Disputant Receptivity to Negotiation in Violent Political Conflict: Lessons from South Africa's Apartheid Struggle

by

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In the Faculty of Human and Social Development

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

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ABSTRACT

One of the important challenges in trying to reduce the use of violence to resolve political conflict is getting disputants to agree to negotiate. There has been limited attention to this issue in conflict resolution literature. The purpose of this study is to increase our awareness and understanding of factors affecting disputant willingness to move from violence to negotiation. The term *Negotiation Receptivity Factors* is introduced to identify these factors. From a review of conflict resolution and power theory literature, and through an exploratory case study of South Africa's apartheid struggle, thirteen negotiation receptivity factors; e.g., *commitment to cause*, *power balance*, *trust*, and *leader attributes*, are defined; and their influence on disputant receptivity to negotiation is described. The issue of cooperative versus competitive power in negotiation receptivity is introduced.

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List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiating Process
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NP	National Party
NRF	Negotiation Receptivity Factor
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAG	South African Government
SAPF	South African Police Force
TBVC	Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei
UDF	United Democratic Front

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to my employer the Canadian International Development Agency, whose faith and support made it possible for me to undertake the course of study leading to this thesis. My former manager John Deyell was a particular source of encouragement and good advice. I am especially indebted to Stephen Owen, former Director of the University of Victoria's Institute for Dispute Resolution, whose tireless commitment and pragmatic approach to global social justice continue to be a source of inspiration.

Thanks to the members of my thesis committee: supervisor William Neilson and members Gordon Smith and Yvonne Martin-Newcombe, for their insightful guidance. Thanks also to Catherine Morris, Associate of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, my thesis external examiner, and a patient, perceptive advisor and rescuer on numerous occasions throughout my course of study. My appreciation to several other University of Victoria faculty, staff, and colleagues who have made special contributions to my learning and to my sense of belonging: Leslie Brown, Michelle Connolly, Barbara Egan, Alan Hedley, Teri Hibbs, Jane King, Michelle LeBaron, Karen Levin, Maggie Little, Mark McDonald, Maureen Maloney, Brian Parai, Lois Pegg, Gordon Sloan, David Turner, and Chris Young.

Thanks especially to my wife Lorna and to my family for their sacrifices, love, and support.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Problem statement: When will disputants negotiate?

One of the important challenges in trying to resolve violent political conflict is getting disputants to abandon violence in favour of negotiation (Janice Gross Stein 1989). Although there has been some attention in conflict resolution literature to this issue (e.g., I. William Zartman 1985, Stein 1989), our understanding of when and why disputants will or will not negotiate is quite limited. One major obstacle to that understanding is the absence of a typology. Although one can discern from the conflict resolution literature a number of factors that influence disputant willingness to negotiate, no evidence was found that a systematic list of such factors has been developed. No common terminology or definitions exist. The limited pertinent literature has focused primarily on positive conditions for negotiations, leaving relatively unexamined the negative portion of the receptivity spectrum. Exploration of inter-factor relationships has been limited and ad hoc. To better understand when disputants will and won't negotiate, we need to be much clearer about identifying and defining the determining factors and describing how disputant decisions about negotiation are affected by those factors.

The term *negotiation receptivity* is introduced here to describe *the willingness (or reticence) of disputants to move from violence to negotiation* and the term *negotiation receptivity factors (NRFs)* is introduced to collectively identify *factors that influence disputant willingness to move from violence to negotiation.*

1.2 Study purpose: Understanding negotiation receptivity

The general purpose of this study is to contribute to an increased awareness and understanding of negotiation receptivity among disputants in violent political conflict. Specific objectives are:

- to identify, define, and classify a number of negotiation receptivity factors (NRFs) drawn from the relevant theoretical literature;
- to examine an actual conflict, the South African apartheid struggle, for evidence of these NRFs and of how NRFs interact to influence disputant decisions regarding negotiation;
- to present preliminary conclusions about when parties to violent political conflict will and will not agree to negotiate; and
- to identify opportunities for further research.

1.3 Study outline

This thesis consists of six chapters including this Introduction. In chapter 2 the conceptual and theoretical frameworks are presented. The conceptual framework describes the author's worldview and approach to the study of human behaviour. The theoretical framework presents and defines thirteen NRFs, and summarizes the theory about conflict resolution and power in conflict, from which the concepts and definitions of negotiation receptivity and NRFs are drawn. In chapter 3 the case study methodology followed in this study is described. In chapter 4 a chronological account of South Africa's

apartheid conflict is presented, focusing on descriptions of disputant attitudes and decisions regarding negotiations. Instances of NRF influence are cited. In chapter 5 the dynamics of the thirteen NRFs in the case study; i.e., how they influenced disputant receptivity to negotiation, are described. Chapter 6 consists of a review of the study problem, purpose, results, and conclusions regarding when disputants will negotiate, a brief look at the issue of sustainable conflict resolution, and suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2 – Conceptual & Theoretical Framework

2.1 The author's approach to research

It is often helpful for a reader to understand a researcher's basic beliefs about human behaviour. My view of conflict is affected by my general worldview that people's behaviour is based on their perceptions of reality, and the meanings they attach to these perceptions. People's behaviour patterns can change as they acquire new information and/or analytical skills. This perspective is referred to in social science as a *constructivist* worldview or paradigm; in contrast, for example, with a *positivist* paradigm that puts more emphasis on an objective reality independent of people's perceptions (Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln 1994, 105-117).

As a constructivist, I am interested not only in descriptions of observable behaviour as a source of data (as a positivist would be), but also in descriptions by disputants and observers of those disputants, of disputant perceptions about circumstances that influence their decisions regarding negotiation.

2.2 Negotiation receptivity: What is known?

2.2.1 The state of research

In the 1989 book *Getting To The Table*, editor Stein brought together Zartman, a leading conflict analyst, and a number of other conflict and negotiation specialists to examine the process of "pre-negotiation" in international conflict. Stein explained that traditional

analysis had focused on the negotiation process itself, but "more recently, ... analysts and practitioners alike have recognized the importance of investigating the conditions and processes that encourage the parties to consider negotiation" (Stein 1989, ix).

Although the term negotiation receptivity, introduced in this study to describe the willingness of disputants to move from violence to negotiation, has not been commonly used, a review of recent literature on conflict resolution and power in conflict reveals some direct and some implicit consideration of the issue. From that review, thirteen negotiation receptivity factors (NRFs) have been identified and defined. In the NRF descriptions to follow, the reader will notice frequent references to the concept of power. Therefore, before introducing these NRFs, it is useful to summarize the theory of the role of power in conflict.

2.2.2 The role of power in conflict

At the core of all definitions of power encountered in the literature is the notion of the ability to achieve one's objectives. Beyond that core, there is vast disagreement. From those writers who classify the main theories about power (e.g., Dennis H. Wrong 1979, Stephen Lukes 1986, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* 1998 ed.), a number of observations stand out. First, an understanding of power is central to any analysis of social interaction. Second, power is a complex concept comprising many facets that individually are the subject of considerable scholarly attention. Third, there are a variety of definitions of the concept of power, even among those writers who work within the same general theoretical framework.

A fourth observation is more specific to the role of power in political conflict and its implications for negotiation receptivity. The traditional and majority view among power theorists is that power is a hierarchical-competitive phenomenon. Definitions of power by this group focus on power inequality and the competitive nature of relationships: one party's power over another. The précis of Max Weber's definition of power in the *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* (1998 ed., under "power"), is typical. According to Weber, "[Power is] the probability of persons or groups carrying out their will even when opposed by others." Such definitions reflect *win-lose* notions of the nature of political conflicts and their resolution.[1] They are based on the assumption that disputing parties are motivated only by self-interest. In international political theory, the realist school reflects this notion of the behaviour of parties in conflict (Jack S. Levy 1998).

The objective of disputants operating under a hierarchical competitive paradigm is to be on top in a relation of power dominance. With respect to negotiation receptivity, competitive disputants may in some cases favour negotiations to a continuation of the conflict, but they would generally perceive negotiation as a process of staking out positions, seeking as much gain as possible, and compromising as little as necessary.

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[1] A *win-lose* approach implies a belief that the only possible outcome of a conflict is that one either wins or loses. This approach is also referred to as a *zero-sum* approach, meaning that the sum of the wins on one side and losses on the other must equal zero. It is the opposite of a *win-win* or *positive-sum* approach, which implies a belief that both sides' legitimate needs and interests can be addressed.

An alternative, cooperative conception of power is found in the work of some humanists and liberals, and is particularly evident in the work of many feminist and peace researchers. Nancy C. M. Hartsock (1996) reviews the writings of several feminist power theorists; particularly Hannah Arendt, Dorothy Emmet, Hannah Pitkin, and Berenice Carroll, and notes their emphasis on positive, constructive notions of power. Kenneth Boulding and John Paul Lederach, influential thinkers in the field of peace-building, both stress the importance of the cooperative aspects of power. Boulding (1989, 10) uses the term "integrative" power and describes it as "the most dominant and significant form of power . . . ." Lederach (1995, 21) uses the term "empowerment" in his conception of power in the peace-building context. Most if not all of those who emphasize cooperative power do not ignore competitive power, but they feel traditional power theorists have overlooked the presence and influence of cooperative motivations and behaviour in power relationships.

The implication of cooperative conceptions of power for negotiation receptivity is that disputants applying cooperative power would almost always be positive about negotiation, seeing it as inherently more constructive than continued violent conflict. They would be looking for opportunities to address both sides' legitimate interests. This does not mean abandoning their own needs; nor does it mean assuming the other side is operating from the same set of values.

Particularly important to our study, there are reminders in the literature that most disputants do not act exclusively within a competitive or cooperative mode. David

Bloomfield, Charles Nupen, and Peter Harris (Peter Harris and Ben Reilly 1998, 64) argue that serious consideration of genuine negotiations implies movement toward cooperation. "Good process [in negotiation or pre-negotiation] moves the parties beyond an exclusive focus on the competition of bargaining to include a degree of co-operation: without co-operation there will be no satisfactory outcome."

In summary, a disputant operating *cooperatively* prefers negotiation to violence as a means of resolving conflict, and looks at conflict from an *interest-based, win-win* perspective. A disputant operating *competitively* may choose combat or negotiation, but looks at both from a *position-based, win-lose* perspective.

Although the consideration of cooperative versus competitive uses of power is important to the promotion of a culture of non-violent resolution of conflict, it is not this study's purpose to present a critique of the traditional realist view that power relations are always competitive. The intention here with regard to cooperation versus competition is: first, to raise the issue and stress its importance to conflict resolution; second, to describe the current literature and present a typology of NRFs based on current mainstream thinking; and third, in the study's conclusion, to reflect upon the implications of cooperative versus competitive views of power for reducing the use of violence to resolve conflicts.

In the next section, each of thirteen NRFs is presented and defined, and its theoretical basis is explained. Table 1 at the end of this section provides a summary list of these NRFs, their definitions, and a brief indication of their derivation. These NRFs are

presented in rank order, from most to least influence on a disputant's decisions about whether to negotiate. Given the absence of a typology of negotiation receptivity and NRFs prior to this study, it is not surprising that there is little in the literature on which to base such a ranking. The only reference found to a hierarchy of influence is attributable to Zartman who (in Stein 1989, 9) suggests "hurting stalemate" and "belief in reciprocity", in that order, as the two most important conditions for getting disputing parties to negotiate. However, Zartman is looking only at positive influence on negotiation receptivity, whereas the definitions of negotiation receptivity and NRFs introduced here are intended to accommodate both positive and negative influence. Therefore, the ranking presented here is based on my own impressions from the literature and from the case presented below. This ranking is intended to provide only a gross and general distinction between terms at the top and those at the bottom. Clearly, in a given conflict situation, any single NRF might take on special prominence.

2.2.3 Thirteen negotiation receptivity factors: An introduction

2.2.3.1 *Leader attributes*

- *a disputing party leader's personality traits, beliefs, and values.*

William Mark Habeeb (1988, 12-13) makes reference to a number of writers who approach the issue of power and conflict from a psycho-social perspective. Although Habeeb is an empiricist and thus is more interested in an actor's behaviour than their characteristics, he acknowledges the contribution of the psycho-social school and their understanding of personality and motivation to help explain actual or likely behaviour.

Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Louis Kriesberg & Stuart J. Thorson 1991, 237-246) identifies "very weak or very strong leaders" among a list of seven conditions for conflict resolution "ripeness". Kriesberg (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 5) says disputant personal factors are important in determining ripeness for the de-escalation of conflict.

Although the literature reviewed supports the inclusion of *leader attributes* as an NRF, it does not suggest the importance of this factor relative to others.[2] The argument offered here for ranking *leader attributes* first among the thirteen NRFs to be introduced is based on the observation that in most societies social and political structures are hierarchical in nature. Most political leaders have significant influence, even control in many cases, over political decisions. In conflict situations, where quick and decisive action is crucial, there is an even greater tendency for decision-making power to be in the hands of a very few people at the top of a party's hierarchy.

If there is strong, centralized disputing party leadership, then it is hard to over-emphasize the role of *leader attributes*. As much as it is important to determine what factors influence a disputing party's decisions about whether to negotiate, it is equally important to determine who is making the decisions. In essence, the influence of any other factor on negotiation receptivity is filtered through the decision-maker. The decision-maker's attributes determine how those other factors will play in the actual decision. If one is

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[2] Throughout this study, when the term *leader attributes* refers to 'the NRF *leader attributes*', it appears in italics. When the term is used generically to describe the attributes of leaders in a conflict, italics are not used. This convention also applies to the other NRF terms presented here. The only exception to this convention occurs in the indented annotations in the case study (chap. 4), where NRF dynamics are summarized in bold, non-italicized typeface.

faced with weak, decentralized, disputing party leadership, then several sets of leader attributes are at play and the effect may be more diffused. At the very least, it will be much more difficult to assess.

2.2.3.2 *Disputant objectives*

- *a disputant's preferred immediate and longer-term conflict outcomes.*

There is direct reference in the literature linking *disputant objectives* to negotiation receptivity. Kriesberg (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 5) identifies objectives as an important factor in determining disputant willingness to "de-escalate" a conflict. Habeeb (1988, 15, 19) and John W. Thibault & Harold H. Kelley (1959, 20-23) also describe disputants interacting with opponents in order to achieve their objectives.

With regard to the relative importance of *disputant objectives*, one could make a facile argument that almost every human decision is motivated by objectives. But the assumption behind identifying *disputant objectives* as the second most important of the NRFs introduced here is that, for the most part, actors make reasoned decisions. Thus, a disputant's immediate and longer-term objectives are seen to play a part in most decisions about whether to negotiate. Within this framework, *disputant objectives*, like *leader attributes*, is a 'cross-cutting' NRF that affects and is affected by all other NRFs in the list.

2.2.3.3 *Commitment to cause*

- *a disputant's commitment to their[3] side's cause in a conflict.*

Hubert M. Blalock (1989) presents a general model of conflict in which *motivation*, *resolve*, and *determination* are factors influencing disputant decisions. Thibault & Kelley (1959) identify *commitment to cause* as one determinant of a disputant's power.

One expression of *commitment to cause* that is particularly relevant to negotiation receptivity is the extremist's commitment described by Lawrence Schlemmer (Hermann Giliomee & Lawrence Schlemmer 1989, 34). "Struggle is often its own reward. Regrettably world history is replete with models of glorious martyrdom." In the same vein, Zartman (1995, 10-11) warns that an over-commitment to cause may blind a disputing party to the value of negotiation. One possible contributor to such an over-commitment to cause is the *sunk costs syndrome*, another NRF introduced below (2.2.3.13).

It follows from these references that the stronger a disputant's commitment to cause, the less receptive to negotiation that disputant is likely to be. The literature describes how mediators and other peace-builders address the issue of *commitment to cause* in order to increase disputant receptivity to negotiation. In the earlier discussion of the role of power in conflict (2.2.2), two contrasting approaches to conflict resolution were presented: a cooperative or interest-based, win-win approach and a competitive or position-based,

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[3] To avoid problems with gendered pronouns (he, she, his, her), I will use the 3rd person plural (they, them, their, etc.), even for the singular.

win-lose approach. It is commonly argued in conflict resolution literature (e.g., Roger Fisher, William Ury, & Bruce Patton 1991), that sustainable resolution of a conflict can only be achieved if the parties become seriously committed to addressing both sides' legitimate interests; *legitimate* being a relative term. If a disputant's commitment to cause can be transformed into a commitment to interests, that disputant is likely to be more receptive to negotiation.

An important relationship between *commitment to cause* and *solidarity*, another NRF, is described under ***Solidarity*** (2.2.3.12).

2.2.3.4 *Power balance*

- *the relative ability of each side in a conflict to unilaterally impose their preferred solution to the conflict.*

The realist school (see Levy 1998) and authors of several specific power theories (e.g., Habeeb 1988, Kriesberg & Thorson 1991) suggest in their own terminology that *power balance* is an NRF. However, as indicated in the discussion of the role of power in conflict (2.2.2), power is defined differently among, and even within, the various schools of thought. There were strong arguments in the literature for looking beyond the traditional, narrow notion of military power when assessing *power balance*. Such writers as Rubin and Zartman 1995, Blalock 1989, and Habeeb 1988 suggest a more inclusive consideration of all the resources at one's disposal that might influence the ability to achieve one's objectives.

Zartman (1995, 8-9) argues that a "mutually hurting stalemate" is a necessary, and perhaps sufficient, condition for getting disputants to negotiate. He says stalemate occurs "when the parties have some form of a mutual veto over outcomes." In other words, along one arm of the power balance spectrum, disputing party A would be seen to have a power advantage. Along the other arm, disputing party B would have the advantage. At the midpoint power is seen to be roughly equal, causing a stalemate.

The *hurting* aspect of hurting stalemate is discussed immediately below under ***Hurt*** (2.2.3.5).

Kriesberg (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 6) cites Touval (1982) and Zartman (1977) in a discussion of disputants' readiness to de-escalate a conflict.[4] He suggests readiness to de-escalate rises from the point at which a disputant perceives their side to be weaker but gaining in strength (i.e. approaching parity), through a perception of power parity and on through a perception of slight power advantage. However, once a disputing party perceives their side to be much stronger than the opponent, their readiness to de-escalate diminishes, or at least their settlement demands increase.

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[4] De-escalation readiness is interpreted here to be generally equivalent to negotiation receptivity. In a more detailed analysis, and in practice, it would be important to validate this interpretation.

2.2.3.5 *Hurt*

- the degree to which a disputant is suffering.

The term *hurt* emerges from Zartman's (1995, 8-9) concept of "mutually hurting stalemate". Zartman argues that stalemate alone is not sufficient to induce negotiation receptivity. The parties to the conflict must also be hurting enough to consider abandoning their original objectives in favour of a negotiated compromise. In the absence of such hurt, opponents sometimes find themselves in a "mutually *acceptable* stalemate"; i.e., they are not hurting enough to consider abandoning their original objectives, and the conflict, or perhaps an unstable peace, persists, with the underlying causes of the conflict remaining unresolved (Zartman 1995, 334). Zartman cites Angola, Lebanon and Sudan in the 1980s as countries where stalemated conflicts have endured for years.

Zartman's notion about the parties hurting enough to consider negotiation implies that *hurt* encompasses a range of intensity, from deep and grievous suffering at one extreme, to total absence of hurt at the other extreme. And although little detailed analysis of *hurt* was encountered in the literature, it is reasonable to imagine that the type of hurt might also vary. It could, for example, be in the form of human suffering, economic pressure, or damage to infrastructure.

We might reasonably expect such a complex NRF as *hurt* to vary significantly in its influence on negotiation receptivity, depending on the combination of the above characteristics at play in a given instance.

2.2.3.6 *Trust*

- reliance on the integrity of the other disputant; in particular: a) belief in an opponent's general trustworthiness; b) belief in reciprocity; i.e., belief that one's conciliatory gesture will be met by a similar gesture from the other side; c) belief that the negotiation process will be fair.

The application of the term *trust* is, for the purposes of this study, restricted to the relationship between disputing parties. The purpose of this restriction is to avoid confusion between *trust* and two other NRFs, *face* and *legitimacy*, introduced below, which have similar generic meanings.[5]

Zartman (in Stein 1989, 9) identifies "belief in reciprocity" as an important NRF. Kriesberg (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 6) mentions the disputants' relationship history, reminding us, "It is easier to restore a mutually accommodative [i.e. 'trusting'] relationship than to create it." Indeed, it is optimistic to expect that disputants who have suffered and inflicted violence and death in a conflict, and who may have engaged in virulent demonization of the enemy to build support for their own just cause, would have any feelings of trust in that same enemy. Blalock (1989, 247-248) suggests that, in such cases, trust in a proposed negotiation process may be sufficient to attract a disputant to the negotiation table.

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[5] *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.* (1970 ed.) defines *trust* as "reliance on the integrity, ability, or character, of a person. . . . a feeling that a person will not fail in performance." The same dictionary's definition of *face* reads, "value or standing in the eyes of others; dignity; prestige". The term *legitimacy* derives from power theory literature. Wrong (1979, 49-52) says that "legitimate authority" exists when A's right to command and B's obligation to obey are acknowledged by B as legitimate.

Such scenarios often arise through third party intervention in a conflict. This notion of third party intervention reveals a dimension of negotiation receptivity that hasn't been considered before in this study, that of indirect or mediated negotiation. Clearly, mediated negotiation can be an important and fruitful alternative when the relationship between disputants is too embittered for direct talks. It is thus useful to note that negotiation receptivity, defined in **Problem Statement** (1.1) as *the willingness of disputants to move from violence to negotiation,* is intended to include receptivity to mediated as well as to direct negotiation.

A number of observations can be made about the dynamics of *trust*, based on our understanding of the term. First, *trust*, like *hurt*, can vary in degree from total lack of trust in the other disputant to strong belief in the other disputant's integrity and reliability. Second, we can assume that the greater the trust, the greater the willingness of a disputant to enter into negotiations. Third, as trustworthiness is commonly understood to be a personal attribute, there is a logical link between *trust* and *leader attributes* (2.2.3.1).

2.2.3.7 *Face*

- *a disputant leader's value or standing in the eyes of their own constituents.*

This definition is adapted from *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (1970 ed.) to reflect the particular situation of political conflict, and to distinguish *face* from two other NRFs, *trust* and *legitimacy*, as explained under ***Trust*** (2.2.3.6).

The introduction of *face* as an NRF is based primarily on my own general observation of political conflict. Political leaders, particularly those who depend on the continued voluntary support of their constituents to stay in office, demonstrate an almost obsessive concern to preserve or enhance their standing in the eyes of their constituents; i.e. to save face. Given the global democratization trend and the increased scrutiny of political leaders by the media and by their electors, the face-saving art of spin-doctoring; i.e., explaining decisions to the media in such a way as to present the political leader in the best possible light, is widely practiced.

Although only indirect references to *face* were encountered in the literature reviewed, there is support for the above explanation of *face* as an NRF. Stein (1989, 243), analyzing the circumstances leading up to the 1978 Camp David negotiations on the Middle East conflict, concludes that the U.S. president "was increasingly anxious for a visible foreign policy success to offset domestic criticism." The U.S. may have been a third party, but it was highly influential in the Middle East, and the president, according to Stein, was pushing for the two sides to negotiate a solution, at least partly to save face with his domestic constituents.

The concept of *face* is also addressed indirectly in the theory of power. Wrong (1979, 53) explains that a leader has "competent authority" when a group accepts the leader's commands or decisions "out of belief in [the leader]'s superior competence or expertise to decide which actions will best serve [the group]'s interests and goals." Comparing the definitions of *face* and "competent authority", we see the two are intimately related. A

leader who loses face; i.e., whose standing drops in the eyes of constituents, is at risk of losing competent authority; i.e., constituents may question or reject the leader's commands or decisions because they no longer have faith in the leader's competence to act in their best interests.

The manner in which *face* influences negotiation receptivity can be discerned from the above descriptions. We have established that political leaders tend to avoid decisions that may result in a loss of face. If in a conflict situation a disputing party leader perceived that constituents would consider negotiations to be against their best interests, the leader would tend to reject negotiation. As has been mentioned, a leader may still agree to negotiate and try to reverse the constituents' negative views through spin-doctoring. In either case, *face* is a factor in disputant decisions about whether to negotiate.

It should be evident from the above description that *face* refers to a range of conditions from face-saving or face-enhancing circumstances to those that cause a loss of face.

2.2.3.8 *Context change*

- *any internal or external event or series of events that change the conflict dynamics.*

Harris and Reilly (1998, 63) point out that "negotiation becomes an attractive proposition precisely because of changes in context – a new government or leader, a shift in support for one side or the other, a unilateral 'circuit-breaking' initiative . . . . [a] turning point in perceptions." The effect of *context change* on a disputant's negotiation receptivity would

depend on the particular type of change. Some changes, such as Harris and Reilly's example of a change in leadership, bring the *leader attributes* factor (2.2.3.1) into play. A shift in support for one side or the other would affect *power balance* (2.2.3.4).

The above examples reflect conflict-specific changes. Changes in the external environment might also affect the conflict and the receptivity of disputants to negotiation. One example would be an earthquake or other natural disaster that threatened one or both parties and their constituents. If both parties faced the same external challenge, they might be motivated to set aside their differences, even if temporarily, to address a common threat. It is possible that working together in such circumstances might contribute to a breakdown of enmity and a build-up of trust (2.2.3.6). Stein (1989, 240) specifically lists recent or impending conflict-related or other crises as possible negotiation "triggers".

Although all these examples describe sudden context changes, Harris and Reilly's reference to a "turning point in perceptions" doesn't exclude the notion that perception changes may arise from more gradual changes in conflict dynamics.

2.2.3.9 *Victory tactics*

- *manipulation of negotiation by a disputant to achieve military or political victory.*

The inclusion of *victory tactics* as an NRF is based indirectly on Stein's (1989, 245) reference to disputants using pre-negotiation to "assess the intentions and objectives of

other parties . . . ." Stein is referring to information gathering in the constructive sense of weighing the implications of making a commitment to genuine negotiations. However, one might imagine disputants approaching negotiations with less honourable intentions. For example, a disputant might agree to negotiate as a stalling tactic while manoeuvring behind the scenes for military advantage. Similarly, a disputant might agree to negotiate with the intention of manipulating the situation to show that negotiation won't work, perhaps to justify a renewed military offensive or to secure outside intervention and an imposed political solution in their favour.

2.2.3.10 *Disputant interdependence*

- *degree of dependence of each disputing party on the other for achievement of its objectives; objectives not necessarily related directly to the conflict.*

Levy (1998, 8-10) describes theories related to economic interdependence between disputing parties. Besides economic interdependence, it is easy to imagine interdependence of a political or environmental nature. For example, two feuding ethnic minority groups might depend on each other for combined political influence facing a third majority group. Environmental interdependence would apply if, for example, a common water supply could be polluted by either group's waste management practices.

Given that Habeeb (1988, 19-23) and others (e.g., Fisher, Ury & Patton 1991) describe interdependence as a key determinant of the power balance between two parties, an argument could be made for subsuming *disputant interdependence* under *power balance*

in this list of NRFs. However, given the complexity of the concept of power and the variety of definitional and theoretical approaches to it, the risk that significant *interdependence* factors such as those described above might be overlooked in the larger analysis of *power balance* justifies their separate treatment.

2.2.3.11 *Legitimacy*

- *the issue of a disputing party's right to the authority they claim; in particular: a) a disputing party's assertion of their right to govern their opponent; b) a disputing party's assertion of their right to formal recognition by their opponent; c) a disputing party leader's assertion that they rightfully lead their claimed constituency;*

Among the majority of theorists who define power in hierarchical terms, some focus on the competitive nature of the hierarchy, while others stress the legitimacy of power in a hierarchy. David Beetham (1991, 19) explains that "for power to be fully legitimate, . . . three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; [and] the *express consent of the subordinate [parties] to the particular relations of power*" [emphasis mine].

In civil strife between a government and some segment of the country's citizenry; e.g., aboriginal peoples in many countries, the issue of the governing party's legitimacy is often a primary cause of the conflict. In some conflicts, a challenging party's legitimacy is also at issue. This would be the case if the disputant leaders are not recognized as the legitimate leaders of the parties they claim to represent, or if the whole party's right to recognition is questioned. *Recognition* would have a case-specific definition. In either circumstance, when legitimacy is in question, a disputant's decision whether to negotiate

is often influenced by a concern that doing so would be seen as acknowledging the legitimacy of the other side.

Zartman and Aurik (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 155) describe another legitimacy issue, related to the spokespersons proposed by a disputing party to handle its negotiations. They identify "valid spokespersons" as one condition for considering a conflict "ripe for resolution". The implication is that one side would not be receptive to negotiation if they perceived that the spokespersons for the other side were just messengers, not legitimate leaders able to make decisions and ensure that agreements are implemented. While it is true that leaders who hold coercive rather than legitimate power over their constituency can impose agreements on their own side, this raises again the issue of sustainability introduced under ***Commitment to cause*** (2.2.3.3) and ***Victory tactics*** (2.2.3.9).

2.2.3.12 *Solidarity*

- *the degree of determination of members of a disputing party to support party decisions about the conflict, including decisions they disagree with.*

Wrong (1979, 148) suggests that "solidarity and organization ... are the fundamental collective resources" for the political mobilization of groups. For example, disputing party leaders would be expected to consider the level of solidarity in their party before making decisions that might be unpopular. A decision to negotiate is often unpopular if

the enemy had previously been demonized in order to mobilize support for engaging in violent conflict (Zartman, 1995, 13). The more successful that demonization effort, the harder it is to undo the negative stereotype when the time comes to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict. Given that the period leading up to negotiations can be a roller coaster ride in terms of rhetoric about the opposition, party solidarity is an important factor in a leader's decision about whether and when to negotiate.

One might be tempted to combine *solidarity* and *commitment to cause*, but the distinction between them is important. *Solidarity* is about attachment to the group, whereas *commitment to cause* is about attachment to a vision or objective. There typically comes a point in a conflict where disputing party followers have to choose whether the group or the cause is more important to them. High solidarity will keep a disputing party united when the difficult decision has to be made whether to abandon the original cause and negotiate a compromise solution with the enemy or keep fighting despite little likelihood of victory. If a significant number of party followers are more committed to the cause than to the party, the party may break up over the decision whether to negotiate. If this happens, the advantage in the conflict might well go to their common opponent.

2.2.4 NRFs in the literature: A summary

This completes the introduction of thirteen NRFs including a description of their roots in theory. Although the question of how these NRFs function in an actual conflict setting is explored in the case study, some preliminary observations from the literature may be useful for comparison. First, all NRFs are affected by each other and/or by surrounding conditions. Thus, they would be expected to vary in their make-up and in their influence on negotiation receptivity as surrounding conditions change. A general hierarchy of influence on negotiation receptivity has been proposed, with the recognition that any NRF may have particular importance in a specific conflict. Also, an important factor in determining the influence of an NRF is whether the disputing party is approaching the issue of negotiation from a cooperative or a competitive perspective. The following **Table 1** presents a list of the thirteen NRFs, their definitions, and a brief indication of their derivation.

Table 1 - Negotiation Receptivity Factors: Definition and Derivation

Negotiation receptivity refers to *the willingness (or reticence) of disputants to move from violence to negotiation.* A **negotiation receptivity factor (NRF)** is *any factor that influences disputant willingness to move from violence to negotiation.*
1. *Leader attributes*: *a disputing party leader's personality traits, beliefs, and values.* Derivation: Habeeb (1988) credits power theorists from the psycho-social school for increasing our understanding of the role of personality factors in power relationships.
2. *Disputant objectives*: *a disputant's preferred immediate and longer-term conflict outcomes.* Derivation: Kriesberg & Thorson (1991, 5).
3. *Commitment to cause*: *a disputant's commitment to their side's cause in a conflict.* Derivation: Blalock's (1989) general model of conflict describes motivation, resolve, and determination as factors influencing disputant decisions. Thibault & Kelley (1959) identify *commitment to cause* as one determinant of a disputant's power.
4. *Power balance*: *the relative ability of each side in a conflict to unilaterally impose their preferred solution to the conflict.* Derivation: The realist school (see Levy 1998); also Habeeb (1988); also Kriesberg & Thorson (1991). Zartman (1995, 8-9) says a "hurting stalemate" is necessary to get disputants to negotiate.
5. *Hurt*: *the degree to which a disputant is suffering; hurt may include human suffering, economic pressure, damage to infrastructure, etc.* Derivation: Zartman (1995, 8-9) re "hurting stalemate" (see ***Power balance***, #4).
6. *Trust*: *reliance on the integrity of the other disputant; in particular: a) belief in an opponent's general trustworthiness; b) belief in reciprocity; c) belief that the negotiation process will be fair.* Derivation: Zartman (Stein 1989, 9) says "belief in reciprocity" is important for getting disputants to negotiate. Blalock (1989, 247) addresses the issue of trust in the negotiation process.
7. *Face*: *a disputant leader's value or standing in the eyes of their own constituents.* Derivation: Wrong's (1979, 53) definition of "competent authority" provides a basis for *face*.
8. *Context change*: *any internal or external event or series of events that change conflict dynamics.* Derivation: Harris & Reilly (1998, 63) and Stein (1989, 240).
9. *Victory tactics*: *manipulation of negotiation by a disputant to achieve military or political victory.* Derivation: Habeeb (1988).
10. *Disputant interdependence*: *degree of dependence of each disputing party on the other for achievement of its objectives; objectives not necessarily related directly to the conflict.* Derivation: Levy's (1998, 8-10) economic interdependence theory.
11. *Legitimacy*: *the issue of a disputing party's right to the authority they claim; in particular: a) a disputing party's assertion of their right to govern their opponent; b) a disputing party's assertion of their right to formal recognition by their opponent; c) a disputing party leader's assertion that they rightfully lead their claimed constituency.* Derivation: Beetham (1991, 19) describes necessary conditions for *legitimacy*. Zartman and Aurik (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 155) describe the importance of "valid spokespersons"; i.e., leaders who can deliver on promises, to negotiation receptivity.
12. *Solidarity*: *the degree of determination of members of a disputing party to support party decisions about the conflict, including decisions they disagree with.* Derivation: Wrong's (1979, 148) discussion of the importance of solidarity for successful political mobilization.
13. *Sunk costs syndrome*: *the tendency of a disputant to persevere in violent confrontation, despite sensing that victory is unlikely, because of a strong need to justify costs already incurred.* Derivation: Teger (1980).

Chapter 3 – Approach to the Study of NRFs

3.1 Case study: South Africa's apartheid conflict

Based on W. Lawrence Neuman's (1994, 54-78) distinctions between qualitative (i.e. descriptive) and quantitative (objective measurement) social research, my constructivist view and the objectives of this study are best served by a qualitative approach. A qualitative study is appropriate for introducing a typology of negotiation receptivity factors (NRFs). Quantitative techniques are undoubtedly useful for some of the future research recommended at the end of this study, in particular for work related to testing the validity and reliability of the typology introduced here.

Within the qualitative approach, an instrumental, exploratory, single case study (John W. Creswell 1998, 61-62) has been chosen to test the preliminary NRF typology constructed from the theoretical literature (2.2.3). [6] Case selection was based upon the following criteria:

1. The conflict has clearly identifiable disputing parties (preferably two main disputants).
2. The conflict involves significant visible negotiation activities.
3. Sufficient English language data is available from published sources readily accessible from North America.
4. The conflict occurs in a client country of the Canadian International Development Agency.

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[6] . The term *instrumental* indicates that the primary interest of the research is not the case *per se*, but its usefulness to demonstrate a particular phenomenon – in this case negotiation receptivity. (Creswell 1998, 61-62).

5. The conflict is intra-state and involves violent political struggle.[7]

Based on these criteria, the case selected for study is South Africa's apartheid conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Government (SAG) during the decisive years 1978 to 1991.

3.2 Data sources and analysis

The study data are drawn from commonly available published documents. The conflict account consists, in large part, of direct quotes from primary sources; i.e. party leaders and close associates responsible for making decisions about negotiation receptivity, or people involved in the consultation process that influenced those decisions. Secondary sources include published works by knowledgeable analysts of the apartheid conflict. These sources serve to corroborate primary sources and strengthen the evidence of NRF influence on negotiation decisions in the conflict.

The analysis of case data was guided by Robert K. Yin's (1994, chap.5) two strategies and four principles for data analysis. Yin's two strategies are to *develop a logical case description* and to *analyze against the theoretical foundations of the research*. The case description in chapter 4 is logical to the extent that the links between a particular point of interpretation and the supporting data are perceived by the reader to be direct and obvious. The analysis against theory happens in two stages. The first stage is the

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[7] Criteria 1 and 2 address the purpose of the study; criteria 3 accommodates this study's limitations of depth and scope; and criteria 4 and 5 ensure the research is relevant to one of its primary supporters, the Canadian International Development Agency.

preliminary analysis of the literature from which the thirteen NRFs are developed in the **Theoretical Framework** (2.2.3 and Table 1). The second stage analysis occurs in chapter 5, in which findings from the theory are compared to the evidence from the case study to produce a richer description of how NRFs influence negotiation receptivity (5.2 and Table 3).

Yin's four principles for analyzing data should be evident in subsequent chapters 4 and 5. The first principle, to *consider all relevant evidence,* is addressed by concentrating on primary sources; i.e., the autobiographies of both principal disputants, and by seeking to fairly assess all pertinent data, whether it is supportive or critical of the preliminary NRF typology developed from the literature. The second principle is to *focus on the most significant aspect of the case study*. This has been accomplished through the case literature editing process. Chapter 4 presents only those elements of the chronology of the apartheid conflict that shed light on the disputing parties' deliberations and decisions regarding whether to negotiate. Yin's third principle of analysis is to *address all major rival explanations*. Within the scope and objectives of this study, it is possible to make only preliminary observations about negotiation receptivity. Before seeking rival explanations there is a need to further clarify those that are offered here. Yin's third principle should be an important motivator for future research. Yin's fourth principle is to *apply your own expertise*. Minimal as my own direct experience and analysis of violent political conflict have been, the knowledge and impressions I have developed in the field of conflict resolution and international development are reflected in the analysis of the data collected for this study.

In conclusion, in order to be able to demonstrate *validity*, *reliability*, and *generalizability* of research findings,[8] it is necessary to be clear about the concept being studied. The creation of a typology for NRFs represents the first step in that clarification. Efforts to ensure that the terminology, definitions, and descriptions of NRF dynamics presented here provide a reasonably valid base upon which to build are described above. The issues of duplicability and generalizability remain to be addressed in future NRF research.

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[8] *Validity* refers to measuring what one claims to measure; *reliability* refers to consistency and duplicability of findings; and *generalizability* refers to the applicability of findings beyond the specific case being studied.

Chapter 4 – NRFs in the apartheid conflict: The evidence

4.1 Introduction

The introduction of apartheid in South Africa began in 1950 when the minority white South African Government (SAG) implemented the discriminatory Population Registration Act. Despite repeated efforts by black leaders to address this discrimination through negotiation, it was almost three decades before the first hints emerged, during the presidency of P. W. Botha, that the South African Government (SAG) might consider a negotiated arrangement with the majority black population. The period from the beginning of P. W. Botha's presidency in 1978 to the beginning of formal negotiations to resolve the conflict in 1991 is thus the most appropriate for our examination of negotiation receptivity.

Although there were at one time as many as ninety parties involved in peace talks (Collinge 1992, 14), this study concentrates on relations between the two primary protagonists in the struggle. On one side was the South African Government (SAG), a government run almost exclusively by the National Party which held power from 1948 until the installation of a multi-party Transitional Executive Council in 1993. On the other side was the African National Congress (ANC), a party that was also a coalition of groups representing the interests of the vast majority of the suppressed black population

of South Africa.[9] There is only limited reference in this case study to the involvement of the third largest party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Although violence between ANC and IFP supporters was a major problem, the case literature reveals that for the most part the political struggle was a two-party conflict between SAG and the ANC. The actions of Buthelezi and the IFP did provide important context that influenced SAG-ANC relations and decisions about negotiation, and they do appear in that regard.

As much as possible, this is the story as seen by the leaders of the two main disputing parties, supported by quotes of key participants in decisions about negotiations, and by the observations of analysts who made it their business to get the inside picture. Drawing upon readily available published material, I rely first and foremost on the autobiographies of F. W. de Klerk (1998) and Nelson Mandela (1994), SAG and ANC leaders respectively through most of the heavy pre-negotiation period. First among over a dozen secondary sources is the detailed account of the struggle by American *Financial Times* journalist Patti Waldmeir (1997). Waldmeir spent the period 1985 to 1995 in Lusaka, Zambia, where ANC leaders spent many years in exile, and in Johannesburg, South Africa, and got very close to the events that are central to this study. Although I quote liberally in order to present the story through the eyes of those who participated in it, in

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[9] The ANC may have started out as one among many parties in opposition to SAG. However, it is clear from the discourse on the apartheid conflict that the ANC emerged to be the predominant opposition force with whom SAG would have to engage if there was to be a negotiated solution to the struggle.

keeping with the instrumental nature of this case study I include descriptions of only those events that shed light on SAG and the ANC's receptivity to negotiation.

Following **Table 2 – A Chronology of South Africa's Apartheid Conflict**, and a brief **Historical Background** (4.2), the presentation of the conflict period under scrutiny is divided into four phases marked by major milestones. Phase 1 reveals the build up of pressures during P. W. Botha's regime that led him to make SAG's first public negotiation offer in August 1985. Phase 2 takes us to Botha's resignation and F. W. de Klerk's accession to the presidency in September 1989. Phase 3 examines the dramatic early days of de Klerk's presidency up to the May, 1990 Groote Schuur talks which marked the first joint public commitment by SAG and the ANC to engage in *pre-*negotiations. Phase 4 takes us from Groote Schuur to the opening of formal multi-party constitutional negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991. A brief **Epilogue** outlines key events between CODESA and South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994.

The presentation of the apartheid conflict story is interspersed with my own interpretive comments, pointing out evidence of NRF influence on the two parties' receptivity to formal negotiations. These interpretive comments appear in the format of the following actual example from the case study.

> 'While the public message was one of mutual distrust and disdain, Mandela's personal qualities clearly enabled both sides to step closer

to the negotiation table (**Mandela's leader attributes → SAG/ANC(+)**).'

The cryptic notation in parentheses is intended to summarize the description above it; in this example it indicates that Mandela's leader attributes influenced both SAG and the ANC to be *more* receptive (+) to negotiations.

Finally, before we embark on this adventure, a few reminders about what we are looking for in the presentation of the apartheid story. First, we want to determine whether any or all of the thirteen NRFs introduced in chapter 2 (2.2.3) were at play in the conflict. Second, we want to see whether and how these NRFs actually influenced one or both sides to be either more or less receptive to negotiations. Also, we want to watch for evidence of disputants acting cooperatively or competitively.

Here then is the story of South Africa's incredible journey from the degrading pass laws and segregated toilet stalls of apartheid to the empowering ballot boxes and integrated voting stalls of its first democratic election.

Table 2 - Chronology of South Africa's Apartheid Conflict

1652	First European settlement.[10]
1899-1902	Anglo-Boer War.
1910	Union of South Africa (SA) formed.[11]
1912	African National Congress (ANC) formed.
1914	National Party (NP) formed.
1918	Nelson Mandela born.
1936	F. W. de Klerk born.
1948	NP comes to power.
1950	Population Registration Act implemented (Sisk 1995, 61).
1950	South Africa Communist Party (SACP) banned.
1952	First major black uprising (Sisk 1995, 61).
1955/06	Resistance movement's Congress of the People adopts the Freedom Charter.
1958	Hendrik Verwoerd becomes Prime Minister.
1960	Second major black uprising (Sisk 1995, 61).
1960/03/21	Sharpeville massacre of 69 people at demonstration against *pass* laws (Sisk 1995, 62).
1960	ANC banned.
1960	ANC President Albert Luthuli wins Nobel Peace Prize (Mandela 1994, 247-248).
1961	South Africa declares itself a republic.
1961	Verwoerd ignores Mandela request for democratic constitution (Sparks 1995, 25).
1961	ANC decides to take up armed struggle (Mandela 1994, 239).
1962/08/05	Mandela arrested: 5-year sentence (Mandela 1994, 275); converted to *life* in 1964.
1966	Verwoerd assassinated; John Vorster replaces him.
1968	UN resolution labels apartheid "a crime against humanity" (Sisk 1995, 65).
1972	UN bans South Africa (Sisk 1995, 65).
1976	Soweto revolt against Afrikaans language teaching in black schools (Sisk 1995, 63).
1978	P. W. Botha becomes President after 12 years as Defence Minister (Sparks 1995, 35).
1979	Black trade unions legalized.
1983	Blacks excluded from Whites/Indians/Coloureds parliament; UDF formed to fight it.
1984-1986	Township uprisings and States of Emergency are prevalent.
1985/01	ANC "call to ungovernability" (Waldmeir 1997, p46).
1985/08	Botha's 'Rubicon' speech debacle.[12]
1985/08	SAG declares foreign debt repayment moratorium after banks call in loans.
1985/11	Mandela and NP's Kobie Coetsee begin secret meetings.
1986	ANC's Thabo Mbeki and Broederbond's Pieter de Lange meet secretly in New York.
1986/03-05	Commonwealth EPG visit; ends in failure; leads to sanctions (Commonwealth 1986).
1986/05/19	SAG bombs suspected ANC bases in neighboring countries (Mandela 1994, 461).
1986/08	SAG policy reforms end official racism, protect minorities (de Klerk 1998, 109-111).
1988	NP's Niel Barnard team begins meetings with Mandela.
1989/08/14	Botha resigns, six months after suffering a stroke.[13]
1989/08/21	Harare Declaration drafted by ANC, adopted by the Organization for African Union.
1989/09	De Klerk becomes President; legalizes protest marches (Waldmeir 1997, xv-xvi).
1989/10	Several ANC leaders [excluding Mandela] released from prison.
1989/11	USSR/Berlin Wall collapses (de Klerk 1998, 160). ...cont'd.

[10] This and subsequent entries to 1988 inclusive are from Waldmeir (1997, xv-xvi) except where noted.

[11] South Africa was created from the joining of Boer republics Transvaal and Orange Free State, and British colonies The Cape and Natal.

[12] Hyped as a major reform speech, it had the opposite effect internationally and domestically. Botha sounded defiant, not cooperative.

[13] This and subsequent entries to 1993/11 inclusive are from Sisk (1995, 301-304) except where noted.

	Table 2 – Chronology of South Africa's Apartheid Conflict (cont'd)
1989/12/13	De Klerk – Mandela 1st meeting.
1990/02/02	De Klerk legalizes ANC, PAC, & SACP in "great leap forward" speech.
1990/02/11	Mandela released after 27 years in prison.
1990/02/16	ANC agrees to direct talks with SAG.
1990/03	Namibia gains independence from SAG-supported regime (Waldmeir 1997, xv-xvi).
1990/05/02	Groote Schuur meetings mark the overt start of ANC-SAG pre-negotiations.
1990/07	NP and Inkatha declare non-racial membership; township and Natal violence soars.
1990/08/06	Second formal SAG-ANC talks; recorded in Pretoria Minute.
1990/09	ANC-Inkatha violence expands from Natal to Johannesburg-area townships.
1991/02/15	SAG-ANC sign D. F. Malan Accord re cooperating to reduce violence.
1991/03	ANC releases *Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa.*
1991/04/06	ANC 'ultimatum' makes negotiation conditional on diminution of violence.
1991/05/18	ANC withdraws from talks to protest SAG failure to implement Pretoria Minute.
1991/05/24	SAG-sponsored peace conference (w/o ANC and some churches) (Haysom 1992, 33).
1991/06/17	Population Registration Act repealed.
1991/07	First Inkathagate scandal reports emerge in *Weekly Mail* newspaper.[14]
1991/09/14	Despite heavy violence, National Peace Accord signed.[15]
1991/10/27	ANC, PAC, 70 other parties form short-lived Patriotic Front for unity at CODESA.
1991/12/20	Convention For A Democratic South Africa (CODESA I) marks start of formal multi-party negotiations on new constitution and process of transition to democracy.[16]
1992/03	After NP loses key by-election, whites-only referendum supports NP reforms (68%).
1992/05	CODESA II ends in deadlock.
1992/06	Boipatong massacre of 49 ANC supporters by IFP supporters.
1992/06	ANC withdraws from negotiations.
1992/09/07	Twenty-eight protestors killed by security forces at Bisho.
1992/09/26	SAG-ANC Record of Understanding charts basic transition path.
1992/10	ANC/SACP leader Joe Slovo publishes proposal for temporary power sharing.
1992/10/06	IFP, homeland leaders, right-wing white groups form rejectionist front (COSAG).
1993/02/12	SAG-ANC conclude broad agreement based on Slovo's Oct'92 power-sharing paper.
1993/04/01	Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) starts.
1993/04/10	ANC/SACP leader Chris Hani assassinated.
1993/07/02	MPNP sets election for April 1994; 600 die in July violence.
1993/09/24	SAG parliament adopts Transitional Executive Council legislation.
1993/09/24	Mandela calls for end to most remaining sanctions.
1993/10/15	De Klerk and Mandela win the Nobel Peace Prize.
1993/11/18	MPNP adopts interim constitution.
1993/12	Transitional Executive Council (multi-party interim gov't) begin operation.[17]
1994/04	Inkatha Freedom Party enters elections.
1994/04/26 -28	ANC wins election majority.
1994/05	Mandela inaugurated as President; Gov't of National Unity formed.
1996/05	New constitution adopted, for 1999 implementation.
1996/06	NP withdraws from Government of National Unity, claiming participation is incompatible with its opposition role.

[14] Inkathagate arose from reports that SAG security forces supported IFP violence against ANC supporters.

[15] Only far-right parties boycotted these efforts. (Haysom 1992, 33).

[16] CODESA I established five working groups which reported to CODESA II in May,'91.

[17] This and remaining entries are from Waldmeir (1997, xv-xvi).

4.2 Historical background

Conflict has characterized the relationship between whites and blacks in South Africa since their first contact. F. W. de Klerk (1998, 3) describes what happened to the Khoi and San people who had been the first inhabitants of South Africa's southern Cape where Dutch Boer settlers established Cape Town in 1652. "The relationship was often bitter – and increasingly the San people were forced further and further into the interior. The Khoi people, [who] gravitated more toward the new settlements ... suffered the fate of many other indigenous peoples throughout the world at that time: servitude, disease, and the loss of their land."

One factor contributing to white domination in South Africa was the Boer dream of self-determination. Boers who emigrated to Africa to escape religious persecution in Europe "had their eyes set on an independent future as a nation in its own right in the vast and open spaces of the sub-continent" (De Klerk 1998, 3-4). As far as they were concerned, they too were "Afrikaners". They spent the next 300 years in conflict with both indigenous blacks and neighboring British colonies. Within the framework of local colonial politics they formed their own National Party (NP) in 1914 and came to power, in whites-only elections, in 1948. The NP immediately started implementing official apartheid policies such as the 1950 race-based Population Registration Act.

In the meantime, the oppressed black population had not been idle. The ANC had been formed back in 1912. In 1952 the ANC and other black liberation organizations rebelled

against the Population Registration Act in what Timothy D. Sisk (1995, 61) describes as "the first major black uprising".

Between 1950 and 1985, when President P. W. Botha made the first official gesture of willingness to negotiate some involvement of blacks in national governance, the NP-led South African government (SAG) doggedly built up and defended apartheid, while local and international opposition grew apace. A few key events described in de Klerk (1998) give a flavour of developments over this thirty-five year period. On February 3, 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his "Wind of Change" speech. He warned the South African parliament of the need to change to accommodate the "awakening [black] African consciousness". South African president Verwoerd replied that South Africa's policies of independent homeland development were "not out of step with these new realities. . . . He continued that it was not only the black peoples of Africa who had a right to independence. The whites had the same right"(De Klerk 1998, 34-35).

"Six weeks after Macmillan's speech, [at a Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)-organized demonstration against the hated 'pass' laws], police opened fire on a crowd of several thousand demonstrators in the black township of Sharpesville, killing sixty-nine. . . . The incident signaled the intensification of the international condemnation that would, over the years, lead to our growing isolation" (De Klerk 1998, 35). That same year, 1960, the ANC was banned.

After South Africa became a republic in May 1961, Mandela, by then one of ANC's leaders, wrote to President Verwoerd seeking a national convention to create a non-racial, democratic constitution. Verwoerd ignored his letter (Allister Sparks 1995, 25). At this point the ANC made the decision to take up armed struggle. Mandela was put in charge of the task. In 1964 Mandela and other ANC leaders were sentenced to life in prison. In 1968 the UN labeled apartheid "a crime against humanity", and in 1972 the UN banned South Africa entirely (Sisk 1995, 65). In 1976, after SAG insisted that the Afrikaans language have equivalent place with English in black secondary schools, Soweto erupted in riot (Sisk 1995, 63). By this time, as Waldmeir (1977, 33) explains, a significant split had emerged between young, urban, prosperous Afrikaners, and the older generations with farmer roots. The younger group "knew political hegemony was doomed; and the politically ambitious among them were looking to develop a new, multi-racial power base." The older ones were more conservative and feared domination by the black majority.

P. W. Botha was especially aware of the political tensions facing him when he assumed the presidency in 1978. He had spent the previous twelve years as Defense Minister, during which time the pressures of apartheid were putting a severe and growing strain on internal security. Marina Ottaway (1993, 9-10) provides some very revealing apartheid statistics: Of a total population of 38 million, 5 million whites [or 13 % of the population] controlled 87% of the land and most other economic assets. 29 million blacks [76% of the population] comprising 10 ethnic groups [were expected to live in dispersed homelands

representing 13% of the land]. There were also 3 million Coloureds and 1 million Indians. De Klerk (1998, 53) confirms the 87%-13% land split.

And so the stage is set for the more detailed story of the events and factors that influenced SAG and ANC receptivity to negotiations to resolve the apartheid conflict.

4.3 Phase 1 (1978 – Aug. 1985): Tinkering with apartheid – tempting fate

4.3.1 Apartheid gone wrong

Increasing international isolation and internal political unrest were major problems for Botha as new president; but they were not his only serious challenges. According to Waldmeir (1997, 25), the fundamental demographic and economic calculations upon which apartheid was planned were dramatically flawed. "Apartheid's planners had got their arithmetic hopelessly wrong, underestimating black population growth by some 50 percent. . . . placing intolerable pressure on black homelands and forcing even more people into the cities. . . . At the same time, the economy began to outgrow its traditional pool of skilled [white] workers . . . . A shortage of two million such workers was anticipated by 1980, as a result of the declining importance of primary industries . . . and the rise of manufacturing . . . . And as the structure of the economy began to change, the cost-benefit analysis of apartheid changed with it. By the end of the 1960s, apartheid had become an obstacle to growth."

> This demographic and economic analysis represents a significant context change facing SAG. It is clear that SAG was hurting from

these context changes and from the political pressures described above. But we can't assume from this text that SAG was consequently ready to take steps toward negotiation.[18]

4.3.2 SAG security establishment advice

A clearer indication of how some influential SAG members felt is found in Waldmeir (1997, 35-36). She quotes from an interview with General Constand Viljoen, former head of the South African Defence Force (SADF). "'I can remember at least four occasions when we had formal briefings with the cabinet, between 1975 and 1985, in which we warned that militarily we can carry on for a long time but politically, year after year, the strategic options keep narrowing,' Viljoen recalls. He counseled early action, otherwise 'you end up in a much weaker position than if you had tackled the thing politically [i.e., through negotiation] at the right moment. . . .' [However,] the Afrikaner government refused for nearly two decades to heed Viljoen's warning . . . [because the majority of] Afrikaners remained terrified of the alternatives. Foreign Minister Pik Botha summed up [their] mood at the end of the Vorster years [1966-1978] in an interview recorded in 1978. 'A political system of one man, one vote within one political identity means our destruction. It's a statistical fact, not a political one. I am not aware of any nation in the history of the world having knowingly committed that sort of suicide.'"

The head of SADF, an influential advisor to the President, clearly believed that due to this chronic hurt, SAG should be more receptive

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[18] As explained in the **Introduction** to this case study (4.1), this and subsequent similar annotations are indented to distinguish them from the actual story presentation. The purpose of these inserts is to draw attention to incidents of NRF influence that are explicit or implicit in the data. More detailed analysis of NRF dynamics is reserved for chapter 5 which follows this presentation of the case.

to negotiation **(hurt → SAG(+))**.[19] But for Foreign Minister Pik Botha and some other SAG decision-makers this hurt was obviously outweighed by their strong aversion to negotiating within the ANC's objectives of a simple majoritarian democracy. So, in this example, SAG's perception that the ANC was strongly committed to objectives unacceptable to SAG, was a strong incentive for SAG to reject negotiation. **(ANC objectives & ANC commitment to cause → SAG(-))**.

It is worth noting that the hurt Botha's advisor was referring to here was a chronic hurt. We will see in some subsequent examples a distinction between chronic and acute hurt, such as an eruption of violence or an instance of brutal police crackdown. Whereas chronic hurt tends to be positive in its influence on negotiation receptivity, such acute hurt is often negative in its influence.

4.3.3 Botha's piecemeal approach

President Botha was facing a difficult choice. He dealt with it as he would many similar dilemmas during his decade as president, by tinkering with the apartheid system only as much as he thought necessary to address the immediate situation. In 1979, Botha abolished the *colour bar* legislation under which blacks had been denied access to the more skilled trades and jobs, and he legalized black trade unions.

According to de Klerk (1998, 49-50), these newly legal trade unions "soon began to play a vanguard role in agitating for black political rights across the board." De Klerk (1998,

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[19] The meaning of this and similar cryptic notations is explained in the **Introduction** to the case study (4.1).

101) also describes Botha's approach as piecemeal, and lacking consideration of the bigger picture, a view shared by Waldmeir (1997, 42).

In 1983 following several years of investigations SAG adopted the recommendations of the Schlebusch Commission to establish a tri-cameral parliament of Whites, Indians and Coloureds. The intention was to allow these groups with no traditional homelands to have "autonomy over the affairs of their respective communities [and] a form of joint decision-making on matters of common concern. . . . The combined chambers would . . . [elect the president, but] the formula was so devised . . . that . . . the Indian and Coloured majority parties [could neither] outvote the . . . White chamber, nor prevent [it] from electing its choice as [South Africa's] president" (De Klerk 1998, 93-94). De Klerk acknowledges that the tri-cameral parliament didn't succeed; but he concludes, "Within the framework of the political attitudes of the time, the new constitution represented dramatic progress and far-reaching renewal." The fact that the black majority were once again denied voting rights and representation in the new parliament was consistent with SAG's view that blacks' governance rights should be exercised within the homeland system.

In that same year, 1983, a significant proportion of the membership of the secret, historically conservative, and broadly influential Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) was far more ready for reconciliation with the black population than was SAG. Waldmeir (1997, 52) explains that reform-minded Pieter de Lange, newly elected chair of the Broederbond, circulated a discussion document entitled *Basic Political Conditions For Survival Of The Afrikaner* to every corner of 'Afrikanerdom'. His purpose was to convince Afrikaners that "'the exclusion of effective black participation in the political process is a threat to White survival, which cannot be offset with the maintenance of the

status quo or . . . [with] a further consolidation of power in white hands.'" Waldmeir cautions that the document stopped short of proposing straight majority government; it recommended instead "a system of special representation for (racial) groups, group vetoes, and aggressive devolution of power." Even though one-third of Broederbond members left the organization over this incident, it is nevertheless a dramatic illustration of the gap between the official SAG position and that of the rising generation of Afrikaner business and political leaders.

> Despite the kinds of pressures and advice coming from significant players within his own constituency, there is no indication here that Botha was receptive to negotiation. We soon see evidence that a significant factor in this resistance was Botha's personal leadership qualities.

4.3.4 Tri-cameral parliament: A failed experiment

As for the tri-cameral parliament, it was a disastrous failure. And reaction to it was pivotal in the gradual shift of power from SAG to its opposition. In the first tri-cameral parliament elections, in the summer of 1984, the voter turnout was a dismal 25% (De Klerk 1998, 95). The Coloureds and Indians, supposedly the more friendly of SAG's opposition, had not been won over.

As might be expected, these events had a significant impact on the black community. As de Klerk acknowledged, the legalization of black trade unions gave the resistance movement a mechanism that had much greater influence on the ultimate result than is acknowledged in some accounts of the conflict. The snubbing of blacks in the tri-cameral

parliament motivated them to form the United Democratic Front (UDF), which brought together the local black action committees, known as "civics", and unleashed one of the worst waves of violence and township uprisings of the whole conflict (Alex Davidson & Per Strand 1993, 4-5). De Klerk (1998,112) acknowledges that over 700 organizations were soon joined under the UDF banner.

> From an NRF perspective, we have the insult inflicted on the black majority by this snubbing, and a clear indication of SAG's objectives and vision for resolving the conflict. In light of black reaction, I think it fair to conclude that this acute hurt and this message about SAG objectives increased the resistance movement's commitment to their cause and made them less receptive to negotiations (**hurt & commitment to cause & SAG objectives → ANC(-)**).

4.3.5 The turning tide

The ANC's January 1985 "call to ungovernability" was more a case of the ANC leading from behind. "The crucial strategic shift which finally delivered liberation ... does not seem to have come from Lusaka [the exiled ANC's headquarters in Zambia]. Millions of black people, [under the loose but effective leadership of the new UDF], simply decided to exploit their power - educational, economic, industrial, if not military . . . . They stopped trying to lock horns with the apartheid bull, and began to nip annoyingly at its ankles: by refusing to pay rent on government houses, staying away from school and destroying school properties, staging political work stoppages, and boycotting white-owned businesses. And for the first time in seventy years of ANC history, they began to win"(Waldmeir 1997, 48).

Botha's reaction was consistent with his combative reputation. He responded to this "total onslaught" – this "Communist-inspired offensive upon white Christian civilization in South Africa" with a "'total strategy' for maintaining white supremacy." "It involved repression at home coupled with military operations against neighboring states to dissuade them from harboring the ANC" (Waldmeir 1997, 48). At home Botha invoked the first of two States of Emergency in July 1985.

Despite the gross violations of human rights that were part of emergency rule, "the centrepiece of the total strategy was political reform, and in this, Botha went well beyond his predecessors" (Waldmeir 1997, 45). Waldmeir says that the tri-cameral parliament was such a big compromise for Afrikaners that the right-wing 30% of the National Party broke away in protest and formed the Conservative Party.

> As we approach Botha's August 1985 Rubicon speech, we begin to see multiple, often contradictory, patterns of behaviour by both disputing parties. Those who are familiar with political conflict analysis will recognize the discrepancies between public, official behaviour of the spokespersons of the two sides and unofficial, often secret activities. To complicate the matter, the differences between behaviour at the top of the organization and at the grass roots increased and became a bigger factor as the conflict evolved. This description of complex patterns is an oversimplification of reality but it is sufficient for our purpose, for it reveals the emergence of

contradictory pulls toward and away from negotiation, from and within each party to the dispute.

4.3.6 The Rubicon speech

De Klerk (1998, 99-100) sets the stage for the Rubicon speech. "By the beginning of the eighties, it had become clear that the policy of grand apartheid had encountered two apparently insurmountable obstacles: firstly, the demands of the booming economy of the sixties and seventies . . . [and the lifting of the colour-ban on jobs, had resulted in] a flood of black South Africans to the so-called white cities . . . which had washed away for once and for all any illusion that whites would ever constitute a majority in the areas of the country they had claimed for themselves; secondly, only four of the ten [black] homelands were prepared to accept full independence. . . ."

"Ironically, it was this decision by homeland governments, which were generally derided as being puppets of [SAG], which sounded the death knell for grand apartheid, the very system that had brought them into being. It was clear that the government would have to find some alternative constitutional framework to accommodate the political aspirations of the great majority of black South Africans who lived either in the non-independent homelands or in the so-called white areas. In February 1983 P. W. Botha established a Special Cabinet Committee to look into this question. . . . The key question was . . . in short, how could the whites dismount the proverbial tiger on which history had placed us without being devoured ourselves?"(De Klerk 1998, 99-100) The answer was supposed to be contained in Botha's public opening address to the Natal Congress of the National Party on August 15, 1985.

De Klerk describes Botha's speech. "[Botha offered to engage in] negotiations with black South Africans to reach agreement on how they would be accommodated in a new constitutional dispensation, including the possibility of their representation in the President's Council." De Klerk claims that the package of guidelines of which the negotiation offer was a part "signaled nothing less than the demise of the whole ideology of grand apartheid." Unfortunately, as de Klerk admits, Botha's Rubicon speech "was probably the greatest communication disaster in South African history. . . . The crux of his message was . . . tucked away in a single paragraph at the bottom of page twelve of his [eighteen page] speech." And despite agreeing to negotiate with blacks, Botha also "aggressively dismissed the United Democratic Front and the banned ANC as 'barbaric Communist agitators and even murderers'. . . . He also warned his audience that our readiness to negotiate should not be mistaken for weakness and . . . warned that he was not prepared 'to lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide'. For many . . . who watched the speech, President Botha's aggressive attitude undermined the credibility of his and the government's . . . commitment to genuine negotiations. . . . The result of the speech was catastrophic"(De Klerk 1998, 102-105).

De Klerk describes Botha "pitching his speech at the immediate [National Party] audience, . . . [speaking] within the idiom of traditional South African political meetings, [with the result that] the international audience of millions of viewers were utterly bewildered – and deeply disappointed by what they saw." Despite all this, de

Klerk's assessment that "it did indeed signify that the South African government had at least put its toes in the Rubicon" (De Klerk 1998, 102-105), is supported by Waldmeir's (1997, 54) account. "Stripped of the [negative] body language, the speech was, ironically, one of the most important Botha ever delivered. Those who could decipher his paranoiac code knew it marked a groundshift in the land of apartheid." Waldmeir goes on to summarize the significant points in Botha's speech, including "some kind of power-sharing with blacks"; black rights to permanent residency in white South Africa; possibly "South African citizenship [and franchise] for all; . . . [and possible repeal of] the hated pass laws (which were repealed the next year)."

Before assessing the NRFs at play around the Rubicon speech, it may help to consider the reactions of various key stakeholders. It requires no speculation to assert that blacks were outraged at Botha's dismissal of the UDF and the ANC as "barbaric Communist agitators and even murderers", particularly in light of Botha's government having "detained tens of thousands of black activists and stepped up assassinations" under emergency rule (Waldmeir 1997, 49).

De Klerk acknowledges that there was also "a substantial collapse in international confidence in the ability of [SAG] to handle the mounting crises that confronted it on all sides. Coupled with the increasingly alarming TV coverage of the escalating unrest in South Africa's cities,[20] the speech convinced many international observers – friends and critics alike – that South Africa was hurtling headlong toward a cataclysm. Any

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[20] Waldmeir (1997, 56) refers to "nightly television footage of South African police brutality."

confidence they might have had in Botha's ability to manage the crisis had evaporated overnight" (De Klerk 1998, 104). Foreign bankers had already started to recall short-term SAG loans, and in the same month as the Rubicon speech, August 1985, SAG put a moratorium on foreign debt repayment.

Within a year of the Rubicon speech the U.S., the Commonwealth, and the European Union had introduced tough political sanctions against South Africa. Waldmeir (1997, 50) quotes Mike Louw, former spy for P. W. Botha. "'The entire world turned their backs on us; my children were growing up knowing that the world hated them, that they were welcome nowhere. The entire nation was being stigmatized.'" Waldmeir continues the thought. "Members of the Botha government put up a good show of not caring about that stigma. But ordinary, decent Afrikaner people – and even some ordinary, decent people in government – grew more ashamed than angry at their pariah status."

> Despite the image and reality of repression under emergency rule, in Botha's Rubicon speech we have SAG's first public offer to negotiate with blacks. De Klerk's introduction makes it clear that the hurt had reached sufficient intensity to force SAG to consider a negotiated solution (**hurt → SAG(+)**). What we also see in this speech is a good example of *face* as an NRF. Botha's 'finger-wagging' warning that "our readiness to negotiate should not be mistaken for weakness" fits precisely our definition of face-saving behaviour (**face → SAG(+)**). De Klerk's (1998, 67-68) and Waldmeir's (1997, 53-57) accounts make it clear that Botha, nicknamed the "Groot Krokodil", was autocratic, defensive, and testy under pressure. De Klerk points out that it was Botha's performance more than the substance of the Rubicon speech that contributed to the universally negative reactions.

> The ANC's negative reaction to Botha's negotiation offer can be fairly ascribed to distrust related directly to his personal qualities (**distrust & Botha's leader attributes → ANC(-)**).

> Once SAG had raised the possibility of negotiations, there would be many more explicit examples of the NRFs *hurt*, *power balance*, *trust*, and *face*.

4.3.7 Botha's belligerence

Botha reacted to the foreign pressure with belligerence. "In a classic exchange, [he] told U.S. Ambassador Herman Nickel in 1986, 'We are a small country but I am not going to be buggered about – I'd rather fight.'" "Genuinely mystified by what he considered the perverse refusal of foreigners to credit his good intentions, he gave up reform to concentrate on repression. He lost the will to change, if not the will to rule" (Waldmeir 1997, 54, 57).

De Klerk (1998, 111) defends SAG retrenchment as a necessary response to the ANC/UDF ungovernability campaign. "The accent of the government's activities shifted increasingly from the need for reform to the imperative of counteracting the serious revolutionary threat that had arisen within the country."

> SAG blamed its retreat from negotiation on the ANC's continued commitment to violent upheaval (**ANC objectives & commitment to cause → SAG(-)**).

But as we saw with SAG's juxtaposition of emergency rule and the negotiation offer that got lost in the Rubicon debacle, black uprisings and a SAG crackdown weren't the only initiatives coming from the two sides. As the political temperature in South Africa approached the flash point, both parties were looking for ways to avoid a full-scale explosion. A shift into a paradoxical relationship of demonstrations and debate, repression and reappraisal, marked the second half of Botha's decade as president, and Phase 2 of our story.

4.4 Phase 2 (Aug. 1985-Sept. 1989): One foot forward . . . one foot back

4.4.1 Dangerous impasse

In 1985 Nelson Mandela, in prison with other ANC leaders and activists for twenty years already, came to the fore in the negotiation dance. "If we did not start a dialogue soon, both sides would be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence, and war. . . . The enemy was strong and resolute. Yet even with all their bombers and tanks, they must have sensed they were on the wrong side of history. We had right on our side, but not yet might. It was clear to me that a military victory [by the ANC] was a distant if not impossible dream. It simply did not make sense for both sides to lose thousands if not millions of lives in a conflict that was unnecessary. They must have known this as well. It was time to talk"(Mandela 1994, 457).

De Klerk (1998, 174, 179) actually mentions and concurs with Mandela, although his spin differs slightly from Mandela's picture of 'might versus right'. "The government had

the power and the authority and the ANC had the numbers. A settlement between us was thus essential."

Steven Friedman (1993, 10-13) offers a more complete analysis which reinforces Mandela and de Klerk's comments. "Even while war was being declared in the mid-1980s, both the ANC and the government were realizing that conflict would not defeat the 'enemy' and were seeking an alternative. The ANC's guerilla war never held out a serious prospect of overthrowing the apartheid state . . . . The physical and economic cost of hosting ANC bases was becoming unsustainable for neighboring states, . . . The Soviet Union [under the severe economic strain which contributed to Gorbachev's policy of 'glasnost'] . . . was distinctly unwilling to continue funding military activity; indeed, it began pressuring the ANC to settle the conflict by negotiation. Domestic insurrection had seemed to offer a better prospect of success, but the state of emergency had underlined the state's ability to contain this threat. And while the campaign to isolate the state . . . was making ground, sanctions were an ineffective revolutionary instrument; they were far better suited to forcing an adversary to the bargaining table than to its knees. The changes in the Soviet Union . . . raised the prospect of a joint western/Soviet initiative to settle the South African conflict; if the ANC was seen to be unwilling to cooperate, sanctions might not last long. . . . This was probably more persuasive than the military setbacks."

Friedman continues with an assessment of SAG's situation. "The state was in no danger of collapse, but the costs of ruling by force were becoming unsustainable - in the longer term at least. . . . The country faced an inevitable economic decline. The NP's strategists

had known since the mid-1980s that it could not continue to rule indefinitely without black co-operation. The emergency, [which] was . . . designed to ensure that [negotiation on black participation would occur] on government terms, . . . failed. 'Moderate' black leaders such as [the IFP's] Buthelezi . . . refused to talk until the repression ended. . . . The international dimension was again crucial. The erosion of Soviet power, together with increased South African international respectability created by its role in negotiations which led to Namibian independence, sharply lowered the risk of negotiation - and created the expectation that concessions to international opinion might hold concrete gains. In sum, the costs of not negotiating were growing, but so too was the hope of rewards for doing so"(Friedman 1993, 10-13).

> While neither Mandela nor de Klerk was at this point titular leader of their party, they would eventually assume those positions and become the key architects of the ultimate solution. I think it fair to conclude that their views were at least significant factors influencing the two sides' considerations about whether to negotiate. Their statements, enhanced by Friedman's, bring together the two elements *hurt* and stalemate as reason to take up negotiations (**hurt & power balance/stalemate → SAG/ANC(+)**). This example also demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of *hurt* which, besides encompassing systemic and acute pain, can include past, present, and anticipated hurt, as well as the hope of relief from hurt.

4.4.2 Tentative steps

Mandela (1994, 458) continues with a description of the delicacy of initiating what conflict analysts typically call *pre-negotiation* talks. "This would be extremely sensitive.

Both sides regarded discussions as a sign of weakness and betrayal. Neither would come to the table unless the other made significant concessions."

> This is a simple, concise example of *trust* and *face* (and the related notion of reciprocity). In this instance, the parties clearly did not have sufficient trust in each other to proceed to formal negotiation. Nor did they believe their own constituencies would countenance such a move. So while hurt and stalemate were bringing the sides together privately, at the public level, there was a lack of trust in the opponent, and a concern to preserve face (**distrust & face → SAG/ANC(-)**).

4.4.3 Leaders must lead

Mandela (1994, 458-459, 462) acknowledges that the decision to start talks should have come from the ANC executive in Lusaka, and that his fellow inmates would strongly disapprove. However, "There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way." He says later, after he had met the Minister of Justice in May 1986, "I told no one of my encounter. I wanted the process to be under way before I informed anyone. Sometimes it is necessary to present one's colleagues with a policy that is already a fait-accompli."

> While the public message was one of mutual distrust and disdain, Mandela's personal qualities clearly enabled both sides to step closer to the negotiation table (**Mandela's leader attributes → SAG/ANC(+)**).

4.4.4 Beginning to trust

Private talks did begin in 1985. Although they remained secretive through the end of Botha's regime in 1989, at one level or another, as Waldmeir aptly puts it, "talking became the country's primary growth industry. . . . After refusing to talk for 350 years, South Africans [black Africans and white Afrikaners] indulged in an orgy of communication. . . . Local power groups recognized more quickly than their national masters that they had reached a stalemate. It is one of the ironies of the time that ungovernability led as often to talks as to chaos; for activists knew that insurrection, on its own, could not deliver the goods. They had political power, but the state had control over the essentials of life . . . . Only negotiation could bridge the gap. . . . The townships became the laboratories where ANC activists developed a whole new concept of power, rejecting the revolutionary paradigm in favour of strategic compromise. In this they were heavily influenced by business and labour . . . who, [since the legalization of black trade unions in 1983], had already [been testing] the negotiating paradigm and [proving] that it could work" (Waldmeir 1997, 71-73).

> In talking about business and labour proving that negotiation could work, Waldmeir hints at the possibility of *context change*/perception reframing and increased *trust* helping to bridge the gap between the two sides. William Zartman explains below how these NRFs were at work in South Africa.

4.4.5 "Small" negotiations make a *big* difference

Zartman (1991) refers to several types of local negotiations which started after the legalization of black trade unions in 1983, became strained throughout emergency rule in

the mid-80s, and picked up again in the latter years of the decade. "The success of local, limited, or 'small' negotiations is leading, pacing, and supporting the larger process." These "small" negotiations addressed a broad range of issues, among them the July 1987 metalworkers' strike, the August 1987 mineworkers' strike, rugby desegregation, and the rent boycott.

Zartman (1991, 123-126) describes the somewhat unique characteristics of these "petition" politics - where power was asymmetrical but pressure was used to get concessions from government. Groups had to organize to petition and pressure successfully. Success led to 'empowerment' and often negotiation success led to joint management of some of the issues, raising the petitioner group's status from "problem-poser to joint problem-solver", which led to a more equitable involvement, something which could serve as a model for relations between the parties at the national level.

Although most of the sources researched for this case study focus on the national level dynamics, Zartman cites four ways that local negotiations among the disputants could influence national level relations: 1. "Empowerment at the bottom empowers the top." 2. "Local negotiations reinforce the national process." 3. "Local negotiations make national negotiations more democratic" by helping to break the tendency to elite bargaining at the top, which was happening in South Africa. 4. "Talking at all levels

tends to replace fighting." 5. National levels inherit obligations to respect some local level negotiation agreements.[21]

> From Zartman's analysis we can see that success at "small" negotiations contributed, at least among the masses on both sides, to positive changes in their perceptions of each other, and to increased trust both in each other and in the negotiation process. Progressing from a 'petitioner-government' relationship to a 'joint problem-solver' relationship put their interdependence on a positive instead of a negative footing (**context change/perception reframing & trust & disputant interdependence → SAG/ANC(+)**).

4.4.6 Walking in the enemy's shoes

Back at the national level Thabo Mbeki, who would eventually succeed Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa, was one of the ANC leaders tagged by then ANC president Oliver Tambo to take a lead in private talks with SAG or other Afrikaner spokespersons. Speaking years later to Waldmeir (1997, 68) of these early encounters, Mbeki describes his approach and Afrikaner reaction. "'A lot of the time they were surprised that we were not confrontational. We didn't want to be confrontational because we knew it was not going to produce results.' Like the accomplished lay psychologist that he is, Mbeki made clear that nothing would outrage him: no aberration of human behaviour was too great to be corrected, no fear too ridiculous to be taken seriously, no rift too deep to heal."

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[21] My general impression from this research is that most participants in South Africa's transformation feel that the trade unions and the "civics" were very successful locally at breaking down apartheid barriers. They were influential in building mass support for transition from both sides of the conflict. However, some feel that a climate of elitism persisted among SAG and ANC leaders and that they did not take advantage of the even greater contribution local initiatives could have made.

Waldmeir goes on to describe the 1986 talks in New York between Mbeki and Broederbond head Pieter de Lange: "If de Lange left New York with what he says was a 'normalized perception of the ANC as human beings,' Mbeki also left enlightened." Discussing Botha's repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act, which the ANC had dismissed as meaningless tinkering at the edges of apartheid, de Lange convinced Mbeki of the significance of those changes. Mbeki recalls de Lange's argument. "'I know what I am saying is nonsense as far as your own aspirations are concerned, but you must understand the Afrikaners; we needed those laws because we thought that without them, the Afrikaner people would cease to exist. They would be swamped and perish as a people. Psychologically, we have built a fortress around ourselves. But when Botha repeals the Group Areas Act, and we wake up the next morning and nothing has happened, our suburb has not been swamped by black people; when he removes the Mixed Marriages Act, and the Afrikaner people remain the Afrikaner people, that will allow Afrikaners to pose the question, do we need a white government? . . . Perhaps if it, too, went the way of the Group Areas Act, nothing would happen. It is of no meaning to you to repeal these laws, but of great meaning in terms of preparing Afrikaners for change,' de Lange concluded. That is what Mbeki means when he says, 'You have to start from where they were. Then you would understand'" (Waldmeir 1997, 68).

> We see here the beginning of perception reframing and the build-up of trust in the other side that could help the parties overcome the effects of the demonization they had each used to mobilize their

supporters (**context change/perception reframing & trust → SAG/ANC(+)**).

The interaction of disputants seeking resolution of their conflict is often described as an elaborate political dance. In South Africa's apartheid conflict from the mid-80s onward the basic move in this dance seemed to be *one foot forward, one foot back.* In the summer of 1985 there were uprisings and emergency rule in full swing while Botha made his negotiation offer in the Rubicon speech. In June 1986, the same month that Botha reinstated repressive emergency rule after a two-month break, he also agreed that Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee could engage in private talks that Mandela had been requesting (Waldmeir 1997, 98).

4.4.7 Different leaders – different perceptions

In March 1986, SAG agreed to a visit by a Commonwealth delegation known as the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). Although common wisdom downplays the influence of this group and of other outsiders on resolution of the conflict, the events triggered by this visit were pivotal, and accounts of those events reveal several NRFs in play.

The Commonwealth had undertaken a number of sanctions against SAG, but was concerned that the sanctions were not having the desired effect of replacing apartheid with democracy. Before imposing tougher sanctions, they mandated the EPG to visit South Africa to promote dialogue toward a solution. SAG agreed, although Botha's acceptance letter was full of concerns about outside interference and expressions of

determination to "proceed with our reform programme, . . . whatever the obstacles we have to contend with" (Commonwealth 1986, 75-77).

The EPG visit took place from March 2 to May 21, 1986. It ended on a very sour note after SAG, on May 19th, bombed suspected ANC bases in three neighboring countries. Botha, in a post-apartheid interview with Waldmeir, offered the truculent explanation that if U.S. President Reagan could bomb terrorist bases in Libya, he could bomb terrorist bases on his borders. Waldmeir turned to Chester Crocker, then US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, for a more plausible explanation: "Botha was fed up with foreigners telling him what to do, without ever offering any credit for positive action. . . . His (sometimes justified) persecution complex overcame all sense of diplomacy, and he paid a high price for his obstinacy." SAG cabinet moderates, who had not been informed of the bombing plans, were furious. More importantly, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan, holdouts among the Western powers, supported tough Commonwealth and US sanctions imposed later that year (Waldmeir 1997, 96-97).

Mandela (1994, 461) offers his reaction, which is also a simple but elegant explanation for the *one foot forward, one foot back* dance step. He says that despite the need to be seen to react strongly to such attacks, "often the most discouraging moments are precisely the time to launch a [negotiation] initiative. At such times people are searching for a way out of their dilemma." Mandela was encouraged by the fact that "the Commonwealth [EPG] group had ascertained that among ordinary South Africans there was a widespread

desire for a negotiated settlement and enough potential common ground to get negotiations going" (Sparks 1995, 35). This finding is confirmed by a survey which showed that in May 1985, in the heat of the uprisings two months before emergency rule was imposed, 65% of blacks favoured negotiations compared to 23% who supported the use of violence as a political tool (D. Van Vuuren et al 1991).

But Mandela seems to have been far ahead of his constituents on this occasion. "His colleagues in Lusaka and in the UDF displayed something far closer to relief. Botha's bombs had got them out of a tight diplomatic corner. [SAG] was not the only party reluctant to negotiate. The ANC in exile and the UDF were also less than keen. . . . Their judgment was that the balance of forces had tipped decisively in their favor as the township revolt gathered pace; they were not ready for compromise" (Waldmeir 1997, 97).

> Botha rejected the negotiation track by bombing ANC camps while the EPG was still in South Africa. The explanations given above suggest he was motivated by a combination of factors. He felt wrongly vilified and isolated by the international community, and he was stubbornly committed to a cause that was incompatible with the ANC's objectives. (**hurt & Botha's leader attributes & commitment to cause → SAG(-)**). In contrast Mandela had a more balanced reaction. The acute hurt of the bombings and the need to preserve face in front of other ANC and UDF leaders led him to publicly condemn the bombings. At the same time his ability to understand the desperation that was driving Botha led him to favour negotiation (**Mandela's leader attributes → ANC(+)**). As well, the

EPG message about mass support for negotiations meant he would not lose face by moving in that direction (**face → ANC(+)**).

However, the majority of the exiled ANC and the UDF, angry at the bombings and perceiving that they were not in stalemate but at a power advantage, were less receptive to negotiation. (**hurt & power balance/power advantage → ANC(-)**).

4.4.8 The delicate dance continued

The bombings did not stop the private meetings from proceeding apace. "Botha kept each initiative in its own sealed envelope." In addition to continuing with the Coetsee-Mandela meetings, Botha allowed Constitutional Development Minister Chris Heunis "to meet with the internal anti-apartheid movement, but never with Mandela; . . . and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), was pursuing its own clandestine [negotiation] agenda throughout" (Waldmeir 1997, 99).

In May 1988 Botha upgraded the Coetsee-Mandela meetings by bringing in an NIS team led by Niel Barnard, NIS chief and Botha's most influential advisor in the late 80s. Still in prison, Mandela told his fellow ANC inmates of his plan to meet with the Barnard team. He says they all supported negotiations, but half felt that it was a sign of weakness for ANC to make the first move. Despite their concern, Mandela held forty-seven meetings with this group in one year before he finally got to meet Botha himself in July 1989, just a month before Botha would resign as President (Mandela's diary, in Sparks 1995, 36).

Mandela (1994, 468) says the Barnard team was also concerned about who should make the first move, since the ANC had not renounced violence against the State. Mandela argued that ANC violence was self-defence and that SAG had to renounce violent repression of blacks. In response, the SAG group pointed out that "the National Party had repeatedly stated that it would not negotiate with any organization that advocated violence: therefore, how could it suddenly announce talks with the ANC without losing its credibility? In order for [SAG] to begin talks, . . . the ANC must make some compromise so that the government would not lose face with its own people." Mandela said SAG credibility was not his problem.

> These are explicit and exact definitions of *face* as a negative NRF for both sides. Issues of trust and reciprocity follow closely on the heels of face considerations. If one side agreed to make the first move, could it trust the other side to reciprocate? (**face & trust/reciprocity → SAG/ANC(-)**).

4.4.9 Botha out of step

These meetings "persuaded some key government figures that a settlement with the ANC need not mean the demise of white South Africa - or, indeed, of the National Party itself as an influential political force" (Friedman 1993, 10). Barnard explained to Waldmeir how a stereotypically staunch law-and-order group like the NIS could arrive at such a conclusion. "The Afrikaner people are much more pragmatic than people think. The typical idea of an Afrikaner being a dour, Old Testament, Calvinistic type of person, I don't think it's true deep down. . . . We are capable of adjusting to what's happening" (Waldmeir 1997, 51). Friedman (1993, 10) concludes however, "as long as P. W. Botha

remained state president, this [NIS conversion] was not enough to secure a breakthrough."

> Although Botha's rigid, unshakable perceptions and inability to trust his opponents are negative NRFs for SAG, Mandela's success in converting the top brass of the NIS would have major positive consequences for a smooth transition. (**lack of trust & Botha's leader attributes → SAG(-)**); at the same time, **context change & trust & Mandela's leader attributes → SAG(+)**).

4.4.10 Stalemate? Depends who's talking

So how did the parties perceive a decade of Botha's presidency? Because of the secrecy of these pre-negotiation talks, the only thing the public and the world saw was the township violence and brutal police repression under draconian emergency rule. De Klerk (1998, 120-121) suggests that from SAG's perspective, "the most important effect of the State of Emergency was to force revolutionaries to adopt more realistic perceptions of the balance of power between them and the government. . . . [By 1988] the more realistic leaders of the ANC and the internal uprising realized that there could be no quick or easy victory. They also began to accept that a prolonged struggle between them and the government would be so bitter and destructive that there would be little left for anyone to inherit. This perception was an indispensable pre-condition for the beginning of genuine negotiations."

Mandela (1994, 468-469) noted the pressures on SAG in the late '80s: US sanctions, other international pressures, continued ungovernability, a bad business climate, and

ANC determination to continue the armed struggle until SAG agreed to talk. He also acknowledged that in some respects the National Party and SAG were in a much stronger position to drive a hard bargain after the 1987 election. In that election the Afrikaner extreme right had become the official opposition and was pressing for a rollback of the reforms that had already taken place.

Waldmeir (1997, 70-71) believes that "the most basic principle of Afrikaner politics has always been to 'act from a position of strength.' She contends that after the State of Emergency both sides thought they were operating from a position of strength. SAG believed it had neutralized the ANC in the townships, and the ANC concluded that the State of Emergency showed that SAG might "contain, but not eradicate dissent; it could never rule peacefully again."

> De Klerk and Mandela's assessments are that both sides were hurting, and neither side could prevail over the other. As they had agreed in 1985, they still agreed at the end of the decade – it was time to talk. (**hurt & power balance/stalemate → SAG/ANC(+)**). Waldmeir's assessment reminds us that the more belligerent on both sides (e.g. Botha on the SAG side and some UDF and exiled ANC leaders on the resistance side) were thinking that it wasn't a situation of stalemate, that the power balance was shifting in their favour. These people weren't receptive to negotiation because they believed they could prevail through unilateral action, without risking the kinds of compromises that characterize negotiation (**mutual perceptions of power advantage → SAG/ANC(-)**).

4.4.11 Mandela - Botha meeting: Anti-climax

By 1989 Botha's regime was coming to an end. In January President Botha suffered a stroke and relinquished the leadership of the National Party but not the Presidency. De Klerk was elected NP leader by the cabinet, and after six months of difficult relations between Botha and the cabinet led by de Klerk, Botha resigned in August. A month earlier he had finally agreed to a meeting with Mandela. However, it was to be anti-climactic rather than historic. Mandela (1994, 479-480) describes it as tea and pleasantries, with no important substance except that Botha refused Mandela's request for the unconditional release of all political prisoners.

In September 1989 the National Party won what would be the last blacks-excluded election, and de Klerk became President of South Africa on September 14, 1989. South Africa was about to enter the most dramatic five years in its political history. Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert (1992, 34) sums up observers' general consensus about the state of the conflict that de Klerk inherited in September 1989. "Perhaps the most unintended legacy of the decade of P. W. Botha was [that], not despite his efforts but precisely because of them, the ANC was placed squarely on the map as an agent for transition. [Botha] and [his Defence Minister] Magnus Malan helped to give 'the struggle' international prominence and domestic popularity. . . ." Botha's era had at minimum produced a stalemate, and there were some on both sides who thought the advantage lay squarely with the ANC.

4.5 Phase 3 (Sept. 1989-May 1990): The "great leap forward"

4.5.1 De Klerk's new rules

It immediately became apparent that de Klerk intended to handle things differently, and to address that balance of power. In a speech to the top brass of the South African Police Force (SAPF) in January 1990, de Klerk declared his intention to remove the obstacles to a political battle between the National Party and the ANC, a battle de Klerk believed he could win (Nicholas Haysom 1992, 27). Mandela (1994, 481) acknowledges that "de Klerk began a systematic dismantling of many of the building blocks of apartheid." One of his first steps was to grant permission for a resistance movement march and demonstration, even though he had not yet legalized the ANC and other anti-government organizations. Waldmeir describes this de Klerk decision as "a more fearful leap into the dark than any the president made later - including the release of Mandela." De Klerk advisor Gerrit Viljoen explains de Klerk's logic. " 'If we didn't allow such marches, then we might have seen half a million people marching on Parliament, and not thirty thousand'" (Waldmeir 1997, 138-139). De Klerk (1998, 159-160) saw such reforms as important indications of SAG determination to democratize, and as good inducements to get ANC and other resistance organizations to the table.

> De Klerk's speech to the SAPF indicated that he saw negotiations as the appropriate venue for continuing the battle (**victory tactics → SAG(+)**). His concern that the resistance movement would explode if he did not give it the release valve of legitimate demonstration is at least an acknowledgement of an impending crisis, and perhaps of actual stalemate (**anticipated hurt & power balance/stalemate → SAG(+)**). De Klerk also believed his reforms would increase ANC

trust in his intentions and lead them to reciprocate by coming to the table. Whether the ANC was more receptive remains to be seen.

4.5.2 Timing is everything

De Klerk was moving assertively at this point, and he couldn't have asked for a better break than the final disintegration of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. He recalls, "Within the scope of a few months, one of our main strategic concerns for decades, the Soviet Union's role in Southern Africa and its strong influence on the ANC and the SACP [South African Communist Party] had all but disappeared. A window had suddenly opened which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceivable" (De Klerk 1998, 160-161).

On December 13, 1989 de Klerk had his first meeting with Mandela, whom he was preparing to release from prison. De Klerk (1998, 157) suggests he and Mandela accepted as a starting point that the two main obstacles to cooperation were the same as those Mandela had mentioned in a letter to Botha in March 1988. The ANC was insisting on majority [therefore black] rule in a unitary state, and SAG was determined to get guarantees of protection for minority [i.e. Afrikaner] rights. De Klerk recalls that Mandela challenged SAG's approach to guaranteeing these rights, calling it apartheid in disguise.

That fundamental difference over how much control Afrikaners would maintain over their future was the key issue underlying the main political battle that was about to

unfold. A reminder of the black-white demographics and resource distribution might help put ANC's concerns into perspective. Writing in 1989 as de Klerk was about to take over the presidency, Giliomee & Schlemmer (1989, 146) point out that SAG's offer to share power came with the caveat of self-determination in regard to "own" affairs. Such self-determination would result in Afrikaners, who represented 13% of the population compared to 76% blacks, "having the choice occupations, controlling virtually all management functions, having the lion's share of capital resources, [and] enjoying dominant ownership of territory [87% vs. 13% for black homelands] and housing . . . protected by formal residential segregation. [SAG's] proclaimed willingness to share power is therefore totally mistrusted [by the black population]."[22]

Nevertheless, Mandela's impression of de Klerk was that he "seemed to represent a true departure from the National Party politicians of the past. [He] ... was a man we could do business with" (Mandela 1994, 484).

> The Berlin Wall collapse represented another sudden context change. De Klerk's comments suggest that with the elimination of the communist threat, a major source of SAG distrust in the ANC was removed, and SAG was more receptive to negotiation (**sudden context change & reduced distrust of the opponent → SAG(+)**). Essentially, the remaining obstacles to cooperation were the irreconcilable objectives of the two parties (**irreconcilable SAG/ANC objectives → SAG/ANC(-)**). Here we have evidence that the Botha-de Klerk switch mentioned previously did result in the

[22] The statistics inserts are from Ottaway (1993, 9-10).

ANC being more receptive to negotiation (**context change & de Klerk leader attributes → ANC(+)**).

4.5.3 De Klerk's leap of faith

We have arrived at what became known as "the great leap forward": de Klerk's famous February 2, 1990 speech to open Parliament followed by the release of Nelson Mandela on February 11. Exactly one year prior to this speech, de Klerk had been elected National Party leader, and had said to his caucus, "Now is the time for a great leap forward." The caucus had replied, "Leap, we are with you" (Waldmeir 1997, 108).

De Klerk (1998, 163) outlines the essence of the February 2 announcements. "[In addition to] the [plan to] release Mandela it also included the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP, the PAC and a number of lesser organizations; the release of a further category of ANC prisoners and the lifting of the State of Emergency regulations affecting the media and education." It also included repeal of the Separate Amenities Act, a moratorium on the death penalty, and exploration of the possibility of a human rights charter. Allister Sparks, "a veteran critic of the National Party government, gasped, 'My God, he's done it all!'"(De Klerk 1998, 165)

Friedman (1993, 13) describes the general reaction to the "great leap forward". "In those euphoric early days of 1990 De Klerk . . . [was] feted in black townships as 'Comrade FW'. Mandela . . . was also hailed by white decision-makers as the guarantor of a negotiated future." Friedman also reminds us what lay beneath this euphoria. "While much was made of the 'chemistry' between Mandela and De Klerk, the excitement hid a

continuing and seemingly unbridgeable gulf between their two organizations. Both camps had turned to negotiation as a reluctant 'second best'. . . . Initially, both seemed more concerned to be *seen* to be negotiating - in the hope that the other would be manoeuvred into appearing unreasonable in the eyes of the foreign [powers]."

There is lots of evidence in statements by the main protagonists to support Friedman's conclusion about their intentions. De Klerk (1998, 162-163) explains, "I realized that we would have little chance of success in the coming negotiations if we did not grasp the initiative right at the beginning and convince the important players that we were not negotiating under pressure, but from the strength of our convictions." Also, "We had to convince them that our acceptance of a unified South Africa with universal franchise was not simply a negotiating ploy and that we were not trying to cling to elements of apartheid under a different guise."

In contrast to these face-saving yet conciliatory statements, de Klerk (1998, 174-177) describes how both SAG and ANC were preparing for coming talks. "We were ... in possession of secret SACP documents that clearly indicated that the ANC/SACP alliance believed it should use all means (including talks) to advance the process of 'breaking the cohesion and unity of the ruling class' and to 'isolate and weaken its most racist and politically reactionary sector'. . . . According to the documents, this area of the politico-military struggle had already served to 'weaken the cohesion of the enemy and needed to be pursued with even more vigour'." Subsequently de Klerk exhibits some hypocrisy in his criticism of the ANC's tactics. "We could not afford the kind of two-sided approach

that the ANC would have preferred - with the 'forces of liberation' ranged on one side of the table under their leadership and the government on the other." He then says, "The government and I tried to form a bloc of parties and organizations that believed in [a common set of] principles."

In his January 1990 speech to senior police officers, de Klerk revealed another angle on SAG's proactive strategy, expressing concern about the likelihood of a violent conflagration if decisive progress weren't made. "For if this Armageddon takes place - and blood flows ankle deep in our streets and 4 or 5 million people lie dead - the problem will remain exactly the same as it was before the shooting started" (Waldmeir 1997, 137). In March 1990 de Klerk offered yet another reason to seize the initiative. "We did not wait until the position of power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement" (Johannes Rantete & Hermann Giliomee 1992, 518).

> Friedman's mention of the early 1990 euphoria is an indication that both sides were more receptive to negotiation due to the dramatic context change of de Klerk's February 2, 1990 speech and Mandela's release. De Klerk's and Mandela's leadership styles and values were obviously also at play (**sudden context change & de Klerk/Mandela leader attributes → SAG/ANC(+)**). De Klerk's reference to being seen to be negotiating from the strength of convictions and not from pressure is a classic example of *face* as an NRF (**saving face → SAG(+)**).
>
> De Klerk refers to secret documents proving that the ANC was using negotiations as a victory tactic. However, he subsequently admits trying to line up a government-led bloc of like-minded parties to

counteract the ANC-led "forces of liberation". This, and his comment about not waiting until the power balance changed in the ANC's favour, constitute an admission that SAG itself was approaching negotiations as a competitive process, hoping for a political victory (**victory tactics → SAG(+)**).

Despite Friedman's assessment and de Klerk's accusations that the ANC was employing victory tactics, I delay assuming this was the ANC's approach until we have reviewed ANC statements on the matter. Finally, de Klerk's speech to police shows that anticipation of crisis and more hurt was a strong motivation for SAG to move forward with negotiations (**anticipated hurt → SAG(+)**.

4.5.4 Negotiations: A new battlefield

Let's look now at the ANC side of these dramatic February 1990 events. Mandela's release on February 11, after twenty-seven years in prison, was undoubtedly one of the two most publicized events of the apartheid conflict – the other would be the first free election in April 1994, which in 1990 was nothing more than an unlikely dream.

Mandela's speech on that day consisted of a small conciliatory gesture and several challenges to SAG. He acknowledged the contribution of whites to building South Africa, and indicated that all who abandoned apartheid would be equally welcome in a new South Africa (Mandela 1994, 495). However, after the huge steps de Klerk had taken on February 2, Mandela was unnecessarily combative, reasserting the ANC's commitment to armed struggle, and calling for the international community to continue the sanctions (De Klerk 1998, 169-170). Waldmeir (1997, 157) describes Mandela's speech, delivered "to

the largest audience he would ever reach, totaling many millions worldwide" as one prepared by "radical UDF leaders, profoundly suspicious of de Klerk, [who] had penned a speech from hell, a speech without warmth, vision, or humanity; a speech for the warpath." The very next day Mandela, in his first press conference, with the world's press still on the scene, "set out to correct those [disappointing] first impressions" (Waldmeir 1997, 157).

Mandela, however, did not apologize for his aggressive stance. "I told the reporters there was no contradiction between my continuing support for the armed struggle and my advocating negotiations. It was the reality and the threat of the armed struggle that had brought the government to the verge of negotiations" (Mandela 1994, 495). In a statement prior to Mandela's release the ANC had "stated that it . . . would enter the negotiating process because negotiations were a terrain of struggle" (Haysom 1992, 28). As the ANC's approach to negotiations was criticized by de Klerk, Mandela (1994, 503) likewise accused de Klerk of manipulative tactics, arguing that despite these first moves, "the government was in no great rush to begin negotiations; they were counting on the euphoria that greeted my release to die down. They wanted to allow time for me to fall on my face and show that the former prisoner hailed as a saviour was a highly fallible man who had lost touch with the present situation."

> This text demonstrates a pattern of important advances marred by increasing violence, acrimony, and mutual blaming that would persist until the April 1994 elections. The ANC's declaration that negotiations were another terrain of struggle put the ANC on the same level as SAG. They entered negotiations not to find mutually

satisfactory solutions, but to win what couldn't be won in the streets (**victory tactics → ANC(+)**).

4.5.5 The effects of violence

The tragic massacre of demonstrators in Sebokeng township in March 1990 reminds us that anger and hatred were ever present. It also shows how quickly a party can change its receptivity to negotiations according to its perception of the political requirements of the moment. Haysom (1992, 30) reported that "following the police shooting of demonstrators in Sebokeng . . . , the ANC indicated that it was withdrawing from talks with the government. After the resultant media outcry the ANC *clarified* its announcement, stating that its position was not rigid and that it had no intention of sabotaging the negotiating process."

> This ANC reversal might be attributed to two NRFs. First, the ANC was reacting to the acute hurt of the massacre, plus saving face by meeting its supporters expectations that it would react to such an outrage (**acute hurt & face → ANC(-)**). The ANC's reversal of position might be attributed to the importance of maintaining the international community's support (a power balance issue), as well as to an ANC perception that negotiation was really the best way to relieve the chronic hurt (**power balance & anticipated relief from chronic hurt → ANC(+)**).

4.5.6 Run-up to Groote Schuur

As the two main protagonists approached the May 1990 Groote Schuur talks, their first official *pre*-negotiation meeting since the legalization of the ANC, there were a number

of obstacles to formal negotiations about a post-apartheid arrangement. SAG wanted protection of minority rights, and an end to international sanctions and the ANC's violent struggle. The ANC had sought the release of all political prisoners, total removal of the State of Emergency, and withdrawal of SAG troops from the townships (Waldmeir 1997, 161-162).

> NRFs are evident in this list of obstacles to formal negotiations. Both SAG and ANC concerns reflect the influence of current and anticipated hurt and issues of face. SAG was politically embarrassed by the international sanctions. The ANC and other black leaders were embarrassed by the presence of SAG troops in what they considered their political turf – the townships (**hurt & face → SAG/ANC(-)**).

The political climate in South Africa had changed dramatically in the mere eight months since de Klerk became president. The euphoria of the great leap had been seriously dampened by the tough realities of such a political upheaval. The next year and a half would test both Mandela and de Klerk's political skills and determination.

4.6 Phase 4 (May 1990 – CODESA): Fighting all the way to the altar

4.6.1 Public bonding

Van Zyl Slabbert (1992, 34-34, 45) identifies a paradoxical symbiosis between violence and negotiations that was triggered by de Klerk's "great leap forward" and would characterize the wild political ride ahead. "Until 2 February 1990 the prevalent conventional paradigm of change, at least in the ANC, was revolutionary transition and seizure of power over decades, not negotiated transition over months." Van Zyl Slabbert

explains that as a negotiated transition was recognized as a real possibility, the more radical within each party would ratchet up their protest and each main disputant constituency would start to fracture. Consequently the ANC and SAG needed each other's cooperation to prove that their option - negotiation - would work. "De Klerk needs the ANC [to be reasonable] to help him placate white fears. [Similarly], any hint of a double agenda on De Klerk's part is then particularly damaging to Mandela, because he has staked his reputation on trusting De Klerk." Although they needed each other, neither would abandon their constituency or their incompatible goals without using all the political wiles at their disposal to protect them. They were certainly in for a wild ride.

Waldmeir (1997, 161) sums up the purpose of the Groote Schuur talks. "Its brief was simply to clear the obstacles to constitutional negotiation. . . . In reality," says Waldmeir, "Groote Schuur was about bonding, and being seen to bond, in the eyes of the nation and the world. Nothing substantive was agreed there – except to keep talking." Thabo Mbeki, then ANC director of international affairs, recalls first impressions at Groote Schuur. "'We were a bit surprised, I think, at how foolish all of us had been, because in a matter of minutes everybody in the room realized that nobody there had horns'" Sisk (1995, 91).

De Klerk (1998, 182) expresses satisfaction with the Groote Schuur Minute, as the agreement was called. "For us, the heart of the Groote Schuur Minute lay in its first and penultimate paragraphs:

'The government and the ANC agree on a common commitment toward the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations.'

and

'Efficient channels of communication will be established between [us] in order to [achieve this].'

It was the clearest commitment to the ending of the armed struggle that we could get from the ANC at that stage. They were extremely sensitive about not being seen by their more radical supporters to be making too many concessions too soon - particularly with regard to the armed struggle" (De Klerk 1998, 182). Those statements, however, contained nothing concrete to avoid the subsequent four years of mutual blaming, as each would accuse the other of supporting or being unable to control violence coming from their constituencies. The Groote Schuur Minute, as Waldmeir said, was indeed about image, not substance.

> The NRF implications of Van Zyl Slabbert's assessment are twofold. First, he predicted that the main disputant leaders' behaviour would begin to show their mutual commitment to negotiation based on perceptions of stalemate and their interest in avoiding further hurt. Once on that path, their interdependence for political face-saving in relation to challenges from their more belligerent flanks would keep them pushing for negotiation success (**power balance/stalemate & anticipated relief from hurt → SAG/ANC(+)**) and (**disputant interdependence for face-saving → SAG/ANC(+)**). At the level of specific incidents, Waldmeir's reference to "bonding" reflects trust-building, and "being seen to be bonding" reflects an effort at face-saving by perception reframing – building an image that negotiations will work, to convert or counteract those who see negotiations as a sell-out (**trust & face →SAG/ANC(+)**). Mbeki's comment about both sides being surprised "no one had horns" is a simple example of *context change*/perception reframing, and greater trust in the opponent increasing their receptivity to negotiation (**context**

change/perception reframing & trust in opponent → SAG/ANC(+)). Finally, de Klerk's comment about ANC's hesitance to abandon armed struggle mirrors earlier examples of *face* being a deterrent to negotiation (**face → ANC(-)**).

4.6.2 "Swans and swine"

Following Groote Schuur, the working group established to resolve details and implementation arrangements "subsequently experienced serious difficulties in reaching agreement on [a number of] issues" (De Klerk 1998, 182). Haysom (1992, 31) offers a much more cynical interpretation of these "serious difficulties", which he sees as pre-negotiation tactics. As we will see later, it is an interpretation shared by many within the ANC coalition. "Negotiation,' says Haysom, " requires swans and swine. Swans may sail through the troubled waters of conflict securing agreements in principle. The swine move in holding the ground and tying up the detail without conceding an inch." Comparing the two sides' behaviour, Haysom continues, "Some trade unionists suggested that the ANC negotiating style boasted too many swans and not enough swine. The government, supported by a barrage of negotiators and lawyers, had their swine fully in place to ensure concessions granted in principle would be clawed back in the detail."

Unfortunately for the ANC, it was more than just "some trade unionists" who were unhappy with the way things were unfolding. Waldmeir (1997, 163) identifies three competing leadership factions within the ANC: Mandela and close prison comrades of his generation, the leaders who had been exiled in Lusaka, and the union and other UDF leaders who had suffered through the long, hard years of internal struggle. These internal

divisions weren't of recent origin. Waldmeir (1997, 165-166) describes an incident in the late 80s in which "ANC and UDF leaders [had] got wind of Mandela's memorandum from his recently improved and privileged prison quarters to P. W. Botha, in which he made his startling offer of special constitutional protections for whites. Instructions went out, through parts of the fractured leadership chain of the UDF, to shun Mandela." According to one ANC leader, Mac Maharaj, " 'The word was, Madiba [Mandela's clan name] was wearing a three-piece suit, drinking wine, you name it, he was a sellout.'"

On top of this long-standing ANC internal strife, de Klerk's great leap had, as he intended, caught the ANC unprepared. The ANC's Joe Slovo talked about the ANC's challenge to prepare for the Groote Schuur talks. " 'We've had to devote the bulk of our energies to getting here – not to what we're going to do when we arrive'" (Waldmeir 1997, 163). De Klerk kept pressing. He started travelling to rebuild international support. In June 1990 he acted on one of SAG's Groote Schuur commitments and lifted the State of Emergency everywhere except in Natal, where ANC – Inkatha Freedom Party violence was concentrated. In July, he convinced his party to open its membership to non-whites, a necessary move if the NP were to have a chance to win a future election.

If these moves, coupled with the ANC's internal strife and surprise at de Klerk's great leap, weren't enough to convince some that the ANC was at a distinct disadvantage in this pre-negotiation struggle, the uncovering in July 1990 of the ANC's Operation Vula removed any doubt. "Worried [in the late 80s] that the ANC would appear weak at the negotiation table, the insurrectionist wing of the movement had kept alive 'Operation

Vula' (the underground operation [to overthrow the government], spearheaded by Mac Maharaj . . . .) Vula had never flourished, and by July 1990, it existed far more powerfully in the mind of Maharaj than in fact. Still, when [SAG] . . . arrested Maharaj and other Vula leaders Mandela was furious – not at de Klerk but at his own people. The ANC could not afford to create the impression that it had a secret agenda to overthrow the state" (Waldmeir 1997, 162).

> Haysom's "swans and swine" analogy attributes to both sides a view of negotiation as a forum for achieving victory, not compromise (**victory tactics → SAG/ANC(+)**). The reference to Mandela as a sell-out indicates that such challenges to his face and to his commitment to the cause represented pressures against negotiation (**face & commitment to cause → ANC(-)**). Mandela's reaction to Operation Vula reflects a worry that SAG would have reason to distrust ANC's motives regarding negotiations (**reduced trust in ANC → SAG(-)**), and an equally serious worry that the power balance would be negatively affected if local and international support were to diminish because of Vula.

4.6.3 Dissension in the ANC ranks

In August 1990 SAG and ANC met again to address the lack of progress and the growing violence since Groote Schuur. Mandela was convinced by Joe Slovo, "whose immaculate radical credentials made him the perfect advocate of moderation", to use this occasion to unilaterally suspend the armed struggle, despite the fact "the lobby [within the ANC] in favour of compromise was frighteningly small" (Waldmeir 1997, 163, 165). Waldmeir believes Mandela saw it as an opportunity to seize the moral high ground that

de Klerk had held since the great leap. Mandela (1994, 510-511) argues two points in favour of the move; first, that it was only "suspension", not "termination" of the armed struggle, and second, that the armed struggle had been more symbolic than directly effective.

Although Mandela's argument prevailed at the ANC executive level, suspension proponent Joe Slovo admitted later that "90 per cent of ANC supporters thought the decision was a sellout" (Waldmeir 1997, 165-166). ANC director of information Pallo Jordan defended the ANC decision, " '[De Klerk] felt very much over a barrel on the question of a cease-fire,' Jordan explained.... 'The National Party *must* remain on board. Should it pull out, there is no *knowing* what the future will be.' "Within days of the signing of the Pretoria Minute, South Africa descended into an orgy of violence unprecedented even by its own woeful standards" (Waldmeir 1997, 165-166). In 1990 approximately 3600 people died in political clashes, compared to an average of 2000 per year between 1984 and 1991 (Sisk 1995, 115).

De Klerk (1998, 187) admits that some of this violence came from those on the far right who saw his Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minute agreements as capitulation to the ANC. Unfortunately, "leaders on both sides bickered over responsibility for the carnage, but did nothing to stop it. They would carry South Africa to the brink of destruction" (Waldmeir 1997, 166). In February 1991, the two parties signed a third agreement, the D. F. Malan Accord, to try and rein in the violence, but it was no more successful in that regard than its two predecessors. However, the D. F. Malan Accord did contain the seeds of the

structure of constitutional talks to come. In particular it indicated that all political parties should participate in the talks (De Klerk 1998, 205).

That same month SAG pushed forward again, with announcements in parliament of actions to meet Pretoria Minute commitments - such as notice that the Group Areas Act, the Lands Act, and the Population Registration Act would be scrapped. Jo-Anne Collinge (1992, 10-11) accuses SAG of duplicity and manipulation. "In terms of international relations, the legislative reform package was a triumph - it brought South Africa within inches of what was required for the lifting of [US] sanctions . . . . But its contribution to clearing the path to negotiations was unremarkable . . . . SAG is threading the needle - doing enough so that on the surface it looks positive, but putting sufficient caveats on the reforms to ensure the maintenance of white control.

> Jordan's spin-doctoring was an acknowledgement that many in ANC were against armed struggle suspensions, which they saw as a sign of ANC weakness and a lack of commitment to the cause (**face & commitment to cause → ANC(-)**). Collinge's comment about SAG reforms is included here because it is supported by earlier examples of ANC distrust of SAG (**distrust of opponent → ANC(-)**).

4.6.4 Negotiations: A means to victory

Friedman offers a good example of growing ANC-SAG interdependence. In the spring of 1991, SAG was trying to organize a multi-party peace conference for the month of May, to get at the persistent and debilitating violence. Mandela, under pressure from his ANC colleagues and allies, continued to claim that SAG could be doing a lot more to control

violence. Rumours were rampant that the SAG security establishment was encouraging and supporting Inkatha Freedom Party supporters in attacks on fellow blacks who supported the ANC. In early April, Mandela issued an ultimatum that the ANC would withdraw from pre-negotiations if SAG did not act on its Pretoria Minute obligations by April 30. When the deadline passed with no response from SAG, the ANC pulled out of talks. By that summer, Friedman explains, "some, but not all, of the ANC's demands were met, but it returned to the negotiation nevertheless. It said, in effect, [that] it was doing so because the violence would persist as long as the NP remained in power. Only an interim government, in which the ruling [NP] would be forced to share power, could address the problem, and only negotiation could achieve that" (Friedman 1993, 16).

In July 1991 Mandela was elected ANC president, replacing Oliver Tambo. Despite the year and a half of unprecedented violence and mutual blaming since Groote Schuur, his acceptance speech indicates that the ANC's fundamental position and strategy had not changed: "Though we were then at loggerheads with the government, negotiations in and of themselves, I said, constituted a victory. The mere fact that the government was engaged in negotiations at all was a sign that they did not have the strength to sustain apartheid. I reiterated that the process would not be smooth, as we are dealing with politicians who do not want to negotiate themselves out of power. 'The point which must be clearly understood is that the struggle is not over, and negotiations themselves are a theater of struggle.'" (Mandela 1994, 516).

Both Mandela and de Klerk may have felt that their incompatible positions – Mandela for majority rule, de Klerk for minority/Afrikaner rights - represented lines they could not cross: "[For] negotiators on both sides . . . compromise remained a strategic necessity, not a preferred option. . . . Nor had those they represented reconciled themselves to compromise. Both sides therefore assured their camps that negotiation was a means of achieving the old goals by new means. De Klerk repeatedly insisted that the NP was not about to surrender to 'simple majority rule', . . . it would demand a guaranteed share in power, whatever the outcome of a popular vote. ANC leaders insisted that negotiations would produce precisely the 'majority rule' - and hence the surrender - which 'people's war' and international isolation had failed to achieve" (Friedman 1993, 14).

> The ANC pullout from pre-negotiation talks over SAG inaction on violence shows *distrust* and *face* as negative NRFs (**distrust & face → ANC(-)**). Mandela's explanation for ANC's return to pre-negotiations is quite important; it reflects a significant perception reframing. Mandela concluded that protesting de Klerk inaction would not end the violence; that only negotiating an end to NP rule would achieve that (**context change/perception reframing & anticipated relief from hurt → ANC(+)**). Mandela's ANC presidency acceptance speech described stalemate and victory tactics as reasons to proceed with negotiations (**power balance/stalemate & victory tactics → ANC(+)**). Friedman's analysis suggests both sides saw negotiations as a means to victory (**victory tactics → SAG/ANC(+)**).

4.6.5 Inkathagate: A bombshell to SAG

In order for this standoff to be resolved, one side would have to blink. Although we can only speculate on whether it might have turned out differently, the Inkathagate scandal which erupted in July 1991 was a serious blow to de Klerk's credibility, and certainly contributed to putting the ANC in the driver's seat for the remainder of this historic journey. In July 1991 came the first incontrovertible evidence of secret SAG funding for the Inkatha Freedom Party and other anti-ANC groups. It would eventually be revealed, as de Klerk acknowledges in his autobiography, that SAG security forces had, well into the de Klerk years, been involved in funding and otherwise inciting IFP supporters in black-on-black violence, and in running its own death squads. De Klerk himself, describing the Inkathagate revelations, talks of being "struck by another bombshell" (De Klerk 1998, 202-204, 207-214).

A growing number of critics questioned de Klerk's unswerving denials of personal knowledge, despite his initiatives to uncover the truth and his actions to clean up the security regime. Sparks captures the essence of the general reaction, and cites a SAG intelligence insider's explanation for de Klerk's failure on this issue. "De Klerk periodically revealed sleights of hand which caused more and more people to suspect that a hidden agenda lay behind his public image of Mr. Integrity." Sparks suspects de Klerk's less-than-persistent behaviour in weeding out the rotten eggs in Security was related to his hesitance about the security establishment's loyalty to him. Conscience-stricken former Colonel Gert Hugo explained that de Klerk wouldn't act because Military

Intelligence had plenty of material with which to blackmail SAG top brass left over from the Botha years (Sparks 1995, 155, 158, 174).

In the midst of the violence and the mutual recriminations, there was slow but inexorable movement toward a resolution. After the ANC had withdrawn from the SAG-sponsored May 1991 peace conference, the business community and the churches, which had been involved for years pressuring for peaceful resolution of the conflicts, managed to get most parties including the ANC to have another try at producing a peace plan. In September 1991, twenty-nine signatories, including SAG, the ANC, the IFP, and the trade unions, endorsed the National Peace Accord. Only far right parties boycotted this major agreement (Haysom 1992, 33). Although violence and mutual blaming would continue up to and beyond the 1994 elections, the general public and the politicians were getting used to the idea of multi-party negotiation as the way to tackle the country's problems.

The stage was being set for CODESA, and as its December 1991 start date approached, the jockeying for political advantage intensified, both between SAG and ANC, and within each camp. In October 1991 the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and up to ninety other parties formed a short-lived Patriotic Front in an effort to present a united stand in the CODESA negotiations (Collinge 1992, 14). In November there was a mass two-day general strike to protest introduction of a Value-Added Tax (VAT). Collinge (1992, 13-15) suggests that while Inkathagate dramatically broadened the challenge to SAG's legitimacy to preside over the transition negotiations, the Nov4-5, 1991 VAT

protest "challenged the NP government's right to reshape economic policy unilaterally. . . . The impact on the negotiation process was undoubted." Even *Sunday Times* editor Ken Owen, whom Collinge describes as "no apologist for the ANC", apparently remarked in that paper's November 10, 1991 edition about "the astonishing display of power that the country had witnessed" (Collinge 1992, 13-15).

> The fact that Inkathagate and the successful VAT protest were perceived by ANC as shifting power in their favour does not tell us whether they would consequently be more or less receptive to negotiation. As was explained earlier, perceived power advantage might be seen as useful outside or within negotiations. For those already aligned against negotiation, Inkathagate reinforced their distrust of SAG and negotiations, and the VAT display of power likely increased their belief in their ability to prevail by force (**distrust & increased commitment to cause & perceived power advantage → ANC(-)**). For those ANC members already favouring negotiations as a victory tactic, these two events would boost their confidence in success (**victory tactics → ANC(+)**).

4.6.6 CODESA: Negotiating a new South Africa

Whether or not de Klerk felt that he was entering the Convention for a Democratic South Africa at a power disadvantage, one thing is certain: he was determined to apply all his political skills to protecting Afrikaners from majority domination. And he believed he had sufficient support from Buthelezi's IFP and other groups who felt their power base could best be maintained by a high degree of power decentralization and by minority power-sharing and vetoes in a national parliament.

On December 20, 1991, CODESA opened at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg, marking the end of pre-negotiation talks and the beginning of formal, multi-party negotiations toward a post-apartheid constitution and democratic government. Twenty parties including SAG were represented at the negotiations (De Klerk 1998, 221). A few smaller parties on the right and left had declined or walked out at the last minute, some accusing SAG and the ANC of having "pre-caucused their positions on venue, parties attending, and the mode of decision-making for CODESA" (Haysom 1992, 39).

CODESA's mandate was to define the process of transition to a post-apartheid, democratic state. Five multi-party working groups were assembled to address key issues and to report back to a second conference, CODESA II, in May 1992. The topics assigned to working groups included: "a climate for free political activity [in preparation for a general election]; necessary . . . principles to be included in a new constitution, and the constitution-making forum; interim government/transitional authority/transitional arrangements; the future of the TBVC states[23]; and time frames and modes of implementation of CODESA agreements" (Haysom 1992, 39).

Standing in the World Trade Centre on December 20, 1991, an observer might have wondered whether it truly was the beginning of the end. With the advantage of hindsight, both main disputing party leaders considered CODESA the true Rubicon of the apartheid conflict. Mandela (1994, 518) says, "With the dawn of CODESA, progress in South Africa had at last become irreversible." In de Klerk's words, "we had at last embarked on

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[23] TBVC refers to Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, four independent homelands.

the constitutional negotiations which would create a new South Africa" (De Klerk 1998, 225).

4.7 Epilogue: South Africa's "socio-political miracle"

Although CODESA marked a commitment by all the main parties to a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy, the conference's conclusion in deadlock in May 1992 signaled that the transition would not be smooth. In June 1992 forty-nine ANC supporters were massacred at Boipatong; in September of the same year twenty-eight protestors died at Bisho. In April of 1993 Chris Hani, an ANC/SCAP leader, was assassinated; and in July 1993 six hundred died in violence.

In many cases the violence reflected the frustration of the extremists on both sides with the inexorable progress toward a negotiated transition. In September 1992 SAG and the ANC signed a Record of Understanding which charted the basic transition path. In February 1993 they agreed on a temporary power sharing arrangement. In September 1993 the SAG parliament adopted legislation paving the way for a multi-party Transitional Executive Council to oversee the final stages leading to an election.

Mandela's ANC and de Klerk's National Party survived the political strain of the violence-filled three years between CODESA and South Africa's first full-suffrage election on April 26-28, 1994. In a vote that was surprisingly free of violence and intimidation, the ANC won slightly less than the two-thirds majority it would have needed to effectively over-rule other parties in the new multi-party Government of

National Unity. Mandela expressed relief at having fallen short of that two-thirds majority. "Had we won two-thirds of the vote and been able to write a constitution unfettered by input from others, people would argue that we had created an ANC constitution, not a South African constitution. I wanted a true government of national unity" (Mandela 1994, 539).

Although the new South Africa has not been violence-free since 1994, it no longer vies for international headlines in that department and the war correspondents have moved on. For those interested in the peaceful negotiation of solutions to conflict, South Africa's apartheid struggle is a fascinating case. The next chapter captures some of the lessons we can draw from this case about negotiation receptivity.

Chapter 5 - NRFs in the apartheid conflict: The dynamics

5.1 Focus on disputant perceptions

Before presenting my analysis of what the case revealed about NRFs, I think it helpful to remind the reader of my constructivist worldview, and its influence on my approach to this study. As described in the **Conceptual Framework** (2.1), a constructivist believes "people's behaviour is based on their perceptions of reality, and the meanings they attach to these perceptions." Now in retrospect it should be evident how this has played out in the presentation of the case. I tried to capture, through a heavy reliance on direct quotes of disputing party leaders, their perceptions of the factors that most influenced their decisions to approach or retreat from negotiations at key points in the conflict. Consequently, in the following discussion of NRF dynamics, it is implied that disputant perceptions are the determinants of NRF influence on their decisions. A reference to *hurt* or *power balance* is not intended to reflect some objective reality; it reflects disputant perceptions of *hurt* or *power balance*.

5.2 NRFs in the case study: Theory meets reality

It is clear from the case presentation (Chap. 4) that the case literature contained a multitude of direct quotes of the main disputants referring explicitly to their or their opponent's willingness or reluctance to engage in negotiations. In fact, the case study generally supported and expanded the understanding of NRFs that emerged from the review of the literature (2.2.3). Following is a description of how each NRF influenced

negotiation receptivity in South Africa's apartheid conflict. Table 3 at the end of this section provides a summary of NRF dynamics based on the combined evidence from the literature and the case.

5.2.1 *Leader attributes*

It is not at all difficult to cite examples in this case of *leader attributes* influencing negotiation receptivity. It is clear that Mandela and de Klerk had an enormous influence on the fact that the apartheid conflict was resolved essentially on the political, not the military, battlefield. De Klerk's "great leap forward" would never have been undertaken by any of his predecessors. And Mandela's genuine sympathy for his oppressors is remarkable. Despite twenty-seven years of incarceration he believed that both oppressors and oppressed were prisoners, the oppressors being prisoners of their own prejudice (Waldmeir 1997, 19). What we often hear about the best leaders - their daring moves at crucial moments in their lives, sometimes despite strong advice to the contrary - was evident in this conflict. De Klerk, in hopes of convincing the ANC to embrace negotiations, dared in September 1989 to allow resistance movement marches, despite the volatility of emotions on both sides of the conflict (4.5.1). In the early 1990s Mandela decided to press on with negotiations despite the escalation of violence and strong opposition within his own ranks (4.6.4).

Leader attributes can be seen in this case to have had a significant influence on *commitment to cause*. Mandela and de Klerk were both successful in persuading a critical mass of their constituents to focus their commitment on interests and not on positions.

5.2.2 *Disputant objectives*

The most obvious and direct reference to *disputant objectives* in the apartheid conflict occurred when the two sides set out pre-conditions to formal negotiations or to preliminary steps toward formal talks. For example, leading up to the May 1990 Groote Schuur talks, their first official pre-negotiation meetings, each side spelled out conditions for agreeing to formal negotiations. SAG wanted protection of minority rights, an end to international sanctions, and an end to the ANC's violent struggle. The ANC had sought the release of all political prisoners, total removal of the State of Emergency, and withdrawal of SAG troops from the townships (4.5.6).

From these and other examples in the case, a number of observations are possible about the influence of pre-conditions on negotiation receptivity. Extremely unrealistic pre-conditions are often a signal of a lack of serious commitment to negotiations. A good example is SAG's hypocritical insistence that the ANC denounce violence at the same time that SAG was implementing a very brutal emergency rule. Also, one party's pre-conditions often have a direct and significant impact on the other disputant's receptivity. Disputant pre-conditions are not static; they can change as the result of bargaining, or in light of direct changes in the conflict or in the surrounding context.

Also, this case supported an observation in the literature that a disputant's negotiation pre-conditions list is often a statement of position, not interests. This is very important to mediators and other stakeholders who may be working to get disputants to adopt an interest-based rather than position-based approach to resolution of the conflict.

In contrast to the explicit declaration of pre-conditions, disputants in the apartheid conflict made only indirect references to more general objectives affecting their negotiation receptivity. However, the following statements from SAG leaders leave little doubt as to their objectives. In 1978 SAG Foreign Minister Pik Botha was explaining the mood of Afrikaners at the time, in particular their determination not to allow majoritarian rule: "A political system of one man, one vote within one political identity means our destruction. It's a statistical fact, not a political one. I am not aware of any nation in the history of the world having knowingly committed that sort of suicide" (4.3.2) (Waldmeir 1997, 35-36). President P. W. Botha declared in his August 1985 Rubicon speech that that he was not prepared "to lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide" (4.3.4) (De Klerk 1998, 102-105).

These examples confirm the views of Kriesberg & Thorson (1991) and other theorists that *disputant objectives* plays an important role in disputant decisions about negotiation.

5.2.3 *Commitment to cause*

Commitment to cause was a factor throughout the conflict. It often surfaced as an issue between factions on the same side of the dispute. For example, those within the ANC coalition who saw suspension of the armed struggle and agreement to negotiate as tantamount to capitulation accused those supporting suspension of not being sufficiently committed to the cause (4.6.3). Another example is Botha's dramatic gesture of bombing suspected ANC camps in border states in May 1986, signifying his rejection of the

negotiation proposals of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group that was visiting South Africa at the time. Botha was firmly committed to apartheid objectives that he saw as clearly incompatible with the ANC's majoritarian rule objectives that the Commonwealth appeared to be supporting (4.4.7).

There is sometimes a crossover effect with respect to *commitment to cause*, in which one side's receptivity to negotiation may be affected by their perception of the other side's commitment to its positions. This was clearly the case with Botha, who in 1985 rejected the idea of negotiating with the ANC because he believed they were committed to a revolutionary overthrow of SAG (4.3.6).

There is a connection between *commitment to cause* and *hurt*. In some cases increased hurt leads to increased commitment to cause. This appeared to be how blacks reacted to Botha's announcement about a tri-cameral parliament from which they were, once again, excluded (4.3.2). However, this example is insufficient to suggest what the reaction pattern would be as the level of hurt increased dramatically.

5.2.4 *Power balance*

The most striking examples of *power balance* influencing negotiation receptivity in the apartheid conflict relate to Zartman's "hurting stalemate". Typical are Mandela and de Klerk's descriptions of the dangerous impasse that faced the two sides in 1985 (4.4.1), and their reiteration of the same view at key junctures later in the conflict. For example, de Klerk in his January 1990 speech to senior police cadres (4.5.3), and Mandela in his

1991 ANC presidency acceptance speech (4.6.4) both acknowledged the existence of a hurting stalemate.

Although Mandela and President de Klerk were generally consistent in their view that neither side could defeat the other, the majority in their own parties did not always support them. Waldmeir (1997, 70-71) argued that after the State of Emergency in the mid-80s, both sides thought they were operating from a position of strength; SAG because it had neutralized the ANC in the townships, and the ANC because the uprisings had proved that SAG "could never rule peacefully again". Certainly the more belligerent on both sides were thinking that it was not a situation of stalemate, that the power balance was shifting in their favour. These people were not receptive to negotiation because they believed they could prevail through unilateral action, without risking the compromises that characterize negotiation (4.4.10).

The case also supported findings from the literature that *power balance* is affected by *disputant interdependence.* An example from the case is presented under ***Disputant interdependence*** (5.2.10).

5.2.5 *Hurt*

Besides the presence of *hurt* in the examples of hurting stalemate cited under ***Power balance*** (5.2.4), *hurt* was a factor affecting negotiation receptivity throughout the conflict. Economic hurt due to dependence on black labour and political hurt associated with international isolation played a significant role in Botha's 1985 offer to negotiate

(4.3.6). Hurt from each of several massacres of ANC supporters; for example the Sebokeng township massacre of March 1990 (4.5.5), typically resulted in the ANC pulling away from the pre-negotiation table.

The case revealed variations in negotiation receptivity due to the intensity of *hurt*. The ANC's immediate suspension of talks in response to the acute, intense hurt of the massacres was in contrast to their reaction to the long-term chronic hurt of oppression under apartheid, which led them to seek a negotiated response, and to keep returning to the negotiations after these suspensions. As well, because the intensity of hurt was different among sub-groups within the ANC side, there were variations in their receptivity to the idea of continuing negotiations. Those on the front lines, closest to the killing, were more vehemently opposed to continuing negotiations than ANC leaders, who had to consider the bigger picture. In order to accommodate this dilemma, Mandela did as a student of politics might expect. In public he condemned the violence and vowed to walk away from negotiations. Privately he often carried on with pre-negotiation meetings because he believed that a negotiated settlement was the only viable solution, and the sooner the better (4.4.3).

There were also changes in the response to hurt at different stages in the conflict. This occurred when the ANC reacted differently to the killings in the latter stages of the conflict than it had earlier. Walking away from negotiations after each episode of fatal violence was having no effect, and the ANC concluded that reaching a negotiated settlement was the only way to end the killings (4.6.4).

5.2.6 *Trust*

Trust was evident at every stage of the apartheid conflict. Early in the case there is a description of black South Africans' distrust of Botha's sincerity in his infamous Rubicon speech of August 1985. Essentially, he offered to negotiate a resolution to the conflict while at the same time condemning the key opposition parties, the ANC and the United Democratic Front, as "barbaric Communist agitators, even murderers" (4.3.6). The May 1990 Groote Schuur meetings demonstrated both sides' willingness to trust the other's ability to deliver on their promises (4.6.1). Following the many outbreaks of violence that persisted up to and beyond the December 1991 start of CODESA, each side withdrew their trust, blaming the other for not controlling their constituencies.

In this conflict, trust between Mandela and de Klerk diminished over time due to frequent disappointments on either side about lack of action to control violence. Despite this trend, increased interdependence based on each side having staked their reputation on the negotiation option required that each side overcome their distrust of the other.

5.2.7 *Face*

Given that the South African apartheid struggle was more a political than military conflict, it is not surprising that there is ample evidence of *face* influencing SAG and ANC's receptivity to negotiations. Mandela described the nervousness with which SAG and the ANC began the first round of highly secret pre-negotiation meetings in 1985. "Both sides regarded discussions as a sign of weakness and betrayal"(4.4.2). In 1988

Botha's secret talks team, led by National Intelligence Service head Niel Barnard, argued that SAG, which had insisted on ANC denouncing violence as a pre-condition to official talks, would "lose face with its own people" if the ANC did not make some compromise on that point (4.4.8). After de Klerk's great leap forward in February 1990, he and Mandela staked their reputations on each other delivering on the pre-conditions to official negotiations (4.6.1). And when Mandela decided in August 1990 to announce a unilateral suspension of the armed struggle, he suffered a serious loss of face as "90 per cent of ANC supporters thought the decision was a sellout" (4.6.3).

One other dynamic characteristic of *face*, the phenomenon of spin-doctoring, was observed in the apartheid conflict. Saving face appears to be one major motivation for spin-doctoring, the practice in which a party attempts to explain an embarrassing circumstance in a way that is plausible and presents that party in the best possible light. This practice is often attributed to politicians, and may be part of the explanation for the ANC and SAG, particularly in the early stages of the conflict, publicly rejecting negotiations while carrying on informal negotiations in secret. Each side believed that negotiations were necessary, but they also believed their constituencies were not ready to support negotiations (4.4.2).

5.2.8 *Context change*

The most dramatic examples of *context change* in the apartheid conflict may have been the 1989 change of presidency from Botha to de Klerk, and de Klerk's "great leap forward" speech of February 1990. How these changes affected negotiation receptivity

has been amply discussed under ***Leader attributes*** (5.2.2). An important context change of a different nature was the demise of the Soviet Union symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. This outside event removed one of the obstacles to negotiations: SAG's claimed fear of a communist-inspired and supported revolution.

An example of a less dramatic context change in the apartheid conflict is the gradual realization among Afrikaners that apartheid would not solve the race problem, and that some sort of negotiated inclusive arrangement was the only peaceful way out of the dilemma. Such realization, or perception reframing, as it is often called in conflict resolution literature, is the essential link between the triggering event(s) and the change in receptivity to negotiation.

These examples reflect positive context changes: ones that increase receptivity to negotiation. An example of a negative context change would be Botha's bombing of suspected ANC bases in neighboring countries during the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group's mission to South Africa in May 1986 (4.4.7).

5.2.9 *Victory tactics*

Although it is not surprising that neither side in the conflict admitted to using negotiation to distract attention from efforts to gain military advantage, there are examples in the case of each side accusing the other of such tactics. When the ANC's insurrectionist Operation Vula was uncovered in July 1990, SAG understandably accused the ANC of using negotiation as a facade to cover the more sinister plot (4.6.2). Exactly a year later the

tables were turned when the Inkathagate scandal erupted. With violence having risen dramatically in the year since the first public commitment by both sides to seek a negotiated solution, the ANC had incontrovertible evidence of the SAG security establishment attempting to weaken ANC resolve and black solidarity by inciting black-on-black violence (4.6.5).

These two examples also demonstrate links between this type of *victory tactic* and *trust*, *face*, and *power balance*. When Operation Vula and Inkathagate became public knowledge the perpetrating sides obviously lost each other's trust, but they also lost face among some of their own supporters. In this particular case Operation Vula, which at the time of its discovery was perceived as a grand but unrealistic scheme, was far less damaging to the ANC than Inkathagate was to SAG, especially since SAG was already seen as the heavy-handed bully in the fight. De Klerk lost much of the credibility he had struggled to regain. SAG's loss of credibility due to Inkathagate also affected the power balance at a crucial stage of the conflict. With justice and international opinion clearly on the side of the ANC, and SAG under de Klerk too committed to a negotiated solution to resort to a defiant and bloody military strategy, Inkathagate might be considered the proverbial nail in SAG's coffin. Although de Klerk tried to distance himself from Inkathagate, SAG control in pre-negotiations and at the formal sessions of CODESA was irreversibly compromised (4.6.5).

The apartheid conflict also demonstrates that sometimes when disputants agree to negotiate they are not seeking mutually satisfactory solutions, but looking to achieve

through political means the victory that couldn't be won in the streets. When de Klerk spoke to senior South Africa Police Force staff in January 1990, just prior to his "great leap forward" speech, he spoke about removing the obstacles to a political battle between his party and the ANC – a battle he believed he could win (4.5.1). Similarly, when Mandela was elected ANC president in July 1991, he referred to negotiations as "a theatre of struggle" (4.6.4). Although peaceful political victory is tremendously preferable to the use of violence, there is a common argument in current conflict resolution discourse that unless or until disputants find mutually satisfactory solutions to the root causes of a conflict, no peace will be sustainable over the longer term.

5.2.10 *Disputant interdependence*

White South Africa's dependence on black labour proved to be a significant factor in SAG's decision that it would have to negotiate a solution to the apartheid conflict. It also demonstrated the relationship between *disputant interdependence* and *power balance* that was evident in the literature. Essentially, white dependence on black labour rendered impossible the full implementation of apartheid (4.3.1); and Botha's consequent legalization of black trade unions provided a mechanism for the growth of black political power (4.3.3). It would appear from events subsequent to those covered in this case study that a converse relationship also existed, in which the ANC's realization of its dependence on white economic and governance skills gave SAG more influence in negotiating the transition than it would otherwise have had.

Political interdependence is evident in Mandela and de Klerk's reliance on each other's sincerity and ability to honour commitments (4.6.1). Early in their relationship, this interdependence was accompanied by mutual trust. Later in the conflict the two leaders were more interdependent than ever to make progress in the face of increasing opposition from the extremists on both sides (4.6.1). The trust, however, had disappeared, the victim of too many incidents of violence that neither leader seemed able or willing to control.

The examples just presented demonstrate close *disputant interdependence* linkages with *power balance* and with *trust*. It also appears from this case that disputant interdependence tends to increase after the parties have publicly committed themselves to achieving a negotiated settlement. In the military resolution of conflict success depends on one side's ability to prevail over the other. In a negotiated settlement success often depends on the two sides prevailing together over opposition from hard-liners in their own ranks.

5.2.11 *Legitimacy*

In the apartheid conflict, the majority of the black resistance movement challenged the legitimacy of SAG's authority to rule over them, in particular because it was a government elected only by whites. The influence of this legitimacy challenge on receptivity to negotiation varied within the ANC camp. Mandela argued that the image of the ANC bargaining as an equal would erase any sense of SAG's authority over it (4.6.4). Hard-liners, on the other hand, argued that agreeing to negotiate would give the appearance of acknowledging SAG's authority. In fact, when they heard Mandela was

unofficially negotiating with SAG from his prison cell, they accused him of being a "sellout" (4.6.2). Collinge (1992, 13-15) suggested that the 1991 Inkathagate scandal broadened an existing challenge to SAG's legitimacy to preside over upcoming transition negotiations (4.6.5).

In addition to demonstrating the effects of challenges to government legitimacy on negotiation receptivity, the apartheid conflict offers a dramatic example of the challenger's legitimacy being questioned. President Botha was very explicit when he made a first public offer to negotiate in August 1985 that he would not negotiate with the ANC and their allies the United Democratic Front, whom he considered to be "barbaric Communist agitators and even murderers" (4.3.6). On the surface this appears to be an example of the government questioning the ANC and UDF's validity as representatives of the black population (Zartman's "valid spokesman" issue, see 2.2.3.11). However, the case literature suggests that a more important question was whether Botha's challenge to ANC and UDF's legitimacy may have been a way for him to dismiss any black groups who would not agree with his ideas about how to resolve the conflict.

5.2.12 *Solidarity*

It is clear from the case evidence that de Klerk and his cabinet had to carefully weigh the strength of support among their rank and file when they decided to make the great leap. For many Afrikaners, this about-face was a direct threat to the defining Afrikaner dream of self-determination (4.5.3). *Solidarity* was also an issue in the ANC leadership's August 1990 decision to suspend the armed struggle as a way to advance negotiations. Many

ANC members were committed to overthrowing the government oppressor, even if that meant challenging their own leaders. (4.6.3).

These examples of *solidarity* also highlight the interaction of *solidarity* and *commitment to cause* described in the **Theoretical Framework** (2.2.3.12).

5.2.13 *Sunk costs syndrome*

Although one might easily infer that some hard-liners on both sides were affected by this factor, no significant direct evidence was encountered in the case.

This completes the analysis of how the thirteen NRFs functioned in the apartheid conflict. A number of general observations can be made about NRF dynamics in the conflict. The following overview first compares observations from the case with earlier observations from the literature. Next is a comparison of the roles of cooperative and competitive power in the apartheid conflict. Finally, Table 3 expands Table 1's list of the thirteen NRFs with their definitions and derivations, to include highlights of NRF dynamics based on the combined observations from the literature and the case study.

5.3 NRFs in the apartheid conflict: A summary

5.3.1 No dramatic departure from the literature

Evidence from the case was broadly consistent with the preliminary observations of NRF dynamics based on the literature. All but one (*sunk costs syndrome*) of the thirteen NRFs

gleaned from the literature was evident in the case, and in most instances the evidence was explicit in the words of the disputing party leaders and their close advisors. Changes in NRF influence over time were common; *trust* was probably the most volatile. NRF linkages were well demonstrated; the link between *interdependence* and *power balance* being a good example. The case significantly enhanced understanding of the complexity of some NRFs, in particular *hurt* and *face*. In addition, although the issue of cooperative versus competitive power is secondary in this study to the identification and description of NRFs, it was not difficult to observe some effects of the two approaches in the apartheid conflict. Following is a description of those effects.

5.3.2 Cooperative versus competitive power in the apartheid conflict

The importance of the distinction between cooperative and competitive power to an understanding of negotiation receptivity was raised in the **Theoretical Framework** (2.2.2). In that context, it is useful to highlight what the apartheid conflict case revealed about the use of cooperative and competitive power.

Let us look first at competitive power. Evidence from the case supported most of the linkages between power and negotiation receptivity described in the literature review. For example, there was evidence that hard-liners on each side of the apartheid conflict behaved according to realist power theories, perceiving conflict and negotiation as win-lose propositions (4.6.2, 4.6.3). There was frequent evidence of the existence of a hurting stalemate and of the use of *victory tactics*, both of which are grounded in competitive views of power. The case bears out Thibault & Kelley's (1959) competition-based, social

exchange theory predictions that *disputant interdependence*, *commitment to cause*, and *power balance* would be factors influencing negotiation receptivity (2.2.3). Also, in the latter part of the conflict the political dynamics of the pre-negotiations and formal transition negotiations were highly competitive. As Mandela and de Klerk both admitted, they were determined to achieve by political means the victory that had eluded them in the streets (4.6.4, 4.5.1). As well, coercive power in the form of political violence was used by both sides, particularly their hard-line factions, in attempts to influence the conflict outcome right up to the 1994 transition elections.

What about evidence that cooperative power played a significant role? Going back to the limited theoretical literature on cooperative power, we recall that two defining characteristics of the cooperative use of power were identified: first, a strong preference for a negotiated solution over one achieved by force; second, an interest-based, win-win approach to the negotiation process (2.2.2). Before applying these criteria to the specifics of the apartheid conflict, it might be useful to consider the larger context.

At the height of the violence after SAG and the ANC had announced their commitment to seeking a peaceful solution, Zartman (1991, 131-132) assessed the prospects for peaceful, i.e. cooperative, resolution. "Never before in history has a poor majority assumed the power from - or even entered into power with - a rich minority, except by revolution or de-colonization. For this to be accomplished smoothly, through negotiation, would be a sociopolitical miracle . . . ." Zartman (1995, 167-168) argues elsewhere that "the rising violence showed that the unthinkable was at the doorstep, not just a vague potentiality."

Moving to specifics, Mandela's repeated choice of negotiation over violence, both during his twenty-seven years of incarceration, and even later in the conflict, after Inkathagate, when the power advantage had clearly switched to the ANC, are significant examples of the use of cooperative power. Zartman also provides a specific example of the influence of cooperative power in the conflict. He describes how "small" negotiations, those that occurred nationally and locally in South Africa on the less problematic issues surrounding apartheid, had an important influence on negotiation receptivity at the highest political level (4.4.5).

Also, there may be a more complex reality behind the combative statements of Mandela and de Klerk about negotiations being a terrain of struggle, mentioned above as examples of competitive power behaviour. It is common in politics for parties to express public positions that may not necessarily reflect their private behaviour. This spin-doctoring phenomenon was explained under ***Face*** (5.2.8). The implication here is that competitive public behaviour toward a political opponent does not necessarily preclude cooperative behaviour behind the scenes. There is a strong political motivation to save face. The private conflict resolution efforts may well be much more cooperative than public behaviour would suggest. Several other examples of this dichotomy were cited in chapter 4.

Although it is not the purpose of this study to do an in-depth comparative analysis of the use of cooperative and competitive power in the apartheid conflict, I cannot resist sharing

my overall impression. The fact is, Zartman's "socio-political miracle" did happen. And while there are undoubtedly many competing explanations for this exceptional accomplishment, there is evidence in the case literature reviewed here to suggest that Mandela's fundamental belief in the cooperative use of power had a dramatic cumulative impact on the outcome of the conflict. As well, it was Mandela's good fortune to find in de Klerk a leader who, despite his Afrikaner isolationist roots, appeared for the most part to prefer negotiation to bloodshed. Though his options may have been limited, he chose to reach out rather than lash out as his predecessor and others in similar situations have done before.

This completes the review of the general dynamics of NRFs in the apartheid conflict. Next is Table 3, which summarizes the typology of NRFs based on both the literature and the case study. Finally, I present in chapter 6 an overall summery of this research project including "bottom line" observations about when disputants in violent political conflict will negotiate.

Table 3 – Negotiation Receptivity Factors: Definition, Derivation, and Dynamics

Negotiation receptivity refers to *the willingness (or reticence) of disputants to move from violence to negotiation.* A **negotiation receptivity factor (NRF)** is *any factor that influences the willingness of disputants to move from violence to negotiation.*
1. *Leader attributes*: *a disputing party leader's personality traits, beliefs, and values.* Derivation: Habeeb (1988) credits power theorists from the psycho-social school for increasing our understanding of the role of personality factors in power relationships. Dynamics: a) All other NRFs are filtered through *leader attributes.* b) Impact of *leader attributes* on negotiation receptivity depends on the specific attributes.
2. *Disputant objectives*: *a disputant's preferred immediate and longer-term conflict outcomes.* Derivation: Kriesberg & Thorson (1991, 5). Dynamics: a) *Disputant objectives* affects and is affected by most other NRFs. b) Pre-conditions to negotiations are a special example of *disputant objectives.* c) Impact of *disputant objectives* on negotiation receptivity depends on the specific objectives.
3. *Commitment to cause*: *a disputant's commitment to their side's cause in a conflict.* Derivation: Blalock's (1989) general model of conflict describes motivation, resolve, and determination as factors influencing disputant decisions. Thibault & Kelley (1959) identify *commitment to cause* as one determinant of a disputant's power. Dynamics: a) High *commitment to cause* is often associated with a competitive approach to negotiation; therefore, greater commitment tends to result in reduced receptivity to negotiation. b) *Commitment to cause* is often at issue between factions of the same party.
4. *Power balance*: *the relative ability of each side in a conflict to unilaterally impose their preferred solution to the conflict.* Derivation: The realist school (Levy 1998); also Habeeb (1988); also Kriesberg & Thorson (1991). Zartman (1995, 8-9) says a "hurting stalemate" is necessary to get disputants to negotiate. Dynamics: a) The role of power in conflict is more complex than traditional realist theories assume. b) Kriesberg says willingness to de-escalate rises as a weaker disputant perceives their side to be gaining strength, stays high through parity and slight power advantage, then diminishes or is accompanied by tougher demands as the disputant gains significant power advantage.
5. *Hurt*: *the degree to which a disputant is suffering; hurt may include human suffering, economic pressure, damage to infrastructure, etc.* Derivation: Zartman (1995, 8-9) re "hurting stalemate" (see ***Power balance*, #4**). Dynamics: a) *Hurt* varies in intensity & type; its impact on negotiation receptivity is hard to gauge. b) Higher *hurt* tends to increase disputant receptivity to negotiation; however, intense, acute *hurt* can increase *commitment to cause*, which tends to decrease receptivity to negotiation.
6. *Trust*: *reliance on the integrity of the other disputant; in particular: a) belief in an opponent's general trustworthiness; b) belief in reciprocity; c) belief that the negotiation process will be fair.* Derivation: Zartman (Stein 1989, 9) says "belief in reciprocity" is important for getting disputants to negotiate. Blalock (1989, 247) addresses the issue of trust in the negotiation process. Dynamics: a) *Trust* varies in intensity & type. b) Higher *trust* tends to increase disputant receptivity to negotiation. … cont'd.

Table 3 – Negotiation Receptivity Factors: Definition, Derivation, & Dynamics (cont'd.)

7. *Face*: *a disputant leader's value or standing in the eyes of their own constituents.*

Derivation: Wrong's (1979, 53) definition of "competent authority" provides a basis for *face*.
Dynamics: a) *Face* varies from loss to gain.
b) Saving face is a motivation for political *spin-doctoring*.
c) Higher risk of loss of face tends to decrease disputant receptivity to negotiation.

8. *Context change*: *any internal or external event or series of events that change conflict dynamics.*

Derivation: Harris & Reilly (1998, 63) and Stein (1989, 240).
Dynamics: a) *Context change* may be sudden or gradual.
b) Impact of *context change* on negotiation receptivity depends upon specific change.

9. *Victory tactics*: *manipulation of negotiation by a disputant to achieve military or political victory.*

Derivation: Habeeb (1988).
Dynamics: a) Use of victory tactics is competitive by definition.
b) Use of victory tactics implies positive but disingenuous receptivity to negotiation.

10. *Disputant interdependence*: *degree of dependence of each disputing party on the other for achievement of its objectives; objectives not necessarily related directly to the conflict.*

Derivation: Levy's (1998, 8-10) economic interdependence theory.
Dynamics: a) *Disputant interdependence* varies in type.
b) *Interdependence* influences *power balance*: higher dependence reduces relative power.
c) Higher *interdependence* tends to increase disputant receptivity to negotiation.

11. *Legitimacy*: *the issue of a disputing party's right to the authority they claim; in particular: a) a disputing party's assertion of their right to govern their opponent; b) a disputing party's assertion of their right to formal recognition by their opponent; c) a disputing party leader's assertion that they rightfully lead their claimed constituency.*

Derivation: Beetham (1991, 19) describes necessary conditions for legitimacy. Zartman and Aurik (Kriesberg & Thorson 1991, 155) describe the importance of "valid spokespersons"; i.e., leaders who can deliver on promises, to negotiation receptivity.
Dynamics: a) *Legitimacy* varies in type (see definition).
b) A party challenging an opponent's right to govern is likely to be hesitant to negotiate with that opponent.

12. *Solidarity*: *the degree of determination of members of a disputing party to support party decisions about the conflict, including decisions they disagree with.*

Derivation: Wrong's (1979, 148) discussion of the importance of solidarity for successful political mobilization.
Dynamics: a) Lower *solidarity* reduces a party's power.
b) Higher *solidarity* increases disputing party ability to switch from violence to negotiation; otherwise *solidarity* is neutral in its impact on negotiation receptivity.

13. *Sunk costs syndrome*: the tendency of a disputant to persevere in violent confrontation, despite sensing that victory is unlikely, because of a strong need to justify costs already incurred.

Derivation: Teger (1980).
Dynamics: a) By definition, disputants with *sunk costs syndrome* are likely to reject negotiation.

Chapter 6 - NRFs: What did we learn?

6.1 The study problem, purpose, and results

A review of literature on conflict resolution revealed that limited research attention has been paid to the serious challenge of getting disputants in violent political conflict to be more receptive to negotiation. Even within the limited literature addressing the issue, there was no evidence of prior development of an NRF typology: common terminology, definitions and descriptions of the dynamics of factors affecting negotiation receptivity.

This study was based on the argument that developing a typology of negotiation receptivity factors would contribute directly to a better understanding of when disputants will and will not negotiate. Its objectives have been: to develop a typology of negotiation receptivity factors based on the limited literature; to test that typology in a case study of an historical conflict; to present preliminary conclusions about when disputants will negotiate; and to identify opportunities for further research.

The typology has been developed by reference to the literature (Chapter 2 and Table 1), and tested and expanded in a case study (Chapters 4 and 5, and Table 3). A summary of preliminary observations about when disputants will negotiate and a description of future research opportunities follow.

6.2 The bottom line: When disputants will and will not negotiate

A word of caution: This research is too preliminary to support definitive claims about when disputants will and will not negotiate. Much further research is needed. As well, the following statements of negotiation receptivity tendencies reflect for the most part the traditional realist paradigm: that parties in conflict act out of self-interest, and that they perceive conflict and negotiation in competitive win-lose terms. This is the paradigm that is still prevalent in the literature. However, when you insert into the equation a disputant party leader who appears to be operating primarily from a cooperative, win-win perspective, the negotiation receptivity behaviour may be significantly different. In my summary of NRF dynamics in the case study (5.3.2) I highlighted evidence of both cooperative and competitive behaviour. The need to pay more attention to the role of cooperative power in negotiation receptivity and conflict resolution is raised in the Future Research section (6.4). In the meantime, it may be useful for conflict resolution practitioners to consider the following *preliminary observations* from the literature and the case study about the *tendencies* of disputants in violent conflicts to accept or reject negotiations:

1. ***Leader attributes* is the single most important factor in determining when a disputing party will negotiate.**

   Disputing party leaders are often the primary decision-makers with respect to negotiation receptivity. Consequently, the influence of all other factors is filtered through these leaders and the ultimate decision about whether to negotiate is affected by their personality traits, beliefs, and values.

2. **A disputant in a violent political conflict will agree to negotiate when negotiation is perceived as serving that disputant's objectives.**

Therefore, the more one can learn about a disputant's immediate and longer-term objectives, the better one can judge a disputant's receptivity to negotiation at a particular point in a conflict. Disputants' stated pre-conditions to negotiation are an explicit example of such objectives.

3. **Disputants typically see no point in agreeing to negotiate when they perceive the two sides both have strong commitments to incompatible objectives.**
   To tackle this obstacle, conflict resolution practitioners try to get disputants to re-examine their objectives, to think more in terms of interests than positions.

4. **Both disputants are likely to agree to negotiate if they are in a mutually hurting stalemate; i.e., when both sides find the current situation intolerable, but neither side can unilaterally impose their preferred solution on the other.**
   However, *hurt* is a complex factor that is difficult to measure; its influence on negotiation receptivity is hard to predict. For example, disputants tend to be less receptive to negotiation immediately after being subjected to acute, intense hurt. However, the effect may be different in the medium or longer term.

5. **Disputants are unlikely to negotiate directly when they don't trust the other side, unless they are confident they have the upper hand in negotiations.**
   Third parties can be useful in situations of distrust.

6. **Political leaders tend to reject negotiation if agreeing to negotiate would lead to a loss of face with their own constituency.**

7. **The more interdependent disputing parties are, the more likely they are to agree to negotiate.**

6.3 Beyond the bottom line: Approaching sustainable negotiated solutions

The bottom line of this study has been about improving our understanding of the factors that determine when disputants in violent conflict will negotiate. Through our examination of the *pre*-negotiation process we have also captured a few glimpses of disputant behaviour at the negotiating table. On those occasions the issue of the

sustainability of negotiated solutions has arisen. In the introduction of the NRF *commitment to cause* (2.2.3.3), reference was made to trying to get disputants to shift from a commitment to cause (a particular outcome) to a commitment to interests. The underlying argument, supported in conflict resolution literature, was that mutually satisfactory, and therefore more sustainable, solutions are more likely to result from interest-based negotiations. In the introduction of *legitimacy* (2.2.3.11), the argument was made that negotiated agreements are more sustainable if disputant leaders have legitimate power to secure their constituents' support than if they must rely on coercive power to do so.

This pursuit of sustainability, which in essence means reducing the likelihood of future violence due to agreement breakdown, leads to a point raised briefly in the discussion of *victory tactics* in the apartheid conflict (5.2.9). While the first order of business in dealing with violent conflict is to stop the violence, it is a mistake in the long run to be satisfied with a move from highly competitive, win-lose, *violence* to highly competitive, win-lose *politics*. In many countries, the line between those two is very fragile. In order to achieve a sustainable reduction in the use of violence to resolve conflicts, it will be necessary to imbue peaceful politics with a much better balance of competitive and cooperative behaviour. The following discussion of future research includes suggestions to advance that agenda.

6.4 Future research

The NRF typology produced here has emerged from a review of existing literature on conflict resolution and theories of power in conflict. It has also been influenced by analysis of an historical conflict. It is consistent at least in spirit with the limited theory on negotiation receptivity and with the lessons from the case study. However, this typology can only be considered a working model, in much need of improvement. There is a need to test these tentative NRF definitions and findings about NRF dynamics.

It will be helpful if future researchers can develop observable indicators of these NRFs; for example, explanations of how we know that we are observing *trust* or *disputant interdependence*. As well, where feasible, scales should be developed to describe, at least in an approximate way, the degree of an NRF condition; for example, the intensity of *hurt*.

In relation to the issue of cooperative versus competitive behaviour, there is a need for more thorough research, or development if necessary, of the theory of the cooperative use of power. The NRF typology presented here should be subject to rigourous analysis to determine whether it reflects a bias toward a competitive conception of power, and if so, to also determine the implications and the remedies.

Ultimately, this NRF typology will only be useful if it can contribute to a reduction in the use of violence to resolve conflicts. As Habeeb (1988, 146) suggests, "Frameworks are created to guide analysis and to assist in organizing data. But true understanding only

comes from examining [actual cases]." Therefore, it would be valuable to have this typology tested by practitioners working to alter the course of current and imminent violent conflicts.

This case entailed violent political conflict in a unique developing nation. It was beyond the scope of this research to examine other conflicts. It would help if future researchers could undertake comparative case studies to determine the applicability or adaptability of this NRF typology to analysis of other types of conflict: even non-violent disputes.

6.5 Final word: The challenge ahead

The literature and the case revealed a disturbing relationship between violence and negotiation, a relationship that is all too familiar to students of violent political conflict. Zartman, in a retrospective on South Africa's apartheid conflict, describes this relationship. "A successful conclusion does not imply a friendly process. Indeed, it was the fear and presence of conflict that kept the negotiations on track. The rising violence showed that the unthinkable was at the doorstep, not just a vague potentiality. Inkatha violence kept the two mainstream parties [SAG and the ANC] together, but the two parties [themselves] used violence and breakdown to keep each other on track. . . . The moments of breakdown were crucial to the dynamic of continuity" (Zartman 1995, 167-168).

This is a sobering description of the reality behind Zartman's rather sanitary term "hurting stalemate". When analysts describing violent political conflict conclude that the

parties are not hurting enough to consider a negotiated solution, too often the practical implication is that the *body count* is too low.

Improving our understanding of negotiation receptivity is only a very small piece of a much bigger challenge – the challenge to render the term *body count* obsolete in the vocabulary of conflict resolution.

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Title of Thesis:

Disputant Receptivity to Negotiation in Violent Political Conflict: Lessons from South Africa's Apartheid Struggle

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April 3, 2001