of Maine* (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1981), p. 25.
14. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Urbana, Ill.: Illinois U. Press, 1965), p. 103.
15. An example of the procedure is contained in Acting Sec. of War, Graham's letter, "on Appropriations for Fortifications," Jan. 3, 1818, *NASPMA*, v. 3, pp. 92-93.
16. Lorenzo Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby (Eastport, Me.: Edward E. Shead and Co., 1888), p. 152.
17. Trescott to Dearborn, June 1, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
18. Trescott to Dearborn, Aug. 16, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
19. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America*, p. 196.
20. Samuel E. Morison, Henry S. Commanger, William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Growth of the American Republic*, v. 1, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 405.
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22. Graham, *Sea Power and British North America*, pp. 199-200.
23. Sears, *Jefferson and the Embargo*, p. 90.
24. Tho. Barclay to Warren, May 15, 1808, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 498, p. 242.
25. Prevost to General Sir James Henry Gray, May 23, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 728, pp. 11-18.
26. See Prevost's analysis of the strategic importance of the island in his *Report on the Defence of British North America*, May 18, 1812, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 1707, p. 10.
27. Prevost and Douglas to Officers Commanding Moose Island, May 22, 1808, and Prevost and Warren to Officers Commanding Moose

Island, June 3, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 728, pp. 15-16.

28. Jefferson to D. D. Smith, July 10, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

29. Trescott to Dearborn, June 1, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

30. Prevost to Gen. Sir J. H. Gray, May 23, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 728, pp. 11-18.

31. Nicolls to Prevost, June 19, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 366, p. 152.

32. Nicolls to Prevost, June 30, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 673, p. 116.

33. Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R. Trescott to Dearborn, Aug. 9, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

34. Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 153.

35. Trescott to Dearborn, Dec. 1, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

36. Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 153; Lt. M. A. Patrick to QMG, Sept. 2, 1822, NA, RG 92, QMG, Let. Rec., Box 1091.

37. Trescott to Dearborn, Dec. 1, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

38. Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

39. Trescott to Dearborn, Dec. 28, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

40. Philip Katchner, *The American War 1812-1814* (London: Osprey Books, 1972), p. 26.

41. Nicolls to Prevost, June 30, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 673, p. 116.

42. Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

43. *Ibid.*; Letter from Prevost, June 26, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 366, p. 157A.

44. Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 145.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 145; Nicolls to Prevost, June 19, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 366, p. 152; Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

47. Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. Nicolls to Prevost, June 19, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 366, p. 152.

51. Ramsay to Shattuck, Oct. 24, 1808, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 498, p. 396.

52. Delesdernier to Shattuck, Oct. 26, 1808, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 498, p. 405.

53. Swett to Dearborn, July 26, 1808, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

54. Swett to Dearborn, Jan. 26, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

55. Trescott to Eustis, July 13, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.

56. See the several maps of Fort Sullivan found in Chapter Two.
57. Trescott to Sec. of War, Feb. 9, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
58. Observation of David Zimmerman and Charles Rand, site archaeologists, Fort Sullivan site, June, 1982. Also see Capt. Winder to QMG, May 15, 1843, NA, RG 92, Box 1091.
59. Trescott to Sec. of War, Feb. 9, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
60. Ibid.
61. Monagle to Swett, July 21, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.; Monagle to Swett, Oct. 4, 1809, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
62. Trescott to Eustis, Sept. 12, 1812, RG 107, NA, WD, SO, LR, R.
63. Dearborn to Eustis, June 5, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, July 17, 1907, p. 4.
64. Ulmer to Dearborn, Mar. 3, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Sept. 11, 1907, p. 4.
65. Henry Smith to the Commander of the St. John Garrison, June 26, 1808, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 722, p. 35.
66. Ibid.; "Recollections of an Old Resident," *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 23, 1859, p. 2.
67. *Niles Register*, Aug. 22, 1812.
68. Alden Bradford, *History of Massachusetts* (New York: Research Reprints, Inc., 1970, reprint of 1829 ed.), Vol. 3, p. 130.
69. Trescott to Sec. of War, June 8, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4.
70. Dearborn to Strong, June 22, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4.
71. Dearborn to Trescott, July 1, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4.
72. Proclamation of General Brewer, July 15, 1812; Trescott to Brewer, July 13, 1812; Robbinston Committee of Safety to Brewer, July 10, 1810; Delesdernier to Brewer, June 28, 1812. All from Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 13, 1907, p. 4.
73. Donnison to Sewall, Aug. 5, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 27, 1907, p. 4.
74. Strong to Eustis, Aug. 21, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 27, 1907, p. 4.
75. Strong to Eustis, Sept. 10, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Feb. 27, 1907, p. 4.
76. Ibid.
77. Donald R. Hickey, "American Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812," *JAH*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Dec., 1981), p. 524.

78. Proclamation of Sherbrooke, *Niles Register*, Aug. 1, 1812.
79. Prevost to Sherbrooke, Aug. 4, 1812, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 1218, p. 353.
80. Jacob Ulmer to Eustis, Sept. 26, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 14, 1907, p. 4.
81. Kate Caffrey, *The Twilights Last Gleaning* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), pp. 119-149.
82. Trescott to Eustis, Sept. 1, 1812; King to Eustis, Aug. 24, 1812. All Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 7, 1907, p. 4. Eustis to King, July 31, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, July 31, 1907.
83. King to Eustis, Aug. 24, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 7, 1907, p. 4.
84. Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 161.
85. Ulmer to Armstrong, Mar. 29, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
86. Ibid.
87. Ulmer's Decree, Jan. 8, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 6, 1907, p. 4.
88. Ulmer to King, Jan. 10, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 21, 1907, p. 4.
89. Gen. Boyd to Ulmer, Jan. 18, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, Un.R; *National Intelligencer*, Feb. 8, 1813.
90. Eustis to Ulmer, Feb. 8, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 28, 1907, p. 4.
91. Jeremiah O'Brien to Sec. of War, Apr. 8, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, Un.R; Ulmer to Armstrong, Apr. 14, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R; King to Armstrong, Feb. 9, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 28, 1907, p. 4.
92. Ulmer to Dearborn, Mar. 3, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Sept. 11, 1907, p. 4.
93. Ulmer to Armstrong, Apr. 16, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
94. Ulmer to Boyd, Dec. 26, 1812, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 23, 1907, p. 4.
95. Ibid. Armstrong to HQ Albany, Feb. 20, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 28, 1907, p. 4; Ulmer to Armstrong, Feb. 28, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 28, 1907, p. 4; Ulmer to Armstrong, Mar. 29, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R; Ulmer to Armstrong, Apr. 16, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
96. Ulmer to Dearborn, Mar. 3, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Sept. 11, 1907, p. 4.
97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ulmer to Armstrong, Mar. 29, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
101. Sabine, "Moose Island," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 165.
102. *Niles Register*, May 14, 1813.
103. Ulmer to Armstrong, Mar. 29, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
104. Ulmer to Armstrong, May 30, 1813, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Oct. 9, 1907, p. 4.
105. Ulmer to Cushing, July 2, 1813; Ulmer to Cushing, July 11, 1813. All NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, Un.R.
106. Cushing to Sec. of War, Aug. 16, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
107. Cushing to Ulmer, July 31, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, un.R.
108. Ulmer to Cushing, Aug. 28, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, Un.R.; Ulmer to Madison, Aug. 21, 1814, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R; Ulmer's pay slip, Nov. 10, 1814, NA, Record of George Ulmer, Ulmer's Volunteers, War of 1812.
109. Cushing to Sec. of War, Dec. 20, 1813, NA, RG 107, WD, SO, LR, R.
110. Sabine, "Moose Island," *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 154.
111. Journal of J. B. Varnum, Collection of the Chicago Historical Society, p. 32.
112. Captain's Log, HMS *Fantome*, April 30, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2295; *Boston Palladium*, May 10, 1814.
113. Journal of J. B. Varnum, p. 32.
114. Ibid.
115. Journal of J. B. Varnum, p. 33.

### Chapter Three: CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION

1. Sir G. Prevost, "Report on the Defence of British North America," May 18, 1812, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 1707, p. 10.
2. Sherbrooke to Prevost, June 23, 1812, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 772, p. 33.
3. Bathurst to Sherbrooke, April 28, 1813, PRO, CO, 218, Vol. 29.
4. Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 9, 1814, PRO, CO, 217, Vol. 93; "Captain's Log," HMS *Ramillies*, July 21-23, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2027; "Hardy's Report on the Invasion of Moose Island," July 12, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 507.

5. Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 9, 1814, PRO, CO, 217, Vol. 93.
6. *Ibid.*; Sherbrooke to Prevost, July 12, 1814, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 684, pp. 80-83; Griffith to Croker, July 9, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 506; "Captain's Log," HMS *Ramillies*, July 6-7, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2027.
7. "Captain's Log," HMS *Ramillies*, July 8-11, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2027.
8. "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282; Masters' Logs of HMS, *Ramillies*, *Martin*, *Borer*, *Terror*, Adm., 37, Vols. 4111, 4680, 4884, 4698.
9. "A Report of the Prisoners of War Surrendered at Fort Sullivan, Moose Island," July 11, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 507.
10. "Hardy's Report on the Invasion of Moose Island," July 12, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 507; "Captain's Log," HMS *Ramillies*, July 11, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2027.
11. "Hardy's Report on the Invasion of Moose Island," July 12, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 507.
12. "Captain's Log," HMS *Borer*, July 11, 1814, PRO, Adm., 51, Vol. 2178.
13. Journal of Jacob Varnum, July 11, 1814, pp. 33-34; Lorenzo Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby (Eastport, Me.: Edward E. Shead and Co., 1888), pp. 176-177; Putnam to Dearborn, July 12, 1814, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Oct. 2, 1907, p. 4.
14. "Articles of Capitulation for the Surrender of Moose Island," July 12, 1814, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 373.
15. Journal of Jacob Varnum, p. 34; Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 177-178; Putnam to Dearborn, July 12, 1814, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Oct. 2, 1907, p. 4.
16. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 178; Putnam to Dearborn, July 12, 1814, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Oct. 2, 1907, p. 4.
17. Journal of Jacob Varnum, pp. 34-35.
18. Putnam to Dearborn, July 12, 1814, Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Oct. 2, 1907, p. 4.
19. *Ibid.*; Journal of Jacob Varnum, pp. 36-37.
20. "Return of Ordnance and Stores Found in Fort Sullivan," July 11, 1814, PANS, MG 12, RE 5.
21. "Report of the Prisoners of War Surrendered at Fort Sullivan,"

July 11, 1814, PRO, Adm., 1, Vol. 507; Records of the Eastport Light Infantry, Peavey Memorial Library, Eastport, Me.

22. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 199.

23. *Niles Register*, Aug. 13, 1814.

24. *Boston Patriot*, Aug. 9, 1814.

25. Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 9, 1814, PRO, CO, 207, Vol. 93.

26. First recorded use of term Fort Sherbrooke, in a letter from Nicolls to Sherbrooke, July 29, 1814, PANS, MG 12, RE 5.

27. Sherbrooke to Prevost, Aug. 24, 1814, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 685, p. 149.

28. Sherbrooke to Bathurst, July 9, 1814, PRO, CO, 217, Vol. 93.

29. Nicolls to Sherbrooke, July 29, 1814, PANS, MG 12, RE 5.

30. "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 2," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 9, 1859, p. 2.

31. "Report on the State of the Forts and Batteries and Field Ordnance Establishment in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and their Dependencies," Jan. 1, 1817, PRO, CO, 218, Vol. 29.

32. *Ibid.*; Henry Stanton to QMG, Feb. 11, 1825, NA, RG 92, Box 1090.

33. "Report on the State of the Forts and Batteries and Field Ordnance Establishment in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and their Dependencies," Jan. 1, 1817, PRO, CO, 218, Vol. 29.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Bathurst to Sherbrooke, Sept. 6, 1814, PRO, CO, 218, Vol. 29; Addison to Smyth, Apr. 5, 1815, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 3792, p. 45.

36. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 182, 193; "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," July 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, vol. 282.

37. W. D. Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine* (Hallowell, Me.: Master and Co., 1832), Vol. 2, p. 641.

38. Hardy to Weston, Maurey, Bartlett and Dana, July 24, 1814, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 373, p. 236; *Battery Records Royal Artillery, 1716-1859* (Woolich, England: Royal Artillery Institute, 1952), p. 159; "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," Aug. 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282.

39. "Monthly Returns of the 102nd Regiment," Sept. 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282; "Monthly Returns of the 98th Regiment," Aug. 25, 1817-July 25, 1818, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 322, 330.

40. "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," Sept. 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282. Figures are as follows:

English	56 men	—	9.2 percent
Scotch	41 men	—	6.8 percent
Irish	355 men	—	58.6 percent
Foreigners	154 men	—	25.4 percent

And Michael Glover, *Wellington's Army* (London: David and Charles, 1977), p. 115.

41. *Ibid.* Figures are as follows.

English	25 men	—	23.4 percent
Scotch	10 men	—	9.3 percent
Irish	59 men	—	55.1 percent
Foreigners	13 men	—	12.2 percent

42. "Casualty Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, Vol. 25, p. 557. Fifty-eight deserters are listed with occupation and place of origin.

Laborers	29	—	50.0 percent
Weavers	7	—	12.0 percent
Carpenters	4	—	6.9 percent
Shoemakers	4	—	6.9 percent
Tailors	3	—	5.2 percent
Butchers	2	—	3.5 percent
Teacher	1)		
Reath	1)		
Potter	1)		
Hatter	1)		
Cooper	1)	—	15.5 percent
Hosier	1)		
Dyer	1)		
Lamplighter	1)		
Breech Maker	1)		

Place of origin of the deserters is as follows:

Laborers—Foreign, 15; Irish, 12; English, 1; and Scotch, 1.

Skilled—Foreign, 7; Irish, 20; English, 2; and Scotch, 0.

43. "Report on the State of the Fort and Batteries and Field Ordnance Establishment in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and their Dependencies," Jan. 1, 1817, PRO, CO, 218, Vol. 29; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 2," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 9, 1859, p. 2.

44. William Henry Kilby, "A New England Town Under Martial Law," *New England Magazine*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Winter, 1896), p. 695.

45. "Penalties Received," PRO, WO, 27, Vol. 130 pt. 3.

46. "Penalties Received," July 20, 1814, PRO, WO, 27, Vol. 130 pt. 3.

47. "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," Sept. 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282. The figures are:

For Life Service — 484 men — 70.2 percent

For Limited Service — 205 men — 29.8 percent

48. "Monthly Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282; "Quarterly Pay List of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-June 25, 1817, PAC, WO, 121, Vol. 9906; "Casualty Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 25, Vol. 557; "Monthly Returns of the 98th Regiment," Aug. 25, 1817-July 25, 1818, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 322, 330; "Quarterly Pay List of the 98th Regiment," June 25, 1817-Sept. 24, 1818, PRO, WO, 12, Vol. 9732.

49. Smyth to Addison, July 29, 1815, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/19; Smyth to Addison, June 14, 1815, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/19; "Confidential Report of Regiments Abroad," PRO, WO, 27, Vol. 132.

50. *Niles Register*, Sept. 10, 1814; *Salem Gazette*, Aug. 18, 1814; "Monthly Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282; "Casualty Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 25, Vol. 557.

51. Smyth to ?, Aug. 17, 1815, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/19. Figures given in this letter are:

English — 3 men — 3.2 percent

Irish — 55 men — 58.5 percent

Scotch — 3 men — 3.2 percent

Foreigners — 33 men — 35.1 percent

52. "Monthly Returns of the 102nd Regiment," June 25, 1814-Aug. 25, 1817, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282.

53. Smyth to Addison, Sept. 1, 1815, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/19.

54. Smyth to Addison, May 22, 1815, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/1a; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 2," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 9, 1859, p. 2; *Boston Patriot*, ?, 1814.

55. "Monthly Return of the 102nd Regiment," Sept. 25, 1814, PRO, WO, 17, Vol. 282. Figures are:

English — 7 men — 25.9 percent

Scotch — 4 men — 14.8 percent

Irish — 16 men — 59.3 percent

56. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 189; Glover, *Wellington's Army*, pp. 36-39.

57. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under

- Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 188.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.
59. *Ibid.*; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 2," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 9, 1859, p. 2.
60. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 191-193.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 191; H. Q. Halifax, Jan. 17, 1815, PANS, MG 12, HQ 15.
62. Pilkington to Sherbrooke, Feb. 25, 1815, PRO, CO, 217, Vol. 96.
63. W. Odell to Smyth, Aug. 5, 1815, PAC, RG 23, Vol. 53, pp. 643-645.
64. "Terms of the Oath of Allegiance," July 16, 1814, PANB.
65. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 195.
66. "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 3," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 16, 1859, p. 2.
67. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 187.
68. "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 3," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 16, 1859, p. 2.
69. *Ibid.*; Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 188.
70. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 188.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
72. H. Q. Halifax, Sept. 30, 1814, PANS, MG 12, HQ 15; Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 190; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 3," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 16, 1859, p. 2.
73. "Monthly Returns of the 98th Regiment," Aug. 25, 1817-July 25, 1818, PRO, WO, 17, Vols. 322, 330.
74. H. Q. Halifax, Sept. 30, 1814, PANS, MG 12, HQ 15; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 3," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 16, 1859, p. 2.; Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 215-216.
75. Dalhousie to Sherbrooke, Oct. 20, 1817, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 933; Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 196; "Recollections of an Old Resident, No. 3," *Eastport Sentinel*, Mar. 16, 1859, p. 2.
76. Kimbole to Gibbons, Sept. 30, 1817, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/1b.
77. Inhabitants of Eastport to Gibbons, June 27, 1818, in Sabine,

"Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 213.

78. Legislative Council of New Brunswick, Aug. 13, 1814. Eldridge Collection, *Eastport Sentinel*, Aug. 21, 1907, p. 3.

79. Sherbrooke to Freer, Jan. 16, 1815; PAC, RG 8, Vol. 515; Freer to Sherbrooke, Feb. 18, 1815; PAC, RG 8, Vol. 1226.

80. Smyth to Dalhousie, Sept. 12, 1816, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/1a; Dalhousie to Sherbrooke, Oct. 20, 1817, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 933.

81. Renney to Dalhousie, Nov. 4, 1816, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 103.

82. Dalhousie to Sherbrooke, June 18, 1817, PAC, RG 8, Vol. 993.

83. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 188-189.

84. Smyth to Dalhousie, Sept. 12, 1816, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/1a.

85. Smyth to Dalhousie, Dec. 19, 1816, PANB, RG 1, RS 366/A/2; Smyth to Dalhousie, Sept. 24, 1817, PANB, RG 1, RS 558/A/19; Dalhousie to Sherbrooke, Oct. 20, 1817, PAC, RG 8, RS Vol. 933.

86. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, p. 199; Kilby, "A New England Town Under Martial Law," *New England Magazine* (Winter, 1896), p. 696.

87. Sabine, "Moose Island and Its Dependencies Four Years Under Martial Law," in *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, ed. W. H. Kilby, pp. 201-203; Kilby, "A New England Town Under Martial Law," *New England Magazine* (Winter, 1896), p. 696.

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### ESSAY

Historians have tended to shy away from studying the usually mundane coastal forts for the more exciting events of the frontier. The standard work on the history of the early development of the American army, James R. Jacob's *The Beginnings of the U.S. Army: 1788-1812*, almost completely ignores the subject. Other works that deal with the period also tend to overlook the importance of the coastal defenses. There are, however, a few scholars who have attempted to correct this unfortunate oversight.

The only detailed study of American coastal fortifications that has yet been published is *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History* by Emanuel Lewis. The book, as Lewis admits, is not comprehensive and suffers from a concentration on the larger fortifications and on architectural characteristics. It still provides, however, a great deal of information concerning contemporary attitudes. When used in conjunction with Walter Millis' commentary on American military policy, *Arms and Men*, it is possible to trace the important role these coastal fortifications had in American military planning up to the beginning of this century.

The scholars of Maine have not ignored the study of fortifications in their state, and it is generally recognized as an important aspect of their heritage. The forts of the Second System are simply one part of an impressive list of fortifications that extends back to the Popham colony of 1607, and that would continue until well into the twentieth century. Two works have dealt exclusively with the subject. Neither has dealt

with Fort Sullivan in any great detail, but this is more a reflection on the emphasis of these books, and on the lack of proper scholarly research done in this century on the history of Eastport, than a failing on the parts of the authors.

Henry E. Dunnack was the state librarian in the early 1920's when the state acquired several fortifications to use as historic parks, and he was requested to research their histories. The book that resulted from his research, *Maine Forts*, was an important first step. But it suffers from a very heavy concentration on the state owned forts, and from extensive quotations of documents that were often almost completely valueless. Fort Sullivan is only briefly mentioned in this gazetteer of the military sites in Maine. Robert E. Bradley's excellent new work, *The Forts of Maine*, is intended only as a brief survey concentrating on those fort sites operated by the Maine State Bureau of Parks and Recreation. Here, Fort Sullivan has only brief mention as being a typical Maine Second System fortification.

The only secondary sources of any value on the history of Fort Sullivan are found in William Henry Kilby's *Eastport and Passamaquoddy* which was published in Eastport in 1888. Kilby compiled the writings of several amateur scholars who had, like himself, written on different aspects of the history of the area. Five chapters of the book, by three different authors, contain information on the fort. The most useful of these are two chapters written by Lorenzo Sabine, who lived in Eastport for a period of nearly thirty years from 1821 to about 1848. His writings have an unusual professional quality about them and, although he did not use footnotes, he does make extensive mention of the documents he had collected and used. He also states that he talked to those who could still remember the events. Unfortunately, the accounts of the fort in Kilby end with the return of the American forces in 1818.

The primary sources used in this study are as diverse as the story itself. For the period between 1808 and 1814 the most useful group of documents are found in the National Archives' collection of letters received by the secretary of war (Record Group 107). This correspondence covers the full spectrum of military activities, although it provides little information on the garrison. In determining the British reaction to the building of the fort and subsequent events, the collection of Colonial Office documents at the Public Record Office (London) and the British

military records at the Public Archives of Canada (Record Group 8 or C-series) are invaluable. Also of great use are the documents compiled on Eastport's early history by Charles T. Eldridge around the turn of the century. The Eldridge collection appears in serial form in *The Eastport Sentinel* from October, 1906 to December, 1907, and contains much information not readily available elsewhere. Of singular note is the journal of Captain Jacob Varnum found in the collection of the Chicago Historical Society. Varnum, an officer in the Fortieth U.S. Infantry, was stationed at the fort between April and July 1814, and his journal contains interesting accounts of smuggling and of the British invasion.

Besides Varnum's journal, the British period (1814-1818) is well covered by the Colonial Office records, the Eldridge collection, and the Public Archives of Canada's British military series. Several series of admiralty and war office documents in the collection of the Public Record Office contain information on the invasion and occupation. The records of the North American Station (Admiralty 1/497-507) and a variety of Captains' Logs (Admiralty 51) give a good account of the naval side of the invasion. The most detailed information of any garrison stationed at the fort is found in the monthly and quarterly returns of the 98th and 102nd Regiments (War Office 12, 17, 25 and 27). The collection of papers of General Smyth in the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick provide useful material on the martial law administration of the island (Record Group 1/558).

The return of the island to American control brought a substantial change to the garrison and to the documents which chronicle the fort's history. There are three main sources of information for the period between 1818 and 1860. *The Eastport Sentinel*, which began publishing in 1818 and survives from 1819 to 1832 and 1853 to 1954 along with a few scattered issues between 1832 to 1853, contains numerous articles on the garrison and is the primary source of information of the civil-military relationship within Eastport.

The best source on the numerous structural additions and alterations made to the fort are found in the National Archives' collection of letters received by the Quartermaster General's Office (Record Group 92). The monthly returns of United States military posts (Record Group 94), which survive virtually complete for Fort Sullivan from 1821 to give excellent information on the garrison. Although not as rich as

sources on the British garrison, the monthly returns give irreplaceable information on a typical group of American soldiers between 1821 and 1853. Also of use are the diary of Sarah Connell Ayer, the records of the Washington Street Baptist Church (Eastport), and the books of the Eastport Light Infantry Company.

The three main sources of the 1818 to 1860 period continue to be of primary importance in the era after the Civil War. The files of letters received by the office of the Chief Engineer found at the National Archives (Record Group 77) contain most of the information on the two temporary batteries built in 1863 to defend Eastport. The records of the Bureau of Land Management (Record Group 49), in the National Archives, chronicle the government's disposal of the fort between 1877 and 1901. Finally, interviews with two women who grew up on the fort site, Mrs. Bernard O'Neil and Mrs. Carrie Matthews, give interesting insights into the civilian community that flourished on the hill from 1877 to the mid-1920's.

To supplement the written sources, an impressive collection of maps, plans, and photographs of the fort survive. The earliest is the 1815 map of Moose Island prepared by Lieutenant Brandreth of the Royal Engineers. Also of great interest are the earliest plan of the fort, dated from 1834, and a series of three panoramic stereoscopic photographs of the site taken between 1870 and 1877.

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## 6. TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEWS


Mrs. Bernard O'Neil, Calais, Maine. May 14, 1982.

Mrs. Carrie Matthews, Eastport, Maine. June 28, 1982.

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